Republic of the Philippines Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio,

SUPREME COURT Parañaque City (respondents), on the ground that the

Manila petitioner’s cause of action was not for unlawful
SECOND DIVISION detainer but for recovery of possession. The appellate
court affirmed this decision in its resolution of August
G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012 22, 2005.2
FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner,
vs. The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the
ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO BACAY, ILUMINADO name of Rodolfo Chua Sing under Transfer Certificate of
BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO, LETTY BARCELO, JING Title No. 52594,3 with an area of 1919 square meters,
BERMEJO, MILNA BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Chua
JHONNY BORJA, BERNADETTE BUENAFE, ALFREDO Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua
CALAGOS, ROSAURO CALAGOS, ALEX CHACON, AIDA Sing leased the property to the petitioner. Their
CONSULTA, CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE VERA, contract of lease was neither notarized nor registered
ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY DING, JOSE ESCASINAS, with the Parañaque City Registry of Deeds.4
GORGONIO ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO
ESTRERA, EDUARDO EVARDONE, ANTONIO The lease contract provided that:
GABALEÑO, ARSENIA GARING, NARCING GUARDA, That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and
NILA LEBATO, ANDRADE LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ, renewable for the same period upon mutual agreement
RAMON MACAIRAN, DOMINGO NOLASCO, JR., of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of
FLORANTE NOLASCO, REGINA OPERARIO, CARDING any occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby
ORCULLO, FELICISIMO PACATE, CONRADO P transfers all its rights and prerogative to evict said
AMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE SANTOS, DOMINADOR occupants in favor of the LESSEE which shall be
SELVELYEJO, VILLAR, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and responsible for all expenses that may be incurred
Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, without reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is
Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Respondents. understood however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving,
in favor of the LESSEE any and all damages that may be
DECISION recovered from the occupants.5(Underscore ours)
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Significantly, the respondents already occupied the
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the property even before the lease contract was executed.
decision1 dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the
in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166. The Court of Appeals’ decision petitioner signed the lease contract, the petitioner
reversed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the
of Parañaque City, Branch 257, and of the Metropolitan property within 30 days and that they pay a monthly
Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 77, by rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.6
dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Jose’s complaint for The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On
ejectment against Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto Bacay, October 20, 1999, the petitioner filed an ejectment case
Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo, Letty Barcelo, Jing against the respondents before Branch 77 of the
Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo Bermejo, Jhonny Borja, Parañaque City MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo Calagos, Rosauro Calagos, 11344.7
Alex Chacon, Aida Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo De
Vera, Ana Dela Rosa, Rudy Ding, Jose Escasinas, In this complaint, no mention was made of any
Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio Estrera, proceedings before the barangay. Jose then brought the
Eduardo Evardone, Antonio Gabaleño, Arsenia Garing, dispute before the barangay for conciliation.8 The
Narcing Guarda, Nila Lebato, Andrade Ligaya, Helen barangay issued a Certification to File Action on March
Lopez, Ramon Macairan, Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante 1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended
Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo, Felicisimo complaint, incorporating the proceedings before the
Pacate, Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos, barangay before the summons and copies of the
Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, Sergio Villar, complaint were served upon the named defendants.10
John Doe, Jane Doe and Unknown Occupants of
1
In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents to vacate
petitioner claimed that as lessee of the subject the premises and to remove all structures introduced
property, he had the right to eject the respondents who on the land; to each pay P500.00 per month from the
unlawfully occupy the land. He alleged that: date of filing of this case until they vacate the premises;
and to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of suit
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected
their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the
law whatsoever, much less any building permit as issue, among others, that no legal basis exists for the
sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, petitioner’s claim that their occupation was by
lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.12 tolerance, "where the possession of the defendants was
illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, there
The petitioner also stated that despite his written can be no tolerance."16
demand, the respondents failed to vacate the property
without legal justification. He prayed that the court The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27,
order the respondents; (1) to vacate the premises; (2) 2003. It issued its decision17 on October 8, 2003,
to pay him not less than P41,000.00 a month from May reiterating the MeTC’s ruling that a case for ejectment
30,1999 until they vacate the premises; and (3) to pay was proper. The petitioner, as lessee, had the right to
him attorney’s fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the file the ejectment complaint; the respondents occupied
