ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS document, the court has interpreted the Declaration as a part of the generally

accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

PRIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENFORCEMENT 2. While conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, the
sequestration orders remained valid as they were expressly recognized upon the
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN (Bill of Rights after EDSA Revolution) adoption of the Freedom Constitution.
GR NO. 104768 JULY 21, 2003 3. During the interregnum, the directives and orders issued by government officers
were valid so long as they did not exceed the authority granted by the revolutionary
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Sandiganbayan government and did not violate the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
resolution dismissing petitioner’s amended complaint and ordering the return of revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since they did not
repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specifically
the confiscated items of Elizabeth Dimaano stated the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect
Facts: to the items in the warrant. However, the constabulary seized items not in the
warrant.
1. President Cory Aquino issued EO No. 1 after the EDSA revolution 4. The warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and
• EO 1 created the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) to land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The raiding team thus had no legal
recover all ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and his cronies. The PCGG then created basis for the seizure of the items. Such actions amounted to warrantless search
the AFP Anti-graft Boad to investigate corrupt AFP Personnel. and seizure, exceeding its authority. The seizure was therefore void and the items
2. The AFP Board investigated the unexplained wealth of Josephus Ramas must be returned to Dimaano.
• Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time of
former President Ferdinand Marcos. Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
3. Pursuant to said investigation, the constabulary raiding team served a search of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
and seizure warrant on Dimaano’s premises.
• The search warrant was for “Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition” PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORG V. PHILIPPINES BLOOMING
but the team confiscated firearms and ammunition, along with items not included MILLS CO. INC (Hierarchy of Rights)
in the warrant such as monies of P2.8M and $50,000, jewelry and land titles. JUNE 25, 1973
4. The AFP Board then recommended that Ramas be prosecuted before the
Sandiganbayan FACTS: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter
• The case was for violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, otherwise known as the Act for the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino,
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. Accordingly, the Solicitor General, in Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint against Ramas and Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
Dimaano before the Sandiganbayan. petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
5. Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of merit Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
• The grounds for the dismissal were: (1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to
investigate the private respondents and (2) the search and seizure conducted Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration
was illegal. at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police,
6. Petitioner appealed before the SC arguing that the search was conducted during to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as
a revolutionary government bound by no constitutional limitation. those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
• During the interregnum, the exclusionary right from illegal seizure granted to the P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
respondents by the Bill of Rights was inoperative. demonstration.
Issue: W/N the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house were illegally seized
The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO
and therefore inadmissible as evidence.
after learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the planned
Held: No. demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that
1. Although the Bill of Rights was inoperative during the interregnum, as the de jure the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in factual exercise of
government, the Philippine revolutionary government was still bound by treaty the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of
obligations under the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The revolutionary government had
the duty to insure that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal
interference with his property.” Although it is not intend as a legally binding course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up
with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed
through with the rally.

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 petitioners with the proper pay from the moment they were dismissed minus the one
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the day of strike as well as the earnings which they might have earned during their
workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not separation from other sources.
absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too
late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were DISSENTING by Barredo, J
eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of Barredo argues that such negligence of the submission of the motion for
their Collective Bargaining Agreement. reconsideration is right to be dismissed. He says that the petitioner with the help of his
counsel had the proper number of days to submit such motion. Barredo argues with
The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers proof of previous jurisprudence. Added to this argument is that the constitutional right
of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for is not what is being tackled in the case at bar, according to Barredo. The errors is said
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being to be in the interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional precept and not
filed two days late. a denial of due process. All of these must first comply with the rules of procedure and
overpowering a final and executory decision of the Court of Industrial Relations devoids
ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the Collective them of power and renders them useless hence the dissenting opinion of Barredo.
Bargaining Agreement?
SEPARATE by Teehankee, J
RULING: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of Teehankee restates the reasons of the decision of the majority of the court in the
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate primacy of human rights over property rights are to be considered and are considered
and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat imprescriptible.
of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation TUPAS V. CA (Late Petition) DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL
only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru FEBURARY 6, 1991
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
• A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent Facts:
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil 1. October 12, 1989: court denied petition for certiorari for failure to show CA
which the State has the right to prevent (respondent court) committed reversible error in its resolution dated May 31, 1989.
• Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The 2. November 23, 1989: petitioner filed motion for reconsideration to which SC required
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never a Comment followed by a Reply and a Rejoinder
be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to 3. After examining the issues and arguments, SC affirmed the decision of CA.
humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of a. petitioners received copy of the Pasay RTC decision on April 3, 1989
which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues. b. motion for reconsideration was filed on April 17, 1989
• Injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if c. such motion for reconsideration was denied by RTC on May 3, 1989 but
it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike only received by the petitioner’s counsel on May 9, 1989
d. petition for review with CA was done only on May 23, 1989 which was
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression, free assembly and
clearly outside the 15-day reglementary period
petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of
his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms ISSUE: W/N the petitioners were denied of procedural due process after they fail to
the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government comply with the 15-day prescription for appealing
through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can HELD/RATIO: NO. Records showed that the petitioner’s counsel did not file petition for
appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection review within the remaining period which he should have known was only one day.
as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and • The tardiness of the petitioners to file an extension for review has forfeited
employees. their right to appeal. Therefore, they cannot claim that they have been denied
of due process.
Also the strike was not in violation of the CBA of the company because it was not • Observance of both procedural and substantive rights is equally guaranteed
against the company. The company must be the protectors of their employees but by due process and must be followed whatever the source of such rights.
rather in the case at bar, it seemed like they were looking for a chance to reduce such • Petition for certiorari cannot be a remedy if the reason behind the lost of the
personnel. They are guilty of unfair labor practice. The dismissal of the Court of right to appeal is due to the petitioner’s inexcusable negligence.
Industrial Relations of the motion for reconsideration because of the prescription of 5 • Lacsamana V. CA : If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by
days upon the notice and 10 days to arguments that support such motion was the a regional trial court, the movant has only the remaining period within which
reason. Considering the nature of the offense the Supreme Court allowed such
‘negligence’ to prosper hence the reversal of the decision and the reinstatement of the

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 to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with RULING:
the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review
• Petitioners’ argument that they should not be prejudiced by the mistake of On Jurisdiction: The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related,
their counsel was not acceptable especially that their counsel is equipped with senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a
impressive credentials. particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with finality. It is so ordered. power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the
litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the
actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant
EL BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO VS. VICENTE PALANCA (JURISDICTION OVER
A PERSON)
How Jurisdiction is Acquired: Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
MARCH 26, 1918 voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or
it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject
of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein,
the court over the property is recognized and made effective. under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized
and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the
The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration
expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where
of that nature and is substantially such. the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its
progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of
be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual
under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to
instituted for its condemnation and sale. be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title
in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of
real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a
China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly
The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non- speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The
resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to
directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as
in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The
Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former
proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings
August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant,
the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus
of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings parties.
subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the
judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is
over the defendant or over the subject of the action. made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as
such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference
the subject matter of the action; (2) Whether or not due process of law was observed to the principles governing actions in rem.

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The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites (3) The decision must have something to support itself;
are; (4) The evidence must be substantial;
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
and decide the matter before it. contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
the property subject of the proceedings. consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard. of a subordinate;
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing. (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved,
ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING; ARBITRATION and the reason for the decision rendered.

ANG TIBAY V. CIR (due process in administrative proceedings) The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. The
February 27, 1940 failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and
FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the
supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be
layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
valid. According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically
terminate the employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It SHU V. DEE (NBI without judicial or quasi-judicial power)
claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of ULP because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating April 23, 2014
against the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers
Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer. PONENTE: Brion
The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a motion for new trial was TOPIC: Right to due process, right to be heard
raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
ISSUE: What is the function of CIR as a special court? Is the Court of Industrial charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage submitted
Relations the proper venue for the trial? to Metrobank. Both deeds of real estate mortgage were allegedly signed by the
petitioner, one in his own name while the other was on behalf of
HELD: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR 3A Apparel Corporation. According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees
is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which of Metrobank. After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of
is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of Makati charging the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of public
the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive documents.
organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to
the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them
is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its comparison.
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to
controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them
or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. comparison. The findings contained in the questioned documents report only covered
the sample signatures unilaterally submitted by the petitioner as compared with the
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean that signatures appearing on the two deeds of real estate mortgage. An examination of the
it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental signatures of the petitioner which appear in several documents in Metrobank’s
and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an possession revealed that his signatures in the questioned deeds are genuine.
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character: ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were denied of their right to due process
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit during the NBI investigation.
evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

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HELD: NO. The Court held that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory
and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable Comelec maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in
of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI accordance with the Fair Election Act as this would truly give life to the constitutional
is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It objective to equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a more effective
undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may way of "levelling the playing field" between candidates/political parties with enormous
require in accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in resources and those without much.
the investigation or detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible.
ISSUES:
Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, the Court found that no denial
of the respondents’ due process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings were 1. Does Section 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limit violate the
still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?
finding the existence of probable cause.
2. Does resolution No. 9165 impose unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry?
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI
issued the questioned documents report. There was no categorical finding in the RULING:
questioned documents report that the respondents falsified the documents. This report,
too, was procured during the conduct of the NBI’s investigation at the petitioner’s 1. Yes, Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the
request for assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The report “aggregate-based” airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom
is inconclusive and does not prevent the respondents from securing a separate of speech and of the press.
documents examination by handwriting experts based on their own evidence. On its
own, the NBI’s questioned documents report does not directly point to the respondents’ Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental
involvement in the crime charged. Law. “Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties
and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy.”
GMA NETWORK, INC V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
September 2, 2014 GMA came up with its analysis of the practical effects of such a regulation: Given the
reduction of a candidate’s airtime minutes in the New Rules, petitioner GMA estimates
PONENTE: Peralta that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for his political
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days, or will only
have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he chooses to place his political
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal allocation, he will only have 27.27
Law. “Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely translates to 1 advertisement spot
and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy.” The “aggregate-based” on a 30-second spot basis in television.
airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the
ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. The Court agrees. The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates
Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) changed the airtime and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
limitations for political campaign from “per station” basis, as used during the 2007 and reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field –
2010 elections, to a “total aggregate” basis for the 2013. Various broadcast networks does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
such as ABS-CBN, ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, RMN and KBP questioned the restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their
interpretation of the COMELEC on the ground that the provisions are oppressive and ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and of the press.
2. No, Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the
Collectively, they question the constitutionality of Section 9 (a), which provides for an broadcast industry
“aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political The Court cannot agree with the contentions of GMA. The apprehensions of COMELEC
campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for appear more to be the result of a misappreciation of the real import of the regulation
candidates' television and radio guestings and appearances. Petitioners claim that rather than a real and present threat to its broadcast activities. The Court is more in
Section 9(a) limits the computation of “aggregate total” airtime and imposes agreement with COMELEC when it explained that the legal duty of monitoring lies with
unreasonable burden on broadcast media of monitoring a candidate’s or political party’s the COMELEC. Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to
aggregate airtime. On the other hand, COMELEC alleges that the broadcast networks aid the COMELEC in ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the
do not have locus standi, as the limitations are imposed on candidates, not on media allowed limits. There is absolutely no duty on the broadcast stations to do monitoring,
outlets. much less monitoring in real time. GMA grossly exaggerates when it claims that the

Jlyrreverre|5
non-existent duty would require them to hire and train an astounding additional 39,055 to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty—a reexamination of the Court’s
personnel working on eight-hour shifts all over the country ruling in Purganan was made
§ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the fundamental rights
GOV’T OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS HON. OLALIA of every person were proclaimed, is recognized as customarily binding upon
(Extradition) the members of the international community.
April 19, 2007 § The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines
signed and ratified also upholds the rights of every person to life, liberty and
Quick Digest: This is a petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify two Orders of RTC due process.
§ The Philippines as member of the family of nations has the responsibility of
Manila Judge Felixberto Olalia Jr (respondent) protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process
1) Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz (private ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings—
respondent) to post bail to make available such remedies which include the right to bail.
2) Order dated April 10 2002 denying the motion to vacate said Order (1) If bail can be granted in deportation cases (Mejoff v Director of Prisons considered the
filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Universal Declaration on Human Rights), it should also be allowed in extradition cases.
(HKAR) represented by the Both are administrative proceedings where the innocence and guilt of the person
Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner detained is not an issue.
The petition alleges both Orders were issued by Olalia with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution Although there is no law providing bail to the extraditee, there is also no prohibition
granting bail to a potential extraditee. Petition was dismissed. from exercising his constitutional right to post bail.
• The right of the extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the
Facts Philippine treaties concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.
x Muñoz was charged before the HK court with 3 counts of offense of “accepting • According to Justice Puno is Purganan case, only “clear and convincing
an advantage as agent” (bribery). He also faces 7 counts of conspiracy to evidence” will be considered. Private respondent did not yet show evidence
defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. to show that he was not a “flight risk”.
x DOJ then received from the Hong Kong a request for the provisional arrest of
Muñoz. The National Bureau of Investigation then filed in with the RTC an WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court
application of provisional arrest of Muñoz. RTC issued an order of arrest. NBI to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of “clear and
agents then arrested and detained him convincing evidence”. If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail and
x In the same case that the HKAR filed a petition for extradition of Muñoz, he his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
files a petition for bail. Judge Ricardo Bernardo Jr. denied the petition for bail dispatch.
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and
that Muñoz is a high “flight risk”. Thereafter, Judge Bernardo inhibited himself RCBC V. BANCO DE ORO (Arbitration)
from the case and Judge Olalia (respondent judge) presided. G.R. No. 196171 and G.R. No. 199238, December 12, 2010
x Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application
for bail. It was granted by Judge Olalia (Order dated December 2001). Quick Digest—RCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision dated
x HKAR filed urgent motion to vacate such decision. It was denied by respondent December 2010 one of which is that the CA acted contrary to law and prior rulings in
judge Olalia (Order dated April 2002). Hence, the instant petition. vacating the second partial award on the basis of Chairman Barker’s alleged partiality
x Petitioner alleges that Judge Olalia acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction granting the said Orders as there is Facts:
no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee 1. RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with Equitable-PCI
Issue Bank, Inc. (EPCIB), George L. Go and the individual shareholders of Bankard,
Inc. (Bankard) (2000)
Whether or not a prospective extraditee may be granted bail (Topic on Extradition 2. There was dispute between the parties when RCBC informed EPCIB and the
Proceedings under Procedural Due Process) other selling shareholders of an overpayment of the subject shares, claiming
Held/Ratio there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to P478 million
and that the sellers violated their warranty under the SPA (2003)
A prospective extraditee can be granted bail. 3. As no settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings
with the ICC-ICA in accordance with Section 10 of the SPA (2004)
In USA vs Purganan, the Court held that the exercise of right to bail is limited to criminal
i. Section 10. Arbitration: Should there be any dispute arising between the
proceedings and not to extradition. However in light of the various international treaties
parties relating to this Agreement which cannot be resolved by agreement
and also the modern trend in public international law—giving recognition and protection
of the parties within 15 days after written notice by a party to another, such

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 matter shall then be finally settled by arbitration under the Rules of to give the Claimant any relief against the Respondents’ refusal
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by to pay.
three arbitrators appointed in accordance with such rules. The decision of d. RCBC paid the additional US$100,000 under the second assessment to
the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon the parties hereto and the avert suspension of the Arbitration Tribunal’s proceedings
expenses of arbitration shall be paid as the arbitrators shall determine. e. Meanwhile, EPCIB’s corporate name was officially changed to Banco
ii. In its Request for Arbitration, Claimant RCBC charged Bankard with De Oro (BDO)-EPCIB after its merger with BDO was duly approved by
deviating from and contravening generally accepted accounting principles the Securities and Exchange Commission. As such, BDO assumed all the
and practices and resulted in the overpayment of P556 million. For this obligations and liabilities of EPCIB under the SPA.
violation of sellers’ representations and warranties under the SPA, RCBC 7. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered a Partial Award and makes the following
sought its rescission, as well as payment of actual damages declarations (First Partial Award) (September 2007)
4. In their answer, EPCIB, Go and the other selling individual shareholders denied a. The Claimant’s claim is not time-barred under the provisions of this SPA
RCBC’s allegations contending that RCBC’s claim is one for overpayment or b. The Claimant has established the following breaches by the Respondents
price reduction under the SPA which is already time-barred. A counterclaim for of the SPA
litigation expenses and costs of arbitration as well as moral and exemplary i. The assets, revenue and net worth of Bankard were overstated
damages, was likewise raised by the Respondents (2004) c. Subject to proof of loss the Claimant is entitled to damages for the
a. Subsequently, the Arbitration Tribunal was constituted where Sir Ian foregoing breaches
Barker was appointed by the ICC-ICA as Chairman. 8. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm the First Partial
5. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that they are required to pay US$350,000 as Award, while Respondents filed a motion to vacate the same (October 2007)
advance on costs pursuant to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (ICC Rules) (2004) a. The Makati City RTC issued an order confirming the First Partial Award
a. RCBC paid its share while Respondents’ share of the advance on and denying Respondents’ separate motions to vacate. Respondents’
costs was thus fixed at US$175,000 motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
b. Respondent filed an Application for Separate Advances on Costs 9. ICC-ICA by letter increased again the advance on costs. Respondents
stating that it is improper for them to share equally on the advance cost of declined to pay its adjudged total share and the ICC-ICA then invited RCBC to
Claimant’s (RCBC) claim since the total amount of RCBC’s claim is substitute for Respondents in paying the balance. RCBC complied with the
substantially higher – more than 40 times –the total amount of their request (October 2007)
counterclaims 10. RCBC filed an Application for Reimbursement of Advance on Costs Paid,
c.Respondents refused to pay their share in the advance cost fixed by the praying for the issuance of a partial award directing the Respondents to
ICC-ICA reimburse its payment representing Respondents’ share in the Advance on
d. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that if Respondents still failed to Costs (2008)
pay its share in the advance cost, it would apply the ICC Rules and request a. Respondents filed their opposition arguing that in issuing the award for
the Arbitration Tribunal to suspend its work and set a new time limit, and if advance cost, the Arbitration Tribunal will be deciding an issue beyond the
such requested deposit remains unpaid at the expiry thereof, the terms of the Terms of Reference (TOR)
counterclaims would be considered withdrawn 11. In his letter, Chairman Barker advised the parties, as follows (2008):
6. The ICC-ICA notified the parties of its decision to increase the advances on a. The Tribunal notes that neither party has referred to an article by Matthew
costs from US$350,000 to US$450,000 subject to later readjustments (2005) Secomb on the very subject of the case at bar. To assist both sides (later
a. The ICC-ICA again invited the Respondents to pay the US$100,000 the court will decide that the Secomb article was evident partiality of the
increment. Respondents, however, refused to pay the increment, insisting Tribunal for RCBC) and to ensure that the Tribunal does not consider
that RCBC should bear the cost of prosecuting its own claim and that material on which the parties have not been given an opportunity to
compelling the Respondents to fund such prosecution is inequitable. address, Chairman Barker attached a copy of the article
Respondents reiterated that it was willing to pay the advance on costs for i. Secomb is the ICC Secretariat
their counterclaim 12. RCBC contended that based on Mr. Secomb’s article, the Arbitration Tribunal
b. In view of Respondents’ continuing refusal to pay its equal share in the is vested with jurisdiction and authority to render an award with respect to said
advance on costs and increment, RCBC wrote the ICC-ICA stating that reimbursement of advance cost paid by the non-defaulting party
the latter should compel the Respondents to pay as otherwise RCBC will a. Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that RCBC’s application
be prejudiced and the inaction of the ICC-ICA and the Arbitration Tribunal for reimbursement of advance cost has no basis under the ICC Rules
will detract from the effectiveness of arbitration as a means of settling 13. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered the Second Partial Award as follows (2008):
disputes a. Respondents are forthwith to pay to the Claimant the sum of
c. Chairman Ian Barker, in a letter stated in part (2006): US$290,000
The Tribunal has no power under the ICC Rules to order the
Respondents to pay the advance on costs sought by the ICC or

Jlyrreverre|7
 14. EPCIB filed a Motion to Vacate Second Partial Award in the Makati City RTC a. In the Court of Appeals of Oregon, evident partiality in its common
while RCBC filed in the same court a Motion to Confirm Second Partial Award definition implies "the existence of signs and indications that must lead to
(2008) an identification or inference" of partiality
15. The Makati City RTC issued the Order confirming the Second Partial Award b. In Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters
and denying EPCIB’s motion to vacate the same (2009) Benefit Funds, they stated that evident partiality will be found where a
a. Said court held that since the parties agreed to submit any dispute reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial
under the SPA to arbitration and to be bound by the ICC Rules, they to one party to the arbitration
are also bound to pay in equal shares the advance on costs 3. The Court adopts the reasonable impression of partiality standard, which
b. It noted that RCBC was forced to pay the share of EPCIB in requires a showing that a reasonable person would have to conclude that an
substitution of the latter to prevent a suspension of the arbitration arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitration.
proceedings, while EPCIB’s non-payment seems more like a scheme a. Such interest or bias must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration
to delay such proceedings rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative
16. EPCIB filed in the CA a petition for review with application for TRO and/or writ b. When a claim of arbitrator’s evident partiality is made, the court must
of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 113525) in accordance with the ascertain from such record as is available whether the arbitrators’ conduct
Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules) was so biased and prejudiced as to destroy fundamental fairness
(2010) 4. CA found factual support in BDO’s charge of partiality
a. EPCIB assailed the Makati City RTC in denying its motion to vacate a. Chairman Barker’s furnishing the parties with a copy of the Secomb article.
the Second Partial Award despite the fact that it was issued with This article ultimately favored RCBC by advancing its cause. Chairman
evident partiality Barker makes it appear that he intended good to be done in doing so but
17. The Arbitration Tribunal issued the Final Award (2010) due process dictates the cold neutrality of impartiality
a. BDO filed in the Makati City RTC a petition to vacate final award i. By furnishing the parties with a copy of this article, Chairman
b. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm final award Barker practically armed RCBC with supporting legal arguments
18. The CA rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 113525 (found in no. 14), the to deal with the situation when one of the parties to international
dispositive portion of which reverses (December 2010): commercial arbitration refuses to pay its share on the advance on
a. The Second Partial Award dated May 28, 2008 issued in International costs
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration b. Applying the foregoing standard, we agree with the CA in finding that
19. RCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision dated Chairman Barker’s act of furnishing the parties with copies of Matthew
December 2010 one of which is that the CA acted contrary to law and prior Secomb’s article, considering the attendant circumstances, is indicative of
rulings in vacating the second partial award on the basis of Chairman Barker’s partiality such that a reasonable man would have to conclude that he was
alleged partiality favoring RCB

Issue: W/N there was evident partiality which is a legal ground to vacate the Second
Partial Award
ADMU V. CAPULONG (ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE: FRATERNITY)
Held: There was evident partiality and therefore constitutes as a legal ground for May 27 1993
vacating the Second Partial Award
1. Special ADR Rules sets forth that evident partiality or corruption in the arbitral Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious
tribunal or any of its members is a ground for vacating an arbitral award physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis.
a. The failure of the CA to apply the applicable standard or test for judicial Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal
review prescribed in the Special ADR Rules may warrant the exercise failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same
of the Supreme Court’s discretionary powers of judicial review occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-
b. Rule 19.10. Rule on judicial review on arbitration in the Philippines— Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report
As a general rule, the court can only vacate or set aside the decision within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice
of an arbitral tribunal upon a clear showing that the award suffers from also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four
any of the infirmities or grounds for vacating an arbitral award (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written
2. Evident partiality is not defined in our arbitration laws. As one of the grounds notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive
for vacating an arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in the suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after
United States (US), the term "encompasses both an arbitrator’s explicit bias receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found
toward one party and an arbitrator’s inferred bias when an arbitrator fails to a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School
disclose relevant information to the parties." Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their

Jlyrreverre|8
written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to 2. Letran started an investigation--4 students admitted that they were
hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students neophytes of the Tau Gamma Fraternity.
guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which 3. These 4 neophytes identified Emerson Kim Go, a 4th year highschool
prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity student, as one of the fraternity seniors present during their hazing.
among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the 4. In an incident report prepared by Letran, it stated a list of fraternity members
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas including Kim.
imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed 5. November 23, 2001: a PTA conference was held, informing Kim's mother,
with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO petitioner Go, that neophytes identified Kim as a frat member.
was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the 6. Thereafter, Letran asked Kim to explain his side.
expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board 7. December 19, 2001: Kim, in a written statement, denied that he was a frat
to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. member and that he did not attend said hazing.
This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation 8. On the same day, Letran sent a written notice to inform spouses Go to attend
of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of a conference on January 8 to address the issue of Kim's frat membership.
spouses Go did not attend said conference.
due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.
9. january 15: Letran subsequently conveyed to Mrs Go and Kim the
decision of Letran to SUSPEND Kim from Jan 16 to Feb18.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
10. Spouses Go filed a case in RTC of Caloocan claiming that Letran unlawfully
DISMISSED Kim, not observing due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process.
11. Petitioners claim that due process was not observed under the guidelines set
Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit by Ang Tibay v. CIR. they claim that respondents violated due process by:
their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students a) not conducting a formal inquiry into the charge of Kim
requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the b) not giving them any written notice of the charge
accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin c) not providing them with opportunity to cross examine the neophytes.
elements of notice and hearing. 12. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses GO.
13. CA rendered judgment in favor of Letran, stating that Letran observed due
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant process.
petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration
first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is Issue: Whether or not due process was observed in suspending Kim.
accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is Held: Yes. Due process was observed in suspending Kim.
when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether The case of Guzman v. NU should be observed in academic due process rather than
or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their the case of Ang Tibay. Due process in disciplinary cases of students does not entail
dismissal from Petitioner University. proceedings similar to judicial or administrative proceedings.
Minimum standards to be observed:
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in a) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of the
academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: accusation
b) right to answer the charges against them
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation c) right to be informed of the evidence
against them; d) right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance e) The evidence must be duly considered by the school authorities deciding
of counsel, if desired:
Requirement a - The spouses and Kim were informed of the nature and charge of the
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
accusation through the written notices given to them for attending the conferences on
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
Jan 8 and 15.
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Requirement b and d - They also gave an opportunity to be heard by lettinh Kim
answer the charges against them as proved by the written statement of Kim dated
GO V. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN (Academic Discipline)
December 19. Thus, he was also given a chance to adduce evidence on his behalf.
October 10, 2012
Facts: Even though at that time, they haven’t received the written notice yet, they were
1. October: Letran recieved information that fraternities were recruiting nevertheless given notice through the PTA meeting of the charge against Kim. What
members among Letran's high school students. is important is the notice given, not the form of the notice.

Jlyrreverre|9
Requirement c - In the same PTA meeting, petitioners were informed that the case February 11, 1982: said respondents then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
was evidenced by the statement of the neopythes, thus they were given the right to and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
be informed of the evidence. restraining order. After requiring a comment thereon, on April 28, 1982 this court en
banc resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
Cross examination is not needed, as again, this should not be likened to
administrative due process. Earlier, Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public documents in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Manila in Criminal Case No. 60172 for alleging that he was a
Note: Letran merely SUSPENDED Kim and not dismissed, contrary to what Filipino citizen in the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale of certain real property. He
spouses Go allege in their claim was acquitted by the trial court in an order dated May 5, 1982 on the ground that
Opinion No. 191 of the Secretary of Justice may be equated as res judicata and that
LAO GI v. COURT OF APPEALS (Deportation Proceedings in General) revocation thereof by Opinion No. 147 cannot be considered just, fair and reasonable.
December 29, 1989
Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if they are aliens.
Quick Digest Portion: This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners wherein they Held: The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner Nituda that they
seek to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask that a new one be register as aliens as required by the Immigration Act. While it is not disputed that it is
also within the power and authority of the Commissioner to require an alien to so
rendered setting aside the order of the CID (Comnmission on Immigration and
register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive finding that the person
Deportation) dated September 28, 1982 and directing it to proceed with the reception who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship of the petitioners
of the evidence in support of the charges against the petitioners. is in issue there should be a previous determination by the CID that they are aliens
before the petitioners may be directed and required to register as aliens.
Facts:
September 3, 1958: Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191: finding Filomeno The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority
Chia, Jr., alias Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino citizen born on November 28, 1899 being the legitimate presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic
son of Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug of Guagua, Pampanga. tranquility of the people.
October 3, 1980: Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147: cancelling Opinion No. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
191: setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A motion for reconsideration of said Opinion affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person
was denied by the Minister of Justice on February 13, 1981. to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
March 9, 1981: a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on proceedings.
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it
and children. is provided:

March 19, 1981: an amended charge was filed with the CID alleging that said c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds
respondents refused to register as aliens having been required to do so and continued for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure
to refuse to register as such. On August 31, 1981 another amended charge was filed to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
alleging that Manuel Chia committed acts of undesirability.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of
September 4, 1981: said respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended charges which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common
on the ground that the CID has no authority to reopen a matter long settled under understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the
Opinion No. 191. The motion to dismiss was opposed by the private prosecutor. The CID to pronounce a proper judgment.
CID special prosecutor also filed an opposition on the ground that the citizenship may
be threshed out as the occasion may demand and that due process was accorded to Petition is hereby granted and the questioned order of the respondent CID is hereby
respondents. The respondents filed a reply thereto. The motion to dismiss was denied set aside.
by the CID and a motion for reconsideration of said denial was also denied in a
resolution dated December 10, 1981. MACEDA V. ERB (Regulations: Fixing Rates)
July 18, 1991

Jlyrreverre|10
FACTS: Private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective function As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules
applications on oil price increases. On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an order of evidence governing court proceedings.
granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for
Prohibition on September 26, 1990 seeking to nullify the provisional increase. We In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing
dismissed the petition on December 18, 1990, reaffirming ERB's authority to grant Hearings Before the ERB provides that — These Rules shall govern pleadings,
provisional increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry,
clarifying as follows: study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the
What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional matter, except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall
increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: promote the objectives of the Order.
(1) to make it permanent;
(2) to reduce or increase it further; or SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PROVISIONAL RELIEF:
(3) to deny the application.
The Solicitor General likewise commented:
Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary Among the pieces of evidence considered by ERB in the grant of the contested
attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex-parte and which are subject to the provisional relief were:
resolution of the main case. (1) certified copies of bins of lading issued by crude oil suppliers to the private
Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise, operate respondents;
exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same (2) reports of the Bankers Association of the Philippines on the peso-dollar
time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may exchange rate at the BAP oil pit; and
decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending (3) OPSF status reports of the Office of Energy Affairs.
that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, The ERB was likewise guided in the determination of international crude oil prices by
without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, traditional authoritative sources of information on crude oil and petroleum products,
of course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional such as Platt's Oilgram and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
authority-which is of course, the better procedure — however, it cannot be stigmatized
later if it failed to conduct one. We concede ERB's authority to grant the provisional increase in oil price.

In the same order of September 21, 1990, authorizing provisional increase, the ERB The rise in crude oil importation costs, which as earlier mentioned, reached an average
set the applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties on October 16, of $30.3318 per barrel at $25.551/US $ in September-October 1990; the huge OPSF
1990. Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as on the second deficit which, as reported by the Office of Energy Affairs, has amounted to P5.7 Billion
hearing on October 17, 1990. Hearing was postponed to November 5, 1990, on written (based on filed claims only and net of the P5 Billion OPSF) as of September 30, 1990,
notice of petitioner Maceda. On November 5, 1990, the three oil companies filed their and is estimated to further increase to over P10 Billion by end December 1990; the
respective motions for leave to file or admit amended/supplemental applications to decision of the government to discontinue subsidizing oil prices in view of inflationary
further increase the prices of petroleum products. The ERB admitted the respective pressures; the apparent inadequacy of the proposed additional P5.1 Billion government
supplemental/amended petitions on November 6, 1990 at the same time requiring appropriation for the OPSF and the sharp drop in the value of the peso in relation to
applicants to publish the corresponding Notices of Public Hearing in two newspapers the US dollar to P28/US $, this Board is left with no other recourse but to grant
of general circulation. Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him applicants oil companies further relief by increasing the prices of petroleum products
of his right to finish his cross-examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his sold by them.
right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out that this
relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process. We shall thus respect the ERB's Order of December 5, 1990 granting a provisional
ISSUE: Whether ERB has the authority to grant the provisional increase in oil price price increase on petroleum products premised on the oil companies' OPSF claims,
HELD: YES. crude cost peso differentials, forex risk for a subsidy on sale to NPC (p. 167, Rollo),
since the oil companies are "entitled to as much relief as the fact alleged constituting
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS the course of action may warrant.

Maceda was not denied of his right to due process. The order of testimony both with CORONA VS. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSN. OF THE PHILS. (Regulation:
respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the general course of the Profession)
trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in permitting December 12 1997
to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper. Such a relaxed
procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in matters Facts: The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
of rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, 505. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the
PPA’s charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and

Jlyrreverre|11
 §
the pilotage profession, the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 on March 21, 1985, The Office of the President later dismissed the appeal maintaining
which embodied the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct that it applied to all harbor pilots in general and it comes within the
of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.” These rules mandate, inter alia, that power of the PPA to control and regulate pilotage.
aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in 4. Capt. Compas filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with a
outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they prayer for TRO. The Manila RTC ruled in favor of Compas declaring that PPA
have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and regular AO 04-92 is null and void.
appointments by the PPA itself
Issue: Is pilotage a property right? Is A.O. 04-92 violative of due process? Issue: W/N the license of harbor pilots can be cancelled without due process
Ruling: of law.
Held: No. Section 1 of Article III states that “No person shall be deprived of
Yes, The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, their life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Their license, which
recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right allows them to practice their profession, comes within the definition of a
property. PPA-AO No. 04-92 restricts the pilots from practicing their
No, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful profession to only one year. In light of this, due process of law in the form of
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the a hearing must occur in order to protect the rights of the pilots.
issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment
to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid
evaluation of the appointee’s performance. PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but SALAW V. NLRC (DISMISSAL IN PRVATE SECTOR)
merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA’s SEPTEMBER 27, 1991
jurisdictional area. PPA-AO No. 04-92 restricts the pilots from practicing their
profession to only one year. In light of this, due process of law in the form of a hearing Petitioner, Espero Santos Salaw, was employed by the private respondents Associated
must occur in order to protect the rights of the pilots. Bank in September 1967 as a credit investigator-appraiser. His duties included
inspecting, investigating, appraising, and identifying the company's foreclosed assets;
Quick Digest Portion — This is a petition for review of a decision of the giving valuation to its real properties, and verifying the genuineness and encumbrances
Manila RTC regarding of the titles of properties mortgaged to the respondents.
their ruling on the unconstitutionality of PPA Administrative Order 04-92.
On November 27, 1984, The Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) of the Philippine
Facts: Constabulary was able to extract from him, without the assistance of a counsel¸ a sworn
1. Philippine Ports Authority promulgated PPA Administrative Order 03-85 on affidavit admitting that he and a co-employee sold twenty sewing machines and electric
March 21, 1985 and PPA Administrative Order 04-92 on July 15, 1992. generators foreclosed by the bank from Worldwide Garment and LP Garment and
§
PPA AO 03-85 contains the “Rules and Regulations divided the proceeds of Php 60,000.000 among them in equal shares.
Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and
Pilotage Fees in the Philippines.” Petitioner appeared before the Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee of the
o This rule contains that aspiring pilots must have pilot licenses and said bank without the assistance of a counsel. And April 1, 1985, the petitioner was
must train for a number of months in outports and in the Port of terminated from his employment effective March 27, 1985, for alleged serious
Manila. It is only after such training that they are given permanent misconduct or willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on
and regular appointments by the PPA. They can practice pilotage him by the private respondents.
until the age of 70 or they are removed by reason of unfitness.
§
The petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal against respondent
PPA AO 04-92 states all existing regular appointments would only be Bank and submitted an affidavit recanting his Sworn Statement before the CIS.
valid until December 31, 1992 only. All the subsequent appointments
would only have a term of one year subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the PPA. Issue: Whether or not in exercise of the administrative power, the respondent bank
legally dismissed the petitioner?
2. United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association
through Capt. Compas questioned PPA AO No. 04-92 before the Held: No. The Supreme Court said that the dismissal of the petitioner was illegal. The
DOTC. dismissal of the petitioner from his employment was characterized by undue haste. The
§
The secretary of DOTC insisted that the matter review and law is clear that even in the disposition of labor cases, due process must not be
recall of the administrative order lies with the PPA’s Board subordinated to expediency or dispatch. In order for an employee’s dismissal to be
of Directors.
legal under the Labor Code, it must be for an authorized cause and due process –
3. Capt. Compas appealed the ruling of the DOTC to the Office of the
notice and hearing – must be observed.
President.

Jlyrreverre|12
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the technical in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
rules of procedure in the adjudication cases. However, the right to counsel, a very basic muscle.
requirement of substantive due process, has to be observed. Indeed, rights to counsel
and to due process of law are two of fundamental rights guaranteed by the But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by
1987Constitution to person under investigation, be the proceeding administrate civil, or either a saving clause or by construction.
criminal. Hence the petition was granted,
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (PLUNDER, VOID FOR VAGUENESS)
PEOPLE V. NAZARIO (Manager, Void for vagueness) November 19, 2001
August 31, 1988
Overview of the Case
This is an appeal to reverse the Court of First Instance of Quezon's decision finding The case deals with a petition to declare RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Eusebio Nazario guilty of the! violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series od 1955, Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, unconstitutional.
as amended by Ordinance 15 and 12.
In the case, Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
Facts: Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
municipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon the court that the assailed law is so
under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries
from the constitutionally infirm.
Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966.
Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance.
He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the
He was found guilty thus this petition.
crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice
Objections of petitioner: He contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner and manager". The Ordinance prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea (criminal intent) in crimes
was vague as to the dates of payment already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Held: NO. The Court found that accused is not merely a lessee but an owner and The supreme court ruled the law as valid and constitutional: (a) The Congress intended
manager the words “combination” and “series” to be understood in their popular meanings is
evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill that eventually became the law.
He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishpond, introduced Also, “Overbreadth” and “vagueness doctrines” have special application only to free
fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them speech cases, not to penal statutes. (b) The “reasonable doubt” standard cannot be
presumed to be dispensed by the legislature in the law as this standard “gives life” to
Neither are the said Ordinances vague as to dates of payment, they have been the Due Process clause in the constitution. It is also clear that the legislature did not do
definitely established Ordinance No. 15: In making the tax payable "after the lapse of 3 away with the “reasonable doubt” standard as shown in their deliberations. (c) The court
years starting from the date said said that plunder as defined by RA 7080 is malum in se which requires proof of criminal
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries" intent (mens rea). This is shown by the an earlier resolution of the Congress placing
plunder as one of several heinous crimes ,and is implied with the application of
Ordinance No. 12: "Beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the RPC to the prosecutions under the
started operating before the year 1964.” said Plunder Law.

The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates is Facts
concerned, presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the
ordinance vague

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible

standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
11
differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion

Jlyrreverre|13
 1.Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate informations for NO. The Plunder Law does not require less evidence for proving the crimes of
violation of RA 7080, RA 7659, RA 3019, RA 6713, RA 6085, etc. (April 4, plunder. The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to
2011)
• NO. The Plunder Law is NOT unconstitutional for being vague.
2. Estrada (Petitioner) filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the a.) A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of
case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and for the employment of terms without defining them.
b.) There is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses to give the accused
word in an enactment. It is enough that the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
to prove lack of probable cause. (April 11,2011) c.) It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
a.) The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the technical or special legal meaning to those words. (Note: Webster's
law under which they are charged were never raised in that New Collegiate Dictionary was used to show the definition of the words
Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and "combination” and "series”.)
d.) As shown from the legislative deliberations on the bill, which eventually became the Plunder
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. Law, the Congress intended the words "combination” and "series” to be understood in their
b.) On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a popular meanings.
Resolution finding that "a probable cause for the offense of e.) Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced.
f.) A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
the arrest of the accused." g.) The statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
c.) On June 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s avoid; and, (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions.
motion for reconsideration. h.) Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
3. Petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground that the of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as
law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that in all other statutes.
the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) i.) A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
offense. (June 14,2011) j.) The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
a.) Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash on June cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
21,2011
4.
b.) Petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition 5 days later (June command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of
26,2001)
5. criminal law. It was shown in the legislative deliberations that the legislature did
c.) On July 9, 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to not in any manner refashion the standard of quantum of proof in the crime of
Quash. plunder.
b. The petitioner filed the instant petition to the Supreme Court and oral a.) This "reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm
arguments were made on September 18, 2001 where the issues were of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the
summarized and delineated accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Issue: W/N The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; b.) What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number
W/N The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each
and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the
W/N Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
the power of Congress to so classify it. accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
c.) In short, only the relevant acts (which number should sufficient enough for them
Held: to be considered as a “combination” or “series” of acts) constituting a certain pattern
Gallego v. Sandiganbayan - Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, it is not necessary that every act alleged
Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners in the information is proven.
posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with d.) As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements
no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative of the crime must be proved and the requisite criminal intent (mens rea) must be
precedents; that, for its vagueness violate due process in that it does not give fair shown.
warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. This Court found that there was e.) Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood
nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in the said law, which from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of
was understood in its primary and general acceptation. them.

Jlyrreverre|14
 f.) Section 4 is a purely procedural measure and does not define nor establish any 5. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and
substantive right in favor of the accused. Detention which the District Collector denied in an Order.

