Protection of Indigenous Populations' Cultural Property in Peru, Mexico and The United States, The
Protection of Indigenous Populations' Cultural Property in Peru, Mexico and The United States, The
Protection of Indigenous Populations' Cultural Property in Peru, Mexico and The United States, The
3-1-1997
Recommended Citation
Jason C. Roberts, Protection of Indigenous Populations' Cultural Property in Peru, Mexico and the United States, The, 4 Tulsa J. Comp. &
Int'l L. 327 (1996).
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THE PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY IN
PERU, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES
The Governor asked him how much he would give and how soon. Atahualpa
said that he would give a room full of gold. The room measured 22 feet long
by 17 feet wide, and [was to be] filled to a white line half way up its
height-[the line] he described must have been about 1.5 estados [over eight
feet] high. He said that up to this level he would fill the room with various
objects of gold-jars, pots, tiles, and other pieces. He would also give the
entire hut filled twice over with silver. And he would complete this within 2
months.
-Francisco de Xerez, November 1532'
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment will examine current international agreements and
national legislation protecting cultural property as a non-renewable
resource for the indigenous populations, and the modern nations in
which they reside as a whole, of Peru, Mexico, and the United States.
Contemporary law enforcement efforts, as well as their historical de-
velopment, regarding the protection of cultural property in Peru, Mexi-
co, and the United States will be discussed. In addition, this comment
will examine the debate concerning whether a total ban on trade in
1. Francisco de Xerez, the secretary of Francisco Marquis Pizarro, describing the ransom
of Atahualpa Inca, the last Inca ruler, was executed by the Spanish on July 26, 1533. JOHN
HEMMING, THE CONQUEST OF THE INcAs 47-48 (1970). In 1532, Francisco de Xerez, with
Spanish mercenaries, captured Atahualpa at Cajamarca, Peru. After the payment of Atahualpa's
ransom, worth about $50 million by today's bullion standards, the monarch was garroted. Thus
ended the Inca Empire, and began the exploitation of its indigenous population. MICHAEL E.
MOSELEY, THE INCAS AND THNm ANCESTORS 7 (1992).
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:327
2. Synonyms for cultural property include the terms "cultural patrimony" (national patri-
mony), "cultural heritage" and "antiquities." All of these words can be used interchangeably,
however, the term cultural patrimony is often applied to objects that are of such significance
that they form an integral part of the cultural heritage and identity of a particular cultural group.
Karen J. Warren, A PhilosophicalPerspective on the Ethics and Resolution of CulturalProper-
ties Issues, in ETIFcs OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE? WHOSE PROP-
ERTY? 8 (Phyllis Mauch Messenger ed., University of New Mexico Press 1989).
1997] INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY 329
Similar to the term "art," there is not a set definition for cultural prop-
erty. Rather, a general definition for cultural property "includes all
objects produced or adopted by a given culture-that is, works of art
with special historical, archaeological, or ethnological values." 3 Cultur-
al property can be viewed as objects holding monetary value within the
international art market.4 Cultural property can also be viewed as items
that function as "a repository of cultural and traditional information,"'
which places these items beyond any monetary value assigned by the
international art market. For indigenous populations,6 cultural property
is of vital importance to their communities because these items are
often viewed as integral elements of their religion.7
The ability to retain and control significant objects of cultural
property is important for indigenous populations attempting to secure
and nourish their individual cultural heritage! Stripping indigenous
peoples of their cultural property denies these populations access to
their history, cripples their present ability to retain their defining indi-
vidual cultural heritage, and jeopardizes their future generations' cul-
tural vigor.
9. See Jeffrey Schaire, Notes from the Editor: Shades of Gray, ART & ANTiQurrIS, May
1990, at 12.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Countries whose citizens purchase foreign antiquities are refened to as "purchaser na-
tions," "market nations," "collector nations," "artifact poor nations," and "demand nations."
