Force,Level Effectiveness Modeling for the Tomahawk

Land Attack Cruise Missile

Steven M. Biemer

Erce-leVel analysis of Tomahawk Land Attack Missile effectiveness and survivabil-

ity in an operational context is a complex process requiring computer simulation
models as analysis tools. Detailed one~on~one engagement simulations that model the
performance of individual radars and surface~to~air missiles against a single Tomahawk
are fundamental to this process. The analyst must integrate the results obtained from
the models with information from other sources to develop an appropriate set of inputs
to a force~ level model simulating a multiaircraft strike against targets defended by a
multicomponent defense system. After employing the force~level model, the analyst
must study and interpret the results to obtain meaningful estimates of Tomahawk
effectiveness and survivability. The Applied Physics Laboratory has a central role in
these processes.

INTRODUCTION
The Applied Physics Laboratory has been the tech~ Air Defense System (lADS). To include such effects,
nical direction agent for the Tomahawk Weapon Sys~ complex computer simulation models are used as an~
tern (TWS) Program since its inception and is respon~ alytical tools. Before the TWS can be examined at the
sible for estimating and analyzing Tomahawk system operational level, the performance of individual lADS
effectiveness and providing those estimates to Navy components, such as radars and Surface~to~Air Missiles
decision makers. The Laboratory thus ensures that the (SAMs), against a single Tomahawk Land Attack
TWS meets current and future operational require~ Missile (TLAM) (Fig. 1) must be studied through
ments and assists the Navy in developing improve~ detailed detectability and engageability analyses using
ments for new variants of the weapon system. engineering~ level models. The analyst must incorpo~
Tomahawk effectiveness estimates must be devel~ rate the results obtained from these studies into an
oped within an operational context to take into ac~ operational scenario by developing an appropriate set
count the synergistic effects associated with multiple of inputs to the selected force~level models. These
missile strikes against targets defended by an Integrated models are employed as part of an operational~level

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 16, NUMBER 1 (1995) 59

S. M. BIEMER

Engineering-level analysis

Detectability Engageability analysis

analysis - IMARS
TRAMS GTD
MECA

Figure 1. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile in fli ght. Scenario ~ Force-on-force modeling
generation W---"'~ APL MBER
JSAM Planner ~ ADSIM

analysis. Finally, the re ult of the operational analysi

are in terpreted to obtain statistical estimates of TLAM
effectiveness. Figure 2 is a schematic of this proce s, ,
beginning with an examination of the study objectives Mission Data reduction
planning
(estimating TWS effectiveness) and extending through I---
Graphical routines
JSAM Planner Postprocessing software
the analysis of the operational results. This article
surveys the engineering and operational analyse and
briefly describes the computer models listed in the fig~
ure under each process in a series of boxed in erts.
Results
and
ENGINEERING .. LEVEL ANALYSIS conclusions
Operational-level analysis
AND TOOLS
To estimate Tomahawk effectiveness at the engi~
neering level (i.e., the subsystem or component level) Figure 2. A model of the Tomahawk effectiveness analysis pro-
requires detectability and engageability analyses. A cess . (TRAMS , IMARS, GTD, MECA, JSAM , and ADSSIM are
detailed throughout the article.)
detectability analy is focuses on a variety of surveil~
lance system (e.g., radar and pa ive detection sy ~
tems), and an engageability analysis involves a wide
range of SAM , air~to~air missile systems, and gun sys~
tems. For the detectability analysis, severa l land~based The output of TRAMS i horizontal and vertical
radar modeling tools are available. One model is the plots of detection range for the radar against the Tom~
Technical Radar Analy i Modeling System (TRAMS), ahawk. Figure 3 i a sample vertical plot from TRAMS.
which simulates a one~on~one encounter between an Radar detection contours (vertical and horizontal) rep~
airborne vehicle (in this case a Tomahawk missile) and resenting the range at which the radar has a 50% prob~
a single land~ba ed radar (see the boxed insert on ability of detection against the TLAM are used to
TRAMS). define th e initial geometry of the engagement in the
The inputs for TRAMS include a functional descrip~ engageability analysis as well as the detection capability
tion of the radar y tem, the radar cross section of the of each radar in the operational~level analy is. 1
Tomahawk, and initial atmospheric conditions. Tom ~ Engageability analysis also requires detailed comput~
ahawk trajectorie are typically represented as a set of er models to calculate important parameter and statis~
straight and level flight profiles, each at different alti~ tics. Two parameter ets are particularly important, as
tudes, over flat terrain. If actual trajectories are avail~ they tend to be major determinants in TWS effective ~
able from the mission planning process described later ness studies: the intercept envelope of each SAM type
in this article, they can be used over actual terrain. against a Tomahawk (consisting of the maximum SAM
Radar descriptions can be obtained th rough research intercept range) and the single ~shot probability of kill
in th e A PL In telligence Library and visits to various (SSP k ), given an intercept. These data are a function
intelligence agencies. Often, information th at has been of intercept range, azimuth angle, Tomahawk altitude,
research ed or generated previously can be used for cur~ and Tomahawk radar cross section; therefore, this anal ~
ren t studies, thus saving much time in this one~on~one ysis involve tens or even hundreds of cases represent~
analysis. ing the appropriate combinations of th ose factors .

