Global public policy, transnational policy communities, and their networks

Diane Stone
Policy Studies Journal. 36.1 (Feb. 2008): p19+.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2008 Policy Studies Organization
http://www.ipsonet.org/web/page/395/sectionid/374/pagelevel/2/interior.asp
Abstract:

Public policy has been a prisoner of the word "state." Yet, the state is reconfigured by
globalization. Through "global public-private partnerships" and "transnational executive
networks," new forms of authority are emerging through global and regional policy processes
that coexist alongside nation-state policy processes. Accordingly, this article asks what is
"global public policy"? The first part of the article identifies new public spaces where global
policies occur. These spaces are multiple in character and variety and will be collectively
referred to as the "global agora." The second section adapts the conventional policy cycle
heuristic by conceptually stretching it to the global and regional levels to reveal the higher
degree of pluralization of actors and multiple-authority structures than is the case at national
levels. The third section asks: who is involved in the delivery of global public policy? The
focus is on transnational policy communities. The global agora is a public space of
policymaking and administration, although it is one where authority is more diffuse, decision
making is dispersed and sovereignty muddled. Trapped by methodological nationalism and
an intellectual agoraphobia of globalization, public policy scholars have yet to examine fully
global policy processes and new managerial modes of transnational public administration.

KEY WORDS: public policy, agora, globalization, transnational networks

Full Text:

1. Introduction

The concept of "global public policy" is not well established. Accordingly, this article asks:
what is global public policy, where is it enacted, and who executes such policies? The first
part of the article sets out to delimit the discussion to transnational policy spaces where
global public policies occur. These spaces are multiple in character and variety and will be
collectively referred to as the "agora." This section also addresses what is "global public
policy" and some difficulties with the use of the term or its synonyms as well as the way in
which some higher education institutions are responding.

The second section conceptually stretches the conventional policy cycle heuristic to the
global and regional levels. The policy cycle concept is used as an analytical device (not as a
portrayal of decision-making realities). It is done to reveal the higher degree of pluralization
of actors as well as the multiple and contested modes of authority than is usually the case at
national levels of policymaking. It is also adopted to make the point that the mainstream
study of public policy can ill afford to disregard these policy processes and new
administrative structures.

The third section asks: who is involved in the delivery of global public policy? The
discussion addresses the roles of policy networks. The activities of transnational policy
communities reveal the dual dynamics of new public spaces carved out in tandem with
privatizing modes of decision making. In other words, "globalization makes such publicness
more problematic ... reshaping multi-level governance around various 'new architectures' that
will recreate the 'public' either at a higher level or through a more complex network structure"
(Cerny, 2006, p. 105).

Some policy scholars have addressed global policy dynamics (inter alia, Baltodano, 1997;
Evans, 2004; Soroos, 1991). First, there are discussions of the "internationalisation of the
public sector" (e.g., Ladi, 2005). Second, there are sectoral or issue-specific studies of
elements of global public policy. Analyses of "global trade policy" (Xu & Weller, 2004),
"global environmental policy" (Haas, 2000), or aspects of "global health policy" are readily
found. But, there has been little reflection on the commonality and differences concerning the
process dynamics across these sectors. Third, over the past decade there has been a raft of
debate and discussion of the public policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, the World
Trade Organization (WTO), and United Nations (UN) agencies, among others. However,
accounts of globalized policy processes--distinct from national processes--are few and far
between.

2. Public Spheres and Private Policy Practice in the Global Agora

If global public policy is distinct and to some extent delinked from national processes of
policymaking, the venues in which such policy action occurs need not be tied to sovereign
structures of decision making. This is not to suggest a divorce between global and national
policy processes. However, national public institutions no longer serve as the sole organizing
center for policy. Instead, it is necessary to "look at the restructuring of the playing field
itself" (Cerny, 2006, p. 97), that is, the historical and structural changes to the "state" and
"sovereignty." Through the reinvention of a Greek political term, this restructured playing
field will be referred to as the "global agora."

The Global Agora

The notion of "agora" is a more familiar concept in studies of Athenian history and politics
but has been stretched conceptually to the global arena. At its simplest, the term is meant to
mean a marketplace or a public square. While it is commonplace in the contemporary era to
see the "marketplace" and the "public square" as distinct domains, such boundaries were
neither clear nor fast in the Greek agora. Importantly, the "agora" was not only a marketplace,
but the heart of intellectual life and public discourse.

In ancient times, the agora was a physical place as well as a social and political space
(Wycherley, 1942, p. 21). The public landscape included the mint, shrines and statuary, shops
and law courts, the market hall and the council house, and the Assembly. Evidence from
archaeological digs--public documents inscribed on stone, weight and measure standards, and
jurors' identification tickets and ballots--reflect the administrative nature of the site. (1) In
short, the agora was a place for social, economic and political interaction. The boundaries
were ill defined and fluid where political activity was as likely to take place inside private
shops (cobblers, barbers) as in public buildings. That is, the "commercial impinged upon the
public buildings and shrines of the central Agora at many points, and probably on every side"
(Wycherley, 1956, p. 10).

The merging and the blurring of the commercial and the public domains is apparent in the
modern global era.