Countries which contain large reserves of antiquities are referred to as "source nations," "na-
tions of origin," "artifact rich nations," and "supply nations." Jessica L. Darraby, Current De-
velopments in International Trade of Cultural Property: Duties of Collectors, Traders and
Claimants, in THE LAW AND BUSINESS Op ART 718 & n.50, 58 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 297, 1990). The application of
these terms to countries can be confusing because "purchaser nations" can also be "source na-
tions." The United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan are "purchaser nations," howev-
er, they are also "source nations" with large repositories of portable cultural property.
13. See id. at 385.
14. See Schaire, supra note 9, at 12.
15. Id.
16. See Ricardo J. Elia, PopularArchaeology and the Antiquities Market: A Review Essay,
18 J.OF FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 95, 96 (1991).
17. See Marguerite Holloway, Trends in Archaeology: The Preservationof Past, Sci. AM.,
May 1995, at 98, 101.
1997] INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY 331
24. "They play a much more extensive role in transmitting information and molding the
public's taste." LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 3, at 48.
25. "Indeed, it must be recognized that the museum is the normal final resting-place for all
cultural goods that have been shorn of their sacred and functional properties." Id.
26. See id.
27. See id. See generally CONKLIN, supra note 4, at 201-204. See generally David Wilson,
Return and Restitution: A Museum Perspective 99-106, in, WHO OWNS THE PAST? (Isabel
McBryde ed., Oxford University Press 1985); Timothy Kaiser, Dealing for Dollars, 17 J. OF
FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 205, 205-10 (1990); Pendergast, supra note 23, at 89-95.
28. See de Varine, supra note 20, at 48. See generally Kaiser, supra note 27. See also
Pendergast, supra note 23. See also Colin Renfrew, Viewpoint: Collectors Are the Real Looters,
ARcHAEOLtoY, May/June 1993, at 16, 17 (calling for a "re-examination of the tax concessions"
for donations of antiquities made to museums).
29. See de Varine, supra note 20, at 48.
30. See id.
31. See Pendergast, supra note 23, at 91.
32. See id.
33. See id. "In the rich countries, and in the upper social classes of the poor countries, col-
lectors represent a considerable market on their own, whose operation is little known. One will
finance clandestine excavations in Peru in order to stock a private museum with gold artifacts
culled from tombs (at a cost of totally destroying the rest of the funerary furniture)." See de
Varine, supra note 20, at 48.
34. See de Varine, supra note 20, at 49. See generally Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 6, at
17.
35. See PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 6, at 17.
19971 INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY 333
"a mysterious aura around their activities, referring to their intelligence
networks, keeping the sources of their merchandise secret, maintaining
an aloofness, and tantalizing prospective buyers."36 In short, unscrupu-
lous dealers treat antiquities as mere objects that are to be purchased,
traded, and resold for a profit.3
The origins of antiquities are often hidden by the art auction sys-
tem, which can provide the proper sale records necessary for the estab-
lishment of an object's provenance.38 Purchasers at auctions are not
required to identify themselves or even be present at the sale.39 Thus, a
stolen object can move from an auction house into obscurity. Addition-
ally, the laws of some countries act to obscure the origins of stolen
antiquities. For example, Switzerland allows individuals to deposit
artworks in their banks. After five years, as long as the individual was
not the thief, the artwork becomes the depositor's property."
C. The Effect of the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property on the
Archaeological Record.
The illicit trade in cultural property, through the looting of archae-
ological sites, causes irreparable harm to the archaeological record&4 '
and the archaeological context.42 Individuals who locate antiquities
will completely loot the surrounding area, which destroys much of the
archaeological information that can be gleaned from the site.
In order to obtain information on the behavior of past communities,
archaeologists employ careful methods of excavation when they exam-
ine an archaeological site.43 However, looters"4 do not practice these
back breaking work they do, which strips their country of its cultural heritage. See generally
Carol L. Howell, Daring to Deal with Huaqueros, ARCHAEOLOGY, May/June 1992, 56-58; Carl
Nagin, The Peruvian Gold Rush, ART AND ANTIQUITIES, May 1990, 98-105, 134-45.