60 UMBER 1 (1 995)
 FORCE-LEVEL EFFECTIVENESS MODELING FOR THE T OMAHAWK

TECHNICAL RADAR ANALYSIS MODELING SYSTEM (TRAMS)

The Technical Radar Analysis Modeling System is a collec- output is an xz plot (see Fig. 3 ). Finally, the flyby simulation
t ion of software tools dividable into two major sets. The first examines the detection performance of a radar against a single
set includes an alytical tools to examine seven aspects of the target flying along a user-entered trajectory, which is uncon-
radar detection process using a high level of detail. These seven strain ed in azimuth or altitude.
aspects are antenna design , waveform design , detect ion perfor- Within the three simulations, TRAMS models land-based
mance, tracking filter evaluat ion , filter design , radar-range pulse, pulse-Doppler, or continuous-wave radars operating
equation evaluation , and Doppler processing. The seven tools against an airborne target. Each radar is defined through user-
are integrated so that the user may select one tool to design entered parameters; the user enters technical information , such
a compon ent of the radar and incorporate that component as frequency and bandwidth, and the applicable operating
within another tool. For example, the user may experiment modes or procedures. The target is defined by a target fluctu-
with new antenna designs and examine those designs within ation-type (e.g. , Swerling Type 1) , radar cross-sectional table,
the detection performance tool to calculate radar performance. and, in the case of the flyby simulation , by a three-dimension al
The second set of tools consists of three simulations that trajectory. The simulations use radar range equations to deter-
examine h orizontal detection contours, vertical detection con- mine the radar performance. Included in the model are
tours, and a flyby situation . The horizontal detection contour multipath calculations, clutter effects, attenuation , and de-
simulation evaluates the detection capability of a specified tailed antenna representation . The flyby simulation incorpo-
radar against a constant altitude target at selected horizontal rates the option to use either digitized terrain information
cross ranges. The output is a graphical xy plot. The vertical fro m the Digital Terrain Elevation Database (DTED) provided
detection contour simulation evaluates the detection capability by the Defense Mapping A gency or a simple spherical
against a constant cross-range target at selected altitudes. The Earth model.

Elevation angle (deg)

China Lake, C alifornia, wh ere it is used to generate a
fuzing point along the SAM trajectory. The fuzing
4Y,--,9_0,,5_0-r3_0,-,-20__. -____. -____.-T1_0-,
point is the location along the trajectory at which the
SAM fuze detects the T omah awk and instructs the
SAM warhead to detonate. A computer model based
3Y
on the Geometric Theory of Diffraction (GTD) is
used to determine this point (the model is referred to
as the GTD model) .
3. Finally, the fuzing point and the SAM trajectory are
passed to another computer model at NAWC jWD
known as the Modular Endgame Computer Algo-
rithm (MECA) . This simulation models the warhead
blast pattern and the vulnerable areas of the T oma-
3X 4X 5X 6X hawk. The trajectories of thousands of warhead frag-
Range (km) ments are calculated to derive an estimate of damage
Figure 3. A vertical detection plot from TRAMS using a 50% caused by the fragments that penetrate vulnerable
probability of detection (X and Y denote any positive numbers). areas.· The aggregate results are examined to deter-
mine whether the T omah awk was killed. Each en-
counter is repeated until statistical settling of average
Generating these data entails three steps, each requir- values occurs. The output of this simulation is the
ing a separate computer model as follows: SSP k for given pairs of T omah awk and SAM trajecto-
1. The Integrated Miss ile and R adar Simulation ries. Parallel Tomahawk trajectories are examined,
(IMARS) is used to gen erate miss-distance statistics and P k values are calculated for selected SAM inter-
for each SAM type against the T omahawk (see the cept points along those trajectories. Figure Sa displays
boxed insert on IMARS ). This simulation (located at these TLAM trajectories and lists the calculated SSPk
A PL) uses the detection information generated from values at different intercept points for a generic SAM.
the detectability analysis and stochastically models The points are color-coded according to SSPk value.
the missile flyout and engagement, resulting in an Figure 5b displays a sample SSPk template that aver-
estimate of the SAM's closest point of approach ages the P k values over range and azimuth angles from
(CPA) to the T omah awk. Figure 4a schematically the SAM to the intercept point.
represents the CPA; Fig. 4b displays one output Once the engineering-level analys is is complete, the
product of IMARS, a miss-distance contour, where analyst h as obtained the following:
the SAM system is located at the origin.
2. The CPA information is provided to the N aval War- • Detection contours for various radars
fare Center/Weapon s Division (NA WC/WD) at • Engagement envelopes for selected SAM systems