The agora embraces much more than the market and much more than
 politics. As a public space it invites exchanges of all kinds....
Although the agora is a structured space, it is wrong to attempt to
subdivide into sectors like markets, politics or media (Nowotony,
Scott, & Gibbons, 2001, p. 209).

The idea of agora is used here to identify a growing global public space of fluid, dynamic,
and intermeshed relations of politics, markets, culture, and society. This public space is
shaped by the interactions of its actors--that is, multiple publics and plural institutions. Some
actors are more visible, persuasive, or powerful than others. However, the global agora is a
social and political space--generated by globalization--rather than a physical place. Some
have already adopted the term to speak of the agora as an electronic or virtual global
commons (Alexander & Pal, 1998; Arthurs, 2001, p. 97). The global agora is also a domain
of relative disorder and uncertainty where institutions are underdeveloped and political
authority unclear, and dispersed through multiplying institutions and networks. Similar to
Plato's Athenian agora when political discussions took place in the dwelling of a resident
foreigner, (2) the sovereignty challenging features of global decision making in semiprivate
or quasi-public networks are increasingly apparent.

The global agora is normatively neutral. This is in contrast to a growing body of literature
that advocates the need to democratize global governance and to enhance the legitimacy of
international organizations (e.g., the special edition in Government & Opposition, 2004).
Without disputing the value of such advocacy, nevertheless, the call for global
accountabilities puts the (normative) cart before the (conceptual) horse. The realm where
such legitimacy questions and accountability issues are to be raised remains poorly
conceptualized. Social scientists operate with a series of metaphors where the new
vocabulary attempts to grasp new policy structures. They include:

* "Transnational public sphere" (Nanz & Steffek, 2004) or the "global public sphere"
(Dryzek, 1999);

* "The return of the public domain" (Drache, 2001);

* The "global arena" (Ronit & Schneider, 2000) or "global policy arena" (World Bank (3));

* A "playing field" of "new levels and spaces" (Cerny, 2006);

* "An acephalous ... modern global polity" (Drori, M yer, & Hwang, 2006, p. 14).

Some argue that the realization of a democratic global order "ultimately depends on the
creation of an appropriate public sphere" (Nanz & Steffek, 2004, p. 315). Yet, the emphasis is
on what is "appropriate" (read: deliberative) and the presumed progressive potential of global
civil society in forging this sphere. Here, the transnational public sphere is conceived as a
Habermasian "communicative network" (Nanz & Steffek, 2004, p. 322).

The concept of a "global agora" makes no presumptions about the communicative,

progressive, or deliberative character of institutional or network interactions. The dynamics
for exclusion, seclusion, and division are just as likely. A "global agora" encompasses a
wider array of political relationships inspired by liberal democracy through to coercive
arrangements of strong authoritarianism, as well as to patterns of disorder, randomness, and
an absence of rational imposition of planning. The global policy agora may become an
accessible participative domain for plural expressions of policy input. But it might not.
As in the ancient Athenian agora, the global one is characterized primarily by elite rule and
lack of participation. The majority of Athenian citizenry did not participate directly in
politics. Instead the Athenian agora was made up of three kinds of citizens:

... the passive ones' who did not go to Assembly; the standing
participants who went to the assembly but listened and voted, and "did
not raise their voice in discussion," and the "wholly active citizens"
(a small group of initiative takes who proposed motions) (Hansen
quoted in Urbinati, 2000, pp. 762-63).

It is the "wholly active citizens" in international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in

international organizations, and in internationalized public agencies that drive global policy
processes. While the global policy agora may have dimensions of "publicness," the capacity
for, and character of public action is much more varied.

In the Athenian agora, the mint, shrines and statuary, shops and law courts, the market hall
and the council house, and the Assembly were all in physical proximity even if women,
slaves, or resident foreigners had little participation in these forums. In the global agora, the
international institutions are dispersed between Washington, DC, the Hague, Geneva, and
Paris. The nodes of global finance are found in exclusive venues in New York, London,
Tokyo, and a few other global cities such as Basle or Davos. As discussed below, policy
networks and self-regulation privatize decision making. Consequently, the institutional
locations are dispersed and the boundaries of the global agora are indeterminate and opaque.
Policy activity is as likely to take place inside private associations among nonstate actors as
in intergovernmental conferences. The vast majority of citizens of nation-states are
uninformed about these policy venues and even if interested, face significant obstacles "to
raise their voice."

Global Public Policy

In the last decade, there has been increasing use of the term "global public policy." Books
have emerged under this title (Reinicke, 1998) or related titles like Global Social Policy
(Deacon, 2007). University courses in development studies or political science have been
launched with this label. Yet, the term remains underspecified. It is used without definition
by many scholars (inter alia, Grugel & Peruzzotti, 2007; Held & Koenig Archibugi, 2004;
True, 2003). Generally, "global public policy" has little resonance among policy elites and
the general public.

Instead, other terms and concepts are better established in the lexicon. One of the most
current terms is "global governance." An alternative term is "governing without government."
At other times, "global policy" is equated with the financing and delivery of global public
goods (Kaul et al., 2003). Another synonym is the idea of "global public-private partnerships"
or the "global programs" sponsored by the World Bank (2004). "Transnational
constitutionalism" is a phrase rarely encountered; indeed, these constitutional processes have
emerged only in the European Union (Arthurs, 2001, p. 107).

