Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A.

Bellis, et al

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife
(whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two (2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven
surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of
their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his
Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights

RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article
10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his
national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes,
is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the national
law of the deceased.

Acain v. IAC (1987)

Facts:

On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the RTC of Cebu City, a petition for the probate of the
will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to Acain of letters testamentary. When Nemesio died, he left a will in which
Acain and his siblings were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner without
objection raised by private respondents. Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case Segundo
pre-deceas

es Nemesio, Segundo’s children

would then succeed. After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez, legally adopted daughter of
Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: for the petitioner has no legal
capacity to institute these proceedings; he is merely a universal heir and the Rosa and Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion
was denied. After the denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC granted the private respondents' petition and ordered the TC to dismiss
the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio. His MR having been denied, Acain filed this present petition for the review
of IAC’s decision.

Issues:
1. Whether private respondents have been preterited. No for the widow, yes for Fernandez.

2. Whether Acain has legal standing to intervene in the probate proceedings. No.

**3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority. No.

Ratio/Held:

1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, there is no preterition, for she is not in the direct line. However, the same cannot be said for Fernandez. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator. Neither can it be denied that she was
not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the Fernandez. The universal institution of Acain and his
siblings to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will.

2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the
will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who
would be benefited by the estate. Acain, at the outset, appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy
having resulted from the preterition of Fernandez and the universal institution of heirs, Acain is in effect not an heir of the
testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and must then be dismissed.

3. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet
the issue. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents. The petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO vs. ANDRE BRIMO

FACTS: A will of a Turkish testator (Joseph Brimo) provided that his Philippine estate is disposed of in accordance with the
Philippine Law. The testator further provided that whoever fails to comply with this request (that his estate be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law) would forfeit his inheritance.

The Appellant (Andre Brimo), one of the brothers of the deceased Joseph Brimo, opposed the Appellee (Juan Miciano)'s
partition scheme of the estate which denies his participation in the inheritance.

ISSUE: Whether the Turkish Law or Philippine Law be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo's estates. Will Andre Brimo
forfeit his inheritance?

RULING: The court held that the provision of a foreigner's will that his properties shall be distributed according to Philippine law
and not his national law is NOT LEGAL because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 16 of
the civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Testator’s estate shall be distributed according to his national (Turkish) law. He cannot provide otherwise. The appellant's
inheritance will not be forfeited because the provision is not legal.
CLEMENTE CALDE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMO AGAWIN and DOMYAAN APED

Facts:

Decedent (Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang) left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property. She also left a
Last Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil thereto, dated July 24, 1973. Both documents contained the
thumbmarks of decedent. They were also signed by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A.
Tolete, then the Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.

Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province,
Br. 36. 2 He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly substituted by petitioner. Private respondents, relatives
of decedent, opposed the Petitioner filed by Calde, on the following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a
dialect that decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents because of her
advanced age, illness and deafness; that decedent’s thumbmarks were procured through fraud and undue influence; and that
the codicil was not executed in accordance with law.

On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing decedent’s will and its
codicil. The decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals. It held:

The will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of the New Civil Code but for one crucial factor of
discrepancy in the color of ink when the instrumental witnesses affixed their respective signatures. When subjected to cross-
examination, Codcodio Nacnas as witness testified as follows:

Two (2) of the six (6) witnesses testified that only one ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary documents
and were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion. However, on the face of the
document, the signatures of some of the attesting witnesses in the decedent’s will and its codicil were written in blue ink while
the others were in black. In addition, Judge Tomas A. Tolete testified in narration as to how the documents in question were
subscribed and attested, starting from decedent’s thumb-marking thereof, to the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses
thereto in consecutive order.

Issue:

Whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent appellate court erred in concluding that both
decedent’s Last Will and Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on separate occasions.

Held:

Evidence may generally be classified into three (3) kinds, from which a court or tribunal may properly acquire
knowledge for making its decision, namely: real evidence or autoptic preference, testimonial evidence and circumstantial
evidence.

In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by petitioner. Thus, it
was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve petitioner’s claim that both testamentary documents in
question were subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Neither did respondent court err
when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge Tomas A. Tolete since nowhere in Judge Tolete’s testimony is
there any kind of explanation for the different-colored signatures on the testaments. The petition for review is denied. The
Supreme Court affirmed in toto the Decicion of the Court of Appeals.

RABADILLA vs. CA

FACTS:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of
the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla
shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar
and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.

ISSUE: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.

HELD:

Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his
death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily,
the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs
upon his death.

Cruz v. Judge Villasor, G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973

FACTS

The probate of the last will and testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz was opposed by petitioner Agapita on the ground of fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence, and that it was not executed in accordance with law. Of the three instrumental
witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last
named, is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate of a will is valid if one of the three instrumental witnessed is the notary public to whom the
will was acknowledged.

RULING

NO. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect
of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at
least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of
witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been said, that only two
witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.