The crime of plunder is a malum in se, as deemed in the decision of Congress in 6. The District Collector issued his decision finding M/T “ULU WAI” guilty of violating
1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464) and
a.) The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense her cargo of gas oil and fuel oil guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f) and (1-1) and
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral forfeited in favour of the RP.
or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate 7. Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision
crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for affirming in toto the decision of the District Collector.
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check
8. Petitioner filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the
Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the
Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance
inherent wrongness of the acts.
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the
b.) The application of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the Revised Commissioner from implementing his decision. The Court of Tax Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Commissioner.
Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that
criminal intent (mens rea) is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility 9. Petitioner filed a petition in the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Tax
of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Appeals’ decision. SC issued a resolution referring the disposition of the case to
the Court of Appeals.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the 10. x This is in view of the SC decision in Development Bank of the Phils vs CA: final
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
FEEDER INTERNATIONALL LINE V. CA (TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE)
May 31, 1991 11. 10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and
then denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Quick digest: The petitioner Feeder International seeks to reverse the decision of
12. 11. Petitioners filed an instant petition in the SC seeking the reversal of the
respondent CA, affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals which found the
decision of CA.
vessel M/T “ULU WAI” liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines and its cargo liable under Section 2530(a), (f) and (1-1) of the same
Issues/Held: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Judgment appealed from is
Code ordering the forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo, on the ground that the
AFFIRMED in toto.
petitioner was deprived of property without due process and that the decision was not
made on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 1. W/N the CA erred in finding that there had been illegal importation on the basis
Facts: of circumstantial evidence
1. M/T “ULU WAI” a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by No. A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs law is not penal in nature (do not
Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore left Singapore carrying 1,100 result in the conviction of the offender) and is purely civil and administrative in
metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy
Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. character. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence (relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion).
2. The vessel anchored at Guiuanon, Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs
authorities. A civilian informer notified the Iloilo authorities. Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when
the carrying vessel enter the jurisdiction of the Phils with intention to unload therein.
3. The Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team and found that the Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof but must be inferred
vessel did not have the required ship and shipping documents on board, except for from the facts. The Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation
a clearance from Singaporean port officials clearing the vessel for Zamboanga.
or at least an attempt thereof has been committed on the basis of substantial evidence.
4. The vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention was 2. W/N the petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law
issued after due investigation.
because of the lack of assistance of counsel

Jlyrreverre|15
No. The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless
required by the Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charter only during the HELD: NO. Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not contemplate
custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime and during the trial of the prior notice and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed
under receivership. When par. 4 provides for the filing of a case within ten (10) days
accused. Since the forfeiture proceeding is not criminal in nature, the assistance of after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is unmistakable that the
counsel is not deemed essential. assailed actions should precede the filing of the case. Plainly, the legislature could not
have intended to authorize "no prior notice and hearing" in the closure of the bank and
3. W/N the petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law at the same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of absence thereof. A previous
because its right to be presumed innocent was not recognized hearing is NOT required. It is enough that a subsequent judicial review be provided.
No. The petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to
This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal
be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused
considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank's assets and as a valid
in a criminal case
exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders and the
general public. The mere filing of a case for receivership by the Central Bank can trigger
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS (Relative
a bank run and drain its assets in days or even hours leading to insolvency even if the
Constitutionality)
bank be actually solvent. The procedure prescribed in Sec. 29 is truly designed to
220 SCRA 536(1993) protect the interest of all concerned, i.e., the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the
bank itself, and the general public.
The concept of relative constitutionality: The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in
every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable The absence of notice and hearing is not a valid ground to annul a Monetary Board
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied resolution placing a bank under receivership. The absence of prior notice and hearing
to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. cannot be deemed acts of arbitrariness and bad faith.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered 2) As regards the second ground, to rule that only the receiver may bring suit in behalf
circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or of the bank is, to echo the respondent appellate court, "asking for the impossible, for it
confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to cannot be expected that the master, the CB, will allow the receiver it has appointed to
inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. question that very appointment. "Consequently, only stockholders of a bank could file
an action for annulment of a Monetary Board resolution placing the bank under
FACTS: Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and Examination receivership and prohibiting it from continuing operations.
Sector of the Central Bank "that the financial condition of TSBis one of insolvency and
its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors and creditors," PEREZ V. MADRONA (NOT NUISANCE PER SE)
the Monetary Board issued a RESOLUTION ordering the closure of Triumph Savings
(March 21, 2012)
Bank, forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership,
and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. One week later, TSB filed a complaint
FACTS: Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered
against Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui challenging in the process the
owners of a residential property located in Greenheights Subdivision, Phase
constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, otherwise known as "The Central Bank Act," as
II, Marikina City and covered by TCT No. 169365 of the Registry of Deeds of
amended, insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to take over a banking institution
Marikina. In 1989, respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with a
even if it is not charged with violation of any law or regulation, much less found guilty
concrete fence and steel gate. In 1999, respondents received the following letter
thereof. The RTC granted a TRO against the CB resolution.
dated May 25, 1999 from petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition
Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint before the RTC for failure to state
Office stating that the structure that they built encroached on the sidewalk and that is
a cause of action, i.e., it did not allege ultimate facts showing that the action was plainly
in violation of PD 1096 of the National Building Code and RA 917 on Illegally
arbitrary and made in bad faith, which are the only grounds for the annulment of
occupied/constructed improvements within the road right-of-way. The respondent-
Monetary Board resolutions placing a bank under conservatorship, and that TSB was
spouses are given 7 days to remove the said structure. As response, respondent
without legal capacity to sue except through its receiver. These were denied. The denial
Madrona sent petitioner a letter stating that the May 25, 1999 letter (1) contained an
was elevated to the CA, which upheld the orders of the RTC. Thus, this petition for
accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him and his property without due
(Rule45) certiorari.
process; (2) has no basis and authority since there is no court order authorizing him to
demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not expressly give petitioner
ISSUES 1) Is absence of prior notice and hearing constitutive of acts of arbitrariness
authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation since their fence did not in
and bad faith, as to annul the MB resolution?2) Is it only the receiver who has a right of
fact extend to the sidewalk. More than a year later or on February 28, 2001, petitioner
action to question the resolution of the CB, and not the stockholders of the corporation?
sent another letter with the same contents as the May 25, 1999 letter but this time giving

Jlyrreverre|16
respondents ten days from receipt thereof to remove the structure allegedly protruding Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to
to the sidewalk. This prompted respondents to file a complaint for injunction before the the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to secure the
Marikina City RTC on March 12, 2001. Respondents likewise sought the issuance of property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that
petitioner and all persons acting under him from doing any act of demolition on their respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a
property and that after trial, the injunction be made permanent. On March 16, 2001, hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a
the RTC issued a TRO against petitioner. On July 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is
Decision in favor of respondents. The RTC decision permanently enjoined defendant unwarranted.
Perez from performing any act which would tend to destroy or demolish the perimeter
fence and steel gate of the respondents’ property. The RTC held that respondents, AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORP. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
being lawful owners of the subject property, are entitled to the peaceful and open Gutierrez, J. | May 23, 1991
possession of every inch of their property and petitioner’s threat to demolish the
concrete fence around their property is tantamount to a violation of their rights as FACTS:
property owners who are entitled to protection under the Constitution and laws. The - In 1984, Glorious Sun (Glorious) was found guilty of dollar-salting and
RTC also ruled that there is no showing that respondents’ fence is a nuisance per misdeclaration of importations by the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB),
se and presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare, nor is there basis as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled.
for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to justify its - Glorious then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that its right to
summary demolition. CA affirmed, due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by
evidence.
ISSUE: W/N respondents’ structure is a nuisance per se that presents immediate - The Court issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings.
danger to the community’s welfare and can be removed without need of judicial However, Glorious subsequently filed a motion to withdraw its petition, which was
intervention since the clearing of the sidewalks is an infrastructure project of the granted. Glorious then filed another motion to dismiss, which was duly noted by the
Marikina City Government and cannot be restrained by the courts as provided in court.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 - Two years later, Glorious filed with the GTEB a petition for restitution of its export
quota and requested for a reconsideration of the previous decision by the GTEB. In
HELD: No. If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the addition to alleging that it was denied due process, it also contended that the GTEB
sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed decision to cancel its quotas was due to duress and threats from former Minister
to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove Ongpin in order to transfer Glorious’ quotas to Marcos crony-owned corporations
respondents’ supposed violations in the construction of the concrete Del Soleil Apparel Manufacturing and American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC).
fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily This petition was denied.
without judicial intervention. Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC - Thereafter, an appeal was brought to the Office of the President. AIFC sought to
Liner, Inc., on the need for judicial intervention when the nuisance is not a nuisance per intervene claiming that the GTEB decision had long become final.
se, is well worth mentioning. In said case, we ruled: - The Office of the President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case to
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the GTEB for further proceedings.
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a ISSUES and HOLDING:
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property - WON the previous GTEB decision constituted res judicata to the instant case on
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. the ground that the former decision was a final judgment on the merits. – NO
Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a - WON Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB
legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of decision. – NO
property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it RATIO:
may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance - A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. [Underscoring right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or final or merely
supplied.] technical points.
- The dismissal of the GTEB case cannot be considered as a judgment on the merits.
In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac where the appellant-municipality It was based solely on the notice of withdrawal of Glorious.
similarly argued that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by On the due process issue:
the Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court held: “Suffice it to say that in the - Although AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB decision failed to disclose to Glorious
abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that Glorious was guilty of
observed and followed. This appellant failed to do. dollar-salting, it contends that the subsequent disclosure in 1987, where relevant
documents were given to Glorious and that the latter was given an opportunity to

Jlyrreverre|17
 comment thereon, cured the defect. This contention by AIFC, the court holds as determined them to belong as of December 31, 2003, until revised by
MISLEADING. Congress.
- The SC recognized that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of the • In effect: older brands or existing brands will have, in the long term, lower
GTEB. price and tax rate as inflation and price appreciation were not factored in.
- AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the evidence used by o Their tax rate shall remain until Congress changes it
the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB resolution. The glaring fact o Hence, a legislative freeze in the class of cigarettes
is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB failed to disclose evidence Net 2005 Tax 2007 Tax 2009 Tax 2011 Tax Supreme
used by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious. Retail Court
- Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced the Price Classificatio
charge that the former was denied due process. The data given showed that the (excludin n
price of Glorious was actually below the median. Apparently, the GTEB g excise
Investigating Panel picked up four importers whose prices were lower than Glorious tax and
in order to show that the latter’s prices were the highest. VAT
- Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit and how AIFC claims that it is an Less than P2/pack P2.23/pack P2.47/pack P2.72/pack Low-priced
inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board did not give credence to it. To this P5 per
the court replied that à Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured by Minister Ongpin, pack
not the members of the Investigating Panel. Mr. Puno was the Chairman of the Bet P5- P6.35/pack P6.74/pack P7.14/pack P7.56/pack Medium-
Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of his position he was the one P6.50 priced
pressured by Minister Ongpin. There is every reason to suspect that even before Bet P10.35/pac P10.88/pac P11.43/pac P12/pack High-priced
Glorious Sun was investigated, a decision to strip it of its quotas and to award them P6.50- k k k
to friends of their administration had already been made. At the very least, Mr. P10
Puno's "complete turn about" casts doubts on the veracity and fairness of the Above P25/pack P26.06/pac P27.16/pac P28.30/pac Premium-
Investigating Panel's Report to GTEB which formed the basis for the 1984 GTEB P10 k k k priced
decision. • New brands shall be classified according to current net retail price
- Finally, the court held that although factual findings of administrative agencies are • New brands are the ones registered after January 1, 1997
generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be disregarded if they are • In 2001, Lucky Strike was introduced in the market
not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or • Lucky Strike was classified as premium-priced hence was imposed the Above
collusion; where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular; P10 tax rate
when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion • Lucky Strike protested the P22.77M tax assessment pegged at P25/pack
arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest. • Lucky Strike interposes that the legislative freeze is discriminatory against
- Clearly, the right of Glorious to due process was violated. Glorious’ export quota new brands and poses barrier to entry in the cigarette industry
allocation, which initially was a privilege, evolved into some form of property right o Legislative freeze means: existing or "old" brands shall be taxed
which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to based on their net retail price as of October 1, 1996.
hurriedly confer it to another. o Hence, the classification based on pricing is lower for older brands
compared to new entrants
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION V. FINANCE SECRETARY
• Lucky Strike found it unfair that Philip Morris and Marlboro are classified only
CAMACHO, BIR COMMISSIONER PARAYNO (2008)
as High-priced while it is classified as Premium Priced.
Doctrine: Classification if rational in character is allowable. The taxing power has the
WON:
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation.
1. The pertinent portions of RA 8240, as amended by RA 9334, discriminates against
new cigarette brands and favors old cigarette brands?
Facts:
2. The classification freeze provision unduly favors older brands over newer brands?
• British American Tobacco is the distributor of Lucky Strike Cigarette in the
Philippines Held: In applying the rational basis test, the Court found the questioned law
• The company is questioning the constitutionality of RA 8240, entitled "An Act Constitutional.
Amending Sections 138, 139, 140, and 142 of the NIRC, as Amended and For • A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional
Other Purposes," which took effect on January 1, 1997 guaranty of the equal protection of the laws.
• The law provided a legislative freeze on brands of cigarettes introduced • The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that:
between the period January 2, 1997 to December 31, 2003, such that said (1) it rests on substantial distinctions;
cigarettes shall remain in the classification under which the BIR has

Jlyrreverre|18
(2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; o The current net retail price, similar to what was used to classify the
(3) it applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and brands under Annex “D” as of October 1, 1996, was thus the logical
(4) it applies equally to all those belonging to the same class. and practical choice
• classification freeze provision uniformly applies to all newly introduced brands • The classification freeze provision was in the main the result of Congress’s
in the market, earnest efforts to improve the efficiency and effectivity of the tax administration
• Finding that the assailed law seems to derogate, to a limited extent, one of its over sin products while trying to balance the same with other State interests
avowed objectives (i.e. promoting fair competition among the players in the
industry) would suggest that, by Congress’s own standards, the current excise SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
tax system on sin products is imperfect. But the Court cannot declare a
statute unconstitutional merely because it can be improved or that it does not Substantive Due Process
tend to achieve all of its stated objectives. § Not rigid but is grounded on reasonableness. a. Laws which interfere with life, liberty,
or property comply with substantive due process when:
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION V. FINANCE SECRETARY o The interests of the public generally, as distinguished form those of a particular
CAMACHO, BIR COMMISSIONER PARAYNO (2009) class, require such interference.
o That the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
Doctrine: A levy of tax is not unconstitutional because it is not intrinsically equal and
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
uniform in its operation.The uniformity rule does not prohibit classification for purposes
o Lupangco v. CA: The state may not prohibit candidates for board exams from
of taxation
attending review classes etc. because it is unreasonable arbitrary and violates
Facts: academic freedom of schools.
• British American Tobacco filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the Court’s § Interest of public requires such interference and the means are reasonably necessary
decision in 2008 for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
• Petitioner interposes that the assailed provisions: § Liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of public health, public order
(1) violate the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the Constitution, and safety, or anything else within the scope of police power.
(2) contravene Section 19,[1] Article XII of the Constitution on unfair competition, and
(3) infringe the constitutional provisions on regressive and inequitable taxation. US V. TORIBIO: CARABAO SLAUGHTERHOUSE
• Petitioner further argues that assuming the assailed provisions are
Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in
constitutional, it is entitled to a downward reclassification of Lucky Strike from
the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or
the premium-priced to the high-priced tax bracket.
caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of
• Lucky Strike reiterates in its MR that the classification freeze provision violates the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act
the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses because older brands No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle.
are taxed based on their 1996 net retail prices while new brands are taxed The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
based on their present day net retail prices. purposes for human consumption.

HELD: Petition is denied The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter
• Without merit and a rehash of petitioner’s previous arguments before this of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal
Court treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter
• The rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a
the assailed law in the face of an equal protection challenge taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without
The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests on providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise
substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private
things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to property.
all those belonging to the same class.
• The classification freeze provision was inserted in the law for reasons of Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter
practicality and expediency. of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
o since a new brand was not yet in existence at the time of the passage
of RA 8240, then Congress needed a uniform mechanism to fix the Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
tax bracket of a new brand.

Jlyrreverre|19
The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the Churchill asked, and was granted by the court of first instance of Manila for an injunction
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any which restrains and prohibits Rafferty (defendant) from collecting against the plaintiff.
place without the permit provided for in section 30 According to the plaintiff the source of the tax which is subsection of Section
100 of act no 2339 (effective july 1 1914) was invalid.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that Plaintiff also asserts that sec 139 and 140 of Act 2339 are unconstitutional because it
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent deprives aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedy for the protection of their
of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a property. Thus, no due process of law
construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of Churchill also was granted an injunction with regard to the defendant’s acts of
the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, (Churchill’s Property), for the
sole reason that those mentioned is/are or maybe offensive to the sight
The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat
the purpose of the law. ISSUES: W/N court has power to restrain by injunction the collection of tax complained
of validity of those provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339 conferring
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sigh, signboard, or
invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a
nuisance.
Court think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the
provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable
HELD: Supreme Court Reversed the decision of CFI-Manila on both issues. Plaintiff
and proper exercise of that power. filed Motion for Rehearing: denied.
No
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that Valid
wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos. The Supreme Court also said that these
animals are vested with public interest for they are fundamental use for the production RATIO: No, Act 2339 Sections 139 and 140 expressly prohibit the court from
of crops. These reasons satisfy the requisites of a valid exercise of police power granting an injunction from the collection of taxes. US Supreme Court, in a
similar case, has upheld that such prohibition is not against due process or equal
The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power protection clause which plaintiffs are claiming.
of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of carabaos for public
US-SC cites the public policy that taxes are the lifeblood of the government
purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private
properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest. Plaintiff’s remedy is to pay under protest first, then file a suit to question the validity
of the tax, if granted he can seek for reimbursement
DOCTRINE: It is the duty of the legislature to: I-R Nature of injunction is that it is only granted when there’s no other remedy in law,
§ Determine what the interests of the public require but in the case of tax suits, there is a remedy provided by law.
Valid as it is a valid exercise of police power.
§ Determine what measures are necessary for the protection of such
Police power are usually exercised for the well being of the public
interests.
Scope: Public health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare of the
The determination, of the legislature on what is a proper exercise of police power is
community
subject to the supervision of the courts
it is the right of the public that they properly enjoy the outdoor life without the
billboards marring the landscapes and civic beauty
CHURCHILL V. RAFFERTY: BILLBOARDS AS NUISANCE Annoyance and irritation to the public from the billboards justifies the use of police
power against them
DOCTRINE: Standards of Police Power Thus “police power may regulate and restrict uses of private property when devoted
to advertising which is offensive to the sight”
Lawful Purpose- for the general welfare of the community. It is not really a regulation of the property of the plaintiff, since billboards are usually
Lawful Method- reasonable, non-oppressive and non-arbitrary means and methods found in public thoroughfares, it is a regulation of the use of the streets and other public
employed in connection to the accomplishment of the purpose. thoroughfares
Three ways for the state to interfere with private property (Police, Taxation, Eminent
Police power cannot interfere with private property for purely aesthetic purposes. But Domain)
where the act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public
health, safety or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. Detailed Digest – RATIO

FACTS: W/N COURT HAS POWER TO RESTRAIN BY INJUNCTION THE COLLECTION OF

TAX COMPLAINED OF
Churchill is being collected for his annual property tax under Act 2339.

Jlyrreverre|20
Act No. 2339 section 139 (forbids the use of an injunction to stay the collection of any Exercised by Legislature
internal revenue tax) and 140 (provides a remedy for any wrong in connection with such
taxes) will control unless found to be unconstitutional hard to define what it’s boundaries/limits
Plaintiff urge that both sections above are unconstitutional because: Scope of Police Power
Depriving aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedy for the protection of their Public health, safety, morals, comfort or general
welfare of the community
property, thereby depriving them of their property without due process of the law
They attempt to diminish the jurisdiction of the courts Usually for the well being of the public
Working hours, laws against child labor etc..
SC: jurisdiction was never given to the court to enjoin the collection of taxes State’s interference with private property (three ways)
SC: never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in court’s judgement, Taxation (citizens receive: protection and benefits from
beyond reasonable doubt. (respect to wisdom of legislature) government)
To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favour of its validity Eminent domain (:market value of property)
Settled law in US, due process of law does not always require, in respect to Police power (:benefit from maintenance of healthy economic
the government, the same process that is required between citizens, though standard of society)
it generally implies and includes regular allegation, opportunity to answer Offensive noises and smells have been for a long time considered susceptible of
and a trial suppression in thickly populated district
Banning stables, garages from residential homes, etc...
A citizen’s property both real and personal, may be taken in payment of its taxes
without any judicial proceedings whatever These kinds of cases have little bearing upon the health of the normal
person, but a great deal to do with his physical comfort and convenience
Based on public policy that no government could exists if every litigious man and not a little to do with his peace of mind
were permitted to delay the collection of its taxes
Man’s esthetic feelings are constantly being appealed through his sense of sight
There is a similar law to Act 2339-139/140 in the US which the Investment in theatres, paintings, etc...
US Supreme Court upheld as constitutional and non-violative of Why then should the government not interpose to protect from annoyance
due process and equal protection (jurisprudence) this valuable man’s senses as readily as to protect him from offensive
Remedy of Tax Payer noises and smells
Act 82 sec 84, Act 1189 Sec 52 Billboards compels attention by its strategic location and obstruct the range of vision at
Requires that before court can entertain suit regarding points where traveller most likely to direct their sight.
the validity of tax assessed, taxpayer must pay under Beautiful landscapes are marred or may not be seen at all by the traveller
protest first
Finds support from US jurisprudence also Quite natural for people to protest against this indiscriminate and
wholesale use of the landscape and the intrusion upon their hours of
Injunction leisure and relaxation from work its value is its proximity to the public
Two types thoroughfares
preliminary – anytime before final judgement; and Hence it is not so much a regulation of private property as it is a
final – at the termination of the trial as relief regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares
granted by CFI or SC
Granted only when the complaint shows facts entitling the If the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic
condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are
plaintiff to the relief demanded included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory
DEVESA vs ARBES (definition of injunction) is amenable to the Police Power
Special remedy issued by the authority and under the
seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in other cases SC : prevailing sentiment is manifestly against the erection of billboard which are
where equitable relief is sought, to those cases where offensive to the sight
there is no plain adequate and complete remedy at law Thus “police power may regulate and restrict uses of private property when devoted to
Nature of the writ (injunction), which requires that there’s adequate advertising which is offensive to the sight”
remedy at law before it could be issued, prevents its issuance since there
is a remedy - which is to pay under protest first PEOPLE V. FAJARDO: NOT ALLOWED TO BUILD ON HIS LOT AS IT COVERS
validity of those provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339 THE VIEW FROM THE PLAZA
conferring power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sigh,
signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines
is otherwise a nuisance. Defendants and appellants: Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia (son-in-law of
This issue has something to do with public interest and the police power Fajardo) August 29, 1958
of the state
Is this then a legitimate exercise of police power – all property is subject
to that power DOCTRINE: The State may not under the guise of Police Power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to

Jlyrreverre|21
preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. An ordinance may being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must
be considered invalid if: L-NP-LS give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
e. It fails to state any policy to guide or limit the mayor’s discretion
f. It expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit DECISION: Municipal Ordinance No. 7 is null and void. The conviction of the
g. enumerates no condition for its grant or refusal appellants is reversed and said accused are acquitted with costs.
h. Lacks standards, conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
power.
the LGU to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene
FACTS: During the incumbency of Fajardo, then Mayor of Baao, Camarines Sur, the
municipal council of Baao, Camarines Sur passed Municipal Ordinance no. 7. It states, the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
among others, that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner. be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

Four years later (after appellant’s term), appellants filed a written request with the ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS V. CITY OF MANILA : CURB
incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their IMMORTALITY: LICENSE FEE
gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the
national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was July 31, 1967
denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view Petitioners: Ermita-Malate Hotel, Motel Operators Association, Hotel Del Mar, Go
or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, Chiu (president and general manager of Motel Operators Association)
but again the mayor turned down the request. Respondents: City Mayor of Manila

Appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because Principal Question: Whether Ordinance 4760 is violative of the due process
they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed clause? Principal Answer: No, there is a failure of the requisite showing to
by a typhoon and they had been living on leased property. sustain an attack against its validity

The defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted Facts:
by the peace court of Baao (affirmed by the CFI). They were asked to pay a fine of - Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition of abovementioned law (July 1963)
P35.00 each and the costs as well as demolish the building. Accused appealed to the Against the Mayor of Manila in his capacity charged with the powers
CA, who forwarded the records to the SC due to the attack on the ordinance’s of enforcing ordinances in the said city
constitutionality. Vice Mayor (and acting Mayor) Herminio Astorga approved
the bill (June 1963)
ISSUE: Alleged that the petitioner is dedicated to the promotion and
WON the ordinance the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. protection of the interest of 18 members (hotels and motels which
WON the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. are legitimate, licensed, tax payers, giving livelihood, and
representing an investment of over P3 Million)
HELD: Grievances
No. Ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit They asserted that the City of Manila cannot regulate
the mayor’s action. (1) No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is Motels - the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any
other law, no reference is made to motels
expressed and (2) no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is a
settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or Violative of due process - unreasonable
prevent an activity is invalid. Law imposes 6k per annum for first class motels
4.5 k per annum for second class motels
No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and Requires the owner, manager, or authorized
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to
use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and refrain from entertaining guests without filing up the
amounts to a taking of appellant’s property without just compensation. prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence (name, middle name,
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' birthdate, address, occupation, sex, nationality, length
land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in of stay, number of companions in the room, residence
question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the certificate, passport number, signature in the presence
highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land of the representative)
remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited,

Jlyrreverre|22
 Violative of due process - arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, Burden of proof of assailing lack of conformity to the Constitution lies on
vague, indefinite and uncertain; invasion of right to privacy and the party that assails it
guaranty against self incrimination Memorandum for petitioners (February 1965)
Premises and facilities of motels and hotels would be Ordinance is null and void and unenforceable
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, Chief of Trial Court granted the petition
Police, or their duly authorized representatives
Violative of due process - arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive Held: No, judgement reversed
Section 2 classifying motels into 2 classes
1st class maintenance requirements Primary reason: absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
Telephone for each room,
validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance
dining room or restaurant, and o Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
laundry
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
2nd class maintenance requirements
Dining room police regulation
o Rebutting evidence must be presented unless statute is void on its face (not
Prohibits persons under 18 from being accepted into
such venues unless accompanied by parents or lawful the case here)
guardians Mantle of protection of due process does not cover petitioners in this case
Violative of due process - guaranty for lack of certainty and for Police power measure aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from
its unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive character imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
Unlawful for the owner, manager, or representative to unsupported by anything of substance
lease any room or portion for more than twice every 24 Otherwise, scope of police power is restricted
hours Due Process crossed because of raised fees? NO
Violative of due process
Penalty provided in Section 4 - Automatic cancellation o It is a well settled law (since 1922) that municipal license fees could
of license causing destruction of business and loss of be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations
investments o Cu Unjieng Case: licenses for non-useful occupations are also
Lower Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction (July 1963) incidental to police power
Ordered mayor to refrain from enforcing such ordinance from and after Power to exact a fee: part of the power to license and regulate
July 8 1963 As long as its not unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical
Respondents filed an answer (August 1963) Lutz v. Araneta: taxation may be made to implement state's
Petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel and motel business police power
o Denial of the alleged nullity of the ordinance, whether on statutory and Police power protecting public interests > certain
constitutional grounds occupations
§
Petitioners failed to state a cause of action o
Ordinance has a proper purpose - curb immorality o Valid Disallowing the manager et.al. to use the lease the rooms/premises more than
and proper exercise of police power twice a day constitutes a violation? NO
Only the guests can complain of alleged invasion of right to privacy and Intended to curb opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use
guaranty against self incrimination o Legislative attempt to correct undeniable existence of an
Injunction was contrary to law, Mayor prayed for its dissolution and undesirable situation
dismissal of the petition The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
No evidence filed by both parties, instead, a stipulation of facts was submitted restraint by general law for the common good
(Sept 1964) Vague and uncertain? NO
Petitioners have the capacity to sue Petitioners point at the requirement of the guests submitting certain
Respondent mayor is charged with the power and duty to enforce information in the prescribed form about the companions of the
ordinances guests - vague because it did not specify which companions
At the time of registry?
Petitioners are licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and
motels in Malate and Ermita Those who enter the room?
Ordinance 4760 was enacted Coming at an indefinite later time?
Also the requirement of providing restaurants
Explanatory note signed by then councilor Astorga was submitted with
the proposed ordinance Is it dependent upon the discretion of the manager/owners?
City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from The two grounds above are not grounds for vagueness
license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels Vagueness: act that men of common intelligence must
Memorandum for respondent (January 1965) necessarily guess at its meaning and differ to its application
o Presumption of validity of the ordinance Common sense provisions

Jlyrreverre|23
 Lower courts have authority to resolve issues of constitutionality of legislative
Power to tax- police power to regulate behavior. Congress can legislate morality measures
through sin taxes. (Ermita-Malate v. City Mayor of Manila)
Although there is the presumption of validity of constitutional laws, it is not
The extinction of Mortgage and other liens owned by legitimate creditors of AGRIX conclusively specially if there is evidence to the contrary (Justice Laurel in
constitutes a taking without due process. The mortgages and loans are purely Zandueta v. Dela Costa)
private and have not shown to be affected with private interest; therefore, there was
no cause to deprive the private individuals of vested property rights. Outright While lower courts should observe modesty in examining constitutional
confiscation of Property without NOTICE and HEARING is invalid. If there is a questions, they are not prevented from resolving them when warranted,
taking, there must be Just Compensation. (NDC v. Phil Veterans Bank) subject only to review by the highest tribunal .
Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts.
YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT: TRANSPORT OF CARABAO
According to Amendment No. 6, the President may issue decrees, orders or letters
FACTS: of instructions that were to have the force and effect of law when under
2 Executive Order No. 626-A circumstances of grave emergency or threat.
20. Amendment to EO No. 626 No showing of any exigency to justify that the minimum requirements of notice
a. and hearing be dispensed with.
Prohibition on the interprovincial transportation of carabaos Circumstances justifying the use of Police Power (as cited in Toribio case):
and slaughtering of carabaos unless they are at least 7 That the interest of the public generally require such interference à
years old if male and 11 years old if female upon issuance in the present case, EO No. 626-A has established a public welfare
of the necessary permit, to conserve those still fit for farm that is a lawful subject for enactment
b.
work, breeding and to prevent their improvident depletion Means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
Violators circumvent the prohibition by transporting of the purpose
carabeef instead à
measures employed are not lawful (more about this under due
a. Amendment now provides:
process)
No carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or p
urpose and carabeef shall be transported from one provi Giving full discretion to the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
nce to another Commission and the Director of Animal Industry without setting standards as
Upon violation, such carabao or carabeef shall be subject to to whom the confiscated carabao and carabeef shall be forwarded is laden
confiscation by the government to be distributed to with opportunities for partiality, abuse, and corruption.
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Executive Order No. 626-A is declared unconstitutional.
Chairman of National Meat Inspection Commission “may Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
see fit” (carabeef), and to deserving farmers as the denied the right to be heard and is immediately condemned and punished.
Director of Animal Industry “may see fit” (carabaos). Judgments must be based on the sporting idea of fair play (to hear
Signed and promulgated by President Ferdinand Marcos on the other side)
October 25, 1980 in the city of Manila Both sides should be considered in rendering an impartial verdict
Sequence of events based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention
. In January 13, 1984, petitioner Restituto Ynot transported 6
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. BALACUIT V. CFI AGUSAN DEL NORTE: DISCOUNT TO CHILDREN IN MOVIE
c. Confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo HOUSE
for violation of EO No. 626-A
a. Petitioner sued for recovery in the RTC of Iloilo city wherein the court June 30, 1988
sustained the confiscation and declined to rule on the constitutionality of
the executive order for lack of authority and its presumed validity. DOCTRINE: Legislature, may not, under the guise of protecting public interest,
a. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court arbitrarily interfere with private businesses, which is a property right of the owner.
which upheld the decision of the trial court hence the current petition for Theaters, cinemas and other exhibitions cannot be considered Public Utilities (Balacuit
review on certiorari. v. CFI)
ISSUES:
Nature of petition: petition for review from the decision of the CFI of Agusan del Norte
a. Whether or not lower courts have authority to resolve questions of and Butuan City, Branch II
constitutionality of legislative measures Petitioners: Carlos Balacuit (manager of Maya and Dalisay Theaters), Carlos Tan
a. Whether or not there is improper exercise of legislative power by (Crown Theater), Sergio Yu Carcel (Diamond Theater)
President Ferdinand Marcos under Amendment No. 6
Respondents: CFI of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II, and the city of
b. Whether EO No. 626-A is constitutional
Butuan
Petitioner claims its unconstitutionality because the penalty
(confiscation) is imposed without according the owner the right to be
heard before a competent court as guaranteed by due process. FACTS
April 21, 1969—Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the municipal board of the City of
HELD: Butuan:
Decision reversed in favor of petitioner

Jlyrreverre|24
 Children between 7 and 12 yrs. old will only pay for half the full price of tickets The legislature must not arbitrarily use the power to impose unusual and
for movies or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
performances. A police measure for the regulation of conduct should not encroach upon the
Those who violate will be punished with a fine of Php 200-600 or not more legitimate and lawful exercise of property right. The exercise of police power
than 6 months imprisonment or both upon discretion of court is valid unless it contravenes fundamental laws.
The exercise of this power is always subject to judicial review.
June 30, 1969—Petitioners filed a complaint with the CFI of Agusan del Norte and
Butuan city to declare the law unconstitutional and therefore void and unenforceable. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property and is thus
within the protection of due process of law.
July 14, 1969—TRO was issued enjoining the city from enforcing the
ordinance. July 29, 1969—Respondents filed answers sustaining validity of What is the purpose of the enactment? (form Minutes of the Municipal Board)
the ordinance. 1. ease burden of parents
2. but children still have a right to enjoy these types of entertainment so their
January 30, 1973—Litigants filed stipulation of facts admission will be reduced given that they cannot fully grasp the nuances
of these movies or other exhibitions due to their age
June 4, 1973—court rendered decision in favor of the city, holding that the law was
constitutional and valid but amending the fine to not more than Php 200 for the violation Requirements for police power are lacking:
of the ordinance 1. the purpose of the ordinance is to ease the burden of parents who have to pay
equal amounts for their young children who cannot fully grasp the nuance of
November 10, 1973—Motion for reconsideration was denied. movies or other public exhibitions
2. it helps parents but makes the petitioners bear the costs
Hence, this petition for review with the SC: 3. it not only makes petitioners’ earnings suffer, but penalizes them for failure to
comply with it
Petitioners’ arguments 4. threats for which the ordinance contains no safeguards:
o Ordinance is ultra vires and invalid exercise of police power o children over 12 years will try to pass themselves off as 12 years old o
not within the general powers of the municipal board because according to the with the lowered price, children may be encouraged to neglect their
Charter of the City of Butuan Section 15(n), it can only regulate and fix the amount studies and use their money for movies and such
of license fees for public exhibitions and all other performances and places of 1. movie house owners will be discouraged to show general patronage
amusement films because it will cut their earnings because children are charged
less
Respondents’ arguments: 2. no rational basis for classifying children as a distinct group—no pretense that
1. It has the power, invoking general welfare clause of that same charter, the purpose of the ordinance is to protect them or enhance their morals, etc.
Section 15(nn), providing: to enact all ordinances necessary and proper 3. A theater ticket has been described as a license, revocable at the will of the
for…the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and such others as proprietor or may be evidence of a contract, where the purchaser acquires the
may be necessary for the discharge of its powers and duties. rights to enjoy the service provided he behaves properly. It is a right of
property. So it has been held in the past that state interference in fixing the
ISSUE AND HELD: WON Ordinance no. 640 is constitutional - NO price of admission is invalid.
Decision of the trial court REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Info from concurring opinion:
RATIO: It is already settled in our jurisdiction that operation of theaters and other General welfare clause has 2 branches:
places of exhibition is subject to regulation by the municipal council in the 1. authorizes the municipal council to enact such ordinances and make
exercise of delegated power by the local government. Respondents use police regulations not repugnant to the law as may be necessary for the discharge
power to justify the ordinance. of their duties
1. Police power practiced by municipal corporations derives its authority 2. authorizes the municipal council to enact such ordinances necessary for
from the Revised Administrative Code. Only the state has inherent police health, peace, safety, order…of inhabitants and protection of property therein
power.
Cases cited:
2. Requirements in the exercise of police power: 1. Kwing sing v. Ciy of manila: regulate was imterpreted to include power to control,
• it must appear that the interest of the public generally requires an to govern, or restrain
interference with private rights 2. In re Gilchrist: the power of regulation does not include with it the authority to
• means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of interfere with the price of admission or the resale of tickets or tokens of admission
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

Jlyrreverre|25
3. Homeowners’ Assoc. of the Philippines v. Municipal Board of the City of
Manila: curtailment of right to property is subject to qualification, limitation or restriction The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
because of due respect to fundamental laws and the Consti that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
4. Collister v. Hayman: the proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
the terms of admission in any reasonable way 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES AND PAGCOR (G.R. NO 111097. JULY 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
20, 1994) : LOCAL ORDINANCE AGAINST PAGCOR 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
Ponente: CRUZ
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
FACTS: obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as
PAGCOR was created by PD 1869 for the purpose of centralizing and regulating all the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea which fall under the territorial exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCOR decided to expand to CDO and leased a government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
building owned by Pryce corp. power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

However, the City Council of Cagayan promulgated the following ordinances: SEPARATE OPINIONS:

Ordinance No. 3353 which cancels and prohibiting the issuance of permits for buildings PADILLA, concurring
to be used operation of a casino. (December 7 1992) [I]t is my considered view that the national government (through PAGCOR) should re-
examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents
Ordinance No. 3375-93 which prohibited the operation of casinos. (January 4, 1993) of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very
much against it, and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the
The Court of appeals has declared the ordinance as invalid. prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of
the Filipino sense of values?
The issue was raised in the SC. Petitioners argue that the LGC has gives them the
power to prohibit gambling as stated in Sec. 458 of the code. DAVIDE, concurring
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances
Petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is
the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the
official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as
proper upbringing of the youth. offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So
reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by
the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid. BENNIS V. MICHIGAN: CONFISCATION OF CAR

HELD: NO. Petition was denied. Decision of respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed. March 4, 1996
Petitioner: Tina Bennis
RATIO: The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per
se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is FACTS: Tina Bennis’ husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute in a car jointly
nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that owned by the couple. A cop found them and charged Mr. Bennis with gross indecency.
matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees The State then sued the Bennises to have the car be declared as a public nuisance
fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether and abated as such under Michigan Law.
or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others
for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Petitioner Tina said that she did not know that her husband would use the car for
indecent activities, and thus, it should not be abated. The state’s Court of Appeals
Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse- accepted her argument, but was reversed by the Supreme Court of Michigan, stating
racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this that there was no need for the State to prove that Tina knew her vehicle would be used
for indecent activities, and that the car was declared a public nuisance. Bennis then
Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts
elevated the case to the US SC.
do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.

Jlyrreverre|26
 (Justice Clarence Thomas) Forfeiture of property without proof of the owner’s
ISSUE: W/N Michigan’s abatement scheme deprived petitioner of her interest in the wrongdoing, merely because it was used in or was an instrument in the crime has long
car without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or that her interest been permitted in this country.
was taken for public use, without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment (Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) The statute is used to deter others from using cars
they own or co-own to contribute to neighborhood blight.
HELD: Yes, CA’s decision was affirmed.
RATIO: Bennis was accorded due process. She was given due notice and an Discussion. When property is jointly owned, it will still be subject to forfeiture for the
opportunity to be heard. wrongdoing of one party, even if the other owner had no idea that something illegal
took place. While this may seem unfair, the purpose is to deter criminal activity.
US jurisprudence has shown that there is no need for an owner to have knowledge or
consent that her property would be used for illicit or illegal activities. In the case of CRUZAN V. DIR. MISSOURI (INFORMED EUTHANASIA)
Calero Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the SC ruled that “the innocence of the
owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a Argued on December 6, 1989
defense.” Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses "both by preventing further illicit Decided on June 25, 1990
use of the [property] and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal This is a United State-Supreme Court Jurisprudence (foreign case)
behavior unprofitable." Cruzan – Nancy Cruzan represented by her parents and guardian, Lester and Joyce
Cruzan
Ponente: Rehnquist CJ
Michigan's abatement scheme has not taken petitioner's property for public use without Topic: Due Process; Doctrine of informed consent; euthanasia
compensation. Because the forfeiture proceeding did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, the State lawfully acquired the property by virtue of the proceeding. The Facts: Nancy Beth Cruzan (petitioner) was in a car accident which placed her in a
car was used in a criminal activity, and because the State sought to deter illegal activity, vegetative state (generally, a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but
the car was duly confiscated. evinces no indications of significant cognitive function) and now being kept alive by
an artificial feeding and hydration equipment
Forfeiture of property prevents further illicit use in two ways. It prevents further illicit use
of the property and renders the illegal behavior unprofitable by imposing an economic State of Missouri bears the costs of her treatment
penalty. i.
After it was clear that she would not recover from her vegetative state, her
parents requested the hospital staff to stop the artificial nutrition and hydration
The government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which procedures, but the staff refused to do so without a court order
j.
it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority The parents’ petition was granted by the trial court stating that she had the
other than the power of eminent domain. fundamental right under the state and federal constitutions to refuse or direct
the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures
Note: The court also cited the statement she made to her house mate that
“if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she
Fourteenth Amendment, section 1: “… No State shall make or enforce any law which could live at least halfway normally” (doctrine of informed consent)
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any k.
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the state trial court’s decision stating
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor that the latter did not observe the procedure that the requirement of proof is a
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” clear and convincing evidence and that state policy strongly favour the
Fifth Amendment: “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without preservation of life
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just Missouri SC recognized the doctrine of informed consent but
compensation” expressed scepticism about the application of the said doctrine in
the circumstance of this case.
Dissent. l. no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence
(Justice John Paul Stevens) Petitioner has no responsibility for her husband’s act. An of the formalities required by the Living Will statute or clear and
innocent person is being punished. No deterrent function will be served by taking her convincing evidence of the patient's wishes.
car. She did not entrust her car to her husband; they owned it jointly. She did not know
he planned to use it wrongfully. The seizure constituted an arbitrary deprecation of Issue: Should the Court grant the petition to stop the artificial nutrition and hydration
property. procedure of the petitioner and thus as a result kill her?
(Justice Anthony Kennedy) The forfeiture does not comply with due process.
Petitioner was not negligent or complacent, so her car should not be taken away from HELD: No, Missouri SC’s decision affirmed
her.
RATIO:
Concurrence.
Primary RATIO: The testimony adduced at trial consisted primarily of Nancy Cruzan's
statements made to a housemate about a year before her accident that she would not

Jlyrreverre|27
want to live should she face life as a "vegetable," and other observations to the same June 9, 2004 (GR 157036, 431 SCRA 534)
effect was not clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent patient Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
(petitioner) did really want to die rather than to live life as a “vegetable.” The
observations did not deal in terms with withdrawal of medical treatment or of Relevant Topic: Right to bear arms – statutory privilege, Licenses, due process
hydration and nutrition. (revoking of license), Police power
Doctrine of Informed consent: patients generally posses the right not to consent, that Facts: January 2003, President Arroyo delivered a speech before the PNP directing
is to refuse treatment
PNP chief to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence
Right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
(PTCFOR) to avert the rising crime incidents
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law o PARAMOUNT NEED FOR LAW AND ORDER - Arroyo cited the killing
of former NPA leader Rolly Kintanar, among others, and rising crime
A competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing incidents as reasons for the suspension
unwanted medical treatment o Only police and military are allowed to carry firearms and public
the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in o Others (i.e. civilians who want to go target practice) will be given special
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment and temporary permits
The question whether that constitutional right has been violated must be determined by o Revoked license may be re-applied after following procedure
balancing the liberty interest against relevant state interests In line with the directive of Arroyo, Ebdane issued the Guidelines in the Implementation
IN Jacobson v Massachusetts: balancing the individual right to refuse of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence dated Jan 31, 2003
smallpox vaccination versus the state’s interest to eliminate or prevent the Petitioner Chavez questioned the validity of the said guidelines
disease
An incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to Issue:
exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a "right" must
be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate safeguard to assure that Whether respondent Ebdane is Authorized to issue the assailed guidelines; YES
surrogate’s actions conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient
while competent is to prove by clear and convincing evidence of the wishes of the Whether the citizen’s right to bear arms is a constitutional right? NO
patient
with this level of proof requirement, courts want to safeguard the personal Whether the revocation of petitioner’s PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed guidelines is
decision/choice (of choosing life or death) of the patient and intend to guard a violative of his right to property NO
against potential abuses of surrogate when the patient is incompetent
Whether the issuance of the assailed Guidlines is a valid exercise of Police Power?
the level of proof is to distribute between the litigants the risk of error YES
if court grant the termination of life, and it turns out to be
erroneous it would be permanent already
if court does not grant it, and it turns out to be erroneous, other Whether the assailed Guidelines Constitute and ex post facto law NO
events could still happen to correct said error (e.g. eventual
natural death of patient, development in medicine, etc.) Held: petition denied
Petitioner contends that state must recognize the "substituted judgment" of close family
members even in the absence of substantial proof that their views reflect the views of Ratio:
the patient.
SC: we do not think the Due Process Clause requires the State to repose
judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient herself. Close Yes, power to issue license, though given to the legislative branch, may be
delegated to other branch/people/LGU, etc..
family members may have a strong feelings feeling not at all ignoble or
History of power to grant Firearm Licenses have first been delegated
unworthy, but not entirely disinterested, eitherthat they do not wish to witness to Governor General (now President) then to the Chief Constabulary
the continuation of the life of a loved one which they regard as hopeless, (now PNP Chief)
meaningless, and even degrading. But there is no automatic assurance that
the view of close family members will necessarily be the same as the Right to bear arms is not a constitutional right but a Statutory privilege
patient's would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of Petitioner cites American authority as his ground, more particularly
her situation while competent. the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the USA
“A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of
CHAVEZ V. ROMULO: RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS free state, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed”
Romulo (executive Secretary), Director General Hermogenes E. Ebdane (Chief of Right to bear arms according to the Second amendment of US
PNP) Const. pertains to the citizens’ collective right to take arms in defense
of the state, not to the citizen’s individual right to own and possess
o Represented by Solicitor General arms
While petitioner, a license gun owner represented himself

Jlyrreverre|28
 Right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental nd
under the of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
1987 Phil Const. there is no provision similar to the 2 amendment defendant.
Possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the XX
exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory X XXX XXX
privilege, not a constitutional right XX
First real firearm law is Act 1780 (10/12/1907)
X XXX
Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot
be considered an inalienable or absolute right
GUIDELINES ISSUED BY EBDANE
License is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant
of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the
declaration of rights TO : All Concerned
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost FROM : Chief, PNP
consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists SUBJE Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying
Tan v Dir of forestry: A license is merely a permit or privilege CT : of
to do what otherwise would be unlawful... it is neither a Firearms Outside of Residence.
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right DATE : January 31, 2003
Erdelyi v O’Brien (US Jurisprudence)
When state law gives the issuing authority broad discretion Reference: PD 1866 dated June 29, 1983 and its Implementing Rules and
to grant or deny license application in a closely Regulations.
regulated field initial applicants do not
th
have a property right
in such licenses protected by the 14 amendment General:
Since in 8our jurisdiction the PNP chief is granted broad
discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR, therefore the PTCFOR The possession and carrying of firearms outside of residence is a privilege
does not constitute a property right protected under our granted by the State to its citizens for their individual protection against all
constitution threats of lawlessness and security.
Licensee is subject to condition imposed by the legislature As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special
and one of the statutory conditions is that it might be permit, certificate of registration or MR) are prohibited from carrying their
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure firearms outside of residence. However, the Chief, Philippine National Police
may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under conditions as he
may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearms outside of
Laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been residence.
upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power Purposes:
Interest of the public generally
This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines in the implementation of the ban
Yes, Need for peace and order in the society on the carrying of firearms outside of residence as provided for in the
Reasonable necessity
Yes, what is proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms Implementing Rules and Regulations, Presidential Decree No. 1866,
outside of residence dated June 29, 1983 and as directed by PGMA. It also prescribes the
May re-apply for a new PTCFOR conditions, requirements and procedures under which exemption from the ban
Revocation would make it difficult for criminal to roam may be granted.
around with their guns and would be easier for PNP to Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:
apprehend them
a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms
Not ex post facto law as the guidelines is prospective in its application covered with valid PTCFOR may re-apply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with
the conditions hereinafter prescribed.
Definition [Mekin v Wolfe, 2 Phil 74 (1903)] b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby prohibited from
carrying their firearms outside their residence except those covered with
one – (a) which makes an action done before the passing
of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, mission/letter orders and duty detail orders issued by competent authority
pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall
and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime pertain only to organic and regular employees.
or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of residence.
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved, provided, that
less or different testimony than the law required at the time the persons and security of those so authorized are under actual threat, or by the nature
of their position, occupation and profession are under imminent danger.