JOHNS HOPKINS APL T ECHN ICAL DIG EST, VOLUME 16, NUMBER 1 (1995) 61
 S. M. BIEMER

• SSPk templates for each SAM that are a function of 4. Defensive order of battle (OOB) (the lADS)
intercept range, azimuth angle, and Tomahawk alti~ 5. Defensive system locations and tactics (i.e., their
tude. command and control structure)
This information will be used in an operational anal~ Mission objectives are typically obtained from dis~
ysis, which is the other major phase of the force~level cuss ions with the Tomahawk Program Office (PMA~
effectiveness and survivability analysis process. 280) , the office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV~N 8 6) , strike planners at the Naval Strike
Warfare Center in Fallon, Nevada (NSWC/Fallon),
OPERATIONAL .. LEVEL ANALYSIS and APL personnel. Targets that, when destroyed, will
AND TOOLS satisfy those objectives are typically identified by PMA~
280, NSWC/Fallon , OPNAY, APL, and selected oper~
Scenario Generation ational commands. If strike aircraft are involved, the
Naval Air Systems C ommand (NAVAIR) will also
Before Tomahawk effectiveness can be examined at
participate in the mission definition and target selec~
the operational level, the missile system must be studied
tion process.
within an operational scenario. Each scenario has five
Unless the defensive OOB and site locations are
components as follows:
already defined, the analyst must develop an appropri~
1. Tomahawk mission objectives ate database. Determining an OOB is accomplished
2. Strike asset descriptions (including T omahawk and through coordination with the applicable Defense ln~
other strike weapons) telligence A gency (DIA) organ izations for the time in
3. Target descriptions question . Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have

(a) (b)
~5Yft

4Yft
3Yft
2Yft
Yft
4X .-----.-----,_----~-----.--------,__,

I3X
c
.Q
rou
.2 2X
Q)
0>
C
~
C
~ X
TLAM~ o

-2X -X o X 2X 3X
Cross-range location (nmi)
Figure 4. (a) Closest point of approach (CPA) of a SAM fired against a Tomahawk. (b) A contour plot from IMARS displaying the SAM's miss
distance as a function of the down-range and cross-range location of the SAM's intercept point (X and Y denote any positive numbers).

INTEGRATED MISSILE AND RADAR SIMULATION (IMARS)

The Integrated Missile and Radar Simulation is a collection freedom model and are flown to the closest point of approach
of simulations designed to model the Surface -to~Air Missile to the target. M issile lethality and target vulnerability are not
(SAM) engagement of an airborne target. Currently, versions modeled, n or are fuze and warhead models included. The
of IMARS for the SA-S , SA-6, SA-S, SA~lO , output of the model is primarily miss-distance statistics
SA-ll, and SA~ 12 land-based systems exist. The simulation (generated stochastically); missile engagement plots are also
models the tracking radar (detection is assumed to h ave oc- available.
curred at model start ), illuminator (for semiactive missile sys- The user is responsible for entering the three-dimension al
tems), communications links, and missile flyout and intercept. target trajectory and missile radar operating modes. Addition-
The radar model is based on radar-range equations and includes ally, the user may select site-specific terrain or a flat-Earth
detailed clutter processing and multipath representation for representation . If a site-specific terrain is selected, the Digital
low-altitude targets. SAMs are represented by a 6-degree~ of- Terrain Elevation Database (DTED) is used.