In classical political science, public policy occurs inside nation-states. In the field of
international relations, a "realist" perspective would also hold that states are the dominant
actor in the international system and that international policies are made between states. With
its strong tendency to "methodological nationalism" (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002), traditional
comparative public policy has compounded this standpoint. Scholars in the field usually
compare policy development within and between states where states remain the key
policymaking unit. That is, "... public administration has been a prisoner of the word 'state' ...
(it) has assumed that the nation-state is the natural context within which the practice of public
administration has to be studied" (Baltodano, 1997, p. 618).

Moving beyond minimalist interpretations (of a realist-rationalist variety) that limits analysis
to the capacity of public sector hierarchies to globalize national policies does not necessarily
entail jumping to maximal positions (of an idealist-cosmopolitan character) that speak of
deliberative world government. A complex range of state capacities, public action and
democratic deliberation fall in between these two extremes. Scholars and practitioners alike
are arguing that new forms of authority are emerging through global and regional policy
processes that coexist alongside nation-state processes. Governance can be informal and
emerge from strategic interactions and partnerships of national and international
bureaucracies with nonstate actors in the marketplace and civil society (Reinicke & Deng,
2000).

However, economic globalization and regional integration are proceeding at a much faster
pace than processes of global government. One outcome of this disjuncture is that the power
of the nation-states has been reduced or reconfigured without a corresponding development
of international institutional cooperation. This is one of the major causes of a deficiency of
public goods at global levels. For example, the regulation of financial flows, environmental
protection or intellectual property safeguards are inadequately provided. UN agencies such as
UNDP (Kaul, 2003) and UNIDO have become institutions central in researching and
articulating dimensions of "publicness" in the global sphere and how international
organizations and non-state actors create global public goods or seek to regulate the adverse
effects of global public bads.

Policy practice is moving faster than its paradigmatic parallels. The Westphalian conceptual
cage of a nation-state system has incapacitated critical thinking (Albert & Kopp-Malek,
2002). Multilevel polycentric forms of public policy in which a plethora of institutions and
networks negotiate within and between international agreements and private regimes have
emerged as pragmatic responses in the absence of formal global governance. If "public
policy" is "whatever governments choose to do or not to do" (Dye, 1984, p. 2), then some
governments are choosing to devolve aspects of public policy. This is a double devolution;
first, beyond the nation-state to global and regional domains; and second, a delegation of
authority to private networks and nonstate actors.

An indicator of "global public policy" is the extent to which is becoming a field of teaching.
Graduate programs in "global public policy" are rare, but they provide insight into attempts to
conceptualize, and operationalize for educational purposes, this field. The first of its kind in
Germany, the mission of the graduate degree program in Global Public Policy at Potsdam
University is a good example. It is

meeting the challenges posed by the internationalization of policies

and economies, and the changing demands of citizens, requires
political and economic leaders to rethink their roles and act
appropriately. Increased economic and political interdependence
worldwide has meant that events and decisions in one part of the world
can have significant repercussions in others. Public Policy issues
(e.g. Environmental protection or refugees) are increasingly
"transnationalized," and require joint management by governments,
private concerns, and the citizens concerned. At the same time,
 globalization has considerable impact on the ability of national
governments to deal with what were previously purely "domestic"
policies [my emphasis]. (4)

Similarly, the University of British Columbia offers an MA in Global Policy, (5) and the
Fletcher School's Global Master of Arts Program (6) is designed for the "international affairs
professional," while the Masters in Public Policy at Central European University (CEU)
emphasizes "international policy practice." (7) The CEU program has been criticized for
developing an "elite that adheres to the ideology of globalization, is familiar with its main
debates and tends to be compliant with its requisites"; that is, CEU is "training the
administrators of globalisation" (Guilhot, 2007).

In developing and transition countries, international organizations are encouraging the

establishment of new graduate programs. The World Bank has been more active in promoting
graduate education in economics albeit with recent emphasis on the parallel need for "good
governance" (see Bourguignon, Elkana, & Pleskovic, 2007). The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union (EU) have been active in
advocating for public administration and public policy programs that can deal with problems
of transition, development and globalization (Verheijen & Connaughton, 2003). Many other
examples could be given. The point is that universities are adapting to their changing
environment to provide education and training for young professionals who need the skills
and knowledge to traverse global policy processes. As "expanding globalized institutions of
science and expertise," universities, their scholars, and their students are drawn into, and
structure, the global agora (Drori et al., 2006, p. 12).

3. Global Policy Processes

The global agora is expanding and diversifying. The state is not necessarily retreating or in
decline. However, it is reconfiguring with the dynamics of globalization and remains an
important or central agent in the agora. Yet, the constitution of the agora--its values,
discourses, symbols, norms, institutions, and practices (Arthurs, 2001, p. 89)--are also created
by other nonstate actors that have acquired or appropriated public authority when responding
unilaterally or in partnership to global policy problems. Global policy processes have
emerged with governments, international organizations, and nonstate actors responding to
three types of policy problems (Soroos, 1991):

* "transboundary problems" of cross-border-movement money laundering, pollution or drug

trafficking (see, e.g., Raab & Milward, 2003);

* "common property problems" regarding oceans, Antarctica, the atmosphere (see Haas,
2000);

* "simultaneous problems" of nations experiencing similar problems in areas of education;

health, welfare, urbanization, and population growth (see Deacon, 2007).