Jlyrreverre|29
b. All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted by their a. The firearm must not be displayed or exposed to public view, except those
respective agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that authorized in uniform and in the performance of their official duties.
such Mission/Letter Orders is valid only for the duration of the official mission which in b. The firearm shall not be brought inside public drinking and amusement
no case shall be more than ten (10) days. places, and all other commercial or public establishments.
c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their respective security
agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such DDO GSIS V. MONTESCARLOS: SURVIVORSHIP PENSION CLAIM
shall in no case exceed 24-hour duration.
d. Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the Petitioner: Government Service Insurance System (Cebu Branch)
PNP for purposes of practice and competition, provided, that such firearms while in Respondent: Milagros Montesclaros
transit must not be loaded with ammunition and secured in an appropriate box or case Ponente: J.Carpio
detached from the person.
e. Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps. FACTS: Nicolas filed and was approved an application for retirement benefits under
PD No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 on January
Requirements for issuance of new PTCFOR: 31, 1986; to take effect on February 17, 1984.
a. Written request by the applicant addressed to Chief, PNP stating his qualification to
possess firearm and the reasons why he needs to carry firearm outside of residence. On April 22, 1992, Nicolas died. Milagros, as wife and designated beneficiary, filed with
b. Xerox copy of current firearm license duly authenticated by Records Branch, FED; GSIS a claim for survivorship pension. GSIS denied the claim because under Section
c. Proof of actual threat, the details of which should be issued by the Chief of 18 of
Police/Provincial or City Directors and duly validated by C, RIID; PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension “if the surviving
d. Copy of Drug Test Clearance, duly authenticated by the Drug Testing Center, if spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the
photocopied; pensioner qualified for the pension. (The Proviso)” According to GSIS, Nicolas wed
Copy of DI/ RIID clearance, duly authenticated by ODI/RIID, if photocopied; Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on “17
February 1984.”
Copy of Neuro-Psychiatric Clearance duly authenticated by NP Testing Center, if
photocopied;
Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning
Copy of Certificate of Attendance to a Gun Safety Seminar, duly validated by the validity of the proviso. The trial court declared Milagros to be eligible. GSIS
Chief, Operations Branch, FED; appealed to the CA, but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
NBI Clearance;
i. Two (2) ID pictures (2” x 2”) taken not earlier than one (1) year from date of filing of ISSUE: WON the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is valid and constitutional.
application; and
j. Proof of Payment HELD: No. It is void for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the law. The GSIS cannot deny the claim of Milagros for
Procedures: survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
a. Applications may be filed directly to the Office of the PTCFOR Secretariat
in Camp Crame. In the provinces, the applications may also be submitted to Retirement benefits as Property Interest:
the Police Regional Offices (PROs) and Provincial/City Police Offices PD1146 mandates the government employee to pay monthly contributions,
(P/CPOs) for initial processing before they are forwarded to the office of the which will then be returned as a form of compensation when they retire from
PTCFOR Secretariat. The processors, after ascertaining that the office. It serves as an incentive/reward for the government employees to stay
documentary requirements are in order, shall issue the Order of Payment (OP) in the service the government.
indicating the amount of fees payable by the applicant, who in turn shall pay Pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as
the fees to the Land Bank. provided by the law. No law can deprive such person his pension rights
b. Applications, which are duly processed and prepared in accordance with without due process of law: notice and hearing.
existing rules and regulations, shall be forwarded to the OCPNP for approval.
c. Upon approval of the application, OCPNP will issue PTCFOR valid for one Denial of Due Process:
(1) year from date of issue. The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which
d. Applications for renewal of PTCFOR shall be processed in accordance with provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
the provisions of par. 6 above. due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
e. Application for possession and carrying of firearms by diplomats in the laws.”
Philippines shall be processed in accordance with NHQ PNP Memo dated
September 25, 2000, with Subj: Possession and Carrying of Firearms by The proviso is unduly oppressive in out rightly denying a dependent spouse’s
Diplomats in the Philippines. claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage
to the pensioner within the three- year prohibited period.
Restrictions in the Carrying of Firearms:

Jlyrreverre|30
 There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without
giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. ISSUES AND
m. ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the resolution as the same is allegedly:
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure 1. A gross violation of the non-impairment clause
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to 2. An invalid exercise of police power
government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness, Mere product endorsements and not election propaganda subject to
disability, death, and retirement of the government employees. COMELEC rules
3. In the nature of an ex-post facto law
Violation of EPC Makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the EPC. removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said
advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal
Requirements of EPC: 4. Contrary to the fair elections act
Substantial Distinction
According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as
Germane to the purpose of the law lawful election propaganda
Not limited to existing conditions
5. Invalid due to overbreadth.
Apply equally to all members of the same class
HELD: Petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is
The proviso does not satisfy these requirements because it discriminates against declared valid and constitutional.
the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
Not violative of non-impairment clause
The proviso does not provide any reason or purpose for such prohibition. Non-impairment clause must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government (public welfare)
CHAVEZ V. COMELEC: CANDIDATE BILLBOARDS Prevent Premature campaigning
Private individual - while petitioner entered into the contracts as a private individual and
FACTS: Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 had all the right to lend his name and image, when he filed his certificate of candidacy
for Senator, the billboards assumed partisan political character because the same
“All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or
paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or indirectly promoted his candidacy
name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who Equal Opportunity - An individual intending to run for public office, could pay private
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public
candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period, to the
disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same means.
candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3
days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and
said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to Valid exercise of police power
have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the
the Omnibus Election Code.” enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, all aimed at the holding of
Sequence of events free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Petitioner Chavez entered into formal agreements with certain Lawful subject (public interest) - to prohibit premature
establishments to promote their products campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of
96° North, a clothing company, Konka International Plastics public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich
candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer
Manufacturing Corporation, G-Box \candidates
Lawful means (reasonable means) - by preventing the former
3 billboards were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on
North Expressway and 1 more billboard was set up along Roxas account of their resources and popularity.
Boulevard
Not an ex post facto law
December 30, 2003 – Chavez filed a certificate of candidacy for the Not penal in nature, and it is prospective
position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of Does not punish entering in endorsement contracts or putting up of
three political parties: PROMDI, REPORMA, and Aksyon Demokratiko. billboards but the non-removal of the described propaganda materials
three 3 days after the effectivity
January 6, 2004 - respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520
and petitioner was directed to comply Not contrary to Fair Elections Act

Jlyrreverre|31
 Does not prohibit putting up of campaign materials but only regulates null and void for being an ultra vires act. Motion for Reconsideration was denied
such to allow, as far as practicable, equal opportunity to all candidates. on August 6, 1999
• Court of Appeals affirmed RTC decision on December 15, 2000. Motion for
Not void for overbreadth Reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2001.
Limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only disallows the • Thus, the present Petition for Review
continued display of a person’s propaganda materials and
advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the ISSUE: (1) WON trial court has jurisdiction over the case it not having furnished the
start of the campaign period.
Office of the Solicitor General copy of the Orders;
Void for overbreadth - when it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental (2) WON the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may subject ordinance.
not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms. HELD:
(1)Yes, has jurisdiction (2) No, unnecessary means
Vagueness – a statute or act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
RATIO:
its application. It violates due process for failure to accord to person fair notice of the
conduct to avoid and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its 1st Issue:
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of government muscles. The decision rendered a null and void judgement hence the ordinance in
question was declared invalid, not unconstitutional.
Void-for-vagueness doctrine – a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess Section 22 of Rule 3 provides that any action involving the validity of any...
its meaning and differ as to its application ordinance, the court in its discretion, may require the appearance of the
solicitor general. Further Section 4 of rule 35 that if such ordinance is alleged
Overbreadth doctrine – a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means to be unconstitutional, the solicitor general shall be notified and entitled to
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected be heard.
freedom.
Nowhere is it stated in the above-quoted rules that failure to notify the solicitor
LUCENA GRAND TERMINAL V. JAC LINER: EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISE general is a jurisdictional defect. In validity cases, the courts are given
discretion
Petitioner: Granted by Lucena City an exclusive franchise to construct, finance, 2
nd
Issue:
establish, operate and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal for 25 years
Local Government may be considered as having properly exercised its police
Respondent: A common carrier operating buses which ply various routs to and from power only if there is a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
Lucena City; it has its own terminal in the city
Topic: Exercise of Police Power by Local Government; Abatement of nuisance per (1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
accidens particular class, require the interference of the state (Lawful Subject)
o Traffic congestion is a menace to public safety and thus, a public
CARPIO-MORALES, J concern.
o The ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving
FACTS: traffic, they involve public interest warranting the interference of
• Ord 1631 grants Petitioner exclusive franchise while Ord 1778 prohibits the the State.
entrance of buses, mini buses, and out-of-town jeepneys from entering the city and o The first requisite is present.
declared inoperable all terminals within the city (including that of respondent’s).
• JAC liner assailed before the RTC of Lucena City, Ordinance Nos 1631 and 1778 (2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
as unconstitutional on the ground that the same constituted (1) invalid exercise of object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
police power, (2) undue taking of private property and (3) violation against (Lawful Method)
monopoly. o With the aim of localizing the source of traffic, the ordinance prohibited
• Lucena Grand Central Terminal was allowed to intervene the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena and use
the facility of Petitioners located outside the city.
• November 25, 1998 the hearing was conducted and on March 31, 1999, RTC
declared Ord 1613 as valid (except provision on exclusivity) while Ord 1778 as o The ordinances assailed are characterized by overbreadth: they go
beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.

Jlyrreverre|32
 Cause of traffic is indiscriminate loading and unloading P5,000 or both. In case of subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the
which impedes traffic. But terminals per se do not impede erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
or help impede flow of traffic.
Even entities which might be able to provide facilities better Private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation
than the franchised terminal are barred from operation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It
Also, an exclusive franchise to petitioner has not been built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
shown to be the only solution to the problem accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTOC filed a Petition with the
Petitioner argue that ordinance was pursuant to the power of the
lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among
Sanggunian to “prohibit encroachments or obstacles theron..” its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional mainly because
Terminals are not obstacles. Rather, buses and jeepneys it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection
that indiscriminately load and unload are.
Terminals are not public nuisance. The operation of bus under the law. Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the
terminal is a legitimate business. Supreme Court.
Assuming that they are, they are at most nuisance
per accidens, not per se. ISSUES:
Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it
may not be abated via an ordinance, W/N the Ordinance is constitutional.
without judicial proceedings.
W/N the Ordinance has standards that will guide law enforcers in carrying out its
Petitioners argue that the ordinance has been proven effective in provisions.
easing traffic. BUT, it is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power.
which bears upon its validity/ constitutionality W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law.
Second Requisise is ABSENT
HELD: All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights
PETITION DISMISSED and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not
NOTE: Weight of popular opinion must be balanced with that of an individual’s rights
to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance
The court is aware that a number of Barangays have expressed support to
and is therefore ultra vires null and void.
the ordinance. Likewise the private sector has shown support.

However, weight of popular opinion must be balanced with that of an individual’s rights.
It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III RATIONALE: The Ordinance goes against the constitutional guarantees of a person's
of the Constitution is a majority (except in notable exceptions) of one even as against fundamental right to liberty and property. Motel patrons may invoke this right to
the rest of the nation who would deny him that right autonomy to sexual consummation as long as they do not violate the Constitution. Their
right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the
law. Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful
government restraint; it must include privacy as well, which is also a constitutional
guarantee. The invasion of the right to privacy should be justified by a compelling state
CITY OF MANILA V. LAGUIO: SAUNA, MASSAGE PARLORS, NIGHT CLUBS interest, which is absent in the case at bar. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the
exception.
Petitioner: City of Manila et al.
Respondent: Hon. Perfecto Laguio Jr. (RTC Manila) and Malate Tourist Development The Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend
Corporation to disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and
“adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.” In effect, it gives
FACTS: The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7783, which prohibited certain unbridled discretion for public officers.
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities (e. g. saunas, night clubs,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, beer houses, etc.) where women are used as tools in The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and respondent of the beneficial use of its property. An ordinance which permanently
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. Such types of restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes
establishments were given three months to wind up business operations, transfer, or beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
convert their business to other kinds of business allowable in the area (e. g. coffee compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
shops, restaurants, art galleries...) The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by
and conviction, the offender shall be imprisoned for one year or fined an amount of zoning, be destroyed without compensation

Jlyrreverre|33
 October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa
The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since one of the requisites for a valid (B.P.) No. 880
exercise of police power is missing. In the case at bar, the protection of social and
moral values of the community is the lawful subject of the Ordinance. However, the All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only
lawful method is not met since the aforementioned establishments are not the source Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated
of immorality in the first place; rather, the problem lies with the people who use these Preemptive Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no
places for immoral purposes. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in
itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger.
take place even in the most innocent places. The establishments are lawful pursuits It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which
the expression is sought.
The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws. The
Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis It is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest
lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
"maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. it is ultra vires or otherwise, unfair,
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power. The Local Government Code strict scrutiny test.
merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 violated their rights as
Addendum organizations and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
was violently dispersed by police authorities?
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the HELD: Petitions granted in part:
local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure • DILG Sec. ordered to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: Sec 15 of BP 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one sutitable
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; freedom park or plaze in every city and municipality of the country.
must not be unfair or oppressive; • After 30 days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permits shall be required to
must not be partial or discriminatory; exercise the right to peaceable assemble and petition in the public parks or palazas
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Sec 15 of the law
must be general and consistent with public policy; and • Calibrated Preemptive Response, insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in
must not be unreasonable lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ordered to
REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE maximum tolerance
BAYAN V. ERMITA: NO PERMIT, NOR RALLY • Petitions are dismissed in all other respects.
• CONSITTUTIONALITY of BP 880 SUSTAINTED.
Three Groups of Petitioners: Bayan, et al, Jess del Prado, et al, , Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), et al, KMU, et al., v.
Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage
Respondents: Ermita et al. in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who
FACTS: Petitioners intended to conduct a rally, which was scheduled to proceed along would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact,
España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their
bridge. claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional
guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary
Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other
rallyists were arrested Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution

Allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on

Jlyrreverre|34
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit
for redress of grievances of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement
will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination
and orderly activities.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and KMU V. DIRECTOR GENERAL AND PLIPINAS: UNIFORM ID SYSTEM
of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional
protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic FACTS: Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 420 requiring all government agencies and GOCCs
polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and to streamline and harmonize their ID system, and Dir-Gen of NEDA to implement the
unprotected rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a same.
redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for
purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted
Sec. 1 states the purpose such as, to reduce cost and lessen the financial burden on
activities.
both the government and public, ensure greater convenience in transacting with
These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly government agency.
Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3
of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements
Sec. 3 Enumerates the data requirements and submits that only the name, home
defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights
address, sex, picture and signature; plus ID number issued by the participating agency,
common reference number and fingerprint is needed. (Fourteen to be exact though)
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but
Sec. 6 provides for the safeguards such as;
a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the a. Recorded and stored only for purposes of establishing the identity of the
assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner person and limited to sec. 3;
of holding public assemblies.
b. No collection or compilation of data in violation of a person’s right to privacy
shall be allowed;
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the ID system shall be
22
all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference instituted;
to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really d. Data collected shall be treated as strictly confidential;
have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and Written request from the owner is required if revisions are to be instituted.
entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the E.O. invoking the ruling in Ople v. Torres,
refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of usurpation of legislative power, will using the budget in areas not prescribed by the
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be constitution and invasion of privacy.
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
ISSUES: WON the E.O. a usurpation of the legislative power? WON it violates the right
to privacy?
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or RATIO:
public health.
1. There are two ways to achieve a unified ID system for the government
agencies, first, heads of government entities can enter into a MOA. Second, the
Other Notes: The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our
president can issue an EO or an AO.
legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other
hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or E.O. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated
place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for in executive orders. Usually used in the implementation of laws.
the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power
to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear A.O. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations
and present danger" standard. in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving
local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom
parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so

Jlyrreverre|35
EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue cards as part of their functions (DPWH) Department Order No. 74 (DO 74), Department Order No. 215 (DO 215), and
under existing laws, these agencies have already been issuing ID cards prior to the the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory
EO. Board (TRB) violate Republic Act No. 2000 (RA 2000) or the Limited Access Highway
Act. Petitioners also seek to declare Department Order No. 123 (DO 123) and
The president’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1) unconstitutional.
implementing legislation. The constitution mandates that the President should ensure
that laws are faithfully executed (Sec. 17 Art. VI), there are several laws mandating Facts: In 1957, RA 2000 or the “Limited Access Highway Act” was enacted. RA
government entities to reduce cost, increase efficiency and improve general public 2000 gave the then Dept. of Public Works, Transportation and Communications
service. Thus, giving a reason for the EO 420. the authority to regulate, restrict or prohibit access to “limited access facilities” (like
highways, for instance), to best serve the needs of the public and to alleviate traffic
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. It only applies to government congestion.
entities that under exisiting laws are already collecting data and issuing an ID. The court
cannot interfere on how the Executive branch should undertake the efficiency of its DPWH then issued the following, in chronological order:
operation and provide a user-friendly service to the public. A.O. 1, which prohibited motorcycles on limited access facilities.
D.O. 74, declaring portions of NLEX and SLEX as limited access facilities
2. Sec. 5 enumerates the safeguards and the usage of the said data, thus unlike D.O. 215, which enforced a total ban of motorcycles in NLEX, SLEX and the
Ople measures that prevent potential abuses are instituted. Manila-Cavie Toll Expressway (better known as Coastal Road).
D.O. 123, which DPWH issued acting thru the Toll Regulatory Board or TRB.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners This order allowed motorcycles with engine displacements of 400cc (whatever
cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 that means) inside limited access facilities.
narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards. The facts also stated that the TRB issued revised rules and regulations on limited
access facilities, the purpose of which is to implement the A.O. and D.O.s
mentioned.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government
entities. Some one hundred other countries have compulsory national ID systems. This petition seeks to prevent the DPWH from enforcing a total ban of motorcycles in
Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have the North and South Luzon Expressway and Coastal Road under DO 215.
compulsory national ID systems but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health
services, and other specific purposes.
Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court dismissed the petition but declared
In comparison to Ople, a national ID system was not in existence before unlike the invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition;
government IDs which are already in existent. Moreover, EO 420 makes existing but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated June 16, 2003.
sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less
costly, more efficient, reliable, and user friendly to the public. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Wherefore the petitions are dismissed. EO 420 is VALID! Issues:

MIRASOL V. DPWH: MOTORCYCLE PROHIBITION Whether the RTC’s decision is already barred by res judicata. NO.
Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations contravene RA 2000. YES
June 8, 2006 Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional. VALID & VOID, respectively.

Petitioners: JAMES MIRASOL, RICHARD SANTIAGO, and LUZON Held: Petition was partially granted. DO 74, 215 and 123 are VOID. AO 1, however,
MOTORCYCLISTS FEDERATION, INC. is valid.
Respondents: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD Ratio:
Ponente: Justice CARPIO
The decision is not barred by res judicata because the preliminary injunction given to
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision dated 10 March 2003 the petitioners was not an adjudication of the case. It is NOT a final injunction.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 147, Makati City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-034,
as well as the RTC’s Order dated 16 June 2003 which denied petitioners’ Motion for The former Dept. of Public Works, Transportation and Communication were split by
E.O. 546 into two separate departments: DPWH and DOTC. The question is: which of
Reconsideration. Petitioners assert that Department of Public Works and Highways’ these two agencies is now authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited
access facilities?

Jlyrreverre|36
DPWH assumed the public works function, while DOTC was tasked to (1) formulate On
nd
5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of
policies and guidelines for an integrated and comprehensive transportation and 2 Lieutenant.
communications system; and (2) regulate, whenever necessary, activities relative to Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three
transportation and communications. Clearly, under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the years pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to
DPWH, which has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited P13,680.
access facilities
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen.
Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with
[4]
certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential
[5]
is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field Decree No. 1650.
of transportation and to regulate related activities. Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who loses his
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement
TRB cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship.
access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not
possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension o
implementing them are likewise void. COA decline to render judgment since petitioner’s claim is essentially challenging
Petitioners claim that the DPWH’s use of police power was baseless and unwarranted. the constitutionality of PD 1638 which COA has no jurisdiction
They also claim that AO 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out
motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport. Finally, petitioners argue that AO ISSUE: Basically, does the petitioner has right to claim his retirement despite of him
1 violates their right to travel. becoming a US citizen and if PD 1638 is valid
The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an
exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its HELD: Petition denied;
exercise is reasonableness. What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact RATIO:
definition or scientific formulation. The SC thus held that AO 1 was not
unreasonable. Petitioner claim that PD 1638 should apply prospectively, he’s interpretation
being that it should apply only to those new recruits of AFP
A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates SC: Yes, it should apply prospectively, meaning that it should apply to those people
constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the law. who will retire from the army after the date of effectivity of PD1638
o PD 1638, took effect upon approval on 10 September 1979 and Petitioner retired
Petitioners’ contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles out motorcycles is specious. 5 Jan 1982 thus still applicable to him
Classification by itself is not prohibited. A classification can only be assailed if it is Petitioner claim that sec 27 of PD 1638 deprives him of his property which
deemed invidious, that is, it is not based on real or substantial differences. constitution and statutes vest in him
To assure that the general welfare be promoted, a regulatory measure may cut into the
rights to liberty and property. SC: It does not impair any vested right or interest of petitioner because when PD
1638 took effect he was still in active service and still has no right over the
PS. If, by virtue of the voidness of DO 215, motorcycles are NOT banned sa SLEX, retirement benefit before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an
then why are there no motorcycles in SLEX? Wala lang. employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect
to the nature of employment, age, and length of service. It is only upon
PARREÑO V. COA: PENSION BANNED FOR US CITIZENS retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to retirement
benefits.
nd
Petitioner: 2 LT. SALVADOR PARREÑO represented by his daughter Myrna P. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
Caintic immediate payment under pre-existing law

Respondents: COA, Chief of staff, AFP June 7, 2007 Petitioner/OSG argues that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, discriminates
Puno, C.J. against AFP retirees who have changed their nationality.

RELEVANT TOPICS: AFP Retirement Benefits-property right; Equal Protection The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject
Clause to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification
(a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(b) must be germane to the purpose of the law;
Facts: Salvador Parreño (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(AFP) for 32 years.
(d) must apply equally to each member of the class

Jlyrreverre|37
There is substantial difference because Government has constitutional right to require November 26, 1998 - Personnel Manager of SLMC issued a "Notice of Separation from
all citizens to render personal and military. the Company" to Maribel S. Santos effective December 30, 1998 considering the
Though a retiree who is still a Filipino is not in active service he latter's refusal to accept the offer for early retirement
is still part of the Citizen Armed Forces
But those who are already foreigners, they can’t be compelled to December 18, 1998 - Jack C. Lappay, President of the Philippine Association of
render service already Radiologic Technologists, Inc wrote to SLMC to give due consideration to 3 employees
and have them assigned to other departments while they await their chance to pass
REMEDY: reapply for Filipino citizenship and he’ll still be considered natural-born the board exam
citizen (remember Consti 1 case). He’ll receive his benefits again after taking the oath
of allegiance. Any benefit received when he was still a foreigner should be returned to January 6, 1999, Personnel Manager of SLMC again issued a "Notice of Separation
the Phil Gov’t from the Company" to Maribel S. Santos effective February 5, 1999 after the latter failed
to present her appeal on the results of the exam which she took and failed
Note: # 2 and 3 are issues regarding the constitutionality of PD 1638
March 2, 1999 – Maribel S. Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
ST. LUKE'S V. NLRC: REGULATION OF PROFESSION of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits

March 7, 2007
September 5, 2000 - Labor Arbiter came out with a Decision ordering private
respondent SLMC to pay petitioner Maribel S. Santos P115,500.00 as her separation
PETITIONER: RESPONDENTS:
pay. All other claims of petitioner were dismissed for lack of merit.
St. Luke’s Medical Center Employee’s National Labor Relations Commission
Association-AFW (SLMCEA-AFW) (NLRC)
Hence the current appeal
Maribel S. Santos St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC)
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS:
petition for review on certiorari
Whether the CA overlooked certain material facts and circumstances on petitioners'
FACTS: Republic Act No. 7431 - Radiologic Technology Act of 1992 requires that no legal claim in relation to the complaint for illegal dismissal
person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the
Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion and erred in not resolving with
of Radiologic Technology clarity the issues on the merit of petitioner's constitutional right of security of tenure
*Santos argues that her failure to comply with the certification requirement did not
Sequence of events
constitute just cause for termination as it violated her constitutional right to security of
tenure.
October 13, 1984 – Maribel S. Santos hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology
department in SLMC
HELD: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
graduate of Associate in Radiologic Technology from The Family Clinic
Incorporated School of Radiologic Technology No, the Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the CA
particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and are
April 22, 1992 – Congress passed and enacted RA 7431 supported by substantial evidence.

No, while the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its
September 12, 1995 - Assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director
exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to
of SLMC issued a final notice to comply with the requirement of Republic Act No. 7431
safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of
by December 31, 1995; otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an
area which does not require a license if a slot is available the people.
Exams - persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
March 4, 1997 - Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a final notice to petitioner scientific or technical knowledge (especially medicine) may be required to take
Maribel S. Santos requiring the latter to comply with Republic Act. No. 7431 by taking an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers
and passing the examination scheduled in June 1997; otherwise, private respondent
SLMC may be compelled to retire her from employment should there be no other Purpose of the law – Sec. 2 of RA 7431 states that the law intends to upgrade the
position available where she may be absorbed practice of radiologic technology in the Philippines for the purpose of
protecting the public from the hazards posed by radiation as well as to ensure
More notices were sent to petitioner asking for other requirements but she
safe and proper diagnosis, treatment and research through the application of
never made efforts to comply hence arrangements were made for her early
machines and/or equipment using radiation
retirement which she refused

Jlyrreverre|38
 Police Power - state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray Viron asked the court to construe the scope of RA 7924 (the law which created the
technicians and/or any other professions (lawful method) connected with the MMDA) and rule on whether the planned closure would contravene the Public
health and safety of its citizens (lawful subject) Service Act.
Management Prerogatives - prerogative to determine the place or station where
an employee is best qualified to serve the interests of the company on the June 19, 2003, Mencorp Transport Corporation likewise filed the same petition and
basis of the his or her qualifications, training and performance belongs solely was later consolidated with Viron.
to the employer But Mencorp’s prayer for a TRO was denied as was its application for
While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social issuance of preliminary injuction.
justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor
dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes Issues in RTC:
that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and Whether MMDA’s power to regulate traffic include the power to direct
enforcement in the interest of fair play. provincial bus operators to abandon their existing terminals
Whether EO 179 is consistent with Constitution and Public Service Act
The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the required exam, was Whether provincial bus operators would be deprived of the real properties
without due process
allowed by private respondent to apply for and transfer to another position with the
hospital does not constitute unlawful discrimination. This was a valid exercise of
management prerogative, petitioners not having alleged nor proven that the reassigned January 24, 2005, RTC sustained legality and constitutionality of the EO pursuant to
RA 7924; also held a valid exercise of police power.
employee did not qualify for the position where she was transferred.
September 8, 2005, RTC reversed its decision and held that EO was unreasonable
exercise of police power; that power of MMDA under RA 7924 did not include power to
MMDA V. VIRON: POWER OF MMDA
order closure and; EO is inconsistent with public service act. Motion for reconsideration
was denied
PETITIONERS: MMDA; Bayani Fernando; Alberto Romulo (executive secretary) Hence, the present petition for certiorari
RESPONDENTS: Viron and Mencorp are domestic corporations engaged in the
business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation
ISSUE/HELD:
Petition for Certiorari (1) WON the requisites of declaratory relief are present there being no justiciable
controversy (minor issue) YES
CARPIO-MORALES, J:
(2) WON the president has the authority to undertake or cause the implementation
of the Project. YES
FACTS: (2a)WON the president’s delegation to MMDA is valid NO
(2b)WON there was a valid exercise of Police Power NO
February 10, 2003, PGMA issued EO 179 (Providing for the establishment of
Greater Manila Mass Transport System)
Purpose: Decongest traffic in manila RATIO:
Plan: Aims to develop 4 interim intermodal mass transport terminals to integrate
all transport modes (train, bus, jeep, van, etc) There is a justiciable controversy thus the filing of a declaratory relief is valid. The
Implementation Agency: MMDA requisites of declaratory relief are:
Recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus Justiciable controversy: satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening
terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares seeds thereof exist between the parties. In this case the issue has already
ripened because the letter of the EO expressly states the elimination of bus
MMC (the governing board of MMDA) expressed full support of the terminals
project and recognized the imperative to establish common bus The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse:
parking terminals. present in this case because VIRON has showed that it will suffer upon
enforcement of EO
February 24, 2003, Viron filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Manila RTC The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
Alleged that MMDA was poised to issue a circular, memorandum, or order closing, controversy: Viron has legal interest because they have the right to property
or tantamount to closing all provincial bus terminals in EDSA and in the whole of The issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination: The issue is ripe
the Metropolis.
Viron had terminals in Sampaloc and 2 in QC The Department of Transport and Communication (DOTC) by virtue of EO 125
Alleged that MMDA’s authority does not include the poser to direct provincial bus (issued by Cory when she had legislative powers) is authorized to administer programs
operators and projects for transportation. Since the President controls all executive branches,
it follows that s/he also has the same power to issue orders pertaining to transportation.
The president has all the powers which the law may confer to a subordinate

Jlyrreverre|39
department. These powers partakes of police power because they are for the general The white L300 van was driven by M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo
welfare.
The brothers were repeatedly beaten and tortured and questioned about their
POLICE POWER RESTS PRIMARILY WITH THE LEGISLATURE BUT SUCH knowledge of the NPA.
POWER MAY BE DELEGATED. BY VIRTUE OF A VALID DELEGATION, THE
POWER MAY BE EXERCISED BY THE (1) PRESIDENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE Sometime in the third week of detention, Raymond attempted to escape. He discovered
BOARDS AND (2) LAWMAKING BODES OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS OR that they were in Fort Magsaysay (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). He was however recaptured
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER LGC OF 1991. and tortured. Detention in Fort Magsaysay lasted for 3 and a half months.

One day, Rizal Hilario took the Manalo brothers to Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and
(2a) However, the president may not validly delegate the implementation of EO 179 to then beaten up. They remained there for one or two weeks.
MMDA because there is no legal basis. The scope of the power of MMDA as an
administrative, coordinating and policy setting body has been discussed in the Then brought to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan to meet Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan,
case of MMDA v. Bel Air (consti 1). There is no provision in RA 7924 that grants the th
Commanding General, 7 Infantry Division
MMDA police power or the power to legislate. Its functions are administrative in nature Gen. Palparan told the Manalo brother to tell their parents to not go to rallies and
hence it is devoid of authority to implement the project as envisioned in the EO. hearings regarding their disappearance. Instead, they should help in the capture
(2b) Assuming arguendo that police power may be delegated to the MMDA, its of “Bestre”.
exercise of power does not satisfy the two tests. (See similar case of Lucena v. Jac
Liner). Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of colorum buses, Respondents were then brought to their parents’ house to deliver Palparan’s
vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking and passenger message. Their parents agreed out of fear.
pick-up points might be even more effective in easing traffic situation. So would the
strict enforcement of traffic rules and removal of obstructions. Manalo brothers were given medicine named “Alive”. Gen. Palparan said that this
In short, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents’ terminals not only would make them feel better, but the real effect was drowsiness and a heavy feeling
because no authority to implement the project has been granted nor legislative or police after waking up.
power been delegated to it, but also does not satisfy the standards of valid police power
measure. After 3 months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson. He was ordered to
clean outside the barracks of the Army Rangers.
Petition DENIED, and EO 179 declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires Met Sherlyn Cadapan, a UP student who was also abducted, tortured and raped
by the military.
DND V. MANALO: (AMPARO)
Reynaldo was brought to Camp Tecson a week later. Other captives (Karen Empeño
History of the case: and Manuel Merino) also arrived.
All the captives were chained every night. They were told that their families would
Originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and TRO filed on Aug. 23, 2007 before be killed if they escaped.
the Court of Appeals by Manalo brothers against the military officers.
Cadapan, Empeño and Merino would later on be killed. Merino would even be
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on Oct. 24, 2007. The Manalo brothers burned.
then filed a motion to treat the pending petition as an amparo petition. The CA granted th
the motion. November 22, 2006 – the captives were transferred to a camp of the 24 Infantry
Battalion in Limay, Bataan. They were continually beaten and made to do chores. o
Here, respondents witnessed how soldiers killed an old man suspected of harboring
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the Privilege of the Writ of the NPA and also of an Aeta who was subsequently burned.
Amparo with certain reliefs (to be discussed later on). The Secretary of Defense and
the AFP Chief of Staff then appealed before the SC via a Petition for Review under The captives were then brought to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. They were
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. th
brought back to Limay on June 2007 by Caigas, the commander of the 24 Infantry
Battalion.
Facts of the case:
June 13, 2007 – Respondents were brought to Pangasinan to farm the land of Caigas.
Feb. 14, 2006 - Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, brothers and herein respondents, Here, they started to save their earnings to aid in their escape. When they saved 1000
were abducted by elements of the military (AFP and Citizen Armed Force Geographical pesos, they were able to acquire a cellphone.
Unit or CAFGU) from their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
The abductors were looking for a certain “Bestre”. Manalo brothers were suspected August 13, 2007 – Reynaldo and Raymond Manalo were able to escape and board a
of being members of the NPA bus bound for Manila.

Jlyrreverre|40
The respondents were able to corroborate each other’s affidavits. Petitioners produce to the CA all medical records (medicines given, medical
personnel,
st nd
etc.) of the Manalo brothers while in captivity
Dr. Benito Molino also corroborated the accounts of the Manalo brothers. He For the 1 and 2 reliefs, petitioners argue that it is similar to a search warrant and
that requisites for search warrant are not present
specializes in forensic medicine. He conducted a medical exam on the respondents
Application made under oath
after their escape. The scars and wounds of respondents were consistent with their
account of physical injuries inflicted on them. He followed the Istanbul Protocol in the Search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
things to be seized
medical exam.
There exists probably cause with one specific offense
Probable cause personally determined by the judge
Petitioners also submitted affidavits Sec.
of DND: SC said that the production order under the Amparo Rule is not a search warrant
Unaware of the abduction since he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 but similar to a production order of documents or things (subpoena duces
Directed the AFP Chief of Staff to comply with the Amparo Rule tecum) under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
nd rd
AFP Chief of Staff: For the 2 and 3 reliefs, petitioners say that such disclosure is irrelevant,
Received the order from DND Secretary unnecessary and improper. Such disclosure would jeopardize the official
Directed an investigation functions of the said military personnel.
Gen. Palparan and M/Sgt. Hilario filed their affidavits late. SC said that the disclosure is important in ensuring the safety of the
Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall and witness for the petitioner, conducted an respondents, so it can be known which places to avoid.
investigation on May 29, 2006, from 8am to 10pm. Disclosure will also ensure that the military officers can be served notices
All 6 persons (CAFGU members) implicated in the abduction denied the and court processes
allegation. They had alibis (some were building a chapel, some were just at YES, Privilege of the Writ of Amparo was properly given (here’s the most
home) important part)
Discovered that “Ka Bestre” is actually Rolando Manalo, elder brother of the What is the Rule on the Writ of Amparo?
respondents. Promulgated in October 24, 2007. First time that the
Recommendation was for the dismissal of the case. Supreme Court exercised its expanded power in the 1987
Constitution to promulgate rules to protect the people’s
Issues: constitutional rights (life, liberty, property)
WON the CA erred in accepting the testimony of Raymond Manalo Product of the National Consultative Summit on
WON the CA erred in requiring the amparo reliefs to be granted Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances (July
WON the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly given 16-17, 2007)
Coverage of which is confined to:
Held/Ratio: o Extralegal killings – killings committed without due
NO, the factual findings of the CA were affirmed process of the law
As an Amparo Petition, the burden of proof is only substantial evidence o Enforced disappearances – an arrest, detention or
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to abduction by the government; refusal of the State
support a conclusion to disclose the fate or whereabouts places him
Respondent’s testimony was indeed corroborated by that of Reynaldo outside the protection of the law
Manalo’s and Dr. Molino’s. n. “Amparo” literally means protection in Spanish. Writ of
Raymond Manalo’s familiarity with facilities in Fort Magsaysay also Amparo originated in Mexico (Yucatan State). Eventually
corroborate his account incorporated into the Mexican Constitution in 1847.
In the foreign case of Ortiz v. Guatemala, the Inter-American Commission Spread across the Western hemisphere and eventually to
on Human Rights finding of fact were based on Sister Ortiz’s credible the Philippines
statements, written and oral, about her torture by the Guatemalan Provides for swift relief because of the summary nature of
government. its proceedings. Only Substantial evidence is required.
Because of the secret nature of enforced disappearances, it is logical to
assume that much of the information and evidence will come from the victims There is still a threat to the life, liberty and a violation of their right to security
themselves. of the Manalo brothers because their captors, whom they escaped from, still
NO remain at large.
The CA granted the ff amparo reliefs: Right to security is in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution o It
Petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the is the right to enjoyment of life
investigation Three ways of exercising Right to Security
Petitioners confirm in writing the present assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario and Freedom from fear
Caigas Enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and

Jlyrreverre|41
 Political Rights (ICCPR) On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist
Guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security from enforcing the Ordinance.
Physical torture, force and violence are a severe invasion
of bodily integrity On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and
Guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government void.
Right to security of person can exist independently of the
right to liberty.
Governments cannot ignore known threats to the life of The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However,
persons in their jurisdiction. They have a positive duty to the Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals.
protect right to liberty.
The continuing threat on the life of the Manalo brothers is apparent. This threat The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
vitiates their free will because they are forced to limit their movements and Local government code and the Revised Manila charter.
activities. Threats to liberty, security, and life are actionable through a
petition for a writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
The military failed to provide protection for the respondents. They were even constitutionality of the Ordinance.
the ones who actually tortured them. The one-day investigation conducted by
Jimenez was limited, superficial and one-sided. ISSUES:
“In sum, we conclude that respondents’ right to security as “freedom from Whether or not the establishments have the locus standi to plead for protection of their
threat” is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of patrons’ equal protection. YES
person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government Whether or not the Ordinance is constitutional. NO
is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part
of the military.” HELD:
a. YES, THEY HAVE THE LOCUS STANDI.
Petition DISMISSED. CA decision is AFFIRMED. o Locus Standi – ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection
to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party’s
participation in the case

Requirements: injury, causation and redressability (Allen v. Wright)

Exceptions to GRs on standing: overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits,
third party standing, and doctrine of transcendental importance
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v CITY OF MANILA: WASH UP RATES
Third-party standing and overbreadth doctrine are applicable
Petitioners: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & It is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured
Development Corporation by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their
continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of
Respondents: City of Manila (represented by Mayor Alfredo S. Lim) the Ordinance.
Ponente: J. Tinga
Criteria for third-party standing:
FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and Litigant must suffer an injury-in-fact (still affected)
ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Close relation to the third-party
Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and There exists some hindrance to the third party
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.” Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their
patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth
doctrine comes into play.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed Challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the
a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or rights of the third parties.
temporary restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9
Overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains
and prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
even constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The petitioners claim that the ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and to the right of liberty of their clients.
Sta. Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was
granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by b. THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
the RTC. It is a null and void ordinance
Test of validity: (1) must not contravene the Constitution, (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive, (3) must not be discriminatory, (4) must not prohibit

Jlyrreverre|42
 but may regulate trade, (5) must be general and consistent with public Roxas enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with a group called BAYAN-
policy, (6) must not be unreasonable USA. She then joined a group called BAYAN-TARLAC in a health survey in La Paz,
Tarlac. She had with her a passport, wallet and Php 15k in cash, journal, digicam with
POLICE POWER
memory card, laptop, external hard disk, IPOD, wrist watch, sphygnometer,
Lawful Subject: minimize if not eliminate the use of covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike stethoscope, and medicines (hereafter known as “STUFF”).

Lawful Means: NONE. There already exist laws, which prohibit the said acts more May 19, 2009—After doing survey work, petitioner and companions decided to rest in
effectively (those which are less intrusive of private rights).
the house of Jesus Paolo (hereafter, Mr. Paolo). At 1:30pm, they were startled by
DUE PROCESS people banging on the door, demanding for them to open up. 15 armed men, with
bonnets to conceal their faces (except the leader), tied them up and blindfolded them.
Procedural Due Process – procedure that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty or property They were dragged into a van.