62 JO HNS HOPKINS APL TEC HN ICAL DIG EST , VOLUME 16, N UMBER 1 (1 995 )
 FORCE-LEVEL EFFECTIVENESS MODELING FOR THE T O MAHAWK

THE DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (DPG)

(a) SSPk values
SCENARIOS
• High • Medium The Joint Chiefs of Staff have outlined seven Joint Planning
• Low 00.00 Scenarios in the DPG that are recommended for use in Navy
TLAM trajectories
warfare appraisals and operational effectiveness studies. These
scenarios are collectively known as the DPG Scenarios and are
used extensively throughout the Department of Defense. The
seven scenarios represent the following situations:
1. Major Regional Contingency-East: A militarily ag,
gressive country invades a neighboring country in its
quest to become a dominant regional power in South,
west Asia.
2. Major Regional Contingency-West: A militarily
strong country in Southeast Asia invades a neighboring
country with the objective of destroying its current po-
litical system.
3. Major Regional Contingency-Concurrent: A com,
bined major regional contingency occurs in the East and
West separated by 45 days.
4. Major Regional Contingency-Europe: A major re-
gional power makes an expansionist thrust into a neigh-
boring country and is opposed by a post-Cold War
NATO.
5. Lesser Regional Contingency-Near: A destabilizing
Down-range location
revolution that may result in the taking of many Amer-
ican and third-nation hostages threatens U.S. interests
in the Western Hemisphere.
SSPk values 6. Lesser Regional Contingency-Far: The aftermath of
a destabilizing insurgency far from the United States
_ High
poses a threat to U.S. interests and citizens.
_ Medium 7. Reconstitution: A superpower emerges to challenge the
_ Low
United States militarily. This scenario represents the
period in which the United States must reconstitute its
forces to deter aggression.
The DPG Scenarios are each two to three pages long and
contain few technical details. The Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command (SPAWAR 31) and the Naval Air Warfare
Center/Weapons Division have provided technical details of
the defensive orders of battle and laydown for each of the
military scenarios listed above (all but the Reconstitution sce-
nario). These documents, which are continually updated, con-
tain detailed information that provides the analyst with a foun-
dation for examining the operational effectiveness of the Tom-
Down-range location (nmi) ahawk Weapon System. The analyst is responsible for tailoring
Figure 5. Modular Endgame Computer Algorithm (MECA) out-
the scenario to ensure relevance without violating the basic
put. (a) Calculated MECA output SSPk values for a sample SAM assumptions outlined in the documents.
against a Tomahawk missile as a function of the down-range and
cross-range locations of the SAM intercept point. (Each tick mark
represents 2 nmi.) (b) A contour plot of SAM SSPk values as a
Defensive site locations given in the DPG scenarios
function of the down-range and cross-range locations of the SAM
intercept point. may need to be modified or enhanced by analyzing the
lADS components and the Command and Control
(C 2) structure of the Tomahawk,specific scenario. In
examining the lADS, terrain masking is a major issue
outlined seven Joint Planning Scenarios in the Defense for defensive system placement when defending against
Planning Guidance (DPG) that are recommended for low, altitude cruise missiles (such as Tomahawk) . To
use in Navy warfare appraisals and operational effec, address terrain masking effects on defensive system
tiveness studies (see the boxed insert on DPG scenar, placement, a software tool that uses digitized terrain
ios).2 These scenarios, which primarily consist of a de' information from the Digital Terrain Elevation Data,
fensive OOB and associated locations, have been base (DTED), provided by the Defense Mapping Agen,
approved by DIA and therefore provide foundational cy, is employed. This tool is known as the Joint Strike
information for the development of an appropriate Analysis Model (JSAM) Planner (JSAM is a simula,
Tomahawk effectiveness analysis plan. tion currently under development that will use JSAM

JO HNS HOPKINS APL TEC HN ICAL DIG EST, VOLU ME 16, NUMBER 1 (1 995) 63
S. M. BIEMER

Planner; however, JSAM Planner can be used indepen,

dently).
Figure 6 is an example of JSAM Planner output and
displays a sample defensive site placement scheme for
four radars to provide radar coverage of a coastal region.
The shaded portion represents those areas where the
radar has a line of sight to a low, altitude target, aI,
though it still may not be able to detect or track the
target owing to other factors. It is evident that several
areas are masked from the line,of,sight view of the four
radars; for example, the valley in the center receives
only spotty coverage from the center radar. Figure 7
shows a more optimal placement of the four radars to
ensure proper coverage of the coast. When the two
center radars are moved closer to the water, the local
lADS can provide continuous coverage of the coastal
region. This type of coverage analysis is used to ensure
that the defensive placement and structure will present
an operationally realistic threat to the Tomahawk
strike. Figure 7. A more optimal placement of four radars defending the
same coast as in Fig. 6.