Looters can be organized and well-funded groups. For example "pot hunters" paid
$10,000 in 1987 to the owners of Slack Farm, near Uniontown, Kentucky, for the right to "ex-
cavate" their land. The Slack Farm area had included an undisturbed Native American archaeo-
logical site, which was occupied between 1450 and 1650 C.E. After paying the owners, the
looters used a tractor to bulldoze through the old village to reach the graves. Bones, potsherds,
stone implements, and hearths were pushed aside in search of salable grave goods. When the
looters finished, the Slack Farm site was full of shovel holes and gaping trenches. Unfortunate-
ly, looting on this devastating scale is commonplace in the United States. See FAGAN, supra
note 41, at 18.
Not only do looters cause damage to archaeological sites, they will occasionally break up
antiquities in order to get them past customs or to sell easier. See CONKLIN, supra note 4, at
252.
45. See generally Howell, supra note 44.
46. See id. "It is tragically clear that wiping out a site can wipe out cultural identi-
ty-something that happens when ethnic groups clash, each trying to obliterate the culture of
the other. China's razing of the monasteries of Tibet is but one example." Holloway, supra note
17, at 101.
47. The term "artifact" encompasses any form of archaeological discovery, which includes
stone axes, pottery, butchered animal bones, and "manifestations of human behavior found in
archaeological sites." See FAGAN, supra note 41, at 17-18.
48. See generally Clemency Coggins, Archaeology and the Art Market, 175 Sci. 263
(1972).
49. See generally id.
50. See generally id.
1997] INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY 335
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232 (provides protec-
tion of cultural property and heritage by prohibiting illegal transfers).
58. See Leo J. Harris, From the Collector's Perspective: The Legality of Importing Pre-
Columbian Art and Artifacts, in ETHIcs OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CiL-
TIJRE? WHOSE PROPERTY? 163-164 (Phyllis Mauch Messenger ed., 1989).
59. See generally CONKLIN, supra note 4, at 280-284.
60. See id.
61. See Barbara Borst, Africa: Fight Intensifies Against Theft of Native Treasures, INTR
PRESS SERvicE, Nov. 14, 1994, at 2,availablein LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
62. See CONKLIN, supra 4, at 280. The United States, Mexico, and Peru have joined the
UNESCO Convention. See Harris, supra note 58, at 163.
63. See CONKLIN, supra note 4, at 280. See also UNESCO Convention, supra note 3, art.
5(a)-(g), art. 6(a)-(c), and art. 7(b)(i).
64. See CONKLIN, supra note 4, at 281.
65. See id. at 281-282. See also Harris, supra note 58, at 165.
66. See Convention on Cultural Property, 19 U.S.C. § 2601-13 (1988). See CONKLIN, supra
1997] INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY 337
note 4, at 28 1.
67. Australia's enabling legislation for the UNESCO Convention is the 1986 Protection of
Movable Cultural Heritage Act. See Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, 1986 Austl.
C. Acts 11. See also Jerry Theodorou, A New International Law for Antiquities?, MINERVA,
March/April 1992, at 32.
68. Canada joined the UNESCO Convention in 1978, making cultural property claims of
reciprocating nations enforceable within Canadian courts under the Cultural Property Export and
Import Act, S.C., ch. 50, § 31(2) (1975) (Can.).
69. See Harris, supra note 58, at 164.
70. See id.
71. See 19 U.S.C. §2601-13 (1988). See also CONKLIN, supra note 4, at 281.
72. See CONKLIN, supra note 4, at 281.
73. See Treaty of Cooperation between the United States of America and the United Mexi-
can States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and
Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, U.S.-Mex., 22 U.S.T. 494, 1970.
74. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Peru for the
Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties, Sep. 15,
1981, U.S.-Peru, 33 U.S.T. 1607, 1981.
75. See Agreement Between the United States of America and Guatemala for the Recovery
and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties, May 21, 1984, U.S.-
Guat., T.I.A.S. No. 11,077, 1984.