These problems have led to new forms of "soft" authority or "soft law" (Arthurs, 2001) that
complements the traditional "hard" or formal authority of states and international
organizations. "Soft" authority is seen in the emergence of private regimes, and global
standard setting and transnational policy communities. The exercise of public and private
authority through policy networks and law-like arrangements creates policy processes.
Adapting traditional concepts from policy studies highlights some of the difficulties in
analytically capturing the idea of global public policy. One advantage of adapting this
approach to the global levels is that it brings into relief the role of private actors and
processes of self-regulation (Porter & Ronit, 2006). The common (overly sequential)
heuristic device for the policy cycle is to divide it into four stages:

1. problem definition and agenda setting;

2. formal decision making;

3. policy implementation; and

4. monitoring and evaluation.

These traditional elements of the "policy cycle," as understood in domestic contexts, are
conceptually stretched to the global context. (8) This context is evolving, fast changing, and
lacks formal, authoritative, and sovereign power. To date, transnational public administration
has also been less transparent than at the domestic level.

Problem Definition and Agenda Setting

There is no global decision-making process, at least not in the sense understood in policy
studies where there is an authoritative, sovereign decision maker. Consequently, at the global
level, the "ownership" of public problems is often characterized by a policy vacuum. Which
countries or what institutions have responsibility for dealing with issues is not automatically
apparent, and if public goods are insufficient, those who take responsibility for their
financing and provision is not self-evident. Contemporary social and civic regimes in the
policy sectors of health, labor standards, and social inclusion are sectors where nonstate
activists have been prominent (Grugel & Peruzzotti, 2007; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; True,
2003). Agenda setting is more contested, externalized beyond the nation-state, and open to
the input and disruption of a variety of political agents.

Some see this diversity of interests and institutions as a sign of a healthy and vibrant global
civil society (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), that is, indicative of a pluralistic set of political
pressures and countervailing power at the global level where the anti- and alter-globalization
movements voice their causes in the same domain as multinational companies, the media,
states, and international organizations. The World Social Forum reacts to the agenda-setting
or "opinion-forming" aspirations of the World Economic Forum. Agenda setting is
characterized by cacophonic sets of debates and demands where it is unclear who, or what
institution, has the authority or legitimacy to mediate. There are not only significant problems
of negotiation and compromise, but also uncertainty concerning in which forums it is
appropriate to advance issues. This has consequences for policy coordination and policy
coherence alongside continuing conflict and power battles of who gets to set global agendas.

Policy Transfer and Formal Decision Making

A difference in the policy process under globalization would appear to be that "policy
transfer" is on the increase. Policy transfer is a process whereby knowledge about policies,
administrative arrangements, or institutions in one place is used across time or space in the
development of policy elsewhere (Evans, 2004). An emerging but as yet not fully understood
characteristic of the global era is the manner in which some governments and international
organizations become proactive in promoting cross-border policy harmonization (especially
in regional arrangements) or in exporting policy lessons. Privatization policies, the spread of
the ombudsman institution (Ladi, 2005), and freedom of information laws, gender main-
streaming (see True, 2003), or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) guidelines on budgetary best practices are examples of policy transfer and standard
setting (Brutsch & Lehmkuhl, 2007).

There is no global forum for global decision making such as a "world parliament" or "global
state." However, international commissions such as those headed by Brandt, Palme, and
Brundtland function as venues for the official discussion of global public policies (see the
essays in Thakur, Cooper, & English, 2005). When a problem is recognized by nations, the
policy tools available are international treaties and conventions. Their effectiveness is
problematically reliant on compliance and good international citizenship, and founded upon
an implicit assumption that states will act "rationally" and recognize that collective action is
to long-term interests.

The transnational dimensions of public policy and decision making is usually seen as the
responsibility of international organizations such as the Bretton Woods institutions, regional
associations such as the EU or other bodies such as the WTO, Global Environment Facility,
and International Telecommunication Union. They have the scope and delegated powers to
deal with specified common property and transboundary problems. These organizations do
not have a global remit but are restricted by their charters to limited domains of
responsibilities. These are disaggregated regimes that collectively create a complicated
architecture of institutions, laws, and instruments.

Looking toward these organizations for coherent global responses to global policy problems,
one finds serious unresolved coordination issues and overlapping responsibilities. This can
lead to cooperation among international organizations, but it also leads to "turf battles" where
authority is contested. Similarly, in the absence of enforcement capabilities and use of
sanctions, noncompliance remains high.

Nevertheless, international organizations do develop policies to deliver global public goods.

The World Bank is a good example. Through its Development Grant Facility, the bank funds
programs such as the Global Invasive Species Program, the Global Forum for Health
Research, and the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Public-Private Partnership, among 56 other
initiatives. (9) These examples are only a snapshot of considerably more diverse activity of
public policy being "spun-off" to semiautonomous networks and partnerships. Moreover, it is
not restricted to international organization. Business plays a role in multilateral initiatives, for
example, the Global Road Safety Partnership and the Global Business Coalition on
HIV/AIDS. These global programs are sector or issue specific, executed through multiple
public and private venues rather than through a single executive authority.