costs of suit.13 the land by mere tolerance and their possession
became unlawful upon the petitioner’s demand to
In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out vacate on April 28, 1999. The RTC, moreover, noted that
that they have been in possession of the land long the complaint for ejectment was filed on October 20,
before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and 1999, or within one year after the unlawful deprivation
that the lease contract between the petitioner and took place. It cited Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar, etc.,
Chua Sing does not affect their right to possess the land. et al.18 and Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support its ruling that a
The respondents also presented a Deed of case for unlawful detainer was appropriate.
Assignment,14 dated February 13, 2000, issued by David
R. Dulfo in their favor. They argued that the MeTC had On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the
no jurisdiction over the case as the issue deals with RTC and MeTC decisions.20 It ruled that the respondents’
ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his
complaint for lack of cause of action and for lack of lessor’s tolerance. It defined tolerance not merely as
jurisdiction. They also filed a counterclaim for actual the silence or inaction of a lawful possessor when
and moral damages for the filing of a baseless and another occupies his land; tolerance entailed
malicious suit. permission from the owner by reason of familiarity or
neighborliness. The petitioner, however, alleged that
After the required position papers, affidavits and other the respondents unlawfully entered the property; thus,
pieces of evidence were submitted, the MeTC resolved tolerance (or authorized entry into the property) was
the case in the petitioner’s favor. In its decision15 of not alleged and there could be no case for unlawful
January 27, 2003, the MeTC held that the respondents detainer. The respondents’ allegation that they had
had no right to possess the land and that their been in possession of the land before the petitioner’s
occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance. It lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this finding.
further noted that the respondents could no longer Having been in possession of the land for more than a
raise the issue of ownership, as this issue had already year, the respondents should not be evicted through an
been settled: the respondents previously filed a case for ejectment case.
the annulment/cancellation of Chua Sing’s title before
the RTC, Branch 260, of Parañaque City, which ruled The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases
that the registered owner’s title was genuine and valid. are summary proceedings where the only issue to be
Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not divested of resolved is who has a better right to the physical
jurisdiction over the case because of the respondents’ possession of a property. The petitioner’s claim, on the
assertion of ownership of the property. On these other hand, is based on an accion publiciana: he asserts
2
his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of lease express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession
he contracted after the respondents had occupied the of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession
land. The dispositive part of the decision reads: was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express
or implied contract between them. However, the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The defendant’s possession became illegal when the
decision dated October 8, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 257, plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the
Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 03-0127, is REVERSED subject property due to the expiration or termination of
and SET ASIDE and the amended complaint for the right to possess under the contract, and the
ejectment is DISMISSED.21 defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for
unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the
The petitioner filed a motion for unlawful withholding of possession.25
reconsideration,22 which the Court of Appeals denied in
its resolution23 of August 22, 2005. In the present The allegations in the complaint determine both the
appeal, the petitioner raises before us the following nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.
issues: The complaint must specifically allege the facts
constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these
I allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court or
HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE SUBJECT the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.26
COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT FOR
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND THEREFORE In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the
DISMISSIBLE following allegations in support of his unlawful detainer
complaint:
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN 3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr.
DECIDING THE CASE BASED ON RESPONDENTS’ Rudy Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned and registered
MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY WHICH IS COMPLETELY in the lessor’s name, covering the area occupied by the
INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR DEFENSES INVOKED BEFORE defendants.
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
xxxx
III 6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property as
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY early as 1991 through sale, thereafter the aforesaid
DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE MERITS TO AVOID Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently registered
CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF under his name.
JUSTICE.24
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful
The Court’s Ruling occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected
We find the petition unmeritorious. their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or
law whatsoever, much less any building permit as
Unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy for the sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true,
present case. lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.