Substantive Due Process – inquires whether the government has sufficient From here on out remember, she’s blindfolded.
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty or property.
When they got to the destination, she was informed that she had been detained for
being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CCP-
Standards of Judicial Review:
NPA). She was separated from her companions and kept in a room with metal bars.
o Strict Scrutiny – the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather From the sound of gunfire, planes taking off and construction bustle, she inferred she
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of was in Fort Magsaysay.
less restrictive means for achieving that interest; used today to
test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, She was subjected to 5 days straight of interrogation and torture to convince her to
gender or race and other fundamental rights abandon her communist beliefs and return to the fold. She had blindfolds on even while
o Rational Basis – laws are upheld if they rationally further a she was sleeping and only got to take them off to take a bath and to occasionally sneak
legitimate governmental interest a peek at her surroundings. She was able to learn the names of her 3 interrogators
o Intermediate Review – governmental interest is extensively during her stay—Dex, James and RC.
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered.
May 25, 2009—Petitioner was released to her uncle’s house in QC. Her abductors gave
Rational basis test (for this case) – The only restraint imposed by the law is the injury her a cellphone with a SIM card and an email address with a password, biscuits,
to property sustained by the petitioners books, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse, and a pair of shoes. She was told not to
o The said ordinance invades private rights.
report what she went through to a group called Karapatan or something untoward will
o Not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really happen to her and her family. She would receive calls on the phone occasionally. For
there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed fear for her and her family’s safety, she threw away the phone.
rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought
to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or
Start of the case
less subjected only to a limited group of people.
o The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected
Seeking sanctuary from all the threats, she filed with the SC a Petitioner for the Writs
only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
of Amapro and Habeas Data against her interrogators and also impleading public
demands of public interest or public welfare.
officials, police officers, and military men of the highest rank (check out the list of
respondents) because she believed that it was the government that was responsible
DECISION: Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of businesses of the for her abduction.
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.
Petition is GRANTED. Ordinance No. 7774 is declared unconstitutional.
She prayed:
1. that respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching her family
ROXAS V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (SEPTEMBER 7, 2010): WRIT OF AMPARO/
2. an order be issued to inspect the detention areas in Fort Magsaysay
HABEAS CORPUS
3. that respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any reports
about her case, including intelligence reports and operations reports of the
Facts Special Operations Group of the AFP
4. that respondents expunge from the records any documents pertinent to her
Background of events (Petitioner’s version): name or any name which sounds the same
5. that respondents be ordered to return her STUFF

Jlyrreverre|43
SC issued the desired writs and referred the case to the CA for hearing and reception • There is a transgression of the the petitioner’s right to information privacy
of evidence; SC also directed the respondents to file their answer. because according to photos and videos (supplied by party-list reps Jovito
Palparan and Pastor Alcover), there were “records of investigation”
OSG on behalf of respondents: concenrning petitioner’s involvement in the CPP-NPA—CA granted the
1. petitioner’s alleged abduction was just “stage-managed” and a scheme to put privilege of the writ of habeas data, mandating respondents to refrain from
the government in bad light distributing to the public any records relative to her alleged ties with the CPP-
a. according to Mr. Paolo’s report: prior to her abduction, she instructed NPA or her abduction and torture.
him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house. From this, they • CA not convinced that the military or any of the public officials were involved
conclude that no one else could have known where petitioner and in the abduction and torture and also absolved PGMA because of immunity
companions were except the people already in the house. If there from suit
was actually an abduction, she herself consented to it
b. the Medical Certificate showed abrasions in her wrists and knee Ratio
caps. If she was indeed choked and boxed by her abductors, it would • Petitioner invokes doctrine of command responsibility in impleading the public
have showed respondents
2. even assuming that the abduction and torture were genuine o Incorrect. Rubrico v. Arroyo: Command responsibility refers to the
a. PGMA is immune from suit as a sitting president responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by their
b. There are no specific allegations against the officials impleaded that subordinate members or other persons subject to their control in
they actually participated therein international wars or domestic conflict
3. Public respondents were not remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind o Since its application presupposes imputation of individual liability, it
the allegations of the petitioner is invoked in criminal cases, not amparo proceedings—see definition
a. Police action—when the police heard of the abduction at 4:30pm, of writ of amapro in Sec. of National Defense v. Manalo
they launched an initial investigation. They sent a Flash Message to • However, they may be impleaded on the basis of responsibility or
all the police stations around in an effort to locate the van. The accountability
Special Investigation Task Group (Task Group CAROJAN) was o Razon v. Tagitis: Responsibility—extent the actors have been
formed to conduct an in depth investigation. They contacted established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
Karapatan and Alliance for Advancement of People’s Rights to get way in an enforced disappearance; the Court may craft the directive
help, but these never heeded. They still have not found out the to file an appropriate civil or criminal proceeding against them.
abductors identities, which they attribute to the lack of help from Accountability—measure of remedies that should be addressed to
petitioner, her companions, and the afformentioned groups. those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
b. Military action—GIBO (Secretary of Defense) first heard of the without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
abduction when this case was filed. But upon receipt of the resolution responsibility or imputed with knowledge relating to the
from the Court, he issued a Memorandum Directive to the AFP Chief disappearance or those who carry the burden of extraordinary
of Staff to conduct an investigation. AFP Chief of Staff sent a diligence in the investigation of enforced disappearances
message to the Commanding General of the Army Lt. Gen. Bangit to • Totality of evidence does not prove that respondents were her abductors or
cause the investigation. Bangit then instructed Maj. Gen. Villanueva that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay
to set this in motion, who then tasked Office of the Provost Marshall o Direct evidence of identity (cartographic sketched of abductors,
(OPV) to conduct the investigation. They described petitioner’s which Roxas was able to describe) is accorded more weight than
allegations as “opinionated” and cleared the military for any kind of mere circumstantial evidence in amapro proceedings (i.e. past
involvement. abductions in Fort Magsaysay having similar circumstances as hers)
o Given that the identities of the men in the cartographic sketches were
CA’s decision: not identified as belonging to the military or public officials, they
• Gave great weight to petitioner’s version of the story cannot be held liable
• Disregarded the “stage managed” argument of respondents because it was o Roxas is just a sojourner in the Philippines and not even a citizen, so
based on unfounded speculation that only Roxas and companions knew the Court can’t rely on her inference that she was taken to Fort
where they were Magsaysay merely because the distance from Mr. Paolo’s house to
• Medical Certificate can only affirm that there was indeed an abduction; it where they were taken felt like the distance between the house and
cannot be reflective of the actual injuries suffered Fort Magsaysay
• There is an ongoing threat to the security of petitioner and family and so • With regard prayer for the return of her belongings
extended the privilege of the writ of amparo and ordered respondents to use o The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once
extraordinary diligence to continue the investigations the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and

Jlyrreverre|44
 exhaustive proceeding. Matters of liability are not discusses in WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
amparo cases.
• Prayer for inspection of Fort Magsaysay Facts: Lim is an administrative clerk at MERALCO, an anonymous letter was posted
o Since it was not proven that Fort Magsaysay was indeed the palce at the door of her assigned office denouncing respondent. By Memorandum of
where abductees were taken, an order to inspect it would be Alexander (head of MERALCO Human Resource Staffing), he directed the transfer
tantamount to a “fishing expedition” for evidence of respondent to another sector due to the accusations and threats against her from
o It is a rule in amapro that a place inspected must at least be identified unknown individuals and which could possible compromise her safety and security.
with clarity and precision and that allegations be sufficient in
themselves to make a prima facie case Lim then requested deferment of his transfer, but due to futility, she filed a TRO for
• HABEAS DATA her transfer and a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas data against MERALCO
o Conceptualized as a judicial remedy for enforcing a right to privacy, commanding MERALCO, to wit:
most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. It 1. Full disclosure of a the data or information about respondent in relation to
operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her
himself, particularly, in the instances where such information is being safety and security;
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends 2. The nature of such data and te purpose of its collection;
o The indispesable element is a showing, at least substantially, that a 3. The measure taken by MERALCO to ensure the confidentiality of such data
violation or threatened violation of the right to privacy in lifem liberty or information; and
or security has happened, which the petitioner has failed to do 4. The currency and accuracy of such data or information;
o There is no evidence that any of the public respondents have violated Issue: Whether or not habeas data is proper in this case.
or threatened a right to privacy of the petitioner. There wasn’t even
evidence that they had access to the photos and videos Ruling: No, the writ of habeas data directs the issuance only against public officials
o The grant of habeas data by the CA has no legal basis or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting or
• Extraordinary diligence was not exercised by the respodnents storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home
o The reports of Task Group CAROJAN contained background checks and MERALCO is not engage in such activities.
of the abductees but none about the abductors. They also blame the
failure of their investigation on the petitioner’s lack of participation. Habeas data is designated to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
They could have used many other means, i.e. a cartographic sketch privacy, honor, information and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant
of the unmasked abductor could have been obtained from the to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy,
testimony of Mr. Paolo thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology. There is no showing
Held from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
• Deny prayer for return of belongings violation of respondents right to privacy, life, liberty or security.
• Deny prayer for inspection of detention areas in Fort Magsaysay
• Reverse grant of privilege of habeas data, without prejudice to changes that FACTS OF THE CASE: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an
might occur after the investigation is completed administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4, 2008, an
• Modifying directive for further investiation: anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration
o Appointing Commision on Human Rights (CHR) to be the lead building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, which reads:
agency in the investigation
o Directing incumbent Chief of PNP or whoever succeeds him and the Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO,
chief of staff of the AFP to assist the CHR NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
o Directing PNP chief to furnish CA with copies of the investigation BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG
reports UTANG NA LOOB.
o Directing CHR to furnish CA with copy of report and
recommendations within 90 days from receipt of this decision [1] Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
Respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine
• Referring the case back to the CA for monitoring, determination if the
National Police. By Memorandum dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head
abduction was indeed performed by public respondents, and to submit the
of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to
report to the SC within 10 days from the receipt of the report from the CHR
MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008
• All other findings not contrary to the ones here, affirmed
in light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against
[her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM
security.
G.R. No. 184769, October 5, 2010

Jlyrreverre|45
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice- The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint
President and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is
transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy,
on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and
due process. In her letter, the repondent cited the grueling travel from her residence in security against abuse in this age of information technology.
Pampanga to Alabang, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
pending resolution of the issues she raised. No response to her request having been extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is
received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
petitioners before the RTC of Bulacan. independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.[13]

By respondents allegation, petitioner’s unlawful act and omission consisting of their Castillo v. Cruz[14] underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario[15]
continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or
report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor
security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, are vague or doubtful.[16] Employment constitutes a property right under the context
correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ of the due process clause of the Constitution.[17] It is evident that respondents
commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following: reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report terms and conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably
nature of such data and the purpose for its collection; lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or
information; and In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained. any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right
to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO enjoining petitioners from reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation
effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector. of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats
and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10,
The trial court granted respondent's application for a TRO. 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.[18]
And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds intent of management] and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes
that, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked that the issue is labor-related.
jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision
of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and
By Decision of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED
including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist
from implementing respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the No costs.
disclosures required. Hence, this petition. SO ORDERED.

ISSUE: Whether or not Writ of Habeas Data is the proper remedy.

RULING OF THE COURT: No. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND
BUILDERS’ ASSOCIATION – versus – PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION
(REAL ESTATES DEVELOPER’S RIGHT TTO DISPOSE PROPERTY)
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful G.R. No. 197676
act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity February 4, 2014
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and FACTS:
underscoring supplied)

Jlyrreverre|46
On June 29, 2009, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law Republic requirements. There shall at least be one (1) licensed real estate broker for every
Act No. 9646, otherwise known as the ‘Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines’. twenty (20) accredited salespersons.

The law aims to professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory (b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in marketing or
scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners selling any real estate development project in the regular course of business must be
(real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the headed by full-time registered and licensed real estate brokers.
country. Prior to its enactment, the real estate service practitioners were under the
supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade (c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be manned by
Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer a duly licensed real estate broker, appraiser or consultant as the case may be.
regulation functions. Such authority has been transferred to the Professional In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service
Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real practitioner, the same shall be reported by the employer to the Board within a period
Estate Service (PRBRES), created under the new law. not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of effectivity of the resignation or
termination.
On July 21, 2010, the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were
promulgated by the PRBRES, upon approval of the PRC, under Resolution No. 02, Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may hire the
Series of 2010. services of registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants on
commission basis to perform real estate services and the latter shall be deemed
On December 7, 2010, the petitioners, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the independent contractors and not employees of such corporations.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA), instituted Civil Case No.
10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to
declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646:
ISSUES AND RULINGS
SEC. 28.Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate
Service. – The provisions of this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the 1. Whether R.A. No. 9646 violates the ‘one title-one subject’ rule under Article VI,
following: Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts
mentioned in Section 3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own property, except real The Arguments:
estate developers;
xxxxx Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution mandates that every bill
passed by Congress should embrace only one subject, which subject should be
SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. – expressed in the tile of the bill.
No person shall practice or offer to practice real estate service in the Philippines or offer Nowhere in the title of Republic Act No. 9646 it can be gleaned that the law covers real
himself/herself as real estate service practitioner, or use the title, word, letter, figure or estate developers. However, the assailed provisions prohibit them from performing acts
any sign tending to convey the impression that one is a real estate service practitioner, or entering into transactions constituting real estate service practice without first
or advertise or indicate in any manner whatsoever that one is qualified to practice the complying with registration and licensing requirements for their business, brokers or
profession, or be appointed as real property appraiser or assessor in any national agents, appraisers, consultants and salespersons.
government entity or local government unit, unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the Moreover, partnerships and corporations engaged in marketing and selling of real
licensure examination given by the Board, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a estate development projects in the regular course of business are required to be
holder of a valid certificate of registration, and professional identification card or a valid headed by full-time, licensed and registered real estate brokers.
special/temporary permit duly issued to him/her by the Board and the Commission, and These provisions transgress the property rights and business prerogatives of real
in the case of real estate brokers and private appraisers, they have paid the required estate developers. These matters are not at all reflected in the title of R.A. 9646; as
bond as hereto provided. such, the law violates the ‘one-subject, one-tile rule’ prescribed by the Constitution.
xxxxx
The Ruling: No, Republic Act No. 9646 does not violate the ‘one tile – one subject
SEC. 32.Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. – rule’.

(a) No partnership or corporation shall engage in the business of real estate service The ‘one title-one subject’ rule does not require Congress to employ in the title
unless it is duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
the persons authorized to act for the partnership or corporation are all duly registered all the contents and the minute details therein.
and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants, as the case may be. The
partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a list of its real estate service The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include
practitioners to the Commission and to the SEC as part of its annual reportorial the general object which the statute seeks to effect. It is satisfied if all the parts of the

Jlyrreverre|47
statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as presumed to have known existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. conflicting laws. Congress, therefore, could not be presumed to have intended Sections
28, 29 and 32 of R.A. No. 9646 to run counter to P.D. No. 957.
An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent 3. Whether R.A. No. 9646 violates the right of the petitioners to due process
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object. The Arguments:

Since the marketing aspect of real estate development projects entails the performance The provisions in controversy constitute deprivation of property without due process of
of those acts and transactions defined as real estate service practices under Section law. The provisions infringe on the property rights of the petitioners, specifically the
3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme to rights to use and to dispose, by requiring them to hire only licensed and registered real
professionalize the entire real estate service sector. estate brokers and salespersons to sell and market their property. This would diminish
The inclusion of real estate developers, the petitioners in particular, in the coverage of business control and management prerogative, and would entail additional expenses
R.A. No. 9646 is well within the scope of the title of the law which states: ‘An Act on their part.
Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the
Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating The Ruling: No, R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the right of the Petitioners to due
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes’. process.

Hence, such inclusion of the real estate developers does not violate the ‘one title- The law does not deprive the petitoners of their property for the following reasons:
one subject’ rule. • The law does not restrict petitioners’ use and enjoyment of their property .
• If the requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate
2. Whether R.A. No. 9646 is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with professionals burdens the petitioners, it is an unavoidable consequence of a
respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate reasonable regulatory measure.
developers
• Professionalizing the real estate service is a valid exercise of police power,
which has general welfare for its object, considering that real property
The Arguments:
transactions are susceptible to manipulation and corruption, and real estate
service practitioners serve a vital role in promoting overall national progress
Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended, vests upon the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade • As between general welfare and property rights, the latter must yield
and business. Such jurisdiction included the authority (a) to issue a license to sell to
real estate developers and (b) to register real estate dealers, brokers or salesmen 4. Whether Republic Act No. 9646, particularly Section 28(a), violates the right of
upon their fulfillment of certain legal requirements. the petitioners to equal protection

R.A. No. 9646 divests the HLURB of such exclusive jurisdiction by: The Arguments:
– imposing limitations on the property rights of real estate developers
– conferring regulatory powers over real estate brokers and salespersons, including Section 28 exempts from the coverage of the law natural and juridical persons dealing
licensing and registration, on the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service with their own property. However, the provision specifically excludes real estate
(PRBRES). developers from the exempt entities; hence, effectively bringing them back within the
ambit of the law.
The Ruling: No, R.A. No. 9646 is not in conflict with P.D. 957. There is no substantial distinction between real estate developers and other property
owners which would justify the discriminatory treatment. As such, the provision violates
The HLURB supervises only those real estate service practitioners engaged in the sale the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution.
of subdivision lots and condominium projects, specifically for violations of the provisions
of P.D. No. 957, and not the entire real estate service sector which is now under the The Ruling: No, R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the right of the petitioners to equal
regulatory powers of the PRBRES. HLURB’s supervision of brokers and dealers to protection of the laws.
effectively implement the provisions of P.D. No. 957 does not foreclose the
regulation of the real estate service as a profession. Plainly, there is no The equal protection clause does not require absolute equality among
inconsistency or contradiction in the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. persons. The clause merely requires that all persons should be treated alike under like
957, as amended. circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and as to liabilities
enforced. Classification is warranted when there are substantial distinctions which are
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other germane to the purpose of the law.
laws in a way that will form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The legislature is In this case the following circumstances constitute substantial distinctions:

Jlyrreverre|48
 • Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own FACTS: Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina,
property, real estate developers are engaged in selling and marketing of real Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and
property in the regular course of business Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to
• Real estate developers are the largest employers of real estate service 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the
practitioners “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected
under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from
• There have been a large number of cases of violations of P.D. 957, as
enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
amended, by real estate developers
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and
Hence, the distinct treatment of the real estate developers compared with other
Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications
property owners is reasonable and relevant to the purpose of the law.
Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that Republic Act No. 9646 (the Real Estate Service
Act of the Philippine) was not unconstitutional.
ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014 : CYBERCRIME LAW constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal
protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions
Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also known as “spam” is against double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the right
entitled to protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of against unreasonable searches and seizure;
unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited o • Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to in violation of the petitioners’ right against Double Jeopardy;
protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally o • Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the
guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of PNP “with due cause” to engage in real time collection of traffic data
expression. without the benefit of the intervention of a judge, violates the
Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to be free from
Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to the privacy
constitutional. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
of communications;
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since o • Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent
Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any content upon
Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” a prima facie finding that the same violates the law, contains an
for committing libel. But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial
law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it power of the judiciary, and violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-
certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code provisions on libel were protected right to due process and freedom of expression; and
enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
o • Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to
Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel Section 6 of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years
on the cyberspace is a nullity. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years, infringes
that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the
posts, comments, and other messages. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the
of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at service providers
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace
to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a
front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as
libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of
interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. The increased
Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand removed from access, work together as a “chilling effect” upon
scrutiny. protected speech.

Jlyrreverre|49
 2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this any reasonable standard except “due cause” which presumably, the
Petition is therefore cognizable by the SC’s judicial power under Article VIII, PNP and NBI will determine for itself;
Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the o • While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Security Act, are protected by the intervention of the Court of Appeals
before surveillance operations are conducted, the privacy of all
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS: citizens may be infringed without judicial participation in the
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech: Cybercrime Act;
o • imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based o • Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into
libel; single act of online libel will result in two convictions penalized the right to privacy;
separately under the RP and the Cybercrime Act; o No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully
o online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment collect traffic data at all times without interruption;
of the accused and for a much longer period. Such changes will o • No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into
result in a chilling effect upon the freedom of speech; the privacy of citizens
o • with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto III’s 4. The Respondent DOJ Secretary’s Take Down Authority under Section 19 of
earlier threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers and internet users the Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue Delegation of
who were critical of his alleged plagiarism of online materials for use Legislative Authority
in his speech against the Reproductive Health Bill became real; o • The DOJ Secretary’s overwhelming powers to order the restriction
threat of criminal prosecution under RA 10175 will work to preclude or blocking of access to certain content upon a mere prima facie
people such as Petitioners from posting social commentaries online, finding without any need for a judicial determination is in clear
thus creating a “chilling effect” upon the freedom of expression; violation of petitioners’ Constitutionally protected right to due
o • gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block process;
access to content whether authored by private citizens or the o • The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ
organized press sans any hearing of any kind but merely upon a Secretary will be “judge, jury and executioner” of all cybercrime-
mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article constitutes related complaints;
online libel; o To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are
o • respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare cybercrimes under Section 6, it • follows that:
under strict scrutiny 1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may
2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and be acted upon the Respondent DOJ Secretary to block
Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution: access to websites and content upon a mere prima
o • Persons who commit crimes using information and communication facie showing of an infringement;
technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned more 2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to
than double the imprisonment laid down in the RPC or special law, Philippine citizens may be blocked for violating the Retail
simply by the passage of the Cybercrime Act; Trade Law;
o • the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act 3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked
are absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and special from offering voice services without securing a license from
laws which raises the possibility that an accused will be punished the National Telecommunications Communication;
twice for the same offense in violation of the Constitution; 4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the
o • Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes “by, IP Code.
through or with the use” of ICTs in violation of the equal o • The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court
protection clause in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to
3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure: completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test
o • No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data; 1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Act’s declaration of policy does
the authority vested on the Philippine National Police and the it lay down the legislative policy with respect to the blocking
National Bureau of Investigation to collect data is not bounded by

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 of content. No limits upon the takedown power of the for sale products and services are prohibited" unless certain conditions – such as prior
respondent DOJ Secretary; affirmative consent from the recipient – are met. This was ruled unconstitutional.
2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ
A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows the rest of
Secretary from exercising infinite discretion and becoming
the law to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held invalid.
the supreme authority in the Philippine Internet landscape.
PRAYER: Nuances in other provisions
1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and
19 of RA 10175; Three other provisions were not struck down and remain in the law, but they will not
2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 apply in certain cases as decided by the SC. Among these provisions is online libel,
of RA 10175; which is constitutional as far as the original author is concerned.
3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4),
Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime and to
6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; and
the attempt to commit a cybercrime, was declared unconstitutional only in the following
4. Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises. cases: child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications (or spam), and
5. The Supreme Court on Tuesday, February 18, upheld as constitutional most online libel. Section 5 will apply to all other cybercrimes outlined in the law.
provisions of Republic Act 10175 or the Cybercrime Law, including online libel National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime Division Chief Ronald Aguto
– subject to one condition. explained to Rappler that it will also be hard for both law enforcement and the
6. The High Court also struck down a provision of the law that gives the state the prosecution to prove the "attempt to commit a cybercrime."
power to take down online content without a court warrant.
Aiding and abetting the commission of a cybercrime, he added, might unduly cover
7. Seeking to strike a balance between fundamental freedoms and government
certain players in the online industry.
control, the High Court decided on the constitutionality of Republic Act 10175
a little over a year afteroral arguments were heard on Jan 15, 2013. Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber criminal under other laws, was declared
8. Among the hotly-debated issues during the oral arguments was the law's unconstitutional only in the following cases: online libel and child pornography.
provision on online libel. (READ: 'Libel gone is best-case scenario for SC
cybercime ruling') The SC cited the guarantee against double jeopardy or being punished more than once
for the same offense – a guarantee outlined in the Constitution – in deciding on Section
9. The Supreme Court decision, penned by Justice Roberto Abad, ruled online
7.
libel to be constitutional but with an exception – that is, in cases where it
covers persons other than the original author. Recipients of, and netizens who Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, while child pornography
react to a potentially defamatory post, will not be covered by online libel. is punishable by RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act.
A person convicted of libel or child pornography can only be punished once, under the
Unconstitutional provisions coverage of a single law.
Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:
• Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications JAMES M. IMBONG, ET AL., PETITIONERS, V. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
ET AL., RESPONDENTS. (RH LAW VOID FOR VAGUENESS)
• Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data
• Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data MENDOZA, J.
The SC decided that Section 19 – granting power to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
to restrict computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence – POLITICAL LAW: due process
was not in keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is found
in Section 19 of the cybercrime law. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before the standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
SC that Section 19 is "constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
restraint on speech without prior judicial determination." violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause to collect discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
or record by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real time. Government muscle.

Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial electronic Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must
communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation

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 to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be 2. Right to health
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed 3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole 4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
enactment. 5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being 7. Equal protection clause
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning 8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the PROCEDURAL:
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning 1. Actual Case or Controversy
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive 2. Facial Challenge
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms 3. Locus Standi
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information 4. Declaratory Relief
and the rendering of medical procedures. 5. One Subject/One Title Rule

FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Discussions:
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress
on December 21, 2012. PROCEDURAL

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review
said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
grounds: (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. lis mota of the case.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
the Constitution. hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
Constitution challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
controversy. and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
1. Power of Judicial Review himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
2. Actual Case or Controversy immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
3. Facial Challenge of
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is
6. One Subject/One Title Rule one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and
Issue/s: to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right
to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is thoughts are externalized.
unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life

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Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that
result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins
of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the at fertilization.
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment
of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition,
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that
is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take
the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
of paramount public interest.” permissible.

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
“so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the bounded duty to protect it.
principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading
it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.” mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also
view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute 2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729
had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under
Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
as law. pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a
Ruling/s: qualified medical practitioner.
SUBSTANTIAL Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory”
only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this abortificient and effective”.
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this matter. 3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However,
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
conception.”

Jlyrreverre|53
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other
policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program 6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution
through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the as the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners. vague.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to
the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. health care service provider.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to
defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of procedures.
marriage and the family.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive
already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and services on reproductive health.
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In 7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and
as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non- children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
surgical procedures.”
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe
minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the
procedures. poor.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education
which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does
has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
in the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State. government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.

Jlyrreverre|54
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court
PROCEDURAL set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute. 4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has
or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays
vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, under Rule 65.
at least, be heard on the matter now.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights
the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority legislation.
to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
detriment of the Filipino people.
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as- private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which their parents or guardian/s;
the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or 2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

Jlyrreverre|55
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs. confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access
to full information about their businesses.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary
consent of the spouse; Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his
firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures. Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section wives/women and not to husbands/men.
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or 2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Women and Their Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility violence by men against women.
or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against
children and other women.
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support husband/father of the remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of and punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the
a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering an abused wife, theequal protection guarantee is violated.
of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:
1. Safeguard Human Rights,
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier 2. Ensure Gender Equality and
“primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, 3. Empower Women
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights
JESUS C. GARCIA VS.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.
G.R. NO. 179267, JUNE 25, 2013 (CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA 9262 "ANTI- 1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004") of Human Rights (UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many
United Nations human rights treaties such as the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: 2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
private respondent (wife and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank 4. Convention Against Torture, and the
manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the household help. His 5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises
and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom UDHR: As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the
he blamed for squealing on him. promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration. Among the standards
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt under the UDHR are the following:
suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital,
petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was confined for seven (7) Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his extramarital endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her. brotherhood.
xxxx
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid
he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her

Jlyrreverre|56
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms,
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any which includes promoting gender equality and empowering women, as mandated not
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such only by our Constitution, but also by commitments we have made in
discrimination. the international sphere, are undeniably important and essential.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by of violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by
law. a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.
Declaration of Policy in RA 9262: enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to
fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women
and children by providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical, 3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to the
psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father Achievement of Governmental Objectives
of the victim.
The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure Historical Perspective:
gender equality, which is quoted as follows: • A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on,
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall the subjugation of women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. • Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law
Legal Code: all "assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination
stemming from the view of male superiority."
ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF • 18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. assumption that: husband and wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus "they
were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one person was the husband," a
HELD: RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL. concept that evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior
to the enactment of the Family Code.
1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW • Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men are
expected to take on the dominant roles both in the community and in the
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that family. This perception naturally leads to men gaining more power over
seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality women – power, which must necessarily be controlled and maintained.
with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’ compliance with Violence against women is one of the ways men control women to retain such
the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs power.
its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate • In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were
discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in practice. under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
• The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even
CEDAW kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her.
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most • Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal
comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW, family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination
• English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of
• However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common
rights and respect for human dignity.
law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common
law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives
with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
2. Philippine’s obligation as state-party to CEDAW
Statistics: The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous
The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement
cases involving violence committed against women in the Philippines.
for the improvement of their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality
with men. The CEDAW, going beyond the concept of discrimination used in many legal
In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969
standards and norms, focuses on discrimination against women, with the emphasis that
cases involving violence against women were filed under RA 9262.
women have suffered and are continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination
on account of their biological sex.

Jlyrreverre|57
From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the different categories
of violence committed against women. The number of reported cases showed an RA 9262 is “THE” ameliorative action
increasing trend from 2004 to 2012,
In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that would address
The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women the evil effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply embedded in
and children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal the society’s subconscious, on Filipino women and children and elevate their status as
intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a human beings on the same level as the father or the husband.
conclusion that men need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of discrimination against
women. It is an ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse discrimination"
4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and against. Ameliorative action "is not an exception to equality, but an expression and
cultural differences attainment of de facto equality, the genuine and substantive equality which the Filipino
people themselves enshrined as a goal of the 1987 Constitution." Ameliorative
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women measures are necessary as a redistributive mechanism in an unequal society to
and men prescribe that they be treated differently under particular conditions in order achieve substantive equality.
to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the disadvantaged position of a
woman as compared to a man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality
from the following recommendations of the CEDAW Committee:
In the context of women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by the
The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough as equality which requires that women be given an equal start and that they be
to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough
as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well
taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be
men will be required in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women
substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming under and men will be required in order to address such differences.
representation of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men
and women.

Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality. These Women’s struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:
results may be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their 1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the same. But
rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying the same income this model does not take into account biological and socially constructed differences
levels, equality in decision-making and political influence, and women enjoying freedom between women and men. By failing to take into account these differences, a formal
from violence. equality approach may in fact perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model – this recognizes differences between women and men but
The government’s commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of considerswomen’s weakness as the rationale for different treatment. This approach
her life are parallel to that of a man, requires the adoption and implementation of reinforces the inferior status of women and does not address the issue of discrimination
ameliorative measures, such as RA 9262. Unless the woman is guaranteed that the of women on account of their gender.
violence that she endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the government, 3. Substantive equality model – this assumes that women are "not vulnerable by
which is committed to uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then she can nature, but suffer from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these imposed
neither achieve substantive equality nor be empowered. disadvantages were eliminated, there was no further need for protection." Thus, the
substantive equality model gives prime importance to women’s contexts, realities, and
5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts and measures directed, at or affecting
them, with a view to eliminating the disadvantages they experience as women.
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively
undertake ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities
experienced by women and children brought about by years of discrimination. The 6. The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal
equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate Protection Clause (application of the substantive equality model)
for the government to combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under
political inequalities and remove cultural inequities." RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy

Jlyrreverre|58
and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, Justice Abad: RA 9262 is a historic step in the Filipino women's long struggle to be
historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women. freed from a long-held belief that men are entitled, when displeased or minded, to hit
their wives or partners and their children. This law institutionalizes prompt community
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are response to this violent behavior through barangay officials who can command the man
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important to immediately desist from harming his home partner and their children. It also
governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and establishes domestic violence as a crime, not only against its victims but against society
empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies as well. No longer is domestic violence lightly dismissed as a case of marital dispute
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact that law enforcers ought not to get into.
essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the
intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification Chief Justice Puno on Expanded Equal protection and Substantive Equality
therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses that the equal protection clause can no longer
Constitution. be interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. "It
ought to be construed in consonance with social justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the
Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional provision of equal protection 1987 Constitution—a transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to
simply requires that similarly situated persons be treated in the same way. It does not enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely
connote identity of rights among individuals, nor does it require that every person is egalitarian democracy." This means that the weak, including women in relation to men,
treated identically in all circumstances. It acts as a safeguard to ensure that State- can be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be weak.
drawn distinctions among persons are based on reasonable classifications and made
pursuant to a proper governmental purpose. In short, statutory classifications are not Chief Justice Puno goes on: "The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on
unconstitutional when shown to be reasonable and made pursuant to a legitimate the human rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the indignity of
government objective. discrimination so that in the patently unequal Philippine society, each person may
be restored to his or her rightful position as a person with equal moral status.”
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the CARAM V. SEGUI (ADOPTION NOT SUBJECT TO AMPARO)
failure to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to
actively promote the family’s total development. Congress also found, as a reality, that PONENTE: Villarama, Jr.
women and children are more susceptible to domestic and other forms of TOPIC: Writ of amparo
violence due to, among others, the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and
the stereotyping of roles within the family environment that traditionally exist in FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually
Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found it necessary to recognize the became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting
substantial distinction within the family between men, on the one hand, and women and pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in
children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be made in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she
the laws as our law on persons and family under the Civil Code also recognize, in intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in
various ways, the distinctions between men and women in the context of the family. Parañaque City.

Justice Leonen: It may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial
should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue. Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical
expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way
By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the normative constitutional of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.
requirements of human dignity and fundamental equality can become descriptive
reality. The socially constructed distinctions between women and men that have On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as
afflicted us and spawned discrimination and violence should be eradicated “Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with
sooner. Power and intimacy should not co-exist. Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced.

The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our safe havens from the On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter
helter skelter of this world. It is in that space where we grow in the safety of the special to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She
other who we hope will be there for our entire lifetime. If that is not possible, then for also said she wanted her family back together.
such time as will be sufficient to create cherished memories enough to last for eternity. On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to
DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby
I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law take its full course. Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three
months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her
parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

Jlyrreverre|59
 Facts:
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before
the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD. That on 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of
Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request9 to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison,
HELD: The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportation
as there was no enforced disappearance in this case. of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.

As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico On 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired then on 3 January 2014 he was charged for being
enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is a risk to public interest. A summary deportation order was then issued.
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police
liberty; District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention
2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence center, Ku was detained.13
of, the State or a political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport. On the same day,
to acknowledgeor give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies.
subject of the amparo petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the Assailed Orders:
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the
The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red
DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine National
a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his
custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, immediate family.
she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby
Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced On 29 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the second assailed Order directing the
disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth transfer of custody and protection of Ku to the PNP-PSPG.
elements are missing.
Thereafter, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed order denying the Motion to Dismiss of
Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child Petitioners and the Resolution granting the privilege of the writ of Amparo to
and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary respondent.
legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not
searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and ISSUE: WON the privilege of the writ of Amparo was properly granted in the case at
contesting custody over him. bar

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child HELD: NO.
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and
purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) provides:
properly applied.
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra- person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee entity.
or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to
life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
life.
Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo: writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
MISON V. GALLEGOS (WRIT OF AMPARO) extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.

Jlyrreverre|60
Navia v. Pardico: the elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term the aggrieved party’s right to privacy of threats of such violation affect the aggrieved
is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851, to wit: party’s right to life, liberty, or security. No such threat can exist if the person already
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of passed away.
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, The Court’s ruling in Zarate, however, ignores the fact that there could be information
the State or a political organization; that can threaten not only the life and liberty of the person who died, but also of his
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to family members.
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparo petition; and FACTS: Petitioners aver that they are members of various progressive party- lists
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the and/or national and religious organizations, and that these organizations have been
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. wrongfully tagged by the military and the police as "communist front organizations.”

Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s Sometime in March 2014, the Government commenced intensified military offensives
circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary in Talaingod, Davao del Norte under the rubric of counterinsurgency.2 In April 2014,
disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal about 1,300 Manobos allegedly evacuated to Davao City to escape the effects of said
on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give military operations. These evacuees returned to their communities in May 2014.
information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any
intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. Sometime in 2015, some of the Manobos started going back to Davao and
approximately 700 Manobos sought refuge at the United Church of Christ in the
It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by Philippines (UCCP) Haran due to persisting militarization of their communities and
substantial evidence. Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was not able forcible recruitment to the paramilitary group, Almara.
to present evidence that he was exposed to "life-threatening situa ons" while confined
at the BI Deten on Center. On the contrary, the records show that he is afforded Certain Manobos claimed that they were deceived into going to Davao City; that, upon
visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel. reaching UCCP Haran, they were deprived of their freedom of locomotion and were
held there against their will from 3 February 2015 to 25 February 2015; that during
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of said period they were forced to listen to lectures and join rallies; that their repeated
amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, pleas to go home fell on deaf ears until a fellow tribe member was found dead,
and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and hanging lifeless on a tree, inside the UCCP Haran compound; and that it was only then
unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of that they were allowed to go home with the body of the deceased.
amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the
enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never On 12 May 2015, the CIDG forwarded a complaint to the Office of the Prosecutor of
hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the Davao City for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and Human Trafficking.
case at bar.
To determine who would be charged in the complaint, the complainants were shown
It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject "lists" from which they purportedly identified the defendants. Petitioners now aver
of a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s proper recourse that the inclusion of their names and photographs in the "lists" indicates that they are
is with the BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP. and have been the subject of State surveillance.

ZARATE V AQUINO III (WRIT OF AMPARO/ HABEAS DATA) Petitioners argue that their inclusion in the "lists" are threats to their life, liberty, and
security warranting the protection of the writ of amparo and that there is no basis for
A case decided by the Supreme Court in 2015 illustrates that the writ of habeas data, the inclusion of their names and respondents should be compelled via the writ of
or the remedy available to a person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is habeas data to disclose copies of all information and evidence pertaining to them.
violated or threatened is not available to the heirs of a deceased person.
The case of Zarate vs. Aquino III involved a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas ISSUE: WON the petitioners be given the privilege of the writ of amparo and habeas
data in favor of several persons, who are allegedly in the target list of the military and data
are subject to surveillance. The heirs of Crispin Beltran, former Bayan Muna and
Anakpawis Party-list Representative, joined the petition to determine what documents HELD: NO.
are in the possession of state agents.
Writ of Amparo: The Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the following:
In ruling that the heirs have no legal standing to file the petition, the Court reasoned
that Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data presuposses that the aggrieved Every petition should state the rights that have been violated or threatened with
party is still alive. This is because it requires the petitioner to show how the violation of violation by an unlawful act or omission by respondent and how it was violated

Jlyrreverre|61
It requires substantial evidence.
The facts and circumstances must establish actual threats.

Mere membership in these organizations or sectors cannot equate to an actual threat

that would warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo. The writ of amparo is sought
individually and granted individually.
Lumping together the previous and present experiences of petitioners may give off the
impression that, indeed, taken together, petitioners' life, liberty and security are
threatened to be violated. But this way of presenting the obtaining situation is
misleading. A perusal of their individual circumstances negates the conclusion that they
are each entitled to a writ of amparo

The filing of cases, however, cannot be characterized as an unlawful act or omission in

the context of the Amparo Rule.

Moreover, the fact of death of one of KARAPATAN's workers, without corroborative

evidence that his death was on account of his membership in KARAPATAN, is not an
actual threat that will pass the test of substantial evidence.

Only Balaba was able to allege personal circumstances claiming threatned violation of
her right to life, liberty and security. However, the same is not corroborated by
substantial evidence.

The court cannot conclude that petitioner Balaba's inclusion in the "lists" has a direct
relation to the circumstances she experienced, which circumstances are even less
menacing than the ones reported in the Ladaga case.

Writ of Habeas Data: the petition should aver the manner the right to privacy was
violated and threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty and security. It also
requires substantial evidence.

Petitioners fail to show how their right to privacy is violated given that the information
contained in the "lists" are only their names, their positions in their respective
organizations, and their photographs. All these data are of public knowledge and are
readily accessible even to civilians, especially since petitioners are known personalities
who are often featured in news reports.

Although the petition for a writ of habeas data may be filed by family member, or even
relatives, on behalf of the aggrieved party,35 the Habeas Data Rule presupposes that
the aggrieved party is still alive as Section 6 of the said Rule requires the petitioner to
show how the violation of the aggrieved party's right to privacy or threats of such
violation affect the aggrieved party's right to life, liberty or security. Given the obtaining
circumstances, petitioner Heirs of Crispin Beltran do not have the legal standing to file
the present petition.

Jlyrreverre|62
 discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
PART 3: EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW CLAUSE appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
Equal Protection of the Law persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
• Guarantees legal equality of all before the law still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
• Equal protection clause can also be violated not by denial of equality but by
creating a system that can foster inequality (People v. Vera) PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause, as the legislative records
• The guaranty of Equal Protection is not violated by a legislation based on of the Bicameral Conference Meeting show that PAGCOR's exemption from payment
reasonable classification. of corporate income tax, as provided in the 1997 NIRC, was not made pursuant to a
• Constitutional guarantee of the “Equality of the Person” valid classification based on substantial distinctions and other requirements of a
• Equality guarantees: legal equality, equality of all persons under the law reasonable classification by legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on
• Here, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does some, and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The legislative records
not treat the person differently because of who he is or hat he is or what he show that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate income tax
possesses was PAGCOR's own request to be exempted. (PAGCOR vs. BIR)
• THE EPC is NOT absolute: the State has the power to classify à It does not
deny the state the power to recognize and act upon factual differences The difference in the dates of payment of delinquent contributions provides a
between individuals and classes substantial distinction between the two classes of employers. In limiting the benefits of
the Condonation Law to delinquent employers who remit the Social Security Service
(SSS) contributions of his employees within the six (6)-month period, the legislature
For classifications to be reasonable: S-G-L-E
refused to allow a sweeping, non-discriminatory condonation to all delinquent
1. It must rest on substantial distinctions employers, lest the policy behind Social Security be undermined. (Mendoza vs.
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law People)
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People v. Cayat) The law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct
- it does not demand absolute equality among residents, it merely requires that all primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike, under like circumstances; both as to collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. Both are bureaus under the
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. (Tiu v. CA) DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions - taxation. Such
ALIENAGE: The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitute a basis for substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law.
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. SC held that the disputed law Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA
was enacted to remedy an actual threat and danger to nat’l economy posed by alien 9335, providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards
dominance and control of the retail trade, and would free citizens from such dominance and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board fully satisfy the
and control. (Ichong v. Hernandez) demands of equal protection. (Bureau of Customs vs. Teves)

The term “non-resident alien” and its obverse “resident alien,” must be given their
technical connotation under our law on immigration. There lies substantial differences VILLEGAS V. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO (EMPLOYMENT PERMIT)
between the two. (General Milling Corp. v. Torres)
Doctrine: ALIENAGE: the protection the EPC guaranteed is applicable to both citizens
The concept of relative constitutionality: The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in and aliens.
every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied
to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time
may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute
in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though
affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of
changed conditions. In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued
enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes
in circumstances.

Applicability of the equal protection clause. : [C]ourts are not confined to the
language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any

Jlyrreverre|63
Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of
Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance
it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City
of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-
city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
other purposes. (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art.
VI, Constitution).
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's
ordinance. power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the
afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that
protection clauses of the Constitution. upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant
chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes,
Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose Issue: (1) Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the
of regulation. equal protection clause under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution. (2) Whether or not it was
violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights, Sec. 22[1], Art. VI,
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment Constitution.
permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing
and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied
which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that
measure. the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification
While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any who belong to the same class.
standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment
permit fee. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet
them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL V. ORMOC CITY (LAW SPECIFIC FOR ORMOC Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc
SUGAR CENTRAL) Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still,
the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions
Doctrine: Laws should not target a single and exclusive company in a way that as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequent companies of the same nature shall not be affected by the law. subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage
of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to
the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company,
Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not
arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of
collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same
being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No.
4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance
the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund
centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.
countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5, 000, or
a total of P12, 087.50.

Jlyrreverre|64
 CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V BANGKO SENTRAL NG levels in accordance with sound principles of management.” On behalf of the
PILIPINAS (CLASSIFICATION BASED ON SALARY – RELATIVE respondent executive secretary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the
CONSTITUTIONALITY) classification was based on actual and real differentiation.
Issue: The sole issue was whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c) of Article II of
Doctrine: Statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in RA 7653 violated the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the laws.
operation.... If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is
unconstitutional. The Court’s Ruling: Voting 9[4] to 4, the Court held that while the questioned proviso
was not, on its face and by itself, constitutionally infirm under the “equal protection”
Different classifications of employees in terms of their respective wage structures clause, subsequent laws[5] amending the charters of seven other governmental
violates the EPC if no substantial distinctions are shown between the groups. financial institutions (GFIs) had worked a discriminatory effect upon the rank-and-file
employees of the BSP. Hence, the continued operation of the provision violated the
equal-protection guarantee of the Constitution.

Relative Constitutionality

Under the concept of relative constitutionality, the ponente, Justice Reynato S. Puno,
explained that a statute that was valid at one time could become void at another time
because of altered circumstances or changed conditions. To support this position, he
cited a number of US cases,[6] as well as Rutter v. Esteban[7] in Philippine
jurisprudence.

The proviso in question was subjected to a two-tiered scrutiny to determine its

An initially valid provision of law can become subsequently unconstitutional when its constitutionality: the “rational basis test” and the “strict scrutiny test.”
continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law.
The majority conceded that RA 7653 had started as a valid measure. Its classification
Thus ruled the Court in Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP was found reasonable due to
Pilipinas.[1] It declared in that case that the last proviso of Section 15 (c) of Article II of substantial distinctions or real differences between the two classes. Particularly, the
Republic Act No. 7653[2] was unconstitutional for being an “invidious discrimination” exemption of officers (SG-20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the
against the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives,
not to discriminate against the rank-andfile. Thus, the provision passed the “rational
To set the case in the proper context, let me narrate the background. basis” test.
The Facts: On July 3, 1993, RA 7653 abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines Nonetheless, the petitioners contended that the enactment of subsequent laws
(CB) and created a new Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). Almost eight years after, exempting from the SSL all rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs constituted a
the Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc. filed a petition for prohibition significant change in circumstance that considerably altered the reasonableness of the
against the BSP and the Office of the President, which were sought to be restrained continued operation of the proviso in question. Scrutinized this time was the
from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA No. 7653,[3] constitutionality of the classification of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP and that
on the ground that it was unconstitutional. of the seven other GFIs, who all belonged to the same class. Between persons who
were similarly situated, the proviso could not unjustly distinguish or grossly discriminate
The provision allegedly distinguished between two classes of employees in the BSP: in its operation.
(1) the officers who were exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization
Law (SSL); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG]-19 and below) who were not Against the standard of “strict scrutiny,” the disparity in the treatment of the rank-andfile
exempted from the coverage of the SSL. It was argued that the classification was not employees of the BSP and those of the other GFIs could not stand judicial scrutiny. It
reasonable, but arbitrary and capricious, and violated the equal-protection clause of the was held that there were no characteristics peculiar only to the rank-and-file employees
Constitution. The proviso was allegedly not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c) of the seven GFIs that would justify the exemption that was denied to those of the BSP.
of Article II of RA 7653, the most important of which was to establish professionalism Moreover, the challenged provision operated on the basis of the salary grade or officer-
and excellence at all levels in the BSP. employee status, a distinction akin to that based on economic class and status. That
classification was suspect, as shown by a number of international conventions, as well
On the other hand, the BSP contended that the provision could stand the constitutional as foreign and international jurisprudence.
test, provided it was construed in harmony with other parts of the same law that
provided for, among others, the “fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP”; and with Finally, it was stressed that, under most circumstances, the Court would exercise
the mandate of the Monetary Board to “establish professionalism and excellence at all judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality and would base judicial

Jlyrreverre|65
scrutiny on the “rational basis” test. It was equally stressed, though, that such scrutiny
ought to be stricter if and when “the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the
of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied
Constitution with special protection x x x.” A weak and watered-down view would call with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his
for the abdication of this Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the duties.
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. NLRC affirmed.

