Napoleon and The Struggle For Germany

Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany
volume ii
The first comprehensive history of the decisive Fall Campaign of 1813, which
determined control of Central Europe following Napoleon’s catastrophic
defeat in Russia the previous year. Using German, French, British, Russian,
Austrian, and Swedish sources, Michael V. Leggiere provides a panoramic
history that covers the full sweep of the struggle in Germany. He shows
how Prussia, the weakest of the great powers, led the struggle against Napo-
leon and his empire. By reconstructing the principal campaigns and operations
in Germany, the book reveals how the defeat of Napoleon in Germany was
made possible by Prussian victories. In particular, it features detailed analysis
of the strategy, military operations, and battles in Germany that culminated
with the epic four-day Battle of Nations at Leipzig and Napoleon’s retreat to
France. This study not only highlights the breakdown of Napoleon’s strategy
in 1813, but also constitutes a fascinating study in coalition warfare, inter-
national relations, and civil–military relations.
Michael V. Leggiere is Professor of History and Deputy Director of the

Military History Center at the University of North Texas.
CAMBRIDGE MILITARY HISTORIES
Edited by
hew strachan Chichele Professor of the History of War, University of
Oxford and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford
geoffrey wawro Professor of Military History and Director of the
Military History Center, University of North Texas
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throughout the ages and throughout the world. Books in the series take a
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militaryhistories
Napoleon and the Struggle for
Germany: The Franco-Prussian
War of 1813
Volume ii
The Defeat of Napoleon
MICHAEL V. LEGGIERE
University of North Texas
University Printing House, Cambridge cb2 8bs, United Kingdom
Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107080546
# Michael V. Leggiere 2015
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2015
Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd. Padstow Cornwall
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data
Leggiere, Michael V., 1969–
Napoleon and the struggle for Germany : The Franco-Prussian War of 1813 ;
The War of Liberation, Spring 1813 / Michael V. Leggiere, University of North Texas.
page cm. – (Cambridge military histories)
isbn 978-1-107-08054-6 (Hardback) – isbn 978-1-107-43975-7 (Paperback)
1. Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815–Campaigns–Germany.
2. Wars of Liberation, 1813-1814–Campaigns–Germany. 3. Napoleon I, Emperor of the
French, 1769-1821–Military leadership. 4. France. Armée. Grande Armée–History.
5. France–History, Military–1789-1815. I. Title.
dc236.l443 2015
940.20 740943–dc23 2014022386
isbn 978-1-107-08054-6 Hardback
isbn 978-1-107-43975-7 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication,
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
For my little man,
Nicholas Thomas Leggiere
Contents
List of figures page ix

List of maps xi
Preface xiii
Introduction 1
1 Trachenberg and Reichenbach 22
2 The Silesian Army 72
3 “The infamous conduct of the Prussians” 125
4 Löwenberg 165
5 Goldberg 199
6 The Katzbach 235
7 Blücher’s hare hunt 287
8 “Nothing more remains than to have them shot dead” 345
9 Lusatia 399
10 The Middle Elbe 451
11 The Mulde 499
12 Hide and seek 547
13 Opening round 585
14 “A battle of the most obstinate and sanguinary class” 624
15 Leipzig 685
vii
viii Contents
16 Race to the Rhine 759

Assessment 804
Bibliography 832
Index 843
Figures
1 Field-Marshal Prince Karl Philipp zu Schwarzenberg, 1771–1820 page 24

2 Johann Josef Wenzel Anton Franz Karl Count Radetzky von
Radetz, 1766–1858 28
3 Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, Charles XIV John of Sweden,
1763–1844 40
4 Field-Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, 1742–1819 73
5 General August Wilhelm Antonius Neidhardt von Gneisenau,
1760–1831 75
6 Marshal Michel Ney, 1769–1815 158
7 The three Allied monarchs at Prague, August 1813 200
8 2nd Battalion of the 1st East Prussian Infantry Regiment at
Goldberg, 23 August 1813 208
9 Prince Carl of Mecklenburg at Goldberg, 23 August 1813 209
10 Marshal Étienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald,
1765–1840 236
11 Blücher at the battle of the Katzbach, 26 August 1813 263
12 French lancers marauding 296
13 The destruction of Puthod’s division on 27 August 1813 307
14 The three Allied monarchs at the Festival of Thanks for the
victories at Großbeeren, the Katzbach, and Kulm, Teplitz,
2 September 1813 370
15 Russian Cossacks attacking a French soldier 379
16 General Yorck at Wartenburg, 3 October 1813 478
17 Combat at Wartenburg, 3 October 1813 482
18 Schwarzenberg’s victory report to the three Allied monarchs,
Leipzig, 18 October 1813 726
ix
x List of figures
19 Pursuing the French into Leipzig’s inner city, 19 October 1813 739
20 Allied forces storming Leipzig, 19 October 1813 741
21 Fighting before Leipzig’s Peters Gate, 19 October 1813 744
22 Napoleon after the battle of Leipzig 763
All illustrations reproduced courtesy of Anne S. K. Brown

Military Collection, Brown University Library
Maps
1 The theater of war, 1813 page 16

2 Region between the Queis and the Katzbach Rivers 17
3 Situation, 19 August 1813 18
4 Region between the Spree and the Elbe Rivers 19
5 Region between the Black Elster and the Saale Rivers 20
6 Region between the Mulde and the Saale Rivers 21
7 Neutral zone in Silesia 74
8 Crossing the neutral zone 135
9 Engagement at Löwenberg, 21 August 1813 177
11 Engagement at Goldberg, 23 August 1813 202
12 The battle of the Katzbach, 26 August 1813 239
16 Region between the Bober and the Neiße Rivers 330
18 Region between the Neiße and the Spree Rivers 348
19 Saxon–Bohemian theater of war 373
20 Situation, 9 September 1813 386
21 Situation, 12 September 1813 408
22 Engagement at Wartenburg, 3 October 1813 473
23 Situation, 8 October 1813 534
24 Battle of Leipzig, southern front, 16 October 1813 628
25 Battle of Leipzig, northern front, 16 October 1813 635
26 Battle of Leipzig, 18 October 1813 700
27 Battle of Leipzig, 19 October 1813 731
28 Region between the Elster and the Rhine Rivers 767
xi
Preface
This seven-year project has been greatly assisted by many dear friends and
colleagues who gave limitless support, shared their research, and focused early
drafts. Alexander Mikaberidze is a friend like no other: for years he has not
merely graciously provided me with Russian sources, but he also translates
them; I am deeply indebted to Alex. His help in canvassing Russia’s archival
collection as well as his insight have greatly improved this work. Other dear
friends such as Rick Schneid, Huw Davies, Jack Gill, Dennis Showalter,
Jeremy Black, Chuck White, and Peter Hofschröer have provided endless
support, inspiration, and assistance. I must also convey my deepest appreci-
ation to Peter Harrington of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection at
Brown University for providing all the artwork that accompanies the text on
the shortest notice. At Cambridge University Press, I wish to thank Hew
Strachan for his support, Michael Watson for his patience and understanding,
and especially for granting me the opportunity to present the 1813 campaign
in two volumes, Rosalyn Scott and Rachel Cox for seeing the manuscript
through production, and Karen Anderson Howes for being the superb copy-
editor for both volumes on 1813. At the University of North Texas, I am
indebted to the Department of History, the Military History Center, and the
College of Arts and Sciences for their generous financial support. Behind all
three is my chairman, colleague, and friend, Rick McCaslin, who has been a
steady source of support and encouragement. I am fortunate to work with two
of the foremost military historians in the world: Geoff Wawro and Rob
Citino. Both set the standard extremely high but their steadfast advice and
encouragement are boundless. I especially want to thank Geoff for his friend-
ship, confidence, and support. Last but not least, I thank my graduate students
for their patience when they found the door to my office closed: Jon Abel,
Chad Tomaselli, Jordan Hayworth, Nate Jarrett, Casey Baker, and Eric Smith.
xiii
xiv Preface
I must thank the Sixth Count Bülow von Dennewitz, Hasso, for provid-
ing a constant stream of documents and information. I offer special thanks to
Bertrand Fonck as well as the staff of the Service historique de l’armée de
terre at Vincennes for patiently handling my requests to exceed the daily
limit of cartons. I also express my gratitude to the helpful staff of Berlin’s
Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz for producing repositoria
from the former German General Staff archive previously thought to have
been lost during the Second World War. I express my sincere gratitude to my
mentor, Donald D. Horward, for seeing the potential in me, releasing it, and
stopping me from making the mistake of attending law school. My wife of
sixteen years and companion of more than twenty, Michele, has always been
my source of strength. Our beautiful children, Jordyn and Nicholas, have
likewise endured countless hours of having to entertain themselves while
I was writing. Finally, I wish to thank my mother, Rosalie, who is always a
source of solid support. Many others have contributed in many ways. To
them: thanks and an apology for any omission. Whatever merits this work
has are due in part to their contributions; whatever faults may lie here are
those of the author.
In the text, I employ native, modern spellings of villages, towns, smaller
cities, and geographic features as much as possible. Larger cities, capitals,
and rivers are Anglicized. I also provide at first mention the modern Polish,
Russian, Lithuanian, and Czech names of population centers and geographic
features in regions that once belonged to Prussia or Austria. Names of
persons are likewise native, except for monarchs, whose names are Angli-
cized. To avoid confusion, all general officers are referred to simply as
“general.” Lastly, I use “imperials” to refer to the French and their allies
after 1804.
Introduction
After losing 500,000 soldiers in Russia between June and December 1812,
Napoleon started rebuilding his army in early 1813 to stop the Russians in
Germany. At the end of 1812, Tsar Alexander I of Russia made the momentous
decision to continue his war with Napoleon and drive the French from Central
Europe. The destruction of the Grande Armée of 1812 provided Alexander
with an opportunity to build a Russian-dominated coalition to liberate Europe.
Russian pressure forced the French to fall back from the Vistula (Wisła) River
and then across the Oder (Odra) River to Berlin by mid February 1813.
Hoping to stop the pursuing Russians before they could step foot onto
German soil, Napoleon looked to his ally, King Frederick William III
of Prussia, for assistance. As Eugène de Beauharnais, the viceroy of Italy
and commander of imperial forces on the eastern front, surrendered land for
time, direct negotiations between the Russians and Prussians commenced.
With two-thirds of Prussia occupied by Napoleon’s forces, Frederick
William made the bold decision to break the French alliance and join the
Russians to form the Sixth Coalition. Negotiations culminated on 28 Febru-
ary 1813 with the signing of the Treaty of Kalisch: the much-anticipated
Russo-Prussian military alliance. The Prussians agreed to field an army of
80,000 men to assist a Russian contingent of 150,000; both states pledged not
to make a separate peace with Napoleon. The British did their part to bolster
the new coalition by promptly dispatching arms and ammunition to the
Baltic for use by the Russians and Prussians. Alexander also hoped for an
Austrian alliance in early 1813 but Austria’s foreign minister, the adroit
Klemens von Metternich, feared Russian success would be accompanied
by Russian territorial expansion. With Alexander’s armies approaching
Central Europe, the Austrians declared neutrality.
For Napoleon, 1813 brought a fresh series of challenges. As French
forces in the east steadily retreated, his political-military situation likewise
1
2 Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany, vol. II
deteriorated. Failure in Russia not only resulted in the loss of the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw, but also threatened French control of Germany, which
Napoleon had organized into the Confederation of the Rhine in 1806. As
Napoleon’s prestige plummeted, German nationalists called for a Befreiung-
skrieg, a war of liberation, against French hegemony. Prussia’s declaration of
war only added to the complex set of problems that confronted Napoleon.
Austria stood as an armed neutral, endeavoring to mediate between Napo-
leon and his enemies. Despite the dynastic ties between France and Austria
due to the marriage between Napoleon and Marie Louise, the daughter of
Kaiser Francis I, the Austrians could not be trusted.
The burden of waging war in Central Europe fell on Tsar Alexander in the
early stage of the contest. Russia’s frontline army, likewise devastated by the
winter campaign in 1812, consisted of 51,745 tired soldiers, 12,283 Cossacks,
and 439 guns when it crossed the Prussian frontier. Reinforcements, not
expected to reach the front until the beginning of April, amounted to
12,674 men, 2,307 Cossacks, and 48 guns. Russian second-line troops –
56,776 men, 9,989 Cossacks, and 319 guns – besieged French-controlled
fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula Rivers. A reserve of 48,100 men had
yet to depart from Russia. As for the Russian High Command, it had been
divided for some time. While Tsar Alexander fashioned himself as the liber-
ator of Germany, Russian commander in chief General Mikhail Kutuzov
opposed carrying the war into Central Europe to emancipate the same
countries that had supported Napoleon’s bid to conquer Russia. Other
Russian commanders expressed concerns over their tenuous lines of commu-
nication. This boded well for the French, for crushing the Russian army in
battle amid so much disagreement would certainly put the Russians to flight,
similar to the 1805 campaign.
Of the 600,000 men and 1,300 guns of the Grande Armée of 1812, only
93,000 men and 250 pieces returned. Of the 93,000, more than half were
Austrians and Prussians. Undaunted by such catastrophic and unpreced-
ented losses, Napoleon planned to have 656,000 men mobilized by June of
1813. For leadership, the emperor transferred experienced noncommis-
sioned officers from his armies in Spain to the new units. In a little more
than four months, Napoleon’s unrivaled organizational skills produced the
140,000-strong Army of the Main. Together with Eugene’s Army of the
Elbe, imperial forces amounted to almost 200,000 men by the end of April.
With the French having lost 180,000 horses in Russia, critical deficiencies
remained in the cavalry; this robbed the army not only of its shock tactics,
but also of its eyes and ears. Napoleon adequately replaced the losses
sustained in Russia, but draft horses remained in short supply. Reflective
of the army itself, the French officer corps in 1813 contained strengths and
weaknesses. In the senior ranks, the Russian campaign had taken its toll on
the aging marshalate. However, one asset remained: the army’s field-grade
Introduction 3
officers, most of whom were battle-hardened veterans. Nevertheless, the

Grande Armée of 1813 lacked many of the tactical attributes of previous
French armies, which in turn placed strategic and operational limitations on
Napoleon.
Several factors hampered Prussian mobilization in January and February
1813. French troops still occupied half of the country and held all of
Prussia’s significant fortresses. Tedious negotiations with the Russians also
slowed the process. Concentration of the field army, scheduled to begin on
12 February, had to be postponed until the formation of the Coalition. After
creating the alliance at Kalisch, the mobilization continued at an accelerated
pace and culminated with the 17 March 1813 decrees creating a national
Landwehr (militia). Aside from a few battalions, the militia would not be
ready for field service until August. At the beginning of the war, the Prussian
regular army consisted of 127,394 men and 269 guns. Of this figure, only
65,675 men had received sufficient training to be utilized in the field; only
half of Prussia’s armed forces were trained regulars or reservists.
During initial operations, the Allies liberated Berlin with their northern
army of 30,000 Prussians and 18,000 Russians commanded by Russian
general Ludwig Adolph zu Wittgenstein, while Prussian general Gebhard
Leberecht von Blücher’s 26,000 Prussians and 10,500 Russians took the
Saxon capital of Dresden with the Coalition’s smaller southern army. Behind
these two armies followed the Allied commander in chief, Kutuzov, with the
Russian main army and reserve. After clearing Berlin, Wittgenstein drove
southwest through a detachment of the French Army of the Elbe at Möck-
ern near Magdeburg on 5 April, allowing for his union with Blücher east of
the Saale River in the vicinity of Leipzig. Following Kutuzov’s death on
28 April 1813, Tsar Alexander named Wittgenstein Allied commander
in chief.
The appearance of Allied forces in Saxony in late March prompted
Napoleon to concentrate his forces on the left bank of the Saale River
throughout April. The emperor began his counteroffensive on 30 April by
leading 120,000 men across the Saale to confront the Allied army near
Leipzig. Reports of French movements indicated that the emperor would
converge on Leipzig in two columns: Eugene’s Army of the Elbe marching
southeast from Magdeburg and Napoleon’s Army of the Main due east from
Weißenfels. The Allies resolved to attack.
Approximately 88,000 Russians and Prussians with 552 guns prepared to
engage Napoleon’s army of 145,000 men and 372 guns. Although Napoleon
possessed fewer total guns, he had more heavy batteries than the Allies,
which granted the French artillery an advantage in range and effectiveness.
Early on 2 May 1813, the Allied army advanced southeast to northwest in
the hope of smashing through the imperial armies as they moved east.
Wittgenstein opened the battle of Lützen by having the Prussian II Corps
attack a supposed French rearguard holding the quadrilateral of villages

immediately north of the Allied army: Großgörschen, Kleingörschen,
Rahna, and Kaja. This French force turned out to be Napoleon’s massive
III Corps. Although surprised by the Allies, Napoleon quickly recovered
and ordered a double-envelopment. After eight hours of brutal fighting, his
enveloping forces reached their positions. With both flanks threatened,
Wittgenstein ordered a retreat.
The 2 May 1813 battle of Lützen proved extremely bloody. Prussia’s
new army shouldered the weight of the engagement and paid dearly in its
debut, losing 8,400 men. In addition, Gerhard von Scharnhorst received the
wound that took his life on 28 June. Russian losses are not known, but can
be estimated at 3,000 casualties. Imperial forces lost some 22,000 combatants
and 5 guns. Operationally, the battle of Lützen again demonstrated
Napoleon’s supremacy. His ability to move units to the battlefield where
and when they were needed to deliver maximum combat power remained
unrivaled. Indeed, on 2 May, the Sixth Coalition came within hours of being
destroyed by a double-envelopment that would have been so crushing it
would have ended the war.
Following Lützen, the shortage of cavalry prevented Napoleon from
unleashing a deadly pursuit to annihilate the Allies and make his victory
decisive. Therefore, he hoped an operation in North Germany would create
strategic opportunities that had thus far eluded him in Saxony. On 4 May,
Napoleon directed Marshal Michel Ney to the Elbe fortress of Torgau,
which, along with Wittenberg, provided the gateway to Berlin and North
Germany. Ney’s army eventually numbered 84,300 men, while Napoleon
commanded 119,000. Napoleon knew that Ney’s march to Torgau would
signal to the Allies the start of a French offensive against Berlin. He hoped
this would prompt the Prussians to separate from the Russians and march
north to save their capital. Similar to his First Italian Campaign, he would
then execute a manoeuvre sur position centrale to destroy the Prussians and
Russians in succession.
Meanwhile, Wittgenstein retreated to the Spree River, where he placed
the Allied army in a commanding position just east of the river and the town
of Bautzen. The imperials followed slowly and cautiously, engaging in
almost daily combat with Wittgenstein’s rearguard. Instead of effecting a
split among the Allies, Napoleon found his adversaries in a fortified position
around Bautzen and along the Spree River. Although the emperor intended
to engage the Allies at Bautzen and still move against Berlin with a portion
of Ney’s army, the marshal mistakenly brought his entire army south to join
the battle.
Napoleon issued orders to attack the Allied left wing and center at
Bautzen on 20 May. While his Guard, IV, VI, XI, and XII Corps fixed the
Allies, Ney’s III, V, VII, and II Corps would swing southeast to envelop the
Introduction 5
Allied right. By nightfall on the 21st, he planned to have 144,000 combatants

on the battlefield facing 96,000 Coalition soldiers. To facilitate Ney’s oper-
ation against the Allied right flank, Napoleon sought to deceive the Allies
into thinking he intended to turn their left. Napoleon spent the morning of
20 May 1813 moving his pieces around the board to increase Allied concern
over the left wing. Although Wittgenstein did not fall for the ruse, Alexander
did. Ignoring Wittgenstein’s objections, Alexander transferred his few
reserves to the left wing. Having had enough of being ignored, Wittgenstein
napped under a tree. Around noon, French artillery blasted the Allied
positions while IV, VI, XI, and XII Corps advanced east across the Spree.
Combat lasted until 8:30 that night. Altogether the Allies lost some 1,400
Russians and 500 Prussians; French losses are not known. The engagement
on the 20th won Napoleon the keys to Wittgenstein’s forward position: the
city of Bautzen and the crossings over the Spree north and south of the
town. By pinning the Allies and deceiving them over the point of his attack,
the emperor attained basic objectives through the simplest of means.
Napoleon resumed the offensive by attacking the Allied left at dawn on
21 May. Around 11:00 a.m., he directed his VI Corps to move against the
Allied center. Around 2:00 p.m., two divisions of IV Corps crossed the river
and prepared to assault the Allied right on the Kreckwitz heights from the
west. One hour later, Ney mistakenly turned southwest to storm the Kreck-
witz heights from the east instead of proceeding southeast to sever
Wittgenstein’s only line of retreat. As imperial forces closed on the right
of the Allied position from the west, north, and east, Tsar Alexander
reluctantly agreed to break off the battle.
Allied losses on the second day of Bautzen are estimated to be 10,850
men. By comparison, French losses reached 22,500 men including 3,700
missing. Napoleon could not interpret the battle of Bautzen as anything
but a disappointment. Fortunately for the Allies, the compulsive Ney could
not turn away from the Kreckwitz heights. Had Ney followed orders, the
war quite conceivably could have ended with both Alexander and Frederick
William being taken prisoner. Ney’s blunder could not have been more
fortuitous for the Allies and therefore disappointing for Napoleon.
Retreating to Silesia in the aftermath of Bautzen, the Coalition experi-
enced a crisis just when it appeared that Austria would join the alliance
against Napoleon. Prior to Bautzen, an Austrian envoy, the anti-French
former foreign minister Johann Philipp von Stadion, met with Prussian
chancellor Karl von Hardenberg and the de facto Russian foreign minister,
Karl Robert Nesselrode, to discuss the Coalition’s peace terms. More
importantly for the Allies, he announced that Kaiser Francis would decide
for either war or neutrality by 1 June. Consequently, Stadion came prepared
to engage the Allies in serious military planning in the event his master chose
war against Napoleon. He shared a memo drafted in Vienna on 10 May by
General Jan Josef Václav Radetzky von Radetz, the chief of staff of the
Austrian army assembling in Bohemia. The memo presupposed that Austria
would join the Sixth Coalition and wage war against the French Empire.
Regardless of the whereabouts of the main Allied army, Radetzky declared
that Napoleon would fall on the Austrian army with his main force as soon
as Francis declared war on him.1
Acknowledging Radetzky’s views, the Russians and Prussians drafted the
Wurschen Plan for future combined operations. The blueprint strongly
emphasized unprecedented communication, cooperation, and understanding
between the Austrian and Russo-Prussian armies. Both would take a position
facing one of Napoleon’s flanks. Whichever Allied army he did not target
would immediately take the offensive against him. When drafting his memo,
Radetzky had envisioned the theater of war being somewhere between the
Saale and the Elbe Rivers. However, by the time Stadion delivered the memo,
the Allies had already abandoned the Elbe and had prepared to accept a
second battle with Napoleon on the Spree. If the Russo-Prussian army were
forced to retreat across the Oder, the Wurschen Plan called for it to remain
close to the Austrians by hugging the Bohemian frontier and leaning on the
Riesengebirge (Karkonosze), part of the Sudetes Mountain system. If pressed
by Napoleon, the Allied army could maintain contact with Austria by
moving into one of the entrenched positions in Silesia such as Schweidnitz
(Świdnica). Thus, the Wurschen Plan signaled the Coalition’s recognition that
unreserved, close collaboration with Austria would be the primary objective
of future operations.2
After being named Allied commander in chief on 26 May 1813, Russian
general Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly rejected the Wurschen Plan out of
concern over the condition of the Russian army. Instead of placing the Allied
army in a position to immediately cooperate with the Austrians, Barclay
advocated a retreat across the Oder and into Poland for a six-week hiatus for
rest and reorganization. The Prussians could either follow or face Napoleon
on their own. However, Tsar Alexander imposed his will on Barclay,
ordering the retreat to turn southeast toward Schweidnitz in south-central
Silesia. Not only did Alexander spare Frederick William from having to
make a very difficult decision, but the Russian monarch also maintained the
Wurschen Plan’s implied commitment to cooperate with Austria. Thanks to
Alexander, the signing of the armistice on 4 June found the Russo-Prussian
army still west of the Oder, a crucial factor for a partnership with the
Austrians. Alexander’s devotion to the Wurschen Plan along with Napo-
leon’s inability to drive the Allies across the Oder opened the door for
unprecedented collaboration with the Austrians.
As for Napoleon, despite defeating the Allies at Lützen and Bautzen,
decisive victory eluded him mainly because he lacked cavalry to exploit his
success. After pursuing the Allied army into Silesia, Napoleon failed to
Introduction 7
maneuver it into a third battle. By late May 1813, marauding and straggling
in the Grande Armée had increased to epic proportions. With 90,000 men on
the sick list, the emperor realized he had pushed his army beyond exhaus-
tion. Although not the ultimate factor in Napoleon’s decision to accept an
Austrian proposal for an armistice, these ugly indicators as well as the
realization that he simply could not substitute infantry for cavalry and
expect to win a decisive victory led him to open negotiations with the
Prussians and Russians. An Austrian proposal to prolong a temporary
armistice to 20 July was signed at Pläswitz in Silesia on 4 June and eventually
extended to 17 August.
The Armistice of Pläswitz saw the failure of Austria’s attempts to mediate
a peace between Napoleon and the Allies. After Austria declared in favor of
the Coalition, the Allies finalized their plans to field three multinational
armies. The 42-year-old Austrian general Karl Philipp zu Schwarzenberg
received command of all Allied forces, including the main army – the Army
of Bohemia – which consisted of 220,000 Austrians, Prussians, and Russians.
Blücher commanded the Army of Silesia – 105,000 Russians and Prussians –
while the former French marshal, Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, took command
of the Army of North Germany – 140,000 Prussians, Russians, Swedes,
and North Germans. A fourth Allied army, General Levin August von
Bennigsen’s Army of Poland, was expected to reach Silesia in September.
The Allies created these multinational armies both to prevent Napoleon from
defeating them piecemeal, and to limit politically motivated acts of national
self-interest.
For operations, the Russians and Prussians accepted the Austrian-
authored Reichenbach Plan as the Coalition’s operational doctrine.
According to it, the three Allied armies would form a wide arc around
French forces in Saxony and Silesia and engage only detached enemy corps:
pitched battles with Napoleon would be avoided. Should the emperor
concentrate against any one army, it would retreat, while the other two
attacked his flanks and communications. As Napoleon could personally
command only one army at a time and thus could directly challenge only
one Allied army at a time, the other two Allied armies would attack his
flanks and lines of communication, while the threatened army refused battle
but induced the emperor to pursue, thus extending and exposing his line of
operation. The plan aimed to split and exhaust French forces. Although
Napoleon had the advantage of interior lines, he would be forced to fight
against armies advancing simultaneously against his center, flanks, and
communications.
To cover his base of operations at Dresden, maintain his mastery of the
Elbe River, and capitalize on the enemy’s mistakes, Napoleon assembled his
forces in three groups. In the center, the Grande Armée (I, IV, and V Cavalry
Corps, Guard, and I, II, VI, and XIV Corps) stood between Bautzen and
Görlitz. On his left in Silesia, he posted III, V, and XI Corps and II Cavalry
Corps under Ney’s command. After the expiration of the armistice, he
wanted his center to march west to Silesia and unite with his left. This would
enable him to concentrate his left and center – almost 270,000 infantry and
30,000 cavalry – to oppose what he believed to be the Coalition’s main army
of 200,000 Russians and Prussians in Silesia. Based on the actions of the
Allies in May, Napoleon counted on them accepting battle in Silesia, where
he planned to decisively defeat them before the Austrians could launch a
serious operation against Dresden. Meanwhile, on his right wing, the IV,
VII, and XII Corps and III Cavalry Corps of Marshal Nicolas Oudinot’s
Army of Berlin supported by Marshal Nicolas Davout’s XIII Corps coming
from Hamburg would conduct an offensive against the Prussian capital.
After defeating the Coalition’s Army of North Germany, Napoleon
planned for the Army of Berlin to liberate the besieged imperial garrisons
along the Oder River and advance to the Vistula, wheeling behind the Allied
army in Silesia, which itself would be retreating eastward after being
defeated by the emperor. Should Bernadotte somehow check the Army of
Berlin, Napoleon could easily shift forces from the Silesian theater to
Brandenburg to complete the work.
After learning that the Allies had actually assembled their main army in
Bohemia, Napoleon still planned to destroy Blücher’s Army of Silesia, thus
removing its threat to the rear of both his Grande Armée in Saxony and
Oudinot’s Army of Berlin. Although he did not know where Schwarzenberg
would lead the Army of Bohemia, Napoleon decided to march against
Blücher, defeat him, and then rush back to Dresden. As for Blücher, from
15 to 20 August 1813 he chased Ney’s forces westward from the banks of the
Katzbach River to Bunzlau on the Bober River. Napoleon likewise reached
the Bober on the 20th, attacking Blücher on the 21st. Complying with the
Reichenbach Plan, Blücher retreated eastward for the next four days. Mean-
while, Schwarzenberg led the Bohemian Army across the Saxon frontier on
22 August en route to Dresden. With Blücher running, Napoleon’s attention
immediately switched to Saxony. On the night of 22/23 August, he issued
orders for the Guard, VI Corps, and I Cavalry Corps to return to Dresden.
With the forces that remained in Silesia (III, V, and XI Corps and II Cavalry
Corps – 100,000 men, according to Napoleon’s calculations), he formed the
Army of the Bober commanded by Marshal Étienne Jacques Macdonald.
Always seeking a decisive victory, Napoleon welcomed Schwarzenberg’s
advance on Dresden as an opportunity rather than a setback. He planned to
concentrate 200,000 men at Dresden to confront the Army of Bohemia.
Little did Napoleon know that, as he made these plans, Bernadotte’s Army
of North Germany was holding its ground eleven miles south of Berlin
at the battle of Großbeeren on 23 August 1813. Again shouldering the
brunt of the combat, the Prussians suffered losses amounting to more than
Introduction 9
1,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Imperial casualties numbered more than
3,000 men and 14 guns. Despite the low body count, Oudinot ordered a
headlong retreat that did not stop until his army reached the safety of
Wittenberg on the Elbe. The Coalition’s victory at Großbeeren saved Berlin
and provided much-needed confidence for the Prussians.
Back in Silesia, Macdonald eagerly prepared to move against Blücher’s
suspected position east of the Katzbach River on 26 August. Meanwhile,
Blücher, assuming Napoleon had departed for Dresden, likewise ordered
his army to resume the offensive. On that day, the Army of the Bober
collided with the Army of the Silesia along the banks of the Katzbach
River. In a heavy downpour, the Allies repulsed the imperials, losing fewer
than 1,000 men. Macdonald’s losses on the 26th are not known, but his
army suffered acute attrition during the ensuing retreat west to Saxony. By
1 September 1813, the Army of the Bober had lost 30,000 men and 103 guns.
Meanwhile, the Bohemian Army moved across the Saxon frontier on
22 August and stormed the imperial camp at Pirna on the 23rd. As the Silesian
Army engaged the Army of the Bober on the 26th, Schwarzenberg assailed
Dresden. In the midst of the engagement, Napoleon unexpectedly arrived
with the Guard to repel Schwarzenberg’s assault. During the night, II and VI
Corps came up, increasing Napoleon’s combatants to 135,000 men against
215,000 Allied soldiers. Continuing the battle on the 27th, Napoleon
enveloped Schwarzenberg’s left, crushing two Austrian corps. With the
French also steadily working around his right, Schwarzenberg ordered a
retreat. The Army of Bohemia withdrew after losing 38,000 killed, wounded,
and captured along with 40 guns. Although the imperials sustained far fewer
casualties (10,000), decisive victory again eluded Napoleon. Despite his
having adequate cavalry, illness forced the emperor to leave the field rather
than personally direct the pursuit.
In the aftermath of Dresden, General Dominique Vandamme’s I Corps
followed by XIV and VI Corps led the pursuit. On the 29th, Vandamme
caught one of Schwarzenberg’s Russian corps at Kulm, thirty-five miles
south of Dresden and just inside the Bohemian frontier. Neither side gained
an advantage despite savage fighting. With the battle continuing on the
30th, Schwarzenberg’s Prussian II Corps attacked Vandamme’s rear as the
Russians pushed against his front and an Austrian corps enveloped his left.
With XIV and VI Corps too distant to support, Vandamme attempted but
failed to drive through the Prussians. Imperial losses on 29 and 30 August
amounted to 25,000 killed, wounded, and captured along with 82 guns;
Allied casualties numbered 11,000 men.
Following the defeats at Großbeeren, the Katzbach, and Kulm,
Napoleon considered either an offensive against Prague or another march
on Berlin for his next step. Both projects sacrificed the principle of annihi-
lating the main enemy army, which would have provided the most direct
means of achieving total victory. Rather than a decisive battle with one of
the three Allied armies, geographic objectives dominated the emperor’s
planning. Rejecting the Prague offensive, Napoleon returned to the capture
of Berlin. A victory over the Army of North Germany and the timid
Bernadotte appeared certain. Therefore, the emperor decided to allow the
Army of Bohemia to recover after its drubbing at Dresden while he person-
ally commanded the march on Berlin. He planned to lead 30,000 men from
Dresden, unite with the Army of Berlin, and resume the operation against
the Prussian capital.
Thanks to Blücher, Napoleon never executed the Berlin offensive as
planned. Due to events in southeast Saxony, he neither marched north nor
provided reinforcements for the Army of Berlin. Blücher’s pressure on
Macdonald’s beleaguered Army of the Bober required Napoleon’s personal
intervention. Ney, who replaced Oudinot as commander of the Army of
Berlin on 3 September, never received word of the emperor’s change of
plans. Therefore, when he began his operation on the 4th, he ordered the
Army of Berlin to march eastward to unite with Napoleon, who, according
to Ney’s information, would reach Luckau on 6 September. Instead of his
emperor, Ney found the Prussian III and IV Corps of the Army of North
Germany at Dennewitz on the 6th. Ney’s losses amounted to 21,500 dead,
wounded, and captured along with 53 guns. Prussian casualties numbered
9,700 killed and wounded. After this victory, the Army of North Germany
pursued the wreck of the Army of Berlin to Wittenberg and Torgau on the
Elbe.
Unlike the victories he had enjoyed during the Spring Campaign,
Napoleon’s situation became critical after less than one month of campaign-
ing. The success of the Reichenbach Plan depleted the ranks of the Grande
Armée: since the expiration of the armistice, the imperials had lost 150,000
men and 300 guns – an additional 50,000 names filled the sick rolls. While
French commanders suffered defeats at Großbeeren, the Katzbach, Kulm,
and Dennewitz, the emperor raced back and forth between the Elbe and the
Bober Rivers in futile attempts to achieve a decisive victory. Under normal
conditions, the constant marches and countermarches would have exhausted
his conscripts both mentally and physically. Yet the conditions remained far
from normal. Heavy rains had washed out the roads and Cossacks menaced
the lines of communication. Although the poor conditions forced Napoleon
to grant his men plenty of rest, the slow starvation of the army could not be
ignored. Supply shortages and the exhaustion of the Saxon countryside
prompted Napoleon to write: “The army is no longer fed; to view it in
any other way would be mere self-deception.”3
The battle of Dennewitz provided a crucial turning point in the Fall
Campaign. In its aftermath, both sides changed strategy. Blücher led his
Army of Silesia down the Elbe to Wartenburg, where it crossed the river on
Introduction 11
3 October and defeated the French IV Corps. Based on an agreement with

Blücher, Bernadotte also ordered his Army of North Germany to cross the
Elbe and move into the Saxon theater. Blücher’s decisions in early October
and the efficient work of the Prussian General Staff throughout the cam-
paign made the battle of Leipzig possible. For his part, Napoleon made one
final attempt to catch Blücher and Bernadotte south of Wittenberg. On 9
October, Napoleon and 150,000 imperial soldiers stood ready to destroy the
two Allied armies in the region of Bad Düben and Dessau. Yet, both Blücher
and Bernadotte escaped by retreating west across the Saale River, thus
exposing Berlin and their own communications. At this juncture, Napoleon
decided to draw the Allies to Leipzig for an epic struggle: the Battle of
Nations. Knowing that Schwarzenberg was slowly advancing on this city,
the emperor accepted the fact that he would soon be surrounded. After
months of chasing an elusive enemy who had smashed his lieutenants,
Napoleon welcomed the prospect of a showdown.
After the monumental Allied victory at Leipzig in mid October, the
Bohemian and Silesian Armies pursued Napoleon to Mainz but the Army
of North Germany split. Two of its corps insured the collapse of the
Confederation of the Rhine by marching through the heart of Germany
while Bernadotte led the rest of his forces north to contend with Marshal
Davout’s XIII Corps at Hamburg. Reaching the Rhine the second week of
November, the Allies convened a council of war at Frankfurt to plan the
invasion of France. Deliberations lasted for the better part of the next six
weeks. In the midst of the military planning, the Allies offered Napoleon
a conditional peace. Although Napoleon would have remained ruler of a
France that included the natural frontiers of the Rhine, Alps, and Pyrenees,
he rejected the offer. During a council of war on 7 December 1813, the Allies
agreed to invade France across a front that stretched from the North Sea to
Switzerland.
Similar to Volume I, The War of Liberation, which focuses on Prussia’s
role in 1813, the current volume, The Fall Campaign, describes how Prussia
played a pivotal role in the multinational coalition that formed during the
armistice and wrested Germany from Napoleon’s control by the first week
of November. It continues to expand Gordon Craig’s assertion that the
war against Napoleon was not a political struggle but an ideological “fight
against evil, a struggle against the anti-Christ and his minions.” More so
than the Russians and later the Austrians, the Prussians fought a holy
war against Napoleon. Enthusiasm and popular support did vary greatly,
yet Prusso-German patriotism permeated the public mind. Although
Russians made up two-thirds of the Army of Silesia, it was still viewed by
the Coalition as the Prussian army by virtue of its all-Prussian leadership
at the army level. This work is the first unofficial history of the 1813 Fall
Campaign that reconstructs the principal campaigns and operations of the
Army of Silesia to focus on how the Prussians attempted to wage a Franco-

Prussian war within the framework of a multinational war effort. Like
Napoleon, they believed decisive battles should settle the war. Similar to
Paul von Hindenburg’s relationship to Eric von Ludendorff during the
First World War, Blücher relied on his chief of staff, August Wilhelm von
Gneisenau, to provide the brains while he provided dauntless, unwavering
leadership. By consistently thwarting Napoleon’s plans and carrying the
war to the French, the Prussians channeled their impetuosity through the
Silesian Army to change the course of history in 1813. By reconstructing
Blücher’s principal campaigns, this book will reveal the magnitude of
Blücher’s operations and how they led to the Coalition’s complete victory
over Napoleon in Germany.
My 2002 book, Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North
Germany, 1813, builds on Gordon Craig’s assertion that the Prussian military
establishment wanted to wage an almost fanatical holy war against the French
for emancipation and freedom.4 While Napoleon and Berlin focuses on the
Prussian defense of their capital, the two volumes of Napoleon and the
Struggle for Germany, which constitute my penultimate work on 1813, con-
tinue to develop Craig’s thesis by exploring the role played by the Prussians in
the main theater of war and particularly their relations with the Russians.5
Prussia’s foremost commanders at the start of the war, Blücher, Scharnhorst,
and Gneisenau, labored to fight a different kind of war – a war guided by
“mystical nationalism,” according to Craig – than their Russian allies, many of
whom believed Russia should play only an auxiliary role following the great
exertions of 1812. After six years of French occupation, the leaders of the
Prussian military establishment labored to restore both national and inter-
national honor to their profession, their army, and, most of all, their state.
Prussian generals took the initiative to precipitate a rupture with France, and
personal feelings translated into political action. Frederick William allowed
himself to embrace the nationalistic fervor that it aroused and summon his
people to arms. More so than the Russians and Austrians, the Prussians turned
their war against Napoleon into a total war between two peoples: a Franco-
Prussian War.6
The weakest of Napoleon’s adversaries, the Prussians managed to field an
army of 250,000 men in August 1813. Although dispersed among the three
principal Allied armies and besieging French garrisons in Prussia, the Prus-
sians truly fought a war of liberation to drive the French from Germany.
Although languishing under Russian leadership during the Spring Campaign
of 1813, the Prussians willingly shouldered the weight of the conflict and
demanded the opportunity to take the war to Napoleon. This volume
explains how Prussian impetuosity not only led to Allied victories in August
and September, but also created the conditions that led to the colossal four-
day battle at Leipzig in mid October.
Introduction 13
The hundred years from 1813 to 1913 witnessed the publication of

numerous Prusso-German, French, and Russian official General Staff
histories of 1813 as well as a plethora of works written by military officers
and contemporaries of the period. Each borrowed from the others freely but
the Prusso-German General Staff histories were viewed as authoritative. In
some cases, whole sections of the Prusso-German histories were reproduced
verbatim in the studies of the war by French and Russian historians. While
the Prussian archives at the Geheimes Staatsarchiv in Berlin contain tomes
of documents on the 1813–1815 period that did survive the Second World
War, the principal papers – mainly the inter-army correspondence – of the
Silesian Army 1813–1814 (as well as the Prussian Army of the Lower Rhine
that fought in 1815) are not among them. Whether these papers were
actually destroyed or carried off by the Russians remains to be seen. Be
that as it may, Gneisenau’s Nachlaß has been extremely helpful, particularly
the huge Paket Nr. 18 titled “Various Papers from the 1813 and 1814
Campaigns,” but it too has gaps in the documentary record. Blücher’s
Nachlaß is one of the greatest disappointments I have encountered in
archival research: it consists only of fourteen letters (including five to his
wife), all of which have been published, and Blücher’s service record.
Fortunately, the Prussian General Staff’s official history of the Silesian
Army, written by Eduard von Höpfner and published in the 1843–1847
editions of the Militär-Wochenblatt, contains a treasure trove of the Silesian
Army’s inter-army correspondence reproduced in full. Unlike the
Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813–1815 written by the Great German
General Staff during the first decade of the twentieth century, Höpfner’s
account is much less of a teaching tool and instead presents the documents
to the readers, allowing them to form their own judgments.7 It would have
been impossible to reconstruct Blücher’s campaigns without the primary
documents contained in Höpfner’s account.
I have been able to make good use of copies of correspondence between
the Silesian Army’s leadership and other Allied commanders contained in
other archival collections. The British Manuscript Collection contains copies
of most of the following correspondence: Blücher to/from Bernadotte; Blü-
cher to/from Schwarzenberg; and Blücher’s daily orders or “dispositions” to
his corps commanders. The French military archives (SHAT) at Paris contain
a pristine copy of all of Bernadotte’s orders to his corps commanders, no
doubt a “gift” from the former marshal of France. Although many of the
delos of the Russian state archive’s RGVIA (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi
Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv) that cover Russia’s wars with Napoleon
1805–1815 have been microfilmed, the delos concerning the Silesian Army
in the Fall Campaign of 1813 have not. I attempted unsuccessfully to work
with the Russians for three years to provide me with documents pertaining to
the Silesian Army.
Since 1913, few historians have attempted to piece together an oper-

ational history of 1813. The damage to the Prusso-German General Staff
archives during the Second World War makes the task daunting. Moreover,
in their exhaustive studies the historians of first the Prussian and then the
German General Staff published much of the official correspondence
coming from the headquarters of Blücher and Gneisenau during this period.
In addition, thanks to the historiographic war between the German General
Staff and Hans Delbrück, this prolific historian likewise published vast
quantities of the official correspondence in his massive five-volume biog-
raphy of Gneisenau. Thus, we have much in terms of primary sources.
Based on Prussian, French, Russian, British, Austrian, Swedish, and
private archival documents, this book, written from the Coalition’s perspec-
tive, describes how Napoleon confronted the armed might of the other great
powers united for the first time ever in a war against him. After miraculously
assembling a new army of 200,000 men in April 1813 for a campaign in
Germany, Napoleon drove the Russo-Prussian army from the banks of the
Saale to the banks of the Oder. On reaching the Oder, the Russo-Prussian
alliance came perilously close to imploding only to be saved by an eleventh-
hour armistice. The Armistice of Pläswitz provides a clear line dividing the
one-dimensional conflict between the French Empire and the Russo-Prussian
alliance that ensued during the spring of 1813, and the multidimensional war
of a multinational coalition against a French Empire dwindling in resources
in the autumn of 1813. During the Spring Campaign, Napoleon essentially
faced a single Russo-Prussian army that numbered barely 100,000 men. To
end French hegemony east of the Rhine, some Russians and Prussians hoped
to ignite Germany and fan the flames of a people’s war based on the Spanish
model. Aside from the Russo-Prussian alliance, mutual suspicion and trad-
itional rivalries resulted in nothing more than a series of nonbinding bilateral
agreements between the Prussians, Russians, Swedes, and British. Yet the
military and political situation completely changed after the armistice. As
this volume will describe, Napoleon faced not one enemy army but three
(Army of Silesia, Army of Bohemia, and Army of North Germany), which
he opposed with three of his own. Allied forces in Central Europe numbered
more than 500,000 men while Napoleon’s exceeded 400,000. Austria and
Sweden joined the Sixth Coalition. Although a grand treaty of alliance
would not be signed until March 1814, the Sixth Coalition was bound by
subsidy agreements with Great Britain to continue the war against Napo-
leon. Metternich was now the prime minister of the coalition and his tool,
Prince Karl zu Schwarzenberg, was named Allied commander in chief. The
nature of the conflict changed. Talk of a people’s war on a par with that in
Spain ended, and Metternich did everything he could to separate British
interests from the Russo-Prussian war aims, which he likewise sought to
undermine.
Introduction 15
Notes
1 Radetzky to Schwarzenberg, “Memoire über den Zweck der Operationen und
deren muthmaßlichen Gang, so wie die anzuwendenden Mittel,” Vienna, 10 May
1813, reproduced in full in Radetzky, Denkschriften, 101–04. The key paragraphs
are located on pages 103–04.
2 The plan is reproduced in Oncken, Österreich und Preußen, II:321–22 in German
and 658–59 in French.
3 Correspondance de Napoléon Ier (hereafter cited as CN), No. 20619,
XXVI:236–38.
4 Craig, “Problems of Coalition Warfare,” 42. To avoid repetition, the two volumes
of Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany will focus on the military and diplo-
matic history of 1813. See Napoleon and Berlin for discussions concerning the
myths, fabrications, and realities about the origins of Prussian-German national-
ism during the war of 1813.
5 My final work on 1813 will focus on Austria’s role in 1813 and detail the battles of
Dresden, Leipzig, and Hanau.
6 Nipperdey, Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 68–69. In the book, Leyer und
Schwert, 37, Theodore Körner, a Saxon who served in a Prussian volunteer unit –
the Lützow Rifles – reflected the mood of the educated and the young when he
wrote: “It is not a war of the kind the kings know about, it is a crusade, ’tis a
holy war.”
7 In 1821, Major August Wagner of the Prussian General Staff published three
volumes titled Plane der Schlachten und Treffen welche von der preussischen Armee
in den Feldzügen der Jahre 1813, 14, und 15 geliefert worden. Four years later, he
published the fourth volume of the series. In 1831, he published Die Tage von
Dresden und Kulm in dem Feldzuge 1813 as an appendix to the earlier work; it has a
slight modification of the title in this fifth volume: Plane der Schlachten und
Treffen, welche der preussischen Armee und ihren Verbüdteten in den Feldzügen
der Jahre 1813, 14, und 15 geliefert worden. In all five studies, Wagner not only
utilized the papers of the Prussian General Staff, primarily after-action reports, but
he also received much material and support from French officers and General Staff
historians such as Marmont, Pelet, Haxo, Kellermann, Reille, and Koch. He also
utilized archival material from the Russian General Staff, provided by Diebitsch, as
well as the archives of Bavaria, Württemberg, Hanover, Baden, and Hesse-
Darmstadt. As the title indicates, Wagner’s study is an analysis of the major battles
fought during the period with details of the operations leading up to the battles.
Moreover, the work does not follow the chronology of the campaigns. The first
volume examines Lützen, Großbeeren, Hagelberg, and Dennewitz; volume II: the
Katzbach, Wartenburg, and Möckern; volume III: Bautzen and Laon; volume IV:
Ligny, Waterloo, and Wavre. Unlike the study of the Silesian Army in the
1813 Campaign published by the Prussian General Staff in the Militär-Wochenblatt
in the mid 1840s, and certainly very different from the German General Staff’s
Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813–1815 published by Rudolf Friederich in the
first decade of the twentieth century, Wagner’s work does not provide critical
analysis but is an excellent source for studying the course of the battles noted above.
Hamburg 0 25 50 75 100 miles
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1. The theater of war, 1813

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Grosnig Liegnitz Breslau
Paritz Ottendorf Seifersdorf Giersdorf
Ullersdorf Herzogswaldau Gröditz Rothkirch Teichmann Estate
Wenigwalditz Wilhemsdorf Rothbrünnig
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evening, Allied Positions evening, late morning, 17 August
18 August 18 August Allied positions
xxx x Parchwitz nightfall, 14 August
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Napoleon Gd Löwenberg x bac
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Bautzen xxx Yorck
Sacken Kanth Neudorf-am-
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Meißen Lähn xxxx Gröditzberg Ohlau
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xx
atze r iße Ri
b Gl ver Kosel
Turnau 2 Wartha
Teplitz Aussig xxx xxx
ng
ge Wittgenst. Guard &
xxx
Leitmeritz Kleist Reserve Glatz
eb
Görkau
rz Gitschen
Lobositz
Jungbunzlau
E Brüx
ir
Komotau
g
e
AU S TR IA
Prague
0 10 20 30 40 50 miles
3. Situation, 19 August 1813

Introduction 19
0 10 20 30 40 miles
Torgau Bad Liebenwerda

Koßdorf
Belgern Elsterwerda Hoyerswerda

Mühlberg Gröden
Streumen Ortrand
Strehla
LUSATIA
S pr
SAX O NY
ee
v
Ri
Riesa
er
N ei ß e
Großenhain Schönfeld Königsbrück Kamenz Göda Förstchen
Medessen Böhla Schwosdorf
Panschwitz-
Kuckau Bautzen
Wantewitz Rothnaußlitz
Leipzig Ockrilla
Pottschapplitz Spittwitz
Pulsnitz Rammenau
Litten
Wurschen
Oberkaina
Görlitz
Radeburg Geißmannsdorf Kleinpraga Hochkirch
Goldbach Wölkau Singwitz Radmeritz
Lommatzsch Meißen Lotzdorf Frankenthal Demitz-Thumitz Löbau
Radeberg Großhartau Bischofswerda Großpostwitz
Arnsdorf Putzkau Wilthen Bernstadt auf
Lindenau Schmiedefeld Bühlau
Neukirch Schirgiswalde dem Eigen
Ringenhain
Weißig LauterbachGroßdrebnitz Oberottendorf Neusalza
Herrnhut Ostritz
Stolpen
Altenburg
Dresden Pillnitz
Langenwolmsdorf
Röhrsdorf Rückersdorf
Stürza
Sohland
Neustadt in Sachsen
Großhennersdorf
Hohnstein Ulbersdorf Schluckenau

Mittweida Dohna
Lohmen
Rathen Porschdorf
Hainsbach Zittau
Freiberg Pirna
Wehlen Lilienstein Altendorf Rumburg
Dippoldiswalde Bad
Königstein Schandau Georgenthal
Penig Bad Gottleuba-Berggießhübel
Hellendorf Herrnskretschen Böhmisch-
Ölsen Tetschen Kannitz
Öderan Altenberg Peterswald
Nollendorf Gabel
Rohrsdorf
Chemnitz Schellenberg Kulm
Sobochleben Böhmisch-
Zschopau Außig Leipa
N e
g Teplitz
i r Brüx
Marienberg Leitmeritz BOHEMIA
Lobositz
b Theresienstadt Melnik Jungbunzlau
Annaberg-Buchholz e Komotau
Görkau
g r
Budin
z Ege Laun
Slaný
r
E
Eibenstock AU STR IA
Karlsbad Prague
4. Region between the Spree and the Elbe Rivers

Berlin
Brandenburg Potsdam
Großbeeren
Magdeburg Belzig
N
Zerbst
Elb
e Dennewitz
Nudersdorf
Calbe Roßlau
Coswig Wittenberg
Nienburg Aken Seyda
Dessau Pötnitz
Oranienbaum Wörlitz Elster
Bernburg Klitzschena Wartenburg
Schleesen Rackith Jessen
Meilendorf Hinsdorf Gräfenhainichen Kemberg Trebitz
Alsleben Köthen Raguhn Annaburg
Bobbau Jeßnitz Gröbern Pretzsch Herzberg
Zehbitz Mühlbeck Schköna
Pouch Falkenberg Bad Schmiedeberg
Radegast Bitterfeld Dommitzsch
Rothenburg Bad Dahlenberg
Petersberg Zörbig Sausedlitz Düben Weidenhain Neiden
Wettin Quetzdölsdorf
Pfützthal Sylbitz Roitzsch Brösen Pristäblich Süptitz
Brehna Luckowehna Noitzsch Hohenprießnitz
Torgau Bad Liebenwerda
Salzmünde Klitzschen
Delitzsch Mockrehna
Giebichenstein
Landsberg Hohenrode
Wölkau
Zschepplin
Langenreichenbach
Wildschütz Koßdorf
Black Elster
Reideburg Kölsa Krensitz Schöna
Eilenburg Schildau
Halle Liemehna Elsterwerda
Teutschenthal Bruckdorf Wiederitzsch Kollau Großzschepa Mehderitzsch Mühlberg
Schkopau Schkeuditz Taucha Falkenhain
Merseburg Lindenau Püchau Wurzen Dahlen
Strehla Streumen
Leipzig MachernBennewitz
El
Lützen Oschatz Kamenz

be
Zwenkau Hubertusburg
Großenhain
Weißenfels Seerhausen
Pegau
Mulde
Colditz Meißen
Naumburg Borna Bischofswerda
Froburg
Zeitz Nossen
Dresden
Altenburg
Penig Freiberg Pirna
le
Öderan
Saa
Chemnitz
Zwickau
0 25 50 75 miles
5. Region between the Black Elster and the Saale Rivers

Introduction 21
El
be
Calbe Steutz
Roßlau
Coswig Griebo
Aken Wittenberg
Dessau
Oranienbaum Wörlitz Elster
Bernburg
Wartenburg
Saale
Mulde
Rackith
Alsleben Gräfenhainichen Kemberg

Köthen Raguhn
El
Jeßnitz Gröbern
be
Zehbitz
Mühlbeck
Rothenburg Radegast
Zörbig Bitterfeld Bad
Petersberg Düben
Wettin Sylbitz Torgau

Brehna
Oppin
Delitzsch Lindenhayn
Landsberg
Hohenleina
Kölsa Krostitz
Giebichenstein
Reideburg Freiroda Podelwitz Hohenossig
Teutschenthal Halle Bruckdorf Kursdorf Radefeld Göbschelwitz Eilenburg
Werlitzsch Breitenfeld Lindenthal
Großkugel Schkeuditz Hänichen Wiederitzsch
Gröbers Modelwitz
Lützschena Gohlis Mockau
Rückmarsdorf Möckern Eutritzsch Taucha Wurzen
Merseburg Günthersdorf Lindenau Reudnitz
Markranstädt
Leipzig HolzhausenZweinaundorfs
Connewitz Seifertshain
Lößnig Dösen Naunhof
Dölitz Zuckelhausen Fuchshain
Lützen Markkleeberg
Wachau Liebertwolkwitz
Crostewitz Großpösna
Cröbern Güldengoßa Pomßen Grimma
Zwenkau Störmthal
Weißenfels Rötha
Espenhain
Pegau Colditz
Naumburg Borna
Zeitz
N
0 5 10 15 20 25 miles
6. Region between the Mulde and the Saale Rivers

1
Trachenberg and Reichenbach
Like Napoleon, the Russians and Prussians entered the armistice committed
to continuing the war on 20 July 1813. Yet what hope did they have for
victory? During the Spring Campaign, the French emperor had driven their
army more than 200 miles from the Saale to the Oder in one month’s time.
Two major battles had been fought and lost. Who among the Russians and
Prussians could challenge Napoleon? Although they had ejected the French
from their motherland in 1812, the Russians did not achieve a decisive
victory over Napoleon himself during that entire campaign. Forsaking the
Prussians and returning home remained an option after the failures of
the Spring Campaign, yet leaving Central Europe under Napoleon’s control
offered Russia little long-term security. As for the Prussians, zeal and hatred
on their own failed to liberate their state in the first six months of 1813.
By breaking his alliance with Napoleon, Frederick William jeopardized
his very crown. To avoid the same fate that had befallen the previous five
coalitions that had waged war against France, the military and political
leaders of both states understood that they needed more than the unprece-
dented cooperation that had characterized their operations during the Spring
Campaign. With the stakes so high, they realized that only an unconven-
tional strategic plan would allow them to again challenge French dominance
in Central Europe.
Moreover, Napoleon’s success in the Spring Campaign merely impressed
upon the Russians and Prussians how much they needed the Austrian army
to successfully oppose the legions of the French Empire. In fact, both sides
sought Austria as a partner to continue the war. While Napoleon refused to
believe that his father-in-law, Kaiser Francis, would declare war against him,
the Russians and Prussians as well as their allies, the Swedes and British, had
less reason to be optimistic. In addition to the general suspicion of Austria
shared by all who opposed Napoleon, the Swedes and British looked
22
Trachenberg and Reichenbach 23
askance at the Russians and Prussians as the latter negotiated with the
Austrians in secret. The British paymaster in London desperately sought
to meld a system of bilateral arrangements into a grand alliance but Austria
stood in the way. Consequently, Allied monarchs, diplomats, and generals
labored during the armistice to achieve two goals. First, they wanted to draft
an incomparable plan of campaign that offered the promise of defeating
Napoleon. Second, they sought to bring Austria into the Sixth Coalition.
The two objectives became intertwined as the Allies had to plan on fighting
Napoleon either with or without the Austrians.
Shortly after establishing his headquarters at Reichenbach (Dzierżoniów)
in Silesia, the commander in chief of Coalition forces, Barclay de Tolly,
received a request from the Austrian commander in chief, Schwarzenberg,
for information concerning the Allied campaign plan should the war against
Napoleon resume. This proved problematic for two reasons. First, as Aus-
tria still had not joined the Sixth Coalition, Barclay could not divulge any
plans. Second, the Allies had no plans to divulge. However, the industrious
Russian general, Karl Wilhelm von Toll, had been tinkering with the
Wurschen Plan. Refining the plan’s concepts, Toll presented a new draft
to Alexander on 9 June. Before we examine the plan’s details, it is important
to bear in mind two points. First, the Allies expected the armistice to expire
on 20 July. Following an eight-day suspension of hostilities, the war would
resume on the 28th. Second, neither the Russians nor the Prussians could
estimate the number of troops they would have under arms when hostilities
resumed. Written in French so that it could be immediately communicated
to the Prussians, Toll’s “Mémoire” actually offered two plans: one in the
event Austria remained neutral, and a second that included Austria in
the Coalition. As the former never came to pass, we will examine only
the latter.
Toll advocated a premature rupture of the armistice by the Allies if they
should detect French forces withdrawing west from Silesia to the left bank
of the Elbe. Should the armistice run its course, he calculated the total
strength of the Allied army in Silesia to be 150,000 men by 20 July, with
the Austrians fielding an additional 120,000 combatants. Underestimating
Napoleon’s organizational abilities, he allotted the emperor only 160,000
soldiers. Toll’s “Mémoire” called for the Russo-Prussian main army to be
united at Schweidnitz in Silesia no later than 26 July. On that same day, the
Austrians would commence their march to Upper Lusatia (Lausitz, Łużyee)
in two columns: the first through Gabel (Jablonné) and Ostritz to Görlitz,
the second through Liebau (Lubawka) to Reichenbach. Likewise on the
26th, General Friedrich Wilhelm von Bülow would lead his corps of
25,000 Prussians from Berlin south to Görlitz and unite with the Austrians
in Lusatia. Any enemy forces that Bülow encountered during the march
would be attacked unless they outgunned his own.
1 Field-Marshal Prince Karl Philipp zu Schwarzenberg, 1771–1820
Toll assumed that, as soon as the armistice expired, Napoleon would

seize the offensive and turn against either the main Russo-Prussian army at
Schweidnitz or the Austrians advancing on Görlitz. From his central pos-
ition, Napoleon could attack one of these armies before the other could
pressure his rear and flank. However, because both Allied armies would have
sufficient strength to face Napoleon’s main force and oppose it for a few
days, Toll did not consider this danger to be significant. Moreover, Allied
Streifkorps would maintain constant contact with French forces to provide
accurate information on their movements and thus enable the Allied armies
to be in position at the right time.
If Napoleon decided to operate against the Russo-Prussian army at
Schweidnitz, Toll maintained that the Allies should accept battle while the
Austrians and Bülow’s Prussian corps closed on the rear of the French army.
Should the main Russo-Prussian army be defeated at Schweidnitz and forced
to retreat, then the 145,000 Austrians and Prussians threatening Napoleon’s
rear would prevent him from exploiting the victory. With the emperor’s
troops already exhausted and weakened from fighting the Russo-Prussian
army, Toll believed that the threat posed by the Austro-Prussian army in
Lusatia would force Napoleon to immediately turn around and fight a second
battle against these fresh Allied forces. In the meantime, the Russo-Prussian
army would also turn around and advance against his rear. Should Napoleon
seek to attack the Austro-Prussian army in Lusatia, the two armies
would simply exchange roles and the execution of the plan would remain
the same. In both cases, Allied forces on the lower Elbe – mainly Russians
under Mikhail Vorontsov and Aleksandr Chernishev – would advance against
the enemy’s rearward communications at Leipzig, Dresden, and Altenburg
while at the same time observing the French forces at Hamburg and
Magdeburg.
In a third scenario, Toll envisioned Napoleon evacuating all territory east
of the Elbe and concentrating his forces at Dresden. Should this occur, Toll
recommended that, as soon as the armistice expired, Blücher’s Prussian corps
and General Fabian Gottlieb von der Osten-Sacken’s Russian corps – both
part of the main Russo-Prussian army in Silesia – pursue the French to
Dresden. From Berlin, Bülow would also drive on the Saxon capital to unite
with Blücher and Sacken to form an army of 70,000 men. Meanwhile,
approximately 100,000 Russians from the main Russo-Prussian army in Sile-
sia would march to Bohemia and unite with the Austrians on the Eger (Ohře)
River to form an army of 220,000 men. This army would then advance toward
the upper Saale River to threaten Napoleon’s rear. Toll predicted that this
movement would prompt Napoleon to cover his communication with France
by immediately evacuating the left or western bank of the Elbe. However,
should Napoleon remain at Dresden and defend the Elbe against Blücher’s
Russo-Prussian army, then the Austro-Russian army in Bohemia would cross
the Elbe at Leitmeritz (Litoměřice) and advance through Teplitz (Teplice)
into Saxony and threaten Napoleon’s rear and flank.
Toll’s belief that strategic maneuvering against Napoleon’s line of com-
munication would force him to abandon the Elbe suggests a certain ignor-
ance of the emperor’s mastery of operations on interior lines. Moreover,
hoping to fix Napoleon at Dresden with 70,000 Russians and Prussians
under Blücher long enough for the Austro-Russian army to reach the upper
Saale does not strongly recommend Toll. In addition, his inaccurate estimate
of French forces burdened his plan with one inherent flaw. The whole
situation would change significantly if Napoleon were to add a mere
50,000 combatants to the 160,000 men estimated by Toll. With more than
200,000 effectives at his disposal, Napoleon would be able to mask one of
the Allied armies while he led the bulk of his forces against the other. In
addition, Toll makes no mention of the active participation of Swedish
forces – an understandable oversight based on Bernadotte’s total inactivity
during the Spring Campaign.
Yet beyond the basic errors concerning numbers, Toll’s plan offered
much. First and foremost, he recommended that the Allied armies seize
the initiative and seek battle in either Silesia or Lusatia. The principle of
one army holding its ground against the emperor’s main force until the other
Allied army could make its presence felt to his rear as well as having Bülow
force-march to Lusatia or Silesia suggests a boldness of action that the Allies
lacked during the Spring Campaign. Toll’s concepts generated much discus-
sion at Barclay’s headquarters and ultimately provided the foundation for all
future drafts of the Allied campaign plan. As a result of their discussions, the
Russians modified some of Toll’s essential points. Few details have survived
regarding the participants and the date the changes were made, but evidence
suggests that Barclay authored the modifications. A Corfu native in Russian
diplomatic service, Count Ioannis Antonios Kapodistrias, drafted the new
plan, Barclay signed it, and Toll personally delivered it to Austrian head-
quarters at Gitschin (Jičı́n).1 Placing faith in the Austrians, he also provided a
detailed report on the strength and dislocation of Russian and Prussian
forces.2
Following an introduction that partly blamed the Allied retreat from
the Saale to the Oder on Austria’s refusal to enter the war during the
Spring Campaign, Barclay’s plan provides three scenarios. The first, and
in Barclay’s opinion the most likely, would be a French offensive against
Austria. Although Radetzky first expressed this concern in his memo of
10 May, Toll completely ignored this possibility. According to Barclay,
Napoleon would leave some forces on the right bank of the Elbe facing
the Russo-Prussian army in Silesia but unite his main mass on the left
bank of the Elbe and turn against the Austrian army. In this case, the
Austrians would have to contend with a much larger enemy force. To
reinforce the Austrians, Barclay suggested sending the 25,000 men of
Wittgenstein’s Russian army corps from Silesia to Bohemia to unite with
the Austrian army at Leitmeritz. With these reinforcements, the Austrian
army would be strong enough to either stand against Napoleon’s attack or
take the offensive against him. Should the Austrians seize the offensive, the
Russo-Prussian army in Silesia would support their operations through an
energetic advance on Dresden.
In his second scenario, Barclay speculated that Napoleon would concen-
trate his forces between the Elbe and the Oder. In this case, the main Russo-
Prussian army in Silesia would advance west while the Austrian army
simultaneously drove north from Bohemia. Barclay’s third scenario, and
the one he considered the least likely – although Toll thought it to be the
most likely – found Napoleon massing his forces in Silesia to confront the
Russo-Prussian army that he had pursued to the Oder during the Spring
Campaign. Should this occur, all Allied forces would take the offensive: the
Russo-Prussian army in Silesia would advance west, the Austrian army north-
east through Zittau against Napoleon’s right flank, and Bülow southeast
against his left. As for the troops under the crown prince of Sweden, which
included Russian corps commanded by Vorontsov and General Ludwig
Georg von Wallmoden, they would observe Hamburg and Magdeburg and
remain on the defensive until a decisive battle on the upper Elbe decided the
fate of Germany. As soon as the Allied armies achieved this victory, the crown
prince would cross the Elbe and move west across the Weser River toward the
lower Rhine.
Barclay omitted or changed some aspects of Toll’s plan in part to make
the whole more palatable to the Austrians, in part to maintain control
over his own troops. Unable to gauge the Austrian reaction, he disregar-
ded Toll’s recommendation to prematurely terminate the armistice should
Napoleon withdraw his forces to left bank of the Elbe. Moreover,
Barclay assigned tasks to the troops commanded by the crown prince of
Sweden. Regarding Toll’s third scenario, which required 100,000 Russians
to reinforce the Austrians in Bohemia, Barclay lowered the number to
25,000 men. As Barclay still served as Allied commander in chief, this
change is certainly understandable: few generals in such a position would
voluntarily turn over three-quarters of their men for use by an ally. More-
over, even with 100,000 Russians, the majority of the troops would still
be Austrian, meaning command of this Austro-Russian army would go to
an Austrian general.3
Meanwhile, per a request from Schwarzenberg, Radetzky drafted
another memo known as the Prague Memorandum. Written on 10 June at
Prague, it addressed troop strengths, strategy, and operations. According to
Radetzky, Napoleon would resume the struggle with 230,000–250,000 men.
Should Austria enter the war, he assumed Napoleon would leave some
50,000 to 60,000 men in Silesia to mask the Russo-Prussian army while he
directed his main force of 150,000 to 180,000 men against the Austrians.
Radetzky stressed the need for the Austrians to seize the offensive and defeat
Napoleon’s main force. For the Austrians to be successful, the army in
Bohemia needed to number 150,000 combatants, based on Radetzky’s calcu-
lations. To achieve this number solely with Austrian troops, he recom-
mended the mobilization of the third battalion of each regiment posted in
Galicia. To oppose the French forces assembling in Italy and Bavaria,
Radetzky proposed the use of Landwehr and small detachments of line units
posted in well-chosen and strongly entrenched positions, where they would
remain on the defensive until the main army achieved success. After the first
decisive victory, all Austrian forces would conduct a double offensive in
Italy and Germany.4
Radetzky’s memo stated nothing about Allied operations in Silesia or
Germany. By assuming Napoleon would leave 50,000 to 60,000 men in
Silesia facing triple the number of Russo-Prussian soldiers, either he
accepted as obvious that Allied forces there would smash this masking force
and reach the rear of the main French army advancing against Austria, or he
deferred mention of combined operations with the Allies. Regardless, his
statements about seizing the offensive, defeating the main French army, and
2 Johann Josef Wenzel Anton Franz Karl Count Radetzky von Radetz, 1766–1858
maintaining the defensive in all secondary theaters marked significant pro-

gress in the mindset of the Austrian General Staff after the splitting of forces
between the Italian and German theaters had contributed to Austria’s
defeats in 1805 and 1809. However, beyond these theoretical statements,
Radetzky’s Prague Memorandum lacked initiative and failed to explain how
the Austrians would defeat Napoleon.5
After receiving the tsar’s approval, Toll again traveled to Gitschin, where
he delivered Barclay’s plan to Schwarzenberg and Radetzky on 14 June. In
particular, Barclay tasked him with explaining the movements the Allies
planned to make at the commencement of hostilities. Despite the inherent
differences in the Allied plan and Radetzky’s Prague Memorandum, Toll
found common ground with the Austrians during a meeting on the 15th.
Purportedly, they attained total agreement after just a few hours.6 Although
Barclay omitted Toll’s original suggestion to prematurely rupture the armis-
tice, the staff officer mentioned the idea to Radetzky, who agreed. Radetzky
also accepted Barclay’s proposal to dispatch Wittgenstein’s 25,000 Russians
to unite with the Austrian army. As for operations, the Austro-Russian army
in Bohemia would cross the Elbe at Leitmeritz and fall on the enemy’s right
flank while the Russo-Prussian army in Silesia crossed the Elbe between
Torgau and Dresden. Bülow’s corps would observe Wittenberg and Torgau
as Vorontsov’s monitored Magdeburg. Should Napoleon maintain his forces
in Silesia facing the Russo-Prussian army, the latter would assemble at
Schweidnitz and advance through Jauer (Jawor) and Goldberg (Złotoryja)
directly against the French while the Austro-Russian army debouched

through Zittau and proceeded north to Görlitz. At Görlitz, it would unite
with Bülow and the Russian corps of General Ferdinand von Wintzinger-
ode, turn east, and threaten Napoleon’s rear. Toll assumed Napoleon would
attack the Austro-Russian army first, but felt confident that within two days
the Russo-Prussian army would reach the rear of his army.
A 17 June letter from Toll to Scharnhorst provides the only evidence
available regarding the former’s meeting with the Austrian generals and the
resulting Gitschen Agreement.7 Aside from commending “the good spirit of
the commanders of the Austrian army, especially its quartermaster-general,
Radetzky, for the good cause,” Toll explained the basis of the plan of
operations that emerged after just a few hours of discussion:
(1) The six-week armistice will give the enemy the means to move up
reinforcements of all arms and because he has much to fear from Austria it
is very probable that he will leave a chain of posts along the Katzbach
[Kaczawa River] facing us and he will gradually withdraw all of his forces
to the left bank of the Elbe to be closer to his reinforcements and
magazines . . .
Should it occur that the enemy makes these movements, we will immedi-
ately break the armistice by following the enemy with the combined Russo-
Prussian army; Wintzingerode will also start his march, but Bülow will go to
Roßlau and cross the Elbe there. The Austrian army, which will be joined by
Wittgenstein’s corps of 25,000 men, will go to Leitmeritz, where it will cross
the Elbe in order to fall on the enemy’s right flank while the combined
Russo-Prussian army crosses this river between Torgau and Dresden.
Bülow’s corps will observe Wittenberg and Torgau; Vorontsov’s will observe
Magdeburg. Both generals will send their partisans as far as possible against
the enemy’s communications.
(2) The second supposition is that the enemy will remain at the Katzbach.
Should this be the case, the Russo-Prussian army will assemble at Schweid-
nitz, the Austrian army will debouch through Zittau upon Görlitz, to which
Bülow and a portion of Wintzingerode’s corps will also take their direction to
establish communication with the Austrian army as quickly as possible and
together threaten the rear of the enemy. The combined Russo-Prussian army
will march through Jauer and Goldberg straight at the enemy; the Austrians
will proceed from Görlitz to Lauban [Lubań] in the enemy’s right flank . . .
Based on all of these combinations, the enemy probably will attack the first
army with all his forces. We will therefore assume that the Austrian army will
be attacked by superior enemy forces. After a two-day battle, the Russo-
Prussian army will be completely to the enemy’s rear so that if the Austrian
army is forced to yield, the enemy will have to face a new and numerous
army or must flee.
However, to execute this with precision and advantage, the commanding
general, Barclay de Tolly, has ordered that as soon as the reserve – which is
due in twenty days – arrives, the armistice will be broken and the strongest
offensive seized; the Austrian commander in chief will be informed of this in

a timely manner.8
At this point, the Allies reached an encouraging agreement with the

Austrians. Both sides viewed a French invasion of Bohemia as Napoleon’s
first step in a renewed conflict and both believed that the Austrian army
needed to be increased to 150,000 men. Radetzky initially sought to reach
this number by mobilizing additional Austrian troops but accepted Barclay’s
offer of 25,000 Russians for operations in Bohemia. Moreover, the Austrians
concurred with Toll’s idea of breaking the armistice to commence a general
offensive before Napoleon could launch his own. Although Schwarzenberg
and Radetzky apparently agreed with Toll and Barclay, no definitive plan of
operations could be established until Austria officially joined the Coalition.
Consequently, military talks between the Allies and the Austrians ceased for
the next few weeks, yet both sides continued planning at a furious pace.9
As for forming a grand alliance against Napoleon, the chances of achiev-
ing a diplomatic consensus appeared bleak, due to British and Swedish
suspicion of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The British goodwill that the
Russians and Prussians had earned by way of the 16 May Wurschen Con-
vention fizzled with the cessation of hostilities.10 Neither the Russians nor
the Prussians had informed the British and Swedes of their negotiations with
the Austrians that had led to the armistice. Much of the diplomatic impasse
lay in Russia’s hostility toward Great Britain. Although the tsar desperately
needed British aid to continue the war, he did not want to share leadership of
the Coalition with London. While the British viewed Russia as a natural ally,
the tsar’s government still considered Great Britain a rival for trade and
influence from the New World to the Near East. The alliance created by the
Kalisch–Breslau accords established the war aims of a Russo-Prussian coali-
tion and largely omitted British interests. In addition, London viewed
Russia’s offer to mediate between Great Britain and the United States to
end the War of 1812 as “an attempt to save the American fleet as a counter-
weight to British maritime supremacy and as a way of forcing Britain to end
its maritime despotism.”11 Thus, as Charles Webster notes in his mammoth
study of the foreign policy of Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, “the
Coalition was, indeed, undergoing a severe strain and at moments seemed as
if it would suffer the same fate as its predecessors. By their treaties, it is true,
Russia and Prussia had promised not to make peace without Britain. But
already, after two defeats, they had accepted an armistice without consulting
her. The opportunity of Austria had, at last, arrived.”12
As for the Austrians, Nesselrode met with Francis, Metternich, and
Schwarzenberg between 3 and 7 June. He returned convinced that the kaiser
would not join the coalition “until Napoleon had been offered and rejected
very moderate and minimal terms of peace.” Nesselrode also delivered to
Tsar Alexander a memorandum drafted by Metternich outlining these con-

ditions. Although the Austrian minister agreed in principle with the provi-
sions of the Wurschen Convention, he feared Napoleon would reject its
harsh demands. He felt that the Allies would have to propose a minimum set
of conditions just to attract the French emperor to the peace table. Thus,
Metternich formulated the “four points” to offer Napoleon as the price for a
peace conference: the partition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw among
Russia, Prussia, and Austria; the complete evacuation of all imperial forces
from Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as well as the return of
Danzig (Gdańsk) to Prussia; the return of the Adriatic coast (Illyria) to
Austria; and the independence of Hamburg and Lübeck in North Germany.
Debate then ensued at Reichenbach over whether Russia and Prussia could
accept these terms.
As the Spring Campaign demonstrated, the Allies desperately needed the
Austrian army. Russia and Prussia, even supported by Great Britain and
Sweden, could not achieve victory in Central Europe over Napoleon and the
resources of the French Empire. Although the four points fell far short of the
Wurschen Convention, particularly in regard to the Third Germany, few
options remained open for the Russians and Prussians given the mindset of
the Austrian kaiser. Regardless, Nesselrode attempted to explain the Russian
view to Metternich: any peace concluded on the basis of the four points
would only be a truce. As soon as Napoleon rebuilt his forces, he would seek
to reestablish French hegemony over the continent. The Russians main-
tained that Austria and Prussia had to be sufficiently strengthened to balance
France and prevent Napoleon from challenging any peace settlement.
Should a peace fail to achieve this point, history eventually would repeat
itself. Just as in 1805 and 1806, Napoleon would crush the Austrians and
Prussians before Russia’s distant legions could arrive. Nesselrode urged
Metternich to avoid this mistake by taking advantage of the present circum-
stances. For the first time in the French Wars, the armies of the three Eastern
powers stood within 150 miles of each other and could be quickly concen-
trated in the same theater. Despite the logic of these arguments, the Aus-
trians stood firm. Thus, the Russians and Prussians decided that they would
negotiate with the French based on the four points but would not approve a
peace settlement that left the Third Germany in Napoleon’s hands. As the
end of June approached, they could do little but hope Napoleon would
reject Metternich’s offer.13
Metternich himself feared a separate peace between France and Russia
that would divide Europe between them. Alexander’s victory in 1812 led
Metternich to dread Russian preponderance almost as much as that of the
French. He desired not only to break French power east of the Rhine,
but also to limit Russian influence west of the Vistula River. To take the
wind out of Alexander’s sails, Metternich targeted the stipulations of the
Kalisch–Breslau accords that called for Frederick William to cede Prussian

Poland to Alexander in return for Saxony. Such an exchange would run
counter to Austria’s policy of limiting Prussia’s influence in Germany and
restraining Russia’s expansion in Central Europe. Metternich also sought to
outmaneuver the growing Anglo-Russian-Prussian consensus. It appeared
that these three powers would soon establish the Coalition’s general goals:
Russian domination of Poland, Prussian compensation in Germany, and a
free hand for Great Britain in Iberia, the Low Countries, Sicily, and the
colonies, and on the high seas. Metternich recognized that a settlement for
Central Europe would never be reached with Napoleon as long as the
Russians and Prussians championed British interests. To achieve peace in
Central Europe, he decided to isolate Great Britain and completely ignore
British objectives. Metternich not only excluded the British from the nego-
tiations that produced the armistice but also insisted that neither Britain nor
Sweden be informed of them.14
Napoleon’s victory at Bautzen considerably strengthened Metternich’s
hand by making Austrian cooperation much more urgent for the Russians
and Prussians. Over the next month, he worked diligently to convince the
Allies to offer Napoleon the four points as the basis for a peace conference.
His envoy at Napoleon’s headquarters, General Ferdinand von Bubna,
assured the French emperor that due to London’s hostile attitude no hope
existed for a general peace that would cover the issues of maritime rights.
Instead, the British would have to be forced into negotiations by a peace that
ended the war in Central Europe.15 Such a peace would leave Great Britain
isolated and exposed to the full weight of Napoleon’s military machine.
Conversely, Metternich explained to his representative at Allied headquar-
ters, Johann Philipp von Stadion, that a general peace could be established
only if the British made maritime concessions: British domination of the seas
had proved equal to French domination of the continent. Should London
refuse, then Austria would seek a settlement for Central Europe only.16
Metternich’s machinations caused great trepidation among the British
envoys at Allied Headquarters. Not only did the goal of creating a grand
alliance seem out of reach, but the survival of the Coalition itself appeared to
be at stake. Months of careful negotiations with the Russians and Prussians
unraveled as the British found themselves next to the Swedes on the outside
looking in. Much progress had been made by the British since London had
committed an army to Iberia in 1808. Portugal had been liberated from
French control and Joseph Bonaparte’s kingdom of Spain teetered on col-
lapse thanks to the campaigns of General Sir Arthur Wellesley, the marquess
of Wellington. Yet the British knew that, despite all their great efforts in
Iberia, the fate of Europe would be decided on the plains of Saxony. Should
the Allies be defeated or come to terms with Napoleon, the master then
would be free to send his masses to Spain. All that the British had
accomplished in Iberia after five long years of war would be for naught.
How helpless the British envoys to Russia, Prussia, and Sweden must have
felt as the redcoats of Wellington’s army waged war on the other side of
Europe. Without boots on the ground, the only leverage they had was the
promise of subsidies and diplomatic support. As long as London steadfastly
refused to put the issue of maritime rights on the agenda of a general peace
conference, the term “Perfidious Albion” echoed in the ears of its allies.
From Reichenbach, General Charles Stewart, the British ambassador
and military commissioner to Prussia, wrote a sour note on 6 June to his
half-brother, Castlereagh, Britain’s foreign secretary.17 “The news we send
home is not the best, and, from what I see, I fear political treachery and the
machinations that are in the wind more than any evils from Bonaparte’s
myrmidons. We must keep a sharp look-out, especially since our refusal of
Austrian mediation. The accounts from Hamburg and Stralsund are bad. I fear
the Swedes will go [home], and Bonaparte gets 20,000 Danes in the North. The
disorder in the Russian army is great.” He continued by warning Castlereagh
that Tsar Alexander had mismanaged Bernadotte to such an extent that the
former needed to be wary of the latter seizing Finland. Stewart also hoped
Wellington could provide a victory to offset the anticipated negative reaction
by the British public to the news of the armistice.18 “I cannot help thinking
that the great personages of the drama here will meet, and Metternich will
attempt some family alliances to aid the object of peace. If things turn to a
Congress, and if you acquiesce in sending a negotiator, pray select a very able
man. Depend upon it, he will be required. I have seen enough in a little time of
the windings and turnings of diplomatic chicane to fear.” In a subsequent
letter, Stewart lamented the failure to finalize firm treaties of alliance during
the preceding months. “I hope you will get us through our Treaties,” he
exhorted his brother; “it is best to show something, even under doubtful
circumstances. Had we finished as we ought, and as I would easily have
accomplished a month since, we should have been able throughout to play a
higher game, and an armistice might have been more combated.”19
On the positive side of the ledger, Stewart lauded the Prussians, calling
them “infinitely better” than the Russians. “They have everywhere greatly
distinguished themselves, and will do much more in a little time. You cannot
send them too much ammunition and arms. Russia rides the bear over them,
but they are obedient and patient, and I will pledge my faith for theirs;
although the Germans will not burn their Moscow, and lay waste to their
country, still they will be true; and Prussia will not be the first power that
will withdraw from [the] English alliance.”20
Stewart’s letter conveying news of the armistice reached Castlereagh on
22 June. With his confidence shaken, Castlereagh responded: “we are in
great anxiety to hear from you upon the armistice. Its extension to 20 July
puzzles and alarms us for the temper of Austria.”21 Despite this, Castlereagh
initially played into Metternich’s hands by declining the Austrian mediation

and by refusing to send a negotiator or even “precise orders as to the
negotiations that may possibly arise, pending the armistice. Our general
views and existing engagements are sufficiently understood . . . to have their
due influence in any decision to be taken.”22 He instructed the British
ambassador and military commissioner to Russia, General William Cathcart,
“to guard against a Continental peace being made to our exclusion.”23
Castlereagh also urged both Stewart and Cathcart to do all they could to
heal the rift between Alexander and Bernadotte. In early 1813, before
Frederick William broke his alliance with Napoleon, Castlereagh resigned
himself to granting very generous terms to Bernadotte “to raise the north of
Germany, where Prussia still lay apparently supine.” Pressed to decide
between Denmark and Russian-backed Sweden, Castlereagh chose the latter
and so threw British support behind Bernadotte’s plan to annex Norway.
According to the initial plan, Bernadotte’s Swedes, reinforced by North
Germans who rallied for liberation from the French yoke, would form a
large force to strike Napoleon’s flank while the Russians attacked his front.
After making his deal with the devil, Castlereagh endeavored “to get as
much value as possible out of Bernadotte for the common cause.” Despite
giving money and the promise of Norway, the British found a troublesome
bedfellow in the former French marshal. Negotiations between the Russians
and Danes had left him feeling double-crossed by Alexander, particularly
after the tsar did not provide the Russian auxiliary corps stipulated in their
treaty arrangements. The failure of North Germany to rise and rally to the
Allied cause soured all parties involved.24
“We have done everything to prevail upon the Prince Royal to manage
matters with your parties,” Castlereagh wrote to Stewart, “and I trust all
may be arranged before the resumption of hostilities.” The foreign secretary
insisted that “nothing would have half so good an effect as a personal
interview” between Alexander and Bernadotte. “I have written officially to
recommend it; and I do hope Lord Cathcart and you will labor to bring it
about.” Castlereagh also pressed Cathcart to arrange a meeting between
Alexander and Bernadotte: “I am sorry to observe asperities still existing
between the Tsar and Prince Royal. As the Prince Royal has expressed his
wish that they should meet and settle all matters in the true spirit of a
common cause, I hope you will be enabled to bring this about. I am sure
three hours would do more, so employed, than volumes of dispatches and
autographical letters.”25 To lay the groundwork for such a meeting, the
Swedish diplomat Anders Fredrik Skjöldebrand made his way to Reich-
enbach in mid June. At the end of the month, Bernadotte received a letter
from Alexander inviting the crown prince to meet with him at the Silesian
town of Trachenberg (Żmigród).26
Despite the suspicion caused by the armistice, Stewart and Cathcart

continued to negotiate with the Prussians and Russians respectively over
£2,000,000 in subsidies that London had offered to divide between the two.
A strong push by Hardenberg to secure Hanover for Prussia momentarily
damaged relations until the British firmly declared Hanover to be off limits.
With this matter settled, Stewart and Hardenberg concluded a subsidy
agreement on 14 June that granted the Prussians £666,666 in monthly
payments to maintain a field army of 80,000 men. Although the Prussians
eventually fielded double this number, they still received only one-third of
the £2,000,000. Cathcart and Nesselrode concluded a similar Anglo-Russian
treaty on 15 June 1813 after the British accepted Alexander’s claim that the
armistice and subsequent negotiations were necessary to bind Austria to the
coalition. Per the treaty signed at the tsar’s headquarters in Peterwaldau
(Pieszyce) near Reichenbach, the British pledged to pay the Russians
£1,133,334 in monthly installments ending on 1 January 1814 for the main-
tenance of a field army of 160,000 men. In addition, the Russians would
receive £500,000 for the support of their fleet. As for Austria, Castlereagh
instructed Stewart “to bring Austria to a point, and, if she takes the field, to
give her half a million to help her on.”27
In addition to the subsidy treaties, the British accepted a Russian request
for a special issue of paper money called “federative paper” to enable the
Russians and Prussians to pay their military expenses. The British proposed
limiting the issue to £5,000,000 redeemable at 5 percent interest six months
after the peace or on 1 July 1815, whichever came first. All federative paper
could be used only to cover the cost of military expenditure. Moreover,
Great Britain would assume responsibility for half the capital and interest,
Russia one-third, and Prussia one-sixth. Finally, London would never be
asked to assume responsibility for more than one-half the total issue.
Although the British accepted this last point, the Allies then insisted that
London assume the capital and interest for the full amount.28
Castlereagh “fully approved” of the conduct of his two envoys “in
concluding the treaties at the period they were signed.”29 Regardless, the
foreign secretary balked at the Russo-Prussian request for London to
assume the capital and interest for the full £5,000,000 of federative paper.
He explained to Stewart in a letter of 22 June that:
We did not hesitate to agree to bear our share, if the system could be reduced
to practice; but it is too much to expect that we should take the whole, with
all its possible abuses, upon ourselves.30 There would be nearly equal difficulty
in introducing a British paper into circulation in Germany, under the present
circumstances, with one jointly issued by the combined powers. If it should be
found that the credits of the three powers cannot be advantageously combined
in the same paper, we might undertake to be answerable for an issue not
exceeding 750,000 Thalers per month in paper, for the reimbursement of which
Great Britain should be separately liable, till the whole sum of £2,500,000 was
issued, which would be in about twenty months – but our responsibility cannot
be pushed beyond the original limits, nor should we bear more than our
share of the progressive monthly expenditure of the armies.31
Castlereagh also reminded Stewart to urge the Allies to give “full scope
to British commerce, in order that they might draw their subsidy at a more
favorable rate of exchange. It is too unrealistic, first to cramp our commerce
by prohibitions and high duties, and then expect us to incur the loss of
exchange produced by their own injudicious policy.” In general, the foreign
secretary explained to his brother that “the whole question of money has
become a very difficult one, since Hamburg has been reoccupied, and the
Allies have fallen back. I trust, however, Austria will take her part and
the sources of remittance may again be extended.” Until the subsidy treaties
with the Russians and Prussians could be ratified, Castlereagh authorized
Stewart and Cathcart to “draw to the extent of the monthly installments,
which, upon the £2,000,000 sterling, ought not, with a view to the exchange,
exceed £200,000 in any one month.”32 Negotiations continued until
11 August, when the British government accepted an Allied proposal that
reduced the issue of federative paper to £2,500,000 with London accepting
responsibility for the full amount.33 In return for this financial assistance,
no separate peace with Napoleon would be signed and Hanover would
be restored to Great Britain. Another stipulation allowed British officers
to accompany the operations of each Allied army. Cathcart signed an add-
itional agreement with the Russians for London to cover the costs of 10,000
men of the German Legion.34
As for Sweden, on 21 June the British minister-plenipotentiary to
Stockholm, Edward Thornton, relayed to Castlereagh the details of a
discussion he had had with Bernadotte about “the measures to be taken
by Great Britain and by Sweden in concert, in case the present armistice
should be terminated by a pacification between Russia and France, to the
exclusion of the two former powers.” Although Thornton guaranteed
Castlereagh that he had received assurances from numerous officials as well
as from Bernadotte himself that nothing in particular had moved the
Swedish crown prince to raise the subject, the memory of Tilsit and
Franco-Russian rapprochement still lingered. Thornton forwarded
Bernadotte’s suggestion that the size of the Anglo-Swedish force in North
Germany be increased to 50,000 men with a view “to cooperate with Russia
and Prussia at the close of the armistice, but also with that of being able to
act independently of those powers, in case they should make a separate
peace.” The crown prince assured Thornton that, should Russia conclude a
separate peace with France, an Anglo-Swedish force of 50,000 men could
reembark, take the island of Zealand, and there “carry on a successful war,
in this or the succeeding campaign, even on the Continent, or at any rate

present a point of union for any future struggles which might be made on
the Continent for the liberties of Europe.” According to Thornton,
Bernadotte then proceeded to the heart of the matter, stating that “while
Sweden should obtain by this measure the kingdom of Norway (without
which it was impossible, he said, that he or the Swedish army could return
to Sweden) Great Britain might keep the island of Zealand as a means for
the restitution of Hanover at a future peace; and if that was not obtained,
might possess it, with the neighboring islands in perpetuity.” Although he
remained silent on this subject during the conversation with Bernadotte,
Thornton expressed to Castlereagh his personal support of the proposal,
citing “the importance of Zealand to the security of Sweden and of the
Baltic for England.” Admitting the sensitivity of the subject, the British
envoy nevertheless encouraged Castlereagh to consider the proposal. “It
was, in fact,” he wrote, “the first time that the Prince Royal spoke of it to
me or before me with so much detail, sensible perhaps of the repugnance
which I felt at entertaining such propositions at this particular moment, of
which even the discussion is calculated to alienate and to embitter, though
they cannot, in common political and military prudence, be too soon
maturely considered and determined upon, at least in secret.”35
In a second dispatch written on 21 June, Thornton alerted Castlereagh to
a 7 June letter from Tsar Alexander to Bernadotte that explained the former’s
reasons for accepting the armistice. On Bernadotte’s orders, the Swedish
statesman Baron Gustaf af Wetterstedt shared the contents of the letter with
Thornton.36 With a hint of relief, he informed Castlereagh that, “from the
views taken in that letter of the motives of the armistice, and of the deter-
mination of the courts of Prussia and Russia to take the first opportunity of
declaring it broken, it is not to be thought that there exists any intention of
coming to a congress for the purpose of a general, and still less of a separate
pacification; and the gentleman who showed me this letter . . . was earnest to
impress this opinion on me, for the sake of its being imparted to his
Majesty’s Government.” Although the French took “for granted” the meet-
ing of a congress for further negotiations, Thornton assured Castlereagh that
“nothing in the Russian correspondence quite warrants them to draw this
conclusion.” Nevertheless, he did not rule out the possibility of a peace
congress. Moreover, he warned that Bernadotte harbored “a very great
distrust and jealousy” of the tsar that would not be “easy entirely to
eradicate.” Thornton hoped to “soften it as not to let it interfere with the
most cordial cooperation (if cooperation is intended), which is as much as
can be done at present.”
As noted, Bernadotte requested a meeting with Alexander but at the time
Thornton penned his report no answer had arrived. Should the Russian
monarch decline, Thornton feared “the distrust w[ould] be almost
irremovable; and all the movements, even on a renewal of hostilities, w[ould]

be calculated on a latent idea of the possibility of being abandoned.” He
explained that the failure of both the Russian and the Prussian courts to give
“the very earliest intimation of the first proposition by the French of an
armistice is another ground of mistrust, which has really been of great injury
to the cause.” As proof that the negotiations for an armistice had been
underway for some time, Bernadotte explained to Thornton his belief that
all French operations had been based on the certainty of an armistice being
concluded on a specific date. According to Thornton’s report on this con-
versation, “Hamburg was pressed with that sole view: and the Prince
declared that Oudinot (the Duke of Reggio) had orders to get possession
of Berlin, even at the expense of half his corps, because an armistice, dating
its dispositions from 8 June, at midnight, would have left this capital, as well
as Hamburg, in possession of the French.” Thanks to Bülow’s victory over
Oudinot at Luckau on 6 June, the French had failed to reach Berlin. Yet
Bernadotte assured Thornton that the important city of Hamburg likewise
would have remained in Allied hands during the armistice “if the Prince
Royal, by being apprised of an intended armistice, could have seized Ham-
burg by the sudden advance of a considerable force.”37
Castlereagh reacted to Bernadotte’s concerns by upping Great Britain’s
ante in North Germany and dispatching all spare regiments to Stralsund.
Including artillery and cavalry, he estimated these reinforcements to number
5,000 men. Moreover, he authorized Thornton to expand the German
Legion from 10,000 to 15,000 combatants. An arms depot with 20,000 to
30,000 stands would be established at Stralsund which the Russians and
Prussians could also draw from as soon as they exhausted the 70,000 stands
shipped to Kolberg.38 Nevertheless, Great Britain could not provide an
endless supply of war materiel. “As our supplies are becoming scarce,”
Castlereagh informed Cathcart, “we must not let them lie idle in the maga-
zines of our Allies – they must now be spared only upon an actual need that
is proven to exist, and in their distribution, relative claims must be weighed
upon principles of military efficiency.”39
Stewart also finalized the subsidy treaty first negotiated with the Swedes
on 3 March to insure that Bernadotte would not seek a friend in Napoleon.
Although the Swedish contribution during the Spring Campaign was negli-
gible, the British accepted Bernadotte’s claim of logistical and financial
hardship. They agreed to a £1,000,000 subsidy for 30,000 Swedes to fight
on the continent, naval support in Sweden’s war against Denmark for
Norway, and the acquisition of the island of Guadeloupe. Moreover, Russia
and Prussia pledged to support the 30,000 Swedes with 35,000 Russians and
27,000 Prussians – no strings attached. Such a commitment to Bernadotte’s
army excited Castlereagh: “It has occurred to me that, in the event of
hostilities recommencing, and the Prince Royal advancing, the Northern
operation may become a great feature, and essentially interesting to Prussia.”

At the same time, concern that Bernadotte would remain idle just as he had
done in the Spring Campaign prompted Castlereagh to suggest that Stewart
join the crown prince’s headquarters after hostilities resumed; Cathcart
would remain with Allied Headquarters. Castlereagh mentioned to Stewart
that General Alexander Hope believed that the crown prince “would be glad
to have you with him, and to lean on your advice and support. Of course
this could only be done with perfect concurrence of the King of Prussia; but
it occurs to me that, as his Majesty cannot well in person superintend the
Prince Royal’s operations, the King of Prussia might find a particular advan-
tage in having you with him to animate his exertions, and to direct them as
far as possible in the spirit of his policy and interests.” This set the stage for
Charles Stewart to be assigned to Bernadotte’s headquarters during the Fall
Campaign.40 Despite his presence, Allied military operations in North
Germany would be held hostage by the Swedish prince royal.41
Meanwhile, the Allies continued their councils of war after Toll returned
to Reichenbach with the Gitschin Agreement. Comprehensive plans flowed
in from many sources, including three from Bernadotte, all of which con-
cerned a neutral Austria. Bernadotte’s desire to be placed at the head of the
strongest Russo-Prussian army provided the common thread in all three of
his proposals. If Austria entered the war on the side of the Allies, the
Austrian army would act as an “auxiliary corps” in Bohemia and proceed
accordingly.42 Moreover, he did not advise seizing the offensive against
Napoleon himself but instead advocated conducting the war against his
rearward communication with France, liberating Hamburg and Lübeck,
conquering Holstein and Westphalia, invading Denmark, and sparking
revolt in Holland and Belgium. Thus, his plans sought to avoid an encounter
with his former master by operating on the lower Elbe, the lower Weser, and
the lower Rhine. His proposals attracted little interest at Reichenbach.43
Despite Bernadotte’s bloviating, a pessimistic 20 June memorandum by
Frederick William’s adjutant-general, Colonel Karl Friedrich von dem
Knesebeck, influenced Allied Headquarters by introducing the concept of
a third Allied army and proposing an Austria-first strategy. One of the best-
educated officers in the Prussian army, Knesebeck served as Frederick
William’s “strategist,” and Alexander also held his military opinions “in
high esteem.”44 Major Rudolf Friederich, whose three-volume study of the
Fall Campaign led to his appointment as chief of Military Historical Section
II of Germany’s Great General Staff in 1908, describes Knesebeck thus:
He belonged to a school of strategy that based its ideas of warfare on the

latter stages of the Seven Years War, particularly the warfare waged by Prince
Henry’s army in which strategy was reduced to a scientific formula based in
part on geography and in part on mathematics. He had studied the wars of
3 Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, Charles XIV John of Sweden, 1763–1844
the French Revolution with care and also followed Napoleon’s feats of arms
with thoroughness, without ever being completely clear on the real causes of
the successes of this man. By nature tending to be extremely cautious,
pessimistic, and pusillanimous, he sought the decisive moment by avoiding
battle against Napoleon; ambiguous ideas on the influence of geographic
conditions and strategic lines, which mastered so many of the excellent
officers of that time, determined his view of the situation, and he believed
that the same fundamental beliefs were also accepted by Napoleon, and so it
was that he ascribed plans to the enemy that were the farthest from the minds
of French commanders.45
With a captive audience, Knesebeck’s memo began with an overview of

available field forces for both sides: 390,000 men for the Allies and a total of
270,000 for Napoleon with 150,000 spread east from Dresden to the neutral
zone in Silesia and the remaining 120,000 at Würzburg. As for theaters,
Knesebeck urged the Allies to consider the Danube valley: “A look at the
map shows that the extended line of the Danube falls right in the middle of
the French forces; pursue a war on this river and France will fall much easier
than pursuing a war on the Elbe and the Oder. Indeed, one can add that a
war on these latter rivers would be possible only through a shift in French
forces, where a war on the Danube itself moves them back to their natural
tracks. Austria’s entry into the Coalition again brings France back to its
natural theater of war.” He speculated that, as soon as Austria declared
against him, Napoleon would transfer the theater of war either to Bohemia
or to the Danube valley, therefore directing his main blow against Austria.
To invade Bohemia, his main force could follow the course of the Elbe while
the secondary army advanced from Würzburg through Eger (Cheb) or
Pilsen (Plzeň). Conversely, Napoleon could shift forces so that his main
army marched from Würzburg through Münich and Passau to reach the
Danube’s right bank and then head straight to Vienna. The troops north of
Bohemia would support this movement by inundating Austrian territory
from Dresden and Zittau.
“In both cases,” continued Knesebeck, “he will attack the Austrian army
with superior forces. A mere auxiliary corps in Bohemia will not suffice, one
must see in the course of the armistice 130,000 to 140,000 men (i.e. the entire
army standing in Silesia) march to Bohemia. Czaslau [Čáslav] or Prague,
each according to time and situation, might be chosen as the point of union.”
Knesebeck then called for a third Allied army – “the Combined Army of the
North” – to immediately advance from Berlin to Dresden or Leipzig “while
in Silesia the Landwehr battalions and the strongly occupied fortresses must
suffice.” In his opinion, the best case for the Allies but the least likely to
unfold would be if Napoleon turned against the Russians and Prussians in
Silesia with his main army and against the Austrians with his secondary
army. This would require the Allies “to advance from Brandenburg, Silesia,
and Bohemia against the enemy’s main army, which would be on the Elbe or
in Lusatia or in Silesia.” If the Allies quickly executed these movements so
that their armies could cooperate within a few days, Knesebeck predicted
that “victory [would be] very probable. However, it should not be assumed
that Napoleon will place himself in this position, nor is he likely to proceed
against Berlin.”
Knesebeck concluded by suggesting that, as soon as Austria declared
war, the main Russo-Prussian army in Silesia “rush” to Bohemia and unite
with the Austrians. He assigned the Combined Army of the North the task
of advancing toward Dresden to operate against Napoleon’s left flank and
communications. Referencing Bernadotte’s plans, Knesebeck cautioned
against an eccentric operation in North Germany by the Combined Army.
Instead, it should always seek to move as close as possible to the main Allied
army in Bohemia:
If all powers devote strength, unity, decisiveness, goodwill, and resolve to

such an operation, the outcome of the campaign could be successful for the
Allies. In the opposite case, one can expect no favorable results, even if
Austria participates in the war. The mere addition of this power means more
forces, but does not secure success. Only the march to Bohemia, executed in a
timely fashion during the course of the armistice, makes it possible to start
operations with a successful offensive; its objective is the French army that
stands on the Elbe; against Würzburg the defensive can be maintained.
Indeed, even if it does not again come to war, such a union of the Allies
would have the greatest influence on the peace negotiations. It would
militarily and politically impress Napoleon. In any case this operation is so
necessary that one can say that the fate of Europe depends on it; only this can
save Austria.46
Although he granted the Allies a numerical superiority of 120,000 men,

Knesebeck viewed Austria as seriously threatened; in his opinion, saving
Austria had to be the Coalition’s primary responsibility. Rather than
Barclay’s proposal of 25,000 men, he advocated sending the entire Russo-
Prussian army to Bohemia. He accepted that this step would grant Austria
both military and political leadership of the Allied war effort and in return
Russia and Prussia should show “goodwill and determination.” While his
plan contained offensive elements, it surrendered the initiative to Napoleon,
allowing the emperor to concentrate his troops at any point and direct them
anywhere. An unexpected positive result did emerge from Knesebeck’s plan
and subsequent lobbying: making “the fate of Europe” solely dependent on
the salvation of Austria increased the willingness of Kaiser Francis and the
Austrian General Staff to join the Coalition.47
The idea of a third Allied army resonated in two separate plans submit-
ted to Frederick William by Prussian officers – Karl Leopold von Borstell,
and Bülow along with Hermann von Boyen of the General Staff. Both plans
discount Austria’s participation, meaning that Napoleon would direct his
main offensive against Berlin and North Germany. Similar to Napoleon’s
own “master plan,” they envision an offensive through Berlin to Stettin
(Szczecin) with 150,000 men. Up to this point, the protection of Branden-
burg and Berlin had not figured in Allied war planning. Toll did not consider
a French offensive to the north because he understood Napoleonic warfare:
Napoleon would force a decisive battle in Silesia or Saxony. In his narrow,
Austria-first view, Knesebeck likewise did not give thought to Brandenburg
or the Baltic coast. Nevertheless, to protect North Germany and thwart an
operation to reach the Oder, the Borstell and Bülow/Boyen plans suggested
that all Allied forces found between the lower Elbe and the lower Vistula
should be concentrated. They wanted this army placed in the hands of a field
commander vested with unlimited authority, “who lives large and exalted
only in the promotion of the general cause, subordinating everything to the
success of the war and the understanding to act independently.” Although
they would come to regret it, the Prussians proposed Bernadotte as
their man.
Neither plan carried enough clout to impact Allied High Command at
Reichenbach, yet they did influence Frederick William.48 The Prussians
knew that, according to the 1812 Convention of Åbo, the tsar had agreed to
provide a Russian auxiliary corps to support the Swedes in North Germany.
They also knew that the Russians fell far short of providing the numbers
Alexander had promised. As a result, Bernadotte did not take part in the
Spring Campaign. Instead of viewing his idleness as grounds for suspicion,
Frederick William believed that the Allies could count on Bernadotte’s
active participation if they placed him at the head of significant forces. Both
Toll’s plan and the Gitschin Agreement envisioned Bülow’s corps operating
as a completely independent unit. “Anxiously conscientious and devoted to
agreements,” the king wanted to place Bülow as well as the small Russian
units already in North Germany under Bernadotte’s command. In this way,
Bernadotte would have no reason to be discontented. Based on Frederick
William’s arguments, the Russians revisited the idea of dividing all Allied
forces. Both monarchs rejected the earlier idea found in Toll’s plan as well as
the Gitschin Agreement of dividing Allied forces between Silesia and Bohe-
mia, whereby Berlin would be guarded only by weak detachments. Instead,
they accepted Knesebeck’s proposal that all Allied forces be divided between
Bohemia and Brandenburg with two-thirds posted in the former and one-
third in the latter.
Political considerations snapped the Prussians back to reality. It mattered
little whether the Allies posted their main army in Bohemia, Silesia, or
Brandenburg because Napoleon could not ignore it; he eventually would
confront it with his main force. However, if the Allies assembled two-thirds
of all their forces in Bohemia, the position of commander in chief would be
placed in the hands of an Austrian general. Posted in Brandenburg, the
remaining third would be commanded by the crown prince of Sweden in
part, ironically, due to Prussian insistence. This meant that Prussia, the state
fighting for its very existence, would have little influence on the conduct of
the war. Instead, Austria and Sweden – two states that had thus far provided
little proof that they deserved such responsibility – would direct the war.
Although Alexander would be an omniscient force at Allied Headquarters,
the Prussians realized that they could not place their fate in the hands of
Metternich and Bernadotte. Consequently, the Allies drew up a compromise
between Toll’s plan and the various proposals submitted by Knesebeck,
Borstell, and Bülow. A strong army under Bernadotte would be posted in
Brandenburg while the Austrian army in Bohemia would be increased by
two-thirds of the Russo-Prussian forces posted in Silesia. They calculated
that enough forces would remain in Silesia to form a third army of some
55,000 men. This army would be placed under the command of a Prussian
general, so that Prussia at least would have some influence on the course of
operations. It is not clear who made these proposals but it is clear that they
came from the Prussians. Likewise, it is certain that Alexander and his
generals assessed and endorsed this plan, especially because an Allied army
in Silesia could better cover Russian communications with Poland than the
Landwehr battalions Knesebeck suggested. Little did the Allies know how
crucial this decision would be for their war effort.
Sensing a drift toward war before all diplomatic efforts were exhausted,
Kaiser Francis reeled in his generals and urged caution. On 26 June, the
Prussian envoy to the Austrian camps at Prague and Brandeis, Colonel Karl
Wilhelm von Grolman, reported to his king that Francis did not agree with a
premature rupture of the armistice. Grolman did not receive an explanation
and found that Austria’s mobilization had progressed far enough to risk such
a step. Moreover, the Austrians expressed concern that Napoleon would
mask the Russo-Prussian army in Silesia and use the armistice to concentrate
the bulk of his army on the left bank of the Elbe. In this way, he could
immediately launch an offensive against Austria as soon as the armistice
expired. Austria would then be forced to endure the entire weight of his
attack until the Allies marched 155 miles from eastern Silesia to Dresden.
Therefore, the Austrian generals requested that Wittgenstein’s corps be
assembled at Liebau (Lubawka) on the Austro-Prussian frontier to com-
mence the march to Bohemia as soon as the armistice expired on 20 July.
Lastly, the Austrians suggested that a powerful French offensive against
Austria would require the union of all Allied armies in Bohemia. In such a
scenario, the Allies could utilize three bridges over the Elbe at Leitmeritz,
Raudnitz (Roudnice nad Labem), and Melnik (Mělnı́k).49
Meanwhile, Austria’s diplomatic maneuvering resulted in Metternich’s
meeting with the Russians and Prussians at Reichenbach to determine a
minimum set of demands to present Napoleon as the price for a peace
conference. By the time he left for Dresden on 24 June at Napoleon’s
invitation, Metternich had achieved a victory at the exclusion of the British
and Swedes. The resulting Convention of Reichenbach authorized Metter-
nich to present Napoleon the four points as the price for convening a
preliminary peace conference. Should Napoleon refuse these conditions,
Austria would join the Sixth Coalition with at least 150,000 men and fight
for the harsher Allied peace terms as formulated by Hardenberg and
Nesselrode in the Wurschen Convention of 16 May, mainly the dissolution
of the Confederation of the Rhine and the restoration of Prussia to its
full 1806 status. Moreover, if the war resumed, Russia and Prussia could
demand further conditions for peace; again, the British and Swedes were not
informed of the existence of the Reichenbach Convention.50
Metternich departed for Dresden believing he had fair terms to offer for
the basis of a peace between the continental powers. Should Napoleon
refuse, he could threaten him with a coalition consisting of all four powers.
The famous nine-hour meeting between Napoleon and Metternich on
26 June fell far short of the Austrian minister’s expectations. Metternich
offered to end the war through negotiation, claiming that a peace settlement
would preserve Napoleon’s crown. In return, the Austrians demanded an

independent and neutral Central Europe. After the French had driven the
Allies from the Saale to the Oder in less than one month, Metternich’s veiled
threat enraged Napoleon. Calling Metternich a liar, he demanded that the
Austrian reveal his government’s true objective.51 “So you want war? Well,
you shall have it,” screamed Napoleon. “I annihilated the Prussian army at
Lützen; I smashed the Russians at Bautzen; now you want to have your turn.
Very well – we shall meet at Vienna.”52
Metternich’s negotiations with Napoleon, which continued on 27, 28,
and 29 June, revealed the futility of making any demands on the French
emperor as a price for commencing peace negotiations. After four days of
wrangling, Metternich completely dropped the four points of his minimum
program. In this way, he managed to convince Napoleon to accept the
Convention of Dresden on 30 June. Thus, Napoleon consented to an
Austrian-led preliminary peace conference to convene at Prague on 5 July.
Should this conference establish a preliminary settlement, a general congress
would convene to establish continental peace. Not only did the Convention
of Dresden ignore the stipulations of the Reichenbach Convention, but it
also extended the armistice from 20 July to 10 August with a further six-day
suspension of hostilities. In the hot seat, Stadion explained to the Allies that
the extension was serving as a ploy to gain time for the Austrian army to
complete its mobilization.53 The peace conference began at Prague on 5 July
with Baron Johann von Anstedt representing Russia and Wilhelm von
Humboldt Prussia, but the chief French representative, Armand de Cau-
laincourt, did not arrive until the 28th, thus revealing Napoleon’s ultimate
indifference to the meeting’s success. As Cathcart wrote, “He was too aware
that for him, personally, the end of war could not be peace. The demon he
had unchained and let lose upon the world, if deprived of its prey, would
have turned inevitably in vengeance on the hand which should attempt to
curb it.”54
From the Austrian viewpoint, Metternich’s failure to impose the four
points on Napoleon signaled the improbability of a negotiated peace. Con-
sequently, Vienna moved closer to the Russians and Prussians, who reluc-
tantly accepted Stadion’s explanations. Joining the Coalition and fighting
France in a fifth war since 1792 seemed likely for Austria.55 Yet as of 3 July,
“the prospects of gaining Austria” as an ally appeared bleak to the British
and Swedes. Thornton reported that, despite the tsar’s upcoming visit with
Francis at Gitschin, “the Emperor of Austria is not to be gained to a hostile
declaration against France by any inducements that Russia and Prussia can at
present offer to him.” After the details of Metternich’s minimum peace plan
became known, the situation only worsened. Thornton described the four
points as containing “the most unpalatable conditions of peace.” Although
he predicted that Napoleon would ultimately reject them, Thornton still
faulted Metternich: “instead of acting upon them, [he] retrenches, modifies,

and retouches them, in order to render them more palatable to Bonaparte.
This is the conduct of a power seeking reconciliation, rather than justifiable
grounds for a declaration of hostilities.” Thornton hoped that Bernadotte,
who planned to meet with Alexander and Frederick William at Trachenberg,
“might have influence enough to encourage the two Allied courts to con-
tinue the war, and to draw Austria into it by an application to her fears, since
every other motive is ineffectual.” According to his Russian opposite at
Bernadotte’s headquarters, Carl Andreas Pozzo di Borgo, Alexander would
have to threaten to make a separate peace with Napoleon to force Francis
into the war. “It is evident that Austria dreads as much a peace between the
Allied courts and France, to which she is not a party, as a hostile declaration
against the latter.”56
Regarding Sweden, Bernadotte could hardly contain himself after learn-
ing that the tsar had accepted Metternich’s four points, which said nothing of
Sweden receiving Norway. Nesselrode attempted to explain that the subject
could not be broached “without giving France a right of interfering in a
business already decided.” Thornton claimed that, despite the “force and
justice” of Nesselrode’s reasoning, the neglect of Sweden’s interests “has
once more mortified the Prince Royal, and he has expressed himself to me
upon it, and upon the want of attention to the interests of Great Britain, with
a great deal of warmth.” To calm him, Thornton observed that, in declining
the Austrian mediation, Great Britain could not expect Metternich to cham-
pion the interests of George III. In the case of Sweden, he asserted that
reminding Napoleon of Denmark’s interests “by having the claims of
Sweden put forward” might not be the best way for Bernadotte to attain
his prize.57 At the least, Bernadotte could take comfort in the fact that he
would meet with Alexander at Trachenberg.
Metternich’s twists and turns along with troubling reports from the
British envoys in Central Europe caused much trepidation at London. On
30 June, Castlereagh instructed Cathcart “to endeavor to bring the court of
Vienna to a private explanation of its views. It is not for Great Britain to
goad other powers into exertions which they deem inconsistent with their
own safety; but . . . we should know on what we have to reckon. The rapid
progress of the British arms in Spain will, I trust, prove that we are not
disposed to be inactive.”58 On 6 July, he described the renewal of hostilities,
with Austria fighting against France, “as the safest policy for Europe in the
long run.” Yet Castlereagh feared that “impracticability on our part” could
lead to a Franco-Austrian rapprochement which in turn would produce a
general peace that ignored British interests “notwithstanding our treaties.”
He insisted that Cathcart avow London’s “readiness to treat with our
Allies . . . [so] that they have no reproach to make against us. The great
practical question is a renewal of hostilities or a prolongation of armistice.
If the accomplishment of a reasonably solid peace, through negotiation, is not

clear, hesitation in recurring to hostilities will damp and disunite the confeder-
acy, and the resources of the Allies will be wasted in inactivity; better in
that case try the fate of war for the remainder of the campaign, and let future
policy be governed by the result.”
Coming when British interests seemed so neglected by the Eastern
powers, Wellington’s 21 June victory over Joseph Bonaparte at Vitoria
appeared to provide London with much-needed leverage.59 “The recent
successes in Spain have put us on strong ground,” Castlereagh explained to
Cathcart on 6 July. “We can now with honor evince a disposition to concur
with our Continental Allies in negotiations; having done so, we shall act on
our own part with more effect, if fortune and friends should forsake us. Lord
Wellington’s successes may now give us the title to treat for our Allies, the
Spaniards, with the possession of the Peninsula on our side; to hazard such
an advantage by showing a reluctance to negotiate, while Russia and Prussia
are negotiating under the Austrian mediation, could not be borne out as a
line of separate policy.” Despite Metternich’s efforts to ignore the British,
Castlereagh recognized the importance of maintaining at least the semblance
of a united coalition against Napoleon. “The risk of treating with France is
great, but the risk of losing our Continental Allies and the confidence of our
own nation is greater. We must preserve our own faith inviolate to Spain,
Portugal, Sicily, and Sweden.”60 Still, Castlereagh believed a coalition con-
sisting of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Sweden could defeat Napoleon
in Central Europe. As for Austria, on 28 July61 he expressed his hope to
Cathcart that “Lord Wellington’s progress and victory will have animated
the councils at Trachenberg, and induced Austria to take a more decisive
tone. Of all the Powers, Austria will be the first sacrifice of an inadequate
arrangement; and if, with the present means assembled against France, she
cannot erect an adequate barrier for her own preservation, she ought never
to have emerged from her servile relations to Buonaparte.”62
Alexander’s upcoming meeting with Bernadotte provided an opportun-
ity to finalize a plan of operations. Thus, the Allied monarchs called a
conference at the estate near Trachenberg belonging to Prussian general
Franz Ludwig von Hatzfeldt. The Russian and Prussian monarchs arrived
around noon on 9 July; the crown prince of Sweden and his entourage
shortly after midnight. Talks on the 10th focused on diplomacy. Bernadotte
came to Trachenberg convinced that Austria would not join the Coalition.
Instead, he believed Francis would remain neutral while the other powers
cannibalized themselves in a bloody struggle. He predicted that the Aus-
trians would enter the war at the last moment to play the main role at the
peace table. Backed by his fresh legions, Francis would win the lion’s share
of the spoils. Alexander and Frederick William sought to reconcile the
prince royal, assuring him that they at least intended to renew the war with
Napoleon. Although pleased by these statements, Bernadotte received no

satisfactory answer regarding their thoughts on Austria. Hoping the Allies
had received a written pledge from Francis to join the Sixth Coalition, he
learned to his dismay that they had not. Instead, Alexander shared a letter
from Francis promising war should Napoleon reject any of the four points
contained in the Convention of Reichenbach, which the Convention of
Dresden had already rendered worthless. Moreover, neither monarch
thought it prudent to reveal the terms of the Reichenbach Convention to
Bernadotte. Instead, they made a poor attempt to portray Metternich’s
verbal duel with Napoleon as proof of Austria’s goodwill. Despite “winning
the favor of both monarchs in the shortest time,” neither Frederick William
nor Alexander could change Bernadotte’s opinion.63
Ultimately, two meetings with Stadion that lasted for several hours on
11 July managed to allay the crown prince’s deep mistrust of the Habsburgs.
Initially reserved, he became more relaxed as the Austrian envoy explained
his state’s certain path to war with Napoleon. Bernadotte then turned the
conversation to Norway, stating that he came not to save Central Europe as
Gustavus Adolphus had in the seventeenth century, but only to gain
Norway for Sweden; he demanded to know where Austria stood on the
matter. Informed by the tsar of Bernadotte’s displeasure with Metternich for
omitting the issue of Norway in his discussions with Napoleon, Stadion
strummed the right chords. He explained that Metternich had not men-
tioned the issue because Austria considered the affair to be between Great
Britain and the Scandinavian states. At a general European peace congress
rather than the preliminary conference convening at Prague, Sweden’s inter-
ests would be ranked alongside those of the other powers. Should the Prague
conference fail to bring about conditions for a general peace congress,
Austria would join the Sixth Coalition. Stadion pledged that Vienna would
abide by the agreements Stockholm made with Russia and Prussia to support
Sweden’s claim to Norway. Although Stadion had no authority to make such
guarantees, Bernadotte appeared very satisfied.
Later on the 11th, Toll, Knesebeck, the Dutch-born Russian general and
diplomat Jan Pieter van Suchtelen, and the chief of staff of the Russian Army
General Pyotr Volkonsky represented the Allies in a council of war with
Bernadotte and Swedish general Curt Stedingk. Due to Stadion’s success,
Bernadotte agreed that Napoleon would direct his first attack against
Austria. In this case, he vowed to conduct an energetic advance from North
Germany to cross the Elbe and reach Dresden as soon as possible. If the
Allied army in Silesia advanced through Lusatia “or on the most direct road
toward the enemy,” he held Napoleon to be as good as lost. Bernadotte
urged the Allies “to advance with energy, without being delayed by maneu-
vers, calculations, and those fallacies of military science that through
wavering reservations so often confound the surest and best-laid plans.”64
Toll also presented his plan along with the ideas contained in the
Gitschin Agreement. Bernadotte purportedly responded with shouts of “très
bien! C’est très vrai.” To allow for the freedom of discussion, neither
Alexander nor Frederick William participated in the talks on the 11th.
Stadion did not attend any of the general meetings, which indicates that
the Trachenberg conference sought to establish agreement between the
Russians, Prussians, British, and Swedes rather than draft a final plan of
operations.65 In particular, the Russians and Prussians wanted to assign the
crown prince a specific task and place at his disposal the necessary forces
to accomplish it. Müffling provides insight into the tsar’s interest in cultivat-
ing Bernadotte as a means to smooth relations between Sweden and Russia
after the latter had not fulfilled the promises made at Åbo: “The tsar
required his cooperation in settling relations between Russia and Sweden;
and this was sufficient reason for us to endeavor to satisfy the crown prince
to the extent that the tsar would have confidence in him and thus be able to
employ his forces outside the Russian Empire and against Napoleon to the
advantage of his allies, and be able to advance to the Rhine without appre-
hension for his own states. From our proceedings, the crown prince dis-
covered that the fortunate moment had placed him in a position to make
large demands.”66
The stars seemed to align for the crown prince of Sweden on 11 July.
That night, the tsar promised Bernadotte that he would break diplomatic
relations with Denmark. Conversely, the crown prince accepted advice from
Alexander and Frederick William to demonstrate good faith toward Austria
by approving the continuation of the armistice. Bernadotte likewise declined
an indirect invitation to participate in the Prague conference on the grounds
that the agenda did not include Norway and that he did not want to offend
the British, who had not sent an envoy to Prague. In military matters,
Bernadotte learned that evening that, should the war resume, his “army”
would receive one Russian corps numbering 22,000 men and more than
40,000 Prussians. Combined with his 30,000 Swedes and the 20,000 men of
German and Hanseatic Legions, Bernadotte would command well over
100,000 men. This news more than satisfied his vanity.67 “There is no
denying that the crown prince is an engaging and intelligent gentleman,”
said Frederick William to his adjutant, Wilhelm Ludwig Viktor Henckel von
Donnersmarck, shortly before breakfast on the 12th.68
Before noon on 12 June, Stadion delivered a response from Kaiser
Francis to a letter penned by Bernadotte on 23 May. Although filled with
phrases to flatter the prince royal, Francis assured him that, “animated by an
equal spirit of benevolence,” both Austria and Sweden would fight for the
“common rights of all states.” He explained that these views “dictate the
efforts I am making through negotiations and, if they should fail, then
through arms to achieve a state of peace, which is Europe’s primary need.
The latest information I have received from the headquarters of Their

Majesties the Tsar of Russia and the King of Prussia brought me the greatest
pleasure by giving me the hope that the obstacles that seemed opposed to the
cooperation of the forces under Your Royal Majesty’s command have been
removed. I regard this cooperation as one of the strongest supports for the
cause of the powers, which may again have to be defended by a war that does
not stand a chance of success unless supported by the greatest means and
especially the greatest unity.”69
Stadion also related the latest intelligence from Dresden courtesy of the
snooping Bubna: news of Wellington’s victory at Vitoria and the headlong
flight of Joseph’s army caused chaos at the French emperor’s headquarters.
A very reliable source confided to Bubna that the retreat of Joseph’s army to
the mountains of Pamplona could be compared to Napoleon’s retreat from
Moscow. For damage control, Napoleon immediately dispatched Marshal
Jean-de-Dieu Soult to Spain to take command. Napoleon’s figurehead for-
eign minister, Hugues-Bernard Maret, confided to Bubna that the Allies
should soon expect to learn “of the evacuation of Madrid” and “of great
concentrations” of French forces in the Biscay region of northeastern Spain.
Thornton maintained that the news of Wellington’s victory would influence
the Austrians to take heed of Anglo-Swedish interests: “this is visible” he
concluded, “in the answer of the Kaiser to the Crown Prince, which came
today from Austrian headquarters.” Euphoric at this news, the Swedish
crown prince told Thornton that Wellington’s victory probably would
induce Napoleon to withdraw his forces from Silesia and move his army
closer to the Rhine.70 Bernadotte went as far as to say:
If the results, which can be easily foreseen, soon arise, it cannot be doubted
that they will provide Napoleon with even more reason to withdraw the
majority of his troops behind the Elbe, perhaps to the upper Main to Würz-
burg and Bamberg and to attack us in Bohemia; this would be a decision of
desperation, which for the emperor of the French inevitably must be disas-
trous, especially if he ventures too far and reaches the vicinity of Vienna. In
this case, the Allies need only to march on him from the various directions
where they are located. Some 60,000 to 80,000 Russians united with the
Bohemian army would suffice to stop the French or even defeat them and
secure the fruits of their victory. With 80,000 to 100,000 men, he [Bernadotte]
himself would then march against the rear of the enemy as the troops in
Silesia marched against his flank . . . Thus, the French would find themselves
in a desperate situation, and the center of the Austrian monarchy would be
the grave of the great Napoleon and his boundless power outside the borders
of France.71
Although Bernadotte could not have been happier, the kaiser’s letter still
managed to earn Thornton’s suspicion.72 He informed Castlereagh that,
according to Bubna, Napoleon had accepted the extension of the armistice

from 20 July to 10 August only so he could better assess the situation in
Spain after Vitoria. Because Bubna learned that the reinforcements Napo-
leon expected from Spain would reach him before 20 July, Thornton
speculated that gaining “time to divide the Allies, to accede to the modified
bases of pacification proposed by Austria,” represented Napoleon’s true
motive for extending the armistice. Thornton believed that the Russians
and Prussians ultimately would reject Metternich’s four points rather than
base a general European peace on them, but “such an acceptance on the part
of Bonaparte is calculated to put the cooperation of Austria to some hazard,
unless she be fully determined to have recourse to arms. It is from that point,
more than from any other, that danger is now to be apprehended.”73
Later in the day, the council of war reconvened in the presence of
Alexander and Frederick William. Seated between the two monarchs, Ber-
nadotte took the lead role, making statements similar to those he had made
to Stadion and presenting specific proposals. After his adjutant-general, Karl
Löwenhjelm, read a written memorandum, he summarized his proposals
verbally:
(1) Three armies, the Grand or Bohemian Army, the Silesian, and the
Northern, should maneuver so that the enemy was not in a position to
attack one of them with all his forces.
(2) Therefore, these armies should operate at a distance from each other that
allowed them to support each other so that the enemy was not in a
position to attack one of them with his main force.
(3) If Napoleon’s main force attacks, the target must withdraw while the
other two armies attack the enemy’s line of communication so that he
will always be threatened in his flank and rear.
(4) The main force of the Allied armies should threaten the flanks and
interrupt the enemy’s line of operation.
(5) All should avoid decisive battles and instead maneuver to exhaust the
enemy. But if the enemy is divided, he should be attacked.74
As in June, Bernadotte’s military proposals again failed to attract the
interest of the Russians and Prussians. With all his experience as a marshal of
France, it is surprising how little the crown prince’s five points reflected
Napoleon’s art of war. Instead, true fear of his former master mastered
his thoughts. Insuring that under no circumstance would he have to face
Napoleon alone remained Bernadotte’s ultimate objective. Although far
from the principles that the Allies had formally accepted at Trachenberg,
the crown prince’s ideas closely resembled the campaign plans being pre-
pared in Bohemia by Radetzky.
Following this final discussion, Knesebeck, Volkonsky, and Swedish
general Löwenhjelm signed the Trachenberg Protocol for their respective
states. Russian general Hans Karl von Diebitsch immediately departed to

deliver a copy to Kaiser Francis at Brandeis-Altbunzlau (Brandýs nad
Labem-Stará Boleslav). The Allies took great pains to keep the Protocol
secret but unconfirmed rumors later spread that a copy had been smuggled
to Napoleon. Knesebeck claimed credit for designing the decisive plan and
for prevailing over the crown prince after vigorous debate. Toll did as well,
but for a long time public opinion regarded the crown prince of Sweden as
the sole author. Basically, the issue is moot. The Trachenberg Protocol
included ideas from earlier drafts made by Toll, Barclay, Radetzky,
Knesebeck, Boyen, and Bernadotte so that the whole was a compromise of
the views of these men and the interests of the three countries and armies
they represented.
According to the Protocol, the Allies would open the campaign with
three field armies. This decision arose more from the Coalition’s political
concerns than from strategic planning. Austria’s position remained vital:
only with the Austrians could the Allies achieve numerical superiority over
the French and their allies. Therefore, the Coalition needed to protect
the Austrian heartland, particularly Bohemia. A French offensive into the
Austrian interior that led to a separate peace between Kaiser Francis and
Napoleon would be devastating for the Russians and Prussians. Based on
this consideration, a large Allied army capable of both defending Bohemia as
well as executing offensive operations would be organized in Bohemia.
Meanwhile, the alliance with Great Britain and Sweden as well as with the
North German states such as Mecklenburg necessitated the posting of
another considerable Allied force in Brandenburg and along the lower Elbe
to maintain communication with Stralsund and Kolberg and to protect
North Germany from imperial forces at Lübeck and Hamburg. Finally,
the Allies deemed they needed a third army to cover Silesia and secure
communications with Russia. Consequently, the Coalition formed the
Bohemian, North German, and Silesian Armies. A fourth army – the
50,000 men assembling on the lower Vistula to form General Levin August
von Bennigsen’s Russian Reserve Army, later dubbed the Army of Poland –
would either reinforce the Army of Silesia if Napoleon conducted his main
offensive in that province or secure Poland should it be invaded.75
For the Allied army in Bohemia to be strong enough to both protect the
province and conduct offensive operations, a portion of the Russo-Prussian
army in Silesia, “90,000 to 100,000 men,” would march a few days before the
expiration of the armistice through Landeshut (Kamienna Góra) and Glatz
(Kłodzko) to unite with 120,000 Austrians at Jungbunzlau (Mladá Boleslav)
and Brandeis-Altbunzlau northeast of Prague to form the Army of
Bohemia.76 Also referred to as the Hauptarmee (main army) or Grand
Army, this force of 200,000 to 220,000 soldiers77 would serve as the Coali-
tion’s version of Napoleon’s Grande Armée by virtue of the presence of
the three Allied monarchs and their accompanying Guard formations.

Bernadotte received command of the second Allied army: the Army of
North Germany. While a corps of 15,000–20,000 soldiers took a position
on the lower Elbe to observe the Franco-Danish forces at Lübeck and
Hamburg, approximately 70,000 men would assemble south of Berlin
around Treuenbrietzen. According to the Protocol, Bernadotte would “cross
the Elbe between Torgau and Magdeburg, and then march on Leipzig
without delay.”
The third Allied force, the new Army of Silesia, would consist of the
50,000 Russo-Prussian troops that remained in the province after the
departure of the “90,000 to 100,000 men” to Bohemia. Moreover, it would
consist of both Russians and Prussians as opposed to the army assigned to
Blücher in late May, which contained only Prussian units. The 12 July
meeting ended before the Allies named a commander for the Army of
Silesia. Müffling maintains that, in addition to his own Army of North
Germany, Bernadotte actually requested command of the Silesian Army.
Moreover, he wanted General Bogislav Friedrich von Tauentzien’s Prus-
sian IV Corps assigned to the Army of North Germany. “These demands
were too great,” recalled Müffling, “and could not be conceded by the
sovereigns. The extension of the armistice from 20 July to 10 August with
an ensuing six-day suspension of hostilities minimized the immediate need
to name a commander for the Silesian Army. Nevertheless, Alexander
and Frederick William wanted Bernadotte to leave Trachenberg satisfied,
and so admitted that circumstances might occur that rendered it necessary
for him to assume command of Tauentzien’s corps as well as the Silesian
Army.” By the end of the armistice, Bernadotte had achieved his goal in
regards to Tauentzien’s corps, and he would not forget the promise made to
him concerning the Silesian Army.78
As for operations, the Bohemian Army either would invade Bavaria
through Eger and Hof, or move north into Saxony or northeast to Silesia,
or debouch south toward the Danube depending on the circumstances.
Should Napoleon invade Bohemia, Bernadotte would drive “as fast as
possible in forced marches” against his rear. If Napoleon turned against
the crown prince, the Bohemian Army would operate against his
communications to force him to deliver a battle. As for the “Allied army
in Silesia,” the plan stipulated that it would pursue the imperial forces
in Silesia to the Elbe, avoiding a general battle unless under extremely
favorable conditions. It would cross the Elbe between Torgau and Dres-
den, and unite with the Army of North Germany to provide a total of
120,000 men for Bernadotte’s operations. Although not directly stated in
the Protocol, such a union would place the Silesian Army under his
command. However, should the Bohemian Army require reinforcements
before the Army of Silesia joined the North German Army, the Silesian
Army would march “without delay” to Bohemia. These stipulations

would also not be forgotten.
In general, the Trachenberg Protocol called for the three Allied armies to
form a wide arc around the imperial forces in Saxony and Silesia. Yet nothing
is stated in the Protocol about retreating ahead of Napoleon’s onslaught.
Nor does the document contain any statements about attacking detached
French corps while avoiding the emperor’s main force. In fact, the Protocol
states exactly the opposite:
It has been agreed to adopt as the general principle that all Allied forces will
always go where the largest enemy forces are found. They will proceed in the
following manner:
(1) The corps that operate against the flanks and rear of the enemy must always
choose the line that leads most directly to the enemy’s line of operations.
(2) The largest Allied force must choose a position that places it in a position
to face the enemy wherever hе wants to turn. The salient bastion of
Bohemia seems advantageous for this.
In its essence, the Trachenberg Protocol established four basic yet crucial
tenets. First, all Allied forces would target the enemy’s main force. Second,
any Allied corps maneuvering against the enemy’s rear and flanks should
always seek the most direct route to strike the enemy’s main line of oper-
ations. Third, the Allies should always position their main force to be able to
make front in any direction taken by the enemy – the Protocol suggests
Bohemia. Finally, “all Allied armies will seize the offensive, and the enemy
camp shall be their rendezvous.” Thus, the core principles of the Trachen-
berg Protocol reflect the main lessons of modern war taught by Napoleon:
taking the initiative and targeting the enemy’s main force.79
Following Russian, Prussian, and Swedish acceptance of the Trachenberg
Protocol, the fate of the plan depended on Austrian approval. Yet the
Austrians had ideas of their own. In a second memo drafted in June,
Radetzky provided various offensive options for Napoleon and explained
the best Austro-Allied responses. Napoleon’s ability to allocate 180,000 to
200,000 men for use against the Austrians while still possessing enough
manpower to mask Allied forces in Brandenburg and Silesia concerned
Radetzky. To reinforce the Austrians, he sought 70,000 Russian reinforce-
ments from the Russo-Prussian army in Silesia, yet lowered the size of the
Austrian contingent to 80,000 men so that this combined Austro-Russian
army would total only 150,000 soldiers. If Napoleon invaded Bohemia by
way of the right bank of the Elbe, Radetzky suggested that the Austro-
Russian army fight a defensive battle at the Polzen (Ploučnice) River near its
confluence with the Elbe at Tetschen (Děčı́n). Radetzky predicted success as
long as Bernadotte led his army from Brandenburg across the Elbe and south
through Saxony toward Bohemia. Should Napoleon advance up the left
bank of the Elbe – the operation Radetzky viewed as most likely – the
Austro-Russian army would meet him at Saaz (Žatec) on the Eger River.
Only in his third scenario – Napoleon’s offensive against Berlin – did
Radetzky approve an offensive for the Austro-Russian army down the left
bank of the Elbe with the main effort directed at Chemnitz. Should Berna-
dotte survive the blow from his former master, Radetzky planned for the
Austro-Russian army to continue its operations “by severing the enemy’s
communications.” On the other hand, should Bernadotte’s forces be des-
troyed, the Austro-Russian army would retreat across the Erzgebirge and
behind the Eger. Radetzky’s fourth option, which he considered least likely,
pictured Napoleon remaining on the defensive astride both banks of the
Elbe. Radetzky called for the Austro-Russian army to advance but predicted
Napoleon would seek battle in the region of Marienberg to drive the Allied
army’s right away from the Erzgebirge.80 Because of their proposal to base
Allied operations on these principles of eighteenth-century warfare, it is
difficult to defend the Austrians against the accusation that in the Napo-
leonic wars they neither learned anything nor forgot anything.
Yet a few days before the Allies met at Trachenberg, Radetzky drafted
another plan of operations for Austro-Allied forces. Simply titled “Oper-
ationsentwurf” (Operations Outline), he submitted the plan to Schwarzen-
berg on 7 July, who forwarded it to Kaiser Francis on 12 July. Radetzky
estimated the total strength of Coalition forces to number 405,000 men
while Napoleon would field a total of 450,000 combatants. He maintained
that Napoleon intended to concentrate his main force of 190,000 men on the
Elbe. Radetzky understood that the French emperor would seek to deliver a
massive first blow that would dissolve the Sixth Coalition just as his
1805 victory at Austerlitz had caused the end of the War of the Third
Coalition. For Napoleon to achieve success, he needed to direct his first
offensive against the Austrian army in Bohemia. Consequently, Radetzky
believed that he would invade Bohemia with his main army of 190,000 men
while the remainder of his forces conducted demonstrations against the
Allied armies in Brandenburg and Silesia. Therefore, to reduce the number
of men Napoleon could bring to bear on the Austrians, Radetzky called
for immediate offensive operations by the Allied armies operating outside
Bohemia. As for the Austrian army, Radetzky advised a “well-calculated
defensive” until the other two Allied armies could “effect a separation of
French forces.”81 This made perfect sense because at the time he drafted
the “Operationsentwurf,” Radetzky expected that only Wittgenstein’s
25,000 Russians would reinforce the Austrian army in Bohemia. According
to the Austrian staff chief, the fate of the Coalition depended on the
Allied armies in Brandenburg and Silesia launching and conducting bold
offensive operations as soon as the war resumed. Only by sustaining
such operations could they force Napoleon to lessen his pressure on the
Austrians. In turn, the Austrians would be able to take the offensive and
possibly unite with the other Allied armies to deliver a decisive battle against
French forces, who would be exhausted from constant engagements.
Radetzky viewed this strategy as the best chance for the Allies to gain the
advantage over Napoleon.
Should Napoleon decide against invading Austria, Radetzky cited
three possible courses that the French emperor could pursue. The first
envisioned Napoleon leading his main force north against Bernadotte’s
army in Brandenburg. In this case, the crown prince would avoid the
main blow until the other two Allied armies could unite and advance
against the enemy. The second scenario called for Napoleon to seize the
offensive against the Russo-Prussian army in Silesia. As in the first case,
the threatened Allied army would avoid a decisive battle while Berna-
dotte’s army and the Austrian army united and advanced. Third, Radetzky
speculated that Napoleon could maintain a general defensive posture.
In this case, both the Russo-Prussian army in Silesia and Bernadotte’s
army would seize the offensive while the Austrian army remained on
the defensive. As soon as the Russo-Prussian army and Bernadotte’s
came within supporting distance, all three Allied armies would unite for
a decisive battle.82
Thus, delivering a decisive blow with numerical superiority became the
main objective of Radetzky’s combined operations. To avoid compromising
this main objective, he advised that no single Allied army accept battle with a
force superior in number. To defeat Napoleon, the Austrian staff chief
recommended a gradual escalation of minor engagements. Instead of an
immediate offensive by all three Allied armies to seek a decisive battle, he
suggested operations that would divide and incessantly harass French forces;
the Allies should take the offensive only against points where the enemy
appeared weak. Providing the quintessential Prusso-German analysis of the
“Operationsentwurf,” Friederich explains that “only when the French army
was contained by the three Allied armies in a semicircle on both banks of the
Elbe, fatigued by incessant back-and-forth marches, demoralized by the lack
of physical and moral upkeep, when through defeats, hardships, and hunger
it would be reduced in size so that it was no longer numerically superior to
the Allies, only when that moment arrived according to Radetzky’s view
should all forces unite for a major blow.” Conversely, Alan Sked argues that
Radetzky’s plan “deprived Napoleon of all his traditional advantages,
[threw] him from the offensive to the defensive, and forced him into a
number of choices, none of which was ideal. The strategy was to force
Napoleon onto the defensive, leaving him to decide whether to move in
strength and leave his communication lines open to attack or whether to
divide his forces and march back and forth against one Allied army after
another and exhaust his troops. Eventually, after encircling and wearing
down Napoleon and pushing him back the three armies would come
together with superior force and defeat him in a decisive encounter – exactly
what happened at Leipzig.”83
Few similarities can be found between Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf,”
which is better known as the Reichenbach Plan, and the Trachenberg Proto-
col. No mention is made in the Austrian plan of the Allies seizing the
initiative through a general offensive.84 Instead, Napoleon was free to oper-
ate as he pleased. Should he attack any Allied army and not just the army
in Silesia, it should retreat and conduct a defensive until the two other
armies could operate against his rear and flanks. The only point of conver-
gence is the supposition that Napoleon would attack the Austrians first.
While the Trachenberg Protocol embraced the main concept of Napoleonic
warfare: the Niederwerfungsstrategie (strategy of annihilation), the
Reichenbach Plan paid homage to the Ermattungsstrategie (strategy
of attrition) of the eighteenth century. Where the Trachenberg Protocol
required the Allies to take the initiative and target the enemy’s main force,
the Reichenbach Plan rejected the principle of bringing about a decision
through a rapid, decisive blow with all forces. With respect to operations,
the general principle of the Trachenberg Protocol was a vigorous offensive
by all Allied armies, which would always advance against the enemy’s
main body; his camp would be their rendezvous. The idea was not to
avoid battle, but to accept it with the confidence of receiving assistance
from the other Allied armies. In contrast, the Reichenbach Plan sought
to defeat the master of the operational art through slow-paced warfare
with small means by threatening his lines of communication, operating
against his rear and flanks, attacking his individual corps, and cutting off
his supplies. This bias toward the strategy of attrition of the previous
century dominated the Reichenbach Plan while the Trachenberg Protocol’s
strategy of annihilation – uniting all forces to deliver a decisive blow –
was ignored.
On 16 July 1813, the Trachenberg Protocol arrived at Austrian head-
quarters. Although the Protocol called for the Austrian army to be
reinforced by 90,000 to 100,000 Russians and Prussians, Radetzky made
only minor changes to his “Operationsentwurf.” After receiving the
approval of both Schwarzenberg and Kaiser Francis, he sent it to Allied
Headquarters at Reichenbach three days later. The bearer, Colonel Theodor
Franz von Baillet de Latour, received the following instructions:
The colonel is tasked with delivering the operations plan of the Austrian
army in Bohemia to His Majesty the Tsar of All the Russias and to engage
with him in its detail to which you will be instructed by His Majesty. Because
this operations plan summarizes all suspected chances, only engage in the
details of the following:
(1) The march of Wittgenstein’s corps to this army.

(2) The operations. In respect of the same, in addition to the information
contained in the Operations Plan, the following is still noted in
particular:
If the enemy takes the offensive against the Austrian army along either
the right or the left bank of the Elbe, the Russian and Prussian army will
likewise take the offensive with all forces in the direction of Dresden; the
same offensive will occur if the French army advances against the crown
prince of Sweden.
If the emperor of the French takes the offensive with all his forces against
the Imperial Russian and Royal Prussian Armies [in Silesia], this combined
Allied army will remain on the defensive and the Austrian [army] will begin
an offensive through Zittau.
If at the commencement of operations the Austrian army is weaker than
the enemy’s combatants and if all French forces advance against it, then the
Austrians will sacrifice territory and remain on the defensive until either
the enemy weakens his forces or the Russians and Prussians link with the
Austrians.85
By the time Baillet de Latour reached Allied Headquarters at Reich-

enbach on 22 July, all influential parties unanimously agreed that Napoleon
would aim his first blow at Austria.86 For this reason as well as their
increasing dependency on Austria, the Russians and Prussians insisted on
sending “90,000 to 100,000 men” to Bohemia as further proof of their
commitment to the Austrian monarchy. In return, they hoped such a display
of goodwill would convince Kaiser Francis to declare war against his son-in-
law. Admittedly, the Austrians initially expressed concerns about the ability
to supply the huge Russo-Prussian contingent coming from Silesia.
“As much as we recognized the accuracy of this principle,” recalled Baillet
de Latour, “we were not prepared to accept such a large army. We explained
that we would not be able to supply more than 70,000 Allied soldiers.”
Moreover, the issue of command and control concerned the Austrians as it
did not seem likely that either Alexander or Frederick William would
surrender control of their elite formations. Also, the presence of the two
monarchs at Austrian headquarters did not seem appealing to Schwarzen-
berg. “But as the Russian tsar placed a great value on following
Wittgenstein’s 70,000 men with his entire reserve,” concludes Baillet de
Latour, “we finally accepted the proposal.”87
Aside from insisting on the point of sending such a large force to Bohemia,
Allied leaders at Reichenbach accepted Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf.”88
As a result, they retracted the statements in the Trachenberg Protocol
regarding a general Allied offensive to produce the final Allied blueprint
for operations: the Reichenbach Plan. The Russians and Prussians recog-
nized that, if Austria joined the Coalition, circumstances would determine
where the Army of Bohemia would advance: west to Bavaria, north to

Saxony, or northeast to Silesia. They deemed that a position in northern
Bohemia west of the Elbe would best serve the purpose of facilitating its
march in any of these directions. Moreover, Knesebeck, Toll, and Volkonsky
assumed that Napoleon’s operations would be governed by three inter-
related factors: Austria’s entry into the war, Bohemia’s geographic position,
and concern about an Austrian envelopment of Dresden from the west. In
particular, they thought that the Army of Bohemia’s proximity to Dresden
would induce Napoleon to withdraw all the forces he had posted east of the
Elbe and ultimately evacuate that river’s right bank. They speculated that he
would then unite his main army and turn against either the Austrians in
Bohemia or Bernadotte in Brandenburg, with the former viewed as the more
likely target. In either case, the leaders at Reichenbach expected the Bohe-
mian Army to cross the Erzgebirge and seek battle with Napoleon, despite
the statements in Radetzky’s plan. Enabling the Army of Bohemia to con-
duct offensive operations in part justified the sending of 110,000 Russians
and Prussians to join the Austrians. Only the Army of Bohemia possessed
sufficient strength to challenge Napoleon head on, and thus the Allied
leaders at Reichenbach expected it to commence offensive operations at
the resumption of hostilities.
At first glance, this insistence on the Bohemian Army’s seeking battle
with Napoleon appears to violate Radetzky’s principle of retreating before
the emperor’s onslaught and conducting a defensive until the operations of
the two other armies against his rear and flanks could be felt. Although this
is a grey area in Allied planning, Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf” stated
that, if Napoleon’s main army “remained on the defensive à cheval the Elbe,
the Austrian army would undertake an offensive along the left bank of the
Elbe at the moment when the Allied army approached the Elbe [from
Silesia]. If the enemy’s superiority on the left bank is too great, it [the
Austrian army] would act as noted above,” meaning it would conduct a
defensive until the operations of the main Russo-Prussian army coming
from Silesia could impact Napoleon.89 Moreover, the Allies at Reichenbach
understood that Radetzky based his plans for the Austrian army in Bohemia
on the idea that it would be reinforced by only 25,000 Russians rather than
100,000 Russo-Prussian troops.
Should Napoleon’s main army operate against Allied forces in Silesia or
Brandenburg, the Russians and Prussians presumed that the Army of Bohe-
mia would take advantage of the French emperor’s absence by overwhelm-
ing any masking force and then conducting an offensive either to take
Dresden or to threaten his communication with France, presumably by
marching on Leipzig. Despite these offensive components, the change of
strategy from the Trachenberg Protocol to the Reichenbach Plan meant that
the Allies had ceded the initiative to Napoleon: his actions would determine
their response. Thus, the Army of Bohemia could do nothing until Allied
High Command determined Napoleon’s intentions. How many times in the
past had such an approach led to disaster for the enemies of France?
As for the two other Allied forces, the Russians and Prussians agreed to
assign secondary roles to the Silesian and North German Armies. These two
armies would secure territory too valuable to abandon to the enemy. Yet in
doing so, they should not under any circumstances engage Napoleon in a
general battle where his superior numbers and operational talent would
provide him with a decisive advantage. Therefore, the architects of the
Reichenbach Plan agreed that the Silesian and North German Armies should
never accept battle with the emperor himself but should always retire before
his onslaught – especially the Silesian Army, which did not have a national
capital to protect. These two armies should seek to distance themselves from
Napoleon’s line of operation, exhaust his troops by compelling them to
make forced marches, and always keep the French emperor in their sights.
The instant Napoleon quit the pursuit of one Allied army to move against
another, the former should immediately resume the offensive against the
masking force left behind by Napoleon. As Allied planners at Reichenbach
expected Napoleon would withdraw his forces from Silesia for a general
concentration as the prelude for an invasion of either Bohemia or Branden-
burg, the Silesian Army should follow imperial forces during their with-
drawal from Silesia, delay these forces, and continuously harass them with
light troops but still avoid battle against superior forces. At the same time,
this army would protect Silesia and guard Russian communications in
unison with Bennigsen’s Army of Poland.
Very little is known about this last period of planning. In fact, no written
revision of the Trachenberg Protocol has been found in the German or
Austrian archives, suggesting that the final plan of operations was concluded
verbally. Moreover, no written or spoken reports emerged regarding a
change in the Trachenberg Protocol. Regardless, referring to the Allied plan
of campaign as the “Trachenberg Plan” is a misnomer, as the Trachenberg
Protocol proved to be very different from the Reichenbach Plan that emerged
after the Russians and Prussians accepted Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf.”
Despite the silence, Allied leaders recognized the differences between
the plans. Over time, the variances between the two blurred, leading to
the Coalition’s final plan of operations simply being called the Trachenberg
Plan because of the celebrated meeting that took place there in July 1813.
Consequently, the Trachenberg Protocol should be regarded as only a
step in the development of the Reichenbach Plan. Moreover, the identity
of individuals deserving credit for the Reichenbach Plan becomes moot.
Radetzky and the Austrian General Staff provided the theoretical frame-
work that ultimately trumped the offensive aspects of the Trachenberg
Protocol.90
Returning to diplomacy, Castlereagh may have hoped for too much from
the impact of Vitoria but the foreign secretary remained sober in his expect-
ations. He recognized that, at the least, Vitoria would raise British prestige
and influence on the continent.91 Based on this consideration, Castlereagh
reversed his position concerning the Prague conference. In a letter dated 14
July, he authorized Cathcart “to accept the Austrian mediation, if the state of
affairs should continue.” Castlereagh also accredited Cathcart full authority
to begin the preliminary negotiations for “a general pacification.” However,
he emphasized that Cathcart could not sign any treaty, but instead would
learn “the basis on which the Continental Powers are prepared to negotiate.”
After the foreign secretary received this information, a “Minister” would be
sent from London with instructions “to act for us.” Castlereagh advised
Cathcart of “the importance of ascertaining clearly the Continental basis
before we can say a word as to particular cessions; beyond the mere admis-
sion of the principle, we cannot advance till this is known.” Although he
hoped the contrary, Castlereagh supposed it possible “that the basis agreed
to by the Continental Powers under the Austrian mediation might be so
defective as to afford no temptation to Great Britain to make a sacrifice of
any of her conquests for the purpose of giving effect to such an arrange-
ment.” Thus, the British government needed to “know the nature of the
object aimed at” before judging “what it becomes us to do.” Lastly, he
stressed the need for Cathcart to “make the Tsar feel that we cannot advance
money for armistices, and that it is, therefore, of more importance to bring
matters to a short notice.”92 In a second dispatch written on the 14th,
Castlereagh addressed another pointed letter to Cathcart explaining “the
importance of awakening the Tsar’s mind to the necessity, for his own
interests as well as ours, of peremptorily excluding from the general negoti-
ations every maritime question. If he does not, he will risk a misunderstand-
ing between those powers on whose union the safety of Europe now rests.
Great Britain may be driven out of a Congress, but not out of her own
maritime rights, and, if the Continental Powers know their own interests,
they will not hazard this.”93
Overestimating the impact of Vitoria, Castlereagh assumed that Metter-
nich would soon add some British demands to his conditions for peace. He
predicted that, by doing so, the “preliminary” basis of peace would be so
expanded that it would “materially diminish the chance of Buonaparte
yielding.” He doubted Napoleon “could stoop so low” as to accept
Metternich’s conditions. Moreover, Castlereagh expected the Allies to demand
some immediate physical proof of Napoleon’s goodwill should the French
emperor agree to Metternich’s conditions. As security, Castlereagh considered
the evacuation of all Prussian fortresses and the retreat of the Grande Armée.
He predicted that any demands for “substantial securities” beyond “a mere
paper engagement” would present “a new stumbling block.” Ultimately,
Castlereagh could “hardly conceive it possible that the Conferences at Prague

can, under present circumstances, end in peace, if the Allies are true to
themselves and to each other. Buonaparte has had a severe lesson; but, whilst
he has such a force under arms, he will not submit to any arrangement which
even Count Metternich could have the face to sign his name to, as providing on
the solid principles for the repose of Europe.” Again he urged Cathcart to
emphasize Wellington’s contribution to the overall war effort:
Before Lord W. forms his future plans, he must know what is to happen in
Germany; his whole policy must be governed upon that of the Allies. He
writes in great spirits, and the Continental Powers may rely on his doing his
best for them. Fatal would it be for them, and for the world, if they could for
a moment think of seeking their safety in what is called a Continental peace.
We have done wonders in the Peninsula . . . We may sink before the undivided
power of France: and if we do, Germany, and even Russia, will soon resume
their fetters. We have now the bull close pinioned between us, and if either of
us let go our hold till we render him harmless, we shall deserve to suffer for it.
Castlereagh appeared satisfied by the positive diplomatic outcome of the

Trachenberg conference, despite Thornton’s pessimistic view. Not having
received Cathcart’s report on the proceedings at Trachenberg until 7 August,
the foreign secretary responded that the letter from Francis to Bernadotte
“renders the whole of that proceeding a most important and, I trust, auspi-
cious incident in the Continental drama. The dénouement of the plot is yet a
matter of anxiety. I trust, however, the impulse which has been given will not
yield to nominal concessions. I should hope, if the Austrian terms were not
opened by Metternich at Dresden, that the Kaiser is yet free to insist upon an
arrangement more consonant to the general interests.” Again Castlereagh
pointed to Wellington’s success, insisting that the “events in Spain not only
justify, but require his Imperial Majesty, as a mediator, to alter his terms.
He must see how fatal it would be to all were he to separate his cause from
that of the other Powers. Neutrality must exhaust his resources as much as
war; and, if Buonaparte should triumph over the others, his own fate is
sealed.” Castlereagh urged Cathcart “to bring our claims forward.” He
could not see the Russians and Prussians rejecting London’s demands, which
he termed to be “so just and moderate in themselves.” Likewise, he could
not see how Austria could ignore British national security objectives yet
mediate “a general peace.”94
As much as the British wanted to believe that Wellington provided the
deciding factor in the fate of Europe, initial news from Prague indicated the
likelihood of a settlement. Metternich’s gag order closed the normal sources
of information the British envoys relied on to provide Castlereagh with
news. Despondency soon seized the British Cabinet and Castlereagh’s
anxiety soared. “I wish you to ascertain clearly,” he wrote to Cathcart,

“whether any and what basis of alliance between the three great powers
has been laid out at Prague. I have the greatest confidence in the Tsar; but
I do not like his concealing anything . . . of which there has been a striking
instance recently. Engagements of secrecy against us are of bad precedence
and must not be.”95 Inevitably the darkness cleared as 10 August approached
and the Prague peace conference dissolved in failure despite Napoleon’s
eleventh-hour concessions. On 9 August, he offered to restore Prussia to
its 1806 material extent and surrender the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as well
as Illyria but insisted on retaining Danzig, Trieste, and Istria. Rejecting
Napoleon’s offer, Kaiser Francis declared war on his son-in-law three days
later. The British pound would bring Austria and Great Britain together in
early October. Regardless, the British could not derail Metternich directly,
nor could they prevent him from making separate deals with the Russians
and Prussians.96
To insure that the effort of a multinational coalition served Austria’s
needs, Metternich sought to control the three principal Allied armies. For
this reason, Kaiser Francis insisted on the post of Allied commander in chief
being filled by an Austrian; he selected the 42-year-old Schwarzenberg to be
“l’homme de la coalition,” as Tsar Alexander aptly observed. That Francis –
the ally sought after by both sides – wanted an Austrian general at the post
of commander in chief is understandable. With the memory of Austerlitz
having yet to fade, Francis could not simply hand his army to the tsar.
According to the German General Staff historian August von Janson, while
Schwarzenberg’s appointment satisfied Alexander, it greatly displeased
Frederick William, who would have been satisfied with the tsar serving as
commander in chief; the Prussian monarch purportedly acquiesced with
reluctance to the selection of Schwarzenberg. He expressed his reservations
over a dinner with Francis on 18 August, greatly upsetting the Austrian
emperor, especially because after the Spring Campaign the king had no
reason to hold the leadership of the Russian army in high esteem. His
preference for Alexander to be Allied commander in chief appears to have
been based on their personal friendship and the king’s ability to negotiate
personally with the tsar. With a foreign general who was not a sovereign, it
would be much more difficult for him, and Kaiser Francis showed no
inclination to engage in direct discussions about the war. By nature cold
and calculating, Francis showed little interest in the day-to-day operations
of the war and often remained isolated from the other two monarchs; only
rarely did he appear on the battlefield. Thus, personal contact between him
and Frederick William seldom occurred. Moreover, from the beginning,
Frederick William “appeared to harbor a personal dislike for Schwarzen-
berg, which, as a rule in such cases and to the detriment of the cause, soon
became mutual. Schwarzenberg was hurt by his own regular and uniform
nature of sharply opposing the short and often biting nature of the king, who
always attributed bad motives to Schwarzenberg and judged him unfairly.”97
Keeping the Austrian army united and not distributing its corps to the
Silesian or North German Armies can also be viewed as a step toward
controlling the Coalition. Schwarzenberg’s ability to direct the operations
of the other two Allied armies quickly foundered after the war resumed, and
the tsar eventually eclipsed him as Allied generalissimo. Nevertheless, the
sheer size of Schwarzenberg’s army meant that the Coalition could only go
as far and as fast as Schwarzenberg wanted. Although by no means a great
Feldherr (field commander), the Austrian possessed the extraordinary ability
to manage people and to balance divergent opinions.98 Schwarzenberg’s
erudite chief of staff, Radetzky, has received credit for formulating the
Reichenbach plan of operations adopted by the Allies. Yet, in the end, credit
for Allied success in 1813 belongs to the operations of the Silesian Army.
The following chapters will tell its story.
Notes
1 To be closer to Allied Headquarters, Kaiser Francis and Metternich also estab-
lished their quarters at Gitschin, less than eighty miles southwest of Reichenbach.
Several meetings were held between the Austrians and the Russians and Prussians
at Gitschin as well as thirty-five miles to the east at the château of Ratiborsitz
(Ratibořice). See Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 357.
2 Toll’s “Mémoire sur les opérations militaires, présenté à Sa Majesté L’Empereur
Alexandre à Reichenbach le 28 Mai/9 Juin 1813” is reproduced in full in Bern-
hardi, Toll, II:481–84; Barclay’s instructions to Toll, his cover letter to Schwar-
zenberg, and “General-Dislocation der verbundenen Kaiserliche Russischen und
Königlich Preußischen Truppen mit der Anzeige der wirklichen Stärke dieser
Armee” are all reproduced ibid., II:484–87. See also Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, I:72.
3 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Denkwürdigkeiten, 123–24.
4 Aside from the 150,000 men in Bohemia, the Austrians sought to post some
30,000 men along the Danube and 40,000 in Inner Austria. See Baillet de Latour,
Erinnerungen, 114.
5 “Über den Waffenstillstand zwischen Frankreich einerseits dann Rußland und
Preußen andererseits und was derselbe für Folgen haben wird” is reproduced in
full in Radetzky, Denkschriften, 105–11. See the commentary in Oncken, Öster-
reich und Preußen, II:342–44.
6 See Schwarzenberg to Barclay de Tolly, Gitschin, 16 June 1813, reproduced in full
in Bernhardi, Toll, II:488–89.
7 See Oncken, Österreich und Preußen, II:346.
8 Toll to Scharnhorst, Opotschna, 17 June 1813, reproduced in full in Friederich,
Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:80–81.
9 Bernhardi, Toll, II:36–37; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Denkwürdigkeiten, 123–24.
10 “Wurschen Plan” is used to reference the plans for military operations while
“Wurschen Convention” is used to denote the revised Allied war aims. On 16
May, the Russians and Prussians expanded the war aims established by the
Kalisch–Breslau accords to include British interests. According to the Wurschen
Convention, the Allies demanded the complete dissolution of Napoleon’s Con-
federation of the Rhine and the complete independence of all German states. In
addition, they pledged to fight for the liberation of Spain, Holland, and Italy. The
seven articles of the Wurschen Convention can be found in Oncken, Österreich
und Preußen, II:318.
11 Schroeder, European Politics, 457.
12 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, I:134.
13 According to Lieven, “Nesselrode trusted and saw eye-to-eye with Metternich,
whom he had known for many years.” Both statesmen satisfactorily concluded
these meetings with an understanding and appreciation of their “two countries’
interests and positions.” He also notes that Alexander and Nesselrode focused
exclusively on the German question as the means of achieving a stable peace that
would guarantee Russian security. He maintains that both believed Napoleon’s
control of the Third Germany would have to be broken in order to establish a
true European balance of power as well as security for Russia, Prussia, and
Austria. They tied Russia’s security to Prussia’s standing in Germany. While the
Wurschen Convention called for the abolition of Napoleon’s Confederation of
the Rhine, Metternich’s fourth point demanded only the independence of
Hamburg and Lübeck. This would leave the Confederation and its centerpiece,
Jerome Bonaparte’s kingdom of Westphalia, under Napoleon’s control, giving the
French emperor control of the Elbe and its fortresses from the North Sea to
Bohemia. Lieven cites Alexander’s thoughts on such a scenario: “any hope for the
independence of any part of Germany would be lost for good. Prussia would
constantly be exposed to attacks which could come at any moment and against
which it could only offer a feeble defense, and the emperor Napoleon could
almost at will make himself master of the Baltic coastline, so that any hope of
the security of trade would be merely illusory.” The Russians also thought
the four points did not satisfy Austria’s security needs. In their opinion, regaining
only Illyria would leave Austria vulnerable. According to Lieven, the Russians
believed that Austria at a minimum needed to get back Tyrol, the fortress of
Mantua, and a defensible frontier along the Mincio River in northern Italy. As
Prussia had no choice but to follow Russia’s lead, a discussion of Prussian views
of the four points is superfluous. See Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 357–59.
14 In European Politics, 475–76, Schroeder points out that “Austria had plenty to
object to in British ideas and attitudes. Britain renewed its old tactics of raising
European insurrections against France regardless of their consequences for other
powers.” He states incorrectly that the British expected Austria to enter the
war before London provided any subsidies; Castlereagh’s correspondence states
otherwise. Schroeder also claims that the British ignored “vital Austrian concerns
in Central Europe,” a difficult accusation to substantiate because Castlereagh did
not receive an opportunity to negotiate with Metternich until his arrival on the
continent in the winter of 1813. According to Webster in The Foreign Policy of
Castlereagh, I:140–41, because London had refused to allow Metternich to raise
maritime and colonial issues, he punished Britain by excluding it “from all influ-
ence on the continental basis which was to be offered to Napoleon. She would
thus be forced to use her colonial conquests to obtain those points in which she
was especially interested.” See also Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, 53; For
Metternich’s attempts to undermine Russia and Prussia, see Leggiere, Napoleon
and Berlin, 122–27.
15 The phrase employed at the time was “continental peace” but, as Metternich had
little interest in Iberia, the Low Countries, and Sicily, it is misleading and so
I refer to a settlement for Central Europe.
16 Nipperdey, Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 70; Nicolson, The Congress of
Vienna, 42–43; Ross, European Diplomatic History, 332; Kissinger, A World
Restored, 73; Kraehe, Metternich’s German Policy, I:174; Webster, The Foreign
Policy of Castlereagh, I:135–36.
17 That same day, 6 June, Colonel Hudson Lowe wrote General Sir Henry Bunbury,
Britain’s under-secretary of state for war and the colonies, a long and carefully
considered exposé of the situation. Lowe speculated that the six-week duration of
the armistice appeared to be designed to prevent the British from participating in
the negotiations with Napoleon that would occur during that period. He also
explained that Kaiser Francis “has arrived at Gitschin (the castle of Wallenstein)
within twelve German miles of this place.” According to the rumors Lowe had
heard, the Habsburg monarch had already submitted to Napoleon his price for
Austria’s continued neutrality: the return of the Austrian littoral, Dalmatia,
Trieste, and Fiume as well as seven regiments of Croats currently in French
service. See Lowe to Bunbury, Reichenbach, 6 June 1813, British Library Add-
itional Manuscripts (hereafter cited as Add MSS), 20111, 31–35.
18 Although unconcerned about British public opinion, the British minister-
plenipotentiary to Sweden, Edward Thornton, likewise suggested an acceleration
of British military operations by suggesting “the vast importance of military
demonstrations, during the armistice, on the coast of England opposite Holland
and East Friesland, and the North of Germany between it and the Elbe, in order
to prevent as much as possible the withdrawing from thence of troops to reinforce
the French army in Silesia. The most vigorous prosecution possible of the
campaign in Spain would have the same effect, but no man is more sensible than
Lord Wellington of the importance of such a measure; and Bonaparte, in making a
six weeks’ armistice, certainly calculated on drawing reinforcements from Spain.”
See Thornton to Castlereagh, Stralsund, 14 June 1813, Correspondence of Vis-
count Castlereagh (hereafter cited as CVC), VIII:399.
19 Stewart to Castlereagh, Reichenbach, 6 June 1813, CVC, IX:22; Stewart to
Castlereagh, Reichenbach, 19 June 1813, ibid., IX:29.
20 Stewart to Castlereagh, Reichenbach, 6 June 1813, CVC, IX:22–23.
21 Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, 22 June 1813, CVC, VIII:408.
22 Castlereagh to Cathcart, Foreign Office, 30 June 1813, CVC, VIII:411.
23 Castlereagh to Cathcart, Foreign Office, 6 July 1813, CVC, IX:30.
24 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, I:119–20, 133; Schroeder, European
Politics, 457.
25 Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, 22 June 1813, CVC, VIII:408–09;
Castlereagh to Cathcart, Foreign Office, 22 June 1813, ibid., VIII:404–05.
26 Scott, Bernadotte, 83.

27 Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, 30 June 1813, CVC, VIII:409; Webster,
The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, I:128–30, 139. Stewart, the junior partner,
remained highly critical of Cathcart’s negotiations with the Russians. On 28 June,
Stewart complained to Castlereagh that “Lord C. is desirous of being as agreeable
as possible to the Emperor of Russia. This, in the long run, will be seen”:
Stewart to Castlereagh, Berlin, 28 June 1813, CVC, IX:29. Others noticed the
rivalry: “Lord Cathcart is not much pleased with his Dispatch of the Battle
of Bautzen not having been published while that of Sir Charles Stewart has
appeared in the Gazette.” See Lowe to Bunbury, Reichenbach, 28 June 1813,
Add MSS, 20111, 44.
28 A copy of the Russian proposal submitted to Cathcart by Nesselrode is in Stewart
to Castlereagh, Wurschen, 17 May 1813, CVC, VIII:391–97; Castlereagh to
Stewart, Foreign Office, 22 June 1813, ibid., VIII:409.
30 In a second letter written on the 22nd, Castlereagh explained that “the House of
Commons, after the Austrian loans, will never hear of lending again to a foreign
power; and we do not feel that we could possibly propose such an amount in any
shape to Parliament”: Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, 22 June 1813, CVC,
VIII:409.
31 Moreover, Castlereagh insisted that “the mode of realizing the subsidy on the
Continent . . . was expressly stated from the first that the credit was to be in
London.” He instructed Stewart to impress on the Russians and Prussians the
need to follow the Swedish example of redeeming British credit: “What you
represented in reference to Sweden was perfectly correct. Having a credit to a
certain extent on the British Treasury, the Swedish Government draws bills on
London, or [Gotthard Mauritz von] Rehausen [Swedish minister plenipotentiary
in London] orders a banking house here to remit to Sweden or Stralsund, arran-
ging with the Treasury the payment of such bills to the extent of the monthly
installment receivable on account of subsidy. Russia and Prussia must, when you
have settled the installments, authorize their ministers here to act in the same
manner, or the Russian and Prussian Governments may draw on London, as
above described, to the extent of the monthly payments. The funds will be ready
for them, subject to a proportional deduction in each month for stores, etc., sent”:
Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, 22 June 1813, CVC, VIII:406–08.
32 Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, 22 June 1813, CVC, VIII:406–08.
33 Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, 14 July 1813, CVC, IX:33, and Stewart to
D’Ivernois, Reichenbach, 12 August 1813, ibid., IX:42. Muir claims that the
official treaty was signed on 30 September “but it was followed by further delays
and in the end no securities were actually issued, Britain discharging her obliga-
tion by paying Russia and Prussia directly, and in full, in 1814 and 1815”: Muir,
Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 253–54.
34 Cathcart to Castlereagh, Reichenbach, 28 June 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 46–50;
Cathcart, Commentaries, 185–86.
35 “The publicity with which these conversations are held, and the vanity of persons
with whom they are discussed, are injurious circumstances; but they are in the
character of the Prince Royal, though they are not always the effect of a voluntary
effusion, but I believe are the result of deliberate reflection”: Thornton to Cas-
tlereagh, Stralsund, 21 June 1813, CVC, VIII:400–02.
36 Although Count Lars von Engeström (1751–1826) served as First Prime Minister
for Foreign Affairs from 1809 to 1824, Wetterstedt can be regarded as Sweden’s
de facto minister of foreign affairs beginning in 1812. Wetterstedt had been
appointed secretary of state in 1809. Named court chancellor the same year,
he accompanied Bernadotte to the meeting with Tsar Alexander at Turku in
1812 and remained by his side during the campaigns in Germany, Holstein, and
Norway from 1813 to 1814.
37 Thornton to Castlereagh, Stralsund, 21 June 1813, CVC, VIII:402–04.
38 Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, 30 June 1813, CVC, VIII:409–10.
39 Castlereagh to Cathcart, Foreign Office, 30 June 1813, CVC, VIII:411–12.
40 Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, 30 June 1813, CVC, VIII:410.
41 For Bernadotte’s standing in the Coalition at this point, see Oncken, Österreich
und Preußen, II:410–16; Woynar, Österrikes förhållande, 88–101.
42 Boyen, Erinnerungen, ed. Schmidt, II:602.
43 For a comprehensive summary of Bernadotte’s plans, see Pertz and Delbrück,
Gneisenau, III:109–11.
44 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 52.
45 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:81–82. One French source describes him as
“militarily erudite, but systematic and the enemy of great resolutions”: Anon.,
Précis militaire de la campagne de 1813 en Allemagne, 82.
46 Knesebeck’s memorandum, titled “Betrachtungen über die nächste Kriegsoper-
ationen,” is reproduced in full in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:83–84. See also
Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:108–09.
47 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:84–85. In Russia Against Napoleon, 389, Lieven
notes: “Potentially, Austria remained the weak link in the Coalition. If the main
army was destroyed or seriously weakened and Bohemia was invaded, then there
was a real chance that Austria would renew negotiations with Napoleon or even
drop out of the war.”
48 Boyen’s cover letter to Frederick William and his plan of operations containing
Bülow’s comments in the margin is reproduced in full in Boyen, Errinerungen, ed.
Nippold, II:449–53.
49 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:85–88.
50 Stadion actually signed the Convention of Reichenbach on 27 June so Metternich
could tell Napoleon that no formal agreements bound Austria to the Allies.
51 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, I:141; Schroeder, European Politics,
467–71; Kraehe, Metternich’s German Policy, I:177; Scott, Bernadotte, 83.
52 Quoted in Oncken, Österreich und Preußen, II:389.
53 According to Baillet de Latour, “the mobilization and reorganization of the
militia progressed only slowly in terms of outfitting because despite all efforts
the lack of available uniforms could not be easily remedied. There was so little
seriousness in the peace negotiations that 20 July had almost passed without one
even agreeing on the basics. As our mobilization still had not been completed, the
truce was extended to 10 August with an ensuing six-day cessation of hostilities”:
Baillet de Latour, Erinnerungen, 114. See also Oncken, Österreich und Preußen,
II:384–95; Kraehe, Metternich’s German Policy, I:180–81; Nicolson, The Congress

of Vienna, 41.
54 Cathcart, Commentaries, 180.
56 Thornton to Castlereagh, Greifswald, 3 July 1813, CVC, VIII:414. Webster notes
that “Thornton, who had been putting forward some very wild ideas, was not
very competent”: Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, I:119.
57 Thornton to Castlereagh, Greifswald, 3 July 1813, CVC, VIII:414.
58 Castlereagh to Cathcart, Foreign Office, 30 June 1813, CVC, VIII:411.
59 On 3 July Castlereagh wrote to Cathcart: “I consider it of so much importance
that your lordship be informed of the state of affairs in Spain . . . that may give so
new and important a character to the relative situation of all the belligerent
powers.” See Castlereagh to Cathcart, Foreign Office, 3 July 1813, CVC,
VIII:412; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, I:143.
60 Castlereagh to Cathcart, Foreign Office, 6 July 1813, CVC, IX:30–32.
61 When he wrote this letter on 28 July, Castlereagh was responding to the arrival of
dispatches written by Cathcart prior to 8 July. The Trachenberg conference that
the foreign secretary alludes to took place from 9 to 12 July.
63 Woynar, Österrikes förhållande, 88–93; Scott, Bernadotte, 84; Henckel von Don-
nersmarck, Erinnerungen, 202.
64 Oncken, Österreich und Preußen, II:422.
65 Janson, Friedrich Wilhelm, 183.
66 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 55–56.
67 Stadion to Metternich, 14 July 1813, reproduced in Woynar, Österrikes förhål-
lande, 163–65; Scott, Bernadotte, 85–87. However, requests from Wetterstedt to
Nesselrode and Hardenberg for assurances that in the case of peace both courts
would demand Napoleon’s approval of the cessation of Norway to Sweden were
refused on the familiar grounds that it would be best to keep Napoleon out of this
affair. Sweden would have to act before receiving further pledges of support.
68 Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 203.
69 A copy of this letter is in CVC, VIII:416–17.
70 Thornton to Castlereagh, Trachenberg, noon, 12 July 1813, CVC, VIII:420.
71 Quoted in Oncken, Österreich und Preußen, II:423.
72 “This answer of the Kaiser contains a more formal avowal than appears to have been
given in the writing of his determination to enforce by arms the general security and
independence, if negotiation should fail”: Thornton to Castlereagh, Trachenberg,
12 July 1813, CVC, VIII:415. Scott, in Bernadotte, 87, states: “Bernadotte himself was
personally pleased to receive . . . a flattering note from the Emperor Francis; it
promised nothing, but implied Austrian cooperation; hence Bernadotte and
Stadion expressed anew the mutual regard and need of Austria and Sweden.”
73 Thornton to Castlereagh, Trachenberg, 12 July 1813, CVC, VIII:415–16.
74 Quoted in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:90–91.
75 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:25–26.
76 Various versions of the Protocol state Budin (Budyně) rather than Brandeis-
Altbunzlau.
77 Various versions of the Protocol state 200,000 to 250,000 men.

78 Müffling, Aus meinen Leben, 56–57.
79 Copies of the Trachenberg Protocol can be found in Beilage I of the second
volume of Plotho’s Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich, as well as Nr. 160
in Pflugk-Harttung’s collection of primary documents assembled from the hold-
ings of the Prussian Geheimen Staatsarchiv (Secret State Archives): Das
Befreiungsjahr 1813, 229–30; and Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Denkwürdigkeiten,
124–27. See also Bernhardi, Toll, II:49–52; Janson, Friedrich Wilhelm, 183; Frie-
derich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:94; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges im Jahre
1813, Ib:262–64. For an accurate and concise French account of the Coalition’s
war planning, see Anon., Précis militaire de la campagne de 1813 en Allemagne,
71–73. Accusations by Maude that the plan demonstrated that the Allies “had
neither learned anything nor forgotten anything” are off the mark: Maude,
Leipzig Campaign, 161.
80 “Was ist nötig um die Offensiv-Unternehmungen berechnen zu können” is
reproduced in full in Radetzky, Denkschriften, 121–27.
81 “Operationsentwurf,” Lieben, 7 July 1813, is reproduced in full in Hellwald and
Schönhals, Radetzky, 160.
82 Hellwald and Schönhals, Radetzky, 156–67.
83 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:96; Sked, Radetzky, 41.
84 The authors of the 1858 biography of Radetzky, one of whom was the Austrian
General Staff officer and veteran of the War of the Sixth Coalition, Feldmarschall-
leutnant Friedrich Jakob Heller von Hellwald, admits that the “Operationsentwurf”
was “not based on offensive action but instead took the greatest care to secure the
Austrian monarchy by keeping the theater of war as far as possible from Austria”:
Hellwald and Schönhals, Radetzky, 156.
85 Quoted in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:96–97.
86 Janson, Friedrich Wilhelm, 184.
87 Lieven follows Baillet de Latour’s remark about being “surprised” when he
learned at Reichenbach that the Allies planned to send 110,000 men instead of
25,000 to Bohemia. Yet Radetzky already knew per the Trachenberg Protocol that
he had received before Baillet de Latour’s departure for Reichenbach that the
Allies planned to send “90,000 to 100,000 men.” According to Baillet, he left for
Reichenbach with the understanding that “an operational plan had been drafted
according to which the Austrian army, reinforced by 25,000 Russians under
Wittgenstein, should act according to circumstances”: Baillet de Latour, Erinner-
ungen, 115–16; Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 389.
88 Hellwald and Schönhals maintain that the Allies never really agreed with Radetz-
ky’s plan: “It is understandable that Prussia and Russia could not accept it because
both were animated by the same desire for their own territories. Russia’s main
concern was to remove the war as far as possible from the area of the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw.” See Hellwald and Schönhals, Radetzky, 156.
89 Hellwald and Schönhals, Radetzky, 166.
90 Sked, Radetzky, 41; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 3;
Langeron, Mémoires, 207; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:97–98, 154–55.

93 In particular, Castlereagh notes that Alexander, “if he knows anything of Eng-
land, must be convinced that no Government dare surrender the right of search
for enemy’s property, or British subjects.” Any interference on this subject by a
third party “would probably decide the nation against it.” See Castlereagh to
Cathcart, St. James Square, 14 July 1813, CVC, IX:34–35.
94 Castlereagh to Cathcart, Cray Farm, 7 August 1813, CVC, IX:39–41.
95 Castlereagh to Cathcart, Foreign Office, 1 September 1813, CVC, IX:46.
96 Signed on 3 October 1813, the Anglo-Austrian subsidy treaty was modeled on
the agreements made with Russia and Prussia in June. The Austrians would
receive a subsidy in the amount of £1,000,000. Half had already been advanced
to the Austrians and the remaining half was payable at £100,000 per month until 1
April. See Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, I:157–58; Ross, European
Diplomatic History, 333; Kissinger, A World Restored, 82.
97 Janson used Hardenberg’s journal to support this argument. For example, despite
the Allied victory at Kulm on 30 August 1813, Hardenberg noted on 2 September
that “the king is displeased with Schwarzenberg” and again on 6 September:
“Have been with Schwarzenberg. The king will not award him the Black
Eagle!” See Janson, Friedrich Wilhelm, 184–86, 210.
98 As Lieven points out, “under no circumstances was Schwarzenberg a commander
who would seize the initiative and impose his will on Napoleon”: Lieven, Russia
Against Napoleon, 389.
2
The Silesian Army
Prior to the armistice, several Allied Streifkorps conducted operations in the

rear of the French army ranging from raids and surprise attacks to severing
imperial communications. Pressing deep into Thuringia, a portion of
Lützow’s Streifkorps outdistanced Allied communications and for a while
remained uninformed of the armistice. After learning of the cessation of
hostilities, the small unit attempted to reach Allied lines. Yet on 17 June a
superior French and Württemberger force attacked and routed the Prussians
at Kitzen near Leipzig, purportedly on Napoleon’s order. Those who sur-
rendered spent the next nine months aboard France’s notorious prison hulks.
Emphatic Allied protests fell on deaf ears. Blücher, Gneisenau, Bülow, and
several other high-ranking Prussian officers loudly claimed that this French
treachery rendered the armistice void. They particularly urged the termin-
ation of Article Five, which stipulated that the besieged imperial garrisons at
Danzig, Zamosc (Zamość), Modlin (Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki), Stettin, and
Küstrin (Kostrzyn) each receive fresh supplies every five days. Frederick
William and Alexander agreed, forcing the imperials to tighten their belts.
The early surrender of these fortresses can be attributed to the threat of
starvation caused by this measure.1
During June and July, the Coalition’s uncertain future forced the Prus-
sians in Silesia to plan for the worst. Should the Sixth Coalition collapse and
the Russians withdraw to Poland, Gneisenau planned to position the Prus-
sian army in the mountains of Upper Silesia. Supported by the fortresses of
Neiße (Nysa), Glatz, and Silberberg (Srebrna Gόrna), he envisioned the
army fighting to the last man.2 Frederick William named him military
governor of Silesia, tasking the staff officer with the defense of the province
and the mobilization of the Silesian Landwehr. “Return to me when the feud
resumes,” Blücher begged Gneisenau. “In every regard it is necessary that
we are together.”
72
The Silesian Army 73
4 Field-Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, 1742–1819
News about Scharnhorst challenged Blücher’s usual optimism. For some

time, reports had indicated an unfavorable turn in his health. While traveling
to Vienna, Scharnhorst neglected to properly care for the wound he received
at the 2 May battle of Lützen even after the onset of gangrene. “It does not
go well with our brave Scharnhorst,” Blücher informed Gneisenau on 29
June. “I’d rather lose a battle than lose Scharnhorst!”3 But the 57-year-old
Scharnhorst was already dead, having passed away at Prague on 28 June.
A 12 July order from Frederick William established three army corps
under General Hans David von Yorck, General Friedrich Heinrich von
Kleist, and Bülow, as well as a fourth commanded by Tauentzien
consisting primarily of Landwehr. Frederick William also formed his Royal
Guard, which had been divided between I and II Corps, into a special
brigade separate from the army corps.4 Like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau
believed that only Blücher possessed the ability to command this Prussian
army. Due to Hardenberg’s confidence in Gneisenau’s judgment, the chan-
cellor championed Blücher’s interests. In addition, Stein diligently lobbied
Alexander to have faith in Blücher. Despite this strong support, neither
Blücher nor Gneisenau had been invited to attend the councils of war at
Trachenberg, Reichenbach, and Gitschin. Ultimately, the Allied decision to
distribute the various Prussian and Russian army corps among multinational
armies eliminated the need to name a commander in chief of the Prussian
army.
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7 Neutral zone in Silesia

5 General August Wilhelm Antonius Neidhardt von Gneisenau, 1760–1831
As for Gneisenau, he formally succeeded Scharnhorst as Chief of the

General Staff of the Prussian Army at the end of July. This post jeopardized
his position as Blücher’s staff chief because of its exacting duties, particularly
in view of the army’s rapid expansion, as well as its requirement of remaining
close to the king and state chancellor. Official acknowledgment that he had
succeeded his friend did little to assuage Gneisenau’s fierce temper, which
had been stoked by Frederick William’s total reliance on Knesebeck. His
3 August complaint to the king perfectly captures his frustration: “If
I remain uninformed of the war plans, inevitably I will not be able to execute
useful projects.” Gneisenau requested command of a brigade, suggesting
that the king name Knesebeck Chief of the General Staff. Blücher refused
to remain silent on this issue and resolutely protested to Hardenberg
through Hippel: “Unfortunately our good Scharnhorst is now dead. Believe
me this is worse for us than a lost battle. Gneisenau now remains; where he
goes, I will follow dead or alive because I do not agree with Herr
Knesebeck’s ideas, and even less with Herr [General Friedrich Wilhelm
von] Krusemarck’s,” whose name had also surfaced as a potential candidate
for the position of Prussian staff chief. Citing the latter’s 1811 stint as
ambassador to France, Blücher chided that Krusemarck had “sucked up
too much Parisian air.”5
Although he took Scharnhorst’s death very badly, Blücher’s impatience
with the armistice eclipsed his grief. He and Gneisenau had opposed the
ceasefire from the start, fearing that a dishonorable peace would be the
result. Stewart noted the concerns that most Allied commanders harbored:
“Bonaparte, it was stated, could make greater efforts during the period of the
truce than the Allies; and the general conduct of Austria led to a supposition
that she was more anxious to dictate a peace than to incur all the dangers that
might result from a protracted war in the center of her own empire. On the
other hand, the object of Great Britain was to preserve the Allies from again
entering into those separate treaties with Revolutionary France that had
always proved so fallacious in themselves, and injurious to the common
cause of Europe.”6 Heinrich Steffens, a professor attached to Blücher’s staff
to serve as a propaganda specialist, provides insight of the prevailing view at
Blücher’s headquarters at this time:
The two battles [Lützen and Bautzen] that had been fought raised rather
than depressed the hope of future victories; and it was loudly proclaimed
that the war must be continued in the spirit that gave rise to it, and that it
would remain a deep national disgrace if it were abandoned without a signal
triumph that would cripple Napoleon’s power forever. I was too much
behind the scenes not to be aware of the doubtful and dangerous point on
which our deepest interests turned. We were reduced at last to rest our hopes
on one man, and that was Napoleon himself: our chief reliance was on his
obstinacy, which might exhaust the patience of the negotiating princes. The
truce was declared on 5 June, but the war was apparently suspended only to
be secretly pursued by our enemy by means of different but more dangerous
tactics; and the better informed among us knew that the secret weapons of
the foe were now being used in our very midst. Two months passed on with
the daily anxious inquiry: “Will Napoleon win Austria, or will Austria be
true to us?” The news of Scharnhorst’s death, which occurred at Prague, was
an inauspicious omen, and increased the painful doubts of that most anxious
period.7
The proximity of four imperial army corps forced the Prussians in Silesia
to maintain a constant state of readiness.8 German historians claim that the
daily cost of supplying just the headquarters of each imperial corps averaged
200 thaler.9 Of course their soldiers sustained themselves only through the
pitiless extraction of Silesia’s resources, yet such was the discrepancy
between supply and demand that malnutrition soon ushered in his deadlier
brothers: illness and starvation. Discipline continued to be a challenge, with
persistent desertion thinning imperial ranks. According to Allied intelli-
gence, Marshal Ney’s III Corps had dwindled from 45,000 men on 1 May
to a mere 3,700 by 6 June. According to a 16 July report from a spy at
Liegnitz, fewer than half of 1,700 recently arrived Westphalians still
mustered. Desertion among the French troops had likewise increased.
“The rumor of the extension of the armistice has dashed all fortitude,” notes
the report. “One foresees only death by starvation.”10
As supplies became scarce, imperial requisitions increased exponentially,

before collapsing into chaotic arbitrariness. Similar to East Prussia in 1812,
the length of French-held Silesia suffered the oppressive consequences of
foreign occupation. Plundering became so general that French officers pri-
vately advised their distraught hosts to send all livestock and valuables to the
neutral zone.11 Decreeing that only one male beast should be left in each
commune, the imperials assembled legions of cattle and horses. They con-
scripted men and collected money in the disputed Cottbus District, and
extorted 600,000 thaler from the Sagan (Żagań) District and 300,000 thaler
from the Grünberg (Zielona Góra) District.12 The Goldberg and Löwenberg
Districts scraped together requisitions worth 400,000 thaler; Löwenberg
alone provided yards of cloth estimated to be worth 80,000 thaler. “All cattle
are gone from every estate in the Bunzlau District,” continued the spy report
of 16 July. “They now take the sheep herds. Cattle and sheep for the most
part have been taken to Saxony probably to replenish this region. Several
estates have been abandoned and are completely deserted. The misery
increases with each day and really is beyond all description.”13 Near the
end of the armistice, the French administration ordered all cattle, corn,
bread, hay, and cloth transferred to Saxony. For this task, each district had
to provide fifty wagons. Even the new crop, which had yet to be harvested,
was targeted for removal. Imperial raiding parties frequently violated the
neutral zone partly to forage, partly to threaten the villagers with fire and
death to prevent the delivery of supplies to the Allies.
Despite the problems caused by inadequate supply, numerous reinforce-
ments flowed into the imperial camps located in eastern Saxony, Lower
Lusatia, and Lower Silesia from France, Italy, and Germany. War-ravaged
Saxony alone provided an additional 24,000 soldiers for the emperor. By his
decree of 12 March 1813, Napoleon had established a new Grande Armée.
Although the campaign opened before all thirteen army corps reached
combat-ready status, tens of thousands of recruits from the levée of
1813 as well as hundreds of apprehended réfractaires (deserters) had left
their depots well before Napoleon concluded the armistice. Thus, sufficient
manpower arrived not only to fill the gaps in the corps that had fought
during the Spring Campaign (III, IV, V, VI, VII, XI, and XII), but also to
complete the mobilization of four additional corps (I, II, XIII, and XIV).
Moreover, the total number of troopers and mounts enabled Napoleon to
field five cavalry corps of varying size.14 By mid July, the imperial army in
Silesia alone had increased to approximately 142,000 men including almost
9,000 cavalry. At the expiration of the armistice in mid August, the Prussians
assessed the total strength of Napoleon’s mobile forces to be 373,500 men.15
As noted, Frederick William and Alexander agreed to augment the
Austrian army with approximately 115,000 men, namely: Kleist’s II Corps,
the Prussian Guard Brigade, Wittgenstein’s corps, and the massive Russian
Guard and Reserve commanded by the tsar’s brother, Grand Duke Constan-
tine. Barclay received nominal command of these units as well as the title of
Commander in Chief of All Russian Troops; he remained at Reichenbach
until the eve of the commencement of hostilities. In addition, Alexander
assigned Wintzingerode’s corps to Bernadotte’s Army of North Germany
while those commanded by Sacken and the French émigré, Louis Alexandre
de Langeron, joined the Silesian Army. Dispensing with protocol, the tsar
instructed his commanders to employ the generals under their orders
according to ability rather than seniority. “As embarrassing as this order
was to execute,” commented Langeron, “I nevertheless used the rights it
gave me on several occasions. At the beginning of the campaign, [Aleksandr]
Rudzevich was only a major-general, and he often had 12,000–15,000 men
under his command, and during the passage of the Mulde [October 1813],
I gave him 18,000 infantry and the better part of my cavalry, and I left
fourteen generals in the rear (of which three were lieutenant-generals) with
six squadrons.”16
All of this happened very quickly, catching Gneisenau by surprise. Using
his privilege as Chief of the Prussian General Staff to communicate directly
with the king, he strongly protested against the parceling of Prussia’s four
army corps among the three Allied armies. That Gneisenau did not partici-
pate in this decision-making process and that he learned of it through
hearsay illustrate just how far removed he was from genuinely filling
Scharnhorst’s boots. “On my last trip to Schweidnitz,” continued Gneisenau
in his letter of 3 August, “I learned that the Allied armies would be divided
among the theaters of war. With distress I also learned that Your Majesty’s
Silesian Army will be divided so that half will go to Bohemia and the other
half will operate in Silesia. I can foresee nothing but disadvantages of such a
division of Your Majesty’s army. It will suffer reproach for any defeat of the
other troops while the Prussian name will never be cited in victory. This will
only serve to aggrieve or weaken national honor.” More importantly, he
expressed concern that the distribution of Prussian corps would leave only a
small force to defend Silesia against a reportedly huge imperial army. Gnei-
senau also criticized the decision to place Kleist under Barclay’s command,
who in turn would take orders from Schwarzenberg. He complained that
this relegated Kleist to being “the subordinate of a subordinate. Further-
more, Barclay’s character leaves me very fearful of the outcome. Of course
he will obey the direct orders of his monarch . . . but otherwise, when it can,
intrigue will cause a destructive effect because his secret ambition will not
abide the indignity of being subordinated to the general of a foreign power.”
Gneisenau concluded his letter to the king by posing four questions:
“First, who will occupy Breslau [Wrocław] immediately on the 11th; second,
what assignment has been given to the Russian troops in Poland; third, how
strong will be the corps that assumes the defense of Silesia and how many
Russian troops will join the [Prussian] I Corps; and fourth, what shall its
task be in general: must it go on the defensive or can it take the offensive?”17
Unbeknownst to Gneisenau, the answer to his second question had already
been decided: Bennigsen’s Army of Poland would link with the Army of
Silesia as soon as the Russians completed its mobilization. Gneisenau with-
drew his ridiculous request to lead a brigade after receiving assurances that
he could serve as Blücher’s chief of staff and that Blücher would command
an independent army. As for distributing the various corps of the Prussian
army, his petition to the king achieved nothing. Bülow’s III Corps and
Tauentzien’s IV were assigned to Bernadotte’s Army of North Germany while
Kleist’s II Corps and the Guard Brigade were attached to Schwarzenberg’s
Army of Bohemia. Only Yorck’s I Corps and the Silesian Landwehr would
remain in Silesia.
By the end of the armistice, Coalition field forces in the German theater
amounted to 512,113 men divided into 556.5 battalions and 572 squadrons
with 1,380 guns and 68 Cossack regiments. In round figures, 350,000
second-line troops could also be made available. Regarding the field armies,
the 254,404 men of Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia included 127,345
Austrians, 82,062 Russians, and 44,907 Prussians. Bernadotte’s Army of
North Germany consisted of 73,648 Prussians, 29,357 Russians, and 23,449
Swedes. In addition, Bernadotte held nominal command over Wallmoden’s
28,000-man corps that consisted of various contingents (the German Legion,
Mecklenburgers, Swedes, Hanoverians, Hanseatic Germans, and Prussians).
This corps guarded Mecklenburg, observing Davout at Hamburg and the
Danes in Holstein.
On 9 August, the 124,000 men and 402 guns of Kleist’s II Corps,
Wittgenstein’s corps, and the Russo-Prussian Guard and Reserve moved
into the district of Landeshut and the County of Glatz along the Bohemian
frontier. The Army of Silesia received the Prussian and Russian forces that
remained in the province – 104,974 soldiers and 339 guns – a force much
larger than the 50,000 men first anticipated by the Allies. A further 47,650
men, mainly Landwehr, assembled under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Johann Wilhelm von Krauseneck for the defense of Silesia and the
siege of Glogau (Glogόw). In the long run, the creation of multinational
armies helped overcome the problems experienced by previous coalitions
and paid dividends in solidifying unity of effort, at least during the war in
Germany.18
Although the monarchs had made the decision five days earlier, Alexan-
der and Frederick William officially appointed Blücher commander of the
Silesian Army on 8 August. Gneisenau also received orders to assume his
post as Chief of the General Staff of the Prussian Army at Blücher’s head-
quarters, where he would likewise serve as chief of staff of the Silesian Army.
Both Alexander and Frederick William insisted that a Prussian command
this army. In the tsar’s mind, Blücher’s bold attack at Haynau (Chojnów)
helped erase the stigma associated with his name following Bautzen.
Blücher’s nomination received strong support from both Hardenberg and
Stein, who believed he possessed the charisma to both motivate the soldiers
and electrify the nation. Yet the decision to place Blücher at the head of the
new Army of Silesia rankled many Russian and Prussian officers. Critics felt
that Blücher’s age (seventy-one), uncertain health, and vices such as gambl-
ing and excessive alcohol consumption made him a poor choice for this
massive responsibility. Others questioned his experience, claiming that Blü-
cher knew only of the cavalry. Some pointed to the fact that, prior to the
Spring Campaign, he had never commanded more than 20,000 men. Despite
their monarch’s role in the decision-making process, the Russians noted that
foreigners commanded all three principal Allied armies. “From the choice of
the commanders in chief of the three armies,” noted Langeron, “one can see
that there was no Russian army properly speaking. Tsar Alexander wished to
appear a mere auxiliary to the great struggle that was destined to liberate
Germany, for which he was then fighting, but this auxiliary greatly resem-
bled the Supreme Chief and one can say without undue flattery that he was
the Agamemnon of the Allies.”19
The efficient staff officer and member of Scharnhorst’s inner circle, Karl
Wilhelm von Grolman, received the task of accompanying Barclay de Tolly,
ostensibly to keep an eye on the Russian commander. News that the mon-
archs had officially announced Blücher’s appointment as commander in
chief of the Silesian Army came in the form of a pessimistic report from
Grolman at Barclay’s headquarters in Reichenbach:
The situation here has been resolved: the tsar, Barclay, and all will go to
Bohemia, Blücher will retain the command here [in Silesia] . . . Great disputes
over the command in Bohemia will occur. The Austrians believe that every-
thing will be placed under Schwarzenberg; here one says that the command-
ers [Barclay and Schwarzenberg] will be equal; it appears to me that some
gentlemen have the idea of solving everything through sit-down councils;
thus all the previous madness and problems will occur again. Unfortunately,
I am attached to Barclay and cannot get free. Everything remains wretched
for the internal condition of the army; Boyen comes not, but instead remains
with Bülow as chief of staff. Knesebeck will direct the entire internal business
of the army but without having received the appropriate authority for this.
Hardenberg is in mortal terror because the troops that are to go to Bohemia
need money, and he has none. The English refuse to unload the £100,000
sterling and the military supplies that arrived at Kolberg until hostilities
resume; one keeps all negotiations secret from them.
Despite this negative view of the situation, Grolman offered one tantalizing
nugget. Referring to the situation in Silesia, he assured Gneisenau: “You will
find here the best fate because all the wretches go to Bohemia, and so you
will be your own master.”20
The advantages this independence offered depended on how well Blü-
cher worked with his staff, especially Gneisenau. Since 1807, Blücher’s
rapport with Gneisenau had blossomed into an intimate friendship. During
the Spring Campaign, they proved that the stress caused by their increasing
responsibilities did not affect their working relationship but had instead
brought them closer. Friederich best defines their relationship: “Bound
closely together by supreme leadership skills, identical military and political
convictions, a burning love and respect for king and Fatherland, and a
burning hatred of all things French, similar to each other in desires, insight,
energy, and stamina, Blücher and Gneisenau belonged together; one cannot
think of one without the other.” Blücher explains the nature of their working
relationship: “My very reliable chief of staff, Gneisenau, reports to me over
the proposed maneuvers to be executed. Once convinced he is right, I drive
my troops through hell toward the goal and I never stop until the desired
goal has been accomplished – indeed, although the officers trained in the old
school pout and complain and all but mutiny.”21
Aside from a cordial relationship with the field commander, the chief of
staff needed to possess the knowledge, abilities, and skills that the former
lacked in order for the military marriage to work. If Blücher represented the
Frederician period, Gneisenau belonged to the new age. Born near Torgau in
1760 to an impoverished Saxon lieutenant and his wife, he studied at the
University of Erfurt for only two years before enlisting in the Austrian
army. Enticed by an officer’s commission, Gneisenau transferred to the
margrave of Ansbach-Bayreuth’s army and served in a regiment hired by
the British to fight in the American Revolutionary War. After returning from
that conflict, Gneisenau applied for Prussian service, being commissioned by
Frederick II as a first lieutenant in the infantry. Like Napoleon, he possessed
a voracious appetite for reading and learning. Ironically, the early career of
General Bonaparte captured Gneisenau’s attention. He zealously followed
Napoleon’s life and campaigns, seeking to uncover the secret of his success.
“Thus the great Corsican was actually his master in the art of war,” con-
tinues Friederich. “In his subsequent positions, he [Gneisenau] learned how
the army was a living organism as well as the nature of its various branches;
travels in foreign lands sharpened and expanded his view so that he belonged
to the educated officers of his time but without being able to make any
special claim of erudition.”
An engaging outward appearance that exuded self-confidence character-
ized the 52-year-old. Irrepressible liveliness complemented an amiable, witty
nature. Like Blücher, he combined fiery optimism with selfless patriotism.
The confidant of Hardenberg, and politically connected in Austria, Russia,
Sweden, and Great Britain, Gneisenau could project Blücher’s voice both
nationally and internationally. Always ready to recognize another’s merit,

Gneisenau, like Blücher, never shirked his responsibility or sought a scape-
goat to blame for his own mistakes. “Through a perceptive and confident
view,” concludes Friederich, “through bravery and the love of taking risks,
through freshness of spirit and an untiring body, he was certainly the man to
place at the side of a commander like Blücher, assuming the second place
with self-denial, when he probably deserved the first.”22 According to
Gerhard Ritter,
The classic human ideal Clausewitz envisaged, was, as we have seen, the
universal man of culture, not yet spoiled by mechanization and specializa-
tion. It was from this living tradition that he constructed his ideal image of
the general in whose mind military and political leadership were to fuse into a
higher unity. If there ever was a Prussian general who met these criteria, it
was his much-admired friend Neithard von Gneisenau, beyond doubt the
most inspired personality among all generals who ever pitted themselves
against Napoleon in combat. A quartermaster-general without proper expert
training, as he himself knew and frankly admitted, he possessed the qualities
of character and the intellectual faculties of the born military leader. The
sweep and grandeur of his mind exert their effect even on posterity, by the
impact of his eloquence, the creative imagery of his style. He was a soldier
who remained sensitive to the great political ideas of his time, apprehending
foreign and domestic affairs with equal enthusiasm, ever pursuing the
supreme goals of national policy far beyond petty day-to-day affairs.23
Lieutenant-Colonel Friedrich Karl von Müffling received the

quartermaster-general’s position due to recommendations from his friends,
Knesebeck, and the Prussian war minister, General Karl Georg von Hake.
Gneisenau wanted Colonel Carl von Clausewitz, his personal friend and
Scharnhorst’s prodigy, and frankly told Müffling, who likewise had been
trained in General Staff work by Scharnhorst. Gneisenau bemoaned the
departure of Clausewitz and Grolman: Clausewitz, technically still in Rus-
sian service, went to Wallmoden’s corps while Grolman soon exchanged
Barclay’s headquarters for that of Kleist, where he served as chief of staff of
II Corps. This left Müffling, who had a history with Blücher that fell far short
of amicable. In 1805, he had served on Blücher’s staff and accompanied him
during the retreat to Lübeck following the disaster of Jena–Auerstedt in 1806.
After the French captured Scharnhorst, Müffling served as acting staff chief,
persuading Blücher to surrender at Ratkau. Blücher never forgave Müffling
for this and forever harbored a grudge against him. Despite being friends and
comrades-in-arms with Müffling’s father, Blücher despised “the lurking
observer in Müffling, who possessed a great satirical talent and the gift to
imitate to an exceptional degree, but concealed both and only seldom with
great caution allowed them to show; instead, he aspired to have a serious,
educated demeanor, a diplomatic reserve, which he succeeded at all too well.

Blücher knew that Müffling frequently made jokes about him, mimicked his
speech and gestures, and in general exposed his infirmities, and it irked him all
the more the way he would conceal all of this.” Indeed, although Blücher
never said a word about the mocking, he could not tolerate “the Philosopher
of Weimar,” a relatively sanitary nickname he had for Müffling compared to
other, less flattering monikers. Until the end of the armistice, Blücher referred
to him as the “commandant of the headquarters.”24
Apparently, Müffling did not resent Blücher for the ill-feelings the old
hussar harbored toward him and even believed that the general liked him.
Müffling maintains that “Blücher was friendly to me; and since the conflict at
Haynau, which I had proposed, and for which I had drafted the plan . . . I rose
in his favor, because in it he thought I understood the cavalry service. This
was an advantage I did not underrate; yet I was not placed immediately under
him, but under Gneisenau; and with the great difference of our views, the idea
that I could gain his entire confidence would have been hopeless.” According
to Hans Delbrück, “Müffling was very different from Gneisenau and
Blücher; he relied more on the watch and the compass, without confidence
in spiritual greatness . . . almost pedantically observing the minutes.”
Although Gneisenau initially valued Müffling’s sober, reflective nature, the
relationship soon soured. Müffling intimates that he and Gneisenau possessed
opposing views of warfare, but that the latter “declared that the difference lay
rather in my [Müffling’s] being softer and less self-confident than he, and that
this inclined me to listen to considerations he disregarded.”25
Despite their differences, Müffling always obeyed Gneisenau’s instruc-
tions. A future Chief of the General Staff of the Prussian Army, he faithfully
and indefatigably drafted orders based on Gneisenau’s directives. Like
Napoleon’s renowned chief of staff, Marshal Alexandre Berthier, Müffling
possessed the great ability to process numerous commands and quickly
present them accurately and concisely. Gneisenau discussed operations with
him, listened to his opinion, yet made the final decision. In important
matters, Gneisenau followed his own conviction based on the similar beliefs
he shared with Blücher. If Müffling initially opposed an idea, Gneisenau
attempted to understand his arguments and to correct and educate him.
Based on this open dialogue, Gneisenau confidently allowed Müffling to
compose the instructions for the army based on his directives: a responsi-
bility that Müffling executed with great utility during the campaigns of
1813 and 1814. Müffling’s ability to speak French made him valuable to
Gneisenau, who never mastered the language. In the hope of winning
Gneisenau’s “esteem,” Müffling felt it necessary to distance himself from
Blücher, lest he come between field commander and staff chief.26
For decades, Müffling had concealed his jealousy of Blücher, Gneisenau,
Grolman, and Clausewitz. After they died and the truth appeared to be
buried in the past, Müffling went to work on his memoirs, actually noting in
them that “now, when the heat and passion of the time have died away, and
many questions important to military history still remain, accounts may be
supplied of many verbal transactions known to few persons still living. False
conclusions may thus be corrected, and false accusations that have received
acceptance for a period of thirty years will be refuted.” The 75-year-old
Müffling died on 16 January 1851; that same year saw the publication of his
Aus meinem Leben, or Passages from My Life. Filled with unjustified
innuendo and outright defamation, his memoirs paint an objectionable
picture of his colleagues, accusing them of being members of a secret society,
the Tugendbund, who pursued their own political agendas. For example, in
describing their difference of opinion over the armistice, Müffling wrote
that it had been “censured, especially by the members of the Tugendbund
(a so-called alliance of students), as unnecessary and as a mistake; nay, it was
regarded as a misfortune for the state. I had many heated disputes with
General Gneisenau who, in his excitement, had sent a letter to the king
bitterly censuring the armistice. The general wanted to convince me.
I opposed him very calmly, but was determined not to yield, because he
spoke as the head of a party, which had its seat in the army.”27 Yet not all
who had lived during the Napoleonic Wars were dead. On 29 April 1854,
General Ferdinand Theodor von Stosch, Gneisenau’s adjutant in 1813,
explained to Hans Delbrück: “I have had only three opportunities to look
at Müffling’s attack on Gneisenau in his posthumous memoir. The book
itself is a stigma of Müffling’s vanity.”28
During the course of the war, Gneisenau used Müffling’s friendship with
Knesebeck for the good of the Silesian Army and the war effort itself.29
“Remaining on good terms with Knesebeck was an exercise in cleverness,”
wrote one of Blücher’s biographers, General Wolfgang von Unger, “which
Scharnhorst had also practiced. Now it was even more important since
Hardenberg did not always find himself with the king’s entourage and was
not always familiar with the military situation.” Knesebeck likewise saw it as
beneficial to maintain a close relationship with Gneisenau. Thus, both
Blücher and Gneisenau managed to have an outwardly cordial relationship
with Knesebeck, who in his position as the king’s adjutant-general received
all incoming correspondence over the course of events even though this task
did not pertain to his actual sphere of jurisdiction. For the sake of the war
effort, Gneisenau wisely established direct communication with Knesebeck.
Neither infrequently nor insignificantly did their views of strategy differ
over the course of the campaign. Fortunately for Blücher and Gneisenau,
their relationship with Stein and Tsar Alexander offset Knesebeck’s conser-
vative influence on Frederick William. Blücher, Gneisenau, Stein, and Alex-
ander firmly resolved that the war could end only with Napoleon’s downfall
and the restoration of an independent Germany. Early in the war, Stein
provided the link between Blücher/Gneisenau and the tsar by sharing with
Alexander every memo that Gneisenau wrote to the former Prussian minis-
ter. Through this support, Stein helped facilitate the excellent relationship
that developed between Blücher and Alexander. Long after Stein faded from
the military scene, the beneficial understanding between Blücher and Alex-
ander proved decisive.30
On 9 August, Blücher received an invitation from Barclay, now the
ranking Allied general in Silesia, to meet with him at Reichenbach on the
10th to discuss “various important circumstances.” That same day, the 9th, a
comprehensive letter arrived in which Barclay officially informed Blücher
that he would command the Army of Silesia. “Because a considerable portion
of the army stationed in Silesia until now will march to Bohemia and . . . I will
follow this army, our two monarchs have decided to place all Allied troops
that remain behind in Silesia under your tried and tested command.” Barclay
explained that he would provide Blücher an overview “of the entire course of
operations decided upon by our two monarchs in agreement with the
emperor of Austria and the crown prince of Sweden and in this way provide
guidance for your future operations which, because of your military experi-
ence, will certainly add new laurels to the glory of the Allies.”
Choosing not to reveal the details of the new Reichenbach Plan, Barclay
simply stated that “the guiding principle of all our operations is the Protocol
agreed upon by our two monarchs and the crown prince of Sweden at
Trachenberg, of which I enclose a copy.” He then explained that as the “main
idea for the general plan of military operations in Silesia,” Blücher would seek
to do the greatest possible damage to any enemy forces that turned against the
Army of Bohemia or the Army of North Germany. “Nevertheless,” con-
tinued the Russian commander, “at the same time you must seek to avoid a
battle against superior forces. In this regard, it is absolutely necessary for the
army left behind in Silesia to constantly seek to harass the enemy with its
advance guard and all of its light troops so that he is never lost from sight and
cannot win a march toward Saxony; yet the main body can never engage in a
battle with a superior enemy.”
Barclay advised that, if Napoleon committed his main force against the
Silesian Army, Blücher should slow the enemy’s march as much as possible,
withdraw east-southeast toward the Glatzer Neiße River, and avoid a battle
against superior forces.31 Blücher’s right wing – Sacken’s Russian army
corps – would withdraw up the Oder, posting some of its light cavalry on
the right bank to maintain communication with Bennigsen’s Army of
Poland. Blücher’s left, General Guillaume-Guignard St.-Priest’s Russian
army corps, would withdraw to Glatz on the Glatzer Neiße, hugging the
Riesengebirge (Krkonoše, Karkonosze) to secure communication with
the Bohemian Army and Allied Headquarters. Meanwhile, the main body
of the Silesian Army would take its direction toward the fortress of Neiße on
the Glatzer Neiße, “finding a new strongpoint in this fortress and its
entrenched camp, which must be placed in readiness while the Army of
Bohemia and that of the crown prince of Sweden will operate against the
enemy’s rear.” He advised Blücher to insure that all Silesian fortresses
received their assigned garrisons sooner rather than later.
“On the other hand, should Napoleon direct his main force to Saxony or
the Mark [Brandenburg], it will be necessary for the army in Silesia to
likewise take the offensive.”32 Barclay instructed Blücher to move his left
wing – St.-Priest’s corps – from Landeshut along the Riesengebirge “durch
schnelles Vordingen [through rapid advances]” to Marklissa (Leśna) on the
left bank of the Queis (Kwisa) River, bypassing the considerable entrench-
ments the imperials had purportedly erected along the Bober (Bóbr) River.
In the meantime, Blücher would lead his main body toward Goldberg. As
for Sacken and Blücher’s right wing, if the imperials did not force a union
with the main body by making a stand on either the Bober or the Queis,
Sacken would move further northwest, “advancing in forced marches
between Bunzlau and Sagan toward Großenhain and seeking to open com-
munication with the crown prince of Sweden through a strong cavalry
detachment.” If Napoleon directly targeted the Army of North Germany,
Blücher would proceed according to these same instructions, but continue
all the way to the Elbe. Thus, in the case of a French offensive against the
Army of North Germany, Barclay explained that “we [the Bohemian Army]
must then concentrate our main force on the Elbe and immediately march
against the enemy’s rear, with the main force on the left bank of the Elbe and
the Silesian Army on the right bank.” Sacken’s corps and especially all of its
cavalry would march “more in the direction of Berlin and operate with the
greatest force against the enemy’s rear.”
Barclay recognized that, for Blücher to react in time to these possible
movements by the enemy, he needed a constant flow of accurate news.
Because the Silesian Army lacked large numbers of light cavalry, the Russian
commander strongly urged Blücher to form Streifkorps. “General [Sergey]
Lanskoy with his cavalry detachment can provide good service; also Colonels
[Vasily] Rakhmanov and [Aleksandr] Figner of Sacken’s corps and General
[Paisi] Kaysarov on the left wing . . . can be advantageously employed for this
task.” He also expressed concern that the imperial forces in Silesia would
occupy the neutral zone before Blücher’s forces. Calling the prevention of
this “desirable,” Barclay suggested that Blücher enter the neutral zone before
16 August if he detected that the enemy had crossed the line of demarcation.
If not, he advised Blücher to enter the neutral zone shortly after 12:00 a.m. on
17 August. Barclay believed that Sacken’s vanguard should march to Neu-
markt (Środa Śla˛ska) while his main body occupied Breslau. Yorck and
Langeron should concentrate their corps at Striegau (Strzegom), pushing
their vanguards to Jauer. Barclay recommended that, on Blücher’s left,
St.-Priest’s corps should forward its vanguard from Landeshut to Hirschberg

(Jelenia Góra). Concluding, Barclay stated: “These are the main ideas drafted
for the plan of operations for the army in Silesia according to the views of our
sovereigns. Based on your well-known military experience and insight, you
will adapt them to the circumstances and modify them according to the
enemy’s operations. In the case that you do so, it is desired that you establish
direct and rapid communication with the main army in Bohemia and the
Polish Army . . . Likewise it would be good to open a rapid form of communi-
cation with the crown prince of Sweden.”33
In a second letter dated 10 August, the Russian commander reminded
Blücher that, although the armistice formally expired that very day, a six-day
suspension of hostilities would ensue. Thus, the neutral zone could not be
entered until 17 August. However, in a postscript he added: “Nevertheless, if
the enemy undertakes hostilities, this prohibition should be disregarded.”
Between 8 and 10 August, reports reached Blücher’s headquarters about
extensive French movements toward the neutral zone: the march of imperial
troops to Glogau, the concentration of considerable forces at Liegnitz, and
the advance of elements from the enemy’s right wing into the Riesengebirge
as well as toward Spiller (Pasiecznik) on the road to Hirschberg. At the same
time, rumors reached Barclay that the French did not intend to honor the six-
day suspension of hostilities. This led to the belief that the imperials would
enter the neutral zone at the earliest possible moment, thus prompting a third
letter from Barclay on 10 August: “From the enclosed reports, you will see
that we believe the enemy will enter the neutral zone before the expiration of
the six-day suspension of hostilities, thus making it necessary to double all
security measures.” Barclay instructed Blücher to act according to the dis-
position contained in his first letter of 10 August “as soon as one squad of
enemy troops crosses the line of demarcation.”34
During their meeting on 10 August, Barclay reiterated the main points of
his letters, adding that the Silesian Army (1) would advance toward the
enemy; (2) could never lose contact with the enemy; and (3) could never
engage a superior enemy force. Should Napoleon advance into Silesia,
Blücher would retreat and draw imperial forces into the interior. Yet, as
soon as the imperials broke off the chase and turned around to confront
another Allied army, Blücher would pursue them. If Napoleon allocated his
main force to operations in Saxony or Brandenburg, Blücher would advance
toward the imperial forces that remained in Silesia or pursue them wherever
they went. If Napoleon directed his main strength against the Army of
North Germany, which was rumored to be likely, the Bohemian Army
would pursue along the left bank of the Elbe while the Silesian Army
moved down its right bank. Only Schwarzenberg’s army received author-
ization to take the offensive by advancing from Bohemia to Saxony by way
of Teplitz. As his main goal, Blücher would avoid being defeated, but remain
close enough to the imperial forces in Silesia to follow them and arrive in
time to participate in a general battle in the vicinity of the Elbe.
As Barclay lectured, Blücher listened quietly, shaking his head in doubt.
After the Russian commander finished, Blücher rejected the assignment. He
offered his resignation, claiming he could not operate so tightly bound to the
defensive. Barclay and his quartermaster-general, Diebitsch, maintained that
Blücher had misinterpreted the instructions, that they were not to be taken
literally, and that the Prussian could take the offensive under favorable
circumstances: “An officer in command of an army of 100,000 men can
never be tied down absolutely to the defensive; thus, if a good opportunity
arose, he could attack and defeat his enemy.” Blücher demanded approval in
writing from the monarchs. If they did not agree with this condition, then
they could find another assignment for him. Barclay did not dare amend
instructions he had received from the monarchs but Blücher insisted that he
would accept command of the Silesian Army only on the condition that the
instructions be modified. Moreover, he asked Barclay to notify Alexander
and Frederick William of this condition. Müffling believed that Barclay had
informed the sovereigns but that nothing ever resulted either verbally or in
writing. Receiving no other assignment from the sovereigns, Blücher
assumed the monarchs had approved his demand and thus considered his
assignment to be modified. In his mind, Blücher unfettered himself from a
Fabian strategy and protected himself against any reproach of having dis-
obeyed orders should he suffer a setback. He informed Bernadotte that “the
Trachenberg Convention forms the basis of my instructions.”35
Totaling 104,974 men, the Army of Silesia numbered approximately
74,000 infantry, 24,000 cavalry, and 339 guns. Russian troops provided the
majority of Blücher’s forces, some 66,490 men grouped in three army corps
led by Langeron (34,551 men), Sacken (18,353 men), and St.-Priest (13,586
men); General Pyotr Pahlen, known as Pahlen III, temporarily commanded
until St.-Priest arrived from Vienna. Blücher’s Prussian troops consisted of
the 39,243 men of Yorck’s I Army Corps.36 Behind the field army, the mainly
Landwehr Prussian auxiliary forces, numbering 47,650 men, garrisoned the
fortresses and depots of Upper Silesia. Of these, one Landwehr detachment of
12,990 men in 8 battalions and 12 squadrons supported by 4 guns received the
assignment of blockading Glogau after hostilities resumed.37
Prussian and Russian army organization differed considerably. While the
Prussians utilized regiments, brigades, and army corps, the Russians formed
regiments, brigades, divisions, infantry/cavalry corps, and army corps. The
Prussians integrated infantry, cavalry, and artillery on the brigade level while
the Russians did so at the army corps level. Each Russian infantry corps
consisted of two infantry divisions and foot artillery but no cavalry. Russian
cavalry corps usually contained at least one regular cavalry division, one
Cossack division, and horse artillery. To create army corps, which the
Russians did not numerically designate, they combined their infantry and
cavalry corps.38 For the Silesian Army, the Russians allocated five infantry
corps and two ad hoc cavalry corps. The XI Infantry Corps and 1 pioneer
company along with a cavalry corps consisting of 2nd Hussar Division, 1
brigade from 3rd Dragoon Division, and 12 Cossack regiments (4,700 men)
formed Sacken’s army corps. St.-Priest’s VIII Infantry Corps technically
belonged to Wittgenstein’s army corps but the Russians created an inde-
pendent army corps by combining St.-Priest’s infantry with another ad hoc
cavalry corps formed by 1st Dragoon Division, 2 regiments from 4th Drag-
oon Division, and 3 Cossack regiments (1,000 men).39 The VI, IX, and
X Infantry Corps combined with I Cavalry Corps, which included 4,800
Cossacks, to form Langeron’s army corps. Conversely, Yorck’s corps con-
tained four combined-arms brigades composed of ten to twelve battalions,
four squadrons, and one battery of eight six-pound guns. His Reserve
Cavalry consisted of three brigades and horse batteries, with Landwehr
accounting for four of its seven regiments. Fifty-six guns including two
batteries of twelve-pound pieces, two batteries of six, two batteries of horse,
and one battery of three-pound pieces constituted the Reserve Artillery.
Neither the Silesian nor the North German Armies contained reserves or
elite forces at the army level.
Forming the right wing of the Silesian Army, Sacken’s corps camped just
east of Breslau on the right bank of the Oder. Nine Cossack Regiments
(3,743 men) formed a cordon along the right bank of the Oder between
Steinau and Breslau while two regiments each of Hussars and Cossacks
(2,213 men) under Lanskoy pushed north on the right flank to Polnischlissa
(Leszno), thirty miles east of Glogau. Between Breslau and Schweidnitz,
Yorck’s corps formed the center.40 As the left wing, Langeron’s army corps
camped north of Schweidnitz at Jauernick (Stary Jaworów). Langeron’s
thirteen Cossack regiments extended northeast along the line of demarcation
formed by the Striegau stream (Strzegomka) from the mountains to Kanth.
On the extreme left wing, Pahlen III’s corps took post in the mountains by
Landeshut, establishing communication with the 6,000 men of Schwarzen-
berg’s Austrian 2nd Light Division, commanded by Bubna, on the opposite
side of the Riesengebirge.
To feed the troops, the Prussian leadership of the Silesian Army sought
to improve on hard lessons recently learned. During the armistice, the
Russians and Prussians utilized magazines to supply their men. Although
the provincial and municipal authorities of Silesia did their utmost to pro-
vide for the magazines, problems inevitably surfaced. First and foremost, the
vast number of Allied soldiers – some 200,000 – automatically strained the
supply system. Second, the region’s shortage of wagons – many of which had
been confiscated by the opposing armies – hindered the transport of food to
the magazines. Dependent on Polish grain imports, both Upper and Lower
Silesia quickly suffered from resource exhaustion. Obtaining adequate

amounts of forage for the horses also proved problematic. As the truncated
eastern portion of Lower Silesia allotted to the Allies by the armistice did
not produce enough oats, they supplemented the feed with corn and barley.
Horses in the Prussian service found their diets reduced to peacetime
rations. The Allies completely exhausted the territory they occupied, which
prompted some Russians to pillage. A late June protest to the Prussians
lodged by Barclay on multiple accounts offers insight into the growing
dilemma over resources. Gneisenau forwarded the letter to Hardenberg,
adding: “you much more than I can better judge this complaint – mainly
that the Russian army suffers a shortage of all necessities while ours is
provided with everything. If these shortages in the Russian army are due
to negligence of our officials they will not go unpunished by you. For this
reason, I asked the general [Barclay] to inform you.”41
Although the Allies suffered from supply shortages, the French fared
worse because their problems had started in May. By early August, Blücher’s
spies reported a complete lack of food in the imperial camps. Deserters
confirmed that the daily ration for soldiers amounted to one-half to one-
quarter pound of meat and little salt while bread rations consisted of one and
one-half pounds every other day. Thus, from the pure standpoint of feeding
the troops, the neutral zone offered pristine supplies of food and forage. As
it had been untouched for more than two months, both armies desired to be
the first to take possession of this oasis. The Prussians became increasingly
concerned that the imperials would forage as much as they could as soon as
the armistice expired. “But what if the French army attempted this foraging
during the armistice?” asked Müffling. “Complaints over the violation of
international law would not return what was lost. For this reason, it was
Blücher’s burning desire to find cause to occupy the neutral zone . . . before
the expiration of the armistice.”42
The march to Bohemia of more than 100,000 Russians and Prussians did
little to ease supply problems. After two months, Silesia reached the point of
exhaustion. Regardless, Friedrich Wilhelm Ribbentrop, Blücher’s longtime
friend and commissar of the Silesian Army, sought to prepare the troops for
the advance into the French occupation zone, which he believed would be
stripped bare by the time the Allies arrived. Overambitious to a fault,
Ribbentrop planned to provide each soldier with various victuals in the
following daily supply amounts: biscuit (three days), bread (one day), rice
(six days), and salt (seven days). He wanted each brigade supplied with four
days of meat and brandy, and the chuck wagons loaded with a three-day
supply of biscuit and a four-day supply of rice, salt, meat, and flour for
baking bread. Reserve magazines would contain a four-day supply of biscuit
and an eight-day supply of liquor. For the horses, the troops would be
supplied grain fodder for two days.43
To achieve these goals, the district government of Frankenstein

(Za˛bkowice Śla˛skie) gathered a four-month supply of victuals to feed
120,000 men and 40,000 horses. On 17 August, Blücher’s army received
one month’s worth of these stores, while Ribbentrop equally divided the
supplies for the remaining three months among the fortresses of Schweid-
nitz, Glatz, Neiße, and Kosel (Koźle). After the war resumed, the Liegnitz
District government received orders to provide the same amount of supplies
to satisfy three months. For each corps of the Silesian Army, the Prussians
established three supply depots and two field bakeries.44 Each depot con-
tained a park of 120 four-team farm wagons under a foreman to oversee the
care of the horses and vehicles as well as a government commissar to
coordinate deliveries. Each depot contained an emergency supply of six days
of food for its corps. Blücher’s staff allocated three-eighths of the total
amount of supplies to Yorck and Langeron each; Sacken received the rest.
For provisions, Yorck’s corps alone possessed 180 wagons divided into
3 trains of 50 each and 1 reserve train of 30. A military commissar adminis-
tered each. Despite Ribbentrop’s efforts, tremendous difficulties arose
following the resumption of hostilities due to the Silesian Army’s unique
assignment as well as the rainy season’s corrosive impact on the roads. The
fact that the Russians lacked field bakeries had apparently escaped
Ribbentrop’s attention. Moreover, his allies refused to build earthen ovens,
which the Russians had first utilized in 1812 at the fortified camp of Drissa,
as long as the prospect remained of receiving “better and cleaner” –
according to Prussian General Staff historian Colonel Eduard Friedrich
von Höpfner – Prussian bread. Although the Prussians assigned commissary
officers to the Russian corps, they could not completely eliminate all the
difficulties “that are always raised by foreign troops with foreign supply
requirements.”45
As for troops, the Prussians moved heaven and earth to replace the
losses of the Spring Campaign, expand the regular army, and complete the
mobilization of more than 100,000 Landwehr. From a population of some
5,000,000, the Prussians fielded approximately 275,000 men for the Fall
Campaign.46 A 12 July order decreed that each Prussian brigade would
include one Line regiment, one Reserve regiment consisting of Krümpern,
thus soldiers who had received military training, and four Landwehr
battalions. Frederick William later decided to organize the militia into
regiments, thus changing this formula slightly so that each brigade con-
sisted of one regiment each of Line, Reserve, and Landwehr. The order of
battle for Kleist’s II and Bülow’s III Corps reflected this ratio, yet the
War Department instructed Yorck to transfer three of his four Reserve
regiments to Tauentzien’s IV Corps and replace them with Landwehr
regiments. Of Yorck’s forty-five battalions, the Landwehr accounted for
twenty-four while Kleist’s ratio was sixteen of forty-one, and Bülow’s
twelve of forty-one. The final organization gave the impression that

Yorck’s corps would serve an auxiliary role only.47
Not only did the Prussians expand their combat power, but they also
continuously sought improvement. In particular, Frederick William
emphasized the need for flexibility, mobility, and speed. In a cabinet order
issued from Neiße on 29 July, he prohibited the use of an entire Prussian
brigade as the vanguard for an army corps. Instead, when a vanguard needed
to be formed, the king’s instructions specifically called for Fusilier and
Reserve Infantry Battalions only, which would be drawn from all four
brigades of a Prussian army corps. For every Fusilier Battalion employed
in the van, one Reserve Infantry Battalion would likewise be assigned to it.
However, each regiment would be required to provide only one battalion
until the Landwehr received sufficient field experience to likewise serve in
the vanguard. As for cavalry, the king stipulated that only hussars and uhlans
drawn from the brigade cavalry be utilized for advance guard duty. Should a
vanguard require more sabers, the squadrons from the Reserve Cavalry
should be used, but not cuirassiers.48
In Silesia, Gneisenau labored to make the Silesian Landwehr combat-
ready in accordance with the king’s announcement that militia regiments
would be amalgamated with their Line and Reserve counterparts at the
brigade level. Auxiliaries no longer, Frederick William expected the Land-
wehr to fight alongside the army. As noted, Gneisenau took control of the
Military Government of Silesia for the duration of the armistice to direct
both the mobilization of the province’s Landwehr as well as the measures to
defend the province; Bülow assumed the same post in Brandenburg.
Gneisenau utilized his boundless energy to oversee the equipping and
training of the Landwehr. He immediately recognized the militia’s value
for defensive purposes, but transforming the Landwehr into a field army in
nine weeks proved extremely challenging. Hardenberg did all he could to
remedy the persistent shortage of cash, which did much to hinder the
mobilization. Slowly but steadily, Gneisenau received shipments of shoes,
muskets, uniforms, and cooking gear so that the number of men who were
marching barefoot armed only with pikes gradually decreased. For the
defense of Silesia, Gneisenau’s assistants inspected the fortresses of Schweid-
nitz, Glatz, Kosel, and Silberberg. As much as funds allowed, he ordered
their fortifications improved and warehouses stocked; any surpluses went
straight to the troops.49
Blücher praised Gneisenau’s work with the militia. “Landwehren Sie
man immer druff! [Really let those militiamen have it!],” he exclaimed in a
29 June response to Gneisenau’s request for his opinion of the first Silesian
militia battalions (four in total) deemed combat-ready. Three weeks later he
again wrote Gneisenau: “Yesterday I inspected twenty battalions and four
squadrons of the Landwehr organized by you. I must confess that I am very
satisfied with their condition, the grand duke [Constantine] joined me during
the inspection; he mounted a horse that I gave him and the troops marched
past him: he admitted his amazement about their fine condition. Another
sixteen battalions of all strengths that will join the two corps arrived today.
Tomorrow I will inspect Kleist’s corps; I have already inspected Yorck’s.
The troops are in fine condition.”50 Eventually, the Silesian Landwehr
provided ten infantry regiments (forty battalions) and seven cavalry regi-
ments (twenty-eight squadrons) for the Prussian I and II Corps.51 Compared
to Prussia’s other provinces, Gneisenau’s success in Silesia remained unpar-
alleled. However, recruited mainly from the impoverished regions of Silesia,
from the weaving and factory districts, the men – although willing and quick
to learn – were far inferior in physical strength to the young men drafted
from the agricultural provinces. Thus, in terms of endurance, the Silesian
Landwehr proved to be the worst militia of the entire state.52
As a matter of principle, the Landwehr received only the equipment that
the regular army did not need. Consequently, the militia’s shortages of
uniforms and equipment grossly overshadowed the Line’s deficiencies.
One soaking from the summer rains rendered the ill-prepared tunics and
blue jackets far too tight while the linen trousers shrank to the point of
discomfort; the shoes proved so poor that many preferred to go barefoot.
The caps that covered their heads offered little protection against rain drops
or saber cuts. Overcoats could not be provided, cooking gear remained
sparse, and the men received linen bags rather than rucksacks. “The spirit
and goodwill of the Prussian troops were beyond all description,” judged
Müffling. “Yet at this time they were far behind the Russians in arms and
equipment. The Silesian Landwehr was particularly ill supplied with uni-
forms; they were even lacking shoes at the beginning of the campaign. Cloth
had been obtained wherever it could be found. There had been no time to
take the usual precautions in preparing it, and after the first rain the jackets
shrank so much that they barely covered body and arms. The sick lists of the
first four weeks of the campaign proved how much the health of the men
was affected by insufficient clothing.”53
Limited supplies of muskets meant one-third of the Silesian Landwehr
marched with pikes until captured enemy firearms could replace them. This
meant that target practice remained a luxury that few Prussian recruits
enjoyed. Despite the hard work that went into the mobilization of the
Landwehr, many battalions still lacked the necessary gear for campaigning.
Training fell short of satisfactory for the Landwehr mainly due to the limited
number of experienced men to lead the drills. Nevertheless, exercises pro-
gressed far enough by the time the militia battalions joined Yorck’s corps
that they could maneuver on par with the relatively inexperienced Line
units. Discipline remained a concern as even the best intentions could not
create unit cohesion instantaneously, especially when some of the officers
possessed no more military knowledge or education than their men. Among

four militia companies that reported to Yorck’s corps at the same time, not a
single sergeant could write. “In order to increase my difficulties, they have
assigned to me four of the worst Landwehr battalions,” complained Yorck.
“On account of some personages, the poor state must be bled and afflicted;
you can easily imagine, my friend, the kind of mood this places me in.”54 In
general, more officers with military training could be found among the
Landwehr cavalry than the infantry but the lack of experienced leaders
remained the militia’s greatest obstacle.
For any army, the creation of cavalry within a short timeframe posed
almost insurmountable challenges. Yorck’s corps contained three forms of
cavalry: Line, Landwehr, and National. Voluntary enlistment and contribu-
tions from the provinces formed the last category: the East Prussian
National Cavalry and the Mecklenburg-Strelitz Hussars, both of which
served in Yorck’s corps. Pride as well as wallets deep enough to keep a son
at home with minimal public shame insured that both regiments received
quality equipment and sufficient arms. Each Mecklenburg-Strelitzer Hussar
carried two pistols and one rifled carbine while the depot of the East
Prussian National Cavalry Regiment supplied each soldier with a lance,
but only a portion of the men received pistols. Both units benefited from
the large number of unemployed veteran officers from the pre-Jena army but
few experienced troopers served in the ranks. Moreover, while the quality of
mounts for both regiments exceeded those of the Line cavalry in quality, age,
and strength, the average soldier’s equestrian skill and knowledge of horse
care remained poor, resulting in the premature exhausting of many mounts.
The East Prussian National Regiment possessed one Jäger squadron; the
Mecklenburgers one detachment of forty Jäger.55
Numerous experienced veterans from the pre-Jena army filled the gaps in
Yorck’s Line cavalry regiments, meaning that very few raw recruits needed
to be trained but horses remained in short supply. The Lithuanian Dragoons,
2nd Leib Hussars, and Brandenburg Hussars each contained one volunteer
Jäger squadron as their fifth field squadron. Many of these volunteer
troopers had already gained combat experience in the Spring Campaign,
making them extremely valuable, particularly as dispatch riders and order-
lies. The Jäger of the Brandenburg Hussars benefited from a full comple-
ment of carbines. Although the least valuable of the three, the Silesian
Landwehr cavalry not only possessed good mounts, but because former
officers of the pre-Jena army conducted their exercises they also progressed
much further than the Silesian Landwehr infantry. On the whole, the
troopers of the Silesian Landwehr cavalry appeared zealous and hardy
compared to their poorer counterparts on foot.
Morale remained positive among officers and soldiers in all three cat-
egories of cavalry but goodwill did not suffice to overcome the inherent
difficulties that arose with the army’s rapid expansion. The contrast between
Yorck’s twenty Landwehr squadrons and twenty-eight Line squadrons
remained glaring, although the former eventually became adept at using
the lance. On the average, Yorck’s cavalry regiments fell short of their full
complement by 30 men and between 50 and 100 mounts; only the Branden-
burg and Mecklenburg-Strelitz Hussars as well as the Landwehr regiments
approached full capacity. While the quality of horses and overall training
varied, Prussia’s empty arsenals and depleted pastures affected both Line and
Landwehr. Prior to the Russian campaign, the imperials requisitioned every
horse they could find. Foreign horses, which the state purchased mainly
from Russia for use by the Line, took time to arrive. As a result, numerous
unbroken horses, coach horses, and older horses needed to be employed,
producing a multifarious composition. Horses for the Landwehr’s cavalry
remained in even shorter supply, resulting in the employment of many poor
and unserviceable beasts that should have been enjoying the quiet of the
pasture. Regarding arms, the Prussians attempted to provide each soldier
with a saber and pistol. Line regiments had to surrender their second pistols
to the Landwehr. In total, only 25 percent of the Prussian cavalry carried
carbines. As uhlans, the East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment and all
Landwehr troopers bore lances. The volunteer Jäger squadrons formed the
best armed of their respective regiments.
In general, uniforms and equipment for both man and horse likewise
varied in terms of quality. Yorck’s two national cavalry regiments generally
possessed satisfactory equipment and uniforms while those of the Line
bordered on worn and poor; the equipment and uniforms of the Landwehr
cavalry ranged from extremely poor to incomplete or even nonexistent.
Yorck’s Line units stood far behind the Russians as well as the Prussians of
Kleist’s corps in terms of equipment and arms. The Landwehr – 13,370 men
of his 30,000 infantry and 1,320 troopers of his 6,000 cavalry – looked the
least impressive. After an inspection, he explained to the king the needs of
his men, especially footgear. Frederick William lamely responded: “This is
very displeasing to me, but the war has needs and everything has started.”56
As for the Prussian artillery, inadequate funds coupled with equipment
shortages caused dire problems. Among the thirteen batteries assigned to
I Corps and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Johann Heinrich Otto von
Schmidt, the majority struck Yorck as being pitiful. “Regarding the uniforms
of the gunners,” stated an inspection report from Yorck’s corps dated 21
July, “everything is very poor; the gunners assigned to the horse batteries are
almost naked. With each horse battery there are more than thirty men who
have no overalls but instead perform their duties in tattered and coarse
cotton trousers. Also, the overcoats and the linen sacks as well as the
caparisons are extremely poor.” Regarding the guns and carriages, the report
noted that, “due to the shortage of funds, only the most pressing repairs
were made and much still remains to be done. Harnesses and stall equipment
and everything belonging to the guns are in a very pitiful condition by every
battery.”57
Yorck’s Line infantry contained several companies that had never
experienced combat and had not completed their training before the armis-
tice expired. In general, replacements for the Line and Reserve had been
under arms for three months when they reported to their units during the
armistice.58 Approximately one-third of the eight battalions designated as
“veteran” consisted of conscripts. “The I Army Corps has had great
changes,” he wrote on 4 July. “It now consists solely of recruits: I do not
have 1,000 veteran soldiers.”59 On the other hand, I Corps received four of
the Army’s six Grenadier Battalions: the 1st East Prussian, Leib, West
Prussian, and Silesian. Led by proven commanders, these elite units com-
bined with two companies of East Prussian Jäger to form a special ad hoc
Grenadier Brigade commanded by Major August von Hiller; they would
soon demonstrate the meaning of being the “Zange und Hammer [hammer
and tongs]” of Yorck’s corps. The Grenadiers along with the 5th and 13th
Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiments (four battalions each), the 2nd Leib
Hussar Regiment, known as the Black Hussars and bearing the death’s head
on their shakos, and one battery of eight-pound foot artillery formed
Yorck’s 1st Brigade commanded by Colonel Karl Friedrich Franciscus
von Steinmetz. Apart from only one Landwehr infantry regiment – the
6th Silesian – Yorck’s 2nd Brigade consisted of the veteran 1st and 2nd East
Prussian Infantry Regiments (three battalions each). Lieutenant-Colonel
Karl Friedrich von Lobenthal, who had already distinguished himself,
commanded the former while Colonel Ludwig Friedrich von Sjöholm
“the Silent,” as Yorck once called him, led the later. The imposingly
equipped troopers and excellent steeds of the Mecklenburg-Strelitz
Hussar Regiment served as the brigade cavalry. Suspecting these units to
be hand-picked, Yorck soon discovered the reason. Because General Fried-
rich Heinrich von Hünerbein still had not recovered from the wound he
received at Lützen, Duke Karl of Mecklenburg-Strelitz (Frederick Wil-
liam’s brother-in-law), received command of his brigade. “I’d rather have
the devil instead of another prince,” exclaimed Yorck after receiving the
news of Karl’s appointment. He viewed this as the beginning of an attempt
to relieve him of command as retribution for Tauroggen. Embittered,
Yorck felt that his detractors could have at least openly launched their
attack. While he could not be cashiered or brushed aside altogether, they
should have awarded Karl command of the corps and placed a brigade
in Yorck’s hands “so that all would report to the right source” in his
opinion.60
To further increase Yorck’s angst, Karl did not have a favorable reputa-
tion in the army after he had furloughed himself following the battle of
Auerstedt and returned to Mecklenburg-Strelitz. His reinstatement in the

army – probably in 1810 – caused much indignation. Despite his relationship
to the king and the Black Eagle he wore on his breast, Yorck received the
army’s youngest brigade commander with the cold aristocratic politeness
that his entourage feared more than his wrath. Before the resumption of
hostilities, Yorck traveled to Klein Öls to inspect 2nd Brigade. Dismounting,
he walked through the ranks of the 1st and 2nd East Prussian Infantry
Regiments, minutely inspecting everything but finding no cause to com-
plain. Every so often he tested a musket: all were flawless. He finally found
one whose firing mechanism was not in the proper order. He turned to the
entourage that followed him: “The gentleman,” he said, staring at the prince,
“should nevertheless always remember that soldiers are for war and are not
toys; such neglect of a weapon is inexcusable, one loses battles because of
such disorder and negligence, and the fate of the monarchy possibly hangs
on one lost battle.” Although Karl remained silent as Yorck’s very offensive
tirade continued, his face grew pale and then red with rage. At the conclu-
sion of the review, Karl extended Yorck an invitation to breakfast with him,
which the corps commander accepted. A kinder and friendlier Yorck broke
bread with his subordinates, allowing them to see a side that few ever did:
the accomplished man of the world. After a cheerful hour he took his leave.
As the prince accompanied him to his carriage, Yorck wished him
“a favorable reunion on the battlefield.” Driving away, Yorck turned to
one of the adjutants accompanying him: “There, I have given the gracious
gentleman his lesson; he will immediately write to the king over everything
and that is just what I want.”61
Like 1st Brigade, General Heinrich Wilhelm von Horn’s 7th Brigade
contained two Landwehr infantry regiments – the 4th and 15th Silesian – but
only one Line regiment, the Leib. In addition, two companies of Guard
Jäger were attached to the brigade as well as the Thuringian Battalion from
Weimar. Still uniformed in the French style and still adhering to French
regulations, the battalion had mobilized in the spring to join Napoleon’s
army as it marched to the Saale. The soldiers had purportedly waited for the
opportunity to allow themselves to be surrounded by Prussian Hussars at
Ruhla. During the Spring Campaign, the battalion had joined the Allied
forces blockading Glogau. Possessing scores of marksmen, the Prussians
decided to attach this unit to 7th Brigade as an auxiliary fusilier battalion.
Yorck joked with the officers that they would take revenge on him for his
poaching of rabbits in their homeland during the 1806 Campaign. As brigade
cavalry, Horn received two squadrons of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry
Regiment – which mainly operated as raiding parties under Major Friedrich
von Falkenhausen – as well as three squadrons of Brandenburg Hussars.
With his arm still in a sling, Hünerbein arrived in time to take command
of Yorck’s 8th Brigade, which received several newly formed battalions. Yet
the 1st and 2nd Reserve Battalions of the Leib Regiment and the 3rd Battal-
ion of the 1st West Prussian Regiment had already received their baptism of
fire at Bautzen. In particular, the 1st Reserve Battalion had participated in
the terrifying bayonet struggle around the village of Kreckwitz, which had
led to the capture of 300 Württembergers. During the armistice, the War
Department formed these three battalions into the Brandenburg Infantry
Regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Karl August Ferdinand von
Borcke, the recipient of the first Iron Cross (second class) to be awarded,
which he received for his actions at Lüneburg on 21 April 1813. To form his
second infantry regiment – the 12th Reserve – Hünerbein received three
Reserve battalions, only one of which actually saw action during the Spring
Campaign. One Landwehr Regiment completed 8th Brigade’s infantry con-
tingent. For the brigade’s cavalry, the two other squadrons of the Branden-
burg Hussar Regiment were joined with the two remaining squadrons of the
3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiment. The former had participated in
the 1812 Campaign, marching on Moscow with Napoleon’s main host. As
most of the troopers had not come back, the squadrons needed to be rebuilt,
a process completed during the armistice.
With his wound from the engagement at Haynau still not completely
healed, Colonel Georg Ludwig von Jürgaß assumed command of Yorck’s
Reserve Cavalry, consisting of three brigades. The Lithuanian and West
Prussian Dragoon Regiments received the king’s wing adjutant, Count
Henckel von Donnersmarck, as their brigade commander. Henckel had
served under Yorck during the Russian campaign but had hardly earned
his respect. He recalled how the corps commander greeted him during the
armistice: “I found him by the troops riding around the camp when I arrived
and reported to him. His first words were: ‘I know nothing of you, Herr
Count!’ which was just not very encouraging. I pulled out my cabinet order
to present it to him. He shouted: ‘That means nothing to me.’ After he had
ridden around a full mile, he called me over to him and said: ‘You can assume
your command for the present.’”62
Colonel Friedrich von Katzler enjoyed a better greeting, although Yorck
considered him to be one of Blücher’s pets. Droysen describes Katzler as a
“natural-born advance guard commander, cunning, light-hearted, adventur-
ous, [and] always as harsh as possible toward the enemy. As long as he still
saw enemy posts in front of him, he would not rest until he overwhelmed
them all. If comfortable accommodations, especially any Schloß with a good
cellar, remained within reach of the enemy’s outpost, he spared nothing to
drive it off for the sake of inserting himself and refreshing himself and his
comrades . . . taking care that they could feast and booze in peace. How
Yorck often raged about him . . . For the present, as brigade commander,
this sly and amusing Katzler received the Brandenburg Uhlans and the
East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment.” Insinuating that Blücher had
engineered Katzler’s appointment to brigade commander, Droysen con-

cludes: “We know the reason for this.” The third and final Reserve Cavalry
brigade consisted of three Landwehr regiments: two from Silesia and one
from Neumark. As with the entire Silesian Army, Yorck’s corps did not
contain any elite cavalry units such as cuirassiers because all were assigned to
Kleist’s II Corps.63
Equipment shortages combined with the raw manpower produced by
the general mobilization to shape Yorck’s view of how the war should be
conducted and how much could be demanded of the soldiers. According
to Langeron, Yorck possessed “a hard, uncompromising personality; he is
violent, hateful, and crude, and it is difficult to have him as a comrade or
subordinate.”64 Yorck’s attitude and character had monumental repercus-
sions on his relations with Blücher. “Yorck,” Maude poignantly remarks,
“who undoubtedly had higher claims in the army itself, and who was
intellectually and morally immensely Blücher’s superior, was his exact
antithesis. His conduct at Tauroggen should have made him the idol of the
nation, but somehow it failed to do so, and though the men immediately
under his command loved him for his care of them and devotion to their
interests, it was precisely this attitude of fatherly solicitude for their welfare
that would have rendered him useless in the supreme command; he lacked
the stern resolution requisite for great emergencies.”65 It would seem that
Yorck’s very actions at Tauroggen proved him capable of confronting great
emergencies. While Maude’s assessment is unfair, he correctly hints that
Yorck’s concern for his men put him at odds with Blücher and Gneisenau.
As one historian states:
Yorck, the commander of the Prussians, was an incommodious subordinate,

who saw himself more as Blücher’s equal than his subordinate. With a self-
confidence based on a thorough knowledge of the service and unshakeable
courage, he scrutinized every order he received and often couched his diver-
gent views in biting words. With particular bitterness he expressed himself
against Gneisenau, in whom he correctly recognized the leading personality,
but also poured forth his ridicule against his assistant, Müffling. He believed
it was his duty to protect the troops from the extraordinary exertions
demanded by headquarters and in this way to keep his corps fresh.66
Droysen best captures the reaction of the man of Tauroggen to being

assigned to the Army of Silesia:
Before long it emerged that not Kleist, not Bülow, but instead he would be in
the army commanded by Blücher, therefore he actually would remain dir-
ectly under Gneisenau’s leadership. When Yorck labeled this arrangement a
misfortune, it was not merely the typical ill-temper with which he usually
greeted any change. From Gneisenau he saw nothing but impractical things,
overexcitement, and his personality: abundantly offensive and deliberately

insulting. Any contact with him gave new fuel to the increasing bitterness of
his mood. Müffling’s wise cautiousness and urbane skillfulness appeared too
inadequate to completely ensnare old Blücher, who was the only choice for
the supreme command because he alone would allow another to command in
his name; through this, the “Kraftgenies [dynamic geniuses],” whose influ-
ence now counted for everything, were indeed handed the command.
Droysen admits that Yorck “judged the people and the circumstances in
his harsh and acrimonious way. It took him a while to gruffly come to terms
with this.”67 “The armistice approaches its end,” wrote Yorck, “the French
reinforced themselves considerably. I am convinced not only that the
struggle will resume with new fury but that our side will be led with the
same indecisiveness and ignorance. With complete justification we must
shudder for the future.”68 According to Droysen, Yorck’s personality con-
tained too many “fetters and forces” to prevent the inevitable polarization of
the two Prussian camps. Yorck drew “his entourage, which increasingly
adopted his view, firmly and solidly around him. Soon a complete antithesis
between Yorck’s and Blücher’s headquarters formed, a contrast that the
different methods of conducting business only made all the more striking.
If Blücher, free of envy and full of great, thoughtful confidence, granted
Gneisenau, as well as Müffling, complete freedom, and allowed the junior
staff officers to operate in competing independence, at Yorck’s [headquar-
ters] every staff member adhered to the strictest regulations, the most precise
order. ‘Yorck commanded, ordered, [and] led everything himself,’ wrote one
of his adjutants, ‘he demanded from his subordinates only rapport and
obedience; none, from the first to the last, exercised the slightest influence
on him.’” Comparing the two headquarters, Droysen echoes Yorck’s deri-
sive views to conclude that Blücher’s was the domain of the “strategists,”
and the “geniuses and enthusiasts,” while Yorck’s was the sanctuary of the
tacticians, who “all the more turned to the practical.” Adding to the differ-
ences, Yorck’s chief of staff, Karl Heinrich von Zielinsky, “did everything in
his power to see that the poor relations with Blücher’s headquarters per-
sisted in their entirety.”69
Turning to the Russians, although the armistice proved to be less pro-
ductive in filling the gaps in their regiments because of the great distance
from their depots, it was still a watershed. The Russians indeed faced several
obstacles, conscripting more than 650,000 men, largely between August
1812 and August 1813.70 “The Russian army received a great quantity of
convalescents and recruits,” noted Langeron, “so well-armed, equipped, and
trained that we could consider them veteran and excellent soldiers. These
preparatory advantages were due to the excellent organization of the Rus-
sian army.”71 By the end of the armistice, a total of 184,123 Russians with
639 guns stood ready in Silesia, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg to continue

the war against Napoleon. Behind them in second line, 30,000 regulars and
militia besieged Danzig with 59 guns; Bennigsen’s Army of Poland, which
eventually numbered 70,000 men and 200 guns, was forming in the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw, which itself was occupied by Prince Dmitry Lobanov-
Rostovsky’s 50,000-man Reserve Army.
In general, the quality of Russian equipment as well as the quantity of
supply varies according to the source, yet most agree with the claim made by
the nineteenth-century Russian general and military historian Modest Bog-
danovich72 that arms and uniforms left little to be desired.73 “At the recom-
mencement of the war,” continued Langeron, “munitions were in
abundance, the soldiers were rested, dressed and equipped, the weapons
were repaired, and the soldiers were in a good state, which equaled that at
the very beginning of the war.”74 Nevertheless, many Russian regiments still
consisted of only one battalion, which seldom numbered more than 500
men. Despite Langeron’s glowing review, most of the replacements consisted
of raw recruits. Fortunately for Blücher, Sacken’s corps contained “formid-
able divisions, packed with more veterans than any other corps apart from
the Guard: Dmitry Neverovsky’s excellent 27th Division.”75 “This corps was
the remnant of an army that had been employed against the Turks,” noted
Müffling, “and had not been recruited for a long time. It was composed of
old and seasoned soldiers.”76
Instead of seven or eight squadrons, Russian cavalry regiments consisted
of only three or four, some of only two. Although not at full strength, the
Russian cavalry remained impressive. The regiments possessed very good
mounts, the artillery excellent teams, and the equipment was in good condi-
tion. In addition to sabers, Russian dragoons and mounted Jäger carried
muskets, the hussars lances. The Cossacks carried sabers and lances, and
many had muskets. Several Cossack commanders were cavalry officers from
the regular army, and regulars actually formed the three regiments of the
Ukrainianskii Cossack Division. Created in 1812, it consisted for the most
part of Polish and Ukrainian farmers, people generally known to be good
riders. Their officers lacked military experience and the division itself had
yet to see combat but Russian commanders later commended its bravery and
utility. Among the other Cossack regiments, that from the Black Sea
distinguished itself for its military bearing. In addition to the Cossacks,
thousands of Bashkirs and Kalmyks, unfit for pitched combat and barely
suitable for gathering intelligence, could swarm the front, flanks, and rear of
the enemy to disrupt communication, terrorize stragglers, and screen the
movement of friendly forces.77
On 6 August, Barclay ordered Langeron to assemble his army corps in
the entrenched camp at Schweidnitz. There, he learned a few days later that
the monarchs awarded command of the Silesian Army to Blücher. Langeron,
a finely cultured French émigré, could not have been more incompatible
with the hoary Prussian in terms of personality and mannerisms. Naturally,
Blücher’s lack of a formal military education and unrefined exterior
offended the Old Regime aristocrat, who derisively referred to the Prussian
as the “bon sabreur [good swordsman].” Born in Paris in 1763, Langeron
had served with French forces in the American Revolutionary War, attaining
the rank of colonel in 1788. After emigrating during the French Revolution,
he received a lateral commission in the Russian army in 1790. Distinguished
service during the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1792 helped launch his
Russian career, earning him the rank of lieutenant-general by 1798.
Although disgraced for his poor performance at Austerlitz, Langeron had
redeemed his reputation in the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–1812, during
which he attained the rank of general of infantry and held an independent
command. In the 1812 campaign, he led a corps in the Army of the Danube,
seeing action at the Berezina. Aside from his haughty disposition, Langeron
enjoyed the reputation of being a solid officer much respected by his men.
His chief of staff, General Rudzevich, ranked among the very best of
Russia’s general officers. Although trained in staff work, Rudzevich had
gained tough combat experience during numerous years of service in the
rugged Caucasus. Langeron wisely took advantage of his subordinate’s
extensive skills, employing him as his advance guard commander and having
the quartermaster-general of the corps, Colonel Paul von Neydhardt, fill the
role of staff chief.78
Not seeing the magnanimity of their master’s decision to distribute his
forces among the three Allied armies, the Russian generals felt slighted by
their posting to the Silesian Army. Wishing to fight in the tsar’s presence,
they believed their assignment to Blücher’s army drastically if not fatally
diminished their opportunity to earn glory. That a Russian had not been
selected to command one of the Allied armies likewise galled them. Some
still opposed Alexander’s decision to continue the war into Central Europe.
As the senior Russian officer in the Silesian Army, Langeron felt obligated to
do his best to maintain the harmony between his adopted countrymen and
the Prussians. Unfortunately, he did little to hide his dissatisfaction over
being superseded by Blücher. An extensive and successful military career
made it difficult for Langeron to subordinate himself to Blücher, a feeling
that quickly spread among the thirty-five generals in his corps, causing a
“veiled hostility” to persist throughout the war. Blücher’s personality and
notorious vices probably pleased their soldiers, but could not satisfy the
Russian generals, who in the spirit of the time looked for commanders
equipped with high intelligence, knowledge, and an education rooted in
military science. Langeron himself “would have hated serving under any
foreign officer, but might have submitted with better grace to a man of
acknowledged military education and more courtier-like manners that those
of rough old Blücher.”79 Disdainful of everything German and unable to

speak the language, he could not communicate directly with Blücher, but
instead had to have Müffling translate his French. Gneisenau held a low
opinion of him, and Langeron returned the favor.80
Langeron’s disgruntlement and complaints induced Barclay to provide
some sign that the French émigré still enjoyed the tsar’s trust and confidence.
To appease him, Barclay informed Langeron of the secret instructions
conveyed to Blücher, but failed to mention the concessions he had granted
the Prussian. Consequently, Langeron came to believe that his posting to the
Silesian Army had political overtones that superseded military protocol.
Viewing himself as Blücher’s appointed overseer, the native Frenchman
believed that Tsar Alexander expected him to hold Blücher true to Barclay’s
cautious directives.81 Thus, the Prussian liaison assigned to Langeron’s
headquarters, Lieutenant-Colonel Friedrich Albrecht von Ende,
experienced numerous difficulties impressing Blücher’s views on the senior
Russian corps commander. “He saw in every energetic move of Blücher’s an
overstepping of the bounds of his authority,” wrote one historian, “and felt
justified in quietly placing what difficulties he could in the way of obeying
commands that he felt sure his own imperial master would disapprove; and
Blücher had not the least inkling of what was the cause of this passive
resistance. The worst of it was that Langeron had much influence with the
officers under him and had their moral support even when committing acts
that verged on open insubordination.”82 Langeron, judged Müffling, “no
doubt with the best intentions, predetermined Blücher’s conduct based on
these instructions, which he also made the guide of his own actions. When,
in consequence of this, the situation went contrary to Blücher’s orders,
Langeron believed himself to be on the right course while Blücher pursued
the wrong one. His generals shared this opinion, and misunderstandings
accumulated.” It did not help that Langeron proceeded with excessive
caution and feared the recklessness of the Prussian veteran and his staff.83
As we will see, Langeron made mistakes, but to his credit he recognized
them. In his reports to Blücher, both written and verbally, Langeron
admitted his errors so openly that the Prussian actually became sympathetic
and rejected any notion of malice on the part of his subordinate. Neverthe-
less, Blücher felt that Langeron easily lost his head under pressure and
lacked sound military judgment. Johann Nepomuk von Nostitz, one of
Blücher’s adjutants and confidants, wrote in his journal: “Langeron
absolutely was not a man who Blücher could speak to; a Frenchman by
birth, he had the characteristics of his nation and held on to the mannerisms
of his early experiences. He loved to discuss his previous campaigns:
describe them, tell what he did, and what he would now do, but when it
came to action he vacillated and was indecisive. His intentions and actions
lacked the energy and endurance that Blücher considered to be the foremost
requirement of a good general, prompting Blücher to say of him: ‘Langeron

is not one of the people I need or like.’”84
Langeron’s exact thoughts regarding the Prussians who received com-
mand of the Silesian Army are not known but his memoirs tell us how he felt
when they parted ways after the war. Although the extract is lengthy, it is
beneficial to allow Langeron to speak:
General Blücher, to whom the Army of Silesia was confided, was more than
seventy years old but his spirit and body had lost none of their vigor. He was
an old hussar in the clearest sense of the word: a drinker and debaucher; he
had all the faults that one is at pains to excuse in a young man. But he
redeemed them by many qualities: an intrepid soldier, an ardent patriot,
frank, loyal, possessing a martial figure in the style of a grenadier; he knew
how to inspire the most complete confidence in his troops and win the love of
his soldiers: he was soon adored by the Russian soldiers just as much as he
was by the Prussians.85
His activity was prodigious, he was always on horseback; on the battle-
field, he had the experience and routine of an old soldier; his coup d’oeil was
excellent; his heroic bravery carried the troops but his talent as a general was
limited to these qualities. It was a great deal but would not have been enough
had he not been seconded; he had little strategic ability, could not find himself
on a map, and was incapable of making a campaign plan or disposition. He
left all military and political details to the three people that were given and
attached direct to him; these three people had his entire confidence and
merited much praise.
General Gneisenau, chief of Blücher’s staff, was well trained, a brave
soldier, and a distinguished general; his studies and experience of the wars of
the French Revolution had taught him to reject old ideas about a tight and
faint-hearted tactical system which still inspired, not long ago, a servile
respect, and which had caused, for twenty-two years, every reverse suffered
by the enemies of France, especially Austria’s defeats. He realized that, to
defeat Napoleon, it was necessary to adopt his style of war and surprise him
with grand operations, just as Napoleon himself had surprised Europe by the
audacity of his maneuvers.
But, in rendering justice to General Gneisenau’s talents, I cannot give the
same praise for his character: his pride and amour-propre did not allow him to
suffer the least contradiction. Egotistical, stiff, fiery, crass, and brutal, even to
a fellow German, he handled no one with tact; he was generally detested and
deservedly so. Moreover, his liberal principles, his attachment to the disas-
trous opinions of German propagandists and professors, his hatred of his
king, all rendered him equally dangerous to his sovereign and his country . . .
Colonel Müffling, the army’s quartermaster-general, rivaled the spirit and
talents of General Gneisenau but his character was greatly different: Müffling
was soft, ingratiating, full of affability, and through his amiable manner
brought back those who Gneisenau distanced or scared away. He became
quartermaster-general of the Prussian Army and was well suited to fill that post.
These two officers knew Silesia and Saxony perfectly and all the different
regions in which the events of the campaign of 1813 occurred. This was an
immense advantage for our army: in France, they did not possess the same
knowledge of the country and this was reflected in our operations.
Colonel Count Goltz, in charge of political relations, showed as much
talent in this sphere as did Gneisenau and Müffling in military affairs. Count
Goltz had often served in war and was a very distinguished officer.
The other soldiers who surrounded Blücher and composed his staff, and
especially the quartermaster officers, were commendable for their talent and
bravery. During the entire war, every individual in the Prussian army –
princes, generals, officers, soldiers, and militiamen – covered themselves in
glory; one could not carry military honor further than them; but they left to
be desired a greater degree of modesty: their boasting was truly insupport-
able. They remembered too much of the Seven Years War, too little of the war
of 1806. Our officers were required to display a highly meritorious prudence
and self-abnegation, dictated by the circumstances and the orders of our
sovereign. I myself had more need than others of these two qualities; Blücher,
Gneisenau, Müffling, etc., saw me arrive in their army with a marked and
unique repugnance because I was French; they did not know me personally,
and some knowledge of my successes against the Turks could have weakened
their prejudices against me; but I was French, and their hatred, their rage (if it
is permissible to express it thus), against those who had so humiliated them
on the battlefield and in the cabinets of the capitals was such that it was
impossible for them to make a single exception among the French nation.
Moreover, I had a great fault amongst these men: I did not know a single
word of German, which was a great inconvenience when serving with a
Prussian army. Almost all of the Prussian officers spoke French but General
Blücher did not even understand it.86
Ten years younger than Blücher, the other Russian corps commander,
Sacken, was the scion of German nobles from Courland. “Prince Fabian von
der Osten-Sacken,” states one Russian source, “was of medium height,
pleasant appearance, sharp, intelligent glance; mocking smile; and refined
mind. He combined his military talents with extraordinary gallantry and
experience; was enterprising, firm, just, considerate with subordinates and at
the same time strict and demanding. In society, he was known for his cheery
disposition, courteousness, and quick wit, often making biting remarks in
conversation. Impregnable firmness of character was a distinctive trait of his
personality.”87
A veteran of the Russo-Turkish Wars on 1769–1770 and 1787–1792, Sacken
received his promotion to general officer in October 1797. During the War of
the Second Coalition (1798–1801), he fought in Switzerland, commanding the
Russian rearguard at Zurich. He next saw action in East Prussia during the
War of the Fourth Coalition but ran afoul of Bennigsen, who accused him of
insubordination. Court-martialed and found guilty, Sacken was relieved of his
command on 10 June 1807. Reinstated in 1812, he commanded a corps in the

III Reserve Army of Observation. Now, in 1813, he found himself subordin-
ated to Blücher. Knowing little of his Prussian commander, Sacken harbored
no ill-will toward Blücher and could at least communicate with him in
German. Although purported to be “an active soldier and an able man,” he
came with the reputation of being a difficult subordinate. Historian Dominic
Lieven describes him as “a sharp-tongued and short-tempered man,” yet
compared to Yorck he was “an angel.” According to Müffling, all that the
Prussians knew of him was the rumor that the court-martial had soured
Sacken, rendering the general “so irritable that his superiors found it difficult
to deal with him.” Energetic and brave, he soon developed a close relationship
with Blücher, who described him as “reliable in the highest degree, bold and
decisive in battle, intelligent and careful in the assessment of his enemy.”88
As for Blücher, the decision made by Frederick William and Alexander
to create multinational armies did not sit well with him either. Through
Hippel, he harangued Hardenberg to convince the king to reverse his deci-
sion. “Can’t it be arranged,” he queried, “so that our troops play their own
part and the Russians play theirs? If so, I will comfortably wager my head on
good success; but together it will not go well. Our allies demand too much
from us; we have done the most possible but the Russian Guard and their
heavy cavalry are conserved like ammunition chests while all else is spent.”89
Regardless, Blücher took a very pragmatic approach in his relations with the
Russians. Müffling claimed that simply avoiding discord was not Blücher’s
ultimate goal. Instead, he sought to “establish brotherly harmony” so that
the Russians would execute the war “if not with pleasure, at least without
reluctance.” Blücher rejected the opinion shared by many Prussians that the
Russians should adopt German customs while in Germany. Instead, he
believed that the Prussians should conform to the Russians. As standard
operating procedure, Blücher maintained that the Prussian army should
“earn and preserve the respect of their allies through great actions.” Thus,
in his opinion, the Prussians should receive the most difficult tasks, march
on the worst roads, lead every attack, and claim the least credit for success.90
Yorck eventually protested, yet Müffling insists that this belief formed “the
fundamental condition” of Blücher’s command. “Without the assistance of
the Russians, we were unable to crush the colossus that threatened us with
degradation and eternal slavery; but to desire more than assistance, when our
own strength did not suffice, would be unfair.” No fan of Blücher, Müffling
concluded: “Russia had freed itself in 1812; our turn now came, and General
Blücher had too exalted a notion of national honor to balance it against a
policy that might teach us cunningly to shift on others the heavy labors from
which we hoped to reap the advantages.”91 In the end Blücher could not
remove all of the discontent, yet the Army of Silesia managed to play the
most decisive role in the War of the Sixth Coalition.
In mid August, the Allies fielded approximately 512,000 soldiers, with

reserves and besieging forces providing an additional 143,000 men. Napo-
leon’s field army exceeded 400,000 men; the armistice had served his needs
by allowing him to replace the losses from the grueling Spring Campaign.92
His field forces amounted to 372,236 infantry and 40,764 cavalry and some
29,810 gunners, engineers, and support personnel for a total of 442,810 men
with 1,284 guns and 101,301 horses.93 An additional 26,068 men garrisoned
the fortresses on the Elbe: Hamburg (12,000); Bremen (1,500); Magdeburg
(3,250); Wittenberg (2,318); Torgau (2,000); and Dresden (5,000). Second-
line troops, including 10,000 men who would eventually be part of IX Corps
as well as 25,000 Bavarians, amounted to 42,900 men. A further 51,000
exhausted and sick imperial soldiers, many being survivors of the Russian
campaign, held fortresses on the Oder and in Poland.94 In round figures, a
conservative estimate of Napoleon’s available forces in the German theater
amounts to almost 575,000 combatants. By comparison, the imperial troops
who took the field in August held a qualitative edge over those who had
marched to the Saale in April, although the conscripts were serving at a
younger age than those called up in the wake of the Russian disaster. The
rigors of the Spring Campaign and the hardships of the armistice combined
to purge the weak and deficient from the ranks. While the cavalry still
suffered mainly from want of adequate mounts, the artillery remained far
superior to that of the Allies. By far, Napoleon’s unchallenged mastery of
operations provided the imperials with their greatest advantage over the
Coalition.
The length of the Elbe between Hamburg and Königstein on the Bohe-
mian frontier – an extent of 290 miles – provided Napoleon’s front line. He
stood at the center of the Allied armies that formed a semi-circle around
him, and although inferior in numbers he possessed strategic advantages by
virtue of his central position that granted him the initiative to move rapidly
and by the shortest line against any one of the three armies opposing him.
Although this line extended north to the mouth of the Elbe, the emperor’s
communications continued to run west through southern Germany, indicat-
ing that he would not venture too far from the line he had taken in June.
While a coup de théâtre remained an option throughout the campaign, he did
little to prepare his communications to run through northern Germany to
France. In hindsight, exchanging Saxony for Brandenburg in October would
have been a better option than challenging the Allies to a showdown at
Leipzig. In addition, the emperor should have built more roads during the
armistice to facilitate his internal communications.
Be that as it may, Dresden served as Napoleon’s main supply base with
secondary depots throughout Germany. To guard its southern approaches,
he ordered the construction of an entrenched camp twelve miles to the south
at Pirna. Six miles south of Pirna, imperial forces occupied and fortified
Königstein. Bridges at Dresden, Pirna, and Königstein provided three imme-

diate crossing points over the Elbe. Further afield, the bridgeheads at Mag-
deburg, Wittenberg, and Torgau provided intermediate bases from where
imperial forces could move north or east. Before Austria joined the Coali-
tion, Napoleon planned to resume the war by continuing operations through
Silesia to Poland. As he had reached the Oder in early June and imperial
forces held the river’s great fortresses of Stettin, Küstrin, and Glogau, this
appeared to be the most logical plan. Thus, the emperor considered deliver-
ing a decisive battle as close as possible to Liegnitz on the Katzbach River in
Silesia: the terminal point of his communication. This made sense consider-
ing he expected the entire Russo-Prussian main army (including Wittgen-
stein, Kleist, and the Russian Guard and Reserve) to remain in Silesia.95
Napoleon echeloned the 300,000 men of the Grande Armée in the
triangle formed by the Katzbach, the Elbe, and the northern border of
Bohemia. In eastern Saxony he spread the Guard, I, IV, and V Cavalry
Corps, and II, VIII, and XIV Corps between the Elbe and the Neiße
Rivers while III, V, VI, and XI Corps along with II Cavalry Corps camped
in Silesia between the Neiße and the Katzbach. Although necessitated weeks
earlier by the demands of supply, this distribution of forces would allow
Napoleon to quickly concentrate overwhelming mass on one of three river
lines: the Bober, the Neiße, or the Elbe itself. After hostilities with the
Russians and Prussians recommenced, he planned to shift the troops in
Saxony east toward Bunzlau on the Bober while his forces in Silesia with-
drew west likewise to the Bober. In this way, the emperor could concentrate
almost 270,000 infantry and 30,000 cavalry to oppose the 200,000 Russians
and Prussians he expected to confront in Silesia. Based on the spirit they
displayed in May and early June, Napoleon counted on Alexander and
Frederick William accepting battle in Silesia.
While his larger right wing attacked the main Russo-Prussian army in
Silesia, he entrusted Marshal Oudinot with his left wing. In compliance with
Napoleon’s “master plan,” Oudinot would conduct an offensive against
Berlin with IV, VII, and XII Infantry and III Cavalry Corps – altogether
70,000 men – supported by Davout’s XIII Corps (30,000 men) at Hamburg
and one division of 10,000 men coming from Magdeburg. After defeating the
Army of North Germany, Oudinot’s “Army of Berlin” would liberate the
Oder garrisons and advance to the Vistula, swooping behind the main Russo-
Prussian army, which would be reeling eastward after being defeated in Silesia
by the emperor. Oudinot’s arrival at the Vistula would, in Napoleon’s opin-
ion, force the Russians to withdraw through Poland. Should Bernadotte
somehow check the Army of Berlin, Napoleon could easily dispatch forces
from the Silesian theater to Brandenburg to finish the job.
After receiving Austria’s declaration of war, Napoleon scrapped the
Silesian offensive on 12 August. In view of protecting his main base against
the Austrians, the 115 miles that separated Dresden from Liegnitz rendered
impractical a concentration at the latter. To better cover Dresden, Napoleon
decided to assemble the 300,000 men of the Grande Armée between Bautzen
and Görlitz. Moreover, he uncharacteristically surrendered the initiative to
the Allies. As he explained to Marshals Ney and Auguste Frédéric de
Marmont: “So that these 300,000 men cannot be cut off from the Elbe,
I will take a position between Görlitz and Bautzen that will make me master
of the course of this river, allow me to supply myself through Dresden, and
enable me to wait and see what the Russians and Austrians will do and then
take advantage of the circumstances.” He still believed he would decisively
defeat the Russo-Prussian army before the Austrians launched a serious
operation against Dresden. Even if he ran afoul of his timetable, Napoleon
did not think the Austrians could assemble more than 100,000 to 120,000
men in Bohemia after sending an estimated 50,000 men to Italy and posting
another 30,000 along the Austro-Bavarian border. As for Oudinot’s army,
the emperor made no changes to the allocation of 110,000 men for the
implementation of the master plan. In his mind, Austria’s declaration of
war increased the importance of Oudinot’s operation. By reaching the
Vistula, the Army of Berlin undoubtedly would force the Russians “to
detach themselves from the Austrians.”96
For the purpose of supply, the troops in Silesia did not commence the
retrograde movement west until the armistice had expired. After slight
modifications, the situation by mid August found Napoleon’s forces organ-
ized in three main groups. In Silesia, the 130,000 men of III, V, VI, and XI
Corps and II Cavalry Corps provided a strong vanguard to oppose the
Russo-Prussian army there. West of this army group stood Napoleon’s main
body: 150,000 men of the Guard, I, II, and VIII Corps and I, IV, and
V Cavalry Corps between Bautzen, Görlitz, and Zittau. South of Dresden,
the 26,000 men of XIV Corps guarded the Elbe from Königstein to the
Saxon capital. In Lower Lusatia the majority of Oudinot’s 70,000-man
Army of Berlin assembled at Luckau to advance against the Prussian capital
in unison with Davout’s 30,000 men as well as 15,000 men from the garrisons
of Wittenberg and Magdeburg. As we will see, the Coalition’s decision
to form its main army in Bohemia as opposed to Silesia caught Napoleon
by surprise.
French forces in Silesia outnumbered Blücher’s field forces by 25,000
men. The foremost imperial troops held the western edge of the neutral
zone from Liegnitz to Goldberg along the Katzbach. Based at Löwenberg
(Lwówek Śla˛ski), Macdonald’s XI Corps – 24,410 French, Italian,
Neapolitan, Westphalian, and Würzburger troops – formed the right wing.
From Goldberg to Haynau on the Katzbach, General Jacques Alexandre
Lauriston’s V Corps – 27,905 predominantly French troops – provided the
center of the French line. The left wing consisted of the 40,006 mostly
French troops of Ney’s III Corps, which camped between the Bober and the
lower Katzbach. At the end of the armistice, General Horace-François
Sébastiani’s II Cavalry Corps linked with III Corps in the region of Liegnitz.
In second line, the 27,754 men of Marmont’s mainly French VI Corps
quartered in and around Bunzlau.97
On 11 August, Blücher and Gneisenau reviewed Yorck’s corps at Rogau
(Rogów Sobócki) near the foot of the expansive Zobtenberg (Przedgórze
Sudeckie), a mountain in the foothills of the Riesengebirge. After having
inspected the Russo-Prussian troops assigned to the Bohemian Army and
then Langeron’s corps, they found Yorck’s not as pleasing to the eye as the
Russian troops or even Kleist’s corps, yet no time remained for improve-
ment. That night, bonfires illuminated the skies from Prague to Reichen-
bach, signaling the end of the peace negotiations. In Silesia, Barclay notified
the enemy’s forward posts that the Allies had acknowledged the end of the
armistice. Metternich submitted Austria’s declaration of war on 12 August.
On that day, more than 100,000 Russian and Prussian troops commenced the
march from Silesia to Bohemia. That evening, Hardenberg gave Blücher and
Gneisenau a farewell dinner at neutral Breslau. After the two rejoined army
headquarters at Zobten, Blücher dispatched Professor Steffens to Landeshut
with the task of reconnoitering imperial forces on the upper Bober with
Pahlen III’s vanguard. Steffens claims that Blücher believed the right wing of
the French army would advance east from the Bober to Schmiedeberg
(Kowary), only thirty-five miles from Schweidnitz.98
Although the armistice had expired, the ensuing six-day suspension of
hostilities took effect. With each passing day, both sides eyed the twenty-
mile-wide neutral zone in Silesia with hungry eyes. “The country from
Upper Silesia to the Elbe,” noted Müffling in 1827, “where the armies of
both sides had stood during the armistice, was exhausted; only the neutral
zone between them, including Breslau, could maintain an army until the
harvest.” While the neutral zone offered Blücher a solution to the problem
of feeding man and horse, it also presented a quandary. Strategically, the
neutral zone prevented Blücher from establishing and maintaining contact
with the imperial army in Silesia. Should Napoleon summon them to Saxony
for an offensive against the Bohemian Army, Blücher would not know until
his light troops crossed the neutral zone – a move he could not make until
17 August when hostilities officially resumed – and sought contact with the
French. Crossing the neutral zone itself would take the army two days, thus
providing the French with an advantageous headstart.99
Echeloned from the Katzbach across the Bober to the Queis, the various
French corps did not escape the prying eyes of Blücher’s agents. Deserters,
spies, locals, and volunteer Jäger disguised as peasants provided enough
intelligence for Blücher’s staff to form a general picture of imperial forces
in Silesia. On the left wing of the enemy’s first line, 9th and 10th Divisions of
III Corps stood at Liegnitz, 8th Division to the northeast at Parchwitz

(Prochowice), 39th Division at Lüben (Lubin), and 11th Division at Steinau
on the Oder. Far to the north on the extreme left wing, Sébastiani’s II
Cavalry Corps quartered in the region of Freystadt (Kożuchów).
Macdonald’s XI Corps formed the right wing with one division each at
Lähn (Wleń), Löwenberg–Greiffenberg (Gryfów Śla˛ski), and Friedeberg
(Mirsk). In second line, Lauriston’s V Corps distributed one division each
to Goldberg, Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg (Nowa Wieś Grodziska), and Hay-
nau. Marmont’s VI Corps, in and around Bunzlau, formed the third line.
The infantry camped in barracks while the cavalry and artillery received
billets. Discord purportedly reigned in the imperial camps, prompting
numerous desertions, especially by Italian troops. Throughout the armistice,
the imperials purportedly constructed extensive fortifications at Liegnitz.
Moreover, the Prussians knew that additional imperial forces occupied
Upper Lusatia, just west of the troops on the Katzbach and Bober. From
what they could gather, Marshal Claude Victor’s II Corps held Görlitz, the
Imperial Guard camped between Görlitz and Bautzen, and I Cavalry Corps
quartered at Bautzen. General Józef Antoni Poniatowski’s VIII Corps along
with IV Cavalry Corps occupied Zittau, due south of Görlitz and not far
from the Bohemian frontier. These 112,000 men could be readily utilized
either in Bohemia or Silesia. 100
Knowing the positions of the imperial army facing him added to
Blücher’s anxiety over his assignment.101 Like other Allied commanders,
he assumed Napoleon would attack the Austrians in Bohemia first. Blücher
feared the emperor would use the six-day cessation of hostilities to concen-
trate all his forces. Without violating an international agreement, Napoleon
could move the majority of his troops from Silesia to Saxony by 16 August
and be in position to crush Schwarzenberg before the other Allied armies
could threaten his rear and flanks. Even if Blücher’s spies informed him of a
French march to Saxony, he could not enter the neutral zone before the 17th.
While the withdrawal of imperial forces from Silesia to Saxony remained
likely, the Prussians actually knew little regarding French intentions. Intelli-
gence gleaned from deserters did not clarify the situation. As Ney appeared to
be the ranking officer, the Prussians assumed he commanded this army. From
10 August onward, Allied spies reported much back-and-forth movement
between the imperial camps but offered no indication of purpose. Only
Macdonald’s corps began assembling between Löwenberg, Liebenthal
(Lubomierz), and Lähn. His cavalry stood on the road that led to Hirschberg
and occupied Spiller, a few miles west of the French line of demarcation.
According to rumors circulating in the French camps, the army would march
east to Breslau or northeast toward Glogau to make a diversion in Poland, or
west to Saxony. Transports of livestock steadily rumbled west, giving cre-
dence to the rumors that the French would march west when the war
resumed. According to Professor Steffens: “The occupation of Lähn strongly

influenced Blücher to break the unexpired armistice . . . which proved so
important for the success of the campaign.”102
Blücher and Gneisenau recognized the difficulties of reaching the Elbe at
the same time as Ney to prevent Napoleon from achieving overwhelming
mass against Schwarzenberg. The seriousness with which Blücher executed
his responsibility of maintaining constant contact with imperial forces in
Silesia became the hallmark of his operations in August and September. In a
12 August note to Sacken, he emphasized the importance of the Cossacks
following hard on the heels of the enemy: “I assume that if no other means
for the crossing are available, they will swim across the Oder.”103
On the 13th, Blücher tasked Gneisenau with drafting instructions for the
army to cross the neutral zone around midnight on 17 August unless the
enemy entered it before the six-day suspension of hostilities expired. His
orders specifically expressed the importance of gaining possession of this rich
tract of land. As of the 13th, the imperials still maintained their forward
positions along the Katzbach. However, the French commissioner who along
with his Russian and Prussian counterparts oversaw the maintenance of the
neutral zone planned to leave their headquarters at Neumarkt the next day.
“Because the enemy cannot be trusted to honor the armistice until the morn-
ing of the 17th,” wrote Blücher, “I will take all precautions to be ready to
receive him.” To counter a French advance into the neutral zone on the 14th,
Blücher instructed Sacken to prepare his corps to cross the Oder, occupy
Breslau, and push light cavalry to Neumarkt. Yorck received orders to form
a vanguard consisting of six battalions, eight squadrons, and one battery each
of foot and horse and move it east to Saarau (Żarów) on the Striegau stream –
the line of demarcation for the Allies in this sector of Silesia – on the morning
of the 14th. Blücher wanted the vanguard to bivouac but remain ready to enter
the neutral zone while the main body of I Corps bivouacked between Kratz-
kau (Krasków) and Klettendorf (Klecin) on the Schweidnitz stream. Blücher
planned to transfer his headquarters to Schweidnitz on the 14th.104
While still drafting these orders to Yorck on the evening of 13 August,
Blücher received Langeron’s summary of the intelligence collected by his
corps during the course of the morning and early afternoon. Langeron’s
vanguard commander, Rudzevich, reported the presence of a French patrol
in the neutral zone between Liegnitz and Neumarkt. In addition, Rudzevich
learned from the Landrat (district magistrate) of Striegau that the imperials
had received orders to move out but he did not know where they would
march. From Pahlen III came news of an imperial foraging party consisting
of twenty troopers east of the Katzbach operating in the highlands between
Goldberg and Hirschberg. Pahlen reported that this party had raided the
villages of Ober and Nieder Röversdorf (Se˛dziszowa Górna and Dolna) and
Schönau (Świerzawa), all at least ten miles inside the neutral zone. Moreover,
the French had purportedly made large requisitions and collected all
remaining livestock throughout the border regions just inside the neutral
zone along a line extending from Liegnitz through Goldberg to Hirschberg.
Langeron also included a letter from the Russian spy Borzucki written at 3:30
on the afternoon of the 12th at Berbisdorf (Dziwiszów), itself deep inside the
southern portion of the neutral zone. “The enemy is in full advance,” wrote
the agent, “and has pushed as far as Altschönau [Stara Kraśnica]. The town of
Schönau must immediately deliver 300 pounds of bread and 16 kegs of
brandy as well as hay and other supplies. It is highly probable that the enemy
will go to Jauer.” This confirmed Pahlen III’s report, as Altschönau stood in
the same area as the villages named in his report. According to Borzucki,
200 cavalry and 150 infantry representing the vanguard of a larger French
formation occupied Altschönau around 11:00 a.m. Pledging his head on the
accuracy of his statements, he speculated that enemy forces already must
have reached Kauffung (Wojcieszów), three miles south of Altschönau.105
Blücher hoped that a French violation of the neutral zone would provide a
pretext for his troops to cross the line of demarcation. The starving imperials
appeared to have fulfilled his wishes. After confirmation of Langeron’s report
arrived from various sources, Blücher felt absolved of having to respect any
international agreement. “The French violated the armistice by advancing
into the neutral zone,” he later explained to Hardenberg, “carrying off
supplies and cattle; I have stolen a march on them and have saved the entire
neutral zone from being plundered; we found everything [we need] in the
neutral zone.” To Bernadotte he wrote: “After the enemy sent reconnaissance
parties into the neutral territory, I did not hesitate for one moment to likewise
cross our line of demarcation.” Gneisenau reiterated: “A detachment that the
enemy sent into the neutral zone to make requisitions has provided justifica-
tion for Blücher’s army to advance.” According to the official history of the
Silesian Army written in the 1840s by the Prussian General Staff, “the enemy
did not throw down the gauntlet in a challenge but instead simply let it fall to
the ground. Blücher picked it up, but not to hold it temporarily or return it,
but to immediately take the proper distance between himself and the duelist
facing him, which in his situation was the most appropriate action.”106
After reading Langeron’s summary, Blücher added a postscript to the
orders drafted for Yorck: “Because I just now received news that the enemy
has violated his line of demarcation, you will disregard my above instruc-
tions for you to respect ours. The vanguard can send patrols into the neutral
zone to obtain news of the enemy’s movements.” At 7:00 that same evening,
the 13th, Blücher dictated a general order to Langeron, Yorck, and Sacken:
“The enemy has crossed into the neutral zone. Enclosed you will find the
disposition for the march. If you encounter the enemy in the neutral zone
you are to attack him.” However, if the French remained behind their line of
demarcation, Blücher instructed his subordinates not to cross it. A new
disposition issued by Silesian Army Headquarters covered both 14 and

15 August. For the 14th, the vanguards of each corps would push deep into
the neutral zone while their main bodies concentrated along the Coalition’s line
of demarcation. As march objectives for the 14th, Gneisenau instructed Sacken
to occupy Breslau, move his corps west to Deutschlissa (Leśnica), and push
his vanguard to the halfway point between Deutschlissa and Neumarkt,
with its light cavalry reaching the latter. Sacken would also seek to establish
communication with the left wing of Bernadotte’s army. In the center, Yorck’s
corps would march at 2:00 a.m. on the 14th in three columns to a position
at Saarau on the Striegau stream. In front of the corps, his vanguard would
proceed sixteen miles northwest of Saarau to Mertschütz (Mierczyce), with
patrols reconnoitering further northwest toward Liegnitz. On Blücher’s left
wing, Rudzevich would lead Langeron’s vanguard ten miles northwest to
Jauer, dispatching strong patrols toward Goldberg. Langeron’s main body
received orders to march at 7:00 a.m. on the 14th to a position just east of
Striegau. On the extreme left wing, Pahlen III would move his main body ten
miles west from Landeshut to Schmiedeberg, pushing his vanguard northwest
to Hirschberg and dispatching strong cavalry patrols toward Lähn and
Berthelsdorf (Barcinek). For security, Blücher ordered the formation of a
Cossack chain extending from Kanth through Striegau to the Bohemian
frontier.107
The disposition for the 15th instructed all vanguards to patrol toward the
French line of demarcation at daybreak. Should the imperials concentrate
and take the offensive against the reconnoitering forces with superior
numbers, Blücher explained that they – the patrols – should fall back on
their respective vanguards, which in turn would fall back on their respective
corps. If the enemy withdrew or started to withdraw in the face of the
reconnoitering forces, Blücher gave permission for the patrols to cross the
Katzbach and do as much damage to the enemy as possible. “This must be
reported immediately so that the corps can follow.” Early on the 14th,
Gneisenau wrote his wife from Schwentnig (Świa˛tniki): “The movements
of the army begin today. The enemy is concentrating his forces. Most reports
claim that he is in the process of evacuating Silesia. At present we must seize
the opportunity. In any case, we will provide him with an escort.”108 At
dawn on 14 August, the Silesian Army entered the neutral zone.
Notes
1 Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, I:282; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau,
III:8–12. Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (hereafter cited as GStA
PK), VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Albrecht, Nr. 52, is dedicated to the Lützow affair. For
the French side of the story, see Weil, Campagne de 1813, 78–79; Pertz and
Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:8–12.
2 As a defensive position for an army, Gneisenau later suggested the ridges north-
east of Glatz between Frankenstein (Za˛bkowice Śla˛skie) and Wartha (Bardo) on
the Glatzer Neiße (Nysa Kłodzka) forty miles south of Breslau (Wrocław). If
Prussian forces alone were to defend Silesia, he advocated a narrower position
extending from Wartha to Silberberg. Both positions required entrenchments. See
Gneisenau to Frederick William, Glatz, 3 August 1813, in Pertz and Delbrück,
Gneisenau, III:82.
3 Blücher to Gneisenau, Strehlen (Strzelin), 29 June 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23.
4 GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16.
5 Blücher to Hippel, July 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 169–70; Gneisenau to
Frederick William, Glatz, 3 August 1813, reproduced in Pertz and Delbrück,
Gneisenau, III:81.
6 Stewart, Narrative, 57.
7 Steffens, Adventures, 108.
8 Napoleon’s III, VI, XI, and V Corps camped at Liegnitz (Legnica), Lüben
(Lubin), Steinau (Ścinawa), Goldberg, Polkwitz (Polkowice), Glogau, Haynau
(Chojnów), Bunzlau (Bolesławiec), and Löwenberg (Lwówek Śla˛ski).
9 In 1900, the thaler corresponded to three marks, and the mark at that time was
worth 1,500% more than the German mark in 1996. Thus, 200 thaler in 1900 was
equal to 9,000 marks in 1996. Therefore, approximately 200 years ago, 200 thaler
was worth around 18,000 marks in 1996 and 12,000 US dollars. As of 2012,
200 thaler was equal to $17,560.
10 Quoted in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:12.
11 Awarding western Germany as far as the mouth of the Elbe, all of Saxony,
and the majority of Lower Silesia to the imperials, the armistice created a neutral
zone ranging from fourteen to twenty-eight miles in length to separate the
opposing armies in Silesia. On the French side, the line of demarcation extended
north from the Bohemian frontier through Schreiberhau to the Bober just east of
Berthelsdorf and along this river to Lähn. From there it followed the Katzbach
to the Oder. Imperial forces could occupy the towns of Lähn, Goldberg,
Liegnitz, and Parchwitz. Hungry imperial soldiers eventually exhausted the
territory on their side of the neutral zone in addition to Saxony and Lusatia.
On the Allied side, the demarcation line likewise started at the Bohemian
frontier, running northeast through Landeshut, Bolkenhain, and Striegau, then
along the Striegau stream to Kanth, and from there along the Schweidnitz stream
to the Oder slightly downstream of Breslau. Allied troops could occupy these
towns but neither side could enter Breslau or the neutral zone. North of the
neutral zone, Allied forces retained possession of Mecklenburg, Brandenburg,
and Pomerania.
12 As of 2012, 200,000 thaler in 1813 was equal to $17,560,000 and 600,000 thaler
was equivalent to $52,680,000.
14 Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 147–49. I Cavalry Corps numbered 16,537 men (78
squadrons and 36 guns); II Cavalry Corps: 10,304 men (52 squadrons and 18
guns); III Cavalry Corps: 6,000 men (27 squadrons and 24 guns); IV Cavalry
Corps: 3,923 men (24 squadrons and 12 guns); V Cavalry Corps: 4,000 men (20
squadrons and 6 guns).
16 Langeron, Mémoires, 223.
17 Gneisenau to Frederick William, Glatz, 3 August 1813, reproduced in Pertz and
18 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:26–28; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges,
Ib:275; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:567–74, 85–90.
19 Langeron, Mémoires, 204; GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18;
Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:26; Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 159.
20 Grolman to Gneisenau, Reichenbach, 8 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23.
21 Quoted in Henderson, Blücher, 116.
22 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:229–230; Unger, Blücher, II:64.
23 Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, I:71.
24 Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:148.
25 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 50, 57–58; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau,
III:148–49.
26 Unger, Blücher, II:60.
27 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 54–55, 59.
29 Müffling, in Aus meinem Leben, 52, describes Knesebeck as “a friend of
my youth.”
30 Unger, Blücher, II:61; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:152. Prince William of
Prussia, the king’s younger brother by thirteen years, was also assigned to
Blücher’s headquarters but it does not appear that he used his voice to influence
Frederick William: Schneidawind, Prinz Wilhelm, 79.
31 The Glatzer Neiße (Nysa Kłodzka) or Eastern Neisse is a river in southwestern
Poland, a left tributary of the Oder. It should not be confused with the Lusatian
Neiße (German: Lausitzer Neiße; Polish: Nysa Łużycka), a left-bank tributary of
the Oder that formed the border between Silesia and Saxony in 1813 and today
forms the Polish–German border from its junction with the Oder. Being the
longest and most notable of the three rivers named Neiße (the third being the
Wütende Neiße), the Lusatian Neiße is simply referred to as the Neiße or Nysa.
32 Here, Barclay refers to the province of Brandenburg as a geographic objective,
differentiating between a French offensive into Brandenburg and one against the
Army of North Germany.
33 Barclay to Blücher, Reichenbach, 10 August 1813, reproduced in Höpfner, “Dar-
stellung,” 1843:29–30.
34 Quoted in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:35.
35 Blücher to Bernadotte, Schwentnig, 12 August 1813, Riksarkivet (National Arch-
ives of Sweden, Stockholm) Krigsarkivet (Military Archives) (hereafter cited as
RA KrA), 25; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:30; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 2–3;

Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:17–19.
36 Yorck’s corps contained 31,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 1,660 gunners ser-
vicing 104 pieces; Langeron’s: 25,000 infantry, 7,000 cavalry, and 2,500 gunners
servicing 139 pieces; Sacken’s: 9,000 infantry, 8,500 cavalry, and 1,000 gunners
servicing 60 pieces; and St.-Priest’s: 9,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 535 gunners
servicing 36 pieces. As for the crucial horse artillery, Yorck possessed four
batteries of eight guns each; Langeron: two batteries of twelve guns each; and
Sacken: one battery of twelve guns; St.-Priest’s corps possessed none.
37 GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 108; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIa:22; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 4–5;
Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:26–29. The remaining 34,660 Prussians in Silesia
were distributed as follows: at Schweidnitz under Krauseneck’s personal supervi-
sion stood 8 Landwehr and 3 garrison battalions as well as 4 Landwehr cavalry
squadrons totaling 10,050 effectives and 450 cavalry. At Glatz assembled 5 Land-
wehr battalions, 2.5 garrison battalions, and the replacement squadron of the 1st
West Prussian Dragoon Regiment for a total of 6,110 effectives and 150 cavalry.
Four Landwehr and 2 garrison battalions as well as 2 replacement squadrons for
the Neumark Dragoon Regiment and the 2nd Silesian Hussars totaling 5,100
effectives and 300 cavalry held the fortress of Neiße. A garrison of 1 each Land-
wehr and garrison battalion totaling 1,600 men guarded Silberberg while Kosel
(Koźle) was held by 1 Landwehr and 3 garrison battalions as well as the replace-
ment squadron for the 1st Silesian Hussars totaling 2,250 effectives and 150
cavalry. Three Landwehr battalions and 8 Landwehr cavalry squadrons totaling
3,300 infantry and 900 cavalry quartered in and around Frankenstein. The Royal
Guard Reserve Battalion, 4 replacement battalions, and the replacement squadron
for the Silesian Cuirassiers totaling 4,150 infantry and 150 cavalry billeted in and
around Grottkau (Grodków). As soon as the Silesian Army advanced through
Schweidnitz, the troops at Frankenstein would unite with Krauseneck’s men at
Schweidnitz, form a reserve of eight battalions and twelve squadrons, and follow
Blücher’s army. If the enemy evacuated Silesia, this reserve would join the siege
troops at Glogau. If the French commenced an offensive in Silesia, the reserve
would reinforce the garrison at either Glatz or Neiße. Meanwhile, the troops at
Grottkau would occupy Breslau as soon as Blücher’s army crossed the neutral
zone. If the Silesian Army suffered a reverse, they would reinforce the garrison at
either Neiße or Kosel.
38 Lieven notes that the Russians went to war in 1812 with the army organized in
corps, divisions, and brigades, but that during the armistice of 1813 the command
structure had to be reorganized because of the glut of recently promoted major-
and lieutenant-generals. Although Russian lieutenant-generals saw it as beneath
them to command mere divisions, not enough army corps existed for each to have
his own command. As a result, an intermediary level between army corps and
division was created: the infantry and cavalry corps, themselves barely larger than a
pre-1812 Russian division. A Russian infantry corps was approximately the same
size as a Prussian brigade in terms of numbers but lacked attached cavalry, making
them analogous to French divisions. A Prussian brigade and a Russian infantry
corps each contained 7,000–9,000 infantry but the Prussian brigade contained
about 600 cavalry. What the Russians lacked in cavalry, they made up for by
possessing much more artillery than the Prussians: where the Prussian brigade
had only eight guns attached, the Russian infantry corps usually possessed two
batteries of twelve guns each: one heavy and one light. Lieven acknowledges that
the creation of infantry and cavalry corps made “the Russian command structure
top-heavy and complicated relations with the Prussians.” Although the Prussian
brigade and the Russian infantry corps were approximately the same size, colonels
could command Prussian brigades while lieutenant-generals commanded Russian
infantry corps. This increased the likelihood of friction emerging over seniority
and status whenever the troops became mixed. Five Russian army corps com-
menced the Fall Campaign: two (Langeron and Sacken) were attached to the
Silesian Army; two (Wittgenstein and Grand Duke Constantine) joined the Army
of Bohemia; and one (Wintzingerode) served in the Army of North Germany.
After the failed experiment with the Napoleonic corps system in 1809, the Aus-
trians divided their field army for the 1813 Campaign into the combined-arms 1st
and 2nd Light Divisions, both numbering fewer than 5,000 combatants, and three
combined-arms “Armee-Abteilung” that lacked cavalry or artillery reserves. Cor-
responding to left and right wings and a reserve, the Abteilung numbered 27,983
men, 52,736 men, and 46,626 men respectively. The left wing Abteilung consisted
of two infantry and two cavalry divisions subdivided into three infantry and two
cavalry brigades respectively. Unlike Prussian brigades, Austrian divisions did not
contain organic cavalry. Three batteries of six-pound guns were assigned to each
infantry division, but each battery consisted of six guns rather than the eight of the
Prussian battery or twelve of the Russian. The huge right wing Abteilung con-
tained two infantry divisions, three reserve infantry divisions, and two cavalry
divisions while the Reserve Abteilung was assigned the combined-arms 3rd Light
Division and two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. By the end of September,
reorganization had doubled the size of 2nd Light Division, established five Abtei-
lungen (I, II, III, IV, and Reserve) as well as an Army Artillery Reserve, and created
a handful of combined-arms divisions. For example, I Abteilung (20,735 men and
50 guns) contained 3 divisions of which the 1st Division received all 3 arms; II
(12,129 men and 50 guns) and III (18,689 men) each were made up of 2 divisions
with the 1st of each likewise being a combined-arms unit; IV Abteilung (24,354
men) included 3 divisions with 1st and 3rd having combined-arms. The four
regular Abteilungen contained artillery reserves. The Austrian Reserve Abteilung
(19,771 men and 40 guns) consisted of 1 cavalry and 2 infantry divisions. The Army
Artillery Reserve fielded 112 guns including 8 twelve-pound batteries and 2
eighteen-pound batteries. For simplicity, “corps” will be used throughout this
work rather than “Abteilung.” See Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 390.
39 St.-Priest maintained his independent command until the Leipzig campaign in
October when he operated with the Silesian Army and so was subordinated to
Langeron, who outranked him. St.-Priest remained in command of VIII Infantry
Corps but it as well as his cavalry were absorbed into Langeron’s army corps.
“Until the arrival of St.-Priest (then at Vienna),” explained Langeron, “Pahlen . . .
was placed under my orders, even though this corps belonged to Wittgenstein’s
army corps. It was destined to maintain communication between the Army of

Silesia’s left and the Army of Bohemia’s right, and to join whomsoever had the
most need of it; it was tied to my army corps until the end of the war”: Langeron,
Mémoires, 224.
40 Yorck’s main body cantoned at Zobten (Sobótka), Wernersdorf (Wojnarowice),
and Rosenthal (Mirosławice). He placed his outposts – two Fusilier battalions, the
Mecklenburg-Strelitz Hussar Regiment, and 8th Brigade’s four squadrons – on
the line of the Schweidnitz stream from Kanth to Breslau.
41 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:32. At least one clash between the Russians and
native Silesians occurred during the armistice. Regarding “the incident at
Giesmannsdorf [Gostków] between a Russian detachment and the peasants of
that village,” wrote Gneisenau, “I have already ordered an investigation and
politely requested that the general [Barclay] appoint a Russian officer to be
present at the inquiry and bear witness that strict impartiality was practiced”:
Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Ober-Peilau (Piława Górna), 30 June 1813, Briefe des
Generals Neidhardt von Gneisenau, ed. Pflugk-Harttung, Nr. 94, 126. For an
excellent discussion of the issue of Russian supply, see Bogdanovich, Geschichte
des Krieges, Ib:248–49 and IIa:1–16.
42 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 9.
43 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:32, 35.
44 Depots for Sacken’s corps were established at Parchwitz (Prochowice),
Neumarkt, and Breslau; Yorck’s corps at Jauer, Schweidnitz, and Ohlau (Oława);
and Langeron’s and St.-Priest’s corps at Falkenhain (Sokołówka, but cannot be
located on modern maps), Reichenbach, and Brieg (Brzeg).
45 Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:92–93; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
II:260; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:32. Kankrin, Über die Militairökonomie,
II:56. Located at the confluence of the Drysa River and the Daugava River,
Verkhnyadzvinsk (Belarusian) or Verkhnedvinsk (Russian), a city in Belarus in
the northwest of the Vitebsk Region, was named Drysa (in Russian transliter-
ation, Drissa) until 1962.
46 Varying figures for the Prussian army at the beginning of August can be found.
According to Plotho’s calculations for 10 August, the army numbered 277,900
men organized into 249 battalions, 224 squadrons, and 47.5 batteries. By com-
parison, the Austrians fielded a total of 262,000 men for all theaters, the Russians
249,000, and the Swedes 24,000. According to one official estimate cited by
Delbrück, the Prussian army contained 231,838 infantry and cavalry, 15,000
artillerists, and 3,000 volunteer Jäger, altogether 249,838 men, of which 144,500
were for offensive operations and 87,334 for siege and garrison duty. Another
estimate he found in the papers of the War Ministry cites an infantry total of
224,241 comprising 90 battalions of the field army numbering 72,130 noncom-
missioned officers, musicians, and enlisted men; 39 battalions and 5 companies of
garrison and replacement troops numbering 31,838 men; 8 battalions and 35 com-
panies of volunteer Jäger and Freikorps numbering 11,153 men; 151 battalions of
Landwehr numbering 109,120 men. As for cavalry, a total of 30,780 men with
30,663 horses, comprising 89 squadrons of the field army numbering 13,375 men
with 13,375 horses; 22 squadrons of replacement cavalry numbering 3,389 men
and 3,389 horses; 23 squadrons of volunteer Jäger and Freikorps numbering 3,064
men with 2,947 horses; 113 squadrons of Landwehr numbering 10,952 men and
10,952 horses. Artillery was calculated at 50.5 batteries, 36 companies numbering
15,315 men, and 9,112 horses; pioneers consisted of 14 companies numbering
1,305 men. These figures amount to 271,641 men with 39,775 horses excluding
4,000 officers and train personnel. See Plotho, Der Krieg, VI, appendix 2; Pertz
and Delbrück, Gneisenau, II:80–81.
47 This also reflected the original plan of having the Prussian Landwehr defend
Silesia. Frederick William probably wanted to make a good impression on his
allies and thus made sure that his strongest corps in terms of Line units served
under Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte. See Droysen, Yorck, II:107–11; Friederich,
49 Blasendorff, Blücher, 199.
50 Blücher to Gneisenau, Strehlen, 29 June and 24 July 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
51 The 4th, 5th, 6th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiments and
the 3rd, 5th, and 10th, Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiments were assigned to the
brigades of I Corps. Two of I Corps’s four brigades, the 1st and 7th, were
“supersized” with heavy infantry and did not conform to the model of one
regiment each of Line, Reserve, and Landwehr. Instead, the order of battle lists
the 1st Brigade as containing the 1st East Prussian Grenadier Battalion, Leib
Grenadier Battalion, West Prussian Grenadier Battalion, Silesian Grenadier Bat-
talion, two companies of the East Prussian Jäger Battalion, and an unnumbered,
ad hoc “Landwehr Infantry Brigade” composed of the 5th and 13th Silesian
Landwehr Regiments each of four battalions. Including cavalry and gunners,
the 1st Brigade of I Corps totaled 9,353 men – almost 2,000 more effectives than
the brigades that followed the model of one regiment each of Line, Reserve, and,
Landwehr. For example, Yorck’s 2nd and 8th Brigades mustered 7,847 men and
7,638 men respectively. Kleist’s II Corps received the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th
Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiments as well as the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 8th
Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiments. See Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
I:569–70, 576–77.
52 Droysen, Yorck, II:108.
54 Yorck to Rohr, 4 July 1813, quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:108.
55 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 6–8.
56 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:117.
58 Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 151.
60 Droysen, Yorck, II:109–11.
61 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:109–10.
65 Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 159–60.