76. See Bolivia was granted protection for antique ceremonial textiles belonging to the
Aymara indigenous population from Coroma, Bolivia. CONKLIN, supra note 4, at 282. See also
Import Restrictions on Cultural Textile Artifacts from Bolivia, 54 Fed. Reg. 10.618-19 (1989).
77. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador for
the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties, Nov. 17,
1983 U.S.-Ecuador, T.I.A.S. No. 11,075, 1983.
78. See Import Restrictions on Archaeological Material from El Salvador, 52 Fed. Reg.
34,614 (1987). El Salvador receives protection for pre-Columbian antiquities from the Cara
Sucia Archaeological Region. For information concerning El Salvador's request for emergency
import restrictions, See Ann Guthrie Hingston, U.S. Implementation of the UNESCO Cultural
Property Convention, in ETHIcs OF COLLECrING CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE?
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:327
tered into six treaties for the protection of cultural property from source
nations because it is difficult for source nations to create specific lists
of cultural property to be protected and the low priority political leaders
place on the protection of their nations' cultural property.79
The UNESCO Convention is "widely regarded as ineffectual""0
because the major art importing nations of Western Europe and Japan
have failed to join.8" Many UNESCO Convention provisions are slant-
ed in favor of source nations and the transaction costs of litigation are
placed on the purchaser nations. 2 Therefore, nations that purchase art
and have the resources to protect their individual cultural property have
no incentive to join the UNESCO Convention, other than the fear of
becoming entangled in an embarrassing international incident.8 3 Addi-
tionally, the provisions of the UNESCO Convention have been "watered
down" by the United States' enabling legislation, the 1983 Convention
on Cultural Property Implementation Act. 4 The Convention on Cultur-
al Property Implementation Act allows the President to place import
restrictions only on designated archaeological and ethnological objects
on a country-by-country basis. 5 The Act places limits on archaeologi-
cal and ethnological objects holding that "archaeological material" must
be, "of cultural significance; at least 250 years old; and normally dis-
covered as a result of scientific excavation, clandestine or accidental
digging, or exploration on land or under water."86 The Act also holds
that "ethnological material" must be "the product of a tribal or nonin-
dustrial society and important to the cultural heritage of a people be-
cause of its distinctive characteristics, comparative rarity, or its contri-
87. See Hingston, supra note 78, at 131-32. See also Cultural Property Implementation Act
of 1983, 19 U.S.C. § 2601-2613 (1988 & Supp. 1994)).
88. See Theodorou, supra note 67, at 32.
89. See id.
90. See Theodorou, supra note 67, at 32. See generally Jerome M. Eisenberg, Conservation
and the Antiquities Trade, MINERVA, March/April 1994, at 38. See also Preliminary Draft
UNIDRO1T Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, arts. 1-10, reprinted
in abbreviated version in Jerome M. Eisenberg, The UNIDROIT Convention on the International
Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: Report on the FourthMeeting, MINER-
VA, March/April 1994 at 41.
91. See Theodorou, supra note 67, at 32.
92. For list of unresolved issues, see Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 41-42.
93. See Herscher, supra note 84, at 118.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:327
129. See Peni v. Johnson, 720 F.Supp. 810, 810-815 (C.D.Cal. 1989).
130. Id.
131. See generally MOSELEY, supra note 1, The extent of the Pre-Columbian "Peruvian" or
Andean cultures spread beyond the modem boundaries of Columbia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru,
Bolivia, and Argentina. See also Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. at 810-815.
132. The Court in Peru v. Johnson held:
Peru may not prevail in this action to recover the artifacts here concerned
because:
(a) We do not know in what country they were found and from which they
were exported.
(b) If they were found in Peru, we do not know when.
(c) We do not know if they were in private possession in Peru more than one
year after the official registry book was opened.
(d) The extent of Peru's claim of ownership as part of its domestic law is
uncertain.
See Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. at 815.