YCASUEGI V PAL (OBESE FLIGHT ATTENDANT) : the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that
Doctrine: EMPLOYMENT: There is substantial distinction between obese cabin the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the
attendants against other given that the former’s immobility can impede passengers result of his dismissal for being overweight.
from evacuating the aircraft in cases of emergency.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The
dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination,
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992,
was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal
company. weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”

The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the
the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration company physician, per the advice of PAL.
Manual of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code
vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that
October 17, 1988 to February 1989. the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which
he failed to comply with. NOTES: The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a
weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex,
dates, which he did not report to. religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test
for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ
being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same. is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory
job performance.”
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft.
terminated “effective immediately.”

Jlyrreverre|66
The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern
upon its employees. for the safety and well-being of members of the community.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the
is flight safety.Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee State should train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area
as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not that the Court perceives difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets
for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character. in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the
trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night and urinate on
PEOPLE V SITON (VAGRANCY) otherwise decent corners of our streets.

Doctrine: CRIMINAL LAW, LITIGATION: Penal statutes do not go against the EPC Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes
as they do not punish people for who they are, rather, what is punished is what they do wait for customers by the roadside all around the metropolis, some even venture in
or how they conduct themselves. bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter around dark avenues waiting to pounce
on helpless citizens. Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and
establishments for their next hit. The streets must be made safe once more. Though a
man’s house is his castle,35 outside on the streets, the king is fair game.

LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC (PENDING BILLS FOR CITIES- CITYHOOD

LAWS)

Doctrine: GOVERNMENT POWERS, POLICE POWER: The cities enumerated in the

cityhood laws have substantial difference against those not enumerated given their
Facts: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with capability to become component cities of their respective provinces.
vagrancy pursuant toArt. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused
were found wandering and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao
City, without any visible means to support herself norlawful and justifiable purpose.
Respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overboard. The municipal trial court denied
the motions, directed respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, and
declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power (or
the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property) and justified by the Latin maxim “salus populiest suprema lex” (which
calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number).

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the FACTS: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by
constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
protection clause. The RTC granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the
Art. 202 (2) unconstitutional. municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant
ISSUE: Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause? to the subject laws.

HELD: Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted
discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating
punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm
and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4,
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6,
It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision
place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are of December 21, 2009.
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and

Jlyrreverre|67
ISSUE: appointing authority while the latter occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate.
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws

First issue: The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its
legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make
laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the
people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
Congress of the Philippines. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Resolution No. 8678 provide:
Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public
of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income, population, appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
and land area. Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a filing of his certificate of candidacy.
belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines elective office or position.
for economic growth in their respective provinces.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who
through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration
Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners
also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC
Second Issue: Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or
municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso
enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal
pursuit for cityhood up to the present. protection clause

The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Held: Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned
Laws are declared CONSTITUTIONAL. from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other
civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the
first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
QUINTO V. COMELEC (APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL) differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
Doctrine: ELECTION: There is substantial difference between appointive and elective may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
officials as they former hole their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

Jlyrreverre|68
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the
purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the
between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. equal protection clause.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus
equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four- Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
wheel vehicle. UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The
present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second
under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
obligations imposed. unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that “For this
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered
and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned
than to their office work. or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her
office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision certificate of candidacy.
cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent
is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal
be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-
President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, Held: No To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal
elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The
that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has
differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our four requisites:
law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
his office to support his campaign. (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions
of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions
officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the
excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for. dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected

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officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent
remain." and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina.
the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist
his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead,
constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the here to our bed.”
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they
were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal
concerned. pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got
angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and
the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, transferred to the bed.
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside
the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire
yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will. to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding
off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the
intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.
declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested
his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued
provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”
including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered
automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office. Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape
charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.
the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on
candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the ISSUE:Whether or not there can be a marital rape.
proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this
reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over
Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if
not consensual, is rape.
PEOPLE V JUMANAN (MARITAL RAPE)
Violation of equal protection clause
FACTS: Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children. The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases
in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, infringes on the equal protection clause.
the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence
in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused- The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape
appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him. and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of
the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property
rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

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 Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such policy
The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental
unconstitutional. to the JBC’s principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies
in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay
Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants’
prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
abets another person in raping her. only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
relationship with his victim. sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

Implied consent theory untenable Issue 3: W/N the violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by
by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.
cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved. Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience
and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court,
her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to
CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of
under R.A. No. 8353. judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional
standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven competence.” In
VILLANUEVA V JBC determining competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications, experience
and performance.
Facts: After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva
applied for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC Civil Law
however informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position
because the JBC’s long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first- Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published in the ONAR
level courts before one can apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the SC, he No. The JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement
assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction the in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive
policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave abuse branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the
of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due process for lack of Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative
publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center Office of the National Code.
Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the policy should have been published
because it will affect all applying judges. Issue 2: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published
Yes. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
On the other hand, one of the JBC’s arguments was that the writ of certiorari and administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under binding force and effect. Exempted from requirement of publication are interpretative
the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. the administrative agency and not the public, and the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially regulations exempted from the publication requirement. It involves a qualification
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not
judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members
public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who
While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to
this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and apply to these vacant positions. Thus, naturally it follows that potential applicants be
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to
prepare for and comply with them.

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Jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, FERRER V BAUTISTA (GARBAGE COLLECTION FEES)
by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks
to implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of Facts: Petitioner, a QC property owner, assails the constitutionality of two QC
the judiciary. ordinances, namely Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 or the Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City and Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on garbage collection fees.
Remedial Law
Section 3 of SP-2095 provides:
Issue 1: W/N the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are applicable to SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%)
JBC (Remedial) on the assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
Yes. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the
reach. Under Rule 65, Sec 1(par 1), the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special
to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a special account to be established
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, for the purpose (i.e., programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of dwellings).
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Consequently, petitions for On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on garbage collection places the
certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to rates of the imposable fee dependent on the land or floor area and whether the payee
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment.
Here, the JBC indeed does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening Issues:
applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed
unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the 1. WON SP-2095, S-2011 on the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) is valid.
formulation of guidelines and criteria is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the a. WON the SHT is a tax which is within the QC government to impose.
JBC’s constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has b. WON the SHT violates the rule on equality.
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in c. WON the SHT is confiscatory or oppressive.
issuing and enforcing the said policy. 2. WON SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is valid.
a. WON the Ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on double
Issue 2: W/N the remedy of mandamus is proper in assailing the policy of the JBC taxation.
No. First, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly b. WON it violates the rule on equality.
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by
the JBC. Second, petitioner has no clear legal right since there is no law that grants Ruling:
him the right of promotion to second-level courts.
1. SP-2095, S-2011 on the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) is VALID.
Issue 3: W/N the remedy of declaratory relief is proper
No. First, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, a. Yes. The SHT charged by the QC Government is a tax which is within its
the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to power to impose. Cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and
be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC’s five-year discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
requirement policy. Again, no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of services and facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for
appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right low-cost housing and other mass dwellings. The collections made accrue to
that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates, its socialized housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise
which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory
petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy. purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the
Second, the SC does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest.
even if only questions of law are involved. The special civil action of declaratory relief Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to BP 129, Sec underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real
19, as amended by R.A. No. 7691. property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their
The SC assumes jurisdiction over the petition only because of the Court’s supervisory property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure,
duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power. But in any event, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making
even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.
dismissed. b. No, the SHT does NOT violate the rule on equality. For the purpose of
undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing

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 program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is
as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a
The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and socialized housing project.
is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public
purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to
legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another. It is inherent in its declared purpose of “promoting shared responsibility with the residents to
the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present
which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or resources and in generating waste.” Instead of simplistically categorizing the
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation. payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have
c. No, the SHT is NOT confiscatory nor oppressive. The reasonableness of considered factors that could truly measure the amount of wastes generated
Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others,
oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density
actually allows. While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on lands with of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the
an assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only property.
covers lands with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00. Even better, on
certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total Dispositive Portion:
amount of the special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its
effectivity. Far from being obnoxious, the provisions of the subject ordinance WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and
are fair and just. legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the “Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon
City,” is SUSTAINED for being consistent with Section 43 of Republic Act No. 7279.
2. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is INVALID. Although it does not violate On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage
the rule on double taxation, it nonetheless violates the rule on equality. fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with
a. SP-2235 does NOT violate the rule on double taxation. reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected relative to its enforcement.

The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a 1-UNITED V COMELEC
charge fixed for the regulation of an activity. In Progressive Development
Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that “if the generating of TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech, posting of campaign materials on
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the PUV and public terminals, captive-audience doctrine
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax.” In DOCTRINE: The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental
a U.S. case, the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather than right in any democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge
a tax as it was actually a fee for a service given by the city which had others to vote for a particular candidate. The right to express one’s preference for
previously been provided at no cost to its citizens. a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any
governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.
No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.

b. Yes, SP-2235 violates the rule on equality. FACTS: On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615,
which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof,
distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other
hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it
uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is is unlawful:
both just and equitable.
xxxx
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a
resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of
has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit
authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the
occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to

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consent of the owner thereof. The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition,
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following: owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited
from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election
xxxx offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.

5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid
and tricycles, whether motorized or not; content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.

6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the
seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like. incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the
transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of 1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the
Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules. Government;

Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of 2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The 3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the and
assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post
election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals. 4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the
petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral
in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615. regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may
be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615,
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under
null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to
restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
are prior restraints on speech The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory
speech. Centralto the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section
and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory
election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them. powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits for the operation,”
inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se
campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same.
with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner
thereof liable for an election offense. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the
constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the

Jlyrreverre|74
franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election government, in choosing the types of advertisements that would be placed on its
campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the advertisements
with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal. that may be posted on their properties.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under the Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political
captive-audience doctrine. advertisements on their buses. Considering that what were involved were facilities
owned by the city government, impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals remains
matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The “captive- private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by proscribing the
audience” doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an posting of election campaign materials on their properties.
unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication cannot be
avoided. Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election
campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which
undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free
that they are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on
only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity which this government was founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied
makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
exposure.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the
justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise purported class. However, the classification remains constitutionally impermissible
intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) since it is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience law. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private
doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs
materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to
to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under
they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per
se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner
Lehman’s case not applicable affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.

The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and
campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already
Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for
government, which prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses, was use by the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the advertising properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting
space on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out that advertisement space on election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to
government-run buses, “although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In
a part of commercial venture.” In the same way that other commercial ventures need terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport
not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public, the city’s transit system terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely
has the discretion on the type of advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles. superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the
government; the city government, as owner of the buses, had the right to decide which public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private
type of advertisements would be placed on its buses. vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would
be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many people. However,
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the city election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by

Jlyrreverre|75
the public, e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, Respondents: Court of Apples, Romeo Zamora (Quezon City RTC), Rafael Salcedo-
there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the Ortanez
prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
Recit-ready version: Rafael filed a case for annulment against his wife Teresita. He
Summary provided wire-tapped conversations stored in cassette tapes as evidences against her.
When the RTC admitted the tapes as evidences, Teresita filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA. The CA dismissed her petition because she should have appealed first.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate The SC ruled that if the RTC ruling is patently erroneous, then certiorari may be availed.
the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the The grave error committed by the RTC is the admission of the tapes as evidence. RA
constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the 4200 explicitly prohibits the admission of wire-tapped conversations as evidence in any
objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the candidates. They are not hearing. Thus, the RTC and CA rulings are set aside, and the tapes are inadmissible
only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative of the equal protection as evidence.
clause, as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. Facts: Rafael filed a case for annulment with damages against his wife Teresita, on
the grounds of lack of marriage license and psychological incapacity. Judge Zamora
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy presided over the proceedings.
is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom
without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic One of the evidences submitted by Rafael are three cassette tapes of phone
way of life. conversations that the wife had with different people. Rafael sought the aid of the
military in wire-tapping their home.
ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS Teresita filed a case to assail the validity of the usage of the cassette tapes as evidence.
SECTION III The trial court however and nonetheless, admitted such tapes as evidence. Teresita
then filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of Apples. The CA dismissed it, saying it
SECTION 3: was not the proper remedy for her, that it is “notoriously inappropriate to rectify a
(1) Privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during the trial. If [the admission of
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires evidence] is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal.”
otherwise as prescribed by law Hence, this petition.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
Issues:
o. W/N the remedy of certiorari was properly availed of by Teresita in the Court
Exceptions:
of Apples – YES
1. Lawful order of the Court
p. W/N the cassette tapes can be admitted as evidence in the annulment
2. When Public Safety or Order requires it as prescribed by law.
proceedings – NO
A. Anti-wiretapping Law
Held: The decision of the Court of Apples is hereby set aside. The subject tapes are
inadmissible as evidence.
RA 4200 requires previously written judicial authorization to be issued upon fulfillment
of requirements for the issuance of a warrant effective for only 60 days.
Ratio:
1. Petition for certiorari versus appeal
Privacy of Communication with regard to Telephone Conversations
A. Certiorari is generally inappropriate to challenge an interlocutory
Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone conversations are not admissible as
evidence. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversation order (a temporary or provisional decision, which is subject to
allowed the recordings of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory immediate appeal) of a trial court.
under RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Law). Tape recordings can only be made upon lawful B. However, where the assailed order is patently erroneous, or that the
order of the Court. (Salcedo-Ortañez vs. CA) appeal will not provide adequate relief, a petition for certiorari may
be used.
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS (WIRETAP) 2. Cassette tapes are inadmissible as evidences
A. R.A. 4200 (An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire-Tapping) explicitly
August 4, 1994 prohibits the admission of wire-tapped conversations as evidence in
Petitioner: Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez any hearing.

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 B. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone Held/Ratio: NO
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility • The documents were accepted in court at THAT SPECIFIC TIME because the
of the subject tapes is mandatory SC released a TRO
o This justified the judgement that Felix, Jr.'s actions did not constitute
B. Exclusionary Rule: Bars admission of illegally obtained evidence. malpractice
o However, after the effectivity of the TRO, the decision of the lower
court stands again - the documents are inadmissible
ZULUETA V. COURT OF APPEALS (HUSBAND AND WIFE PRIVACY) • Documents are inadmissible in evidence
o Constitutional protection: "the privacy of communication and
DOCTRINE: The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them correspondence [to be] inviolable"
in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale o The only exception is when there is (1) lawful order from the court,
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her or (2) when public safety or order requires, as prescribed by law
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her. (Zulueta v. CA)
o The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Alfredo Martin
Summary: Petitioner is the wife of public respondent. She went to the latter's clinic
PEOPLE V. MARTI (SEARCH BY PRIVATE PERSON)
and destroyed the cabinets to get certain documents to use them as evidence in a legal
separation case she filed. Lower court and CA said that the documents are Restraint against unlawful searches and seizures applies only against the
inadmissible. The SC also ruled that the documents are inadmissible because the government but not on private individuals. If the evidence sought to be excluded was
constitution provides that the privacy of correspondence and communication shall be primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
inviolable. and without participation/intervention of State authorities, then the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
Facts:
• Petitioner is the wife of the private respondent Martin Test:
• She entered the clinic of her husband 1. Evidence primarily discovered and obtained by private person
o In the presence of her mother, a driver, and the husband's secretary (subsequent verification of evidence by State authorities upon request
of private individual is allowed).
o Forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet and took 157 documents 2. Private person acted in private capacity.
consisting of private correspondence between the doctor and the 3. No intervention and participation by the State authorities in primary
alleged paramours § Documents were seized for use in evidence discovery. (People v. Marti)
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine the petitioner had filed against her husband BUT: The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and
• Dr. Martin filed for a recovery of the documents and papers and for damages correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
o RTC of Manila Branch X (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against
§ Ordered return of documents whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order
§ Payment of 5k as nominal damages
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed
§ Payment of 5k as moral damages and attorney's fees
by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
§ Enjoined herein petitioner and her attorneys from using the
“for any purpose in any proceeding.”
documents as evidence
• Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision January 18, 1991
• Zulueta appealed Topic: Search by a private individual
o Ground: the documents were admissible in evidence in Alfredo PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., and thus used by her attorney Felix, Jr. ACCUSED-APPELLANT: Andre Marti

o Thus, Felix's actions did not constitute gross malpractice and SUMMARY: Andre Marti was going to have 4 packages shipped to Switzerland via
misconduct Manila Packing and Export Forwarders. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau
of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) following standard
Issues: WON the documents were admissible as evidence operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection and found dried marijuana

Jlyrreverre|77
leaves and a couple of tabacalera cigars. The same was sent to the Narcotics Section • Where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request
of the NBI for investigation. Marti was convicted for a violation of Republic Act 6425: of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is
Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti claims that the package was illegally seized hence no unreasonable search and seizure.
inadmissible as evidence. It was held that a violation of Sec. 2 of Art. III cannot be • Commissioner Bernas – “[The Bill of Rights] The protection of fundamental
invoked because the guarantees of the Bill of Rights only apply to searches by the liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against
State and not by the private individual. Also, the search was validly made as a whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship
reasonable precaution. Hence, the packages are admissible as evidence. between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of
FACTS: Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
• August 14, 1987 – Marti went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export inaccessible to any power holder.”
Forwarders (a shipment company) in Ermita, Manila, carrying 4 gift wrapped 2. No. The evidence coming into possession of the Government without the latter
packages. transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, there is no
o Inspector Anita Reyes asked if she can open the package but reason why the same should not be admitted against the appellant.
appellant said that there is no need for it only contains books for a
friend in Switzerland. C. Prohibition
o Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or "Not absolute. The state may infringe such by applying for a previous judicial
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) following standard authorization in cases of national security or non-judicially when required by public
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection and found safety, public order or otherwise prescribed by law.
dried marijuana leaves and a couple of tabacalera cigars.
o Within the same day, Job Reyes sent a sample of the shipment to Purpose: Protection against the State. “The Bill of Rights governs the relationship
the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) between the individual and the State. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
where the content of the packages were affirmed to be marijuana. between a private individual and other private individuals. What the Bill of Rights does
o The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the packages, is declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power
after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. holder.” – Fr. Bernas during the Constitutional Commission.
o Accused was found guilty.
• Hence this appeal from a decision by the Special Criminal Court of Manila NOTE: If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must first
convicting accused-appellant of violation of Republic Act 6425: Dangerous generally be secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search
Drugs Act is made at the behest or the initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own private purposes, without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
• Appellant submits that the the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked, for only the act of the private
illegally searched and seized objects contained in the four parcels.
individual and not the law enforcers are involved.
ISSUES:
Right to Privacy in terms of a Statute infringing on the Individual
WON the search and seizure was legal
WON the exclusionary rules shall apply The right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right merely
requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justifies such
HELD: Petition is DENIED. Judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and
reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED.
well- defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. Any law or order that
invades individual privacy will be subjected by the Judiciary to strict certainty.
RATIO:
Requisites for a Law to intrude upon privacy of an Individual:
1. No. Evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
1. Law is narrowly focused
private capacity without the intervention of State authorities. An
act of a private individual in the absence of governmental interference, allegedly in 2. A compelling interest justifies intrusion
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, cannot be invoked against the State. 3. Proper safeguards
• The inspection made in such private capacity was reasonable and a standard 4. Well-defined standards (Ople v. Torres and KMU v. NEDA)
operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure
before delivery of packages. WAIVER OF RIGHTS UNDER SEC. 2 AND 3
• Mere receipt of the articles by the NBI did not convert the reasonable search
PEOPLE V. DAMASO (PERSONAL WAIVER)
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure. To observe and look
at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed, is not search.

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RECIT READY: Damaso was charged with violation of PD 1866 in connection with the • While it is true that the defense did not object to the hearsay testimony, and
crime of subversion. Evidence against him were an M14 rifle, ammunition and other thus it was correctly admitted as evidence, it does not mean that they now
books and pamphlets of subversive orientation. These were seized from appelant’s have probative value.
house after Luz Morados, the oocupant of the house let the soldiers in. The court held o Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
that there was no valid search warrant and hence, the evidence were inadmissible. The credence.
fact that the occupant let the soldiers in is not a waiver of the right of Damaso against o Admissibility =/= weight of evidence.
warrantless search and seizures. Such waiver can only be made by the person whose • For the sake of argument, even if the appellant WAS the lessee of
rights are invaded, or one whom he authorizes to do so. There is no evidence that Luz • the house, the case shouldn’t prosper, because there was no compliance with
Morados was given such authority.
the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceeding
o None of the exceptions that allows warrantless searches was
Facts present
• Appellant Damaso was charged before the RTC of Dagupan with violation of § Search incidental to arrest
PD 1866, in connection with crime of subversion
§ Search of a moving vehicle
• Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary Officer and some companions were sent
§ Seizure of evidence in plain view
to verify presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang in Dagupan
City. o SG’s argument – when the occupants of the house let the police
search the place, that constituted consent, and thus the evidence
• They apprehended several people, who revealed that there was underground
was in plain sight.
safehouse at Gracia Village, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
• The group proceeded to the said house, and found: o SC disagrees, the constitutional protection can’t be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded, or one who he
o Subversive documents
authorizes to do so. There is no evidence that Luz Morados, the
o Radio
occupant of the house, was given such authority.
o 45 Cal firearm
o Others Illegal Possession of Firearms- The Constitutional Immunity from unreasonable
• After the raid, they proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan Cty, and put under searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the
surveillance the rented apartment of a certain Aritumba, the sister of one of person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or
those earlier apprehended. In an interview with a visitor to the said apartment, her behalf.
they learned that the occupants worked with one Bernie Mendoza, herein
appellant. Records show that the appellant was not at the house at the time his alleged helper,
• They went to the house of the appellant. They asked the occupants if they allowed the authorities to enter it. We find no evidence that would establish the fact that
could look around, and found radio sets, “Ang Bayan” pamphlets, books for Luz Morados was indeed the appellant’s helper, or if she was the helper, that the
subversive orientation, an M-14 rifle, bullets and ammo, etc. appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. (People v.
• He was found guilty. He argued: Damaso)
o Prosecution’s evidence was based on hearsay, and thus
inadmissible VEROY V. LAYAGUE (SEARCH OF PERSONS, NOT OF MATERIALS)
o Evidence was also ILLEGAL because there was lack of valid search
warrant The case does not fall within the exceptions to warrantless search. The reason for
Issue: w/n the Court erred in convicting the appellant searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a
hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. Permission was indeed granted by
Held: Decision reversed, appellant not guilty Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel
Ratio: soldiers.
• There were serious flaws in the police’s methods of obtaining evidence
• Also, evidence presented is too weak to sustain a conviction Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to
o There was no substantial and credible evidence to establish that procure a search warrant but did not. The articles seized, having been confiscated
the appellant is the same person as the lessee of the house illegally, are protected by the exclusionary principle and cannot be used as evidence
where the items were found against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of
o The testimonies that established that the appellant was the lessee firearms. (Sps. Veroy v. Layague)
were merely based on hearsay, not the personal knowledge of the
witnesses. RECIT READY: Petitioners are husband and wife who live in Quezon City but they own
a house in Davao City to which 2 houseboys and a caretaker was assigned to maintain
it. The police raided the house in Davao because they received information that it was

Jlyrreverre|79
being used to hide rebel soldiers. The owners were not there so they did not enter the • On November 2, their motion for bail was denied by RTC. Thereafter
house. The police then called one of the petitioners, Luisa, to ask permission for them supplemental petition to SC was filed and the court granted bail.
to enter and ascertain the presence of rebels. Luisa granted permission and the police • The issues on bail and hospital confinement were rendered moot.
found .45 caliber gun and 7 live bullets in the rooms among other articles. Petitioners • The issue that remained to be resolved is the petition for prohibition.
were charged for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of Petitioners argue that:
Rebellion (PD 1866). They filed before the Supreme Court petitions for certiorari, o PD 1866 is unconstitutional
mandamus (the first two became moot and academic) and prohibition. The court ruled o PD 1866 has been repealed by RA 6968
that the articles cannot be admitted as evidence because they were confiscated o Articles cannot be admitted as evidence because they were obtained
illegally, without a warrant. Police only had permission to check the presence of rebels in violation of prohibition against unreasonable searches and
in the house, not to conduct a room to room search inside the house. Illegal possession seizures.
of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of rebellion case against petitioners
dismissed. ISSUES/HEL/RATIO:
1. Constitutionality of PD 1866
FACTS: a. It is constitutional. The constitutionality of PD 1866 has been upheld in
• Petitioners are married and formerly resided at no. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Misolas v. Panga
Village, Catalunan Grande, DAVAO City. They transferred to 130 K-8th b. It is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of double
St., East Kamias, Quezon City when the husband was promoted in his jeopardy
job at the SSS. 2. Whether RA 6968 repealed PD 1866
• The couple left the key for the kitchen where the circuit breakers were located a. NO
to Edna Soquilon who was also in charge of giving salary to the 2 houseboys b. Referred to two distinct offenses.
employed. 3. Question on Admissibility of Evidence
• On April 12, 1990, the house in Davao was raided on information that the a. Not Admissible, articles were seized unlawfully without warrant
residence was being used as safe house for rebel soldiers. They entered the b. Although Capt. Obrero had permission, it was only for the purpose of
yard but was not able to enter the house because the owner was not present ascertaining the presence of rebel soldiers. The permission did not
and they did not have a search warrant. include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the
• Luisa Veroy was contacted and agreed to the search of the house apartment house.
on the condition that Major Macasaet would be present. i. Art III, Sec 2 guarantees right of people to be secure in
their person, houses, papers and effects against
• The following day, the house was searched by Capt. Obrero and Maj.
unreasonable searches
Macasaet. Among others, they recovered a .45 cal. hand gun with magazine
containing 7 live bullets, 3 half full jute sacks containing printed materials, a ii. Rule on search warrant is not absolute, there are
book entitled “Islamic revolution future path of the nation” exceptions:
1. Incidental to arrest
• They turned over the articles to the police station. The preliminary
investigation recommended the filling of information against the Petitioners for 2. Moving vehicle
violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in 3. Plain view
Furtherance of Rebellion). Information was filed on August 8, 1990 and no bail iii. None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar.
was recommended. They filed a motion for bail but was denied. 1. Even Capt. Obrero did not enter the house
• On August 15, petitioners were admitted to St. Luke’s Hospital for various during the initial raid on April 12 because he
ailments brought about or aggravated by stress caused by the case. They filed recognized the need for a warrant
for motion for hospital confinement and likewise reiterated their motion for bail. 2. They had permission on the second raid but
• The court ordered there transfer to Davao City Rehabilitation Center to which was limited to ascertaining presence of
petitioners filed motion for reconsideration but was denied. rebels
• They were returned to St.Lukes after their motion for hospital confinement was 3. Under the circumstances, they had ample
set for another date. B/Gen Dumlao, meanwhile, issued a directive for their time to apply for a warrant
transfer to Camp Crame but petitioners contend that they should be allowed 4. Also, motive is immaterial in mala prohibita
to stay at St. Lukes while their motion for hospital confinement was pending. but subjects of this offense may not be
• Petitioner filed in the SC petition for certiorari to review denial of hospital summarily seized simply because they are
requirement, mandamus to compel judge to resolve issue on bail, and prohibited; a search warrant is still necessary
prohibition because evidence were inadmissible. SC issued TRO against
Dumlao.

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 c. Hence, the rule being violated and no exception being applicable, the Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
articles seized were confiscated illegally and are protected by the 1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a
exclusionary rule case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and

PETITION GRANTED, case of illegal possession of firearms against petitioners is 2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an
DISMISSED. entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
VIVARES V. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE (HABEAS DATA) aggrieved party”.

Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Right to Privacy – Online Privacy First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of
(Social Media) Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Writ of Habeas Data extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would
suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a
FACTS: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
(STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz
and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has
Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus,
showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action. such privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were
from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. published as “Public”.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his
Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, “wall” (profile page):
STC still barred said students. (a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition (b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among view the photo;
others, that: (c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at (d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
“Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which networks of the Facebook user; and
must be respected. (e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they
saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was
STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their
upon; teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy
information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer on the pictures of them scantily clad.
Laboratory;
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates
printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the
violation of the children’s right to privacy. recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it
was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal. of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first place
because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
Some notable foreign jurisprudence used by the Supreme Court in this case:
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper. 1. United States v. Gines-Perez: “A person who places a photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly

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under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective government has to prevent (substantive, extremely serious danger where
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the the degree of imminence is really high)
photograph itself.”
2. United States v. Maxwell: “The more open the method of transmission is, the less PRIOR RESTRAINT
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat Official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any of actual publication or dissemination like licensing or censorship.
semblance of privacy.”
3. H v. W, (South Africa Case dated January 30, 2013): “The law has to take into NEAR V. MINNESOTA (MALICIOUS ARTICLES AGAINST OFFICIALS)
account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will
lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond DOCTRINE: Censorship or prior restraint is done by suppressing publication and
appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.” punishing as contempt further publication. In determining the extent of constitutional
This case recognized this ability of Facebook users to “customize their privacy protection, it has been generally, If not universally considered that it is the chief purpose
settings,” but did so with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it of the guaranty of freedom of press is to prevent previous restraints of publication.
makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not
foolproof.” Examples are:
q. system of licensing administered by an executive officer
ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS r. movie censorship- Movies are vehicle not just for entertainment but also for
SECTION IV communication
s. judicial prior restraint in the form of an injunction order
SECTION 4: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. The prior restraint principle is not an unbending rule but admitted exceptions such as:
1. when a nation is at war, publication which may obstruct government
NOTES: recruitment
2. publication of obscene materials
GENERAL PRINCIPLES: 3. materials inciting to acts of violence to overthrow the government
Also: seditious speech, censorship, electoral process
Free speech and free press: the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be no prior restraint on RECIT-READY: The Saturday Press, a newspaper owned by Near, published articles
the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution that the mayor, chief of police and county attorney of Minneapolis was not doing their
for sedition of action for damages, or contempt proceeding unless there be a clear and job, thus allowing a Jewish gangster to control gambling, racketeering and bootlegging
present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent in the city. The newspaper was then enjoined from publishing any more publications
pursuant to Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota which provides for the
Freedom pf Speech, Expression and of the Press: abatement, as a public nuisance, of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory
• The ideals expressed under this freedom are confined not only to those that newspaper, magazine or other periodical” other periodical." The US SC reversed the
judgment and declared the law to be unconstitutional. It is a law designed to suppress
are conventional and acceptable to the majoritybut also those that present the
and give prior restraint to the publication of allegedly offensive newspaper articles.
articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others
Such suppression and prior restraint violates the freedom of the press guaranteed in
• The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to
the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution).
nearly all forms of communication
FACTS:
Differentiation: Limits and Restraints of Free Speech
• Chapter 285 of the Session Las of Minnesota provides for the abatement, as
There are 3 Tests that determine the validity of restraints on freedom of speech and
a public nuisance, of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper,
expression (DBC)
1. Dangerous Tendency Doctrine: permits limitations once a rational magazine or other periodical.”
connection has been established between the speech restrained and the • The Saturday Press, a Minneapolis newspaper owned by Near, published a
danger contemplated series of articles which alleged that a Jewish gangster was in control of
2. Balancing of Interests Tests: used when there is a need to balance gambling, racketeering and bootlegging in the city, and that the mayor, chief
conflicting social values and individual interests; requires a conscious and of police and the county attorney were not performing their duty to stop the
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given criminal acts.
situation • The Saturday Press was abated and perpetually enjoined from publishing any
3. Clear and Present Danger Rule: speech may be restrained because more periodicals after it was found to be a “malicious, scandalous and
there is a substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the defamatory newspaper.”

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 • Near appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, invoking his his Baltimore theatre without first submitting the picture to the State Board of
rights to due process under the 14th Amendment. The SC of Minnesota Censors.
upheld the ruling and the constitutionality of the statute. Hence, the appeal to • The State conceded that the picture did not violate statutory standards and he
the US Supreme Court. would have gotten a license if he properly submitted for one.
• He was convicted of violation of Sec. 2 and affirmed by the Court of Appeals
ISSUE: Whether or not Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota is constitutional. of Maryland. Supreme court reversed it.
• The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of
HELD: NO
statutory provisions for judicial participation in the procedure to prohibit a film
• The liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the
It laid down the following guidelines: (1) place the burden of proving the film
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state
is unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require judicial determination to
action. It was found impossible to conclude that this essential personal liberty
impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a
of the citizen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of fundamental
specified time period.
rights of a person and property
• Under the assailed law, it is not necessary to prove the falsity of the article in
FACTS: Appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Maryland motion
order to get an injunction. The mere proof of publication is enough. The SC of
picture censorship statute and exhibited the film, “Revenge at Daybreak” at his
Minnesota even said that the purpose of the law is to suppress offending
Baltimore theatre without first submitting the picture to the State Board of Censors. The
newspapers and periodicals. This is censorship or prior restraint for the
State conceded that the picture did not violate statutory standards and he would have
alleged purpose of preserving the public order and morals.
gotten a license if he properly submitted for one. Since he didn’t, he was convicted for
• The proper remedy for such kind of publications is a libel case filed against
violation of Section 2 of the act.
the publishers, not an injunction or suppression. In a libel case, the factual
basis of the publications are examined.
Appellant argues that Section 2 of the act presents a danger of unduly suppressing
• As Blackstoned said, “The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature protected expression. He focuses particularly on the procedure for an initial decision by
a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication, the censorship board, which, without any judicial participation, effectively bars any
and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.” disapproved film, unless and until the exhibitor undertakes a time-consuming appeal to
• This immunity from previous restraint, however, is not absolute. (example: In the Maryland courts and succeeds in having the Board’s decision reversed.
times of war, there are some things which the press cannot report on lest it
jeopardize military operations.) There is no statutory provision for judicial participation in the procedure which bars a
• Thus, the statute is unconstitutional because it infringes upon the right to film, nor even assurance of prompt judicial review. Risk of delay is built into the
freedom of the press guaranteed in the 14th Amendment. Maryland procedure because no time limit is imposed for completion of Board action.
FREEDMAN V. MARYLAND (JUDICIAL DETERMINATION) ISSUE: Whether or not the Maryland statute violates freedom of expression.
DOCTRINE: STANDARD FOR CENSORSHIP TO BE VALID: B-F-P HELD: Yes.
1. The burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest RATIONALE: A noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a
on the censor. censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards
2. While the State may require advance submission of all films, in order to designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.
proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the 1. The burden of providing that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the
requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an censor.
effect of finality to the censor's determination whether a film constitutes 2. While the State may require advance submission of all films, in order to proceed
a protected expression because only a judicial determination in an effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be
adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor’s
expression-only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to determination whether a film constitutes protected expression.
impose a valid final restraint. • The exhibit must be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial
3. The procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision to construction that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either
minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film.
of a license. (Freedman vs. Maryland) • The Maryland scheme fails to provide adequate safeguards against
undue inhibition of protected expression, and this renders the
RECIT-READY: Section 2 requirement of prior submission of films to the Board an
• Appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Maryland motion invalid previous restraint.
picture censorship statute and exhibited the film, “Revenge at Daybreak” at

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3. Once the censor disapproves the film, the exhibitor must assume the burden of ISSUE: W/N the publication of articles related to the Pentagon Papers is allowed under
instituting judicial proceedings and of persuading the courts that the film is protected the First Amendment (right to free speech)
expression.
4. Once the Board has acted against a film, exhibition is prohibited pending judicial HELD: YES
review, however protracted. Under the statute, appellant could have been convicted if RATIO: It is incumbent upon the government to show cause as to why such articles
he had shown the film after unsuccessfully seeking a license, even though no court had should not be published, but in this case, “the government [did not meet] the heavy
ever ruled on the obscenity of the film. burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.”
5. It is abundantly clear that the Maryland statute provides no assurance of prompt
judicial determination. Concurring Opinion of Justice Black: The Bill of Rights is a charter "under which no
6. Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the branch of government could abridge the people's freedoms of press, speech, religion
"undue inhibition of protected expression." These guidelines are to: and assembly."
(1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the
censors, "Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press
(2) require judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions,
(3) require prompt determination "within a specified time period." or prior restraints."
“To find that the President has ‘inherent power’ to halt the publication of news by resort
NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. US (TOP SECRET INFORMATION) to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty
and security of the very people the Government hopes to make ‘secure.’”
DOCTRINE: Presumption of Invalidity: Any system of prior restraints of expression
bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government thus NOTES: Movie Censorship Process: Non-criminal process, which requires the
carries the burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint. prior submission of a film to a censor, avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes
place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
RECIT-READY: New York Times and co-petitioner Washington Post had been issued system.
injunction orders to refrain from publishing articles which excerpted “History of US
Decision-Making Process in Vietnam Policy,” a study which the United States NOTES: The Boards of Review for Moving Pictures and Television has the power to
government classified as “highly-classified.” The US SC decided against the screen review and examine all television programs. The exercise of religious
government, saying that the publication of the articles is a valid exercise of the right to freedom can be regulated by the state when it will bring about the clear and present
free speech in the First Amendment (equivalent to Section 4 in our Bill of Rights). It is danger of some substantial evil, which the state is duty bound to prevent. However,
incumbent upon the government to show cause as to why such articles should not be there is no showing of the type of harm the tapes will bring. Prior restraint on speech
published, but in this case, “the government [did not meet] the heavy burden of showing cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a SUBSTANTIVE
justification for the enforcement of such restraint.” and IMMINENT EVIL. (INC v. CA)

FACTS: This case occurred during the late 1960s-early 1970s, at the time of the NOTE: The test is still applied to 4 types of speech:
Vietnam War. The US Secretary of Defense ordered the creation of a top-secret history 1) speech that advocates dangerous ideas;
of the American role in Indochina (the peninsula where Vietnam, Thailand, etc. are 2) speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction;
located). 3) out of court contempt; &
4) release of information that endangers a fair trial.
The history article was entitled “History of US Decision-Making Process in Vietnam
Policy,” and was included in the so-called “Pentagon Papers.” Freedom of the Press- The press is not exempt from the taxing powers of the state,
NY Times got hold of this article and began publishing news reports and articles about the law granted the press a privilege, they could take back such a privilege any time.
it. The US government issued an injunction order against NY Times in order to restrain In withdrawing the privilege, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax
them from further publication of other articles purporting to the Pentagon Papers. burden to which other businesses have ling ago been subjected, The VAT is not a
license tax and therefore, not a form of prior restraint. It is not a tax on the exercise
The Attorney General cited Section 793 of the Espionage Act in order to uphold such if the privilege, much less a constitutional right. (Tolentino v. Sec. Of Finance)
injunction. Said section penalizes “whoever [has] unauthorized possession of xxx any
document xxx relating to national defense, which information the possessor has reason TV coverage of Criminal Trial
to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any Freedom of press and right to public information versus rights of the accused versus
foreign nation.” power of court to control proceedings -the rights of the accused must prevail,
therefore, it may be prohibited
The district court and the US court of appeals disallowed such injunction orders. The
case was then elevated to the US SC.

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 SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT Exceptions: contempt libel, obscenity and seditious speech
There are limits to the power of the government to impose rules or regulations
penalizing the exercise of the right of freedom of expression Right to privacy - seeks to protect people from unwarranted intrusions and wrongful
publication of the private affairs and activities of individuals, which are outside the
Tests for determining the validity of curtailment of speech: (these do not apply sphere of legitimate public concern.
only to freedom of speech and press, but also to other preferred freedoms: freedom
of association, right of assembly and petition, freedom of religion) PEOPLE V. PEREZ (DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE)

1. Dangerous Tendency Rule – This means that speech may be curtailed or DOCTRINE: NOTE: The fear must be for evil that is serious, imminent and which has
punished when it creates a dangerous tendency to produce a certain evil which the a high probability of serious injury to the state
State has the right to prevent. An example is if the content of the speech or
expression tends to stir rebellious sentiments against the government, or to commit The attack on Governor-General Wood exceeds the bounds of free speech and
crimes. common decency. There was a seditious tendency, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people. This case is an example of the application of the
All it requires, for speech to be punishable, is that there be a rational connection dangerous tendency rule where all it requires, for speech to be punishable is that there
between the speech and the evil sought to be avoided. is a rational connection between speech and evil apprehended.

NOTE: The fear must be for evil that is serious, imminent and which has a high Seditious remarks – Criticisms against the branches of government within the range
probability of serious injury to the state of liberty and speech unless the intention and the effect be seditious

2. Clear and Present Danger Rule – It means that the speech and expression used RECIT-READY: Perez uttered the following about Gov. Gen. Leonard Wood (but Wood
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and was not present) at a gathering in Sorsogon: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State has a for cutting off Wood's head...” SC convicted him for violation of the Treason and
right to prevent. Compared to the dangerous tendency rule, the clear and present Sedition law. His words were deemed seditious for stirring up disturbance against the
danger test requires a greater level of proximity and degree between the speech and state. Liberty of speech cannot be upheld when the intent is seditious.
the evil sought to be avoided.
RECIT READY: Perez uttered the following about Gov. Gen. Leonard Wood (but Wood
It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when, was not present) at a gathering in Sorsogon: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos
in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the for cutting off Wood's head...” SC convicted him for violation of the Treason and
public peace and safety it seeks to extinguish the spark of rebellion without Sedition law. His words were deemed seditious for stirring up disturbance against the
waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It state. Liberty of speech cannot be upheld when the intent is seditious.
cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its
own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual FACTS: Accused is ISAAC PEREZ, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon. He met
disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its with Fortunato Lodovice (a citizen) and other people in the presidencia of Pilar and in
own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the the course of discussion made use of such language (originally Spanish but translated
threatened danger in its incipiency. in English): "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for
having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence."
Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
Trial court charged him with violation Article 256 of the Penal Code. Hence, the appeal
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
to the Court. Issues were brought up regarding what he really said and what he meant
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
but the Court sustained the trial court’s factual findings.
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media due to its overwhelming
reach and influence. The clear and present danger test, therefore, must
ISSUE: WON he was charged with the correct crime.—
take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The
government has a right to be protected against broadcasts, which incite the
HELD: NO Court charged him with violation of Act. No. 292 (Treason and Sedition
listeners to violently overthrow it. (Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans)
Law). Sentenced to 2 months and 1 day imprisonment with costs.
3. Balancing of Interest – it is the courts function to balance public interest and the
Constitutional freedoms affected by it, and to arrive at a judgment where the greater RATIO: Sedition—the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt
weight shall be placed. i.e. RA4880 limiting period of partisan politics - Proves that against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the
public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it
the freedoms are not absolute when there is a substantial interest involved. - Usually
used NOT to prevent evil or danger.