Policy Implementation and International Coordination

There are major analytical problems when addressing public policy implementation in a
global context. International organizations generally lack both the authority and the means to
enforce policy compliance. Implementation is dependent on international cooperation and
states behaving as responsible "international citizens" to keep their commitments as well as
educating electorates and convincing them of the real impact of global problems on local
communities. There are few sanctions that can be employed against recalcitrant states except
for engineering consensus, moral pressure from other states, trade sanctions, and, at the
extreme, military intervention. At official levels, there is considerable policy rhetoric for joint
commitment, cofinancing, or aid harmonization, all of which represent pleas for policy
coordination. Time-consuming processes of consensus building, the diplomatic pressures for
compromise, the sources of opposition, and the resource implications of developing global
policy programs significantly delay state coordinated international action.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, on issues ranging from organized crime and terrorism to
human rights, the environment, finance, and trade, it is increasingly evident that government
officials are exchanging information, coordinating policies, enforcing laws, and regulating
markets through increasingly elaborate informal intergovernmental channels. Public policy is
enacted in the decentralized (and less visible) activity of judges, regulators, and legislators
working with foreign counterparts on specific issues (Slaughter, 2004). This is horizontal
intergovernmental networking on transboundary problems. For instance, issue-specific policy
fields that generate networked bodies like the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS), (10) the Basle Committee (11) or the International Network on
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) (12) for functional coordination and
policy cooperation.

"Global public policy networks" are of a more mixed character than the "intergovernmental
networks" identified earlier. They are composed of business, NGOs, and other civil society
actors, governments, and international organizations. Examples include the Global
Environmental Facility (Haas, 2000), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
(GAVI), (13) and the Global Water Partnership. (14) Actors build consensus, pool their
authority, engage in collective decision making and share policy responsibilities and program
funding, that is "soft" authority. These "global public policy networks" (sometimes called
"transnational public-private partnerships") are quasipublic or semiprivate. They can be
contrasted with private regimes. For instance, bond rating agencies (Sinclair, 2005) and the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) are different types of private actors that
perform global roles of accreditation and coordination respectively (Ronit & Schneider,
2000).

More generally, the emergence and spread of legal and law-like arrangements mean that
states cooperate in more or less precise, binding and independent regimes, but also that
nonstate actors can engage in the framing, definition, implementation, and enforcement of
these norms and rules (Brutsch & Lehmkuhl, 2007). However, global standards and best
practices that may be adopted in OECD countries are far less likely to be seen in failed states;
consequently, the pattern of implementation is also highly uneven and contingent. At the
same time, there may be ongoing shifts in the balance of power between different
international organizations, and continual contests for "forum switching" of global issues and
responsibilities.

Transnational Monitoring and Evaluation

Reflection on success and failure potentially promotes efficiency, innovation, and learning in
policy. At the national level, evaluation is usually undertaken "in-house" by national
bureaucracies, commissions of inquiry, or audit agencies. In global spheres, evaluation comes
from various sources. The international financial institutions often have an in-house capacity
for research and evaluation that bolsters their sovereignty challenging policies. For instance,
the intellectual homogeneity and professional strength of the economists within the
international financial and trade institutions is well recognized.

Sometimes evaluation is contracted out to private sector experts and advisers. Unsolicited
advice and evaluation comes from NGOs and social movements. The sheer volume of
knowledge, expertise, and advice cannot all be incorporated and potentially creates
incoherence, conflict, and gridlock. There is a need for translators and interpreters of
analysis, and for "knowledge management" systems. Such experts who edit and vouch the
credibility of information and analysis acquire power and potentially become "gate keepers"
in determining what meets international standards and best practice. Rather than operating
independently, they are often to be found in transnational networks of think tanks,
consultants, university policy centers, professional bodies, and consultancy firms. In the weak
institutional context of the global agora, these policy actors are arguably more influential in
shaping the parameters of policymaking, defining problems, and specifying what constitutes
"global public goods" and selling their "expert evaluation" services than they are within the
confines of the nation-state.

Order and Chaos in Global Policy Processes

The model of the policy cycle depicts a linear model of policy moving from one stage to the
next. In reality, policymaking is messy. It is more accurate to conceptualize the policy
process as "a chaos of purposes and accidents" (Juma & Clark, 1995). This is apparent at
national levels, but even more so beyond the authority structures of "sovereign" nation-states.
A major theme in the conceptual literature on public policy is a prescriptive one of making
the policy process more rational. However, to search for signs of an orderly or stable global
policy process is misguided. Global policy processes are more fluid and fragmented than
might be found in stable political systems of most OECD nations. Instead, disorder and
unpredictability are the norm. As a result of the vast differences in policy style, structure,
institutional setup, powers, and resources of global policy arrangements and regulatory
frameworks, there is no consistent pattern of global policy processes. To the contrary, the
bewildering array of public action is complicated by its often semiprivate composition. The
absence of, or constantly contested, authority structures within the global agora mean far
greater time and effort is also spent convening, debating, and negotiating in arenas created by
interlocutors in order to promote compliance rather than exert enforcement (Porter & Ronit,
2006, p. 57).

