Yanong 1 To 5 Article 114 Treason
Yanong 1 To 5 Article 114 Treason
1. CRIMINAL LAW; AMNESTY, TREASON AND SEDITION. — The violation of oaths of allegiance,
and kindred crimes provided for in Act 292, United States Philippine Commission, are included in the
general terms "treason and sedition" as used in the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902.
FACTS:
ABAD was charged and convicted of a crime defined in section 14 of Act No. 292 of the United
States Philippine Commission, which is as follows:
"Any person who shall have taken any oath before any military officer of the Army
of the United States, or before any officer under the Civil Government of the Philippine
Islands, whether such official so administering the oath was specially authorized by law
so to do or not, in which oath the affiant in substance engaged to recognize or accept
the supreme authority of the United States of America in these Islands or to maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who shall, after the passage of this
act, violate the terms and provisions of such oath or any of such terms or
provisions, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both."
The defendant is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of the
proclamation of amnesty if the offense is one of those to which the proclamation applies.
Assuming, for the purposes of the present motion, that the defendant is guilty of the
offense, there is no evidence in the record showing that it was committed pursuant to orders
issued by the civil or military insurrectionary authorities, or that it grew out of internal political
feuds or dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards or the Spanish authorities, or that it
resulted from internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves. If it is
covered by the amnesty it must be because it is embraced within the words employed in the
proclamation to designate the first class of offenses amnestied, namely, "offenses of treason
and sedition."
TREASON is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against the
United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their enemies, giving
them aid and comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere. Sedition is defined in section
5 of the same act as the rising publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside
of legal methods certain enumerated objects of a political character.
ISSUE: WON the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance is included in the general words
treason and sedition.
HELD:
YES.
We hold, therefore, that the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the
political offenses defined in Act No. 292, is included in the general words "treason and
sedition," as used in the proclamation. The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the
proclamation, and upon filing in this court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the
court below with directions that he be discharged.
In the present case the act by which the defendant is found by the court below to have
violated the oath was that of denying to an officer of the United States Army the existence of
certain rifles, which had been concealed by his orders at the time of his surrender in April,
1901, and of the existence and whereabouts of which he was cognizant at the time of the
denial. If this act was a violation of the oath, which upon the evidence in the case may be
doubtful, it was probably also an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of
the United States, giving them aid and comfort, and if the element of breach of promise is to be
regarded as merely an incidental circumstance forming no part of the essence of the crime of
violation of oaths of allegiance, the offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be held to be
covered by the amnesty as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted under another
name.
We prefer, however, to base our decision upon a broader ground, and one which will
cover all cases of prosecution for the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance.
PERFECTO, J.:
FACTS:
Carmelito Victoria was accused of treason. It was said that during the period compromised
between March, 1942 to December, 1944, in different places, did knowingly adhere to the enemy, the
Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the United States
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort.
Allegedly, on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a member of the Intelligence Unit
attached to the Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give
said enemy aid and comfort, joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about eight spies and a
Japanese soldier, which went to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking Labak
Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused Federico Unson of hiding guerrillas. Said patrol was
arresting said Federico Unson when some guerrillas appeared and killed one of the spies and the
patrol left.
Victoria directed several men in the patrol in picking up the dead spy and carrying him away.
And in the afternoon of the same day, the same party of spies, including the accused and eight
members of the Japanese Military Police, went again to the house of Federico Unson and
treasonably arrest him, together with Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at the
house. With the latter’s hands bound, they were tortured and then taken along by said patrol after
setting fire on the house of Federico Unson and that of Isaias Perez were found lying nearby with
numerous bayonet wounds; and that Ruben Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison in Lucena,
Tayabas, and there killed.
Also, December 21, 1944, the accused, accompanied by other Japanese spies who were all
armed went to the house of Jose Unson, in Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said Jose Unson and
brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that he had a short wave radio, that he was
furnishing radio information to the guerrillas and at the same time supporting them. Unson was
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released on the same day, but on the next day he was again arrested and brought to the Japanese
garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned.
On or about February 10, 1945, the accused and some members of the Intelligence Unit of the
Kempei Tai, who were all armed, went to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, and
placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over to the Japanese Military Police
who on that occasion were concealing themselves near the house of Romulo; and that, since the
arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of him.
On or about December 21, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused, accompanied
by two Japanese Military Police and two undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena,
Tayabas, and apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that said two Japanese Military Police and
the accused conducted a search of the house and afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese
garrison where he was subjected to inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of
the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
On or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused, acting as an
informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, caused the Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehended
Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and there torture
and unlawfully detained up to September 20, 1944.
On or about February, 1945, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party,
joined the Makapili organization designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying war
against their enemies. He took military training from the Japanese and bore arms and joined the
enemy forces as a Makapili soldier, taking orders from the Japanese. He also participated in the raid
and burning of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese and carried
ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from Bautista to the mountains of Susong Dalaga
and Mt. Malipuño, Laguna. He also performed sentry duty for the Japanese Army in Mount Malipuño,
where he was stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers.
Admitting that appellant's conduct during the Japanese occupation has not been impeccable,
counsel wants us to consider what the accused did in behalf of the guerrillas in mitigation of his
criminal responsibility, and that the purpose of a penalty, not being to satisfy public vengeance, but to
attain the correction of the guilty person, such purpose will not be attained with appellant's death as
decreed by the lower court.
Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a spy; that he joined the Japanese in
their raids only because he was forced to do so; that in the instances he had to go to the Japanese
garrison he did it either in obedience to a summon of his friend Captain Yuki or to intercede in behalf
of some prisoners; that he remained in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor Constancia, who appealed
to him not to go to the mountains so he may continue helping those who were detained by the
Japanese; and that in October 1943, he was arrested by the Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and
that he was released only after he had been made to promise to indicate who the guerrillas were but,
notwithstanding the involuntary promise exacted from him, he did not cause the arrest of any
guerrilla.
HELD:
YES. Even if we accept this testimony of appellant it cannot overthrow the clear, positive, and
straightforward declarations of the witnesses, for the prosecution. Appellant's claim that he, too, was
a guerrilla, had helped the resistance movement, and in fact, succeeded in interceding for some
Filipino prisoners, does not relieve him from criminal responsibility for the acts he had committed as
alleged in the counts in the information which were declared proven by the People's Court.
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The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as
correctly stated by the Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the
commission of wrongs, and although appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if
he had caused the killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy, he is,
nonetheless, a traitor. It was already said that: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet
offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (James 2:10).
We do not find any merit in appellant's allegations that the acts committed by him are not
punishable as treason and that the People's Court who tried him had no jurisdiction, they being
merely upshots of the wrong theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty. The Court is
unanimous in finding appellant guilty of treason as found by the lower court.
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and
consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there
was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
HELD:
No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the unending allegiance
owed by citizens or subjects to their states. Generally, a person who owes permanent allegiance to a
state is called a national.) of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated (repealed) or severed by the enemy occupation because
the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It
remains vested in the legitimate government. (Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.")
What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government
of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in
abeyance during military occupation.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people. (Art. 114. Treason. — Any person who, owing allegiance to
(the United States or) the Government of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war
against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed
P20,000 pesos.)
DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
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adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the nation.
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced
government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants
such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of the law
and order, and for the proper administration of the country.
FACTS:
On October 29, 1902, Dalmacio Lagnason (defendant) with his band (“Babaylanes”
which camped in the northern part) of men in arms against the Government of the United
States made an attack upon the pueblo of Murcia in Province of Occidental Negros. They
were however driven off by the force of Constabulary. (Note: there is a similar band, the one
led by Dionisio Papa, camped in the southern part)
Two inspectors of the Constabulary arrived with additional forces and left the pueblo in
search of the defendant. They located him about three kilometers from the pueblo (Iglauaan).
Their fight lasted an hour and a half. The defendant was captured in battle and had a
Springfield rifle, a revolver, and a talibon. About twenty of his men were killed. On the side
of the Constabulary, two policemen of the vicinity (Tranquilano Toscano and Lazaro
Quiachon) who were acting as guides were killed.
The defendant’s band consisted of 70-80 men who had for arms five or ten rifles, bolos,
daggers, and one small cannon. They wore black shirts, white pantaloons, and black caps.
They carried no banners, but did carry two large wooden crosses which were captured
together with the cannon.
W/N the penalty for the crime of insurrection should be imposed in accordance with
Sec. 3 of Act No. 292? YES
Justice Field in US vs. Greathouse: the intent of Congress in Sec. 2 of Act of July,
17, 1862 (now Sec. 5334 of Revised Statutes and Sec. 3 of Act No. 292) is “… 2)
to punish treason thereafter committed with death, or fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of court, unless the treason consist in engaging in or assisting a
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the US… in which event the
death penalty is to be abandoned and a less penalty inflicted.”
The acts committed by the defendant constituted “a levying of war” as that
phrase was understood at the time the act of the Commission was passed. However,
these same acts constituted “rebellion or insurrection” within the meaning of
Sec. 3 of Act No. 292.
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress does have the power to fix the penalty for
this crime and the construction placed upon the act of July 17, 1862, in the case of
Greathouse was that under both sections, the offense constitute treason, but
when the treason consisted of engaging in an insurrection or rebellion, it
could be punished only by imprisonment for not more than ten years in
accordance with Sec. 3 of Act 292.
It is not necessary to decide on whether testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act is required or whether testimony required in ordinary cases is enough. In this
case, the overt act was proved by two witnesses.
The defendant is also a native of Cebu and is therefore covered both by Sec. 1 and
Sec. 3.
**The judgment is affirmed with a change of the penalty, however, from death to ten
years and a fine of $10,000, money of the United States, with the costs of this
instance against the defendant.
McDonough, J.:
The crime committed is that of insurrection, and that the conviction should be had under
Sec. 3 of Act No. 292 for insurrection.
It was the intention of the law-making body to create a crime of a less degree and of less
magnitude than that of levying war against the Government, which new crime was
designated as rebellion or insurrection.
The defendant was charged with TREASON on three counts. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to DEATH by the 1st Div. of the People's Court in Tacloban, Leyte.
ISSUE: WON death was the correct penalty to be imposed on the accused.
HELD:
NO.
2. RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
In People vs. Racaza, the trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, superior strength, treachery and employment of means for adding
ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first 3 circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason
and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty.
o Treachery is merged in superior strength; and to overcome the opposition and
wipe out resistance movements which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration
with the enemy, the use of a large force and equipment was necessary.
o It was this superior force which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time
subdue its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and
its adherents to meet their foes only on even terms according to the romantic
traditions of chivalry.
BUT the law abhors inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary
to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent,
human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of
cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating
circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main
criminal objective under par. 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the RPC.
The killings themselves and other accompanying crime should be taken into consideration for
measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which
they were committed. If it were not this the rule, then treason considered as the highest crime
known to law would confer on its perpetrator advantage that are denied simple murderer.
To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the penalty in treason will be adapted within the
range provided in RPC to the danger and harm and to which the culprit has exposed his
country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deeds.
The letter and spirit of the RPC adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived
and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the
prescribed standards is inapplicable as in the case of homicides in connection with treason,
the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be
summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in the furtherance of the law's aims.
The appellant’s spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the
maximum. The appealed decision is MODIFIED and the sentence REDUCED to reclusion
perpetua with the legal accessories and costs.