133. See generally MOSELEY, supra note 1.
134. See CONKLIN, supra note 4, at 259. Peru has a multitude of problems which drain re-
sources that could be used to protect its cultural heritage. Peru must divert its resources to deal
with rebels, drug trafficking, and an impoverished indigenous population. There is not enough
money for Peru to police its 60,000 known archaeological sites. See also Nagin, supra note 44,
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:327
at 102-03.
135. See generally Nagin, supra 44, at 102.
136. See Almanac, supra note 99, at 797.
137. See id. There are too many indigenous groups within Mexico to be fully described in
this article.
138. See id.
139. Some Pre-Columbian Mesoamerican Civilizations that developed within the borders of
modem Mexico include the Olmecs, Zapotecs, Mayans, Toltecs, and Aztecs. See generally COE,
supra note 101.
140. Prior to the Spanish conquest of 1519, the indigenous population of central Mexico was
estimated to have numbered eleven million people. By 1650 there were only 1.5 million indig-
enous people remaining within central Mexico. See COE, supra note 101, at 202.
141. See PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 6, at 56.
142. Ley Sobre Monumentos Arqueologicos, (Law On Archaeological Monuments), art. 1,
Diario Oficial de la Federacion, May 11, 1897 (hereinafter "Law of 1897"), reprinted in
LEONARD D. DuBoFF, THE DESK BOOK OF ART LAW 975 (1977 and Supp. 1984, V 1-19).
Monuments were defined as city ruins, fortifications, palaces, pyramids, temples, sculpted or
inscripted rocks, and edifices interesting for the study of Mexican history. art. 2.
143. See id. art. 6.
1997] INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY 345
ral Beauty of 1930 (Law of 1930).'" The Law of 1930 defined mon-
uments as being both movable and immovable objects, 45 and it al-
lowed private ownership of antiquities.'" However, cultural property
could not be exported without governmental consent 47 and the gov-
ernment retained the right of first refusal over antiquities offered for
sale."4 Furthermore, any important antiquities recovered by unautho-
rized9 or authorized excavations were considered to be national proper-
14
ty.
144. See Leslie S. Potter and Bruce Zagaris, Toward a Common U.S.-Mexican Cultural
Heritage: The Need for a Regional Americas Initiative in the Recovery and Return of Stolen
Cultural Property, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 627, 668 (1992). See also Law on the Protection and
Conservation of Monuments and Natural Beauty, 58 D.O. 7 (Jan. 31, 1930) [hereinafter "Law
of 1930"], reprinted in DUBOFF, supra note 142, at 976-980 (1977).
145. See Law of 1930, supra note 144, art. 1
146. See id. art. 16.
147. See id. arts. 19 and 20.
148. See id. art. 16
149. See id. art. 27.
150. See Clifton E. Wilson, The Maya Crisis and the Law: Current United States Legal
Practice and the InternationalLaw of the Maya Antiquities Trade, 1 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
283, 294 (1982). See also Law for the Protection and Preservation of Archaeological and His-
toric Monuments, Typical Towns and Places of Scenic Beauty, 82 D.O. 152 (Jan. 19, 1934)
[hereinafter "Law of 1934"], reprinted in DuBOFF, supra note 142, at 972-74 (1977).
151. See Law of 1934, supra note 150, art. 4. Archaeological monuments were defined as
"all vestiges of the aboriginal civilization dating from before the completion of the Conquest."
Id. art. 3.
152. Id. art 9.
153. See id. arts. 12 and 23.
154. See FEDERAL LAW CONCERNING CULTURAL PATRIMONY OF THE NATION, 303 D.O. 8
(Dec. 16, 1970) [hereinafter "Law of 1970"], reprinted in DuBoFF, supra note 142, at 962-71
(1977).
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:327
166. See Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexi-
can States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and
Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, U.S.-Mexico, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088 [hereinafter
"U.S.-Mexico Treaty"], brought into force March 24, 1971. Reprinted in SHARON A. WILLIAMS,
THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 287-89 (1978).
167. U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 166, art. II.
168. Id.art. I.
169. See id. art. II.
170. See generally, Michael S. Blass, Legal Restrictions on American Access to Foreign
Cultural Property, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1195 (1978).