69 Droysen, Yorck, II:107, 109.
70 Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 340.
71 Langeron, Mémoires, 200–01.
72 Bogdanovich (1805–1882) was a Russian lieutenant-general and military histor-
ian. A nephew of the poet Ippolit Bogdanovich, he received his commission in
1823 and served in the war against the Poles. In 1839 he became a professor of
military history and strategy at the St. Petersburg Military Academy.
73 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, Ib:247–48. See also Mikhailovsky-
Danilevsky, Denkwürdigkeiten, 117–18. Lieven, in Russia Against Napoleon,
329, states that “the Russian army was transformed” during the armistice. Müf-
fling, in Die Feldzüge, 4, describes Langeron’s troops as being “in excellent
condition.”
75 Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 324, 364–66.
77 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:223; According to Freytag-Loringhoven in
Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 8–9, the corps assigned to the Silesian Army
had to reorganize the Dragoon and Mounted Jäger Regiments from five to two
squadrons, and the Hussar Regiments from eight to between five and seven
squadrons.
78 Mikaberidze, The Russian Officer Corps, 218–20; Langeron, Mémoires, 211, 220.
Langeron describes Rudzevich as “A Tartar from the Crimea (he was baptized at
twelve years old); he brought together every military quality: instruction, bravery,
activity, sang-froid, prudence; he was an excellent advance guard commander, and
I believe he is very much of a quality to someday be commander in chief;
however, in his character, he was a bit of a braggart and sometimes partial, thereby
rendering himself less agreeable to his commanders and subordinates than he was
useful (in 1813 he was only thirty-six-years-old).” In Russia Against Napoleon,
376, Lieven explains that Langeron employed Rudzevich “as his troubleshooter
wherever the going was toughest.”
79 Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 160.
80 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:31; Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 374–75.
81 In Russia Against Napoleon, 377, Lieven notes that the tsar “remained very
nervous about where Blücher’s aggressive nature would lead.”
82 Henderson, Blücher, 124–25.
83 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 7–8; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:19; Höpf-
ner, “Darstellung,” 1843:31.
84 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 56; Unger, Blücher, II:59; Blasendorff, Blücher, 203. Lieven,
Russia Against Napoleon, 374, counters that, on the battlefield, Langeron “was
calm and imposing and had a good eye for terrain.”
85 In Anon., Précis militaire de la campagne de 1813 en Allemagne, 82, Blücher is
described as having “all the resilience of youth, despite his seventy years, and [being]
distinguished by the energy and straightforwardness of his character, a natural good

sense and firmness in reverses – all qualities that are always demanded first in a
commander in chief and remind us of what Napoleon wrote to General Henri
Gatien Bertrand: ‘War is made with the strength of decision and a constant desire.’”
87 Bantysh-Kamenskii, Slovar dostopamyatnykh lyudei russkoi zemli, II:553.
88 Quoted in Unger, Blücher, II:59–60; Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 375;
Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 5; Mikaberidze, The Russian Officer Corps, 285–86;
Blasendorff, Blücher, 203.
89 Blücher to Hippel, Strehlen, July 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 168–69.
90 Steffens noted that “the account of the battle of Möckern [16 October 1813] as
given by [Blücher’s] headquarters was singularly short; it was contained in a few
lines, and the heroism displayed, and the important consequences that promised
to result from it, were scarcely noted. On the second day, between that and the
great battle of Leipzig, an attack of cavalry took place under General [Illarion]
Vasilchikov, which was duly praised. It was plainly intended to pass slightly over
the Prussian exploits and to bring forward those of the allied Russians as much as
possible”: Steffens, Adventures, 120.
91 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 6–7.
92 According to Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:62, Napoleon’s forces amounted
to the following: Imperial Guard: 58,191 men and 218 guns; I Corps: 33,298 men
and 76 guns; II Corps: 25,158 men and 76 guns; III Corps: 40,006 men and 122
guns; IV Corps: 23,633 men and 72 guns; V Corps: 27,905 men and 74 guns; VI
Corps: 27,754 men and 84 guns; VII Corps: 21,283 men and 68 guns; VIII Corps:
7,573 men and 44 guns; XI Corps: 24,418 men and 90 guns; XII Corps: 19,324
men and 58 guns; XIII Corps: 37,514 men and 76 guns; XIV Corps: 26,411 men
and 92 guns; I Cavalry Corps: 16,537 men and 36 guns; II Cavalry Corps: 10,304
men and 18 guns; III Cavalry Corps: 6,000 men and 24 guns; IV Cavalry Corps:
3,923 men and 12 guns; V Cavalry Corps: 4,000 men and 6 guns; mobile troops at
Magdeburg and Wittenberg: 15,000 men and 28 guns; Corps of Observation at
Leipzig: 7,800 men and 10 guns; and Artillery, Engineers, and Reserve Park: 8,010
men. These numbers correspond to Pelet’s with the following exceptions: IV
Corps: 21,217 men; XII Corps: 18,986; XIV Corps: 36,149 men; III Cavalry
Corps: 10,801 men; and IV Cavalry Corps: 4,831 men. Pelet does not provide a
figure for V Cavalry Corps; the mobile troops at Magdeburg and Wittenberg; the
Corps of Observation at Leipzig; or the Artillery, Engineers, and Reserve Park.
See Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 164.
93 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:62. Pelet reduces this total to 312,306 infantry,
69,707 cavalry, 32,528 gunners, 4,087 engineers, and 3,333 support personnel for a
total of 421,961: Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 165.
Anon., Précis militaire de la campagne de 1813 en Allemagne, 79–80, provides a
round figure of 400,000 effectives as of 6 August.
94 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:62. Danzig (25,000 men); Zamość (4,000);
Modlin (3,000); Stettin (8,500); Küstrin (4,000); and Glogau (5,500).
95 Napoleon’s initial plans can best be seen in his supply requisitions, see CN,
Nos. 20142 and 20173, XXV:393–97, 420–22; Pelet, Des principales opérations de
la campagne de 1813, 160–63; Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 162–63.
96 CN, Nos. 20306, 20336, 20339, 20360, and 20364, XXVI:8–9, 13–18, 34–41;
Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 172; Anon., Précis
militaire de la campagne de 1813 en Allemagne, 65–66; Maude, Leipzig
Campaign, 165.
97 Specifically, XI Corps consisted of three infantry divisions and one light cavalry
brigade, amounting to thirty-eight battalions, seven squadrons, and ninety guns.
Macdonald’s forces camped in the following areas: 36th Division at Friedeberg,
35th at Lähn, and 31st at Löwenberg with forward elements at Schmottseifen
(Pławna) and Greiffenberg; Macdonald quartered at Löwenberg. Lauriston’s
V Corps likewise consisted of three infantry divisions and one light cavalry
brigade, totaling thirty-seven battalions, seven squadrons, and seventy-four
guns. Lauriston’s divisions camped in the following locales: 16th in and around
Goldberg, 17th at Neudorf on the Gröditzberg, 19th at Haynau, headquarters at
Goldberg. Ney’s III Corps consisted of 5 infantry divisions and 1 light cavalry
brigade, totaling 62 battalions, 11 squadrons, and 122 guns. His 9th and 10th
Divisions camped in and around Liegnitz while 8th Division quartered to the
northeast at Parchwitz, 11th Division at Steinau on the left bank of the Oder,
and 39th Division, which consisted of Badeners and Hessians, at Lüben, halfway
between Liegnitz and Glogau; Ney quartered at Liegnitz. Only two-thirds of
Sébastiani’s fifty-two squadrons – totaling 10,304 men and 18 guns on paper –
were available when hostilities resumed. The cavalry corps consisted of two
light divisions and one of cuirassiers. Marmont’s VI Corps likewise consisted of
three infantry divisions and one light cavalry brigade, totaling forty-eight bat-
talions, eight squadrons, and eighty-four guns. Its troops were mainly French
units, with one battalion of Spaniards and a Württemberger light cavalry bri-
gade. Sailors composed seventeen of Marmont’s forty-eight battalions. See
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:581–84.
98 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 53; Steffens, Adventures, 108; Pertz, Stein, III:403; For a
copy of Austria’s declaration, see Stewart, Narrative, 374–76.
100 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:39–40; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und
Armeeführung, 9–10.
101 As of 14 August, Blücher knew the location and troop strengths of the French
forces that faced him: 4,000 infantry, 150 cavalry, and 26 guns at Friedeberg;
6,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 25 guns at Liebenthal; 3,000 infantry and 1,000
cavalry at Lähn; 6,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and 30 guns at Goldberg; 5,000
infantry, 500 cavalry, and 24 guns at Löwenberg; 25,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry,
and 100 guns at Liegnitz; 5,200 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 30 guns at Haynau;
and 24,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and 65 guns at Bunzlau. Reports on the size of
the imperial forces at Parchwitz, Steinau, and Lüben fluctuated wildly and failed
to provide a clear picture. See GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 109.
102 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:35, 39–40; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges,

IIa:21; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 9–10; Steffens,
Adventures, 108–09.
103 Quoted in Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 42.
104 Yorck would remain in this position on the 15th, but on the 16th have his
advance posts unite at Kanth by noon. At midnight, after the suspension of
hostilities officially ended, these forward units would advance east almost
twenty miles through Kostenblut (Kostomłoty) to Panzkau (Pe˛czków). Like-
wise on the 17th, Sacken’s light cavalry would reach Neumarkt, seven miles
northeast of Kanth. For the 17th, Yorck’s corps would march in two columns at
1:00 a.m. to a bivouac at Saarau. As for Langeron, Blücher instructed him to lead
his corps in two columns from Jauernich to Striegau. From Landeshut, Pahlen
III’s corps would take a position at Schmiedeberg. On the 17th, all corps would
advance west. “Disposition in the Event That the Enemy Respects the Neutral
Zone Until Early on the 17th,” in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:36–37.
105 Langeron to Blücher, 13 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:37;
Langeron to Barclay, Report on Langeron’s operations from 7 August to 2
September, 2 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau,
Nr. 18; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:22; Nostitz, Tagebuch, 53.
106 Blücher to Hardenberg, Striegau, 16 August 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger,
173; Blücher to Bernadotte, Würben (Wierzbna), 15 August 1813, RA KrA,
volym 25, and Add MSS, 20112, 39; Gneisenau to Eichhorn, Jauer, 16 August
1813, Gneisenau, ed. Griewank, Nr. 133, 241; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:39;
Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 175. According to Freytag-Loringhoven in Aufklär-
ung und Armeeführung, 16, French commanders neither authorized nor knew of
violations of the neutral zone for the purpose of requisitions.
107 Blücher to Yorck, Schwentnig, 13 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1843:37; Blücher to Bernadotte, Schwentnig, 12 August 1813, RA KrA, volym
25. A pristine copy of Blücher’s disposition can be found in Add MSS,
20112, 117.
108 Blücher to Bernadotte, Wurben, 15 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25, and Add
MSS, 20112, 39; Blücher to Langeron, Yorck, and Sacken, Schwentnig, 7:00 p.m.,
13 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:37–38; Gneisenau to Caroline,
Schwentnig, 14 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
3
“The infamous conduct of the Prussians”
Yorck’s van – a combined-arms detachment commanded by Lobenthal –

spearheaded the drive into the neutral zone.1 Departing from Lorzendorf
(Wawrzeńczyce), the Prussians marched almost twenty miles northwest to
secure Mertschütz, itself halfway to Liegnitz. From Panzkau (Pe˛czków),
one cavalry detachment under Major Schenk consisting of two squadrons
each from the 2nd Leib Hussars and the Brandenburg Hussars established
communication with Sacken’s corps. Yorck’s main body trooped to Saarau
and Konradswaldau (Mrowiny) in three columns. For added security, the
Prussian corps commander kept the cavalry of each of his four brigades close
to the infantry. To the left of the Prussians, Langeron’s vanguard reached
Jauer; the main body halted ten miles to its southeast at Striegau, itself four
miles west of Yorck’s main body.2 Two hundred Cossacks maintained com-
munication between Yorck’s and Langeron’s vanguards. On Blücher’s right,
Sacken’s corps marched into Breslau but did not achieve its objectives of
Neumarkt and Deutschlissa. After occupying the provincial capital, the
Russian corps commander continued only to Breslau’s western suburbs
instead of the Schweidnitz stream. He pushed six Cossack regiments to
Deutschlissa rather than Neumarkt. Purportedly, Sacken admitted to pur-
posefully deviating from the disposition. On Blücher’s extreme left wing,
Kaysarov led Pahlen III’s van of four Jäger battalions and three Cossack
regiments only to Schmiedeberg, likewise falling short of his objective of
reaching Hirschberg. Blücher’s headquarters moved to Würben, four miles
north of Schweidnitz (see Map 2).3
At noon on the 14th, the Allies received their first break in the new
campaign. Ney’s chief of staff, the Swiss-born General Antoine-Henri
Jomini, defected. Already an accomplished military writer with an inter-
national reputation, he had attracted Napoleon’s attention in Spain during
the 1808 campaign. No doubt Jomini had rendered valuable service as Ney’s
125
staff chief, yet Berthier – possibly out of jealousy – had blamed him for the
marshal’s mistakes earlier in the year at Bautzen. Subsequently, he made sure
that Jomini did not receive a promotion in August.4 According to Langeron:
My advanced post at Striegau sent me a letter from General Jomini, the

famous author of Traité des grandes opérations militaires, at that time
Marshal Ney’s chief of staff; he asked to speak with me. I knew that our
enemies, especially at the beginning of campaigns, were in the habit of
sending such emissaries in attempts to uncover or learn something that was
highly disadvantageous for us to let them know; I refused to see Monsieur
Jomini. A second letter arrived and I gave the same response. Finally, he
wrote me that he was coming to join our army and remain with it; at the same
moment, Lieutenant-Colonel [Pavel] Brozin, adjutant to the tsar, arrived at
my camp and was looking for him [Jomini], and they left together for the
headquarters of the sovereigns. This long-plotted desertion caused great
commotion, produced little honor for Monsieur Jomini (although he is not
French, but Swiss), and resulted in little profit for the Allied armies. On the
spot, Jomini lost the reputation he had acquired, justly so, by means of his
excellent works. He soon became a general and the tsar’s adjutant.5
Jomini revealed that French forces in Silesia had received orders to proceed
defensively and mask the Silesian Army while the emperor turned with his
main force against Berlin and the Army of North Germany.6 Blücher
immediately forwarded this information to Bernadotte: “He [Jomini] told
the Russian general Count Langeron, whom he met for a moment, that the
emperor Napoleon would attack the army under your command to take
the city of Berlin.” Blücher promised to inform the crown prince as soon as
he could verify this news. If Napoleon “moved with the majority of his
forces” against the Army of North Germany, Blücher pledged “not to fail to
follow closely and assist in the most active way the operations of Your Royal
Highness.” Despite Blücher’s assurances, this news placed Bernadotte in
panic mode for the remainder of the campaign.7
Although Blücher’s troops did not encounter the enemy on the 14th, the
general did have some explaining to do. First, he had to answer to the three
armistice commissioners at Neumarkt. Just a few days earlier, Blücher had
promised the Prussian representative, General Krusemarck, that he would
not enter the neutral zone before 16 August. Pleased, Krusemarck shared
this news with the French commissioner, who in turn pledged that imperial
forces likewise would not enter the neutral zone until the 17th. Blücher felt
obligated to inform Krusemarck of his change of mind. Krusemarck received
the news with dismay, refusing to believe Blücher’s claim that the imperials
had violated the neutral zone first. It did not help Blücher’s case that all the
reports that Krusemarck had thus far received indicated that the French
intended to withdraw west when the campaign resumed. The fact that the
“The infamous conduct of the Prussians” 127
imperials had already begun transporting their sick and their supplies – as
well as all the cattle that they had recently requisitioned – to Saxony served
to reinforce Krusemarck’s conviction. He demanded that Blücher refrain
from any premature action. Blücher refused, writing to Krusemarck that
“the diplomatic buffoonery and letter-writing must end. I will beat time
without notes.” A few days later, after completing his assignment at Neu-
markt, Krusemarck passed through Silesian Army Headquarters en route to
his next post with the Army of North Germany. He rebuked Blücher for
violating the terms of the armistice and for compromising him as the king’s
commissioner. “Regardless,” noted Nostitz, “this had no result other than
the general dismissing this accusation with the remark that he was respon-
sible for his actions only to the king and no one else, least of all the French,
and that, on the contrary, it made him extremely happy if this act annoyed
Krusemarck.”8
Second, the Russians disagreed with Blücher’s high-handed actions. “The
entry into the neutral zone,” explained Müffling, “caused a multitude of
remarks in the Russian corps, which were loud enough to spread in the
army: ‘this was against intentions and instructions; General Barclay, who
actually commanded the army, would oppose this, and had to return to the
Silesian Army and lead it; the Russian corps could not be placed under
General Blücher, etc.’ General Blücher learned of these statements but, as
unpleasant as they must have been to him, he paid no attention and did not
change his demeanor toward the Russian troops.” Be that as it may, Blücher
issued an order of the day to the troops, perhaps with an eye to his Russian
generals: “Hereby, the army will be informed that during the night of 10/11
August, Austria declared war on France and at the same time His Imperial
Highness the Tsar of Russia and His Royal Highness the King of Prussia
terminated the armistice. Therefore, hostilities can resume on the expiration
of the 16th of this month unless the enemy breaks the truce sooner.” After
having time to reflect on the circumstances, Langeron noted in his memoirs
that “this movement, somewhat precipitate, was nevertheless imposed by
necessity and by the approach of French troops, who appeared to want to
advance on Breslau and exhaust the country which we needed to furnish our
subsistence.”9
By nightfall on the 14th, the main bodies of Blücher’s three principal
corps held a forty-mile line extending from Striegau through Saarau to
Breslau while the vanguards extended across a front of thirty-six miles from
Jauer to Mertschütz to Deutschlissa. The reports that arrived did little to
clarify the situation. From Deutschlissa, Sacken’s Cossacks patrolled north-
west to the Oder and due west to Neumarkt without encountering French
forces. From Mertschütz, Lobenthal reported that his patrols likewise had
not detected any imperials in the neutral zone west of Yorck’s front. Locals
informed his men that, up to that point, the enemy had not crossed his line
of demarcation but Colonel Steinmetz learned of an imperial patrol at

Malitsch (Małuszów), four miles north of Jauer. Langeron’s patrols observed
only weak detachments east of the Katzbach. It appeared that the French
intended to evacuate the line of the Katzbach on the 15th and withdraw to
Upper Lusatia. On the other hand, work on the fortifications at Liegnitz
accelerated, signaling a desire to hold that town. To clarify the situation as well
as mask the movement of his army, Blücher wanted a large cavalry screen to
reconnoiter at dawn on the 15th. Specifically, the vanguard of each corps
would patrol toward the line of the Katzbach. Gneisenau instructed each
corps commander to dispatch large cavalry detachments with horse artillery
toward the opposite line of demarcation but not across it (see Map 3).10
At daybreak on the 15th, strong detachments of cavalry and horse
artillery from the vanguards of Blücher’s army moved toward the French
line of demarcation but the army remained idle. They rode west with
instructions to attack any imperial forces found inside the neutral zone but
to refrain from hostilities on the French side of the line. From Sacken’s
corps, General Vasilchikov led one infantry, three cavalry, and six Cossack
regiments supported by twelve horse guns west through Neumarkt. His
cavalry reached Parchwitz without encountering the French. After posting
General Akim Karpov there with four Cossack regiments, Vasilchikov
returned to Neumarkt. In the center, Lobenthal rode northwest from
Mertschütz toward Liegnitz on the Katzbach with all the cavalry of Yorck’s
vanguard. Some eight miles southeast of Liegnitz, the Prussians found ten
starving imperial soldiers searching for food. Lobenthal’s troopers passed
through several villages where they encountered only individual soldiers
scavenging for food. The staff officer accompanying Lobenthal’s lead elem-
ent reported that, despite the existence of French camps north of Liegnitz at
Pfaffendorf (Pia˛tnicka) and on the Pfaffendorf hills, he had observed only a
small enemy post at the Katzbach monitoring the road to Pfaffendorf. As the
staff officer continued toward Liegnitz, he received reports of large enemy
columns marching west from the town. This led to the assumption that the
French would evacuate their two camps and limit themselves to holding
Liegnitz.
French security measures and vigilance improved considerably after
Blücher’s surprise attack at Haynau on 25 May. Several times between
10 and 13 August, French patrols reported Allied violations of the neutral
zone. As the Prussians approached Liegnitz on the 15th, they encountered a
French post on the right bank of the Katzbach guarding the bridge.
Although the post was technically in the neutral zone, the Prussians did
not attack, purportedly because the staff officer “gave strict orders that in no
case could they be the first to open fire.” On seeing the Prussians, the French
fell back but fired their muskets, mortally wounding Lieutenant Albrecht of
the Brandenburg Uhlans. Thus fell the first shots of the Fall Campaign.
Incensed by the loss of their officer, the uhlans attacked, wounding a few
imperials and bringing back one prisoner. The withdrawal of the post
allowed the staff officer to move closer and view Liegnitz’s much-heralded
fortifications, which he found to consist of only a few earthworks and
palisades. He deemed Liegnitz to be weak enough to take with cavalry
alone. This report arrived at Yorck’s headquarters with a copy of a message
written by a credible spy stating that on the previous day the imperials had
evacuated from the area around Liegnitz all the wagons and animals that
could be harnessed. After transporting the sick to Glogau, all imperial forces
withdrew from Liegnitz, leaving behind one battalion each of French and
Spanish troops – the latter looked to desert at the first opportunity.
Although Ney’s headquarters remained there, the French generally believed
they would soon march west.11
In the meantime, Lobenthal’s patrol reached Liegnitz and received fire
from the left bank of the Katzbach. He could not ascertain the size of the
enemy force holding the town. Moreover, another staff officer, Lieutenant
Röder, reported the existence of a French camp eight miles west of Liegnitz.
According to deserters, Liegnitz itself would be evacuated during the night,
with part of its garrison going west to Haynau, the other part heading
southwest to Goldberg. Throughout the night, bivouac fires could be seen
on the opposite bank of the Katzbach; drums beating the march could be
clearly heard.
On Blücher’s left, Langeron’s quartermaster and acting chief of staff,
Colonel Neydhardt, led the cavalry of the Russian van northwest from
Jauer toward Goldberg, likewise on the Katzbach. En route, his troopers
saw nothing of the enemy and found Goldberg’s defenses insignificant; an
estimated 1,500 men garrisoned the town. Although the entrenchments built
to guard the camp on the left bank of the Katzbach still stood, the imperials
were gone. Locals claimed that some of them had marched west toward
Löwenberg, others northwest toward Bunzlau. Russian patrols that
approached the Katzbach received fire from posts on the opposite bank.12
During the course of the 15th, Gneisenau, Müffling, and several staff
officers rushed to Jauer to obtain the results of the reconnaissance and to
direct the vanguards accordingly. Yet Silesian Army Headquarters did not
move to Jauer with the chief of staff and quartermaster-general, leading to an
excess of problems and headaches for the commander in chief. Nevertheless,
the intelligence Gneisenau received in the afternoon indicated that an enemy
offensive in Silesia seemed unlikely. Instead, French forces appeared to be
marching west. However, as the enemy’s position immediately west of the
Katzbach did not change, Gneisenau felt that the French had yet to decide
whether they would abandon the Katzbach without a fight. For this reason,
the staff chief informed Blücher that he and Müffling would pass the night at
Jauer. He also provided a disposition for the army to continue its general
advance on the 16th with Sacken’s corps marching southwest on the

Neumarkt–Jauer road to Eisendorf (Jarostów) and Ober-Mois (Ujazd
Górny), fifteen miles east of Jauer. Yorck would direct his vanguard to
Jauer while his main body marched eleven miles west from Konradswaldau
to Fehebeutel (Wieśnica). Gneisenau wanted Langeron to advance west to
Bolkenhain, pushing his vanguard to Schönau. Pahlen III would move
to Hirschberg and forward his van toward Lähn. After dispatching the
disposition to Blücher at Würben, Gneisenau wrote a somber letter to his
wife: “Yesterday, I joined the vanguard. The first shots have already fallen.
We have a gravely wounded officer here. Please open the accompanying
letter upon my death. Many signs lead us to conclude that the enemy has
started his retreat. Our army is still rearward and today reached only
Striegau.”13
During the night of 15/16 August, Blücher waited in vain for the return
of his staff chief and quartermaster-general. To pass the time, he penned his
thoughts to Hardenberg: “Reports indicate that the enemy is marching with
his main force through Torgau on Magdeburg and have pulled back units
from Liegnitz. Today, I will move the army to the Katzbach; I will not loaf if
the enemy retreats tomorrow. Since I am now my own master, the king will
see that I will not twiddle my thumbs. All the same, I will not act rashly.”14
After neither Gneisenau nor Müffling had returned by dawn on the 16th,
Blücher notified his corps commanders that the army would march that day
according to a disposition that would be delivered in a few hours. For
reasons unknown, Gneisenau’s letter and disposition did not reach Blücher
until 10:00 on the morning of 16 August. The noon hour had already passed
by the time Blücher’s staff issued Gneisenau’s instructions.
Meanwhile, Lobenthal remained active throughout the night of 15/16
August. His patrols provided Gneisenau with three key reports. The first,
sent at 9:00 p.m. on the 15th, confirmed that four French infantry regiments
remained at a camp near Parchwitz. The second, submitted at 4:30 a.m. on
the 16th, stated that twelve fully armed Spaniards who had defected to the
Prussians insisted that the French would evacuate Liegnitz on the 16th and
withdraw west through Bunzlau and Goldberg. Their statements confirmed
a report received from an agent at Liegnitz who informed the Prussians that
the imperials had sent their equipment and baggage rolling west on the 15th
and that the two French divisions (9th and 10th of III Corps) stationed there
had received orders to depart for Saxony at 7:00 p.m. on the 16th. According
to the spy, all enemy troops had received orders to fall back to Torgau on the
Elbe. Napoleon still quartered at Dresden but planned to move east with
cavalry on the 16th or 17th to cover the withdrawal of his forces from Silesia.
The reason cited for this withdrawal was that the imperial army in Silesia
stood too far from Napoleon’s main forces. The third and final report
provided by Lobenthal, dated 7:30 a.m. on 16 August, stated that the patrol
he had sent toward Liegnitz during the previous night had found the bridge
over the Katzbach down and encountered only one small post consisting of
eight enemy troopers. This patrol also learned that the imperials had evacu-
ated Liegnitz during the night but had kept their watch fires burning to
deceive the Allies. Lobenthal expressed his opinion that the French had
already withdrawn their forces from the left bank of the Katzbach.15
With the army already marching, Blücher received a second letter from
Gneisenau at 12:30 informing him of this latest intelligence. Because all
signs indicated that the imperials intended to evacuate Liegnitz, Gneisenau
suggested that Yorck press further west by having his vanguard reach
Goldberg and his main body Jauer. Blücher concurred, ordering Yorck to
cover an additional eight miles to Jauer. With his crops marching from
Konradswaldau in two columns, Yorck received Blücher’s revised orders
between 2:00 and 3:00 in the afternoon. The crotchety corps commander
was already in a foul mood because of the late start, but the day only
became worse for him. His first column – 2nd and 7th Brigades and the
Reserve Cavalry – managed to reach the bivouac at Jauer around 11:00 p.m.
on the 16th without mishap. However, his second column – 1st and 8th
Brigades and the Reserve Artillery – collided with units of Langeron’s
corps en route to Bolkenhain. After untangling the columns had claimed
several hours, the Prussians marched through the night to reach Jauer,
where they arrived after dawn on the 17th. Heavy summer downpours
and the resulting mud rendered the march doubly unpleasant. Yorck’s
Landwehr particularly suffered; many men fell out because their boots
remained stuck in the unyielding mud and continuing through the muck
barefooted did not seem appealing.16
The factors that led to the night march on 16/17 August can be attributed
to Gneisenau’s absence from headquarters, which one military observer
accurately labels “an interruption of the mechanism of command” and
another attributes to “the want of experience in the Prussian staff.”17
Although the separation from Blücher led to “friction” on the army level,
Gneisenau’s presence at Jauer represents an understandable desire to obtain
information through visual inspection rather than depending on reports
generated by inexperienced junior officers and the conflicting statements
of local inhabitants. More importantly, this night march marked the begin-
ning of a campaign that would be grueling and costly from the very start
because of what Yorck viewed as Blücher’s excessive and contradictory
demands. Yorck, Langeron, and Sacken viewed the orders coming from
Army Headquarters with extreme skepticism. In this case, judgment comes
down squarely on their side: Gneisenau and Blücher should not have separ-
ated. Gneisenau’s messenger wasted precious hours delivering the staff
chief’s report to Blücher. Moreover, the orders issued at noon and then
expanded led to collisions and night marches, neither of which made a
favorable impression. Thus, 16 August ultimately proved to be the opening

round of Blücher’s struggle with his corps commanders.
Two miles west of Jauer, Yorck’s van reached only Peterwitz
(Piotrowice) on the evening of the 16th, pushing patrols toward Goldberg.
Yorck dispatched an additional five squadrons from his 7th Brigade north
from Jauer toward Liegnitz to secure his right flank. One patrol encountered
imperial forces just south of Liegnitz. Blücher himself rushed to Jauer but
the rest of the army could not keep up. Already behind, Sacken did not
receive the disposition for 16 August until 4:00 that afternoon. Conse-
quently, his men also needed the entire night to march twenty miles before
halting between Eisendorf and Ober-Mois around 9:00 on the morning of
the 17th. Vasilchikov led Sacken’s vanguard on a night march to Panzkau.
Sacken’s units furthest to the west, Karpov’s Cossacks, rode northwest
on the afternoon of the 16th to verify reports that the imperials had evacu-
ated their camps at Parchwitz and Lüben. Passing through the former en route
to the latter, Karpov confirmed the French withdrawal. He then turned south,
taking a position at Großtinz (Tyniec Legnicki) some eleven miles east of
Liegnitz. On the left wing, Langeron’s troops reached Bolkenhain between
12:00 and 1:00 a.m. on the 17th. Rudzevich with Langeron’s vanguard halted
around 6:00 a.m. on the hills east of Schönau (see Map 2).18
In the meantime, Kaysarov dispatched three strong patrols from Pahlen
III’s vanguard to reconnoiter Kemnitz (Stara Kamienica), Berthelsdorf, and
Lähn on the morning of 16 August. Some ten miles west of Hirschberg, the
Russians found enemy detachments of 500 infantry each at Kemnitz and
Berthelsdorf. The Russians attacked, prompting the imperials to withdraw
to Spiller, where they offered stubborn resistance in the village cemetery
before continuing their retreat. Meanwhile, the third detachment, which
Steffens accompanied, encountered a French post east of Lähn. It too
received the Russians with sustained small-arms fire before several flank
attacks prompted the imperials to retreat to Lähn. The day’s fighting cost the
Russians six killed, seventeen wounded, and three missing. Sent from
Schmiedeberg on the evening of the 16th, Pahlen’s report on these events
reached Langeron’s headquarters at Bolkenhain on the afternoon of the 17th.
From there, Langeron forwarded the communiqué to Jauer, where it reached
Blücher at 8:00 p.m. – more than twenty-four hours later.19
By late morning on the 17th, the Silesian Army reached the following
positions along a 45-mile front: Pahlen III at Hirschberg, Langeron at
Bolkenhain, Yorck and Army Headquarters at Jauer, and Sacken at Ober-
Mois. Granting Sacken’s men no rest, Gneisenau instructed the Russian
general to push his vanguard to Liegnitz but move his main body closer to
Yorck’s by marching to the hills of Wahlstatt (Legnickie Pole), eight miles
north-northeast of Jauer. Based on Barclay’s suggestion one week earlier, he
authorized Sacken to form Streifkorps commanded by Rakhmanov and
Figner. Gneisenau tasked them with leading their units through Parchwitz to
harass the enemy’s left flank.20 Finally, news arrived that the lead elements of
Bennigsen’s Army of Poland had reached Polnischlissa (Leszno), some
seventy miles north-northeast of Jauer. Blücher requested that Bennigsen
immediately return the cavalry brigade from Sacken’s corps stationed
there: two regiments each of hussars and Cossacks commanded by Lanskoy
(see Map 3).21
According to the reports, the French appeared to be marching from the
northeast to the southwest along the thirty-mile line of Liegnitz–Goldberg–
Löwenberg. As Blücher noted in his letter to Hardenberg, they seemed
content to completely evacuate the Katzbach. Gneisenau expressed this
same conviction to Sacken at 7:00 on the morning of the 17th. With hostil-
ities officially resuming on the 17th, the Prussians no longer felt constrained
in their pursuit of news of the enemy. For extensive reconnoitering, Yorck’s
Reserve Cavalry received orders to leave the main body and join the van-
guard. Before the additional troopers could arrive, Gneisenau and Müffling
decided to personally conduct reconnaissance late on the morning of the
17th to confirm that the French had evacuated the Katzbach. Seven miles
northeast of Jauer at the village of Seichau (Sichów), Gneisenau and Müffling
separated: each led a column northwest toward the Katzbach. Escorted by a
detachment of Lobenthal’s vanguard, Gneisenau struck the highway that ran
through Laasnig (Łaźniki) and Röchlitz (Rokitnica).22 A few miles south of
Gneisenau, Lobenthal’s remaining troopers accompanied Müffling through
Prausnitz (Prusice) on the road to Goldberg. An imperial post at Prausnitz
retreated without offering any resistance, thus opening the road to Goldberg.
From Prausnitz, Müffling covered three miles to reach the hills on the right
bank of the Katzbach close to Goldberg. In this position, he observed a large
imperial camp extending from Goldberg to Röchlitz; troops could be seen
forming as the alarm sounded. Smoke rising from the hills west and north
of Goldberg indicated French camps in those areas. After completing the
mission, Müffling’s column withdrew through Seichau to the hills of
Hennersdorf (Chroślice) on the Goldberg–Jauer road.
Meanwhile, Gneisenau’s column found a French post two miles north-
west of Seichau at Laasnig. Pursued by the Prussians, the French withdrew
to Röchlitz on the right bank of the Katzbach. A sharp skirmish ensued
when the Prussian fusiliers of Yorck’s van moved up to take possession of
the village. This prompted the Prussians to envelop the enemy position. Led
by two platoons of skirmishers, three companies assaulted the entrance to
Röchlitz. The remaining company turned the left (south) of the village while
two platoons of skirmishers moved around its right (north). This maneuver
succeeded: the imperials abandoned the enceinte but one detachment with-
drew into the village’s church and cemetery. Situated on a hill and sur-
rounded by a wall, the position could not be taken. Although the
Prussians moved up two pieces of horse artillery, a firing position could not
be located, forcing the gunners to withdraw with some loss. Resolved to take
the cemetery, the Prussians committed one platoon of skirmishers and half a
company to eject the French while the remaining companies completed the
envelopment of Röchlitz. Before the attack could unfold, Gneisenau
rescinded the orders after observing numerous imperial squadrons on the
opposite bank of the Katzbach. Soon, French infantry reached Röchlitz,
forcing Gneisenau to retreat through Seichau to Hennersdorf, where he
reunited with Müffling. With a loss of eight dead as well as two officers
and twenty-eight soldiers wounded, Gneisenau’s reconnaissance mission
had found the enemy.
Elsewhere on the 17th, Sacken’s patrols noted the continued presence of
French forces at Liegnitz, despite the reports of the enemy’s withdrawal. His
main body marched northwest from Ober-Mois and Eisendorf to Wahlstatt,
seven miles southeast of Liegnitz. It arrived on the evening of the 17th,
completely exhausted from the strenuous efforts needed to make up for the
short march on the 14th. Langeron’s corps maintained its position at
Bolkenhain with the vanguard east of Schönau. His forward troops estab-
lished communication with the Prussians of Yorck’s corps to the north and
Pahlen III’s Russians to the south. That evening, Rudzevich reported that his
patrols had encountered French outposts east of Goldberg; peasants claimed
that Lauriston’s entire V Corps was bivouacking on the hills at Goldberg.
One patrol that proceeded through Lähn learned from the village mayor that
20,000 French troops were camping east of the Bober and south of Löw-
enberg at Schmottseifen, Liebenthal, and Friedeberg.
On the extreme left of Blücher’s front, Kaysarov led Pahlen III’s van-
guard north along the Bober, crossing the river at Lähn. From there, he
dispatched Cossack patrols west and north. At Märzdorf (Marczów), seven
miles south of Löwenberg, the Russians found 200 French infantry.
Kaysarov ordered an attack by two companies of the 33rd Jäger Regiment
that resulted in the capture of two prisoners and the deaths of nineteen
imperial soldiers. While pursuing the French, Kaysarov observed a column
of approximately 1,000 infantry supported by cavalry emerge from the
village of Mois (Mojesz) less than two miles south of Löwenberg to take
in their beleaguered comrades. Kaysarov withdrew to Märzdorf, posting his
pickets two miles west of this village on the road to Löwenberg. His patrols
confirmed the reports of large and, according to locals, entrenched camps at
Löwenberg and Schmottseifen, identifying the 20,000 men as belonging to
Macdonald’s XI Corps. Peasants informed the Russians that enemy camps
also existed at Liebenthal and Ottendorf (Radoniów). Apparently, the
imperials had remained in their camps awaiting an Allied attack; Kaysarov
directed his Cossacks and spies to confirm these reports. Around 4:00 that
afternoon, the French probed Märzdorf as part of a reconnaissance mission.
Grünberg
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0 10 20 30 40 50 miles
8 Crossing the neutral zone

Fearing this would result in an attack by larger imperial forces the next day,
Kaysarov withdrew his infantry that same day to Lähn, leaving only posts at
Märzdorf and Schmottseifen. His 17 August report on these events made its
way from Pahlen III’s headquarters through Langeron’s to Blücher’s by late
morning on the 18th.23
Turning to the French, Blücher’s crossing of the neutral zone earned their
ire. “Without regard for sworn oaths and in an infamous violation of the
armistice treaty, today the enemy attacked the posts of 36th Division,”
reported Macdonald from Löwenberg on the 17th.24 Blücher’s offensive
against the French right on the upper Bober threatened the rear of the
imperial army. In turn, this prompted the retreat of the individual French
corps and divisions posted along both the Katzbach and the Bober. Like
Napoleon, the French corps commanders in Silesia believed they faced the
main Allied army, having not yet learned of the departure of Barclay’s
100,000 men for Bohemia. “Instead of being wary of his opponent,” notes
one French historian, “and concentrating the various corps of his army on 11
August, Marshal Ney found himself surprised and forced to abandon his
positions.”25 The initial movements of the French army occurred haphaz-
ardly because the emperor had yet to name a commander in chief. He
remedied this situation on the 15th by appointing Ney and instructing the
marshal to withdraw to Bunzlau if the enemy’s main force advanced through
Liegnitz on the east–west highway. Should Blücher advance from Jauer
through Goldberg, Napoleon directed him to retreat to Löwenberg. On
the 16th and 17th, Ney concentrated III Corps and II Cavalry Corps at
Liegnitz. All departed west for Haynau as part of the general French
movement across the Katzbach on 17 August.26
As for Napoleon, the emperor initially assumed that the Russo-Prussian
army he had pursued to the Oder in May would advance west from Silesia
toward Upper Lusatia while the Austrian army in Bohemia invaded Saxony
either along the right bank of the Elbe or through Zittau. He knew vaguely
of the arrangements made at Trachenberg, but did not think the Allies would
dare leave Silesia only weakly guarded by sending considerable forces to
Bohemia.27 Despite its length, Napoleon’s position offered him the great
advantage of interior lines, which would allow him to concentrate a force
much larger than any Allied army threatening his center or one of his wings.
Although the defensive character of his plans ceded the initiative to the
Allies, Napoleon felt confident as long as his forces could hold Dresden
for at least one week. Moreover, the extensive fortifications that protected
the Saxon capital made an Allied operation against it along the left bank of
the Elbe seem unlikely. He hoped and predicted that the Allies would not
break their tradition of waging war based on the principles of the eighteenth
century. By adhering to this system of warfare, the Coalition would view his
communications with France as their main objective and thus target Leipzig.
That the Trachenberg Protocol called for the Allies to advance on Leipzig
demonstrates how well the emperor knew his opponents.
At Dresden on his birthday, 15 August, the emperor of the French
climbed into his carriage followed by his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat,
the king of Naples by the grace of Napoleon, and proceeded south. He
inspected the fortifications and bridges at Pirna at 9:00 p.m., followed by the
pontoon bridge at Königstein around midnight before turning northeast
toward Bautzen.28 General Marie Victor de Latour-Maubourg’s I Cavalry
Corps and the Old Guard followed. After his aide-de-camp took a wrong
turn, costing the emperor thirty minutes and greatly fouling his mood,
Napoleon reached Bautzen at 2:00 a.m. on the 16th. Later that morning,
he received intelligence from spies that Barclay and Wittgenstein had led the
Russian army from Silesia to Bohemia. There, it would join Schwarzenberg’s
army, which had already moved to the left bank of the Elbe. In addition,
Blücher’s army – a mere 50,000 men according to the emperor’s estimate –
started driving west from Breslau. Blücher’s violation of the six-day suspen-
sion of hostilities irked the emperor, who referred to it as “the infamous
conduct of the Prussians.” The support of the Russian and Prussian com-
missioners at Neumarkt did little to assuage him.29
Although Napoleon wanted confirmation that the Russians had left
Silesia, the spy reports concerning the movements of Barclay and
Wittgenstein from Silesia to Bohemia allowed him to tighten his plans. To
threaten Prague and distract Schwarzenberg, Napoleon planned to push
100,000 men south to the Bohemian frontier with II and VIII Corps actually
moving onto Austrian soil. To the east, Macdonald’s 50,000 men (XI and V
Corps) would defend the Bober crossing at Löwenberg while Ney did the
same with 70,000 men (III and VI Corps) at Bunzlau. West of them at
Lauban on the Queis stood Marshal Adolph Édouard Mortier’s three Young
Guard divisions. Napoleon himself would lead the Old Guard, I Corps, and
I Cavalry Corps to Silesia to commence the campaign by destroying Blü-
cher’s small army, thus removing the threat it posed to the rear of both his
Grande Armée in Saxony as well as Oudinot’s Army of Berlin. Two condi-
tions had to be met for him to march against Blücher. First, the Prussian
would have to advance on Bunzlau and, second, Barclay’s Russians would
have to be in Bohemia, marching north toward Dresden or Zwickau.
Napoleon assured Macdonald that, as soon as he received this confirmation,
“I will march to destroy Blücher.”30
With the official resumption of hostilities on the 17th, Napoleon ordered
a general reconnaissance. One Guard cavalry division followed by one
Young Guard infantry division crossed the Bohemian frontier at Rumburg
(Rumburk) while thirteen miles to their left (east) the Poles of IV Cavalry
Corps and VIII Corps filed across the border at Zittau. Napoleon himself
left Bautzen on the evening of the 17th en route to Görlitz on the east–west
highway. According to Odeleben, during the ride, Napoleon’s “active con-

cern for the plan of campaign began; he labored incessantly; couriers and
officers were dispatched to all points. The rupture with Austria became
certain. Although the war that was about to break out with Austria was
hardly mentioned at headquarters, it was known that the combined Russian
and Prussian army had left Silesia, taking the direction of Bohemia, and that
it was already in the region of Münchengrätz [Mnichovo Hradiště], thus
signaling the Allied intention to cross the Bohemian mountains either
through the Lusatian mountain passes to their north [near Zittau] or the
Saxon passes [near Pirna] further west.”31
On 17 August, news reached Imperial Headquarters at Bautzen that
some 40,000 Russians had entered Bohemia by way of Glatz on 13 August.
Although it would appear that this information confirmed the spy reports
that Napoleon had received on the 16th, he viewed the intelligence with
skepticism. Yet, if true, and should these troops make for Prague, the
emperor figured they could not reach the Bohemian capital until the 25th
or 26th, which would give him plenty of time to crush Blücher. Thus,
Napoleon remained determined to move his headquarters to Görlitz, where
he would unite I, III, V, VI, and XI Corps while I and II Cavalry Corps held
a forward position at Bunzlau. According to his numbers, this would pro-
duce an army of 130,000 to 140,000 men, which combined with the five
divisions of his Guard, would total 180,000.32 Napoleon confidently
informed St.-Cyr that the Austrians would not cross the upper Elbe, march
northeast, and attempt to enter Lusatia by way of Zittau. However, should
the Austrians and Russians combine in an attempt to punch through Zittau,
VIII and II Corps and IV Cavalry Corps held a strong position. “I have
occupied the position from Eckartsberg to Zittau with 40,000 men, making
it impossible to debouch through this gorge.” If need be, I Corps could
reach Zittau in thirty-six hours to increase imperial forces to 70,000 men
while Napoleon could arrive with another 50,000 in one march to reach
120,000 men.
With Zittau thus covered, the emperor arranged for the protection of
Dresden. He suspected the Austrians would follow the banks of the Elbe to
the Saxon capital. The responsibility for blocking these approaches fell
mainly to the 26,000 men and 92 guns of St.-Cyr’s XIV Corps, which
Napoleon directed to occupy Pirna and Bad Gottleuba-Berggießhübel on
the left bank of the Elbe, and Stolpen, Hohnstein, and Bad Schandau on the
right bank. St.-Cyr’s 42nd Division would relieve two divisions of I Corps
guarding the defiles further east at Neustadt in Sachsen, Schluckenau (Šlu-
knov), and Rumburg. If all Austro-Russian forces moved on Dresden by
way of the left bank of the Elbe, Napoleon assured St.-Cyr that General
Dominique-Joseph Vandamme’s I Corps would “march to Dresden; two of
his divisions can arrive within twenty-four hours, the third within thirty-six
hours: you will thus be able to unite 60,000 men around Dresden on both
banks of the river. Moreover an Allied movement down the Elbe would
allow the 40,000 men at Zittau to reach Dresden within four days to total
100,000 defenders.” If circumstances allowed, Napoleon claimed that he
himself could be there within four days with “the 50,000 men of my Guard.”
It is this letter to St.-Cyr that contains the oft-quoted passage stating
that, if the Austro-Russian army moved due west from Prague to invade
Bavaria through Bayreuth, Napoleon would wish it bon voyage knowing
the Allies would return faster than they had gone. Hardly concerned about
his communication with France, the master nevertheless instinctively rec-
ognized the importance of Dresden and the Elbe. Thus, the other famous
quote from this letter: “It is clear that one cannot turn 400,000 men based
on a system of fortresses, on a river like the Elbe, and able to debouch at
will through Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg.” With the
180,000 men at the Görlitz–Bunzlau position, the emperor planned to
“debouch on Blücher, Sacken . . . who, it appears, are marching on my
troops today and after I have destroyed or routed these corps the balance
will be restored.” After smashing the enemy army in Silesia, Napoleon
planned to either march to Berlin depending on Oudinot’s situation or
drive through Bohemia to reach the rear of the Austro-Russian army if it
invaded Bavaria.33
On 18 August, Marmont’s VI Corps concluded its march east by reach-
ing Bunzlau on the Bober. In the center, Lauriston’s V Corps fell back west
to Löwenberg, likewise on the Bober. On the right wing, Macdonald assem-
bled his 35th and 36th Divisions at Schmottseifen, leaving the 31st Division
further west at Greiffenberg to secure the right flank. Fearing an envelop-
ment of his right, Macdonald ordered 35th Division to eject the enemy posts
reported to be along the Bober at Lähn and Berthelsdorf. Napoleon reached
Görlitz that evening, where he received “confusing” news over the enemy’s
movements. He learned that the Austrians had crossed the Elbe en route to
an unknown destination. “One report claims that 60,000 Russians and
Prussians have entered Bohemia, and that Tsar Alexander reached Prague
on the 15th,” he informed his minister of war, Henri Clarke. Regardless, he
remained confident that his subordinates could hold either Zittau or Pirna
long enough for him to arrive should the Allied army in Bohemia follow one
of these invasion routes. Vandamme, whose I Corps lagged far behind
Napoleon’s main body, received orders to lead his 1st Division from
Stolpen to Rumburg rather than Bautzen. At Rumburg, he would unite with
St.-Cyr’s 42nd Division and 3,000 sabers of 1st Guard Cavalry Division as
well as 3rd Infantry Division of the Young Guard. Should the Allies go west
from Prague to Bavaria, “then they would allow me to conduct an offensive
in all of Bohemia. If, however, the news of the arrival of the Russian army in
Bohemia is false, or if it is only a small corps, then in two days I will unite
200,000 men against the enemy army in Silesia. As you can see, this war is
based on a large scale.”34
To slow the retreat of Ney’s army, Berthier started issuing directives
from Görlitz at 6:00 a.m. on 19 August based on the emperor’s instructions.
Reacting to Macdonald’s belief that he had cut off an Allied corps advancing
west from Greiffenberg, Berthier ordered the infantry of the Guard as well
as I Cavalry Corps to support the marshal in destroying this enemy force.
One hour later, he conveyed the emperor’s instructions for Macdonald to
drive the Cossacks across the Bober and hold the river line instead of falling
back to the Queis. Latour-Maubourg’s I Cavalry Corps received a second
order calling for it to take a position that day, the 19th, at Lauban and to
dispatch patrols along the Queis to prevent the Cossacks from crossing. At
7:00 on the morning of the 19th, Napoleon dispatched a letter to Ney
explaining that “according to all available news, the Russian army has
entered Bohemia; it is certain that Barclay de Tolly himself arrived there
on the 15th and every indication is that Wittgenstein, with a corps of 40,000
men, was at Böhmisch-Leipa [Česká Lı́pa] on the 17th. We know that
Wintzingerode and Mikhail Miloradovich went in another direction. All of
this suggests that, while there are few Russians in Silesia, there is the
Prussian army, which seems to maneuver in the direction along the moun-
tains, intending to win Zittau to establish communication with the Austrian
army through this great pass.”35
While these conditions met Napoleon’s requirements to commence
the offensive against Blücher, he still did not have a clear picture of
Schwarzenberg’s intentions. Regardless, the master of war enjoyed an
uncanny ability to make his opponent do exactly what he wanted. Needing
to know where Schwarzenberg would lead his massive army before he
departed for Silesia, Napoleon believed he could dictate the Allied com-
mander in chief’s first move. Moreover, he wanted to see for himself if an
operation from Lusatia could have success against the flank of the Russian
columns purportedly marching west through Bohemia to join
Schwarzenberg on the left bank of the Elbe. If time allowed, he could fall
on Barclay with superior forces and considerably frustrate the Coalition’s
plans. To answer these questions, Napoleon returned to Zittau on the 19th.
Forty-five miles southwest of Löwenberg, twenty-two miles south of
Görlitz, fifty-three miles east of Dresden, and seventy miles north of Prague,
Zittau provided Napoleon with the ultimate central position between
Schwarzenberg and Blücher. After reviewing elements of Poniatowski’s VIII
Corps, including the newly formed Polish Cossacks, the emperor followed a
large reconnaissance force consisting of 4,000–5,000 men eleven miles south
to the Bohemian town of Gabel (Jablonné v Podještědı́). Meeting little
resistance, the French advanced beyond Gabel, obtaining “such information
concerning the Allied armies as the common inhabitants and ignorant
peasants could afford.” Another large reconnaissance force from

Poniatowski’s VIII Corps reached Kratzau (Chrastava), southeast of Zittau,
while west of Zittau a third did not venture beyond Rumburg.36
Napoleon returned to Zittau around midnight with a clear understanding
of the situation. First, he could not reach Barclay’s army group. To give
Napoleon a wide berth, the Russians moved across the northeastern frontier
of Bohemia from Upper Silesia and struck a road that ran southwest from
Trautenau (Trutnov) to Jungbunzlau, forty miles south of Zittau. From
there, they continued west to Melnik on the right bank of the upper Elbe
seventy miles south of Dresden. Kleist’s II Corps and the Prussian Guard
took a road that ran even further south. On 17, 18, and 19 August, the
Russian and Prussian columns marched through the vineyards and orchards
of Leitmeritz to cross the Elbe, forty-eight miles southwest of Zittau and
forty-seven miles southeast of Dresden. Thus, the French only found the
troops of the Austrian 2nd Light Division in northeastern Bohemia, main-
taining communication between Allied Headquarters and Blücher through
the Landeshut–Trautenau pass. Napoleon received confirmation that the
three Allied sovereigns had met either at Prague or Schlan (Slaný) on the
previous day, the 18th, and that a Prussian corps had likewise marched with
the Russians to Bohemia.37
As noted, Napoleon suspected Schwarzenberg would march to the left
bank of the upper Elbe – a movement that prisoners now confirmed.
Apparently, the Allies intended to employ their main strength against his
line of communication by marching on Leipzig or Dresden or some other
point. At the same time, he received Ney’s report on the determined advance
of the Silesian Army. This caused Napoleon to return to the idea that
Schwarzenberg would make for Zittau. He did not know exactly where
Schwarzenberg would lead the Army of Bohemia but that no longer
mattered. Napoleon predicted that, as soon as the Allied commander in
chief learned that he had been at Gabel, the Austrian would direct his army
to Zittau. By the time the Allies arrived there, the emperor would be in Silesia
crushing Blücher. Thus, Napoleon decided to continue his plan to march
against Blücher, defeat him, and then rush back to Dresden. To increase the
number of bayonets in the Zittau sector, 1st Division arrived at Rumburg,
while Vandamme’s 2rd and 3rd Divisions echeloned between there and
Dresden, but St.-Cyr’s 42nd Division returned to the Pirna sector.38
Not having the numbers to simultaneously crush Blücher and stop
Schwarzenberg’s advance through Zittau, Napoleon based his plans on a
very tight timetable. In turn, his timing depended on the notoriously slow
and methodical movements of the Austrians as well as the difficulties inher-
ent in the operations of a multinational army. He calculated that the 65,000
soldiers of I, II, and VIII Corps and IV Cavalry Corps as well as 1st Guard
Cavalry Division and elements of V Cavalry Corps would have at least four
or five days to entrench positions in the passes and on the roads between
Upper Lusatia and Bohemia. The passes would be secured by I Corps at
Rumburg and II Corps at Zittau. With VIII Corps and IV Cavalry Corps,
Prince Poniatowski would move south to Gabel and remain on Bohemian
soil. On the 20th, 1st Division of I Corps would cross the Bohemian frontier
at Rumburg and push south to St. Georgenthal (Jiřetı́n pod Jedlovou) and
Rohrsdorf (Svor), the latter being nine miles west of Gabel. Expecting the
troops to tenaciously defend their well-fortified mountain positions,
Berthier instructed Vandamme that “the emperor intends for you to fight
to the last man.” In this way, Napoleon believed he would have time to
destroy Blücher in Silesia and return to Upper Lusatia before
Schwarzenberg could push across the mountains. The French drive through
Rumburg and Zittau sufficed to send the Austrian 2nd Light Division
running thirty-three miles south of Zittau to Turnau (Turnov), but the
question remained: would Schwarzenberg take the bait and march on
Zittau?39
Despite the optimism that permeated Blücher’s headquarters on 16
August, all intelligence collected on the 17th indicated that strong French
forces still held both the Katzbach and the upper Bober. Thoughts that the
imperials would withdraw to Lusatia or Saxony now appeared premature at
best. Piecing together the numerous reports, Gneisenau figured that Ney
held a forty-mile front running northeast to southwest, with his left at
Liegnitz, center at Goldberg, and right between Löwenberg and
Greiffenberg. At least two of his corps stood at the Katzbach between
Goldberg and Liegnitz while a third camped at Löwenberg on the Bober.
Blücher informed Langeron that the day’s reconnaissance had not only
detected imperial forces at Liegnitz and Goldberg, but had also signaled
their intent to hold those positions. To be certain, Blücher issued orders on
the evening of the 17th for more reconnaissance to be conducted on the
army’s flanks early on 18 August. He instructed Sacken to have an officer of
his general staff at Army Headquarters by noon on the 18th with the result
of this reconnaissance. At the least, the majority of Sacken’s men would be
able to rest their weary legs on the 18th. As for Langeron, Blücher ordered
him to push his main body to Schönau on the 18th, with the vanguard
moving across the Katzbach to Probsthain (Proboszczów). He instructed
Langeron to have an officer of his staff at Army Headquarters by 2:00 p.m.
on the 18th to receive the disposition for the 19th. Frustrated by his inability
to attack sooner, Blücher hoped to assemble the army at Jauer and Schönau
to smash through the French center at Goldberg on the 19th.40
As Sacken and Langeron executed these orders, news reached Army
Headquarters midmorning on 18 August that completely changed the situ-
ation. From Wahlstatt at 6:30 a.m., Sacken reported that the French had
evacuated Liegnitz during the night. Elements of Vasilchikov’s vanguard
occupied the town while other units pursued the imperials west on the
highway to Haynau. Reports from Yorck’s patrols confirmed the French
departure: the Prussian troopers had observed the campfires go out at Liegnitz
around midnight. Moreover, Jürgaß reported that the French also withdrew
from Goldberg. To determine the direction they took, he dispatched Katzler
with the Brandenburg Uhlans. For support, the Lithuanian Dragoon Regi-
ment thundered along the two roads that ran from Seichau to Prausnitz and
Röchlitz. Further south at Schönau, Rudzevich also confirmed the French
withdrawal from Goldberg. Reporting at 8:00 a.m., the Russian general added
that the imperials were marching north-northwest toward Haynau. Finally,
Kaysarov’s report from 17 August arrived explaining that the French appar-
ently intended to remain in and around Löwenberg on the Bober.41
Despite Macdonald’s presence at Löwenberg, the fact that the French
had evacuated the line of the Katzbach mattered most to Blücher. He and his
staff incorrectly attributed this retrograde movement to the Bohemian
Army’s advance on Dresden, which presumably caused Napoleon to
summon Ney’s forces from Silesia for a general concentration on the left
bank of the Elbe. Craving to win the first laurels of the new campaign,
Blücher and Gneisenau intended to drive to the Neiße in four columns
spread across a 25-mile front. Displaying a flair for maneuver reminiscent
of Napoleon, the Prussians planned to reach Görlitz on the Saxon frontier
before Ney. Issued at noon on the 18th, “The First Disposition for the
Continued Pursuit of the Enemy” called for the Silesian Army to reach a
25-mile line extending south from Steuditz (Studnica) through Goldberg to
Altschönau during the course of the 18th. Blücher’s cover letter to his corps
commanders opened by stating: “The enemy has evacuated his position on
the Katzbach; it is therefore probable that he will also withdraw from his
positions in the highlands.” Gneisenau directed Blücher’s right – Sacken’s
corps – through Liegnitz and Haynau to Bunzlau while in the center Yorck’s
corps would proceed west through Goldberg to Löwenberg and from there
turn northwest toward Naumburg. On the left wing, Langeron’s corps
would march west through Löwenberg to Lauban on the Bober and then
move northwest to Görlitz to block the east–west highway that led to
Dresden. South of Langeron, Pahlen III would advance twenty-five miles
west from Hirschberg toward Marklissa, due south of Lauban. Langeron
and Yorck received instructions to form Streifkorps and send them toward
Dresden to disrupt French communication along the east–west highway.42
“I have sent all the corps instructions to dispatch Streifkorps that can turn
both the enemy’s flanks and explode into the middle of his columns,” Blücher
informed Bernadotte. “I hope for good results from this measure because the
parties I have already detached have advanced as far as Parchwitz and Lüben
but found few enemy forces there. The retreat of the enemy army has
principally been directed toward Saxony and on Dresden.”43
Blücher regarded the movement as a pursuit but cautioned his corps

commanders. The French army numbered around 90,000 men. Should any
corps encounter a superior enemy force, it would “fix him in the front
until the other columns envelop him on the left and on the right and
attack him in the rear.” For speed, his orders called for the army to be
marching in several columns by 5:00 a.m. on the 19th. All but the
vanguards would halt between 10:00 and 11:00 to allow the men to cook
and feed the horses. The advance would continue from 3:00 p.m. to 7:00 or
8:00 p.m. As for the vanguard, Blücher insisted that it maintain constant
contact with the enemy and halt only in the evening to eat. Escorted by
Yorck’s corps, Blücher planned to transfer his headquarters to Löwenberg
on the 19th.44
Gneisenau and Müffling typically drafted the orders and Blücher
approved them. Very similar to Wittgenstein’s first efforts prior to Lützen,
these instructions included rookie mistakes and have received their due
criticism. First, the Prussians placed too much stock in the reports of the
evacuation of Liegnitz and Goldberg. They based their planning on the
supposition that the French would evacuate Silesia and withdraw as far as
the Elbe. Yet no evidence supported this belief other than the retreat from
the Katzbach, which certainly did not provide compelling proof that the
imperials would recede all the way to Dresden. To the Prussians, Kaysarov’s
report, which confirmed the presence of Macdonald’s XI Corps south of
Löwenberg, appeared to be a logical French precaution: Ney’s right wing
would hold the upper Bober while his left wing fell back from the Katzbach
to come on line with the right. Army Headquarters did take into account the
possibility that the French could stop and thus instructed the nearest column
to fix the enemy in the front for as long as possible until the neighboring
corps could envelop his flanks. Regardless, the Prussians appeared to ignore
the fact that each corps could encounter a large enemy force before one of
the neighboring corps could provide assistance.
Advancing in several columns along a front twenty-five miles wide
entailed a considerable amount of risk. Considering that the disposition
provided no march objectives or stages for the corps commanders,
Blücher’s headquarters significantly increased the chances that friction could
wreak havoc on the internal cohesion of the army. Driving against an
unshaken opponent and wanting to orchestrate the symmetrical advance of
three corps by regulating their time of departure instead of assigning their
daily march goals “surrendered the tight, uniform management of the
whole.” From a practical viewpoint, the late arrival of the reports from the
corps commanders led to the issuing of the disposition late in the day. This in
turn led to another night march. While Blücher could not prevent it if he
wanted to remain in close contact with the imperials, another night march
did not sit well with the troops or their commanders.45
Blücher’s desire for the imperials to leave Silesia probably fathered the
thought. As the Silesian Army proceeded west on the 18th, the French
demonstrated their intent to defend the Bober. “It appeared that the Bober
was the fixed point for the enemy for the final concentration of their troops
and the end of their retreats,” explained Langeron. On Blücher’s right wing,
Sacken’s vanguard under Vasilchikov crossed the Katzbach at Liegnitz and
continued west toward Haynau. At Steudnitz, the Russians caught the
French rearguard and drove it to Haynau, capturing 6 officers and 200
men. Vasilchikov halted east of Haynau while Sacken’s main body bivou-
acked at Steudnitz after a march of only eleven miles. With Lanskoy’s
cavalry brigade still detached at Polnischlissa, Sacken’s shortage of cavalry
prevented any exploitation of this success.46 Intelligence indicated that the
withdrawing troops – as well as the divisions moving southwest from
Parchwitz, Steinau, and Lüben – belonged to Ney’s III Corps. Although
reports identified several divisions, the Allies calculated the strength of III
Corps to be only 25,000 men and Lauriston’s V Corps to number around
18,000 men.
In Blücher’s center, Jürgaß led Yorck’s vanguard west on the morning of
the 18th to confirm that the enemy had evacuated Goldberg. Katzler joined
his Brandenburg Uhlan Regiment, which served as Jürgaß’s lead unit. On his
own initiative, Katzler proceeded toward Goldberg accompanied only by
his adjutant, the future Chief of the General Staff of the Prussian Army
(1849–1857) Karl Friedrich Wilhelm von Reyher, and one orderly. Reaching
Röchlitz, he found the town clear of the enemy and continued to the
outskirts of Goldberg, where he united with two of his Brandenburg
Uhlan squadrons returning from a patrol. Two horse guns and the six
remaining squadrons of his brigade soon caught up. Katzler then led these
eight squadrons through Goldberg along the highway to Löwenberg. On the
hills between Pilgramsdorf (Pielgrzymka) and Hermsdorf (Jerzmanice-
Zdrój) he found Lauriston’s rearguard: an estimated 2,000–3,000 men
escorting a large herd of cattle. Katzler reported his position to Jürgaß and
requested reinforcements.
West of Pilgramsdorf, the extensive Hainwald (Hain Forest) provided
the French infantry with protection from Katzler’s cavalry. Knowing that
the Prussians would gain the advantage on the open ground west of the
wood, the French resolved to make a stand. After emerging on the opposite
side of the forest, one French battalion supported by cavalry turned to face
the Prussians and buy time for the main body to escape to Lauterseiffen
(Bielanka) with its priceless booty. As the Prussians deployed from the
wood, five French squadrons charged them. Although the French broke
Katzler’s lead squadron, the others managed to repulse the imperials. Katzler
waited in vain for Jürgaß to arrive with the vanguard’s main body. During
this time, French skirmishers utilized the undulating terrain on both sides of
the road to maneuver against the flanks of the Prussian cavalry. Refusing to
needlessly expose his lancers to enemy musketry, Katzler ordered a retreat
east through the Hainwald to Pilgramsdorf after netting three officers and
fifty soldiers as prisoners.
In the Hainwald, the Prussians encountered Langeron’s vanguard cav-
alry, which informed them that Rudzevich had mistakenly led Langeron’s
vanguard to Goldberg, where it had collided with Jürgaß’s main body. Thus,
the time needed to clear the roads accounted for Jürgaß’s inability to support
Katzler. Due to the bottleneck at Goldberg, Jürgaß had led the main body of
Yorck’s vanguard north from Goldberg on the highway to Haynau, patrol-
ling the many roads that intersected this area. He sought to confirm rumors
of the existence of imperial camps along the left bank of the Schnelle
Deichsel (Skora River) at Steinsdorf (Osetnica) and Modelsdorf (Modliko-
wice), three and six miles southwest of Haynau respectively. After nightfall,
Katzler’s uhlans rejoined Jürgaß at Adelsdorf (Zagrodno), some nine miles
south of Haynau on the right bank of the Schnelle Deichsel.
As the headquarters of both the army and I Corps passed the night of 17/
18 August at Jauer, Yorck instantly received the “First Disposition for the
Pursuit of the Enemy” that Blücher had issued at noon. These orders
directed Yorck’s main body west through Goldberg that day. Shortly after
noon, I Corps commenced the fourteen-mile march from Jauer to Goldberg
in two columns. Yorck’s right column (2nd and 1st Brigades) utilized a side
road to troop northwest across the plateau on which it would fight the battle
of the Katzbach eight days later and then crossed the Katzbach at Röchlitz.
Yorck’s left column (8th and 7th Brigades and Reserve Artillery) struck the
main Jauer–Goldberg highway. After ten miles of marching, the brigades
took a dilapidated detour at Prausnitz to continue west to Goldberg while
the Reserve Artillery remained on the highway. At Röchlitz, the artillery
joined the right column and crossed the Katzbach in the evening. This
column bivouacked along the left bank of the Katzbach not long after dusk.
However, the poor state of the detour so delayed the march of the left
column that the troops did not trudge through Goldberg until midnight.
Utterly exhausted, they continued to their bivouac on the hills east of the
town. Again, Yorck raged over the incompetence of Army Headquarters.
As noted, Rudzevich had incorrectly led Langeron’s vanguard due north
to Goldberg, becoming entangled with Yorck’s vanguard. He eventually
continued west toward Löwenberg, stopping for the night between
Pilgramsdorf and Hermsdorf. Ahead of Rudzevich, General Pyotr Grekov
VIII’s Cossack regiment took 180 prisoners and advanced as far as
Lauterseiffen, five miles east of Löwenberg, before returning to Pilgrams-
dorf for the night. Unlike Yorck, Langeron received Blücher’s “First
Disposition for the Pursuit of the Enemy” late on the afternoon of the
18th while leading his main body to the crossroads at Altschönau.47
Further south on Blücher’s extreme left, the Russians suffered their first
setback of the new campaign. Pahlen III’s main body passed the night of
17/18 August at Hirschberg. Thirteen miles north of Hirschberg, Pahlen’s
vanguard under Kaysarov held Lähn on the Bober with posts near Märzdorf
and Schmottseifen. At 3:00 a.m. on the 18th, strong Neapolitan columns
from General Carlo Zucchi’s 2nd Brigade of Macdonald’s 35th Division
marched from Schmottseifen, scattering the Cossack posts in their path.
Seven hours later, additional combined-arms columns debouched from
Schmottseifen, Mois, and Siebeneichen (De˛bowy Gaj) to assail Lähn.
With the 33rd Jäger Regiment and the sole battalion of the Yeletskii
Infantry Regiment, General Adam Bistrom prepared to defend the portion
of Lähn that stood on the left bank of the Bober. Without firing a shot, the
imperials burst into the town to gain a foothold. Bistrom’s soldiers counter-
attacked with the bayonet but could not drive them from Lähn. Hoping to at
least hold their ground, the Jäger sought cover in the houses and various
structures. Halted by withering fire from the concealed Russians, the imper-
ials moved up artillery to lambast the streets with canister. After sustaining
considerable losses, the Russians retreated across the Bober bridge.
Kaysarov directed Bistrom’s men to occupy the houses on the right bank
and those nearest to the bridge. Covered by two companies of the 1st Jäger
Regiment, the Russians quickly moved into these positions. By maintaining
an impressive volume of fire, they prevented some 8,000 imperial soldiers
from crossing the Bober.
Riding north from Hirschberg, Pahlen III reached Lähn around 1:00 p.m.
when Kaysarov appeared to have control of the situation. After ordering
him to hold his ground for as long as possible before retreating to
Hirschberg, Pahlen departed. For another five hours, Kaysarov’s soldiers
defended the bridge over the Bober at Lähn, until he received disturbing
news at 6:00 p.m. that strong imperial forces coming from Greiffenberg had
attacked the Russian post at Berthelsdorf, eleven miles southwest of Lähn
and seven miles west-northwest of Hirschberg. After ejecting the Russians,
the imperials continued their advance toward Hirschberg. To slow their
progress, Pahlen dispatched four battalions from his main body toward
Berthelsdorf. He ordered Kaysarov to evacuate Lähn and withdraw halfway
to Hirschberg. Leaving Cossack posts all along the Bober, the Russians
retreated almost ten miles south to Grunau (Jeżów Sudecki), itself only three
miles north of Hirschberg. The day’s fighting cost Kaysarov 2 officers and
48 soldiers killed, and 6 officers and 192 men wounded. French losses are not
known and they did not cross the Bober to pursue Kaysarov.
Breaching protocol, Kaysarov reported directly to Langeron over the
“lengthy, intense, and bloody engagement at Lähn, of the march of enemy
troops from Greiffenberg through Berthelsdorf toward Hirschberg, and of
the necessity of his retreat to Hirschberg.” Based on a report from Steffens,
Pahlen informed Langeron that Macdonald’s 30,000 men and 100 guns
stood between their respective corps. In addition, Steffens reported to
Pahlen that an imperial corps of 60,000 men and one cavalry corps of
16,000 sabers stood between Bunzlau and Liegnitz. Additional French
forces had left Görlitz and were marching east toward Bunzlau while
Polish and Saxon troops from Upper Lusatia moved east to replace them.
In particular, Steffens’s report of a division of some 8,000 men and 20 guns
reaching Kemnitz – some seven miles west of Hirschberg – increased
Pahlen’s fear of being enveloped on the left. He intended to hold
Hirschberg for as long as possible but believed the French would force
him to retreat within twenty-four hours. In this case, he planned to lead his
troops ten miles southeast from Hirschberg to Schmiedeberg. As we will
see, these three reports threw Langeron into a panic, which in turn caused
fits at Army Headquarters.48
After reaching Altschönau, fourteen miles northeast of Pahlen’s position
at Hirschberg, Langeron received Kaysarov’s report of the check at Lähn
around 8:00 p.m. Believing Macdonald’s demonstration marked the start of a
general French offensive, Langeron ordered an immediate halt rather than
continue the march in accordance with Blücher’s “First Disposition.” The
news that imperial forces had advanced from Löwenberg to Lähn and from
Greiffenberg to Berthelsdorf particularly alarmed Langeron. At Goldberg
around 10:00 that night, Blücher received Langeron’s report, which included
Kaysarov’s communiqué. In his cover letter, Langeron questioned the
wisdom of continuing the advance on the 19th according to the “First
Disposition.” Blücher responded by explaining that the enemy had appar-
ently made the decision to withdraw his center and left from the Katzbach.
Thus, “we should be inclined to doubt a systematic, coinciding movement”
by his right. “Meanwhile,” continued Blücher, “it is completely possible that
the enemy is seeking to halt the advance of our right wing” through a
demonstration by his own right. Blücher believed that his push against Ney’s
left and center would cause Macdonald to abandon the upper Bober. For 19
August, he instructed Langeron to continue the march to Löwenberg
according to the “First Disposition,” observe the imperial post at Lähn,
and report to him every four hours over the situation on the army’s left
wing. Moreover, Pahlen should continue his march northwest to Marklissa
on the Queis. Should he be attacked by superior forces, Blücher wanted him
to slowly retreat to the entrenched camp at Landeshut, some twenty miles
southeast of Hirschberg. Army Headquarters would reach Löwenberg
around 5:00 on the afternoon of the 19th.49
Before this response reached Langeron, the corps commander received
the reports from Pahlen and Steffens. Anxiety over the proximity of
Macdonald’s corps prompted Langeron to have his Prussian liaison officer,
Lieutenant-Colonel Ende, inform Gneisenau that the Russian corps would
march to Löwenberg only on Blücher’s express command. He requested

instructions on how to proceed, thus implying that he did not intend to
march to Löwenberg. Moreover, Langeron communicated the news that he
had ordered Pahlen to remain at Hirschberg. However, if that position
became untenable, Langeron instructed him to retreat to Schmiedeberg.
Although this news threw Gneisenau into a rage and prompted an order
for Yorck to halt, Blücher penned a patient response to Langeron at 7:30 a.m.
on the 19th:
From the letter you ordered Ende to write to Gneisenau, I see you are
concerned about Pahlen and view the march based on the “Disposition” to
be dangerous. I can only believe that the enemy is making a movement with
the right wing in order to stop the march of the Silesian Army’s right wing
because it has been reported to me that the enemy has evacuated Haynau. All
news indicates that he has withdrawn his left wing to Bunzlau. Yesterday, a
captured French officer interrogated here stated that he did not know how
the French army would return, because the infantry is so exhausted that it
cannot continue. He as well as many officers had been ordered to round up
marauders, which is how he was captured.
If the news that the enemy is marching in force from Löwenberg to
Lähn is confirmed, caution demands that this movement be reconnoitered.
I have thus halted the march of Yorck’s corps until I receive more detailed
news over this and I request that you likewise halt your march . . . at
Schönau. Your vanguard should then proceed toward the Bober to deter-
mine if the enemy still stands in force at Lähn or has withdrawn. Further-
more, it must discover if the troops are actually marching this night from
Löwenberg to Lähn.
If the enemy has withdrawn, I request that you continue the march
according to the Disposition and that you quickly inform me so that I can
direct Yorck’s corps to Löwenberg. The loss of time means that the corps
cannot cross the Bober today, but must remain on the right bank. I request that
you instruct Pahlen according to the contents of my letter from last evening; in
particular he should retreat to Landeshut if he is forced.50
As for Yorck, after receiving little rest his main body trooped west from
Goldberg at 5:00 a.m. on the 19th to cover the sixteen miles to Löwenberg.
Reaching the Schnelle Deichsel three hours later, he received Blücher’s order
to halt his two columns at Ulbersdorf (Wojcieszyn) and Pilgramsdorf
respectively, and await further instructions. As noted, Langeron’s panic over
Kaysarov’s repulse at Lähn accounted for this pause. Although Army Head-
quarters firmly believed that Macdonald’s push solely aimed to facilitate
Ney’s withdrawal, Blücher acknowledged Langeron’s concerns by halting
Yorck. This affected Blücher’s timetable, which called for the entire army to
reach the Bober on the 19th. Nevertheless, Blücher prudently chose to
conduct another general reconnaissance. To his credit, Langeron ultimately
complied with orders and continued his march to Löwenberg before Blü-
cher’s response arrived. Rudzevich led the vanguard west from Pilgramsdorf
to Petersdorf (Pieszków). A few miles south of Rudzevich, Langeron’s main
body marched west through Probsthain toward Löwenberg at 4:00 a.m. on
19 August. Less than five miles southeast of Löwenberg, Langeron’s forward
cavalry found the bridge over the Bober at Zobten (Sobota) destroyed.
Grekov’s Cossacks located a ford south of Zobten, crossed, and took post
on the hills along the left bank. Rudzevich’s cavalry followed; the infantry
escorted the artillery across the waist-deep water. Rudzevich continued to
Siebeneichen preceded by the 12th and 22nd Jäger Regiments. Southwest of
Siebeneichen, Grekov led his Cossacks toward Schmottseiffen. Around
10:00 a.m., the Russian Jäger made contact with the imperials at
Siebeneichen (see Map 2).51
Having come between Macdonald’s XI Corps marching down the Bober
from Lähn toward Löwenberg and Lauriston’s V Corps at Löwenberg, the
Russians had a fight on their hands. Despite determined resistance by French
skirmishers, the 12th and 22nd Jäger drove Macdonald’s troops from the
hedgerows before Siebeneichen. Rudzevich moved up the remainder of the
vanguard and attacked the village, which the French defended courageously.
Three times the Russians took Siebeneichen and three times the imperials
drove them out. “After a long and bloody combat,” recalled Langeron,
“Rudzevich finally took it with the bayonet and held fast.” With two
dragoon regiments and Prince Nikolay Shcherbatov’s 2nd Ukrainskii Cos-
sack Regiment, General Yegor Emmanuel intercepted the remains of the
French force after riding around Siebeneichen undetected and taking a
position at Mois. While his dragoons cut down 1 battalion and took 200
prisoners, Shcherbatov’s Cossacks amused themselves by intercepting Mac-
donald’s baggage, taking 260 prisoners, the marshal’s valuables, and numer-
ous supply, hospital, equipment, and baggage wagons as well as the war
chest with an estimated 10,000 gold coins. The Russian horsemen also
helped themselves to Napoleon’s correspondence and the cipher of the
French army but neither ever reached Blücher’s headquarters.52
Rudzevich’s men had barely had time to regroup when reports arrived of
a French column approaching from the south: the Italians who had attacked
Kaysarov at Lähn the previous day. Rudzevich sent Grekov’s Cossacks to
contain the Italians for as long as possible. At the same time, he learned of
the proximity of another French division coming southeast on the road from
Mois while a second moved south from Löwenberg along the Bober.
Rudzevich held his ground, hoping Langeron’s main body would arrive in
time to support him. Led by the commander of Lauriston’s 19th Division,
General Donatien-Marie de Rochambeau, the son of Marshal Jean-Baptiste
Donatien Rochambeau of the American Revolutionary War, the imperials
attacked the Russians at Siebeneichen.
Meanwhile, Langeron’s main body experienced delays. “The horrible,

narrow passes of Schönau had retarded the march of my column, which was
25,000 men strong,” recalled Langeron. “These passes were so narrow that
they could only be passed in single file; at 11:00 [a.m.], the head of my column
reached Zobten, where the rear did not arrive until late in the night. By the
time I reached Zobten, Rudzevich was attacked by a superior force and hit
hard; I immediately ordered General [Aleksandr] Talyzin II to advance with
the Moskovskii and Libavskii Regiments, which were at the head of the
column . . . My vanguard found itself in the greatest danger of being driven
into the Bober and losing all its artillery; there was not a moment to lose and,
although at that immediate moment I could not dispose of many men, I had
to sacrifice as many as I could to save Rudzevich.”
After fording the Bober, Talyzin’s two regiments managed to reach
Siebeneichen and link with Rudzevich’s troops. Yet the French division
coming from Löwenberg arrived soon after and sent one column through
the wooded Bober valley. Approaching unseen, the imperials launched a
surprise attack that drove the Russian infantry from Siebeneichen and south
along the Bober. According to Langeron, “Talyzin II was pushed back to the
meadows that were situated between the Bober and the village; his two
regiments were overthrown in an instant, they dispersed and fled, the village
was lost, and the enemy energetically pursued our troops. I was witness to
this disaster that worsened the situation of my vanguard.”
While Langeron attempted to re-form Talyzin’s two regiments for another
attack on Siebeneichen, General Ivan Witte charged the enemy skirmishers
with the 1st and 3rd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiments. Although the terrain did
not favor cavalry, Witte reached the hedgerows around Siebeneichen and held
the imperials in check for quite a while. Nevertheless, the French managed to
direct a considerable volume of fire at Langeron and his entourage. “Several of
my orderlies were wounded, and I lost the horse that I was riding, which
received two musket [ball] wounds.” Meanwhile, to avoid surrendering or
being totally destroyed, Rudzevich ordered a retreat. Before encountering the
column coming from Lähn, the Russians escaped three miles due south of
Siebeneichen to the Frauenberg hills. Yet Langeron had no idea if Rudzevich
would find an open ford to flee across the Bober. Witte’s charge, which actually
allowed Rudzevich to escape, gained enough time for General Pavel
Turchaninov’s 22nd Division of General Pyotr Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps
to arrive. To create a strong diversion, Langeron, Kaptsevich, and Turchaninov
led the 22nd in another assault on Siebeneichen. While the four battalions of
the 29th Jäger and Vyatskii Regiments attacked the village, the Starooskolskii,
Olonetskii, and 45th Jäger Regiments (five battalions total) turned the village
to the north. Siebeneichen fell to the Russians. The turning movement and “the
sight of the rest of our troops, who arrived successively and formed into a
second and third line, forced the enemy to fall back,” explained Langeron.
Led by a peasant, Rudzevich marched less than two miles east from the
Frauenberg hills to ford the Bober at Dippelsdorf (Przeździedza) around
10:00 that night. General Jacques-Pierre Puthod’s 17th Division of V Corps
pursued. The Bober’s steep banks made the crossing of Rudzevich’s artillery
slow and difficult. Fortunately for the Russians, the French did not harass
them. “For a long time I was very uneasy,” continued Langeron, “and was
calm only when Rudzevich informed me that all of his forces were on the
right bank: it would have been a sad beginning of a campaign to lose thirty-
six cannon.”53 Incidentally, Blücher had sent Nostitz, who owned an estate
at nearby Zobten, to locate Langeron’s corps. He found the Russians just in
time to join Talyzin’s charge across the Bober but remained with Rudzevich
after the Russians broke. “Another enemy column emerged from Lähn,”
noted Nostitz. “In this situation, no other means of escape remained than to
ascend the high, steep valley edge of the Frauenberg and to cross the river
near Märzdorf by way of another ford. The order to do this was given and
executed in such a manner that all of the troops, but especially the artillery,
earned great honor. When we saw the spot where this crossing would be
conducted, we could not comprehend how it would be possible to move the
cannon across the almost vertical rock-face.” After Rudzevich crossed the
Bober, Nostitz went in search of Langeron’s headquarters and learned that
the Russian corps commander would pass the night at Zobten. He reached
his hometown at the same time as Langeron and accompanied him to the
local Schloß. Nostitz continues: “Only when General Langeron . . . entered
the completely devastated house did I tell him that I was the owner of the
estate. Up to then I had intentionally kept it secret so that the general would
not be influenced to take any consideration for the . . . maintenance of the
village.”54
Although taking Siebeneichen, Langeron recalled 22nd Division to the
right bank of the Bober after learning that Rudzevich had made good his
escape. “As soon as I knew that the vanguard had recrossed the river,”
commented Langeron, “I withdrew my men from the village but retained
the hedgerows and remained master of the left bank of the Bober. In this
bloody combat that lasted nearly ten hours, all of the troops fought with the
utmost valor and most perfect order.”55 Russian losses during the engage-
ment at Siebeneichen amounted to 68 officers and 1,573 men. Langeron
claimed that the imperials had sustained 800 dead as well as the loss of 600
prisoners, including several staff officers.56 Rudzevich extracted himself
from a dangerous situation but the risk he took did not please Langeron.
His thoughts on the engagement as well as his view of his former country-
men are worth hearing:
The excellent dispositions of this brave general, his intrepidness, and that of
his troops thwarted for a long time every effort of the enemy; his conduct
was perfect in this moment that was so critical for him; one must salute the
vanguard for its sang-froid and its wonderfully combined operations, but he
made the great fault of exceeding my orders and very imprudently attacked
the greater part of the enemy’s army; he delayed for too long the moment of
retreat and tried to do so at the moment when he no longer could; it was the
first time that he was the independent commander of a detachment, and this
lesson was very useful, but I was obligated to sacrifice myself for him, and
lost many men to save him. General Rudzevich committed a great fault in
exposing himself too rashly, but the mistake that the French committed by
allowing him to cross the Bober, in the dark, is unpardonable, and it proved
that their generals truly had little knowledge of this theater of war, although
they had been cantoned there for two or three months, and that their outpost
troops were far from valuing the importance of our Cossacks. Moreover, the
experience proved to me that the French never undertake anything during the
night; the close of the day for them is always the end of battle, in whatever
position night may find them.57
Langeron’s engagement at Siebeneichen impacted Pahlen, who loitered

around Hirschberg on the 19th in fear of the French troops at Berthelsdorf
and Lähn. Langeron’s advance prevented the imperials from continuing the
offensive against Pahlen’s corps. In fact, the Russian presence at Siebenei-
chen forced the French to abandon Lähn but Pahlen did little to exploit this
development.
Sacken’s task for the 19th included advancing from Steudnitz through
Haynau to Bunzlau, where he would cross the Bober. His van met little
resistance at Haynau, from where Sacken reported at around 10:00 a.m. that
“the enemy retreats on Bunzlau . . . Ney passed through here yesterday
morning and Sébastiani passed the night here. Marmont’s corps stood at
Bunzlau the day before yesterday. We do not know if it marched off.”
Concluding, he added that a report had just arrived stating that the forty
squadrons of Sébastiani’s cavalry had taken the road to Löwenberg. Mean-
while, Vasilchikov found Marmont’s VI Corps six miles further west
between Kreibau (Krzywa) and Wolfshain (Wilczy Las).
After Sacken’s main body started to arrive, Vasilchikov resumed the
advance around 2:00 p.m., meeting stubborn resistance at Kaiserswaldau
(Okmiany). “The vanguard,” states the Journal of Operations of Sacken’s
corps, compiled by the quartermaster-general, Colonel Giuseppe Venançon,
“which had passed Haynau, was stopped by enemy positions, of which the
right was set on a height covered with woods, the left on a forest, and the
center on a hillock full of artillery.” Sacken ordered Neverovsky’s 27th
Division to move south “into the mountains without cannon or caissons”
and threaten Marmont’s right flank “by filling the woods to the enemy’s left
with Jäger” while the 8th and 39th Jäger Regiments (four battalions total)
from the 3rd Brigade of 10th Division enveloped the marshal’s left flank.
Vasilchikov’s cavalry along with General Aleksey Voyeikov’s 49th and 50th
Jäger Regiments (three battalions total) supported by artillery executed a
frontal assault on the French center at Kaiserswaldau. Facilitated by the
salvos of the 8th Horse Guns that demolished a French battery, the Russian
infantry pushed forward, forcing the marshal to withdraw toward Thomas-
waldau. “The maneuver succeeded perfectly,” wrote Venançon. “Despite the
terrain obstacles, Neverovskii ascended the heights, took the enemy in the
flank, and repulsed him; then the center acted vigorously, and the Jäger of
our right moved forward. A maneuver in peacetime, where distance and time
are calculated, could not have been better executed; the enemy’s center was
forced to cede ground, and as soon as our cavalry was able to deploy in the
plain it charged and . . . forced them to retreat.” Vasilchikov pursued until
night put an end to the incessant skirmishing. Sacken’s corps bivouacked east
of Thomaswaldau, the imperials west of the village.58
In the center, Blücher’s orders for Jürgaß to lead Yorck’s vanguard
cavalry and Reserve Cavalry west from Adelsdorf at 2:00 a.m. on the
19th, followed by Lobenthal’s infantry, did not reach the colonel until
3:00 a.m., although Army Headquarters had issued them six hours earlier.
Within thirty minutes, the diligent Jürgaß placed his lead squadrons on the
road with Katzler at their head. Yorck’s columns marched three hours later
but, as noted, Blücher ordered them to halt around 8:00 as a result of
Langeron’s report. Should the movement of the French right be more than
a demonstration, Blücher did not want the gap between his center and left to
increase. By keeping Yorck’s main body at the Schnelle Deichsel just west of
Goldberg, the Prussians would be eleven miles from Langeron’s assumed
position at Altschönau. In addition, the presence of imperial troops at
Modelsdorf and Steinsdorf made the presence of strong enemy forces on
the Haynau–Bunzlau highway extremely likely.
Reports soon clarified the situation on Blücher’s left. Around 10:00
a.m., Rudzevich’s adjutant reached Army Headquarters at Goldberg with
news of the engagement at Siebeneichen and a claim that the imperials had
retreated from Lähn toward Greiffenberg. At the same time, a dispatch
arrived from Langeron penned at 8:00 a.m. from Probsthain, halfway
between Altschönau and Löwenberg, informing Blücher that his corps
had been marching since 4:00 a.m. Finally, Nostitz returned around noon,
informing Blücher that Langeron had indeed reached the Bober instead of
halting at Altschönau. Based on this news as well as the report from Sacken
stating that his opponent had retreated west from Haynau, Blücher released
Yorck’s main body to continue its march to Löwenberg. Although Lan-
geron received instructions to remain at Probsthain, his advance to Zobten
had already rendered these instructions obsolete. Blücher himself rode to
join Yorck’s left column and Reserve Artillery, which he found in the
process of crossing the Schnelle Deichsel at Pilgramsdorf. Likewise
crossing, he and his staff continued west to reach Yorck’s vanguard just as it
launched an attack.59
Between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., Katzler located Lauriston’s rearguard a
few miles east of Löwenberg just as Macdonald’s troops engaged
Rudzevich’s Russians at Siebeneichen, four miles south of Löwenberg.
French forces stretched from Plagwitz (Płakowice) across the Hirseberg
ridge to Ludwigsdorf (Chmielno). Finding the latter occupied, Katzler
requested the support of one of Lobenthal’s battalions. After deploying its
skirmishers to distract the French in the village, the battalion closely
followed the cavalry from Deutmannsdorf (Zbylutów) to a point just north
of Ludwigsdorf. From there they could see the extent of the French force
between Plagwitz and Ludwigsdorf; in cavalry the imperials appeared to
have sixteen squadrons. Neither Jürgaß nor Lobenthal knew how far Yorck’s
columns had progressed, and they had both been instructed to avoid combat
with superior forces. At this time, reports arrived of enemy columns moving
southwest from Haynau toward the Gröditzberg (Grodziska), a domineer-
ing height northwest of the village of Gröditz (Grodziec), which stood to
the northeast and thus behind Yorck’s vanguard. The Prussians did not know
it, but the troops belonged to Ney’s III Corps and Sébastiani’s II Cavalry
Corps. All reports indicated that Ney had led the two corps due west from
Haynau to Bunzlau. All of Yorck’s patrols as well as Sacken’s had missed the
French turn at Haynau onto the road that ran southwest past the Gröditz-
berg to Löwenberg.60
Based on this news, Jürgaß instructed Lobenthal to post his infantry in
the wood south of Deutmannsdorf facing the Hirseberg while the cavalry
moved onto the hills north of Deutmannsdorf and dispatched patrols to
reconnoiter northeast toward the Gröditzberg. Lobenthal deployed a line of
skirmishers facing the Hirseberg; the imperials countered by moving up
superior numbers of infantry. A firefight ensued during which French
cavalry arrived but did not attack. After several hours of skirmishing, the
imperials began an orderly withdrawal. Although the French force moving
southwest toward the Gröditzberg could come between him and Yorck’s
main body, Lobenthal made the bold decision to attack. “Those chaps can go
to the devil – they must learn to fear us,” he purportedly exclaimed to a staff
officer. “This is odd: I believe the chaps are more surprised by us than we are
by them; nevertheless, I will not allow myself to be disturbed from giving a
sound drubbing to whoever is before us.”61
Leaving a small detachment to guard his rear, Lobenthal advanced. The
sudden Prussian assault startled the French, who withdrew all the way to
Braunau (Brunów) on the Bober, two miles north of Löwenberg. From
Deutmannsdorf, Katzler supported the infantry with the Brandenburg
Uhlan Regiment and two horse guns by threatening the enemy’s left. After
the French broke, his lancers caused havoc at the Braunau bridge while his
horse artillery peppered the fleeing imperials. Arriving during this action,
the fiery Blücher subjected himself and his staff to heavy artillery fire. In the
fog of battle, they found themselves in the midst of a cavalry unit returning
to French lines. To take in his rearguard, Lauriston moved one division to the
left bank of the Bober. In addition to this superior firepower, the French
broke the bridges behind them at Braunau and one and one-half miles
further north at Sirgwitz (Żerkowice). Toward evening, the main body of
Jürgaß’s vanguard moved into a bivouac on the Hirseberg under the protec-
tion of forward posts on the hills further west along the right bank of the
Bober. Blücher established his headquarters at Lauterseiffen. “At this
moment, I stoutly cut down the French,” he boasted to his wife. “They lost
2,000 men and 6 guns including 300 caissons and many prisoners as well.
I am healthy and write this amidst the living and the dying.”62
East of this action, Prince Karl led Yorck’s right column across the
Schnelle Deichsel at Ulbersdorf, three miles north of Pilgramsdorf. While
marching west, the prince received news of an enemy force with a large body
of cavalry hardly one mile from his column. Another patrol reported the
presence of more cavalry to the northeast at Großhartmannsdorf. Karl
immediately halted the march and deployed his troops at Neudorf-am-
Gröditzberg. The 2nd Leib Hussar Regiment drove back the foremost
French squadrons to allow the infantry to take a position. Aside from
unlimbering horse artillery at the foot of the Gröditzberg and occupying
Gröditz on the height’s southern slope, the French did little.
Yorck arrived and inspected the situation. He learned that his patrols
could not ascertain the size of the enemy forces standing on the northern
side of the Gröditzberg. Every patrol had thus far failed to get past the
French cavalry screen on the open plain east of the height. To support Karl
and protect the rear of the army, Yorck directed his 7th Brigade and Reserve
Artillery to Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg while 8th Brigade continued west
with the task of occupying Lauterseiffen to secure communication with
the vanguard at Deutmannsdorf. Yorck himself rode west to Lauterseiffen
and informed Blücher of the situation, insisting that the large French cavalry
force had slowed his march because his Reserve Cavalry now served with
the vanguard. Blücher authorized him to recall the East Prussian National
Cavalry Regiment from Katzler’s brigade of the Reserve Cavalry. Yorck
ordered the regiment to Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg, where he established
his command post. Yorck also concentrated his troops, moving up Horn’s
7th Brigade to form his left wing. Around 7:00 p.m., the East Prussian
National Cavalry Regiment arrived, providing enough sabers to attack.
Yorck decided to begin with a cavalry charge by the East Prussians and
Black Hussars. Encouraging the former, who would experience combat for
the first time, Jürgaß explained that they could expect to receive a carbine
volley at their approach. Nostitz recalled that Jürgaß exhorted his men:
“Do not allow yourselves to be startled by this, but instead strike them right
in the mug with your saber.” The cavalry gradually gained steam as it
approached the Gröditzberg. Not only did the Prussian troopers receive a
carbine volley but grenades rained down on them as well. Before contact
could be made, the French withdrew; even at a quick trot, the Prussians
could not catch them.
As Yorck prepared his infantry to advance, Major Ludwig von Oppen
from Blücher’s staff reached Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg with a report on the
size of the enemy force on the other side of the Gröditzberg. He and Nostitz
had reconnoitered to the northern side of the height. “I, who best knew the
region,” noted Nostitz in his journal, “offered . . . to reach the point from
where I could see the other side of the Berg. Major Oppen of the General
Staff accompanied me. The reconnaissance succeeded completely; I reached
the point on the high ground that offered an open view as far as the Bober
and saw two enemy divisions in bivouac. But enemy cavalry detected us and
charged from all sides yet we rode good horses, which quickly brought us to
safety. Nevertheless, Oppen lost his beautiful English field-glass during this
chase.” The presence of these two divisions at Großhartmannsdorf, less than
four miles north of Yorck’s right wing, appeared to confirm the statements
of a prisoner who claimed that Ney’s corps of 20,000 men as well as
Sébastiani’s cavalry corps had moved southwest from Haynau rather than
west. Under these circumstances, Yorck did not venture an attack without
support from Langeron and Sacken.63
However, Ney’s subsequent inactivity indicated that he intended to
depart shortly. Carefully observing his opponent’s every move, Yorck read-
ied his cavalry and artillery to pursue as soon as the imperials withdrew.
In the growing darkness, three hussar regiments and one horse battery
advanced. Spotting an enemy battery near the village of Gröditz, the Prus-
sians opened fire but received none in return. A patrol discovered that they
had shelled some wagons with tree trunks lying across them. Moreover,
under the cover of heavy smoke from campfires that they had left blazing,
the imperials had retreated northwest toward Bunzlau. Yorck’s cavalry
attempted to pursue but did not fare well in the choppy terrain that sur-
rounded the Gröditzberg. Four battalions sent from Neudorf-am-
Gröditzberg likewise failed to catch the enemy. Yorck’s corps bivouacked
at Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg, Wilhelmsdorf (Se˛dzimirów), and Lauterseiffen
facing Bunzlau to the northwest while the vanguard remained on the
Hirseberg facing Löwenberg to the west. Nightfall on the 19th found Ney
and Marmont in retreat; Lauriston’s rearguard remained on the west bank of
the Bober.
As for Ney, he learned that on the 18th his rearguard had engaged
Sacken’s advancing troops at Steudnitz. Simultaneously, V Corps evacuated
the Katzbach, withdrawing from Goldberg to Löwenberg while Macdonald
6 Marshal Michel Ney, 1769–1815
assembled XI Corps on the upper Bober. Macdonald’s strike toward Lähn

on the 18th that led to the engagement with the Russians provided clarity on
the intentions and strength of the Allied army. To Ney, Blücher’s main body
appeared to be advancing west through Jauer. Based on this assumption, he
wanted to concentrate the army more on his center. For this reason, he
decided on 19 August to leave the east–west highway at Haynau and march
southwest toward Löwenberg rather than continue west to Bunzlau. Reach-
ing the region of the Gröditzberg that day, the marshal found the road to
Löwenberg blocked by Yorck’s vanguard. Due to the uncertainty of his
situation, with the enemy before him, and artillery fire from Sacken’s
engagement with Marmont at Kreibau behind him, the marshal hesitated
to force open the road to Löwenberg. Thus, he did not advance beyond the
southern edge of the Gröditzberg, missing a terrific opportunity to catch
Yorck’s marching columns. Conversely, by not immediately attacking, he
allowed Blücher to prepare a powerful strike against him. Moreover, while
Ney marched southwest toward Löwenberg on the 19th and Marmont
moved VI Corps east, the latter encountered Sacken – who had continued
his march through Haynau – east of the Bober. In his isolated position,
Marmont did not attempt to stop the Russians despite his numerical super-
iority. Thanks to a night march on 19/20 August, Ney escaped the dangerous
position he had created by isolating himself on the Gröditzberg.
To Blücher’s staff, the movements of the French army appeared baffling:

its center seemed to be withdrawing west on Löwenberg while the wings
seemed to be advancing east on Lähn and Haynau respectively. Thus, Army
Headquarters faced the difficult task of trying to plan an operation to
counter these puzzling movements. Despite Gneisenau’s attempts to con-
centrate the army, the distance between the various corps had increased, thus
preventing mutual support on the 19th. Blücher’s front extended thirty-
seven miles from Hirschberg to Thomaswaldau. Occupied at Siebeneichen,
Langeron would not have been able to reach the Prussians had Ney’s 50,000
troops attacked Yorck’s 36,000. Had Marmont held Haynau against Sacken
and Ney assailed Yorck, Blücher would have had his hands full. Instead,
Marmont withdrew before Sacken’s weaker forces while Ney halted before a
handful of squadrons. Admittedly, the intelligence Ney received from his
cavalry and corps commanders provided no indication of the opportunity
to crush Yorck. Thus, Ney did not make Blücher and Gneisenau pay for
their underestimation of his forces or their careless overextension. Instead,
his retreat indicated that he had overestimated the size of Blücher’s army
(see Map 3).
Both sides were guilty of faulty intelligence work and security measures.
Lobenthal committed a grave error that would have led to the destruction of
Yorck’s corps if Ney had been aware of the golden opportunity. Before
departing from Adelsdorf, Lobenthal failed to act on the news of an imperial
column at Haynau. Moreover, he neglected to forward the reports over this
column’s march toward the Gröditzberg – thus in his flank and rear – to
Yorck’s main body. Consequently, Yorck did not receive this news until
Prince Karl’s flank patrol stumbled into the column. Sacken likewise failed
to detect Ney’s presence on the Gröditzberg in a timely manner. Little did
Blücher know how vulnerable he was to a disaster such as the thrashing his
army would receive at the hands of Napoleon the following February.
Fortunately for Blücher, he was facing Ney rather than the master. The
Silesian Army received a pass on this collection of blunders but the time
for mistakes was running out.64
Notes
1 Lobenthal’s command consisted of six battalions, eight squadrons, and one battery
each of foot and horse. For this duty, Yorck assigned him the Fusilier Battalions of
the 1st and 2nd East Prussian, Leib, and Brandenburg Infantry Regiments as well
as two Landwehr battalions; one squadron each from the 2nd Leib and
Mecklenburg Hussar Regiments, the four squadrons of the Brandenburg Uhlan
Regiment, and two squadrons of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiment.
2 Rudzevich commanded the eight battalions of the 15th Infantry Division, the
Kievskii Dragoon Regiment and two squadrons of Liflyandskii Jäger for a total
of seven squadrons, seven Cossack Regiments, the Nr. 15 Heavy Battery and
Nr. 29 Light Battery, and one Cossack battery: 7,800 men altogether.
3 Blücher to Bernadotte, Würben, 15 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25, and Add
MSS, 20112, 39; Droysen, Yorck, II:118; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
I:239–40. Yorck’s complete march route is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:41.
4 According to Jomini, at the time that Tsar Alexander made overtures to him, the
armistice had expired and “hostilities would resume on 16 August. Two or three
days later, Marshal Ney received many unsolicited promotions for his army; there
were no fewer than 500 to 600; my name and that of Captain [Jean-Baptiste
Frédéric] Koch, my aide-de-camp, were the only ones absent. Naturally, this new
mystification was well suited to double my grievances and make my resolution
[to defect] more excusable. However, I must confess that my resolution became
irrevocable the day these judgments and this humiliating agenda beat me so
cruelly. The reason is very simple; because, as it would have been absurd to
impose on a government the obligation to give me the promotion, as deserved
as it might have been, I did not think I deserved to suffer an offense serious
enough to impair my self-esteem”: Jomini, Lettre du général Jomini à
M. Capefigue, 11. See also Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 158.
6 French writers such as Norvins blame Jomini for Blücher’s offensive against
Ney: “No doubt instructed on the position of the extremely dispersed troops
of Marshal Ney by the reports of General Jomini, a Swiss national and chief
of staff of III Corps who had defected to the enemy only a few days before,
Marshal Blücher prepared to surprise and attack the positions that the French
held along the Katzbach.” See Norvins, Portefeuille de mil huit cent treize,
II:293–94.
7 Blücher to Bernadotte, Würben, 15 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25, and Add
MSS, 20112, 38–39. Bernadotte’s response is found in SHAT, C17 132: Charles
John to Blücher, Charlottenburg, 19 August 1813, and Add MSS, 20112, 41–42.
8 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 11–12; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, 141; Nostitz,
Tagebuch, 53; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:38–39. Blücher was never rebuked
by his king or by Allied High Command, which in general believed that the
French had violated the neutral zone first, prompting Blücher’s reaction.
9 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 11, emphasis added; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:42;
Langeron, Mémoires, 224.
10 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:42; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und
Armeeführung, 13.
11 These reports are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:42.
12 Langeron to Barclay, Report on Langeron’s operations from 7 August to 2
Nr. 18; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:43; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und
Armeeführung, 14; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:240–41.
13 Disposition for 16 August 1813, Jauer, 15 August 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 118;
Gneisenau to Blücher, Jauer, 15 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:43;
Gneisenau to Caroline, Jauer, 16 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gnei-
senau, Nr. 21.
14 Blücher to Hardenberg, Striegau, 16 August 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 173.
15 These reports are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:44.
16 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:45; Droysen, Yorck, II:119.
17 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 44; Maude, Leipzig Cam-
paign, 176. Lieven, in Russia Against Napoleon, 376, excuses these early mistakes
by Blücher and Gneisenau, stating that they needed time “to get into their stride:
the Army of Silesia had after all only come together on the very eve of the
campaign.”
Nr. 18. Pahlen III also conducted a night march on 16/17 August to reach
Hirschberg but this had no relation to the snafu at Army Headquarters.
19 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:45.
20 This letter, signed by Gneisenau, informed Sacken that Yorck’s corps had reached
Jauer and his vanguard stood further west, pushing posts toward Liegnitz. More
often than not, Silesian Army Headquarters failed to inform the corps command-
ers of the status of neighboring corps. Gneisenau makes no mention of Langeron
in this letter. Such omissions contrast glaringly with Napoleon’s superior practice
of keeping his subordinates informed.
21 Gneisenau to Sacken, Jauer, 7:00 a.m., 17 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1843:46.
22 Gneisenau’s column consisted of the 3rd Uhlan Regiment, two squadrons of the
2nd Leib Hussars, two horse guns, and the Fusilier Battalion of the 1st East
Prussian Infantry Regiment.
23 The account of the operations on 16 and 17 August is based on Blücher to
Bernadotte, Jauer, 18 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Müffling, Die Feldzüge,
12–13; Langeron, Mémoires, 225; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:44–49; Freytag-
Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 16–18, 44; Friederich, Herbstfeld-
zug 1813, I:241–43.
24 SHAT, C2 154: Macdonald to Berthier, 17 August 1813. Pelet, in Des principales
opérations de la campagne de 1813, 175, castigates the entire Coalition: “Forty-
eight hours before the moment when hostilities were to commence, Blücher,
Schwarzenberg, and Bernadotte were all in movement. The first [Blücher] sur-
prised our troops who were quietly resting in their cantonments.” Norvins, in
Portefeuille de mil huit cent treize, II:293, thus describes the situation: “On the
14th, Blücher, known since his retreat from Jena to Lübeck to be unscrupulous in
honoring his oaths, sent his troops marching into the neutral territory. Marshal
Ney was waiting religiously until the last day for the armistice to end.” Jomini, in
Lettre du général Jomini à M. Capefigue, 10–12, also absolves his patron, Ney, of
any wrongdoing: “After having rejected my proposal, I thought Marshal Ney
might be compromised if Blücher, wiser than him and a great lover of surprises,
advanced on the 15th close to the camps to attack at daybreak on the 16th. On my
own responsibility, I ordered General [Frédéric-Auguste] Beurmann’s light cav-
alry to march hastily from Lüben to Liegnitz, cross through this town, and place
itself on the right bank of the Katzbach to protect headquarters, the parks, and the
camps against any surprise. At the same time, I ordered all the artillery train
companies to march day and night to assemble at Liegnitz as soon as possible. All
of the marshal’s staff can attest to his astonishment in the middle of the night over
the fanfare of his own cavalry passing through Liegnitz without his knowledge.”
At the same time, Jomini indicts Macdonald: “Macdonald, who commanded on
our right, thought like me, and pushed reconnaissance in this area. Blücher did
much more; he brought 100,000 men.” In Campagne de 1813, 83–84, Command-
ant Weil of the French General Staff ignores the entire issue of which side violated
the neutral zone first and simply states that Blücher ordered reconnaissance to be
conducted early on the 14th. Anon., Précis militaire de la campagne de 1813 en
Allemagne, 89, makes absolutely no mention of the controversy, stating only that
Blücher’s troops advanced to Jauer and Bolkenhain on 16 August.
25 Norvins, Portefeuille de mil huit cent treize, II:294. This criticism is harsh con-
sidering that Napoleon did not appoint Ney to command the forces in Silesia until
15 August.
26 CN, No. 20380, XXVI:61–62; SHAT, C17 178: Berthier to Ney, 15 August 1813;
Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 175–76; Pelet, Des principales opérations de la cam-
pagne de 1813, 175.
27 CN, No. 20373, XXVI:45–47; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, 139; Bogda-
novich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:26.
28 Cathcart, in Commentaries, 209, suggested that Napoleon first travelled south
probably to confuse Allied spies in Dresden while Odeleben stated: “It has been
pretended that he took the road to Bohemia in order to deceive the spies . . . but
that is not probable, for his journey agreed exceedingly well with the arrival of
General [Louis] Narbonne, who had returned from Prague in the greatest haste.
The fear of spies could not have disturbed him in his plans.” See Odeleben,
A Circumstantial Narrative, I:256–57.
29 CN, No. 20389, XXVI:68–69; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:22.
30 CN, Nos. 20390 and 20392, XXVI:69–71.
31 CN, Nos. 20391 and 20392, XXVI:70–71; Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative,
I:258–59.
32 On 17 August, Vandamme received orders to move I Corps from Dresden to Bautzen,
from where it would proceed to Görlitz to form Napoleon’s Regular Reserve: SHAT,
C17 178: Berthier to Vandamme, 17 August 1813; CN, No. 20410, XXVI:92.
33 CN, No. 20398, XXVI:77–78.
34 CN, Nos. 20408 and 20410, XXVI:88–89, 93. Napoleon instructed Vandamme to
have his 2nd and 3rd Divisions garrison Dresden’s Neustadt.
35 SHAT, C17 179: Berthier to Macdonald, Mortier, and Latour-Maubourg,
19 August 1813; CN, No. 20411, XXVI:95.
36 CN, Nos. 20397, 20398, and 20410–20412, XXVI:75–78, 92, 95; SHAT, C17 179:
Berthier to Mouton, Mortier, Monthion, and Latour-Maubourg, 18 August 1813;
Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:26; Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narra-
tive, I:260–61.
37 CN, Nos. 20412–20414, XXVI:95–97; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und
Armeeführung, 41; Cathcart, Commentaries, 206.
38 CN, Nos. 20413, 20414, and 20421, XXVI:96–98, 103–04; Vaudoncourt, Histoire
de la guerre, 40; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:27.
39 CN, Nos. 20414, 20421, and 20437, XXVI:97–98, 104, 111–12; SHAT, C17 179:
Berthier to Vandamme, 19 and 20 August 1813; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la
guerre, 140; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:12–14; Bogda-
novich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:27; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 186–87.
40 Blücher to Bernadotte, Jauer, 18 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Blücher to
Sacken and Langeron, Jauer, 17 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:47.
Blücher blamed his inability to launch a “primary attack” before the 19th on the
time it took to “reunite the principal corps of the army.”
41 Sacken to Blücher, Schenk to Yorck, Jürgaß to Yorck, and Rudzevich to Langeron
are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:47–48.
42 “The following are to be sent out as Streifcorps: from Langeron’s corps:
Kaysarov, who will proceed toward Dresden and raid along the highway from
Görlitz to Dresden. From Yorck’s corps: Major Boltenstern with infantry and
cavalry detachments; Major Falkenhausen with cavalry”: “The First Dispos-
ition for the Continued Pursuit of the Enemy,” Jauer, 18 August 1813, Add
MSS, 20112, 118.
43 Blücher to Bernadotte, Jauer, 18 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25.
44 “The First Disposition for the Continued Pursuit of the Enemy,” Jauer, 18 August
1813, Add MSS, 20112, 118. The orders reproduced in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, I:242–44, state that the march would continue from 3:00 to 11:00 p.m.
45 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 19–20, 45; Friederich,
Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:243; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1843:49.
46 “Journal of Operations of General Sacken’s Corps,” in Langeron, Mémoires, 244.
47 Langeron to Barclay, Report on Langeron’s operations from 7 August to 2 Sep-
tember 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18.
48 The account of 18 August is based on Langeron, Mémoires, 225–26; Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1843:49–51; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:23; Frieder-
ich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:242–44; Droysen, Yorck, II:120, Freytag-Loringhoven,
Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 20–23, 38–40.
49 Blücher to Langeron, Goldberg, 10:00 p.m., 18 August 1813, in Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1843:52.
50 Blücher to Langeron, Goldberg, 7:30 a.m., 19 August 1813, in Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1843:52–53.
Nr. 18; Langeron, Mémoires, 226–27.
52 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:25; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
I:246–47; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 13–14.
54 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 54.
55 Langeron, Mémoires, 228, 231. Apparently, Talyzin’s troops proved the exception:
“Had I the choice of my troops, I would not have chosen this brigade, composed
of two regiments that I did not know, which had never served under me, and
which were terribly commanded by Talyzin II, who lacked both talent and
experience of war and who was nearly blind. This Talyzin was five foot ten
inches, very thin, and had immense arms: we called him ‘the Telegraph’.”
56 Sources for the engagement at Siebeneichen are Langeron to Barclay, Report on

Langeron’s operations from 7 August to 2 September, 2 September 1813, GStA
PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18; Plotho, Der Krieg, II:94–97; Müffling,
Die Feldzüge, 13–15, Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:152–58;
Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges; IIa:25–26; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
I:253.
57 Langeron, Mémoires, 232. Langeron’s after-action report must have concealed his
true feelings, for Gneisenau lauded Rudzevich in a letter to Hardenberg for
keeping his head in a situation where “a thousand other generals would have
despaired. With great courage and prudence, he ordered his troops to repulse all
enemy attacks and moved them back across the Bober orderly, intact, and
slowly”: Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Jauer, 25 August 1813, GSTA PK, I HA
Rep. 74 Staatskanzleramt O Ap. Nr. 9, Bd. 3.
58 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 23; “Journal of Oper-
ations of General Sacken’s Corps,” in Langeron, Mémoires, 244–45; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:23; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, I:141.
59 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 27.
60 As noted, in his 10:00 a.m. report, Sacken added the news that Sébastiani’s cavalry
had taken this road. Apparently, Sacken’s courier did not reach Blücher for
some time.
62 Blücher to Amalie, [Lauterseiffen], 19 August 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger,
174; Unger, Blücher, II:68–69; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeefüh-
rung, 23–25; Droysen, Yorck, II:121; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:249.
63 The account of 19 August is based on Droysen, Yorck, II:121–22; Friederich,
Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:249–52; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 15; Nostitz, Tagebuch,
53–54.
4
Löwenberg
The appearance of Ney’s two corps in the midst of his columns both
surprised and pleased Blücher. Before receiving Yorck’s report on Ney’s
departure, Blücher sensed that the marshal had walked into a trap.
He correctly assumed that Sacken had continued his march west to
Thomaswaldau, a few miles east of Bunzlau. Should this be the case, Ney’s
line of retreat through Bunzlau was as good as cut and the marshal as good as
encircled; Blücher need only close the net to crush him. His exuberance
soared. Reports from Saxony claimed that Ney had been reinforced so that
his army numbered six infantry and one cavalry corps, as well as the Young
Guard. Completely oblivious to the implications of this French buildup,
Blücher boasted to his wife on the morning of the 20th: “Yesterday I fought
six French corps for six hours and forced all to retreat. The generals com-
manding against me were Ney, Macdonald, Marmont, Bertrand, Lauriston,
[General Jean-Louis] Reynier, Sébastiani, and Mortier. I march immediately
to pursue the enemy.”1
That evening, Gneisenau drafted an attack disposition that would have
led to Ney’s destruction if Yorck had been able to hold the marshal at the
Gröditzberg long enough for Langeron and Sacken to envelop him. Worded
in very simple, straightforward terms, the disposition called for Yorck to fix
Ney’s front by attacking through Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg at daybreak on
the 20th. Likewise at dawn, Langeron’s corps would march north from
Lauterseiffen against Ney’s right flank while Sacken moved his troops south
from Thomaswaldau directly to the rear of the enemy corps.2 Around
midnight, shortly after the orderlies sped off with copies of the disposition,
Yorck’s 10:00 p.m. report on Ney’s departure arrived. The whole operation
had to be scrapped (see Map 2).
Even if Ney had stood his ground, Blücher’s plan would have been
ruined by his two Russian corps commanders. Along with the attack
165
disposition, Langeron received orders to immediately send a portion of his

corps north from Zobten to Deutmannsdorf to block Ney’s road to
Löwenberg. Then, Langeron would follow with the rest of his corps except
the vanguard, which would remain at Zobten. Langeron refused to comply.
He responded that the day’s combat had fatigued his men; they could not
march through the night to Deutmannsdorf.3 Moreover, his park columns
remained in the rear so he could not replenish his ammunition. Thus, his
corps could not participate in the expected battle on the 20th. According to
Nostitz:
On this day, the large loss of men, the pressing danger that the vanguard –
which had been pushed too far forward – was exposed to for many hours,
made an impression on Langeron that detrimentally influenced his behavior
during the entire campaign. He reproached himself for having executed
Blücher’s orders too punctually and too willingly, and henceforth would be
more cautious – a resolve that he honored to the slightest detail. That evening
he reported to Blücher that his park column had not arrived, the expended
ammunition could not be replenished, and the corps was not in a condition to
take part in the battle intended for the next day. The enemy withdrew in the
night, the battle became impossible, and Blücher’s confidence in the talent
and goodwill of General Langeron was ruined for good.4
According to Müffling, Blücher “found himself in one of the most difficult

and unpleasant situations.”5 He and his staff could not understand
Langeron’s refusal. Was it militarily or politically driven, or was it simply
a bold manifestation of his displeasure over being subordinated to a Prus-
sian? More importantly, Blücher had to determine the proper response.
Although pursuing a conscious policy of maintaining good relations with
his Russian subordinates, Langeron’s cheek exasperated him. He firmly and
somewhat stubbornly insisted that, if his orders had been followed to the
letter, a French corps of 18,000 men would have been destroyed.6 Bogdano-
vich judges that not only did Langeron’s refusal allow Ney to escape across
the Bober at Bunzlau on the 20th, but also that Macdonald received the
opportunity to attack Langeron’s vanguard with superior forces.7
Langeron’s actions warranted a court-martial, but at this moment, with
the enemy army a few miles away, Blücher had little recourse. The politics of
coalition warfare further limited his options. At this early stage of the war
and with the “cabal” waiting for him to err, could he even risk a strong
reprimand? “If the commander in chief wanted retribution,” continued
Müffling, “the dissatisfaction that existed in the army could have easily
erupted and the entire machine, on whose cooperation the Bohemian Army
relied, could have come to a standstill. The Prussian commander also had to
consider his Fatherland. In this critical situation, the commander in chief
decided to accept Langeron’s disobedience as a misunderstanding and to
Löwenberg 167
shrug it off lightly. For the future he had no choice but to remain by this
corps and await an insubordinate act to orders personally given by himself in
which the excuse of a misunderstanding could not be used.”8
Although not as belligerent as Langeron, Sacken likewise refused to obey
Blücher on the grounds that the order made no sense in light of his current
position. Receiving the disposition at 4:00 on the morning of the 20th, the
Russian responded that opposite him stood a strong corps – Marmont’s VI –
and that he would have to march backward (east) twelve “long” miles in the
face of this enemy to reach the Gröditzberg. Incorrect on two accounts,
Sacken could have marched a mere four miles due south from
Thomaswaldau to reach the Goldberg–Bunzlau road, which Ney would
have been forced to take if Langeron drove through Deutmannsdorf in
accordance with Blücher’s plans. Although Sacken agreed with Blücher’s
idea for the battle, he felt that his march to the Gröditzberg would result
only in the surrender of hard-won terrain. Moreover, Marmont would
surely march to the sound of the guns and follow Sacken, who doubted
his Russians could even arrive in time to assist Blücher. He requested further
orders but promised to have his reserve of dragoons, infantry, and artillery
move toward the Gröditzberg.9
No evidence exists that Army Headquarters issued a revised disposition
for 20 August despite Ney’s escape. Pahlen’s corps again did not move from
Hirschberg. Langeron’s corps remained in the Siebeneichen–Zobten area.10
On the right wing, Sacken attacked Marmont’s rearguard at Thomaswaldau
and pursued the French to Bunzlau. Vasilchikov and the vanguard reached
Bunzlau just as III and VI Corps retreated across the Bober around 4:00 in
the afternoon. As the Russians entered Bunzlau, Sacken’s order to withdraw
arrived. Bogdanovich speculates that Sacken had probably received a
warning from the inhabitants that the French had mined the town to destroy
the fortifications they had built during the armistice. Thirty minutes after
the French retreated, several explosions rocked the town followed by a
thunderous blast that marked the blowing of an enormous powder depot.
Bogdanovich claims that “the whole city was showered with grenades,
shrapnel, and rocks; fires started in many places. All buildings were severely
damaged.” Sacken’s troops entered Bunzlau that evening; the French main-
tained possession of the bridge over the Bober a few miles west at Ottendorf,
guarding it with numerous batteries erected on the hills along the left bank.
Sacken’s main body bivouacked east of Bunzlau. Venançon noted in the
journal of Sacken’s corps: “All of this contributed to the idea that the French
plan was to withdraw from Silesia; the reports of their deserters and the
measures they took not to be followed supported this assumption.”11
In the center, I Corps again provided a scene of controversy. During the
night of 19/20 August, Gneisenau withdrew Yorck’s vanguard from the
Hirse hill to a position seven miles east at Hockenau (Czaple), southwest
of Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg. The staff chief also directed Hünerbein’s

brigade northeast from Lauterseiffen to Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg. Blücher
repositioned these units before Yorck’s report on Ney’s departure arrived at
midnight. Obviously, these movements, which resulted in a third consecu-
tive night march for the troops involved, indicate the importance Blücher
placed on having maximum combat power to pin Ney. After receiving
Yorck’s report, Blücher most certainly went to bed and Gneisenau probably
fell asleep from exhaustion; no one at headquarters remembered to either
rescind these particular orders or notify Yorck. The Prussian vanguard had
been marching and fighting in streaming rain since 4:00 a.m. on the 19th.
After barely two hours of rest during which the men cared for their horses
but had yet to eat, the order arrived to ride to Hockenau, and they departed
as quickly as possible.12 As a result, only Katzler’s weak forward posts
remained along the right (east) bank of the Bober with a few squadrons
from the Reserve Cavalry in support at Deutmannsdorf.
Yorck awoke at Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg early on the 20th to find his
vanguard only one mile from his headquarters. To his utter disbelief, he
learned that Army Headquarters had ordered Lobenthal to abandon the
Hirse hill as part of the attack disposition. Indicative of his attitude toward
Blücher and Gneisenau, he wrote in the margin of I Corps’s Journal of
Operations that this movement “violated all of the rules of the art of war,
and I know not upon whose order” it was executed. It did not take much to
sour Yorck’s mood. His demand for perfection permeated I Corps. Already
the hostility toward Blücher’s staff mounted as Yorck’s harsh criticism
seeped into the written reports. The journal entry for 19 August reflects
the low opinion of Yorck’s headquarters toward their compatriots at
Blücher’s: “partially in march, partially standing under arms since 2:00 a.m.
and 5:00 a.m.; from hour to hour expecting the order to continue the march,
then again marching, fighting here and marching there, and finally in the
middle of the night disturbed from a short rest and sent on poor country
roads to different positions.”13 The situation that greeted Yorck early on the
20th threw more fuel on the fire. Hoping the French had yet to occupy the
Hirse hill, he immediately dispatched cavalry and horse artillery to reclaim
possession of the heights. After reinforcing the vanguard with one heavy
battery, he directed Lobenthal to Plagwitz. Later that morning and before
Lobenthal could secure the Hirse hill, Yorck learned that French cavalry had
again approached the Gröditzberg. His anger mounted. Should Lobenthal
find the French on the Hirse hill and if Ney had turned around, Yorck and
Langeron ran the risk of being defeated successively in their isolation. Not
just I Corps, but the entire Silesian Army would be in jeopardy.
“Thus,” Yorck wrote to Blücher, “partial engagements against a concen-
trated enemy who is advancing on one of two roads . . . are best to avoid.
I defer the assessment of this comment to your discretion as it depends on
Löwenberg 169
the situation of the whole and can only be considered by me according to my

narrow view.” According to the records of I Corps, “Yorck complained
about this manner of immediately following the enemy with the entire army
based on any rumor of his retreat. As it lay in the plan of the commanding
general to avoid a main battle, the advance of the whole would likewise
cause the retreat of the whole, which would ruin the army through
marches.” The statement goes on to say that, rather than the entire army,
Yorck suggested having a strong vanguard remain in constant contact with
the enemy. While the vanguard accurately ascertained the enemy’s move-
ments, the army could rest and reorganize. After the vanguard provided a
clear picture of the situation, the army could lunge forward and grapple with
the enemy. “But the gentlemen always fear the enemy will escape them
because they attribute to the enemy army their preconception of viewing
the movements of an army like the wanderings of travelers.” Blücher’s terse
response that a new disposition would be issued as soon as the relevant
reports arrived did nothing to stem the ill-will that already prevailed at
Yorck’s headquarters. A short memo in Yorck’s own handwriting captures
his bitter frustration: “The letter remains unanswered, but the true reason
lays in the indecisiveness of the General Staff, which does not know whether
it should go forward or backward and from time to time hopes for news that
the enemy has run away.”14
Meanwhile, Katzler reported from the right bank of the Bober early that
morning that “the enemy holds Löwenberg and guards the destroyed bridge
over the Bober. Also, a considerable infantry and cavalry mass still bivouacs
on the hills behind [west of] Löwenberg. Now and then convoys leave
Löwenberg for Lauban; the enemy is probably moving magazine stores to
Lauban. The enemy probably holds Löwenberg only to cover the movement
of these convoys. Regarding the bridge at Sirgwitz, only the planks have
been thrown down; they can be quickly restored by an advance in this
direction.”15 Around noon, Lobenthal found the Hirse hill unoccupied.
After securing the high ground, he moved further west to the Weinberg
farmstead on the hills along the right bank of the Bober. Gazing across the
river at Löwenberg, he observed the imperial camp bustling like a disturbed
mound of ants. He estimated 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. After
appearing to be marching west, they suddenly halted and made camp.
Lobenthal’s reports, which reached Blücher late in the afternoon, also con-
tained astonishing news: according to locals, the imperials expected Napoleon
to arrive at any moment. Unconfirmed reports claimed that the emperor had
already reached Löwenberg. Blücher rightly doubted that Napoleon had
already arrived, yet he could not ignore basic logic. Confirmed intelligence
indicated Napoleon’s approach. Moreover, the emperor probably would not
be traveling alone but instead would be accompanied by reinforcements;
prisoners now came in from units hitherto not part of Ney’s army.16
Five days earlier on 15 August, Blücher conveyed to Bernadotte the

news divulged by Jomini that Napoleon would march on Berlin. Ironically,
his letter crossed with one penned to him by Bernadotte on the 16th. His
note urged Blücher to accelerate his advance because he feared the Army of
North Germany would soon suffer a defeat. He based his anxiety on the
presence of an imperial army of 100,000 men at Baruth, 35 miles south of
his position at Berlin and 150 miles northwest of Bunzlau.17 Although
three days later the crown prince reduced the number of imperials to
60,000 men posted between Baruth and Luckau, his letter of the 16th had
to have caused some jaws to drop at Silesian Army Headquarters.18 Even
facing 100,000 men, Bernadotte’s army of 125,000 enjoyed an advantage,
where Ney’s 130,000 soldiers clearly outnumbered Blücher’s 100,000. This
would not be the last time Blücher heard from the Swedish prince royal.
Yet Bernadotte’s letter did provide Blücher with additional cause to ignore
an order from Schwarzenberg. Communicated via Barclay de Tolly, the
Allied commander in chief wanted Blücher to send Pahlen III’s corps to
Trautenau to relieve Bubna’s 2nd Light Division so it could join the Army
of Bohemia.19 With the crown prince in need of support and with reports
indicating Napoleon would soon join Ney with reinforcements, Blücher
absolutely refused to weaken his forces at such a critical moment. More-
over, the number of days it would take for Pahlen to reach Trautenau via
Landeshut would put the corps out of action for an unacceptable amount
of time.20
Meanwhile, Yorck’s corps remained at Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg but
patrols ascertained that the approaching imperial cavalry had halted between
Mittlau and Altjäschwitz; whether the French horse masked foot could not
be determined. Around noon, Blücher received the report of this cavalry’s
withdrawal toward Bunzlau. At the same time, a report from Langeron
reached Army Headquarters at Pilgramsdorf. Langeron held his position
at Zobten but the French forced him to evacuate Siebeneichen. That morn-
ing, French forces again occupied Siebeneichen as well as the hills that
extended to Mois. Langeron estimated the enemy’s strength to be thirty
battalions and just as many squadrons. Around 10:00 a.m., the majority of
these forces trooped north to Löwenberg and the Russians moved back to
Siebeneichen. Yet around noon, a strong French column unexpectedly
approached the village, forcing the Russians to again withdraw. In the
afternoon, the imperials continued their march to Löwenberg and the Rus-
sians reoccupied Siebeneichen. Seven miles upstream along the Bober at
Lähn, the Russians counted six large enemy columns during the night of
19/20 August but five left before daybreak; their destination remained
unknown. Only a weak detachment remained at Lähn. Further south in
Pahlen III’s sector, Macdonald’s detachment at Berthelsdorf withdrew to
Greiffenberg but returned soon after. Regardless, Langeron informed
Löwenberg 171
Blücher that the enemy had pulled the majority of his troops from Berthels-
dorf, Lähn, and Mois.
Russian claims that the French had evacuated these villages seemed to
confirm other reports that Ney intended to continue his retreat across the
Queis. Yet other points in the reports confirmed that Ney had received
reinforcements. Prisoners professed to belong to IV and VII Corps as well
as the Young Guard. Further intelligence placed VIII Corps at Görlitz.
Pahlen reported that not Macdonald’s corps, but Mortier’s Young Guard
held Greiffenberg. Intelligence stated that French masses had marched east
from Görlitz on the east–west highway to Bunzlau; statements from
prisoners identified these masses as Young Guard. Much of this proved
to be nonsense: IV and VII Corps were marching on the Prussian capital
with the rest of Oudinot’s Army of Berlin while VIII Corps remained
south of Dresden. Regardless, these reports also suggested a change in the
demeanor of Ney’s army indicative of the unexpected counterpunch at
Siebeneichen.21
By late afternoon on the 20th, Silesian Army Headquarters still could not
determine whether Ney would continue his retreat to the Queis or, having
been reinforced by as many as three corps, would switch to the offensive.
Strong imperial forces remained around Löwenberg as well as west of
Bunzlau. Opinions differed: some advised preparing for an attack, others
for an immediate retreat. Blücher rejected all thoughts of withdrawing
before Ney or Napoleon or whomever. He maintained that Yorck and
Langeron held an uncommonly strong position that could repulse any
frontal attack.22 Although a French flanking movement remained possible,
Sacken blocked the only other permanent bridge over the Bober at Bunzlau.
Not fearing a French offensive, Blücher wanted to be ready to exploit a
continuation of the French retreat. This meant preparing the army to cross
the Bober immediately and simultaneously. With the only crossing points at
Bunzlau and Löwenberg, the staff looked for a position that would best
accommodate the army’s Russian pontoons. Katzler claimed to have found
the spot at Sirgwitz, less than four miles north of Löwenberg.
Around 5:00 p.m., I Corps trudged toward Sirgwitz after Yorck granted
his men the luxury of a hot meal. That was about all that went right for the
Prussians during this ten-mile march. Yorck again formed two columns for
the march: the right crossed through Großhartmannsdorf to Gähnsdorf
(Gaszów), the left through Deutmannsdorf to Ludwigsdorf. Another
summer storm rendered the already drenched roads impassable. Both
columns had to clear numerous defiles while the left encountered village
after village along a four-mile stretch. It goes without saying that delays led
to a fourth consecutive night march. In streaming rain, the lead elements of
Yorck’s left column finally cleared Deutmannsdorf to reach Ludwigsdorf
around midnight.23
Yorck’s chief of staff, Zielinsky, rode ahead to reconnoiter. His report

called into question Katzler’s findings. “The position at Sirgwitz,” he
explained to Yorck, “which should be taken according to the orders of the
commanding general, has so many considerable military disadvantages that
I hold it as my duty to formally protest against it because the occupation of
this point could have the most unfortunate consequences.” The staff officer
described the position as being hemmed between the Bober and a rivulet that
flows into it downstream of Sirgwitz. In addition, it could be observed and
flanked by the enemy on the left bank of the Bober. Only one road con-
nected Sirgwitz with Lobenthal’s position on the right bank facing
Löwenberg, which the enemy still possessed along with the town’s stone
bridge over the Bober. “This position grants no opportunity to maneuver
because only one road runs rearward through Ludwigsdorf. Therefore,
I thus suggest halting the corps at Ludwigsdorf, where the Löwenberg–
Liegnitz road crosses the Neudorf–Deutmannsdorf road, and await further
orders from the commanding general.”24 The final straw for Yorck came
when Zielinsky failed to locate a suitable place at Sirgwitz for I Corps to
camp. Consequently, Yorck halted his columns at Gähnsdorf and Ludwigs-
dorf. Straggling units filtered in to the bivouacs throughout the night and
into the morning. The rear of the two columns did not arrive until 5:00 a.m.
on 21 August. One of Yorck’s staff officers, Major Ferdinand Wilhelm von
Schack, noted in his journal: “Many stragglers, weary, rain. No one knows
where General Blücher will establish his headquarters.”25
In his report to Blücher, Yorck cited Zielinsky’s findings as justification
for the halt. This did not deter Blücher, who personally reconnoitered
Löwenberg from the hills on the right bank around sunset on 20 August.
There he received a second report from Langeron containing intelligence
from spies and deserters claiming that Napoleon had reached Löwenberg on
the afternoon of the 19th. Langeron noted that the enemy had conducted
reconnaissance in force on all points but had withdrawn toward evening and
hidden their masses behind the Löwenberg heights.26 According to the
Russian general: “We could see that the enemy’s forces were considerably
augmented and we learned that Napoleon and Murat arrived at Löwenberg
with the French Guard, the Reserve Cavalry, the cuirassiers, and other
troops that had come to join the corps of Ney, Lauriston, and Macdonald
and Sébastiani’s cavalry, which were the original components of the army
that we faced.”27
Blücher either did not want to fall for a French ruse or again allowed his
wishes to master his thoughts. The results of his reconnaissance along with
other information contained in Langeron’s letter – particularly the evacu-
ation of Siebeneichen by the French and the continuous movement of
imperial forces to Löwenberg – strengthened Blücher’s opinion that Ney
would continue to retreat and defend the Bober to conceal his movements.
Löwenberg 173
His assumption that the advance of the Bohemian Army on the left bank of
the Elbe would soon impact the imperial forces in Silesia fed this suppos-
ition. Moreover, a report from Sacken that arrived in the evening confirmed
that imperial forces had evacuated Bunzlau. “The enemy took his retreat on
Görlitz,” wrote Sacken. “A large number of troops were concentrated here;
today, Marshal Ney rode through the ranks at Thomaswaldau and was
greeted with music and “Vive l’Empereur!”28
Passing the night one mile east of Sirgwitz at the Schloß in Hohlstein
(Skała) under the immediate protection of one battalion supported by
Horn’s brigade at nearby Ludwigsdorf, a restless Blücher champed at the
bit to launch a rapid offensive across the Bober. He calculated that, by
nightfall on the 20th, all of his corps would reach on the right bank of the
Bober: Pahlen III at Hirschberg with the left wing; Langeron and Yorck in
the center facing Löwenberg; on the right, Sacken before Bunzlau. During
the night, Blücher summoned the Russian bridge train to Sirgwitz and
occupied the town with one Guard Jäger company and one sharpshooter
platoon. The Mecklenburg Hussars moved down the Bober early in the
morning to establish contact with Sacken’s corps. Meanwhile, the Russians
built their bridge at Sirgwitz so Yorck and Langeron could pursue if Ney
continued his retreat. Although he was eager to rush forward, a hint of
uncertainty gripped Blücher as Barclay’s instructions echoed in his ears.
Drafting all of Blücher’s reports to Frederick William, Gneisenau wrote to
the king that “with regard to the enemy army, I follow cautiously in
accordance with my instructions so I can avoid becoming entangled in an
uneven contest before the Bohemian Army can begin its operations.”29
During the course of the 20th, Marmont withdrew to Bunzlau’s eastern
suburb of Gnadenberg (Godnów) in preparation to cross the Bober. Ney
placed III Corps and II Cavalry Corps on the hills of Tillendorf (Bolesła-
wice), on the opposite bank of the Bober west of Bunzlau. Marmont’s main
body then moved through Bunzlau, crossed the river a few miles west at
Ottendorf, and headed southwest to link with Lauriston, who stood eight
miles further south at Löwenberg. Marmont’s rearguard held Bunzlau until
evening. As noted, it razed all the fortifications constructed during the
armistice, blew the powder magazine, and destroyed every bridge that could
be found as far as Eichberg (Da˛browa Bolesławiecka), five miles north of
Bunzlau. In the middle of the French position, Lauriston did little on
the 20th. Prussian patrols observed long wagon trains departing from
Löwenberg for the Saxon frontier. The imperials partly burned and partly
barricaded the bridges over the Bober, making clear they planned to con-
tinue their retreat.30
History is filled with ironies. In this case, Blücher’s most troublesome
corps commander, the French émigré Langeron, ordered his corps forward
after telling the old hussar he would not move without express orders. As it
turned out, the operations of his corps at Siebeneichen on 19 August brought

Napoleon racing to Löwenberg with I Cavalry Corps and the Old Guard,
altogether around 40,000 men. Odeleben recounts that the movements
“suddenly began” on the morning of the 20th as Napoleon “hastened to
quit Zittau” and reach Lauban. “It was clearly perceived that this sudden
change was the result of the losses the French had suffered in the violent
attacks near Lähn, where they had been repulsed the preceding day at the
Bober.”31 Somewhere between Zittau and Görlitz the emperor halted after
receiving news “that the key for the ciphers of a dispatch sent to one of his
marshals [Macdonald] . . . had been lost; the officer who was the bearer of it
was taken prisoner. It became necessary to directly remedy this matter
through immediate orders. The bureau de la guerre was established in
the open air in a small copse; it consisted of Napoleon, Berthier, and
Caulaincourt. Napoleon dictated, walking backwards and forwards;
Caulaincourt was seated on the ground and wrote.” So many orderlies and
officers had to be dispatched that the emperor had few men remaining for
further assignments. Odeleben recounts that at both Görlitz and Lauban “an
indefatigable activity appeared to be employed during the whole of the
day . . . and Napoleon expected an important engagement the next day, in
which he reckoned completely to defeat the Army of Silesia.”32
Arriving at Görlitz on the afternoon of the 20th, Napoleon wrote to Ney
and Marmont at 2:00 p.m.: “At 5:00 I will be at Lauban. The main business
at this moment is to unite and march against the enemy.” He then led the
Old Guard and I Cavalry Corps to Lauban, where he passed the night
planning his offensive against Blücher, whose army the emperor had accur-
ately reassessed to be 80,000–90,000 strong. He intended to attack Blücher
on the following day, 21 August: “I plan to fight tomorrow, from noon to
6:00 p.m.,” he informed Macdonald. French intelligence still incorrectly
placed Kleist with Blücher’s army, and the emperor did not know the exact
location of Ney and Marmont, nor did he know if French forces still held
Bunzlau. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe Odeleben’s claim that
Napoleon “was extremely uneasy on being informed that he had to deal
with three generals full of energy and experience: Blücher, Kleist, and
Langeron, who possibly might prevent his junction with his marshals.”
Instead, Napoleon wrote Maret at Dresden that the upcoming battle “prob-
ably would be a very successful event.”33
At midnight, Imperial Headquarters issued the attack disposition for
21 August.34 Ney received instructions to lead III Corps and II Cavalry
Corps across the Bober at Bunzlau at 10:00 a.m. If Ney found fewer than
30,000 men before him, he would pursue briskly and then cut sharply south
to Giersdorf (Żeliszów) to form the emperor’s left wing.35 Napoleon’s belief
that the main mass of Blücher’s army stood on the upper Bober is stated as
the reason for Ney’s march southeast rather than due east. Marmont’s VI
Löwenberg 175
Corps would advance between Ney and Löwenberg on Napoleon’s imme-

diate left. Lauriston’s V Corps followed by Macdonald’s XI Corps would
cross at Löwenberg and form the emperor’s center and right. Napoleon
expected VI Corps and the Old Guard to reach Löwenberg at noon. News
that Ney had ordered the evacuation of the Bober and the retreat west of the
Queis during the afternoon of the 20th unsettled Imperial Headquarters
during the predawn hours of the 21st.36
Although reports flooded Blücher’s headquarters on the morning of the
21st, the Prussians still could not determine Ney’s next move. Thick clouds
that dumped torrential rain on the Bober valley concealed its secrets from
prying eyes. Around 5:00 a.m., the commander of the Mecklenburg
Hussars, Lieutenant-Colonel Ernst Friedrich von Warburg, reached
Bunzlau’s southeastern suburb. He reported that “Russian skirmishers are
in the city. At daybreak great movement was heard in the enemy camp.
However, we cannot distinguish anything because of the heavy rain. My
vanguard is close to the Bober; all bridges are down.” Forty-five minutes
later, Lobenthal reported from the Weinberg farmstead that “the darkness of
the weather does not allow us to accurately observe the enemy, yet it appears
that the second wave has departed because no campfires are burning. Our
Cossacks have crossed the Bober and have not lost sight of the enemy.
Colonel Neydhardt reported that Siebeneichen is in our hands and the
Cossacks are a good half-hour west of it, patrolling to the right and left.”
Halfway between the twelve miles that separated Löwenberg and Bunzlau,
the 4th Squadron of the Mecklenburg Hussars crossed the Bober at
Großwaltitz (Włodzice Wielkie) and continued northwest toward the
Görlitz–Bunzlau stretch of the east–west highway. From Kroischwitz
(Kraszowice) at 6:00 a.m., its commanding officer reported the continued
retreat of imperial forces and that troops of all arms could ford the Bober at
Großwaltitz.37
Although the weather prevented Blücher from gaining an overview of
French movements, he remained convinced that Ney would evacuate the
Bober. If not, he thought of exploiting the gap between Ney and Lauriston,
thus between Bunzlau and Löwenberg. Patrols had observed very little
enemy activity in this sector on the 20th. With this in mind, Blücher
considered having Yorck and Langeron cross the Bober at Sirgwitz and then
drive sixteen miles west to Lauban, itself sixteen miles east of Görlitz.
Wanting some definitive news of events on the left bank, Blücher ordered
Major Friedrich Georg von Sohr to lead one Brandenburg Hussar squadron
and the infantry that occupied Sirgwitz across the Bober to reconnoiter
south toward Löwenberg. After repulsing the imperial posts at the river’s
edge, Sohr did not get far before his detachment encountered strong forces,
purportedly Württembergers, belonging to Marmont’s VI Corps. Pursued
by enemy infantry and cavalry, the Prussians barely had time to recross the
Bober. Imperial infantry reached the bridge, which the Russians managed to
dismantle under fire. The little time Sohr spent on the left bank sufficed for
him to observe numerous columns marching east.38
Despite the thick clouds, imperial infantry could be seen massing around
Löwenberg at 7:00 a.m. One hour later, a lieutenant reached Army
Headquarters with Lobenthal’s 7:15 a.m. report: “The enemy camp is in
movement; we still do not know whether it will be an attack or a retreat, yet
according to the report . . . six battalions are now advancing.” Within an
hour the weather cleared, allowing Lobenthal to see the bustling activity
around Löwenberg from his position at the Weinberg farmstead. The hills on
the right bank on which the farmstead stood extended northwest to south-
east between two dominating heights of equal proportion: the Luften hill to
the north and the Stein hill to the south. The Löwenberg–Goldberg highway
ran between these twin peaks through a pass 300–400 yards wide before
breaking free and cutting through the western portion of Plagwitz. The
western face of both heights descended steeply toward the Bober while
the eastern cliff of the Stein hill gently stretched its outcrops toward
Deutmannsdorf. The smaller Hirse hill rose east of the Luften hill to
command the highway running east from Löwenberg to Goldberg as it
emerged from the pass. Müffling described the village of Plagwitz as long
and considerably intersected, lying between the two mountain ridges.39
Almost 100 yards below their position on the Luften hill, the Prussians
could clearly see the Bober valley, between 900 and 1,100 yards in width.
Löwenberg, a relatively large town, was wedged among the shallow hills on
the opposite edge of the valley. Löwenberg’s mill race, itself as wide as the
Bober, flowed parallel to the river. The Löwenberg–Goldberg road crossed
the mill race on a wooden bridge that the French had destroyed. It pro-
ceeded to the Bober where a highly arched stone bridge that the French had
barricaded carried it across the water. On the right bank, a small stream
accompanied the highway, meandering along the foot of the Stein hill to the
village of Plagwitz.40
It appeared that the French had received considerable reinforcements.
The Prussians observed skirmishers deploying along the left bank.
Lobenthal unlimbered three batteries on the Luften hill but the height and
steepness of the cliff prevented the artillery from having any effect on the
Bober defile; Löwenberg and the hills along the opposite bank were out of
range. Between forty and ninety yards wide, the Bober could be forded at
many places, which likewise did not bode well for the defenders. Around
9:00, the Prussians clearly heard the shout go up in the imperial camp: “Vive
l’Empereur!” Napoleon had arrived. On receiving Lobenthal’s report, Yorck
rushed to join his vanguard, which held the Luften hill, the pass, and
Plagwitz with the main body some 2,000 yards north of the Luften hill.
From his vantage point, he could see Langeron’s troops moving north from
Löwenberg 177
Gaehnsdorf
N
Sirgwitz
Hohlstein
Bo b
Niederrackwitz
er R
iver
Ludwigsdorf Deutmannsdorf
Großrackwitz
Braunau
Hirse
Luften hill
hill
Weinberg
Farm to
Goldberg
Löwenberg
Plagwitz
Stein Höfel
hill
Mois
Siebeneichen
0 1000 2000 3000 metres
9. Engagement at Löwenberg, 21 August 1813
Zobten toward the Stein hill. Langeron himself soon joined Yorck. Across
the river, the Prussians observed Napoleon reviewing the troops.
Lobenthal’s attempt to enhance the celebration with some shelling had little
effect. The French replied, likewise without effect. “They opened a sharp
and completely useless cannonade,” noted Langeron, “which could only
serve to distract us; these batteries, which we could not see and which were
firing in parabolic angles, unleashed an immense quantity of balls and shells
on the Weinberg, where they inflicted no harm; Yorck had a few advance
posts there.” Soon the French guns went silent and outpost skirmishing
began. Yorck moved his 2nd Brigade into position immediately behind the
Luften hill. One battalion from Langeron’s corps occupied the Stein hill
while the rest of his vanguard (one Jäger battalion, four squadrons, and four
horse guns) moved to Höfel (Dworek), two miles southeast of Plagwitz.41
Blücher rode to the Luften hill but Gneisenau remained at headquarters.
At 8:45 a.m. the staff chief received a second report from Warburg. Written
near Bunzlau, the note stated that Ney “again halted; he positioned much
artillery by the rearguard and many [pieces] are concealed in the woods. If
this entire mass falls on General Sacken he will be in danger. The enemy is
again marching toward Bunzlau; it is around 7:30 a.m.” Gneisenau
immediately recognized the gravity of the situation. While the Prussians
refused to believe Napoleon would launch a frontal assault across the Bober
from Löwenberg, they understood that a flanking maneuver posed a serious
threat. Should Ney cross the Bober at Bunzlau to attack Sacken or move
across the river further south to drive between Sacken and Yorck, the
Silesian Army would be forced to wage “a battle under unfavorable circum-
stances.” Therefore, Gneisenau prepared for a general retreat. He instructed
Sacken to slowly withdraw before Ney, taking the road from Bunzlau
southeast to Modelsdorf. Yorck’s corps would take a position on the Grö-
ditzberg while Langeron’s corps moved east to Pilgramsdorf. If the French
launched a general offensive, the Silesian Army would retreat behind the
Katzbach to “provide time for the Bohemian Army as well as the North
German Army to . . . begin their main drives.” As for Blücher’s left wing, if
the French attempted to outflank it, Yorck would still fall back to the
Gröditzberg but Langeron would take a position eleven miles slightly south-
east of Löwenberg at Probsthain. From there the Russians would launch a
counterattack. Sacken would remain on alert and await orders. If the French
withdrew, Gneisenau intended to “follow with caution” but also with
enough boldness to slow their march. He believed that, by detaining imper-
ial forces in Silesia, “the operation of the Bohemian Army on the left bank of
the Elbe . . . can begin in earnest.” After dispatching this letter, Gneisenau
sent Müffling to inform Blücher and then followed.42
Blücher joined Yorck and Langeron on the Luften hill just in time to see
the penultimate column of imperial troops reach Löwenberg. Excitement in
the imperial camp soon settled down and even the skirmishing subsided. As
Blücher maintained, the Allied position appeared formidable. “Our position
from Braunau to Zobten is so strong that an attack would cost the enemy
many people without obtaining its goal,” Gneisenau assured Sacken.43 Yet
rock alone would not stop Napoleon. Perhaps their overconfidence caused
the leadership of the Silesian Army to overlook important details. Perhaps
Blücher’s insistence on launching an offensive through Sirgwitz distracted
them. Although Lobenthal’s infantry held the pass and Plagwitz, few battal-
ions remained to defend the Luften hill itself. Conversely, Langeron’s sole
battalion on the Stein hill was virtually worthless, especially without
Löwenberg 179
artillery. Inexplicably, the Allies failed to post a ground-level battery to fire

on Löwenberg’s bridge. Yorck’s famed biographer, Johann Gustav Droysen,
claims that, in a rare moment of agreement, both Gneisenau and Yorck
pleaded with Blücher to change his mind about crossing the Bober at
Sirgwitz. Gneisenau conveyed the news he received from Warburg and
explained the measures he prepared for the retreat. Blücher could not be
convinced that easily. Instead, he watched and waited before returning to his
headquarters at noon. The French camp remained quiet but in the distance
the Old Guard could be seen marching east from Lauban.44
Shortly after returning to Hohlstein, Gneisenau received another discon-
certing report from Warburg concerning the advance of considerable French
forces on Bunzlau. The 1:00 hour had just struck. With it came the roar of
artillery as the French launched their assault from Löwenberg. It appeared
that Napoleon planned to fix Blücher’s center while Ney turned his right.
Despite Gneisenau’s planning, Blücher could not escape without a fight. In
accordance with Gneisenau’s plan, Blücher ordered I Corps to the Gröditz-
berg. “It is my intention,” Blücher informed Yorck, “to avoid the battle that
the enemy seeks and to withdraw to the Gröditzberg with your corps. The
vanguard will hold the enemy for as long as possible, falling back on the road
to Lauterseiffen, and not allowing itself to be thrust aside from it.” Langeron
received instructions to withdraw to Pilgramsdorf.45
Early on the morning of the 21st, Russian and Prussian patrols observed
Ney and Sébastiani rendezvous at Tillendorf and march southwest toward
Naumburg. As Sacken prepared to pursue from Bunzlau, Ney turned
around, having received the emperor’s attack disposition. In accordance,
Ney directed III Corps through Bunzlau to Giersdorf. He ordered Sébas-
tiani to cross the Bober south of Bunzlau and then turn southeast toward
Großhartmannsdorf and the Gröditzberg. At 10:00 that morning, the
French secured Bunzlau and started repairing the bridge. On its completion,
General Joseph Souham’s 8th Division led III Corps across the Bober.
Venançon’s comments in Sacken’s journal relate the Russian view of the
situation: “At 10:00 a.m., Marshal Ney, reinforced by a cavalry division
commanded by General Sébastiani, attacked the village of Bunzlau where
General Sacken had some Jäger, who retired to the position that we had
taken between Gnadenberg and Bunzlau. The enemy repaired the bridges
that they had burned the previous day; at noon, they crossed the Bober; their
forces could have been between 30,000 and 35,000 men” (see Map 2).
Sacken formed his corps at the rim of the valley. His 16,000 Russians stood
their ground as Vasilchikov’s cavalry and the 10th Division fought a textbook
rearguard action that kept Sébastiani’s troopers at bay.46 Venançon noted:
Their plan for this day was easy to divine; their feint against our right, where
our cavalry was deployed, did not mislead General Sacken at all; the infantry
that deployed on our left and that outflanked us alerted us to their true
intentions. At the beginning of the engagement, we spread ourselves as much
as possible. Finally, we were completely outflanked around 6:00 p.m. and
General Sacken withdrew his troops. Neverovsky’s division took no part in
the fighting; according to the disposition, it formed the second line. The 10th
Division, commanded by General [Ivan] Lieven, withdrew in echelon by the
right and through Gnadenberg. The reserve, composed of two regiments, was
thrown in and protected the retreat of the cavalry which, by two consecutive
charges, provided time for the reserve to establish itself. After our cavalry
withdrew, our reserve followed it. After six hours of fighting, 17,000 men had
held against more than 30,000. General Sacken withdrew without being
overwhelmed, although he delayed this movement to learn the exact inten-
tions of an enemy whose marches and countermarches left us unable to make
any real calculations of his intentions.47
Sacken retreated toward Modelsdorf covered by the seven squadrons of

the Smolenskii and Kurlandskii Dragoon Regiments. His after-action report
to Blücher stated: “Today we had a hard day. The enemy attacked us with a
superiority of 40,000–50,000 men. One report claims that the French
emperor himself was present. We retreated in good order but not without
considerable loss. A portion of the enemy force followed us but the main
body of his army went through Thomaswaldau to Haynau; he has much
cavalry. I request that you give me a directive and determine how I can
maintain contact with you in all situations.” Clearly the theory that the
retreating soldier counts every enemy twice applies here, for Ney certainly
did not cross the Bober with 60,000 to 70,000 men. Moreover, only Ney’s
39th Division continued east on the highway to Haynau after his main body
turned south. Sacken’s vanguard held Alzenau (Olszanica) while his main
body camped at Modelsdorf.48
Meanwhile, before dawn on the 21st, Napoleon had “hastily repaired to
his troops, who were rushing like a torrent along the road to Löwenberg.”
He reached the outskirts of Löwenberg around 9:00 that morning. After
inspecting the troops outside the city, he distributed Eagles for the standards
of a few newly formed regiments with great pomp to animate the men, some
of whom were seeing him for the very first time. As the emperor rode past
his foremost units, he exhorted his warriors: “Forward, forward my chil-
dren, we must advance!” Entering Löwenberg before noon, he established a
temporary command post in the stables of the White Horse Inn. He studied
two maps spread on a high bench in a corner. Every so often he would
unbutton his signature grey overcoat and then nervously button it up again.
His movements revealed restlessness and impatience. Shortly afterward, he
put his men to work on the bridges. Sappers of the Guard used requisitioned
timber and planks to bridge the mill race. Napoleon then ascended the hills
on the left bank of the Bober to observe the unfolding of what he hoped
Löwenberg 181
would be a battle. Around noon, General Nicolas Joseph Maison’s 16th

Division formed to lead Lauriston’s V Corps across the Bober. Behind
V Corps came units from Latour-Maubourg’s I Cavalry Corps followed
by the 35th and 36th Divisions of XI Corps.49
“At noon,” wrote Langeron, “we saw a group of officers on the Löw-
enberg bridge. It was Napoleon, Murat, and their staffs.” One hour later, the
intermittent French artillery fire gave way to a massive bombardment, with
some guns opening fire from concealed positions along the water’s edge.
French infantry cleared away the barricades on the Bober bridge, muskets
blazing at the Russian skirmishers. Lobenthal’s guns responded. Gradually,
French skirmishers crossed the Bober either by sprinting across the bridge
individually or in small groups that forded the river upstream of the bridge.
“A column of light infantry crossed the Bober at the ford, to the left of
Plagwitz,” continued Langeron; “this column was so weak that at first we
did not think it could be a serious attack but rather a reconnaissance.
Nevertheless, soon after some strong columns crossed the bridge au pas de
charge and threw themselves on the village of Plagwitz. We had committed
the fault of not sufficiently manning this important position.”50
Gaining the right bank, the imperials utilized hedges for cover while
reinforcements steadily crossed under the protection of their fire. Having
sufficient numbers on hand, the French suddenly charged the Stein hill and
overwhelmed the single Russian battalion. They chased Langeron’s men all
the way to Plagwitz, where the Brandenburg Fusilier Battalion had just
arrived. Lobenthal had also dispatched the East Prussian Fusilier Battalion
to support the Russians on the Stein hill but now ordered it to retake the
height. French reinforcements moved onto the hill, making this an impos-
sible task. Maison’s main body then moved across the Bober as his artillery
unlimbered on the Stein hill. After repulsing the East Prussians, the French
drove the Russians and Prussians from Plagwitz. “The enemy’s attack was
terrible,” recalled Langeron, “and I was not content with our defense on this
occasion, neither with Colonel Stegemann, nor with his Jäger regiment (the
7th), nor with the Prussian battalion; they all retreated too quickly.”51
Although the French did not attack the Luften hill, Lobenthal realized he
would be trapped and so directed his remaining battalions to Plagwitz.
Meanwhile, Blücher arrived at Yorck’s command post on the Hirse hill
and ordered Prince Karl’s 2nd Brigade to open the road to Plagwitz and
keep open the road to Zobten. Karl positioned his brigade battery on the
Hirse hill, deploying his brigade at the foot of the hill parallel to the
highway. One horse battery from Yorck’s Reserve unlimbered and sited
the guns to fire canister at Plagwitz’s exit. Intense combat erupted around
the village. Lobenthal ordered several infantry charges through Plagwitz and
up the Stein hill; all failed with considerable casualties. Kaptsevich’s 7th and
37th Jäger Regiments arrived but Maison already firmly held the Stein hill.52
Four Russian horse guns moved up to support the Jäger. As French infantry
emerged from Plagwitz in dense columns, the Russian gunners blasted them
with canister. Russian and Prussian artillery also managed to clear the
imperials from the Löwenberg–Goldberg highway. Lobenthal’s vanguard
still held the Luften hill, Karl’s 2nd Brigade blocked the highway east of
Plagwitz, and Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps took a position at Höfel.
Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade stood at Lauterseiffen as Yorck’s main body
retreated toward the Gröditzberg and Wilhelmsdorf. Langeron’s main body
withdrew toward Pilgramsdorf, expertly covered by Emmanuel’s cavalry.53
The French held Plagwitz and the Stein hill: stalemate ensued.
Müffling provides a glimpse of the situation and decision-making pro-
cess at Blücher’s command post: “Up to now, the general could not fathom
the enemy’s intentions, but when he saw from the Weinberg hill the entire
enemy army defiling with great haste through Löwenberg in attack columns,
and great clouds of dust continuously rising above the Lauban–Löwenberg
highway, and finally, when a spy found a way to get across the Bober and
deliver the news that Bonaparte himself had arrived, no doubt remained that
the enemy’s intention was to deliver a battle.”54 Gneisenau’s report to
Hardenberg also offers insight into the thought process at Blücher’s head-
quarters: “On the 21st, the enemy wanted to engage us in a general battle (at
Löwenberg). However, we committed only the vanguard and a portion of
the prince of Mecklenburg’s brigade to the engagement. We held back our
remaining masses, Russians and Prussians, and withdrew them to the region
of the Gröditzberg unmolested because superior enemy forces advanced
against General Sacken’s position at Bunzlau and forced him to retreat.”
The Prussians estimated the strength of Napoleon’s force to be six army
corps. At 5:00, Blücher reluctantly gave the order for all troops to withdraw
from the Plagwitz sector. Although Langeron disagreed, Müffling main-
tained that “Blücher’s position was bad (mainly because Langeron’s corps
at Zobten was too far from Yorck’s left wing) but the terrain favored
breaking off the engagement.” Covered by General Fyodor Korf’s Reserve
Cavalry from Langeron’s corps, the Silesian Army escaped but French
cavalry fiercely pursued Lobenthal’s exhausted detachment as well as Karl’s
2nd Brigade. Both had to turn around numerous times to repulse the
hunters, who finally broke off the chase at Deutmannsdorf. Not one man
fell into French hands during this retreat, yet Nostitz claims that Yorck’s
Landwehr “received many bitter rebukes” at Army Headquarters.55
At nightfall, Yorck’s 1st, 2nd, and 8th Brigades and the Reserve Cavalry
halted at Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg, the 7th Brigade and the rearguard held
Wilhelmsdorf and Gröditz. General Denisiyev’s Severskii Mounted Jäger
Regiment and the sole battalion of the Shlisselburgskii Infantry Regiment
covered the retreat of Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps as it marched to
Neuwiese (Nowa Ła˛ki). There it remained as Langeron’s rearguard and
Löwenberg 183
occupied the passes of Lauterseiffen in conjunction with Yorck’s 2nd

Brigade. Langeron’s main body (Rudzevich’s advance guard, VI and IX
Infantry Corps) marched to Pilgramsdorf, where Blücher established Army
Headquarters. Langeron, who joined Kaptsevich and Karl, noted: “the
prince of Mecklenburg found himself directly under my orders; we fought
together for more than four hours against very superior forces without
losing an inch of ground; on this occasion, I appreciated the merit of this
young prince, who at this time was only twenty-three years old, his value,
and that of his troops. Nevertheless, the enemy constantly received
reinforcements. Nightfall, which we awaited with impatience, finally put
an end to hostilities and the French advanced only a short way from
Löwenberg.”56
Both Sacken and Langeron stood on the eastern bank of the Schnelle
Deichsel, a small yet “rapid” mountain stream. Covered on both banks by
dwellings, gardens, and hedges, the Deichsel’s fords did not permit the easy
passage of large bodies of troops. In fact, Müffling wrote that only individ-
uals could get across. “Thus, the general was able to wait quietly for the
enemy to reveal his measures without being forced into battle.” Neverthe-
less, Yorck’s sector at Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg and Gröditz formed a
vulnerable salient west of the Deichsel. With difficult defiles between him
and the eastern bank, he warned Army Headquarters that his corps could be
encircled and destroyed. Blücher’s response reveals the purpose of his plan
to slowly and methodically withdraw: “If you fear for the retreat of I Corps
over the defile of the Schnelle Deichsel in the face of the enemy, I thus leave
it to you to select two of your brigades to depart early and take a position
behind the defile in order to cover the retrograde march of the others. I do
not want the departure of the entire army to occur too soon and before the
enemy shows himself because I will not know . . . if the enemy has deployed
a considerable force against us – even though I completely seek to avoid a
general battle.” Receiving Blücher’s letter at 2:00 a.m. on the 22nd, Yorck
sent his 1st and 8th Brigades across the Schnelle Deichsel at Leisersdorf
(Uniejowice) and Ulbersdorf respectively. The rest of the corps followed at
daybreak. The fighting at Löwenberg had exhausted Lobenthal’s vanguard.
Yorck dissolved the formation, returning the battalions and squadrons to
their parent regiments and organizing a new combined-arms detachment
under Katzler’s command. Its cavalry took a position on the Gröditzberg
while Colonel Heinrich Wilhelm von Weltzien posted its infantry at
Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg. Patrols swept both north and south (see Map 2).57
The loss of 51 officers and 2,095 men reflected the day’s hard fighting.
Yorck’s Landwehr received its baptism of fire. “It had been a mere skir-
mish,” noted Müffling, “and they proved to be brave yet inexperienced, as
was to be expected of young troops. As a result, the loss in dead and
wounded was considerable and exceeded 2,000.” Despite the opinions
expressed at Army Headquarters, Yorck appears to have been genuinely

impressed with the militia, which he thought performed just as well as the
Line troops. One battalion of Silesian Landwehr twice executed a bayonet
attack against imperial forces attempting to advance from Plagwitz; both
times it returned to its position under blasts of canister. The story goes that
when the commander of this battalion, a Captain Kossecki, received a
rebuke for not sending skirmishers against the enemy but instead engaging
in line, he answered that “as an old fusilier he knew what had to be done; but
the battalion was in fire for the first time; if he dispersed it through skirmish-
ers, he would lose control of it because of the shortage of experienced officers;
he would rather die here than see his battalion scattered.” After expending its
ammunition, the battalion withdrew from the line. As it marched rearward,
Yorck solemnly rode past, saluting the men for their bravery.58
From the French perspective, V Corps had hardly crossed the Bober
“when the general of the Allies refused to accept a decisive battle in that
position.” Allied artillery, “advantageously posted” along the hills of the
right bank, kept the French in check. Napoleon could only watch as the
Allies retreated “with the greatest order and coolness” and without losing a
prisoner or a gun. “It may now be considered as certain that the retreat had
been prudently determined beforehand in the expectation that Napoleon
would fall upon that particular army in person.” For the moment, Napoleon
“appeared to have no suspicion of a plan of operation conceived with so
much sagacity and executed with such perseverance.” Instead, he “experi-
enced the most lively satisfaction at having repulsed the Allies that day in
person and opening the campaign with some success and without sustaining
much loss.”59
Retreat never sat well with the man who eventually earned the epithet
“Marshal Forwards,” but at least Blücher understood the circumstances. The
same could not be said for the average soldier. Concern over morale
prompted Blücher to take action. That night, he issued an order of the day
from his headquarters at Pilgramsdorf to explain his decision and praise the
troops:
The enemy wants to force us into a decisive battle, but to maintain our
advantage we must avoid it. Therefore, we will go back and in a manner that
causes him to lose time so the combined Russian, Austrian, and Prussian
army gains time to break out of Bohemia and cross the Elbe to his rear while
the crown prince of Sweden advances from the Mark and also attacks him
from the rear. Thus, the Allied army entrusted to me will view itself as not
being forced to retreat, but instead is voluntarily retreating to lead him [the
enemy] to his doom. With true pleasure I saw and have learned that the
Landwehr troops who participated in the combat today fought bravely and
just like the veteran Line troops. I will not fail to inform His Majesty the
King of this honorable conduct.60
Löwenberg 185
Napoleon continued his quest to destroy Blücher or at least engage and

defeat the salty Prussian on the 22nd.61 Favorable yet incorrect news reached
Imperial Headquarters that Blücher had been wounded the day before. To
“briskly pursue the enemy in the direction of Goldberg,” the emperor
ordered XI and V Corps to advance east on both sides of the Löwenberg–
Goldberg road. With III Corps and II Cavalry Corps, Ney would pursue the
enemy toward Haynau or any other direction the Allies took. Napoleon
wanted one of Ney’s columns to drive between Haynau and Goldberg in
case the opportunity existed to block the Allies from the latter. The emperor
also ordered 2nd Guard Cavalry Division supported by two battalions from
V Corps to scour the square formed by Löwenberg, Goldberg, Hirschberg,
and Friedeberg. “You will send us everything you find and disarm the
inhabitants,” wrote Berthier to General Philippe-Antoine Ornano,
Napoleon’s cousin and commander of the division. “You will send forces
against the Cossacks and scatter their patrols.”62
As for the Silesian Army, controversy again accompanied its proceedings
on 22 August. From the advantageous position on the eastern (right) bank of
the Schnelle Deichsel, Blücher could observe Napoleon’s movements. He
informed his three corps commanders of his intention to avoid battle but to
hold the position on the right bank of the river “until it becomes evident that
the enemy is advancing to give battle with superior forces and has deployed
these forces before us on the left bank of the Deichsel.” In case a further
retreat became necessary, Sacken would withdraw through Seifersdorf
(Łukaszów) and ford the Katzbach at Schmogwitz (Smokowicka) while
Yorck crossed at Dohnau (Dunino) and Kroitsch (Krotoszyce), and
Langeron at Röchlitz and Goldberg. Blücher reserved the exclusive right
to determine if the situation demanded a retreat. Langeron objected to
the halt behind the Schnelle Deichsel. During a meeting at Pilgramsdorf,
he informed Blücher that it violated Barclay’s directives, which the Russian
commander now admitted to knowing. He attempted in vain to persuade
Blücher to retreat across the Katzbach. Blücher’s refusal mattered little.
As soon as the Prussian commander departed to join Yorck’s corps
around 10:00 a.m., Langeron ordered his corps to retreat to Goldberg (see
Map 2).63
During the late morning, Katzler reported that imperial forces held
Deutmannsdorf, Großhartmannsdorf, and Lauterseiffen. His troopers
observed huge enemy columns west of the latter two, yet some of the troops
that advanced to Deutmannsdorf the day before had already returned to
Löwenberg, where Napoleon passed the night according to locals. Sacken’s
8:00 a.m. report from Modelsdorf stated that Ney had moved southeast
from Thomaswaldau toward the Allied center. Accordingly, it appeared that
the imperial forces that had advanced through Bunzlau the day before had
turned off the great highway to march south. This alerted the Prussians to
the strong possibility of a renewed French advance toward Goldberg.

Because the French tended to depart only after cooking, they could assume
the enemy’s main columns would not march before noon.64
Although Berthier issued the emperor’s orders at 6:30 on the morning of
22 August, V Corps and the 35th and 36th Divisions of XI Corps did not
commence the advance toward Goldberg until midmorning. From
Löwenberg, they sought to catch the enemy’s rearguard.65 While Yorck’s
rearguard escaped before contact could be made, the French did find the
Russians. At 10:00 a.m. on the 22nd, a column of 10,000 men from
Macdonald’s XI Corps advanced from Deutmannsdorf, attacking Kaptse-
vich’s X Infantry Corps at Neuwiese one hour later. According to Langer-
on’s instructions, Kaptsevich slowly retired east toward Pilgramsdorf,
contesting every step and skillfully utilizing the terrain. Meanwhile, a second
column of 10,000 men from V Corps closed on Pilgramsdorf from the
southwest. To take in Kaptsevich, Rudzevich occupied the hills of Pilgrams-
dorf with the 2nd Brigade (7th and 37th Jäger and Shlisselburgskii Infantry
Regiments) of General Aleksandr Urusov’s 8th Division supported by Gen-
eral Aleksandr Berdyayev’s 3rd Dragoon Division from Langeron’s Reserve
Cavalry. These units managed to delay the imperials long enough for
Langeron’s main body to clear the Katzbach at the Goldberg defile and
move through Goldberg.
From Yorck’s command post on a hill near Ulbersdorf, Blücher gained a
clear view of the situation two miles north of him. Müffling claims that,
because no imperial forces appeared to be pursuing Yorck and Sacken, “the
general took the enemy’s movement for a reconnaissance.” Around the same
time, Blücher received a report from Langeron informing him that consider-
able French forces obliged him to retreat through Goldberg. Gneisenau
immediately dispatched an adjutant with orders for Langeron to halt. Blü-
cher himself rushed to Pilgramsdorf, finding Langeron’s main body gone
and the imperials challenging Kaptsevich’s rearguard for possession of the
village. At 3:00 p.m., the main French column surged forward. As French
numbers steadily increased, Blücher ordered Kaptsevich to torch the village
and fall back to Goldberg but remain near the village and occupy the heights
east of it on the road to Jauer.66
Although a furious Blücher demanded that Langeron turn around imme-
diately, he had little choice but to sign orders for Sacken and Yorck to also
retreat. Despite his aggravation over Langeron, Blücher sensed that the
situation had changed. From the hills east of Pilgramsdorf, he estimated
the strength of the opposing French force to be 20,000 men at most. This
certainly did not constitute Napoleon’s army. Moreover, they “did not
advance with the same zeal they usually displayed when Bonaparte was at
their head,” recalled Müffling. “He [Blücher] was convinced that Bonaparte
had turned back, and sorely regretted that Langeron’s premature retreat had
Löwenberg 187
frustrated his intentions.” To withdraw before Napoleon in accordance with

the Reichenbach Plan was one thing, fleeing from an isolated French corps
was another. A retreat across the Katzbach now appeared impulsive. After
sending orders for Yorck to halt, Blücher himself rushed to Goldberg to find
Langeron and drag the Russian general back to his position on the Schnelle
Deichsel. Yet not a trace of Langeron’s corps could be found. The few locals
who remained in the village claimed that the Russians had marched right
through Goldberg and kept going on the road to Jauer, which stood fourteen
miles to the southeast. Langeron had already covered so much ground that
his troops could no longer be seen in the distance. August rains insured wet
roads, preventing the dust clouds that normally revealed the march of
soldiers.
Despite Blücher’s orders, Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps departed from
Goldberg to follow Langeron’s main body. Blücher summoned Kaptsevich
to return but needed some troops to hold the town. Thus, he redirected
Katzler’s rearguard to Goldberg around 6:00 that evening. Arriving within
an hour, Major Golz occupied the town with four battalions, sending two
others to the hills immediately to the south. Nine squadrons under Major
Hermann Otto von Stößel covered the right flank between Hohberg
(Wyskok) and Goldberg while six squadrons and one battery reinforced by
four Russian guns moved behind the hills south of the town. As Golz pos-
itioned his battalions, the French moved up to the left bank of the Katzbach.
They opened considerable artillery fire that routed Katzler’s two Landwehr
squadrons as well as one of the militia battalions. This seemed to satisfy the
imperials, who ceased firing at dusk. Meanwhile, the lead units of Kaptsevich’s
rearguard – 2 Jäger battalions and 2,000 cavalry – arrived east of Goldberg.
While Katzler occupied the Goldberg position, Blücher’s adjutants
chased after Langeron. They finally caught up with the Russians at
Seichau, exactly seven and one-half miles from Jauer. Müffling maintains
that they delivered Blücher’s firm order “‘to turn back instantly and resume
the position at Goldberg’. The fate of the army hung on this movement:
General Langeron executed it.” In his journal, Langeron accepted partial
responsibility for his actions on this day:
I withdrew one and one-half miles east of Goldberg toward Seichau. I should
have remained at Goldberg but the day before General Blücher had informed
me that he intended to withdraw to Hennersdorf.67 This intention appeared
very logical in view of the report that he had received [from Sacken] on the
march of Ney’s corps but, since this corps never appeared, Blücher decided to
remain at Goldberg and found that I was too far from him; the Prussian
generals very much would like to present this as a fault on my part, but there
is no means of attributing it to me. If it was a fault, it was soon repaired, as
during the night I reported to Goldberg: Blücher ordered me to hold the
enemy while Yorck’s and Sacken’s corps made a sharp attack against his left.
Regardless of whether Blücher expressed an intention to withdraw to

Hennersdorf, he explicitly ordered Langeron to remain at Pilgramsdorf until
further notice. “Thus, it is impossible to justify this high-handed act,” judges
Friederich. “The explanation for this mistake can only be that he hoped
to drag Blücher on a further retrograde movement that he held to be
indispensable according to Barclay’s directives, which were only partially
known to him.”68
As night fell on the 22nd, Sacken’s main body camped at Schmogwitz, a
little over nine miles northeast of Goldberg and four miles southwest of
Liegnitz. Around 6:00 that evening, Yorck received orders to continue his
march to Niederkrayn (Krajów) and Dohnau, the latter being nine miles
northeast of Goldberg, the former eight miles east of the town. Late in the
night, Yorck’s two columns crossed the Katzbach and reached their destin-
ations after completing a fifth night march since the beginning of the
campaign. Yorck and Blücher established their respective headquarters at
Niederkrayn. Langeron decided to pass the night at Seichau and depart for
Goldberg early on 23 August. On the extreme left, Pahlen III’s main body
withdrew east to Schmiedeberg while Kaysarov’s rearguard remained at
Hirschberg (see Map 2).
At Niederkrayn, Blücher received a report from Sacken claiming that
part of the French army had returned to Bunzlau. His patrols found no sign
of the imperials between Haynau and Thomaswaldau on the Bunzlau–
Breslau highway. This news further confirmed the inaccuracy of Sacken’s
earlier report on Ney’s southeast march to link with Napoleon’s center.
Sacken’s report, combined with the enemy’s lackadaisical performance at
Goldberg, reinforced Blücher’s belief that the push to the Katzbach had the
sole purpose of masking the emperor’s departure. Other intelligence claimed
that imperial forces had been withdrawing along the Bunzlau–Görlitz high-
way for the past three days. This news, along with Sacken’s report, was
wrong and Blücher’s assumption proved only partially correct. To com-
pound the situation, a letter from the tsar dated 19 August arrived late in
the evening. Alexander communicated his expectation that Napoleon would
throw himself on the Bohemian Army. He emphasized the need for Blücher
to keep his sword in the back of the imperial army in Silesia but avoid
embroiling himself in a general battle.69
Although Ney’s troops did not march until 3:30 on the afternoon of the
22nd, III Corps and II Cavalry Corps reached Adelsdorf on the Schnelle
Deichsel that same day. North of Ney’s main body, his 39th Division, which
did not depart from Bunzlau until 6:30 p.m., ejected Lanskoy’s cavalry from
Haynau.70 During the night, the French occupied Haynau, extending
their left wing from Thomaswaldau to Kreibau, and their right wing from
Großhartmannsdorf to Adelsdorf. After driving Langeron’s rearguard from
Pilgramsdorf, the imperials continued toward Goldberg. At nightfall on the
Löwenberg 189
22nd, XI Corps settled in Ulbersdorf and Hermsdorf, the latter being three
miles west of Goldberg on the direct highway from Löwenberg; V Corps
held the five-mile stretch from Hermsdorf south to Neukirch (Nowy Koś-
ciół). At Löwenberg, the Guard, VI Corps, and I Cavalry Corps rested from
their recent forced marches.71
During the course of the operation on 22 August, Napoleon followed V
Corps toward Goldberg. “He had great difficulty in concealing his joy when
he learned from the reports that the rearguards of the Prussians and Russians
were pursued to the Katzbach, near Goldberg,” recalled Odeleben. “He
himself went halfway to Goldberg, made his observations on the environs,
and the enemies’ soldiers who remained on the field of battle, and spoke with
the peasants who had had sufficient courage not to quit their homes, con-
versing affably on indifferent subjects.” After receiving news of Blücher’s
retreat across the Katzbach, the emperor returned to Löwenberg, “his mind
being rendered easy with respect to the success of his arms, which had made
him gain ground on that side.”72 Napoleon thus described his situation,
somehow forgetting that he had started his offensive on the 21st rather than
the 20th: “The enemy’s Army of Silesia moved against our own, reaching
Bunzlau, Goldberg, and Löwenberg on the 20th. I immediately went there
and attacked the enemy on the same day, overthrowing him everywhere, and
we are now pursuing with the sword in his back. As for my Guard divisions
that are destined to join the army I have placed in Bohemia, they rested
today and will probably start for Görlitz tomorrow. Nevertheless, if the
enemy moves on Dresden, I will arrive in time to fight there and none of my
previous dispositions will change: General Vandamme is only two days from
Dresden, the duc de Bellune [Victor] is only three days, my Guard divisions
are only four days, all of which united with XIV Corps would make a very
considerable force.”
Statements from prisoners allowed the emperor to draw a conclusive
picture of Blücher’s army. It consisted of three corps with Langeron com-
manding a corps of five divisions and Sacken a corps of three divisions. In a
letter to Maret, he did not recognize Blücher as the commander in chief,
stating only that Blücher and York commanded a corps of four divisions.
The entire Army of Silesia amounted to twelve divisions, which Napoleon
estimated to total 80,000 to 90,000 men. “What is good is that their infantry
is extremely poor,” judged the emperor. Moreover, he already sensed that
something had to be afoot to account for the enemy’s retreat. Instead of
attributing it to Allied strategy, he chalked it up to Allied ineptitude and fear.
“It seems that their Army of Silesia advanced with more speed than the
Allied plan called for and under the belief that we would retreat across the
Elbe. They believed that all they had to do was pursue because as soon as
they saw our lead columns resume the offensive, terror took them, and we
are convinced that their leaders want to avoid a serious engagement. The
0 10 20 30 40 50 miles
Glogau N
Hoyerswerda
Parchwitz
Haynau O der
Steudnitz
Bobe r
Bunzlau xxx xxx
xxxx II III Liegnitz Deutschlissa
Queis
xxx Napoleon Neumarkt
Neiße
Großenhain Gd xxx xxx xxx Breslau
Goldberg XI Sacken Panzkau
Naumburg VI xxx xxx
Spree
Görlitz xxx V Yorck xxxx
Löwenberg I
Bautzen xxx Silesia Ober-Mois
Königstein Lauban Schmottseifen
Langeron Jauer Kanth Neudorf-am-
Meißen Lähn Gröditzberg Ohlau
Greiffenberg Saarau
xx Marklissa Schönau
xx
Katzbach
Gd Gd
Friedeberg Brieg
xxx
El
xxx II Striegau Würben
be
I
xxx Berthelsdorf Bolkenhain
XIV Hirschberg
Str.
Stolpen xxx xxx x Schweidnitz Grottkau
IV VIII Strehlen
.
Rumburg xxx
gau
Str
Dresden Pirna Zittau Friedland Schmeideberg Pahlen
itz
xxx xxx Reichenbach
Strie
idn
Kleist Wittgenst. Landeshut
e
Schreiberhau
hw
Peterswaldau
Sc
190
xxxx BOHEMIA
Bohemia ge Silberberg
Rie
ir se Nieße
tzer Neiße Ri
xx Gla ver Kosel
Turnau 2 Wartha
eb Teplitz Aussig
ng
Glatz
Leitmeritz
zg eb
r Görkau Lobositz Gitschen
Jungbunzlau
E
Brüx
ir
Komotau
g
e
AU S TR IA
Prague

Löwenberg 191
whole Allied plan was based on assurances from Metternich that we would
retreat across the Elbe, and they are very confused to see otherwise.” The
only negative aspect of the campaign thus far proved to be the lack of
confidence that his subordinates displayed in their own abilities. Left to
their own devices, his marshals and generals seemed to always exaggerate the
difficulties they faced.73
With Blücher on the run, Napoleon’s attention immediately switched to
Bohemia. Contrary to most histories of the campaign, Napoleon did not
receive cries for help from St.-Cyr at Dresden. True, Schwarzenberg did not
take the bait. Instead of marching on Zittau as Napoleon expected, the
paunchy Austrian directed his army to the left bank of the Elbe from where
it would advance on Dresden. However, neither St.-Cyr nor Napoleon
knew this on the night of 22/23 August when Berthier issued orders for
the return to Görlitz. At 2:30 a.m. on 23 August, the major-general ordered
General Jean-Baptiste Corbineau’s 1st Light Cavalry Division of I Cavalry
Corps to move out of Löwenberg at 4:00 a.m. in order to clear the road
between Lauban and Görlitz. The Old Guard would follow thirty minutes
later and proceed to Lauban; the Young Guard would strike the same road
between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. At 11:00, the rest of I Cavalry Corps would
depart. Marmont’s VI Corps likewise received orders to return to Lauban
but on another road to prevent its columns from crossing with those of the
Guard.74
As for the emperor, he first thought of going to Prague and expressed this
intention to Ney at 11:00 a.m. on the 23rd, wanting the marshal to accom-
pany him. One hour later he changed his mind, telling Macdonald that he
would return to Görlitz that same day but “that his further operations
would depend on those of the enemy: if the enemy, on the 23rd or 24th,
positively takes the offensive on Dresden, my intention is to leave the
initiative to him and immediately go to the fortified camp of Dresden and
fight a great battle.” Commenting on the refusal of the Allied army in Silesia
to accept battle, he informed Maret that nothing would be more fortunate
than “an enemy march on Dresden, since then there would be a battle.”
After reaching Görlitz late in the afternoon of the 23rd, Napoleon received a
report from St.-Cyr. Writing at 11:00 p.m. on the 22nd, the marshal
explained that a Russian corps (Wittgenstein’s) had debouched through the
Peterswald (Petrovice) pass with what appeared to be the entire Austrian
army following. Napoleon assured him that he would soon arrive at Dres-
den with 200,000 men.75
After sending the Guard, VI Corps, and I Cavalry Corps marching back
to the Saxon theater, Napoleon formed the Army of the Bober with the
forces that remained in Silesia. He named the 48-year-old Macdonald its
commander. Personnel changes needed to be made to aid Macdonald’s
transition from corps to army commander. Very hard lessons from
campaigns in Portugal, Spain, and Russia had taught Napoleon that more
than one marshal spoiled the army, meaning that more than one marshal
could not be assigned to an army that he did not personally command. Thus,
with Macdonald being junior to Ney, the bravest of the brave had to go.
Indeed, it was Ney who had been such a thorn in the side of the great André
Masséna during the 1810 invasion of Portugal. Determined not to make the
same mistake, Napoleon summoned Ney to join him. Souham assumed
command of III Corps while Maurice-Étienne Gérard took the helm of XI
Corps. Macdonald’s army consisted of III, V, and XI Corps as well as II
Cavalry Corps: 100,000 men according to Napoleon’s estimation. To pro-
vide balance and to ease Souham’s responsibility of commanding the huge
III Corps, he transferred Jean-Gabriel Marchand’s 39th Division to XI
Corps. Macdonald’s corps commanders represented a new crop of battle-
hardened divisional generals eager to receive the marshal’s baton. For good
reason, Napoleon believed he had placed the Army of the Bober in compe-
tent hands.76
Although Macdonald would prove an utter failure as an independent
commander, the instructions he received from the emperor and Berthier
cannot be considered either difficult or complicated. Basically, the Army
of the Bober would shield Napoleon’s operations against the Bohemian
Army in Saxony. Equally important, it had to protect the rear of Oudinot’s
Army of Berlin as it drove on the Prussian capital. Macdonald simply had to
hold Blücher at the Bober River long enough for Napoleon to dispose of the
Army of Bohemia and return to Silesia with overwhelming forces. However,
Napoleon’s instructions, confirmed by a second letter from Berthier,
referred to the position on the Bober as defensive. In the case of a lost battle
on the Bober, Macdonald would retreat to the Queis, which he would hold
at all costs. Yet, should Blücher take the offensive, Macdonald did receive the
authority to reciprocate. Napoleon encouraged the marshal: if he posted the
army in accordance with the emperor’s instructions, he could explode
from Löwenberg or another point and beat back any enemy offensive. On
the 23rd, Napoleon ordered tactical strikes across the Katzbach to drive
Blücher beyond the Wütende (Raging) Neiße (Nysa Szalona) and to keep
the Prussians guessing. But what would be next for Macdonald? Neither
Napoleon nor Berthier made clear whether Macdonald should continue to
drive the enemy through Jauer and then return to the Bober position, or
whether he should first build the entrenchments to fortify the Bober pos-
ition and then meet Blücher on a prepared battlefield. Napoleon’s oversight
in this matter led to the failure of his plan – a failure that ultimately would
cost him Germany.77
Little did Napoleon know that, as he was emphasizing Macdonald’s need
to protect the rear of the Army of Berlin, the Prussians were successfully
defending their capital against Oudinot with a “pack of bad Landwehr,” to
Löwenberg 193
quote the emperor. As dawn broke on 23 August, the Army of Berlin

converged on the Prussian capital. Tauentzien’s IV Corps held Bertrand’s
IV Corps at Blankenfelde while Bülow’s III Corps engaged Reynier’s VII
Corps at Großbeeren, a village eleven miles south of Berlin. After fierce
hand-to-hand combat, Reynier’s two Saxon divisions broke, carrying away
his lone French division. Darkness fell and the battle ended with VII Corps
in full retreat. During the combat, Oudinot’s own XII Corps remained idle
at Ahrensdorf, facing Bernadotte with his Swedes and Wintzingerode’s
Russian corps, which likewise did nothing. Casualties on both sides were
modest, with Prussian losses numbering 159 dead, 662 wounded, 228 miss-
ing, and 6 destroyed guns. Bülow’s men captured 14 guns and 52 filled
caissons. Reynier’s two Saxon divisions lost 20 officers and 1,918 soldiers
while the French 32nd Division lost 1,138 men. Despite the low body count,
Oudinot, a choice worse than Macdonald for an independent command,
ordered a headlong retreat that did not stop until his army reached the safety
of Wittenberg on the Elbe.78
In Silesia, the Prussians of Blücher’s staff knew Napoleon could not
pursue them indefinitely and overextend himself from Dresden. As long as
the Bohemian Army advanced toward the Saxon capital, the emperor’s
operations in Silesia would be limited. Blücher believed that, as soon as
Napoleon sensed the Silesian Army would not accept battle, he would
depart for Saxony to attack Schwarzenberg. To provide time for Schwar-
zenberg’s massive army to reach Dresden, Blücher had to distract Napo-
leon for as long as possible. “The question now,” explained Müffling, “was
what would the enemy do next. If he penetrated deeper into Silesia with
such a considerable force, he would give the Bohemian Army time to gain
Dresden and the line of the Elbe and, since that was the goal of our
operations, we could wish for nothing more desirable. But Bonaparte could
also turn back from the Bober toward Dresden; thus it was necessary to
make him deploy his forces in front of us before we retreated another
step.”79
Notes
1 Quoted in Unger, Blücher, II:69.
2 A copy of the attack disposition can be found in Add MSS, 20112, 121.
September, 2 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18;
Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:25.
4 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 54–55.
7 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:1–25.

10 Langeron made no mention in his memoirs of refusing to comply with Blücher’s
orders.
11 “Journal of Operations of General Sacken’s Corps,” in Langeron, Mémoires, 245;
13 Reproduced in Droysen, Yorck, II:123.
14 Reproduced in Droysen, Yorck, II:124.
17 SHAT, C17 132: Charles John to Blücher, Potsdam, 16 August 1813.
18 SHAT, C17 132: Charles John to Blücher, Charlottenburg, 19 August 1813.
19 Barclay to Blücher, Melnick, 18 August 1813, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi
Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (hereafter cited as RGVIA), f. VUA, op. 16,
d. 3911, ll. 125–125b.
20 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:259.
Nr. 18; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 32–33.
25 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:126. According to August von Janson of the
Historical Section of the German General Staff: “Schack’s journal, compared to
the original reports and papers, proves . . . to be a very reliable source. There exists
no reason to assume that the opinion of the situation contained therein as well as
the orders received are not completely in accordance with the thought process
and the mood of Yorck and his entourage as it actually was at the time . . . so the
typical critical judgment over Blücher’s arrangements is nevertheless completely
and clearly genuine. If one had aspired to subsequently embellish the opinions,
certainly many of the statements and thoughts would have been omitted.” See
Janson, “Die Unternehmungen des Yorckschen Korps,” Appendix 2, 53.
A portion of the journal covering the period from 11 January to 16 February
1814 can be found in GStA, PK, IV HA Rep. 15 A 234.
September, 2 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18.
29 Blücher to Frederick William, 20 August 1813, quoted in Friederich, Herbstfeld-
zug 1813, I:259.
31 Odeleben’s next statement that this engagement led Napoleon to assume “that the
principal strength of the enemy was united there,” thus making “his presence to
be very necessary at that point,” must refer to the concentration of Blücher’s army
because Napoleon knew by this time that Schwarzenberg’s army formed the main
host of the Allies: Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, I:263.
Löwenberg 195
32 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, I:264.

33 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, I:265; CN, Nos. 20425–20428,
XXVI:106–07.
34 On the morning of the 21st, III Corps and II Cavalry Corps stood at Tillendorf
and Birkenbrück (Brzeźnik); VI Corps at Ottendorf and Rackwitz (Rakowice
Małe); V and XI Corps as well as the Young Guard at Löwenberg; the 31st
Division from XI Corps at Greiffenberg, and 2nd Brigade from 5th Division of
II Corps at Lauban. See Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:264.
35 Four roads all on the right bank of the Bober, radiating east and south from
Bunzlau, were available to Ney. Working clockwise, they were: the main highway
that ran through Haynau to Breslau; the Bunzlau–Modelsdorf road, which
Sacken had been ordered to take in case he had to retreat; the Bunzlau–Giersdorf
road; and the Bunzlau–Löwenberg road.
36 CN, Nos. 20428, 20429, and 20435, XXVI:106–10; SHAT, C17 179: Berthier to
Ney, Marmont, Mouton, Mortier, Latour-Maubourg, Lauriston, and Friant, 21
August 1813.
37 Warburg’s 5:00 a.m. report from the suburbs of Bunzlau is reproduced in repro-
duced in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:80; Lobenthal to Gneisenau, Weinberg,
5:45 a.m., 21 August 1813, ibid.
38 Sohr’s group consisted of two hussar squadrons, one Guard Jäger company, and
the skirmishers of the 1st Battalion of the Leib Regiment: Müffling, Die Feldzüge,
17; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:259–60.
39 Lobenthal to Gneisenau, Weinberg, 7:15 a.m., reproduced in Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1844:80; Droysen, Yorck, II:126, refers to the northern hill as the Weinberg
and the southern as the Plattenberg; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 17–18.
40 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:81; Unger, Blücher, II:70–71; Friederich, Herbst-
feldzug 1813, I:262–63.
41 Langeron, Mémoires, 233; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:82.
42 Warburg’s 7:00 a.m. report is reproduced in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:82;
Gneisenau to Sacken, Hohlstein, 21 August 1813, reproduced ibid., 82–83; Unger,
Blücher, II:71.
43 Gneisenau to Sacken, Hohlstein, 21 August 1813, reproduced in Höpfner, “Dar-
stellung,” 1844:82–83.
44 Droysen, Yorck, II:126. Droysen’s 1833 Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen (His-
tory of Alexander the Great) heralded a new school of German historical thought
that idealized the power and success held by the so-called great men of history.
His work on Yorck has been labeled one of the best German-language biograph-
ies. See also Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:260–63.
45 Blücher to Yorck, Hohlstein, 21 August 1813, reproduced in Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1844:83.
46 Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 375–76.
47 “Journal of Operations of General Sacken’s Corps,” in Langeron, Mémoires,
245–46.
48 Sacken to Blücher, Modelsdorf, 8:30 p.m., 21 August 1813, reproduced in Höpf-
ner, “Darstellung,” 1844:88.
49 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, I:265–66.

52 “Having arrived with difficulty on the road from the village of Plagwitz to Höfel,
I saw a little before the latter village the 7th Jäger Regiment joined by the 37th
that marched up from Höfel attacked sharply on the flank by two (very weak)
regiments of French Chasseurs-à-cheval. At the time, I had only two squadrons
of the Severskii Mounted Jäger Regiment and their commander, [Luc] Denisiyev,
near me. I did not have time to make clear to him the danger that my two foot
Jäger regiments faced, before this brave general jumped on his horse, ordered the
charge, and with his two brave and beautiful squadrons fell on the enemy cavalry
with the speed of lightning, and took them in the flank, overthrew them, and
disengaged the infantry”: Langeron, Mémoires, 234–35.
53 Lieven, in Russia Against Napoleon, 376, mistakenly attributes Gneisenau’s praise
of Rudzevich’s action at Siebeneichen on the 19th to the engagement at Löw-
enberg on the 21st.
55 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 19; Langeron, Mémoires, 235–36; Gneisenau to Hard-
enberg, Jauer, 25 August 1813, GStA PK, I HA Rep. 74 Staatskanzleramt O Ap.
Nr. 9, Bd. 3; Nostitz, Tagebuch, 55.
57 Katzler’s detachment consisted of eight battalions, twenty-one squadrons, and
two batteries: Blücher to Yorck, Pilgramsdorf, 21 August 1813, reproduced in
Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:89; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 20; Droysen, Yorck,
II:128.
58 Yorck’s corps lost 30 officers and 1,618 men; Langeron’s 11 officers and 320 men;
and Sacken’s 10 officers and 157 men. Langeron estimates the losses to be higher:
“We lost 3,000 men, 2,600 of whom were Prussians and 400 were Russians.” The
account of the combat of Löwenberg is based on Langeron to Barclay, Report on
Langeron’s operations from 7 August to 2 September, 2 September 1813, GStA
PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:83–87;
Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 17–20; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege,
II:169–73; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, I:142–43; Bogdanovich, Geschichte
des Krieges, IIa:28–29; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:260–68; Droysen, Yorck,
II:127, Unger, Blücher, II:71–72; Langeron, Mémoires, 232–37.
60 Order, Pilgramsdorf, 21 August 1813, reproduced in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:89.
61 At nightfall on the 21st, III Corps and II Cavalry Corps halted at
Großhartmannsdorf and Giersdorf. Lauriston’s V Corps and 3rd Light Division
of I Cavalry Corps occupied Deutmannsdorf, Lauterseiffen, and Petersdorf
(Pieszków). The Guard, XI Corps, VI Corps and the rest of I Cavalry Corps
remained on the left bank of the Bober at Sirgwitz and Löwenberg: Friederich,
Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:268.
62 SHAT, C17 179: Berthier to Macdonald, Lauriston, Ney, and Ornano, 22
August 1813.
63 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 21–22; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:31, does
not pass judgment on Langeron’s actions.
Löwenberg 197

65 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:90. Per Blücher’s initial order to retreat from Löw-
enberg, Yorck’s corps marched in two columns toward Dohnau and Kroitsch,
respectively, with two rearguards following. Katzler accompanied the rearguard
of the southern column – fifteen squadrons, six battalions, and one battery –
whose infantry Major Golz commanded.
66 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 22; Langeron, Mémoires, 237–38.
67 Hennersdorf was less than two miles from Seichau on the road to Jauer.
68 Langeron, Mémoires, 238; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 22–23; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, Iia:31; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:271–72. Gneise-
nau makes no mention of this in his report to Hardenberg: Gneisenau to
Hardenberg, Jauer, 25 August 1813, GSTA PK, I HA Rep. 74 Staatskanzleramt
O Ap. Nr. 9, Bd. 3.
69 Alexander to Blücher, Jungfer-Teynitz, 19 August 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16,
d. 3399, ll. 7b–8; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:33; Freytag-
Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 52–53; Droysen, Yorck, II:129.
70 Lanskoy, relieved at Polnischlissa by the lead elements of Bennigsen’s Army of
Poland, crossed the Oder on 20 and 21 August. He received orders to reach
Haynau on the 21st with his lead squadrons.
72 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, 268–69.
73 CN, No. 20445, XXVI:118–19.
74 SHAT, C17 179: Berthier to Corbineau, Mouton, Mortier, Latour-Maubourg, and
Marmont, 23 August 1813.
75 CN, Nos. 29437, 20440, 20443, 20445, and 20446, XXVI:112, 114, 117–20; SHAT,
C17 179: Berthier to Victor and Vandamme, 23 August 1813.
76 CN, Nos. 20440–20442, XXVI:114; SHAT, C17 179: Berthier to Ney, Macdonald,
Souham, and Gérard, 23 August 1813.
77 Napoleon’s instructions clearly identify Macdonald’s position along the Bober as
defensive. Three divisions from III Corps would guard Bunzlau; Napoleon
wanted all approaches thoroughly entrenched. Three divisions of XI Corps would
hold Löwenberg and cover the Hirse, Luften, and Senften hills with entrench-
ments. For the easy and rapid crossing of the Bober, the emperor ordered the
construction of three solid bridges. Lauriston’s V Corps would occupy Hirsch-
berg and echelon its divisions toward Löwenberg. With the Bober forming the line
of communication between Bunzlau and Hirschberg, Napoleon demanded that
the river be carefully guarded against a surprise attack. One division from III
Corps would fall back to a fortified position between the Queis and the Bober
while Marchand’s 39th Division entrenched itself in the principal positions on the
Queis: Naumburg, Lauban, and Greiffenberg. Strong combined-arms detachments
would be posted on each flank to patrol ceaselessly and prevent Blücher from
wheeling around the army. Although the emperor prescribed the building of
numerous fortifications on both the Bober and the Queis, he wanted the army to
remain mobile and ready to march. All corps would receive eight to ten days of
provisions. As Macdonald’s main supply depot, Lauban had to be entrenched and
defended by redoubts on the surrounding hills. Napoleon did not want Blücher to
exploit the gap between Macdonald’s left and the Oder to threaten the Army of
Berlin, or hug the Riesengebirge and squeeze past Macdonald’s right to get to
Lusatia and Saxony. Should Blücher attempt to outflank Macdonald’s left,
Napoleon instructed the marshal to unite all of his cavalry and one infantry division
on his left wing and as a flying corps have it observe the enemy so he could not
drive toward Berlin between him and the Oder. See CN, Nos. 20442 and 20443,
XXVI:115–18; SHAT, C17 179: Berthier to Macdonald, 23 August 1813; Jomini, Vie
politique et militaire de Napoléon, VI:18–19; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign,
189–90. Although Jomini claims that Berthier received orders from Napoleon to
instruct Macdonald to take advantage of the opportunity to fall on the Allies with
his forces united, the documentary evidence does not support this.
78 See Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, 160–77.
5
Goldberg
As the Reichenbach Plan deferred the initiative to Napoleon, the Army of

Bohemia could do little until Allied High Command determined the
emperor’s intentions. To this end, Austrian intelligence proved totally inad-
equate during the last weeks of the armistice. Having almost no news of
Napoleon, Schwarzenberg could only hope that the emperor would not
cross the Erzgebirge before the Russians and Prussians arrived from Silesia.
Aside from knowing very little of Napoleon’s intentions, the Austrians
possessed only a vague idea of his troop dispositions along the Bohemian
frontier. After allocating sufficient forces to other theaters, they assumed
that 151,000 men out of a total of 413,000 would remain at Napoleon’s
immediate disposal for an invasion of Bohemia. Yet to everyone’s surprise,
the French gave no indication of conducting such an operation. By the time a
council of war convened at Melnik on 17 August, most Allied commanders
believed Napoleon would attack Bernadotte rather than invade Bohemia.
Reports confirmed the concentration of large imperial forces for an offensive
against Berlin. Although intelligence placed Napoleon at Bunzlau, spies
reported that French authorities expected him to arrive at Görlitz from
where he would turn north to Cottbus and direct the drive on the Prussian
capital. While the emperor conducted his “master plan,” imperial forces
along the Bohemian frontier and in Silesia would mask the Allied armies
facing them. According to the Reichenbach Plan, the Army of Bohemia
should respond by crossing the Erzgebirge. While the Army of North
Germany retreated ahead of Napoleon’s offensive, Schwarzenberg would
either take Dresden or march on Leipzig to sever French communications.
At Melnik, however, Schwarzenberg raised the possibility of Napoleon
taking a central position at Leipzig. There, he would observe the approach of
the Bohemian and North German Armies, waiting to exploit the first
mistake made by either Allied army. Just as in Italy in 1796, he would utilize
199
7 The three Allied monarchs at Prague, August 1813
his interior lines to defeat each army in detail. From this supposition
emerged the idea that the French would oppose the Allies as they attempted
to debouch through the passes of the Erzgebirge where the mountain roads
ran almost perpendicular to the vital communication artery that ran from
Dresden through Freiberg, Chemnitz, and Plauen to South Germany. In
order for Napoleon to maintain communication with his German allies, it
appeared logical for him to take a position at either Chemnitz or Freiberg.
This led to the decision to divide the Bohemian Army into four columns for
an offensive against Leipzig. Three would cross the Erzgebirge and make for
the city while the fourth column debouched on Pirna and Königstein to
cover Schwarzenberg’s right flank (see Map 1).1
Both Radetzky and Jomini objected, with the former proposing that
Schwarzenberg wait for Napoleon to invade Bohemia and then pounce on
his columns as they debouched from the Erzgebirge. Yet at Melnik,
Schwarzenberg’s views attracted the support of Tsar Alexander as well as
Goldberg 201
the Russian and Prussian generals. But at Prague on 18 August, Allied High
Command learned that Napoleon had left Dresden on the 15th and pro-
ceeded to Bautzen, presumably to continue through Görlitz to Silesia. News
that Napoleon had gone east made it imperative to undertake a more
immediate demonstration to relieve the pressure on Blücher.
Thus, a drive on Dresden surfaced in Allied plans as an afterthought to
assist the Silesian Army. On 19 August, Alexander, Francis, and Frederick
William departed from Prague and reached Komotau (Chomutov). News
arrived on the following day of Napoleon’s appearance at the Zittau Pass on
18 August. These tidings convinced the Allies to postpone the offensive
against Leipzig and instead advance on Dresden. Thus, the “Grand Army”
of Bohemia crossed the Saxon frontier in four columns on 22 August. On the
far right, Wittgenstein and Kleist led their respective corps through
the Peterswald defile, twenty-five miles south of Dresden. After clearing
the pass, they struck the great highway that led to the Saxon capital. Running
parallel to the Elbe, this direction required the Allies to blockade the fort at
Königstein and attack the entrenched camp at Pirna. Wittgenstein
accomplished both tasks on the 22nd. After masking Königstein, the Russian
vanguard carried the lines of Pirna with the bayonet. The French troops of
XIV Corps withdrew to Dresden. Schwarzenberg’s three other columns
likewise crossed the Saxon frontier; all four converged on Dresden.
In Silesia, the Army of the Bober received the task of pushing across the
Katzbach on the 23rd to cover the emperor’s departure. Napoleon ordered
V Corps to take Goldberg while XI Corps moved across the Katzbach on its
left. North of XI Corps, part of II Cavalry Corps would advance directly to
Liegnitz while the main body rode to Grosnig (Leśniki) and Rothkirch
(Czerwony Kościół), four and five miles southwest of Liegnitz respectively.
For reasons unknown, Ney did not receive Berthier’s letter summoning him to
Imperial Headquarters and transferring command of III Corps to Souham. As
a result, he sent three of his divisions marching east on the east–west highway
to Liegnitz while the other two joined Sébastiani’s cavalry at Rothkirch (see
Map 2).2
Blücher did not receive word of Lanskoy’s mishap at Haynau until noon
on the 23rd. Had he learned of it earlier, his plans for the 23rd would have been
different. Instead, a report arrived from the single Brandenburg Hussar
squadron remaining on the left bank of the Katzbach. According to one of
its patrols led by a noncommissioned officer that had circumnavigated the
Gröditzberg, the French III Corps had not advanced toward Goldberg.
Moreover, the patrol did not encounter any imperial forces behind the French
right wing at Ulbersdorf. Consequently, Blücher and his staff made prepar-
ations to hold Goldberg and the line of the Katzbach on the 23rd. Just east of
the river, Goldberg sat at the foot of the Wolfs hill, an isolated height that
mastered the surrounding terrain especially to the east, thus making its
To Haynau
0 1000 2000 3000 metres
N
Neudorf-am- Knobelsdorf
To Rennwege
Bunzlau Hohberg
To Liegnitz
Kosendan
Niederau
Oberau Kopatsch Röchlitz

To Kopatsch hills
Löwenberg
Selzer Goldberg
suburb
Ober Prausnitz
suburb Flens hill
Wolfs hill
Wolfsdorf
To Jauer
11. Engagement at Goldberg, 23 August 1813
possession invaluable for Goldberg’s defense. Ranging between ten and twelve
feet in height, Goldberg’s medieval wall as well as its accompanying embank-
ment and trench ringed the entire town. Four gates and three emergency exits
breached Goldberg’s old walls. The roads running west to Löwenberg and
Bunzlau converged at the Selzer Gate on the west side of Goldberg. A stone
bridge carried the highway from Löwenberg across the Katzbach while the
road from Bunzlau spanned a wooden structure. On the southwest side of
Goldberg, roads to Löwenberg and Hirschberg departed from the Ober Gate.
Roads south could be found outside the Friedrich Gate while the Niederau
Gate received travelers from points to the north and east. Between these two
gates rose the gentle Flens hill chain that overlooked the eastern side of
Goldberg. Extensive suburbs surrounded all four gates. Wooded hills flanked
the town to the south and southeast while the terrain leveled to the north to
favor cavalry operations. North of Goldberg extended the undulating Silesian
plain. Rocky hills bordered the steep valleys of the Katzbach and its tributar-
ies. Dominating points and plateaus randomly jutted upward.3
Goldberg 203
Golz received instructions to occupy the town with four battalions while
the remaining three took a position on the Flens hill supported by ten guns.
Katzler placed his six squadrons at the eastern feet of the Flens hill. Around
6:00 a.m. on the 23rd, Blücher instructed Kaptsevich to occupy the Flens hill
to provide closer support for the Prussians at Goldberg. Langeron’s main
body, consisting of VI and IX Infantry Corps, moved up to Prausnitz, where
the corps commander arrived shortly after daybreak. He placed General
Korf’s Reserve Cavalry west of the Flens hill. Further west, Rudzevich
occupied the Wolfs hill with the four battalions of the 29th and 45th Jäger
Regiments. To protect the left flank, the Arkhangelogorodskii and Staroin-
germanlandskii Infantry Regiments held the village of Wolfsdorf (Wilków)
south of the Wolfs hill. Eighteen guns supported the infantry; the three
regiments of the 2nd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment and six squadrons of
Mounted Jäger formed echelons between Wolfsdorf and Goldberg. In the
open terrain northeast of Goldberg stood two more Jäger regiments, with the
rest of X Infantry Corps (four battalions and eighteen guns) somewhat
further behind on the Kopatsch hills. Langeron dispatched two infantry
regiments to Konradswaldau (Kondratów), seven miles southeast of Gold-
berg. “As we assumed the enemy wanted to turn our left via Konradswal-
dau,” he recounted, “which is the shortest route to take from Goldberg to
Jauer, and since there I had only four squadrons4 under the orders of General
[Andrey] Umanets, I ordered General Talyzin II to march there with the
Moskovskii and Libavskii Infantry Regiments, and I put this entire detach-
ment under the orders of General Count Pavel Pahlen [known as Pahlen II].”
Blücher ordered Yorck to post one brigade less than one mile north of
Goldberg at Niederau to prevent the enemy from moving into the Katzbach
valley between Goldberg and Röchlitz. At 7:00 a.m., Yorck dispatched the
6,400 men and 8 guns of Prince Karl’s 2nd Brigade from Niederkrayn. The
wet summer weather had been unfavorable for several days but on 23 August
the rain fell in torrents, making small-arms fire almost impossible. Morale
plummeted as the troops dragged themselves through the clay mud. The
Landwehr particularly suffered; many had to surrender their boots to the
uncompromising muck. Karl posted one battalion at the Röchlitz cemetery
to secure his retreat across the Katzbach. Next, he forwarded the Fusilier
battalions of the 1st and 2nd East Prussian Regiments, both commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Sjöholm, into the steep Katzbach valley west of Nie-
derau; two squadrons of Brandenburg Uhlans and one squadron of Land-
wehr cavalry joined them. The prince intended to take a position facing west
and parallel to the Haynau–Goldberg road with the left wing anchored on
Niederau and the right on Hohberg.
This still did not satisfy a restless Blücher. With each hour his anxiety
increased as he waited for news that the French army had departed for
Saxony. According to Langeron: “Our spies told us that, having failed in
his plan to force us into a general battle at Löwenberg, Napoleon had left for
Dresden, but we were not at all certain of this.” A report from a reliable
agent stating that large imperial columns had marched through Bunzlau
toward Görlitz provided the last straw for Blücher. At 8:00 a.m., he signed
orders changing the day’s operation from a defensive to an offensive that
sought to envelop the French corps west of Goldberg and place the army in a
position to pursue the withdrawing imperials. “Having received the news
that one part of the French army that had been facing me at Löwenberg had
retired to take another direction,” Blücher informed Bernadotte, “I resolved
to attack the enemy today to oblige him to deploy his forces.”5
To envelop the French corps, he directed Yorck to march east to Ulbers-
dorf on the Schnelle Deichsel from where cavalry and horse artillery would
continue to Neuwiese. Yorck’s right wing and Reserve Cavalry would move
to Pilgramsdorf (see Map 2). Leaving one brigade and one heavy battery in
reserve on the hills east of Pilgramsdorf, Yorck instructed both of his wings
to descend on the French corps between Pilgramsdorf and Goldberg. Sacken
received instructions to march east from Schmogwitz through Adelsdorf to
the Gröditzberg. To shield Yorck’s rear, Blücher wanted Sacken to take a
defensive position, blocking the roads running from Bunzlau and
Löwenberg to Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg. Having not yet received news of
Lanskoy’s troubles, the disposition called for this general to advance from
Haynau toward Bunzlau with Sacken’s light cavalry. As soon as Yorck’s
cannonade announced the arrival of I Corps, Langeron, whom Blücher
would accompany, would advance against the French from the east.6
Although the term had yet to be invented, Blücher sought to boil the enemy
corps to a pulp in a Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle).
A mere hour sufficed to shake Blücher from this beautiful dream. Instead
of receiving a confirmed report on the departure of the French army to
Saxony, he learned of the approach of large imperial columns toward Gold-
berg as well as Neudorf-am-Rennwege (Nowa Wieś Złotoryjska), three
miles north of Goldberg. Almost at the same time, Sacken reported
Lanskoy’s setback at Haynau, adding the news of a French advance on
Seifersdorf, nine miles north of Goldberg. “Just when I wanted to leave to
join the troops,” Blücher explained, “I received a report from Sacken that
Lanskoy had been attacked at Haynau and driven from the road to Liegnitz;
furthermore, that the enemy had directed an attack on Seifersdorf.” The coup
de grâce for Blücher’s plans came with the report that very superior forces
had engaged Yorck’s 2nd Brigade at Niederau. A captured French captain
claimed that he had seen Napoleon that morning. “At the same time
[that Sacken’s report arrived],” stated Blücher in his after-action report,
“I received news from Yorck’s forward posts that a very large enemy was
marching . . . toward Neudorf, and the combat by Langeron’s corps was
growing ever more intense. All of these circumstances indicated that by
Goldberg 205
executing my disposition I could not avoid a battle and, because under the
current circumstances I did not know the true strength of my adversary,
I decided to remain at the Katzbach and await the deployment of the
enemy’s forces.”7
French columns seemed to appear out of nowhere. “Just as we were in
the process of executing our attack, the enemy assaulted us at Goldberg
while 50,000 men advanced toward Liegnitz,” reported Gneisenau. “Our
mission made us cautious as a rule.” Blücher ordered Sacken to Seifersdorf.
If he did not encounter resistance there, he would proceed to Adelsdorf to
cover Yorck’s left flank and rear. Yorck received orders to move up I Corps
to support Karl’s 2nd Brigade but to delay committing his brigades until
Sacken’s corps reached its position. Blücher joined Langeron on the hills east
of Goldberg, where he received another report from Sacken written at 11:15
a.m. telling of an enemy column of unknown strength moving against his
rear from Liegnitz. Blücher brushed it off, believing that this mystery
column could not reach Goldberg on that day or threaten the retreat to
Jauer if it became necessary. Obviously, he thought only of a retreat from
Goldberg as this column would prevent Sacken from marching in any other
direction. Just before leaving Niederkrayn, Blücher dictated a report to
Allied Headquarters about the recent events:
On the 22nd, the entire army stood concentrated with the left wing behind
Pilgramsdorf and the right behind Adelsdorf. In this position I expected an
enemy attack on Pilgramsdorf, which resulted around noon when the enemy
deployed some 15,000 men for the battle. Langeron’s corps marched east
behind the defile of the Katzbach at Goldberg; I expected any moment the
report of an attack on my right wing but that never occurred. Toward
evening, I received the news from my advance posts that the enemy had
withdrew toward Bunzlau. I awaited confirmation and received this on
23 August through reconnaissance. After receiving it, I issued the accom-
panying disposition. The troops are already marching and just now the sound
of cannon fire by Goldberg signals that the enemy is attacking the six
Prussian battalions left behind in the city. I now go to the troops and will
send a courier to you immediately after the engagement.8
Lauriston’s V Corps assaulted both Goldberg and the Wolfs hill. His
vanguard crossed the stone bridge over the Katzbach and entered the Selzer
suburb only to be repulsed by three Silesian Landwehr companies that were
seeing action for the first time. The French fell back to the hills west of the
Selzer and Ober suburbs, directing the fire of their skirmishers against the
Prussians with little effect. French artillery from the hills on the northern
edge of the Katzbach valley poured salvos into the two suburbs. Meanwhile,
Rochambeau’s 19th Division crossed the Katzbach slightly northwest of the
Wolfs hill and drove Rudzevich’s two Jäger regiments from the height.
Rochambeau immediately moved his artillery onto the Wolfs hill. From the
Flens hill and Wolfsdorf, Russian and Prussian battalions failed on several
attempts to retake the Wolfs hill. Each time the Allies drove the imperials
against the Wolfs hill, the latter countered with greater numbers. Situated on
the Kopatsch hills, Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps prevented them from
passing between Goldberg and Rudzevich’s troops at Wolfsdorf. Yet Allied
losses mounted: one Silesian Landwehr battalion that started the day with
524 men under arms came back with only 258 survivors.
Russian dragoons, Mounted Jäger, and the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainskii
Cossack Regiments executed numerous charges to slow the French advance.
Regardless, the imperials mastered Wolfsdorf as large bodies of enemy
cavalry started working around Rudzevich’s left. Langeron reinforced
Kaptsevich with four battalions from General Pyotr Kornilov’s 15th Div-
ision of IX Infantry Corps and the twelve guns of the heavy artillery battery
belonging to VI Infantry Corps. Nevertheless, an attempt to retake the
Wolfs hill misfired. An extremely intense firefight ensued for several hours
as additional imperial troops arrived. On the other side of Goldberg, combat
also lasted for many hours. Finally, as flames engulfed the Selzer and Ober
suburbs, the Prussians withdrew to Goldberg’s outworks. After expending
their ammunition, they retreated into the town. The French followed but
withering fire from Goldberg’s walls halted their advance. This scene
repeated itself at the Friedrich gate. Stalemate ensued on all three sides of
Goldberg.
At 2:00, Katzler informed Golz that the Wolfs hill could not be retaken:
Goldberg would have to be evacuated. Just before the last Prussian battal-
ion pulled out, Blücher’s adjutant, Oppen, arrived with news that 2nd
Brigade had held its ground at Niederau. He insisted that Goldberg be
held at all costs. Golz turned his men around and reentered the town just as
the French broke through the Ober gate. The Prussians fixed their bayon-
ets, huddled shoulder to shoulder, and charged down a narrow lane, driving
the French beyond the gate. As Golz secured Goldberg, the fighting
around the Wolfs hill still raged. Rudzevich and Kornilov fell back to the
Flens hill pursued by imperial infantry and cavalry. Finally, Blücher’s
orders for a general retreat toward Jauer arrived: the 2nd Brigade could
no longer hold on at Niederau.
The action at Niederau began at 9:30 when three large imperial columns
approached from Ulbersdorf and Neudorf-am-Rennwege. Having already
detached three battalions, the prince deployed his remaining seven in two
waves. The first contained two battalions of the 6th Silesian Landwehr
Infantry Regiment on the left and two battalions from the 2nd East Prussian
Infantry Regiment on the right. In the second wave, a third battalion from
the 6th Silesian Landwehr formed on the left while the two remaining
Goldberg 207
battalions of the 1st East Prussian Regiment moved up on the right.

Thus, Karl’s left wing consisted solely of Silesian militia. He divided his
brigade artillery into half-batteries, placing one on each flank. Hardly had
the brigade deployed when the French unlimbered thirty guns along the
Goldberg–Haynau road and peppered the length of the Prussian position.
After silencing the half-battery on the Prussian right, the French concen-
trated their fire on the Line infantry, which stood completely exposed on the
open plain. Horrendous losses rocked the East Prussians until they moved
out of range. During the bombardment, a French column drove the skir-
mishers of the 1st Battalion of the 1st East Prussian Regiment from the
burning wreck of Hohberg. French cavalry attacked the East Prussians
during their retreat but the Mecklenburg Hussars launched a successful
counterattack to save them.
On Karl’s left, one French column reached Niederau and continued
toward an extensive compound of military barracks that had been used
during the armistice. Not only did the compound provide cover, but it also
allowed the imperials to work around the Prussian left. Having preserved
his ammunition for the decisive moment, the junior officer who com-
manded the left half-battery – Lieutenant Stern – allowed the column to
approach. Firing canister at 400 paces, the Russians sent the imperials
reeling back to Niederau. Their blasts quickly attracted counterbattery fire
from the French guns. Shell and shot rained down on the half-battery as
well as the 4th Battalion of the 6th Silesian Landwehr directly behind it. Its
commander likewise pulled his men out of range. Only the frantic efforts
of its officers enabled it to resume its position at the end of the line just in
time for a shell to exploded in its midst; the men broke and fled in every
direction.9 Despite the collapse of this battalion, the other two militia
battalions posted on the left wing held their position while absorbing
devastating losses.
Perceiving their adversary to be shaken, the French launched two attack
columns, each with between 1,000 and 1,200 men, against the Prussian right
wing. Lobenthal ordered the 1st Battalion of the 2nd East Prussian
Regiment to fix bayonets. Supported by the second wave’s 2nd Battalion
of the 1st East Prussian Regiment, it repulsed the French. No sooner had
the French infantry yielded when imperial cavalry swarmed the two Prus-
sian battalions. Both suffered considerable losses during this attack. Mean-
while, on the left wing, the French reoccupied the compound and pushed
forward skirmishers to harry the gunners of Stern’s half-battery. Their
steady fire forced the half-battery to withdraw to the rear, where the sole
surviving gun from the right half-battery joined it. Stern soon returned to
the line, moving from position to position and pouring canister into the
ranks of the imperials.
8 2nd Battalion of the 1st East Prussian Infantry Regiment at Goldberg,

23 August 1813
As French guns continued to mow down the Prussians, the infantry

moved up and directed murderous fire at the left wing’s remaining battalion –
the 3rd of the 6th Silesian Landwehr Regiment; soon it began to waver. To its
right stood the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd East Prussian Regiment, which also
started to dissolve in chaos. Karl moved up the 2nd Battalion of the 6th
Silesian Landwehr from the second wave into the first. Observing the
approach of three French columns, Karl likewise ordered an advance. The
men of his 2nd Battalion of the 6th Silesian Landwehr fixed bayonets and
marched forward. With its order restored, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th
Silesian Landwehr followed as well as the “shamed” East Prussians.
Together they repulsed the French attack. Close-quarter fighting resulted
in the use of the musket-butt by both sides. The arrival of fresh imperial
forces halted the Prussian advance.
To end the stalemate, Karl gave Sjöholm permission to attempt to take the
compound and envelop the French right with the Fusilier Battalion of the 2nd
East Prussian Regiment. He also granted Sjöholm’s request for the support of
the two Landwehr battalions that formed his left wing. After the militia
Goldberg 209
9 Prince Carl of Mecklenburg at Goldberg, 23 August 1813
marched south to unite with the fusiliers, a huge gap opened between the four
battalions of the right wing and the edge of the Katzbach valley. To close it,
Karl ordered a general movement to the valley’s edge. Hoping to break the
vulnerable Prussians as they marched, French cavalry attacked numerous
times. Two large infantry columns also advanced at the double-quick and
closed on the Prussians. At the last minute, the East Prussians discharged a
full volley into their ranks and then surged forward with the bayonet. The
attackers fell back, pursued by the 2nd Battalion of the 1st East Prussian
Regiment. The hunters soon became the hunted as French cavalry supported
by intense artillery fire drove them back. The four remaining guns of the
brigade battery had to be saved by a bayonet attack on the part of the 2nd
Battalion of the 2nd East Prussian Regiment. French cavalry immediately
descended on the Prussian battalion, which formed a square. Followed by his
small staff, Karl came streaming toward it, shouting: “Battalion march!” He
then seized its standard and roared: “Now’s the time, East Prussians!” With a
“Hurrah,” the battalion charged and repulsed the French cavalry.10
While the prince of Mecklenburg struggled to save his four remaining
battalions, Sjöholm broke into the compound. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting
ensued until the French detachment withdrew. During the melee, Sjöholm
lost control of his men; all three Prussian battalions pursued the imperials
onto the open plain. Attacked on all sides by French cavalry, the disorgan-
ized Prussians would have been shredded if not for the timely charge of two
Brandenburg Uhlan squadrons supported by a regiment of Don Cossacks.

Under their protection, Sjöholm re-formed the battalions as best he could
and withdrew across the Katzbach.
The exhausted survivors of Karl’s 2nd Brigade made yet another stand at
Röchlitz. Yorck moved up to support Karl with his other brigades but less
than one hour from Goldberg he received Blücher’s order to retreat to the
Wütende Neiße, which he had left just a few hours earlier. Indignant by
nature, Yorck raged over this order, shouting that “the strength – indeed the
very lives – of the men was being treated like ‘child’s play.’”11 Leaving
Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade at Laasnig to receive the 2nd Brigade, Yorck turned
his columns south on the road to Jauer. By the time Karl received Blücher’s
order to retreat – around 2:00 in the afternoon – he had lost 28 officers and
1,747 men. In a five-hour struggle that prevented the enemy from penetrat-
ing the Katzbach valley, the Prussian 2nd Brigade repulsed every attack by
two French divisions (35th and 36th of XI Corps), supported by 3rd Light
Division of I Cavalry Corps, altogether around 18,000 combatants. The
brigade earned great praise as well as Blücher’s acclaim. According to
Gneisenau, the Russian generals spoke with amazement about the perform-
ance of the Prussians during this engagement. The next day, Yorck greeted
Karl with the solemn words: “Up to now you have worn the Order of the
Black Eagle as the king’s brother-in-law; yesterday you earned it.”12
Against Blücher’s center, more imperial troops streamed south from
Neudorf-am-Rennwege toward Karl’s exhausted brigade. On his left, the size
of the force attacking the Wolfs hill could not be determined. With French
columns reportedly marching to Liegnitz and Seifersdorf on his right, Blü-
cher recognized that retaking the Goldberg sector did not warrant the risk of
becoming embroiled in a general battle. He could have committed all of
Langeron’s corps to retake the Wolfs hill but thought better of escalating
the engagement with an adversary whose strength he did not know. More-
over, prisoners claimed that Napoleon remained with the army. Although it
tore at every fiber of his being, he ordered the army to retreat along both
banks of the Wütende Neiße in the general direction of Jauer. “After having
seen the forces that the enemy deployed, Blücher could believe that Napoleon
still faced him, and so ordered me to retreat at 3:00 p.m.,” recalled Langeron.
From Goldberg, Golz’s Prussians and Kaptsevich’s Russians withdrew
toward Jauer covered by fifteen Prussian squadrons under Katzler as well
as Korf’s entire Reserve Cavalry. General Yevstafy Udom’s 9th Division of
General Nikolay Olsufiyev’s IX Infantry Corps took a position west of the
narrow Prausnitz defile to facilitate the retreat. Olsufiyev, Udom, and their
staunch Russian warriors held the imperials for more than two hours before
retreating to Seichau, where Langeron’s VI Infantry Corps received them.
Blücher lingered in the skirmishing line until the very last so that his
personal opposition to the retreat would be known to the troops. “I found
Langeron’s vanguard embroiled in a very intense skirmish,” continued
Goldberg 211
Blücher in his after-action report. “Many times the Russian and Prussian
battalions took the Wolfs hill near Goldberg with much bravery, and the
affair here probably would have had a positive outcome had not the cohe-
sion of the whole, the nature of the circumstances, and still more the prime
directive [Barclay’s instructions] demanded that I break off the battle.”
Langeron claimed that “Blücher, who came over to me during the combat
and remained with the rearguard, was full of praise for the bravery and good
order of my troops and for the courage, the cold-bloodedness, and satisfac-
tory arrangements of the generals. He continuously shouted: ‘Oh, how
beautiful,’ and clapped his hands. By the second retrograde movement he
forgot himself completely, remained immobile, and said repeatedly: ‘Oh,
how beautiful!’ I had to wake him from his admiration and inform him that
if he had stayed with the front line five minutes longer, he could repeat his
enthusiasm to the enemy. This anecdote perfectly paints the value and love
of his work which so eminently distinguished Blücher.”13
The day’s fighting at Goldberg cost the Allies 1,883 men; in round
figures: 1,500 Russians and 400 Prussians. Fortunately for them, an intense
French pursuit ended at Prausnitz. Altogether, the Silesian Army sustained
more than 4,000 casualties during the engagements on the 23rd. The per-
formance of the artillery and the numerous charges by the cavalry favorably
impressed Blücher. He claimed imperial losses were “very considerable” and
that Cossacks had killed a French general. According to his estimate, the
Silesian Army had fought six “sharp” combats in seven days and sustained
6,000 to 7,000 casualties. “The infantry is a little fatigued but the whole army
has only one desire: to fight the enemy.”14
Due to the presence of Ney’s infantry and Sébastiani’s cavalry around
Liegnitz, Sacken received instructions to withdraw to Malitsch, less than five
miles due north of Jauer on the main road to Liegnitz. Yorck’s corps
retreated south to Schlaupe (Słup) on the Wütende Neiße some six miles
northwest of Jauer. Gneisenau directed Langeron’s corps to Hennersdorf,
a few miles southwest of Schlaupe. This order immediately earned Gneise-
nau the native Frenchman’s denigration for having summoned him to
Goldberg that morning.15 Müffling noted that “now, after marching and
countermarching the whole night, a strong march again had to be made. This
caused much discontent. General Langeron had wanted to stay [at Jauer],
but as this did not occur he now believed that this new countermarch clearly
proved how completely unnecessary it had been for him to return to Gold-
berg the previous night.”16 Langeron also expressed renewed concern for his
flank and suggested to Blücher that the retreat continue all the way to
Schweidnitz. Blücher viewed such a measure as drastic and premature. In
addition, he also became suspicious of the goal of this powerful French
advance through Silesia under the personal direction of the emperor. Could
this be an attempt by Napoleon to reach the Silesian mountain passes into
Bohemia, swing south through them, and then march west to catch an
unsuspecting Schwarzenberg from behind? In this case, if Blücher withdrew

too deep into Silesia a single corps could mask his army while Napoleon
turned south and crossed the Riesengebirge without the Prussians knowing.
Even if Blücher maintained constant contact with the French while he
retreated, Napoleon could gain an advantage of several days (see Map 2).
Based on this concern, Blücher needed to pin the French in Silesia.
Consequently, at midnight on 23/24 August, he sent a request to Bennigsen,
who had already informed him of his approach, to move all available units of
the Army of Poland across the Oder to strike the rear of the French army in
Silesia. At the same time, Gneisenau drafted instructions for his successor as
military governor of Silesia, Friedrich Wilhelm Leopold von Gaudi, to
mobilize the Landsturm and to accelerate work on an entrenched camp at
Neiße. This letter is equally instructive as a snapshot of how the Prussians
viewed the impact of the other Allied armies on the situation in Silesia:
The emperor Napoleon has continued the offensive against the combined
army in Silesia with six army corps. Accordingly, there have been almost
daily combats; those yesterday and today at Goldberg were very considerable
and involved large losses on both sides. In compliance with the general
operations plan, the combined army will continue to retreat: today it will
be in the camp at Jauer; if the enemy deploys considerable strength before my
front, it will withdraw from here through Schweidnitz and continue the
retreat to Neiße if the operations of the Grand Army of Bohemia do not
ultimately cause a change here. As this does not appear to be the case, and
both the crown prince of Sweden and General Bennigsen have made no
operation to benefit us, we have no choice but to implement every measure
at our disposal to offer the enemy as much resistance as possible. Accord-
ingly, I request that you mobilize the Landsturm in those parts of the
province that will be in the rear and the flanks of the enemy, and to execute
this measure as vigorously as possible.
Regarding the camp at Neiße, Blücher wrote: “I thank you for the
appropriate measures you have taken thus far, which your letter of
the 22nd mentions, and upon which I return the following instructions:
The construction of the main entrenchments of the camp at Neiße must be
accelerated as much as possible. General Gneisenau already has discussed
this with Colonel [Johann August] von Harroy de Techreaux and explained
his ideas to him; the camp will be constructed to accommodate around
50,000 men exclusive of the fortress’s garrison.” Blücher also explained
how he intended to increase the garrisons of Glatz, Neiße, Schweidnitz,
Kosel, and Silberberg through both Landwehr and Line battalions. His
letter requested the provisioning of the fortresses and the removal of the
cavalry depots. All replacements for I Corps were to be directed to Neiße
(see Map 7).17
Goldberg 213
On the evening of the 23rd, Army Headquarters decided that Yorck

should continue his retreat to Jauer. One of Blücher’s adjutants, Count
Friedrich Franz von Moltke, delivered the instructions to I Corps at sun-
down. Not only did this order require another night march but the wording
of the letter, which was dictated by Gneisenau, further infuriated Yorck.
“Langeron has moved into his camp between Hennersdorf and Seichau, and
I thus kindly request that you establish yours by the local gallows.” Yorck
sensed a degree of spitefulness in being assigned to the “Galgenberg [gallows
hill].” He did not share this letter with his staff, and the journal of I Corps
simply and incorrectly notes: “verbal orders delivered by Count Moltke.”18
An abominable night march ensued for the men of I Corps. Moving
south in the dark, Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade struck the wrong roads, veered too
far east, and collided with Langeron’s baggage en route to Schweidnitz via
Jauer. Droysen claims that Steinmetz forced the Russian drivers “to make
room for his troops to pass, yet the wagons returned before all had gotten
through. One company opened its way with the bayonet but two Landwehr
battalions and the East Prussian Grenadiers became cut off and wandered
around for a much longer time.” While the Prussians most likely did not
turn their bayonets against the Russian traı̂ners, the resulting mess took
hours to clear.19 Several of Yorck’s battalions remained entangled with the
Russian wagon trains until late in the night. Order collapsed and many men,
especially the Landwehr, dropped from exhaustion. Entire companies dis-
solved in the chaos. Hungry, tired and soaked, Yorck’s soldiers staggered
into their bivouacs early on the 24th, finding neither wood nor straw. His
rearguard camped at Altjauer (Stary Jawor), the main body on Jauer’s
Galgenberg. Horn and Hünerbein reached the gallows “in the pitch-dark
of night and in apparent disorder,” wrote Schack in his journal. The Prussian
Reserve Cavalry and those units from Steinmetz’s brigade that made it
through bivouacked with Sacken’s men at Profen (Mściwojów) in pouring
rain.20
The condition of I Corps appalled Yorck. After “an incessant rain had
largely inundated the land,” innumerable rivulets, swollen by the summer
rains, rolled like torrents from the mountains. As a result, the men continu-
ously waded through water that reached their knees. “At night, each bivouac
was made in ankle-deep mud and mire while the rain fell without intermis-
sion. Supplies could not be brought up and the army suffered privations.”21
Yorck believed that his corps would be completely ruined by the fatiguing
marches, incessant exertions, and appalling weather before it saw battle.
During the early hours of the 24th, he dispatched every staff officer to help
reorganize the troops. In the midst of the confusion, Jürgaß reported the
approach of two enemy columns from Liegnitz. Army Headquarters
insisted that this had to be a false alarm. Fortunately for Yorck, this proved
true, as I Corps was incapable of resistance. Yet, always doubting the news
that came from Blücher, Yorck had the 2nd Leib Hussars reconnoiter
northwards on the morning of the 24th. Failing to find any trace of the
enemy, they returned to Profen. After reading his report, Yorck angrily said
to their commander, Major Stößel, “I have no hussars.”22
During the night of 23/24 August, Langeron’s rearguard halted at Sei-
chau, the main body at Hennersdorf. Sacken’s rearguard stopped at Malitsch
while his main body continued to Profen, less than five miles east of Jauer.
Yorck himself went to Profen, quartering in a dilapidated farmhouse while
Sacken enjoyed the amenities of the local Schloß. Pahlen III’s position did
not change from the previous day except that St.-Priest returned to resume
command of the corps and Pahlen departed to command the cavalry corps
attached to Wittgenstein’s army corps. Blücher and his staff spent the night
of 23/24 August at Jauer debating what to do next. Around 8:00, Blücher
signed his name to orders that instructed Langeron not to yield Hennersdorf
without his express order. In particular, a French attempt to turn the army’s
left concerned the Prussians. With the roads through Konradswaldau and
Schönau observed by Langeron’s patrols, Blücher emphasized the import-
ance of vigilance and prudence: “Under no circumstance can you abandon
your current position before the enemy deploys in strength before your
front and I have given the firm and clear order for you to depart. You will
inform me of what occurs in your front and your flank in a timely manner.
Upon the first artillery round that falls on your front I will mount my horse
and quickly join you. Today the enemy showed us weak forces and we
cannot provide an answer to our sovereigns for unnecessarily retreating
before a weak force.” “All is quiet here and all the troops are in camp,”
responded Langeron at 9:00 p.m. He informed Blücher that four squadrons
held Konradswaldau with three Cossack regiments prowling to the north
and east. Four battalions and four guns had just departed from Hennersdorf
to take post there. He also reported that French forces did not appear to be
pursuing from Liegnitz (see Map 2).23
One hour after issuing orders to Langeron, Blücher dictated his after-
action report to Allied Headquarters; the letter offers tremendous insight
into Blücher’s thought process:
The losses of this day are still not known but they may amount to some 2,000
killed and wounded. Prisoners have been taken from III, IV, V, VI, and XI
Corps. Almost all say the French emperor is with the army yet I am still
uncertain about this. Five enemy corps and a reserve cavalry would amount
to at least 100,000 men. The enemy has not shown this much and his attacks
were not intense enough for such a large force. I imagine that, in an attempt
to deceive me, the enemy could have left behind a portion of each army
corps. I hope to be able to send you news of this quickly because I now have
such a position that the enemy must deploy before me.24
Goldberg 215
This report, along with the orders to Langeron, best illustrates the diffi-
culty of Blücher’s assignment. To be in position to either evade a general battle
with Napoleon or assume the offensive against his marshals required the
Silesian Army to maintain constant contact with its adversary. Should Blü-
cher flee before a masking force, Napoleon would have the opportunity to
concentrate overwhelming numbers against Schwarzenberg. Conversely, as
Barclay’s instructions clearly indicated, he had to avoid a confrontation with
Napoleon. If Napoleon forced him to deliver a battle and Blücher lost, what
would be his excuse for not having retreated in the first place?
It mattered little that Blücher still could not be certain of the size of the
imperial army that he faced. Already he could see the telltale signs: offensive
operations that “were not intense enough” for a large army commanded by
Napoleon himself. Both he and Gneisenau sensed that the retreat should
continue only if the imperials displayed the energy that signaled the presence
of their master. His growing concern about being deceived reflected not
what he and Gneisenau hoped, but what they observed and gleaned from
intelligence. During the night of 23/24 August, they proved that hopes and
wishes did not govern their thoughts. A report arrived claiming that Napo-
leon and his Guard had accompanied the advance of the French army. This
news, as well as the belief that enemy forces eventually would move south
from Liegnitz to threaten Langeron’s line of retreat, persuaded the Prussians
to err on the side of caution and expect an attack on 24 August.25 At 7:00 on
the morning of the 24th, Gneisenau issued instructions for the Silesian Army
to continue the retreat southeast to Striegau. Sacken and Yorck received the
order to withdraw to Kohlhöhe (Goczałków Górny); Langeron through
Jauer to Großrosen (Rogoźnica).26
Following an awful night that granted man and beast little rest, the Army
of Silesia resumed its retreat at 9:00 on the morning of 24 August. Showing
preferential treatment to the Russians as a rule, Army Headquarters assigned
Sacken’s corps the direct highway to Striegau while Yorck’s exhausted
soldiers groped their way along side roads and detours. Summer storms
continued to pound the soldiers with unrelenting fury. After marching
southeast for six miles, the Russians and Prussians bivouacked at the village
of Kohlhöhe, halfway between Jauer and Striegau. After ten days of cam-
paigning, the Army of Silesia stood at almost the exact spot from where it
had commenced operations. The exhausted troops desperately needed rest.
In less than eight days, the Silesian Army had twice traversed the sixteen-mile
stretch between the Katzbach and the Bober – sometimes by way of consecu-
tive marches and countermarches – on washed-out roads, in bad weather, and
in constant contact with the enemy. In the past six days, the men endured
four night marches; they had not been able to cook during the previous four
marches and the horses broke down from lack of fodder. The necessity of
sleeping on damp ground, insufficient clothing, and dwindling food supplies
prevented the soldiers from recovering. Whenever a halt occurred, exhausted

troopers fell out of their saddles asleep. A general demoralization reigned,
similar to the mood that accompanied a crushing defeat. The tight bonds of
discipline unraveled, ushering in acts of desperation. “The nightly bivouac,”
noted Professor Steffens, “in the absence of tents, also hardened the feelings
of the men. An encampment introduces some regulations of social order but
the bivouac fire encourages the license of brigandage.”27
With its large contingent of militia, Yorck’s corps teetered on collapse.
The consecutive night marches resulted in much straggling, especially
among the Upper Silesian Landwehr, which was fast gaining a reputation
for being unreliable. Soldiers became separated from their units; others had
to be left behind after they had worn holes in their boots right through to
their feet. Noncombat-related losses led to the disappearance of entire
Landwehr companies, while Line troops also suffered considerable attrition
from exertions and privations. More than 5,000 men disappeared from
Yorck’s infantry. On 16 August, the 4 battalions of the 2nd Brigade’s 6th
Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiment mustered 2,000 men; 8 days later the
remnants of all 4 formed 1 battalion of 700 men. Four other battalions
disappeared during the night march on 23/24 August and no trace of them
could be found; they finally surfaced at Schweidnitz, having been swept
away by Langeron’s trains. Clothed in uniforms considered sub-par before
the war resumed, the Landwehr now appeared more like apparitions of
scantily clad Spartan hoplites. One young officer wrote home: “Every day
I wish an enemy ball would put an end to me as life is no longer bearable.
For three days I have had nothing more to eat than a piece of moldy bread.
The horses wander about like skeletons; when looking for oats, they have
known nothing for so long that they greedily snatch the leaves from the trees
on the street in order to satisfy their hunger. In the completely soaked
ground, which is like a sea of filthy mud, we proceed at an dreadful pace.
My small, feisty mare has become a meek lamb . . . the enemy has it no
better.”28
Blücher hoped that the news his patrols provided on the 24th would help
him determine his next move. Early that morning, Jürgaß informed Yorck of
the approach of enemy columns from both Liegnitz and Goldberg. Yorck
responded by dispatching Stößel’s Black Hussar Regiment to Wahlstatt to
obtain an overview of the situation seven miles further northwest at Lieg-
nitz. Arriving at Wahlstatt, Stößel forwarded a patrol of one lieutenant and
forty Hussars to Liegnitz with one squadron following in support. Around
12:30 p.m., Stößel reported the results: the French had occupied Liegnitz at
9:00 p.m. the previous night but had yet to advance from it; their numbers
could not be determined. Other patrols found the right bank of the Katz-
bach in their vicinity clear of imperial forces. Later that morning, Blücher
received the report of a spy claiming that the French had pulled out of
Goldberg 217
Liegnitz. Aside from contradicting the reports submitted by Jürgaß and

Stößel, this intelligence said nothing of where the imperials had gone. Until
the situation could be clarified, Blücher decided to keep Army Headquarters
at Jauer to be closer to the incoming reports. Langeron posted two battalions
at Jauer to cover Army Headquarters; Korf’s Reserve cavalry camped just
east of the town.29
Confusing reports arrived throughout the course of the 24th. Sacken sent
not only intelligence, but also a French corporal of the 10th Hussars cap-
tured by Cossacks on the 23rd. The prisoner informed Blücher that Napo-
leon had been present during the engagement at Goldberg but that in the
evening he had ridden in the direction of Liegnitz. After finding Ney with
III Corps and II Cavalry Corps on the left wing, the emperor had departed
for Lauban. This contradicted the statements of another captured French
officer who professed Napoleon’s determination to continue the offensive in
Silesia. This in turn supported Müffling’s insistence that the French emperor
would not leave Silesia until he had more to show for his efforts. Intelligence
from Lauban proved equally vexing. The Prussians learned that Napoleon
had passed through there on the 20th going east to Silesia escorted by 10,000
heavy cavalry of the Guard, part of the Guard’s light cavalry, 4 horse
batteries, and 6,000–8,000 infantry of the Old Guard. The emperor returned
to Lauban on the 23rd and traveled west to Görlitz on the 24th. Approxi-
mately 15,000 bayonets of Mortier’s Young Guard had reached Lauban on
the 18th, struck the road south to Zittau on the 19th but returned to Lauban
one hour later, departed east on the 20th with Napoleon for Silesia, and then
returned to Görlitz on the 23rd. The Allies knew well that Napoleon
calculated on making a big impact wherever he went when escorted by his
Guard. Thus, they could be confident of his objective when he arrived with
his grand reserve. Determining the location of the emperor and his bearskins
provided one crucial variable of Blücher’s equation.
Around 3:15 p.m. on 24 August, Sacken forwarded a report from Vasil-
chikov at Malitsch stating that the French had evacuated Liegnitz and
marched west toward Haynau. Around 6:00 that evening, Sacken confirmed
the enemy’s hurried evacuation of Liegnitz. Vasilchikov’s Cossacks followed
their retrograde movement through Liegnitz, and Sacken’s remaining for-
ward troops likewise crossed the Katzbach that evening to reach Rothkirch.
Gneisenau sent Lieutenant Wilhelm von Scharnhorst to investigate reports
of a large imperial force at Lähn as well as enemy movements up the Bober
and Katzbach toward Hirschberg and the passes into Bohemia. At 8:30 p.m.
on the 24th, the young staff officer reported that he had not encountered the
enemy at Schönau and that nothing indicated that the French had moved
south from Goldberg to Hirschberg. All French troops south of Goldberg
on the 23rd marched northeast to the Goldberg–Jauer road. According to
Langeron, Blücher received confirmed news that evening of Napoleon’s
departure for Saxony, taking VI Corps with him. Spies also confirmed the
rumors of the emperor’s departure. That Macdonald’s army simply did not
do much on the 24th convinced Blücher that Napoleon had left Silesia.
Lauriston’s V Corps passed the night of 23/24 August at Goldberg while
XI Corps bivouacked between Niederau and Neudorf-am-Rennwege with
its cavalry at Hohendorf. As noted, Ney never received Berthier’s dispatch
and so divided his infantry to follow II Cavalry Corps: three of his divisions
went to Liegnitz and two to Rothkirch. Arriving at the latter during the
evening, the marshal finally received Napoleon’s summons to Görlitz.
Misunderstanding the instructions, Ney ordered his entire corps to march
west to Bunzlau on the morning of the 24th, which explains Vasilchikov’s
report. Finally realizing his mistake that evening, Ney turned over command
of III Corps to Souham, who spent all of the 25th reinserting his divisions
into Macdonald’s front line. By forcing Macdonald to wait forty-eight hours
before he could commence his operation, Ney’s mistake proved fatal to the
Army of the Bober. The imperials likewise did little on the 25th. Lauriston
extended V Corps to Röchlitz on the right bank of the Katzbach but XI
Corps remained on the left bank north of Goldberg.
To Blücher, the energy displayed by the imperials in Napoleon’s presence
at Löwenberg had fizzled by the 23rd. No appreciable French movements
on the 24th could only mean that the emperor had departed, presumably in
response to the Bohemian Army’s advance on Dresden. The push at Gold-
berg served to mask his exit from Silesia, just as Blücher had predicted. Some
members of his staff, such as Müffling, countered that Napoleon would not
have ended the pursuit of the Silesian Army after attaining such paltry
results. Blücher shook his head. Around 7:00 on the evening of 24 August,
Army Headquarters issued orders with the heading “Provisional Dispos-
ition” for 25 August. First and foremost, Blücher wanted to find the French.
For this task, “the cavalry of the Reserves and vanguards of all three corps
will march with horse artillery to conduct a reconnaissance at daybreak on
25 August.” Sacken’s men received the task of patrolling through Liegnitz
and Haynau; Yorck’s across the Katzbach between Liegnitz and Goldberg;
and Langeron’s toward Goldberg and Schönau. If the imperial army could
not be found, Blücher wanted to know where it had gone. Regardless of
whether the French had marched south to utilize the mountain passes into
Bohemia or marched west toward Lusatia and Saxony, the Silesian Army
would follow. “At Jauer around 7:00 a.m.,” stated Blücher’s cover letter to
his corps commanders, “I expect to receive the reports of the reconnaissance
over where I can find the enemy. Each corps will send an orderly to my
headquarters today to report to General Gneisenau and then deliver the
disposition to the corps. PS: If around 8:00 or later three cannon shots fall by
Jauer, all infantry will immediately march to Jauer.” “I will set in movement
8,000 cavalry to follow the enemy if he retires toward Dresden,” Blücher
Goldberg 219
informed the tsar, “and tomorrow, the 25th, I march to attack him at Gold-
berg if he has plans to march to Bohemia or to pursue him if he retreats
toward the Elbe.”30
On the night of the 24th, Yorck received Blücher’s orders for the
following day. The thought of turning around and marching back to Jauer
made Yorck’s blood boil. He believed that his men deserved a full day of
rest. A staff officer, Major Christian Karl Dietrich, received the task of going
to Army Headquarters at Jauer to verbally deliver Yorck’s protest. “Old
Blücher was also in an evil mood,” explains Droysen, “or Dietrich’s state-
ments put him in one; he [Dietrich] was snapped at in the most abject way,
threatened with arrest, and being brought before a court-martial. Blücher’s
order stood.” Dietrich paid the penalty in the form of a tongue-lashing for
arriving in the midst of one of the few known moments of discord at Army
Headquarters. Blücher had always remained fearful of the demoralizing
effects of a prolonged retreat. Now he saw his army dissolving around
him. Disgruntled and frustrated, he knew that all the exertions had thus
far produced no appreciable success. With the haunting memory of the
1806 collapse forever etched on his psyche, he foresaw the army’s disinte-
gration if it continued to adhere to Barclay’s instructions. Instead of drastic
measures, he returned to the idea of a general battle, seeing it as the best
solution to the army’s problems. Both officers and men would have some-
thing to focus on rather than their miserable condition and their frustration
with Army Headquarters. A victory would do much to heal the rifts and
exorcise the demons of demoralization. Arguably, a defeat could lead to the
army’s utter collapse but so could the retreat if it continued. For these
reasons, Blücher decided to stand and fight. His staff failed in their attempts
to change his mind. Blücher countered that he liked the terrain on the
Katzbach and the Wütende Neiße, that he was tired of retreating, and that
he was determined to fight a battle in that position. If the enemy advanced
on Jauer the next day, the Silesian Army would meet him. The old hussar
stood firm and for a moment even considered replacing Gneisenau as chief
of staff with Katzler, prompting the former to lament to Clausewitz: “You
can imagine how difficult my position is. Blücher always wants to go
forward and accuses me of being too cautious; Langeron and Yorck hold
me back and consider me foolhardy and reckless.”31
Allied cavalry moved out very early on 25 August. With thirteen squad-
rons newly assigned to vanguard duty, Katzler rode northwest toward
Kroitsch on the Katzbach.32 He reported at 4:30 a.m. that one of his patrols
had made contact with the French around 2:00 a.m. at Röchlitz and had
observed numerous campfires around Goldberg. This report reached Blü-
cher before 6:00 a.m. Around 8:30, a second report arrived from Katzler.
Writing from Kroitsch at 7:00, he reported the presence of enemy vedettes
from Prausnitz to Goldberg. Peasants reported hearing a cannonade at
Haynau. The locals had also seen many campfires between Prausnitz and
Goldberg during the previous night.
Meanwhile, Langeron’s vanguard cavalry advanced from Peterwitz
northwest toward Goldberg but reached only Hennersdorf by 9:00 a.m.
The first report that Langeron received came from Pahlen II. Schönau and
Lähn, where he observed strong enemy forces on the 23rd, had been evacu-
ated. His patrols rode as far as Probsthain but did not encounter the French.
All signs indicated that the imperial forces facing the left wing of the Silesian
Army had conducted a retrograde movement. “According to the news that
I have received from the mountains that separate Silesia from Bohemia,”
reported Blücher, “I judge that the enemy is retiring toward the Elbe and that
he has renounced his plan to debouch into Bohemia through Landeshut.”33
By 9:00 a.m., the information at Blücher’s disposal appeared very per-
suasive. On his right, the French had apparently marched to Bunzlau. In his
center, the enemy remained at Goldberg while nothing of the imperials
could be found on his left. Around 10:00, the three signal shots echoed from
Jauer, and the army marched according to new orders based on the assump-
tion that the enemy was in full retreat. Blücher instructed Sacken to cross the
Katzbach at Dohnau, Yorck at Kroitsch, and Langeron at Goldberg. If
Langeron found Goldberg still in French hands, he would fix their front as
Yorck and Sacken enveloped them. If the French retreated before Langeron,
the Russian vanguard would pursue and maintain constant contact. Blücher
demanded a vigorous pursuit and called for “zeal and activity” from his
corps commanders.34 “Two different plans of the enemy are already ruined,”
Blücher assured them. “In the meantime, he has lost time that is precious to
him. If we act quickly and energetically, this latest plan will be foiled as
well.” Blücher also wrote to Bernadotte: “The army is marching and if the
enemy makes a stand at Goldberg to cover his retreat he will be attacked
tomorrow at daybreak.”35
Three hours into the advance, new reports reached Blücher from the
Allied cavalry. Considerable imperial forces remained at Goldberg and
several large columns – Souham’s III Corps – were marching east from
Haynau toward Liegnitz. Sacken reported at 12:45 that his Cossacks had
also found the enemy advancing anew from Haynau east toward Liegnitz in
numerous columns of considerable strength. For this reason, Sacken planned
to halt at Malitsch until he received further orders. Jürgaß, who led Yorck’s
Reserve Cavalry likewise to Kroitsch, added that “the enemy advances in
strength on the road from Haynau to Liegnitz; it could be perhaps 10,000
infantry and they are already at Steuditz. Vasilchikov has only 2,000 infantry
and, in case he is very hard pressed, will withdraw to Rothkirch. The
Russians still hold Liegnitz” (see Map 2).36
By 1:00 that afternoon, Blücher had heard enough; he ordered an imme-
diate halt due to the threat posed to the army’s right. The head of I Corps
Goldberg 221
had just marched into Jauer when Yorck received the new orders: “Because
I have just received the report of enemy movements on the side of Liegnitz,
which must be reconnoitered before the march of the army can continue,
I request that your corps remain at Jauer until further instructions. Sacken’s
corps will halt at Malitsch and Langeron’s at Peterwitz.” This sent Yorck
over the edge. After establishing his headquarters likewise in Jauer, he
sought out Blücher.37
Blücher, Gneisenau, and their officers had just sat down for a late lunch
when the door suddenly flew open and Yorck stormed in, shouting: “You
are destroying the troops, you are marching them to no end.” An ugly and
embarrassing scene unfolded in full view of Blücher’s staff, including several
Russian and British officers. “I was witness to the most scandalous scene,”
explained Langeron, “Yorck was in Blücher’s room, spewing the most
formidable injuries that the German language can furnish on him,
Gneisenau, and Müffling; thank God I did not understand a thing because
I do not know German but the tone allowed me to judge the ferocity.
Yorck’s three antagonists made good use of their own voices; the din and
the cries of these gentlemen were audible from the street, and I thought they
would fight each other, and they were not far from it. I withdrew without
uttering a word and retired to my quarters, which offered no such scene.”38
Gneisenau jumped up and led Yorck to a small antechamber; Blücher
followed. Inside, Yorck lambasted Blücher for the reckless leadership of
the army and demanded an explanation. He expressed his outrage over the
numerous marches and countermarches, which he insisted had crushed
the excellent morale of the troops. Yorck concluded by assuring them that
the entire army would collapse and that he would no longer accept responsi-
bility for it. He intended to disclose everything in a report to the king. Two
accounts exist over what happened next. According to Nostitz as well as
Carl Blasendorff, one of Blücher’s early biographers, the old hussar
responded with surprising fierceness, insisting on the need for unconditional
obedience.39 He ended the conversation with a blistering reality check for
Yorck: “The difference between us is that I command and you obey, and that
I, and not you, have to bear the responsibility for the orders given.”
According to Delbrück, who based his account on a letter Gneisenau wrote
shortly before his death in 1831, it was Gneisenau who took Yorck to task.
“Although he was only a Generalmajor and Yorck was a Generalleutnant,
he concisely recounted to him what had occurred and why, that no matter
what they did Yorck always opposed it, and that the old general’s obstinacy
often bordered on insubordination. He then opened the door and asked:
‘Does Your Excellency have any further orders?’ Yorck left with a cold bow
to Blücher.”40
While this episode may be amusing, it appears that age and bravado
probably played a role in Gneisenau’s fanciful account. Regardless, Yorck
resolved to resign on the spot and leave the army, but Prince Karl urged him
to put the matter to the king’s judgment. That night, Yorck wrote to
Frederick William:
Promoting Your Royal Majesty’s almighty interests and those of the state to
the best of my ability has been my endeavor throughout forty-three years of
service. Therefore, please accept as the purest expression of my conviction, if
I candidly express the confession that I can no longer be of use to Your Royal
Majesty as commander of I Corps. Perhaps my imagination is too narrow to
be able to understand the ingenious views that direct the high command of
General Blücher. But experience tells me that continuous marches and coun-
termarches in the eight days of the reconvened campaign have already placed
the troops entrusted to me in such a condition that a good result cannot be
expected if the enemy launches a powerful offensive. That until now he has
still not seized the offensive is a stroke of luck, which has protected the
combined army here from results similar to those of 1806. Recklessness and
inconsistencies in the operations, inaccurate intelligence, and the grasping at
any feint by the enemy, thus ignorance of the practical elements that are more
important for the leadership of a large army than sublime opinions, are
unfortunately the causes well known through experience that can lead an
army to ruin before it can achieve its main task. As a subordinate general, my
duty demands blind obedience from me. On the other hand, my duty as a
loyal subject requires me to strive to counter the evil, and this contradiction
has the natural consequence that I stand in the way of the commanding
general and on the whole am more harmful than useful. Thus, I turn to Your
Royal Majesty with the most humble request to release me from the com-
mand of I Corps and to place me in another, be it still a subordinate situation,
where I can serve Your Majesty with more utility.41
Yorck’s frustration represents both a common complaint of corps com-

manders as well as the relatively recent opposition to the dual-command
system of the Prussian General Staff. Regarding the former, corps commanders
often felt that army headquarters failed to provide enough insight on the
general state of affairs. Viewing the situation only from their limited perspec-
tive, they often bombarded army headquarters with requests for more infor-
mation, complaints and questions about orders, and suggestions for a better
way to proceed. Blücher had himself been guilty of this as a corps com-
mander in the Spring Campaign. Yorck’s idea to create an advance guard
corps to maintain close contact with the enemy rather than wear down the
entire army through this task exemplifies the attitude that those idiots at
headquarters don’t know what they’re doing. Simple questions immediately
render the suggestion indefensible. How large should the advance guard
corps be and which corps would provide the manpower? Who would
command? Upon which of the three roads being utilized by the imperials
would it deploy? If all three, then each detachment would have to be large
Goldberg 223
enough to hold the enemy for at least twenty-four hours so the rest of the
army could move up. As for the issue concerning the General Staff, Yorck
suspected that Gneisenau ran the army and that Blücher served as his
mouthpiece. He resented taking orders from a staff officer junior in rank to
him. More than this, he still believed that the commander should command
and not forfeit control of the army to his staff. Yorck had a very good
relationship with his chiefs of staff, but they took orders from him: dual
command did not exist in I Corps.
Following the scene at Jauer, Blücher wanted to determine Sacken’s
mood. Having yet to meet the Russian in person, he traveled to Malitsch
during the afternoon of the 25th. Blücher expressed his satisfaction to the
Russian over the performance of his troops and invited him to share his
views over the course of the war. Blücher then instructed Sacken’s staff
and generals on their position for the next morning and ordered them to
harass the enemy as much as possible during the night. Müffling claims
that Blücher departed “very satisfied after discovering that while the
commanders of the other two corps disagreed with him General Sacken
was in complete agreement with his views.” In a 25 August letter to
Hardenberg, Gneisenau praised Sacken even though he had started the
campaign with a march that did not comply with Blücher’s order. Regard-
less, Gneisenau labeled Sacken as one of three Russian generals whom the
chancellor should mention to Tsar Alexander: “First and foremost is
General Sacken. It is not possible to be more active, timely, insightful
and determined than he is. He always performs the movements prescribed
for him with precision and, when orders cannot reach him, he always
arranges the most expedient measures instantly. This is the man who must
be placed at the head of an army. At headquarters, we speak of him only
with admiration, having become better acquainted with him by observing
his measures.”42
Although this meeting earned Sacken’s goodwill and cooperation, disaf-
fection among the Russian generals in Langeron’s camp increased to the
point of insubordination. Russian discontent over command of the Silesian
Army going to a foreigner when they provided the majority of the man-
power, which somewhat diminished when Blücher abruptly started the
campaign, returned to the fore. Even his first step of the campaign, the
premature occupation of the neutral zone, had struck some Russian com-
manders as inexplicable and undignified. With each day, Langeron’s behav-
ior became more obstinate and detrimental to the army as a whole.
Naturally, the mood of the Russian commanders impacted their subordin-
ates from general to private. For these reasons, the Prussians had to present a
unified front. Any complaint, criticism, or glimmer of distrust toward
Blücher’s leadership could jeopardize the unity of the army and its ability
to function. At this critical juncture of the campaign, Yorck’s temper
produced an outright scandal, doing much to discredit Blücher and his staff
in the eyes of both Russians and Prussians.43
Sacken’s corps passed the night of 25/26 August at Malitsch; his van-
guard withdrew across the Katzbach to a position between Baben (Babin)
and Neudorf (Nowa Wieś Legnicka). The infantry of Yorck’s vanguard
camped at Bellwitzhof (Bielowice), pushing detachments to the crossings
over the Wütende Neiße at Niederweinberg (Winnica) and Schlauphof.44
After stationing cavalry posts on the left bank of the Katzbach and in
support of the infantry at the Wütende Neiße, Katzler’s vanguard cavalry
bivouacked on the high plateau east of the Wütende Neiße. Jürgaß also
moved Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry onto the plateau, south of Katzler. In
terrible weather, patrols from the cavalry posts that remained on the left
bank of the Katzbach detected the bivouac fires of the imperials extending
from Rothkirch along the Goldberg–Liegnitz road to Liegnitz itself. The
French did not move into the towns immediately along the Katzbach.
Yorck’s main body camped between Grögersdorf (Grzegorzów) and Jauer,
with corps headquarters at the latter.45
The reports from Langeron’s troopers stated that, as of noon on the
25th, the French still held Prausnitz and that many infantry regiments
could be seen east of the Katzbach between Prausnitz and Goldberg.
Artillery crowned the hills on both sides of Goldberg and behind them
the Russians could see smoke rising, indicating the presence of more
bivouacs. Yet the imperials gave no signs of advancing or withdrawing.
Langeron’s vanguard reached Seichau and pushed its Cossacks toward
Röchlitz and Prausnitz; the main body of the corps camped at Henners-
dorf. Pahlen II’s detachment secured the left flank at Konradswaldau.46
Nothing changed on the 25th for St.-Priest, yet he did report that Napo-
leon had returned to Saxony on the 23rd by way of Lauban and that many
troops had followed the emperor.
Gneisenau issued orders to Yorck around 10:00 p.m. to move I Corps at
5:00 on the morning of the 26th from Jauer to a concealed position at
Schlauphof to be abreast of the other corps. As soon as Yorck reached this
point, all three corps would proceed to the Katzbach along three roads that
did not offer mutual support until the army reached the opposite bank of
the river. On the left, Langeron would proceed on the Jauer–Goldberg
highway to the latter. In the center, Yorck’s corps would cross the Katzbach
at Niederkrayn, while on the right Sacken marched from Malitsch to
Dohnau. For much of their respective marches, Yorck and Langeron
would be separated by the Wütende Neiße and the high plateau that
this narrow but turbulent brook bordered to the west and the Katzbach
bordered to the north. Although Yorck and Sacken initially would march
along parallel roads on the plateau, Yorck would turn northwest and
debouch from the plateau to get across the Wütende Neiße and then the
Goldberg 225
Katzbach while Sacken continued due north to the latter river. As soon as
Yorck exited the plateau, Sacken would be isolated, as would Yorck until
he crossed the Katzbach. What an opportunity for a skilled enemy com-
mander! Moreover, it appears that Army Headquarters had not taken into
account the weather. Heavy summer storms continued their assaults.
By the evening of the 25th, most of the watercourses in Blücher’s area
of operations rose above their banks, flooding the lowlands and fouling
the roads.47
While anger drove Yorck’s quill on the evening of the 25th, pure opti-
mism guided those of Gneisenau and Blücher. Again, Gneisenau’s corres-
pondence grants us a look into the thought process at Silesian Army
Headquarters: “If the enemy further continues his retreat to Saxony, then
obviously he has failed to attain his objective against us. With his superior
forces, he has failed to engage us in a battle and the partial attacks have cost
him much blood. Our losses are not slight. His retreat can still cost him
much. Nothing shall lack in our efforts to exploit his retreat.”48 Blücher’s
letter to his wife is worth citing in full, because it perfectly captures Blü-
cher’s understanding of his role and that of his army:
The tide has turned! For three days the emperor Napoleon attacked me with
all his forces and tried everything to bring me to battle; I successfully
thwarted all of his plans. He retreated yesterday evening; I will follow him
immediately and I hope Silesia is now safe. I have saved Berlin by drawing
the emperor of France here and delaying him for seven days, during which
the Grand [Bohemian] Army invaded Saxony from Bohemia. The crown
prince of Sweden is marching from Berlin to likewise invade Saxony. Both
large armies advance in the rear of the enemy while I now follow close on his
heels and will attack him wherever I find him.
They will bless us in Berlin. I am well and very pleased that I have led the
great man around by the nose; he will be very angry that he could not force
me to fight. Both sides have suffered casualties; the enemy has lost three times
as many as us. We have already captured 1,500 men; the enemy has taken
fewer than 100 from us.49
Blücher’s casualty estimates fell far short of the truth. During the engage-
ments on 21, 22, and 23 August, the Silesian Army had lost some 6,000 to
8,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Imperial losses since 17 August
numbered just as many. Limited operations on the 24th and 25th did much
good for both armies, but especially the Silesian, which according to Gnei-
senau had fought seven large engagements in the five-day period from 19 to
23 August. Although these two days allowed the troops to rest, repair their
weapons, and restock ammunition and food, Blücher knew he needed to end
the continuous back-and-forth marches. Likewise, he knew that only a
battle would heal the army. Only a battle would reconcile Langeron and
his Russians as well as Yorck and his Prussians. “Discontent among the
foreign troops and inexperience among his own,” noted Müffling, “dissatis-
faction among their commanders, and demands that could not be fulfilled –
truly the situation required speedy help, and only in a great and successful
military event could such be sought.” Encouraged by the news that Napo-
leon and his Guard had departed for Saxony, Blücher intended to find battle
the next morning, regardless of the situation.50
Following Napoleon’s Löwenberg offensive, Blücher suspected he
would mask his departure through tactical offensive strikes by his marshals.
Thus the dilemma: because the situation could change any day as a result of
Napoleon’s departure, the Silesian Army had to maintain constant contact
with the French to be able to immediately exploit his absence. Yet, this
meant executing a methodical, fighting withdrawal in the presence of
the master of operations, of the manoeuvre sur les derrières, and of the
manoeuvre sur position centrale. Blücher simply could not flee before
advance guards, but had to find a way to force the imperials to deploy for
battle, determine if the energy they displayed indicated the emperor’s pres-
ence, and then react accordingly by either continuing the retreat or assuming
the offensive. The complexity of his task cannot be underestimated, particu-
larly considering his penchant to attack. With no choice but to surrender the
initiative, his opponent’s actions would dictate his own. If the French
advanced, he had to retreat. If the French withdrew, he had to follow. If
they stood still, he had to determine the reason for their halt: was it
temporary or was it the prelude to an extensive operation?
Blücher’s position became all the more difficult after the French
appeared to be marching back and forth between the Katzbach and the
Bober. For this reason, the cavalry of his advance guards traversed the area
between the Schnelle Deichsel and the Bober three times within a 24-hour
period. To accurately assess the intent of his adversary, Blücher’s army had
to remain in close contact with the enemy at all points along its front. This
required exhausting marches and countermarches regardless of the time of
day, and with apparent indifference to the needs of man and horse. Although
the Allied army was well provided with intelligence, errors in judgment
could be made just as easily while on patrol as at Army Headquarters. At
times, Blücher’s orders appeared haphazard or contradictory to his corps
commanders, who never appreciated the difficulty of a task he never felt
inclined to explain.
Allied High Command kept the Reichenbach Plan secret, never explain-
ing to the corps commanders its principles prior to the commencement of
hostilities. Müffling explains: “Peculiar circumstances, especially the diffi-
cult task of never losing sight of the enemy yet never engaging in a decisive
action with him, had demanded great exertions from the army. Moreover,
this often caused very contradictory orders to be issued in the course of a
Goldberg 227
few hours according to the incoming reports.” Yorck certainly did not know
of the plan, nor was he privy to the discussion between Blücher and Barclay.
Thus, the corps commander based his judgments only on what he could
observe from his limited perspective. Although Yorck had little confidence
in Blücher and Gneisenau from the start, the increasing illogic of their
leadership eroded any trust he had in his countrymen. Failing to see the
pursuit of a consistent plan, he attributed the excessive night marches to
blind ignorance and folly. As noted, neither Blücher nor Gneisenau felt
inclined to explain their decisions to Yorck.51 Although Nostitz adored
Blücher, he had a solid relationship with Yorck, making the following
account nearly unbiased:
Due to the events of the latter day [23 August], Yorck had become very
vexed. He saw in the deficient leadership of the army’s high command the
real and only cause of the losses suffered. The many night marches and
exertions negatively impacted the good morale of the troops. The general
loudly expressed the bitterest censure and depicted the entire dissolution of
the corps as unavoidable if Blücher continued to place his trust in men, who,
without practical training and experience, gave advice on the arrangements of
the operations based merely on their brilliance and fantasies. He considered
Blücher himself a brave soldier and harbored feelings of gratitude for him
from earlier times in his career, but he hated the advisors, finding himself
pushed to the background and Gneisenau and Müffling exercising greater
influence on the direction of affairs than did he. This always provided his evil
temper with new sustenance and increased the bitterness and asperity of his
nature. Thus, Yorck was wrong in the affair itself, and the rebuke he received
is justifiable because through his behavior Blücher’s relationship with the
Russian corps commanders became more difficult and uncertain. Neverthe-
less, none can deny that the army command did not always observe the
formalities that Yorck felt were completely legitimate based on his experi-
ence. The reciprocal antipathy and mistrust that had already sunk deep roots
before and during the armistice increased daily. Thus, it came to pass that
both sides observed only the respect toward each other that the regulations
required as indispensable. Already, the general had been informed several
times of how Yorck’s behavior had negatively impacted the mood of the
army. Now, he was formally ordered by way of a serious and clear-cut
reprimand to end the bad state of affairs.52
Already suspicious of Blücher’s compliance with Barclay’s instructions,

Langeron became increasingly indignant over the pointless marches and
countermarches as well as the seemingly endless cycle of turning around,
making front, and marching away only to repeat the process a few miles
down the road. In describing Langeron, Nostitz noted: “Meanwhile, the first
unfavorable combats at the beginning of the campaign made him skeptical.
As the senior general of the two Russian corps under Blücher’s command, he
felt a great responsibility in terms of scrutinizing the orders he received,

striving to limit Russian participation in the operations to those principles
that appeared compatible with his individual views. Also, he had loudly and
often stated his disapproval and complaints; only intelligence and the con-
siderations that were necessary to observe prevented Blücher from repri-
manding him as he did General Yorck.”53
In evaluating Blücher’s fulfillment of his primary responsibility – main-
taining constant contact with the enemy army in Silesia – we find a mixture
of success and problems stemming from the nature of the task as well as
some flaws inherent to the new Prussian army. As for the latter, Frederick
William issued instructions for the composition of vanguards on 29 July
1813: “I determine that, when advance guards must be formed in the field,
entire brigades, whose composition is not calculated for this, should not be
used. Instead, in accordance with regulations, only fusilier battalions from
the brigades and likewise battalions from the Reserve Infantry regiments
should be used. These should be taken in the manner that only one battalion
from each regiment should be designated for this duty until the Landwehr is
far enough along in field experience for it to also be used for advance guard
service. As for cavalry, hussars and uhlans from the brigade cavalry should
be used as much as possible, but additional requirements should be met by
the reserve cavalry, yet not the cuirassiers.”54 Thus, the Prussians placed
great emphasis on the combined-arms composition of their vanguards,
meaning infantry would be used in addition to cavalry and horse artillery.
In their post-Jena zeal to modernize the army, the Prussians in fact went
overboard in adopting and modifying the tenets of combined-arms units so
that they both forgot the Frederician principle of employing the cavalry en
masse for shock and seemingly ignored the Napoleonic principle of the great
cavalry reserve to ensure the decisive victory, just as Murat’s sabers had
demonstrated in October 1806.
The combined-arms composition of the vanguard in which each branch
received commensurate representation meant that the cavalry never con-
tained enough sabers to operate independently. Thus, it could not get too far
ahead of its infantry. “The combination of cavalry with infantry units has
always proven to be a ball and chain for the cavalry arm,” explains Freytag-
Loringhoven. “Only complete freedom of movement assures good perform-
ance.”55 In addition, the lack of reconnaissance in the right flank of Yorck’s
corps on the 19th resulted from the constraints placed on the cavalry
associated with being part of the combined-arms advance guard, which in
turn could not conduct a uniform reconnaissance of the entire front of the
army. Moreover, patrolling and reconnoitering led to the dispersal of the
advance guard cavalry and the corresponding erosion of combat strength in
the frontline regiments. Consequently, they remained glued to their own
infantry as soon as they made contact with the enemy. For example, on the
Goldberg 229
18th, Katzler sacrificed contact with the French to return to the bivouac at
Adelsdorf and the protection of the advance guard infantry.
Basing operations on the task of maintaining constant contact with the
adversary meant that Gneisenau employed the majority of Blücher’s cavalry
in front of the army.56 In the situation in which the Prussians found them-
selves, an encounter battle appeared much more probable than a pitched
battle. With the cavalry proliferating before the front of the army, the
numerical advantage enjoyed by the Allies in this arm would have had little
to no effect on the course of an encounter battle. “This abortive arrangement
immediately asserted itself,” continues the prolific Prussian historian and
deputy chief of the German General Staff during the First World War, Baron
Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, “and was the reason the 24,000 cavalry of
the Silesian Army did not completely make itself felt.”57 Two examples
support this argument. First, on the 18th, Sacken could not exploit his
success at Steudnitz due to Lanskoy’s continued absence. Second, after
Jürgaß’s Reserve Cavalry joined Yorck’s advance guard on the 17th, the
corps commander lacked adequate cavalry to contend with Ney after the
marshal suddenly appeared on the Gröditzberg two days later. Yorck had to
request that Blücher allow the East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment to
rejoin the main body of the corps before he could take action.
The seriousness with which Blücher approached his task of remaining in
constant contact with the French in Silesia did not always have a positive
impact on the army. For example, on the 21st, when it became crystal clear
that the imperials had concentrated along the left bank of the Bober,
he could not break free from his belief that the French would retreat.
Admittedly, most Allied commanders from Bernadotte to Schwarzenberg
to Alexander believed that Napoleon would summon his forces from Silesia
to turn against either Berlin or Prague. Regardless, Blücher tended to inter-
pret the intelligence to indicate a French retreat. This led to the frequent
revisions of directives that his headquarters did not always draft and issue
punctually. As a result, orders sometimes reached the troops so late that their
objective could be attained only through strenuous night marches. Also, in a
very marked contrast to the Napoleonic system, Gneisenau’s orders failed to
inform corps commanders of the instructions issued to the neighboring
corps. At times, he sought a quick fix to the difficulties that resulted from
this negligence by ignoring the corps commander and issuing orders directly
to individual units, as we saw with I Corps on the 20th.58
Despite these numerous difficulties, which worsened before they
improved, Blücher had passed his first major test. Overcoming his instinct
to attack the French army, especially one commanded by Napoleon himself,
he complied with the tenets of the Reichenbach Plan. According to Gneise-
nau, Headquarters proceeded according to a very basic principle: as soon as
the French threatened one of his flanks, Blücher broke off the engagement
and retreated.59 Moreover, Blücher accepted the principles of the Allied

strategy: he would fix Napoleon’s attention on himself to provide
Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte with time to cross the Elbe and reach Saxony
from Bohemia and Brandenburg respectively. Indeed, he accomplished
much by boldly advancing. Not only did he throw Ney’s army into disarray,
but he brought the emperor to Silesia with his Guard and I Cavalry Corps.
Blücher certainly did his part to facilitate Schwarzenberg’s offensive.
Blücher and Gneisenau never lost sight of the best way to liberate Silesia:
by crushing the French army in a decisive battle. Such a battle could be
sought as soon as the emperor departed. Retribution for Jena-Auerstedt
remained ever present in their minds. Not for one moment did they believe
the retreat would be indefinite, again because they understood how the
operations of the two other Allied armies would facilitate their own. After
conducting a slow, fighting withdrawal, Blücher was about to see his
patience rewarded.
Notes
2 The orders issued to the Army of the Bober for 23 August have been lost. The
description is based on the operations that took place on the 23rd.
3 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:272–73; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und
Armeeführung, 53; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 24; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIa:33.
4 The Kinburnskii Dragoon Regiment and Dorpatskii Mounted Jäger Regiment,
each consisting of two squadrons.
5 Blücher to Charles John, Jauer, 23 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Gneisenau to
O Ap. Nr. 9, Bd. 3; Langeron, Mémoires, 238; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIa:35; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:272–75.
6 Attack Disposition, Add MSS, 20112, 122.
7 Blücher to Barclay, Jauer, 9:00 p.m., 23 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25;
Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 24.
8 Blücher to Barclay, Niederkrayne, 11:00 a.m., 23 August 1813, RA KrA, volym
25. Reports such as these were written in fours, with one each going to Alexander,
Frederick William, Barclay, and Bernadotte. The salutations and pronouns were
changed accordingly. Silesian Army Headquarters did not report to Schwarzen-
berg or the headquarters of the Bohemian Army. In fact, Blücher wrote several
letters to Bernadotte between 12 August and 14 October but only three to
Schwarzenberg.
9 The battalion was never re-formed and its manpower was distributed to other
battalions.
10 Quoted in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:98–99. “The demeanor of these four
battalions during the continuous attacks by a strong cavalry was downright
exemplary,” judges Friederich in Herbstfelduzg 1813, I:280.
Goldberg 231

12 The account of the combats on 23 August is based on Blücher to Barclay, Jauer,
9:00 p.m., 23 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Jauer,
25 August 1813, GSTA PK, I HA Rep. 74 Staatskanzleramt O Ap. Nr. 9, Bd. 3;
Stern-Gwiazdowski, Das Gefecht bei Goldberg-Niederau; Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1844:97–100; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:275–285; Droysen, Yorck,
II:130–33; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freheitskriege, II:179–83; Bogdano-
vich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:35–40; Langeron, Mémoires, 240; Vaudoncourt,
Histoire de la guerre, 144; Wagner, Plane der Schlachten, II:12–18.
13 Langeron, Mémoires, 243; Blücher to Barclay, Jauer, 9:00 p.m., 23 August 1813,
RA KrA, volym 25; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung,
55–56; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:39–40; Friederich, Herbstfelduzg
1813, I:281–82.
14 Blücher to Alexander, Jauer, 24 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25.
15 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:40, maintains that Blücher ordered
Langeron to Jauer but the Russian corps commander refused. Claiming his men
were exhausted and needed rest, Langeron united his corps at Hennersdorf,
where it passed the night.
17 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:42; Blücher to Gaudi is in Höpfner,
18 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:133. Delbrück describes Yorck as being “incapable
of grasping great plans; melancholic, grim, and morose; he rebuked all their steps,
interpreting them as personal, intentional slights, and seeing in them the downfall
of the army, a second edition of Jena and Auerstedt . . . Unfamiliar with the
contents of the secret instructions [Reichenbach Plan], seeing only the suffering
and privations of the troops . . . namely the young Landwehr, he engaged in
acrimonious and bitter outbursts against the leadership, not only with denounce-
ments, but claims that he could virtually foresee the destruction of his corps.
Admittedly, he compensated for these vices and his inflexible, insubordinate
refusal to obey unpleasant orders with the greatest bravery and a stamina that
earned him the utmost respect from subordinate and superior, from friend and
enemy”: Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:197.
19 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 58, claims that
Steinmetz’s brigade “had to forcibly carve a path through the Russian trains.” It
is not known if he is merely echoing Droysen. Friederich says nothing about the
Prussians having to cut their way out. Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges,
IIa:41, who cites Müffling as his source for this account, states that the Prussians
“lost patience and so made use of the musket-butt to clear a path.”
20 Droysen, Yorck, II:133; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung,
21 Gneisenau, Blücher, 162.
22 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:133. See also Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 25.
23 Langeron to Blücher, Hennersdorf, 23 August 1813; Blücher to Langeron, 8:00
p.m., 23 August 1813; and Langeron to Blücher, Hennersdorf, 9:00 p.m.,
23 August 1813 are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:105.
24 Blücher to Barclay, Jauer, 9:00 p.m., 23 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25.
25 Blücher to Alexander, Jauer, 24 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25.
26 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:285–86. Bogdanovich asserts that Blücher’s
failure to concentrate the army on the 23rd led to the continuation of the retreat
on the 24th: Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges im Jahre 1813, IIa:41–44.
27 Steffens, Adventures, 111; Droysen, Yorck, II:133–34.
28 Quoted in Kähler, Litthauischen Dragoner-Regiments, 363; Müffling, Die Feld-
züge, 25; Unger, Blücher, II:73; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:286.
29 The rest of Langeron’s corps moved into a bivouac at Großrosen, between Jauer
and Striegau. Langeron’s rearguard held Peterwitz, two miles west of Jauer.
Likewise from Langeron’s corps, Pahlen II covered the army’s left flank from
Pläswitz to Falkenberg with his detachment while a detachment of one dragoon
and one Cossack regiment under Dmitri Yuzefovich went to Bolkenhain.
Blücher’s two other corps bivouacked at Kohlhöhe: Sacken in the first line,
Yorck in the second. To secure the right flank of the army, the Mecklenburg
Hussar Regiment took a position eleven miles east of Jauer at Kuhnern (Konary)
while Katzler and fifteen squadrons stood halfway between the two at Profen.
Jürgaß secured the northern perimeter of Jauer with Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry;
north of him, Vasilchikov stood with Sacken’s rearguard at Malitsch on the Jauer–
Liegnitz road so that between Jürgaß and Vasilchikov 6,000 Allied cavalry
blocked the road south from Liegnitz. See Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung
und Armeeführung, 59; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:286–87.
30 Preparatory Disposition, Jauer, 7:00 p.m., 24 August 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 123;
Blücher to Alexander, Jauer, 24 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Gneisenau to
O Ap. Nr. 9, Bd. 3; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:198–99; Unger, Blücher,
II:73–74; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 59–62; Lan-
geron, Mémoires, 247; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges; Vaudoncourt, His-
toire de la guerre, 144; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 150.
31 Droysen, Yorck, II:134; Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Goldberg, 28 August 1813,
GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21; Unger, Blücher, II:73.
32 Lobenthal’s battalions likewise returned to their parent regiments and were
replaced by fresh units. Major Johann Friedrich August von Hiller replaced
Lobenthal as commander of the advance guard infantry.
33 Blücher to Charles John, Jauer, 12:00 p.m., 25 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25;
Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 63–64; Friederich,
34 From the Katzbach, Blücher planned to march to the Bober. Sacken’s corps
would cross at Großwalditz (Włodzice Wielkie), halfway between Bunzlau and
Löwenberg, but its light cavalry was to pursue the French through Bunzlau.
Yorck’s corps would return to Sirgwitz and cross the river. Langeron’s corps
would move across the Bober at Löwenberg, with a detachment crossing further
south at Lähn to secure the army’s left and cut off any imperial forces that had
reached Hirschberg. See Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:290–91.
35 “Disposition,” Jauer, 25 August 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 124–25; Blücher to
Charles John, Jauer, 12:00 p.m., 25 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25.
Goldberg 233