This disjointed pattern of policy processes is enhanced by the "new public management" with
its ethos of contracting out, "freeing" managers, and market incentivisation (Kettl, 2005).
However, where this managerial paradigm for the public sphere focuses on devolution to
subnational units of governance, analysis has missed the equally apparent devolution to
supranational and intergovernmental models of governance. The public domain is not under
threat; instead, it is "state-ness" that is under stress (Drache, 2001, p. 40). As a corollary,
public-ness is expanding as the global agora takes shape.

4. Transnational Policy Communities

Scholarly investigation of those who execute or implement global public policies has long
been underdeveloped (Weiss, 1982). Attention is now being paid to individual agents of
policymaking with attempts to get inside the "black box" of international organizations (see
Gulrajani, 2007; Xu & Weller, 2004).
 More specifically, the staff of certain international organizations
have a substantial degree of discretion in formulating and
implementing policies, and thus should be regarded as distinct actors
in global governance (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 128).

The concern is to address the roles, powers, and impacts of what has been variously described
as "international civil servants" (Weiss, 1982) or "supranational bureaucrats" (Held &
Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 128) who are also the "wholly active citizens" in the global
agora, those who are proposing and implementing global public policy. It is useful to
disaggregate these actors into three general types. The umbrella term "transnational policy
community" will be used for the three types. They are the carriers of global policy processes
involved in the diffusion of ideas, standards, and policy practice.

First is the "internationalised public sector official." This is the type of individual (described
by Anne Marie Slaughter, 2004) who operates in "transnational executive networks."
Slaughter (2004, p. 19) argues that the state is not disappearing but that it is becoming
disaggregated and penetrated by horizontal networks existing between "high level officials
directly responsive to the national political process--the ministerial level--as well as between
lower level national regulators." These networks of judges, legislators, or regulators are
intergovernmental in character, and the state remains core. What makes her idea of network
"public" is that actors who compose them are formally designated power holders and rule
makers who derive their authority from their official positions within their nation-state.
Examples of such networks include the International Association or Insurance Supervisors or
INECE.

Second, "international civil servants" are employed by an international organization to staff

its secretariat and institute operations. They are not state delegates. The conventional
paradigm of international civil service includes impartiality, objectivity, and international
loyalty rather than national particularism (Weiss, 1982, pp. 288-92). The reality of
international administration is more complex, where national interests continue to be pursued.
In international organizations, civil servants have considerable capacity to shape (or delay)
policies because of their expertise, routines, and positions of power (Xu & Weller, 2004). The
relative lack of analysis of these actors, or a tendency to treat them as a conforming to the
conventional paradigm, combined with the lack of transparency of most international
organizations, means their roles as global policy implementers and their contributions to
policy innovation are rarely open to public scrutiny.

Third is the emergence of "transnational policy professionals." This is a diverse community

of consultants, foundation officers, business leaders, scientific experts, think tank pundits,
and NGO executives who are growing in number, policy reach, and professionalism. Their
status as either public or private agents is not always clear-cut. Private consultants are
contracted by public bodies, and private experts are co-opted into official advisory bodies.
Rather than acting individually, they are usually found in a network or association that is
often in receipt of public support and/or patronage.

All three categories of actors interact in varying degree with each other to facilitate
multilateral cooperation and the delivery of global public goods. It is increasingly evident to
see individuals building careers across all three categories. Their sources of power and
influence vary. In general, however, they hold power as a result of their (semi)official
position; their control of information, and other organizational resources; their technical
expertise or epistemic authority; or their often lengthy international experience as career
officials and consultants. They are agents in the galaxy of transnational networks that are the
vehicles for policy processes.

Transnational Policy Networks

Networks, coalitions, and multilateral partnerships contribute to the shape, diversity, and
(in)equality of the global agora. Networks can be thought of as creating spaces of assembly in
the global agora. They are potentially a means for civic engagement and a vehicle for
expanding participation. This is neatly captured in the social movement character of
"transnational advocacy coalitions" (TANs). These networks accommodate a range of NGOs
and activists. TANs are bound together by shared values or "principled beliefs" and a shared
discourse where the dominant modality is information exchange. They are called advocacy
networks because "advocates plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition"
(Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 8). For instance, a TAN emerged around the theme of "blood
diamonds" or "conflict diamonds" (Mbabazi, McLean, & Shaw, 2005) in part as a response to
the covert "dark network" mode of operation of arms traffickers (Raab & Milward, 2003).
TANs usually have a strong normative basis for moral judgment in seeking to shape the
climate of public debate and influence global policy agendas. However, they are not well
integrated into policymaking and tend to operate more like "outsider groups."

The "agora" is also an economic sphere of commerce and market exchange. In this regard,
networks can be a force for "market deepening." Business-related networks such as the
European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) or the Transatlantic Business Dialogue
(TABD) have an advocacy orientation. (15) They operate more as "insider groups" given
their closer connections with governments. Networks with a social movement or interest-
group character are usually more prominent in agenda setting.

By contrast, the transnational executive networks described earlier have greater executive
authority where government officials have a dual domestic and international function.
Networks become tools for the maintenance of sovereignty where global problems are solved
by "networked government" responses. As mechanisms for the state to reinvent itself,
transnational executive networks offer a system of "checks and balances" to ensure
accountability and public responsiveness (Slaughter, 2004, p. 29).