171. See id. at 1194.
172. See UNITED STATES 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARAC-
TERISTICS, 3 (Issued November 1992) [hereinafter "Census"].
173. See id.
174. The indigenous population of the United States is made up of American Indian (Native
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:327
American), Eskimo (Inuit), Aleut, and Native Hawaiian groups. These indigenous groups can
further be divided into a multitude of subgroups, but they are too numerous to be individually
mentioned within this article. Today there are more than six hundred Native American nations,
tribes, and bands. See SHARON O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTs 77 (1989).
175. See Census, supra note 172, at 3. The European expansion throughout the modem
North American countries of Canada and the United States during the sixteenth, seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries triggered a dramatic population collapse of indigenous
groups. The depopulation of North American indigenous populations was due to disease, war-
fare, population relocation, and the destruction of indigenous peoples' traditional way of life.
By 1850 the total United States Native American population had been reduced to 250,000 from
over five million within three centuries. See O'BREN, supra note 174, at 77. See generally,
Jared Diamond, The Arrow of Disease, DIscovER, October 1992, at 64 (concerning the depop-
ulation of the New World's indigenous population). See also ANN RAMENOFSKY, VECTORS OF
DEATH: THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF EUROPEAN CONTACT (1987).
176. See Census, supra note 172, at 3.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protectionof CulturalProp-
erty in the United States, 73 B.U. L. REv. 559, 562-563 (1995).
180. See id. at 563.
181. See id. The failure of the United States to provide legal protection for its indigenous
population's cultural property may be due to the view held by the majority of Americans that
indigenous culture does not represent their European heritage. See also Harrington, supra note
22, at 30.
182. See PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 6, at 62-3.
183. See id. at 63. Some initially perceived Native Americans to be the typical specimens of
Rousseau's "noble savage" or "primitive man," who were equal to one another because of their
independence. See generally, JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY,
(Maurice Cranston trans. 1987). However, the majority of Europeans, and their American dece-
dents, viewed Native Americans to be heathens, which justified the British wars of expansion
1997] INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY 349
and the latter American settlement of the United States. See generally, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,
JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990).
184. See A. Irving Hallowell, The Beginnings of Anthropology in America, in Contributions
to Anthropology: Selected Papersof A. Irving Hallowell 36, 114 (1976).
185. See id. The burial mounds and prehistoric earthworks of the eastern United States were
also attributed to the lost tribes of Israel or the Phoenicians. The early settlers of the United
States denied any connection between these archaeological sites and the Native Americans. See
also Deborah L. Nichols et al., Ancestral Sites, Shrines, and Graves: Native American Perspec-
tives on the Ethics of Collecting Cultural Properties 27-28, in THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING
CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE? WHOSE PROPERTY? (Phyllis Mauch Messenger ed.,
1989).
186. See Don D. Fowler, Conserving American ArchaeologicalResources 137, in AMERICAN
ARCHAEOLOGY, PAST AND FUTURE (David J. Meltzer, Don D. Fowler, and Jeremy Sabloff eds.,
1986).
187. See Hallowell, supra note 184, at 111-112.
188. See Ch. 3060, § 2, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33m
(1988)). The Antiquities Act of 1906 was originally proposed in 1900. However, the act took
six years to pass due to political debate. See also H. MARCUS PRICE EI, DISPUTING THE DEAD:
U.S. LAW ON ABORIGINAL REMAINS AND GRAVE GOODS 25 (1991).
189. See PROT & O'KEEFE, supra note 6, at 63.
190. See Gerstenblith, supra note 179, at 579.
191. See 16 U.S.C. §431 (1988).
192. See id. § 433. Permits to conduct excavations on federal land are granted by the Secre-
350 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:327
taries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Army. See also id.§ 432.
193. In United States v. Diaz, a person was convicted by a federal district court under the
Antiquities Act for the removal of antiquities from federal land. Upon appeal, this decision was
reversed. The appellate court found the Act's definitions for "ruin," "object of antiquity," and
"monument" to be too vague. See United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113,114 (9th Cir. 1974).