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does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the o To advocate and teach the duty and necessity of such
Constitution. overthrowing Trial Judge told jury
o They cannot convict unless they found that petitioners intended to
A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino overthrow the US government
people and on American sovereignty. Perez’s words were seditious. o But, if they found that that was true, there was sufficient danger of a
Doctrine: Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the substantive evil, that Congress has a right to prevent.
Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be § Petitioners were convicted
seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional § CA sustained the conviction SC heard the appeal for certiorari
guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to
ISSUES
punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the
§ Do sections 2 and 3 of the Smith act violate the first amendment? Do
supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.
they violate the Fifth amendment (right against self-incrimination) because of
indefiniteness
SC charged him with a graver offense than originally designated in the lower court. The
fiscal’s designation of the crime is not conclusive. An accused may be found guilty and
HELD – convictions were AFFIRMED.
convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the information, if such graver
offense is included or described in the body of the information, and is afterwards
RATIO
justified by the proof presented during the trial.
§ Purpose of the law is to protect the government from change by violence,
DENNIS V. US (EARLY NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES) revolution, and terrorism
o Congress can prohibit acts intended to overthrow the government by
DOCTRINE: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such force and violence – the question in this case is whether the measns
circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they employed by Congress conflict with the 1st amendment
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a o One of the arguments against the law
question of proximity and degree. Clear and present danger is not dependent on the § It prohibits academic discussion about Marxism
probability of success of attempted overthrow § It stifles ideas and is contrary to all concepts of free
speech/free press
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494(1951), was a United States Supreme o This is wrong, because the act is directed at advocacy, not
Court case relating to Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party USA. discussion
The Court ruled that Dennis did not have the right under the First Amendment to the § The application of the Smith Act in this case has resulted in the prohibition of
United States Constitution to exercise free speech, publication and assembly, if the speech, in some capacity – advocacy, intrinsically, contains an element of
exercise involved the creation of a plot to overthrow the government. speech.
§ Thus, special attention must be paid to the demand of the First amendment,
FACTS marking out the boundaries of “speech”
§ Involved here is the First Amendment to the US Constiution o Basis of first amendment : free speech will result in wise
o Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, government policies Value of free discourse
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of § This is not an unlimited right—value of speech may be subordinated to other
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to values
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of o Holmes : “The question in every case is whether the words used are
grievances. used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
§ In question was a law passed called the Smith Act clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
o It made it a crime for any person knowingly or willfully to advocate evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” – the CLEAR AND
the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the US by force or PRESENT DANGER test
violence, to organize a group which does so, or to conspire to do so. o Thus, a conviction relying on speech as evidence of violation may
§ The SC held in this case that this law DID NOT violate the first amendment. only be sustained when the speech creates a clear and present
Petitioners were leaders of the Communist Party in the US. danger of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime – in
o They were indicted under section 3 of the Smith Act, for willfully and this case, overthrowing the government
knowingly conspiring... § Overthrow of a government is certainly a substantial enough interest for the
o To organize as the Communist Party a group of persons Government to limit speech
who would advocate overthrowing the US Govt by use of § “Clear and present danger” – what is meant by this
force and violence o It cannot mean that the Government must wait until the rebellion is
about to be exectured

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 o If Gov’t is aware that a group aiming to overthrow it is attempting to RECIT READY: RA 4880 which prohibited the too early nomination of candidates (150
indoctrinate their members to do so, the government must take days/ 90 days) and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity
action. (120 days/90 days) was challenged on constitutional grounds. The case went directly
o This is true even if the rebellion is unlikely to succeed to the SC because it was so important. Petitioners argue that RA 4880 is
§ Justice Learned Hand – “Courts must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ unconstitutional as it violates SEC 4. Respondents argue that the law is a valid exercise
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is of police power. The court recognized that SEC 4 rights may be limited using the clear
necessary to avoid danger” and present danger rule but according to the majority, the prohibitions on speeches,
§ The SC said that the requisite danger existed in this case. announcement, commentaries or interviews; publication or distribution of campaign
o There was a group ready to make the attempt materials; solicitation of votes; undertaking of propaganda are repugnant to the
o Highly organized conspiracy constitution. Also the majority believes that the law could have been more narrowly
o Ideologically attuned drawn. However, the required 2/3 vote for declaration of unconstitutionality was not met
§ Dissenting opinion – Black (they lacked 1 vote) and thus, the petition was dismissed. RA 4880 remains
These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the constitutional.
Government. They were not charged with overt acts of any kind
designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged FACTS:
with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the • June 17, 1967: RA 4880 which prohibited the too early nomination of
Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to candidates (150 days/ 90 days) and limiting the period of election campaign
talk and publish certain ideas at a later date: The indictment is that or partisan political activity (120 days/90 days) was challenged on
they conspired to organize the Communist Party and to use speech constitutional grounds.
or newspapers and other publications in the future to teach and o More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press,
advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government. No matter how freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to
it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and nullify the act.
press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids. I would hold 3 of • Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent
the Smith Act authorizing this prior restraint unconstitutional on its councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official
face and as applied.... candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on
November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private
So long as this Court exercises the power of judicial review of individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his
legislation, I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to co-petitioner.
sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis • There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the
of Congress' or our own notions of mere "reasonableness." Such a fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and
doctrine waters down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among
more than an admonition to Congress. The Amendment as so themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and
construed is not likely to protect any but those "safe" or orthodox that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police
views which rarely need its protection.... power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render
the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect.
There is hope, however, that in calmer times, when present • Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and
pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will elucidated that
restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place o Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the
where they belong in a free society. preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association.
o He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present
danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections,
GONZALES V. COMELEC (COURTS AND QUASI-TRIBUNALS) whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded
by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
DOCTRINE: Prolonged political campaigns: freedom of expression not absolute; concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in
The speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and government but of lives as well
truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be • The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the UP Law Center
then no previous restraint to the communication of views or subsequent punishment and the UP Women Lawyer’s Circle were requested to give their opinions.
unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has the • Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.
right to prevent. o To ensure a “free, orderly and honest election by regulating
conduct which Congress has determined harmful because if
unrestrained and carried for a long period before elections it

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 necessarily entails huge expenditures of funds on the part of the o THEY WERE UNABLE TO AGREE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
candidates, precipitates violence and even deaths, results in the OF (a) and (f) in the enumeration of restrictions/prohibitions
corruption of the electorate, and inflicts direful consequences upon § (a) Formation of organizations, associations, clubs,
public interest as the vital affairs of the country is sacrificed to purely committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of
partisan pursuits..” soliciting v otes or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party.
ISSUE: WON RA 4880 is Unconstitutional § (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving contribution for election
purposes, either directly or indirectly, is equally free from
HELD: The SC cannot declare RA 4880 unconstitutional because the required 2/3 vote constitutional infirmity.
was not met. The majority of the court lacked 1 vote to call for the declaration
of unconstitutionality.
RATIO: § For the majority, the prohibition and restrictions is
• Rights in Section 4 may be limited; repugnant to the constitution.
o As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may § Also, the majority believes that the statute could have been
supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom more narrowly drawn in order to satisfy the allowable
of speech. limitations under the clear and present danger rule.
§ clear and present danger rule, means that the evil § “it is undeniable therefore that even though the
consequence of the comment or utterance must be governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, they
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiffly
high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be narrowly achieved.”
prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according • IN THE END, the petition was dismissed because the 2/3 requirement was
to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It not met.
provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
established. READ P. 71 and 72 of BERNAS PRIMER, the case was discussed there also and it
§ dangerous tendency rule is such that “If the words uttered talked about “balancing of interest test.”
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, AYER PROD PTY LTD V. JUDGE CAPULONG (PUBLIC FIGURE)
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that
such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it DOCTRINE: The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long
to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information
It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of a public
the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which character. The right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and
the legislative body seeks to prevent. dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by
o Court has adopted the clear and present danger rule and is the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
applicable in limiting freedom of expression, assembly and publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the
association realm of legitimate public concern. The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does
• The court recognizes the social purpose (see respondent’s defense above) not mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming
for such legislation. However, the terms candidate, partisan political to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is
activity and election campaign was argued to be VAGUE. necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
o ON THE ONE HAND: the constitutional objections are thus
formidable (on vagueness) RECIT READY: Petitioners proposed a film that would depict the 1986 EDSA
o ON THE OTHER HAND: evils substantial in character taint the purity Revolution. They presented the synopsis to private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, who
of the electoral process (thus the passage of RA 4880) did not give his approval on the use of his name or that of any member of his family.
• The court ruled: Since there was an enumeration on prohibited partisan Petitioners acceded and deleted respondent’s name from the script. While filming,
political activity and election campaign, “the objection that may be raised as respondent filed a complaint with a prayer for TRO (issued) and preliminary injunction
to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at rest.” before the court of Makati. Petitioners, thereafter, contested the TRO issued against
• The next issue discussed was the constitutionality of the said them before the SC and argued that their freedom of expression is being violated. The
enumeration: SC held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression includes production

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of motion pictures and encompasses both local and foreign production companies. § 9 March 1988 - Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to
Further, it stated that the right of privacy of Enrile was not being violated because, being Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action, as the mini-series had not yet been
a public figure, his right of privacy is narrower than ordinary citizens. completed.
§ 16 March 1988 - respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction
FACTS: against the petitioners
§ Sometime in 1987, petitioners envisioned, for commercial viewing and for
Philippine and international release, historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos Hence, this petition.
at EDSA.
o The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was ISSUE/HELD: Petition granted.
endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board 1. W/N petitioners have a claim to exercise freedom of speech and of expression –
(MTRCB) as well as the other government agencies consulted. YES
o General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film 2. W/N the production and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an
production. unlawful intrusion into private respondent’s privacy which he is entitled to enjoy – NO
§ 16 December 1987 – Petitioner McElroy sent a letter to private respondent
Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis of RATIO:
it (see full text of the case for the synopsis). • This freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures
o The film would be presented in "docu-drama" style. It created 4 and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them
fictitious characters to trace the revolution from the death of Senator through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a universally
Aquino, to the Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the utilized vehicle of communication and medium Of expression. Along with the
country. press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of
mass communication for information, education and entertainment.
o It is essentially a re-enactment of the events that made possible the
o This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and
EDSA revolution
to foreign-owned motion picture companies.
o It planned to utilize actual documentary footage as background. o The circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
§ 21 December 1987 – Enrile’s reply: commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
o "[He] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
• The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation"
expression, is not an absolute right.
o “[I]n the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said o A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or permissible where:
visual) should be made to [him] or any member of his family, much § that person is a public figure, and
less to any matter purely personal to them.”
§ the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
§ It appeared that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private published about him constitute of a public character.
respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
o The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the
proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
§ 23 February 1988 - private respondent filed a Complaint with application for publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the are outside the realm of legitimate public concern
Regional Trial Court of Makati
• Private respondent relied heavily on Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales
o Complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series o Petitioners in this case is a motion picture producer who sought a
without private respondent's consent and over his objection, license to produce a movie about the deceased Mayoralty candidate,
constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy Moises Padilla, who was murdered during the 1951 elections by Gov.
§ 24 February 1988 - trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order
Rafael Lacsion and his men.
and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction
o “a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased
§ 9 March 1988 - Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the person to protect his memory, but the privilege its for the benefit of
Petition for Preliminary Injunction, contending: the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their
o the mini-series fim would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce
own rights in the character and memory of the deceased.”
Enrile nor that of his family
o “neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that the Licensing
o a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
of free expression and of the press XXX It is not, however, without limitations.”

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 § “Clear and present danger” rule Equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office is also clearly an important
§ “Balancing of interest test” - requires a court to take value. Therefore, no presumption of invalidity arises with respect to exercises of
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the COMELEC for purposes of
interests observable in given situation or type of situation securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such may
result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. (National Press
Club v. COMELEC)
• What is involved in the instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part
of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by
ADIONG V COMELEC (ELECTION PROPAGANDA)
petitioners. However, there was no "clear and present danger" of any
violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. DOCTRINE: Campaign Stickers- The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places
like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government
• The film does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the
of private respondent Ponce Enrile. curtailment of the citizen's right of free speech and expression. Moreover, the freedom
o Intrusion is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
historical account candidate or the political party. The provision Is so broad that it encompasses even the
o Public Figure: a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or private Citizen's private property and the freedom to convince others to agree with him.
mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives
the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his RECIT-READY: Jan 13 1992, Comelec Resolution No. 2347 was promulgated
character, has become a 'public personage.' providing that campaign materials (stickers, printed materials, decals, leaflets etc.. )
o The press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public may be posted only in authorized posting areas. Said resolution also prohibited the
about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. display of election propaganda in any places including mobile or stationary
private/public except those in the allowable areas. Petitioner assailed the resolution as
o The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower violative of the Omnibus election code and RA 6646. SC declared the resolution as
than that of an ordinary citizen and, as such, portrayal in the film null and void on constitutional grounds, more specifically, art 3 sections 1 and 4. SC
may be carried out even without a license from the private said that the prohibition of posting of stickers etc... on an individual’s property does not
respondent.
only deprive the said individual from the use of his property -since owner is not allowed
to place campaign materials on his property- but also deprive him of his right to free
NOTES: Content-based vs. Content-neutral Regulations
speech and information - since posting/placing such material or property
Content-based – is when the subject of the speech or utterance is sought to be reflects/expresses his political views or the candidates he believes in.
regulated. To pass constitutional muster, any content-based regulation must show
that the government has a compelling or overriding interest in the subject of the FACTS:
regulation. • Jan 13, 1992 Comelec Resolution No 2347 was promulgated to enforce the
Omnibus Election Code [OEC](sec 82) – lawful election propaganda and RA
Content-neutral - Regulates only the conduct associated with speech, such as the 6646 (Sec 11-a) – prohibited forms of election propaganda
time, place and manner. A content-neutral restriction need only show an important
or substantial government interest, for as long as it leaves open alternative channels • Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
of communication. Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful
election propaganda:
SPEECH AND ELECTORAL PROCESS
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or
NOTES: COMELEC: The COMELEC has NOT been granted the right to supervise printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than
and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches
during plebiscite periods. There are no candidates involved in a plebiscite, therefore in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in
the evil sought to be prevented in an election is not present in a plebiscite. (Sanidad v. any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
COMELEC) Section 21 hereof.
• Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
CAN regulate time in broadcast media and space in papers, it does not violate freedom Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is unlawful:
of expression. The general welfare is affected here, public interest demands that they xxx xxx xxx
know their candidates. Also it would operate for a limited period only.

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 (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any • considering the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other
election propaganda in any, whether public or private, mobile or moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents
billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more
party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech
house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than and information
one:Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not o The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation
exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied) but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of
xxx xxx xxx justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally
• Petitioner Adiong, a Senatorial Candidate, challenged the resolution on the convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.
grounds that it is violative of the OEC and RA 6646 EQUAL ACCESS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE (Art 2 sec 26) – not violated even if the
resolution is declared void
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the • the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies,
location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. o but in this case, it is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on
cars and other private vehicles.
HELD: NO. It is unconstitutional and vilative of the Bill of Rights. o Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing
freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the
regulation are of marginal significance.
RATIO:
CLEAR AND PRESESENT DANGER RULE – no danger
FREE SPEECH (ART III SEC 4 VIOLATED) • Under the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE not only must the danger
• the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must
speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument
interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this to be stilled.
case. 1. In this case there’s nothing that endanger any substantial
o “free speech [has] the status of a preferred freedom” government/public interest
o “it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other
freedom.” NOTES: What is involved here is simply a regulation of time, place and manner. Any
o Between Freedom of speech versus action intended for restriction of speech is only incidental and it is no more than necessary to achieve
maintaining clean and free elections the police, local officials the purpose of promoting equality of opportunity. What makes this regulation
and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. reasonable is that it applies only to the election period. For content-neutral
o There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain restrictions such as the case at bar, the O'Brien test must be used.
them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed. Content-Neutral Regulation The O'Brien test provides that a Government
• Regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is regulation of time, space and manner is sufficiently justified if: W-F-U-R
too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it 1. If it is within the constitutional power of the Government,
restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his 2. If it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest
or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the 3. If the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the
expression
constitutionally sanctioned objective (National Press Club v COMELEC)
4. And if the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
• The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual [and not at the
political parties] to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
to convince others to agree with him.
Restrictions that are content-neutral are not censorial. The restriction is not
PROPERTY RIGHTS (ART III SEC 1 VIOLATED) concerned with the content of the speech thus, it needs only a substantial
• the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad governmental interest to support them. (Osmena v. COMELEC)
that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle. EXIT POLLS - random polling of voters as they come out of the booths, and the
o Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall dissemination of their results through mass media cannot be banned by COMELEC,
be deprived of his property without due process of law they argue that it might confuse the voters. But it does not fall under clear and

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 present danger. The evil to be prevented is merely speculative. (ABS CBN v.
COMELEC) HELD: Petition for prohibition GRANTED.
Sec. 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 and Sec. 24(h) of COMELEC Resolution 3636 (implementing
SWS V COMELEC (ELECTION SURVEY BEFORE ELECTION) resolution), are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

DOCTRINE: ELECTION SURVEYS – a ban on surveys published 15days before RATIO:

elections for national candidates and 7days before elections for local candidates is a A. COMELEC Resolution is invalid because:
direct and total suppression of freedom of expression amounting to prior restraint. The 1. It imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression.
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by other means. • Prior restraint – refers to official governmental
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
RECIT READY: Petitioners SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC advance of actual publication or dissemination.
from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of • Burden of proof – the Government carries a heavy
election surveys 15 days before the election of national candidates and 7 days before burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such
the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveys covering the restraint. There is a reversal of the normal presumption of
entire election period and argue that the resolution violates their right to free speech validity that inheres in every legislation.
and expression. COMELEC on the other hand argues that the resolution is in pursuit 2. It is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression
of governmental interest, and that the impairment is minimal. It was held that the even though such suppression is only for a limited period.
resolution is invalid as because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of • The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute,
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the governmental and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of category of speech and is not made less so because it is
freedom of expression. only for a period of 15 days immediately before a national
election and seven 7 days immediately before a local
FACTS: election.
• Action for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 3. The governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
1. “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15 expression.
days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall B. Test to determine the constitutional validity of Sec 5.4
not be published seven 7 days before an election.” • The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren,
• Petitioners’ arguments: held in United States v. O 'Brien
1. They wish to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the • A Government regulation is sufficiently justified:
elections both at the national and local levels and release to the 1. if it is within the constitutional power of the Government
media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. 2. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
2. The restriction on the publication of election survey results interest
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech 3. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. free expression
• Respondent’s arguments: • Not present.
1. The prohibition on the publication of election survey results 4. if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection (of speech, expression and press) is no greater than is
to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement essential to the furtherance of that interest.
of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, • Not present. Such purposes of the COMELEC may be
bandwagon effect, and absence of reply. achieved through other means which will not impede
2. It is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented. speech and expression such as punishing unlawful acts of
releasing false information or survey materials.
3. The impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the DIOCESE V BACOLOD
restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days
before the national election and the last 7 days before a local TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
election.
FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 is constitutional. compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls

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of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed
RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the and review of this court.
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with o In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right
a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were political question brings.
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it • SECOND ISSUE: No.
form “Team Buhay.” o The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any o Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished
but were not candidates for that election. or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.”
ISSUES: o Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election
review. offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the curtail petitioners’ speech.
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions. o In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
citizens. violation of their freedom of speech.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content- • THIRD ISSUE: No.
neutral regulation. o Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property. support their position that they had the power to regulate the
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech. tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain
to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
HELD: Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not
• FIRST ISSUE: No. have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
o The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be • FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted o The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.. consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
o The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review o Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who
a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of no water.
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging o The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or
the fundamental right to expression. failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
o Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
whether an issue involves a truly political and non- paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate,
justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether political party, or party-list group.
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions o By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty- not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the o The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
government properly acted within such limits.
o A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering

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 informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more political consequences and not religious speech.
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
speech. With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
• FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation. government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
o Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
o The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to
The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals
medium. whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create
o Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as flourish.”
measure.
o Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must Lemon test
be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence A regulation is constitutional when:
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the 1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with 2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed 3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
unconstitutionality.”
o Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to 1-UNITED V COMELEC (read with ADIONG)
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify DOCTRINE: The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason right in any democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post others to vote for a particular candidate. The right to express one’s preference for
the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any
not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights. governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries
• SIXTH ISSUE: Yes. with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.
o The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their FACTS:
right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution. • On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615,
o Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with
of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the election propaganda, pertinently provides:
laws. o SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the
o The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where campaign period, it is unlawful:
decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it xxxx
encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it § (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that propaganda material outside of authorized common poster
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of areas, in public places, or in private properties without the
law. consent of the owner thereof.
• SEVENTH ISSUE: No. § (g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f)
o The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners include any of the following:
are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion o xxxx
in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify § Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains,
the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of or not;

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 § Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as place or manner, and under well-defined standards,
bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free
stations, and the like. speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
§ The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall 1. The government regulation is within the constitutional
be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise power of the Government;
and will make the owner and/or operator of the 2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election 3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as of free expression; and
implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules. 4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no
• Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to • Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral
Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and regulations since they merely control the place where election
transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant
reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid
owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials content-neutral regulation.
on their vehicles and transport terminals. • Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
• The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the
the petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there
(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615. is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of • The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and
Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional. not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
• In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of
HELD: supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election
• The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants
null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or
Constitution. utilization “of all franchises or permits for the operation,” inter alia, of
• Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution transportation and other public utilities. The
No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation
o Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but
No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to only to the franchise or permit to operate the same.
freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of • Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or
to express their preference, through the posting of election regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or
with them. on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act
• Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the
an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport PUV or transport terminal.
terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise • Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified
and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense. under the captive-audience doctrine.
• The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free • The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a
expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be
of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully restricted. The “captive-audience” doctrine recognizes that a listener
and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances
pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their in which the communication cannot be avoided.
franchise or permit to operate. • A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise
of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some
• The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. Such
invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause. selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the
o A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or
the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.

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• Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5)
not be justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV
otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner affect
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive- the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read • As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of
the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other
are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport
posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If
they find the same unbearably intrusive. owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express
• Lehman’s case not applicable their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials
• The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred
election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership,
v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
Lehman, a policy of the city government, which prohibits political owners of private vehicles and properties is merely
advertisements on government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the advertising space on the buses • The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use
was not a public forum, pointing out that advertisement space on government- by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart
run buses, “although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a from private vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any election
part of commercial venture.” In the same way that other commercial ventures campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals
need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public, the city’s would be seen by many people. However, election campaign materials
transit system has the discretion on the type of advertising that may be posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public,
displayed on its vehicles. e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus,
• In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the
city government; the city government, as owner of the buses, had the right to prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
decide which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses. • Summary
• Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., • Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
the city government, in choosing the types of advertisements that would be 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations,
placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are
Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and
terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties. opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech
• Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse clause, but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no
political advertisements on their buses. Considering that what were involved substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and
were facilities owned by the city government, impartiality, or the appearance owners of private vehicles and other properties.
thereof, was a necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and • On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s political
transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. A
their political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign materials restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most
on their properties. valuable feature of the democratic way of life.
• Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting
election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
• Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of
the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the
basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality
of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
• It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally
to the members of the purported class. However, the classification remains
constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction
and is not germane to the purpose of the law. A distinction exists between
PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties
in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the SWS V. COMELEC (2015)
government either a franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as

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FACTS: Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Third, whether Resolution No. 9674, insofar as it compels petitioners to submit the
Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as "other survey names of their subscribers, violates the constitutional proscription against the
4
firms of similar circumstance" to submit to COMELEC the names of all commissioners impairment of contracts (Article II, Section 10); NO
and payors of all surveys published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including
5
those of their "subscribers." Fourth, whether at the time petitioners were required by COMELEC to reveal the
names of the subscribers to their election surveys, Resolution No. 9674 was already in
SWS and Pulse Asia are social research and public polling firms. Among their activities force and effect; and
6
is the conduct of pre-election surveys.
Lastly, whether COMELEC deprived petitioners of due process of law when it: YES
As recounted by SWS and Pulse Asia, on February 15 to February 17, 2013, SWS a) failed to provide them with a copy of Resolution No. 9674 and the criminal
conducted a pre-election survey on voters’ preferences for senatorial candidates. complaint for an election offense; and
Thereafter, it published its findings. b) refused to specify the election offense under which they were being
prosecuted.
10
In his letter, Tiangco asked COMELEC to "compel [SWS] to either comply with the
directive in the Fair Election Act and COMELEC Resolution No. 9[6]1[5] and give the HELD: The court sustains the validity of Resolution 9674
names or identities of the subscribers who paid for the [pre-election survey
conducted from February 15 to February 17, 2013], or be liable for the violation RATIO:
11
thereof, an act constitutive of an election offense."
1. The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including
SWS and Pulse Asia recounted that during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair
Brillantes, Jr. (COMELEC Chairman Brillantes) stated that the proceeding was merely Election Act.
a clarificatory hearing and not a formal hearing or an investigation
This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and
On April 23, 2013, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 9674 ordering SWS effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to
47
to submit the names of all subscribers of those published surveys. Such opportunities for public service[.]"
information/data shall be for the exclusive and confidential use of the Commission;
19
à basis COMELEC cited Article IX-C, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution § Petitioner:
20
and Sections 5.1 to 5.3 of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the o Ultra Vires: They maintain that the Fair Election Act "as it was
21
Fair Election Act, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. written by Congress covers only those who commission or pay
for a particular election survey, and requires disclosure of their
On July 26, 2013, petitioners Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc. filed names only when that particular survey is published."
34
the present Petition. They assail Resolution No. 9674 as having been issued ultra o creat[ing] an election offense where there was none before"
vires. They are of the position that Resolution No. 9674, in requiring the submission of § Supreme Court: the Fair Election Act provides means to realize the policy
information on subscribers, is in excess of what the Fair Election Act articulated in Article II, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution to "guarantee
35
requires. Likewise, they assert that Resolution No. 9674 transgresses the Fair equal access to opportunities for public service[.]" Article II, Section
36
Election Act in making itself executory immediately after publication. Moreover, 26 models an understanding of Philippine political and electoral reality. It
they claim that it violates the non-impairment of contracts clause of the is not merely hortatory or a statement of value.
37
Constitution, and was enforced in violation of their right to due process (as they § Among others, it sums up an aversion to the perpetuation of political
were charged for its violation despite not having been properly served with its copies power through electoral contests skewed in favor of those with
38
or of the complaint filed against them). Petitioners pray for the issuance of a resources to dominate the deliberative space in any media.
39
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the interim. § The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by the Fair
Election Act is a recognition that election surveys are not a mere
ISSUES: descriptive aggregation of data. Publishing surveys are a means to
shape the preference of voters, inform the strategy of campaign
First, whether Resolution No. 9674 is invalid in that it requires the disclosure of the machineries, and ultimately, affect the outcome of elections. Election
names of "subscribers" of election surveys; NO surveys have a similar nature as election propaganda. They are
expensive, normally paid for by those interested in the outcome of
Second, whether the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the elections, and have tremendous consequences on election results.
requirement to submit the names of their subscribers; NO
2. Section 5.2(a)’s requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails
petitioners’ free speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription
against the impairment of contracts.

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 From the text of Section 5.2(a), the legislative intent or regulatory concern
§ The inclusion of published election surveys in a statute that regulates is clear: "those who have financed, one way or another, the [published]
110
election propaganda and other means through which candidates may survey" must be disclosed.
shape voter preferences is itself telling of the recognition that published
election surveys, too, may influence voter preferences. This inclusion is (2) Second, not only an important or substantial state interest but even a compelling
similarly telling of a recognition that, left unregulated, election surveys can one reasonably grounds Resolution No. 9674’s inclusion of subscribers to election
undermine the purposes of ensuring "fair" elections. These recognitions surveys. Thus, regardless of whether an intermediate or strict standard is used,
are embedded in the Fair Election Act; they are not judicial constructs. In Resolution No. 9674 passes scrutiny.
adjudicating with these as bases, this court is merely adhering to the
legislative imperative. Regulation of election surveys effects the guarantee of equal access to
§ Effects of Surveys on Voter Behavior have been postulated: opportunities for public interest
o Bandwagon effect: "electors rally to support the candidate
leading in the polls." Resolution No. 9674 addresses the reality that an election survey is
o Underdog effect where "electors rally to support the candidate formative as it is descriptive. It can be a means to shape the preference of
trailing in the polls." (sympathy) voters and, thus, the outcome of elections. In the hands of those whose end
o Motivating effect where "individuals who had not intended to vote is to get a candidate elected, it is a means for such end and partakes of the
are persuaded to do so," nature of election propaganda. Accordingly, the imperative of "fair"
o strategic voting where "voting is influenced by the chances of elections impels their regulation.
winning
o Theory of a free-will effect where "voters cast their ballots to While it does regulate expression (i.e., petitioners’ publication of election
prove the polls wrong surveys), it does not go so far as to suppress desired expression. There is
§ Surveys, far from being a passive "snapshot of many viewpoints held by a neither prohibition nor censorship specifically aimed at election surveys. The
90
segment of the population at a given time," can warp existing public freedom to publish election surveys remains. All Resolution No. 9674 does is
opinion and can mould public opinion. They are constitutive. Published articulate a regulation as regards the manner of publication, that is, that the
election surveys offer valuable insight into public opinion not just because disclosure of those who commissioned and/or paid for, including those
they represent it but more so because they also tend to make it. subscribed to, published election surveys must be made.
§ Appreciating this tendency to both entrench and marginalize is of acute
relevance in the context of Philippine political reality. This is the same NO PRIOR RESTRAINT
reality that our policymakers, primarily the framers of the Constitution, § Resolution No. 9674 poses no prohibition or censorship specifically aimed at
have seen fit to address. election surveys. Apart from regulating the manner of publication, petitioners
remain free to publish election surveys. COMELEC correctly points out that
3. However, it is evident that Resolution No. 9674 was promulgated in violation of "[t]he disclosure requirement kicks in only upon, not prior to, publication."
the period set by the Fair Election Act. Petitioners were also not served a copy § the requirement of disclosing subscribers is neither unduly burdensome nor
of Resolution No. 9674 with which it was asked to comply. They were neither onerous.
shown nor served copies of the criminal Complaint subject of E.O. Case No. 13- § Petitioners’ free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair Election
222. Petitioners’ right to due process was, thus, violated. Act’s purpose of ensuring political equality and, therefore, the speech of others
who want to participate unencumbered in our political spaces. On one hand,
IMPORTANT: We thus proceed to evaluate Resolution No. 9674’s requirement of there are petitioners’ right to publish and publications which are attended by
disclosing the names of subscribers to election surveys in light of the requisites for valid the interests of those who can employ published data to their partisan ends.
regulation of declarative speech by private entities in the context of an election On the other, there is regulation that may effect equality and, thus, strengthen
campaign the capacity of those on society’s margins or those who grope for resources
to engage in the democratic dialogue. The latter fosters the ideals of
(1) First, the text of Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act supports the inclusion of deliberative democracy. It does not trump the former; rather, it provides the
106
subscribers among those persons who "paid for the survey[.]" Thus, Resolution No. environment where the survey group’s free speech rights should reside.
9674 is a regulation finding basis in statute.
DAVAO CITY V ARANJUEZ
Section 5.2(a) thus requires the disclosure of two (2) classes of persons: "
FACTS: That as early as 16 May 2007, the members and officers of NAMADACWAD
[first,] those who commissioned or sponsored the survey; and [second,] have been staging pickets in front of the DCWD Office during their lunch breaks to air
109
those who paid for the survey." their grievances about the non-payment of their Collective Negotiation Agreement
(CNA) incentives and their opposition to DCWD’s privatization and proposed One
Hundred Million Peso Loan.

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 be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government
GM Gamboa issued an Office Memoransum addressed to all department managers employees, by themselves or through their employees organizations, with the
regarding the upcoming anniversary celebration which stated that the participant are intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
free to wear any sport attire. demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective
agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and
09 November 2007: Came the anniversary, officers and members sported t-shirts with acts of similar nature.
inscriptions "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!" at the beginning of
the Fun Run at VictoriaPlaza at around 6:30 in the morning and continued to wear the The operative phrases are "any collective activity" and "work stoppage or service
same inside the premises of the DCWD office during the office hours. Also, one of the disruption." Without the intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the
members of the Board of Directors of NAMADACWAD Gregorio S. Cagula (Cagula), concerted activity is not prohibited. The time and place of the activity are not
with the help of some of its members, attached similar inscriptions and posters of determinative of the prohibition. Whether done within government hours, a
employees’ grievances to a post in the motor pool area, an area not among the officially concerted activity is allowed if it is without any intent at work stoppage.
designated places5 for posting of grievances
We cannot isolate the provision of Section 6 of the Resolution from definition of
On 23 November 2007, another Memorandum was sent to the officers of prohibited activity in Section 5 thereof. It is erroneous to interpret the provisions
NAMADACWAD requiring them to explain within 72-hours why they should not be held in such a way that an act not within the circumstances as defined under Section
liable for the actions committed by Cagula. 5 can still be regarded as prohibited if done within government hours. To
subscribe to the argument of DCWD would in effect expand the definition provided
Finding prima facie case against them, GM Gamboa filed formal charges against the by Resolution No. 021316 on what constitutes a prohibited mass action.
officers and members of NAMADACWAD
It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions
CA affirmed the decision of CSC and ruled that the act of respondents in sporting a on CNA incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As
t-shirt with the inscription "CNA INCENTIVE IHATAG NA, DIRECTOR pointed out by the respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa "to be
BRAGANZA,PAHAWA NA!" during the fun run and even inside the office premises there" at the fun run.
hardly qualifies as a prohibited concerted mass action under CSC Resolution No.
021316. GSIS v. Villaviza (GSIS case) : It was there ruled that the acts of GSIS
To say the least, Section 5 of Resolution No. 01316 provides a specific guideline employees wearing similarly colored shirts while attending a public hearing inside
as to what constitutes a prohibited concerted activity. A prohibited concerted the GSIS Office, with clenching of fists and orating against the then President
activity must be one undertaken by government employees, by themselves or Winston Garcia, were not constitutive of a prohibited activity but were only an
through their association, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service exercise of their constitutional freedom of expression.
disruption, in order to realize their demands or force concessions.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate
In the case at hand, we can readily observe that respondent’s participation in the the political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or
fun run, as well as their behavior inside the premises of DCWD office during the mass action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work
regular working hours of that day indicate a complete absence of any intention on stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force
their part to effect a work stoppage or disturbance. In fact, as attested by both concession. "Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at
parties, all the respondents participated with the planned activities and festivities the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their
on that day fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not
constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and
WON THE CONCERTED MASS ACTION WAS PERMISSIBLE UNDER (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands or force concession.
RESOLUTION NO 021316 (YES)
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution
P à DCWD argues that since the concerted or mass action was done within No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not
government office hours, such act was not permissible, therefore prohibited. all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited.
Otherwise stated, a concerted activity done within the regular government office Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the
hours is automatically a violation of Section 6 of the Resolution. government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.

SC à Prohibited concerted mass action is defined not in Sec. 6 of Resolution No. DCWD also found that Cagula and the rest of the officials violated MC No. 33 in relation
021316 but in Sec. 5 thereof to 8 February 1996 Office Memorandum. DCWD also argues that a violation of this
circular constitutes as a serious violation of CSC Rules as the circular is a CSC-issued
Section 5. Definition of Prohibited Concerted Mass Action. - As used in this Memorandum and not just a mere issuance of DCWD.
Omnibus Rules, the phrase ‘‘prohibited concerted activity or mass action’’ shall

Jlyrreverre|99
CSC issued MC No. 33 in recognition of the rights of the government employees to air
their grievances balanced by the delivery of services to the public which should not be Does not enjoy the same protection as core speech (communicates political,
prejudiced. religious and social ideas)

Pursuant to this mandate, the former General Manager of DCWD issued an office Even truthful and lawful commercial speech may be regulated if they fulfill the ff.
memorandum designating the bulletin board at the motor pool area below the Office of requirements of the Hudson Test: S-D-O
the Purchasing Division and the side of the office building beside the guard house 1. The governmental interest sought to be served by the regulation must
where the bundy clock is located as the designated areas for posting of grievances.44 be substantial
Clearly, the DCWD Office Memorandum hews close and faithfully to MC No. 33. It is a 2. The regulation must be directly advance the government's interest
reasonable rule issued by the heads of the agencies in order to regulate posting of 3. The regulation must not be overboard (Rubin v. Coors Brewing)
grievances of the employees.
The city's news rack policy is neither content neutral nor, "narrowly tailored." Thus,
That those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree of regardless of whether or not it leaves open ample alternative channels of
limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the communication, it cannot be justified as a legitimate time, place, or manner
relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens restriction on protected speech. (Cincinnati v. Discovery Network)
just by reason of their employment.45 Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public
employment "must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." But there are some The ordinance prohibiting the placing of signs violates the residents' right to free
rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a speech. While said signs are subject to the municipality's police power, any
contract for public employment. It is the Court’s responsibility to ensure that citizens regulation may be challenged on the ground that it restricts too little speech because
are not deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government. its exemptions discriminate on the basis of Sign's message or on the ground that it
prohibits too much protected speech.
The GSIS case pronounced: Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as
much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe The ordinance cannot be justified as time, place manner restriction since handbills
to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their and newspaper advertisements are inadequate substitutes for important medium
freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, such as the posters that were prohibited by Ladue's ordinance. (City of Ladue v.
the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be Gilleo)
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away

regulation of the freedom of expression is not removal of the constitutional right. RUBIN V. COORS BREWING (LIQUOR LABELS)
Apparently, DCWD, not satisfied by the CSC ruling that a violation of the memorandum DOCTRINE: Commercial speech does not enjoy the same protection as core speech
is punishable with reprimand, argues that what occurred was a serious violation (communicates political, religious and social ideas)
implying that a higher penalty is warranted.
Even truthful and lawful commercial speech may be regulated if they fulfill the ff.
Under Section 52 (C) (3), Rule IV of Resolution No. 991936,48 violation of reasonable requirements of the Hudson Test: S-D-O
office rules and regulations is punishable with reprimand on the first offense and 1. The governmental interest sought to be served by the regulation must
suspension ranging from one to thirty days for the second offense.
be substantial
2. The regulation must be directly advance the government's interest
Thus, in line with the civil service rules and jurisprudence, we conclude that a violation
of an office memorandum, which was issued as an internal rule to regulate the area for 3. The regulation must not be overboard (Rubin v. Coors Brewing)
posting of grievances inside the office premise, is only a light offense punishable by
reprimand. RECIT READY: In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court struck down a federal statute,
27 U.S.C. §205(e), that prohibits beer labels from displaying alcohol content unless
COMMERCIAL SPEECH state law requires such disclosure. The Court found sufficiently substantial to satisfy
the second prong of the Central Hudson test the government’s interest in curbing
“strength wars” by beer brewers who might seek to compete for customers on the basis
NOTES:
of alcohol content. However, it concluded that the ban “cannot directly and materially
advance” this “interest because of the overall irrationality of the Government’s
Communication whose sole purpose is to propose a commercial transaction. Ex:
regulatory scheme.” This irrationality is evidenced by the fact that the ban does not
Ads of goods or services - It must not be false, misleading or illegal. (Friedman v.
apply to beer advertisements, and by the fact that the statute requires the disclosure of
Rogers), or propose any illegal activity (Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations alcohol content on the labels of wines and spirits.
Commission)

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LAW: First Amendment—“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of alcohol content not only on their strongest but also weakest
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or beverages
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the o Government’s anecdotal evidence and educated guesses were not
Government for a redress of grievances.” sufficient to overturn the irrationalities mentioned above

PETITIONER: Secretary of Treasury—responsible for implementing regulations on the • Whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest
bottling, labeling and packaging of alcohol products as indicated in the FAAA - N/A since third requisite is already lacking
RESPONDENTS: Coors Brewing Co.—brews beer
UNPROTECTED SPEECH: LIBEL
FACTS: Coors Brewing (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (BATF) for approval of its labels and other advertisements, which disclose the
alcohol content of its beer. The labels were rejected because the Federal Alcohol NOTES:
Administration Act (FAAA) prohibited this disclosure on labels.
Coors filed a case for declaratory judgment with the District Court because the law was LIBEL– a pubic and malicious imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary
violative of the First Amendment right. The Government argued that the purpose of the or any act, omission, condition status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
FAAA was to prevent strength wars—competition among brewers trying to attract discredit or contempt of a person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
customers based on the potency of their drink. District Court ruled that there is a Elements: A-P-I-M a. The allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
legitimate government interest, but that the law does not advance this interest in a direct another b. Publication of the charge- making the defamatory matter, after it has
and material way. Court of Appeals affirmed. Hence this petition for certiorari. been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been
written. c. Identity of the person defamed d. Existence of malice - when the author
ISSUE: WON the law is violative of First Amendment right to free speech—HELD: YES. of the imputation is prompted by ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty
Supreme court affirmed CA and District Court. but merely to injure reputation.

RATIO: Commercial speech (such as these beer labels) is also protected under the Privileged Communications- every defamatory act is presumed malicious except
First Amendment. The case of Central Hudson provides for factors that the court must in the following cases:
consider in determining WON a regulation of commercial speech survives First 1. Private Communication made by any person to another in the
Amendment scrutiny (and applying it to the case at bar): performance of a legal, social or moral duty.
• commercial speech must concern lawful activity and is not misleading 2. Fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments, remarks of
o respondent seeks to disclose truthful, verifiable and non- misleading any juridical, legislative, or other official proceeding which are not
factual information about the alcohol content of its beer on the labels confidential or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings. Or any other act performed by public officers in the
• there is a substantial government interest exercise of their functions.
o “curbing strength wars”—Government here has a significant
interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by Requisites: P-A-G
preventing brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol strength, 1. The person who made the communication has a legal, moral or social
which could lead to greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs duty to make the communication, or had an interest to protect.
2. The communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior
o “preserving state authority” was also raised but the Court decided having an interest in the matter, who has the power to furnish the
this was not a legitimate government interest. They presented protections sought.
nothing to show that the States needed any federal assistance. So 3. Statements are made in good faith and communicated w/o malice.
this argument was set aside
Nature of Libel- The law against libel is protective of reputation according to
• the regulation directly advances the asserted government interest community standards and not according to family or personal standards (Bulletin
o according to the FAAA, disclosing alcohol content is prohibited for Publishing Corp. v. Noel)
LABELS, but is allowed for OTHER advertisements. If they really
wanted to curb strength wars, it would have been an absolute ban For liability to arise without offending the press freedom, the test to meet is WON
on all kinds of advertisements the statements were made with 'actual malice'- ie. knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not (NY times v. Sullivan).
o in malt beverages (like beer), disclosure of alcohol content on labels
is prohibited; but it is allowed for wines and spirits. If they really
Burden of Proving Malice- lies on the plaintiff (Borjal v. CA)
wanted to curb strength wars, they should regulate the disclosure of

Jlyrreverre|101
Newspaper may publish news items relative to Judicial, legislative or other official tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the
proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to memory of one who is dead. The requisites for libel are:
know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official and non a. the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication b. publication of the charge
containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and. It must c. identity of the person defamed; and
be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks. Omissions in the d. existence of malice.
newspaper report, is libel by negligence.
The RPC provides that if the defamatory statement is made against a public official
If the publisher is unaware, when under the facts the truth could have been verified,
with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the
the publisher is guilty of negligence and was liable for libel. (Policarpio v. Manila
allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal. (Vasquez v. CA)
Times)
It is essential in a libel suit that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary
Libel of Public Officials and Public Figure
that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself
The constitutional guarantee prohibits a public official from recovering damages for
as the person attacked but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
him as the object of the libelous publication. (Borjal v. CA)
statement was made with actual malice. (STANDARD: Bars media liability for
defamation of a public official absent proof that the defamatory statements were
The petitioner's act of distributing copies of an article from The Inquirer stating that
published with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth) (NY
graft charges were filed against Judge Sidro cannot be considered as malicious.
Times v. Sullivan)
(Vicario v. CA)
The protection given to all debate and communication involving matters of public or
The court held that the statements embodied in the advertisement and the open-
general concern is extended without regard to whether the persons involved are
letter are protected by the constitutional right of freedom of speech. The
famous or anonymous, but the commitment to robust debate on public issues cannot
advertisement stating that a PCGG Commissioner committed illegal and
be displaced. (Rosenbloom v. Metromedia)
unauthorized acts which constitute graft and corruption was held by the court to be
a vehicle informing the public and the stockholders of the goings-on in the business
The State's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not
world. (Jalandoni v. Drilon)
sufficient to deny Constitutional protection to speech that could not reasonably have
been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. The rule in
POLICARPIO V MANILA TIMES (PROTECTED IF TRUE, AND DONE IN GOOD
TIMES case is extended to PRIVATESECTOR PUBLIC FIGURES (e.g. newscaster,
FAITH)
political analyst etc). (Hustler Magazine v. Falwell)
DOCTRINE: Newspaper may publish news items relative to Judicial, legislative or other
A publication relating to judicial action in a pending case which tends to impede
official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled
embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the
to know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official and non
administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is
confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication
punishable as contempt.
containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and. It must be
made in good faith and without any comments or remarks. Omissions in the newspaper
To constitute contempt, the publication must have been made under the
report, is libel by negligence.
circumstance as would be calculated to imperil the fair and orderly functioning of the
judicial process, not remotely or probably, but immediately, and it must constitute a
If the publisher is unaware, when under the facts the truth could have been verified,
clear and resent danger to the administration of justice which danger must be
the publisher is guilty of negligence and was liable for libel.
'serious and substantial. (in re Jurado- Enrile v. Salazar)
FACTS:
Libel of Private Individuals - A publisher of defamatory falsehoods about an
individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim the New t. Plaintiff filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates, which
York Times protection against liability for defamation. Media defamation of private caused the latter to be terminated. Reyes filed counter charges which were
persons whenever an issue of general or public interest is involved would be unfair then investigated by Col. Crisanto Alba, Special Investigator in the Office of
because private individuals characteristically have less effective opportunities for the President. (This was an administrative proceeding.) Reyes also filed with
rebuttal than public officials and public figures. New York Times standard is the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint against Policarpio for malversation of
inapplicable to private individuals. (Gertz v. Welch) public funds and estafa thru falsification of public documents. (A criminal
proceeding.)
Times Doctrine applied in Philippine Jurisprudence - An allegation is u. Respondent newspapers then published 2 news articles on Aug. 11, 1956 and
considered defamatory If it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime which Aug. 13, 1956 which reported the said complaints filed against Policarpio.