The global public policy networks described earlier are trisectoral in character, and different
yet again in their public-ness and sources of authority. Although the term corporatism has
fallen out of fashion and the "operative word today is partnership," this framework has
considerable applicability (Ottaway, 2001, p. 266) for arrangements like GAVI or the Global
Water Partnership.

Knowledge networks and epistemic communities give discursive, intellectual, and scientific
structure to the global agora (Stone, 2005). They provide scholarly argumentation and
scientific justification for "evidence-based" policy formulation. The transnationalization of
research and policy-analysis industries is readily apparent. Knowledge networks of
likeminded think tanks are commonplace including PASOS in Central and Eastern Europe or
the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. (16) One long-term regional venture--the
Asian Fisheries Social Science Research Network--has formalized as a part of the World Fish
Center. Epistemic communities are "scientific" in membership (Haas, 2000). They have
common notions of validity based on intersubjective, internally defined criteria for validating
knowledge which galvanize members toward a common policy enterprise. They seek
privileged access to decision-making venues on the basis of their expertise and knowledge.
Technocratic in design, the concept builds in (social) scientific knowledge as an independent
force in policy development. Scientific consensus seeking among scientific experts is
considered to promote learning and a transformation of interests that converge around policy
choices in favor of the public interest (Nanz & Steffek, 2004, p. 319). Critics highlight how
scientific expertise is used for ideological purposes of "paradigm maintenance" and the
normalization of discourses of power (Bull, Boas, & McNeill, 2004; Stone, 2005). Typically,
knowledge networks and epistemic communities overlap with one of the types of policy
networks outlined earlier or build alliances with governments and international organizations.

The different varieties of networks that intersect and help compose public spaces can be a
force for democratization by creating a venue for representation of "stakeholder" interests, a
means for wider participation in modes of global governance and a venue for societal voices.
In short, networks are "gateways." However, these same networks can also be exclusive, elite
and closed to deliberative decision making. For instance, the discourse and techno-scientific
language as well as professional credentials of those within knowledge networks can be a
form of "gate keeping." Policy debate in the agora need not be democratic. Instead, as in the
Athenian agora (Urbinati, 2000), the global agora is managed by the elite transnational policy
community.

Moreover, network participation is resource intensive. Access to global public policy

networks requires time, commitment, and funds. Many developing countries, and most
ordinary citizens, do not have sufficient resources to devote to national policy deliberations,
let alone global dialogues. Despite widening Internet "connectivity," they are "passive" or
"standing" citizens in the agora compared to the "wholly active" citizens of transnational
policy communities.

Global Managers and Transnational Policy Communities

Transnational networks and policy processes calls forth new forms of leadership and public
management. Policymaking and administration of global nature means understanding
different decision-making milieu, greater cross-cultural sensitivity, and different behaviors on
the part of policy actors. This is not limited to diplomats but has widened and applies to the
more diverse "transnational policy communities," Similarly, there are greater pressures on
parliamentarians and political party officials to engage with counterparts (McLeay & Uhr,
2006). Indeed, the World Bank seed funded the development of the Parliamentary Network
on the Bank. (17) Leadership skills required in the global agora mean functioning in several
languages, comprehending the legal and political contexts of many policy venues (for
example, the EU, neighbouring countries, WTO) and mastering different modes of
communication and policy deliberation.

The geographical dispersion of international civil servants means that they meet irregularly,
are highly reliant on information technology, and travel all the time. It may be the case that
they adopt a globalized identity and outlook. In other words, the values guiding the behavior
of bureaucrats are increasingly shaped by the imperatives of the global economy and
constraints on governmental policy (Baltodano, 1997, p. 625).

By fore-grounding their professional identity, they transcend the

power of the nation-state system to impose its categories of identity
upon them. They also tend to assume a global or regional rather than
national outlook on key issues (Krause Hansen, Salskov-Iversen, &
 Bislev, 2002, p. 109).

Whether or not transnational managers see themselves as a class apart is something that is yet
to be subject to in-depth anthropological and ethnographic work. It is, however, fertile ground
for consideration of the types of policy entrepreneurs and various styles of professionalism in
play.

Comparing transnational managers to traditional bureaucrats, their hybrid character suggests

that they could be more difficult to control. This is largely because of their office being more
privatized or less public. Their institutions and networks tend to behave like regulated
organizations rather than extensions of administrative agencies under legislative control.
Hybrid entities--given their private, informal, and "delegated authority" status--are also
intrinsically less responsive to the political preferences of their political masters and publics.
Moreover, networks are often temporary and can be easily unpacked and reassembled into
different entities. This makes enforcing accountability difficult. It is more than simply an
issue of bureaucratic control as networked policy communities implies that public authority
has been semiprivatized.

There is a sizable literature from business studies--especially in the subfield of human

resource management--concerning the global leadership models and styles (see Morrison,
2000, for an overview). However, there is very little discussion in the political science, policy
studies, and international relations literatures regarding the different qualities and capacities
of the diverse actors in the global agora. While there is a burgeoning literature on "policy
entrepreneurs," it tends to focus on the roles of such individuals at local and national levels of
governance.

The requirements of a transnational network executive or officer of a philanthropic

foundation (such as Gates, Ford, or Aga Khan) may require management skills and
bureaucratic knowledge that differ from counterparts in national or local governments.
Consequently, the types of graduate programs referred to earlier may well spread as pressures
increase for innovation and creativity in how national leaders as well as nonstate executives
to project their organizational and community interests in the global agora. More young elites
will be sent for international education and training. Already, international consortiums of
graduate education such as the Global Public Policy Network aim "to prepare some of the
world's most able graduate students to assume global leadership roles in the coming decades."
(18) Such programs provide graduate training for administrative positions in internationalized
public sectors. These programs also cater for international organizations (which appear to be
growing in number and policy ambit) as well as for a new generation of policy entrepreneurs
who see their future careers in transnational networks and regimes.

Not only do countries need to rethink civil service training in order to fully and effectively
negotiate global policy processes, so too the citizenry needs to consider these new domains
for the pursuit of democratic accountability. For public policy and management scholars, it
means a greater engagement with the increasingly related research communities of
international relations, political economy, and organization studies. For too long, the scholar
of public policy and administration assumed an insulated sovereign domain within which to
make policy. What happened beyond these borders was the stuff of foreign policy and
diplomacy. Such assumptions are no longer tenable.

5. Conclusion
A global agora is evolving with different sets of networks, global public-private partnerships,
and multilateral initiatives. These global policy processes are distinguishable from national
and intergovernmental processes but remain interconnected. The agora is portrayed in its
network character, managed by business and policy elites, and more so exclusionary than
participatory. The objective has been to shift the focus from institutions, actors, and policies
at the nation-state level, to address how policymaking has transnational dimensions. This is
not to deny the continuing power and impact of nation-states. The domestic politics of nation-
states will continue to ensure difference and diversity. States will remain important mediators
of globalization, but their capacities to react and respond will differ dramatically.
Circumstances of complex multilateralism bring additional considerations of how global
activists and networks bypass national and intergovernmental policymaking processes to
influence international organizations, private regimes, and multilateral initiatives.

The global agora is a public space, although it is one where authority is diffuse, decision
making is dispersed and semiprivatized, and sovereignty is muddled by recognition of joint
responsibility and collective action. Transnational networks--whether they go by the label
"partnership," "alliance," "facility," or "forum"--are one mechanism of global public policy.
For the scholar, these developments presage the need to overcome the methodological
nationalism and agoraphobia of mainstream public policy scholarship to examine global
policy processes and new managerial modes of transnational public administration.

Diane Stone is a Professor of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick and
Marie Curie Chair, Central European University. Research for this article was funded by the
Non-Governmental Public Action Programme of UK Economic and Social Research Council.
www.lse.ac.uk/ngpa.

Notes

1. The Athenian Agora Excavations: http://www.agathe.gr/introduction.html. See also:

http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~loxias/agora.htm

2. In the scene that opens Plato's Republic, the dialogue takes place in a metic household (i.e.,
the home of a resident alien, the patriarch Cephalus, and his son Polemarchus). Metics
typically shared the burdens of citizenship with few of its privileges.

3. "More than ever before, the Bank is playing an important role in the global policy arena"
(my emphasis). From World Bank History:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,conte
ntMDK:20053333~menuPK:63762~pagePK:36726~piPK:36092~theSitePK:29506,00.html

4. http://www.mgpp-potsdam.de/

5. UBC organizers state: "Global problems transcend borders, defy regulation and cannot be
solved by any single state no matter how powerful. Addressing these issues effectively
requires new combinations of knowledge and action--it requires governments, international
institutions, and citizen-based networks working together in new and innovative ways."
http://www.supporting.ubc.ca/priorities/faculties/grad/current/global.html

6. Dean of Fletcher School, Deborah Nutter: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/gmap/overview.html

7. CEU Department of Public Policy: http://www.ceu.hu/dpp

8. This is not the place to enter debates about the utility of the policy stages model which has
faced substantive criticism. It is a heuristic tool that provides "partial answers" (Pielke, 2004,
p. 11).

9.
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTFININSTRUMENTS/EX
TTRUSTFUNDSANDGRANTS/EXTDGF/0,,enableDHL:TRUE~menuPK:64283045~pageP
K:64283090~piPK:64283077~theSitePK:458461,00.html

10. IAIS: http://www.iaisweb.org/

11. The committee is not a classical multilateral organization. It has no founding treaty, and it
does not issue binding regulation. Instead, its main function is to act as an informal forum to
find policy solutions and to promulgate standards.

12. INECE: http://www.inece.org/

13. GAVI: http://www.gavialliance.org

14. Global Water Partnership: http://www.gwpforum.org

15. ERT is a personal membership organization of 46 chiefs of European companies:

http://www.ert.be. TABD companies work with governments to foster regulatory co-
operation: http://www.tabd.org

16. PASOS: http://www.pasos.org/; NDRI: http://www.wmd.org/ndri

17. PNoB: http://www.pnowb.org/

18. Lisa Anderson, Dean of Columbia University's School of International and Public
Affairs--SIPA: http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=154039

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Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)

Stone, Diane. "Global public policy, transnational policy communities, and their networks." Policy
Studies Journal, vol. 36, no. 1, 2008, p. 19+. SPJ.SP00,
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