Offensive Mission Planning

Mission planning is divided into two steps: deter,
For Tomahawk, this calculation is a function of missile
mining the number and type of Tomahawk missiles to
accuracy, expressed as circular error probable (CEP),
assign to each target (this step is called weaponeering)
the size and characteristics of the missile's warhead, and
and developing TLAM routes. First one must deter,
the target characteristics (primarily its ability to with,
mine the weapon's probability of damage against spe,
stand blast and fragmentation damage).
cific target types, which is generally the product of the
For example, against a specified building, a Toma,
weapon's probability of hitting the target (PH) and the
hawk cruise missile may have a 0.7 probability that it
probability of damaging the target given a hit (P 01H ).
will cause sufficient damage to satisfy a preselected
damage criterion (Po). These criteria are defined in
the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals for many
weapon/target pairs. Against a very small building, the
Tomahawk Po may be small owing to the low proba,
bility of hitting the target as opposed to the ability to
destroy it if hit (e.g., if PH is 0.1 and P0 1H is 0.9, the
Po would be 0.09). Similarly, against a very large
building, the Tomahawk Po may be small because the
missile's warhead is not sufficient to destroy the build,
ing even though the probability of hitting a piece of
the building and damaging it is high.
When more than one missile hits a target, a cumu,
lative Po is calculated by

Cumulative Po = 1 - (1 - single shot PO)N ,

where N = the number of Tomahawk hits achieved on

the target.
For analysis purposes, a required cumulative Po
threshold is determined to define when a target can be
considered destroyed. Thus, to declare a target de,
Figure 6. Defensive site placement scheme for four radars from stroyed, the cumulative Po must exceed the predeter,
JSAM Planner output. The shaded areas represent the li ne of sight
for four early warnin g radars defending a coastline overl aid on a mined threshold. If the single,shot Tomahawk Po is
DTED map. greater than this threshold, only one missile is required

64 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 16, NUMBER 1 (1995)

 FO RC E-LEVEL EFFECTIVENESS MODELING FOR THE TOMAHAWK

to hit the target before it will be declared destroyed. Once the Tomahawk weaponeering data and flight
Otherwise, additional missiles must be assigned. trajectories have been produced, the analyst is ready to
Once the missile assignments have been established, start the operational analysis.
the flight routes must be developed. The flight~route
generation process can be thought of as an optimization Force .. on .. Force Simulations
problem, since various constraints limit where a Tom~ All of the necessary data are now available to per~
ahawk route can be placed. These constraints include form a force~on~force analysis. If survivability informa~
the following: tion is known or assumed and the Tomahawk missile
strike is against strategic, nondefended targets, a spread~
• Navigation constraints sheet may be used to determine the probability of
• Capabilities and locations of threats destroying individual targets, from which other infor~
• Time of arrival constraints mation can be calculated. In most cases, however,
• Launcher constraints survivability information in a many~on~many context
• Target approach route feasibility is not known because multiple TLAMs in a strike cause
To determine the constraints posed by the threats, synergistic effects in overcoming an lADS. Multiple
the DTED tool (described earlier) is used. This software missiles can confuse or even saturate single lADS
tool is not an automated route generator; rather, it is components, contributing to an overall degradation of
a display tool with which the analyst can evaluate performance. Only a many~on~many analysis using a
candidate TLAM routes. The tool can display an over~ sophisticated simulation will be able to represent this
head view of the candidate route and the various threat reality.
sectors perturbed by local terrain. In addition, a vertical The Laboratory uses two force~on~force simulations:
profile of the route and the terrain directly below can APL MBER and ADSIM. The former is an APL~
be displayed. The analyst can then modify the altitude enhanced version of the Multiple Battlefield Engage~
of the TLAM route manually to reflect operational ments and Reactions Model (see the boxed insert on
knowledge of Tomahawk terrain~following capabilities. APL MBER). This simulation models a multiple Tom~
The analyst can rely on a naval operational planner ahawk and aircraft strike against targets defended by a
to assist in developing TLAM routes. Ideally, the routes ground~based IADS. 2 The Air Defense Simulation
should be planned by the operational Cruise Missile (ADSIM) is an APL~developed simulation that models
Support Activities (CMSA), located in Norfolk, Vir~ a Tomahawk~only strike against targets defended by an
ginia, and San Diego, California, since these activities airborne lADS.} Output from both simulations can be
plan operational TLAM routes for the Navy. Security integrated to represent the strike against the airborne
constraints, limited knowledge of future weapon system and ground~based portions of the lADS whenever the
characteristics, and tasking priorities, however, typical~ two types of engagements occur in sequence. When
ly preclude using a CMSA to plan routes for Tomahawk they occur concurrently, an iterative approach is used.
effectiveness studies. Other sources for operational Both models are executed and the results incorporated
planning include NSWC/Fallon, the Washington, into the other at selected times to represent the nec~
D.C., CMSA (a training/testing facility), the Naval essary interaction.
Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia, and
various personnel within APL with expertise in Tom~ Outputs and Measures of Effectiveness
ahawk mission planning. Regardless of who plans the Both graphical and tabular output are provided by
routes, they must consist of a series of turn waypoints APL MBER. The graphical output is obtained from a
and altitude action points between the launch point standard output file containing event records used by
and the target. a graphics program to animate the events. With this
Since TLAM mission plans may not be sufficient for tool, the user can step through a single run of the
the operational analysis, a TLAM trajectory may need simulation. Flight paths of each Tomahawk are drawn,
to be developed. This trajectory would include detailed as well as the locations of SAM sites and targets. When
altitude information along the route, navigation update a SAM engages a TLAM, an engagement line is drawn
points, and actual latitude/longitude/time locations. between the SAM and the current position of the
Depending on the level of fidelity required, the trajec~ TLAM. Symbols represent events such as a TLAM kill
tory can be generated in a variety of ways. If high by a SAM (a red circle), a SAM miss (a red X), and
fidelity in the trajectory is not required, the trajectories a target hit by a TLAM (a red box). Finally, the output
can be derived manually from the routes on the basis can be overlaid on the DTED of the area. Figure 8
of missile climb/dive rates. If more fidelity is required, displays sample graphical output overlaid on a DTED
a 6~degree~of~freedom simulation can be used to gen~ map of the area.
erate trajectories, given the information about the The Air Defense Simulation can also produce graph~
planned route. ical and tabular output. The graphical display is similar

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 16, NUMBER 1 (1995) 65

S. M. BIEMER

APL MULTIPLE BATTLEFIELD ENGAGEMENTS AND REACTIONS MODEL (APL MBER)

The APL MBER is a stochastic operational~level simulation jamming environment) and communicates those tracks to a
that models an airborne strike against targets defended by a command center, where the track is evaluated for action.
ground~based Integrated Air Defense System (lADS). The Following the evaluation, the track is assigned to an lADS
strike package can include cruise missiles, strike aircraft carry~ component (typically a SAM battery), and an engagement
ing weapons, antiradiation missiles, support jamming aircraft, scheduled. The engagement is evaluated stochastically; if the
loitering air vehicles (such as unmanned aerial vehicles), and result is a kill, the battery initiates a reload sequence (if re~
airborne decoys. Since APL MBER defines air vehicles gener~ quired) and becomes available for another assignment. If the
ically using input parameters, any airborne strike aircraft or result is a miss, the battery checks whether it can engage again
missile can be represented. Furthermore, antiradiation missiles and, if so, schedules another engagement.
and jamming platforms can be defined to react to defensive The strike aircraft or missile can be assigned a component
stimuli (Le., RF transmissions). This simulation represents of the lADS as a target. If the aircraft or missile is successful
targets as a point mass at a single location. at reaching its target, a stochastic evaluation is performed. If
Defensively, APL MBER models individual components of the target is destroyed, the lADS component is removed from
the lADS such as the following: the lADS structure and is unavailable for use. If a command
center is destroyed, the subordinate components become inde ~
• Early warning radars
pendent and free to acquire and engage targets at will (thus,
• SAM systems, including acquisition, tracking and illuminat~
they lose the information and coordination available from the
ing radars, as well as launchers, reload capability, and missile
C 2 structure).
inventories
Tabular output from the simulation is user selectable and
• Gun systems, including RF and electro~optical acquisition
can include up to all possible events recorded by the program.
and tracking systems
Thus, the analyst can obtain profuse data from a single execu~
• The C 2 structure that defines the coordination among the
tion. Postprocessing program are available to reduce the output
components
by filtering appropriate data and generating distributions for
Part of the C 2 structure includes command centers that selected measures of effectiveness (MOEs) by integrating the
control selected IADS components. Each component is de~ results from multiple iterations. Any event can be selected as
fined generically by input parameters; thus, any defensive sys~ an MOE.
tem can be represented. Furthermore, the C 2 structure is user~ The APL MBER simulation was developed by Kamak Re~
definable and can represent a local air defense system. This search Corporation and has been used for various Navy and Air
structure allows the user to define target prioritization schemes, Force operational analyses for over 10 years. The Laboratory
target assignment logic, track file capacities at different com~ acquired the source code from Kamak in 1988 via a permanent
mand levels, and reaction delay times. lease agreement and has significantly enhanced the original
Functionally, the lADS initiates tracks of penetrating strike version, renaming the simulation APL MBER to distinguish it
aircraft through RF and electro~optical sensors (possibly in a from the MBER simulation, which still exists at Kamak.

to that of APL MBER except that enemy aircraft and

their air~to ~ air missile engagements are displayed as
well as enemy airfields and early warning radars with
TLAM detection range rings.
Although the force~on~force models can provide
output for many parameters, top~level measures of ef,
fectiveness (MOEs) must be chosen that address the
study objective. In short, these measures are what the
analyst will use to define effectiveness. From among the
many possible measures, the following are several can,
didates:

• Probability of destroying a percentage of a target set

• Probability of arriving at a target
• Probability of survival
• Probability of striking a target within a certain time
window
• Minimum number of TLAMs required to damage a
selected target set
• Number ofTLAMs reaching their target
Figure 8. Sample APL MBER output overl aid on a DTE D map. • Number of aircraft saved by using TLAMs

66 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHN ICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 16, NUMBER 1 (1995)
 FORCE-LEVEL EFFECTIVENESS MODELING FOR THE TOMAHAWK

• Number of aircraft sorties required against a target set are compared, and conclusions are drawn. For example,
when TLAMs are present the number of TLAMs participating in a strike against
• Number of aircraft sorties saved by using TLAMs a common target set would represent a case study. Sup~
pose the MOE is the probability that 80% of a selected
In addition, secondary measures may need to be deter~
target set was destroyed. Figure 9 presents a sample case
mined by decomposing a primary measure into its com~
study result for this situation. Notice that the lowest
ponents. For instance, a measure like "number of
quantity is entirely insufficient to destroy 80% of the
TLAMs required" could consist of an equation involv~
target set. Also observe that, at larger quantities, the
ing two other measures:
marginal increase in probability is reduced consider~
ably. The most cost~ effective quantity would therefore
TLAMrequired = Total TLAMlaunched be either the center value or, possibly, the fourth quan~
tity. Adding missiles would be cost~ineffective (or even
- TLAMreliability failures - TLAMattrited' wasteful).
Regardless of the type of analysis, the analyst
In this case, the number of reliability failures and of must understand that the output of any stochastic
operational~ level simulation is statistics, not truth. Sto~
TLAM attrited are two lower~level measures. The first
can be assumed on the basis of TLAM specification chastic simulations produce probability distributions of
values or testing experience; the second is calculated selected MOEs. It is up to the analyst to determine what
by APL MBER. By successively decomposing MOEs, those distributions mean.
the analyst eventually arrives at measures that can be It is tempting for the analyst to calculate mean
calculated mathematically, estimated by simulation, as~ values for each MOE and use those values as the answer,
sumed, or parameterized. At that point, the decompo~ but this approach can be deceptive. Assuming the
sition is sufficient. In some instances, no decomposition output distributions are normally distributed (typically
is needed. they are when a sufficient number of iterations are
run- but not always), confidence intervals can be used
when comparing and displaying the same MOE for
Analysis of the Results different cases. A common statistical test to determine
Once the input databases have been defined, the whether two mean values are equal when the variances
analyst executes the stochastic models and collects are unknown (but equal) is the Student's~t test with
statistics on the selected MOEs. When this baseline nl + nz - 2 degrees of freedom, where n1 and nz are the
analysis is complete, the analyst has the option of sample sizes of the two cases. 5
performing three additional types of analysis that may Figure 10 is a sample plot of Tomahawk survivability
(and often do) provide vital information in understand~ versus the number of Tomahawk missiles employed.
ing the simulation results. 4 The first type of analysis is Although the mean values differ, the 90% confidence
parameterization, which is the process of selecting a set intervals suggest that the values are equivalent for the
of parameters (usually just one) and varying their values three larger quantities of TLAMs. In fact, the equality
to calculate the boundary conditions on a selected conclusion can be substantiated after statistical tests are
MOE. Parameterization is typically performed when applied to these values.
the value of the parameter is unknown or known with
a level of uncertainty. It is quite useful in examining
1.0
"worst~ case" or "best~case" scenarios as well.
The second approach is sensitivity analysis. The pro~
?t-
a 0.8
cess is the same as parameterization, but the purpose is co
OJ
different. In this type of analysis, the analyst calculates c .....
the selected MOE for varying values of a single input e! 0.6
. - 0)