194. See Gerstenblith, supra note 179, at 579.
195. See PRICE, supra note 188, at 25.
196. See Gerstenblith, supra note 179, at 579.
197. See Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act of 1935, Ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666 (1935)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. s 1 (1988)).
198. See 16 U.S.C. § 462(f) (1988).
199. See id. § 462(e).
200. PRICE, supra note 188, at 26.
201. See Reservoir Act, Pub. L. No. 86-523, § 1, 74 Stat. 220 (1960) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 469 to 469c-1 (1988)).
202. See id.
203. See PRICE, supra note 188, at 26.
204. See National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-665i § 1, 80 Stat. 915 (1966)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a to 470w-6 (1988 & Supp. Ell1991)).
19971 INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY 351
205. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-70d (1988). The National Preservation Act of 1966 was
amended in 1980 in order to provide guidance for the national historic preservation program at
the federal, state, and local levels.
206. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470h-2(a)(2) (1988).
207. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-l(a) (1988). The nomination of sites that are of international
significance to the World Heritage Committee on behalf of the United States is also to be con-
ducted by the Secretary of the Interior. See also id. § 470a-l(b).
208. See PRICE, supra note 188, at 27.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See National Environmental Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 2, 83 Stat 852 (1970)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70a (1988 & Supp. 1111991)).
212. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-32 (1988 & Supp. m1 1991).
213. Id. at § 4331(b)(4).
214. Id. at § 4332(C).
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ARPA repealed the Antiquities Act of 1906. See Thomas Boyd, Disputes Regarding the Pos-
session of Native American Religious and Cultural Objects and Human Remains: A Discussion
of the Applicable Law and Proposed Legislation, 55 Mo. L. REV. 883, 897 (1990).
The ARPA's purpose "is to secure for the present and future benefit of the American
people, the protection of archaeological resources and sites located on public and Indian lands."
16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (1988).
226. The term "archaeological resource" is defined as any material remains of past human
life or activities of archaeological interest which are at least one hundred years old. See 16
U.S.C. § 470bb(l) (1988). Therefore, the ARPA is more specific than the Antiquities Act of
1906, which fails to define ambiguous terms such as "ruin" or "object of antiquity."
227. See 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (1988).
228. See id. at §470ee (1988).
229. See id. at § 470cc(c), (g) (1988).
230. See Margaret B. Bowman, The Reburial of Native American Skeletal Remains: Ap-
proaches to the Resolution of a Conflict, 13 HARv. ENVrL. L. Rev. 147, 188-189 (1989).
231. See Gerber v. United States, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
232. See United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir. 1993). Gerber pleaded
guilty to misdemeanor violations of the ARPA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa et seq., and was sentenced
to twelve months in prison. However, Gerber reserved the right to appeal on the ground that the
ARPA did not apply to his offense. Gerber had entered upon land owned by the General Elec-
tric Company, without permission, and excavated a prehistoric Native American antiquities
from an earthen burial mound associated with "Hopewell phenomenon" culture. See also id. at
1113-14. Gerber was convicted under the section of the ARPA which provides that:
no person may sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or offer to sell,
purchase, or exchange, in interstate or foreign commerce, any archaeological
resource excavated, removed, sold, purchased, exchanged, transported, or
received in violation of any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or permit in
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prior to the removal of any human remains or associated objects. See also id.at § 3002(c)
(Supp. V 1993).
242. See George Johnson, Indian Tribes' Creationists Thwart Archaeologists, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1996, at Al, B6.
243. See id.at B6.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. See Gerstenblith, supra note 179, at 631 and note 310 for list of state statutes protecting
human remains and cultural property.
248. See id.
249. See Pre-Columbian Art Act, Pub. L. No. 92-587, § 201, 86 Stat. 1297 (1972) (codified
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-95 (1988)). The Pre-Columbian Art Act was implemented due to the
destruction of Pre-Columbian monuments in the 1960s. See also Hingston, supra note 78, at
131.