The key issue in this case is whether an action for 8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful
unlawful detainer is the proper remedy. occupancy of the subject premises, plaintiff referred the
matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a formal
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery demand upon each of the defendants to vacate the
of possession of real property. This action may be filed premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April
by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against 1999 are xxx hereto attached as annexes "C" to "QQ."
whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination 9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and
of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, refused and continues to fail and refuse to vacate the
3
premises without valid or legal justification.27 (emphasis continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by
ours) prescription." Further expounding on the concept,
Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus,
run counter to the requirements for unlawful detainer. not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of
In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By
defendant was originally legal and his possession was virtue of tolerance that is considered as an
permitted by the owner through an express or implied authorization, permission or license, acts of possession
contract. are realized or performed. The question reduces itself
to the existence or non-existence of the permission.
In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the [citations omitted; italics supplied]
respondents’ occupancy was unlawful from the start
and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an The Court has consistently adopted this position:
unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession tolerance or permission must have been present at the
becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful
defendant to vacate the property and the defendant’s from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
subsequent refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.29
characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful
even before the formal demand letters were written by It is not the first time that this Court adjudged
the petitioner’s counsel. Under these allegations, the contradictory statements in a complaint for unlawful
unlawful withholding of possession should not be based detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of
on the date the demand letters were sent, as the Urban,30 the claim that the defendant’s possession was
alleged unlawful act had taken place at an earlier merely tolerated was contradicted by the complainant’s
unspecified date. allegation that the entry to the subject property was
unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then ruled
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly that the unlawful detainer action should fail.
alleged that the respondents occupied the premises by
mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the The contradictory statements in the complaint are
complaint nor any supporting evidence on record, further deemed suspicious when a complaint is silent
however, shows when the respondents entered the regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the
property or who had granted them permission to enter. alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty Corporation v.
Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: "(1) defendant
regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld. immediately occupied the subject property after its sale
to her, an action merely tolerated by the plaintiff; and
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,28 the Court cited Prof. (2) the respondent’s allegedly illegal occupation of the
Arturo M. Tolentino’s definition and characterizes premises was by mere tolerance." The Court expressed
"tolerance" in the following manner: its qualms over these averments of fact as they did not
contain anything substantiating the claim that the
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely plaintiff tolerated or permitted the occupation of the
tolerated are "those which by reason of neighborliness property by the defendant:
or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor
or another person to do on the property; they are These allegations contradict, rather than support,
generally those particular services or benefits which plaintiff’s theory that its cause of action is for unlawful
one’s property can give to another without material detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that
injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out defendant’s occupation of the property was unlawful at
of friendship or courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts its inception. Second, they counter the essential
of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiff’s
neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be
do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying present right from the start of a possession that is later
a horse therein, or getting some water from a well." sought to be recovered.
And, Tolentino continues, even though "this is
4
As the bare allegation of plaintiff’s tolerance of A close assessment of the law and the concept of the
defendant’s occupation of the premises has not been word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore
proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from expressed that such tolerance must be present right
the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
ejectment case should have been for forcible entry — categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer
an action that had already prescribed, however, when — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise
the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
reckoned from the date of defendant’s actual entry into challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that
the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32 right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior
court — provided for in the rules. If one year from the
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed,
considered the owner’s lack of knowledge of the then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the
defendant’s entry of the land to be inconsistent with possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
the allegation that there had been tolerance. relief in the inferior court.