37 Blücher to Yorck, Jauer, 1:00 p.m., 25 August 1813, in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, I:291.
38 Henderson, Blücher, 126; Langeron, Mémoires, 247; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIa:43, cites Droysen as the source of his account.
39 Blasendorff, Blücher, 204. Droysen can probably be added to this group.
According to his version, “He [Yorck] personally went to Blücher; there was a
very ugly scene; Blücher’s anger appears to have been pushed to the extreme
limit”: Droysen, Yorck, II:135.
40 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 56; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:200.
42 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 26–27; Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Jauer, 25 August 1813,
GSTA PK, I HA Rep. 74 Staatskanzleramt O Ap. Nr. 9, Bd. 3. Rudzevich and
General Ivan Witte were the other two. Although Gneisenau could speak frankly
to Hardenberg, it is possible that he exaggerated his praise of Sacken to cause the
absence of Langeron’s name to appear more glaring.
43 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges im Jahre 1813, IIa:42–43; Blasendorff, Blü-
cher, 204; Unger, Blücher, II:73.
44 Kaemmerer, Ortsnamenverzeichnis der Otschaften jenseits von Oder und Neiße,
144, lists Słup for Schlauphof as well as Schlaupe, but modern maps do not
provide a Polish name for the small town south of Winnica that was referred to
as Schlauphof.
45 Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 212–13.
46 This detachment consisted of the two squadrons of the Kinburnskii Dragoon
Regiment, the two squadrons of the Dorpatskii Mounted Jäger Regiment, and the
Moskovskii and Libavskii Infantry Regiments.
47 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 27–28; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armee-
führung, 66–67; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:49.
48 Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Jauer, 25 August 1813, GSTA PK, I HA Rep. 74
Staatskanzleramt O Ap. Nr. 9, Bd. 3.
49 Blücher to Amalie, Jauer, 25 August 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 174–75.
50 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 26; Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Jauer, 25 August 1813,
GSTA PK, I HA Rep. 74 Staatskanzleramt O Ap. Nr. 9, Bd. 3; Vaudoncourt,
Histoire de la guerre, 144; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:47.
51 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:287; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 25; Droysen,
Yorck, II:136; Henderson, Blücher, 126.
53 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 56. Lieven, in Russia Against Napoleon, 377, contends that
Langeron had been unfairly placed in a difficult position, believing that his
opposition to Blücher corresponded to the tsar’s desire that the Prussian obey
the Reichenbach Plan.
54 Quoted in Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 11–12.
56 Gneisenau likewise understood the role of the Silesian Army, as seen in this
25 August letter to Hardenberg: “Finally I have a free moment to inform you
that we have opened the campaign with much activity, and the difficult task that
we received – to never lose sight of the enemy, to engage him constantly, to

initiate combat with him and yet avoid a battle – up until now has been fulfilled.”
See Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Jauer, 25 August 1813, GSTA PK, I HA Rep. 74
58 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 45–46.
59 Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Jauer, 25 August 1813, GStA PK, I HA Rep. 74
6
The Katzbach
Including most of III Corps, Macdonald’s army held a twelve-mile line

stretching northeast to southwest along the Katzbach between Goldberg
and Liegnitz on the evening of the 25th. Souham’s main body camped at
Rothkirch, with one division still marching east from Haynau to Liegnitz,
which the French occupied. Sébastiani’s cavalry passed the night at Hohen-
dorf, some nine miles southwest of Liegnitz and four miles northeast of
Goldberg. Lauriston’s V Corps maintained Goldberg itself, with a vanguard
at Prausnitz. Gérard’s XI Corps stood just west of Goldberg; his 31st
Division held Schönau, eleven miles south of Goldberg. After losing two
days because of Ney, Macdonald eagerly prepared to move against Blücher’s
suspected position north of Jauer. He wanted to drive the Allied army
deeper into Silesia and believed the mere advance of his own army would
suffice to achieve this goal (see Map 2).
Just as Blücher needed a battle to save his army, Macdonald likewise
needed to improve the situation of his own. Supply became a headache that
worsened with each passing hour. Sitting in a region sucked dry during
the armistice, his army desperately needed to move across the Katzbach
and the Wütende Neiße in the hope of finding food in the untouched region
of the former neutral zone. The region as far west as the Queis offered little
for the masses that concentrated along the Katzbach. Inadequate supply
forced the individual soldier to survive as best he could, inflicting devasta-
tion and violence on the inhabitants. The complete breakdown of discipline
led to the victimization of the civilian population through plunder, robbery,
burning, rape, and murder. Now the time had come for this army to conduct
a military operation: could discipline be restored with the flip of a switch?
Macdonald could not worry about the answer: the marshal felt he had no
choice but to move east on 26 August. From Goldberg, he issued an “Order
of Movement” at 11:00 on the night of the 25th. Like Wittgenstein a few
235
10 Marshal Étienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald, 1765–1840
months earlier, the newly minted French commander drafted lengthy, com-
plicated, and partly unclear instructions. For the next day, Gérard’s XI
Corps, minus François Ledru’s 31st Division, would form the center of the
imperial army and proceed from its positions west of Goldberg through
Röchlitz and Seichau to Jauer. Macdonald instructed Ledru to unite his
division at Berthelsdorf on the 26th to attack the Allied corps at Hirschberg
on the 27th. On the right wing, V Corps, less Jacques-Pierre Puthod’s 17th
Division, would take the military highway southeast from Goldberg
through Prausnitz and Seichau to Jauer. On his far right, the marshal wanted
17th Division to reach Schönau on the 26th. From there, Puthod would send
one brigade to unite with the 31st Division in the assault on Hirschberg.
With his main body, Puthod would push through Jägendorf (Myślinów)
toward Jauer on the 27th to threaten Blücher’s line of operation.
While the instructions for XI and V Corps are fairly concise in the sense
that Macdonald at least provided clear objectives for his right and center,
those for his left wing – III Corps and II Cavalry Corps – are based on
conjecture and in consequence are extremely vague. All that clearly emerges
is the marshal’s desire for the close cooperation of the units on his left wing.
Macdonald wanted III Corps marching by 7:00 “to pursue the enemy in the
supposition that he is retreating on Jauer, but whether he takes one or several
directions, Souham will limit himself to demonstrations with some of his
army corps and, as far as possible, with troops in proportion to the enemy’s
forces, and with the rest he will threaten Jauer, heading toward this town by
The Katzbach 237
the regular road from Liegnitz. Understanding the importance of always

being in communication, Souham will remain in contact with Sébastiani and
the troops he considers sufficient to leave at Liegnitz as well as those facing
the enemy. Souham will echelon his corps and reach an agreement with
Sébastiani over the amount of cavalry forces that will be appropriate to
move to the left [east] of III Corps for flank coverage.” Although less vague
than Souham’s, the instructions for Sébastiani indicate that Army Headquar-
ters had little knowledge of the terrain: “After providing Souham the cavalry
he will need to attain the dual objective noted above, Sébastiani will depart at
7:00 in the morning to move through Kroitsch on Jauer, using the Bunzlau–
Jauer road. This general will remain in contact with Gérard and Souham
through detachments. If Sébastiani has to cross defiles to pass, Souham will
provide a few battalions to cover the cavalry.”
With this, Macdonald’s instructions came to an end. To his credit, the
marshal invited scrutiny: “If this order of movement is susceptible to some
observations or modifications, the commanding generals will share them
with me immediately.” He also recognized the possibility that his corps
commanders would be unable to offer each other mutual support. Thus, to
prevent his corps from becoming isolated, he reserved the right to determine
the point of attack. Based on the army’s movements as well as the numerous
after-action reports, we can deduce how the corps commanders, mainly
Souham and Sébastiani, interpreted their orders. Both believed they had to
cross the Katzbach at Liegnitz and Kroitsch respectively. Souham would
then strike the highway to Jauer and proceed south to Malitsch while
Sébastiani crossed the Katzbach and Wütende Neiße in the region of
Kroitsch and debouched on the plateau, seeking the Liegnitz–Jauer road.1
Because the marshal believed Blücher either would be caught south of
Jauer or would continue to retreat deeper into Silesia, he departed from
Goldberg without making any contingency plans in case the enemy should
appear north or west of Jauer. His center, XI Corps, marched at 6:00 from
Neudorf-am-Rennwege on the morning of 26 August “to reach Jauer
through Röchlitz and Seichau.” Macdonald accompanied V Corps, which
advanced from Prausnitz along the left bank of the Wütende Neiße on the
Goldberg–Jauer road at 7:00 a.m. Likewise at 7:00, Sébastiani’s II Cavalry
Corps filed out of Rothbrünnig (Brennik) en route to Kroitsch. Macdonald
expected III Corps to also commence its operation at 7:00 in order for
Souham to reach the plateau at the same time as Gérard and Sébastiani.2
Macdonald’s courier left Army Headquarters at 11:00 p.m. on the 25th
but did not reach Souham at Rothkirch until 9:30 on the morning of the
26th: two and one-half hours after III Corps should have departed. Souham
then required an additional two hours to assemble his divisions.3 In addition,
Souham directed III Corps to Kroitsch rather than across the Katzbach at
Liegnitz, claiming that the heavy rains had rendered the river impassable
there. The results of a grossly delayed march to the wrong objective would
prove disastrous for the marshal: the left wing of his army failed to reach the
battle in time to influence its outcome. Macdonald could never have foreseen
that III Corps would play such a limited role in the battle.
Terrain played a prominent role in the upcoming clash. The area of Silesia
where the battle occurred formed a triangle between Goldberg, Liegnitz, and
Jauer. To the west, the Katzbach between Liegnitz and Goldberg formed one
side of the triangle. Main crossing points existed at Goldberg, Niederau,
Röchlitz, Kroitsch, Schmogwitz, the Teichmann estate, and Liegnitz. Half-
way between Goldberg and Liegnitz, the Wütende Neiße, a mountain stream,
flowed into the Katzbach, thus cutting the battlefield in two. The Brechelshof
estate, Schlaupe, Schlauphof, and Niederkrayn provided the main points of
passage between the stream’s steep banks. At Niederkrayn in particular, the
right bank dominated the streambed. While both the Katzbach and the
Wütende Neiße could be forded at many points in the dry season, they often
overflowed their banks in rainy weather, carrying away the bridges and
providing considerable obstacles. Having a large waterfall and absorbing
several other mountain streams when in flood, the Wütende Neiße bore the
well-deserved reputation of wütende (raging). The rainy season affected not
only the watercourses, but the clay soil as well. Heavy summer storms turned
roads into muddy quagmires, making the movement of military forces almost
impossible: the unrelenting mud swallowed artillery up to the axles.
Along the right bank of the Wütende Neiße, on the eastern half of
the battlefield where Yorck and Sacken would fight, the undulating plain of
the mile-wide plateau extended north for two miles before descending to the
Katzbach at Dohnau. On the western spur of the plateau, the hill chain that
extended to Goldberg squeezed the Wütende Neiße into a narrow but steep
gorge extending north from the Brechelshof estate to its junction with the
Katzbach. Thus, the Wütende Neiße’s sloping valley formed the western edge
of the plateau as it snaked its way past Schlauphof, Niederweinberg, and
Niederkrayn to just west of Dohnau. From the Brechelshof estate to the influx
of the Wütende Neiße in the Katzbach, the flat, treeless plateau towered from
100 to 200 feet above the valley floor. Narrow, precipitous, overgrown ravines
descended into the valley. Between Eichholtz (Warma˛towice) and Bellwitzhof
on one of the gentle hills that rolled across the plateau stood a colossal Linde
(lime tree) later called the “Blücherlinde” because the Prussians established
Blücher’s command post under its boughs. Two main roads traversed the
eastern half of the battlefield. The first ran northwest from Jauer through
Brechelshof, Oberweinberg, and Niederweinberg4 to Niederkrayn, where it
crossed the Wütende Neiße and led to Kroitsch. There, the road forked: one
branch continued northwest to Bunzlau while the other extended southwest
through Röchlitz to Goldberg. The second road extended almost due north
from Jauer through Neudorf to Liegnitz.
The Katzbach 239
0 1000 2000 3000 yards N

xxx Schmogwitz
Wültsch III
Ka
Dohnau tzb
ach
Kroitsch
Riemberg
iße
Ne
e
Katz nd
bach
Wüte
Kleintinz
xxxx Jänowitz
Bober Niederhochkirch
Laasnig Niederkrayne
Niederweinberg
Oberkrayne xxx
II
Oberweinberg x
Kuh hill
xx 2
Wü
8 Eichholtz
ten
Kreuz hill
de
Ne
iß
e xxx
e
Arnoldshof xxx Tauben hill

ins
Sacken
Pl
Yorck
xxx Schlauphof
Bellwitzhof Christianenhöhe
XI
Seichau
xxx Schlaupe
V
er
lb
Si
Breite hill xxxx

Hennersdorf Silesia
Kirch hill
Wein hill xxx
Langeron
Brechelshof
Mönchswald Herrmannsdorf
Eichel hill to Jauer
to Jauer
Wein hill Peterwitz
12. The battle of the Katzbach, 26 August 1813
Along the left bank of the Wütende Neiße, the western half of the
battlefield bore little resemblance to the eastern portion. Less than three
miles west of the Wütende Neiße rose the Mönchswald (Monks Forest) on a
steep outcrop of the Sudeten Mountains called the Fulnigsberge. From this
hill chain sprang numerous streams of varying depth that fed both the
Wütende Neiße and the Katzbach. The intervals between these water
courses formed excellent terrain sectors in the hilly region that provided
very favorable defensive positions for Langeron’s corps. The Goldberg–

Jauer road, which ran northwest passing Hennersdorf and Seichau, cut
through a valley located between the Mönchswald and the Wütende Neiße.
This road intersected at right angles two advantageous terrain features found
in this valley: a hill chain south of Hennersdorf and the swampy Plinse
stream, which practically covered Langeron’s entire front. Flowing south-
west to northeast between Hennersdorf and Seichau, the Plinse discharged
into the Wütende Neiße near Niederweinberg. A slight ridgeline along its
eastern bank offered an excellent position for Langeron’s vanguard. Behind
this ridge, his cavalry found a suitable plain between Herrmannsdorf
(Me˛cinka) and the Mönchswald. A second stream, the marshy Silber,
passed through Hennersdorf, likewise flowing southwest to northeast to
feed the Wütende Neiße near Schlaupe. While the Plinse covered the front of
Langeron’s position, the Mönchswald and the Wütende Neiße guarded
its respective flanks. Between Seichau and the Plinse, the terrain offered
a forward, covered position for defenders, while the hill chain south of
Hennersdorf – primarily the Eichel, Wein, Kirch, and Breite hills – provided
a primary position.
Lauriston’s vanguard made contact with Langeron’s advance posts on the
hills north and west of Seichau around 9:00 on the morning of 26 August.
According to Langeron: “the enemy advanced against me; strong columns
attacked my vanguard on the Seichau heights, and others moved into the
woods on my left flank, which they obviously sought to turn.” At 9:30 a.m.,
Langeron informed Blücher that the enemy had engaged Rudzevich’s forward
posts, but the thick woods of the Mönchswald prevented the Russians from
determining the size of the attacking force. Thirty minutes later, at 10:00, the
French attacked the Russian post at Seichau itself; Lauriston’s vanguard
slowly drove back the Russians. At 11:00, Langeron ordered his forward
posts to withdraw across the Plinse and reunite with Rudzevich’s vanguard.5
Turning to the Prussians, Katzler passed the night slightly northwest of
Bellwitzhof on the hills of Niederweinberg with Yorck’s vanguard: six
battalions, twelve Reserve Cavalry squadrons, and one battery each of horse
and foot. Cavalry posts extended to the villages of Kroitsch and Wültsch
(Wilczyce) situated close together on the left (western) bank of the
Katzbach.6 Early that morning, three East Prussian Jäger companies,
100 skirmishers from the Brandenburg Regiment, the Brandenburg Uhlan
Regiment, and the 3rd and 4th Squadrons of Lithuanian Dragoons moved
into the two villages; the rest of the cavalry and the horse battery remained
on the right bank. Hiller, the commander of the vanguard infantry, sent small
detachments to occupy the defiles of the Wütende Neiße from Schlaupe
downstream to Niederkrayn while the main body held positions at the
Niederweinberg mill, on a hill close to Niederweinberg, at the bridge over
the Wütende Neiße at Niederkrayn, and along the bank downstream of this
The Katzbach 241
bridge.7 The six-pound guns of Light Foot Battery Nr. 24 unlimbered on a

steep hill that commanded the road from Niederkrayn to Jänowitz.
Meanwhile, Sébastiani’s II Cavalry Corps approached Kroitsch. His 4th
Light Cavalry Division under Rémy-Joseph Exelmans advanced in squadron
columns to the left of the road while Nicolas-François Roussel’s 2nd Light
Cavalry Division proceeded along the right; Antoine-Louis St.-Germain’s
2nd Heavy Cavalry Division followed behind the center of the two lead
divisions. Roussel’s detachments established and maintained communication
with XI Corps to the southwest while Exelmans did the same with III Corps
to the northeast. Inexplicably, neither reconnoitered the front toward
Kroitsch, thus enabling the Prussians to spot their approach at 10:00.8
Around 11:00, Katzler observed Langeron’s advance posts retreating
southeast. With his left flank exposed by the Russian retreat, he withdrew
the cavalry across the Wütende Neiße; two uhlan squadrons remained to
take in the Jäger posted at Kroitsch and Wültsch. Meanwhile, Sébastiani’s
cavalry steadily closed on Wültsch. Waiting until the head of the column
came very close, the Prussian Jäger opened fire, ripping holes in the ranks of
the imperials. The well-aimed volleys at such close range forced the French
to fall back. To blast the Prussians from their position, French horse artillery
attempted to unlimber, but the Jäger inflicted so many casualties on the gun
crews that the battery had to withdraw several hundred yards before
opening an ineffective bombardment. After streaming rain fouled their
muskets, the Prussian Jäger evacuated Kroitsch, crossed the Katzbach, and
took position at Niederkrayn. The commander of the Jäger, Major Franz
Karl von Klüx, described the action:
I had hardly occupied the villages for five minutes when the outposts were
thrown back in full gallop on Kroitsch by six or eight cavalry regiments
mixed with artillery that were already getting close to the village. The enemy
appeared to want nothing more than to reconnoiter and march through our
outposts when he received fire from the Jäger at fifty paces. The resulting
terror caused an about-face that rolled up the enemy and made such a great
mass that no shot could miss. They withdrew somewhat, unlimbering a
battery facing Wültsch and firing caseshot against the Jäger without great
effect; they did likewise at Kroitsch, which they set ablaze with grenades.
Because no infantry faced me and the thickly overgrown Katzbach was close
in my rear, I viewed the villages as fortresses to be occupied as long as I could
still fire a shot from the bushes in the strong rain, and only then moved across
the water straight backwards.9
As soon as the Prussians withdrew from the villages, Sébastiani’s cavalry

continued its advance. At this time, the lead brigade of XI Corps’ 35th
Division marched through Riemberg (Rzymówka) and reached Kroitsch
from the west just as Sébastiani’s troopers entered the village from the north.
Infantry and cavalry collided. Both columns rolled pell-mell through the
village and across the bridge, causing needless confusion that could have
been avoided had Macdonald directed II Cavalry Corps to Dohnau.
A portion of Sébastiani’s cavalry took this road, but the majority rode
through and sometimes over the infantry.10 The awful weather made matters
worse: pouring rain obscured the horizon, turned the rivers into swollen
torrents, and washed out the roads. Both sides experienced difficulties
executing movements.
Around this same time, Macdonald and Gérard rode into Laasnig with the
head of XI Corps: General Claude-Marie Meunier’s 2nd Brigade from 36th
Division. Hearing musket fire to his left, Gérard rode northeast to investigate.
Observing about a dozen Prussian squadrons in the valley south of Kroitsch
facing Sébastiani’s cavalry, he summoned three battalions and two guns from
Meunier’s brigade to scatter the enemy horse and take possession of the bridge
over the Wütende Neiße at Niederkrayn. According to Gérard’s report, his
infantry moved to within fifty paces of the enemy cavalry line without being
noticed. Behind the Prussians, the French infantry could have wreaked havoc,
but the heavy rain had fouled the powder so that only forty muskets dis-
charged. Nevertheless, Gérard maintains that this sufficed to convince the
Prussian horse to hastily retreat to Niederweinberg. After a short resistance,
the Prussians yielded that hamlet as well as the entire stretch between the
Katzbach and the Wütende Neiße. Macdonald instructed Gérard to open the
Oberkrayn–Niederweinberg road for II Cavalry Corps. The marshal wanted
Sébastiani to re-form his regiments south of Kroitsch and then ascend the
Niederweinberg defile as soon as Meunier’s brigade had crowned the plateau
with its infantry and artillery as well as the battery of twelve-pound guns
belonging to XI Corps and now attached to 36th Division. Macdonald
planned to support V Corps against Langeron with the rest of 36th Division
as well as all of 35th, the corps cavalry, and reserve artillery.11
Despite the disorganized rabble on the opposite bank, Katzler realized
he would not be able to resist the enemy’s growing numbers. Hiller
methodically withdrew his infantry to Niederkrayn, pursued by the three
lead battalions of Meunier’s brigade. Firing both too high and too low, Light
Battery Nr. 24 failed to slow the French advance. Hiller retreated across the
Wütende Neiße bridge, moving upstream in the valley (south) to the Nie-
derweinberg defile. Pursued by Meunier’s infantry, the Prussians defended
the gorge for almost one hour. Without artillery support, the French could
not dislodge Katzler’s combined-arms vanguard from the slopes above
Niederweinberg. Fortunately for the Allies, the Prussians eventually
retreated and opened the passes to the French, thus allowing the ensuing
battle on the plateau.
According to Hiller, imperial forces, “whose strength I estimated to be
40,000 men, pressed forward with uncommon zeal.” Macdonald’s troops
The Katzbach 243
appeared everywhere. Besides pressing Hiller, the French reached Schlau-

phof south of Niederweinberg while to the north Sébastiani’s cavalry moved
west toward Dohnau. As far as the eye could see, cavalry, infantry, and
artillery advanced across and through the ever-swelling waters of the
Wütende Neiße to the sunken roads and ravines of the valley. The French
finally unlimbered their artillery. Hiller continues:
Three to four batteries, which came closer and closer to the defile, bom-
barded me very intensely; some balls, which fell in Kempsky’s [Oppeln’s]
Landwehr battalion, broke it, and the wild mass wanted to throw itself on the
next battalion. Along with me, the brave commander of the battalion . . .
attempt to halt and re-form this battalion, which consisted only of raw Upper
Silesians. Regardless, we were not successful until I pointed some cannon at
them and gave my word of honor that I would fire on them. This worked,
and from that moment on the battalion was so brave that, when a shell
suddenly struck down fourteen men, it maintained order.12
Earlier that morning, I Corps had departed from Jauer at 5:00 and
marched northwest toward Schlauphof to fill the gap between Sacken and
Langeron.13 In two columns, Yorck’s soldiers trudged out of their bivouac
under heavy downpours and in the face of an unrelenting north wind. To
add to their misery, a portion of the march ran through fields that the
merciless rain had turned into bogs: many a soldier emerged without his
footgear. The mood of the troops matched the grey sky: with heavy hearts
they dragged themselves through the clay sludge. Following the right bank
of the Wütende Neiße, the Prussians trudged north through the Brechelshof
estate toward Bellwitzhof directly opposite Schlauphof; the Reserve Cavalry
moved right (northeast) to the Christianenhöhe farmstead 2,000 yards from
Bellwitzhof. In streaming rain, Yorck’s lead brigades halted between Bre-
chelshof and Bellwitzhof around 10:00 to await further orders; reports
arrived that Katzler’s vanguard could not hold the enemy at the Katzbach.
Finally overpowered, Hiller conceded the Niederweinberg defile.
Reaching Brechelshof around 10:30 that morning, Blücher planned to
cross the Katzbach and attack Macdonald.14 Starting around 9:00, intermit-
tent firing could be heard from the direction of Seichau, but Headquarters
attributed this to outpost skirmishing. The Allies could see little: “A most
tremendous, continuous rain and a lowering sky had so darkened the hori-
zon that every movement was difficult and any kind of reconnoitering
almost impossible.”15 Thus far, all reports had indicated the concentration
of enemy forces at Liegnitz and Goldberg. Between the two, a large body of
cavalry camped at Rothbrünnig. According to informants, Macdonald’s
right wing did not move on the 25th while the left had fallen back to Haynau
on the 24th, but again moved forward on the 25th. Based on this infor-
mation, Blücher and Gneisenau concluded that the imperials would
maintain a defensive position west of the Katzbach. Having no idea that

Macdonald intended to take the offensive, they decided to proceed with
their advance. Some accounts mistakenly claim that Blücher convened a
council of war. Per his tradition, the general did speak openly with Gneise-
nau in the presence of the General Staff officers, especially those charged
with writing and delivering his orders. In 1817, Blücher himself refuted this,
telling an associate “that a dumb chap had just written a book” on the
history of the Katzbach “in which he said that before the battle he [Blücher]
had held a council of war. This was not true – never in his life had he
[Blücher] held one.”16
Around 11:00 a.m., Blücher issued the orders he hoped would bring him
the battle he so desperately needed. For a diversion, he instructed Langeron
to dispatch his left wing detachment (Pahlen II) from Schönau and Kon-
radswaldau to attack the enemy at Goldberg. Langeron’s vanguard would
maintain a defensive posture at Seichau, shielding the main body as it
marched north to cross the Katzbach at Riemberg and if possible Röchlitz
as well. After crossing the river, Blücher wanted Langeron to form
columns with the cavalry pushed northwest toward the Schnelle Deichsel.
Meanwhile, the main blow would fall on Macdonald’s left wing.17 Yorck
would lead I Corps across the Katzbach at Kroitsch and Dohnau. Marching
northwest, he would take a position at Steudnitz, halfway between Liegnitz
and Haynau, cutting off the enemy from the latter and attacking his rear at
the former. To gain time for Yorck to complete the envelopment, Sacken had
to fix the French at Liegnitz and gradually swing south, moving his corps
across the Katzbach to “intensely” attack the enemy’s right flank. The
disposition ordered Sacken to send his light cavalry across the Katzbach
downstream of Liegnitz to slam the enemy’s left flank and cut off his retreat
to Glogau. All corps should begin the march at 2:00 that afternoon. Blücher
later extended the time to 3:00 for reasons that we shall soon see. “As soon as
the enemy retreats,” concluded Blücher’s orders, “I expect the cavalry to
proceed with boldness. The enemy must learn that he cannot retreat before
us unscathed.”18
After crossing the Katzbach, French officers restored enough order to
form two main columns and send them in different directions. Sébastiani’s
cavalry mainly crossed the Wütende Neiße at Niederkrayn, ascended
the plateau by various paths, and converged on the road that ran east
to Jänowitz. The smaller column – Meunier’s brigade and some of
Sébastiani’s regiments – turned south at Niederweinberg to move through
Oberweinberg and debouch on the plateau by the Kuh hill. Although
Meunier’s infantry led the march, Sébastiani’s troopers strove to reach the
plateau first. Carelessly cutting their way through the foot soldiers, the
impetuous riders completely shattered the cohesion of the infantry as it
attempted to get through the pass. Meunier’s battalions disintegrated as
The Katzbach 245
companies became separated. As soon as the officers restored order in one

battalion, it continued to plod up the steep slope. Consequently, only
individual battalions gradually cleared the pass to reach the plateau, which
meant the French never gained numerical superiority over the retreating
Prussians. The defile delayed the advance of the imperial infantry for some
time, but Katzler knew his small vanguard could not stop the enemy from
deploying. Moreover, his position at Niederweinberg became increasingly
dangerous after French forces cleared the Niederkrayn defile and struck the
road to Janöwitz, thus threatening his right flank.
Katzler formed the rest of Hiller’s infantry in two lines on the road to the
Christianenhöhe farm. Soon joined by the cavalry, the Prussians withdrew
en echelon with the left wing remaining forward of the right. Light Battery
Nr. 24 somewhat redeemed itself by placing four guns on each wing and
skillfully using the terrain to destroy one gun and one mortar from a French
battery. Heavy rains continued to foul the muskets so that the pursuing
imperials could only fire curses at the Prussians. In his report, Hiller claimed
that they “made front every 100 paces in order to give the army time to
position itself.” Around 1:30 p.m., the first French infantry – Meunier’s
battalions – reached the plateau. They immediately dispatched swarms of
skirmishers, who soon discovered that the weather had rendered their
muskets useless. “Believing we were retreating,” continued Hiller, “the
enemy mocked us with swear-words, deployed quickly, and pushed forward
a mass of skirmishers, but they were hardly effective because of the continu-
ous rain.”19
Although the French infantry posed little threat, the main mass of
Sébastiani’s cavalry as well as his horse artillery also debouched onto the
plateau after climbing the slopes of the Wütende Neiße valley in columns of
twos. His lead division, Roussel’s 2nd Light, turned southeast, placing its left
wing at Kleintinz (Tyńczyk Legnicki) and arranging its regiments in three
lines: 11th and 12th Chasseurs and 2nd Lancers formed the first; 2nd and 4th
Lancers and 5th Hussars the second; and 3rd and 9th Hussars the third.
Next, the twenty-four guns of II Cavalry Corps moved up and unlimbered
between the right wing of the 2nd Light Cavalry and the left wing of
Meunier’s brigade near the Kuh hill.20 The French completed this deploy-
ment by 2:00; Sébastiani’s troopers wasted no time in harrying Hiller’s
infantry. Again the Landwehr performed admirably. “Later,” reported
Hiller, “when no man could fire any longer, the battalion held together in
square when it was beset by enemy cavalry. Throughout the entire engage-
ment, the Seydlitz [Schweidnitz] Landwehr Battalion maintained itself with
the order and calm of a veteran battalion.”21 To take in the advance guard,
Jürgaß formed the Reserve Cavalry between Christianenhöhe and the
Oberweinberg–Bellwitzhof road; his Nr. 1 and Nr. 2 Horse Batteries went
into action against the French artillery. Thus covered, Katzler’s troops
continued their retreat. Around 2:00, they reached a position between Bell-
witzhof and Christianenhöhe while Yorck’s main body moved up between
Bellwitzhof and Brechelshof.
Macdonald did not follow the troops to the plateau, but instead estab-
lished his command post near the Bunzlau–Jauer road purportedly
“awaiting from one moment to the next the arrival of III Corps.” To the
east, a few enemy battalions appeared to be retreating on the plateau.
However, V and XI Corps seemed to be intensely engaged to the south,
leading the marshal to believe that the main action would occur on his right.
Hearing the increasing intensity of Lauriston’s guns, the marshal rode
toward his right wing. En route, he met Souham, who “announced the
arrival of III Corps behind II Cavalry Corps.” Although two battalions
from III Corps had been at Liegnitz since the 25th, they had taken no
measures to reconnoiter that sector of the Katzbach to determine the condi-
tion of the bridges and crossing points. Not until the march commenced on
the 26th – albeit four and one-half hours late – did the French evaluate these
points of passage. The commander of Souham’s engineers reported that he
could not find one passable bridge over the Katzbach in the Liegnitz region.
“I took all the information on the crossings of the Katzbach that I could get
in that short time, which did not allow reconnaissance to be conducted,”
stated Souham in his after-action report to Berthier. “I learned that all the
bridges at Liegnitz were down, and the only one that existed vis-à-vis the
position was at Kroitsch.” To save time, Souham directed III Corps to
Kroitsch. Instead of the entire corps, only the 39th Division marched to
Liegnitz to cover the engineers as they rebuilt the bridge on the Liegnitz–
Jauer road.22
With his right wing leading the march, Souham’s lead division – General
Michel-Sylvestre Brayer’s 8th – reached Kroitsch at 2:30 p.m., just as II
Cavalry Corps finished crossing the Katzbach. “Because the marshal told me
to maintain direct contact with the cavalry corps of General Sébastiani,”
continued Souham, “I thought it necessary to direct the right of the army
[corps] to this village to fulfill this goal, and at the same time not act alone
and not become involved in a separate affair, which the marshal had warned
each corps against.” Macdonald expressed his understanding of Souham’s
predicament but, in view of the smooth deployment of the army, III Corps
had arrived at a terrible moment. Thus, he insisted that only 8th Division
cross the Katzbach at Kroitsch and climb the valley wall at Niederkrayn.
But what of the rest of the corps: 9th, 10th, and 11th Divisions?
An unexpected opportunity to redress Souham’s mistake became avail-
able to Macdonald. Only the commander in chief had the authority to
prevent III Corps and II Cavalry Corps from becoming entangled. Indeci-
sion momentarily froze Macdonald; he limited himself to mere recommen-
dations. Before continuing to Lauriston’s sector, he advised Souham to move
The Katzbach 247
one division onto the plateau while two others turned it by seeking a point
of passage across the Katzbach further downstream, and the fourth remained
in reserve. Souham’s version slightly varies, yet the corps commander’s
report to Berthier and thus the emperor provides sufficient evidence to
conclude that Macdonald did not make a decisive decision on the spot:
“The affair was already heavily engaged, the other three divisions were
placed in a position on the left bank to be able to turn the enemy’s right
wherever the marshal judged necessary. The 8th Division formed at the foot
of the plateau on which the engagement was taking place.”23
Thirty minutes later, Macdonald finally made a firm decision.24 After
observing the combat on his right wing, he sent orders for Souham’s 9th,
10th, and 11th Divisions to “move rapidly to the left along the right bank of
the Katzbach to take the enemy in the flank and force him to abandon his
position [on the plateau].” The marshal hoped this movement would open
the defiles of the Wütende Neiße. French staff officer and historian Gabriel
Fabry criticizes the marshal for not throwing all of III Corps against
Langeron, whom the Wütende Neiße and the hills south of Oberkrayn
separated from the rest of Blücher’s army. Moreover, how could the marshal
expect the divisions of III Corps, whose head arrived at Kroitsch at 2:30, to
march on a single road and get across the Katzbach in time to intervene on
the plateau with force? Even if they cleared the river in good time, Souham’s
divisions would then have faced the possibility of having to master enemy-
occupied heights just to climb on the plateau. Indeed, according to the
journal of the III Corps, by the time 9th Division, which was closest to
the battlefield, changed direction, marched left (east), and “boldly climbed
the mountain” at Dohnau, the Allies had already driven the French from the
plateau. Thus, 9th Division “was received by an artillery fire that its own
could not answer.” While the first and second points of Fabry’s critique are
legitimate arguments, this last criticism, which relies exclusively on hind-
sight, is undeserved: Macdonald had no way of knowing that the situation
on the plateau would end with the rout of his left wing.25
Returning to Blücher’s left wing, Langeron completed the deployment of
his army corps around noon. North of Hennersdorf, Rudzevich’s ad hoc
vanguard division held the ridgeline along the left bank of the Plinse, with
1st Brigade of 8th Division of X Infantry Corps (Staroingermanlandskii and
Arkhangelogorodskii Infantry Regiments, four battalions total) to the left
(west) of the Goldberg–Jauer road, the two battalions of the 45th Jäger
Regiment in the center holding the left bank of the Plinse itself, and the
two battalions of the 29th Jäger Regiment to the right (east) of the
Goldberg–Jauer road.26 Regarding the cavalry and artillery, Rudzevich’s
disposition reflects Langeron’s concern about being enveloped on the left.
While the three squadrons of the 2nd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment covered
the extreme right wing, the two squadrons of the Litovskii Mounted Jäger
Regiment and the five squadrons of the Kievskii Dragoon Regiment held the
extreme left, supported by the 3rd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment, which
took a position behind (south of) 1st Brigade of 8th Division. On a hill north
of these two regiments, the ten guns of the Don Cossack 2nd Artillery
Battery unlimbered. Forward posts stood north and west of Seichau.
Langeron’s main body deployed along the curve formed by Herrmanns-
dorf, Wein hill, Kirch hill, Breite hill, and Schlaupe, with Olsufiyev’s IX
Infantry Corps and General Aleksey Shcherbatov’s VI Infantry Corps
forming the respective left and right wings. Langeron posted his reserve
behind the right wing of his position between Herrmannsdorf and Breite
hill, Korf’s cavalry on the left east of Herrmannsdorf, and two brigades as
well as the artillery of Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps on the right west of
Breite hill. “My other [infantry] corps,” noted Langeron, “occupied the
three heights of Wein, Kirch, and Breite, between Herrmannsdorf and
Schlaupe, having in front of them the village of Hennersdorf, which was
occupied by my Jäger; Schlaupe was occupied by the 11th Jäger, supported
by the 2nd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment . . . and by some Prussian cavalry
squadrons from the left flank of Yorck’s corps, on which my right flank
rested; my left flank was secured by the movement I [eventually] ordered
Rudzevich to make.”27
With more than thirty battalions, eleven squadrons of regular cavalry,
and seventy-eight guns at his disposal, Langeron could have offered consid-
erable resistance.28 With his right anchored to Schlaupe on the Wütende
Neiße and his left on the Mönchswald, Langeron’s front extended a man-
ageable 5,000 yards. At Schlaupe, the Russian right connected with Yorck’s
left on the eastern bank of the Wütende Neiße while the thick wood of the
Mönchswald prevented any sizeable force from turning his left in a tactical
envelopment. However, a strategic envelopment of his left through Jägen-
dorf concerned the Russian corps commander, although he hoped Pahlen II’s
detachment at Konradswaldau would inform him in time of such a
movement.
By noon, Langeron’s vanguard was in position on the left bank of the
Plinse while his main body stretched from Herrmannsdorf to Schlaupe along
the curve of the Silber. Facing it, Lauriston deployed his two divisions –
Maison’s 16th and Rochambeau’s 19th – in the one-mile gap between Sei-
chau and Arnoldshof (Sichówek). To envelop the Russians, a flanking
detachment consisting of two battalions and two guns took a position on
the Kreuz hill – the northern gateway to the Mönchswald – with orders to
proceed through the forest by way of a ravine. At this time, Blücher’s
courier, Lieutenant Ludwig Friedrich Leopold von Gerlach, delivered the
attack disposition that had been drafted at 11:00. “At noon,” Langeron
recalled, “Blücher shared with me a brilliant and daring plan that he had
conceived to attack the enemy with his right. He ordered me to move to my
The Katzbach 249
right via Bromberg to support his attack if possible but, if I could not
execute this movement, to content myself with holding the enemy to their
right; he added that my corps would be the pivot in the great maneuver that
he was projecting.”
According to Langeron, the scribe – probably Müffling – had used a thin
sheet of paper that the rain reduced to pulp. Langeron asked Gerlach if he
knew the contents. Gerlach had been listening while Gneisenau dictated the
orders, but could not recall his instructions verbatim. Langeron ordered the
lieutenant to recite what he knew several times before witnesses, explaining
in his memoirs that “I had to use extreme caution with a man like Gneisenau
who, in fact, commanded our army and wanted a German and not a
Frenchman to command my corps.” Not able to contain his discontent,
the corps commander blurted: “Your general [Blücher] is a good swords-
man, but that is all.” He explained to Gerlach the difficulty of his situation
and, according to German sources, added: “We must be prudent and, you
must admit, prudence is not the strongpoint of General Gneisenau.”29
Blücher’s instructions – based on the assumption the French would
remain at Goldberg, thus allowing Langeron to march north – no longer
appeared feasible. Even worse, the imperials had taken the offensive. Believ-
ing that Lauriston’s advance had completely changed the situation, the
Russian commander understandably felt he could not execute his orders.
Should he attack Lauriston? Headquarters made no mention of this circum-
stance in the recent correspondence, and the disposition stated that the
advance would not begin until 2:00. Langeron noted that “the considerable
forces I had before me and the clear intention of the enemy to turn my left
did not permit me to abandon my position and march to my right without
opening the Jauer road, but I assured Blücher that I would not lose an inch
of terrain and that I would continue to tie down a large number of the
enemy’s forces, although I was weakened by the detachment of X Infantry
Corps. I had not overstretched myself in giving this assurance to Blücher,
considering the excellent troops that I commanded.”30
Meanwhile, Lauriston ordered V Corps to advance around 12:30. He
positioned his left wing – all of Rochambeau’s 19th Division – to move
across the Plinse ravine. On his right, Maison’s 16th Division prepared to
turn the Russian left. Led by the flank detachment of two battalions and two
guns, Maison’s main body surged forward. After moving straight through
Seichau, Rochambeau’s division divided into several battalion columns south
of the village to advance in a broad front across the Plinse. According to the
French corps commander: “The enemy appeared on the hills of
Hennersdorf: lots of artillery and cavalry, but few infantry. In cavalry,
I had [Paul Ferdinand] Dermoncourt’s brigade, which did not contain more
than 600 horses. When I heard the first shots of XI Corps, I began the attack
for the passage of the ravine. I placed a battery of six twelve-pound guns and
two six-pound howitzers, which took the enemy’s batteries obliquely. I also
established other batteries in advantageous positions. General Maison
brought up the troops with his usual vigor.”31
Lauriston’s advance settled the issue in Langeron’s mind: the situation
called for a retreat. He immediately dispatched an officer to Blücher armed
with a lie. To justify his intended retreat through Jauer on Striegau, Langeron
reported that he faced superior forces in his sector. In response to Blücher’s
11:00 attack disposition he wrote: “Two columns that want to turn my left
flank are moving toward the woods followed by three others. In addition,
I can see the columns debouching from Seichau to attack the vanguard. If
I execute the ordered movement, the vanguard will be forced to immediately
withdraw to Jauer because it will be attacked by a superior enemy force. The
enemy has taken Seichau.”32 Although correct in the assumption that he
could not execute Blücher’s order, Langeron’s desire to retreat superseded
his military judgment. In dictating his letter to Blücher’s liaison officer, Ende,
Langeron caused a scene. Purportedly, he originally stated: “Two strong
columns have turned my left.” Ende asked Langeron to clarify what he meant
by the term “strong.” Langeron requested clarification from the officer who
delivered the report. In turn, the Russian replied that at most the columns
consisted of two battalions each. “Very well,” exclaimed Langeron, “write
two columns.” Ende then questioned the use of the phrase “have turned my
left,” “Very well,” retorted Langeron, “write: ‘want to turn.’”33
Lauriston’s steady pressure prompted Langeron to withdraw
Rudzevich’s vanguard from its positions between the Plinse and Henners-
dorf. “I pushed the enemy to the heights of Seichau,” stated Lauriston in
his after-action report; “he took a few cannon shots, but as this produced
no effect, we made the enemy cross the deep ravine that separated Seichau
from Hennersdorf. I halted in this position, both to make my dispositions
for the passage of the ravine and to await the divisions of XI Corps, whose
attack was to take place simultaneously.”34 After exchanging a few shots
with the French, Rudzevich received instructions to withdraw southwest
of Hennersdorf to a position west of Herrmannsdorf and form Langeron’s
new left wing. Thus, Langeron abandoned the advantageous ridgeline
along the left bank of the Plinse. His front now consisted of Rudzevich’s
vanguard division on the left, west of Herrmannsdorf; Olsufiyev’s IX
Infantry Corps in the center between Herrmannsdorf and the Kirch hill;
and Shcherbatov’s VI Infantry Corps on the right wing, extending north-
east from the Kirch hill across the Breite hill to Schlaupe. In his memoirs,
Langeron attempted to justify this decision:
After two hours of cannon and musket fire from the skirmishers, and seeing
the majority of the enemy’s forces moving to their right and turning the left
of my vanguard through the woods, I ordered Rudzevich, whom I had been
The Katzbach 251
with since the beginning of the engagement, to quit the Hennersdorf heights
and place himself to the left of my line between the woods and the village of
Herrmannsdorf, in a plain through which the enemy could easily turn my left
flank, which was totally unsupported. This movement . . . was made just in
time; if I had delayed for only thirty minutes, I would have been completely
outflanked and forced to quit my position.
Langeron’s next move likewise caused controversy. He ordered

Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps to march south and take a position just north
of Peterwitz, forming its battalion lines facing west on another height called
Wein hill. According to Langeron, after he “received from Yuzefovich the
news that an enemy corps was moving on Schönau, and seemed to wish to
move to Jauer (which Macdonald had effectively ordered), I detached
X Infantry Corps from the rear that formed my second line, and I ordered
General Kaptsevich to move on Peterwitz and, if it was necessary, on Mois-
dorf to stop the enemy’s advance on Jauer. Having detached X Infantry
Corps, which also served as my reserve, I remained with a highly extended
line.”35 Macdonald had indeed ordered Puthod to march on Jauer, but not on
26 August. As noted, the marshal wanted the 17th Division to march from
Steinberg to Schönau on the 26th. From there, Puthod would push through
Jägendorf toward Jauer on the 27th. Moreover, Steinberg was located five
miles west-southwest of Goldberg. Puthod did not begin his march until
12:30 p.m. and Yuzefovich did not receive news of it until the evening.
Nevertheless, Langeron ordered Kaptsevich to withdraw to Peterwitz some-
time before 1:00 p.m. This can only mean that Langeron was preparing for a
general retreat.
On the eastern side of the battlefield, Yorck’s rear echelon reached the
Brechelshof estate around 11:00. Shortly afterward, he received the attack
disposition along with instructions to have the troops cook. Yorck’s mood,
no doubt soured by the march, certainly did not improve by what appeared
to be a bad joke: how could his men cook in such weather? Some accounts
claim that, like Langeron, Yorck also refused to comply with Blücher’s
attack disposition. With an eye toward Gneisenau, the crotchety man of
Tauroggen supposedly swore that he would rather break his sword than
cross the Katzbach. Although this tale undoubtedly captures Yorck’s foul
mood, it is only partially correct. To comply with Blücher’s attack dispos-
ition, Yorck issued a “Special Disposition” to his corps.36 Yet, starting
around noon, he “heard a quickly approaching fire.” To his left on the other
side of the Wütende Neiße, individual cannonballs falling on the road to
Goldberg came closer and closer. Around this time, Gneisenau requested
that I Corps be ready to send one column downstream along the Wütende
Neiße and a second to the plateau north of Bellwitzhof at 2:00. Yorck’s
biographer, Droysen, claims that “Yorck’s refusal was evident.” One of
Blücher’s biographers, Blasendorff, maintains that Yorck demanded two

days of rest before the army launched an offensive. Moreover, Droysen
attributes the delay of the attack from 2:00 to 3:00 to the debate triggered
by Yorck’s refusal.37
After receiving Hiller’s report that the advance guard had withdrawn
onto the plateau, Yorck retracted the “Special Disposition,” mounted his
horse, and prepared to ride north. Ordering the columns to follow, he
shouted, “I will decide the rest on the spot.” Before his horse could break
into a gallop, an officer, Captain Karl Otto von Brünneck, approached from
Army Headquarters. Although described as “very brave and capable,” Brün-
neck tended to irritate Yorck. The major presented himself to Yorck and
recited: “‘General Blücher orders General Yorck to allow as much of the
enemy to move up as he believes he can still defeat and then he will attack.’
Yorck responded to the pretentious Junker blueblood: ‘You ride out there
and you count; I can’t even count my fingers in this rain.’” With enemy
shells falling increasingly closer to his thick columns, Yorck ordered the
infantry to form lines to spare the men from having to execute this maneuver
under fire. He also instructed Colonel Schmidt to unlimber the artillery on
the Tauben hillock between the Christianenhöhe estate and Eichholtz.
Although only a slight elevation, the Tauben hill commanded the entire
plateau. Before the Prussian guns arrived, the twelve-pound pieces of
Sacken’s Nr. 13 Heavy Battery blazed from this same position. Recognizing
the importance of the hill, Sacken had directed his heavy guns there,
although the point was not situated on his line of march. This earned the
Russian commander Blücher’s highest praise as well as the “lasting esteem
and attachment” of Yorck’s men. Upon receiving Blücher’s orders, Sacken
purportedly exclaimed: “Tell the general my only answer is ‘Hurrah!’”38
To the right (east) of I Corps, Sacken’s troops marched northwest from
Malitsch toward the space between Niederhochkirch (Kościelec) and Eich-
holtz, the latter being one and one-half miles northeast of Bellwitzhof.
Sacken’s foot consisted of the three divisions (27th, 16th, and 10th) of XI
Infantry Corps. The four battalions of the 8th and 39th Jäger Regiments that
constituted one of 10th Division’s three brigades occupied Eichholtz with
Karpov’s six Cossack Regiments roaming north of the village. Sacken moved
up Neverovsky’s 27th Division and the remaining two brigades of 10th
Division, commanded by General Lieven, to a position just south of
Eichholtz. From these positions, Sacken ordered 27th Division along with
the Okhotskii and Kamchatskii Infantry Regiments (two battalions total) of
the sole brigade of 16th Division to form the first line; Lieven’s 10th
Division provided the second. General Sergey Ushakov posted the
Kurlandskii and Smolenskii Dragoon Regiments south of Eichholtz on the
right flank of the second line while Vasilchikov led the 2nd Hussar Division
to a position just east of Eichholtz.
The Katzbach 253
In the meantime, Gneisenau and Müffling left Brechelshof to reconnoiter

the plateau. At Christianenhöhe they met Hiller, who reported that the
enemy had crossed the Katzbach in considerable strength, pursued through
Niederkrayn, and ascended the plateau. Katzler remained behind with the
cavalry. Unable to see more than 500 yards in front of them, Gneisenau and
Müffling managed to ride north for a long way because the French neglected
to deploy a cavalry screen. “We saw nothing before us,” recalled Müffling;
“we did not hear a shot.” Finally they met up with Katzler, who claimed the
enemy to be “close on my heels. More he could not tell, for in his irrespon-
sible hussar manner he had called in all his flankers.” Müffling started to
censure Katzler, but Gneisenau cut him short, stating that the mistake had
been made and they had to move on. Gneisenau started to move forward with
Katzler and the officers of the advance guard cavalry. Müffling insisted that
such a large suite would not be effective for reconnaissance work and offered
to go alone. Gneisenau accepted and the colonel sped toward the Kuh hill.
“I was mounted on a chocolate-colored horse,” continues Müffling, “and
I wore a grey cloak, so that in the pouring rain I was not visible at 100 paces.
Moreover, I took a good map of the district with me, which I had already
learned by heart.” Reaching the Kuh hill, “not one man was to be seen on the
plains toward Kleintinz or anything to be heard in the valley toward
Oberweinberg.” Müffling then rode toward the Niederweinberg–Jänowitz
road. Reaching the latter, he found himself so close to enemy cavalry that he
had to take cover “behind a leafy tree to remain undiscovered. I saw some
batteries follow the cavalry on the road from Niederkrayn to Jänowitz.
Behind me I heard shouts in French, and saw in the valley of Niederkrayn
an enemy infantry column marching, whose head had almost reached the
plateau.” Müffling quietly slipped away. Gaining the Niederkrayn–
Brechelshof road, he looked back. As much as the rain would permit an
estimate, he observed 3,000 cavalry and several batteries moving east in the
direction of Jänowitz.39 Imperial infantry followed on the same road, but
only a few battalions appeared to be moving south. Owing to the streaming
rain, the Prussian officer could not ascertain if more French columns stood
further north. In all, it appeared that 10,000–12,000 enemy troops had
ascended the plateau.
Returning to Blücher’s command post, Gneisenau explained that the
French apparently intended to overwhelm the few battalions of Yorck’s
vanguard on the plateau in order to double-envelop Langeron’s corps.40 If
a second column debouched through Dohnau – which the Prussians could
not reconnoiter – enemy forces could increase to between 35,000 and 40,000
combatants. Thus, Müffling suggested that Blücher order Yorck to immedi-
ately attack with three and one-half brigades, leaving the other half-brigade
to maintain contact with Langeron’s corps; Sacken should be directed to
Eichholtz. Although Yorck and Sacken outnumbered the enemy, Müffling
advised against giving the imperials time to move additional forces onto the
plateau. Not knowing if French forces stood north of Jänowitz, the colonel
insisted that the best option would be to drive the imperials into the defiles
and onto their approaching reinforcements. Purportedly with watch in hand,
Müffling assured Blücher “that, if General Yorck moves out immediately
and continues to march in column uninterrupted, in fifty-one minutes he can
reach the point on the plateau where I saw the enemy infantry column.
Because they must march through a narrow defile, General Yorck cannot
possibly find more than 10,000 infantry.” No one doubted that Langeron
could maintain his strong position to cover Blücher’s flank and rear. With
the Wütende Neiße and the Katzbach in their rear, the French could not
avoid a catastrophe.
Blücher approved with gusto. Headquarters again cut new orders for
Yorck: instead of waiting, I Corps would establish its artillery line and right
wing on the hills between Bellwitzhof and Eichholtz to engage the enemy
approaching from Niederweinberg and Kleintinz. His left wing, concealed
on the high western edge of the plateau, would advance north, hugging the
edge of the Wütende Neiße valley. Gneisenau accepted Müffling’s conten-
tion that in one hour Yorck’s left could reach the point where the sunken
road from Niederkrayn opened onto the plateau. From there, this wing
could envelop the enemy’s right flank while Sacken executed a similar
movement against the opposite flank. Müffling received the task of leading
Yorck’s corps to its designated position.41
Yorck had already arranged his corps to comply with the original attack
disposition Blücher had issued at 11:00. His left wing consisted of 8th and
7th Brigades as well as the Reserve Artillery; 2nd and 1st Brigades and the
Reserve Cavalry formed the right. According to Blücher’s new instructions,
2nd and 7th Brigades as well as the majority of 8th Brigade would form the
first wave while 1st Brigade followed in reserve; battalions from 8th Brigade
would secure Schlaupe, maintain contact with Langeron, and cover Yorck’s
flank. Yorck disregarded these instructions to place three brigades in his first
line and marched with his corps in two wings.42 As the infantry slogged
across the sopping fields between Brechelshof and Bellwitzhof, the Nr. 3
Light Battery unlimbered next to the Russian artillery on the Tauben hill
while the Nr. 1 Heavy Battery (twelve-pound guns) and the Nr. 15 Light
Battery formed a line next to the Nr. 2 Horse Battery of the Reserve Cavalry
northwest of Christianenhöhe to cover the deployment. A total of ninety-
two Allied guns dueled with forty pieces of French artillery. To occupy the
imperials while Yorck’s infantry moved up, the 1st, 2nd, and Jäger Squad-
rons of the Lithuanian Dragoon Regiment dismounted on the left to provide
covering fire.
During the march, Yorck ordered Horn’s 7th Brigade to change places
with Karl’s 2nd, so that the former would move from the second wave of the
The Katzbach 255
left wing to form the first wave on the right wing, and the latter would move
from the first wave of the right wing to form the second wave of the left wing.
Following this switch, I Corps would be arranged so that 8th Brigade
followed by the 2nd formed the left and 7th Brigade followed by 1st the
right. Yorck’s reasons for altering the march formation are not known. Inex-
plicably, not all of the brigade commanders received this order. As the two
wings of I Corps approached the Bellwitzhof–Christianenhöhe line, Yorck
found both brigades in their original position: the 2nd on the right in the first
wave and the 7th on the left in the second wave. The Prussians then wasted
considerable time crossing the two brigades in compliance with Yorck’s
instructions. Moreover, Horn and Karl purportedly argued over whose bri-
gade would receive the place of honor in the front line. During this interval,
Yorck received word of two large enemy columns approaching Schlaupe.
With orders to hold this vital position at all costs, he sent the 4th Battalion of
the 14th Silesian Landwehr and the Silesian Grenadier Battalion to reinforce
the Brandenburg Fusilier Battalion. Moreover, one of Blücher’s staff officers,
Major Oppen, informed Yorck that at most the enemy force on the plateau
consisted of four battalions, eight guns, and some cavalry. Concluding that he
would not encounter strong resistance on the plateau, Yorck dispatched 8th
Brigade’s commander, Hünerbein, to direct the defense of Schlaupe.
As noted, Yorck deployed his brigades in lines to enable his inexperi-
enced battalions to attain the proper extension along the length of the front.
After rearranging the brigades to his liking, 7th and 8th formed the first
wave, 2nd the second, and 1st remained in reserve. Each brigade formed two
echelons. On Blücher’s orders, Müffling arrived to guide I Corps to its
correct position. Seeing the infantry formed in lines, he reminded Yorck
that the approach march should be executed in columns. Although linear
formations would reduce the deadly and terrorizing effects of French
shelling, advancing in line required more time than an advance in column.
Müffling argued that the imperials would use this time to move more troops
onto the plateau. Moreover, he insisted that the soaked ground and the
inexperience of the Landwehr had rendered a linear advance impractical.
Yorck resisted, furiously protesting against this staff officer’s interference.
“Müffling became excited over the loss of time,” explains Droysen, “but the
practitioner [Yorck] placed no value on winning time if it was purchased
with the lack of tactical security.” Purportedly “foaming with rage,” Müf-
fling rode off to find Blücher, eventually returning with a direct order for
I Corps to advance in column. “The general deliberated sullenly, but at last
obeyed though not without signs of anger,” recalled Müffling.43
Blücher and Prince William rode before the front of each battalion,
inciting the men and demanding that they attack with cold steel rather than
try to fire their muskets in the rain. “My brave lads,” Blücher shouted, “this
day decides it! Prove to your king and to your country that your courage is
equal to your devotion. Prove it, I say, at the point of your bayonet. Look
yonder, there’s the enemy. Now march and prove yourselves to be gallant
Prussians.”44
Delayed by its collision with 2nd Brigade, Horn’s 7th Brigade had not
completed the formation of its columns when Yorck commenced the advance.
Thus, only the six remaining battalions of 8th Brigade – commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Borcke – moved forward on Yorck’s left; even the brigade
cavalry remained behind because Yorck ordered it to move south of Bell-
witzhof in case Hünerbein needed support at Schlaupe. “The ground was
undulating,” wrote Müffling in 1824, “and the rain so violent, that both
combined to prevent the French army from detecting the approach of our
infantry until the village of Bellwitzhof was far to our rear.” Meanwhile, on
Yorck’s right, the Reserve Cavalry moved through the intervals of the artillery:
the eight squadrons of the 5th and 10th Silesian Landwehr Regiments pos-
itioned themselves to the right of the artillery line to cover the guns while the
Brandenburg Uhlans secured the link with Sacken. The Nr. 24 Foot Battery
and Nr. 1 Horse Battery formed the left of the artillery line. Jürgaß placed the
remainder of the Reserve Cavalry between the 7th and 2nd Brigades.
From left to right, the first wave of 8th Brigade consisted of the 2nd
Battalion of the 12th Reserve Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 14th Silesian
Landwehr Regiment, and Major Karl Thomas von Othegraven’s 2nd Battal-
ion of the 2nd Brandenburg Regiment; the 3rd and 1st Battalions of the 12th
Reserve and the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Silesian Landwehr formed the
second wave. Platoons of skirmishers preceded the battalions, but they
remained bunched in groups for safety because their muskets could not fire.
The rain fell so violently that they did not see the French. Marching
in complete isolation, with its left wing pressed against the edge of the
Wütende Neiße valley, 8th Brigade unknowingly came within range of a
French half-battery on the Kreuz hill. “I led the left wing of the two
brigades toward the Kuh hill,” explains Müffling, “behind which the enemy
cavalry was posted with five or six batteries that were firing at great dis-
tances. Nothing else was to be seen of the enemy. Completely unexpectedly,
enemy infantry with some cannon appeared on the Kreuz hill this side of the
Kuh hill.”45
Moving ahead of the rest of the first wave, Othegraven’s battalion soon
received flesh-tearing canister fire: many men fell, but the survivors con-
tinued to advance. In addition to the enemy guns, the Prussians soon
discerned Meunier’s three battalions cresting the Kuh hill. On seeing the
Prussians, two of Meunier’s battalions retraced their steps to avoid a skir-
mish but the third moved down the slope and formed a square. From the
French viewpoint: “The enemy [Katzler] had continued his retrograde
movement, and we believed very much he was in full retreat when we saw
columns to our left, which we initially took for III Corps, which was
The Katzbach 257
supposed to debouch in that direction. A moment later, enemy artillery and

infantry appeared in front of us.”46 Coming within range of French muskets,
the Prussians increased their march but had little to fear because the enemy
could not fire. Othegraven, marching with the first rank of his battalion,
ordered his men to fix bayonets. Unable to fall back, the French offered
fierce resistance. Supported by the 2nd Silesian Landwehr Battalion from the
second wave, the Prussians encircled the square. An extremely bloody
struggle ensued: musket-butt clubbed and bayonet stabbed. One Prussian
officer recalled:
We now doubled our pace, lowered our muskets, and attacked the middle
square of French grenadiers with fixed bayonets amid terrifying cries of
“Hurrah.” The square stood like a wall. We came within two paces. For a
moment our people stood across from the French so that both sides could see
each other. We officers shouted: “Drauf, drauf! [On them, on them!]” and
now the soldiers reversed their muskets and drove into the French with the
butt of their muskets. Because we stood in line, the square was quickly
encircled on the left and right and thus attacked from all sides with the
bayonet and the musket-butt. No one thought of giving quarter; after ten
minutes the entire square was shattered and transformed into a pyramid.
Some 150 unscathed and lightly wounded found themselves among heaps of
dead and wounded; they were sent back as prisoners.47
Othegraven lost 3 officers and 188 men; the Prussians captured 7 officers and
165 men; French killed and wounded are not known.
Meanwhile, the other two battalions of the first wave turned against the
half-battery on the Kreuz hill. After driving the infantry escort down the
reverse slope, the Prussians took one gun but the other three attempted to
escape. Yorck’s men would not have it: they tracked down and captured the
pieces. A French Chasseur squadron approached the right flank of the 3rd
Silesian Landwehr Battalion, which had become completely disordered
during the melee. French officers offered quarter, but the commander,
Colonel Gaza, managed to re-form the militia. With bayonets fixed the
Prussians advanced toward the French troopers, who decided it would be
best to follow their infantry. “The Landwehr battalion was surrounded by
enemy cavalry and ordered to surrender,” recounts Gneisenau. “‘No! No!’
shouted the Landwehr and attempted to fire. Few muskets could fire due to
the heavy rain, yet the brave men staved off the cavalry with the bayonet.
When the cavalry retreated, the men immediately fell on a pair of cannon
and took them. This is what veteran, experienced soldiers would do, which
makes this even more noteworthy because it was done by freshly raised
infantry.”48 Unable to pursue due to their lack of cavalry, Borcke’s first wave
fell back to the Kreuz hill to reorganize while the battalions of the second
wave formed squares.
During this action, the Prussians moved two more batteries into the
artillery line on the Tauben hill: Heavy Battery Nr. 2 and Light Battery
Nr. 12. “The enemy reestablished his line and began a bombardment of the
most vivid that lasted over five hours,” stated Gérard in his after-action
report.49 Meanwhile, Horn and Karl did their utmost to realign the 7th and
2nd Brigades. Gradually, the battalions formed columns and the 7th Brigade
cleared the Bellwitzhof–Christianenhöhe line. Katzler’s vanguard battalions
formed on Horn’s left wing; the Reserve Cavalry came next, followed by
2nd Brigade. Behind the guns, all surged forward, advancing north through
the intervals of the artillery.
In the meantime, Sacken’s infantry had continued to move up. To oppose
the progress of the Russian columns at Eichholtz that threatened the French
left, Roussel positioned the second line of his 2nd Light Cavalry Division
opposite the village gallows. French reinforcements arrived only slowly.
Following Roussel through the defile at Niederweinberg, Exelmans’s 4th Light
Cavalry Division encountered tremendous difficulties ascending the slope.
Trodden by the horses of the 2nd Light, the slippery and treacherous ground
forced the troopers to dismount and lead their steeds. In this manner, General
François-Isidore Wathiez deployed the eleven squadrons of his 2nd Brigade
from Exelmans’s 4th Light on the plateau at the exit of the defile; General
Antoine Maurin followed with the seven squadrons of 1st Brigade. Sébastiani’s
after-action report provides a glimpse of this period of the battle from the
French perspective: “Around 4:00, enemy infantry and cavalry debouched on
us all along our front, but stood en masse and marched slowly. During this time,
Wathiez’s brigade from Exelmans’s division crossed the defile and formed in
squadron columns in front of the defile and Maurin’s brigade was following.”
At the same time, additional French infantry started to arrive on the
plateau: the head of the 1st Brigade of Brayer’s 8th Division. A bottleneck at
Kroitsch caused by Sébastiani’s baggage had forced Brayer to leave behind
all of his artillery. For the same reason, St.-Germain’s 2nd Heavy Cavalry
Division failed to get across the Katzbach and remained idle at Kroitsch
throughout the day. The journal of III Corps grants us a view of the scene
Brayer’s men found: “Forming the head of the column, 8th Division left its
position at noon. The weather was awful. It arrived at the defile of Kroitsch
at 2:30. The II Cavalry Corps had crossed the defile but obstructed and
greatly delayed the march of 8th Division. A considerable number of
wagons cluttered the road and we made some effort to unblock it but it
became necessary to give up on moving the artillery. The infantry
debouched into the marshy valley formed by the foothills of the position
occupied by the enemy who, perceiving the confusion that reigned in the
defile, had returned with an imposing force.”50
Just as the Prussian Reserve Cavalry reached the artillery line, Major
Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg of the General Staff informed
The Katzbach 259
Jürgaß of the enemy’s retreat – referring to the repulse of Meunier’s three

leading battalions. “Therefore,” stated Jürgaß in his report, “the moment
appeared favorable for the troopers to sharply attack him.”51 He led Yorck’s
Reserve Cavalry with seven squadrons in the first line north and to the right
of 8th Brigade. The second wave – three squadrons from the East Prussian
National Cavalry Regiment – wheeled left (west) to contend with imperial
forces moving onto the plateau from Niederweinberg. The heavy battery
from XI Corps escorted by two Chasseur squadrons had just debouched
when the East Prussians charged. Attempting to turn around, some of the
guns and caissons overturned; the Prussians attempted to ride off with the
guns that could not escape.
Unfortunately for the attackers, infantry fire from nearby hedges and the
appearance of three battalions – the 1st Brigade of Brayer’s 8th Division –
forming near the Kuh hill and thus behind the East Prussian troopers
distracted them from their prey. The journal of III Corps grants a view of
the action: “A swarm of Prussian lancers charged the reserve park of XI
Corps and took possession of it. At once 1st Brigade of 8th Division formed
battalion masses. One of them, the 4th Battalion of the 34th, fired at the park
and the cavalry. It had been raining since morning and the weapons were
wet; barely one-sixth could ignite. However, this proved sufficient to end
the melee. The cavalry was shaken. This battalion saw this and put it to flight
by charging it with the bayonet. Master of the park by [virtue of] this
vigorous blow, the 4th Battalion reorganized and remained in that position
200 or 300 yards from the rest of the brigade.” Exelmans’s troopers moved
up in support. “While this occurred on the right,” continues the journal, “II
Cavalry Corps debouched on the left through a rather narrow gorge. As the
squadrons cleared the defile in twos and formed for battle, they fell on the
enemy cavalry that threatened to charge and retake the park of XI Corps.”52
Thus, without infantry support and receiving sporadic fire from the 4th
Battalion of the French 34th Line, the Prussian troopers fell back just in time
to support a fourth squadron of the National Cavalry Regiment, which had
been left behind to cover the left wing of the artillery line. Seeing an
opportunity to charge a French battery that had unlimbered opposite
Yorck’s line, the East Prussian horsemen charged the gunners, but two
imperial cavalry regiments moved up to challenge them. At risk of being
severely handled by the more numerous imperials, all four squadrons
retreated behind Horn’s 7th Brigade.
The East Prussians reached the safety of the infantry at almost the same
time as the seven squadrons of the first wave returned. Joined by a half-
battery of horse guns, the first wave had continued north after the East
Prussians turned west. In the distance, the Prussians observed a small
infantry column advancing toward their left wing. Accelerating to a gallop,
the Prussians closed in for the kill. To their disappointment, they found that
the column consisted of Othegraven’s prisoners being escorted to the rear.

Regrouping became problematic: the long gallop had broken the cavalry’s
cohesion as the weaker horses had to be left behind after the boggy fields
sapped their strength. Although the officers failed to close the gaps in the
line, individual squadrons launched numerous charges against the French
batteries that had now started to mass. Henckel von Donnersmarck’s bri-
gade of West Prussian and Lithuanian Dragoons charged straight into the
imperial artillery line, overwhelming the cavalry escort. Yet, the numerous
charges and sharp melees completely disordered the Prussian troopers. Now
in the midst of the imperial line, the Prussians found themselves attacked on
all sides by fresh forces and superior cavalry, mainly Wathiez’s 2nd Brigade.
With retreat or surrender the only options for survival, the Prussians turned
their steeds south as quickly as the tired beasts could move. Watching his
Reserve Cavalry flee behind the 2nd Brigade, Yorck believed all was lost.
Screaming curses at “those who wanted to acquire fame” (Gneisenau), the
corps commander went straight to Jürgaß, lambasting the colonel with a
tapestry of insults for losing control of his cavalry.53
Closely pursued by Wathiez’s troopers, the Prussian riders hoped to
reach the safety of their infantry. After catching the Prussian half-battery,
the French cavalry split: a portion slammed into the left wing of Yorck’s
artillery line – taking nine guns according to French sources – while the rest
headed for the four battalions of the advance guard infantry, which had just
come abreast of the artillery. “At 5:00,” reported Sébastiani, “the enemy
debouched from Brechelshof with fifteen squadrons and passed in column
between the wood and the right of General Henri-François Charpentier,
charging Wathiez’s brigade. This brigade, which went to meet the enemy,
repulsed and pursued him beyond Bellwitzhof and took nine guns. The 23rd
and 24th Chasseurs and the 11th Hussars executed this charge, taking more
than 200 prisoners and leaving the battlefield covered with dead.”54
Sébastiani’s cavalry formed to move along a broad front between Klein-
tinz and the edge of the valley against the Allied artillery and Yorck’s
infantry. Hiller hurried to the batteries with the lead unit: the 1st Battalion
of the Brandenburg Regiment. The three others fixed bayonets and charged
the French cavalry. Still, if not for the intervention of Army Headquarters,
the artillery would have been lost and the infantry severely shaken. At this
critical moment, Blücher ordered four battalions from 2nd Brigade to fill the
gaping hole between the 8th and 7th. Behind them, Karl moved forward the
rest of the brigade. Their horses now exhausted, the French refrained from
attacking four fresh battalions. A period of fifteen minutes passed during
which Yorck’s infantry and Sébastiani’s cavalry faced each other but neither
side attacked.
Just prior to this point, Müffling, after observing the loss of the half-
battery of horse guns and the flying retreat of the East Prussian National
The Katzbach 261
Cavalry, raced back to Brechelshof to alert Blücher and Gneisenau. After

listening to the colonel’s description of the dire situation, Blücher tasked
Gneisenau with investigating Müffling’s allegations. On finding Yorck,
Gneisenau learned that everything thus far had occurred according to plan,
although the prickly corps commander did admit that the situation was not
wonderful. Despite their utter disdain for each other, the two officers
planned the next steps for I Corps, with Gneisenau mainly telling Yorck
what had to be done. Exchanging Müffling for Gneisenau did nothing for
Yorck’s demeanor. He struck Gneisenau as extremely grumpy, more so than
usual, which Gneisenau did not attribute to the battle, but to Yorck’s
ill-feelings over the events of the previous days. Yorck did not help his case
when he exclaimed that the army would not see a victory on this day and
that victory had been ripped from his hands. Gneisenau took the trouble to
offer a rebuttal, but sensing Yorck’s negativity, resorted to admonishing him
to execute their arrangements as if they had the force of Blücher’s orders.
Yorck restored order and reassembled the cavalry. Fortunately for the Allies,
the French were unable to either carry off or spike his guns. Soon, the entire
arsenal of I Corps – some 100 pieces – opened against the French right wing
as well as the defiles.55 Blücher knew he could count on Yorck. “He is a
venomous chap,” the old hussar once remarked; “he does nothing but
complain; but when he bites, nobody bites harder.”56
While Yorck reassembled the Prussians, the stalemate along his front
ended thanks to a massive Allied cavalry charge. From his position at
Eichholtz, Sacken observed a golden moment present itself on his left. By
charging the Prussians, Sébastiani exposed his own left flank. After
Vasilchikov’s scouts did not find any imperial infantry in the villages north
of Eichholtz, Sacken gave the signal to charge around 5:00. At the same time,
Karpov moved his Cossacks north through Kleintinz to attack the enemy’s
rear. Supported by Ushakov’s Dragoon Brigade (seven squadrons total),
General Anastasy Yurkovsky smashed into Sébastiani’s front with the 2nd
Brigade of the 2nd Hussar Division.57 Soon afterward, the Allies overran his
left flank between Kleintinz and Eichholtz with the 1st Brigade of the 2nd
Hussar Division led by Lanskoy, along with the Brandenburg Uhlans and
two squadrons of Lithuanian Dragoons.58 With six Cossack Regiments,
Karpov fell on Sébastiani’s rear between Kleintinz and Jänowitz.
Neverovsky’s 27th Division followed Yurkovsky’s troopers while Lieven
moved his 10th Division into the first line and advanced toward the enemy
“with impetuosity and a defiance of danger that baffles all description, as if
animated by one soul, and impelled by one spring of action.”59 “A great
cavalry combat began with alternating results,” wrote Gneisenau, “mostly
occurring in one long line. For a moment, the venture hung in the balance.”
From three directions, the Allied cavalry fell on Sébastiani’s troopers and
drove them back upon the imperial infantry. “The enemy returned with
thirty squadrons against this division [Exelmans], and with more than forty
against Roussel’s division, while twenty squadrons debouched through
Jänowitz,” attested Sébastiani’s after-action report. “We were obliged to
charge the enemy in three different directions: we were surrounded. He
was overthrown twice, but at 6:15 more than 12,000 line cavalry and 2,000 or
3,000 Cossacks supported by 30,000 infantry and formidable artillery came
upon us.”60
In the meantime, after being gone for thirty minutes, Gneisenau
returned to inform Blücher of Yorck’s status. Around the same time, the
report arrived that Sacken’s cavalry had attacked the enemy’s left flank.
Together with Katzler, the Allied horse had forced the imperials to retreat.
Blücher now gave the order for the general advance; with sword drawn
he placed himself at the head of Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry, which had
re-formed behind 2nd Brigade. Reinforced by the sixteen squadrons of
the 5th and 10th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiments, the 1st Neumark
Cavalry Regiment, and the Brandenburg Uhlans, the troopers headed
north toward Jänowitz. Behind the cavalry, Yorck led the thick attack
columns of infantry. As Yorck’s corps moved north, Sacken’s infantry
formed on either side of Eichholtz and likewise advanced. While additional
artillery unlimbered on the Tauben hill and its northeastern slope, the
Russian cavalry linked with the right of the Prussian horse between
Eichholtz and Niederhochkirch.
Although Macdonald had hoped III Corps would be up by now, all
Sébastiani could do was call on 1st Brigade of Brayer’s 8th Division for
assistance. Preceded by three light cavalry regiments, 1st Brigade sliced
through the disordered Russo-Prussian cavalry and momentarily drove
them back. The journal of III Corps captures the action: “Our squadrons,
constantly swamped [and] having to deal with much larger forces, were
always rejected and finally driven back in disorder. General Sébastiani,
who commanded them, ordered 1st Brigade of 8th Division to move for-
ward to support them. By that time it had not 100 muskets that could fire. In
a broad valley, the arrival of this brigade was of very little help to the cavalry.
Isolated, unable to make use of its musketry and without artillery, it just
narrowed the vast field upon which the enemy maneuvered; very soon it had
to be ready to receive the charge he threatened to make.”
After Brayer’s 1st Brigade advanced, his 2nd moved up and took its
position, sending a battalion to clear the Niederweinberg defile, which the
Prussian cavalry had already reached. Apparently, the Prussians had also
moved behind 1st Brigade and again seized XI Corps’s heavy battery.
Brayer’s 2nd Brigade wrestled it back. Pressure mounted on the French foot
and horse, with the former unable to support the latter. “The action became
more obstinate,” continues the journal of III Corps, “and our squadrons
were exhausted in vain efforts; their partial charges were repulsed by the
The Katzbach 263
11 Blücher at the battle of the Katzbach, 26 August 1813
enemy, who stood forty to fifty paces from 1st Brigade, which could not
provide any help. This difficult situation made them throw themselves in the
gorge, which they entered pell-mell with the enemy.”61
To make matters worse for the imperials, Yorck’s infantry caught up with
the action. Supported by canister from a horse battery, the Prussians drove
back Brayer’s troops, especially because the French infantry could not
exchange fire. While Sébastiani does not admit that his warriors flew down
the defile “pell-mell” with the Prussians, his after-action report roughly
agrees with III Corps’s journal: “I retired to the left of the infantry division
of III Corps, which was beginning to form in front of the defile, where
I directed all my guns. This 8th Infantry Division would have supported us
against the shock of this mass, but a horrible rain that had lasted for eighteen
hours had rendered its efforts useless and paralyzed its courage. The
weapons were in such a state that each square got off no more than twenty
shots. We were forced to descend into the ravine.”62
With his left exposed and his right battered by fifteen Allied guns, Brayer
struggled to restore order. Against his center advanced two large Prussian
columns preceded by twelve guns. To evade the Prussian infantry, Brayer
withdrew to the edge of the plateau, where he labored to steady his men and
buy time to cover Sébastiani’s retreat. As the Prussian columns came within
musket range, their artillery fired several times at point-blank range. This
proved too much for the French, who threw themselves down the slope in
search of cover amongst the undergrowth. We hear a final word from the
journal of III Corps concerning the struggle on the plateau: “A battery of
fifteen pieces placed at the tip of a mountain in front of the ravine struck the
right side of the division while two strong columns of infantry supported by
twelve guns prepared to take it obliquely. It continued to rain: night was
approaching. Recognizing the danger of this position . . . General Brayer
united 8th Division on the crest of the hill to protect the retreat of II Cavalry
Corps. But the two enemy columns that we had sought to avoid engaging . . .
took a position within gunshot of our small mass and fired several artillery
volleys at close range, which forced us to retreat into the thicket that covers
the side of the mountain.” Gneisenau provides the Prussian view: “The
infantry masses, which remained standing to await the outcome of the cavalry
combat, were led against the enemy infantry. Finally, the enemy, whose rear
was pressed against the deep valley edge of the Wütende Neiße and the
Katzbach, was driven over it, after which we shelled him with canister.”63
Around 6:30 p.m., II Cavalry Corps, Brayer’s 8th Division, and
Meunier’s 2nd Brigade collapsed. While only a few imperial battalions
managed to withdraw in squares to the other side of Niederkrayn, the
after-action reports submitted by III and XI Corps contest the notion of a
collapse. Souham’s report, based on Brayer’s account, purposely downplays
the division’s disaster on the plateau:
The 8th Division had formed on the crest when the Russian [Prussian] cavalry
charged and shattered ours, forcing it to retreat behind the infantry. After
forming squares without flinching, the infantry countered the efforts of the
enemy and, if it had been able to make use of its arms that evening, victory
would have been assured by the wise arrangements made by the marshal. But
the rain, which had fallen in torrents since the morning, put the weapons
temporarily out of service and from whole squares only a few could fire. At
that moment, the light cavalry yielded to the efforts of the enemy, whose
number was growing. It was then vital to yield to necessity and escape the fire
of the batteries that poured canister on the masses of infantry. The 8th Division
effected its retreat in order, always firmly repulsing the attempts made by the
enemy to engage and disorder our ranks. Nightfall ended the battle.
Gérard’s after-action report, which appears slightly more credible than

Souham’s, describes the fate of the five battalions of Meunier’s 2nd Brigade
after the Allied cavalry charge:
They charged Sébastiani’s cavalry at the same time that they directed the
columns of infantry supported by two lines of cavalry and artillery on the
The Katzbach 265
battalions of General Charpentier [Meunier]. Sébastiani’s corps made a retro-

grade movement; the enemy seized the opportunity to direct numerous
cavalry on the left and the rear of the infantry. They charged our squares
which were unable to fire because of the excessive rain that had made the
weapons incapable of service. The squares presented bayonets and this atti-
tude intimidated the enemy, who dared not undertake anything.
The Russian [Prussian] infantry had closely followed their cavalry; they
marched to a square of the 14th [Light Infantry Regiment] and engaged in a
bayonet melee. The soldiers of the battalion made the most vigorous
resistance: they did not allow themselves to be overwhelmed, repelled the
attack, and kept their ranks in the greatest order. The cavalry charges were
successful on both sides. Sébastiani, despite his best efforts, was unable to
resist the enemy and made his movement to the rear. No longer having
support, Charpentier’s infantry withdrew to the woods in great order; it
crossed the woods and the ravine near Oberkrayn [Oberweinberg]. The only
road to retreat was blocked by the equipment of II Cavalry Corps; none of
the guns of Meunier’s brigade nor the twelve-pound battery could pass.
I drew all these details from General Charpentier’s report. I enclose the
original so that Your Excellency can judge the facts.
Even Sébastiani’s account of the battle’s climax is somewhat sanitized:
In the position I found myself, I felt that retreat was impossible. Thus, for six
hours I stood under a horrible cannonade in front of forces that were way out
of proportion to mine. We always charged, repeating the cry “Vive l’Emper-
eur!” and we inflicted a lot of damage on the enemy. A detachment of Cossacks
had passed the ravine far below us and attacked St.-Germain’s Cuirassier
Division, from which two squadrons charged and killed many. Our losses are
very considerable; our artillery remained stuck in the mud. Without taking one
step backward, the 11th and 12th Chasseurs and the 2nd Lancers lost about
80 and 100 horses each to the cannon. Generals Exelmans and Roussel
distinguished themselves by their courage as much as by their goodwill.64
If French forces did not collapse in a rout on the plateau itself, they
certainly disintegrated in the defiles and valleys. Infantry, cavalry, guns, and
caissons rushed down the steep gorges that led from the plateau to the
Wütende Neiße valley and from there to the Katzbach. In the chaos, wagons
and guns overturned, horses lost their footing and tumbled down the slopes,
men crawled over each other seeking to escape. In a short time, the gorges
became blocked by the wreck of Macdonald’s left wing. A mass of 15,000
men rushed in disorder from the hills after having abandoned all resistance.
Leaving behind their weapons and equipment, survivors struggled to reach
the bridges and fords of the Wütende Neiße and Katzbach. Many soldiers
and horses reached the valley floor dazed and injured, as ruin fell from the
sky in the form of enemy shells. Langeron recalled:
While the sharp and brilliant charges of Sacken’s and Yorck’s cavalry forced
the enemy into partial retreats, which, soon thereafter, became a general
flight, troops of deserters rushed into the valley of Wütende Neiße. The
cannon, caissons, equipment, etc., were all overthrown and fell down the
sunken roads, or thrown from the steep heights, that lined the right bank of
the Wütende Neiße: this brook and the Katzbach, swollen by the rain,
offered no fords, and drowned the men and the horses that tried to cross
them in the same places as the day before and that morning, places where
they had not found a foot of water. There was a bridge at Niederkrayn, but it
was not sufficient for the quantity of deserters, and those that remained on
the right bank were smashed by the Russian and Prussian batteries estab-
lished on the heights.65
As Langeron indicated, the elements themselves appeared to have con-

spired against the French. Within a matter of hours, the constant, streaming
rains had transformed the shallow mountain streams into raging rivers; the
swollen Wütende Neiße and Katzbach became ferocious tempests. Their
maelstrom swept away the imperials who attempted to wade across. The
bridges at Niederkrayn and Dohnau could not be crossed safely by the
masses that attempted to push across. Hundreds fell into the water and
drowned in their panic-stricken attempts to swim. Thousands wandered
along the banks of both rivers seeking a way to cross with many men and
horses finding death beneath the waves. The whirlpool of the general flight
carried away most of the imperial foot. Again, while maintaining that the
withdrawal from the plateau had been orderly, III Corps’s journal provides
a glimpse of the chaos that ensued: “Despite the night and the rain, the
ground was disputed step by step. The retreat was orderly up to the first
arm of the Katzbach [the Wütende Neiße], which has very steep banks and
is very deep. Its wooded bank was still crowded with wagons; our soldiers
crossed the water under the fire of the enemy, and reached the other side in
disorder. We wanted to rally after the passage of the second arm of the river
[the Katzbach], but we could not do it. The night was so dark and the
weather so bad we could not recognize each other. Part of the division got
lost.”66
In pursuit, Yorck’s corps turned west toward the Niederweinberg and
Niederkrayn defiles while Sacken’s troops continued north toward Dohnau.
From the hills, Yorck’s Nr. 12 Horse Battery, the howitzers of the Nr. 2
Heavy Foot, and one Russian twelve-pound battery pounded the enemy
with canister before switching to shells. Finding an open path, Katzler
himself led the Black Hussars followed by two East Prussian battalions to
Niederkrayn, taking the village and its bridge across the Wütende Neiße.
Fortunately for the imperials, exhaustion quickly ended the Prussian pursuit
while the onset of darkness silenced their artillery. Displeased by the
cavalry’s lackluster pursuit, Gneisenau recalled Katzler to the plateau; only
The Katzbach 267
sixty hussars and the sharpshooter platoons from two East Prussian battal-
ions occupied the ruins of Niederkrayn.67
Late in the afternoon, Antoine-Guillaume Delmas’s 9th Division, led by
Souham himself, ascended the plateau at Dohnau. Although his artillery
could not negotiate the muddy slopes and his infantry could not fire their
muskets, Souham sought to turn the enemy’s right. Receiving heavy artillery
fire from the Russians, he resolved to have his men fix bayonets and charge.
However, Delmas protested, calling it suicide. Conceding, Souham opted to
maneuver beyond the range of Sacken’s guns, which destroyed six French
pieces that had managed to climb the plateau after “incredible efforts.”
Seeing nothing of the 10th and 11th Divisions on his left and certain of the
failure of Macdonald’s center to his right, Souham ordered Delmas to retreat
to Kroitsch, where St.-Germain’s division of cuirassiers and carabineers
stood all day. The 9th Division recrossed the Katzbach and took a position
on the hills north of Kroitsch; one of its brigades covered the park of III
Corps.68
Sacken halted on the hills of Kleintinz, but soon learned of the approach
of large enemy columns from Liegnitz. This force – the 10th and 11th
Divisions of III Corps – sought to cross the Katzbach at Schmogwitz and
move onto the hills between Dohnau and Kleintinz. On finding the bridge
swept away, Souham’s staff chief, General Jean-Joseph Tarayre, ordered the
soldiers to wade across the waist-deep water; twelve guns as well as the 10th
Hussar Regiment and Badenese Light Dragoon Regiment likewise reached
the opposite bank. According to the journal of III Corps, the Russians
observed the movement but did nothing to hinder it, “probably not sus-
pecting that we would undertake a serious attack on this side, or perhaps
too heavily occupied on the right to notice.” In his report to Blücher,
Sacken described one infantry brigade with sixteen cannons that came from
Liegnitz reached the Katzbach “to harass my right flank and to cover the
retreat of the enemy. The night assisted this operation, our people remained
in their places, but we could not judge the strength of the enemy and his
position.”69
Both French divisions formed brigade masses with artillery in the inter-
vals and struck the road south toward the hills of Kleintinz. While trying to
determine why the enemy was so far north, Étienne-Pierre Ricard, the
senior general of division, observed a column cresting the hill to his right,
which he believed to be Delmas’s 9th Division. He then noticed several
squadrons on the plain. “The fire on the right was slowing,” continues the
journal. “We saw a strong column of infantry filing on the crest of the
mountain at the time when we assumed General Delmas would be chasing
the enemy before him. Almost immediately we saw several squadrons on the
plain to the right: new reason to believe that the column was ours.” Taking
them to be French, Ricard decided to attack. Before the French assault could
get under way, however, scouts brought back the perplexing news that the
cavalry happened to be Prussian hussars – the column to his right: Russian
infantry. “Therefore, there was no doubt about the purpose of the march of
the column that we found a quarter of an hour earlier: it was the corps
commanded by [Sacken] who, after getting rid of everything before him, had
just reinforced the right wing of the combined army, which he thought was
being attacked by reserves coming from Liegnitz.”70 Russian skirmishers
greeted the French around 7:00. Supported by numerous guns, Sacken’s 27th
and 10th Divisions advanced.
In Fabry’s opinion, an immediate attack would have been the best option
for Ricard. However, Macdonald’s instructions had explicitly warned against
becoming entangled in an isolated engagement. “As elsewhere, extremely
serious responsibility had to be taken at this point, [but] no one took
charge,” laments Fabry. “General Souham certainly was not there. We note
his [Ricard’s] indecision; the enemy infantry descended to mid range, the
artillery to the left forced our masses to fall back.” The journal of III Corps
is just as critical of Ricard:
Night was falling and the rain increased. In the position that our two
divisions were in they had to attack quickly. They advanced at the double,
under arms, and in silence. When they were within range of artillery, the
enemy unmasked all his batteries and had them play on our masses; our
people responded with their best. Yet just as the infantry began to suffer, the
enemy artillery changed direction. Small-arms firing began and was sustained
by both sides with as much vivacity as time permitted. Before ordering the
two divisions to take the position with the bayonet, General Ricard wanted
to know what was happening to his right. Regardless, the undertaking
appeared too risky to accept responsibility; he remained for almost twenty
minutes in that position, where he was protected from enemy fire. We saw his
irresolution. The enemy infantry descended halfway: the artillery moved left
to take our masses in the rear. Even our skirmishers were repulsed. We were
going to be charged, unless we ourselves charged.
At that moment, news of Macdonald’s disaster arrived to convince

Ricard of the futility of attacking. “An energetic man at least would have
attempted an attack; General Ricard saw a reason to retreat,” decries Fabry.
Around 7:30 that evening, the two divisions retreated in good order across
the ford. The French claim that Sacken did not pursue. “After some shots
were exchanged, he withdrew,” maintained Sacken in his after-action report.
“In the pursuit, General [Louis] Suden, chief of a brigade of III Corps, was
wounded and captured.” Within thirty minutes, the head of 10th Division
lost contact with the rear of 11th. En route to Kroitsch, the 11th lost its way
several times before bivouacking between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. on a farm
located at the junction of the roads coming from Bunzlau, Haynau, and
The Katzbach 269
Liegnitz. Halting north of Schmogwitz, 10th Division eventually took the

road northwest to Haynau around 2:00 a.m. after being swarmed by Sack-
en’s Cossacks.71
Returning to Langeron’s sector, the columns of Rochambeau’s 19th
Division pushed across the Plinse shortly after 2:00. “The fire became very
intense,” noted Lauriston, “we silenced the enemy’s batteries and forced
them to withdraw. Our troops drove out the infantry established in the
depths of the ravine and reached the hill on the opposite side. The transition
was difficult; I reconnoitered for the artillery; we found a position. My
batteries forced those in the center of the enemy line to move away; I sent
Rochambeau’s division on the road from Seichau to Hennersdorf.” To
Lauriston’s left (northeast), units from XI Corps – 35th Division, the rest
of the 36th, and the corps cavalry – began moving through Seichau. Directed
by Macdonald, Gérard advanced toward the gap between Hennersdorf and
Schlaupe. “The enemy has thus far offered little resistance,” noted Gérard in
his report to Macdonald, “but we found him in position and in force on the
hills behind Hennersdorf, occupying this village strongly. Your Excellency
ordered me to attack it.”72
The situation on Lauriston’s right did not unfold so well. Unable to
move up the cannons, Maison’s men advanced toward the Russian left
without artillery support. Lauriston tells us that 16th Division lost “many
men by attacking it head on. In fact, I could not find positions in the center
favorable for my guns.” Maison directed two columns toward the forest
edge to work around the Russian left as a third marched on Herrmannsdorf.
A successful charge by Emmanuel with the Kievskii Dragoons and Colonel
Philip Paradovsky’s Liflyandskii Mounted Jäger brought the advance of the
first two columns to a standstill while Witte stopped the third column with a
bold charge by his 4th Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment. According to
Langeron: “the enemy made his principal attack on my left around 2:00
p.m. Rudzevich received it and held with great valor; Emmanuel and Para-
dovsky charged and cut down two enemy columns that tried to flank our
skirmishers. The Ukrainian horsemen charged a third time toward Herr-
mannsdorf; these charges met with great success; but unfortunately I lost
Colonel Paradovsky, who was killed by a cannonball; he had been wounded
on 23 August, but his zeal already had him back in the saddle leading his
regiment.” “The position would have been easily taken if the fire of our
infantry had not been somewhat extinguished by the rain that had not ceased
since the early morning,” lamented Lauriston. “Perceiving our inability to
fire, the cavalry charged so many times that our infantry could not hold. It
returned to charge more than ten times.”
Finally, one last effort by Maison’s warriors, supported by an attack on
Langeron’s center by one of Rochambeau’s brigades, overwhelmed and
routed the Russians. Langeron described the situation:
From the hills by Schlaupe, I soon saw the brilliant and fortunate attack
ordered by Blücher, and so well executed by Yorck’s and Sacken’s corps, and
the complete victory that we owe to this beautiful movement, so well calcu-
lated, so rapid, and so unexpected by the enemy, who, the attackers having
become the attacked, were flung into a horrible confusion within a half-hour:
the cavalry from Yorck’s and Sacken’s corps immortalized themselves on this
occasion. I then prepared to second this great attack by attacking General
Lauriston who faced me; but this general (whose conduct in battle is worthy of
the highest elegies) had pushed forward his reserve, anticipated me, and made
(apparently to make a diversion in favor of the left of his army) one of the
sharpest and most vicious attacks that I saw during the war.
“We managed to drive the enemy from the side, pushing and even
routing him,” continued Lauriston. “Our troops pursued three guns, passing
their bayonets through several enemy gunners, but could not reach the
pieces.” Lauriston moved forty heavy guns onto the hills northwest of
Hennersdorf. This battery silenced the lighter caliber Russian artillery on
the slopes of the Wein hill and then covered the storming of Hennersdorf by
General François Hénin’s 1st Brigade of 35th Division. Without artillery, the
two battalions (10th and 38th Jäger Regiments) that comprised the 3rd
Brigade of Olsufiyev’s 9th Division could not hold Hennersdorf. The village
fell around 4:00.
After taking Hennersdorf, Hénin drove the Russians from Stein hill,
which stood between Schlaupe and Hennersdorf. “With his 1st Brigade,
General Hénin marched on the village of Hennersdorf with the charge
beating as two battalions of the 22nd headed to the heights on the left,”
declared Gérard. “Everywhere the enemy was overthrown: we not only
captured the village, but we also drove the enemy from a hill [Stein], which
was carried by the bayonet.” The Russian 28th and 32nd Jäger Regiments
withdrew behind the ravine at Schlaupe while the 10th, 12th, and 38th Jäger
retreated to the second line south of Wein hill. Lauriston quickly exploited
the situation, concentrating all of his artillery against Wein hill. According to
Langeron:
Despite the fire of my batteries placed on the three heights by my artillery

commander, General [Gavriil] Veselitsky, General Lauriston placed a battery
of forty cannons on the heights between Seichau and Hennersdorf, and the
fire of this battery directed against my center silenced my batteries on the
Weinberg to the right of Herrmannsdorf. Under the protection of this fire,
strong columns appeared from the hedgerows of Hennersdorf and pushed
back the troops that were defending the Wein hill and occupied it themselves.
This moment was critical; this height was the key to my position, the battle
was already lost on my flank unless I reoccupied it; in the contrary case,
I would be forced to refuse my entire left, to open all of the roads to Jauer and
to compromise Pahlen’s detachment.
The Katzbach 271
At this point, with both of Langeron’s flanks hard pressed, cooperation

between the French V and XI Corps ended. Apparently, all of Rochambeau’s
division became embroiled in the attack on the Russian center and left,
mainly between Hennersdorf and the Mönchswald. Consequently, no elem-
ents of V Corps supported Gérard’s advance. Uninformed about the events
to his right, Gérard simply halted. “This movement was not supported by
the troops who were on our right, and who remained in the same position,”
explained Gérard. “I decided not to continue. We remained in that position
until dusk.” Around this time, 6:00 p.m., Macdonald arrived and undertook
to restore command and control on his right. Unfortunately, at this critical
juncture, he learned of the disaster that had befallen his left.73
From the plateau, the weather prevented Blücher and his staff from
gaining a complete overview of Langeron’s situation, but it appeared that
the Russians could not hold their position. “The firing on the left bank of the
Wütende Neiße was moving further and further away toward Jauer,” reports
Müffling, “and had already become very faint.” Blücher and Gneisenau grew
extremely indignant: Langeron appeared to abandon one good position after
another. “During a discussion near Niederkrayn,” continues Müffling,
“General Langeron was called a miserable coward who should be
denounced to the tsar and cashiered. His (cowardly) behavior was con-
trasted with ours, through which we considered ourselves heroes.” As
Lauriston advanced further and the flashes of his artillery moved closer to
Blücher’s line of retreat to Jauer, Müffling became convinced that Langeron
faced Macdonald’s main force. Arguing that Yorck and Sacken had engaged
merely “left-wing patrols,” Müffling implored Blücher to commit Yorck’s
reserve – Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade – to save Langeron. Blücher and Gneisenau
rejected all of the future field-marshal’s points. Nevertheless, Müffling did
not relax his pressure, especially after Gneisenau left the command post.
Observing Lauriston’s push to the Weinberg, Müffling hounded Blücher.
Finally, the old man reluctantly approved: “In the name of the devil, advance
with the brigade, now!”74
Around 6:00, after the issue had been decided on the plateau, Müffling
along with Captain Stosch and Lieutenant Gerlach hurried to Langeron’s
command post. As they rode through Schlaupe, fighting between the
Prussians and units of XI Corps erupted. At the same time, 1st Brigade
received orders to cross the Wütende Neiße between Schlaupe and Schlau-
phof to operate against Lauriston’s rear and flank. “To somewhat shame
him,” states a note in the margin of Blücher’s Journal of Operations,
“Colonel Müffling and several other officers from Headquarters very
triumphantly informed General Langeron of the successful results – we
had taken twenty cannon, Sacken is a brave general, Steinmetz’s brigade
would advance against the enemy’s left flank – because otherwise nothing
would have occurred.”75
Thus informed by Müffling of Blücher’s success on the plateau, Lan-

geron realized his folly. His conduct had jeopardized the day’s success and
could have threatened the very existence of the Silesian Army if the imperials
had driven Blücher from the plateau. Embarrassed by his mistakes, the
French émigré accepted responsibility for them, stating that he was
extremely disappointed with himself. Again, he claimed to have based his
actions on his knowledge of Barclay’s instructions. To believe Langeron,
around 6:00, when the French attack stopped, he thought of resuming the
offensive. Müffling claims the contrary: “I found General Langeron engaged
in withdrawing.” With Shcherbatov, Olsufiyev, Rudzevich, Ende, and sev-
eral other officers looking on, Müffling purportedly cried: “In the name of
God, general, you beat a retreat while we have won a brilliant victory?
Delivered from our enemies, our reserves are in full march to cross the
Wütende Neiße and to take back everything that is before you.” Embracing
him, Langeron supposedly replied: “Colonel, you are my savior.” “Let’s
attack immediately,” continued Müffling, “I will stay with you. I need to
witness your glory just as I witnessed General Sacken’s.” Ende interrupted
this scene by interjecting: “We have nothing left here but the rearguard;
100 guns were sent back a long time ago.” “Recall everything,” Müffling
cried out, “and attack with what you have.” Although the officers of his
suite voiced their support for Müffling, Langeron raised one final objection:
“Colonel, are you sure that the commander in chief does not need my corps
to cover his retreat?” “I’m sure, sir,” responded Müffling, “the commander
in chief will cross the Wütende Neiße to crush the enemy who has attacked
you: we must stand firm, we must correct the mistakes, and we must
intimidate the presumptuous by attacking them with drums beating.”
Gazing through the rain toward the plateau, Langeron suddenly saw the
imperials scrambling to get across the Wütende Neiße. “Good God, they are
running,” he purportedly exclaimed.76
To make good his mistakes, Langeron ordered the retaking of Wein hill.
Udom stormed the height with the 1st and 2nd Brigades of Olsufiyev’s 9th
Division. “I ordered General Olsufiyev to retake this height at all costs,”
recounted Langeron, “which he executed with as much celerity as courage:
the Nasheburgskii, Ryazhskii, Yakutskii Regiments, under the orders of
General Udom . . . moved in dense columns onto the heights, chasing away
the enemy and following them into the village. The rain had so dampened
the muskets that none could fire and so the fighting was hand to hand, with
musket-butts and bayonets.” Not expecting the counterattack and com-
pletely unprepared, the French streamed back to Hennersdorf.
As darkness descended, Langeron’s right wing – Shcherbatov’s VI Infan-
try Corps – likewise advanced to link with Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade. “To the
right,” continues Langeron, “Shcherbatov perfectly contained the enemy,
despite their reiterated attacks: after the success of Olsufiyev’s attack,
The Katzbach 273
I ordered Prince Shcherbatov to advance with VI Corps and attack the

enemy, by moving to his right, and thereby to link up with the Prussians,
which he did instantly and with great resolution. The 7th and 18th Divisions,
commanded by General Stepan Talyzin I and Benardos, forced the enemy to
retreat.” Despite the Allied pressure, Lauriston held a portion of Henners-
dorf as well as the terrain north of the village. Between Hennersdorf and
Schlaupe, General Vasily Meshcherinov drove the French from the domin-
eering Stein hill.77 Master of this height, Shcherbatov moved the 34th Light
Battery onto it to take Lauriston’s great battery in the flank; soon after the
French guns withdrew. “The VI Infantry Corps established itself on the left
of Hennersdorf,” affirmed Langeron, “and Meshcherinov, with his brigade
of Jäger, chased the enemy from a height between Hennersdorf and
Schlaupe, where Shcherbatov posted the Nesterovskii light artillery com-
pany, which opposed the great French battery, scattering and silencing it . . .
Neither the darkness nor the rain ended the fighting; it lasted until 11:00
p.m. in the village of Hennersdorf.”
Meanwhile, Steinmetz directed four battalions to Schlauphof and three
to Schlaupe, forcing the imperials to form a flank to oppose the Prussian
advance.78 Steinmetz himself forded the Wütende Neiße with two battalions
and took the hills on the left bank. His brigade artillery unlimbered on the
hills of the Wütende Neiße’s right bank; its fire drove the French from the
opposite bank. Around 8:00 p.m., Langeron finally summoned his heavy
artillery and Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps to return to the battlefield. He
also ordered Pahlen II to advance toward Konradswaldau. In his memoirs,
Langeron defended his original decision to send Kaptsevich’s infantry to
Jauer: “Having seen the success of the day and having nothing to fear for
Jauer, I was joined by Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps at 8:00 p.m., which
took no part in the action; he would have been very useful to me, but he
would have been more useful where I sent him.” Macdonald’s report the day
after the battle maintains that Langeron’s counterattack severely shook XI
Corps. Yet, other French reports claim that no one left this sector of the
battlefield with a sense of defeat. In fact, Lauriston, in his report written two
days after the battle, maintained that his “position at the close of the day was
beautiful; we were masters of the heights and could have remained there.”
French troops remained at Seichau until as late as 4:00 on the morning of the
27th.79
Blücher’s exhausted troops remained where they stood when darkness
fell, with only the Reserve Cavalry moving back behind the hill at Brechel-
shof. “The contest completely had the look of a battle in antiquity,” wrote
Gneisenau. “During it, small-arms fire was completely silenced until we
were able to move our artillery through the soppy ground. Only the cries of
the warriors filled the air; the polished weapon decided the affair.” “The
strong rain prevented the infantry from firing and so we fought almost
exclusively with cannon, bayonet, and cold steel,” confirmed Henckel. The
losses of the Silesian Army amounted to 1,400 men from Langeron’s corps,
874 from Yorck’s, and 575 from Sacken’s. Two days later, on the 28th,
Blücher signed his second report on the battle: “Perhaps never has a victory
been purchased with so little blood for, although I still have no report over
the losses, at most they amount to 1,000 men.” The fruits of the victory
remained equally uncertain; his initial report on the 28th stated that 36 guns,
110 caissons, 2 medicine wagons, 4 field forges, and 1,200–1,400 prisoners as
well as numerous officers had fallen into Allied hands. Regardless of the
numbers, Maude concludes that “this brilliant victory was the making of
Blücher and the Prussian army.” While such an epithet may be too bold, the
victory on the Katzbach certainly marks the rise of Blücher as the mover and
shaker of the Sixth Coalition.80
In a private letter written on the night of the battle, Gneisenau estimated
that “the booty of this battle is 30 cannon, 300 caissons, field forges, etc., and
15,000 prisoners. The battle lasted one hour into the night. The darkness did
not allow us to determine the extent of our victory. Therefore, the after-
action report written immediately after the battle states only the cannon
captured with the sword and bayonet without mentioning those the enemy
have left standing on the field or which toppled into the steep valley.” The
number of prisoners – 15,000 – is just part of the myth that surrounds the
battle’s conclusion. German accounts tell of a complete rout on the plateau:
“We have won a very glorious battle on the Katzbach,” continued Gneise-
nau, “so decisive that the French have never suffered such a defeat in battle.
The road between the Katzbach and the Bober shows the terror that had
seized the enemy. Everywhere run-over corpses are stuck in the mud.
Regarding the enemy army, few organized units remain available. The
French who were cut off from the river crossings wander around in the
woods and commit offenses.”81
French reports stated the exact opposite. Certainly, the French argument
can be used to correct the exaggerated notion that Macdonald’s entire army
collapsed on the plateau. Yet, reports from division and newly appointed
corps commanders – most of whom still dreamed of attaining the marshal’s
baton – to a green army commander naturally would paint a defeat in the
best light. Thus, according to Souham, “8th Division conducted its retreat in
order and always firmly rejected the enemy’s attempts to engage and bring
disorder in our ranks. Night ended the battle.” Gérard, who relied on
Charpentier’s account, stated in his after-action report: “Unable to resist
the enemy despite the best efforts, Sébastiani executed his movement to the
rear. From then on without support, Charpentier’s infantry retired to the
woods in the greatest order. It passed the woods and the ravine near Ober-
krayn and re-formed on the hills close to where one of Souham’s divisions
had taken a position.” Not only did Fabry allow himself to be influenced by
The Katzbach 275
such reports, but he also looked for proof of French resistance in the actions
of the Allies: “It is three kilometers from Brechelshof to Bellwitzhof, and
less than two from the latter to Niederkrayn. Yorck’s corps needed nearly
five hours to win this stretch of terrain; it only had to contend with
Meunier’s brigade, a part of the 8th Division, two divisions of II Cavalry
Corps, and thirty-six guns. Nevertheless, the intervention of Sacken’s whole
corps was necessary to break our resistance.”82
An unexpected encounter by two opposing armies advancing simultan-
eously resulted in the battle of the Katzbach. Both army commanders
believed they could get their forces across the Katzbach without interference
from the other. The weather, which severely limited visibility, contributed to
this erroneous idea. While Macdonald planned to engage the Silesian Army
at Jauer, Blücher believed he would find his opponent at Goldberg and
Liegnitz. Macdonald intended to envelop the Army of Silesia
concentrically while Blücher wanted to separate the individual corps of the
Army of the Bober and defeat them in detail. Preparing for battle, Blücher
concentrated his army. Preparing for envelopment and pursuit, Macdonald
stretched his army. Having no overview of the situation rendered Blücher
just as blind as Macdonald. The two armies moved toward each other
without knowing it. This much the Prussians knew: having met gutsy yet
brief resistance, the imperials pursued what they perceived to be Yorck’s
rearguard without having any idea of the proximity of the entire Silesian
Army. In his memoirs, Henckel von Donnersmarck provides some astute
observations: “Emboldened by our previous retreats, the enemy believed
that we were once again withdrawing, and thus, holding our vanguard to be
a rearguard, attacked it, drove it across the Katzbach, and crossed this river,
which later led to his actual destruction. On our left, General Langeron was
also engaged. Because of the terrible roads, he had already sent back most of
his artillery and had on hand only a few light pieces while the enemy
deployed ten[-] and twelve[-pound] guns; to the enemy, all of this reinforced
the idea that we were retreating and he only had to deal with a rearguard.”
“All of his prior retreats actually gave Blücher an advantage: it made the
French imprudently advance onto the plateau,” observed Blücher’s authori-
tative German biographer, General Unger. According to Langeron: “We
were all surprised to see Macdonald, one of the most distinguished generals
of the French army, due equally to his talent and his bravery, risk and lose –
by his own fault – such a decisive battle. His supporters claim that Napoleon
said he had only 50,000 men facing him: this assertion does not accord with
the instructions Napoleon gave him. Moreover, it is very true that, in this
campaign as in 1812, he always believed that we were much weaker than our
actual effective strength.”83
After Macdonald’s advance rendered the 11:00 a.m. attack disposition
obsolete, Blücher decided to use the opportunity to allow part of the enemy
army to ascend the plateau, then fall on it and drive the imperials over the
cliffs. Written a few hours after the battle, Gneisenau’s letter to Count Ernst
Friedrich Herbert von Münster, the Hanoverian minister in London, cap-
tures the thinking of Blücher’s headquarters: “We made the disposition for
the attack and were in the process of executing it when the report arrived
that enemy columns were advancing over the Katzbach against us. We
quickly changed our plan of attack, hiding our columns, showing only our
vanguard, and positioning ourselves as if we were falling back on the
defensive. Now the cocksure enemy pressed forward. All at once we
emerged.” To Clausewitz he explained: “Our plan for the attack and the
circumstance that we had been marching early saved us from ruin. We could
now make our dispositions calmly. The enemy was approaching over the
Katzbach and had the defile to his rear.”84
“Also, the heavy rain hindered reconnaissance,” added Unger, “and
negated French effectiveness with the musket, and brought the unleashed
fury of Germanic and Slavic warrior into the struggle of man against man.”
While this last statement represents the nationalistic fervor that besieged
Europe when General Unger published his work at the beginning of the
twentieth century, Blücher’s men won him the battle he so desperately
sought. He lauded the bravery of the Prussian troops: “Particularly praise-
worthy was the conduct of the infantry, which mostly consisted of very raw
soldiers.” Gneisenau likewise could not conceal the pride he felt about the
performance of the Silesian Army in general and the Prussian foot specific-
ally. Regarding the latter, Gneisenau informed Alexander Gibsone that
“after the combat of this day, the infantry, which overall remained in
noteworthy order throughout the entire battle, stood in well-ordered, com-
plete squares. This day marks the triumph of our newly-created infantry.”
Concerning the army on the whole, he wrote: “The Silesian Army has
performed great service. In eight days it has had seven large engagements
and one battle – engagements that have cost us (Prussians alone, without the
Russians) 1,800–2,000 men in dead and wounded.”85
Napoleon’s 23 August directive advised Macdonald to execute a short
offensive strike through Jauer. Macdonald would have achieved his goal had
he conducted his operation on either the 24th or 25th, when Blücher, still
uncertain of Napoleon’s whereabouts, had decided to retreat east-southeast
toward Striegau. Ney’s hijacking of III Corps prevented Macdonald from
maintaining the army’s momentum and commencing the offensive during
this crucial 48-hour period. During these two days, Macdonald also failed to
direct Ledru’s 31st Division to Hirschberg and in line with the army to
provide right-flank coverage. Had Ledru advanced toward Hirschberg on
the 25th, he would have learned that St.-Priest had withdrawn from there on
the 24th and made for Landeshut. With this information, Macdonald would
not have had reason to send Puthod’s 17th Division to Schönau with the task
The Katzbach 277
of forwarding one brigade to Hirschberg and the other to Jauer. These

mistakes ultimately deprived Lauriston of his 17th Division on the day of
battle. Considering the events in Lauriston’s sector, an additional division
may have sufficed to send Langeron running and to roll up Blücher’s right
and rear.86
Macdonald’s intentions have come under scrutiny. Writing in 1886, the
retired French cavalry officer, Commandant Maurice-Henri Weil, asserts
that Macdonald’s orders for 26 August reflected the marshal’s hope of using
maneuver rather than battle to force his adversary to withdraw into the heart
of Silesia. Less than twenty years later, Friederich argued that “obviously
Macdonald expected to engage his adversary in a position at Jauer; on the
26th he thought to continue his advance up to the plateau of Jauer and attack
on the 27th in case the Silesian Army had not voluntarily retreated.” By 2:00
on the 25th, Macdonald himself remained uncertain over his next move,
initially because he did not know the whereabouts of III Corps thanks to
Ney’s error, and then because he could not be sure if Blücher would make a
stand. During the course of the morning, much enemy cavalry prowled
around the front of V and XI Corps, while the sound of artillery to the
north indicated that Sacken had pursued III Corps. Macdonald did not
believe this activity signaled an imminent Allied offensive, but did assume
Blücher thought the rest of the Army of the Bober would “retreat” like III
Corps. “We are ready to receive him or march on him, if he retires,” he
assured Napoleon at 2:00 p.m. If III Corps returned, he planned a demon-
stration against Jauer. If not, he would fall back to the Bober, reorganize the
army, and resume the offensive. In a report drafted two hours later, the
marshal informed Napoleon that III Infantry and II Cavalry Corps had
returned to their positions. In the next line, the marshal exclaims: “I will
prepare an offensive movement on Jauer.” He concluded: “I do not worry
about the forces opposite me; I will march against them without hesitation.”
But to Berthier he confided: “I am organizing the army and then I shall
present battle to the enemy but I doubt it will be accepted.” Therefore,
Macdonald believed Blücher would retreat or was in the process of
retreating.87
To be fair to Macdonald, his operation complied with Napoleon’s
instructions and, although advancing, he did not seek battle. Perhaps being
better acquainted with Blücher would have triggered the idea that the
impetuous Prussian might launch his own offensive. Such a consideration
can only be made with the benefit of hindsight. As of August 1813, Blücher
remained the man who had recklessly squandered the Prussian cavalry at
Auerstedt, the man who had surrendered at Lübeck, and the septuagenarian
loudmouth whom the emperor had cashiered. If the Russians doubted
Blücher’s abilities, how could the French not? Indeed, he had followed the
French when they retreated west, but fled before the emperor. If the
Prussian commander’s marches and countermarches had infuriated and

dumbfounded his subordinates, they must have looked just as erratic to
the French as those of the Prussian commander in chief, Duke Charles
William Ferdinand of Brunswick, in 1806. Although Langeron and Sacken
remained in contact with Macdonald’s wings, what reason did the marshal
have to assume they would not follow Blücher’s center and retreat deeper
into Silesia?
To secure his right, Macdonald allocated 12,000 men (the 31st Division
and one brigade of the 17th) to contend with St.-Priest’s VIII Infantry Corps
in the Hirschberg region. With 45,000 men (V and XI Corps), he would fix
Blücher at Jauer by sending two of Lauriston’s divisions southeast from
Goldberg directly on Jauer, while half of the 17th Division trekked east from
Schönau. Meanwhile, the rest of the army, another 45,000 men (III Infantry
and II Cavalry Corps), would cross the Katzbach and the Wütende Neiße to
flank Blücher’s position at Jauer. As the emperor’s instructions had stressed
the importance of keeping open the army’s communications, Macdonald left
the 31st Division in its positions at Kemnitz and Berthelsdorf and moved
Puthod’s 17th along with Lauriston’s 6th Light Cavalry Brigade to the left
bank of the Katzbach to observe the river crossings south of Goldberg.
On the surface, all are textbook maneuvers, but Macdonald should have
employed a sharper eye for judging the terrain and should have followed his
master’s habit of interrogating the locals. Terrible weather and false assump-
tions about Blücher led to inefficient reconnaissance. He directed his army
to descend on Jauer in two groups separated by the Katzbach and the
Wütende Neiße. Moreover, his center first had to cross the Katzbach,
followed by the Wütende Neiße, and then ascend the steep slope that
towered over its right bank before XI Infantry and II Cavalry Corps could
debouch onto the plateau. For good reason the locals referred to the latter
watercourse as “raging.” With the water level constantly increasing due to
the summer rains, the Wütende Neiße could become an impassable obstacle
in a matter of hours. The few bridges found in the tiny villages along its
banks hardly provided the opportunity for mutual support between Mac-
donald’s right and center. No doubt to the marshal’s horror, the situation
that unfolded led to the isolation of the 27,000 men from II Cavalry Corps
and elements of XI Corps on the plateau east of the Wütende Neiße. There
they would face the 55,000 men under Yorck and Sacken concentrated along
a four-mile front between Bellwitzhof and Eichholtz. On the other side of
the Wütende Neiße, Lauriston’s corps – reduced to 17,000 men – confronted
Langeron’s 24,000 Russians.
Regardless, Macdonald’s measures could have led to victory. He intended
to unite 60,000 men on the plateau, who would have confronted the 55,000
men of Yorck’s and Sacken’s corps. The reason this plan failed is simple: his
subordinates failed to provide on-the-spot leadership and cooperation.
The Katzbach 279
Columns belonging to Gérard and Sébastiani collided at Kroitsch, where

they simultaneously engaged Yorck’s vanguard. Due to the enemy’s pres-
ence, the French should have taken security measures for the advance to
Jauer. Instead of one corps waiting for the other to pass, both corps con-
tinued the march intermingled, pushing through each other to reach Nie-
derkrayn. Although Katzler withdrew onto the plateau, French leadership
dissolved in the face of the adverse weather and imposing terrain. Imperial
units disintegrated into numerous small columns, which chaotically sought
to win the plateau. Intending to cover the deployment of Gérard’s infantry,
Sébastiani’s cavalry mistakenly pressed forward. Having already encoun-
tered resistance at the Katzbach, the infantry should have taken the lead,
opening the defiles and pushing up the slopes to the plateau. Under their
protection, Sébastiani’s troopers should have ascended the plateau and
deployed with the artillery following. Instead, cavalry, infantry, and artillery
all emerged on the plateau haphazardly and in isolated pockets. Numerous
batteries unlimbered along the Kuh hill–Kleintinz line; the cavalry gradually
re-formed north of the guns, while the infantry slowly deployed on the
plateau. Not one French commander on the spot sought to determine if
Souham’s III Corps had come on line. After a considerable artillery duel,
Jürgaß charged the French guns with part of Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry but
Sébastiani’s cavalry forced him to fall back. Sacken’s cavalry attack on the
flank and rear of the French line decided the battle, which on the right bank
of the Wütende Neiße was essentially only a cavalry engagement. Driven
from the plateau and back down the defiles, the retreating French slammed
into their approaching reinforcements, disordering them and eventually
sweeping them away. This enabled Blücher to send Steinmetz’s brigade
across the Wütende Neiße to threaten Lauriston’s left. In this sector of the
battlefield, we saw the fatal lack of cooperation between the French V and
XI Corps. With both of Langeron’s flanks hard pressed and his center
suffering under the withering fire of the French grand battery, Lauriston
and Gérard stopped collaborating. With Rochambeau’s division attacking
the Russian center and left between Hennersdorf and the Mönchswald, no
elements of V Corps supported the advance of XI Corps, prompting Gérard
to simply halt.
It must be noted that the same factors that plagued Macdonald could
have worked against Blücher. Believing he had found the Army of the Bober
split in two groups at Goldberg and Liegnitz, he wanted to destroy one of
them. The distance between Goldberg and Liegnitz amounted to eight miles,
meaning that the portion of Macdonald’s army that he attacked would not
receive support from the other for several hours. Thus, the decisive blow
would have to fall within this timeframe. Blücher and Gneisenau decided to
envelop Souham’s corps at Liegnitz by having Yorck’s corps cross the
Katzbach at Kroitsch and Dohnau and turn toward Steudnitz by passing
to the left of Rothkirch. At Steudnitz, Yorck would strike the Liegnitz–

Haynau road and thus sever Souham’s line of retreat. Yet, Souham could
have held the line of the Katzbach with two of his divisions and simultan-
eously attack Yorck’s right with the remaining three. This would have
forced Yorck to make front to the northeast, allowing Sébastiani’s cavalry
at Rothbrünnig to attack the Prussian’s left flank and rear. Langeron
received the task of securing Yorck’s left flank and rear, but the imperial
forces at Goldberg would have kept the Russians in check. Cut off from
Sacken by the Wütende Neiße and the Katzbach and with Langeron
neutralized, Yorck’s corps could have been destroyed, especially consider-
ing the morale of his men. As Friederich concludes, “certainly, to say
that Blücher’s disposition was impossible to execute goes too far. Yet its
success depended on a series of contingencies, and we can only view it as
fortunate that the circumstances made the execution of his intentions
unnecessary.”88
Notes
1 “Ordre de mouvement,” Goldberg, 25 August 1813, reproduced in Fabry, Étude
sur les opérations du maréchal Macdonald, 50–51; SHAT, C2 154: Lauriston to
Macdonald, 26 August 1813; Sébastiani to Macdonald, 27 August 1813; Macdonald
to Berthier, 27 August 1813; Souham to Berthier, 29 August 1813; and Gérard to
Macdonald, 31 August 1813. Weil offers a different interpretation of Macdonald’s
orders. According to Weil, Macdonald directed V Corps to take the direct road
southeast from Goldberg through Seichau to Hennersdorf. To its left, II Cavalry
Corps had to cross the Katzbach at Kroitsch and move south along the left bank of
the Wütende Neiße. In the center, Gérard’s XI Corps would ford the Katzbach at
Schmogwitz and proceed south along the western edge of the plateau to
Brechelshof (Brachów). On the left wing of the army, III Corps received instruc-
tions to cross the Katzbach at Liegnitz and proceed south to Malitsch. On his far
right, he wanted Puthod’s 17th Division at Schönau on the 26th, from where he
would send one brigade through Jägendorf to Jauer while the second brigade
united with the 31st Division to contend with the enemy corps at Hirschberg.
Because of the roads that existed in the region at that time, Weil’s supposition that
XI Corps would cross the Katzbach at Schmogwitz was impossible based on the
march direction it took on the morning of the 26th. See Weil, Campagne de 1813,
103; see also Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:295.
2 SHAT, C2 154: Gérard to Macdonald, 31 August 1813.
3 Souham’s report to Berthier claims that III Corps moved out at 11:30 a.m., yet the
journal of III Corps puts the start time at noon: SHAT, C2 154: Souham to
Berthier, 29 August 1813; Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 55.
4 During the course of the nineteenth century, Oberweinberg and Niederweinberg
became the town of Weinberg, which is now Winnica in Poland.
5 Langeron, Mémoires, 248; Langeron to Blücher is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:123; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:298.
The Katzbach 281
6 Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sources refer to Wildschütz as Wöltsch

and Wültsch.
7 Specifically: 50 skirmishers and a Jäger detachment from the Silesian Grenadier
Battalion at Schimmelwitz; 150 skirmishers at Niederkrayn; the 4th Battalion of
the Brandenburg Regiment at the Niederweinberg mill; the 2nd and 3rd Battal-
ions at the bridge over the Neiße at Niederkrayn; and the 1st Battalion on the
bank downstream this bridge. The Thuringian Battalion placed its 1st and 3rd
Companies astride Niederweinberg. The two Landwehr battalions and the Sile-
sian Grenadier Battalion formed the reserve on the hills east of Weinberg. See
Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:124–25.
8 SHAT, C2 154: Sébastiani to Macdonald, 27 August 1813; Friederich, in Herbst-
feldzug 1813, I:299, incorrectly states that the enemy column consisted of infan-
try. He corrects this error in Die Befreiungskriege, II:124.
10 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:300. French reports make no mention of this
collision.
13 Yorck’s 1st and 2nd Brigades formed his right column, which marched toward the
Weinberg villages, passing east of Altjauer and Brechelshof. The left column – 7th
and 8th Brigades and Reserve Artillery – marched through Jauer, Altjauer, and
Brechelshof likewise toward the Weinberg villages: Fabry, Étude sur les opérations
du maréchal Macdonald, 67.
14 “We had made the plan to cross the Katzbach with the combined army and attack
the enemy. We were two [eight] miles closer to the enemy than he expected us.
The headquarters directed itself to Brechelshof in a timely manner to be closer to
all the reports”: Gneisenau to Gibsone, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, GStA PK,
VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
16 This statement is from a letter written by Johann Friedrich Benzenberg to
Gneisenau on 11 March 1817, quoted in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:204.
17 In Mémoires, 250, Langeron states that Blücher informed him that he intended to
attack the French army with his right. In Étude sur les opérations du maréchal
Macdonald, 68, Fabry concludes that Blücher’s orders state the exact opposite.
Instead, the French staff officer claims that by directing Yorck to Steudnitz,
Blücher intended to crush Macdonald’s center and then have Yorck fall on the
rear of the enemy force supposedly marching from Haynau to Liegnitz. This
assertion cannot be supported because Blücher knew of only a French cavalry
force posted between Macdonald’s two wings.
18 “Disposition,” Brechelshof, 11:00 a.m., 26 August 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 128.
20 SHAT, C2 154: Sébastiani to Macdonald, 27 August 1813.
22 SHAT, C2 154: Macdonald to Berthier, Goldberg, 27 August 1813; Fabry, ed.,
Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 55.
23 SHAT, C2 154: Souham to Berthier, 29 August 1813 and Macdonald to Berthier,
Goldberg, 27 August 1813.
24 Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 58, states that Brayer’s division
reached Kroitsch at 2:30 and that “the duc de Tarente [Macdonald], who was
observing the progress of the enemy on the right [Langeron] at the moment when
III Corps debouched, around 3:00 sent General Tarayre to the 9th, 10th, and 11th
Divisions that followed the 8th with orders to execute an attack on the left to
create a diversion and disengage those forces that presented us with so many
disadvantages in the defile of Kroitsch.”
25 SHAT, C2 154: Souham to Berthier, 29 August 1813; Fabry, ed., Journal des
opérations du IIIe Corps, 56, 58.
26 The 29th and 45th Jäger Regiments formed the 2nd Brigade of the 22nd Division
of Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps.
27 Langeron, Mémoires, 248. Starting with Olsufiyev’s IX Corps on Langeron’s left,
Kornilov split the 3rd Brigade of his 15th Division, sending the two battalions of
the 12th Jäger Regiment to defend the Silber west of Hennersdorf and the sole
battalion of the 22nd Jäger to occupy Herrmannsdorf. Udom, the commander of
Olsufiyev’s 9th Division, instructed his 3rd Brigade (10th and 38th Jäger Regi-
ments, two battalions total) to occupy Hennersdorf. The four remaining brigades
(nine battalions total) of 9th and 15th Divisions formed south of the Weinberg,
extending from Herrmannsdorf on the left (west) to the Kirchberg on the right
(east). On Langeron’s right wing, the 1st and 2nd Brigades (four battalions total)
of General Panteleimon Benardos’s 18th Division of Shcherbatov’s VI Infantry
Corps extended northeast from the Kirchberg to the Breiteberg, where the 1st
and 2nd Brigades (five battalions total) of General Stepan Talyzin I’s 7th Division
deployed. Benardos’s 3rd Brigade, consisting of the 28th and 32nd Jäger Regi-
ments (two battalions total), held the hills just east of Hennersdorf between
Schlaupe and the Breiteberg, while the three battalions of Talyzin’s 3rd Brigade
(11th and 36th Jäger Regiments) secured Schlaupe on the extreme right.
28 Subtracting Pahlen II’s detachment, which consisted of the two squadrons of the
Kinburnskii Dragoon Regiment, the two squadrons of the Dorpatskii Mounted
Jäger Regiment, and the Moskovskii and Libavskii Infantry Regiments, Langeron
had at his disposal: the eight battalions, six squadrons, two Cossack regiments, and
ten guns of Rudzevich’s vanguard; the twelve battalions and twenty-four guns of
Shcherbatov’s VI Infantry Corps; the eleven battalions and twenty-four guns of
Olsufiyev’s IX Corps; the eight battalions and twenty-four guns of Kaptsevich’s
X Corps; and the eleven squadrons and six guns of regular cavalry belonging to
Korf’s reserve. The historian of the Russian General Staff, Bogdanovich, describes
Langeron’s position as very advantageous. See Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIa:57–58, 66–67; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:297–99.
29 Langeron, Mémoires, 250, quoted in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:126. These
sentences are not included in Langeron’s memoirs.
31 SHAT, C2 154: Lauriston to Macdonald, 28 August 1813.
32 Langeron to Blücher is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:127. In his memoirs,
Langeron claims to have responded to Blücher that he could not leave his position
to execute a movement to the right because of the enemy’s attempt to turn his left,
but promised he would not yield an inch of terrain. See Langeron, Mémoires, 250.
The Katzbach 283
33 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844: 127.

34 SHAT, C2 154: Lauriston to Macdonald, 28 August 1813.
36 The disposition, which is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:127, calls for I Corps
to form two massive columns. The left wing would be composed of 7th and 8th
Brigades. Horn’s 7th Brigade would be arranged so that the brigade cavalry
would be at the head followed by one battalion, the brigade artillery and one
twelve-pound battery, and then the remaining battalions. Hünerbein’s 8th
Brigade would be arranged so that the lead battalion would be followed by the
brigade artillery, one twelve-pound battery, the remaining battalions, and the
brigade cavalry at the rear. This column received the task of marching through
Schlauphof and Niederkrayn to Kroitsch, where it would cross the Katzbach and
passing Rothkirch on the right proceed to Steudnitz. The right wing column
would consist of 1st and 2nd Brigades and the Reserve Cavalry. The brigade
cavalry of both units would form the head followed by one battalion of the 1st
Brigade, one twelve-pound battery, and the brigade battery, and the remaining
battalions of 1st Brigade followed by 2nd Brigade in the same order but without a
twelve-pound battery; the Reserve Cavalry would form the rear. This column
would march through Jänowitz to Dohnau, where it would cross the Katzbach
and march through Rothkirch to Steudnitz. To secure the two points of passage
across the Katzbach, Yorck split his vanguard.
37 Blasendorff, Blücher, 206; Droysen, Yorck, II:139.
38 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 31–32; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:60.
39 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 29–30, and Aus meinem Leben, 59–61. Written in
1824 before Gneisenau’s death six years later, the former provides an excellent
operational history without the backbiting and self-promotion found in the latter.
Because Gneisenau was still alive at the time of the publication of the former, we
can assume that the account is accurate.
40 “A quarter-mile from us, the enemy was just in the process of taking the corps of
General Langeron in the right flank as he had already done in the left. He wanted
to bowl over the few battalions of our vanguard”: Gneisenau to Gibsone, Bre-
chelshof, 26 August 1813, and Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Goldberg, 28 August
1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21; Pertz and Delbrück,
Gneisenau, III:206.
41 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 28–31, and Aus meinem Leben, 61–62.
42 Yorck decided that the narrow stretch between the plateau’s edge and Eichholtz –
hardly 2,000 paces in width – did not suffice for a front of three brigades to
deploy, especially since Sacken’s artillery extended west of Eichholtz.
43 Droysen, Yorck, II:142; Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 62.
44 Quoted in Gneisenau, Blücher, 163.
45 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 32, and Aus meinem Leben, 63.
48 Gneisenau to Gibsone, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21. In his letter to Clausewitz written two days later, Gnei-
senau claims that only one musket fired.

50 Marbot, Mémoires, III:285; SHAT, C2 154: Sébastiani to Macdonald, 27 August
1813; Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 55–56.
52 Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 56.
53 Unger, Blücher, II:80; Droysen, Yorck, II:142.
55 Blasendorff, Blücher, 206; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:207. Blasendorff
claims that Yorck “only slowly deployed his troops to support the vanguard” and
“withheld his serious cooperation.” Such allegations can be dismissed.
56 Unger, Blücher, II:80. “It was typical for General Yorck to be irresolute before he
determined on an attack,” wrote Steffens; “but, once resolved, he held back
nothing”: Steffens, Adventures, 120.
57 The Aleksandriiskii and Mariupolskii Hussar Regiments, eleven squadrons total.
58 The 1st Brigade of the 2nd Hussar Division consisted of the Akhtyrskii and
Belorusskii Hussar Regiments, twelve squadrons total.
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21; SHAT, C2 154: Sébastiani to Macdonald, 27 August 1813.
61 Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 56–57.
63 Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 57; Gneisenau to Gibsone,
Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
64 SHAT, C2 154: Souham to Berthier, 29 August 1813; Gérard to Macdonald,
31 August 1813; and Sébastiani to Macdonald, 27 August 1813.
66 Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 58, 60.
67 “Tagebuch der reitenden Batterie Nr. 12 des I AK,” GStA PK, IV Rep. 15a
Nr. 376; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 83.
68 Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 58; SHAT, C2 154: Souham to
Berthier, 29 August 1813.
69 Sacken to Blücher, Großjänowitz, 10:00 a.m., 27 August 1813, is in Pertz and
Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:236.
70 Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 59. The journal incorrectly states
that this Russian corps was commanded by General Nikolay Rayevsky.
71 Fabry, Étude sur les opérations du maréchal Macdonald, 90–91; Sacken to Blücher,
Großjänowitz, 10:00 a.m., 27 August 1813, is in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau,
III:236; Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 59–60.
73 SHAT, C2 154: Gérard to Macdonald, 31 August 1813, and Macdonald to Ber-
thier, 27 August 1813; Langeron, Mémoires, 251–52.
74 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 64–67. Müffling disagreed with both the harsh
criticism of Langeron and the notion that victory on the plateau had elevated
them to hero-like status. Posing as the savior, he notes in his memoirs: “Accord-
ingly, here again fell to me the difficult task of disturbing self-satisfying delusions
by using plain truths to eradicate the consequences of such hallucinations.” In
The Katzbach 285
Étude sur les opérations du maréchal Macdonald, 96, Fabry criticizes Blücher for
neither leading 1st Brigade himself nor going to Langeron’s command post:
“There is no doubt that the intervention of a leader as energetic as Blücher would
have given Steinmetz’s attack another character. Because the commander in chief
was concerned about what was happening to Langeron’s corps, his true place was
with it. He would have found a favorable opportunity to intervene by launching
the 1st Brigade through Schlaupe against the left of XI Corps and to reestablish
the combat of the Russian corps he claimed was lost by the incorrect measures of
its commander.” Blücher had to decide between the lesser of the two evils: Yorck
or Langeron. Had he accompanied the latter, the former may have been the one to
retreat to Jauer, leaving Sacken’s corps to absorb the full weight of III Infantry
and II Cavalry Corps.
75 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:145, but the journal itself was lost during the
Second World War.
76 Quoted in Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 384–85; Langeron, Mémoires, 252;
Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 67–68. Gneisenau’s adjutant, Captain Stosch,
attested to the accuracy of Müffling’s testimony regarding this assignment. See
Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:208.
77 Meshcherinov led the 28th and 32nd Jäger Regiments of the 3rd Brigade of 18th
Division, supported by the 11th and 36th Jäger Regiments of 7th Division’s 3rd
Brigade.
78 As noted, Gneisenau wrote that Langeron “was saved when some battalions from
Steinmetz’s brigade crossed the Wütende Neiße and took the enemy in the left
flank.” Moreover, Nostitz asserts that, “through the appropriate maneuver, a
Prussian brigade prevented the enemy from making use of his superior numbers
against Langeron’s corps. In this case it was Steinmetz’s brigade, which through
its crossing of the Neiße and victorious advance between Schlaupe and
Schlauphof forced the French to disengage from Langeron’s corps.” Fabry firmly
rejects the Prussian claim that Steinmetz saved Langeron. According to the
French officer, Steinmetz “himself forded the river with two battalions and took
the heights on the left bank. His movement was supported by the battery of his
brigade, half of the Nr. 1 Horse Battery, the Grenadier Battalion that had been
assigned as an escort. In fact, the support provided by Steinmetz’s brigade was
reduced to two battalions. Therefore, Gneisenau had no right to claim to have
saved Langeron by jumping on the rear of the French corps that was attacking
him.” See Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Goldberg, 28 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21; Nostitz, Tagebuch, 57; Fabry, Étude sur les
opérations du maréchal Macdonald, 98.
79 Langeron, Mémoires, 252–54. While Fabry is quick to point out that Müffling
maintained that three French battalions retreated from the plateau in order, he
fails to mention that the Prussian claimed the imperials “behaved without energy
and irresolutely” after the Russian counterattack: SHAT, C2 154: Macdonald to
Berthier, 27 August 1813 and Lauriston to Macdonald, 28 August 1813; Müffling,
Aus meinem Leben, 68.
80 Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Goldberg, 28 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21; Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 214; Blücher
to Charles John, Goldberg, 28 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Maude, Leipzig
Campaign, 178.
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21. Freytag-Loringhoven, in Aufklärung und Armeeführung,
83, states: “With regard to the trophies and the losses of the French, it can no
longer be determined what fell into Allied hands during the battle itself and what
they captured in the pursuit.” Although vicious attacks on Gneisenau abound in
his memoirs, Müffling, in Aus meinem Leben, 73–74, offers a possible explanation
for the inflation of numbers: “He [Gneisenau] was anxious that the victory on the
plateau should be considered by all of Europe as a general defeat of the whole of
Macdonald’s army, because this suited his ‘electrifying system.’” It is more
plausible based on his correspondence with Münster that Gneisenau sought to
portray the victory as decisive to earn more British monetary and material
support for Prussia in general and the Silesian Army in particular.
82 SHAT, C2 154: Souham to Berthier, 29 August 1813, and Gérard to Macdonald,
31 August 1813; Fabry, Étude sur les operations du maréchal Macdonald, 89.
83 Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 213; Unger, Blücher, II:79; Langeron,
Mémoires, 260.
84 Gneisenau to Münster, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 20b; Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Goldberg, 28 August 1813,
ibid., Nr. 21. Not surprisingly, Gneisenau’s assessment in his letter to Münster
agrees with Blücher’s initial after-action report to the king, which Gneisenau
drafted: “I had decided to attack the enemy today but at the moment when my
orders were about to be executed the enemy crossed the Katzbach opposite me.
I concealed my troops and initially brought only my vanguard into combat; but
when all of his troops had crossed the Katzbach, I led the army entrusted to my
command against them and I soon had the fortune of achieving a complete
victory.” A copy of Blücher’s letter to Frederick William, written in German at
Brechelshof on 26 August 1813, is in RA KrA, volym 25.
85 Unger, Blücher, II:79; Gneisenau to Gibsone, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, GStA
PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
86 Sources for the battle of the Katzbach are: Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:123–27;
Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, 144; Plotho, Der Krieg, II:107; Gneisenau,
Blücher, 163–64; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:50–70; Pertz and Del-
brück, Gneisenau, III:201–08; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 28–37; Unger, Blücher,
II:76; Droysen, Yorck, II:138–46; Fabry, Étude sur les opérations du maréchal
Macdonald, 72–79, 90–99; Weil, Campagne de 1813, 104; Friederich, Herbstfeld-
zug 1813, I:297–311; Blasendorff, Blücher, 205–07; Henckel von Donnersmarck,
Erinnerungen, 213–14; Unger, Blücher, II:77–78; Lieven, Russia Against Napo-
leon, 380–83.
87 SHAT, C2 154: Macdonald to Berthier, 4:00 p.m., 25 August 1813, and Macdonald
to Napoleon, Goldberg, 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., 25 August 1813.
7
Blücher’s hare hunt
In the streaming rain, Blücher rode back to Brechelshof accompanied by

Gneisenau. Initially silent, he then joked with his companion. “No, Gnei-
senau,” he purportedly exclaimed, “we have won the battle and nobody can
deny us that. Now, they will demand to know how we did it so well and
I will have to teach them!” Unable to find a structure large enough to
accommodate Army Headquarters because the few buildings on the estate
housed the wounded, they went to the Rittergut (manor), which now served
as the army’s main hospital. Karl Ernst Friedrich, Baron von Richthofen,
had purchased the estate, previously the Leubus Seminary, in 1811 during
Prussia’s liquidation of religious holdings. At a long table in the large, arched
great room, Blücher and his staff sat down to a meager victory dinner
consisting of boiled potatoes served in large clay bowls. Although the
potatoes were freshly dug, no spices could be found to add flavor. Seated
at the far end of the table, young Scharnhorst seemed restless and looked
around disappointingly. Blücher noticed and asked the lieutenant what
troubled him. When Scharnhorst declared he desired salt, Blücher bellowed:
“He is such a gourmand that he even needs salt!”1
After dinner, work continued deep into the night. Blücher wrote his own
report to the magistrate of Breslau announcing the victory as well as request-
ing care for the wounded and food for his troops. Despite his exhaustion, he
also penned private letters. “Today was the day that I have so long wished
for,” he divulged to his wife; “we have completely defeated the enemy,
capturing many cannon and taking many prisoners. I expect even more
prisoners will be taken tomorrow because I will pursue the enemy with all
my cavalry.” He briefly summarized the campaign in a letter to a friend:
Being moved by the insolence of the French, I started hostilities two days
before the expiration of the armistice. I drove the French army under Ney
287
back to the Bober, where the great Napoleon appeared with six marshals and
six different corps. I was forced to yield before this great superiority. In
constant combat, I withdrew behind the Katzbach to Jauer. Then I learned
that the emperor had returned to Saxony, taking with him Marshal Marmont
and his corps. I now made the decision to seize the offensive and on the 26th
marched against the enemy to attack him. The enemy had made the same
decision and had already crossed the Katzbach. We met each other at
Brechelshof. I attacked: the combat lasted from 2:00 p.m. until the evening.
The enemy was completely defeated: more than forty cannon and most of his
ammunition have fallen into my hands. Not too many prisoners were taken:
the troops were too bitter and cut down everything. We are in pursuit of the
enemy and I promise even greater gains. It rained the entire day and toward
evening the muskets could no longer fire. My infantry fought with bayonets;
Prussians and Russians competed with each other and neither wanted to
concede the advantage. Our troops fought with great bravery. I still cannot
determine my losses yet they are not great compared to the victory that we
have won.2
As of midnight, Blücher likewise could not estimate the extent of Macdonald’s

losses. “We have taken a considerable number of cannon and caissons,” stated
Blücher’s initial account to Bernadotte, “but at this moment, I cannot deter-
mine the exact number. Before daybreak, the light cavalry supported by
infantry will again attack or intensely pursue the enemy.” A copy of this
report never reached the king because the courier, Count Moltke, drowned
crossing the Elbe at Arbesau (Varvažov) in Bohemia.3
A name for the battle still needed to be chosen. Ironically, Blücher
eventually selected “the battle of the Katzbach” as a form of damage control
to placate an offended corps commander. Instead of Yorck or Langeron, this
time Blücher had to contend with Sacken, whose performance in the battle
had unequivocally pleased Army Headquarters. On the night after the battle,
Blücher informed Bernadotte that Sacken had worked wonders. On the 27th,
Blücher exclaimed to his entourage: “We owe a great deal to General Sacken;
his twelve-pound guns on the Eichholtz hills facilitated our work; his cavalry
in Sébastiani’s rear completed the victory. Let us regard this man with honor.”
Blücher’s words stuck – the Prussians held Sacken in esteem. Shortly after
this, Sacken accidentally appeared in the midst of Yorck’s columns. Per their
tradition, the Prussian officers saluted him in silence as he passed, while the
soldiers greeted him with a hearty “hurrah” per theirs. Sacken recognized the
value of such approbation from his allies.4
“General Sacken participated with fortitude and strength in the fate of
the day, and in a noteworthy manner put behind him all of the bitter
accusations that had been made against him in the previous campaign
[1812],” declares Nostitz. “Alluding to this, Blücher said to him the day
after the battle with a hearty handshake: ‘My dear Sacken, yesterday you
Blücher’s hare hunt 289
defeated the tsar’s enemy as well as your own personal enemy.’”5 Neverthe-
less, Blücher learned that his brief after-action report to the king had irked
Sacken and offended his officers. Apparently, the Russians felt that Blücher
had failed to adequately highlight their performance and contribution to the
victory. “Modesty,” sneered Gneisenau, “attires well those who have been
miserable for so long.”6 Regardless, Blücher sought to make amends in a
second, more comprehensive report to the king on the 28th: “I owe this
important victory first to Baron Sacken, who occupied the hills between
Brechelshof and Eichholtz quickly and spontaneously with a twelve-pound
battery, which made it possible for me to immediately direct the formal
attack on the enemy’s right wing. Gneisenau and Müffling arranged the
attack . . . while Yorck held the center.” To further satisfy Sacken, Blücher
officially informed him on 30 August that, “to honor you, this battle will be
called the battle of the Katzbach because your brave troops advanced to this
stream amidst constant fighting.”7
Indeed, the Prussians not only lauded Sacken’s conduct, but exploited
the effects of his actions to paint an ugly picture of Langeron: “The battle
has been named the battle of the Katzbach to honor the brave and insightful
Russian general Sacken,” wrote Gneisenau, “whose right wing extended up
to this river while we were on the Wütende Neiße. These two rivers mainly
united before our front and in the rear of the enemy position. Through our
victory, General Langeron, who hovered in great danger throughout, was
ultimately saved.” Blücher’s two reports to Allied Headquarters made no
mention of Langeron. The only reference to the action on his part of the
field occurred when Blücher noted that Lauriston’s “still unbeaten V Corps”
remained north of Hennersdorf during the night of 26/27 August. To
Bernadotte he wrote: “Langeron’s corps was on my left. It remained on
the defensive and did not quit its position.” Nostitz provides insight into
how Army Headquarters viewed Langeron’s performance in the battle:
The conduct of General Langeron on this day deserved the well-earned

rebuke. If the day had not ended so gloriously, he would have been held
accountable. Out of timidity and against orders, he sent his Reserve Artillery
so far back that when the battle began he had no batteries to employ against
the enemy. As decisive as these almost unprecedented proceedings certainly
would have been in any other battle, the negative impact was only slight and
soon overcome by a Prussian brigade that maneuvered to prevent the enemy
from making use of his superior numbers against Langeron’s corps. The
jubilation and universal joy over the victory in part stifled the reprimand
that the general expected and earned.8
According to nineteenth-century German sources as well as the main

Russian authority on the 1813 campaign, Bogdanovich, Langeron did not
intend to either attack the French or defend his position. They claim that,
knowing of the task assigned to Blücher but not the secret concessions
granted to him by Barclay, Langeron thought Blücher would order the army
to retreat in the face of the enemy’s advance. Langeron himself decided that a
retreat to Striegau would best comply with Barclay’s directives. As a result,
he sent almost all of his heavy artillery – forty-eight pieces – retreating
through Jauer toward Striegau. After describing the strength of Langeron’s
position, Bogdanovich notes: “Langeron, who not in the slightest considered
a defensive battle, directed his entire attention only toward securing a retreat
to Silesia’s interior; for this purpose, he left behind all his battery artillery at
Jauer, believing that in the case of a march on poor roads it would be more of
a hindrance than a use. These measures were taken unbeknownst to the
commander in chief, but Langeron took the opportunity to defend his
position. His situation would have been extremely dangerous if Sacken
and Yorck had not won a glorious victory.”9
In addition, Langeron instructed Kaptsevich to take a defensive position
at Peterwitz to receive the army corps as it retreated and to guard against
enemy forces approaching from the Schönau–Jägendorf region.10 Langeron
also claimed that his artillery commander, “General Gavriil Veselitsky, an
excellent officer, but sharing in the highest degree the weakness that affects
all Russian artillery commanders, which is the belief that the loss of one gun
is a great dishonor, believing that the battle was lost (he was unaware of the
success of our right) and providing that the rain could make the roads
impassable, hastened to withdraw, without my orders, all the spare batteries
to Jauer, where their arrival caused the greatest alarm.”
Aware of how the Prussians of Blücher’s staff viewed these proceedings,
Langeron added:
Gneisenau wished to make me responsible . . . it seemed to him to be an

excellent opportunity to rid himself of a Frenchman who offended him and
to obtain some Tudesque [Teuton (German)] from our army; he convinced
Blücher to send the tsar a report against me which undoubtedly would have
caused the loss of my sovereign’s confidence had it arrived at Allied Head-
quarters, but the adjutant, Count Moltke, who was charged with its delivery,
drowned while crossing the Elbe at Arnau in Bohemia and all of his papers
were lost. The success that the troops under my command constantly
enjoyed, especially after the battle of the Katzbach, inhibited Monsieur
Gneisenau from renewing his attacks against me; he never wished me well
but at least he kept up appearances; Müffling was more just in his treatment
of me.11
Nostitz delivered Gneisenau’s after-action reports to Hardenberg as well

as to the king’s adjutant, Major Ludwig Gustav von Thile. In both, the staff
chief praised Sacken and chastised Langeron, reiterating his request that the
former receive command of the latter’s larger corps and for Langeron to be
transferred elsewhere. “I will make good use of all your remarks concerning
the Russian generals,” responded Hardenberg on the 30th. Thile answered
from Teplitz on the 31st: “I wish . . . that your request referring to Langeron
and Sacken will soon be fulfilled. Concerning them and you, I can say nothing
except that we know what is happening.” Much to the chagrin of the Prus-
sians, Langeron would remain at the head of his corps for the rest of the war.12
In his duel with Yorck, Blücher waged everything on this battle. “The
Prussian corps played the decisive part in the victory,” Nostitz recorded in
his journal; “this conviction removed for a time all the wrinkles from the
forehead of its heroic commander.” Yorck did indeed send the letter of
complaint he had written to the king the day before the battle. Droysen claims
to have found the fragment of a recantation that Yorck never finished.
Writing sometime before the end of August, Yorck stated: “After the glori-
ous victory on the 26th of this month, it may appear that I was incorrect to
criticize the operations as such. I would commit an injustice to both myself
and the truth if I argued that wise arrangements based on proper judgment
procured for us that great success. On the contrary, this success is attribut-
able only to good luck. This inept operation, in which the enemy opposite us
frustrated our offensive operations, probably would have led us to a mishap
like the enemy himself suffered.” Work on this essay probably ceased as a
result of two cabinet orders issued by the king from Teplitz on 31 August to
sooth Yorck. Frederick William’s first note rewarded Yorck’s performance at
the Katzbach with Prussia’s highest civil-military award: the Order of the
Black Eagle. The king’s second letter firmly but gently sided with Blücher:
I quite believe that the movements executed by I Army Corps since the
resumption of the campaign have exhausted the troops and I do not fail to
recognize in the concerns you expressed on the 25th of this month your
praiseworthy care for the preservation of the good condition of the troops
subordinated to you. Nevertheless, these movements cannot be avoided
because they are based on the plan that has been agreed upon by my allies
and me for the operations of the Allied armies. As you already know, the
execution of this plan generally has had the best results. Therefore, I request
that you persist in the zeal with which you have up to now supplied the state
with the most laudable services. The status of your health will hopefully be
bolstered as much as possible by the preservation of your goodwill, and
through the fulfillment of this, which is my wish, you will acquire new
claims on my particular gratefulness.13
Victory certainly provided Blücher with the moral edge over the hero of
Tauroggen, especially in view of Yorck’s behavior at the start of the battle.
“Yorck held everything to be lost,” Gneisenau explained to Clausewitz.
“‘We are lost!’ he shouted. ‘Now you can collect your laurels. We will be
beaten into the ground; victory will be ripped from our hands,’ and things to
that effect. Nevertheless, our entire infantry stood in the most superb order.
‘The march from behind Jauer should not be made,’ he said. ‘You needlessly
fatigue the troops,’ he said. Thus we had to obtain this victory by force,
success is sweet for us, and the just cause was victorious despite all jealousy.
Success is so sweet for me!”14
Many historians incorrectly follow the contention stated by Blücher’s
biographer, Unger, that “this victory restored the trust in the army’s high
command that threatened to completely collapse. This victory completely
justified all of the recent hardships as well as the incomprehensible back-
and-forth marches.”15 “The battle at the Katzbach was fought,” recorded
Nostitz. “Among the many and great results that the glorious victory
produced was the restoration of harmony among the commanding generals
and the rejuvenation of troop morale; the losses and hardships of the
previous days passed into oblivion.”16 In his 1827 work, Müffling
showered Blücher with praise: “The general in chief demonstrated that he
knew well the proper moment to switch from a cautious defense to a bold
attack, which would produce great results. Thus, one day’s work removed all
discord and all ill-humor from the heart of the Silesian Army.”17
Claiming that the victory had reestablished trust between Army Head-
quarters and Yorck and Langeron is certainly a stretch considering the two
corps commanders had never trusted Blücher’s staff in the first place. More-
over, asserting that the victory vindicated Army Headquarters for what
appeared to the corps commanders to be two weeks of incomprehensible,
exhausting tramps across Silesia is hagiographic. In fact, the lauding of
Sacken in the reports over the battle sickened Yorck, who from that time
on referred to the Russian as “General Hurrah.” Langeron, whom the
reports purposefully did not mention at all, was all the more displeased.
To console him, Blücher submitted for publication Langeron’s full account
of the pursuit after the battle as the army’s official report. In both cases – the
army report over the battle and the army report over the pursuit – Army
Headquarters ignored the part played by Yorck’s corps based on his report
because it did not correspond to the Russian versions. “It lay in the nature of
the relationship,” explains Droysen, “that Blücher’s headquarters avoided
with most abject care anything that could give the Russian generals and
troops cause for ill-feeling and jealousy.”
While the victory did not heal the rifts, it is accurate to view the day of
the Katzbach as the emergence of Blücher, the birth of Marshal Vorwärts.
From this point on, the magic that the troops affixed to Blücher’s personal-
ity – just like the charisma of Napoleon – unfolded its full power. Behind the
field commander, Gneisenau’s boldness of thought and complete devotion
enabled Blücher to soar increasingly higher. Even Droysen declared that the
Katzbach “decided the high moral and intellectual preponderance that from
this time on characterized the leadership of the Silesian Army.”18
Gneisenau appears to have been much more affected than Blücher by the
hostile demeanor of the corps commanders. Proof emerges from the battle-
field that very night when Gneisenau rode over to Yorck, removed his cap,
and offered his congratulations in the hope of restoring good relations. “I
commend Your Excellency on the victory,” stated Gneisenau. “Yea, which
I have won for you,” responded the curmudgeon, “but where are the
provisions? The poor soldiers are dying of hunger.” Gneisenau retorted
sharply: “You still have bread for two days, fat stock for one; here [pointing
at the potato field], where they stand, potatoes are in abundance as well as
wood for the cooking; twigs are on the wagons. Therefore, if the soldiers are
starving, it is your fault!” Gneisenau turned his horse and sprang forward.
After this exchange, the two officers spoke no more. A few years later,
during a commemoration of the battle, both tried in vain to reconcile.
Gneisenau simply explained that “regarding old, coarse Yorck, it is best if
one does not speak to him at all.”19
From Gneisenau’s own melodramatic letters it emerges that Langeron
and Yorck directed the brunt of their anger, criticism, and jealousy at him,
which compounded the pressure applied by Blücher. “Both consider me to
be an aspiring daredevil, and my commander always wants an attack dispos-
ition from me. It actually takes a degree of good luck to emerge unscathed
from such dangerous situations. Thus far, fortune has favored me, but will it
always be sweet to me? When it does abandon me, reproach and disgrace
will fall on me alone; think of me from time to time: I do not at all share in
the glory of the success.”20 To Knesebeck he wrote: “My position is critical.
The commanding general wants me to go forward, others pull me back,
making difficulties, evading or not following orders. The palm of victory
was forced into the hands of the corps commanders. My value to them is
slight. I have only decisiveness and mental fortitude. Fortune again showed
me its favor. The bravery of the infantry and artillery completed what we
planned. Hatred, envy, and resentment are humbled; and the slander may
now go its own way. This time it went well; but do not always count on my
good fortune, even less on my merit. It will not always be possible for me to
extricate myself from the difficult situation in which the will of the king has
placed me.”21
Mounting tension between Gneisenau and Müffling did not make
matters any easier for the staff chief. During the Spring Campaign, the latter
had become sensitive to the issue of spinning battle accounts for public
consumption. He alleged that the Prussian newspapers published accounts
“that partly gave a distorted picture of events” and frequently compromised
the Prussian army to please the Russians. Despite a public hungry for news
of the war, the government possessed no official bureau for providing infor-
mation to the press. This made the media dependent on news provided by
volunteers, mainly private letters usually written by officers to their
relations with the intent of having the contents forwarded for publication.
Recognizing that this type of report could positively impact public morale,
Frederick William preferred this method of disseminating information.
However, explaining that private letters “often unintentionally state the
most insignificant facts as the most important” and thus “provide a false
picture of the situation of the belligerent armies,” Müffling preferred a
formal method of channeling the fullest account of an event as possible.
“Therefore,” he argued, “the acceptance of unauthenticated reports from the
army by newspaper correspondents must be prohibited by the censorship;
but at the same time something else must be substituted, namely official
articles, simple and true rather than lying bulletins like Napoleon’s.” More-
over, by parroting criticism of Allied leaders without providing a balanced
description of events, such letters could in fact undermine the war effort.
“By such inconsiderate communication is public opinion formed,” he
lamented.
With Gneisenau wanting to capitalize on the victory as much as possible
both abroad and at home, Müffling found his personal view of the battle,
particularly “that the engagement on the plateau had been an insignificant
encounter,” ran counter to that of his superior. Müffling’s first attempt to
draft an account of the battle for the media earned Gneisenau’s censure for
being “too cold, measured, and pedantic.” Blücher rejected it for failing to
praise “his brave comrades in arms, which, to be just, he could not deny
them.” Responding to Gneisenau’s criticism, Müffling insisted that he had
“studied the prose of our official style,” that he knew no other way to write,
and that no other style would be suitable. To Blücher he stressed the need to
keep the press releases short and to minimize praise or blame to avoid
offending allies and encroaching on the rights of the sovereigns. He added
that Blücher’s account would be published long before the official reports
that included comments on particular commanders reached the monarchs,
who had the sole right to mete out punishment or rewards. “All these
arguments availed to nothing,” wailed Müffling. “Gneisenau adorned my
paper with phrases and flowers; General Blücher introduced Prussian
names.” Müffling of course claimed that he had staunchly held his ground,
challenging Gneisenau to submit the matter to the king’s judgment. “Gnei-
senau yielded, not wishing that the affair be referred to the king for judg-
ment. Blücher fell quiet when I told him that military achievements,
conveying in them the highest praise, might be related as facts, and the
names of the actors mentioned as a matter of course, without laudatory
additions.”
Müffling wrote a second draft, attributing victory to three events: (1) the
struggle on the plateau; (2) Steinmetz’s attack at Schlaupe; and (3) Langeron’s
counterattack at 6:00 p.m. Gneisenau objected to the second and third points
because, according to Müffling, they weakened the impression of the first.
Müffling overcame these objections by countering that, if the report ignored

Langeron’s operations, “the partial struggle on the plateau could not be
designated as a battle of the Silesian Army.” Similar to Blücher’s report to
the king, Müffling’s third draft, written on the night of the 27th, attracted the
enmity of the Russians. Sacken objected because the account said too little of
his corps, and Langeron because it said nothing of his. Müffling included the
statements of both Russian corps commanders in a fourth version, which of
course angered Yorck because the account contained nothing from his
mouth. “General Blücher and Gneisenau always catered to the discontented
party, and I could expect no defense from them,” noted Müffling. Although
he made no mention of a fifth draft, this statement leads us to believe that he
returned to his quill yet again.
While everything Müffling claims must be carefully measured, circum-
stantial evidence, particularly Gneisenau’s propagandizing correspondence,
suggests that this fracas occurred at Army Headquarters. In fact, it is just as
easy to see Müffling caught between Gneisenau and Blücher in regards to
reporting as it is to see Gneisenau caught between Blücher and Yorck
concerning operations. According to Müffling, the confrontation with
Gneisenau by no means settled this issue. “Each report gave rise to fresh
contests of the same nature. Although my opponents had yielded, I had not
convinced them. Gneisenau accused me of viewing all the achievements of
the Silesian Army as trifles not worth mentioning. Blücher wished to see
every well-executed commission mentioned and praised as a martial exploit.
In this continued conflict, Gneisenau feared that in the next report I would
present the combat on the plateau as a Cossack hurrah; and he strove
incessantly to get me to acknowledge its more extensive importance.” The
only closure Müffling provides is the following quip: “My experience at this
time taught me that it is impractical to take away from the commanding
general the charge of drafting such army reports.”22
Following the battle, providing security for the local inhabitants became
a concern. “The French, who were cut off from the river crossings, wander
around in the woods and commit offenses,” Gneisenau explained. “I have
ordered the alarm sounded in order for them to be killed or captured by the
peasants.” On the evening of the 26th, he instructed Müffling to issue orders
for the mobilization of the Landsturm in the districts along the flanks and
rear of the Army of the Bober but particularly at Jauer. Müffling wrote to
the military governor of Silesia, General Gaudi, requesting the immediate
mobilization of the Silesian Landsturm to collect the routed bands of imper-
ials, the stragglers and deserters, the sick and wounded, and the arms,
cannon, and wagons that littered the fields as far as the eye could see. All
should be sent to the Silesian fortresses. Ironically and inexplicably, Gaudi
issued a memorandum that same day announcing the retreat of imperial
forces from Silesia before receiving any news of Blücher’s victory. Later
12 French lancers marauding
claiming that Müffling’s letter had never reached him, Gaudi did not decree a
general mobilization of the Landsturm. Only Hirschberg, a district directly
instructed by Blücher to deploy its Landsturm, contributed in the way
Gneisenau envisioned.23
To avoid a second battle, Blücher and Gneisenau wanted to destroy Macdo-
nald’s army before it escaped from Silesia. “I shall do everything in my power to
complete the destruction of this army,” Gneisenau assured Clausewitz. Of
course, delivering the coup de grâce to the Army of the Bober required more
than the mobilization of teenaged peasants and middle-aged burghers.
According to the reports, French forces occupied Liegnitz and the left bank of
the Katzbach as far as the influx of the Wütende Neiße. West of Hennersdorf,
which the imperials still held, stood Lauriston’s V Corps. Between these two
points – Hennersdorf and the influx of the Wütende Neiße – XI Corps and some
elements of III Corps, including Sébastiani’s cavalry, withdrew toward Haynau
through Goldberg, Kroitsch, and Rothkirch.24
At 9:30 on the night after the battle, Gneisenau drafted extremely detailed
instructions for the pursuit. The wording made it crystal-clear that Blücher
sought retribution for the lethal hunt Napoleon had unleashed in October
1806 following the battles of Jena–Auerstedt. Gneisenau directed Sacken’s
corps to Haynau, Yorck’s corps to Kroitsch, Langeron’s corps to Röchlitz
and Goldberg, and St.-Priest’s corps to Greiffenberg. He instructed Yorck to
attempt to move one infantry brigade across the Katzbach at Kroitsch around
2:00 a.m., “followed by the majority of the Reserve Cavalry with horse
artillery; both should ruthlessly fall on the enemy with cold steel and push as
far as the Schnelle Deichsel. The infantry was to cross in battalion masses
and observe the greatest quiet. No soldier may relieve himself or dare smoke
tobacco.” Gneisenau further declared that, “if the infantry encounters the
enemy, they will attack with fixed bayonets and without firing. At the head
of this infantry will be the majority of the Reserve Cavalry. The bravest and
most resolute people will be placed at the head of the column.”
If Yorck’s brigade found enemy forces on the left bank of the Katzbach,
Blücher wanted the Prussians to repulse them and then take the most direct
route to the hills at Ulbersdorf. Sacken would send his cavalry across the
Katzbach at Schmogwitz to reach the great east–west highway; if the
cavalry needed support for this task, the infantry should follow. A portion of
his cavalry also had to cross the Katzbach below Liegnitz in order to win the
road from Liegnitz to Lüben. As for Langeron, Gneisenau wanted him to push
Rudzevich’s vanguard, supported by the majority of the Russian cavalry and a
“suitable infantry corps,” toward Röchlitz on the Jauer–Goldberg road, seeking
to cross the Katzbach and take Goldberg. He further instructed Langeron to
dispatch orders for St.-Priest to advance in forced marches toward Greiffenberg.
“The rest of the troops will remain ready to follow the enemy tomorrow as soon
as they have eaten. Because night combat is a possibility, the password for the
troops of both nations will be Alexander and Frederick William.”25
Müffling sharply opposed these orders, which Gneisenau had issued before
his subordinate returned to Brechelshof sometime after 11:00 p.m. on the 26th.
Near the end of the battle, Müffling had suggested occupying Niederkrayn
with as many brigades as possible. He departed for Langeron’s command
post to deliver the news of the victory on the plateau believing his recom-
mendation had been accepted. Instead, Gneisenau decided to have only one
of Yorck’s brigades secure Niederkrayn at 2:00 a.m. and then attempt to
cross the Katzbach at Kroitsch. Condemning this plan as “censurable in
every respect and ill considered,” Müffling claimed that Gneisenau had
based this decision on the mere assumption that the French V and IX
Corps – 30,000–40,000 men according to Müffling – had already retreated
to Goldberg. “The very contrary should have been assumed,” he noted in his
memoirs. In his opinion, before retreating from Hennersdorf, the enemy
first had to secure it, which meant occupying Niederkrayn because the
Hennersdorf–Goldberg road came within 3,000 paces of this key position.
“Such impractical orders,” he continues, “have the effect of undermining
obedience and destroying the army’s confidence in its commander. My
remonstrance, however gentle, was very ill received by General Gneisenau.”
The degree to which Müffling complained to Gneisenau certainly falls in
the realm of speculation as no other sources support this account. Yet we do
find agreement in his contention that Yorck refused to comply with any
order he felt could not be executed. Instead, he would, according to Müf-
fling, “inquire about everything to be relieved of the responsibility.” Yorck
would indeed find excuses to avoid executing his orders. Army Headquar-
ters viewed his alleged inability to carry out orders as passive-aggressive
disobedience. This tension between Army and Corps Headquarters pro-
vided the backdrop to the pursuit and caused a “vexatious” correspondence
between Yorck and Gneisenau, with Blücher serving as the conduit.26
Meanwhile, the rain streamed down on the exhausted troops and horses,
almost all of whom remained where the end of the battle and the onset of
darkness found them. With a cold north wind howling, they mainly camped
on the open fields where no fires would light. Yorck’s soldiers passed the
miserable night sleeping on the drenched ground; the Landwehr in particular
suffered. With his men soaked to the skin, without provisions or straw, clad
in thin, linen trousers, lacking proper clothing and overcoats, and many
without footgear, Yorck observed only the hardiest muster the following
morning.27 Hünerbein’s 14th Silesian Landwehr Regiment provided an
appalling example of the attrition. Of the 577 men of the 1st Battalion, only
271 reported for duty the next day; of the 3rd Battalion’s 510 men, only
202 could muster; and the 4th Battalion provided only 407 men out of 625.
On the other hand, the 2nd Battalion, which along with Othegraven’s 2nd
Battalion of the 2nd Brandenburg Regiment had taken overcoats and shoes
from dead and captured imperials, lost only 53 men.28 Under such condi-
tions, it is hard to believe Gneisenau’s claim that despite all the hardship the
mood of the troops remained positive:
The army fought through hardships, difficulties, and shortages; the soldier
waded through rain-swollen waters up to his belt. Deprived of wagons by
both friend and foe, with villages evacuated by their inhabitants, neither the
means of transport nor nourishment could be found. Because of this lack of
wagons and because of the muddy roads, food could not be supplied. Many,
very many, soldiers go barefoot. Nevertheless, the stout soldier endures all
hardships and all privations with patience, without grumbling, and with
pleasantness. Is there anything more honorable when such toleration mates
with such bravery? At such times, the soldier rises high above his fellow
citizen who remains at home.29
Inconceivably, Blücher’s orders did not reach Yorck until 5:00 a.m.,
three hours after his troops should have commenced the pursuit across the
Katzbach. Yorck read the instructions in disbelief. Cynics at Yorck’s head-
quarters questioned why only one brigade would conduct the pursuit. “The
commanders must have a special reason for not advancing,” they murmured.
Now, at the end of a long day, he had to dispatch one brigade in streaming
rain to navigate a steep defile under a black sky and then cross an extremely
swollen river, quite possibly having to fight the enemy in the process. Aside
from the weather, Lauriston’s presence at Hennersdorf justified Yorck’s
concerns about moving down the plateau that night. Instead, he preferred
to reassemble all of his brigades on the plateau and allow man and horse to
rest. Lecturing his entourage that the victory could not be secured until he
had several combat-ready battalions at hand, Yorck issued orders for the
troops to be reorganized as quickly as possible and prepared to renew the
struggle. His adjutants rode off in the downpour to assemble the units as
best they could.30
Although they were ambitious and appropriate, nature ultimately stymied
Blücher’s plans. Rain fell continuously for twenty-eight hours in Silesia,
Lusatia, and Saxony, turning small streams into raging rivers everywhere. At
Kosel, the Oder purportedly rose twenty-four feet above its highest water
mark, carrying away part of the fortress’s outworks. With the Katzbach still
rising, Sacken’s Cossacks under Karpov failed to get across the river at
Schmogwitz. Forced to detour downstream to Liegnitz, they finally reached
the town around 2:00 on the afternoon of the 27th. Around the same time that
Karpov’s Cossacks arrived, the French garrison received orders to withdraw
on Haynau. However, Karpov had already informed Sacken that enemy forces
still held the town. Consequently, the Russian corps commander dispatched
his vanguard under Vasilchikov to Liegnitz but the main body of the corps did
not move, allowing his prey to make good progress. West of Sacken, Streif-
korps under Falkenhausen and Rakhmanov harassed the French retreat on the
Liegnitz–Bunzlau stretch of the east–west highway. With one squadron and
some Cossacks, Falkenhausen pursued Marchand’s 39th Division as it
retreated from Haynau to Bunzlau. Falkenhausen captured only thirty-five
men but spread terror among the demoralized imperials. With Falkenhausen’s
other squadron and eighty Cossacks, Rakhmanov followed the portion of III
Corps that had retreated in good order from the Katzbach. In a successful
attack in the region of Haynau, he inflicted 150 casualties.
Opposite Langeron, Lauriston retreated from Hennersdorf to Goldberg
during the night of 26/27 August; his rearguard followed at daybreak.
Numerous fugitives both preceded and followed V Corps as discipline
unraveled. Before the battle on the 26th ended, absconders had already made
their way to Goldberg: at first lone soldiers, then groups. Utter confusion
reigned as throngs of soldiers pushed through the town to escape across the
Katzbach by way of Goldberg’s sole bridge. Units became mixed and all
order collapsed. Demoralized by the weather and their empty bellies, the
soldiers refused to obey commands. Officers went to great lengths to drive
them from Goldberg’s houses and force them to continue the retreat. The
arrival of Lauriston’s main body worsened the situation as the corps com-
mander ordered his soldiers to employ violence to drive through their
countrymen and allies to get across the bridge. By noon on the 27th, most
of the imperials had left Goldberg; almost all struck the highway west to
Löwenberg.
Rudzevich led Langeron’s vanguard – reinforced by Kaptsevich’s fresh
X Infantry Corps and regiments from Korf’s Reserve Cavalry – toward
Goldberg prior to sunrise on the 27th. All along the road the Russians found
corpses as well as wounded and dying soldiers; discarded equipment, artillery,
and caissons likewise guided the way to Goldberg. Scores of imperial soldiers
surrendered. “Before daybreak on the 27th and during a frightful rain,”
recalled Langeron, “Rudzevich moved toward Prausnitz and the Wolfsberg
with the vanguard; I followed him with all the other corps. At each step, we
found the dead, dying, and wounded thrown and abandoned in the mud, a
multitude of dead horses, overturned wagons, equipment, cannon, caissons; at
each step, we took prisoners; the loss and the disorder of the enemy moment-
arily reminded me of the flight from Moscow to the Vistula.”31
Making for Goldberg, Grekov advanced through Prausnitz with Langer-
on’s Cossacks while Emmanuel moved on the highway toward Röchlitz with
the van’s regular cavalry. As Emmanuel’s troopers continued west, Yorck’s
Black Hussars emerged on the road in front of them. Taking the initiative, its
commander, Major Stößel, had commenced the pursuit from Niederkrayn as
soon as his patrols reported the enemy’s departure from Hennersdorf. At
Röchlitz, the Prussians found a French rearguard of some 1,000 men. Seeing
Emmanuel immediately following, Stößel attacked without delay. More than
400 French soldiers, many whose muskets could not fire, surrendered to the
Prussians. The major then crossed the Katzbach by way of the bridge on the
Goldberg–Liegnitz road and turned northeast after receiving a report of
enemy columns marching from Kroitsch toward Haynau.
With a portion of his cavalry, Emmanuel followed Stößel across the
bridge but continued west to Goldberg, enveloping the town from the north.
His remaining squadrons advanced through Goldberg as soon as the French
departed. Reuniting his cavalry, Emmanuel continued the pursuit west to
Pilgramsdorf, where his Kharkovskii and Kievskii Dragoon Regiments cap-
tured 200 men and 6 guns. Meanwhile, Grekov’s Cossacks collected
700 exhausted imperial soldiers and 5 guns as they pursued the three battal-
ions of Lauriston’s rearguard on the road to Prausnitz. On seeing
Emmanuel’s cavalry already in possession of Goldberg, the French com-
mander, Colonel Jean-Pierre Maury, turned south in an attempt to cross the
Katzbach upstream of Goldberg. Maury’s rearguard had originally pos-
sessed four cannon but three had to be abandoned in the valleys of Prausnitz.
With the Severskii and Chernigovskii Mounted Jäger Regiments and
Tverskii Dragoon Regiment, General Ivan Panchulidzev I caught Maury
at the Wolfs hill. Denisiyev’s Mounted Jäger enveloped the enemy’s right
flank to prevent the French from reaching the woods, where they would
have been more difficult to attack. On the French left, Berdyayev’s
Dragoons moved around their flank to block the escape route to

Löwenberg. The Chernigovskii Mounted Jäger took a position directly
facing the French. Despite the fact that many of their muskets could not
fire, the French prepared to resist. After the enemy greeted a Russian
negotiator with small-arms fire, Panchulidzev gave the order to attack from
all three sides. Langeron described the situation:
This attack was not necessary and even became difficult given the disadvan-
tages of the marshy terrain and the plowed earth after thirty-six hours of
pouring rain, but we needed to make an account, to task ourselves to create
cordons, crossings, etc., which the great talents of the two Panchulidzevs32
and their warriors demonstrated in all their brilliance; no one offered them
any resistance; they penetrated at the petite trot the ranks of the discouraged
soldiers, exhausted from fatigue and hunger, whose muskets could not fire
and who did not have enough energy to make use of their bayonets. The
attack was an act of cruelty more deserving of punishment than reward. In
five minutes, more than 500 men were cut down and laid to rest on the spot;
we took the enemy’s remaining cannon and 950 prisoners; Colonel Maury,
the commander of this brigade, and 30 officers fell into our hands.
Altogether, Panchulidzev I captured 1,156 men and 1 gun. That afternoon,

Langeron transferred his headquarters to Goldberg, which contained a
French hospital with 1,200 wounded, including 200 Russians and 400 Prus-
sians. His main body bivouacked there as well while Rudzevich halted the
vanguard at Pilgramsdorf. On the army’s far left at Schmiedeberg, St.-
Priest’s van detected the presence of Puthod’s division north of Hirschberg
but could do little due to the flood of the upper Bober.33
In the center, Yorck formed a strong vanguard for the pursuit.34 Despite
being ill, Katzler volunteered to lead the cavalry while Horn commanded
the entire advance guard. Whether or not Yorck objected to Blücher’s order
mattered little at this stage because practical reasons prevented its execution.
Overturned caissons and artillery blocked all the roads leading down the
plateau to the valley. Rather than commencing the pursuit, Yorck’s troops
started clearing the defile that led to Niederkrayn. Around 6:00 on the
morning of the 27th, Yorck finally authorized Katzler to proceed with the
vanguard cavalry followed by Horn’s 7th Brigade. Although the defile had
been cleared, the ruined roads could hardly support the passage of almost
10,000 men. More delays ensued.
At 8:00 a.m., the Prussian van started crossing the Wütende Neiße; the
infantry waded in water up to their chests. A detachment of Black Hussars
left behind at Niederkrayn reported that imperial forces still held Kroitsch
and its bridge over the Katzbach. Large infantry and cavalry units –
Delmas’s 9th Division and part of Sébastiani’s cavalry – could be seen on
the hills of the left bank of the Katzbach apparently covering the retreat of
French forces (10th and 11th Divisions) to the Liegnitz–Haynau road. South
of this position, the Black Hussars observed enemy columns – XI Corps –
retreating through Adelsdorf toward Alzenau. Katzler took the bridge at
Kroitsch after a short combat; the imperials had neglected to destroy the
structure. Around 10:00 a.m., the French evacuated Kroitsch and started the
retreat northwest to Rothkirch. To reach the bridge, Horn’s infantry waded
through a good stretch because of the flooding river. Finally, at noon, the
Leib Fusilier Battalion crossed the Katzbach and entered Kroitsch. “But the
march of my brigade,” Horn reported to Yorck, “took so long that I had no
more than three cavalry regiments and one battalion through Kroitsch. The
Katzbach is rising so much that according to farmers it will no longer be
passable by nightfall. The bridge here at Kroitsch is useless because we have
to cross through the water that is overflowing its banks.” Although con-
cerned that the Katzbach would cut him off from the rest of I Corps, Horn
authorized the pursuit to continue.35
In a short time, Horn’s troops captured more than sixty wagons, a herd of
cattle, and numerous stragglers, yet Katzler’s cavalry inflicted only minimal
damage on the retreating imperials. Horn’s infantry reached Wildschütz but
the imperials outdistanced him en route to Haynau and Alzenau. Two enemy
cavalry regiments supported by numerous horse guns faced down the
Lithuanian Dragoons, one Landwehr Cavalry Regiment, and the Brandenburg
Hussars of the 7th Brigade. Fulfilling Müffling’s prophecy, Yorck requested
instructions after Horn reported that he could not move his horse artillery
across the Katzbach. In response, Gneisenau issued the verbal order “to cross
the Katzbach wherever he could, to give the enemy no rest either in his
cantons or in his bivouacs, and to proceed between Sacken’s and Langeron’s
vanguards in communication with both.” With the bridge at Kroitsch already
under water and in constant danger of being ripped apart, Horn lacked secure
communication with the rest of I Corps. Thus isolated, he did not want to
venture too far. He sent his two batteries back across the Katzbach and in the
evening recalled Katzler’s cavalry from Rothkirch to Wildschütz, leaving only
fifty Brandenburg Hussars under Captain Theodor Franz Sartorius von
Schwanenfeld to maintain contact with the enemy. The two orderlies Horn
dispatched to deliver his report to Yorck had to swim across the Katzbach.
Sacken reported finding enemy infantry at Liegnitz but Cossacks
prowled the suburbs and closed the roads leading to the town. Although
the enemy appeared to have evacuated the right bank of the Katzbach,
Sacken contended that his troops could not cross the swollen river. “I have
ordered the Cossacks to do everything possible to get across the Katzbach,”
he assured Blücher. “According to the statements of a captured officer from
the horse artillery, Marshal Macdonald has been the commander since
Marshal Ney’s departure; he believes the following units fought here: the
corps of Macdonald and Lauriston, and two divisions of Ney’s corps under
General Souham, and the entire cavalry under General Sébastiani. This
cavalry marched here very quickly from eight miles behind Bunzlau; the
twenty-four cannon that were all captured or demolished yesterday
belonged to this cavalry as did this artillery officer.” In a postscript, Sacken
added that a report from Colonel Valerian Madatov had just arrived claiming
“that the enemy has sent a great portion of his troops to Saxony. Only two
regiments should remain at Bunzlau and only one at Haynau.”36
Sensing his enemy slipping away, Blücher signed orders around 2:00 p.m.
on the 27th for Yorck to forward the rest of the Reserve Cavalry to Horn’s
position. Two hours later, he issued instructions for the rest of I Corps to cross
the Katzbach and advance one hour west of the river. This order, which
reached Yorck at 5:00 p.m., earned the following comment in the log of
Yorck’s headquarters: “Here it can be observed that Sir Gneisenau and Sir
Müffling have no idea how to move an army.” With the lowland between the
Wütende Neiße and the Katzbach a veritable swamp and the rain still
streaming down, Yorck foresaw only difficulties if he attempted to cross the
Katzbach on washed-out roads with troops he considered exhausted. Yet if he
did not cross the river, Horn would be cut off. Moreover, the vanguard risked
losing contact with the enemy unless support arrived. Therefore, Yorck issued
orders to commence the march but sent Zielinsky to the Katzbach to deter-
mine if the river could be crossed. As he waited for the staff officer’s verdict,
Yorck factored in other considerations. Crossing the Wütende Neiße required
the brigades to march in tight columns and the same would be true to get
across the Katzbach. In this formation, it would take hours for the entire corps
to reach a position one hour west of the Katzbach. In addition, dry ammuni-
tion could be in neither the pouch or the caisson. Finding the water rising
quickly, Zielinsky reported that the Katzbach could not be crossed at either
Kroitsch or Röchlitz. Should the tired, starving troops swim the Katzbach
in the dark to comply with Blücher’s order? Yorck did not have to think
twice about the answer. In his mind, nature left him no choice. Thus, after
having made little progress, Yorck ordered a halt: the portion of the Reserve
Cavalry still with I Corps passed the night at Niederkrayn; the infantry never
moved off the plateau. From his headquarters at Niederkrayn, Yorck wrote
Blücher at 7:45 that evening describing his inability to cross the Katzbach.
With the river passable only at Liegnitz and Goldberg, he suggested that
Blücher direct Horn to the latter, where he could link with Langeron.37
After receiving a second report from Sacken concerning the enemy’s
evacuation of Liegnitz, Blücher dispatched a third order to Yorck around
6:30 that evening. Assuming I Corps had already started the march to reach a
position one hour west of the Katzbach, Blücher allowed Yorck to quarter his
troops with the exception of the vanguard, which would bivouac. If the
French corps that the Allies had repulsed on the plateau retreated on Bunzlau,
Yorck’s van and Reserve Cavalry would pursue and attack it. In addition,
Blücher wanted the communication cut between this corps and the corps that
had attacked Langeron. For this task, he wanted Yorck to push his cavalry
toward the Gröditzberg. A few hours later, Blücher received Yorck’s 7:45 P.M
report informing him that I Corps had not crossed the Katzbach. The frus-
trated commander in chief issued verbal orders for Yorck to “cross the
Katzbach wherever he can, not exposing Horn but having him pursue along
with Sacken’s and Langeron’s vanguards.” Thus, the main body of the corps
had to cross the river wherever it could. He demanded that Horn continue the
pursuit and not allow the enemy any rest. This response and its key phrase of
crossing the Katzbach “wherever he could” did little to help Yorck. Should he
march to Goldberg or Liegnitz and risk becoming entangled with Langeron
or Sacken? Unfortunately for Yorck, written instructions assigning a point of
passage to I Corps did not follow Blücher’s gruff response until much later.38
The euphoria of the previous night turned to disgust in less than twenty-
four hours. “Regarding our cavalry,” complained Gneisenau to Clausewitz,
“they did not pursue because they no longer understood their craft . . . in
part the commanders could not be found, others were not in the mood.” In
Blücher’s official report on the 28th, the staff chief retracted his claws: “The
darkness of night and the obstruction of all defiles by cannon and caissons
hindered the execution of this order [to pursue]; only toward noon did
General Horn take the village of Kroitsch and its bridge and follow the
enemy with his brigade and half of the Reserve Cavalry. The Wütende Neiße
and the Katzbach rose so much that the former was very difficult to cross
and the latter thoroughly impossible. Despite all of the army’s efforts, it
could not pass the Katzbach at Goldberg and Liegnitz on the 27th because of
the continuous rains.” “We crossed through swollen waters up to the chest,”
Gneisenau informed Clausewitz. “We hope to find the enemy at the Bober
and to find this river so swollen that he cannot escape.”39
Despite attributing the army’s difficulties to nature in this report, Blü-
cher remained less than satisfied with the energy displayed by Sacken and
Yorck.40 The former’s vanguard reached only Liegnitz while his main body
did not move from Kleintinz. Horn halted at Wildschütz and the main body
of I Corps remained around Niederkrayn. To make up for his actions the
previous day, Langeron reported that, after occupying Goldberg, he had
pursued the imperials another four miles toward Löwenberg. The Russian
corps commander pushed the cavalry of his vanguard to Pilgramsdorf while
the main body of his corps camped around Goldberg. On this day, Langer-
on’s Russians captured 5 guns, 20 caissons, and more than 1,000 prisoners.
On the far left, floods forced St.-Priest’s corps to remain inactive with its
vanguard at Schmiedeberg and main body at Landeshut.41
At least in the case of Yorck, Army Headquarters deserves some of the
blame for the slow progress of the pursuit. The 4:00 p.m. orders for all of
I Corps to cross the Katzbach should have been issued no later than noon.
Had this occurred, Yorck could have crossed the Katzbach before the waters
made this an impossible task. Supported by the entire corps, Horn’s brigade
could have maintained contact with the enemy. Regardless, a furious Blücher
ordered Gneisenau to write to Yorck early on 28 August and rebuke the corps
commander.42 “I have received your letter from 7:45 p.m. on the 27th and
cannot conceal my displeasure over the cavalry. You know its assignment: to
maintain contact with the enemy and to inflict damage on him where it can.
Instead of this, the cavalry wants to observe and to postpone orders. It is not
enough to be victorious: one must also know how to exploit the victory. If we
do not press the enemy hard, he will naturally make another stand and we will
have to fight another battle to achieve what we could have obtained from this
one had we acted with energy. I request that you proceed according to this
view and to make this known to the vanguard and Reserve Cavalry.”
A second letter written on the evening of the 28th states:
By the present retreat of the enemy, our entire effort must be to inflict so
much damage on him that it is impossible for him to again oppose us. This
important goal can be achieved only through a rapid and bold pursuit of the
enemy. Yet I see with regret that the conduct of our cavalry in no way
corresponds with this goal, that it has taken no prisoners, and that it generally
acts with such wariness that it seems as if it faces a victorious rather than a
defeated foe. You will thus make each of your cavalry commanders respon-
sible for pursuing with the zeal and the untiring activity that the importance
of the task assigned to them demands. Also, make them aware that they must
act according to their own judgment because of their distance from the
army’s main body. On no occasion should they stop to request instructions
and waste precious time they could be using.43
Despite the fatigue of man and horse, Blücher would not be satisfied
until his cavalry had pursued the imperials in the same manner as the French
had hunted the Prussians in 1806. Disgusted by Langeron’s conduct on the
day of the battle followed by Yorck’s passive-aggressive disobedience during
the pursuit, Gneisenau drafted an Army Order that Blücher promulgated.
One of the harsher decrees to emerge from Army Headquarters, it illustrates
the mounting frustration over the seemingly lethargic pursuit:
After receiving a march or supply order, every brigade chief and every detached
commander will immediately report where and when he received this order.
Even if he is at a post or a bivouac, he will immediately send an officer or at
least a noncommissioned orderly to General Gneisenau with a status report.
This officer will remain with General Gneisenau. If a brigade chief or another
detached commander cannot reach his destination in a timely manner, he must
immediately report this to Headquarters. Any brigade chief who receives no
supply according to the general arrangements or who has not procured any
shall be held responsible because he has complete authorization to use all means
for the completion or the procurement of supply. If negligence therein occurs,

the brigade commissariat likewise will be punished. As soon as the brigade
halts, the senior officers of the General Staff attached to the brigade must
inform General Gneisenau and always report the location of the brigade.44
“General Blücher was fixated on the notion that he had totally defeated the
French army,” opined Müffling, “and all that remained was to pursue it hotly,
for which the cavalry would suffice.” Contrary to the sage advice offered by
Müffling, “Gneisenau . . . agreed with General Blücher’s notion, assented to all
that he wished, and admitted that through this hussar pursuit Macdonald would
reach Dresden alone.” Regardless, Yorck and his officers did not deserve such
treatment. Based on the circumstances, the Prussian cavalry could not have
achieved much more than it did. Aside from the men, the horses had become
horribly rundown from the exertions and privations of the previous two weeks.
On the morning of the battle, Katzler had requested rest for man and horse.
Instead, they spent the day in combat while the rainy night granted little relief.
By the next morning, Katzler himself needed bed rest. “Although I find myself
extremely ill,” he wrote Yorck early on the 27th, “the motive of hurting the
enemy with all our strength is too splendid a thought for me to remain behind.”
Somehow finding the strength, he again assumed command of the advance
guard cavalry. Yet, by early on the 28th, the exhaustion of his horses forced
Katzler to report that he could no longer catch the enemy despite riding far
with the Cossacks “to take part in this hare hunt.”45
On the French side, by the night of the 27th, the heads of Macdonald’s
army had cleared the Bober River while the rearguards remained at the
Schnelle Deichsel. Marchand’s 39th Division retreated from Liegnitz to
Bunzlau, picking up fugitives from all four corps along the way. East of
the 39th, III Corps and most of II Cavalry Corps reached Haynau. Gérard’s
XI Corps retreated across the Schnelle Deichsel at Adelsdorf and continued
northwest toward Bunzlau. Lauriston’s rearguard halted at Neuwiese, his
main body at Lauterseiffen. Ledru’s 31st Division remained at Spiller; and a
large mass of refugees from all corps sought salvation at Löwenberg. Because
the bridge over the Bober at Löwenberg could no longer be used, the
imperial troops stranded on the right bank turned downstream toward
Bunzlau, where they arrived east of the city on the following night. Puthod
led his 17th Division from Hirschberg to Grunau on the 27th in an attempt
to escape across the Bober but found the water so far over its banks that he
turned back and sought to go further downstream along the right bank of the
river. From Grunau, he reported his intent to march through Lähn to Zobten
on the 28th. General Yuzefovich’s Cossacks, which closely pursued and had
already netted numerous prisoners, intercepted the letter. Thanks to the
terror caused by the Cossacks and the feeling of not being able to escape,
most of Puthod’s division had scattered in the woods or hid in the small
13 The destruction of Puthod’s division on 27 August 1813
villages. The Cossacks hauled in numerous stragglers – many of whom had

to be forcibly retrieved from the houses. “Yuzefovich,” explained Langeron,
“an intelligent and active officer, never lost sight of him [Puthod], followed
him and, although he had neither infantry nor cannon, disordered the
enemy’s rearguard, taking 1,200 prisoners.” Puthod’s report to Macdonald
stated “that, despite my efforts and exertions and those of their chiefs and
officers, three-quarters of the soldiers have thrown themselves in the woods
and houses. Kindness, threats, and blows have no effect on them and they
answer that it is better to be captured than to succumb to misery.”46
Although pressured only by Langeron, Macdonald decided to run for it
rather than attempt to rally. He hoped to outdistance the Allies and reach
Lusatia where he could reorganize his army close to the emperor’s legions.
Resorting to a survival-of-the-fittest mentality, he accepted the harsh reality
that thousands would be lost to straggling and desertion. Yet by escaping with
the core of his army largely intact, he stood the chance of avoiding the emperor’s
fury. Unfortunately for Macdonald, the current state of his army rendered this
hope fanciful. It is important to remember that, like the men of the Silesian
Army, the soldiers of the Army of the Bober had also marched and counter-
marched continuously for two weeks sustained by food supplies that were
approaching exhaustion before hostilities had resumed. Many imperial battal-

ions consisted of young conscripts unaccustomed to the rigors of campaigning –
very similar to the harsh baptism experienced by the Prussian Landwehr. As the
Allied pursuit gained steam, the Army of the Bober resembled a forlorn mob
driven by fear, cold, sickness, and hunger. Those who pushed on faced the
streaming rain, drenched roads, violent mountain streams, and bridges smashed
or weakened by flood waters. Order and discipline crumbled, hundreds
remained skulking about the fields and scattered in the villages, producing
horrible desolation. All over the fields lay discarded weapons and backpacks,
cannon, and caissons as well as the dead and dying. Units that maintained order
found themselves herded like cattle by the Allied vanguard. With canister and
roundshot, the lance and the bayonet, the victors wreaked havoc on the imperial
formations. Allied detachments led away prisoners in the hundreds. “Despite
the fact that some people do not understand how to exploit a victory,” con-
tinued Gneisenau in his letter to Clausewitz, “the results of ours – at least what
is known – are considerable nonetheless. Some 60 cannon, 200 caissons, 8 field
forges, and 6,000–7,000 prisoners are the fruits of the victory. What we have seen
in corpses, wagons, etc., during our march from Eichholtz, and what we have
heard about the disorder and composition of the [enemy] rearguard, which
consists of the fugitives of many regiments, tells us that Macdonald’s army has
completely collapsed.”47
Silesian Army Headquarters moved only a few miles to Eichholtz during
the afternoon of 27 August. Good tidings from abroad helped ease the
mounting aggravation at Army Headquarters but increased Blücher’s
impatience. A message arrived confirming that the Prussians of the Army
of North Germany had stopped Oudinot’s Army of Berlin at Großbeeren on
the 23rd. The bravery of the Landwehr units that had fought in Bülow’s III
and Tauentzien’s IV Corps earned great praise. According to this preliminary
report, the entire imperial army had retreated toward Torgau in the after-
math.48 Blücher believed that the crown prince of Sweden would closely
follow Oudinot, so this news only inflamed his desire to launch a relentless
pursuit of Macdonald. He had already envisioned the possibility of the
Silesian and North German Armies cooperating in an offensive across the
Elbe. Through St.-Priest, who established communication with the Austrian
2nd Light Division, Blücher received word that the Bohemian Army had
moved across the Saxon frontier on 22 August and that Wittgenstein had
stormed the imperial camp at Pirna on the 23rd. The temporary commander
of the Austrian 2nd Light Division, General Adam Albert von Neipperg,
speculated that Schwarzenberg’s crossing of the Erzgebirge prompted Napo-
leon to withdraw from Silesia. This report confirmed news that had arrived
the day before, telling of the Bohemian Army’s entry into Saxony. Due to
Neipperg’s report, Blücher believed Schwarzenberg would continue his
offensive. He had no idea that, while the Silesian Army engaged Macdonald’s
forces on the 26th, Schwarzenberg was assailing Napoleon at Dresden. After

a second day of fighting on the 27th, the Allies broke off the attack and
retreated. Not knowing this, Blücher incorrectly concluded Napoleon
would withdraw to Torgau before Schwarzenberg’s onslaught.49
Based on these thoughts, Blücher and Gneisenau decided to direct the
Silesian Army through Görlitz and Bautzen to Dresden, finishing off the
Army of the Bober in the process. “I must assume that the enemy marches to
Torgau,” Blücher explained to Langeron, “because after the loss of the camp
at Pirna it will be difficult to maintain Dresden as his central point. Thus, it
is necessary to destroy Macdonald’s army without delivering a new battle.”
Early on the 28th, Army Headquarters issued orders to intensify the pursuit.
To Langeron went instructions for St.-Priest to circumvent the upper
courses of the rivers that slowed the army – the Katzbach, Schnelle
Deichsel, Bober, and Queis – and attempt to block the enemy’s retreat to
Marklissa and Görlitz. Blücher also hoped that the 6,000 men of Neipperg’s
light division would advance toward Görlitz and Bautzen. “Without doubt,”
continued Blücher in his dispatch to Langeron, “you are already moving
toward Löwenberg with the army, which is going in this direction. Today
I move my headquarters to Goldberg.” “Forward, always forward, my
children,” bellowed Blücher. “If you start out hard, you can spare yourselves
another battle.” In response, the soldiers shouted: “Long live Father Blü-
cher!” But again he would be disappointed: nature and Langeron’s obstinacy
continued to slow the Silesian Army.50
Learning that Gaudi had yet to summon the Landsturm, Blücher issued a
second letter: “I kindly request that you inform me, why . . . the Landsturm
still has not been mobilized in the rear and flanks of the enemy and the
tocsin still has not been sounded in the manner that I instructed you through
General Gneisenau. If this measure had been carried out, the enemy’s losses
in the battles on the 26th and 27th would have been much greater because
the Landsturm would have captured the stragglers and taken the enemy’s
wagons, which would have been easy because of the poor roads and swollen
waters.” On the next day, the 29th, Gaudi attempted to excuse himself by
claiming he had never received the instructions. Gneisenau smelled a rat. It
appeared that Gaudi was dragging his feet in hesitating to issue general
mobilization orders. When he finally did, his couriers could not get across
the rain-swollen rivers of Silesia to deliver the summons. Gneisenau drafted
a sharp response that Blücher signed. “If you had carried out the assignment
that my quartermaster-general gave in my name for the immediate sounding
of the tocsin at Jauer, which he requested that you do, the impassable waters
at that time would not have hindered your orders from being executed.
Thus, much time was lost and the waters swelled forty-eight hours later.
However, this measure has met with success where it was received and
executed; yesterday, the peasants of the Hirschberg District seized 700
prisoners. Had this measure been enacted earlier, we could have captured
several thousand, whom we now must fight again because they escaped.”51
Returning to operations, during the morning of the 28th, Katzler and
Karpov resumed the pursuit of Souham’s rearguard in the direction of
Haynau. Around 8:00, Karpov’s Cossacks arrived after capturing 180 strag-
glers. Katzler’s troopers reached Haynau thirty minutes later. Around 9:00,
the Prussian officer reported to Blücher and Yorck that “the enemy flees so
quickly it is impossible for me to catch up with them with the exhausted
horses of my cavalry. Today they evacuated Haynau around 6:00 a.m. and
yesterday from 9:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m. they fled through here in the
greatest disorder, meaning cavalry and infantry all mixed together. They
broke the bridge over the Schnelle Deichsel at Haynau, but I have instructed
the local magistrate to use all means for its restoration as soon as possible.”
Katzler complained that he had to rest his horses while the better steeds used
by the Russians allowed the Cossacks “to take the butter from our bread.”
Despite the exhaustion of their mounts, he and 100 of his Hussars joined the
Cossacks in pursuing the enemy toward Bunzlau.52
Around 6:15 p.m., Katzler reported from Wolfshain that the horses “are
very fatigued and absolutely must have an hour to feed.” Souham’s rearguard
of six battalions, some cavalry, and two guns fell back in good order and
took a position first at Kreibau and then on the hills of Thomaswaldau to
cover the crossing of the Kleinen Bober (Bobrzyca). “All statements of the
inhabitants agree that the enemy is retreating in disorder. Only the rearguard
remains organized, as I myself have seen.” According to Katzler, the route to
Thomaswaldau offered a gruesome sight: “The road is covered with dead
enemy soldiers and dead horses; some may have been killed in earlier
engagements because they are already decomposing.” Without artillery, the
Allied horse could do little except observe the imperials retreat.53
East of Katzler and Karpov, Sacken’s vanguard under Vasilchikov pushed
through Haynau around noon and camped on the east–west highway between
Wolfshain and Haynau. Horn’s 7th Brigade arrived one hour later. Both
commanders decided not to proceed any further on this day. Behind them,
Sacken’s main body halted at Liegnitz, thus moving only one hour west from
the battlefield in the two days that followed the struggle on the 26th. In this
completely exhausted region, the Russians and Prussians as well as the imper-
ials suffered from the lack of provisions. On this day, 700 prisoners lumbered
toward the rear – they had even less to eat. Around 7:00 p.m., Katzler
received a report from his picket at Thomaswaldau on the departure of the
enemy from the hills on the right bank of the Kleinen Bober. Katzler tasked
the reporting officer, Captain Friedrich von Eisenhart, with ascertaining the
status of the bridge over the Kleinen Bober as fast as possible. If the enemy
had destroyed it, Eisenhart would repair it immediately.54
Yorck’s corps lost time crossing the Wütende Neiße at Niederkrayn and
then the Katzbach at Röchlitz. Not only did the cresting rivers force the
infantry to wade through water up to their chests, but the ammunition of the
brigade artillery became soaked and unusable. Nevertheless, I Corps cleared
the Katzbach. Horn’s two batteries moved northwest toward Haynau
escorted by the Brandenburg Uhlans while the rest of the corps trudged
west through Goldberg. Major Stößel again seized the initiative with his
Black Hussars. Of his own accord, he hunted French stragglers between the
Katzbach and the Bober. If the reports to Yorck were accurate, Blücher’s
wish in part came true. One lieutenant with 15 troopers of the Jäger squad-
ron captured 144 men while 1 corporal with 2 hussars purportedly captured
50 more. Another squadron apprehended 150 imperials. One captain with
60 Hussars brought back 55 prisoners. Near Adelsdorf, they salvaged four of
six guns found stuck in the mud. “Today,” Blücher informed Bernadotte,
“Yorck’s corps has taken 4 cannon, a number of wagons, and some 700
prisoners. His vanguard has united with Sacken’s at Haynau and pursues
toward Bunzlau. More important than anything else is the disintegration of
the enemy army, which all reports confirm. I have learned that during the
affair at Goldberg General Ricard was killed and General Maison lost a leg.”
By the end of the day, Jürgaß reached Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg with the
Reserve Cavalry. Further east, 2nd Brigade reached Leisersdorf and Ulbers-
dorf on the Schnelle Deichsel late in the evening. Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade
did not arrive at the Schnelle Deichsel until the morning of the 29th while
Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade pulled in during the afternoon.55
On the left wing of the Silesian Army, Rudzevich’s vanguard moved west
from Pilgramsdorf to Lauterseiffen, forwarding its Cossacks to the Bober.
Shcherbatov’s VI Infantry Corps followed as far as Pilgramsdorf but the rest
of Langeron’s corps remained at Goldberg. Langeron had planned to con-
tinue west toward Löwenberg in accordance with Blücher’s orders until
Yorck informed him that, rather than continue west, I Corps would turn
north at Ulbersdorf and thus remain behind Langeron’s corps. Not wanting
to advance on Löwenberg until Yorck came on line with him, Langeron
decided to give his main body a day of rest at Goldberg, completely dis-
obeying Blücher’s instructions. “In the meantime,” stated his report to
Blücher, “the enemy is in such a rout that the light troops almost suffice
and I do not doubt that they will bring in many prisoners.”56
As noted, Blücher had already written to Langeron from Eichholtz
expressing the necessity of maintaining close contact with the enemy,
requesting that the corps commander order St.-Priest to cross the Katzbach,
Schnelle Deichsel, Bober, and Queis at their upper courses, and stating his
expectation for Langeron to march on Löwenberg. This order induced the
general neither to move his corps further west from Goldberg nor to push
his advance guard to the Bober, despite the “rout” of the enemy mentioned
in his report. Consequently, Langeron missed a great opportunity to trap
elements of XI Corps at Löwenberg. Unable to repair the bridge due to the
Bober’s swift current, the imperials backtracked to Plagwitz. That evening,
they departed for Bunzlau, hoping to find passage across the Bober there.
Langeron could have caught at least part of these troops, yet only his
Cossacks reached the Bober. St.-Priest succeeded in crossing the upper
Bober on temporary bridges and reaching Schmiedeberg with his main
body; Bistrom occupied Hirschberg with the vanguard. According to Blü-
cher’s report to the king, Langeron’s corps still managed to harvest 6 guns, “a
great number of caissons,” and approximately 2,000 prisoners.
As for Macdonald’s army, early on the morning of the 28th Puthod led his
17th Division from Grunau down the Bober, seeking a crossing in vain.
Losing many stragglers to Yuzefovich’s Cossacks, the French halted for the
evening at Zobten. West of Puthod, Ledru’s 31st Division marched unhin-
dered northwest from Spiller to Greiffenberg. Meanwhile, Macdonald’s main
body continued to flee westward: Marchand’s division and thousands of
refugees from other corps crossed the Bober on makeshift bridges at Bunzlau
and reached Paritz (Parzyce) on the right bank of the Queis. Units of V and
XI Corps that marched down the right bank of the Bober from Löwenberg to
Bunzlau on the 27th likewise escaped across the river on the 28th and made
for the Queis; detachments of XI Corps remained at Löwenberg. The III
Corps and II Cavalry Corps cleared the Kleinen Bober and reached Bunzlau,
leaving a rearguard at Thomaswaldau facing Katzler and Karpov.57
An intercepted letter written on the 30th by a French officer to his wife
in France describes the travails of the imperial army:
Up until the 25th we defeated the enemy continuously; Goldberg was taken
by storm after inflicting great losses on the enemy. But with the 26th, despite
a horrible rain from early morning on . . . we fought from 8:00 a.m. until the
night. Our infantry was drenched to the bone, the muskets would not fire,
and they gave way in disorder. This forced us to likewise retreat up to this
city [Löbau], which lies in Saxony. The emperor must come to help us
reorganize the three defeated corps. As brave as all our young soldiers are,
when they are pressed by the enemy, they are good for nothing but to retreat.
Terror masters them. Also, the rain has continued uninterrupted for four days
and nights, making the men sick, the weapons useless. We have not had a day
of rest – the enemy has not granted us any. My boots have not come off since
the 15th; I have not had anything to eat since the 20th except for biscuit,
which I have to soak because it is so hard. No meat or brandy, and I am on
my horse from 3:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The horse has had nothing to eat except
for some straw – fortunately it has this – and the men likewise fall from
hunger. We arrived here around 3:00. I will try to reach headquarters on the
great highway; my strength and my courage abandon me. Hopefully they
will soon return but the enemy has three cavalry troopers to our one.58
The rain finally ended during the night of 28/29 August and beautiful
weather returned. On 29 August, Langeron again advanced. After receiving
Puthod’s intercepted letter from Yuzefovich, the corps commander claimed
0 5 10 15 20 25 miles
N
Eichberg
Bober River
Thomaswaldau Wolfshain Kreibau Haynau Schne
lle D
Tillendorf
Bunzlau eic
hse
Gnadenberg xxx l
xx Kaiserswaldau Steinsdorf III r
Modelsdorf xxx ive
II Steudnitz ch R
Siegersdorf xxxx tz b a
Alzenau Bober Ka
xxx Pohlsdorf Neumarkt
Mittlau III
Lobendau
Adelsdorf Liegnitz x
Görlitz Giersdorf Breslau
Ottendorf Gröditzberg Giersdorf
Paritz Seifersdorf
Naumburg Gähnsdorf Leisersdorf Wildschütz xxx
x
Neudorf-am-Rennwege x
Ulbersdorf Sacken
Sirgwitz x xxx Wahlstatt
Braunau xxx Kroitsch Yorck
Neuwiese Goldberg Langeron xxxx
Lauban Plagwitz Silesia
xxx Lauterseiffen Pilgrimsdorf Hermsdorf Niederkrayn
Löwenberg V Laasnig
Mois
Zobten Prausnitz Seichau Brechelshof Estate
Siebeneichen Neukirch
Hennersdorf
Dippelsdorf
Wü
Probsthain
Queis River
tend
Märzdorf Konradswaldau Profen
Peterwitz Jauer Kohlhöhe
e Ne
Marklissa Greiffenberg Jägendorf
Lähn Großrosen
iße
313
Schönau
xx Altschönau
Spiller xx
Grunau
Bolkenhain
Kemnitz Hirschberg
BOH SILESIA
EM x
Schweidnitz
xxx
St.-Priest
Schmeideberg
IA
Landeshut

0 5 10 15 20 25 miles
N
Eichberg
Bober River
Thomaswaldau Wolfshain x x Haynau Schne
Bunzlau x lle D
Tillendorf xxx eic
III
hse
Kaiserswaldau Steinsdorf l
xxx xxx r
II iv e
xxx V Modelsdorf Steudnitz
XI ch R
tz b a
Alzenau Ka
xxxx Pohlsdorf xxx Neumarkt
Bober Sacken
xx
Lobendau
Görlitz Großwalditz Großhartmannsdorf Adelsdorf Liegnitz
Siegersdorf Giersdorf Gröditzberg Giersdorf
Breslau
Paritz Ottendorf Seifersdorf
Wilhemsdorf Gröditz xxx xxxx
Naumburg Gähnsdorf Leisersdorf Yorck Silesia Wildschütz
Sirgwitz x Ulbersdorf xxx Kroitsch Wahlstatt
Braunau Goldberg Langeron
Lauban Plagwitz Lauterseiffen
Löwenberg Pilgrimsdorf Hermsdorf
Laasnig Niederkrayn
xx
Prausnitz Seichau Brechelshof Estate
Neukirch
Zobten Hennersdorf
Wü
Probsthain Jauer
Queis River
tend
xx Konradswaldau Profen
eN
Marklissa Greiffenberg Jägendorf Peterwitz Kohlhöhe
314
Lähn Großrosen
eiße
Schönau
x Altschönau
Spiller
Grunau
xxx
Bolkenhain
Kemnitz St.-Priest
Hirschberg
BOH SILE SIA

Schweidnitz
EM
Schmeideberg
IA
Landeshut

that he “conceived the hope of cutting off and surrounding” the 17th
Division. From his position in the valleys and woods between Pilgramsdorf
and Lauterseiffen, Rudzevich pushed Emmanuel’s cavalry westward to block
Puthod’s route to Löwenberg, where the French could have escaped across the
town’s stone bridge and the rafts being hastily constructed there. In addition,
Korf led Langeron’s Reserve Cavalry west from Lauterseiffen to Zobten.
Meanwhile, Puthod continued with his plan to march downriver from
Zobten through Höfel to Bunzlau. He cleared Zobten but did not know
Korf’s cavalry was behind him. Hoping to find a passage through the flooded
terrain east of Löwenberg, Puthod turned west toward Plagwitz around 8:00
on the morning of the 29th. At Löwenberg, two battalions and five guns
from Ledru’s 31st Division waited on the opposite bank of the Bober to take
in the beleaguered 17th. To obtain building material for a bridge, Puthod’s
soldiers demolished several of Plagwitz’s houses. Despite their strenuous
work, they could not bridge the river. To make matters worse, their security
posts reported the approach of Russian forces from the east. Around 9:30,
Emmanuel reached Plagwitz with Rudzevich’s vanguard cavalry. At the
same time, Stößel’s Black Hussars arrived. Resolving to cut his way through
to Bunzlau, Puthod ordered the firing of seventy caissons and almost all the
baggage. To defend against the enemy cavalry, he assembled his division on
the Stein hill. Soon, however, Rudzevich’s infantry arrived and by 11:30 the
Russians held Plagwitz. Skirmishing fixed the French and prevented them
from marching down the Bober while Shcherbatov’s VI Infantry Corps
closed in from Pilgramsdorf, and Korf reached Zobten with Langeron’s
Reserve Cavalry to completely block Puthod’s escape route. Ordered by
the Russians to surrender, the French chose honor over shame.
Around 2:00, the Russians commenced a general assault on the Stein hill
supported by one battery each on the Hirse and Luften hills. With the
Kharkovskii and Kievskii Dragoon Regiments, Emmanual enveloped
Puthod’s left. Korf led the Tverskii and Kinburnskii Regiments as well as
the Don Artillery Company to Zobten and then moved around Puthod’s
right. On arriving, Shcherbatov’s 34th Light Artillery Company unlimbered
on the hills overlooking Stein hill. Several well-aimed shots disordered the
French. According to Langeron, “Nesterovsky’s battery ravaged the squared
ranks and forced them to retire dispersed.” One hour into the engagement,
General Vasily Meshcherinov ordered the 11th, 28th, 32nd, and 36th Jäger
Regiments (five battalions in total) to fix bayonets and charge up Stein hill.
Behind the infantry thundered the Russian cavalry. Puthod’s line broke.
Some soldiers threw down their muskets; others joined the many officers
who jumped into the river and attempted to swim to the other bank. Almost
all drowned – 400 according to Russian estimates – including Benoı̂t-
Prosper Sibuet, the commander of Puthod’s 2nd Brigade, who had received
his promotion to general only one week earlier on the 22nd. Altogether,
120 officers including Puthod, 3,500 soldiers, and 16 guns fell into Allied
hands. Two officers – Lieutenant Aleksandr Kalinin and Ensign Aleksandr
Bogdanov – from the sole battalion of the 28th Jäger Regiment captured the
Eagles of the 146th and 148th Infantry Regiments; the French threw the
Eagles of the 134th and the 147th into the Bober. Langeron’s men found the
Eagle of the former after the Bober’s waters receded. At the start of the
campaign, Puthod’s division numbered 8,237 men: only 254 managed to
recross the Bober. The Russians purportedly lost between 80 and 200 men
on this day.59
Gneisenau proudly tallied the results of the “hare hunt.” In the first three
days of the pursuit, Stößel’s Black Hussars alone captured 7 cannon, 36
caissons, field forges, several hundred horses, 26 officers, and 335 men.
“Some 80 guns, 300 caissons, wagons, mobile forges, etc., 11,000–12,000
prisoners are the trophies that we have ripped from the enemy,” boasted
the staff chief. “The swollen waters halted our pursuit but we followed as
best we could. The consequences of the terror that seized the enemy are
visible everywhere on the roads from the Katzbach to the Bober: corpses
stuck in the mud, overturned wagons, and heaps of prisoners. I hope to
completely destroy Macdonald’s army. Long live the king! His throne is
now safe and we will bequeath national independence to our children. Now
I go to sleep a happy man.”60
While the left wing had success on the 29th, Blücher’s right wing and
center stalled completely. On the extreme left, St.-Priest’s main body
remained at Schmiedeberg but his vanguard reached Spiller and made con-
tact with Ledru’s division at Langwasser (Chmieleń). In the early hours,
Souham’s rearguard exchanged its position at Thomaswaldau for one behind
the defile at Gnadenberg to secure the passage across the Bober at Bunzlau.
Receiving news of this, Katzler and Karpov continued the pursuit followed
by the cavalry of Sacken’s van, Horn’s 7th Brigade, and Vasilchikov with
Sacken’s vanguard infantry. En route, two Prussian squadrons and the
Cossacks collected another 600 imperial stragglers. Reaching Gnadenberg,
the Allied cavalry again halted before six French squadrons supported by
three guns. Discerning additional French forces west of the cavalry, Katzler
and Karpov decided to wait until Horn and Vasilchikov came up. On
arriving, Vasilchikov and Horn together scouted the enemy. Covered by
the six squadrons, the imperials held a position extending from Looswitz
(Łaziska) to Neuschönfeld (Chościszowice). Although unable to determine
the enemy’s strength, Horn and Vasilchikov did not believe their own forces
sufficed to attack. Horn requested cooperation from Sacken. The Russian
commander “would commit himself to nothing, but promised to advance
immediately if Yorck, who stood four hours away on the left [south],
showed some sign of life” (see Map 2).61
0 5 10 15 20 25 miles
N
Eichberg
Bober River
Wolfshain xxx Haynau Schne
Bunzlau x x lle D
Sacken eic
Tillendorf
xxx xxx xxx Gnadenberg Thomaswaldau
hse
l
II XI III Steinsdorf
r
Modelsdorf Steudnitz iv e
ch R
Siegersdorf xxxx tz b a
Alzenau Ka
Bober Neumarkt
Görlitz Großwalditz Adelsdorf Liegnitz
Giersdorf Gröditzberg Giersdorf Breslau
Paritz Ottendorf Seifersdorf
xxx
V xxx Wildschütz
Naumburg xxxx Neudorf-am-Rennwege
Yorck
Sirgwitz Silesia xxx Kroitsch Wahlstatt
xx Langeron Ulbersdorf
Braunau x Goldberg
Lauban Lauterseiffen
Löwenberg Pilgrimsdorf Laasnig Niederkrayn
Plagwitz
Mois Seichau
Zobten Prausnitz Brechelshof Estate
xx Siebeneichen Neukirch
Hennersdorf
W
Dippelsdorf
ü
Probsthain Jauer
Queis River
Märzdorf Konradswaldau tend Profen
e Ne
Marklissa Greiffenberg Jägendorf Peterwitz Kohlhöhe

Lähn Großrosen
iße
317
Schönau
x Altschönau
Spiller
Grunau
xxx Bolkenhain
Kemnitz St.-Priest
Hirschberg
BOH SILESIA
EM Schweidnitz
Schmeideberg Landeshut
IA
Around 11:00 a.m., Horn sent his adjutant, Lieutenant Karl Friedrich
von Reibnitz, to Yorck with a report over the situation, assuring him that “if
it is possible for you to make an attack on the enemy’s right flank on this
day, we will have a glorious affair. The affair will be decided in fifteen
minutes. As soon as we hear the first cannon shot from you we will attack.”
While Horn awaited Yorck’s answer, Schwanenfeld’s detachment of fifty
Hussars reached the Bober north of Bunzlau. He could see that considerable
French forces had already crossed the Bober there but the river had risen so
much in the past twenty-four hours that a point of passage no longer could
be found. Therefore, the imperial units east of Bunzlau on the right bank of
the Bober could not escape. Cut off from Macdonald’s main body on the left
bank, these troops appeared to be easy prey. “The Bober is unusually high
and almost impossible to cross,” explained Schwanenfeld. “Confirmed
reports claim that before the water rose several crossings existed for the
corps of the enemy army; but the troops who arrived yesterday are in the
greatest predicament and must surrender as soon as they are attacked in
earnest.” Horn forwarded this report to Yorck, again requesting a joint
attack on the imperial forces stranded on the right bank east of Bunzlau.62
Meanwhile, a portion of the Reserve Cavalry under Jürgaß remained
with I Corps in and around Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg. Jürgaß sent only
officer patrols northwest toward Bunzlau and southwest to Löwenberg. In
the first direction, the Prussians encountered French cavalry at Neuwarthau
(Warta Bolesławiecka) which withdrew to Looswitz, less than three miles
southwest of Bunzlau. Pursuing, the Prussians learned that the imperials
stranded on the right bank of the Bober at Bunzlau could cross the river only
by boat. Meanwhile, Major Stößel led his 2nd Leib Hussar Regiment north-
west from Großhartmannsdorf toward Bunzlau, encountering four imperial
cavalry regiments and several battalions. With man and horse still weak from
the preceding exertions, Stößel deferred attempting an attack. Yet he too
reported to Yorck that the Prussians could “take thousands of prisoners if
several cavalry regiments advance. The enemy appears to remain holding on
coûte que coûte [at all costs] because he cannot cross the swollen water.”63
Around 4:00 p.m., Reibnitz delivered Horn’s report to Yorck at
Leisersdorf. Despite the brigadier’s urging, Yorck did not depart northwest
for Bunzlau with 2nd Brigade, which had been resting for almost twenty-
four hours. Instead, he ordered Stößel to lead the Black Hussars southwest
toward Löwenberg because the corps commander believed the Bober cross-
ing at Sirgwitz could be utilized. The only clue we have to explain this
puzzling decision is a note that Droysen found in the column of Schack’s
journal: “General Gneisenau told Colonel Valentini, Colonel Müffling, and
Major Schack that the direction of I Corps is Sirgwitz.” Compounding the
problem, Blücher’s instructions for Yorck to march to Bunzlau on the 29th
did not reach the corps commander until 6:00 on the morning of the 30th.
Droysen tells us that Schack’s journal contains a morning entry for the 30th
stating: “Waiting for march orders since yesterday.” Consequently, late on
the afternoon of the 29th, Yorck simply forwarded Reibnitz to Blücher at
Goldberg with Horn’s reports and a request for instructions. Before
Reibnitz could reach Goldberg, Army Headquarters departed for Hohlstein,
north of Löwenberg and less than two miles east of Sirgwitz. Of course,
neither Yorck nor Reibnitz knew of this until the latter rode four miles east
from Leisersdorf to Goldberg and then had to backtrack through Leisers-
dorf and cover another fifteen miles west to reach Hohlstein. After being in
the saddle for fourteen hours, the good lieutenant finally delivered his report
to Army Headquarters around 6:00 a.m. on 30 August – the very same time
Blücher’s courier delivered the 29 August order for Yorck to cross the Bober
at Bunzlau.64
Meanwhile, back at Löwenberg on the 29th, the patrol dispatched there
by Jürgaß received infantry fire from the opposite bank. The officer learned
that large numbers of imperial soldiers had reached Löwenberg but found
the Bober impossible to cross. As a result, they continued marching north
toward Bunzlau. Major Schenck from the Black Hussars confirmed this
news in a 10:00 a.m. report to Yorck. According to Schenk, the last of the
units still east of Löwenberg on the right bank of the Bober marched toward
Bunzlau between 5:00 and 7:00 that morning. However, locals alerted the
Prussians to the approach of an enemy column – Puthod’s division – from
the upper Bober along the river’s right bank. This news accounted for
Stößel’s arrival in time to participate in the destruction of Puthod’s corps.
Schenk likewise expressed his opinion that a mere advance by I Corps would
force the enemy to surrender in droves. Despite all of this inviting news,
Yorck did nothing on the 29th, meaning that Horn and Vasilchikov likewise
remained inactive all day. Sacken’s main body arrived at Haynau around 3:00
p.m. After receiving Vasilchikov’s report on the situation east of Bunzlau,
Sacken informed Blücher that he remained ready to support the vanguard if
needed. What accounted for Yorck’s behavior?65
As noted, the victory on the 26th did little to alter Yorck’s negative view
of the army’s leadership. Although the Silesian Army had won a major
victory, the repercussions of it resembled a defeat for I Corps. While
inclement weather and supply shortages exhausted and spread illness among
the well-clad line troops of both armies, it devastated the insufficiently
uniformed and sometimes barefooted Landwehr. Desertion, straggling, and
sickness soared as the inevitable result. Even Langeron described his stout
Russians as being “utterly crushed by fatigue.”66 In the days following the
Katzbach, Yorck’s anger intensified as starvation took its toll on his
exhausted soldiers.67 “Two hundred loaves of bread weighing ten pounds
each,” reported Horn on the morning of the 29th, “is all that I have been able
to obtain from the city [Haynau] and surrounding region.” He claimed that
the 4th Battalion of the 15th Silesian Landwehr and the 2nd Battalion of the
4th Silesian Landwehr could muster only 100 men each. According to the
majors who commanded them, these survivors could no longer march
because of exhaustion and the lack of food. Horn found them so malnour-
ished and fatigued that he had to leave them at Haynau. He informed Yorck
that the other battalions of these regiments appeared very weak; he feared
the majority would desert because of hunger. The four battalions of the 15th
Silesian Landwehr had started the campaign with a total of 3,200 men but
now numbered only 320. Horses suffered as well from the acute shortage of
fodder. “The enemy has so thoroughly foraged everything here that neither
horse nor man can get anything,” concluded a report from Jürgaß. “This
forces me to put down many horses and I am also forced to send back many
sick men. Thus, I urgently request that you provide me with provisions and
fodder as soon as possible because otherwise I cannot guarantee that the
regiments will be able to do what you so urgently desire.”68
In a controversial report to Blücher on the 29th, Yorck unfairly ques-
tioned the fortitude and commitment of his Landwehr troops: “With regret,
I have the honor to inform you that, due to the extraordinary poor weather
in these days and due to the utter lack of uniforms, the Landwehr, especially
the Landwehr battalions attached to Prince Carl von Mecklenburg’s brigade,
are quickly beginning to dissolve. In part from exhaustion, but also in part
from ill-will, hundreds remain behind and because sufficient measures
cannot be taken in the rear of the corps they might scatter in the countryside
or return to their homes.”69 Major Reiche, the war commissar assigned to
I Corps, could do little to overcome the obstacles caused by the weather. On
the 29th he informed Yorck that the flooding made it completely impossible
to quickly move up provisions for the troops:
To the degree that the glorious victory has made you happy, in the same
degree I feel miserable that the current weather makes it completely impos-
sible to quickly deliver the food supplies to the troops. We wage war in a land
where hands are for work and threshing, where the means for transport are
completely lacking. In order to provide one day’s supply of fodder, we need
more than 300 wagons, and no magazine is available from which we can
fulfill the need of 3,000 bushels a day. My arrangements and efforts appar-
ently do not interest God, yet I cannot hide the impossibility that I can
neither forage the hay in the fields nor the corn in the sheaves from the barns.
In my situation, where the best intentions cannot help, I am so miserable that
I no longer have joy, and I dread seeing any more since everything weighs on
me and because it is certainly very embarrassing to suffer underserved
statements of discontent and complaints.
Resupplying the ammunition proved no less challenging. “The continu-

ous rains,” stated a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Schmidt, “thoroughly
soaked all cartridge pouches, completely ruining the ammunition found

therein. The regiments flooded me with the request to replace this ammuni-
tion and by calculation I found that all my columns did not suffice to replace
half of the ammunition that had been ruined by moisture. Had events . . . led
to a new, serious engagement or a full battle, the Silesian Army probably
would have been very unfortunate due to the lack of ammunition.” On the
26th, the day of the battle, a Lieutenant Peucker went to the fortress of
Neiße to organize and bring back munitions columns. Not only should this
task have been completed earlier in the month, but Army Headquarters
should have established an ammunition depot closer to the area of oper-
ations such as at Schweidnitz. Nevertheless, Peucker executed his task
efficiently, prompting Prince August of Prussia, the chief of artillery, to
exclaim that “his ideal example can serve every young officer in a similar
situation.”70
Confronted by these interrelated crises, Yorck gave his men another day
of rest on the 29th. “The roads are so bad and the rivers so extremely
difficult to cross,” he explained to Blücher, “that the majority of the troops
did not reach their assigned destinations until last night and many still have
not arrived. The Schnelle Deichsel is so swollen that it can be crossed only
by way of the bridge at Pilgramsdorf. We will know tomorrow whether the
water level will allow some footbridges to be built. For these reasons, only
the forward cavalry will ride toward the Bober today and I will remain
behind with the main body because neither General Langeron nor General
Sacken are on line with me.” On the previous day, Langeron had not
advanced because Yorck failed to come on line with him, now Yorck would
not advance because Langeron and Sacken remained behind him. We can
only imagine the angst that this caused at Army Headquarters.71
Not having received formal instructions from Blücher of where to cross
the Bober on the 29th, Yorck opted to wait until the French made their
next move. He had already decided to grant the day of rest before he
received the reports from Stößel, Schenk, and Horn, which did not arrive
until around 4:00 in the afternoon. This certainly did not correspond to
Blücher’s demand “to pursue and to harm the enemy unceasingly.” Blü-
cher’s style of command, although much more decentralized than Napo-
leon’s, established the principle that the corps commanders had to proceed
according to the spirit of the general instructions, establish communication
with neighboring corps, and find material to build bridges. He rejected the
notion of sacrificing time to reorganize brigade-level units. The pursuit
itself should consume all efforts. “What is behind will remain behind and
must follow,” he declared. Although satisfied with the troops for enduring
the strains and privations, by no means did Blücher believe the hardships
had been extreme: more could have been asked and accomplished. The
cavalry had to be utilized with ruthlessness. Yorck either did not believe he
could take the initiative, or thought the actions of Langeron and Sacken
would dictate his own, or simply cited these reasons as excuses for his
continued defiance. Even Yorck’s biographer, Droysen, has little ammuni-
tion to defend the corps commander: “Those at Blücher’s headquarters
recognized this evil situation, but according to the audacious and grandiose
view that reigned there, they appreciated the significance of the victory and
its costs more than Yorck could in his position and possibly according to
his nature.”72
In Blücher’s response to the report made by Reibnitz, we can feel his fury
over Yorck’s failure to march on Bunzlau, especially because the dispatches
from Horn that Yorck included with his letter claimed that the enemy forces
on the eastern bank of the Bober would be forced to surrender. “You asked
me what to do about Horn’s report,” seethed Blücher. “According to my
previous letters, I expressed the desire that you make a decision without
inquiry. Now, so much time has been lost that any measure will be too late.
Moreover, I asked that in all cases any question should be resolved according
to the general disposition that was issued. Because the enemy has directed all
of his columns toward Bunzlau to cross the Bober there, you will thus
depart for Bunzlau and cross the Bober there. Should the enemy still be at
Gnadenberg you will attack him immediately.”73
Yorck fired back. His response, which Gneisenau read before passing it
to Blücher, contained the staff chief’s comments in the margin, which
capture the friction between Army and Corps Headquarters. Yorck begins
by maintaining that the first order he received from Blücher to march on
Bunzlau only arrived at 6:00 that morning – the 30th – and not the 29th. He
then addressed the events of the 29th directly: “I did not depart immediately
after receiving Horn’s report because the majority of Steinmetz’s and Hüner-
bein’s brigades still had not reached their designated points.” Gneisenau
remarked: “The brigades did not have to fight, but send only a few battalions
for support.” “I found myself in the unfortunate situation of having to cross
extraordinarily swollen rivers without bridges,” continued Yorck, “because
the corps of Generals Sacken and Langeron are operating on the two main
highways where bridges are available.” Remarking on Yorck’s “unfortunate
situation,” Gneisenau retorted: “The enemy found himself in an even worse
situation because he was defeated.” As for Yorck’s claim that he could not
cross the swollen rivers, Gneisenau scribbled: “One can find appropriate
measures to get across water if one wants to.” The corps commander then
raised an issue that constantly plagued Blücher’s operations – an issue that
caused Napoleon comparatively few problems because of his superior
system of communication. “Had I,” asserted Yorck, “remained in movement
with the corps without awaiting orders from Your Excellency, it would have
become extremely necessary for me to be informed of the existing situation
of the two adjacent corps.” In the margin next to Yorck’s statement “Had
I remained in movement,” Gneisenau, now quite exasperated, snapped:

“Yea, since it was already ordered.” Concerning Yorck’s insistence that
Army Headquarters should have informed him of the situation of Langeron
and Sacken, Gneisenau scrawled: “This is the responsibility of the general-
lieutenant. Only he can maintain communication because we do not know
where the corps are situated.” By comparison, the orders issued by
Napoleon and Berthier always contained a status report of the friendly
units – mainly corps and divisions – operating in the area. Napoleon’s orders
constantly stress the need for the corps commanders to establish and main-
tain communication with each other.
“Had I marched yesterday with a small portion of the corps to Löw-
enberg,” persisted Yorck, “which was my direction to take, I thus would
have made a futile march, and the corps would have been completely
fragmented.” “False assertion,” noted Gneisenau, “not at all futile. The
corps could have gone to Sirgwitz. No! Not fragmented, but divided in
columns to facilitate the march and to arrive between the enemy’s columns.”
Yorck continued: “General Horn’s brigade, including the Reserve Cavalry,
was sent forward to pursue the enemy. Wherever Horn went the main body
[of the corps] had to follow; whether it would be Löwenberg or Bunzlau
depended on the operations of the two flank corps [Sacken and Langeron]
and I believed I had to await either a request from one of the imperial
Russian corps commanders or an order from Your Excellency to determine
where I should march with the main body of the corps because the arrival of
many corps on one point can only be disadvantageous.” Next to Yorck’s line
that stated he had to await an order from Blücher, Gneisenau wrote: “Who-
ever wants to pursue zealously does not wait for an order.” Gneisenau’s
blood had started to boil. Remarking on Yorck’s comment about all corps
arriving at the same point, he penned: “Above: not fragmented, here: not
united!”
“Early yesterday I reported to Your Excellency that the majority of the
corps still had not reached the designated point of the Schnelle Deichsel,
thus making a further march impossible,” explained Yorck. “And why?”
asked Gneisenau. “Could not a part [of the corps] have advanced and the
other followed?” Yorck continued: “Moreover, I proved on the 26th that
I will gladly do all that is feasible and that the troops can achieve everything
that is in their power.” Gneisenau could not resist reminding Blücher that
Yorck had insisted on giving the troops a day of rest on the 26th: “If we had
waited a second twenty-four hours as he demanded, we would have been
defeated. Now we should be thankful that he came to the battle?” Yorck
concluded by emphasizing the exertions of the troops, “in particular during
the march of the 28th, which lasted for thirty-six hours, in which the troops
had to wade through the waters.” Gneisenau’s final response mirrored the
sentiment at Army Headquarters: “Had he crossed the river on the 27th,
they would not have had to wade through the flooded waters on the 28th. If
one does not pursue the enemy with exertions, one will find himself in the
situation where the enemy, whom one could have destroyed, has to be
fought again. Because he had shunned exertions, Prussian blood will again
have to be shed.”74
Based on Gneisenau’s comments, Colonel Johann Georg (Gustav) von
Rauch drafted a reply that the former proofread and Blücher signed: “I
received your letter of the 30th in which you compare for me the exertions
of the troops and the difficulties that you encountered by advancing. It gives
me so much pleasure each time to have the same opinion as you, yet I see
myself forced to explain to you that although I am content with the goodwill
and the manner in which the troops have endured all exertions,
I nevertheless in no way find that the exertions have been carried to the
extreme and that more still could not have been achieved.” Concerning this
point, we again hear from Müffling: “This corresponded with his [Gneise-
nau’s] principle that you must always require from the men more than they
can perform, because in execution less is invariably accomplished than is
demanded – a principle that I have always considered as dangerous as it is
incorrect.”75 Returning to Blücher’s letter:
The instructions issued to you during the night of 26/27 [August], then later
to General Horn, and the orders issued to you in the afternoon, expressed
with the greatest clarity my intention to pursue and harm the enemy without
delay. Three corps received orders from my headquarters. As soon as these
were issued, it became the business of the corps commanders not only to act
according to the general instructions, but to observe everything that pertains
to these orders. I cannot maintain communication between them: the corps
themselves must maintain it; where a bridge is lacking, it must be built
quickly and at such an important moment one should raze the nearby houses
to obtain lumber. The corps are provided with the necessary personnel for
this. In the pursuit of a fleeing enemy who is weakened every hour by the loss
of prisoners and fugitives, it is not necessary to march against the enemy with
whole brigades or even with whole battalions and squadrons. What remains
behind must be left behind and brought up.
One must not heed the complaints of the cavalry, because if one can
achieve an objective as great as the destruction of an entire enemy army, the
state can spare a few hundred horses that fall from exhaustion. Instead of
settling the affair with some energy, the immediate consequence of failing to
exploit a victory is that a new battle must be delivered. Yesterday’s engage-
ment at Bunzlau should be viewed in the same way, in which a failure in the
pursuit of the enemy is to blame.76
Claiming that this lecture convinced Yorck of the error of his ways would
misrepresent the curmudgeon’s character, but he remained silent and the
unpleasant correspondence between the Prussians temporarily ceased.
To summarize the movements of the 29th, Macdonald’s army crossed the

Bober and halted west of the river while the van of the Army of Silesia
reached the Bober.77 After receiving the news of Langeron’s engagement
with Puthod east of Löwenberg, Blücher moved his headquarters to
Hohlstein, north of Löwenberg. There he received letters from Tsar
Alexander and Barclay, both dated 25 August, informing him that the
Bohemian Army had reached Dresden. Moreover, Allied Headquarters
assumed that Napoleon and the Grande Armée stood in Lusatia. Although
both Alexander and Barclay warned Blücher to avoid a serious engagement,
they both expressed the desire of seeing the Silesian Army approach the Elbe
and thus the Bohemian Army as soon as possible.
During the night of 29/30 August, Souham’s rearguard withdrew from
Gnadenberg to the opposite bank of the Bober, leaving Bunzlau occupied
only by light infantry. Allied patrols immediately detected the French
retreat; Horn and Vasilchikov decided to take the town without delay. To
minimize losses, the Allies maneuvered the imperials out of Bunzlau, which
stood east of the Bober. With the Brandenburg Uhlans, one horse battery,
the Jäger detachments of the Leib Regiment, and the skirmishers of the Leib
Fusilier Battalion, Katzler enveloped the city to the southwest and reached
the Kessel hill. As soon as the Nr. 2 Horse Battery started shelling Bunzlau,
Horn led the 7th Brigade against the eastern side of the town. The French
skirmishers evacuated the city after attempting to ignite a magazine. To
guard the Bober bridge, the French posted one battalion southeast of the
Bunzlau mill race. Shelled by the Prussian horse guns and attacked in the
flank by the Jäger and skirmishers, the battalion fell back after setting fire to
the bridge over the mill race. Jäger and Uhlans sought to put out the flames
and save the bridge. This delay allowed the imperials to rip up the planking
on the large bridge over the Bober and fire the structure itself. French troops
started to deploy on the hills along the western bank but a Russian battery
numbering twelve guns unlimbered further west on the Kessel hill and fired
so effectively that they retreated. As this unfolded, two guns from the
Prussian horse battery moved from the hill to the mill race and pelted the
French skirmishers with caseshot to force them to withdraw. Horn’s battal-
ions finally reached the bridge to reinforce the Jäger. With sufficient man-
power, the Allies drove off the remaining enemy skirmishers and
extinguished the flames on the bridge. However, heavy fire from Tillendorf
prevented them from repairing it. A heated firefight ensued between the
banks of the river, until the Prussians suffered from the effects of their
ammunition shortage. Additional cannon arrived but French guns unlim-
bered as well so that the exchange intensified and continued for quite some
time, until the imperials began to withdraw around 10:30 a.m.
After repairing the bridge, the Allies moved across the Bober with
Cossacks leading the way. Horn ordered the skirmishers of the Leib
Regiment and two Landwehr battalions to follow and occupy Tillendorf as

well as the hills along the western bank while two other battalions moved
into the outskirts of Bunzlau. Horn and Vasilchikov believed that the
imperials had retreated, and the situation remained quiet until 2:00. Around
that time, the French rearguard emerged from a concealed position in the
woods west of Tillendorf, attempting to eject the Cossacks and Landwehr
battalions posted in the village. Unable to fire their muskets because they
lacked ammunition, the Landwehr withdrew east across the Bober bridge.
Prussian skirmishers and a few companies of the Leib Regiment ended the
French charge but the bridge remained in enemy hands. Out of ammunition,
the Prussians could do nothing but watch as the enemy went to work
destroying the vital structure. Finally the ammunition wagons arrived and
distributed the last remaining supplies. Then, all soldiers with cartridges
attacked the bridge. A stalemate ensued until a bayonet attack by the two
battalions of Sacken’s Ochakovskii and Kamchatskii Infantry Regiments
drove the French from the bridge. Although the Russians could not secure
Tillendorf, they managed to maintain possession of the damaged bridge over
the Bober.78
To Yorck’s credit, he immediately issued the necessary orders to “depart
for Bunzlau and cross the Bober there” on the 30th after he received
Blücher’s letter from 29 August. Yet despite Blücher’s insistence on speed,
I Corps did not march until around noon due to delays in crossing the
Schnelle Deichsel. Although its waters had subsided, safe passage still
required bridges, which slowed the crossing. Yorck’s main body reached
Bunzlau around 5:00 p.m. on the 30th, bringing additional supplies of
ammunition; three battalions from 2nd and 8th Brigades relieved the troops
guarding the Bober bridge. Small-arms fire continued late into the night.
Vasilchikov’s troops occupied Bunzlau while Sacken posted his main body
west and north of the town. Yorck positioned two brigades west and south
of Bunzlau while the rest of the corps camped to the southeast at the Drüssel
Estate. Horn’s losses amounted to 8 officers and 354 men; Russian and
French losses are not known. The Allies made good use of the large maga-
zine at Bunzlau that the French had attempted but failed to burn, yet the
horses still continued to suffer from lack of fodder.
Prisoners claimed that troops from the French III Corps formed the
rearguard at Bunzlau. On the evening of the 30th, Yorck received a report
from Schwanenfeld written at 3:00 p.m. near Görlitz, where he arrived after
crossing the Bober north of Bunzlau. According to the intrepid captain, after
completely collapsing in its retreat across the Queis, the Army of the Bober
had continued toward the Neiße. The portion that reached Görlitz camped
in the greatest disorder. A French staff officer captured by Schwanenfeld’s
troopers alleged that Napoleon could be found seventy miles east of Bunzlau
at Stolpen. South of Schwanenfeld’s detachment, Russian Streifkorps under
Madatov and Rakhmanov also crossed the Bober, sending a portion of their
Cossacks toward the Bunzlau–Siegersdorf road. With their main bodies,
they crossed the Queis and the Neiße, destroying the bridges over the latter
between Görlitz and Penzig (Pieńsk). Madatov reached the region of Löbau
on the 30th. Falkenhausen had not been able to follow the Cossacks because
of the weaker horses that carried his Landwehr troopers. Then, he could not
find any bridges across the Neiße. On the 31st, he finally managed to cross
the Neiße at Penzig and unite with Schwanenfeld near Görlitz.
On the left wing of the Silesian Army, Langeron attempted to cross the
Bober on the 29th but high water levels frustrated his plans. For the 30th, he
intended to cross downstream (north) of Löwenberg at Braunau in the
morning. Coming from Lauterseiffen, his pontoons reached the bridging site
at 8:00 a.m. Around the same time, the 35th and 36th Divisions from Gérard’s
XI Corps reached Löwenberg, taking a strong position on the Popel hill
opposite the bridge site. After retreating through Bunzlau, Gérard had
reorganized the two divisions east of Naumburg and then marched back to
the Bober. Now unable to build the bridge at Braunau, Rudzevich attempted
to throw a bridge thirty minutes upstream of Löwenberg but encountered
elements of Ledru’s 31st Division that foiled his efforts. The Russians decided
to make a third attempt to cross the Bober, this time at Zobten. While the
vanguard and Olsufiyev’s IX Infantry Corps remained at Plagwitz,
Langeron’s main body marched south only to find difficulties of another sort.
After reaching Zobten, the Russians could not move the pontoons over the
muddy and flooded ground to reach the Bober. Transferring the pontoons to
Dippelsdorf, they managed to build a bridge only to see the Bober’s raging
current tear it apart on three occasions. Toward evening, Rudzevich informed
Langeron that the behavior of the French at Löwenberg indicated that they
would depart soon. As the French proved him correct, the Russians started
building a bridge there at daybreak on the 31st.
On Blücher’s far left, Bistram led St.-Priest’s advance guard toward
Greiffenberg, where he encountered Ledru’s main body. Following a sharp
combat, the French withdrew into Greiffenberg, successfully defending the
town’s barricaded gate against Russian attacks. After night fell, Bistram
withdrew to Ottendorf (Radoniów). St.-Priest’s main body reached Spiller
that evening. Ledru’s 31st Division evacuated Greiffenberg on the following
day and took a position behind the Queis with two brigades at Marklissa and
a third at Lauban.
The day of 30 August thus ended with Yorck’s and Sacken’s corps at
Bunzlau, and Langeron’s vanguard at Plagwitz and Braunau; the latter’s
main body at Dippelsdorf and Zobten. While the Silesian Army failed to
get across the Bober with the exception of St.-Priest, Macdonald’s army
remained between the Queis and the Bober, with the majority at points
along the former. Souham instructed his rearguard to hold Tillendorf but
echeloned the rest of III Corps westward. Macdonald’s center – XI Corps

and II Cavalry Corps – halted at Siegersdorf and Naumburg, both on the
Queis. To his right, Lauriston’s V Corps and Marchand’s 39th Division
likewise stood at the Queis in and around Lauban. Ledru’s 31st Division
held Greiffenberg. As noted, Souham’s rearguard evacuated Tillendorf
during the night of 30/31 August and the entire III Corps withdrew across
the Queis to Lauban, destroying the bridges at Naumburg and Siegersdorf.
From Lauban, Marchand’s division commenced the march due west to
Görlitz, sending one brigade southwest to Ostritz to link with VIII Corps.79
Macdonald’s headlong flight continued as described by Gneisenau:
Our victory on the 26th was far more complete than I was able to tell you in
my last letter. In the steep, wooded valleys of the Wütende Neiße and the
Katzbach we found overturned guns and military wagons on the next day.
We have captured more than 100 cannon, 300 caissons, and field forges;
15,000 prisoners have been brought in, many come in hourly. All roads
between the Katzbach and the Bober show the effects of our enemy’s terror;
corpses run over and stuck in the mud, overturned wagons, and burned
villages. The majority of Macdonald’s army has dissolved. Cut off from the
crossings over the swollen rivers, the stragglers wander around in the forests
and mountains, succumbing to delirium from hunger. I have sounded the
tocsin against them and summoned the peasants to kill them or take them
prisoner. Yesterday, Puthod’s division met its end in this vicinity. It was
overtaken and had to fight with its back against the Bober. Initially, we
shelled it with canister and then attacked with the bayonet. Some were killed,
others driven into the water; the rest – generals and officers – were taken
prisoner and two Eagles captured. Some 20,000 men are all that remain of
Macdonald’s 80,000-strong army. If the orders that have been issued are
executed, they also will be eliminated.80
On the 30th, Blücher charged Gaudi with ensuring that the liberated
districts of Silesia resume the delivery of manpower, horses, and war mate-
riel. Officials needed to be appointed to administer Liegnitz, Löwenberg,
Bunzlau, and especially Goldberg, which contained 800 wounded soldiers
from both armies. Blücher instructed Gaudi to assist the postmaster in
restoring the mail system. Probably fearful that his predecessor, Gneisenau,
would report him to the king, Gaudi did not let this opportunity slip away.
The military governor responded that he had already placed an order for
20,000 pairs of shoes to meet the needs of the army: 10,000 each would come
from Neiße and Breslau. A convoy had already left Breslau for Goldberg
with doctors and surgeons to care for the wounded and transport them to a
military hospital. The Landsturm of the surrounding districts had been
summoned to procure horses, round up Allied stragglers, and apprehend
enemy fugitives. Finally, district authorities decreed the collection of all
arms, which would be delivered to Jauer and Schweidnitz.81
That evening, Blücher instructed Yorck to cross the Bober “if possible”
on the 31st and attack or pursue the imperials. Sacken received orders to
march on Siegersdorf, which meant at least a part of Yorck’s corps would
have to take the road to Naumburg because the two corps could not operate
on the same road. Blücher expected Langeron to cross the Bober that same
night at Zobten and attack the enemy. Sometime after midnight, Gneisenau
drafted Blücher’s report to the king explaining that the army still could not
cross the Bober in the vicinity of Löwenberg. “This hinders the complete
destruction of the enemy. But in the meantime, if St.-Priest can execute the
orders repeatedly issued to him, the enemy will be attacked from the rear at
Marklissa and thus destroyed. He, St.-Priest, will then stand on the shortest
road to Dresden and can unite with Neipperg. If all our subordinate com-
manders execute the orders that have been issued, Your Royal Majesty can
consider the army of Marshal Macdonald as practically destroyed.”82 Blü-
cher signed similar letters addressed to Alexander and Barclay.
Early on the morning of the 31st, Sacken’s corps commenced the crossing
of the Bober at Bunzlau. Vasilchikov reached the Queis at Paritz but found
the bridge destroyed and the French guarding the opposite bank. Organiza-
tional issues again delayed Yorck’s march. This time the creation of a new
vanguard at Tillendorf consumed several hours. After Sacken’s corps cleared
Tillendorf around 3:00 p.m., Katzler departed for Naumburg at the head of
an impressive vanguard: seven and three-quarters battalions, eighteen squad-
rons, twenty guns, and per his request a pioneer detachment. At 4:30, its lead
elements entered Naumburg. Of course they found the bridge over the
Queis down and the opposite bank lined with French skirmishers. Behind
them, the Prussians could see a large bivouac. Hiller, who again commanded
the van’s infantry, moved three Jäger companies to the eastern bank. He
scattered skirmishers among the terrain and in the houses of Ullersdorf
(Oldrzychów). Katzler’s cavalry occupied Naumburg along with two bat-
talions; the rest of the vanguard camped south of the town. Patrols estab-
lished communication with the vanguards of both Russian corps: Rudzevich
eight miles upriver at Bertelsdorf (Uniegoszcz) and Vasilchikov three miles
downriver at Paritz. East of Katzler, Yorck’s main body crossed the Bober
around 4:00 p.m. to bivouac one mile east of Naumburg at Herzogswaldau
(Milików) after sunset. The repair work on the bridge at Naumburg pro-
ceeded slowly during the night of 31 August–1 September because the
imperials had burned the pylons. Patrols reported that the river could not
be crossed without a bridge due to the high water level.
In Langeron’s sector, the French forces that had opposed his bridge-
building attempts near Löwenberg likewise withdrew in the night to
Lauban. Thus, on the morning of the 31st, the Russians finally bridged the
Bober at Löwenberg and Dippelsdorf. Rudzevich’s vanguard crossed the
river around 8:00 a.m. and commenced the march to Lauban. Arriving there,
N 0 5 10 15 20 25 miles
r
ve
er
Ri
is
Riv
ue Neudorf Tillendorf Bunzlau

Q
Bober
LU SAT IA SILESIA Siegersdorf
330
Penzig
r
Waldau
Schützenhain
Paritz
Hochkirch Kroischwitz
Neiße Rive
Ullersdorf Ottendorf
Hennersdorf Kieslingswalde Herzogswaldau Wenigwalditz
Naumburg
Reichenbach Markersdorf Görlitz Leopoldshain Pfaffendorf
Löwenberg
Lauban Bertelsdorf
Troitschendorf Seifersdorf
Landeskrone Hermsdorf
Schönberg Dippelsdorf
Bernstadt auf dem Eigen Ostritz
Marklissa Greiffenberg
Deutsch Ossig
Ottendorf
Radmeritz
Seidenberg
16. Region between the Bober and the Neiße Rivers

the Russians found both of its bridges over the Queis destroyed and a large
imperial force holding the opposite bank. Rudzevich posted the vanguard in
the region of Bertelsdorf while Langeron’s main body reached Seifersdorf
(Mściszów), five miles east of Lauban. Langeron informed Blücher that,
after destroying the bridges, the imperials had taken a position on the hills
of the left bank that surrounded Lauban in a semi-circle facing east.
According to prisoners, Lauriston had arrived from Bunzlau with V Corps
to unite with Marchand’s 39th Division, the 2nd Brigade of Ledru’s 31st
Division, 3,000 cavalry, and 24 guns. Further south, the rest of Ledru’s
division evacuated Greiffenberg and retreated to Marklissa on the Queis,
seven miles upriver of Lauban. As soon as the townspeople of Greiffenberg
informed St.-Priest of the French departure, Bistrom’s vanguard marched.
Pursuing west toward Marklissa and northwest toward Lauban, Bistrom
established communication with Rudzevich; St.-Priest’s main body moved
into Greiffenberg. By nightfall on the 31st, only the Queis separated the
main bodies of the two armies.
As for Blücher, the 31st found him feeling “very sick.” Nostitz tells us
that normally Blücher’s health “left nothing to be desired. His strong,
powerful body endured with ease all the fatigues of war and although
seventy years old his spirit maintained a juvenile cheerfulness. He accom-
panied all marches on horseback.” Learning about the loss of Moltke may
have contributed to his condition. “But all luck is accompanied by misfor-
tune: my good Count Moltke is no more,” wrote Blücher to his wife. “I sent
him to the king with news of the victory, where he certainly would have
received a considerable reward. On the way, he drowned in high water [the
Elbe] and here we grieve his loss.”83
Before transferring his headquarters from Hohlstein to Löwenberg on the
afternoon of the 31st, he received a discomforting report from Major Oppen,
his intelligence chief. Apparently, rumors had reached Löwenberg as early as
the afternoon of the 28th of a great French victory over the Austrians at
Dresden. A captured Westphalian officer added that his unit had been
informed of the emperor’s decisive victory over the main Allied army during
an epic struggle at Dresden on 26 August. According to the prisoner,
Schwarzenberg lost 12,000 prisoners, 15 guns, and 8 flags. Blücher and
Gneisenau immediately recognized the serious implications of this news
should it be true. Leaving the pursuit of Schwarzenberg to his marshals,
Napoleon would return to Silesia with reinforcements to crush Blücher and
drive him into Bohemia.84 By maneuvering Blücher into Bohemia, Napoleon
could surround and destroy both the Bohemian and Silesian Armies in one
great battle, similar to the situation that would lead to Königgrätz (Hradec
Králové) during the 1866 Austro-Prussian War. Consequently, Army Head-
quarters took precautions to prepare a fallback position in case Napoleon
forced a retreat. Before the defile of Wartha near Frankenstein, in the vicinity
of the three fortresses of Glatz, Silberberg, and Neiße, Gneisenau identified a

position that would allow the Silesian Army to stand against a superior
enemy and to close the southeastern passes into Bohemia. “If I am pressed
by superior forces,” Blücher assured Schwarzenberg, “I will move into this
position and accept battle in it if I am attacked.”85
That same day, the 31st, Blücher instructed his corps commanders to
have their light cavalry maintain constant contact with the enemy. Their
vanguards would remain within supporting distance of the forward cavalry
but their main bodies would not cross the Queis until further notice.
Recognizing the need to proceed with caution, similar to the operations
before the 26th, Blücher wanted his vanguards to continue to pressure and
unsettle Macdonald’s forces. At the same time, he halted the main body of
the army and concentrated his corps. In this way, he planned to be battle-
ready when Napoleon arrived with superior forces. He also informed his
corps commanders of the news he had received. Acting on this information,
Yorck ordered bridges thrown across the Bober at Wenigwalditz (Włodzice
Małe) and Kroischwitz to avoid colliding with Sacken’s corps at Bunzlau.
A road from both points had to be cut through Ottendorf (Ocice).
While Blücher prepared to retreat eastward, Macdonald continued his
retreat westward. During the night of 31 August/1 September, the Army of
the Bober left its position on the Queis, crossed the Neiße at Görlitz, and
took a position on the hills to the west. A single brigade reinforced by some
cavalry remained on the hills of the eastern bank until it crossed the Neiße
and occupied Görlitz on the evening of the 1st. On the opposite end,
Macdonald’s vanguard, Marchand’s 39th Division, reached Reichenbach.
We do not know why Macdonald united his army at Görlitz on 1 September.
If he wanted to defend the Neiße, a position at Görlitz would prove useless
because the Allies could cross the river at several other points. If he wanted
to continue the retreat, uniting his army on the hills west of Görlitz to
conduct a retrograde march on a single road made little sense.
On the morning of 1 September, Blücher repeated the order for the
cavalry to maintain contact with the enemy and for the infantry of the
vanguards to follow at a suitable distance. “The army has a day of rest,”
concluded the order. “At 6:00 this evening will be a religious service, both by
the corps as well as by the vanguards. Following it, a volley will be fired
from large and small cannon to celebrate the victory on the Katzbach and
the liberation of Silesia.” “So, one day of rest and a religious service! Then,
we will certainly get a good beating,” scoffed Yorck after receiving this
order. In compliance with Blücher’s orders, the main bodies of all three
corps remained on the eastern bank of the Queis that day while the van-
guards continued west. Around 7:00 a.m., Sacken reported that his light
cavalry had made contact with the enemy retreating toward Görlitz. From
Löbau, Madatov reported large French forces assembling at Görlitz,
0 5 10 15 20 25 miles N
er
r
iv
sR
Tillendorf
Rive
ei Neudorf Bunzlau
Qu
ber
Bo
L U S A T I A S I L E S I A Siegersdorf
Penzig
Waldau
Schützenhain
ver
x
333
xxx
Hochkirch Sacken Kroischwitz
x
Neiße Ri
Paritz Ottendorf
Ullersdorf xxxx
Hennersdorf xxx Herzogswaldau Wenigwalditz Silesia
xxxx Yorck Naumburgxxx
Bober Leopoldshain Troitschendorf Löwenberg
Bertelsdorf Langeron
Bautzen Lauban
Görlitz Hermsdorf Seifersdorf
x
Schönberg Dippelsdorf
Ostritz
Marklissa xxx Greiffenberg
Deutsch Ossig St.-Priest
Ottendorf
Radmeritz x
Seidenberg

fourteen miles east of his position. Yet imperial troops had already started
the retreat from Görlitz toward Bautzen. Twenty miles south of Görlitz,
Poniatowski’s VIII Corps held a fortified position at Zittau. Later in the day,
around 3:00, Sacken’s engineers repaired the bridges over the Queis down-
stream of Paritz at Siegersdorf (Zebrzydowa-Wieś) and Neudorf (Nowa
Wieś), allowing Vasilchikov’s vanguard to reach Hochkirch (Przesieczany)
ten miles east of Görlitz. Sacken’s main body remained at Paritz. The corps
commander’s 3:00 p.m. report expressed his intention to continue to Görlitz.
Without considering the general circumstances, Sacken suggested attacking
Macdonald immediately. Doubtless Sacken’s aggressive attitude pleased Blü-
cher, but the news about Dresden made the stakes much higher than the old
Prussian could afford. Around 8:30 p.m., Sacken communicated Karpov’s
report that large enemy forces indeed stood at Görlitz.86
In the center, Yorck’s men did not repair the bridge over the Queis at
Naumburg until 10:00 a.m. on the 1st. Not wanting to lose contact with the
imperials, Katzler had ordered six squadrons of the Brandenburg Uhlans
and Black Hussars to swim the river four hours earlier. He pursued the
enemy to Hennersdorf (Je˛drzychowice) on the Neiße downriver from
Görlitz. Aided by the Cossacks, his patrols rode close to Görlitz. They
learned that the main body of Macdonald’s troops had moved into an
entrenched camp west of Görlitz: only weak imperial forces remained on
the east bank. Meanwhile, Hiller and the rest of Yorck’s vanguard joined
Vasilchikov at Hochkirch. On the left wing, the imperial units facing
Langeron’s corps at Lauban likewise departed early in the morning for
Görlitz pursued by the Cossacks. As soon as the Russians completed the
pontoon bridge, Rudzevich’s vanguard cavalry crossed the Queis and
advanced to the Neiße. Rudzevich’s infantry remained at Lauban while
Langeron’s main body rested at Seifersdorf. St.-Priest’s vanguard, now com-
manded by General Nikolay Borozdin II, moved to Seidenberg (Zawidów),
eleven miles southeast of Görlitz. Leading his main body to Marklissa on the
Queis, St.-Priest reestablished communication with Neipperg’s Austrians at
Liebenau (Hodkovice nad Mohelkou) and delivered Blücher’s instructions.87
With his vanguard in Upper Lusatia, Blücher’s first campaign as an
independent army commander ended with the liberation of Silesia in just
fourteen days. To celebrate, he issued a general order to the army on
1 September courtesy of Gneisenau’s quill:
Silesia is now liberated from the enemy. To your courage, brave soldiers of the
Russian and Prussian army under my orders, your exertions and perseverance,
your patience in the endurance of hardships and shortages, I owe the good
fortune of having ripped a beautiful province from the hands of a greedy foe.
During the battle of the Katzbach, you defiantly opposed the enemy.
Courageously and with the speed of lightning you broke forth from behind
the hills. You spurned attacking him with musket fire; without hesitating you
advanced, [and] your bayonets drove him over the steep valley edges of the
Wütende Neiße and the Katzbach.
Since then you have waded through rivers and swollen streams. Some of
you have suffered from the shortage of provisions because the washed-out
roads and lack of wagons prevented their transport. You have struggled with
cold, wet, privations, and some of you lack sufficient clothing; nevertheless,
you did not grumble and you pursued your defeated enemy with effort.
I thank you for such praiseworthy conduct. Only he who combines such
characteristics is a natural-born soldier.
In our hands are 103 cannon, 250 caissons, the enemy’s hospital equip-
ment, his field forges, his flour wagons, 1 general of division, 2 generals of
brigade, and a large number of colonels as well as staff and other officers,
18,000 prisoners, 2 Eagles, and other trophies. The remainder of those who
faced you in the battle of the Katzbach have been so seized by the terror of
your arms that they can no longer bear to see your bayonets. You have seen
the roads and fields between the Katzbach and the Bober; they bear the signs
of the terror and confusion of your enemy.
Let us sing praises to the Lord of Hosts, through whose help you have
defeated the enemy and in religious service let us publicly thank him for the
glorious victory. A threefold salvo of artillery will conclude the hour that you
consecrate to prayer. Then, after your enemy anew!88
Feeling better than the previous day, Blücher boasted: “Yesterday

I chased the last Frenchman across the Saxon frontier. The fruits of our
victory you will see . . . 103 guns, 250 caissons, 18,000 prisoners, 2 Eagles,
and other trophies. This evening around 6:00 p.m. will be a general religious
service and early tomorrow morning the bridges over the Queis, which the
enemy burned and destroyed, will be repaired and I will pursue.” Although
Blücher had reason to celebrate, losses among the Prussians had not been
slight. Yorck’s corps had lost some 12,925 men and 1,119 horses since
hostilities had commenced. On 31 August, I Corps numbered 25,296 men
and 6,248 horses. The Russians had fared better: Sacken reported the totals
of his musters to be 15,119 men indicating a loss of 2,793 men after hostilities
resumed. After sustaining a loss of 6,648 men since the armistice expired,
Langeron reported his corps to number 28,340 men on 1 September.
St.-Priest’s army corps totaled 13,320 men by 1 September. In round figures,
the Silesian Army had lost some 23,000 men in less than three weeks of
campaigning; 82,000 men remained for the next stage of the war.89
Harmony rarely existed between the leading figures of the Silesian Army,
as Gneisenau explained:
The two subordinate generals, Langeron and Yorck, are poor commanders.
The former is nervous and faint-hearted to the extreme, the latter always
pessimistic; both lack mental fortitude. Moreover, the latter hates me
wholeheartedly and censures all of my measures. If it had been up to these

two, instead of being victors, we would have been completely defeated on 26
August. From the brilliant position assigned to him, Langeron sent back
almost all of his artillery so he would not have to fight. Nevertheless, because
of the victory of our wing, he was saved, barely. The latter wanted twenty-
four hours of rest. Had he been granted this, his corps would have stood five
miles behind Langeron’s, and when Langeron was overwhelmed we would
have been defeated.90
Gneisenau remained embittered by the conduct of Yorck and Langeron.

“I gave the disposition for the pursuit of the enemy immediately after the
battle. Had it been followed, nothing of Macdonald’s army would have
survived. At that time, the waters of the heavens were in league with
us, discharging so that all streams were swollen and the rivers overflowing
their banks. No enemy would have been saved. But the pursuit was post-
poned by the subordinate commanders and for the most part the enemy
escaped.”91 “Such were the results of the battle on the Katzbach,” explained
Müffling in his 1827 work, “which although not bloody, was as important in
its consequences as the most bloody of battles. Until 3 and 4 September,
prisoners continued to be brought in from all sides; the Landsturm in the
mountains on our left flank took an active part in this. From 18,000 to 20,000
prisoners, over 100 guns, more than 300 caissons, the hospital wagons, and
baggage of the army remained in our hands. More important than this was
the spirit that now pervaded the army, which must be viewed as the result of
this battle. The army itself was amazed about the great results, as each
individual part could only see a small portion of the results of the pursuit.
All united in praise of the field commander and the acclamation for rescuing
Silesia was itself a satisfying reward for the Russian soldiers.”92
On reaching the Neiße after liberating Silesia, Blücher had much to be
proud of: energy, controlled aggression, and commitment to defeating the
enemy army marked his leadership. His army had remained in constant
contact with the imperials since it moved across the neutral zone. Almost
no day went by in which some part of his army did not engage the enemy.
While the need for the numerous combats, countermarches, and night
marches can be debated, it is difficult to imagine how Blücher could other-
wise have fulfilled his charge at a time when information, which was not
always accurate, traveled only as fast as a horse could gallop. Blücher often
had to overcome the passive resistance, preconceived opinions, jealousies,
and biases of his corps commanders, who habitually saw only difficulties in
the task at hand. Rather than consider the far worse situation of the French
army, Yorck and Langeron only looked at the situation of their own troops.
According to Freytag-Loringhoven: “In the creation of this contrast
between the army leadership and the subordinate commanders lies no
reproach for otherwise reliable men because they conducted the war as they
had learned it, but in this is a claim to glory for the leadership of the Silesian
Army and the proof of how high they stand out above the mass of their
contemporaries.”93
As for Macdonald, his biggest mistake occurred on the night after the
battle itself. Rather than withdraw during the night, he should have allowed
the army to rest along the left bank of the Katzbach throughout the night of
26/27 August. For this to have been possible, imperial command and control
needed to have been more efficient in reordering the troops coming from the
plateau. Niederkrayn could have been held by at least one division to stop
the Allies from debouching. As we have seen, the disaster on the plateau in
no way resembled Prussian accounts of a complete rout. Besides, two
cavalry divisions, one infantry division, and one infantry brigade supported
by three batteries did not constitute Macdonald’s army. After Lauriston
stopped Langeron’s late push, Macdonald had little to fear from Blücher’s
army considering the weather, terrain, and time of day. Regardless, Macdonald
ordered a general retreat during the night, which further disrupted his com-
mand and control. Worse for the Army of the Bober, Macdonald overtaxed
the physical limits of his starving and exhausted soldiers. For this reason, the
men of Lauriston’s V Corps, who had arguably scored a victory against
Langeron’s Russians, fell apart on the road to Goldberg. In such a state of
exhaustion, they could no longer fight or march. Thus, we see Langeron’s
soldiers take the lion’s share of the spoils. Although this argument is based
on speculation, twelve hours of rest and reorganization followed by a coordin-
ated retreat commencing at 7:00 on the morning of the 27th could have
saved Macdonald’s army from the dissolution that overcame it.94
Notes
1 Quoted in Blasendorff, Blücher, 207–08. According to Delbrück, in Gneisenau,
III:214, Dr. Karl Otto Johannes Theresius, Baron von Richthofen (1811–1888)
communicated this story to Hans Delbrück. Only two years old in 1813, Karl no
doubt heard this story from his father, Karl Ernst (1747–1841). Manfred von
Richthofen (1892–1918), the famous Red Baron of the First World War, was a
distant cousin.
2 Blücher to Amalie, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, and Blücher to Bonin, at the Katz-
bach, 27 August 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 175–76; Blassendorf, Blücher, 208.
3 Blücher to Bernadotte, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, is RA KrA, volym 25.
Scharnhorst delivered a copy of the same report to Bernadotte. Moltke bore
victory reports to Alexander, Frederick William, and Barclay but nothing for
Schwarzenberg.
4 Quoted in Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 32.
5 Quoted in Nostitz, Tagebuch, 57.
7 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:83; Blücher to Frederick William, Gold-

berg, 6:00 p.m., 28 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Blücher to Sacken, Hohl-
stein, 30 August 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3851, ll. 266–266b. Although
Gneisenau stated this to be the case in his 26 August letter to Gibsone, it is
unclear why Blücher waited until the 30th to make it official.
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21; Blücher to Bernadotte, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, RA
KrA, volym 25; Nostitz, Tagebuch, 56–57.
9 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:66–67. According to Droysen in Yorck,
II:138, “On receiving this disposition, Langeron declared he would not follow it.
‘He spoke of secret instructions he had to obey and that he could not risk his
corps.’” Later German scholars retreated from their nationalistic assault on
Langeron. Writing in 1900, Freytag-Loringhoven argued that Langeron’s “actions
appear less ambiguous than they have been described up to now by German
sources. In view of the continued back-and-forth marches of the recent days,
which must have been blamed on the army’s leadership, Langeron’s measures
appear comprehensible in a purely objective military assessment of the situation,
at least from the standpoint of a Russian commander, all the more so when
Langeron’s corps was attacked by Lauriston’s V Corps. Regardless, Langeron’s
behavior cannot be justified by hindsight”: Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung
und Armeeführung, 81.
10 According to Langeron, “At noon, despite the rain that had fallen in torrents
since nine in the morning, the enemy sharply attacked my front but, having seen
that their principal columns were still moving on my left and into the woods, and
having received from Yuzefovich news that an enemy corps was moving on
Schönau, and seemed to wish to move on Jauer (which Macdonald had effectively
ordered), I detached X Infantry Corps from the rear . . . and ordered Kaptsevich
to move on Peterwitz and, if necessary, on Moisdorf, to stop the enemy from
advancing on Jauer. Having detached X Infantry Corps, which also served as my
reserve, I remained with one extremely extended line”: Langeron, Mémoires, 253.
11 Langeron, Mémoires, 253, emphasis added.
12 Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 20b, and Hardenberg to Gneisenau, Laun an der Eger
(Louny nad Ohřı́), 30 August 1813, ibid., Nr. 24; Thile to Gneisenau, Teplitz,
31 August 1813, ibid., Nr. 21.
13 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 56, quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:159.
14 Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Goldberg, 28 August 1813, GStA, PK, VI HA Rep. 92
15 Unger, Blücher, II:81. Unger followed Blasendorff’s assessment: “Blücher
achieved great success through the victory at the Katzbach and the restless
pursuit. It became even greater through the influence that it had on the victorious
army. Now, the defiant corps commanders had to admit that Headquarters’ plan
had been more than the sudden bright idea of an ingenious mind.” See Blasen-
dorff, Blücher, 211.
17 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 40–41. Despite the balanced approach to this work as
opposed to his Aus meinem Leben, Müffling continues with a blatant lie to shield
the image of the Silesian Army: “In the subsequent seven months, until its
demobilization after the peace, no complaint and no discontent occurred again.
Everyone served willingly under General Blücher, and the deeds performed by
this army in 1813 and 1814 will sufficiently prove to posterity that it must have
been animated by a rare spirit of unity and trust.” Droysen, in Yorck, II:148, calls
this comment “inaccurate.”
20 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:149. According to Droysen, Gneisenau wrote this
letter in early September and obviously before he had received the king’s letter of
31 August stating: “General Blücher’s report informed me of the part you have
had in the operations of the Silesian Army and especially in the success of the
attack on 26 August and the defeat of the enemy.” Thanks to Blücher’s praise,
Frederick William awarded Gneisenau the Iron Cross, First Class. See Frederick
William to Gneisenau, Teplitz, 31 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 16.
21 Gneisenau to Knesebeck, Hohlstein, 31 August 1813, in Droysen, Yorck, II:148–49.
23 Gneisenau to Gibsone, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, GStA, PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21; Gneisenau to Gaudi, Jauer, 26 August 1813, ibid., Nr. 16;
Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:239–40; “Generalmajor von Gaudi über den
Abzug der Franzosen aus Schlesien,” Frankenstein, 26 August 1813, in Pflugk-
Harttung, Das Befreiungsjahr 1813, Nr. 202, 282.
24 Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Goldberg, 28 August 1813, GStA, PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21; Blücher to Frederick William, Goldberg, 6:00 p.m.,
28 August 1813, RA KrA, volym 25.
25 Army Order, Brechelshof, 9:30 p.m., 26 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:126; see also Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:316; Unger, Blücher, II:83.
26 Müffling calls the disposition for the 27th “impractical” and “impracticable”:
Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 69–70.
27 During the morning just before the battle, Blücher wrote to the magistrate of
Breslau requesting a loan of 150,000 thaler from the city so he could purchase
cloth for better uniforms: Blücher to Kospoth, magistrate of Breslau, Jauer,
26 August 1813, Blücher, “Aus Blüchers Korrespondenz,” ed. Granier, 159–60.
Kospoth responded that the city was not in a position to make large loans.
28 Droysen, in Yorck, II:147, took these figures as well as the description of the militia
being “almost all without shoes and trousers; all without coats, in the worst
condition” from Hiller’s comments on 1st Battalion of 14th Silesian Landwehr.
29 Gneisenau to Gibsone, Brechelshof, 26 August 1813, GStA, PK, VI HA Rep. 92
30 Droysen, Yorck, II:150; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 37.
31 Langeron, Mémoires, 261; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:234; Freytag-
Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 85–86; Bogdanovich, Geschichte
des Krieges, IIa:73–75.
32 Ivan Panchulidzev, known as Panchulidzev I, and his younger brother Semyon,

known as Panchulidzev II. However, it does not appear that the younger Pan-
chulidzev participated in this engagement.
33 Blücher to Charles John, Goldberg, 6:00 p.m., 28 August 1813, RA KrA, volym
25; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 38–39; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges,
IIa:75–76; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:322; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklär-
ung und Armeeführung, 89–90; Gneisenau, Blücher, 168; Lieven, Russia Against
Napoleon, 386–87; Langeron, Mémoires, 261–63. In Geschichte des Krieges,
IIa:31, Bogdanovich puts the loss of French officers lower, at seventeen
including Maury.
34 The vanguard consisted of Horn’s 7th Brigade, the 4th Company of the Guard
Jäger Battalion, and a portion of the Reserve Cavalry: the Lithuanian Dragoons,
the 5th and 10th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiments, and one horse battery.
35 Horn to Yorck is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:139; see also Müffling, Die
Feldzüge, 37; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 86.
36 Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:210, 235–36; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
I:317–18; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 87.
37 Blücher to Yorck, Brechelshof, 2:00 p.m., 27 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1844:139; Droysen, Yorck, II:150; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:319;
Yorck to Blücher, Niederkrayn, 7:45 p.m., 27 August 1813, GStA PK, IV HA
Rep. 15 A 324.
38 Blücher to Yorck, Eichholtz, 6:30 p.m., 27 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1844:140–41; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:318–19; Freytag-
Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 88.
39 Blücher to Frederick William, Goldberg, 6:00 p.m., 28 August 1813, RA KrA,
volym 25; Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Goldberg, 28 August 1813, GStA, PK, VI
HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
40 Sacken’s performance certainly had nothing to do with goodwill. On the morning
after the battle, he wrote to Blücher that “the victory that Your Excellency won
over the enemy yesterday will find a distinguished place in our history. It has
gloriously reopened the campaign. Our descendants will read with compassion
how hand in hand the Allies defeated the destroyer of human peace, and they will
say: that was their strength”: Sacken to Blücher, Großjänowitz, 10:00 a.m.,
27 August 1813, in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:235.
25; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:148–49; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:320;
Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:236–37.
42 According to Droysen, in Yorck, II:152: “Both letters were written by Gneisenau,
and whoever recalls the pursuit after the battle of Belle-Alliance [Waterloo] can
recognize that they breathe his spirit.”
43 The first letter is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:141, while the second is in
Droysen, in Yorck, II:151–52.
45 Quoted in Unger, Blücher, II:84; Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 70–71.
46 Quoted in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:322–23; Langeron, Mémoires, 263;
Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 90.
47 Lieven, Napoleon Against Russia, 387; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:212;
Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Goldberg, 28 August 1813, GStA, PK, VI HA Rep. 92
48 Oudinot later changed course and took the direct road to Wittenberg. See
Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, 160–76.
49 Blasendorff, Blücher, 212; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und
Armeeführung, 96.
50 Blücher to Langeron, Eichholtz, 28 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:149; Varnhagen von Ense, Blücher, 191–92.
51 Blücher to Gaudi, Eichholtz, 28 and 29 August 1813, GStA, PK, VI HA Rep. 92
52 Katzler to Blücher and Yorck in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:145.
53 Katzler to Blücher in Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 93.
54 Horn to Yorck in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:146; Freytag-Loringhoven,
Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 93.
56 Langeron to Blücher in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:149.
57 Blücher to Frederick William, Goldberg, 6:00 p.m., 28 August 1813, RA KrA,
volym 25; Droysen, Yorck, II:151; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:325–27;
Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 94–99.
58 In Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:241–42.
59 This account is based on Langeron, Mémoires, 264–65; Plotho, Der Krieg,
II:116–17; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 39–40; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre,
147–48; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:79–80; Friederich, Herbstfeld-
zug 1813, I:332; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:240; Gneisenau, Blücher, 170;
Six, Dictionnaire Biographique, II:455.
60 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 100; Gneisenau to a
friend, Hohlstein, 29 August 1813, in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:242–43.
62 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 98; Horn to Yorck, Gna-
denberg, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:151; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
I:330.
63 Quoted in Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 98–99.
64 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:154–55. After the war, Schack compiled the “Tage-
buch of I Armeekorps während des Feldzuges von 1814,” which for the most part
is reproduced in the essay “Der Verluste der Armeen in den neueren Kriegen,”
1841:143–82, 192–208, without the source being specified.
65 Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 99–100; Friederich,
67 Gneisenau maintained that these severe conditions did not impact morale: “The
soldier went through water up to his chest; he sank in the mud; many are barefoot
and their number increases. In this ravaged region is a lack of foodstuffs and the
supply wagons cannot follow because of the muddy roads. Also, the evacuated
villages lack wagons. Regardless, instead of complaining, the soldier bears these
hardships with joy.” See Gneisenau to a friend, Hohlstein by Löwenberg,

29 August 1813, in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:242–43. Regarding the
internal conditions of the Russian corps, the available sources say little, yet the
Russians who were weather-beaten, hardened by the tremendous march from the
Russian interior, and much more well clothed and outfitted, appeared to have
better endured the exertions and privations of these days.
68 Jürgaß to Yorck in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:150–51; Droysen, Yorck, II:152;
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:328.
69 Yorck to Blücher, Leisersdorf, 29 August 1813, GStA PK, IV HA Rep. 15 A 324.
Friedrich explains: “according to the conditions among the Landwehr, we must
find it understandable that goodwill was not sufficient to surmount the unex-
pected exertions when the men were insufficiently clothed and fed. How import-
ant at that very moment good clothing is for the endurance of extraordinary
hardships is proven by the circumstance that those battalions who obtained
overcoats and shoes from dead or captured French soldiers fared much better.”
See Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:328.
71 Yorck to Blücher, Leisersdorf, 29 August 1813, GStA PK, IV HA Rep. 15 A 324.
72 Unger, Blücher, II:85–86; Droysen, Yorck, II:154.
73 Blücher to Yorck, Hohlstein, 30 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:154–55.
74 Yorck to Blücher, Leisersdorf, 30 August 1813, GStA PK, IV HA Rep. 15 A 324;
Blücher to Yorck, Hohlstein, 31 August 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:155–56; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:243–45.
75 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 71.
1844:155–56.
77 Souham’s rearguard halted at Gnadenberg with his main body on the west bank
of the Bober at Tillendorf along with XI Corps and II Cavalry Corps. In the
center, Lauriston’s V Corps bivouacked west of the Bober at Ottendorf while
Ledru’s 31st Division extended between Löwenberg and Greiffenberg. Clearing
the Queis, Marchand’s 39th Division reached Lauban. St.-Priest’s main body
reached Hirschberg, his van Spiller. Yorck’s and Sacken’s vanguards remained
united at Schwiebendorf (Świeborowice) while the main bodies of the corps stood
at Ulbersdorf and Haynau respectively. Langeron’s van held Plagwitz; the main
body halted at Lauterseiffen.
78 These two “regiments” comprised the 1st Brigade of Sacken’s 16th Division.
79 The account of the action on 30 August is based on Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIa:81; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 100–05;
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, I:336–39.
80 Gneisenau to Münster, Hohlstein by Löwenberg, 30 August 1813, GStA, PK, VI
HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 20b. Whether Gneisenau actually believed that
only 20,000 men remained at Macdonald’s disposal or he meant for such state-
ments to be used as political capital in London matters little. The disintegration of
Macdonald’s army unquestionably helped erase the memory of the destruction of
the Prussian army in 1806. Yet Gneisenau, a political animal, knew that Münster,
the former Hanoverian minister, enjoyed a close relationship with the British
royal family. He took this opportunity to lobby for more support, mainly
material aid, based on the merit of the Silesian Army: “The weather is awful,
the rain incessant. The soldier spends the night in the open air, sinks in the mud,
lacks shoes, and wades after the enemy in swollen waters up to his chest. He goes
without food because the abandoned villages contain nothing edible. Due to the
lack of wagons, nothing can be delivered. Often, he is barefoot and wades through
the muck. Most of the militia have only linen trousers and lack overcoats. Due to
the expansion of the army from 40,000 men to 270,000 men and because of the
exertions of the state, neither material nor money is available to purchase cloth.
Nevertheless, the soldier does not complain, but endures with patience all these
difficulties and goes joyfully and decisively against the enemy. The militia rivals
the standing army. Give my regards to the prince regent and the duke of York.”
81 Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:247–48.
1844:161; Blücher to Frederick William, Hohlstein by Löwenberg, 31 August
1813, in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:251–52.
83 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 59; Blücher to Amalie, Hohlstein by Löwenberg, 1 September
1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 177; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges,
IIa:81–82; Freytag-Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 106–07.
84 Blücher to Gaudi, Hohlstein by Löwenberg, 31 August 1813, GStA, PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16: “The enemy could win advantages against the
Grand [Bohemian] Army, wanting to make himself master of Bohemia, concen-
trate against our Silesian Army with superior forces, endeavor to defeat us, and
then seek to win additional passages into Bohemia. This is the case we must keep
in mind.”
85 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Hohlstein by Löwenberg, 2 September 1813, Add
MSS, 20112, 5.
86 Sacken to Blücher, Paritz, 7:00 a.m., 3:00 p.m., and 8:30 p.m., 1 September 1813,
in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:165–66; Droysen, Yorck, II:160; Freytag-
Loringhoven, Aufklärung und Armeeführung, 106–08.
87 Blücher to Neipperg, Hohlstein by Löwenberg, 31 August 1813, Österreichisches
Staatsarchiv Kriegsarchiv (hereafter ÖStA KA), FA 1530, 66a; Friederich, Herbst-
feldzug 1813, I:338–41.
88 Order of the Day, Hohlstein by Löwenberg, 1 September 1813, in Höpfner,
89 Blücher to Amalie, Hohlstein by Löwenberg, 1 September 1813, Blüchers Briefe,
ed. Unger, 176; GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 108; Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1844:169–70. The loss of 12,925 men from I Corps is broken down
as follows: 11,132 infantry; 1,617 cavalry; 192 gunners; and 14 pioneers. Of the
12,955, the Landwehr accounted for 7,092. The Prussian General Staff estimated
that 5,000 of the 12,955 had been lost prior to the Katzbach, 874 during the battle
itself, 354 during the engagement at Bunzlau, and the rest during the pursuit to
the Neiße. Of the 25,296 men still under arms, 18,785 served with the infantry;
4,101 cavalry; 1,755 artillery, and 135 pioneers. Sacken’s corps lost 575 men at the
Katzbach. Of Sacken’s remaining 15,119 men, 7,454 were infantry; 6,700 cavalry,
and 965 gunners. Langeron reported a loss of 1,400 men at the Katzbach but this
number appears too low. His remaining 28,340 men are broken down thus: 19,769
infantry; 5,789 cavalry; and 2,782 artillery and pioneers. St.-Priest commenced the
campaign with 13,586 men but received one cavalry regiment numbering 500
troopers. Thus, his losses in August amount to some 856 men.
90 Gneisenau to Münster, Bautzen, 18 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 20b.
91 Gneisenau to Maria von Clausewitz, 7 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
8
“Nothing more remains than

to have them shot dead”
The triumphant proclamation Blücher issued to the troops on 1 September

masked the anxiety of Silesian Army Headquarters, which only increased on
the 2nd. On this day, Blücher received Barclay’s letter from Altenberg dated
the 29th, which reported the failed attempt on Dresden and the advance of
Vandamme’s I Corps from Königstein around the right flank of the Bohe-
mian Army. In response, Schwarzenberg decided to retreat over the
Erzgebirge and back into Bohemia. Still, the Allies held all the mountain
passes and Barclay predicted Schwarzenberg would advance again soon. He
added that the Prussian troops had distinguished themselves through discip-
line and courage. Later that day, Major Wenzel Liechtenstein arrived from
Schwarzenberg’s headquarters to present a verbal report based on extensive
instructions from the Austrian staff. Not only did Liechtenstein provide
news of the battle of Dresden, but he also requested that Blücher march to
Bohemia with 50,000 men to reinforce the main army. The Austrian major
also delivered Gneisenau a letter from Neipperg at Liebenau urging him to
support Schwarzenberg’s request. “In the name of the good cause,” wrote
Neipperg, “please do what is possible. By doing this, you will only bring
more military renown to your glorious army.”1
As noted, the Bohemian Army had moved across the Saxon frontier on
22 August, storming the imperial camp at Pirna on the 23rd. As the Silesian
Army engaged the Army of the Bober on the 26th, Schwarzenberg assailed
Dresden. However, the three days Schwarzenberg used to cover the twelve
miles that separated Pirna from Dresden cost him dearly. Although not
present, Langeron provides interesting commentary:
While Napoleon arrived to attack us at Löwenberg, the main army of the

sovereigns moved on Dresden. By moving against the Army of Silesia with
the majority of his forces and leaving only a small contingent at Dresden,
345
Napoleon appeared to count more on slowness – always justified regarding

the Austrians – than on a real calculation based on the rules of the military
art. According to these rules, he should have lost Dresden. Encircled by our
armies, deprived of his base, deprived of his lines of operation, and cut off
from his reserves, he should have been destroyed.
The plan to liberate Dresden adopted by the chiefs of the main Allied
army was perfectly conceived and would have unfailingly succeeded had its
execution corresponded to the dispositions; but Schwarzenberg and his
quacks totally ignored the great principle of war that a moment can never
be lost, or to put off until tomorrow what can be done today. Had Schwar-
zenberg pushed his attacks on the same day that he appeared before Dresden,
even if he had pushed them vigorously the next morning, undoubtedly
Marshal St.-Cyr would have been forced to surrender or evacuate the Saxon
capital by the Dresden bridge, but Schwarzenberg wanted to wait . . . It is due
to their incurable slowness that the Austrians always suffered reverses,
because their troops (especially the Hungarians) are very brave, their officers
instructed and susceptible to serve well, although they are too pedantic and
too attached to old principles . . . They provided time for Napoleon to arrive
and completely change the situation.2
Thus, Napoleon arrived with the Guard to repel Schwarzenberg’s

assault. During the night of 26/27 August, the French II and VI Corps
came up, increasing Napoleon’s combatants to 135,000 men against
215,000 Allied soldiers. Continuing the battle on the 27th, Napoleon
enveloped Schwarzenberg’s left, crushing two Austrian corps. With
Vandamme’s I Corps steadily working around his right, Schwarzenberg
ordered the retreat. The Army of Bohemia withdrew after losing 38,000
killed, wounded, and missing along with 40 guns. Although the imperials
sustained far fewer casualties in comparison (10,000), decisive victory again
eluded Napoleon. Illness forced the emperor to leave the field rather than
personally coordinate the pursuit. Vandamme’s I Corps followed by XIV
and VI Corps closed on Schwarzenberg’s demoralized army.
Allied Headquarters feared Napoleon would invade Bohemia along the
left bank of the Elbe. Planning to take a position on the right bank of the
Eger in the region of Budin or Laun (Louny), Schwarzenberg sought sub-
stantial reinforcements to stop the French emperor. Thus, he petitioned
Blücher on 30 August to personally hurry to aid him by leading the majority
of the Silesian Army, at least 50,000 men, through Theresienstadt (Terezı́n),
while 5,000–6,000 of Blücher’s Cossacks should be sent across the Elbe to
operate against the enemy’s communications in Saxony. Schwarzenberg
stipulated that the rest of the Silesian Army should unite with the Austrian
2nd Light Division and take a position around Zittau. He also expressed
hope that Bernadotte’s Army of North Germany had already crossed the
Elbe and would close on the rear of the Grande Armée as it penetrated
“Nothing more remains than to have them shot dead” 347
Bohemia.3 Although flawed, the logic behind Schwarzenberg’s request is

clear: thinking that his own advance on Dresden had compelled Napoleon to
concentrate the majority of his forces at the Saxon capital, Schwarzenberg
incorrectly assumed that nothing stood in Blücher’s path. Second, he sup-
posed that Napoleon would ignore the Silesian Army in order to pursue the
Bohemian Army with all of his forces. His being wrong on both accounts
made it impossible for Blücher to comply with Schwarzenberg’s request
even if he had desired to do so.
Before examining and assessing the evasive yet insightful response the
Prussians made to Schwarzenberg, it is useful to scrutinize a letter draf-
ted by Gneisenau to Bennigsen, the commander of the Army of Poland.
Arriving almost simultaneously with Liechtenstein, a Russian orderly
delivered a communiqué from Bennigsen stating that he would reach
Breslau on 31 August with his left wing: General Dmitry Dokhturov’s
corps of 26,000 men. His right wing, Pyotr Tolstoy’s corps of 16,000 men,
standing only one march from the Silesian frontier, would observe
Glogau on the right bank of the Oder and maintain communication with
Bernadotte. Bennigsen planned to remain at the Silesian capital until an
evaluation of the situation determined where he should direct his force.4
Schwarzenberg’s letter prompted Blücher’s response to Bennigsen’s
dispatch; its contents reveal how the Prussians planned to handle
Schwarzenberg:
Just now the imperial Austrian major, Prince Liechtenstein, arrived with
instructions for me in the name of Field-Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg;
I have the honor of sending you a copy. Because it is known to me that His
Majesty Tsar Alexander commands the Allied armies and up to now I have
received my operational orders only from him, I believe that on these
grounds I do not have to implicitly obey the request of Prince Schwarzen-
berg. I will especially refuse to obey it because this request is based solely on
an assumption, mainly on the concern that the emperor Napoleon will
pursue the Bohemian Army into Bohemia with his main force. Yet, it can
just as likely be his intention – as he has already done on 21 August at
Löwenberg – to suddenly turn against me with the majority of his forces,
defeat me, and win all the debouches from Silesia into Bohemia. Thus,
I consider it absolutely necessary to keep my army together until the enemy’s
movements remove all doubt over his intentions. However, in case Prince
Schwarzenberg’s assumption comes true, I want to satisfy his immediate
desire and so I request that you issue orders to General [Yevgeny] Markov,
whom you stated you would send to me, so I can send Langeron’s corps to
join the army in Bohemia. Furthermore, I see myself induced to urgently and
insistently request that if the emperor Napoleon actually pursues the army in
Bohemia with his main force that you will unite with me in a joint offensive
operation against the Elbe, which . . . will be of decisive service for the good
cause.5
r
N
R ive
N
e
Schöps
e
e
Wei
Löbau S
tream
Weißenberg
Spr
ße S
w a rz e
ch
Königshain chö
p
S
s
Wurschen Ebersbach
iße River
Bautzen Litten
Niethen Schöps
Pommritz Lauske Markersdorf
Kuppritz Glossen
Hochkirch
348
Plotzen Kittlitz Reichenbach Töpfer Height Görlitz
Sornßig Eiserode Krappe
Pitschen Height
Wuischke Lehn Lobau
Nechen
Wendisch Paulsdorf
Ebersdorf Landeskrone
Herwigsdorf
Bernstadt auf
dem Eigen Ostritz
Gruhna
0 5 10 15 miles
18. Region between the Neiße and the Spree Rivers

In this letter to Bennigsen, four points clearly emerge. First, Blücher would
accept direct orders only from Alexander. Second, he did not agree with
Schwarzenberg’s assumption that Napoleon would pursue the main army
into Bohemia. Third, he wished to rid himself of Langeron by transferring
his corps to the Bohemian Army in return for Markov’s corps from the
Army of Poland.6 Fourth, Blücher wanted to drive to the Elbe in unison
with Bennigsen.7
Keeping these intentions in mind, let us look at his response to Schwar-
zenberg. “In your desire for me to detach 50,000 men from my army corps,”
stated Blücher, “Your Excellency assumes that the French emperor will
follow the Allied army into Bohemia with his main force.” Reminding
Schwarzenberg that this scenario “is still not certain,” Blücher speculated
that “an offensive movement by my army to the Elbe on indirect roads may
perhaps be a more effective response than a straight march of 50,000 men to
Bohemia, a number that will hardly increase the actual strength of the Allied
army in Bohemia compared to the strategic and morale advantages of
keeping my army together and having it make an offensive movement to
the Elbe.” He then stated his main concern: “We also can foresee the case
that the French emperor will once again unite his main force against us here
to defeat us or at least to drive us back and through this win the passage from
Silesia to Bohemia and reach the Allied rear. In this case it is undoubtedly
better to maintain the local [Silesian] army in an imposing condition instead
of dismembering it and sending it where it will not be much help.”
The letter continued by stressing that “much hard fighting” had reduced
the Silesian Army to fewer than 70,000 men. By detaching 50,000 soldiers,
“the existence of an army here would disappear.” Blücher then emphasized
two advantages of preserving the Silesian Army. First, it offered the only
direct protection for Silesia if the French emperor decided to invade the
province. Second, it offered “the advantage of an offensive movement to the
Elbe if he should pursue the Allied army into Bohemia.” Staying with his pet
project, Blücher assured Schwarzenberg that a march to the Elbe would
place him “in position to unite with the crown prince of Sweden,” who
otherwise “would be difficult to convince to advance toward the Elbe.” He
also informed Schwarzenberg of his plans to withdraw to the entrenched
camp near Frankenstein if Napoleon advanced against the Silesian Army:
“As soon as I learned yesterday of the disaster of the Allied army,
I immediately instructed my quartermaster-general to entrench the strong
position at Frankenstein and provide it with heavy caliber guns. I will move
into this position if I am pressed by superior forces and there I will accept a
battle if attacked by a large superiority.” Blücher assured the Allied general-
issimo that he would immediately write to Bennigsen. “Because he has
promised to help me, I will ask him to move General Markov closer to me.
If this happens, a portion of my Russian troops can move to you,
although here I must again repeat that an offensive movement toward the
Elbe from my position will be far more certain to free the Allied army in
Bohemia than a flank march by a part of my army through the mountains
and defiles.”
Blücher concluded with a plea for Schwarzenberg to act sensibly: “a
psychological reason supports my opinion, mainly that it is not good to
separate a victorious army, where the troops have mutual trust in each other
and with whom the memory of their victory is still fresh.” If this logic failed
to sway the Austrian, then Gneisenau designed the last sentence to send a
message: “From Tsar Alexander and the king, my master, I have heard
nothing.” This is an example of Gneisenau’s “diplomatic acuteness,”
employed to emphasize “that an order as decisive as the directive to march
to Bohemia and thus abolish all the decisions made at Trachenberg and
Reichenbach had to be communicated at least by one of the monarchs of
Russia or Prussia.” In the end, this last line clearly implied that the com-
mander of the Silesian Army would comply with a direct order from
Alexander or Frederick William only and not the Allied commander in
chief.8
Fortunately for the Prussians, an unexpected victory near the town of
Kulm (Chlumec) in northern Bohemia on 30 August helped make
Schwarzenberg’s request superfluous. On the 29th, Vandamme caught Rus-
sian general Aleksandr Osterman-Tolstoy’s ad hoc army corps just inside the
Bohemian frontier at Kulm, thirty-five miles south of Dresden.9 Neither
side gained an advantage despite savage fighting. With the battle continuing
on the 30th, Kleist’s Prussian II Corps marched east to Nollendorf (Nak-
léřov), six miles north-northeast of Vandamme’s position. While the Prus-
sians attacked the rear of Vandamme’s I Corps, the Russian Guard pushed
against its front and an Austrian corps enveloped its left. With XIV and VI
Corps too distant to support, Vandamme attempted to drive through the
Prussians but failed. Imperial losses on 29 and 30 August amounted to
25,000 killed, wounded, and captured along with 82 guns; Allied casualties
numbered 11,000 men. We return to Langeron’s commentary:
A few of his [Napoleon’s] victories have been highly vaunted, and they well
deserve to be: Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Ratisbon, Friedland, and some ten
battles in Italy were greatly appreciated by the men of the military arts, but
less has been said of Dresden, which I regard as one of his greatest victories.
Encircled and outnumbered by a force double the size of his own, confined in
a tightly packed city, he struck from all sides, overthrew the masses that
opposed him, cut off the left wing of his enemy and took it all prisoner,
smashed its center and right and pushed them back into the gorges and
mountains where everything was an obstacle and a danger for them: he had
foreseen this victory, designating the place where he would drive back his
enemy; he detached Vandamme to guard the outlets, and by that he should
have destroyed all of the Coalition’s equipment and precluded the flight of
the Allies across the narrow, mountainous road that was bordered by preci-
pices, where the men were isolated and dispersed. The failures of Vandamme
and the heroic resistance of the Russians, especially the Guard, saved our
armies and our cause.10
By refusing Schwarzenberg’s 29 August request to march to Bohemia

with 50,000 men, Blücher has been accused of letting pride cloud his judg-
ment. While his character, temper, and past behavior suggest that he sought
only to preserve his independence of command and avoid being directly
subordinated to Schwarzenberg, the reasons for the snub were military
rather than personal. Certainly human nature and egotistical interests cannot
be entirely dismissed but Blücher wanted to maintain the independence of
his army because he and Gneisenau foresaw the ruinous consequences of a
union with the Bohemian Army. They knew enough about the Austrians to
suspect that they would paralyze the offensive spirit that the Prussian
leadership of the Silesian Army had labored to instill in its officers and
men. Intertwined with the great mass of the Bohemian Army and subordin-
ated to the hydra formed by the combined staffs of the monarchs, Schwar-
zenberg, and Barclay, they instinctively recognized that their ability to wage
a war of revenge to defeat the French would be impossible. By 9 September,
Gneisenau had heard enough about the battle of Dresden to reach the
following conclusion: “At Dresden on 26 and 27 August, our arms suffered
a defeat more through misunderstanding or lack of agreement than through
the superiority of enemy arms.”11 Of course, hindsight allows us to use the
results Blücher achieved during the war to justify his refusal. Yet these
results would not have occurred had he and Gneisenau lacked the foresight
in September 1813 to resist Schwarzenberg’s cries for help.
Schwarzenberg’s request also violated the tenets of the Reichenbach
Plan. According to the plan, if Napoleon launched a major offensive into
Bohemia, Schwarzenberg would simply withdraw behind the Eger River
and all the way to Prague if necessary. Thus, the Army of Bohemia would
yield as much ground as possible until the advance of the Silesian and North
German Armies against the rear and flank of Napoleon’s army forced him to
break off his pursuit. In Schwarzenberg’s defense, hopelessness pervaded
Grand Allied Headquarters in the wake of the mauling the Bohemian Army
had suffered at Dresden. Had Napoleon actually advanced into Bohemia
with his entire army, the results could have been colossal. Thus, for good
reason, and not for the last time, Schwarzenberg viewed Blücher’s army as
his only means of salvation. Yet the union of the Bohemian and Silesian
Armies would have created a mass of more than 300,000 men. Schwarzen-
berg would not have had the luxury of squatting on the foothills of the
Erzgebirge for an extended period before supply shortages and disease
ravaged his ranks.12 Thus, he would have been obliged to advance into
Saxony, where Napoleon would have displayed his operational mastery. It
is highly unlikely that the combined Silesian and Bohemian Armies would
have succeeded in forcing Napoleon to accept battle around Chemnitz or at
Leipzig on Schwarzenberg’s terms.
Although a request and not a direct order, Blücher’s refusal certainly
bordered on insubordination in view of Schwarzenberg’s position as Allied
commander in chief. Blücher’s rejection of Schwarzenberg’s request did
jeopardize the Bohemian Army and thus the Sixth Coalition itself. Although
correct in their assumption that Napoleon would not advance into Bohemia,
neither Blücher nor Gneisenau could predict the emperor’s next move with
absolute certainty. Conversely, while they again correctly assumed he would
return to Silesia, the probability of such an operation remained no greater
than his pursuit of Schwarzenberg’s army. Finally, while Blücher’s conten-
tion that his army had to remain in Silesia to protect the province probably
resonated with those at Allied Headquarters still entrenched in eighteenth-
century principles, it hardly related to Napoleonic warfare. Guarding Silesia
would become unnecessary as soon as the Silesian Army departed for
Bohemia because Napoleon ultimately would target the army and not the
province. Macdonald’s army – defeated, demoralized, and exhausted – could
be held in check by 30,000 men. By refusing Schwarzenberg’s appeal,
Blücher was clearly gambling with the future of the Coalition. Regardless,
Schwarzenberg’s request and Blücher’s response, news of which quickly
circulated throughout Allied Headquarters and became known to Frederick
William, eventually earned the Prussians an apology. Per Schwarzenberg’s
4 September request, General Karl George von Hake, the Prussian attaché
assigned to Austrian Headquarters, sought Blücher’s pardon for an appeal
made under extreme duress. He also conveyed “expressions of the utmost
admiration from Schwarzenberg.”13
After dispatching the letters to Allied Headquarters and Bennigsen on 2
September, Blücher left Löwenberg for Lauban. After granting the main
bodies of his three corps a day of rest on 1 September, Blücher ordered the
army to cross the Queis and proceed to Görlitz on the 2nd. Langeron’s corps
struck the Lauban–Görlitz highway, Sacken’s remained on the great east–
west highway, and in the middle Yorck’s corps proceeded west from Naum-
burg. Blücher ordered the pontoon train to march in front of the Prussians
so a bridge could be thrown across the Neiße as quickly as possible. If
Macdonald placed a strong rearguard west of Görlitz, the columns would
halt at the Neiße and await further orders.14
All three vanguards crossed the Neiße on 2 September. Finding Görlitz
free of imperial forces, Katzler led Yorck’s vanguard across the river by way
of a ford and a quickly built trestle bridge. Followed by the vanguards of
both Russian corps, the Prussians occupied Görlitz. Blücher instructed them
to continue to Hochkirch, some twenty miles west of Görlitz and less

than seven miles east of Bautzen. All three corps commanders established
their headquarters at Görlitz, where Blücher and his staff also passed the
night. Eight miles due south of Görlitz, St.-Priest reached Radmeritz
(Radomierzyce). Fifteen miles southwest of Radmeritz, Poniatowski’s VIII
Corps evacuated Zittau, which the Austrian 2nd Light Division promptly
occupied. Allied patrols reported that the imperials had formed two columns
at Reichenbach. By the evening of the 2nd, the northern column stood
echeloned between Bautzen and Wurschen while the southern column
extended between Bautzen and Hochkirch. Poniatowski withdrew just inside
the Austrian frontier to Schluckenau, posting a rearguard at Rumburg.15
Blücher prepared to either continue the pursuit of Macdonald or revert
to the defensive should Napoleon assail the Silesian Army. On the 2nd,
Gneisenau drafted general orders for 3 September. “After a failed attempt
on Dresden,” stated Blücher’s cover letter, “the Grand Bohemian Army has
withdrawn to Bohemia and it is still completely uncertain whether the
enemy will pursue it with all of his forces or direct them against the Silesian
Army. Thus, I must proceed with caution yet make the enemy believe that
we are pursuing him with all energy and attack so that he will be forced to
direct a portion of his forces against us and to disengage from the Bohemian
Army. Enclosed is a disposition through which I hope to achieve this goal
and which will be communicated to the commanders of the vanguards and
St.-Priest.”
According to the disposition, Blücher finally complied with a request
from Yorck to form an “advance guard corps” by uniting the vanguards of
all three army corps. After the Katzbach, the Silesian Army faced a much
smaller, demoralized army that was marching on two roads from Görlitz to
Bautzen along a narrow front. These very different circumstances that
confronted the Silesian Army allowed for the formation of the advance
guard corps that would separate Blücher’s main body from the French,
allowing it more rest and more room to maneuver without losing contact
with imperial forces. Consisting of the 18,000 men belonging to the com-
bined vanguards of Sacken, Yorck, and Langeron with the addition of a mass
of horse artillery, the vanguard corps would be under the direct orders of the
commander in chief. Its commander would report directly to Blücher.
Command went to the most senior general officer: General-Lieutenant
Vasilchikov. He received the task of constantly maintaining contact with
the French. In addition, the Streifkorps would continue to operate on the
flanks and rear of the enemy to obstruct imperial communications. The main
body of the Silesian Army, including Army Headquarters, would follow the
vanguard at a distance of one day’s march, standing ready to take in Vasil-
chikov should he be driven back. With this constant pressure, Blücher and
Gneisenau hoped to distract Napoleon from his pursuit of the Bohemian
Army. “This advance corps,” stated Blücher, “will remain on the enemy and
always seek to disrupt his march with horse artillery; if the enemy unlimbers
artillery, he must immediately be attacked by our superior numbers. The
advance corps will take pains to determine the strength of the enemy, his
positions, and his movements, and immediately report them to me.” For 3
September, Vasilchikov received orders to march on Bautzen in unison with
St.-Priest and Bubna, who had resumed command of the Austrian 2nd Light
Division. Meanwhile, Blücher’s three army corps would take positions west
of Görlitz. Gneisenau directed Langeron’s corps, which still formed the
army’s left wing, to the Landskrone, with the great east–west highway
separating it from Yorck’s corps in the center. In addition, Langeron had
to throw a bridge across the Neiße downstream of Görlitz. Sacken’s corps
would remain on the right wing.16
Early on the morning of the 3rd, Vasilchikov assumed command of the
vanguard corps. Placing all Russian cavalry on the right wing, the Allied
infantry in the middle, and all Prussian cavalry on his left, he prepared to
pursue Macdonald’s army on the road to Bautzen. Vasilchikov did not go far
before his Prussian scouts reported a French rearguard entrenched at Hoch-
kirch. The Russian commander opted to postpone the attack until the
following day. He moved into positions along the Weißenberg–Löbau road
that ran perpendicular to the east–west highway. East of the vanguard, the
main body of the Silesian Army marched around 7:00 a.m., crossed the
Neiße on pontoon and trestle bridges, and camped along the Ebersbach–
Landskrone line that evening. St.-Priest’s small corps and Bubna’s division
maintained their positions but their cavalry raided north toward Reich-
enbach and south toward Rumburg. The Russo-Prussian Streifkorps
turned the left wing of Macdonald’s army. At Wurschen, behind the imper-
ials, Madatov’s forces surprised an ammunition column on the
Bischofswerda–Bautzen road, taking 500 men prisoner, blowing 100 cais-
sons, and pilfering numerous horses. Falkenhausen scattered an imperial
detachment between Görlitz and Bautzen, capturing one gun.17
A communiqué from Barclay’s headquarters at Teplitz reached Görlitz
announcing the victory over Vandamme’s I Corps at Kulm. Barclay con-
cluded his letter with the news that Allied “parties raid as far as Pirna and
Königstein, and Marmont, who attempted to drive through Altenberg, is
now being pursued by Wittgenstein. In a few days we will follow and
operate with energy against the enemy.”18 This news confirmed Blücher’s
assumption that Napoleon would not pursue Schwarzenberg into Bohemia.
Yet Barclay did not provide any insight into Napoleon’s next move. Of the
Silesian and North German Armies, undoubtedly the former posed the
greater threat to the emperor. Thus, just as they expected, the Prussians
had to prepare for another offensive by Napoleon himself. That night,
Blücher informed Frederick William of his inability to issue further orders
until he ascertained Napoleon’s intentions. Apparently, he had received

instructions from the king to move his left wing closer to the Bohemian
Army. He assured his monarch that he would comply with these instruc-
tions and remain in close communication with Schwarzenberg, “especially
because the army of the crown prince of Sweden is still too far back for me
to link with it in any effective way.” Moreover, he declared that should the
enemy “throw himself on the Silesian Army, I will avoid a battle against
superior forces, but hold him up as long as possible through chicanery to
give the Bohemian Army time to begin its operations.”19
Aside from Napoleon’s victory at Dresden, the first two weeks of the
Fall Campaign proved devastating for imperial arms. Macdonald and Oudi-
not failed miserably as army commanders. Many historical accounts claim
that Macdonald’s army collapsed in the days following the battle of the
Katzbach. This is incorrect. As we will see, the Army of the Bober
resumed offensive operations on the 4th at the mere rumor of the emperor’s
arrival. An army that has collapsed simply cannot go from the defensive to
the offensive at the flip of a switch. Nevertheless, Macdonald had lost 30,000
men since the expiration of the armistice. In terms of materiel, the Army of
the Bober had likewise suffered staggering losses: 103 guns could not be
replaced overnight. As for Oudinot, the marshal let his minor defeat at
Großbeeren on 23 August drive his Army of Berlin (IV, VII, and XII Corps
and III Cavalry Corps) completely from the theater of war. Unmolested by
the Army of North Germany, Oudinot conducted a headlong retreat to the
safety of Wittenberg’s guns. In so doing, he exposed General Jean-Baptiste
Girard’s division as it moved up from Magdeburg to support him. On 27
August, a brigade of mostly Landwehr from Tauentzien’s IV Corps des-
troyed Girard’s force at Hagelberg.20 Three days later came Vandamme’s
disaster at Kulm.
In addition to the loss of men, materiel, and morale, Napoleon’s strategic
situation had worsened considerably. Allied Streifkorps tore at his communi-
cations, shortages of all kinds had already taken a toll on the army, and the
master had failed to maneuver one of the enemy armies into a decisive battle.
Moreover, Oudinot’s demoralized army stood where it started the campaign,
while Macdonald’s army had been driven from Silesia. Napoleon thrived on
adversity and made a sport of exploiting his adversary’s mistakes. Rather
than taking advantage of his enemy’s missteps, he now had to contend with
his subordinates’ blunders, which had devastating effects on his strategy. On
28 August, the day after the battle of Dresden, Napoleon left the pursuit of
Schwarzenberg to his marshals and returned to the Saxon capital to contem-
plate his next move. No sufficient answer exists to explain why he left the
army on the 28th. Two days later, in an extensive essay simply titled “Note
sur la situation générale de mes affaires,” Napoleon decided against convert-
ing the pursuit of Schwarzenberg into a full-scale invasion of Bohemia.
Instead of an operation against Prague, he returned to his pet project: taking

Berlin, relieving Stettin and Küstrin, and moving the theater of war to the
lower Oder. “By marching on Berlin, I will immediately attain great results,”
predicted the emperor. In part, he envisioned Oudinot’s army at Berlin and
Davout’s XIII Corps at Stettin. Yet two requirements had to be met in order
for him to personally implement the master plan. First, with I, II, VI, and
XIV Corps and I Cavalry Corps, Murat had to be able to defend Dresden
along both banks of the Elbe by containing Schwarzenberg for at least two
weeks. Second, Macdonald had to hold the Queis against Blücher. Having
thus secured his communications, Napoleon and the Guard could join the
Army of Berlin and march on the Prussian capital.21
Within thirty-six hours, events unfolded that impacted Napoleon’s time-
table as well as his ability to personally execute the master plan. While
Vandamme’s mauling at Kulm would appear to be the culprit, his defeat
simply marked the end of the pursuit of Schwarzenberg’s army. Although a
devastating blow, its strategic impact was minimal because Napoleon had
already decided against invading Bohemia. Instead, Macdonald’s retreat
proved much more detrimental to Napoleon’s plans. On 1 September, the
emperor learned that the Army of the Bober had abandoned the line of the
Queis in the face of Blücher’s pursuit. With Macdonald now at Görlitz on
the Neiße, Napoleon feared the marshal would continue his retreat. He
informed Murat that, should Macdonald continue his retrograde movement,
“it will be necessary for me to march to reestablish my affairs there.” Above
all, he could not let Macdonald retreat west of Bautzen.
Berthier cut orders for Macdonald to hold his position at Görlitz. To
discourage him from retreating to Bautzen, Napoleon instructed the major-
general to write that “the area around Bautzen is quite ruined.” Suspecting
Macdonald would not heed these orders, Napoleon assumed the Army of
the Bober would reach Bautzen on 3 September. Should this be the case, he
resolved to go there himself. Thus, he had to postpone taking personal
leadership of the Berlin offensive. Moreover, not knowing the exact condi-
tion of Macdonald’s army or Blücher’s proximity, Napoleon wanted a
substantial reserve available to take in the Army of the Bober. For this
reason, he summoned the Young Guard, VI Corps, and I Cavalry Corps
from the Bohemian frontier to Dresden. To monitor the passes into Bohemia
in Dresden’s vicinity, Napoleon placed St.-Cyr’s XIV Corps at Pirna and
Victor’s II Corps at Freiberg.22
In addition, Ney departed to replace the incompetent Oudinot as com-
mander of the Army of Berlin. Two letters from Berthier on 2 September
explain the purpose of Ney’s mission as well as Napoleon’s commitment to
the master plan. According to the first, Napoleon wanted Ney to assume
command of the army, which he believed stood at Jüterbog, twenty-five
miles northeast of Wittenberg and forty-five miles south of Berlin. The news
that Bernadotte had sent considerable reinforcements from the Berlin sector
to support Wallmoden on the lower Elbe against Davout is the only justifi-
cation cited by Berthier for the change in command. “You know how
important it is that the prince d’Eckmühl [Davout] can continue his move-
ment to relieve Stettin,” concluded the major-general. According to his
instructions, Ney should have the army marching toward the Prussian
capital by 4 September. “His Majesty will be on the right bank of the Elbe
and take an intermediate position between Berlin and Görlitz, not too far
from Dresden.”23 While Berthier did not reveal what Napoleon planned to
do from this intermediate position, we can assume he intended to proceed to
Berlin.
In the second missive to Ney, which can be traced to a letter from
Napoleon to Berthier earlier that day, the emperor further developed his
thoughts and demanded a speedier implementation of the master plan.
Apparently, after writing the first dispatch to Ney, Berthier received
Oudinot’s report on his retreat to Wittenberg. Incensed, Napoleon
declared that Oudinot’s movement had ultimately allowed “Tauentzien’s
corps and a strong party of Cossacks to move on Luckau and Bautzen and
harass Macdonald’s communications.”24 Napoleon recognized that this
development would do little to halt Macdonald’s retrograde movement. To
fill the gap between Oudinot and Macdonald, secure the latter’s communi-
cations, and place himself in a position to lead the Berlin offensive, Napo-
leon selected Luckau as the “intermediate position between Berlin and
Görlitz, not too far from Dresden.” “The emperor instructed me to inform
you that everything here is preparing to move to Hoyerswerda,” Berthier
explained to Ney, “where His Majesty will have his headquarters on the 4th.
Thus, it is necessary for you to start your march on the 4th so that you are at
Baruth on the 6th” (see Map 1).
Napoleon planned to have one corps at Luckau on the 6th to establish
contact with Ney’s army. After securing this communication, he wanted the
marshal to continue the march on Berlin and assail the Prussian capital on
9 or 10 September. Referring to the Army of North Germany as “all this
cloud of Cossacks and pack of bad Landwehr,” he predicted that
Bernadotte’s forces would flee before Ney as long as his army proceeded
forcefully. Berthier reiterated Napoleon’s admonition: “You know well the
necessity of maneuvering rapidly to take advantage of the disarray of the
Grand Bohemian Army, which will make its movements as soon as it notices
those of the emperor.” Berthier then issued orders for the Guard and II
Cavalry Corps to march to Stolpen on 3 September and from there to
Hoyerswerda.25
Thanks to Blücher’s steady pressure on Macdonald, Napoleon canceled
the march to Hoyerswerda on the 3rd. Up to this point the marshal had
concealed the destitute condition of his army from Imperial Headquarters.
Only Lauriston made two appeals for assistance to Berthier, both on 31

August, but based his reasoning more on supply problems than combat-
effectiveness: “This army is extremely reduced, I have almost 8,000 men and
42 guns, and 2 are out of service. We cannot replenish our ammunition;
I have found that, since the 26th, [each] soldier has had only three or four
cartridges. If His Majesty wants to move this army forward, it is necessary to
send a new corps. Simply its march would bring back many men who have
gone astray.” His second missive stated: “To raise the spirit and confidence
of the army, it would be necessary for His Majesty to send a corps such as
the Young Guard to meet us. This march would collect a large number of
fugitives. Yet no discouragement exists. The troops know they are superior
to the enemy in combat, and . . . I am sure of success.”26
The further west Macdonald withdrew, the more accountable he became.
After offering no resistance at the Queis and evacuating the river line against
orders, he finally shed light on the condition of his army. “We have rallied
5,000 men of all arms and from all corps,” stated his 1 September report to
Berthier. “I intend to retrieve double this number between here and Dres-
den. I must have 60,000 to 70,000 men; many lack weapons and the corps
lack ammunition. The enemy picks up the marauders whom no discipline
can keep in the ranks where, to be frank, there is great indifference.” Writing
to Berthier at 5:00 a.m. on the 2nd, the marshal already knew that his retreat
would persist on the 3rd: “Tomorrow our march will continue on Bautzen.
We cannot reach a position soon enough where we can rest and rearm the
soldiers who lack weapons and cartridges, which cannot be found anywhere
in the army. They were all consumed on the days of the 21st, 23rd, and 26th
and not replaced.” Later on the 2nd, after receiving Napoleon’s 1 September
instructions to hold his position at Görlitz, the hapless marshal could no
longer avoid full disclosure. Aside from requesting to be replaced as army
commander, Macdonald took the low road by blaming his officers and
soldiers:
I also thought of remaining at Görlitz but I must say that the indifference of
the chiefs, the indiscipline, the pillaging, and the lack of weapons and ammu-
nition for perhaps 10,000 men are all reasons that should prompt His Majesty
to move closer to his army in order to completely reorganize it and restore its
morale. I resent the lack of zeal and interest that [officers have] for the
service. I put all the energy and strength of character that I can into the very
difficult circumstances that I find myself. I am neither supported nor imi-
tated. I pray that you earnestly solicit from His Majesty another commander
for this army and let me command XI Corps only. I will give the others an
example of obedience, zeal, and dedication. In the present state of affairs, it is
preferable to concentrate the army by establishing a camp where it can rest
and then resume the offensive because, if it is exposed to a failure at this
moment, it will completely dissolve.27
Believing he would leave Ney on his own only momentarily, Napoleon

planned to take in the Army of the Bober, quickly demolish the Silesian
Army, and then “march in great haste on Berlin.”28 Thus, Macdonald’s
bleeding stopped on the 3rd. On this day, the emperor ordered the Guard,
VI Corps, and I Cavalry Corps to unite at Bischofswerda and proceed to
Bautzen. He informed the marshal that arms and ammunition would be
transported from Dresden to Bautzen on the following day. Napoleon
instructed Macdonald to tightly concentrate the Army of the Bober so that
the emperor could ride across its front in thirty minutes. Planning to engage
Blücher on the evening of the 4th or the morning of the 5th at the latest,
Napoleon passed the night of 3/4 September at Großharthau.29 He woke
early on the 4th and rode toward Bautzen. While he expected to find
Macdonald’s army in disarray, the extent of the army’s disorder caught
him by surprise. Hoards of starving, unarmed, barefooted soldiers marauded
along the road. A convoy of provisions and ammunition he had sent to
resupply Macdonald fell prey to Blücher’s Streifkorps; its smoking ruins
remained by the roadside. The whole scene so rocked the emperor that he
lost his composure. A small dog barking incessantly at his horse earned
Napoleon’s ire. He drew his pistol and attempted to fire but the weapon
fouled. In a fit of rage, he hurled the pistol at the animal and rode off in
silence.
Around 11:00 a.m., he reached the outskirts of Bautzen, where Macdo-
nald and his staff received him. Not Macdonald but Sébastiani became the
victim of such a tongue-lashing that the emperor’s staff circled around the
two to conceal the undignified scene. Napoleon purportedly greeted Sébas-
tiani with the words: “You command a mob, not soldiers.” Sébastiani
responded that his men had suffered much and nothing more could be
demanded of them; Macdonald attempted to support him as best he could.
The emperor then tore into Sébastiani’s regimental commanders. After
venting, Napoleon proceeded to Hochkirch from where he could see the
heads of Blücher’s columns. Macdonald’s rearguard, which had departed
from Hochkirch at 5:00 that morning, received the order to halt. After
orienting himself with regard to Blücher’s position, the master ordered
Murat to form the left wing with III Corps and I Cavalry Corps. At noon,
the king of Naples commenced his advance from Bautzen toward Görlitz on
the great east–west highway. Macdonald received instructions to form the
emperor’s right wing with V and XI Corps, II Cavalry Corps, and the
Guard. Accompanied by the emperor, Macdonald struck the Hochkirch–
Löbau–Görlitz road. With VIII Corps and IV Cavalry Corps, Poniatowski
marched from Zittau to Löbau to slam Blücher’s left flank. General Samuel
François Lhéritier’s V Cavalry Corps and the remains of I Corps, now
commanded by General Georges Mouton, would hold Dresden while II
Corps remained at Freiberg and XIV Corps at Pirna.30
For the 4th, the main body of the Silesian Army continued west toward
the Wurschen–Hochkirch line around 6:00 a.m. The disposition called for
the army to march in three columns at 6:00 a.m. For march goals, Sacken
received Wurschen, Yorck a position north of Hochkirch between Pomm-
ritz and Niethen, and Langeron Hochkirch. Blücher planned to accompany
Yorck’s corps and establish his headquarters at Lauske. He directed St.-Priest
through Löbau to Schirgiswalde on the Spree, eight miles upstream of Baut-
zen. Temporarily under Blücher’s command, Bubna marched through Neus-
tadt in Sachsen toward Stolpen far southwest of Bautzen to envelop the
enemy’s right flank. In front of the army, Vasilchikov closed on Macdonald’s
rearguard. Initially, the imperials fell back slowly but then something
changed. Large dust clouds could be seen rising from the plains of Bautzen
moving toward the Army of Silesia. “All of a sudden,” recounted Langeron,
“the enemy, who had retired from Hochkirch and seemed to want to
abandon Bautzen, reappeared in force and repulsed our advance posts and
my quartermasters. I immediately went to the vanguard and I saw near
Hochkirch several strong columns advancing toward us. I was able to
observe that the French Guard and the cuirassiers were part of this contin-
gent and, as the forces that deployed in front of us could be estimated at
more than 50,000 men, and we could see near Bautzen dust clouds that
announced other strong columns moving toward Weißenberg, I no longer
doubted Napoleon had arrived from Dresden a second time to fight us with
superior forces.” Fortunately, a snafu at Langeron’s headquarters prevented
Blücher’s orders from being forwarded to St.-Priest, “who would have
found himself behind the enemy army’s left flank, and completely cut off
from us, could have suffered a total defeat or been forced to push into the
Bohemian mountains.”31
Katzler led eight squadrons of the Prussian vanguard west of Hochkirch
but soon encountered imperial skirmishers. He received heavy fire from
Hochkirch as well as an adjacent hill where the French unlimbered a battery
of heavy mortars and numerous cannon. Ten enemy battalions moved up
and drove him east. As the Jäger and fusiliers of the vanguard hurried
forward, they too failed to hold the village. While Katzler attempted to
contain the enemy at Hochkirch, Vasilchikov posted the left wing of his
Prussian infantry on the Hochkirch–Löbau road and the right wing at the
village of Kuppritz. Imperial troops continued to advance in force. From the
right wing soon came the report that a considerable mass of imperial infan-
try likewise was advancing toward Hochkirch. To hinder the impending
breakout from Hochkirch, Vasilchikov issued orders to Hiller around 8:00
a.m. to move the six battalions of Prussian infantry onto the advantageous
Pitschen height and defend it to the last man. Hiller posted his battalions on
both sides of the height, covered by Landwehr cavalry on the plain to the left
(south). Four miles north of Hochkirch, the Russian infantry encountered
fierce resistance at Wurschen. Specifically designed to perpetually and ener-

getically harass the enemy, the vanguard corps managed to fight well on the
defensive, holding the imperials until 3:00 p.m. At that time, the French
surged from Hochkirch and blasted through the forward troops; Katzler fell
back to the Pitschen hill.
Meanwhile, Blücher reached Glossen where reports streamed in not only
of the French advance, but also of the arrival of Napoleon and his Guard.
This seemed to confirm the numerous rumors that Napoleon had crossed
the Elbe at Pirna with masses of reinforcements to support Macdonald.
Cossacks apprehended an Italian courier, who claimed to have been at
Imperial Headquarters earlier in the day. He reported that Napoleon had
reached Bautzen at the head of the Guard. A young man from Bautzen
likewise maintained that he had observed the emperor ride into Bautzen
around noon. Again Blücher demonstrated that going backward could be
just as valuable as going forward. Again he proved that he could control his
emotions and instincts. Without hesitating, he ordered the army to retreat
east of the Löbau stream, from where it would fall back to a position on the
Landskrone, slightly southwest of Görlitz. Headquarters would remain at
Görlitz. Blücher decided he would continue the retreat only if the enemy
army drove through Reichenbach. “I will avoid a serious engagement,”
Blücher wrote to Barclay. “Should the enemy go through Zittau to Bohemia,
I will attack him and follow to Bohemia as long as he does not leave behind
too great a force against me.”32
To cover the army’s retreat, Blücher tasked Vasilchikov’s corps with
holding the Pitschen hill until evening. At 5:00 p.m., large imperial infantry
and cavalry columns debouched from Hochkirch and formed east of the
village. One hour later, they advanced in three columns on the Löbau road to
attack the Pitschen height. A fourth column moved on the east–west high-
way from Bautzen to Görlitz to overwhelm the Russians. “When I left the
vanguard,” continued Langeron, “it was 4:00 p.m.; we were very lucky that
Napoleon had arrived so late. Nightfall needed to arrive soon to protect us.
Without it, Vasilchikov would have found himself in a critical position. This
brave and capable general, who was so well seconded by Lanskoy,
Rudzevich, and Katzler, certainly could have withdrawn with honor but
he needed to protect our retreat and, consequently, as he could retire only
slowly, risked encirclement, and we could help him only by risking a general
battle, which we had to avoid.” Despite French numerical superiority, the
Prussians managed to hold the Pitschen hill until Vasilchikov withdrew the
Russian infantry in order. An intense engagement first to hold the Pitschen
height, then to hold back the press of the enemy during the retreat, con-
tinued until long after sunset. Attacking from all sides, the imperials sorely
pressed the Prussian rearguard. Numerous cavalry charges were repulsed
with the bayonet as the Prussians cut crosscountry due west to Krappe.
In complete darkness, the retreat continued to positions west of Glossen and

the Löbau stream. Prussian losses reached 400 men on this day; Russian and
French casualties are not known.33
Blücher’s retrograde march encountered difficulties: mainly narrow
gorges and poor roads blocked by baggage and supply wagons. Langeron
described the conditions: “I immediately ordered my column to halt before
becoming too engaged in the Löbau defiles from which we could not escape
without great difficulty and losses if attacked. These passes were so narrow
that a single cannon could not be turned in them and, if my column had
advanced, I would still, even without being attacked, have lost precious time.
Fortunately, Shcherbatov, who commanded at the head of the column,
foresaw the orders that I would send him and stopped the column while
the artillery was still in the plain. After that, my retreat, which I ordered
soon afterward, was easy. On this occasion, I owe a great deal to
Shcherbatov’s resolution and foresight.” Langeron failed to mention that a
Russian hospital train, followed by Russian troops and baggage including a
host of Cossacks, had driven right through Yorck’s columns. Around 10:00
that night Yorck’s corps commenced the retreat to Görlitz. The hasty nature
of the retreat only magnified the chaos the collisions with the Russians had
caused in I Corps. Again, many soldiers, particularly Landwehr, dropped
from exhaustion and hunger. After marching for the majority of twenty-four
hours, the last units reached the bivouac at the Landskrone late on the
morning of the 5th. According to Schack’s journal, “abominable night
march; ran into Sacken’s [Langeron’s] Russian column at Schöps; innumer-
able wagons clogged the defile of Reichenbach; a halt was made behind [east
of] Reichenbach until all [the wagons] were in order. The troops did not
reach camp until 10:00 a.m.”
“At 9:00 p.m.,” explained Langeron, “Blücher warned me that Napoleon
had come from Dresden with a great portion of his forces; he learned this
from his spies, from deserters, and from prisoners that our advance posts had
taken. At the same time, he told me that he did not wish to engage in a
general battle with forces greatly superior to his own, and so he would revert
to his wise system of retreat to foil the enemy’s new plans, pull him once
again far from Dresden, and once again make him lose precious time. We
marched at 10:00 p.m. and returned to the position on the Landskrone, west
of Görlitz.” Ten miles further west, Vasilchikov’s corps passed the night
around Glossen while St.-Priest fell back to Bernstadt auf dem Eigen.
Southwest of the army, Bubna’s division extended between Zittau and
Rumburg, too far removed to play a role in the current affair. “Since
yesterday,” stated Blücher in a letter to Knesebeck early on the 5th, “the
emperor Napoleon has been ready to fall on me with all of his forces. As
long as he has everything assembled here, he shall not tempt me to accept
battle; should he turn and go to Bohemia, he shall find in me a true
companion and the devil will take the hindmost . . . I will not fight the entire
force of our enemy and he will have to divide his forces. Thus, I will keep
myself strong enough to destroy a portion. It is 6:00 a.m. and the enemy is
still resting.”34
Early on 5 September, Silesian Army Headquarters issued instructions
for the troops to cook, rest, and feed the horses. Gneisenau wanted the
soldiers supplied with provisions to see them through the next twenty-four
hours at least. All wagons moved east across the Neiße to facilitate a further
retreat if necessary. Exhausted from six weeks of hard campaigning, the
soldiers of the Silesian Army no doubt welcomed the rest. Although it was
a pursuit of only ninety miles, the exertions and privations encountered
during the march from the Katzbach to the Spree eroded discipline and
morale. After the army advanced west, its magazines followed only to the
Bober. The stores received continuous replenishment from further east, but
poor roads and difficult terrain prevented the supply columns from keeping
pace with the army. Blücher’s vanguard, pushed far to the west, suffered the
most. The troops received permission to seek help from the locals but the
unfortunate inhabitants of western Silesia and Upper Lusatia had little to
offer. Impoverished from weeks of being sacked by the imperials, those who
still cared to help a man in uniform could offer hardly anything more than
potatoes. The arrival of the Cossacks only worsened their plight. Despite
Blücher’s threats, the Russian warriors surpassed the French in the unpre-
cedented pillaging and mistreatment of both peasant and burgher. Prussian
authorities did not manage to establish the orderly arrival of supplies from
Löwenberg until mid September.35
While the Russians persevered, Yorck’s Landwehr continued to disap-
pear. Several militia battalions from Yorck’s 1st Brigade completely dis-
solved during the night march of 4/5 September. To collect stragglers and
round up marauders, flying columns scoured the rear areas. By the end of
the month, 2,000 Landwehr remained missing and had probably deserted.
Gneisenau also called on the Military Government of Silesia to issue proc-
lamations recalling the militiamen who had returned to their homes: “The
districts that harbor such deserters will be punished; the deserters themselves
will be punished through harsh treatment and poor fare, and their names will
be dragged through the mud. If you do not employ strict measures, I fear
that the majority of the Silesian Landwehr will dissolve because aside from
combat there is not enough discipline among them to hold them together;
discipline can be produced mainly only through severity, and only through
severity will the soldier know that returning home will not be tolerated.”36
Incensed by the desertions, Blücher demanded that the regimental com-
manders report to Yorck on its causes. They claimed to have done their
utmost to maintain order but the Landwehr battalions had too few officers
to assist them. They accused the available company and battalion officers of
being too old and too unfamiliar with regulations to be effective. Dead tired
and physically drained, the soldiers fell to the ground and remained lying in
the muck believing that a little sleep would restore their strength to look for
potatoes and then continue the march.37 An explanation from the brigade
commander, Steinmetz, confirmed these reports:
During a night march, when many columns cross with each other, it is not
possible to keep together troops who are completely exhausted by repeated
deployments in the night and by hunger, and who are suffering on their feet
because their clothing is incredibly poor. The officers took great pains to
maintain proper order but this was impossible because of the weakness,
youth, and inexperience of the general Landwehr man and the lack of good
officers opposite them. I cannot in any way guarantee that henceforth strag-
gling will not occur because I have already taken pains to prevent this evil
through punishment and very harsh punishment at that. The battalion com-
manders have been punished by way of severe reprimands, several officers
have been arrested, and by far the majority of the Landwehr has been
demoted to second class, paraded through the ranks with their caps turned
upside down, punished with hunger and blows from the cane, and nothing
more remains than to have them shot dead.38
As for Napoleon, after spending the night of 4/5 September at Hochkirch,

he personally reconnoitered the Allied position east of the Löbau stream
early on 5 September and then ordered a general advance through Löbau and
Reichenbach. Expecting to encounter considerable resistance at Reichenbach,
the emperor instructed Macdonald to attack the front of the assumed Allied
position while Poniatowski marched northeast through Löbau to envelop the
left and Murat with the northern column enveloped Blücher’s right. Napo-
leon joined the forward cavalry but would be disappointed on this day as
Blücher continued his retreat across the Neiße. Not wanting to waste any
more time on Blücher – or Macdonald – the emperor hoped to finally be
able to participate in the Berlin offensive. However, he received reports from
St.-Cyr concerning the movement of Schwarzenberg’s army. Leaving behind
Murat and Macdonald with approximately 70,000 men to continue the offen-
sive against Blücher, Napoleon returned to Bautzen that same evening with
the Guard and VI Corps. He selected Bautzen because it allowed him to
return to Dresden if Schwarzenberg moved on it or to march north and
support Ney’s operation against Berlin.39
To obtain a precise view of the enemy’s movements and intentions,
Gneisenau and Lieutenant Scharnhorst went to Reichenbach on the morning
of the 5th, with Blücher and Müffling posted on the Landskrone to observe
the enemy. Blücher would not give orders for the further retreat until he saw
for himself large enemy columns advancing from Reichenbach. As soon
as he received confirmation of the enemy’s advance around 10:00 a.m.,
Gneisenau drafted a report to Allied Headquarters in Blücher’s name: “The

news has been confirmed that Napoleon has joined the army facing me and
has reinforced it with the Guard, Poniatowski’s corps, and several cavalry
divisions. At this moment, I received the report that the enemy is marching
toward me through Löbau and Glossen. If he remains before me in superior
strength, I will avoid the decisive battle that he appears to seek. Neverthe-
less, I will harass his movements and exploit any advantage, especially if he
should go through Zittau and Annaberg-Buchholz to Bohemia.” A similar
letter went to Bernadotte, whom Blücher implored to act: “The offensive
movement that you seemed to want to make against the enemy’s left flank is
sure to hamper him quite prodigiously. It is possible that the emperor
Napoleon’s intention is to enter Bohemia by way of Zittau.”40
Denying Napoleon the opportunity to envelop him, Blücher continued
the retreat of his main body that again lasted late into the night. The Allies
utilized three bridges to escape across the Neiße: one upstream of Görlitz,
another at Görlitz, and the third downriver from the town. By evening, the
main body of the Silesian Army reached the right bank of the Neiße thanks
to the sacrifices of the vanguard.41 While his cavalry remained on the right
bank of the Löbau stream, Vasilchikov withdrew his infantry and artillery to
Reichenbach at daybreak on the 5th. From there, his main body took a
position on the Töpfer height east of the town. West of Reichenbach, the
rapid advance of the imperials forced the Allies to turn and fight at 11:00
a.m. Prussian and French sources disagree over the events that followed. On
the left, Katzler charged the thirteen squadrons of the 3rd Light Cavalry
Division of I Cavalry Corps with sixteen Prussian squadrons led by the West
Prussian Dragoons. According to the French staff officer and historian
Gabriel Fabry, a French volley broke the dragoons, who fell back in disarray
and prevented the approaching Prussian 1st and 2nd Hussar Squadrons from
charging. At the same time, a blast of grape ripped through the Prussians.
Fabry maintains that the charge of the Prussian 3rd and 4th Hussar Squad-
rons stabilized the situation and allowed Katzler to reorganize.42 On the
right wing, Emmanuel engaged four regiments of enemy light cavalry sup-
ported by two regiments of cuirassiers that attempted to cut off his retreat
and take six guns that supported his right. After bloody hand-to-hand
combat, Emmanuel repulsed the imperial horse. Langeron described the
action:
Emmanuel distinguished himself again during this sharp and unequal fight.
The enemy cavalry was superior to that of our vanguard; it wanted to turn
their flank, cut them off from the pass at Reichenbach, and take six pieces of
cannon that Emmanuel had placed on his right. Four regiments of French
light cavalry, supported by two regiments of cuirassiers, advanced to attack
these cannon, but were repulsed by Emmanuel, who charged them with the
Kievskii Dragoon Regiment and Prince Nikolay Shcherbatov’s43 2nd

Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment to which was attached two squadrons of the
Aleksandriiskii Hussars . . . The enemy cavalry was repulsed; the engagement
was long and costly for both sides; each of our squadrons attacked several
times, and each time with the same audacity and success; the cannon were
saved, the pass was not outflanked, and General Vasilchikov withdrew,
fighting all the while to the Neiße, which he recrossed after our columns:
the wooden bridge was burned and the pontoon bridges raised, despite the
enemy efforts to stop it.44
During this cavalry combat, Vasilchikov directed two Prussian battalions

to Reichenbach with orders to hold the town to their last drop of blood. He
then changed his mind and started the retreat east from the Töpfer height
shelled by French cannon and mortar fire. Under intense fire, the Allies
experienced many difficulties retreating through the elongated village of
Reichenbach. At the Landskrone, Vasilchikov again turned to face his pur-
suers and buy time for Blücher’s main body to cross the Neiße. Vasilchikov
ordered Katzler, who had already passed through Markersdorf, to turn
around and again charge the imperials. Katzler and his Brandenburg Hussars
could not hold the French cuirassier regiments indefinitely but they slowed
the imperials long enough to allow Vasilchikov’s rearguard to clear the
narrow defile at Markersdorf and reorganize west of Görlitz and continue
the retreat. As soon as the sound of the guns approached Görlitz, Blücher
gave the order to depart. Yet because of the late arrival of Yorck’s corps to its
bivouac, many of the chuck wagons that had come up to distribute provi-
sions had not returned to the rear. This caused a bottleneck as Schack noted:
“The wagons became entangled in and close to the city; confusion on all
sides; wagons driving through the river, many getting stuck. Disorderly
retreat. The situation looked desperately dangerous and would have been
if the enemy had followed.”45 Langeron provides a different perspective:
The retreat was momentarily obstructed by a crowd of Prussian wagons,

overburdened by all those foul creatures by which the Prussian army is
infested; there were more than 200 women on these wagons, which should
have retired long before. They let loose horrible cries and wanted to move
ahead of our troops; they were forced to remain on the left bank, and when
our men had passed, burned the bridge, and raised the pontoons, all these
women went to charm the leisure time of the French. I only mention this
event on our part to be honest, but not to suggest that it was humane yet it
did great good to free our army of these miserable wretches.
According to Friederich, “poor execution of the order to move out the

trains had caused a bottleneck at the bridge, which was only cleared up when
old Blücher, in order to provide the troops with an example, went through
the river at the head of the cavalry.” Müffling of course assumed credit for
resolving the situation. First, he claimed that, while on the Landskrone, he

had advised Blücher of the correct moment to depart and cross “the Neiße
bridges without any serious fighting, but some unnecessary delays in Yorck’s
corps produced a stoppage at the bridge and an engagement at a disadvan-
tage became unavoidable, unless all the cavalry of the rearguard could cross a
ford, yet they had no inclination to do so because of its depth.” Refusing to
listen to their officers, the huddled troopers continued to block the infantry
from gaining access to the bridge. Second, Müffling maintains that, “in this
quandary, I suggested to the commander in chief that he set the example.
Without a moment’s hesitation he plunged into the water that rose up to his
saddle-bow. All the cavalry had to follow and, covered by a twelve-pound
battery, we reached the right bank without losing one man. The soldier
happily and willingly will follow a field commander who thus shares the
hardships of the common trooper.”
Soon Vasilchikov’s corps reached Görlitz; Hiller’s infantry covered the
retreat through the town. On the eastern bank, Yorck’s 2nd Brigade and
Langeron’s VI and X Infantry Corps formed to take in the vanguard.
Imperial artillery continued to pound the retreating Allies. After crossing
the river, Vasilchikov posted his rearguard along the hills on the right bank.
His main body halted on a line extending from Leopoldshain, some four
miles east of Görlitz, to Hermsdorf, situated upstream of Görlitz on the
right bank. Further south, St.-Priest’s corps probably reached Seidenberg
but its vanguard remained on the left bank of the Neiße. Bubna’s division
withdrew to Georgenthal with its vanguard stretched along the Zittau–
Rumburg line.46
Imperial forces followed to the Neiße. That same evening, Murat
attempted to cross the bridge upstream of Görlitz with the lead elements
of I Cavalry Corps packed in a tight column. Only one Prussian cavalry
regiment guarded the opposite bank. To cover his crossing, Murat directed
two horse batteries to open fire on the Prussians from 700 paces. After the
first shots fell, half the Prussian squadrons peeled off to the right, the other
half to the left, revealing a line of Russian heavy artillery. The Allied guns
opened an intense bombardment that shattered the morale of the unsuspect-
ing French. In a matter of moments, some 150 men and even more horses
fell; well-aimed fire disabled two of Murat’s guns. Langeron recalled:
“Shcherbatov placed twelve twelve-pound guns from Nesterovsky’s com-
pany on the right bank of the river; they conducted such a sharp and well-fed
fire that the enemy, who had advanced to the left bank, was forced to pull
back with loss, and even momentarily abandon two pieces of cannon, that
we could not take, the bridges already having been razed.” Such losses did
not deter the king of Naples. He issued orders for one cavalry regiment to
ford the river and flank the enemy guns. His subordinate generals begged
him to rethink the wisdom of such bravado. They reminded Murat that
during the last review the emperor had demanded that his officers manage
the cavalry with greater prudence. Murat conceded, ordering his troopers to
withdraw to the opposite side of Görlitz. Macdonald directed three battal-
ions from Meunier’s brigade to occupy Görlitz. Encountering no oppos-
ition, the French pushed east and occupied the suburb on the left bank of the
Neiße.
By the end of the day’s fighting on 5 September, Murat’s vanguard stood
in and around Görlitz, the main body on the Landskrone. Poniatowski’s
corps camped at Löbau, with its van at Ebersdorf. Thus, his forward troops
passed the night along the Weißenberg–Löbau line; Murat departed and
command of the Army of the Bober reverted back to Macdonald. Owing
to Blücher’s tenacity, Macdonald did not relish his task. Yet the marshal
hoped his opponent would not learn of the emperor’s departure for a few
more days. For this reason, he counted on the Silesian Army continuing its
retreat. To deceive Blücher into thinking that the offensive would continue,
Macdonald ordered his vanguard to cross the Neiße in several small columns
on 6 September; his main body remained on the Landskrone. Only
Poniatowski’s vanguard skirmished with Bubna’s troops and St.-Priest’s
Cossacks. “On this day,” concluded Gneisenau in his report to the king,
“they [the French] showed 30,000–40,000 men between the Landskrone and
Görlitz, having some detachments cross the river, yet again withdrew,
whereupon Blücher had the advance corps move back to the Neiße in order
to exploit the first favorable moment in case Napoleon should again disen-
gage his main force from the Silesian Army.”47
Obliging Macdonald, Blücher ordered the retreat to continue east of the
Queis during the night of 5/6 September. Moreover, he dissolved the
advance corps. Its inability to protect the army from either unnecessary
engagements or night marches led to its demise after a mere three days.
Unfortunately for Army Headquarters, this experiment did not yield the
results it desired, such as increased flexibility for the army’s main body. At
the least, its creation demonstrates that Blücher and his staff recognized the
need to conform to the changing conditions of war instead of remaining
static. With the army now operating in an area where Blücher could disperse
his corps, each again formed its own vanguard. Operations continued on the
6th with Sacken retreating across the Queis at Siegersdorf and proceeding
southeast to Paritz with considerable enemy forces in view. “The French
army is very strong,” he reported to Blücher. “The Old and New Guard are
here and many cuirassiers. Marshals Mortier and Macdonald are with
them.”48 Yorck crossed at Ullersdorf and marched to Naumburg;
Langeron passed the Queis at Lauban and halted; and St.-Priest remained
at Seidenberg. The respective vanguards of each corps halted halfway
between the Neiße and Queis, with their forward posts remaining very close
to the former. “On 7 September,” noted Langeron, “we withdrew to Lauban
and behind the Queis; the vanguard was separated once again . . . but the
advance posts remained at the Neiße. Some French skirmishers crossed the
river and stationed themselves several paces from our front but refrained
from sticking out their necks too far. Nevertheless, the enemy was preparing
materials for the construction of a bridge and even had it halfway built,
thereby announcing the offensive intentions that they were far from being
able to support.”49
After two marches, the Silesian Army stood east of the Queis with
headquarters at Lauban. “Here the page has again turned,” Blücher
explained to his wife, “the emperor Napoleon, angry about the destruction
of the Army [of the Bober], is again marching against me with his main
army. For two days he did everything possible to make me accept battle
because he is twice as strong as me. All his maneuvers have been in vain;
I will withdraw before him until he has to again go back: and then I will
warmly embrace him.”50
Meanwhile, Gneisenau received a report written by Knesebeck from
Allied Headquarters at Teplitz on 3 September. Knesebeck described the
battle of Kulm on the 30th as the opportunity “to avenge the stain of
Dresden.” Indeed, the destruction of Vandamme’s I Corps had made quite
an impression on Allied High Command, as Knesebeck’s account demon-
strates: “Thus, on the 29th, 8,000 Russian Guards under Osterman-Tolstoy
fought with Vandamme’s corps – which numbered 43,000 men according to
the muster that was found – at Kulm like the Spartans at Thermopylae, and
yielded not a foot, although they were attacked the entire day in the front
and on both flanks. Thus the brave Osterman-Tolstoy lost an arm. Overall,
our losses were considerable, especially by Kleist on the 30th.” Kleist led his
II Corps straight into the enemy’s rear at Nollendorf, fighting “for three
long hours [and] having to cut his way through the enemy; thus Grolman
was wounded in the hip . . . Kleist lost almost all his adjutants.” Similar to
the experience of Yorck’s I Corps, the majority of Kleist’s Landwehr “was
scattered,” causing Knesebeck to consider reassembling them in Silesia. “We
would be inconsolable over these losses had the results not have been so
good because of Kleist’s resolve.” According to the most recent figures, the
Allies captured 83 guns, numerous caissons, and 10,000–12,000 prisoners as
well as Vandamme himself and four other French generals.
Despite the victory at Kulm, Knesebeck explained that the fatiguing
marches during the retreat from Dresden to Bohemia as well as “the great
loss in baggage and draft horses has prevented us from driving back over the
mountains with force.” Although Kulm relieved the pressure on
Schwarzenberg’s army, the Allied commander in chief wanted to resupply
and reorganize his army before taking another step. Attrition from combat
and illness reduced the Bohemian Army by some 45,000 men. A complete
collapse of the commissariat demoralized the soldiers and turned the
14 The three Allied monarchs at the Festival of Thanks for the victories at
Großbeeren, the Katzbach, and Kulm, Teplitz, 2 September 1813
Cossacks against the local population. Yet Schwarzenberg’s forces retained

control of the passes through the Erzgebirge and his Streifkorps raided
downstream the Elbe as far as Meißen and along the Saale. Knesebeck stated
that the further plans and movements of the Bohemian Army “will probably
be determined by the direction we see the enemy take.” He informed
Gneisenau of his opinion that, if Napoleon made a stand at Bautzen to
confront Blücher, Schwarzenberg should reinforce Bubna with 30,000 to
50,000 men for an immediate operation against his flank. Should Napoleon
concentrate all his forces west of the Elbe, Knesebeck offered a typical
eighteenth-century response: “our plan must thus proceed to further divide
him. We will achieve this if we attempt to cut him off from his ammunition
at Erfurt, while the crown prince of Sweden does the same with Magdeburg.
Because Napoleon has expended much ammunition and has lost even more,
he cannot abide this and therefore this will force him to detach [forces] and
through this we will find an opportunity to again defeat him in detail and to
fall on one of his corps with superiority.”
Although Knesebeck’s views on strategy and operations belonged to
the past, his take on some of the personalities at Allied Headquarters is
worth citing in full at least for its comedic value. “The tsar of Russia is
surrounded by many young advisors who always argue against maneuvering –
others have eccentric movements in mind, like those of the Austrians in
1809. Jomini appears suspicious to me; he can offer six different sugges-
tions in just one minute; he always puts himself in a position where it is
not easy to reproach him; he seeks to increase disunity; he blames every-
one else; in short, he is completely useless.51 Schwarzenberg and Radetzky
are good people but have no control over the Russians. Barclay de Tolly
is inert: just as you know him to be. Thus, the situation of our overall
command; but when the troops fight they make everything right through
their bravery.”52
Two days later on 5 September, Blücher’s refusal to lead 50,000 men of the
Silesian Army to Bohemia reached Allied Headquarters.53 Schwarzenberg’s
reaction justified the moniker “l’homme de la coalition.” In two letters
addressed to Blücher that same day, the Allied commander in chief not only
expressed his agreement with the Prussian’s views, but also officially attached
Bubna’s 2nd Light Division to the Silesian Army. Schwarzenberg explained
that, following the “partial check” Napoleon suffered at Kulm, the emperor
had concentrated all his forces around Dresden “in order to attack with
overwhelming superiority any army that offers him the greatest advantages
through its situation.” This circumstance required mutual support between
the Bohemian and Silesian Armies. Planning his preliminary steps, Schwar-
zenberg informed Blücher of his intention to throw two bridges across the
Elbe at Außig and repair the roads that ran from this point to Rumburg and
Zittau. He also pledged to allocate between 50,000 and 60,000 troops to
support the Silesian Army. The Austrian commander planned to issue explicit
orders for Bennigsen to advance and support Blücher. Finally, the former
Saxon general, Johann von Thielmann, received the task of harassing French
lines of communication with the objective of cutting off Napoleon from the
resources of his German allies. For this last point, Schwarzenberg informed
Blücher that Thielmann’s 3,000 men would not suffice and the Bohemian
Army could spare few of its troops. Consequently, Schwarzenberg wanted
Blücher to forward all of his Cossacks to Thielmann. Blücher neither
responded nor forwarded his Cossacks to Thielmann. In his opinion, Schwar-
zenberg’s memo represented an extension of the same thinking that had
formulated the Reichenbach Plan. Based on this frame of mind, the Allies
perpetually ceded the initiative to Napoleon; instead of acting, they reacted.54
Still, on 5 September, enough information reached Allied Headquarters to
confirm reports that Napoleon had gone to Bautzen with his Guard. Believing
this heralded an offensive against Bernadotte or Blücher, Schwarzenberg
prepared a serious demonstration against Dresden. A few hours after writing
his first letter to Blücher, Schwarzenberg dictated the second that warned of
Napoleon’s march from Dresden to Bautzen. Moreover, considerable French
forces marched northeast through Pirna and Königstein toward Stolpen on

the road to Bautzen. “I thus hurry to inform you of this and to notify you that
I will depart immediately with 50,000 to 60,000 Austrians and debouch
through Zittau by the 13th of this month. Until then, you will probably face
superior forces.” Bubna’s division would now serve as Schwarzenberg’s van-
guard; the Allied generalissimo “urgently” requested that Blücher provide
Bubna with news of the Silesian Army’s whereabouts twice a day.55
While the Erzgebirge shielded Schwarzenberg’s legions, the mountains
also inhibited the timely flow of reports to Allied Headquarters. Intelligence
generally arrived too late, thus rendering Schwarzenberg’s arrangements
inappropriate by the time his couriers reached their destinations. Moreover,
the inertia that reigned at Allied Headquarters and in the Austrian army
itself prevented the Bohemian Army from reacting to any situation in a
timely manner. Schwarzenberg did indeed seek to exploit the success at
Kulm but his timetable paled in comparison to that of Napoleon. Per the
intentions he had expressed to Blücher, Schwarzenberg detached 60,000
Austrians and personally led them in two columns along the right bank of
the Elbe with the goal of reaching Lusatia by 11 September. Simultaneously,
Barclay’s Russo-Prussian troops marched on Dresden. Barclay also received
command of the Austrian troops that remained on the left bank of the Elbe:
IV Corps and 1st Light Division. Because these units stood on the far left
wing of the Bohemian Army, they did not participate in the demonstration
against Dresden but instead advanced from Komotau toward Freiberg.56
Although noble, Schwarzenberg’s decision to divide his army and march
to support Blücher was extremely dangerous. Neither Schwarzenberg nor
Alexander instructed Blücher to hold his ground and thus fix Napoleon in
Lusatia. Consequently, if Blücher adhered to the Reichenbach Plan and
retreated into Silesia to avoid Napoleon’s blow, Schwarzenberg would sud-
denly emerge in Lusatia with only one-third of his army. Depending on how
fast both Napoleon and Schwarzenberg reacted, the former would have the
opportunity to catch the latter before he could escape to Bohemia. Based on
Napoleon’s mastery of operations, Schwarzenberg could very easily find
himself surrounded by 200,000 imperials.
Meanwhile, Barclay’s demonstration against Dresden looked like a full-
scale offensive. On 5 September, his troops commenced the march north:
General Andrey Gorchakov’s Russian I Infantry Corps and General Hans
Ernst von Zieten’s Prussian 11th Brigade marched from Nollendorf toward
Peterswald. Some twenty miles south of Dresden, Zieten’s vanguard took
Hellendorf on the left bank of the Elbe from the reconstituted French
I Corps after a sharp engagement. A few miles southwest, Prince Eugen of
Württemberg’s Russian II Infantry Corps took the hills of Ölsen. Two days
later, the rest of Kleist’s main body moved north from Teplitz to Altenberg.
On the right wing, 60,000 Austrians crossed to the right bank of the Elbe at
0 10 20 30 40 50 miles
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19. Saxon–Bohemian theater of war

Außig and proceeded to Lewin (Levı́n) on 7 September “ready to march on

the road to Rumburg and operate in unison with the army from Silesia.” By
nightfall, the Army of Bohemia’s center stood at Altenberg while its left
wing moved north from Komotau toward Freiberg and Marshal Victor’s II
Corps. Allied Headquarters prepared to relocate from Teplitz to Außig.57
These movements alarmed St.-Cyr, whose XIV Corps was divided between
Pirna and Lilienstein on the right bank of the Elbe while the small I Corps
retreated to Dresden. The marshal’s cry for help brought Napoleon racing back
to Dresden. He initially sent VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps marching north-
west to Hoyerswerda early on the morning of the 6th in the hope of finally
taking part in the Berlin offensive. However, at 10:00 a.m., he recalled them
and sent them southwest to Dresden in response to St.-Cyr’s reports of the
advance of the Bohemian Army. Again forced to at least postpone his
participation in the master plan, Napoleon and the Guard returned to
Dresden that night. Little did he know that earlier in the day the Prussian
III and IV Corps of Bernadotte’s Army of North Germany had smashed
Ney’s Army of Berlin at the small village of Dennewitz, some ninety miles
northeast of Dresden. As a result of Macdonald’s plight, Napoleon could not
execute the Berlin offensive as planned in his “Note” of 30 August. He
neither marched north nor sent reinforcements. Ney, who had assumed
command of the Army of Berlin on 3 September, never received word of
the emperor’s change of plans. Therefore, when the marshal began his
operation on the 4th, he ordered the Army of Berlin to march east to unite
with Napoleon, who, according to Ney’s information, would reach Luckau
on the 6th.58 Instead of the emperor, Ney found Bülow and Tauentzien. Left
to his own devices, Ney succumbed to his own fiery personality, which cost
him the victory. Approximately 45,000 Allied soldiers defeated four imperial
corps commanded by one of the period’s most charismatic leaders.
Two days later, on 8 September, Barclay’s vanguards approached
Napoleon’s headquarters at Dohna, only ten miles southeast of Dresden.
Around 2:00 that afternoon, the imperials launched a fierce counterattack.
Led by Napoleon himself, St.-Cyr’s troops crossed the Elbe at Pirna and
assaulted the Allied rear, killing, wounding, and capturing some 1,000 men
mostly from Zieten’s brigade. At this point, Allied Headquarters did not
know the extent of Ney’s defeat at Dennewitz, meaning its strategic reper-
cussions had yet to be felt. Thus, Schwarzenberg, who on the 7th learned of
Napoleon’s march from Bautzen to Dresden, returned Allied Headquarters
to Teplitz on the 8th, ordered a general halt, and recalled the 60,000 Austrian
troops who had crossed the Elbe en route to Rumburg to support Blücher.
As for Napoleon, he returned to his headquarters at Dohna on the
evening of the 8th escorted by the Guard. Although dining with Murat
and St.-Cyr and having a long conversation with them, the master said
nothing about his next step. During the course of dinner, Napoleon’s
aide-de-camp, General Anne-Charles Lebrun, arrived with a detailed

account of Ney’s defeat at Dennewitz. With “unshakable composure,” the
emperor listened to every detail and then interrogated Lebrun. Despite
maintaining his poise, Napoleon quickly realized that Oudinot,
Macdonald, Vandamme, and Ney had squandered the fruits of his victory
at Dresden. Recognizing the mounting threat to his position in Central
Europe, he sought to insure the readiness of his Rhine fortresses for a
defensive war. Yet even this precautionary step added to his dilemma:
France’s German allies certainly would view this as a precursor to a French
withdrawal from Central Europe that would leave them at the mercy of the
Allies. The Coalition itself would certainly exploit the propaganda value of
such a desperate move by portraying it as further proof of his vulnerability.
To keep the preparations as secret as possible, that night he ordered his
foreign minister, Maret, to send a dispatch in code to Minister of War Henri
Clarke in Paris with instructions to place the fortifications on the Rhine in a
state of defense.59
From Teplitz, Knesebeck penned a morose update on 8 September
describing Schwarzenberg’s operations. Napoleon’s arrival had caused panic
and disagreement at Allied Headquarters. According to Knesebeck,
decision-making approached the impossible for a variety of reasons: “We
know little for certain about the enemy. His outposts have fallen back and it
appears that he wants us to advance on Dresden. To say what we will do is
very difficult, because as always we do not proceed according to sound
military principles. Schwarzenberg is a sensible man but does not enjoy
the confidence of the monarchs and lacks faith in himself. The tsar issues
orders occasionally; Toll, Volkonsky, Jomini, and Diebitsch blunder in
threes. As a result, we receive counterorder after counterorder, and nobody
knows who is the cook and who is the waiter. As a result, up to now we have
done much too little according to our strength.” Despite this vacillation,
Knesebeck felt confident enough to promise that, should Blücher advance or
be pressed by Napoleon, Schwarzenberg would support him.
Knesebeck concluded with a plea for an update: “We have heard nothing
from the Silesian Army since the 5th, and nothing from the crown prince [of
Sweden] since the 30th. A report from the 31st from Berlin said that Oudinot
concentrated at Wittenberg and the crown prince would deliver a second
battle. Whether it has occurred or not is unknown. Send some news of
yourself soon. Your deeds will set us in motion.” Just after signing his name,
Knesebeck added that, according to new intelligence, “it appears absolutely
necessary to hasten to the aid of the crown prince.” Knesebeck related that,
twelve days earlier, Bernadotte had ordered 20,000 biscuits to be baked for
Wallmoden’s troops facing Davout’s XIII Corps on the lower Elbe. He
notified Wallmoden that a large quantity of wagons would be en route and
made this news very public. French spies obtained this information but
somehow confused biscuits with men. Thus, as noted, Berthier informed Ney
on 2 September that Bernadotte had detached considerable reinforcements
from his main body at Berlin to send to Wallmoden. This letter, a copy of
which the Allies intercepted, instructed Ney to take command of the Army of
Berlin and have it marching on the Prussian capital by 4 September. Thus,
Knesebeck’s desperate cry for Blücher to rescue the crown prince.60
Schwarzenberg convened a council of war at Teplitz on the 9th. Debate
focused on finding an explanation for the emperor’s return to Dresden. Some
believed he intended to hold the line of the Elbe while others insisted that
this marked the start of his evacuation of the right bank of the Elbe and
retreat to Leipzig. In either case, the Allies agreed that the best counter-
operation would be an offensive movement by the Bohemian Army fifty
miles north-northwest of Teplitz to Chemnitz. To protect Bohemia and
cover the army’s communications, the Silesian Army would move to Bohe-
mia, linking with Schwarzenberg’s right wing at the Elbe to facilitate his
advance into Saxony.61
Volkonsky prepared a summary of the council of war for Blücher that
provided a view of the thought process at Allied Headquarters:
All reports lead us to believe that the French army is considering a movement
on Leipzig. Nevertheless, it should be assumed that only the most compelling
circumstances will prompt the emperor Napoleon to abandon the Elbe and
so he will leave his forces concentrated at Dresden for as long as possible. In
both cases, we recognize that the best means of operating against him is for
the Silesian Army to move closer to our right wing in order to secure our
communications and to cover and support an offensive movement by our left
wing in the direction of Chemnitz.
Blücher will recognize the importance of this assignment and is experienced
enough to decide how far he can risk this movement in the face of the enemy . . .
it is up to him to select the way he prefers and even to refrain if it is completely
impossible.62 Bennigsen’s army will follow Blücher’s movement as far as Gör-
litz, where it will take a position and observe the enemy. His light troops will
raid as far as possible in the direction of Dresden in order to secure Blücher’s
march on Rumburg. However, whatever Blücher decides, he will upon receipt
of this order immediately dispatch six Cossack regiments on the shortest road
through Leitmeritz to Teplitz, from where they can fall on the enemy’s commu-
nication with Leipzig and Erfurt. Prince Schwarzenberg will send Blücher a
bridging train to facilitate his arrival, be it through Pirna or by way of another
point. He himself should be equipped with a similar bridging train.63
To avoid any ambiguities, a cover letter from Tsar Alexander accompanied

Volkonsky’s minutes. Alexander wrote nothing about Blücher’s deciding for
himself on the necessity of this march. According to a Saxon officer who
defected, Napoleon held Dresden with 100,000 men, making a march to
Pirna too dangerous. For this reason, Alexander insisted that Blücher utilize
the road to Leitmeritz. Bennigsen likewise received Volkonsky’s memo

along with a cover letter from Alexander that ordered him to march directly
to the Elbe. Should the French evacuate its right bank, Bennigsen would
besiege Dresden, Königstein, and Torgau. In the opposite case, he would
avoid an engagement with superior enemy forces. Blücher received the tsar’s
letter on 11 September. Alexander’s participation in this correspondence
served to reinforce Blücher’s belief that he did not have to obey orders from
Schwarzenberg. In this latest round of letters, the Allied commander in chief
remained conspicuously silent. Rather than an agreement between Alexan-
der and Schwarzenberg to have the former handle recalcitrant subordinates,
most likely the Allied commander in chief had no knowledge of the detailed
arrangements issued by the tsar.64
Returning to Napoleon, on 9 and 10 September he made a futile attempt
to double-envelop Barclay and cut him off from the Erzgebirge passes
before the Austrians, who had crossed the Elbe en route to Rumburg,
could return to the right bank. Unfortunately for the imperials, Barclay
observed their movements, divined the intent, and ordered a general retreat
across the Erzgebirge. Only two Prussian uhlan regiments and two Russian
Cossack regiments remained on the hills of Nollendorf; the rest of the Allied
troops moved into two lines at Sobochleben (Soběchleby) between Kulm
and Teplitz on the 10th. By the end of 10 September, St.-Cyr’s XIV Corps
had reached Ebersdorf (Habartice) with its vanguard at Mariaschein (Boho-
sudov), less than four miles northeast of Allied Headquarters at Teplitz. On
the 11th, Napoleon observed the Army of Bohemia assembled at Sobochle-
ben. With his troops unable to enter the Teplitz valley, he could not go any
further. Frustrated, he departed for Pirna.65
That night, Napoleon addressed the strategic repercussions of Ney’s
defeat at Dennewitz. He believed the current operation would suffice to
convince Schwarzenberg to withdraw all his troops from Saxony: “I have
reason to believe that the enemy, who appears very alarmed [and] who has lit
alarm fires all across the mountains of Bohemia, will recall all detachments
and thus the whole of Saxony will be purged of enemy parties.” Should
Bernadotte advance toward Großenhain as part of a combined movement
with Blücher against Dresden, Ney would threaten the Army of North
Germany by debouching from Torgau against its flank. He instructed
Macdonald to hold Bautzen and the right bank of the Spree. Concerns over
both Ney and Macdonald prompted him to order two Young Guard
divisions as well as 1st Guard Cavalry Division to prepare to march to
Bautzen. Although the orders to commence the march did not come, the
gendarmes received instructions to collect the stragglers of Macdonald’s
army and return them to their respective corps.66
The mood at Allied Headquarters during the night of 11 September
remained so somber that Alexander sent another letter to Blücher, which
the Prussian commander received on the morning of 13 September. Claiming

that the Army of the Bober had retreated to the Elbe to unite with the
Grande Armée for an offensive against the Army of Bohemia, the tsar
explicitly ordered Blücher to lead the Army of Silesia to Bohemia along
the road that ran through Rumburg to Leitmeritz. He explained that “the
emperor Napoleon has crossed the Elbe at Dresden with the majority of his
forces and is moving on the highway to Teplitz against the Army of Bohe-
mia – his vanguard has reached the defile of Nollendorf. It is probable that
the corps of Ney, Lauriston, Poniatowski, and Sébastiani will attempt to
reunite with the emperor Napoleon by way of Königstein.” Schwarzenberg
also requested that Bubna convey to Blücher the Allied commander in
chief’s pressing desire “to know the decision General Blücher has made
regarding the union with this army and what movements he plans to make.”
Bubna forwarded a copy of this letter to Silesian Army Headquarters, where
it arrived around 10:00 p.m. on 12 September.67
While the generals wrung their hands, the diplomats at Teplitz achieved
success on the 9th with the signing of bilateral alliance treaties between Russia,
Austria, and Prussia. The general terms called for the material restoration of
Austria and Prussia to their pre-1805 status; the restoration of the states of
northwestern Europe to their 1803 status; the dissolution of the Confeder-
ation of the Rhine; the independence of the German states between the Rhine
and the western frontiers of Austria and Prussia; and the partition of the
Grand Duchy of Warsaw along lines that would be determined later. The
three Eastern powers vowed not to make a separate peace with Napoleon, and
each agreed to keep an army in the field until the end of the war. Although
something could be found in the Teplitz Accords that satisfied each Eastern
power, Metternich achieved another victory. The stated goal of the alliance
was not the ultimate destruction of France. For Austria’s geopolitical interests,
Metternich needed to retain a powerful and preferably Napoleonic France to
help contain Russia. The accords ignored Italy, Holland, and Spain; Metter-
nich figured he could use these issues later to coerce the British into accepting
his designs for Central Europe. Yet Teplitz was not a total victory for the
Austrians; Tsar Alexander recovered some of the diplomatic initiative he had
lost to Metternich during the Armistice. Both Prussia and Austria remained
dependent on Russia to secure their postwar objectives. For Prussia, Frederick
William could take comfort that, as long as he remained loyal to the tsar,
Prussian influence in Germany would increase, despite Austrian opposition.68
As for Blücher, by nightfall of 6 September he had received numerous
reports stating that the French did not appear inclined to pursue across the
Neiße, despite their work on a bridge at Görlitz. His staff quickly concluded
that such idleness signaled Napoleon’s departure. Moreover, the various Streif-
korps operating in the region reported that the emperor had returned to Bautzen
on the evening of the 5th with numerous troops. Sacken also provided
15 Russian Cossacks attacking a French soldier
confirmation of Napoleon’s departure. Around 5:00 p.m. on the 5th, his

Cossacks raided along the Reichenbach–Bautzen stretch of the east–west
highway and intercepted Caulaincourt’s secretary. The terrified captive
declared that the emperor would soon ride to Bautzen. According to Sacken’s
8:00 p.m. report on 6 September, “Colonel Figner, one of my partisans, has
just arrived with General Caulaincourt’s secretary. He was captured yester-
day afternoon between Reichenbach and Bautzen; he had been sent from the
former to arrange his master’s lodgings at Bautzen. At that moment, both the
emperor Napoleon and the king of Naples were still at Reichenbach but both
planned to go to Bautzen.” “We soon learned,” noted Langeron, “that having
failed a second time to achieve his goal, which was to engage us in a general
battle with forces superior to our own, Napoleon had again returned to
Dresden with all the troops he had brought. He left facing us the same corps
that had faced us previously, of which three had been manhandled at the
Katzbach.”69
Nevertheless, Langeron continued to act arbitrarily, thus undermining
Blücher. On this day, 6 September, he again sent his heavy artillery far to
the east, purportedly spreading terror in the countryside and preventing
Blücher from resuming the offensive. Consequently, the army received a
day of rest on the 7th so the Russian guns could return. Blücher sent Langeron
a pointed reproach, demanding that the corps commander strictly obey
orders. A repeat of such behavior would prompt Blücher to complain to the

tsar. Gneisenau, in turn, wrote to Stein at Allied Headquarters, explaining his
thoughts on the military situation as well as the Silesian Army’s imminent
plans and measures. Knowing Stein would share the contents of the letter with
Alexander, Gneisenau sought assistance with countering the opposition posed
by Yorck and Langeron. Three days later, after no change could be seen in
Langeron’s conduct, Gneisenau drafted a long complaint to the king that
Blücher signed. Describing in detail the infractions committed by Langeron
as far back as 19 August, it requested that the king seek the recall of the native
Frenchman. Blücher explained that “ill-will is not the reason why Count
Langeron acts like this, but it is because he momentarily loses his head and
has no military judgment.”70 Although Allied Headquarters did not take
immediate action, Langeron’s behavior created an issue that had to be moni-
tored and rectified if needed. A letter of 28 September from the king’s
adjutant, Major Thile, to Yorck provides the evidence. Accordingly, Thile
requested that Yorck confidentially comment on Langeron’s performance as a
corps commander: “Both monarchs are – which I am telling you in the
strictest of confidence – in agreement that General Langeron can be replaced
by another general if the interest of the good cause demands it. His Majesty
the King, however, also wishes to know your opinion on this, which is an
issue of consequence with the tsar, and which requires acuteness and imparti-
ality. I thus ask you to communicate to the king your confidential views on
the leadership of Langeron’s corps, but to keep the knowledge of this request
to yourself out of consideration for General Count Langeron and to expedite
the affair as much as possible because the monarchs believe that, if an evil
remedy is needed, it is [better] done sooner than later.”71
Concerning Yorck, the retreat behind the Queis had perturbed him and
his staff. Although believing that the larger strategic plan required the
retrograde march, they complained that it could have been conducted with
more composure and less loss. Lieutenant-Colonel Georg Wilhelm von
Valentini recorded in his journal: “Precipitate retreat from Görlitz; humili-
ating to see that we are chased by a handful of enemies.” The 6 September
entry in Schack’s journal states: “The enemy still has not occupied Görlitz,
proof that the poor affair merely was caused by the poor measures.” Hiller’s
infantry lost 520 men and again the corps made consecutive night marches in
heavy summer rains. The troops were “extremely exhausted, the horses
deteriorating, the supply continuously difficult, the clothing poor beyond
all measure.” Fortunately for the men, they found some potato fields.72
Also arriving on 6 September was Frederick William’s 31 August congratu-
lations for the victory at the Katzbach, which somewhat lightened the mood of
the Silesian Army’s key players. Blücher received the Great Cross of the Iron
Cross; Yorck and Sacken the Black Eagle; Gneisenau, Müffling, and Prince Karl
the Iron Cross, First Class; Majors Othegraven, Bieberstein, Thiele, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Warburg the Iron Cross, Second Class. While Kaiser

Franz named Blücher a commander of the Order of Maria Theresa, Tsar
Alexander awarded him the Order of St. Andrew, removing the pin from his
own uniform and sending it to the Prussian general with this flattering letter:
Among the most agreeable moments of the campaign, I recognize those in

which I can give you proof of the particular satisfaction I feel in doing justice
to your brilliant courage, the activity of your operations, and the energy of
your movements. At this moment when we for our part have won a brilliant
victory [Kulm], I detach from my coat the insignia of the Order of
St. Andrew, which I award to you. I do not believe that this circumstance will
increase the value of this sign of my satisfaction but it will at least prove to
you that I have not wasted one moment in assuring you as well as those brave
soldiers under your orders of the pleasure your success has brought me. The
soldier reflects the glory of his commander, just as the commander reflects
that of his soldiers. Tell them, general, how much I appreciate their deeds and
accept the assurances of my best wishes.
More rewards followed. Alexander promoted Sacken to general of infan-

try, awarding him the Order of St. George, Second Class. On their shakos,
the troopers of Sacken’s Mariupolskii, Aleksandriiskii, Akhtyrskii, and
Belorusskii Hussar Regiments received the inscription commemorating the
battle of the Katzbach dated according to the Russian calendar: “Distin-
guished on 14 August 1813.” For his role in the Allied victory, Langeron
received 30,000 rubles as well as the imperial Wenzel: the practice of granting
to distinguished individuals or entire units the right to wear the Russian
imperial monogram represented by the first letter of the ruler’s name.73
After granting his soldiers a day of rest on the 7th mainly so Langeron
could recall his artillery, Blücher resumed the offensive on the 8th. Gneise-
nau issued orders to commence a two-day operation that Blücher hoped
would force the imperials to either retreat on Bautzen or accept battle at the
Neiße. The terrain between the Neiße and the Queis consisted of rolling,
wooded hills with valleys deep enough to hide their contents from prying
eyes on the banks of the former. Based on this advantage, Gneisenau planned
to move the left wing of the army unnoticed around Macdonald’s right to
attack his rear. For the 8th, the vanguards would remain in their positions to
occupy Macdonald’s front while the army’s main body marched southwest:
Langeron to Ostritz, Yorck to Radmeritz, and Sacken toward Görlitz.
Gneisenau wanted St.-Priest to cross the Neiße at Ostritz and proceed six
miles west to Bernstadt auf dem Eigen, where his corps would serve as
Langeron’s new vanguard. On the 9th, Sacken would pin the imperials at
Görlitz with his corps as well as Yorck’s vanguard under Katzler while
Langeron and Yorck crossed the Neiße at Ostritz to envelop Macdonald
from the south; Bubna’s division would sever the marshal’s line of retreat.
This operation appeared all the more secure because Bennigsen’s Army of
Poland could reach the Katzbach by the 8th and 9th meaning that, in case of
a setback, the Silesian Army could retreat to Bohemia knowing that Ben-
nigsen could defend Silesia.74
“I am resuming my offensive movement,” Blücher declared with confi-
dence on the 8th, “and have reinforced my left to cross the Neiße today at
Ostritz. I count on turning the enemy’s right by marching on Löbau.” At
daybreak, he received a report stating that the enemy skirmishers on the east
bank of the Neiße at Görlitz had withdrawn to the opposite bank. More-
over, the imperials had partially restored one of Görlitz’s bridges and
numerous campfires still burned west of the town. St.-Priest reported that
Yuzefovich’s patrols along the west bank of the Neiße had brought back
prisoners who stated that Napoleon and most of the imperial cavalry had
departed for Dresden on the 5th. With only weak detachments opposite him,
St.-Priest confirmed that he would commence the march to Bernstadt auf
dem Eigen around 4:00 that morning.75
However, a letter from Bubna, written shortly after midnight on the
night of the 7th/8th, seemed to challenge the statements made by
Yuzefovich’s prisoners. According to the Austrian, Napoleon was marching
to Bautzen with 50,000 men, and Poniatowski’s VIII Corps again occupied
Schluckenau. Blücher doubted the accuracy of Bubna’s claims. After the
operation commenced on the 8th, the Prussian commander received
Schwarzenberg’s two letters from 5 September warning of Napoleon’s
march from Dresden to Bautzen and promising to lead 60,000 Austrians
through Zittau by the 13th. Blücher immediately responded: “Your Excel-
lency should already have been notified that on the afternoon of 4 September
the emperor Napoleon turned around his retreating troops at Bautzen and
seized the offensive. I halted the army, learned at 6:00 of the arrival of the
emperor and his reinforcements, and avoided a battle on the 5th by with-
drawing across the Neiße.” Blücher then provided an account of his oper-
ations on 6 and 7 September as well as the news that several reports had
confirmed Napoleon’s return to Dresden with his reinforcements. “An
enemy force still stands on the left bank of the Neiße by Görlitz, but I am
ready to deal with it and already today I have commenced an offensive
movement . . . If the enemy maintains his position at Görlitz he will be
forced to engage me under very unfavorable circumstances. Whether based
on this news Your Excellency finds it necessary to continue your march or
instead turn around and considerably reinforce the offensive of the Bohe-
mian Army I leave to your judgment.” Blücher’s failure to inform Schwar-
zenberg earlier of Napoleon’s return to Dresden is indicative of the
inadequate system of communication at Silesian Army Headquarters.76
Meanwhile, Blücher’s vanguards quietly faced the enemy at Görlitz while
his three corps swung southwest. St.-Priest crossed the Neiße at Ostritz and
repulsed a French detachment but pushed only his vanguard to Bernstadt auf
dem Eigen rather than his entire corps per Gneisenau’s instructions.
Langeron’s corps moved into Ostritz, Yorck to Kieslingswalde, and Sacken
to Hochkirch. According to Gneisenau’s plan for the 9th, St.-Priest would
march straight to Löbau, where reports placed Poniatowski’s VIII Corps as it
covered Macdonald’s right flank between Bautzen and Pirna. While St.-
Priest engaged the Poles, Langeron would support this attack and then
march to Reichenbach and attack the rear of the enemy forces at Görlitz.
Blücher would lead Yorck’s corps from Ostritz against Macdonald’s right
flank while Sacken assaulted his center. Gneisenau designed this plan to
attain considerable results but again Langeron’s carelessness ruined its exe-
cution. Although Blücher wanted Langeron’s corps to remain in the con-
cealed valleys east of the Neiße, Langeron led Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps
across the Neiße on the 8th. Moreover, by failing to prevent his troops from
lighting campfires west of Ostritz, Langeron revealed the approaching
danger to Macdonald. Some of Blücher’s staff firmly believed that Langeron
intentionally presented himself to the enemy in order to induce Macdonald
to retreat and avoid a battle. According to Müffling,
We again assumed the offensive with a view to take the king of Naples in the
flank and rear; everything depended on our concealing from the enemy the
flank march to the left; Langeron received strict injunctions to allow no fires
to be kindled at night in the bivouac at Ostritz, which could be seen from the
Landskrone. Langeron was not aware that Napoleon had returned to Dres-
den, and considered the passage of the Neiße at Ostritz an extremely hazard-
ous undertaking. He did not follow the injunction not to allow any fires to be
lit, and thus drew upon himself the suspicion that this fresh instance of
disobedience, which deprived us of the fruits of this movement, was not
unintentional. He received a well-deserved reprimand, but I had to defend
him against the suspicion of any bad intention.77
“You will demand a written explanation from St.-Priest as to why he did not
follow my orders to advance to Bernstadt auf dem Eigen,” a frustrated Blücher
wrote to Langeron. “Furthermore, it was my intention that you place yourself
behind this place [Ostritz], as the disposition clearly states. Your position is
such that from the Landskrone one can see all your campfires. I must admit my
discontent with you.” Naturally, Langeron denied any wrongdoing:
I only waited for the arrival of Yorck’s corps, which was marching from
Kieslingswalde to Ostritz, to move rapidly on Reichenbach, but despite the
precautions that we had taken, the enemy observed our march from the
mountain of the Landskrone, from where one can see the entire country,
and withdrew quickly from Görlitz to Reichenbach: my cavalry took some
prisoners. Sacken’s corps entered Görlitz and moved on Reichenbach.
The plans that directed all of these movements were well conceived but the
dispositions were not made well and the march was not concealed: some
uncertainty and confusion existed at headquarters. Sir Gneisenau dared say
nothing less than that it was the campfires of my corps that aroused the
enemy; nothing is more false and he himself is alone responsible for the
disposition and delivery of orders.78
Regardless of who was at fault, Macdonald recognized the danger to his

right. To Blücher’s dismay, the marshal wasted no time withdrawing his
troops from Görlitz to Reichenbach. Poniatowski’s VIII Corps covered the
march of Macdonald’s right wing by holding firm at Löbau. Some five miles
northwest of Bernstadt auf dem Eigen, the Polish vanguard took post at
Herwigsdorf. With his left wing falling back westward to Weißenberg and
Glossen, the marshal swung his right wing to the northwest so that the
Army of the Bober faced south.
As the French army retreated, Borozdin led the main body of St.-Priest’s
vanguard northwest from Bernstadt auf dem Eigen before dawn on the 9th. St.-
Priest’s main body marched at daybreak; Langeron himself led Kaptsevich’s
X Infantry Corps from Ostritz. Borozdin found the Poles holding the heights
and thick woods just south of Herwigsdorf. Although the Poles welcomed the
Russians with the hatred that marked almost every confrontation between
these deadly foes, the Moskovskii Dragoons supported by several Cherno-
morskoye Cossack Regiments pushed back their advance posts. Bistram
directed the 1st and 33rd Jäger Regiments (three battalions in total) through
the woods, turning the enemy’s left flank and reaching the road to Reichenbach.
Outflanked, the Poles withdrew two and one-half miles west to Ebersdorf,
where their rearguard took a position on the hills east of this village. The native
Livonian, General Rodion Gerngross, moved up with the 1st Brigade of the 1st
Dragoon Division; his Kargopolskii and Mitavskii Dragoons dispersed the
Poles. Poniatowski’s rearguard fought hard to hold Ebersdorf as French infan-
try and cavalry support could be seen advancing from Löbau. To take Ebers-
dorf before the Poles could be reinforced, Borozdin committed the Ryazanskii
Infantry Regiment supported by the Kargopolskii and Mitavskii Dragoons; a
well-placed battery silenced the Polish cannon and ignited several fires in
Ebersdorf. The Polish infantry desperately sought to hold their ground but
mounting flames forced them to finally abandon the position.
Poniatowski established a new position north of Löbau but his rearguard
continued to occupy the village. From Ebersdorf, Borozdin directed his men
northeast to a 400-meter-tall height just east of Löbau. As soon as the
Russians reach the domineering hill, the Poles sortied from Löbau. But
around this time, St.-Priest’s 17th Division arrived from Ebersdorf to attack
the right flank of the advancing enemy columns while Borozdin attacked their
front. Although Poniatowski recalled his columns to Löbau, the Russians
observed elements of Lauriston’s V Corps moving southwest toward their rear

from the direction of Reichenbach. Any joy on the part of the Poles proved
illusory as timing favored St.-Priest on this day. Before the French could reach
their allies, Kaptsevich’s infantry arrived. The 29th and 45th Jäger Regiments
blocked the Reichenbach road and chased the imperials from Wendisch Pauls-
dorf. Around 4:00 p.m., Poniatowski finally ordered a withdrawal; the blood
of his countrymen had bought enough time for Lauriston’s V Corps to pass
west. After evacuating Löbau, the Poles took a position a few miles northwest
of the town on line with Lauriston’s corps, which halted on the hills of
Kittlitz. Kaptsevich pushed north and deployed his infantry on the hills facing
V Corps. Skirmishing continued until around 9:00 p.m., at which time the Poles
withdrew under the protection of IV Cavalry Corps – likewise an all-Polish
unit except for its commander, General François-Étienne Kellermann –
six miles northwest to Hochkirch on the road to Bautzen, leaving their
rearguard at Plotzen. At nightfall, V Corps halted at Hochkirch with III and
XI Corps and II Cavalry Corps between Glossen and Weißenberg.79
Thus, Macdonald’s army escaped to Bautzen largely unscathed on
9 September; each side lost some 500 men. Borozdin pursued the Poles for
a few miles before establishing a camp between Eiserode and Nechen; St.-
Priest’s main body bivouacked between Nechen and Löbau. Langeron’s
corps camped at Bernstadt auf dem Eigen, Yorck’s just west of Ostritz at
Gruhna, Sacken’s at Görlitz, and Bubna’s division at Rumburg. Blücher
portrayed the day as a success to Bernadotte: “This maneuver was so very
successful that at this moment the enemy is in full retreat on Bautzen. I hope
my vanguards will attain still more.”80
On 10 September, the day that his Streifkorps reached the Elbe and the rear
of the French army, Blücher granted Langeron and Yorck a day of rest; only
the vanguards continued the pursuit west from the banks of the Neiße toward
Bautzen. Long before dawn Katzler ordered the hussar regiment commanded
by Prince Friedrich of Hesse forward to seek an advantage where possible.
Katzler followed at daybreak with the vanguard’s main body, taking a north-
west direction with Reichenbach to the right (north). To his northwest,
Vasilchikov led Sacken’s vanguard through Glossen and Wurschen, halting
at the latter and pushing his outposts toward Bautzen. His forward units
found the imperials retreating in two columns: one through Weißenberg, the
other through Hochkirch.81 Sacken’s main body trooped from the Land-
skrone to Schöps, with corps headquarters taken at Reichenbach. Yorck’s
corps remained at Gruhna and Langeron’s at Bernstadt auf dem Eigen.
Continuing through Hochkirch and Weißenberg on 10 September, the
majority of Macdonald’s army halted on the hills east of Bautzen while the
Poles – VIII Corps and IV Cavalry Corps – marched thirteen miles southwest
from Bautzen to Putzkau. Again, the Russians on Blücher’s left wing endured
intense fighting. At 4:00 a.m. on the 10th, St.-Priest pushed his corps
0 10 20 30 40 50 miles
Glogau
N
Hoyerswerda
Haynau O d er
Spr
Bobe r
ee
Bunzlau Liegnitz
Queis
Neumarkt
Neiße
Großenhain xxxx xxx
Breslau
xxx Naumburg Goldberg
Bober III IIxxx Sacken h
xxx xxx c
Bautzen V IV xxx Görlitz Löwenberg tzba
xxx XI xxxx Lauban Ka
Elb
Greiffenberg Jauer
e
VIII xxx
Meißen xxx
Silesia Lähn
St.-Priest xxx
Langeron Yorck Marklissa Schönau
Friedeberg
Brieg
Striegau
Berthelsdorf Bolkenhain
Stolpen Hirschberg
xx Schweidnitz
2 Zittau Friedland
386
Dresden Pirna Rumburg Schmeideberg
Königstein Schreiberhau Landeshut
xxxx
Napoleon
xxx e BOHEMIA
II Silberberg
g xxxx
Rie
ir Bohemia r Neiße R Nieße
atze i
se Kosel
b Gl Wartha ver
Aussig Turnau
Teplitz
ng
ge Leitmeritz
eb Glatz
rz Görkau Gitschen
Lobositz Jungbunzlau
Brüx
ir
E
Komotau
g
e
AU STR IA
Prague
20. Situation, 9 September 1813

northwest toward Hochkirch on the Bautzen–Löbau road. Leading St.-

Priest’s vanguard, Borozdin made contact with Poniatowski’s posts south
of Plotzen. While Yuzefovich’s dragoons pinned the Poles, Bistram’s Jäger
brigade turned their right by reaching Lehn. Thus taken in the flank, the Poles
withdrew on Plotzen, where Poniatowski committed a sizeable force sup-
ported by eight guns. Other columns – Lauriston’s V Corps – could be seen
moving south from Hochkirch toward Lehn, Sornßig, and Wuischke, which
the Poles also held. Poniatowski posted his main body in battle order on the
hills of Hochkirch less than one mile northwest of Plotzen. St.-Priest moved
up General Yegor Pillar’s 17th Division to take Plotzen while Gerngross led
the Ryazanskii Infantry Regiment and Novorossiiskii Dragoons west to
support Bistram’s Jäger at Wuischke. After the Russians took both Plotzen
and Wuischke, Pillar continued northwest toward Hochkirch. The Poles
evacuated the village around 1:00 in the afternoon and withdrew on Bautzen.
Yuzefovich’s dragoons pursued some four miles to the defile at Jenkwitz,
itself less than three miles southeast of Bautzen, before withdrawing to
Niethen for the night. Borozdin bivouacked at Hochkirch; St.-Priest led his
main body to Eiserode, three miles southeast of Hochkirch. Behind him,
Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps halted at Löbau. Both sides again lost around
500 men with the Russians taking an additional 400 prisoners.82
Although Blücher failed to pin Macdonald at the Neiße for a second battle
on 8 or 9 September, he forced the Army of the Bober to retreat to Bautzen. In
reflecting on the overall situation, we again see the magnitude of Blücher’s
operations. His constant pressure prevented Macdonald from rallying his
army at the Bober, the Queis, or the Neiße. By driving the marshal to
Bautzen, Blücher completely disrupted Napoleon’s timetable and planning.
From 31 August to 3 September, the emperor sat at Dresden uncertain if he
could lead the Berlin offensive because of Macdonald’s steady flight westward.
Forced to stop the Army of the Bober from retreating across the Spree,
Napoleon transferred VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps from the Bohemian
frontier to Bautzen, to where he proceeded with his Guard on 4 September.
Hoping to quickly engage Blücher and destroy his army, Napoleon lunged
but missed. Again proving that going backward could be just as beneficial as
going forward, Blücher retreated across the Neiße to the Queis.
Not only did Blücher conform perfectly to the tenets of the Reichenbach
Plan, but his drive against Macdonald both spared Bernadotte a confron-
tation with Napoleon and took the pressure off Schwarzenberg. To take in
Macdonald’s beleaguered army, Napoleon assembled the Guard, VI Corps,
and I Cavalry Corps at Dresden. Instead of marching on Berlin, he went to
Bautzen to personally restore Macdonald’s command. Thus, while a great
victory for the Allies, Kulm only managed to pull the imperials out of the
passes of the Erzgebirge. The return of VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps to
Dresden, and the posting of II and XIV Corps at Freiberg and Pirna
respectively – all precautionary measures taken as a result of Macdonald’s

flight – relieved the pressure on the Army of Bohemia. Sensing that he no
longer had a sword at his back, Schwarzenberg managed to generate enough
steam to alarm St.-Cyr and bring Napoleon racing back to Dresden, which
in turn took the pressure off Blücher.
While Schwarzenberg deserves credit, the damage to Napoleon’s strategy
had already been done by 6 September. Owing to Blücher’s pressure, Mac-
donald’s retreat obstructed Napoleon from taking command of the Berlin
offensive from 31 August to 3 September. Then, his pursuit of the Silesian
Army cost the emperor another three days and culminated with his returning
to Dresden rather than marching on Berlin. Thus, Napoleon squandered an
entire week contending with the difficulties caused by Blücher. While Napo-
leon secured Macdonald, Ney continued his operation and met with defeat at
Dennewitz on the 6th. Detaining Napoleon in Saxony from 31 August to
6 September must be counted as one of Blücher’s major achievements in the
Fall Campaign. Had Napoleon and the Guard united with Ney’s army it is
difficult to imagine Bülow and Tauentzien winning the battle of Dennewitz.
Warned of the emperor’s approach, Bernadotte would have retreated to
Swedish Pomerania. The campaign in Brandenburg then would have
depended on how well Napoleon could maneuver in conjunction with
Davout and how well the prince royal could counter their movements. While
the Swedes and Russians followed the crown prince, Bülow and Tauentzien
would have made a stand somewhere to bravely sacrifice their corps rather
than continue a shameful retreat. If Murat and Macdonald held up against
Schwarzenberg and Blücher, Bernadotte would eventually have to fight or
risk being driven across Swedish Pomerania and into the Baltic. By maintain-
ing constant pressure on Macdonald and then going backward at the right
moment, the future Marshal Forwards prevented this scenario altogether.
Instead of triumphantly entering Berlin as he did in 1806, Napoleon
returned to Dresden after having achieved nothing.
Taking stock of the situation, Gneisenau considered a further pursuit
pointless and even detrimental to the overall situation. Favorable results
could easily drive Macdonald’s army across the Elbe and into Napoleon’s
arms, allowing the emperor to again fall on the Bohemian Army with
superior forces before the Silesian Army could rush to its support. Indignant
about the lost opportunity to deliver a decisive blow, Blücher demanded that
the army press forward. Gneisenau and Müffling countered that a further
advance would serve no purpose. “Bonaparte stood with his principal forces
in and near Dresden,” recalled Müffling. “Although he had detached a
portion to oppose the main army and another against the Silesian Army,
he could still reunite all his forces in one night and attack with superior
numbers whichever of the two armies exposed itself to him. This reason
alone would have prevented General Blücher from moving any closer to
Dresden than Bautzen, and thus risk an unequal engagement; but there were
other reasons besides.” By driving Macdonald across the Elbe, Blücher
would then be obliged to post the Silesian Army along the river. “In that
case, it would be in a barren district,” continued Müffling, “amidst forests in
which it was impossible to live.” Worse, “the army would be immediately
obliged to fall back on the defensive.” Unable to cross the Elbe at Dresden,
another point of passage from the eastern to the western bank of the Elbe
would be needed. Even if Blücher found a secure crossing, the Silesian Army
would not be able to cross to the left bank undetected. Napoleon would then
make “counterarrangements to impede a new movement.”
Blücher could hardly reconcile himself to this unnatural way of war; his
instinct told him to strike. His constant demand to go forward led to another
disagreement with Gneisenau. Like Napoleon, Blücher believed that the
problems of warfare could not be solved through inactivity. Yet, on this
occasion, Gneisenau refused to compromise. As with most of their clashes,
Gneisenau emerged the victor because Blücher trusted his subordinate’s
grasp of strategy and operations much more than his own. “All of these
reasons combined to make General Blücher decide against proceeding fur-
ther,” wrote Müffling, “and instead to take a position so that, if Bonaparte
advanced against him, he could evade the blow.”83
Blücher’s report to the king, drafted by Gneisenau at 11:00 a.m. on the
10th, grants insight into their view of the situation as well as their solution,
which explains the day of rest for Yorck and Langeron. Rather than drive
Macdonald into Napoleon’s arms, Gneisenau suggested the opposite: force
Napoleon to rescue the marshal. In this way, the Bohemian Army would
have time to take Dresden or cut French communications. “Because the
opportunity to force the enemy into a battle has escaped me, the continu-
ation of my offensive operation in my opinion appears to be of no use to
the Bohemian Army. On the contrary, if I drive the corps facing me
(Poniatowski, XI Corps, with part of III and V Corps) across the Elbe,
they can then easily unite and fall on the Bohemian Army before I have time
to come to its assistance. In general, nothing would be more advantageous
than if my operations again induce the emperor Napoleon to come to the aid
of the Army of the Bober with a considerable force.” The letter continued by
stressing the advantageous nature of Napoleon’s “strategic position” at
Dresden but asserted that a weakness could be found: “so risky would it be
if he lingered there for some time and exhausted himself.” With this, Gnei-
senau began constructing an argument in favor of a strategy of attrition. In
Napoleon’s current situation, Gneisenau maintained that “the most advanta-
geous move he can make is to quickly throw the army that faces the crown
prince of Sweden onto the Saale and use it to reopen all communication. If
this does not occur, in my humble opinion an offensive against the subsist-
ence of the enemy and a defensive against his forces will most certainly lead
to a favorable result. I await most humbly Your Royal Majesty’s orders over
the further operations and until then will continue to hurt the enemy through
the kleinen Krieg.” Müffling further explains this thought process:
By all accounts, we can assume that the French armies were weaker than
those of the Allies at the beginning of the campaign. As the former suffered
much greater losses in battle, Allied forces (including Bennigsen’s army
marching from Poland through Silesia) must have exceeded them by
100,000 men. The Allies had, namely, 400,000 men; Napoleon 300,000 men,
or 4 to 3. Therefore, the surest means of successfully ending the war was to
engage in daily combats, even if they decided nothing. If after some time, an
equal number of men were killed (say 100,000 men on each side) in this
manner, the Allies would have a 3 to 2 ratio and it would then be the time to
completely crush Bonaparte in a great battle. This was the general opinion at
General Blücher’s headquarters. Officers were dispatched by him to the
headquarters of the main army and of the crown prince of Sweden to learn
the opinions that prevailed there.84
Gneisenau’s suggestion to halt the advance and allow the effects of the
kleinen Krieg to exhaust Napoleon appears to have been influenced by
Knesebeck’s letter of 3 September and marks a change in the outlook of
Silesian Army Headquarters. When not retreating from Napoleon, Blücher
and Gneisenau had pursued a strategy to overwhelm their enemy, a
Niederwerfungsstrategie (strategy of annihilation) that would culminate in a
Vernichtungsschlacht (battle of annihilation). Up to this point, Blücher had
distinguished his way of war with extraordinary energy and activity, missing
no opportunity to attack and damage the enemy. Now, he reluctantly
endorsed a strategy of exhaustion, an eighteenth-century Ermattungsstrategie
akin in principle to the ideas that mastered the Reichenbach Plan. Gneisenau’s
logic for halting the offensive against the Army of the Bober – because it
would unite with Napoleon’s Grande Armée, thus increasing the forces facing
the Bohemian Army – defies explanation. It certainly ignores the fact that the
Silesian Army would maintain complete independence, meaning it could
either march on Napoleon’s vital base at Dresden or unite with the Army of
North Germany, cross the Elbe, and operate against the rear of the Grande
Armée. Moreover, as the Prussians knew well, the Reichenbach Plan stipu-
lated that, if the Bohemian Army faced a superior enemy force,
Schwarzenberg could withdraw deep into Bohemia. “But it appears even
more disconcerting to us,” bemoans Friederich, “to hear from the mouths of
Blücher and Gneisenau the view that the defensive against the enemy’s forces
and the offensive against his rearward-lying communication was the best
guarantee for a favorable result.” While we cannot account for this “disturb-
ing” change, as Friederich terms it, it is useful to understand that the cult of the
Frederician army had not disappeared entirely – and could not. Thus, we must
judge the degree to which Blücher and Gneisenau – a rookie combination of

commander and staff chief co-leading a multinational army for the first time –
successfully reconciled their institutional heritage with Napoleon’s new way
of war in the midst of the largest conflict Europe had ever seen.85
After writing the report to Frederick William at 11:00 a.m. on 10
September, Blücher and his staff traveled thirteen miles west from Radmeritz
to Herrnhut. Two interesting letters arrived. The first, Knesebeck’s gloomy
report from Teplitz on 8 September, described Napoleon’s sudden arrival at
Dresden and warned that “it appears absolutely necessary to hasten to the
aid” of Bernadotte. Blücher and Gneisenau knew better thanks to the second
letter that arrived on 10 September. Sent from Bernadotte’s headquarters at
Jüterbog, it announced the Army of North Germany’s victory over Ney at
Dennewitz on the 6th. In describing Ney’s defeat, the crown prince praised
the heroism of the Prussian III and IV Corps but spitefully and incorrectly
attributed the victory to the Russian and Swedish corps attached to his army.
By thus destroying his relationship with Bülow and Tauentzien, Bernadotte
created conditions that would facilitate Blücher’s march down the Elbe. For
now, however, the Army of North Germany’s booty could not have been
better: 5,000 prisoners, at least 40 guns, 200 caissons, and 3 flags. Two days
later the number of prisoners jumped to 15,000. Like the disintegration of
Macdonald’s army, this number increased over the course of the next week as
Ney retreated to Torgau, producing a total loss of 23,215 men, 53 guns,
12,000 muskets, 412 wagons, and 4 flags.86
Consequently, Knesebeck’s alarm over the crown prince of Sweden did
not resonate at Blücher’s headquarters. Instead, Blücher and Gneisenau
believed the time had come for Bernadotte to cross the Elbe and enter the
main theater of war. A subsequent letter from the crown prince dated 9 Sep-
tember raised their hope that the Army of North Germany would be led
across the Elbe by its commander without much goading. “According to the
news I receive from you,” wrote the prince royal, “I am prepared either to
march against the flank of the emperor Napoleon if he goes to Silesia or to
cross the Elbe if he withdraws before you.” Bernadotte explained that he had
sent 10,000 men to Luckau, seventy miles northwest of Bautzen, and could
have another 10,000 follow. If Napoleon crossed to the right bank of the Elbe
to attack Blücher, Bernadotte pledged to march up (south) the Elbe to attack
the emperor’s left flank. Should Napoleon withdraw before the Silesian
Army, he still planned to lead the Army of North Germany south, cross
to the left bank of the Elbe, and proceed against the Grande Armée.87
Although Bernadotte’s plans sounded promising, the Prussians remained
skeptical. “The correspondence of the crown prince of Sweden,” noted
Müffling, “which was entrusted to me, required very unique attention, being
more diplomatic than military. Every word had to be weighed and con-
sidered, with a view toward the conclusions that might be drawn from them.
We found by experience that the written communications of the crown

prince did not at all agree with his verbal expressions, which we learned
through the Prussian officers at his headquarters.” Nevertheless, the Prus-
sians felt that “the time had come to arrange a new plan of operations. At the
beginning of the campaign after the armistice, each field commander acted
on his own, observing some important general principles, but the army’s
approach to the Elbe made it necessary for arrangements for all operations to
be made in time so the Allies could take full advantage of the superiority in
manpower and so that no army be exposed to the danger of being defeated
individually.”88 With this thought in mind, the Prussians started planning
one of the most unorthodox yet decisive operations of the campaign.
Notes
1 Barclay to Blücher in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:168, quoted in Pertz and
3 Peter Duka von Kádár on behalf of Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Dux, 30 August
1813, Add MSS, 20112, 2–3.
4 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:241; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:256.
5 Blücher to Bennigsen, Löwenberg, 2 September 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:208.
6 Markov commanded an advance corps of around 9,246 infantry, 2,197 cavalry,
3,255 Cossacks and Bashkirs, and 689 gunners to man 38 guns. Dokhtoruv
commanded the right wing corps of Bennigsen’s army consisting of 19,924
infantry, 3,424 cavalry, and 120 guns for a total of 26,571 combatants. Tolstoy
commanded the left wing corps of mainly militia and cavalry: 15,995 men and 40
guns. In all Bennigsen’s army numbered 59,052 men and 198 guns. See n. 63,
lxxiii–lxxix, in the appendix of volume II of Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges.
7 Continuing to Bernadotte’s headquarters, Liechtenstein was to also request that
the Army of North Germany execute a general movement toward the Elbe.
Purportedly, Blücher had Liechtenstein deliver a letter to Bernadotte likewise
requesting that he cross the Elbe.
8 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Löwenberg, 2 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530,
ad83; RA KrA, volym 25 and Add MSS, 20112, 4–5.
9 Tolstoy’s command consisted of one Guard Cavalry brigade, one regular cavalry
corps, V Guard Corps, and II Infantry Corps.
11 Gneisenau to Caroline, Radmeritz, 9 September 1813, Gneisenau, ed. Griewank,
250–51.
12 Supply difficulties and the effects of the bivouac on the health of the army would
take their toll. By the second week of September, the Austrian army alone tallied a
sick list of 209 officers and 15,132 men.
14 “Disposition for 2 September,” Löwenberg, 1 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 129.
15 Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Gabel, 3 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 66;

Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 44; Droysen, Yorck, II:160–61; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, II:244.
16 Blücher to Langeron, Yorck, and Sacken, Lauban, 2 September 1813, Add MSS,
20112, 141; Blücher to Langeron, Lauban, 2 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA,
op. 16, d. 3912, chast 2, l. 432; Disposition, Lauban, 2 September 1813, Add MSS,
20112, 130; Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Gabel, 3 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA
1530, 66; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:245–46; Pertz and Delbrück, Gnei-
senau, III:265.
17 Vasilchikov’s report is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:212; Bubna to Schwar-
zenberg, Gabel, 3 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 66; Blücher to Charles
John, Lauban, 8 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 44;
19 Blücher to Frederick William, Görlitz, 3 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
20 See Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, 181–83.
21 CN, No. 20492, XXVI:153–57; Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General,
II:307.
Macdonald, Murat, Mortier, Marmont, Victor, St.-Cyr, and Latour-Maubourg, 1
September 1813.
23 SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Ney, 2 September 1813.
24 While dictating the letter for Berthier, the emperor instructed his scribe to use
quotation marks so the staff chief would know to copy those exact words. While
copying much of Napoleon’s note verbatim, the major-general did omit the line:
“It is really difficult to have fewer brains that the duc de Reggio [Oudinot].” See
CN, No. 20502, XXVI:162.
25 SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Ney and Mortier, Dresden, 2 September 1813.
26 SHAT, C2 154: Lauriston to Berthier, 31 August 1813.
27 Macdonald’s reports to Berthier are in SHAT, C2 155.
28 CN, No. 20508, XXVI:165; SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Ney, 3 September 1813.
29 CN, Nos. 20507, 20516, and 20517, XXVI:164–65, 171–72; SHAT, C17 180:
Berthier to Marmont, Latour-Maubourg, and Mouton, 3 September 1813.
30 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, I:182–83; CN, No. 20510, XXVI:166–67.
31 “Disposition,” Görlitz, 3 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 132; Bubna to
Schwarzenberg, Gabel, 5 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 83; Müffling,
Die Feldzüge, 44–45; Langeron, Mémoires, 268–70.
32 Blücher to Barclay, Glossen, 6:30 p.m., 4 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16,
d. 3912, chast 2, ll. 545–545b; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:217; Plotho, Der
Krieg, II:260; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:290–91; Bog-
danovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:307–08; Droysen, Yorck, II:161–62.
33 The account of 4 September is based on Blücher to Barclay, Glossen, 4 September
1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3912, chast 2, ll. 540–541; Müffling, Die
Feldzüge, 44–45; Plotho, Der Krieg, II:261; Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:215–19; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:291–92; Bog-
danovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:308; Droysen, Yorck, II:161–63; Pertz and
Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:289; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:247–48; Lan-

geron, Mémoires, 269.
34 Langeron, Mémoires, 269–70; Blücher to Knesebeck, Görlitz, 5 September 1813,
Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 178; Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Gabel, 5 September
1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 83; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:291; Droysen,
Yorck, II:162–63.
35 Blücher to Sacken, Langeron, and Yorck, Görlitz, 5 September 1813, GStA PK,
VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:260.
36 Gneisenau to Gaudi, Lauban, 3 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 16.
37 Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:291, 301.
38 Steinmetz to Gneisenau, Herzogswaldau, 7 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 24, emphasis added.
39 SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Macdonald, 5 September 1813; Fabry, Étude sur les
opérations de l’empereur, 1; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, I:177; Norvins,
Portefeuille de mil huit cent treize, II:345; Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 213.
40 Blücher to Barclay, Görlitz, 2:00 p.m., 5 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA,
op. 16, d. 3912, chast 2, l. 516; Blücher to Charles John, Görlitz, 2:00 p.m.,
5 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 45; Pertz and
41 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 46. Sacken’s corps and Yorck’s 1st and 2nd Brigades
crossed the Neiße on a pontoon bridge downstream of Görlitz; Langeron’s corps
and Yorck’s 7th and 8th Brigades crossed by way of a bridge of boats upstream of
the city. Olsufiyev’s IX Infantry Corps and Langeron’s Reserve Artillery reached
Pfaffendorf (Rudzica) while the latter’s VI and X Infantry Corps remained on the
right (east) bank of the Neiße along with Yorck’s 2nd Brigade to take in
Vasilchikov’s advance guard corps. Upstream of Görlitz, the rest of Yorck’s corps
crossed the river and reached Kieslingswalde (Sławnikowice). Sacken’s corps
halted on the great east–west highway north of the Prussians. Further south,
St.-Priest’s corps escaped across the Neiße to Seidenberg but its van remained at
Radmeritz on the western bank. Bubna’s division withdrew to Georgenthal
(Jiřetı́n pod Bukovou) inside the Bohemian frontier.
42 Fabry, Étude sur les operations de l’empereur, 3–4. According to the Prussian
account, carbine fire from Katzler’s West Prussian Dragoons broke the French.
The Brandenburg Hussars and Uhlans followed the dragoons and charged the
enemy troopers, driving them into the undergrowth and gorges until two cuirass-
ier regiments belonging to the 1st Heavy Cavalry Brigade of I Cavalry Corps
moved up in tight formation. Poorly mounted, they too were thrown back. See
Gneisenau to Frederick William, Lauban, 6 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16; Droysen, Yorck, II:163.
43 The younger brother of the commander of X Infantry Corps: Aleksey Shcherbatov.
44 Langeron, Mémoires, 271–72. Not providing a rebuttal to Langeron’s account con-
cerning Emmanuel’s repulse of the four light and two heavy squadrons of French
horse, Fabry merely states: “if we are to believe Langeron, they were rejected by the
Kievskii Dragoons, the 2nd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment, and two squadrons of
the Aleksandriiskii Hussars.” See Fabry, Étude sur les operations de l’empereur, 3.

46 Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Gabel, 10:00 p.m., 5 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA
1530, 83.
47 Gneisenau to Frederick William, Lauban, 6 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16. The account of 5 September is based on Blücher to
Charles John, Görlitz, 5 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Blücher to Barclay,
Görlitz, 5 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3912, chast 2, l. 516; Bubna
to Schwarzenberg, Gabel, 6 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 178; Müffling,
Aus meinem Leben, 79–80; Langeron, Mémoires, 271–72; Plotho, Der Krieg,
II:262–63; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:217–21; Beitzke, Geschichte der
deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:338–42; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges,
IIa:308–10; Droysen, Yorck, II:163–65; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
II:249–51; Fabry, Étude sur les operations de l’empereur, 3–6.
48 Sacken to Blücher, Paritz, 8:00 p.m., 6 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16,
d. 3912, chast 2, l. 544.
50 Blücher to Amalie, Lauban, 6 September 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 178–79.
The account of 6 September is based on Blücher to Barclay, Görlitz, 6 September
1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3912, chast 2, ll. 543–543b; Bubna to Schwar-
zenberg, Gabel, 6 and 7 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 178 and 194;
Plotho, Der Krieg, II:262–63; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege,
II:341–42; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:310.
51 Langeron’s appraisal of Jomini was no more flattering: “He had no influence over
the plans for the campaign and the little counsel that he was asked to give was all
very timid, which might be surprising, coming from a writer who had attributed
(and rightly so) all of Napoleon’s success to his audacity and the calculated
temerity of his operations. Moreover, all of these great geniuses, pen in hand,
(and this is only referring to contemporaries) starting with Mack and Jomini,
failed as soon as it became necessary to drop the pen and take up the sword.” See
Langeron, Mémoires, 225. Austrian general Karl Mack von Leiberich (1752–1828)
capitulated to Napoleon at Ulm on 20 October 1805.
52 Knesebeck to Gneisenau, Teplitz, 3 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:302; Maude,
Leipzig Campaign, 216.
53 Janson, in Friedrich Wilhelm, 211, does not comment on Frederick William’s
reaction to Blücher’s response.
54 Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Teplitz, 5 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 6–8, 11.
In Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:302, Bogdanovich notes that “with the exception of
Blücher, none of the Allied commanders exploited the favorable circumstances
following the battles they won.”
55 Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Teplitz, 5 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 12.
56 Bernhardi, Toll, III:302.
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23; Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Teplitz, 7 September 1813,
ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 210; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:311; Plotho,
Der Krieg, II:185; Bernhardi, Toll, III:302.
58 SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Marmont and Latour-Maubourg, 6 September 1813;

CN, No. 20502, XXVI:162–63.
59 St.-Cyr, Mémoires, IV:141–50; Plotho, Der Krieg, II:192; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:312–13; Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a Gen-
eral, II:314. Napoleon’s 8 September letter to Maret is in Thiers, Histoire du
Consulate et de l’Empire, XVI:441–42.
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23, emphasis added. Knesebeck claimed that Berthier’s letter
to Ney stated that Wallmoden would receive 20,000 men from the Army of
North Germany rather than 20,000 biscuits. Berthier actually wrote: “Il paraı̂t
que l’armée ennemie de Berlin fait un fort détachement contre le prince d’Eck-
mühl [Davout] qui se trouve du côté de Wismar et de Schwerin [It appears that the
enemy army at Berlin has sent a strong detachment against the prince d’Eckmühl,
who is between Wismar and Schwerin].” No letter from Napoleon to Berthier
that would have prompted the latter to send this information to Ney is contained
in the CN. Moreover, Napoleon makes no mention of these reinforcements in his
letter to Berthier concerning Ney on 2 September. It was this letter that prompted
Berthier to issue instructions to Ney. See CN, No. 20502, XXVI:162; SHAT, C17
180: Berthier to Ney, 2 September 1813.
61 Janson, Friedrich Wilhelm, 212–13.
62 The minutes also stated: “There are two routes to effect this union. The first
would be if Blücher’s army is near Bautzen: from there it would proceed through
Neustadt to Pirna or Königstein. This would be the best way and Blücher will
prefer it as soon as he is certain that the main body of the enemy army and the
emperor Napoleon have evacuated the right bank of the Elbe or have turned
against the crown prince of Sweden. In the opposite case, this movement is not
feasible. The second would be for Blücher to have his vanguard advance as far as
possible toward Dresden and, thus covered by Bubna’s division, he can decide
whether to march on Leitmeritz either through Rumburg and Böhmisch-Kannitz
[Česká Kamenice] or through Zittau and Böhmisch-Leipa. Blücher will send two
intelligent staff officers, the first through Rumburg, who then will return through
Zittau, the other through Leitmeritz and Böhmisch-Leipa to Zittau, who can then
report on the condition of the roads and the possibility of executing a movement
on them” (see Map 19).
63 “Opérations arrêtées pour les armées combinées,” Volkonsky, Teplitz, 9 Septem-
ber 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:244.
64 Alexander to Blücher, Teplitz, 9 September 1813, in Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky,
Denkwürdigkeiten, 336–37.
65 CN, No. 20534, XXVI:182–83; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:63–64; St.-Cyr,
Mémoires, IV:151–58; Marmont, Mémoires, V:155–61; Plotho, Der Krieg, II:198;
Bernhardi, Toll, 313–18; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:315–18; Thiers,
Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire, XVI:445–50; Yorck von Wartenburg, Napo-
leon as a General, II:314–16.
66 CN, No. 20538 and 20540, XXVI:185–86; SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Ney and
Macdonald, 11 September 1813.
67 Alexander to Blücher, Teplitz, 11 September 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”

1844:248–49; Schwarzenberg to Bubna, Teplitz, 11 September 1813, ibid., 247.
68 See Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, 218–19. The full text of the treaty can be
found in F. F. Martens, Recueil des traités et conventions, conclus par la Russie,
III:117–26.
69 Sacken to Blücher, Paritz, 6 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3912,
chast 2, l. 648; Sacken to Blücher, Paritz, 8:00 p.m., 6 September 1813, ibid., 544.
See also Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 46; Unger, Blücher, II:89; Langeron, Mémoires,
273. “Langeron,” notes Droysen in Yorck, II:164, “again in his unnecessary
caution, sent back his Reserve Artillery.”
70 Quoted in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:261.
71 Blücher to Langeron, Lauban, 7 September 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:229; Gneisenau to Stein, Lauban, 7 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 20b; Thile to Yorck, 28 September 1813, GStA PK,
IV HA Rep. 15 A 268. Unfortunately, Yorck’s response has been lost. Droysen,
Yorck, II:168. See also Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:310; Plotho, Der
Krieg, II:263; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:303–04.
73 Frederick William to Blücher, Teplitz, 31 August 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16; Alexander to Blücher, Teplitz, 30 August 1813, in
Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Denkwürdigkeiten, 331; Bogdanovich, Geschichte
des Krieges, IIa:83–84. In this case, Alexander granted Langeron the right to wear
an embroidered Wenzel in the shape of the letter “A” on his epaulette: a sign of
great honor.
74 See Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 47–48; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:252; Bog-
danovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:310, 319–20; Disposition for 8 September,
Lauban, 7 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 134; Blücher to Bubna, Lauban,
7 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 229a, and Add MSS, 20112, 133.
75 Blücher to Charles John, Lauban, 8 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Höpf-
ner, “Darstellung,” 1844:231–32.
76 Bubna to Blücher, Grottau, 8 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 229b; Blücher
to Schwarzenberg, Lauban, 10:00 a.m., 8 September 1813, ibid., FA 1531, 329.
77 Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Gabel, 8 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1531, 294;
Disposition for 9 September, Lauban, 7 September 1813, ibid., FA 1530, 266, and
Add MSS, 20112, 135; Droysen, Yorck, II:165; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
II:252; Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 80.
78 Blücher to Langeron, Radmeritz, 10:00 p.m., 8 September 1813, in Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1844:233; Langeron, Mémoires, 275. In Herbstfeldzug 1813,
II:252, Friederich makes no mention of Langeron’s culpability, stating only that
from the Landskrone the enemy observed Allied movements.
79 The account of 9 September is based on Blücher to Frederick William, Radmeritz,
11:00 a.m., 10 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16;
Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Rumburg, 9 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1530, 266;
Langeron, Mémoires, 275–77; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 32; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:320–21; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freiheit-
skriege, II:344–45; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:252–53.
80 Blücher to Charles John, Radmeritz, 9 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25, and
Add MSS, 20112, 48.
81 Sacken’s report to Blücher is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:238.
82 The account of 10 September is based on Blücher to Charles John, Hernnhut,
11 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25, and Add MSS, 20112, 49; Langeron,
Mémoires, 277–78; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:320; Beitzke,
Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:346–48; Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:238; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:253–54.
83 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 49–50; Unger, Blücher, II:89.
84 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 51–52; Blücher to Frederick William, Radmeritz, 11:00
a.m., 10 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16. Based
on Gneisenau’s letters and Müffling’s analysis, Delbrück validated this argument,
pointing out that “up to now the results of the kleinen Krieg had far surpassed all
expectations”: Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:300.
85 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:253–54.
86 Charles John to Blücher, Jüterbog, 7 September 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 114–15;
Unger, Blücher, II:90; Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, 216. Lowe noted the
ferocity with which the Prussians fought: “It is accounted for as a reason for so
few prisoners being taken at Jüterbog [actually Dennewitz], in the same way as it
was with General Blücher in Silesia, that the Prussians are particularly averse to
giving quarter.” See Lowe to Bunbury, Stralsund, 9 September 1813, Add MSS,
20111, 117.
87 Charles John to Blücher, Jüterbog, 9 September 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 116.
88 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 84, and Die Feldzüge, 49–50.
9
Lusatia
For 11 September, Blücher again planned to push forward only the van-
guards. In fact, he remained quite wary, writing to Yorck over the “extreme”
necessity of being able to withdraw through the defiles in the region of
Bernstadt auf dem Eigen and Herrnhut “in the case that a rapid advance by a
superior enemy forces a retreat toward the Neiße.” The reports that arrived
early on the 11th indicated that Macdonald’s army remained on the hills
both east and west of Bautzen. Before daybreak, Katzler crept as close as
possible to the imperial outposts. At first light, he estimated having some
20,000 men in sight. Prisoners confirmed that the troops in front of the
Silesian Army belonged to XI, III, and V Corps in addition to Poniatowski’s
VIII Corps. Based on these statements, Katzler estimated the total size of
Macdonald’s force to be 50,000 men. North of Katzler, Vasilchikov planned
to lead Sacken’s vanguard from Wurschen through Litten toward Bautzen in
an attempt to move around Macdonald’s left. However, he halted at Litten
after observing that Borozdin had not led St.-Priest’s vanguard from Hoch-
kirch toward Bautzen.1
Blücher’s commitment to the kleinen Krieg ended in less than thirty-six
hours. He changed his mind after receiving several reports including many
dispatches found on one of Poniatowski’s captured adjutants claiming that
Napoleon had resumed the offensive against Schwarzenberg; Gneisenau
agreed. Around 10:30 a.m. on the 11th, Army Headquarters issued new
orders. “According to reports,” stated Blücher’s cover letter, “the enemy has
turned against the Bohemian Army with his main force. My intention is to
drive what stands before me away from Dresden. I know from an inter-
cepted letter that Poniatowski wants to take a position at Neustadt in
Sachsen to cover Macdonald’s flank. He must be attacked quickly and
destroyed so that the army can turn right and drive the enemy northwest
399
from Bautzen toward Kamenz. With this intent . . . each commanding officer
will proceed and attack the enemy where he finds him.”2
Covering 11 and 12 September, the accompanying disposition called for
the Silesian Army to pivot on Bautzen with its right wing (Sacken) while its
left wing (St.-Priest, Langeron, and Yorck) executed a sweeping movement
to the west in the spirit of Blücher’s earlier plans. While Sacken’s corps
advanced directly on Bautzen, St.-Priest’s main body would move west from
Hochkirch to Großpostwitz on the eastern bank of the Spree less than five
miles south of Bautzen. Blücher ordered St.-Priest’s light cavalry to make for
Bischofswerda on the great east–west highway twelve miles west of Bautzen.
South of St.-Priest, Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps would march west from
Löbau through Schirgiswalde to the region of Ringenhain, pushing its light
cavalry to Neustadt in Sachsen, some seventeen miles southwest of Bautzen
and twenty-three miles due east of Dresden. Behind these forward troops,
Langeron would lead the rest of his corps from Bernstadt auf dem Eigen to
Neusalza, twelve miles south-southeast of Bautzen. Yorck’s corps received
the task of marching west-southwest from Ostritz to Rumburg. Katzler’s
vanguard remained temporarily under Sacken’s command for the operation
against Bautzen. “Should the enemy evacuate Bautzen, the vanguards must
fall on him from all sides and engage him in serious rearguard combat so that
the enemy breaks in disorder,” concluded Blücher’s orders. Typical of Sile-
sian Army Headquarters, this ambitious plan called for marches in excess of
twenty miles. Also typically, concern about a night march played no role in
the planning.3
One hour after issuing the 10:30 a.m. disposition for 11 September,
Blücher received Volkonsky’s minutes and the tsar’s letter dated 9 September
that again summoned the Silesian Army to Bohemia. Alexander’s letter
arrived at a time when the leadership of the Silesian Army gazed at the
crown prince of Sweden with increasing suspicion and disdain. According to
that erstwhile bard, Müffling, “important transactions took place at Bautzen,
where Blücher moved his headquarters on 15 September. General Bülow,
who had never placed any faith in the [French] marshal who had been
summoned to Sweden, observed the machinations at the headquarters of
the crown prince, and putting together his indiscretions with his deliberate
insinuations, soon saw through the threads of the web. He warned Tauent-
zien and Blücher, and made a secret agreement with Wintzingerode as to
how far they should obey and in what cases they must refuse obedience to
avoid irreparable disasters. These views and agreements explain Bülow’s
behavior . . . and provide a complete explanation of Blücher’s measures from
the time he arrived at Bautzen.” Shortly after the battle of Dennewitz,
Bülow sent a confidential report to Blücher detailing “the daily progressive
measures that the crown prince of Sweden adopted to prove to the French
army that he acted not only as their countryman, but their friend; and how
Lusatia 401
far he was from wishing to destroy them with his Swedes or to shed their
blood. These proofs were very comprehensive, and of such recent date that
they could not yet have reached Allied Headquarters. They convinced
General Blücher to resolve to obviate all political high treason by a rapid
flank march to the right; and he persisted in this resolution, even when, at
almost the same time, he received orders from the sovereigns to move closer
to them on the left, toward Bohemia.”
Müffling tended to exaggerate his own influence on Blücher’s decision-
making, but his testimony about Bülow’s report needed no embellishment.
Bernadotte’s conduct exasperated both Bülow and Tauentzien. According to
the former, they were tired of seeing themselves inhibited “by the timidity
and egotistical politics of a foreigner.”4 Not only Bülow and Tauentzien, but
also Wintzingerode and even the commander of the Swedes, Stedingk,
considered Bernadotte a charlatan. This sentiment reached the Silesian Army
and considerably influenced its Prussian leaders. Commenting on Berna-
dotte’s lethargic operations following the victories at Großbeeren and
Dennewitz, Müffling noted that Blücher’s headquarters knew the crown
prince could have exploited both victories to make them decisive. “Not only
was this not done, but the report spread that he had prevented General
Bülow from undertaking a pursuit that would have produced the greatest
results. These opinions and rumors spread the notion in the Russian and
Prussian armies that the crown prince or perhaps the Swedish government
had a special agreement that included the obligation of sparing the French.”
Müffling maintains that Blücher received accurate information of all that
occurred in Bernadotte’s army. “Thus, he thought it necessary and conducive
for the good cause to remain in the vicinity of the Army of North Germany
for future operations.” On account of Bernadotte’s idleness, Blücher assumed
that no activity could be expected from him as long as he remained isolated in
a separate theater of war. “Thus, General Blücher was disposed . . . to turn to
the right and toward the crown prince, and with him cross the Elbe.”
The Prussians presumed that if the crown prince crossed the Elbe between
Wittenberg and Magdeburg, Napoleon would most likely abandon his pos-
ition at Dresden to confront his former marshal. In this case, the Silesian
Army would cross the Elbe between Dresden and Torgau to link with the
Bohemian Army, which Blücher believed would direct its main body to the
plain between Altenburg and Leipzig. Consequently, the Prussians viewed a
march down the Elbe as imperative to force Bernadotte to assume an active
role in the war rather than remain on the passive defensive.5
On that same day, 11 September, Blücher took the initiative and wrote
directly to Bernadotte. Calling the victory at Dennewitz “brilliant,” he
devoted a long paragraph to flattering and praising the crown prince of
Sweden. “I learned with a pleasure that is difficult to express that the
Prussian troops conducted themselves well in this battle but I am not
surprised because of the happiness they must have had to fight under a
prince who has earned the admiration of all soldiers and whose fame is
known throughout Europe.” Then, after describing his Army of Silesia as
“principally destined to support the Grand Army in Bohemia” by marching
against the enemy’s bridges at Lilienstein and Pirna, he stated his belief that
an offensive movement along the left bank of the Elbe by the Army of North
Germany “would have the most pernicious results for the enemy.” Blücher
assured the prince royal that he did not have to fear for the Army of North
Germany’s left: “Bennigsen has received the order from his sovereign to
enter on line on the Neiße with his 40,000 men.”6
As for the tsar’s dispatch, Gneisenau drafted Blücher’s response, which
stated only that “the 9 September letter from Your Imperial Majesty reached
me today and I have the honor to lay at your feet the considerations
I suggest for my movements. Today, the enemy has taken a position behind
the Spree. My outposts stand before the gates of Bautzen. I have sent
St.-Priest to Großpostewitz and Kaptsevich to Schirgiswalde; they will cross
the Spree at these points. The corps will follow these movements. I hope to
fix the enemy but according to all that we have learned this evening I believe
he will depart for Dresden tonight. If this is the case, I will attack him either
tomorrow evening or the following morning.” In addition, the Silesian
Army’s ammunition and supply wagons remained on the other side of the
Neiße. In light of this and with the army extended between Kamenz and
Neustadt in Sachsen, it could not reach Leitmeritz for at least eight days.
Blücher suggested that he continue his drive into Saxony without sending
any reinforcements to Bohemia. He also informed the tsar that Bernadotte
would do nothing if the Silesian Army moved away from the Army of
North Germany.7
A lengthy “Mémoire” written by Gneisenau and signed by Blücher,
purportedly with a sly grin, accompanied the letter to Alexander; the Prus-
sians also sent a copy to Bernadotte with a request for him to approve their
measures. Once again, Gneisenau’s mastery of the quill emerged. Although
Alexander’s 9 September orders allowed Blücher to choose the route he
would take to Bohemia, the tsar suggested that he march through Leitmer-
itz. Instead, Silesian Army Headquarters presented choices completely dif-
ferent from those listed by the monarch. Reading between the lines of
Gneisenau’s memo, the fact that Blücher and his staff did not consider a
union with the Bohemian Army their first priority clearly emerged.
Although claims by Friederich that they wanted to avoid becoming “tangled
in the listless strategy of Allied Headquarters” are premature, Blücher and
Gneisenau certainly wanted to maintain their freedom of movement.
Completely ignoring the fact that Alexander had not sent a request,
Gneisenau wrote: “His Majesty the Tsar of All the Russias has given us
the choice between two proposed operations: (1) to march through
Lusatia 403
Rumburg, Bohemian-Leipa, and Leitmeritz and unite with the Bohemian

Army or (2) to advance toward the Elbe and establish communication on
Saxon territory.” Gneisenau then explained the considerations that would
determine “which of the two operations would offer the two armies the
greatest advantage.” Accordingly, the Army of North Germany’s “brilliant
victory” at Dennewitz on the 6th paralyzed Ney’s Army of Berlin. This
allowed the crown prince of Sweden to inform Blücher that the Army of
North Germany could advance anywhere it was needed. Blücher, stated the
memo, responded that a crossing of the Elbe by the Army of North Ger-
many “would have disastrous consequences for the enemy. If this victorious
army crosses the Elbe between Wittenberg and Magdeburg at this moment
and drives on Leipzig, it would be very probable that through this move-
ment the emperor Napoleon would be forced to abandon his position at
Dresden to oppose the crown prince’s army. In this case, the Silesian Army
would seek to cross the Elbe without delay between Torgau and Dresden to
link with the Bohemian Army, which without doubt would proceed to the
plains of Altenburg and Leipzig.” Indirectly referring to the order to trans-
fer the Silesian Army to Bohemia, Gneisenau noted that, while the battle of
Dennewitz had changed the situation, the crown prince “probably will
immediately lapse into a completely justified idleness if he perceives that
the Silesian Army is distancing itself from him along a very wide stretch.”
Viewing Napoleon’s return to Bautzen as an indication of another offensive
against Schwarzenberg, Gneisenau added that, if the emperor attacked the
Bohemian Army, the crown prince would halt the Army of North Germany
until the results of this operation became known. In light of this argument,
Gneisenau suggested that “His Majesty the Tsar of All the Russias will
probably be inclined to give his authorization to Blücher to drive the enemy
toward the Elbe rather than march to Bohemia.”
Gneisenau also insisted that, although the Army of the Bober numbered
only 40,000 to 50,000 men, the closer it moved to Dresden, the more Blücher
needed to be on his guard against Napoleon advancing against him with
superior forces. To be secure against any attack, he advocated a central
position between Bautzen and Schluckenau with forward posts pushed to
the Elbe. As soon as Bennigsen’s Army of Poland reached the line of the
Neiße, the Army of Silesia could resume offensive operations by either
marching north to link with the Army of North Germany or immediately
crossing the Elbe should Napoleon invade Bohemia. If the emperor decided
to operate against the Silesian Army, Blücher could withdraw either through
Zittau to Bohemia or across the Neiße and into Silesia. Gneisenau speculated
that, if the Army of Poland could reach the Neiße, the Silesian Army’s
withdrawal through Zittau would force the enemy to divide his forces or
expose his flank to either Blücher or Bennigsen depending on which Allied
army he pursued. Concluding the “Mémoire,” Gneisenau simply stated that
the same advantage would exist if the Army of North Germany crossed the
Elbe and the Silesian Army marched on Elsterwerda to link with it. Neither
Blücher nor Gneisenau knew that, at Trachenberg in July, the tsar had
pledged to subordinate Blücher to Bernadotte if the North German and
Silesian Armies came together. Had they known, the Prussians would
not have refrained from pursuing this operation. As we will see, they
planned to completely circumvent Bernadotte by getting his Prussian corps
commanders – Bülow and Tauentzien – to follow Blücher across the Elbe,
despite the crown prince’s orders.8
We left the Bohemian Army facing large imperial forces at Sobochleben
in the Teplitz valley on 11 September. Much to the surprise of Allied
Headquarters, Napoleon did not attack on 12 or 13 September, thus
allowing Schwarzenberg to hold his position. Patrols even reported the
enemy’s withdrawal along the entire front: an imperial outpost remained
only at Nollendorf. The enemy’s unexpected withdrawal along with news of
the victory at Dennewitz convinced Schwarzenberg that Napoleon would
commence a general retreat of all imperial forces to Leipzig. In his opinion,
the French posts at Nollendorf and on the ridge of the Erzgebirge served to
mask the departure of the Grande Armée. He assumed the Silesian Army’s
proximity to the Elbe had contributed to Napoleon’s decision. Moreover, he
figured that by now Blücher had received the order to march to Bohemia
and had taken the road to Pirna. Based on these considerations and assump-
tions, Schwarzenberg decided to drive back the weak French forces left
behind by Napoleon, pursue them into Saxony, and establish communica-
tion with Blücher. Then, he planned to advance on Leipzig in unison with
the Army of North Germany. This plan differed slightly from the one made
during the 9 September council of war: now the march to Saxony would
begin immediately and before Blücher’s army reached Bohemia. Moreover,
the plan of 9 September envisaged a strategic flanking maneuver with the
purpose of forcing Napoleon to evacuate Dresden and abandon the Elbe.
Schwarzenberg now advocated a pursuit of the enemy, who he believed
would be withdrawing on Leipzig. A council of war at Teplitz on the 13th
produced general support for Schwarzenberg’s proposals. After repulsing
the enemy forces on the foothills, the main body of the Army of Bohemia
would march northwest in the direction of Chemnitz and Leipzig while
Barclay guarded Bohemia with the corps of Wittgenstein and Kleist until the
Silesian Army arrived.
The 13 September council of war had barely ended when Blücher’s
11 September response to Alexander’s 9 September order to march to Bohe-
mia arrived, prompting the monarchs and generals to reconvene. During the
first council of war earlier that day, the Allies had decided that Schwarzen-
berg would immediately commence his army’s march to Chemnitz before the
Silesian Army reached Bohemia. They based this decision on the assumption
Lusatia 405
that Blücher would soon pass Pirna, move into Bohemia, and thus cover
Schwarzenberg’s communications as his army marched. Yet Blücher’s reply
placed the Silesian Army at Bautzen, thirty miles northeast of Pirna. More-
over, Blücher faced the Army of the Bober, making it unlikely that he would
offer his flank and rear to Macdonald by marching to Bohemia. Conse-
quently, Allied Headquarters had little choice but to view the arrival of the
Silesian Army in Bohemia as very unlikely or delayed indefinitely. Thus,
during the second council of war on the 13th, Schwarzenberg decided to
postpone the advance to Chemnitz.9
But what of Blücher? Despite Gneisenau’s finesse, Allied Headquarters
remained far from satisfied with his rejection of the tsar’s direct order, which
had offended Alexander. Blücher’s apparent refusal to march to Bohemia
incensed those who saw numerical superiority as the only means to defeat
Napoleon. Yet those who understood operational warfare recognized
Gneisenau’s wisdom. Even Radetzky, whose memorandums of 4 and
5 September called for the Silesian Army to march to Bohemia, now rejected
the idea of uniting the two armies. “Any immediate union with the crown
prince of Sweden or General Blücher would make us a clumsy colossus,” he
wrote on 14 September, “which only a God-like will and God-like obedi-
ence could inspire. United we would be the army of Xerxes.” Frederick
William also agreed with Gneisenau. During the second council of war on
the 13th, he endorsed the idea for the Silesian Army to march down the Elbe
to link with the Army of North Germany. The king likewise agreed that
Bennigsen’s Army of Poland should take the place of the Silesian Army in
Upper Lusatia. His arguments failed to impress Alexander, who turned to
Knesebeck. He instructed the Prussian officer to compare the pros and cons
of Blücher’s proposed movement to the middle Elbe with those of his
movement to Bohemia. Support for the latter operation still held sway by
the time the meeting concluded at 8:00 p.m. Nevertheless, Frederick William
managed to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat by convincing Alexander
to allow Blücher the latitude to decide for himself.10
Knesebeck recorded the minutes of the second council of war on the 13th
and dispatched them to Blücher that same night. Before examining the
memo, it is useful to consider the contents of the cover letter Knesebeck
wrote Gneisenau: “At a conference held today, His Majesty the Tsar tasked
me with drafting a memo containing the various reasons that would emerge
for and against a movement of the Silesian Army to the middle Elbe or to
Bohemia. I did this, but had to stop writing about the main reason, which
I can mention to you only in the confidentiality of friendship. With the
knowledge of the sovereigns, I will explain myself to you.” Knesebeck
continued by describing that in the Army of North Germany’s two
victories – Großbeeren on 24 August and Dennewitz on 6 September – the
crown prince of Sweden had sacrificed the Prussian III and IV Corps,
leaving them to face the French alone. In addition, Bernadotte failed to

exploit either victory. “We have been informed of this,” admitted
Knesebeck, “and the Russians and Swedes are angry and aggrieved over this.”
“Choose now from the alternatives available to General Blücher,” he
declared. Yet he cautioned against advancing to the region of Torgau and
Mühlberg to attempt a passage of the Elbe because it would bring the Silesian
Army too close to Bernadotte. Knesebeck finally revealed to Blücher the
pledge Alexander had made to Bernadotte in July: “According to the arrange-
ments made at Trachenberg, the crown prince of Sweden could place the
entire Silesian Army under his command temporarily.” Showing acute fore-
sight, Knesebeck predicted that Bernadotte would cross the Elbe only under
this condition. “Therefore, it is quite possible that the entire effort of the
Silesian Army would be paralyzed by this. It would be risky for you to cross
the Elbe alone because you are not strong enough for this. Consider this
important point and those contained in the memo and then decide.”
As for the memo, Knesebeck’s first sentence stated that only Blücher
could decide whether the Silesian Army should march to Bohemia or march
down the Elbe and cross the river near Torgau in unison with the Army of
North Germany: “Therefore, he alone must make the choice.” Enumerating
three reasons that supported the movement down the Elbe, Knesebeck
contended that the march could commence immediately without having to
await the arrival of Bennigsen’s army; the gap that would emerge because of
Blücher’s movement could be filled by a masking force. Second, the Silesian
Army would be able to remain closer to its resources and, third, Blücher
could extend his hand to Bernadotte. Next, Knesebeck listed five reasons
against Blücher’s proposed march down the Elbe:
(1) A reinforcement of Allied forces on the middle Elbe or in the region of

Torgau would push the enemy back upon his resources and his mother-
land, thus strengthening him; increasing Allied forces in Bohemia would
pull him away from his resources and therefore would work in our favor.
(2) If Blücher does not move his army to Bohemia, the Bohemian Army is
not strong enough to both venture toward Chemnitz against the enemy’s
communications and leave behind 50,000 men to cover its point d’appui
on the Elbe [Dresden] because it will be weaker than the enemy on the
other side of the Erzgebirge. Because Napoleon needs only three
marches from Dresden to reach Teplitz, the Bohemian Army cannot
distance itself further than three marches . . . from Teplitz in order to
have enough time to be able to return to defend this point if necessary.
Therefore, it will not be able to operate against Napoleon’s
communications with entire army units but instead with only insuffi-
cient raiding parties. In contrast, if the Silesian Army assumes guard over
the Elbe, then the Bohemian Army can confidently move into Saxony.
Lusatia 407
(3) The Silesian Army will encounter great difficulties crossing the Elbe in
the region of Torgau. If it cannot effect the crossing, it will be outside its
sphere of effectiveness and, because the Army of North Germany will
find itself in the same situation, the strength of the enemy will fall on the
Bohemian Army alone.
(4) If the Silesian Army manages to cross the river, it will find itself quickly
forced to accept battle because with the river behind it, it will no longer
be able to avoid a blow as it has up to now. A battle before the union
with the Army of North Germany would be very risky.
(5) United with the crown prince of Sweden, the Silesian Army would
lose its independence, which would be quite contrary to its basic
purpose.
Concluding, Knesebeck wrote: “These are the reasons that support
the movement to Bohemia as soon as Bennigsen is in the vicinity to take
the place of Blücher’s army. Because we cannot predict the situation of
General Blücher’s corps or of the enemy standing on the right bank of the
Elbe – and this must have a large bearing on the decision – at the time this
letter arrives, the choice of what part he will play must be left to the insight
of this general.” Perhaps foreseeing Blücher’s decision, Alexander wrote to
Bennigsen that same day, ordering the Army of Poland to march to Bohemia
to cover Schwarzenberg’s communications. For reasons unknown,
Knesebeck’s memo did not reach Blücher until 15 September. By that time,
Alexander and Frederick William had reached a definitive decision concern-
ing Blücher.11
Returning to Blücher’s front, the vanguards of the Silesian Army
advanced toward Bautzen on 11 September followed by their parent corps.
Toward evening, Prussian patrols reported a French withdrawal but soon
found the movement to be an extension of Macdonald’s right wing further
south toward Oberkaina and Singwitz. Yorck received the disposition at
4:00 p.m. Although the corps marched immediately, it did not reach the
defiles of the Neiße at Ostritz until nightfall. Difficult terrain permitted
the corps to proceed only in a single column with the Reserve Cavalry at the
head. The tip of Yorck’s column did not reach Großhennersdorf until after
10:00 p.m.; the corps bivouacked there in the order of its march columns.
Sacken received the orders even later than Yorck and thus reached Glossen
late on the 11th. St.-Priest’s troops crossed the Spree to reach Neukirch,
detecting the enemy at Putzkau some four miles further west. Kaptsevich’s
troops took a position at Ringenhain.
During the course of the 11th, Macdonald’s forces remained in
their positions east and west of Bautzen while Poniatowski led the Polish
infantry and cavalry southwest from Putzkau to Neustadt in Sachsen.
Macdonald’s army commenced the retreat from Bautzen around 2:00 a.m.
0 10 20 30 miles Hoyerswerda
Neiße
Großenhain Kamenz
Spree
xxx Litten
V x Bautzen xxx Wurschen Görlitz
x
Sacken
Spittwitz xxxx Hochkirch
Bischofswerda Silesia
Meißen Goldbach x xxx Löbau Radmeritz
xxxx Großpostwitz
St.-Priest
Bober xxx
Putzkau Neukirch Langeron Bernstadt auf dem Eigen
El e xxx xxx
b VI I xxx
VIII xxx
Ringenhain
Neusalza Herrnhut Ostritz
IV
Stolpen Großhennersdorf
Neustadt in
Hohnstein Sachsen
xx Schluckenau
Dohna x
Freiberg Dresden Lilienstein
x
2 xxx
Yorck
Zittau
Pirna
Chemnitz Rumburg
Königstein Bad
Schandau Georgenthal
Bad Gottleuba-Berggießhübel Börnersdorf xxx Kratzau
Hellendorf xxx I
Böhmisch-Kannitz
Altenberg XIV Tetschen
Peterswald
Fürstenwalde
Rohrsdorf
Gabel
xxx
Sayda
r ge Sobochleben xxxx
Böhmisch-Leipa
II
i Teplitz Bohemia
Aussig
Marienberg
g eb Leitmeritz BOHEMIA
rz
Lobositz
Görkau Theresienstadt
Annaberg-Buchholz Brüx Jungbunzlau
Melnik
E Komotau Laun Budin
r Slaný
Ege
N
AU STR IA
Prague
21 Situation, 12 September 1813
on 12 September. In two columns, the imperials trooped thirteen miles

southwest to Bischofswerda and Putzkau respectively. A strong rearguard
held the former; Macdonald’s main body bivouacked between there
and Goldbach. Poniatowski’s Poles continued their march, reaching
Stolpen, eight miles southwest of Bischofswerda and eighteen miles east of
Dresden.
Around 5:00 on the morning of 12 September, the French rearguard
evacuated Bautzen; Katzler’s Prussians pursued. After uniting most of
Yorck’s vanguard at Bautzen, Katzler forwarded the cavalry, horse artillery,
and light infantry toward Bischofswerda. The Prussians did not advance
very far before they encountered Macdonald’s rearguard, which kept them at
bay until nightfall; Katzler halted at Spittwitz, seven miles west of Bautzen.
Sacken’s corps and the majority of Katzler’s infantry under Hiller remained
at Bautzen and did not follow the Prussian vanguard because a spy informed
Sacken that Napoleon had reached Bischofswerda with his Guard.
Lusatia 409
Vasilchikov led Sacken’s vanguard northwest toward Hoyerswerda and

Kamenz to reconnoiter that region.
From Großposterwitz, St.-Priest reported the enemy’s retreat from
Bautzen. He informed Blücher that he planned to lead his Russians through
Neukirch straight to Bischofswerda to take Macdonald in the flank and
sever Poniatowski’s line of retreat. His vanguard commander, Borozdin,
encountered strong imperial forces at Putzkau, three miles southeast of
Bischofswerda. With Sacken’s corps still too far to the northeast to support
him, St.-Priest ordered Borozdin to remain near Putzkau and halted the
main body of the corps three miles to the east at Neukirch. Rudzevich led
Langeron’s advance guard to Neukirch as well; Kaptsevich’s X Infantry
Corps halted at Ringenhain, some two miles southeast of Neukirch. On
the army’s left, Yorck’s corps marched at daybreak on the 12th in the
direction of Rumburg, where the main body arrived long after nightfall.
West of Yorck, Bubna moved his main body from Schluckenau to Ulbers-
dorf in Saxony, but he also heard rumors that Napoleon had led massive
columns east after crossing the Elbe at Dresden.12
Blücher’s thoughts on the situation are best illustrated in his reply to a
letter from Bennigsen notifying him that the vanguard of the Army of
Poland had crossed the Oder at Breslau and Steinau. “Early this morning,
the enemy evacuated Bautzen and fell back on Dresden,” responded Blücher.
“According to intelligence reports, a strong enemy column has defiled from
Dresden toward Bautzen, which is to join another enemy offensive oper-
ation.” He notified Bennigsen that the Silesian Army would take a central
position between Bautzen and Schluckenau, pushing its vanguards toward
the Elbe. In the meantime, Blücher planned to await either the approach of
Bennigsen’s army, the crossing of the Elbe by the Army of North Germany,
or orders from Allied Headquarters. He did not fail to note that Bernadotte
had been requested to cross the Elbe after his victory at Dennewitz. “Should
the emperor Napoleon fall on us with superior numbers,” concluded his
letter, “I will avoid his blow through a prepared retreat across the Neiße at
Ostritz.”13
As noted, Blücher received the copy of Schwarzenberg’s 11 September
letter to Bubna late on the 12th and responded immediately to the former.
Using the same logic employed by Gneisenau in his “Mémoire” of 9 Sep-
tember to Alexander, Blücher explained that the Army of North Germany’s
victory at Dennewitz had convinced him that the best service the Silesian
Army could provide to Schwarzenberg would be to drive the enemy across
the Elbe and in this way relieve any pressure on the Bohemian Army. In a
more forceful tone, the Prussian informed Schwarzenberg “that it is
extremely unlikely that the emperor Napoleon would move more than one
march into Bohemia . . . Nevertheless, should this occur against all probabil-
ity, I will throw myself onto the left bank of the Elbe and against the enemy’s
rear in unison with the crown prince of Sweden.” To conclude, Blücher

returned to numbers. Pointing out that Macdonald’s army numbered at least
50,000–60,000 men, he assured Schwarzenberg that Napoleon could not
invade Bohemia with more than 100,000 men. “Because your forces are
superior in number,” he reminded Schwarzenberg, “there is absolutely no
probability of a successful outcome for the emperor Napoleon.”14
Sacken’s reports on 12 September concerning a renewed offensive by
Napoleon prompted Blücher to halt the advance of his main body on the
13th; only the vanguards pushed forward. No evidence could be found of
an advance by the French emperor. Instead, the initial reports that reached
St.-Priest indicated a continuation of Macdonald’s retreat. Learning that the
Poles had withdrawn further west from Putzkau, St.-Priest ordered
Borozdin’s vanguard to pursue and occupy the heights and woods near the
village of Großdrebnitz, less than five miles west-southwest of Putzkau.
Before Bistram could lead the head of the vanguard from Putzkau toward
Großdrebnitz, Poniatowski’s rearguard sortied from the thick woods
between the two villages. With one battalion of the 48th Jäger, Bistram held
his position on the outskirts of Putzkau and sent the other battalion of the
48th into the woods to the south toward the heights of Oberottendorf.
Satisfied with repulsing the Russians, the Poles halted and commenced the
march back to the woods, leaving their skirmishers and artillery to cover
the retreat. Despite their steady fire, Yuzefovich’s Kharkovskii Dragoon
Regiment navigated the marshy terrain and charged the Polish skirmishers,
cutting down several. After clearing the line of skirmishers, the Russian
troopers caught up with the main body of Polish infantry. Again charging,
the Russians forced the Poles to seek shelter in the woods of Großdrebnitz,
where they re-formed and again sortied supported by several guns. By this
time, a Russian battery unlimbered to answer the imperial artillery. To
support Bistram, St.-Priest moved up the two battalions of the Vilman-
strandskii Infantry Regiment from his 17th Division. On arriving, the Rus-
sians fixed their bayonets and charged the Poles in conjunction with
Yuzefovich’s dragoons. This audacious attack on the numerically superior
Poles surprised and disordered Poniatowski’s usually stout warriors, who
again withdrew into the Großdrebnitz woods. To counter the Russians, a
second Polish column attempted to turn St.-Priest’s left by marching north-
east toward Bischofswerda. General Ivan Poll repulsed this column with his
Kargopolskii Dragoons and a regiment of Don Cossacks. Despite this suc-
cess, fighting lasted until 11:00 p.m. and St.-Priest ultimately failed to dis-
lodge the Poles from Großdrebnitz. Hearing the sound of St.-Priest’s cannon,
Yorck marched I Corps to Schluckenau but Sacken and Langeron maintained
their positions at Bautzen and Neusalza respectively.15
On the morning of the 13th, Blücher received Alexander’s letter of
11 September claiming that Macdonald’s army would unite with Napoleon
Lusatia 411
for an offensive against the Army of Bohemia. Thus, the tsar ordered the
Silesian Army to immediately march through Rumburg to Leitmeritz.
Blücher’s response, again a fine essay written by Gneisenau, assured him
of the Silesian Army’s preparations to march to Rumburg in accordance with
the monarch’s instructions. However, the Prussians presented three counter-
arguments meant to convince the tsar to rescind his order. Similar to their
12 September response to Schwarzenberg, the Prussians first discussed the
numbers at Napoleon’s disposal for an offensive against the Bohemian
Army. “The news of the change in the enemy’s situation will induce Your
Imperial Majesty to change the direction given to me. The enemy force that
my forward troops observed withdrawing yesterday from Bautzen to Neu-
stadt in Sachsen [and] toward Bischofswerda and Stolpen is very consider-
able. Marshal Macdonald and Generals Lauriston and Sébastiani evacuated
Bautzen around 1:00 a.m.; Prince Poniatowski moved to Neustadt in Sach-
sen.” Moreover, the Prussians claimed that the Army of Berlin, which
Bernadotte had defeated at Dennewitz, numbered between 60,000 and
70,000 men. “Therefore, the force that the emperor Napoleon can lead
against the main army in Bohemia can be only 100,000 men.”
Logistics and timing provided Blücher’s second point. “My ammunition
transports and my supply trains have yet to cross the Neiße, and because the
army is extended from Kamenz to Schandau it is unlikely to reach Bohemia
through Rumburg before 15 September and thus the heads of the columns
will not reach Leitmeritz before 19 September.” His third reason centered
on Bernadotte: “I have the honor to inform Your Imperial Highness that
I have summoned the crown prince to cross the Elbe.” He guaranteed
that the Army of North Germany would “encounter no difficulties because
the defeated army has withdrawn across the Elbe and according to the
latest report has taken the road to Leipzig. I will not mention to the crown
prince my preparations to march to Bohemia until a second courier arrives
from your Imperial Majesty to avoid providing him a reason to halt his
operations.”16
Gneisenau expressed his concern that Allied Headquarters might inter-
pret their counterproposals to be the work of the staff chief alone. To be
clear that Blücher totally supported the march north and the crossing of the
Elbe, Gneisenau convinced him to personally write a note to Knesebeck.
“For the general good,” wrote Blücher, “I must warn against a union with
the Grand [Bohemian] Army. What will such an enormous mass achieve in
such a wasteland? Here, I will be effective and I can be useful. If I deviate
from the plan of operations communicated to the crown prince of Sweden,
he will crawl forward instead of proceeding with forceful steps. If Napoleon
wants to invade Bohemia, he must be destroyed in Bohemia, but I believe he
will abandon the Elbe if we maneuver well.”17 Major August Otto Rühle
von Lilienstern, a former classmate of Carl von Clausewitz in Scharnhorst’s
courses for staff officers, received the task of delivering these letters to Allied
Headquarters. Blücher also authorized him to make a verbal report to
Alexander and Frederick William concerning the strategic situation of the
Silesian Army and the views of its leadership.
To relieve the pressure on Schwarzenberg, Blücher considered crossing
the Elbe at Herrnskretschen (Hřensko) and Tetschen, twenty-eight and
thirty-three miles upstream of Dresden respectively; Bubna received orders
to conduct the necessary reconnaissance. For the 14th, Blücher ordered the
vanguards to continue toward Dresden: their patrols should seek to cross the
Elbe. Blücher again kept the main bodies of his three corps in their positions:
Sacken at Bautzen, Langeron at Neusalza, and Yorck at Schluckenau. He
insisted on the continuous flow of information to headquarters: “For every-
one it is determined that the outposts will report all morning, all afternoon,
and all evening when their patrols bring in news of the enemy even if
nothing is new. In this way, the commander in chief expects regular reports
because he must then direct all the movements of the army.”18
Early on the 14th, Katzler reported the evacuation of Bischofswerda by
the imperials. He followed but soon found the French holding a position on
the hills along the Wesenitz River, a right tributary of the Elbe. In fact, the
imperials had settled down to cook, making their continued retreat seem
unlikely. Escorted by one platoon of troopers, Katzler rode into an ambush,
which prompted the Prussians to retreat. Katzler returned to where the
vanguard had bivouacked the night before and received the disposition from
Army Headquarters that directed him to Stolpen. While en route, he
reported to Blücher that in no way did the enemy appear to be retreating
to the Elbe. Unable to take the direct road from Bischofswerda to Stolpen,
Katzler led his brigade through Neukirch to Oberottendorf, seven miles east
of Stolpen, and halted. St.-Priest also reported to Blücher that, after with-
drawing from Bischofswerda and Großdrebnitz, the imperials had taken a
position behind the Wesenitz extending from Bischofswerda through Gold-
bach and Großharthau to Schmiedefeld. As a result of this movement, St.-
Priest remained in his position at Putzkau. He again forwarded to Blücher a
spy’s report claiming that Napoleon and his Guard had reached Stolpen, less
than eight miles south of Bischofswerda. To the southwest, Bubna informed
Blücher from Ulbersdorf that across the Elbe from his position the enemy
did not appear to be advancing through Nollendorf into Bohemia.
Moreover, the intelligence he collected indicated Napoleon had left Pirna
with his Guard and returned to Dresden on the 12th. Blücher likewise
received information from spies claiming that large French forces including
Marmont’s VI Corps had marched from Dresden toward Großenhain
on 12 and 13 September. Finally, a message from Streifkorps commander
Major Falkenhausen noted the departure of large forces from Dresden
north toward Großenhain. Thus, the reports that Blücher received on the
Lusatia 413
14th completely contradicted the news from Allied Headquarters concern-

ing the retreat of Macdonald’s army.19
In addition to his report, Bubna forwarded to Blücher a letter written by
Schwarzenberg on the 12th. Based on Bernadotte’s victory over Ney at
Dennewitz, the Allied generalissimo informed Bubna that Napoleon had
commenced a general retreat to Leipzig. Schwarzenberg believed that the
forces standing in front of him simply served to mask the withdrawal from
Dresden. He explained his plan to attack and drive back the imperials
holding the passes of the Erzgebirge in order to closely cooperate with
Blücher’s army, which Schwarzenberg placed in the vicinity of the Elbe.
He intended to move a pontoon train to the Elbe as soon as possible to
establish direct communication with Blücher.20
Rejecting Schwarzenberg’s optimistic hope that Napoleon would retreat
to Leipzig, Blücher and his staff correctly interpreted these movements as
Napoleon’s preparations for an offensive. A letter from Teplitz written by
Frederick William’s adjutant, Major Thiele, reached Blücher early on the
15th; it echoed Schwarzenberg’s statements about the enemy’s withdrawal
from the passes of the Erzgebirge to Dresden but warned that this probably
indicated Napoleon’s plans to target the Silesian Army. Reports from
Blücher’s forward troops concerning French movements along their front
likewise reinforced the idea of an enemy offensive but the target remained the
question. In addition, more information arrived concerning the concentra-
tion of imperial forces at Großenhain, twenty-one miles north of Dresden.
Thus, the situation appeared to require the exact opposite of Schwarzenberg’s
plans. Rather than concentrate the Silesian Army on its left wing as the
preliminary step for close cooperation with the Army of Bohemia, Blücher
wanted to concentrate the Silesian Army on its right wing to prevent
Napoleon from attempting a bold flanking maneuver such as the one Ney
had executed at Bautzen. The easing of the pressure on Schwarzenberg
supported this idea. Moreover, Blücher’s own “master plan” of marching
down the Elbe would not be served by a concentration on the upper Elbe.
As a result, Sacken received orders to push his light cavalry toward Königs-
brück and to move his main body to the St. Marienstern Convent at
Panschwitz-Kuckau, approximately ten miles northwest of Bautzen, while
Yorck led his corps north to Bautzen (see Map 4). The portion of Langeron’s
corps that stood at Neusalza likewise would march to Bautzen. All remaining
troops would maintain their positions facing the enemy in accordance with
the disposition of 13 September. In the case of a general French offensive
against the Silesian Army, Sacken, Yorck, and Langeron would withdraw
from Bautzen toward Görlitz while St.-Priest withdrew through Herrnhut
and across the Neiße at Ostritz; Bubna would remain parallel to St.-Priest.21
After working out the disposition with Müffling and Gneisenau, Blücher
drafted an explanation of his plans for Tsar Alexander. He claimed that the
reports from Falkenhausen as well as the news that the French had disen-
gaged from the Army of Bohemia had convinced him to immediately
concentrate the Silesian Army on its right wing at Bautzen, pushing Sacken
to Kamenz. “Will the enemy move across the Elbe? Will he march to Torgau
or perhaps against the crown prince to prevent him from crossing the Elbe?
Will he take the Silesian Army in the right flank? I will be able to answer
these questions in forty-eight hours.” Blücher also wrote a short note to
Bernadotte regarding confirmed reports of a French concentration at
Großenhain. “It is difficult to judge the enemy’s intentions because a march
against you or against the Army of Silesia is just as likely. To be à portée to
all, I am having Sacken’s corps march to Kamenz and I am uniting my forces
at Bautzen to be able to follow the enemy as soon as I receive news that he is
marching against you.”22
As for Napoleon, late on the night of the 11th he entertained the idea of
going to Großenhain to contend with Bernadotte. For this reason, he did not
want Macdonald to abandon Bautzen. At 3:00 a.m. on the 12th, the emperor
decided to send V Cavalry Corps and the cavalry brigade from VI Corps to
Großenhain. Two immediate factors converged to prompt this movement.
First, the shortage of flour at Dresden had become acute, forcing Napoleon
to decrease the daily ration from eight ounces of bread to four ounces of rice
supplemented by potatoes if possible. For relief, he arranged the transfer of
mainly flour from Torgau to the Saxon capital. With Blücher and Bernadotte
closing on the right bank of the Elbe, barges could not safely sail up the river
from Torgau to Dresden. To protect transportation on the river, Allied
forces had to be driven from the right bank. Second, the emperor wanted
to secure communication with Ney’s army at Torgau, especially if Berna-
dotte were to link with Blücher on the right bank of the Elbe north of
Dresden. Later on the morning of the 12th, he decided to recall his forces –
namely the Guard, I, II, and XIV Corps – from Bohemia.23
Returning to Dresden on the night of the 12th, he instructed Berthier to
send the remaining units of VI Corps to Großenhain early on the 13th with
orders “to chase the enemy from the right bank of the Elbe, between Torgau
and Dresden, and aid a convoy of 15,000 hundredweights of flour that soon
will be moving from Torgau to Dresden. The arrival of this convoy is of
utmost importance because it will provide subsistence for several months at
our central supply depot of Dresden.” Murat likewise received instructions
to depart for Großenhain on the 13th with I Cavalry Corps. On arriving,
he would take command of V Cavalry Corps as well. With VI Corps, he
would “maneuver to free the Elbe so that the convoy of 15,000 hundred-
weights of flour that is embarking at Torgau can reach Dresden.” An officer
departed from Dresden for Torgau with orders for Ney to immediately send
the flour convoy and coordinate with Murat to assure its safe passage. The
convoy left Torgau on 13 September. “The important business is the convoy
Lusatia 415
that will deliver 15,000 hundredweights of flour,” Napoleon anxiously

explained to Murat on the 14th. “I hear it left Torgau on the 13th, and
I think the wind was favorable, so it should not be far off, and it must have
passed the difficult points.”24
Napoleon then busied himself with preparations for an offensive
against the Army of North Germany. Should Bernadotte cross the Elbe
and repulse Ney a second time, he could then operate against Napoleon’s
communications with France. In view of this threat, Napoleon conceived a
bold operation. First, he would cross the Elbe at Pirna to attack Blücher’s
left wing. After he drove back the Silesian Army, the road would be open for
him to unite with Murat and Marmont in the Großenhain–Königsbrück
region. Second, while St.-Cyr and Victor masked Schwarzenberg, Napoleon
would lead the Grande Armée down the Elbe toward Torgau to unite with
the remnant of Ney’s army and seek a decisive battle with Bernadotte.
Informing Ney that he had driven the Army of Bohemia back to Teplitz,
the master revealed that he would now contend with Bernadotte. “Be
prepared to follow the movement of the emperor and tell us the number
of infantry, cavalry, and artillery with which you can rejoin His Majesty,”
wrote Berthier.25
To secure his rear and flank while he hunted his former marshal, Napo-
leon took painstaking measures to stiffen Macdonald’s resolve. Around 4:00
on the morning of the 14th, he sent his orderly, Captain Caraman, to deliver
a letter from Berthier to Macdonald as well as the master’s verbal instruc-
tions extolling the benefits of the terrain at Bautzen. Napoleon wanted the
Army of the Bober “well situated in open country, on the hills where the
whole army can give battle.” “The hills behind Bautzen provide the best
positions,” he advised. Napoleon tasked Macdonald with placing a strong
combined-arms vanguard on the east–west highway, and securing his flanks
with detachments that would reconnoiter to the north and the south. “In this
way,” lectured the emperor, “the army will be in a good position, protected
against any surprises, and ready for combat or to do whatever it wants.”26
Events during the 14th turned Napoleon’s attention away from Berna-
dotte and back to Bohemia. On this day, Schwarzenberg’s army conducted a
reconnaissance in force along the Austro-Saxon frontier. Barclay easily
repulsed elements of I Corps at Nollendorf and then again at Hellendorf
on the Saxon side of the frontier, eleven miles south of Pirna. Despite
Barclay’s advance, the emperor did not believe it signaled a general Allied
offensive. He explained to Murat that, although 15,000 to 20,000 men had
debouched through Peterswald, the Allies had not challenged XIV Corps at
Borna, eight miles northeast of Hellendorf. According to the emperor,
I Corps “fell back to the only position it could defend, that of Berg-
gießhübel. The enemy arrived there at 1:00. After a few shots he stopped
in front of this position and remained quiet.” “It is unclear what will happen
today,” concluded Napoleon early on the 15th. He planned to lead the

Guard south from Dresden to see if the Allies had the stomach for an
engagement.27
On the other side of the Erzgebirge, Rühle’s arrival at Teplitz on the
evening of the 14th started a chain reaction. Delivering the letters drafted at
Silesian Army Headquarters on the 13th, the major made a persuasive verbal
report that proved more effective than Blücher’s written response. Rühle
rationalized the necessity of having the Silesian Army march down the Elbe,
arguing “that, because of the crown prince’s politics, we should expect no
activity from him while he stands alone with his army and is assigned to a
separate theater of war. Thus, after leaving behind a few troops to conceal
his departure and to cover his main communication with Silesia, General
Blücher intends to turn right [north] toward the crown prince and to cross
the Elbe with him.” Based on Rühle’s persuasive presentation, the tsar now
completely understood and approved Blücher’s proposal. Considerations
over what to expect from the crown prince of Sweden influenced Alexander
and Frederick William. Both agreed that Blücher had to take the lead; he
would set the ball rolling. They regarded the issue as their personal business,
thus earning the enmity of the Austrians at Allied Headquarters.28
Early on the 15th, Alexander and Frederick William officially rescinded
the order for the Silesian Army to march to Bohemia. It is unclear if the
monarchs issued an official letter repealing the orders that same morning.
Yet it is clear that the Austrians did not have any say in the matter. As an
explanation, Schwarzenberg and the rest of Allied Headquarters received the
lame excuse that the Silesian Army already stood too close to the Elbe and
could not march to Bohemia unnoticed by the enemy. Rühle eventually
departed from Teplitz on the afternoon of the 17th with an extremely
confidential communiqué from Knesebeck that expressed the two mon-
archs’ secret approval for Blücher to march down the Elbe to the region of
its juncture with the Black Elster River.29
After reports of the success at Nollendorf and Hellendorf reached
Teplitz, the council of war reconvened on the 15th to debate Schwarzen-
berg’s next move. In addition to the likelihood that Blücher would not come
to Bohemia, Bennigsen’s Army of Poland remained much further east than
Allied Headquarters had anticipated: his lead elements could not reach
Zittau until 17 September while his rear echelon would not arrive until the
26th. This meant that, if the Bohemian Army marched to Chemnitz, it
would do so without support from either Blücher or Bennigsen. On the
other hand, the success at Nollendorf and Hellendorf reinforced the convic-
tion that Napoleon’s retreat to Leipzig had commenced or simply needed a
slight nudge. In turn, this led some to argue that the Bohemian Army no
longer needed support. Despite Schwarzenberg’s opposition, the Allies
decided to immediately commence the march to Chemnitz without awaiting
Lusatia 417
reinforcement from another army. As a result, the Bohemian Army received

orders to begin the march northwest on the 15th.30
This came to naught after Schwarzenberg misread the situation. Still
fearing a general invasion of Bohemia, he quickly rescinded the orders after
Napoleon’s tactical strike on the 15th. During the course of the day,
I Corps and the Guard pushed Barclay across the Bohemian frontier.
Although Schwarzenberg concentrated his army and stood his ground, he
missed a golden opportunity to counterattack when imperial troop
strength had markedly declined due to the need to safeguard the flour
convoy from Torgau. As of the morning of the 15th, VI Corps stood at
Großenhain while Murat maneuvered between Torgau and the Black Elster
with the cavalry.31
Following the operation on the 15th, Napoleon went to Pirna and issued
directives for the building of a pontoon bridge to improve communication
with Macdonald. On the 16th, the emperor endeavored to reach Peterswald
inside the Bohemian frontier with I Corps, while XIV Corps advanced on
his right. En route, his cavalry dispersed a mass of Allied horse from
Peterswald and Nollendorf. A wounded Lieutenant-Colonel Franz von
Blücher numbered among the prisoners taken by the Polish Lancers.32
Reaching Nollendorf late in the day, Napoleon obtained little information
due to a heavy mist that blanketed the valleys of the Erzgebirge. Remaining
at Peterswald throughout the 17th, the emperor did little other than instruct
Ney as well as the commandants of Wittenberg and Magdeburg to refuse
any attempts by Bernadotte to open negotiations; all communication with
the Allies would be conducted through Schwarzenberg’s army. At 5:00 on
the morning of the 18th, he expressed his intention to resume the master
plan despite the attrition of Ney’s Army of Berlin. Berthier explained to Ney
that Murat and Marmont remained on the right bank of the Elbe between
Torgau and Dresden for the purpose of operating against Berlin and the
Army of North Germany. In case of a setback, Ney would “do everything
possible to save Leipzig.”33
Unfortunately for the emperor, Macdonald did not do everything pos-
sible to hold his ground against Blücher. Napoleon assigned him the “indis-
pensable” task of guarding the roads on his left (north) to assure the safe
arrival of the flour convoy. This prompted Napoleon to continue his plan to
bridge the Elbe at Pirna to facilitate communication with the marshal, some
thirty miles northeast at Bautzen. Twenty miles southwest of Bautzen,
Macdonald started building redoubts between Neustadt in Sachsen and
Hohnstein. This signaled to Napoleon the marshal’s intention to continue
his retreat. With the latter point only eleven miles east of Pirna and twenty
miles southeast of Dresden, Napoleon could not allow Macdonald to with-
draw into this position with Blücher following. He demanded that the
marshal hold Bautzen and inform him “of the movements he can execute
to hurt the enemy.” With Murat and Marmont between Großenhain and
Torgau, Napoleon expected the Army of the Bober to make some type of
stand.34
Encouraged by the proximity of the emperor, Macdonald ordered a
general reconnaissance on the 15th; imperial patrols clashed with Allied
posts all along Blücher’s front. In some sectors the engagements became
intense: St.-Priest barely managed to hold Putzkau. At 5:00 that morning,
the Poles launched an energetic attack against Borozdin’s vanguard while a
flanking column moved toward Oberottendorf and St.-Priest’s left flank.
With the Karkovskii and Novorossiiskii Dragoon Regiments, the Don Cos-
sacks, and the 1st Jäger Regiment, Yuzefovich held his ground against the
Polish columns that emerged from the woods between Großdrebnitz and
Putzkau. As the enemy “ceaselessly reinforced himself,” it became apparent
to the Russians that this was not a mere demonstration to cover a retreat.
Borozdin moved up reinforcements, thus allowing Yuzefovich to arrange a
counterattack. Yet more Polish support arrived, including one battery
that opened fire on the Russian center. Borozdin summoned Bistram from
Putzkau with the 33rd Jäger Regiment, one battalion of the 48th, and two
companies of the 30th.
After observing Borozdin fail to make headway with these additional
troops, St.-Priest moved up all available artillery as well as the Moskovskii
Dragoon Regiment. Soon after, he committed the Yeletskii, Vilmanstrandskii,
and Ryazanskii Infantry Regiments as well as the remaining battalions
of the 30th Jäger. Borozdin deployed the Polotskii Infantry Regiment
and the other battalion of the 48th Jäger to defend the Oberottendorf
heights. Well-aimed fire from St.-Priest’s thirty-six guns soon took its toll
on the Poles, dismounting several cannon and forcing them to momentarily
retreat. After re-forming, the Poles again moved against St.-Priest’s
left flank and renewed their attacks on the Oberottendorf heights. “It is
difficult to determine their intentions,” recalled Langeron; “they fought
ferociously and without an objective, as the position that they occupied
was not sufficiently valuable to sacrifice as many men as they did to
maintain it, while their army was too weak to resist our own, and at the
moment had to await the order before it could retreat. Our artillery moved
with audacity until it reached the skirmishing line, crushing with grapeshot
the heads of the enemy columns that were trying to deploy from the woods
under the protection of their cannon, which were soon forced to retire.”
After sixteen hours of “ferocious fighting,” the Poles finally conceded the
field. They withdrew altogether on the following day, 16 September,
retreating eight miles southwest to Stolpen on the road to Pirna. St.-Priest
occupied Großdrebnitz and the steep Bühlau heights three miles to the
west from which he could observe and dominate every enemy position.
Losses amounted to 400 for each side.
Lusatia 419
While attempting to move Yorck’s vanguard west from Oberottendorf to

Stolpen, Katzler collided with a column from Poniatowski’s corps at Rück-
ersdorf, less than three miles south of Großdrebnitz. Forced to retreat four
miles southeast to Neustadt in Sachsen, the Prussians found General
Emmanuel from Langeron’s corps engaged with a second column of Poles.
Together, Katzler and Emmanuel managed to drive the Poles northwest on
the road to Stolpen. Less than two miles from Stolpen, the Allies took the
village of Langenwolmsdorf but could not hold it and eventually withdrew
southeast to the hills at Rückersdorf. Around noon, Sacken informed Blü-
cher that the imperials still held firm at Bischofswerda and that all reports as
well as prisoners’ statements confirmed the movement of large enemy forces
to Großenhain.
As for the main body of the Silesian Army, Blücher’s disposition for
15 September did not reach the corps until that afternoon. Sacken
immediately dispatched Vasilchikov with the van toward Kamenz and
followed with the rest of the corps as far as the St. Marienstern Convent.
Yorck’s corps marched through Sohland and Schirgiswalde toward
Großpostwitz but became entangled with Langeron’s Russians and lost
several hours. After reordering the columns, Yorck continued to Bautzen.
His lead elements did not bivouac until 2:00 on the morning of the 16th; the
main body around 7:00 a.m. Langeron’s corps likewise trudged into the
bivouac very late: the two corps camped astride the great east–west highway
on the eastern side of Bautzen.35
A report from Sacken written on the evening of the 15th confirmed that
Murat had arrived at Großenhain with 50,000 men on the 14th. As for the
Army of North Germany, Bülow’s III Corps reached Wittenberg on the 14th;
his engineers started work on bridging the Elbe ten miles upstream of the
fortress at Elster. On the 15th, elements of Tauentzien’s IV Corps destroyed
the bridge over the Elbe near Torgau.36 Northwest of the Prussians, the
remainder of the Army of North Germany moved west to Roßlau and Zerbst
while Chernishev crossed the Elbe with 2,000 Cossacks. Blücher received
Tauentzien’s request to drive through Kamenz toward Großenhain and
secure communication with Bernadotte. A letter from Bennigsen indicated
that, on the 16th, General Pavel Stroganov’s division of the Army of Poland
would reach Görlitz while Dokhturov’s corps would extend to the Queis.
The activity along the length of Blücher’s front throughout the course of
15 September again demonstrated the futility of continuing the dance with
Macdonald. His close proximity to Dresden allowed the marshal to double
his forces on the right bank of the Elbe in less than twenty-four hours. If
Blücher still managed to drive him back, Macdonald could simply withdraw
into Dresden’s fortified camp. Pinning Macdonald at Dresden would not
grant the Silesian Army any greater degree of flexibility. With considerable
French forces rumored to be at Großenhain, Blücher could not march down
the Elbe. Moreover, he could not risk crossing the Elbe immediately down-
stream from Dresden at Meißen or Mühlberg because of the proximity of the
Grande Armée.37 Conversely, the situation upstream of Dresden offered
little chance for a successful crossing, as Langeron noted:
We knew that Napoleon was at Pirna with all of his forces; that there were
two bridges across the Elbe; and that the old Schloß and the heights of
Stolpen – which had been repaired and fortified – offered him an excellent
point of support. A good, freshly paved road took him from Pirna, and,
because of his position, Napoleon could move with his entire army either
against the army [of Bohemia] . . . via Peterswald or against us via Stolpen.
This reason, as well as the passes and the woods that rendered offensive
operations extremely difficult, caused General Blücher to wait for several
days near Bautzen to see the results of the movements behind the Elbe of the
Grand Army of Bohemia and that of the prince royal of Sweden while the
reserve army under Bennigsen, which had already reached the Neiße,
marched through Zittau to Teplitz in Bohemia.38
In view of these considerations, Blücher and Gneisenau wisely decided to

watch and wait. They hoped a few days would provide time for Bennigsen’s
army to pass unobserved behind the Silesian Army and into Bohemia. By
that time, the French presence at Großenhain would be clarified and Blücher
could commence the march down the Elbe to cross the river somewhere
between Torgau and Wittenberg. The next few days remained relatively
quiet along Blücher’s front.
On the 16th, Blücher received a message from Tauentzien that communi-
cated his desire to cooperate with the Silesian Army. “Nothing good comes
from our operations,” wrote the Prussian general; “we lose time and do
nothing. Because it appears that Napoleon wants to exploit the weakness of
our left wing by sending a corps (supposedly under the king of Naples) to
Luckau, I urgently request that you detach something to Großenhain [see
Map 4]. My most ardent wish is to unite with you. I urgently request that
you inform me of your position and your future plans so I can act in concert
with them.” Responding that same day, Blücher wanted to know how fast
Tauentzien could join him to attack the imperial forces at Bischofswerda.
“I am of the mind to quickly concentrate and attack the enemy standing
before me. If you cooperate, I can be even more certain of success. There-
fore, I am responding to your declaration with the request that you inform
me when you can arrive in this region.”39
Tauentzien’s courier also delivered a letter from Bernadotte dated 14
September. Written from Coswig on the right bank of the Elbe 110 miles
northwest of Bautzen, the letter stated that the crown prince had received
Blücher’s 11 September memo, itself a version of the letter the Prussians wrote
to Alexander in protest to the Silesian Army being summoned to Bohemia.
Lusatia 421
Bernadotte expressed his complete agreement with Blücher’s suggestion that

the Army of Silesia march down the Elbe to cross the river in unison with the
Army of North Germany. Nevertheless, he attempted to scare the Prussians
with the thought of losing Berlin should his army cross the Elbe:
I recognize in this the wisdom of an experienced general and the talent that
corresponds to the current principles of war. A few days ago, I was in a
critical situation with 70,000 men facing me, the Oder fortresses behind me,
Magdeburg, Wittenberg, and Torgau in front of me, and 10,000 men on my
right flank. The day of the 6th [the battle of Dennewitz] has done much to
improve our situation. The enemy no longer holds the region of the right
bank [of the Elbe] in front of us and Marshal Davout has withdrawn to the
right bank of the Stecknitz.
Nevertheless, all of this does not eliminate the difficulties of crossing the
Elbe. The line that I have to hold is immense; it spreads from Hamburg to
Torgau. Behind me I hold only Spandau, which is a cesspool. Moreover, its
distance from the Elbe hinders us from using it and the enemy has three
crossings over this river. While I march on Leipzig, he can march on Berlin
from Magdeburg. I do not attach the fate of monarchies to that of their
capitals but the case of Berlin is an exception. If the French advance there,
they would find immense resources, and would fully destroy the means to
recruit and equip the Prussian army. Nevertheless, I am determined to cross
the Elbe and will make the necessary preparations.
Bernadotte continued by citing his orders for Tauentzien to build a

bridgehead near Torgau and for Bülow to besiege Wittenberg. He also
mentioned his intent to bridge the Elbe at Roßlau, less than twenty miles
downstream of Wittenberg. With the bulk of the Army of North Germany
west of Wittenberg, the crown prince requested that Blücher extend a hand
to Tauentzien at Torgau, thirty miles upstream of the city made famous by
Martin Luther. Moreover, Bernadotte claimed to have received confirmed
reports of Napoleon’s march on Großenhain. In light of this, he suggested
that Blücher assist Tauentzien by advancing a large column through Kamenz
to Großenhain. In a postscript he added with a note of panic: “I just received
a report confirming that Napoleon has advanced his army to Großenhain.
Now do you see how difficult it is for me to cross the Elbe in force with my
left flank thus threatened?”40
In response, Blücher assured Bernadotte that he had directed the Silesian
Army to assemble on its right and that Sacken’s corps had already struck the
road to Kamenz: “You will be informed the very moment that I hear of the
enemy’s march on Großenhain. The enemy is still in front of me at Bischofs-
werda, which I am planning to attack if he continues his march on
Großenhain; but if he retires from Großenhain to Dresden, the concentration
of all forces on this side will force me to act only in conjunction with the
Grand Army; but I will not fail to attract to me all so that I can deliver a great
blow.” He informed the crown prince that “numerous prisoners” attested to

“the pitiable state and demoralization of the French army. Bennigsen has
received the order to march with his army of 75,000 men in two columns
through Zittau and Rumburg and occupy the position of the Grand Army,
which will march to its left to completely cut off the emperor Napoleon from
his resources.”41
A few days later, the Allies learned that the French force at Großenhain
mainly served to protect a supply convoy moving south from Torgau to
Dresden. Committing 50,000 men under the king of Naples to ensure the
safe delivery of flour certainly revealed the severe supply problems Napo-
leon faced just one month into the Fall Campaign. Whether this force
intended to launch an offensive or guard flour mattered little to Blücher;
he wanted to inflict as much damage as possible: “If only the crown prince of
Sweden would advance as I have incessantly requested him to do, the
situation would go well. Yesterday I received the news that 50,000 men were
marching to Großenhain and only the Guard remained at Dresden; today
I learned that all would return to Dresden. To deceive us, Napoleon goes
here and there; with God’s help this will do him no good; he is on the move
and we must be off.”42
Blücher’s forward troops under St.-Priest, Bubna, and Katzler spent the
16th and 17th locked in minor clashes with Macdonald’s rearguards but the
main bodies of the two armies did not change position. On 18 September,
Army Headquarters received confirmed reports that two days earlier an
imperial detachment of approximately 1,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry had
marched toward Elsterwerda while an army of 40,000 men and 32 guns had
camped at Großenhain.43 From a letter to Sacken, we know the conclusion
Blücher drew from these reports: the French held Großenhain and its
environs in part to obtain food and fodder for Dresden and in part to relieve
the supply problems at the Saxon capital by forwarding 40,000 men to a
relatively untouched region. Still contemplating an operation against
Großenhain, Blücher ordered Sacken to determine the exact position and
strength of the enemy. In his opinion, until the Bohemian Army launched an
offensive, the most appropriate step for the Silesian Army would be to drive
the imperials from Großenhain. That evening, the Russian corps commander
sent patrols west from Kamenz toward Großenhain, moving northwest
toward Elsterwerda and southwest in the direction of Radeburg. Sacken’s
presence twelve miles north of Bischofswerda apparently prompted Macdo-
nald to move closer to Dresden. Evacuating the Bischofswerda–Frankenthal
area, the imperials moved half a day’s march westward to the Großharthau–
Arnsdorf line. Blücher’s troops occupied Pulsnitz; Russian cavalry pursued
as far Arnsdorf (see Map 4).44
Rühle returned from Allied Headquarters with Knesebeck’s secret letter
confirming that the Russian and Prussian monarchs had granted Blücher
Lusatia 423
complete freedom of action. As soon as the Army of Poland reached

Bohemia, the Prussian commander could march north to cross the Elbe at
an appropriate point. That same evening, the 18th, Gneisenau issued orders
to invest Glogau on the left bank of the Oder and to secure the army’s
rearward communications. On the 19th, Blücher received the results of
Sacken’s reconnaissance: Großenhain contained a camp of 30,000 men,
mostly infantry, and 6 guns as well as Murat’s headquarters.45 That night,
confirmation reached Blücher concerning the Army of Poland’s march to
Bohemia: Bennigsen planned to reach Zittau on the 20th.
More importantly, Tauentzien’s response to Blücher’s letter of the 16th
arrived. “It is my most sincere wish to join you and to operate against the
enemy in unison with your army,” wrote the commander of the Prussian IV
Corps. To accomplish this with as much strength as possible, Tauentzien
suggested that Bernadotte order Borstell’s 5th Brigade from Bülow’s III
Corps to occupy the defiles at the village of Elster. “If this occurs, I will
be strong enough to move through Elsterwerda against the enemy at
Großenhain and to link with you through Elsterwerda and Ortrand.
Should the crown prince reject my suggestion, I will be forced to leave
behind [General Karl Georg von] Wobeser’s brigade at Elster and facing
Torgau. I then will have only 10,000–11,000 men at my disposal.” Even with
10,000 men, Tauentzien pledged his readiness to link with Blücher and only
awaited his orders. “In the meantime, I am very weak in cavalry and
especially in artillery and thus humbly request that you support me with
some cavalry and if at all possible with some horse artillery or at least heavy
artillery” (see Map 4).
Although Blücher’s one-time rival for command of the Prussian army
appeared ready to operate in unison with the Silesian Army, he offered no
prediction regarding Bernadotte’s possible reaction. Blücher harbored little
concern for protocol or the manner in which this cooperation would be
viewed by the crown prince. “As soon as you can,” stated his reply,
“I request that you march on Elsterwerda and inform me of your arrival.
Then, I will direct a corps from Königsbrück to Großenhain so that it
reaches the enemy at the same time you do. I will send you cavalry and
artillery; expect to meet it halfway between Elsterwerda and Großenhain.
If the enemy makes a stand at Großenhain, we can probably cut him off
from Dresden.” According to the rumors that reached Silesian Army Head-
quarters, Bülow likewise prepared to proceed with or without Bernadotte’s
approval. 46 Steffens noted the positive mood that permeated Blücher’s head-
quarters over this news:
During our stay at Bautzen important negotiations ensued between the

Silesian and the main armies. I almost always dined with Gneisenau,
together with many officers of the staff. One day he was in great spirits;
the conversation turned to the victories we had already won at Dennewitz,

Jüterbog, and Kulm; at length Gneisenau said, with the most confident air,
“Gentlemen, we shall taste this year’s grapes on the Rhine; but do not mistake
me, I mean the last grapes which, in November, will yet be hanging on the
vines.” I guessed that this decided belief sprang from some great intended
enterprise of the success that he felt assured. Yet Napoleon was still mighty;
he ruled not only over France, but great parts of Germany, Italy, Belgium,
and the Netherlands; and though his fortunes seemed dire in Spain, his
resources were enormous. Therefore, Gneisenau’s positive prediction was
startling.47
Blücher’s confidence, especially in the troops, also remained high: “You

will not believe how brave our Landwehr is,” he wrote a friend; “the
Russians I have with me are also very brave but the Cossacks steal like
ravens.” However, the campaign continued to take a toll on the soldiers,
which in turn eroded discipline and increased attrition. By 25 September, the
Landwehr of Yorck’s corps mustered 8,012 men and 528 officers, while an
additional 2,410 lay in the hospitals and 386 men had died. Thus, from the
militia’s original strength of 13,370 men, some 2,034 were still missing. Some
had been captured by the French but others deserted. Of the 16,741 men of
the Line infantry at the expiration of the armistice, only 12,058 were still
under arms despite the arrival of more than 3,000 replacements. The total
strength of the corps on 25 September 1813 numbered 20,588 infantry and
4,043 cavalry.
With its magazines still on the Bober, the Army of Silesia was barely
receiving enough food. Official reports to the king by Gneisenau and Blücher
claimed that the Silesian Army did not lack bread, meat, or brandy, but
fodder. Consequently, foraging parties had to be dispatched miles away from
the camps to find food for the horses, yet discipline in general remained
satisfactory. Some disagreement existed over this last issue. Major Oppen,
who administered the army’s military police, reported that “order is main-
tained by mobile columns, a superb spirit reigns in the army, and an excellent
understanding exists between the allies.” However, Müffling took issue with
this appraisal and spoke openly of the lack of discipline in the Silesian Army.
In a letter to his friend, Knesebeck, he reiterated Blücher’s sentiments
regarding the Cossacks but also implicated the Prussian soldiers as well as
the army’s leadership for not taking a tougher stand against marauding:
The momentary pause in our operations was absolutely necessary to avoid

degenerating into a wretched state. A great convoy of shoes has finally
reached us and 4,000 pairs have been distributed to each brigade. Half of
the men in many battalions went barefoot. Regarding the provisions, up to
now the system is still functioning; but soon everything will be consumed
because the disorder caused by the Cossacks is indescribable. It is not enough
Lusatia 425
that they destroy everything that they cannot take with them, but they steal
all horses and livestock so that transports are no longer possible. Due to
recurring robberies on the public highways, which everyone is exposed to
and defenseless against, deliveries no longer come from Silesia. Deputies who
came from many cities from inner Silesia and wanted to bring the army gifts
of food were robbed, and their boots stolen; they had to return home
barefooted. The severest punishment of the marauders by means of compli-
ance with the judgment of martial law is the only means to restore discipline
and safeguard our subsistence. But for this our generals and especially Blü-
cher cannot decide. If we remain idle any longer it will then be possible to
gradually get through this and restore order but it will be impossible if we
move. Almost all the Cossacks are behind the army. With them is a portion of
the Landwehr and even our best cavalry regiments have numerous marauders
who plunder and steal. This disorder has caused me much concern and it still
does, for if we move ten miles further without a halt, it will be just as bad as it
was.48
Supply shortages did indeed exist in the Silesian Army. While marching
to Bohemia, Bennigsen’s army moved across Blücher’s rear, thus severing the
latter’s supply lines. The stoppage of provisions from Silesia drove the men
of the Silesian Army to take steps necessary for their survival. Thus, only the
strict enforcement of the regulations could end the increasing crimes com-
mitted by the starving soldiers. Yet the generals, especially Blücher, could
not bring themselves to punish the soldiers, especially because time would
improve the situation. Actual complaints to the king and his entourage over
shortages concerned the critical dearth of hard currency. Officers had not
received pay since July. Asserting that this made the officers indignant,
Gneisenau urged Hardenberg to remedy the problem. He explained that,
unable to purchase new boots and uniforms, officers had to have the former
resoled and the latter patched. Replacing footgear in general became vital. In
some battalions, only half the manpower still possessed footgear. Army
Headquarters did not have the funds to cover the needs of thousands.
“One speaks of English subsidies,” complained Gneisenau, “but no one sees
any money.” The state chancellor responded two days later:
That the army suffers from the lack of funds and has received no pay since the
month of July arouses an extremely unpleasing feeling in me, dear friend. But
I confess that I do not understand this since 250,000 thaler has been desig-
nated for this army since the outbreak of hostilities [150,000 thaler from the
national government and 100,000 from the Silesian provincial treasury].
When I received your letter, measures already were being taken to make a
further 175,000 thaler available, as you can see from the copy of my letter to
General Blücher. “One speaks of English subsidies, but no one sees any
money,” you wrote. From where, then, did those payments come, as well
as the great variety of other things that I have supplied, other than from this
source? It is only bad in the sense that it is difficult to turn the English credits
into hard currency and that the movement to and fro is poor and much time
is lost. It has been much more difficult to procure the necessary funds for this
war and for our great exertions than the uninformed multitude believes . . . If
I have enemies, dear friend, my conscience tells me that I do not deserve them
and this awareness raises me above their judgment.49
Resentment and concern over the pause at Bautzen mastered the Prussians at
a time when many anxiously awaited the outcome of a war they thought
would soon be over. Should all the sacrifice and strains be in vain because the
Allied commanders delay out of fear of Napoleon’s genius? “If we cannot do
anything now, then when can we really do something?” asked Clausewitz.
“Who is the huntsman; who will take the redemptive shot?”50
Blücher’s movements, which had caused panic at Macdonald’s headquar-
ters, finally caught Napoleon’s attention. Shortly after learning on the
morning of the 19th of Macdonald’s retreat, Napoleon received a proposal
from Murat that appealed to the emperor: unite Murat’s command (VI
Corps and I and V Cavalry Corps) with Ney’s army between Herzberg
and Torgau, drive all enemy forces east, turn northwest to destroy Berna-
dotte’s army, and then continue to Berlin. “Your plan,” responded the
emperor at 10:00 a.m. on the 19th, “would not, I believe, encounter any
great obstacle.” Yet Macdonald’s situation and more importantly Blücher’s
proximity frustrated Napoleon. “It seems that the enemy has pushed a
sufficiently strong detachment [Sacken’s vanguard] from Pulsnitz to Rade-
berg, and that the duc de Tarente [Macdonald] is very worried.” Seeking a
way to kickstart Macdonald, Napoleon explained to Murat that the latter’s
movement from Großenhain to Königsbrück and Kamenz would enable
Macdonald to resume the position at Bautzen. Nevertheless, Napoleon
hesitated. He could not decide between endorsing Murat’s suggestion to
implement the master plan or to conduct a general operation against Blücher
in conjunction with Murat and Macdonald. Odeleben claims that the news
of Bernadotte’s crossing of the Elbe at Dessau caused consternation: “A
dismal silence reigned at French headquarters. The majority of the army had
been harassed by useless marches and countermarches; a painful expectation
continually prevailed. The blinds of Napoleon’s cabinet remained drawn, as
was the case during all emergent business.” Napoleon speculated to Murat:
“If I decide to march on Stolpen, Bischofswerda, and Bautzen tomorrow,
your movement on Kamenz . . . would cut off several detachments and even
the enemy’s infantry. Get yourself and the duc de Raguse [Marmont] ready
to execute the movement you suggested.”51
The fact that Allied Streifkorps were gnawing at Napoleon’s communi-
cations exacerbated the situation. In particular, the renegade Saxon general,
Thielmann, now in Russian service, had severed the French lifeline to Erfurt
Lusatia 427
and thus Paris. To restore his communication, the emperor dispatched the
Guard Cavalry’s 2nd Division. “It is of utmost importance to drive the enemy
from Naumburg and Weißenfels, reopen communication with Erfurt . . . and
restore freedom to the debouches of the Saale,” he wrote to the cavalry
commander, General Charles Lefebvre-Desnouettes. “Several of my couriers
are missing. Send all my cavalry depots and wounded as well as all the
materiel at Leipzig to Erfurt and Gotha. All of this is of utmost importance.”
To secure his communication across the Saale, Napoleon ordered Marshal
Charles Pierre Augereau’s IX Corps to march from Würzburg to either
Erfurt or Jena (see Map 1).52
One hour after replying to Murat, Napoleon moved closer to making a
decision. According to Yorck von Wartenburg, Blücher’s advance on
Kamenz brought the Silesian Army “so close to the central position of the
French army that the whole strategical [sic] edifice was shaken.” Conse-
quently, Napoleon ordered two divisions of Young Guard as well as the
Guard Cavalry to cross the new bridge at Pirna. Masked by the Poles of VIII
Corps and IV Cavalry Corps a few miles east at Stolpen, the master
instructed his shock troops to take positions in the triangle formed by the
villages of Lohmen, Röhrsdorf (Dürrröhrsdorf-Dittersbach), and Stürza.
The northern point of the triangle – Röhrsdorf – lay seven miles south of
the Großharthau–Arnsdorf line, which Macdonald held that day. “If the
weather is less terrible tomorrow,” wrote Napoleon at 11:00 a.m., “I am
inclined to march on the enemy and push him beyond Bautzen.” He gave
the Poles strict orders to ensure that Blücher remained completely ignorant
of the approach of the Imperial Guard: “Conceal your troops with your
cavalry so the enemy sees nothing and remains absolutely ignorant of this
movement” (see Map 4).53
Drenched by the downpours of late summer, the Young Guard and
Guard Cavalry crossed the eight or so miles to reach the triangle formed
by Lohmen, Röhrsdorf, and Stürza on the 19th. Orders to continue to
Bautzen did not follow that day or the next. Napoleon postponed operations
simply because of the bad weather and its impact on the troops. He passed
the night of 19/20 September at Pirna. Little had changed by 4:00 a.m. on
the 20th. “Yesterday and last night were so awful that it was impossible
to move,” he informed Marmont at Großenhain. “The duc de Tarente
[Macdonald] gave a false alarm. You must remain in your position until
further notice. It is unlikely that the enemy infantry will dare to advance. If
it does, I will arrive to reinforce you and we will give battle, which would be
very advantageous, but that appears to be opposed to their system. The
major issue at the moment seems to be to conserve the weapons and
cartridges as much as possible.” This letter suggested that, in addition to
the foul weather, the Reichenbach Plan had impacted Napoleon’s thinking
and contributed to his forfeiture of the initiative. After concluding his letter
to Marmont, the emperor decided that the adverse weather ruled out oper-
ations on the 20th. “The dreadful weather that has continued today makes all
movement impossible,” he explained to Berthier; “if the weather is better
tomorrow, we will be ready the day after.”54
Returning to Blücher, he estimated that perhaps 50,000 imperial soldiers
spread between Bischofswerda, Stolpen, and Großenhain faced his army.
Aside from a small skirmish at Großharthau, 20 September passed quietly.
Sacken’s intelligence service provided numerous reports on the situation at
Großenhain. Estimating the Silesian Army to number 120,000 men, the
imperials appeared to be bracing themselves for an attack but had returned
the majority of their artillery to Dresden. According to deserters, Murat
himself commanded between 45,000 and 50,000 men at Großenhain. Insuffi-
cient food, lack of shoes, and exhaustion sapped their strength and morale.
Considerable unrest reigned in the imperial army as a whole, especially
among the Germans.55
On the extreme left wing, Bubna conducted reconnaissance toward Pirna
based on a request from Gneisenau.56 He reported from Langburkersdorf
near Neustadt in Sachsen that a spy placed the main French army eleven
miles south of Dresden along a twelve-mile stretch between the villages of
Dohna and Dippoldiswalde; Napoleon was quartering at a mill near Pirna.
To cover the bridge over the Elbe at Pirna, the imperials extended their line
along the right bank of the Elbe through Lohmen to Stürza. Bubna esti-
mated the detachment at Lohmen to number 500–600 men. Aside from the
smaller garrison at Stürza, he remained certain that no considerable imperial
forces had crossed the bridge at Pirna. A large garrison occupied Pirna itself
exclusive of the 1,000 men of the Imperial Guard who defended the bridge.57
Around noon on the 21st, Blücher received Tauentzien’s response from
Bad Liebenwerda, sixty miles northwest of Bautzen, written at noon on the
20th. Finding the imperials concentrated at Großenhain, twenty miles south
of his main position, Tauentzien urgently requested information on Blü-
cher’s next move. As a result of this communiqué, Gneisenau and Müffling
issued the extremely detailed “Secret Disposition” for 21 through 24 Sep-
tember to envelop the enemy forces facing the Silesian Army on the highway
to Dresden. Quite simply, Yorck and Langeron would fix Macdonald in the
region of Radeberg while Sacken and Tauentzien attacked Murat at
Großenhain. To honor his pledge to Tauentzien, Blücher instructed Jürgaß
to lead three Prussian cavalry regiments and two horse batteries across the
Spree downstream from Dresden and proceed to Rosenthal. On the 23rd,
the detachment would continue northwest to Ortrand and await Tauent-
zien’s orders. During these two days, the Silesian Army would move west:
Sacken to Königsbrück, Yorck ten miles behind him at Kamenz, and
Langeron to Förstchen. On the afternoon of the 24th, Army Headquarters
planned on Sacken and Tauentzien attacking Murat at Großenhain and
Lusatia 429
preventing his forces from retreating to Dresden. Meanwhile, Langeron’s

vanguard would execute a feint attack on Macdonald’s position at
Großharthau as Yorck’s vanguard did the same at Lotzdorf and Radeberg.
Should Sacken and Tauentzien succeed at Großenhain, Blücher instructed
them to remain there. In the opposite case, both would withdraw either
northeast to Ortrand or southeast through Königsbrück.58
Although reports clearly indicated that Murat would have a slight
numerical advantage over Tauentzien’s 11,000 men and Sacken’s 25,000
including the cavalry under Jürgaß, Blücher remained confident of a victory
at Großenhain. Time represented one inherent flaw in the “Secret Dispos-
ition” that the Prussians could not control. They could hardly count on the
situation of the imperials to remain the same from the evening of the 21st to
the afternoon of the 24th. Indeed, late on the morning of the 22nd, a report
from Sacken arrived: Murat had evacuated Großenhain. Acting on Napo-
leon’s orders, the king of Naples had withdrawn eleven miles southwest to
Meißen with his main body. Blücher requested confirmation from Sacken. If
this was true, the Russian commander had to inform Tauentzien and attack
Macdonald’s left wing at Radeberg either alone or with him. Despite the
uncertainty of the situation, Blücher’s optimism mounted. “I stand with
Dresden under my nose and I think I will soon go there,” he wrote on the
morning of the 22nd. “The French emperor stands at Pirna with his main
force. Facing me at Großenhain stands the king of Naples; I think I will
attack him in a few days.” So confident was Blücher that he spoke of peace
and retirement: “The situation now goes well. We will certainly reach the
Rhine before winter and then there will be peace. If I live to see this, I will
say farewell to the service and live a few days for myself.”59
Yorck’s main body camped in tight cantonments between the Spree and
the Bautzen–Weißenberg road; Prussian veterans recalled the narrow escape
from that very place five months earlier. Late in the morning, Yorck rode
west with Schack to the outposts to reconnoiter the terrain. Bischofswerda
lay completely in ruins. From a hill on the opposite side of the town he
observed the enemy position at Großharthau and on the Kapellen hill; the
outposts of both sides stood very close to each other. The wood to the north
particularly concerned Yorck because it could conceal a force approaching
Bischofswerda. Returning, he had barely had time to dismount when he
received Katzler’s report of a general enemy advance.60
Returning to Napoleon, he limited his movements on the 21st to
recalling one division of Young Guard to Pirna while he himself went
to Dresden with the Old Guard. His purely defensive arrangements aimed
to secure the line of the Elbe and grant the army some rest. He transferred
V Corps from Macdonald’s purview to that of St.-Cyr. With V, I, and XIV
Corps – in Napoleon’s estimate 40,000–50,000 men – St.-Cyr not only had to
hold the Elbe from Pillnitz to Königstein, but guard all the debouches from
Bohemia between Königstein and Freiberg. He directed VI Corps to Frei-

berg and II Corps to Chemnitz: together they would observe the Bohemian
frontier from the left bank of the Elbe to the right bank of the Saale. Stripped
of command of all but his XI Corps, Macdonald received instructions to fall
back to the woods west of Dresden. Returning III Corps to Ney, Napoleon
tasked the bravest of the brave with the defense of the Elbe from Magdeburg
to Torgau with this corps as well as the remains of the Army of Berlin: IV
and VII Corps and III Cavalry Corps. This assignment received particular
emphasis because of the news that reached Imperial Headquarters concern-
ing Bernadotte’s efforts to bridge the Elbe in the Dessau–Roßlau region.
Between the sectors of the Elbe held by Ney and St.-Cyr, Murat received
orders to cross to the left bank of the Elbe at Meißen early on the 22nd with
I and V Cavalry Corps and VI Corps. If he received confirmation that the
Army of North Germany had crossed at Dessau, Napoleon wanted him to
lead his army group directly to Torgau. Regardless of the situation further
downstream, Murat would dispatch detachments along the left bank to
Torgau. As for VI Corps, if reports confirmed Bernadotte’s crossing of the
Elbe, presumably to make for Leipzig, the master wanted Marmont to
occupy the bridgehead at Meißen and to be ready to march on Torgau rather
than move his corps to Freiberg.61
While these orders addressed the threats posed by Schwarzenberg and
Bernadotte, they ignored Blücher. However, later on the 21st, Napoleon
received news from Poniatowski at Stolpen over the approach of Blücher’s
army. The emperor insisted that Macdonald support the Polish prince “so
that under no circumstances will he be obliged to evacuate Stolpen.” Early
on the 22nd, Blücher’s operations finally forced Napoleon to take action.
His letter to Berthier provides an interesting snapshot of the extent to which
Blücher’s movements bedeviled Macdonald and, by extension, Napoleon.
“The situation of the enemy between the Spree and Bischofswerda appears
uncertain,” wrote the emperor. “The duc de Tarente [Macdonald] indicated
in his letter of the 14th that the corps of Langeron and St.-Priest . . . had
maneuvered to the right [south], and that he decided to concentrate on his
position. Since then, he has claimed in his letter of the 19th that he feared
taking a position at Weißig because the enemy, after operating on his right,
now maneuvered on his left and threatened to reach Dresden before him.
Finally, according to yesterday’s report, the duc de Tarente’s spies
announced that 15,000 men from Yorck’s corps are on the far left [north],
and that another Russian or Prussian corps is following, always in the
direction of the Elbe.”
In addition, Müffling maintained that on 21 September Blücher wrote a
letter to his son, Franz; a Prussian trumpeter delivered it to the nearest
imperial outpost. To deceive Napoleon about his whereabouts, Blücher
dated his letter from Bischofswerda.62 Langeron confirmed this story:
Lusatia 431
This was a ruse by Blücher, who made Napoleon believe that our army had
advanced as far as Bischofswerda. Blücher’s son, who was serving with the
main army, had been wounded and taken prisoner near Dresden. Napoleon
advised Blücher of these events and proposed exchanging his son for Colonel
Edmond de Perigord, who had been taken by Tauentzien’s light troops,
whom Napoleon believed to be from our army. Blücher thanked Napoleon
for his concern and dated his letter from Bischofswerda, where Napoleon had
hoped to surprise us and thus lost five precious days that he needed. Blücher
also noted that Perigord was not held by our army but could have been taken
prisoner by the light troops of the prince royal of Sweden, or by those of
Bennigsen, who was still far away from us; Blücher wanted to make him
believe that we had all united and he succeeded in this for a short while.63
Revealing his frustration with Macdonald, Napoleon put down the

imperial foot: “In this situation, the emperor now orders the duc de Tarente
to attack between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. on the 22nd with his left, center,
and right, approaching the enemy in all of his positions and carrying every-
thing before him until he finds himself in a position facing an army ready for
battle and in strength equal to or greater than his. He will try to take
prisoners; he will interview the inhabitants to gather as much information
as possible about the enemy’s movements.” Napoleon hinted that he would
probably follow Macdonald, ready to unite with the marshal according to
circumstances and to attack Blücher the next day “if we find the enemy
line.” Per the norm of Imperial Headquarters, Napoleon wrote these
instructions to Berthier, who then generated a second letter to Macdonald.
However, per Napoleon’s original letter, the major-general included the
admonition: “Today’s attack for a grand reconnaissance is ordered by the
emperor as part of the general affairs of the whole and should not be
postponed for any pretext whatsoever, unless the weather is as bad as it
was on the 20th; but, if the weather is like it was on the day of the 21st, the
attack should proceed.”64
Macdonald received these orders at 9:30 on the morning of the 22nd. Not
expecting to be called to launch an offensive, he had already dispatched large
foraging parties. Responding with a request to postpone the operation until
the following day, Macdonald learned that the emperor himself would reach
the vanguard “between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m. I want you to unite all the
cavalry, infantry and artillery that you can. If the artillery cannot move on
the highway, it will be the same for the enemy. Today I want to know
positively what the enemy is doing. Between noon and 2:00 we will make
a sudden attack and take some prisoners. We will also obtain some infor-
mation at Bischofswerda, and then, depending on the circumstances, we will
be able to act strongly tomorrow. I warned you that my intention was to
attack as long as the weather was not so bad.” Despite having wasted the
days of the 19th, 20th, and 21st, the emperor concludes: “In a war like this,
days are of great importance. Please, make your dispositions.” With orders
for its dissolution already issued, the Army of the Bober would advance one
last time.65
Napoleon himself arrived at Macdonald’s headquarters accompanied by
only one battalion of Old Guard, one squadron of Chasseurs-à-cheval, and
sixty gendarmes. Per his tradition before a decisive battle, the emperor
reviewed the battalions on hand, awarded the Legion of Honor, and conse-
crated the standard of the 49th Line with the usual pomp. Around 2:00 p.m.,
Macdonald’s subordinates received their marching orders: III and XI Corps
toward Bischofswerda, and V Corps on Neustadt in Sachsen. Suspected
enemy forward positions at Goldbach, Großdrebnitz, and Pulsnitz should
be attacked immediately. Slightly after 2:00, imperial squadrons supported
by one battalion advanced from Großharthau. Intense fire from the heavy
artillery that supported the Prussian outposts kept them at bay. “Then one
saw many fire signals go up; immediately after, columns advanced from a
concealed position north of the Kapellen hill; all proceeded with such
intensity and the en avant was so strongly shouted that one immediately
concluded that Napoleon was present.”66
Extensive columns – some 20,000 to 30,000 men according to Blücher –
advanced from the Kapellen hill west of Großharthau as well as from the
Massenei wood to the northwest. Artillery unlimbered on the hill east of
Großharthau. The Allied outposts gradually withdrew east toward Gold-
bach. Two miles south of Großharthau, Langeron watched as the imperials
deployed:
From the hills of Bühlau, where I had gone with Count St.-Priest to observe
the enemy positions, I noticed at 4:00 p.m. on 22 September that they were
once again advancing toward us with large forces. At 5:00, I saw all these
columns move quickly on the Bischofswerda road; they defiled 1,000 paces
from us, and we knew, by means of a deserter, that Napoleon had arrived
from Pirna that morning with large forces, and that he himself was at their
head to direct the attack that he planned. I estimated the forces he deployed
against my advance guard to be around 40,000 men. Earlier that morning, he
had driven Sacken’s Cossacks from Pulsnitz. Thus secured on his left flank,
he wished to once again attempt to engage our army in a general battle,
believing us to be at Bischofswerda. At 6:00 p.m., he made an impetuous
attack on the vanguards of Borozdin, Rudzevich, and Katzler.
Emmanuel, commanding Rudzevich’s vanguard cavalry, and Katzler with

Yorck’s agreed to stop the French at Goldbach. Should this attempt fail,
they hoped to slow the enemy as much as possible before making a stand
east of Bischofswerda. With his forward infantry east of Goldbach and his
cavalry on the right wing, Katzler covered the eastern exits of the village
with four batteries. His main body remained in reserve at Bischofswerda.
Lusatia 433
Emmanuel placed his troops on Katzler’s left wing; Borozdin stood west of
Bühlau with St.-Priest’s advance guard.
With an intensity befitting their emperor’s presence, Macdonald’s troops
pursued the Prussians east from Großharthau. Two miles to the north, a
second column plowed southeast through Frankenthal toward Goldbach,
unlimbering several batteries on the hills west of the latter village. To the
south, Lauriston’s V Corps converged on Bühlau, gradually pushing the
Russians east to Großdrebnitz. Langeron continues:
I again found myself with Count St.-Priest, Borozdin, and many officers on
the heights of Bühlau, from where I observed all the French columns and
examined their movements. They stopped near us, and I saw Napoleon
(whom we easily recognized) enter the farm of Großharthau. At the same
moment, his light troops quickly moved against our advance posts and they
managed to get ahead of us in the woods, even though we were retreating at a
gallop. They fired many musket shots close to us and for a moment I thought
they had cut off my retreat on the Bautzen road . . . had they killed my horse,
I would not have had any means to escape capture; we had remained, very
imprudently, too long on the mountain of Bühlau, and the speed of our
horses alone saved us from this unfortunate fate. The French light troops
are truly unbelievable.
North of Großdrebnitz, Prussian canister confined the imperials at

Goldbach for approximately thirty minutes. That is all the time Katzler
could buy before the column coming from Frankenthal threatened to
envelop his left. To cover the retreat east to Bischofswerda, the Prussian
cannon withdrew from the firing line individually, thus maintaining the
shelling for as long as possible. Despite the deadly effects of Prussian grape,
the imperials seemed to sprint across the two miles that separated Goldbach
and Bischofswerda. Bitter street fighting ensued in the latter, with Katzler’s
rearguard barely holding the town. “The enemy burned Goldbach and
attacked Bischofswerda, which the Prussian infantry of Katzler’s vanguard
defended with the greatest courage,” noted Langeron. “After having lost
many men, Napoleon was obliged to employ great forces to take this little
village, which had burned three months earlier during the retreat from
Dresden to Bautzen, and he could not advance further . . . The Prussian
major Hiller, who commanded at Bischofswerda, earned great honor with
his stubborn defense.”67
Although the imperials finally took the town, Katzler’s guns east of
Bischofswerda prevented them from debouching. Fighting persisted until
10:00 p.m., at which time the Allies retreated five miles northeast to Roth-
naußlitz. Katzler lost 252 killed and wounded; Russian and French losses are
not known. Macdonald did not pursue beyond Bischofswerda: III and XI
Corps camped on the western edge of the town while V Corps halted at
Großdrebnitz and Lauterbach opposite Langeron’s rearguard. Napoleon

spent the entire afternoon on the Kapellen hill receiving reports but passed
the night at Großharthau. He sent for the mayor of Bischofswerda and made
inquiries over the whereabouts of Blücher himself. Although Napoleon
could not find his Prussian adversary, he obtained the desired information
regarding the Silesian Army. To his foreign minister, Maret, he wrote:
“I attacked and drove the enemy, who withdrew to Bautzen. My vanguard
moved beyond [east of] Bischofswerda. It appears the enemy is divided into
three corps: that of Langeron forward [east] of Stolpen, to turn our right;
that of Sacken at Kamenz, to turn our left; Yorck at Bischofswerda. The
column of 20,000 men that marched on our left was that of Sacken. It
appears that the bulk of the enemy army is at Hochkirch on the right bank
of the Spree.”68
Not knowing the number of reinforcements Napoleon had brought with
him and expecting the emperor to continue the offensive, Blücher ordered a
limited but general retreat for 23 September. Katzler, Borozdin, and
Rudzevich received explicit instructions to avoid serious engagements and
withdraw on Bautzen but to slow the imperials as much as possible while
observing all their movements. Army Headquarters tasked Sacken with
notifying Tauentzien that, rather than an operation against Großenhain,
the Silesian Army would concentrate at Bautzen. Should the imperials seek
a battle, Sacken’s corps and Jürgaß’s detachment would withdraw on the
great east–west highway to Bautzen. On the left wing, St.-Priest would also
avoid a serious engagement and march east to Herrnhut, twenty miles
southeast of Bautzen “to be on line with the other corps.” South of St.-
Priest, Kaptsevich and Bubna would retreat from the Stolpen–Neustadt in
Sachsen region to Rumburg. Gneisenau dispatched staff officers to insure
the availability of all the crossings over the Neiße. Although preparing for a
further retreat, Blücher planned to wait at Bautzen before determining his
next move. “If our Grand [Bohemian] Army does not operate soon,” Blü-
cher warned Knesebeck, “I will be paralyzed here and winter will come
before we have achieved anything considerable with a half-million men
under arms.”69
Around 11:00 a.m. on 23 September, the Army of the Bober resumed its
advance in three huge columns. Consisting of all arms, the left or northern
column marched through Geißmannsdorf, less than two miles north of
Bischofswerda. Macdonald’s middle column, exclusively infantry, negotiated
the marshy terrain between Geißmannsdorf and Bischofswerda. His right or
southern column of cavalry and artillery pushed through Bischofswerda
itself. Katzler commenced the retreat northeast on the road to Bautzen
with the imperials closing fast. Using a large, dense wood east of Bischofs-
werda for cover, Prussian skirmishers managed to slow the French long
enough to allow the infantry to withdraw in order. On the other side of
Lusatia 435
the grove, Katzler took a position on the high ground west of Wölkau and
Demitz-Thumitz, almost four miles northeast of Bischofswerda, to ascertain
the size of the enemy force that had cleared the wood. Time did not permit
the colonel to be an observer. Threatened on both flanks by the huge
imperial columns, he withdrew another three miles northeast to Kleinpraga.
Battalion-sized swarms of skirmishers followed by their organic units
pursued but the advance of the main column broke on the forest. Katzler,
Emmanuel, and Witte utilized this moment to charge the French van with
nine Prussian and six Russian squadrons. Led by the East Prussian National
Cavalry Regiment, the Allies drove most of the skirmishers northwest from
the Bischofswerda–Bautzen road toward the village of Pottschapplitz. Those
who escaped fled south of this road to Rothnaußlitz. The other Allied
squadrons remained on the road, passing Rothnaußlitz and charging three
imperial cavalry regiments that emerged from the wood to support the
infantry of the vanguard. Only one rode forth to meet the Allies; soon, its
terrified troopers came flying back, disordering the other two. All three
sought shelter behind three fresh infantry regiments of the main body that
had finally moved up from the wood. Although tiring, the Allied horse
successfully charged this infantry and pursued almost to the wood’s edge,
where fresh imperial foot debouched to end the hunt. The Russian and
Prussian troopers slowly withdrew to Kleinpraga and from there to Göda,
five miles due west of Bautzen. They brought with them the trophies of the
engagement: 10 officers and 360 men. Langeron described the action:
Noticing that after crossing the defiles of Bischofswerda, the enemy sent
forth numerous skirmisher battalions but did not support them with massed
troops, Rudzevich and Katzler attacked with their cavalry. Emmanuel, with
the 1st and 3rd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiments, two squadrons of the Kievskii
Dragoon Regiment, the Prussian cavalry, and supported by General Udom
and Major Hiller with the infantry of the two vanguards, fell on the skir-
mishers; this attack, made sharply and at the right moment, was a complete
success: almost all of the enemy Chasseurs were cut down; 360 Westphalians,
some of whom were from the Guard, were taken along with many officers.
The French cavalry, which remained in columns too far to the rear, was
unable to arrive in time to save its skirmishers who had advanced too far
forward.
After the Russo-Prussian cavalry charge, the French formed an artillery

line of twenty-four guns; both sides exchanged salvos for a few hours until
the imperials moved up sufficient numbers of infantry. Funneling through
the Bischofswerda wood consumed so much time that they did not reach
Göda until nightfall. After shelling the village, French infantry surged
forward in an attempt to double-envelop Göda. A heated and confused
struggle ensued for possession of the village. Realizing the futility of their
efforts, Rudzevich and Katzler evacuated Göda, taking a position on the

hills to the east with outposts close to the village. Russo-Prussian losses
amounted to 6 officers and more than 200 men killed and wounded.
Throughout the day of the 23rd, Yorck’s and Langeron’s corps remained
in their bivouacs close to Bautzen’s eastern edge on either side of the road to
Weißenberg. On the left wing, St.-Priest’s main body reached Wilthen, six
miles south of Bautzen. After receiving Blücher’s orders for the general
retreat at the late hour of 3:00 p.m., Bubna arranged with Kaptsevich to
withdraw east that evening to Hainsbach (Lipová/Hanšpach), inside the
Austrian border and nine miles south of Wilthen. However, before they
could execute this movement, Lauriston’s V Corps deployed on the hills
between Lauterbach and Langenwolmsdorf facing Kaptsevich’s outpost at
Rückersdorf, six miles south of Bischofswerda. After repulsing two attacks
by a French division, the Austro-Russian force retreated. Unmolested by the
imperials, they bivouacked at Hainsbach around midnight.70
As for Napoleon, he passed the night of 22/23 September at
Großharthau, where he learned that Bernadotte’s troops had completed a
bridge across the Elbe near the mouth of the Black Elster. He spent most of
the day of the 23rd at Großharthau, purportedly in a fit of indecision over
whether he should return to Dresden or continue his offensive to take
Bautzen. Finally joining Lauriston around 4:00 p.m., he observed V Corps
give a final push to Bubna’s retreating Austrians. At sunset, he returned to
Großharthau. To his great relief, Napoleon learned that Lefebvre-
Desnouettes had defeated Thielmann and restored communication with
Erfurt, which allowed seven couriers from Paris to continue on to Imperial
Headquarters. Although his cavalry had reestablished rear-area security, the
emperor made a decision: he would evacuate all territory east of the Elbe.71
Frustrated by the Reichenbach Plan in general but specifically by
Blücher’s refusal to accept battle, the master decided on a purely defensive
strategy that would allow his troops to rest along the left bank of the Elbe.
The dismal state of Macdonald’s 60,000 men contributed to his decision.
Tightly confined in the desolated area between the Elbe and the Spree,72 the
exhausted imperial soldiers suffered from severe shortages of food. Sur-
rounded by Allied light troops, the French commanders could not allow
their soldiers to go too far afield to forage. After consuming the immediate
area’s meager resources, tens of thousands faced starvation as food simply
could not be found. Marauding reached unprecedented levels and the situ-
ation would only become worse as summer steadily yielded to autumn.
Because his men could not supplement their scanty provisions by foraging,
they again deserted in droves, thus thinning Macdonald’s ranks. To compen-
sate for the loss of manpower, the French impressed captured native Poles
who served in the Allied armies. Conversely, Austrian, Prussian, and Rus-
sian prisoners volunteered to fight for the French in Spain to escape death by
Lusatia 437
starvation in prison camps. Meanwhile, the Allied armies closed in from all
sides, slowly suffocating Napoleon and his Grande Armée.73
The condition of the troops only accentuated the dire need for Napoleon
to attain a decisive victory. To increase the chances of waging such a battle,
he offered the right bank of the Elbe as bait, particularly to attract Blücher.
Macdonald, who had retained command of III and V Corps a bit longer,
would withdraw across the river but remain ready to return to the right bank
as soon as the Prussians came closer. Still clinging to Dresden as his base,
Napoleon ordered the construction of two formidable redoubts: one on the
highway leading to Berlin and the other on the great east–west highway
coming from Bautzen. In fact, Napoleon based his strategic defensive on the
same logic he had applied at the start of the campaign: the ability to debouch
at will across the Elbe. In the immediate theater of operations, he possessed
no fewer than seven bridges: three at Dresden and one each at Pirna,
Königstein, Pillnitz, and Meißen. “All these bridges will be defended by
good bridgeheads,” he explained to Murat, “and we will occupy all the
outlets of the Dresden Forest. In this position I will closely watch the enemy
and, if he engages in an offensive operation, I will fall on him so he cannot
avoid a battle.” Although the execution of his plan had failed in August
thanks to Oudinot and Macdonald, the logic remained sound. Now, one
month later, he dispensed with detaching independent army groups that
operated far from his support. He would concentrate and let the Allies come
to him using the Elbe first to lure them into his lair and then as a trap for a
strategic envelopment.
Claiming that Blücher had retreated across the Spree in “disorder” and
that Macdonald “must be moving on Bautzen,” the master revealed more of
his thinking and plans to Marmont. He placed I Cavalry Corps under the
marshal’s orders and planned to send III Corps to Meißen on the 25th or
26th. Thus, with III and VI Corps as well as I and V Cavalry Corps, “you
will have a strong army to move wherever circumstances require.” Resuming
his plans to disestablish the Army of the Bober, he charged Macdonald’s XI
Corps with guarding the entrenched camp at Dresden as well as all the
outlets of the wood west of the Saxon capital. “Therefore, I can have III,
V, and VIII Corps and the majority of II Cavalry Corps and all of my Guard;
with these forces I will watch the enemy closely and exploit the first error he
makes.” Such thoughts comforted Napoleon at a moment when he had
completely surrendered the initiative to his foes: the Allies would now
dictate his next move.74
The withdrawal across the Elbe commenced on 24 September. Napoleon
himself again rode east almost as far as Bischofswerda before returning to
Großharthau. At 5:00 that evening, he made preparations for the continued
retreat. Napoleon directed XI Corps to Großharthau, V Corps to Stolpen,
and III Corps to Weißig. For the 26th, he wanted III and V Corps at
Dresden and XI Corps at Weißig. “The duc de Tarente will remain at Weißig
the 27th,” Napoleon instructed Berthier. “He must make his movement in a
manner that does not tire his troops and does not lose any men. I noticed on
the road a few French corpses; the duc de Tarente must bury them and leave
no trace.” One hour later, Napoleon expressed his belief to Macdonald that
Blücher would “beat a retreat this night and recross the Spree.” If he did not
recross that night, the emperor planned to “deploy large forces against him”
to force Blücher to recross on the 25th. Yet he admitted that such an
operation would cost him several days “with no hope of any result.” As if
thinking aloud, he changed his mind. “Send III and V Corps to me at
Dresden right now,” he snapped. Napoleon wanted Macdonald himself to
remain at Weißig until the 28th with XI Corps and II Cavalry Corps. He
also challenged the marshal to show some initiative: “nothing prevents you
from coming to Dresden to confer with me and acquainting yourself with
the entrenched camp and all the outlets of the forest. You are responsible for
guarding the part of the fortified camp on the right bank and all the outlets
of the forest within two leagues of Dresden. You will have time to recon-
noiter all the outlets of the forest, so that when you leave Weißig you can
cover all debouches.”75
After returning to Dresden during the night, the master received a
message from Macdonald at noon on 25 September. He responded with
admirable patience: “I see by your letter that you think the enemy has been
reinforced and is in a position to give battle. If this is the case, I think it is
acceptable if you retain III, V, and XI Corps on the heights of Weißig, and
that you take a good position.” With his interest somewhat piqued, Napo-
leon speculated: “We shall see what the enemy wants to do in this situation.”
Stating the obvious, he suggested that Macdonald’s “retrograde movement
may have emboldened him.” Nevertheless, he assured the marshal that,
should Blücher force him to retreat across the Elbe, several divisions would
be available to support him. “I think this plan will further frustrate the
enemy army, better cover Dresden, and will be more suitable for troops that
are encamped on the heights all together. You can take this position tomor-
row. I will find you tomorrow and we will reconnoiter. In response to any
movement the enemy makes, I can reinforce you with 40,000 men in one
night, debouching at daybreak.”76
Later on the 25th, Napoleon rode to Bischofswerda, apparently
expecting to be attacked. Odeleben comments that Blücher’s march had
“seriously threatened the flank of the French army. I have no doubt that
considerable losses could have been inflicted on him, yet a mere demonstra-
tion was made.” As night approached, he left Bischofswerda and made his
way back to Dresden. The reconnaissance he mentioned to Macdonald never
occurred. “At Dresden,” continues Odeleben, “he watched the maneuvers of
his opponents, always hoping to discover a weak spot and exploit it.
Lusatia 439
He sometimes occupied himself with the business of his cabinet, sometimes

with the fortifications of Dresden . . . so that the days passed in weariness
and care.”77 As unlikely as it seems, Napoleon ignored Blücher for the next
several days thanks to Schwarzenberg’s decision to advance on Leipzig.
Returning to Blücher, Silesian Army Headquarters correctly assumed on
23 September that Napoleon was no longer accompanying the Army of the
Bober, meaning that Macdonald no longer sought battle. Blücher hoped to
exploit this transition of command with a surprise attack on Macdonald’s
left. For this purpose, the Prussians made plans for Sacken to drive the
enemy from the St. Marienstern Convent that same night. Yet the staff’s
recurring problem of cutting orders too late rendered this operation imprac-
ticable. As a result, Blücher placed Katzler at Sacken’s disposal and
instructed the Russian corps commander to take a concealed position two
miles north of Göda on the 24th. If the opportunity arose, Sacken could
attack the enemy’s flank.78
Unfortunately for Blücher, 24 September does not stand out as a shining
example of his staff’s work. Quite the contrary, it serves more as a precursor
to his sloppy operations in February 1814 during the campaign in France.
Communication and reconnaissance – hallmarks of Napoleon’s successful
system of command and control – are conspicuously missing from the Allied
operation. Again, the belated issuing of orders as well as the poor coordin-
ation of the march columns in difficult terrain prevented Sacken from
executing his task. Joining Yorck’s vanguard, Blücher watched and waited
throughout the morning of the 24th, but Napoleon ordered the retreat to the
Elbe. “On 24 September,” recalled Langeron, “the enemy made no serious
movements. Nevertheless, numerous columns advanced against us, but at
noon these columns retreated toward Dresden, and we soon knew that
Napoleon had received reports that forced him to make this retreat.” Con-
sequently, Blücher decided to have his vanguards attack the enemy’s front at
Göda while Sacken’s corps advanced in the direction of Bischofswerda to cut
his line of retreat. Receiving the order at 5:00 p.m., Sacken did not com-
mence the operation because he did not think his troops could reach the
enemy before sundown. After waiting in vain at Yorck’s outpost for four
hours to observe Sacken’s movement, Blücher returned to Bautzen “very
dissatisfied,” according to Schack’s journal.79
Around midnight, Sacken finally launched a surprise attack from
Pottschapplitz but found Bischofswerda abandoned. Meanwhile, a few miles
east of Sacken, Katzler’s men passed the entire night under arms waiting in
vain for the Russian commander’s signal to advance. At 4:00 on the morning
of the 25th, the Prussian forward posts reported the enemy’s evacuation of
Göda. Katzler made contact with the imperial’s rearguard at Demitz-
Thumitz but Sacken did nothing. On the left wing, Bubna and Kaptsevich
advanced west before Blücher’s orders arrived. Encountering no resistance,
the Austro-Russian force-marched to Neustadt in Sachsen, twenty-three

miles east of Dresden, on the 25th. St.-Priest also moved west, occupying
his former positions stretching from Bühlau to Putzkau just south of
Großharthau and Bischofswerda.
According to intelligence provided by Katzler, Napoleon had gone to the
hills of Bischofswerda on the afternoon of the 24th. There, he received
reports from Dresden that caused him not only to return to the Saxon
capital, but also to order the Army of the Bober to retreat to the Elbe.
Macdonald withdrew during the night of 24/25 September. By 8:00 on the
morning of 25 September, Silesian Army Headquarters still remained
unclear over the meaning of these movements. “Last evening,” Gneisenau
explained to Knesebeck on the morning of the 25th, “the enemy quickly
withdrew from us. This rearward movement had already started yesterday
afternoon. Meanwhile, until noon yesterday, the enemy’s troop movements
toward us extended to our left wing but he then began this rearward
movement. We do not know whether this was prompted by the march of
Sacken’s corps or by events on the other side of the Elbe. During the night,
we received news only of the retreat of the left wing, which Sacken had
alarmed but now no longer can be found. Our forward troops are scouting
and pursuing the enemy, but up to now we have no news of the results.”
Although the reports had yet to arrive, the Prussians believed these
movements indicated that Napoleon had finally relinquished the offensive
against the Silesian Army. Blücher and his staff even speculated that he had
decided to completely evacuate the right bank of the Elbe. Furthermore, the
last troops of Bennigsen’s army presumably would clear Zittau on the
25th.80 By focusing on Blücher, Napoleon’s short two-day offensive against
the Silesian Army allowed the Army of Poland to reach Bohemia unnoticed
and unmolested. Based on these circumstances, the situation appeared ideal
for the Silesian Army’s march down the Elbe. Should Macdonald withdraw
as far as Dresden, the Silesian Army would “prepare to move closer to the
Elbe through a march to the right,” continued Gneisenau. “We do not
believe this will expose Silesia to danger, either in regard to the general state
of affairs which will not permit the emperor Napoleon from making such an
overextended invasion [of Silesia], or in our particular position, where it
would be extreme audacity for him to drive to Bohemia or Silesia in front of
our face.” Returning to the issue of supply, he conceded that “the lack of
fodder itself justifies such a movement.”
In this letter to Knesebeck on the morning of the 25th, Gneisenau
insisted “that we must freely conform to the war of maneuver but we must
conduct it in a manner that leads to great results in order to reward ourselves
for the dangers that we thus have to endure. The crown prince of Sweden
acts as if he will cross the Elbe. Sending 20,000 men across, like he wants,
will frighten nothing. But if we execute the crossing with the Silesian Army
Lusatia 441
and the majority of the Army of North Germany, we will attain a com-
pletely different result. We would then be in position to deliver a great battle,
which could decisively influence the war.” Gneisenau asserted that Blücher
could afford to take risks: “A defeat will not be very dangerous to us, since
your army [the Bohemian] will stifle the enemy’s pursuit.” Moving to the
heart of his argument, Gneisenau exclaimed: “I repeat that I do not think it is
likely that the crown prince of Sweden will cross the Elbe with his army. An
invitation from us to do this is merely a polite request. What if he answers
with beautiful phrases and does nothing? Should we then leave splendid
forces unused in his hands even longer? The duty to our master demands
that we work to prevent such a paralysis. We must strive to unite with Bülow
(Tauentzien is already prepared to operate in unison with us) so that we are
in a position to deliver a battle on the plains of Saxony along the left bank of
the Elbe.” Pointing to the “dissatisfaction that reigned among the generals of
the Army of North Germany,” Gneisenau reasoned that Wintzingerode
could likewise be swayed to unite with Blücher. “If we win the battle, the
crown prince can then pursue his personal and his purely Swedish plans
because we will need him no more.”
Gneisenau’s opinion of Bernadotte, which prevailed throughout the
Silesian Army, could not have been much lower. “He has a weak character
and is surrounded by many intriguers. Much pro-French sentiment still
reigns in Sweden. To him, his purely Swedish goals must come first because
only through their attainment can he expect to maintain himself on the
Swedish throne.” Ignoring the simple fact that Napoleon’s hegemony had
to be reduced considerably in order for Bernadotte to take Norway from
Denmark, Gneisenau argued that, “as great as his hate toward the French
emperor may be, his goal can never be to proceed in the extreme against him
or destroy the system to which he owes his elevation. We must not forget
that the crown prince of Sweden is a son of the Revolution. If the French
system falls, the Swedish nobility will not suffer General Bernadotte on their
throne.” Conceding that Bernadotte possessed the talents of a field com-
mander, Gneisenau insisted that the strategic situation now rendered him
superfluous. Referring to 1812, he noted that “the appearance of a bold field
commander on the German coast with 35,000 Swedes, 25,000 Russians, and
10,000 British could have had a decisive result for the war in Russia; now the
help of 25,000 Swedes is of little importance.” Predicting that a decisive
victory in Saxony would lead to the defection of several German states from
Napoleon’s fold, he insisted that Allied forces would be increased by 100,000
men – more than enough to replace Bernadotte’s 25,000 Swedes. He hoped
that by detaching Bülow and Tauentzien from the Army of North Germany,
either officially or unofficially, “the crown prince would return home out of
annoyance. But he will not do this because he does not want to lose his
British subsidies and his chances to secure Norway.”
Expressing the imperativeness of quickly executing this plan, Gneisenau

revealed his intention to secretly communicate Blücher’s plans to Bülow.
“The appearance of a great force on the left bank of the Elbe will undoubt-
edly and immediately give the war a different turn and everything that we do
there will in no way disturb the movements of the Bohemian Army. Instead,
it will facilitate everything you undertake.” Gneisenau certainly walked a
fine line. Ignoring treaty obligations and diplomatic concerns, he justified
his request for Bülow and Tauentzien to disregard Bernadotte’s orders in
favor of Blücher’s by telling Knesebeck that loyal service to Frederick Wil-
liam demanded such insubordination. He then had the pluck to seek Kne-
sebeck’s endorsement of his scheme.81 “If my plans are not approved,” he
warned, “we will continue to endure the frustration of seeing a great army
whirling about between the Spree and the Elbe after two victories [Großbee-
ren and Dennewitz], and through this it holds back a neighboring army [the
Silesian] on the latter river.”82 To Clausewitz he wrote: “Tauentzien is in
agreement with us and will operate in unison with us. Because of his well-
known personal interests, I hope Bülow will likewise do this without being
too troubled by the paralyzing effects of the crown prince. If he cannot
follow our invitation, we believe we are ready for the undertaking even
without him.”
Gneisenau could not conceal his excitement about the upcoming oper-
ation. “We will break on the scene and assume the main role because the
others do not want it,” he informed Clausewitz. “In the main army they
constantly draft new plans and nothing gets done; after two victories,
the crown prince of Sweden loiters between the Nuthe and the Elbe.”83
At 8:00 p.m. on the 25th, Gneisenau drafted Blücher’s report to the king
with pride about the events of the previous days and the ensuing march
down the Elbe:
I have the honor to report the failure of the enemy’s third offensive operation
against the Silesian Army. Because Bennigsen’s army will have completed its
march to Zittau and my assignment – to cover this march – is complete, I will
begin my rightward movement and attempt to cross the Elbe and in unison
with the army of the crown prince to draw the enemy onto the plains so the
Bohemian Army can execute its operations with greater ease. Bubna and a
small corps of the Silesian Army will remain behind to observe the enemy,
maintain communication with Bohemia, and prevent the enemy from oper-
ating against Bohemia or Silesia. Should he attempt such an improbable
movement, I will stop him through a flank position at the Black Elster and,
if this should not suffice, through a march against Dresden to cut him off.84
Rühle’s masterful argument in favor of Blücher’s proposed march down

the Elbe convinced Alexander and Frederick William to discard the plan of
transferring the Silesian Army to Bohemia. Instead, Bennigsen received
Lusatia 443
orders to lead the Army of Poland to Bohemia. Masked by the Silesian

Army, Napoleon received no intelligence concerning Bennigsen’s march.
For these two reasons, the decision made at Allied Headquarters on the
night of 14 September to accept Blücher’s proposal proved to be one of the
most profound and consequential judgments of the campaign.
While Allied Headquarters approved Blücher’s bold plan, Napoleon’s
relative inactivity in the month of September is conspicuous. As one con-
temporary noted, “The Grand Combined Austrian, Russian, and Prussian
Army under the supreme command of Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg had
remained for a long time inactive in the vicinity of Teplitz, watching the
movements of the French Grande Armée under Napoleon in person who,
after the disaster that had occurred to General Vandamme, appeared to limit
his operations, principally to his own security, the defense of Dresden, and
the preservation of his line of communication along the Elbe.”85 After
disengaging from Blücher and returning to Dresden on 7 September, Napo-
leon bounced between the Saxon capital and Peterswald: a line of twenty-
three miles between the former and the latter. Although Napoleon did not
confirm until the 18th that Schwarzenberg did not intend to launch a general
offensive, the other two Allied armies did not remain idle. As Blücher and
Bernadotte gradually closed on the Grande Armée, they threatened to
negate Napoleon’s strategic advantage of interior lines by tactically sur-
rounding all of his forces.86
It is hard to believe that the general who waged the 1796 Italian
Campaign so willingly forfeited the initiative in 1813. The indecisive, almost
listless activity that had first become noticeable during the Russian campaign
continued. Instead of action, we hear Napoleon’s excuses: “I will await the
news of this day . . . I will send orders tonight,” he wrote Murat on the
morning of 19 September. “The weather is horrible. The prince de Neuchâtel
[Berthier] is sick; I do not know if it is his gout or only a fever.” Between
3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on the 20th, he instructed Berthier to explain to Macdo-
nald that “it is unfortunate he made an unnecessary movement and relocated
his bivouacs and camps on such a horrible day, which causes infinite
suffering among the troops.”87
Until the end of September, the Allied armies operated at considerable
distances from each other. After reaching Bautzen, Blücher closed the
distance between his army and the Bohemian Army at Teplitz to a mere
fifty-five miles as the crow flies over the Lusatian highlands, a branch of the
Sudetes. However, the closest road for Blücher to take over the mountains –
Bautzen–Zittau–Gabel–Leitmeritz–Teplitz – increased the actual distance to
ninety-five miles. Moreover, some 125 miles still separated the main forces
of the Silesian and North German Armies. Schwarzenberg’s army was
operating on the left bank of the Elbe, while Blücher’s and Bernadotte’s
remained on the right. Between the three Allied Armies, Napoleon
maintained his strong central position on the Elbe with fortresses protecting
his main points of passage. Conversely, to unite with Schwarzenberg,
Blücher and Bernadotte could rely only on bridges that had to be built
within reach of Napoleon’s forces or in the vicinity of a French stronghold.
Yet only the simultaneous advance of all three Allied armies against Napo-
leon’s communications would deny him the advantages offered by his cen-
tral position on the Elbe and force him to accept battle under extremely
unfavorable conditions. Blücher took it upon himself to make this happen
by resolving to cross the Elbe and drag Bernadotte’s army with him.88
Notes
2 Blücher to Langeron, Sacken, Yorck, St.-Priest, Kaptsevich, and Bubna, Herrn-
hut, 11 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 136.
3 Disposition, Herrnhut, 11 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 137.
4 Bülow to Blücher, Nudersdorf, 1 October 1813, in Höpfner “Darstellung,”
1844:301–02.
5 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 51–54; Unger, Blücher, II:91.
6 Blücher to Charles John, Herrnhut, 11 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25, and
Add MSS, 20112, 49.
7 Blücher to Alexander, Herrnhut, 11 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1531, 419b.
8 Blücher to Charles John, Herrnhut, 11 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25;
“Mémoire,” Herrnhut, 11 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1531, 419b, and RA
KrA, volym 25.
9 For the best accounts of the deliberations at Allied Headquarters, see Bernhardi,
Toll, III:327–29; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:345–46; Friederich,
Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:64–72.
10 “Über die Grundsätze damit die, aus vielen Körpern bestehende Armee der
Alliirten, nicht in einen Koloß zusammengedrängt, sondern theilweise, mit ver-
einten Kräften auf den Feind loszugehen habe, und dadurch die eine Armee die
andere zu unterstützen vermöge,” Teplitz, 14 September 1813, in Radetzky,
Denkschriften, 172; Janson, Friedrich Wilhelm, 214.
11 Knesebeck to Gneisenau, Teplitz, 8:00 p.m., 13 September 1813, GStA PK, VI
HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23; Alexander to Bennigsen, Teplitz, 13 Septem-
ber 1813, in Mikhailovsky-Danlivesky, Denkwürdigkeiten, 341–42. The tsar
instructed Bennigsen to take a position north of Teplitz facing Kulm with his
vanguard pushed north to Nollendorf or Peterswald. Alexander explicitly stated
that, aside from covering the rear of the Bohemian Army, Bennigsen would
“facilitate General Blücher’s passage of the Elbe.” See also Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:346–47.
12 The account of the operations on 11 and 12 September is based on Zychlinski,
Geschichte des 24sten Infanterie-Regiments, I:91–92; Henckel von Donners-
marck, Erinnerungen, 220–21; Ollech, Reyher, 216–17; Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:242–46; and Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:54–56. On this day, Bubna
Lusatia 445
detached General Theophil Zechmeister’s brigade to Altendorf to observe the

Elbe from Bad Schandau to Lilienstein and Neipperg’s brigade to Hohenstein to
monitor the river from Porschdorf to Rathen. With the remaining brigade of 2nd
Light Division, Bubna moved to Ulbersdorf: Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Ulbers-
dorf, 12 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1531, 474.
13 Blücher to Bennigsen, 12 September 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:246–47.
14 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Herrnhut, 10:00 p.m., 12 September 1813, ÖStA KA,
FA 1531, 419a, and Add MSS, 20112, 16.
15 The account of the operations on 13 September is based on Langeron, Mémoires,
279; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:250–52; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges,
IIa:320–21; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:256–57; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de
la guerre, 177–78; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:346–58.
16 Blücher to Alexander, Herrnhut, 13 September 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:249.
17 Blücher to Knesebeck, Herrnhut, 13 September 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger,
179–80.
18 Gneisenau to Bubna, Herrnhut, 5:30 p.m., 13 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA
1531, ad 497a; Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Ulbersdorf, 14 September 1813, ibid.,
497; Disposition, Herrnhut, 13 September 1813, ibid., ad 474; and Add MSS,
20112, 138–39. Blücher issued these orders on the night of the 13th before reports
from Katzler and St.-Priest arrived.
19 Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Ulbersdorf, 14 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1531,
497; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:257; Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:253–54. Falkenhausen stumbled on a French hospital at Kamenz. He
arrested a Saxon major who had brought his sick wife there for treatment.
Falkenhausen had him escorted to Bautzen, where he was interrogated at Sacken’s
headquarters. According to his statements, Napoleon and the Guard had returned
to Dresden during the afternoon of the 12th; other French troops, probably
coming from Pirna, had likewise arrived at Dresden that afternoon but had
continued without delay to Großenhain. Moreover, all Guard personnel at Dres-
den received orders to be ready to march to Großenhain at 4:45 a.m. on 15
September. Reporting from Pulsnitz at 4:00 a.m. on the 14th, Falkenhausen
confirmed the statements of the Saxon officer that considerable troop masses
had marched from Dresden toward Großenhain on the morning of 13 September
and that Napoleon had followed around 7:00 a.m. The two enemy camps in the
Dresden moor likewise departed and were probably marching toward
Großenhain. According to the rumors circulating through the imperial army,
Napoleon would go to Torgau and cross the Elbe but not to conduct an offensive
against the crown prince of Sweden.
20 Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Rumburg, 11:00 p.m., 10 September 1813, ÖStA KA,
FA 1531, 316; Schwarzenberg to Bubna, Teplitz, 12 September 1813, in Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1844:254; Bubna to Blücher, Ulbersdorf, 15 September 1813,
ÖStA KA, FA 1531, 500a.
21 Disposition, Herrnhut, 10:30 a.m., 15 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1531, 500b,
and Add MSS, 20112, 140.
22 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:256; Blücher to Alexander, Herrnhut, 11:00 a.m.,

15 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3913, ll. 39–40; Blücher to Charles
John, Herrnhut, 15 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 52.
Ney, Macdonald, and Daru, 11 September 1813. By that evening, the Young
Guard reached Cotta, just west of Dresden while to the south I Corps held the
Nollendorf–Peterswald line; XIV Corps Börnersdorf to Fürtsenwalde; and II
Corps between Sayda and Marienburg. See Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as
a General, II:315–16.
24 CN, Nos. 20552, 20553, 20562, XXVI:192–93, 200; SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to
Marmont, Murat, and Ney, 12 September 1813, Berthier to Piré, 13 September
1813. Approximately 10,000 hundredweights of wheat that could be ground into
flour would remain at Torgau. Napoleon likewise ordered the transfer to Dresden
of some 2,800 hundredweights of flour from Leisnig, 2,300 from Rochlitz, and
1,300 from Colditz.
25 SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Ney, 12 September 1813.
26 CN, No. 20560, XXVI:198; SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Macdonald, 14
September 1813.
27 CN, Nos. 20567 and 20568, XXVI:202–03; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:73.
28 Quoted in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:319–20; Janson, Friedrich
Wilhelm, 215.
29 It is not clear when Blücher received notification of the monarchs’ approval prior
to Rühle’s return to Silesian Army Headquarters on 18 September. Friedrich
maintains that the official cancellation was sent to Blücher early on the 15th but
“we do not know the exact contents of the letter; Blücher immediately destroyed
it on the express order of the monarchs”: Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:77.
However, in a letter written by Gneisenau to Knesebeck on 18 September, the
staff chief states, “We expect at any hour Major Rühle, who will bring to us the
treatise you have completed on the order of the tsar. According to a report from
Major Rühle, I already know that my suggestion to utilize Bennigsen’s army for
the posting on the Eger has been accepted”: Gneisenau to Knesebeck, Bautzen,
18 September 1813, in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:343–44. Knesebeck’s
letter to Gneisenau was likewise destroyed probably because of the derogatory
comments concerning Bernadotte: Janson, Friedrich Wilhelm, 215.
30 For the best accounts of the events at Allied Headquarters, see Bernhardi, Toll,
III:331–39; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:351–53; Beitzke, Geschichte
der deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:355–59; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
II:75–78.
31 CN, No. 20568, XXVI:203.
32 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, I:306–07. Odeleben and thus Petre, who
follows him, mistakenly state that the younger Blücher was captured on 11
September: Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 284–85.
33 CN, Nos. 20569, 20577, and 20582, XXVI:203, 209, 211; SHAT, C17 180: Berthier
to Ney, 17 and 18 September 1813. On the 17th, Berthier informed Ney of the
emperor’s decision to dissolve XII Corps and divide its remains among IV and VII
Corps as well as the garrison at Dresden.
Lusatia 447
34 CN, Nos. 20568 and 20573, XXVI:203, 207; SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Macdo-
nald, 16 September 1813.
35 The account of 15 September is based on Langeron, Mémoires, 280–81; Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1844:256–59; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, 178; Beitzke,
Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:358; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
II:257–59.
36 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 54. Tauentzien operated with only 2 of his 4 brigades,
altogether about 20,000 men. The other 2 brigades were conducting sieges.
37 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:258; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:259; Leg-
giere, Napoleon and Berlin, 234.
39 Tauentzien to Blücher, Herzberg, 15 September 1813, and Blücher to Tauentzien,
Bautzen, 16 September 1813, are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:262–63.
40 Charles John to Blücher, Coswig, 15 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 50–51.
41 Blücher to Charles John, Bautzen, 16 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25, and
Add MSS, 20112, 53–54.
42 Blücher to Hardenberg, Bautzen, 16 September 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed.
Unger, 181.
43 Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Langburkersdorf, 16 and 17 September (2) 1813, ÖStA
KA, FA 1532, 531, 561, and 565; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:264–65; Frieder-
ich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:259. At 10:00 a.m. on the 17th Katzler reported to
Blücher that Napoleon and his Guard stood at Pirna, where the French threw
two bridges across the Elbe. After reaching the Bischofswerda–Bautzen road
around 2:00 in the afternoon, Katzler again reported at 4:00 p.m. that
Macdonald’s XI Corps stood at Schmiedefeld, Großdrebnitz, and Goldbach
while III and V Corps camped at Geismannsdorf, Rammenau, and Frankenthal
with VIII Corps at Stolpen. Altogether, he estimated this force to number 50,000
men. On Blücher’s left wing, Bubna sent patrols from Hohenstein to Lohmen
and Wehlen to closely monitor the French pontoon bridges at Pirna in case
Napoleon should cross to the right bank of the Elbe. He reported to Blücher that
on the 16th the imperials had driven back Zieten’s brigade from Nollendorf
toward Kulm but a flanking maneuver on the 17th forced the French to retreat to
Hellendorf. From Tetschen on the Elbe, Streifkorps commander Major
Boltenstern reported to Blücher that Napoleon had been present during the
fighting at Nollendorf on the 17th.
44 Blücher to Alexander, Bautzen, 5:00 p.m., 19 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA,
op. 16, d. 3913, l. 116; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:263; Blücher to Sacken,
Bautzen, 18 September 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:265; Pertz and
45 Streifkorps under Prince Valerian Madatov and Major Falkenhausen repulsed a
Saxon cuirassier brigade from General Étienne Bordessoulle’s 1st Heavy Cavalry
Division of I Cavalry Corps at Böhla as it advanced toward Ortrand, seventeen
miles northwest of Sacken’s position at Kamenz.
46 Tauentzien to Blücher, Herzberg, 18 September 1813, and Blücher to Tauentzien,
Bautzen, 5:00 p.m., 19 September 1813, are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:267–68; see also Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 80–81.
47 Steffens, Adventures, 114–15.

48 Blücher to Bonin, Bautzen, 22 September 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 183;
Droysen, Yorck, II:172; Droysen, Yorck, II:171–72; Unger, Blücher, II:94; Müf-
fling’s letter to Knescbeck is in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:260.
49 Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Bautzen, 25 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 20b. Hardenberg to Gneisenau, Teplitz, 28 September
1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 24.
51 SHAT, C2 156: Macdonald to Berthier, 18 September 1813; CN, No. 20593,
XXVI:218; Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, I:314–15.
52 CN, Nos. 20581 and 20583, XXVI:210–11.
53 Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:321; CN, No. 20594,
XXVI:219.
54 CN, Nos. 20601 and 20601, XXVI:224.
55 Blücher to Charles John, Bautzen, 19 September 1813, RA KrA, volym 25;
Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:268–69.
56 Gneisenau to Bubna, Bautzen, 6:00 p.m., 19 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1532,
ad661. Gneisenau’s letter was in response to a letter written by Schwarzenberg at
11:00 on the night of the 17th to Bubna. According to a captured French general,
Napoleon was preparing to invade Bohemia. Schwarzenberg wanted Blücher to
be ready to support the Bohemian Army by immediately marching against
Napoleon’s communications and rear.
57 Bubna to Blücher, Langburkersdorf, 20 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1532, 727c,
and Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Langburkersdorf, 20 September 1813, ibid., 661.
58 Secret Disposition for 21–24 September, 21 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1532,
727b, and Add MSS, 20112, 142; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:270.
59 Blücher to Bonin, Bautzen, 22 September 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger,
182–83.
60 Droysen, Yorck, II:175; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:265–66; Höpfner,
61 CN, Nos. 20603 and 20604, XXVI:224–26.
62 CN, Nos. 20607 and 20609, XXVI:226–28; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 56–57.
64 SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Macdonald, 22 September 1813.
65 CN, No. 20612, XXVI:229.
68 CN, No. 20615, XXVI:232–33. The account of 22 September is based on Blücher
to Bubna, Bautzen, 8:30 p.m., 22 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1533, 887c;
Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:273–75; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:264–65;
Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:332–33; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la
guerre, 181; Marmont, Mémoires, V:161; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 57.
69 Quoted in Unger, Blücher, II:93; Blücher to Bubna, Bautzen, 8:30 p.m., 22 Sep-
tember 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1533, 887c.
70 The account of 23 September is based on Blücher to Frederick William, Bautzen,
25 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16, and ÖStA
Lusatia 449
KA, FA 1533, 832; Langeron, Mémoires, 285–86; Höpfner, “Darstellung,”

1844:275–77; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:265–69; Beitzke, Geschichte der
deutschen Freiheitskriege, II:409–12; Bernhardi, Toll, III:342–43; Droysen, Yorck,
176; Langeron, Mémoires, 286–87; Bubna to Schwarzenberg, 25 September 1813,
ÖStA KA, FA 1533, 814.
71 SHAT, C2 156: Ney to Berthier, 22 September 1813; CN, No. 20617, XXVI:235;
Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, I:315–16; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIa:333.
72 At Großharthau on the great east–west highway, Macdonald’s three infantry
corps (III, V, and XI) stood some eighteen miles east of Dresden and sixteen
miles west of Bautzen. Poniatowski’s VIII Corps held Stolpen. The marshal
established his headquarters at Fischbach, likewise on the east–west highway
but four miles west of Großharthau. With VI Corps and I and IV Cavalry Corps,
Murat established his base at Großenhain, twenty miles north of Dresden. See
Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, 177; Marmont, Mémoires, V:161.
73 CN, No. 20618, XXVI:236; Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General,
II:323; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 291; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen
Freiheitskriege, II:400–06; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:333.
74 CN, Nos. 20616–20618, XXVI:233–36; Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a
General, II:324.
75 CN, Nos. 20625 and 20626, XXVI:241–43; SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Macdo-
nald, 24 September 1813.
76 CN, No. 20632, XXVI:246–47.
78 Gneisenau to St.-Priest, Bautzen, 10:00 p.m., 23 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA
1533, ad871; Blücher to Sacken, Bautzen, 24 September 1813, in Höpfner, “Dar-
stellung,” 1844:278.
79 Langeron, Mémoires, 287; Droysen, Yorck, II:177 and 198; Müffling, Die Feld-
züge, 57–59.
80 Gneisenau to Bubna, Bautzen, 9:00 p.m., 24 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1533,
ad814; Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Langburkersdorf, 25 September 1813, ibid., 814;
Blücher to Alexander, Elsterwerda, 29 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16,
d. 3913, l. 268; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:269–70; Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1844:277–80.
81 Realizing that his three-volume study would be a training tool for the officers of
the Second Reich, Friederich counsels that “Gneisenau’s attempts to coerce the
dissatisfied generals of the North Army to join the Silesian Army against the will
of their commander in chief was without doubt – even if emerging from patriotic
endeavors – ill judged and dangerous. They could have had the most ill-fated
results, and indeed could have led to the complete collapse of the alliance. Thus,
we can only see it as a fortunate chance that the general’s letter reached the hands
of King Frederick William, whose judgment on the crown prince was doubtless
more impartial and correct, and who also did not fail to intervene.” While it is
doubtful that the Sixth Coalition would have fallen apart had Bülow and Tauent-
zien followed Blücher across the Elbe without Bernadotte’s authorization, prob-
lems that Frederick William did not need predictably would have arisen. See
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:273.
82 Gneisenau to Knesebeck, Bautzen, 8:00 a.m., 25 September 1813, in Pertz and

83 Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Bautzen, 8:00 a.m., 26 September 1813, GStA, PK, VI
84 Blücher to Frederick William, Bautzen, 8:00 p.m., 25 September 1813, GStA PK,
VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16, and ÖStA KA, FA 1533, 832.
85 “Battles of Leipzig,” Lowe, Add MSS, 20111, 161.
86 CN, No. 20585, XXVI:212; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 288–89.
87 CN, Nos. 20593 and 20602, XXVI:218, 224.
88 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:35.
10
The Middle Elbe
Breaking onto the scene momentarily appeared more difficult than Gneise-
nau had imagined due to the backlash in the Silesian Army caused by the
unveiling of the plan to march north. Although it had long been contem-
plated, the staff had kept this idea so secret that its announcement caused
incalculable surprise in every quarter. The boldness of the plan did not
receive general approval. General Dideric Jacob Teyl van Seraskerken, the
Dutch-born Russian war commissar attached to Blücher’s staff, provided
surprising, vehement protest. Having emigrated to Münster after the
1794 French conquest of the Netherlands, Teyl had become close friends
with Blücher, even being a house and table companion for years. For this
reason, Tsar Alexander selected Teyl for the post on Blücher’s staff. In
August, Blücher received him as an old friend. Müffling described him as
“a brave man, but cautious in the extreme.” After Blücher issued orders at
7:00 p.m. on 25 September for the march down the Elbe, Teyl argued that
the operation would violate the principles of the Reichenbach Plan and
selfishly jeopardize the results of the entire campaign thus far. “He availed
himself of his grandes entrées to the general,” maintained Müffling, “to make
the most urgent remonstrance against allowing himself to be carried away by
Gneisenau and me into such hazardous undertakings. Blücher answered: ‘Be
quiet, old friend; everything has been maturely considered’.” Teyl continued
his protest, insisting that Blücher solicit the opinion of the army’s generals.
Blücher looked at him in astonishment. “I do not hold councils of war,”
roared the hoary Prussian. “Colonel, the tsar, your master, sent you here to
report to him, for which purpose I furnish you with all the necessary
materials with the greatest readiness. When you protest against my pub-
lished orders, you depart altogether from your instructions; you are not my
appointed advisor! Therefore, I will not listen to you and I take my leave.”
With that, Blücher walked out of the room.
451
Lingering eighteenth-century conceptions of warfare also prompted

concern over Silesia. General Rauch, whose special assignment consisted
solely of overseeing the security of Silesia, drafted a memo describing the
poor condition of the province’s fortresses and all the danger entailed in
Blücher’s march north. After failing to force his opinion on Gneisenau, he
attempted to persuade Blücher. Müffling claimed that Rauch fared worse
than Teyl in this endeavor. “General Blücher made no mystery of these
conversations, and the result was that these two officers sought and obtained
other appointments; at the same time, his opponents became more cautious.”
Still others opined that abandoning the ties to Silesia’s supplies of food and
war materiel appeared extremely risky. Blücher’s strength of character
weathered the storm.1
Blücher and Gneisenau recognized the risks entailed in this operation.
The crossing of the Elbe would occur within Napoleon’s reach. If the
Silesian Army won the left bank, Blücher would enter his lair and face the
Grande Armée itself: a force far superior in numbers and morale than the
Army of the Bober. Even if he had wanted to cooperate, Schwarzenberg’s
ability to do so seemed doubtful based on the chaotic descriptions of the
daily business at Allied Headquarters that Blücher received. Bernadotte’s
cooperation appeared even more doubtful. Tauentzien seemed committed to
following Blücher even if it meant ignoring the crown prince’s orders. That
night, Blücher wrote to Tauentzien instructing him to inform the crown
prince of the march of the Silesian Army but to say nothing of a resolute
decision to cross the Elbe. As for Bülow, after numerous disagreements with
Bernadotte about the defense of Berlin as well as the correct way to exploit
the victories at Großbeeren and Dennewitz, the crown prince’s threat to
arrest him completely alienated the Prussian corps commander. Assigned to
the pointless siege of Wittenberg, Bülow viewed this task as the crown
prince’s punishment for his outspokenness, as well as an excuse for the
Army of North Germany to remain idle on the right bank of the Elbe.
Gneisenau tempted Bülow with the prospect of receiving independent com-
mand of an army if he cooperated with Blücher on the left bank of the Elbe.
The staff chief also hoped to win over Wintzingerode, whose Russian corps
likewise belonged to the Army of North Germany. Regardless, with or
without cooperation, Blücher and Gneisenau committed themselves and
the Army of Silesia to crossing the Elbe. “Neither your general [Bülow],”
Gneisenau wrote to Boyen on the 25th, “nor mine, nor you, nor I shun any
great accountability. If one wants to render his master an important service,
one must have the courage to do something. Besides, one victory will justify
everything.”2
“At this moment,” responded Boyen, “I have received your letter dated
the 25th and hasten to reply in detail over it. I gave your letter to Bülow to
read. Based on the character of the general as well as the circumstances, you
The Middle Elbe 453
can be assured that he is in complete agreement and I can give you my word
that Bülow fought and won the two victories at Großbeeren and Dennewitz
despite all sorts of obstacles and even against the actual will of the crown
prince. Since Dennewitz, Bülow has repeatedly asked the crown prince to
cross the Elbe but all has been in vain; the king knows of this. Of all that we
could reasonably do, nothing has happened.” Despite the enthusiasm, Boyen
posed some tough questions: “Where will we undertake the crossing to
achieve our union? In a possible march to our left [southeast], we would
approach you on the Elbe but we will be weakened considerably by a major
detachment that we would have to leave before Wittenberg; also our food
supply is so bad that we often have nothing to eat for several days. Please do
not view these questions as evasive complaints; our will is resolved; our only
question is what means do you have to overcome these difficulties, what is
your plan – then I can see what is possible.” Boyen also relayed Bülow’s
belief that Blücher would not be able to hijack both Prussian corps from
Bernadotte. Bülow suggested leaving Tauentzien, his rival, with Bernadotte.
According to Bülow, “it would be best if we allocate only 27,000 men for use
by the Swedes; Tauentzien can be placed at the disposal of the crown prince
and we can support you, then everything can be accomplished with ease.”
Moreover, Bülow did not realize that Blücher planned to conduct this
operation behind the back of the crown prince. Instead, he advised Blücher
to make a proposal to Bernadotte in the hope of getting him to cooperate.
Blücher and Gneisenau needed time to consider these points.3
Regardless, on 26 September 1813, Yorck’s birthday, the Silesian Army
commenced the fifty-mile march northwest from Bautzen to Elsterwerda,
from where it would continue another forty-five miles to the village of Elster.4
After striking out at daybreak on the 26th, Sacken’s corps pushed six miles
west through Kamenz to Schwosdorf on the road to Königsbrück. To conceal
the army’s movement, Gneisenau tasked the Russian commander with taking
a position between Königsbrück and Großenhain. Behind the Russians,
Yorck’s corps departed at 6:00 a.m. and marched seventeen miles northwest
from Bautzen to Kamenz. Three hours later, Langeron’s soldiers started their
twelve-mile march to the St. Marienstern Convent at Panschwitz-Kuckau
while St.-Priest’s main body covered the army’s rear from Bischofswerda.
Kaptsevich moved into St.-Priest’s former position at Putzkau and estab-
lished communication with Bubna. For his part, the Austrian general con-
tinued to observe the region of Neustadt in Sachsen, guarding the road
through Rumburg and maintaining communication between the Silesian
and Bohemian Armies. Patrols extended west to the Elbe, ever vigilant of
enemy movement from the directions of Meißen and Torgau. East of the
army, 2 Russian companies escorted 100 canvas pontoons from Görlitz to Bad
Liebenwerda. To both deceive the imperials and guard communication along
the great east–west highway to Silesia, the two divisions of Shcherbatov’s VI
Infantry Corps remained at Bautzen. Reinforced to more than 9,500 men by

the addition of cavalry commanded by Panchulidzev I, Shcherbatov received
orders to follow the French to the Elbe if they continued to retreat.5 If they
advanced, Blücher instructed him to do all that he could in unison with
Bubna’s 10,000 Austrians to block the enemy’s path to Silesia. In the worst-
case scenario, he could retreat through the province to the entrenched camp at
Landeshut but Blücher would not turn back. South of the Silesian Army,
Bennigsen reached Zittau with 198 guns and almost 60,000 men, reportedly in
“excellent condition.” Three days later, he informed Blücher of his arrival at
Außig and the Bohemian Army’s impending departure for Chemnitz.
Bennigsen noted that he would begin his advance on 1 October to distract
the imperials and thus support Blücher’s crossing of the Elbe.6
At 7:00 on the morning of the 26th, Gneisenau penned another epistle for
Knesebeck that was meant for the king’s eyes. “Today,” he wrote, “our army
has started its march to the right; headquarters will remain here today but in
a few marches we will reach the Elbe. Regarding the execution of the plan
that I communicated to you yesterday, I have consulted with Müffling and
Rühle. The result is the following. As soon as we cross the Elbe, we must
expect a battle. Of course we can again play the same role that we did on this
side of the river but ultimately it will come down to a decisive day . . .
The task is now to deliver it because we can accept battle with the highest
probability of victory.” Recognizing the danger of fighting with a river
behind them, Gneisenau formulated the ingenious idea of building an
entrenched camp on the right bank of the Elbe complete with bridges to
the opposite bank. However, the army would actually cross from the right to
the left bank at a different point along the river. In so doing, he hoped to
confuse the French in case the Silesian Army should suffer a defeat in the
field. The French would naturally believe that the Silesian Army’s line of
operation would extend across the bridges that it had utilized to cross the
Elbe. Yet, in the case of a defeat, Gneisenau planned to abandon this line of
operation and instead withdraw to the entrenched camp. He selected the
confluence of the Black Elster and the Elbe, thirty miles downstream of
Torgau and ten miles upstream of Wittenberg, where “the latter river in its
course to the north makes a sharp bend to the west, as the site for this camp.
We will use this angle for an entrenched camp and build our bridges there,
not to cross the Elbe there, but to have the complete freedom to quickly
return to this bank should it become necessary for us. While we build this
entrenched camp, we will move further upstream along the Elbe and seek to
quickly cross.” Gneisenau identified Mühlberg, fifteen miles upstream of
Torgau and thirty-seven miles upstream of the confluence of the Black Elster
and the Elbe, as the location for the army to cross the river.
Gneisenau also explained to Knesebeck how the Silesian Army would
resume its role on the left bank of the Elbe in accordance with the
The Middle Elbe 455
Reichenbach Plan: “we will place ourselves in the vicinity of the enemy and
withdraw before him if he moves against us with his forces united. If we can,
we will engage his detachments because we are of the opinion that these
engagements must be deadly for him. With all our means, we will conduct
our operations so that we become a heavy burden for him and to entice him
to move against us with all his forces. If he does this, we will withdraw as
slowly as possible to our entrenched camp. If he attacks us in it, we can only
hope the camp is built well enough to guarantee us victory. We hope to build
it so that 50,000 men will suffice for its defense and the remaining troops can
be used as a reserve.”
Demonstrating his knowledge of modern war, Gneisenau offered a
lesson for Knesebeck, whose views tended to reflect Frederician warfare.
“Not the immediate coverage of a province,” he lectured, “but the destruc-
tion of enemy forces must be the goal that a general must strive to achieve.
During the next few days, we will try to convince the enemy that we want to
concentrate toward Dresden so we can win a few days to build the
entrenched camp; then, we will quickly turn to the crossing point.” Some-
what prophetically, he concluded: “I hardly believe that another [plan] can
be found that promises the Bohemian Army so many advantages and such
wide room to maneuver while giving our army the possibility to torment the
enemy, first through back-and-forth marches, and then by delivering a
decisive battle with a high probability of success. Also, it is very necessary
to bring into play the forces that are in the hands of the crown prince of
Sweden.”7
From this letter, we see that Gneisenau recommended crossing the Elbe
between Dresden and Torgau, presumably at Mühlberg. He based this
suggestion on the assumption that the Grande Armée would exchange
Dresden for Leipzig. If Napoleon’s main army moved to Leipzig, Mühlberg
offered Blücher the most expedient means of maintaining communication
with Schwarzenberg. As yet, no sign indicated that Napoleon had evacuated
Dresden. Should the emperor hold Dresden and presumably defend the
Elbe, the Silesian Army would then cross the river closer to the entrenched
camp and unite with Bernadotte. Consequently, Gneisenau dispatched
Rühle and Captain Johann Christoph Lölhöffel von Löwensprung to find
a suitable crossing point downstream of Mühlberg. The staff chief carefully
explained his thought process to the major. He believed Murat’s “army” had
crossed to the left bank to take a position at Lommatzsch, twenty-five miles
northwest of Dresden. He speculated that Murat would guard the Elbe
along the 32-mile stretch between Lommatzsch and Torgau while the
Grande Armée held the 40 miles of river line that extended from Lom-
matzsch to Königstein. “The Silesian Army,” stated Gneisenau in his
instructions to Rühle, “will fail in its purpose if it seeks a crossing between
these points.”
Should Murat hold his position, Gneisenau understood that a crossing

between Torgau and Wittenberg would not only be easier, but would also
allow the army greater flexibility to react to adverse situations or escape to
the right bank in the event of unforeseen enemy movements. As a result of these
considerations, Rühle received the task of reconnoitering the right bank of the
Elbe from Torgau toward Wittenberg “to locate a point where we can cross the
Elbe with our pontoons and without counting on the help of rafts or boats.
Moreover, it is of the greatest importance to select an opposite point that offers
the advantage of a bridgehead so that an army of 50,000 men, with both wings
leaning on the [left bank of the] Elbe, can advantageously accept a battle against
a force three times its strength. The curves of the Elbe near Elster appear to best
combine these advantages.”8 A sortie up the right bank of the Elbe from
French-occupied Torgau could force the Silesian Army to abandon the bridge-
head and entrenched camp on the left bank. Thus, Gneisenau called for the
construction of a second entrenched camp, this one on the right bank of the Elbe,
that would allow 20,000 men to “fight with advantage against a superior force.
The confluence of the Black Elster with the Elbe appears favorable for the
construction of such an entrenched camp.” Lastly, he stipulated that all entrench-
ments had to be battle-ready within five or six days of the start of construction.
As soon as Rühle completed the reconnaissance, he would seek Tauent-
zien and Bülow. Concerned that the Army of Berlin might be close enough
to the Elbe to attack the Silesian Army, Gneisenau instructed Rühle to
request their assistance. At the least, Gneisenau wanted them “to remain
close enough until the Silesian Army reaches the point where it can protect
the works.” Verbally, he tasked Rühle with pointedly asking Tauentzien and
Bülow if they would follow the Silesian Army across the Elbe without the
crown prince’s approval.9
To dupe the imperials, Army Headquarters lingered at Bautzen for as
long as possible on the 26th. Throughout the day, Blücher received reports
confirming Macdonald’s retreat to the Elbe. After evacuating Radeberg,
imperial forces held only the river’s crossings. Numerous rumors also
reached the Prussians. From Dresden, Napoleon had purportedly trans-
ferred many units along the right bank of the Elbe to Meißen, reinforcing
his troops with 4,000 impressed Austrian prisoners and his Guard with 6,000
Poles. At Dresden, where 30,000 imperial soldiers filled the hospitals, the
French had supposedly burned 3,500 bushels of hay. Rumors also spread
that 30,000 Bavarians had defected, giving more reason for the Prussians to
envision winter quarters on the Rhine. For the 27th, Blücher ordered
Sacken’s main body to march fifteen miles west from Schwosdorf to Schön-
feld, pushing its vanguard an additional eight miles toward Großenhain.
Uncertain of the status of the latter, Blücher wanted Großenhain observed
if the imperials held the town in strength. In the opposite case, he authorized
the Russians to inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible.10
The Middle Elbe 457
Around 2:00 a.m. on 27 September, the imperials withdrew from

Großenhain leaving behind a rearguard, which Sacken’s vanguard attacked
seven hours later. Pursuing south toward Meißen, Vasilchikov’s cavalry
overtook Lhéritier’s cavalry division at Medessen, plucking 200 prisoners
and inflicting 200 casualties. Continuing south, the Russians halted at Wan-
tewitz, the midpoint between Großenhain and Meißen. With imperial forces
so close, Sacken led his main body back to Großenhain. Yorck’s corps
pressed nineteen miles west through Königsbrück to Radeburg while Lan-
geron’s corps halted at Königsbrück, St.-Priest moved from Bischofswerda
to Schwosdorf, and Kaptsevich pulled into Kamenz. That same day, Shcher-
batov occupied Schmiedefeld and Bubna moved into Stolpen: both less than
twenty miles west of Dresden. Although their right wing extended through
Dresden and their left through Meißen, the French gave every indication
that they intended to evacuate the right bank of the Elbe. Locals stated that
the imperials had driven all the livestock they could find on the right bank to
Meißen. On the left bank, long columns could be seen marching from
Dresden to Meißen. Unless the circumstances changed, Blücher planned to
march through Bad Liebenwerda to Herzberg, with headquarters reaching
Elsterwerda on the 28th (see Map 4).11
After crossing the Elbe, Blücher expected to encounter Ney’s Army of
Berlin before the Silesian Army could reach Leipzig. Following his defeat at
Dennewitz, Ney maneuvered the wreck of his army between the Elbe and
the Mulde. He then spent the next five days (17–21 September) reorganizing
the Army of Berlin based on Napoleon’s instructions. Mainly, he dissolved
XII Corps, transferring its remaining manpower to IV and VII Corps.12
Oudinot went to Dresden, where he assumed command of I Young Guard
Corps, consisting of the 1st and 3rd Divisions of Young Guard. Like
Macdonald in the wake of his defeat on the Katzbach, Ney requested
Napoleon’s personal intervention to prevent the multinational Army of
Berlin from disintegrating. Friction between the French and their Italian,
Saxon, Württemberger, Westphalian, and Bavarian allies mounted. On the
night of 22/23 September, an entire Saxon battalion of 300 men defected to
the Army of North Germany. Reynier also reported that 1,019 cavalry
troopers deserted. Ney lamented that “this example of mass desertion
requires a prompt remedy.” Unable to answer Ney’s pleas, the emperor left
the marshal on his own. As a result, Ney continued to maneuver the 35,000
men and 96 guns of his army between the Elbe and the Mulde.13
Although Bernadotte did not exploit the victory at Dennewitz according
to the demands of his Prussian subordinates, he did not remain idle. On 16
September, the Swedes crossed the Elbe at Roßlau and started building a
bridgehead on the left bank. They entered Dessau on the 18th, where their
engineers threw a bridge across the Mulde on the 20th. Construction of a
second bridge over the Elbe began twelve miles downstream of Roßlau at
Aken on the 21st. Thirty-two miles upriver from Roßlau, Bülow besieged
Wittenberg from the right bank with the main body of III Corps while his
3rd and 5th Brigades camped fifteen miles to the east at Seyda to cover the
construction of a bridge at Elster. After his engineers completed the bridge
on the 21st, the Prussians occupied the bridgehead near the village of
Wartenburg on the left bank across from Elster (see Map 5).14
On 21 September, Ney learned that Bülow’s corps had completed a
bridge near Wartenburg. The marshal doubted the accuracy of the report
and demanded more information. For the 23rd, he instructed General
Charles-Antoine Morand’s 12th Division of IV Corps to drive the Prussian
detachment back across the Elbe and destroy the bridge while the rest of the
army marched toward Dessau to contend with the crown prince of Sweden.
On the morning of the 23rd, the three battalions and Westphalian light
cavalry that formed Morand’s vanguard easily drove the Prussian post from
Wartenburg. Yet Morand’s attack did not catch the Prussians by surprise. On
the previous day, 22 October, Bernadotte had informed Bülow that,
according to intercepted dispatches addressed to Ney and Reynier, the
imperials would attempt to destroy the bridge at Elster. Thus forewarned,
the Prussian commander, Major Hellwig, made a stand in the thick woods
between Wartenburg and the left bank. Prisoners informed Morand that the
pioneers had finished the bridge and that Bülow’s corps had started crossing
the Elbe. This misinformation caused Morand to reconsider his mission.
With Bülow’s entire corps supposedly defiling across the river, he did not
want to risk becoming entangled in the overgrown terrain east of Warten-
burg. Rather than drive Hellwig across the river, Morand decided to await
support. At dusk, he broke off the firefight with the Prussians and withdrew
less than one thousand paces west of Wartenburg, which Hellwig
immediately reoccupied.15
Sometime during the night of 22/23 October, Ney received the emperor’s
orders dated 4:00 a.m. on 22 September to concentrate his forces at Witten-
berg and not for any reason allow himself to be cut off from Torgau. These
directives, along with the enemy’s activity at Wartenburg, convinced Ney to
renounce his plan to march on Dessau. Instead, he decided to take a position
that allowed him to cover both Wittenberg and Torgau as well as to monitor
Allied movements, especially through Dessau. To support Morand, he
directed Bertrand’s 38th Division, all Württembergers commanded by Gen-
eral Friedrich von Franquemont, to Bad Schmiedeberg. Yet the news Ney
received of Morand’s situation caused him also to send Bertrand’s 15th
Division – Italians commanded by General Appiani Fontanelli – to Pretzsch,
less than ten miles south of Wartenburg.16
On the Allied side of the Elbe, Bülow learned from Hellwig on 23 Sep-
tember of the march of French forces toward Wittenberg and assumed Ney
would attempt to advance through the fortress and raise the siege.
The Middle Elbe 459
Consequently, he summoned his 3rd Brigade from Elster to Wittenberg and

ordered General Borstell’s 5th Brigade to backtrack from Jeßen to Elster.
These movements took place on the 24th, with Borstell arriving just as
Hellwig withdrew from Wartenburg after skirmishing with Morand’s
troops for several hours. Nevertheless, Prussian resistance convinced Ber-
trand, who had arrived in the evening, that he faced the vanguard of an
enemy corps of between 15,000 and 20,000 men who probably planned to
cross the Elbe the following day. His report persuaded Ney to concentrate
IV Corps at Wartenburg to prevent Bülow from crossing.
On the 25th, Ney himself went to Wartenburg to greet Bülow’s Prussians
when they crossed the river. He waited but the Prussians never showed. “It
appears that the bridge was built too hastily,” he explained to Marmont at
noon, “and that the enemy will not dare move his cannon across until it is
reinforced, which will take several days.” By 4:00 p.m., no attack had come
but the situation still did not please the marshal. “My position is extremely
hazardous,” he complained to Berthier, “because if the enemy debouches
from Dessau on Kemberg and at the same time through Elster, I would have
no choice other than to quickly retire to avoid being cut off from Torgau,
which, if this happens, would require me to fall back under the protection of
Wittenberg’s guns.” Interestingly, Ney took responsibility for the presence
of the bridge at Elster: “The bridge that the enemy has vis-à-vis Elster, as
poor as it is, is still very disturbing, and it is even more unfortunate that we
did not oppose its establishment but I never obliged Reynier to approach it.”
As for the emperor, he could not understand why the Elster bridge caused
his subordinates such fits: “His Majesty has charged me with telling you that
he cannot fathom why Bertrand does not launch rafts to destroy the enemy’s
bridge. Launching them in the middle of the night is likely to succeed.” This
would not be the first mistake that either Ney or Bertrand would make at
Wartenburg.17
With only General Jean-Marie Defrance’s 4th Heavy Division of III
Cavalry Corps and General Jan Henryk Da˛browski’s all-Polish 27th
Division (four battalions, eight squadrons, and eight guns) facing the Swedes
and Russians of his right wing, Bernadotte could easily have driven across
the Elbe. Instead, reports of Ney’s march toward Wittenberg had the same
effect on Napoleon’s former marshal as it did on Bülow. Thinking that this
movement heralded an attempt by Ney to break out of Wittenberg, Berna-
dotte issued inexplicable orders to Bülow on the 24th. Referring to the
bridge at Elster “as an object of secondary importance,” the prince royal
instructed him to recall his troops from the left to the right bank of the Elbe,
dismantle the bridge, and unite his corps at Wittenberg to support the
Swedes. Extremely bitter, Bülow forwarded the instructions to Borstell,
who received the dispatch early on the 25th. With the imperials holding
Wartenburg, he prudently delayed its execution until dark. During the night
of 25/26 September, he sailed as many of the boats as he could up the Black

Elster and sank the remainder. On the morning of the 26th, his 5th Brigade
departed for Wittenberg, leaving five companies, one squadron, and four
guns at Elster to observe the French on the opposite bank.18
After the Prussians failed to appear at Wartenburg, Ney quickly turned
his attention to Dessau. On the 26th, he led VII Corps west to Oranienbaum
while IV Corps temporarily remained at Wartenburg. All three of Reynier’s
divisions encountered Cossacks and small detachments from Bernadotte’s
army during the course of the day but all withdrew. This convinced Ney that
he had nothing to fear of an Allied crossing of the Elbe in strength. He
reported to Berthier that, aside from 6,000 men who held Dessau, the crown
prince of Sweden’s entire army remained north of the Elbe in camps around
Roßlau; Bernadotte’s headquarters stood at Zerbst, some ten miles north-
west of Roßlau. After learning that the Prussians had dismantled the bridge
at Elster, Ney drew down his forces at Wartenburg so IV Corps could better
support VII Corps at Dessau. Eventually, only a weak post of thirty troopers
remained at Wartenburg to observe the Elbe.
On the 27th, IV Corps extended from Kemberg to Schleesen while
Reynier conducted further reconnaissance toward Dessau, which prompted
the Swedes and Cossacks to abandon the right bank of the Mulde. In fact, 1st
Brigade of 1st Division of Bernadotte’s Swedish corps fled across the Elbe,
leaving only Cossacks to hold the portion of the town situated on the
Mulde’s left bank; two companies of French voltigeurs occupied the part
of Dessau on the right bank. Pleasantly surprised by the withdrawal of the
enemy’s regular forces, Ney planned to take the rest of Dessau on the 28th,
drive any remaining Allied troops across the Elbe, and destroy the bridge at
Roßlau.19
Although Bernadotte had ordered the commander of the Swedish 1st
Brigade, Conrad Theodor von Schulzenheim, to avoid a serious engagement,
the general’s retreat across the Elbe and the evacuation of Dessau did not
please the prince royal, particularly because he had given his word to
Blücher that the Army of North Germany would cooperate with the Army
of Silesia within three days of the latter’s crossing the Elbe. Thus, he ordered
Stedingk to send a detachment to reoccupy Dessau on the morning of the
28th. To distract Ney, relieve the pressure on his own right wing, and
prepare for Blücher’s crossing, Bernadotte ordered Bülow to send a few
battalions and some artillery to rebuild the Elster–Wartenburg bridge on the
army’s left. On the 28th, the Swedes failed to retake Dessau but managed to
prevent the imperials from reaching Roßlau. The following day, Ney
launched an attack on Roßlau from the east with VII Corps supported by
IV Corps. Although avoiding a frontal assault on the Swedish position, the
imperials could do little against the entrenched bridgehead. Outnumbered
five to one, the Swedes admirably maintained their positions under the
The Middle Elbe 461
protection of batteries posted on the right bank of the Elbe. Failure con-
vinced Ney that the entrenchments could not be taken by storm.20
Early on the morning of the 28th, Ney received extensive instructions
from Imperial Headquarters. The contents assured Ney that Bernadotte
would not dare move on Leipzig and expose his flank. Napoleon thought
it even less likely that Bernadotte would make such a move until Schwarzen-
berg launched an offensive through Chemnitz. Should the Army of North
Germany launch an offensive on Leipzig, the emperor instructed Ney to
destroy Bernadotte’s bridges over the Elbe and sever his line of retreat
to Berlin. If Bernadotte remained in his position, Ney should cross the
Elbe at Wittenberg, raise Bülow’s siege, and from the right bank threaten
Bernadotte’s bridges, “which will oblige him to quickly recross” the Elbe.
For this operation, the emperor grossly overestimated Ney’s force to number
80,000 men.21
Based on these instructions and after failing to drive the Swedes from
Roßlau, Ney decided to dig parallels and formally besiege the bridgehead.
With the arrival of Marmont’s VI Corps at Leipzig and Latour-Maubourg’s
I Cavalry Corps at Wurzen, Ney planned to guard the debouches of the
Mulde and contain the Allies at Roßlau while he moved on Wittenberg. On
the 30th, however, he learned of renewed enemy activity at Elster. In fact,
Bülow’s Prussians had rebuilt their bridge during the night of 29/30 Septem-
ber but only 200 Jäger had thus far crossed. Bertrand responded by instruct-
ing Franquemont to send one brigade to reconnoiter and drive off any
Prussians it found on the left bank.22
In addition to having to contend with Bernadotte and Bülow, Ney
somehow had to lift the siege of Wittenberg in accordance with
Napoleon’s orders. To fulfill this task, he demanded more manpower, and
so the emperor instructed him to utilize Marmont’s VI Corps.23 However, as
in previous campaigns, the inability of the marshals to work together
hampered operations. By sending mixed messages, Napoleon bears much
of the blame in this case. On the 30th, he placed VI Corps and I Cavalry
Corps in an army group commanded by Marmont to counter a supposed
Allied operation from Bohemia to Altenburg. “Did the enemy send 25,000
infantry to Altenburg?” the emperor asked Marmont. “If this is the case, this
corps must be cut off and destroyed. If they sent cavalry as well, this corps
must still be harassed and forced to withdraw. The prince de la Moskova
[Ney], with IV and VII Corps, III Cavalry Corps, and Da˛browski’s division,
has 40,000 men. The VI, VIII, and V Corps, I and IV Cavalry Corps, and
Margaron’s division will give you nearly 60,000 men.” Consequently, Napo-
leon informed Ney that he should utilize Marmont for his operations on the
middle Elbe while at the same time he offered Marmont an independent
command south of Leipzig. Until Marmont determined the situation at
Altenburg, he offered little assistance to Ney.
On 1 October, Ney instructed Marmont to send one division to Bad

Düben, another to Bitterfeld, and the third to Wurzen, where it could cover
communication with Dresden along with I Cavalry Corps. He explained
that this disposition would fulfill Marmont’s dual requirement of covering
Leipzig and supporting Ney’s own operation. Ney sensed that Marmont
would be a difficult subordinate. Before giving Marmont time to respond, he
explained to Berthier that he did not think Marmont would cooperate
because “I do not know if the marshal deems it appropriate to carry out
the provisions that I will take.” Marmont did not reply to Ney. This
prompted a complaint to Imperial Headquarters. Ney described Marmont’s
movement to the Elbe and especially Wittenberg as “essential so that I am
free to operate there with all troops of IV and VII Corps to prevent the army
of the crown prince of Sweden from debouching between the Saale and the
Mulde.”24
On 2 October, Marmont reported to the emperor that he could not
comply with Ney’s demands because he had received reports that an Allied
corps of 20,000 men had indeed reached Altenburg. As soon as he received
confirmation, Marmont planned to march there. In this case, he could only
send one of his divisions to relieve Ney’s troops at Delitzsch. He further
noted that, “if I do not march on Altenburg and the enemy does not cross
the Elbe, I will await further events by occupying Leipzig and its environs,
Delitzsch, and Wurzen.” From Ney came another complaint on the 2nd: “It
is essential to combine a movement with the troops of the duc de Raguse
[Marmont] and Da˛browski to force the enemy to evacuate the region
between the Saale and the Mulde, and to force him to cross to the right
bank of the Elbe; this would have the great advantage of severing the
enemy’s communication with the Austrians and restoring our own with
Magdeburg.” Due to this impasse between Ney and Marmont, the former
paid little heed to lifting the siege of Wittenberg. Moreover, Blücher’s army
would burst on the scene in the midst of this turmoil and change not merely
Ney’s situation, but that of the entire war.25
As for Blücher, he passed the night of 27/28 September at Königsbrück.
There, he received a letter from Tauentzien conveying both positive and
negative news. Writing after his meeting with Rühle at Elsterwerda,
Tauentzien confirmed his countrymen’s suspicions of Bernadotte: “The
great commander operates on the right wing in such a manner that it must
be God’s will that the situation is still favorable.” Tauentzien planned to
maintain his position at Bad Liebenwerda, thirty miles northwest of Königs-
brück, until he could operate “in unison” with Blücher. While Tauentzien
again presented the prospect of IV Corps cooperating with the Silesian
Army, news that Bernadotte had forced Borstell to disassemble the pontoon
bridge at Elster frustrated the entire undertaking. “Borstell received orders
to dismantle the pontoon bridge that was built with so much difficulty at
The Middle Elbe 463
Elster,” complained Tauentzien, “because a few enemy battalions have

attempted to oppose the building of the bridgehead. As a result of the
dismantling of the bridge at Elster, all offensive operations are now frus-
trated and the time used for building the bridge has been wasted.”26
Blücher immediately wrote to Bernadotte. Uncertain of how to motivate
the native Frenchman, the Prussians wanted to make him aware of the
current opportunity and alleviate the fears that had prompted him to dis-
mantle the bridge at Elster. At the same time, they could not resist
employing a scare tactic. Thus, we see an interesting letter that seeks to both
frighten and encourage the crown prince. In describing his operations,
Blücher explained that he had learned from the local inhabitants that a
courier from Dresden had reached Napoleon at Bischofswerda on the
25th. After reading the dispatches, the emperor immediately departed for
Dresden – leaving behind a feast for forty – and ordered the troops to retreat.
“There is no longer any doubt that he will quit the entire right bank of the
Elbe today,” Blücher assured Bernadotte, “but according to the news that
I have received so far, it appears that the enemy army, perhaps seeing its
communications threatened by the left of the Grand Army, has decided to
descend the Elbe along its left bank and to move onto the plains of Leipzig
to fight a decisive battle or proceed to Wittenberg to raise the siege and
repulse you. Although this latter assumption appears less likely to me, I will
skirt the right bank of the Elbe to be within range for all cases.”27
Despite the setback at Elster, Tauentzien affirmed that the old bridge-
head at Mühlberg could be utilized. However, the threat posed by the
French pontoon bridge at Meißen, twenty-seven miles upstream of Mühl-
berg, first needed to be eliminated. Thus, for 28 September, Blücher ordered
Sacken’s vanguard “to drive the enemy across the Elbe and destroy the
pontoon bridge at Meißen if the enemy has not already done so.” General
Jean-Pierre Doumerc’s 3rd Heavy Cavalry Division of I Cavalry Corps held
Meißen and its vicinity while one infantry brigade, one small cavalry detach-
ment, and a few guns from VI Corps served as an advance post three miles to
the northeast at Ockrilla. Vasilchikov attacked these troops early on the
28th, driving them to Meißen. The sole brigade of Sacken’s 16th Division as
well as the 8th and 39th Jäger Regiments assaulted the bridge.28 Believing the
Allies intended to cross the Elbe at Meißen, the French dismantled their
pontoons and evacuated the town (see Map 4).29
Elsewhere on the 28th, Blücher met with Tauentzien at Elsterwerda,
fifteen miles east of Mühlberg, to discuss the Elbe crossing and the ensuing
operation, which the former decided would be a march on Leipzig. As the
two commanders talked, Tauentzien’s vanguard occupied Mühlberg while
his main body remained at Bad Liebenwerda. Yorck led I Corps north from
Radeburg to Elsterwerda, eight miles southeast of Bad Liebenwerda.
Langeron’s corps, including St.-Priest and Kaptsevich, moved to Ortrand,
itself fourteen miles southeast of Elsterwerda; the rearguard reached Königs-

brück. On the following day, Tauentzien personally inspected Mühlberg. He
found that, despite the presence of French forces on the left bank, a bridge
could be built due to the fair condition of the old bridgehead. Yet, unless
Blücher acted quickly, the imperials would doubtlessly present greater
obstacles.30
Tauentzien ultimately dropped a bombshell on his countrymen at Blü-
cher’s headquarters. Despite all his recent assurances, he revealed his plans to
force-march IV Corps thirty miles northwest to Jeßen in compliance with
Bernadotte’s most recent order to move closer to the Army of North
Germany for a general operation. As a result, he withdrew his van from
Mühlberg. Blücher and Gneisenau tried to remain optimistic, hoping that
this general operation would be Bernadotte’s crossing of the Elbe. Thus, the
Silesian Army continued its preparations to cross the Elbe at Mühlberg; the
East Prussian Fusilier Battalion from Yorck’s corps scrambled to take pos-
session of the town.31
During the course of 29 September, the majority of the Silesian Army
moved into positions to make a lunge for Mühlberg as soon as the Russians
had completed the pontoon bridge. Yorck retraced his steps, marching a few
miles south to Gröden, eighteen miles east of Mühlberg. Langeron moved
into Yorck’s former position at Elsterwerda while Sacken’s main body
remained at Großenhain (see Map 4). From Meißen, Sacken’s vanguard
commander, Vasilchikov, reported large enemy troop movements from there
toward Torgau and Leipzig. On the 30th, one brigade from Souham’s III
Corps arrived and sharply attacked Vasilchikov, but Blücher allowed the
army to rest in anticipation of the crossing at Mühlberg. At 6:00 p.m.,
Sacken forwarded several reports to Blücher, including one from a captured
imperial commissar who had traveled down the right bank of the Elbe to
Meißen. He stated that Dresden’s garrison of 40,000 men could evacuate the
city as early as that very day. Napoleon planned to move the army through
Freiberg to Leipzig. Moreover, the prisoner attested to the demoralized state
of the entire army, which viewed the war as a waste. 32
News that the Russian bridge train could not reach Bad Liebenwerda
until 1 October disrupted the timing of Blücher’s operation. This setback,
along with news from the tsar, Knesebeck, Bernadotte, and Rühle, forced
Gneisenau to change plans. From Allied Headquarters, Tsar Alexander
informed Bernadotte in a letter of 24 September that, rather than the Silesian
Army, Bennigsen’s Army of Poland would march to Bohemia. He urged the
crown prince to cooperate with Blücher. On the next day, 25 September,
Alexander wrote to Blücher, who received the letter on the 29th. According
to the Russian monarch, Schwarzenberg would attempt another foray into
Saxony but this time would make for Leipzig rather than Dresden.
Alexander believed that Napoleon would either launch an offensive against
The Middle Elbe 465
the Bohemian Army at Freiberg or invade Bohemia to attack Bennigsen. In

the latter case, Bennigsen would fall back to the Eger and unite with Bubna,
coming from Leitmeritz. Blücher could assist by crossing the Elbe at Pirna
or further downstream and fall on the rear of the Grande Armée. Even
better, if the crown prince crossed the Elbe, Blücher could unite with him
at Wurzen and advance on Leipzig. Above all, Alexander wanted Blücher to
cross the Elbe as soon as Napoleon either advanced south toward Bohemia
or moved west in the direction of Leipzig. If the Army of North Germany
remained on the right bank of the Elbe, Alexander instructed Blücher to turn
toward Dresden and fall on Napoleon’s rear. Hinting at the dangers of
crossing the Elbe, the tsar urged Blücher to wait until the Army of Poland
had reached Pirna and then cross the Elbe there under its protection. “If you
continue,” he concluded, “as you have done so well up to now, not losing
sight of the enemy for one moment and you combine your operations with
those of the Bohemian Army, Napoleon will never have time to throw all his
forces at any point.”33
At this moment, when Allied Headquarters had again resolved to enter
Napoleon’s lair, the monarchs again looked to Blücher as the possible savior
who could prevent another mauling of the Bohemian Army. Although their
appreciation for Blücher had increased, they still underestimated him and
Gneisenau. They had no idea that Blücher had already decided to take
matters into his own hands and had no intention of waiting on the oper-
ations of Schwarzenberg or Bernadotte or even Napoleon to determine his
next move.
On the night of the 28th, Gneisenau received a long letter from Knese-
beck dated the 26th. “I have not written anything official for two days,”
explained the king’s advisor, “because nothing has changed here. Our move-
ment will probably not begin before the 29th. We still have not completely
decided how and where we will advance, whether through Marienberg, or
through Zwickau, or through Eger. In all cases, we need six to seven marches
before we reach a point where we can seriously engage the enemy. There-
fore, the enemy’s main force probably will not distance itself from the Elbe
before 4 or 5 October if it turns toward Chemnitz; and not before the 2nd or
3rd if it turns against Bennigsen.” He cautioned Gneisenau that, if Blücher
attempted to cross the Elbe any earlier, “the Silesian Army would expose
itself to serious danger.” He advised that Blücher be certain Napoleon was
marching against the Bohemian Army before he led the Silesian Army across
the Elbe.
At noon on 26 September, Knesebeck was in the midst of drafting this
letter when he received Gneisenau’s missive from the 25th that revealed
Blücher’s plans to hijack Bülow and Tauentzien for a crossing of the Elbe.
According to Knesebeck, the king walked into the room before he could
finish reading the long communiqué. “I could not prevent His Majesty from
reading the whole letter, especially because I was in the king’s room. The
king had already agreed to the idea of the entire Silesian Army marching to
the right and uniting with the crown prince, its place being taken by
Bennigsen’s army. You know from my earlier memo the reasons opposed
to this idea that reigned here. Then we reached the part of the letter where
you mention that, to avoid losing time, you wrote to Bülow and Tauentzien
over this. I cannot conceal from you that this aroused the king’s displeasure,
because the crown prince is guaranteed Bülow’s corps by treaty.” Knesebeck
warned Gneisenau to prepare himself “to receive a letter over this, for even if
the king completely believes that the crown prince perhaps could have
pursued his victory [at Dennewitz] with more intensity he nevertheless
believes that the entire business has been conducted by him with much
prudence. It is undeniable that his position, where he is threatened from
the rear by Davout and has to fear Magdeburg in his right flank, Wittenberg
in front, and a movement from Torgau in the left flank, is very difficult and
requires great caution.”34
Gneisenau responded on the 29th: “Because I now know His Majesty’s
displeasure, I will take no further steps to induce Bülow to unite with us but
instead will strive to bring this about only by convincing the crown prince to
operate in unison with us. This was my original intent, and only then, if our
efforts failed, would we have induced Bülow to jointly operate with us.”
Referring to the letter from Alexander that Blücher had just received,
Gneisenau expressed his relief “that the tsar has based the operations of
the Bohemian Army on the principle that the crown prince of Sweden will
cross the Elbe. Therefore, we can assume an agreement over this has been
made with the crown prince. We are ready to simultaneously cross the river
with him; therefore, I can assume he will pose few obstacles to doing this.”
Despite this apparent good news, Blücher and Gneisenau wanted the
events at Elster made known at Allied Headquarters. “When some enemy
battalions appeared there,” continued Gneisenau in his letter to Knesebeck,
“the crown prince gave the order to quickly dismantle the bridge and for the
troops to recross. We still do not know how this was carried out and if there
were losses.” Regarding Bernadotte himself, the staff chief assured Knese-
beck that, “if you were as close to the complaints about the crown prince of
Sweden as we are, your judgment of him would be more severe. Prussians
and Russians talk about it. Everything good that has occurred in his army has
been done against his will. Thus, based on my knowledge of this individual,
can I judge him any differently than I have? It is my constant concern that he
will cause mischief.” In a postscript, Gneisenau added that Tauentzien had
received a very firm order from the crown prince directing IV Corps to
immediately unite with the Army of North Germany and undertake a great
operation. “We can only hope that this operation is a crossing of the Elbe,
which will facilitate our own,” concluded the usually pessimistic staff chief.35
The Middle Elbe 467
As for Rühle, after his meeting with Tauentzien on the 27th, he jour-
neyed to Elster. There, he found that the bends of the Elbe met all of
Gneisenau’s prerequisites for the entrenched camp. The generally flat bank
at Elster favored a strong camp of three redoubts with 100 twelve-pound
guns. He estimated that 3,000 men could build the fortifications in thirty-six
hours. Using the available boats and barges, some forty-eight hours would
be required to span the 450 yards that separated the two banks of the Elbe; a
bridgehead would take just as long to build according to his calculations. He
found the neighboring villages, woods, dead arms, and ponds all conducive
to Gneisenau’s plan. Should Bülow likewise agree to cooperate with Blücher,
he judged the locale to be so strong that the Silesian Army would not need a
fortified camp on the right bank of the Elbe. From Elster, Rühle traveled to
Bülow’s headquarters near Wittenberg. During their meeting, Bülow stated
his intentions to follow the Silesian Army across the Elbe. Like Tauentzien,
Bülow expressed his commitment to cooperating with Blücher but advised
the major to inform Bernadotte of Blücher’s intentions. Although Bülow’s
disgust about the crown prince’s conduct of the war exceeded Tauentzien’s,
he had more experience dealing with the recalcitrant native Frenchman.
Bülow knew the crown prince would not respond well to a covert attempt
to detach half his army. Thus, he urged his countrymen to discuss the
situation with Bernadotte and arrange a joint crossing of both armies.
Regardless of Bülow’s sage advice, Rühle lacked the authorization to
negotiate with the crown prince. He solved this quandary by volunteering to
deliver Bülow’s report on his meeting with Rühle to Bernadotte’s headquar-
ters at Zerbst. After the crown prince read the contents of the letter, Rühle
requested his thoughts. The Swedish prince royal answered that he would
act in unison with Blücher. Moreover, although the monarchs had guaran-
teed that all Allied corps operating in his vicinity would be placed under his
command, he and Blücher would fight next to each other as equals. He then
asked Rühle how many troops Blücher intended to bring across the Elbe.
According to the major, after answering that the entire Silesian Army would
cross the river, the crown prince immediately resolved to likewise move the
entire Army of North Germany across the Elbe. In addition, Bernadotte
endorsed Elster as a favorable point for Blücher’s crossing. He even prom-
ised to conduct serious demonstrations from Roßlau and Aken to distract
the imperials. Should Napoleon launch an offensive against the Silesian
Army, he pledged to come to Blücher’s aid. Conversely, he expected the
same from Blücher if the emperor directed his blow against the Army of
North Germany. Again displaying his dexterity, Rühle somehow managed
to persuade the prince to state in writing his promise to cross the Elbe in
three to four days. If the Silesian Army crossed the Elbe at Elster, the Army
of North Germany would do so at Aken and Roßlau within three or
four days.
Rühle returned to Silesian Army Headquarters on 30 September with the

crown prince’s written vow to cooperate with Blücher as well as the favor-
able report concerning Elster. This news, combined with Napoleon’s appar-
ent intent to defend the Elbe, convinced Gneisenau to scrap the plans to
cross the river at Mühlberg. Instead, Blücher informed the crown prince that
the Silesian Army would cross the Elbe at Elster on 3 October and engage
Ney’s Army of Berlin at Kemberg on the 4th. Following Ney’s defeat, the
army would be ready to unite with the Army of North Germany at Bad
Düben on the Mulde River. “Our business here has finally gained some good
results,” Gneisenau reported to Knesebeck. “Major Rühle returned from the
headquarters of the crown prince of Sweden with a verbal and written
declaration from him that he would cross the Elbe with us. All persons
attached to his headquarters are stunned by his sudden change of mind.”
Gneisenau confessed that he believed Bernadotte’s petty desire to prevent
Blücher from beating him across the Elbe accounted for this change.36
Meanwhile, Knesebeck shared with Gneisenau the prevailing views at
Allied Headquarters in a long communiqué written late on the afternoon of
the 28th. One point he made clear was that the Allied leaders believed the
Silesian Army should cross the Elbe at Elster rather than Mühlberg. “Here,”
he explained, “we believe that, if Napoleon remains at Dresden, a crossing at
Mühlberg would be dangerous for the Silesian Army.” He also explained
that, strategically, the short distance between Dresden and Mühlberg would
not suffice to force Napoleon to abandon Dresden, whereas a crossing at
Elster would pose more of a threat. Yet, if Blücher’s movement forced
Napoleon to direct the Grande Armée to either the Zwickau–Chemnitz
region or to Bohemia, “then indeed the crossing at Mühlberg is preferable
because it would threaten the enemy’s lifeline. For the same reason, we
believe the position of Elster must be the real point of operation for the
Silesian Army; we are convinced that the Bohemian Army would be in a
better position at Zwickau rather than Chemnitz.” Based on this assump-
tion, Knesebeck explained that Schwarzenberg planned to post his main
body at Zwickau, the vanguard at Chemnitz, the reserve at Komotau, and
the Army of Poland at Teplitz. However, he did not think the main body
could reach Zwickau before 10 October. He informed Gneisenau that
Schwarzenberg planned to conduct short marches in part to be able to return
to Bohemia should Napoleon invade the province and in part to prevent the
axles of his transports and artillery from being completely ruined on the
generally poor roads.
According to Knesebeck, Bernadotte had chastised Allied Headquarters
by pointing out “the evil consequences of the current inactivity of the Allied
armies, which will allow Napoleon to reorganize his forces.” Never short of
cheek, the crown prince insisted that his next step, especially in regard to
taking Wittenberg and the bridgehead of Torgau, would be determined by
The Middle Elbe 469
the activity displayed by the other Allied armies. He offered two options.
First, the Bohemian Army could undertake a great offensive to Franconia.
Second, Schwarzenberg could fix the Grande Armée on the upper Elbe
while the Silesian Army marched downstream, united with the North
German Army, and both assumed the offensive. To comply with Berna-
dotte’s call for action, Knesebeck related that Allied Headquarters had
drafted two plans. The first involved a general operation against Leipzig,
the second an offensive through Kassel, Hamburg, and Holland. “The latter
suggestion will be rejected, as you will easily judge, in favor of working
concentrically.” Knesebeck reminded Gneisenau that the spirit of both the
Reichenbach Plan and the kleinen Krieg remained strong at Allied Head-
quarters. “The main goal,” he explained, “is to always retain the power to
accept or avoid battle according to circumstances. Also, to continuously
conduct the war directly against the enemy’s food and ammunition supply in
order to destroy his forces through these indirect yet certain means.” As for
intelligence, Knesebeck related that the Grande Armée again stood in the
triangle formed by Dresden, Pirna, and Freiberg, with Napoleon at the last
named location. “At Würzburg, Augereau’s army [corps] daily receives
reinforcements and in a few days will contain 100 cannon; some say it is
expected at Bamberg on the 25th. Of Bavaria, there is great hope that it will
soon declare for us.”37
Frederick William ordered Knesebeck to write Gneisenau a second time
on the 28th concerning the plan to hijack the two Prussian corps from
Bernadotte’s army. “Today, the king spoke to me about the point that you
mentioned in your last memo; and said to me that I may inform you in a
friendly manner to bear in mind the situation of the corps belonging to the
crown prince, that disagreement already has started to tear apart this army,
and that this could be so very disadvantageous for the general good. More-
over, the king was very pleased about the view that you provided concerning
operations and was also in agreement that they will force the crown prince
to display some activity. But, all the same, His Majesty suggests that you
maintain and bring about friendly terms and harmony; you will encounter
praiseworthy enthusiasm on one side and possibly great caution on the
other.” According to Knesebeck, the king concluded by stating that his
admonitions should be viewed by Gneisenau as orders but winked his eye.
“I acquit myself of this task,” finished Knesebeck, “and free myself of it
knowing that my last expressed concern over this circumstance is seen as
final. Therefore, I request that you mention this no further.”38
While at Elsterwerda on 1 October, Blücher received a long missive from
Bernadotte, communicating reports of an enemy advance toward Witten-
berg apparently to attack Bülow. He explained that this news – and not plans
for a general crossing of the Elbe – had prompted him to order Tauentzien to
force-march to Jeßen. His letter requested that Blücher cross the Elbe as
quickly as possible at either Elster or Mühlberg. “If your disposition can

conform to my wishes,” concluded the crown prince, “together we would
form a mass of 120,000 men which can quickly move on Leipzig and venture
a battle against the majority of the emperor Napoleon’s forces.” Blücher
responded that he would have 50,000 men at Jeßen by 2 October with
another 20,000 following one march behind; he would cross the Elbe on
the 3rd and fall on the enemy’s flank. The crown prince pledged to push
Wintzingerode’s light cavalry across the Elbe and up the Mulde to Bitterfeld,
Bad Düben, and Delitzsch. To cross the Elbe, he directed the Russians to
Aken, the Swedes and Bülow’s Prussians to Roßlau, and Tauentzien’s corps
to Coswig. He urgently requested a combined operation with the Silesian
Army and expressed his satisfaction about Blücher’s proximity. From
Bülow’s headquarters, Boyen urged Gneisenau to conduct a rapid drive.
Demonstrating the frustration felt by the Prussians in the Army of North
Germany, Boyen concluded: “Only your arrival makes us hope that we
won’t spend the winter inactive on the Elbe.”39
In the meantime, Prussian Jäger from Borstell’s 5th Brigade crossed the
Elbe by boat and drove off the Württemberger cavalry post at Wartenburg;
Prussian engineers started restoring the bridgehead in compliance with
Bernadotte’s orders. As noted, this news prompted Bertrand to dispatch
one brigade of Franquemont’s 38th Division to Wartenburg. Blücher and
his staff attributed the movement of IV Corps to Wartenburg to Bernadotte’s
failure to make suitable demonstrations along his sector of the middle Elbe.
“This not only rendered the crossing of the Silesian Army more dangerous,”
affirmed Müffling, “but also enabled the enemy on the 2nd to move a corps
from the region of Wörlitz, opposite the crown prince, to Wartenburg,
opposite Elster.” Regardless, neither Napoleon nor Ney had any idea that
Blücher’s army had marched down the Elbe. Numerous factors account for
this critical oversight. After the Silesian Army moved north, Shcherbatov
and Bubna had taken positions at Schmiedefeld and Stolpen respectively
(see Map 4). This proved crucial after deserters claimed that the 35th,
36th, and 39th Divisions of XI Corps as well as all of II Cavalry Corps
would remain on the right bank of the Elbe. Thus, while Blücher’s main
body marched north, the movement west by light forces under Katzler,
Vasilchikov, and Rudzevich combined with Shcherbatov and Bubna to create
an impenetrable curtain that concealed the right wheel. In addition, Sacken’s
attack on Doumerc at Meißen along with Tauentzien’s appearance at Mühl-
berg served to distract French attention from the actual point where Blücher
intended to cross the Elbe.40 Langeron explains:
They [the French] initially directed their attention on Wartenburg when the
prince royal of Sweden approached it to build a bridge of boats. However,
after he abandoned this project and moved further downriver toward Aken,
The Middle Elbe 471
Napoleon observed that point and Dessau, never believing that Blücher could
execute such a bold movement as to turn and cross great rivers; he did not
know it nor divine it and, even when we did cross the Elbe, he believed it was
only a weak detachment of our army that was exposed as a diversion to fool
him. After he finally noticed that our corps were no longer near Bautzen, he
still could not convince himself that we had all crossed the Elbe. In the papers
of Marshal Macdonald, we found a letter from Berthier telling him: “The
emperor absolutely wishes to know what has become of Langeron, Sacken,
and Yorck.” We were then at Bad Düben, twenty miles from Leipzig, and
Napoleon had no idea!41
In the meantime, Franquemont’s lead brigade reached Wartenburg that

same evening (30 September) and assaulted the bridgehead on the left bank.
Borstell’s small post retreated across the Elbe but the French only partially
destroyed the works. On 1 October, three Prussian companies recrossed the
Elbe. Supported by artillery on the right bank, they repulsed the Württem-
berger outposts and started restoring the palisades and tambours. As a result,
Franquemont moved the rest of his division to Wartenburg and Bertrand sent
one brigade from Morand’s 12th Division, which arrived on the afternoon of
the 2nd. That evening, Bertrand – one of the best engineers of the Napoleonic
period – arrived with the rest of 12th Division as well as Fontanelli’s 15th
Division. Morand’s troops camped at Wartenburg, Franquemont’s at Bleddin,
and Fontanelli’s at Globig (see Map 5).42
Elsewhere, Langeron’s Russians and Yorck’s Prussians marched
twenty-three and twenty-eight miles respectively to reach Herzberg – itself
twenty-two miles southeast of Elster – on 1 October.43 Blücher and Army
Headquarters likewise proceeded down the Black Elster to Herzberg. To
deceive the imperials, Sacken’s main body moved into Mühlberg. Despite
orders to march north, it appears that Vasilchikov remained at Meißen with
Sacken’s vanguard. His presence there attracted attention: Souham’s entire
III Corps arrived. On 2 October, Langeron’s and Yorck’s corps trooped
another sixteen miles northwest. Crossing the Black Elster, they bivouacked
at Jeßen, less than seven miles southeast of the village of Elster. Sjöholm’s
detachment of three battalions and one battery each of horse and foot joined
Borstell’s battalions at Elster that evening to cover the bridge work. Yorck’s
corps was selected to cross first and, as Blücher’s report to Frederick William
states, “to make the attack so that the enemy, accustomed to fighting
Prussian troops at this point of the Elbe, would not observe that he had to
deal with the Silesian Army.” Army Headquarters likewise moved to Jeßen
while the Russian pontoon train reached Elster. Sacken’s corps legged
twenty miles, pushing north from Mühlberg to Herzberg.44
Reports that the bridge construction at Elster lacked sufficient wagons
prompted Yorck to empty his baggage and forage carts so they could be used
to haul the necessary materiel. Blücher blamed these shortages as well as any
other inconvenience on the machinations of the crown prince. Despite

Bernadotte’s promises, the Prussian sensed that the prince royal wanted
to complicate the crossing of the Silesian Army in any way possible.45
Gneisenau, Müffling, and Rühle went to Elster during the afternoon of the
2nd to accelerate the construction. That night, one horse battery and some
troopers from Bülow’s Reserve Cavalry likewise arrived to support
Sjöholm’s detachment. Surprisingly, the imperials did nothing on the 1st.
Finally, around 6:00 p.m. on the evening of the 2nd, a line of skirmishers
followed by some support advanced toward the bridgehead but its small
garrison as well as the artillery on the right bank of the Elbe quickly forced
the Württembergers to retire. At nightfall, the Russians drove up their
trestles and canvas pontoons. Starting at 9:00 p.m., the Russians went to
work assembling one boat bridge and another consisting of seventy-two
pontoons. Blücher credited the diligence of the Russian engineers, especially
Majors Ivanov and Shishkin, for making possible the crossing on the
following morning.46
Blücher hoped the two bridges would be ready by morning but knew
very little concerning the strength and position of the imperial force at
Wartenburg. Earlier in the day, Bülow had reported the noon departure of
some 6,000 men (Fontanelli’s division) from a position south of Wittenberg
eastward in the direction of Wartenburg. Blücher’s headquarters knew even
less about the terrain on the opposite bank. Thick undergrowth concealed
the details. His only map, the standard Petri map, did not suffice for a
tactical operation. Statements from local peasants failed to provide a clear
picture. Oddly, not one officer from Bülow’s staff, which had spent one
week preparing a crossing at Elster, fighting at Wartenburg during the
process, made a report on the conditions on the left bank. Even stranger,
none was present at Blücher’s headquarters on 3 October.47
While the Elster–Wartenburg position contained all the key require-
ments to make a good crossing point – a considerable meander in the river,
a domineering right bank, a firm river bed, solid banks, a suitable current for
bridging preparations, and an unobstructed approach march on a good road –
the impassable terrain on the left bank completely outweighed these advan-
tages. Had Gneisenau received more details of the conditions on the left
bank, he would not have chosen this point. During his journey to Zerbst,
Rühle postponed a detailed inspection of the terrain on the left bank until his
return trip. Unfortunately for the Prussians, while returning to Blücher’s
headquarters, the presence of imperial forces on the left bank prevented the
major from surveying the ground. As Delbrück dramatizes, “This failure to
reconnoiter would now be paid for with a river of blood.” With hardly any
knowledge of the terrain and the size of the enemy force on the opposite
bank, the Silesian Army prepared to cross the Elbe. “It pleases me greatly,”
wrote Blücher to Knesebeck, “to see from the letter you wrote to Gneisenau
The Middle Elbe 473
N
Hohndorf
El
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Ri
ver
Gallin
Dabrum
Iserbecka
Elster
Elbe River
Melzwig
Sand
hills hohe
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Wartenburg
Mo
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a in
ich
tc
ture
ana
Eichwald
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Ho
Shützberg
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Biedegast m
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Lan
Elbe River
Globig
Schützenberg
Dorna ne Bleddin
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0 1000 2000 3000 metres
22. Engagement at Wartenburg, 3 October 1813
that [the monarchs] agree with our decision to cross at Elster. Even if I did
not think the crossing at Mühlberg was dangerous, I still would have moved
closer to Tauentzien, whom I have already spoken with. Once we are across,
I will bring him forward and His Highness [Bernadotte] will have to
come.”48
Situated on the right bank less than one mile downstream of a sharp
meander in the Elbe, the village of Elster indeed met all of Gneisenau’s
requirements. Just upstream of Elster, the generally northward-flowing Elbe
cut sharply northeast taking in the discharge from the Black Elster River,
then made a 180-degree rotation and continued northwest so that the land
on the left bank resembled a peninsula. This U-shaped curve greatly facili-
tated the movement of forces from the concave bank (northern and right) to
the convex bank (southern and left). Artillery on the concave bank could
easily protect bridge construction, especially because in this region of the
Elbe the right bank dominated the left. Of equal importance, the area
between the concave banks remained large enough for the crossing troops
to deploy.
While the French could not prevent Blücher from crossing the Elbe at
Elster, the terrain on the left bank presented almost insurmountable obs-
tacles. Several dead arms of the Elbe crisscrossed the peninsula, granting
only narrow access to both Bleddin and Wartenburg. Undergrowth and
woods mixed with boggy meadows covered the majority of the peninsula.
The old river bed stretched south to north from the village of Bleddin
twisting and turning to sand dunes, which the lower portion of the bend
in the Elbe washed. On the southernmost of these dunes rose the village and
Schloß of Wartenburg, described by Langeron as a “veritable fortress.”
Heavy rains in August and September had rendered the already marshy
ground around the village impassable as far as Bleddin. A long embankment,
referred to as the Landdamm, formed a semi-circle extending from northeast
of the village south to help protect Wartenburg from unwelcome flood
waters, not to mention unwelcome guests.49
On 3 October, Blücher would have his hands full, not with crossing the
Elbe, but with driving Bertrand from a position that appeared unassailable.
To make matters worse, Bertrand knew well the advantages of his position
after having inspected Wartenburg on 23 September. In his ensuing report to
the emperor, the general expressed his confidence that the soaked and
partially flooded ground would enable IV Corps to prevent the Allies from
making any progress.50 In his after-action report following the engagement
on 3 October, he still noted that “Wartenburg is one of those good positions
where a small army can fight with advantage against a larger army.”51 On
returning to Wartenburg on the 2nd, Bertrand had no warning that soon he
would face the entire Silesian Army. Instead, he believed that a detachment
from the Army of North Germany was making a demonstration at Elster to
mask an operation at Roßlau, Bernadotte’s main point of passage. Inexplic-
ably, the numerous Allied guns on the right bank that repulsed the Würt-
tembergers did not indicate to him that he had to contend with more than a
detachment. Thus, for fortifications, he merely blocked the footpath along
the levee leading to Elster, built gun emplacements behind the Landdamm,
and cleared some trees to create fields of fire for the artillery.
Not only did Bertrand neglect to better fortify his position, his troop
placement made no sense. In total, IV Corps consisted of 14,000 men and 32
guns. For his left wing, Bertrand posted the eleven battalions of Morand’s
12th Division at Wartenburg and along the portion of the Landdamm that
extended north of the village. Franquemont’s 38th Division took a position
two miles south of Wartenburg at Bleddin to form the right wing. Bertrand
The Middle Elbe 475
situated the fourteen battalions of Fontanelli’s 15th Division west of War-

tenburg on the road to Globig. General André Louis Briche’s Württember-
ger light cavalry brigade filled the gap between the two wings. While the
terrain made his left wing virtually unassailable, the more open ground
between Bleddin and the bridgehead offered the enemy the means of out-
flanking Wartenburg. For the defense of this vital stretch of his front,
Bertrand assigned the 4 battalions and 6 guns – 1,500 men in all – of
Franquemont’s weak 38th Division. After reconnoitering the terrain, Fran-
quemont purportedly expressed concern about being overwhelmed before
support could arrive. Recognizing the vulnerability of his right flank, Ber-
trand nevertheless dismissed Franquemont’s unease by claiming that Mor-
and would not allow the enemy to pass Wartenburg in order to attack
Bleddin. Unfortunately for the imperial cause, Bertrand failed to utilize
the considerable defensive advantages offered by the terrain and critically
weakened his position by the unnecessary extension of his line.
Sunday, 3 October, broke with foggy, cold, wet weather. Around 5:00
a.m., Yorck’s corps marched northwest from Jeßen in two columns. At
Elster, Gneisenau met the commander of the first column, Prince Karl,
who arrived well ahead of his 2nd Brigade. The staff chief instructed Karl
to lead Sjöholm’s detachment across the Elbe as soon as the engineers
finished the two bridges. On reaching the left bank, Karl would continue
to Wartenburg. Gneisenau told the prince he should expect to encounter a
small post but nothing significant. As soon as Karl reported that he had
secured the village, the rest of I Corps would follow.
Around 7:00 a.m., the prince led the three battalions and a half-battery
across the bridge. Advancing on the road to Wartenburg, he soon encoun-
tered imperial outposts. After a short firefight, the Württembergers
withdrew into a thick wood east of Wartenburg called das hohe Holz (the
High Wood).52 The small-arms fire immediately alarmed the garrison at
Wartenburg, prompting Bertrand to post his cavalry on the plain between
Wartenburg and Bleddin and to summon Fontanelli’s division from
Globig.53 Although they could not see the village, the Prussians could
clearly hear the commands being shouted: it became obvious that they faced
a far stronger enemy force than initially assumed. Karl quickly found
that his battalions could not march through the swampy terrain and thick
undergrowth. After dividing the battalions into squads to increase mobility,
the prince realized that even these small groups would not get far in such
terrain. He ordered a halt, reported the situation to Yorck, and requested
reinforcements.
By the time Karl’s adjutant reached the right bank, Yorck had arrived.
After a short time, three battalions from the 2nd Brigade crossed the Elbe
and moved up. One assumed the coverage of the right wing and so swung
into the front line, while the other two remained in the second line. After
Karl signaled the advance to resume, the Prussians drove the enemy skir-
mishers from the hohe Holz and took some prisoners. Emerging from the
wood, the Prussians moved into a clearing about 1,500 yards east of Warten-
burg. This opening separated the hohe Holz from a larger thicket, the
Eichwald (Oak Forest), which stretched north–south between the concave
banks of the meander. A brutal crossfire sent them scrambling back to the
cover of the trees. For the moment, Karl could not consider a further
advance. By now the fog had lifted, and from the hohe Holz the Prussians
could finally survey the terrain and gain an overview. Realizing they could
not reach Wartenburg on this road, Karl decided to envelop the village from
the south. He ordered Sjöholm to employ four battalions to somehow fix the
enemy’s front without exposing the men to fire. With the half-battery and
the remaining two battalions as well as the two that had just finished
crossing the bridge, Karl planned to turn left (south) and envelop the right
flank of the enemy position.
Again, the Prussians found the terrain so overgrown that they could not
get through. After futile attempts to find a passage through the marsh, Karl
sent back the artillery to Sjöholm. With locals serving as guides, he led his
troops south along the eastern bank of the Moyenhainicht Canal to the
Landdamm, a narrow pathway through the Eichwald between the beginning
of the canal and the Elbe. Although Württemberger skirmishers were
guarding this tiny “pass,” the Prussians drove them back with ease. Around
9:00 a.m., Karl led his battalions through and out of the Eichwald. South of
the wood, the terrain opened in an area called the Schützberg; the village of
Bleddin could be seen in the distance. Two of Franquemont’s battalions held
the Schützberg clearing, while the remaining two occupied Bleddin. Lacking
cavalry and artillery, Karl did not want to risk crossing this open field.
Instead, he decided to turn north and attempt to move through Wartenburg’s
orchards to reach the village. Despite his guides’ insistence on the futility of
this plan, the prince of Mecklenburg left two battalions to hold the Land-
damm and made for the orchards with the other two.
The difficult ground soon proved the accuracy of the admonitions of
Karl’s guides. Officers sent forward to reconnoiter found the terrain com-
pletely impassable. Even worse, the imperials held unassailable positions
behind large ponds. Karl did not have time to contemplate his next move.
An intense crossfire from enemy guns at Wartenburg and Bleddin took a
toll on his men. He then received a report that the Württembergers had
advanced from Bleddin, repulsing the Prussian skirmishers deployed by the
two battalions holding the Landdamm. With few sensible options available,
the prince ordered his two battalions to turn around and return to the
Landdamm to prevent the loss of this important conduit. On arriving, the
battalions deployed their skirmishers, enabling the Prussians to again repulse
the Württemberger marksmen. Karl scribbled a report to Yorck requesting
The Middle Elbe 477
more reinforcements. In the meantime, he dispatched scouts to find other

suitable points of passage across the Moyenhainicht canal.
For his part, Sjöholm pushed west across the clearing toward Warten-
burg. His skirmishers gradually pushed through the bushy meadows to get
close to Wartenburg. Losses mounted as the Prussians received a high
volume of fire in the front and right flank. Soon, Sjöholm’s advance faltered.
For support, Yorck moved up Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade, which had crossed the
Elbe in the meantime. Steinmetz concealed the majority of his battalions
along the eastern edge of the Eichwald. From there, he had to reinforce the
skirmisher line numerous times to replace the considerable losses sustained
from enemy caseshot and salvo fire. With the imperials protected behind the
high Landdamm, the Prussian foot could do little. Yorck and his staff soon
came up and rode through the High Wood to get an overview of the combat
and the terrain. Steinmetz’s skirmishers pressed forward to the dead arm of
the Elbe but suffered terribly from caseshot and musket fire. Yorck rode up
to their line: a ball from canister fire struck one of his adjutants in the mouth;
Lieutenant-Colonel Schmidt, the commander of Yorck’s Reserve Artillery,
had his horse shot out from under him while two soldiers from the staff
guard fell from wounds. “One saw clearly,” wrote one of Yorck’s adjutants,
“the sandy hills behind [north of] Wartenburg covered with artillery.”
Bertrand reported that Morand had repulsed these early attacks and inflicted
“enormous losses” on the Prussians.54
Yorck remained calm and quickly grasped the situation: a frontal attack
would achieve nothing; only the envelopment through Bleddin could gain
Wartenburg. While the flanking force worked around the village, he wanted
the enemy’s front fixed and his artillery on the Sand Hills north of Warten-
burg silenced. To their disbelief, the Prussians could not find suitable ground
for artillery positions. Only from the high right bank of the Elbe could their
counterbattery fire be effective against the enemy guns. Schmidt received
orders “to silence the battery on the Sand Hills with one twelve-pound
battery on the right bank of the Elbe and to shell the flank of the enemy
position.” The task of fixing the enemy’s center and left wing fell to Stein-
metz’s 1st Brigade. With instructions to take Bleddin, Karl assembled his
2nd Brigade. “Prince Karl will quickly advance on the village of Bleddin,”
stated Yorck at 9:00 a.m., “eject the enemy, and through a right wheel seek
to envelop him in his right flank.” Horn’s 7th Brigade took a concealed
position along the east bank of the Moyenhainicht Canal to both support the
prince and plug the gap between 1st and 2nd Brigades. “As soon as the 2nd
Brigade takes Bleddin and envelops the enemy’s right wing,” continued
Yorck, “the 1st and 7th Brigades will attack his front, storming Wartenburg
with several battalions and enveloping it on both sides with their remaining
troops.” Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade formed the Reserve and remained some
2,000 yards west of the bridges on the road to Wartenburg.55
16 General Yorck at Wartenburg, 3 October 1813
During this time, Yorck’s remaining units crossed the bridges, forming
columns on the left bank. Blücher reached the bridges as the last battalions
of I Corps marched across. Looking through the treetops, he could see smoke
rising from what he held to be breakfasts being cooked in Wartenburg. “Look,
my children,” shouted Blücher, “the cursed French are baking bread for
breakfast; let’s take it from them while it’s still hot!” After the remaining
infantry of I Corps crossed the river, the troopers of the Mecklenburg and
Black Hussars led their horses across the bridge. Old Blücher shouted to them:
“Hussars! If you are not victorious, you will drown in the Elbe; I am having
the bridges burned down behind us.” According to Nostitz, “this pronounce-
ment offended the pride of the soldiers, who saw in it a threat made for the
sake of assuring the loyal fulfillment of their duty, and opined that the utiliza-
tion of such means was not merited since they had fought as worthy Prussians
in the battles and engagements that had taken place up to now and had always
earned Blücher’s praise. The general was pleased by this sensitivity: ‘You
cannot take a joke,’ he said to them smiling, and with this all was forgotten.”56
Professor Steffens provides a romantic description of the Prussians
crossing the Elbe:
For many hours the infantry continuously crossed in close and rapid order
along the floating-bridge, then the cavalry crossed, slower and more care-
fully. The arms glanced in the sunbeams, and old legends sprang up in my
The Middle Elbe 479
memory, while first the reflection of their bright weapons, and then host after
host, was seen coming from afar, till every hill blazed with glittering life. The
enemy was hidden behind the great forest of oaks which borders the river; a
few cannonballs reached the Elbe, and some that struck the surface of the
water rebounded and sprang in wide arches upwards. The whole was a most
lively spectacle: we feasted long on it, for Blücher and his staff did not cross
the river until a considerable part of the army had reached the opposite shore.
The enemy, divided from us as they were by the forest, had misdirected their
fire, and as long as I stayed to witness the passage not a shot reached the
bridge. As the troops landed, they disappeared again behind the wood. Our
headquarters remained for some time in the wood but Blücher soon disap-
peared with some of his adjutants, and I and others were ordered to remain
there and wait for him.57
Orderlies posted on the left bank recited Yorck’s orders to the units as
they completed the crossing. Soon, the brigades trooped west. Lobenthal
with the battalions from 2nd Brigade that had yet to join Karl led the march;
Yorck accompanied them. In addition, Yorck placed five guns from 7th
Brigade at the prince’s disposal. In total, Karl commanded six battalions,
seven squadrons, and thirteen guns. Horn’s brigade of eight battalions came
next. Six took a position in the portion of the Eichwald east of the Moyen-
hainicht canal while two others pushed forward into the orchard before the
portion of the Landdamm east of the hog pasture to secure Horn’s right flank.
Langeron’s Russians started crossing as soon as Yorck’s last battalion
reached the left bank. Blücher also spoke electrifying words of encourage-
ment to the men: Goltz translated Blücher’s German into French for the
Russian commanders and they further transmitted Blücher’s message in
Russian to their men: “You old Muscovites, you have never turned your
backs on the enemy. I will place myself at your head.” Pointing toward
Wartenburg, he shouted: “That is where you shall attack those dogs, the
French. I know that on this day you will not show them your backs.
Vamoose!” Although the Russians enthusiastically responded with a loud
hurrah, the struggle ended before they could deploy.58
Meanwhile, Karl’s troops managed to establish a crossing over the
Moyenhainicht canal so their artillery could pass. At 1:00 p.m., the prince
ordered the general advance southwest toward Bleddin. Two battalions
formed the first echelon. The two battalions that had been holding the pass
since 9:00 – reduced by constant skirmishing with the Württembergers to a
few hundred men each – followed as the second echelon. Further rearward,
two battalions and seven squadrons formed the third echelon. Nine guns
unlimbered in the intervals of the echelons.
After Prussian skirmishers drove the Württemberger forward troops
from the Landdamm, Franquemont recognized the danger. Tripling the size
of his vanguard, he ordered his men to retake and hold the Landdamm.
With much tenacity and courage, a total of two and one-half Württemberger
battalions hurled themselves against the advancing Prussian brigade. Seeing
Prussian cavalry and artillery advance across terrain he considered impass-
able forced Franquemont to accept the futility of a prolonged resistance,
despite the bravery of his soldiers. Further north, he observed Horn’s
infantry move into the gap between Bleddin and Wartenburg. In addition,
he received Bertrand’s negative response to his plea for support. Although
the corps commander could not spare any reinforcements for the Württem-
bergers, Fontanelli’s division would advance. In light of this, Franquemont
decided that his best option would be to withdraw on Bleddin. His troops
executed the retreat in a slow and orderly fashion. His last battalion entered
the combat, while his reserve of two weak companies occupied Bleddin
and received their countrymen. This small rearguard managed to keep the
Prussians out of Bleddin until Franquemont established a new position
southwest of the village.
Meanwhile, during the time 2nd Brigade needed to deploy, Steinmetz’s
1st Brigade took a beating while holding its ground in front of Wartenburg.
Intense artillery fire from eighteen-pound guns that mainly fired shells
mowed down the Prussians like a great scythe. Despite the gut-wrenching
losses, Steinmetz could not order a retreat. If he fell back, the Wartenburg
garrison would certainly attack 2nd Brigade’s right flank as it advanced on
Bleddin. In accordance with Yorck’s order, Schmidt unlimbered a heavy
battery on the right bank of the Elbe to take out the enemy artillery on
the Sand Hills. However, the imperials had concealed their guns so well in
the wooded terrain that they could not be seen from either bank. Moreover,
the Prussian artillery chief had failed to locate a suitable position for his
cannon. Unchallenged by counterbattery fire, the imperial artillery
unleashed their fury on the Prussian skirmishers, who suffered horrific
losses that had to be replaced immediately.
Several times Steinmetz fed reinforcements into the sausage grinder.
“From 7:00 to 11:00,” wrote Bertrand, “the enemy made the most vigorous
attacks on Wartenburg; his columns, which were re-formed every half-hour,
moved very close to our dikes; our troops lay in ambush, allowed them to
approach, and opened fire while the artillery fired grapeshot; everywhere
these columns were repulsed; the dead and injured were piled before the
dikes; several times the enemy had to remove the dead to open a passage for
his columns.” “I have seen few infantry battles that were as ferocious as that
near the Wartenburg dike,” recalled Langeron, “which was defended for a
long time: there were more than a thousand dead, laid out in rows, in the
place where they had fought, at fifty paces from their adversaries, and no
Prussian was seen on French terrain, and no Frenchmen on Prussian ter-
rain.” According to Yorck’s after-action report, only sixty men led by one
wounded lieutenant remained in the line of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd East
The Middle Elbe 481
Prussian Regiment after six hours of combat dispersed as skirmishers. “With

his typical cold-bloodedness,” Steinmetz replaced this battalion with three
Landwehr battalions. Likewise sustaining horrendous losses, the militia had
to be both reinforced and resupplied with ammunition twice. After a short
time, mounting casualties forced Steinmetz to commit the manpower of all
three battalions as skirmishers. Regardless, the French killed or wounded
almost all of them. “Morand’s division fought for eight hours,” boasted
Bertrand, “with the greatest valor; the approaches to the dike were covered
with the enemy’s dead and wounded; we allowed his columns to march right
up to the abatis, and there they received either grapeshot or a brisk fusillade,
which destroyed everything. The 8th, 13th and 23rd Regiments competed
with each other in courage.”59
Finally, the lieutenant who commanded Steinmetz’s battery directed his
fire at the smoke rising from the French position; his first shot blew up a
caisson. Yet his exposed position offered the imperials a fine target. Many
gunners fell and could be replaced only by infantry rushing up from the
nearby battalions. While one battalion after another melted under the mur-
derous fire, Steinmetz waited anxiously for a sign of Karl’s envelopment.
Nothing could be seen. In fact, a momentary lull in the Prussian fire due to
the rotation of the skirmishers resulted in an immediate counterattack.
Although repulsed, this attempt reinforced Steinmetz’s conviction that a
retreat would allow the imperials to immediately seize the offensive. Some
relief finally came when the chief of the heavy battery on the opposite bank
of the Elbe managed to find a position for his guns near the village of Gallin,
more than three miles downstream. From there, the Prussian guns shelled
the battery on the Sand Hills as well as its escort. The imperials responded
with effective counterbattery fire from their larger eighteen-pound pieces.
Four guns opened direct fire on the Prussian battery, while six others shelled
its flank. Shortly afterward, the Prussian battery withdrew, allowing the
imperials to resume the mauling of 1st Brigade.
Around 2:00, the Prussians finally overwhelmed the brave defenders of
Bleddin to win the village. Karl’s skirmishers pursued the Württembergers
southwest but his cavalry and artillery continued west, with the latter
unlimbering by the windmill west of Bleddin. Franquemont decided to
continue the retreat three miles further southwest to Trebitz but received
the explicit order from Bertrand to unite with Morand’s division at Warten-
burg. To comply, he had to march west to Globig and then two and one-half
miles northeast to Wartenburg. As the Württemberger infantry rushed
toward Globig, the seven squadrons of Prussian Hussars spotted Briche’s
light cavalry brigade just east of this village. Four well-aimed shots by the
Prussian guns on the windmill hill had already shaken the Württemberger
troopers. After some movements, they halted approximately 100 yards from
Globig and awaited the Prussian attack standing still. With a loud hurrah,
17 Combat at Wartenburg, 3 October 1813
the hussars charged; Briche’s cavalry broke and attempted to flee. Most
could not escape the Prussian first wave, which cut down or captured the
majority.
Of the second wave, the 4th Squadron of the 2nd Leib Hussars received
the task of driving between the enemy cavalry and infantry to attack the
Württemberger artillery retreating from Bleddin. Confident that Briche’s
cavalry would stand against the approaching Prussian troopers, the Würt-
tembergers halted near the Globig windmill. The artillery commander
ordered the crews to unlimber their guns to cover the infantry’s passage of
the Leine rivulet. After the cavalry turned tail, the crews did not have time to
limber the guns before the Prussians charged their position. As a result, the
troopers of 4th Squadron captured five guns and four caissons. One officer
of the Black Hussars played a “trick,” reported Gneisenau. “The regiment
captured an enemy battery including all the gunners and horses. The officer
demanded that the captured gunners fire on their own column. The gunners
refused, so he cut down two of them and the others promised to open fire. ‘If
one of you refuses,’ he shouted to them, ‘all of you will be cut down,’ and in
their fear the chaps fired on their own column with caseshot.”60
Quickly re-forming, the hussars charged the battalion about to escort
Franquemont and his staff across the Leine. Before they could form a square,
The Middle Elbe 483
the Württembergers found themselves surrounded. Rather than surrender,

the battalion cut through the Prussian cavalry to escape across the Leine
albeit with considerable losses. No longer concerned about uniting with
Morand, Franquemont led his survivors southwest to Schnellin from where
he marched sixteen miles through the night all the way to Bad Düben. The
day cost the Württembergers 500 men, most of their cavalry, and all their
artillery. “This division,” reported Bertrand, “which I supported with Gen-
eral Beaumont’s cavalry, was to withdraw to Wartenburg, but when I saw
the enemy’s guns beyond Globig, and when the cavalry and artillery which
had passed through Bleddin placed itself on our flanks and our rear,
I ordered the retreat that was conducted with great order.” “The terrain
between the crossing point and the village of Wartenburg was unfavorable
for cavalry,” reported Blücher, “and thus prevented me from moving up my
cavalry, which stood at the bridge in readiness, in time to destroy the enemy
corps as thoroughly as possible. The 2nd Leib Hussar and the Mecklenburg
Hussar Regiments, the only cavalry that the prince of Mecklenburg had with
him, did inflict considerable damage on the enemy.”61
We left Horn’s brigade in a position behind the Moyenhainicht Canal,
with two battalions in the orchard east of the hog pasture. Just as 2nd
Brigade’s assault on Bleddin succeeded, both French and Italian
reinforcements arrived and fiercely attacked these two battalions. Horn’s
skirmishers needed to be reinforced so many times that all the manpower of
both battalions had to be dispersed. For support, the brigade commander
moved up the 2nd Battalion of the Leib Regiment. In addition, the Russians
completed their crossing. Blücher became concerned after no results of the
attempt to envelop Bleddin could be observed. Aside from having no news
concerning the enemy’s strength, one of St.-Priest’s spies had reported that
Napoleon was approaching from Torgau with 20,000 men. It appeared
urgently necessary to press forward with all available troops and force a
decision. After a stout speech, Blücher ordered Langeron’s vanguard to
advance. St.-Priest’s infantry corps moved between Yorck’s 7th and 2nd
Brigades, assuming the coverage of Karl’s right and thus releasing 7th
Brigade to participate in the engagement. Horn pushed his battalions
through the orchards toward the formidable hog pasture.
With its east side enclosed by the Landdamm, the west side by a second
embankment, and the north and south sides bordered by dead arms of the
Elbe, the hog pasture served the Italians like a fortress. Concealed behind the
embankment, the defenders could pour a murderous volume of small-arms
fire and caseshot into the ranks of the attackers. Under this lethal hail, the
attackers had to then cross a marshy canal that linked the two dead arms of
the Elbe west of the Landdamm. Accompanying Horn’s advance, Yorck
immediately recognized the extreme difficulty of this attack. He originally
wanted Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade to support 2nd Brigade’s envelopment but
decided to have it move up behind Horn and support 7th Brigade’s attack.
As soon as 8th Brigade arrived, Horn’s two right wing battalions would
envelop Wartenburg from the south, while the rest of the brigade stormed
the Landdamm. Pressing forward, the two wing battalions received
withering small-arms fire and caseshot that halted the advance. According
to Bertrand’s after-action report, after “the superior forces that the enemy
moved on Bleddin forced the Württemberger division to evacuate this
village,” he moved up General Étienne Hulot’s 3rd Brigade from Morand’s
12th Division as well as General Ange-Pierre Moroni’s 3rd Brigade of
Italians from Fontanelli’s 15th Division to support the Germans. Bertrand
asserted that “the enemy was thrown back in the swamp and fell back along
the whole line, but the column that pursued the Württemberger division had
already turned Bleddin. At the head of his division, General Fontanelli
inflicted great damage on the enemy.”62
To break the stalemate, Horn requested permission to storm the Land-
damm before 8th Brigade arrived. After some thought, Yorck consented.
The 2nd Leib Battalion led the advance followed by the Löwenberg
Landwehr battalion and then the 1st Leib Battalion. Yorck instructed the
officers to remain as much as possible on the left to avoid the deep water.
Consequently, they marched through the orchard where many helped them-
selves to a plum or two. At the head of the 2nd Leib Battalion, Horn led the
march on horseback until a ball struck his horse in the chest; it collapsed
dead. After shouts went up that the general was dead, Horn responded with
a fit of vexation. Those closest helped him wiggle out from under his horse.
As soon as he was free, he grabbed the musket of a wounded soldier and
bellowed: “Ein Hundsfott, wer noch schießt [Only a scoundrel shoots]!”
Horn exhorted his soldiers to attack with the musket-butt and bayonet. He
then led them on foot. Unable to fire as they waded through the marshy
canal, the Prussians sustained considerable losses. Horn led his men out of
the canal and onto the Landdamm, repulsing all that Fontanelli threw at
them. With one Landwehr battalion and the Leib Regiment’s 1st Battalion
following, the 2nd Battalion executed an unstoppable charge through the
hog pasture that drove the Italians over the western or rearward embank-
ment. Purportedly, the Prussians ejected five battalions from the pasture.
Fontanelli’s division completely collapsed; Italian fugitives covered the ter-
rain west of Wartenburg. In addition, the two right wing battalions waded
through the canal and ascended the Landdamm. The lead battalion pene-
trated Wartenburg but Morand’s Frenchmen repulsed the Prussians. Regard-
less, the loss of the Landdamm marked the beginning of the end of the
defense of Wartenburg. After laboriously dragging some guns onto the
embankment, Horn’s gunners shelled the village. Around 3:30, the Prussians
broke into Wartenburg. From the Sand Hills, the French artillery sought to
halt the pursuing Prussians but withdrew after the loss of two guns.63
The Middle Elbe 485
Meanwhile, Steinmetz’s situation became increasingly difficult with each

passing minute. Almost every tree concealed a wounded or dead soldier.
Murderous fire prevented any forward movement; the need to buy time for
2nd Brigade made any retrograde movement impossible. After ordering
Langeron’s corps to move up, Blücher rode forward to the plain of the
Schützberg. He arrived around the time of the attack on Briche’s cavalry.
Recognizing the need to exploit 2nd Brigade’s breakthrough to reach a
decision quickly, he instructed Karl “to attack the rear of the enemy’s
position at Wartenburg at any price because all frontal attacks are futile.”
With only two battalions readily available and nine guns, the prince imme-
diately turned north toward Wartenburg. He sent orders for the cavalry to
follow but the squadrons needed time to reorganize after some had pursued
the retreating Württembergers, while others had escorted the prisoners and
captured artillery to the rear.
Reaching the windmill some 800 yards west of Wartenburg, Karl noticed
Fontanelli’s battalions fleeing toward him. His artillery greeted them with
caseshot, forcing the unfortunate Italians to turn back toward Wartenburg.
Without cavalry, the prince could do little. His own brigade cavalry
remained unavailable for reasons already noted; that of the 7th Brigade
remained at the bridges, and Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry had just started
crossing the Elbe at this time. Likewise at this point, Bertrand received news
of the collapse of his right wing and center. With no reserves to commit, he
broke off the engagement and evacuated Wartenburg. Despite enduring
almost eight hours of continuous combat, Steinmetz did not pass on the
opportunity to participate in the final push. Observing the enemy withdraw
his artillery, he gave his foremost battalion the order to advance. Clearing
away the abatis blocking the Landdamm consumed so much time that 1st
Brigade did not reach Wartenburg until after Morand’s troops pulled out.
Steinmetz pursued the French north for only a short while before his troops
dropped from exhaustion.
After taking the second embankment, Horn reorganized his battalions,
swung north, and advanced toward the Sand Hills north of Wartenburg.
Under the protection of the batteries located on this high ground, Bertrand
assembled Morand’s troops and received the wreck of Fontanelli’s division.
Withdrawing west in two columns, the imperials soon received artillery fire
from Yorck’s batteries on the right bank of the Elbe. To make matters worse,
Karl’s brigade cavalry finally came up and attacked the Italian column.
Lacking the manpower to rout the division, the Prussians did manage to
capture some guns as well as a quantity of caissons and baggage wagons.
Although the pursuit ended eight miles west of Wartenburg at Pratau just
south of Wittenberg, Bertrand continued another eight miles to Gohrau.
That night, I Corps camped south of Wartenburg on the other side of the
hog pasture; Langeron’s corps bivouacked between the Prussians and
Globig. Not reaching the Elster until midnight, Sacken’s corps remained on
the right bank of the Elbe. Blücher dispatched Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry nine
miles west toward Wittenberg. From Langeron’s corps, Emmanuel led the
1st and 3rd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiments as well as two Donskoye Cossack
Regiments including one horse battery nine miles southwest to Kemberg
while Yuzefovich moved up the Elbe to Trebitz with the Kievskii and
Kharkovskii Dragoon Regiments, one regiment of Kalmyks, and two guns
from 2nd Donskoye Cossack Battery.64
Combat ended around 3:00 that afternoon. Yorck issued orders for the
troops to cook, and to bury their dead. That same night, Blücher held a
victory dinner at the Wartenburg Schloß, as Steffens explains: “With a
number of staff officers, we were brought into a great hall, where the walls
and floor were torn and damaged by the cannonballs; one ball had rico-
cheted off the floor and passed completely through the wall. Preparations
were made for a feast of rejoicing, and we all assembled. The day had been a
glorious one but as yet we could hardly reckon the results.” Blücher gave a
stirring speech. Gneisenau, who did not like large festivities, retreated with
some friends to a small antechamber to dine. Suddenly, just as they finished,
Blücher knocked loudly at the door. Turning to all those present, he roared:
“Today, thank God, we have taken a good step for the liberation of the
Fatherland. I feel like a craftsman who has completed his task but here
everything was prepared so that we were all able to work together to achieve
success.” He then summoned Lieutenant Scharnhorst to his side: “Your
father,” he began, but overwhelmed by emotion, words escaped him. After
regaining his composure, Blücher continued: “Look down, radiant spirit of
our Scharnhorst, and see how we all pledge a solemn oath on your dear son,
to emulate you in word and deed until we free the German Fatherland from
the enemy and the oppressors, and have again covered the name of Prussia
with honor.” “Our repast was truly joyous,” continued Steffens; “but some
sad and solemn feelings clouded our happiness before we parted: thoughts
turned to the memory of Scharnhorst. Blücher spoke; and I never listened to
words as eloquent as those he used when he painted in glowing terms the
character and services of the hero. The almost involuntary rush of language
was the outpouring of poetry itself. At the conclusion, he called to him the
son of the great departed, who, although used to concealing his feelings
under a calm exterior, could scarcely hide his emotions as he stood before
the aged leader and orator.”65
The merrymaking did not extend beyond the walls of the Wartenburg
Schloß, as Droysen reiterates the note in Schack’s journal: “Sad scenes
among the wounded.” “Our losses are considerable,” wrote Blücher at
2:30. Yorck’s casualties amounted to 67 officers and 1,548 killed and
wounded compared to fewer than 500 of Bertrand’s soldiers. Overall, 1st
Brigade suffered the most casualties: 992 dead and wounded including
The Middle Elbe 487
29 officers. “I do not believe I would be exaggerating if I estimated the

enemy’s losses to be between 5,000 and 6,000 men,” noted Bertrand; “ours
are not considerable because of the advantage that our infantry had, being
situated behind a dike.” Blücher claimed to have taken 1,000 prisoners, 50
caissons, and 11 guns. “General Bertrand commanded against me,” he
reported to the king. “Captured staff officers cited his strength at
23,000–25,000 men. According to the reports that have arrived, I will find
no other enemy as far as the Mulde except the VII Corps.” Although
Blücher firmly believed he faced more than 20,000 men, Bertrand’s corps
numbered only 13,000 men and 32 guns against Yorck’s 12,000.66
Not numerical superiority but the bravery of the Prussian troops
combined with the prudence and calmness of the leadership produced the
success of this day. “The exhausting marches, sickness, and desertion,”
explains Friederich, “had gradually removed all doubtful elements, all the
physically and morally unfit from the ranks; what remained were worthy
members of the army who competed with the veteran troops of Yorck’s
corps.” Droysen echoes the sentiments of Yorck and his officers: “Infin-
itely more important was it that the Prussian corps alone with a loss of
almost 2,000 dead and wounded had driven an enemy . . . from such a
position without any Russian assistance. Finally, Blücher’s headquarters
now had to honor the truth in the army report and not, as up until now,
award the glory to the Russians for what the Prussians had achieved;
finally, Herr von Müffling, who wrote the reports, now had to recognize
what Prussian troops had achieved.” After the battle, the troops marched
past Yorck, who greeted each commander. When the 2nd Battalion of the
Leib Regiment, which Horn led in the storming of the Landdamm,
approached, Yorck asked: “Is this the 2nd Battalion of the Leib
Regiment? The men shouted “Ja!” Yorck then removed his cap and his entire
entourage followed the example until the battalion marched past.” “This
brave battalion,” Yorck purportedly said to his staff, “has earned the respect
of the entire world.” The Landwehr also received praise for having fought
like the grenadier battalions of Frederick’s army. “Now the Silesian Land-
wehr has also passed the great test with honor,” Yorck purportedly claimed.
“The bravery of the troops carried them in the battle,” Gneisenau explained
to Hardenberg, “and after six hours of combat they finally stormed the
village. The Landwehr played a superb role in this, namely the Sommerfeld
Battalion from the Hirschberg District, which for the most part consists of
linen-weavers. Thus the young now form the troops for war! ‘See! There
advances the battalion of the Leib Infantry Regiment against the enemy; they
want to be better than you,’ said General Horn to the Landwehr men. ‘No!
No! We are just as good as them,’ they answered and at the same time
advanced against the enemy.” With an eye toward the shortage of cash,
Gneisenau added: “It would break your heart if you could see how these
brave, poor men lack the necessary clothing and succumb to sickness and
despondency.” Based on Gneisenau’s after-action reports, Frederick William
decided to reward the Landwehr regiments with their own standards.67
As for the leaders of I Corps, Blücher reported to Frederick William
that Prince Karl had “executed his assignment with the decisiveness and
energy of a distinguished officer and his movement, combined with the
bravery of Horn’s troops, who fought between Steinmetz’s brigade and
that of the prince of Mecklenburg, brought us a complete victory around
2:00 p.m. General Yorck supported me in a most satisfactory manner
through the decisive execution of the general disposition. Cut off from
Torgau and Leipzig, the enemy fled to Wittenberg.” Droysen claims that
Blücher once said: “That lady-killer Yorck is difficult to bring into the fire,
but once I have done so, there is none better than he.” Claiming that 1st
Brigade needed to be looked after more than the other brigades, Yorck
scolded Steinmetz for failing to advance with fortitude. Yet in his report to
the king, the old curmudgeon expressed his admiration: “On this day,
Colonel Steinmetz held the most difficult post which he maintained with
his customary cold-bloodedness; his brigade stood opposite Wartenburg,
which was unassailable due to a wall, marsh, and abatis. During eight hours
of combat he defied the enemy here and only because of this was it possible
to envelop the village from Bleddin while the enemy concentrated his forces
against Colonel Steinmetz.” During the Russian campaign, Macdonald had
called Horn the Prussian Bayard because of his outstanding bravery. The
nickname stuck. “Well sir, you are indeed a man! Compared to you, even
Bayard is a dog,” declared Yorck when he saw Horn the morning after the
battle.68
“The courage and impetuosity of the Prussian troops,” concludes Lan-
geron, “and the good dispositions of General Yorck, who, by his energy and
his talent, placed himself among the ranks of the best generals in this
campaign, allowed my troops to arrive only as witnesses to the success of
their glorious companions.” “Nauseatingly friendly were the gallantries of
Count Langeron toward Yorck,” notes Droysen; “‘my illustrious comrade,’
is how he addressed him, whereupon Yorck only answered ‘Your Excel-
lency’ with a slight bow. ‘May the hangman fetch these Russian comrades’ is
what he said when he was alone with his Prussian comrades.” Nor did the
victory cause him to think any more favorably of Gneisenau. In private,
“Yorck expressed that he had been led to the slaughterhouse.” “Regardless,”
laments Delbrück, “his relationship with Gneisenau remained unchanged.
Yorck used this opportunity to rage against him.”69
Despite Yorck’s personal feelings, the 3 October 1813 engagement at
Wartenburg demonstrated the synergy that existed among Blücher,
Gneisenau, and Yorck. The idea belonged to Gneisenau, the decision to
Blücher, the deed itself to Yorck. A bold decision earned success based on
The Middle Elbe 489
the energy of its execution. On 2 October an entire French corps moved into
an uncommonly strong position to hold the left bank opposite Elster.
Bertrand even assured Napoleon that his corps would suffice to hold the
position. Fortune smiled on the bold. Not only did the Prussian General
Staff select an excellent point for the crossing, but the imperials failed to
disrupt the bridge construction. Yet the tenacity, energy, and self-sacrificing
spirit of Yorck’s corps earned the victory. Frederick William later united this
deed with the name of the man whose corps opened the road for the Silesian
Army to march to Leipzig: Hans David von Yorck became Hans David
Count Yorck von Wartenburg. Blücher played his part in the operation and
the decisive order for the envelopment came from him.
Notwithstanding the bravery of Yorck’s men, they would have failed had
it not been for inexcusable French errors. By utilizing the majority of his
infantry to hold Wartenburg and the segment of the Landdamm north of the
village, Bertrand squandered his limited manpower on the strongest part of
his position. Due to the terrain, Bleddin represented the only accessible
point along his line. Yet he assigned only 1,500 Württembergers and 6 guns
to defend this village even after acknowledging that it represented the
weakest point of his entire position. In his center, the portion of the Land-
damm before the hog pen remained unguarded, with Fontanelli’s division
standing one mile to the rear in reserve. During the battle, Bertrand should
have committed some of Fontanelli’s battalions to reinforce Franquemont,
especially after he received several status reports from the Württemberger
general. The timely arrival of the Italians at Bleddin could have changed the
course of the battle.
Much of Bertrand’s faulty disposition can be attributed to his belief that
he faced only weak detachments from the Army of North Germany rather
than the Army of Silesia. Based on Bertrand’s arrangements, it appears that
he intended to take the offensive with Fontanelli’s division if the enemy
managed a breakthrough at Bleddin. Such a strike at the moment the Allies
debouched from Bleddin would have produced a favorable result had Ber-
trand faced only a weak Allied detachment. If Bertrand had known that he
faced Blücher, a position east of Wartenburg would have been preferable.
A successful defense could have been executed had he deployed Franque-
mont’s weak division to hold the Elster–Wartenburg causeway while the rest
of IV Corps took a position behind the Moyenhainicht Canal. In this case,
the numerical superiority of the Silesian Army would not have played a role
because the difficult terrain would have prevented Blücher from deploying
both Yorck and Langeron.
Regarding Yorck’s conduct, few excuses can justify leaving 1st Brigade in
an exposed position for almost eight hours. Steinmetz could have accom-
plished his task just as well by withdrawing to a position that allowed him to
merely fix the French division at Wartenburg. Yorck could have directed his
three other brigades directly to Bleddin. His foremost brigade, Karl’s 2nd,
could have driven Franquemont from Bleddin while 7th and 8th Brigades
crossed the Moyenhainicht Canal and turned north to attack Wartenburg.
Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry and Langeron’s corps would have had to follow
immediately to exploit the breakthrough and roll up Bertrand’s line. Instead,
Yorck kept his Reserve Cavalry and 8th Brigade in reserve. Perhaps out of
mistrust of Langeron, Yorck acted as if he had to fight only with his own
corps and could not risk committing all of his forces. Here we find the
absence of the army’s leadership. We do not know why Blücher and Gnei-
senau did not take a more active role in this engagement. They as well as
Yorck knew the army could not remain at the bridges, meaning that open
terrain had to be won. This emerges as all the more necessary considering the
Allies did not know the size of the imperial force at Wartenburg. It could
have been a detachment or the entire Army of Berlin. Thus, it is odd that
neither Army Headquarters nor Yorck sought to achieve a decisive break-
through from the start. Equally puzzling is the limited use of Langeron’s
corps. Unger claims that, had Blücher known beforehand that Bertrand’s
entire corps were defending Wartenburg, he would not have hesitated to
commit the Russians – an unconvincing excuse for failing to take advantage
of having mass at the point of attack.70
As for Langeron’s cavalry, the French émigré recalled: “Had my cavalry
arrived in time to charge the enemy fugitives, they would have taken a great
number, but they were too late: General Korf had left to seek good quarters
and no one could find him. Only Emmanuel arrived with two regiments, but
he was too late.” That the Russians did not have more cavalry on hand for
the pursuit displeased Gneisenau: “Due to the uncommon ignorance of
General Neydhardt, chief of staff of Langeron’s corps, there was not suffi-
cient cavalry available to exploit the victory. The few and weak squadrons of
ours which engaged the enemy did wonders of bravery.”71
Regardless, the Prussians basked in the success of their operation:
64,000 battle-hardened veterans supported by 332 guns now stood on the
left bank of the Elbe. Blücher crossed the river with the intention of
motivating Bernadotte to take the same step. “The consequences of this
victory may be very important if His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of
Sweden, as discussed, quickly crosses the Elbe,” stated Gneisenau in Blü-
cher’s after-action report to the king. Before the guns fell silent, Blücher
dispatched Bernadotte’s liaison officer from Silesian Army Headquarters to
that of the crown prince with a report on the victory. This courier had
delivered a letter from Bernadotte to Blücher written earlier that day that
stated: “I received the letter that you addressed to me yesterday. I thank
you and I am happy to have you as a neighbor. I’ll send an officer of my
staff to you so you can tell me where you are; I can [then] make my
arrangements.” The short note concludes by informing Blücher that
The Middle Elbe 491
Russian forces under Chernishev had taken Kassel, prompting the king of
Westphalia, Jerome Bonaparte, to flee. Although doubting Bernadotte’s
resolve to accept battle on the left bank, Blücher requested that the Army
of North Germany likewise cross the Elbe. During that same night, an
encouraging letter arrived from Bülow’s headquarters stating that the
crown prince planned to cross the Elbe with his entire army on the 5th.
In addition, Tauentzien reported that Bernadotte had ordered him to
march twenty-two miles west from Seyda to Coswig, halfway between
Wittenberg and Roßlau, presumably to cross the river.72
Through a combined operation with Bernadotte, Blücher hoped to entice
Napoleon to turn north. By baiting the emperor, he wanted to buy time for
the Bohemian Army to reach the plains of Saxony. This scheme sparked
debate at Silesian Army Headquarters. Some argued that Blücher’s numer-
ical superiority would allow him to quickly drive the remnants of Ney’s
Army of Berlin west across the Mulde. Next, the vanguard of the Silesian
Army could cross the forty miles to reach Leipzig by the 7th. A union at
Leipzig with the Army of North Germany could occur as early as the 8th.
Others, mainly Müffling, countered that such a rapid advance and premature
arrival at Leipzig would needlessly expose the Silesian Army to a setback.
They based their dissension on sound reasoning. Doubtless, Napoleon
would learn on the 4th that the Silesian Army had crossed the Elbe at
Wartenburg. He would cover the seventy miles that separated Leipzig from
Dresden to arrive at the former with considerable forces no later than the
9th. Accepting a battle with the master meant accepting the possibility of
defeat. Yet by waiting a few days for the Bohemian Army to reach Leipzig,
the Allies would secure numerical superiority.
The next question to be addressed concerned escaping Napoleon’s
blow. On his approach, both Blücher and Bernadotte would be forced to
fall back either across the Elbe or behind the Saale. As Napoleon most
likely would give chase, the limited number of crossings over both rivers
meant that high losses would be sustained in rearguard actions. Moreover,
if Blücher and Bernadotte separated, Napoleon would receive the oppor-
tunity to isolate and defeat each in turn. Consequently, temporarily
remaining at the Mulde and uniting with the Army of North Germany
appeared prudent. Should Napoleon move north to the Mulde,
Schwarzenberg would gain plenty of time for the Bohemian Army to enter
Saxony. Moreover, if from Dresden the emperor turned directly against
Schwarzenberg, the Prussians felt confident that they would learn of this
movement early enough to rush through Leipzig and Altenburg to support
the Bohemian Army.73
Never prone to councils of war, Blücher ended the debate. He stood by
his decision: the Silesian Army would march southwest and cross the Mulde
on 6 October. To his friend, Bonin, Blücher wrote: “The trophies are not as
considerable as at the Katzbach but the consequences of the victory are

much greater because now everything will cross the Elbe and the Bohemian
Army can advance from Bohemia. The great man [Napoleon] will be at
Leipzig and I will expect him in a few days.” Little did Blücher know that
the great man was already on the move.74
Notes
1 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 83–84; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:375–76;
Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:36; Droysen, Yorck, II:178. Droysen
could not find Yorck’s thoughts on the plan.
2 Gneisenau to Boyen, Bautzen, 25 September 1813, in Boyen, Erinnerungen, ed.
Nippold, III:647–50; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:281; Unger, Blücher, II:95–96;
Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, 226–28, 235–38.
3 Boyen to Gneisenau, Nudersdorf, 27 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
4 General Vaudoncourt, in Histoire de la guerre, I:192, cites the incorrect
French view that, when Bennigsen reached Leitmeritz on 26 September and
thus made contact with the Bohemian Army, this was the signal for the Coalition
to commence its general offensive. He points to Blücher’s departure from
Bautzen, which he claims occurred on 28 September, as the start of this offensive
but as we have seen the operation had already commenced on the 26th. Moreover,
Bennigsen reached Zittau, forty-six miles northeast of Leitmeritz, on the 26th.
5 Panchulidzev’s cavalry consisted of 2 squadrons of the Tverskii Dragoon Regiment
and 3 squadrons of the Chernigovskii Mounted Jäger as well as the 2nd Ukrainiskii
Cossack Regiment and 250 warriors of the Donskoye Cossack Regiment.
6 Blücher’s disposition for 26 September is in GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 18; Blücher to Bubna, Bautzen, 25 September 1813, ÖStA KA,
FA 1533, 884b; the instructions for Kaptsevich and Bubna are in ÖStA KA, FA
1533, 884; Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Langburkersdorf, 26 September 1813, ÖStA
KA, FA 1533, 844. Bubna provided Schwarzenberg with reports of varying detail
on Blücher’s operations starting on the 28th and continuing to 12 October: Bubna
to Schwarzenberg, Stolpen, 9:30 p.m., 28 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1533,
893, and Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Preschwitz an der Elbe, 12 October 1813,
ÖStA KA, FA 1535, 277. See also Blücher to Alexander, Elsterwerda, 29 September
1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3913, l. 268; Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:286–87; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:36–37; Pertz and Delbrück,
7 Gneisenau to Knesebeck, Bautzen, 7:00 a.m., 26 September 1813, in Pertz and
8 “If the stretch between the two sides of the bend in the Elbe extends 6,000 to 7,000
paces,” continued Gneisenau, “a great battery for fifty twelve-pounders will be
constructed in the middle of this stretch, and between it and the Elbe on each side
one of twenty-five twelve-pounders to provide it with a strong profile and good
glacis. In this manner, crossfire of caseshot can be produced between these
redoubts. Moreover, these batteries will be furnished with epaulements
The Middle Elbe 493
[breastworks] to create maneuverable batteries, which will open the battle and
distract the enemy’s attention from the great battery, which will be employed
in the actual attack on the troop masses and will support an offensive against
the enemy’s columns. For the infantry, nothing more is needed than a trench
to protect them from the effects of the enemy’s artillery”: Gneisenau to
Rühle, Bautzen, 24 September 1813, GStA, PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneise-
nau, Nr. 18.
9 Gneisenau to Rühle, Bautzen, 24 September 1813, GStA, PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 18.
10 Blücher to Alexander, Elsterwerda, 29 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16,
d. 3913, l. 268; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:286–87; Disposition for 27 Septem-
ber, Bautzen, 26 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1533, 884d, and Add MSS,
20112, 144; Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Neustadt, 27 September 1813, 9:00 a.m.,
ÖStA KA, FA 1533, 884.
d. 3913, l. 268; Bubna to Schwarzenberg, Stolpen, 28 September 1813, 9:00 a.m.,
ÖStA KA, FA 1533, 893; Langeron, Mémoires, 288; Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:287–88; Gneisenau to Knesebeck, 5:00 p.m., Königsbrück, 27 September
1813, in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:398.
12 SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Ney, 17 and 18 September 1813. As for XII Corps,
Ney divided its artillery among VII and IV Corps and transferred the survivors of
14th Division to 13th Division, which he assigned to VII Corps. Oudinot’s 29th
Division, consisting of Bavarians, was dissolved, and the remaining four battal-
ions went to Dresden along with the 2nd Brigade of the corps’s light cavalry, also
Bavarians. The remaining 1st Brigade of light cavalry – Hessians and
Westphalians – was transferred to IV Corps. Moreover, Ney combined the
remnants of VII Corps’s two Saxon divisions, the 24th and 25th, so that only
the former remained. See SHAT, C2 156: Ney to Berthier, 19 September 1813;
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:195.
13 SHAT, C2 155: Ney to Berthier, 12 September 1813; SHAT, C2 156: Ney to
Berthier, 23 September 1813.
14 SHAT, C17 133: Order of the Day, 15 September 1813; Charles John to Tauent-
zien, 19 September 1813; SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Bülow, 13 September
1813; SHAT, C2 156: Ney to Berthier, 17 September 1813.
15 SHAT, C2 156: Ney to Berthier, 22 September 1813; Ney to Arrighi, 24 September
1813; SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Bülow, 22 September 1813. Bertrand’s
detailed after-action report, written to Ney from Trebitz at 6:00 p.m. on the 23rd,
is in Fabry, Étude sur les opérations de l’empereur, III:22. See also Friederich,
16 SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Ney, 22 September 1813; SHAT, C2 156: Ney to
Berthier, 8:00 a.m., 23 September 1813; Fabry, Étude sur les opérations de
l’empereur, III:20–21.
17 SHAT, C2 156: Ney to Marmont and Berthier, 25 September 1813; SHAT, C17
180: Berthier to Ney, 27 September 1813.
18 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Bülow, 24 September 1813; Leggiere, Napoleon
and Berlin, 240–41, 247; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:198.
19 SHAT, C2 156: Ney to Berthier, 26 September 1813, 7:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on
27 September 1813, and 8:00 a.m. on 28 September 1813.
20 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Stedingk, 26 and 27 September 1813; Charles John
to Bülow, 27 and 28 September 1813; SHAT, C2 156: Reynier to Ney, 30 September
1813, and Ney to Berthier, 28 and 29 September 1813. On the 29th, Reynier’s 13th
Division occupied Jonitz and Dessau, the latter serving as Reynier’s headquarters;
32nd Division stood just south of the confluence of the Mulde in the Elbe, having
one infantry regiment east of Wörlitz observing the point of passage across
the Elbe at Coswig; and 24th Division and General François Fournier’s 6th
Light Cavalry Division held Pötnitz, the position of Ney’s headquarters. As for
IV Corps, Morand’s 16th Division and Defrance’s 4th Heavy Cavalry Division
escorted Bertrand’s headquarters to Wörlitz; Fontanelli’s 15th proceeded to
Schleesen; and Franquemont’s 38th pushed one brigade each to Schleesen and
Kemberg. Reynier reported losing 250 killed in the fighting around Roßlau–
Dessau between 26 and 29 September. For the details of these operations, see
Fabry, Étude sur les opérations de l’empereur, III:162–85, 183–84.
21 This figure included what Napoleon estimated to be the 30,000 infantry of IV and
VII Corps, the 4th and 6th Divisions of III Cavalry Corps, 27th Division, and
General Pierre Margaron’s division of 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry which
would be formed at Leipzig on the 28th: C17 180: Berthier to Ney, 26
September 1813.
22 Franquemont to Bertrand, 30 September 1813, in Fabry, Étude sur les opérations
de l’empereur, III:187–88; Bertrand to Franquemont and Ney, 30 September 1813,
ibid., III:188.
23 According to Napoleon’s letter to Marmont at 4:00 a.m. on the 27th, the emperor
wanted VI Corps to immediately cross to the left bank of the Elbe with I Cavalry
Corps. One infantry brigade would be left at Meißen to defend the bridgehead.
Napoleon instructed Marmont to echelon his first two divisions and a portion of
I Cavalry Corps along the road to Torgau so that the head of his column remained
one good march from the fortress. “According to the news that we receive in the
course of the day from Dessau and from the prince de la Moskova [Ney], you
must be ready to execute a great march to come to his support.” Five hours later,
Napoleon issued Marmont new orders for the following day to move his first
division to Eilenburg, his second as well as corps headquarters to Wurzen, and his
third to Oschatz; I Cavalry Corps would move on Dahlen and Schildau. “From
this position on the Eilenburg–Wurzen–Oschatz line, you will be able to move to
join the prince de la Moskova to cover Leipzig and cut off the enemy from the
Elbe or take the offensive on Wittenberg to destroy all the enemy’s bridges or go
back to Dresden, Chemnitz, or Altenburg to oppose the movements the enemy
can make from Bohemia”: CN, Nos. 20643 and 20644, XXVI:252–54. Two days
later, Berthier informed Ney that “the emperor desires that he [Marmont] be
employed in the operation that has the goal of raising the siege of Wittenberg”:
SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Ney, 29 September 1813.
24 CN, No. 20663, XXVI:267–68; SHAT, C2 157: Ney to Berthier, 1 October 1813;
Ney to Marmont, 1 October 1813, in Fabry, Étude sur les opérations de l’emper-
eur, III:207; Ney to Berthier, Pötnitz, 1 October 1813, ibid., III:208.
The Middle Elbe 495
25 Marmont to Napoleon, 2 October 1813, and Ney to Berthier, 2 October 1813, are
in Fabry, Étude sur les opérations de l’empereur, III:233, 240–41.
26 Tauentzien to Blücher, Bad Liebenwerda, 8:00 a.m., 27 September 1813, in
Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:288–89. Boyen also confirmed this news in Boyen
to Gneisenau, Nudersdorf, 27 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 23.
27 Blücher to Charles John, Königsbrück, 27 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112,
55–56; Droysen, Yorck, II:177.
28 Numbering 1,202 combatants at the outset of the campaign, this single brigade –
itself composed of the single battalions of the Kamchatskii and Ochakovskii
Regiments – of Sacken’s XI Corps demonstrates the thinness of some
Russian units.
29 Blücher to Gneisenau, 27 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 18; Blücher to Sacken, Elsterwerda, 28 October 1813, RGVIA,
f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3851, ll. 213–214. Blücher’s short disposition for 28 September
is in GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18, and Add MSS, 20112, 145;
Sacken to Barclay de Tolly, 1 October 1813, in Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIb:38; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:290. General Vaudoncourt, in His-
toire de la guerre, I:192, errs by claiming that VI Corps was also at Meißen. See
CN, Nos. 20643 and 20644, XXVI:252–54.
d. 3913, l. 268; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:290; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
II:277.
31 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Tauentzien, 29 September 1813; Tauentzien to
Blücher, Bad Liebenwerda, 3:00 p.m., 29 September 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1844:290.
32 Blücher’s disposition for 29 September is in GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 18, and Add MSS, 20112, 146; Blücher to Alexander, Elsterwerda,
29 September 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3913, l. 268; Bubna to Schwarzen-
berg, Stolpen, 1 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 20; Sacken to Blücher,
Großenhain, 6:00 p.m., 30 September 1813, RA KrA, 25. On 1 October Bubna
reported that both “the emperor Napoleon and the king of Saxony are at Dresden
with the French and the Saxon Guard.”
33 Alexander to Blücher, Teplitz, 25 September 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:291; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:376.
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23. See Janson, Friedrich Wilhelm, 216–17.
d. 3913, l. 268; Gneisenau to Knesebeck, Elsterwerda, 8:30 p.m., 29 September
1813, in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:399–400.
36 Charles John to Blücher, Zerbst, 29 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 57;
Blücher to Charles John, 30 September 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 23; Gneisenau to Knesebeck, Elsterwerda, 8:00 p.m., 30 September
1813, in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:401–02; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIb:39; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:278–79.
37 Knesebeck to Gneisenau, Teplitz, 4:00 p.m., 28 September 1813, GStA PK, VI

39 Charles John to Blücher, Zerbst, 30 September and 3 October 1813, Add MSS,
20112, 58–60; Blücher to Charles John, Herzberg, 1 October 1813, GStA PK, VI
HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:406.
40 Bubna to Blücher, Stolpen, 2 September 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 111b. Bubna
reported that Macdonald had moved closer to the entrenchments east of
Dresden’s Neustadt, closely monitored by the forward posts of both Bubna (in
the Hartha Forest) and Shcherbatov (at Weißig and Radeberg). Bubna also
established communication with Bennigsen through Major Ferdinand Wilhelm
Franz Bolstern von Boltenstern’s detachment. See Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIb:41; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 60.
42 Bertrand’s “Rapport sur le combat de Wartenburg” is in Fabry, Étude sur les
opérations de l’empereur, III:266; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:281–83; see
also Fabry, Étude sur les opérations de l’empereur, III:184–85, 200–01.
43 Blücher issued a two-day disposition on 30 September that covered 1 and 2
October: “On 1 October, Langeron’s corps will march to Herzberg, Yorck’s to
Herzberg, and Sacken’s to Mühlberg giving the impression that it will cross
there. Langeron’s vanguard will march to Bad Liebenwerda, Yorck’s to Koßdorf,
and Sacken’s to Streumen. Headquarters will go to Herzberg. On 2 October,
Langeron’s and Yorck’s corps will cross the Black Elster and bivouac opposite
Jeßen. Sacken’s corps will go to Herzberg. Langeron’s and Yorck’s vanguards
will go to Annaburg, Sacken’s to Koßdorf. Headquarters will go to Jeßen. The
pontoons (which should arrive at Bad Liebenwerda on 1 October) will travel at
the head of Langeron’s corps. On 2 October they will go to Elster.” Blücher
included a copy of this disposition with his letter to Bernadotte on the 30th:
Disposition, Elsterwerda, 30 September 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 147.
44 Blücher to Frederick William, Wartenburg, 6:00 p.m., 3 October 1813, ÖStA KA,
FA 1534, 74; Blücher to Bubna, Wartenburg, 3 October 1813, ibid., 149c; Höpf-
ner, “Darstellung,” 1844:300–01.
45 To be fair to Bernadotte, he wrote Vorontsov on the 3rd claiming that he had just
received news from Blücher that the Silesian Army would throw bridges across
the Elbe at Elster to cross the river that same day. “One has heard cannon –
probably General Blücher attacking the enemy on the road to Kemberg. There-
fore, I ask that you send this same night Cossacks to Raghun and Bitterfeld to
harass the communications of Bertrand’s corps, which faces Blücher. To save time,
I ask that you report directly to me and I will share your information with
Wintzingerode. Tomorrow we cross the Elbe”: SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to
Vorontsov, Zerbst, 3 October 1813.
46 Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Wartenburg, 3 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21; Blücher to Frederick William, Wartenburg, 6:00
p.m., 3 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 74; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 59;
Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:40. Droysen credits Lölhöffel von
The Middle Elbe 497
Löwensprung: “Meanwhile, under Captain Lolhöffel’s leadership, the bridge was

zealously built. It progressed so far that on 2 October he reported that he could
finish that same day if he did not run out of planks to cover the bridge and did not
lack the necessary carts to transport the planks”: Droysen, Yorck, II:180.
FA 1534, 74.
48 Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:407; Blücher to Knesebeck, Elsterwerda,
1 October 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 184.
50 SHAT, C2 156: Bertrand to Berthier, Wartenburg, 23 September 1813.
51 Bertrand’s “Rapport sur le combat de Wartenburg” is in Fabry, Étude sur les
opérations de l’empereur, III:266.
52 This wood no longer exists, the land having been cleared for cultivation.
53 Bertrand claims that his forward posts alerted him at 6:00 a.m. that a large
quantity of enemy cavalry and infantry was crossing the bridge. Bertrand’s
“Rapport sur le combat de Wartenburg” is in Fabry, Étude sur les opérations de
l’empereur, III:267.
54 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:185; SHAT, C2 157: Bertrand to Ney, 8:00 p.m.,
Klitzschena, 3 October 1813.
FA 1534, 74, quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:186.
56 Quoted in Unger, Blücher, II:99–100; Nostitz, Tagebuch, 67.
58 Quoted in Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:47.
59 Langeron, Mémoires, 292; SHAT, C2 157: Bertrand to Ney, 3 October 1813.
60 Yorck was very angry about this event, calling such proceedings “un-soldierly,”
and “a brutal act.” He rejected the officer’s excuse that the enemy infantry would
have retaken the cannon: Droysen, Yorck, II:195–96.
61 SHAT, C2 157: Bertrand to Ney, 3 October 1813; Blücher to Frederick William,
Wartenburg, 6:00 p.m., 3 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 74.
62 SHAT, C2 157: Bertrand to Ney, 3 October 1813.
FA 1534, 74.
64 The account of the battle of Wartenburg is based on Blücher to Frederick William,
Wartenburg, 6:00 p.m., 3 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 74; Blücher to
Charles John, between Wartenburg and Globig, 2:30 p.m., 3 October 1813, RA
KrA, 25; SHAT, C2 157: Bertrand to Ney, 8:00 p.m., Klitzschena, 3 October 1813;
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:281–98; Droysen, Yorck, II:181–98; Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1844:303–15; Plotho, Der Krieg, II:283; Wagner, Plane der
Schlachten, II:64–65; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:49; Petre, Napo-
leon’s Last Campaign, 297–99; Unger, Blücher, II:98–99; Vaudoncourt, Histoire
de la guerre, I:192.
65 Steffens, Adventures, 116; Unger, Blücher, II:101; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau,
III:416.
66 Droysen, Yorck, II:197; Blücher to Charles John, between Wartenburg and Glo-
big, 2:30 p.m., 3 October 1813, RA KrA, 25; SHAT, C2 157: Bertrand to Ney,
3 October 1813; Blücher to Bubna, Wartenburg, 3 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA

1534, 149c; Blücher to Frederick William, Wartenburg, 6:00 p.m., 3 October 1813,
ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 74. In appendix 104 of the second volume of Plotho’s Der
Krieg, he cites Yorck’s losses at 67 officers killed or wounded and 1,539 soldiers
wounded with an additional 291 killed and 182 missing for a slightly higher total
of 2,012 casualties among the enlisted personnel.
67 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:298; Droysen, Yorck, II:194; Pertz and Del-
brück, Gneisenau, III:409, 416.
68 Quoted in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:416; Droysen, Yorck, II:195–96.
69 Langeron, Mémoires, 292; Droysen, Yorck, II:193–94, 196; Pertz and Delbrück,
Gneisenau, III:416; Blücher to Frederick William, Wartenburg, 6:00 p.m., 3 Octo-
ber 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 74.
71 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:196; Langeron, Mémoires, 292–93.
FA 1534, 74; Charles John to Blücher, Zerbst, 3 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23; Blücher to Charles John, between Wartenburg and
Globig, 2:30 p.m., 3 October 1813, RA KrA, 25; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIb:50. The letter, written on behalf of Boyen by Major August von
Reiche of Bülow’s staff, stated that the crown prince had decided to cross the Elbe
on the 5th but would probably commence the operation on the 4th as soon as he
learned of Blücher’s crossing at Wartenburg. See Reiche to Gneisenau, Ruders-
dorf, 6:30 p.m., 3 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:315.
74 Blücher to Bonin, Wartenburg, 4 October 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 185.
11
The Mulde
Bertrand’s 8:00 p.m. report to Ney on 3 October stated that the Army of
Silesia led by “Blücher, Yorck, and Prince Karl” had attacked him “vigor-
ously” and “with numerous forces” that day, turning his right, and forcing
him to retreat in the direction of Bad Düben. Based on this sketchy infor-
mation, Ney planned to withdraw ten miles south from Pötnitz to Raguhn
on the Mulde with VII Corps the next day. He requested that Marmont
strongly occupy the point of passage across the Mulde at Bad Düben some
twenty miles upstream of Raguhn. Noting that Bertrand had directed his
retreat on Bad Düben, Ney emphasized to Marmont “that it is thus indis-
pensable that you move all the forces that you have at your disposal to this
point” and to notify him “the moment you commence your movement.” In
a postscript, he added that some units of Bertrand’s corps had retreated
south to Pretzsch on the Elbe and others southwest toward Bad Düben on
the Mulde. On the morning of the 4th, Marmont marched from Leipzig to
Eilenburg with one division of his corps and I Cavalry Corps; a second
division of VI Corps that already stood at Eilenburg had moved eleven miles
downstream to Bad Düben (see Map 5).1
By the morning of the 4th, Ney possessed accurate information
regarding the events at Wartenburg. A captured Prussian sergeant of the
Black Hussars confirmed that “the Silesian Army, commanded by Generals
Blücher, Yorck, and the prince of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, composed of four
corps, and 90,000-men strong, had moved from Silesia to Bautzen, from
where it moved after a sojourn through Königsbrück on Wittenberg. On
October 2, it passed the night one mile from the village of Elster. This army
was followed by the Russian corps commanded by Generals St.-Priest and
Langeron.” The report goes on to state that the Allies had utilized the bridge
that Bülow had built at Elster as well as a second that the Russians con-
structed a little further upstream. At daybreak on the 3rd, the Prussians
499
commenced the passage; Blücher himself crossed at 8:00 and the whole army
by 10:00. Allied cavalry had captured several caissons retreating on the road
to Gräfenhainichen.2 Ney informed Marmont that, “after marching continu-
ously for five days and five nights,” the Silesian Army had bridged the Elbe
at Elster and attacked Bertrand at Wartenburg. After fighting for twelve
hours and inflicting considerable losses on the enemy, Bertrand withdrew
eleven miles west to Klitzschena. Prisoners taken by his troops claimed to be
from the corps of Langeron, Sacken, and Kleist. “The losses of IV Corps are
not considerable because the troops were advantageously posted behind
dikes and abatis; but the Württemberger division, which numbered 1,400
men and was defending the village of Bleddin, was completely destroyed.”
Not known as a gifted strategist, Ney nevertheless recognized the impli-
cations of the operations unfolding around him: “As I find my right thus
turned by very considerable forces and I can be attacked on both banks of
the Mulde by the army of the prince of Sweden, it appears indispensable for
me to retreat on Delitzsch. It is of the utmost importance for the emperor to
immediately take decisive action because, by the 6th, the enemy will be able
to direct more than 100,000 men on Leipzig.” Consequently, Reynier’s corps
continued the retreat from Pötnitz through Raguhn toward Delitzsch, a
march of twenty-four miles; the marshal himself passed the night of 4/5
October at Bitterfeld.3 During the 4th, Bertrand’s IV Corps crossed the
Mulde thirteen miles north of Delitzsch at Raguhn and Jeßnitz; the rear-
guard burnt the bridges and followed the corps south. Bertrand united with
VII Corps and III Cavalry Corps at Delitzsch – thirteen miles north of
Leipzig – to provide Ney with a total of 30,000 men. Reports that a weak
enemy detachment had reached Bad Düben sparked concerns at Blücher’s
headquarters that it represented the vanguard of an imperial army approach-
ing from Leipzig.4
Despite these tidings, good news arrived from Bernadotte on the morn-
ing of the 4th in the form of a letter written the day before. After learning of
Blücher’s crossing of the Elbe, Bernadotte decided that his army would also
start crossing on the 4th. He informed Blücher that Wintzingerode would
push his light cavalry to Jeßnitz, Bitterfeld, Bad Düben, and Delitzsch.
Wintzingerode would unite his main body at Aken while the Swedes would
assemble at Roßlau. Leaving behind his 4th Brigade (6,000 men) to blockade
Wittenberg on the right bank of the Elbe, Bülow would lead his other three
to Roßlau on the morning of the 4th. Tauentzien received orders to assemble
his corps at Coswig, march to Roßlau, and cross the Elbe on the 5th to form
the army’s reserve. “Do me the favor of providing me news of you during
the day so we can march in concert and support each other,” concluded
Bernadotte’s letter to Blücher. Silesian Army Headquarters also learned that
Bülow’s corps had marched at 9:00 a.m. from Nudersdorf – itself five miles
north-northeast of Wittenberg – through Coswig to Roßlau and would
The Mulde 501
commence the river crossing that same day. In fact, although the Swedish
corps already stood at Roßlau, Bernadotte ordered III Corps to cross the
river before them; these orders were later rescinded and the Swedes crossed
on the 4th and the Prussians on the 5th.
The Swedes received orders to reconnoiter Dessau and send patrols on
the road running east from there to Wörlitz. Bernadotte believed the imper-
ials had evacuated Dessau, but wanted the Swedish corps commander,
Stedingk, to proceed with caution and “not fall into a trap.” If the imperials
still held Dessau, Bernadotte wanted the Swedes to attack “without indeci-
sion.” As it turned out, Wintzingerode’s entire corps crossed on the 4th and
pushed its vanguard to Köthen from where small detachments continued
south-southeast to Radegast and Zörbig. Patrols raided deep into Ney’s rear
area by reaching Landsberg and Delitzsch. French reports state that an
enemy force of 2,000 infantry and several guns reached Halle by the 5th.
Meanwhile, Stedingk’s Swedes crossed at Roßlau. While his vanguard pro-
ceeded to Raguhn, the main body marched to Dessau, where Bernadotte
established his headquarters. Bülow’s corps moved into Roßlau. General
Karl Friedrich von Hirschfeld’s brigade from Tauentzien’s corps guarded
the bridge and continued work on a bridgehead.5
With Ney retreating, Blücher’s vanguards obtained little news concern-
ing the location of his main body. In the hope that reports would clarify the
situation, Gneisenau postponed cutting orders for the 4th.6 The guns and
caissons taken at Wartenburg as well as the prisoners and wounded went to
Elster, from where they continued another sixty miles north to Berlin.
Gneisenau, Rauch, Müffling, Rühle, and Oppen inspected Wartenburg and
its environs after sunrise in search of a position for the army should it
confront a numerically superior force led by Napoleon. They did not have
to look very far: Wartenburg and Bleddin provided the optimum site for an
entrenched camp. To build the field works, Blücher issued orders for each of
his 3 corps to provide 4,000 infantry to labor for the pioneers and engineers
in 3 detachments for 7 days and nights under the direction of General Rauch.
The two and one-half miles between Wartenburg and Bleddin would be
entrenched; works included three redoubts on the right wing, one battery
for fifty guns to guard the western approaches to the village of Wartenburg,
and a massive battery for a hundred guns between Wartenburg and Bleddin.
Blücher wanted the camp to be a defensive bastion for 50,000 men. He
instructed each corps to have small detachments comb the stretch between
the Mulde and the Elbe to collect wagons, workers, entrenching tools, and
especially wheelbarrows. With 10 October as the target date for completion,
construction began on the 4th, but the shortage of tools delayed the work
considerably.7
After reports failed to uncover the direction of Bertrand’s retreat, Blü-
cher and Gneisenau decided on a short march southwest. This movement
aimed to find the imperials, establish communication with Bernadotte’s

army, and secure the crossing over the Mulde at Bad Düben.8 Consequently,
Yorck’s soldiers broke camp at 1:00 p.m. on the 4th and trooped five miles to
Rackith-Gaditz followed by Langeron’s men; Sacken’s corps proceeded five
miles to Trebitz. The army’s vanguards and patrols fanned west and south to
Coswig, Oranienbaum, Gräfenhainichen, Bad Düben, Mockrehna, and
Torgau. Blücher’s headquarters moved to Kemberg (see Map 5). On Blücher’s
extreme left, Langeron’s cavalry detachment under Yuzefovich – the
Kievskii and Kharkovskii Dragoons, one Kalmyk regiment, and two guns
from the 2nd Donskoye Cossack Battery – rode south from Pretzsch to
Dommitzsch on the Wittenberg–Torgau highway that ran along the left
bank of the Elbe. At Dommitzsch, less than nine miles north of Torgau
and fifteen miles south of Wartenburg, it surprised a small detachment of
one officer and forty-two men of the 5th Würzburg Battalion guarding a
palisaded redoubt, which the Russians destroyed. It was one of fifteen
redoubts and blockhouses the imperials had built between Dommitzsch
and Meißen to observe the Elbe.9 Yuzefovich and his main body remained
at Dommitzsch, but four miles further south at Neiden his lead elements
captured a blockhouse with a Würzburger garrison of similar size. His
patrols reached the Meißen–Torgau road. Reconnoitering Torgau, they
intercepted a French courier near the city en route from Dresden to Dessau,
capturing his entire forty-man escort. From 3 to 5 October, the Silesian
Army netted some 2,000 prisoners including several couriers.10
At 4:00 p.m., Katzler reported that both Ney and Bertrand had com-
menced the retreat to Leipzig, where they expected to meet Napoleon.
Leipzig itself purportedly contained 10,000 men. Other reports placed
Napoleon at Meißen en route from Dresden. Two hours later, one Prussian
patrol sent to Wörlitz reported the crossing of Bernadotte’s Swedish corps at
Roßlau. For the first time in the war, Bernadotte established his headquarters
south of the Elbe. Langeron’s vanguard reached Bad Düben and its bridge
over the Mulde but could not drive off the imperial post that guarded it. At
9:00, the French departed after completely burning the bridge.11 Sacken’s
vanguard under Vasilchikov reached Bad Schmiedeberg, pushing patrols
toward Eilenburg on the Mulde some eleven miles south of Bad Düben.
A bridgehead guarded the eastern access to the crossing, and locals informed
the Russians that Eilenburg served as headquarters of I Cavalry Corps and
that considerable reinforcements had arrived from Leipzig on the 3rd to
reinforce the garrison.
Blücher and his staff carefully considered the reports concerning
Napoleon. While Allied Headquarters in Bohemia speculated that the
emperor would fall back to Saxony’s second city, the Prussians found the
supporting evidence to be lacking. Instead, Katzler’s report that only 10,000
imperial soldiers stood at Leipzig influenced their planning. Added to Ney’s
The Mulde 503
army, this meant merely 60,000–70,000 men would be at hand for the
emperor. With such paltry numbers awaiting him, Napoleon certainly
would arrive with numerous reinforcements. As the patrols found no sign
of large-scale movements, Blücher dismissed the rumor that Napoleon
would soon reach Leipzig. It helped that Bubna’s 3 October report – con-
firming Napoleon’s presence at Dresden as of the 3rd and that the main body
of the French army stood between Freiberg and Nossen – reached Blücher
on the 5th. Moreover, Blücher knew that Schwarzenberg’s great “left wheel”
northwest toward Chemnitz and Zwickau should have commenced already
and that his movement through the Erzgebirge would probably attract
Napoleon’s attention. Blücher and Gneisenau decided that the best course
of action for the Silesian Army would be to drive to the Mulde, throw back
Ney, arrive at Leipzig on the 6th, and unite with the Army of North
Germany on the 8th.12 Momentarily delayed by the destruction of Bad
Düben’s bridge, Gneisenau decided late on the 4th that operations would
resume on 5 October with the vanguards of all three corps reaching the
Mulde. However, only the cavalry would cross to scour the region between
Leipzig and Dessau. Late on the morning of the 5th, he ordered the army to
move closer to the Mulde. Thus, Yorck proceeded toward Gräfenhainichen,
Langeron to Bad Düben, and Sacken to Dahlenberg. Blücher insisted that his
corps commanders ensure the safety of the inhabitants. In particular, he did
not want the officers or soldiers stealing horses.13
Meanwhile, seven squadrons from Yorck’s vanguard moved across the
repaired bridge over the Mulde at Raguhn and advanced south on the road to
Delitzsch. More than halfway to Delitzsch, Polish troops from Da˛browski’s
27th Division forced the Prussian horse to turn back. Polish troops likewise
prevented Katzler from fording the Mulde at Mühlbeck with the bulk of
Yorck’s vanguard. Yorck’s main body reached Gräfenhainichen, ten miles
northeast of Mühlbeck that afternoon but remained too distant to support
the van. Nevertheless, pressure from Bernadotte’s Russian cavalry eventually
forced Fournier’s 6th Light Cavalry and Defrance’s 4th Heavy Cavalry
Divisions to retreat to Delitzsch; Da˛browski likewise withdrew his 27th
Division to Delitzsch after evacuating Bitterfeld. By nightfall on the 5th,
Ney’s forces held a short line extending ten miles east from Delitzsch to
Naundorf.14 Moreover, Marmont refused to comply with Ney’s request to
debouch eastward through Eilenburg. Instead, he withdrew and broke the
bridge, earning a rebuke from Imperial Headquarters.15 Regardless, the
combined advance of the Silesian and North German Armies along with
Marmont’s intransigence broke Ney’s resolution to hold the line of the
Mulde. He planned to move closer to Leipzig.16
Elsewhere, Korf led all of Langeron’s cavalry toward Bad Düben,
encountering Ney’s weak post there as well as imperial pickets along the
left bank of the Mulde. Aided by the fire of horse artillery from the opposite
bank, one Cossack regiment that swam across the river drove the French
from the town and started rebuilding the bridge over the Mulde. Later in the
day, the imperials – Marmont’s division – returned to Bad Düben, ejected the
Cossacks, and unlimbered cannon to prevent the Russians from continuing
their work on the bridge. Bad Düben went up in flames during the ensuing
artillery engagement. As Langeron’s main body approached, the Russians
managed to move up sufficient guns to silence the French artillery. By
nightfall on the 5th, all of Langeron’s corps reached Bad Düben, where
Army Headquarters also passed the night amidst the smoldering remains
of the town.17
East of Langeron, Sacken’s vanguard pushed south to Weidenhain, send-
ing patrols to Wurzen, Schildau, and the Dresden–Leipzig road; his main
body reached Dahlenberg, eleven miles east of Bad Düben. On Blücher’s
extreme left flank, Langeron’s cavalry detachment under Yuzefovich
patrolled from Dommitzsch toward Torgau. At Süptitz, less than four miles
east of Torgau, the Russians surprised another company of Würzburgers
guarding a blockhouse; they captured a second small garrison holding a
blockhouse further south. Reaching the Meißen–Torgau road, one of
Yuzefovich’s patrols intercepted a courier dispatched from Dresden on the
night of 3/4 October with correspondence for Marshal Ney. The letters he
bore offered little information but his verbal testimony placed Napoleon at
Dresden at the time the courier had departed. This confirmed Bubna’s report
that Napoleon and the Old Guard stood at Dresden as of 3 October.
Napoleon at Dresden meant the Grande Armée stood between the Mulde
and the Elbe. Consequently, Blücher decided to drop his plan to force the
passage of the former on the 6th. Instead, he would await the emperor’s next
move. For now, the Silesian Army would push further south toward Dres-
den to better observe Napoleon’s movements. If he crossed the Mulde,
Blücher planned to sacrifice his own line of communication by likewise
crossing the Mulde and uniting with Bernadotte.18
Northwest of Blücher, Bernadotte intended to concentrate the 80,000
men of the Army of North Germany in the square formed by the towns of
Aken, Köthen, Jeßnitz, and Dessau (see Map 5). On the 5th, Bülow’s Prussians
followed the Swedes across the Elbe but continued ten miles south of Dessau
to Hinsdorf, with Borstell’s brigade reaching Jeßnitz on the banks of the Mulde
some eight miles east of the main body. Wintzingerode’s Russians and
Stedingk’s Swedes received a day of rest. Tauentzien reached Dessau with
one brigade while his second remained at Roßlau. Along the right bank of
the Elbe, General Heinrich Ludwig von Thümen observed Wittenberg with
Bülow’s 4th Brigade while General Karl George von Wobeser’s brigade from
Tauentzien’s corps monitored Torgau.19 Cossacks continued to unsettle Ney’s
rear areas by prowling as far south as Delitzsch and Landsberg, where they
encountered the 6th Light and 4th Heavy Cavalry Divisions of III Cavalry
The Mulde 505
Corps. The Russian warriors retreated for the moment, taking 120 prisoners
with them, but their constant pressure unnerved the imperial horsemen and
contributed to Ney’s decision to retreat to Delitzsch.20
With Blücher’s advance on Gräfenhainichen, Bad Düben, and
Dahlenberg threatening to cut his communication with Dresden and thus
the Grande Armée, Ney destroyed all of the bridges across the Mulde and
planned to withdraw IV and VII Corps along with 27th Division fourteen
miles east-southeast from Delitzsch to Eilenburg on the 6th. Before
departing from Delitzsch, he informed Marmont of a critical shortage of
ammunition. In fact, IV Corps had none after the vicious firefight at
Wartenburg. He asked Marmont to provide Bertrand with enough muni-
tions for six 12-pound guns, two 6-inch mortars, twelve 6-pound guns, and
four 24-pound mortars as well as ten caissons of cartridges for the infantry.
“We are certain that a considerable depot exists at Torgau and that it
contains, among other things, more than one million rounds in reserve;
you can resupply yourself from this city,” wrote Ney.21
By transferring his headquarters to Eilenburg on 6 October, Ney actually
moved closer to Blücher’s command post eleven miles to his north at Bad
Düben. Yet at Eilenburg, Ney increased his forces to 50,000 men by uniting
with I and V Cavalry Corps. From his headquarters halfway between Bad
Düben and Eilenburg, Marmont suggested defending the Mulde. “My dear
marshal,” responded Ney, “I received the letter you wrote me today from
Hohenpriesnitz. It is not, I believe, [necessary] to concentrate at Eilenburg
to hold this outlet but to unite as quickly as possible at Leipzig.” He
insinuated that the Allies would overrun his position at any moment and
requested that Marmont withdraw VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps west to a
central position at Luckowehna. With Blücher’s back to the Mulde, Ney did
not believe he would engage an imperial army consisting of three infantry
and two cavalry corps. In this case, they could maintain their position for
another day. “Should the enemy show only weak forces,” Ney instructed the
junior marshal, “we can offer resistance along the Delitzsch–Luckowehna
front. In the opposite case, we can fall back in unison. Messages from the
emperor will probably arrive by that time and hopefully His Majesty will
play a great role. If you think it fit to unite at Luckowehna or Krostitz, I’ll
await the enemy tomorrow at Delitzsch. I await, my dear marshal, your
response to my proposal before I make my final arrangements.”22
Marmont received this letter during the night of 5/6 October. He dis-
agreed, seeing no satisfactory reason to surrender the line of the Mulde to
Blücher. To add to his disgruntlement, the emperor’s orders arrived, which
placed him under Ney’s command, leaving him little choice but to bow to
Ney’s wishes. Nevertheless, he delayed evacuating his position throughout
the daylight hours of the 6th. Writing to Ney at 4:00 that morning, Marmont
explained that the Allies had managed to repair the bridge over the Mulde at
Bad Düben. Consequently, he could not withdraw from his position during
the day because he did not want to see his rearguard mauled by the Allies.23
Meanwhile, Ney also received the emperor’s orders and instructions that
placed VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps as well as III Corps under his
direction. At 6:00 on the morning of the 6th, he changed his mind about
making a stand at Delitzsch and withdrawing south on Leipzig. Instead, the
marshal wanted to move his army closer to the emperor. Thus, he proposed
crossing the Mulde and streaking east toward Torgau to unite with III
Corps. To allow enough time for Marmont’s VI Corps to move across the
Mulde at Eilenburg, Ney planned to maintain his positions until 4:00 p.m.
on the 6th. At that hour, IV and VII Corps as well as the cavalry would troop
seventeen miles southeast to cross the Mulde at Wurzen and then proceed
another eleven miles northeast to Schildau. “After passing Eilenburg, take a
position at Mockrehna and Langenreichenbach; we will then be situated to
march against the enemy’s flank,” he instructed Marmont.24
Although Ney assured Marmont that he would remain at Wölkau until
4:00, he commenced the march to Wurzen at 1:00 p.m. on the 6th. Already
aggravated by Ney’s evacuation of the Mulde, Marmont became furious over
his senior colleague’s sprint to Wurzen, which uncovered the left flank of VI
Corps. Exasperated, Marmont remained on the heights of Eilenburg.
A miffed Ney complained to Berthier that Marmont “did not judge it
appropriate to debouch through Eilenburg.” Marmont received another
order from Ney around nightfall instructing him to march south to Taucha
to better cover Leipzig and guard a convoy coming from Naumburg. Ney
also instructed him to conduct reconnaissance east of Eilenburg. “Marshal
Ney,” Marmont later wrote, “brave and intrepid soldier, man of the battle-
field, understood nothing about combined movements. His mind was terri-
fied of what he could not see. Calculations never dictated his actions.” After
receiving this dispatch, Marmont fired his own complaint to the emperor:
“In the interest of the service, I will take the liberty to speak openly: it is
indispensable that you come here. If you do not come, we will conduct the
poorest business, which I fully believe to be the case based on the measures
I see being taken. Had I complied with the first order that I received, I would
have placed the army in the worst situation possible because it was given
without any consideration of time or purpose. To avoid pestering you, I will
not go any further into the details but will limit myself to repeating with
certainty that nothing can be more counterproductive for your service in the
poor situation that we are in than to see the leadership of the operation
entrusted in the current hands.” This letter earned a response via Berthier:
“His Majesty has received the letter that you wrote to him. It is insignificant.
Send all the information you have on the enemy.”25
A furious Marmont led VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps to Taucha – a march
of eight miles southwest from Eilenburg – that same night (see Map 5). He also
The Mulde 507
ordered Souham to march west from Torgau to Eilenburg – an odd move

considering Ney’s plan to lead IV and VII Corps and III Cavalry Corps east
from Wurzen to Torgau. One possible explanation is that Marmont believed
Ney had exaggerated the threat posed by Blücher. As for Ney, despite
starting his march three hours early, only III Cavalry Corps reached Wur-
zen; the rest of his army camped at various points along the left bank of the
Mulde between Eilenburg and Wurzen. Ney himself reached Bennewitz,
across the Mulde from Wurzen. Da˛browski’s division, which had remained
at Delitzsch to cover Marmont’s march, departed for Taucha at 1:00 a.m. on
the 7th swarmed by Cossacks and Allied light cavalry. Twenty miles north-
east of Wurzen, III Corps assembled at Torgau on the 6th. At 7:00 p.m. on
the 6th, Ney reported to Berthier that the enemy appeared to have
renounced his intentions to immediately march on Leipzig. Instead, Blücher
seemed intent on defending the right bank of the Mulde and awaiting the fall
of Wittenberg. One column of enemy cavalry and artillery marched up the
Mulde while the Cossacks held Wurzen. Ney planned to send a strong
detachment from Dahlen toward Torgau to establish contact with III Corps.
He hoped to unite VII and IV Corps as well as the divisions under Da˛b-
rowski and Fournier in the region of Bennewitz.26
To be prepared to counter Napoleon, Blücher wanted confirmation that
Bernadotte would keep his word. In a letter dated 5 October, he reminded
the crown prince that “your army and the Silesian [Army] have Leipzig as
the objective of their operations” based on the tsar’s instructions of 25
September. “Thus,” he continued, “three suppositions must be taken into
consideration: (1) the enemy undertakes offensive movements against both
of our armies; (2) the enemy stands firm and awaits us on the plains of
Leipzig; (3) the enemy withdraws his forces from Leipzig to attack the
Bohemian Army. The first condition subdivides into three: (A) the enemy
turns against your army; (B) the enemy turns against the Silesian Army; or
(C) the enemy turns against both. It appears that we can assume the
following principle: the army that is attacked by superior forces will fall
back one march while the other maintains its position to fix the enemy or to
attack him in the flank and rear.” He informed Bernadotte of the entrenched
camp under construction at Wartenburg, exaggerating its size by claiming
that it could hold 150,000 men. If a superior enemy forced the Silesian Army
to retreat into this camp, Blücher wanted Bernadotte to move his left wing
toward Kemberg while taking the offensive with his right. In fairness, he
conceded that Bernadotte would “have the honor of determining the move-
ments that the Silesian Army would make as soon as the enemy turns
against you.”
Regarding the second supposition, Blücher flatly stated: “If we receive
confirmed news from the Bohemian Army . . . then it would be very advan-
tageous to attack the enemy the same day this information arrives.”
According to all reports, the imperials apparently posted separate armies at

Leipzig, Altenburg, and Dresden. “The first two can unite very quickly to
fight. Your Streifkorps that stand along the Saale and are disrupting enemy
communication can provide news of the enemy’s positions and intentions
while those of the Silesian Army can advance toward Wurzen and
Hubertusburg to hinder the enemy’s march between Dresden and Leipzig.
Thus, for the second supposition, we only have to ascertain the enemy’s
strength and position to determine the day and the point of attack.”
Concerning the third supposition, Blücher insisted on maintaining con-
tact with the imperials: “It appears that the vanguards of the Allied armies,
each a strength of 20,000 men, with numerous cavalry and horse artillery,
must always remain close to the enemy and fall on his rearguard while the
armies themselves follow one strong march behind them. In this case, the
direction of Merseburg and Weißenfels may offer the greatest advantage for
your army; for the Silesian Army, [it will be] the direction between the
Mulde and the (White) Elster.”27
On the 6th, Bernadotte responded: “I received your letter from yester-
day. The memo that it contains is in complete agreement with my ideas . . .
but due to the circumstances, which are so crucial, we cannot do enough to
guard against [unforeseen] events. This consideration, as well as the longing
to renew an old acquaintance with you, stirs in me the wish for us to meet if
possible at Mühlbeck, where we can speak with each other and through a
discussion we can cut short what takes so long to write.” He notified
Blücher of his intention to transfer his headquarters to Zehbitz, twenty-
five miles west of Bad Düben, on the 7th. With Mühlbeck roughly in the
middle of their respective command posts, the crown prince proposed a
meeting on the evening of the 7th.28
As noted, Blücher halted operations on 6 October until reports clarified
the overall situation. Moreover, he wanted the entrenched camp at
Wartenburg completed before he commenced a general offensive. In his
immediate vicinity, Blücher estimated that one division faced Langeron at
Bad Düben and appeared to be awaiting his attack. Thirteen miles south of
Bad Düben, a second imperial division held Eilenburg and its bridge over the
Mulde, which the French secured through a bridgehead on the eastern bank.
Both divisions belonged to VI Corps. Late on the 6th, the imperials evacu-
ated Delitzsch and withdrew toward Eilenburg, thus enabling Emmanuel to
strike the road to Leipzig with Langeron’s vanguard cavalry. Blücher knew
that the Army of North Germany had crossed the Elbe and that its outposts
had reached the hills of Bitterfeld, thirteen miles west of Bad Düben. He also
learned from Katzler that Bernadotte’s advance had forced Da˛browski’s 27th
Division to withdraw southwest from Mühlbeck toward Leipzig during the
night of 5/6 October. Based on this news, Blücher believed his right wing to
be “completely secure and all our attention must now be directed to our left
The Mulde 509
flank.” Regarding his left, one of Sacken’s patrols captured a courier sent
from the frantic governor of Torgau, General Louis Narbonne, to Marmont
at Eilenburg with a letter stating that Blücher was marching on Torgau and
that his vanguard had already reached Dommitzsch. Word had spread and
soon Napoleon would know for certain that the Silesian Army had crossed
the Elbe.29
Blücher received this intercepted dispatch along with a short note from
Sacken on the morning of the 6th. Sacken communicated the news he had
received from Colonel Madatov at Mühlbeck on the Elbe: his patrols had
found endless troop columns along the left bank of the river stretching for
forty miles from Dresden through Meißen to Strehla. Numerous bivouac
fires – those of III Corps en route to Torgau – had dotted the environs of
Strehla during the previous night (4/5 October). With admirable prudence
and patience, Blücher decided to await further reports from Sacken before
determining the army’s next move. He responded by instructing Sacken to
rest his main body but to push forward his “vanguard and partisans as far as
possible in order to be correctly oriented over the troop masses that are in
movement on the highway from Dresden to Leipzig. The most important
point for us is to know whether the emperor Napoleon is leading a consider-
able mass against us in the stretch between the Elbe and the Mulde from
Dresden, Freiberg, or Wurzen. In this case, a rapid concentration of all our
corps will be necessary. But to be able to do this early enough, I must be
informed in time by you of the enemy’s movement and I am certain . . . that
it will be impossible for us to be surprised from this direction.” At the
moment, Yuzefovich’s detachment from Langeron’s corps had the important
task of observing Torgau and thus the army’s left flank. After the breakout at
Wartenburg, Sacken’s corps moved to the left wing. As a result, Blücher
directed Yuzefovich to Eilenburg and ordered Sacken to observe the Elbe
from Torgau upstream.30
That same morning, 6 October, Blücher forwarded copies of several
intelligence reports as well as Narbonne’s intercepted dispatch to the crown
prince of Sweden. Not only does his cover letter provide a snapshot of the
prevailing views at Silesian Army Headquarters, but it is also interesting for
what the communiqué leaves unsaid: “The enemy has taken a position vis-à-
vis Bad Düben. Yesterday, he attempted to stop us from rebuilding the
bridge. He must have received reinforcements from Leipzig because today
he showed a lot of infantry who, during the night, dug a trench to defend the
passage. Eilenburg as well as the entire left bank of the Mulde is occupied by
the enemy’s VI Corps. Yesterday, reinforcements from Leipzig arrived at
Eilenburg.” Regarding Napoleon, Blücher informed the prince royal that
the captured courier who had departed from Dresden on the night of 3/4
October placed the emperor and his Guard at the Saxon capital as of the 3rd.
“My posts before Dresden,” continued Blücher, “inform me that everything
there remains unchanged.” To avoid spooking Bernadotte, he made no

mention of the troop columns moving northwest from Dresden to Strehla.
All Blücher revealed was that he had issued orders to drive further south
between the Elbe and the Mulde “to determine whether the emperor is at
Dresden or if he is marching to Freiberg or Leipzig.” His cover letter
concluded: “I believe the enemy will evacuate the Mulde as soon as he learns
that your troops have reached Delitzsch. Then I will fall on him with my
entire cavalry.” That evening, he received the crown prince’s response to his
5 October treatise in which Bernadotte requested a meeting at Mühlbeck on
the evening of the 7th. “Gneisenau,” explained Müffling, “who hated the
crown prince with every fiber of his being, believed that more could be
achieved with him by verbal intercourse than by written negotiations.”
Thus, Blücher accepted Bernadotte’s invitation.31
On 6 October, Blücher and Gneisenau decided against a further advance.
Per Müffling’s cautious advice, Blücher chose to remain at the Mulde and to
await the Bohemian Army’s drive on Leipzig. “Alone and without the
cooperation of the neighboring army,” noted Müffling in his history of the
Silesian Army, “the commanding general could proceed no further. His
army consisted of approximately 60,000 men and his entrenchments at
Wartenburg could not be completed until 12 October.”32 Yet the pursuit
of Ney’s army drew Blücher’s vanguards across the Mulde. Rudzevich found
an imperial division of approximately 6,000 infantry and 2 heavy cavalry
regiments in battle order at Hohenprießnitz on the Mulde between Bad
Düben and Eilenburg. Cossacks had purportedly forced the French to
retreat two miles south along the left bank to Zschepplin. This allowed
Emmanuel to lead the cavalry of the Russian vanguard across the Mulde at
Hohenprießnitz and pursue to Zschepplin.33 Fourteen miles downstream of
Hohenprießnitz, the East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment led Katzler’s
vanguard across the Mulde at Mühlbeck in pursuit of Da˛browski’s division.
The East Prussian commander, Major Karl Friedrich Ludwig von Lehndorff,
reported that the enemy had retreated south toward Eilenburg and Taucha
and that Delitzsch should be free. Vasilchikov added his belief that the
French appeared to be retreating from Eilenburg to Wurzen (see Map 5).
A letter from Bennigsen dated 4 October indicated that 60,000 men of the
Bohemian Army had commenced the advance toward Leipzig on that day and
that Allied Headquarters would follow from Teplitz on the 5th. Bennigsen also
planned “to make a movement on the left bank of the Elbe with a part of my
army in order to at least support your bold operation strategically.”34 Despite
this good news concerning Ney’s forces and Schwarzenberg’s advance, Lan-
geron delivered pivotal tidings: “General Yuzefovich reported that based on
the quantity of troops that are between Meißen and Torgau it is probable that
the enemy will soon attack our left wing and thus it would be expedient to
strongly reinforce the post at Dommitzsch.”35
The Mulde 511
Based on these reports, the leadership of the Silesian Army reached a

decision on 7 October. “A complete change in the judgment of the strategic
situation appears to have taken place, which was probably due to Blücher
himself. The prolonged standstill at the Mulde hardly corresponded to the
character of the commander. His bold way of thinking obviously favored a
continuation of the advance, making him master of Leipzig, and from there
striving to unite with the Bohemian Army and delivering a decisive battle
wherever Napoleon was found.”36 Thus wrote Major Friederich in 1904. In
the century that has passed since the Historical Section of Germany’s Great
General Staff published its official history of the war, nothing of note has
surfaced to counter the assertion of this erudite scholar. Not one soul at
Blücher’s headquarters knew exactly where Schwarzenberg’s army stood on
7 October, but that mattered little. All assumed that the Austrian, Russian,
and Prussian legions of the Allied Grand Army were beating the plains of
Saxony.37 To comply with basic strategy, the needs of coalition warfare, and
the spirit of the Reichenbach Plan, not to mention honor itself, Blücher felt
he had to do his utmost to immediately move his army closer to Schwarzen-
berg. Overcoming Müffling’s caution proved easy enough, but would Blü-
cher be able to convince the crown prince of Sweden to participate in this
operation?
During the course of 6 September, Bülow’s corps trooped southeast to
Jeßnitz. His vanguard, Borstell’s 5th Brigade, reached Bitterfeld, with for-
ward troops coming within six miles of Delitzsch and linking with Yorck’s
cavalry to the east. The Swedes and Russians remained in their positions: the
former at Dessau with their vanguard at Raguhn, the latter at Aken with
their van at Köthen. In total, the combined outpost line of the Silesian and
North German Armies extended forty-five miles east from Halle on the
Saale to Dommitzsch on the Elbe.38 That evening, Yorck dined with Bülow
at Jeßnitz. Like Blücher, Yorck had bad history with Bülow. Nevertheless,
the two corps commanders found common ground in their complaints about
their respective commanders. An intense conversation took place at the
table. “Jawohl,” said Yorck, “the Old Hussar chased me across the Elbe
and here we sit without any communication with the opposite bank; if
Napoleon realizes this situation, he can drive us into the Elbe to such a
degree that no one will escape. But this is the work of the clever gentlemen at
headquarters, this Gneisenau, this Müffling: this is a mess that can no longer
be tolerated.” “At least yours will take the bait,” responded Bülow, “my
generalissimo always thinks of running away; we brought him to this point
only with great difficulty but, should Napoleon turn against us, I believe he
will immediately race across the Elbe and drag us with him.”39
While Bülow and Yorck carped about their respective superiors, Blücher
hoped to win over Bernadotte. Success appeared elusive after the old Prus-
sian received a letter from him on the morning of the 7th that responded to
the intelligence reports Blücher forwarded to his headquarters the previous

day. Not surprisingly, the crown prince expressed a substantially different
view of the situation. Bernadotte pointed to the report that placed Napoleon
at Dresden on 3 October. Claiming that he had yet to receive any news that
indicated the emperor had left the Saxon capital, Bernadotte attempted to
turn the tables on Blücher and spook him. “His insistence on holding this
city suggests that he may intend a desperate strike. Thus, we must stop at
nothing to be informed of his decision at least twenty-four hours in advance.
I believe we must hold ourselves fast and avoid giving him an opening.”
Bernadotte continued by sharing his intelligence. One recent report pin-
pointed the march of 8,000–10,000 men to Hamburg purportedly to replace
a division that had departed for Magdeburg. He also claimed that General
Pierre Lanusse’s 6,000-man division from Magdeburg had concentrated at
Calbe on the Saale with orders to immediately advance against the bridge at
Aken as soon as the Army of North Germany moved south. Along with this
attack on his right, he speculated – correctly – that Napoleon would target
Blücher’s left. “This operation, which was ordered by the emperor himself,
makes me believe that he intends to attack your left wing. You are in a better
position than me to ascertain his movements. With much desire I await the
news that you have the goodness to communicate to me. In the meantime,
I will attack the enemy by Aken and Bernburg tomorrow.”40
Based on the march of Lanusse’s 6,000 men to Calbe, Bernadotte
informed his corps commanders that this signaled Napoleon’s intention to
attack Blücher’s left. To prevent Lanusse from taking the bridge at Aken, the
crown prince ordered Hirschfeld’s brigade to arrive there by 7:00 a.m. on
the 8th. He also instructed Lieutenant-Colonel Ludwig von der Marwitz to
move his Prussian Streifkorps as close as possible to Magdeburg to prevent
the French from reinforcing Lanusse. During the 7th, Tauentzien’s IV Corps
remained in the Roßlau–Dessau area while the Russians and Swedes
marched to Radegast to come on line with Bülow’s corps, which extended
from Hinsdorf to Jeßnitz. Wintzingerode’s vanguard, commanded by
Vorontsov, stood closest to Leipzig. With his command post at Sylbitz,
Vorontsov’s pickets stretched along the Halle–Landsberg–Delitzsch line
(see Map 5). Cavalry detachments and Cossacks patrolled from the suburbs
of Leipzig to Halle. Skirmishing with French cavalry ensued throughout the
day. That evening, the Cossacks repulsed French cavalry coming from
Leipzig, pursuing them to the very gates of the city. Of particular note,
Wintzingerode’s Cossacks established communication with those of
Schwarzenberg’s army. The news soon reached Bernadotte and Blücher
that the Bohemian Army had reached Chemnitz, fifty-three miles south of
Leipzig, and would continue to Altenburg.41
On the morning of the 7th, Ney informed Marmont that to facilitate
communication between them VII Corps would throw another bridge
The Mulde 513
across the Mulde at Kollau, four miles upstream of Eilenburg. Ney added
that IV Corps would continue toward Torgau with the goal of uniting with
III Corps “if it is still close to this place.” “Give orders so that all convoys
between Leipzig and Erfurt arrive hastily at the former; recall all detach-
ments and remain concentrated. As you have noted, gaining time is no
longer an issue; the emperor, who is definitely moving, undoubtedly will
soon change the face of the affair.” After receiving Reynier’s report that
Marmont’s division had completely evacuated Eilenburg and marched to
Taucha the previous night, Ney ordered the general to detach 1,000 to 1,200
men to guard the bridge. He also gently admonished Marmont by explaining
that the Eilenburg bridge would become “an important débouché at the
moment the reinforcements arrive that the emperor is leading in person,
thus announcing that we will resume the offensive.” He also informed
Berthier that, on the previous day, the Cossacks had delivered a proclam-
ation to Wurzen announcing that Blücher would march on Leipzig with
60,000 men and that the French army had been destroyed.42
Ney’s troops did not make much progress on 7 October. Reynier’s VII
Corps assembled at Püchau, less than two miles west of Bennewitz, and
Da˛browski’s 27th took post near Wurzen. Ney’s orders to Bertrand directed
IV Corps through Wurzen to Schildau in the direction of Torgau to seek
contact with III Corps but only 12th Division attained this objective.
Bertrand’s 15th and 38th Divisions trooped six miles east to Falkenhain
because for several hours they had waited in vain for the emperor to arrive
at Wurzen. Elsewhere, III Corps completed its march west by reaching
Wurzen. Marmont’s VI Corps remained at Taucha; and I Cavalry Corps
bivouacked along the Leipzig–Wurzen road. Meanwhile, the reconnaissance
by VI Corps that Ney requested to be conducted east of Eilenburg found
nothing but enemy cavalry patrols. This led Ney to believe that “the enemy
has his principal forces at Bad Düben and downstream from there.”43
Although confirming that Ney had evacuated the left bank of the Mulde,
the intelligence that reached Silesian Army Headquarters during the course
of 7 October proved so contradictory that Blücher’s staff could not deter-
mine the enemy’s intentions. “The movements of the various enemy corps
seemed to cause a great deal of surprise amongst our own and much indeci-
sion,” recalled Langeron. Katzler confirmed the news that the French had
evacuated Delitzsch during the night and that all imperial forces appeared to
be withdrawing southwest to Taucha and Eilenburg, six and fourteen miles
northeast of Leipzig respectively. The East Prussian National Cavalry
Regiment as well as Borstell’s 5th Brigade and Bülow’s Cossacks were
pursuing. At 10:30 on the morning of the 7th, Blücher received a report
from Emmanuel at Zschepplin written at 9:30 a.m. stating that Lukovkin’s
Cossacks had followed the French after they evacuated that village and
retreated through Eilenburg, which the Russians occupied. Lukovkin’s
patrols crossed the Mulde and likewise pursued the imperials; Emmanuel
himself struck the road that ran from Bad Düben to Leipzig. Lukovkin
confirmed the enemy’s evacuation of Eilenburg and the destruction of its
bridge over the Mulde. Other reports claimed that Marmont with 12,000
men and part of I Cavalry Corps had stood at Bad Düben before retreating
to Zschepplin on 6 October and toward Eilenburg on the 7th. “I await
confirmation of this,” Blücher explained to the king; “I can offer no explan-
ation of this movement . . . [but] a traveler arrived here from Leipzig without
having encountered a single enemy soldier.”44
Based on these reports as well as the knowledge that Schwarzenberg had
commenced his offensive, the Prussians concluded that Napoleon would
soon lead his masses from Dresden. Blücher and his staff assumed that he
intended to unite his forces at Leipzig either to accept a battle there or lead
his army from there against either Schwarzenberg or Blücher and
Bernadotte. The march west of Souham’s III Corps particularly baffled the
Prussians. A message from Yuzefovich sent at 5:00 a.m. from
Langenreichenbach and delivered to Blücher at noon reported the arrival
of 35,000 imperials (III Corps and the 10th Hussar Regiment) at Torgau on
the evening of 6 October. Although this development perplexed the Prus-
sians, they bowed to caution and decided to reinforce the army’s left wing.
Langeron received instructions to move his IX and X Infantry Corps from
Bad Düben ten miles northeast to Bad Schmiedeberg to support Sacken if
necessary. Moreover, Blücher ordered Shcherbatov to quickly cross the Elbe
“somewhere between Meißen and Torgau” as soon as the enemy evacuated
the left bank. After crossing, Blücher wanted the Russian commander “to
operate in the rear of the enemy columns and link with my left wing.” 45
Around 1:00 on the afternoon of the 7th, Blücher received news con-
cerning the march of Souham’s III Corps from Torgau southwest toward
Schildau. Silesian Army Headquarters could not determine if III Corps had
relieved Torgau’s garrison, which had then commenced the march to Schil-
dau, or if Souham had reinforced it and then continued to Schildau with the
remaining units of his command.46 Blücher recognized that the reinforce-
ment of Torgau’s garrison could be the preliminary step for an operation
along the right bank of the Elbe against his bridge at Wartenburg–Elster, the
latter standing only twenty-five miles downstream of Torgau. To alert
Wobeser, whose brigade was observing Torgau from the right bank of the
Elbe, Blücher wrote directly to him, bypassing both Bernadotte and Tauent-
zien, his immediate superiors. Should significant forces emerge from Torgau
on the right bank, Blücher instructed Wobeser to withdraw to Jeßen “to
cover our bridge over the Elbe at Elster, destroying all bridges over the Black
Elster from its mouth to as far above Herzberg as it is in your ability to
do.”47 Blücher instructed Sacken to double his attention on Torgau,
reinforce his post at Dommitzsch, and “remain ready to fall on the enemy’s
The Mulde 515
throat” if he attempted to advance downstream along the left bank of the

Elbe from Torgau toward Wartenburg. He also requested confirmation from
Sacken regarding the report of Souham’s march from Torgau toward
Schildau.48
From 1:00 p.m. onward during 7 October, reports of imperial troop
movements flooded Blücher’s headquarters in rapid succession. Vasilchikov
informed Blücher “that the enemy is moving from Belgern and Dahlen in
great masses. All reports indicate that great enemy masses face our left
flank.” Sacken also detected large French camps on the left bank of the
Mulde just west of Wurzen at Bennewitz. In addition, one of his patrols
reported the arrival of large French forces at Schildau. Lastly, Sacken for-
warded a message from the magistrate of Eilenburg stating that Marmont’s
VI Corps and Reynier’s VII Corps – both of which had stood in and around
Eilenburg – had retreated in the night. Where they had gone the Saxon civil
official did not know, but French forces stood six miles west of Eilenburg at
Liemehna on the road to Leipzig. Marshal Ney had likewise marched
through Eilenburg to Wurzen. More importantly, the magistrate reported
that Napoleon’s baggage as well as Murat’s had passed through Eilenburg
during the night en route to Leipzig. Although quarters had been arranged
for Napoleon at Eilenburg, they remained vacant. This led the magistrate to
believe that Napoleon had passed the night at Eilenburg incognito. Finally, a
second report from Vasilchikov written around 4:30 that afternoon stated
that imperial forces occupied the villages of Langenreichenbach, Wildschütz,
and Schöna. To the Russian general, the enemy appeared to be headed for
Eilenburg to cover the advance from Torgau through Schildau to Wurzen.
Locals confirmed the conclusions drawn by his patrols that the imperials
planned to move considerable forces through Schildau to Wurzen, itself less
than twenty miles up the Mulde from Blücher’s headquarters at Bad Düben.
Prisoners taken from the Torgau region confirmed the arrival and departure
of Souham’s III Corps but could not state where it had gone. Thus far,
Vasilchikov’s post at Mockrehna, halfway between Torgau and Eilenburg,
had not been attacked. Thick forests shielded the imperials from roving
Cossacks, which meant few prisoners were brought in for interrogation.49
Some of these reports had not yet reached Silesian Army Headquarters
when Blücher and Prince William of Prussia commenced the eleven-mile
ride west from Bad Düben to Mühlbeck for the rendezvous with
Bernadotte, who had to travel fourteen miles east from Zehbitz. “General
Blücher required an interpreter for this – a role that Gneisenau absolutely
refused to play but to my great horror entrusted to me,” recounted Müffling.
Gneisenau declined to accompany Blücher, mainly because of his aversion to
the native Frenchman. Of course, Gneisenau publicly stated that he could
not distance himself from headquarters in the midst of such a tense situation.
He drafted instructions for Müffling, which the latter terms “impracticable,”
concerning the proposals Blücher should present to the crown prince. Müf-
fling claimed that Bernadotte, accompanied by Bülow and Carl Johan
Adlerkreutz, met Blücher on his arrival that evening. Calling him “mon cher
frère d’armes [my dear brother-in-arms],” Bernadotte embraced Blücher
with the bonhomie of an old soldier.
While Müffling employed his French language skills to explain Gneise-
nau’s proposals for the march on Leipzig, the crown prince sat “nodding all
the time kindly” to Blücher. The Prussian expressed the need for an advance
on Leipzig by both armies. By distracting and containing the emperor, they
would facilitate Schwarzenberg’s march through Saxony. Bernadotte coun-
tered that the most important service they could do for the Bohemian Army
would be to entice Napoleon to the Mulde. “Then he began,” continues
Müffling, “and spoke at first with the finest phrases in the sense we desired;
but he gradually deviated in essential parts so materially that our proposition
was no longer at all the same. He concluded with the words: ‘Ainsi nous
sommes d’accord [there, we agree].’”
Yet their two positions remained far apart. Blücher sought a battle to
provide time for Schwarzenberg to advance. He believed they could strike
the imperials before Napoleon could concentrate all his forces. Conversely,
Bernadotte did not want a battle, either sooner or later. Although he
attempted to give the impression that he did indeed seek a battle, his words
betrayed him. Müffling pointed out the differences between their two pos-
itions but Bernadotte “contrived to gloss over all my arguments with the
ease natural to a Frenchman, and always repeated, turning to the general,
‘mais nous sommes d’accord [but we agree].’” Mainly, the crown prince
argued that a battle should be sought on the lower Mulde. In this way, they
could entice imperial forces to march north from Dresden and Leipzig, thus
opening the road to the latter for Schwarzenberg. Müffling countered that
the exact opposite would occur. Instead of marching to confront the Silesian
and North German Armies on the Mulde, Napoleon would concentrate the
Grande Armée and pounce on Schwarzenberg south of Leipzig. From the
lower Mulde, Blücher and Bernadotte would not be able to arrive in time to
support Schwarzenberg.
With this last rebuttal, the crown prince changed tactics, assenting to all
the movements the Prussians suggested. To claim that Bernadotte agreed
with the Prussians is misleading. Blücher wanted a bold offensive and did
not fear a battle with Napoleon. On the other hand, the crown prince
wanted to position his army on the left bank of the Pleiße and the
Elster to disrupt Napoleon’s communications and avoid battle with him
until Schwarzenberg arrived. For now, as both commanders believed
Napoleon remained at Dresden, they assumed their armies could reach
Leipzig before his. Thus, they agreed to begin the advance to Leipzig on
the very next day, the 8th, to challenge only a small imperial force. As
The Mulde 517
preparatory movements, Blücher agreed to push his forces southwest while

the North German Army advanced on the road to Delitzsch, sending
cavalry to Eilenburg to cover Blücher’s left wing. Both armies would con-
tinue the march to Leipzig on 9 September. At the end of the meeting,
Bernadotte turned to Blücher “with the greatest show of regard for his ‘cher
frère d’armes.’” With a heartfelt hug, the crown prince took his leave.
Climbing into the carriage, Müffling purportedly predicted to Blücher that
the crown prince’s excuses for not adhering to the agreement would arrive in
the morning. Blücher thought Bernadotte expressed too much goodwill to
mask such intentions but made no secret of how much he scorned “all such
chaps who are only out for themselves.”50
Despite the agreements made during their meeting, Bernadotte main-
tained his positions at Radegast and Jeßnitz on the 8th; only Tauentzien’s IV
Corps moved up from Dessau to Hinsdorf. From Hirschfeld’s brigade, two
battalions and six guns guarded the bridgehead at Roßlau, two battalions
held the crossing over the Mulde at Dessau, while the rest – six battalions,
two cavalry regiments, and two batteries – moved to Aken to secure the
bridge against Lanusse’s division. In addition, Bernadotte ordered
Tauentzien’s Kurmark Landwehr brigade commanded by General Friedrich
Wilhelm von Putlitz to build a bridgehead on the right bank of the Elbe at
Ferchland, thirty miles down the Elbe from Magdeburg, and to defend it to
the extreme. Bernadotte’s orders for 9 October – issued on the 8th – proved
more promising. He instructed Bülow to slide southwest to Brehna, pushing
his vanguard to Landsberg. Wintzingerode received orders to move his corps
from Radegast to a position just southwest of Zörbig, with his van reaching
Schkeuditz on the Elster, less than nine miles northwest of Leipzig.
Vorontsov would lead one of Wintzingerode’s divisions to Halle while
Russian cavalry patrolled the Halle–Leipzig highway. Bernadotte directed
his Swedes to Zörbig (see Map 5). Unfortunately for the Allied cause, the
crown prince rescinded all of these orders at midnight on 8/9 October based
on the intelligence he had received from Blücher.51
On returning to Bad Düben after his meeting with Bernadotte, Blücher
assessed the new intelligence that had arrived during his absence. Korf
reported that the imperials had driven off Yuzefovich’s post between
Klitzschen and Langenreichenbach. South of Langenreichenbach, a Russian
patrol discovered a large column of enemy infantry marching from Torgau
to Schildau. Finally, Yuzefovich’s troopers had captured a captain from the
staff of XI Corps. Although the dispatches he bore contained no infor-
mation of use, he stated that the troops marching from Torgau to Schildau
belonged to Souham’s III Corps. Of greater importance, the captain claimed
that up to this point Napoleon still had no news of the movements of the
Silesian Army. In fact, on 5 October the emperor actually conducted exten-
sive reconnaissance toward Stolpen in the hope of finding Langeron’s corps.
Later interrogated at Blücher’s headquarters, the prisoner stated that, when

he had departed from Dresden on the 6th, Napoleon was still there but
planned to make a great movement. To where the prisoner could not answer
but his own corps commander, Macdonald, had received orders to go to
Meißen. From Madatov at Mühlberg on the Elbe arrived news from the
evening of the 6th concerning the march of a French army – infantry,
cavalry, artillery, and baggage – from Dresden through Meißen and Strehla
on the highway to Leipzig. More perplexing news arrived late on the 7th.
After a detachment from Reynier’s VII Corps unexpectedly evacuated
Eilenburg on the 7th, the Russians moved in. However, the enemy returned
in the evening, ejected the Russians, and reoccupied Eilenburg. Moreover,
the French troops at Schildau who appeared to be headed southwest to
Wurzen suddenly turned due west toward Eilenburg at sunset.52
Ultimately, these reports failed to clarify Napoleon’s intentions. Obvi-
ously the Grande Armée would concentrate at Leipzig but what then? At
this point, Blücher found no reason to renounce his drive across the Mulde
and toward Leipzig. Gneisenau issued orders for the 8th “to seek the enemy
in the region of Leipzig.” With headquarters remaining at Bad Düben,
Blücher directed Yorck’s corps to Mühlbeck and his vanguard to Sausedlitz,
nine miles west of Bad Düben. Langeron’s corps would concentrate at Bad
Düben, with his van proceeding five miles southwest of there to Brösen.
Sacken’s corps would move up to Mockrehna, pushing his vanguard ten
miles further west to Eilenburg. Blücher wanted Sacken’s engineers to
quickly strike a bridge at Eilenburg suitable for artillery to cross. Two
additional pontoon bridges would be thrown across the Mulde north and
south of Bad Düben. One of Sacken’s cavalry detachments would observe
Torgau. Blücher sent a copy of the disposition for the 8th to the crown
prince along with a cover letter. Admitting that his left flank was exposed, he
requested that the Army of North Germany “conduct a great cavalry
movement toward Eilenburg.”53
Early on the 8th, the Silesian Army marched. Yorck’s advance guard
crossed the Mulde at Mühlbeck: the infantry on ferries, the cavalry forded
the river. Its forward units rode far and wide; two of its squadrons joined
Hellwig’s Streifkorps from the Army of North Germany as well as Bülow’s
Cossacks in a clash with French cavalry four miles north of Leipzig at
Wiederitzsch, driving the imperials into the city. Yorck’s main body achieved
its goal by reaching Mühlbeck. As for Blücher’s Russians, Langeron’s main
body concentrated at Bad Düben on the right bank of the Mulde. From
there, Rudzevich led the vanguard across the Mulde and southwest on the
highway to Leipzig to Noitzsch, where he posted his infantry. The van-
guard’s cavalry continued to Krensitz, twelve miles northeast of Leipzig. His
patrols observed a large imperial corps at Taucha. Sacken’s vanguard could
not move beyond Eilenburg on the 8th; his main body reached Mockrehna.
The Mulde 519
Katzler described Leipzig as being only weakly garrisoned and reported

the sound of heavy artillery – ostensibly Schwarzenberg’s – from the direc-
tion of Altenburg the day before. At noon, Sacken reported that the columns
marching from Torgau through Schildau to Eilenburg on the previous day
had turned around and were presently heading through Schildau toward
Torgau. Prisoners claimed that the destruction of Eilenburg’s bridge
accounted for the retrograde march. Other reports indicated the concen-
tration of large imperial forces at Wurzen. Of the troops that remained on
the right bank of the Elbe, Major Falkenhausen’s Streifkorps severed com-
munication between Meißen and Dresden. Learning of the march of a
French column between these two points, he commenced the hunt. His
horsemen took many prisoners, horses, an empty supply train, and some
boats. More importantly, his post opposite Meißen clearly recognized
Napoleon, who struck the road to Leipzig preceded and followed by huge
columns. His dispatch reporting Napoleon’s appearance at Meißen reached
Blücher at noon on the 8th.
One final report from Sacken, although confusing in itself, finally enabled
Blücher and his staff to gain a clear picture of the situation. Writing from
Mockrehna at 7:30 on the evening of the 8th, the Russian corps commander
confirmed that the imperials had again occupied Eilenburg but “much infantry
and two cannon” had moved east across the Mulde to occupy Eilenburg Ost.
Thirteen miles due east of Eilenburg, French infantry and cavalry maintained
their position at Schildau throughout the day, pushing outposts as far as
Langenreichenbach, only five miles east of Sacken’s position at Mockrehna.
“Behind these forward posts, it appears that the enemy moves in force to
Wurzen.” Four miles north-northeast of Wurzen, the French occupied the
village of Großzschepa. From the hills surrounding it, the Russians observed
“great enemy columns” moving toward Wurzen on the Leipzig–Dresden high-
way and “infantry, cavalry, and artillery marching from Torgau to Schildau.”54
Despite the confusing aspects of Sacken’s brief, it became clear that
Napoleon intended to concentrate huge masses at Wurzen, less than twenty
miles south of Blücher’s headquarters at Bad Düben. Moreover, it appeared
that the Grande Armée would reach Leipzig before Schwarzenberg’s arrival
south of the city could impact Napoleon’s operations. Regardless, some
important questions still needed to be answered. Did Napoleon intend –
just as Bernadotte warned – to launch an offensive against Blücher’s left?
Would the emperor first seek to gain Leipzig and then proceed either north
against Bernadotte or south against Schwarzenberg? Or would he seek a
decisive battle with Bernadotte and Blücher before turning against Schwar-
zenberg? Notwithstanding Napoleon’s plans, if Blücher continued his
advance on Leipzig, he risked an encounter with the emperor. Certainly
the Prussian did not shirk from the thought of such a confrontation but the
extenuating circumstances demanded prudence.
A major impediment to decisive action on Blücher’s part remained the

sobering realization that he had to defer the initiative to both Bernadotte and
Napoleon and by extension Schwarzenberg. If the emperor turned against
the Bohemian Army, then Blücher and Bernadotte had to follow and be in
position to fall on his rear and flanks as soon as he engaged Schwarzenberg.
As for Bernadotte, preexisting agreements with Blücher would dictate their
responses to a French offensive. If Napoleon attacked the Silesian Army
between the Mulde and the Elbe, Blücher would retreat to the entrenched
camp at Wartenburg, sending the majority of his cavalry to unite with the
Army of North Germany. Thus reinforced, Bernadotte would operate
against Napoleon’s flank and rear if he pursued Blücher to Wartenburg.
On the other hand, if Napoleon commenced an offensive against Bernadotte
between the Saale and the Elbe, the Army of North Germany would
withdraw to the bridgehead at Roßlau while Blücher operated against the
emperor’s flank and rear.
Under the circumstances, an immediate retreat to Wartenburg, where
work on the fortifications lagged behind schedule due to insufficient man-
power, hardly appealed to Blücher. Occupying an incomplete entrenched
camp, fighting with his back against the Elbe, and ceding his cavalry to
Bernadotte, whom he did not trust, ran contrary to Blücher’s nature. Yet he
could not face Napoleon without Bernadotte’s full support. Thus, the Sile-
sian Army could remain in the theater only if the Army of North Germany
held its ground. Blücher understood that he could not face Napoleon alone
and that he needed the staunch support of at least Bülow’s III Corps. This
left him little choice but to unite his forces with Bernadotte’s as quickly as
possible. Only then would the combined Armies of Silesia and North
Germany be strong enough to face the Grande Armée. Total agreement with
Bernadotte over their next step remained paramount; Gneisenau dispatched
Rühle to the crown prince’s headquarters at Zehbitz on the afternoon of the
8th. He tasked the major with gaining the crown prince’s assurance that the
Army of North Germany would assume the role of the Angriffsflügel
(attacking wing) in a battle at Wartenburg. To honor protocol, Gneisenau
instructed the major to ask Bernadotte for his suggestion on the proper
manner to proceed but to clearly state and insist on the views of Silesian
Army Headquarters.55
Rühle reached Zehbitz late on the evening of the 8th. Although already in
bed, Bernadotte received the Prussian major, who informed him of Napo-
leon’s possible approach. According to Rühle’s recollection of their conver-
sation, the crown prince appeared more determined than before to avoid a
battle with Napoleon. Bernadotte informed him that he, too, no longer
planned to adhere to the original plan he had communicated to Blücher.
Instead of withdrawing to the bridgehead at Roßlau to evade Napoleon’s
blow, the prince royal preferred to escape across the Elbe at Aken.
The Mulde 521
He spoke of the need to provide time for Schwarzenberg to advance by fixing

Napoleon but insisted on retreating to the right bank of the Elbe, destroying
the bridge behind him, and awaiting further developments. Bernadotte sug-
gested that Blücher should likewise retreat across the Elbe. Rühle claimed to
know for certain that Blücher would not withdraw to the right bank of the
Elbe. Instead, he claimed that the Prussian commander preferred to move
across the Saale, where he could operate against Napoleon’s communications
and cooperate with Schwarzenberg. Upon hearing this answer, the surprised
crown prince asked how Rühle knew that Blücher would cross the Saale.
“Based on the character of his general, he would certainly escape across the
Saale,” responded the Prussian major. This response further surprised
Bernadotte but he accepted the idea and proposed that both armies cross
the Saale. “Good . . . if Napoleon follows, we will cross the Elbe at
Ferchland,” determined the crown prince. Rühle repeated his opinion that
under no circumstance would Blücher cross the Elbe. Instead, he would
march up the Saale and unite with the Bohemian Army. Bernadotte coun-
tered that such a movement violated all of the rules of war because Blücher
would completely sacrifice his communications and cut off the army from its
ammunition transports, supply convoys, and reinforcements. “And what
shall become of Berlin,” he purportedly asked. “As Moscow was burned,
we can also sacrifice Berlin,” answered Rühle. Bernadotte gradually became
receptive to the idea of retreating across the Saale and uniting with the
Bohemian Army. His conditional acceptance required Blücher to position
the Silesian Army south of his own to cross the Saale at Wettin, where the
crown prince promised to strike a bridge. He also conceded to Rühle’s
request for an officer to return with him to Bad Düben with a written
confirmation of these negotiations. In Rühle’s presence he dictated the
following letter, which Count Alexis Noailles delivered to Blücher:
Major Rühle has delivered your letter and informed me of the emperor
Napoleon’s march on Meißen and of his apparent intentions against your
left flank. Because we have no other purpose than to fix the forces of this
commander to provide the Bohemian Army with time to advance against his
rear and flanks, I thus believe that you should not rush [forward], especially
because a further advance on Leipzig will offer the emperor Napoleon the
opportunity to move between you and your bridges. If the emperor Napo-
leon shows the intention to attack us from the side and from the front,
I believe we must either withdraw to the right bank of the Elbe or cross to
the left bank of the Saale. In the latter case, your bridges must be quickly
dismantled and struck along with the one that I had built at Ferchland. For
my part, I will dismantle the one at Roßlau, burning it if necessary, and leave
only ten battalions at Aken to hold this point and guard the bridge. We will
then be in a position to choose whether we want to cross the Saale or turn to
cross the Elbe at Ferchland. In both cases, Napoleon will lose time. Once
more I say that this is necessary for the success of the Bohemian Army. As
soon as a movement against you is recognized, not a moment can be lost in
either withdrawing upon the right bank [of the Elbe] or to assume the line of
the Saale.56
By convincing Bernadotte to remain on the left bank of the Elbe, Rühle

achieved his purpose. Still, he failed to attain the crown prince’s complete
agreement with Blücher’s plans. The Prussians regarded a movement across
the Saale as a means by which to seek the union with the Bohemian Army,
while Bernadotte viewed such a crossing as the prelude to a further retreat
across the Elbe at Ferchland to preserve his communications.57
As noted, Bernadotte intended for the Army of North Germany to move
closer to Leipzig on the 9th but canceled his orders at midnight on 8/9
October as a result of the information delivered by Rühle. He explained to
his corps commanders that a report from Blücher stated that two imperial
corps had reached Leipzig. Moreover, Blücher informed him of Napoleon’s
march down the Elbe with his Guard. “General Blücher has just indicated to
me that the emperor Napoleon has made a reconnaissance in front of
Eilenburg toward Bad Düben with a corps of 10,000 cavalry,” Bernadotte
wrote to Bülow. “As all of this announces the plan for an attack on General
Blücher, I have advised him to cross to the left bank of the Mulde, and move
between Jeßnitz, Zörbig, and Bitterfeld. If he can make that movement
before being attacked, we will be in a retracted position with more than
110,000 men, and thenceforth we can have a nice affair.” Until further news
arrived, the crown prince did not want the orders for 9 October executed:
“Thus, nobody will move until further notice and each army corps will
maintain the position that it occupies at this moment.”58 On Bernadotte’s
extreme right, a cavalry detachment from Wintzingerode’s corps occupied
the Saale crossing at Bernburg on the 9th but failed to prevent Lanusse’s
troops from destroying the bridge four miles downstream at Nienburg.
Thus, the Army of North Germany did little on either 8 or 9 October.
Rühle returned to Bad Düben on the morning of the 9th. Although
recognizing he would be forced to sacrifice all rearward communications,
Blücher consented to the retreat across the Saale. Emphasizing that this plan
bore the stamp of the unorthodox, Gneisenau expressed his support. While
the Silesian Army turned toward Napoleon’s communications, it would
expose its own to the enemy. “This was a very unique movement,” explains
Müffling, “through which the connection with the Army of Bohemia would
be established on the most exposed point of the enemy’s rear. Although by
this movement the Silesian Army lost its line of communication, it was of the
utmost importance to remove every reason that might induce the crown
prince to retreat across the Elbe.” As it turned out, the Silesian Army would
not see its baggage, which remained on the other bank of the Elbe, until the
The Mulde 523
trains caught up with it at the Rhine in mid November. Moreover, this

movement would open the road to Berlin. Regardless, Blücher planned to
move into the fertile region between the Saale and the Harz Mountains to
spin a web around the enemy and establish communication with the Bohe-
mian Army. “Convinced that at this moment,” responded Blücher to the
letter delivered by Count Noailles, “a movement to the right [west] in order
to get us to the left bank of the Saale is preferable to any other, I will
immediately order my army to march in this direction. My right column,
namely Yorck’s corps, will reach Jeßnitz this evening . . . I will leave only a
few companies in the entrenchments at Wartenburg. Demonstrations against
Leipzig appear necessary to mask our movements. Thus, I will attack
Eilenburg today.”59
Returning to Napoleon, he did not pay heed to Blücher until 1 October.
In a letter to Macdonald, the emperor called attention to Sacken rather than
the entire Silesian Army, the bulk of which he placed between Stolpen and
Bautzen. “General Sacken has moved vis-à-vis Meißen. He attacked the
bridgehead [the day before] yesterday.” Napoleon initially thought of
marching from Dresden with 30,000 to 40,000 men but preferred to hold
firm at the Saxon capital in anticipation of Schwarzenberg’s advance: “All
information confirms that the enemy has made a movement on Marienberg
on the road from Komotau.” His letter to Macdonald suggested that Napo-
leon viewed Sacken’s movement as a demonstration: “No doubt the enemy
does not consider attacking at this moment, yet the time may come when it
suits him.” Consequently, he left III Corps to contend with Sacken, and XI
Corps to guard the roads from Meißen and Großenhain, with one division of
II Cavalry Corps patrolling the plain between the two routes.60
On 2 October, Napoleon and Berthier ordered the reorganization of III,
V, VII, XI, and XIV Corps so that all of the battalions of each regiment
served in the same corps. The most notable changes occurred in XIV Corps,
which sent ten battalions to III Corps, two to XI Corps, and one to VII
Corps while receiving nine from III Corps, two from XI Corps, and one
from V Corps.61 All transfers took place on the 3rd, providing Allied spies
much confusing information to report. It was on 2 October that Napoleon
finally became aware of Blücher’s disappearance: “It appears that the corps
of Langeron, Sacken, and Blücher have all moved on Elsterwerda and
Großenhain,” he wrote Macdonald. Regarding the reason behind Blücher’s
movement, the emperor speculated that Dresden could be the target: “It is
possible that this is to attack the entrenched camp on the side of the plain by
way of the roads from Berlin and Meißen. Because they would thus avoid
the forest, this is the point most assailable.”62
By the end of the day, his attention switched back to Schwarzenberg
thanks to Poniatowski’s report that one regiment each of Allied infantry and
cavalry had occupied Chemnitz on 1 October; the size of this purported
force eventually grew to 20,000 men. Moreover, confirmed reports arrived

that Matvei Platov, ataman of the Don Cossacks, had reached Altenburg
with his warriors. Consequently, at 11:00 p.m. on the 2nd, Napoleon issued
orders for Murat to go to Freiberg, halfway between Dresden and Chem-
nitz, that same night. There, the king of Naples would take command of II,
V, and VIII Corps and IV and V Cavalry Corps as well as 1st Heavy Cavalry
Division of I Cavalry Corps. “It appears to the emperor that Your Majesty’s
presence at Freiberg is needed to coordinate the movements of these various
corps and to keep His Majesty informed of what is happening at Chemnitz,”
instructed Berthier. “Everything indicates that the enemy is moving and His
Majesty thinks that we must know positively what the enemy is doing at
Chemnitz.”63
By 4:30 on the morning of the 3rd, Napoleon had received enough
information to dispel the rumors of 20,000 Allied soldiers reaching
Altenburg. Moreover, he referred to rumors of Bavaria’s defection as
unfounded. “The emperor tasked me with telling you that all rumors are
false,” Berthier explained to Ney, “that Bavaria has not changed its alliance;
that the enemy has not yet debouched on the side of Chemnitz; that near
Kassel [capital of Westphalia] he has only partisans; that in general, the
enemy is spreading all kinds of rumors against which we must be on our
guard, but it appears that the enemy is moving, and we are waiting on this
movement to decide to act.”64
Regardless of the emperor’s attempts to control the bleeding, most of the
rumors proved true. On 2 October, Schwarzenberg’s lead units crossed the
Erzgebirge to commence the offensive on Leipzig. By 3 October 70,000
Allied soldiers held a 33-mile line north of the Erzgebirge stretching from
Eibenstock through Annaberg-Buchholz to Marienberg while another
80,000 men stood south of the mountains from Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary)
to Komotau (see Map 4). Further northeast, the 50,000 men of Bennigsen’s
Army of Poland held Teplitz and Außig. On 4 October, the vanguard of
Schwarzenberg’s II Corps reached Chemnitz but could not hold it against
Lauriston’s V Corps. However, Lauriston withdrew thirteen miles north to
Mittweida after being menaced by Platov’s Cossack corps, the purported
20,000 men at Altenburg.
Also on 4 October, Napoleon received information from spies confirm-
ing the departure of the Silesian Army from the Bautzen area in the direction
of Elsterwerda. To obtain news, he ordered Macdonald to reconnoiter all
major roads. In addition, he ordered Souham to transfer his headquarters
and one division of III Corps to Meißen. To guard the Elbe against Blücher,
Napoleon instructed him to post one division each at Riesa and Strehla,
seventeen and twenty-one miles downstream of Meißen respectively. The
emperor demanded that Souham’s troops “subject themselves to good dis-
cipline, monitor the banks of the Elbe, and camp in the countryside.”65
The Mulde 525
Owing to Schwarzenberg’s advance toward Chemnitz, Napoleon con-

cluded that Blücher would either make for Dresden or drive on Leipzig.
Belated reports from the commander of 3rd Light Division of I Cavalry
Corps, General Louis-Pierre Chastel, concerning Blücher’s activity at
Meißen and Mühlberg unsettled the emperor but reinforced his presumption
that the Prussian would attempt to pass the Elbe between the former and
Torgau. Intelligence seemed to support this assumption. In his report of 3
October, Ney attributed the Allied activity at Elster and Wartenburg to
Bülow’s III Corps rather than the Army of Silesia.66 During the course of
3 October, Napoleon clarified and emphasized his instructions for Souham
to send a strong advance guard to obtain news of Blücher’s army,
particularly Sacken, whose vanguard had purportedly cleared Ockrilla and
Meißen on 28 September. “Has he retired on Großenhain and Elsterwerda,
or has he retired on the road from Torgau? One of your divisions must be at
Strehla, and the other at Riesa. It is necessary, general, that the division at
Strehla monitors the enemy’s movements; if he attempts to throw a bridge
between Strehla and Torgau, you will move quickly to prevent it.”67
At 4:00 a.m. on 4 October, Napoleon sent his aide-de-camp, Lebrun, to
Meißen to find Souham. After meeting with the corps commander, Napo-
leon wanted Lebrun to ride through Strehla and Riesa to Mühlberg, thirteen
miles downstream from the latter. If he found that the enemy had indeed
built a bridge there, then 3rd Light Cavalry Division, the two divisions of III
Corps at Strehla and Riesa, and General François Bony’s 2nd Brigade from
Souham’s 8th Division at Meißen – all supported by III Corps’s Reserve
Artillery – would “march on this point to drive the enemy to the opposite
bank and destroy the bridge. If the enemy is in great force, you will write to
the duc de Raguse [Marmont] at Leipzig, who has specific orders not to
allow the enemy to establish a passage of the Elbe.” Again the emperor’s
emphasis on the incessant exchange of accurate, verified information is
conspicuous: “As soon as you arrive at Meißen and Strehla, you will write
me all the news that you and General Souham have learned. Confirm with
your own eyes that the enemy has thrown a bridge at Mühlberg; I don’t
think he has.”
From Mühlberg, Lebrun would continue fifteen miles further downriver
to Torgau “to see how things are going there. Write to me from Torgau.
From Torgau, you will take the road through Wartenburg to Dessau to see
how the river is guarded. You will be certain to write me from Wartenburg
and Dessau. You will return via the same route along the river.” Lebrun also
delivered the emperor’s letter to Souham, instructing the corps commander
to prevent Blücher from crossing the Elbe between Torgau and Riesa, and
reiterating the instructions for the operation at Mühlberg. That such detailed
instructions were issued not only to a general, but to one of Napoleon’s aides
who had served him since 1800, underscores the emperor’s ubiquitous
demand for intelligence. “I am waiting for news all the time,” he vented to
Marmont. “Yesterday, we took 200 or 300 prisoners . . . between Chemnitz
and Freiberg. You send me officers who are children who know nothing and
cannot provide me with any information verbally: send me men.”68
Becoming more inclined to believe the rumors of Blücher’s presence at
Mühlberg, Napoleon issued instructions for Marmont to handle the affair. If
the marshal learned that the enemy had indeed thrown a bridge at Mühlberg,
he would immediately march from Leipzig with his entire corps and destroy
it. Souham would support with his heavy artillery as well as 9th and 11th
Divisions. Describing this operation as “very urgent,” Berthier conveyed the
master’s desire to see the Allies driven across the Elbe and their bridge
destroyed if one existed. Later in the day, Napoleon explained to Macdonald
that “intelligence claims the enemy has a camp, probably Sacken’s corps, at
the village of Lindenau, about halfway from Meißen to Dresden . . . Try to
confirm this through reconnaissance.” Still that same day, 4 October, he
again wrote Macdonald with a hint of desperation: “I attach great import-
ance to knowing exactly what became of Langeron, Sacken, and Yorck.
Therefore, tomorrow, I want you to reconnoiter with 7,000 to 8,000 infan-
try, cavalry and artillery toward Großenhain (Sacken was there); you will
send patrols in other directions so that you know positively what has
become of the enemy army from Silesia.” Napoleon’s anxiety is echoed in
Berthier’s 4:00 p.m. order to Souham to transfer the division at Strehla
twelve miles downriver to Belgern, and replace it with the division at Riesa:
“The emperor also commands, general, that tomorrow you conduct a strong
reconnaissance on Großenhain to see clearly what infantry you have before
you and to try to find out positively what has become of Sacken and what is
happening on this side.”69
Napoleon knew of the Allied bridge work at Wartenburg but still attrib-
uted it to the Prussians of Bernadotte’s army. To put an end to the nuisance
caused by his former marshal, he authorized Marmont to assemble VI Corps
and I Cavalry Corps at Bad Düben on the Mulde and “march against the
enemy. Eliminate his bridges at Wartenburg, Dessau, and Aken; then he will
have none.” Napoleon urged Marmont to communicate to Ney the import-
ance of destroying all the enemy’s bridges. From Eilenburg on the 4th,
Marmont wrote to the emperor at 11:00 a.m. of Bertrand’s engagement at
Wartenburg but could provide little information. His cursory report reached
Imperial Headquarters at Dresden sometime before 3:00 a.m. on the 5th and
long before the more detailed accounts provided by Ney and Bertrand. This
caused the emperor to snap on 5 October: “I have heard about General
Bertrand’s affair only through your letter from yesterday. I wish you had
provided a few details; give me all you have.”
Although uncertain about who had attacked Bertrand, Napoleon’s
response to Marmont suggests that he did not think the Silesian Army had
The Mulde 527
crossed the Elbe at Wartenburg. “It is of the highest importance that you
restore the bridge at Bad Düben and that you march quickly to destroy the
enemy’s bridge. Your union with the prince de la Moskova [Ney] and
Da˛browski is also of utmost importance. I have ordered the duc de Casti-
glione [Augereau] to cover Leipzig with his corps. It is urgent that we drive
the enemy across the river before he receives reinforcements.” To unify
command on the Mulde–Elbe front, Napoleon instructed Berthier early on
5 October to place III Corps, en route to Torgau that morning, under
Marmont’s command, which currently consisted of VI Corps and
I Cavalry Corps. In the same letter to Berthier, he formally added all of
Marmont’s command to Ney’s army, which consisted of IV and VII Corps
and III Cavalry Corps as well as Da˛browski’s 27th Division. Napoleon then
instructed Berthier to write Marmont and “alert him that, as the Marshal
Prince de la Moskova is more senior, he and his army are under the com-
mand of that prince; it is necessary for them to immediately unite and
quickly maneuver to drive the enemy across the river.”70
Still suspecting Blücher to be in the Meißen–Mühlbeck region, Napoleon
prepared to go to the former. He cut orders for Oudinot, now commanding
a Young Guard corps of two divisions, to move one of them as well as his
headquarters to Meißen along the left bank of the Elbe early on the 5th. To
secure his rear, Napoleon emphasized to Murat the importance of holding
Chemnitz. With II Corps in a good position between Chemnitz and Zscho-
pau, and VIII Corps at Penig, the emperor assured Murat that he would
master all of the enemy’s communication. He mentioned sending Mortier to
Freiberg but did not specify the number of Guard units that would accom-
pany him. With Schwarzenberg’s forward troops already at Schellenberg, ten
miles east of Chemnitz, Napoleon stressed that “it is especially important to
force the enemy to evacuate Schellenberg and retreat to his camp at
Marienberg.”71
Sometime before 3:00 a.m. on the 6th, the news arrived that Napoleon
had been waiting for: the entire Silesian Army stood in the region of
Wittenberg. Reports from Ney, Bertrand, and Lebrun allowed Napoleon
to construct the events that had occurred between the Mulde and the Elbe.
“At night, the vanguard of the Silesian Army threw a bridge across the Elbe
at Wartenburg. Bertrand held the isthmus, behind the dikes and marshes. He
fought for twelve hours; seven times the enemy assaulted but failed to
dislodge him. Seeing this army grow stronger every moment, Bertrand
retired in the night. Last night, the 5th, the prince de la Moskova, Bertrand,
and Da˛browski were at Raguhn, Bitterfeld, and Bad Düben, guarding the
Mulde.” He placed Marmont’s VI Corps at Eilenburg, occupying the bridge-
head and holding Wurzen. Napoleon calculated on all of III Corps reaching
Torgau on this day, the 6th, with the Guard, XI Corps and II Cavalry Corps
following.72
Napoleon saw an opportunity. Apparently, Blücher and Bernadotte

would unite to drive on Leipzig from the north while Schwarzenberg
rumbled toward the city from the south. The advance of the Allies in two
large masses from opposite directions completely changed the situation by
bringing the decisive battle within his reach. Although he had been on the
verge of being strategically enveloped, the situation actually improved dras-
tically for Napoleon. Facing two enemy armies instead of three meant he
could focus his attention on just two directions, enhancing his personal
command and control of his forces. His adversaries entered a region where
he could fully exploit his central position and interior lines. They had
ventured into the heart of his lair, where they would be unable to easily
avoid his blows. Although Großbeeren, the Katzbach, Kulm, and
Dennewitz had broken the confidence of his best subordinates and left
gaping holes in his ranks, one decisive victory would wipe away the memory
of those setbacks. He could wage the decisive battle that he had long sought
but which the Allies had always evaded with great skill. Yet the key to
victory in Germany became clear: he had to prevent the union of all Coali-
tion forces. Should Blücher, Bernadotte, Schwarzenberg, and Bennigsen
unite their forces, they would possess overwhelming numerical superiority.
Thus, the emperor had to defeat the enemy armies individually and before
they could unite.
For the Allies, a drive on Leipzig likewise offered the opportunity to end
the war in Germany. From the start of the Fall Campaign, both the Trachen-
berg Protocol and the Reichenbach Plan identified Leipzig as the natural
midpoint of the theater of war. Seven weeks after commencing hostilities, all
Allied forces finally made the Saxon city the objective of their movements.
This left Napoleon three unfavorable options. First, he could unite his army
at Leipzig and accept battle in a well-prepared, defensive position. There, he
would be forced to surrender the initiative and accept being strategically
enveloped. Moreover, he would risk being tactically enveloped on the
battlefield and surrounded. Facing such a numerical superiority, he would
expose his army to a decisive defeat. Second, he could fall back on his line of
communication and withdraw west of the Saale. With the resources of
Germany slipping through his hands, he had to make a stand in Saxony.
A retreat west would lead to the total collapse of the Confederation of the
Rhine. In fact, despite Napoleon’s insistence to the contrary, secret negoti-
ations ensued between the Austrians and King Max Joseph I of Bavaria. On
8 October, the king signed his name to the Convention of Ried: Bavaria
entered the War of the Sixth Coalition as Austria’s ally. As a third option,
Napoleon could mask one of his adversaries to provide time for him to seek
and destroy the other Allied army. This option promised the most success
because it aimed to exploit the concentration of Allied forces in two major
masses. Equally important, it corresponded perfectly with the advantages
The Mulde 529
offered by Napoleon’s central position and interior lines. Manpower

remained the only question: did the emperor still possess enough combat
power to form two armies that could execute these tasks? Although his
estimates notoriously exaggerated the size of imperial forces, in early Octo-
ber the Grande Armée still remained a formidable fighting force. Including
Augereau’s approaching reinforcements, the legions of the French Empire
numbered more than 270,000 men and 851 guns.73
With these numbers, Napoleon could assemble an army of 180,000 men
in three days to confront Schwarzenberg’s 185,000. With the smaller army of
90,000 men, Ney would receive the task of masking Bernadotte and Blücher.
Although outnumbered, Ney’s forces would suffice to check their advance.
On the other hand, should the emperor decide to direct his first blow against
Bernadotte and Blücher, he could unite 200,000 men at Bad Düben in four
days. This would leave 70,000 combatants to hold the ninety-mile Leipzig–
Altenburg–Freiburg line against Schwarzenberg. Typical of Napoleon’s
operations, timing decided where he would direct his first blow. The Silesian
and North German Armies stood within three marches of Leipzig while the
bulk of the Bohemian Army had only commenced its movement across the
Erzgebirge. As long as his tired soldiers rallied to his call, the furious pace of
Napoleon’s operations would allow him to confront Blücher and Bernadotte
at the same time that Schwarzenberg’s columns cleared the Erzgebirge and
regrouped on the Saxon plain. Furthermore, the Bohemian Army could
easily elude his attack by again escaping across the Erzgebirge and retreating
behind the Eger. For Bernadotte and especially Blücher, such an escape
would not be easy, with the Elbe at their backs and imperial garrisons
holding Magdeburg, Wittenberg, and Torgau. With Blücher having the sole
bridge at Wartenburg and Bernadotte the bridges at Aken and Roßlau,
Napoleon could expect decisive results if he drove them against the Elbe.
Based on such obvious advantages, the emperor decided to first turn against
the Silesian and North German Armies while masking Schwarzenberg. After
crushing Blücher and Bernadotte against the Elbe, he then planned to
concentrate all his forces to destroy the Bohemian Army. A lesser com-
mander would have collapsed under the weight of the approaching enemy
masses but not Napoleon. This very simple plan evolved not from his genius
but from his boldness and sangfroid. By crossing the Elbe, the Allies had
crossed their Rubicon: they could only retrace their steps in defeat. They
finally exposed themselves and offered the master a target he could hit. His
plan should have worked. That it failed can be attributed to Blücher alone.
At 3:00 a.m. on 6 October, Napoleon instructed XI Corps to march
along the right bank of the Elbe to Meißen, where it would cross to the left
bank. At 7:30 a.m., Berthier reiterated the order for Macdonald to immedi-
ately place XI Corps on the road to Meißen joined by II Cavalry Corps,
which again passed under the marshal’s authority. The master demanded
reports from Sébastiani’s troopers: “Send scouts in the direction of Torgau

and Wurzen for news of General Souham and the duc de Raguse [Marmont].
I’ll be at Meißen early tonight. Your scouts will interrogate everyone they
encounter and you will communicate to me all the news you obtain.”
Oudinot moved his young bearskins one league northwest of Meißen
to the junction of the roads coming from Wurzen and Torgau. Orders went
to Augereau to accelerate the march of IX Corps to Leipzig. On the plain
south of Leipzig, Murat received instructions to mask Schwarzenberg’s
slow-moving army. “The passage of the enemy on the lower Elbe
should in no way impact your operation,” Napoleon explained to his
brother-in-law.74
Throughout the 6th, not only did XI Corps and II Cavalry Corps march
from Dresden to Meißen in two columns along both banks of the Elbe, but
the army’s Reserve Artillery and Park, the engineers and bridge train, and
the ambulances and surgeons all followed. To conceal their departure,
Macdonald fiercely attacked Bubna’s Austrian 2nd Light Division at Stolpen
with one brigade supported by cavalry. After considerable losses on both
sides, the marshal broke off the engagement to proceed to Meißen.75
Napoleon communicated his intentions to Marmont:
I will reach Meißen this evening with 80,000 men; my vanguard will be at the
intersection of the roads to Leipzig and Torgau. There, I will receive your
report, from which I will decide which of the two roads I take. I intend to
turn on Torgau and from there to advance on the right bank [of the Elbe] to
cut off the enemy and to take all of his bridges without having to attack his
bridgeheads. An advance on the left bank has the disadvantage of allowing
the enemy to withdraw across the river and avoid a battle. In this case, we
could certainly debouch through Wittenberg. Because the enemy has the
initiative of movement, I will only be able to decide this evening when
I know the situation.76
As for Dresden, St.-Cyr recommended an evacuation of the Saxon capital

due to the region’s exhaustion, which made the task of feeding man and
horse in the city as well as the surrounding countryside increasingly difficult.
Allied partisan activity had rendered the transportation of food supplies on
the Elbe almost impossible. With Dresden’s magazines empty, French agents
descended on the poor inhabitants with requisitions that could not be filled.
The hungry soldiers resorted to foraging, which soon degenerated into
pillaging. Napoleon’s instructions to St.-Cyr and Count Pierre-Antoine
Daru, director of the Department of the Administration of the Army,
suggest that Napoleon finally gave serious consideration to abandoning the
city. He ordered St.-Cyr to post one division of I Corps as well as corps
headquarters at Pirna while St.-Cyr transferred his headquarters to Dres-
den’s southwest suburb, less than ten miles downstream the Elbe from Pirna.
The Mulde 531
Two divisions of XIV Corps would occupy Dresden and part of St.-Cyr’s
cavalry would guard the left bank of the Elbe from Dresden to Pirna.
Engineers dismantled the pontoon and boat bridges at Pirna and Pillnitz.77
Daru received instructions to embark 1,500 sick and wounded from
Dresden’s hospitals on ten boats to be sailed to Torgau. As many as possible
of the remaining patients, preferably officers and noncommissioned officers,
would be evacuated by road through Nossen to Erfurt. Without drawing too
much attention to his task, the emperor wanted Daru to find as many sick
officers or generals as possible who had their own transportation and urge
them to likewise go to Erfurt. Later in the day, Napoleon increased the
number of sick to be evacuated to 6,000 on 40 boats. “Six thousand patients,
200 to 300 wagons, 30,000 to 40,000 artillery rounds were embarked at
Dresden and will arrive at Torgau,” Napoleon notified the commandant of
Torgau, Narbonne. “This is an additional burden. Arrange it as best you can.
I signed the order to send 300,000 to 400,000 francs to the paymaster of
Torgau. From Wittenberg, I will send you powder and flour. From Leipzig,
Count Daru will send to Torgau 10,000 hundredweights of flour. This
should rectify everything. The wounded and sick will recover. You have
clothing and supplies.” A convoy of seventy boats, including those laden
with wounded, would sail down the Elbe on the 7th bound for Torgau.78
Napoleon assessed the situation that confronted him at 1:00 a.m. on the
night of 6/7 October. In an interesting document titled “Notes sur les
mouvements des différents corps d’armée,” the emperor drafted a plan to
both evacuate Dresden and concentrate the Grande Armée at Wurzen. The
document appears to have been generated as a reaction to Murat’s report
from 4:00 p.m. on the 6th. After failing to attack the vanguard of
Schwarzenberg’s army at Chemnitz that day, Murat expressed concern about
the Bohemian Army’s advance. According to his “Notes,” Napoleon
planned for “a great march toward Wurzen” on the 7th to unite with Ney’s
army. With II Cavalry Corps, the Guard Cavalry, and Oudinot’s Guard
corps, he calculated on coming within twelve miles of Wurzen on the 7th
and then reaching Leipzig on the 8th “if it becomes absolutely necessary.”
By combining XI Corps, II Cavalry Corps, and the Guard with Ney’s army,
Napoleon calculated on having more than 160,000 men to crush Blücher and
Bernadotte as they marched on Leipzig. After defeating and driving them
across the Elbe, the master would return to Leipzig, unite with Murat, and
attack the Bohemian Army (see Map 5).
Regarding Murat’s situation along the southern front, Napoleon believed
V and II Corps could unite with VIII Corps some twenty-four miles south
of Leipzig at Frohburg on the 8th to contain the head of Schwarzenberg’s
army. As for St.-Cyr, he would withdraw I and XIV Corps to Dresden on
the 7th and evacuate the city that same day. The emperor wanted him at
Meißen on the 8th, from where he would lead I and XIV Corps to Wurzen.
If necessary, he should be ready to evacuate Dresden in the night of 8/9

October “after destroying the blockhouses, burning the artillery carriages,
spiking the fortress guns, and destroying all ammunition and equipment that
otherwise must be left behind. Only 5,000–6,000 sick that are too weak to
transport can be left behind.” “By the result of this movement,” he con-
cluded, “I shall be master to do what I want: from Wurzen I can move on
Torgau and on the enemy debouching from Wittenberg, or move my whole
army on Leipzig and have a general battle, or recross the Saale. On the 8th,
the army under my personal command will be at Wurzen. On the 10th, the
corps of Marshal St.-Cyr will be at Wurzen.”79
Satisfied with this plan, Napoleon issued the necessary directives to
Berthier. He then impressed on Murat that the king’s “main goal must be
to delay the enemy’s march on Leipzig [and] not allow himself to be cut off
from the Mulde, so that we can approach Leipzig at the same time, keeping
the enemy away, or, if necessary, delivering a general battle.” If the Allies
managed to move between Murat and the Mulde, Napoleon would lose not
only Leipzig, but also the advantages of mutual support, interior lines, and
central position. Two hours later, at 3:00 a.m., the emperor issued orders for
1st and 2nd Divisions of Old Guard to commence the march to Meißen that
morning at 5:00 and 6:00 respectively; Imperial Headquarters would follow
at 10:00. He also cut orders for Oudinot’s Young Guard corps and Bony’s
2nd Brigade of III Corps’s 8th Division to commence the forty-mile march
northwest from Meißen to Wurzen on the Mulde at 6:00 a.m. followed by II
Cavalry Corps, XI Corps, and the Old Guard Cavalry, as well as the
artillery and engineer parks. Napoleon placed the brigade of III Corps that
remained at Meißen under Oudinot’s temporary command and it likewise
departed with the Young Guard. He also ordered that the king and queen of
Saxony be escorted to Meißen by Saxon and Polish troops. “They do not
want to stay in Dresden during my absence,” he explained. “The other
princes of the family can remain.”80
Indicative of the emperor’s superior system of disseminating information
to his subordinates, he again wrote Marmont at 4:00 a.m. on the 7th: “Based
on the direction you have given to III Corps, in summoning it to the Mulde,
I have given orders . . . for a forced march on Wurzen today, so that we can
be at Leipzig tomorrow during the day if it becomes absolutely necessary.
I myself will be at Wurzen tonight.” In his last dispatch from the Saxon
capital, Napoleon informed Murat of his imminent departure for Meißen.
“The whole army from Silesia debouched through Wartenburg,” he wrote,
“and there is nobody from Dresden to Gorlitz, or Dresden to Berlin. St.-Cyr
remains at Dresden. Hold back the Austrians as much as possible so I can
defeat Blücher and the Swedes before their union with Schwarzenberg’s
army.”81
The Mulde 533
Departing Dresden around 6:00 a.m. on 7 October, Napoleon had much

to contemplate as he rode to Meißen. His confidence about the prospects of
defeating Blücher and Bernadotte must have increased during the four-hour
ride. This optimism induced the emperor to change his mind about evacuat-
ing Dresden. The arrival of Ney’s report written from Bennewitz on the
evening of the 6th explaining that Blücher had stopped his drive on Leipzig
and appeared to be holding the right bank of the Mulde, presumably to
cover the siege of Wittenberg, considerably influenced Napoleon.82 He
wrote to St.-Cyr around 1:00 p.m. after arriving at Meißen:
I have ordered the flour transports to continue on their way to Dresden.

I hope to draw the enemy into a battle. Defend all of your positions south of
Pirna throughout the 8th. My plan will be complete tomorrow and if
I maneuver the enemy into a battle, my intention is to hold Dresden; all
the more so because I will operate through Torgau and because my commu-
nications will be secure on both banks [of the Elbe]. Bake bread; work on an
entrenched camp, and evacuate as many wounded as possible. Reassure the
city, tell everyone you will not evacuate Dresden; that you have 50,000 men
to defend it, and that you are certain you can be quickly rescued if necessary.
Grand Headquarters is now at Meißen. I will transfer mine to Oschatz. From
there, I will probably go to Torgau.83
This decision ultimately cost Napoleon the manpower of I and XIV Corps
at the battle of Leipzig and provides a glaring example of Emperor Napo-
leon’s political needs superseding General Bonaparte’s military judgment.
Leaving Meißen on the afternoon of 7 October, Napoleon rode another
fourteen miles northwest to the Schloß at Seerhausen. After issuing instruc-
tions for the 8th, he continued seven additional miles northwest to Oschatz,
where he passed the night with his petit quartier-général (little
headquarters). To feed the soldiers, imperial authorities forced the local
villages to provide 100,000 rations of bread. All detachments from I and
III Cavalry Corps along the Elbe between Meißen and Torgau received
orders to assemble at the latter under Chastel’s command. According to
Napoleon’s instructions, Oudinot’s young bearskins would commence the
thirty-mile march from Meißen to Dahlen at 6:00 on the following morning.
From Dahlen, the army would have only a twelve-mile march due west to
Wurzen. Napoleon expected Augereau’s IX Corps to reach Leipzig on the
8th and to be ready to participate in the offensive by the 9th. Following to
Seerhausen with Grand Headquarters and the king of Saxony in tow,
Berthier disclosed to Ney the emperor’s intentions. On reaching Dahlen
on the 8th, Napoleon expected to find a report from Ney concerning the
enemy. If he did not receive news from the marshal, he would continue to
Wurzen. “His Majesty intends to immediately push the enemy against
Berlin
be Brandenburg Potsdam
El Großbeeren
Magdeburg Situation 7 October

Belzig
Zerbst
Dennewitz
Nudersdorf
x
x Roßlau Coswig
Calbe
Aken
xxx
Wittenberg
Seyda
N
Dessau Tauentzien Elster
Bernburg Wartenburg Jessen
Alsleben xxxx Gräfenhainichen
Köthen North Raguhn xxx
xxx Jeßnitz xxx xxxx Sacken Herzberg
Zehbitz
Stedingk xxx xxx Yorck Silesia Bad
Annaburg
Rothenburg Bülow Schmiedeberg Dommitzsch
Wintzing. Radegast xxx
Zörbig Bitterfeld Bad Langeron Torgau
Düben x
Wettin x Bad Liebenwerda
Delitzsch Mockrehna
Sylbitz
Landsberg Koßdorf Black Elster
Halle Eilenburg Schildau Elsterwerda
xxx Mühlberg
Taucha xxx xxx Falkenhain IV
VI VII Wurzen xxx Streumen
Merseburg Lindenthal Bennewitz xx xxx III Dahlen Strehla
xxx
Leipzig I xxxx 27 III
Hubertusburg
Lützen Ney
Kamenz
Großenhain
Oschatz
Weißenfels Pegau
Mu
xxxx Meißen
Naumburg Borna Colditz Napoleon Bischofswerda
lde
xxx xxx xxx xxxx

II
xxx
V VIII Murat
xxx Nossen
Dresden
V IV xx
2
Altenburg
xxx
xxx XIV Elbe
Freiberg I
xxxx
a le
Bohemia
Sa
Chemnitz
xxxx
Zwickau Poland
0 25 50 75 miles
23 Situation, 8 October 1813
Wittenberg and drive him across the river to the right bank and to eliminate
all of his bridges; it appears necessary that you unite all your forces.”
Moreover, “His Majesty hopes to receive tomorrow at Dahlen details con-
cerning the enemy’s situation as well as the positions of VI and III Corps and
I Cavalry Corps.”
Marmont’s complaint about Ney seems to have had little impact on the
emperor. In fact, not only is Berthier’s annoyance with Marmont for failing
to report his position obvious, but Imperial Headquarters also blamed the
junior marshal for Ney’s erratic orders. “His Majesty is surprised to see that
after ordering this corps to Eilenburg, the duc de Raguse destroyed the
bridge there, retired to Leipzig, and particularly compromised this corps;
secure it as soon as possible.” To Marmont, Berthier wrote: “The emperor
The Mulde 535
learned with astonishment that after you ordered III Corps to move from
Torgau to Eilenburg, an order that General Souham has executed . . . you
departed from Eilenburg after destroying the bridge that His Majesty
ordered to be built. His Majesty will be at Dahlen early tomorrow, where
he hopes to receive news on the current state of affairs to be able to give the
orders for the movement of the 9th.”84
At 9:00 on the morning of the 8th, Napoleon went to Wurzen escorted
by 1st Old Guard Division and Oudinot’s Young Guard. On departing from
Oschatz, he had no news of Ney’s position. He still hoped to receive
intelligence from Ney to determine the orders for the 9th. For the time
being, the rest of the army continued marching northwest to Dahlen. During
the course of the day, Ney’s report finally reached Napoleon: III Corps took
a position on the right bank of the Mulde between Wurzen and Eilenburg
while VII Corps stood at Püchau likewise between the two towns but on the
left bank. Bertrand’s IV Corps reached Schildau, eleven miles northeast of
Wurzen. By nightfall on the 8th, the emperor’s position appeared formid-
able. Some 150,000 men grouped in 22 infantry and 12 cavalry divisions held
a front that stretched a mere 22 miles from Taucha to Schildau.85
In addition to finding Ney’s army, the emperor learned enough about
Blücher’s whereabouts to issue an attack disposition for 9 October. With the
Army of Silesia extended along the Mulde and purportedly isolated, he sought
to engage Blücher around Bad Düben. Escorted by Oudinot’s Young Guard,
Napoleon planned to go to Bad Düben early on the 9th. Ney received
instructions to have III, IV, and VII Corps and I Cavalry Corps likewise
moving toward Bad Düben by 6:00 a.m. His initial march objectives called
for VII Corps to cross the Mulde and reach Sprotta, ten miles south of Bad
Düben. Napoleon directed IV Corps eight miles northwest from Schildau to
Mockrehna, some thirteen miles southeast of Bad Düben. Ney himself
would determine the movements of III Corps and I Cavalry Corps. The
emperor promised to be right behind Ney, supporting him with the rest of
the army. Yet Ney could not make a move unless he received instructions
from the master. “I am waiting this night for the latest intelligence but I must
give preparatory orders,” Napoleon explained almost apologetically.
Berthier alerted Macdonald to be ready to move XI Corps and II Cavalry
Corps to Mockrehna to support Bertrand’s IV Corps but not to commence
the march until he received new orders. However, if he heard the sound of
the guns coming from Mockrehna, “you can press your movement to
support it and from that moment you will establish communication with
that general. It is also suitable for you to summon the [units] belonging to
Chastel’s cavalry that are at Torgau.” Lastly, Napoleon wanted Grand
Headquarters, the Saxon king, the Old Guard, Mortier’s Young Guard
divisions, bridging equipment, and Reserve Artillery and Park to be on the
road to Wurzen by 9:00 a.m. “I arrived today at Wurzen,” stated Napoleon’s
last dispatch of 8 October, addressed to Murat. “There is nothing new. All is

well here.”86
The reports that reached Napoleon late on the 8th confirmed that little
had changed in the dispositions of his adversaries. Aside from underestimat-
ing the size and proximity of the Army of North Germany, he had gained a
fairly accurate picture of the Coalition forces that stood between him and
the Elbe. “I am leaving for Wittenberg,” he wrote Murat on the morning of
the 9th, “which the enemy is besieging. I intend to attack Blücher at Bad
Düben, where I am assured that the Army of Silesia is in position. Tomor-
row, I hope to be at Wittenberg to lift the siege, cross to the right bank of the
Elbe, and eliminate the enemy’s two bridges [Roßlau and Wartenburg].
According to the information that I have, Blücher, with the Army of Silesia
forming about 60,000 men, is at Bad Düben and the prince of Sweden, with
40,000 men, is at Dessau.” The emperor instructed his brother-in-law “to
prepare everything to debouch on the rear of the enemy if he moves on
Dresden.” He also warned Murat not to believe the news of Bavaria’s
defection, “or anything that benefits the enemy.”87
A little past midnight on 9 October, Napoleon started issuing instruc-
tions to move the Grand Reserve to Eilenburg to form the anvil. He wanted
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions of the Guard Cavalry united there as soon as
possible. Souham’s III Corps immediately marched followed by Oudinot’s
Young Guard. At daybreak, 2nd Old Guard Division would move up to
Wurzen followed by the Guard Artillery Reserve with the light batteries at
the head of the column. The bridge train and engineer park, the army’s park,
Grand Headquarters with Frederick August’s suite, and 1st Old Guard
Division all had to be at Wurzen by 2:00 that afternoon. The emperor
himself with his “Little Headquarters” planned to depart from Wurzen at
9:00 a.m. and establish a command post near Eilenburg.88
To provide the hammer, Ney received orders to have his army marching
by 6:00 that morning. With III Corps moving along the right bank of the
Mulde to Eilenburg, VII Corps would proceed there from Püchau along the
left bank. From Schildau, IV Corps followed by XI Corps would march
eight miles northwest to Mockrehna. Napoleon did not place Macdonald’s
XI Corps under Ney’s command. “You will depart today at 6:00 a.m. with
your army corps and proceed to Mockrehna,” Berthier explained to
Macdonald, “if IV Corps is at Schilda, it will precede you. You will support
it if circumstances require it. I inform you, marshal, the emperor will leave at
6:00 this morning for Eilenburg and go from there to Bad Düben. As soon as
you arrive at Mockrehna, it will be necessary for you to move on Bad Düben
so you can contribute to the attack on this point where they say Blücher is
located.” All of the cavalry – two brigades – that had united at Torgau was
placed under Macdonald’s command but Napoleon placed II Cavalry Corps
under Ney’s command, informing the marshal that at 6:00 a.m. Sébastiani
The Mulde 537
would leave his bivouac just east of Wurzen and make for Eilenburg.
Napoleon wanted Ney to accompany III Corps, with II Cavalry Corps
forming the vanguard. Reynier would lead VII Corps across the Mulde at
Eilenburg to serve as Ney’s left wing as Bertrand pushed IV Corps to
Mockrehna to form the right. To obtain intelligence and facilitate the march
of IV Corps, the master instructed Ney to have III Corps between Eilenburg
and Bad Düben as soon as possible. “Consequently, prince,” noted Berthier,
“you have under your command III, IV, and VII Corps, II Cavalry Corps,
and Da˛browski’s division; the emperor himself will be there to support you
with the Imperial Guard: cavalry, infantry, and artillery. The emperor
attaches importance to being master of Bad Düben today and, if the enemy
has no more than 30,000 men, His Majesty intends to attack tonight.”89
For his Regular Reserve, Napoleon directed Marmont to have I Cavalry
Corps depart from Taucha at 6:00 that morning to reach Eilenburg no later
than 11:00 a.m. From there, the troopers would take the direct road to Bad
Düben. Their patrols had to scour the countryside along the Leipzig–
Eilenburg and Leipzig–Bad Düben roads. Behind the cavalry, Marmont
would also have a large combined-arms vanguard from VI Corps on the
Leipzig–Bad Düben road likewise at 6:00 a.m. The marshal would follow
with the main body of VI Corps and 5th Light Cavalry Division from III
Cavalry Corps, with a flying column reconnoitering along the Leipzig–
Delitzsch road. “It is necessary for you to reach the height of Eilenburg
before 11:00 a.m. today,” Berthier instructed Marmont. “The emperor will
be at Eilenburg at 8:00 this morning to march on Bad Düben, today, the 9th,
with 120,000 men.” With the Grand Reserve at Wurzen, Napoleon would
have his famous bataillon carré of 120,000 men formed along a front ten
miles wide and fifteen miles deep: success appeared guaranteed. He arranged
for the Grande Armée to advance against Blücher’s position at Bad Düben in
three main columns along the shortest roads. “Today, I march on Bad
Düben,” he wrote to Narbonne at Torgau, “tomorrow on Wittenberg, where
I will give battle to the enemy. With God’s help, I hope to have complete
success. At the least, I will force the enemy to raise the siege of Wittenberg
and I will take possession of his two bridges at Wartenburg and Dessau; and,
as he has huge baggage trains on the left bank, his retreat will be difficult.”90
Napoleon entrusted Jean-Toussaint Arrighi, duc de Padua and com-
mander of III Cavalry Corps, with the defense of Leipzig. “We occupy
Colditz, Rochlitz, Penig, and Frohburg,” noted the emperor, “Leipzig is well
covered on all sides, except those of Halle and Dessau.” Arrighi had at his
disposal an ad hoc division of six infantry battalions and sixteen guns under
General Pierre Margaron as well as the 2nd Brigade of 4th Heavy Cavalry
Division of III Cavalry Corps and a march regiment of reinforcements
belonging to V Corps. “These troops are sufficient to guard Leipzig and to
protect it from the attack of cavalry or a vanguard,” continued Napoleon.
In addition, he projected the arrival of Augereau’s lead division under

General Étienne-Nicolas Lefol consisting of 6,000 or 7,000 infantry,
3,000 cavalry, and 10 guns. He instructed Arrighi to post Lefol’s regiments
at the city’s various gates and bridges as well as on the roads from Halle
and Dessau, and to form from them “two strong vanguards of infantry,
cavalry, and artillery that will occupy the villages that are one league from
the city.” “You have 1,800 Honor Guards there,” added Berthier; “you
will not do anything with them in battle but place them in reserve to
intimidate the enemy.”91
After issuing these orders at 1:00 a.m., Napoleon clarified his instruc-
tions merely sixty minutes later. So much depended on this battle; every
aspect and every detail had to be clearly explained to his subordinates. “Start
the march of Da˛browski and the divisions of III Cavalry Corps early today,”
Berthier instructed Ney, “so they are across the river before 6:00 a.m.”
Breaking protocol, the emperor wrote directly to Reynier: “The prince de
la Moskova [Ney] will order you to depart at 6:00 a.m. to march on
Eilenburg. I myself will be there at 7:00 a.m. It is essential that the head of
your corps arrives at 8:00, so that between 9:00 and 10:00 it will pass and be
on the way to Bad Düben, where I want to attack the enemy today. You will
depart at 6:00 a.m., sharp.”92
Napoleon’s legions commenced their movements early on the 9th in
accordance with the master’s orders. With 6th Light and 4th Heavy Div-
isions from III Cavalry Corps and Da˛browski’s cavalry leading, the infantry
of the 27th Division and VII Corps crossed the Mulde at Eilenburg. Seven
miles east of Eilenburg, the vanguard encountered Russian cavalry from
Sacken’s corps at Böhlitz. After driving the enemy troopers four miles north
to Doberschütz, Ney received instructions to prepare the mainly Saxon VII
Corps to be inspected by the emperor at Kültschau on the right bank of the
Mulde facing Eilenburg. Odeleben recounts:
Napoleon endeavored to reanimate the courage of his troops through a

harangue. He told them “that he was aware of how many reverses the VII
Corps had experienced; that he had come to repair those misfortunes by
placing himself at their head to repulse the enemy beyond the Elbe; that the
Prussians planned to seize Saxony but he would protect it in concert with
the king, his faithful ally; that all who no longer felt inclined to further his
cause were at liberty to quit the service, and that the commanding officers
should express his sentiments to all who could not hear him.” This discourse
had no effect. It was longer than those that the soldiers had been accustomed
to hearing on such occasions; he expressed himself in a drawling manner,
correcting himself by repetitions . . . To add to his misfortune, his speech was
translated into worse German than ordinary by the grand equerry,
Caulaincourt, to all the generals and officers standing at attention before
their regiments.
The Mulde 539
After the review, a dejected Napoleon slumped into the corner of his
carriage, “full of vexation and ill-humor,” and took the road to Bad Düben.93
With the cavalry leading, VII Corps turned north followed by III Corps; 1st
and 3rd Guard Cavalry Divisions formed the rearguard. Napoleon’s advance
benefited from Russian inefficiency. Lanskoy stood between Eilenburg and
Bad Düben with Sacken’s advance guard, which replaced Langeron’s van-
guard on the right bank of the Mulde after it crossed the river. Without
dispatching a report to Bad Düben, Lanskoy withdrew east to rejoin his
main body at Mockrehna. Consequently, the imperials encountered only
one Cossack regiment, which quickly scattered. Around 3:00 p.m. the heads
of the French columns reached Bad Düben, completely surprising the Sile-
sian Army. The great man had arrived.
Notes
1 SHAT, C2 157: Bertrand to Ney, 3 October 1813; Arrighi to Augereau, 4 October
1813; Ney to Marmont, 3 October 1813.
2 SHAT, C2 157: Report to Bertrand dated 3 October 1813.
3 Ney to Marmont, Bitterfeld, 2:00 p.m., 4 October 1813, in Marmont, Mémoires,
V:344; Weil, Campagne de 1813, 202–03.
4 Gneisenau to Bubna, Wartenburg, 4 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, ad121.
This letter stated that Blücher had crossed the Elbe on the morning of the 3rd at
Wartenburg. Gneisenau also stated that the main body of the Army of North
Germany would cross the Elbe on the 4th near Roßlau. On receiving this report on
6 October, Bubna immediately forwarded it to Schwarzenberg, who received it on
the 7th according to the entry noted on the letter itself: Bubna to Schwarzenberg,
Stolpen, 6 October 1813, ibid., 121; Plotho, Der Krieg, II:285; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:51; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, I:193; Frieder-
ich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:299–304.
5 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Wintzingerode, Tauentzien, Bülow, and Stedingk,
3 October 1813; Charles John to Blücher, Zerbst, 3 October 1813, Add MSS,
20112, 60; Reiche to Gneisenau, Nudersdorf, 4 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Dar-
stellung,” 1845:318; SHAT, C2 157: Arrighi to Ney, 5 October 1813; Blücher to
Frederick William, Kemberg, 5 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 16.
6 During the night of 3–4 October, Gneisenau ordered six of Sacken’s Cossack
regiments under General Gavriil Lukovkin to Kemberg, where they arrived at
6:00 a.m. on the 4th and found Korf’s Cossacks from Langeron’s corps. Lukovkin
continued to Bad Düben; Korf’s Cossacks rested until 11:00 a.m. at which time
they received orders for the 4th: Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1844:319.
7 Blücher to Rauch, Wartenburg, 4 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1844:316; Unger, Blücher, II:102–03; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 62; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:50. The Prussians provided 42 officers and 1,332 men,
of which four Landwehr battalions accounted for 38 officers and 1,103 men while 1
officer and 51 troopers of the Lithuanian and West Prussian Dragoons and 3 officers
and 178 pioneers completed Yorck’s contribution. The Russians provided 88 officers
and 3,025 men of which 78 officers and 2,719 were infantry and 10 officers and
306 men were pioneers and pontooniers. Together, the Russians and Prussians
amounted to 130 officers and 4,357 men. However, manpower needed for
prisoner-escort duty and to transport the sick and wounded reduced this figure to
some 3,000 men. This forced the Allies to requisition laborers from the surrounding
villages, which contained very few hearty males. As a result, greybeards, children,
and women reported for work. After subtracting the labor force for the entrenched
camp at Wartenburg, approximately 60,000 men remained at Blücher’s disposal for
field service.
8 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Wartenburg, 4 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 90;
Disposition, Wartenburg, 4 October 1813, RA KrA, volym 25, and Add MSS,
20112, 148.
9 These blockhouses were part of Napoleon’s system to defend the Elbe between
Torgau and Meißen. On 27 September, he ordered Marmont to utilize VI Corps
and I Cavalry Corps “to form 3 columns, each consisting of 300–400 cavalry,
1 battalion of infantry, and 6 pieces of horse artillery. You will send one to
Mühlberg, one to Strehla, and one between Strehla and Meißen, where the ferries
operate. These columns will patrol the length of the bank and prevent any
crossing. They will build blockhouses between those that already exist, so that
instead of having one every other league there will be one every league. These
columns will show their artillery on the road along the river so they can be seen
on the other side and so the enemy knows that their boats can be destroyed by
cannon. You will form 2 columns, each of 500 cavalry, 500 infantry, and 2 pieces
of cannon, and you will have intelligent officers command them. They will
coordinate their movements with Prince Poniatowski, General Lefebvre-
Desnoettes, the duc de Padua [Arrighi], and General [Jean-Thomas] Lorge [5th
Light Cavalry Division, III Cavalry Corps] to drive off enemy partisans and ensure
that none operate between the Elbe and Leipzig. Instruct all columns that none can
pass the night where they see the sun go down. All these columns must be very
active, communicate with each other, and purge the countryside of all enemy
parties.” On the 28th, the commander of V Cavalry Corps, Lhéritier, also received
instructions to form two columns each of 400–500 cavalry and 2 guns. One column
would monitor the Elbe downstream along the right bank on the twenty-mile
stretch from Meißen to Riesa; the other would patrol upriver the fifteen miles that
separated Meißen and Dresden: CN, Nos. 20644 and 20653, XXVI:253–54, 261.
10 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:319–21; Langeron, Mémoires, 293–94; Blücher to
Frederick William, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 16; SHAT, C2 157: Narbonne to Bertrand, 4 October 1813; Weil,
Campagne de 1813, 202.
11 Blücher to Frederick William, Kemberg, 5 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA
1534, ad108.
12 Blücher to Frederick William, Kemberg, 5 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534,
ad108; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:324.
13 Blücher to Frederick William, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16; Disposition for 5 October, Kemberg, 4 October
The Mulde 541
1813, RA KrA, volym 25 and Add MSS 20112, 149; Disposition, Kemberg,
5 October 1813, Add MSS 20112, 150.
14 SHAT, C2 157: Ney to Berthier, 5 October 1813. As rearguard, 27th Division held
Delitzsch. Eight miles east, VII Corps stood at Wölkau and IV Corps at Naun-
dorf. The 6th Light Cavalry Division took a position at Lindenhayn, dispatching
patrols through Reibnitz toward Bitterfeld, while the 4th Heavy Cavalry
Division halted at Gollmenz.
15 “Monsieur le duc, the emperor learned with astonishment that, after having
ordered III Corps to move from Torgau to Eilenburg, an order that General
Souham has executed by departing at 4:00 a.m. this morning, you left Eilenburg
after destroying the bridge that His Majesty had ordered to be built there.” Ney’s
compensation stated: “It was with astonishment that His Majesty learned that
after ordering III Corps to move to Eilenburg, the duc de Raguse [Marmont] cut
the bridge, retired on Leipzig, and singularly compromised this corps”: SHAT,
C17 180: Berthier to Marmont, 7 October 1813; Berthier to Ney, 7 October 1813.
16 SHAT, C2 157: Ney to Berthier, 6 October 1813.
18 Blücher to Frederick William, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
19 Tauentzien’s brigades did not receive numerical designations because they were
chiefly composed of Landwehr regiments.
20 The account of 5 October is based on Blücher to Frederick William, Kemberg,
5 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, ad108; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 62–63;
Plotho, Der Krieg, II:285–86; Marmont, Mémoires, V:266–67; Langeron, Mém-
oires, 293–95; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:322–24; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, II:305–07; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:51–52; Vaudoncourt,
Histoire de la guerre, 193.
21 Ney to Marmont, 5 October 1813, in Marmont, Mémoires, V:346–47.
22 SHAT, C2 157: Ney to Bertrand, 5 October 1813; Ney to Marmont, 5 October
1813, in Marmont, Memoires, V:347–48.
23 SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Ney, 6 October 1813.
24 Ney to Marmont, 6 October 1813, in Marmont, Memoires, V:351–52.
25 Marmont, Memoires, V:266–67; SHAT, C2 157: Ney to Berthier, 6 October 1813;
SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Marmont, 7 October 1813; Marmont to Napoleon,
6 October 1813, in Marmont, Memoires, V:354–55.
26 C2 157: Ney to Berthier, 6 October 1813; Ney to Marmont, 7 October 1813, in
Marmont, Memoires, V:353–54; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:307–08.
27 Blücher to Charles John, Kemberg, 5 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23. A copy of this memo was sent to the tsar and king: Blücher
to Alexander, Kemberg, 5 October 1813, RGVIA, f. VUA, op. 16, d. 3913, ll.
424–424b, and ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 108; Blücher to Frederick William, Kemberg,
5 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1534, ad108. “Attached I include a memo that
I have just sent to the crown prince in order to learn his intentions and make
further arrangements.”
28 Charles John to Blücher, Dessau, 6 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 65; Blücher
to Charles John, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Blücher to
Gneisenau, Nr. 16.
29 Narbonne’s intercepted report from midnight on 4 October confirmed this news:
SHAT, C2 157: Narbonne to Bertrand, 4 October 1813; Müffling, Die Feldzüge,
62; Blücher to Frederick William, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16; Plotho, Der Krieg, II:287; Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1845:322–25. Katzler also reported that Da˛browski’s “division” consisted
of four regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and two guns. The captured courier
also revealed that Torgau’s garrison consisted of 10,000 to 11,000 men but mostly
from the depots of the army; approximately one-third were sick and the number
of dead increased each day.
30 Blücher to Sacken, Bad Düben, 6 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:325–26.
31 Blücher to Charles John, Bad Düben, 6 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 66;
Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 84.
33 The reports from Rudzevich and Emmanuel to Gneisenau are in Höpfner, “Dar-
34 Bennigsen to Blücher, Teplitz, 4 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:327–28.
36 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:313.
37 On 8 October, Schwarzenberg’s headquarters reached Chemnitz, sixty-three
miles south of Bad Düben.
38 Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, 258; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:327.
40 Charles John to Blücher, Dessau, 7 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 67.
41 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Tauentzien, Wintzingerode, Hirschfeld, and
Putlitz, 7 October 1813; Blücher to Shcherbatov, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813,
ÖStA KA, FA 1535, ad228; Plotho, Der Krieg, II:317–18; Friederich, Herbstfeld-
zug 1813, II:315–16.
42 Ney to Marmont, Bennewitz, 6:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., 7 October 1813, in
Marmont, Memoires, V:352–54; SHAT, C2 157: Ney to Berthier, Bennewitz,
1:00 p.m., 7 October 1813.
43 Ney’s report states “Eilenburg to Sprottau,” but this must be a mistake as the latter
stood 142 miles east of the former. At fifteen miles east of Eilenburg, the village of
Schildau appears to be the endpoint of Marmont’s reconnaissance: SHAT, C2 157:
Ney to Berthier, 7 October 1813; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:313.
44 Langeron, Mémoires, 295; Blücher to Charles John, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813,
RA KrA, volym 25; Blücher to Frederick William, Bad Düben, 11:00 a.m.,
7 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16; Höpfner,
45 Blücher to Shcherbatov, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1535, ad228.
Shcherbatov received these orders on the evening of the 9th: Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1845:327, 330–31.
The Mulde 543
46 Blücher to Frederick William, Bad Düben, 11:00 a.m., 7 October 1813, GStA PK,
VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16.
47 Blücher to Wobeser, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:331.
48 Blücher to Sacken, Bad Düben, 7 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:331. Acting on Blücher’s orders during the afternoon of the 6th,
Yuzefovich turned over the post at Dommitzsch to Colonel Rakhmanov of
Sacken’s corps; he also turned over the posts he held facing Torgau to Vasilchikov.
Yuzefovich then led his detachment to Langenreichenbach, reinforcing the post at
Schildau, and detaching two dragoon squadrons and 200 Cossacks toward Meh-
deritzsch on the road that led from Meißen to Torgau.
49 The reports by Vasilchikov and Sacken are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:331–32.
50 Unger, Blücher, II:104–05; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 63, and Aus meinem Leben,
85–86; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:52; Schneidawind, Prinz Wil-
helm, 85; Unger, Blücher, II:104.
51 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Tauentzien, Wintzingerode and Hirschfeld,
7 October 1813; Charles John to Putlitz, Bülow, and Stedingk, 8 October 1813;
Charles John to Stedingk, Bülow, and Wintzingerode, 9 October 1813.
52 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:332–33.
53 Disposition, Bad Düben, 8 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 153; Blücher to
Charles John, Bad Düben, 8 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 23; Vasilchikov’s report is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:333.
54 Falkenhausen to Shcherbatov, Baslitz near Meißen, 11:00 a.m., 6 October 1813,
ÖStA KA, FA 1534, 149a; Sacken to Blücher, Mockrehna, 7:30 p.m., 8 October
1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:338; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
II:316–18; Unger, Blücher, II:105.
56 Charles John to Blücher, Zehbitz, 8 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 23, and Add MSS, 20112, 153.
57 Two variations of the discussion between Bernadotte and Rühle exist. According to
the first, which is based on Rühle’s verbal report on his return to Blücher’s headquar-
ters, the crown prince proposed that both armies cross the Saale. Müffling’s 1827 his-
tory of the Silesian Army supports this version: “The confidential officer [Rühle] sent
by the commanding general . . . returned early on the 9th, delivering the news that the
crown prince wished to remain behind [north of] the Elbe, and consented to
remaining on the left bank only on the condition that General Blücher resolved to
jointly cross the Saale with him to take a position behind that river.” See Müffling, Die
Feldzüge, 63–64. The second version, published in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:332,
is based on Rühle’s oral testimony thirty years later and not surprisingly attributes the
idea for the joint passage solely to Rühle. Yet in General Unger’s biography of Blücher,
written several years after Höpfner’s account, Bernadotte receives sole credit for
suggesting the joint passage: Unger, Blücher, II:106; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
II:319–22.
58 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Bülow, Stedingk, and Wintzingerode, 9
October 1813.
59 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 64; Blücher to Charles John, Bad Düben, 9 October
1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23, and Add MSS, 20112, 70;
Unger, Blücher, II:106.
60 CN, No. 20673, XXVI:275. At the end of September, Napoleon situated his I, III,
V, XI, and XIV Corps as well as II and IV Cavalry Corps in the tight triangle
formed by Dresden, Pirna, and Weißig. Victor’s II Corps stood at Freiberg, while
Poniatowski held Penig and Altenburg with VIII Corps. Marmont’s VI Corps
along with I and V Cavalry Corps moved to Leipzig, to where Augereau’s IX
Corps was marching from the Main River valley.
61 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to St.-Cyr, Souham, Macdonald, Lauriston, Arrighi, and
Durosnel, 2 October 1813.
62 CN, Nos. 20678 and 20679, XXVI:280–81.
63 According to Berthier, II Corps stood between Freiberg and Öderan; V Corps
held Mittweida; and VIII was marching from Frohburg to Altenburg: CN,
No. 20677, XXVI:279–80; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Murat, 2 October 1813.
64 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Ney, Arrighi, Augereau, and Kellerman, 3
October 1813.
65 SHAT, C2 157: Lauriston to Berthier, 3 October 1813; Poniatowski to Berthier,
3 and 4 October 1813; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Macdonald and Souham, 3
October 1813.
66 SHAT, C2 157: Ney to Marmont, 3 October 1813.
67 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Souham, 3 October 1813; Berthier to Chastel,
4 October 1813. Chastel received a reprimand on the 4th: “The emperor charged
me with communicating to you his displeasure over your conduct in quitting the
banks of the Elbe, where the duc de Raguse placed you. Return immediately to
the river. His Majesty has the right to expect more zeal for his service from a
general of division. How could you neglect to immediately send an officer to
headquarters and to General Souham to communicate the passage of the enemy?
How could you push caution so far that you believed you were compromised
when the enemy had not even built his bridge? The emperor is exasperated by
such conduct and such negligence.”
Souham, Dresden, 3 October 1813.
69 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Marmont and Souham, 4 October 1813; CN,
Nos. 20692 and 20693, XXVI:290.
70 CN, Nos. 20694–20696, XXVI:290–92; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Souham,
Marmont, and Ney, 5 October 1813. One brigade from III Corps would remain
at Meißen to guard the bridge.
71 CN, Nos. 20697 and 20698, XXVI:292–93; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Drouot, 5
October 1813.
72 CN, Nos. 20703 and 20704, XXVI:295.
73 In and around Dresden stood the 44,000 men and 202 guns of the Guard; the
25,000 men and 68 guns of XI Corps; the 12,500 men and 47 guns of I Corps; the
28,000 men and 60 guns of XIV Corps; and the 6,800 men and 12 guns of II
Cavalry Corps, for a total of 116,300 men and 389 guns. Between the Elbe and
Mulde were the 15,900 men and 61 guns of III Corps; the 15,500 men and 32 guns
The Mulde 545
of IV Corps; the 22,000 men and 48 guns of VII Corps; the 22,500 men and
82 guns of VI Corps; the 3,200 men and 8 guns of 27th Division; the 2,500 men
and 6 guns of III Cavalry Corps; and the 6,000 men and 27 guns of I Cavalry
Corps, for a total of 87,600 men and 264 guns. On the Leipzig–Altenburg–
Freiberg front stood the 16,000 men and 55 guns of II Corps; the 14,200 men
and 53 guns of V Corps; the 6,900 men and 30 guns of VIII Corps; the 3,000 men
and 12 guns of IV Cavalry Corps; the 2,450 men and 6 guns of V Cavalry Corps;
the 1,000 men of 1st Brigade of I Cavalry Corps; and the 7,200 men and 22 guns
of the Observations Corps of Leipzig for a total of 50,750 men and 178 guns.
Approximately 5,000 cavalry and 6 guns kept open communications across the
Saale, while IX Corps marched on Leipzig with 12,700 men and 14 guns. See
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:300–01.
74 CN, Nos. 20701–20703, 20706, and 20707, XXVI:294–97; SHAT, C17 181: Ber-
thier to Macdonald, Augereau, and Sébastiani, 6 October 1813.
75 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Rognait, Sorbier, and Durrieu, 6 October 1813;
Norvins, Portefeuille de mil huit cent treize, II:372; Plotho, Der Krieg,
II:286–87; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:306–08.
76 CN, No. 20705, XXVI:296.
77 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:57; St.-Cyr, Mémoires, IV:185–88; CN,
No. 20699, XXVI:293; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to St.-Cyr, 6 October 1813.
78 CN, Nos. 20709 and 20733, XXVI:297–98, 312–13; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to
Daru, Sorbier, and Durosnel, 6 October 1813.
79 CN, Nos. 20711 and 20714, XXVI:299–302.
80 CN, Nos. 20712, 20713, 20715, and 20716, XXVI:301–03; SHAT, C17 181: Ber-
thier to Macdonald and Drouot, 7 October 1813.
81 CN, Nos. 20717 and 20718, XXVI:303–04.
82 SHAT, C2 157: Ney to Berthier, 6 October 1813. Writing in 1845, Höpfner of the
Prussian General Staff asserted that this prompted Napoleon to abandon his
initial plan to march to Wurzen and instead to march directly through Dahlen
to Bad Düben in order to catch Blücher between the Mulde and the Elbe. Jean-
Jacques Pelet, in Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 153–54,
claimed that Napoleon received this report on the evening of the 7th at Seerhau-
sen while Höpfner, in “Darstellung,” 1845:329, which Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, II:312–13 follows verbatim, believes this report reached him at Meißen
during the afternoon of the 7th. Based on Berthier’s correspondence, it does not
appear that Napoleon received this information until the 8th.
83 CN, No. 20719, XXVI:304; St.-Cyr, Mémoires, IV:433.
84 CN, No. 20720, XXVI:304–05; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Marmont, Ney,
Joinville, Drouot, Daru, Chastel, and Augereau, 7 October 1813.
85 On the left wing, Marmont’s VI Corps and General Lorge’s 5th Light Cavalry
Division of III Cavalry Corps remained at Taucha, with forward posts extending
northwest toward Delitzsch. In the center, on the left bank of the Mulde, two
divisions each from I and III Cavalry Corps stood at Machern, and Reynier’s VII
Corps at Püchau and Eilenburg. On the right bank of the Mulde, Da˛browski’s
27th Division took post west of Eilenburg, Souham’s III Corps at Großzschepa,
1st Old Guard Division and Oudinot’s Young Guard corps at Wurzen. The right
wing comprised 2nd Old Guard Division and Mortier’s two divisions of Young
Guard echeloned between Wurzen and Oschatz, Bertrand’s IV Corps at Schildau,
Macdonald’s XI Corps and the II Cavalry Corps at Dahlen, and Chastel’s cavalry
detachment at Torgau. See CN, No. 20723, XXVI:306–07; SHAT, C17 181:
Berthier to Macdonald, 8 October 1813; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges,
IIb:57–58; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, 193–94; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, II:316–17; Bernhardi, Toll, III:366–67.
86 CN, No. 20723 and 20724, XXVI:306–07; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Souham,
Latour-Maubourg, and Ney, 8 October 1813.
87 CN, No. 20735, XXVI:313–14.
88 CN, No. 20725, XXVI:307–08; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Drouot, and Arrighi,
9 October 1813. Lefebvre-Desnouettes’s 2nd Guard Cavalry Division stood at
Leipzig with VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps. For the movement on the 9th, the
2nd Guard Cavalry Division was temporarily placed under the orders of Latour-
Maubourg, commander of I Cavalry Corps.
89 CN, No. 20727, XXVI:309; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Ney and Macdonald, 9
October 1813.
90 CN, Nos. 20728 and 20733, XXVI:310, 312; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Mar-
mont, 9 October 1813.
91 CN, No. 20726, XXVI:308; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Arrighi, 9 October 1813.
92 CN, Nos. 20730 and 20731, XXVI:311; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Ney and
Sébastiani, 9 October 1813.
93 The text of the speech to the Saxons can be found in Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIb:59; Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, II:2–4. The French troops
of VII Corps were also “solemnly harangued.”
12
Hide and seek
The preliminary reports that reached Blücher on 9 October indicated

Leipzig as the objective of French movements. Unaware of the emperor’s
offensive down the Mulde that very day, Silesian Army Headquarters did
not make haste. Gneisenau and Müffling rescinded the disposition for the
march on Leipzig and drafted new orders, entitled the “Secret Disposition
for 9 October,” to evacuate the entire stretch between the Mulde and
the Elbe. Rather than along the left bank of the Elbe, the Army’s communi-
cation would run on the right bank through Roßlau and Aken starting on
11 October. Rauch received instructions to dismantle the pontoon bridge
at Wartenburg and post one battalion and twenty troopers at Elster to
defend the bridgehead. He would proceed through Wörlitz to Dessau with
his remaining units and the bridge train. All three corps would slide west:
Yorck’s corps would move across the Mulde at Jeßnitz; he would post his
advance guard five miles south of there at Bitterfeld. While Langeron’s corps
crossed five miles upstream of Jeßnitz at Mühlbeck, his vanguard would take
a position eight miles further south at Sausedlitz. Sacken would move to
Bad Düben, directing his vanguard to Pristäblich east of the Mulde with
cavalry patrolling the Eilenburg–Torgau road. If Shcherbatov had yet to
cross the Elbe, Blücher instructed him to force-march to Elster and there
await further orders. At 11:30 a.m., Blücher reported these measures to
Frederick William as well as the news that he and Bernadotte had agreed
that the imperial columns at Wurzen had come from Torgau and would
proceed to Leipzig. Thus, both commanders viewed a Rechtsabmarsch
(march to the right) as suitable for all contingencies (see Map 5).1
Already on the left bank of the Mulde, Yorck’s vanguard, commanded by
the capable Katzler, patrolled toward Leipzig. After observing Marmont’s
columns debouch, he withdrew to Bitterfeld, where Bülow’s 5th Brigade
stood. Katzler’s detachments continued to observe the roads to Delitzsch
547
and Bad Düben. Rudzevich stood even further south with Langeron’s
vanguard. With his command post at Pressen – only four miles west of
Eilenburg – the Russian general found himself in the midst of the imperial
columns. Throughout the day, his troopers sparred with Marmont’s cavalry,
which a captured cuirassier claimed to total three divisions. That evening,
Rudzevich withdrew ten miles north to Sausedlitz. At that time, he finally
reported the march of large columns from Leipzig to Eilenburg, as well as
along the right bank of the Mulde toward Bad Düben. Two officers who
had defected swore that Napoleon would be at Eilenburg, where the Guard
and four army corps had already arrived.
Although Blücher did not receive Rudzevich’s report until nighttime, news
did reach him from Sacken around noon on the 9th of the enemy’s march
down both banks of the Mulde toward Bad Düben. Sacken stated that a report
from Lukovkin dated 7:00 that morning warned of the movement of imperial
infantry and artillery led by two cavalry regiments from Wurzen down the
eastern bank of the Mulde toward Eilenburg. The Russians also spotted
imperial forces moving down the western bank of the Mulde. Enemy forces
remained at Großzschepa, Schildau, and Wurzen. Two hours later, Silesian
Army Headquarters received a report from Katzler concerning the movement
of large imperial forces northwest from Taucha. This report also stated that
Napoleon’s baggage escorted by three Guard Cavalry Regiments had rolled
through Taucha the previous evening en route to Leipzig on the great highway
from Dresden. Blücher wanted to wait for Sacken to arrive before he departed
with Langeron’s corps but the Russians never appeared; anxiety over their fate
mounted. Finally, Blücher’s posts reported the approach of a column marching
down the right bank of the Mulde. Believing the column to be Sacken’s corps,
the commander delayed his departure even longer and ordered Langeron’s
rearguard to remain at Bad Düben.
Soon, columns could be seen marching down both banks of the Mulde
but they did not belong to Sacken’s corps. Realizing that the enemy was fast
approaching, Blücher finally took the road to Pouch at 2:00 in the afternoon.
Less than sixty minutes after he departed, French cavalry entered Bad
Düben. Langeron’s Reserve Artillery, escorted by Kaptsevich’s X Infantry
Corps, had just marched out. Among the last to leave, Gneisenau barely
avoided capture. Thus, Rudzevich’s negligence almost caused a disaster for
Langeron’s corps and Blücher’s headquarters. “Langeron’s Reserve Artillery
marched in its usual place behind the columns,” recalled Müffling, “and
the enemy might have taken it had they known how to exploit the misun-
derstanding. Meanwhile, because he was so slow, we had time to send
infantry and some cavalry against them.” Three Jäger regiments and four
guns from Kaptsevich’s corps sufficed to confine the French vanguard at
Bad Düben. Although Langeron’s rearguard escaped, Napoleon succeeded
in cutting off Sacken’s corps at Mockrehna.
Hide and seek 549
With the French IV and XI Corps approaching his position, Sacken

planned to withdraw due north to Bad Schmiedeberg but first sought
Blücher’s permission. Hours passed as Sacken waited in vain for instruc-
tions. His anxiety increased after reports arrived of imperial columns esti-
mated to be 40,000 to 50,000 men marching down the Elbe. Threatened in
both the front and the right flank, Sacken decided to withdraw through
Bad Schmiedeberg to Wartenburg. As he prepared to retreat, the Russian
general finally received the “Secret Disposition” some three hours later than
expected. According to Müffling, the “Secret Disposition” called for one
officer from each corps staff to be sent to Army Headquarters so that
he could “transmit safely all urgent orders either by day or night. On the
morning of the 9th, when this orderly officer from Sacken’s corps should
have taken the disposition to General Sacken, he was nowhere to be found,
having already returned to his corps.” Another officer had to be sent. He
apparently lost his way, thus delivering the orders three hours late.
With the imperials contesting his vanguard around Eilenburg, Sacken
figured that the enemy already stood between him and Bad Düben.
Correctly concluding that he could not contest 40,000 to 50,000 imperials
for control of the village, Sacken also realized he could not execute the
march to Wartenburg. As Blücher decided to cut all communication along
the left bank of the Elbe, a march to Wartenburg would separate his corps
from the rest of the army. Sacken and the Prussian liaison who served
at his headquarters as de facto chief of staff, Major Wilhelm Ernst von
Brockhausen, hatched a brilliant scheme to both escape the French and
rejoin the army by immediately marching northwest, circumventing Bad
Düben, and cutting through the large forest, the Düben moor, north of that
town to reach Jeßnitz. Without encountering the imperials, his troops legged
twenty miles that day, reaching Schköna, seven miles north of Bad Düben
and eleven miles east of Jeßnitz, around midnight.2 He planned to depart for
the latter at 5:00 a.m. “The army could have suffered a disaster,” concluded
Müffling, “if the enemy had been more attentive and General Sacken less
resolute.”3 Sacken’s cavalry eventually rejoined the corps at the Mulde.
Meanwhile, Yorck had arrived at Jeßnitz earlier that day and found
Bülow’s corps on the opposite bank and the two bridges too weak to support
cavalry and artillery. Such information should have been obtained long
before the corps moved in this direction: yet again the negligence of subor-
dinates hindered Blücher’s operations. Ever cautious, Yorck decided to
postpone the crossing until the following morning, when the infantry
would pass the Mulde at Jeßnitz while the other arms crossed three miles
downstream at Raguhn. After forwarding his lead units there, Yorck estab-
lished a bivouac for his main body between Jeßnitz and Müldenstein. This
did not bode well for Langeron, whose corps Blücher determined would
cross at Jeßnitz in light of the French offensive. With his corps back to back
on the right bank of the Mulde, Blücher grumbled over Yorck’s measures
after reaching Jeßnitz that evening. He ordered the crossing to be exe-
cuted that night and a third, stronger bridge immediately built for
Langeron’s corps.
Consequently, I Corps crossed the Mulde at Jeßnitz around midnight
and moved into a bivouac two miles further west at Bobbau, very close to
Bülow’s corps. Yorck’s units that crossed at Raguhn rejoined his main body
around 6:00 a.m. on the 10th. Langeron’s troops marched through the night
to Jeßnitz and crossed the Mulde on the morning of the 10th by way of the
three bridges. In response to Sacken’s report that he would march to Jeßnitz
on the 10th, Blücher directed him to cross the Mulde at Raguhn. The bold
maneuver completely succeeded. On the next morning, 10 October, Yorck
dispatched Schack to Gneisenau with his report. In their meeting, the staff
chief could not contain his joy over outwitting the master: “Yesterday,
Napoleon struck in the air; he will do the same this morning because we
will withdraw across the Saale; the Mark is sufficiently covered by Putlitz
before Magdeburg, Hirschfeld at Aken, Tauentzien at Dessau, and Thümen
before Wittenberg. Moreover, Prince Shcherbatov is force-marching from
Dresden to reach the mouth of the Black Elster at Jeßen.”4
After delivering the army from the brink of chaos, Blücher, Gneisenau,
and Müffling drafted a detailed letter to Bernadotte describing the enemy’s
operation. They explained to the crown prince that the movement along
the right bank of the Mulde appeared too serious to be a mere reconnais-
sance. Yet this concentration cost Napoleon one full day. Consequently,
the Prussians judged that the Army of North Germany could march to
Halle unmolested. Never happy with retreating, Blücher proposed making
a stand: “I believe that if you want to take a position between Halle and
Leipzig while you prepare your crossing over the Saale at Halle, and if
I take a position in the region of Zörbig with crossings at Rothenburg or
Bernburg, we will be in position to await the enemy and proceed according
to circumstances.” Müffling informed Blücher that Bruckdorf, on the
road to Leipzig four miles southwest of Halle, offered a strong position.
“The right wing of this position would lean on the Elster River, the front
would be covered by a large pond and a small stream that flows through a
swampy meadow, and the left wing of this position offers the cavalry a very
advantageous field,” concluded Blücher.5
With imperial forces moving east from Leipzig to the Mulde to join the
large columns advancing north on Bad Düben, Blücher offered to shield
the Army of North Germany, which did nothing on the 9th, while it slid
southwest to a position between Halle and Leipzig. Meanwhile, Blücher
would assess the situation from Zörbig, with crossings over the Saale avail-
able twenty-three miles northwest at Bernburg and eighteen miles due west
at Rothenburg. The intent and genius of this plan should not be overlooked.
Hide and seek 551
Blücher and his staff ultimately believed that both armies would be com-
pelled to cross the Saale. Upon doing so, the Prussians wanted both armies
to march south along its left bank to unite with the Bohemian Army.
Yet they feared Bernadotte would attempt to slip across the Elbe and fall
back into Brandenburg under the pretext of guarding Berlin. By offering to
shield the Army of North Germany as it marched southwest to Bruckdorf
or some other point between Halle and Leipzig, Blücher created the façade
of sacrificing his army for Bernadotte’s. Blinded by this magnanimous offer,
Bernadotte would accept, thus placing the Army of Silesia between his
army and its bridges to escape across the Elbe. Thus, with Blücher driving
him from behind, Bernadotte would have no choice but to march south and
seek the union with Schwarzenberg.
Although this was a cunning ploy, Bernadotte was no fool. He rejected
Blücher’s suggestion to cross the Saale at Halle and place the Army of North
Germany south of the Silesian Army. To protect his army, he preferred
that Blücher remain at Zörbig – halfway between the Mulde and the Saale –
on the 10th while his army took a position north of the Silesian Army,
bridging the lower Saale at Alsleben and Bernburg. The crown prince again
appeared more concerned with securing his line of retreat to the Elbe bridges
rather than cooperating with the approaching Bohemian Army. “As the
emperor Napoleon has turned against you today, it is completely impossible
to execute our movements to the left bank of the Saale without being
intensely harassed and pressured by him,” he informed Blücher. “To avoid
a disadvantageous battle under the current circumstances, I believe there is
nothing better to do than for you to quickly place your army between
Jeßnitz, Zörbig, and Bitterfeld. In this way, we support our left wing on
the Mulde and have no need – after the bridges are downed – for concern
about this side. Our right wing can extend toward the Saale.” Moreover, the
crown prince pledged to bridge the Saale at Bernburg as well as eight miles
further upstream at Alsleben.
While Bernadotte’s proposal appeared to concur with Blücher’s bid to
make a stand between the Saale and the Mulde, the specific details proved
too suspect for the Prussians. In his letter from the evening of the 9th,
Blücher clearly explained Marmont’s eastern movement from Leipzig to
Eilenburg as well as Napoleon’s northern drive down the Mulde. Thus,
the threat clearly came from the east and not from Leipzig to the south.
Yet Bernadotte’s claim that the “left” of the army would be secured along
the Mulde while the “right” extended to the Saale applied only to a
situation where an enemy force moved north from Leipzig. However, it
was no mistake that his notion of “left” and “right” did not conform to
the actual disposition of the opposing armies. By recommending that
Blücher take a position between Jeßnitz, Zörbig, and Bitterfeld to counter
an enemy force moving west, the crown prince actually meant for the
Silesian Army to assume the first line while the North German Army
safely remained west of it in the second line.
Equally important, Bernadotte made no mention of Blücher’s suggestion
for the Army of North Germany to slide southwest to a position between
Halle and Leipzig. Instead, the crown prince expressed his intention to
bridge the Saale far downstream at Alsleben and Bernburg, the latter being
twenty-five miles north of Halle. Thus, his vague assertion that the right
wing of the combined armies would “extend to the Saale” really meant due
west to the Saale rather than sharply southwest as Blücher proposed.
Bridging the Saale downstream of Halle at Alsleben and Bernburg indicated
that Bernadotte did not intend to abandon the immediate vicinity of the
Elbe and the bridges that could safely deliver his army to Brandenburg.
The crown prince’s penultimate statement appeared the most dubious of all.
Assuming Blücher had dismantled his bridge at Wartenburg, Bernadotte
advised him to “immediately transport the pontoons to Aken or Roßlau.”
Therefore, the Prussians believed he wanted to maintain the liberty to either
take part in a great battle with Napoleon or fly across the Elbe. “This
new demand was most annoying,” explains Müffling. “If the crown prince
found it inconvenient to quit the Elbe, how much more inconvenient was
it for General Blücher, who had his base in Silesia, and had detached
Shcherbatov to Dresden. At headquarters, it was considered proof that
through this the crown prince wished to reserve for himself the option of
participating in a general battle.”6
In fact, Bernadotte proved much too clever to fall for Blücher’s ruse.
Despite the latter’s selfless offer to shield the Army of North Germany as it
marched southwest to Bruckdorf, Bernadotte refused to allow the Silesian
Army to come between him and his bridges across the Elbe. This placed
the Prussians in a difficult situation by jeopardizing the entire purpose of
crossing the Elbe at Wartenburg. For the moment, the Prussians accepted
this check in their chess match with Bernadotte. Rather than attempt another
move, Blücher and Gneisenau wanted to convince the crown prince that
the roads to the Saale remained open. They forwarded a 9 October report
from Sacken stating that Napoleon had reached Eilenburg with the bulk
of his forces. In addition, according to the statements of two defected
Württemberger officers, the 16,000-man VI Corps had marched northeast
from Taucha on the road to Bad Düben. Based on this news, the Prussians
did not believe Napoleon could force a battle on the 10th. Consequently,
Blücher planned to maintain his rearguard (Sacken) on the left bank of the
Mulde: the bridges at Raguhn and Jeßnitz would be burned at the enemy’s
approach. While the Silesian Army marched to Zörbig, a bridge train would
proceed sixteen miles further west to Wettin. “In this manner,” concluded
Blücher, “I believe I will fulfill your intentions, which can then lead to the
crossing of the Saale. Because the enemy can move against Dessau to cut us
Hide and seek 553
off from the crossing at Roßlau, I hold it as dangerous to accept battle

without a secure retreat.”7
Blücher’s disposition for 10 October called for Sacken’s rearguard to
hold the bridge at Raguhn; should the enemy arrive in strength Blücher
wanted the Russians to torch the structure. Langeron’s rearguard would do
the same at Jeßnitz. All three corps should forward nonessential vehicles to
Dessau for the immediate passage of the Elbe at Roßlau. In accordance with
the disposition, Yorck’s corps marched at 2:00 that afternoon in two columns
from Bobbau to a camp on Zörbig’s west side. Katzler moved the vanguard
from Bitterfeld to Brehna, where it joined the outpost of Bülow’s vanguard.
Langeron’s soldiers likewise retreated in two columns to a bivouac just
southwest of Zörbig. Rudzevich posted the advance guard eight miles
further southwest at Roitzsch and only three miles west of Katzler. After
Korf’s cavalry crossed the Mulde at Jeßnitz, Russian engineers dismantled
the twenty pontoons that formed one of the bridges and sent the train on
a forced march to Wettin. The Russians prepared the second bridge for
burning; only one post from Langeron’s corps remained east of the Mulde
at Friedersdorf, a little more than four miles upriver from Jeßnitz. After
Sacken’s corps crossed the Mulde at Raguhn late on the morning of the 10th,
the Russians made preparations to destroy that bridge as well. Likewise,
only one post from Sacken’s corps remained on the right bank to observe
the imperials. Sacken’s troops camped on the left bank of the Mulde at
Jeßnitz and Raguhn to observe the enemy’s march along the right bank of
the Mulde. Lanskoy positioned the vanguard on the highway to Delitzsch
not far from Bitterfeld. Cavalry patrols reported that the imperial forces
on the right bank had moved in huge columns north through Bad Düben
and into the Düben moor (see Map 5).8
Passing through Zehbitz on the road to Zörbig, Blücher and Gneisenau –
already in a foul mood over Bernadotte – met with the prince royal.
According to Müffling, who again served as interpreter, the conversation
proved less friendly than their first meeting: “The crown prince was much
more agitated and no longer so level-headed. The great decision was
approaching; we gave up trying to accomplish something through reasoning.
The fear of being compromised and for giving cause to complain to the
Allied sovereigns – who had entrusted their troops to his leadership – was
the only means of forcing him out of his passivity.”9 Bernadotte soured the
meeting at the very start by informing Blücher that, rather than transferring
his headquarters to join Blücher’s at Zörbig, he would move to Radegast.
The growing difference in their military objectives only exacerbated the
situation. Countering Blücher’s insistence that no significant imperial forces
stood between Leipzig and the Saale, the crown prince shared the news of
Augereau’s march from Erfurt toward Leipzig with IX Corps. He correctly
asserted that Napoleon planned to concentrate the Grande Armée to first
defeat their two armies and then march against Schwarzenberg. To escape
Napoleon’s blow, Bernadotte suggested having both armies cross the Saale
and concentrate at Bernburg, twenty-five miles downstream of Halle.
Not wanting to merely escape, Blücher proposed moving closer to the
Bohemian Army by marching across the plains of Leipzig from Zörbig to
Halle and up the right bank of the Saale. United, he believed they could
accept a battle with Napoleon if necessary. In Blücher’s opinion, moving
closer to the Bohemian Army would force Napoleon to yield the Leipzig
plain and withdraw across the upper Saale to the region of Erfurt. Returning
to his earlier idea, he declared to Bernadotte that the movement to the Saale
would be effective only if their two armies united at Halle. There, they could
extend their right wing to Bruckdorf, where it would be covered by several
lakes and ponds as well as the Elster. Meanwhile, their combined cavalry
could hold the left wing, exploiting their numerical superiority on the Saxon
plain. Between the two armies, five bridges could be thrown across the
Saale between Halle and Schkopau in case of a retreat. Thus positioned,
they could accept battle or evade it, shield the approaching Bohemian Army,
and forestall Napoleon on the middle Saale.
Unmoved by Blücher’s argument, the crown prince rejected the position
at Halle, claiming that he had found it too risky in 1806 – a year the Prussians
did not want to remember. Moreover, imperial forces at Leipzig concerned
him.10 Thus, he insisted that a march up the left bank of the Saale offered
more security than a direct trek from Zörbig to Halle. Seeing that he could
not win this showdown with the eloquent native Gascon, Blücher finally
abandoned the idea of placing the Silesian Army on the left wing – between
Bernadotte and his bridges across the Elbe – and driving the Army of North
Germany toward Schwarzenberg. Instead, he consented to posting the Sile-
sian Army on the right wing and crossing the Saale at Wettin, thus leaving
Bernadotte a clear path to his bridges. According to the Prussians, the crown
prince promised to immediately strike a bridge at Wettin and to extend his
left wing only as far as Alsleben.11 At this point, Blücher lost all faith in the
crown prince. Nostitz explains the way the Prussians at Silesian Army
Headquarters viewed their proceedings with Bernadotte:
As long as the crown prince of Sweden viewed our crossing of the Elbe as a
mere feint, he willingly promised all support and cooperation; when it was
reported to him on 2 October that the army would cross the bridge on the
following day, he was very inclined to hold this as boasting. After the
crossing actually occurred, the victory at Wartenburg had been fought, and
he was involuntarily pulled one step forward with [the Silesian Army], the
enemy moved a corps against this part of the Elbe, forcing the bridges at
Aken and Roßlau; having made necessary the dismantling of our bridge at
Elster, he then began to regret the steps taken and he exerted everything to
Hide and seek 555
make apparent the need for a retrograde movement for the Silesian Army as
well. The general rejected this suggestion with contempt; from now on, the
last glimmer of confidence died out which we had harbored up to that point
in the talents and the goodwill of the crown prince. We concluded that we
could count only on our own strength and not on the support of such an
unreliable ally. “For the sake of keeping himself in the good graces of both
Paris and Stockholm, the crown prince will not sacrifice any Swedes or do
anything to make the French suffer,” said Blücher. Meanwhile the day of the
decision moved ever closer. Napoleon left Dresden and concentrated the
army at Leipzig. Everything now depended on the outcome there. On our
side, everything depended on uniting all of our forces on this great battlefield;
the most urgent verbal and written proposals regarding this were sent to the
crown prince. The commanding generals of the various corps of his own
army recognized the necessity of these measures but he remained immovable,
the cooperation, which he promised, was insignificant, and what he promised
he never intended to provide.12
During the course of the 10th, Bülow’s corps reached Zörbig while his
vanguard extended three miles further south to Quetzdölsdorf, approxi-
mately five miles northwest of Yorck’s vanguard at Brehna. Bernadotte
instructed Bülow to cooperate with the Silesian Army by supporting it at
Jeßnitz if necessary. On learning that the Prussian III Corps had arrived at
Zörbig, Blücher sent Müffling to inform Bülow of the result of the meeting
at Zehbitz. He tasked Müffling with convincing Bülow to unite his corps
with the Silesian Army if Bernadotte refused to participate in a battle with
Napoleon. Although he had little love for Blücher, Bülow not only promised
to cooperate, but also expressed his conviction that Wintzingerode would
proceed in the spirit of Tsar Alexander and do the same. Blücher’s personal
visit with Bülow later in the day sealed their secret agreement. For his part,
Gneisenau contacted the Prussian, Russian, Austrian, and British envoys
attached to Bernadotte’s headquarters. Of this group, assistance from
Charles Stewart proved invaluable. Stewart monitored Bernadotte’s actions
to determine if the prince royal had conformed to the stipulations of the
subsidy agreement between Great Britain and Sweden. He also held the
purse strings, having the authority to apportion the funds or refuse payment.
Stewart did not fail to threaten Bernadotte that he would exercise his power
should the crown prince proceed in a manner contrary to the general cause.13
As for the rest of the North German Army, Wintzingerode held
Radegast with instructions to remain combat-ready and to assemble all his
cavalry. Bernadotte also requested a status report on “the state of affairs at
Bernburg, so we can send the infantry there if necessary” and “to hasten the
construction of the bridge over the Saale.”14 Vorontsov moved Wintzinger-
ode’s vanguard from Sylbitz to Halle and his own lead elements to
Bruckdorf with Cossacks at Schkeuditz and Merseburg. At the other end
of the army, Tauentzien received lengthy directives from the prince royal to
cover the rear. First, he would lead the Prussian IV Corps from Hinsdorf
back to Dessau, “destroying all the bridges and burning all the pylons so the
enemy cannot use them under any circumstances.” If imperial forces crossed
the Mulde and advanced against IV Corps, Tauentzien should withdraw
into the bridgehead at Roßlau, defending it to the extreme. If the French
drove Thümen from Wittenberg and then advanced along the right bank of
the Elbe, the crown prince instructed Tauentzien to abandon Roßlau, send
all bridging material to Aken, summon all Allied troops on the right bank
of the Elbe (Thümen and Hirschfeld) to him, and proceed according to
circumstances. However, if the imperials remained on the left bank of the
Elbe and moved to the left bank of the Mulde without attacking him,
he should threaten the enemy’s right flank and defend the bridgeheads at
Roßlau and Aken. Bernadotte cautioned his Prussian subordinate that he
might find himself cut off from the rest of the army. To prevent Tauentzien
from being surprised, the crown prince urged him to deploy his Cossacks on
both banks of the Mulde until they found the enemy. The Swedes marched
to Gröbzig, thirteen miles west of Zörbig, on 10 October. Stedingk received
orders to forward an engineer officer fluent in German another twenty-two
miles northwest to Alsleben, where work would ensue night and day until
a bridge spanned the Saale. At Aken, Hirschfeld complied with the
crown prince’s command to send a dozen anchors each to Bernburg and
Alsleben for the bridges.15
For the 11th, Bernadotte planned to have his army marching by 4:00 a.m.
Wintzingerode would cross the Saale at Rothenburg while Vorontsov
guarded Halle. If Stedingk’s Swedes could not cross at Alsleben because
the engineers had yet to complete their work, they would march down-
stream to Bernburg, cross the Saale, and proceed upstream to Alsleben.
Bülow’s III Corps would accompany the Silesian Army across the Saale at
Wettin. To reiterate this last point, Bernadotte informed Bülow on the
evening of the 10th that Vorontsov had reported that he would throw a
bridge across the Saale near Wettin. However, the crown prince did not seem
certain that this would be the case. “If it is finished,” stated his next sentence
to Bülow, “your corps can cross there. The prince desires that you send an
officer there to press the construction.” If the Russians failed to complete the
bridge, he directed Bülow to cross either at Rothenburg with the Russians or
at Alsleben. Like Stedingk, if Bülow found the Alsleben bridge incomplete,
he would march to Bernburg. Apparently, Bernadotte believed that Blücher
would strike his own bridge at Wettin per the latter’s letter of 10 October.
Thus, if Vorontsov built a bridge, it would be for Bülow’s use. This likewise
emerges from the prince royal’s letter to Bülow: “But if the bridge that
General Blücher builds suffices for the passage of his army and your corps,
you can cross on this same bridge, and thus united with the Army of Silesia
Hide and seek 557
you will find yourself in a position to resist the attacks that the enemy may
execute against you.” After issuing his orders, Bernadotte informed Blücher
that the Army of North Germany would cross the Saale at 4:00 a.m. on the
next day in accordance with their agreement. Bülow’s corps would accom-
pany the Silesian Army across the Saale at Wettin.16
After meeting with Bernadotte on the 10th, Blücher, Gneisenau, and
Müffling rejoined Silesian Army Headquarters at Zörbig. Katzler reported
the movement of large imperial columns from Eilenburg northwest to
Delitzsch. From the hills of Delitzsch, Major Klüx observed a French force
of approximately 20,000 men approaching from Hohenrode on the road
to Eilenburg around 11:00 a.m. Two miles east of Delitzsch at Beerendorf,
the column split with half continuing to Delitzsch and the other half march-
ing northeast through Sausedlitz toward Bad Düben. At Delitzsch, the first
column halted for thirty minutes and then reversed course, returning
to Hohenrode. At the same time, the Prussians observed the column headed
toward Bad Düben return to Hohenrode. Klüx speculated that the move-
ment constituted merely a reconnaissance. Korf’s 3:00 p.m. report from
Jeßnitz stated that all the imperial forces that had marched from Bad Düben
to Tornau had returned to the former. The infantry camped south of Bad
Düben while the cavalry continued southwest on the road to Leipzig.
However, this report proved to be incorrect. Korf actually observed the
Guard establishing a camp just south of Bad Düben. Rather than return to
Bad Düben, the troops that marched north continued to Kemberg, as a 6:00
p.m. report from Sacken confirmed. Moreover, a second column from Bad
Düben followed the course of the Mulde downstream to Mühlbeck.
Yet Blücher and his staff had no way of knowing that Korf was mistaken.
In addition to these puzzling reports, interesting news arrived from the
direction of Leipzig. Borstell, the commander of Bülow’s 5th Brigade,
reported the arrival of 45,000 fresh imperial troops at Leipzig on the evening
of the 9th. After analyzing the intelligence, Silesian Army Headquarters
reached the conclusion that, after Napoleon failed to find the Allies in the
angle formed by the Elbe and the Mulde, he had renounced his offensive
northward and now planned to cross the Mulde and advance on Zörbig.17
Returning to Napoleon, such a promising start to the day of 9 October
ultimately ended in failure for the master of war. All that the cavalry
could show for his well-laid plans amounted to twenty wagons loaded with
biscuit as well as twenty-six wounded Allied soldiers, all of which Blücher
had been forced to leave behind at Bad Düben. Including foraging parties cut
off and captured by imperial forces, the Allies lost 105 men on the 9th. On
this occasion, blame could not be placed on a hapless subordinate, not even
Ney. Blücher escaped because of quick thinking and cooperation with
Bernadotte. While Ney established his quarters at Bad Düben, a dejected
Napoleon passed the night of 9/10 October at Eilenburg, where he received
enough intelligence to gain an accurate picture of Blücher’s plans for the

9th – plans he had just foiled. “It appears,” he explained to Ney at 4:00 a.m.
on the 10th, “that the enemy intended for Sacken to take possession of the
bridge at Eilenburg, Langeron the one at Bad Düben, and Yorck the one at
Bitterfeld; each corps would then have its bridge and its direction to quickly
advance to Leipzig.” He also knew that Sacken had beaten a hasty retreat
from Mockrehna through Weidenhain and that Langeron had evacuated Bad
Düben. But where had Blücher gone? “We have to find where he has
moved,” continued his letter to Ney. “I believe that you arrived too late to
know the direction he has taken.”
For 10 October, Napoleon assumed that Langeron would withdraw
through Mühlbeck toward Dessau and Sacken would retreat north toward
Kemberg or east to Wartenburg. He planned to pursue the Russians with
individual corps supported by additional cavalry to determine Blücher’s
intentions. At the least, he hoped to cut off Sacken’s isolated corps. On his
left, the horsemen of Lefebvre-Desnouettes’s 2nd Guard Cavalry Division
moved down the Mulde from Eilenburg along the left bank to Bad Düben,
scouring the countryside between Eilenburg, Bad Düben, Delitzsch, and
Dessau. The emperor instructed Lefebvre-Desnouettes to secure Marmont’s
left flank and confirm the withdrawal of the enemy rearguard from
Delitzsch to Dessau. Marmont’s VI Corps trooped seven miles northeast
from Lindenhayn likewise to Bad Düben. Fournier’s 6th Light Cavalry
Division moved west across the Mulde at Bad Düben to rendezvous with
Marmont and Lefebvre-Desnouettes. Fournier’s patrols also sought news of
the Allies at Bitterfeld and Delitzsch. The master entrusted Marmont with
alerting him to any enemy movements toward Bitterfeld, Delitzsch,
or Leipzig. Should the Army of North Germany march on Leipzig, the
marshal would take a flanking position with his rear facing Bad Düben
and Eilenburg. “It appears that our offensive movement was totally unex-
pected and that the enemy believed we were one hundred leagues away,”
he boasted to Marmont. “In this situation, it is essential that you observe
carefully what occurs at Delitzsch and what kind of movement the enemy is
making. Report several times during the day.”18
In the center of the army, Da˛browski’s 27th Division formed the spear-
head of the pursuing forces. Supported by VII Corps and Defrance’s
4th Heavy Cavalry Division, the Poles marched north to Kemberg with
orders to open communication with Wittenberg. With his light cavalry
reconnoitering in the direction of Mühlbeck, Souham led III Corps halfway
to Kemberg, halting at Schköna, some seven miles north of Bad Düben.
Bertrand’s IV Corps and Sébastiani’s II Cavalry Corps marched to Pressel,
five miles east of Bad Düben. To cut off Sacken, Napoleon’s right wing – XI
Corps, 3rd Light Division of I Cavalry Corps, and 2nd Light Division of II
Cavalry Corps – advanced from Mockrehna toward Weidenhain, seeking
Hide and seek 559
signs of the Russians. Napoleon instructed Macdonald to pursue Sacken

wherever he went: Dommitzsch, Pretzsch, or Kemberg. The parks, bridge
train, and Grand Headquarters moved from Wurzen to Eilenburg.19
While the army marched, the emperor remained at Eilenburg. Uncer-
tainty about the enemy’s intentions caused him considerable concern. To his
foreign minister, Maret, he addressed three letters starting at 10:00 in the
morning. The first two ordered the minister, who quartered at Wurzen, to
inform Paris “that we are on the eve of a great event that will have significant
influence on the affair. Also, write in cipher to Lauriston and the king of
Naples to request news from them. Write to Lauriston to establish commu-
nication with Nossen, where Marshal St.-Cyr has a brigade.” Aggravated by
Augereau’s failure to communicate the whereabouts of IX Corps, Napoleon
snapped. “I still don’t know if the duc de Castiglione [Augereau] has arrived
at Leipzig. I count on the arrival of this corps to send the king of Saxony
there.” Apparently, the emperor felt that Frederick Augustus deserved
better than following with the imperial baggage. “If I learn that the duc de
Castiglione has reached Leipzig, possibly tomorrow I will send the king
of Saxony to that city.” He also directed Maret to “write in duplicate and
triplicate to St.-Cyr, have the former delivered by local agents and the
latter by courier, and above all you must send me news of Leipzig three or
four times a day. At this moment, all information is most important to me.
I am in great haste to receive information from Leipzig on the movements of
the enemy, and whether they are retreating or advancing; it appears that
his greatest strength is between the Mulde and the Saale. It is between the
Mulde and the Elbe that I prepare to maneuver until new information and
events make me move all to the Elbe.”
In the third letter, Napoleon informed Maret that a report from St.-Cyr
dated 10:00 p.m. on the 9th had arrived. He tasked the foreign minister with
conveying his response, which revealed his plans, in code: “Tell him that
the head of my army will be at Wittenberg today; that a battle is possible
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow; that, as soon as this occurs, I will
return to him. Tell him that you have news of the king of Naples, who is at
Altenburg, Frohburg, Penig, and Colditz.” He expressed his desire that
St.-Cyr hold Dresden but, if the marshal could not, he should retreat
to Torgau along either bank of the Elbe. “If I fight and beat the enemy
here,” advised Napoleon, “the Austrians will return to their borders, and
I will approach Torgau along the right bank, establish communication with
him [St.-Cyr], and then visit Berlin.” On the contrary, if he could not force
Blücher and Bernadotte into a battle, “it is very possible that I will maneuver
on the right bank of the Elbe because, as all of the enemy’s plans have been
based on my movements along the left bank, I would thus fall on their line
of operation, and following the events of today and tomorrow [the effect of]
this could be incalculable; I plan on firmness and prudence.”20
Around noon, the emperor rode to the new headquarters prepared for
him at the Bad Düben Schloß, where he finally received crucial information.
The news was not good. He learned of the Bohemian Army’s advance
on Leipzig. The Austrians had debouched through Penig while Wittgenstein
moved through Altenburg and Zeitz purportedly with 25,000 men. This
meant that Murat would probably be forced to yield his positions at
Frohburg, Borna, and Rochlitz, and withdraw on Leipzig. Further east,
Bubna attacked St.-Cyr at Dresden. Despite this news, the emperor still
sought a decisive battle with Blücher and Bernadotte. Unwilling to break
off the chase and rush to Murat’s aid, he made a momentous decision.
Rather than worry about Leipzig and Dresden, he would withdraw all of
his forces to the right bank of the Elbe.
At 3:00 on the afternoon of 10 October, a courier sped to Wurzen
bearing a fourth letter addressed to Maret ordering the evacuation of all
war materiel from Leipzig to Eilenburg, beginning that very night. Instead
of going to the second city of his kingdom, Frederick August would be
escorted to Eilenburg as well. “In case the king of Naples is forced to
evacuate Leipzig, my intention is to cross the Elbe with my entire army;
by doing this I will either drive the Armies of Silesia and Berlin [North
Germany] onto the right bank of the Elbe and obtain time to destroy them
or, if they prefer to sacrifice their bridges, I will leave them on the left
bank and transfer my line of operations to the right bank of the Elbe, from
Dresden to Magdeburg.” If Schwarzenberg forced Murat to abandon Leip-
zig, Napoleon instructed his brother-in-law to withdraw toward Torgau
and Wittenberg: “My plan is to cross over to the right bank of the Elbe.”21
Thus, the emperor prepared to abandon Saxony and transfer the theater
of war to North Germany. With Magdeburg as his new base of operations,
he could maneuver on the right bank of the Elbe, slashing the communi-
cations of the North German and Silesian Armies, and debouching
at will through Wittenberg, Torgau, Magdeburg, and Dresden to surprise
the Allies, relieve the Oder garrisons, raise the Poles, and trap the Swedes
on the continent. Communication with France would run along the
Magdeburg–Wesel road. By transferring his army to the relatively
untouched lands of North Germany, his headaches over supply would be
alleviated. Conversely, the Allied armies would face starvation on the now-
barren wastelands of Saxony until convoys could arrive from Silesia and
Bohemia. Lastly, the master would be able to unite with his best lieutenant:
the iron marshal, Davout.
Instructing Maret to also inform St.-Cyr of these arrangements, he
insisted that the minister use the cipher: “it is better to write nothing than
write without using the code; see to it that for three days this is the great
secret of the army; if the enemy manages to get hold of these plans, it would
cause me the greatest damage. You will send this news to Dresden by post
Hide and seek 561
and by locals. Also write in code to the foreign ministry at Paris so that no
one is surprised by anything published by the enemy, and so they know that
this is a combined movement on my part to bring the enemy to battle and
produce something decisive.” As for his erstwhile ally, Frederick August,
Napoleon counseled Maret to keep him in the dark: “There is no need to
entrust this secret to the king. You will tell him only that the affair goes well;
that I have raised the siege of Wittenberg, but that the combined movements
do not allow him to go to Leipzig at this moment; that it is better for him
to go to Wittenberg or to Torgau.”22
By 4:00, Napoleon’s mind was set. He issued orders sending III Corps
and 4th Heavy Cavalry Division to Gräfenhainichen, VII Corps to Kemberg,
and 27th Division to Wittenberg. According to reports, Sacken appeared to
be retreating eastward to Wartenburg. Consequently, Napoleon directed IV
Corps and II Cavalry Corps to Trebitz on the road to Wartenburg, with XI
Corps following. Indicative of the emperor’s demand for speed, he wrote
directly to Reynier and Bertrand. “It is essential that you arrive promptly”
at Kemberg, he urged the former, while to the latter he emphasized that “it is
indispensable that you march rapidly on Wartenburg.” Napoleon wanted the
Young Guard posted in a “military position” north of the Bad Düben
windmill while the Old Guard moved into Bad Düben with VI Corps to
form the reserve. All marches needed to be completed that night and all
materiel coming from Leipzig would continue to Wittenberg.23
No sooner did Napoleon finish dictating the letter to Bertrand than a
new report arrived: instead of marching east, Sacken’s corps had escaped
westward by crossing the Mulde at Raguhn. In a postscript, Napoleon
modified Bertrand’s orders. As soon as he received confirmation that the
enemy no longer possessed a bridge at Wartenburg, Bertrand would lead IV
Corps to Wittenberg. Despite the emperor’s admonishment, Bertrand could
get his men to go no farther than Bad Schmiedeberg, where they halted
after midnight; XI Corps bivouacked at Falkenberg and Weidenhain.
Already exhausted from the day’s march, most of the troops failed to achieve
their objectives. Only III Corps and 4th Heavy Cavalry Division (Gräfen-
hainichen and Gröbern), VII Corps (Kemberg), and the Guard (Bad Düben)
met the emperor’s expectations. Da˛browski forwarded only a small detach-
ment to Wittenberg while Marmont’s VI Corps remained on the left bank
of the Mulde opposite Bad Düben (see Map 5).24
The news that Napoleon received from several sources confirmed
Blücher’s retreat to Dessau, where Sacken had also arrived. With Blücher
on the run, he considered his next step, the relief of Wittenberg, to be
indispensable. “For tomorrow,” he explained to Reynier, “it is essential to
overwhelm the corps that is in front of Wittenberg [and] seize the right bank,
where it is possible I will cross with my whole army because I ordered all
military materiel transferred from Leipzig to Wittenberg.” Reports also
placed the Army of North Germany at the Saale, a move that the emperor
believed to be in concert with Schwarzenberg’s advance. “To wreck these
plans, I will go to the Elbe where I will have the advantage because I possess
Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden.” He still hoped
to have a battle on the next day, the 11th, with at least Blücher. “The Army
of Silesia is retreating on all sides,” he informed St.-Cyr. “We have taken
several hundred prisoners; tomorrow I will oblige it to accept battle or
surrender its bridges at Dessau and Wartenburg. Then, I may decide to cross
to the right bank with my whole army; it is along the right bank that I will
move on Dresden.”25
Napoleon felt certain Blücher could be maneuvered into a battle in the
Dessau–Roßlau region. If the Prussian evaded a confrontation, Napoleon
would cross the Elbe at Wittenberg, destroying the bridges at Roßlau, Aken,
and Wartenburg from the right bank. He hoped that, if he threatened these
bridges, both Blücher and Bernadotte would accept battle to protect
their points of passage. He figured that the defeat of these two adversaries
would prompt Schwarzenberg to fly across the Erzgebirge without risking
battle. If Schwarzenberg held his ground, Napoleon would return to
Dresden and commence an operation to drive the Bohemian Army out of
Saxony. As soon as the Allies evacuated Saxony, he would return to his pet
project of taking Berlin.26
With the likelihood of battle increasing, Napoleon’s confidence returned
and he shook himself free of the despondency and uncertainty that had
purportedly seized him for much of the 10th. “If you have nothing
else facing you besides Wittgenstein and you do not experience any
mishaps,” he encouraged Murat, “you will be equal in number to him after
you are reinforced by the duc de Castiglione and the garrison of Leipzig. If it
means detaching a corps of 20,000 men to facilitate your defense of Leipzig,
I could send it to you in a few hours. The Austrians, having a considerable
corps this side of Dresden, could be very strong compared to you. Finally,
my general instructions that I have issued and my intentions . . . will remedy
all.” To Arrighi at Leipzig, he explained his plans with some exaggeration:
“I have relieved Wittenberg and the Silesian Army is in complete retreat to
Dessau and its bridges. Tomorrow I will either force it to accept battle
or take its bridges. I assume that the king of Naples, united with you and
Augereau, can hold Leipzig. If this is not the case, the retreat should proceed
to the bridges over the Mulde at Eilenburg and Bad Düben, and if necessary
to the Elbe through Wittenberg and Torgau.” If he did not have time to
defeat Blücher and Bernadotte before Schwarzenberg reached Leipzig,
he intended “to thoroughly confuse the enemy by abandoning the entire
left bank to obtain time to destroy this army, having at my disposal the
magazines and crossings at Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg.
This requires the utmost secrecy; write only in code.”27
Hide and seek 563
At 5:00 p.m., he again wrote to reassure Murat: “During tomorrow, the

day of the 11th, I will have either swept away the enemy or destroyed his
bridges and driven him across the river. Having expelled the Army of Silesia,
I will then be at Leipzig with my whole army on the day of the 13th.” He
estimated Murat’s strength to be 49,000 infantry and 12,700 cavalry,
repeating that he could easily send 20,000 reinforcements, “which would
give you more than 80,000 men.” Moreover, the master assumed that, if only
Wittgenstein and Kleist confronted Murat, they could field no more than
50,000 men. Yet if Schwarzenberg added a single Austrian corps to the mix,
the Allies could easily advance with 80,000 men. Consequently, he warned
Murat to take a very good position and accurately estimate the size of the
force facing him. “I have already noted,” stated Napoleon’s last sentence,
almost in the form of a plea to encourage his brother-in-law, “that the whole
army can be at Leipzig on the 13th.”28
Shortly before 1:00 a.m. on the 11th, Napoleon received confirmation
that Sacken’s corps had reached Dessau. Based on this verification, he
concluded that the rest of the Silesian Army as well as the North German
Army would concentrate there as well. Napoleon initially reacted by
ordering Macdonald to march on Wittenberg at dawn so XI Corps could
cross the Elbe that same day. He tasked Bertrand’s IV Corps with confirm-
ing the removal of the bridge at Wartenburg, leaving a post there, and then
likewise proceeding to Wittenberg. After two hours of thought, Napoleon
issued a more comprehensive plan for operations at 3:00 a.m. on the 11th.
He informed Berthier that “all of the enemy’s army appears concentrated
at Dessau.” Thus, he intended to cross the Elbe and proceed along the
right bank to Roßlau. To achieve mass on the right bank, he demanded
that VII Corps and 27th Division reach Wittenberg very early on the 11th
and immediately cross the river followed by II Cavalry Corps. Souham’s III
Corps would remain at Gräfenhainichen, monitoring the roads to Dessau,
Raguhn, Jeßnitz, and Mühlbeck. Marmont received orders for VI Corps to
cross the Mulde and occupy Bad Düben as soon as the Guard and I Cavalry
Corps departed for Kemberg at 6:00 a.m. Instead of following his main
body, the marshal himself would depart one hour before dawn with his own
cavalry brigade as well as the 5th Light Cavalry Division from III Cavalry
Corps and enough infantry to form a combined-arms column of 4,000
to 5,000 men to clear the enemy from Bitterfeld and reconnoiter toward
Jeßnitz, Delitzsch, and Leipzig. Napoleon simply reiterated his assignments
for Bertrand and Macdonald. Lefebvre-Desnouettes’s 2nd Guard Cavalry
Division would form the rearguard and maintain communication with
Leipzig throughout the day. After issuing this flurry of orders, all Napoleon
could do was wait and wonder if he could catch Blücher.29
Around 5:00 on the morning of 11 October, the Silesian Army com-
menced its march to Wettin. Blücher’s disposition for the 11th called for
Yorck’s corps to march sixteen miles west from Zörbig to Wettin. Blücher
informed Yorck that his corps would cross the Saale over Bernadotte’s
pontoon bridge, which would be built slightly downstream of Wettin. On
different roads than those used by Yorck, Langeron’s corps would march
seventeen miles from Zörbig to Wettin, where it would cross the Saale by
way of the Silesian Army’s pontoon bridge slightly upstream of the town.
Sacken would recall all posts that still stood east of the Mulde, dismantle the
bridges at Raguhn and Jeßnitz, and then march through Radegast to Wettin.
Yorck’s and Langeron’s vanguards would serve as rearguards by maintai-
ning the positions they moved into on the 10th, while Sacken’s would
follow its main body. Blücher informed his corps commanders that 5,000
Allied soldiers had already occupied Halle and that the Army of North
Germany would likewise cross the Saale: Bülow at Wettin, Wintzingerode
at Rothenburg, and the Swedes at Alsleben.30
Difficulties plagued this operation from the start. On 10 October,
Gneisenau sent a Lieutenant Ösfeld to the position upstream of Wettin
between the villages of Pfützthal and Salzmünde to report on the construc-
tion of Blücher’s pontoon bridge, which Headquarters expected to have
already reached Jeßnitz, some twenty-seven miles to the northwest. As of
Ösfeld’s 10:00 p.m. report on 10 October, the Russian pontoons had yet
to arrive. This report reached Blücher during the predawn hours of the 11th.
Nevertheless, the movements commenced. As the columns of Yorck and
Langeron approached Petersberg, some eight miles east of Wettin, Blücher
learned that the pontoon train would not reach Wettin until evening. This
meant that the Silesian Army would be limited to the sole bridge that the
Prussians believed Bernadotte would have ready at Wettin at daybreak.
About four miles northeast of Wettin, Lieutenant Scharnhorst, who had
been sent forward to check on the progress of the crown prince’s bridge,
returned with the discouraging news that no bridge existed at Wettin and no
preparations were underway to build one. Naturally, Blücher interpreted
this as Bernadotte’s insidious attempt to force the Silesian Army to remain
with him on the lower Saale. To be sure the crown prince learned a lesson, he
ordered the army to immediately swing south, strike the highway that ran
from Magdeburg to Halle, and cross the Saale at the latter. Describing the
result of this apparent breach of faith, Müffling relates: “Here, the com-
manding general appears to have resolved to no longer proceed in concert
with the crown prince, to rely only on his own forces, to make decisions
in the future without consulting the crown prince, and to communicate to
him only his decision.”31
Several times the Russian and Prussian columns became entangled,
making an extraordinarily long and exhausting march of twenty-three miles
much worse. Langeron’s corps reached Halle first, crossed the Saale, and
bivouacked north of the town. Yorck’s corps arrived shortly after but had
Hide and seek 565
to wait several hours for the Russians to finish parading through the city
and crossing its sole bridge; the Prussian troops did not step foot on the
left bank until 2:00 a.m. on the 12th. Despite the hour, the inhabitants
purportedly rejoiced throughout “the good old Prussian city.” “The town,”
recalled Steffens, who had earlier worked as a professor at the University
of Halle, “had suffered much and was in great excitement. It was known that
the Bohemian Army had advanced and was concentrating; that the enemy
had drawn all his forces toward Leipzig; and that a great battle could be
expected. Gneisenau occupied my old dwelling, and it seemed strange to see
him in that former retreat of household joys and cares.” The Prussian troops
bivouacked in and around Halle, with the Reserve Cavalry remaining on
the right bank. As a result of miscommunication, Langeron’s cavalry never
received orders to march to Halle but instead went to Wettin. On arriving,
it received instructions to continue to Halle, where it arrived at 12:00 a.m.
on the night of the 11th/12th. The Russian cavalry crossed the Saale later in
the day and bivouacked a few miles upstream of Halle. Blücher’s cavalry
posts extended as far east as Bitterfeld; detachments from Vorontsov’s van-
guard patrolled southeast from Halle toward Leipzig.
Around 5:00 a.m. on 11 October, Sacken’s corps marched southwest
from the left bank of the Mulde. Sacken himself remained at Raguhn
awaiting reports from patrols on the right bank. At 9:30 he dispatched a
summary of their findings to Blücher. The Russians encountered French
bivouacs at Gräfenhainichen and Gröbern. No imperial forces had appeared
at Raguhn by the time Sacken departed. After a march of twenty-five miles,
his corps reached Wettin shortly before midnight and bivouacked on the
right bank of the Saale.
Northeast of the Silesian Army, the Army of North Germany marched
west to the Saale early on the morning of the 11th. The Swedes crossed at
Alsleben and the Russians at Rothenburg. After learning of Blücher’s march
to Halle, Bülow led his corps to Rothenburg as well. Yet Wintzingerode’s
troops took so long to cross the river that Bülow’s men passed the night on
the right bank. Tauentzien’s IV Corps remained at Dessau astride both banks
of the Mulde with forward troops pushed to Wörlitz and Oranienbaum.32
That evening, Blücher reported his progress to Tsar Alexander: “The
enemy continued his march. Our patrols found his bivouac on the night
of the 10th at Gräfenhainichen. Therefore, it appears that the enemy thinks
I took the road to Dessau, where Tauentzien’s corps stands. Tomorrow I will
occupy Merseburg with St.-Priest’s corps. After this secures communication
with the Bohemian Army, I will await your orders. The three armies now
stand so close to each other that a simultaneous attack can occur on any
point where the enemy concentrates his forces.” To Bernadotte he wrote:
“On arriving at Wettin, I found that the bridges still had not been built;
I thus decided to march to Halle and concentrate the army there. According
to the reports that the courier will give you, I assume that you will push your
corps toward Leipzig to be able to attack the enemy in unison with the
Bohemian Army. I request that you give me your decision over this.”33
“I heard you encountered many obstacles in striking a bridge at Wettin
and so decided to go to Halle,” responded the crown prince. “The position
you have taken at Halle implicitly places you in the front line.” According
to Bernadotte, the latest intelligence indicated that Napoleon had united all
of his troops at Leipzig apparently to proceed south to Altenburg.
Moreover, Augereau stood somewhere between Naumburg and Weißenfels.
If Blücher intended to maintain his position astride the Saale at Halle on the
12th, the crown prince offered to leave Bülow’s corps on the right bank as
well. North of III Corps, the Swedes and Russians would remain ready to
march. “Positioned in this manner,” continued Bernadotte, “we will be able
to march to Leipzig if the emperor Napoleon moves on Altenburg. If he
comes toward us, we will be able to decide to fight or withdraw to the left
bank of the Saale.” Moreover, the crown prince would direct Tauentzien to
Zörbig “so that we can always maintain communication with Aken and thus
with Dessau. I request that you inform me of your plans because it is
extremely necessary that we act together to cause the emperor Napoleon
as much damage as we can in his critical situation. When our troops are
united, we will, you and I, be in the position to deliver a battle or to avoid it
if we mutually agree on our plan of operations.” While he did not reject
the idea of accepting battle, the crown prince offered no response to
Blücher’s request for him to move closer to Halle – classic Bernadotte.34
For 12 October, Blücher issued specific orders to his corps commanders.
To form the army’s vanguard, St.-Priest’s corps would occupy Merseburg,
nine miles south of Halle and seventeen miles west of Leipzig. Korf likewise
would lead Langeron’s Reserve Cavalry to Merseburg while Rudzevich
remained at Petersberg with the Langeron’s vanguard to shield the army.
If the French pursued in force, Rudzevich would withdraw across the Saale
via the Russian pontoon bridge that Blücher still expected to be built at
Wettin, unlimber his artillery on the left bank, and cover the dismantling of
the bridge. Yorck received instructions to remain at Halle with his Reserve
Cavalry on the right bank. Katzler and the Prussian vanguard, likewise at
Petersberg, would cooperate with Rudzevich. For Sacken, Blücher’s
disposition called for the Russian corps to cross the Saale at Wettin and
march twelve miles south.35
During the 12th, St.-Priest moved his 12,000 men into Merseburg and
established communication with the Bohemian Army’s forward cavalry
detachments. Sacken’s corps crossed the Saale at Wettin and proceeded south
along the only available road, which left much to be desired. Due to its
poor condition, the Russians reached only Teutschenthal, eight miles west of
Halle, by nightfall. Little about the imperials could be gleaned from the
Hide and seek 567
confusing reports that reached Blücher’s headquarters. Near Bad Düben,

prowling Cossacks captured an army surgeon attached to the Young Guard.
He claimed that Napoleon had first intended to go from Dresden to Leipzig
but then turned north to Bad Düben from where he planned to continue
to Wittenberg. Katzler reported that his patrols encountered only weak
enemy posts on the highway from Delitzsch to Eilenburg. Moreover, only
two infantry regiments purportedly held Leipzig. General Joseph
O’Rourke, a native Russian of Irish descent who patrolled the Halle–Leipzig
road with a detachment of Wintzingerode’s cavalry, informed Blücher that
the imperials had moved west across the Mulde to occupy Bitterfeld but had
evacuated the town in the evening. At Leipzig, O’Rourke’s patrols encoun-
tered French posts along the length of the Parthe River but found no signs
of the enemy on the roads running from Leipzig to Merseburg and Lützen.
His troopers reported hearing heavy artillery fire from the direction of
Borna. On the roads leading south from Zwenkau and Pegau, the Russians
found Murat’s army awaiting the arrival of Schwarzenberg’s legions.36
Blücher and his staff viewed the prospect of Napoleon’s continuing
his offensive to Wittenberg with skepticism, thinking any movement in that
direction to be a demonstration intended to mislead the Allies. Nevertheless,
to determine if the emperor intended to continue north toward Wittenberg
or turn south against the Bohemian Army, Blücher ordered a general recon-
naissance toward Leipzig for the 13th. The disposition called for Yorck’s
and Langeron’s vanguards to depart at daybreak from Petersberg with
Katzler’s infantry marching to Bruckdorf and Rudzevich’s to Reideburg.
Katzler’s cavalry and horse artillery would make for Brehna while
Rudzevich’s would proceed to Kölsa on the Landsberg–Leipzig road. “The
cavalry of both vanguards will reconnoiter toward Leipzig and seek the
enemy. It is very important to send reports of his movements. At the same
time, the cavalry of the crown prince of Sweden will reconnoiter toward
Bitterfeld and Delitzsch.” At dawn, Blücher wanted the Russian pontoon
bridge at Wettin disassembled and rebuilt at Giebichenstein, less than two
miles north of Halle. If the French launched an offensive, Rudzevich would
retreat across the Saale at Giebichenstein while Katzler did so at Halle.
Blücher requested that Bernadotte conduct reconnaissance toward Bitter-
feld and Delitzsch with 5,000 to 6,000 troopers supported by the appropriate
horse artillery.37
News from Tsar Alexander’s headquarters at Altenburg reached
Blücher during the afternoon of the 12th. According to a Russian officer
from Alexander’s entourage, General Mikhail Vlodek, Schwarzenberg had
reached Chemnitz on 8 October. To his east, the vanguard of the Austrian
I Corps reached Zehista, less than two miles south of Pirna. That same day,
Bubna took the bridgehead on the right bank of the Elbe opposite Pirna. The
combined offensive forced the imperials to break their bridge at Pirna and
retreat to Dresden. After reconnoitering Dresden, Bennigsen left 20,000 men

under Osterman-Tolstoy to observe St.-Cyr’s XIV and I Corps while he
marched toward Leipzig via Colditz on the 10th with 30,000 men. In front
of Schwarzenberg, Murat retreated north on the 10th after the Austrians had
taken Penig the day before. On the 11th, Wittgenstein, Kleist, and General
Johann von Klenau’s Austrian IV Corps reached Borna, less than twenty
miles south of Leipzig while Schwarzenberg moved to Altenburg, twenty-
seven miles south of Leipzig.
According to Vlodek, patrols from General Ignác Gyulay’s Austrian III
Corps reached Lützen, less than thirteen miles southwest of Leipzig, the
previous day. Twenty miles southeast of Gyulay, Kleist and Wittgenstein
reached Borna. Further south, Allied Headquarters and the monarchs halted
at Altenburg. Moreover, after posting Osterman-Tolstoy’s corps to blockade
Dresden, Bennigsen led the right wing of the Bohemian Army toward
Leipzig as well. In light of this news, Blücher decided to have Yorck make
an attempt to seize Leipzig. Yorck received instructions to advance early on
the 13th and storm the city if he deemed it to be weakly guarded. In the
opposite case, I Corps would remain before the city and await the support of
the Bohemian Army. St.-Priest would facilitate the operation by sending
forward a combined-arms detachment of 2,000 men to secure Yorck’s left.38
Like the Silesian Army, the Army of North Germany maintained its
positions on the 12th. Around 2:00 that afternoon, Bernadotte learned that a
French force had crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg: its size and intentions
could not be determined. In addition, imperial forces moved down the
left bank of the Elbe toward Oranienbaum. Later in the day, the crown
prince received word that the imperials had overrun Dessau and destroyed
the bridge over the Elbe at Roßlau. Believing the corps that crossed at
Wittenberg formed an advance guard, Bernadotte correctly assumed
Napoleon intended to move his army from the left bank of the Elbe to the
right, thus transferring the theater of war from Saxony to Brandenburg.
He informed his corps commanders that 100,000 imperials stood between
the Elbe and the Mulde. As a result, the crown prince ordered his army to
unite at Köthen, twenty miles due north of Halle on the 13th.39
“I have just learned that the enemy is moving through Wittenberg and
has repulsed Thümen,” the crown prince informed Blücher. “Tauentzien
has been forced to withdraw to the right bank of the Elbe in order to
support Thümen. At the same time, I received news that the enemy has
taken Dessau. All reports that arrived yesterday claim that the emperor
Napoleon was at Eilenburg and intends to go to Bad Düben; a report from
today claims that 25,000–30,000 men are between the latter and Wittenberg.”
We know from the crown prince’s orders to his subordinates that he actually
estimated this number to be 100,000 men. Bernadotte impressed on Blücher
that “it would be imprudent to leave this corps to our rear if we march on
Hide and seek 569
Leipzig. Because it is important to determine its actual strength, I have

ordered Bülow and Wintzingerode to Köthen and from there to advance
and attack it.” While no mention of attacking this corps is made in his order
of the day, he did instruct Bülow and Wintzingerode to push cavalry
detachments eastward to Dessau, Jeßnitz, Bitterfeld, Landsberg, and Brehna.
In his letter to Blücher, he repeated the claim that only a small force held
Leipzig. Yet he attributed this to the rumor that the Bohemian Army had
fought a battle at Altenburg on the 11th. “According to one report, only
2,000 men remain at Leipzig and the rest have moved to Altenburg, from
where many wagons laden with wounded arrived in Leipzig. On Saturday
[9 October], 7,000 cavalry arrived there from France and went to Altenburg
on Sunday.”40
Based on this news, the leadership of the Silesian Army concluded that,
instead of attempting to mislead the Allies, Napoleon did indeed intend to
move the Grande Armée across the Elbe, perhaps to retreat through
Magdeburg. Should this be the case, Murat would be compelled to abandon
Leipzig and withdraw across the Mulde to Wittenberg. Hoping to trap
Murat, Blücher added a postscript to his letter to Yorck: “From the crown
prince of Sweden I have just received the news that the enemy has repulsed
Thümen from Wittenberg. Through your movement, you will probably be
able to determine with certainty whether this is a demonstration or a retreat
on Magdeburg.”41 Gneisenau wrote a few lines to his wife at Hirschberg in
Silesia that conveyed the optimism that permeated Blücher’s headquarters
on the eve of the great confrontation at Leipzig:
Since the 3rd of this month, on which day I last wrote you and gave you news
of the combat of that day, our operations again have taken on the character of
the unorthodox. To the rear of the enemy, we have crossed the Mulde and the
Saale and since yesterday we have been here at Halle. Through this move-
ment we have severed the enemy’s communication with France but must
expect that the enemy will throw himself on our communications and you
will not have any news from us for a period. The situation is excellent. If
great mistakes are not made . . . victory for the good cause is completely
guaranteed. Our Silesian Army under General Blücher earned great merit
through the speed and boldness of its marches, through its exertions, and
through the bravery with which it has fought.42
We left Napoleon at Bad Düben on 11 October. On this day, he expected

VII, IV, and XI Corps, Da˛browski’s 27th Division, and I and II Cavalry
Corps to cross the Elbe at Wittenberg, drive off the Prussian troops block-
ading the fortress, and then move downstream along the right bank to
Bernadotte’s bridge at Roßlau. This westward movement would be covered
from the left bank by Ney with III Corps at Gräfenhainichen and Marmont
with VI Corps at Bad Düben. The cavalry of both corps would observe all
roads from Dessau to Delitzsch and maintain the emperor’s communication

with Leipzig. At Kemberg, the Guard would remain ready to engage in any
direction. By the end of the day’s toils on the 11th, the situation of the
Grande Armée hardly corresponded to these plans. Of all the troops ordered
to cross the Elbe, only 27th Division and VII Corps as well as 2nd Light
Cavalry Division of II Cavalry Corps and 3rd Light Cavalry Division of
I Cavalry Corps reached Wittenberg but considerably later than the emperor
expected. Da˛browski’s and Reynier’s troops deployed that evening along
the right bank of the Elbe, facing the Prussian trenches. Thümen, who
observed the large columns entering Wittenberg, withdrew west to the
suburb of Piesteritz before departing in the night for Coswig. A heavy rain,
the onset of darkness, and sheer exhaustion prevented the Saxons, Poles, and
French from pursuing.43
While his army moved north, Napoleon had no idea that Blücher and
Bernadotte had already escaped to the west. Uncertainty over Allied inten-
tions and positions fouled the emperor’s mood throughout the 11th. “The
enemy had lots of people at Jeßnitz,” he declared to Ney, “but this morning,
no one. Some information suggests that the enemy will remove his bridges
and remain on the left bank, vis-à-vis Roßlau. If so, where do we march to
attack him, do we seize Dessau and block its bridgehead?” Although
his orders indicated that he would proceed to Kemberg with the Young
Guard, Napoleon remained at Bad Düben, where news could reach him
more easily. “Maybe in the night I will go to Kemberg,” he wrote Ney.
“Have you any news from the detachments you sent to Dessau and other
points along the Elbe?”
After cavalry sweeps found few enemy troops at Bitterfeld and Jeßnitz,
Napoleon ordered Ney to move III Corps to Oranienbaum to cover the
Wittenberg–Dessau road. He instructed the marshal to have Reynier send
patrols west and northeast “to obtain clues about the enemy’s intentions.”
As soon as the general drove off “the five or six battalions” observing
Wittenberg, Napoleon wanted VII Corps and I Cavalry Corps to cross
the Elbe and debouch on the northern side of the fortress. The news from
Wittenberg itself did not appear very encouraging: “It appears we have few
resources at Wittenberg,” continued Napoleon in his letter to Ney. “There
are many grains indeed but little flour and few means to grind.” “I assume
that the division blockading Wittenberg has now departed,” Napoleon later
wrote Reynier. “Drive it off as far as possible so flour can be delivered there
along both banks.”
Further reports indicated that the two Allied armies no longer stood
at Dessau, but where they had gone could not be ascertained. Rumors
claimed that the North German Army had withdrawn across the Elbe
while the Silesian Army turned toward Halle. “Latour-Maubourg will soon
arrive,” Napoleon informed Reynier; “have him cross the bridge. With
Hide and seek 571
Latour-Maubourg and the Saxon and Polish cavalry, you can patrol far
and gain some indication of the enemy’s intentions at Dessau. Does he
intend to withdraw upon the right bank and deliver a battle, or does he
intend to break the bridge and remain on the left bank? If you can reach
Coswig, you will be able to obtain plenty of news. As soon as you have
obtained intelligence on the situation, take a position north of the fortress
[Wittenberg] so there is room for all the corps that will cross this night and
tomorrow. The Guard will be close to Wittenberg tonight.”44
Around 3:00 on the afternoon of 11 October, Napoleon again received
news that no Allied forces remained at Raguhn and only a post held Dessau.
“The enemy appears to be retreating on Köthen and Radegast,” he wrote
Ney. “Send strong reconnaissance parties toward Raguhn and Dessau
to confirm this news.” Marmont’s patrols indicated that the Allied armies
remained south of the Elbe. Ney’s troops encountered enemy cavalry while
patrolling toward Raguhn and Oranienbaum but failed to provide substan-
tial news of the whereabouts of the Allied armies. Therefore, the reports
that reached Napoleon during the night of 11/12 October offered little
clarification: “All the information that I’ve been able to obtain states that,
during the day of the 10th, Blücher went to Halle, the enemy’s headquarters
was near Radegast, and a lot of baggage remained at Köthen.” Yet good news
from the south helped ease his mind. Murat reported that he had repulsed
Wittgenstein at Borna on the 10th. “Wittgenstein engaged the king of
Naples at Borna,” Napoleon wrote to Ney at 3:00 a.m. on 12 October.
“Wittgenstein was beaten. At 11:00 a.m. on the 11th, Wittgenstein and the
Austrian prince Schwarzenberg retreated on Frohburg.”45
Thus, some reports claimed large Allied forces had retreated from
Raguhn, Jeßnitz, and Bitterfeld in the direction of Halle while others
indicated movements to Dessau–Roßlau – the opposite direction. This led
Napoleon to assume that Blücher and Bernadotte had separated. Influenced
by the presence of Tauentzien’s corps in the Dessau–Roßlau region, the
emperor hoped to find all or at least a significant portion of Bernadotte’s
army at Dessau. He concluded that Blücher must have gone to Halle.
Consequently, Napoleon ordered VII Corps, Da˛browski’s 27th Division,
and II Cavalry Corps to rapidly drive along the right bank of the Elbe to
Roßlau. He figured XI Corps would complete the seven-mile march north
from Rackith to reach Wittenberg later that morning. If the Allies offered
resistance at Roßlau, XI Corps and I Cavalry Corps would cross the Elbe
to support Reynier. If nothing opposed Reynier, these units would remain
on the left bank. With III Corps and all the cavalry at his immediate disposal,
Napoleon believed Ney could take Dessau and its bridgehead. As soon
as Reynier secured Roßlau and made its bridgehead untenable, he wanted
Ney to raze the bridgehead at Dessau, occupy the town in force, and build
two bridges. “If your cavalry can debouch onto the plain of Dessau,”
speculated Napoleon, “I think it will do much harm to the enemy, who

seems completely preoccupied with his offensive operations.” Should VII
Corps not need support on the right bank, IV Corps would join Ney at
Dessau. Oudinot’s Young Guard corps would take the place of III Corps at
Gräfenhainichen, occupying both Raguhn and Jeßnitz with a vanguard.
To observe Halle and Leipzig, Napoleon directed VI Corps to backtrack
to Delitzsch. Mortier’s Young Guard corps as well as the Old Guard
received a day of rest on the 12th “because I think that if the enemy
continues to disseminate I will need to march on him with my Guard and
the duc de Raguse [Marmont].”46
Over the next sixty minutes, Napoleon’s conviction that his adversaries
had separated increased. “From this side, it appears fairly consistent that the
majority of the Allied army is marching in the direction of Halle and
the lower Saale,” he notified Maret. Based on this belief, Napoleon formal-
ized and expanded the ideas he had first expressed to Ney. His orders
suggest that the master wanted to dictate where his adversary would go
next. By taking the bridges at Dessau–Roßlau, he hoped to entice the Allies
into accepting a battle to save their line of retreat. Between 4:00 and 4:30
a.m., he wrote direct to Reynier, Oudinot, and Marmont while Berthier
addressed instructions to Ney and General Antoine Drouot. Only Reynier
received a detailed explanation of the emperor’s intentions: “All of the
enemy’s dispositions lead me to believe that Roßlau is not guarded in force
and if you march with your corps and Da˛browski, you will take possession
of the enemy’s bridges and a lot of baggage. Spread disorder everywhere
and capture baggage. The enemy may well have counted on the incursion of
some parties coming from Wittenberg but he did not foresee a serious
operation.” Oudinot’s instructions called for his Young Guard to forward
a combined-arms detachment to Raguhn and restore its bridge while 1st
Guard Cavalry Division dispatched large patrols to Jeßnitz. Napoleon
demanded that Oudinot remain in close communication with Ney and keep
his bearskins ready to march wherever the situation demanded. Marmont
received a challenging task. Not only did the emperor direct him to take a
position at Delitzsch to cover Bad Düben, Jeßnitz, and Leipzig, but he also
had to be prepared to attack any enemy forces marching from Halle to
Leipzig. Thus, the orders issued early on the 12th sought to attack the Allied
forces suspected to be at Dessau, to take Dessau and Roßlau, and to observe
the enemy at Halle, keeping him in check should he advance on Leipzig.47
At Bad Düben, Napoleon waited impatiently for information that would
clarify the situation. Late on the morning of 12 October he received news,
but not the sort he wanted. Around 9:00 arrived Murat’s report from the
11th, stating that, rather than retreating, Schwarzenberg had launched
another offensive. Murat had already fallen back to the outer suburbs
of Leipzig; his further retreat to the Mulde appeared likely. The impact of
Hide and seek 573
this report cannot be overstated. In an instant, Napoleon dropped his plans

to transfer his army to the right bank of the Elbe. Instead, he considered
concentrating the entire army for a showdown with the Allies at Taucha,
six miles northeast of Leipzig.
Thirty minutes later he fired a dispatch to Berthier, instructing the staff
chief to order Ney “to immediately, on receipt of this order, move all his
troops to Bad Düben, cross the river there, and march to Taucha, where
he must arrive on the 14th because it is my intention to reunite all of
my forces and deliver a battle there.” Instructions for Macdonald specified
that the marshal should “move as fast as possible to Bad Düben, where it is
indispensable that he arrive on the morning of the 14th.” Reynier and
Da˛browski should “return to Bad Düben, where they must arrive on the
13th in order to be at Taucha on the 14th, where I intend to deliver a battle.
Order Generals Bertrand, Sébastiani, and Latour-Maubourg to move imme-
diately to Bad Düben.” Napoleon planned for the Grande Armée to cross
the Mulde at Bad Düben and converge on Leipzig on the 14th. By that
evening, he wanted the forces under his command echeloned north of
Leipzig from Taucha through Bad Düben to Kemberg.48
Thirty minutes after dictating these instructions to Berthier, the
emperor committed his thoughts to paper in a note titled “Concerning the
Concentration of the Various Army Corps at Taucha.” Again, timing played
the crucial role in Napoleon’s calculations. “I have sent orders to Ney
to proceed to Bad Düben. Ney cannot receive this order before 2:00 p.m.
[on the 12th]; his troops will commence their march at 3:00; they cannot
cross the bridge at Bad Düben until tomorrow the 13th (the Guard will have
crossed already); they can reach Taucha by the evening of the 13th without
difficulty.” Regarding Latour-Maubourg’s I Cavalry Corps, Napoleon
assumed that, because it stood at Kemberg, it would have no difficulty
likewise reaching Taucha by the 14th. Mortier, Oudinot, and the Reserve
of the Guard would cross the Mulde at Bad Düben that day, 12 October, and
reach Taucha early on the 13th. South of Leipzig, Murat’s 50,000 men had
reached the vicinity of Cröbern on the 12th, less than ten miles south of
Leipzig, from where they would fall back to Taucha on the 13th. Napoleon
planned to be at Taucha on the 13th with the 40,000 men of the Old and
Young Guard as well as VI Corps. Together with Murat’s 50,000, the
emperor would have 90,000 men available for battle on the 13th. Moreover,
“these 90,000 men will be reinforced during the course of the day by Ney,
Bertrand, and Latour-Maubourg” (see Map 6).
As for the rest of the Grande Armée, Napoleon calculated that
Macdonald would not receive the summons to Bad Düben until 3:00 that
afternoon. If XI Corps had already crossed the Elbe, Napoleon figured
it would need the entire night to recross the river. This meant XI Corps
would reach Bad Düben on the 13th and commence the march to Taucha on
the 14th. Reynier, en route to Roßlau with 27th Division, VII Corps, and II
Cavalry Corps, could only reach Wittenberg by the evening of the 12th,
meaning that he could not arrive at Taucha via Eilenburg until 15 October.
Based on these calculations, the emperor concluded that “our entire army
will be concentrated on the 15th.” The forty-eight hours needed to concen-
trate the army did not trouble him. Figuring that Schwarzenberg’s lead
elements would reach Cröbern on the 13th, he assumed they would learn
of the concentration at Taucha and respond by massing their troops
throughout the 14th. “Therefore, I have the 13th and 14th to concentrate
mine. Furthermore, even if my whole army were at Bad Düben it could
not arrive any earlier unless it had at least five or six crossings” over the
Mulde. As for numbers, Napoleon believed that by the 14th he would have
120,000 men in his first line and 70,000 men in the second.49
Napoleon completely changed his plans from an offensive to destroy
Bernadotte in the Dessau–Roßlau region to a decisive battle with
Schwarzenberg around Taucha. While criticism of Napoleon’s supposed
irresolution between 10 and 12 October is overly harsh, Blücher again
seemed to have become an afterthought in Napoleon’s planning.50 “Tell me
what you know of the Silesian Army from your side,” he wrote to Marmont,
“and the positions that could be taken against this army and against the army
coming from Halle and or through Dessau.”51 Such carelessness combined
with Blücher’s determination to cooperate with Schwarzenberg ultimately
ruined Napoleon’s chances for a decisive victory over the Bohemian Army.
With only Tauentzien’s Landwehr standing in his way, Ney smashed
through the Prussian positions at Oranienbaum and Wörlitz early on the
12th; 1st Brigade of 8th Division took Wörlitz, destroying Figner’s Russian
Streifkorps consisting of Italian and German deserters. At noon, Delmas’s
9th Division secured Dessau and its bridge. Thanks to the bridgehead,
Tauentzien’s troops managed to escape across the Mulde and then the Elbe
via Roßlau but panic completely disordered the Landwehr. Reports that
immense baggage trains and parks could be seen on the right bank of
the Elbe north of Roßlau persuaded Napoleon that Bernadotte’s army had
fled across the Elbe at Aken. “The enemy appeared to be in great terror,”
he informed Marmont. Ney reported that his advance had netted more
than 1,500 Allied prisoners, which Napoleon inflated to 2,500 men inclu-
ding 50 officers. Meanwhile, Reynier and Da˛browski marched west from
Wittenberg along the right bank toward Coswig. Six miles west of the
fortress, Thümen decided to make a stand at the village of Griebo. As his
brigade deployed in two waves, the Prussian general observed the approach
of overwhelming numbers, threatening both his front and his flank. Seeing
no need to sacrifice his men, Thümen commenced an orderly retreat
to Roßlau around 4:00 p.m. Although exhausted stragglers fell into
French hands, the brigade reached Roßlau intact around 9:00 that night.
Hide and seek 575
Darkness ended Reynier’s pursuit, which brought in 400 prisoners. Aside

from this action, all other French units reached their objectives per
Napoleon’s orders but had relatively little to report.52
Although faulty intelligence placed the Army of North Germany on the
right bank of the Elbe, Napoleon did not second-guess his decision to
deliver a battle near Leipzig. In fact, the thought that he would have
40,000 to 50,000 fewer Allied soldiers to face in the upcoming battle pleased
him. Throughout the 12th, he proceeded with preparations for the epic clash
that he planned to deliver on 15 October. These included the distribution
of 31,000 pairs of shoes from the depot at Leipzig. Nevertheless, anxiety set
in. Around 4:00 on the afternoon of the 12th, Napoleon sent an officer to
Leipzig to confirm that Murat had held his position at Cröbern and faced
at least 60,000 Allied soldiers. To Maret he confided that, if Murat could
hold his position throughout the 13th, Napoleon would continue with
his plan to go to Leipzig and deliver a battle near Taucha. As soon as the
officer confirmed that Murat held his position at Cröbern throughout
the 12th, Napoleon would “depart with my Guard, so tomorrow during
the day I will have 80,000 men at Taucha, and the rest of the army will arrive
during the 14th.” Should Murat fail to maintain his position, Napoleon
would concentrate the army on the Mulde with Murat’s units forming
the left wing at Grimma and Wurzen. “I will then maneuver to give battle
to the enemy.”53
The officer Napoleon dispatched bore the emperor’s letter to Murat
asking hard questions but offering encouragement in the former’s classic
style. “During the course of the 13th,” explained Napoleon, “I will be at
Taucha with 70,000 men and during the course of the 15th all my army
will be united there; I will not be in a position to give battle to save Leipzig
until the 15th.” He then bluntly asked: “Can you maintain both your
position and Leipzig throughout the day of the 13th without compromising
yourself?” Napoleon assured Murat that he would receive reinforcements
throughout the day and especially during the night of 13/14 October.
He instructed him to take a position with his left supported by Connewitz
and his right extended toward Wurzen. “You will be increased by 80,000
men, whom I will bring to you; the rest of the army will arrive on the 14th.
We will have 200,000 men by the morning of the 15th. If you cannot hold
your position, direct your movements on Taucha and Wurzen.”54
During the evening of the 12th, Napoleon’s confidence increased. He
learned of Ney’s success at Dessau and eagerly awaited similar news from
Reynier at Roßlau. He also received word that Augereau had reached
Leipzig with enough reinforcements to reconstitute General Claude Pierre
Pajol’s V Cavalry Corps and boost Murat’s troop strength to 60,000 men.
According to reports from Dresden, Bennigsen had blockaded the city “with
a bunch of poorly trained recruits who up to now have been considerably
abused by our people.” Again Blücher appeared to be an afterthought.

“Apparently Blücher’s corps was near Zörbig,” he told Murat. “Some claim
that it is marching toward Rothenburg near Könnern but this seems very
apocryphal. It is to impose on him that I purposefully sent Marmont, as head
of the column, in this direction. One report claims that Schkeuditz is a good
position to take against an army coming from Halle. Reconnoiter the ter-
rain.” Based on this positive news, Napoleon briefly reconsidered going
to Taucha and postponing his operation against Schwarzenberg. Although
he did not reveal an alternative plan, the emperor informed Murat that,
“if I do not go there to take part myself, I will send enough men to give
you between 85,000 and 90,000; with them you need to win a few days.
A good ruse is to fire salvos announcing a victory over another army. You
should hold a review as if I was there and make the men shout: “Vive
l’Empereur!” Do not forget the fact that it is very important to hold Leipzig.
At around 1:00 in the morning I will receive reports from all sides and I will
decide what my part will be.”55
Four hours later, at 12:00 a.m. on the 13th, Napoleon revealed his
alternative plan in a letter to Marmont, whom he now placed under Murat’s
command. “If Reynier has not seized Roßlau today, this will give me
time to take it tomorrow, to defeat the army from Berlin, and finish all
of the business there.” Again, it would appear that charges of uncertainty
and indecision can be leveled at the emperor. Instead, we see Napoleon’s
personality flaws influencing his judgment. Rather than censuring
Napoleon for irresolution and torpor, we can consider him to be guilty of
spite, stubbornness, pride, arrogance, and wishful thinking. Detesting
Bernadotte, he had wanted to humiliate him since the Fall Campaign
commenced. He harbored no respect for the Army of North Germany,
derisively referring to it as a cloud of Cossacks and pack of bad Landwehr.
Although two of his marshals had suffered reversals at its hands, the
emperor would make short work of it to impress his mastery on them.
Finally, the destruction of the Army of North Germany would partially
fulfill his master plan centered on the Berlin offensive and perhaps initiate
the further advantages he espoused in this scheme. Demonstrating his
contempt for enemy troops, he believed Reynier and Ney could easily
catch Bernadotte’s retreating army and destroy it under the emperor’s
direction. Lastly, Napoleon surely wanted to have something to show for
all his labors since leaving Dresden. Instead of irresolution and uncertainty,
Napoleon is guilty of being fixated on destroying his former marshal.
He desperately needed a victory; crushing Bernadotte’s army would serve
many purposes and fulfill many needs. Even with Schwarzenberg’s army
lumbering across the Saxon plain, he could not take his eyes off of the
crown prince of Sweden. The vengeance of Emperor Napoleon appeared
to master General Bonaparte.56
Hide and seek 577
Yet by no means did Napoleon consider turning his back on the Bohemian
Army. Although Murat had failed to stop Schwarzenberg’s advance through-
out the month of October, Napoleon had apparently convinced himself
that his brother-in-law would finally halt the Coalition’s main army. After
destroying Bernadotte, the master would return to Leipzig and concentrate
200,000 men against Schwarzenberg. In the same letter to Marmont, he
informed the marshal that “the decisive moment appears to have arrived.
March in such a manner that you can help maintain Leipzig and send a request
to the king for orders to join the battle; there is no longer a question that we
will fight. If you hear the sound of the guns from the direction of Leipzig,
accelerate your march and take part in the affair.” Here again we see the
conflict between Emperor Napoleon and General Bonaparte. Thirty minutes
later, he informed Maret that “there is no longer any doubt that the army
from Berlin has recrossed to the right bank” of the Elbe. Having reinforced
Murat with Augereau and Marmont to a total of 90,000 men, Napoleon
expressed his belief that he would “have the time to finish tomorrow the
operations against the army that has crossed to the right bank.” As for
Blücher, he speculated to Marmont with a hint of indifference: “I suppose
that the reconnaissance parties you sent in the direction of Halle have already
reported back to you; conduct strong reconnaissance in this direction.”57
As promised, Napoleon wrote to Murat at 1:00 a.m. on the 13th with a
summary of the evening reports. He again confirmed that the Army of
North Germany had withdrawn to the right bank of the Elbe. However,
Ney reported hearing a cannonade from Reynier’s vicinity between Coswig
and Roßlau. “We do not yet know the outcome,” wrote Napoleon, meaning
he had yet to decide whether he would pursue Bernadotte or unite with
Murat. Three hours later, he returned to the idea of concentrating the army
for a decisive battle near Leipzig. Writers such as Petre and Yorck von
Wartenburg have attributed this decision to Napoleon’s discovery that
Bernadotte’s army had remained south of the Elbe. However, the emperor’s
correspondence suggests that he did not know of Bernadotte’s whereabouts
at the time he made this decision.58 Instead, at 4:00 a.m. on the 13th, he
informed Maret that Reynier took Roßlau along with 600 prisoners but the
enemy had dismantled the bridge; Reynier would now march to Aken.
At the same time, he issued orders to Berthier to instruct I Cavalry Corps
as well as the Guard units under Oudinot, Mortier, Frédéric-Henri Walther,
and Ornano to move to Bad Düben without delay. One hour later,
Napoleon summoned IV and III Corps to Bad Düben as well.59 According
to Yorck von Wartenburg’s assessment:
It cannot be open to any doubt, that, as matters stood on 12 October, the

emperor no longer had any choice but to depart for Leipzig; this was the
punishment for his irresolution. To have now carried out that bold operation
beyond the Elbe would have meant only a blind sally into air; there were no
longer any forces there, and Murat, left to face thrice his numbers unsup-
ported, would have been lost. But the departure for Leipzig was, in itself,
only a maneuver dictated by despair; were the whole French army there, it
would face greatly superior forces, for nothing could now prevent the enemy
from advancing thither with all their forces, and the tactical position there, as
Marmont said very appositely, “at the bottom of a funnel,” would lead to
annihilation should the battle be lost. Strategically the emperor was already
lost. Blücher and Schwarzenberg stood ominously near his only lines of
communication with their main forces, and had already effected communi-
cation with each other to his rear. If we take the most unfavorable positions
in modern warfare – Ulm, Jena, Sedan – we shall find none worse than this.60
Rather than irresolution and despair, Napoleon’s decision arose from

a practical reassessment of the situation. Schwarzenberg’s army stood
right under his nose. Although assembling his forces, he kept an open
mind, cautioning Ney that “we should not concentrate too hastily.” More-
over, he did not renounce completely his pet project of smashing
Bernadotte: “If the crown prince of Sweden has moved to the right bank
with his army from Berlin, that means we will face 40,000 fewer men
in battle; if, on the contrary, the crown prince of Sweden is still on the
left bank, then he will have all the more reason to withdraw.” Clinging
to the hope of inflicting some damage on any units of the Army of North
Germany that remained south of the Elbe, Napoleon charged Ney with
collecting as much information as possible concerning the enemy troops
that had passed through Dessau, “division by division, regiment by regi-
ment.” In light of this, Napoleon planned to have Reynier continue his
march to Aken on the 14th. To support VII Corps, he instructed Ney to
make a diversion on the left bank of the Elbe near Aken. Regardless,
as soon as Reynier destroyed the bridge at Aken, the emperor wanted
Ney to move to Bad Düben “because undoubtedly there will be a great
battle at Leipzig.”61
Between 5:00 and 6:00 on the morning of the 13th, Napoleon learned
that Bernadotte’s headquarters had been at Bernburg on the Saale – some
forty-five miles west of Bad Düben – on 11 October. His resolve to deliver
an epic battle at Leipzig hardened as his interest in Bernadotte’s whereabouts
ebbed. He figured that Reynier would be master of Roßlau by daybreak.
From there, VII Corps would obtain news of the situation at Aken. Believ-
ing the operation on the right bank of the Elbe no longer required XI Corps
and II Cavalry Corps, he summoned them to Bad Düben. “After completing
his operation,” Napoleon explained to Macdonald, “General Reynier will
return to Wittenberg to likewise move to Leipzig, where I think we will
have a general battle. He should be able to cross the bridge at Bad Düben
tomorrow before dark. If you know of Bertrand’s whereabouts, let him
Hide and seek 579
know he has been summoned to march today, the 13th, to Bad Düben.”
Napoleon explained that 90,000 men under Murat held Leipzig against
the “Austrian army.” He correctly placed Blücher’s army at Halle. “We
are at a very important moment. I think the battle will take place on the
15th or 16th. If the entire army from Berlin has crossed to the right bank,
as is asserted, we would be rid of 40,000 men.” With this, the emperor finally
shook himself free of his obsession with Bernadotte and turned to the
business at hand.62
By 10:00 on the morning of the 13th, thoughts of the situation around
Leipzig consumed Napoleon. By reinforcing Murat to 90,000 men, he
figured the king could hold Schwarzenberg south of Leipzig. In light of
this, Napoleon decided to deliver the battle at Leipzig rather than Taucha.
He issued orders for the rear echelons of the Guard to immediately
commence the march to Bad Düben. He calculated on the Young Guard
divisions (two each) under Mortier and Oudinot clearing Bad Düben during
the course of the day and reaching Hohenleina and Lindenhayn respectively,
the halfway points to Leipzig. Napoleon contemplated going to Hohenleina
that night; he expected the rest of the army to arrive there during the course
of the 14th. As they arrived, he planned to place them around Leipzig,
keeping the Guard in the center as his reserve.63
Between 8 and 13 October, Napoleon missed a great opportunity to
defeat Blücher’s Army of Silesia and probably the Army of North Germany
as well. Instead of crushing these two armies against the Elbe River, the
French emperor found that his prey had escaped west and across the
Saale River. Although the Allied retreat across the Saale opened the road
to Berlin and North Germany, the time for Napoleon to execute a coup de
théâtre had passed. Moving north and across the Elbe would have saved him
the garrisons at Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Stettin as well as
Davout’s XIII Corps at Hamburg. Moreover, by exchanging places with
the Allies, Napoleon could have stranded the Bohemian, Silesian, and North
German Armies in the depleted Saxon countryside and held the right bank
of the Elbe against them from Hamburg to Dresden. His forces south of
Leipzig could probably have escaped eastward to Torgau before the Allies
caught them. Yet the time for running was over. No maneuver, flank march,
or surprise attack could truly alter the course of the war unless it led to
the destruction of one or more of the Allied armies. At this late stage of the
campaign, Napoleon knew that it mattered little if he reached Hamburg or
Danzig; he still needed to destroy the enemy’s ability to wage war. Mounting
war-weariness in France meant that a decision soon had to be reached.
Instead of wasting his scant resources by evacuating the theater, he decided
to draw the Allies to Leipzig for an epic struggle. He hoped to unite 200,000
men at Leipzig by 14 October to wage a decisive conclusion to the cam-
paign: the Battle of Nations.
Notes
1 “Secret Disposition for 9 October,” Bad Düben, 8:00 a.m., 9 October 1813, ÖStA
KA, FA 1535, 277b, and Add MSS, 12,112, 154; Blücher to Shcherbatov, Bad
Düben, 8:00 a.m., 9 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1535, 277a; Blücher to
Gneisenau, Nr. 16.
2 Sacken’s march proceeded through Wildenhain, Pressel, Authausen,
Durchwehna, and Söllichau to Schköna.
4 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:203. The account of 9 October is based on Plotho,
Der Krieg, II:293–95; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege,
II:485–86; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:343–46; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIb:59–60; Unger, Blücher, II:106; Yorck, Droysen, 202–03; Friederich,
5 Blücher to Charles John, Jeßnitz, 9 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 23, and Add MSS, 20112, 71–72.
6 Charles John to Blücher, Zehbitz, 9 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 69; Müffling,
Die Feldzüge, 66–67; Unger, Blücher, II:106.
7 Blücher to Charles John, Jeßnitz, 10 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 74.
8 Disposition, Jeßnitz, 10 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 155; Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1845:351, 354.
9 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 86; Unger, Blücher, II:106.
10 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Wintzingerode, 9 October 1813.
12 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 67–68.
13 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Bülow, 9 October 1813; Müffling, Die Feldzüge,
68–69, and Aus meinem Leben, 87; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:352.
14 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Wintzingerode, 9 and 10 October 1813.
15 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Tauentzien, Hirschfeld, and Stedingk, 10
October 1813.
16 SHAT, C17 133: Order of the Day, 10 October 1813; Charles John to Bülow,
10 October 1813; Charles John to Blücher, Großweißandt, 10 October 1813, Add
MSS, 20112, 73.
17 The reports from Klüx, Korf, and Sacken are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:353–54.
18 CN, Nos. 20740 and 20741, XXVI:316–17; Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative,
II:4; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:324–25.
19 CN, Nos. 20736–20739, XXVI:314–15; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Lefebvre-
Desnouettes, Marmont, Macdonald, Ney, Latour-Maubourg, Bertrand, Sébastiani,
Sorbier, Rogniat, and Lassaux, 10 October 1813.
20 CN, Nos. 20743–20745, XXVI:318–20.
21 CN, No. 20746, XXVI:320–21.
22 CN, No. 20746, XXVI:320–21.
23 CN, Nos. 20747, 20750, and 20751, XXVI:321–22, 324–25; SHAT, C17 181:
Berthier to Ney and Druout, 10 October 1813.
Hide and seek 581

25 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Sébastiani, 10 October 1813; CN, Nos. 20750 and
20752, XXVI:324–25.
26 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Marmont, 10 October 1813; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, II:331.
27 CN, Nos. 20748 and 20749, XXVI:322–23. For Napoleon’s despondency, see
Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 309–10.
28 CN, No. 20754, XXVI:325–26. Napoleon based these figures on the following
calculations, which he had no doubt inflated: VIII Corps: 5,000 infantry and 3,000
cavalry; V Corps: 12,000 infantry and 500 cavalry; II Corps: 16,000 infantry and
1,200 cavalry; IX Corps: 8,000 infantry; V Cavalry Corps: 2,000 sabers; Arrighi’s
Leipzig garrison: 8,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.
29 CN, Nos. 20757–20760, XXVI:327–29; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Marmont,
Latour-Maubourg, Macdonald, Bertrand, Sébastiani, Ney, Curial, and Lefebvre-
Desnouettes, 11 October 1813.
30 Disposition, 10 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 156.
31 In his 1827 work, Müffling definitively states that the crown prince promised to
have a bridge available at Wettin. Yet the extremely pro-Prussian Stewart simply
comments that “General Blücher was not enabled – the bridge being incomplete –
to traverse the Saale at Wettin”: Stewart, Narrative, 149. Unbiased reporting by
the Prussian General Staff must be acknowledged in this case. In the official
history of the Silesian Army written by the Prussian General Staff between
1843 and 1845, Höpfner points to a letter from Bernadotte’s chief of staff,
Adlerkreutz, to Bülow written on 10 October. According to this document,
Vorontsov informed Bernadotte that he planned to build a bridge at Wettin. Thus,
Adlerkreutz informed Bülow that, should it be completed, III Corps would cross
the Saale there. “The prince desires that you send an officer there to direct the
construction,” state the orders to Bülow. “If the bridge is not ready and too much
time would be needed to complete it, the prince wants you to immediately effect
your crossing at Rothenburg with Wintzingerode or at Alsleben if the bridge
there is finished, or you may do so at Bernburg. However, if the bridge that
General Blücher builds is suitable for the crossing of his army and your corps,
then you should cross at that point”: SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Bülow,
Großweißandt, 10 October 1813. Höpfner concludes: “According to this, it
appears that, based on a report from Vorontsov, the crown prince himself believed
that a bridge would be built at Wettin.” However, later that same day, Adlerk-
reutz informed Wintzingerode that, “having learned that the bridge at Wettin is
not in a state to service the passage of Bülow’s corps with those of General
Blücher, the prince royal has ordered Bülow to cross at Rothenburg”: SHAT,
C17 133: Charles John to Wintzingerode, Radegast, 10 October 1813. This led
Höpfner to question how the crown prince knew that the bridge was not ready to
support the passage of the Silesian Army as well as Bülow’s corps when abso-
lutely no steps had been taken by Vorontsov to build a bridge: Höpfner, “Dar-
stellung,” 1845:360. Friederich’s unbiased reporting also must be acknowledged:
“Omitting to build the bridge at Wettin has been portrayed as a deliberate attempt
to deceive Blücher in order to deny him a point of passage and thus force him ‘to
follow the North German Army and go in the direction that the crown prince had
previously failed to persuade him to take.’ If we examine the existing service

letters with unprejudiced eyes, the crown prince appears to be completely inno-
cent of this omission. Obviously, misunderstandings existed that emerged from
a report from Vorontsov indicating the construction of a bridge at Wettin. It is
not worth investigating the matter further as it is just typical to always give the
worst possible interpretation to the efforts, actions, and omissions of the crown
prince”: Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:340. As for the historian of the
Russian General Staff, Modest Bogdanovich, he follows earlier German histor-
ians in stating that Bernadotte had promised to build a bridge at Wettin. See also
Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:61. Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 68–70;
Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:357; Droysen, Yorck, II:204.
32 Charles John to Blücher, Rothenburg, 11 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 75–76;
Steffens, Adventures, 116; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:357; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:62; Droysen, Yorck, II:204; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, II:340–41.
33 Blücher to Alexander, Halle, 11 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:358; Blücher to Charles John, Halle, 11 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 77.
34 Charles John to Blücher, Rothenburg, 11 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 75–76.
35 Blücher to Langeron, Yorck, and Sacken, Halle, 11 October 1813, Add MSS,
20112, 157–59.
37 Disposition for 13 October 1813, Halle, 12 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 160;
Blücher to Charles John, Halle, 12 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 23.
38 Blücher to Yorck, Halle, 6:00 p.m., 12 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 316–17.
39 SHAT, C17 133: Order of the Day, 12 October 1813.
40 Charles John to Blücher, Rothenburg, 12 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 78.
41 Blücher to Yorck, Halle, 6:00 p.m., 12 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
42 Gneisenau to Caroline, Halle, 12 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
43 Although ordered to march at 6:00 a.m., Reynier’s troops did not depart for
Wittenberg until 11:00 a.m. Making a long halt at Pratau to observe the Prussian
positions on the right bank, VII Corps finally crossed the Elbe in the evening.
Da˛browski’s division, which Napoleon had expected to be at Wittenberg the day
before, moved from Kemberg to the fortress. Sébastiani’s II Cavalry Corps reached
the vicinity of Wittenberg. Bertrand’s IV Corps marched around 7:00 a.m. through
Schmiedeberg to Trebitz, where it halted. In the evening, the general pushed his
38th Division to Wartenburg. The lead elements of XI Corps reached Rackith; its
cavalry appears to have reached Wittenberg. Latour-Maubourg’s I Cavalry Corps
halted at Kemberg; the Young Guard stood between Kemberg and
Gräfenhainichen; III Corps at Gräfenhainichen; VI Corps at Bad Düben; the Old
Guard at Bad Düben and Eilenburg. Friederich attributes this tardiness to the total
exhaustion of the starving troops. Endless straggling required long halts for the
tired soldiers to catch up. See Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:337–38, 339–40.
Hide and seek 583
44 CN, Nos. 20761 and 20763, XXVI:329–31.

45 CN, Nos. 20764 and 20765, XXVI:332.
46 CN, Nos. 20763 and 20765, XXVI:331–33.
47 CN, Nos. 20766 and 20768–20770, XXVI:333–36; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to
Ney and Drouot, 12 October 1813. On 13 October, Tauentzien sent the
unescorted baggage of the North German and Silesian Armies through Branden-
burg and behind the Havel River.
48 CN, No. 20771, XXVI:336.
49 CN, No. 20772, XXVI:336–38.
50 For “proof of the irresolution and uncertainty” that allegedly mastered Napoleon at
Bad Düben, see Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 313–14. Petre fails to recognize
that this campaign was unlike Napoleon’s earlier wars because he no longer faced
Frederician armies commanded by Frederician generals, although Schwarzenberg
comes close to fitting this description. As Napoleon himself admitted, the animals
had learned something and in this case they demonstrated a suitable understanding
of the art of operational warfare and distributed maneuver. As always, Napoleon
required detailed information to plan his operations with exactitude. He waited
for his enemy to make a mistake. As the information arrived, he adjusted his plans
accordingly. Yorck von Wartenburg, in Napoleon as a General, II:340–41, likewise
is critical of Napoleon for his indecision at Bad Düben. Undoubtedly, stress had
taken its toll, but to criticize him for waiting for reports to arrive rather than riding
ten leagues per day to “superintend everything and conduct everything” is unfair.
Where Petre at least objects to Odeleben’s pathetic description of Napoleon con-
fining himself to his bedroom, Yorck von Wartenburg accepts this portrayal. See
Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, II:5–6.
51 CN, Nos. 20771 and 20775, XXVI:336, 339.
52 CN, Nos. 20780, 20782, and 20785, XXVI:342, 344, 346; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, II:343–44.
53 CN, Nos. 20774–20776 and 20779, XXVI:338–40, 342.
54 CN, No. 20779, XXVI:341–42.
55 CN, No. 20781, XXVI:342–43.
56 Yorck von Wartenburg’s declaration that as late as the 11th Napoleon could have
changed “the fortune of the war” had he quickly united with Murat and pounced
on Schwarzenberg or effected a coup de théâtre by throwing all his forces onto the
right bank of the Elbe fails to take into consideration that the objective of his
operation was to destroy either Blücher or Bernadotte or both on the left bank.
As of the 10th, this goal still appeared to be well within Napoleon’s reach.
Instead, the Prussian General Staff historian faults Napoleon for adopting “no
general resolution but, acting as Mack and Brunswick had done in the past and as
MacMahon was to do in the future, he pushed individual corps forward,
intending to arrive at a decision if he should be able by this means to obtain
definite news of the enemy.” Yet was not this the means that he had won his great
victories in 1805, 1806, 1807, and 1809 – by pushing forward individual corps to
find the enemy and then concentrate the army for the decisive battle? See Yorck
von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, 344–45.
57 CN, Nos. 20782 and 20783, XXVI:344–45.
58 See Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 314–15; Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon
as a General, II:344–45.
59 CN, Nos. 20785–20788, XXVI:346–48.
60 Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:344.
61 CN, No. 20789, XXVI:348.
62 CN, No. 20790, XXVI:349. Yorck von Wartenburg’s assessment continues: “For-
merly, he always had advanced rapidly against the enemy’s most vulnerable point,
sure that the latter would then be forced to meet him with his main body; now,
while he hesitated to act and always sought full information first, Bernadotte
disappeared and Blücher evaded him despite the corps he pushed forward as far
as and even beyond the Elbe; despite staying for four days at Bad Düben, the
emperor was entirely mistaken regarding Bernadotte and lost time that could not
be regained at the most decisive moment of the campaign.” Again, the Prussian
staff officer fails to acknowledge that Napoleon’s entire operation had been
directed at the “enemy’s most vulnerable point.” His offensive to the Mulde
and then the Elbe had forced Blücher and Bernadotte to react in a totally
unorthodox fashion: sacrificing their lines of communication. After attacking
the bridges across the Mulde and the Elbe, Napoleon sought his opponents in
the same manner he always had practiced. That they resorted to the unexpected to
escape cannot be blamed on him. Thus, Napoleon does not deserve censure, but
instead Blücher and Bernadotte should be praised for embracing the unorthodox.
As for Napoleon wasting time and the most decisive moment of the campaign,
the time became decisive only because the emperor willed it. Had he not ordered
the concentration at Leipzig, a battle would not have taken place. See Yorck von
Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:345.
63 CN, Nos. 20792, 20794, and 20795, XXVI:352–53. Napoleon’s orders to Drouot,
“aide-major” of the Guard, sent Mortier’s first division to Hohenleina, his second
one league north of it at Hohenroda; Oudinot’s first division to Gollmenz,
the second to Lindenhayn along with the Guard Artillery. Napoleon’s cousin
and future marshal of the Second Empire, Ornano, was to move the 1st Guard
Cavalry Division likewise to Hohenleina with Walther’s 3rd Guard Cavalry
Division behind him. General Philibert Jean-Baptiste Curial’s 2nd Division of
Old Guard at Eilenburg and General Louis Friant’s 1st Division of Old Guard
at Bad Düben would commence their march at 4:00 a.m. on 14 October; the
former would escort the king of Saxony to Leipzig should the monarch desire to
be so near the battle. In addition, Napoleon directed Latour-Maubourg’s
I Cavalry Corps “to the right” of Gollmenz, observing Delitzsch and assumed
IV Corps “would be in position at Bad Düben’s windmill.” The parks, pontoon
train, and Grand Headquarters would go to Eilenburg.
13
Opening round
At Silesian Army Headquarters, confusing information reached Blücher

during the night of 12/13 October. Katzler reported that, according to
deserters, the rumors circulating through the French army claimed that
Napoleon planned to march on Berlin. Moreover, Rudzevich’s patrols
reported the advance of considerable imperial forces from Bad Düben to
Delitzsch, and therefore toward Halle. News from St.-Priest that Augereau’s
IX Corps had moved from Naumburg through Weißenfels to Lützen, and
probably would continue to Leipzig, did little to clarify the situation.
A report from one of Katzler’s patrols, which the colonel forwarded to
Blücher around 10:00 p.m., stated that a merchant coming from Leipzig
estimated its garrison to be 4,000 men. Murat’s army stood one hour south
of the city at Connewitz. Napoleon’s army, some 120,000 men, straddled the
Mulde from Wurzen to Eilenburg to Bitterfeld; a burgher from Leipzig had
spotted the emperor at Eilenburg on the 10th. Rumors circulated through
Leipzig of a battle with the Bohemian Army at Borna on the 11th. Fugitives
without arms drifted into the city throughout the night of the 11th and all
day during the 12th. With Augereau’s corps very close to Leipzig, another
imperial corps at Delitzsch, and the expectation that Murat would move
across the Mulde and follow Napoleon to Wittenberg, Blücher wanted the
Silesian Army ready to react. As a result, he rescinded the orders for Yorck’s
operation against Leipzig on the 13th. Nevertheless, both Yorck’s and
Langeron’s vanguards would conduct the general reconnaissance. At Halle,
the Silesian Army remained concentrated and ready to turn toward either
Leipzig or Magdeburg according to the enemy’s movements (see Map 6).
Early on the 13th, the infantry of Yorck’s vanguard marched to Bruckdorf
while Langeron’s proceeded to Reideburg. Emmanuel led the Russian cav-
alry twelve miles west from Merseburg to Rückmarsdorf; Katzler’s troopers
rode fifteen miles south from Brehna to Schkeuditz on the Halle–Leipzig
585
highway. Six miles southeast of Schkeuditz, the Prussians encountered one

French battalion supported by one cavalry regiment at Möckern. With
three guns and the majority of his cavalry, Katzler charged the right flank
of the enemy cavalry. The imperials retreated to Gohlis while the infantry
withdrew from Möckern along the Elster. Katzler shelled the retreating
enemy with a half-battery of horse artillery. He broke off the pursuit at
dusk and returned to Schkeuditz after receiving word from Emmanuel that
the Russians had run into Marmont’s entire corps. After leaving a consider-
able number of his troopers to guard the road coming from Delitzsch,
Emmanuel reached Wiederitzsch, some three miles northeast of Katzler’s
position at Möckern, in the evening. There, the Russians found French
infantry, cavalry, and artillery from Marmont’s corps, itself in the process
of retreating from Delitzsch through Taucha. Prisoners claimed that Murat
and Marmont had reached the city while the latter’s corps had marched
from the Mulde to Leipzig. Others stated that the corps approaching under
Augereau numbered 30,000 men and consisted mainly of troops recalled
from Spain, including a large, veteran cavalry unit. Elsewhere on the 13th,
Rudzevich’s patrols described a large imperial force at Delitzsch (Marmont’s
VI Corps) that later withdrew. To the north, two of his detachments found
Dessau occupied by French forces; Cossacks reported hearing a cannonade
along the Elbe on the 12th. While returning to Allied Headquarters at
Altenburg, General Vlodek, a member of the tsar’s staff, passed through
Halle and shared the news with Blücher that Austria and Bavaria had
concluded a treaty. As a result, a combined force of 10,000 Austrians
and 20,000 Bavarians under General Karl Philipp von Wrede would soon
march on Würzburg to cut Napoleon’s line of communication with France.1
In the midst of processing this information, Blücher received a shrill
letter from Bernadotte, demonstrating the impact of Napoleon’s mane-
uver. “Tauentzien has informed me that four army corps are marching on
Wittenberg and he believes that the emperor himself is leading them,”
warned the crown prince. Calling this movement “unusual,” he claimed to
have no other option but to withdraw his army to the right bank of the Elbe.
After the approaching imperials had prompted Tauentzien to burn the
bridge at Roßlau, only the bridge at Aken remained at Bernadotte’s disposal.
He requested that Blücher proceed “according to the information that you
have on the enemy’s movements and that you send all your cavalry against
the enemy’s rear. I have not a moment to lose. I must accelerate the march
of my troops to execute my crossing, if possible, without incident. If you
can, accompany my movement.” Saving his best for last, Bernadotte
attempted to play his trump card: “Tsar Alexander has informed me that
you will carry out my orders if I find that it is necessary. I thus request
that you consider this letter as an invitation for you to unite the majority of
your troops with me. As soon as we are united, we will have nothing to
Opening round 587
fear and we can go anywhere circumstances require.” Just as Blücher had

pulled the Army of North Germany to the left bank of the Elbe, Bernadotte
sought to pull the Army of Silesia back to the right bank.2
Charles Stewart himself delivered this letter to Blücher at Halle. He
explained to the Prussians that “the most discordant opinions” existed at
the crown prince’s headquarters. “One party thought Napoleon would
march to Magdeburg, another that he would join Davout in Mecklenburg,
a third assumed Berlin to be his objective, a fourth, Stralsund to get revenge
on Sweden. Others went still further; they foresaw reinforcements reaching
the Oder fortresses and Napoleon sparking a revolution in the heart of
Poland – none of which required communication with France.”3 A second
letter arrived later on 12 October. “My dear General Blücher,” continued the
crown prince, “thirty minutes after I mailed you my morning letter a secret
agent arrived and informed me that the emperor’s Guard stands at Dessau.
You see that the moment is critical and there is not a moment to lose for
us to unite. I direct my march on Köthen: I do not know if I will have time
to complete it. In all cases, you must advance on the shortest road against
the enemy’s rear; but I would prefer if you would unite with me and that
your cavalry follow close on his heels.”4
Despite Bernadotte’s politeness of employing requests and stating pref-
erences rather than issuing direct orders, the Prussians read between the
lines of his eloquent prose. Mentioning Tsar Alexander’s mandate raised
the specter of an international crisis at such a crucial phase of the war. What
if Bernadotte demanded control of the Silesian Army? What if he attempted
to have Blücher arrested, as he had threatened to have Bülow arrested
after a previous disagreement? What if he switched his allegiance back to
Napoleon? Although Blücher had never received any notification that
Bernadotte could pull rank on him, Knesebeck had warned of just such a
scenario in his 13 September letter to Gneisenau. After rebuffing the tsar
and Schwarzenberg throughout September, could Blücher afford to ignore
the crown prince’s orders – especially if his reports proved true? Gneisenau
informed Müffling that “General Vlodek just saw me and explained to me
that the crown prince had complained about us; that we had carried him
away in the current movements: that this cannot continue, that he must have
our army under his command, that we should take our position with our
left wing leaning on Delitzsch and more such foolishness.”5
To make this monumental decision that would have irreversible
consequences, Blücher carefully weighed the evidence. According to all
reports that reached Silesian Army Headquarters, Napoleon remained at
Bad Düben, the midpoint of the Wittenberg–Leipzig line. Yet assuming the
accuracy of Bernadotte’s reports of Napoleon personally leading an offen-
sive through Wittenberg with four army corps while Ney remained on the
left bank with considerable forces, the Prussians continued their attempt to
divine the emperor’s intentions. One scenario pictured Napoleon assembling

his army on the right bank of the Elbe for the march to Magdeburg. Second,
he could move his main force to the right bank of the Elbe to strike Berlin in
unison with Davout coming from Hamburg. Third, he could send part of his
forces across the Elbe to the right bank to threaten both Berlin and the
rearward communications of the North German and Silesian Armies. In this
way, Napoleon could influence both armies to return to the right bank and
leave Schwarzenberg on his own. Then, he could quickly reunite his forces
and turn against the Bohemian Army.
Although solid arguments could be made in support of each case,
common sense separated fact from fiction. If Napoleon pursued either the
first or the second scenario, he would need the troops he left south of the Elbe.
Moreover, the Prussians did not believe Murat’s army, despite being reinforced
by Marmont and Augereau, could stand against the numerical superiority
the Coalition could throw at Leipzig. Consequently, leaving behind such a
considerable part of his army in and around Leipzig could mean only that
the master intended to return shortly, per the third scenario. Thus, Murat’s
actions would reveal Napoleon’s intentions. Without a doubt, Murat would
follow the emperor across the Mulde and the Elbe in cases one and two, but
he would seek to hold his current position at Leipzig in the third case. Blücher
could only hope that the reconnaissance conducted toward Leipzig would
clarify the situation. Augereau’s arrival and the news of Marmont’s march
from Delitzsch to Taucha and Eilenburg seemed to indicate that the imperials
would hold Leipzig. If this proved true, Napoleon’s movement through
Wittenberg and along the right bank would be a mere demonstration.6
No sentimental consideration for Berlin mastered Blücher’s headquarters.
“Napoleon moved with a part of his army as if he intended to threaten
Berlin,” explained Professor Steffens, “believing that he would be able to
wreck our plans and compel us to separate from our concentrated position.
Had he carried out this view, Berlin would have been surrendered to him. But
the strong mind of Germany, which now ruled in our army, was too bold
and wise to be deceived. We foresaw that if our combined forces stood firm,
he must abandon his design; he could not spare a portion of his army from the
coming struggle, on which his future – his very existence – could be staked.
The great day that would seal the fate of Germany thus approached.”7
Needing to buy time for the final reports from the forward cavalry to arrive,
Blücher delayed acting on Bernadotte’s “orders.” After alerting the army to
remain ready to march north should the imperials evacuate Leipzig and move
across the Mulde toward Wittenberg, Blücher responded to the crown prince:
Please allow me to remind Your Royal Highness that it was you who
suggested the crossing of the Saale and that by executing it I have corres-
ponded to your wishes. I canceled my plans to conform to those of Your
Opening round 589
Royal Highness. According to the order of battle, your army should have
occupied the place upon which I now stand; when I saw that you placed value
on remaining close to the Elbe, I wasted no time in contenting myself with
the position that Your Royal Highness had not taken but needed to be filled
to establish communication with the Bohemian Army by securing the cross-
ings at Merseburg and Halle, and becoming master of the line of the Saale.
Your Royal Highness told Major von Rühle “that you would burn the
bridge at Roßlau; that you would post ten battalions at Aken; that, if
necessary, you would sacrifice the bridge at Aken and move onto the left
bank of the Saale.” Thus, when I saw Your Royal Highness so firmly
resolved, I accepted without hesitation the proposal to march to the left bank
of the Saale. Your Royal Highness now informs me that you will cross the
Elbe at Aken. Through this movement, I will be cut off from the Elbe. There
remains nothing else for me to do than to unite with the Bohemian Army. It
is still not clear to me how Your Royal Majesty intends to execute your
crossing of the Elbe and how you will proceed after the crossing if you are
concentrated between the enemy, the Elbe, Magdeburg, and the Havel.
The reconnaissance that I am conducting today toward Leipzig and
Delitzsch will clarify the enemy’s position. I will send my First Adjutant to
His Majesty Tsar Alexander to inform him of the situation of our armies and
the position of the enemy and I must await the orders that His Imperial
Majesty will give me. An officer returning to Grand Allied Headquarters
informed me that the treaty between Austria and Bavaria was signed on
4 October according to which 10,000 Austrians and 20,000 Bavarians are
marching on Würzburg.8
Gneisenau’s deft quill is clearly discernible in this brilliant letter. If

Napoleon really were to lead an offensive along the right bank of the Elbe,
the thought of crossing the river and finding himself hemmed in by it and the
Havel with Napoleon in front of him and Davout behind him must have
truly terrified Bernadotte. Moreover, the Prussians ignored the whole issue
of Bernadotte taking command of the Silesian Army. Blücher had never
heard a word about this and doubted that Tsar Alexander had actually
granted such a concession. Although furious and giving “loud expression
to his anger,” Blücher simply but firmly reiterated the stand he had taken in
September: he would obey only orders issued by the monarchs. This missive
gained him the time he needed to allow further reports to arrive and be
evaluated. Gneisenau wrote to his opposite at Bernadotte’s headquarters,
Adlerkreutz, asking him to use his influence to convince the crown prince to
remain in the theater. Blücher also decided to send his First Adjutant, Count
Goltz, to Alexander’s headquarters with a report on Bernadotte’s proceed-
ings and to ask if Schwarzenberg would support an attack on the enemy
forces around Leipzig.9
The situation at Bernadotte’s headquarters became frantic. The Prussian
envoy to the Army of North Germany, General Krusemarck, informed
Blücher “that the news of the march of a strong French corps on Wittenberg
and the enemy’s capture of Dessau has unnerved the crown prince . . . he
ardently wishes that your army can come to his aid through a movement
toward Bitterfeld. It would be very meritorious work to lift the drooping
spirits of this merciful lord because he already believes all is lost. I ask you
earnestly to give him more hopeful advice.” After transferring his head-
quarters to Köthen, Bernadotte issued orders for the army to commence
the march toward the Elbe. Learning that Rauch had reached Aken with
the pontoons of Blücher’s army, the crown prince instructed the Prussian
officer to remain there and build a second bridge with a bridgehead
on the right bank. Writing before he received Blücher’s evasive response,
the prince royal seemed confident that Blücher would obey his orders.
“General Blücher is moving to Aken in forced marches to unite with me,”
Bernadotte told Rauch. “United, we will deliver a battle if the enemy
comes back to the left bank; we will cross the Elbe with all of our forces
if he remains on the right bank. In order to cover you in your responsi-
bility, I inform you that I have received a letter from Tsar Alexander
authorizing me to give General Blücher the necessary orders. Therefore,
you can see that the success of the operations of the Allied armies depends
on your execution of this order.”10
En route to reunite with the Silesian Army, Rauch reached Steutz,
opposite Aken, on 12 October. Owing to Reynier’s advance, he quickly
crossed the river and proceeded south through Köthen. While marching
through Köthen on the 13th, he received Bernadotte’s orders. Having
received a letter from Blücher earlier in the day summoning him to Halle
as soon as possible, Rauch found himself in an unenviable predicament.
While weighing his options, he learned that Reynier had assaulted Aken
and forced Hirschfeld to dismantle the bridge. With the bridge out of
service, neither army could cross. Under these circumstances, Rauch
believed that he had no choice but to turn around and lead his trains back
to Aken.11
On the following morning, 14 October, Blücher received Rauch’s report
on the affair. To provide a general reason to disobey the crown prince,
Blücher and Gneisenau drafted a persuasive letter:
From the moment you left Wartenburg, your detachment served as an escort
for the reserve ammunition, the baggage, and the pontoon train, all of which
are quite indispensable to the army. You were never detached from it and you
should have told the crown prince that you are not in a position to start a
campaign for his army. His Royal Highness was very wrong to interfere with
executing the instructions you received from me and you should have
followed your orders. As you know well, I have no ammunition with me
other than that which belongs to the batteries and I will be in the greatest
quandary if I have to deliver a two-day battle and I am separated from the
Opening round 591
ammunition that you now escort. The news that His Majesty Tsar Alexander
has placed me under the command of His Royal Highness is just as unknown
to me as the news that I am marching to Aken.
Despite this free pass, only Rauch himself reached Halle, prompting Blücher
to give the younger general a tongue-lashing. Rauch tried to explain that he
had been forced to follow the orders of the crown prince. Blücher answered
him: “If I run out of powder in the next battle, I will have you court-
martialed.” Fortunately for Rauch, supplies captured at Leipzig would
replenish the ordnance expended during the ensuing battle.12
In the end, the intelligence that arrived during the evening and night
of the 13th confirmed the Prussians’ appraisal of the situation. All signs
indicated that Napoleon had directed the Grande Armée to march with haste
through Bad Düben to Leipzig, where the emperor himself would arrive.
Some 15,000–20,000 men (VI Corps) were marching toward Halle
apparently to mask his concentration at Leipzig. One of Rudzevich’s
patrols netted a French lieutenant-colonel attached to the imperial suite
who confirmed that Napoleon remained at Bad Düben. According to
the prisoner, Napoleon had sent him from Bad Düben to Marmont around
6:00 a.m. with orders to position his corps three leagues from Leipzig and to
await further orders from Murat. Moreover, the statements of a captured
Prussian officer from Tauentzien’s corps led Napoleon to believe the Prus-
sian army had retreated across the Elbe and that only a small portion of it
remained south of the river. The Frenchman also revealed that III Corps had
taken Dessau and probably remained there; that the Guard still stood at Bad
Düben as of that morning; and that the king of Naples had reached the region
of Leipzig with the troops that faced Schwarzenberg’s army. He also claimed
that great shortages, especially of bread and fodder, reigned in the army; that
the way Napoleon had conducted the war was strikingly different from that
of earlier times; that his former energy had abandoned him; that he showed
a great need for comfort, especially sleep; and that he was as surly as ever.
Around 5:00 on the morning of the 14th, Blücher received the final
critical piece of the puzzle. A report from Rudzevich written one hour
earlier from Reideburg revealed the movements of massive imperial forces
from Bad Düben toward Leipzig since the 13th. “Already since yesterday
great numbers of fires can be seen from Leipzig to Taucha. It now appears
that the whole riddle of the enemy’s movement has been solved and that he
is concentrating his entire strength at Leipzig.” This information convinced
Blücher that Napoleon had absolutely no intention of transferring the
theater of war to the right bank of the Elbe. Instead, the emperor wanted
to mislead the Silesian and North German Armies so they would retreat
across the Elbe, thus allowing him to make a rapid movement against
Schwarzenberg.13
Blücher and his staff went to work. They completed the report to
Tsar Alexander that Goltz would deliver. Blücher not only relayed the
information provided by the French lieutenant-colonel captured near Bad
Düben, but sent the officer as well for further interrogating. “As for the
emperor Napoleon,” wrote Blücher, “he was still at Bad Düben as of
6:00 a.m. yesterday with the forces of the French army; it is probable that
he does not intend to cross the Elbe with considerable forces, but that he
wants to induce the Armies of North Germany and Silesia to recross
the Elbe so that he can engage the Grand Army without being threatened
in his right flank. As the captured officer claims, they are convinced at
the emperor’s headquarters that the Army of North Germany and that of
Silesia have recrossed the Elbe so that there is nothing between the Mulde,
the Saale, and the Elbe except partisans or small corps. I assume that the
French army will march toward Leipzig and Wurzen where it will effect
its concentration.” Blücher also forwarded the news from Bernadotte that
the bridge at Roßlau had been burned and the bridge at Aken dismantled.
“Thankfully, the prince royal cannot recross the Elbe, which is of great
importance based on today’s news. At this moment, General Rudzevich
informed me that his patrols have observed a great movement by the enemy
that took place throughout the night of 13–14 October. The direction of this
march has been from Bad Düben to Leipzig or toward Taucha. And the
Grand Army should expect an attack. I will immediately give all of this
information to the prince royal and I will get him to commit to driving
toward the Mulde, Bitterfeld, and Delitzsch.”14
Just as Blücher and Gneisenau finished this brief, the former received a
flattering missive from Schwarzenberg that expressed his joy over Blücher’s
proximity and explained his plans. A note from the tsar to Blücher written
on 13 October accompanied Schwarzenberg’s packet. According to
Alexander, “Prince Schwarzenberg is sending you the plan that he intends
to follow. I have approved it, but I must add news, that I cannot confirm, of
Napoleon’s march through Bad Düben on Wittenberg, apparently from
there to threaten your bridges and your communication, perhaps to clear a
passage along the right bank of the Elbe from Wittenberg to Magdeburg,
although this would be very risky. I hope the parties and detachments on
your left will notify you in time of any movement such as this and that you
take your countermeasures in concert with the prince royal of Sweden.
I only ask you to inform us as soon as possible of each new circumstance
that occurs on your side.”15 What an opportunity for Blücher: not only
could he expose Bernadotte’s poor leadership to Allied Headquarters, but he
could also provide the crucial news of the French concentration at Leipzig.
As for Schwarzenberg’s letter, the Allied commander in chief wrote:
“With true enjoyment I received news from my forward posts that they
are in communication with your army between Weißenfels and Naumburg.
Opening round 593
This is extraordinarily pleasing to me and I recognize it as an honor to

have such a revered commander nearby at such an important moment, which
is so crucial for the entire world. I hurry herewith to send you in the
enclosed the plan of operations, which has been approved by His Majesty
the Tsar of Russia, as well as the arrangements that I have made for the
Bohemian Army for tomorrow. Through this you will obtain complete
information on the situation of the Bohemian Army and I will personally
hurry to inform you of any changes that may arise. I request that you
likewise communicate everything that occurs on your side, the position of
your army, and what you can learn regarding the intentions of the enemy.”
Schwarzenberg’s cover letter for the 14 October disposition stated: “All
news that we have received of the enemy confirms that he has concentrated
his entire force between Leipzig, Grimma, Wurzen, and Eilenburg. Our
ultimate purpose must be to surround the enemy in this position and to
proceed against him with all of our combined forces. After obtaining his
subsistence on the Elbe went from being difficult to being impossible, he
abandoned this river and concentrated in a region that allows us to tighten
the noose daily. The advantages of our current position allow us to view as
possible the destruction of the enemy army. Any rashness deserves to be
punished and we must thus proceed with caution. For this purpose, the
following general disposition has been suggested and will be executed by the
Grand Army tomorrow.”
According to the disposition, reconnaissance conducted on the 13th
by Wittgenstein would confirm the enemy’s strength and position. For the
14th, Schwarzenberg ordered Bernadotte “to extend his right wing to
Merseburg. General Blücher has united with him on the Saale. The terrain
of this region grants to both an advantageous position between Merseburg
and Halle. Their outposts can proceed to Schkeuditz and jointly occupy
Lützen with our outposts.” Ten miles southwest of Lützen, the vanguard
of Gyulay’s Austrian III Corps would take a position at Weißenfels
while the main body occupied Naumburg. Schwarzenberg instructed the
left wing of the Bohemian Army, namely General Maximilien-Friedrich
von Merveldt’s Austrian II Corps, General Prince Frederick Joseph of
Hessen-Homburg’s Austrian Reserve, and Grand Duke Constantine’s
Russo-Prussian Guard, to move to Zeitz. The Bohemian Army’s right
wing, namely Wittgenstein’s Russian army corps, Kleist’s Prussian II
Corps, and Klenau’s Austrian IV Corps, would slide west. Wittgenstein
and Kleist would lead their corps to Pegau. Klenau would march to Borna
and forward light troops toward Colditz and Grimma. Schwarzenberg
ordered the Russian III Grenadier Corps and 3rd Cuirassier Division
to temporarily remain at Altenburg. South of Schwarzenberg’s main
body, General Hieronymous von Colloredo’s Austrian I Corps received
instructions to occupy Chemnitz and Penig (see Map 5).
Regarding the Army of Poland, Schwarzenberg wrote: “Bennigsen

will seek as much as possible to master the roads from Nossen and Meißen
and from there to win as much ground as possible but cautiously. In this
position, we can and must await the arrival of General Bennigsen if
the enemy allows us the time and then with the greatest certainty and the
fullest cooperation all armies will daily seek to win more ground.” This last
statement does much to explain the mindset behind the pitiful generalship
that had characterized Schwarzenberg’s operation since it commenced on
27 September. In terms of strategy, Schwarzenberg concluded that Wrede’s
Bavarian corps would “move in forced marches on Bamberg and do every-
thing possible to make itself master of Würzburg, hold the line of the
Main, and march against Marshal Kellermann, in case he does not encounter
him sooner, at Frankfurt-am-Main. The emperor Napoleon will have no
choice other than to cut a way through our armies; we, on the other hand,
have no disposition to follow other than to march together against the point
where he attacks and which must be defended for as long as possible.
This will be facilitated all the more by the true cooperation of the armies
with each other, which will gradually tighten the circle that we have built
around him.”16
From these letters, Blücher learned that Allied Headquarters sought
to surround the French army at Leipzig. While Schwarzenberg’s plan
stressed slow, cautious conduct and counted on the enemy running out
of supplies, at least the Allied commander in chief no longer spoke of
retreating. The key words “the destruction of the enemy army” won over
the Prussians. Reinvigorated by these letters, Blücher assured the tsar that he
would execute all of the prescribed instructions “with exactitude.”17 He also
forwarded the intelligence summaries as well as Schwarzenberg’s disposition
to Bernadotte: “My advance posts have just informed me that the French
army marched through the night from Bad Düben toward Leipzig and
Taucha.” He explained to Bernadotte that, based on Schwarzenberg’s dis-
position, he “must beg the crown prince to attack without delay any
enemy forces still found on the left bank of the Mulde and to advance from
Bitterfeld toward Leipzig.”18 To impress the sense of urgency on Berna-
dotte, Gneisenau dispatched Lieutenant Gerlach to Köthen with a letter
for Charles Stewart that described the situation. Gneisenau urgently sought
the British envoy’s assistance in convincing Bernadotte to unite with Blücher
and march to Leipzig the following day. As for the Army of Silesia, its main
body received a day of rest on 14 October.19
Meanwhile, the role that Blücher could play increased Napoleon’s
anxiety. He expressed his thoughts, as if thinking aloud, to Marmont at
10:00 on the morning of the 13th: “I think it is necessary that you enter
the line on the left bank of the Parthe only if the king [Murat] is attacked; yet
it would be a great mistake for you to move into the line on the left bank
Opening round 595
of the Parthe because of the fear that Blücher could debouch from Halle
or some other point. If you are placed in line on the left bank of the Parthe
and something comes against you from Blücher’s side, it will disrupt the
entire line and have the worst effect. It is important that the Army of Silesia
does not come within two leagues of Leipzig. With the good troops that
compose your three divisions, they can be spaced apart widely.” Based on
this concern, the emperor ultimately instructed Marmont to reconnoiter
Breitenfeld and the line of the Parthe as far as Taucha. He recommended
posting vanguards at Schkeuditz and on the road to Landsberg. “By these
means,” he wrote, “you will be able to deploy quickly, your left on the
Elster and your right on the Parthe, to receive anything that comes down
these roads. Acquaint yourself well with this position. You have three
bridges over the Parthe to debouch quickly to the left bank if need be, but
keep your cavalry facing Halle and Landsberg; patrol the roads to Delitzsch
and Bad Düben to keep all communication completely open.”20
Napoleon reiterated these points to Murat, adding a lesson in the art
of war: “The duc de Raguse [Marmont] . . . arrived at Hohenleina at 8:00
this morning. It is very important that you do not have this marshal enter the
line on the left bank of the Parthe because if you have him enter the line
here and Blücher debouches from Halle you will have to weaken your line at
an important moment. It is this type of movement that loses every battle;
battles are won by reinforcing the line at the critical moment.” He informed
the king that he wanted Marmont posted at Breitenfeld, “where I have
been told that a good position can be found,” with his right anchored on
the Parthe and his left on the Elster (see Map 25). “He will hold the roads
from Halle and Landsberg; all his cavalry will be placed in the forefront on
these 2 roads, 500 to 600 men each, with 2 battalions and 6 pieces of cannon,
so that these roads are observed well.” Napoleon advised Murat to monitor
the left bank of the Parthe as far as Taucha with cavalry and artillery posts.
“On the Parthe are several bridges: three shall be reserved for the case that
the enemy at Halle makes no movement but the Austrians attack and you
need VI Corps; it can debouch by these three bridges and cross the Parthe.
But be careful not to employ VI Corps until the last extremity because
it is likely that the Army of Silesia will advance from Halle. I think
Marmont must immediately build some redoubts in the position he chooses
at Breitenfeld. I think you should immediately build a tambour at Connewitz
and at Leipzig’s various bridges and especially at Lindenau.”21
To the north, Reynier reached Roßlau on the right bank of the Elbe
around 11:00 a.m. on the 13th but found the town evacuated and the bridge
dismantled. Although he had directed Sébastiani’s cavalry to Aken, the
French troopers did not arrive in time to prevent Hirschfeld from detaching
the bridge from the left bank. Reynier arrived, unlimbered three guns, and
fired on the Prussians along the left bank. He ended the shelling at 4:00 in the
afternoon after it proved futile. After receiving the emperor’s orders, he

commenced the march to Wittenberg. On the left bank, Ney’s troops
likewise found the bridge at Roßlau dismantled. To support Reynier, one
cavalry division and one infantry brigade continued toward Aken. The
detachment’s commander, Brayer, attempted to storm the part of the town
situated on the left bank of the Elbe after midnight and long after Reynier
had quit his position on the right bank. Ensconced in a ring of palisades,
Aken served as a bastion for Hirschfeld’s Landwehr. Realizing the pointless-
ness of this operation, Brayer broke off the engagement around 4:00 on the
morning of the 14th.22
Rather than join the Young Guard at Hohenleina on the night of 13/14
October, Napoleon decided to remain at Bad Düben and postpone the
battle until the 16th to provide more time to prepare.23 He issued orders
for Maret to impress on the Saxon government at Leipzig the need to
prepare rations of bread and brandy for 300,000 men. Specifically, the master
ordered “100,000 rations of bread, 500 quintals of rice, and 300,000 rations
of brandy per day. This large amount of rice will be distributed at 6 ounces
per man, so that 100,000 rations of bread, which is only one-third of the
necessary rations, will suffice. Make them understand the importance of the
measures they need to take to achieve this.” He also continued to obsess
over Marmont’s sector of the line. “The position of Eutritzsch on the road
to Halle,” he mused to Murat, “anchors its left on the Elster and its right
on the Parthe, can be occupied by 12,000 men, who would be protected from
being forced from their position; order the duc de Raguse to reconnoiter it;
the duc de Raguse must have arrived by now.”24
Yet the news that reached the emperor on the evening of 13 October
increased his confidence. Bertrand’s IV Corps had reached Bad Düben and he
expected Macdonald’s XI Corps to arrive at 1:00 on the afternoon of the 14th;
he hoped Reynier would arrive sometime in the evening. “We destroyed the
bridges of Wartenburg, Dessau and Aken,” he boasted to Maret. “In these
various affairs we took 3,000 prisoners, 20 guns, 200 to 300 wagons, spread
the alarm all the way to Berlin, and my whole army will be assembled at
Leipzig on the 16th to deliver a battle. The news is that the headquarters of the
prince of Sweden was at Bernburg on the 12th. Tauentzien’s corps and part of
Bülow’s corps were repulsed on the right bank with baggage, a large propor-
tion of the park, and are now separated from their army. Communicate these
results to Dresden and Leipzig, but increase the numbers.”25
At 3:00 on the morning of the 14th, Napoleon announced his intention
to depart for Leipzig in four hours. He issued orders to Maret for Frederick
Augustus to be escorted from Eilenburg to Taucha by Curial’s 2nd Division
of Old Guard and Lefebvre-Desnoettes’s 1st Guard Cavalry Division. At
Taucha, the Guard would take post while the Saxon king continued to
his second city with the small battalion of Saxon grenadiers he had brought
Opening round 597
with him from Dresden and a detachment of the Guard Cavalry. “I leave
at seven in the morning to go to Leipzig,” Napoleon informed Maret.
“Thus, I will be on the direct road from Bad Düben to Leipzig. The town
of Eilenburg will be guarded by General [Antoine-Simon] Durrieu, who
arrived yesterday with Grand Headquarters and the parks. Six hundred
Cossacks who had escaped the business at Dessau attempted to swim
across the Elbe but as the wind was too strong they all drowned.” With
his mind set, Napoleon made the final calculations to concentrate the army
at Leipzig.26
Indicative of the emotional highs and lows associated with the over-
whelming weight on his shoulders, Napoleon’s anxiety increased as the
morning lengthened and he received confirmed reports of Blücher’s location.
“I hope you will arrive here early today,” he wrote to Macdonald at 7:00
while still at Bad Düben. “You must cross the river immediately. There is
no doubt that we will be attacked tomorrow, the 15th, by the Army of
Bohemia and the Army of Silesia. So march in haste, and if you hear the
sound of the guns turn toward it. The Silesian Army debouches through
Halle and Zörbig.” Around the same time, Ney’s report from Pötnitz at 5:00
p.m. on the 13th reached Napoleon. According to the marshal, Bernadotte
had marched south from Bernburg on the 12th. “The news you have of the
prince royal should cause you to accelerate your march,” responded
the emperor; “if he left Bernburg on the 12th, he may reach Leipzig today,
the 14th, and be able to attack us tomorrow: so march with all dispatch on
Leipzig. It is likely that we will be attacked tomorrow at Leipzig. If you hear
the sound of the guns tomorrow, double your march.”27
Shortly after addressing instructions to Berthier around 7:00 a.m. on the
14th, the emperor departed. Traveling twenty-two miles south-southwest
from Bad Düben to Leipzig, he covered the distance by noon. En route,
Napoleon heard “a fairly brisk cannonade.” Instead of halting in the city, he
continued to the open fields south of the Leipzig–Wurzen road and estab-
lished his command post. From there he could see forty pieces of Murat’s
artillery engaging an equal number of guns belonging to the Bohemian
Army. Reports arrived around 4:00 stating that his troops had thus far
captured 300 Russians, Prussians, and Austrians. “The enemy greatly
extends his right,” Berthier informed Macdonald. “We saw many columns
arrive; it looks like the day before or the day of a battle.” After following
the course of the combat, Napoleon rode in the evening to the village of
Reudnitz, some one and one-half miles southeast of Leipzig on the right
bank of the Parthe at the intersection of the Leipzig–Taucha and Leipzig–
Wurzen roads. From his headquarters at the village inn, the emperor
informed Marmont that “the enemy was repulsed. We occupy Liebertwolk-
witz, the right leaning on the Elster; the enemy is extended on his left, that
is to say, on our right.”28
The engagement at Liebertwolkwitz, described by Napoleon as a “van-

guard affair,” proved to be both the greatest cavalry clash of the war and the
opening round of the epic battle of Leipzig. Murat’s 32,400 infantry, 9,800
cavalry, and 156 guns held a 5-mile line extending east from Markkleeberg
(VIII Corps and IV Cavalry Corps) through Wachau (II Corps) to Liebert-
wolkwitz (V Cavalry Corps and 1st Heavy Division of I Cavalry Corps).
Less than three miles due north of Wachau, V Corps stood in reserve. Early
on the 14th, Wittgenstein’s vanguard of 2,800 Russian and Prussian cavalry
under Pahlen III supported by 20 guns advanced north from Cröbern
toward the French positions. By pushing forward, the Allies hoped to see
what stood between Murat and Leipzig and determine if the king of Naples
intended to hold his position (see Map 6). After observing Murat’s masses
south of Markkleeberg and Wachau, Pahlen halted. Kleist moved up twenty
squadrons and fourteen guns from his Reserve Cavalry. As soon as the
Prussians started to arrive, Pahlen resumed the advance and Murat commit-
ted his cavalry to a back-and-forth struggle that ended slightly in favor of the
Allies. On Murat’s left, Klenau’s Austrian IV Corps attacked Liebertwolk-
witz around 2:00 that afternoon. The village fell to the Allies except the
churchyard, which the imperials defended like a fortress. Although Klenau
repulsed all French counterattacks during an afternoon of hard fighting, he
withdrew in the evening.
Easily identifiable by his outlandish costume and tiger-skin saddle
pad, Murat narrowly escaped capture on more than one occasion during
the many cavalry clashes. Allowing himself to become embroiled in a
needless battle, the renowned cavalry commander proved unfit for the
task at hand. Rather than use his infantry and artillery to stop the Allies
as they approached the heights extending between Markkleeberg and
Liebertwolkwitz, Murat charged forward with the emperor’s precious
cavalry. He kept his troopers so tightly packed that command and control
broke down as soon as one regiment became disordered. Fortunately
for the French, the Allies attacked piecemeal and did not have the numbers
available to gain a decisive victory. Yet they managed to obtain their
goals of looking behind Murat’s position; his resistance indicated that the
imperials meant to hold their ground. The Allies lost some 2,200 killed,
wounded, and missing; French losses are estimated to have been slightly
higher.29
While Murat’s troops fought the lead elements of the Bohemian Army,
Napoleon pushed the troops coming from the Mulde further south.
As for Marmont, the emperor suggested that “it would be appropriate for
you to move some dirt. Make some abatis and place some palisades where
they could be useful. I send you an account of the battle of Gustavus
Adolphus, which concerns the positions that you now occupy.”30 According
to Marmont’s version of the story, he received orders during the night of
Opening round 599
13/14 October to find a position north of Leipzig that could cover the city
from the direction of Halle and Landsberg:
I have traveled the country enough times to know that this position existed
one and one-half leagues from Leipzig, at Lindenthal and Breitenfeld, on the
same ground where Gustavus Adolphus fought, then 142 years earlier, and
won a signal victory.31 I occupied it; after reconnoitering the battlefield with
care and detail, I assured him [Napoleon] that it was too big for my corps, but
with some works that could be easily built and 30,000 men, I could hold in
check the Armies of North Germany and Silesia for twenty-four hours.
I reported this to Napoleon, who ordered me to perform the work without
delay and told me that, when the time came, I would have III Corps at my
disposal, bringing my strength to the number of men I desired. I went to
work and neglected nothing to fulfill my task. I built many abatis in the wood
west of Lindenthal and east of Radefeld. Then I occupied them strongly. This
wood was like a fortress.32
Meanwhile, XI Corps started crossing the Bad Düben bridge at 2:00 on

the afternoon of the 14th. At 4:30, Berthier wrote to Macdonald imploring
him to accelerate his march on the 15th. Napoleon hoped Reynier and
Da˛browski would soon follow but as of 6:00 on the evening of the 14th he
remained uncertain of their whereabouts. At 8:30, Berthier issued orders
summoning the ambulances and petite headquarters to join the emperor
at Reudnitz. He directed all other baggage to Mockau. Despite the prepar-
ations, many questions remained unanswered. “It is 8:00 in the morning,”
Napoleon wrote to Macdonald on 15 October. “None of our patrols have
encountered anything. Has the enemy taken a defensive position to receive
battle or has he retired, seeing that we are able to crush him? We will know
the answer to this question in a few hours.” The overall situation simply
did not make sense to Napoleon. Once again we find him obsessing over
his former marshal, who he believed commanded Blücher’s army as well.
“All the information agrees that, by way of a maneuver that I cannot
comprehend, the prince of Sweden has crossed the Saale and moves on
Merseburg in such a manner that the duc de Raguse [Marmont] has nothing
before him except cavalry. If this march is intended to take us in the flank,
I see further evidence of the madness that has seized the prince of Sweden at
this moment because in the meantime he leaves the Austrians and Wittgen-
stein’s army to their own devices. Send a copy of this letter to the prince de la
Moskova [Ney].” In any case, Napoleon directed Macdonald to Taucha.
Already thinking of making short work of Schwarzenberg by turning his
right, the emperor did not want Macdonald to cross the Parthe at Taucha
“because I may send you to Naunhof.” By way of the copy of this letter that
Macdonald would forward – an odd method of disseminating orders given
Napoleon’s penchant for constant communication – the emperor instructed
Ney to continue his march in the current direction. Orders likewise went
to Reynier to unite his corps on the left bank of the Mulde at Bad Düben
and await further orders.33
If, as Napoleon expected, a battle occurred on the 16th, he would have
190,000 men and 690 guns at his disposal; only the 14,000 men of VII Corps
would not be available. Of the Allies, Blücher and Schwarzenberg combined
could commit 205,000 men and 1,026 guns.34 Bernadotte, Bennigsen,
and Schwarzenberg’s I Corps – altogether 125,000 men – would remain
too distant to participate. In this sense, Napoleon had succeeded in concen-
trating his forces at Leipzig faster than Schwarzenberg, who appeared
more intent on establishing communication with Blücher and Bernadotte
than fighting the French. Moreover, Napoleon needed to win the battle on
16 October. With the difference in numbers on 16 October being 15,000 men
as opposed to 140,000, he would stand the best chance of success as long
as he deployed his legions in the most effective manner. To do so, he needed
accurate news of the enemy.35
After a long conversation with Murat, Napoleon mounted his horse
around 10:00 on the morning of the 15th and the two rode to the heights
between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz. He remained there for several hours
conversing with Murat and Berthier, making adjustments to the positions
of his corps. During the course of the 15th, the Grande Armée continued
to move into positions around Leipzig. North of the city on Napoleon’s
right, VI Corps occupied the Lindenthal sector facing Halle to the west
and having IV Corps behind it and to the east at Eutritzsch. Slightly east of
IV Corps, two divisions from III Corps reached Mockau with the third still
en route from Bad Düben. South and east of Leipzig, Napoleon’s left curved
southwest to northeast for seven miles with VIII Corps holding Markklee-
berg and Dölitz; IV Cavalry Corps was at Dösen; II Corps at Wachau;
V Corps at Liebertwolkwitz; IX Corps at Zuckelhausen; V Cavalry Corps
at Holzhausen; I Cavalry Corps at Ober- and Unternaundorf; and all of
the Guard remained around Reudnitz as the Grand Reserve. On the far left
wing, XI Corps reached Taucha that evening with II Cavalry Corps en route
from Bad Düben, where VII Corps arrived. To close the gap on his left wing
and hopefully deliver the coup de grâce for Schwarzenberg, Napoleon
summoned Macdonald to depart from Taucha at daybreak and march six
miles south-southwest to Holzhausen. From there, the marshal would
move three miles east to Seifertshain “where he will receive orders to turn
the enemy’s right” by way of Naunhof (see Map 6).36
Napoleon also received reports placing Bernadotte at Merseburg.
Numerous campfires observed seven miles west-southwest of Leipzig
around Markranstädt led him to incorrectly believe that Bernadotte’s main
force, which included Blücher, stood on the southwest-to-northeast-running
Weißenfels–Leipzig road rather than the northwest-to-southeast-running
Opening round 601
Halle–Leipzig highway. From Markranstädt, he assumed Bernadotte would

link with Schwarzenberg’s left through Zwenkau or Pegau. The emperor
could not have been more wrong. Rather than the Armies of North
Germany and Silesia, the fires observed at Markranstädt belonged to the
left wing of the Bohemian Army. Moreover, Blücher’s army had already
advanced from Halle to Schkeuditz, eight miles northwest of Leipzig.
Bernadotte still loitered far to the north in the Wettin–Zörbig region.
Responding to Marmont’s report that the marshal had failed to push
his patrols to Schkeuditz, Napoleon merely expressed his regret for the
oversight.37 Despite this negligence, the marshal insisted that he had pro-
vided Napoleon with plenty of intelligence concerning the approach of
Blücher’s army. One officer and two sappers, captured by Allied forces
two days earlier near Delitzsch and taken to Blücher’s headquarters at Halle,
managed to escape and reach French lines on the 15th.38 They informed
Marmont that both the Silesian and North German Armies would reach
his position at Lindenthal by the morning of the 16th. Moreover, the marshal
reported that Prussian cavalry and artillery supported by infantry had
forced him to pull back his outposts and abandon Hänichen. That night,
the marshal ascended the church steeple at Lindenthal. He claimed that
from the belfry “I could see with my own eyes all of the enemy’s campfires.
The horizon was ablaze. I hastened to report this to the emperor and to
remind him that my position demanded 30,000 men. I asked him not to lose
a moment in putting III Corps at my disposal per his promise.” In his
memoirs, Marmont noted that he climbed Lindenthal’s tower at 10:00 p.m.
but that he reported all this information – the statements of the escaped
sappers, the appearance of Prussian infantry before his posts that prompted
him to withdraw them, and the view from Lindenthal’s belfry – to Napoleon
at 9:00 p.m. The marshal maintains that he was looking “forward to the
results of my reports and the effects they would have, when, on the 16th at
8:00 a.m., I received a letter from Napoleon . . . criticizing all of my reports
and their conclusions. He claimed that I was totally mistaken. He said I had
nobody in front of me. Accordingly, he ordered me to withdraw immedi-
ately to Leipzig, cross through this city, and form the army’s reserve.”39
This episode again provides proof of Napoleon’s tendency to see the
situation only as he wished it to be. Not until 3:00 a.m. on the 16th did
the master write the response that Marmont received at 8:00 a.m. acknow-
ledging the emperor’s receipt of a report from him penned at 9:00 p.m. on
the 15th. In between, Marmont received a communiqué from Berthier
drafted at Reudnitz at 11:00 p.m. on the 15th. It expressed Napoleon’s
unpleasant surprise that Marmont had yet to establish communication with
Bertrand, who had been at Eutritzsch since the 14th. In addition, Berthier
relayed the news that Napoleon planned to engage the Austrians “on the
height of Liebertwolkwitz, where the emperor’s headquarters will be
tomorrow, the 16th, at 7:00 a.m. If you have only a few cavalry or infantry
before you, drive them off and prepare to join the emperor. General Ber-
trand will suffice to maintain the position on this side as long as the entire
Army of Silesia does not debouch there. In the opposite case, the prince de
la Moskova’s corps is at Mockau, and if the enemy debouches before you in
great strength, your corps, that of General Bertrand, and that of the prince
de la Moskova are intended to be used against him.”40
Marmont commented that this arrangement would have been “perfectly
wise and in accordance with logic had I not received the report of the
sappers who escaped from Halle, which informed me of the [enemy] army’s
resolute march; had not the report of 9:00 p.m. on the 15th made known that
Prussian infantry was facing the outposts, and that the sight of the campfires
proved that the whole enemy army was present; and had not the order been
given on the morning of the 16th for IV Corps to march on Lindenau, and
for III Corps to go to the Grande Armée.”41 In all likelihood, Berthier
had yet to read Marmont’s report from 9:00 p.m. when he issued his dispatch
at 11:00 p.m. on the 15th. Nevertheless, both he and Napoleon had read
its contents when the latter responded at 3:00 a.m. on the 16th:
I received your letter dated 9:00 p.m. on 15 October. I am not certain that a
battalion of infantry forced your battalion to retreat from Hänichen. On the
contrary, it appears that it only faced cavalry. It would have been appropriate
for you to support the battalion at Hänichen in order to take some prisoners.
Regulations do not permit an enemy reconnaissance that is not supported by
an army to approach and reconnoiter our army. The instructions that you
gave to this battalion to retreat if it encountered an enemy army corps were
misapplied because your troops withdrew without the enemy presenting a
corps de bataille. With this manner of making war, it is impossible to learn
anything. Over the last two days, you should have sent spies to Halle and
Merseburg, and do what is customary in war, ordering the mayor to give you
a peasant whose wife would be held hostage and sending with this peasant a
soldier disguised as a servant who would conduct this mission.
In his memoirs, Marmont responds to this last point: “The French

sappers who escaped and arrived on the 15th provided better information
than any peasant would have been able to give.” Napoleon continues:
“Although this succeeds all the time you do not employ any of the
precautions that are used in war. How, with 30,000 men, have you not
captured any prisoners for two days?” Again Marmont responds: “How
can you take prisoners when 4,000 to 5,000 cavalry surround you and you
have fewer than 1,000 to 1,200 horses?” Napoleon concludes: “The fact is
that your corps is one of the finest in the army, that it is in battle against
nothing, and that you maneuver as if you have an enemy army a league and
a half from you while it is clear that the day before yesterday and yesterday
Opening round 603
you did not see anyone.”42 Four hours later, at 7:00 a.m. on the 16th,
Napoleon again wrote directly to Marmont:
It appears to me that there is nothing to indicate that the enemy wants to

debouch through Halle, and that there is only one cavalry corps there. It
seems doubtful that some infantry battalions were observed yesterday, as one
report claims. This will be completely verified when the reconnaissance
returns this morning. As I am going to attack the Austrians, I think it is
appropriate that you cross the Parthe by way of the bridge in the suburbs and
that you come and place yourself in reserve, half a league from the city,
between Leipzig and Liebertwolkwitz, with your divisions in echelons. From
there you can move on Lindenau if the enemy makes a serious attack on this
side, which to me seems absurd. I will summon you to battle as soon as I see
the strength of the enemy and I am sure that he is committed. Finally, you can
move to support Bertrand, who has placed posts on your position, if an
enemy army appears on the road from Halle, which is unlikely to happen.43
A second dispatch from Berthier, penned at Reudnitz at 8:00 a.m. on the

16th, made clear that Ney commanded all forces north of the Parthe: VI, IV,
and III Corps as well as three cavalry divisions. “In consequence,” stressed
Berthier, “follow the orders of the prince de la Moskova. If this morning we
have no glimpse of an army debouching by Halle, as there is every indication
that we have not seen anything, you will cross the Leipzig bridge and place
yourself in battle order between Leipzig and Liebertwolkwitz, your three
divisions in echelons, and you will remain at Liebertwolkwitz half a league
on the main road from Leipzig in a house where you will establish your
headquarters. To execute this disposition, you will await the orders of the
prince de la Moskova.”44 Taken together, these four letters from Imperial
Headquarters probably baffled Marmont.
As for Bernadotte, he remained determined to fly across the Elbe on
14 October. Tauentzien’s report that Napoleon had crossed the Elbe at
Wittenberg with four corps placed him in a state of panic. During the night
of 13/14 October, he learned of Ney’s advance on Aken along the left bank
of the Elbe as well as Reynier’s operation on the opposite bank. He inter-
preted these movements to be the prelude of a great French offensive in
North Germany, which he believed would completely change the complex-
ion of the war. Yet a report that cited the presence of strong French forces
at the Mulde cast doubt on Napoleon’s intention to cross the Elbe with his
main body. Regardless, Blücher’s 13 October letter made it clear that the
Silesian Army would not follow the Army of North Germany across
the Elbe. Thus, Bernadotte would find his army isolated on the right bank
if he proceeded with his plan. Blücher’s decision angered him, prompting the
native Frenchman to express his irritation with much emotion. He remained
firm in his decision to return to the right bank of the Elbe to pursue
Napoleon, who he expected would take the road to Berlin. Yet he needed
Blücher’s cooperation to confront the master. What a predicament for the
Swedish prince royal!45
During the night of 13/14 October, the crown prince wrestled with this
issue. Early on the 14th, he sent Bülow’s 3rd Brigade to support Hirschfeld
at Aken but remained uncertain about his next move. Rather than follow
3rd Brigade with the rest of the army, he issued orders for it to maintain its
current position but remain ready to march. Whether Blücher’s refusal to
obey his orders prompted him to change his mind cannot be determined.
The reports that arrived during the night probably caused him to question
his view of the situation. Around 5:00 a.m. on the 14th, Adlerkreutz
repeated the order for Rauch to remain at Aken (rather than depart to rejoin
the Silesian Army) until a bridge across the Elbe was struck. However,
the penultimate sentence of the letter states: “as soon as the bridge is
finished, His Royal Highness plans to march to Halle.”46 A second letter
written to Rauch sometime between 5:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. on the 14th
claims that a change in circumstances no longer required him to remain at
Aken. The crown prince thanked Rauch for his services and wished him
a speedy journey “to his first destination, conforming to the orders that you
have received from General Blücher.” Also, a letter to Blücher, written
before noon on the 14th, concludes with the statement: “The
army marches early tomorrow morning and I will unite with you tomorrow
evening.” A letter from Stewart to Gneisenau at 11:00 a.m. likewise com-
municates the decision to march to Halle. Finally, Bernadotte’s headquarters
issued the orders for the army to march to Halle on the 15th before noon on
the 14th. Thus, based on the documentary record, Bernadotte reversed his
decision about retreating across the Elbe sometime around sunrise on 14
October.47
Bernadotte’s disposition for 15 October called for the entire Army of
North Germany to advance in two columns with the Prussians and Russians
forming one, the Swedes and Hirschfeld’s brigade the other. Bülow received
orders to depart from his current position near Köthen around 3:00 a.m. and
proceed twenty-three miles south to Halle. Wintzingerode’s Russian corps
would commence its march at 8:00 a.m. and follow the Prussians.
The Swedes would also march at 3:00, trooping thirty-three miles from
Köthen to Halle. Bernadotte’s headquarters would follow the Swedish corps
while Hirschfeld’s brigade brought up the rear of the column. The crown
prince instructed each corps commander to send one “intelligent” officer
and four troopers to the domineering Peters height by the village of Peters-
berg some nine miles due north of Halle “to observe the enemy’s movement
as far as the eye can see.” Should the enemy approach, a great fire would be
lit on the Peters to signal the main bodies of the respective corps to halt
and for their rearguards to rejoin them.48
Opening round 605
These measures somewhat complied with the expectations of Allied

Headquarters, where Schwarzenberg hoped the Army of North Germany
could be extended between Halle and Merseburg by the 14th.
Schwarzenberg’s disposition for the 14th required Bernadotte to “extend
his right wing to Merseburg. General Blücher has established communi-
cation with him on the Saale. The terrain of this region grants to both an
advantageous position between Merseburg and Halle. Their outposts can
proceed to Schkeuditz and jointly occupy Lützen with our outposts.”
Merseburg, however, stood an additional nine miles south of Halle. As
noted, to reach Halle, Bernadotte’s right column faced a march of twenty-
three miles while his left trudged thirty-three miles. Another twenty-two
miles separated Halle from Leipzig. Although the Allies anticipated a clash
somewhere between the two cities rather than at Leipzig itself, little chance
remained for the Army of North Germany to arrive in time to participate.
At most, Bülow’s corps could reach the vicinity of the probable battlefield
in the course of the afternoon and receive the Allies should they suffer a
setback. However, if the crown prince intended to prevent his troops from
participating in the anticipated battle, as Stewart claimed, but wanted to
avoid the appearance of subterfuge, then positioning his army at Halle
and behind Blücher would serve this purpose perfectly.49 Such speculation
becomes moot in view of Bernadotte’s next move, which astonished con-
temporaries, outraged allies, and continues to baffle historians.
In his 14 October letter to Blücher, Bernadotte explained that he had
“held back General Rauch with the pontoons because I urgently needed
them for the Elbe crossing. But after I learned through a report from a secret
agent that the emperor Napoleon stood between Wittenberg and Eilenburg
with six corps and his Guard, and that 50,000 men [had] already crossed
to the right bank, I dropped that plan, especially because I knew that the
duc de Raguse had taken the direction from Delitzsch to Leipzig, and
Marshal Augereau had left Lützen to likewise move to Leipzig.” As noted,
Bernadotte pledged that his “army marches early tomorrow morning and
I will unite with you tomorrow evening.” Although pleased by the news
that the North German Army would unite with them, Blücher and his staff
remained suspicious of the crown prince. In particular, his decision to
march to Halle drew their ire. Perhaps asking too much of Bernadotte, the
Prussians wanted him to hold the Mulde. They interpreted his march to
Halle as a means to position the Army of North Germany in the second line,
thus maintaining his freedom to participate or not in the imminent contest.
Blücher immediately responded: “I request that you attack the enemy
at Dessau and anywhere he can cross the Mulde, and that you send detach-
ments through Bitterfeld, etc. Only then will we be able to see if Your Royal
Highness can execute these movements. I also request that you forgo your
march to Halle. This will give the enemy the opportunity to advance toward
Bernburg. I am convinced that the Elbe crossing was nothing more than
a demonstration to deceive us into taking incorrect measures.”50
Bernadotte replied at 7:00 on the evening of the 14th: “I have received
your letter from this afternoon. You will see from mine that, from the
moment I was informed that the enemy was going from Wittenberg and
Bad Düben to Leipzig, I made the decision to move to the region of Halle.
The more we are united on the day of battle, the greater are the chances
of success. If the Grand Army is successful, no one will be happier than me.
But if it manages to only provide balance, we will thus decide the battle.”
The crown prince went on to assure Blücher that he had sent the majority
of his cavalry toward Eilenburg; Wintzingerode’s vanguard moved to
Brehna, patrols found Delitzsch free of the enemy, and one of his detach-
ments occupied Bitterfeld (see Map 6). Thus, the native Frenchman had
apparently abandoned his plan to withdraw north across the Elbe. Instead,
he decided to transfer his headquarters to Halle on the 15th and unite with
the Silesian Army for the decisive battle that Schwarzenberg expected on 16
October. Informing his corps commanders that a large battle would prob-
ably occur in the vicinity of Leipzig on the 16th, the prince royal exhorted
them to prepare their corps to support the Bohemian and Silesian Armies at
a moment’s notice.51
Following the great cavalry clash at Liebertwolkwitz on 14 October,
the Allied monarchs demanded that Schwarzenberg direct all his troops
against the French forces at Leipzig and to provide Bernadotte and Blücher
with specific points to attack. Schwarzenberg still remained uncertain of
both French strength and intentions. Reports stated that Napoleon himself
had entered Leipzig on the 14th with his Guard. Numerous reports con-
firmed his presence at Leipzig on the 15th; around noon, the Allies clearly
heard the shout of “Vive l’Empereur!” coming from thousands of voices on
the hills north of Wachau. Around 5:00 p.m. on the 15th, Schwarzenberg
received the report that the French had reinforced Liebertwolkwitz and
that the position of Napoleon’s left wing clearly indicated his intention to
attack the next day. Based on all of this news, the Allies ultimately concluded
that Napoleon would not withdraw from Leipzig.
In response, Schwarzenberg and his staff prepared detailed orders to
attack the imperial forces in the Leipzig area no later than 16 October.
The key feature of the disposition drafted during the night of 14/15 October
is Schwarzenberg’s complete uncertainty over Napoleon’s intentions.
The disposition itself is mainly attributed to General Karl Friedrich von
Langenau, a former Saxon staff officer. After serving as the chief of staff of
Reynier’s VII Corps during the invasion of Russia, Langenau joined the
Austrian General Staff. Claiming to possess detailed knowledge of the
region around Leipzig, Langenau demanded and received the task of formu-
lating the directives that would produce victory on the 16th. Schwarzenberg
Opening round 607
placed complete trust in Langenau’s judgment while his own chief of

staff, Radetzky, exerted little influence on the decisions made during the
night of 14/15 October. This proved to be a mistake. As Toll’s biographer,
Theodor von Bernhardi, has noted, Langenau’s disposition “is of such
a peculiar nature that it requires only a very superficial knowledge of the
region – indeed, even a glance at the map – to become convinced of the
uselessness of his proposals.”52
Schwarzenberg meticulously described the Allied offensive as consisting
of two parts: “Preparation,” to occur on the 15th and “Execution” on the
16th. “To the former” states his cover letter, “belongs a secure and reliable
communication between the respective armies, which will be achieved
tomorrow, the 15th, through the following disposition.” His instructions
for 15 October called for Blücher’s main body to march through Merseburg,
pushing its vanguard nine miles east to the hills of Günthersdorf on the
Merseburg–Leipzig road. A detachment would also move into Schkeuditz,
six miles northeast of Günthersdorf. Both objectives stood nine miles from
Leipzig. Unclear about Napoleon’s intentions, Schwarzenberg described
Blücher’s movement as “absolutely necessary.” Fearing that the emperor
could be marching to Leipzig with his main force, Schwarzenberg
wanted Blücher’s army to prevent Napoleon from enveloping the Army of
Bohemia’s left wing while Murat fixed its center. Referring to Gyulay, he
added that “a single column marching from Schkeuditz on Leipzig could
be easily crushed by him [Napoleon].” South of Blücher, Gyulay’s vanguard
would advance on Lützen. Schwarzenberg chose Markranstädt as the point
for Blücher’s troops to link with Gyulay’s Austrians.
Fifteen miles south of Günthersdorf, Schwarzenberg planned to unite
52,000 men of the Austrian II Corps, Austrian Reserve, and Russo-Prussian
Guard at Pegau to form the left wing of his army. Thirteen miles east
of Pegau, the Russian III Grenadier Corps and 3rd Cuirassier Division
would unite with Wittgenstein and Kleist at Espenhain. Seven miles further
east, Klenau’s Austrian IV Corps would remain in its position at Pomßen
to observe the roads coming from Grimma. Although Barclay’s name is
conspicuously absent from the disposition, he would command this army
group, which formed the right wing of the Bohemian Army. The two wings
of the army would be linked by General Moritz Joseph von und zu Liech-
tenstein’s 1st Light Division, which along with two Streifkorps (Thielmann’s
and Colonel Count Emanuel von Mensdorff-Pouilly) would advance to
Zwenkau. South of both wings, the Austrian I Corps received orders to
march from Chemnitz northwest to Penig.
For the “Execution” phase on the 16th, Schwarzenberg instructed all
units of the Bohemian Army to be marching toward Leipzig at precisely
7:00 a.m. He ordered the Silesian Army to be concentrated at Günthersdorf
by dawn and to likewise commence the march to Leipzig at 7:00. Blücher’s
detachment at Schkeuditz would seek to gain the bridge over the Parthe,
taking precautions to secure its line of retreat to Halle. Ceding command of
Gyulay’s corps and Liechtenstein’s light division to Blücher, Schwarzenberg
instructed them to unite at Markranstädt at dawn and likewise commence
their march to Leipzig at the appointed hour; Blücher would provide further
orders based on the situation.
The left wing of the Bohemian Army that reached Pegau on the 15th
would assemble six miles to the northeast at Zwenkau early enough on
the 16th to be able to start the march at 7:00. It would then drive through
Connewitz and between Leipzig and Murat’s position to attack Napoleon’s
right and rear. For the right wing, Schwarzenberg stipulated that Wittgen-
stein’s army group supported by Klenau should attack the enemy forces
facing them at 7:00 and drive on Leipzig. Finally, Schwarzenberg wanted
the Austrian I Corps to cover the nineteen miles from Penig to Borna
by 10:00 a.m. Thus, Schwarzenberg’s left, 28,000 Austrians and 24,000
Russo-Prussian Guards – some 52,000 men – would advance north through
the marshy and densely overgrown region between the Pleiße and the Elster.
His right, 72,000 Russians, Prussians, Austrians, and the elite grenadiers
and cuirassiers of the Russian Reserve, would advance north and attack
Napoleon’s left and center. On Blücher’s front, 19,000 Austrians along with
his own 54,500 men would push east and attack along the Elster to close
the Lindenau defile through which ran the main highway from Leipzig to
the west.
If the Allies took Leipzig, Schwarzenberg directed Blücher to position
the Silesian Army north of the city to observe the roads coming from
Bad Düben and Zörbig. The left wing of the Bohemian Army including
Gyulay’s III Corps would halt northeast of Leipzig on the roads running
to Eilenburg and Wurzen while the right wing placed itself on the road
to Grimma. Should the Allies suffer a reverse, Schwarzenberg instructed
Blücher to retreat to Merseburg; Gyulay and Liechtenstein to Weißenfels
and Naumburg respectively; the left wing of the Bohemian Army through
Pegau to Zeitz; the right wing to Altenburg; and the Austrian IV and I Corps
to Penig. Finally, “should the unbelievable yet still possible case arise that
the enemy is hastening to the Elbe and is covering Leipzig and its area with
one corps, then the Bohemian Army will emphatically execute the above
attack on the 16th, exploiting the advantages according to circumstances
while General Blücher simultaneously marches north and the Bohemian
Army quickly follows his movements.”
Many at Allied Headquarters bemoaned Schwarzenberg’s disposition.
Radetzky, Toll, Volkonsky, Barclay, Diebitsch, and Jomini immediately
recognized the blueprint’s shortcomings. They argued that Langenau based
the entire plan on the supposition that the Allies could force Napoleon
to retreat to the Elbe. Toll pointed to the difficult nature of the terrain,
Opening round 609
which made any movement between the Elster and the Pleiße impossible.
Jomini accused Schwarzenberg’s disposition of being so poor that Napoleon
himself must have drafted it to guarantee French success. Mainly, the 52,000
men (28,000 Austrians and 24,000 men of the Russo-Prussian Guard)
that formed Schwarzenberg’s left would be separated from the 72,000 men
on the right by the marshy valley of the Elster and the Pleiße. Although
Schwarzenberg held a long meeting with Langenau to discuss the com-
plaints, the Russian generals failed to convince the former sufficiently to
correct the latter’s mistakes. Schwarzenberg deserves some censure as well.
Although he personally reconnoitered the flats between the Elster and the
Pleiße, the Allied commander in chief failed to appreciate the difficulty of
the terrain. Bernhardi refers to the disposition “as a mere Lieblingsgedanke
[pet idea] from which they [Schwarzenberg and Langenau] could not easily
break free. If we consider the marches of the previous days, we see that
the use of the main force between the two rivers was decided earlier and
strategically introduced.”53
After Toll’s reasoning failed to move Schwarzenberg and Langenau, he
requested that, at the least, the Austrians delay issuing the disposition
until he could speak with Alexander. Toll immediately went to the tsar
and quickly convinced him of the problems with the disposition. Alexander
also summoned Diebitsch and Jomini for their thoughts on the issue. The
general agreement over the inadequacies of Schwarzenberg’s disposition
purportedly shocked Alexander, who immediately summoned the Allied
commander in chief. During a long meeting, the tsar employed all his
powers of persuasion in a vain effort to convince Schwarzenberg to change
the disposition. In the end, the Russian monarch lost patience. “Now, my
good field-marshal, you can do whatever you like with the Austrian army;
but concerning the Russian troops of Grand Duke Constantine and Barclay,
they will cross to the right bank of the Pleiße where they will remain
and nowhere else!” Consequently, Schwarzenberg had no choice but to
accept the reduction of his left wing from 52,000 men to 28,000 Austrians
and the increase of his right from 72,000 men to 96,000 through the addition
of the 24,000 men of the Russo-Prussian Guard.54
Early on the morning of 15 October, an Austrian officer arrived at
Blücher’s headquarters in Halle bearing a small note written in minute
handwriting. Explaining that his orders required him to swallow the dis-
patch should he be captured, he delivered Schwarzenberg’s disposition. The
cover letter opens with the statement: “General Blücher stands at Halle; it
is determined that he will join the movements of the Grand [Bohemian]
Army and participate in a combined attack on the enemy toward Leipzig.”
Yet the very next line stated that Blücher’s operation would be determined
by the actions of the Army of North Germany. If Bernadotte had already
retreated north across the Elbe, then the Silesian Army would advance along
the left bank of the Elster on the Merseburg–Leipzig road toward the latter
in unison with Gyulay’s Austrian III Corps. However, if the crown prince
remained south of the Elbe, Schwarzenberg wanted the Silesian Army to
advance as far as possible toward Leipzig along the right bank of the Elster
in the direction of Schkeuditz on the 15th, attacking the enemy wherever
Blücher found him on the 16th. In this case, the Army of North Germany
would seek to achieve two objectives on the 16th. First, the crown prince
would march toward the Mulde at dawn on the 16th “to attract the enemy’s
attention in this direction through demonstrations.” Second, Bernadotte
would “powerfully support General Blücher’s left wing.”55
All reports that reached Blücher’s headquarters early on 15 October
placed the Army of North Germany on the march to Halle. Consequently,
Blücher issued a disposition to have the Army of Silesia marching by 11:00
a.m. on the 15th based on Schwarzenberg’s directions to advance along
the right bank of the Elster toward Schkeuditz on the road to Leipzig.
Yorck received orders to proceed ten miles southeast through Bruckdorf
and Großkugel to Schkeuditz, pushing his vanguard toward Leipzig. North
of Yorck’s corps, Langeron would march along a parallel road through
Reideburg to Kursdorf on the hills north of Schkeuditz; Blücher wanted
the Russian vanguard to reach Lindenthal, five miles north-northwest of
Leipzig. Blücher instructed Sacken to escort Army Headquarters through
Halle to Großkugel, where his corps would remain in reserve. He directed
St.-Priest east from Merseburg to Günthersdorf with his vanguard continu-
ing four miles further east to Rückmarsdorf (see Map 6). Blücher informed
his corps commanders of the positions to be taken by Gyulay and Liechten-
stein. “On 16 October the enemy at Leipzig will be attacked on all sides and
St.-Priest will concentrate with Gyulay,” he explained. “General Rauch,
who will arrive today at Halle with the detachment from Wartenburg, will
remain on the left bank of the Saale with the pontoons and all superfluous
baggage and throw at least two bridges across the Saale.” If possible, the
troops should receive a supply of rations to last three days.56
At Silesian Army Headquarters, Blücher learned during the course of the
morning of 15 October that his patrols had found strong columns marching
from Bad Düben to Leipzig. At the head of an Ukrainian Cossack brigade,
General Witte reported that the Imperial Guard as well as a huge artillery
train had reached Leipzig on the 14th; prisoners attested to the preparations
for battle being made by the French army. Rudzevich’s compelling report
at 8:45 on the morning of the 15th stated: “According to the movements
the enemy has made from Bad Düben toward Leipzig since 6:00 on the
evening of the 13th, I believe the enemy concentrated all his forces yesterday
between Leipzig and Taucha and, if the enemy does not place himself in
a defensive position, we should, according to my opinion based on his
current position, expect him to attack Merseburg or even Halle.”57
Opening round 611
Meanwhile, around 10:00 on the morning of the 15th, large swarms

of imperial skirmishers from Marmont’s VI Corps pressed westward on
the Halle–Leipzig highway. Taking advantage of cover provided by villages
and undergrowth, the French drove back Yorck’s cavalry posts. Combined-
arms columns followed the French skirmishers. The Brandenburg Hussars
supported by the Brandenburg Uhlans took a flanking position, observing
the enemy cavalry and horse artillery that surged forward. Although
the imperials made a forceful showing, the Prussians concluded that their
adversaries simply sought to conduct reconnaissance. Content to leave the
imperials to their business, Katzler ordered a retreat to Großkugel. Before
this could be executed, he received Blücher’s disposition, which ordered
Yorck’s vanguard to drive on Leipzig. Instead of withdrawing, the Prussians
turned around to engage the French skirmishers. After marching ten miles
east from Bruckdorf, Hiller reached Schkeuditz with the vanguard’s infantry
around 4:00. Katzler directed him to continue on the Halle–Leipzig highway
toward the French-occupied village of Hänichen, some two miles southeast
of Schkeuditz. With the Elster to their right and the Prussian cavalry
advancing on the open plain to their left, Hiller’s men proceeded. After
clearing Schkeuditz, three Jäger companies and one battalion each of Line
and Landwehr left the road with instructions to hug the Elster and move
through Modelwitz in an attempt to flank Hänichen. Although Katzler’s
squadrons took the French cavalry in the right flank and caused it to seek
cover east of Hänichen, by the time the Prussian foot arrived the imperials
had withdrawn from the village. Halting behind a dam, the French surprised
the pursuing Prussian skirmishers with a volley. A bayonet charge drove
the French from this position but the onset of darkness forced the Prussians
to halt their pursuit at Lützschena on the Halle–Leipzig road some three
miles east of Hänichen, where Katzler’s main body camped for the night.
Behind the van, I Corps bivouacked in and around Schkeuditz. The outposts
at Lützschena stood very close to those of the enemy, with the right
extending to the Elster and the left toward Lindenthal. Through Lindenthal,
which the French occupied, ran the road closest to the Halle–Leipzig
highway: the Landsberg–Leipzig road. Possession of Lindenthal meant the
imperials could threaten the flank of the Silesian Army as it marched to
Leipzig. Only Bernadotte’s Army of North Germany could prevent this.58
As for the rest of the Silesian Army, around noon on the 15th it marched
from Halle in two columns to the region of Schkeuditz; only St.-Priest
advanced from Merseburg south of the Elster in the direction of Leipzig.
Emmanuel led the cavalry of Rudzevich’s vanguard toward the villages of
Freiroda and Radefeld: both stood four miles north of Hänichen and both
were held by Marmont’s troops. Two miles north of Schkeuditz, Rudzevich
himself reached Kursdorf with the infantry of Langeron’s vanguard while
the main body of the Russian corps arrived at Werlitzsch, two miles west
of Kursdorf and approximately thirty minutes from Schkeuditz. Sacken’s

corps encountered numerous delays marching through Halle due to clogged
roads and so did not reach its bivouac between Gröbers and Großkugel
until midnight. Instructed to spread the rumor that the entire Silesian
Army would advance on Lindenau, St.-Priest’s corps trooped eight miles
east from Merseburg to Günthersdorf, approximately five miles southwest
of Schkeuditz. Thus, the Silesian Army held an eleven-mile line extending
southwest to northeast from Günthersdorf to Radefeld. Schkeuditz,
which formed the center of Blücher’s position, stood less than nine miles
northwest of Leipzig (see Map 6).59
Although they were committed to complying with Schwarzenberg’s
disposition, the situation did not please the leadership of the Silesian Army.
In the first place, Blücher and Gneisenau rejected the idea that Schwarzen-
berg – being so far away and having so little knowledge of Napoleon’s
intentions – should presume to issue detailed orders for the Silesian Army.
Instead, they felt that the Allied commander in chief should have communi-
cated his plans for the Bohemian Army, provided a status report on the
imperials, and identified the general objectives according to which Blücher
could determine his own operation. Second, they found themselves at
the mercy of Bernadotte, whose conduct would dictate the movements of
the Silesian Army. Based on Bernadotte’s 7:00 p.m. letter on the 14th as well
as the incoming reports, Blücher assumed that the Army of North Germany
would march to Halle. Thus, Blücher and his staff issued orders for the
Silesian Army to proceed in accordance with Schwarzenberg’s instructions
for this case. However, the further advance from Schkeuditz toward Leipzig
on the 16th would require great caution. Even if Bernadotte complied
with Schwarzenberg’s disposition, the Silesian Army would still risk being
attacked in the left flank and rear by imperial columns marching from Bad
Düben to Leipzig. For this reason, the Prussians hardly thought it possible
to execute Schwarzenberg’s orders exactly according to his disposition.
Instead, the movements of the Silesian Army most certainly would need to
be modified based on those of the enemy as well as Bernadotte’s operations.
More importantly, neither Blücher nor Gneisenau felt they could depend
on Bernadotte’s cooperation in a battle near Leipzig. Consequently, they
did not think the Silesian Army could spare the manpower of St.-Priest’s
corps to unite with Gyulay and operate against Lindenau. Schwarzenberg’s
decision to confine Blücher’s army of 54,500 men within the angle formed
by the Elster and the Pleiße to prevent the few enemy forces that appeared
to be operating there from participating in the struggle on the right bank
of the latter hardly seemed sensible to the Prussians. A simple glance at the
map revealed how the Pleiße would separate Schwarzenberg’s left from the
Silesian Army, meaning that either could be attacked and easily crushed
by the entire weight of Napoleon’s army before the other could arrive in
Opening round 613
support. Lastly, Schwarzenberg directed Blücher’s entire army of 54,500

men along with Gyulay’s 19,000 men against the highly defensible Lindenau
defile. If they failed to storm it, which seemed likely, they would have
no impact on the battle.
To Blücher and his staff, Schwarzenberg’s disposition appeared to be a
half-measure indicative of indecision. Apparently, Allied Headquarters
could not totally abandon the original idea of advancing northwest to
place the Coalition’s main force on Napoleon’s line of communication.
Now, Schwarzenberg decided to operate on the right bank of the Pleiße
while small forces situated between the Pleiße and the Elster and between
the Elster and the Saale seemed sufficient to maintain the communication
between the Silesian and Bohemian Armies and attract considerable imperial
forces. These concerns prompted Blücher to dispatch Rühle to Allied Head-
quarters with a list of protests and counterproposals. Again, Rühle was
the right man for the job. He possessed intimate knowledge of Leipzig and
its environs thanks to the thorough reconnaissance of the region he
had conducted for the late Scharnhorst prior to the 2 May battle of Lützen.
He departed from Halle with instructions to explain to the tsar and
Schwarzenberg the reasons why the disposition needed to be changed.
Moreover, he had to persuade them that Bernadotte’s cooperation could
not be counted on with certainty.60
Alexander’s power play also persuaded Schwarzenberg to issue a revised
disposition. With regard to the Silesian Army, the first line of the new orders
states: “As a result of agreement, General Blücher’s army will depart from
Schkeuditz precisely at 7:00 and march to Leipzig.” Schwarzenberg not
only changed his plans for Gyulay, so that Austrian III Corps would not
operate under Blücher’s orders on the 16th, but he also spared the Silesian
Army from having to take the Lindenau defile. Instead, Blücher could
advance directly to Leipzig on the main highway from Halle; Gyulay’s III
Corps along with Liechtenstein’s 1st Light Division and St.-Priest’s infantry
would march from Markranstädt toward Leipzig, attacking the enemy
forces facing him and maintaining communication between the Bohemian
and Silesian Armies. After taking Lindenau, Schwarzenberg wanted Gyulay
to push south to facilitate the advance of Schwarzenberg’s left wing,
mainly his Austrian II Corps. Consequently, Rühle, who reached the tsar’s
headquarters at Rötha around midnight on 15/16 October, had little
work to do.61 Alexander received him and agreed with Blücher’s proposals.
Schwarzenberg also offered no opposition to Blücher’s suggestions and
noted that the second disposition had already eliminated some of his con-
cerns. Moreover, he made St.-Priest’s union with Gyulay optional.62
Based on the reports that arrived during the course of the 15th, Blücher
and his staff knew that the entire French army probably stood in the vicinity
of Leipzig. Nevertheless, the Prussians still did not know the details of
the enemy’s position, particularly regarding the size of the forces that
faced the front and left flank of the Silesian Army. Moreover, they still did
not know if further French forces remained en route to Leipzig from Bad
Düben. Should Blücher proceed to Leipzig on the 16th, any French
forces approaching from Bad Düben would pose a threat to his left. Thus,
around 9:00 on the night of 15 October, Blücher issued orders for patrols to
reconnoiter toward the Mulde throughout the night. For the morning, he
instructed the Reserve Cavalry and the adjoining horse artillery of all three
army corps to move out by 6:00. As soon as the Reserve caught up with
the vanguard’s cavalry, the latter would lead the former toward Leipzig.
With Blücher at their head, Yorck’s troopers would continue along the
Halle–Leipzig highway while Langeron’s would take the road running
from Radefeld through Lindenthal. Besides escorting Army Headquarters,
Sacken’s cavalry would follow Yorck’s through Schkeuditz toward Leipzig.
If the French did not hold a position west of the Parthe, Blücher wanted
Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry to move between Möckern and Gohlis while
Langeron’s pushed southeast of the Wiederitzsch villages (see Map 6). In
this case, “the cavalry of both vanguards will advance in order to find the
enemy and tell me if his position is behind the Parthe or on the road to Bad
Düben.” Blücher wanted all infantry to cook early enough so that they
could march by 10:00 a.m. on 16 October.63
The Prussians assumed that the news of Schwarzenberg’s intended
attack on the 16th as well as the advance of the Silesian Army had reached
Bernadotte some time before noon on the 15th. By sending a copy of
Blücher’s orders for the 16th to Charles Stewart, Gneisenau hoped the
British envoy could influence the crown prince to accept the Prussian
request to cooperate in the attack. Blücher likewise sent a copy of his
disposition to Bernadotte along with a humble, almost pitiful entreaty:
“I ask that you tell me your dispositions so I can continue my movements.
My left flank is exposed. Your Royal Highness had the grace to tell me that
you wanted to make a great cavalry movement toward Eilenburg. I dare
to ask if you have given the necessary orders for the execution of this
movement.” Unfortunately for the soldiers of Yorck’s I Corps, Blücher did
not receive a satisfactory response. Thus, on 16 October, the Prussian
commander would commence an operation against Leipzig believing
Napoleon’s main force stood northeast of the city on a plateau across
which ran the roads from Delitzsch, Bad Düben, Eilenburg, and Wurzen.
Although Blücher and his staff would overcome this error in judgment,
Yorck’s men would pay dearly for this mistake.64
Shortly after issuing these orders, Blücher received a letter from Volk-
onsky, the tsar’s chief of staff, written at 10:00 on the morning of the 15th.
Schwarzenberg requested that he inform Blücher that the Bohemian Army’s
reserves would be concentrated at Pegau and Borna by the end of the day;
Opening round 615
Bennigsen and Bubna would reach Colditz on the 16th and Colloredo
would pass the night at Borna. It also acknowledged Alexander’s receipt
of Blücher’s 14 October report from Halle and provided news regarding the
successful cavalry clash on the 14th. According to Volkonsky, Wittgenstein’s
left stood at Crostewitz and his right at Liebertwolkwitz. After the engage-
ment on the 14th, Murat retreated toward Leipzig, leaving posts at Wachau.
“You will see by the disposition of our armies,” wrote the Russian staff
chief, “that the concentration of our forces is the principal goal of our
movements, so that if the circumstances require we are in position to accept
a battle or to make a general attack on all points as soon as we learn what
is occurring on your side.”65
Believing that the imperials had completely evacuated the right bank
of the Elbe, Bernadotte issued orders early on the 15th for Tauentzien to
rebuild the bridge at Roßlau and reoccupy the fortifications at Dessau.
Apparently committed to marching to Halle, the crown prince made no
attempt to delay his army from commencing its march in two columns early
on the 15th. However, while en route, he received Schwarzenberg’s first
disposition for a general attack on Leipzig. From these instructions, the
crown prince clearly saw that his own actions would determine Blücher’s
movements.66 As noted, Schwarzenberg’s instructions for the 16th called
for Bernadotte to attract the enemy’s attention through demonstrations
on the Mulde and to strongly support Blücher’s left wing. Yet the crown
prince perceived an insurmountable contradiction in these assignments.
With Halle being some thirty miles from the Mulde, he did not think his
army could march to the former and still conduct demonstrations on the
latter. Moreover, he refrained from adjusting his march so that his right
wing could support Blücher’s left while his own left demonstrated toward
the Mulde. In addition, Boyen asserts that Bernadotte received confirmed
reports concerning the continued withdrawal of French forces from Leipzig
as a result of Schwarzenberg’s approach. This news rendered the further
advance of the North German Army superfluous.
Moreover, the head of intelligence at Bernadotte’s headquarters,
Lieutenant-Colonel Ludwig Ernst Heinrich von Kalckreuth, a Prussian,
signed his name to a detailed report at 7:00 p.m. on 15 October at Halle.
Written in French, the intelligence brief states that “30,000 enemy troops
that had marched toward the Elbe retraced their steps on the 13th and were
directed toward Eutritzsch in front [northeast] of Leipzig, where they were
still found on the 14th of this month. Marshal Augereau’s corps, some 8,000
men, reached Lützen on the afternoon of the 13th, passed through the city of
Leipzig, and arrived in the environs of Taucha. This corps did not possess
any cannon but had around 1,500 cavalry. The king of Naples and Prince
Poniatowski were at Leipzig on the evening of the 13th. The enemy corps
that had been detached toward Wittenberg and Dessau returned on the
14th through Bad Düben and reached Radefeld on the Dessau–Leipzig

road, where it remained until 3:00 p.m., at which time it again marched on
the road to Bad Düben. In the meantime it has been impossible for the secret
agents to ascertain whether this corps went to Bad Düben or Taucha. All day
throughout the 14th, one heard a strong cannonade from the direction
of Altenburg. The duc de Padua [Arrighi] is at Leipzig with a garrison of
10,000 men. The prince de la Moskova [Ney] has command of the corps
detached toward the Elbe. The emperor Napoleon himself commands the
army assembled near Leipzig, which is estimated to be around 180,000 men.
One report makes it certain that the emperor Napoleon will march on Halle.
The king of Saxony is near the emperor Napoleon. On the evening of the
14th a corps of 6,000 men pushed [west] toward Freiroda and Lützschena on
the Leipzig–Halle road. As of yesterday morning, the emperor Napoleon
was still at Leipzig.” This unclear and exaggerated report concerning
the movement of large imperial columns between Bad Düben, Dessau, and
Leipzig as well as strong speculation that Napoleon would advance on Halle
caused Bernadotte to fear being outflanked. Under these circumstances,
explains Boyen, the crown prince “amended” the march to Halle. Instead
of continuing his march to Halle, the crown prince ordered a general halt.67
From Sylbitz, seven miles north of Halle, Bernadotte issued new ins-
tructions to his corps commanders for execution on 16 October.68
Wintzingerode received the place of honor, being ordered to position his
corps in the front line at Oppin, five miles northeast of Halle and seventeen
miles northwest of Blücher’s left at Schkeuditz. The Russians would occupy
Zörbig and observe the entire 25-mile stretch between Dessau and Delitzsch.
Bernadotte instructed Bülow to remain a few miles north of Wintzingerode,
with his right leaning on the Peters hill and his left extending east
toward Radegast. The cavalry of his vanguard would proceed to Brehna,
some fourteen miles north of Schkeuditz, with patrols moving through
Schkeuditz and as close as possible to Leipzig. West of Bülow, the Swedes
would remain between Wettin and the Peters hill (see Map 6). Except for
100 troopers whom Stedingk would send around 3:00 a.m. on the 16th
through Schkeuditz toward Leipzig, the entire Swedish cavalry would take
a position behind the army.
General instructions called for each corps to send detachments toward
the Elbe around 3:00 on the morning of the 16th: the Russians to Dessau,
the Prussians to Aken, and the Swedes to Bernburg. “Each army corps has
to move into its camp so that one brigade will remain 1,000 paces behind
the main bivouac with its front facing the Elbe; the remaining part of the
infantry will camp in two waves. Because it is possible that there will be a
battle tomorrow in the vicinity of Leipzig, the army must be combat-ready
either to support the Bohemian Army or, if it is victorious, to inflict great
damage on the enemy. Wintzingerode must initiate the concentration
Opening round 617
and readiness of as many Cossack regiments as possible. The army will

be under arms tomorrow at 7:00 a.m. and remain ready to march, for which
reason the soldiers should cook in the night. General Hirschfeld and Colonel
[Woldemar Hermann von] Löwenstern must defend their posts with extreme
stubbornness, namely the former at Aken, the latter at Bernburg.”
Thus, to the great surprise of not only his own army, but also the
leadership of the Silesian Army, Bernadotte halted five miles from Halle
on the 15th. This decision placed his army in a position to be unable in any
way, not even indirectly as a reserve, to participate in the decisive struggle
that all expected to occur on the following day. His apparent unwillingness
to take part in the battle and the accompanying duplicity he displayed
toward his allies justifiably aroused the suspicion of both contemporaries
and posterity. In a letter to Alexander, the crown prince stated that he
had halted his march on the 15th because of troop fatigue. After they had
rested on the 14th and marched only ten to twelve miles on the 15th,
this excuse hardly seems justifiable. Instead, his orders to halt, to post one
brigade from each corps with its front facing the Elbe, to send patrols
north to Dessau, Aken, and Bernburg, and for Hirschfeld and Löwenstern
to defend the bridges at Aken and Bernburg à outrance (to the extreme) can
be traced to Bernadotte’s unforgivable, self-serving caution. Later on the
15th, he ordered Stedingk to send two Swedish battalions with two guns to
Bernburg; Bülow received orders to send one Prussian battalion there as
well. Fixated on the situation north and east of him, the crown prince
refused to place his army in position to support Blücher and Schwarzenberg.
Evidently, he assumed Napoleon would either win the battle at Leipzig or
order a general retreat in the direction of Bad Düben and Bitterfeld.69
Bernadotte’s halt troubled the military envoys attached to his headquar-
ters. Consequently, Thornton suggested that Stewart, Krusemarck, Karl von
Vincent, Pozzo di Borgo, and himself, all of whom had gone to Halle
in expectation of his arrival, draft a very pointed letter to the prince royal
that same day, 15 October. To avoid offending Bernadotte by lending the air
of military advice to the letter, they employed the hand of the career British
diplomat Thornton to produce the final draft. Thornton requested
that Wetterstedt, who observed these proceedings, inform the crown prince
that the letter should be viewed only in regard to diplomacy. The final draft
stated:
We went to Halle where Your Royal Majesty had determined to move your
headquarters. General Stewart has informed us that you have changed your
mind and that you have decided to halt at Sylbitz. We know the resolution of
the Grand Army [of Bohemia] is to make a general attack against the enemy
who is concentrated between Leipzig and Taucha; for this General Blücher
has moved his headquarters to Großkugel. Your Royal Majesty has been
informed by him of his movements and plans. We come together to beg you
to put yourself in a position from where you can take part in an event that
must decide the fate of Europe. Your eminent talents as well as the Allied
forces entrusted to your disposition can effectively influence success. We
wish to see your name forever associated with this great result.70
As Bernadotte did not change his mind and move the army to within
supporting distance of Blücher, it appears that this letter had no influence
on him. On 21 October, he frankly informed Thornton “that if he had not
been actuated by égards for the persons and for the sovereigns whom they
represented, he should have done right to send back the letter unopened, and
that, on a second occasion of the kind, he would do so.”71
Regardless of Bernadotte’s actions, the board was set and the pawns
would soon close the distance between their respective lines. “Minute to
minute,” Schack wrote in his journal, “the knot becomes tighter and more
dangerously tied. Napoleon, who should have concentrated his troops at
Leipzig, led them to Bad Düben; a captured lieutenant-colonel depicts him
to be odd: he sleeps long, cannot be woken, and refuses to listen to the
complaints of the troops about shortages. It must soon bend or break. We
lived in the greatest joy at Halle.” Officers and soldiers alike found the three
days of rest at Halle quite enjoyable. The old university town rejoiced over
being liberated from the Kingdom of Westphalia and Jerome Bonaparte’s
foreign rule. Army Headquarters as well as Yorck’s headquarters and
Hünerbein’s brigade quartered in the town. Yorck’s other brigades camped
in the nearby villages on the opposite bank of the Saale. Received by the
locals with gratitude and friendship, the Prussians enjoyed several hearty
meals. Many in Yorck’s corps – officers, volunteers, and Landwehr – had
studied at the University of Halle. Utilizing their free time, they renewed
acquaintances and visited old haunts. Many of their professors still lived in
Halle; Professor Steffens met with several old colleagues. In the evenings,
many of the men could be found in the Ratskeller carousing with the locals
and students. “The educated and uneducated,” noted Droysen, “staff officer
and Landwehr man, all next to each other, in the spirit of this Prussian army,
of this German war.”72 For many of these soldiers, the merriment they
briefly enjoyed at Halle would be their last.
Notes
1 Blücher to Charles John, Halle, 13 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 82–83.
3 Stewart himself makes no mention of one or more journeys to Blücher’s headquar-
ters at Halle in his Narrative. On the 13th, Gneisenau informed Boyen that
Bernadotte had sent Stewart to Halle on the 12th “with complaints about
the danger of his situation.” Stewart returned to Halle on the morning of the
13th with this letter. Gneisenau wrote: “In the morning, Stewart came again with a
Opening round 619
letter from the crown prince, who asked us to go back across the Elbe with
him!!!”: Gneisenau to Boyen, Halle, 13 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
5 Gneisenau to Müffling, Halle, 4:00 a.m., 13 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
8 Blücher to Charles John, Halle, 13 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 82–83.
9 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 74; Unger, Blücher, II:107; Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:373–74.
10 Krusemarck to Blücher, Rothenburg, 13 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:373; SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Rauch, 13 October 1813. For the
situation at Bernadotte’s headquarters, see Stewart, Narrative, 151–52.
11 Rauch to Charles John, Köthen, 14 October 1813, RA KrA, volym 25; Müf-
fling, Die Feldzüge, 74. Müffling believes that the attack on Aken’s bridge “did
Napoleon bad service, for, had it not been for this, the Army of North
Germany would have crossed the Elbe on the 13th, and either followed
the same route as Tauentzien, who was force-marching on side roads to reach
Berlin before the enemy, or in any case would not have been present at the
battle of Leipzig.”
12 Rauch to Blücher, 13 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:374–75;
Blücher to Rauch, 14 October 1813, ibid., 378–79; Unger, Blücher, II:108.
13 Katzler’s and Rudzevich’s reports are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:375, 379;
Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 73.
1845:379–80.
15 Alexander to Blücher, Altenburg, 13 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:381.
16 Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Altenburg, 13 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1535, 338,
and Add MSS, 20112, 16–18.
1845:379–80.
18 Blücher to Charles John, Halle, 14 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 89.
19 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:363.
20 As a point of interest, Napoleon instructed Marmont to discard the traditional
three-deep line: “Place your troops in two rows instead of three; the third rank is
useless in a firefight; it is even less useful with the bayonet. When we are in close
columns, three divisions will form six ranks and three rows of closed lines. You
will see the advantages of this; your fire will be better; your strength will be
increased by one-third; the enemy, accustomed to seeing us in three ranks, will
believe our battalions are one-third stronger. Give the most precise orders for the
enforcement of this provision.” He extended this order to the rest of the army
that same day: CN, Nos. 20791 and 20793, XXVI:349–50, 352.
21 CN, No. 20792, XXVI:350–51.
23 “I will not be able to attack the enemy until the 16th,” he wrote to Murat at 7:00
p.m. on the 13th: CN, No. 20797, XXVI:355. In Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:23,
Friederich claims that as of the 14th Napoleon still hoped to have the majority
of his army concentrated at Leipzig by that evening so that he could attack
Schwarzenberg on the 15th. Based on this letter to Murat, Napoleon had already
given up hopes of fighting on 15 October.
24 CN, Nos. 20796 and 20797, XXVI:353–55.
25 CN, No. 20796, XXVI:354; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 317.
26 CN, Nos. 20797–20800, XXVI:356–57; SHAT, C17 180: Berthier to Ney, Macdo-
nald, Reynier, Sébastiani, Latour-Maubourg, Drouot, Bertrand, and Durrieu,
14 October 1813.
27 CN, Nos. 20801 and 20802, XXVI:358.
28 CN, No. 20805, XXVI:360; SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Macdonald, 14 October
1813; Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:346.
29 See http://greatestbattles.iblogger.org/GB/Liebertwolkwitz/Liebertwolkwitz-
PartIII-ByHofschroer.htm. See also Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:82–88.
30 CN, No. 20805, XXVI:359–60.
31 King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden had defeated Johann Tserclaes, Count of
Tilly, at Breitenfeld on 17 September 1731 in the Protestants’ first major victory
of the Thirty Years War. The victory ensured that the German states would not be
forcibly reconverted to Roman Catholicism and induced many Protestant
German states to ally with Sweden against the German Catholic League, which
was led by Maximilian I, Elector of Bavaria, and Holy Roman Emperor
Ferdinand II of Austria.
32 Marmont, Mémoires, V:278–79.
33 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Macdonald, Da˛browski, Reynier, and Terrier,
14 October 1813; CN, No. 20807, XXVI:360–61.
34 Numbers are based on Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:22–23, 27–28.
35 Napoleon’s “mistake” of leaving St.-Cyr at Dresden with XIV and I Corps –
some 30,000 men – has been well documented as a politically motivated error
of judgment. However, St.-Cyr managed to tie down some 65,000 Russians and
Austrians monitoring Dresden so that these troops were not available for
battle on the 16th. True, Napoleon could have used the additional 30,000 men
on 16 October but a further 65,000 Allied soldiers would have followed St.-Cyr
as soon as his forces departed from the Saxon capital and probably would have
been available to Schwarzenberg on the 16th. Using the 30,000 men of XIV and
I Corps to tie down 20,000 Russians under Osterman-Tolstoy admittedly
does not offer an expedient example of economy of force but in the end their
presence at Dresden made the odds of victory on the 16th much more favorable
for Napoleon. In the realm of pure speculation, we can only wonder how
Schwarzenberg would have reacted had St.-Cyr escaped from Dresden and
marched due west across the Saxon plain to sever his communications with
Bohemia. See the discussions in Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General,
II:346–48; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 319–22.
36 CN, No. 20811, XXVI:362.
37 CN, No. 20812, XXVI:362.
Opening round 621

40 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Marmont, Reudnitz, 11:00 p.m., 15 October 1813.
41 Marmont, Mémoires, V:374.
42 Napoleon to Marmont, Reudnitz, 3:00 a.m., 16 October 1813, Marmont, Mém-
oires, V:376–77. Incidentally, this letter is not included in the nineteenth-century
publication of Napoleon’s Correspondence but can be found in Marmont’s
memoirs. Moreover, Napoleon’s headquarters at Reudnitz was six miles southeast
of Marmont’s command post at Lindenthal. It is curious that the imperial courier,
identified by Marmont as being the orderly officer Lavesaut, took five hours to
cross six miles.
43 CN, No. 20814, XXVI:364–65, emphasis added.
44 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Marmont, 16 October 1813.
45 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 72; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:364–65.
46 Adlerkreutz to Rauch, Köthen, 14 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstellung,”
1845:376.
47 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Rauch, Köthen, 14 October 1813; Charles John
to Blücher, Köthen, 14 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 85; Stewart to Gneisenau,
Köthen, 11:00 a.m., 14 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau,
Nr. 28. The existence of several accounts of the proceedings at Bernadotte’s
headquarters during 13 and 14 October render a precise retelling extremely
difficult. Friederich’s unbiased reporting again must be recognized: “When we
compare these various reports that have come to us with unprejudiced eyes we see
immediately that we have to deal with a colorful mixture of truth and falsehood
that has apparently driven the legend to its most luxuriant blooms. When we peel
out of this jumble of conflicting accounts the historically established and prob-
able corresponding core, we obtain the following picture: as all vacillating char-
acters tend to do in such a situation, he [Bernadotte] summoned a council of war,
during which he presented the pros and cons of crossing the Elbe, apparently
favoring it. Because all who were present declared in favor of uniting with the
Silesian Army, the crown prince thus approved this decision.” See Friederich,
Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:368.
48 SHAT, C17 133: Order of the Day, Köthen, 14 October 1813.
49 Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Altenburg, 13 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1535, 338,
and Add MSS, 20112, 17; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:362.
50 Charles John to Blücher, Köthen, 14 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 85; Blücher
to Charles John, Halle, 12:00 p.m., 14 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 23; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:364.
51 Charles John to Blücher, Köthen, 7:00 p.m., 14 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112,
84; Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, 264.
52 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:88; Bernhardi, Toll, III:420.
53 Bernhardi, Toll, III:422–23. Lieven, in Russia Against Napoleon, 439 and 441,
concludes: “Prince Schwarzenberg’s operational plan for the battle seemed guar-
anteed, however, to ensure that Napoleon need not worry about defeat.” Lieven
correctly argues that Schwarzenberg liked the plan because he never intended to
deliver a decisive battle at Leipzig. Instead, his plan for the month of October was
to block Napoleon’s retreat to the west. “Though not totally implausible as a

strategic concept, his efforts to translate this idea into tactical deployments
around Leipzig were a disaster. There was in any case a very basic problem with
the Austrian plan. Napoleon had not concentrated his forces in Leipzig in order
to retreat westwards. He was intending to smash the Army of Bohemia and win
the campaign.” Maude wrote: “Viewed by the light of subsequent events, Schwar-
zenberg’s conduct appears almost imbecil[ic].” See Maude, Leipzig Campaign,
253–54.
54 Jomini, Précis politique et militaire, II:155–56; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
III:10–14; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:108–11.
55 Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Altenburg, 14 October 1813, in Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1845:385–86. Although this disposition can be found in numerous second-
ary sources, it is not in either the Austrian archives or the British manuscript
collection.
56 Disposition, Halle, 15 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 161.
57 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:15–16; The reports by Witt and Rudzevich
are in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:387–88.
58 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:388–89; Droysen, Yorck, II:211–12; Aster, Leipzig,
I:333.
59 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 77; Aster, Leipzig, I:334; “Die Mitwirkung des k.k.
dritten, von dem Feldzeugmeister Grafen Ignaz Gyulay befehligten Armeekorps
während der Schlacht von Leipzig, bis zur Überschreitung der Saale; vom
13 bis 21 Oktober 1813,” Österriechische militärische Zeitschrift (1836), III:121.
Mistrust of Bernadotte made St.-Priest’s return to the Silesian Army all the more
urgent. On the evening of the 15th, Blücher instructed him to cross the Elster
at Günthersdorf and march to Schkeuditz to unite with Langeron’s corps. He
directed St.-Priest’s vanguard through Rückmarsdorf. To inform Gyulay of this
change, the Austrian military envoy assigned to Blücher’s headquarters, Captain
Baron Wenzel Philipp Leopold von Marschall von Biberstein, rode to Lützen.
He delivered Blücher’s letter informing Gyulay that St.-Priest would not be able
to support him at Lindenau on the 16th. Blücher also explained the considerable
terrain difficulties that Gyulay’s troops would encounter on the road from
Lützen to Leipzig – difficulties which the Prussian opined would only be
increased by having St.-Priest’s corps likewise operating in the area. For this
reason, Blücher instructed St.-Priest to advance on the right bank of the Elster
rather than its left.
60 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:387; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:9–10, 14–15.
61 The tsar quartered at Rötha, eleven miles south of Leipzig and nine miles east of
Schwarzenberg’s headquarters at Pegau.
62 Disposition for the Attack on 16 October, Pegau, 15 October 1813, Add MSS,
20112, 163–66.
63 Disposition for 16 October, Schkeuditz, 15 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 162;
Aster, Leipzig, I:336.
64 Blücher to Charles John, Schkeuditz, 15 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 86;
Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:455; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 77; Droysen,
Yorck, II:212.
Opening round 623
65 Volkonsky to Blücher, Altenburg, 10:00 a.m., 15 October 1813, in Höpfner,

66 As Schwarzenberg’s second disposition makes no mention of the Army of North
Germany, the Allied commander in chief may have elected not to forward a copy
to Bernadotte.
67 “News from the Secret Agents,” Halle, 7:00 p.m., 15 October 1813, RA KrA,
volym 25. It is not known if a copy of this brief was sent to Blücher; German and
Swedish sources make no mention of it, which is surprising because its contents
strengthen Swedish historian Georg Swederus’s defense of Bernadotte’s actions.
Because the brief is written in French, we can assume it was sent to Bernadotte.
See also Boyen, Erinnerungen, ed. Schmidt, II:678–79; SHAT, C17 133: Charles
John to Tauentzien, 15 October 1813.
68 On the 14th, Bernadotte had issued his orders of the day for the 15th from
Köthen. He issued these orders from Sylbitz, some fourteen miles south of
Köthen.
69 SHAT, C17 133: Order of the Day and Charles John to Stedingk and Bülow,
15 October 1813; Aster, Leipzig, I:334; Stewart, Narrative, 161–62; Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1845:391; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:372–73. “I must here
observe,” noted Stewart, “that the orders intentionally (for they could not be
ignorantly) issued on this day by the Prince Royal were for the different corps
to have brigades formed towards the Elbe, evidently to give the impression that
the enemy were to be looked for in that quarter.” In the Prussian General Staff’s
official account of the Silesian Army, Höpfner simply states that “determining the
reason for this unexpected halt must be left to the reader.” Bernadotte never
offered an explanation for this bizarre behavior. Once again, Friederich of the
German General Staff demonstrates his objectivity: “When we consider the total
political situation of the crown prince and his dependence on the Allied great
powers, we consider that it was absolutely necessary for his political existence
that Napoleon be defeated in the decisive battle expected at Leipzig, and that
the Army of North Germany not be spared in obtaining a decisive victory, we can
only reach the conclusion that it is impossible for bad faith to have caused him
to halt behind the Peterswege, that apparently there must have been rather serious
reasons that prompted him to make this decision. In the absence of any evidence
we are dependent only on conjecture.” For a weak defense of Bernadotte’s
actions, see Swederus, Schwedens Politik und Kriege, II:304–12.
70 Reproduced in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1845:392.
71 Thornton to Castlereagh, Leipzig, 22 October 1813, CVC, IX:67–68.
14
“A battle of the most obstinate

and sanguinary class”
The wide lowland through which the Elster and the Pleiße Rivers flowed in
a northern direction gradually curved westward from the walls of Leipzig
toward the valley of the Saale. Between both rivers sprawled a wooded
marsh that formed an eastward projecting salient in front of which stood
Leipzig. North of the city, the course of the Parthe ran northeast while the
Elster flowed northwest, giving the terrain sector between these two water
courses the appearance of a broad funnel into which the great highways from
Halle, Magdeburg, Dessau, Wittenberg, and Torgau merged. These arteries
ran through gentle inclines and over shallow hills, which at most rose no
more than twenty to thirty yards above the lowlands of the Elster and the
meadows of the Parthe. Steady rains in August and September had rendered
the clay soil very soft; low-lying farmlands and meadows hindered the
movement of close-ordered troop units. Due to the wet summer and
autumn, the marshes of the Elster, Parthe, and Pleiße could be crossed only
by way of the existing roads; the rivers themselves formed obstacles because
of their depth and could not be crossed without preparation.1
From every direction roads converged on Leipzig like the radii of a
circle. The Allies controlled the two running west to Naumburg and Merse-
burg on the Saale; Napoleon commanded all the opposite roads leading east
and northeast to Wurzen, Eilenburg, and Bad Düben on the Mulde as well as
the roads to Torgau and Wittenberg on the Elbe. In between lay three roads
that ran north and three that ran south; the ensuing battle would determine
which side controlled these six avenues. With the possession of Leipzig,
Napoleon held the hub of all the roads. Simultaneously, he flanked the
Bohemian Army by the road to Wurzen and the Silesian Army by the
highway to Bad Düben; his forces separated the two Allied armies like a
wedge between them. For the 16th, Allied Headquarters wanted to drive
through this wedge and take Leipzig.2
624
“A battle of the most obstinate and sanguinary class” 625
Napoleon did not intend to fight a defensive battle. Instead, he wanted to

destroy the Army of Bohemia south of Leipzig. With II, V, and VIII Corps
as well as IV Cavalry Corps, all under Murat, the emperor planned to hold
Schwarzenberg’s army along the six-mile line extending from Connewitz to
Liebertwolkwitz. While Murat fixed Schwarzenberg, IX and XI Corps
along with I, II, and V Cavalry Corps would pivot on Liebertwolkwitz
and envelop his right. Once the Allies weakened their center to support their
right, Napoleon planned to unleash his Regular Reserve – IV, VI, and III
Corps and III Cavalry Corps – and ultimately his Grand Reserve – the
whole of the Imperial Guard – against their center. He calculated on having
160,000 men at his disposal to face the 96,000 Allied soldiers in that sector –
great odds for the emperor. Napoleon positioned 120,000 south of Leipzig
by the morning of the 16th. Including Leipzig’s garrison, another 60,000
men remained north of the city.3
French positions on the morning of the 16th from left (west) to right
(east) indicate that Napoleon planned to let nature protect his right flank.
Defending the Pleiße from its eastern bank allowed the emperor to mass
superior forces against Schwarzenberg’s center. On his right, the Poles of
VIII Corps and IV Cavalry Corps as well as a 2,000-man French division of
march units under General Étienne-Nicolas Lefol held the Pleiße’s eastern
bank by occupying the northeast-to-southwest-running line of Connewitz,
Lößnig, Dölitz, Markkleeberg, and Dösen. From Markkleeberg, the French
line extended east with II Corps behind and on both sides of Wachau;
V Corps between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz supported by the Young
Guard and 2nd Old Guard Division; IX Corps at Zuckelhausen northeast of
Liebertwolkwitz; XI Corps and II Cavalry Corps en route from Taucha to
Holzhausen. Around Probstheida stood I and V Cavalry Corps as well as
the Grand Reserve: 1st Old Guard Division and the Guard Cavalry. As for
the situation north of Leipzig, Napoleon firmly believed the Silesian Army
still stood at Merseburg with elements (St.-Priest) approaching Markran-
städt. Marmont had guaranteed him that he could hold the Silesian and
North German Armies for one day. For this, Napoleon promised him a
stronger force than he could actually provide: Souham’s III Corps. More-
over, early on the 16th, both Ney and Marmont received the master’s
summons for VI Corps to march south through Leipzig to Liebertwolkwitz
where it would form the emperor’s Regular Reserve for the struggle with
Schwarzenberg. Napoleon assured Marmont that only cavalry faced VI
Corps, and that Blücher’s army stood on the opposite bank of the Elster.
Ultimately, confusion hampered French operations north of Leipzig,
leading to the complete collapse of Napoleon’s entire plan. Reaching
Eutritzsch around 9:00 a.m., Ney realized that III Corps had yet to arrive.
Adjusting to the situation, he ordered Bertrand’s IV Corps and Defrance’s
4th Heavy Cavalry Division to move four miles northwest from Eutritzsch
to relieve Marmont at Lindenthal and thus enable VI Corps to march to

Liebertwolkwitz and form the emperor’s Regular Reserve. Yet around the
same time, Marmont learned that approximately 1,500 Allied soldiers faced
his front. Although this seemed an insignificant number, the bivouacs behind
them indicated the presence of much larger forces. At 10:00, Ney decided to
comply with the emperor’s order by sending Bertrand’s IV Corps to Lie-
bertwolkwitz while Marmont determined the intent of the Allied forces
opposite his position. Before IV Corps could march, Ney received word
from a panicked Arrighi at Leipzig. Charged with defending the city, he
informed Ney of the advance of an Austrian corps toward Lindenau and the
sole road to the west that still remained open to the Grande Armée. Ney felt
he had no choice but to redirect Bertrand to Lindenau.4 Consequently, IV
Corps turned west and spent the day locked in combat with Gyulay’s
Austrian III Corps. Moreover, Bertrand’s detour meant that Ney still had
not complied with Napoleon’s orders to send his Regular Reserve to Lie-
bertwolkwitz. “Sire,” he reported at 10:30, “I just sent IV Corps to Lindenau
to support the duc de Padua [Arrighi], who has only four battalions there,
and who has informed me that he will be attacked by a large column coming
from Lützen. The VI Corps has one division at Schönefeld to protect the
parks and baggage there. Its other two divisions will be relieved by III
Corps; immediately after this occurs, it will be echeloned on Liebertwolk-
witz. If the enemy does not come in great force from the direction of Halle,
III Corps, except for one division that will remain at Eutritzsch, will follow
the movement of VI Corps.”5 Yet VI Corps never reached Liebertwolkwitz,
being pinned and defeated in a bloody struggle with Blücher’s army north of
Leipzig at Möckern.
As for III Corps, much uncertainty exists over its exact whereabouts on
16 October. According to the journal of the corps, the commander of 11th
Division, General Ricard, reached Mockau at 11:30 a.m. After hearing a
strong cannonade south of Leipzig, he received orders to move his 1st
Brigade to Lindenau to support Arrighi and his 2nd to a position south of
Leipzig. Brayer’s 8th Division “marched to support the divisions of Fournier
and Defrance at Eutritzsch that were covering the roads from Halle and
Delitzsch. At 1:00 p.m., 8th Division quit this position and marched through
Schönefeld to take a position to the left of one division of Old Guard
between the villages of Dölitz and Markkleeberg, where it arrived around
5:00 p.m. The 11th Division followed the movement of the 8th.” The journal
affirms that poor roads slowed the march of both divisions and neither
reached their destination with artillery. Despite this confusion, it is apparent
that the 12,000 men of Souham’s 8th and 11th Divisions did not relieve VI
Corps so it could march to Liebertwolkwitz per Ney’s 10:30 a.m. report to
the emperor.6 Napoleon later viewed the nonappearance of III Corps as the
greatest calamity of the day.7
Including Cossacks, Allied forces totaled approximately 205,000 men

supported by 1,026 guns for battle on 16 October. How much of the artillery
actually saw action remains unclear as 108 guns of the Austrian Reserve
Artillery en route from Zeitz never reached the battlefield. On Schwarzen-
berg’s extreme left, Gyulay’s III Corps, Liechtenstein’s 1st Light Division,
and the two Streifkorps under Thielmann and Mensdorff attacked Lindenau
and became embroiled with Bertrand’s IV Corps for the entire day. Schwar-
zenberg’s left wing – Merveldt’s Austrian II Corps supported by the
Austrian Reserve – received the task of advancing on Leipzig between the
Elster and the Pleiße. Swampy terrain prevented Merveldt from moving up
his artillery, and he failed to get across the Pleiße. By 11:00 his attacks had
failed, and he reverted to the defensive for several hours.
Although Barclay de Tolly commanded the right wing of the Bohemian
Army, he vested Wittgenstein with executive authority for the battle. Witt-
genstein decided to advance against the French positions along the
Markkleeberg–Wachau–Liebertwolkwitz line in five widely separated
columns that extended west to the Pleiße along the Cröbern–Güldengoßa–
Großpösna line. From left (west) to right (east), the five Allied assault
columns consisted of Kleist’s 12th Brigade, one battalion from his 9th
Brigade, and the Russian 14th Division from General Andrey Gorchakov’s
Russian I Infantry Corps. This column received the task of advancing from
Cröbern against Markkleeberg and supporting the attack on Wachau. From
Güldengoßa, Wittgenstein’s second column – Prince Eugen of
Württemberg’s Russian II Infantry Corps and 9th Brigade of Kleist’s II
Corps (11,000 men and 31 guns) – would assault Wachau from the southeast.
Gorchakov would lead the third column consisting of his 5th Division as
well as Kleist’s 10th Brigade, altogether some 9,000 men and 20 guns, north
from Störmthal to assault Liebertwolkwitz from the south. Fourth, some
5,400 Russian and Prussian cavalry (one division each of Russian hussars and
uhlans as well as Kleist’s Reserve Cavalry) and 24 guns under the command
of Pahlen III would proceed from Güldengoßa to the hills between Wachau
and Liebertwolkwitz to fill the gap between Wittgenstein’s third and fifth
columns. Fifth, the 33,000 men and 80 guns of Klenau’s Austrian IV Corps
and Kleist’s 11th Brigade would advance from the Großpösna–Fuchshain
sector to attack Liebertwolkwitz from the east. As a reserve, the 10,500 men
and 34 guns of the Russian Grenadier Corps and Cuirassier Brigade stood
south of Gruhna while the 24,000 men and 243 guns of the Russo-Prussian
Guard and Reserve Cavalry were en route to Rötha, less than 8 miles south
of Güldengoßa.8
North of Leipzig, Blücher commanded 54,500 men with 310 guns and
3,516 Cossacks. Yorck’s corps, which again would shoulder the burden of
the fighting, mustered 20,831 men.9 Langeron’s corps totaled some 15,000
men10 and Sacken a total of 14,000 men.11 Still uncertain about the position
x Taucha N
Lützschena xxxx 1
xx
Silesia 5 xx
6 Mockau
Möckern
xxx Eutritzsch
Elster VI xx
27
Schönefeld
e
Gohlis
rth
Pa
Sommerfeld
Paunsdorf
Reudnitz
Althen
Leipzig Sellerhausen
Mölkau
Lindenau
xxx Engelsdorf
Plagwitz Stünz
IV Unter
xxx
Zweinaundorf
III xx
1 Ober xxx
Schönau Stötteritz xxx Baalsdorf Hirschfeld
xxxx XI
II
Napoleon xxx
Gd Stein hill Kleinpösna
Probstheida Holzhausen
Kleinzschocher xx
Pleiße
xxx
Gd IX
er
628
xxx xxx
V I
Connewitz
Elst
Zuckelhausen
Seifertshain
Großzschocher Lößnig xxx
xxx xx IIGd Kolm hill
Dölitz
Gd
Meusdorf I Gd Liebertwolkwitz Fuchshain
Dösen
xxx Galgenberg Niederholz
xx II xxx
Ötzsch xxx
IV xxx x IV
xxx
II Wachau V
Großpösna
Markkleeberg xxx
VIII Auenhain
xxx
Austrian Crostewitz xxx Threna
Reserve x
xx xxx 9
x Eugen x xx
12 14 10 5
Güldengoßa
Cröbern Störmthal
xxx xxxx Oberholz

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 yards
Guard & Reserve Bohemia
24. Battle of Leipzig, southern front, 16 October 1813

of the Grande Armée, Blücher and his staff placed it on the highways leading
to Leipzig from Bad Düben and Delitzsch.12 Before departing from his
headquarters at Großkugel early on the 16th, Blücher received a dispatch
from Rudzevich’s command post at Kuhrsdorf. The Russian confirmed the
presence of imperial forces at Radefeld and Freiroda. Based on the campfires
he had observed during the night, Rudzevich outlined a French position
between those two villages and Lindenthal. Ten miles north-northeast, one
of his patrols found Delitzsch free of enemy forces but a second patrol
spotted an imperial camp at Krostitz, halfway to Leipzig on the road from
Bad Düben (see Map 6). As of the previous evening, French forces still held
Bad Düben but Rudzevich awaited the latest report. Closer at hand, Hiller
reconnoitered from Hänichen along the Halle–Leipzig road with a small
detachment of Yorck’s vanguard just after first light on the cold, foggy
autumn morning of 16 October. He found a weak enemy force holding
Stahmeln, imperial cavalry on the hills north of the village, and what
appeared to be a large bivouac further east near Möckern.
At 6:00 a.m., the Reserve Cavalry of Blücher’s three corps moved out to
unite with the vanguard cavalry detachments on what Steffens described as a
“bright and mild” day that followed a cold windy night that had seen gusts
uproot trees and damage roofs.13 On Blücher’s left, Langeron’s Reserve
Cavalry under Korf rode through Kursdorf toward Freiroda and united
with Emmanuel’s vanguard cavalry but could go no further due to the
French garrison at Radefeld. On the army’s right, Yorck’s cavalry rode three
miles east from its bivouac to Schkeuditz. Then, with Blücher leading, the
Prussian horse advanced southeast on the Halle–Leipzig road. According to
Colonel Hudson Lowe, whom Charles Stewart had ordered to accompany
Blücher’s staff during the battle of Leipzig, “The infantry he left at its
bivouac in front of Großkugel with orders to hold itself in readiness to
march at an instant’s notice. On coming within view of the village of
Freiroda, it was ascertained that the enemy held possession of it, and
different parties of the enemy’s infantry, cavalry, and artillery were observed
to occupy the ground lying between it and the villages of Radefeld and
Lindenthal.” From the rear of the army, Sacken’s cavalry advanced from its
bivouac between Gröbers and Großkugel, following Yorck’s troopers
through Schkeuditz.14
Blücher halted west of Stahmeln, itself two miles east of Schkeuditz.
Over the next two hours he received reports from his forward patrols,
indicating that enemy infantry held the villages immediately opposite the
Silesian Army: Stahmeln, Wahren, Radefeld, and Freiroda. The French
position appeared to extend south from Radefeld–Freiroda to Lindenthal
and from there to Stahmeln–Wahren. Further afield, large imperial
forces still occupied Bad Düben and camped at Krostitz on the Bad
Düben–Leipzig road but Delitzsch, thirteen miles north-northeast of
Schkeuditz, remained free of the enemy. The ridge of hills between Radefeld
and Lindenthal formed the dominant watershed in the region, extending
eastward through Hohenossig to a plateau on which ran the roads from
Delitzsch, Bad Düben, Eilenburg, and Wurzen. Blücher and his staff sur-
mised that Napoleon held this plateau and would accept battle on it or eight
miles north of Leipzig in the Podelwitz–Hohenossig region on the Bad
Düben–Leipzig road (see Map 6). Reports that imperial forces remained in
the Bad Düben area during the night of 15/16 October appeared to confirm
this assumption. Thus, the Prussians believed that French forces occupied
Radefeld and Lindenthal to guard the ascent to this plateau.15
Around 8:00 a.m., Blücher rode to the hills of Lützschena, where he
received the cavalry’s reports. Yorck’s troopers found a small imperial post
just east of Lützschena at Stahmeln. Further east, they could see that the
enemy also held Wahren, which apparently anchored the French left. From
Wahren, the French line extended one mile north to Lindenthal while the
French right wing curved three miles northwest from Lindenthal toward
Radefeld along the Leipzig–Landsberg road. Imperial cavalry, estimated by
the Prussians to number 1,200 troopers, stood west of the pine grove that
separated Lindenthal and Radefeld; infantry occupied the woods. French
cavalry could also be seen on the hills between Stahmeln and Wahren. Major
Hiller of Yorck’s vanguard observed a large infantry camp further east and
beyond Möckern on the Halle–Leipzig highway. Strong combined-arms
units occupied Lindenthal, Radefeld, and the woods between the two vil-
lages. An accurate estimate of French strength could not be obtained because
the pine grove north of Lindenthal prevented the Russians and Prussians
from gaining an overview.
This information did little to shake the Prussians free of the thought that
the French intended to accept battle either on the Breitenfeld plateau
between Lindenthal and Radefeld or further northeast in the Podelwitz–
Hohenossig region. In either position, they could be reinforced by the
troops coming from Bad Düben or, if defeated, they could withdraw
through Hohenossig to Bad Düben. This left Blücher two options: he could
either drive to Leipzig, ignoring the enemy forces facing his left flank, or he
could attack them. He could not expose his flank unless Bernadotte
complied with Schwarzenberg’s disposition and advanced on the road from
Delitzsch toward Leipzig. Already the artillery of the Bohemian Army
could be heard engaging the French south of Leipzig. Thinking the crown
prince would comply with Schwarzenberg’s disposition, Blücher felt himself
drawn to the sound of the guns. He started preparing for the advance to
Leipzig but had to abandon this plan after Stewart, “much chagrined at the
Prince Royal’s resolutions,” arrived at Lützschena. The British general
delivered the news that the Army of North Germany would not be in
position to support the Silesian Army that day.16 Stewart explained that all
he “had been able to accomplish by dint of persuasion was to get the

Russians to Zörbig; and General Blücher fairly and naturally sympathized
with my painful sensations on this result.” Yet, should the enemy attack
Blücher on the 17th, Bernadotte would be able to support him by sending
8,000 to 10,000 cavalry and light artillery through Delitzsch to Eilenburg.17
Langeron thus recalled the feeling shared by the leaders of the Silesian
Army: “The prince royal of Sweden, who had 70,000 men under arms,
marched quietly (as we have seen) between Halle, Dessau, and Bad Düben;
it was, he said, in the conviction that Napoleon was moving against Berlin or
Magdeburg; finally, persuaded of the futility of his promenades, and no
longer being able to reasonably explain why he would not join us, he
approached us . . . but he could arrive only on the evening of the 17th.”18
After Stewart divulged his news, a dispatch arrived from Langeron
communicating the latest news from Rudzevich: a Cossack regiment now
occupied Delitzsch; the report of a large imperial camp at Krostitz was
confirmed; French forces still held Bad Düben. In a postscript, Langeron
added that the imperials had just evacuated Radefeld but still held Freiroda.
Müffling asserts that Blücher, unable to count on Bernadotte to shield his
left flank, had no choice but to confront the enemy facing him “in the
supposition that they would retreat on the causeway from Radefeld to
Hohenossig.” According to Lowe: “Though General Blücher felt himself
deprived, by the change in the disposition of the Prince Royal’s army, of the
aid of that army, a change which withdrew from his immediate and direct
support a force of no less than 60,000 men, he nevertheless decided without
an instant’s hesitation on the part he himself was to take.” Blücher could take
comfort in the thought that, while he could not march to the decisive
struggle south of Leipzig, neither could his immediate adversary.19
As the wind scattered the mist and clouds, the Prussians recognized that
the French forces facing the Silesian Army intended to accept battle on the
Radefeld ridgeline; earthworks could be discerned on the summits and
behind them long rows of cannon. For his first objective, Blücher wanted
to gain the ridge so he could obtain an overview of the situation from which
he could base his subsequent actions. His staff cut orders for the infantry to
march immediately. Followed by St.-Priest, whose troops would cross the
Elster at Schkeuditz, Langeron would attack Freiroda and Radefeld. Yorck
would continue his march southeast from Schkeuditz on the Halle–Leipzig
road but turn his main body east at Lützschena and attack Lindenthal from
the west. With the infantry of the vanguard, Hiller would remain at
Lützschena monitoring the road from Leipzig. Sacken would follow the
Prussians as their reserve.20
Müffling explains that, through this preliminary movement, Blücher
hoped “to discover the position and intentions of the enemy.” Planning to
establish his command post on the hills between Lützschena and Radefeld,
Blücher rode north to join Langeron’s corps. As he passed the lines of

Yorck’s cavalry accompanied by the king’s brother, Prince William, the old
general exhorted the troopers in his coarse manner. “Children, today you
will attack in the old Prussian style,” he shouted to the East Prussian
National Cavalry Regiment; to others he said: “Whoever is not either dead
or enraptured this evening must have fought like a dishonorable dog.”
Blücher planned to observe the battle from the Lindenthal windmill hill
on the road that ran to Landsberg. Neither he nor Gneisenau could conceal
their satisfaction that finally they would engage Napoleon in a general
battle. Gneisenau beamed with joy, reported his adjutant, Stosch.21
As Blücher and his staff drafted the attack disposition, Stewart penned a
firm note to Bernadotte. He explained to the crown prince that, because the
French no longer held Delitzsch, Blücher considered it crucial for the Army
of North Germany to move east to a position just behind Delitzsch, some
thirteen miles north-northeast of Schkeuditz. Stewart noted that the marshes
and defiles east of Delitzsch would shield the army from any danger.
Attempting to play on Bernadotte’s vanity, the British envoy added that
from this position the crown prince would be able to take part in the battle,
“which would be much more decisive with your army and your military
talents. Because all the enemy’s forces are around the city of Leipzig, permit
me to point out that moments are precious.” Changing tactics, he became
more forceful: “The English nation is watching; it is my duty to speak
frankly. England will never believe that you are indifferent, as long as the
enemy is beaten, if you take part or not. I beg you, if you remain in second
line, to send Captain [Richard] Bogue with his rocket brigade, to operate
with General Blücher’s cavalry.” After Stewart sent his adjutant to deliver
this letter to Bernadotte, Blücher strongly urged him “to hasten to the prince
royal in person [so] that the object of this letter might be insured.” En route,
he met one of Bernadotte’s adjutants on the road bearing a letter from
Adlerkreutz informing him that the crown prince had decided that only
his vanguard – Wintzingerode’s Russian corps – would march to Landsberg,
fifteen miles north of Schkeuditz. Bülow’s Prussian corps remained one
march behind the Russians, and the Swedes one march behind the Prussians.
Stewart rode on, hoping he could persuade Bernadotte in a personal meeting.
A few hours later, Gneisenau sent Professor Steffens to Bernadotte’s head-
quarters with another request for support.22
As noted, Napoleon believed the Silesian Army still stood at Merseburg.
Should Blücher and perhaps Bernadotte as well approach Marmont, the
emperor had the marshal’s assurance that VI Corps could hold the Allies
for one day as long as Souham’s III Corps arrived; Napoleon agreed.
Regardless, early on the 16th, Marmont received orders to move VI Corps
to Liebertwolkwitz and form Napoleon’s Regular Reserve. Although the
emperor assured Marmont that only cavalry faced VI Corps, the marshal’s
patrols informed him of eight enemy battalions approaching on the road

from Halle and three on the road from Landsberg. Reporting from Lin-
denthal at 10:30 a.m., he informed Napoleon that these forces would reach
his position in less than three hours. Nevertheless, because he could hear the
sound of the guns south of Leipzig, Marmont guaranteed Napoleon that he
would commence his movement to Liebertwolkwitz. He sent his equipment
and ordered the infantry to follow, thus evacuating the Wahren–
Lindenthal–Breitenfeld position. “Due to the good organization of my
troops,” wrote the marshal, “their training and discipline, one half-hour
after the order was received they were formed in six parallel columns and
were marching to get to Leipzig. But hardly had the movement began when
the enemy debouched on us.”23
The bulk of Marmont’s vanguard, consisting of General Louis-Jacques
Coëhorn’s 1st Brigade of 22nd Division, occupied Radefeld. Around 12:30
p.m., the Württemberger general Karl Friedrich von Normann, who com-
manded Marmont’s 25th Light Cavalry Brigade, recognized the enemy’s
superior numbers and commenced the retreat along with the rest of the
vanguard. “A strong vanguard occupied the village of Radefeld,” recalled
Marmont. “It was commanded by a general of great value and great ability, a
man of an illustrious military name, General Coëhorn. It was forced to
withdraw, but it did so slowly and in good order.” As noted, Marmont did
not intend to remain north of Leipzig but had already made plans to march
through the city to form the Grande Armée’s reserve in compliance with
Napoleon’s orders. In his after-action report, the marshal attempted to
explain the situation he found himself in: “His Majesty having the intention
to attack the enemy and, as no considerable corps had yet to appear before
me, I received on the morning of the 16th the order to move close to Leipzig
so that while still covering everything I could take part, where appropriate,
in the battle that was to be fought on the other side of the city. I started the
march of my equipment and soon after my corps moved out.” To cover the
march of VI Corps to Leipzig, Coëhorn’s vanguard became Marmont’s
rearguard.24
In his report to the emperor, Marmont explained his thought process: “It
was too late, and I was too weak to hold the position of Lindenthal.
Therefore, I continued my march to Leipzig, supporting my movement with
a brisk cannonade. The enemy followed with activity, but in so doing
showed that his forces were not too superior to mine. I had two courses to
take: either to continue my march and pass through the defile of Leipzig,
under the fire and the efforts of the enemy, with all the disadvantages that
the terrain has, or face the enemy.” Years later, when crafting his memoirs to
defend his reputation, he took a swipe at the emperor: “Napoleon’s opinion
was no longer relevant. The enemy was there; we were face to face with him.
It was the entire Army of Silesia which was present and with which we had
to contend. We could not move to the battlefield south of Leipzig. Entering

Leipzig and forming behind the Parthe would have been perilous for us.
Passing through a defile like the one we had before us, a defile subjected to
the action on the heights that immediately dominated it, could produce great
confusion and cause a disaster.”25
Like Blücher, Marmont faced a decision: he could either continue the
march to Leipzig per the emperor’s instructions, which would be a difficult
maneuver in the presence of Blücher, or he could accept battle on the hills
between Eutritzsch and Möckern. To confront the Silesian Army, Marmont
looked for support from the neighboring corps but nothing remained within
reach north of Leipzig. He explained in his memoirs that “General Bertrand,
having received the order to clear the enemy in the rear of the army and open
the defile of Lindenau, had started his march to execute it immediately. But
III Corps could still be at Leipzig and à portée to support me.
I reconnoitered a position that was not as good as that of Lindenthal but
narrower and closer to the city [Leipzig], where the right is at Eutritzsch and
the left at Möckern. I sent an officer to Marshal Ney, who was at Leipzig and
to whom the emperor had given command, to see if III Corps was still there.
He gave me an affirmative answer and said that I could count on it to be at
my disposal. I did not hesitate to order a halt, take a position, and deliver a
battle. I stopped my columns on the plateau and formed my line of battle.”
In his report to Napoleon, Marmont emphasized that he had based his
decision on Ney’s response: “I was all the more determined after
I received several assurances from the prince de la Moskova [Ney] that the
disposition ordered by His Majesty for III Corps to support me would be
executed and that he would march to my support. I turned to face the
enemy; I held the position that has the creek of Eutritzsch to its right and
the Elster to its left, at the village of Möckern, and I prepared to fight,
supported by nearly 100 pieces of cannon.”26
Marmont held a strong position: all of VI Corps and Lorge’s 5th Light
Cavalry Division defended a line of 3,000 yards. Anchored by Möckern, his
left leaned on the Elster while his right extended to the marsh of the
Rietschke stream, which flowed southeast from Lindenthal passing by the
western edges of Kleinwiederitzsch, Großwiederitzsch, and Eutritzsch
before emptying into the Pleiße at Gohlis some 2,000 yards before
Leipzig’s northern gate. The Rietschke stream and the Elster marsh enclosed
a terrain sector that the road from Lindenthal cut through almost in the
middle and which gently rose as it extended south between Möckern and
Eutritzsch. Two miles north of Eutritzsch, the 3,700 men and 14 guns of
Da˛browski’s 27th Division, Fournier’s 6th Light Cavalry Division, and
General Jacques-Philippe Avice’s 1st Brigade from Defrance’s 4th Heavy
Cavalry Division reached Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch, both of which
stood on the right bank of the Rietschke. With only four weak battalions
and Bad Düben

Radefeld
to
N
xxx La
to D
nd
Sacken sb
elit
erg Birch Grove
Breitenfeld
zsc
To Hohenossig
h
xxx x
1 Seehausen
Langeron
Tannenwald
Kleinwiederitzsch xx
27
Lindenthal Großwiederitzsch
xxxx
xx
Silesia 6
Lützschena xxx
to H
alle Yorck xx m
ea
r
5
chke S t
Stahmeln xxx Mockau
Wahren VI
Rie ts
Elster Möckern Eutritzsch
Abtnaundorf
Luppe the
P ar Schönefeld
Gohlis
Rosenthal
Leutzsch
to Mersebur
g
Pfaffendorf
Reudnitz Sellerhausen
Leipzig Grottendorf
Lindenau
Plagwitz
Schönau Stötteritz
Elster
nfels
eiße
to W
Kleinzschocher
Pleiße
0 1000 2000 3000 yards
25. Battle of Leipzig, northern front, 16 October 1813
at his disposal, Da˛browski placed one each in Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch

with one in reserve east of each village. A total of fourteen French and Polish
squadrons stood between Großwiederitzsch and Seehausen. From these
positions, Da˛browski and Fournier could fall on Blücher’s left flank if he
attempted to attack the Möckern–Eutritzsch line.27
The villages of this northern portion of the Leipzig battlefield stood
mostly in the low areas so that their roofs and orchards hardly hindered
vision. Except for the Tannenwald north of Lindenthal, insignificant thickets
crowned the hills. Tree lines accompanied the roads only in the vicinity of
Leipzig yet thick bushes and woods bordered the water courses. With winter
fast approaching, the bare, harvested fields granted a wide overview. From
the hills at Lindenthal, the Allies could clearly see between Leipzig’s spires
and further southeast they could discern the shallow hills on the other side
of the Pleiße and even further to the somewhat higher hills of Probstheida,
Wachau, and Liebertwolkwitz. Looking northwest from the hills between
Möckern and Lindenthal, Marmont could clearly view the approach of the
Silesian Army. Despite the previous reports he had made predicting an
attack from this direction, the marshal seemed surprised. “The enemy army
rapidly marched against me,” he wrote in his after-action report; “its forces
appeared to rise up out of the earth; on closer examination it continued to
increase: it was the entire Silesian Army.”28
After Marmont positioned his three divisions between Möckern and
Eutritzsch, only the cavalry remained in reserve: Normann’s brigade stood
in second line behind (southeast of) the left wing while Lorge’s division
stood further rearward. Had Marmont commanded the 30,000 men that
Napoleon had promised, his position would have been impregnable. An
experienced artillery officer, he counted on his guns to hold the enemy until
III Corps arrived. Marmont positioned his artillery with particular care,
acknowledging the importance of Möckern. “The enemy’s attack could only
come from our left,” he recounted. “Our right was rearward, supported and
covered by a small Polish division commanded by General Da˛browski, and
placed on the other side of the marsh and creek that flows to Eutritzsch, was
in a good position to take the enemy’s left in the rear. So I had to conclude
that it would be on my left and on Möckern that the enemy would move. All
my artillery was placed on the highest point of the line occupied by my
corps. My eighty-four guns were disposed to stop the enemy. Twelve pieces
of twelve, among others, were pushed forward on the flank to the right of
the village of Möckern.” With orders to hold it for as long as possible, the
2nd Marine Regiment that formed the extent of the 2nd Brigade of
Lagrange’s 21st Division occupied Möckern. A small detachment moved
across the Elster to take positions in the thick undergrowth along the
southern bank. As Marmont explained, a large battery of twelve-pound guns
took position on the hill right next to Möckern north of the Halle–Leipzig
road. Including Lorge’s 5th Light Cavalry Division, Marmont commanded
around 17,000 men. Unlike most of the corps of the Grande Armée by this
point in the campaign, VI Corps had a spotless record, having never suffered
a defeat.29
After a cold rainy night, thick mist hung over the southern portion of the
battlefield, forcing Wittgenstein to delay his attack until the wind could clear
away the fog and smoke. At 8:00, the Allied columns commenced their
advance. One hour later, just as Wittgenstein’s troops made contact with
the French, Alexander reached his command post on a hill southwest of
Güldengoßa. Although no Napoleon, the Russian monarch had seen enough
war to have a decent eye for the proper positioning of forces. He
immediately recognized that Wittgenstein’s widely spread columns had

little chance to support each other and thus risked being defeated piece-
meal. To provide some support, the tsar summoned the Russian Grenadier
Corps and Cuirassier Brigade to the sheep farm of Auenhain, a little more
than one mile west-northwest of Güldengoßa. Moreover, he ordered the
Russo-Prussian Guard and Reserve Cavalry to continue through Rötha to
Cröbern and Güldengoßa. Lastly, he requested that Schwarzenberg send
the Austrian Guard and Reserve across the Pleiße to support Wittgenstein.
The Allied commander in chief reluctantly complied around noon but it
would take hours before either the Russo-Prussian or Austrian Guards
arrived.
Napoleon himself reached Liebertwolkwitz around 9:00 and established
his command post on the Galgenberg (gallows hill) immediately west of that
village.30 He met with Murat, who had passed the night at the Wachau
Schloß. Around the same time, Wittgenstein launched his assault before all
of Napoleon’s units had reached their appointed positions. Powerful and
unexpected, the Allied advance forced the emperor to retire almost two
miles north from the Galgenberg to the sheep farm of Meusdorf. His line
began to buckle with the mainly Polish defenders of Markkleeberg losing
that village to Kleist’s column and II Corps being pushed out of Wachau by
Prince Eugen of Württemberg’s Russians by 9:30.
Although Wittgenstein’s first and second columns achieved initial suc-
cess, the others floundered. Lauriston’s V Corps managed to hold the
smoldering remains of Liebertwolkwitz thanks to Gorchakov’s impatience
and Klenau’s poor timing. Without waiting for Klenau’s column to attack
from the east, Gorchakov commenced his assault. Devastating French artil-
lery smashed the approaching Russian columns and sent them scurrying for
cover in the Niederholz Forest between Liebertwolkwitz and Großpösna.
This widened the gap between Gorchakov and Eugen, which the latter
plugged with the Prussian 9th Brigade from his second line. The cavalry of
Pahlen’s fourth column likewise could not withstand the French artillery.
Klenau’s column commenced its advance from Großpösna at 10:00: two
hours later than Wittgenstein’s other columns. After securing the Kolm hill
east-southeast of Liebertwolkwitz with two battalions and twelve guns,
Klenau finally sent five battalions, four squadrons, and fourteen guns against
Liebertwolkwitz. However, he observed large French columns approaching
Holzhausen: Macdonald’s flank corps. Klenau requested support from Pah-
len, who dispatched fourteen of his forty-six squadrons. By this point,
Klenau’s column became divided in two with his left assaulting Liebert-
wolkwitz while his right – the troops on the Kolm hill supported by one
Austrian brigade and Pahlen’s cavalry – monitored the enemy forces at
Holzhausen. Another Austrian brigade and the Prussian 11th Brigade
remained in reserve between Großpösna and Fuchshain.
Despite the uneven success of Wittgenstein’s first attack, the damage to

Napoleon’s plan and timetable proved irreversible. To prevent the Allies
from overrunning his line, he directed General Louis-Michel Letort’s bri-
gade of Guard Cavalry as well as IX Corps from his left wing to support the
Poles on his right after Kleist took Markkleeberg. He moved up Oudinot’s
I Young Guard Corps to prevent Eugen’s Russians from breaking out of
Wachau. The 1st Old Guard Division marched a little over a mile southeast
from Probstheida to the sheep farm of Meusdorf where it could support
either the Poles against Kleist or the I Young Guard Corps against Eugen. To
meet Klenau’s late attack on Liebertwolkwitz, Mortier’s II Young Guard
Corps and the 2nd Old Guard Division bolstered V Corps. Napoleon
returned to the Galgenberg but he had few units remaining at his disposal
as VI and III Corps still had not arrived from north of Leipzig to form his
Regular Reserve.
Meanwhile, Macdonald reached Holzhausen with XI Corps and II Cav-
alry Corps around 11:00. After storming the Kolm hill and almost capturing
Klenau, he continued to Seifertshain and Kleinpösna to envelop Wittgen-
stein’s right. Observing Macdonald’s progress, Napoleon ordered a general
advance around 1:00. With the Grand Reserve already engaged and no sign
of VI Corps, Napoleon assembled I Cavalry Corps and the Guard Cavalry
at Meusdorf to exploit any breakthrough. Mortier led II Young Guard
Corps south between the Kolm hill and Liebertwolkwitz toward the Nie-
derholz Forest. Lauriston’s V Corps drove the Austrians out of Liebert-
wolkwitz and all the way to Großpösna. Klenau’s collapse caught the
attention of Gorchakov and Pahlen, who retired to the Güldengoßa–
Oberholz Forest line; the wood stood between Güldengoßa and Großpösna.
At Wachau, Victor’s II Corps supported by Oudinot’s I Young Guard Corps
drove Eugen’s badly battered force one mile south to the sheep farm of
Auenhain. On the French right, Augereau with IX and VIII Corps pushed
southeast to retake Markkleeberg. After leaving a detachment to hold that
village, Kleist slowly retreated toward Cröbern, launching a counterattack
after observing the approach of the Russian III Grenadier Corps. Regardless,
the French and Poles proved too strong and he continued his retreat to
Cröbern. The lead elements of General Johann Nepomuk von Nostitz’s
Cuirassier Corps, part of the Austrian Guard and Reserve, crossed the
Pleiße just as Letort’s Guard Cavalry brigade and ten squadrons from
I Cavalry Corps’s 1st Light Division prepared to pursue Kleist. Although
the Austrian horse drove back the French troopers, thick musket fire from
enemy squares as well as the arrival of more French cavalry forced Nostitz
to sound the recall to Cröbern. By 2:00, all five of Wittgenstein’s columns
stood where they had started the battle.
Returning to Blücher, Langeron’s troops, advancing southeast on the
road from Landsberg, found Freiroda and Radefeld abandoned. Langeron
recalled that, “with the cavalry of my vanguard, Emmanuel turned the

villages of Freiroda and Radefeld, from which the enemy retired precipit-
ously; there was a small advance guard of 2,000 to 3,000 men and a few
cannon that exchanged some shots with my horse artillery. Rudzevich
followed Emmanuel with the infantry of the vanguard, and the corps of
Kaptsevich and Olsufiyev followed the vanguard.” Attempting to emerge
from Radefeld, the Russian infantry received artillery fire from a French
battery posted north of the Tannenwald. Müffling noted that “the position
of this battery was in the direction that Blücher expected the enemy to
retreat.” Around 12:30 Russian guns unlimbered; effective counterbattery
fire soon drove off the French, “but the enemy unexpectedly turned on
Lindenthal.”31
To the surprise of Blücher and his staff, Marmont’s vanguard withdrew
south toward Lindenthal rather than northeast along the road to Hohenos-
sig. Blücher directed Langeron’s infantry to follow the French while his
vanguard’s cavalry under Emmanuel reconnoitered toward Hohenossig to
ascertain if the enemy’s main force stood on that plateau or could be seen
approaching from Bad Düben. For reasons unknown, Emmanuel’s cavalry
did not comply with this directive but instead followed the vanguard’s
infantry. Blücher ordered Langeron to advance almost due south against
both the Tannenwald and Lindenthal.32 After clearing the wood, the Rus-
sians would look for enemy forces marching toward Leipzig on the roads
from Bad Düben and Delitzsch. Should they encounter imperial columns,
Blücher wanted the Russians to prevent them from reaching Leipzig “and if
possible crush them by a sudden onslaught.” Sacken’s infantry would remain
in reserve at Radefeld until Emmanuel confirmed that Blücher had nothing
to fear from the direction of Hohenossig; once again, Emmanuel’s cavalry
remained with Rudzevich.
At Schkeuditz, Yorck received his orders. “As he always cared for us,”
wrote an officer of his entourage, “he had called us together for a warm
breakfast with him; the horses stood saddled before the door. Count Bran-
denburg arrived with Blücher’s orders. Yorck stood up, his glass in his hand,
and recited his favorite prayer: ‘May beginning, middle, and end turn out for
the best,’ emptying the glass and setting it down. We did the same. In a
solemn, serious mood we went to battle. We all felt that upon these so often
blood-soaked fields we were about to wage the decisive struggle over our
Prussian, our German Fatherland.”33 To execute Blücher’s disposition,
Yorck decided that, as soon as the head of the column – Hünerbein’s 8th
Brigade – reached Lützschena, it would slide left of the road and form to
attack Lindenthal. Horn’s 7th Brigade would follow the 8th en echelon
while Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade formed further to the rear. As Prince Karl’s
2nd Brigade contained mainly Line troops, it would provide the reserve.
Yorck’s disposition states that “all will form battalion columns and place
themselves en êchiquier [checkerboard formation] so that the brigades form

two lines.” Until he received further orders, Hiller would remain between
Lützschena and Stahmeln with the vanguard’s infantry. With the vanguard’s
cavalry, Katzler covered the deployment of the brigades. Yorck attached the
Reserve Artillery’s two twelve-pound batteries to 8th Brigade; their four
ten-pound howitzers led the heavy guns forward.34
“Initially,” recalled Henckel von Donnersmarck, “everything remained
quiet on the morning of the 16th until suddenly the vanguard was summoned
to advance and take Lindenthal. The brigades were all next to each other
marching in battalion columns, the Reserve Cavalry behind them.”35 After
moving southeast along the Halle–Leipzig highway for three miles from
Schkeuditz to Lützschena, 8th Brigade turned east around 12:30. Hünerbein’s
men trooped along a field-path from Lützschena toward Lindenthal, dragging
both twelve-pound batteries with them to the foot of the Radefeld–Lindenthal
hills facing the left wing of Marmont’s vanguard. Observing that the French
held the Tannenwald between Lindenthal and Radefeld, Yorck moved up
Horn’s 7th Brigade to form his right rather than have it follow 8th Brigade
en echelon. At 1:00, he ordered Hünerbein to clear the imperials from the
Tannenwald while Horn assaulted Lindenthal. As second echelon on the
oblique right, 1st and 2nd Brigades would follow Horn’s 7th. Jürgaß’s Reserve
Cavalry formed in two waves and moved up to form the third echelon.
Normann’s eight squadrons halted west of the Tannenwald to take in the
troops retreating from Radefeld; one horse battery and numerous skirmish-
ers stood at the edge of the wood opposite Lindenthal. Acting on orders
from Yorck, Katzler instructed the East Prussian National Cavalry Regi-
ment supported by two squadrons of the Leib Hussars and the Brandenburg
Uhlans to attack Normann’s cavalry. The Württembergers allowed the Prus-
sians to approach and at the last minute pivoted and retreated. This
uncovered the front of an infantry square that the Württemberger cavalry
had concealed from sight. Supported by skirmishers in the woods and the
battery at the edge of the Tannenwald, the infantry fired on the approaching
East Prussian troopers from the western edge of the pine grove. Led by its
1st and Jäger Squadrons, the East Prussians could do little against the
sustained musketry of the imperials, described by one eyewitness as “the
most galling.” After losing eleven prisoners and sustaining several casualties,
the East Prussians withdrew in order.36
The French battery shelled the Prussians as they withdrew and opened
fire on the Russians as they approached the Tannenwald. Finally, blasts of
canister from Katzler’s Nr. 2 Horse Battery induced the French to evacuate
their position along the western edge of the Tannenwald. More importantly
for the Allies, Marmont’s decision to march to Liebertwolkwitz caused the
imperials to completely abandon Lindenthal. The retreating enemy troops
did not go far before they joined Coëhorn’s main body in a strong position
on the hills between Wahren and Lindenthal. In and next to one of the three
redoubts that Marmont had hastily built along the 2,500 yards separating
these two villages stood a battery of sixteen guns that poured murderous fire
into the ranks of the advancing Prussians. Yorck directed his two heavy
batteries against the French artillery. Behind the Prussian guns, his brigades
advanced with Hünerbein’s 8th closing on Lindenthal. An intense artillery
duel ensued between the French and the Prussians during which time
Langeron’s troops reached Breitenfeld.37
After one hour, Coëhorn took the next step in his calculated withdrawal.
Under the protection of Normann’s Chasseurs, Coëhorn withdrew east to
unite with Marmont’s main body on the hills between Möckern and
Großwiederitzsch. “The 2nd [21st] Division, commanded by General
Lagrange, stayed behind to support the rearguard and take it in,” noted
Marmont. “When all was in order and properly disposed of, the movement
to Leipzig continued, every moment exchanging cannon shots with the
enemy. One brigade of Württemberger light cavalry, a part of my corps
and attached to the vanguard, also acted with valor and courage. It was the
last move of honor and loyalty by General Normann and his soldiers. A few
hours later, they would be fatal to us rather than helpful.”38
Yorck ordered the infantry to pursue while Katzler led his cavalry onto
the plain north of the road to Möckern to cover the march of the infantry. As
the skirmishers of the 3rd Battalion of the 14th Silesian Landwehr plunged
into the Tannenwald, some of Hünerbein’s battalions marched through
Lindenthal while others passed its southern side; all made for the main
French position. Yorck’s other brigades followed as fast as they could. Not
wanting to offer his flank to the imperials, Yorck decided to refuse it, execute
a right wheel, and turn his corps southeast to face the enemy’s front. Without
awaiting new orders, he pivoted his corps southeast to align it with the
Möckern–Eutritzsch line. Horn’s 7th Brigade formed the pivot and now
faced southeast with the village of Lindenthal behind its right wing. This
movement forced Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade to swing far to the east to
establish contact with Langeron’s corps, which momentarily continued east
in the direction stipulated by Blücher’s original intention to meet the
enemy’s masses supposedly on the plateau by Hohenossig. Consequently,
large gaps opened between the two corps as well as between 8th and 7th
Brigades. The situation only became worse when an even larger gap opened
between Horn’s brigade and Hiller’s vanguard on the Halle–Leipzig high-
way. Yorck ordered this gap temporarily filled by Jürgaß’s Reserve Cavalry.
Yet no quick fix could be found to fill the hole between Hünerbein and
Langeron even after Blücher turned the Russians southeast. Initially, 8th
Brigade’s cavalry – 3rd and 4th Squadrons of the Brandenburg Hussars –
moved into the gap but Blücher himself redirected them to a different sector
of the field. For the time being, Hünerbein’s left was completely in the air.
On Blücher’s left, Langeron’s Russians advanced through Breitenfeld and

slowly moved toward Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch. Reaching the Radefeld
ridge, Blücher found a large enemy force holding a strong position along a
three-mile line extending east from Möckern to Eutritzsch. Moreover, Rus-
sian reports indicated that considerable imperial forces also held both Wie-
deritzsch villages, which stood at almost a 90 degree angle to the Möckern–
Eutritzsch line. Thus, it appeared that Marmont held the sector north of
Leipzig between the Elster and the Parthe. Although seeing the extent of
Marmont’s position, the leadership of the Silesian Army could not free itself
from the fear of superior enemy forces advancing through Hohenossig. To
engage Marmont, the army would have to slide to the southeast, increasing
the danger posed to the left wing by the enemy columns Blücher expected to
be approaching from the Mulde. Yet across the horizon, on the hills at
Liebertwolkwitz and Wachau, on the edge of the Pleiße valley and further
west at Lindenau, the battle between Schwarzenberg and presumably Murat
raged with incomparable intensity. Despite the incorrect perceived threat to
his left, Blücher knew that he had to allow himself to be fixed by attacking
Marmont. Rather than continue northeast to Hohenossig or south to Leip-
zig, Blücher decided that Langeron and Yorck would continue the advance
southeast. Around 2:00, he signed orders for Langeron to march along the
Delitzsch–Leipzig road to take Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch. After the
Russians had secured these two villages, Yorck would attack the Möckern–
Eutritzsch line. Gneisenau sent Langeron’s Reserve Cavalry under Korf
toward Podelwitz to secure the left flank. To fill the gap between Hünerbein
and Langeron, the staff chief wanted Sacken’s cavalry to move up. However,
due to a misunderstanding, Sacken’s troopers followed Korf. A sole Russian
Hussar Regiment that arrived by chance was all that Gneisenau could find to
plug the gap; it took a position east of Lindenthal. Blücher established his
command post on the Lindenthal windmill hill near the road to Landsberg. 39
From Lützschena on Blücher’s extreme right, Hiller observed the pro-
gress of Yorck and Langeron. He also saw Katzler’s cavalry receive flanking
fire from the direction of Stahmeln and Wahren as it moved toward the
Radefeld–Lindenthal hills to cover Yorck’s artillery. Without waiting for
orders, Hiller ordered Major Klüx to advance along the Elster and drive
the imperials from Stahmeln. To take Stahmeln, Klüx assembled three pla-
toons of Jäger, the skirmishers of two infantry companies, and one company
from the Fusilier Battalion of the 2nd East Prussian Regiment; the rest of the
Fusilier Battalion would follow in support. Three Jäger companies and the
4th Battalion of the 15th Silesian Landwehr would march three hundred
paces behind this group. As he prepared his columns, a platoon from the
Austrian 2nd Jäger Battalion sent by Gyulay to link with the Silesian Army
arrived on the opposite bank of the Elster. Greeted by the Prussians with
shouts of joy, the Austrians also marched on Stahmeln. The imperials
evacuated the village without resistance and withdrew less than one mile
southeast to Wahren. At that moment, orders arrived from Blücher to
advance on Leipzig and pressure the enemy. Before Klüx could launch his
attack, some 100 French soldiers withdrew from Wahren to Möckern as that
small village did not favor a defense. “From the hill of Wahren,” stated
Hiller in his after-action report, “I observed that the enemy moved into
Möckern, strongly occupied this village, and positioned much artillery and
infantry masses on the hill of Möckern, and that the left wing of I Army
Corps as well as the corps under Count Langeron advanced fighting through
Radefeld and Lindenthal. I thus ordered the troops assigned to me to take up
arms, formed them for the attack, and advanced.” Klüx followed, halting
east of the village and sending a small detachment to reconnoiter toward
Möckern. Meanwhile, Hiller’s main body moved up in battalion columns on
both sides of the Halle–Leipzig road. The pursuit then continued to Möck-
ern, only one mile from Wahren.40
After obtaining an overview of Marmont’s position, Yorck likewise
recognized the importance of the village of Möckern. The large enemy
forces in his flank at Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch ruled out a general
advance of I Corps against the Möckern–Eutritzsch line. For this reason,
he instructed Hünerbein and Horn to halt until Langeron’s corps came on
line with them. But the Prussians already stood too close to the French
position and were suffering from the enemy’s artillery on the hills north of
Möckern; to hold their ground would have been tantamount to suicide.
Thus, Yorck decided to pull back his left and occupy Marmont’s right with
fifty guns that gradually unlimbered on both sides of the Lindenthal–-
Großwiederitzsch road.41 Meanwhile, Yorck’s own right would attack
Möckern, the anchor point of Marmont’s left. “So in this way,” explains
Friederich, “an echelon attack from the right wing took place while without
doubt it would have been more appropriate to persist in its original form by
beginning the echelon attack from the left wing and in this way envelop the
strongest point of the enemy position, the village of Möckern.”42
Returning to the struggle south of Leipzig, as Macdonald moved on
Seifertshain, Napoleon ordered an assault against the Allied center, still
thinking VI and III Corps would arrive to deliver the death blow. To soften
the enemy, he instructed Drouot to form a battery of eighty-four guns on
the ridge between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz. Arranged in battalion
columns, II and V Corps advanced from Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz
respectively. Oudinot’s I Young Guard Corps moved into the line between
II and V Corps while II Young Guard Corps followed V Corps and 1st Old
Guard Division marched to Wachau. After clearing Liebertwolkwitz,
V Corps moved southwest to assault Güldengoßa; Mortier’s II Young Guard
Corps moved against the Oberholz Forest. A Russian battery of ninety-four
guns inflicted horrendous casualties on the approaching French infantry yet
the human waves steadily closed on their targets. Around 2:30, II Corps and
I Young Guard Corps successfully stormed Auenhain but V Corps could
not take Güldengoßa. To break the enemy’s resistance, the 2,500 cuirassiers
of General Étienne Bordessoulle’s 1st Heavy Division of I Cavalry Corps
charged from the right (west) side of the great French battery. Bordessoulle
assigned four Saxon squadrons the unenviable task of attacking the enemy
battery.43 The fatigued Russian and Prussian troops of Eugen’s column
melted before this onslaught. Bordessoulle’s sabers reached the ponds in
front of the Allied command post on the hill southwest of Güldengoßa
where Alexander and Frederick William stood. As the spent imperial
troopers tried in vain to get through the morass, the tsar’s Cossack escort
attacked their front while thirteen squadrons of Russian cuirassiers charged
their left flank. The combined attack sapped their remaining strength, and
they whipped their tired horses to make for the safety of Drouot’s guns. By
3:30, the last of Bordessoulle’s cavalry had reached the French artillery,
whose withering fire promptly ended the Russian pursuit. In all, the imper-
ials managed to spike twenty-six Russian guns.
Although the French cavalry returned to their lines, the infantry con-
tinued to press the Allies. On the right, II and IX Corps closed on Cröbern
while V Corps struggled to wrest Güldengoßa from Eugen’s battered Rus-
sians and Prussians. The Allies dug in, wisely taking cover in the villages,
woods, and coppices. Thus protected, they sustained the continued artillery
bombardment with minimal losses. Moreover, reinforcements started to
arrive. At 4:00, General Vincenzo Federico Bianchi reached Cröbern with
2nd Infantry Division of the Austrian Reserve. Behind Eugen, General
Nikolay Rayevsky’s Russian III Grenadier Corps prepared to move into
the line; the Prussian Guard likewise reached Güldengoßa. Lauriston’s 16th
Division broke into Güldengoßa but the fresh Allied troops countered with
such ferocity that the division broke. Mortier’s Young Guard failed to clear
the Oberholz Forest of Allied forces. On Napoleon’s right, Augereau’s IX
Corps at Cröbern fell back before Bianchi’s Austrians and the survivors of
Kleist’s column. Augereau’s retreat impacted II Corps to his left (east),
which had gained Auenhain but could not dislodge the Russians from its
Schloß. With IX Corps retiring, Victor had little choice but to order II
Corps to withdraw from Auenhain. The arrival of General Nicolaus von
Weißenwolf’s 1st Infantry Division of the Austrian Reserve enabled Bianchi
to take Markkleeberg and advance toward Dölitz. In addition, Merveldt’s
Austrian II Corps finally crossed the Pleiße and took Dölitz by 5:30. On the
verge of turning Napoleon’s right, the mainly Austrian drive soon came to a
halt with the arrival of 2nd Old Guard Division and 11th Division of III
Corps. Thus reinforced, the imperials stopped Bianchi, retook Dölitz, and
drove Merveldt’s troops back across the Pleiße, capturing the Austrian corps
commander in the process.
Shortly after 2:00, Yorck’s artillery opened the struggle with counter-
battery fire against the twenty-four French guns the Prussians could see.
Behind the artillery, I Corps formed to assault Möckern. The village stood
on the reverse slope of the Möckern hill which descended toward wooded,
bushy lowlands through which the Elster meandered. At Möckern, the river
itself formed the edge of this lowland so that the village stood on its steep
right bank. One bridge approximately halfway through the long, narrow
village spanned the Elster on Möckern’s southern side. The northern side of
the village bordered the Halle–Leipzig highway so that it ran between
houses and walled gardens. The western side of the rectangular-shaped
village was only 300 yards wide.
Hiller received orders for the vanguard infantry reinforced by the Leib
Grenadier Battalion to lead the attack. Prince Karl’s 2nd Brigade would
follow obliquely to his left, supporting if necessary but seeking contact with
Horn’s 7th Brigade south of Lindenthal. As the reserve, Steinmetz’s 1st
Brigade would follow behind 2nd Brigade. During the advance, 7th and
8th Brigades would slide further right (southeast) to close the gap between
them and the portion of the corps attacking Möckern. Behind the infantry
followed the Reserve Cavalry and Katzler’s vanguard cavalry. After receiv-
ing Blücher’s orders for I Corps to delay its main attack until Langeron took
Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch, Yorck held back his brigades but allowed
Hiller to proceed with the attack on Möckern, thus playing right into
Marmont’s hands. With the Prussian left appearing very far from the battle-
field and moving forward only slowly, the marshal reinforced the artillery
on his right wing but moved more infantry to his left.
With the artillery still blazing, Major Klüx surged forward with Hiller’s
first wave: two platoons of Jäger and the skirmishers of the Fusilier Battalion
of the 2nd East Prussian Infantry Regiment supported by the rest of the
battalion. Some 300 yards behind this first wave followed three Jäger com-
panies, the 4th Battalion of the 15th Silesian Landwehr Regiment, and the
Austrian Jäger, all supported by the Leib Grenadiers; five battalions remained
in reserve at Wahren.44 Opposite Möckern, Hiller’s Nr. 12 Battery of six-
pound guns unlimbered on both sides of the defile through which the Halle–
Leipzig road ran. The half-battery on the right of the road supported the
assault on Möckern while that on the left offered counterbattery fire to the
French guns on the northern side of the village. Klüx’s small first wave
penetrated the village but they lost their foothold after a brutal counterattack.
A second attack ended with the same result. Klüx’s skirmishers came
flying back, closely pursued by the French and enfiladed from the opposite
bank of the Elster. Such fear gripped them that they disordered the heads of
the Jäger companies that moved up in the second wave. Hiller stated in his
report that “now it appeared as a matter of honor to take the village.” His
men claimed that the French had barricaded all the houses and barns in the
village, knocking out loopholes to make each structure a miniature fortress.

After restoring order, Hiller launched a third attack with the forces of both
waves. While one Jäger company countered the fire of French skirmishers
posted in the undergrowth on the southern bank of the Elster, two Jäger
companies and the fusiliers sought to penetrate Möckern in small detach-
ments wherever they could find an opening. Meanwhile, the 4th Battalion of
the 15th Silesian Landwehr, whose commander, Count Gottlob Wilhelm
von Wedel, a former government official (Kammerpräsident) with no prior
military experience, requested the honor of being the first unit to storm the
village, assaulted the massive manor house that stood to the right (north) of
the short side of the village that faced Wahren. Lastly, the Leib Grenadier
Battalion attempted to envelop the village from the northern bank of the
Elster.
Hiller’s troops executed the attack with determination and appeared to
achieve success despite receiving devastating fire. The Jäger and fusiliers
penetrated the village at various places while the Landwehr stormed the
manor house with bayonets. Yet after the Prussians gained footholds on the
outskirts of Möckern, the French refused to allow them to advance deeper
into the village. Hiller reported that French grenadiers “strongly occupied
and fiercely defended each house and every wall,” barricading doors and
windows, and pouring murderous fire into the Prussians from every direc-
tion.45 French artillery on the hills north of Möckern enfiladed Hiller’s men
with canister. Advancing from the manor house, the 4th Battalion of the 15th
Silesian Landwehr managed to reach the crossroad that led from the Halle–
Leipzig road to the bridge over the Elster. There, they encountered fresh
battalion columns; Marmont moved the 37th Light Infantry Regiment into
Möckern to support the 4th Marine Regiment. “The enemy furiously
attacked the village of Möckern,” noted Marmont, “and supported the
attack through the fire of numerous cannon that he deployed opposite my
front. But for a long time all his efforts were in vain. After repeated attacks
on the village, part of it was evacuated, but soon retaken by the same
regiment that defended it and that was charged with retaking it. Overthrown
again, the 4th Marine and 37th Light successively moved on Möckern, where
the whole battle seemed to be.”46 In murderous hand-to-hand combat, the
French gradually drove the Prussian militia out of the village. Fortunately
for the Landwehr, the Leib Grenadier Battalion, which had failed to gain
entry into the village along the steep bank of the Elster, returned in time to
take them in.
As is often the case in such engagements, the Prussians turned the tables
on the pursuing French. After repulsing the imperials, Hiller’s troops –
fusiliers, Jäger, grenadiers, and Landwehr – all drove into the village with
little order. Again reaching the crossroads, the Prussians received a severe
blast of canister in their front as well as heavy small-arms fire in the rear and
on both sides. Again the French fed fresh battalions into Möckern,
overwhelming the Prussians and driving them from the village. “Because
I not only encountered new enemy columns,” wrote Hiller, “but also
received the heaviest artillery fire in the front and musket fire in the rear,
I saw myself forced to again surrender the village after considerable losses in
killed and wounded.” Not content with ejecting the Prussians, the French
closely pursued and reached the Prussian half-battery on the northern side
of the defile. In vain, the half-battery on the southern side tried to cover the
retreat with caseshot. Just as one Prussian howitzer fell into French hands,
four battalions from Hiller’s reserve arrived. Under heavy fire, Hiller
reorganized the troops, who escaped the burning village while the skirmish-
ers of the West Prussian Grenadier Battalion worked around the northern
side of Möckern.
After directing the 1st Battalion of the Brandenburg Infantry Regiment
to advance on the northern side of the defile toward the French twelve-
pound battery, Hiller led the other three – the 3rd Battalion of the 13th
Silesian Landwehr, the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Silesian Landwehr, and the
2nd Battalion of the 12th Reserve Regiment – as well as the survivors of the
earlier attacks back to Möckern. With drums beating, Hiller ordered the men
to fix bayonets. Shouting “Long live the king,” he led the charge against the
two French columns that emerged from Möckern. The fresh Prussian units
managed to drive back the enemy, retake the howitzer, and enter the village
at the same time as the retreating French. In what was tantamount to a
suicide mission, the 1st Brandenburg Battalion advanced toward the French
battery but caseshot shattered its front while a marine battalion attacked its
left flank. In just a matter of minutes the Prussians sustained such grisly
losses that the survivors broke and fled down (south) the slope toward
Möckern. There they joined Hiller’s battalions that had penetrated the
burning village. While some companies pursued the French to the opposite
exit of the village, others battled with the enemy soldiers holed up in the
houses. Although practically destroying the 2nd Marine Regiment which
stood in reserve in the streets of Möckern, the Prussians could not venture
beyond the village. A few companies that attempted to advance in the open
received deadly blasts of canister from numerous guns and quickly fell back.
According to Hiller: “I was received by such heavy canister fire from several
batteries that I not only had to give up the pursuit but also had to again
reassemble and reorder several retreating battalions.”47
Unsupported, Hiller’s spent battalions could not hold Möckern against
Lagrange’s 1st Brigade, consisting of the three battalions of the 4th Marine
Regiment and the four battalions of the 37th Light Infantry. “The enemy
first directed his attack on the village of Möckern,” Marmont noted in his
report. “This village was attacked with vigor, and the enemy received all the
fire of my artillery. It was defended well by the troops of the 2nd [21st]
Division under the command of General Lagrange. The 2nd Marine Artil-
lery, which was responsible for this position, fought with vigor and tenacity,
held this village for a long time, and lost and regained it several times. The
37th Light and 4th Marine Regiment were successively brought to the
village; they regained and defended it with all the courage we could expect
from fine troops.”48 After again being ejected from Möckern, Hiller
informed Yorck that he could not take and hold the village without support.
Observing that the combat around Möckern had taken an unfavorable turn,
Yorck decided to deviate from the disposition and no longer wait for the
Russians to take the Wiederitzsch villages per Blücher’s orders. Yorck
replied to Hiller that the closest brigade, Prince Karl’s 2nd, would support
his next attack. Karl received orders to rush to Möckern with Steinmetz’s 1st
Brigade following. Based on Yorck’s answer, Hiller summoned his last
remaining fresh battalion – the West Prussian Grenadiers – and launched
his seventh assault on Möckern.
Facilitated by the advance of 2nd Brigade, Hiller’s troops again pene-
trated the burning village, driving the French out of the opposite end. Again
fresh French forces threw them back but this time the Prussians managed to
hold the outlying houses. Again the attack proved costly: Hiller left the field
with a serious wound; the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 14th
Silesian Landwehr, Major Thiele, fell wounded, while the commander of
the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Silesian Landwehr, Major Rekovski, numbered
among the dead. With his last breath, Count Wedel purportedly shouted to
his men: “Children, save the Fatherland! Help us God!”49 Hiller explained
his thoughts in the after-action report:
Everyone was burning with desire to get close to the enemy, and on my shout
that today must decide Germany’s fate, the battalions did not hesitate to
again charge across the corpses of their brothers and engage the enemy with
cries of hurrah. Notwithstanding the courage and fury of the troops, which
had increased to the extreme, it was still impossible to silence the fire of the
enemy battalions posted in the houses. Nevertheless I thoroughly enjoyed
the satisfaction of watching the courage and perseverance of the brave troops,
especially the Landwehr battalions, turn back the enemy grenadiers and
Guardsmen who had moved up as reinforcement. As I saw them running
away, I also saw the other brigades of the Army Corps advancing. At that
moment I was wounded. I sank to the ground in unconsciousness with the
blessed feeling that we would be victorious.50
Establishing a firm foothold in Möckern proved impossible. French

infantry strongly occupied the dominant points but also gallantly defended
every house, cellar, stable, shed, barn, roof, and wall; fresh reinforcements
constantly moved into the village. Finally acknowledging the grim lesson
that the French had unmercifully taught them, the Prussians realized that
they would have to drive the enemy from each individual structure to secure
Möckern. Forced to admit the pointlessness of advancing in tight attack
columns that offered perfect targets to the barricaded imperials, the Prus-
sians resolved to take the village house by house. At each structure, the
surrounding wall would be stormed, the doors smashed, and floor by floor
the enemy would be cleared. Calm contemplation would have led the
Prussians to a far less costly conclusion: let the fires that blazed in Möckern
do the bloody work for them. But consumed by the heat of battle and
thirsting to avenge their fallen comrades, the Prussians descended like
locusts on individual houses in groups of thirty to forty. All order collapsed
as Jäger, fusilier, grenadier, musketeer, and Landwehr – all mixed together –
savagely fought with unity of purpose and will. A gruesome struggle ensued
where neither side granted quarter; all were cut down without mercy.
Although Klüx fell along with one-third of his men, the Prussians slowly
made progress, even taking the Elster bridge.
To support the attack on Möckern, Yorck directed 2nd Brigade against
the French artillery position on the hill north of the village and instructed
Steinmetz to follow with 1st Brigade. For massive firepower, Yorck com-
bined the Nr. 2 Horse Battery, Nr. 12 six-pound battery, and the batteries of
2nd and 1st Brigades. Behind the artillery, the cavalry of the vanguard
formed: two squadrons of Leib Hussars, three squadrons of Brandenburg
Hussars, the Brandenburg Uhlan Regiment, and the National Cavalry Regi-
ment. Yorck established his command post in the midst of the cavalry. Balls
fell all about the Prussians; one crashed through the midst of Yorck’s staff.
With a stern glance, the man of Tauroggen quelled any thoughts of panic.
Reaching into his pocket, he pulled out his box of snuff, took a pinch
between his fingers, and closed the box. Still looking around, he noted that
his six-pound batteries could achieve nothing against Marmont’s twelve-
pound pieces. Aggravated, Yorck threw down the snuff, shouting: “Let’s
give those chaps a surprise.” He then ordered an adjutant to move the
twelve-pound batteries closer to the enemy line. In fact, the entire artillery
line of 88 pieces followed by the cavalry moved to within 1,100 yards of
Marmont’s position. To minimize the losses to his cavalry, Yorck ordered it
to form in a single long line. Under the protection of its intense fire, Prince
Karl led 2nd Brigade forward. At the same time Hiller commenced his
seventh assault on Möckern with bayonets fixed and drums beating. Horn
and Hünerbein also advanced with orders to close the gap between them-
selves and 2nd Brigade by sliding right (southeast). By this time Blücher and
his staff had corrected the mistake made by Sacken’s cavalry, which Nostitz
brought back and posted close to Lindenthal, thus closing the gap between
Yorck and Langeron.
Observing the advance of a fresh Prussian brigade toward Möckern,
Marmont ordered his entire corps to execute a 45 degree turn to the left to
better support the struggle on the left wing. “The enemy redoubled his
efforts and sent powerful support to take this position. So I made an oblique
change of front by brigade, which immediately formed six lines by echelon
so that all were equally well disposed to support this village, where the entire
battle seemed to hinge.”51 He also moved up his reserve artillery to reinforce
the left wing and ordered Compans’s 20th Division to be ready to support
Lagrange’s division in and next to Möckern. Forming his troops in six
echelons, one behind the other, the marshal did not wait for Karl’s
Prussians to attack. According to Yorck’s chief of staff, Zielinsky, Marmont
clearly saw the Prussian deployment. After observing “that the left wing
of the army – Langeron’s corps – was advancing very slowly and still
remained very far from the battlefield, he concentrated his main strength
through a march to the left close to Möckern, assembled around ninety
cannon, and began his very superior attack on our left wing.”52 Protected
by his twelve-pound battery, Marmont personally led a few battalion
columns between the intervals of the guns to engage the Prussians.
With drums beating, 2nd Brigade’s five battalions advanced: the Fusilier
Battalion of the 1st East Prussian Regiment and 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
East Prussian Regiment formed the first wave. Behind in second line
followed the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st East Prussian Regiment. Major
Fischer’s entire 2nd Battalion of the 6th Silesian Landwehr Regiment dis-
persed as skirmishers. As murderous caseshot from the twelve-pound bat-
tery smashed its front and the small-arms fire from Möckern enfiladed its
flank, 2nd Brigade ascended the hill. At fifty paces, a marine battalion of the
Guard opened fire and then charged the Fusilier Battalion of the 1st East
Prussian Regiment. After some brief hand-to-hand fighting that claimed the
life of their commander, Major Pentzig, a small group of survivors from the
Prussian battalion could do nothing more than flee south to join Hiller’s
seventh attack on Möckern. From the second line, Lobenthal, the com-
mander of the 1st East Prussian Infantry Regiment, moved up Major
Schleuse’s 1st Battalion. Ferociously attacking the French marines, the bat-
talion steadily pushed forward despite stubborn resistance. After over-
whelming the marines, 1st Battalion closed on the twelve-pound battery
with bayonets fixed. In the meantime, the commander of the 2nd East
Prussian Infantry Regiment, Sjöholm, led Karl’s other first-line battalion,
Major Dessauniers’s 2nd Battalion, close to the French battery, reaching a
small hollow that protected the men from the vicious artillery fire. In this
position, the battalion deployed into line and opened a sustained fire on the
French gunners that prompted some of the crews to abandon their guns.
With the rate of French fire considerably slowed, Schleuse’s battalion made a
dash for the guns. Just before it could reach the artillery line, fresh French
battalions poured through the intervals to protect the guns. Instinctively, the
Prussians slowed their advance. As Prince Karl rushed toward the battalion
encouraging his men to advance, his horse collapsed under him. While
climbing into the saddle of another mount, the prince too sank to the ground
with a serious wound; Lobenthal assumed command.
Close-range volley fire from Dessauniers’s 2nd Battalion, still well pos-
itioned in the hollow, momentarily froze the French infantry. In addition,
four French caissons with the ammunition for one of Marmont’s twelve-
pound batteries suddenly exploded thanks to a well-aimed shot by Yorck’s
artillery commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Schmidt. “At the time of a new
attack by the enemy,” wrote Marmont, “the battery of twelve-pound guns,
whose effect had been so favorable and so powerful, was suddenly taken out
of service, a shell having blown up four caissons. These caissons also con-
tained shells. The shells exploded just as the enemy made a decisive charge.
This accident had disastrous consequences.”53 The French guns fell com-
pletely silent and the imperial infantry yielded. This enabled Schleuse’s 1st
Battalion to capture two guns and their crews. Lobenthal then directed
Major Kurnatowsky’s 2nd Battalion of the 1st East Prussian Regiment to
advance and take possession of the remaining guns.54
Before the Prussians could secure their prizes, Marmont launched a
counterattack with the 20th and 25th Provisional Regiments of Compans’s
20th Division. Charging in column, one battalion slammed into the flank
of Schleuse’s 1st Battalion, putting it to flight; three other French battalions
closed on Kurnatowsky’s 2nd Battalion. Lobenthal ordered Kurnatowsky
to charge the closest enemy battalion, which did not expect to be attacked
and so fell back. The two others initially followed but blinding smoke from
the artillery still hung thick in the air, preventing Lobethal from seeing
them execute a left wheel. Suddenly, the two French battalions emerged in
the right flank of Kurnatowsky’s 2nd Battalion. Lobenthal ordered a
retreat and then fell from his horse wounded; Sjöholm assumed command.
The imperials hotly pursued, forcing most of Yorck’s batteries to fall back
but two held their ground: Foot Battery Nr. 1 (six-pound cannon) and
Heavy Battery Nr. 2 (twelve-pound cannon). Their caseshot along with a
charge by the Mecklenburg Hussars halted the French advance and
allowed the wreck of 2nd Brigade to reorganize by a partially destroyed
brick barn that provided good cover on the side of Möckern. According to
Marmont:
I decided to engage the troops of the 1st [20th] Division, who in echelon
formed the center, and directed these to assist those already engaged against
the enemy, who was moving against our center. The battle assumed a new
character, and in an instant our infantry masses found themselves less than
thirty paces from the enemy. No action was more intense. The 20th and 25th
Provisional Regiments, commanded by Colonels [Jean-Pierre] Maury and
[Jean] Druot, covered themselves with glory in this situation. They advanced
against the enemy and forced him to yield but, overwhelmed by numbers,
these regiments were forced to halt, yet they managed to hold their position.
The 32nd Light also worked wonders.55
After losing more than 1,500 men – 419 from Schleuse’s battalion alone –
almost half of its manpower, and almost all of its officers, 2nd Brigade could
do little more on 16 October. Prince Karl and his chief of staff, Major
Schütz, as well as Lobenthal, Kurnatowsky, Dessauniers, and Fischer,
numbered among the wounded; Schleuse and Pentzig were dead. “The
wounded came back in such masses,” recalled Henckel von Donnersmarck,
“that at first we were inclined to believe that entire battalions had been
destroyed.”56 Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade now arrived to take its turn on the
killing fields.
Meanwhile, Langeron’s corps marched through Breitenfeld and prepared
to assault Kleinwiederitzsch. On Langeron’s right, Kaptsevich’s X Infantry
Corps deployed against the latter village. With the eight battalions of Lan-
geron’s vanguard, Rudzevich formed the left wing by moving north and
around Kleinwiederitzsch to a position between it and a birch grove situated
further to the northeast. Emmanuel’s vanguard cavalry covered the left wing
while, as noted, Korf’s Reserve Cavalry rode north toward Podelwitz.
Behind X Infantry Corps, the 9th Division of Olsufiyev’s IX Infantry Corps
moved up in reserve.57 Kaptsevich attacked Kleinwiederitzsch at the same
time as Hiller launched his first assault on Möckern. Despite their slight
number, Da˛browski’s Poles greeted their Russian foes with stubborn resist-
ance. As at Möckern, the struggle went back and forth before superior
Russian numbers overcame the Poles. After evacuating the village, the
imperials also abandoned Großwiederitzsch and fled south in an attempt
to reach Eutritzsch. According to Langeron, “Kaptsevich attacked and
carried the two villages of Wiederitzsch with the courage and resolution
that distinguished him as well as the brave corps that he commanded. The
enemy was routed and fled toward Leipzig and the Parthe.” Reinforced by
the Derptskii and Liflyandskii Mounted Jäger from the Reserve Cavalry,
Emmanuel charged eight Polish squadrons and Fournier’s Light Horse close
to Großwiederitzsch with the Kharkovskii, Novorossiiskii and Kievskii
Dragoon Regiments. Supported by the attack of the 1st and 3rd Ukrainskii
Cossack Regiments against Fournier’s right flank, the Russians drove the
imperials toward Eutritzsch in disarray, taking 7 guns, several caissons, and
some 500 prisoners.58
“But all of a sudden,” continues Langeron, “at 2:00 in the afternoon,
I saw these runaways stop and re-form, and I saw strong columns arriving
from the Parthe and Leipzig. They attacked the Wiederitzsch villages with
great vigor and despite the resistance of X Infantry Corps, these villages
were momentarily lost. Lieutenant-Colonel Voyevodsky of the Staroskolskii
Infantry Regiment was killed, Major Yuzefovich, gravely wounded; the fight
was very lively, my losses bad enough.” Contrary to Langeron’s statements,

French reinforcements did not arrive from the Parthe and Leipzig.59 Instead,
Da˛browski managed to reorganize his men and launch a bloody counter-
attack that regained Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch. After sustaining tremen-
dous losses, both Kaptsevich and Rudzevich fell back in complete disorder.
The imperial counterattack delivered a blow that sent the Russians reeling.
First, the cavalry and artillery of Rudzevich’s vanguard fled west toward the
Rietschke stream. Behind them followed the infantry of the vanguard.
Confusion and disorder reigned on the left bank of the Rietschke as the
Russians panicked at the crossing. In his published memoirs, Langeron
described the scene:
The cavalry of my vanguard was forced to recross the Rietschke brook; the
fire of the enemy columns and the grapeshot caused them to suffer consider-
able losses. The infantry of this same vanguard was also momentarily forced
to retreat; the fire was terrible, but this was not the moment to spare the
troops: we had to win. This moment was critical; my columns, forced into a
precipitated retreat by the masses that were moving on them, by the fire of
grapeshot, and by a cloud of skirmishers, moved [west] quickly (but not in a
disorderly fashion) toward the swampy brook, which was very difficult to
cross, and on the left bank my cavalry and artillery were bunched, both of
which had had a great deal of trouble crossing it; if the infantry had also
arrived, closely followed by the enemy, the confusion there would have
been general, and I would have suffered great losses: we had to stop the
infantry.60
From both villages, the Poles advanced toward the Rietschke. Imperial
artillery mowed down the Russians, claiming numerous officers and men.
Despite the shelling, Langeron, Rudzevich, and the other generals restored
order and turned the Russian vanguard infantry east to face the villages.
Langeron described the action from his perspective:
I had Russians under my orders; I knew their precise obedience and courage;
I passed the Shlisselburgskii Regiment and without amusing myself with
witty phrases or haranguing them, without talking to their officers or sol-
diers, I commanded in a loud voice: ‘Halt, half-turn to the left, forward; fix
bayonets, march, march!’ The regiment stopped, as if at an exercise, turned
and marched forward, the other regiments stopped as well and moved for-
ward. Shocked by this movement, the enemy stopped and seemed to hesitate,
believing that numerous forces had come to my aid. This hesitation saved me;
my cavalry and my artillery crossed the brook and formed on the right bank.
My infantry also arrived and took up positions. The enemy then stopped all
of a sudden and this small setback which I had just suffered, the result of
which would have been so dangerous for other soldiers, was immediately
repaired by the intrepidity of the infantry of my vanguard and those of
Kaptsevich’s X Corps, which had found themselves in the same situation as

me and pulled themselves out in the same way.61
At this point, the Russians spotted a French column approaching on the

Bad Düben–Leipzig road almost in the rear of their position; its depth
indicated a considerable force. After the main body halted between Podel-
witz and Göbschelwitz, its vanguard deployed against the Russian left wing.
Although the column consisted of III Corps’s trains, baggage, and Reserve
Artillery escorted by Delmas’s 9th Division – 10 battalions and 14 guns
totaling 4,800 men – its size convinced Langeron that it represented an entire
army corps.62 Langeron noted:
At the same time, Ney’s corps, commanded by Souham, and 7,000 to 8,000
men strong, appeared on the road from Bad Düben, on my left flank, which
was in the air, and which I could not anchor anywhere. This moment was
extremely critical; I was obliged to extend this flank using Olsufiyev’s IX
Infantry Corps, and ending with General Korf’s cavalry, in a way that left
me with a single immense line, without reserves. Therefore, my line was
extremely extended and weak everywhere; without the steadfastness of my
generals, their firm dispositions, the intrepidity of my troops, I ran the risk
of seeing the enemy pierce my line again and being obliged to retreat on
Breitenfeld. The recapture of the Wiederitzsch villages, which stood near
the center of my line, was indispensable for assuring the success of
the day.63
While Olsufiyev’s 9th Division deployed against Delmas, Kaptsevich

arranged another attack on the Wiederitzsch villages with his 22nd and 8th
Divisions. Again the Russians overwhelmed Da˛browski’s warriors,
regaining both villages with the bayonet and ejecting the Poles in disorder.
As that assault proceeded, Langeron and Rudzevich turned the villages to
the north with the vanguard infantry followed by Emmanuel’s cavalry. We
hear one last time from Langeron:
General Kaptsevich, although wounded with a bad bruise caused by a ball

that killed his horse, never quit the battlefield; he once again attacked the
villages with the greatest decisiveness. Perfectly seconded by Generals Turch-
aninov and Prince Urusov, commanders of the 22nd and 8th Divisions
[respectively], Vasilchikov, commander of the Vyatskii Regiment, who par-
ticularly distinguished himself and Colonel Magdenko of the artillery, who
although wounded never left his post, and by all the regimental commanders
of this brave corps, he took the two villages while Rudzevich and myself once
again drove the infantry of the vanguard to attack the enemy troops moving
up to support those who were defending the villages. The enemy was again
overthrown and withdrew in disorder, leaving many dead, wounded, and
prisoners.64
Around this same time, Olsufiyev instructed General Udom to occupy

the birch grove northeast of Kleinwiederitzsch with the 10th and 38th Jäger
Regiments (one battalion each) and the skirmishers of the Nasheburgskii,
Apsheronskii, and Yakutskii Regiments. Olsufiyev also moved up the twelve
guns of Light Battery Nr. 29 from the reserve. Fortunately for the Allies,
Delmas had not been informed of the events in this sector. For about one
hour he debated whether to directly support Da˛browski or continue to
Schönefeld per his orders. Instead of being decisive, Delmas settled on a
half-measure. To cover his march to Schönefeld, he pushed a detachment
west to attack the birch grove. A “very obstinate engagement” ensued
amidst the beautiful white bark. To support Udom, Olsufiyev sent the
Ryazhskii and Kolyvanskii Regiments (three battalions total) into the wood.
During bitter hand-to-hand combat, the Ryazhskii Regiment took the flag
of the 125th Line and forced the French to evacuate the wood, “leaving the
ground covered with his dead and wounded.”65 Due to the Russian break-
through, Delmas withdrew through Seehausen and crossed the Parthe at
Plösen and Neutzsch.66 Korf’s cavalry pursued Delmas, with the Mitavskii
Dragoon Regiment alone bringing back 400 prisoners. General Lukovkin’s
four regiments of Don Cossacks on loan from Sacken’s corps rode northeast
on the highway to Bad Düben. They found 6 guns and around 100 wagons
abandoned by the French because the exhausted horses could pull them no
further.
Meanwhile, after Da˛browski had again reorganized his troops, he
attempted to cross the Rietschke between Großwiederitzsch and Eutritzsch
to exploit the large gap between Yorck and Langeron. To stop the Poles,
Langeron sent Vasilchikov with the Vyatskii and Arkhangelogorodskii Regi-
ments as well as Heavy Battery Nr. 34 across the stream above
Kleinwiederitzsch. He also requested that St.-Priest, whose lead units had
just cleared Lindenthal, support him with the three battalions of Bistrom’s
Jäger brigade. In danger of being cut off by Vasilchikov and seeing the
approach of St.-Priest’s fresh units, Da˛browski withdrew to Eutritzsch.
Two of St.-Priest’s batteries escorted by the 3rd and 4th Squadrons of the
Brandenburg Hussars moved into the gap between Yorck’s left and Langer-
on’s right. The onset of darkness ended the fight on this part of the
battlefield.
Thus far, Blücher had spent the entire day with Langeron’s corps on the
highway forward of Lindenthal, in part because he feared large enemy forces
would arrive from Bad Düben via Hohenossig, in part because he trusted
Yorck to handle the situation on the right wing. At 4:00, Charles Stewart
returned to Blücher’s headquarters. Disagreement exists over the nature of
the news that Stewart delivered. According to Lowe, Stewart communicated
“the Prince Royal’s acquiescence in all that General Blücher had desired, and
his intention of marching his army that night.”67 However, Stewart claims
that, after Bernadotte had refused to meet with him, he settled on explaining
to Adlerkreutz “how imperiously necessary it was for the Russian cavalry
and light artillery to advance immediately [southeast] in the direction of
Taucha.” Adlerkreutz responded that, if Stewart could convince Wintzin-
gerode to take such a step, “he would answer for the concurrence of the
prince.” Stewart then hurried to find the Russian commander, “who stated
that his orders were positive from the Emperor of Russia not to act but by
the express commands of the crown prince; that he dared not move in
person.”68 Thus, the consequences of Blücher’s earlier attempt to hijack
Bernadotte’s two Prussian corps. Nevertheless, Wintzingerode pledged to
send 3,000 Cossacks to be followed in the morning by 8,000 cavalry if
Stewart “could procure such [an] order. I returned to General Blücher
greatly disappointed; but was happy to learn, in sequel, that 3,000 horses
were actually pushed forward that evening, on [account of] General
Adlerkreutz seeing the Prince.”69 In fact, Bernadotte issued orders for the
5,000 troopers of Wintzingerode’s Reserve Cavalry to continue another six
miles further south from Landsberg to Kölsa, itself ten miles northwest of
Möckern.70
This did Blücher little good regarding the situation at hand. Yet finally,
around 5:00, he received the report that he had so impatiently awaited:
Russian patrols had found no more enemy forces on the road from Bad
Düben. He immediately ordered Sacken to commence the one-hour march
from Radefeld to support Yorck at Möckern – an order that the Russian
troops purportedly received with joy. Although the corps advanced on the
most direct route toward the burning village, it did not arrive until nightfall,
which came at 6:00, and thus did not see action. According to Nostitz:
After the struggle became general and the decision became doubtful, Blücher
sent Sacken the order to reinforce the attack of the Prussian corps with one
brigade; this order was repeated by a second officer and yet the help they so
desperately needed approached only slowly. Then Blücher tasked me with
accelerating the march of the [Russian] troops. When General Sacken saw me
approaching, he rode toward me with a serious face and said: “What have
I done to the general to deserve being placed in reserve?” “Your Excellency
knows,” I answered, “that one always places in reserve the general and the
troops in which one has the most trust, and considering this point, it certainly
appears that you have the highest honor.” General Sacken extended his hand
to me in a friendly manner, placed himself at the head of the foremost
marching Jäger regiment, and had it proceed at the double-quick; neverthe-
less it arrived on the battlefield too late in order to be able to take part in the
glory of the day.71
St.-Priest also received orders to advance along an arm of the Rietschke that
flowed from Lindenthal directly to Eutritzsch, post his three twelve-pound
batteries, and attack Marmont’s right wing. Yet his march proceeded so
slowly that Blücher had to repeat the order several times. Aside from two
batteries, St.-Priest’s corps likewise did not arrive in time to participate in
the battle.
While the struggle around Möckern raged, Horn and Hünerbein slowly
advanced on Yorck’s left, sliding southeast until they finally crossed the
Lindenthal–Leipzig road. Although neither brigade had engaged the imper-
ials, both had already suffered tremendous losses from the enemy’s murder-
ous artillery fire. Thus, only the eight battalions of Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade –
Yorck’s last reserve – still remained intact. Considerable firing still could be
heard in Möckern, meaning that the Prussians had yet to secure the village.
The 5:00 hour struck and Yorck knew what needed to be done. Although it
was extremely risky, he could not delay in committing 1st Brigade to finally
drive Marmont from Möckern and the surrounding hills. Yet, if Steinmetz
failed, Yorck would have spent his last reserve and no support could be
expected from Langeron, while nothing could be seen of Sacken and St.-
Priest. At this point, Yorck finally sent one of his adjutants, the count of
Brandenburg, with orders for Horn and Hünerbein to attack.
To drive back the French, Yorck reinserted Heavy Battery Nr. 1 in the
artillery line next to Foot Battery Nr. 1 and Heavy Battery Nr. 2. The
batteries on the left that had fallen back after 2nd Brigade broke likewise
returned to the line. Their fire as well as Steinmetz’s advance prompted
Marmont’s infantry columns to retreat to the hills, where they prepared to
meet the new Prussian attack. “The combat was maintained with the same
fury for three hours,” reported Marmont, “the enemy had suffered huge
losses because of the advantageous position of our artillery, which allowed
us to crush his masses. But new forces were arriving constantly and renewed
the attacks.” “We had arranged ourselves in battalion masses,” explained
Gneisenau. “The enemy artillery raged among them. Our Landwehr battal-
ions acted splendidly. When an enemy ball mowed down ten to fifteen men,
they shouted: ‘Long live the king’ and closed the gaps by coming together
over the dead.” From their high vantage point on the hills, the French could
clearly see the Prussians approaching; they could also see that nothing stood
behind Steinmetz. Marmont realized he had a golden opportunity before
him. If he could break though Yorck’s corps, he stood the chance of rolling
up Blücher’s left.72
Yorck’s artillery skillfully exploited the enemy’s retrograde movement
by advancing 700 yards. While the Prussians poured caseshot into the
French ranks, Steinmetz steadily advanced with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battal-
ions of the 13th Silesian Landwehr Regiment supported by the Silesian
Grenadier Battalion in the first wave, and the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Battalions
of the 5th Silesian Landwehr Regiment supported by the 1st East Prussian
Grenadier Battalion in the second. The survivors of 2nd Brigade formed the
third wave followed by the cavalry of 1st Brigade: the Black Hussars.
Steinmetz instructed his two right wing battalions (2nd Battalion of the
13th Silesian Landwehr and 3rd Battalion of the 5th Silesian Landwehr) as
well as the Silesian Grenadiers to advance through Möckern while his center
and left assaulted the hills north of the village. Thus, the three battalions of
Steinmetz’s right wing advanced eastward along the Halle–Leipzig highway
close to the northern edge of the village before turning south where the
village’s outlying structures reached the highway. With the 2nd Battalion
leading, the Silesian Landwehr penetrated the burning village despite receiv-
ing heavy fire from the houses on their left. Reaching the crossroads in the
middle of the village, the Prussians turned left (east) and charged toward the
opposite end of Möckern. On reaching their goal, the Silesian militia
received such a devastating blast of caseshot that they broke, throwing
themselves on the grenadiers who followed. Led by Major Friedrich August
von Burghoff, the grenadiers pushed through the demoralized militia and
fixed their bayonets. Behind them the officers of the Landwehr reorganized
the battalions and followed. Running the gauntlet between the fortified
houses from where the French poured fire into their ranks, the Prussians
managed to emerge on the eastern side of Möckern and storm the enemy’s
barricades. Again the Prussians sustained horrendous losses; if relief did not
come from outside Möckern the advantages that had just been won could
not be held.
Meanwhile, the five battalions of Steinmetz’s center and left attacked the
wall of artillery estimated to number forty guns that lined the hills north of
Möckern. Led by the commander of the 13th Silesian Landwehr Regiment,
Major Gädicke, the 1st and 4th Battalions of that regiment led the advance
“im Sturmschritt [at the double-quick]” with bayonets fixed, according to
Yorck’s after-action report. Like 2nd Brigade earlier, they received horren-
dous fire in the front and in the right flank from Möckern. According to
Prussian after-action reports, the French infantry stood in squares. Advan-
cing in attack columns, Steinmetz’s first wave managed to come within
110 yards of the French but could not break through the wall of lead that
greeted them. Gädicke’s two Landwehr battalions received such intense fire
that within a few minutes all mounted officers were either dead or wounded.
Two balls mortally wounded Gädicke but the battalion commanders, Lar-
isch (1st) and Martitz (4th), remained unscathed. For a few moments the
shaken Prussians staggered forward before the survivors broke rank and
started firing. Steinmetz rushed forward to stop this ineffective fire. In the
process he too fell and command passed to Colonel Michael Heinrich von
Losthin.73 Along with Larisch and Martitz, Losthin managed to get the
columns to continue the advance. Regardless, steady French volley fire
broke the Landwehr, which retreated in disorder. According to Marmont,
he ordered the Württemberger cavalry brigade to attack the broken
Prussians, but General Normann did not obey. Only after the marshal
repeated the order did the cavalry advance, yet the favorable moment had
passed: “We had fought hard for more than four hours. The enemy had
suffered huge losses from the superior fire of our artillery and its devastating
effect on the masses, when he executed a new attack. It failed like the
previous ones and produced a great disorder among his troops. I gave orders
for the Württemberger cavalry brigade, commanded by General Normann,
to charge this infantry with the goal of creating the greatest confusion. He
initially refused to execute my orders, and the time passed so that there was
nothing useful that could be undertaken. However, after receiving a second
order, it moved off; but it threw itself on a battalion of the 1st Marine
Regiment, overthrew it instead of charging the enemy, who recovered and
resumed his offensive.”74
As the first wave fled back to the Prussian lines, the three battalions of
the second line – Yorck’s last battalions – advanced at the double-quick.
They rushed past the remnant of the first wave on their left heedless of their
own losses. Like Gädicke, Major Malzahn, the commander of the 5th Sile-
sian Landwehr Regiment, led his 1st and 4th Battalions, commanded by
Majors Mumm and Kossecki respectively, up the hill through the hail of lead
followed by Major Leslie’s 1st East Prussian Grenadier Battalion. Again
French musketry claimed the majority of Prussian officers: Malzahn and
Kossecki fell dead while Losthin, Mumm, Leslie, and numerous others
collapsed with serious wounds. Despite the devastating losses, the columns
of the second wave continued uphill, driving over the corpses of their
comrades. Behind them the first wave reorganized and followed. “The fate
of this day hung on a silk thread,” wrote Schack.
Yorck’s situation became worse as his artillery started to go silent due to
counterbattery fire, lack of ammunition, and having its field of fire
obstructed by Steinmetz’s troops. Conversely, Marmont’s guns reached their
greatest intensity. Yorck watched as Steinmetz’s second wave faltered. With
nothing left but his cavalry, Yorck issued orders for the troopers to charge.
Committing the cavalry changed the entire situation and produced the
result. According to one eyewitness: “The struggle grew more intense with
each moment until its severity in and beside Möckern reached such a height
that all at once hundreds of wounded from the ranks of the engaged battal-
ions came streaming back creating such a crisis that it appeared the
approaching climax of the bloody drama would be to our disadvantage. In
this important moment, when everything was at stake, Major Sohr charged
the enemy.”75 It appears that Katzler’s vanguard cavalry stood behind the
left wing (7th and 8th Brigades) and the Reserve Cavalry behind the center
(1st and 2nd Brigades) but further rearward than Katzler while the brigade
cavalry had remained close to their individual brigades. Although Sohr with
his 1st and 2nd Brandenburg Hussar Squadrons and the Jäger detachment of
that regiment served with Katzler’s vanguard that day, he had been tasked
with supporting Hiller’s effort to take Möckern. Therefore, his troopers
stood in squadron columns on the Halle–Leipzig highway only a few
hundred yards west of Möckern; 2nd Brigade’s cavalry – the Mecklenburg
Hussars – remained a few hundred paces behind them. During the attack of
Steinmetz’s first wave, Sohr moved his three squadrons close behind the
second with Möckern to their right (south). Sometime after the attack of the
second wave bogged down, Yorck himself galloped madly toward them and
shouted: “Major Sohr attack!”76 Sohr complied, ordering his men to take no
prisoners.77
Yorck sent the same order to all troops: infantry and cavalry. As the
closest echelon, Sohr’s hussars, with the Brandenburg Uhlans and 5th Sile-
sian Landwehr Cavalry Regiment led by Katzler in second echelon on their
left (north), led the desperate assault. Behind them followed the remaining
regiments of vanguard cavalry, then the Reserve Cavalry and brigade cavalry,
and finally the reorganized infantry of 1st Brigade with the remnant of the
2nd. On Yorck’s left wing, 7th and 8th Brigades finally hurried to close the
distance between them and Marmont’s position. Thick smoke from the fires
that were devouring Möckern prevented Sohr’s troopers from seeing the
French; only the numerous flashes from the enemy’s muskets informed them
that the French had accelerated their counterattack. Fortunately for the
Prussians, the smoke also concealed their approach. Perhaps ten minutes
passed before Sohr gave the order for the bugler to sound the trot. After
moving through the intervals of the Prussian infantry, they completely
surprised Marmont’s approaching columns. The charging Prussian Hussars –
light cavalry – managed to break two battalion columns. With the hussars
pursuing hard on their heels, the fleeing infantry sought the safety of
Marmont’s great battery. Sohr’s troopers plunged into the artillery line,
taking six guns. To save the infantry and artillery, Normann’s
Württemberger cavalry slammed into Sohr’s left flank with “great determin-
ation,” according to the Prussian major. A musket ball pierced Sohr’s right
arm as he led his hussars toward the Württembergers; he switched his saber
to his left hand. A few minutes later, the second echelon of Prussian cavalry
arrived – the Brandenburg Uhlans and 5th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry
Regiment – on Sohr’s left and in the flank of the Württembergers.
Seeing Sohr threatened in the flank by Normann’s cavalry, Yorck placed
himself at the head of three Black Hussar squadrons. With saber in hand, he
shouted “March, march, long live the king!” and reiterated his orders for a
general advance.78 On the French side, one brigade from Lorge’s 5th Light
Cavalry Division rushed up to support the Württembergers but the imper-
ials could not stem the Prussian tide. From the Reserve Cavalry, Jürgaß
arrived with the 1st West Prussian Dragoons. Behind them in the second
wave galloped the Lithuanian Dragoons led by Yorck himself; the 1st
Neumark Landwehr Cavalry and 10th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry followed

the Lithuanians. Not only did the Prussians sweep away the imperial cavalry
but they also delivered the decisive blow to Marmont’s lines. “This was the
situation,” reported Marmont, “and III Corps, whose arrival would have
been so decisive, had not appeared when the enemy threw 6,000 horses
against our masses, which were already grappling at a short distance with
the enemy infantry. In general, our infantry showed composure and courage.
But several battalions of the 1st and 3rd Marine Regiments, which held an
important position, broke, forcing our masses to move closer for better
support.”79 As Marmont’s center caved, the survivors of Lagrange’s
division evacuated Möckern. The remains of Yorck’s right wing emerged
from the village to take part in the general attack. Marmont judged that his
left wing could no longer hold; he now strove to use his still seemingly
unbroken right wing to cover the retreat southeast toward Gohlis.
After Count Brandenburg delivered Yorck’s orders to advance, 7th and
8th Brigades proceeded toward Marmont’s right wing in two waves of
battalion columns with drums beating and bugles blaring. Horn’s first
echelon consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 15th Silesian Landwehr, the
two remaining battalions of the 4th Silesian Landwehr Regiment, and the
Thuringian Battalion from Weimar. The three battalions of Lieutenant-
Colonel Konstantin Gottlieb von Zepelin’s Leib Regiment and the 2nd
Battalion of the 15th Silesian Landwehr formed the second wave. To the
left of Horn, Hünerbein’s 8th Brigade, reduced to five battalions after having
supplied Yorck’s vanguard with three, marched with the Fusilier and 2nd
Battalions of the Brandenburg Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of
the 12th Reserve Regiment in the first wave; the 1st Battalion of the 12th
Reserve and the remaining battalion of the 14th Silesian Landwehr
Regiment, the 3rd, provided the second wave.80
As 7th Brigade approached Marmont’s center and right wing, the French
artillery bit deeply into the Prussian ranks. This caused the first wave to slow
but the second wave to accelerate. As a result, the battalions of the second
wave pushed their way up to the first wave without orders although only the
commander of the 15th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Regiment, Colonel
Wollzogen, fell wounded in the assault. At the head of 1st Battalion of the
Leib Regiment, Horn found himself swept away. According to Count
Brandenburg’s after-action report, Horn’s men advanced steadily but did
not fire a shot; the thicker the enemy caseshot became, the louder the troops
shouted “Hurrah! Long live the king! Forward, forward! We must have
victory!”81 Now that Horn’s two waves had melded into one, the far right
wing battalion (3rd Battalion of the 14th Landwehr) charged the batteries of
Marmont’s center, which managed to escape after losing only one gun. After
clearing the French artillery line, the Prussians moved toward the thick
battalion columns of Friederichs’s 22nd Division, purportedly storming
the French infantry as they would a redoubt and repulsing a French cavalry
attack. Suddenly, a strong blast of artillery raked the left flank of the Leib
Regiment – Russian guns from St.-Priest’s infantry corps had mistakenly
opened fire on the Prussians and continued to blast them until the error
could be corrected. Regardless, Horn’s brigade cavalry moved up. Along
with the infantry, they captured an entire battalion, bringing back some 400
prisoners, 1 flag, and 1 howitzer. Around this time, the Prussian cavalry
slammed into the portion of the marshal’s center that stood close to Möck-
ern. The combined effect of Horn’s attack and the cavalry charge broke the
French center; the effects rippled across the French line. Simultaneously,
Horn’s left and Hünerbein’s five battalions smashed into Marmont’s right,
which likewise started to buckle and retreat.
Hünerbein’s men had advanced with the same resolution as their com-
rades in 7th Brigade but several officers fell to devastating enemy artillery
fire including the commander of the 12th Reserve Regiment, Major Götze,
who numbered among the killed while the commander of the Brandenburg
Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel von Borcke, the commander of the
2nd Battalion of the Brandenburg Regiment, Major Othegraven, and the
commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Reserve Regiment, Major
Laurens, received wounds. In his report, Hünerbein explained that the
brigade endured a “hail of caseshot,” “the blood-lust of the heavy balls,”
and “the bone-shattering crack of bursting grenades.” Finally reaching the
French line, the Fusilier Battalion of the Brandenburg Infantry Regiment
charged an enemy square with bayonets fixed. Struck by a musket ball and
pierced by a French bayonet, the battalion commander, Major Heinrich
Krosigk, fell out of his saddle. With his last breath, he purportedly pointed
his sword toward the French and ordered his men to continue fighting.
Friederichs’s fresh troops fought savagely, making the Prussians pay dearly
for each yard gained. “What poetry tells us of Spartan courage, what the
artist’s brush has painted for us of Roman boldness, was infinitely surpassed
by what took place in this battle,” continued Hünerbein.82 After redirecting
St.-Priest’s two batteries, the Russian guns provided much-needed artillery
support for the Prussians. Still the French fought tenaciously until Frieder-
ichs received Marmont’s order to retreat.
Marmont ordered a general withdrawal during which his left fell back
one mile southeast to Gohlis and his right went a little further to Eutritzsch.
Unfortunately for the French, all of Yorck’s cavalry had reached the field
and engaged. The Brandenburg Hussars and the Brandenburg Uhlans
together brought back twenty-eight guns and five caissons. After cutting
down 200 men, the Black Hussars captured 7 guns and 400 prisoners. The
East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment brought back four guns. Numer-
ous French columns and squares collapsed under the weight of the Prussian
attacks. According to Commandant Weil, Major Stößel, with two squadrons
of Black Hussars, broke a square, was then repulsed by French cavalry,

rallied, and overwhelmed the French troopers. In another example, three
squadrons of Mecklenburg Hussars attacked the rear of a French battalion
while Horn’s infantry assaulted its front. In total, the regiment’s four squad-
rons brought back 700 prisoners and 1 Eagle or as the hussars called it, a
“Vogel [bird].”83 Leading the 1st West Prussian Dragoon Regiment, Jürgaß
drove off Normann’s cavalry, captured four guns, and pursued the French all
the way to Gohlis. Yorck’s other regiments enjoyed similar success.
Yet the thrill of victory eroded Prussian command and control, which
provided the French with some breathing room.84 The retreat of Marmont’s
right toward Eutritzsch necessitated a left wheel by 7th and 8th Brigades.
Already during the approach march and assault, the battalions of Horn’s
right and Hünerbein’s left had collided. Now, the left wheel disordered all of
the latter’s battalions because of the lack of space on the field. Seeking to
exploit this confusion, Friederichs counterattacked and managed to drive
back 8th Brigade. “On our left side toward our rear appeared enemy
masses,” noted the journal of the Lithuanian Dragoons. Led by Henckel
von Donnersmarck, the second wave of the Reserve Cavalry – Lithuanian
Dragoons and 10th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry – came back from the pur-
suit, turned toward the threatened wing, and engaged numerous marine
battalions while Hünerbein and his surviving officers worked to restore
order. Forming two large squares, the French awaited the Prussian attack.
The 10th Silesian Landwehr, commanded by Sohr’s brother, scattered the
closest square but heavy fire from the adjacent square sent the mounted
militia reeling. At that moment, Yorck rode up to the Lithuanians and
shouted: “Go, go, old Lithuanians, cut them down. Do this and everything
is ours.” Despite facing rows of blood-thirsty bayonets, the Lithuanians
immediately charged. According to the journal of the Lithuanian Dragoons:
The square was broken on the first attempt. We had driven deep into the
enemy’s ranks when the Marine Guard opposed us. All who had already
received pardon immediately seized discarded weapons, and now danger was
before us and behind us and a dreadful carnage was the result. On our right
wing, other cavalry joined us; Colonel Welzien came to our support with a
detachment of Silesian Landwehr. Now our Lithuanians abandoned all cau-
tion, because the overpowered [enemy] shot and stabbed like mad everything
around them. But the Guard succumbed. The scene was gruesome. We
penetrated deeper and deeper into the mass that by this time had become
very confused; those who did not fall to the weapon were trampled under the
horses’ hooves; heaps of twenty to thirty of these unfortunates lay jumbled
together; through this some found protection from the fury of our people;
and certainly nothing of this column (1,200 strong) would have escaped had
not an unexpected heated artillery fire from our left side disturbed us from
completing our work.85
The shelling came from Eutritzsch, where the French right wing had
conducted an orderly retreat aided by nightfall and Prussian exhaustion.
With his left and center broken, Marmont sought to reorganize his troops as
much as possible and position them on the left bank of the Rietschke stream
between Gohlis and Eutritzsch. On his orders, 300 Württembergers secured
the crossing over the Rietschke stream at Gohlis. Marmont squarely blamed
Ney for his defeat: “Thus, the troops of VI Corps resisted a force quadruple
its strength for five hours and victory would have been the fruit of our
efforts, despite the disproportion of forces, if the orders given by His
Majesty to support me had been executed.”86 Despite voting for Ney’s death
in 1815, Marmont later absolved the bravest of the brave of any wrongdoing:
“I had to rely on III Corps but Marshal Ney had been disposed of by the
order of the emperor, and had marched to join the Grande Armée. Informed
of my engagement, Napoleon sent him the order to march back, but he was
already beside him. However, he did set in motion to return without being
able to arrive in time to help us, and during this decisive day, having marched
from one army to another, he was not useful anywhere.” Of course this did
not prevent Marmont from blaming the defeat on the failure of III Corps to
arrive: “I felt a great impatience for the arrival of III Corps based on what
Marshal Ney had told me. If it had been available to me, as I was authorized
to believe, it would have debouched on my right, and an offensive move-
ment against the enemy’s left would have ensured the success of the battle,
that is to say the maintenance of our position throughout the day.” Marmont
likewise held Normann accountable: “If the Württembergers had done their
duty, a complete success would have been the fruit of our efforts. Aside from
maintaining the entire battlefield, we would have taken numerous
prisoners.”87
After observing the final struggle at Möckern, Blücher rode to Lin-
denthal. “He had his cooking wagons bring back the wounded from the
battlefield, gave shirts and bed sheets for dressings, used the houses or
villages for the wounded,” recalled his surgeon, Dr. Carl Ludwig Bieske,
“and remained in the field near the watch fires until finally a half-dilapidated
empty smithy was found for him to get a few hours of rest in. His staff
camped in the open field despite the raw weather.”88 The question of how
the Bohemian Army had fared and what the next morning would bring
occupied everyone’s mind. Yorck had no idea of the extent of his losses but
expected them to be extremely numerous. Nevertheless, spirits at Blücher’s
headquarters remained high due in part to Gneisenau’s declaration that
this victory meant the liberation of Germany. That night, Captain August
von Hedemann departed for Bernadotte’s headquarters to deliver news of
the victory as well as Blücher’s request for support on the 17th.89 Captain
Knakfuß sped off through Schkeuditz to Schwarzenberg’s command post.
In the darkness, he missed the road through the difficult Elster valley.
Thus, Knakfuß did not arrive until the following morning around the same
time as Colonel Goltz, Blücher’s first adjutant, who delivered the captured
Eagle.90
During the night, Marmont continued his retreat and crossed the Parthe,
leaving behind Delmas’s division as well as Lorge’s and Fournier’s cavalry
between the Parthe and the Rietschke with strong posts holding Gohlis and
Eutritzsch. Gneisenau moved Sacken and St.-Priest into the front line; the
former east of Möckern, the latter facing Eutritzsch. Rudzevich’s vanguard
bivouacked to the northeast at Mockau. In second line, Langeron’s corps
passed the night at Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch while Yorck’s vanguard,
1st, and 2nd Brigades camped east of Möckern, the 7th and 8th west of St.-
Priest, and outposts along the Rietschke stream. Yorck’s cavalry camped in a
bivouac west of Möckern. Flames from that village and several others licked
the heavens on the cold, damp night. One participant noted in his journal
that “the corps bivouacked on the battlefield, exhausted from the bloody
work of this day. As once before at Leuthen, there sounded a solemn chorus
of the hymn of thanksgiving: ‘Nun danket alle Gott [Now all thank God].’”
In the silence of the night, fires sprang up here and there. Each of us counted
friends and acquaintances among the fallen of this day but the lamenting was
mixed with joy because their blood had not been shed in vain and we had
won.”91
Yorck’s troops had defeated an imperial corps that was well led, equal in
number, and defending an advantageous position.92 His Prussians had
broken and routed Marmont’s center and left, capturing 2,000 men, 40 guns,
2 flags, 1 Eagle, and enough caissons to replenish the ammunition expended
that day. Langeron noted:
There were few enemy forces facing me; they were assembled between
Möckern and Gohlis. The first of these villages was occupied by a great
number of infantry. Yorck attacked it; this intrepid general and the brave
troops under his orders were covered in glory in all the affairs of this
immortal campaign, but, if it is permissible to say so, they once again
surpassed themselves in this memorable battle: one cannot carry heroism
further. Each general, each officer, [and] each soldier in this brave corps
merited on this day the eternal recognition of his country and the admiration
of posterity. The village of Möckern was carried; thirty pieces of cannon
[and] one Eagle of the marines of the French Guard were taken at the point of
the bayonet by the infantry or carried off by the cavalry despite the enemy’s
ferocious resistance. The fighting lasted all day and was equally fierce on both
sides but Prussian valor triumphed over all. This fight may be regarded as one
of the most brilliant but bloodiest of the campaign.93
In particular, the Prussian cavalry earned praise for delivering the decisive
blow and deciding the battle. According to Commandant Weil, “It was
universally recognized that the victory at Möckern was due to the cavalry,
and the first to render this arm the justice it deserved was General Yorck. He
spoke to Major Sohr, who after the battle and although seriously wounded
went riding in front of him: ‘To you alone I owe the victory that we have just
won; I will never forget what you and your brave regiment did today.’”94
The honor of winning “a battle of the most obstinate and sanguinary
class” certainly belonged to the Prussians.95 Yet success came at a heavy
price. Of the 20,831 men who mustered on the morning of 16 October, only
13,150 men remained fit for service on the following day. Of 16,120 infantry,
no more than 9,000 men answered roll call.96 The 172 dead and wounded
officers included Steinmetz and Prince Karl in the latter category as well as 4
brigade, 3 regimental, and 12 battalion commanders from the infantry.97
Although only one member of Yorck’s staff was wounded, Karl’s chief of
staff along with two of Horn’s adjutants had received wounds. Among the
dead were Steinmetz’s chief of staff as well as two regimental and six
battalion commanders. “What could easily have been won in the battle at
Möckern by the combined forces of the Silesian and North German
Armies,” recounted Nostitz, “was laboriously gained by the heroics and
the perseverance of Yorck’s corps. There, the trophies were dearly bought by
one-third of these brave warriors who were killed or wounded.”98 Langeron
continues: “The Prussians paid dearly for the immortal glory with which
they covered themselves. Yorck’s corps, already greatly weakened by the
losses it had previously suffered, lost nearly 7,000 men in this terrible affair.
Almost all of the generals, brigade, and battalion commanders were killed or
wounded. Young Prince Karl of Mecklenburg, Colonels Katzler, Steinmetz,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Hiller; a multitude of other brave officers were
gravely wounded and some regiments were nearly destroyed.”99 “The
battlefield is uncommonly covered with dead and maimed,” wrote Gneise-
nau on the morning of the 18th. “Praise God, there are more French than
ours. Yet our losses are likewise great. Yorck’s corps alone lost 6,000 men
without counting Russian losses. We have taken forty-one cannon and just
as many caissons, which we can use to replenish what we expended in the
battle.”100
Langeron estimated Russian losses to be 1,500 men. His trophies
included 1 flag, 13 guns, numerous baggage wagons, and a few hundred
prisoners. “The Army of Silesia had never fought with more courage or
success,” noted the French émigré; “the indebtedness that I had that day to
the generals and troops under my command attracted Blücher’s attention; he
informed them of his satisfaction and gave an account to the tsar and the
king of Prussia of the success of the day, in adding that he was indebted to
me for a great part of his glory.”101
In his memoirs, Marmont claims to have lost 6,000 to 7,000 men and
27 guns but these figures are probably too low.102 In his report to Berthier,
the marshal made special mention of Lagrange, “who fought a lot at the
beginning of the action” and the commander of Friederichs’s 1st Brigade,
Coëhorn, “who supported all the efforts [to stop] the enemy at the end of
the day.” French wounded included Marmont himself, Compans, and Frie-
derichs. “We have suffered great losses,” reported Marmont, “but those of
the enemy are huge.” In his after-action report, the marshal claimed that VI
Corps had taken 10,000 prisoners but this figure appears highly excessive
and is not repeated in his memoirs. There he noted:
In this battle, the whole of Yorck’s corps, 22,000 men strong, was engaged,
and almost all general or senior officers were killed or wounded as they had
to pay in person to hold their troops together and to maintain their positions
against the fury of our attacks or the energy of our defense. Langeron’s corps
was only partially engaged. Our battlefield was the bloodiest on this memor-
able day, the place where the action was the strongest. I have heard from
various Prussian officers, among them, Goltz, adjutant-general sent by the
king of Prussia to serve with Blücher . . . that after the evacuation of Leipzig
the Allied sovereigns, visiting all the battlefields, were struck by the appear-
ance of it, the number of dead, and especially the proximity of the dead of the
two armies.103
Although a victory, Möckern does not rank among the shining moments
of the Silesian Army’s leadership.104 Certainly Bernadotte’s participation
could have magnified the results of the day but Blücher’s restraint also
contributed to prolonging the struggle and the suffering of Yorck’s men.105
Rather than the boldness that characterized his operations up to that point of
the campaign, he and his staff demonstrated indecision and even paralysis.
Blücher’s lackluster role in the battle becomes even more puzzling due to the
lack of contemporary and historical commentary. With few exceptions,
neither the men who participated nor their great biographers discuss his
underperformance, let alone pass judgment.106
For most of the engagement, Blücher (and apparently his staff as well)
feared a flank attack by large imperial forces debouching from the plateau of
Hohenossig. Like Schwarzenberg during the night of 14/15 October, Blü-
cher possessed no clear idea where Napoleon stood. Unlike Schwarzenberg,
Blücher did not have the benefit of hearing thousands of throats proclaim
Napoleon’s arrival at Leipzig on the 15th with wild shouts of “Vive l’Emper-
eur!” As noted, Blücher learned on the morning of 15 October that his
patrols had found strong columns marching from Bad Düben to Leipzig.
Witte reported that the Imperial Guard as well as a huge artillery train had
reached Leipzig on the 14th; prisoners stated that the French army expected
to deliver a great battle. Rudzevich’s 8:45 a.m. report on the 15th stated his
belief that Napoleon’s entire army had concentrated between Leipzig and
Taucha on the 14th. He speculated that, unless Napoleon planned to take the
defensive, Blücher should expect the French emperor to attack toward
Merseburg or even Halle on the 16th. On the morning of the 16th, Rudze-
vich reported that, as of the previous night, imperial forces still occupied Bad
Düben and that his patrols had found a camp at Krostitz on the Bad Düben–
Leipzig road.
Blücher, the hussar general, had 15,000 cavalry troopers at his disposal on
the 16th. Although Yorck’s horse delivered the coup de grâce at the end of
the battle, neither they nor the Russian cavalry did much at the beginning of
the struggle. Blücher hardly sought to exploit the numerical superiority this
arm enjoyed over Marmont. Instead of attempting to envelop the enemy’s
right, which in turn would have provided a view of what if anything stood
behind Marmont, he allowed it to remain inactive before the imperial
position at Lindenthal. Because Emmanuel’s cavalry remained with
Rudzevich, Blücher did not receive Korf’s precise report that no French
forces could be found on the road to Bad Düben until 5:00. Thus, only at this
time, when they could no longer influence the battle, did Blücher commit
Sacken and St.-Priest.
Blücher obviously thought that the fighting south of Leipzig marked
Schwarzenberg’s assault on Murat’s army and that Napoleon still remained
somewhere between Bad Düben and Leipzig with the Grande Armée.107
Despite the threat presumably posed by Napoleon, the measures taken by
Blücher to secure his left wing are baffling. To defend his left against French
forces supposedly approaching from the Mulde, he sacrificed his reserve by
holding back Sacken’s corps some four miles west of the battlefield rather
than moving it northeast. Moreover, he also halted St.-Priest’s infantry,
which in turn retarded the deployment of Langeron’s corps. Merely stop-
ping St.-Priest and Sacken in their tracks did little to defend Blücher’s left.
Not until 2:00 did he send a sizeable cavalry force – Langeron’s Reserve
Cavalry under Korf – to Podelwitz.
More critically, the retreat of Marmont’s van southeast to Lindenthal
rather than northeast toward Hohenossig revealed Blücher’s faulty assump-
tion. Recognition of Marmont’s position on the Eutritzsch–Möckern line
and the sustained intensity of the guns in the Wachau sector both provided
strong proof that Napoleon’s main force stood south of Leipzig. Based on
this evidence, Blücher should have concluded that only small detachments
remained on the Bad Düben–Leipzig highway. If further concern over his
left flank still troubled him, he could have echeloned Sacken and St.-Priest
behind Langeron’s left wing, sending Sacken’s entire cavalry toward Hohe-
nossig for security. This would have allowed the Silesian Army to wage a
uniform battle. With his left thus secured, Langeron could have concentrated
his superior numbers against Da˛browski. After driving the Poles across the
Parthe, he could have left their pursuit to his cavalry while his infantry
wheeled south to attack Marmont’s right flank. Instead of holding back

Horn and Hünerbein until the Wiederitzsch villages had fallen, Yorck
could have advanced in echelon from the left wing. Langeron’s attack
combined with the advance of Yorck’s left would have driven Marmont
against the Elster unless he quickly withdrew across the Rietschke stream.
Had Sacken’s cavalry been sent toward Hohenossig, it could have reported
the approach of Delmas’s division as well as the news that no further enemy
troops could be found on the road from Bad Düben. In view of the task that
Delmas had taken on – protecting III Corps’s trains – Sacken’s cavalry alone
would have sufficed to either halt his advance or force him to retreat across
the Parthe. Blücher could have then pushed the infantry belonging to Sacken
and St.-Priest into the angle between the Parthe and Rietschke in case
Marmont attempted to make a stand between Gohlis, Eutritzsch, and
Schönefeld.
By simply halting Sacken, Yorck and Langeron became mired in two
widely separated and generally mutually exclusive engagements. Unable
to influence the course of the other’s combat, both fought without support,
which required the Prussians to sustain horrendous losses to attain their
objective. In this case, the fixation of the army’s leadership on Hohenossig
rather than the situation at hand again led to an oversight that contributed
to the slaughter of Yorck’s men. Instead of wheeling southeast after taking
Lindenthal and directing his attack on the strongest point of Marmont’s
position, Yorck should have advanced in unison with Langeron’s corps to
ensure mutual support and a uniform battle. By fixing Marmont’s left
at Möckern with Hiller’s brigade-size vanguard, Yorck could have
punched through Marmont’s center and right while Langeron – with
Sacken and St.-Priest echeloned behind his left wing – crushed the Poles.
Success would have forced the French to evacuate Möckern without a
struggle to avoid being cut off from Leipzig or driven into the Elster.
Blücher and his staff should have provided Yorck with instructions,
because the corps commander did not have the necessary overview of
the battle to make such a decision. Rather than requesting orders, the
man of Tauroggen decided to take the bull by the horns. While blame for
the lack of coordination between the two corps should be placed on the
army’s leadership, Yorck can be faulted for his execution of the battle.
In holding back his left wing per Blücher’s order, he also should have
delayed Hiller’s attack on Möckern. By refusing his left and attacking with
his right, Yorck allowed Marmont to achieve mass on his own left wing.
Yorck then fed his men into the sausage grinder. Bogdanovich is very
critical of Yorck for not following Blücher’s plan: “The weakest point of
this [Marmont’s] position was without doubt its right wing, on
which Blücher personally led the attack; Yorck should have supported
Langeron’s corps.”108
French success on Napoleon’s right and center counterbalanced Allied gains

on his left, mainly Blücher’s victory over Marmont at Möckern. Around 4:00,
Macdonald started to roll up Wittgenstein’s right: II Cavalry Corps and 35th
Division took Kleinpösna; 31st Division prepared to attack Seifertshain; and
36th Division turned west against the Niederholz. By 5:00, the French held
Seifertshain and had driven the Austrians from the Niederholz. Yet, as darkness
fell, the imperials ran out of steam. After failing to eject the Prussians from
Großpösna, Macdonald’s 36th Division returned to the Niederholz; 35th
Division withdrew from Kleinpösna to Fuchshain; and 31st Division receded
to the Kolm hill. By nightfall, the French again held the Connewitz–Wachau–
Liebertwolkwitz line from where they started the battle.109
Ultimately, Napoleon lost the battle of Leipzig on 16 October. His own
miscalculation coupled with Blücher’s commitment to battle and Gyulay’s
appearance at Lindenau cost the emperor dearly. David Chandler asserts that
the arrival of either VI, IV, or III Corps “would almost certainly have led to
victory” in the Wachau sector.110 Napoleon’s instructions to Ney on the
morning of the 16th strongly indicate that he did not believe the Silesian
Army would advance on Leipzig from the direction of Halle. Ney’s orders,
arriving via Berthier’s office, stem from Napoleon’s directives to the major-
general: a letter that was not included in the nineteenth-century publication
of Napoleon’s correspondence. According to Berthier’s dispatch, Ney,
having under his command VI, IV, and III Corps as well as the three
divisions of III Cavalry Corps, should remain close to Leipzig throughout
the 16th. “If this morning we have no glimpse of an army debouching from
Halle, as there is ample evidence that no one has seen anything, the duc de
Raguse [Marmont] will cross the Leipzig bridge and be ready to enter the
battle between Leipzig and Liebertwolkwitz with his three divisions in
echelons,” explained Napoleon. General Jean-Thomas Lorge’s 5th Light
Cavalry Division would conduct reconnaissance toward Halle on the high-
way from Leipzig. The cavalry divisions of Defrance and Fournier would
“patrol all roads.” Napoleon also instructed Ney to send German-speaking
soldiers disguised as peasants toward Halle to collect intelligence. “If one
sees the enemy infantry in the direction of Halle and Landsberg, he must
attack strongly and try to take prisoners in order to obtain news. The prince
de la Moskova [Ney] will send patrols to Taucha and to Eilenburg.”111
Some historians attribute the emperor’s mistake to the rumor spread by
St.-Priest concerning the march of the entire Silesian Army to Lindenau.112
In fact, Napoleon’s certainty that Blücher actually stood on the western (left)
bank of the Saale is reiterated in Ney’s orders to Marmont, Bertrand, and
Souham: “All reports claim that the enemy is in position on the left bank of
the Saale between Halle and Merseburg.” Consequently, Ney, who had
reached imperial headquarters at Reudnitz early that morning, sent instruc-
tions directing VI Corps to Liebertwolkwitz while Souham’s III Corps
assumed Marmont’s former position between Lindenthal and Breitenfeld.

Yet Ney incorrectly assumed that III Corps had already arrived from Bad
Düben.113 With the exception of Delmas’s 9th Division, III Corps marched
only ten miles southwest from Bad Düben to Hohenroda on 15 October.
Reaching Hohenroda at 12:00 a.m. on 16 October, Souham granted his men
three hours of rest. Meanwhile, 9th Division bivouacked at Bad Düben
during the night of 15/16 October. At 3:00 a.m. on the 16th, III Corps
continued its march with 11th Division leading followed by the artillery and
8th Division; cavalry covered the corps’s right flank by scouring the region
between the Leipzig–Bad Düben and Leipzig–Delitzsch roads. Having to
first march ten miles meant that the head of 11th Division could reach the
outskirts of Mockau sometime after 11:30 a.m. 114 It would then have to
cross the Parthe and march eight additional miles to reach Liebertwolkwitz.
Thus denied his Regular Reserve and forced by Wittgenstein’s attack to
bolster the line with his Grand Reserve, Napoleon experienced the same
difficulties as did many of the marshals who failed him at independent
command: insufficient reserves. Having a Regular Reserve would have
allowed him to support weak sectors along his own line while making
diversions to weaken points along his enemy’s front, which in turn would
have provided the opportunity for the Grand Reserve to punch through and
shatter Allied cohesion. This simple formula, which had brought Napoleon
so much success in the past, broke down thanks to Prussian impetuosity.
Notes
1 Unger, Blücher, II:109. For an excellent description of the terrain around Leipzig,
see Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 324–26.
3 This figure includes Marmont’s VI Corps (20,000 men) and Lorge’s 5th Light
Cavalry Division (1,500 men) of III Cavalry Corps between Breitenfeld and
Radefeld; Bertrand’s IV Corps (14,000 men) at Eutritzsch with Ney’s headquarters
as well as at Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch and Seehausen; Souham with 8th and 11th
Divisions (12,000 men) of III Corps and Defrance’s 4th Heavy Cavalry Division
(1,500 men) of III Cavalry Corps at Mockau; Da˛browski’s 27th Division (3,000 men)
and Fournier’s 6th Light Cavalry Division (1,200 men) of III Cavalry Corps along
the Parthe close to Mockau. Leipzig’s garrison and depot consisted of 3,500 and
2,250 men respectively. The 4,000 men of 9th Division of III Corps were en route
from Bad Düben. See Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 231.
4 Later in the day, Napoleon endorsed Ney’s decision by ordering Bertrand to hold
the Lindenau sector to the last man.
5 SHAT, C2 157: Ney to Berthier, 17 October 1813; Pelet, Des principales opérations
de la campagne de 1813, 235, 238, 242; Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1847:94; Ney to
Napoleon, Eutritzsch, 10:30 a.m., 16 October 1813, in Pelet, Des principales
opérations de la campagne de 1813, 238.
6 Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 83–84. General Pelet claims that
“long after, when the battle against Blücher was engaged, Marshal Ney made
Souham’s [Brayer’s] and Ricard’s divisions of III Corps march. But instead of
directing them to Liebertwolkwitz, he moved them to Schönefeld where they
remained at his disposal and covered the parks. They passed part of the afternoon
near the mill, sometimes summoned by the emperor, other times called by the
marshal, whom Blücher strongly pressed. Thus, they found themselves almost
completely detached from the events of the day”: Pelet, Des principales opérations
de la campagne de 1813, 242. In Histoire de la guerre, I:209, Vaudoncourt claims
that “this movement was most unfortunate in that these divisions wasted the day in
marches and countermarches.” Although Aster’s chronology is wrong regarding
the time of departure of the two divisions of III Corps, he makes an interesting
point: “Because a significant number of troops (apparently) had remained inactive,
the actions of these two divisions [8th and 11th of III Corps] on the 16th have been
blamed on various factors. But to what extent this complaint is justified can be
difficult to determine. Also, their actions were not absolutely caused by Marshal
Ney . . . Ney was not the commander who led the troops on a useless march when
they were necessary for winning a battle. Instead, it is important to observe here that
Napoleon, standing in the background, was in a bad situation and even needed
reinforcements, and so gave the orders. The escort of the large parks at Schönefeld
required troops; thus these two divisions initially were directed there before
Delmas’s division from III Corps arrived, whereupon the first two, after they had
taken Groß- and Kleinwiederitzsch, departed for Liebertwolkwitz and Dösen and
therefore had to put a five-hour march behind them. That all such changes of troop
masses are not so quick and easy to perform as that of an individual and that they
require more time are obvious; therefore, the criticism expressed over this is unjust.
Considering how Napoleon left Vandamme to his fate at Kulm, it is quite possible
that here he acted the same and withdrew the troop masses he had earlier promised
Marmont”: Aster, Leipzig, I:504–05. Yorck von Wartenburg affirms that Ney sent
these two divisions through Schönefeld to Napoleon but after receiving “more
accurate information regarding the danger that threatened Marmont,” the emperor
returned both divisions to this marshal “but they did not arrive in time to take their
part in the fighting”: Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:349.
7 Fain, 1813, II:404.
8 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:18–20. Maude explains that Wittgenstein
distributed Russian divisions and Prussian brigades, even regiments, with “no
system at all”: Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 254–55.
9 This number breaks down to 16,120 infantry, 3,101 cavalry, and 1,610 gunners
arranged in 34.75 battalions, 43 squadrons, and 104 cannon in 13 batteries. In the
heat of battle, Yorck failed to utilize all his artillery. Of his 104 guns, only 88 came
into action and 2 entire batteries remained in reserve until the end of the battle.
From the 88 guns that came into action, the Prussians fired 2,477 cannonballs, 546
canisters, and 316 shells. See Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1847:108.
10 Langeron’s units consisted of 33 battalions, 24 squadrons, 2 Cossack regiments,
and 110 guns. Shcherbatov’s VI Infantry Corps from Langeron’s army corps still
had not rejoined the army.
11 Sacken’s corps contained 8,931 infantry and gunners, 2,986 regular cavalry, and
some 2,000 Cossacks: Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1847:95.
12 In Die Feldzüge, 77, Müffling states that Blücher believed all French forces had
already reached Leipzig from Bad Düben but could not be certain.
14 Rudzevich to Blücher is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1847:92; Friederich, Herbst-
feldzug 1813, III:82; Steffens, Adventures, 118; “Operations of the Army of
Silesia in the Battles Before Leipzig,” Lowe, 20 October 1813, Add MSS,
20111, 163.
15 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:82, 111. Friederich maintains that these
reports warranted Blücher’s caution: “And, indeed, had Reynier not in the last
moment decided to take the detour through Eilenburg, not merely the 4,000 men
of Delmas’s division but instead a total of 17,000 men could have appeared in the
left flank of the Silesian Army. Under these circumstances a prudent view of the
situation appears completely understandable, even justifiable, in the early hours
of the 16th.”
16 Lowe explained that on the 16th, “simultaneously” with “Blücher’s discovery of
the enemy’s position, information arrived that the Prince Royal had changed the
disposition adopted for his army on the preceding day, having given directions for
its proceeding [southwest] by the way of Gröbzig and Wettin to Halle instead of
directing its march [southeast] in a straight line by Zörbig toward Leipzig. At the
same time a continued fire of artillery with clouds of smoke, to the right and on
the opposite side of the town of Leipzig, announced that the engagement had
already commenced between the Allied Armies and the enemy in that direction”:
“Operations of the Army of Silesia in the Battles Before Leipzig,” Lowe, 20 Octo-
ber 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 163. Lowe added in his report to Bunbury that, had
Bernadotte “moved on Zörbig during the 15th,” the Army of North Germany
“would have been at hand to support the Army of Silesia”: Lowe to Bunbury,
Leipzig, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 177.
17 Stewart comments on this situation twice in his Narrative. First, he notes that
“hopes were entertained, which proved fallacious, that the cavalry and flying
artillery of the Prince Royal’s army would be in line.” “A direct march on . . .
Radefeld, would, without question, have brought the Army of North Germany
into action on the 16th, which would have rendered the victory much more
decisive.” Second, he claimed that “the Prince Royal, however, assured me that
in case General Blücher should make an attack the following day, I might give the
General his word that he would be on the ground in the direction of Delitzsch
and Eilenburg with 8,000 or 10,000 cavalry and light artillery to support him,
even if his infantry could not arrive. This pledge I stated totidem verbis to General
Blücher when I joined him”: Stewart, Narrative, 155–56, 162.
18 Stewart, Narrative, 162; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:82–83; Quistorp,
Geschichte der Nord-Armee, II:210; “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS,
20112, 273.
19 “Operations of the Army of Silesia in the Battles Before Leipzig,” Lowe, 20 Octo-
ber 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 164; Langeron to Blücher is in Höpfner, “Darstel-
lung,” 1847:93; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 78–79.
20 Blücher’s disposition is in Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1847:93. See also Lowe to

Bunbury, Leipzig, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 178.
21 Quoted in Blasendorff, Blücher, 229; Unger, Blücher, II:113; Müffling, Die
Feldzüge, 80.
ber 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 164; Stewart to Charles John, 9:15 a.m., 16 October
1813, in Stewart, Narrative, 162–63. In his defense of Bernadotte, Swederus
attempts to discredit Stewart. “One finds nothing but contradictions in the
behavior of the subordinate Allies toward the commander of the North German
Army. Stewart says that he had delivered the prince’s promise that cavalry and
light artillery would come to Blücher’s aid, even if the infantry could not arrive as
quickly. Now, in Blücher’s name, Stewart asked in writing if the prince would
have the North German Army ‘go to Delitzsch on the left wing’ so that the prince
would have the opportunity to participate in the fighting, which through this
would be decisive. This supposedly occurred by 9:45 on the morning of the 16th.
Now the prince, if he had received Stewart’s letter while on the march from the
area of Sylbitz, and had he deemed it appropriate, could have complied with
Blücher’s wishes but under no circumstances could he have reached Delitzsch
with the troops before evening and then nothing more could be done. So it was
not surprising that (according to Stewart’s own report) the prince replied: ‘One
would be a fool to follow his words.’” Moreover, Swederus incorrectly claims
that in his letter Stewart guaranteed the security of Bernadotte’s march to
Delitzsch by assuring the crown prince that all the bridges over the Mulde were
down. On the contrary, Stewart makes no mention of bridges in his letter.
Swederus also questions the feasibility of the demands made on the crown prince:
“Why should Blücher write letters to him [the crown prince] or have to send
Stewart to verbally persuade him to do what he had promised? Also, the fulfill-
ment of the promise could not be accomplished before the 17th.” In the end,
Swederus resorts to character assassination: “on every occasion, Stewart showed
himself to be unreliable in the highest degree; also he certainly would not mention
here that others would not rely on him.” See Swederus, Schwedens Politik und
Kriege, II:314–15.
23 SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October 1813; Pelet, Des principales
opérations de la campagne de 1813, 238; Weil, Campagne de 1813, 239; Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1847:89; Marmont, Mémoires, V:281–82.
24 Marmont, Mémoires, V:282; SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October
1813. Weil laments that, “although the day before he had reported the march and
approach of the Silesian Army to headquarters, Marmont nevertheless received
on the morning of the 16th the order to cross through Leipzig and arrive to serve
as the reserve to the Grande Armée”: Weil, Campagne de 1813, 239. Yet Pelet is
critical of Marmont, suggesting that with quicker action and economy of force on
his part, VI Corps still could have supported Napoleon in the Wachau sector:
“But it seems that the retreat of VI Corps could have started before 9:00; if it had,
VI Corps could have been near Liebertwolkwitz before noon; and if it had
operated with a rearguard masking Blücher, he would not have been able to reach
Gohlis before 3:00 p.m.” According to this line of thought, Napoleon already
would have secured his victory over Schwarzenberg and Blücher’s presence north
of the city would have meant little: Pelet, Des principales opérations de la cam-
pagne de 1813, 239.
25 SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October 1813; Marmont, Mémoires,
V:282–83.
26 Marmont, Mémoires, V:283; SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October
1813. Commandant Weil adds that Marmont’s position between Möckern and
Eutritzsch was “more favorable and stronger” than the one he had quit at
Lindenthal and that the marshal could hope to maintain it as long as he received
support from III Corps. “It was, in fact, impossible for him to expect that only
one of the divisions of the corps (Delmas) would be able to take part in the
battle”: Weil, Campagne de 1813, 239. On the other hand, Pelet claims that
Marmont had the “disastrous idea to accept battle on the bare plain that extends
from Wiederitzsch to Möckern instead of retiring behind the valley of the
Rietschke”: Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 238.
27 Altogether, Da˛browski’s division of 4 battalions, 8 squadrons, and 8 guns totaled
2,500 men. Combined, Fournier’s division and Avice’s brigade at most provided
1,200 troopers.
28 SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October 1813; Unger, Blücher, II:110.
29 Marmont, Mémoires, V:283–84. Marmont’s VI Corps consisted of many
recently formed units that did not see much action during the Fall Campaign.
Jean-Dominique Compans’s 20th Division contained two Marine Regiments
(1st and 3rd), 32nd Light Infantry Regiment (two battalions), and two provi-
sional Line regiments (20th and 25th). The 20th Provisional Line consisted only
of the 5th Battalion of the 66th Line and the 3rd Battalion of the 122nd Line
while the 25th consisted of the 3rd Battalions of the 47th and 86th Line
Regiments. Joseph Lagrange’s 21st Division comprised the four battalions of
the 37th Light Infantry Regiment, the sole battalion of the Spanish Joseph
Napoleon Regiment, three battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment, and the
six battalions of the 2nd Marine Regiment. Jean-Parfait Friederichs’s
22nd Division contained the two battalions (4th Battalion of the 1st Line and
2nd Battalion of the 62nd Line) of the 11th Provisional Line Regiment, the two
battalions (3rd Battalion of the 14th Line and 4th Battalion of the 16th Line) of
the 13th Provisional Line, two battalions of the 23rd Light Infantry Regiment,
two battalions of the 15th Line, the two battalions (6th Battalion of the
26th Line and 6th Battalion of the 82nd Line) of the 16th Provisional Line,
two battalions of the 121st Line, and two battalions of the 70th Line. Marmont’s
cavalry consisted of Normann’s 2nd and 4th Regiments of Württemberger light
cavalry each containing four squadrons.
30 For an excellent description of the advantages the Liebertwolkwitz ridge afforded
Napoleon, see Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 438.
31 “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 269; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 80;
Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1847:95.
32 Blücher ordered Langeron to send troops both through and around Lindenthal
but this did not occur. It is likely that Blücher observed Yorck’s advance on
Lindenthal and redirected Langeron to Breitenfeld.
33 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:213. The Count of Brandenburg (1792–1850) was

the illegitimate son of King Frederick William II of Prussia and Countess Sophia
Dönhoff, his morganatic second wife.
34 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1847:95. On the day of Möckern, Yorck’s vanguard
contained eight squadrons, eight and three-quarters battalions, and one battery
each of foot and horse artillery. Katzler’s cavalry included the 2nd Leib Hussar
Regiment (two squadrons), the Brandenburg Hussar Regiment (three squadrons),
the Brandenburg Uhlan Regiment (four squadrons), the 5th Silesian Landwehr
Cavalry Regiment (four squadrons) and Horse Battery Nr. 2. Hiller’s infantry
consisted of eight and three-quarters battalions: two companies of East Prussian
Jäger, one company of Guard Jäger, the Leib Grenadier Battalion, the West
Prussian Grenadier Battalion, the 1st Battalion of the Brandenburg Infantry
Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 12th Reserve Infantry Regiment, the Fusilier
Battalion of the 2nd East Prussian Infantry Regiment, the 4th Battalion of the
15th Silesian Landwehr Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Silesian
Landwehr Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Silesian Landwehr Regiment
and the Nr. 12 Foot Battery. Incidentally, this large allotment for the vanguard
considerably weakened Yorck’s 2nd and 8th Brigades, leaving Karl and
Hünerbein with five battalions each: Wagner, Plane der Schlachten, II:96.
36 Stewart, Narrative, 156; Marmont, Mémoires, V:282.
37 As noted, Langeron rerouted his troops to march southeast from Radefeld to
Breitenfeld rather than south from Radefeld to Lindenthal per Blücher’s orders:
Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:150.
39 Gneisenau issued verbal orders for Langeron’s cavalry to move to the left wing
and for Sacken’s to fill the gap between Langeron and Yorck. The adjutant who
delivered the orders incorrectly stated to Sacken that all cavalry should move to
the left wing.
41 At the beginning of the battle, Yorck’s Heavy Battery Nr. 1, the mortars assigned
to both heavy batteries, and 7th Brigade’s Nr. 3 Battery of six-pound guns, all
protected by four squadrons from the 1st Neumark and 10th Silesian Landwehr
Regiments, opened fire on what appeared to be an enemy rearguard on the hills
north of Möckern. Shortly after, Heavy Battery Nr. 2 unlimbered to the right of
its sister battery, next to it stood 1st Brigade’s Nr. 2 Battery of six-pound guns.
After the Nr. 3 Battery rejoined 7th Brigade, the Nr. 1 and 3 Horse Batteries
unlimbered to the left of Heavy Battery Nr. 1 with 8th Brigade’s Nr. 15 Battery
anchoring the left of the artillery line. Most of the smaller mortars were left in the
rear: Wagner, Plane der Schlachten, II:84.
42 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:87.
43 Bordessoulle’s 1st Heavy Division contained three brigades, the third being all
Saxons including the cuirassiers of the Royal Guard.
44 It is not known why Yorck did not send a small detachment with some artillery
across the bridge at Wahren to operate on the left bank of the Elster against the
flank of the French skirmishers and artillery posted in and around Möckern.

48 SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October 1813.
49 Quoted in Blasendorff, Blücher, 230.
54 Some accounts claim that Marmont was wounded by the blast. In his after-action
report, he states that “I was wounded and my uniform riddled; everyone around
me was killed or struck down”: SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October
1813. However, in his memoirs he states that “wounded in the left hand by a ball
while leading the 20th and 25th Regiments to the charge, I finally left the
battlefield. I was not bandaged until 10:00 p.m.”: Marmont, Mémoires, V:287.
Weil also implies that Marmont was indeed wounded by the blast: Weil, Cam-
pagne de 1813, 241.
57 Olsufiyev’s other division, the 15th, provided the infantry for Rudzevich’s
vanguard.
58 “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 270–71.
59 Lowe, Stewart, and Langeron incorrectly attribute this turn to the arrival of
considerable reinforcements from Leipzig led by Napoleon himself. Lowe notes
that “another corps had moved forward on his [Langeron’s] right and regained
possession of the village of Großwiederitzsch. And after the victory had declared
in his favor on all sides, General Blücher had the gratification to learn that
Napoleon, alarmed at the rapid strides which the Silesian Army was making
toward Leipzig, had himself come to the ground in front of Langeron’s line of
attack and arrived just in time to witness the defeat of his troops and capture of
his artillery.” In his report to Bunbury, Lowe puts Napoleon’s arrival at 5:00 p.m.
According to Stewart, “Sacken’s corps, which supported General Langeron, very
much distinguished itself in the presence of Napoleon, who, it seems (according
to the information of prisoners), had arrived from the other wing of his army at
5:00 in the evening.” Langeron’s journal states: “according to reports from
prisoners, the emperor Napoleon himself had come to direct the attacks.” He
corrects this in his published memoirs: “The quantity of troops that advanced on
me at that moment, in enormous, tightly packed columns, at first made me believe
that it was Napoleon, and that he had disengaged from the Grand Army [of
Bohemia] to fall on us but we later learned that he had remained to the right
[southeast] of Leipzig, and had detached some corps against us which would have
been necessary for him to use to follow up the success he initially had against the
Grand Army [of Bohemia], to whom our brilliant and audacious maneuver was
most helpful.” Napoleon did not appear in this sector of the battlefield and it is
very doubtful that reinforcements had arrived from Leipzig because no French
troops were available to come to Da˛browski’s aid. In addition, Marmont makes
no mention of the arrival of reinforcements. More likely, Emmanuel had faced

only a detachment of Da˛browski’s cavalry at Großwiederitzsch while the main
body of this cavalry as well as possibly also Avize’s brigade still stood at
Eutritzsch or had just arrived. See “Operations of the Army of Silesia in the
Battles Before Leipzig,” Lowe, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 165–66; Lowe
to Bunbury, Leipzig, 20 October 1813, ibid., 180; “Journal de Langeron,” Add
MSS, 20112, 271; Langeron, Mémoires, 314; Stewart, Narrative, 157; Friederich,
Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:63.
62 The 9th Division departed from Bad Düben at 4:00 a.m. to unite with the rest of
III Corps. Although the park and reserve were ahead of it, bad roads slowed their
progress along with fear that the ordinary escort did not suffice to protect the
convoy from prowling Cossacks. As a result, 9th Division caught up with the
trains and Delmas decided to escort the convoy. See Fabry, ed., Journal des
opérations du IIIe Corps, 85.
63 “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 271–72. “It is completely inexplicable,”
judges Friederich, “how the Russians, with the superiority in numbers that they
enjoyed, fought such a seesaw and prolonged battle and how it was even possible
for the Russians to have been thrown back on the defensive for a while. Most
accounts seek to explain this wonderful fact by claiming that a division from
Souham’s corps had arrived to help, an explanation whose incorrectness has been
proven with certainty. No doubt, the error that the long wagon train of the III
Corps caused Langeron to make contributed much to his uncertain behavior; a
mistake that would have been easily avoided with proper use of his numerous
cavalry”: Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:114. Indeed, some accounts such as
Wagner, Plane der Schlachten, II:92–93, incorrectly state that a second division
from III Corps – Souham’s 8th – supported Delmas, but this mistake can also be
traced to the errors in reporting by Lowe and Langeron. Lowe wrote: “General
Count Langeron still pursued his advantages and even made preparation for
crossing the stream of the Parthe when a strong body of the enemy’s infantry
consisting of about 8,000 or 10,000 men was observed approaching on his left
flank, commanded as it was afterwards appeared by Marshal Ney and coming
from the direction of Eilenburg.” See “Operations of the Army of Silesia in the
Battles Before Leipzig,” Lowe, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 165. Neither
Vaudoncourt nor Weil makes this mistake. Bogdanovich’s account has a slight
twist. The Russian General Staff historian states that at 3:00 Da˛browski and
Delmas, whose division escorted the trains on the road from Bad Düben, attacked
the Russians, took both Wiederitzsch villages, and drove Langeron’s men across
the Rietschke. “At the same time, there appeared on the road from Bad Düben,
near Hohenossig, a large column. The enemy column observed on the road from
Bad Düben consisted of the parks and trains of the French III Corps, which was
moving with a small escort to unite with the army. Langeron did not know this
and believed he had to reinforce his wing; thus he could not assist Yorck, and
Kaptsevich became separated from St.-Priest”: Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIb:158.
64 Langeron cites the twelve battalions of the 7th, 12th, 22nd, 30th, and 48th Jäger
Regiments as well as the Olonetskii and Shlisselburgskii Infantry Regiments
supported by Emmanuel’s cavalry as participating in the advance that he and
Rudzevich led. The 30th and 48th Jäger formed a brigade belonging to the 17th
Division of St.-Priest’s infantry corps. Langeron does not explain how this
brigade came to fight alongside his corps on this day: “Journal de Langeron,”
Add MSS, 20112, 272.
ber 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 165.
66 Unfortunately, the journal of III Corps contains few accurate facts about these
events: Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 85.
67 Lowe to Bunbury, Leipzig, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 180.
68 According to Swederus, “Stewart did not find the prince at Sylbitz. The head-
quarters of the North German Army was moved four times that day; first it was
at Sylbitz, then Marschwitz, later at Hohenthurm, and finally at Rensdorf by
Landsberg, thus the four locations where the prince had signed and dated letters.
In deep resentment, Stewart attacked Adlerkreutz with his wishes; to be rid of
him, Adlerkreutz referred him to Wintzingerode, who replied that his emperor
had made it his duty to strictly obey the crown prince – a response which proves
that the disaffected Stewart had made the attempt to persuade Wintzingerode to
do the same as the Prussian generals and give himself orders and execute them”:
Swederus, Schwedens Politik und Kriege, 316.
69 Stewart, Narrative, 163–65. Stewart concludes this episode by stating: “I think
I have said enough to show that, if the Prince had exerted all his faculties, and the
mental and physical energy he possessed, the corps of Marmont . . . would have
been more completely overthrown, and the serious losses of Yorck’s corps of
Prussians spared, by the timely arrival of the Prince Royal’s army.” Swederus
counters Stewart’s portrayal of these events: “Now, had Stewart’s journey from
Radefeld to Sylbitz (four [twenty-one] miles) at 9:45 a.m. produced a resolution,
which, executed for the (incorrectly predicted) struggle of the day, which in
reality did not take place, could it have brought about some benefit? Stewart
could not have reached Sylbitz before 11:00. If the army had marched according
to the desire of the ignorant strategists, it could not cover these four or five miles
until very late in the evening and especially considering how bad and rain soaked
the roads were at that time.” While true to a degree, Swederus’s apology fails to
take into consideration the crown prince’s decisions on the 15th. Moreover, as
Schwarzenberg had ordered a general attack on the 16th, how can Swederus claim
that the struggle was “incorrectly predicted”? See Swederus, Schwedens Politik
und Kriege, 316.
70 SHAT, C17 133: Charles John to Wintzingerode, Rensdorf, 16 October 1813.
Even in this move, retired Prussian Generalleutnant Barthold von Quistorp, a
veteran of the nineteenth-century Prussian wars against Denmark, Austria, and
France, found disingenuous activity by Bernadotte. Quistorp states that “relying
comfortably” on Wintzingerode’s obedience, the crown prince decided to have
him personally accompany the cavalry rather than Wintzingerode’s “very active”
vanguard commander, Vorontsov. It should be noted that, unlike many
nineteenth-century historians, General Quistorp meticulously footnoted his

work. His three volumes contain 1,117 endnotes.
72 SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October 1813; Gneisenau to Caroline,
Kleinwiederitzsch, 18 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau,
Nr. 21.
73 In the order of battle for Yorck’s corps, the 5th and 13th Silesian Landwehr
Infantry Regiments formed a Landwehr Brigade commanded by Losthin and
attached to 1st Brigade. A battalion commander at Jena in 1806, Losthin retreated
to Silesia after the defeat to defend the fortress of Glatz. At the head of a newly
formed Grenadier Battalion, he fought with distinction and received the Pour le
Mérite for his actions, albeit three years later. As a lieutenant-colonel in 1809, he
received command of the 2nd Silesian Infantry Regiment. Losthin’s promotion to
colonel came in 1811. In the spring of 1813, he was one of many officers charged
with making the Landwehr capable of field service. In the Waterloo Campaign,
Losthin commanded the 15th Brigade of Bülow’s IV Corps, which consisted
mainly of Landwehr. That the Prussian army performed as well as it did in the
wars of 1813–1815 was due to officers such as Losthin who labored to make the
Landwehr combat-ready. Without the 100,000 men of the Landwehr who par-
ticipated in the campaigns during these years, Prussia could not have played such
a decisive role in Napoleon’s defeat.
74 Marmont, Mémoires, V:285. It should be noted that Marmont does not mention
this incident in his after-action report: SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19
October 1813.
76 Quoted in Blasendorff, Blücher, 231; and in Henckel von Donnersmarck, in
Erinnerungen, 228.
77 Sohr gave this order to maintain the cohesion of his squadrons and prevent the
weakening of their combat power by detaching for prisoner escort. His hussars
brought back only one colonel and a few officers as prisoners: Höpfner, “Dar-
80 In the order of battle for I Corps, the 4th and 15th Silesian Landwehr Infantry
Regiments formed a Landwehr Brigade commanded by Colonel Heinrich Wil-
helm von Welzien and attached to 7th Brigade. In September, attrition prompted
the Prussians to combine the 2nd and 4th Battalions of the 4th Regiment into one.
Moreover, the 1st Battalion of the 4th along with the 3rd Battalion of the 15th
formed part of the garrison at Wartenburg, meaning the 4th Regiment contained
only two battalions on 16 October and, because Wedel’s 4th Battalion served with
the vanguard at Möckern, the 15th Regiment likewise consisted of two battalions.
From the 14th Silesian Landwehr, the 1st and 4th Battalions formed part of the
garrison at Wartenburg while Thiele’s 2nd Battalion served with the vanguard at
Möckern. The 1st Battalion of the Brandenburg Infantry Regiment likewise
served with the vanguard on the day of Möckern.
83 Lowe to Bunbury, Leipzig, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 179.

84 According to the Journal of the Lithuanian Dragoons: “Our regiment maintained
its order while the others had scattered after eight charges.” The Tagebuch des
Königlichen Preußischen Ersten Dragoneregiment (Litthauischen) aus den Kriegs-
jahren 1813 und 1814 is reproduced in an appendix in Henckel von Donners-
marck, Erinnerungen, 448.
85 Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 448–49.
87 Marmont, Mémoires, V:285, 287–88.
89 “The conduct of the prince (as he was a prince) was constantly very fishy, as I will
have occasion to mention again; on the evening of the 16th Blücher wrote him a
very strong letter; I addressed him another one, with a bit of irony, that informed
him of our success that morning and the desire that he join us to share in what was
coming”: Langeron, Mémoires, 320.
90 Sources for the battle of Möckern: “Operations of the Army of Silesia in the Battles
Before Leipzig,” Lowe, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 163–67; “Journal de
Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 273–74; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 77–85; Höpfner,
“Darstellung,” 1847:89–111; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:147–62;
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:81–116; Blasendorff, Blücher, 228–32; Pflugk,
Das Preußische Landwehrbuch, 83–91; Varchmin, Die Völkerschlacht bei Leipzig,
66–73; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, I:209–10; Anon., Précis militaire de la
campagne de 1813, 206, 210–12; Wagner, Plane, II:85–92; Droysen, Yorck,
II:212–19; Weil, Campagne de 1813, 239–41; Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinner-
ungen, 228; Unger, Blücher, II:111–14; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:455.
91 Quoted in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:100.
92 Much like his fellow officers in the Historical Section of the Great German
General Staff, Generalmajor Wolfgang von Unger, in Blücher, II:114, considered
critical evaluation to be more important than nationalistic reporting. He cautions
that “naturally one overestimated the results considerably. The ‘best French
corps,’ as Gneisenau put it, which in this campaign up until now had fought only
victoriously and consisted of mainly veteran, proven troops, was decisively
defeated by some equally strong forces including Landwehr. Moreover, [the
Prussians] believed that the Silesian Army had faced two enemy corps, a portion
of the French Guard, and one Polish corps. With enthusiasm one celebrated the
deeds of the Prussian corps.” Yet German historians are not alone in claiming that
Marmont commanded some of the best troops in the army at that time. Pelet
refers to VI Corps as “elite troops”: Pelet, Des principales opérations de la
campagne de 1813, 231.
93 “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 269–70. “The conduct of the troops,
whether it was infantry, cavalry, or artillery, whether it was Line or Landwehr,
was beyond praise; the conduct of the officers, from old Yorck down to the most
junior lieutenant, will serve as a model for all times of heroic self-sacrifice and
devotion to duty”: Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:110.
94 Weil, Campagne de 1813, 241–43. Weil also points out that Marmont attributed
his defeat to the explosion of the caissons that robbed his heavy guns of precious
ammunition as well as the charges of Yorck’s cavalry.
95 “Operations of the Army of Silesia in the Battles Before Leipzig,” Lowe,

20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 165.
96 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:101. In all, Yorck lost 34 officers, 1,009 men,
and 161 horses killed; 138 officers, 3,765 men, and 158 horses wounded; and 1
officer, 658 men, and 3 horses missing for a total loss of 173 officers, 5,432 men,
and 322 horses. Among the three arms, Yorck lost 139 officers and 5,127 men
from the infantry, which equated to 1/3 its manpower; 21 officers and 332 men
from the cavalry, or 1/9 its strength; and 2 officers and 73 men from the artillery,
or 1/22 of its total. Hiller’s vanguard infantry lost 38 officers and 1,146 men
while 2nd Brigade sustained the loss of 38 officers and 1,493 men, close to one-
half of its effectives. Schleuse’s 1st Battalion of the 1st East Prussian Regiment
from 2nd Brigade, which King Frederick William commended for its valor at
Möckern, lost 1 officer and 128 men killed and 8 officers and 291 men wounded.
Four battalions from 8th Brigade each lost over 200 men. See Höpfner, “Dar-
stellung,” 1847:107–08.
97 “The loss of one-third of the force employed in this attack attests in a remarkable
degree to the high valor and noble patriotism of the Prussian army. Almost the
whole of the officers in command . . . were wounded. On the side of the Russian
army several severe losses were experienced. The total loss of the Allied Russian
and Prussian force is stated at between 6,000 and 7,000 men killed and wounded,
but the wounds of several being of musketry alone give fair hope of recovery”:
“Operations of the Army of Silesia in the Battles Before Leipzig,” Lowe,
20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 165–66. In his report to Bunbury, Lowe
cited Prussian casualties at “perhaps 5,000 men” and Russian losses at “2,000
killed and wounded”: Lowe to Bunbury, Leipzig, 20 October 1813, ibid., 179.
99 “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 270.
100 Gneisenau to Caroline, Kleinwiederitzsch, 18 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
102 Marmont, Mémoires, V:287, 289. In Histoire de la guerre, I:210, Vaudoncourt
claims that VI Corps lost 2,000 men killed, wounded, and captured as well as
10 guns lost. Lowe commented that “the loss of the enemy cannot be rated at
less than 10,000 in prisoners, killed, and wounded, the greater part of the latter of
whom remained in possession of the Allied army. Their loss in artillery [is]
thirty-four pieces and ammunition sufficient to replace all that the Allied troops
had expended”: “Operations of the Army of Silesia in the Battles Before Leip-
zig,” Lowe, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 166.
103 SHAT, C2 157: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October 1813; Marmont, Mémoires,
V:287–88.
104 Friederich concedes that the victory at Möckern “could have been even greater,
even more decisive, even more momentous had not manifold reasons led the
leadership of the Silesian Army to a view that we are not accustomed to seeing it
have. Regarding the motives for Blücher’s conduct, we have no direct reports but
instead only poor third-person accounts. The critic of the army’s leadership thus
encounters great difficulties”: Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:110.
105 “If he [Bernadotte] had been able to join us on the 16th, the results of the battle
of this day would have been, perhaps, the same as those on the day of the 18th”:
Langeron, Mémoires, 320. Swederus counters by arguing that blame for the
slaughter of Yorck’s men rested squarely on Blücher’s shoulders. The Swedish
historian maintains that because Blücher did not know precisely where the main
enemy force stood but speculated that a French retreat would be directed
through Hohenossig and toward the Elbe, he should not have overextended
his army by pushing it eastward. While Swederus errs in stating that Blücher
believed a French retreat would go via Hohenossig to the Elbe when in fact on
the 16th he thought the attack would come from Hohenossig, the Swedish
historian does make a point worthy of a rebuttal. He asserts that because
Blücher feared the arrival of large forces east of the Parthe he should have held
his position on the 16th, awaited the great battle, and made the enemy attack him
on the 17th. Swederus speculates that one more day would have allowed Blücher
to better concentrate his army and “with his 60,000 men he would have been
able to quickly drive Marmont back to Leipzig without significant losses.” Here
Swederus obviously misses completely the important role Blücher played – not
to mention the fact the Allied Headquarters ordered a general attack on the 16th.
Had Blücher waited twenty-four hours, his attack would have mattered little,
for Napoleon would have defeated Schwarzenberg the day before. See Swe-
derus, Schwedens Politik und Kriege, 315.
106 Generalmajor Unger is an exception: “Certainly the results could have been
greater had Blücher committed his reserves earlier. Had Yorck developed his
attack more uniformly he would not have had to commit as many troops to the
struggle around the village. Also, the combat by Langeron probably would have
proceeded faster. The threat to the left flank by the enemy expected from Bad
Düben and by the enemy corps approaching from Eilenburg had kept Sacken
and St.-Priest as well as the majority of the cavalry away from the battle for too
long. The absence of the Army of North Germany caused understandable
caution. A particular desire by Blücher’s headquarters to save strong reserves
was caused by the thought that Napoleon would break off combat with the
Bohemian Army and throw himself on Blücher as soon as he saw his only line of
communication through Leipzig to the west seriously threatened. Above all,
however, one held it as probable that Napoleon, if he did quit the battle, would
take the road to the Elbe where he would unite with strong forces from the
fortresses, sever Allied communications, and then go west. We know that
Napoleon had initially planned such an undertaking when Blücher and Berna-
dotte withdrew before him across the Saale.” See Unger, Blücher, II:115.
107 As noted, the head of intelligence at Bernadotte’s headquarters, Kalckreuth,
signed his name to a detailed report at 7:00 p.m. on 15 October at Halle stating
that spies are “certain that the emperor Napoleon will march on Halle”: “News
from the Secret Agents,” Halle, 7:00 p.m., 15 October 1813, RA KrA, volym 25.
Current Swedish archivists maintain that this letter was sent to Blücher but no
mention of it is made in the literature.
108 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:112–16; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIb:160–61.
109 Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:350–52.

110 Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 932–33.
111 SHAT, C17 181: Berthier to Ney, 16 October 1813, emphasis added. Napoleon’s
letter to Berthier which, per his habit, the latter reiterates almost verbatim in his
instructions to Ney, is in Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de
1813, 228–29.
112 Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1847:91; Weil, Campagne de 1813, 239. Weil asserts that
it is likely Napoleon had been misled by false news spread by St.-Priest per
Blücher’s orders during his march to Günthersdorf that the Army of Silesia
stood on the Leipzig–Merseburg road. Bogdanovich, in Geschichte des Krieges,
IIb:147, also tells this story.
113 Ney ordered Souham to place one brigade west of Stahmeln facing Schkeuditz
and Halle and the other brigade “of this division” north of Möckern. “The two
other divisions will deploy by brigade at a distance of 100 paces; the artillery on
the wings on the line of Lindenthal and Breitenfeld. The light cavalry of III
Corps will occupy Radefeld.” As for IV Corps, Ney ordered Bertrand to remain
in position at Eutritzsch. Regarding the cavalry, Ney wanted Fournier to place
his division at Podelwitz on the road to Delitzsch but Defrance’s would remain
at Mockau, reconnoitering all the bridges over the Parthe from Schönefeld to
Taucha. No mention is made of Da˛browski’s division. Ney’s orders, dictated to
Colonel Louis-Samuel Béchet de Léocourt at Reudnitz, are in Pelet, Des princi-
pales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 229–30.
114 Fabry, ed., Journal des opérations du IIIe Corps, 83.
15
Leipzig
French losses for the 16th neared 25,000 while the Allies lost 30,000: an
ominous ratio because Napoleon’s reinforcements would increase the
Grande Armée only to 200,000 men and 900 guns while the Allies would
reach 300,000 men and 1,500 guns with the arrival of the North German and
Polish Armies.1 Although the emperor considered the 16th a victory, he
could not predict what the Allies would do next. Would they retreat as they
had done after less decisive battles such as Lützen, Bautzen, and Dresden? If
they did retreat, should Napoleon pursue or move closer to Dresden or to
France? If they concentrated their armies north and south of Leipzig, should
he retreat? If they attacked, Gyulay’s position at Lindenau could jeopardize
his retreat. Alone in his tent with maps spread before him, Napoleon
awaited news of the enemy, considering all the movements he could execute
the following day, including a retreat to the Rhine. Odeleben tells us that he
“passed a very uneasy night. [General Étienne-Marie-Antoine] Nansouty
and other generals were called to his bedside.”2
According to Jean-Jacques Pelet,3 “in the middle of the night he [Napo-
leon] learned the true state of affairs and the misfortunes that had befallen
his lieutenants who were engaged away from him.” From Schönefeld at 1:00
a.m. on the 17th, Ney announced that VI Corps had fought the combined
armies of Blücher and Bernadotte supported by one Austrian division and
lost over half of its effectives and more than thirty guns. He also informed
the master that Bertrand had been attacked by at least 20,000 men and had
suffered large losses. Ney added that, if such disproportionate forces
attacked his army group on the 17th, it would be forced to fall back on
Liebertwolkwitz. Marmont added that he could not determine his losses
until the corps could be reorganized on the 17th but that the more than
60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry facing him had increased visibly. From
Holzhausen, Macdonald reported that the enemy opposite him numbered
685
between 40,000 and 50,000 men. He predicted the Allies would attack him
on the 17th with even more forces. Bertrand expressed the same concerns; he
and Poniatowski claimed to be out of ammunition.
At this time, Napoleon’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Gaspard Gourgaud,
returned from a tour of the bivouacs. He found the ranks quite thinned,
especially those of II Corps. Fatigue weighed heavily on everyone and all
had been impressed by the immensity of the enemy’s forces. Zeal lagged but
confidence remained steady. The artillery had expended an enormous quan-
tity of ordnance. Despite the arrival of the army’s main park from Eilenburg,
many feared that ammunition supplies would not suffice for a second battle.
Moreover, prisoners claimed that the Allies would launch their main attack
as soon as Bennigsen and Bernadotte arrived with the Armies of Poland and
North Germany. Lack of news regarding the whereabouts of Reynier’s VII
Corps and Grand Headquarters increased the emperor’s anxiety. At day-
break on 17 October, reports indicated that the enemy remained concen-
trated in his positions both north and south of Leipzig. All his measures
looked defensive in nature and reinforcements appeared to have arrived.
Further discouraging news of Wrede’s Austro-Bavarian force-marching
from the Inn River against Napoleon’s line of communication with France
made a retreat inevitable. “From that moment,” concludes Pelet, “Napoleon
was fully decided to retreat; but it could not begin before the arrival of VII
Corps and Grand Headquarters, before the union of the army and the parks
around Leipzig. It must necessarily proceed from this city to Erfurt, an
intermediate position with our frontiers, from where we could reach France
in fourteen days. Would it stop at this position, facing the mountains of
Thuringia? It could not; because . . . reports from captured officers left no
doubt over the movement of the Austro-Bavarian army. The Allied sover-
eigns would join it by Ilmenau and Schweinfurt. Wrede would form their
vanguard and soon reach the Rhine.” This news meant that Napoleon would
ultimately seek a position between the Main and the Lahn, in front of
Koblenz and Mainz.4 Nevertheless, Napoleon postponed the retreat until
the 18th.
During the course of the 16th, the Army of North Germany marched
toward Landsberg, some sixteen miles northwest of Möckern. Wintzinger-
ode’s Russians bivouacked at Landsberg itself, the Swedes seven miles to the
west at Zöberitz, and Bülow’s corps four miles northwest of Landsberg.
Bernadotte himself went to Halle. That evening, Hedemann arrived from
Silesian Army Headquarters to deliver news of the victory at Möckern as
well as Blücher’s request for Bernadotte to support him on the 17th.
Bernadotte purportedly reacted to the report with marked indifference –
a reaction that became known at Silesian Army Headquarters.5 That
evening, the crown prince issued his dispositions for the 17th. Inconceiv-
ably, the Army of North Germany would remain at Landsberg rather than
Leipzig 687
advance toward Leipzig. Somewhat later arrived an urgent plea from

Stewart: “I have come from General Blücher’s battlefield and have the
honor to send you a report of this battle. I dare to request that you depart
and go to Taucha at the moment you receive this letter. There is not a
moment to lose. You have promised me this. This was spoken as a friend.
I speak now as a soldier and you will only regret it if you do not begin your
march now.” Although this letter befouled the prince royal’s mood, Stewart
had apparently strummed the right chords. Some, such as Müffling, main-
tain that the veiled threat of withholding London’s subsidy installment
motivated the crown prince. Around 12:00 a.m. on the 17th, Bernadotte
finally issued orders for the Army of North Germany to march, adding that
“yesterday the Grand Army as well as the Army of Silesia had very sharp
engagements around Leipzig; the Allies had success, but it is time to
support the Army of Silesia, which in all probability will be attacked at
daybreak by a corps coming from Bad Düben. The Prince counts on the
bravery of the troops and on the talents and experience of the generals. The
fate of Europe can be decided today. The Allied cause is just, and God will
bless our arms.”6
Returning to the Silesian Army, shortly after dawn on Sunday, 17
October, Yorck held a solemn open-air religious service. With few officers
and tattered flags, his soldiers marched up to attend. The staggering losses
from the previous day forced Yorck to reorganize his corps after the service.
For the rest of the war, I Corps would consist of two weak divisions.7
Despite the incredible loss of life, Blücher resolved to continue the struggle,
expecting Schwarzenberg to do the same. He ordered the troops to cook
early and prepare to march. “According to the agreement made with the
Bohemian Army,” claimed Nostitz, “a general attack on the French pos-
ition should take place on the 17th. All arrangements were made and with
impatience; but nevertheless the general waited in vain for the arranged
signal.” Just after dawn, which at that time of year came at 6:30, Blücher
and his staff rode to the outposts. There they observed imperial forces at
Eutritzsch and Gohlis with pickets along the Rietschke; skirmishing had
already commenced. “General Blücher surveyed several lines of enemy
infantry between the Parthe and the road to Landsberg,” recalled Langeron,
“and we could assume that Napoleon was making a move against our
armies.” Although Schwarzenberg’s signal never came and Blücher still
did not know what had become of the Bohemian Army on the 16th, he
decided to drive all imperial forces from the terrain north of Leipzig so his
army could link with Schwarzenberg’s right. He planned to fix the imperials
with Sacken’s corps while Langeron enveloped their right from the Wieder-
itzsch villages. Yorck’s battered corps would remain in reserve but could do
little until the troops received ammunition by way of the caissons taken
from Marmont. The few units that remained fairly well organized received
the task of escorting the captured prisoners and guns to Halle. While
Yorck’s corps probably would not be able to contribute much, the 5,000
Russian troopers from Wintzingerode’s corps had arrived to support the
Silesian Army. Wintzingerode himself joined Blücher early on the 17th and
willingly executed a request to take possession of the bridge over the Parthe
at Taucha and establish communication with the Bohemian Army. His
troopers reached Taucha in the afternoon, having an inconsequential skir-
mish with elements of Reynier’s VII Corps en route to Leipzig from
Eilenburg.9
Around 9:30 a.m. on the 17th, Sacken advanced southeast from Möckern
toward Gohlis while Sacken’s cavalry under Vasilchikov followed by St.-
Priest and Langeron likewise moved southeast from Groß- and Kleinwie-
deritzsch toward Eutritzsch. Marmont had already recrossed the Parthe to
reorganize VI Corps but Ney arrived to take command.10 He ordered
Da˛browski’s division to relieve the Württembergers at Gohlis. Ney also
pulled back Delmas’s division southeast from Eutritzsch to a position on
the rolling hills between Gohlis and Schönefeld so that the French stood to
the right (east) of the Poles. While Sacken’s fresh units made little progress
against the Poles at Gohlis, Vasilchikov led his cavalry toward Eutritzsch.
Behind him Langeron unlimbered twenty-four twelve-pound guns sup-
ported by X Infantry Corps. After finding Eutritzsch abandoned, Vasilchi-
kov’s cavalry continued southeast toward Shönefeld per orders from
Blücher.11
After Marmont’s artillery on the opposite bank of the Parthe shelled
Vasilchikov’s troopers, Blücher moved up two batteries to challenge the
French guns. He observed Delmas’s infantry as well as 5th and 6th Light
Cavalry Divisions of III Cavalry Corps posted on its right wing. Nostitz
overheard Blücher say to Vasilchikov, who stood close by him, “If I was still
at the head of my old hussar regiment, I would attack this infantry in the
front, envelop its flank, and take that battery.” “If Your Excellency permits,
I will attempt this with my hussars,” answered the Russian.12 Vasilchikov
assigned the task to Lanskoy, who formed the two brigades of his 2nd
Hussar Division into two waves of columns.13 After the foremost put to
flight a few squadrons that had moved up to ward off “the large body of
Cossacks” that accompanied the Hussars, it turned against the mass of the
French cavalry.14 Neither French division awaited this attack but instead
fled in complete disorder: some went toward the Gerber Gate of Leipzig’s
Halle suburb, others across the Parthe to Schönefeld, while still others fled
further northeast, smashing through Reynier’s columns as they arrived at the
Heitererblick manor.15 Two of the Russian regiments pursued the groups
that had made for Leipzig, passing the battalions of Delmas’s division, which
formed squares and opened a furious fire. Lanskoy’s troopers pressed
through the suburb all the way to the Halle Gate that led to Leipzig’s inner
Leipzig 689
city, taking 5 guns and 200 prisoners and “sabering everything that presented
itself” before withdrawing.16 “The attack was executed with much determin-
ation and to the great joy of the general,” continued Nostitz, “who closely
oversaw the combat; the cannon were captured.”17 Meanwhile, the two
other regiments made little progress against Delmas’s infantry, which
staunchly held its ground in the middle of the field because no Allied
infantry or artillery arrived to oppose it. Delmas managed to withdraw to
the Halle suburb before Langeron’s infantry reached the vicinity of
Eutritzsch.18
During this time, Sacken’s combat with Da˛browski’s division at Gohlis
became intense. As on the previous day, the Poles defended themselves with
typical stubbornness and repulsed several attacks, prompting Blücher to
move up a portion of Yorck’s infantry. However, after Delmas’s division
retreated to the Halle suburb, thus exposing Da˛browski’s right, the Poles
finally evacuated Gohlis. Although they withdrew in good order, one
portion moved directly south into the Rosenthal (Valley of Roses) north
of Leipzig between the Elster and the Pleiße, while the other marched
southeast to the Pfaffendorf manor and its surrounding farm. With the
exception of a few houses and entrenchments near the Gerber Gate, the
Silesian Army cleared the right bank of the Parthe of French forces by 10:00
a.m. Should strong forces attempt to emerge from Leipzig and attack
Blücher, he now would have plenty of time to make the necessary arrange-
ments. Yet to continue the push and prevent Napoleon from concentrating
all his forces against Schwarzenberg, Blücher needed to cross the Parthe.
Marshy banks on both sides of the river as well as the close proximity of
French forces in Leipzig rendered a crossing near the city imprudent.
Moving six miles upstream to cross at Taucha would eliminate these
difficulties.
Blücher decided that Langeron’s corps along with the majority of Wint-
zingerode’s cavalry would cross the Parthe further upstream while Sacken
and Yorck – some 20,000 men combined – remained on the defensive
between the Pleiße and the Parthe north of Leipzig.19 Attacking Leipzig –
the central point of Napoleon’s might – on the left bank of the Parthe with
the 25,000 men of his left wing while his right wing remained separated by
the Parthe smacks of both audacity and imprudence. Any French forces en
route from Bad Düben could easily smash into the rear of the Silesian Army.
Around noon, the cavalry of Reynier’s VII Corps reached Schönefeld to
increase the French forces defending the Parthe but its infantry would not
reach Paunsdorf until 4:00.20
We will never know what the results of this operation would have been.
Just as Blücher commenced his movement, news arrived that Schwarzen-
berg had postponed his attack until the 18th to give Bennigsen’s army time
to arrive. Schwarzenberg also congratulated Blücher for his success at
Möckern and informed him that the Bohemian Army would resume its
attack on the morning of the 18th to coincide with the arrival of Bennigsen’s
army. Schwarzenberg’s messenger informed the Prussians that the Bohe-
mian Army had gained no appreciable results on the 16th and that Gyulay
had failed to take Lindenau. Shortly afterward, Blücher received word that
the Army of North Germany had commenced its approach march and
would link with the Silesian Army that evening. According to Müffling,
both accounts taken together pleased Blücher immensely because decisive
results could now be expected on the 18th. Consequently, he canceled the
operation and ordered the army to make camp. Sacken’s corps bivouacked
east of Gohlis, Yorck’s west of Möckern, and Langeron’s between
Eutritzsch and Seehausen. Blücher went to his headquarters at
Großwiederitzsch and little else occurred on his front that day. In the
afternoon, word reached him that the Army of North Germany had arrived
on his left while the Army of Poland filled the gap between the Armies of
Silesia and Bohemia.21
Regarding the situation south of the city, Hudson Lowe reported that
“on the side of the Grand Combined Army and the French Grande Armée,
this morning, was silence. Both armies rested closely opposite to each other;
their batteries established within almost musket shot of each other without
any fire being exchanged. On the part of the enemy, there was no induce-
ment to commence.” Langeron noted that “this delay could have hurt us if
Napoleon had known how to use it, but he made no movement.” The
Grande Armée did nothing on 17 October, “which was wise, as Napoleon
fulfilled our expectations by doing nothing.” Around 10:00 a.m., the sound
of artillery could be heard north of Leipzig. News of Blücher’s victory at
Möckern had already arrived, leading Schwarzenberg to believe that Napo-
leon had turned against the Silesian Army. To take some of the pressure off
Blücher, Schwarzenberg arranged an attack in four columns to commence at
2:00 p.m. From the west, the Austrian II and III Corps would advance while
from the south a left wing column would march down the right bank of the
Pleiße, a middle column assaulted Liebertwolkwitz, and the right wing
column attacked both Liebertwolkwitz and Holzhausen. Just as the advance
commenced at 2:00, Schwarzenberg convened a council of war with his
subordinates on the hill south of Güldengoßa to discuss the attack dispos-
ition. By this time, the firing north of Leipzig had ceased. Reports stated that
Bennigsen reached Fuchshain, some three miles east of Liebertwolkwitz,
with the Army of Poland’s van. However, the main body would not be
within supporting distance until evening. Colloredo’s Austrian I Corps had
arrived but its troops needed rest. No word came from Bernadotte, meaning
Allied Headquarters could not depend on the intervention of the Army of
North Germany on 17 October. Based on these circumstances as well as the
stormy weather, Schwarzenberg suggested that the attack be postponed until
Leipzig 691
the following day. All members of Allied Headquarters accepted this sug-
gestion and Tsar Alexander approved as well.22
Bernadotte’s army bivouacked on the hills of Breitenfeld late on the
afternoon of the 17th after having commenced its march before daybreak.23
At Breitenfeld itself, the Russians formed the army’s right wing, Bülow’s
corps stood to their left (northeast) at Kleinpodelwitz, and the Swedes
behind the Russians at Freiroda and Radefeld.24 Cavalry patrolled toward
Taucha while Cossacks destroyed the bridges at Eilenburg, Taucha, and
Wurzen. Should French forces appear at Taucha en route northeast to
Eilenburg, Bernadotte instructed General Nikolay Vuich – Wintzingerode’s
vanguard commander – to close on the former with all his cavalry and attack
the enemy.25 From Breitenfeld, Bernadotte wrote Blücher a vague letter
which the latter received in the afternoon:
I send you my sincere congratulations for your success yesterday and earlier
today. They are the forerunners of those that you can expect in the course of
the morrow. My movement on Leipzig has no purpose other than to support
you and to facilitate the operations of the Grand Army. I most fervently wish
that we can emerge from the awkward condition in which we find ourselves.
In order to achieve great results, I believe it is beneficial to attack the enemy
tomorrow. To provide you with the necessary details, I have sent Chamber-
lain [Peter Heinrich] von Podewils to deliver this dispatch as well as the
request that you send me one of your General Staff officers who enjoys your
trust and knows your plans in order to consult with me. General Gneisenau
has assured Podewils that after you awaken one of your officers will come.
Time slips away and the evening advances. Tsar Alexander has requested that
you and I agree over what appears to be most useful for the success of the
common cause.
You must feel, my dear general, that it is most essential not to lose a
moment. The troops are exhausted from the bivouacs and the misery they
have suffered. I do not doubt for a moment that we will be successful if we
have unity of action in our movements. I have already informed you of my
wish that each will take his appointed place in the order of battle. My
interests in Sweden, the number of cavalry that I have detached to Westphalia
[Aleksandr Chernishev], an army and detached corps on the right bank of the
Elbe [Tauentzien and Thümen], the bridge at Aken, and a thousand other
military considerations and interests make me hope that you encounter no
inconveniences.26
Müffling is adamant that Blücher and his staff interpreted this letter as
an attempt by Bernadotte to shield his army from Napoleon by placing it
behind Blücher’s right wing, just as it had been during the retreat from the
Mulde to the Saale.27 Despite the ambiguity of this letter, reason for
Bernadotte’s desire to hide behind Blücher could be found in his orders
to Wintzingerode, which indicated his expectation that Napoleon would
withdraw to the Mulde and from there across the Elbe. Blücher and his
staff opposed any suggestion that smacked of a time-consuming realign-
ment of the two armies. “It would have been completely useless,”
explained Müffling, “to move a strong army into a defensive position that
30,000 men could defend. Therefore, the commander in chief refused this
demand.”28 Instead, the Prussians insisted on crossing the Parthe in
strength, meaning both armies. Knowing that Gyulay’s 20,000 Austrians
at Lindenau blocked Napoleon’s only escape route to the west, Blücher
and his staff concluded that the French emperor would seek to escape the
Allied net before it could close. To do this, he would have to utilize the
only remaining open road that ran northeast from Leipzig through Taucha
to Eilenburg.29 From there, Napoleon could direct his army to Magdeburg,
Wittenberg, Torgau, or even Dresden. Thus, believing Napoleon would
evacuate Leipzig rather than allow himself to be surrounded, Blücher made
the bold decision to cross the Parthe and drive into the heart of the enemy’s
might.30
Bernadotte also requested a personal meeting with Blücher, which the
Prussian refused. Blücher purportedly told the Swedish officer who
delivered Bernadotte’s letter that the crown prince could do as he pleased
with the Swedes as long as he released the Russian and Prussian troops under
his command.31 To counter Bernadotte’s scheming, Blücher dispatched a
“confidential officer” to Bülow’s headquarters with Prince William of Prus-
sia’s request that he join Blücher’s advance across the Parthe on the 18th
regardless of the crown prince. He also invited Bülow to discuss the situ-
ation with Wintzingerode. Bülow responded that same night: he would not
fail when the welfare of the Fatherland and Europe was at stake.32 Moreover,
Wintzingerode would proceed in the same manner.33
During the night of 17/18 October, Blücher received a second request for
a meeting with the crown prince. This time, Bernadotte wanted to discuss
the details for the combined attack by their two armies on the 18th.34
Believing he could not refuse, Blücher departed for Breitenfeld long before
dawn. Again, due to his aversion to Bernadotte, Gneisenau refused to attend
this “battle of wits.”35 Instead, Blücher asked Prince William to accompany
him and Nostitz. With a prince of the blood in attendance, Blücher hoped to
have the upper hand in convincing Bernadotte “to do what all of Europe
expected on this day from the Army of North Germany.”36 Nostitz main-
tains that Blücher took William with him so that the Hohenzollern prince
could personally secure Bülow’s promise “to join the Silesian Army with at
least his corps, in case on this so decisive day the cooperation of all the forces
of the North German Army should be denied.”37
According to notes taken by Rühle, who served as the interpreter, only
Adlerkreutz and Bernadotte initially met with the Prussians.38 In addition,
the Hungarian captain Count István Széchenyi de Sárvár-Felsővidék, who
Leipzig 693
had just arrived from Schwarzenberg’s headquarters, likewise participated.39

Széchenyi delivered a communiqué stating “that Their Majesties Tsar Alex-
ander, the Kaiser of Austria, and the King of Prussia intend to attack the
enemy and that they wish for the North German and Silesian Armies to
cooperate in this great undertaking.”40 Later, the entire entourage of foreign
envoys joined the group: Pozzo di Borgo, Krusemarck, Vincent, and Stew-
art. Despite their presence, the Prussians failed to convince the prince royal
to immediately cross the Parthe with the Silesian Army and attack the left
wing of the French position. “Also on this occasion the crown prince
remained true to the system that he always followed,” noted Nostitz; “for
each task that he should tackle, he found the means at his disposal too weak
and thus he criticized every disposition slated for him.”41 Bernadotte, whose
“strength lay in bringing forward astonishing counterproposals, simply did
not agree with the Prussian response to the situation.”42 Knowing that in
addition to his own army, Bennigsen and Colloredo would also arrive for the
battle on the 18th, he too dismissed the idea that Napoleon would remain at
Leipzig and allow himself to be surrounded by vastly superior forces. Like
Blücher, the crown prince assumed Gyulay’s presence at Lindenau would
close the French emperor’s escape route to the west. Again like Blücher, the
prince royal concluded that Napoleon would seek to escape the Allied net
via the Leipzig–Taucha–Eilenburg road.
At this point, however, the similarities between Bernadotte and Blücher
came to a screeching halt. Bernadotte could not reconcile himself with
Blücher’s demand that the North German Army join the Silesian Army in
crossing the Parthe and placing themselves on the very road they believed
Napoleon would utilize to break out of Leipzig. Nothing terrified Berna-
dotte more than risking his reputation in a battle with his former master.
Ever mistrustful of his allies, the crown prince also doubted that Schwarzen-
berg’s masses would arrive in time to support himself and Blücher. His
imagination only allowed him to envision the 200,000 men of the Grande
Armée led by the emperor himself desperately fighting to escape Leipzig.
Outnumbered two to one, Bernadotte would be forced to use every available
resource including his Swedes, whom he had carefully spared from battle
over the previous two months. Thus, rather than absorbing the brunt of
Napoleon’s assault frontally, the former French marshal preferred to attack
the flank of the French march columns he anticipated would be retreating
northeast through Taucha to Eilenburg.43 Despite the inherent advantages of
a flank attack, such a maneuver did not guarantee success, as Wittgenstein
had discovered at Lützen on 2 May 1813.
For this reason, Blücher held his ground, determined to throw his
weaker army into the last remaining gap and completely close the iron cage
around Napoleon.44 During the verbal contest, Prince William declared that
as the king’s brother he would take command of Bülow’s corps and lead it to
battle unless Bernadotte agreed with Blücher.45 Even this threat did not
break the crown prince’s determination. After Blücher utterly rejected his
request to place the North German Army on the right wing of the Silesian
Army, the crown prince demanded that it follow as second echelon behind
the army’s left wing. He reasoned that this position would allow the Army
of North Germany to immediately launch a flank attack to counter any
attempt by Napoleon to break out via the Leipzig–Taucha–Eilenburg road.
Blücher continued to insist that both armies cross the Parthe as quickly as
possible. With the Allied envoys present, it became clear to Bernadotte that
his refusal to accept the Prussian proposal would jeopardize his standing in
the Coalition. At last, he agreed to cross the Parthe and advance through
Taucha but on one condition. Arguing that detaching Tauentzien’s corps
and Thümen’s brigade from Bülow’s corps had considerably weakened his
army to merely 65,000 men, the crown prince of Sweden demanded
that Blücher place 20,000 men at his disposal to execute this risky
operation. Gradually this requirement escalated to 25,000 and ultimately
30,000 men.46
Blücher struggled with himself, weighing the pros and cons of submit-
ting to such a demand.47 He knew that, on its own, the Silesian Army could
do little to prevent Napoleon from breaking out and taking the road to the
Elbe. In the end, the paramount importance of getting the Army of North
Germany onto the battlefield persuaded him to agree. Thus, Blücher placed
the needs of the Coalition in front of his own desire to influence the great
struggle against Napoleon.48 Despite having the assurance that Bülow and
Wintzingerode would cooperate with him regardless of any interference
from Bernadotte, Blücher could not be certain. Moreover, Langeron’s past
behavior did not offer him any guarantees that the French émigré would
fight despite any orders to the contrary he received from Bernadotte. Thus,
Blücher resolved to remain at Langeron’s side for the course of the battle.49
Ready for combat and in a malicious tone Blücher answered: “On my honor,
Your Royal Highness can personally lead Langeron’s corps.”50 The council
of war ended at 7:00 on the morning of the 18th. Leaving Rühle behind to
work out a convention with the crown prince and Nostitz to remain at
Bernadotte’s headquarters, Blücher and William rushed back to Silesian
Army Headquarters.51 “The mistrust that one placed in the fulfillment of
such promises was already so great,” noted Nostitz, “that the general
ordered me to remain by the person of the crown prince and to determine
for myself whether or not the arrangements that were taken conformed to
the agreement; in the latter case he [Blücher] had decided to recall the
detached corps and to proceed according to circumstances. The crown
prince was troubled by the presence of one of General Blücher’s adjutants,
and he attempted many times in vain to rid himself of me by sending
instructions to the general.”52
Leipzig 695
After Blücher and William departed, Bernadotte dictated the following

protocol to Rühle:
According to Field-Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg’s communiqué . . . Their

Majesties Tsar Alexander, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia
intend to attack the enemy and they wish that the North German and Silesian
Armies cooperate in this great undertaking. After a meeting between General
Blücher and the crown prince it was agreed that:
(1) General Blücher will provide the crown prince of Sweden with 30,000
men from his army including infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and that
these troops will unite with the North German Army and under the
command of the crown prince attack the army of the emperor Napoleon
through Taucha; General Blücher with his troops will maintain the
position before Leipzig and as soon as the general struggle has com-
menced will seek to take the city itself with all means.
(2) Should the emperor Napoleon turn with all of his forces against the
Silesian and North German Armies, it is agreed that the two armies will
fight jointly until the Bohemian Army comes to their aid. In this case, the
crown prince and General Blücher will act in accord, and each com-
mander will discuss their operations with the other.53
Meanwhile, few at Silesian Army Headquarters had failed to grasp the

importance of this day, as Steffens noted:
I would convey a false sense of the scene in Blücher’s vicinity to suggest that
anything like haste or confusion was to be perceived there. Although such a
great battle was certain to be fought – although all felt that it would decide
the fate of the whole war – there was no sign of any such important crisis near
the great commander. Every officer rose and dressed himself leisurely [sic]
and carefully; the few grooming tools on hand were taken to the wells, and
when used by some were instantly claimed by the servants of others to be
replenished. The windows were opened and laid back on the walls. Coffee
was brought in; some drank from the cups and some from the saucers. Any
little difficulty or accident was seized on to give a cheerful turn to the
remarks but these were never extended to the great event that was impending;
they spoke on indifferent subjects, even of gay recollections, and a joke was
seized on and passed around with thankful eagerness; to a superficial obser-
ver they might have seemed like men who were preparing to pursue a journey
and were amusing themselves with the minor inconveniences of an uncom-
fortable night’s lodging.54
With Blücher at Breitenfeld, Gneisenau took the opportunity to pen his

thoughts to his wife:
I write you on the morning of a battle the likes of which have never been
fought in the history of the world. We have the French emperor completely
surrounded. This battle will decide the fate of Europe. Already the day
before yesterday Blücher’s army again fought a glorious victory. God
be with you! A half-million men now stand pressed together in a narrow
space, ready to destroy themselves. If great mistakes are not made, we will
be the victors. Through the steps that our army has made, through its
bold movements, through the battles and combats that it has won, and
through the advice that our headquarters has given, so much has been done
for the advantageous turn of the war. The victories of the other armies
remained without results and only ours have altered the course of events.
One day the secret history of this war will be told, and posterity will be
astonished.55
Blücher rode four miles from Breitenfeld to the hills of Eutritzsch; the
struggle between Napoleon and Schwarzenberg had already commenced.
Soon after, Rühle returned with the crown prince’s protocol. Gneisenau did
not like the news. “It was now our responsibility to once again make the first
attack while the crown prince placed himself in the fourth line,” he later
wrote.56 A few minutes later, one of Bernadotte’s adjutants delivered orders
for Langeron to examine all points of passage across the Parthe upstream of
Taucha, repair any bridges, and cross the river while Wintzingerode’s corps
moved across downstream of Taucha. Stedingk’s Swedes would cross some-
where between the two Russian corps. Should the imperials attack either the
Silesian or North German Armies before they crossed the Parthe, the latter
would await the French on the hills of Plaußig, two miles west-northwest of
Taucha and six miles northeast of the heart of Leipzig. Despite his earlier
resolution to remain at Langeron’s side, Blücher accompanied his subordin-
ate as far as the Gips windmill hill at Mockau, where the army commander
halted and remained on the right bank of the Parthe for the rest of the
battle.57
Returning to Napoleon, the 17th passed with much stress. Murat spent
the early morning with him; both looked “very serious and pensive . . .
Napoleon appeared constantly much absorbed; he again shut himself up
in his tent.” During the course of the day, Napoleon learned that his Grand
Headquarters and the rest of the parks could not rejoin the army because
they had been directed to Wurzen. In the evening, the 1st Old Guard
Division escorted the emperor to the Little Headquarters at the village
of Stötteritz, less than three miles southeast of Leipzig. “The rain was
pouring down upon the wretches who were encamped; a gloomy silence
reigned around the emperor’s bivouac. The other persons about Bonaparte
were visibly in consternation.” Knowing that his dwindling supplies meant
that he could not expend the same amount of ammunition on the 18th as
he had on the 16th, the emperor resigned himself to preparing for the
retreat.58
Leipzig 697
At 7:00 p.m., Napoleon issued orders for Bertrand’s IV Corps,

reinforced by Reynier’s 13th Division, one battery of heavy artillery, and
one dragoon brigade from Defrance’s 4th Division of III Cavalry Corps, to
secure the bridges over the Saale and Unstrut at Merseburg, Freiburg,
Weißenfels, and Bad Kösen. To reach his rearward base at Erfurt, some
seventy miles southwest of Leipzig, two roads remained open to Napoleon.
The first, which ran through Merseburg, Freiburg, and Buttelstedt, would
bring the Grande Armée within the range of Blücher and Bernadotte at the
Saale crossing. The second, running through Weißenfels, Bad Kösen, and
Weimar, served as the most direct route but would bring the army danger-
ously close to the Bohemian Army, which could either march on parallel
roads to reach Weißenfels first or take perpendicular routes to attack Napo-
leon’s left flank.59 Beyond Weißenfels, this route would also force the French
to cross the Unstrut and gain Buttelstedt by bad roads. A third route leading
through Zeitz, Jena, and Coburg could bring the army to Schweinfurt, some
eighty miles south of Erfurt, if it could get past the Army of Bohemia.
A retreat to either Erfurt or Schweinfurt required the Grande Armée to
debouch through Leipzig’s western exit, cross the bridge over the Elster, and
utilize the causeway to cross the marsh to Lindenau.60 Despite the risks
entailed, Napoleon chose the direct route through Weißenfels.
Around 2:00 on the morning of Monday 18 October, Napoleon
contracted his southern front by a few miles in preparation for the retreat.
Although the great captain accepted that he could not win the battle, he
resolved to fight one more day. In streaming rain, the imperial troops
marched from their bivouacs to a new line that extended from the
Connewitz–Dölitz position along the Pleiße east to Probstheida,
Zuckelhausen, and Holzhausen to Ober- and Unternaundorf, from where
it turned north to Paunsdorf and continued to Schönefeld on the Parthe,
crossed this river, and ended at Göhlis, the Halle suburb, and the Pfaffendorf
estate. To deceive the Allies, the forward posts kept their campfires blazing.
The emperor himself climbed into his open carriage and “calmly but with a
serious countenance” made for Probstheida.61
Murat assumed command of Napoleon’s right, an L-shape that stretched
from the Pleiße to Probstheida. Augereau’s 52nd Division and Lefol’s
division defended both banks of the Pleiße at Connewitz while the Poles
of VIII Corps and IV Cavalry Corps held the terrain along the Pleiße
between Connewitz and Lößnig. South of the Poles, the rest of IX Corps
occupied Dölitz to anchor Murat’s right; weak forward posts extended
further south through Dösen. To their east, Victor positioned II Corps
between IX Corps and Probstheida supported by V Cavalry Corps. North
of Probstheida between Stötteritz and the Thon hill stood the Old Guard
and I Cavalry Corps in reserve.
Macdonald commanded Napoleon’s center, extending east from

Probstheida to the Naundorf villages with XI Corps holding positions at
Zuckelhausen, Holzhausen, and north of the Stein hill. Part of Lauriston’s
V Corps occupied the Naundorfs and Mölkau while the other stood
between Stötteritz and Probstheida as support for XI Corps. To support
XI and V Corps, 3rd Guard Cavalry Division took post north of Zuck-
elhausen with II Cavalry Corps to its left (east) between Holzhausen and the
Naundorfs. The emperor allocated the city’s garrison,62 Da˛browski’s and
Lorge’s divisions, and Mortier’s 2nd Young Guard Corps to defend Leipzig
itself as well as the Halle suburb along the Pleiße to Gohlis. Should Ber-
trand’s IV Corps depart for Weißenfels, Mortier’s Young Guard would move
into its position at Lindenau.
Napoleon entrusted his left wing, which ran from Paunsdorf to Schöne-
feld on the Parthe, to Ney, who posted most of his troops to confront the
threat posed by Blücher north-northeast of Leipzig. The emperor allocated
the only reinforcements to arrive – VII Corps – to Ney’s sector. Reynier’s
sole Saxon division stood in and around Paunsdorf supported by Avice’s 1st
Brigade of Dragoons from Defrance’s 4th Heavy Cavalry Division. Rey-
nier’s 32nd Division of all French troops held the ground left or north of
Paunsdorf, which in turn linked with the right wing of Marmont’s VI Corps,
which Ney tasked with the defense of Schönefeld. To support Marmont,
Fournier’s 6th Light Cavalry Division took post behind (west of) Schönefeld
and next to III Corps, which Ney kept in reserve between Schönefeld and
Volkmarsdorf. Shortly after the battle commenced in this sector, Ney aban-
doned his position along the Parthe due to the simultaneous threats posed by
the Armies of Poland, Silesia, and North Germany. His new line faced north
and extended three miles west to east between the villages of Schönefeld and
Paunsdorf. Two light cavalry brigades and their accompanying horse batter-
ies – all German troops – guarded the plain before Ney’s front that extended
from the Heiterblick estate to Taucha. This cavalry consisted of Normann’s
25th Light Cavalry Brigade (Württemberger) attached to VI Corps and
Major Friedrich Joseph von Fabrice’s 26th Light Cavalry Brigade (Saxon)
that belonged to VII Corps. One mile southwest of the Heiterblick,
Lagrange’s 21st Division and Fournier’s 6th Light Cavalry Division held
Schönefeld on Ney’s extreme left. To their right (southeast) extended Mar-
mont’s 22nd and 20th Divisions respectively. The 32nd Division of VII
Corps faced Paunsdorf and a gap existed between it and Compans’s 20th
Division. Ney anchored his right wing with Reynier’s all Saxon 24th Div-
ision, which stood between Paunsdorf and Stünz, the latter being the pos-
ition of Avice’s 1st Brigade from 4th Heavy Cavalry Division. One mile
southeast of Schönefeld, Souham’s III Corps served as the reserve at
Volkmarsdorf.
Leipzig 699
As darkness prevented Napoleon from reconnoitering the terrain around

Probstheida, he repaired to Ney’s headquarters at Reudnitz, where he found
the marshal fast asleep. After awakening the bravest of the brave, Napoleon
conversed at length with his subordinate. At 5:00 in the morning, the
emperor’s carriage rode through Leipzig to Lindenau. Accompanied by
Bertrand, Napoleon observed the terrain on both sides of the highway that
led west to Weißenfels as much as the grey, foggy morning allowed.
Although he instructed Bertrand on his task of securing that town’s crossing
over the Saale, the general could not commence the march to Weißenfels
until orders arrived to do so. After dismissing Bertrand, Napoleon returned
to his headquarters at Stötteritz, which he reached at 8:00. Per his tradition,
he then rode across the front to inspire his troops before settling at his
command post at the tobacco mill owned by the wealthy Quandt family
near Probstheida. Despite the losses on the 16th and the posting of Ber-
trand’s IV Corps at Lindenau in readiness to march to Weißenfels, Napoleon
still commanded a considerable force: 160,000 men and 630 guns. Yet this
number did not suffice to hold the eighteen-mile line that shielded the
southern, eastern, and northern approaches to Leipzig. The three-mile gap
that existed between the Naundorfs and Paunsdorf could be exploited if the
Allies managed to move their forces into position in time to take advantage
of this weak point.
Schwarzenberg issued orders to have the troops ready to attack at 9:00
on the morning of 18 October. His disposition for the 18th has been lost but
apparently he and his staff simply followed the blueprint that had been
drafted for the 17th. Including the Armies of Silesia and North Germany,
the Austrian staff planned six massive attacks along the entire front. Coun-
terclockwise from west of Leipzig, Schwarzenberg’s first army group, Gyu-
lay’s III Corps, Moritz von Liechtenstein’s 1st Light Division and the two
Streifkorps commanded by Thielmann and Mensdorff – together some
18,000 men – would make another attempt to take Lindenau from
Kleinzschocher. Commanded by Prince Frederick of Hessen-Homburg,
Schwarzenberg’s all-Austrian second group (I, II, and Reserve Corps) of
43,600 men would drive north from Markkleeberg toward Connewitz along
both banks of the Pleiße. The 4,000 men of General Ignaz Ludwig von
Lederer’s 1st Division of II Corps would operate between the Elster and
the Pleiße to attempt to envelop Murat’s right and to maintain communi-
cation between Gyulay and Hessen-Homburg. Barclay de Tolly would lead
the third group – Kleist, Wittgenstein, Pahlen’s cavalry, and the Russo-
Prussian Guard and Reserve, some 32,600 Russians, and 14,500 Prussians
totaling 47,100 men – against the Wachau–Liebertwolkwitz sector southeast
of Leipzig. After securing these villages, Barclay would target the linchpin of
Napoleon’s entire position: Probstheida. Consisting of the 28,000 men of the
Army of Poland, the 23,500 Austrians of Klenau’s IV Corps and Bubna’s 2nd
Plösen
Lützschena Taucha N
Mockau Neutzsch
St. Thekla Church xxxx

Elster Möckern Eutritzsch North
xxxx Abtnaundorf xxx
Silesia x Langeron
xx 26
e
Gohlis 21 xx x
25
rth
6
Pa
Pfaffendorf
xx Heiterblick
Schönefeld 22
Rosenthal xx
20
Reudnitz xx Sommerfeld
Leutzsch Pfaffendorf 32 Paunsdorf
Volkmarsdorf
Leipzig xxx Sellerhausen xx Althen

III 24
Lindenau x
1 Mölkau
xxx Engelsdorf
Plagwitz Stünz
IV xxx Unter xx
xx xx V Zweinaundorf 2
Gd
Thon hill Gd Ober
Schönau xxx
I Stötteritz xxx Baalsdorf Hirschfeld
Schleussig II
xx xxx xxx
xxxx I Gd xx
1 III Napoleon Gd
Stein hill Kleinpösna
Probstheida xxx Holzhausen
Kleinzschocher
Pleiße
Quandt XI
Connewitz xxxx
er
Mill
700
xxx xxx Poland
IV V
xx
Elst
xxx Zuckelhausen
52 VIII xxx Seifertshain
Großzschocher II
xx Lößnig Monarchs Hill
xxx Kolm hill

IX Meusdorf Liebertwolkwitz
Dölitz
xxx Fuchshain
Dösen
IV
Galgenberg Niederholz x
11
Knauthain
xxx xxx Wachau
Gautsch II I Großpösna
Markkleeberg xxx
xx Austrian
Reserve
Auenhain xxx
xxx xxx Wittgen. Threna
Kleist
Crostewitz xxx
Guard & Reserve
Güldengoßa
Cröbern Störmthal
xxx xxxx Oberholz

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 yards Bohemia
Guard & Reserve
26. Battle of Leipzig, 18 October 1813

Leipzig 701
Light Division, the 5,000 men of Ziethen’s Prussian 11th Brigade, and
Platov’s 3,000 Cossacks, the 59,500 soldiers of this group –
Schwarzenberg’s fourth – commanded by Bennigsen, would envelop Napo-
leon’s left flank by advancing on Leipzig from the east. From Fuchshain and
Seifertshain, Bennigsen would first seek to secure Zuckelhausen and Holz-
hausen. The fifth group, the 83,000 men of Langeron’s corps and the Army
of North Germany, would cross the Parthe at Taucha, attack Leipzig from
the northeast, and establish contact with Bennigsen’s forces. Finally, the
forces that remained at Blücher’s disposal, around 25,000 men, would assault
the city between the Elster and the Parthe. Altogether, some 295,000 Coali-
tion soldiers supported by 1,466 cannon would assault the imperial lines
around Leipzig. Strategically and tactically confined to the defensive,
Napoleon stood in the middle of a position that catered solely to the
circumstances by allowing him to quickly bolster weak spots. Schwarzen-
berg would facilitate the French defense by attacking concentrically along
the entire front rather than concentrating superior combat power against one
point. Allied numerical superiority should have managed at least one breach
in the French line.63
During the night, heavy downpours fell as if the heavens wept over man’s
barbarity. Cloud and fog hung thick over the killing fields of Leipzig
following a cold night. Before daybreak, Schwarzenberg’s army groups
formed for the approach march. At 5:30 a.m., Alexander and Frederick
William mounted their horses and proceeded to the assembly point of
Barclay’s columns. Reports from the outposts already indicated that the
French had evacuated Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz; cavalry patrols con-
firmed this news. Around 7:00, Schwarzenberg issued orders for the advance
to commence and soon the artillery of both sides opened the struggle.
Shortly after 8:00 the sun started to break through. One hour later, a bright
autumn light illuminated the giant battlefield. After almost one week of
continuous rain, the beautiful weather raised the spirits of the troops on
both sides.
By 9:00, Napoleon had seen enough of Schwarzenberg’s movements to
divine the Austrian’s intent. As soon as he learned of the advance of enemy
columns toward the three-mile gap between the Naundorfs and Paunsdorf,
he sent orders to Bertrand to commence the march to Weißenfels: the
emperor knew he was fighting a battle he could not win. Starting at 11:00,
all that could not be utilized on the battlefield commenced the retreat: the
diplomatic corps, the wounded that could be transported, and the army’s
baggage.64
From left to right, Gyulay’s command, which formed Schwarzenberg’s
first group, camped south of Lindenau at Klein- and Großzschocher. Most
of his cavalry and a few battalions observed the Lindenau defile from a
marsh between Kleinzschocher and Leutzsch. Still exhausted from the
marches of the previous days, the majority of Gyulay’s infantry bivouacked

south of Großzschocher. His 1st Division, commanded by the French
émigré Louis Charles Folliot de Crenneville, had yet to arrive from Crö-
bern. Lacking these troops as well as elements from Murray’s 2nd Division
that were holding Weißenfels and Naumburg, Gyulay had seventeen battal-
ions and twenty-five squadrons at his disposal. Early on 18 October, the
forward posts reported the march of imperial columns from Lindenau.
Gyulay responded by calling his troops to arms and taking a position on
the ridge between Kleinzschocher and Schönau. Soon the Austrians viewed
the heads of two columns: one consisting of all arms, the other only of
infantry. Both overran Gyulay’s weak posts and marched west but the
former struck the road to Markranstädt while the latter took the highway
to Merseburg. Through the thick fog that blanketed the area, the Austrians
discerned three battalions from the French 13th Line Regiment deploy
against Kleinzschocher while imperial horse made for Gyulay’s left at Schö-
nau. Deceived by the fog into thinking that he faced vastly superior
numbers, Gyulay ordered his artillery park to retreat across the Elster. He
also informed Schwarzenberg and Blücher of the “offensive” and notified
his posts at Weißenfels and Naumburg to be on their guard. Bertrand
attacked Kleinzschocher so quickly that the Austrian 1st Jäger Battalion
fled. Pursued to the bridge over the Elster near Schleußig, the hapless
Austrians found it destroyed and themselves surrounded. Some 12 officers
and 404 men – more than half the battalion – surrendered to the French. One
battalion from the Kottulinskii Infantry Regiment that Gyulay had moved
up in support reached Kleinzschocher too late to save the Jäger but
attempted to retake the village. Despite hard fighting, it could not dislodge
the French; this failure cost the Austrians more than 400 casualties and 298
prisoners.
After securing Kleinzschocher, Bertrand ordered the advance to continue
to Großzschocher while his combined-arms column continued toward
Markranstädt. Gyulay responded by moving his left wing toward
Großzschocher protected by the cavalry of Thielmann and Mensdorff. His
right wing, the three battalions of General Markus von Csollich’s 1st Brigade
of 3rd Division, managed to halt the French push on that side of the
Austrian line. Around this time, Gyulay received orders from Schwarzen-
berg to march the entire Austrian III Corps ten miles southeast from
Lindenau to Cröbern, crossing the Pleiße to join the main army. After
Gyulay learned that the 4,000 men of Crenneville’s 1st Division, en route
to Kleinzschocher, had already halted at Gautsch to comply with these
instructions, he made arrangements for the rest of the corps to likewise
march to Gautsch. Leaving behind Liechtenstein’s 1st Light Division as well
as the two Streifkorps under Thielmann and Mensdorff on the left bank of
the Elster to observe Bertrand’s march, III Corps departed. At Knauthain,
Leipzig 703
less than halfway between Kleinzschocher and Cröbern, Gyulay received

instructions to halt and remain on standby as the situation on the right bank
of the Pleiße had taken a turn for the better. Regardless, the Austrians failed
to close Napoleon’s escape route to the west. Protected by 3rd Heavy
Cavalry Brigade from 4th Division of III Cavalry Corps, 12th, 14th, and
38th Divisions followed by Bertrand’s artillery and parks marched to Mark-
ranstädt; his rearguard consisted of two squadrons: all that remained of a
Württemberger cavalry brigade.
Schwarzenberg’s second army group – the Austrian I, II, and Reserve
Corps – stood closest to the imperials. After leading the troops to Markklee-
berg, Hessen-Homburg halted in compliance with Schwarzenberg’s verbal
orders to wait for Barclay and Bennigsen to come on line with him. On
receiving confirmation that the imperials had evacuated Wachau, he disre-
garded these orders and commenced the march toward Leipzig. His van-
guard, General Ignaz von Hardegg’s light division (two Grenzer battalions
and nine squadrons) of Colloredo’s I Corps, struck the road from Wachau to
Dösen while the rest of the column followed in two waves. Poniatowski’s
cavalry as well as some French battalions that held the road stopped the
Austrian van in its tracks. Stubborn combat ensued until the imperials
observed the approach of Hessen-Homburg’s first wave, the size of which
threatened to envelop them on both sides. Leaving Hardegg’s infantry
behind, the Austrian cavalry pursued the French and Poles to Dösen. The
weak French post before Dösen broke under the weight of the Austrian
cavalry, which pursued the imperials through to Dösen toward Murat’s main
line. After Hessen-Homburg’s right cleared Wachau and took positions to
its north and east, he decided to wait for the neighboring columns to come
on line while his artillery commenced the shelling of Murat’s position. Aside
from the cannon, the situation remained quiet except for a French
combined-arms counterattack on the forward Austrian position at the
Meusdorf sheep farm. Meanwhile, General Friedrich von Bianchi led
Hessen-Homburg’s left along the Borna–Leipzig road toward Dölitz.
After driving back Augereau’s forward post, the Austrians cleared Dölitz
with the bayonet and penetrated the outskirts of Lößnig but could go no
farther due to fierce French resistance. Yet the success generated by Hardegg
and Bianchi motivated Hessen-Homburg’s center to advance into the groves
northeast of Dösen. Murderous French artillery and musket fire did little to
help the Austrians navigate through the tall trees and difficult terrain. After
sustaining considerable losses, they managed to reach the northern edge of
the wood but could go no further.
Napoleon quickly perceived the serious threat posed to his right by
Hessen-Homburg’s success. Should the Austrians push Murat east and away
from the Pleiße, the army’s line of retreat would be compromised. To drive
the enemy from Lößnig, Dölitz, and Dösen, the emperor dispatched
Oudinot with the twelve battalions of General Pierre Decouz’s 3rd Division
of I Young Guard Corps. Oudinot’s approach gave the appearance of a
general offensive after the Young Guard linked with Poniatowski’s troops
to their left and Augereau’s to the right. The sight of the advancing imperials
prompted Hessen-Homburg’s entire line to fall back, surrendering Dölitz
and exposing Dösen. After Hessen-Homburg fell seriously wounded, Col-
loredo assumed command but could do nothing to stem the approaching
French tide. He summoned the second wave of his left wing, namely
Weißenwolf’s 1st Grenadier Division of the Austrian Reserve, which still
stood at Markkleeberg. Meanwhile, Schwarzenberg, who had arrived just
before the French retook Dölitz, summoned reinforcements from Rayevs-
ky’s Russian Grenadier Corps as well as General Ilya Duka’s 3rd Cuirassier
Division from the Russian Reserve Cavalry. As noted, he also sent the orders
for Gyulay to march III Corps from the Lindenau sector to Cröbern. Until
these reinforcements arrived, Colloredo had to make do with Weißenwolf’s
grenadiers. The lead battalion of these crack troops fixed bayonets and
smashed through Dölitz in two columns, driving the imperials to the oppos-
ite end of the village. As the Prussians had experienced at Möckern two days
earlier, the French tide returned just as fast as it had receded. As the
Austrians fell back to the midpoint of Dölitz, a second Grenadier battalion
arrived to help eject the imperials. The French doubled their efforts to retake
the village and a third Austrian Grenadier battalion had to be committed.
This seesaw battle continued for some time until the Austrians finally
managed to secure Dölitz by 2:00.
Meanwhile, Oudinot’s young bearskins made excellent progress against
Colloredo’s right thanks to the Guard Artillery’s ability to silence the
Austrian cannon. The French then overran Dösen, sending Hardegg to the
rear with a serious wound. To prevent the Austrian right from collapsing,
one brigade from Colloredo’s 3rd Division moved up from the second wave.
With Dösen on its right, the brigade advanced north, collecting the re-
formed units of Bianchi’s 2nd Division and Hardegg’s light division to
gradually push back the French to the hill chain that ran from the old
brickworks to Dölitz. From noon onward, the artillery of both sides mainly
continued the struggle as exhaustion prevented either from executing attacks
on a large scale. Gyulay arrived around noon but did not receive orders to
move into the battle line. Moreover, Rayevsky’s grenadiers and Duka’s
cuirassiers received orders sometime after the noon hour to return to their
former position. Due to the difficulty of the terrain, the two Austrian
divisions65 that had advanced along the right bank of the Pleiße could do
little except offer artillery support for the action on the opposite bank.
Hessen-Homburg’s decision to wait for Barclay and Bennigsen to come on
line with him prevented him from exploiting his initial success and achieving
decisive results in the first half of battle on 18 October.
Leipzig 705
Around 7:00 a.m., I and II Infantry Corps of Wittgenstein’s Russian

army corps formed one large column between Güldengoßa and the Ober-
holz Forest. Left (west) of Wittgenstein, the Prussians of Kleist’s II Corps
likewise moved into a huge column. One hour later, Barclay ordered both
columns to commence the advance. Kleist’s three brigades formed the head
of the left column while Wittgenstein’s corps led Barclay’s right. The major-
ity of the artillery belonging to both corps preceded the two columns.
Behind Kleist followed the 2nd Russian Grenadier Division, 3rd Cuirassier
Division, and Russian Light Guard Cavalry. Wittgenstein’s support con-
sisted of Pahlen III’s cavalry corps, the 2nd Cuirassier Division, and 1st
Grenadier Division. Marching from its camp between Güldengoßa and
Störmthal, the Russian and Prussian Guard Infantry split the middle of the
two columns and followed as Barclay’s third wave. The 1st Cuirassier
Division and the Prussian Guard Cavalry brought up the rear.
As noted, Schwarzenberg tasked Barclay with taking Wachau and Lie-
bertwolkwitz and then directing his efforts against Probstheida. Kleist led
his column close to Güldengoßa on the road to Wachau as Wittgenstein’s
I Infantry Corps, commanded by General Andrey Gorchakov, made for
Liebertwolkwitz. Behind Gorchakov, Prince Eugen of Württemberg’s II
Infantry Corps moved northwest into the gap between the Russians and
Prussians. On Kleist’s left, General Klüx’s 9th Brigade linked with the
Austrians of Hessen-Homburg’s right near Wachau. Klüx halted on the hill
north of that village to wait for Kleist’s 10th and 12th Brigades, representing
the Prussian center and right respectively, to come up on his right and close
the gap between him and Gorchakov’s lead elements. After clearing small
French posts from Liebertwolkwitz, Gorchakov came on line with Klüx and
both columns continued the advance. As Kleist’s column came within
cannon range of Probstheida, Gorchakov’s passed the left (western) side of
Zuckelhausen. Around 10:00, both columns halted until Hessen-Homburg
and Bennigsen reached positions that would allow them to support a general
attack against Napoleon’s center. Pahlen III’s light cavalry and the Guard
Cavalry’s 2nd Cuirassier Division established the link between Barclay and
Bennigsen.
Barclay moved his second and third echelons forward. On the Monarch-
enhügel (Monarchs’ Hill), Alexander and Frederick William established
their command post; Kaiser Francis joined them in the afternoon. South of
the hill stood the Russo-Prussian Guard and Reserve. By 2:00, Kleist and
Wittgenstein succeeded in driving all French forward troops in their sector
into Probstheida. Intense skirmishing ensued between the Allies and Victor’s
II Corps as the Russo-Prussian guns shelled Probstheida’s numerous stone
structures. Barclay only awaited Bennigsen’s group to come on line with his
to give the signal for the Russians and Prussians to storm the French
stronghold. To soften the enemy, one battery each of heavy Russian,
Prussian, and Austrian guns lambasted Probstheida while the Russo-

Prussian skirmishers blunted Victor’s numerous counterattacks. Confining
Victor to Probstheida proved relatively easy compared to the daunting task
that awaited Barclay’s men.
As for Bennigsen, he received instructions to envelop what the Allies
believed to be Napoleon’s left between Probstheida and the Naundorf
villages. Moreover, he had to establish communication with Blücher and
Bernadotte as well as close the gap between their armies and the Bohemian.
These responsibilities meant that Bennigsen’s army group had the farthest to
march on the 18th. To find the end of Napoleon’s line, he dispatched Platov’s
Cossacks at 3:00 a.m. north through Hirschfeld, Althen, and Engelsdorf to
the Leipzig–Wurzen highway. From Sommerfeld, the Cossacks followed the
highway west to Paunsdorf to link with the Silesian and North German
Armies. The sudden appearance of Platov’s warriors emerging in the grey
morning caused panic among Macdonald’s unsuspecting train columns as
they stood between Sommerfeld, Engelsdorf, and Mölkau. Despite the
attractive booty, Platov maintained discipline and led his men to the Heiter-
blick manor where they linked with Korf’s troopers to establish communi-
cation with Blücher.
Thirteen miles east of Leipzig, the 6,500 men of Bubna’s 2nd Light
Division marched from Machern at 3:00 a.m. on the morning of the 18th.
Turning southwest, the Austrians trooped through Brandis toward Beucha
to cross the Parthe (see Map 6). Three hours later at 6:00, Bennigsen united
his group four miles southwest of Beucha at Fuchshain to provide time for
Bubna to cross the Parthe. Unfortunately for the Austrians, the river’s rain-
swollen waters had swallowed Beucha’s bridge. Fording the river with
infantry and artillery presented numerous obstacles, none greater than the
loss of time. With the exception of his caissons, which took a long detour
through Althen to stay dry, Bubna’s troops completed the crossing around
8:00 a.m. and commenced their advance west toward Kleinpösna. As Ben-
nigsen’s right wing, Bubna turned north-northwest from Kleinpösna to
advance through Engelsdorf and Sommerfeld seeking to win the Leipzig–
Wurzen highway and attract the enemy’s attention to himself.
Based on the reports he had received about the French positions opposite
him, Bennigsen arranged his troops in four columns that would advance as
soon as he received word of Bubna’s approach. From left to right, Zieten’s
11th Brigade from Kleist’s Prussian II Corps received the task of clearing the
French from the Niederholz Forest and establishing the link with Barclay’s
group at Liebertwolkwitz. To its right, Bennigsen’s second column, Klenau’s
Austrian IV Corps, would assault the Kolm hill from the south and east
while his third column, consisting of General Fyodor Lindfors’s Russian
13th Infantry Division and elements of General Yefim Chaplits’s cavalry
division, both part of Dokhturov’s army corps, attacked the northern side of
Leipzig 707
the hill. Stroganov’s vanguard, Dokhturov’s 12th and 26th Infantry Div-
isions, and the remainder of Chaplits’s troopers – thus the majority of
Bennigsen’s Army of Poland – formed the fourth column. Accompanied
by Bennigsen himself, Dokhturov would lead this group southwest from
Hirschfeld to attack what the Russians believed to be the French left wing at
Kleinpösna.
Shortly after commencing his advance, Bennigsen learned with relief that
the situation had changed overnight. The French had already evacuated both
the Niederholz and Kolm hill and now withdrew from Kleinpösna and
Baalsdorf after offering only token resistance. Regardless, Bennigsen did
not change his original disposition; rather than concentrate his dispersed
columns he continued their extensive movements in order to establish
communication with Bernadotte as soon as possible. By 10:00 that morning,
Zieten’s brigade had reached Zuckelhausen; Klenau sent Prince Ludwig von
Hohenlohe-Bartenstein’s division in pursuit of the French through Seifert-
shain to Holzhausen while turning General Josef von Mayer’s division
toward Liebertwolkwitz, which the French evacuated around this time, to
shield Zieten’s right and rear. Bennigsen’s third column – Lindfors’s 13th
Division supported by Chaplits’s cavalry – continued to march west from
Kleinpösna toward a position next to the Austrian troops facing Holzhau-
sen. Meanwhile, Dokhturov’s column stood at Baalsdorf with Bubna’s
division to its right between Engelsdorf and Sommerfeld.
Although achieving his first objectives with relative ease thanks to the
enemy, Bennigsen remained cautious. A steady wind blew the heavy smoke
clouds caused by Bennigsen’s artillery west toward the Pleiße. From the
north, he could hear Blücher’s guns. Yet he could neither hear nor see, in the
gap between his army and Blücher’s, any sign indicating that Bernadotte’s
army would soon fill the space between the Armies of Silesia and Poland.
Concerned that Napoleon would exploit this hole in the Allied line to break
out of Leipzig, the Russian commander wanted to extend his army north-
east. To prevent exposing Barclay’s right, Bennigsen had no choice but to
continue the forward momentum of his left wing, meaning that Zieten and
Klenau would have to take Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen before he could
move his right wing columns outside supporting distance to fill the gap to
his right.
Unfortunately for the Allies, Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen
represented the teeth of Macdonald’s position. Marchand’s 39th Division
of Hessians and Badenese held the former while Charpentier’s 36th Div-
ision defended the latter; a strong line of skirmishers filled the gap between
the two villages. Artillery mastered the southern approaches to both while
north of the villages artillery crowned the Stein hill, behind which stood
Gérard’s 35th Division in reserve. Klenau answered the French cannon by
moving up 24-pound guns from his reserve escorted by the Alois
Liechtenstein Infantry Regiment, the Hohenzollern Light Cavalry, and the

Kaiser Cuirassier Regiment. After a long bombardment of both villages,
General Adalbert Johann de Best’s 2nd Brigade of Mayer’s 3rd Division
attacked Holzhausen while General Franz Abele von und zu Lilienberg’s
1st Brigade of that division moved against Zuckelhausen. Part of Zieten’s
brigade also assaulted Zuckelhausen from the west as the other half contended
with Badenese troops posted west of the village. Brutal French resistance at
Holzhausen took its toll on the sole Austrian battalion that first penetrated
the village only to be driven out by a counterattack. General Ignatius Rossi’s
1st Brigade of Lindfors’s 13th Division then arrived from Kleinpösna to
support the Austrians. Moreover, Dokhturov’s column had cleared Baalsdorf
two miles northeast of Holzhausen and could launch a flanking attack against
the village. Dokhturov sent additional support in the form of General Nikolay
Khovansky’s 12th Division led by the Narvskii Infantry Regiment and the
twelve guns of the 45th Battery Company. Linfors’s 2nd Brigade under
General Ivan Ivanov also arrived as well as the 47th and 53rd Light Battery
Companies. Around 1:00, four Austrian divisions attacked Holzhausen from
the south while the Russian 12th and 13th Divisions attacked from the east.
Overwhelmed by Allied numerical superiority, Charpentier’s 36th Division
conducted a disorderly withdrawal, losing three guns and several caissons to
pursuing Austrian cavalry.
At Zuckelhausen, the Hessians and Badenese prevented Hohenlohe’s
two battalions from entering the village. Not until Zieten’s brigade attacked
from the south and the west did the imperials withdraw to Stötteritz,
protected by the guns on the Stein hill. With Zuckelhausen and Holzhau-
sen secure, Bennigsen decided to assault the Stein hill and its outcrops,
which Gérard’s 35th Division now deployed across. To provide counter-
battery fire, the Allies moved up their artillery to establish a powerful line
while three columns of Russian infantry formed. On the left, Lindfors’s
13th Division received orders to advance through Holzhausen as
Khovansky’s 12th and General Ivan Paskevich’s 26th Divisions marched
to its right (east) to form the center and right columns respectively. West of
Holzhausen, Klenau re-formed his infantry and likewise marched toward
the hill. Bennigsen’s plan broke down quickly due to the flames that
engulfed Holzhausen. Unable to get through the village, Lindfors slid his
13th Division east, somewhat disordering his men and falling behind
Dokhturov’s other columns. This left a large gap between Dokhturov and
Klenau, which Sébastiani’s II Cavalry Corps and General Frédéric-Henri
Walther’s 3rd Guard Cavalry Division exploited to charge the lead brigade
of Khovansky’s 12th Division. Composed of the Smolenskii and Narvskii
Regiments, the Russian brigade blunted the attack and then watched as ten
squadrons of hussars and uhlans from Stroganov’s van turned the tables on
Leipzig 709
the French. After the French troopers retreated, the Russian foot soldiers
resumed the march toward the Stein hill.
Horrific artillery fire rained down on the Russians; one ball ripped off
Lindfors’s right leg, putting an end to the general’s life two days later.
Finally, the Austrian assault columns came on line with the Russians. Not
expecting to be attacked from two directions, Gérard’s 35th Division
retreated in some disorder to Probstheida. To cut it off, Pahlen received
orders to lead his cavalry from Barclay’s group. Receiving deadly fire from
the French guns at Sötteritz and Probstheida, the Russian cavalry rode
toward the latter but failed to catch Gérard’s men. The Austrians ascended
the Stein hill and establish a strong artillery line to pound Macdonald’s
position between Probstheida and the Naundorfs. At this point, Bennigsen
issued orders for Stroganov and Dokhturov to extend northeast until they
faced Mölkau. On his left, Zieten likewise slid west to maintain contact with
Barclay’s group yet moved his artillery into position to shell Probstheida. As
for the key French positions north of his line, Bennigsen refused to risk an
assault on Ober- or Unternaundorf, Mölkau, or Paunsdorf – which, as we
will see, Bubna failed to secure – until Bernadotte filled the gap between the
Armies of Poland and Silesia.
Meanwhile, on Bennigsen’s extreme right, Bubna had his hands full at
Paunsdorf facing Reynier’s VII Corps.66 Moving northwest between Engels-
dorf and Sommerfeld, around 10:00 the Austrians made contact with the
handful of Saxon and French companies posted in the village. Two Saxon
batteries totaling ten guns shelled the Austrians from the windmill hill west
of Paunsdorf. To draw their fire away from his infantry, Bubna brought up
the twelve pieces of his two horse batteries. After a two-hour artillery duel,
the Austrian gunners mastered their Saxon opposites and Bubna ordered his
infantry to advance. Despite incredible resistance, General Theophil Joseph
von Zechmeister’s 6th Jäger Battalion drove into Paunsdorf only to be
repulsed by a Franco-Saxon counterattack. Bubna committed one battalion
from the Peterwardeiner Grenzer Regiment to support the Jäger. Together,
the two Austrian battalions managed to take and hold Paunsdorf, in part
because Reynier ordered the 2nd Brigade of his all-Saxon 24th Division to
withdraw on to its 1st Brigade at Sellershausen. Around noon, Platov
warned Bubna that Reynier appeared to be preparing to envelop the Aus-
trian’s right with General Pierre-François Durutte’s 32nd Division. To
counter, Bubna committed Neipperg’s 3rd Brigade. The smallest of his three,
3rd Brigade consisted of Jäger Battalion Nr. 5 (846 men), the six squadrons
of the Kaiser Hussar Regiment (838 troopers), and six six-pound horse guns.
Unable to hold his ground against Durutte, Neipperg requested reinforce-
ments. As the engagement intensified, Bubna gradually committed his entire
light division. Not only did the Austrians lose Paunsdorf in the process, but
Reynier also gained the upper hand. Only the arrival of Bülow’s corps saved
Bubna’s division from being routed.
North of Leipzig, Langeron went to Bernadotte’s command post.
According to the French émigré, “Blücher informed me . . . that on this
memorable day I was destined to be under the orders of the Prince Royal
of Sweden. I immediately went to Breitenfeld. When I arrived at his head-
quarters, I found him dictating in French, or rather in Gascon (as he did not
know a word of Swedish), the dispositions to his generals; they seemed to
me to be very good, but somewhat too detailed; he even designated the place
of the junior officers in the columns; this exactitude proved to me that
appearance is now the general malady of all sovereigns and of those destined
to be one.” Bernadotte then gave Langeron instructions, which proved very
different from those that his adjutant delivered to Blücher. According to
these verbal orders, Langeron would temporarily remain on the left bank of
the Parthe at Mockau and Plösen to cover the approach of the North
German Army. As soon as it engaged the imperials on the right bank
Langeron could commence his crossing.67
According to Bernadotte’s orders, Bülow’s III Corps rather than Wint-
zingerode’s Russian corps would lead the march of the North German Army
to the Parthe.68 Bülow received instructions to cross the Parthe at Taucha and
send detachments east toward Wurzen to make contact with Bennigsen’s
army. Wintzingerode’s Russians would follow Bülow, dispatching cavalry
to Wurzen and northeast to Eilenburg to shield Bernadotte’s left. As noted,
the Swedes would cross somewhere between Langeron and Wintzingerode.69
Bülow informed Blücher that he planned to cross the Parthe on the shortest
line in conjunction with Langeron’s corps and thus requested that Langeron
accelerate his crossing to support the movement. Learning that Bülow still
remained a considerable distance from Taucha, Blücher became impatient
and loudly complained about Bernadotte’s lethargy as the thunder of the
guns south of Leipzig intensified.70 Fearing that the prince royal would waste
too much time marching through Taucha and thus give Napoleon an
opportunity to throw superior forces against Schwarzenberg, Blücher
ordered Langeron’s vanguard to immediately cross the Parthe at Mockau.
He informed Bernadotte that Langeron’s corps would await his further
orders on the other side of the Parthe at Abtnaundorf. According to
Müffling, “Blücher resolved not to wait for Bülow but to force the Parthe
at Mockau. He was persuaded to make this decision mainly because we saw
very few troops on the opposite bank of the Parthe; but with good tele-
scopes, he observed a column moving from Leipzig toward the Stötteritz
windmill. Therefore, the commander in chief feared that the majority of
the French army would turn against the Grand Army in order to bring the
battle to a decision before the North German and Silesian Armies could
move up.”71
Leipzig 711
“The enemy had strong lines of infantry and cavalry along the left bank
of the Parthe on the immense open plain that encircled Leipzig on the side of
Bad Düben, Torgau, and Dresden,” noted Langeron. “The Parthe is marshy,
enclosed, and full of trees and thorny underbrush that rendered passage of
the river very difficult when it was defended.”72 His forward troops made
contact with the French around 9:00; a heated skirmish occurred along the
Parthe between Rudzevich’s vanguard and Marmont’s troops. French artil-
lery, sharing a dominant hill with the St. Thekla Church, tore apart the
Russians as they attempted to move across the river. To counter Marmont’s
guns, the Russians divided three heavy batteries, of twelve guns each, among
two hills so that eighteen unlimbered on the elevation northwest of
Neutzsch and eighteen took position on the height northeast of Plösen.
From these advantageous points on the right bank of the Parthe, the Rus-
sians managed to silence Marmont’s artillery by 10:00.
After the French guns went silent, the Russians observed the imperials
withdraw from the left bank of the river. Rudzevich’s infantry and Emma-
nuel’s cavalry wasted little time in crossing the Parthe by Mockau. The
infantry either waded across the waist-deep water or hitched a ride on the
back of a Cossack’s horse. Langeron explains the situation:
All of a sudden, the enemy, either from the fear of being outflanked by the
Prince Royal of Sweden and Bennigsen, whom they could see marching, or
by the need to employ greater forces against the Grand Army, which was
attacking them with great vigor toward Connewitz and Probstheida while
Bennigsen and Bubna moved on Sommerfeld, commenced to distance himself
from the banks of the Parthe. Observing the enemy’s retrograde movement,
Rudzevich and Emmanuel instantly forced the passage of the river; they
crossed it at a ford near Mockau: this decision earned them a great deal of
honor but in no way was their action surprising. They made it without
waiting for my orders and against the dispositions given by the Prince Royal
of Sweden but they acted as they should have; there was no time to lose and
these two generals knew it. Nevertheless, the French still had some troops
and sixteen cannon on the heights; despite the presence of these sixteen pieces
and that of their skirmishers, the 7th, 12th, 22nd, 30th and 48th Jäger, [and]
the Shlisselburgskii and Olonetskii Regiments forced the crossing with great
bravery and the enemy withdrew toward Schönefeld. Coming from Breiten-
feld, I reached my vanguard at this moment; I admired Rudzevich’s
movement and made him aware of my satisfaction.73
The Russians drove back Marmont’s skirmishers and artillery from the St.
Thekla Church and pursued the imperials south to Schönefeld. Langeron’s
main body crossed the Parthe at Plösen by way of a ford and a hastily
thrown footbridge made of barn doors and gates. From the windmill hill at
Mockau on the right bank of the Parthe, Blücher tasked Rühle with
delivering an order to Langeron instructing the corps commander to attack;

if the Russian commander failed to engage the enemy with zeal, Rühle had
the authority to forcefully reiterate Blücher’s orders to do so. In general,
however, Blücher and his staff remained little more than spectators on 18
October.
By 11:00 a.m., Langeron’s corps stood between Mockau and the St.
Thekla Church to cover the approach of the North German Army. Emman-
uel with the vanguard cavalry held a forward position at the Heiterblick
estate while Korf’s cavalry controlled the Leipzig–Taucha road. Langeron’s
Cossacks took possession of the plain between the Parthe, Taucha, and
Paunsdorf, establishing contact with Platov.
Two hours later, Bernadotte informed Langeron that, as soon as the head
of Bülow’s corps reached Paunsdorf, the Russians should storm Schönefeld
and take the village at all costs. Kaptsevich prepared to assault the village
with seven battalions (1,800 men) from his X Infantry Corps. Behind
X Infantry Corps followed VIII and IX with Korf’s cavalry bringing up
the rear; Emmanuel’s regiments stood at Heiterblick. Bernadotte visited
Langeron’s command post shortly after dispatching the order and both
French émigrés predicted that the Russians would encounter considerable
resistance at Schönefeld, the key to Napoleon’s position north of Leipzig.
Situated on the left bank of the Parthe, Schönefeld’s defenses benefited from
the extension of the river’s marsh which prevented an attacking force from
flanking the village from the north. Although not completely enclosed by a
wall, Schönefeld had few points of entry, and these the French had strongly
barricaded. As in many of Leipzig’s suburbs, thick hedges and a thick wall
with freshly made loopholes presented the first obstacle an attacking force
would encounter. Large farm buildings often stood outside the walls, pro-
viding the defenders flank protection. Well-constructed two-story stone
houses each with a garden lined Schönefeld’s streets. French artillery dom-
inated all approaches to the village, which faced northeast. A walled cemet-
ery in the southern part of the village served as a fortress for its defenders.
Marmont personally commanded, and doubtless he looked to punish the
Allies as he had done Yorck’s corps two days prior.74
After receiving intense fire from Lagrange’s 21st Division, Kaptsevich’s
Staroskolskii, 29th, 38th, and 45th Jäger Regiments forced their way into
Schönefeld.75 His troops took the eastern half of the village before Marmont
unleashed a counterattack by Lagrange supported by fresh elements from
Friederichs’s 22nd Division. Inflicting great losses on the Russians, the
French drove them back to Schönefeld’s outlying houses and farm buildings.
During the combat, the French nearly destroyed the Staroskolskii Regiment
in a bayonet attack. Cut off in the courtyard of Schönefeld’s manor
house and leaderless after their commander was killed, some 200 survivors
surrendered. Despite the French success, the Russians managed to retain
Leipzig 713
control of the entrance to the village. Around this time, the British Rocket
Battery and Bülow’s artillery chased Durutte’s 32nd Division from
Paunsdorf to Sellerhausen. This provided an opportunity to pour flanking
fire into Schönefeld from the French right (south) and attack the village from
the northeast and south. A wounded Kaptsevich managed to reorganize his
shaken men. From the 1st Brigade of Turchaninov’s 22nd Division, he
moved the Vyatskii and Olonetskii Regiments into the first line. For his
part, Langeron pushed his artillery line closer to the enemy position, moved
up Olsufiyev’s IX Infantry Corps, and slid St.-Priest’s VIII Infantry Corps
and Rudzevich’s vanguard to his left (south).
As these forces advanced, Kaptsevich’s corps attacked Schönefeld from
the northeast while the eight battalions of St.-Priest’s 17th Division followed
by two from the 11th assaulted the village from the south and east. In all,
these Russian forces probably equaled the strength of Marmont’s 21st and
22nd Divisions. Colonel Vasilchikov led the Vyatskii Regiment into the
village at the head of the Russian storm columns. After a fierce struggle
with bayonets and musket-butts, the French repulsed the Russians from
Schönefeld a second time. Langeron reacted by committing Olsufiyev’s IX
Infantry Corps. From it, the Nasheburgskii and Irkutskii Regiments joined
the Staroingermanlandskii from Kaptsevich’s 8th Division to lead the third
Russian assault. Shortly afterward, the Ryazhskii, Vilmanstrandskii,
Belozerskii, and Brestskii Regiments from the 17th Division of St.-Priest’s
VIII Infantry Corps likewise stormed Schönefeld from the south. Although
flames began devouring the village, French resistance again forced the Rus-
sians to retreat. The wounded of both sides that could not be retrieved from
Schönefeld perished in the flames. Langeron’s subordinates prepared for a
fourth attack.
Meanwhile, the Saxons of Fabrice’s 26th Light Cavalry Brigade had
already repulsed the first Cossack charge at Heiterblick. Just as Olsufiyev’s
men prepared for the third attack on Schönefeld, the Saxons observed the
approach of Emmanuel’s cavalry, formed for a second attack, and charged.
On reaching the vicinity of the Russians, they sheathed their sabers and
summoned their adversary with a loud hurrah. Emmanuel rode toward them
and met with Fabrice who informed him of their decision to defect to the
Allies. Langeron describes this dramatic episode:
Kaptsevich’s corps as well as those of St.-Priest and Olsufiyev and my

Reserve Cavalry followed my vanguard and I moved in mass on the left bank
of the Parthe between the monastery of St. Thekla and the village of Abt-
naundorf. Two beautiful regiments of Saxons, one each of hussars and uhlans,
then moved, at a grand trot, toward Emmanuel; my Cossacks prepared to
charge them with the Kievskii Regiment; the Saxons stopped, cried
“Hurrah!” and the officers advanced out of the ranks; Emmanuel went to
talk to them; they announced the desire to join us and cross into our ranks.
Emmanuel informed me of this; I hurried there and arranged an interview
with the officers of the two regiments.76
Korf provides another eyewitness account:

On 18 October, when the entire army was crossing the river in order to
attack the enemy, General Emmanuel, with four Cossack regiments, was first
to move across the river, followed by other cavalry regiments that comprise
his detachment. Once across the river, he deployed his cavalry [in battle
formation] and ordered it to advance, but just as our flanquers caught up
with the enemy skirmishers, they saw two cavalry regiments advancing
straight at them. They sent out a trumpeter to convey their desire to surren-
der, so General Emmanuel immediately halted his regiments. The com-
mander of these Saxon forces soon arrived and assured Emmanuel that
these two regiments (one hussar and another uhlan) desired to defect to our
side and serve with us against our common enemy.77
While the horse battery belonging to the cavalry brigade returned to the
main French position at Paunsdorf, one Saxon battalion posted in the Parthe
meadows near Seegeritz likewise defected. Although the Saxons expressed
their desire to fight against the French, Blücher ordered them to be sent to a
reserve position and they took no part in the engagements of the day. As for
the Württembergers, Norman decided against waiting for a general retreat to
execute his king’s orders. Followed by some 556 troopers, he left the French
line to join Platov. Unlike the Saxons, Norman declared that neither he nor
his men could take up arms against the French without their sovereign’s
express permission.
Just as Langeron’s troops made contact with the French around 9:00,
Blücher ordered Sacken to attack both the Halle suburb, its Gerber Gate and
bridge over the Parthe, and the Rosenthal; only in the extreme case should
the Russian request support from Yorck. From Gohlis, Sacken’s fresh troops
advanced while Yorck’s two divisions moved into position between Gohlis
and Eutritzsch. The battle-hardened veterans of Neverovsky’s 27th Division
attacked Pfaffendorf while Colonel Rakhmanov advanced toward the
Rosenthal with the Kamchatskii and Okhotskii Regiments. General Jacob
Guine moved twenty-four guns to within pistol range of the wall that
enclosed the Rosenthal. Arrighi’s forward cavalry quickly fell back but
Da˛browski’s Poles supported by 1st Brigade of Brayer’s 8th Division from
III Corps offered ferocious resistance on the Pfaffendorf estate. Guine and
Neverovsky received mortal wounds; Rakhmanov as well as the commander
of the Kamchatskii Regiment, Major Salmanov, were killed in the fighting.78
Gourgaud arrived and observed that Da˛browski’s division, hardly 1,500
men, and the reserve assigned to it, the 2,600 bayonets of General Jean-Louis
Fournier’s 1st Brigade from 8th Division of III Corps, would not hold for
Leipzig 715
long against Sacken’s superior numbers. At this point of the battle, only the
highway running northeast through Taucha remained open to the Grande
Armée. With Sacken now threatening to close it, Gourgaud sped off to warn
Napoleon. The colonel induced him to send General Michel-Marie
Pacthod’s 1st Young Guard Division of 6,000 men and 24 guns as reinforce-
ments. After a forced march, the bearskins reached the Halle suburb shortly
after 11:00 to restore the balance of forces in this sector. As a result, Sacken
not only failed to gain any ground, but an imperial counterattack drove the
Russians back to Gohlis. By 1:00 p.m., Sacken found himself forced to
request support from Yorck to prevent the French from taking Gohlis. Horn
dispatched the Fusilier Battalions of the Leib and East Prussian Regiments,
which helped the Russians hold back the imperial tide.
Thus, the situation at 2:00 on the afternoon of the 18th reflected a mixed
bag that favored Napoleon, who spent much of the day at his command post
by the windmill south of Thon hill and close to the Quandt family’s tobacco
mill. Nearby, the Old Guard stood watch as the emperor rested on the bare
ground for a few minutes. Generals and orderlies came and went; Murat
arrived and held a longer conversation with the emperor. Around 12:00, they
mounted their horses and, joined by Berthier, rode to the line of Guard
Artillery batteries on the hills at Probstheida. Roundshot filled the air as
several balls whistled past Napoleon’s head. Observing Allied preparations
to attack Probstheida, he summoned the 2nd Old Guard Division to form in
columns behind (north of) the village and sent the Saxon and Westphalian
Guard battalions to reinforce Poniatowski. After a short while at
Probstheida, Napoleon returned to his command post. Although his troops
had lost their forward positions at Dölitz, Dösen, Zuckelhausen,
Holzhausen, and Baalsdorf, they retained control of Lößnig, Probstheida,
Mölkau, the Naundorfs, Paunsdorf, and Schönefeld. They repulsed Sacken’s
attack on the northern side of Leipzig and checked Gyulay at Lindenau.
Napoleon’s main position remained untouched, and Bertrand had opened
the line of retreat to Weißenfels. Bernadotte’s late arrival paralyzed the Allies
at the most vulnerable point of the French line. If 18 October was to be the
day the Allies triumphed over Napoleon, the afternoon would have to
provide decisive results.
Once again, we will survey the course of the battle counterclockwise.
During the fighting at Kleinzschocher, Gyulay reported to Schwarzenberg
that he could not determine with certainty that Bertrand’s attack signaled the
start of Napoleon’s retreat. From the hill at Probstheida, Schwarzenberg
responded at 2:00 by emphasizing that the importance of Gyulay’s position
on the left bank of the Elster did not require him to defeat Bertrand but to
determine positively which road the French had taken: the one leading to
Merseburg, the one to Weißenfels, or both. The Allied commander in chief
wanted Gyulay’s detachment approaching from Naumburg to reverse its
march and return there and his cavalry patrols to observe the Saale and
report French movements. Consequently, Allied Headquarters became
aware of the likelihood that Napoleon would retreat: for what other reason
would he send an entire corps marching away from Leipzig?
Gyulay tasked Mensdorff and Thielmann with following the French
columns as closely as possible. Around 5:00, the French cleared Lützen
and headed for Weißenfels, where Murray promptly destroyed the bridge
over the Saale. Believing his forces to be insufficient to defend Weißenfels,
Murray commenced his retreat to Zeitz, where stood the Bohemian Army’s
trains. Late on the evening of the 18th, Gyulay received news from Schwar-
zenberg that the French would probably attempt to retreat on Naumburg.
Gyulay should do his best to beat them there and occupy Bad Kösen.
Schwarzenberg wanted Gyulay’s cavalry as well as the Austrian II Corps
at Pegau by 7:00 a.m. on the 19th to take the road to Naumburg. Yet should
the French threaten to overwhelm Gyulay, Schwarzenberg advised him to
retreat to Zeitz, sending the trains to Altenburg. Should Napoleon press
Gyulay at Zeitz, Schwarzenberg instructed his corps commander to do
everything possible to harass the retreating French army but not allow his
own troops to suffer “einen Echec.” As soon as the French cleared the
Austrians to open a road for the further retreat, Schwarzenberg wanted
Gyulay to follow “only with strong cavalry.”79 Around 2:00 a.m. on the
19th, Gyulay’s III Corps and Liechtenstein’s 1st Light Division commenced
the thirteen-mile march south-southwest to Pegau.
Returning to Colloredo’s front, after losing Dösen and Dölitz, Murat
withdrew all his forces to the main French position around Lößnig’s ponds.
The two sides exchanged brutal artillery fire. Colloredo recognized that he
could not attempt to force Murat’s position until Barclay’s group took
Probstheida. Shortly after 2:00, Murat launched a counterattack with fresh
forces to regain Dölitz and Dösen. At the former, the imperials mauled the
1st Brigade of Bianchi’s 2nd Division from the Austrian Reserve Corps,
requiring Colloredo to transfer three battalions (one from the Reserve
Corps’s 1st Division, two from 1st Division of II Corps) from the left bank
of the Pleiße to the right to maintain control of the village. On the Austrian
right, the French drove them from the ridge that stretched between Dölitz
and the small wood northeast of Dösen. The Austrians managed to stay the
French advance at Dösen and the wood. From the 2nd Division of the
Austrian Reserve Corps, the Hessen-Homburg Infantry Regiment bravely
defended the wood but soon its position again appeared to be in jeopardy
after the French penetrated the grove. General Alois Gonzaga Joseph von
und zu Liechtenstein, commander of 2nd Division of the Austrian II Corps,
committed the two battalions (1,651 men) of his Reuß-Greiz Infantry Regi-
ment to drive the imperials from the wood. Gradually the Austrians pushed
back the French from Dösen and the wood to their former position behind
Leipzig 717
Lößnig’s ponds. The Austrians resumed their line along the ridge and the
artillery duel recommenced.
Shortly afterward, the Austrians made a general advance. Bianchi’s 1st
Brigade, which re-formed south of Dölitz, marched on Lößnig. This bri-
gade, commanded by General August von Beck, penetrated Lößnig several
times only to be repulsed by Poniatowski’s Poles and Decouz’s bearskins.
Despite the bravery of the Poles, Bianchi’s division managed to gain ground
along the Pleiße. Observing these developments, Colloredo personally led
two regiments from the 3rd Division of his own I Corps in the successful
storming of Lößnig. Although the Austrians maintained the village, all
attempts to take Connewitz, particularly the village cemetery, shattered on
the heroic resistance directed by Poniatowski. A timely counterattack
ordered by Napoleon and led by General Henri Rottembourg’s small,
non-French 2nd Brigade80 of the 2nd Old Guard Division turned the tables
on Colloredo. Switching to the defensive, the Austrians repulsed every
French attempt to regain Lößnig. Fatigue on both sides brought the fighting
in this sector to a sustained firefight that gradually weakened and finally
ended with the last light of day. On the western bank of the Pleiße,
General Lederer’s 1st Division of II Corps gained no success enveloping
Murat’s right, despite being reinforced by two battalions from Bianchi’s
division.
Meanwhile, the morning operation had ended with Barclay’s army group
facing Probstheida, which Napoleon recognized as the key to his position.
To defend it, numerous French batteries unlimbered on either side of the
village while large columns of infantry and cavalry could be seen north of it;
Napoleon expected them to defend Probstheida to the extreme. A man-high,
one-foot-thick wall with loopholes completely surrounded the rectangle-
shaped village, which contained stone structures, making it a solid position
for its defenders. Flanked by batteries, Probstheida’s wall presented an
almost insurmountable obstacle. Penetrating the village on its eastern and
western sides presented problems as well because only one narrow point of
entry existed at each. Barclay clearly observed the strength of the position.
Not wanting to sacrifice his men, he decided to wait until Colloredo and
Bennigsen had advanced far enough to envelop Probstheida. Conversely,
both of these commanders were waiting for Barclay to take Probstheida
before they launched attacks on either side of him against Lößnig and
Stötteritz respectively.81 Tsar Alexander broke this stalemate around 2:00
by ordering Barclay to storm Probstheida, most likely to relieve pressure on
Bennigsen at Stötteritz. Kleist’s 10th and 12th Brigades supported by the
1,800 men of Prince Eugen’s Russian II Infantry Corps received instructions
to storm the village.
Unfortunately for the Prussians leading the charge, Barclay launched the
attack before the Allied artillery could soften the French position. In
particular, the Allied guns failed to demolish the wall. Instead, the balls
passed through smoothly without causing significant breaches.82 Under
devastating fire from French cannon, the Prussians advanced toward
Probstheida at the double-quick. Commanding 10th Brigade, General
Georg Dubislav von Pirch I led his men against the portion of the wall
southwest of the village while the 2nd Silesian and 11th Reserve Regiments
of Prince August of Prussia’s 12th Brigade attacked from the east. Preceding
Pirch’s first wave, the skirmishers of the Fusilier Battalion of the 2nd West
Prussian Infantry Regiment dodged musket and cannonballs to reach the
man-high wall, behind which stood the enemy’s forward infantry. After the
Prussians managed to hop the wall, the imperials withdrew fifty paces to a
second garden wall. Despite the hail of musket fire, the Prussians also
cleared this second obstacle. As the skirmishers moved into the streets of
Probstheida, the Fusilier Battalion and the only remaining battalion, the 2nd,
of the 9th Landwehr Regiment gradually cleared the two walls to likewise
penetrate the village. In this way, Pirch managed to assemble enough fire-
power to drive the French reserves from Probstheida. Napoleon arrived to
personally lead reinforcements from Victor’s II Corps to retake the position.
Prussian fatigue as well as the breakdown of command and control due to
the chaotic storming of the village meant that Pirch did not have long to
enjoy his success. After some brief but deadly hand-to-hand combat, the
Prussians withdrew from Probstheida under the protection of their
skirmishers.
On the eastern side of Probstheida, Prince August’s 12th Brigade
encountered numerous terrain obstacles that impeded its march. Followed
by a detachment of Russian hussars, the skirmishers of its lead battalion
braved the storm of lead to reach the outer wall. At the gate, the Prussians
took two abandoned guns whose draft horses had been killed; the Russian
troopers carried the prizes back to Allied lines. Yet the delays that August
encountered en route meant that his skirmishers entered the eastern side of
Probstheida just as Victor launched his counterattack. With the first wave of
12th Brigade just reaching the outer wall, the skirmishers also had to retreat
in the face of the French onslaught. August reacted by assembling his first
wave in a column at Probstheida’s eastern entrance. His foremost battalions
had just pushed into the village when suddenly a concealed French battery
of fifteen guns lambasted the column’s right flank with canister and a large
column of cavalry bore down on it. Forming squares to defend against
the cavalry took precedence over the attack on Probstheida. Thanks to the
Russian hussars who engaged the French in hand-to-hand combat, the
Prussians retreated in good order.
Undaunted, Prince August re-formed his columns and placed himself at
the head of his two foremost battalions.83 The nephew of Frederick the
Great84 led his men through the hail of grape from the fifteen-gun battery
Leipzig 719
that greeted them as they approached Probstheida’s eastern entrance. With

bayonets fixed, the Prussian prince led his men into the village, driving
Victor’s warriors from building to building. On reaching the village square,
the Prussians received brutal flanking fire from a French battery northwest
of Probstheida. Simultaneously, Rochambeau led troops from his 19th Div-
ision of Lauriston’s V Corps to retake the village. Although Rochambeau
and many of his officers fell with mortal wounds, the French smashed
through the village. August received reinforcements in the form of two
battalions from the 19th Reserve Regiment, one battalion of Silesian fusi-
liers, and one company of marksmen from Zieten’s 11th Brigade, which had
just taken Zuckelhausen. Despite this support, August could not hold his
ground. Just as the Prussians came flying out of Probstheida hotly pursued
by the French, Eugen’s Russians arrived to enable August to organize an
orderly retreat. Eugen’s men, who had been shredded in the brutal fighting
on the 16th, then took their turn in the cauldron of Probstheida. Prince Ivan
Shakhovsky led Eugen’s 3rd Division north and bravely stormed the village
only to be repulsed by French counterattacks. Eugen lost 600 men or one-
third of his effectives during the struggle at Probstheida. Russian grape
prevented the French from exploiting Eugen’s setback through a deadly
pursuit.
As noted, the carnage around Probstheida had attracted Napoleon’s
attention. Rushing over to this crucial point of his line, he quickly observed
the exhaustion of Victor’s corps, which included a 75 percent casualty rate
for General Honoré Vial’s 6th Division. This prompted the emperor to
commit the rest of Lauriston’s V Corps to the defense of Probstheida. To
encourage his warriors, Napoleon entered the firing line, exposing himself to
tremendous danger. He responded to a report that the artillery would soon
expend its ammunition by ordering the gunners to slow their rate of fire. No
longer thinking of victory, the French ferociously fought to survive. Instead
of breaking French resolve, the defection of the Saxons and Württembergers
seemed to strengthen their determination. Vial’s 2nd, 4th, and 18th Line
Regiments ferociously resisted the Allied attacks.85 At 5:00, just as the
concussion of a cannonball that flew past Vial killed him, Napoleon
summoned elements of his last reserve: the fusiliers of General Louis Friant’s
1st Old Guard Division. Together with a few hundred dragoons, these fresh
forces helped Lauriston’s men and Victor’s survivors seal the French victory
at Probstheida.
Despite this setback, the Allies found much hope in Gyulay’s report that
the French had started the retreat to the Saale. With the aid of a glass, French
wagon trains could be seen rolling out of Leipzig and across the Lindenau
defile. This signaled to the Allies that the French quite possibly would
abandon Probstheida. Based on this thought, Barclay pulled his men out
of range of French caseshot, sent Kleist’s Reserve Cavalry to his left to
establish the link with Colloredo, and reinforced his artillery line to prevent
the French from breaking out of Probstheida. Both sides exchanged artillery
blasts until darkness silenced the guns. Although Friederich unfairly criti-
cizes Barclay for not committing the idle Russo-Prussian Guard units stand-
ing south of Meusdorf to storm Probstheida and force a decision on the 18th,
the fact remains that Barclay’s group achieved no decisive results during the
course of the afternoon.86
Returning to Bennigsen’s group, his troops faced the Naundorf–
Mölkau–Paunsdorf line with numerous batteries opposite the French
defenders of the first two. Yet, by pushing Bubna to Paunsdorf, Bennigsen
overextended himself, creating large gaps between his columns that pre-
vented mutual support. Conscious of this factor, he delayed attacking the
Naundorfs and Mölkau until Bernadotte’s army arrived. Finally around
2:30, the lead brigade of Bülow’s III Corps – Hessen-Homburg’s 3rd –
appeared. Bennigsen immediately dispatched his adjutant to Bernadotte’s
headquarters with a status report; a little later Bennigsen himself arrived to
discuss a combined operation. Together, they decided that Bennigsen would
not attempt to extend his right wing through Paunsdorf but instead the
Army of North Germany would fill the gap between the Parthe and that
village by pushing Bülow’s 3rd Brigade to a position facing Paunsdorf. This
in turn allowed Bubna to slide south so Bennigsen could concentrate his
forces for the assault on the Naundorf villages and Mölkau. Regardless, the
overly cautious Bennigsen refused to authorize the advance until all of
Bernadotte’s army had arrived. In the meantime, both sides exchanged
vicious artillery fire. The French seized the initiative through a bold cavalry
attack by Nansouty’s Guard Cavalry – which Napoleon himself had
ordered – but Allied steadfastness turned back these elite mounted warriors.
Following this failed attack, the French cavalry supported by twenty pieces
of horse artillery made for the gap between Stünz and Mölkau which
separated Bubna from Bennigsen’s main body. To counter them, Dokhturov
assembled three batteries whose effective caseshot along with intense small-
arms fire from Bubna’s 6th Jäger Battalion slowed the French long enough
for Chaplits’s cavalry to arrive and repulse the attack.
By this time, the 5:00 hour had struck and Bennigsen finally felt that
enough of the Army of North Germany had arrived so that he could order a
general advance. Bubna received orders to attack Mölkau; Stroganov
followed by Dokhturov marched against Unternaundorf; and Klenau’s IV
Austrian Corps assaulted Obernaundorf. Bubna’s troops quickly carried
Mölkau as did Klenau’s at Obernaundorf but the Russians encountered
determined French resistance at Unternaundorf. After Dokhturov
reinforced Stroganov with General Ivan Paskevich’s 26th Division, the
Russians took the village. A French counterattack drove them out again
but after a second attempt the Russians managed to take and hold
Leipzig 721
Unternaundorf. Russian Jäger from the 6th and 11th Regiments moved into
the thickets to the right (north) of the Naundorfs. To contain the Russians in
Unternaundorf, Sébastiani led his II Cavalry Corps supported by Walther’s
3rd Division of Guard Cavalry toward the village. Backed by a powerful
battery of twenty-four guns west of Unternaundorf, the French engaged the
approaching Russian cavalry. The melee produced no clear results until
Stroganov’s 6th Jäger Regiment moved close enough to the French battery
to spook the gunners into withdrawing. After losing their artillery support,
the French cavalry retreated to Stötteritz, bringing back a severely wounded
Sébastiani. Paskevich’s 26th Division moved west from Unternaundorf,
taking the windmill hill behind the village.
From Obernaundorf, Klenau directed his troops slightly southwest
toward Stötteritz. Like the Prussians at Probstheida, the Austrians found
that the features of Stötteritz – a clay wall, hedges, and trenches protecting
the village’s south and east sides – favored the defender. A large French force
of infantry and artillery guarded Stötteritz. Knowing that possession
of Stötteritz would facilitate the capture of Probstheida – the key to
Napoleon’s line – Klenau did not allow these obstacles to intimidate him.
Personally leading 1st Brigade of Hohenlohe-Bartenstein’s 2nd Division,
Klenau marched toward Stötteritz. Before he could cross the one and one-
half miles that separated the Stötteritz and Obernaundorf, his Zach and
Colloredo Infantry Regiments received withering blasts of grape in the front
and flank, forcing him to retreat. Not content with setting Obernaundorf
ablaze with their shells, the French launched a counterattack but failed to
drive the Austrians from the village. As in the other sectors of the line, an
artillery duel ensued until dark. Despite losing the forward positions of the
Naundorfs, Mölkau, and Paunsdorf, the French maintained the critical point
of Stötteritz, thus denying Bennigsen decisive results.
As for Bernadotte’s army, Langeron’s artillery commenced the shelling of
Schönefeld from Abtnaundorf around 1:00 p.m. Delays and blocked roads
slowed Bernadotte’s detour through Taucha, meaning that his vanguard –
Bülow’s corps – did not appear on Langeron’s left until 2:00; the rest of the
North German Army followed even later. Consequently, the gap between
the Armies of Poland and Silesia would not close until around 4:00. In the
meantime, Prince Louis William of Hessen-Homburg led Bülow’s 3rd Bri-
gade toward Paunsdorf shortly after 2:30 p.m. Bülow’s other brigades as
well as Wintzingerode’s Russians and Stedingk’s Swedes had yet to reach the
battlefield. Opposite the Army of North Germany, the main body of Dur-
utte’s 32nd Division stood behind (west of) Paunsdorf while one of its
battalions along with two Saxon companies held the village itself. West of
Paunsdorf, Reynier sought to position his 1st Saxon Brigade on the windmill
hill at Stünz and his 2nd Brigade north of it at Sellerhausen. As soon as 3rd
Brigade reached Paunsdorf, Bülow rolled up four batteries and the British
Congreve Rocket Brigade to engage Durutte’s artillery and shell Marmont’s

right wing. Just as Bülow’s guns opened fire, he received orders from
Bernadotte to take Paunsdorf with Hessen-Homburg’s three left wing bat-
talions. Linking with Bubna’s 6th Jäger Battalion, the Austro-Prussian force
broke into the village, forcing the French and Saxons to withdraw on their
main position. Prussian infantry along with Austrian Jäger and Grenzer
pursued as Bülow’s batteries moved up. Coming within caseshot range of
Durutte’s division, the Prussian guns pelted the French. As Durutte’s div-
ision stood on the brink of collapse, the rocket battery opened fire. This
proved to be too much for the French, who fled to Sellerhausen in
complete chaos.
Some of Durutte’s fugitives crossed the path of Reynier’s two Saxon
brigades. Disgusted by what they had seen and believing that this served as
the last opportunity they would have to defect, some 3,000 Saxons with 19
guns, including 1 battery of 12-pound pieces, prepared to march toward
Unternaundorf. After Reynier sent orders for the heavy battery to withdraw
to Sellerhausen, the gunners led their teams toward the Allied line followed
by the infantry of the Saxon 1st Brigade and then the 2nd. Assuming the
Saxons were marching to attack the Allies, the troopers of General Vincent
Axamitowsky’s 1st Brigade of Defrance’s 4th Heavy Cavalry Division
accompanied them with shouts of “Vive l’Empereur!” Believing that his
men had misunderstood Reynier’s orders, the division’s general, Heinrich
von Zeschau, hurried over to the commander of his 2nd Brigade, General
Xavier Reinhold von Ryssel, who informed him of their intention to
defect.87 Zeschau refused to condone such dishonorable conduct and
pleaded for his officers and men to turn around. Zeschau managed to
convince only two battalions (24 officers and 593 men) to return to their
positions but concerns over their loyalty prompted the French to send them
to Leipzig. At Unternaundorf, the Saxons encountered Stroganov’s cavalry
and defected to the Allies. In all, only 710 Saxons remained loyal to the
French.88 Bennigsen honored Ryssel’s request that his men be spared from
further combat until Frederick Augustus could openly declare for the
German cause. While the Saxon infantry retired to a bivouac south of
Engelsdorf, the Allies impressed four guns each from the two Saxon horse
batteries. The complete battery joined Stroganov’s artillery.89
Returning to Durutte, the Allied artillery and rocket battery pursued his
fugitives. Taking a position between Paunsdorf and Sellerhausen, the Allies
shelled the latter. As flames engulfed Sellerhausen, the two battalions of
Bülow’s 4th Reserve Regiment moved up and dispersed the forward French
skirmishers. Entering Sellerhausen the same time as the retreating skirmish-
ers, the Prussians and Bubna’s Peterwardeiner Grenzer secured the village
after a short fight but could advance no further due to Ney’s strong reserves.
Meanwhile, Durutte’s flight from Paunsdorf had exposed Marmont’s right
Leipzig 723
along the Schönefeld–Paunsdorf line. This prompted Marmont to bend his

right westward so that his corps ultimately held a line extending from
Schönefeld to Sellerhausen. With the Prussians in control of Sellerhausen,
Marmont again found his right in danger of being flanked. Ney recognized
that Sellerhausen needed to be retaken to prevent the collapse of his sector.
From his reserves at Volkmarsdorf, he assigned the task to Delmas’s 9th
Division of III Corps as well as Durutte’s reorganized division. No match
for two French divisions, Bülow’s two battalions and the Austrian Grenzer
attempted to hold Sellerhausen but eventually fled to Paunsdorf in complete
disorder, sweeping the Allied artillery with them. Both the guns and the
rocket battery suffered such considerable losses that they could no longer
take part in the battle. Durutte’s division occupied Sellerhausen and Stünz
while Delmas’s men filled the gap between Durutte and Marmont’s right
wing. Allied canister turned back two French cavalry regiments that
attempted to exploit the situation.
Around 3:00, Langeron received orders from both Blücher and Berna-
dotte to again storm Schönefeld. Blücher reinforced Langeron’s artillery by
moving additional batteries to the right bank of the Parthe. After softening
the enemy position, St.-Priest’s VIII Infantry Corps attacked the village.
Marmont claims that the two divisions of his VI Corps at Schönefeld had
never fought as heroically as they did to defend the village. According to
Bogdanovich’s account, “Amid the cries of the soldiers, the thunder of the
artillery, the crackling of musket fire, the bursting of shells, the church
steeple suddenly collapsed in flames; smoke and dust obscured the light of
day and for a few minutes this night interrupted the efforts of the combat-
ants.”90 Olsufiyev moved up Rudzevich’s and Udom’s divisions from his IX
Infantry Corps to support St.-Priest. Also at this time, Langeron’s artillery
gained the upper hand in its duel with Marmont’s guns, which proceeded to
withdraw after losing numerous pieces to Russian counterbattery fire. The
retreat of Marmont’s artillery meant the end of his infantry’s resistance; the
marshal withdrew the remains of his two divisions almost three miles south-
southwest to Reudnitz around 4:30.
Despite Marmont’s capitulation, Ney decided to throw his last reserves –
Ricard’s 11th Division and 2nd Brigade from Brayer’s 8th, some 7,000 men
and 40 guns – against the Russians at Schönefeld. He tasked Souham with
regaining the village. While reconnoitering to determine the best point to
attack, both Ney and Souham received wounds that put them out of action.
Command devolved to Ricard, who received a break when Langeron’s guns
sped off due to a lack of ammunition and the grape from his own forty guns
drove off St.-Priest’s troops from the southern side of Schönefeld. Despite
being reinforced by six fresh battalions, Kaptsevich’s men in the village
could not prevent Ricard’s assault columns from penetrating Schönefeld.
Success proved fleeting after Bernadotte directed sixty guns from
Wintzingerode’s corps and twenty from Stedingk’s to replace Langeron’s.

Protected by these eighty guns, Langeron formed his entire army corps for a
final assault on Schönefeld. Olsufiyev personally led six battalions of his 9th
Division southwest along the Parthe while Kaptsevich, St.-Priest, and Rud-
zevich attacked Schönefeld from the south and east. Ricard could not hold
his position in the face of such overwhelming numbers. Severely wounded in
the process, Brayer brought up his 2nd Brigade to reinforce Ricard but
nothing could stop the repeated Russian attacks, which numbered eight
altogether. After a brief hand-to-hand skirmish around 6:00, Ricard’s troops
broke in disorder, fleeing toward Reudnitz after losing 117 officers and 5,009
men as well as 459 prisoners. Wintzingerode’s cavalry gave chase, taking four
guns from the fugitives. French forces rallied on the windmill hill between
Schönefeld and Reudnitz, which they defended until the Allies drove them
into Reudnitz around 9:00 p.m. Russian loses in the struggle for Schönefeld
surpassed 4,000 men; the French lost more in addition to several officers
being wounded, including Friederichs, Compans, Coëhorn, and most of
Marmont’s staff.91
During this action, the rest of Bülow’s 3rd Brigade reached Paunsdorf,
taking a position with its right leaning on the village and its left extending
south and linking with Bubna’s right. Behind 3rd Brigade, the rest of the
North German Army gradually arrived on the field to close the circle
around Leipzig toward 4:00 on the afternoon of 18 October. To form
Bülow’s right wing, Borstell’s 5th Brigade halted between Paunsdorf and
the northeast-running Leipzig–Taucha road. As a reserve, Bülow posted
Karl August von Krafft’s 6th Brigade east of Paunsdorf with his Reserve
Cavalry behind it. Bülow’s artillery unlimbered along a line extending
between Paunsdorf and the Leipzig–Taucha road. Langeron’s corps faced
Schönefeld with its right leaning on the Parthe. Wintzingerode’s Russian
corps filled the gap between Bülow’s right and Langeron’s left. Behind (east
of) Wintzingerode stood the Swedish corps as the army’s reserve. Strong
French batteries formed on a line between Schönefeld and Stünz. Bülow
responded with seventy-six Prussian pieces, mauling Nansouty’s cavalry in
crossfire with Bennigsen’s guns.
Just as Ricard launched his counterattack on Schönefeld, Bülow’s artil-
lery engaged the batteries of the French 21st, 22nd, and 32nd Divisions. To
their credit, the French gunners did not waver in the face of Prussian
numerical superiority. Yet this advantage enabled the Prussian guns to move
very close to Sellerhausen. More than one hour later, thus around 5:30, as
Bennigsen commenced the movements of his columns to assault Mölkau and
Unternaundorf, and Langeron’s corps gained uncontested possession of
Schönefeld, Bernadotte ordered Bülow to take Stünz and Sellerhausen.
Following a bombardment by 150 Russo-Prussian guns of the North
German Army, two battalions from the 3rd East Prussian Regiment of
Leipzig 725
Bülow’s 3rd Brigade advanced against Stünz while skirmisher detachments

from two others swarmed Sellerhausen. After Mölkau to the left (south)
of Bülow’s corps fell to the Austrians, the Prussians stormed and secured
Stünz in unison with one of Bubna’s Jäger detachments. However, Bülow
underestimated the number of defenders at Sellerhausen. There, a prolonged
struggle ensued until the main bodies of the battalions whose skirmishers
initially sought to take the village moved up along with four battalions
from Bülow’s 6th Brigade. This show of force prompted Delmas’s 9th
and Durutte’s 32nd Divisions to evacuate Sellerhausen but not until
well after nightfall. In view of the late hour, the Allies did not advance
beyond the Schönfeld–Sellerhausen–Stünz line. Delmas lost his life in the
combat.
Due to his agreement to cede Langeron’s corps to the North German
Army, Blücher did little on 18 October other than observe Sacken’s attempts
to take the Pfaffendorf manor and the Rosenthal. Sacken’s first effort had
failed thanks to the timely arrival of the twelve battalions of Pacthod’s 1st
Young Guard Division as well as three Guard batteries. Around 3:00, Sacken
resumed the attack. Each time Sacken’s troops managed to wrest the stone
buildings of the Pfaffendorf estate from the Poles, brutal French artillery fire
from the Rosenthal forced the Russians to evacuate the structure. As flames
devoured the manor house, many Polish and Russian wounded who could
not escape suffered a cruel death. In the evening, Sacken’s troops crossed the
Pleiße and took the Rosenthal but failed to hold it and retreated to Gohlis.
The struggle ensued until dark without either side gaining an advantage. At
the least, Sacken tied down imperial forces, including Guard units that could
have been used to defend Schönefeld. “With Sacken’s very weak corps,”
explained Gneisenau, “we attacked the suburb of Leipzig, which was
defended by Marmont; it was taken, lost, and retaken. The bloody battle
lasted into the night; we could hold only a part of the suburb. Yorck’s corps,
which had been reduced from 19,000 men on the 16th to 12,700, needed rest
and took only a small part in the struggle on this day.”92
News that the Saxons had defected brought Napoleon to Ney’s
command post, where the two engaged in a lengthy discussion. Keeping
the traitorous behavior of the Saxons and Württembergers a secret so that his
army would not panic became the emperor’s main concern. Around 4:00 that
afternoon, he issued orders for I Cavalry Corps, followed by III and V
Cavalry Corps, to commence the army’s retreat by withdrawing into a
position at Schönau west of Lindenau before nightfall. The entire artillery
park would follow after resupplying the troops and burning the empty
caissons. Napoleon finally accepted that he could no longer maintain his
position. Only darkness prevented the Allies from completing their success
on the 18th and critically threatening his line of retreat. Each side suffered
between 20,000–25,000 casualties on this day, meaning the advantage went to
18 Schwarzenberg’s victory report to the three Allied monarchs, Leipzig,

18 October 1813
the Allies, who had much more manpower to spare. Only a miracle could
prevent the Allies from delivering the final blow on the 19th.
At 5:00 p.m. on 18 October, an exhausted Napoleon returned to his
command post south of Thon hill. Surrounded by generals, adjutants, and
orderlies, Napoleon slumped down by a campfire he ordered lit near the
tobacco mill, providing a scene that Friederich terms “indescribably tragic.”
The 2nd Brigade of 1st Old Guard Division soon arrived from Stötteritz.
After dozing for fifteen minutes on a wooden stool, he awoke after a shell hit
the campfire. He then calmly dictated further instructions for the retreat on
the 19th. These instructions have been lost but according to French sources
the artillery and parks would retire from the field followed before daybreak
by the Old Guard, Oudinot’s Young Guard Corps, IV Cavalry Corps, IX
and II Corps, with II Cavalry Corps forming the rear. The remaining corps
(III, V, VI, VII, VIII, and XI) received the task of defending Leipzig and
covering the retreat.93
Around 6:30, the emperor called for his tent to be established. Learning
that it had already departed with the imperial baggage, he decided to pass the
night in Leipzig itself. Accompanied by Murat, Napoleon left the battlefield.
By now the jam of wagons and men in Leipzig so clogged the roads that
Leipzig 727
Napoleon had to utilize detours to reach his quarters at the Hôtel de Prusse,
around 9:00 p.m. Certainly the irony of the inn’s name was not lost on him.
Napoleon, Berthier, and Maret spent the night finalizing the measures for
the Grande Armée’s retreat. With every minute becoming more precious
than the last, no time could be lost. Orderlies rushed to the various corps
commanders to deliver the master’s commands to accelerate their move-
ments. To cover the retreat, Poniatowski, Macdonald, and Marmont
received command of the right, center, and left respectively. Poniatowski’s
VIII Corps anchored the French line south of Leipzig with its right at
Connewitz on the Pleiße. From there, XI, V, and III Corps extended to
the Grimma Gate on the city’s eastern side. From the Grimma Gate to the
Parthe, Marmont’s VI Corps would defend the line while the only remaining
division of VII Corps – Durutte’s 32nd – reinforced by the Leipzig garrison
held the Halle suburb. As soon as circumstances allowed, III, V, and VI
Corps would follow the army while Macdonald sought to hold the city for
at least twenty-four hours with the 30,000 men of VII, VIII, and XI Corps.
After this rearguard evacuated Leipzig, the Hohenbrücken (high bridge)
over the Elster’s main arm and leading to the Lindenau causeway would
be blown by the charges placed on a boat anchored under its western end. As
soon as the rearguard reached Lindenau, the Rat-Forsthaus-Brücke
(Forestry Council Bridge), which was the bridge closest to Lindenau, would
also be blown. After the engineer in chief of the Grande Armée, General
Joseph Rogniat, departed for Weißenfels, the execution of this task fell to his
assistant, chief of staff of the engineers of the Grande Armée, Colonel Joseph
de Montfort. Only the commander of the rearguard – presumably
Macdonald – could give the order to detonate the charges. Unfortunately
for the French, Montfort never received clear instructions regarding which
units would cover the retreat, which troop units would be the last to cross,
and who would give him the signal to detonate the bridge. This lack of
clarification would lead to disaster.94
After making these arrangements, Napoleon dictated instructions for
Bertrand at Weißenfels to extend IV Corps between Merseburg and Bad
Kösen while observing the passages of the Saale and occupying Freiburg,
and to ensure that victuals were prepared along the line of retreat at Erfurt,
Fulda, and other points. The same courier would then continue to Mainz to
deliver the emperor’s instructions to Marshal François Christophe de Keller-
mann regarding the recall to Frankfurt-am-Main of all march units en route
to join the army.95 Ominously, Napoleon’s orders to Kellermann included
directives for the summoning of the French National Guard and measures to
defend France against the imminent Allied invasion. The commandants of
Erfurt and Würzburg received notification to provision those cities as quickly
as possible. To St.-Cyr at Dresden went a short summary of the events of
16 and 18 October as well as the permission to escape as best he could and
negotiate the surrender of Torgau and Wittenberg. The letter-writing lasted

long into the night; Napoleon finally took a short nap at dawn.96
Meanwhile, Bertrand reached Weißenfels at 7:00 p.m. on 18 October
with the main body of IV Corps after leaving one division at Lützen to
maintain communication with the rest of the army. Early on the following
morning he repaired the Saale bridge and started construction on a second
further downstream. After forwarding a detachment to secure the crossing
over the Unstrut at Freyburg, Bertrand reconnoitered all the way to Naum-
burg, thirty miles southwest of Leipzig. At Naumburg, an Austrian garrison
of five companies and one squadron launched a bold sortie, which caused
him to grossly overestimate the Allied force. He withdrew to Weißenfels,
where V Cavalry Corps arrived that evening. Rather than clear the Allies
from Naumburg, Bertrand decided to turn off the great highway and lead
the army on a detour through Freyburg. Napoleon spent the night at
Markranstädt with the majority of the Guard while the main body of the
French army camped at Lützen; two Young Guard divisions under Oudinot
remained at Lindenau as rearguard.
Back at Leipzig, chaos ensued in the dark, unlit city streets as imperial
troops poured into the inner city from three gates, all making for the
single western exit: the Ranstädt Gate. Order broke down, roads became
clogged with jettisoned equipment, dead horses, broken wagons, and
overturned caissons, columns collided, cavalry and artillery rode through
the infantry, wagons and horses trampled the wounded that lay scattered
throughout the streets. “After the shadows of night covered Leipzig, the
suburbs, and the defile, an orderly retreat became all the more necessary,”
recalled Pelet. “Not only should there have been multiple routes instead
of one, but the streets should have been illuminated and officers posted to
give directions and maintain the columns without interruption. Unfortu-
nately, of those who by duty and by order were responsible for this
service, not a one occupied a point. One encountered difficulties finding
the road to the bridge. A column of 4,000 to 5,000 prisoners, which set out
too late and marched very slowly, steadily increased the confusion.” In
the cold hour before dawn the moon’s sinking rays provided some light to
guide the last of the infantry – II and IX Corps followed by V Corps – to
the Ranstädt Gate. The complete lack of food compounded this awful
situation. So bare was Leipzig that the emperor’s servants had trouble
finding bread for him and his immediate entourage. As dawn broke,
thousands of hungry and exhausted stragglers emerged from Leipzig’s
houses where they had sought refuge to join the disorderly masses moving
west through the city. Also numbering in the thousands were men who
had fought for their emperor and now, incapacitated from wounds, were
left behind without care or food to die a painful death, such was the
master’s gratitude.97
Leipzig 729
At 8:00 p.m., Maret had sent a message to Frederick Augustus. Per

Napoleon’s instructions, the French foreign minister assured the Saxon king
that the battle was won and that the Allies would inevitably retreat in the
night. Pelet claims that Maret actually went to see Frederick Augustus to
personally convince him to withdraw from the French alliance. Other
accounts state that Maret made his way through the throngs to the residence
of the Saxon king to deliver the promise that, if Frederick Augustus joined
the emperor on the journey to Erfurt, Napoleon would guarantee his
security. If any individual had more to fear about the future than Napoleon,
it was certainly Frederick Augustus. Knowing that leaving his kingdom
could cost him his crown, he decided to await the Allied monarchs and so
politely declined the proposal.98
That night, the armies camped where they had ended the day’s events:
Colloredo’s group along the Lößnig–Dölitz–Dösen line; Barclay’s opposite
Probstheida from Dösen to Zuckelhausen; Bennigsen’s along the
Zuckelhausen–Naundorf–Mölkau line; Bernadotte’s in several waves from
Stünz–Sellerhausen to Paunsdorf–Abtnaundorf; Langeron’s corps at Schö-
nefeld; Sacken’s corps between Gohlis and the Parthe, close to Leipzig.
Napoleon’s line extended from Connewitz to Probstheida and then cut
sharply north to Stötteritz, where the reserves bivouacked, and ran through
Crottendorf and Reudnitz to the Halle suburb and Gohlis. The outposts of
the two sides stood so close that each side could clearly hear the other
talking.
To defend Leipzig itself, the French withdrew into the city’s immediate
suburbs or outer city at 2:00 a.m. Like Schönefeld and Probstheida, their
large stone buildings, brick and clay garden walls, hedges, and wooden
fences would have greatly facilitated the defense had time been available
for the French to prepare. According to Pelet and Napoleon’s secretary,
Baron Fain, some of the emperor’s entourage insisted that the suburbs of
Leipzig’s outer city be burned to open fields of fire. They predicted that
6,000 men with 60 guns could defend the inner city and that “our retreat
would be secure: the army could tranquilly regain the Saale. But the emperor
could not bring himself to expose one of the capitals of Germany to such a
harsh fate. He preferred to lose a few hundred wagons than to lower the
French army to sustain the war of barbarians. It would suffice to leverage the
means of resistance that the gates of the suburbs and the inner city wall offer
us to delay the progress of the enemy.” Pelet simply notes that “it was useful
to retain before the suburbs the four armies that the emperor had drawn
there, and which could significantly disturb our retreat.”99
As apocryphal as Fain’s statements appear, darkness prevented the
imperials from evaluating the means at their disposal while clogged roads
obstructed the movement and positioning of the resources needed for a
proper defense. Napoleon’s selection of the corps that stood closest to the
enemy for the defense of the city left them little time to ready their new
positions before the Allies attacked. Yet this did not mean that the imperials
did nothing. In general, they closed and fortified points of access, made
loopholes in walls, transformed larger buildings into bastions, palisaded
fences and hedges, situated batteries, and placed reserves. Because of the
haphazard nature of these preparations, some important points were neg-
lected while others received too much attention.100
Eleven outer gates provided entry through Leipzig’s outer city wall,
which consisted of mostly brick and thin boards.101 Suburbs and gardens
formed Leipzig’s outer city. Between the inner and outer cities extended
large open areas cut by finely manicured esplanades and avenues. Four inner
gates – the Peters, Grimma, Halle, and Ranstädt – provided access through
the old, fairly weak wall that ringed Leipzig’s inner city. Despite the uneven
preparations, Leipzig’s 30,000 defenders occupied a perimeter of 6,500 paces,
which equated to four or five men per pace – a slightly better ratio than that
of the 18th, when 160,000 men had defended a perimeter of 38,000 paces.
After the departure of V Corps, Durutte’s 32nd Division reinforced by the
battalions that formerly garrisoned the city defended the Gerber Gate and
Halle suburb supported by 8th and 9th Divisions of Souham’s III Corps.
East of Durutte and facing northeast, Souham’s 11th Division supported by
22nd Division of Marmont’s VI Corps occupied the Taucha suburb and
extended to Leipzig’s Hinter Gate. South of 11th Division, Marmont’s
20th and 21st Divisions in the Grimma suburb faced due east, holding the
walled gardens between the Blinden and outer Grimma Gates. From the
Grimma Gate to the Windmill Gate, thus facing southeast, Macdonald’s 31st
and 35th Divisions supported by his 36th Division took position to defend
the Bose Gardens and the Johannis suburb. From his 39th Division, Mac-
donald posted its 1st Brigade of Badeners in the Bose Gardens and the 2nd
Brigade of Hessians at the inner Grimma Gate. Finally, from the Windmill
Gate to the Münz Gate in the Pegau suburb, Poniatowski positioned his
own VIII Corps and the two remaining battalions of Rottembourg’s non-
French Old Guard brigade with Da˛browski’s 27th Division in the Richter
Garden as reserve. Behind these forces in Leipzig’s inner city stood two
Badenese and one Italian battalion under the command of Prince William
Louis Augustus, the 21-year-old second son of Grand Duke Karl Frederick
of Baden, who had replaced Arrighi as commandant of Leipzig.102 The
Badeners garrisoned the four inner gates of the city with fifty men each
while one company supported Durutte’s division at the Gerber Gate. Some
1,200 Saxons stood guard on the marketplace in front of their king’s
residence.103
Returning to Blücher, believing that he had fulfilled his commitment to
Bernadotte, he ordered Langeron to return to the right bank of the Parthe
that same night and take a position to support Sacken’s corps if necessary.
Leipzig 731
Schönefeld
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0 500 1000 1500 metres
27. Battle of Leipzig, 19 October 1813
The exhaustion of Langeron’s troops made it impossible for the native

Frenchman to comply with Blücher’s demand. In the evening, Blücher
received word from Schwarzenberg’s headquarters that the enemy appeared
to be retreating to Merseburg and Weißenfels. Consequently, the Allied
commander in chief instructed Blücher to make an attempt to reach the
Saale before the French. Shortly after 7:00 p.m. on the 18th, Blücher ordered
Yorck to secure the bridges over the Saale at Halle and Merseburg, which the
French would likely utilize during their retreat from Leipzig.104 Blücher also
instructed Yorck to cause as much damage as possible to the retreating
enemy forces. For this purpose, the cantankerous man of Tauroggen
obtained a degree of independent command with the freedom “to operate
according to his own view of the circumstances.”105
Reinforced by two of Sacken’s Cossack regiments, the Saxon cavalry
brigade that had defected, and half of an Austrian Jäger company, Yorck’s
corps commenced its march to Schkeuditz around 8:00 p.m. and marched
through the night, reaching Halle at 7:00 the following morning with the
Reserve Cavalry and Horn’s division; Hünerbein’s division and the Reserve
Artillery halted at Bruckdorf and Burgliebenau. Although the march to the
Saale signaled an attempt to exploit a victory, Yorck’s soldiers thought
differently. After they had sustained horrendous casualties at Möckern, their
retrograde movement appeared very similar to the march that had taken
place after the supposed Allied “victory” at Lützen on 2 May 1813. A black
night did not help the situation. The darkness, haste, jam of wagons,
entanglement of units, and general confusion usually associated with hated
night marches typically lowered morale, but in this case served to reinforce
the appearance of a retreat after a lost battle. Yorck, too, succumbed to
despair. Observing portions of the fighting on the 18th from the hills of
Eutritzsch north of Leipzig, he noted the stalemate south of the city, where
Schwarzenberg’s army fought over the same ground for the entire day.
North of Leipzig, he could discern the lack of coordination between Lan-
geron’s Russians and Bernadotte’s army. Likewise, he watched Bernadotte
withhold his Swedish corps and Wintzingerode’s Russians while Bülow’s
Prussians bore the brunt of the fighting. With no details on the status of the
Allied and French armies, a disgusted Yorck viewed his current march to the
Saale as a retreat. Even if Napoleon was retreating, Yorck did not want to
disperse his weak corps of 14,000 men across the wide plain between Halle
and Merseburg in the path of the approaching French army. For this reason
he directed his corps to the northernmost of its objectives, Halle, from
where it would proceed according to circumstances.
Around 6:00 p.m. on the 18th, Schwarzenberg convened a council of war
on the Monarchs’ Hill with the corps commanders in the vicinity. With
Alexander’s endorsement, the Allied commander in chief gave very short
and simple verbal instructions for the attack on the 19th. There would be no
day of rest as on the 17th. At first light, Schwarzenberg wanted all army
groups in battle order and ready to resume the struggle. Should the enemy
retreat, the army groups would remain the same as on the 18th, concentric-
ally attack Leipzig, and storm the city’s gates. Schwarzenberg explained that
only the capture of Leipzig would make the victory decisive. His orders
assigned each army group a specific gate to attack. Colloredo would advance
along the Borna road and attack the Peters Gate; Barclay on the Colditz
highway to attack the Windmill and Sand Gates; Bennigsen through Stötter-
itz to attack the Hospital Gate. He tasked the North German Army with
taking the Grimma and Hinter Gates while the Silesian Army assaulted the
Gerber Gate.
To hinder the French retreat, Schwarzenberg directed Gyulay’s group to
Pegau while Blücher sent Yorck’s I Corps to Halle and Merseburg. Some
accounts claim that Alexander expressed the desire to have the Russo-
Prussian Guard and Russian Grenadier Corps march fourteen miles south-
west to Pegau and cross the Elster that very evening so that these fresh
Leipzig 733
troops would be in a position to fall on the French during their retreat. In

view of the exhaustion of the army and the lack of food, Schwarzenberg and
his staff disapproved. No documentary evidence exists to support this tale,
and if Alexander had desired to send the Guard and Grenadiers to Pegau
Schwarzenberg would not have been able to stop him.106 Instead, Platov
received orders to lead his Cossacks across the Pleiße at Dölitz and the
Elster at Zwenkau that night so they could harass the French on the 19th.
Although “all reports convincingly indicate that after today’s defeat the
enemy will retreat to Merseburg,” the Allies did not do more to block the
roads west due to their expectation of having to fight a third major battle at
Leipzig on the 19th.107 During the course of the night, Schwarzenberg
issued further orders for an additional 40,000 Austrians (II Corps and
General Nostitz’s Cuirassier Corps of the Austrian Reserve) to reach Pegau
by 7:00 a.m. on the 19th where they would unite with Liechtenstein’s 1st
Light Division. Moreover, Bubna should likewise lead his 2nd Light Div-
ision to Pegau as soon as his men had rested. These orders did not reach
Bubna until 8:00 a.m. on the 19th.108
Late on the evening of the 18th, Schwarzenberg changed his mind
concerning the pursuit. Sometime after midnight on the 19th, he recalled II
Corps and Nostitz’s Cuirassier Corps, citing as the reason that the enemy’s
actual movements did not confirm a retreat. In view of Allied numerical
superiority, the dispatching of only Platov and Bubna prompted Russian
historian Bogdanovich to ask “how could one expect decisive results with
such measures?” Of course German historians found no military reasons to
account for this change and thus attribute it to Metternich’s political
scheming. Even objective scholars such as Friederich could find no cause –
military or political – for Schwarzenberg’s waffling. True, it was not until
2:00 a.m. that the French began to evacuate Connewitz, Probstheida, and
Stötteritz and fall back on Leipzig. A dark, misty night coupled with expert
outpost service by the French to prevent the Allies from confirming the
withdrawal to Leipzig until 5:00 a.m. on the 19th.109
During the night of 18/19 October, several reports confirming a great
commotion in the French camp reached Allied Headquarters. Opinion
remained divided over whether these movements signaled the beginning of
a general retreat or marked French preparations for the defense of the city.
As the beautiful autumn day of Tuesday, 19 October, dawned and allowed an
overview, the Allies discovered that in all sectors the imperials had evacuated
their forward positions and retreated into Leipzig’s suburbs. Schwarzenberg
and his staff appeared on the battlefield very early on 19 October followed
by Alexander and Frederick William. The growing light of day left no doubt
over the retreat of the French army but the Allied leaders made no effort to
block its retreat on the other side of the Elster. For the present, they focused
on what they believed would be heavy rearguard action and remained
content with the arrangements Schwarzenberg had made during the previ-
ous night for the pursuit.110
Between 7:00 and 8:00 on the morning of 19 October, the Allied columns
commenced their march on Leipzig. As noted, Schwarzenberg tasked Col-
loredo with proceeding along the Borna–Leipzig road to the Peters Gate.
Colloredo’s I Corps led the march on the Pegau–Leipzig road with General
Franz von Mumb’s 1st Brigade of 3rd Division at the head of the column
followed by Hardegg’s 1st Division and Maximilian Alexander von Wimpf-
fen’s 2nd. Hardegg and Wimpffen halted just west of Probstheida to await
further orders while Mumb’s brigade marched to the Borna–Leipzig road in
two attack waves; four batteries covered by Austrian cavalry sped in front
toward the Peters Gate. The Poles fell back fighting, seeking to protect their
departing artillery from the approaching Austrian cavalry through intense
skirmisher fire.
East of Colloredo, Wittgenstein’s corps from Barclay’s group advanced at
daybreak on the Colditz–Leipzig highway to a position west of the
Straßenhäuser. At 9:00, the Russian artillery commenced its duel with the
French guns that defended the Windmill and Sand Gates; a long pause ensued
while the guns battled. Kleist used this time to move into the charred remains
of Probstheida and retrieve the dead of both sides, many of whom had sought
refuge in the village after being wounded but could not escape being burned
alive. The Prussians also found numerous French stragglers as well as several
full caissons. After Bennigsen returned Ziethen’s 11th Brigade, Kleist led his
entire corps to Napoleon’s former command post by Quandt’s mill.
Next to Barclay’s group, Bennigsen’s troops, who stood furthest from
Leipzig’s outer city, started advancing northwest at first light. Minus Bub-
na’s 2nd Light Division, which had already departed for Pegau, Bennigsen’s
army group moved toward Leipzig’s east-facing Hospital Gate. Observing a
strong line of French guns, Bennigsen ordered the 60 pieces of General
Dmitry Rezvyi’s Reserve Artillery to unlimber 300 paces from Leipzig’s
outer wall. Meanwhile, the infantry took a position between the Straßenhäu-
ser and Crottendorf just beyond the reach of the French guns. Klenau’s
Austrian IV Corps marched from Zuckelhausen to Stötteritz, pushing one
brigade to the Straßenhäuser. By the time Bennigsen’s Reserve Artillery
unlimbered opposite Leipzig’s eastern Johannis suburb and its neighboring
Bose Gardens, Bülow’s skirmishers had reached the wall of the latter. After
the Prussians withdrew to open a field of fire, Bennigsen’s Russian guns
pounded the walls of the Bose Gardens in an attempt to reduce them to
rubble. As Barclay’s gunners had experienced at Probstheida the day before,
the balls passed through the walls smoothly without causing significant
damage. During the bombardment, Bennigsen moved up his infantry in
two waves of attack columns with his 26th Division on the left, 13th forming
the center, and 12th holding the right.
Leipzig 735
Turning to the Army of North Germany, at dawn Bülow’s cavalry patrols

reported the French retreat but found that imperial forces still held the villages
of Crottendorf, Volkmarsdorf, Anger, and Reudnitz east of Leipzig. From its
bivouac at Paunsdorf, Bülow arranged his corps in two waves behind the line
of Prussian outposts that guarded the short gap between Stünz and Sell-
erhausen. Hessen-Homburg’s 3rd Brigade formed on the left while Borstell’s
5th stood on the right. Bülow’s 6th Brigade and Reserve Cavalry stood in
second line. Not expecting to encounter significant resistance, Bernadotte
interfered and ordered Hessen-Homburg supported by Borstell to take the
villages opposite Bülow’s corps. He directed Bülow’s Reserve Cavalry to
Stötteritz, where French cavalry had been spotted. Moreover, he inexplicably
ordered Krafft’s 6th Brigade to join the Swedes as rearguard. Bülow could do
little but comply at 7:00 a.m. With seven battalions, four squadrons, and
twenty-four guns of his brigade, Hessen-Homburg attacked Volkmarsdorf
and Reudnitz while a left flank column of three battalions advanced on Anger.
After token resistance, the imperials evacuated Volkmarsdorf and Anger.
However, as soon as Hessen-Homburg’s lead battalions cleared the villages,
they received devastating artillery fire from a ten-gun battery posted at the
outer Grimma Gate. For counterbattery fire, one and one-half Prussian
batteries unlimbered at Anger while one of the Russian heavy batteries
attached to Bülow’s corps opened fire from Volkmarsdorf. Supported by
one of Bennigsen’s batteries at the Straßenhäuser, this crossfire soon silenced
the French guns. During the artillery exchange, the majority of Bülow’s corps
moved west through the villages of Crottendorf, Volkmarsdorf, Anger, and
Reudnitz with Hessen-Homburg’s flank column linking with Bennigsen’s
right. East of the villages, ten Prussian battalions stood in reserve.
North of Leipzig, French movements had not gone unnoticed by the
Silesian Army’s outposts. Based on the loud creaking of wagon wheels
coming from the city throughout the night, Blücher and his staff correctly
concluded that the French army was retreating. Unlike the other sectors of
the battlefield, first light revealed that the imperials had not evacuated their
forward positions. At 8:00, Blücher ordered Langeron to support Bülow’s
attack on Reudnitz, with one heavy battery. Blücher had intended to send
Langeron’s corps to follow Yorck after the Russians had recrossed the
Parthe. However, the need to support Sacken at the Halle suburb prevented
this. Now, he had to await the arrival of Langeron’s corps before he could
launch his own attack. Moving exceptionally slowly, its lead units did not
cross the Parthe until 8:00, meaning that the corps would not be ready to
attack until 10:30. Realizing that cavalry would be of little use in storming a
city, Blücher sent the cavalry of both Russian corps after Yorck; at 11:00,
they crossed the Elster at Schkeuditz.
Shortly before 10:00 a.m., a delegation from the city’s magistrate reached
Alexander and Frederick William, whose command post had replaced that of
Napoleon’s near the Quandt tobacco mill. In a plot hatched by Napoleon

earlier that morning to gain time for his army to escape, the deputies came to
negotiate with Schwarzenberg over Leipzig’s surrender based on the free
exit of the French garrison. Shortly after their arrival, the Saxon colonel
Anton Friedrich von Ryssel appeared with a plea from Frederick Augustus
to the Allied sovereigns to spare the city – again orchestrated by Napoleon.
Willing to negotiate with the city leaders but not the Saxon king “because all
earlier proposals by the Allies had been rejected,” Alexander ordered a
thirty-minute ceasefire to sound out the proposals. The Russian and Prus-
sian monarchs decided to send Toll and the king’s adjutant, Lieutenant-
Colonel Oldwig von Natzmer, to Frederick Augustus. They gained access
to the inner city because earlier Napoleon had ordered the commanders of
his rearguard to allow the enemy’s envoys to pass. Yet the negotiations
amounted to nothing as the French marshals took orders only from
Napoleon.111
Starting with Bennigsen’s group, the commander of the Army of Poland
used the thirty-minute pause in the fighting to swing his right wing
division – Khovansky’s 12th – in a wide arc west-southwest around the
city’s eastern side so that it faced the Peters gate on Leipzig’s southern side
and now formed Bennigsen’s left wing. Paskevich’s 26th Division slid south-
west opposite Leipzig’s Windmill Gate. Bennigsen ordered his 13th Division
to attack the Sand Gate leading to the Johannis suburb. After these shifts,
only Bennigsen’s Reserve Artillery faced the wall of Bose Gardens. After the
artillery failed to make a breach, sappers from 13th Division blew a hole in
the wall and penetrated the gardens while the main body broke through the
Sand Gate. Meeting no resistance, 13th Division pushed its way through
both the gate and the gardens while Bennigsen personally led six battalions
and two guns from 26th Division through the Windmill Gate. There, the
Russians encountered fierce resistance that prompted Bennigsen to take a
side road that led him to the open Roßplatz around 11:30 a.m., at which
time he linked with a Prussian column from Bülow’s corps. Meanwhile,
Khovansky’s 12th Division on Bennigsen’s left overpowered Poniatowski’s
Poles in the lumber yard facing the Münz Gate, itself on the Floßgraben
west of the outer Peters Gate. From there, Khovansky’s men drove through
the gate and along the Peters Causeway toward the Esplanade. Arriving at
this point around 12:30, the Russians accepted the surrender of more than
300 Poles with at least 47 guns and 27 caissons.112
Bennigsen’s westward shift remains unexplained as no documentary
evidence of the orders for it exists, yet the move effectively blocked both
Colloredo’s and Barclay’s army groups from advancing further. We can only
speculate that Allied Headquarters considered dispatching these two army
groups to Pegau as they stood closest to Napoleon’s line of retreat. Another
possible reason was to spare these troops as both army groups had sustained
Leipzig 737
considerable losses on the 16th and 18th. Regardless of who issued the
orders and why, Wittgenstein and Kleist bivouacked their troops opposite
the outer Peters Gate around 2:00 p.m. while Colloredo’s group commenced
the march to Pegau one hour later.
On Bennigsen’s other side, Bernadotte utilized the thirty-minute pause
to commence the movement of Wintzingerode’s corps around Bülow’s
Prussians to a position between them and Bennigsen’s army group. Shortly
after 10:00, all of Bülow’s corps stood west of Reudnitz, Anger, and Crot-
tendorf. Convinced that the imperials would offer no significant resistance,
Bernadotte ordered Stedingk to prepare the Swedish corps to parade into
Leipzig. Noticing the advance of Bennigsen’s 13th Division toward the Bose
Gardens, the crown prince ordered Borstell’s first wave to attack. Skirmish-
ers from the Fusilier Battalions of the 2nd Reserve Regiment and 1st Pom-
eranian Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion of 6th Brigade’s Kolberg
Infantry Regiment led the way as their parent battalions followed in
columns. The Kolberg battalion’s skirmishers made for the walled St. Johan-
nis church compound while to their right (north) the 2nd Reserve Regi-
ment’s Fusilier Battalion advanced toward the outer Grimma Gate and the
Pomeranians sprinted toward the edge of a garden situated to the right of the
gate. Brutal fire from Marmont’s troops behind the city wall greeted the
tightly packed Pomeranian Fusilier Battalion as it drew closer. Despite
considerable losses, the Pomeranians reached the wall and managed to open
a narrow, barricaded portal. Gradually, the battalion penetrated the garden.
Although engaging in murderous hand-to-hand combat with Marmont’s
troops, the Prussians managed to hold their ground.
Meanwhile, when the fusiliers of the 2nd Reserve Regiment,
accompanied by Bernadotte himself, came within 100 paces of the outer
Grimma Gate, they received withering fire from the three-story St. Johannis
hospital to the left (south) of the gate that was part of the walled St. Johannis
church compound, which included a cemetery as well as a large building
nine windows wide. Caught in the hail of fire coming from the compound,
Bernadotte shouted in French to the battalion’s commander to advance in
column. Closing their ranks, the Prussians ran this gauntlet to reach the gate,
which consisted of two large brick pillars with portals on the right and left
for pedestrian traffic; barricades made of wagons, beams, planks, and posts
closed all three entrances. Despite devastating flanking fire from the church
compound, the Prussians managed to pry open one of the side portals
enough so that individual soldiers could squeeze through. Although the
battalion gradually assembled, the men could not open the main entrance.
On the other side of the gate, the Prussians lacked the manpower to make
any headway. After sustaining numerous casualties in a firefight with French
defenders holed up in the buildings surrounding the gate, the Prussians
withdrew north into the garden secured by the Pomeranians.
Realizing he needed more manpower, Bernadotte ordered Hessen-

Homburg’s flank detachment of three battalions to storm the gate. As soon
as they broke in, the lead unit – Major Karl Friedrich Friccius’s 3rd Battalion
of the 3rd East Prussian Landwehr – would turn left (south) on the first
available road while the second battalion turned right (north) and the third
continued straight ahead (west). Despite the fire from the church compound,
Hessen-Homburg led Friccius’s Landwehr battalion toward the still closed
Grimma Gate. The bottleneck there caused by the fusiliers of the 2nd
Reserve Regiment prevented him from reaching the gate. However, a Land-
wehr officer found what he believed to be a weak point in the wall to the
right of the gate. He directed his men to pound the wall with the butts of
their muskets. In this way, the Prussians opened a narrow breach through
which the battalion gradually flowed. To partially comply with Hessen-
Homburg’s orders, Friccius gathered a sufficient number of men and led
them down the first street he could find to turn left – the aptly named
Todtengasse (Death’s Lane) – while a second group worked with the fusiliers
of the 2nd Reserve Regiment to open the main gate. A third group of
Friccius’s battalion moved through the breach to storm the two houses that
flanked both sides of the gate. At last, the Prussians managed to force open
the main gate. This allowed the second battalion of Hessen-Homburg’s flank
detachment – the 2nd of the 3rd East Prussian Regiment – to enter. The
column’s third battalion, the fusiliers of the 3rd East Prussian Regiment,
moved through a portal in the gardens just north of the gate to enter the
Wendler estate. At this moment, Hessen-Homburg fell gravely wounded.
Bülow placed 3rd Brigade under Borstell’s oversight.
From the Grimma Gate, the Grimma Causeway ran west to the inner
city. The gradual penetration of Hessen-Homburg’s three battalions coin-
cided with several counterattacks by the French reserves. Prussian aggres-
sion broke on French tenacity as individual battalions from Charpentier’s
36th Division moved east along the causeway. Their push along with pres-
sure from the garrison at the St. Johannis church compound forced Friccius
to fall back to the wide Johannisplatz just inside the Grimma Gate. As more
French reinforcements arrived, bloody fighting at close quarters ensued
involving the majority of Friccius’s Landwehr battalion, the fusiliers of the
2nd Reserve Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd East Prussian. After
much back-and-forth fighting that after-action reports fail to clarify, the
Prussians started to waver. The approach of Swedish reinforcements reinvig-
orated the Prussians, some of whom had started to flee through the Grimma
Gate. On arriving, a Swedish Jäger battalion received such heavy fire in
the front and flank that the men broke after their commander fell dead.
However, grape from two Swedish guns that had unlimbered just inside the
gate managed to clear the French and Hessians from the Johannisplatz. Their
fire and the arrival of two additional Swedish Jäger battalions made any
Leipzig 739
19 Pursuing the French into Leipzig’s inner city, 19 October 1813
further counterattacks along the Grimma Causeway impossible, thus

allowing the Allies to finally secure the outer Grimma Gate. Pursuing the
enemy along the causeway, the Prussians attacked but failed to break
the stout French and Hessian resistance. After the two Swedish guns joined
by two Russian pieces moved up, the French and Hessians had no choice but
to withdraw into the inner city.
In the gardens north of the Grimma Gate, the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd
East Prussian Regiment – the third and last battalion of Hessen-Homburg’s
flank column – linked with the fusiliers of the 1st Pomeranian Infantry
Regiment to resist a fierce counterattack by superior numbers from Mar-
mont’s corps. Although suffering large losses, the Prussians held their pos-
ition in the gardens until a final French push drove them out of the gardens
and all the way back to the Purzelgraben. In response, Borstell himself led
four battalions from his reserve: one penetrated the Blinden Gate, the other
three entered the gardens through various openings. After a hard fight, the
Prussians threw back Marmont’s troops onto their reserves standing on the
Quer Lane. In the courtyards of the buildings and in the houses that stood
along the Quer Lane bloody hand-to-hand fighting resumed. There, the
Prussians again triumphed, driving the French toward the inner city. Before
reaching it, the Hessian brigade of Marchand’s 39th Division arrived led by
the Guard Fusilier Battalion followed by the 1st Battalion of the Leib Guard
Regiment. Together with Marmont’s rejuvenated battalions, the Hessians
drove the Prussians back to the Quer Lane. Success proved fleeting for the
French and their Hessian allies. After regrouping, the four Prussian battal-
ions gradually managed to push the French toward the inner city. The
fighting in the garden coincided with the taking of the Milchinsel and the
Hinter Gate at a considerable cost by other battalions from Borstell’s 5th
Brigade. By this time, the Swedish and Russian artillery had secured the
Grimma Gate so that the Prussians controlled the two thoroughfares in their
sector that led to the inner city: the Grimma Causeway and the Hinter Lane.
Around 11:30, just as Bennigsen’s 13th and 26th Divisions arrived on the
open Roßplatz, the Prussians reached the inner city wall that faced east.
Before any further attacks could be launched, Prussian officers needed to
reorganize their units after the brutal street fighting.
While fighting the French and Hessians, Borstell had sent a request to
Bülow for an attack to the left (south) of the Grimma Gate to draw off some
of the troops facing the Prussians. Bülow complied by sending his last fresh
battalion, the Pomeranian Grenadiers, to attack the Hospital Gate. Just as
this unit reached the gate, the five battalions of Wintzingerode’s van arrived
there based on orders from Bernadotte. Along with the two battalions of
Wintzingerode’s 14th Jäger Regiment, the Pomeranians entered the
undefended Hospital Gate while the three remaining Russian battalions
moved into the Bose Gardens. The imperials had so clogged the open space
on the other side of the gate with overturned wagons and even several
abandoned artillery pieces that the Allies first had to clear a path so that
their own guns could follow. After this occurred, Wintzingerode placed
himself at the head of a small cavalry escort and led the 14th Jäger to the
inner Grimma Gate. En route, the Russians came under attack by a squadron
of French cuirassiers and a half-squadron of Polish lancers. Behind the
imperial cavalry followed the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Badenese Infantry
Regiment in tight columns with bayonets fixed. After a brief clash, Wint-
zingerode’s cavalry escort broke and fled through the Jäger, disordering their
ranks and causing a mass flight back to the Hospital Gate pursued by the
imperials. At the gate, the Pomeranian Grenadiers just barely managed to
avoid being swept away by the Russians. Fortunately for the Allies, the
Badeners broke as a result of receiving heavy friendly fire. This enabled the
Prussians to drive them off. After the Russian Jäger re-formed, the Allies
again pushed to the wall of the inner city.113
Thus, the Army of North Germany secured the eastern portion of
Leipzig’s outer city just as the Army of Poland mastered the southern sector.
In the northern zone, Blücher had no easy task before him as the French
placed special emphasis on defending the Halle suburb and Pfaffendorf
because those two points stood closest to their line of retreat. To reach
Leipzig, Blücher could take one of two roads. The first ran across the Gerber
Bridge over the Parthe to the Gerber Gate while the other crossed the Pleiße
bridge to the Rosenthal. On the French side, a fleche defended by Badenese
troops and armed with three guns guarded the Gerber Bridge and one
battery on the left bank of the Parthe flanked the access to it. Durutte’s
32nd Division at the Pfaffendorf manor secured the Pleiße bridge with
numerous guns posted in a flanking position on the left bank of the Pleiße.
A strong line of skirmishers held the left banks of both rivers. All the
advantages belonged to the defenders. Blücher decided to direct the main
attack against the Gerber Bridge because that road provided the most direct
Leipzig 741
20 Allied forces storming Leipzig, 19 October 1813
route to the French line of retreat. Yet, to distract the imperials, he also
planned to assault the Pfaffendorf manor. Langeron’s corps received the task
of storming the Gerber Bridge while Sacken’s corps attacked the Pleiße
bridge.
Around 11:00, Blücher heard the sound of musket fire in the eastern
suburbs, indicating that Bülow had commenced his attack. Some of Langer-
on’s units had yet to arrive but Blücher ordered Sacken to commence the
assault on Pfaffendorf. Following an ineffective bombardment, the four
battalions of Sacken’s first wave managed to penetrate the burned-out manor
but could not hold it. Fighting with desperation, Durutte’s warriors repulsed
repeated charges by the Russian infantry until they heard musket fire behind
them. This prompted Durutte to evacuate the manor and withdraw to the
left bank of the Parthe. Sacken then turned against the stone Gerber Bridge,
which the French and Badeners defended with extreme bravery, repulsing
the Russians.
After Kaptsevich’s and St.-Priest’s infantry corps arrived, Blücher sent
four battalions from the former’s X Infantry Corps to attack the bridge while
St.-Priest made a futile attempt to cross the Parthe above the bridge and thus
envelop the defenders. Kaptsevich’s efforts to take the fleche and bridge by
storm failed as bravery could not counter the murderous artillery and musket
fire directed against the attackers from the houses and gardens on the
opposite bank. St.-Priest attacked with the three battalions of the Yekater-
inburgskii and Rylskii Regiments, and still the Russians could not gain
ground. After inflicting 1,000 casualties on the Russians, Durutte finally
found himself forced to gradually withdraw his troops from the right to the
left bank of the Parthe due to the westward push of Bülow’s troops coming
from the Milchinsel and Hinter Gate directly to his rear. As soon as the
enemy fire weakened around 1:00, the Russians attacked both the fleche
and the Gerber Bridge with what Friederich describes as “death-defying
courage.”114 With the Arkhangelogorodskii and Staroingermanlandskii
Regiments formed in storm columns, Blücher accompanied the attack. As
his promotion to field-marshal had been made known to the troops that
morning, Blücher’s constant shouts of “forward, forward,” during the
advance earned him the Russian nickname of “Marshal Forwards.” Not
allowing the advantage to slip away, the Russians drove at the same time with
the retreating French through the Gerber Gate and into the Gerber Alley that
led to the Halle Gate. After savage street- and house-fighting that particularly
took a toll on the Arkhangelogorodskii Regiment, the Russians pushed the
enemy through the Gerber Alley. They reached the protracted promenade
before the Halle Gate around 12:30 p.m., taking many prisoners along with
fifty guns.115
Although losing the suburbs of the outer city, the imperials conducted a
fairly orderly retreat to the inner city. From that point, the French and their
German allies thought only of escaping to Lindenau. Order collapsed as the
columns exiting the city collided with those retreating from the outer city. In
many places, the artillery took up the entire width of the city’s narrow lanes.
Thanks to the confusion, unit cohesion disintegrated, thus adding to the
chaos. At many points, stoppages along the main line of retreat led to
involuntary resistance against the advancing Allies while at other places a
deliberate defense continued the unprecedented bloodletting.
On Bülow’s right, Borstell’s battalions that drove from the Milchinsel
and the Hinter Gate raced toward the Halle Gate. Their advance prompted
Durutte to evacuate the right bank of the Parthe. This allowed Langeron’s
troops to storm the Gerber Bridge over the Parthe and move through the
Gerber Gate. At the timber market opposite the Halle Gate, two French
guns put an end to the advance of Borstell’s battalions until Langeron’s
Russians arrived from the Gerber Alley. Attacked from two sides, the
French suffered horrendous losses. After several minutes of slaughter, some
surrendered while others fled toward the Ranstädt Gate pursued by the
Russians and Prussians.
On Bülow’s left, the struggle before the locked and barricaded inner
Grimma Gate proved bloodier than that which took place at the Halle Gate.
Charpentier and Marchand rallied their divisions outside the former, where
Bülow’s soldiers attacked from three sides. With nowhere to run, the French
Leipzig 743
and Hessians found themselves backed against the inner Grimma Gate,
which the Badeners refused to open per their instructions. Despite their
predicament, the French and Hessians fought like lions. Prince Emil of
Hessen-Darmstadt saved his men by ordering them to cut their way through
to the Leipzig canal that flowed in front of the inner city wall, follow it to
the Georg Portal at the northeastern corner of the wall, and enter the inner
city. Protected by a rearguard, the majority of the Hessian brigade escaped in
this manner. However, the Prussians slowly pushed the rearguard and the
French against the roundabout in front of the inner Grimma Gate, where a
slaughter ensued led by two battalions of Borstell’s 2nd Reserve Regiment.
Horrible screams, cursing, and ranting filled the air in front of the locked
gates. After another desperate push, the gate finally gave way and the masses
streamed into the inner city. With much trouble the Badeners managed to
reclose and barricade the gate before the Prussians could enter. As more
Prussians arrived they too pressed against the gate, in part seeking cover
from the fire coming from the inner city wall. After finally managing to pry
open the gate, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Reserve Regiment entered the
inner city followed by four more battalions and numerous detachments
from other regiments.
The successful breaching of the inner Grimma Gate marked the end of
serious fighting in Bülow’s sector as the French fled west along Grimma
Lane, before some broke to the north erroneously thinking they could
escape through the Halle Gate, while the others made for the Peters Gate
with the same intentions. Instead of pursuing, the Prussians turn right
(north) and proceeded to the St. Nicolai Church, where they encountered
Prince Emil’s Hessian brigade. Although the prince had restored order, the
Hessians, as well as numerous French soldiers who accompanied them,
surrendered. From the church, the Prussians again moved west through
the city to the central marketplace. There, they found Prince Louis with
one Badenese battalion as well as the 1,200 Saxons guarding their king’s
residence; both groups surrendered to the Prussians. It was now a little after
12:00 and three Prussian battalions went in pursuit of the French who had
fled to the inner Peters Gate while the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Reserve
Regiment set out for the Halle Gate. At 12:30, Paskevich’s 26th Division
from Bennigsen’s army reached the inner city via the inner Grimma Gate.
In Leipzig’s southern sector, Macdonald sent the Badenese brigade of
Marchand’s 39th Division to support Augereau’s troops at the inner Peters
Gate around 11:00. In the process of marching to that gate, the Badenese
commander, General Karl von Stockhorn received counterorders from
Marchand to immediately send his 3rd Infantry Regiment to the outer
Grimma Gate. Stockhorn responded by dispatching the 1st Battalion of that
regiment on the shortest route to the outer Grimma Gate while the 2nd
Battalion took a side road, eventually breaking Wintzingerode’s column
21 Fighting before Leipzig’s Peters Gate, 19 October 1813
before being turned back by the Pomeranian Grenadiers, as noted. After the
Russians and Prussians mastered the eastern portion of the outer city, both
battalions of the Badenese 3rd Infantry Regiment slowly withdrew toward
the inner Peters Gate to reunite with the brigade’s 1st Infantry Regiment.
One battalion from that regiment had moved inside the city to garrison the
Pleißenburg demilune while Prince Louis had summoned the other to the
central marketplace, where it surrendered. Shortly before the Badenese 3rd
Regiment reached the inner Peters Gate, French troops with Macdonald in
tow raced out of the gate. After fleeing from the inner Grimma Gate, these
troops from XI Corps had retreated through the central marketplace, pur-
sued by a battalion of Pomeranians. Soon, various imperial columns con-
verged on the inner Peters Gate: the Badenese 3rd Regiment from the east
and another part of XI Corps and the rest of VIII Corps from the south.
None thought of resistance and all pushed west to get to the single access
lane that led to the Pleiße. They suffered considerably at the hands of the
sole battalion of Pomeranians. At the Pleiße, Poniatowski managed to
organize some of his troops and unlimber three guns at the waterworks to
finally stop the pursuing Prussians, whose attack had been taken up by
Khovansky’s 12th Division coming from the Esplanade.116
Meanwhile, one of Sacken’s detachments penetrated the Rosenthal from
Gohlis, pushing the weak French posts there southwest to the right bank of
the Elster where they finally surrendered. As a bitter struggle erupted at the
waterworks and while Bülow’s battalions pushed westward through the
inner city and Blücher led Langeron’s troops south through the Halle Gate,
Leipzig 745
one of Sacken’s small Jäger detachments found an intact footbridge over the
Elster near Jakobs Hospital. A few hundred paces south of this footbridge
ran the Ranstädt Causeway, across which marched the thick columns of the
retreating Grande Armée to Lindenau. After crossing the rain-swollen
Elster, the Russians immediately opened fire. As noted, Montfort had never
received clear instructions on the measures of the retreat. For clarification,
he decided to seek Berthier at Lindenau and so crossed the causeway. Before
leaving, he instructed a Corporal Lafontaine to blow the bridge should the
enemy appear to prevent its capture. Montfort reached Lindenau but his
attempt to ride east and return to his post east proved impossible because of
the thick masses marching west on the causeway.
Back at the bridge, Sacken’s Jäger opened fire. As no friendly troops
appeared to resist this flank attack, Lafontaine and the three sappers with
him believed the time had come to blow the bridge regardless of the troops
marching across the structure. He lit the fuse and a deafening explosion rose
above the din of battle. While the blast still echoed throughout the city, a
ghastly shower of body parts – both human and equine – along with red-hot
stones and flaming beams, planks, and wagons fell in the neighboring
gardens and streets. The throng of soldiers still on the right bank of the
Elster stopped short. Those closest to the bridge suffered the horror of
having ripped limbs, torsos, and heads fall upon them. The soldiers further
away could see nothing for a few minutes as a thick cloud of smoke and
steam blocked visibility. Still they pressed forward only to find that their
sole way out of the city was gone. Some surrendered while others threw off
their gear, discarded their weapons, and attempted to swim to safety; many
drowned.117
After the destruction of the bridge, the units of XI and VIII Corps
between the Thomas Portal on Leipzig’s western side and the waterworks
found themselves cut off. Turning north, they followed the only lane to the
Pleiße. Only via the footbridges over the Pleiße that led to the Reichel and
Rudolph Gardens on the western edge of the city could they hope to reach
the Elster. Across the footbridges and through these gardens now streamed
the French and Poles like herds of wild animals hotly pursued by the Allies
who shot or bayoneted the stragglers. In the gardens, several waterways
including the Elstermühlgraben, a millrace fed by both the Elster and the
Pleiße, made the going tough. Like several others on this side of Leipzig, the
swampy canal served the double purpose of marking the borders of property
and deterring burglary, thus their colloquial name of Diebsgräben (thief
trenches). Poniatowski’s horse plunged into the millrace but could not work
its way through the muddy bottom, forcing the Polish commander to leap
into the water. Just barely able to keep his head above water, Poniatowski
won the opposite bank thanks to the help of his staff. Exhausted, he
mounted another horse and hastened to the opposite end of the Reichel
Garden to swim the Elster. Still closely pursued by Allied skirmishers, he

spurred his horse and leaped into the swollen Elster. Before he could reach
the opposite bank, a musket ball pierced one side of his torso and exited the
other. Just like downstream at the blown bridge, the French and Poles faced
a difficult choice. Among those who attempted to swim across the Elster,
Macdonald reached the opposite bank but many drowned, including Ponia-
towski, who had received his marshal’s baton the previous day. Thousands of
others accepted their fate and surrendered.118
While these events were unfolding, Leipzig’s meat market north of the
Thomas Portal provided the stage for a bloody struggle. From there north to
the point of entry to the Ranstädt causeway, all the troops fleeing from the
Halle Gate and the inner city jammed together, immediately pursued by
Blücher’s and Bülow’s troops. Attempting to move west from the inner
Halle Gate, Blücher’s troops encountered so many roadblocks in the form
of abandoned guns and wagons that he halted Langeron’s and Sacken’s
troops at the timber market. Only two Jäger Regiments from Kaptsevich’s
corps slowly pressed forward and united at the meat market with Bülow’s
troops as they emerged from several streets. Remnants of various French
corps pressed together in thick masses and, forced by Allied fire, they
desperately raced across the Pleiße via footbridges to reach the Richter
Gardens on Leipzig’s northwest side. In a matter of minutes, French and
Poles of all arms poured into the meadows west of the Reichel and Richter
Gardens. Pressed by the Allies, they savagely fought a bitter bayonet
struggle to reach the Elster. Many jumped into the river and attempted to
swim despite their great fatigue. Soon the river filled with bodies of drowned
horses and men, whose heads, arms, and feet jutted out of the water in
hideous groups. In places the corpses became so thick and bunched together
that they provided footbridges over which their countrymen could pass to
reach the safety of the opposite bank. Many escaped this way and by
swimming but the majority surrendered around 1:00. Firing continued for
hours because Marmont wisely posted skirmishers and artillery on the left
bank of the Elster to prevent the Allies from getting across the river.
Around 1:00, Alexander and Frederick William accompanied by Schwar-
zenberg rode through the Hospital Gate into the city and along Grimma
Lane to the central marketplace. There, they met Bennigsen and Bernadotte,
a little later Blücher and Gneisenau arrived from the Ranstädt Gate.
Countless generals from all four Allied armies gathered around the two
monarchs, who showered them with praise and recognition. From the
central marketplace, the monarchs passed the king of Saxony’s residence en
route to the Ranstädt Gate. Frederick Augustus waited in vain for an
invitation to join them. The victorious procession ended quickly due in part
to the shells the French lobbed into the city from Lindenau – one of which
exploded close to the tsar – as well as the inability to move along roads
Leipzig 747
clogged with troops, discarded arms, and wagons, not to mention the dead
and wounded. Thus, the monarchs turned around and made for the Grimma
Gate to meet Kaiser Francis, who arrived at that time from Rötha. From
there, Alexander and Frederick William went to Reudnitz to review the
Swedish corps at Bernadotte’s invitation. The onset of darkness finally ended
the continuous French musket and artillery fire into the city from
Lindenau.119
Allied losses in the four-day struggle amounted to 1,792 officers and
51,982 men or around 54,000 men. Friederich also provides losses based on
nationality:
(I) Russians: 865 officers and 21,740 men thus divided:
Bohemian Army: 512 officers and 11,411 men
Silesian Army: 250 officers and 6,897 men
North German Army: 33 officers and 432 men
Polish Army: 70 officers and 3,000 men
(II) Prussians: 498 officers and 15,535 men thus divided:
Yorck’s Corps: 176 officers and 5,467 men
Kleist’s Corps: 244 officers and 7,882 men
Bülow’s corps: 78 officers and 2,186 men
(III) Austrians: 420 officers and 14,538 men thus divided
General Staff: 10 officers
1st Light Division: 25 officers and 525 men
2nd Light Division: 11 officers and 227 men
I Army Corps: 53 officers and 1,441 men
II Army Corps: 53 officers and 1,885 men
III Army Corps: 39 officers and 1,486 men
IV Army Corps: 99 officers and 3,900 men
Reserve Corps: 130 officers and 5,074 men
(IV) Swedes: 9 officers and 169 men
French losses in dead and wounded amounted to some 38,000 men. An
additional 15,000 men became prisoners of war due to the premature blow-
ing of the Elster bridge as did the 21,000 sick and wounded in Leipzig’s
hospitals. A further 5,000 either deserted or defected. The Allies captured
28 flags and Eagles, 325 guns, 900 caissons, 720,000 kg of powder, and some
40,000 muskets, numbers which understandably only increased during the
pursuit. Thirty-six French generals including Lauriston, Reynier,
Charpentier, Prince Emil of Hessen-Darmstädt, and Prince William of
Baden were among the prisoners. Marshals Ney, Macdonald, and Marmont
were wounded, along with the corps commanders Reynier, Lauriston,
Souham, Latour-Maubourg, Pajol, and Sébastiani, and divisional command-

ers Maison and Compans.120
Darkness not only brought an end to the epic Battle of Nations, but it
also marked the conclusion of the German Campaign and the struggle for
European mastery. Napoleon’s hope that tactical maneuvering would crush
the Allies on the 16th and that some stroke of good fortune would allow him
to triumph on the 18th had eluded him. Just as in Russia exactly one year
earlier, no other option remained open but retreat. He probably reproached
himself for not having retreated on the 17th. “The retreat,” observes Yorck
von Wartenburg, “which the monarch had refused to begin voluntarily on
the 17th, the defeated general would be compelled to begin on the 19th.”
“Now the retreat as far as the frontier was certain,” observes Pelet; “but it
depended on the progress of the Austro-Bavarian army. The retreat could be
strong and slow, and made by increments to the Saale, to the Gera, and to the
Werra. We could gain time to prepare the defense of the Rhine and the more
remote parts of France.” Thus, the magnitude of the Allied victory and the
pace of Napoleon’s retreat as well as his ability to mobilize France depended
on how much damage the Allies could inflict on the French army during its
retreat to France.121
Notes
1 In Mémoires de chirurgie militaire, IV:441, the chief surgeon of the Grande Armée,
Dr. Dominique-Jean Larrey, calculates the number of wounded to be 6,500 on the
16th. Under normal circumstances, this would mean the number killed approached
2,000.
2 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, II:23.
3 Pelet was commander of 2nd Brigade of 3rd Division of Oudinot’s I Corps of
Young Guard.
4 Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 275–77.
6 Stewart to Charles John, Halle, 9:00 p.m., 16 October 1813, reproduced in Stewart,
Narrative, 164. As for Stewart’s authorization to withhold payment, a letter to him
from Cathcart on 6 October states that “you are alone and supreme in the military
administration of the forces in the north of Germany in British pay and their
supplies”: Cathcart to Stewart, Kommotau, 6 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 157.
For Bernadotte’s reaction, see Stewart, Narrative, 177. As for Stewart’s effective-
ness, Müffling, in Aus meinem Leben, 86–87, states that “Lord Stewart did not
hesitate to avow, on some new instance of intractability in the crown prince, that,
according to his instructions, there might be occasions in which he would be
obliged to refuse the order for the payment of the subsidy. On the refusal of the
crown prince, which was repeated daily, to advance to the battle of Leipzig, Lord
Stewart at last took occasion to fulfill his threat, undeterred by the prince’s
irritability, or his flattering offers of reconciliation. To this circumstance the plains
Leipzig 749
of Breitenfeld are indebted for the honor of being trodden by a successor of the
great king of Sweden. The general in chief of the Silesian Army would never have
succeeded in moving him to take part in the battle of Leipzig.” In Geschichte der
Nord Armee, II:211, Quistorp adds: “The offensive tone of this letter did not fail
to achieve its purpose with the highly sensitive crown prince, and the threat it
contained would be incomprehensible if it had not been supported by a realistic
background. Stewart had dropped the hint that under certain circumstances the
conventional English subsidy payments could be adjusted. With one stroke the
view changed: the commander of the Army of North Germany decided to enter
the line.” Thornton wrote to Castlereagh on 22 October 1813: “I must beg to
inform your lordship that I have spoken both with Adlerkreutz and Wetterstedt
on the subject of Sir Charles Stewart’s conversations with the Prince Royal . . .
and both of them expressed the warmest . . . gratitude, for his conduct, ascribing
much, if not most of all, the good that has happened to it alone, and particularly
with regard to the reputation of the Prince Royal himself and of the Swedes, who
(Adlerkreutz observed to me) were dishonored by the line of conduct which
[Bernadotte] was pursuing, and who were furious at the manner in which they
were treated”: CVC, IX:68; see also SHAT, C17 133: Order of the Day,
Hohenthurm, 12:00 a.m., 17 October 1813.
7 Both contained 20.75 battalions – only 8 of which were Landwehr – totaling
10,066 men commanded by Horn and Hünerbein. The 2nd and 7th Brigades
formed Horn’s 1st Division, while 1st and 8th Brigades made up Hüner-
bein’s 2nd. Most regiments consisted of only two battalions. A mere 3,200
Landwehr infantry remained. See Höpfner, “Darstellung,” 1847:108.
8 Unger, Blücher, II:114–15.
9 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 87–88; “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 276;
Nostitz, Tagebuch, 68–69; Swederus, Schwedens Politik und Kriege, II:349.
10 SHAT, C2 158: Marmont to Berthier, 19 October 1813. “Throughout the day of
the 17th,” recalled Marmont, “the Army of Silesia followed by the Army of
North Germany defiled before our very eyes and ascended the right bank of the
Parthe. I occupied the various bridges on the upper part of the river, and for
observation I placed my light cavalry on the left bank. My infantry was encamped
perpendicular to the Parthe, facing Taucha, the left at the village of Schönefeld,
the right in the direction of the village of Paunsdorf”: Marmont, Mémoires,
V:290–91.
13 Langeron, Mémoires, 322–23. The division’s 1st Brigade, commanded by
Vasilchikov’s younger brother, Colonel Dmitry Vasilchikov, contained the Belor-
usskii (five squadrons) and Akhtyrskii (seven squadrons) Regiments. The 2nd
Brigade, led by the native Hungarian general Anastasy Yurkovsky, consisted of
the Aleksandriiskii (five squadrons) and Mariupolskii (six squadrons) Regiments.
ber 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 168.
15 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:134–35. Reynier’s VII Corps had left Eilen-
burg early on the 17th and reached Taucha in the afternoon. After an insignificant
combat with Wintzingerode’s cavalry followed by several hours of rest, the

Franco-Saxon corps continued its march to the Heiterblick manor. Arrighi’s
fleeing cavalry forced Reynier to take a position facing Schönefeld (west). After
Blücher halted his advance, Reynier’s Saxon division marched to a bivouac at
Paunsdorf; his 32nd Division remained between Paunsdorf and Schönefeld; the
Saxon cavalry took a position at the Heiterblick manor; and the 14th Division
marched to Lindenau in accordance with Napoleon’s orders.
ber 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 168.
19 According to Müffling, Blücher ordered Langeron’s right wing to lean on the
Parthe while his left wing and Wintzingerode’s cavalry crossed the Parthe at
Taucha, moved down the river, and cleared the left bank of imperial forces.
Langeron’s right wing would then cross the Parthe and the entire corps would
assume the offensive.
20 Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 281.
21 Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Güldengoßa, 3:00 p.m., 17 October 1813, Add MSS,
20112, 167; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 90–92.
22 “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 275–76; “Operations of the Army of
Silesia in the Battles Before Leipzig,” Lowe, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111,
167–68. “The Prince Marshal Schwarzenberg had strong motives for not engaging
until the subsequent day,” continues Lowe, “when the junction of the Prince
Royal of Sweden and of the Army of Reserve [Poland] under General Bennigsen
would ensure complete success. The Army of Silesia, however, did not admit the
same motives for inaction. This day was also productive of its show of glory.” See
also Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 355.
23 Langeron met with Bernadotte at Breitenfeld: “It was there that I saw him for the
first time; we went together to see the battlefield of the previous day; he made a
few remarks in the style of his region of birth, and I was forced to make myself a
Gascon to reply; when I left him, he saw me off with an adiousias which was
certainly of the style of the Garonne.” See Langeron, Mémoires, 323.
24 Quistorp, Geschichte der Nord Armee, II:211–12.
25 SHAT, C17 133: Order of the Day, Breitenfeld, 17 October 1813.
26 Charles John to Blücher, Breitenfeld, 17 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 18, and Add MSS, 20112, 87–88.
27 According to Müffling: “All prepared for the battle on the 18th. The crown
prince of Sweden appeared determined to participate. He treated the battle of
Möckern as a small engagement, and Blücher was willing to let this pass provided
the Army of North Germany moved into the line on the 18th. It still had not
arrived when the crown prince made a new and unexpected demand. He wanted
the old order of battle immediately restored, that is to say: to move on the right
wing of the Silesian Army.” See Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 92. Although Bernadotte
made no such suggestion in the letter, Quistorp follows Müffling, maintaining
that “the acceptance of this suggestion would have led to the still intact Army of
North Germany taking a defensive position between the Pleiße and the Parthe,
Leipzig 751
which could have been held by 30,000 men and – because the enemy troops had
already been driven into Leipzig’s suburbs – engaging in no serious combat”:
Quistorp, Geschichte der Nord Armee, II:212. Twenty years later, even the usually
objective Friederich wrote: “This somewhat unclear letter only can be interpreted
as meaning that the crown prince again wished to assume his former position on
the right wing of the Silesian Army probably in the belief that Napoleon would
start the retreat to the Elbe on the 18th, in which case the Army of North
Germany would have to endure the main blow while in the terrain between the
Parthe and the Reitschke it would not experience a serious engagement.” See
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:135. Unger stated the case in similar terms:
“From the unclear phrases, one believed to be reading the crown prince’s earlier
demands to push himself to the right of Blücher in order to avoid any danger if
Napoleon made an attempt to drive to the Elbe.” See Unger, Blücher, II:117.
29 Langeron’s testimony supports Bernadotte’s logic. In describing Napoleon’s
inaction on the 17th, Langeron noted that it “seemed more extraordinary than
any of his other faults in this campaign; he could no longer ignore Bennigsen’s
march nor the return of the Prince Royal of Sweden and, if he was not informed,
it was even more inexcusable that he was so poorly served by his spies in the
country of which the sovereign was an ally. He saw that our forces would be
seriously augmented; he had 160,000 to 170,000 men under arms, we had more
than 300,000; it was the first time since his first campaign in Italy that he had to
fight a battle with inferior numbers. His position was detestable, he was almost
encircled and obliged to face all sides. His only open road was the Eilenburg road,
where he could cross the Mulde and move rapidly on Wittenberg, which we
thought he would do”: “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 275,
emphasis added.
31 Quistorp, Geschichte der Nord Armee, II:212.
32 Throughout the 16th, Bülow had to listen to the sound of Yorck’s guns at
Möckern without being able to assist his countrymen. In the southern sector,
Kleist’s 2nd Corps also fought. As his corps stood idle while the other Prussian
corps commanders led theirs to battle, Bülow vainly attempted to convince
Bernadotte to support Blücher. Bülow would never forget the shame he felt while
he and his men stood and listened to the combat at Möckern. See Boyen,
Erinnerungen, ed. Schmidt, II:679; Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, 266.
33 Unger, Blücher, II:117; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 93.
34 Swederus, Schwedens Politik und Kriege, II:348.
36 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 94; Schneidawind, Prinz Wilhelm, 93.
37 Nostitz, Tagebuch, 69. Schneidawind also supports this assertion.
38 Delbrück and Friederich disagree over who was the interpreter. The former
maintains that “Prince William served as the interpreter and of course in a superb
manner”: Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:467.
39 Schneidawind, Prinz Wilhelm, 93.

42 Henderson, Blücher, 176.
43 Swederus, Schwedens Politik und Kriege, II:347–48.
44 Friederich again must be complimented for unbiased reporting: “The historical
critic sees in the conduct of the crown prince and in his demands the renewed
manifestation of the effort continued by him right up until the last decisive
moment to deprive the Alliance of the commitments that he had entered into
and to leave the armed forces of the Allies entrusted to him unused in favor of
Napoleon. That this view overshoots the mark hardly needs detailed proof.”
Despite being objective, he still judges Bernadotte harshly: “Here again we have
to deal with that manifestation of [Bernadotte’s] generalship, which was prone to
the utmost caution, with that lack of boldness, which extends through the entire
political and military life of this man. At no moment of the campaign can the
difference between the characteristics and the mindset of the crown prince and
Blücher be seen so sharply: before making a decision, the one calculates most
carefully every chance of success and is willing to be satisfied with lesser results
while the other aspires to the highest attainable, to the complete destruction of the
enemy and does not hesitate to gamble on his own existence.” See Friederich,
Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:137–39. Delbrück merely states: “What was said there to
the crown prince and of course in strong statements had the desired effect, and the
crown prince marched. Blücher’s noble self-abnegation overcame the arrogance
and the stubborn obstinacy of the crown prince.” See Pertz and Delbrück,
Gneisenau, III:467.
45 Schneidawind, Prinz Wilhelm, 94.
46 According to Langeron, “Bernadotte had made it known that he would not attack
unless he had 100,000 men under his orders; he had only 70,000 in his own army;
I was taken from Blücher and given to the prince: he was told that I had 30,000
men; I had only 21,000”: Langeron, Mémoires, 323.
47 Quistorp, Geschichte der Nord Armee, II:213.
48 As Henderson notes in Blücher, 175, “The next development in the affair with
Bernadotte is as creditable to Blücher as anything that ever happened in his whole
career. One notes an utter absence of every selfish consideration, a burning desire
to do only what was best for the cause.” In Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 357, Petre
adds that “it is difficult to condemn too strongly Bernadotte’s conduct in the
whole of this campaign or to praise too highly Blücher’s honesty and devotion to
the general cause.”
51 The events of this meeting are reiterated almost verbatim by many contemporar-
ies and historians, particularly Schneidawind, Prinz Wilhelm, 93–95; Quistorp,
Geschichte der Nord Armee, II:212–14; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
III:136–39; and Unger, Blücher, II:117. One point of disagreement concerns
whether the meeting ended at 7:00 or 8:00. Swederus objects to the way the event
has been described. Writing in 1865, he complains that “the council has been
described as stormy, and on the Prussian side one has portrayed the scenes as if
Blücher, Stewart, and the rest forced the crown prince to participate. Images
Leipzig 753
about it flow even now in the deutschen Volkskalendar [German People’s Calen-
dar] and this poetry certainly perpetuates the old wives’ tales, while the history
speaks an entirely different language.” To defend Bernadotte, Swederus cites
numerous examples of various Allied leaders who thought it probable that
Napoleon would seek to break out of Leipzig through Taucha to the Elbe. He
makes no mention of Prince William’s presence nor the threat he purportedly
made to detach Bülow’s corps from the Army of North Germany. See Swederus,
Schwedens Politik und Kriege, II:348–53.
53 Breitenfeld, 8:00 a.m., 18 October 1813, reproduced in Pertz and Delbrück,
54 Steffens, Adventures, 121–22.
58 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, II:25–26; Pelet, Des principales opér-
ations de la campagne de 1813, 281. In Campaigns of Napoleon, 936, Chandler
maintains that on the 19th French artillery ammunition reserves were down
to 20,000 rounds after they had expended 200,000 rounds from 16 to 18
October.
59 The first leg of the Weißenfels–Bad Kösen–Weimar road ran from Leipzig
to Markranstädt and Lützen. This route was parallel to the Leipzig–Zwenkau–
Lützen and Leipzig–Pegau–Weißenfels roads. On either, Schwarzenberg could
block the Grande Armée or attack its left flank as it sought to reach Weißenfels.
60 Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 277–78; Petre, Napo-
leon’s Last Campaign, 354; Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:354.
61 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, II:27.
62 The garrison consisted of Margaron’s ad hoc division of 4,320 men (1 French and
1 Badenese brigade and 2 French provisional cavalry regiments).
63 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:124–26, 139–43. Friederich bases his figure of
295,000 Allied soldiers supported by 1,466 guns on the following totals: Army of
Bohemia including Colloredo and Bubna: 141,500 men and 784 guns; Army of
Poland: 30,000 men and 134 guns; Army of Silesia: 42,000 men and 310 guns;
Army of North Germany: 65,000 men and 226 guns; and Cossacks: 16,500 men
and 12 guns. Bogdanovich, in Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:178, places Allied
strength at 280,200 men. Part of the discrepancy is caused by the Russian
historian’s estimate of the North German Army to be 58,000 men and the Army
of Poland to be 28,000; the number of Cossacks cited by Friederich probably
accounts for the rest.
64 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:143; Unger, Blücher, II:118.
65 Both divisions were from II Corps: Ignaz Ludwig von Lederer’s 1st and Alois
Liechtenstein’s 2nd.
66 Reynier’s VII Corps reached the northern sector of the Leipzig battlefield on the
17th after cutting its way through Wintzingerode’s Cossacks at Taucha. After
taking a position at the Heiterblick estate, Reynier received orders from
Napoleon to hold Paunsdorf against Bennigsen. Napoleon sent Reynier’s 13th

Division to reinforce IV Corps at Lindenau. See SHAT, C2 157: Reynier to
Berthier, 19 October 1813; Sauzey, Les Allemands, III:222–23; Finley,
“Reynier,” 417.
67 Langeron, Mémoires, 323; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:157. This is one of
the few instances where Müffling’s account is incorrect. He claims that Berna-
dotte instructed Langeron to cross the Parthe at Taucha along with the entire
Army of North Germany. “This disposition,” comments Müffling, “would have
obliged this corps to march back for two hours and then again forward to reach
the enemy’s vicinity, where it already stood.” He adds that, if they had utilized
only the crossing at Taucha, Langeron’s corps as well as the Army of North
Germany “would have caused unnecessary pressure on the bridge . . . and the
whole day would probably be lost in the useless march”: Müffling, Die
Feldzüge, 94.
68 In terms of distance, Wintzingerode needed to cover 7.8 miles from his bivouac at
Breitenfeld to Taucha; Bülow’s troops likewise had to cross 7.8 miles from their
camp at Kleinpodelwitz to Taucha. It is not known for certain why Bernadotte
changed his order of battle but as the Prussians of his army always received the
toughest assignments it is reasonable to assume that he preferred to throw
Bülow’s troops into the sausage grinder first rather than those of his benefactor,
Alexander, and certainly before his Swedes. His attitude is adequately surmised
by a statement he purportedly made: “Provided the French are beaten, it is of no
difference to me whether I or my army take part, and of the two, I had much
rather we did not.” See Scott, Bernadotte, 114.
69 SHAT, C17 133: Order of the Day, Breitenfeld, 18 October 1813.
70 Petre notes that “for days past he [Bernadotte] had been hanging back; even on
the 18th he might easily have been up three or four hours before he was. Then
there would have been an overwhelming force against Napoleon’s left on the
Parthe. Even when he did arrive, Bernadotte acted very feebly. His Swedes did
practically nothing”: Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 370.
72 Langeron, Mémoires, 324. The Parthe, a right tributary of the White Elster thirty-
seven miles in length, originates southeast of Leipzig between Colditz and Bad
Lausick in the Leipzig lowlands. It flows northwest before turning west and
discharging into the White Elster in the northwestern part of Leipzig.
75 Kaptsevich’s X Infantry Corps consisted of Urusov’s 8th Division and Turchani-
nov’s 22nd Division. The 29th and 45th Jäger Regiments formed the 2nd Brigade
of 22nd Division while the Staroskolskii Regiment belonged to its 1st Brigade.
The 38th Jäger was one of the three regiments that formed the 2nd Brigade of 8th
Division.
76 Langeron, Mémoires, 325. “I must admit that I was momentarily embarrassed by
that which I did to them,” continues Langeron; “under the circumstances it was
possible that this was an enemy ruse and that these so-called émigrés were
destined, whilst they were mixed with my cavalry, to charge it in the rear or
Leipzig 755
flanks, at the moment of the attack; I wished to send them to my Reserve Cavalry
but they begged to be sent forward with the cavalry of the vanguard; I did not
relent and have never repented.”
77 RGVIA, f. VUA, d. 3889, ll. 165–165b.
78 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:191–92.
80 Rottembourg’s brigade consisted of one battalion each of Saxon, Polish, and
Westphalian Guard.
81 Moreover, Bennigsen was waiting for Bernadotte’s army to arrive and so could
not launch his attack that could possibly have outflanked Probstheida and thus
forced the French to abandon the key to Napoleon’s position: Lieven, Russia
Against Napoleon, 454.
82 Allied counterbattery fire proved far more effective. After taking Probstheida on
the 19th, Kleist’s men found thirty demolished French cannon: Friederich,
83 The Fusilier Battalion of 2nd Silesian Infantry Regiment and 3rd Battalion of 11th
Reserve Regiment.
84 August (1779–1843) was the youngest son of Prince August Ferdinand of Prussia
(1730–1813), who himself was the youngest brother of Frederick the Great
(1712–1786). August’s more famous sibling, Prince Louis Ferdinand
(1772–1806), was killed by the French at Saalfeld. Both Louis Ferdinand and
August are often mistakenly referred to as brothers of King Frederick William III
(1770–1840) when in fact they were second cousins, their first cousin being
Frederick William’s father, Frederick William II (1744–1797), who himself was
the son of the oldest of Frederick the Great’s younger brothers, August William
of Prussia (1722–1758).
85 Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, II:214–15.
87 Thinking the Saxons had misunderstood his orders, Reynier sent his chief of staff,
François-Joseph Gressot, “to stop the Saxons and calm their ardor in an attack
Reynier had not ordered.” The Saxons received Gressot with shouts of “get back,
general, this is not your place.” See Sauzey, Les Allemands, III:225–26; Finley,
“Reynier,” 419.
88 The high-ranking Saxon officers had decided on this step earlier that morning.
They communicated their intentions to the division’s commander, Zeschau, and
requested that he send an adjutant to Frederick Augustus in Leipzig to commu-
nicate the news that 26th Light Cavalry Brigade had already defected and to
request instructions for the rest of the division. Around 2:00 that afternoon
Zeschau received a response from his king: “Herr General von Zeschau! I have
always placed trust in my troops and I do so in the current moment more than
ever. Loyalty to my person can be proven to me only through the fulfillment of
their duty and I am certain that you will do everything in your power to assure
this. I pray to God that he takes you in his holy protection.” Deeming this reply
to be ambiguous, the Saxon officers assumed that their king could not speak his
mind openly because of the French entourage that surrounded him. Moreover,
they considered Frederick Augustus to be Napoleon’s prisoner. If he was a free
man, they did not doubt that he would shed his pro-French politics. Viewing
the battle and the war as lost, they believed that they could best aid their king
by joining the Allies in the least to save what was left of the Saxon army from
the disaster that awaited Napoleon. See Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
III:168–69.
89 Napoleon later blamed the Saxons for his defeat at Leipzig but the 4,000 Saxons
and Württembergers who defected would have hardly tipped the scales in
his favor.
90 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:202.
92 Quoted in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:468; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des
Krieges, IIb:201; Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 455.
94 Hofmann, Leipzig, 61; Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813,
309, 320. Aster, in Leipzig, II:266 and 270, claims that the French also planned on
burning the Ranstädt suburb as soon as the rearguard had evacuated the city.
Although nothing came of this, the city’s authorities were told to provide thirty-
six hundredweights of tar.
95 According to Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 312, a
column of 5,000 men was en route to Kassel to chase the Cossacks from the city,
the capital of Jerome Bonaparte’s Westphalia. Kellermann had also sent the 54th
March Column (3,000 men) from Fulda to Kassel. The 55th March Column –
4,000 men and 14 guns – was approaching Erfurt while the 3,000 men and 16 guns
of the 56th March Column had departed from Mainz. Several other battalions
were echeloned on the roads to Fulda and Würzburg.
96 French contemporaries such as Fain and Pelet claim that Napoleon issued orders
for the building of three bridges over the Pleiße to facilitate the retreat but neither
he nor Berthier insured that these orders were carried out. According to Pelet,
“only one of these auxiliary bridges was built near the Richter Gardens, and so
badly that it soon collapsed.” As for blame, Pelet blasts Berthier: “As much as
possible, we concealed anything that looked like a retreat. Unfortunately, the
major-general, while confidently obliging the designs of the great captain,
thought that some of the demonstrations were superfluous and neglected the
most necessary precautions. The negligence in the construction of the bridges
must be attributed to him as well as the refusal to drive off the reserve batteries
and parks . . . At Leipzig, Weißenfels, and Freyburg, the prince de Neufchâtel
admonished those who were attempting to carry out the orders they had been
given, saying that the emperor thought only of resuming the offensive.” Petre and
Yorck von Wartenburg claim that no such orders were issued while Chandler
maintains that orders were issued for additional bridges to be built at Lindenau
but that this was no longer feasible. Yorck von Wartenburg further maintains that
the “complete want of bridges” indicates “how far the general’s carelessness as to
all the necessary details had gone.” See Pelet, Des principales opérations de la
campagne de 1813, 284, 311, 314; Fain, 1813, II:442; Aster, Leipzig, II:198; Yorck
von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:354; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Cam-
paign, 353–54; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 933.
Leipzig 757
97 Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 313–14; Aster, Leipzig,

II:225–26, 230–32; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:211, 215.
98 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:211; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
III:196; Aster, Leipzig, II:228.
99 Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 315; Fain, 1813,
II:434–36.
100 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:209–10; Aster, Leipzig, II:200–03.
101 Counterclockwise from left to right, these included the Münz, outer Peters,
Windmill, Sand, Hospital, outer Grimma, Blinden, Hinter, Gerber, Floß, and
Ranstädt.
102 In the accounts of the Napoleonic Wars, William is often referred to as the count
of Hochberg.
103 Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 314–15; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:214; Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, II:220.
104 Halle and Merseburg are twenty-one and seventeen miles from Leipzig
respectively.
105 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 97; Gneisenau to Clausewitz, 19 October 1813, GStA
PK, VI HA Rep. 92, Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
106 In Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:207, Bogdanovich perpetuates this story, which he
based on Plotho, Der Krieg, II:414.
107 Schwarzenberg to Bubna, 18 October 1813, in Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
III:192.
108 Bernhardi, Toll, III:460.
109 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:208; Aster, Leipzig, II:178–79.
110 Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freheitskriege, II:636; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:213–14.
111 Quoted in Bernhardi, Toll, III:464–69; Fain, 1813, II:433; Bogdanovich,
Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:216–19.
112 Aster, Leipzig, II:275; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:219–20.
113 Plotho, Der Krieg, 2419–20; Beitzke, Geschichte der deutschen Freheitskriege,
II:644–46; Aster, Leipzig, II:283–92.
115 By the end of the fighting on the 19th, the Arkhangelogorodskii Regiment
mustered only 30 officers and 180 men of the 550 men who had started the
battle on the 16th: Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:223; Plotho, Der
Krieg, II:420; Aster, Leipzig, II:292–94.
116 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:224. Vaudoncourt, in Histoire de la
guerre, II:221, and Norvins, in Portefeuille de mil huit cent treize, II:420, incor-
rectly claim that at the Peters Gate the Badeners defected to the Allies. In Des
principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 319–20, Pelet makes a similar
accusation: “The defense of Leipzig’s wall was entrusted to the Saxons and
Badeners. But the former . . . again betrayed the interests of their sovereign.
The latter, holding the Peters Gate, delivered it to the Allies.” Pelet also makes a
vague reference concerning “the Germans of III Corps” during the struggle at
the Hinter Gate: “Our soldiers threw themselves into the houses and the side
streets; they defended each step. But a new defection by the Germans of III
Corps forced our troops to give ground.” According to Hudson Lowe, one of
the first accounts of Leipzig published by the French-controlled press at
Frankfurt-am-Main stated that the defection of Napoleon’s allies “and particu-
larly that of Bavaria is assigned as the primary cause of all his disasters”: Lowe to
Stewart, Gießen, 3 November 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 204.
117 In Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 320–21, Pelet insists that
Montfort instructed Lafontaine to blow the bridge only on the express order of a
general officer. Pelet reproduced a 20 October report made by a Captain Blay of
the Engineers of the Guard to Berthier which confirmed that Montfort had
ordered the corporal not to blow the bridge unless the enemy was about to seize
the structure. Both Montfort and Lafontaine, the latter criticized in La Moniteur
as a man of no intelligence, were arrested and scheduled to stand before courts-
martial. Montfort was incarcerated at Mainz but reinstated during the Allied
siege to command the city’s engineers until Napoleon’s First Abdication. He
went on to serve Louis XVIII, rallied to Napoleon during the Hundred Days,
and afterward again served in the royal army. In 1834 he became a Grand Officer
of the Legion of Honor.
118 Aster, Leipzig, II:317–18; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:228–29.
Poniatowski had sustained wounds on the 14th and 16th as well earlier on the
19th. Found by fishermen on the 24th, his body was laid out in the St. Johannis
Church by the Grimma Gate, embalmed and initially buried with full military
honors in the crypt at the St. Johannis cemetery. After the transfer of his remains
to Poland in 1814, he was buried on 10 September with the consent of Tsar
Alexander in the vault of the Holy Cross Church in the center of Warsaw but
later transferred to Krakow and buried on 22 July 1817 in the Wawel Cathedral.
119 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:225–26.
120 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:225–27; some of Hofmann’s casualty figures
in Leipzig, 62, are lower. For the Allies, killed and wounded amounted to 1,790
officers and 40,850 men. In terms of nationality, Hofmann reckons that the
Russians lost 800 officers and 20,000 men; the Prussians: 620 officers and
13,550 men; the Austrians: 360 officers and 7,000 men; and the Swedes: 10 offi-
cers and 300 men. For the French, Hofmann cites 38,000 killed and wounded
and 30,000 prisoners.
121 Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:354; Pelet, Des principales
opérations de la campagne de 1813, 310. This account is based primarily on
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:117–234; Aster, Leipzig, II:1–330; Bogdano-
vich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIb:175–231; Pelet, Des principales opérations de la
campagne de 1813, 275–322.
16
Race to the Rhine
At Leipzig, Blücher and his staff recognized the extent of the costly but
momentous victory. On 19 October, Gneisenau wrote to his wife that “our
assault on Leipzig was very bloody. After many hours of work our troops
stormed the city. General Blücher and I were the first to enter. We found a
mass of prisoners, 20,000 wounded, even more sick. The dead lay every-
where. Destroyed houses, overturned baggage wagons, troops of all nations;
it is a mess without equal. Every step has been taken to pursue the enemy
briskly. We will destroy the remainder of his army.”1 Blücher also boasted to
his wife that on the 16th he had engaged the French at Möckern, taking 4,000
prisoners, 45 guns, 1 Eagle, and various other standards. He described the
events on the 18th and 19th as “the greatest battle the earth has ever seen;
600,000 men fought with each other; around 2:00 p.m. I took Leipzig by
storm, the king of Saxony and many generals were captured, the Polish
prince Poniatowski drowned; 170 cannon were taken and around 40,000
men are now prisoners. Napoleon escaped, but he is not safe. At this
moment my cavalry has brought in another 2,000 prisoners; the entire
[French] army is lost.” Yet not all observers wrote such gleeful accounts.
Commenting on the barbarity of war, the British ambassador to Austria,
George Hamilton Gordon, Lord Aberdeen, noted: “For three or four miles
the ground is covered with bodies of men and horses, many not dead.
Wounded wretches unable to crawl, crying for water amidst heaps of putre-
fying bodies. Their screams are heard at an immense distance, and still ring
in my ears.”2
Blücher and Gneisenau started planning to exploit the victory even
before the fighting around Leipzig ended. After Yorck’s corps departed for
Halle on the night of 18 October, Blücher instructed Langeron and Sacken
to unite their corps between the Parthe and Pleiße Rivers to follow Yorck.
According to Müffling, the fatigue of the Russian infantry and the dark night
759
“prevented the immediate execution of this order. The corps did not reach
Eutritzsch until 11:00 the next morning.” With the bridges over the Elster
down, the nearest point of passage could be found only at Schkeuditz,
approximately twelve miles northwest of Leipzig and ten miles southeast
of Halle. This meant that the two Russian corps of the Silesian Army first
had to make a circuitous march to be able to directly pursue the imperials.3
Blücher received confirmation of the French retreat at 8:00 a.m. on the
19th, but the situation did not allow him to pursue. By this time, Langeron’s
men had only recrossed the Parthe. Moreover, Sacken became engaged in a
heated combat with French forces in his sector and requested support. At
noon on the 19th, Blücher instructed Vasilchikov to lead Sacken’s cavalry
across the Elster at Schkeuditz and turn south to strike the Leipzig–
Merseburg road. That evening, Vasilchikov’s advance guard reached
Priesteblich on the road to Merseburg. There the Russians made contact
with a French post and drove it further west to Großdölzig.4
Discussions about the next move occurred both before the storming of
Leipzig and afterward, when the monarchs met with Blücher, Schwarzen-
berg, and Bernadotte on Leipzig’s marketplace. Preliminary arrangements
called for the Silesian Army to move north of Leipzig and then turn west to
harry Napoleon’s right flank. Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia would
move southwest from Leipzig in two columns: the first through
Naumburg and the second through Zeitz. The two columns would unite at
Erfurt. Bernadotte’s Army of North Germany and Bennigsen’s Army of
Poland would follow Blücher and then slide between the Silesian and
Bohemian Armies. In this way, the French would be driven toward
Wrede’s Austro-Bavarian Army. Thus caught between the Allied forces,
the remnant of Napoleon’s army would be destroyed before it could reach
the Rhine. Yet during the talks on Leipzig’s marketplace, Bernadotte, pur-
portedly dressed “like an opera-master,” refused to endorse this plan. He
intended to lead his army north to take Norway from the Danes but agreed
to allow Tauentzien’s corps to continue besieging Magdeburg, Wittenberg,
and Torgau. His allies remained silent; Bennigsen’s army would have to
suffice.5
Although Blücher left the much-heralded meeting on Leipzig’s market-
place elated, Gneisenau felt slighted. That night he complained in a letter to
Clausewitz that the king had said “a few cold, but somewhat friendly words
of satisfaction with our army. To me he said nothing. I have still received no
word of satisfaction about our crossing of the Elbe and the subsequent
events of the war.” On the other hand, the tsar, the kaiser, and Schwarzen-
berg showered him with praise. “But,” Gneisenau continues, “you see the
king’s deeply rooted antipathy against all those who do not share his
political views. As soon as this holy war is over, I will leave his army.
I would rather eat the bread of misery than serve as an unwelcome guest
Race to the Rhine 761
in the army of this unfriendly despot.” Gneisenau would later admit that he
had misinterpreted the king’s silence, yet the same scene would be repeated
more than once during the 1814 campaign in France.6
Gneisenau’s overreaction to Frederick William’s reserved demeanor cer-
tainly reflects the psychological and emotional exhaustion of the man who
for two months had served as chief of staff of the Silesian Army and Chief of
the General Staff of the Prussian Army. As he observed the carnage around
Leipzig, he could only be grateful that his men had not died in vain. His
adjutant, Stosch, recalls that on the 19th Gneisenau and his staff “rode over
the battlefield of Möckern, where the corpses of the soldiers who had fallen
on the 16th, mainly from the Silesian Landwehr, lay so close to one another
that the horses could only get through in single file. I watched Gneisenau’s
solemn face, and he said to me: ‘Victory was bought with German blood at
great cost, at very great cost.’ A tear was in his eye, the only time I ever saw
him weep.” When a grim Gneisenau met with Stein at Leipzig on the 20th,
both agreed that, despite the great success, the war could end only with an
invasion of France and Napoleon’s downfall. This formed the basis of
Gneisenau’s operational doctrine for the next five months.7
By dawn on the 19th, Yorck’s main body had covered fifteen miles from
Leipzig to Großkugel, six miles southeast of Halle, where it rested for
several hours. During the course of the day, various reports on the outcome
of the battle filtered through Yorck’s headquarters. “The first official and
appeasing report of the [Allied] victory,” as Schack noted in his journal,
arrived at dawn. Yorck’s staff quickly disseminated this news to restore
morale and the march continued at 10:00 a.m. Later in the day, Blücher
informed Yorck that the Allies had stormed and taken Leipzig; Sacken’s and
Langeron’s corps would join the pursuit as soon as the Russian troops had
rested. Blücher also stated that the two Russian corps would march south-
west to Lützen, indicating that a union of the Silesian Army would not be
possible for some time.8
Amid the cheers of its inhabitants, Yorck’s main body entered Halle at
7:00 on the evening of 19 October. Horn’s 2nd Division camped in and
around Halle; Hünerbein’s 1st Division marched through Halle and bivou-
acked a few miles east at Bruckdorf after detachments secured the bridges
over the Elster at Burgliebenau and Beesen. Riding without rest, the Reserve
Cavalry continued through Halle to Passendorf and Delitz am Berg. Despite
the fatigue of man and horse, Jürgaß dispatched numerous patrols.9
Throughout 19 October, Schwarzenberg maneuvered the masses of the
Bohemian Army away from the ruins of Leipzig; by that evening his forces
stood between Zeitz and Naumburg. The Armies of Poland and North
Germany remained in and around Leipzig. Of the Silesian Army, Sacken
and Langeron reached Schkeuditz while Yorck’s corps moved into positions
in and around Halle.
Around 9:00 on the morning of 19 October, Napoleon accompanied by

Murat rode to the king of Saxony’s residence to bid him farewell. During the
thirty-minute meeting, Napoleon assured Frederick Augustus that he would
return to Leipzig in two days, much to the chagrin of the king, who had
already asked for the tsar’s terms. From the central marketplace, the emperor
and his staff rode to the Ranstädt Gate. Napoleon could do little to get
through the bottleneck that had formed at the narrow gate and along the
Lindenau Causeway. He resolved himself to being carried along with the
throng. Sometime before 11:30 that morning he reached Lindenau itself.
After issuing further orders for Leipzig’s defense, he fell fast asleep at
the windmill. The roar caused by the exploding bridge woke him shortly
before 1:00.10
Assuming the Allies would hold Naumburg and defend the Saale cross-
ing at Bad Kösen, Napoleon chose to cross the river at Weißenfels. From
there, his army would utilize a rain-drenched country road to reach the
bridge over the Unstrut at Freyburg. Bertrand’s patrol found Freyburg’s
bridge burned by the same Austrian unit that held Naumburg but the
French used the available materials to build a new bridge. Upstream,
Bertrand’s men also repaired the slightly damaged crossing at the Zettenbach
Mill; the French thus had two bridges operational in just a few hours.
At Halle, Yorck had not received any news of the other Allied units. He
particularly hoped to hear something of the Austrian III Corps, which he
believed would engage the French on the road to either Weißenfels or
Merseburg. Virtually on his own, the Prussian commander could only guess
the direction Napoleon would take. A movement due west to Merseburg
offered the French emperor the most direct escape route across the Saale and
would spare his exhausted army a long march on the open plain. On the
other hand, crossing the Saale at Merseburg would then force the French to
plod through the deep valley of the Unstrut to reach the bridges at Freyburg
and Laucha. Yorck had few options other than to dispatch patrols and
occupy the river crossings Napoleon’s army needed to continue the retreat.
He ordered his tired cavalry to turn south; part of the Reserve Cavalry
would take post at Merseburg, while the light cavalry proceeded to
Großkayna and Roßbach, a few miles north of Weißenfels. The Cossacks
and one Brandenburg Hussar squadron raced toward Freyburg and Laucha
on the Unstrut. Yorck granted the infantry some rest after the difficult night
march, mainly because he could do nothing further until his cavalry found
the French army.
While Yorck enjoyed a victory celebration in Halle, courtesy of the city
magistrate, further details arrived regarding the storming of Leipzig and the
collapse of the French army. Unfortunately, this encouraging news failed to
mention the direction Napoleon had taken. The critical news that Napoleon
intended to cross the Saale at Weißenfels finally arrived when the reports of
22 Napoleon after the battle of Leipzig
Yorck’s cavalry reached Halle during the night of 19/20 October. To reach
Weißenfels, I Corps would have to march almost twenty miles. Yorck
believed his cavalry could reach the crossing before the imperials but had
little hope his infantry would arrive in time.11
On the following day, 20 October, Bertrand secured Freyburg and
forwarded a detachment across the hastily built bridge to reconnoiter the
opposite bank of the Unstrut. To the east, Napoleon had spent the night of
19/20 October at Markranstädt, departing for Weißenfels at 11:00 a.m.
There he learned that the Austrian III Corps had reached Naumburg, thus
blocking his path on the direct highway that ran southwest to Jena, where it
then angled due west to Erfurt. Not knowing the size of the Allied force
around Naumburg, the emperor decided to leave the highway and follow
Bertrand through Freyburg. After personally reconnoitering the area, he
moved to Markröhlitz to observe the army’s march. The main body reached
Weißenfels and crossed to the left bank of the Saale under Napoleon’s
supervision. Marmont covered the crossing by taking a position facing
Merseburg with III, VI, and VII Corps. Oudinot’s rearguard evacuated
Lindenau before daybreak, united with the I Cavalry Corps at Lützen, and
proceeded to Weißenfels under the constant pressure of Sacken’s cavalry.
As the hunted moved across the Saale early on the 20th, the hunters gave
chase. Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry saddled and departed around 3:00 a.m. with
orders to move through Bad Lauchstädt to Weißenfels. Horn’s 2nd Division
followed at 5:00 a.m. while Hünerbein’s 1st Division received orders to

occupy Merseburg. Two twelve-pound and two six-pound batteries
remained at Halle because the depleted corps did not have enough crews
to man the guns. Yorck accompanied the main body of Jürgaß’s Reserve
Cavalry to Merseburg but ordered the cavalry to continue west. At the
village of Markröhlitz, Jürgaß’s regiments clashed with Polish lancers and
French skirmishers. The Prussian cavalry observed French infantry at
Weißenfels and Reichardtswerben. French skirmishers extended from
Reichardtswerben along the Freyburg road; behind the hills stood several
cavalry regiments. According to the statements of prisoners, the French
force consisted of at least two cavalry divisions including the horse of the
Young Guard; Napoleon was rumored to be at Weißenfels. Behind this
screen, the French army retreated west on the road to Freyburg.
Reports of the enemy’s march through Weißenfels gradually reached
Yorck during the morning of 20 October. Around 9:00 a.m., news arrived
of a large French column on the Weißenfels–Freyburg road. Yorck rode
forward to personally confirm the report and observed the French army
moving through Markröhlitz toward Freyburg. Strong French cavalry units
belonging to Sebastiani’s II Cavalry Corps could be seen advancing to
Reichardtswerben to cover the column’s right flank. Although his infantry
still remained in the rear, Yorck ordered Jürgaß to attack. As soon as the
Prussian cavalry appeared, the French adroitly deployed their infantry. The
French cavalry and infantry that stood between the Prussians and the defil-
ing columns had such considerable force that any attack would have been
suicide. Even after the disaster at Leipzig, Napoleon’s army remained more
than a match for Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry. In view of the sheer numbers that
opposed him, Yorck called off the attack. Instead, he instructed Jürgaß to
maintain contact with the French and harass their columns with his horse
guns. Both sides exchanged artillery fire with little effect for several hours
until Yorck’s cavalry withdrew to Roßbach. Horn’s division only reached
Frankleben, while Hünerbein marched west to Bad Lauchstädt as the result
of a misunderstanding.12
Closer to Leipzig, Sacken’s cavalry pursued the French rearguard on the
direct road that ran southwest from the city to Weißenfels. Vasilchikov’s
Cossacks reached Markranstädt by 6:00 a.m. on the 20th, attacking some
2,000 stragglers on the road and then harassing Oudinot’s Guard divisions as
far as Lützen. Steffens explains:
The road to Weißenfels lies over a wide plain; we saw the last of the French
troops before us; though in hasty flight, they kept tolerably good order; it
was rather a misty morning and there was nothing to be seen between us and
the retreating enemy; suddenly we noticed Cossacks in every direction,
singly, or by twos or threes: in an instant they formed a troop, in another
they fell on the enemy: these consisted of the tired and weary who were not
able to keep up with the rest; the Cossacks swarmed in between them and the
main body, and they were instantaneously surrounded and cut off from it.
The Cossacks and their prisoners then disappeared, as if by magic.13
Not far from where King Gustav Adolph of Sweden had fallen during
the Thirty Years’ War, the French I Cavalry Corps turned and ended the
Cossack menace for the moment; the Russian horsemen withdrew to await
the arrival of Vasilchikov’s main body. After the commander came up
with the bulk of his cavalry, the pursuit continued around 10:00 a.m.
At Rippach, the French again deployed for combat. Following an insignificant
cannonade, the French rearguard withdrew to Weißenfels in the evening.
Vasilchikov’s cavalry bivouacked by Rippach while his patrols pressed on
to the Saale. Behind the Russian cavalry, Blücher led Langeron’s and
Sacken’s infantry across the Elster at Schkeuditz, turned south, and struck
the road to Weißenfels. He pushed his men as far as Lützen, where he
established his headquarters.14
Napoleon issued a series of orders late on the 20th that reflected his
growing concern over reaching the Unstrut ahead of the accelerated Allied
pursuit. By pushing Gyulay’s III Corps to Naumburg, Schwarzenberg had
closed the direct highway that ran southwest from Leipzig through Lützen
and Weißenfels. Because Napoleon had to take the detour through
Freyburg, he needed to close the passes to the Thuringian plain before his
pursuers reached them. This made possession of the bridge at Bad Kösen
vital. “It is important,” Napoleon emphasized to Berthier, “that no one
advances across that bridge against us.” Should the Allies take Bad Kösen,
they could cross to the left or northern bank of the Saale and proceed to
Freyburg, thus enveloping Napoleon’s army and stranding it on the opposite
bank of the Unstrut. This would provide time for Blücher, Bennigsen, and
Schwarzenberg to converge on Freyburg and either drive Napoleon’s army
into the Unstrut or force a decisive battle. Consequently, Bertrand and the
vanguard of the army received the task of securing Bad Kösen and the
northern bank of the Saale. His three divisions and V Cavalry Corps would
continue the march; a fourth division, which had remained at Weißenfels,
would rejoin the corps.15
To keep the main body of his army on the move, the emperor instructed
several units to continue the march to Freyburg early on 21 October. With
III, VI, and VII Corps, Marmont commenced the march from Weißenfels to
Freyburg at 2:00 a.m. Victor followed one hour later with II Corps, and
then Augereau with one division of IX Corps at 4:00 a.m. Around 5:00 a.m.
the Old Guard marched; two hours later XI and V Corps followed after
regrouping as much as possible. From their positions facing Merseburg,
II and III Cavalry Corps also started toward Freyburg around 4:00 a.m.
In the meantime, Mortier led his two Young Guard divisions and the Light
Guard Cavalry division to Freyburg. Lefebvre-Desnouettes received orders
to likewise direct his V Cavalry Corps to Freyburg early on the 21st. After
uniting with Mortier’s Light Guard Cavalry, Napoleon estimated Lefebvre-
Desnouettes would have a cavalry force of between 5,000 and 6,000 men to
secure Freyburg’s bridge over the Unstrut and to collect news of the enemy.
To avoid a bottleneck on the road, the French proceeded to Freyburg in two
columns: the right wing through Zeuchfeld, the left through Markröhlitz. To
the rear of the army, Oudinot dispatched I Cavalry Corps in the direction of
Merseburg to fill the void left by II and III Cavalry Corps; he remained at
Weißenfels with the two Young Guard divisions that served as the rearguard.
Around noon, I Cavalry Corps returned and Oudinot led the Guard to
Freyburg.16
On 21 October, the two Allied wings finally converged on the French
army. From the left, an Austrian detachment from Gyulay’s III Corps took
possession of the bridge over the Saale at Bad Kösen. As Gyulay led his main
body due west from Naumburg to Bad Kösen early on the 21st, reports
arrived of strong French columns approaching Bad Kösen from the north-
east direction of Freyburg. He accelerated the march but could not arrive
before Bertrand’s men utilized a thick fog to surprise the Austrian post and
drive it across the bridge to Neu-Kösen. A struggle for control of the bridge
ensued until 10:00 p.m., when Bertrand withdrew. The French lost 649 pris-
oners and each side suffered 1,000 casualties but Gyulay secured his object-
ive by preventing Bertrand from destroying the bridge over the Saale. While
the Austrian III Corps fought at Bad Kösen, Schwarzenberg’s right column
reached Naumburg and his left camped at Eisenberg.
On the Allied right wing, Yorck sought to prevent his adversary from
crossing the Unstrut, yet the reports still did not make clear whether the
French would cross the river at both Freyburg and Laucha, or Freyburg
alone. To observe both crossings and to inflict maximum damage on the
retreating enemy, I Corps needed to be reorganized. On the evening of 20
October, Henckel assumed command of a new advance guard in place of
Katzler, who had been wounded at Leipzig on the 18th. Early on 21
October, Henckel advanced to Laucha with orders to either harass the
French army as it crossed the Unstrut or make for Freyburg. As Henckel’s
column bore down on the French from the north, Yorck’s main body and
Reserve Cavalry moved west in an attempt to strike the French rear at
Freyburg. For this purpose, Horn and Hünerbein received instructions to
unite at Petzkendorf around 7:00 a.m.; Jürgaß assembled the Reserve
Cavalry at Braunsbedra around the same time.17
Henckel delayed his march for two hours while his battalions and
cavalry regiments made their way from their bivouacs. Finally, at 7:00 a.m.
on 21 October, the colonel ordered the advance. Marching through
Karsdorf Mücheln Braunsdedra Döllnitz
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28. Region between the Elster and the Rhine Rivers
Baumersroda, he found the remains of a large bivouac. The village magistrate

informed him that it was a pity he had not arrived earlier because a large
number of prisoners had passed the night there guarded by two Polish
battalions. Reconnaissance and further statements from the inhabitants con-
firmed that a large column of mainly Austrian prisoners of war, perhaps
4,000 men, had marched northwest. Henckel instructed the most senior
officer after him, Major Burghoff, to continue the march to Laucha with
the other troops while he pursued this column in the direction of Nebra with
the Black Hussars and the Saxon Uhlan Regiment.
The two cavalry regiments pressed on for what seemed like an eternity
until the large column finally came into view. Individual guards on both
sides of the column escorted the prisoners while the two Polish battalions
formed the head and the rear. Henckel ordered the four Prussian squadrons
to pass the length of the column in order to attack it from the front while he
and the Saxons followed behind the column. Near the village of Gleina, the
Black Hussars overtook the column and trotted past; the prisoners broke
rank and easily subdued the guards that marched to the left and right. Soon
the field was covered with liberated prisoners running in all directions,
similar to the effect of disturbing a mound of ants. Although the two
escorting Polish battalions held their ground, the men of the foremost
battalion cast aside their muskets and surrendered as soon as the Black
Hussars formed for an attack. However, Henckel did not have the same
luck. He ordered the Saxons to charge the rear battalion, which by now had
formed a square. As the colonel bore down on the Poles, he noticed that he,
his adjutants, the Saxon commander, Major Trotha, and the staff bugler
charged the enemy square alone – the regiment refused to follow. Conse-
quently, the few hundred Poles escaped into an adjacent forest and Henckel
could not pursue.18 On questioning the Saxons, Henckel and Trotha learned
that many of the officers and men were on good terms with the Poles of that
unit from their days of serving together in the Grande Armée. In his
memoirs, Henckel admits that he “had not thought of this circumstance
before, otherwise I certainly would have taken another regiment with me.”19
Henckel’s men liberated more than 100 officers and 4,000 men. The
majority consisted of Austrians and Russians captured during the battle of
Dresden in August or more recently during the combats around Leipzig on
the 16th. Among the former prisoners were eighteen Prussian officers and
the entire Austrian 1st Jäger Battalion. Those captured at Dresden had
already marched as far as Thüringen but were returned to Leipzig out of
fear that Allied raiding parties might liberate them. Now, for a second time,
they had started the march to France. The Allies captured Colonel Marc
Antoine Puton, baron de They, the commander of the escort, along with
several officers and 400 men. Henckel decided to have a detachment of
Saxon troops lead Putot, his men, and the liberated prisoners to
Merseburg. For some of Putot’s men the transition from guard to prisoner
was accompanied by acts of retribution for the suffering of the Allied
soldiers. In addition, Henckel recalls that “it went very bad for one camp
follower; in a few minutes she was stripped completely naked and I had to
give her a coat.”
Henckel himself was the hero of the day and it seemed that each of the
4,000 prisoners wanted to personally thank him. In trying to kiss his hand
they almost pulled the colonel from his horse. He proudly notes that “never
in my life have I been kissed more than on this day.” As he reveled in his
moment of glory, Captain Lützow of Yorck’s staff arrived to express the
commanding general’s discontent with Henckel for leaving the vanguard.
Henckel instructed the officer to immediately return and report the rescue;
Lützow complied. Henckel intended to follow but at the moment had to
establish order among the celebrating Austrians and Russians.
Meanwhile, Yorck learned that the French army had not taken the road to
Laucha. Therefore, the Prussian commander wanted to concentrate his corps
to attack the enemy at Freyburg. He sent orders for Henckel to unite with the
rest of the corps at Münchroda, from where it would descend on Freyburg.
Yorck himself caught up with Burghoff and the vanguard shortly after
Henckel departed to follow the column of prisoners. Not finding the colonel
with his troops infuriated Yorck. Ever the stern disciplinarian, he sent
Lützow to find Henckel and relay a sharp reprimand. This transgression so
aggravated Yorck that he turned and impatiently galloped after Henckel.
A few minutes passed and he met Lützow riding back to him; the captain
reported Henckel’s success. “I allowed my cavalry to follow after some rest,”
relates Henckel in his memoirs, “but I now moved quickly to reach my other
troops. On the way I came across Yorck with his entire entourage; in his
impatience he had ridden after me, but was now completely satisfied since
Lützow already reported to him. [The general] removed his cap and said:
‘Gentlemen, three cheers for Count Henckel!’ This statement, coming from
this man, at this moment, I cannot deny, meant more to me than when I had
received the Pour le Mérite with oak leaves for the day of Möckern.”20
Aside from Henckel’s exploits, Yorck’s main body, which had departed
from Petzkendorf around 7:00 a.m. with orders to march through
Zeuchfeld to Freyburg, was on a collision course with Napoleon’s army.
As the Prussians moved southwest from Merseburg to Freyburg, the French
struck the westward road from Weißenfels. Napoleon’s weary men trudged
along the muddy roads that twisted through the rain-drenched hills between
the Saale and the Unstrut. “As we pursued them from Weißenfels to Frey-
burg, we witnessed fearful traces of the general consternation,” noted Stef-
fens. “I shall never forget the sight: weapons thrown away to lighten their
load and increase their speed; guns, ammunition wagons, carriages of all
kinds, even some handsome traveling equipages; all clearly abandoned
because the tired horses could no longer pull them . . . not only on the road
but in the fields as far as the eye could reach in the direction of the flight. The
way was often quite impassable, and we had to make considerable detours to
continue.”21
Reaching Freyburg brought no relief to the toil of man and horse. The
town lay deep in the Unstrut valley, surrounded by a high, precipitous ridge.
Access to Freyburg on the predominantly east–west road that ran from
Weißenfels to Laucha required a steep descent along badly rutted tracks on
either side of the town. Vineyards, gardens, and houses crowded the road,
which narrowed to such an extent that infantry could barely march four
abreast and wagons could hardly move. On reaching Freyburg, the washed-
out approach route to the hastily built bridge over the rain-swollen Unstrut
did little to raise morale. After crossing the bridges at either Freyburg or the
Zscheiplitz estate, the imperial soldiers would face a taxing ascent from the
deep valley up the high Eckartsberg Mountains.22
Napoleon took appropriate measures to shield his army at the time of its
greatest vulnerability. French infantry occupied the town and Schloß of
Freyburg as well as the Zscheiplitz estate. Both cavalry and infantry took
positions among the hills and woods that stretched along the foot of the
ridge that protected Zscheiplitz and Freyburg from the north. A chain of
skirmishers occupied the thickets and vineyards between Weischütz and
Freyburg – a front of almost three miles. Protected by these positions, the
French raced across the bridges in disorderly masses. As Napoleon’s
exhausted men made this arduous journey, the sound of artillery rose above
the rumble of the churning Unstrut. Although this signaled the combat
between Bertrand and Gyulay at Bad Kösen to the west, the dejected French
troops panicked. Believing the enemy had caught their rearguard to the east,
they stampeded down the slope in a desperate attempt to reach the bridge.
Odeleben observed that “all military discipline ceased; each wanted to save
his own life. Only the appearance of the emperor restored order to the chaos
and regulated the flood.” Lieutenant Christian von Martens, a Württember-
ger whose regiment had already crossed the Unstrut and taken a position on
the opposite bank to cover the bridge, observed the collapse of the French
units: “We now had before our eyes a miniature of the Berezina crossing.
Here also one of the bridges over the Unstrut was designated for cavalry,
artillery, and wagons of all kinds, the other for infantry. Both were in very
bad condition, especially the one downstream, which was very crowded
with numerous wagons; the crush and disorder were so great that the bridge
soon collapsed.”23
Yorck’s main body moved southwest through Zeuchfeld to Freyburg.
He believed this better, yet somewhat longer road offered an opportunity to
make contact with the enemy sooner and possibly drive the French rear-
guard toward Schwarzenberg’s forces at Naumburg. From Zeuchfeld, Yorck
steered his corps due west to Schleberoda and began the difficult march to
Freyburg. Captured Westphalian officers claimed that the Guard occupied
the city and Schloß of Freyburg, as well as the Zscheiplitz manor and the
surrounding forest. Once again, caution mastered Yorck; he did not think his
9,000 men sufficed for an attack on the French position. Instead, he decided
to continue west another three miles from Schleberoda through the Neue
Gohle Forest to Münchroda. There he planned to unite with the advance
guard and march on the second crossing over the Unstrut at the Zettenbach
Mill on the Zscheiplitz estate. He planned to simultaneously attack Frey-
burg and Zscheiplitz but figured on only being able to take the latter. Yet, by
taking this position, Yorck would limit the French army to the single bridge
at Freyburg. By slowing Napoleon’s retreat, he hoped to provide time for
the rest of the Silesian Army to arrive.
After leaving the Mecklenburg Hussar Regiment at Zeuchfeld to main-
tain communication with the Reserve Cavalry, which stood in combat at
Markröhlitz, I Corps plunged into the Neue Gohle Forest. Horn’s and
Hünerbein’s divisions united with Henckel’s vanguard at Münchroda
around 2:00 and prepared for combat. The Prussians observed that the
majority of imperial units had already crossed the Unstrut and had started
to climb the likewise poor and steep roads on the opposite bank. Yorck
ordered the assault to commence in thirty minutes. Henckel’s infantry
formed the right wing and advanced from Münchroda to attack the French-
occupied village and Zscheiplitz Schloß. On the left wing, Horn’s division
received the task of driving the French from the thickets and vineyards at the
foot of the ridge line. Hünerbein’s division formed the reserve.
Henckel’s Nr. 2 Horse Battery unlimbered on the plateau between
Münchroda and Zscheiplitz to shell the French infantry positioned by the
latter village as well as the columns defiling on the opposite bank of the
Unstrut. To the extreme right of the artillery, the Austrian Jäger battalion
descended into the Unstrut valley west of Zscheiplitz to drive the French
from the town. Henckel’s right wing, consisting of the 1st Battalion of the
Leib Regiment and the Fourth Company of the Guard Jäger, also deployed
to the right of the artillery with the task of storming the Schloß. On the left
wing, the Thüringian Battalion and two companies of East Prussian Jäger
received orders to clear the enemy skirmishers from the outlying thickets
south of the Neue Gohle Forest in conjunction with three of Horn’s battal-
ions. Henckel’s Silesian Grenadier Battalion occupied Münchroda while two
Landwehr battalions, half of the Nr. 2 Foot Battery, and his cavalry
remained in reserve slightly northwest of the village.
As for the rest of Horn’s 2nd Division, half of the Nr. 3 Horse Battery
took a position on the hills south of the Neue Gohle Forest to shell the
French posts situated along the opposite lying hills of Freyburg. The Fusilier
Battalion of the Leib Infantry Regiment stood at the foot of the hills to
protect the battery. Horn placed his remaining troops – two Landwehr
battalions, the East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment, and the other four
guns of the Nr. 2 Foot Battery – in reserve east of Münchroda along the
southern edge of the Neue Gohle Forest and astride the road to Freyburg.
Hünerbein’s division remained about two and one-half miles northeast of
Freyburg in a concealed position on the eastern edge of the forest.
A strong line of French skirmishers faced the Prussians. Behind this
screen, French infantry concentrated in the center, just north and northeast
of the Zettenbach Mill. With the French appearing comparatively weak on
either wing, Yorck ordered the attack to begin. Much to his chagrin,
Henckel’s right wing soon became bogged down. A French cavalry charge
prevented the Austrian Jäger from reaching Zscheiplitz. Equally unsuccessful
proved to be the attempt to storm the Schloß. Standing on a hill that domin-
ated the surrounding region, the Schloß offered an excellent position for
French artillery. Not far from the walled manor, caseshot halted the Prussian
battalion. The defenders of the Zscheiplitz village and Schloß proved much
stronger than the Prussians had initially believed. “Zscheiplitz was too
strongly occupied,” noted Henckel in his after-action report, “and also very
strong due to the nature of its position; it could be supported at any moment
since the enemy had a bridge close behind it. He used everything to hold this
place because if we had mastered it, we would have been able to shell his two
bridges and the town [at close range].” Aborting the operation, Yorck
ordered Henckel to maintain a standing skirmish with the French, who did
not attempt to counterattack. Combat ended on this wing around 9:00 p.m.
Before Henckel’s right wing had made contact with the French, heavy
fighting ensued in the woods northeast of Zscheiplitz on his left wing.
Deployed in open order against the French skirmishers, the East Prussian
Jäger companies and the Thuringian Battalion met stubborn resistance, but
managed to push back the French just enough to allow Henckel to move his
half-battery of six-pound guns into line next to the horse artillery. Neverthe-
less, the French skirmishers fought tenaciously. They not only defended
bush and thicket, but actually drove back the Prussians. On two occasions
Henckel had to withdraw his artillery to save the guns from falling into
enemy hands. He shifted the 4th Company of Guard Jäger from his right
wing to bolster the skirmishing line on his left. Horn’s half-battery of horse
artillery also unlimbered on a hill near the western edge of the wood. Shortly
afterward, his battalions arrived to assist Henckel’s hard-pressed men. After
a long contest, the Prussians drove the French skirmishers from the woods.
A constant stream of shells from Henckel’s twelve guns forced the French to
halt the crossing of the Unstrut until they could redirect their column
further south on the ridge line.
Horn’s half-battery of horse artillery then turned its guns on Freyburg
itself, likewise spreading terror among the imperials. “Enemy shells, which
were already flying over Freyburg,” recalled the Württemberger, Martens,

“intensified confusion to the extreme. A portion of the cavalry attempted to
withdraw across the river and in the process many horses became stuck in
the mud. The sick and wounded were trampled on the narrow bridge or
pushed into the water. Most of the baggage wagons were lost along with
eighteen guns. As had happened at Jüterbog [Dennewitz], we had an oppor-
tunity to observe that, despite all of their courage in battle, the French lose
all self-control in misfortune, and in these circumstances order cannot easily
be restored among them.”24
Napoleon remained at Freyburg with Murat and Berthier watching his
troops cross the Unstrut. Although he did not direct the combat with
Yorck’s corps, he could not allow the situation to continue. He issued orders
for his battalions to regroup and attack Yorck’s center. On a hill between
Zscheiplitz and Freyburg, sixteen guns unlimbered to counter Horn’s artil-
lery and protect the northern approaches to Freyburg from Zeuchfeld,
Schleberoda, and the Neue Gohle Forest. Several battalions drove the Prus-
sians back across the plain to the thickets south of the forest. A couple of
French squadrons attacked the Thuringian Battalion. Henckel considered
the battalion as good as lost but its commander, a Major Lincker, ordered his
men to fix bayonets and charge the cavalry; the surprised French stopped
short, turned around, and received a volley in the rear. For his bravery,
Lincker received the Iron Cross and the battalion received special recogni-
tion in the after-action report.
Both Horn and Henckel committed their infantry reserves – a total of
five battalions – to muscle the French from the southern edges of the Neue
Gohle Forest. The combat then spilled onto the small plain that separated
the hills from which the artillery of both sides fired. “I had to call up two
[Landwehr] battalions as well as the Silesian Grenadier Battalion from the
village [Münchroda] to maintain communication with my two wings, and so
the entire line was engaged in skirmishing,” recalled Henckel. Yorck’s men
gradually pushed the French across the plain to the Lisiere stream on the
opposite side. The French managed to stabilize their line so that the firefight
continued until Yorck ordered Horn and Hünerbein to withdraw northwest
to Gleina around 9:00 p.m. After eight hours of combat, Henckel’s vanguard
remained at Münchroda and skirmished throughout the night with the
French.
Rather than follow the corps through the ravaged terrain to Freyburg,
Yorck ordered his Reserve Cavalry to proceed through Roßbach in the
direction of Markröhlitz. The usually dependable Jürgaß did not reach
Markröhlitz until noon. Not only did he arrive late – the reason remains
unknown – but strategic consumption had already claimed many of his
units.25 Consequently, Jürgaß did not have a substantial cavalry force when
he encountered the French rearguard outside Markröhlitz. Oudinot’s
cavalry had already reached Markröhlitz; behind it marched the infantry and
artillery on the road from Weißenfels. Jürgaß unlimbered Horse Battery
Nr. 1 on an advantageous hill and shelled the French cavalry as his
Lithuanian Dragoon Regiment attacked the French flank. Oudinot posted
his infantry and artillery – which arrived only gradually – in a wood near the
junction of the roads to Freyburg and Naumburg. An indeterminate cavalry
skirmish ensued for two hours until the French cavalry withdrew to the hills
just west of the woods where Oudinot’s infantry and artillery stood. Jürgaß
gave the Saxon hussars the honor of leading the pursuit. According to his
after-action report, the unit performed admirably and, unlike Henckel’s
uhlans, this Saxon unit had no reservations about attacking their former
allies. Jürgaß even claims that a single squad of 20 hussars captured 176
prisoners.
The 1st West Prussian Dragoon Regiment likewise attacked and drove
the French cavalry from the hills, thus prompting Oudinot to abandon the
road. The French marshal watched the Prussians gradually overwhelm his
cavalry but did little to support his troopers. Late in the afternoon, the
Prussian cavalry made one final charge. Supported by artillery, they forced
Oudinot’s riders to seek shelter in the wood. Skirmishing continued until
dusk. Both Jürgaß and Oudinot claimed victory, yet the French rearguard
did maintain its position until continuing the retreat to Freyburg. Jürgaß
took 3 cannon including 1 twelve-pound gun, “many” caissons, and
approximately 400 prisoners before moving to Zeuchfeld that evening.26
As for the rest of Blücher’s army, the cliché “too little, too late” applies to
its effort to catch Napoleon before his army escaped across the Unstrut. At
noon on 21 October Sacken and Langeron reached Weißenfels and the right
bank of the Saale. At this time, Oudinot’s two Guard divisions still lined the
hills along the opposite bank. Two battalions held the bridge, which was
loaded with flammable material. To allow as many stragglers as possible to
cross, the marshal delayed giving the order to ignite. In the meantime, two
Russian Jäger regiments occupied the Schloß of Weißenfels while a battery
of twenty-four guns unlimbered. Situated on the bank of the river, the old
castle provided an overview of Oudinot’s encamped rearguard of approxi-
mately 12,000 men. Russian Jäger launched a successful surprise attack on
the bridge, yet the startled French managed to ignite it as they fell back. The
Russians could do nothing to save the wooden structure from the flames:
Blücher’s pursuit stalled.27
When the Russian battery opened fire, the French blew their caissons
and departed. As the French cleared the opposite bank, Blücher learned,
presumably from prisoners, why Napoleon had crossed the Saale at
Weißenfels to march crosscountry rather than continue on the highway
through Naumburg to the bridge over the Saale at Bad Kösen. Appar-
ently, the emperor had discovered that Schwarzenberg’s army had reached
Naumburg and elements of Gyulay’s III Corps had entered Bad Kösen.
Blücher now had two options: take advantage of the highway, proceed
through Naumburg to Bad Kösen and envelop the left wing of the French
army, or repair the bridges at Weißenfels and resume the direct pursuit.
The march to Bad Kösen would have caused a logistical nightmare if
Blücher’s columns became entangled with those of Schwarzenberg’s army.
Furthermore, a march in this direction would have isolated Yorck from
the rest of the Silesian Army. However, Yorck’s last report, dated the
19th, informed Blücher that I Corps reached Halle but not Merseburg.
Blücher could only speculate where I Corps would be on the 21st.
According to Müffling, Blücher “could depend on Yorck seeking the
enemy and finding him, for the march to Freyburg would provide him
with that opportunity.” Based on the nature of the terrain around Frey-
burg, Blücher’s headquarters believed that, if Yorck surprised the French
there and the rest of the Silesian Army could catch up, considerable
results could be expected.28
Thus, Blücher chose to continue the direct pursuit. He ordered the
Russian pioneers to construct a bridge across the Saale from boats, rafts,
planks, and whatever else they could find. The Russians conveniently found
an ample supply of planks and rafts in the river, while staff officers scoured
Weißenfels for carpenters. The officers found an old master-carpenter, who
claimed to have been an apprentice in 1757 when Frederick the Great had
ordered a bridge to be built at Weißenfels so he could confront the French at
Roßbach. The greybeard promised not only to build Blücher’s bridge in the
exact place where Frederick’s bridge had been fifty-six years earlier, but to
have it ready in a few hours. Apparently, the old man kept his word. That
evening, Russian light cavalry crossed the Saale and advanced in the direc-
tion of Freyburg while the cavalry of Langeron’s vanguard made contact
with Yorck’s Reserve Cavalry at Markröhlitz. Although both corps moved
across the Saale that same evening, it was too late: Napoleon’s army had
already escaped across the Unstrut.29
Convinced that the retreat over the Unstrut was secure, the emperor
rode through Klosterhäseler on the road to Eckartsberga on the evening of
the 21st. After Yorck withdrew that same night, the French continued their
retreat unmolested. Sometime between 4:00 and 6:00 a.m., the last French
units completed the breakout and destroyed the bridges behind them. As the
sky began to grey, Henckel led a patrol to Freyburg and found that the
French had just evacuated the town. The Silesian Grenadier Battalion took
possession of Freyburg but Yorck’s men could go no further. Reports vary
regarding the prizes Yorck’s corps took both during the combat and after
occupying Freyburg. Most claim the Prussians captured 18 guns and 1,200
prisoners during the fighting on the 21st while an additional 11 guns and
perhaps as many as 400 caissons were found at Freyburg. According to
Delbrück, Freyburg “was covered with abandoned guns, discarded packs,

and ammunition wagons for a quarter-mile to the bank of the Unstrut.”
Regardless of the tally, such modest losses only enhanced Napoleon’s
accomplishment. In just two days he had put the Saale and the Unstrut
between him and the Silesian Army. Oudinot had halted Blücher at
Weißenfels while Bertrand’s action at Bad Kösen stopped Gyulay. Nothing
now stood between the French army and Erfurt’s massive supply depot.30
Yorck’s corps lost 17 officers and 827 men in the combat on 21 October.
Criticism of Yorck’s operation has been based on the general’s after-action
report, which states that I Corps had “attained great results in the combat
and that it could have taken Zscheiplitz if it had attacked in earnest.” Yorck
explained that the French undoubtedly would have committed everything to
retake Zscheiplitz and he would not have been able to hold the position.
“With great sacrifice,” wrote Yorck, “it might have been possible for me to
take the Zscheiplitz Schloß and village, which lie upon a hill and were
strongly occupied by enemy infantry and artillery since it was key to [the
enemy’s] position, before the onset of darkness. Meanwhile, in all likelihood
I would have been dislodged from this position from the enemy batteries
behind it.”31
Yorck believed the losses incurred would not have been worth the results
obtained. “How far this reasoning is valid,” states Friederich, “is impossible
to say.” Or is it? The surviving after-action reports and published eyewitness
accounts suggest that Yorck’s corps was hard pressed just to hold its position
south of Münchroda. Henckel’s statements are clear: “it was impossible to
detach more troops there [to Zscheiplitz], because all were already in
combat.” According to the colonel, he received support from both Horn
and Hünerbein during the course of the eight-hour combat. Although
Napoleon’s army shrank almost hourly from desertion, disease, and despair,
the emperor still had 100,000 men at his disposal with at least 80,000 under
his personal supervision – more than enough to minimize Yorck’s threat.32
Despite Napoleon’s escape, the mood at Blücher’s headquarters
remained confident. During the march from Lützen to Weißenfels on the
21st, Prince William of Prussia rejoined the Silesian Army. The younger
brother of King Frederick William III came from Leipzig after being named
commander of Yorck’s 2nd Brigade in place of the wounded Prince Karl of
Mecklenburg. Of greater importance, he delivered the cabinet order that
promoted Blücher to field-marshal. “By repeated victories,” stated the cover
letter drafted by the king himself, “you continue your services to the state
more quickly than I can follow them with proof of my gratitude. Accept the
promotion to field-marshal as new proof of my gratitude, and long may you
grace this position to the joy of the Fatherland and as a model to the army,
which you have so often led to fame and victory.” Blücher’s soldiers fully
understood that this promotion reflected their bravery and sacrifices. The
Russians, with whom Blücher enjoyed an exceptional relationship, affec-

tionately referred to him as “the Prussian Suvarov.” A rumor spread among
the Cossacks that Blücher actually had been born on the Don River.33
While still at Weißenfels, the leadership of the Silesian Army expected to
catch at least a portion of the French army at Freyburg on the following day.
“Right now, General Yorck is engaged with the enemy between the Unstrut
and the Saale,” Gneisenau wrote to Münster. “We hope to be able to take the
majority of the enemy’s guns at the bottleneck of the Unstrut. If everything
goes as planned, the enemy will cross the Rhine with many fewer. Although
we have taken more than 500 pieces of cannon from him in the various
battles, he still has about 200 with him.” Accompanied by the field-marshal
and his staff, Langeron’s corps marched through Markröhlitz toward Frey-
burg at 5:00 a.m. Sacken proceeded a few miles upstream to Laucha to
rebuild the bridge over the Unstrut. Blücher reached Freyburg around noon
on 22 October only to find Yorck’s corps resting rather than bridging the
Unstrut. One reason for Yorck’s inactivity: the arrival of a transport con-
taining new boots, which were as good as gold to his men. For Blücher and
Gneisenau, the situation finally became clear: Yorck’s small corps had failed
to hold Napoleon and the Russians had not reached Freyburg in time. They
quickly devised another plan to envelop Napoleon’s army by force-
marching the Silesian Army to Eisenach, some thirty miles west of Erfurt
on the main highway to the Rhine. Silesian Army Headquarters issued new
orders to be executed that same day; Blücher demanded speed. Yorck placed
his Reserve Cavalry and horse artillery under Jürgaß to form the extreme
right wing of the army. After crossing the Unstrut at Nebra, Jürgaß would
proceed through Wiehe toward Weißensee. Yorck’s main body received the
task of rebuilding the Zettenbach Mill bridge. After crossing the Unstrut,
I Corps would march west to Sömmerda while Langeron’s corps crossed the
river at Freyburg and trooped to Klosterhäseler. In accordance with Blü-
cher’s original orders, Sacken’s corps would pass the Unstrut at Laucha and
march to Bad Bibra. For the 23rd, Blücher planned a big push to get all three
corps in line at Leubingen, Sömmerda, and Schloßvippach.34
Although Blücher berated his own corps commanders for not doing
enough in the pursuit and complained about Schwarzenberg’s laxity, the
private correspondence issued from Silesian Army Headquarters painted a
picture of confidence. “I just do not know what to do with all of these
decorations,” joked Blücher in a postscript to his wife; “I’m covered with
them like an old coach-horse, but my greatest reward is the thought that
I was the one who humbled the arrogant tyrant.” “Since Leipzig, we, the
Silesian Army, have pursued the enemy,” boasted Gneisenau in a letter to
Clausewitz’s wife, Marie, “taking from him about 4,000 prisoners, setting
free 3,000–4,000 captured Russians and Austrians. All roads are covered
with partially destroyed caissons. There is no uplifting emotion as gratifying
as national revenge. We now stride irresistibly to the Rhine in order to

liberate this river of the Fatherland from its chains.” To Clausewitz
himself he wrote: “The enemy makes his way to Erfurt. I still hope to catch
him at Eisenach. The Silesian Army is once again at the forefront and is
closest to the enemy.”35
Despite this enthusiasm, the difficulty of restoring the bridges cost the
Silesian Army an entire day. Finding the bridge at Laucha likewise des-
troyed, Sacken dispatched Vasilchikov’s cavalry northward around a wide
bend in the Unstrut to cross the river at Burgscheidungen. Yorck’s men
actually gave up on trying to restore the Zettenbach Mill bridge due to the
Unstrut’s swift current. The colorful Henckel led the advance guard to
Laucha, “which was occupied by skirmishers, who crossed the river in
canoes.” “The commanding general [Yorck],” continued Henckel, “went
with all the brigadiers and me to the town in order to communicate the
march order. I had the misfortune of falling into the river from which
the pioneers pulled me out.” That same night, Henckel led his column across
the Unstrut after the Russians finished the bridge. Yorck instructed him to
continue in the direction of Sömmerda on a night that Henckel claims “was
so dark that one could not see one’s hand in front of one’s face.” Meanwhile,
Horn’s 2nd Division marched to the Dorndorf estate one mile north of
Laucha, and Hünerbein led his 1st Division to Burgscheidungen, where
some of his units followed Sacken’s men across the Unstrut. After experi-
encing similar problems with repairing the Freyburg bridge, Langeron’s
Russians eventually bivouacked since the pioneers could not finish their
work until midnight. The difficulty of crossing the Unstrut wrecked
Gneisenau’s timetable, making it impossible for the corps to reach
Leubingen, Sömmerda, and Schloßvippach by 23 October.36
Although the 22nd proved fruitless for the Silesian Army, the other
Allied armies finally moved away from Leipzig. Bennigsen’s vanguard
crossed the Elster at Weißenfels and camped on the evening of the 21st at
Reichardtswerben; the main body marched to Lützen. On the following day,
the advance guard reached Freyburg. The Army of North Germany also
started its march from Leipzig on the 22nd. While the Bohemian, Polish, and
Silesian Armies made their way toward Erfurt, Bernadotte planned to lead
his army northwest to Göttingen to contend with Marshal Davout at Ham-
burg. As for Schwarzenberg, the tsar was not pleased with his progress,
particularly Gyulay’s five-mile march on the 22nd. Alexander ordered the
formation of a Russo-Prussian vanguard that would take the lead from
Gyulay. Regardless, Schwarzenberg remained cautious and wanted to con-
centrate his army at Weimar, believing Napoleon would accept battle at
Erfurt.37
After clearing Freyburg, the imperials made for the crossroads at
Eckartsberga on 22 October. There, the east–west road from Naumburg to
Eisenach intersected the north–south road that ran between Eisleben and
Weimar; at Weimar this road crossed Napoleon’s main east–west line of
communication from the Rhine to Erfurt. As French patrols had already
reported the presence of Cossacks at Weimar, Napoleon chose to follow the
east–west road for a short distance and then cut crosscountry to Buttelstedt,
from where he would proceed southwest to Erfurt. To avoid being cut off at
Bad Kösen, Bertrand marched through Auerstedt to Leibstedt. By nightfall
on the 23rd, the rear echelon of Napoleon’s main body camped at Buttel-
stedt while the advance guard had reached Ollendorf, some ten miles north-
west of Erfurt; Oudinot’s harried rearguard took a position at Eckartsberga.
On the army’s left flank, French cavalry patrolling toward Weimar made
contact with Schwarzenberg’s Cossacks.
On 24 October, Napoleon’s tired infantry reached the safety of Erfurt;
Sébastiani continued on the highway toward Gotha with the majority of the
cavalry. Although the main body had reached a safe haven, the lead elements
of the Bohemian Army closed on Bertrand and Oudinot. The latter evacu-
ated Eckartsberga and halted slightly westward between Ramsla and
Schwerstedt to link with Bertrand, who was approaching from Leibstedt.
Wittgenstein’s cavalry finally caught Bertrand’s rear at Buttelstedt. The
Russian horsemen easily dispatched the French cavalry but could do little
against the infantry. Bertrand withdrew after losing a few hundred prisoners.
Both he and Oudinot continued the retreat to Erfurt under the increasing
pressure of Allied cavalry.
At Silesian Army Headquarters, the realities of the situation did not fail
to influence Blücher and Gneisenau. The delay at the Unstrut allowed
Napoleon to regain his lead. Moreover, the intended forced march had to
be delayed until the bridges could be restored. To salvage his plans, Blücher
wanted the vanguards of his three corps to reach the points designated in the
march table issued the previous day. The forced marches required Yorck’s
vanguard to proceed twenty-five miles from Laucha to Sömmerda, Sacken’s
twenty-two miles from Laucha to Leubingen, and Langeron’s twenty-five
miles from Freyburg to Schloßvippach.38
The nightmarish march wound through the washed-out roads of the
Thuringian plain. “Only on the morning of the 23rd did Yorck’s brigades
cross,” explains Droysen, “and now began a hellish march on the most
abominable roads, with frequent [river] crossings, with dreadfully exhausted
troops, with confusion at every corner.” Henckel led the vanguard across the
Unstrut at Laucha around midnight on the 23rd after Sacken’s corps had
cleared the bridge. After marching west to Bibra, Henckel learned that his
next road to Rastenberg was impassable. This forced him to follow the
Russians. His infantry fell far behind but the cavalry and horse artillery
passed Sacken’s men and reached Sömmerda by 7:00 p.m.; his infantry began
to arrive around 4:15 a.m. on the 24th. Jürgaß’s Reserve Cavalry crossed the
Unstrut at Burgscheidungen early on the 23rd and also outdistanced Sacken

to reach Ostramondra, about nine miles northeast of Sömmerda. Behind the
Reserve Cavalry, Hünerbein’s 1st Division moved from Burgscheidungen to
Billroda. Horn led his 2nd Division across the Unstrut at Laucha around
6:00 a.m. on the 23rd and proceeded to Neuhausen, slightly closer to
Sömmerda than Jürgaß. Apparently, Henckel did not share his intelligence
regarding the road through Rastenberg, because Yorck’s Reserve Artillery
stumbled into a virtual quagmire. Sacken’s advance guard camped just east of
Jürgaß at Bachra but Langeron’s vanguard failed to reach Schloßvippach.
Because of the tsar’s demand for speed, the Bohemian Army steadily
approached Blücher’s left flank. Commanding one of Schwarzenberg’s two
columns, Barclay pursued the French on the main highway from Naumburg
toward Erfurt. On the night of the 23rd his advance guard camped between
Auerstedt and Eckartsberga; the main body extended between the latter and
Naumburg. From there, he established communication with the Silesian
Army to seek Blücher’s opinion on the next step. He specifically requested
a copy of the instructions that Blücher issued to his vanguards so that he
could direct his own accordingly. To continue the pursuit of Oudinot, he
directed Gyulay and Wittgenstein to Buttelstedt, with his headquarters and
the Russo-Prussian Guard following.
Meanwhile, the Allied commander in chief made arrangements to con-
front Napoleon at Erfurt. Schwarzenberg’s headquarters believed the stores
there would allow Napoleon to refurbish his army and accept battle. Know-
ing that the emperor himself had reached the fortress, Schwarzenberg ordered
the two wings of his army to concentrate between Erfurt and Weimar. He also
instructed Blücher to proceed west on the direct road from Sömmerda to
Langensalza. Should Napoleon accept battle, Blücher would be in a perfect
position to envelop the imperials at Erfurt. If Napoleon refused, Blücher still
would be able to attack the rear and flank of the French army. On 24 October,
Gyulay’s III Corps proceeded from Buttelstedt to Ollendorf, with his
advance units at Großmölsen, less than ten miles from Erfurt. Bubna’s 2nd
Light Division reached Mönchenholzhausen on the highway between Erfurt
and Weimar. Behind Bubna and echeloned eastward to Weimar stood the
Russo-Prussian Guard, Kleist’s Prussians, and Wintzingerode’s Russians; the
Austrian I, II, and Reserve Corps held the rear at Weimar. Cossack patrols
scoured the region between Erfurt and Gotha.39
Although Blücher allowed his men to rest on the morning of the 24th, he
continued to drive his army with a fury. At noon his unbelievable orders
reached the various corps. The disposition called for Sacken to march eighteen
miles to Tennstedt, Yorck twenty miles to Gangloffsömmern, and Langeron
eighteen miles to Schwerstedt. Once again, Silesian Army Headquarters
underestimated the paralyzing effect of the rain-drenched Thuringian clay.
Neither man nor beast could escape its clutches; guns and wagons slithered
through mud up to their axles. “The fatigue is excessive,” attests I Corps’s

24 October journal entry, “only a few days of exertions and [Blücher] will
grant the exhausted corps some rest.” The groundless, unpaved roads pre-
vented Blücher’s three corps from reaching their march objectives; only the
vanguards arrived at Tennstedt, Gangloffsömmern, and Schwerstedt.40
While conducting reconnaissance on the morning of the 25th,
Schwarzenberg’s lead elements discovered that the French army had already
left Erfurt. The Allied commander in chief quickly relayed this news to
Blücher. According to the reports, Napoleon had divided his army into three
columns: the first had reached Eisenach on the previous day, the second was
en route, and the rearguard would follow from Erfurt on the 26th. Blücher
decided to herd his army as fast as possible toward Langensalza; the cavalry
and horse artillery of all three corps received instructions to reach the
Langensalza–Eisenach road.
During the night of 24/25 October Yorck again reorganized his corps.
Henckel dissolved his advance guard and returned the infantry units to their
respective brigades. His 2nd Leib Hussar and Saxon Uhlan Regiments as
well as the horse artillery rejoined Jürgaß’s Reserve Cavalry, which now
formed Yorck’s vanguard. Henckel, who had originally commanded a bri-
gade of two regiments in the Reserve Cavalry, resumed his former place
under Jürgaß’s command. Furthermore, Prince William officially assumed
command of Yorck’s 2nd Brigade. Yorck ended the divisional organization
of Horn’s command; Horn simply resumed his former position as brigadier
of 7th Brigade. However, 1st and 8th Brigades remained merged in Hüner-
bein’s 1st Division. Confusion over Blücher’s orders added to the growing
discontent at Yorck’s headquarters caused by the apparent disregard for the
suffering of the men. Schack’s journal entry on 25 October depicts the
vexation. “An extremely inadequate march disposition arrived; three corps
were directed on the most abysmal roads through three defiles . . . all three
corps should depart at daybreak, Yorck and Sacken to the right on the road
to Langensalza, Langeron to the left, no village was designated . . . inconceiv-
able indifference of the army’s commanders toward the troops, who have
been extremely fatigued due to negligence.”41
Similar to the situation in August, the corps commanders wanted an
explanation for the apparently useless marches. The amount of detail con-
tained in Blücher’s orders almost never provided a satisfactory overview of
the general situation. One of the goals of the infant Prussian General Staff
was to eliminate the tedious and time-consuming practice of issuing volu-
minous orders. However, it appears that officers reared in this tradition
perceived brief dispatches to be disrespectful and a dangerous lack of com-
munication. One of the major sources of friction between Yorck and
Gneisenau was the latter’s failure to provide sufficient information. The
same would hold true in 1815, when Bülow misinterpreted Gneisenau’s
orders prior to the battle of Ligny on 16 June because they failed to provide
details regarding the overall situation. Ostensibly, an order from the Chief of
the General Staff of the Prussian Army – and in the case of Yorck in
1814 and Bülow in 1815, from the chief of staff of the army in which their
corps was attached – was to be obeyed, and these extremely competent
officers understood this basic military protocol. Arguments regarding their
seniority to Gneisenau and the polite wording of his orders miss the point.
These men demanded to be informed of the general situation. Short, concise
orders instructing them to move from one point on the map to the next –
which was usually the extent of the orders issued from Blücher’s headquar-
ters – caused frustration, misinterpretation, and, in some cases, outright
insubordination.
On the French side, Napoleon harbored no illusions over the condition of
his army. Weakened physically, mentally, and materially, it could not confront
the Allies in the field: the retreat had to continue to the Rhine. The army’s
forced marches across the Unstrut and the Thuringian plain eroded the good
order that had first characterized the retreat. Daily desertions added to the
attrition that diminished Napoleon’s forces; at most the emperor commanded
70,000–80,000 men. “The rapidity of their flight had completely exhausted
the greater part of the army,” recalls Professor Steffens, “at first we saw single
Frenchmen lying among the bushes; as we proceeded the number of the
exhausted, dying sufferers increased, and we found large groups of dead
and dying; it was painful for me to observe that they viewed it as a great evil
to be discovered by us; although we offered them assistance, they preferred to
be left to perish from hunger and exhaustion among the undergrowth.
I confess, I wished myself away from the horrid scene, it was more terrible
to me than the violence of the fiercest battle.”42
With Schwarzenberg and Blücher approaching Erfurt, Napoleon only
thought of resting, reorganizing, and feeding his starving army. Considering
his next move, he had already ordered the evacuation of all hospitals from
the right to the left bank of the Rhine as well as the garrisoning, equipping,
and provisioning of the Rhine fortresses, notably Mainz and Wesel. The
emperor also expressed his intention to form one army at Mainz, a second at
Wesel, and perhaps even a third at Strasbourg. On the 24th, the advance
guard consisting of XI and II Corps and II Cavalry Corps marched on the
highway to Eisenach, reaching Gotha the next day. At Erfurt, Napoleon left
behind a garrison of 6,000 men and supplies for eight months. The emperor
directed his main body to Gotha, covered on the right by the Guard’s light
cavalry and V Cavalry Corps; and on the left by Bertrand’s troops. Mortier
commanded the new rearguard – two divisions of Young Guard and I
Cavalry Corps – which followed through Erfurt.
Furiously driven westward by Blücher’s sheer will, the Russian and
Prussian soldiers of the Silesian Army endured another horrible day in the
Thuringian plain on 25 October. Schack’s journal entry on the 25th again

provides testimony of the reigning sentiment at Yorck’s headquarters: “con-
fusion and embarrassment; unsurpassed indolence . . . great misery among
the troops, distribution of a few loaves among the poor soldiers. Count
Henckel made a touching but true report regarding the condition of the
troops: ‘one Landwehr officer, unconscious from hunger and exhaustion,
spent the night in a ditch.’” On the night of the 25th, after another grueling
march, Sacken’s corps reached Reichenbach, halfway along the road between
Langensalza and Eisenach; his cavalry moved into Behringen, even closer to
Eisenach. Arriving at Tüngeda, Yorck’s cavalry came on line with Sacken’s
main body; Yorck’s corps camped at Langensalza and Ufhofen. Langeron’s
corps stood just south of Langensalza with his advance guard likewise at
Tüngeda. For its part, the Bohemian Army moved into positions around
Erfurt.43
“Today,” wrote Gneisenau to a friend on the morning of the 26th, “I
hope to cut to pieces a part of the French army on the Hörselberg.” This
simple statement says much regarding the continued optimism and incessant
drive of Blücher’s headquarters. The Hörselberg ridge extended from Sattel-
städt toward Eisenach. A small stream, the Hörsel, flowed northward
through the Thuringian Forest and then westward to join the Werra River
just west of Eisenach. The plateau on the Hörselberg offered the Allies an
advantageous position from which to shell the highway. “The chaussée on
which the enemy was proceeding runs through a valley,” explains Charles
Stewart, “bound on one side by the great chain of the Thuringian mountains,
and on the other by a range of minor heights, called the Hurthberg, Hörsel-
berg, and Kahlenberg.” Gneisenau planned to converge on the French
between the Hörsel and the Hörselberg but timing became the crucial factor
in this operation. Moreover, “the ground was not, in consequence, favorable
for the operation of cavalry or for bringing artillery speedily up to the
attack,” adds Stewart, “and the enemy had occupied all the ravines and
lower eminences bordering on the road with his tirailleurs.” 44
Silesian Army Headquarters issued very detailed orders for the 26th.
Blücher instructed the cavalry and horse artillery of all three corps to move
to the Hörselberg at daybreak. Jürgaß received the task of arriving first to
take possession of the ridge before the French could occupy the advanta-
geous high ground. If Jürgaß secured this objective without being detected,
he was to remain hidden, but forward small patrols toward the Gotha–
Eisenach road to observe the enemy’s march. Sacken’s cavalry and horse
artillery would join the Prussians in this concealed position while
Langeron’s units moved into a position north of the hills. If the opportunity
arose, Blücher gave permission for the cavalry to attack the French before
the corps reached their respective positions. As for the infantry, Sacken and
Yorck received orders to advance to Großenlupnitz, a march of eight and
fourteen miles respectively. Langeron’s corps would reconnoiter the side

roads that ran from Gotha to the Langensalza–Eisenach road and advance
toward the two other corps at daybreak.45
On the cold morning of 26 October Yorck’s men began their march in
the face of a bitter wind. Jürgaß reached Hastrungsfeld at the northern foot
of the Hörselberg around 8:00 a.m. Instead of taking a concealed position
and forwarding small patrols to the highway, he ascended the hills. The
Prussians rode to the southwest edge of the Hörselberg to discover they had
arrived too late – below them trooped the French along the highway from
Gotha. “The Hörselberg marches right up along the highway,” explains
Henckel, “and it was quite a view to see the enemy defiling below us.”
Skirmishers from Jean-Jacques Pelet’s Guard brigade occupied the thickets
on the Hörselberg itself to cover the pass at Sattelstädt. A volley of small-
arms fire surprised the approaching Prussian cavalry. Jürgaß unlimbered his
half-battery of horse artillery; caseshot soon drove the French skirmishers
down the Hörselberg. Pursuing to the edge of the plateau, the Prussians
observed the bivouac of Oudinot’s Guard divisions on the other side of the
Hörsel stream by Sattelstädt. According to Jürgaß, “the enemy had barely
observed our arrival when he occupied the gorges and steep ravine of the
mountains with skirmishers, to whose support two or three battalions were
advancing and, at the overhang of the mountain, the cavalry was favorably
positioned to repulse an attack.”46
Jürgaß moved up his artillery. After several Prussian shells reached their
camp, the French hastily resumed their march along the Hörselberg’s west-
ern spur to Eichrodt. Oudinot’s skirmishers bought time by attacking the
Prussians. Ascending the steep slope, the French deftly utilized every shrub
and crevice to move closer to the Prussians. Man and horse were soon
exposed to their deadly fire; the artillery had to be pulled back to
Hastrungsfeld after the gunners sustained numerous casualties. Jürgaß could
do nothing to counter: his cavalry could not descend the steep paths that led
to the Hörselberg valley. In order to pursue the French column, Jürgaß
moved east along a muddy path to Sattelstädt, where he arrived in the
afternoon.47 By this time his exhausted cavalry could go no further; only
the 2nd Leib Hussar Regiment continued the pursuit and captured some
hundred transport personnel. That evening Jürgaß led his cavalry to a
bivouac at Kälberfeld, about one mile west of Sattelstädt on the main
highway between Gotha and Eisenach. Sacken’s and Langeron’s cavalry
followed the Prussians but did not participate in the combat.
Slightly northwest of the Hörselberg, Sacken’s and Yorck’s infantry
reached Großenlupnitz around noon. A few hours later Blücher received
Jürgaß’s report of the French retreat from Sattelstädt to Eichrodt. The field-
marshal ordered Hünerbein’s division to continue its march to Eichrodt,
while Yorck’s 2nd and 7th Brigades remained in reserve with Sacken’s
Russians at Großenlupnitz. The troops did not greet this order – coming
after a march of several hours and considering the muddy condition of the
road – with joy. Hünerbein’s 1st Division moved toward the defile at the
village of Eichrodt, two and one-half miles northeast of Eisenach. After
making slow progress along the awful road, his men reached a cleft in the
western spur of the Hörselberg north of Eichrodt. They observed French
cavalry trotting westward on the highway to Eisenach. Southeast of
Eichrodt, the Prussians also noticed a French bivouac; this was Mortier with
his two divisions of Young Guard: the very last units of the French rear-
guard. Hünerbein’s half-battery of six-pound foot artillery unlimbered and
lobbed a salvo into the French camp. Mortier followed standard French
procedure and unleashed a mass of skirmishers to silence the enemy artillery.
“His [Mortier’s] position,” states Yorck’s report, “allowed him a stubborn
defense, and the combat became extremely serious and bloody.” In a short
time the battery sustained so many casualties that Hünerbein pulled it out of
the line. On several occasions his infantry had to fix bayonets to repulse the
French skirmishers; combat continued late into the night until Hünerbein
finally withdrew. French losses are not known, but both the civilian scholar
Droysen and the General Staff historian Friederich agree that the results
were hardly worth Hünerbein’s loss of 300–335 killed and wounded. The
French army again escaped Blücher; only Langeron’s corps could boast of
success. With two Russian divisions, Rudzevich attacked Mortier’s rear-
guard at Gotha and took 2,000 prisoners.48
Both contemporaries and historians maintain that the Silesian Army
should have achieved more results on this day. “Col. Hudson Lowe,” notes
Sir Charles Stewart, “being at this time attached by me to Marshal
Blücher . . . conceived that the 26th might have been a most fatal day for
Bonaparte, had the Silesian Army put itself in movement at an earlier hour,
or had there been officers of greater activity and combination at the head of
the Russian cavalry. A prompt march upon Eisenach, which lies in the very
center of defiles, would have rendered all further retreat on that line impos-
sible.” Such expectations far surpassed the physical capabilities of Blücher’s
men, who had just endured four days of strenuous marching. Friederich
quotes the journal of the Leib Grenadier Battalion: “The march, in part on
very bad mountain paths and in part over muddy, washed-out clay roads,
was conducted with indescribable misery and was extremely harmful to the
condition of the troops. So it came to pass that, despite the best will and the
greatest devotion, the bivouac was only reached by the smallest portion of
the soldiers, who, without seeking nourishment, sank to the ground dead
tired. The 26th of October was the last, but also the worst of these terrible
days.” “The troops,” Schack wrote in his journal, “suffered very much in the
bivouac this night; three people froze to death.” “To all of these hardships
was added another, and by no means a small one, because it disturbed
everyone’s rest,” wrote Dr. Wenzel Krimer; “all of us, from general to
drummer, swarmed with lice. There was no question of keeping clean or
of changing our linen. Many, including myself, had nose, ears, hands, and
feet frostbitten, and in many cases these extremities had turned gangrenous
and rotted away. No wonder so many became sick and a virulent form of
typhus quickly spread. Eventually the hunger became so serious that the
poor soldiers could scarcely perform their duties. Pigeons, sparrows, jack-
daws, and ravens, which so far had served as food, were no longer available
for shooting; we were already devouring cabbage stalks, vines, and winter
corn as vegetables.”49
The Silesian Army passed the night in the positions outlined in Blücher’s
orders: Langeron’s corps at Behringen; Sacken at Großenlupnitz with
Yorck’s 2nd and 7th Brigades; Hünerbein’s division outside Eichrodt; and
Jürgaß at Kälberfeld. During the course of the 26th, Schwarzenberg’s army
proceeded westward in three columns. After detaching a siege corps at
Erfurt consisting of one Russian division and two of Kleist’s brigades as
well as his Reserve Cavalry, the right wing – which stood closest to
Blücher – reached positions between Erfurt and Gotha at dusk. Also on this
day, Bennigsen dissolved his Army of Poland. After making short marches
from Freyburg to Rastenberg on the 24th and 25th, Bennigsen received
orders to forward 12,000 men to Wintzingerode and to march to the Elbe
with his remaining 14,000.50
Napoleon himself entered Eisenach at 4:00 a.m. on the 26th; he continued
the retreat that same night. Early on 27 October the rearguard left Eichrodt
and cleared Eisenach by 8:00 a.m. Sacken’s troops entered the city later that
morning after a skirmish with Mortier’s rearguard. From Eisenach,
Gneisenau wrote to Hardenberg to assure the Prussian chancellor that the
Silesian Army would not “fall back on our laurels. Everything has been done
so that nothing more of the enemy army will exist. Blücher’s army pursues
hard on the heels of the enemy.” He also complained of the conduct of the
corps commanders: “We, the Silesian Army, have done much, but not every-
thing that has been done has been executed with determination. The generals
and their entourages scream curses on a large scale against us here in head-
quarters; but we respond with nothing against them. When we have destroyed
everything of the French that still remains on this side of the Rhine, then we
will crown the work of our diminished army, and lead it to new deeds.”51
The continued confidence and determination to destroy Napoleon that
are apparent in this letter reflected Gneisenau’s actual mood on the 27th.
Having recently received the Commander’s Cross of the Austrian Order of
Maria Theresa with a flattering letter from Metternich himself, Gneisenau
decided to celebrate. According to Stosch:
He arranged to have champagne with lunch and we all drank merrily. When
four bottles had been emptied, Gneisenau ordered more, whereupon his
secretary of financial matters, König, announced that according to the
number of guests four bottles was plenty. “Get us more,” shouted
Gneisenau. “Today is my birthday and it is truly the happiest that I have
had thus far.” We now drank heartily to his health; General Kleist, who had
just arrived, took part. The report of the birthday party spread throughout
the Schloß and soon Blücher, Rauch, Müffling, and several others came to the
party, which lasted until the evening.52
As Gneisenau’s letter states, the pursuit of the French army continued,

despite the festivities at headquarters. On 27 October, Napoleon led his
army southwest toward Fulda, where the advance guard arrived that
evening. Behind the emperor, Mortier and Oudinot struggled to follow.
Both reached the crossing over the Werra at Vacha. Bertrand’s IV Corps
took country roads to reach Tiefenort. Captured French officers informed
the Prussians that Bertrand had plunged into the foothills south of Eisenach
in an attempt to make his escape via Ruhla. To envelop Bertrand, Yorck
received orders to advance with all possible speed to the bridge over the
Werra at Barchfeld; Langeron’s corps would pursue through Marksuhl
to Vacha.
After entering Eisenach, Sacken’s infantry pursued the French in two
directions: west to Berka and southwest to Vacha. A few miles southwest of
Eisenach, the Russian detachment caught the French on the road to Vacha.
Sacken’s men captured three guns; the French blew fifteen caissons to cover
their flight. Although the detachment made contact with the retreating
enemy, Sacken recalled it, believing Langeron’s corps would assume the
pursuit to Vacha. Much to the chagrin of Yorck’s headquarters, which
grumbled that Langeron received a solid road for his march disposition
while I Corps continued its trek on a horrible country path, the Russians
failed to catch their prey. Langeron’s main body never cleared Eisenach but
his light cavalry reached Marksuhl. “Two hours from Eisenach,” claims
Droysen, “where the road steeply rises, the Russians caught up with the
enemy rearguard; their ardor waned; only Cossacks still pursued the
enemy.” Although it is an unfair assessment of the situation, Droysen, whose
research mostly depended on eyewitness testimony, accurately gauges the
sentiment at Yorck’s headquarters regarding the Russians. Following the
combat on the Hörselberg, Schack commented in his journal that Sacken’s
men did not have to bivouac. Regarding Sacken himself, the journal states:
“the illustrious comrade is not very intent on the enemy.” Despite Blücher’s
outstanding relationship with his Russian subordinates, the Prussian and
Russian corps commanders felt little love for each other.
Yorck proceeded to Barchfeld on the 27th with the task of catching

Bertrand at the Werra. Although Blücher and Gneisenau had correctly
guessed Bertrand’s march direction, Yorck did not think he could stop the
French general before he reached the road that led from Salzungen to Fulda.
Moreover, the acute fatigue of his men convinced Yorck that they could go
no further without some rest. He started the march late and then allowed the
men to cook at Eisenach: their first hot meal since the battle of Möckern
eleven days earlier. After a minor skirmish with Bertrand’s rearguard,
Jürgaß’s advance guard camped at Gumpelstadt that evening with the corps
echeloned behind it on the Barchfeld–Eisenach road. In addition to permit-
ting his men to cook, Yorck also quartered the soldiers in the surrounding
villages to spare them the hardships of the bivouac.
Squadrons from the Brandenburg Uhlan Regiment patrolled along the
Werra and south on the road to Meiningen. They returned with several
prisoners as well as the news that Bertrand had escaped. A critical
Gneisenau groused over Yorck’s dilatory march: “We, the Silesian Army,
had finally cut off Bertrand’s corps by Eisenach. He had to escape through
the Thuringian Forest. Yorck’s corps received the order to cut it off from the
Werra. Disgruntled about the continuous marches, Yorck wasted time in
curses and allegations against us at Blücher’s headquarters instead of starting
his movement. Meanwhile, Bertrand marched diagonally over the road that
Yorck should have been marching on and thus escaped.” The 2,000 prisoners
brought in by the Cossacks provided little compensation.53
The distance between the opposing forces increased on the next day, 28
October, as Blücher’s operations slowed. Silesian Army Headquarters
remained at Eisenach; Sacken likewise held his position at Berka. Yorck’s
corps made a short march to Barchfeld and Salzungen while Langeron’s
main body moved to Marksuhl and his vanguard to Vacha. Schwarzenberg
ordered Kleist to besiege Erfurt as Wittgenstein led the Bohemian Army’s
advance guard through Hersfeld to Alsfeld. Directly east of the Silesian
Army, the columns of Schwarzenberg’s army reached a line extending
between Zella and Schmalkalden. Meanwhile, the French army stretched
almost fifty miles southwest from the Werra through Fulda on the highway
to Frankfurt. Napoleon with the Guard and III Cavalry Corps reached
Schlüchtern; Macdonald led the advance guard further west to Salmünster,
Oudinot arrived at Fulda, Mortier proceeded to Buttlar, and Bertrand
crossed the Werra.54
“The number of dead bodies on the road had been considerably aug-
mented,” observed Charles Stewart, “from a resolution that had been taken
to carry off all the sick and wounded . . . several of these men were found
abandoned on the road in the last gasp of hunger and disease: the dead and
dying were frequently mixed together, lying in groups of six to eight by
half-extinguished fires on the road-side. Several of these men must have
been compelled to move on foot, as their bodies were found on the road
with the sticks with which they had endeavored to support their march
lying by their sides. The dead might have been counted by hundreds; and
in the space from Eisenach to Fulda could certainly not have amounted to
much less than a thousand.”55
On 29 and 30 October the Silesian Army continued its march to Fulda.
Langeron’s Cossacks entered the city on the evening of the 29th; the
vanguard followed the next day. “I drive the emperor Napoleon before
me every day,” Blücher boasted to his wife. “Serious combat will no longer
occur on this side of the Rhine. In seven days’ time I will be in Frankfurt or
Koblenz according to which way the enemy turns.” Conversely, Yorck’s
headquarters cursed the misfortune of once again receiving a march dis-
position that required the corps to move west along poor country paths
through the Rhön Mountains instead of on the highway assigned to the
Russians. At Hünfeld, the Prussian corps finally struck the great north–
south highway and turned left toward Fulda. Henckel provides a grim
description of the suffering of the French army: “On all of these marches
the deplorable situation of the retreating French army became all too clear.
Everywhere lay dead people and horses, broken guns, muskets, wagons of
all kinds, and discarded ammunition. We encountered large numbers of
half-starved soldiers as well as men who had become sick with typhus due
to the bitter weather. The enthusiasm of our soldiers prevailed, yet they
gave these poor people who roamed about the fields like madmen bread
and brandy. It was not worth taking them as prisoners. On the other side
of Fulda, where the curve of the highway ascended the mountain, lay many
half-burned corpses in a bivouac fire.” “Nothing could be more unpleasant
and disgusting,” recalls Müffling, “than to follow in the wake of the French
army. The whole way along the road lay corpses or dying men. The
prisoners we took had death stamped on their faces. In short, it was
impossible to contemplate sleeping on the same spot, perhaps even on
the same straw, as this fever-ridden army, which had infected the local
inhabitants along the route as well as consuming all the provisions.”
A sergeant-major of the Black Hussars adds:
Everywhere in the enemy’s abandoned camps, which we usually reached in

the early morning after he had left them, sick, dying, and dead soldiers lay
in huge numbers around a smoldering fire. Those who were still alive lay
there in torn, half-burnt coats and looked starved like skeletons. The dead
had been pushed away from the fire to make room for the living to warm
themselves. They often made use of other corpses as pillows. Whatever we
had in the way of food we threw to them, as far as it went, and each
evening we took care to save something for “the poor foreign devil who
can’t march any further.” Often we dismounted in order to comfort a dying
man with a schnapps as an extreme unction. We were always glad to get

away from the places of misery, which remained the same all the way to the
Rhine. The enemy may well have lost as many troops as a result of this
retreat as he had lost in battle.56
On 29 October, Wittgenstein moved to Eisenach while Schwarzenberg’s

main body camped in the region around Meiningen. To the north, St.-
Priest’s vanguard reached Kassel and learned that King Jerome, Napoleon’s
youngest brother, had fled his capital the previous day; a 6,000-man French
division had also withdrawn to the Netherlands. Cheering crowds greeted
St.-Priest when he entered Kassel on the 30th.
Meanwhile, Napoleon won his last victory on German soil by smashing
through Wrede’s small Austro-Bavarian army at Hanau, a few miles east of
Frankfurt, on 30 October. Unfortunately for Wrede, the French emperor
outsmarted Schwarzenberg. The Allied commander in chief believed Napo-
leon would seek to avoid Wrede by turning off the main highway that ran
southwest from Fulda through Frankfurt to Mainz and instead proceed
crosscountry due west through Wetzlar to cross the Rhine at Koblenz.
Napoleon made no such adjustment. Wrede learned of a French column
on the march to Frankfurt. According to Schwarzenberg’s estimates, this
could be nothing more than a flank column of perhaps 20,000 men to cover
Napoleon’s left as he crossed the Rhine at Koblenz. Without waiting to be
joined by 23,000 Austrians, Wrede planned to pounce on the French column
at Hanau with 43,000 men. Wrede’s failure cost him 9,000 men, and
prompted Napoleon to comment that, although he had made Wrede a count,
he had failed to make him a general.
Although the battle cost Napoleon significantly fewer men than Wrede,
the disorganization of the French army had reached deplorable levels.
Between 28 and 31 October the Allies captured as many as 10,000 stragglers.
“Troops as disorganized as those we commanded,” recalled Marmont, “as
harassed and exhausted by marching and fighting as by reverses and priva-
tions, soon surrendered to indiscipline. The impossibility of providing
enough regular distributions of rations provoked and justified their actions.
Each man’s prime concern was finding food; as all military discipline col-
lapsed, an indescribable depression and disgust took its place.” The marshal
estimates that, of the 60,000 soldiers who still remained, “20,000 formed
themselves into bands of eight or ten, scouring the countryside and march-
ing on the flanks. The army gave these soldiers a nickname, which has
become historic and recalls their sole occupation: the search for the means
to stay alive. They were called fricoteurs [marauders].” On 2 November
1813, the main body of the French army arrived at Frankfurt, less than
twenty miles from Mainz and the safety of the Rhine. Five days later, the
French army crossed the historic river.57
On the day of Hanau, 30 October, the Silesian Army, some fifty miles
northeast of Wrede, came on line around Hünfeld north of Fulda on the main
north–south highway. Because Schwarzenberg expected Napoleon to turn
northwest to avoid Wrede, he ordered Blücher to move on a parallel route
through the Vogelsberg to Gießen. Blücher agreed with Schwarzenberg’s
supposition and so ordered his two Russian corps to march toward Gießen
and Wetzlar; Yorck would pursue the French along the highway to Frank-
furt. According to Gneisenau, “the supposition was an unfortunate one.
Had Blücher followed up his march, Napoleon’s total defeat and capture
at Hanau could not, according to all human calculations, have been avoided.
But the Silesian Army changed its line of operations.” A few days later,
Blücher reconsidered the course of events and complained to a friend about
Schwarzenberg’s orders: “I pursued the French emperor continuously on the
highway and arrived daily in the quarters which he had abandoned. Had
[Schwarzenberg] allowed me to continue on this road, I would have reached
the enemy and attacked him in the rear as he was engaged with Wrede. But,
and only God knows why, I actually received the order to take my direction
from Philippstal upon Gießen; the Bohemian Army would pursue the
enemy with its vanguard. But this vanguard was two marches behind me
and arrived too late to support Wrede, and so the emperor escaped this
trap.”58
The news that Schwarzenberg planned to slow his march on the main
highway to Frankfurt as the Silesian Army struggled through the Vogelsberg
did not please Gneisenau. Already irritable from a painful case of gout, he
berated the messenger, Langenau, of the Austrian General Staff. After
venting his anger, Gneisenau turned his attention to improving the material
status of the Silesian Army by writing to Frederick William and Hardenberg.
In this correspondence, Gneisenau displayed a concern for the welfare of the
troops that would have been difficult for Yorck’s headquarters to believe.
“The uniforms of the I Army Corps, especially its Landwehr, are very bad, in
fact pitiful,” Gneisenau explained, “some still do not have uniforms . . . I have
noticed that the caps of the Landwehr are very poor; they do not completely
cover the head. I have noticed many serious head wounds in the battalions,
which were inflicted by cavalry. It is thus very important to give the Land-
wehr shakos. Although their tunics are comfortable, they nevertheless have
one disadvantage: they are not held together by a string or belt, so they expose
the abdomen to the cold air and thus cause illness.” He also informed the king
and Hardenberg that he would need additional equipment and uniforms for
the manpower he planned to conscript in Prussia’s former provinces between
the Elbe and the Weser. Gneisenau had recently received a letter from Charles
Stewart informing him that arms and uniforms for 40,000–50,000 men had
reached Stralsund. According to Stewart, Gneisenau simply had to send an
officer to Stralsund to take possession of the material. In his report to
Hardenberg, staff chief added Stewart’s pledge: “You will have everything
that is needed, I promise you, from England.”59
Meanwhile, Blücher’s headquarters and the two Russian corps reached
Gießen on 3 November. As for Yorck, he continued southwest on the
highway toward Frankfurt. After Blücher learned that Schwarzenberg
would march on Frankfurt, he ordered Yorck to reach Gießen by 3 Novem-
ber. This change, which reached Yorck on the night of 31 October, caused
more outrage at Yorck’s headquarters. To reach Gießen in three days, the
corps would have to march forty-two miles on side roads through the
Vogelsberg. It did not help matters that Blücher assigned the paved road
through Lauterbach to the Russians.60 Such apparently inconsiderate treat-
ment infuriated Yorck. “Strange assignment for the corps, which appears to
be the plaything of the strategic whims and vanities of Blücher’s General
Staff,” states one journal. “What sacrifices have been the cost of the indeci-
sion, idleness, and clumsiness of the generals! How much dear blood they
could have spared! What is glory, and how insignificant are decorations!”
Although not particularly fair to the men who were attempting to end the
war with one final blow, such statements reflect the negative image of
Blücher’s headquarters.61
The march through the Vogelsberg, described by Henckel as “terrify-
ing,” took a toll on I Corps, which did not reach Gießen until 4 November.62
“Very many cannon and wagons broke down on the awful roads and
remained where they were left;” states one journal; “of the Reserve Cavalry’s
two horse batteries, only nine guns [of sixteen] remain.” During the march
to Gießen the corps reported its lowest musters: 9,993 men remained of the
37,800 who had opened the campaign in August. Fortunately for both the
Prussians and the Russians of Blücher’s army, the field-marshal allowed the
men to rest until 7 November. Confirmed reports that Napoleon had
continued his retreat through Frankfurt to Mainz convinced Blücher to
grant this reprieve; the army as a whole had not received a day of rest since
14 October and the strain could be seen. “The successes of this Army have
not been gained without considerable losses,” wrote Lowe on 31 October.
“The Battles of Leipzig and the forced marches subsequently have occa-
sioned a diminution of nearly one-third of its force. Many of the men will of
course be recovered, but so far as I can presume to form an opinion on the
matter, it appears exceedingly desirable that this army should not only be
kept up to its former force, but considerably augmented.”63
Yorck’s corps took quarters in the beautiful and fruitful villages of the
Wetterau as far as the left bank of the Lahn, with Langeron on the right
bank, and Sacken at Wetzlar. “I have marched for fourteen days without rest
on this most abominable road,” wrote Blücher. “Today is the first day of
rest; our people particularly lack shoes and trousers but their goodwill,
among both Prussians and Russians, is steadfast. When I go among them
in the morning they greet me with joy.” Blücher’s men would need the rest,
for the Prussian commanders of the Silesian Army did not plan on remaining
idle for long.64
The reports that Blücher received at Gießen on 3 November indicated
that the French had evacuated Frankfurt and would soon cross the Rhine.
A local provided Blücher with a letter he had received from Frankfurt dated
2 November. It stated that Napoleon had established his headquarters at
Frankfurt on 1 November. The marauders that preceded him had pillaged
several houses but Napoleon’s gendarmes had established order. The
emperor departed at 3:00 p.m. that same day with the army taking a position
at the Nidda River.65 Platov’s Cossacks entered Frankfurt around 10:00 that
night and pursued the retreating French. On 5 November Blücher received
news that despite the victory at Hanau, the French army – which at most
numbered 60,000 men – teetered on the brink of collapse. “On the road, we
passed 270 dead horses and 170 human bodies,” noted Wilson, “and many
half-dead men were not included in this 170. I did not see one wounded
carcass – the whole had perished from disease and famine. Here we found a
scene of general desolation and exterminating poverty.” Such news made the
immediate invasion of France appear more urgent than ever. Blücher sought
permission to cross the Rhine. None of the reports he received indicated the
concentration of French reserves at the frontier. Spies and sympathizers
claimed that the French had failed to arm, provision, and adequately gar-
rison the fortresses on the left bank of the Rhine. Reports also indicated that
the crown prince of Sweden had reached Hanover, which led Blücher to
incorrectly conclude that Bernadotte would soon invade Holland.66
Blücher refused to allow these favorable conditions to be wasted. He and
his staff devised a bold plan to move across the middle Rhine and advance
through Aachen and Liège toward Brussels. According to the Prussian
scheme, Schwarzenberg would cross the Rhine between Mannheim and
Mainz. Paris would be the general goal of all operations. “If we quickly
set out for Holland and cross the Rhine with double strength,” predicted
Müffling on 3 November, “the conquest of Holland will be completed in
two months and a lasting peace concluded. If we remain on this side and
allow ourselves to be held up by negotiations, I thus predict a bloody
campaign in 1814. Napoleon is in the most awful situation . . . I am most
eager to see how his genius will pull him out.” Colonel Lowe urged London
to support the Silesian Army. “General Gneisenau,” he wrote to Stewart on
31 October, “has acquainted me that this army is likely to move in a
northwest direction. If so I hope to cooperate with that of the Prince Royal
toward the only object which it now seems to me can merit the appropri-
ation of a large force in that quarter viz. the liberation of Holland and the
Scheldt. Even Great Britain alone when Napoleon was engaged with Austria
dared to menace Antwerp. With how much more hope of success could the
Allied Powers now detach part of their immense force on that point and thus
at one blow cut off Holland from the French.”67
Blücher believed he could cross the Rhine on 15 November and esti-
mated reaching Brussels ten days later. “You ask what I will do now that
I am on the Rhine,” responded Blücher to a friend’s query. “And I say to
you, we will cross it, we will conquer Holland and Brabant, and we will rout
him [Napoleon] so that he must make peace. The discontent of the nation is
active and Napoleon’s reign will end. This is my belief.” On 7 November, an
optimistic Gneisenau left for Frankfurt to seek approval for the plan at
Allied Headquarters. That same day, Blücher led his army northwest toward
Cologne without authorization to cross the Rhine. Yorck and Sacken moved
upstream along the Lahn to strike the great Frankfurt–Cologne highway at
Limburg; Langeron marched on the road that ran through Siegen, where St.-
Priest’s corps would reunite with him.68
Yorck and his staff did not share the enthusiasm of their Prussian
comrades at Silesian Army Headquarters over the plan to immediately cross
the Rhine. “If one considers the condition of I Corps,” noted Schack in his
journal, “one will not doubt that this corps cannot immediately cross the
Rhine and commence the new campaign. The crossing itself would not be
difficult due to the terrible condition of the enemy, but it is obvious that the
corps would be destroyed in a short time through the increasing resistance it
would encounter by further advancing as well as by the fatigue caused by
this harsh time of year.”69 On 5 November, Yorck’s chief of staff, Zielinsky,
complained to Thile:
The survivors of the corps are in such a weakened condition because of the
extremely strenuous marches on the poorest roads that they arouse compas-
sion. All of my requests, all of my suggestions to conserve as much as
possible the precious remainder of this brave corps have gone unheeded;
what has not been struck down by enemy balls will be overcome by fatigue
if it remains under the leadership of these ingenious people, who take no
consideration of the material needs of an army and move around all of the
corps as if they are knights on a chessboard. We have seldom if ever main-
tained our order of battle: first we stand on the right wing, then on the left,
now in the middle; that the extreme fatigue of the troops is directly connected
to these brilliant moves is clear to see. If I were to provide more details
I would have to write a book, and the most reasonable complaints would
have no end.70
“Pathetic” and “absolutely pitiful” are some of the terms that have been
used to describe the state of the uniforms of I Corps. Some of Yorck’s
veteran units from the Russian Campaign still wore the uniforms they had
been issued in 1811. As testament to the impoverishment of the Prussian
state, the trousers of the Silesian Landwehr had been made with the cheapest
and thinnest cloth that could be found. This material shrank so much that
the trousers had become too short and too tight. Overcoats remained in
short supply, which forced some soldiers to clothe themselves with coats
taken from prisoners of war. The doctrine of “ten patches on one hole”
provided longer life for those lucky enough to have an overcoat. Moreover,
none of Yorck’s men had been issued warmer woolen breeches for the
winter. Providing uniforms for new effectives posed difficulties since the
convalescents arrived in civilian clothing and the replacements lacked shoes.
Gneisenau complained to his wife that the army “suffers the most acute
shortages of clothing. Many of our valiant soldiers had to wade through the
groundless roads barefooted and in linen trousers. By Eisenach we encoun-
tered such cold weather that many of our people froze to death.” Despite the
attempts of Yorck’s officers to commandeer used and new shoes from almost
every city and village between the Saale and the Rhine, the shortage of shoes
and boots persisted. In a stroke of luck, Yorck’s staff finally managed to
secure a double supply of shoes for the infantry: a prize worth its weight in
gold because the shoes issued by the Prussian army were notoriously
wretched.71
Manpower, however, provided Yorck’s strongest argument. Currently,
the Silesian Army numbered only 36,000 men. Yorck’s I Corps ended the
German Campaign of 1813 with 11,515 men. In three months of campaign-
ing, it had lost 26,432 men, including 2,217 killed, 10,127 wounded, and
4,143 missing or captured. The majority of the other 9,945 men remained
behind in the hospitals: sick and exhausted from malnourishment and over-
exertion. Losses among Yorck’s Landwehr units greatly surpassed those of
the Line. On 14 August, I Corps mustered twenty-four Landwehr battal-
ions; by 17 October, the day after the bloody fighting at Möckern, only
seven weak militia battalions remained. Of the 13,369 soldiers of the Land-
wehr infantry attached to Yorck’s corps in August, only 2,164 reached the
Rhine. Grueling marches, inadequate supply, and the harshness of bivouack-
ing accounted for the high rate of attrition among the militia. As neither
replacements nor convalescents would be able to catch up with the army if it
continued to advance, strategic consumption, battlefield casualties, and ill-
ness would further reduce Blücher’s combat power. Yorck did not believe
Blücher could or should begin a winter campaign in the midst of French-
controlled fortresses with an army that badly needed extensive refurbishing
and rest. One day after Blücher commenced his march to the Rhine, Yorck
wrote to Knesebeck, recounting the terrible state of the corps and advising
against an invasion of France; Yorck’s protest did not fall on deaf ears.72
Not only did Yorck vehemently disagree with Blücher and Gneisenau
about continuing the advance, but during these days another affair surfaced
to widen the rift between the Prussians. Yorck’s headquarters complained
about the account of the battle of Möckern published in the Ninth Bulletin
of the Silesian Army. The emphasis on the role of Langeron’s Russian corps
appeared to minimize the Prussian achievement, causing Yorck’s officers to
view the report as a “malicious” distortion of the facts. Moreover, the
Prussians claimed that the portrayal of Vasilchikov’s cavalry attack on the
morning of the 17th as “the most beautiful and boldest of the entire war”
completely eclipsed the events at Möckern. To make matters worse, Profes-
sor Steffens made a speech at the University of Gießen before a large
audience. With some of Yorck’s officers in attendance, Steffens repeated
the same version of the battle of Möckern published in the bulletin. “One
knew well,” explains Droysen, “that in these things Blücher was blameless;
instead, one believed Gneisenau and Müffling and their aversion for Yorck
had to be at fault. That Yorck’s suggestions for promotions and decorations
were usually ignored was attributed to their influence.”73
After the Berlin newspapers refused to publish an anonymous account of
Möckern submitted by Schack, Zielinsky sought to set the record straight.
Although it is not known if Yorck authorized him to do so, Zielinsky
complained to Thile. Zielinsky’s letter of 5 November criticized the Ninth
Army Bulletin for diminishing the role of I Corps and leading the public to
believe that Langeron’s Russians had done everything or at least as much as
Yorck’s men. Zielinsky adamantly stated that the officers who survived the
battle, the general, and the entire corps felt deeply sickened “that not once
has someone told our countrymen, for whose welfare so many fell and so
many had spilled their blood, what the troops had achieved, and that one
attributed to the Army of Silesia what Yorck’s corps had accomplished alone
without the cooperation of any other man or any other unit.” Zielinsky
expressed his hope that the world would soon learn the truth. “Since the
army report was issued in the name of His Majesty the King,” he concluded,
“General Yorck himself cannot dispute it without having to issue a formal
complaint against the field-marshal, which he will never do. However, since
I know that Colonel Müffling is the author of this report, I request on behalf
of the entire I Army Corps that you report this injustice suffered by General
Yorck and his army corps, to His Majesty the King.”74 Although Thile’s
response is not known, the real importance of this episode is that the distrust
and resentment between Blücher’s and Yorck’s headquarters continued and
would contribute to some of the darkest days for the Silesian Army during
the campaign in France.
Returning to Schwarzenberg, after receiving reports that Napoleon
had not changed course to reach Koblenz, but instead remained on the
direct road through Frankfurt and Mainz to the Rhine, he ordered the
Bohemian Army to take the same road. However, cold weather and
supply shortages further slowed the march of Schwarzenberg’s usually
torpid army. On 6 November, Bubna’s advance guard relieved the for-
ward troops of Wrede’s Austro-Bavarian Army and made contact with
Bertrand’s corps, which stood at Hochheim, just east of Mainz. Schwar-

zenberg ordered Gyulay’s corps to attack the French position on the 9th.
A spirited assault forced Bertrand to withdraw from Hochheim after
losing 30 officers, 1,500 men, 4 guns, and 1 Eagle. In the aftermath,
Napoleon’s last units crossed the Rhine and only maintained positions
on the right bank at Wesel and the bridgeheads at Kastel and Kehl, facing
Mainz and Strasbourg respectively.
While Bubna’s division blockaded Kastel, the Bohemian Army moved
into extensive cantonments. Schwarzenberg’s headquarters also issued new
instructions for the distribution of the various Allied armies: the Bohemian
Army moved into cantonments on the upper and middle Rhine, the Silesian
Army on the middle Rhine from the Main to the Lahn, and the Army of
North Germany on the lower Rhine. Austrian troops occupied the Grand
Duchy of Baden and a part of Württemberg; the Russians were assigned the
Grand Duchies of Frankfurt and Hesse-Darmstadt as well as the remaining
districts of Württemberg.75
While en route to the lower Rhine, Blücher received explicit orders from
Tsar Alexander to turn around and besiege Mainz. These instructions
reached the field-marshal on 11 November at Altenkirchen, thirty-five miles
southeast of Cologne. Gneisenau’s mission had failed. On the following day
the Silesian Army reversed its march. On 14 November 1813, Yorck’s corps
marched through the Rheingaugebirge to Wiesbaden in the Duchy of
Nassau. From a height on the Taunus Mountains, the Prussians caught a
glimpse of the flashing Rhine and greeted it with a loud cheer. A sergeant-
major of the Black Hussars whose Jäger squadron had orders to reconnoiter
the river bank, left this account: “We rode at full speed crosscountry, down
wooded slopes, through vineyards, and greeted the German – or soon to be
freed from foreign yoke – Rhine with repeated cheers. We dismounted and
with our hands scooped up the holy water or else lay full length and drank
it.”76 The Prussians had reached the Rhine, but they would have to wait
another six weeks before crossing the historic river.
By early November, the question that divided the Coalition and caused a
rift among the volatile Prussians themselves was whether the Allies should
cross the Rhine and pursue Napoleon’s weak army. The exhausted state of
Yorck’s corps offered compelling evidence that proved the Allies needed to
halt at the Rhine. For this reason, Yorck became a persistent opponent of his
countrymen’s plan to cross the river without delay. Yorck protested against
the immediate continuation of the pursuit out of concern for his troops.
Although this was justifiable, Blücher and Gneisenau, as the leadership of
the army, had to overlook the considerations of a corps commander.
Müffling’s prediction that delay would result in a bloody campaign in
1814 adequately summarizes the thought process behind Blücher’s and
Gneisenau’s planning. By immediately resuming the campaign, they were
prepared to accept further losses and to impose further hardships on their

men. The reason was not callous indifference, as Yorck implied, nor blood-
thirsty revenge as the Austrians suggested, but the simple belief that by
exploiting Napoleon’s current weakness the war would end sooner and with
less loss than if they allowed the master of war to reorganize.
The operations of the Silesian and Bohemian Armies halted in November
for both practical and political reasons. Allied physical and material exhaus-
tion required reorganization and rest. Revitalizing on the march in the midst
of winter did not promise success. Nevertheless, Blücher’s plan to march to
Belgium in early November could probably have succeeded without much
detriment to his men. French forces were in no condition to resist, and the
march route of the Silesian Army would have avoided the departments of
“Old France,” where trouble with the local population posed a threat to
rear-area security. On reaching Belgium, Blücher would have facilitated
Bülow’s invasion of Holland and enabled the Prussian III Corps to unite
with the Silesian Army by the end of 1813. Wintzingerode as well might
have been spirited across the Rhine. Without having to detach Langeron’s
corps at Mainz and with Bülow and possibly Wintzingerode, Blücher could
have launched an invasion of Old France from Belgium with an army of
125,000 men. Even considering strategic consumption, this figure still would
have been triple the size of the Silesian Army that reached the Aube River in
late January. Moreover, such an operation would have occurred one full
month before the Silesian Army actually crossed the middle Rhine. The
distance between Mainz and Paris was double the stretch that separated the
French capital from Belgium’s southern border. With the Silesian Army
much closer to Paris and with the mobilization of the French army still in
its infant stages, Blücher may well have reached Paris in January. Like
Napoleon, Blücher and Gneisenau still measured victory in terms of military
success alone. For this reason they wanted to lead the Silesian Army across
the Rhine at the first opportunity and make for the heart of France. Instead
of pursuing Napoleon’s defeated army, the Allies lost precious time in long
deliberations and councils of war in Frankfurt. Rather than achieving a
quick, decisive end to the conflict in 1813, the war was prolonged, another
campaign was fought, and tens of thousands of lives were lost in 1814.
Notes
1 Gneisenau to Caroline, 19 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneise-
nau, Nr. 21.
2 Quoted in Balfour, The Life of George, I:125; Blücher to Amalie, 20 October 1813,
Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 188. Gneisenau’s own estimates of the spoils vary. On
the 19th, his letter to Clausewitz states that “more than 50 guns and 500 caissons
fell into our hands.” That same day, he placed the number of guns at 60 in a letter
to the military governor of Berlin, General Anton Wilhelm von L’Estocq. Two
days later he informed his wife that more than 200 guns, 800 caissons, and 30,000
muskets were captured. Finally, in a letter to Clausewitz’s wife on the 24th, he
amended his totals to more than 200 guns, 600–700 caissons, and as many as 60,000
muskets. Gneisenau’s letters to the above are in GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nrs. 20b and 21.
5 Wilson, Private Diary, II:186; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:240; Pertz and
6 Gneisenau to Clausewitz, 19 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
8 Blücher to Yorck, 19 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau,
Nr. 18; Droysen, Yorck, II:234; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:237.
9 “Journal of the Reserve Cavalry of I Corps” and “Report of the Battles and
Combats of the Reserve Cavalry of I Corps,” 26 November 1813, in Henckel von
Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 517, 532; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:237.
The Reserve Cavalry now consisted of 1st West Prussian and Lithuanian Drag-
oon Regiments, the East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment, the Saxon Uhlan
Regiment, the Saxon Hussar Regiment, and Horse Battery Nr. 1.
10 Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 378, 380.
11 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:239; Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerun-
gen, 231; Droysen, Yorck, II:234–35.
12 “Journal of 1st West Prussian Dragoon Regiment,” “Journal of the Reserve
Cavalry of I Corps,” and “Report of the Battles and Combats of the Reserve
Cavalry of I Corps,” 26 November 1813, in Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erin-
nerungen, 500, 517, 533; Droysen, Yorck, II:235; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
III:242–43.
14 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:241–42; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau,
III:493.
15 CN, No. 20819, XXVI:369.
16 CN, Nos. 20820 and 20821, XXVI:370–71.
17 The new advance guard consisted of four Line and two Landwehr battalions;
three Jäger companies; the Austrian 2nd Jäger Battalion; eight squadrons of
Prussian hussars, four squadrons of Saxon uhlans; and one battery each of horse
and foot artillery. See Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 232; “Journal
of the Advance Guard Formed After the Battle of Leipzig and Commanded by
Col. Count Henckel,” in Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 547–48;
Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:493; Droysen, Yorck, II:236; Friederich,
18 Henckel to Yorck, “Report of the Advance Guard on 21 October and Its Com-
bats,” in Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 549.
19 Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 233; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau,

III:493–94; Droysen, Yorck, II:236. No mention is made in any of these accounts
of disciplinary action against the Saxon regiment.
20 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:248–49; Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erin-
nerungen, 234; Droysen, Yorck, II:236.
22 Brett-James, Europe Against Napoleon, 258–60; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
III:247–48. Two miles west of Freyburg, Zscheiplitz was a large agricultural estate
with a village that contained the Zettenbach Mill, where the second bridge over
the Unstrut stood.
23 The account of the French retreat through Freyburg on 21 October was taken
from the testimony of three eyewitnesses reproduced in Brett-James, Europe
Against Napoleon, 258–61.
24 Brett-James, Europe Against Napoleon, 259.
25 On the previous evening, Yorck had transferred the Silesian Uhlan Regiment to
Henckel’s vanguard and attached the East Prussian National Cavalry Regiment to
Horn’s division. En route to Markröhlitz, Jürgaß left posts facing
Reichardtswerben, with the Brandenburg Uhlan Regiment in Roßbach for their
support. Patrols also observed the Weißenfels–Freyburg road.
26 Accounts of the combat of Freyburg and the operations of Yorck’s corps on
21 October were drawn from Henckel, Erinnerungen, 236–37, as well as the
following documents that are reproduced in full in Henckel’s memoirs: “Journal
of the Lithuanian Dragoon Regiment,” 451; “Report of the Battles and Combats
of the Reserve Cavalry of I Corps,” 26 November 1813, 534; “Journal of 1st West
Prussian Dragoon Regiment,” 500; and “Report of the Advance Guard on
21 October and Its Combats,” 550–51; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
III:248–52.
27 Late on the day of 21 October, Blücher issued a three-day disposition covering
21, 22, and 23 October: Disposition, Weißenfels, 3:30 p.m., 21 October 1813, RA
KrA, volym 25; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 103; Gneisenau to Caroline, Weißenfels,
21 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau. Gneisenau claims
that the French “had about 6,000 cavalry facing us and just as much infantry.”
28 Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 104; Gneisenau to Münster, Weißenfels, 21 October
1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 20b.
29 Disposition for 22 October, Add MSS, 20112, 171; Müffling, Die Feldzüge,
104–05.
32 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:252; “Report of the Advance Guard on
21 October and Its Combats,” in Henckel von Donnersmarck,
Erinnerungen, 551.
33 Quoted in Henderson, Blücher, 189. According to Blücher’s Nachlaß, the pro-
motion was dated 16 October 1813: GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Blücher von
Wahlstatt; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 103.
34 Gneisenau to Münster, Weißenfels, 21 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92
Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 20b; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:255.
35 Blücher to Amalie, 25 October 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 189; Gneisenau
to Marie von Clausewitz, 24 October 1813, and to Clausewitz, 22 October 1813,
GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
37 Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Naumburg, 22 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 168.
39 Droysen, Yorck, II:238; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:497–98; Friederich,
Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:257–58.
40 Quoted in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:497; Henckel von Donnersmarck,
Erinnerungen, 236; Disposition for 24 October, Add MSS, 20112, 172.
41 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:238–39; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813,
III:258–61; Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 236–37.
43 Quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:239; Disposition for 25 October, Add MSS, 20112,
173; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:261–62.
44 Gneisenau to Siegling, 26 October 1813, quoted in Pertz and Delbrück, Gneise-
nau, III:498; Stewart, Narrative, 193.
45 Disposition for 26 October, Add MSS, 20112, 176; Henckel von Donnersmarck,
Erinnerungen, 236–37; Fane (Lord Burghersh), Memoir, 35; Friederich, Herbst-
feldzug 1813, III:263.
46 Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 237; “Report of the Battles and
Combats of the Reserve Cavalry of I Corps,” ibid., 535.
47 “The ground had become so muddy because of the weather,” states Jürgaß’s
report, “that it was hardly possible to execute a rapid movement”: “Report of
the Battles and Combats of the Reserve Cavalry of I Corps,” Henckel von
Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 535.
48 Sources for 26 October: Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Gangloffsömmern, 25 Octo-
ber 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1537, 114; “Journal of 1st West Prussian Dragoon
Regiment,” Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 501; Friederich, Herbst-
feldzug 1813, III:264–65; Stewart, Narrative, 193; Yorck’s report is quoted in
Droysen, Yorck, II:240–41.
49 Stewart, Narrative, 186–87; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:265–66; Schack’s
journal entry is quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:241; Krimer’s passage is in Brett-
James, Europe Against Napoleon, 278–79.
50 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Eisenach, 8:00 a.m., 27 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA
1537, 636, and Add MSS, 20112, 174–75.
51 Gneisenau to Hardenberg, 28 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 20b.
53 Sources for 27 October: Disposition for 27 October, Add MSS, 20112, 177;
Gneisenau to Münster, 3 November 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gnei-
senau, Nr. 20b; Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Eisenach, 27 October 1813, ÖStA KA,
FA 1537, 636; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:266–67; Droysen, Yorck,
II:241–42; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau, III:501–02; Müffling, Die Feldzüge,
107–08. “Journal of the Lithuanian Dragoon Regiment,” “Journal of the Reserve
Cavalry of I Corps,” and “Report of the Battles and Combats of the Reserve
Cavalry of I Corps,” 26 November 1813, in Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erin-

nerungen, 452, 518, 535.
54 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Philipsthal, 7:00 p.m., 29 October 1813, ÖStA KA,
FA 1537, 696, and RA KrA, volym 25.
55 Stewart, Narrative, 190.
56 Sources for 29 and 30 October: Disposition for 29 October, Add MSS, 20112, 178;
Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Philipsthal, 7:00 p.m., 29 October 1813, ÖStA KA,
FA 1537, 696 and RA KrA, volym 25; Blücher to Amalie, 30 October 1813,
Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 189; Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 238;
Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 109; the hussar’s report is in Brett-James, Europe Against
Napoleon, 277–78.
57 Marmont, Mémoires, V:302–03; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 938.
58 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Hünfeld, 6:00 p.m., 30 October 1813, and from Fulda,
31 October 1813, ÖStA KA, FA 1537, 716, 732; Blücher to Amalie, 3 November
1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 190; Gneisenau, Blücher, 271. In his published
account of Blücher’s operations, Gneisenau makes no mention of Schwarzenberg
but instead holds Blücher responsible for the army’s change in direction: “The
Bavarian army, under General Count Wrede was known to be on the march to
Hanau to intercept the French army; Marshal Blücher drew a very natural
conclusion that in all probability Napoleon would direct the course of his
columns to cross the Rhine at Koblenz rather than throw himself, weak as he
was, into Wrede’s arms.” Blücher himself simply wrote that, “had not a great
mistake been made, he [Napoleon] and all of his army would have been cap-
tured”: Blücher to Bonin, 3 November 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 191.
59 Schwarzenberg to Blücher, Hünfeld, 7:00 a.m., 1 November 1813, Add MSS,
20112, 21–22; Gneisenau to Hardenberg, 31 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA
Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 20b; Gneisenau to Frederick William, 31 October
1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 16.
60 Despite the belief held by Yorck’s headquarters, Langeron’s march was not easy
and the Russians lost 400 horses on the mountain tracks.
61 Disposition for 31 October, 1, 2, and 3 November, Fulda, 31 October 1813, Add
MSS, 20112, 181–83; Blücher to Yorck, 31 October 1813, Add MSS, 20112, 179;
the journal is quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:242.
62 Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 239. According to the regimental
journals reprinted in this work, the actual change in the march direction did not
come until 2 November for the vanguard, which proceeded on the same highway
to Frankfurt on 1 November, reaching Salmünster.
63 Lowe to Stewart, Fulda, 31 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 198.
64 Henckel von Donnersmarck, Erinnerungen, 243; GStA PK, IV Rep. 15 A Nr. 274;
Blücher to Bonin, 4 November 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 191–92.
65 The Nidda is a right tributary of the Main River that springs from the Vogelsberg
on the Taufstein mountain range and joins the Main near Frankfurt.
66 Lowe to Stewart, Gießen, 3 November 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 204; Wilson,
Private Diary, II:212. According to Thiers in History of the Consulate and the
Empire, IX:294, “places indispensable to our home protection, Huningue,
Strasbourg, Landau, Mainz, Metz, Mézières, Valenciennes, Lille, were left utterly
defenseless. The guns were not mounted; there was a lack of tools, of wood for
blinds, of bridges of communication between the works, of horses for transport,
of smiths and carpenters. The artillery and engineer officers who had remained in
the interior of the country were nearly all old men, unfit to support the fatigues of
a siege. Provisions had not yet begun to arrive, and money, which can supply so
many wants, was not forthcoming, and it was doubtful whether it could be sent in
time and in sufficient quantities.”
67 Blücher to Frederick William, 3 November 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 16; Müffling, Die Feldzüge, 111; Müffling is quoted in Droysen,
Yorck, II:246, emphasis added; Lowe to Stewart, Erfurt, 31 October 1813, Add
MSS, 20111, 198–99.
68 Blücher to Bonin, 4 November 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 192.
70 Zielinsky to Thile, 5 November 1813, quoted in Droysen, Yorck, II:245.
71 Gneisenau to Caroline, 11 November 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
72 Janson, Feldzuges 1814, I:15; Damitz, Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1814, I:22;
Craig, “Problems of Coalition Warfare,” 33.
75 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:310–12; Pertz and Delbrück, Gneisenau,
III:524.
76 Quoted in Brett-James, Europe Against Napoleon, 292–93.
Assessment
Austria’s declaration against France, on 12 August 1813, changed the

dynamics of the war by transferring the Coalition’s center of gravity from
Russia to Austria. Aside from liberating the garrisons of the Vistula fort-
resses and perhaps rallying the Poles, the appearance of an imperial army and
even Napoleon himself on the banks of the Vistula would not have had the
same impact on the Allies in the Fall Campaign as during the Spring
Campaign. Russian lines of communication could be rerouted through
Austria. The provinces of the Prussian heartland would have been lost but
the bulk of the Prussian regular army – I and II Corps and the Guard –
would not have been affected. In fact, the main challenge for the Allies
would not have been Napoleon’s presence at the Vistula, but navigating
the shock waves caused by the loss of the Army of North Germany, which
had to be eliminated or driven into the Oder fortresses before any French
force could reach the Vistula. Napoleon recognized that Austria’s accession
to the Coalition rendered unconditional victory through eccentric maneu-
vering unlikely. Instead, he had to defeat the Austrians, which meant
decisively crushing the Bohemian Army. To accomplish this task, he planned
to utilize his central position and operate from his base at Dresden.
Austria had certainly come a long way since the French emperor’s
1809 proclamation that “the House of Lorraine has ceased to exist,” in large
part thanks to Napoleon’s intransigence. Metternich’s usurpation of the
Coalition’s diplomatic and military leadership provided by far the most
decisive development of the armistice. In the former category, Metternich
seized the reins of the Coalition. While a worthy adversary in his own right,
Tsar Alexander simply could not outmaneuver Metternich in the ensuing
diplomatic chess match for control of the Coalition. Determined to conduct
a cabinet war for the equilibrium of Europe rather than a people’s war of
liberation, Metternich resolved to direct the struggle so that any peace would
804
Assessment 805
serve Austrian national security objectives. Emerging as the Coalition’s

prime minister, he aimed to wage war to restore Habsburg preponderance
over Central Europe while limiting Prussian and Russian gains. Napoleon’s
fate became a secondary concern; Metternich did not aspire to remove
Bonaparte from the French throne, believing that only a strong Napoleonic
France could counter Russia.
A coalition consisting of Austria, Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, and
Sweden bound together by a single treaty of alliance pledging each member
to fight for specific objectives for European peace did not exist.1 In fact,
much of the War of the Sixth Coalition would be fought despite the absence
of such a declaration, which did not come into existence until March 1814.
Instead, the decisive Fall Campaign of 1813 began with the Allies held
together by flimsy bilateral pacts and subsidy agreements. Only the ominous
realization that the present moment offered the best opportunity to break
French hegemony in Central Europe bound them. Another failure at the
hands of Napoleon could not be fathomed, for it would truly usher in the
unknown. Dominic Lieven maintains that, had Napoleon won the initial
battles of the Fall Campaign, “it is possible that the rifts would have
reopened between the Allies, and Austria would have resumed negotiations
with Napoleon. That the Allies won these initial battles at Großbeeren, the
Katzbach, and Dennewitz can be attributed only to Prussian leadership.”2
Prussia’s contribution exceeded all expectations. Numbering approxi-
mately 75,000 men at the end of the Spring Campaign, the Prussian field army
increased to 193,000 men during the armistice. In total, the Prussians placed
over 235,000 men under arms, quite an accomplishment for the state’s five
million inhabitants. By comparison, the Russians fielded 175,000 men and the
Austrian army operating from Bohemia numbered around 150,000 soldiers. In
terms of combat power, Prussia had risen from the position of Russia’s auxil-
iary to an independent power in its own right. Anxious to exert this power, the
Prussian generals would discover to their great disappointment that 250,000
men under arms did little to change Prussia’s junior status in the Coalition.3
When Schwarzenberg remained outside the range in which Napoleon
could strike the Bohemian Army and still guard Dresden, the emperor
turned against the closest Allied force: the Silesian Army. Blücher,
Gneisenau, and their staff certainly made mistakes in the Fall Campaign
but we should bear in mind that, unlike the French, the Prussians had not
waged war since 1807. Moreover, Blücher, the hussar general, had never
commanded an army, nor had Gneisenau ever managed a large field force,
nor had Müffling reached the mastery of drafting orders that later distin-
guished his work. Inadequate information, incorrect reports, and the count-
less contingencies of war made mistakes unavoidable. Despite the
deficiencies associated with human nature, the leadership of this army laid
the groundwork for the guiding principles that fundamentally helped
destroy Napoleon’s empire: the ruthless application of all force to a single

objective, the interplay of the individual arms, the strategic utilization of the
cavalry, the exploitation of the victory through pursuit. According to
Friederich:
These principles led our armies to victory in the later wars of the nineteenth
century and are recognizable in our contemporary service regulations. If still
greater results were not achieved, the cause was that the hands of the
commanders of the Silesian Army many times were tied by the organization
of the army, the spirit of the contemporary regulations, the education of the
senior and junior officers, and the lack of combat experience of the troops.
The spirit of linear tactics, in which all senior officers of the Prussian and
Russian armies were trained, still wrestled with that of the new warfare of the
French, and this spiritual struggle took place in many areas; for example, in
the use of the cavalry, this even led to obvious regressions to Frederician
times. Yet, the development of a new way of war is not difficult to recognize,
a way of war, which at a given moment knows to deviate from the confines of
the traditional system and which places the substance of the matter above the
form. The birthplace of this new warfare lies in the struggles of the Silesian
Army, whose thorough study will thus prove useful for all times.4
After moving across the neutral zone prior to the expiration of the
summer armistice, Blücher’s Silesian Army remained in constant contact with
the imperials throughout August. Almost every day some part of his army
engaged the enemy. Blücher’s four army corps each consisted of a vanguard,
main body, and rearguard, all of which received orders from the corps
commander and usually reported to him. As we have seen, on occasion
Blücher and Gneisenau engaged in direct communication with units and
detachments, but the flow of communication usually followed the chain of
command that ran through corps headquarters. Although the moments of
interference by Blücher’s staff probably irked Yorck and Langeron, the
system operated suitably, especially when the army closed on a fixed point.
Yet rarely between 15 and 26 August did the Silesian Army make for a fixed
point. Instead, Blücher did his best to maintain contact with a large enemy
army that operated on three main arteries along a broad front. To comply
with the assignment he had accepted at Reichenbach on the eve of the war’s
continuation, he had to maintain contact with the enemy at all times.
Consequently, the breadth of the front required him to keep his entire army
within one march of his adversary to be able to execute optimal maneuvers
with the greatest force possible. Complying with this unique task created
problems. Blücher had to quickly change from one objective to the complete
opposite: a decided attack had to be transformed into an immediate retreat
based on his adversary’s conduct. This imposed tremendous hardships and
strains on the entire army in the form of marches and countermarches.
Assessment 807
Whether Langeron served as a Russian mole in the Silesian Army pur-

portedly to keep Blücher in check will never be known for sure. Certainly,
Blücher did not enjoy the full support of all influential persons at Russo-
Prussian Headquarters. His refusal on multiple occasions to comply with
directives from Allied Headquarters indicates that the Sixth Coalition
suffered from some of the same problems that had led to the destruction
of the five previous anti-French alliances. Yet Alexander and Frederick
William had thought enough of Blücher to place a fairly substantial army
under his command albeit within strict operating parameters. Even in this,
we have to question their judgment, for Blücher’s reputation should not have
led any to think that he would ape the warfare of Quintus Fabius Maximus.
But, to the surprise of all, he did just that, retreating before Napoleon’s
onslaught on no fewer than four occasions. Each retreat can be completely
justified as Napoleon – the master of central position, interior lines, mass,
and speed – outnumbered Blücher on every occasion. Moreover, rather than
merely conceding the field to Napoleon, the first two retreats required rapid
withdrawals under extremely adverse conditions that lasted for days. In the
third retreat, a veritable coup de théâtre, Blücher led his Army of Silesia
120 miles down the Elbe to cross the river and link with the Army of North
Germany in early October. With both the Silesian and North German
Armies on the left bank of the Elbe, the emperor launched a secret offensive
against Blücher. Just barely escaping Napoleon’s trap, Blücher retreated a
fourth time, dragging the Army of North Germany with him across the
Saale River. The significance of this maneuver – bearing the stamp of the
unorthodox – cannot be overstated: while the combined Allied armies
advanced toward Napoleon’s communications, they exposed their own and
opened the roads to Brandenburg and Silesia. More importantly, the maneu-
ver on the Saale – a retreat forward – created the conditions that encouraged
Schwarzenberg to seek a decisive battle with Napoleon at Leipzig. Had
Blücher followed Bernadotte’s demand to retreat across the Elbe,
Schwarzenberg would have been forced to confront Napoleon on the plains
of Saxony or return to Bohemia.
After the victory at the Katzbach, Blücher’s constant pressure prevented
Macdonald from rallying his army at the Bober, the Queis, or the Neiße
Rivers. By driving the marshal to Bautzen, Blücher completely disrupted
Napoleon’s timetable and planning, costing the emperor an entire week of
indecision. From 31 August to 3 September, Napoleon sat at Dresden
uncertain if he should personally lead the Berlin offensive or secure Macdo-
nald in the face of Blücher’s constant pressure. Forced to stop the Army of
the Bober from retreating across the Spree, Napoleon transferred his VI
Corps and I Cavalry Corps from the Bohemian front to Bautzen, to where
he proceeded with his Guard on 4 September 1813. Hoping to quickly
engage Blücher and destroy his army, Napoleon lunged but missed. Again
proving that going backward could be just as beneficial as going forward,

Blücher retreated across the Neiße to the Queis. Owing to Blücher’s pres-
sure, Macdonald’s retreat prevented Napoleon from taking personal com-
mand of the Berlin offensive from 31 August to 3 September. Then,
Napoleon’s pursuit of the Silesian Army cost the emperor another three
days and culminated with his returning to Dresden rather than marching on
Berlin. Thus, Napoleon squandered an entire week contending with the
difficulties caused by Blücher.
Blücher’s army paid for its success in Silesia with the loss of some 22,000
men. Including St.-Priest’s corps, the Silesian Army numbered 81,000 men on
1 September. Since the end of the armistice on 10 August, Langeron’s corps
had lost more than 6,000 men while Sacken’s losses amounted to a manage-
able 2,000.5 On the other hand, eighteen days of campaigning had reduced
Yorck’s corps from 39,243 combatants on 11 August to 24,517 men on 31
August, with the Landwehr suffering out of proportion compared to the
Line.6 At the start of the campaign, Yorck’s militia contained 13,370 men.
After the loss of 7,092 men, only 6,278 mustered on 1 September. Conversely,
his Line units lost 4,040 soldiers, dropping from 16,747 men to 12,707
combatants. Army Headquarters viewed desertion as the major cause of
attrition. This induced the king to issue a cabinet order on 31 August to
implement the Articles of War in Upper Silesia because this province “distin-
guishes itself so poorly through deficiency of devotion to the Fatherland.”7
One week later, Blücher’s headquarters issued orders on 7 September author-
izing physical punishment, mainly for the militia. An entry in Schack’s
journal captures the disgust in Yorck’s headquarters over this measure that
called for “tired Landwehr men to be refreshed with thirty lashes.”
According to Droysen, Blücher supposedly enacted “other, more abusive
measures.” By mining the official journal of I Corps, Droysen reached the
conclusion that the “discipline” of the Landwehr improved substantially
“after one had clothed their nakedness and satisfied their hunger.” In fact,
he claims that the journal itself stated that “the continued forced marches and
the poor food must be recognized as valid, main causes for the weakness of
the men.” As they had not received reinforcements, the fact that Yorck’s
Landwehr rolls increased from 6,278 men to 8,540 by 14 September indicates
that more than 2,000 men returned after recuperating in their nearby homes.8
Leaving Silesia behind him, Blücher executed the most crucial and con-
sequential operation of the entire Fall Campaign. By marching down the
Elbe and crossing the river at Wartenburg, he set the stage for the monu-
mental struggle at Leipzig less than two weeks later. As Hudson Lowe
concluded:
The bold and decisive movement of the Army of Silesia, which had fought its
way from the remotest corners of that province and by a series of the most
Assessment 809
splendid victories had driven the enemy back under the walls of Dresden, and
which now crossed the Elbe and abandoned the bridge that had served for its
passage, infused fresh vigour into the councils of the Allied generals, discon-
certed all the schemes and projects of the enemy, and rendered a series of
active operations on both sides immediately necessary. The degree to which
the enemy was disconcerted may be best inferred from his own relation,
which states the departure of Napoleon from Dresden on 7 October, imme-
diately after the Army of Silesia had crossed the Elbe, and the series of vague,
perplexed, and uncertain movements which followed between that day and
the 15th.
Stewart makes similar remarks in his Narrative: “The bold and offensive
system now so gallantly commenced by General Blücher, gave a new tone to
the operations of the Allies. The glorious career of the Silesian Army, daily
engaged in action since the opening of the campaign, and hourly covering
itself with laurels, merits the historian’s loftiest eulogy: it stood preeminent
in the advance [to] the next foe, with its venerable and gallant leader eagerly
availing himself of every opportunity to augment his heroic reputation,
rescue his country, and avenge her sufferings.”9
Well planned and conducted, Blücher’s bold campaign represents one of
the best examples of operational planning to that point in military history.
Army Headquarters kept its intentions so secret that the orders for the army
to implement the plan came as a complete surprise. A mass of Streifkorps
masked the army’s departure from the Bautzen area. Napoleon himself did
not become aware of Blücher’s disappearance until 4 October.10 Initially,
Shcherbatov’s corps covered the left flank against an attack from Dresden.
Later during the operation, Sacken’s corps guarded against a strike through
Meißen. Sacken’s demonstrations at Mühlberg also distracted the imperials.
Had Ney’s attention not been attracted to Wartenburg by the Army of
North Germany, the Silesian Army could have executed the crossing with-
out losing one man.11
For his part, Schwarzenberg decided to advance on Leipzig rather than
attempt another offensive against Dresden: the Army of Bohemia began the
march north on 1 October. By no means did he make haste after his army
reached the Saxon plain. Despite the encouraging reports of Napoleon’s
absence and the retreat of Murat’s small army, the Army of Bohemia
advanced very cautiously, almost timidly. Robert Wilson attributed
Schwarzenberg’s inertia to an intercepted letter from Murat to his wife,
Napoleon’s sister Caroline, dated the 8th. “The Allies appear to have aban-
doned their strong position in Bohemia and have moved onto the plain,”
wrote the king of Naples; “this is what Napoleon has long wished for.”12
Apparently, the fear of walking into a well-laid trap froze Schwarzenberg
and Alexander until news arrived on 13 October that completely changed
the situation. On that day, Blücher’s adjutant delivered the general’s
11 October letter stating that the Silesian Army had not retreated across the
Elbe, as Allied Headquarters had secretly feared, but instead stood at Halle
with the Army of North Germany not far behind. Moreover, Blücher
explained that Napoleon faced both Allied armies with his main force. The
concluding sentence of his report – that “the three armies are now so close
that a simultaneous attack against the point where the enemy has concen-
trated his forces can take place” – changed not just the situation, but the
course of the war by making the battle of Leipzig possible.
Lieven maintains that, “however great Blücher’s victories were, in the
end the fate of the campaign would rest above all on the performance of the
main Allied army, in other words Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia. It
contained many more troops than the armies of Bernadotte and Blücher
combined. Only the Army of Bohemia could hope to confront and defeat
Napoleon himself.” The numerical strength of the Bohemian Army certainly
validates this assertion but the Coalition’s leaders doubted whether it could
oppose Napoleon without the support of the other Allied armies, as proven
by the attempts made to bring the Silesian Army or at least part of it to
Bohemia following the battle of Dresden. Wilson echoes the sentiment of
Allied Headquarters in a 5 October letter during the opening phase of
Schwarzenberg’s offensive:
It is not yet certain whether we shall advance or retreat. There will be

movements made to ascertain whether Blücher and the crown prince have
passed the Elbe or not, and what causes may have influenced any change of
intention. You must remember that we have made an offensive demonstra-
tion to assist Blücher and the crown prince. Without that aiding movement,
this army is not strong enough to give battle in Saxony against the enemy’s
whole force; therefore our progress must be regulated by the proceedings of
those [Napoleon] for whose service we threaten and with whose cooperation
[Blücher and Bernadotte] we can only act. Prince Schwarzenberg’s view
appears to me most correct, and he has embraced every possible movement
that can be made by the enemy or ourselves on the calcul and raisonnement
which I have had the good fortune to hear from himself this day.13
“Very strange and dangerous position of the enemy,” wrote Schack in his
journal on 13 October. “One expects a coup d’éclat. A very interesting,
critical point in time.”14 Napoleon’s desire to escape from the net steadily
closing on him probably made sense to the generals and statesmen who
labored to defeat him but still harbored a deep respect for his martial
abilities. Indeed, his surprise movement through Wittenberg to the right
bank of the Elbe must have seemed the prelude of the expected coup d’éclat.
As the Allies pondered the reasons that would prompt Napoleon to cross
the Elbe, numerous factors made such a move quite plausible. Bavaria’s
defection now threatened his main line of communication to the Rhine.
Assessment 811
Thus, it would make perfect sense for him to transfer his communications to
the secondary line that ran through North Germany. A coup de théâtre
would enable the master not only to rally the troops at Magdeburg, but also
to unite with the Franco-Danish forces at Hamburg. As the reasons for
Napoleon to cross the Elbe grew increasingly advantageous for him, the
Prussians came to the realization that this bold maneuver could unravel two
months of hard campaigning. Little about Schwarzenberg’s record up to that
point led the Prussians to believe they could expect a rapid advance into a
new and distant theater of war by the Army of Bohemia. Nor did they
expect Bernadotte to set aside his personal ambition in favor of the Allied
cause if Napoleon suddenly appeared on the lower Elbe. At both Blücher’s
and Yorck’s headquarters, the Prussians appreciated Napoleon’s bold turn as
a strategic and psychological master stroke.15
Friederich describes the operations of the Bohemian Army from 27 Sep-
tember to 14 October as “purely negative.” The early twentieth-century
German General Staff historian goes on to criticize Schwarzenberg for
marching “in the slowest tempo from Teplitz to Marienberg, from Marien-
berg to Chemnitz, and from Chemnitz to Altenburg.” Moreover, he accuses
Schwarzenberg of avoiding “any possible clash with the enemy; he did not
act, but instead only threatened to act; for the most part, he fought useless
and purposeless engagements because of the habit of always committing
insufficient forces; despite numerical superiority, he failed to tear asunder
the thin veil that Napoleon had pushed forward to mask his movements
against the two other Allied armies; he did not do the slightest to prevent a
defeat of the North German and Silesian Armies, and even less for the union
of all forces for a decisive battle to thus bring about the end of the war.”16
Criticism is not confined to Friederich’s pen. Little evidence can defend
Schwarzenberg against General Rudolph von Caemmerer’s accusation that
the Allied generalissimo’s actions were “diametrically opposed to any rea-
sonable interpretation of the agreements made at Reichenbach.” Murat and
by extension Napoleon greatly benefited from what Caemmerer terms the
“most highly defective generalship” displayed by Schwarzenberg during his
campaign in western Saxony. With only Murat’s 45,000 men facing him, the
Allied commander in chief spent seventeen days starting on 27 September
maneuvering his 160,000 men a mere eighty miles from the southern feet of
the Erzgebirge to within one march of Leipzig by 13 October. In this
textbook example of economy of force, Murat succeeded brilliantly in
masking Schwarzenberg. Despite several engagements, Schwarzenberg
failed to overcome his adversary for the simple reason that he made little
effort to do so. Caemmerer criticizes Schwarzenberg for failing to use his
cavalry – as Napoleon had taught – to properly reconnoiter the enemy. Had
he done so, insists Caemmerer, Schwarzenberg would have immediately
recognized the weakness of Murat’s army.
More damning is Schwarzenberg’s indifference to the fate of the Silesian

Army in October, which foreshadowed the Allied commander in chief’s
apathy that led to the near-destruction of Blücher’s army in France in
February 1814. On 9 October, Schwarzenberg knew that Napoleon had
marched north from Dresden and could not support Murat. Conversely,
he knew for certain thanks to communication with Bubna that Napoleon’s
offensive gravely endangered Blücher, whose army stood on the Mulde.
Caemmerer contends that, to end the “crisis” that both Blücher and Berna-
dotte faced and to “correctly respond” to Napoleon’s offensive, Schwarzen-
berg should have crushed Murat at Borna on 10 October. A victory at Borna,
according to Caemmerer, would have forced Napoleon to terminate his
offensive and move south to take in the remains of Murat’s army. Surpris-
ingly, the German critic does not view Napoleon doing this at Leipzig but
instead contends that the city would have fallen to Schwarzenberg on the
11th, thus preventing the arrival of Augereau’s IX Corps While this is pure
speculation, we can accept Caemmerer’s point that a victory over Murat
would have enabled Schwarzenberg to achieve the union with Blücher
sooner and the two Allied armies could have attacked Napoleon under more
favorable conditions with double his numbers earlier than the 16th. “But
what was omitted on 10 October,” concludes Caemmerer, “still could have
been executed with the same advantages on 11, 12, and 13 October and thus
should have been done. Indeed, even on 14 October, when a large cavalry
engagement took place at Liebertwolkwitz [six miles southeast of Leipzig],
it still was not too late for this. The failure to deliver a battle against the king
of Naples south of Leipzig is a serious reproach against the commander of
the Allies, for which he must bear full responsibility.”17
Despite attempts by Gunther Rothenburg and Allan Sked to exonerate
the Austrians, it is difficult to take issue with this assessment. That Blücher
and Bernadotte escaped a crushing defeat cannot be attributed to Schwar-
zenberg’s advance on Leipzig. Instead, a series of fortunate circumstances as
well as their own prudence saved them. Conversely, Blücher’s bold and
adamant determination to remain at Halle and not fly across the Elbe as
Bernadotte demanded most likely saved Schwarzenberg from another drub-
bing at the hands of Napoleon. Had the North German and Silesian Armies
taken the bait and moved across the Elbe to defend Berlin, Napoleon could
have quickly enveloped Schwarzenberg’s right, cutting him off from
Bohemia and driving him against the upper Saale and Thuringian Forest.
Lastly, Blücher and Gneisenau deserve sole credit for making possible a
general attack on the 16th. Even with this development, Schwarzenberg
did not seek to thoroughly exploit the favorable situation by delivering a
blow that would end the war. Instead of envisioning a bold concentric
offensive against Leipzig, the continuation of the army’s shift to the left
was decided. Surprisingly, Friederich ultimately exonerates Schwarzenberg:
Assessment 813
“Any other Allied general, perhaps with the exception of the venerable
commander of the Silesian Army, presumably would have acted the same
way in Schwarzenberg’s place. One believed an attempt had to be made to
drive Napoleon from Germany without a decisive battle. Despite all of his
weaknesses, Schwarzenberg was the most appropriate general to whom the
Allies could give the responsibility for the main army.”18
On 15 October, numerous reports confirmed Napoleon’s presence at
Leipzig. In the afternoon, the shout of “Vive l’Empereur!” coming from
thousands of voices on the hills north of Wachau could be clearly heard
along Schwarzenberg’s front as Napoleon inspected the line. Around 5:00 p.m.
on the 15th, Schwarzenberg received the report that the French had
reinforced Liebertwolkwitz and that the position of Napoleon’s left wing
clearly indicated his intention to attack the next day. Based on all of this
news, the Allies ultimately concluded that Napoleon did not have any
intentions of withdrawing from Leipzig. Thus, Schwarzenberg finally made
the decision to attack the enemy on the 16th after wasting much precious
time and failing to exploit the opportunity to crush Murat’s isolated forces.19
For the Allied commander in chief, the circumstances on 16 October
would prove much less favorable than those of 14 and 15 October, when
most of Napoleon’s forces remained en route to Leipzig. Although postpon-
ing his attack on the 14th and 15th to secure Blücher’s participation, Schwar-
zenberg should have delayed on the 16th as well, based on the near-parity in
forces that Napoleon’s concentration had achieved. Although we cannot
fault Schwarzenberg for not being able to divine Napoleon’s numbers,
common sense and the emperor’s way of war taught that he would not
accept battle unless he possessed overwhelming mass. Schwarzenberg would
have been better served by awaiting the arrival of his remaining corps as well
as the entire Army of Poland, all of which were still thirty-seven miles south
of Leipzig in the Waldheim–Penig region. Yet numerous concerns over both
Napoleon’s intentions and the strength of the French forces assembled at
Leipzig convinced Schwarzenberg of the need to commence his main attack
by the 16th. Some of Schwarzenberg’s advisors speculated that the emperor
would accept battle only on the northern side of Leipzig. Others assumed he
would not accept battle at all but instead would withdraw to the Elbe and
utilize all of his forces against the North German and Silesian Armies. Still
others counseled that Napoleon would shed no further blood to maintain his
position at Leipzig, although this idea held little sway by the evening of
the 15th.
Unconfirmed reports correctly stated that Napoleon entered Leipzig on
the 14th with his Guard. Except for a few detachments still en route to
Leipzig, he managed to concentrate his masses. Yet the Allies had not.
Moreover, their available forces were somewhat fragmented rather than
concentrated. With all of its corps assembled, Schwarzenberg’s Army of
Bohemia could face Napoleon’s army alone. However, on 16 October,

Schwarzenberg divided the Army of Bohemia into three parts incapable of
mutual support due to the impassable waters of the Pleiße and the Elster. On
Schwarzenberg’s right, 96,000 soldiers attacked Napoleon’s left and center
on the Pleiße; in the Allied center, 28,000 Austrians advanced in the marshy
and densely overgrown region between the Pleiße and the Elster to attack
Napoleon’s right and rear. On the left, Gyulay’s 19,000 Austrians along with
Blücher’s army attacked between the upper and lower Elster to close the
Lindenau defile through which ran the main highway from Leipzig to
the west.
Planning for the opportunity that had eluded him since his victory at
Dresden six weeks earlier, Napoleon no longer worried about keeping the
Allied armies apart and welcomed the chance to decide the issue with one
great battle. He had no clear idea how far south Bernadotte and Blücher had
advanced but Schwarzenberg’s mammoth army stood within striking dis-
tance. Unfortunately for Napoleon, the disjointed Allied assault that opened
the battle in the Wachau sector commenced before his troops could move
up, especially Macdonald’s XI Corps, which had yet to reach its position for
the flanking movement.20 This forced the emperor to plug holes in his line
with Guard units at the beginning of the battle rather than save the Grande
Reserve for the coup de grâce. Although the French repulsed Wittgenstein’s
initial attack, Napoleon could not regain his balance and coordination for
the rest of the struggle on the 16th. Moreover, his Regular Reserve never
arrived. Northwest of Leipzig, Blücher’s advance through Schkeuditz fixed
Marmont’s VI Corps; Gyulay’s attack forced Ney to redirect Bertrand’s IV
Corps to Lindenau; and III Corps reached the emperor too late.21 Thus,
Napoleon’s last opportunity to achieve a decisive victory on German soil
failed. Had Napoleon enveloped Schwarzenberg on 16 October, he would
have destroyed the Sixth Coalition that very day.22
Blücher’s arrival denied Napoleon the forces he planned to use to destroy
the Bohemian Army. Committed to the battle at the correct place and time,
the 25,000 men of VI and III Corps would have obtained victory for him.
Wittgenstein’s early start, the late arrival of the French corps, Tsar
Alexander’s battlefield leadership, and the grit of the Allied soldiers did
the rest.23 Nevertheless, Blücher deserves much credit for preventing Napo-
leon from concentrating all his forces along the decisive front of the
extended battlefield. Lieven compares Blücher’s “achievement at
Leipzig . . . to his impact on the battle of Waterloo. By arriving on the
battlefield much earlier than expected, he diverted a key part of the strategic
reserve on which the emperor was counting to decide the battle on its main
front.” Although the French label the battle of Wachau as one of the
emperor’s victories, at best it ended in a draw. Considering Napoleon’s dire
need for a decisive victory on 16 October, it is not an exaggeration to label
Assessment 815
Wachau a strategic defeat. Fighting the Allies to a draw meant that the
emperor would be forced to wage a defensive struggle against enemy forces
that would increase exponentially compared to the reinforcements he could
expect to receive. Thus, Blücher’s victory at Möckern proved monumental.
Marmont maintains that “this battle on the 16th decided the fate of Ger-
many” and that “the great question was answered on the 16th.” Friederich
goes as far as to say that “the salvation of the Bohemian Army must be
attributed solely to Blücher’s timely intervention: his victory at Möckern
countered the success Napoleon had achieved at Wachau. Although the
French are justified in labeling the battle of Wachau as one of the emperor’s
victories, this day actually produced the decision for the entire struggle and
broke Napoleon’s mastery over Germany.”24
In summarizing the struggle on the 18th, we see that imperial forces
defeated every Allied attack against Napoleon’s right wing along the
Connewitz–Probstheida line. Despite being outnumbered, Murat’s men
bravely defended Connewitz: a position vital to Napoleon’s line of retreat.
Thus, the loss of Dösen, Dölitz, and Lößnig mattered little as long as Murat
held Connewitz. Along Napoleon’s center and left wing, the Allies took his
forward positions of Zuckelhausen, Holzhausen, the Naundorfs, Mölkau,
Paunsdorf, Stünz, Sellerhausen, and Schönefeld, driving Macdonald and
Ney into the main position of Stötteritz–Crottendorf–Reudnitz. Without
Langeron’s corps, Blücher made no progress against Napoleon’s extreme left
wing north of Leipzig. In the rear of the Grande Armée at Lindenau,
Bertrand redeemed himself for Wartenburg by defeating Gyulay and
opening the road to the Saale; his vanguard reached Weißenfels while his
main body halted at Lützen.
Despite the overwhelming numerical superiority at Bernadotte’s dis-
posal, his army achieved little during the “Battle of the Nations.” Berna-
dotte’s late arrival on the field – along with Allied concerns that Napoleon
would attempt to escape to the Elbe – shaped the battle on the 18th. Because
the North German Army took so long to reach its position, Bennigsen could
not concentrate his forces in the Probstheida–Naundorf sector but instead
extended them north to close the gap between himself and Blücher: the gap
created by Bernadotte’s tardiness. Here we see a situation where Bennigsen’s
better judgment caused him to commit an error. Concerned that Napoleon
would exploit the gap between his army and Blücher’s, Bennigsen increas-
ingly pushed his right north and into this gap rather than continue his
offensive movement. This mistake, which arose from the ignorance of the
situation at Lindenau and the misunderstanding of Napoleon’s intentions,
would have been avoided had Bernadotte’s army reached its position by
11:00 a.m. rather than 4:00 p.m. After arriving, Bernadotte remained content
with driving back the enemy some thousand yards and taking the villages of
Schönefeld, Sellerhausen, and Stünz. His forces could have achieved much
more had he committed them with determination and energy. Instead, only a
part of Bülow’s corps saw action, and of Wintzingerode’s Russians and
Stedingk’s Swedes only the artillery played a role. The usually objective
Friederich notes that “the blame for this weak leadership must alone be
attributed to the person of the crown prince who, of course, on this day of
numerous examples of outstanding bravery, could not put aside the excess of
caution that he had displayed in his leadership throughout the entire
campaign.”25
Bernadotte’s extreme prudence alone does not account for
Schwarzenberg’s failure to exploit his numerical superiority and deliver a
crushing blow. Instead, the Allied commander in chief – with the approval of
Alexander and Frederick William – relied on tactical maneuvers to grind up
Napoleon’s army, in turn doing the same to his own. If ever there was a time
for “the Coalition’s man” to rise to the occasion, 18 October was the day.
The resources at Schwarzenberg’s disposal had never before been seen on a
European battlefield. Gneisenau thus described the situation on the 18th:
“Yesterday, the vast masses struggled against each other. It was a spectacle
that has not been seen for thousands of years. From a hill I could oversee the
opposing armies. Much blood has been spilled. The dead and mutilated lay
along a stretch that is miles long. We finally drove the French army thickly
together in a narrow space close to Leipzig.”26 Allied forces outnumbered
Napoleon’s by 135,000 men; they possessed double the number of artillery
and could oppose Napoleon’s 30,000 cavalry with at least 60,000 sabers. In
view of these numbers, it is difficult to exonerate Allied High Command for
the day’s paltry results. The shortcomings of the Allied attack plan become
even more egregious when we bear in mind that circumstances clearly
limited Napoleon to a defensive. While German historians such as Bernhardi
and Friederich oversimplify by referring to 18 October as nothing more than
a great rearguard engagement, securing the Grande Armée’s line of retreat to
Erfurt remained Napoleon’s primary objective.27
As late as 17 October, Napoleon still could have directed his army to
numerous points on the Elbe by marching north or east. Moreover, he could
have salvaged the situation on 17 October by turning against Blücher. Unger
maintains that “without doubt, had he found his old energy on the evening
of 16 October, instead of negotiating on the 17th, he could have overrun
Blücher. Without question, Bernadotte would have retreated before such a
blow.”28 We can only imagine the reaction by Allied Headquarters to the
news that Blücher had been crushed and Bernadotte was in full retreat. With
Napoleon “on the loose,” it is difficult to believe that Schwarzenberg would
have maintained his position before Leipzig. The memory of having his
flanks crushed at Dresden by Napoleon’s superior operational skills would
have proven too much for the Allies and a retreat from Leipzig would have
ensued. Langeron offers another option for Napoleon on the 17th: “He still
Assessment 817
could have . . . moved back with all of his forces, by the Lützen road, and
opened a passage by attacking Gyulay’s corps, which was not strong enough
to resist an attack by the entire enemy force, and it would have been
impossible for us [the Silesian Army] to have been able to help him in time,
as between him and us was the Elster, the Lippe, and a marshy area that was
slow and difficult to cross but easy to defend. Therefore, we would not have
been able to make a strong enough diversion to save Gyulay if Napoleon had
detached enough men to block us. Without us, without Bennigsen, or the
prince of Sweden, the Grand Army was not strong enough to face him alone.
Nevertheless, he had already lost too much time; either of the options that
remained to him offered many dangers but they were still preferable to the
one he chose, to wait for us at Leipzig and there to risk a battle that he could
not hope to win and the loss of which could destroy his entire army.”29
On the 18th, Bernadotte’s army plugged the hole that provided the
escape route to the Elbe, thus confining Napoleon to the only direction that
remained open: west to the Saale. To complicate his situation, he had at his
disposal only one road – the long Lindenau defile – across which the army
could withdraw. Guarding that vital lifeline to the west required Napoleon
to spread the army along a fourteen-mile semicircle around Leipzig. Natur-
ally, his central position provided him with the advantage of being able to
quickly shift reserves to bolster weak points, but the army’s extension
prevented him from maintaining any offensive action. Because only one
escape route remained open, an Allied breakthrough anywhere along the
line would jeopardize the entire army. Thus, his vaunted Imperial Guard
received the defensive task of preventing the Allies from breaching the
perimeter.
Conversely, the principal objective of the Allied attack plan should have
been to direct overwhelming force at one point along the enemy line – a
point where a breakthrough would have been especially detrimental to a
French retreat. Meanwhile, economy of force diversions would be executed
along other points of the French line to pin the enemy and prevent
Napoleon from transferring reinforcements to counter the main threat.
Either these points escaped the attention of the Coalition’s military leaders
such as the tsar, or the Austrians did not want to see French power destroyed
on 18 October. Both reasons probably played a role at Allied Headquarters
as did the lack of unity of command and the reluctance to place too much
responsibility on the other Allied armies. Had Schwarzenberg truly served
as the actual Allied commander in chief orchestrating the operations of four
armies toward the goal of destroying French military power in Germany, his
battle plan for the 18th would have been very different.
Although the fighting on the 16th ended in a relative stalemate south of
Leipzig, Blücher’s victory at Möckern had brought his army to the Halle
suburb and the very gates of the city. This meant that the Army of Silesia
stood closest to Napoleon’s line of retreat when fighting resumed on the

18th. However, Schwarzenberg’s attack plan on the 18th solely concentrated
on the French position south of Leipzig while the same plan failed to
provide Allied forces north of the city with a specific objective. Here we
see the consequences of previous failed attempts by both Schwarzenberg and
Alexander to coordinate the operations of the Silesian and North German
Armies. During the Fall Campaign, both Blücher and Bernadotte refused to
comply with directives from Allied Headquarters, whether signed by
Schwarzenberg or the tsar. Thus, despite the exalted title of “Allied com-
mander in chief,” Schwarzenberg in practice thus far had enjoyed little of his
theoretical authority. As for Alexander, as much as he fancied himself the
generalissimo of the Allied armies, doubt remained whether he could hold
Bernadotte or Blücher to his will.
Intertwined with this uncertainty was the concern of placing too much
responsibility on an army other than the Bohemian. Tasking Blücher or
Bernadotte with delivering the decisive blow would have required the risk
of depending on the latter to take the most direct road across the Parthe as
early as possible on the 18th and then conduct an energetic attack. Friederich
maintains that, had the North German Army marched from Breitenfeld
around 4:00 a.m. rather than at 9:00 and had it crossed the Parthe at
Mockau instead of Taucha, Bernadotte could have engaged Ney’s 36,000
men by 11:00 with some 80,000 men including Langeron. This numerical
superiority would soon have forced Napoleon to send all his reserves to the
Parthe, thus greatly facilitating Schwarzenberg’s attacks along the Lößnig–
Probstheida–Holzhausen line, regardless of Bernadotte’s success.30 Yet it is
difficult to imagine any Allied leader having confidence in Bernadotte’s
willingness to comply based on his past actions. As we have seen, the crown
prince effectively prevented Blücher from playing this role by stripping him
of Langeron’s corps. In the end, it is difficult to censure Bernadotte enough
for his performance at Leipzig.31
As the criticism of Schwarzenberg benefits from hindsight, we must
question whether it is fair to hold the Austrian commander as well as the
rest of the Coalition’s leaders accountable for failing to devise a more
imaginative battle plan that sought a decisive victory. Napoleon’s skill at
maneuvering warranted the concern that he might attempt to reach
Wittenberg or Torgau. Moreover, despite the disaster in Russia the previous
year, his reputation as a genius on the battlefield largely remained intact.
Memories of countless defeats at the hands of Napoleon going back to
1796 had been burned in the collective memory of the Austrian military
establishment. Consequently, a cautious approach that left little room for
errors that could benefit Napoleon appeared to be the wisest course of
action. As Alexander stamped his approval on the attack disposition and,
unlike the plan of attack for the 16th, did not make any modifications, we
Assessment 819
can assume that the will of Allied Headquarters strongly favored a conserva-
tive approach that provided no opportunities for the master to exploit.
Despite opting for prudence and its associated disadvantages, by the
evening of 18 October the Allies had decisively defeated Napoleon’s left
wing, driving it back to the immediate vicinity of Leipzig. Only extreme
efforts enabled Murat and Macdonald to maintain the right wing and center
respectively. In a sense, the Allies fell just short of a total victory, which in
view of Napoleon’s situation could have been his Sedan. Almost 100,000
Allied soldiers and more than 100 guns had yet to be committed when
darkness largely put an end to the fighting. At most, Napoleon had
10,000–12,000 fresh troops at his disposal. Had the Allies employed their
additional 100,000 men in the right place and at the right time, French forces
would have been driven into Leipzig on the 18th and their retreat on the
19th would have been seriously jeopardized. Fault for allowing this oppor-
tunity to slip away lies with Bernadotte, Schwarzenberg, and Alexander.
Older French works claim that Napoleon repulsed every Allied attack
but that the shortage of ammunition ultimately forced him to retreat. This
excuse proves to be as empty as Napoleon’s own statements that the defec-
tion of the Saxons cost him the battle.32 Even without these setbacks, the
astounding numerical superiority of the Allies would have led to the
destruction or surrender of his forces on the 19th. With the exception of a
few brigades of Old Guard, all of Napoleon’s troops saw action on the 18th
while Allied reserves, including the majority of Bernadotte’s army, remained
relatively fresh. Thus, had Napoleon decided to make a stand at Leipzig, he
would have suffered a military defeat that quite conceivably could have
expanded to a political disaster like Waterloo. Exiting Leipzig enabled
Napoleon to return to the open field, where he could hope to use his
operational mastery to exploit Allied mistakes. By retreating, Napoleon
secured the opportunity to extricate the majority of his 140,000-man army.
Although it proved to be impossible for him to do this, his return to France
with an army of 60,000 men at least provided him with the possibility of
rallying his subjects. At this time, French forces still retained control of Italy
and the Low Countries. The chance always existed that the Allies would
stop at the Rhine or that Francis would not wish to see his son-in-law
humbled any further. By sacrificing Germany, Emperor Napoleon gave
General Bonaparte a chance in 1814. Considering the extent of Allied
discord after the victory at Leipzig, this turned out to be a wise move. Thus,
the question should not be why Napoleon retreated from Leipzig, but why
did he not retreat as soon as the Allies foiled his plan for 16 October?
Napoleon postponed the retreat until the 18th for numerous reasons.
First, he hoped the Allies might blunder. Second, he attempted to divide the
Allies by offering to negotiate an armistice with his father-in-law, Kaiser
Francis. After the fighting on the 16th, Napoleon resorted to his usual tactic
of providing misinformation to intimidate his opponent. During a long

conversation with the captured corps commander, Merveldt, Napoleon told
the Austrian that he possessed 200,000 infantry and a huge force of cavalry.
In the same breath, he expressed his earnest desire for peace. Napoleon
paroled Merveldt, tasking him with the delivery of an offer for an armistice
that included the French evacuation of Danzig, Modlin, Stettin, Küstrin,
Glogau, Dresden, Torgau, and if necessary Wittenberg. Moreover, the
Grande Armée would withdraw west of the Saale. As for peace terms,
Napoleon declared himself ready to return Hanover to Great Britain;
Hamburg and Lübeck would become neutral; the Netherlands would
receive its independence; and the French and Italian crowns would be
separated. Although Merveldt reported to the Allied sovereigns that
Napoleon looked jaded, ill, and depressed, and would probably retreat all
the way to the Rhine, “this insidious proposal, however, was of course
rejected.”33 Not only did the peace initiative fail, but it also served to
strengthen Allied resolve by convincing Napoleon’s foes that he was spent.
Two contemporaries offer opposing views of Napoleon during the battle
of Leipzig that reflected their personal feelings. First, the Saxon staff officer
and member of Napoleon’s suite, Odeleben, who did little to hide his
contempt for the emperor, maintains that “all the dispositions and prepar-
ations at headquarters indicated the emperor’s intentions to retreat.” Never-
theless, Napoleon could not bring himself to retreat on the 17th after touting
the struggle on the 16th as a French victory. “But he had caused his pre-
tended triumph to be celebrated by the ringing of bells, and all possible
demonstrations of joy. Therefore, greater results appeared justly to be
expected.” Conversely, if he retreated on the 17th, “everyone would have
said he was beaten . . . Thus, on Sunday, 17 October, he obstinately deter-
mined not to quit his position, lest he should appear to have been defeated.
To justify a retreat in the eyes of his nation and army, he had to remain
master of the field of battle for an entire day.” In this way, a scapegoat could
be found.34
Pelet, who commanded a brigade in Oudinot’s I Corps of Young Guard
and later became a historian of the French General Staff, claims that Allied
positions and the very nature of the retreat provided Napoleon with solid
reasons to postpone the retreat for twenty-four hours. Reports indicated
that Liechtenstein’s 1st Light Division still held Markranstädt but Napoleon
did not know that Gyulay had withdrawn from Lindenau and recrossed the
Elster. Yet he acknowledged that Austrian troops from General Murray’s
2nd Division of Gyulay’s III Corps held the easily defended defile of Bad
Kösen. Moreover, the chance that Murray would receive support from the
corps echeloned in the rear of the Bohemian Army or that they could be sent
to the banks of the Elster concerned the emperor. Enemy detachments could
also occupy the defile of the Rippach at Poserna and that of the Saale at
Assessment 821
Weißenfels as well as various positions on the Saale as far as Bad Kösen. It

would be difficult to force these defiles and dangerous to attack them when
the possibility existed to be attacked from behind by a pursuing Allied army.
Moreover, the unruly French national character likewise presented chal-
lenges. Pelet asserts that “the problem consisted of moving an army followed
by 20,000 horses dragging 600 pieces of cannon, parks, and crews beyond
Leipzig and on the long, narrow, and winding Lindenau defile . . . a
weakened army, shaken in its physical and moral organization . . . A retreat
performed in the presence of powerful [enemy] forces is the most difficult
operation with French troops; we openly affirm this.”
According to Pelet’s polemic, Napoleon responded to these consider-
ations by first concealing from the army “for as long as possible” his
decision to retreat and then completely deceiving the Allies. Had the
emperor commenced the retreat early on the 17th, Pelet argues that
Gyulay, Colloredo, and Bernadotte could have moved toward Weißenfels
and fixed the Grande Armée until Blücher and the rest of Schwarzenberg’s
army arrived. “On the 18th,” Pelet declares, “the emperor would have found
the enemy armies arranged against him between the upper and lower Elster.”
To avoid this scenario, Pelet argues, Napoleon implemented a two-step plan.
Leaving Ney to make his arrangements north of the city and Bertrand to
increase the defensive measures on Leipzig’s western side, he ordered the
corps that fought south of Leipzig to maintain the ground taken from the
Allies on the 16th. “This offensive attitude intimidated them; and their fears
are seen in their precautions,” asserts Pelet. Second, he contracted his
southern front at 2:00 a.m. on 18 October but still had Ney hold the
Parthe north of Leipzig. “In this position,” argues Pelet, “the French army
maintained space to fight and maneuver in front of the city. On the 18th, it
was able to withstand four armies that surrounded it.” In contracting his
southern front, Napoleon assumed that the Bohemian and Polish Armies
would not reach the new position to engage his army until late on the
morning of the 18th. Pelet states that Napoleon figured that, in the north,
Ney would hold the Silesian and North German Armies at the Parthe. If
either sought to take the detour through Taucha, it would not be able to
come on line until the afternoon. Ney could then hold the narrow space
between Schönefeld and Stünz, where he could easily stop Blücher and
Bernadotte. All of this would buy time for IV Corps and Mortier’s Young
Guard to secure the road to Weißenfels, for the parks to cross the defile, and
for the army to prepare to follow during the night of 18/19 October. “With
such arrangements,” concludes Pelet, “it was likely that the Allies would not
try to attack, or they would have to delay it until the 19th in order to fully
unite their armies.”35
We will never be certain of Napoleon’s exact thoughts in the period
between the end of the fighting on the 16th and the issuing of his orders to
Bertrand to commence the retreat on the 18th. Admittedly it is hard to

accept Pelet’s eloquent explanation that Napoleon “feared” being caught by
the perpetually slow moving Austrians or even Bernadotte and so used
Leipzig as bait to lure all four Allied armies, fix them there, and make good
his escape on the 19th. While this is certainly how the battle played out,
Pelet may have employed too much hindsight to excuse his idol’s mistakes.
Much more likely appear the explanations provided by military historians.
The heavy fighting on the 16th – particularly the events at Möckern – should
have convinced Napoleon of the Coalition’s resolve but, as Petre notes,
“Emperor Napoleon was now, to a great extent, the master of General
Bonaparte, and the Emperor could not bear to yield what practically meant
his dominion in Germany, though the General saw that to do this was the
only hope.” Making the decision to retreat was not easy, as Yorck von
Wartenburg comments: “only a very decisive victory on this day [the
16th], when the relative numbers were still fairly equal, could have saved
him. Such a victory he had failed to gain, and in a military sense there was
now only one thing to be done, namely, to retreat at once. But in that case
Napoleon as a monarch was lost, and the interests of the sovereign had
precedence over, though they were at variance with, those of General
Napoleon.”36
Schwarzenberg’s failure to move more Allied cavalry and artillery
followed by the reserves to Zwenkau and Pegau during the night of 18/19
October to harass Napoleon’s retreat on the following morning remains
unexplained. For more decisive results, this vanguard could have fixed the
French army in a position that would have allowed the Bohemian Army to
reach it after taking Leipzig. As the battle on the 19th unfolded, the Bohe-
mian Army did little after Bennigsen shifted his forces to the west. Had
Schwarzenberg acted on the initial reports that the French had evacuated the
battlefield, he would have had plenty of time to move at least the reserves of
the Bohemian Army west and order the entire Silesian Army to follow
Yorck’s corps. This would still have left the North German and Polish
Armies to fix Napoleon’s rearguard at Leipzig. Some German historians
attribute this omission to Austrian diplomacy, claiming that Metternich
wanted to leave the road to the Rhine open for Napoleon. No evidence
exists to support this view but, if it was indeed the case, then Schwarzenberg
would have received such instructions from Kaiser Francis and thus cannot
be held accountable. Friederich maintains that an explanation for the omis-
sions of the 18th and 19th can be found in “the general conditions of the
coalition, but especially the personality of the commander in chief and from
the motives and views that he and his entourage brought into this war.”37
For the pursuit after Leipzig, we once again return to Blücher. “That the
rejoicing over the hard-fought victory, the joy over the final union of the
three Allied armies, the mutual salutations, the concern for the wounded,
Assessment 823
dead, and captured, the assembly and reorganization of the troops, and
finally the general relaxation of the nerves that took such a claim on the
leading personalities on the 19th led them to forget about the pursuit of the
defeated enemy is humanly understandable, but inexcusable from a military
point of view. Blücher was the only exception.”38 After reaching the timber
market, he recognized that the blowing of the Elster bridge had cut off the
French in the city. Rather than move more of his own troops into the city, he
and Gneisenau issued orders to halt, reassemble, and march as fast as
possible to Schkeuditz. He wanted his Russian infantry to reach Schkeuditz
that evening so the advance to Lützen could begin on the morning of the
20th. As for the other armies, only Bülow sent forward his entire cavalry
through Leipzig to the immediate pursuit of the French around 2:30. Never-
theless, the Prussians could not extend beyond the Halle Gate because of the
backlog at the blown Elster bridge. In the evening, Bennigsen ordered the
majority of his cavalry to swim across the Elster followed somewhat later by
Paskevich’s 26th Division, which crossed the river via footbridges that had
been built with much difficulty.
As for the attempts to inflict damage on the Grande Armée after
Leipzig, Yorck can be faulted for not renewing his attack before dawn
on 22 October; he could have rested his men and then stormed Freyburg
as the French army’s baggage crossed the Unstrut. While capturing the
enemy’s train certainly would have provided a symbolic victory, it would
not have brought the Allies any closer to preventing Napoleon’s breakout
at Freyburg. Due to the crushing superiority of Allied forces around
Leipzig, the results of the pursuit should have been very different. In
evaluating Yorck’s operations between 18 and 22 October, it is difficult
to imagine that his exhausted men could have done more. It is unlikely
that I Corps could have moved any faster to Weißenfels and Freyburg
after first being dispatched north to Halle. The reasons for the Allied
failure lie in the nature of the French retreat and the Allied pursuit in
general, rather than Yorck’s specific actions. First, the retreat itself had
started late on the 18th, when Napoleon ordered the baggage and part of
his Reserve Cavalry to evacuate Leipzig over the Lindenau causeway and
across the Elster River. At 2:00 a.m. on the 19th, the Reserve Artillery
followed by the Imperial Guard, IV Cavalry Corps, X and II Corps, and II
Cavalry Corps withdrew from Leipzig. As a result, the majority of French
troops that escaped Leipzig had left the city long before the panic and
horror at the Elster bridge. This circumstance allowed the retreat to the
Saale to proceed in fairly good order, although discipline started to unravel
almost as soon as the French army reached the river.
Second, the 19th slipped away while Allied High Command celebrated
the great victory and debated the next step. This allowed Napoleon’s main
body to reach Lützen unmolested. Lacking bridges over the Pleiße and
Elster Rivers, the Allies could not launch an immediate pursuit. In addition,
Oudinot’s successful rearguard action at Lindenau stymied Allied attempts
to directly pursue the emperor on the solid highway that ran southwest
through Lützen, Weißenfels, and Naumburg to Erfurt and ultimately Mainz.
The French army thus won a headstart of approximately eighteen hours.
Schwarzenberg did much to close the gap by reaching Naumburg and
forcing Napoleon to take the detour through Freyburg. This at least allowed
the two wings of the Allied armies – Yorck and Gyulay – to establish contact
with the enemy. However, Yorck did not possess the combat power to make
much of a difference. Although Gyulay displayed the speed needed in a
decisive pursuit by actually getting in front of Napoleon’s army, he too
commanded fewer than 15,000 men.
The reason for the Allied failure to catch the French army at two river
crossings is simple: the favorable point in time to launch the pursuit had
already been lost. This was the evening of 18 October, when Yorck’s
battered survivors of Möckern were ordered north to Halle. Stronger
forces should have been dispatched to threaten the retreat, but the Allied
sovereigns and monarchs did not want to weaken the armies around
Leipzig. Instead of creating a trap that would close tightly, the Allies
prepared a mighty blow that would once and for all smash the French
army.39
An analysis of the Allied pursuit to the Rhine River following the epic
four-day struggle at Leipzig must take into consideration the general
situation rather than unrealistic expectations and overly critical evalu-
ations. Blücher’s army took the lead in the pursuit, but his battered forces
hardly sufficed for the task. Müffling’s remark that “the two corps of
Sacken and Yorck were so thinned that they might be considered as only
advance guards” cannot be viewed as an exaggeration.40 It is difficult to
find any real advantages that favored the men of the Silesian Army other
than the simple fact that the French had lost at Leipzig and they had won.
After clearing Freyburg, the French army struck a solid highway.
Napoleon refused to allow the Silesian Army to close the gap.41 Instead,
his army marched continuously because the declining moral and physical
health of his men would not permit the emperor to accept battle; if
necessary, the rearguard would be sacrificed so that the army could reach
the Rhine.42 Hilly, sometimes mountainous, and barely passable terrain
stretched on either side of his road from the Saale to the Rhine. This meant
that little could be expected from flank maneuvers. Although human
elements such as Yorck’s defiance and Russian lethargy played a role, it
was hardly possible for the Silesian Army to make up the ground between
it and Napoleon, despite Blücher’s forced marches. Numerous eyewitness
testimonies attest not only to the deterioration of the French army, but
also to the privations suffered by the pursuing Allied forces. Even Blücher
Assessment 825
admitted that he lost many people to exhaustion.43 Müffling, however,

offers the simplest explanation:
There are days or seasons in an army, when all the operations, from the
moment they are prepared, are well understood and executed by the troops.
There are other times and other days when nothing will go right, when
stoppages and difficulties, which no one has calculated, arise in the simplest
matters. Such a time had now set in with the Silesian Army, but there was no
accounting for the why or wherefore. Perhaps it was the thought that the
enemy had to cross the Rhine and would march so fast that it would be
impossible to overtake him, and thus it would be of little consequence to
reach the Rhine a day or two later.44
In the final assessment, it is difficult to disagree with Gneisenau’s view of

the Silesian Army’s operations: “Through the steps that our army has made,
through its bold movements, through the battles and combats that it has
won, and through the advice which our headquarters has given, it has done
so much for the advantageous turn of the war. The victories of the other
armies remained without results and only ours have altered the course of
events.”45 Although extremely pro-Prussian, the frank and dour British
officer Colonel Lowe argued in his 31 October letter to Charles Stewart
that the Silesian Army should be considerably reinforced because “the Army
of Silesia has been the principal operating army since the opening of the
campaign, arising probably from the simple cause: its having one only
leading military object in view, to find out the enemy and attack him where
it could. Other armies have been more liable to be influenced by political
considerations . . . which lead sometimes into deviations that do not bear the
test of military reasoning and as this Army has been and is still likely to be
the principal operating weapon without any suspicion that political or other
motives whatever can occasion it to deviate from the direction in which it
can strike hardest, the more force with which it can give the blows the
better.”46
Turning to Napoleon, similar to the Russian Campaign one year earlier,
his “Second Saxon Campaign” ended in failure: Germany was lost for good.
Following Leipzig, the remnants of the Grande Armée of 1813 retreated to
the Rhine River to defend France’s natural frontiers as Napoleon’s empire
crumbled. The liberation of Germany, which started on the fields of
Großbeeren, quickly accelerated after Leipzig as one by one Napoleon’s
satellites withdrew from the Confederation of the Rhine. However, the war
did not end with Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig. Following the battle, the
remnants of the Grande Armée of 1813 retreated across the Rhine at Mainz.
Fewer than 60,000 soldiers returned to France in early November 1813.
Although the emperor continued on to Paris, he left his shattered army on
the left bank of the historic Rhine in the hands of his equally shattered
marshals, who received the impossible task of defending the eastern frontier
from Switzerland to the North Sea. Another bloody campaign ensued until
the Allies captured Paris on 31 March 1814 and Napoleon abdicated on
6 April.
The Coalition’s decisive victory in Germany raises the question: had
Napoleon’s skills deteriorated over time? The answer is inextricably con-
nected to the quality of the Grande Armée, which peaked in the years
1805–1807 following the intense training it had received in the years prior
to the War of the Third Coalition. After sustaining irreplaceable losses in
1807, Napoleon then committed many of the survivors to Iberia, from where
they would never return. After exhausting this invaluable, highly trained
force, he became increasingly dependent on German, Italian, and Polish
manpower that had not received training on par with the original Grande
Armée. The imperial forces that waged Napoleon’s wars from 1809 onward
simply could not rival the performance of the Grande Armée that had won
the Wars of the Third and Fourth Coalitions. Coinciding with this qualita-
tive decline is a marked change in Napoleon’s tactics. Instead of continuing
the progression of his tactical innovations for battlefield problem-solving,
Napoleon became increasingly dependent on the weight of massed batteries,
huge formations, and unimaginative frontal assaults as illustrated by the
battles of Aspern-Essling, Wagram, Borodino, and Waterloo.
Defeat in 1813 in part can be attributed to the marshals whom Napoleon
selected to conduct independent operations. While Davout, perhaps the
greatest of Napoleon’s lieutenants, languished in Hamburg in 1813, Marshals
Ney, Oudinot, and Macdonald received independent commands at the army
level. In particular, the emperor’s failure to appoint officers capable of
independent army command symbolizes the lapse in judgment that plagued
his last campaigns. Particularly after the defection of his chief of staff,
Jomini, Ney simply could not coordinate independent operations. Yet is it
fair to condemn Napoleon’s brave and loyal lieutenants? It should be noted
that Oudinot, Macdonald, and Ney never possessed the same resources as
did Napoleon. Wherever Napoleon went so did his Imperial Guard. Not
only did the Guard serve as the epitome of the period’s most elite fighting
force, but it provided Napoleon with the ultimate trump card. As we have
seen, Napoleon favored having both a Regular Reserve and a Grande
Reserve – the Guard, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. In numerous battles,
he committed the Guard to deliver the coup de grâce after expending his
regular reserve. None of the marshals who commanded independently in
1813 enjoyed the luxury of being able to commit the bearskins. Moreover, as
the Army of Berlin and the Army of the Bober each consisted of three army
corps and one cavalry corps, their commanders would have been hard
pressed to mimic the master’s practice of assigning the role of Regular
Assessment 827
Reserve to an entire army corps, or to one-third of the combined-arms

forces. Admittedly, although the Guard probably would not have helped
Macdonald all that much at the Katzbach, Oudinot and Ney certainly would
have benefited from the use of these crack troops.
Napoleon’s thoughts on his subordinates’ failures are best seen in a long
conversation he had on the evening of 8 September while dining with Murat
and St.-Cyr. During the course of the dinner, Napoleon’s aide-de-camp,
General Anne-Charles Lebrun, arrived with a detailed account of Ney’s
defeat at Dennewitz. With “unshakable composure,” the emperor listened
to every detail and then asked a few questions. On finishing, Napoleon
clearly and correctly explained to Murat and St.-Cyr the reasons for Ney’s
failure but showed not the slightest dissatisfaction with Ney or his subordin-
ates. In Napoleon’s view, the cause lay in the difficulty of the art of war,
which had not yet been brought to light. “If,” he concluded “time will allow
me, I will produce a book in which I will develop all the rules of war with
such clarity that it will be accessible to all military men like any other
science.” Then the discussion turned to the question of how far practice
influenced a commander’s skill in the art of war. Napoleon opined that only
Louis XIV’s general, Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne,
had succeeded in perfecting his own innate talent through experience. In his
opinion, only Turenne had obtained what he hoped to explain in his future
teachings on the art of war.47 The fact that the marshals consistently failed to
meet their master’s expectations underscores Napoleon’s failure to grasp the
importance of an adequate general staff system. Moreover, his fatal tendency
to underestimate the numbers of his adversaries and overestimate his own
did little to help his lieutenants.
After losing the Grande Armée of 1812 in Russia, Napoleon commenced
the War of the Sixth Coalition with young conscripts – both French and
foreign – who lacked all but rudimentary training. With the exception of
Bautzen, he rarely sought to achieve victory through operational maneuver.
In itself, the absence of a progression on the operational level reflects three
important considerations concerning Napoleon’s generalship during the last
years of the empire. First, he understood that the qualitative decline of his
army placed limitations on his operations and tactics. Second, he increas-
ingly viewed his adversaries with utter contempt. Lacking respect for his
enemy’s capabilities, Napoleon waged war with a false sense of infallibility
that stifled his novel approach to battlefield problem-solving. Third,
Emperor Napoleon increasingly placed emphasis on securing geographic
objectives such as Berlin and Dresden as opposed to General Bonaparte’s
maxim of annihilating the enemy army and destroying his ability to resist.
Compounding these developments, the aging marshalate and incompetent
divisional generals often rendered “outside-the-box” thinking impractical.
Odeleben offers an insightful explanation on this issue:
Napoleon, as it has been remarked, appeared to consider attacking his enemy

not according to any particular plan, or in accordance with tactical principles,
but rather according to a self-confidence in his own ability to overcome the
enemy by taking advantage of his errors. He was uncertain where to expect
the principal attack. He appeared to wait at Zittau and Görlitz, to ascertain
on which side he had most to apprehend. Formerly accustomed to taking the
offensive and deceiving his enemies by maneuvers that astonished them, he
now changed his character and was obliged to wait in order to discover where
he himself was to receive the most serious blow, ready at the same time to
parry it, and on whatever point it might fall to assure himself of the victory.
Therefore, he could not reckon on pursuing a well-grounded and invariable
plan of operation because the offensive attitude of his enemies would deter-
mine all the measures he would take in response.48
In operations, Napoleon suffered no rival; the Coalition’s commanders,

including the duke of Wellington, could not match him. In strategy, how-
ever, the Reichenbach Plan exhausted both the emperor and his army,
keeping him off balance and robbing him of one of his greatest maxims –
initiative. Just as important as the Reichenbach Plan was the “community of
interest” that solidified the Sixth Coalition in 1813. Political unity had not
been a characteristic of the previous coalitions that France had faced. How-
ever, in 1813 Napoleon confronted a coalition marked by an unprecedented
degree of unity. Lastly, the adoption of many French innovations, especially
the corps system, which allowed for distributed maneuver on the oper-
ational level, enabled the Allies to meet Napoleon head on. As his own
army declined in quality, Napoleon faced much improved adversaries. After
the loss of the Grande Armée of 1813 in Germany, not even Napoleon’s
mastery of operations could offset the Coalition’s vast numerical superiority
in 1814.
Notes
1 As Schroeder concludes: “A coalition with a good chance of defeating Napoleon
had finally come together; an alliance to forge a durable peace had not yet
emerged.” See Schroeder, European Politics, 476.
5 Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges, IIa:82.
6 GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl. Gneisenau, Nr. 108. On 11 August, Yorck’s corps
totaled 1,022 officers and 38,221 men. This figure had dropped to 749 officers and
23,768 men by the 31st.
9 “Battles of Leipzig,” Lowe, Add MSS, 20111, 161–62; Stewart, Narrative, 149.
Assessment 829
10 CN, No. 20693, XXVI:290.

11 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, II:281–98; Bogdanovich, Geschichte des Krieges,
IIb:43–49; Droysen, Yorck, II:180–93.
12 Quoted in Wilson to Aberdeen, Penig, 10 October 1813, in Wilson, Private Diary,
II:439.
13 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:431; Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 388;
Wilson to Aberdeen, Marienburg, 5 October 1813, in Wilson, Private Diary,
II:431.
16 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:431–32.
17 Caemmerer, Befreiungskrieg, 72–73.
18 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:431–32, 468–47.
19 To Schwarzenberg’s list of failures Friederich adds: “and to take advantage of the
beautiful position of Wachau–Liebertwolkwitz.” See Friederich, Herbstfeldzug
1813, III:10, 16.
20 Petre maintains that without the Regular Reserve (III and VI Corps and III
Cavalry Corps) Macdonald’s flanking maneuver would have failed even had the
marshal been in position on time: Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 349.
21 “This battle was very useful to the Grand Army [of Bohemia] because it forced
Napoleon to divide his forces; but what seemed truly inconceivable was that he
had so little expected an attack from Blücher that he had sent orders to the troops
that were fighting us to join his left so he could reunite all his forces against the
Grand Army”: “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 274.
22 In Russia Against Napoleon, 441, Lieven explains that “Napoleon took it for
granted that the bulk of the enemy army would be deployed in the only sensible
place, in other words east of the rivers Elster and Pleiße. His plan was to turn the
Allies’ right flank east of Liebertwolkwitz, smash through their center, and drive
Schwarzenberg’s army into the Pleiße. Even without Bernadotte and Bennigsen
the Allies had 205,000 troops available on 16 October against Napoleon’s 190,000.
But Schwarzenberg’s plan, even after modifications to appease Alexander, meant
that on the key southern front 138,000 French troops would face 100,000 Allies,
of which Constantine’s 24,000 reserves could not arrive on the battlefield for a
number of hours. Of course the Allies would outnumber Napoleon in other
sectors but the terrain would make it impossible to use this superiority. On the
first day at Leipzig Schwarzenberg therefore gave Napoleon a completely unneces-
sary chance to snatch victory against the odds and against the previous flow of the
autumn campaign” (emphasis added). Maude notes: “Thus failed one of the
greatest, if not the greatest strategic conception in history; for had it succeeded
Napoleon’s success must have been final and irrevocable. Nothing the Silesian
Army could have achieved on the other extremity of the battlefield could have
altered the final result, and the Austrian center columns between the Pleiße and
Elster could not conceivably have extricated themselves from their hopeless
predicament.” See Maude, Leipzig Campaign, 257.
23 Much credit must also be given to Alexander and his advisors Toll and Jomini for
forcing the modification of Schwarzenberg’s original plan of attack. In Napoleon’s
Last Campaign, 348, Petre discusses how the battle on the 16th could have
progressed had the Allies launched their attack based on Schwarzenberg’s original
disposition. Even with III, IV, and VI Corps unavailable, Napoleon could still
have won a tactical victory in the Wachau sector. That this did not occur is largely
due to Alexander’s decision to move up the reserves early in the battle to support
the attack of Wittgenstein’s five columns.
24 Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 441–42; Marmont, Mémoires, V:289–90; Frie-
derich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:116.
26 Gneisenau to Caroline, Leipzig, 19 October 1813, GStA PK, VI HA Rep. 92 Nl.
Gneisenau, Nr. 21.
27 Bernhardi, Toll, III:449; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:182; Neubauer, Pre-
ußens Fall und Erhebung, 475.
29 “Journal de Langeron,” Add MSS, 20112, 275–76.
30 Friederich argues that the gap between Bennigsen and Bernadotte could have
been filled by Bubna and Platov and, while the latter were too weak to prevent
Napoleon from escaping north or east to the Rhine, they could have reported a
French breakout early enough to enable Blücher and Bernadotte to advance
against his left flank while Bennigsen closed on his right. Even with 160,000
men, Napoleon could hardly hope to reach the Elbe without suffering consider-
able losses. See Friederich, Herbstfeldzug 1813, III:184.
31 “[Charles] Stewart decidedly says that he [Bernadotte] not only did nothing, but
willfully avoided doing anything,” notes Robert Wilson in his journal, “although
he might, by cooperating with Blücher, have crushed a great portion of the
enemy’s forces; and yet for such a fellow we are to pay £100,000 per month,
and sacrifice our best interests and another nation [Denmark] whose enmity will
be eternal”: Wilson, Private Diary, II:186.
32 Vaudoncourt, Histoire de la guerre, 218–19; Fain, 1813, II:430–32; Norvins,
Portefeuille de mil huit cent treize, II:414.
33 Lowe to Bunbury, Leipzig, 20 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 180; Stewart,
Narrative, 175–76.
34 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, II:24–25.
35 Pelet, Des principales opérations de la campagne de 1813, 278–80.
36 Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, 353; Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a
General, II:352.
39 Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, 88; Droysen, Yorck, II:237; Friederich, Herbstfeld-
zug 1813, III:269–71.
41 “Hitherto he [Napoleon] has marched with such expedition that the most
advanced of Blücher’s advance guard is twelve hours behind him”: Wilson to
Aberdeen, Hünfeld, 31 October 1813, in Wilson, Private Diary, II:474.
42 Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a General, II:366.
43 Blücher to Bonin, 4 November 1813, Blüchers Briefe, ed. Unger, 192.
Assessment 831

46 Lowe to Stewart, Erfurt, 31 October 1813, Add MSS, 20111, 198.
47 St.-Cyr, Mémoires, IV:148–50.
48 Odeleben, A Circumstantial Narrative, I:262.
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Index
Aachen, 793 overrules Barclay, 6

Abtnaundorf, 710, 713, 721, 729 relations with Blücher, 84, 405
Adelsdorf, 146, 154, 159, 188, 204–5, 229, 302, summons Blücher to Bohemia, 376–77
306, 311 Alps Mountains, 11
Adlerkreutz, Carl Johan, 516, 582, 589, 604, Alsleben, 551–52, 554, 556, 564–65, 582
632, 656, 679, 692, 749 Altenberg, 345, 354, 372
Ahrensdorf, 193 Altenburg, 25, 401, 403, 461–62, 491, 494, 508,
Aken, 458, 467, 470–71, 500, 504, 511–12, 517, 512, 519, 524, 529, 544–45, 559–60,
520–21, 526, 529, 547, 550, 552, 566–69, 586, 593, 608, 616, 716, 811
554, 556, 562, 566, 574, 577–78, 586, Althen, 706
589–92, 595–96, 603, 616–17, 619, Altjäschwitz, 170
691 Altjauer, 213
Alexander I (emperor/tsar), 23, 31, 33–34, 37, Altschönau, 113, 143, 146, 148, 154
39, 43, 46, 58, 63, 65, 68, 71–73, 77, Alzenau, 180, 302
79–80, 84, 88, 102–3, 106, 108, 139, American Revolutionary War, 81, 102, 150
160, 188, 200, 223, 229, 297, 325, 350, Anger, 735, 737
372, 378, 380–81, 400, 402, 404–5, Anglo-American War of 1812, 30
407, 409–10, 412–13, 416, 420, 442, Annaberg-Buchholz, 365, 524
451, 464–66, 555, 565, 567, 586–87, Annaburg, 496
589, 591–92, 609, 613, 615, 617, 691, Ansbach-Bayreuth, 81
758, 778, 797, 804, 807, 809, 814, 816, Anstedt, Johann von, 45
818–19 Antwerp, 793
as Allied generalissimo, 347, 349 Arbesau, 288
as liberator of Europe, 2 Armistice of Pläswitz, 6, 8, 10, 22–25, 27–30,
at Trachenberg, 34, 47–49, 51, 53 32–33, 35–37, 41–42, 44–45, 47, 49,
battle of Bautzen, 5 51–53, 66, 72, 75–77, 79, 83–84, 87,
battle of Leipzig, 636, 644, 691, 693, 695, 89–90, 92, 96, 98, 100, 107, 109–13,
701, 705, 717, 732–33, 735, 746 115, 117, 119, 121, 126–27, 136,
decides to continue war, 1–2 160–61, 167, 173, 199, 227, 235, 287,
explains armistice to British, 35 335, 355, 392, 424, 804–6, 808, 819
honors Wurschen Plan, 6 Army of Bohemia, 7, 110, 118–19, 141, 143,
hopes for Austrian alliance, 1 166, 170, 173, 178, 184, 188, 192–93,
hostility to Britain, 30 199, 212, 218, 325, 349, 351, 353–55,
in Austrian planning, 31 357, 369, 371–72, 374, 376–77, 382,
insists on a Prussian commanding Silesian 388–89, 399, 401–4, 406, 411, 440,
Army, 79 443, 465, 512, 521, 797, 804–5,
negotiates with Denmark, 34 809–11, 814–15, 820, 822
843
844 Index
Army of Bohemia (cont.) in Schwarzenberg’s planning, 404, 605, 609,

battle of Dresden, 8–9, 346 699
demonstration against Dresden, 374 in Trachenberg Protocol, 52–53
Dresden offensive, 8–9, 201, 308, 345 Leipzig campaign, 491, 504, 512, 517–18,
first Leipzig offensive, 200 589, 603, 630, 687
German offensive, 11 advance to Leipzig, 568, 604, 610–12, 615
in Allied planning, 23–29, 41–43, 59, 85–87, battle of Leipzig, 685, 690, 692–94, 698,
109, 347, 378, 406, 416, 465–66, 468, 701, 710, 712, 720–21, 724, 732, 735,
760 740, 747
in Austrian planning, 27, 54–55 battle of Möckern, 632, 666, 673, 683, 686
in Bernadotte’s planning, 469, 522 retreat to Saale, 550, 552, 555, 557, 562,
in Bernadotte’s Trachenberg proposal, 51 564–65, 579, 810
in Blücher’s planning, 110, 173, 225, 347, Napoleon’s opinion of, 357
355, 389, 403, 409, 411, 414, 422, 455, operations after Leipzig, 11
507, 511, 520–22, 554, 588–89 order of battle, 79, 89
in Gneisenau’s planning, 390 Army of Poland, 7, 101, 133, 197, 347, 349,
in Napoleon’s planning, 8, 10, 109, 136, 376, 382, 403, 405, 407, 409, 416, 419,
138–39, 415, 529, 531, 562, 574, 577, 423, 443, 464–65, 468, 524, 594, 686,
597, 697 690, 693, 698–99, 707, 709, 721, 736,
in Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf,” 55, 59 740, 747, 753, 761, 786, 813
in Reichenbach Plan, 59, 85, 199, 351, 390 crosses Oder, 212
in Schwarzenberg’s planning, 413, 607–8 in Allied planning, 79, 85, 87, 760
in Trachenberg Protocol, 52–53, 57 in Reichenbach Plan, 60
inertia, 372 in Trachenberg Protocol, 52
jeopardized by Blücher, 352 Army of Silesia, 7, 52, 64, 80, 88–89, 99, 101,
Leipzig campaign, 442, 454, 491, 510, 516, 103, 118–19, 126–27, 129, 159, 161,
551, 560, 565–69, 585, 589, 593, 170, 189, 193, 307, 380, 388, 402, 413,
597–98, 601, 612 525, 796–98, 805–10, 812–13, 817,
battle of Leipzig, 607, 614, 624, 627, 630, 822, 824–25
664, 683, 687–88, 690, 710, 716, 747 1814 campaign, 796
mood after Dresden, 351 advance guard corps, 353, 368
order of battle, 79 attrition, 225, 335, 349, 792, 795
retreat after Dresden, 345 awards for Katzbach, 380
Rhine offensive, 761, 779–80, 783, 788, 796 battle of the Katzbach, performance, 276
battle of Hanau, 791 discipline, 424
Army of North Germany, 7, 53, 78, 116, 118, Elbe crossing, 460, 468, 470, 472, 474,
126, 170, 178, 355, 392, 396, 405, 421, 489–91, 554
457, 464, 466, 552, 563, 679, 692, engagement at Goldberg, casualties, 211
694–95, 710, 721, 724, 732, 761, 778, engagement at Wartenburg, 489
797, 804, 807, 809, 815, 818 enters Neutral Zone, 114
battle of Dennewitz, 10, 374, 391 exhaustion of, 363
Elbe crossing, 11, 391, 460, 467, 470, 489, first retreat from Napoleon, 182, 185, 215
491 first Saxon offensive, 308, 345, 353–54, 360
Großbeeren (engagement), 3, 308 first Silesian offensive, 114, 132, 143, 145,
idle under Bernadotte, 401–2, 452 168, 171
in Allied planning, 25–27, 41, 86–87, 346, engagement at Löwenberg, 178
405–7, 465, 760 evaluation, 229
in Bernadotte’s planning, 469, 522 fourth Saxon offensive, 442
in Bernadotte’s Trachenberg proposal, 51 German offensive, 11
in Blücher’s planning, 402–3, 409, 411, 419, in Allied planning, 23–26, 28–29, 41–43, 48,
452, 468, 503, 508, 518, 520, 554, 605 78–79, 84–87, 141, 201, 325, 346,
in Gneisenau’s planning, 390, 441 371, 375, 405–6, 413, 416, 455–56,
in Napoleon’s planning, 8, 10, 108, 377, 415, 464, 468, 471, 563–64, 610, 760, 806
417, 430, 461, 536, 558, 560, 570, in Austrian planning, 27, 44, 54
575–79, 592 in Bernadotte’s planning, 391, 467, 469, 521,
in Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf,” 55–56 552, 606
in Reichenbach Plan, 60, 85, 199, 351 in Bernadotte’s Trachenberg proposal, 51
Index 845
in Blücher’s planning, 403, 414, 422, 455, suspicious of Bernadotte, 401

467, 503–4, 507–8, 520, 522 third Saxon offensive, 400, 407, 409, 419,
in Gneisenau’s planning, 390 428
in Napoleon’s planning, 8, 108–9, 136, 139, under Bernadotte’s command, 406
174, 359, 415, 427, 434, 440, 509, 517, Arnoldshof, 248
523–24, 526–27, 532, 535–36, 560, Arnsdorf, 422, 427
562, 570, 574, 592, 595, 597, 602, 625, Arrighi de Casanova, Jean-Toussaint, 537,
632, 670 540, 562, 581, 626, 714, 730, 750
in Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf,” 55–56, Arthur Wellesley, 32, 47
59 Aspern-Essling (battle), 826
in Reichenbach Plan, 58–60, 215, 233, Aube River, 798
351 Auenhain, 637–38, 644
in Schwarzenberg’s planning, 371–72, 404, Auerstedt, 779–80
413, 607–9, 612–13, 690, 699 Augereau, Charles Pierre François, 427, 469,
in Trachenberg Protocol, 52–53 529–30, 533, 538, 544, 553, 559, 562,
inadequate communications, 382 566, 575, 577, 585–86, 588, 605, 615,
internal discord, 335 638, 644, 697, 703, 743, 765, 812
lack of discipline, 363 August (prince), 718, 755
leadership, 292, 337, 390, 667 August Ferdinand (prince), 755
Leipzig campaign, 10, 491, 555, 603, 670 August William (prince), 755
advance to Leipzig, 568–69, 585, 594, Außig, 371, 374, 454, 524
611, 614 Austerlitz (battle), 55, 63, 102, 350
battle of Leipzig, 624, 688–89, 692, 694, Austria, 23, 26–27, 29–33, 35, 42–43, 45–49,
698, 707, 709–10, 721, 732, 735, 747 51, 56, 62–63, 76, 81, 138, 378, 528,
battle of Möckern, 614, 629–30, 633, 586, 589, 620, 793, 804
636, 642, 666, 668, 673, 682, Allied suspicion of, 22
686–87, 796 armed neutral, 1
drive to Mulde, 499–500, 502, 509, 511, Army of Bohemia, 6
513, 518 declares war on France, 110
retreat to Saale, 522, 547–48, 551–52, during Spring Campaign, 5
554–57, 562–65, 579, 810 forces Allies to accept Four Points, 31
line of communication, 504 Gitschin Agreement, 30
Napoleon’s thoughts on, 189 in Allied planning, 58
no commander named at Trachenberg, 53 in Napoleon’s planning, 108
official history, 113 in Trachenberg Protocol, 52
opinion of Bernadotte, 441 needed by Russia and Prussia, 1, 22,
order of battle, 78–79, 88–89 31–32
Prussian leadership of, 351 negotiates with Napoleon, 7, 31, 44
Rhine offensive, 760–61, 771, 775–80, negotiates with Russia and Prussia, 23, 30
782–83, 785–86, 788–89, 791, 793, Order of Maria Theresa, 381, 786
798, 824 policy toward Britain, 32
battle of Hanau, 791 policy toward Prussia, 32
right flank march to Elbe, 416, 421, 440, policy toward Russia, 31
442, 451–54, 456, 462, 464, 470 war planning, 27–28, 30, 64
Russian views of, 102, 104, 223 Austrian army,
second retreat from Napoleon, 363, 365, 1st Light Division, 372, 607, 613, 627, 699,
368–69 702, 716, 733, 747, 820
second Silesian offensive, 218–20, 225, 308, 2nd Light Division, 89, 141–42, 170, 308,
325, 327 346, 353–54, 371, 445, 530, 701, 706,
battle of the Katzbach, 9, 274–75, 286, 733–34, 747, 780
292 Peterwardeiner Grenzer Regiment, 709,
pursuit after Katzbach, 309, 311 722
Secret Disposition, 428–29, 547, 549, 580 I Corps, 567, 593, 600, 607–8, 690, 699, 702,
summoned to Bohemia, 346, 376, 378, 400, 734, 747, 780
411, 421, 442 1st Division, 734
supply problems, 321, 424–25 2nd Division, 704, 734
supply system, 89–91, 402 3rd Division, 704, 717, 734
846 Index
Austrian army, (cont.) Bad Lauchstädt, 763–64

II Corps, 524, 593, 607, 613, 627, 644, 690, Bad Liebenwerda, 428, 453, 457, 462–64, 496
699, 703, 716, 733, 747, 780 Bad Schandau, 138, 445
1st Division, 699, 716–17 Bad Schmiedeberg, 458, 502, 514, 549, 561,
2nd Division, 716 582
Reuß-Greiz Infantry Regiment, 716 Baillet de Latour, Theodor Franz von, 57–58,
III Corps, 568, 593, 608, 610, 613, 626–27, 68, 70
690, 699, 702, 704, 716, 747, 763, Baltic Sea, 1, 37, 42, 65, 388
765–66, 775, 780, 820 Barchfeld, 787–88
1st Division, 702 Barcinek, see Berthelsdorf
2nd Division, 702 Barclay de Tolly, Michael Andreas, 80, 101,
3rd Division, 702 103, 110, 116, 127, 132, 136–37, 140,
Kottulinsky Infantry Regiment, 702 173, 185, 188, 211, 219, 227, 272, 290,
IV Corps, 372, 568, 607–8, 627, 699, 706, 325, 345, 351, 354, 371, 404, 415, 417,
720, 734 607–9, 699, 701, 703–5, 707, 709,
2nd Division, 721 716–17, 719, 729, 732, 734,
3rd Division, 708 736, 780
Joseph Colloredo Infantry Regiment, 721 Allied commander in chief, 6, 23, 26–27,
Zach Infantry Regiment, 721 29–30
Kaiser Cuirassier Regiment, 708 battle of Leipzig, 627
Kaiser Hussar Regiment, 709 Commander in Chief of All Russian
Landwehr, 27 Forces, 78
mobilization, 44 complains about supply, 90
Alois Liechtenstein Infantry Regiment, 708 demonstration against Dresden, 372, 374,
General Staff, 28, 42, 60, 70, 606, 791 377
Hohenzollern Light Cavalry Regiment, 708 Gitschin Agreement, 30
Imperial Guard and Reserve, 593, 607, 627, instructs Blücher on Reichenbach Plan, 85,
637, 644, 699, 705, 716, 747, 780 88, 85, 85, 86, 87, 87
1st Division, 716 plan of operations, 26–28, 42, 52
1st Grenadier Division, 704 rumors of French, 87
2nd Division, 716 Bardo, see Wartha
Cuirassier Corps, 638, 733 Baruth, 170, 357
Hessen-Homburg Infantry Regiment, 716 Battle of Nations, see Leipzig (battle)
Austrian Littoral, 66 Baumersroda, 768
Austro-Bavarian army, 686, 748, 760, 790, 797 Bautzen, 4–5, 7, 109, 111, 137, 139, 162, 201,
Authausen, 580 309, 334, 353–54, 356–61, 364, 370,
Avice, Jacques-Philippe, 634, 675, 698 374, 377–78, 381–83, 385, 387, 389,
Axamitowsky, Vincent, 722 391, 399–400, 402–3, 405, 407,
409–12, 414, 417, 419–20, 423,
Baalsdorf, 707–8, 715 426–28, 433–34, 436–37, 439, 443,
Baben, 224 445, 449, 453, 456, 471, 499, 523–24,
Babin, see Baben 807, 809
Bachra, 780 Bautzen (battle), 4–6, 32, 45, 76, 80, 98, 126,
Bad Bibra, 777 413, 685, 827
Bad Düben, 11, 462, 468, 470–71, 483, 499– Bavaria, 27, 53, 59, 139, 469, 524, 528, 536,
500, 502–6, 508–10, 513–15, 517–19, 586, 589, 810
521–22, 526–27, 529, 535–39, 542, Bayreuth, 139
545, 547–50, 552–53, 557–58, Beauharnais, Eugene de (viceroy of Italy), 1–3
560–63, 567–70, 572–73, 577–79, Beck, August von, 717
582, 584–85, 587, 591–92, 594–97, Beerendorf, 557
599–600, 606, 608, 610, 612, 614, Beesen, 761
616–18, 624, 629–31, 639, 654–56, Befreiungskrieg, 2
667–68, 671, 673, 678, 687, Behringen, 783, 786
689, 711 Belgern, 515, 526
Bad Gottleuba-Berggießhübel, 138 Belgium, 39, 424, 798
Bad Kösen, 697, 716, 727, 762, 765–66, Bellwitzhof, 224, 238, 240, 243, 251–52, 254,
775–76, 779, 820 256, 258, 260, 275, 278
Index 847
Benardos, Panteleimon Yegorovich, 273, 282 criticized by Allies, 406

Bennewitz, 507, 513, 515, 533, 545 criticizes Allied Headquarters, 468
Bennigsen, Levin August von, 52, 101, 105, disliked by Gneisenau, 441
133, 197, 212, 347, 349, 352, 371, dismantles Elster bridge, 459, 462
376–77, 382, 390, 392, 402–3, 405–7, Elbe crossing, 11, 391, 457, 460–61, 467,
409, 416, 419–20, 422–23, 425, 431, 469–70, 472–73, 490–91, 500–2, 533
440, 442, 446, 454, 464–65, 510, 524, engagement at Großbeeren, 8, 193
528, 575, 753, 755, 760, 815, 817, feels betrayed by Alexander, 34
822–23 idle in Spring Campaign, 38, 43
battle of Leipzig, 600, 686, 689–90, 693, in Allied planning, 43, 370, 406–7, 416
701, 703–11, 717, 720–22, 724, 729, in Austrian planning, 54
732, 734–36, 740, 743, 746 in Blücher’s planning, 230, 349, 411, 414,
commands Army of Poland, 7, 79 452, 455, 465, 504, 507–8, 514, 520,
in Allied planning, 85 554, 605, 613, 793
in Reichenbach Plan, 60 in British planning, 34
Leipzig campaign, 568, 594, 615 in Gneisenau’s planning, 441
Rhine offensive, 765, 778 in Napoleon’s planning, 8, 10, 357, 377,
Berbisdorf, 113 414–15, 426, 430, 436, 461, 526,
Berdyayev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, 186, 300 528–29, 531, 559, 562, 571, 574,
Berezina (battle), 102, 770 576–79, 600, 632, 697
Berggießhübel, 415 in Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf,” 56
Berlin, 1, 3–4, 8, 11, 23, 25, 38, 43, 53, 86, 126, in Reichenbach Plan, 58
139, 225, 229, 356, 375, 421, 426, 437, in Schwarzenberg’s planning, 371, 606,
452, 461, 501, 521, 523, 532, 551, 559, 609–10
578–79, 585, 587–88, 596, 604, 631, in Trachenberg Protocol, 53
796, 807, 812, 827 Leipzig campaign, 491, 503–4, 507–8, 510,
French operations against, 42 512, 514, 517, 522, 630–31, 686
in Austrian planning, 55 advance to Leipzig, 567–68, 593–94, 601,
master plan, 9, 170, 199, 356–57, 359, 364, 604–6, 611–12, 614–15
374, 387, 562 agreements with Blücher, 695
Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste (crown prince of battle of Leipzig, 600, 686, 690, 696,
Sweden), 25, 33–34, 37, 42–43, 46, 706–7, 709–12, 715, 720–24, 729–30,
62, 68–69, 88, 108, 113–14, 120, 126, 732, 735, 737–38, 740, 746
160, 170, 199, 220, 229, 346, 357, 365, battle of Möckern, 632, 656, 664, 667, 673
375, 385, 387–88, 391, 400–2, 404–5, disingenuous behavior, 679, 691–94
409, 417, 419, 421, 443–44, 453, meets with Blücher, 511, 515–17, 553–54
458–59, 464, 467, 586, 589, 656, 720, reluctance to advance, 616–18
778, 807, 810–12, 814–19, 821–22 retreat to Saale, 11, 521–22, 547, 550–52,
Allied commitment to, 38 555–57, 564–66, 570
at Trachenberg, 34, 48, 53 wants to retreat, 521, 586–87, 590, 603
agrees to “Austria first” strategy, 48 letter to Francis I, 49
diplomatic success with Russians, 49 operations after Leipzig, 11
dissatisfied with Russians and Prussians, 48 outwits Blücher, 551–52
in Allied planning, 49 plan of operations, 39, 41, 52
leads council of war, 51 problems with Prussians, 391, 404, 442,
meets with Stadion, 48 452–53, 462–63, 466, 468–69, 555
opinions on Austria, 47–48 proposals to British, 36–37
plan of operations, 48, 51 reaction to Vitoria, 50
pleased by Allies, 50 rebuilds Elster bridge, 460
receives command of Army of North regarded as author of Trachenberg
Germany, 49 Protocol, 52
supports Toll’s proposals, 49 rejects Allied plans, 760
wants command of two Allied armies, 53 relations with subordinates, 423
battle of Dennewitz, 374, 405, 411, 413 requests support from Blücher, 421
commands Army of North Germany, 7, supports Blücher, 421
78–79 suspicious of Alexander, 37–38, 46
conditional command of Silesian Army, 53 wants to command largest Allied army, 39
848 Index
Bernburg, 512, 522, 550, 552, 554–56, 578, Blücher, Franz von, 417, 431, 446
582, 596–97, 606, 616–17 Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht von, 3, 72, 75,
Bernstadt auf dem Eigen, 362, 381–85, 109–11, 128, 140–41, 144, 182, 186,
399–400 188, 213, 219, 334, 349, 353, 372,
Bertelsdorf, 329, 331 375–76, 382, 387–88, 391, 402, 413,
Berthelsdorf, 114–15, 132, 139, 147–48, 153, 422, 432, 440, 443–44, 453, 466, 471,
170, 236, 278 483, 548, 550, 586, 604, 610, 656, 665,
Berthier, Alexandre, 83, 126, 140, 142, 162, 669, 686, 702, 731, 780, 793, 795,
174, 185–86, 191–92, 201, 218, 797–98, 805–18, 821–22, 824–25
246–47, 277, 323, 356–58, 376, 396, 1806 surrender at Lübeck, 277
414–15, 417, 428, 430–31, 438, agreements with Bernadotte, 694
443, 459–60, 462, 471, 506, 513, attrition of Landwehr, 363
523–24, 526–27, 529, 532–38, 563, awards for Katzbach, 381
572–73, 577, 597, 599–603, 667, battle of Leipzig, evaluation, 759
670, 715, 727, 745, 756, 758, battle of the Katzbach
765, 773 evaluation, 275, 279, 285, 288
Bertrand, Henri-Gatien, 165, 458–59, 461, praises Sacken, 252
470–71, 494, 496, 499–502, 505, praises troops, 276
513, 526–27, 535, 537, 546, 558, Bernadotte’s request for support, 421
561, 563, 573, 578, 582, 596, bravery, 211
602–3, 627, 634, 671, 684–85, candidate for Prussian army command, 73
701–2, 705, 715, 727–28, 762–63, changes strategy, 390, 399, 511
765–66, 770, 776, 779, 782, charisma, 292, 309
787–88, 797, 814–15, commands Silesian Army, 7
821–22 compliments Yorck, 261, 488
battle of Leipzig, 625, 671, 686, 697–99, cooperation with Bülow, 423, 442, 452
702 cooperation with Tauentzien, 420, 423, 428,
engagement at Blankenfelde, 193 452
engagement at Wartenburg, 474–75, 477, criticism of, 80
480–81, 483–85, 487, 489–90, decides to enter Neutral Zone, 113
527 defense of Silesia, 352
Best, Adalbert Johann de, 708 disappointed by Tauentzien, 464
Beucha, 706 dissatisfied over armistice, 75
Beurmann, Frédéric-Auguste, 161 Elbe crossing, 10, 460, 462, 467, 469–72,
Bianchi, Vincenzo Federico, 644, 703–4, 474, 490, 500
716–17 engagement at Wartenburg, 478–79, 483,
Bielanka, see Lauterseiffen 485–90
Bielowice, see Bellwitzhof explains retreat from Löwenberg, 184
Bieske, Carl Ludwig, 664 faulty staff work, 439
Billroda, 780 first retreat from Napoleon, 8, 182–83,
Birkenbrück, 195 185–89, 193, 204, 212, 214–16, 232
Bischofswerda, 354, 359, 400, 408–12, engagement at Goldberg, 201, 203,
419–22, 426, 428–39, 453, 457, 205–6, 210
463 entrenched camp at Neiße, 212
Bistrom, Adam Ivanovich, 147, 312, 327, 331, first Saxon offensive, 10, 345, 352–54,
384, 387, 410, 418, 655 359–60
Bitterfeld, 462, 470, 496, 500, 503, 508, 511, first Silesian offensive, 8, 114, 125, 128–32,
522, 527, 541, 547, 551, 553, 558, 563, 142–46, 148, 154, 156, 159, 165, 168,
565, 567, 569–71, 585, 590, 592, 594, 171–73, 175, 204
605–6, 617 attempt to trap Ney, 165
Black Elster River, xi, 416, 436, 442, 454, engagement at Deutmannsdorf, 156
456, 460, 471, 473, 486, engagement at Löwenberg, 178–79,
496, 550 181–82
Black Hussars, see Prussian army: I Corps: evaluation, 228–29
2nd Leib Hussar Regiment friction, 131, 144
Bleddin, 471, 474–77, 479–84, 488–89, prepares to cross Bober, 169–70
500–1 forces concessions from Barclay, 88
Index 849
fourth retreat from Napoleon, 434, 436 plans first Saxon offensive, 309
fourth Saxon offensive, 439 policy toward Russians and Prussians, 106
frustrates Napoleon, 426, 436 praised by Müffling, 292
frustration after Katzbach, 304–6, 308 praises Russians, 211
in Allied planning, 25, 347, 406, 465, 468 praises Sacken, 288
in Bernadotte’s planning, 391, 467, 512, 521, praises Silesian Landwehr, 92
551–52 praises troops, 211
in Macdonald’s planning, 237, 277–78 praises Yorck’s 2nd Brigade, 210
in Napoleon’s planning, 8, 137, 139, prepares to enter Neutral Zone, 112–13
141–42, 174, 331, 356, 359, 377, 387, problems of supply and discipline, 425
414–15, 426–27, 430–31, 437–40, problems with Langeron, 102–4, 148–49,
523–25, 527–29, 531–32, 535–37, 166, 185–87, 194, 211, 227, 233,
558–59, 561–62, 571, 574, 576–79, 249–50, 271, 289, 292, 311–12, 379,
594–95, 597, 600, 625, 632, 670, 383
697, 782 problems with Sacken, 167
in Reichenbach Plan, 85 problems with Yorck, 99–100, 131, 168–69,
in Schwarzenberg’s planning, 201, 371, 194, 214, 219, 221–22, 224, 227, 233,
404–5, 413, 605–9, 690, 791 251, 291, 298, 303–5, 321–24, 511,
Knesebeck’s advice, 465 792, 796
Leipzig campaign, 11, 491, 516 promoted to field-marshal, 776
advance to Leipzig, 566–69, 585–86, 588, propaganda, 295
591–94, 601, 605, 607, 609–11, Prussian Suvarov, 777
613–14 pushes army to exhaustion, 363
agreements with Bernadotte, 695 reasons for violating armistice, 112
battle of Leipzig, 600, 687–90, 692, 696, receives command of Silesian Army, 85, 88
698, 701, 706–7, 710–11, 714, 723, receives Great Cross of Iron Cross, 380
725, 730, 732, 735, 740–42, receives instructions from Barclay, 85–87
744, 746 refuses summons to Bohemia, 402–5,
battle of Möckern, 614, 626–27, 629–32, 409–11, 416
635, 638, 641–42, 645, 648–49, relations with Alexander, 85
655–56, 659, 664, 666–68, 670, relations with Gneisenau, 81, 219, 293,
672–73, 675, 682, 687, 690 388–89
drive to Mulde, 499–505, 507–15, 517–19 relations with Knesebeck, 84
meets with Bernadotte, 510–11, 515–17, relations with Müffling, 82–83, 294
553–54 relations with Russians, 106, 127, 223, 228,
meets with Bülow, 555 292, 425, 787
retreat to Saale, 11, 521–22, 547–50, 552, relations with Sacken, 106, 167, 223
556–57, 563–65, 570–71, 579, 810 relations with Schwarzenberg, 351
Schwarzenberg’s disposition, 612–13, 615 relations with Stein, 84
Schwarzenberg’s revised disposition, 613 relations with subordinates, 292
unsupported by Bernadotte, 616–18 relations with troops, 292, 309
liberates Silesia, 335 requests Bernadotte to act, 365
meets with Tauentzien, 463 resented by Langeron, 102
misleads Napoleon, 430 Rhine offensive, 759, 761, 765, 774–77,
mobilizes Landsturm, 296, 309 779–89, 792–95, 797
monitors Neutral Zone, 87 right flank march to Elbe, 401, 405–7, 413,
needs a battle, 219, 225 416, 420, 423, 441–43, 451–57,
news from tsar, 464 462–64, 470–71
news of Scharnhorst, 73 role in Reichenbach Plan, 87–88, 215, 230
offends Sacken’s Russians, 289 Saxon offensives, 443
offensive to Elbe, 349 evaluation, 387–88
offers resignation, 88 second retreat from Napoleon, 361–62,
on Russian Imperial Guard, 106 364–66, 368–69, 378
opposes multinational Allied armies, 106 second Saxon offensive, 381–85, 387, 391
opposes Schwarzenberg, 345–46, 349, second Silesian offensive, 9, 218–20, 225,
351–52, 371, 377 232, 296, 316, 318–19, 325–27, 329,
personality, 100 331–32, 356
850 Index
Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht von (cont.) Bohosudov, see Mariaschein

battle of the Katzbach, 238, 240, 243–44, Bolesławice, see Tillendorf
247, 250, 254–55, 260–62, 270–71, Bolesławiec, see Bunzlau
274, 287–88 Bolkenhain, 115, 131–32, 134, 142, 162, 232
pursuit after Katzbach, 296–97, 299, 303, Bolstern von Boltenstern, Ferdinand Wilhelm
309, 311 Franz, 163, 447, 496
seeks to enter Neutral Zone, 90, 110–11, Bony, François, 525, 532
113 Borcke, Karl August Ferdinand von, 98,
Silesian offensives, evaluation, 334, 336 256–57, 662
summoned to Bohemia, 376–77 Bordessoulle, Étienne, 447, 644, 676
summons Bernadotte to cross Elbe, 401, Borna, 415, 560, 567–68, 571, 585, 593, 608,
403–4, 411 614, 732, 812
supply problems, 424 Borodino (battle), 826
supported by king, 291 Borozdin II, Nikolay Mikhailovich, 334,
supported by Stein and Hardenberg, 80 384–85, 387, 399, 409–10, 418, 432,
suspicious of Bernadotte, 400–1, 412, 442, 434
462, 466, 468, 470, 491, 507–8, 520, Borstell, Karl Leopold von, 423, 459, 462,
551–55, 564, 566, 587–90, 603–5, 470–71, 504, 511, 513, 557, 724, 735,
612, 614, 691–93 737–39, 742–43
third Saxon offensive, 400, 407, 409–10, plan of operations, 42–43
412–13, 417, 419–20, 422, 426, Borzucki, 113
428–29, 434 Boyen, Hermann von, 68, 80, 452, 470, 618
upsets Napoleon’s master plan, 357 plan of operations, 42, 52
view of Cossacks, 424 Brabant, 794
violates armistice, 126, 160–61 Brachów, see Brechelshof Estate
Bobbau, 550, 553 Brandeis-Altbunzlau, 44, 52, 69
Bober River, 8, 10, 110–11, 115, 134, Brandenburg, 8, 41–43, 52, 86–87, 92, 107–8,
136–37, 139–40, 142–45, 147–58, 550–52, 568
166–76, 178–82, 184, 192–93, Cottbus District, 77
195–97, 215, 217, 226, 229, 232, in Austrian planning, 54
274, 277, 288, 301, 304, 306, 309, in Reichenbach Plan, 60
311–12, 315–16, 318–19, 321–22, Brandis, 706
325–29, 332, 335, 342, 363, 387, Brandýs nad Labem-Stará Boleslav,
424, 807 see Brandeis-Altbunzlau
in Allied planning, 86 Braunau, 155, 178, 327
in Napoleon’s planning, 108 Braunsbedra, 766
Bóbr, see Bober River Brayer, Michel-Sylvestre, 246, 258–59, 262–64,
Bobrzyca, see Kleinen Bober River 282, 596, 626, 672, 714, 723–24
Bogdanov, Aleksandr, 316 Brechelshof estate, 238, 243, 246, 251, 253–54,
Bohemia, 8, 25–26, 30, 39, 41, 43–44, 50–51, 260–61, 273, 275, 280–81, 287–89,
53–54, 58, 64–65, 68, 70, 78, 80–81, 297
85, 87, 90, 136–40, 142, 162, 189, 191, Brehna, 517, 553, 555, 567, 569, 585, 606, 616
199–200, 211, 217–18, 220, 230, 290, Breitenfeld, 595, 599, 630, 633, 641–42, 652,
331, 345–47, 349–54, 356, 361–62, 654, 671, 675–76, 684, 691–92,
365, 369, 371–72, 376–78, 382, 390, 695–96, 710–11, 749–50, 754, 757, 818
400, 402–7, 409, 411–12, 414–17, Breitenfeld (battle), 620
420–21, 423, 425, 430, 442, 461, 464, Bremen, 107
468, 492, 494, 502, 560, 805, 807, 809, Brennik, see Rothbrünnig
812 Breslau, 32, 65, 78, 86, 89, 110–12, 114–15,
in Allied planning, 351 117, 119, 125, 127, 137, 195, 287, 328,
in Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf,” 55 409
in Reichenbach Plan, 60 Briche, André Louis, 475, 481–82, 485
in Trachenberg Protocol, 53 Brieg, 119
Bohemian-Leipa, 403 Britain,
Böhlitz, 538 Austrian hostility toward, 23
Böhmisch-Kannitz, 396 House of Commons, 67
Böhmisch-Leipa, 140, 396 ignored by three Eastern powers, 32
Index 851
little leverage in Central Europe, 33 battle of Leipzig, 709–10, 712–13,

subsidies to allies, 33–36, 67 720–22, 724–25, 732, 734–36, 738,
success in Iberia, 32 740–44, 746–47
support for Russia and Prussia, 1 battle of Möckern, 632
suspicious of Austria, 23, 32, 35 meets with Blücher, 516, 555
suspicious of Russia and Prussia, 22, 30, 35 retreat to Saale, 522, 547, 549–50, 553,
wants grand alliance, 23, 30, 32 555–57, 564–65
British Congreve Rocket Battery, 713, military governor of Brandenburg, 92
722–23 plan of operations, 42–43
Brockhausen, Wilhelm Ernst von, 549 siege of Wittenberg, 452, 458, 461
Bromberg, 249 suspicious of Bernadotte, 400–1, 404
Brösen, 518 Bunbury, Henry, 66
Bruckdorf, 550–52, 554–55, 567, 585, 610–11, Bunzlau, 8, 77, 86, 108, 110–11, 115, 123,
732, 761 129–30, 136–39, 143, 148–49, 153,
Brünneck, Karl Otto von, 252 155, 157, 165–67, 170–75, 178–79,
Brunów, see Braunau 185, 188–89, 195, 197, 199, 204–5,
Brunswick, Charles William Ferdinand of 218, 220, 232, 238, 268, 303, 306,
(duke), 278, 583 310–12, 315–16, 318–19, 322–29,
Brussels, 793 331–32, 343
Brzeg, see Brieg Drüssel estate, 326
Brzeźnik, see Birkenbrück Kessel Hill, 325
Bubna, Ferdinand von, 32, 50–51, 89, 170, Bunzlau (engagement), 179–80, 182
370–72, 378, 394, 396, 409, 412–13, Buonaparte, see Napoleon I (emperor)
422, 428, 434, 436, 439, 442, 444, 447, Burghoff, Friedrich August von, 658, 768–69
453–54, 457, 465, 470, 503–4, 530, Burgliebenau, 732, 761
539, 560, 567, 615, 699, 706–7, 709, Burscheidungen, 780
711, 720, 722, 724–25, 733–34, 753, Buttelstedt, 697, 779–80
780, 797, 812 Buttlar, 788
first Saxon offensive, 354, 360
Rhine offensive, 796 Calbe, 512
second retreat from Napoleon, 362, 367–68 Čáslav, see Czaslau
second Saxon offensive, 381, 385 Castlereagh, Viscount (Robert Stewart), 30,
third Saxon offensive, 409, 412 33, 39, 46–47, 50, 61–62, 65, 67, 71
Budin, 69, 346 concerns about Bernadotte remaining idle,
Budyně, see Budin 39
Bühlau, 418, 432–33, 440 fears continental peace, 34
Bühlau heights, 418 on Allied support for Bernadotte, 38
Bülow, Friedrich Wilhelm von, 38, 68, 72, 80, on war materiel for Allies, 38
99, 388, 421, 423, 458, 467, 469, 525, reaction to Bernadotte’s concerns, 38
596, 723, 735, 798, 816, 823 rejects federative paper proposal, 35
1815 Campaign, 781 responds to news of armistice, 33
assigned to Army of North Germany, 79 subsidies for Austria, 35
battle of Dennewitz, 374, 388, 391 subsidies to Allies, 36
commands III Corps, 73, 91 support for Sweden, 34
cooperation with Blücher, 442, 452, 456, Cathcart, William, 34–36, 45–47, 61–62, 67,
466–67, 472 69, 748
dislikes Bernadotte, 452–53, 467, 511, 587, British representative at Allied
692–94 headquarters, 39
Elbe crossing, 470, 491, 500–1, 504 concludes subsidy treaty with Russians, 35
Elster bridge, 458–61 Caucasus, 102
engagement at Großbeeren, 193, 308 Caulaincourt, Armand de, 45, 174, 379, 538
in Allied planning, 23–24, 26, 29, 43 Česká Kamenice, see Böhmisch-Kannitz
in Blücher’s planning, 419, 423, 465, 520 Česká Lı́pa, see Böhmisch-Leipa
in Gneisenau’s planning, 441 Chaplits, Yefim Ignatiyevich, 706–7, 720
Leipzig campaign, 499, 511–13, 517–18, Charpentier, Henri-François, 265, 274, 707–8,
686, 691 738, 742, 747
advance to Leipzig, 568, 604–5, 616–17 Chastel, Louis-Pierre, 525, 533, 535, 544, 546
852 Index
Cheb, see Eger 652–55, 668, 671, 675, 677–78, 684,

Chemnitz, 55, 200, 352, 376, 404, 406, 416, 688–89, 698, 714, 730
430, 454, 461, 465, 468, 494, 503, Dahlen, 494, 507, 515, 533, 535, 545–46
512, 523–27, 531, 542, 567, 593, Dahlenberg, 503–5
607, 811 Dalmatia, 66
Chernishev, Aleksandr Ivanovich, 25, 419, 491 Danube River, 40–41, 53, 64
Chlumec, see Kulm Danzig, 31, 63, 72, 101, 122, 579, 820
Chmieleń, see Langwasser Daru, Pierre-Antoine, 530–31
Chmielno, see Ludwigsdorf Davout, Louis-Nicolas, 8, 11, 79, 108–9,
Chojnów, see Haynau 356–57, 375, 388, 421, 466, 560, 579,
Chomutov, see Komotau 587–89, 778, 826
Chościszowice, see Neuschönfeld De˛bowy Gaj, see Siebeneichen
Chrastava, see Kratzau Děčı́n, see Tetschen
Christianenhöhe Farmstead, 243, 245, 252–54, Decouz, Pierre, 704, 717
258 Defrance, Jean-Marie, 459, 494, 503, 558,
Chroślice, see Hennersdorf 625–26, 634, 670–71, 684, 697–98,
Clarke, Henri, 139, 375 722
Clausewitz, Carl von, 82–83, 219, 276, 291, Delitz am Berg, 761
296, 304, 308, 411, 426, 442, 760, 778, Delitzsch, 462, 470, 500–1, 503–5, 507–8,
798–99 510–13, 517, 541, 545, 547, 553,
Coburg, 697 557–58, 563, 567, 570, 572, 584–89,
Coëhorn, Louis-Jacques, 633, 640, 667, 724 592, 595, 601, 605–6, 614, 616, 626,
Colditz, 446, 537, 559, 568, 593, 615, 732, 754 629–32, 639, 673–74, 684
Colloredo-Mansfeld, Hieronymous Karl von, Delmas, Antoine-Guillaume, 267, 301, 574,
593, 615, 690, 693, 703–4, 716–17, 654–55, 665, 669, 671–73, 675, 678,
720, 729, 732, 734, 736, 753, 821 688–89, 723, 725
Cologne, 793, 796 Demitz-Thumitz, 435, 439
Compans, Jean-Dominique, 650–51, 667, 675, Denisiyev, Luc Alekseyevich, 182, 196, 300
698, 724, 748 Denmark, 34, 38–39, 46, 49, 441, 830
Confederation of the Rhine, 2, 11, 44, 65, 378, Dennewitz (battle), xiv, 10, 15, 374, 377, 388,
528 391, 398, 400–1, 403–5, 409, 411,
Connewitz, 575, 585, 595, 608, 625, 670, 697, 413, 421, 424, 442, 452–53, 457, 466,
699, 711, 717, 727, 729, 733, 815 528, 773, 805, 827
Constantine (grand duke), 78, 93, 118, 593, Dermoncourt, Paul Ferdinand, 249
609, 829 Dessau, 11, 426, 430, 457–60, 471, 494, 501–4,
Convention of Åbo, 43, 49 511–12, 517, 525–26, 536–37, 547,
Convention of Dresden, 45, 48 550, 552–53, 556, 558, 561–63,
Convention of Reichenbach, 44–45, 48, 68 565–66, 568, 570–72, 574–75, 578,
Convention of Tauroggen, 96, 99 586–87, 590–91, 596–97, 605,
Corbineau, Jean-Baptiste, 191 615–17, 624, 631
Coswig, 420, 470, 491, 494, 500, 502, 570–71, Deutmannsdorf, 155–56, 166–68, 171, 176,
574, 577 182, 185–86, 196
coup de théâtre, 107, 579, 583, 807, 811 Deutmannsdorf (engagement), 155
Crenneville, Louis Charles Folliot de, 702 Deutschlissa, 114, 125, 127
Cröbern, 573–75, 598, 627, 637–38, 644, 702, Diebitsch, Hans Karl von, 52, 88, 375, 608–9
704 Dietrich, Christian Karl, 219
Crottendorf, 729, 734, 737, 815 Dippelsdorf, 152, 327, 329
crown prince of Sweden, see Bernadotte Dippoldiswalde, 428
Csollich, Markus von, 702 Doberschütz, 538
Czaple, see Hockenau Dohna, 266, 374, 428
Czaslau, 41 Dohnau, 185, 188, 197, 220, 224, 238,
Czerwony Kościół, see Rothkirch 242–44, 247, 253, 266–67,
279, 283
Da˛browa Bolesławiecka, see Eichberg Dokhturov, Dmitry Sergeyevich, 347, 419,
Da˛browski, Jan Henryk, 459, 461–62, 503, 707–9, 720
507, 510, 513, 527, 537–38, 542, 545, Dölitz, 600, 625–26, 644, 697, 703–4, 715–17,
558, 561, 569–74, 582, 599, 635, 729, 733, 815
Index 853
Dommitzsch, 502, 504, 509–11, 514, 543, 559 Eger River, 25, 53, 346, 351, 446, 465, 529
Dönhoff, Sophia, 676 in Austrian planning, 55
Dösen, 600, 625, 672, 697, 703–4, 715–16, 729, Eibenstock, 524
815 Eichberg, 173
Doumerc, Jean-Pierre, 463, 470 Eichholtz, 238, 252–54, 258, 261–62, 278, 283,
Dresden, 3, 8–10, 15, 25, 28–29, 41, 44, 50, 53, 288–89, 308, 311
58–59, 62, 108–9, 130, 137, 139–41, Eichrodt, 784, 786
143–44, 162–63, 171, 174, 189, 191, Eilenburg, 494, 499, 502–3, 505–6, 508–10,
193, 201, 204, 218, 306, 309, 325, 329, 513, 515, 517–19, 522–23, 526,
331, 334, 345–47, 350, 353, 355–60, 533–39, 541–42, 545, 548–49,
362, 364, 369, 371–72, 374–77, 379, 551–52, 557–60, 562, 567–68, 574,
382, 387–89, 391, 399–403, 406, 582, 584–85, 588, 593, 596, 605–6,
408–9, 412–14, 416–17, 419, 422–23, 608, 614, 624, 630–31, 670, 673, 686,
428–30, 433, 436–40, 442, 445–46, 688, 691–93, 710, 749
449, 455–57, 462–64, 468–69, 491, Eisenach, 777–79, 781–90, 795
493–96, 502–3, 505, 508–9, 512, Eisenberg, 766
514, 516, 518–19, 523, 525–26, Eisendorf, 130, 132, 134
530–32, 536, 540, 544–45, 548, Eisenhart, Friedrich von, 310
550, 552, 555–56, 560, 562, Eisleben, 779
567–68, 575–76, 579, 596, 620, Elbe River, 4, 6, 10, 29, 65–66, 107, 109–10,
692, 711, 727, 804–5, 807, 809, 812, 115, 130, 136, 139, 141, 173, 178, 184,
820, 827 189, 193, 201, 220, 290, 325, 331,
French base, 25–26, 40–41, 48, 59, 107, 109, 346–47, 349–50, 357, 361, 370–72,
136, 139, 189, 193, 200, 346, 359, 362, 374, 376–78, 385, 389, 391, 401–4,
390, 404, 414, 437, 464, 468, 530–31 406, 409, 412, 414, 416–17, 419–21,
in Napoleon’s planning, 7 423, 426, 428–30, 436–42, 444–45,
in Reichenbach Plan, 199 447, 451–78, 480–81, 483, 485, 490,
Dresden (battle), 8–10, 331, 334, 345, 351, 375, 492, 496, 499–502, 504, 508–11, 514,
685, 768, 810, 814, 816 517–22, 524–25, 527, 529–31, 533,
Drissa, 91, 119 536, 538, 540, 545, 547, 549, 551–54,
Drouot, Antoine, 583–84, 643–44 556–57, 559–60, 562–63, 567–71,
Druot, Jean, 651 573–75, 577–79, 582, 586–93,
Düben Moor, 549, 553 596–97, 603–6, 608–9, 615–17, 624,
duc de Castiglione, see Augereau 691, 694, 760, 786, 791, 807–13,
duc de Padua, see Arrighi 815–17
duc de Raguse, see Marmont in Allied planning, 23, 25–29, 39–42, 48, 52,
Duchy of Nassau, 797 86–87, 376, 405–6
Duka, Ilya, 704 in Austrian planning, 44, 54
duke of Wellington, see Arthur Wellesley in Bernadotte’s planning, 391
Dunino, see Dohnau in Blücher’s planning, 112, 143–44, 219, 230,
Durchwehna, 580 308, 403–4, 409, 411, 414
Durrieu, Antoine-Simone, 597 in Gneisenau’s planning, 390
Durutte, Pierre-François, 709, 713, 721–23, in Napoleon’s planning, 7, 107–9, 136,
725, 727, 730, 740, 742 138–40, 356
Dworek, see Höfel in Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf,” 55, 59
Dzierżoniów, see Reichenbach in Reichenbach Plan, 58
Dziwiszów, see Berbisdorf in Schwarzenberg’s planning, 404
in Trachenberg Protocol, 53
East Friesland, 66 Elster, 423, 453, 456, 458–61, 463, 466, 468,
East Prussia, 77, 105 470–72, 474, 489, 496, 499,
Eastern Neisse, see Glatzer Neiße River 501, 525
Ebersbach, 354 Elster River, 517, 550, 554, 595, 608–12,
Ebersdorf, 368, 377, 384 624–25, 627, 631, 634, 636, 642,
Eckartsberg, 138 645–46, 664, 669, 676, 689, 697, 699,
Eckartsberg Mountains, 770 701–2, 727, 732, 735, 745–46,
Eckartsberga, 775, 778–80 760–61, 765, 778, 814, 817, 820,
Eger, 41 823–24
854 Index
Elsterwerda, 404, 422–23, 453, 457, 462–64, Frankfurt-am-Main, 11, 727, 788–91, 793–94,
469, 523–24 802
Emil of Hessen-Darmstadt, 743, 747 Frankleben, 764
Emmanuel, Yegor Arsenyevich, 150, 182, Franquemont, Friedrich von, 458, 461,
269, 300, 315, 365, 394, 419, 432, 470–71, 474, 476, 479, 481–82, 489,
435, 486, 490, 508, 510, 513, 585, 494
629, 639, 652, 654, 668, 679, 711, Frederick II (king), 81, 487, 718, 755, 775
713–14, 721 Frederick Augustus (king), 536, 559–60,
Ende, Friedrich Albrecht von, 103, 148, 250, 596, 722, 729, 736, 746, 755, 762
272 Frederick Joseph of Hessen-Homburg, 593,
Engelsdorf, 706–7, 709, 722 699, 703–5
Engeström, Lars von, 68 Frederick William II (king), 676, 755
Erfurt, 370, 376, 427, 436, 513, 531, 553–54, Frederick William III (king), 1, 6, 22, 32, 34,
686, 697, 727, 729, 756, 760, 763, 39, 42–43, 46, 58, 68, 72–73, 77, 79,
776–83, 786, 788, 803, 816, 824 84, 88, 91–92, 95–96, 106, 108, 116,
Erfurt, University of, 81 120, 173, 201, 222, 228, 294, 297, 339,
Ermattungsstrategie, 57 350, 352, 354, 378, 380–81, 391, 405,
Erzgebirge Mountains, 59, 199–200, 308, 345, 407, 412–13, 416, 442, 465, 469, 471,
351, 370, 372, 377, 387, 404, 406, 413, 488–89, 547, 644, 682, 693, 695, 701,
416–17, 503, 524, 529, 562, 811 705, 733, 735, 746, 755, 761, 776, 791,
in Austrian planning, 55 807, 816
Espenhain, 607 at Trachenberg, 47–49, 51, 53
Eugen of Württemberg, 372, 627, 637, 644, awards Black Eagle to Yorck, 291
705, 719 dislikes Schwarzenberg, 63
Eutritzsch, 596, 600–1, 615, 625–26, 634, 636, on Bernadotte, 49
641–43, 652, 655–56, 662, 664–65, supports Blücher’s right flank march, 405
668, 671, 675, 684, 687–90, 696, 714, Freiberg, 200, 356, 359, 372, 374, 388, 430,
732, 760 464, 469, 503, 509–10, 524, 526–27,
Exelmans, Rémy-Joseph, 241, 258–59, 262, 265 544–45
Freiburg, 529, 697, 727
Fabrice, Friedrich Joseph von, 698, 713 Freiroda, 611, 616, 629, 631, 638, 691
Fain, Agathon, 729 French army,
Falkenberg, 232, 561 27th Division, 459, 494, 503, 505, 508, 527,
Falkenhain, 119, 513 538, 541, 545, 558, 561, 563, 569–71,
Falkenhausen, Friedrich von, 97, 163, 299, 574, 634, 671, 730
327, 354, 412, 414, 445, 447, 519 49th Regiment, 432
federative paper, 35–36 I Cavalry Corps, 8, 109, 111, 116, 122,
Fehebeutel, 130 137–38, 140, 174, 181, 189, 191,
Ferchland, 517, 521–22 196, 230, 356, 359, 367, 374, 387,
Ferdinand II (Holy Roman Emperor), 620 394, 414, 426, 430, 437, 449, 461, 494,
Figner, Aleksandr Samoilovich, 86, 133, 379, 499, 502, 505–6, 513–14, 526–27,
574 533–35, 537, 540, 545–46, 563,
Finland, 33 570–71, 573, 577, 582, 584, 600,
Fiume, 66 625, 638, 705, 725, 763, 765–66,
Fontanelli, Appiani, 458, 471–72, 475, 480, 782, 807
484–85, 489, 494 1st Heavy Division, 447, 524, 598, 644,
Förstchen, 428 676
Fournier, François, 494, 503, 507, 558, 626, 1st Light Division, 191, 638
634, 652, 665, 670–71, 675, 684, 698 3rd Heavy Division, 463
Fournier, Jean-Louis, 714 3rd Light Division, 196, 365, 525, 558,
Francis I (emperor/kaiser), 2, 5–6, 22, 30–31, 570
42, 44–47, 49, 52, 55, 57–58, 62–64, I Corps, 9, 77, 108–9, 122, 137–39, 141,
66, 69, 201, 693, 695, 705, 747, 819, 162, 356, 359, 369, 372, 414–15,
822 417, 429, 446, 505, 530–31, 533,
Franconia, 469 544, 568, 620
Frankenstein, 91, 115, 117, 331, 349 1st Division, 139, 141–42
Frankenthal, 422, 433, 447 2nd Division, 141, 162
Index 855
3rd Division, 141, 162 359, 385, 389, 399, 430, 432–33,
battle of Dresden, 345–46 437–38, 447, 449, 464, 471, 494,
engagement at Kulm, 350, 354 506–7, 509, 513–15, 517, 523–25,
II Cavalry Corps, 8, 108–11, 116, 122–23, 527, 532–36, 539, 541, 544–45, 558,
136, 138, 155, 173–74, 185, 188, 192, 561, 563, 569–71, 577, 582, 591,
195–96, 201, 217–18, 245–46, 258, 599–603, 625–26, 632, 634, 636,
264, 277–78, 342, 357, 359, 385, 638, 643–44, 654, 661, 664, 669–72,
437–38, 470, 523, 527, 529–32, 675, 684, 697–98, 702, 714,
535–36, 544–46, 558, 561, 563, 726–27, 730, 757, 762–63, 765,
569, 571, 574, 578, 582, 600, 625, 814, 829
638, 670, 698, 708, 721, 726, 764–66, 8th Division, 97, 111, 119–20, 123, 131,
782, 823 146, 153, 156, 179, 182–83, 186,
2nd Heavy Division, 241, 258, 265 246–47, 258–59, 262–64, 274, 281,
2nd Lancer Regiment, 245, 265 525, 532, 574, 626, 654, 671–72, 714,
2nd Light Division, 89, 141–42, 170, 241, 723, 749
245, 258, 558, 570 9th Division, 111, 130, 246–47, 267,
3rd Hussar Regiment, 245 301, 526, 574, 654, 671, 678, 723,
4th Lancer Regiment, 245 725, 730
4th Light Division, 241, 258 10th Division, 111, 130, 246, 267–68, 302
5th Hussar Regiment, 245 10th Hussar Regiment, 267, 514
9th Hussar Regiment, 245 11th Division, 111, 123, 246, 267–68, 302,
11th Chasseur Regiment, 245, 265 526, 626, 644, 671–72, 723, 730
11th Hussar Regiment, 260 34th Line Regiment, 259
12th Chasseur Regiment, 245, 265 36th Division, 123, 136, 139, 181, 186,
23rd Chasseur Regiment, 260 242, 327, 470
24th Chasseur Regiment, 260 39th Division, 111, 123, 180, 188, 192,
battle of the Katzbach, 236–37, 241–42, 197, 246, 299, 306, 328, 331–32, 342,
246, 265, 275, 280, 285 707, 730, 739, 743
evacuates Silesia, 328 Badenese Light Dragoon Regiment, 267
retreat after Katzbach, 306 battle of the Katzbach, 235–37, 241,
II Corps, 3–4, 7, 9, 77, 108–9, 111, 122, 246–47, 262, 267, 277, 280,
137–38, 142, 195, 356, 359, 374, 387, 282, 285
414, 430, 446, 524, 527, 531, 544–45, evacuates Silesia, 312, 326, 328
581, 598, 600, 625, 637–38, 643–44, Reserve Artillery, 525
686, 697, 705, 718, 721, 726, 728, 765, retreat after Katzbach, 299, 306
782, 823 IV Cavalry Corps, 109, 111, 116, 122,
2nd Infantry Regiment, 719 137–38, 142, 359, 385, 427, 449, 461,
4th Infantry Regiment, 719 524, 544–45, 598, 600, 625, 697,
6th Division, 719 726, 823
18th Infantry Regiment, 719 IV Corps, 4, 7–8, 11, 77, 108, 122, 171, 214,
battle of Dresden, 346 359, 427, 430, 446, 457, 459–61, 470,
engagement at Kulm, 350 474, 493–94, 500, 505–7, 513, 527,
III Cavalry Corps, 8, 108, 116, 122, 355, 535, 541, 545–46, 549, 558, 561, 563,
430, 461, 494, 500, 507, 527, 533, 569, 572, 577, 582, 584, 593, 596, 598,
537–38, 544–45, 563, 625, 670–71, 600, 602–3, 625–27, 670–71, 684,
725, 765–66, 788, 829 697–99, 727–28, 747, 753, 787, 814,
4th Heavy Division, 459, 494, 503–4, 821, 829
537–38, 541, 558, 561, 625, 634, 671, 8th Infantry Regiment, 481
697–98, 703, 722 12th Division, 458, 471, 474, 484, 513,
5th Light Division, 537, 540, 545, 563, 703
634, 636, 660, 670–71, 688 13th Infantry Regiment, 481, 702
6th Light Division, 278, 494, 503–4, 538, 14th Division, 705
541, 558, 634, 671, 688, 698 15th Division, 206, 282, 458, 471, 475,
III Corps, 4, 8, 76–77, 108–10, 115, 122–23, 484, 513
130, 136, 138, 143, 145, 155, 160, 167, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 481
173–74, 179, 185, 188, 192, 195–97, 38th Division, 458, 470, 474, 513, 582,
201, 214, 217–18, 220, 276–79, 296, 703
856 Index
French army, (cont.) 20th Provisional Infantry Regiment, 651,

engagement at Blankenfelde, 193 675
engagement at Großbeeren, 355 21st Division, 636, 675, 698, 712–13, 724,
engagement at Wartenburg, 489 730
V Cavalry Corps, 7, 108–9, 116, 122, 137, 22nd Division, 633, 661, 675, 698,
359, 414, 426, 430, 437, 505, 524, 540, 712–13, 724, 730
544–45, 575, 581, 598, 600, 625, 697, 23rd Light Infantry Regiment, 675
725, 728, 765–66, 782 25th Light Cavalry Brigade, 633, 698
V Corps, 4, 7–8, 77, 108–9, 111, 115, 25th Provisional Infantry Regiment, 651,
122–23, 137–39, 145, 150, 152, 154, 675
157, 175, 181, 184–86, 189, 192, 26th Infantry Regiment, 675
195–97, 201, 205, 214, 218, 278–79, 32nd Light Infantry Regiment, 652,
296, 338, 342, 359, 385, 387, 389, 399, 675
429, 432–33, 436–38, 447, 449, 461, 37th Light Infantry Regiment, 646–47,
523–24, 531, 537, 544–45, 581, 598, 675
600, 625, 637–38, 643–44, 698, 719, 47th Infantry Regiment, 675
725–28, 730, 765 62nd Infantry Regiment, 675
6th Light Cavalry Brigade, 278 66th Infantry Regiment, 675
16th Division, 181, 248–49, 269, 494, 644 70th Infantry Regiment, 675
17th Division, 152, 236, 251, 277–78, 280, 82nd Infantry Regiment, 675
306, 312, 315 86th Infantry Regiment, 675
19th Division, 150, 205, 248–49, 269, 719 121st Infantry Regiment, 675
134th Infantry Regiment, 316 122nd Infantry Regiment, 675
146th Infantry Regiment, 316 battle of Dresden, 346
147th Infantry Regiment, 316 Spanish Joseph Napoleon Regiment, 675
148th Infantry Regiment, 316 VII Corps, 4, 8, 77, 108, 122, 171, 430, 446,
battle of the Katzbach, 235–37, 242, 246, 457, 460–61, 487, 493–94, 499–500,
249, 271, 277, 280, 289 505–7, 512–13, 515, 518, 523, 527,
evacuates Silesia, 312, 328, 331 535–36, 538–39, 541, 545–46, 558,
retreat after Katzbach, 297, 299, 337 561, 563, 569–72, 574, 578, 582, 600,
VI Corps, 4, 7–9, 77, 108–11, 115, 606, 686, 688–89, 698, 709, 726–27,
122–23, 138–39, 153, 158, 167, 175, 749, 753, 763, 765
189, 191, 195–96, 214, 218, 346, 13th Division, 697
350, 356, 359, 364, 374, 387, 412, 414, 24th Division, 493–94, 698, 709
417, 426, 430, 437, 449, 461, 463, 25th Division, 493
494–95, 499, 505–6, 508–9, 513, 515, 32nd Division, 193, 494, 698, 709, 713,
526–27, 534, 537, 540, 544–46, 552, 721, 725, 727, 730, 740, 750
558, 561, 563, 569, 572–73, 582, 586, engagement at Blankenfelde, 355
591, 595, 600, 603, 611, 625–26, engagement at Großbeeren, 193
632–34, 636, 638, 643, 664, 667, VIII Corps, 108–9, 111, 122, 137–38, 140,
670–71, 674–75, 681–82, 685, 688, 142, 171, 328, 334, 353, 359, 382–85,
698, 723, 726–27, 730, 763, 765, 807, 399, 427, 437, 447, 449, 461, 524,
814, 829 527, 531, 544–45, 581, 598, 600,
1st Infantry Regiment, 675 625, 638, 697, 726–27, 730,
1st Marine Infantry Regiment, 659, 661, 744–45
675 IX Corps, 107, 282, 427, 530, 533, 544–45,
2nd Marine Infantry Regiment, 636, 647, 553, 559, 581, 585, 600, 625, 644, 697,
675 726, 728, 765, 812
3rd Marine Infantry Regiment, 661, 675 52nd Division, 697
4th Marine Infantry Regiment, 646–47, XI Corps, 4, 8, 77, 108–9, 111, 115, 122–23,
675 134, 137–38, 150, 157, 175, 181,
11th Provisional Infantry Regiment, 675 185–86, 189, 192, 195–97, 201,
13th Provisional Infantry Regiment, 675 214, 218, 241, 246, 269, 278–79,
14th Infantry Regiment, 675 327, 342, 358–59, 385, 389, 399,
16th Infantry Regiment, 675 430, 432–33, 437–38, 447, 449,
16th Provisional Infantry Regiment, 675 470, 517, 523, 527, 529–32, 535–36,
20th Division, 650–51, 675, 698, 730 544, 546, 549, 558, 561, 563, 569,
Index 857
571, 573, 578, 582, 596, 599–600, Bavarian troops, 107, 457, 493
625, 638, 698, 726–27, 744–45, 765, deficiencies in Spring Campaign, 2
782, 814 fricoteurs (marauders), 790
31st Division, 139, 195, 235–36, 276, 278, Grand Headquarters, 533, 535–36, 597, 686,
280, 306, 312, 315, 327, 331, 342, 670, 696
730 Grand Reserve, 536–37, 600, 625, 638, 671,
35th Division, 123, 139, 147, 181, 186, 814, 826
210, 241–42, 269–70, 327, 470, 670, Grande Armée, 1–3, 7, 10, 52, 61, 77,
707–9, 730 108–9, 137, 325, 346, 378, 390–91,
36th Division, 123, 136, 139, 186, 210, 404, 415, 420, 437, 443, 452, 455, 465,
242, 269, 670, 707–8, 730, 738 468–69, 504–5, 516, 518–20, 529,
battle of the Katzbach, 235–37, 241–42, 531, 537, 553, 569–70, 573, 591, 600,
246, 249–50, 259, 262, 271, 273, 602, 626, 629, 633, 636, 664, 668, 674,
277–80, 285 685, 690, 693, 697, 715, 727, 745, 748,
evacuates Silesia, 312, 328 753, 768, 815–16, 820–21, 823,
retreat after Katzbach, 296–97, 302, 306, 825–28
311 Hessian troops, 123, 493, 707–8, 730,
XII Corps, 4, 8, 77, 108, 122, 193, 355, 446, 738–39, 743
457, 493 Leib Guard Infantry Regiment, 739
13th Division, 493–94, 753 Imperial Guard, 4, 8–9, 108–9, 111,
14th Division, 493, 750 137–39, 141, 165, 171–72, 174–75,
29th Division, 493 179, 185, 189, 191, 195–96, 217,
XIII Corps, 8, 11, 77, 108, 122, 356, 375, 230, 346, 356–57, 359, 361, 364,
579 368, 374, 377, 387, 409, 412, 414,
XIV Corps, ix, 7, 9, 77, 108–9, 122, 138, 416–17, 427, 432, 527, 548, 561,
189, 201, 346, 350, 356, 359, 374, 377, 563, 567, 570–71, 573, 577, 587,
388, 414–15, 417, 429, 446, 523, 531, 597, 605, 610, 625–26, 638, 667,
533, 544, 568, 620 697, 704, 715, 720, 728, 730, 788,
42nd Division, 138–39, 162 817, 823, 826
Army of Berlin, 10, 108–9, 137, 171, 192, 1st Guard Cavalry Division, 137, 139,
198, 356, 376, 403, 411, 417, 430, 377, 539, 572, 584, 596
456–57, 468, 490–91, 826 1st Old Guard Division, 535–36, 545,
Battle of Dennewitz, 374 584, 625, 638, 643, 696, 719, 726
engagement at Großbeeren, 192–93, 308, 1st Young Guard Division, 715, 725
355 2nd Guard Cavalry Division, 427, 546,
in Napoleon’s planning, 8, 10, 109 558, 563
retreats after Dennewitz, 10 2nd Old Guard Division, 536, 546, 584,
Army of the Bober, 8, 191–92, 201, 218, 596, 625, 638, 644, 715, 717
230, 309, 356, 368–69, 378, 384, 390, 3rd Guard Cavalry Division, 539, 584,
403, 405, 415, 418, 437, 439, 452, 807, 708, 721
826 3rd Young Guard Infantry Division, 139
attrition, 9, 308, 355 I Young Guard Corps, 457, 527, 531–32,
battle of the Katzbach, 9, 275, 277, 279 535, 546, 572, 638, 643, 704, 726, 748,
evacuates Lusatia, 387 764, 766, 774, 784
evacuates Silesia, 10, 326, 332, 356 II Young Guard Corps, 535, 546, 572,
exhaustion, 307, 337 638, 643–44, 698, 766, 782, 785, 821
rescued by Napoleon, 359 artillery, 536, 584, 704, 715
retreat after Katzbach, 295–96 Guard Cavalry, 427, 531–32, 536, 625,
retreats to Elbe, 440 766, 782
Saxon counteroffensive, 359 Old Guard, 191, 429, 504, 532, 535, 572,
third offensive against Blücher, 432, 434 582, 765, 819
Army of the Elbe, 2–3 Young Guard, 191, 356, 427, 429, 446,
Army of the Main, 2–3 532, 535–36, 579, 582, 596, 764
Badenese troops, 123, 267, 708, 730, 740, in Napoleon’s planning, 8
743–44, 753, 757 Italian troops, 28, 109, 111, 457, 483–85,
1st Infantry Regiment, 744 730
3rd Infantry Regiment, 740, 743 Little Headquarters, 533, 536, 696
858 Index
French army, (cont.) Galicia, 27

Neapolitan troops, 109, 147, 150 Gallin, 481
plunder and attrocities, 77 Gangloffsömmern, 780
Polish troops, 121, 137, 383–85, 387, 408, Gaszów, see Gähnsdorf
410, 418, 427, 436, 456, 459, 503, 532, Gaudi, Friedrich Wilhelm Leopold von, 212,
558, 570–71, 625, 638, 652–55, 295, 309, 328
668–69, 688–89, 697, 703, 714, 717, Gautsch, 702
725, 734, 736, 745–46, 764, 768 Gdańsk, see Danzig
rearward communication, 10, 25, 29, 39, Geißmannsdorf, 434
107, 136, 143, 199, 356, 406, 415, 426, George III (king), 46
436, 516, 533, 578, 586, 613, 686, 816 Georgenthal, 367, 394
in Reichenbach Plan, 59 Gera River, 748
in Trachenberg Protocol, 53 Gérard, Maurice-Étienne, 192, 235–37, 242,
Regular Reserve, 162, 537, 625–26, 632, 638, 258, 264, 269–71, 274, 279–80, 306,
671, 814, 826–27, 829 327, 707–9
Saxon troops, 148, 193, 371, 376, 447, 457, Gerlach, Ludwig Friedrich von, 248–49, 271,
493, 495, 532, 538, 571, 596, 644, 676, 594
698, 709, 713–15, 719, 721–22, 725, German Legion, 36, 38, 79
750, 755, 809 Gerngross, Rodion Fedorovich, 384, 387
Spanish troops, 123, 129–30, 675 Giebichenstein, 567
supply problems in Silesia, 109–10 Giersdorf, 174, 179, 196
three-deep line, 619 Giesmannsdorf, 119
unrest, 428 Gießen, 758, 791–93, 796
Westphalian troops, 76, 109, 331, 435, Gips windmill hill, 696
457–58, 493, 715, 755, 771 Girard, Jean-Baptiste, 355
Württemberger troops, 72, 98, 123, 175, Gitschin, 26, 28, 45, 64, 66, 73
457–58, 470–72, 474–76, 479–85, 489, Gitschin Agreement, 29–30, 39, 43, 49
500, 552, 640–41, 658–60, 664, 675, Glatz, 52, 138
688, 698, 705, 714, 719, 725, 756, 770 Glatz (county), 79
Würzburger troops, 109, 502, 504 Glatz (fortress), 72, 85, 91–92, 115, 117, 212,
French National Guard, 727 332, 680
French Revolution, 40, 102, 104 Glatzer Neiße River, 115–16
Freyburg, 728, 756, 762–66, 769–75, in Allied planning, 85
777–79, 786, 800, 824 Gleina, 768, 773
Schloß, 770–72 Globig, 471, 475, 481–83, 486
Zettenbach mill, 762, 771–72, 777–78 Glogau, 79, 87–89, 97, 108, 111, 115, 117,
Zscheiplitz estate, 770–73, 776, 800 122–23, 129, 244, 347, 423, 820
Freyburg (engagement), 800, 823 Glogόw, see Glogau
Freystadt, 111 Glossen, 361–62, 365, 384–85, 407
Friant, Louis, 195, 584, 719 Gnadenberg, 173, 179–80, 316, 322, 325, 342
Friccius, Karl Friedrich, 738 Gneisenau, August Wilhelm von, 12, 72, 75,
Friedeberg, 111, 123, 134, 185 78, 110, 112, 114–15, 119, 144, 350,
Friederichs, Jean-Parfait, 661–63, 667, 675, 369, 391, 423, 440, 453, 465–66, 468,
712, 724 473, 486, 501, 520, 587, 589–90, 594,
Friedersdorf, 553 604, 760, 797–98, 805–6, 812, 816,
Friedland (battle), 350 823, 825
Friedrich of Hesse, 385 admires General Bonaparte, 81
Friedrich Wilhelm, Count von Brandenburg, advice from Knesebeck, 465, 469
258 advocates war of maneuver, 440–41
Frohburg, 531, 537, 544, 559–60, 571 as Chief of the General Staff of Prussian
Fuchshain, 627, 637, 670, 690, 701, 706 Army, 75
Fulda, 727, 756, 787–91 assigned to Silesian Army, 79
Fulnigsberge, 239 attrition of Landwehr, 363
battle of Leipzig, evaluation, 759
Gabel, 23, 140–42, 443 battle of the Katzbach, evaluation, 279
Gähnsdorf, 171–72 praises troops, 276
Galgenberg, 213, 637–38 changes strategy, 390, 399
Index 859
characteristics, 82 problems with Langeron, 148, 186, 249,

complains about Knesebeck, 75 271, 380, 384
complains to king, 78 problems with Sacken, 289
cooperation with Bülow, 442 problems with Yorck, 99, 168, 213, 221,
criticizes Langeron, 289 227, 251, 298, 303, 322–24, 488, 511,
disappointed by Tauentzien, 464 781, 788, 796
discord with Blücher, 219 propaganda, 286, 295
dislikes Bernadotte, 441, 466, 510, 515, 553, reasons for violating armistice, 112–13
692, 696 receives Iron Cross, 339, 380
dissatisfied about armistice, 75 refuses summons to Bohemia, 402–3, 405,
early life, 81 411
Elbe crossing, 467–68, 470, 472–73, 475, 490 relations with Blücher, 81, 389
engagement at Wartenburg, 482, 487–88, relations with corps commanders, 293, 336
490 relations with Knesebeck, 84
favors strategy of attrition, 389 relations with Müffling, 83–84, 293–95
first retreat from Napoleon, 211, 215, 217 relations with Stein, 84
engagement at Goldberg, 205 resolves to invade France, 761
first Saxon offensive, 353–54 responds to Russian complaints, 90
first Silesian offensive, 114, 128–30, 132–34, Rhine offensive, 759, 777–79, 783, 786, 788,
142–43, 159, 161, 167, 173 791, 793–94
disposition to destroy Ney, 165 right flank march to Elbe, 413, 442, 451–56,
engagement at Löwenberg, 178–79 464
evaluation, 229, 233 second retreat from Napoleon, 363–64,
friction, 131 368
objective, 143 second Saxon offensive, 381, 383
force behind Blücher, 292 second Silesian offensive, 218, 224, 296
fourth retreat from Napoleon, 434 battle of the Katzbach, 243, 249, 251,
fourth Saxon offensive, 440 253–54, 261–62, 266, 274, 287
friendship with Clausewitz, 82 pursuit after Katzbach, 296–97, 302, 304,
frustration after Katzbach, 304, 306 308, 316
grief over Leipzig, 761 supply problems, 424–25
halts second Saxon offensive, 388–90 supports Blücher for Prussian army
international connections, 81 command, 73
Knesebeck’s advice, 466 suspicious of Bernadotte, 466, 552, 614
Langeron’s view of, 104 third Saxon offensive, 420, 428
Leipzig campaign, Göbschelwitz, 654
advance to Leipzig, 569, 592, 612 Goczałków Górny, see Kohlhöhe
battle of Leipzig, 695, 746 Göda, 435, 439
battle of Möckern, 632, 642, 664–65, Godnów, see Gnadenberg
676, 687 Gohlis, 586, 614, 634, 661–62, 664–65, 669,
drive to Mulde, 501, 503, 510, 518 674, 687–90, 698, 714–15, 725, 729,
retreat to Saale, 522, 547–48, 550, 555, 744
557, 564–65 Göhlis, 697
lobbies Bülow, 452 Gohrau, 485
military governor of Silesia, 72, 92–93 Goldbach, 408, 412, 432–33, 447
mobilizes Silesian Landsturm, 212 Goldberg, 28–29, 77, 86, 109, 111–12,
objects to multinational armies, 78 114–15, 123, 129–32, 134, 136,
on army’s morale, 341 142–46, 148–49, 154, 157, 185–88,
on battle of Dresden, 351 201, 203–6, 210–11, 216–17, 219–20,
on Langeron, 103 224, 235, 237–38, 243, 249, 251,
on Macdonald’s retreat, 328 275, 278–79, 296–97, 299–301,
opposes Müffling’s account, 295 303–4, 309, 311–12, 319, 328,
plans first Saxon offensive, 309 337
praises 2nd Brigade, 210 Flens Hills, 202–3, 206
praises Sacken, 223 Friedrich Gate, 202
problems with corps commanders, 293, Kopatsch Hills, 203, 206
305 Nieder Gate, 202
860 Index
Goldberg (cont.) Großbeeren (engagement), 8–10, 193, 308,

Ober Gate, 202 355, 401, 405, 442, 452–53, 528, 805,
Selzer Gate, 202 825
Wolfs Hill, 201, 203, 205–6, 210–11, 300, Großdölzig, 760
310 Großdrebnitz, 410, 412, 418, 432–34, 447
Goldberg (engagement), 205–6, 210–12, Großenhain, 86, 377, 412–15, 417–23, 426–29,
217–18 434, 445, 449, 453, 456–57, 464, 523,
Gollmenz, 541, 584 525–26
Goltz, Karl Friedrich Heinrich von der, 105, Großenlupnitz, 783–84, 786
479, 589, 592, 665, 667 Großharthau, 359, 412, 422, 427–29, 432–34,
Golz, Major von, 187, 197, 203, 206, 210 436–37, 440, 449
Gorchakov, Andrey Ivanovich, 372, 627, Großhartmannsdorf, 156–57, 171, 179, 185,
637–38, 705 188, 196, 318
Gordon, George Hamilton, Lord Aberdeen, Großhennersdorf, 407
759 Großkayna, 762
Görlitz, 8, 23, 29, 109, 111, 137, 139–40, 143, Großkugel, 610–12, 617, 629, 761
148, 162–63, 171–72, 174–75, 189, Großmölsen, 780
191, 199, 201, 204, 217–18, 309, 326, Großpösna, 627, 637–38, 670
328, 332, 334, 352–54, 356–59, Großpostwitz, 400, 402, 409, 419
361–62, 365–68, 376, 378, 380–85, Großrosen, 215, 232
394, 413, 419, 453, 828 Großtinz, 132
Gostków, see Giesmannsdorf Großwalditz, 175, 232
Gotha, 427, 779–80, 782, 784–86 Großwiederitzsch, 634, 641, 643, 652, 655
Göttingen, 778 Großzschepa, 519, 545, 548
Gourgaud, Gaspard, 686, 714 Großzschocher, 702
Gräfenhainichen, 500, 502–3, 505, 561, 563, Grottkau, 117
565, 569, 572, 582 Gruhna, 385, 627
Grand Duchy of Baden, 797 Grunau, 147, 306, 312
Grand Duchy of Frankfurt, 797 Grünberg, 77
Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, 797 Gryfów Śla˛ski, see Greiffenberg
Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 2, 31, 63, 70, 101, Grzegorzów, see Grögersdorf
378 Guadeloupe, 38
Great Britain, 30–33, 35–38, 46–48, 52, 61, Guine, Jacob Yegorovich, 714
63, 65–67, 76, 81, 555, 793, 805, Güldengoßa, 627, 636, 638, 643–44,
820 690, 705
Greiffenberg, 111, 123, 139–40, 142, 147–48, Gumpelstadt, 788
154, 170–71, 195, 197, 296–97, 312, Günthersdorf, 607, 610, 612, 622, 684
327–28, 331, 342 Gustavus Adolphus (king), 48, 598, 620,
Grekov, Pyotr Matveyevich, 146, 150, 300 765
Gressot, François-Joseph, 755 Gyulay, Ignác, 568, 593, 607–8, 610, 612–13,
Grimma, 575, 593, 607–8, 727, 730, 742, 758 622, 626–27, 642, 670, 685, 690,
Gröbern, 563, 565 692–93, 699, 701–2, 704, 715–16,
Gröbers, 612, 629 719, 732, 766, 770, 778, 814–15, 817,
Gröbzig, 556, 673 820–21
Gröden, 464
Gröditz, 155–57, 182 Habartice, see Ebersdorf
Gröditzberg, 155–57, 159, 165, 167–68, Hagelberg (engagement), 15, 355
178–79, 182–83, 201, 204, 229, 304 Hainsbach, 436
Gröditzberg (engagement), 156 Hainwald (Hain Forest), 145
Grodków, see Grottkau Hake, Karl Georg von, 82, 352
Grodziec, see Gröditz Halle, 501, 511–12, 517, 537, 550, 552, 554–56,
Grodziska, see Gröditzberg 564–72, 574, 576–77, 579, 585, 587,
Grögersdorf, 224 589–91, 593, 595–97, 599–605,
Grolman, Karl Wilhelm von, 44, 80, 82–83, 608–13, 615–18, 624, 626, 631, 633,
369 668, 670, 683–84, 686, 688, 731–32,
chief of staff of II Corps, 82 757, 759, 761–62, 764, 775, 810, 812,
Grosnig, 201 817, 823–24
Index 861
Hamburg, 8, 11, 25–26, 31, 33, 36, 38–39, 188, 197, 217, 232, 236, 276, 278,
52–53, 65, 79, 107–8, 421, 469, 512, 280, 296, 301, 306, 309, 312, 342,
562, 579, 588, 778, 811, 820, 826 569
Hanau (battle), 793 Hirschfeld, Karl Friedrich von, 501, 512, 517,
Hänichen, 601–2, 611, 629 550, 556, 590, 595, 604, 617
Hanover, 35–37, 793, 820 Hirschfeld, 706–7
Hardegg, Ignaz von, 703–4, 734 Hirse Hill, 168
Hardenberg, Karl von, 5, 35, 44, 69, 71, 73, 75, Hirseberg Ridge, 155–57
80–81, 84, 90, 92, 106, 110, 113, 130, Hochheim, 797
133, 182, 223, 233, 291, 425, 487, 786, Hochkirch (Saxony), 353–54, 359–60, 364,
791 385, 399, 434
Harroy de Techreaux, Johann August von, Hochkirch (Silesia), 334, 383
212 Hockenau, 167
Harz Mountains, 523 Hof, 53
Hastrungsfeld, 784 Höfel, 178, 182, 196, 315
Hatzfeldt, Franz Ludwig von, 47 Hohberg, 187, 203, 207
Hauptarmee, see Army of Bohemia Hohenleina, 579, 584, 595–96
Havel River, 583, 589 Hohenlohe-Bartenstein, Ludwig von, 707,
Haynau, 109, 111, 115, 123, 129, 136, 143, 708, 721
145–46, 149, 153–55, 157–59, 180, Hohenossig, 630–31, 639, 641–42, 655,
185, 188, 195, 197, 201, 204, 217–18, 667–69, 678, 683
220, 235, 243–44, 268, 296, 299–300, Hohenprießnitz, 505, 510
302–3, 306, 310–11, 319, 342 Hohenroda, 584, 671
Haynau (engagement), 80, 83, 98, 128 Hohenthurm, 679
Hedemann, August von, 664, 686 Hohlstein, 173, 179, 319, 325, 331
Heiterblick, 698, 706, 712–13, 750, 753 Hohnstein, 138, 417
Hellendorf, 372, 415–16, 447 Holland, 39, 65–66, 378, 469, 793, 798
Hellwig, Karl Ludwig Friedrich, 458, 518 Holstein, 39, 68, 79
Henckel von Donnersmarck, Wilhelm Holzhausen, 600, 625, 637–38, 685, 690,
Ludwig Viktor, 49, 69, 98, 233, 260, 697–98, 701, 707–8, 715, 815, 818
274–75, 285–86, 444, 640, 652, 663, Hope, Alexander, 39
676–77, 680–81, 766, 768–69, Horn, Heinrich Wilhelm von, 97, 156, 173,
771–76, 778–79, 781, 783–84, 789, 213, 254–56, 258–59, 283, 301–5,
792, 800 310–11, 316, 318–26, 340, 477,
Hénin, François, 270 479–80, 483–85, 487, 639–41, 643,
Hennersdorf, 133–34, 187, 197, 211, 213–14, 645, 649, 657, 661–63, 666, 669, 715,
220, 224, 231, 240, 247–51, 269–73, 732, 749, 761, 764, 766, 771–73, 776,
279–80, 282, 289, 296–97, 299–300 778, 780–81, 800
Hennersdorf (western Silesia), 334 Prussian Bayard, 488
Henry (prince), 39 Hörsel stream, 783–84
Hermsdorf, 145–46, 189, 367 Hörselberg, 783–84, 787
Herrmannsdorf, 240, 248, 250–51, 269–70, 282 Hoyerswerda, 357, 374, 409
Herrnhut, 391, 399, 413, 434 Hradec Králové, see Königgrätz
Herrnskretschen, 412 Hřensko, see Herrnskretschen
Herwigsdorf, 384 Hubertusburg, 508
Herzberg, 426, 457, 471, 496, 514 Hulot, Étienne, 484
Herzogswaldau, 329 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 45
Hessen-Homburg, Ludwig Wilhelm von, 720 Hünerbein, Friedrich Heinrich Karl von,
Hiller, August von, 96, 232, 240, 242–43, 245, 96–98, 168, 182, 210, 213, 255,
252–53, 260, 329, 334, 339, 360, 367, 256, 283, 298, 311, 322, 477, 483, 618,
380, 408, 433, 435, 611, 629–31, 639, 643, 649, 657, 661, 663, 669, 676,
640–43, 645–50, 652, 660, 666, 669, 732, 749, 761, 764, 766, 771, 773, 776,
676, 682 778, 780–81, 784, 786, 657, 663, 772,
Hinsdorf, 504, 512, 517, 556 640, 641, 641, 642, 662, 785
Hippel, Theodor Gottliebe von, 75, 106 Hünfeld, 789, 791
Hirschberg, 87, 111–12, 114, 125, 132, 142–43, Huningue, 802
147–49, 153, 159, 161, 167, 173, 185, Hurthberg, 783
862 Index
Iberia, 32, 66, 826 Kalinin, Aleksandr, 316

Illyria, 31, 63, 65 Kalisch, 3
Ilmenau, 686 Kalisch–Breslau Treaties, 30, 32
Inn River, 686 Kamenz, 400, 402, 409, 411, 414, 419,
Istria, 63 421–22, 426–28, 434, 445, 447,
Ivanov, Ivan Dmitriyevich, 472, 708 453, 457
Kamienna Góra, see Landeshut
Jablonné, see Gabel Kanth, 89, 114–15, 119
Jablonné v Podještědı́, see Gabel Kapellen Hill, 429, 432, 434
Jägendorf, 248, 251, 280, 290 Kapodistrias, Ioannis Antonios, 26
Jänowitz, 241, 244, 253–54, 261–62, 283 Kaptsevich, Pyotr Mikhailovich, 151, 181,
Jarostów, see Eisendorf 183, 186–87, 203, 206, 210, 248,
Jauer, 28–29, 86, 113–14, 119, 125, 127, 129, 251, 273, 282, 290, 300, 338,
131–33, 136, 142, 146, 158, 186–87, 383–85, 387, 400, 402, 407, 409,
192, 197, 203, 205–6, 210–15, 434, 436, 439, 453, 457, 463, 548, 639,
217–18, 220–21, 223–24, 231–32, 652–54, 678, 712–13, 723, 741, 746,
235–38, 243, 249–51, 270–71, 273, 754
275–80, 285, 288, 290, 292, 295, 309, Karkonosze, see Riesengebirge
328, 338 Karl Frederick (grand duke), 730
Jauernick, 89 Karl of Mecklenburg-Strelitz (duke), 5, 39, 42,
Jawor, see Jauer 82, 96–97, 156, 159, 182, 222,
Je˛drzychowice, see Hennersdorf 254–55, 258, 260, 475–77, 479, 481,
(western Silesia) 483, 485, 488, 490, 499, 639, 645,
Jelenia Góra, see Hirschberg 648–50, 652, 666, 676, 776
Jena, 427, 697, 763 engagement at Goldberg, 203
Jena–Auerstedt (battle), 82, 97, 230–31, 296, engagement at Löwenberg, 181–82
350, 578, 680 engagement at Niederau, 205, 207–8,
Jenkwitz, 387 210
Jerome Bonaparte (king), 65, 491, 618, 756, first retreat from Napoleon, 183
790 poor reputation in Prussian army, 96
Jeßen, 459, 464, 469, 471, 475, 496, 514, 550 praised by Yorck, 210
Jeßnitz, 500, 504, 511–12, 517, 522–23, 547, receives Iron Cross, 380
549–53, 555, 557, 563–64, 569–72 Karlovy Vary, see Karlsbad
Jičı́n, see Gitschin Karlsbad, 524
Jiřetı́n pod Bukovou, see Georgenthal Karpov, Akim Akimovich, 128, 132, 252, 261,
Jiřetı́n pod Jedlovou, see St. Georgenthal 299, 310, 312, 316, 334
Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly, 620 Kassel, 469, 491, 524, 756, 790
Jomini, Antoine-Henri, 125–26, 160–61, 170, Kastel, 797
200, 371, 375, 395, 608–9, 826, 829 Katzbach (battle), 9–10, 275, 288–92, 294, 334,
Jonitz, 494 336, 343, 353, 355, 379–81, 457, 492,
Joseph Bonaparte (king), 32, 47, 50 528, 805, 807, 827
Jungbunzlau, 52, 141 Katzbach River, 8–9, 29, 108–12, 114–15,
Jürgaß, George Ludwig von, 98, 143, 145–46, 128–31, 133, 136, 142–46, 148, 157,
154–56, 213, 216, 220, 224, 229, 232, 160–61, 178, 185–89, 192, 201, 203,
245, 256, 259–60, 279, 311, 318–20, 205, 209–10, 215–20, 224, 226, 232,
428–29, 434, 640–41, 660, 663, 761, 235, 237–44, 246–47, 251, 253–54,
764, 766, 773–74, 777, 780–81, 258, 264–67, 274–76, 278–81, 283,
783–84, 786, 788, 800 288, 296–304, 309, 311, 316, 319,
Jüterbog, 356, 391, 424, 773 328, 332, 335, 337, 363, 382
in Allied planning, 29
Kaczawa, see Katzbach River in Napoleon’s planning, 108
Kahlenberg, 783 Katzler, Andreas Georg von, 98, 143, 145–46,
Kaiserswaldau, 153 154–56, 168–69, 171, 183, 185, 187,
Kaiserswaldau (engagement), 153–54 196–97, 203, 206, 210, 219, 224, 229,
Kälberfeld, 784, 786 232, 240–43, 245, 253, 256, 258, 266,
Kalckreuth, Ludwig Ernst Heinrich von, 615, 279, 301–2, 306, 310, 312, 316, 325,
683 329, 334, 352, 360–61, 365–66, 381,
Index 863
385, 394, 399–400, 408, 412, 419, signs Trachenberg Protocol, 51

422, 429, 432–36, 439, 447, 470, warns Blücher about Bernadotte, 406
502–3, 508, 510, 513, 519, 547–48, Koblenz, 686, 789–90, 796, 802
553, 557, 566–67, 585–86, 611, 619, Koch, Jean-Baptiste Frédéric, 160
640–42, 645, 659–60, 666, 676, 766 Kohlhöhe, 215, 232
Kauffung, 113 Kolberg, 38, 52, 80
Kaysarov, Paisi Sergeyevich, 86, 125, 132, 134, Kollau, 513
143, 147–50, 163, 188 Kolm Hill, 637–38, 670, 706
Kehl, 797 Kölsa, 567, 656
Kellermann, François-Christophe de, 727 Komotau, 201, 372, 374, 468, 523–24
Kellermann, François-Étienne, 15, 385, Konary, see Kuhnern
594 Kondratów, see Konradswaldau
Kemberg, 459–60, 468, 486, 494, 496, 502, Königgrätz (battle), 331
507, 539, 557–58, 561, 563, 570, Königsbrück, 413, 415, 423, 426, 428, 453,
573, 582 457, 462, 464, 499
Kemnitz, 132, 148, 278 Königstein, 107–9, 137, 200–1, 345, 354, 372,
Kesselschlacht, 204 377–78, 429, 437, 455
Khovansky, Nikolay Nikolayevich, 708, 736, Konradswaldau, 125, 130–31, 203, 214, 224,
744 244, 248, 273
Kieslingswalde, 383, 394 Korf, Fyodor Karlovich, 182, 203, 210,
Kittlitz, 385 217, 248, 282, 300, 315, 490, 503,
Kitzen (engagement), 72 517, 539, 553, 557, 566, 580, 629,
Klein Öls, 97, 372 642, 652, 654–55, 668, 706, 712, 714
Kleinen Bober River, 310, 328 Kornilov, Pyotr Yakovlevich, 206, 282
kleinen Krieg, 390, 398–99, 469 Kościelec, see Niederhochkirch
Kleinpodelwitz, 691, 754 Kosel, 91–92, 117, 212, 299
Kleinpösna, 638, 670, 706–8 Koßdorf, 496
Kleinpraga, 435 Kossecki, Captain, 184
Kleintinz, 245, 253–54, 260–61, 267, 304 Kostenblut, 124
Kleinwiederitzsch, 634, 655 Kostomłoty, see Kostenblut
Kleinzschocher, 699, 701–2, 715 Kostrzyn, see Küstrin
Kleist, Friedrich Heinrich von, 78, 93, 99, 110, Köthen, 501, 504, 511, 568–69, 571, 587, 590,
120, 141, 174, 369, 372, 404, 500, 594, 604
563, 568, 593, 598, 607, 780, 786–88 Kowary, see Schmiedeberg
assigned to Army of Bohemia, 79 Koźle, see Kosel
battle of Leipzig, 627, 637–38, 644, 699, Kożuchów, see Freystadt
705, 717, 719, 734, 737, 747 Krafft, Karl August von, 724
commands II Corps, 73, 77, 79, 82, 91 Krajów, see Niederkrayn
Dresden offensive, 201 Krappe, 362
engagement at Kulm, 350, 369 Kraszowice, see Kroischwitz
Klenau, Johann von, 568, 593, 598, 607–8, 627, Kratzau, 141
637–38, 699, 706–8, 720–21, 734 Krauseneck, Johann Wilhelm von, 79, 117
Klitzschen, 517 Kreckwitz Heights, 5
Klitzschena, 500 Kreibau, 153, 158, 188, 310
Kłodzko, see Glatz Krensitz, 518
Klosterhäseler, 775, 777 Krimer, Wenzel, 786
Klüx, Franz Karl von, 241, 557, 580, 642–43, Kroischwitz, 175, 332
645, 649 Kroitsch, 185, 197, 219–20, 237–38, 240–42,
Klüx, Joseph Friedrich Karl von, 690 244, 246–47, 258, 267–68, 279–80,
Knesebeck, Karl Friedrich von dem, 39, 48, 282–83, 296–97, 300–4
59, 68, 75, 80, 82, 84, 116, 293, 362, Krosigk, Heinrich, 662
369–70, 375–76, 390–91, 405–7, 411, Krostitz, 505, 629, 631, 668
416, 422, 424, 434, 440, 442, 454, 464, Krotoszyce, see Kroitsch
466, 468–69, 472, 587, 795 Krusemarck, Friedrich Wilhelm von, 75,
advice, 465 126–27, 589, 617, 693
claims credit for Trachenberg Protocol, 52 rebukes Blücher, 127
plan of operations, 39–44, 52 Krzywa, see Kreibau
864 Index
Kuhnern, 232 first Silesian offensive, 114, 125, 128–32,

Kulm, 350, 377 134, 142–43, 146–49, 154, 165,
Kulm (engagement), ix, 9–10, 15, 71, 350, 167–68, 170, 173
354–56, 369, 371–72, 381, 387, 424, engagement at Löwenberg, 176, 178–79,
444, 447, 528, 672 181, 196
Kuppritz, 360 engagement at Siebeneichen, 151–53
Kursdorf, 610–11, 629 march to Löwenberg, 150
Küstrin, 72, 108, 122, 356, 820 panics, 149
Kutuzov, Mikhail Illarionovich, 2–3 reports Napoleon’s arrival, 172
Kwisa, see Queis River fourth retreat from Napoleon, 436
in Allied planning, 86
Laasnig, 133, 210, 242 in Napoleon’s planning, 174, 430, 434, 471,
Lafontaine, Corporal, 745, 758 517, 523, 526
Lagrange, Joseph, 636, 641, 647, 650, 661, 667, incompatible with Blücher, 102–3
675, 698, 712 Leipzig campaign, 744
Lähn, 111, 114–15, 123, 130, 132, 134, 139, advance to Leipzig, 566–67, 585,
147, 149–54, 158–59, 170, 174, 217, 610–11
220, 232, 306 battle of Leipzig, 631, 687, 689–90, 694,
Lähn (engagement), 147–49 696, 701, 710–14, 721, 723–24,
Lahn River, 150, 686, 792, 794, 797 729–30, 732, 735, 741–42, 746
Landau, 802 battle of Möckern, 614, 627, 629, 631,
Landeshut, 52, 86–87, 89, 110, 114–15, 638–39, 641–43, 645, 649, 652–55,
124, 148–49, 170, 220, 276, 304, 657, 665–66, 668–69, 672, 675–76,
454 796
Landeshut District, 79 drive to Mulde, 499, 502–4, 508–10, 514,
Landsberg, 501, 504, 512, 517, 569, 595, 599, 518
611, 632, 638, 642, 656, 670, 679, retreat to Saale, 539, 547–48, 550, 553,
686–87 558, 564
Landskrone, 354, 361–62, 364, 366–68, 383, on Blücher, 102, 104
385, 397 on Blücher violating armistice, 127
Landwehr, 44 on Gneisenau, 103–5
Langburkersdorf, 428, 492 on Goltz, 105
Langenau, Karl Friedrich von, 606, 608, 791 on Jomini, 395
Langenreichenbach, 506, 514–15, 517, 519, on Jomini’s defection, 126
543 on Müffling, 104
Langensalza, 780–81, 783 on Russian army, 100–1
Langenwolmsdorf, 419, 436 on the Prussians, 105
Langeron, Louis Alexandre de, 110, 113, on Yorck, 99
118, 121, 148, 151, 188, 215, 280, opposes Blücher, 103, 131, 148, 166, 185–87,
295, 713, 785, 798, 806–8, 815, 194, 196, 223, 225, 227, 231, 233,
818 249–50, 292, 309, 311, 321, 336, 338,
as Blücher’s overseer, 103 349, 379
assigned to Army of Silesia, 78 opposes Gneisenau, 293
awards for Katzbach, 381 personality, 102–4
background, 102 refutes criticism, 290
Battle of the Katzbach, evaluation, 277, 279, relations with Blücher, 223
285 relations with Gneisenau, 335
comments on Blücher, 80 reputation, 102
criticized by Prussians, 289–90 Rhine offensive, 759, 761, 765, 774–75,
Elbe crossing, 471 777–81, 783–84, 786–89,
engagement at Wartenburg, 479, 483–85, 792, 794
489–90 right flank march to Elbe, 413, 453, 457,
first retreat from Napoleon, 182, 185–88, 463
211, 214, 232 Russian army corps, 89, 117
engagement at Goldberg, 203, 205–6, second retreat from Napoleon, 362,
210–11 367–68
first Saxon offensive, 352, 354, 360 second Saxon offensive, 381, 383–85
Index 865
second Silesian offensive, 218, 220–21, 224, 544–48, 550–55, 557–63, 565–70,
312, 327, 329, 331, 334, 342 572–73, 575, 577–79, 584–85,
battle of the Katzbach, 240–44, 247–51, 587–89, 591–601, 603, 605–18,
269–73, 282–83, 290 624–27, 630–35, 638–39, 641–43,
pursuit after Katzbach, 296–97, 299, 301, 652, 667–69, 673, 685–87, 689–93,
304, 307, 309, 311–12 695–99, 701, 703, 706–7, 710, 712,
special instructions from Barclay, 103 715–16, 719, 722, 724–37, 740, 743,
third Saxon offensive, 400, 409–10, 412, 745–47, 753–57, 759–62, 764–65,
419, 428, 434 776, 778, 807, 809, 811–19, 821–25
Langwasser, 316 Blinden Gate, 730, 739
Lanskoy, Sergey Nikolayevich, 86, 89, 133, Bose Gardens, 730, 734, 736–37, 740
145, 188, 197, 201, 204, 229, 261, 361, Diebsgräben, 745
539, 553 Elstermühlgraben, 745
Lanusse, Pierre, 512, 517, 522 Esplanade, 736, 744
La Tour d’Auvergne, Henri de, 827 Floßgraben, 736
Latour-Maubourg, Marie Victor de, 137, 140, French base, 25
181, 461, 546, 571, 573, 582, 584, 748 garrison, 671
Lauban, 29, 140, 143, 153, 169, 174–75, 179, Georg Portal, 743
191, 195, 197, 217, 224, 327, 329, 334, Gerber Alley, 742
342, 352, 368–69 Gerber Bridge, 740–42
Laucha, 762, 766, 768–70, 777–79 Gerber Gate, 688–89, 714, 730, 732, 740,
Laun, 338, 346 742
Lauriston, Jacques Alexandre, 109, 111, 123, Grimma Causeway, 738–39
134, 139, 145, 150, 155–57, 165, Grimma Gate, 727, 730, 732, 735, 737–38,
172–73, 175, 181, 196–97, 205, 218, 740, 742–44, 747, 758
235, 240, 246, 248–50, 269–71, 273, Grimma Lane, 746
277–79, 289, 296, 299–300, 302, 306, Grimma suburb, 730
328, 331, 337–38, 342, 358, 378, 385, Halle Gate, 688, 730, 742–43, 745–46,
387, 411, 433, 436, 524, 559, 637–38, 823
644, 698, 719, 747 Halle suburb, 688–89, 697–98, 714–15, 727,
Lausitz/Łużyce, see Lusatia 729–30, 735, 740
Lausitzer Neiße River, 116 Hinter Gate, 730, 732, 739, 742, 757
Lauske, 360 Hinter Lane, 740
Lauterbach, 434, 436, 792 Hohenbrücken, 727
Lauterseiffen, 145–46, 156–57, 165, 168, 179, Hospital Gate, 732, 734, 740, 746
182–83, 185, 196, 306, 311, 315, 327, Hôtel de Prusse, 727
342 in Reichenbach Plan, 59, 199
Łaziska, see Looswitz in Schwarzenberg’s planning, 199
Lebrun, Anne-Charles, 375, 525, 527, 827 in Trachenberg Protocol, 53
Lederer, Ignaz Ludwig von, 699 Jakobs Hospital, 745
Ledru, François, 236, 276, 306, 312, 315–16, Johannis suburb, 730, 736
327, 331, 342 Johannisplatz, 738
Lefebvre-Desnouettes, Charles, 427, 436, 546, Leipzig Canal, 743
558, 563, 766 Milchinsel, 739, 742
Lefol, Étienne-Nicolas, 538, 625, 697 Münz Gate, 730, 736
Legnica, see Liegnitz Pegau suburb, 730
Legnickie Pole, see Wahlstatt Peters Causeway, 736
Lehn, 387 Peters Gate, x, 730, 732, 734, 736, 743–44,
Lehndorff, Karl Friedrich Ludwig von, 510 757
Leiberich, Karl Mack von, 160, 395, 583 Pleißenburg demilune, 744
Leibstedt, 779 Purzelgraben, 739
Leipzig, xi, 3, 11, 41, 57, 70, 72, 107, 116, Quer Lane, 739
120–24, 137, 141, 352, 376, 401, Ranstädt Causeway, 745
403–4, 411, 413, 416–17, 421, 427, Ranstädt Gate, 728, 730, 742, 746, 762
430, 439, 455, 457, 461–64, 469–71, Ranstädt suburb, 756
488–89, 491, 494, 499–500, 502–3, Rat-Forsthaus-Brücke, 727
505–19, 521–34, 537, 540–41, Reichel Garden, 745–46
866 Index
Leipzig (cont.) Lilienberg, Franz Abele von und zu, 708

Richter Garden, 730, 746 Lilienstein, 374, 402, 445
Roßplatz, 736, 740 Lille, 802
Rudolph Garden, 745 Limburg, 794
Sand Gate, 732, 734, 736 Lincker, Johannes August Ludwig von, 773
St. Johannis Church, 737–38, 758 Lindenau, 526, 595, 602–3, 608, 612–13, 622,
St. Johannis Hospital, 737 626–27, 634, 642, 670–71, 685, 690,
St. Nicolai Church, 743 692–93, 697–99, 701–2, 704, 715,
Straßenhäuser, 734–35 719, 725, 727–28, 742, 745–46, 750,
Taucha suburb, 730 753, 756, 763, 814–15, 817, 820, 824
Thomas Portal, 745–46 Lindenau Causeway, 762, 823
Todtengasse, 738 Lindenhayn, 541, 558, 579, 584
Wendler Estate, 738 Lindenthal, 600–1, 610–11, 614, 621, 626,
Windmill Gate, 730, 732, 734, 736 629–31, 633–35, 639–43, 645, 649,
Leipzig (battle), 11, 533, 670, 748, 756, 655–56, 664, 668–69, 671, 675–76,
760–61, 768, 777, 792, 808, 810, 814, 684
820, 822, 824 Lindfors, Fedor Andreyevich, 706–9
Leisersdorf, 183, 311, 318 Lipová/Hanšpach, see Hainsbach
Leitmeritz, 25–26, 28–29, 44, 141, 376, 378, Litoměřice, see Leitmeritz
396, 402–3, 411, 443, 465 Litten, 399
Léocourt, Louis-Samuel Béchet de, 684 Lobanov-Rostovsky, Dmitry Ivanovich, 101
Leopoldshain, 367 Löbau, 312, 327, 332, 354, 360–62, 364–65,
Leśna, see Marklissa 368, 382–85, 400
Leśnica, see Deutschlissa Löbau stream, 361–62, 364–65
Leśniki, see Grosnig Lobenthal, Carl Friedrich Ludwig von, 96,
L’Estocq, Anton Wilhelm von, 799 125, 127–30, 133, 154–55, 159,
Leszno, see Polnischlissa 168–69, 172, 175–78, 181–83, 207,
Letort, Louis-Michel, 638 232, 479, 650–52
Leubingen, 777–79 Lohmen, 427–28, 447
Leubus Seminary, 287 Lölhöffel von Löwensprung, Johann
Leuthen (battle), 665 Christoph, 455, 496
Levı́n, see Lewin Lommatzsch, 455
Lewin, 374 Looswitz, 316, 318
Lhéritier, Samuel François, 359, 457, 540 Lorge, Jean-Thomas, 540, 545, 634, 636, 660,
Liebau, 23, 44 665, 670–71, 698
Liebenau, 334, 345 Lorzendorf, 125
Liebenthal, 111, 123, 134 Lößnig, 625, 697, 703, 715–17, 729, 815, 818
Liebertwolkwitz, 597–98, 600–1, 603, 615, Losthin, Michael Heinrich von, 658–59, 680
625–27, 632, 636–38, 640, 642–43, Lotzdorf, 429
670, 672, 674–75, 685, 690, 699, 701, Louis XIV (king), 827
706–7, 734, 812–13, 838 Louis XVIII (king), 758
Liebertwolkwitz (engagement), 598, 606 Louis Ferdinand (prince), 755
Liechtenstein, Alois Gonzaga Josef von and Louis William of Hessen-Homburg, 722, 735,
zu, 716 738–39
Liechtenstein, Moritz Josef von und zu, 607, Louny, see Laun
608, 610, 613, 627, 699, 702, 716, 733, Louny nad Ohřı́, see Laun an der Eger
820, 608 Low Countries, 32, 66, 819
Liechtenstein, Wenzel von, 345, 347 Lowe, Hudson, 66, 629, 655, 690, 785, 793,
Liège, 793 808, 825
Liegnitz, 76, 87, 108–9, 111–12, 114–15, 123, Löwenberg, 77, 109, 111, 115, 123, 129, 134,
125, 128–32, 134, 136, 142–45, 148, 136–37, 139–40, 142–46, 148–51,
161, 201, 204–5, 210–11, 213–14, 153–55, 157, 159, 166, 169–73,
216–18, 220–21, 235, 237–38, 175–76, 185, 189, 191–92, 195–97,
243–44, 246, 267–69, 275, 279–80, 204, 218, 226, 232, 300–1, 304,
296–97, 299, 302–4, 306, 310, 328 306, 309, 311–12, 315, 318–19, 323,
Liegnitz District, 91 325, 327–29, 331, 342, 345, 347,
Lieven III, Ivan Andreyevich, 252 352, 363
Index 867
Hirse Hill, 167, 169, 176, 181, 315 commands Army of the Bober, 8, 191–92,
Luften Hill, 176, 178, 181–82, 315 197, 218, 276–77, 355, 357
Stein Hill, 176–78, 181, 315 evaluation, 337
Weinberg farmstead, 169, 175–77, 182 counteroffensive against Blücher, 359, 361,
Löwenberg (engagement), 176–81, 183, 364, 368
196–97, 204 defends Dresden, 407, 409–10, 413
Löwenhjelm, Karl Emil von, 51 disarray of Army of Bober, 359
Löwenstern, Woldemar Hermann von, 617 evacuates Lusatia, 359, 385, 387
Lubań, see Lauban evacuates Silesia, 10, 307–8, 312, 325, 327,
Lubawka, see Liebau 332, 334, 355–57
Lübeck, 31, 39, 52–53, 65, 82, 161, 277, 820 in Napoleon’s master plan, 356
Lüben, 111, 115, 123, 132, 143, 145, 161, 297 in Napoleon’s planning, 414
Lubin, see Lüben Leipzig campaign, 573, 578, 596–97, 599–600
Lubomierz, see Liebenthal offensive against Blücher, 9
Luckau, 10, 109, 170, 357, 374, 391, 420 requests to be relieved, 358
Luckau (engagement), 38 retreat after Katzbach, 296, 306
Luckowehna, 505 Saxon counteroffensive, 359
Ludwigsdorf, 155, 171–73 unable to contain Blücher, 417
Łukaszów, see Seifersdorf Machern, 545, 706
Lukovkin, Gavriil Amvrosiyevich, 513, 539, MacMahon, Marie Esme Patrice Maurice de,
548, 655 583
Lüneburg (engagement), 98 Madatov, Valerian Grigoriyevich, 303, 327,
Lusatia, 23–25, 41, 48, 77, 109, 111, 115, 332, 354, 447, 509, 518
128, 136, 138, 140, 142, 148, 167, Madrid, 50
198, 218, 299, 307, 325, 334, 363, Magdeburg, 3, 25–26, 28–29, 53, 107–9, 122,
372, 405 130, 139, 355, 370, 401, 403, 417, 421,
Highlands, 443 430, 462, 466, 512, 517, 529, 550, 560,
Lusatian Neisse, see Lausitzer Neiße River 562, 564, 569, 579, 585, 587–89, 592,
Lützen, 4, 15, 73, 144, 567–68, 585, 593, 605, 624, 631, 692, 760, 811
607, 615, 622, 626, 716, 728, 753, 761, Main River, 50, 238, 544, 594, 686, 797, 802
763–65, 776, 778, 815, 817, 823 Mainz, 11, 686, 727, 756, 758, 782, 790,
Lützen (battle), 3, 6, 45, 76, 96, 613, 685, 693, 792–93, 796–98, 802, 824–25
732 Maison, Nicolas Joseph, 181, 248–49, 269,
Lützschena, 611, 616, 630–31, 639–40, 642 311, 748
Lwówek Śla˛ski, see Löwenberg Malitsch, 128, 211, 214, 217, 220–21, 223–24,
232, 237, 252, 280
Macdonald, Étienne Jacques, 111, 123, 134, Małuszów, see Malitsch
137, 139–40, 143–44, 147–50, 155, Mannheim, 793
157, 161, 165–66, 170–72, 174–75, Mantua, 65
186, 191, 198, 218, 242, 244, 246, 302, Marchand, Jean-Gabriel, 192, 197, 299, 306,
328, 332, 352, 357, 359, 374–75, 377, 312, 328, 331–32, 342, 707, 739,
381, 383–84, 387–89, 391, 399, 405, 742–43
410–11, 415, 417–19, 422, 426–31, Marczów, see Märzdorf
433–34, 436–40, 443, 449, 456–57, Marengo (battle), 350
488, 518, 523–24, 526, 529–30, Maret, Hugues-Bernard, 50, 174, 189, 191,
535–36, 546, 559, 563, 599, 730, 788, 375, 434, 559–61, 572, 575, 577, 596,
807–8, 814–15, 819, 826–27 727, 729
XI Corps, 109, 111 Margaron, Pierre, 461, 494, 537, 753
as independent commander, 193, 355 Mariaschein, 377
battle of Leipzig, 637–38, 643, 670, 698, Marie Louise, 2
706–7, 709, 727, 730, 743–44, Marienberg, 55, 465, 523–24, 527, 811
746–47 Markersdorf, 366
battle of Möckern, 685 Markkleeberg, 598, 600, 625–27, 637–38, 644,
battle of the Katzbach, 9, 235–37, 242–44, 699, 703–4
246–47, 262, 267–69, 271 Marklissa, 86, 143, 148, 309, 327, 329,
evaluation, 275, 277–79 331, 334
losses, 288 Markov, Yevgeny Ivanovich, 347, 349, 392
868 Index
Markranstädt, 600, 607–8, 613, 625, 702, 728, Meshcherinov, Vasily Dmitriyevich, 273, 285,
753, 763–64, 820 315
Markröhlitz, 763–64, 766, 771, 773, 775, 777, Metternich, Klemens von, 30–31, 43, 61–65,
800 68, 110, 191, 378, 733, 786, 804,
Marksuhl, 787–88 822
Marmont, Auguste Frédéric, 110–11, 123, 139, abandons Four Points, 45
153, 157–58, 165, 167, 173–75, 191, British opinions of, 33
288, 354, 412, 415, 417, 427, 430, 437, causes concern in London, 46
459, 461–62, 499–500, 503, 505–6, Convention of Reichenbach, 44
509, 512–15, 526–27, 530, 532, 534, excludes British and Swedes from
537, 544, 547, 551, 558, 561, 563, 569, negotiations, 32
571–72, 574, 576–78, 586, 588, 591, fears Russia, 1, 31
594–98, 601–3, 611, 619, 647, 661, fears separate peace between France and
698, 713, 722, 737, 763, 765, 790, Russia, 31
814–15 Four Points, 31–32, 44–46, 48, 51, 61, 65
battle of Leipzig, 688, 698, 711–12, hostile to British, 32, 34, 62
722–25, 727, 730, 737, 739, meets with Napoleon, 44
746–47 negotiates with Allies, 44
battle of Möckern, 625–26, 632–34, 636, opposes Anglo-Russian-Prussian war aims,
639–43, 645–46, 649, 651, 657, 32
659–62, 664–66, 668–72, 675, 677, opposes Kalisch–Breslau Treaties, 32
681, 685, 687 wants peace for Central Europe, 32
Marschall von Biberstein, Wenzel Philipp Metz, 802
Leopold, 622 Meunier, Claude-Marie, 242, 244–45, 256,
Marschwitz, 679 259, 264–65, 275, 368
Marshal Forwards, see Blücher, Gebhard Meusdorf, 637–38, 703, 720
Leberecht von Mézières, 802
Martens, Christian von, 770 Mierczyce, see Mertschütz
Marwitz, Ludwig von der, 512 Milików, see Herzogswaldau
Märzdorf, 134, 147, 152 Miloradovich, Mikhail Andreyevich, 140
Masséna, André, 192 Mincio River, 65
Massenei Wood, 432 Mirosławice, see Rosenthal
Maurin, Antoine, 258, 340 Mirsk, see Friedeberg
Maury, Jean-Pierre, 300–1, 651 Mittlau, 170
Max Joseph I (king), 528 Mittweida, 524, 544
Maximilian I (elector), 620 Mladá Boleslav, see Jungbunzlau
Mayer, Josef von, 707–8 Mnichovo Hradiště, see Münchengrätz
Me˛cinka, see Herrmannsdorf Mockau, 599–600, 602, 626, 665, 671, 684, 696,
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 96–97 710–11, 818
Medessen, 457 Möckern, 15, 586, 614, 626, 629–30, 634, 636,
Meiningen, 788, 790 641–43, 645–52, 656–62, 664–65,
Meißen, 370, 420, 429–30, 437, 453, 456–57, 668–69, 675–76, 680, 684, 686, 688,
463–64, 470–71, 494–95, 502, 732, 769
509–10, 514, 518–19, 521, 523–27, Möckern (battle), 3, 122, 666–67, 670, 676,
529–33, 543–45, 594, 809 681–82, 686, 690, 704, 750–51, 759,
Melnik, 44, 141, 199–200 761, 788, 795–96, 815, 817, 822,
Mělnı́k, see Melnik 824
Mensdorff-Pouilly, Emanuel von, 607, 627, Mockrehna, 502, 506, 515, 518–19, 535–36,
699, 702, 716 539, 548, 558
Merseburg, 508, 555, 565–66, 585, 589, Modelsdorf, 146, 154, 178, 180, 185
593, 599–600, 602, 605, 607–8, Modlikowice, see Modelsdorf
610–11, 624–25, 632, 668, 670, 697, Modlin, 72, 122, 820
702, 715, 727, 731–32, 757, 762–65, Mois, 134, 147, 150, 170
769, 775 Moisdorf, 251, 338
Mertschütz, 114, 125, 127–28 Mojesz, see Mois
Merveldt, Maximilian-Friedrich von, 593, Mölkau, 698, 706, 709, 715, 720–21, 724, 729,
644, 820 815
Index 869
Moltke, Friedrich Franz von, 213, 288, 290, Münchroda, 769, 771–73, 776
331, 337 Münich, 41
Monarchenhügel (Monarchs’ Hill), 705 Münster, Ernst Friedrich Herbert von, 276,
Mönchenholzhausen, 780 286, 343, 777
Mönchswald (Forest), 239–40, 248, 271, 279 Münster, 451
Montfort, Joseph de, 727, 745, 758 Murat, Joachim (king), 137, 172, 181, 228, 356,
Morand, Charles-Antoine, 458, 471, 474, 477, 374, 379, 388, 415, 417, 426–27, 430,
481, 483–85, 494 437, 443, 449, 455–56, 515, 524, 527,
Moroni, Ange-Pierre, 484 559–60, 586, 594, 608, 615, 762, 773,
Mortier, Édouard Adolphe, 137, 165, 171, 217, 809, 811–13, 815, 819, 827
368, 527, 535, 546, 572–73, 577, 579, battle of Leipzig, 625, 637, 642, 668,
584, 638, 643–44, 698, 766, 782, 696–97, 699, 703, 715–17, 726
785–88, 821 counteroffensive against Blücher, 359, 364,
Moscow, 33, 50, 98, 300, 521 367
Mouton, Georges, 359 defends Leipzig, 530–31, 536, 562–63,
Mrowiny, see Konradswaldau 567–69, 571–73, 575–79, 585, 588,
Mściszów, see Seifersdorf 591, 595, 597, 607, 615
Mściwojów, see Profen engagement at Liebertwolkwitz, 598
Müffling, Karl von, 49, 53, 82, 90, 101, 103, Großenhain operation, 414, 417–19, 423,
110, 129, 130, 133, 134, 144, 166, 176, 426, 428–29
178, 182, 183, 186, 187, 193, 211, 217, Murray, Albrecht Joseph von, 702, 716, 820
218, 221, 223, 226, 226, 249, 271, 295, Myślinów, see Jägendorf
302, 364, 366, 388, 413, 424, 428, 430,
454, 472, 487, 491, 501, 510, 511, 515, Nakléřov, see Nollendorf
517, 547, 550, 553, 555, 557, 587, 775, Nansouty, Étienne-Marie-Antoine, 685, 720,
787, 793, 796, 797, 805, 824, 166, 182, 724
183, 186, 227, 511, 796, 516 Napoleon I (emperor), 3–4, 23–25, 40, 137,
account of the Katzbach, 294–95 140, 159, 182, 188, 229, 276, 323, 351,
at the Katzbach, 253–55, 260, 271–72 355, 357, 359, 372, 375, 378–79, 383,
bitter in memoirs, 84 387–89, 399, 403, 408, 410, 413, 424,
disliked by Yorck, 99 427, 431–32, 440, 443–44, 461, 491,
on Blücher’s policy toward Russians and 501–2, 509, 511, 515, 523–26,
Prussians, 106 528–30, 535, 539, 548, 599–600, 608,
on Langeron, 103 613, 631, 686, 715, 790, 797–98,
on Sacken, 106 804–7, 809–28
opposes Gneisenau, 297 accepts armistice, 7
praise for Blücher, 292 accepts Convention of Dresden, 45
problems with Yorck, 303 affected by weather, 427
receives Iron Cross, 380 art of war, 54
relations with Blücher, 82–83 assumptions over Allies, 136, 141
relations with Gneisenau, 83, 293–94 at Bautzen, 137
relations with Knesebeck, 84 Austrian perception of, 32
talents, 83 battle of Bautzen, 4–5
Mühlbeck, 503, 508, 510, 515, 518, 527, 547, battle of Dresden, 8–9, 309, 346
557–58, 563 battle of Hanau, 790–91
Mühlberg, 406, 420, 454–55, 463–64, 468, battle of Leipzig, 11, 624–25, 633, 637–38,
470–71, 473, 496, 518, 525–26, 540, 809 643–44, 664, 670–71, 674, 683,
Mulde River, 78, 457, 460–62, 468, 470, 487, 685–87, 690, 696–99, 701, 703, 707,
491, 494, 499–511, 513, 515–20, 522, 712, 715, 717–21, 725, 727, 729, 736,
526–27, 532–33, 535–36, 538–39, 748
545, 547–53, 556–59, 561–63, 565, battle of Lützen, 4
567–69, 572–75, 585–86, 588, 592, battle plans for Leipzig, 626, 632–33, 636
594, 598, 600, 603, 605, 610, 614–15, breaks off Saxon counteroffensive, 374
624, 642, 668, 674, 691, 812 cannot lead Berlin offensive, 357, 374
Müldenstein, 549 challenges in 1813, 1–3, 10
Mumb, Franz von, 734 concessions at Prague, 63
Münchengrätz, 138 considers abandoning Dresden, 530
870 Index
Napoleon I (emperor) (cont.) indifference to peace conference, 45

counters Barclay’s demonstration, 374, 377 inspects Pirna, 137
creates Army of the Bober, 191 instructions for Macdonald, 192, 197,
criticizes Sébastiani, 359 275–76, 415, 417
defense of Elbe, 456, 461, 468, 470–71, 491 instructions for Ney, 357
defense of Leipzig, 563 interior lines, 136, 200
defensive measures, 429–30, 437 invades Bohemia, 377, 404, 414
despondency, 539, 562, 574, 581 learns of Dennewitz, 374
displeased with Macdonald, 417 Leipzig campaign, 11, 573–79, 591, 594–
Dresden campaign, 191 603, 616–17
dynastic ties with Austria, 2 manoeuvre sur les derrières, 226
Elbe offensive, 11, 519, 522, 527–33, 535–38, manoeuvre sur position centrale, 4, 226
548, 550–52, 557–59, 561–63, 566–67, master plan, 4, 108, 355–57
569–72, 575, 577, 579, 585 meets with Metternich, 44–45
defense of Leipzig, 560 on Army of North Germany, 192
engagement at Löwenberg, 176 operational mastery, 107
estimate of forces in German theater, 107 plan of operations, 7–9, 22, 107–8, 123,
First Italian Campaign, 4, 199, 443 136–39, 141, 331, 357, 415, 426–27
first offensive against Blücher, 8, 108, 137, problems caused by Blücher, 387–88, 426,
139–41, 169, 172, 174–75, 185, 189, 430
193, 201, 210, 345 pursuit after Dresden, 355
engagement at Löwenberg, 177–80, 184 pursuit after Jena–Auerstedt, 296
force allocation, 109, 115 reacts to Dennewitz, 377
after Dresden, 356 rear-area security, 426
German allies, 97 rebuilds French army, 2
goes to Zittau, 140 rebuilds Grande Armée, 77
gradually encircled, 437 rejects Frankfurt Proposals, 11
Großenhain operation, 414, 429 rescues Army of Bober, 359
Hundred Days, 758 retreat to Rhine, 11, 697, 728, 762, 764–65,
ignores Blücher, 439 769–71, 773–79, 781–82, 786–89,
impacted by Reichenbach Plan, 427 792–94, 796
in Allied planning, 6–7, 23–31, 40–43, saves Macdonald, 10
48–49, 58–59, 86–87, 201, 325, 347, Saxon counteroffensive against Blücher,
371, 376, 378, 405–6, 413, 416, 359–62, 364–65, 368
464–65, 468–69, 516, 566, 568–69, second invasion of Bohemia, 416–17
587, 592, 594, 693, 706, 765 second offensive against Blücher, 354
in Austrian planning, 6, 27, 31, 44, 48, 54 seeks decisive victory, 437
in Bernadotte’s planning, 391, 421, 467–68, Spring Campaign, 3, 6
512, 516, 520–21, 553–54, 603, 605 supply problems, 414–15, 422
in Bernadotte’s Trachenberg proposal, 51 third offensive against Blücher, 430–34, 436,
in Blücher’s planning, 111–12, 143, 212, 230, 438, 440
309, 331, 347, 349, 352, 354, 378, 403, wants Macdonald to hold Bautzen, 437
409, 411–13, 420, 422, 439–40, 443, wants to manipulate Schwarzenberg, 140
452, 455, 463–65, 483, 491, 502–4, withdraws across Elbe, 437–39
507, 509, 511, 514, 517–22, 554, 557, worsening strategic situation, 355
567, 587–89, 591, 614, 630, 632, Narbonne, Louis Marie, 162, 509, 531, 537
667–68, 692, 694, 710 Natzmer, Oldwig von, 736
in British planning, 47, 61 Naumburg, 143, 179, 197, 327–29, 334, 352,
in Gneisenau’s planning, 389–90, 441 368, 824
in Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf,” 55–56, Naumburg (Saxony), 427, 506, 566, 585, 593,
59 608, 624, 702, 715, 728, 760–61, 763,
in Reichenbach Plan, 58–60, 199, 351 765–66, 770, 774, 780
in Schwarzenberg’s planning, 199, 349, Naundorf, 503, 541, 709, 720–21, 729, 815
370, 404, 413, 606–8, 612, 690, Naundorf villages, 600, 697, 699, 701, 706,
780, 791 709, 715, 720–22, 724, 815
in Trachenberg Protocol, 52–54 Naunhof, 599–600
inactivity in September, 443 Nebra, 768, 777
Index 871
Nechen, 385 Elbe offensive, 535–36, 538, 557, 569–72,

Neipperg, Adam Albert von, 308–9, 329, 334, 574–78, 596–97, 603
345, 445, 709 escapes Blücher’s trap, 158, 165–68
Neiße (fortress), 72, 91–92, 117, 212, 321, 328, Großenhain operation, 414
332 in Blücher’s planning, 172, 175
Neiße River, 327, 332, 334, 336, 352, 354, 356, in Napoleon’s planning, 377, 529
364–65, 367–68, 378, 381–83, 385, Jomini defects, 125
387, 399, 402–3, 407, 409, 411, 413, Leipzig campaign, 491, 573, 578, 600
420, 807 missed opportunity in Silesia, 159, 168
in Napoleon’s planning, 108 misunderstands orders, 218
Nesselrode, Karl Robert von, 5, 30–31, 35, 44, retreat after Dennewitz, 391
46, 65 Silesian offensive, 174, 178–80, 185, 188,
Netherlands, 424, 451, 790, 820 201, 211, 217
Neudorf, 111, 123, 157, 165, 168, 170, 182–83, Silesian theater, 8, 76, 110–11, 129,
218, 224, 238 136–37, 140–42, 144–45, 148, 153,
Neudorf (western Silesia), 334 155, 157, 171, 173, 178, 229–30
Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg, 111, 123, 156–57, summoned to join Napoleon, 192
165, 168, 170, 182–83, 204, 311, 318 surprised by Blücher, 136
Neudorf-am-Rennwege, 204, 206, 210, 218, Spring Campaign, 4–5, 413
237 Neydhardt, Paul von, 102, 129, 175, 490
Neue Gohle Forest, 771, 773 Nidda River, 793
Neuhausen, 780 Niederau, 203, 218, 238
Neukirch, 189 Niederau (engagement), 204, 206–7
Neukirch (Saxony), 407, 409, 412 Niederhochkirch, 252, 262
Neukösen, 766 Niederholz Forest, 637–38, 670, 706
Neumarkt, 86, 112, 114, 119, 124–28, 130, 137 Niederkrayn, 188, 203, 205, 224, 238, 240–42,
Neusalza, 400, 410, 412–13 244, 246, 253–54, 264, 266, 271, 275,
Neuschönfeld, 316 279, 281, 283, 297, 300–1, 303–4,
Neustadt in Sachsen, 138, 360, 399–400, 402, 310, 337
407, 411, 417, 419, 428, 432, 434, 440, Niederröversdorf, 112
453 Niederweinberg, 224, 238, 240, 242–44, 254,
neutral zone, 40, 77, 86–87, 90, 109–15, 117, 258–59, 262, 266, 280
124, 126–28, 136, 160, 162, 223, 235, Niederwerfungsstrategie, 57, 390
336, 806 Niethen, 360, 387
Neutzsch, 655, 711 Noailles, Alexis, 521, 523
Neuwarthau, 318 Noitzsch, 518
Neuwiese, 182, 186, 204, 306 Nollendorf, 350, 369, 372, 377–78, 404, 412,
Neverovsky, Dmitry Petrovich, 101, 154, 180, 415–17, 444, 446–47
252, 261, 714 Normann, Karl Friedrich von, 633, 636,
Ney, Michel, 640–41, 659–60, 663–64, 675, 698
battle of Bautzen, 5 North Sea, 11, 65, 826
Fall Campaign, 123, 160–62, 165, 172, 195, Norway, 34, 37–38, 46, 48–49, 68–69,
276–77, 287, 378, 415, 426, 458, 461, 441, 760
494, 499, 524–27, 531, 533, 535–36, Nossen, 503, 531, 559, 594
558, 698, 722, 809, 814–15, 818, 821, Nostitz, Ferdinand von, 103, 127, 152, 154,
826–27 156–57, 166, 182, 221, 227, 285,
battle of Dennewitz, 10, 374, 377, 388, 288–90, 292, 331, 649, 688, 692, 694
391, 413 Nostitz, Johann Nepomuk von, 638, 733
battle of Leipzig, 603, 625–26, 634, 654, Nowa Ła˛ki, see Neuwiese
664, 670–71, 684–85, 688, 698, 723, Nowa Wieś, see Neudorf (western Silesia)
725, 747 Nowa Wieś Grodziska, see Neudorf-am-
commands Army of Berlin, 10, 356–57 Gröditzberg
defends Elbe, 414–15, 417, 430, 457–62, Nowa Wieś Legnicka, see Neudorf
468, 470, 506–7 Nowa Wieś Złotoryjska, see Neudorf-am-
defends Mulde, 499, 501–5, 507, 510, Rennwege
512–13, 515 Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki, see Modlin
Dennewitz campaign, 357, 359, 364 Nowy Kościół, see Neukirch
872 Index
Nudersdorf, 500 disgraced in 1807, 105

Nuthe River, 442 Elbe crossing, 471
Nysa (fortress and river), see Neiße first retreat from Napoleon, 180, 183,
Nysa Kłodzka, see Glatzer Neiße River 185–86, 188, 204, 211, 214–15, 217,
Nysa Łużycka, see Lausitzer Neiße 232
Nysa Szalona, see Wütende Neiße stream engagement at Goldberg, 205
first Saxon offensive, 352, 354, 360
Oberholz Forest, 638, 643–44, 705 first Silesian offensive, 114, 125, 127–28,
Oberkaina, 407 130, 132, 134, 142–43, 145, 153, 159,
Oberkrayn, 242, 247, 265, 274 165, 173
Obermois, 130, 132, 134 engagement at Bunzlau, 178–80, 182, 196
Oberottendorf, 410, 412, 418–19 engagement at Kaiserswaldau, 153–54
Oberpeilau, 119 engagement at Löwenberg, 178
Oberröversdorf, 112 evaluation, 229
Oberweinberg, 238, 244, 253, 265, 280 reaches Bober, 167
Ocice, see Ottendorf fourth Saxon offensive, 439–40
Ockrilla, 463, 525 in Allied planning, 25, 85–86
Oder River, 1–2, 6, 22, 26, 45, 89, 107–8, in Napoleon’s planning, 434, 471, 523,
111–12, 115–16, 123, 127, 136, 525–26
197–98, 212, 299, 347, 356, 409, 421, Leipzig campaign,
423, 560, 587, 804 advance to Leipzig, 566, 610, 612
in Allied planning, 6, 26, 40, 42, 85 battle of Leipzig, 687, 689–90, 714–15,
in Austrian planning, 6 725, 729–30, 735, 741, 744, 746
in Napoleon’s planning, 8, 108 battle of Möckern, 614, 627, 629, 631, 639,
in Russian planning, 6 642, 649, 656–57, 665, 668–69, 673, 676
Öderan, 544 drive to Mulde, 500, 502–4, 509, 514,
Odra, see Oder River 518–19
Ohlau, 119 retreat to Saale, 539, 547–50, 552–53,
Ohře, see Eger River 557–59, 561, 563–65
Okmiany, see Kaiserswaldau opposes Blücher, 167
Oława, see Ohlau personality, 105–6
Oldrzychów, see Ullersdorf praised by Prussians, 223, 288, 290, 292
Ollendorf, 779–80 receives Black Eagle, 380
Ölsen, 372 receives Order of St. George, 381
Olsufiyev, Nikolay Dmitriyevich, 210, 248, relations with Blücher, 106, 131, 223
250, 270, 272, 282, 327, 394, 639, 652, Rhine offensive, 759, 761, 763–65, 774,
654–55, 677, 713, 723–24 777–79, 781, 783–84, 786–88, 792, 794
Olszanica, see Alzenau right flank march to Elbe, 413–14, 453,
“Operationsentwurf,” 55–60, 70 456–57, 463–64, 470
Oppen, Major von, 157, 206, 255, 331, 424, 501 Russian army corps, 89, 117
Oppin, 616 second retreat from Napoleon, 362, 368
Oranienbaum, 460, 502, 565, 568, 570–71, 574 second Saxon offensive, 381, 383, 385
Ornano, Philippe-Antoine, 185, 577, 584 second Silesian offensive, 218, 220–21, 224,
O’Rourke, Joseph, 567 316, 319, 326–27, 329, 334, 342
Ortrand, 423, 428, 447, 463 battle of the Katzbach, 238, 243–44, 252,
Oschatz, 494, 533, 535, 545–46 254, 258, 261–62, 266–67, 270,
Osetnica, see Steinsdorf 274–75, 279, 283
Ösfeld, Karl Wolhelm von, 564 praised by Prussians, 271
Osten-Sacken, Fabian Gottlieb von der, 112, pursuit after Katzbach, 296–97, 299, 302,
118, 188, 295, 422, 486, 495, 538, 548, 310
778, 780, 808–9, 824 second Silesian offensive:, 316
angry at Blücher, 288–89 third Saxon offensive, 400, 407–8, 410, 412,
assigned to Army of Silesia, 78 419, 421–22, 428–29, 432
background, 105 Osterman-Tolstoy, Aleksandr Ivanovich, 350,
battle of the Katzbach, praised by 369, 568
Prussians, 289 Ostramondra, 780
second Silesian offensive, 252 Ostritz, 23, 328, 381–85, 400, 407, 409, 413
Index 873
Othegraven, Karl Thomas von, 256–57, 260, Penig, 527, 537, 544, 559–60, 568, 593, 607–8,
298, 380, 662 813
Ottendorf, 134, 167, 173, 195, 327, 332, 342 Penzig, 327
Oudinot, Nicolas-Charles, 8, 10, 38, 108–9, “Perfidious Albion,” 33
137, 139, 171, 192, 308, 341, 375, 437, Perigord, Edmond de, 431
457, 493, 527, 530–33, 535–36, 546, Peters Hill, 604, 616
572–73, 577, 579, 584, 638, 643, Petersberg, 564, 566–67, 604
704, 726, 728, 748, 763–64, 766, 774, Petersdorf, 150, 196
776, 779–80, 784, 787–88, 824, Peterswald, 201, 372, 415, 417, 420, 443–44
826–27 Peterwaldau, Alexander’s headquarters, 35
as independent commander, 193, 355–56 Peterwitz, 132, 220–21, 232, 251, 290, 338
commands Army of Berlin, 192, 308, 357 Petzkendorf, 766, 769
engagement at Großbeeren, 9, 193 Pfaffendorf, 128, 394, 689, 697, 714, 725,
evacuates Brandenburg, 355 740–41
in Napoleon’s master plan, 356 Pfützthal, 564
in Napoleon’s planning, 8 Philippstal, 791
retreats to Wittenberg, 357 Philosopher of Weimar, see Müffling, Karl
von
Pacthod, Michel-Marie, 715, 725 Pia˛tnicka, see Pfaffendorf
Pahlen II, Pavel Pyotrovich, 124, 147–48, 153, Pielgrzymka, see Pilgramsdorf
170, 203, 220, 224, 232, 244, 248, 270, Pieńsk, see Penzig
273, 282 Pieszków. see Petersdorf, Petersdorf
Pahlen III, Peter, 88–89, 110, 112, 118, 125, Pieszyce. see Peterwaldau
130, 132, 134, 136, 143, 147–49, 153, Piława Górna. see Oberpeilau
161, 167, 170–71, 173, 188, 214, 598, Pilgramsdorf, 145–46, 149, 154, 156, 170,
627, 637–38, 699, 705, 709 178–79, 182–86, 188, 204–5, 300–1,
first Silesian offensive, 114 304, 311, 315, 321
Pajol, Claude Pierre, 575, 748 Pillar, Yegor Maksimovich, 387
Pamplona, 50 Pillnitz, 429, 437, 531
Panchulidzev I, Ivan Davydovich, 300–1, 340, Pilsen, 41
454 Piotrowice, see Peterwitz
Panchulidzev II, Semyon Davydovich, 340 Pirch I, Georg Dubislav von, 718
Panschwitz-Kuckau, 413, 453 Pirna, 9, 107, 137–39, 141, 200–1, 308–9, 345,
Panzkau, 124–25, 132 354, 356, 359, 361, 372, 374, 376–77,
Paradovsky, Philip Osipovich, 269 383, 388, 402, 404–5, 412, 415,
Parchwitz, 111, 115, 119, 123, 128, 130, 417–18, 420, 427–29, 432, 437, 445,
132–33, 143, 145 447, 465, 469, 530, 533, 544, 567
Paris, 427, 798, 825 Pitschen Hill, engagement at, 360–61
Paritz, 312, 329, 334, 368 Plagwitz, 155, 168, 176, 178, 181–82, 184, 196,
Parthe River, 567, 595–97, 599, 603, 608, 614, 311, 315, 327, 342
624, 634, 642, 652, 655, 665, 668–69, Plagwitz (engagement), 315
671, 678, 683–84, 687–89, 692–94, Płakowice, see Plagwitz
696–98, 701, 706, 710–14, 720, Platov, Matvei Ivanovich, 524, 701, 706, 709,
723–24, 727, 729–30, 735, 740–42, 712, 714, 733, 793, 830
749, 754, 759, 818, 821 Plauen, 200
Pasiecznik, see Spiller Plaußig, 696
Paskevich, Ivan Fyodorovich, 708, 720, 736, Pławna, see Schmottseifen
743, 823 Pleiße River, 516, 608–9, 612–13, 624–25, 627,
Passau, 41 634, 636–38, 642, 644, 689–90,
Passendorf, 761 697–99, 702–4, 707, 716, 725, 727,
Paunsdorf, 689, 697–99, 701, 706, 709, 733, 740, 744–46, 756, 759, 814, 823
712–15, 720–22, 724, 729, 735, 749, Plinse stream, 240, 247–50, 269
753, 815 Plösen, 655, 710–11
Pe˛czków, see Panzkau Plotzen, 385, 387
Pegau, 567, 593, 601, 607–8, 614, 622, 716, Ploučnice, see Polzen River
732, 734, 736, 822 Plzeň, see Pilsen
Pelet, Jean-Jacques, 784 Podelwitz, 630, 642, 652, 654, 668, 684
874 Index
Podewils, Peter Heinrich von, 691 1st Brigade, 96–97, 120, 131, 182–83,
Poland, 6, 32, 44, 72, 78, 107–8, 111, 280, 390, 213, 254, 270–72, 283, 285, 311, 363,
440, 587, 758 477, 480–81, 485–86, 488–89, 639,
Polkowice, see Polkwitz 645, 648–49, 652, 657–58, 660, 676,
Polkwitz, 115 781
Poll, Ivan Lavrentiyevich, 410 1st Division, 761, 764, 780–81, 785
Polnischlissa, 89, 133, 145 1st East Prussian Infantry Regiment, 96,
Polzen River, 54 97, 159, 161, 203, 207, 209, 650, 651,
Pommritz, 360 682, 207
Pomßen, 607 1st Neumark Cavalry Regiment, 262
Poniatowski, Józef Antoni, 111, 140, 142, 334, 1st Neumark Landwehr Cavalry
353, 378, 382–85, 387, 389, 399, 407, Regiment, 661, 676
409–11, 419, 430, 449, 523, 540, 544, 1st West Prussian Dragoon Regiment,
615, 686, 703–4, 715, 717, 727, 730, 660, 663, 774
736, 744–45, 758–59 1st West Prussian Infantry Regiment, 98
counteroffensive against Blücher, 359, 364, 2nd Brandenburg Infantry Regiment,
368 256, 298
Portugal, 32, 47, 192 2nd Brigade, 96–97, 131, 177, 181–83,
Pötnitz, 494, 499–500, 597 203–4, 206, 210, 216, 254, 256, 258,
Pottschapplitz, 435, 439 260, 262, 283, 311, 318, 367, 394, 475,
Pouch, 548 477, 479–80, 483, 485, 639, 645,
Pozzo di Borgo, Carl Andreas, 46, 617, 693 648–52, 657–58, 660, 682, 776, 781,
Prague, 27–28, 41, 44–45, 48, 52, 73, 76, 110, 784
137–41, 162, 191, 201, 229, 351, 356 Engagement at Niederau, 205
in Napoleon’s planning, 9 2nd Division, 761, 764, 771, 780–81
Prague Memorandum, 27–28 2nd East Prussian Infantry Regiment,
Prague Peace Conference, 45, 49, 61–62 96–97, 159, 203, 206–9, 481, 642,
Pratau, 485, 582 645, 650, 676
Prausnitz, 133, 143, 146, 203, 210–11, 219, 2nd Leib Hussar Regiment, 94, 96, 125,
224, 235–37, 300 156, 159, 161, 214, 318, 483, 676, 781,
Pressel, 558, 580 784
Pressen, 548 3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry
Pretzsch, 458, 499, 502, 559 Regiment, 97–98, 159
Priesteblich, 760 3rd Uhlan Regiment, 161
prince de la Moskova, see Ney, Michel 4th Silesian Landwehr Infantry
prince royal, see Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste Regiment, 97, 320, 661, 680
(crown prince of Sweden) 5th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry
Pristäblich, 547 Regiment, 262, 340, 660, 676
Proboszczów, see Probsthain 5th Silesian Landwehr Infantry
Probsthain, 142, 150, 154, 178, 220 Regiment, 96, 256, 657, 659, 680
Probstheida, 625, 636, 638, 697, 699, 705, 709, 6th Silesian Landwehr Infantry
711, 713, 715–19, 721, 729, 733–34, Regiment, 96, 206–8, 216, 650
755, 815, 818 7th Brigade, 97, 131–32, 156, 182, 254,
Prochowice, see Parchwitz 256, 258–59, 283, 301–2, 310, 316,
Profen, 213–14, 232 325, 340, 477, 479, 483, 485, 490,
Prusice, see Prausnitz 639, 641, 645, 660–62, 676, 781,
Prussia, 1–3, 30–33, 35–38, 42–45, 47–48, 63, 784
65–67, 70–71, 286–87, 291, 321, 378, 8th Brigade, 97–98, 119, 131, 156, 182–83,
805 210, 254–56, 259, 283, 311, 477,
Black Eagle, 71, 97, 210, 291, 380–81 483–84, 490, 639–41, 645, 660–61,
Landsturm, 212, 295, 309, 328, 336 663, 676, 682, 781
Prussian army, 10th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry
1st Silesian Hussar Regiment, 117 Regiment, 262, 340, 661, 663, 676
2nd Silesian Hussar Regiment, 117 10th Silesian Landwehr Infantry
I Corps, 73, 79, 88–89, 96, 110, 112, 117, Regiment, 256
119–20, 144, 212, 229, 255, 291, 369, 12th Reserve Infantry Regiment, 98, 256,
608, 680, 804, 823 647, 661–62, 676
Index 875
13th Silesian Landwehr Infantry Line infantry, 96

Regiment, 96, 647, 657–58, 676, Lithuanian Dragoon Regiment, 94, 98,
680 143, 240, 254, 260–61, 302, 340, 539,
14th Silesian Landwehr Infantry 660, 663, 681, 774, 799
Regiment, 255–56, 298, 339, 641, Mecklenburg-Strelitz Hussar Regiment,
647–48, 661, 676 94–96, 119, 159, 173, 175, 207, 232,
15th Silesian Landwehr Infantry 478, 483, 651, 660, 663, 771
Regiment, 97, 320, 642, 645–46, 661, Nr. 1 Heavy Battery, 254, 676
676, 680 Nr. 1 Horse Battery, 245, 256, 285, 676,
artillery, 95 774, 799
assigned to Army of Silesia, 79 Nr. 1 Light Battery, 651, 657
attrition, 320, 335, 343, 424, 792, Nr. 2 Heavy Battery, 258, 266, 651, 657,
794–95 676
battle of Leipzig, 732 Nr. 2 Horse Battery, 245, 254, 325, 640,
battle of Möckern, 614, 643, 645, 666, 649, 676, 799
682, 687, 796 Nr. 2 Light Battery, 676, 771
battle of the Katzbach, 243–44, 251–52, Nr. 3 Horse Battery, 676, 771
254–55, 261, 283 Nr. 3 Light Battery, 254, 676
Black Hussars, 156, 266, 300–1, 311, Nr. 12 Horse Battery, 266
315–16, 318–19, 334, 478, 482, 499, Nr. 12 Light Battery, 258, 645, 649, 676
658, 662, 768, 789, 797 Nr. 15 Light Battery, 254, 676
Brandenburg Hussar Regiment, 94, Nr. 24 Light Battery, 241–42, 245, 256
97–98, 125, 175, 201, 302, 366, 394, pursuit after Katzbach, 304, 311
611, 641, 649, 655, 659, 662, 676, 762 Reserve Cavalry, 98, 131, 133, 154, 168,
Brandenburg Infantry Regiment, 98, 159, 182, 213, 224, 243, 245, 254, 256,
240, 647, 661–62, 676, 680 258–60, 262, 279, 303, 311, 318,
Brandenburg Uhlan Regiment, 98, 128, 485–86, 490, 565, 659, 732, 761–62,
143, 145, 155, 159, 203, 210, 240, 256, 764, 766, 771, 773, 777, 780–81, 792
261–62, 311, 325, 334, 394, 611, 640, Reseve infantry, 96
649, 660, 662, 676, 788, 800 Rhine offensive, 763, 766, 771, 775, 777,
cavalry, 95 781, 787, 794
depots, 119 right flank march to Elbe, 463
East Prussian Jäger, 96, 120, 240, 676, Saxon troops, 774
771–72 second retreat from Napoleon, 362
East Prussian National Cavalry second Silesian offensive, 221, 224, 302,
Regiment, 94–95, 98, 156, 229, 259, 318–19, 326
261, 435, 510, 513, 632, 640, 649, 662, Silesian Landwehr, 243, 245, 257, 487,
772, 799–800 794
Elbe crossing, 475 at Löwenberg, 184
engagement at Freyburg, 776 Silesian Uhlan Regiment, 800
engagement at Wartenburg, 478, 485, Sommerfeld Landwehr Battalion, 487
488 supply problems, 320
exhaustion, 213 third Saxon offensive, 410
first retreat from Napoleon, 182–83, 213 Thuringian Battalion, 97, 281, 661,
first Silesian offensive, 131–33, 146, 771–73
167–68, 171–72, 179 West Prussian Dragoon Regiment, 98,
Grenadier Brigade, 96 117, 260, 365, 394, 539, 799
Guard Jäger, 97, 173, 195, 340, 676, West Prussian Infantry Regiment, 676
771–72 Zange und Hammer, 96
Landwehr, 91, 93, 95, 131, 203, 213, 298, II Corps, 73, 79, 82, 91, 99, 110, 120, 141,
319, 362, 484, 791, 795, 808 593, 804
Landwehr at Löwenberg, 182–83 2nd Silesian Infantry Regiment, 117, 257,
Leib Hussar Regiment, 640 680, 718, 755
Leib Infantry Regiment, 96–97, 159, 195, 2nd West Prussian Infantry Regiment,
325–26, 482–84, 487, 645–46, 649, 718
661, 676, 771, 785 9th Brigade, 627, 637, 705
Leipzig campaign, 550, 568, 611 10th Brigade, 627, 705, 717–18
876 Index
Prussian army, (cont.) mobilization, 3, 91

11th Brigade, 372, 627, 637, 701, 706, 719, Neumark Dragoon Regiment, 117
734 requirements for regiments, 91
11th Reserve Infantry Regiment, 718 Royal Guard, 73, 77, 79, 117, 141, 593,
12th Brigade, 627, 705, 717–18 607–9, 627, 637, 644, 699, 705, 720,
19th Reserve Infantry Regiment, 719 732, 780, 804
battle of Leipzig, 627, 705–6 Saxon troops, 731, 768, 799–800
engagement at Kulm, 9, 369 Saxon Uhlan Regiment, 768, 781
Landwehr, 91, 93 Silesian Cuirassier Regiment, 117
Reserve Cavalry, 627, 719 Silesian Landwehr, 72, 79, 92–94, 120
III Corps, 79, 91, 193, 419, 423, 525, 798 attrition, 363
1st Pomeranian Infantry Regiment, 737, engagement at Goldberg, 205
739 exhaustion, 216
2nd Reserve Regiment, 737–38, losses at Möckern, 761
743 Prussian Poland, 32
3rd Brigade, 458–59, 720–21, 724–25, Przedgórze Sudeckie, see Zobtenberg
735 Przesieczany, see Hochkirch (Silesia)
3rd East Prussian Infantry Regiment, Przeździedza, see Dippelsdorf
724, 738–39 Püchau, 513, 535–36, 545
3rd East Prussian Landwehr Infantry Pulsnitz, 422, 426, 432, 445
Regiment, 738 Puthod, Jacques-Pierre, 152, 236, 251, 276,
4th Brigade, 500, 504 278, 280, 301, 306, 312, 315–16, 319,
4th Reserve Regiment, 722 325, 328
5th Brigade, 423, 458–60, 470, 511, 513, Putlitz, Friedrich Wilhelm von, 517, 550
547, 557, 724, 735, 739 Puton de They, Marc Antoine, 769
6th Brigade, 724–25, 735, 737 Putzkau, 385, 407, 409–10, 412, 418, 440, 453
battle of Dennewitz, 10, 374, 391, 405 Pyotrovice, see Peterswald
battle of Leipzig, 710 Pyrenees Mountains, 11
Elbe crossing, 501
engagement at Großbeeren, 308 Quandt Mill, 699, 715, 734, 736
Kolberg Infantry Regiment, 737 Queis River, 110, 137, 140, 148, 171, 175, 192,
Landwehr, 91 197, 235, 309, 311–12, 326–27, 329,
Leipzig campaign, 555, 566 331–32, 334–35, 342, 352, 356,
retreat to Saale, 556 358, 368–69, 380–81, 387, 419,
Reserve Cavalry, 472, 724, 735 807–8
IV Corps, 53, 79, 91, 423, 462, 464, 466, 512, in Allied planning, 86
517, 556, 565 in Napoleon’s master plan, 356
battle of Dennewitz, 10, 374, 391, Quetzdölsdorf, 555
405 Quintus Fabius Maximus, 807
engagement at Blankenfelde, 193
engagement at Großbeeren, 308 Rackith, 502, 571, 582
engagement at Hagelberg, 355 Rackwitz, 195
in Blücher’s planning, 419 Radeberg, 426, 428–29, 456, 496
Kurmark Landwehr Brigade, 517 Radeburg, 422, 457, 463
battle of Lützen, 4 Radefeld, 599, 611, 614, 616, 629–31, 633,
cavalry, 94 638–40, 642, 656, 671, 673, 676, 679,
Chief of the General Staff of the Prussian 684, 691
Army, 75, 79, 83, 145, 761, 782 Radegast, 501, 512, 517, 553, 555, 564, 571,
defense of Silesia, 117 616
engagement at Großbeeren, 10 Radetzky von Radetz, Jan Josef Václav, 28–30,
instructions for vanguard brigade, 92 60, 64, 200, 371, 405, 607–8
Iron Cross, 98, 339, 380, 773 Gitschin Agreement, 30
Krümpern, 91 “Operationsentwurf,” 55–60
Landwehr, 3, 73, 88, 91 plan of operations, 6, 26–28, 51, 54, 70
attrition, 363, 369 Radmeritz, 353, 381, 391, 394
Landwehr cavalry, 95 Radomierzyce, see Radmeritz
Line cavalry, 95 Radoniów, see Ottendorf
Index 877
Raguhn, 496, 499–501, 503, 511, 527, 549, Richthofen, Karl Otto Johannes Theresius
552–53, 561, 563–65, 571–72 von, 337
Rakhmanov, Vasily Sergeyevich, 86, 133, 299, Richthofen, Manfred von, 337
327, 543, 714 Riemberg, 241, 244
Rakowice Małe, see Rackwitz Riesa, 524–26, 540
Ramsla, 779 Riesengebirge, 6, 85, 87, 89, 110, 212
Rastenberg, 779, 786 Rietschke stream, 634, 653, 655–56, 664–65,
Ratibořice, see Ratiborsitz 669, 675, 678, 687, 724
Ratiborsitz, 64 Ringenhain, 400, 407, 409
Ratisbon (battle), 350 Rippach, 765
Rauch, Johann Georg (Gustav) von, 324, 452, Rippach stream, 820
501, 547, 590–91, 604–5, 610, Rochambeau, Donatien-Marie de, 150, 205,
787 248–49, 269, 271, 279, 719
opposes march to Elbe, 452 Rochambeau, Jean-Baptiste Donatien de
Raudnitz, 44 Vimeur de, 150
Rayevsky, Nikolay Nikolayevich, 284, 644, Rochlitz, 446, 537, 560
704 Röchlitz, 133, 143, 145–46, 185, 203, 210,
Rechtsabmarsch, 547 218–19, 224, 236–38, 244, 296–97,
réfractaires (deserters), 77 300, 303, 310
Rehausen, Gotthard Mauritz von, 67 Rogau, 110
Reibnitz, Karl Friedrich von, 318, 322, 541 Rogniat, Joseph, 727
Reichardtswerben, 764, 778, 800 Rogów Sobócki, see Rogau
Reiche, August von, 498 Rogoźnica, see Großrosen
Reichenbach, 23, 64, 119, 385 Rohrsdorf, 142
Allied headquarters, 23, 31, 33–34, 39, 42, Röhrsdorf (Dürröhrsdorf-Dittersbach), 427
44, 57, 59, 70, 73, 78, 80, 85, 110 Roitzsch, 553
Reichenbach (Saxony), 332, 353–54, 362, Rosenthal, 119, 428, 689, 714, 725, 740, 744
364–66, 379, 383–85 Roßbach, 762, 764, 773, 775, 800
Reichenbach Plan, 7, 10, 57–60, 85, 187, 199, Rossi, Ignatius, 708
226, 229, 231, 233, 350–51, 371–72, Roßlau, 29, 419, 421, 430, 457, 460–61, 467,
387, 390, 427, 436, 451, 455, 469, 511, 470, 474, 491, 500–2, 504, 512, 517,
528, 806, 828 520–21, 529, 536, 539, 547, 552–54,
Reideburg, 567, 585, 591, 610 556, 562–63, 568–70, 572, 574–78,
Rensdorf, 679 586, 589, 592, 595, 615
Reudnitz, 597, 599–601, 603, 670, 684, 699, Rötha, 613, 622, 627, 637, 747
723–24, 729, 735, 737, 747, 815 Rothbrünnig, 237, 243, 280
Reyher, Karl Friedrich Wilhelm von, 145 Rothenburg, 550, 556, 564–65, 576, 582, 812
Reynier, Jean-Louis, 165, 457–60, 494, 500, Rothkirch, 201, 217, 220, 224, 235, 237, 280,
513, 515, 518, 537–38, 545, 561, 283, 296, 302
570–78, 582, 590, 595–96, 599–600, Rothnaußlitz, 433, 435
603, 606, 673, 686, 688–89, 697–98, Rottembourg, Henri, 717, 730, 755
709, 721–22, 747, 749, 753, 755 Roudnice nad Labem. see Raudnitz
engagement at Großbeeren, 193 Roussel, Nicolas-François, 241, 245, 258, 262,
Rezvyi, Dmitry Petrovich, 734 265
Rheingaugebirge, 797 Rückersdorf, 419, 436
Rhine (fortresses), 375 Rückmarsdorf, 585, 610, 622
Rhine River, 11, 50, 424, 429, 456, 523, Rudzevich, Aleksandr, 78, 102, 114, 121, 132,
685–86, 748, 760, 777–79, 782, 786, 134, 143, 146, 150–55, 159, 183, 186,
789–90, 793–98, 810, 819–20, 822, 196, 203, 205–6, 240, 247–48, 250,
824–25 269, 272, 282, 297, 300–1, 311, 315,
in Allied planning, 27, 39, 49 327, 329, 331, 334, 361, 409, 432,
in Austrian planning, 31 434–36, 470, 510, 518, 548, 553,
Rhön Mountains, 789 566–67, 585–86, 591–92, 610–11,
Ribbentrop, Friedrich Wilhelm, 90–91 619, 622, 629, 631, 639, 652–54,
Ricard, Étienne-Pierre, 267–68, 311, 626, 672, 665, 667–68, 677, 679, 711, 713,
723–24 723–24, 785
Richthofen, Karl Ernst Friedrich von, 287 discovers French in neutral zone, 112
878 Index
Rudzica, see Pfaffendorf 3rd Cuirassier Division, 593, 607, 704–5

Ruhla, 97, 787 III Grenadier Corps, 593, 607, 638, 644
Rühle von Lilienstern, August Otto, 411, 416, at Kulm, 350–51
422, 442, 446, 454–56, 462, 464, Cuirassier Brigade, 627, 637
467–68, 472, 501, 520–22, 543, 589, Grenadier Corps, 627, 637, 704, 732
613, 692, 694–96, 711 Light Guard Cavalry, 705
Rumburg, 137–39, 141, 353–54, 362, 367, 371, in early 1813, 2
374, 376–78, 385, 396, 400, 403, 409, Langeron army corps, 101
411, 422, 434, 453 1st Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment, 151,
Rumburk, see Rumburg 435, 486, 652
Russia, 1–2, 22, 30–31, 33, 35–38, 42, 44–45, 2nd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment, 150,
47–49, 52, 62, 65–67, 70–71, 81, 95, 203, 206, 247–48, 366, 394
106, 192, 378, 441, 606, 804–5, 818, 3rd Dragoon Division, 186
827 3rd Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment, 151,
Order of St. Andrew, 381 206, 248, 435, 486, 652
Order of St. George, 381 4th Ukrainskii Cossack Regiment, 269
policy toward Austria and Prussia, 31 7th Division, 273, 282, 285
Russian army, 2, 6, 25–28, 33, 54, 63, 73, 80, 7th Jäger Regiment, 181, 186, 679, 711
85, 88, 90, 100, 118, 121, 137, 593 8th Division, 186, 713
1st Dragoon Division, 89 9th Division, 270, 272, 282
2nd Hussar Division, 89 10th Jäger Regiment, 270, 282, 655
3rd Dragoon Division, 89 11th Jäger Regiment, 248, 282, 285, 315
4th Dragoon Division, 89 12th Jäger Regiment, 150, 270, 282, 679,
I Cavalry Corps, 89 711
III Reserve Army of Observation, 106 15th Division, 159, 282
VI Infantry Corps, 183, 203, 206, 210, 248, 17th Division, 713
250, 272–73, 282, 311, 315, 367, 394, 18th Division, 273, 285
454, 672 22nd Division, 151
VIII Infantry Corps, 712–13, 723 22nd Jäger Regiment, 150, 282, 679, 711
IX Infantry Corps, 89 28th Jäger Regiment, 23, 45, 270, 282,
Army of Reserve, 101 285, 315
Army of the Danube, 102 29th Jäger Regiment, 151, 247, 282, 385,
battle of Möckern, 682 712
Black Sea Cossacks, 101 30th Jäger Regiment, 679, 711
cavalry, 101 32nd Jäger Regiment, 270, 282, 285, 315
Dokhturov army corps 34th Light Artillery Company, 315
6th Jäger Regiment, 721 34th Light Battery, 273
11th Jäger Regiment, 721 36th Jäger Regiment, 282, 285, 315
12th Division, 707–8, 734, 736, 744 37th Jäger Regiment, 181, 186
13th Division, 706–8, 734, 736, 740 38th Jäger Regiment, 270, 282, 655, 712,
26th Division, 707–8, 720, 734, 736, 740, 754
743 45th Jäger Regiment, 151, 203, 247, 282,
45th Battery Company, 708 385, 712, 754
47th Light Battery Company, 708 48th Jäger Regiment, 711
53rd Light Battery Company, 708 VI Infantry Corps, 89
Narvskii Infantry Regiment, 708 VIII Cossack Regiment, 146
Smolenskii Infantry Regiment, 708 VIII Infantry Corps, 89
Don Cossacks, 210, 410, 418, 524, 655 IX Infantry Corps, 183, 203, 206, 210,
Donskoye Cossacks, 486, 492, 502 248, 250, 270, 282, 327, 394, 652, 654,
equipment, 101 712–13, 723
Imperial Guard and Reserve, 78–79, 593, X Infantry Corps, 89
607–9, 627, 637, 699, 705, 720, 732, 22nd Division, 152, 282, 713
780 Apsheronskii Infantry Regiment, 655
1st Cuirassier Division, 705 Arkhangelogorodskii Infantry Regiment,
1st Grenadier Division, 705 203, 247, 655, 742, 757
2nd Cuirassier Division, 705 attrition, 335, 344
2nd Grenadier Division, 705 Belozerskii Infantry Regiment, 713
Index 879
Brestskii Infantry Regiment, 713 10th Division, 153, 179, 252, 261, 268
Chernigovskii Mounted Jäger Regiment, 16th Division, 252, 342, 463
300, 492 17th Division, 387
depots, 119 27th Division, 101, 153, 252, 261, 268,
Derptskii Mounted Jäger Regiment, 714
652 39th Jäger Regiment, 153, 252, 463
Don Artillery Company, 315 49th Jäger Regiment, 154
Don Cossack 2nd Artillery Battery, 248 50th Jäger Regiment, 154
Dorpatskii Mounted Jäger Regiment, XI Infantry Corps, 252, 495
230, 233, 282 Akhtyrskii Hussar Regiment, 284, 381,
in Blücher’s planning, 347 749
Irkutskii Infantry Regiment, 713 Aleksandriiskii Hussar Regiment, 284,
Kievskii Dragoon Regiment, 248, 269 366, 381, 394, 749
Kinburnskii Dragoon Regiment, 230, attrition, 335, 343
233, 282, 315 Belorusskii Hussar Regiment, 284, 381,
Kolyvanskii Infantry Regiment, 655 749
Libavskii Infantry Regiment, 151, 203, depots, 119
233, 282 Kamchatskii Infantry Regiment, 252,
Liflyandskii Mounted Jäger Regiment, 326, 495, 714
159, 269, 652 Kurlandskii Dragoon Regiment, 180, 252
Litovskii Mounted Jäger Regiment, 248 Mariupolskii Hussar Regiment, 284, 381,
Mitavskii Dragoon Regiment, 655 749
Moskovskii Infantry Regiment, 151, 203, Nr. 13 Heavy Battery, 252
233, 282, 418 Ochakovskii Infantry Regiment, 326, 495
Nasheburgskii Infantry Regiment, 272, Okhotskii Infantry Regiment, 252, 714
655, 713 Smolenskii Dragoon Regiment, 180, 252
Nr. 15 Heavy Battery, 160 St.-Priest army corps
Nr. 29 Light Battery, 160, 655 1st Dragoon Division, 384
Nr. 34 Heavy Battery, 655 1st Jäger Regiment, 147, 384, 418
Olonetskii Infantry Regiment, 151, 679, 2nd Donskoye Cossack Battery, 486, 502
711, 713 17th Division, 384, 410
Reserve Cavalry, 182, 186, 203, 210, 300, 33rd Jäger Regiment, 134, 147, 384, 418
315, 566, 629, 642, 652 48th Jäger Regiment, 410, 418, 679
Ryazhskii Infantry Regiment, 272, 655, VIII Infantry Corps, 278, 679
713 attrition, 335, 344
Schlüsselburgskii Infantry Regiment, Chernomorskoye Cossack Regiments,
182, 186 384
Severskii Mounted Jäger Regiment, 182, Kargopolskii Dragoon Regiment, 384,
196, 300 410
Shlisselburgskii Infantry Regiment, 653, Kharkovskii Dragoon Regiment, 300,
679, 711 315, 410, 486, 502, 652
Staroingermanlandskii Infantry Kievskii Dragoon Regiment, 159, 300,
Regiment, 203, 247, 713, 742 315, 366, 394, 435, 486, 502,
Staroskolskii Infantry Regiment, 151, 652, 713
652, 712, 754 Mitavskii Dragoon Regiment, 384
Tverskii Dragoon Regiment, 300, 315, Moskovskii Infantry Regiment, 384
492 Novorossiiskii Dragoon Regiment, 387,
Vilmanstrandskii Infantry Regiment, 418, 652
410, 418, 713 Ryazanskii Infantry Regiment, 384, 387,
Vyatskii Infantry Regiment, 151, 654–55, 418
713 Vilmanstrandskii Infantry Regiment, 410
Yakutskii Infantry Regiment, 655 Yeletskii Infantry Regiment, 147, 418
manpower shortages, 101 Tolstoy army corps
Sacken army corps, 101 II Infantry Corps, 392
2nd Hussar Division, 252, 261, 284, 688 V Guard Corps, 392
8th Horse Guns, 154 Imperial Guard, 392
8th Jäger Regiment, 153, 252, 463 Ukrainian Cossack Division, 101
880 Index
Russian army (cont.) Scharnhorst, Wilhelm von, 287, 364, 486, 564
Wintzingerode army corps Scheldt River, 793
14th Jäger Regiment, 740 Schellenberg, 527
Wittgenstein army corps Schenk, Major von, 125, 319, 321
I Infantry Corps, 372, 627, 705 Schildau, 494, 504, 506, 513–15, 517, 519,
II Infantry Corps, 372, 627, 705, 717, 719 535–36, 542–43, 546, 548
X Infantry Corps, 151, 182, 186–87, 203, Schimmelwitz, 281
206, 247–49, 251, 273, 282, 300, 338, Schirgiswalde, 360, 400, 402, 419
367, 383–84, 387, 394, 400, 409, 514, Schkeuditz, 517, 555, 576, 585, 593, 595, 601,
548, 652, 654, 688, 712, 741, 754 605, 607–8, 610–14, 616, 622, 629,
XI Infantry Corps, 89 631–32, 639–40, 664, 684, 731, 735,
Russian Reserve Army, see Army of Poland 760–61, 765, 814, 823
Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1792, 102 Schköna, 549, 558, 580
Russo-Turkish War of 1806–1812, 102 Schlan, 141
Ryssel, Anton Friedrich von, 736 Schlaupe, 211, 233, 238, 240, 248, 250, 254–56,
Ryssel, Xavier Reinhold von, 722 269–71, 273, 282, 285
Rzymówka, see Riemberg Schlauphof, 224, 233, 238, 243, 271, 273, 283,
285
Saale River, 3, 11, 22, 26, 45, 97, 107, 370, 389, Schleberoda, 771, 773
427, 430, 462, 491, 508, 511–12, Schleesen, 460, 494
520–22, 528, 532, 543, 545, 550–52, Schleußig, 702
554–57, 559, 562, 564–67, 569, 572, Schloßvippach, 777–80
578–79, 582, 588, 592–93, 599, 605, Schluckenau, 138, 353, 382, 403, 409–10,
610, 613, 618, 624, 670, 683, 691, 697, 412
699, 716, 719, 727–29, 731–32, 748, Schmalkalden, 788
762–63, 765–66, 769, 774–77, 795, Schmidt, Johann Heinrich Otto von, 68, 95,
807, 812, 815, 817, 820–21, 823–24 252, 320, 477, 480, 651
in Allied planning, 25 Schmiedeberg, 110, 114, 124–25, 132, 148–49,
in Austrian planning, 6 188, 301, 304, 312, 316
Saarau, 112, 114, 124–25, 127 Schmiedefeld, 412, 447, 457, 470
Saaz, 55 Schmogwitz, 185, 188, 204, 267, 269, 280, 299
Sagan, 77, 86 Schmottseifen, 123, 134, 139, 147
Salmünster, 788, 802 Schnelle Deichsel Stream, 146, 149, 154, 156,
Salzmünde, 564 183, 185, 187–88, 204, 226, 244, 297,
Salzungen, 788 306, 309–11, 321, 323, 326
Sárvár-Felsővidék, István Széchenyi de, 692 Schnellin, 483
Sattelstädt, 783–84 Schöna, 515
Sausedlitz, 518, 547–48, 557 Schönau, 113, 130, 132, 134, 142–43, 149, 151,
Saxon army 214, 217–18, 220, 235–36, 244, 251,
Saxon Hussar Regiment, 799 276, 278, 280, 290, 338, 702, 725
Saxon Uhlan Regiment, 799 Schönefeld, 626, 655, 669, 672, 684–85,
Saxony, 3–4, 7, 9–10, 25, 32, 42, 54, 77, 85, 87, 688–89, 697–98, 711–13, 715, 721,
105, 107, 115–16, 130, 136–37, 142–43, 723–25, 729, 749, 815, 821
165, 192–93, 198, 203–4, 218, 225–26, Schönfeld, 456, 725
230, 288, 299, 303, 308, 312, 346, 352, Schöps, 362, 385
376–77, 388, 402, 404, 406, 409, 441, Schulzenheim, Conrad Theodor von, 460
464, 491, 502, 511, 516, 528, 532, 538, Schwanenfeld, Theodor Franz Sartorius von,
560, 562, 568, 762, 807, 810–11 302, 318, 326
in Napoleon’s planning, 8 Schwarzenberg, Karl zu, 57–58, 71, 80, 112,
in Trachenberg Protocol, 53 120, 137, 140–42, 191, 193, 229, 331,
to be given to Prussia, 32 355, 371, 375–76, 382, 387–88, 399,
Schack, Ferdinand Wilhelm von, 172, 194, 407, 413, 416–17, 443, 455, 510, 527,
213, 318, 341, 429, 439, 486, 781, 783, 530–31, 554, 587, 607–8, 699, 702,
785, 787, 794, 808, 810 753, 805, 807, 809–14, 816–19,
Schandau, 411 821–22, 824
Scharnhorst, Gerhard Johann von, 4, 29, 73, Allied commander in chief, 7, 63, 78, 347,
75–76, 78, 82, 84, 486 350–51
Index 881
Austrian commander in chief, 23, 27–28, 30, Schweidnitz, 6, 23, 28–29, 78, 89, 91–92, 101,
55 110, 112, 117, 119, 125, 211–13, 216,
battle of Dresden, 8–9, 309, 345–46 321, 328
battle plans for Leipzig, 690 Schweidnitz stream, 112, 115, 119, 125
Bohemian counteroffensive, 404 Schweinfurt, 686, 697
cancels first Leipzig offensive, 201 Schwentnig, 114, 116, 124
commands Army of Bohemia, 79 Schwerstedt, 779–80
demonstration against Dresden, 371 Schwiebendorf, 342
dislikes Frederick William III, 63 Schwosdorf, 453, 456–57
Dresden offensive, 8, 201, 308, 346–47 Ścinawa, see Steinau
first Leipzig offensive, 200 Sébastiani, Horace-François, 110–11, 123,
Gitschin Agreement, 30 153, 155, 157, 164–65, 172, 179, 201,
in Allied planning, 87 211, 235, 237, 241–46, 258, 260–65,
in Bernadotte’s planning, 469, 516, 521, 274, 279–80, 288, 296, 301, 303, 378,
554 411, 530, 537, 558, 573, 582, 595, 708,
in Blücher’s planning, 230, 308–9, 354, 403, 721, 748, 779
409, 412, 452, 465, 511, 514, 516, 519, criticized by Napoleon, 359
521, 588–89, 710 Sedan (battle), 578
in Napoleon’s planning, 8, 140–42, 377, 415, Se˛dzimirów, see Wilhelmsdorf
417, 430, 461, 523, 528–29, 531–32, Se˛dziszowa Dolna, see Niederröversdorf
560, 562–63, 574, 576, 578–79, 600, Se˛dziszowa Górna, see Oberröversdorf
625, 782 Seehausen, 635, 655, 671, 690
in Reichenbach Plan, 199, 351, 390 Seerhausen, 533, 545
Leipzig campaign, 11, 439, 464, 468, 491, Seichau, 133, 143, 187–88, 197, 210, 213–14,
503, 512, 519, 524–25, 551, 562, 224, 236–37, 240, 243–44, 248–50,
567–68, 571–72, 574, 576–78, 269–70, 273, 280
591–94, 599, 605–6, 791 Seidenberg, 334, 367–68, 394
battle of Leipzig, 600, 614, 617, 625, 627, Seifersdorf, 185, 204–5, 210, 331, 334
630, 637, 642, 664, 679, 687, 689–90, Seifertshain, 600, 638, 643, 670, 701, 707
695–96, 699, 701–2, 704–5, 715–16, Sellerhausen, 713, 721–22, 724, 729, 735, 815
731–34, 736, 746 Seven Years War, 39, 105
battle of Möckern, 667 Seyda, 458, 491
disposition for 16 October, 607–9, Shakhovsky, Ivan Leontiyevich, 719
612–13, 615 Shcherbatov, Aleksey Grigorievich, 248, 250,
revised disposition, 613 272–73, 282, 311, 315, 362, 367, 394,
plans after Dresden, 369–70 454, 457, 470, 514, 547, 550, 552, 809
postpones Bohemian counteroffensive, Shcherbatov, Nikolay Grigoriyevich, 150,
405 366, 672
problems with Blücher, 170, 349, 351–52, Shishkin, Pavel Sergeyevich, 472
371, 377, 409 Sibuet, Benoı̂t-Prosper, 315
problems with communications, 372 Sichów, see Seichau
recalls support for Blücher, 374 Sichówek, see Arnoldshof
relations with Blücher, 351 Sicily, 32, 47, 66
requests reinforcements from Blücher, 371 Siebeneichen, 147, 150–51, 167, 170–72,
retreat from Dresden, 9, 331, 345–46, 174–75
355–56 Siebeneichen (engagement), 150–55, 159, 164,
Rhine offensive, 761, 765–66, 770, 774, 196
777–81, 786, 788, 790–93, 796 Siegen, 794
seeks reinforcements from Blücher, 345, Siegersdorf, 327–29, 334, 368
347, 351, 352, 346 Silber stream, 240, 248, 282
seeks to exploit Dennewitz, 404, 413 Silberberg, 72, 92, 115, 117, 212, 332
seeks to exploit Kulm, 372 Silesia, 5–9, 23, 25–28, 40–43, 50, 52, 54, 66,
summons Blücher to Bohemia, 376, 378 72, 76–80, 85–90, 92, 105, 109–10,
supported by tsar, 200 112, 114–17, 120, 129–30, 136–38,
supports Blücher, 371–72 140–45, 162, 173, 178, 188, 191–93,
unclear about Napoleon’s intentions, 199, 201, 211–12, 217–18, 220, 225,
199 229–30, 235, 237–38, 277–78, 290,
882 Index
292, 296, 299, 308–9, 328, 331–32, Soult, Jean-de-Dieu, 50

334, 336, 347, 349, 352, 355, 363, 369, Spain, 2, 32, 46–47, 50–51, 62, 65–66, 69, 192,
372, 374, 382, 390–91, 403, 416, 425, 378, 424, 436, 586
440, 442, 452–53, 499, 552, 560, 569, Spiller, 87, 111, 132, 306, 312, 316, 327, 342
680, 807–9 Spree River, 4–5, 360, 363, 377, 387, 400,
Bunzlau District, 77 402, 407, 428–30, 434, 436–38, 442,
Goldberg District, 77 807
Grünberg District, 77 in Allied planning, 6
in Austrian planning, 54 Sprotta, 535
in Napoleon’s planning, 108 Sprottau, 542
in Reichenbach Plan, 60 Srebrna Gόrna, see Silberberg
in Trachenberg Protocol, 53 Środa Śla˛ska, see Neumarkt
Landwehr, 41 St.-Cyr, Laurent de Gouvion, 138–39, 162,
Löwenberg District, 77 191, 346, 356, 374, 377, 415, 429–30,
Sagan District, 77 530–32, 559–60, 562, 568, 620, 727,
Singwitz, 407 827
Sirgwitz, 156, 169, 171, 173, 175, 178, 196, St. Georgenthal, 142
232, 318, 323 St.-Germain, Antoine-Louis, 241, 258, 265,
Sixth Coalition, 1, 6–7, 9, 23, 30, 32, 35, 41–42, 267
44–45, 47–48, 52, 55, 58, 60, 68, 70, St. Marienstern Convent, 413, 419, 439, 453
72, 106–7, 109, 136, 274, 375, 528, St.-Priest, Guillaume-Guignard, 88, 118, 214,
613, 694, 797, 804, 807, 814, 822, 224, 276, 278, 383, 387, 610, 655, 662,
826–28 790, 794, 808
almost destroyed at Bautzen, 5 communication with Bohemian Army,
almost destroyed at Lützen, 4 308
crisis during Spring Campaign, 5 engagement at Wartenburg, 483
jeopardized by Blücher, 352 first Saxon offensive, 353–54, 360
strategic principles, 6–7, 25, 42 fourth retreat from Napoleon, 436
total forces at end of armistice, 79 fourth Saxon offensive, 440
Sjöholm, Ludwig Friedrich von, 96, 203, in Allied planning, 85, 87
208–9, 471–72, 476–77, 650–51 in Napoleon’s planning, 430
Skała, see Hohlstein Leipzig campaign, 670
Skjöldebrand, Anders Fredrik, 34 advance to Leipzig, 566, 568, 585,
Skora River, see Schnelle Deichsel 610–13
Slaný, see Schlan battle of Leipzig, 625, 688, 713, 723, 741
Sławnikowice, see Kieslingswalde battle of Möckern, 631, 655–56, 662, 665,
Šluknov, see Schluckenau 668–69
Słup, see Schlaup drive to Mulde, 499
Smokowicka, see Schmogwitz right flank march to Elbe, 453, 457, 463
Soběchleby, see Sobochleben Russian army corps, 89, 117
Sobochleben, 377, 404 depots, 119
Sobótka, see Zobten second retreat from Napoleon, 362,
Sohland, 419 367–68
Sohr, Friedrich Georg von, 175, 195, 659–60, second Saxon offensive, 381–85, 387
663, 666, 680 second Silesian offensive, 316, 327, 329, 331,
Sokołówka, see Falkenhain 334, 342
Söllichau, 580 pursuit after Katzbach, 296–97, 301, 304,
Sömmerda, 777–80 309, 311
Sommerfeld, 706–7, 709, 711 third Saxon offensive, 400, 402, 407,
Sornßig, 387 409–10, 412, 418, 422, 432–33
Souham, Joseph, 179, 192, 201, 218, 220, St. Thekla Church, 711
235–37, 246–47, 264, 267–68, Stadion, Johann Philipp von, 5–6, 32, 45, 48,
274, 279–80, 303, 310, 316, 325, 327, 51, 68–69
342, 464, 471, 507, 514–15, 517, at Trachenberg, 49
524–26, 530, 535–36, 541, 544–45, meets with Bernadotte, 48
558, 563, 625–26, 632, 654, Stahmeln, 629–30, 640, 642, 684
670–72, 678, 684, 698, 723, 730, 748 Stara Kamienica, see Kemnitz
Index 883
Stara Kraśnica, see Altschönau Streumen, 496

Stary Jawor, see Altjauer Striegau, 86, 112, 114–15, 124–27, 130, 215,
Stary Jaworów, see Jauernick 232, 250, 276, 290
Stedingk, Curt, 48, 401, 460, 501, 504, 556, Striegau stream, 89, 112, 114–15
616–17, 696, 721, 724, 737, 816 Stroganov, Pavel Aleksandrovich, 419, 707–9,
Steffens, Heinrich, 76, 110, 112, 122, 132, 720, 722
147–48, 216, 618, 632, 796 Strzegom, see Striegau
Stegemann, Colonel von, 181 Strzegomka, see Striegau stream
Stein, Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum, Strzelin, see Strehlen
73, 80, 84, 380, 761 Studnica, see Steuditz
Stein hill, 698, 707–9 Stünz, 698, 720–21, 723–24, 729, 735, 815, 821
Steinau, 89, 111, 115, 123, 145, 409 Stürza, 427–28
Steinberg, 251 Suchtelen, Jan Pieter van, 48
Steinmetz, Karl Friedrich Franciscus von, 96, Suden, Louis, 268
128, 213, 231, 271–73, 279, 285, 294, Sudetes Mountains, 6, 239
311, 322, 364, 477, 480–81, 485, Süptitz, 504
488–89, 639, 645, 648–49, 652, Svor, see Rohrsdorf
657–60, 666 Sweden, 26, 31–34, 36, 38, 43, 46–49, 52, 66–69,
Steinsdorf, 146, 154 81, 441, 511, 555, 587, 620, 805, 817
Stettin, 42, 72, 108, 122, 356–57, 579, 820 in Schwarzenberg’s planning, 605
Steuditz, 143, 220 suspicious of Russia and Prussia, 22, 30
Steudnitz, 145, 153, 157, 229, 244, 279, 283 Swedish army, 25
Steutz, 590 1st Division, 1st Brigade, 460
Stewart, Charles, 30, 34–35, 67, 555, 582, 587, battle of Leipzig, 738–39, 747
594, 604–5, 614, 617–18, 629–32, Swedish corps, 7, 14, 22, 30, 32–34, 38, 43–45,
655, 679, 687, 693, 748, 783, 788, 791, 49, 79, 119, 193, 388, 401, 406, 441,
793, 809, 825, 830 457, 459–61, 470, 500–1, 504, 511–12,
British representative at Bernadotte’s 517, 532, 555–56, 560, 565–66, 604,
headquarters, 39 616, 632, 686, 691–93, 696, 710, 721,
concludes subsidy agreement with Swedes, 735, 747, 754, 758, 816
38 Świa˛tniki, see Schwentnig
concludes subsidy treaty with Prussians, 35 Świa˛tniki Górne, see Schwentnig
diplomatic concerns, 33, 76 Świdnica, see Schweidnitz
praises the Prussians, 33 Świeborowice, see Schwiebendorf
warns Castlereagh about Metternich, 33 Świerzawa, see Schönau
Stockholm, 36, 48, 555 Switzerland, 11, 105, 826
Stockhorn, Karl von, 743 Sylbitz, 512, 555, 616–17, 623, 674, 679
Stolpen, 138–39, 326, 357, 360, 372, 408, Szczecin, see Stettin
411–12, 418, 420, 426–28, 430, 434,
437, 447, 449, 457, 470, 517, 523, 530 Talyzin I, Stepan Aleksandrovich, 282
Störmthal, 627, 705 Talyzin II, Aleksandr Ivanovich, 151–52, 163,
Stosch, Ferdinand Theodor von, 84, 271, 285, 203
687, 786 Talyzin III, Fyodor Ivanovich, 273
Stößel, Hermann Otto von, 187, 214, 217, Tannenwald, 635, 639–41
300, 311, 315–16, 318–19, Tarayre, Jean-Joseph, 267, 282
321, 662 Taucha, 506, 510, 513, 518, 535, 537, 545, 548,
Stötteritz, 696–97, 699, 708–10, 717, 721, 726, 552, 573, 575–76, 579, 586, 588,
729, 732–35, 815 591–92, 594–96, 599–600, 610, 615,
Stralsund, 33, 38, 52, 67, 587, 791 617, 625, 656, 668, 670, 684, 687–89,
Strasbourg, 782, 797, 802 691–93, 695–96, 698, 701, 710, 715,
Strehla, 509–10, 518, 524–26, 540 721, 749, 753–54, 818, 821
Strehlen, 115 Tauentzien, Bogislav Friedrich von, 53, 91,
Streifkorps, 24, 72, 86, 133, 143, 299, 327, 355, 357, 388, 421, 431, 434, 441, 447,
353–55, 359, 370, 378, 385, 412, 426, 453, 463–64, 466, 469–70, 473, 504,
447, 508, 512, 518–19, 574, 607, 627, 512, 514, 517, 550, 556, 565–66, 568,
699, 702, 809 571, 574, 583, 586, 591, 596, 603, 615,
Lützow, 72 619, 691, 694, 760
884 Index
Tauentzien, Bogislav Friedrich von (cont.) plan of operations, 52

assigned to Army of North Germany, 53, 79 Tolstoy, Pyotr Aleksandrovich, 347, 392
battle of Dennewitz, 374, 388, 391 Töpfer Hill, engagement at, 365–66
commands IV Corps, 73 Torgau, 4, 10, 28–29, 53, 81, 107–8, 130, 139,
cooperation with Blücher, 421, 423, 428, 308–9, 377, 391, 401, 403, 406–7,
442, 452, 456, 462, 467 414–15, 417, 419–23, 426, 430, 445–46,
dislikes Bernadotte, 420, 463, 467 453–56, 458–59, 464, 466, 468, 483,
Elbe crossing, 470, 491, 500–1 488, 494, 502, 504–7, 509–10, 513–15,
engagement at Blankenfelde, 193 517–19, 525, 527, 529–33, 535–37, 541,
engagement at Großbeeren, 308 543, 546, 557, 559–62, 579, 624, 692,
Großenhain operation, 428–29 711, 728, 760, 818, 820
in Blücher’s planning, 419–20, 423, 465 Trachenberg, 404
in Gneisenau’s planning, 441 meeting, 34, 46–47, 49, 55, 60, 62, 73, 85
meets with Blücher, 463 Trachenberg Protocol, 51, 53–54, 57–60, 70,
suspicious of Bernadotte, 400–1, 404 88, 137, 350, 528
Taunus Mountains, 797 Trautenau, 141, 170
Teichmann estate, 238 Treaty of Kalisch, 1
Tennstedt, 780 Treaty of Teplitz, 378
Teplice, see Teplitz Treaty of Tilsit, 36
Teplitz, 25, 87, 291, 354, 369, 372, 374–78, 391, Trebitz, 481, 486, 502, 561, 582
404, 406, 413, 415–16, 420, 443, 468, Treuenbrietzen, 53
510, 524, 811 Trieste, 63, 66
Terezı́n, see Theresienstadt Trutnov, see Trautenau
Tetschen, 54, 412, 447 Tugendbund, 84
Teutschenthal, 566 Tüngeda, 783
Teyl van Seraskerken, Dideric Jacob, opposes Turchaninov, Pavel Pyotrovich, 151, 654, 713,
march to Elbe, 451 754
Theresienstadt, 346 Turnau, 142
Thielmann, Johann von, 371, 426, 436, 607, Turnov, see Turnau
627, 699, 702, 716 Tyńczyk Legnicki, see Kleintinz
Thile, Ludwig Gustav von, 290, 380, 794, 796 Tyniec Legnicki, see Großtinz
Third Germany, 31, 65, 378 Tyrol, 65
Thirty Years War, 620, 765
Thomaswaldau, 159, 165, 167, 173, 180, 185, Udom, Yevstafy Yevstafiyevich, 210, 272, 282,
188, 310, 312, 316 435, 655, 723
Thon Hill, 697, 715, 726 Ufhofen, 783
Thornton, Edward, 38, 62, 66, 69, 617–18 Ujazd Górny, see Obermois
assures Catlereagh about armistice, 37 Ulbersdorf, 149, 156, 183, 186, 189, 201, 204,
concerns about Austria, 45 206, 297, 311, 342, 445
concerns about Sweden, 46 Ulbersdorf (Saxony), 409, 412
diplomatic optimism, 50 Ullersdorf, 329, 368
negotiations with Bernadotte, 36–37 Ulm (Capitulation), 160, 578
on Bernadotte’s distrust of Alexander, 36, 38 Umanets, Andrey Semyonovich, 203
supports Bernadotte’s proposals, 37 Uniegoszcz, see Bertelsdorf
suspicious of Austria, 50 Uniejowice, see Leisersdorf
Thümen, Heinrich Ludwig von, 504, 550, 556, Unstrut River, 697, 728, 762–63, 765–66,
568–70, 574, 691, 694 769–72, 774–80, 782, 800, 823
Thüringen, 768 Urusov, Aleksandr Pyotrovich, 186, 654,
Thuringia, 72, 686 754
Thuringian Forest, 783, 788, 812 Ushakov, Sergey Nikolayevich, 252, 261
Tiefenort, 787
Tillendorf, 173, 179, 195, 325, 327, 329, 342 Vacha, 787–88
Toll, Karl Wilhelm von, 23, 25–26, 28–29, Valenciennes, 802
39, 42, 48, 59, 375, 607–8, 736, 829 Valentini, Georg Wilhelm von, 380
at Trachenberg, 49 Vandamme, Dominique-Joseph, 9, 138–39,
claims credit for Trachenberg Protocol, 52 142, 162, 189, 345–46, 350, 356, 369,
Gitschin Agreement, 30 375, 443, 672
“Mémoire,” 23–27, 30, 43 engagement at Kulm, 9, 350–51, 354–55
Index 885
Varvažov, see Arbesau Eichwald, 476, 479

Vasilchikov, Dmitry, 749 High Wood, the, 475–77
Vasilchikov, Illarion Vasiliyevich, 122, 128, Landdamm, 474, 476, 479, 483–85, 487, 489
132, 142, 145, 153–54, 167, 179, Leine rivulet, 482–83
217–18, 220, 232, 252, 261, 299, 310, Moyenhainicht Canal, 476–77, 479, 483,
316, 319, 325–26, 329, 334, 353–54, 489–90
360–62, 365–67, 385, 394, 399, 409, Sand Hill, 477, 481, 484–85
419, 457, 463–64, 470–71, 502, 510, Schützberg, 476, 485
515, 543, 654–55, 688, 749, 760, Wartenburg (engagement), 10, 488, 497,
764–65, 778, 796 500–1, 505, 526, 554, 815
Venançon, Giuseppe, 153–54, 167, 179 Wartha, 115, 331
Vernichtungsschlacht, 390 Waterloo (battle), 15, 340, 680, 814, 819, 826
Veselitsky, Gavriil Pyotrovich, 270, 290 Wathiez, François-Isidore, 258, 260
Vial, Honoré, 719 Wawrzeńczyce, see Lorzendorf
Victor, Claude, 111, 189, 356, 374, 415, 544, Wedel, Gottlob Wilhelm von, 646, 648, 680
638, 644, 697, 705, 718–19, 765 Weidenhain, 504, 558, 561
Vienna, 5, 41, 45–46, 48, 50, 73, 88, 118 Weimar, 97, 661, 697, 778, 780
Vincent, Karl von, 617, 693 Weinberg farmstead, 195, 270–71, 281–82
Vistula River, 1–2, 52, 108–9, 300, 804 Weischütz, 770
in Allied planning, 42 Weißenberg, 354, 360, 368, 384–85, 436
in Austrian planning, 31 Weißenfels, 3, 427, 508, 566, 585, 592–93, 608,
in Napoleon’s planning, 8 697–99, 701–2, 715, 727–28, 731,
Vitoria (battle), 47, 50–51, 61 756, 762–65, 769–70, 774, 776–78,
Vlodek, Mikhail Fyodorovich, 567–68, 586–87 815, 821, 823–24
Vogelsberg Mountains, 791–92, 802 Weißensee, 777
Volkmarsdorf, 698, 723, 735 Weißenwolf, Nicolaus Joseph Rochus von,
Volkonsky, Pyotr Mikhailovich, 48, 59, 376, 644, 704
400, 608, 614 Weißig, 430, 437–38, 496, 544
signs Trachenberg Protocol, 51 Wellesley, Arthur, 50
Vorontsov, Mikhail Semyonovich, 25–26, Wellington, see Arthur Wellesley
28–29, 512, 517, 555–56, 565 Weltzien, Heinrich Wilhelm von, 183, 663, 680
Voyeikov, Aleksey Vasiliyevich, 154 Wenigwalditz, 332
Vuich, Nikolay Vasiliyevich, 691 Werlitzsch, 611
Wernersdorf, 119
Wachau, 598, 600, 606, 615, 625, 627, 636–38, Werra River, 748, 783, 787–88
642–43, 668, 670, 674, 699, 701, 703, Wesel, 560, 782, 797
734, 813–14, 829 Wesenitz River, 412
Wagram (battle), 826 Weser River, 791
Wahlstatt, 132, 134, 142, 216 in Allied planning, 27, 39
Wahren, 629–30, 633, 641–42, 645–46, 676 Westphalia (Kingdom), 39, 65, 491, 524, 618,
Wallenstein, Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von, 691, 756
66 Wetterau, 792
Wallmoden, Ludwig Georg von, 26, 79, 82, Wetterstedt, Gustaf af, 37, 68–69, 617, 749
357, 375, 396 Wettin, 521, 552–54, 556, 564–67, 582, 601,
Walther, Frédéric-Henri, 577, 584, 708, 721 616, 673
Wantewitz, 457 Wetzlar, 790–92
War of the Fourth Coalition, 826 White Elster River, see Elster River
War of the Third Coalition, 55, 826 Wiederitzsch villages, 518, 586, 614, 634,
Warburg, Ernst Friedrich von, 175, 178–79, 642–43, 645, 648, 652, 654–55, 665,
195, 381 669, 671–72, 675, 677–78, 680,
Warma˛towice, see Eichholtz 687, 690
Warsaw, 2, 31, 63, 70, 101, 378, 758 Wiehe, 777
Warta Bolesławiecka, see Neuwarthau Wierzbna, see Würben
Wartenburg, 458–60, 470, 472, 474–81, 483–86, Wiesbaden, 797
488–89, 491, 499, 501–2, 507–10, 514, Wieśnica, see Fehebeutel
520, 523, 525–27, 529, 532, 536–37, Wilczy Las, see Wolfshain
547, 549, 552, 558, 561–63, 582, 590, Wilczyce, see Wültsch
596, 610, 680, 808–9 Wildenhain, 580
886 Index
Wildschütz, 281, 302, 304, 515 Włodzice Małe, see Wenigwalditz

Wilhelmsdorf, 157, 182 Włodzice Wielkie, see Großwalditz
Wilków, see Wolfsdorf Wobeser, Karl Georg von, 423, 504, 514, 543
William (prince), 116, 255, 515, 632, 692–94, Wojcieszów, see Kauffung
776, 781 Wojcieszyn, see Ulbersdorf
William Louis Augustus (prince), 730, 743 Wojnarowice, see Wernersdorf
William of Baden, 747 Wolfsdorf, 203, 206
Wilthen, 436 Wolfshain, 153, 310
Wimpffen, Maximilian Alexander von, 734 Wölkau, 435, 506, 541
Winnica, see Niederweinberg Wöltsch, see Wildschütz
Wintzingerode, Ferdinand von, 118, 140, 496, Wörlitz, 470, 494, 501–2, 547, 565, 574
512, 564, 656, 780, 786, 798, 816 Wrede, Karl Philipp von, 586, 594, 686, 760,
assigned to Army of North Germany, 78 790–91, 796, 802
Elbe crossing, 470, 500–1, 504 Wrocław, see Breslau
engagement at Großeeren, 193 Wuischke, 387
in Allied planning, 29 Wültsch, 240–41
in Gneisenau’s planning, 441 Würben, 124–25, 130
Leipzig campaign, 512, 517, 686, 691 Wurschen, 353–54, 361, 385, 399
advance to Leipzig, 567, 569, 604, 606, Wurschen Convention, 30–31, 44, 65
616 Wurschen Plan, 6, 23, 65
battle of Leipzig, 679, 688–89, 691, 696, Würzburg, 50, 427, 469, 586, 589, 594, 727,
710, 721, 724, 732, 737, 740, 743 756
battle of Möckern, 632, 656 in Allied planning, 40, 42
retreat to Saale, 522, 555–56, 565 Wurzen, 461–62, 465, 494, 504, 506–10, 513,
lobbied by Gneisenau, 452 515, 518–19, 530–33, 535–37,
poor relations with Bernadotte, 692, 694 545–48, 559–60, 575, 585, 592–93,
suspicious of Bernadotte, 400 597, 608, 614, 624, 630, 691, 696, 710
Wisła, see Vistula River Wütende Neiße stream, 116, 192, 210–11, 219,
Witte, Ivan Osipovich, 151, 269, 435, 610, 622, 224, 237–38, 240–45, 247–48, 251,
667 254, 256, 264–66, 271–73, 278,
Wittenberg, 4, 9–11, 28–29, 107–9, 122, 139, 280–81, 285, 289, 296, 301, 303–4,
193, 341, 355–57, 375, 401, 403, 417, 310, 328, 335
419–21, 453–54, 456, 458–59, Wütsch, see Wildschütz
461–62, 466–67, 469, 472, 485, 488, Wyskok, see Hohberg
491, 499–500, 502, 504, 507, 527,
529–34, 536–37, 550, 556, 558–63, Yorck, Hans David von, 295, 806, 808, 811,
567–69, 571–72, 574, 578–79, 582, 822–24
585–88, 590, 592, 596, 603, 605–6, assigned to Army of Silesia, 79
615, 624, 692, 728, 760, 810, 818, 820 attrition of I Corps, 794–95
siege of, 452, 458, 461–63, 468 attrition of Landwehr, 363
Wittgenstein, Ludwig Adolph Peter zu, 3, 58, commands I Corps, 108
77, 79, 118, 137, 140, 144, 191, 214, complains to king, 222, 291
308, 354, 404, 562–63, 568, 571, 593, confronts Blücher, 221, 223, 233
598–99, 607–8, 779–80, 788, 790, 814 Count Yorck von Wartenburg, 489
Allied commander in chief, 3–4, 235, 693 criticizes Army Headquarters, 146, 168, 194
battle of Bautzen, 5 criticizes artillery, 95
battle of Leipzig, 615, 627, 636–38, 670–72, criticizes Katzler, 98
699, 705, 734, 737 criticizes Landwehr, 94, 320
battle of Lützen, 3 described by Hans Delbrück, 231
Dresden offensive, 201 disgusted with Russians, 488
in Allied planning, 26, 28–29 dislikes Bülow, 511
in Austrian planning, 44 dislikes Gneisenau, 293, 488, 796
in Radetzky’s “Operationsentwurf,” 55 dislikes Karl of Mecklenburg, 96–97
in Reichenbach Plan, 58 Elbe crossing, 471, 475
Leipzig campaign, 560 engagement at Wartenburg, 475–77,
Russian army corps, 89 479–80, 483–90
Wleń, see Lähn exhaustion of I Corps, 213, 216
Index 887
first retreat from Napoleon, 183, 185–88, third Saxon offensive, 400, 407, 409–10,
211, 214–15, 232 412, 419, 428–29, 432
engagement at Goldberg, 203 view of Silesian Army’s leaders, 99–100
engagement at Niederau, 204–5, 210 wants advance guard corps, 222, 353
first Saxon offensive, 352, 354, 360 Yurkovsky, Anastasy Antonovich, 261, 749
first Silesian offensive, 114, 125, 127, Yuzefovich, Dmitri Mikhailovich, 232, 251,
129–34, 143, 146, 149, 154, 159, 165, 306–7, 312, 338, 382, 387, 410,
167–68, 170–72 418, 486, 502, 504, 509–10, 514,
engagement at Deutmannsdorf, 155 517, 543
engagement at Löwenberg, 176, 178–79,
181–83, 196 Za˛bkowice Śla˛skie, see Frankenstein
engagement on the Gröditzberg, 156–57 Żagań, see Sagan
evaluation, 228–29 Zagrodno, see Adelsdorf
fourth retreat from Napoleon, 436 Zamosc, 72
fourth Saxon offensive, 439 Zamość, see Zamosc
impressed by Landwehr, 184 Żarów, see Saarau
in Allied planning, 86 Žatec, see Saaz
in Napoleon’s planning, 430, 434, 471, 526 Zawidów, see Seidenberg
jealous of Sacken, 292 Zbylutów, see Deutmannsdorf
Leipzig campaign Zealand, 36
advance to Leipzig, 566–68, 585, 610–11, Zebrzydowa-Wieś, see Siegersdorf
618 Zechmeister, Theophil, 445, 709
battle of Leipzig, 687, 689–90, 714–15, Zehbitz, 508, 515, 520, 553, 555
731, 735, 747 Zehista, 567
battle of Möckern, 614, 627, 629–31, Zeitz, 560, 593, 608, 627, 697, 716, 760–61
639–43, 645, 648–49, 655, 657–66, Zella, 788
669, 672, 675–76, 682, 687, 712, 796 Zepelin, Konstantin Gottlieb von, 661
drive to Mulde, 499, 502–3, 511, 518 Zerbst, 419, 460, 467, 472
retreat to Saale, 523, 547, 549–50, 553, Żerkowice, see Sirgwitz
555, 558, 564 Zeschau, Heinrich von, 722, 755
opposes Blücher, 99–100, 106, 131, 169, Zettenbach mill, 800
213–14, 219, 221, 226–27, 251–52, Zeuchfeld, 766, 769–71, 773–74
291–92, 298, 304, 321–24, 332, 336, Zielinsky, Karl Heinrich von, 100, 172, 303,
380, 511, 792, 795–97 650, 796
opposes Gneisenau, 293 Zielona Góra, see Grünberg
personality, 99–100 Zieten, Hans Ernst von, 372, 374, 447, 706–9,
praises 2nd Brigade, 210 719
praises Sacken, 252 Zittau, 26, 29, 41, 58, 109, 111, 136–41, 174,
receives Black Eagle, 291, 380 191, 201, 217, 334, 346, 353, 359,
rejects General Staff, 100, 223 361–62, 365, 367, 371–72, 382, 396,
relations with Gneisenau, 335 403, 416, 420, 422–23, 440, 442–43,
relations with subordinates, 97–98 454, 828
Rhine offensive, 732, 759, 761–64, 766, 769, Żmigród, see Trachenberg
775–81, 783–84, 786–89, 791–92, Zobten, 110, 119, 150–52, 154, 166–67, 170,
794, 797 177–78, 181–82, 306, 312, 315, 327,
engagement at Freyburg, 770–73, 775–76 329
engagement on the Hörselberg, 783–85 Zobtenberg, 110
right flank march to Elbe, 413, 453, 457, 463 Zörbig, 501, 517, 522, 550–57, 563, 566, 576,
second retreat from Napoleon, 362, 366–68 597, 601, 608, 616, 631, 673
second Saxon offensive, 381, 383, 385 Zschepplin, 510, 513
second Silesian offensive, 218, 220–21, 224, Zschopau, 527
316, 318–19, 326–27, 329, 332, 334, 342 Zucchi, Carlo, 147
battle of the Katzbach, 238, 240, 243–44, Zuckelhausen, 600, 625, 697–98, 701, 705,
246, 251, 254–56, 260–62, 266, 270, 707–8, 715, 719, 729, 734, 815
274–75, 281, 283 Zwenkau, 567, 601, 607–8, 733, 822
pursuit after Katzbach, 296–97, 301–4, 310 Zwickau, 137, 465, 468, 503

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Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany

Michael V. Leggiere is Professor of History and Deputy Director of the

The aim of this series is to publish outstanding works of research on warfare

A full list of titles in the series can be found at: www.cambridge.org/

The Defeat of Napoleon

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

List of figures page ix

16 Race to the Rhine 759

1 Field-Marshal Prince Karl Philipp zu Schwarzenberg, 1771–1820 page 24

All illustrations reproduced courtesy of Anne S. K. Brown

1 The theater of war, 1813 page 16

officers, most of whom were battle-hardened veterans. Nevertheless, the

attack a supposed French rearguard holding the quadrilateral of villages

Allied right. By nightfall on the 21st, he planned to have 144,000 combatants

3 October and defeated the French IV Corps. Based on an agreement with

Army of Silesia to focus on how the Prussians attempted to wage a Franco-

The hundred years from 1813 to 1913 witnessed the publication of

Since 1913, few historians have attempted to piece together an oper-

Ostritz Lauban Jauer

1. The theater of war, 1813

3. Situation, 19 August 1813

Torgau Bad Liebenwerda

Belgern Elsterwerda Hoyerswerda

Hohnstein Ulbersdorf Schluckenau

4. Region between the Spree and the Elbe Rivers

Lützen Oschatz Kamenz

5. Region between the Black Elster and the Saale Rivers

Alsleben Gräfenhainichen Kemberg

Wettin Sylbitz Torgau

6. Region between the Mulde and the Saale Rivers

Trachenberg and Reichenbach

1 Field-Marshal Prince Karl Philipp zu Schwarzenberg, 1771–1820

Toll assumed that, as soon as the armistice expired, Napoleon would

maintaining the defensive in all secondary theaters marked significant pro-

directly against the French while the Austro-Russian army debouched

offensive seized; the Austrian commander in chief will be informed of this in

At this point, the Allies reached an encouraging agreement with the

Tsar Alexander a memorandum drafted by Metternich outlining these con-

Kalisch–Breslau accords that called for Frederick William to cede Prussian

initially played into Metternich’s hands by declining the Austrian mediation

Despite the suspicion caused by the armistice, Stewart and Cathcart

in this or the succeeding campaign, even on the Continent, or at any rate

irremovable; and all the movements, even on a renewal of hostilities, w[ould]

operation may become a great feature, and essentially interesting to Prussia.”

He belonged to a school of strategy that based its ideas of warfare on the

3 Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, Charles XIV John of Sweden, 1763–1844

With a captive audience, Knesebeck’s memo began with an overview of

If all powers devote strength, unity, decisiveness, goodwill, and resolve to

Although he granted the Allies a numerical superiority of 120,000 men,

would preserve Napoleon’s crown. In return, the Austrians demanded an

faulted Metternich: “instead of acting upon them, [he] retrenches, modifies,

If the accomplishment of a reasonably solid peace, through negotiation, is not

Napoleon. Although pleased by these statements, Bernadotte received no

The latest information I have received from the headquarters of Their

according to Bubna, Napoleon had accepted the extension of the armistice

states. Russian general Hans Karl von Diebitsch immediately departed to

the three Allied monarchs and their accompanying Guard formations.

Army would march “without delay” to Bohemia. These stipulations

(1) The march of Wittgenstein’s corps to this army.