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271. See discussion supra Part 1l.C., and accompanying note 43.
272. See generally Note, John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying
Strict Inalienability,74 CORNELL L. REv. 1179 (1989), at 1202-21 (discussion of inalienability
for group rights in property). See also Herscher, supra note 84, at 117.
273. See discussion infra Part ll.B., and accompanying note 17.
274. See discussion supra Part II.A.
275. See discussion supra Part IlI.B-D. Although the United States' current domestic legis-
lation offers protection to cultural property, and a means for indigenous populations to have
their stolen heritage repatriated, there is not enough money to police all of the known and un-
known archaeological sites. See generally, Holloway, supra note 17, at 98.
276. See discussion supra U.B. "If the market cannot be supplied through legal means, it
will be supplied illegally." Merryman and Elsen, supra note 267, at 63, (Referring to the de-
mand for cultural property).
1997] INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS' CULTURAL PROPERTY 359
ed. This record would be open for study, and it would allow a nation to
monitor the cultural property that leaves its borders. It is hoped that
collectors and dealers would be willing to purchase documented cultural
property from the country of origin instead of smugglers, who cannot
guarantee authenticity. 2" Governments should also pay higher rewards
to individuals who find cultural property than could be received from
smugglers. Additionally, if an antiquity includes precious metals, the
finder should receive more than the object's value melted down. This
will reduce the risk of individuals destroying an object for economic
gain. Funds for these purchases would hopefully be covered by the
governments' antiquities sales, or the finders could take a share of the
sale. It is possible that smugglers will simply pay a higher price than a
government, however, any object not sold on the licit market could be
construed as a fake.
Each government entering this licit antiquities trade should create
an agency in charge of regulating excavations, discoveries, and the sale
of antiquities. This agency would be responsible for managing the
government's antiquities sale, providing the documents necessary for
authenticity, and paying finders for their discoveries. Additionally, this
agency would manage the funds generated by the sale of the cultural
property. Source nations, often developing countries, would especially
benefit. A licit trade in cultural property could fund preservation and
education programs aimed at protecting antiquities barred from the
market. 8
It is important for countries to offer high quality antiquities at its
sales in order to entice collectors and dealers away from the smugglers.
However, it is important for a country to provide its indigenous popu-
lation with the means to retain control of cultural property affiliated
with its heritage. For any proposal of a licit antiquities market to be
fair, it must provide for the rights of indigenous people to control their
cultural property. Indigenous groups, working with the governmental
agency overseeing the licit antiquities sale, could designate cultural
property that would not enter the market. The government should enact
laws to protect these designated artifacts, and use funds generated by
the licit antiquities trade to police important archaeological sites. Cul-
tural property affiliated to an indigenous group that is not designated to
be protected should benefit that community economically.
Finally, indigenous populations should be included in the process
of enforcing their cultural property rights before international tribunals.
Currently, indigenous and ethnic groups without state status are gener-
277. Collectors, dealers, and museums do not wish to add fake antiquities to their holdings.
See discussion supra Part H.B.
278. See Merryman and Elsen, supra note 267, at 63.
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VI.CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this proposal will generate continued debate con-
cerning a licit trade in cultural property, raising new questions and
ideas about the protection of our heritage. Many individuals, particular-
ly archaeologists and cultural anthropologists, will criticize this
comment's proposal. However, laws and international treaties do not
reduce the demand for cultural property; therefore, the destruction of
archaeological sites will continue unless a controlled trade in antiquities
can be established.
A regulated trade in antiquities, which allows indigenous groups
control over affiliated cultural property, would benefit purchaser na-
tions, source nations, scholars, and indigenous populations. Purchaser
nations would have access to legally exportable antiquities and reduce
the risk of an international incident. Source nations would be able to
retain, preserve, and protect their cultural property. Scholars would
benefit from the greater preservation of archaeological sites. Finally,
indigenous populations would gain a more effective means to preserve
their cultural property.
Jason C. Roberts
279. See Russel L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of Inter-
national Law?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (1994)