Jlyrreverre|102
 v. Policarpio sued the newspaper for damages. She alleged that there were
factual errors which prejudiced her and portrayed her as guilty or probably LOPEZ V CA (WRONG PICTURE OF PERSON)
guilty. Some errors were the ff.:
w. It falsely reported that the criminal action was filed as a result of the DOCTRINE: Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful
administrative investigation on its face by the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule,
x. It falsely reported that the Presidential Complaint and Action whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant.
Commission filed the charges with the City Fiscal of Manila • Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui à libel is "malicious defamation, expressed
y. It didn’t report that the number of UNESCO stencils involved in the either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to
charge of falsification were only 18 or 20 blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
z. It did no report that the alleged misappropriated fund was only Php54 reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and
aa. Defendants contend that these errors were too minor and immaterial and that thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"
they do not affect the truthfulness of the article as a whole. • Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel à "Publication of a
person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is
ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff should be awarded damages a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the
Held: YES article are imputed to such person."
rd
• Although newspapers are entitled to enjoy a certain degree of discretion in • In this case à 3 person was Cruz à his picture being published beside the
determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the article imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year
public, they must make sure that such sensational presentation will not be
illegal per se. When the articles stated it was a government agency that filed Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim any
an action against Policarpio, it painted that the plaintiff is in a worse position talismanic immunity form constitutional limitations
than where she actually is. Not only was it derogatory, it was also wrong. • State interest in press freedom à citing Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of
• How could defendants claim to have acted with good intentions or justifiable public affairs is necessary for the maintenance of good governance… “Public
motive in falsely stating that the complaint had been filed by the PCAC? Either officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments on official
they knew the truth about it or they did not know it. If they did, the publication acts”…”of course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as
would be actually malicious. If they did not or if they acted under a an individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the
misapprehension of facts, they were guilty of negligence in making said common good.”
statement, • So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to
• In the interest of justice and of all parties concerned, the defendants must have and express their opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right
indemnify the plaintiff for damages. would be to infringe upon freedom of the press.
• “Last word on the subject” à Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be
• The immunity enjoyed by the press presupposes that the derogatory given leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
information they publish are both TRUE and FAIR and made in good faith, perform their important role in our democracy
without any comments or remarks. • Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values
• The errors and omissions by the newspaper were indeed material. • TEST of LIABLITY à must prove there was actual malice in publishing the
o The penalty for estafa or embezzlement depends partly on the story/photo! (Note: but this was not done in this case)
amount of damage caused to the offended party. Therefore, it was
necessary for the newspaper to say the amount of 54 pesos as well Citing Concepcion, CJ. à Correction of error in publishing does not wipe out the
as the number of documents allegedly falsified. responsibility arising from the publication of the original article
o Saying that another government agency filed a criminal case against • Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying circumstance!
an individual gives the view that the probability of guilt of the accused
is higher. Its different when another individual files the case. RECIT-READY: The petitioner was sued for libel, which resulted from a picture
• Defendants claim that the plaintiff did not establish malice on their part. published in This Week Magazine of The Manila Chronicle. Unfortunately, the picture
However, Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code says that “every defamatory was that of a different person. The petitioner asks herein whether the damages
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention awarded to the respondent was proper, on the basis that the former promptly published
and justifiable motive for making it is shown.” a correction and the picture of the actual person related to the event referred to in the
• Although the second article corrected some inaccuracies, it does not wipe out article. The SC cited the Quisumbing case, wherein a picture of a different person was
the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article. It merely also published and where no liabilities were incurred by the publisher, stating that a
mitigates it. newspaper should not be held accountable for honest mistakes done in the course of
its publication. However, the Quisumbing case was not squarely in point, the SC noting
that there was no pressure of a daily deadline in Quisumbing and that reasonable care
Judgment reversed. Damages awarded to plaintiff but reduced for being
was absent. It also cited Policarpio, where it was held that a rectification or clarification
mitigated.

Jlyrreverre|103
should not wipe out all the liabilities, but should instead mitigate it. The damages oo. P5,000 as moral damages, and
awarded to Fidel G. Castro was thus reduced from P11,000 to P1,000. pp. P1,000 for attorney's fees
qq. Respondent CA affirmed CFI’s decision. Thus, this petition.
FACTS:
bb. This case is a petition for certiorari from a decision of respondent Court of ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners should be made to pay at all, contending that, in
Appeals holding petitioners, the then publisher and editor of This Week invoking a liberal construction of the implications of press freedom, they readily owned
Magazine, liable in damages to the tune of eleven thousand pesos arising up to the mistake and that they immediately published a correction as an earnest of its
from the publication of a picture of respondent, Fidel G. Cruz, as being good faith in the publication.
responsible for the hoax of the year.
cc. January 1956 - The Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner Eugenio Lopez was HELD: YES. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 25, 1966 affirming
the publisher, printed a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the the lower court decision of March 22, 1958 is hereby modified, petitioners Eugenio
Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a distress signal to a passing Lopez and Juan T. Gatbonton being ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of
United States Airforce plane, which in turn relayed the message to Manila. P500.00 as moral damages and the additional amount of P500.00 for attorney's fees.
dd. an American Army plane dropped a two- way radio set, which Fidel
Cruz utilized to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the RATIO:
place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since 1. The petitioners invoked the freedom of the press in arguing that they did not commit
Christmas of 1955 libel; however, the SC answered that this is understandable because, indeed, there
ee. Major Encarnacion, lead of the scout rangers sent to respond to Fidel would be no liability if it could demonstrate that there, in fact, was no libel committed.
Cruz’s message, and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a a. Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui:
man, the same Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted transportation home i. “the repeal of the old Libel Law (Act No. 277) did not abolish the
to Manila. civil action for libel.
ff. Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his own ii. A libel was defined in Act No. 277 as a "malicious defamation,
descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. Same word used by other expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or
newspapers. the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead
gg. This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by petitioner Juan T. or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the
Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby "pose
• This week Magazine mentioned that while Fidel Cruz story turned out him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule”
to be false if brought to light the misery of the people living in that iii. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code
place, with almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read providing for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or
and write, food and clothing being scarce. any other form of defamation.
• January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine – the incident was b. Treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a person's
termed the “Calayan Hoax”, and the magazine mentioned that Fidel photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a
Cruz nevertheless did the country a good turn by calling the libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in
government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the the article are imputed to such person. From this angle, libel is a crime,
Republic. (An early publication termed this incident as "Hoax of the and as such subjects the offender to a fine or imprisonment.
rd
Year”) In this case à 3 person was Cruz à his picture being
hh. The magazine, on both occasions, carried a picture of a person purporting to published beside the article imputes him as the purveyor of the
be Fidel Cruz. However, it was actually a photograph of private respondent hoax of the year
Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. (The c. Peck v. Tribune Co – decision penned by Justice Holmes:
photographs of Fidel Cruz and Fidel G. Cruz were in advertently switched.) I. The Chicago Sunday Tribune published certain words of
ii. January 27, 1957 - a correction was immediately published in This Week commendation for a brand of liquor attributed to petitioner ,
Magazine: when in fact she did not make such a statement at all and could
jj. petitioners published the picture of the “hoax” instigator, Fidel Cruz not have made it, as she was a total abstainer. A photo of
kk. the photographs and the correction were enclosed by four lines, the petitioner was also published.
type used was bolder than ordinary II. There were suggestions that the Tribune published the portrait
ll. item was placed in a conspicuous place by mistake and without knowledge that it was the petitioner’s
mm. Respondent Fidel G Cruz sued the petitioners in the CFI of Manila for the portrait. However, Justice Holmes said that this was not a
recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the above defense for, as by Lord Mansfield said, 'Whenever a man
publication of his picture. Damages were awarded as follows: publishes, he publishes at his peril.'
nn. P5,000 as actual damages

Jlyrreverre|104
 III. “A libel is harmful on its face. If a man sees fit to publish television since everyone; including children have easier access to television.
manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without (Gonzalez v. Kalaw- Katigbak)
other justification than exists for an advertisement or a piece of
news, the usual principles of tort will make him liable if the To bar the exercise of the right, there must be a clear and present danger that would
statements are false, or are true only of someone else." warrant State interference – that a danger must not only be (1) clear, but also (2)
2. The SC recognizes that, in their decisions, there is an impression that press freedom present, to justify state action. There must be objective and convincing, not
would be curtailed if an action for libel is not scrutinized in order to remove doubts that subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger,
it is being used to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right. not relying solely on authority's own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or
a. Quisumbing v Lopez safety may require. And the burden to show the existence of great and imminent
i. "So long as it is done in good faith, newspapers have the legal right danger, and obscenity that would justify adverse action lies on the authorities.
to have and express opinions on legal questions. To deny them that
right would infringe upon the freedom of the press." What mayor or authorities must do is to secure a warrant and convince the court or
3. The defamatory matter complained of in the Quisumbing case appeared in the judge with jurisdiction that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene," and pose
headline, without basis. Nonetheless, no liability was deemed incurred by the then a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State
publisher of the Manila Chronicle. A newspaper "should not be held to account to a interference and action. (Pita v. CA)
point of suppression for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words."
a. However, in Quisumbing, there was no pressure of a daily deadline that The Court found that Indiana's public indecency statute is justified despite its
needed to be met incidental limitations on some expressive activity.
b. Also, the added requirement of reasonable care was not satisfied. (And so
the SC holds that there must still be damages awarded, not a total Applying O'Brien:
expungement of liability.) 1. The traditional police power of the State is defined as the authority to provide for
4. Policarpio v Manila Times: “rectification or clarification does not wipe out the the public health, safety and morals. The statute reflected moral disapproval of
responsibility arising from the publication of the first article, although it may and should people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places.
mitigate it” 2. The public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in
protecting order and morality
Dissent: Dizon, J. 3. What Indiana prohibited was not dancing as a communicative element but simply
rr. Manila Chronicle should be absolved because: its being done in the nude.
ss. No evidence of actual malice 4. Indiana's requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties and a g-string is
tt. The article does not ascribe anything immoral or any moral turpitude to Cruz modest and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the State's purpose.
uu. The negligence performed by Manila Chronicle is this case should be (Barnes v. Glenn Theatre)
considered “excusable negligence”
Obscenity on Radio- Stricter rules on obscenity must be followed especially
UNPROTECTED SPEECH: OBSCENITY because of its pervasive quality and the interest in the protection of children. The
prohibition against censorship denies the Commission power to edit proposed
Obscenity and Indecency – something offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. programs in advance and to excise material considered inappropriate. HOWEVER,
the prohibition has never been construed to deny the commission the power to
review the content of COMPLETED broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory
In Testing for obscenity: the basic guidelines for the tier of facts must be: PI-SD-LV
powers. The commission has the right to take not of past program content when
(1) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards considering a licensee's renewal application. (FCC v. Pacifica Foundation)
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest, community standards- standards of a specific community, which do Zoning legislation- dealing with adult entertainment that does not ban adult
not really vary from other communities. theaters altogether is not invalid being properly analyzed as a form of time, place
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual and manner of regulation. "Content-neutral time, place and manner regulations are
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial government interest
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or an do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. (Renton v.
scientific value. (Miller v. California) Playtime Theatre)

Obscene material is that which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient Obscenity in School- The first amendment does not prevent the school district from
interest. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is disciplining students in giving offensively lewd and indecent speech at a school
a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. This assembly. The use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults
ruling however, is limited to motion pictures. A less liberal approach is given for making a political point but it does not follow that the same latitude must be permitted
to children in public school. (Bethel School District v. Fraser)

Jlyrreverre|105
 xx. Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of
Schools have the authority to censor if it could affect the education of others. This illustrated books, euphemistically called "adult material"
case led that the censorship in the schools was only acceptable if it were for "valid yy. After a jury trial, he was convicted of violating California Penal Code 311.2
educational purpose." Stricter rules should be followed for speech in school because • Misdemeanor by knowingly distributing obscene matter
of the nature of the community that is involved and the relationship between school • Conviction specifically based on
and parents. (Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier) o Conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be
sent through the mail in an envelope addressed to a restaurant
in Newport Beach, California
MILLER V. CALIFORNIA (MAILING OF ADULT MATERIALS) o Envelope was opened by the manager of the restaurant and his
mother
DOCTRINE: At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of
o They did not request such brochures so they complained to the
sexual conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit
police
First Amendment protection. The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, zz. Brochures
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or • The brochures advertise four books and a film
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the o "Intercourse"
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, o "Man-Woman"
artistic, political, or scientific value. obscenity is an issue proper for judicial o "Sex Orgies Illustrated"
determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound o "An Illustrated History of Pornography"
discretion. o "Marital Intercourse" (film)
• The brochures consist of
To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national
o Some descriptive print material
"community standard" would be an exercise in futility. Thus the Court herein (a) reaffirm
the Roth holding that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment; (b) o Pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and women
hold that such material can be regulated by the States, subject to the specific engaging in variety of sexual activities, with genitals often
safeguards enunciated above, without a showing that the material is "utterly without prominently displayed
redeeming social value"; and (c) hold that obscenity is to be determined by applying
"contemporary community standards," not "national standards." RULING:

SUMMARY: Appellant was convicted because of sending brochures containing Application of the State's criminal obscenity statute
obscene materials to unwilling recipients. It is now questioned whether or not obscene • The States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or
publications are covered by the protections of the First Amendment, and if not, how it exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries
is punished. The Court decided that obscene materials are not covered by the First with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling
Amendment protection on free speech. In its decision, the court laid down the basic recipients or of exposure to juveniles
guidelines for determining obscenity (as shown below). It also said that such cases • Now, the questions are: What is obscene? How can you determine? Can
must be determined by applying community, and not national, standards. Decision of it be punished?
the lower court is vacated and the case is remanded back to the same court for further • Test of Obscenity
proceedings. o Roth v. U.S.
§ Obscenity is not covered by the protection of the First
FACTS: Amendment. Therefore, it can be punished
vv. Marvin Miller operated a mail-order business in California in 1971. His § Benefits from exposing ideas through obscenity are
company primarily distributed pornographic books and films, and that year he clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
sent out a brochure advertising his products which contained graphic
morality
depictions of sex acts. By mistake, five of the brochures were mailed to a
o Three elements (Memoirs v. Massachusetts)
restaurant, whose owner, upon opening the envelope, called the police.
§ The dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
ww. Miller was charged with violating a California law against 'obscene matter.'
appeals to a prurient interest in sex
Under that law, the legal definition of 'obscene' was based on two previous
Supreme Court decisions which had narrowed the meaning to materials that § The material is patently offensive because it affronts
were 'utterly without redeeming social value.' Miller was convicted, and his contemporary community standards relating to the
appeal quickly moved to the Supreme Court description or representation of sexual matters
§ The material is utterly without redeeming social value

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 o In the Memoirs test, the third requisite is deemed impossible to • Court held that such material can be regulated b the States, subject to specific
be proven under the criminal standards of proof safeguards shown above (no need to show that material is "utterly without
o Given such problem, the test in the Memoirs case was redeeming social value" - rejected Memoirs case)
abandoned • Court held that obscenity is to be determined by applying contemporary
community standards and not national standards
Obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment • Judgement of the Appellate Department Court of the Superior Court, Orange
• First Amendment Protection County, California, is vacated and the case remanded to that Court for further
o Granted to works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, proceedings not inconsistent with the First Amendment Standards established
artistic, political, or scientific value in this opinion
o There is no evidence, empirical or historical, saying that the
censorship of public distribution and display of material relating GONZALES V. GALAW KATIGBAK (OBSCENE MOVIE)
to sex in any way limited or affected expression of serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific ideas DOCTRINE: The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films, but it cannot
• However, statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be impose a censorship in the production of movies, which would constitute a prior
carefully limited restraint. Any restraint must show proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive
• Basic guideline for the trier of fact evil. The test to this is whether to the average person, applying contemporary
o Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal to
prurient interest.
community standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest (sexual matters)
SUMMARY: Petitioner Gonzales, on behalf of Malaya Films, assails the Board’s
o Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently classification of their production Kapit sa Patalim as “For Adults Only” and its resolution
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the to issue a permit only if the petitioner makes certain changes and deletions. It was held
applicable state law Whether the work, taken as a whole, that the Board did not commit any grave abuse of discretion because its resolution was
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value supported by the fact that a number of scenes in the movie are not fit for public viewing.
• Suggested regulatory specifications under the second element in the Hence the court restated the test to determine obscenity: Whether to the average
guideline (for the lawmakers) person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
o Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated
o Patently offensive representations or descriptions of FACTS:
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the • Kapit sa Patalim – motion picture in question classified as “For Adults Only”;
genitals was permitted by the Board with certain changes and deletions.
• No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene • Petitioner’s argument:
materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive o Classification of “For Adults Only” is without basis. The Board
"hard core" sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state exercised an impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The film
law, as written or construed is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the
Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of
Offensiveness of the material to be determined based on community, and not the film.
national, standards • Respondent’s arguments:
§ In the case at hand, both the prosecution and the defense agreed that the o Executive Order No. 876 - reference was made to respondent Board
standards of California should apply and not just some vague generalization of "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard”.
the entire USA o The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to theater
§ Defense counsel contended that the application of national standards violated operators and viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the
the first and fourteenth amendments (was just raised during the appeal) young. Some of the scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-
• His argument was accepted club and a good portion of the film shots concentrated on some
§ People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the
not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity theater stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women
kissing and caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of the picture,
RULING FOR THE CASE there exists scenes of excessive violence attending the battle
between a group of robbers and the police. The vulnerable and
• Court reaffirmed the Roth case by saying that obscenity is not covered by the
imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes.
protection granted by the First Amendment

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 o Petitioner has an option to have the film reclassified to For-General- (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary standards’ would find
Patronage if it would agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare the work, taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.
down the violence in the film.
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
ISSUES: way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.
aaa. Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion by the respondent Board
in classifying Kapit sa Patalim as “For Adults Only”, without any deletion or (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
cut. or scientific value.
bbb. What is the test to determine obscenity?
What mayor or authorities must do is to secure a warrant and convince the court or
HELD: Petition DISMISSED solely on the ground that there are not enough votes for a judge with jurisdiction that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene," and pose
ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference
as "For-Adults-Only." and action.

RATIO: The test for obscenity is whether it has a corrupting tendency, or when it can be said
1. There was an abuse of discretion by the Board but there are not enough votes to that it is offensive to human sensibilities. There has been no uniformity even with
consider it as grave. Decision found support mainly from Respondents’ arguments. American jurisprudence regarding the issue of whether obscenity is included in the
• Power of the Board – limited to the classification of films, but it cannot impose guaranty of free speech or not, but if such pictures are shown in art exhibits for the sake
a censorship in the production of movies, which would constitute a prior of art to be viewed by art enthusiasts, there would be no offense, but if it is for
restraint. commercial purposes then it may be viewed by people whose aim is to satisfy their lust
• Censorship – must show proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive and desires – materials which are not entitled to constitutional protection. In the case
evil. presented, there is no challenge to the right of the state in the exercise of police power
• Opinions: to suppress obscene materials, provided that they are proven to be obscene but these
o Justice Douglas - every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what materials cannot just be deemed obscene because of one’s opinion. In cases involving
the freedom of expression, the courts have always been on the side of the exercise of
medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.
the right, but a clear and present danger that would make state interference justifiable.
o Justice Brennan - sex and obscenity are not synonymous.Obscene
The Court is not convinced that sufficient proof was shown to justify the seizure, for no
material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
lawful court order was even presented authorizing the respondents.
prurient interest. The portrayal of sex in art, literature and scientific
works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and FACTS:
mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a § In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police,
subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks, magazines
of the vital problems of human interest and public concern. believed to be obscene. These were later burned. One of the publications
was Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
2. Test to determine obscenity – Whether to the average person, applying
§ He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this was a violation
whole appeals to prurient interest.
of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an
• Hicklin Test – early leading standard of obscenity where material is to be
Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible
indiscriminate seizure.
persons. Later on rejected by subsequent decisions.
§ Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of
• Duty of the Judiciary - while recognizing the principle that libel is beyond the
obscence reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered by the
pale of constitutional protection, it left no doubt that in determining what
stall owners and the establishments were not raided.
constitutes such an offense, a court should ever be mindful that no violation
§ The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no
of the right to freedom of expression is allowable.
answer.
• Ruling applicable to motion pictures only, not to television - unlike motion § On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for
pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, broadcast television is more hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the
question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic)
seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or
not".
PITA V. CA (PINOY PLAYBOY) § On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from
denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case
DOCTRINES: Miller test (3 Tests) for lack of merit

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 § The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the § Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the
press is not without restraint. guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a
§ In the SC, the petitioner claimed that: climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague
o The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any theories of what is acceptable to society.
court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines § In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the
on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene. legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For
o The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is
and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging
its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What
for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to
preliminary injunction. the present generation.
§ But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter
ISSUE: Was the seizure constitutional? of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and
women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
HELD: No. Petition granted § Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court
RATIO: has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear
§ Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But the
is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral burden to show this lies with the authorities.
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as § "There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof
being obscene may fall of the existence of such clear and present danger."
§ Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the § As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The
by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger
it." (Kottinger) that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to
§ When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said stop the speech.
to be offensive to human sensibilities? § The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the
§ The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for
drawn nor divided. which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
§ Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by
prurient interest." way of a search warrant.
§ Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense § Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under
that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can
than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases conclude that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned
are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process.
what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the The PD’s don’t give the authorities the permission to execute high-handed
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a acts.
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law § It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial
enforcers. warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.
§ The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which § There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of Court
expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to
to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' a lawful arrest and it must be on account fo a crime committed.
would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) § The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific ought to be "punished".
value. § Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid
§ The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant
"obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to
the constitutional dimension of the problem. make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.

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TESTS: Clear and Present Danger Test applied- In the absence of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest, there was no justification
TEST OF OBSCENITY (PEOPLE vs KOTTINGER) then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable
1. Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to assembly. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral streets, there is freedom of access, Nor is their use dependent on who is the
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. (Reyes v. Bagatsing)
charged is being obscene may fall.
Rules on Assembly and Petition: I-A-H-D
2. Those that shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an 1. Inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and
indecency the time when it will take place (private place-only consent of owner
required)
PASEI vs DRILON (Definition of Police Power): State authority to enact legislation 2. Application- filed ahead of time to enable public official concerned to
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote GENERAL appraise whether there may be valid objections
WELFARE 3. (Indispensable condition to refusal or modification that the CPD test be
the standard for the decision reached)
PROCEDURE (OBSCENE MATERIALS)
4. If public authority believes that there is an imminent and grave danger
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a Search Warrant from a
of substantial evil, applicants must be heard on the matter.
Judge, in in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the Court that the materials sought to be 5. Decision must be transmitted at the earliest opportunity.
seized are “obscene”, and pose a CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER of an It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will
evil substantive enough to warrant a State interference and action; inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to
3. The Judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed “obscene” strike is denied government employees. (Acosta v. CA)
the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on his hand’s
sound discretion; Definition of Public Assembly- The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march,
4. If, in the opinion of the Court, probable cause exists, it may issue the Search parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public
Warrant; place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings. It regulates the exercise
5. Paper suit, Article 201; of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant
to the regulation.
UNPROTECTED SPEECH: ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Maximum Tolerance- The highest degree of restraint that the military, police and
other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
Content Neutral Regulation- The government has a right to regulate the time,
manner and place of assemblies to ensure the maintenance of order and public dispersal of the same. - Application for a permit can only be denied on the ground
safety. of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public morals or public
health. (Bayan v. Ermita)
The mayor possessed reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets of
public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof BAYAN V ERMITA (NO PERMIT AND NO RALLY AND CPR)
by other and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder
and maintain public safety and order. (Navarro v. Villegas) RECIT READY: Petitioners assail their peaceful mass actions and rallies were blocked
and violently dispersed by police, on authority from BP 880. People were arrested.
The primacy if human rights, freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and Ermita announced that the CPR was in force in lieu of maximum tolerance provided in
petition for redress of grievances-over property rights should be sustained. To said law. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of BP 880 as well as CPS. The court
regard the demonstration against the police officers, not against the employer, as said that BP 880 is constitutional. The right to peaceful assembly is limitable upon
evidence of bad faith, a violation of the CBA and a cause for the dismissal from showing of a clear and present danger. Rally permits may be denied on this basis. BP
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the 880 imposes content-neutral (time, place, manner) restrictions only. Maximum
CBA, and is a potent means of inhibiting speech and therefore inflicts a moral as Tolerance is for public safety and order; it has nothing to do with the content of
well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free-expression of peaceful speecher.
assembly and petition. (Philippine Blooming Mills v. PBM)
DOCTRINE: The BP 880 requires the permit to rally, wherein the mayor has the duty
to grant the permit unless there is a clear and present danger. It is a content-neutral
regulation referring to the time, place and manner. The CPR on the other hand, is

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unconstitutional for its failure to adhere to the maximum tolerance policy (allow rallies • CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action
without permits unless they are violent). even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or
executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
FACTS: All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a
others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble
seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the
CPR policy recently announced. ISSUE : Whether or not Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12,
13(a) and 14(a) violates the constitutional guarantee set forth in Art. III Sec. 4 of the
Bayan, et. al. Philippine Constitution
• Citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations
and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, HELD WON Batas Pambansa No. 880 is constitutional.
2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa RATIO
(B.P.) No. 880. • It must be remembered that the right to peaceably assembly and petition for
• contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution redress of grievances, while sacrosanct, is not absolute and it may be so
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power
880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the
the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which general welfare of the people.
the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content- neutral as it does not • This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its
apply to mass actions in support of the government. The phrase “maximum legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions,
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies
pass the strict scrutiny test. called municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose.
• B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
Jess del Prado, et al. simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was
• They were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, 288 SCRA 447 (1998), where the Court
held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the referred to it as a “content- neutral” regulation of the time, place, and manner
police of holding public assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus
• that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based
condition for the valid exercise of that right and characterizes public because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words “opinion,”
dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly content
prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act based, since they can refer to any subject. The words “petitioning the
that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside government for redress of grievances” come from the wording of the
from being void for being vague and for lack of publication Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for
the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of
Kilusang Mayo Uno the expressions in the rally. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the law is very clear
• They conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and and is nowhere vague in its provisions. “Public” does not have to be defined.
those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful • Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Webster’s Dictionary defines it, thus:
assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group of people
“Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. distinguished by common interests or characteristics x x x. Not every
• Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to “rally,
cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or
the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: concerted action held in a public place.” So it does not cover any and all kinds
First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of gatherings.
of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day • The Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No.
requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum
public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be

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 followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum of the female body through glass panels. (at 563.) An Indiana statute passed
tolerance. in 1988 (“the statute”) made it illegal to appear nude in a public place.
• In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental § As a result, dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre have to wear
rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of “pasties” and “G-Strings” when dancing to avoid violating the Indiana public
assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban nudity statute. Darlene Miller, a dancer at the Kitty Kat Lounge, and Gayle Ann
has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their Marie Sutro, a performer at Glen Threatre, both wished to dance nude in the
prosperity. He said that “in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should course of their employment at the South Bend establishments because, for
weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, one reason, they believe they “would make more money doing so.” (at 563.)
the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions As a result, the Kitty Kat Lounge, Glen Theatre, and the dancers (“the
that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption challengers”) sued the state of Indiana in federal district court to enjoin
against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened enforcement of Indiana’s public nudity statute, arguing that it violated their
scrutiny.” For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy First Amendment right to freedom of expression — which encompasses the
has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness right to nude, erotic dancing.
that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some § The case rose to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals once before this matter,
police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be which ruled on the “overbreadth” argument posed by the challengers, and
condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; remanded the case back to the district court to determine the whether the
it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner statute’s specific application to nude dancing by the challenging performers
of assemblies. Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit violated the First Amendment. The Northern District of Indiana found upon
of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to remand that the type of dancing the challengers aspired to perform was not
issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound protected by the First Amendment.
“clear and present danger” standard. § On appeal for the second time, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled en
banc that “nonobscene nude dancing performed for entertainment is
ADDITIONAL CASES CONSTI expression protected by the First Amendment, and that the public indecency
statute was an improper infringement of that expressive activity because its
BARNES V. GLEN THEATER purpose was to prevent the message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by
(NUDE DANCERS) the dancers.” (at 565.) The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the
state of Indiana’s claim that its public nudity statute did not violate the First
DOCTRINE: The requirement for the nude dancers to wear pasties-as provided by Amendment rights of the challengers.
Indiana’s public indecency statute does not violate the First Amendment. What is
prohibited is nudity in general and not the eroticism. The court stated that when speech ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC NUDITY STATUTE VIOLATED THE FIRST
and non speech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently AMENDMENT RIGHTS
important governmental interest can justify incidental limitations. The statute passed
the O’Brien test even though it limited expressive activity. HELD: NO

RECIT-READY: A plurality of the Supreme Court of the United States found that RATIO:
although nude dancing was entitled protection under the First Amendment as § Rehnquist, C.J., delivered an opinion of the court, in which O’Connor and
expressive content, Indiana did not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the Kennedy, JJ., joined.
bars or the dancers by imposing certain restrictions. Two establishments in South § There were several steps to the inquiry into whether the Indiana public nudity
Bend, Indiana, including Glen Theatre, Inc., and dancers employed at the statute violated the First Amendment rights of the dancers by forbidding the
establishments, challenged an Indiana statute that made it illegal to dance in the nude dancing that they wished to practice at the South Bend establishments.
nude as a violation of their First Amendment right to freedom of expression. The § First, the Court had to determine whether public nude dancing was the type
Supreme Court held that the statute was narrowly tailored to further a substantial of expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment at all. The Court’s
governmental purpose, thus it was constitutional. plurality opinion found that a string of prior Supreme Court cases “support the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that nude dancing of the kind sought to be
FACTS: performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
§ The Kitty Kat Lounge is a business in South Bend, Indiana, that exhibits Amendment, though … only marginally so.” (at 566.)
dancing for customer entertainment and sells alcoholic beverages. Glen § Then, the Court had to examine whether the public nudity statute’s restriction
Theatre, Inc., (Glen Theatre) has a business location in South Bend, Indiana, on expression was permitted under the First Amendment. The statute did not
as well. Glen Theatre purveys “adult entertainment” which, in addition to criminalize nude dancing specifically, but all nudity in public. The ban on nude
movies and books, includes nude and seminude performances and showings dancing at places like the Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre was
accomplished indirectly by the general prohibition on public nudity. Because

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 the statute banned nudity of any kind “in public,” it is what is classified by order and morals was an “important” governmental interest supported by
the Supreme Court as a “time, place, or manner” restriction on expression. Supreme Court precedent.
§ Incidental “time, place, or manner” restrictions on expressive conduct or § Souter, J., concurring in the judgment. Justice Souter found that the dancing
“symbolic speech” combining speech and non speech elements in “public at issue with the challengers was expressive content protected by the First
forums” are evaluated under the Supreme Court’s rule in United States v. Amendment, with “eroticism” being the primary feeling expressed. The opinion
O’Brien, (at 567), which requires: also found the O’Brien test mentioned by the plurality was the proper test for
1. The regulation “is within the constitutional power of the Government”; evaluating the constitutionality of the Indiana public nudity statute. However,
2. The regulation “furthers an important or substantial governmental Justice Souter wrote a separate opinion to argue that the law was
interest”; constitutional “not on the possible sufficiency of society’s moral views to justify
3. The “governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free the limitations at issue, but on the State’s substantial interest in combating the
expression”; secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments of the sort typified by
4. The “incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is respondents’ establishments.” (at 582.) Justice Souter thought there was
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” significant empirical evidence and Supreme Court precedent supporting the
§ The Supreme Court has long upheld the “traditional police power” of the states view that there are harmful secondary effects from adult entertainment
“to provide for the public health, safety, and morals” as a basis for laws and establishments, such as crime and urban deterioration. This interest was
regulations. Furthermore, Indiana’s public nudity statute furthered order and unrelated to the suppression of the expression in erotic dancing, and thus was
morality, a substantial government interest, as demonstrated by a long history an alternative way to satisfy the third part of the O’Brien test from that posed
of public indecency prohibitions in U.S. statutes and other ancient sources of by the plurality opinion.
law. Thus, the first two prongs of the O’Brien test were satisfied. § White, J., wrote a dissenting opinion joined by JJ., Marshall, Blackmun, and
§ The reason for the Indiana law was also unrelated to the suppression of Stevens. Justice White agreed with the other justices that the nude dancing
freedom of expression, because nudity is not inherently related to expression, at issue was entitled to protection under the First Amendment as expressive
and the Court had previously rejected a notion of “expressive conduct” under conduct. Dancing “is an ancient art form and ‘inherently embodies the
which virtually any person engaging in any conduct is expressing an idea that expression and communication of ideas and emotions.’” (at 587.) However,
would trigger the First Amendment’s protections. The argument that Indiana Justice White found that the law specifically targeted expressive activity, and
was trying to suppress the expression of an erotic message was unconvincing, was not a law prohibiting general conduct. In such a case, the law should be
as “the requirement that the dancers don pasties and G-strings does not unconstitutional “absent a compelling state interest supporting the statute,” a
deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the different standard than the O’Brientest. The primary reason for prohibiting
message slightly less graphic,” and the “perceived evil that Indiana seeks to nudity in public, such as at parks and beaches, is “to protect others from
address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity.” (at 571.) The law did not ban offense.” (at 591.) Such protection from offense “could not possibly be the
erotic dancing but public nudity, and its effect on erotic nude dancing the purpose of preventing nude dancing in theaters and barrooms since the
challengers wished to perform was merely incidental, satisfying the third prong viewers are exclusively consenting adults who pay money to see these
of the O’Brien test. dances.” (at 591.) Therefore, the law did not further a compelling state interest,
§ Given that the interest served by the Indiana statute was the promotion of and was unconstitutional.
public order and morals by way of a prohibition on public nudity, the “statutory
prohibition is not a means to some greater end, but an end in itself.” (at 572.)
Therefore, the law was “narrowly tailored” to further the governmental interest
at hand. By satisfying the O’Brien test, “Indiana’s public indecency statute
[was] justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity,” in
this case nude erotic dancing. (at 568.) FCC V. PACIFIVA FOUNDATION
§ Scalia, J., wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Scalia agreed (MONOLOGUE ON RADIO- FILTHY WORDS: AUTHORITY OF FCC TO
that the Indiana public nudity statute was constitutional, but for different REGULATE INDECENT CONTENT)
reasons than the plurality opinion. According to Scalia, the First Amendment
only protects expressive conduct — as opposed to say, actual speech or the OBSCENITY ON RADIO: Stricter rules on obscenity must be followed especially
freedom of the press — when “the government prohibits conduct precisely because of its pervasive quality and the interest in the protection of children. The
because of its communicative attributes.” (at 577. ) Given the long history of prohibition against censorship denies the Commission power to edit proposed
public nudity laws in Indiana and abroad, there is no evidence that Indiana’s programs in advance and to excise material considered inappropriate. HOWEVER, the
public nudity statute was targeting nudity for its communicative attributes. “On prohibition has never been construed to deny the commission the power to review the
its face,” the law does not target expression at all, but merely the act of being content of COMPLETED broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory powers. The
nude in public. As such, the public nudity statute does not implicate the First commission has the right to take not of past program content when considering a
Amendment at all, and the statute was merely a regulation on general licensee's renewal application.
conduct. Scalia also did not endorse the view that the promotion of public

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DOCTRINE: The prohibition, however, has never been construed to deny the The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the FCC did have the power to regulate
Commission the power to review the content of completed broadcasts in the indecent content, focusing much of its opinion on the need to protect children from
performance of its regulatory duties. The Commission found the language used in the such content. The Court held that the FCC could use its regulatory power to “channel”
monologue as "patently offensive," though not necessarily obscene. American indecent material to times when children are less likely to be exposed to it.
jurisprudence provides that the commission is not prevented from canceling the license
of a broadcaster who persists in a course of improper programming. It is within the As the Court highlighted, indecent speech, unlike obscene speech, is protected by the
Commission’s power to regulate the broadcast of obscene, indecent or profane First Amendment. Therefore, in order to regulate it, the government must have a
language. compelling interest and use the least restrictive means to further that interest. Despite
the high level of scrutiny afforded to issues of free speech, the Court emphasized that
Broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of the broadcasting has traditionally received the most limited First Amendment protection in
people. Furthermore, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. These thereby terms of communication platforms.
justify that there is government interest in regulation of an otherwise protected
expression in order to promote the welfare of its youth. To explain the distinction, the Court pointed to the pervasiveness of broadcasting and
the potential exposure to children. As the Court explained, “The broadcast media have
RECIT-READY: The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) may regulate radio broadcasts that offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only
are indecent, but not obscene after the FCC received a complaint from a listener who in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone
heard an indecent broadcast while driving with his son. A broadcast of patently plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”
offensive words dealing with sex and excretion may, under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Constitution), be regulated because of its content since The Court further highlighted that questionable content can be easily accessed by
such words offend for the same reasons obscenity offends and broadcasting is uniquely children, despite parents’ best efforts to shield them from it. It noted, “Broadcasting is
available to children. uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen’s written
message might have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica’s broadcast
FACTS: In an afternoon weekday broadcast, the Respondent, Pacifica Foundation’s could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant.”
New York radio station (Respondent), aired a twelve-minute radio program called
“Filthy Words” by George Carlan. This monologue contained indecent words, but Given these concerns, the Supreme Court concluded that the FCC was justified in
warned of the content immediately before airing the show. A listener who was driving regulating indecent content.
with his son complained about the indecent radio show. In response to the complaint,
the Petitioner, the FCC (Petitioner), issued a Declaratory Order granting the complaint DISSENT. The First Amendment of the Constitution protects the speech aired in the
and holding that Respondent “could have been the subject of administrative sanctions.” broadcast. The Supreme Court allows the government to prevent minors from gaining
However, the Petitioner did not issue formal sanctions. The Petitioner explained that its access to materials that are not obscene.
regulation of certain words depicting sexual and erectory activity was designed to The constitutional questions could have been avoided by holding that Congress
channel them to “times of day when children most likely would not be exposed.” The intended, by using the word “indecent,” “to prohibit nothing more than obscene speech.”
Court of Appeals overturned the Petitioner’s Order.
CONCURRENCE. The Petitioner sought to “channel” the broadcast to hours when the
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITIONER’S DECLARATORY ORDER VIOLATES THE fewest children would be listening. This strongly supports the Petitioner’s holding.
FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION? Broadcasting comes into the home where people have the right not to be assaulted by
uninvited and offensive sights and sounds.
HELD: No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed.
RATIO: There is no such absolute rule that the First Amendment of the Constitution DISCUSSION. Here the Supreme Court allows the government to rely on “captive
prohibits all governmental regulation that depends on the content of speech. Here, the audience” rationales when applied to the home.
words at issue offend for the same reasons obscenity offends. Because the content of
the radio show’s broadcast was “vulgar,” “offensive,” and “shocking,” that speech is not RENTON V. PLAYTIME THEATER
entitled to absolute conditional protection. Further, the context of the broadcast must (PROHIBITION OF ADULT THEATER FROM 1000 FT OF RESIDENTIAL ZONE,
be considered to determine whether the Petitioner’s action was constitutionally CHURCH PARK, OR 1 MILE FROM SCHOOL)
permissible. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he
hears indecent language is inappropriate. Additionally, broadcasting is uniquely ZONING LEGISLATION: dealing with adult entertainment that does not ban adult
available to children especially during the time of day when the monologue was aired. theaters altogether is not invalid being properly analyzed as a form of time, place and
Therefore, a broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and excretion may, manner of regulation. "Content-neutral time, place and manner regulations are
under the First Amendment of the Constitution, be regulated. acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial government interest an
do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.

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 o District Court's finding that the predominant interest was in
DOCTRINE: The Renton ordinance does not completely prohibit adult theaters. It is a secondary effects, not content, is enough to establish that the city's
form of time, place, and manner regulation, which is acceptable as long as it is designed ordinance was unrelated to suppression of free expression.
to serve a substantial governmental interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative • Ordinance is designed to prevent crime, protect trade,
avenues of communication. It is aimed not at the content of the films shown at "adult maintain property values, and preserve quality of life, not to
motion picture theatres," but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the suppress unpopular views.
surrounding community. It was created to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, o Therefore, it is completely consistent with our definition of "content-
maintain property values, and generally "protect and preserve the quality of the city’s neutral" speech.
neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life.” • Court decided that this type of zoning ordinance should be analyzed under the
standards applicable to content neutral TPM regulations.
RECIT-READY: The Petitioner, City of Renton (Petitioner), passed a zoning code
• Appropriate inquiry here, therefore, is whether the Renton ordinance is
restricting the location of adult movie stores within the city. The court held that a
designed to serve a substantial gov't interest and allows for reasonable
regulation that is content-based on its face may be considered content neutral if it is
alternative avenues of communication.
motivated by a permissible content-neutral purpose.
o It is clear that the ordinance meets this standard.
FACTS: • "A city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of
urban life is one that must be accorded high respect."
• The Petitioner’s zoning code prohibited adult movie theaters from locating
o COA held that because it was enacted w/o the benefit of studies
themselves within 1,000 feet of any residential area, church, park or school.
relating to the particular problems or needs of Renton, the
• However, they were not completely banned from the city. justifications were conclusory and speculative.
• Resolution said that such businesses would have a severe impact on • This is an unnecessarily high burden of proof.
surrounding businesses and residences.
• Renton relied heavily on the experiences of other cities
• Respondents wanted to use two theaters in a proscribed zone to show adult such as Seattle. Renton was entitled to rely on these other
films. experiences.
o There is also no constitutional defect in the method chosen by
ISSUE: Is this zoning ordinance a violation of First Amendment freedom of speech Renton to further its substantial interests.
rights of the Respondent, Playtime Theaters, Inc. (Respondent)?
• It is not the Court's function to determine the wisdom of the
city's decision.
HELD. NO.
• Renton ordinance is narrowly tailored specifically to target
RATIO: The Petitioner had a substantial interest in avoiding the secondary effects of the category of theaters shown to produce unwanted
the adult stores and also allows the stores to be located in other areas of town. Thus, secondary effects.
it is a constitutional content-neutral regulation. o Respondents also argue that the Renton ordinance is "under-
inclusive" in that it fails to regulate other kinds of adult businesses
that are likely to produce similar secondary effects.
• Court analyzes this under Young v. American Mini Theaters.
o Like the ordinance in American Mini Theaters, this residence does • However, there is no evidence of any other adult
not ban adult theaters altogether, but just provides for where they businesses other than theaters.
can be located. • In addition, that Renton chose first to address the potential
o This is therefore a time, place, and manner regulation. (First step) problems created by one particular kind of adult business in
• Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining no way suggests that the city has "singled out" adult
speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the first theaters for discriminatory treatment.
amendment. However, TPM regulations are acceptable so long as they are o Finally, turning to the issue of whether the ordinance allows for
designed to serve a substantial gov't interest and do not unreasonably limit reasonable alternative avenues of communication:
alternative avenues of communications. • Court notes that more than 5% of the entire area of Renton
o Renton ordinance does not fit neatly into either the "content-based" is still open to use as adult theater sites.
nor "content-neutral" category. • Respondents argue that practically none of this land is
• It targets only adult theaters. currently for sales or lease and that it is not commercially
• But, city claims it doesn't really care about the content so viable.
much as the secondary effects of the adult theaters on the § Court says respondents must fend for themselves
community. in the real estate market.