In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required Second, If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is
allegations regarding the grant of permission, but proof allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the
as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the existence result may well be that no action of forcible entry can
of tolerance, but ordered the dismissal of the unlawful really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is
detainer case because the evidence was "totally in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
wanting as to when and under what circumstances xxx demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon plea of
the alleged tolerance came about." It stated that: tolerance to prevent prescription to set in — and
summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion
Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the
were never at all in physical possession of the premises postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and
from the time he started occupying it and continuously unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the
up to the present. For sure, the petitioners merely one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the
derived their alleged prior physical possession only on summary nature of the action.37 (italics supplied)
the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT),
arguing that the issuance of said title presupposes their Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for
having been in possession of the property at one time us to deprive the respondents of possession over a
or another.35 property that they have held for at least eight years
before the case was filed in 1999, by means of a
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases summary proceeding, simply because the petitioner
cannot simply anchor their claims on the validity of the used the word "tolerance" without sufficient allegations
owner’s title. Possession de facto must also be proved. or evidence to support it.
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et
al.,36 we already ruled that a complaint which fails to There was no change in the
positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part respondents’ theory during
indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any the appeal that would amount
showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case to a deprivation of the petitioner’s
for unlawful detainer. As the Court then explained, a right to due process.
case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must
definitely establish its existence from the start of The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never
possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can questioned before the MeTC the fact that their
mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues the
permit it to be filed beyond the required one-year respondents allegedly raised were: (1) the title to the
prescription period from the time of forcible entry: property is spurious; (2) the petitioner’s predecessor is
not the true owner of the property in question; (3) the
petitioner’s lease contract was not legally enforceable;
5
(4) the petitioner was not the real party-in-interest; (5) amended complaint which he even reiterated in his
the petitioner’s predecessor never had prior physical other pleadings.41
possession of the property; and (6) the respondents’
right of possession was based on the "Deed of Although the respondents did not use the word
Assignment of Real Property" executed by Dulfo. The "tolerance" before the MeTC, they have always
respondents raised the issue of tolerance merely on questioned the existence of the petitioner’s tolerance.
appeal before the RTC. They argue that this constitutes In their Answer to Amended Complaint, the
a change of theory, which is disallowed on appeal.38 respondents negated the possibility of their possession
of the property under the petitioner and his lessor’s
It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory tolerance when the respondents alleged to have
of the case or his cause of action on appeal. Points of occupied the premises even before the lessor acquired
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the the property in 1991. They said as much in their
attention of the lower court will not be considered by Position Paper:
the reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the
answer cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical
nature of the issue in the case. To do so would be unfair possession of his supposed property, as when he
to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to became an owner of the 1,919 square meters property
present evidence in connection with the new theory; described in TCT No. 52594, the property had already
this would offend the basic rules of due process and fair been occupied by herein DEFENDANTS since late 1970.
play.39 Therefore, DEFENDANTS were already
occupants/possessors of the property from where they
While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory are being ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed LESSEE
on appeal, this rule is not applicable to the present of a property with a dubious title. The main thing to be
case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the action due the proven in the case at bar is prior possession and that
petitioner’s failure to allege and prove the essential the same was lost through force, intimidation, threat,
requirements of an unlawful detainer case. In strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to
Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao,40 we held that: restore possession regardless of title or even ownership
xxx. In the case at bar, neither RODOLFO CHUA SING nor
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the herein PLAINTIFF ever had any actual physical
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is possession of the property where DEFENDANTS have
necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show already possessed for more than ten (10) years in 1991
such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly when RODOLFO CHUA SING got his fake title to the
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide property.42 (citation omitted)
a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the In addition, whether or not it was credible, the
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the respondent’s claim that their possession was based on
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts the Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in behalf of
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the estate of Domingo de Ocampo, shows that they
where it does not state how entry was effected or how considered the petitioner and his lessor as strangers to
and when dispossession started, the remedy should any of their transactions on the property, and could not
either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. have stayed there upon the latter’s permission.
(emphasis ours; italics supplied)
We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been
Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, directly raised by the respondents before the RTC, the
the petitioner was required to properly allege and prove petitioner still failed to address it before the RTC, the
when the respondents entered the property and that it Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court.43 At best, he
was the petitioner or his predecessors, not any other belatedly states for the first time in his
persons, who granted the respondents permission to Memorandum44 before this Court that his lessor had
enter and occupy the property. Furthermore, it was not tolerated the respondents’ occupancy of the lot,
the respondents’ defense that proved fatal to the case without addressing the respondents’ allegation that
but the petitioner’s contradictory statements in his they had occupied the lot in 1970, before the
6
petitioner’s lessor became the owner of the property in de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and
1991, and without providing any other details. His forcible entry cases are not processes to determine
pleadings continued to insist on the existence of actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the
tolerance without providing the factual basis for this issue of ownership is made only to resolve the issue of
conclusion. Thus, we cannot declare that the Court of possession, and is therefore inconclusive.47 Because they
Appeals had in anyway deprived the petitioner of due only resolve issues of possession de facto, ejectment
process or had unfairly treated him when it resolved the actions are summary in nature, while accion publiciana
case based on the issue of tolerance. (for the recovery of possession) and accion
reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are
The Court cannot treat an ejectment plenary actions.48
case as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria. The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer to be decided in summary
The petitioner argues that assuming this case should proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and
have been filed as an accion publiciana or accion expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal
reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the case, possessor of property from unjustly taking and
as requiring him to properly refile the case serves no continuing his possession during the long period it
other ends than to comply with technicalities.45 would take to properly resolve the issue of possession
de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the
The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented maintenance of peace and order in the community;
before the MeTC in an ejectment case and decide it as otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. These might take the law in his hands and seize the property
cases are not interchangeable and their differences by force and violence.49 An ejectment case cannot be a
constitute far more than mere technicalities. substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of
determining rights of possession or ownership. Citing
In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action Mediran v. Villanueva,50 the Court in Gonzaga v. Court of
for forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion Appeals51 describes in detail how these two remedies
publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor. We should be used:
find these same reasons also applicable to an unlawful
detainer case which bears the same relevant In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and
characteristics: detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person
who in fact has actual possession; and in case of
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve
entry can be treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to
negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction
publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed within upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that
one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real the person who has first acquired possession should
property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the remain in possession pending the decision; and the
unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second, parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a
forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to petty warfare over the possession of the property which
the physical possession of the real property; in accion is the subject of dispute.
publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better
right to possession over the real property. Third, an To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual
action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial security and disturbing to social order. Therefore,
1âwphi1

court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a
is a plenary action in the RTC. [italics supplied] piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership
against the party actually in possession, it is incumbent
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of
in an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by
ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior invading the property and excluding the actual
court to recover physical possession only or possession possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of
7
instituting an action to try the property right. [italics
supplied]

Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and

later consider them as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to simply
file ejectment cases instead of plenary actions. Courts
would then decide in summary proceedings cases which
the rules intend to be resolved through full-blown trials.
Because these "summary" proceedings will have to
tackle complicated issues requiring extensive proof,
they would no longer be expeditious and would no
longer serve the purpose for which they were created.
Indeed, we cannot see how the resulting congestion of
cases, the hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and the
utter lack of system would assist the courts in
protecting and preserving property rights.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the

Court of Appeals' decision dated March 14, 2005 and
resolution dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
80116.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice