The Supreme Court held that (1) a contract of carriage existed between the shipping company and the shipper even though the goods were loaded onto the shipping company's lighter and not the actual vessel, as loading the goods onto the lighter was part of the carriage contract, and (2) the sinking of the lighter was not due to a fortuitous event but rather a lack of precaution by the carrier, as the lighter was shown to be unseaworthy with cracks in its bottom.
The Supreme Court held that (1) a contract of carriage existed between the shipping company and the shipper even though the goods were loaded onto the shipping company's lighter and not the actual vessel, as loading the goods onto the lighter was part of the carriage contract, and (2) the sinking of the lighter was not due to a fortuitous event but rather a lack of precaution by the carrier, as the lighter was shown to be unseaworthy with cracks in its bottom.
The Supreme Court held that (1) a contract of carriage existed between the shipping company and the shipper even though the goods were loaded onto the shipping company's lighter and not the actual vessel, as loading the goods onto the lighter was part of the carriage contract, and (2) the sinking of the lighter was not due to a fortuitous event but rather a lack of precaution by the carrier, as the lighter was shown to be unseaworthy with cracks in its bottom.
The Supreme Court held that (1) a contract of carriage existed between the shipping company and the shipper even though the goods were loaded onto the shipping company's lighter and not the actual vessel, as loading the goods onto the lighter was part of the carriage contract, and (2) the sinking of the lighter was not due to a fortuitous event but rather a lack of precaution by the carrier, as the lighter was shown to be unseaworthy with cracks in its bottom.
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COMPANIA MARITIMA V.
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA
GR NO. L-18965, OCTOBER 30, 1964 The goods were not yet actually loaded on the vessel which would carry the hemp to its destination and that no bill of lading was issued when the vessel sank. SC held that this fact is irrelevant, and that the contract of carriage already commenced when the shipping company’s lighters went to shipper’s private pier to get the goods. FACTS: Macleod and Company of the Philippines contracted by telephone the services of the Compañia Maritima (CM), a shipping corporation, for shipment of hemp from the Macleod's Sasa private pier at Davao City to Manila to be subsequently transhipped to Boston. This oral contract was later on confirmed and the loading of the hemp was completed when CM sent 2 private lighters to Macelod’s pier. The 2 lighters were manned each by a patron and an assistant patron. One of the lighters sank, resulting in the damage or loss of 1,162 bales of hemp loaded therein. All abaca shipments of Macleod were insured with the Insurance Company of North America. Macleod filed a claim for the loss it suffered with the insurance company and was paid P64,018.55. The insurance company failing to recover from the carrier instituted the present action. CA and RTC both ordered CM to pay the insurance company. ISSUES: (1)Was there a contract of carriage between the carrier and the shipper even if the loss occurred when the hemp was loaded on a barge owned by the carrier which was loaned free of charge and was not actually loaded on the S.S. Bowline Knot (Compania Maritima’s ship) which would carry the hemp to Manila and no bill of lading was issued therefor?; YES (2)Was the damage caused to the cargo or the sinking of the barge where it was loaded due to a fortuitous event, storm or natural disaster that would exempt the carrier from liability?; NO HELD: 1. YES. The fact that the carrier sent its lighters free of charge to take the hemp from Macleod's wharf at Sasa preparatory to its loading unto the ship Bowline Knot does not in any way impair the contract of carriage already entered into between the carrier and the shipper, for that preparatory steps is but a part and parcel of said contract of carriage. In other words, here we have a complete contract of carriage the consummation of which has already begun: the shipper delivering the cargo to the carrier, and the latter taking possession thereof by placing it on a lighter manned by its authorized employees, under which Macleod became entitled to the privilege secured to him by law for its safe transportation and delivery, and the carrier to the full payment of its freight upon completion of the voyage. The liability and responsibility of the carrier under a contract for the carriage of goods commence on their actual delivery to, or receipt by, the carrier or an authorized agent. Delivery to a lighter in charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel, where it is the custom to deliver in that way, is a good delivery and binds the vessel receiving the freight, the liability commencing at the time of delivery to the lighter. A bill of lading is not indispensable for the creation of a contract of carriage. As regards the form of the contract of carriage it can be said that provided that there is a meeting of the minds and from such meeting arise rights and obligations, there should be no limitations as to form.' The bill of lading is not essential to the contract, although it may become obligatory by reason of the regulations of railroad companies, or as a condition imposed in the contract by the agreement of the parties themselves. 2. The mishap that caused the damage or loss was due, not to force majeure, but to lack of adequate precaution or measures taken by the carrier to prevent the loss as may be inferred. The ill-fated barge had cracks on its bottom which admitted sea water in the same manner as rain entered 'thru tank manholes,' according to the patron of LCT No. 1023 conclusively showing that the barge was not seaworthy it should be noted that on the night of the nautical accident there was no storm, flood, or other natural disaster or calamity. Certainly, winds of 11 miles per hour, although stronger than the average 4.6 miles per hour then prevailing in Davao on October 29, 1952 , cannot be classified as storm.
G.R. No. 114167 July 12, 1995 Coastwise Lighterage Corporation, Petitioner, Vs - Court of Appeals and The Philippine General Insurance Company, Respondents