..... 0)
(f)OJ
parameter to determine how sensitive the resulting 0) ...
'O~
MOE value is in relation to the varying parameter. If eO)
ȣ
0.4
..........
the resultant MOE value fluctuates greatly with small Be
C1l
perturbations to the input parameter, the MOE is said .0 0.2
e
a..
to be sensitive to the input parameter; otherwise, it is
insensitive. This type of analysis can assist in determin~ a
ing which inputs account for their observed values. 1X 2X 3X 4X 5X
Number of Tomahawk missiles
The third method, called case studies, is very com~
mon in Tomahawk effectiveness studies and entails Figure .9. Sample case study result showing the probability of
developing and examining several cases with different destrOYing 80% of a sample target set (X denotes any positive
number).
assumptions independently. The resulting MOE values

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 16, NUMBER 1 (1995) 67

 S. M. BIEMER

apparent. Experience is required before the analyst can

- 90% confidence interval (positive)
quickly identify and present the important conclusions.

1.0
ii -
-
Mean value
90% confidence interval (negative)
The final step in the Tomahawk effectiveness anal,
ysis process involves presenting the results in a format
understandable to the nonmathematician and integrat,
ing documentation collected throughout the process to
formulate a report.
0.8
Cii
>
·5
:;
SUMMARY
CIJ 0.6
'0 Estimating Tomahawk effectiveness within an oper,
~ ational scenario requires the integration of results from
Ei
co 0.4
.0
several analyse. Engineering,level simulations exam,
e
Cl..
ining the detectability, engageability, and vulnerability
of the Tomahawk cruise missile against components of
0.2
an lADS are used to provide inputs to mission planning
and force,level models that estimate TLAM effective,
0 ness in the context of an operational scenario. Through
1X 2X 3X 4X 5X
the effective application of the process described in this
Number of Tomahawk missiles
article, APL can ensure that the TWS meets current
Figure 10. Aggregated probability of survival statistics for a Toma- and future operational requirement and provide the
hawk strike using the quantities listed in a sample scenario (X
denotes any positive number) .
Navy with valuable effectiveness information in devel,
oping improvements for new variants of the weapon
system.

REFERENCES
Once the statistical values are understood, conclu, iMirchell, R. L, and O'Donnell, P. A., Technical Radar Analysis and Modeling
sions can be drawn on the basis of the input data, System, Mark Resources, Inc., Santa Monica, CA (1988) .
2Multiple Battlefield Engagements and Reactions Model User's Guide , TR-12-87,
scenario assumptions, and force,on,force modellimita, Karnak Re earch Corp., San Diego, CA (Sep 1987).
tions. This process is more of an art than a science. 3 ADS 1M Program Description and Usage Documentation, JHUjAPL BAS-88-094
(Dec 1988) .
Although observations can easily be made from graph, 4Law, A. M., and Kelton, D. W., Simulation Modeling and Analysis, 2nd Ed.,
ical presentations of the data, the meaning of the data McGraw-Hill, ew York, pp. 522-601 (1991).
SDunn, O. J., and Clark, A. V., Applied Statistics: Analysis of Variance and
in relation to the study objectives may not be readily Regression, 2nd Ed. , John Wiley & Sons, ew York, pp. 37-51 (1987).

THE AUTHOR

STEVEN M. BIEMER received his B.E.S. in mathematical cience and

M.S. in computer science from The Johns Hopkin University in 1985 and
1990, respectively, and is currently pursuing an M.S. in technical manage-
ment. Since joining APL in 1985, Mr. Biemer has worked in the Strike
Warfare Group of the Naval Warfare Analysis Department analyzing crui e
missile survivability and effectiveness and participating in OP A V-
sponsored analytical studies that have explored future surface combatant
concepts. Most recently he has served as the lead strike analyst for the DOG-
51 Flight IIA variant study. In 1991, Mr. Biemer was appointed Supervisor
of the Systems Analysis Section, recently renamed the Air Warfare Section.
Currently, he is examining electronic warfare effectivene s for the F/A-18
strike fighter.

68 JOHNS HOPKI S APL TECHN ICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 16, NUMBER 1 (1995)