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 § Prior to the student assembly, two educators warned Fraser that he should
DISSENT. The ordinance places restrictions on establishments based on the content not give the speech and that if he did, serious consequences would result.
of the expression within it. Therefore, this is a content-based regulation. After Fraser delivered the controversial speech, the school’s assistant
principal told him that by doing so he violated the school’s policy prohibiting
DISCUSSION. Because the ordinance does not ban the adult theaters completely, it is the use of obscene language. As punishment, school officials suspended
not content-based. As a content-neutral regulation it is subject to the time, place, Fraser for three days and removed his name from the list of possible
manner analysis where a regulation is constitutional as long as it serves a substantial graduation commencement speakers.
governmental interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of § Disagreeing with his punishment, Fraser first went through the school
communication. board’s grievance procedure, at which the hearing officer determined that the
discipline that Fraser was subjected to was legitimate. Next, Fraser, through
BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT V. FRASER his father, filed suit in a federal trial court in Washington State, alleging that
(STUDENT SPEECH NOMINATING OTHER STUDENT AT ASSEMBLY; officials infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The
DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT RULE) court addressed three legal issues: first, that officials violated Fraser’s free
speech rights; second, that the discipline policy that prohibited the speech was
OBSCENITY IN SCHOOL: The first amendment does not prevent the school district “unconstitutionally vague and overbroad”; and third, that officials violated the
from disciplining students in giving offensively lewd and indecent speech at a school Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in removing Fraser’s
assembly. The use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults name from the list of graduation speakers. The court granted Fraser monetary
making a political point but it does not follow that the same latitude must be permitted damages and ordered the school board to allow him to speak at the
to children in public school. graduation.
§ The school appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed in favor of
DOCTRINE: The first amendment guarantees wide freedom in matter of adult public Fraser. The Ninth Circuit maintained that Fraser’s speech was no different
discourse but it does not follow that simply because offensive expression may not be from the student speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
prohibited to adults in making a political point, the same would be permitted to children School District (1969). In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that school officials
in public school. It would be highly proper for public school education to prohibit the use could not discipline students who wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam
of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Nothing in the constitution prohibits War based solely on the fear that the students would cause a disruption.
the regulation of certain modes of expressions—especially to schools. The schools § Further, the Ninth Circuit rejected the schools’ following three arguments.
must not only teach what is confined in books and the curriculum but also shared values First, the court rejected the notion that Fraser’s speech differed from the
of a civilized social order— mediums are the teachers as well as their parents. passive speech in Tinker because his speech actually caused a disruption.
Second, the court disagreed that officials had the responsibility to protect
Jurisprudence acknowledged limitations—in reaching unlimited audience where the minors from “lewd and indecent” language. Third, the court did not think that
speech is sexually explicit [Ginsberg v. New York]. The court also recognizes the officials had the authority to control speech that occurred during a school-
interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language sponsored event.
[FCC v. Pacifica Foundation].
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DISCIPLINE OF FRASER VIOLATED THE FREE
RECIT-READY: The Respondent, Fraser (Respondent), a student at Bethel High SPEECH CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT OR THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
School, made a speech in front of an assembly that was considered to be lewd. In OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
reaction to the speech, he was suspended from school. The Respondent brought suit § whether the First Amendment rights of students are completely unfettered
to enjoin the punishment, stating that his speech was given within his First Amendment when they are at school or when their conduct may be offensive to their
constitutional rights. The court held that while students are afforded the First classmates and school officials.
Amendment freedoms of speech and expression, they are still answerable for their
actions when they are offensive to others. HELD: NO. Chief Justice Burger (J. Burger). In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and agreed with the school’s arguments.
FACTS:
RATIO: For the majority, J. Burger opined that the “undoubted freedom to advocate
§ In Bethel, Matthew Fraser, a public high school student, gave a nominating unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced
speech for a classmate who was running for an office in student government. against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of
The speech, which occurred during school hours at an assembly as part of a socially appropriate behavior.
school-sponsored educational program, was attended by approximately 600
students. During Fraser’s speech, he made numerous sexual innuendos and Specifically, the Court held that the discipline of Fraser did not violate the Free Speech
references, causing the audience to react in a variety of ways; some appeared Clause of the First Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
confused and embarrassed, while others yelled and made obscene gestures. Amendment. Under the First Amendment, the Court reasoned that officials could
discipline Fraser’s lewd and indecent speech. Although Tinker established that

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students should be afforded free expression rights while at school, the Court explained HAZELWOOD V. KUHLMEIER
that their rights are not equivalent to an adult’s freedom of speech. Moreover, the Court (PRINCIPAL PROHIBITING ARTICLES IN HIGH SCHOOL PAPER)
pointed out that the sexual content of Fraser’s speech was distinguishable from the non
disruptive, political speech that was at issue in Tinker. OBSCENITY IN SCHOOL: Schools have the authority to censor if it could affect the
§ Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Board, the court held that education of others. This case led that the censorship in the schools was only
students do not shed their constitutional rights at the school gate. In that case, acceptable if it were for "valid educational purpose." Stricter rules should be followed
the Court said that the First Amendment gave students the right to wear black for speech in school because of the nature of the community that is involved and the
armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War. relationship between school and parents.

The Court added that because schools are responsible for instilling certain values in DOCTRINE: First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not
students, officials at schools should be able to teach students about what is not socially automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and must be applied
acceptable speech. In a related case, the Supreme Court held in FCC v. Pacifica in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. A school need not
Foundation (1978) that the state has an interest in protecting children from vulgar and tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even
offensive language. The Court noted that on the one hand, while school officials should though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.
allow controversial views to be expressed, on the other, they must balance this interest
with those of other students who may be offended by certain language. The school newspaper here cannot be characterized as a forum for public expression.
School facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have, by
Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court decided that officials did not violate policy or by practice, opened the facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public,
Fraser’s due process rights. or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations.
§ First, the Court was of the opinion that a school’s disciplinary policy does not
need to be as descriptive as a criminal code, because such a policy does not RECIT-READY: The case concerned the censorship of two articles in The Spectrum,
impose criminal sentences. As such, the Court indicated that as a result of his the student newspaper of Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis County, Missouri,
two-day suspension, Fraser was afforded the appropriate level of due process in 1983. When the school principal removed an article concerning divorce and another
procedures. concerning teen pregnancy, the student journalists sued, claiming that their First
§ Second, the Court found that Fraser received ample notice that his Amendment rights had been violated. A lower court sided with the school, but its
inappropriate speech could result in punishment. In fact, the Court determined decision was overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which sided
not only that school officials had an anti obscenity rule, but also that they with the students. The court held that public school curricular student newspapers that
provided Fraser with sufficient warning of the consequences of his actions. have not been established as forums for student expression are subject to a lower level
of First Amendment protection than independent student expression or newspapers
In upholding the rights of school officials to place limits on student expressive activities established (by policy or practice) as forums for student expression.
in school settings, Fraser is important because it acknowledges that they are
responsible for more than simply passing on educational information and can expect FACTS:
students to behave in ways that are not disruptive to school activities. § Students enrolled in the Journalism II class at Hazelwood East High School
were responsible for writing and editing the school's paper The Spectrum. Two
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority. He pointed out that there was a huge of the articles submitted for publication in the final edition of the paper
difference between the protest in Tinker, which dealt with a major issue of public policy, contained stories on divorce and teenage pregnancy. The divorce article
and the lewdness of Fraser's speech. "The purpose of public education in America is featured a story about a girl who blamed her father's actions for her parents'
to teach fundamental values," he wrote. "These fundamental values…must…include divorce. The teenage pregnancy article featured stories in which pregnant
consideration of the political sensibilities of other students." students at Hazelwood East shared their experiences.
Burger conceded that the First Amendment might permit the use of an offensive form § To ensure their privacy, the girls' names were changed in the article. The
of expression by an adult making a political point, but "the same latitude of expression school principal felt that the subjects of these two articles were inappropriate.
is not permitted to children in a public school." He concluded that journalistic fairness required that the father in the divorce
article be informed of the story and be given an opportunity to comment. He
DISSENT: Justices Stevens and Marshall dissented. Stevens wrote, "I believe a strong also stated his concerns that simply changing the names of the girls in the
presumption in favor of free expression should apply whenever an issue of this kind is teenage pregnancy article may not be sufficient to protect their anonymity and
arguable." that this topic may not be suitable for the younger students. As a result, he
prohibited these articles from being published in the paper.
IMPACT: Along with Hazelwood School District et al. v. Kuhlmeier et al (1988), a § Because there was no time to edit the paper if it were to go to press before
case involving a school district that censored a student newspaper, the Bethel case the end of the school year, entire pages were eliminated. The student
shows the Court re-examining the issue of student expression in the schools and journalists then brought suit to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
finding that certain limits on expression are permitted by the First Amendment.

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 of Missouri, alleging that their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech o The question [of] whether the First Amendment requires a school to
had been violated. tolerate particular student speech—the question we addressed
§ The U.S. District Court concluded that they were not. The students appealed in Tinker—is different from the question whether the First
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which reversed the ruling, Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular
stating that the students' rights had been violated. The school appealed to the student speech. The former question addresses educators' ability to
U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. silence students' personal expression that happens to occur on the
§ Lower Court: Eighth Circuit. The decision of the principal to prohibit the school premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority
publishing of certain student articles deemed to be inappropriate violates the over school sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
student journalists' First Amendment free speech rights. expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF A PRINCIPAL TO PROHIBIT THE school.
PUBLISHING OF CERTAIN ARTICLES, WHICH HE DEEMS INAPPROPRIATE, IN § In a footnote, the court clarified that the ruling did not necessarily apply at the
THE SCHOOL NEWSPAPER VIOLATED THE STUDENT JOURNALISTS' FIRST collegiate level.
AMENDMENT RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
DISSENT:
HELD: NO. Supreme Court Ruling: Reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit. The § Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion, in which
decision of the school principal to prohibit the publishing of certain articles deemed to he was joined by Associate Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun,
be inappropriate does not violate the student journalists' First Amendment right of who often took liberal positions on First Amendment issues. In his opinion,
freedom of speech. Brennan expressed concern about the message the majority ruling would
send to students, writing:
RATIO: o The young men and women of Hazelwood East expected a civics
§ The U.S. Supreme Court held that the principal's actions did not violate the lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them today...Such
students' free speech rights. The Court noted that the paper was sponsored unthinking contempt for individual rights is intolerable from any state
by the school and, as such, the school had a legitimate interest in preventing official. It is particularly insidious from (a school principal) to whom
the publication of articles that it deemed inappropriate and that might appear the public entrusts the task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation
to have the imprimatur of the school. for the cherished democratic liberties that our constitution
§ Specifically, the Court noted that the paper was not intended as a public forum guarantees.
in which everyone could share views; rather, it was a limited forum for
journalism students to write articles pursuant to the requirements of their IMPACT:
Journalism II class, and subject to appropriate editing by the school. § The case established the standard that personnel must meet to limit students'
§ MAJORITY: The majority of the justices held that the school principal was freedom of expression in secondary schools. As representatives of the state,
entitled to censor the articles. The majority opinion, written by Associate school administrators can censor, restrain, or refuse to publish school-
Justice Byron White, stated that officials had never intended the school paper sponsored student expression if it interferes with the requirements of school
to be a public forum, as underground publications were in past cases. White discipline, interferes with students' rights, interferes with academic propriety,
went on to say that educators do not infringe on First Amendment rights when generates health or welfare concerns, or is deemed obscene or vulgar. This
exercising control over student speech in school-sponsored activities, "so long extends to theatrical productions, public speeches in an assembly
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns". environment, and publications produced as part of curricular activity, such as
The court established that the student publication could be regulated by a student newspaper. The Supreme Court majority termed these reasons
school officials, and that they "reserved the forum for its intended purpose, as "legitimate pedagogical concerns".
a supervised learning experience for journalism students" § This standard does not, however, apply to personal or non-school-sponsored
o A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with communication, such as off-campus publications, unless that communication
its basic educational mission, even though the government could not interferes with school discipline or the rights of others. The Hazelwood case
. ... (Judicial action to protect students' rights is justified) only when established student newspapers as "limited public forums". This means
the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical schools may exercise prior restraint regarding the "style and content"
production or other vehicle of student expression has no valid of a student newspaper so long as their action is "not unreasonable",
educational purpose. whereas there previously had to be compelling evidence to warrant
§ The decision overrode the precedent set in the Tinker case, which had censorship. Separate cases also established what constituted school
permitted censorship of student speech only if it violated the rights of other activities, such as in-class parties and art created by students at the behest
students or threatened to cause a campus disruption. The majority opinion of teachers.
in Hazelwood held that this case was different. The majority opinion said that § In response to the ruling, some students created web-based publications not
school administrators are not required to tolerate speech that is contrary to subsidized by the school. Some individual states have also responded with
the school's academic mission,and continued:

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 laws designating student newspapers as public forums and offering them § The Solicitor General counters that owners of establishments selling obscene
greater First Amendment protection. publications are expressly held liable under Article 201, and petitioner
Fernando’s ownership was sufficiently proven. As the owner, according to the
FERNANDO V. CA Solicitor General, Fernando was naturally a seller of the prohibited materials
(SEIZURE OF PORN FROM MUSIC FAIR) and liable under the Information.

DOCTRINE: As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to ISSUE: WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from PETITIONERS’ CONVICTION.
obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation. There
is no perfect definition of “obscenity” but the latest word is that of Miller v. California. HELD: NO. Petition dismissed.

Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code: To be held liable, the prosecution must prove RATIO:
that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender § As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to
sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials. Necessarily, that the regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the
confiscated materials are obscene must be proved. The law does not require that a public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the
person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to regulation or limitation.
be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited § One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held
to the public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are engaged in selling and liable, the prosecution must prove that
exhibiting obscene materials. o (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and
o (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such
FACTS: materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene
§ Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of must be proved.
the Philippine National Police CIDG conducted police surveillance on the store § People v. Kottinger: obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity,
bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). decency or delicacy. The test to determine the existence of obscenity is,
§ On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or
Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of Article corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall
a certain Warren Tingchuy. § Also, “that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
§ The warrant ordered the search of the store for copies of New Rave, Hustler, indecency.” The disclaimer was whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
IOU magazine, and VHS tapes. depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question
§ On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to the prosecution, introduced himself as reached by it.
the store attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and § Go Pin: If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art
confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines, exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by
which they deemed pornographic. people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the
§ All appellants pled not guilty to the offenses charged. They waived their right pictures here in question were used not exactly for art’s sake but rather for
to present evidence. The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said
prove his guilt, but convicted herein petitioners Fernando and Estorninos. pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary
§ The CA affirmed the decision. The petitioners sought for review in the SC on or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if
certiorari and assailed the CA decision. not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be
o They assigned the following errors: surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance
§ Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner Fernando fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons
even if he was not present at the time of the raid interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy
§ Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Estorninos who and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their
was not doing anything illegal at the time of the raid. morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love [of] excitement, including the
§ Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield
search, they were selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends that themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures
since he was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling obscene § Padan: test of redeeming feature: An actual exhibition of the sexual act,
materials, the prosecution must prove that he was present during the raid and preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it,
that he was selling the said materials. Estorninos, on the other hand, insists there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated
that he was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so. obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing

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 as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence § Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged
specially on the youth of the land. in selling and exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police
§ Katigbak: the Court measures obscenity in terms of the “dominant theme” of Inspector Tababan, who led the PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search,
the material taken as a “whole” rather than in isolated passages. identified him as the store attendant upon whom the search warrant was
§ Pita v. Court of Appeals, concerning alleged pornographic publications, the served.
Court recognized that Kottinger failed to afford a conclusive definition of
obscenity, and that both Go Pin and Padan y Alova raised more questions ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
than answers such as, whether the absence or presence of artists and
persons interested in art and who generally go to art Definition of Public Assembly- The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march,
exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, determine parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public
what art is; or that if they find inspiration in the exhibitions, whether place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings. It regulates the exercise of
such exhibitions cease to be obscene. Go Pin and Padan y Alova gave too the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear
much latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has permitted ad lib of ideas and and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There
“two-cents worths” among judges as to what is obscene or what is art. is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
§ The Court in Pita also emphasized the difficulty of the question and pointed regulation.
out how hazy jurisprudence is on obscenity and how jurisprudence actually
failed to settle questions on the matter. Significantly, the dynamism of human NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS
civilization does not help at all. It is evident that individual tastes develop,
(ASSEMBLIES AT PLAZA MIRANDA ON WEEKENDS; SUNKEN GARDEN AS
adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of
ALTERNATIVE)
civilization. It seems futile at this point to formulate a perfect definition of
obscenity that shall apply in all cases.
DOCTRINE: The mayor possessed reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
§ There is no perfect definition of “obscenity” but the latest word is that of Miller
streets of public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use
v. California which established basic guidelines, to wit:
thereof by other and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of
o (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards
disorder and maintain public safety and order. Public rally at Plaza Miranda poses a
would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
clear and present danger of public disorders, which is why rallies there will be allowed
interest;
only on weekends and holidays
o (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
The City Mayor offered the Sunken Gardens, instead of Plaza Miranda, as venue for
and
an assembly.
o (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
FACTS:
§ But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts
§ The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas) expressly stated his willingness to
has the unbridled discretion in determining what is “patently offensive. No one
grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays,
will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive “hard core” sexual
disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered
conduct. Ie offensive descriptions of sex acts.
Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of
§ What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial
demonstration sought to be held that afternoon.
determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the
§ The Mayor believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to
judge’s sound discretion.
one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more
§ In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the
imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and
Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. Findings of fact of the Court of
even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has
Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded great respect, even by
manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders.
this Court, unless such findings are patently unsupported by the evidence on
§ On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement of a
record or the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts.
Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to the respondent, the Mayor of the city
§ Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene
of Manila, applying to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda February 26, 1970, from
materials? We emphasize that mere possession of obscene materials,
4-11pm.
without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under
§ On the same day, the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the
Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the
grounds that, the have temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing any permit
dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the
for the used of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstration during weekdays
forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is PUBLICITY. The
due to the events that happened from the past week.
mayor’s permit shows that Fernando was the owner of the store.

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 § On the same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use the In airing their concerns regarding the excesses of the Pasig police, employees of the
Sunken Garden near Intamuros for its rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to Philippine Blooming Mills decided to stage a mass demonstration at the Malacañang.
end before dark. The Company feared of losses to be incurred from 6 am to 2 pm.
§ The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayor’s action on the ground that it
violates the petitioner’s right to peaceable assemble and petition the FACTS:
government for redress of grievances (ART. 3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioner’s § On March 1, 1969, members of the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
right to the equal protection of the law (art. 3, sec. 1). Organization (PBMEO) desired to stage a mass demonstration on March 4,
1969 in protest against the alleged abuse of the Pasig police. Employees
ISSUE: informed the company, Philippine Blooming Mills Co. (PBM) that workers from
§ WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS ACT ON DENYING THE the 1st (6am-2pm), 2nd (7am-4pm), and 3rd (8am-5pm) shifts would
REQUEST OF THE PETITIONER VIOLATES THE PETITIONERS’ RIGHT participate in such demonstration at Malacanang.
TO PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY AND RIGHT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION § A meeting on March 3 was held at the company canteen wherein the company
OF THE LAW. recognized inalienable right of union given to workers but company
management emphasized that the demonstration should not prejudice normal
HELD: NO. operation of the company.
§ Company representatives were adamant that if workers failed to report to work
RATIO: on March 4, it would amount to the violation of the Collective Bargaining
§ The right of peaceable assemble is subject to regulation under the police Agreement as an illegal strike. A subsequent meeting in the same day echoed
power of the state. the first meeting with the company urging the union to just allow workers from
§ The right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, though granted by the 2nd and 3rd shift to participate but the union replied that it was too late to
Constitution, is not absolute for it may be regulated in order that it may not be change their plans.
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right of community § Around 400 PBM employees continued with demonstration and even sent a
and society, This power may be exercised under the police power of the state, letter to the company requesting that day shift employees be excused to join
which is the power of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to the demonstration. However, PBM still issued a charge against the union,
promote the health, morals, peace, education, and good order, safety and particularly its officers and first shift employees, for violating their CBA and
general welfare of the people. certain sections of the now repealed RA 875 or Act to Promote Industrial
§ While the privilege of the citizen to use streets and parks for communication Peace. Meanwhile, the union replied that it had not violated the CBA as prior
may be regulated in the interest of all, said privilege is not absolute. It must be notice was given to the company regarding the protest.
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience and in § The Court of Industrial Relations found PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
consonance with peace and good order, but it must not guise of regulation be faith and unfair labor practice with the consequence of losing employment.
abridged or denied.
§ Every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in ISSUE: W/N PBM AND CIR DECISION WAS VIOLATIVE OF THE PBM EMPLOYEES’
such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE
dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation
disrupted, to the general detriment of the public. HELD: YES. Petition Granted.
§ Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to
grant petitioners’ application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the Court RATIO:
denied the writ prayed for by Navarro and dismissed their petition. § The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and
security “against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing
PBM EMPLOYEES V. PBM hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those
(HEIRARCHY OF RIGHTS) who have no patience with general principles.” In the pithy language of Justice
Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw “certain subjects from
DOCTRINE: The primacy if human rights, freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
and petition for redress of grievances-over property rights should be sustained. To majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
regard the demonstration against the police officers, not against the employer, as by the courts. One’s rights to life, liberty and property to free speech, or free
evidence of bad faith, a violation of the CBA and a cause for the dismissal from press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” Laski
CBA, and is a potent means of inhibiting speech and therefore inflicts a moral as well proclaimed that “the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the
as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free-expression of peaceful State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. Is interest,
assembly and petition. not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise.”
§ The freedoms of expressions and of assembly as well as the right to petition
are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the

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 rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or § In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right
hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom,
protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who the employees and laborers of PBM were fighting for their very survival,
refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution – the
one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of the
§ The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
rights but also political rights essential to man’s enjoyment of his life, to his employees from 6 am to 2 pm, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms, the property rights.
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the § To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer,
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of of the collective bargaining agreement, is a “potent means of inhibiting
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees. speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
§ Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, petition.
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government § It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests
and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence, its judgment is null and void
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs – political, economic and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice
or otherwise. of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus
§ In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.” The against self-incrimination; or who is denied the right to present evidence in his
superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, even after
that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the accused has already served sentence for 22 years.
the law and its object or purpose – that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive – would suffice to validate a law which restricts JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING
or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid (RALLY FROM LUNETA TO NEAR US EMBASSY)
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST APPLIED: In the absence of a clear and
State has the right to prevent. present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest, there was no
§ The freedoms of speech and of the press, as declared in New York Times v. justification then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and
Sullivan, as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of peaceable assembly. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or “when and streets, there is freedom of access, Nor is their use dependent on who is the
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group.
shall be governed.”
§ The demonstration held by petitioners before the Malacañang was against DOCTRINE: A peaceful march and rally from Luneta park to the gates of the US
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer; said Embassy. –
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of (1) The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the place.
Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They (2) If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled
exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what to its legal possession is required.
they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of PBM (3) Application for permit should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
Co. to protect petitioners from the harassment of local police officers. It was official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
to the interest of PBM to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, grant but at another place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
its employees so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks, decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such imminent and grave
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein the employer did not even danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police.

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 (4) Decision of the licensing authority must be transmitted to the applicants at not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with
the earliest opportunity. freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent.
Free speech, like free press, is the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully matters of § Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress
public concern without censorship or punishment. The mayor failed to show the clear that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and
and present danger in denying their request to hold a rally near the US embassy. complements the right of free speech.
§ Reiterating the ruling in Thomas v. Collins, the American Supreme Court held
The Anti-Bases Coalition planned to hold a peaceful march and rally. It would start in that it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech
Luneta Park and end at the gates of the US Embassy. After the march, a program and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the
would follow whereby two brief speeches were to be delivered. However, the City people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
Mayor did not act on the request of organization for permit. grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every
case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of the right,
FACTS: the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
§ Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise
permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is
26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. The route is from the Luneta, a the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
public park, to the gates of the US Embassy which is two blocks away. The safety, public morals, public health, of other legitimate public interest.
march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such § What is guaranteed by the Constitution is peaceable assembly. One may not
conference. advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under
§ A short program would be held after the march. During the program, there the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending
would be a delivery of two brief speeches. After which, a petition based on a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to
the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in US v.
General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Apurado, “[i]t is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the US imaginary, because on such occasions, feeling is always wrought to a high
Ambassador. pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievances and the more intense the
§ The Mayor of the City of Manila however intruded by not acting on the request feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders
of the organization for permit. Rather, he suggested with the recommendation over their irresponsible followers.” It bears repeating that for the constitutional
of the police authorities that a permit may be issued for the rally if it would be right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism
held at the Rizal Coliseum. As such, Reyes, on behalf of the organization, must be avoided. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for
filed a suit for mandamus. condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by
intellectual liberty is our scheme of values.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RALLYISTS SHOULD BE GRANTED THE PERMIT § It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets,
there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant
HELD: YES. Reyes’ petition was granted. for the permit, whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom
of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection
RATIO: question. The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by
§ The Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free Chief Justice Hughes in these words: “The question, if the rights of free
speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices
Constitution is quite explicit that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging the under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.” Free freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.”
speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly § There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were
and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even
There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a “clear and present determining whether or not a permit would be granted. While prudence
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.” requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but
§ Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific
accorded the utmost deference and freedom of expression, of a clear and public place – is that the permit must he for the assembly being held there.
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. It is The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberta, speaking for

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 the American Supreme Court, is not to be “abridged on the plea that it may be the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court. However, they
exercised in some other place.” held the general assembly at the second floor lobby of the VMAS, contrary to
§ The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing what is stated in the permit.
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take § During the gathering, they manifested their opposition to the proposed merger
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture, in a
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed vehement and vigorous language.
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether § After the assembly, at around 10:30 a.m., they marched toward the Life
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at Science building and continued their rally, using megaphones and giving
another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities. As a
modification that the clear and present danger tests be the standard for the result, classes were disturbed aside from the work of non-academic
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent sad grave employees within hearing distance.
danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. § The petitioners were placed under preventive suspension for their failure to
Thereafter, his decision, whether favourable or adverse, must be transmitted explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science building.
to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse § Respondent, the Director of NCR of the Ministry of Education, Culture and
to the proper judicial authority. Sports, found the petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated paragraph
§ Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedom, 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools, more specifically their holding of an
are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted
strongly stressed that on the judiciary – even more so than on the other resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation.
departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect
for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUSPENSION OF STUDENTS FOR ONE
phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been felicitously termed by ACADEMIC YEAR WAS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
Justice Holmes “as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.” Nonetheless, the FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND FREE SPEECH?
presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side
of suds rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. HELD: NO
§ necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
MALABANAN V. RAMENTO public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment
(STUDENT ASSEMPLY) unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil
that the State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly
DOCTRINE: The assembly was held in private premises, hence, only the consent of could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held
the owner is required. Students continue to enjoy the freedom to express their views in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities who are
without shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate. Hence, they may express devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions
their opinion except by conduct that is disruptive of classes. Principles to Guide as to the time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
Schools: stoppage of work of non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms,
ccc. Right to assembly and speech are guaranteed to students. penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
ddd. Discussion cannot be subjected to prior restraint or subsequent punishment.
RATIO
§ It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that specified in
eee. Assemblies in school: permit must be sought from authorities who are devoid the permit and continued it longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they
of power to deny requests arbitrarily, although there may be conditions as to did disturb the classes and caused the work of the non-academic personnel
the time and place. to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have been avoided
fff. Violation: penalty be proportionate. by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the permit.
Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their
Student leaders at the Gregorio Araneta University, after holding the meeting, marched misdeed.
towards the Life Science building using megaphones and giving utterance to language § As declared by the Court in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to
severely critical of the school authorities. Classes were disturbed while the non- freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to
academic personnel’s work was interrupted. free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept
of freedom of expression which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
FACTS: and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment
§ Petitioners organized a meeting, being officers of the Supreme Student and which “is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a
Council of Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They were granted the clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on August 27, 1982 at prevent.”

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§ Petitioners are entitled to invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free (COOPERATIVES)
speech. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens, the freedom to express their
views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in DOCTRINE: Exemption of taxes of cooperatives is not granted by the Constitution. The
gatherings such as in this case. They do not shed their constitutional rights VAT is not a regulation, nor impedes rights.
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. While, therefore,
the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be RECIT-READ: Petitioners claim that the R.A. violates their press freedom and religious
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. liberty, having removed them from the exemption to pay VAT. Suffice it to say that since
On a more specific level, there is persuasive force to this formulation in Tinker the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime
v. Des Moines Community School District: “The principal use to which the without offense to the Constitution. By granting exemptions, the State does not forever
schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Lastly, petitioners contend that the
for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is R.A. violates due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on
personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an taxation. Petitioners fail to take into consideration the fact that the VAT was already
inevitable part of the process. A student’s rights do not embrace merely the provided for in E.O. No. 273 long before the R.A. was enacted. The latter merely
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria or on the playing field, or on EXPANDS the base of the tax. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate, the taxing
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without power having authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
‘materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate taxation. It is enough that the statute applies equally to all persons, forms and
discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of corporations placed in s similar situation.
others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason
– whether it stems from time, place or type of behaviour – materially disrupts The Expanded Value-Added Tax Law was challenged by several petitions. The
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is Philippine Press Institute contends that the law discriminates against the press after
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” the law removed the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintained those
§ If in the course of such demonstration with an enthusiastic audience goading granted to others.
them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose,
that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident FACTS:
types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective § The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods
if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent
academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or
full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale
of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base
youth. of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
§ The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students National Internal Revenue Code.
of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters § The petitoners, PPI, is a nonprofit organization of newspaper publishers
affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. Petitioners
previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a question the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted
clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to to the press under § 103 (f) of the NIRC. Even thought the exemption was
prevent. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content subsequently restored by administrative regulation with respect to the
of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim because of the
assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name possibility that the exemption may still be removed by mere revocation of the
of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to regulation of the Secretary of Finance.
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school § What they contend is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid print media transactions involving printing, publication, importation or sale of
of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for
such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law
to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored
personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty treatment.
incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
§ Petitioners cannot be totally absolved for the events. There was violation of ISSUE: WON WITHDRAWING THE EXEMPTION IS DISCRIMINATORY TOWARDS
the terms of the permit. Accordingly, they could be disciplined. THE PRESS.

TOLENTINO V. SEC OF FINANCE HELD: NO.

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RATIO: RULES ON ASSEMBLY AND PETITION: I-A-H-D
§ As a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing power of the 1) Inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the
State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are time when it will take place (private place-only consent of owner
laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for required)
special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the 2) Application- filed ahead of time to enable public official concerned to
basis of the content of the publication, and RA 7716 is none of these. appraise whether there may be valid objections
§ It would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law 3) (Indispensable condition to refusal or modification that the CPD test be
could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the constitution. The the standard for the decision reached)
reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive
4) If public authority believes that there is an imminent and grave danger of
the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the
substantial evil, applicants must be heard on the matter.
exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which
other businesses have long ago been subject. 5) Decision must be transmitted at the earliest opportunity.
§ If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, law
not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will
but only because of the removal of the exemption previously grants it to it. The inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to
withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other strike is denied government employees.
transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as
part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The FACTS:
law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the § Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On
only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the various dates in September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for
case. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication, work and instead, participated in mass actions by public school teachers at
which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the government for
reasonable basis for the classification. redress of their grievances.
§ The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co. was found to be Petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as grave
discriminatory because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts only of misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules
newspapers whose weekly circulation was over 20,000, with the result that and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official
the tax applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
papers were critical of Sen. Long who controlled the state legislature which service and absence without official leave.
enacted the license tax. The censorial motivation for the law was thus evident. § Petitioners failed to answer these charges. Following the investigations
§ In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, the conducted by the DECS Investigating committees, Secretary Cariño found
tax was found to be discriminatory because although it could have been made petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the
liable for the sales tax or in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of service. Petitioners appealed and the CSC modified the said orders of
using, storing, or consuming tangible goods, the press was not. Instead the Secretary Cariño to six (6) months suspension without pay.
press was exempted from both taxes. It was however later made to pay a § Appeal to CA: Denied
special use tax on the cost of paper and ink which made these items “the only
items subject to the use tax that were component of goods to be sold at retail.” ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
The US SC held that the differential treatment of the press suggests that the RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR
goal of regulation is not related to suppression of expression, and such goal REDRESS TO GRIEVANCES
is presumptively unconstitutional. It would therefore appear that even a law
that favors the press is constitutionally suspect. HELD: NO
§ The VAT is different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise
of a privilege; much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, RATIO:
lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services § Petitioners contention are without merit. Citing Bangalisan v Court of Appeals,
and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press the Supreme Court held that there was an undisputed fact of absence and
to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make stoppage of public service by the petitioners and that they were being
the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its penalized no because they exercised their right to peaceable assembly and
freedom under the Constitution. petition for redress of grievance but because of their successive unauthorized
and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students
ACOSTA V. CA for whose education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners
definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
(TEACHER’S MASS DEMONSTRATION)
punishable under the Civil service law, rules and regulations.

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 § These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated
a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it.
was the teachers’ sworn duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be
§ The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and
absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their
concerted work stoppages for any purpose. members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which
§ Further, herein petitioners, are being penalized not because they exercised KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of
their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers
because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They
produced adverse effects upon their students for whose education they are were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were
responsible. arrested.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, “It is not the exercise by the
petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop
resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy
classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are recently announced.
efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in
question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress
of grievances.” B.P. No. 880, “The Public Assembly Act of 1985,” provides:
§ It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however
temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be
conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably
staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes.
prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not
legalize an illegal work stoppage. Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:

BAYAN V. ERMITA Section 1. Title . – This Act shall be known as “The Public Assembly Act of 1985.”
(NO PERMIT NO RALLY; CPR)
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. – The constitutional right of the people peaceably to
FACTS: assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital
to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free
Petitioners come in three groups. exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal
protection of the law.
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:
violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed
by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. (b) “Public place” shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street,
bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza square, and/or any open space of public
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. ownership where the people are allowed access.
No. 169848, who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful
mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed (c) “Maximum tolerance” means the highest degree of restraint that the military,
by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly
marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the or in the dispersal of the same.
country under an “undeclared” martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed
violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries. Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.– A written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881, place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or
allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property,
and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession

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is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court
institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record
institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying if in terms
provided for by law are not covered by this Act. satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.

Sec. 5. Application requirements.– All applications for a permit shall comply with 7. All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-
the following guidelines: four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately
endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
1. The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the
leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and 8. In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the
probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated
systems to be used. September 21, 2005, shown in Annex “A” to the Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus:

2. The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant Malacañang Official
under Section 8 hereof.
Manila, Philippines NEWS
3. The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) Release No. 2 September 21, 2005
working days before the scheduled public assembly.
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
4. Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing,
On Unlawful Mass Actions
the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be
posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups
to inflame the political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duty
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. –
constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government
units to strictly enforce a “no permit, no rally” policy, disperse groups that run afoul
1. It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue
of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as
or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.
assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum
tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding
2. The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application
a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical
within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the
to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.
permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have
be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be
the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
deemed to have been filed.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful
3. If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
conduct befitting of a democratic society.
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
The President’s call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

4. The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of
within twenty-four hours. the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
5. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
appropriate court of law. regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails
the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the
6. In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression
Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in

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support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage
influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who
the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely
cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no
such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and
The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
danger) are inconsistent.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
and for lack of publication. assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a
permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights
provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other
convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA, the Court,
five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado already upheld the right to
public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. assembly and petition, as follows:

As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the
even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form
order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful
of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution,
exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section
3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and
promoting the people’s exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this century,
this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and
even went as far as to acknowledge:

ISSUES: “It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of
(1) On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160: occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the
1. Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations? grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the
2. Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the
3. Do they constitute prior restraint? prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
4. Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a
5. Do they violate international human rights treaties and the 6. seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and
Universal Declaration of Human Rights? to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the
severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain
(2) On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly
Preemptive Response (CPR): conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and
1. Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness? punished therefore, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line
2. Is it void for lack of publication? between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable
3. Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September assembly and a tumultuous uprising.”
26 and October 4, 5 and 6, 2005?
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of
HELD: speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets
and parks.

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Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in
In Primicias, this Court said: order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of
communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a by the Constitution.” What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the
settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be
exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of
of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the
prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who
safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the
the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure
and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed
subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much
bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder
or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of
Reyes v. Bagatsing further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows: violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an
early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: “It is
It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the
to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such
Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the
Government for redress of grievances.” Free speech, like free press, may be identified disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers.” It bears repeating
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and
censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a “clear and intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.” Freedom
of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of
as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a 1939 vintage of, Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: “Whenever the title of streets and
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and
in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets
speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the people and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to
these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order;
is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine but must not, in the guise of respondents, be abridged or denied.” The above excerpt
the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a was quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court
institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of
public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality.
Reference was made to such plaza “being a promenade for public use,” which certainly
THIRD, Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why
peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public
Frankfurter: “It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child park that is the Luneta.
of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an

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4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of
the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso 8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time
of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the
Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: “Our conclusion finds support in the decision one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well
in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be
statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It
procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is
committee,’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that ‘a recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along
statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional
a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than
of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring
construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying
issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice
or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an Holmes “as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.” Nonetheless, the presumption
opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying
issue or refuse license, * * *. “Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a as they do precedence and primacy.
subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: “Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order x x x.
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The
authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes.
convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good
order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities REYES V. BAGATSING
is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of (G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569)
the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in
the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right 8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection.” inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when
it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
xxx entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may
6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.
Justice Hughes in these words: “The question, if the rights of free speech and It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view
meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants
their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse,
protects.” There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can
marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. It is true that the have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. B.P. No. 880
While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly
occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.– A written permit shall be
assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public
– is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or
right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property,
not to be “abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession
is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational
xxx

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institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms
institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.
provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
Sec. 5. Application requirements.– All applications for a permit shall comply with hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to
the following guidelines: the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or (h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof,
and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
Section 8 hereof. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec,[1] where the Court referred to it as a
“content-neutral” regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality assemblies.[2]
in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public assembly. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds
of public assemblies[3] that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause”
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither
at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. are the words “opinion,” “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words “petitioning
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. – the government for redress of grievances” come from the wording of the Constitution,
so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger
public morals or public health. to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This
is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit Rights.
shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly
posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the
deemed to have been filed. substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall the regulation.
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to
twenty-four hours. “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the
same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160[4] is thus not necessary
the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
appropriate court of law.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate peaceful assembly and petition at any time:
Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-
eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal

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Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P.
“freedom park” or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner
held at any time without the need of any prior permit. of assemblies. Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present
establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act. danger” standard.

CPR: The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor PADER V. PEOPLE
General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it (PI: ORAL DEFAMATION)
does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No.
880. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, DOCTRINE: The words of the petitioner constitute only slight oral defamation since it
submitted by the Solicitor General, thus: was not a deliberate attack to damage the vice mayoral candidate’s reputation, but it
was due to his anger that arose from an incident coupled with his drunkenness.
The truth of the matter is the policy of “calibrated preemptive response” is in
consonance with the legal definition of “maximum tolerance” under Section 3 (c) of B.P. FACTS:
Blg. 880, which is the “highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other § On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was
peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong,
the same.” Unfortunately, however, the phrase “maximum tolerance” has acquired a Bataan when petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted ― Putang ina mo
different meaning over the years. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of Atty.Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!
law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. More § The latter was dumbfounded and embarrassed.
so, other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking § At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of Morong,
this would be “tolerated.” Clearly, the popular connotation of “maximum tolerance” has Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995.
departed from its real essence under B.P. Blg. 880.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF SLIGHT OR SERIOUS ORAL
It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the
DEFAMATION
same law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit, which allows the
dispersal of rallies without a permit, and which recognizes certain instances when water
HELD: YES. Petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation.
cannons may be used. This could only mean that “maximum tolerance” is not in conflict
with a “no permit, no rally policy” or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under
RATIO:
certain circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount of tolerance required is
§ In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability
dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. Our law enforcers should
that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon
calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with the view to
their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging
preempting the outbreak of violence.
them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
Thus, when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.
maximum tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted
§ Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however,
and much abused definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted to disabuse the
the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight.
minds of the public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of
§ The parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he
keeping the peace even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. I
uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioner‘s anger was
wanted to send a message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but
instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioner‘s father died. In which
would henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus I said, “we have instructed the PNP as
case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature
well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy . . .
§ In Reyes vs. People, we ruled that the expression putang ina mo is a common
arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . . . unlawful mass actions will be
enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slender
dispersed.” None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas
but rather to express anger or displeasure.
Pambansa Blg. 880. It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my
§ In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates ones expression
co-respondents to violate any law.
of profanity.
§ We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our
father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words
people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. For this reason,
expressing anger.
the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament

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 § Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not § However, because of Philippine culture, this rule is not as strict in our
necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, jurisdiction. For example, it is not uncommon to find a crucifix in a court
occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not room
uncommon. • Public Schools and Religious Instruction
§ Based on American Jurisprudence, religious instruction, particularly
the use of State resources for religious instruction is not allowed. There
ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS is excessive entanglement.
SECTION V PART I • However, if the law provides a general benefit to
students, regardless of religion, it can be valid.
SECTION 5: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or § In the Philippines, this is not entirely disallowed. The Constitution
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious allows for religious instruction during school hours to be conducted by
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be Instructors designated by the religion they belong. This is without cost
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. to the government AND with written consent by parents
• State Jurisdiction over religious affairs- The government does not have
NOTES: the power to interfere and substitute its own judgment on matters of religious
doctrine and other purely religious affairs
Three parts of the Religion Clause § Examples: halal certification, excommunication from a church
ggg. The Non-establishment clause • Government neutrality is not compromised even if some acts cause some
hhh. The free exercise clause incidental benefit to any religion. The determining factor is that it is not
iii. The prohibition on religious tests primarily aimed at providing such benefit (Aglipay v Ruiz)
Essentially an extension of the free exercise clause
2 Schools of thought/approaches on the Non-establishment clause
NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION 1. Strict Separation or Strict Neutrality
a. Believes that there must be a high and impenetrable wall separating
• This means that the government cannot pass laws which promote or inhibit Church and State
any religion. In other words, it mandates government neutrality. b. Looks at the Religion Clause as a measure meant to protect the
• Neither a state nor a federal government can set up a church, pass laws which Government from influence by Religion
aid one religion or prefer one religion over another, nor can it openly or secretly 2. Benevolent Neutrality or Accommodation Theory
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations. a. More tolerant than strict separation
• Creates a wall of separation between church and state b. Allows government aid to religion when the benefit is only incidental
• Four General Propositions of Government Neutrality: (PAFE) to a secular purpose
1. Government must not prefer one religion over another, or religion over c. Looks at the Religion clause as a measure meant to protect Religion
irreligion and Church from the awesome power of the Government
2. Government funds must not be used for religious purposes d. Recognizes that there is a need to accommodate the religious needs
3. Government action must not aid religion of the community and that the church and the State need not be
4. Government action must not result in extensive entanglement with adverse nor hostile to one another.
religion e. Accommodates the needs of individuals to the operation of the law
• Allowable Government Aid: There are forms of government aid which are by carving out exemptions from its general application.
allowable. The requisites are: SEN When is government aid allowable?
1. A secular legislative purpose Lemon Test: aid must have: S-E-E
2. A primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion (a) secular legislative purpose,
3. Must not require excessive entanglement with the religious institution
(b) must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
• On Religious Symbols religion,
§ The display of religious symbols (crucifix, menorah, crèche) in public (c) must not require excessive entanglement with recipient
places and buildings can be disallowed if it tends to show that the institution (Lemon v. Kurtzman)
government endorses its religious message
§ Content-neutral limits are valid for regulation displays of religious State sponsored bible readings and prayers in public schools violates fist and second
symbols in public places
requisites. (School District v. Schempp)
§ Similar to free speech, content-based restrictions on religious
Note: Schempp was an instance of Strict Separation or Strict Neutrality.
messages can only be implemented if there is a compelling state
interest

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Parochial Schools - Parochial schools, in addition to their sectarian function, perform Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely
the task of secular education. The Court cannot agree that all teaching in a sectarian private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced
school is religious, or that the intertwining of secular and religious training is such that and open to all on equal terms. - Those conditions are satisfied here, and therefore
secular textbooks furnished to students are, in fact, instrumental in teaching religion. the State may not bar respondents' cross from Capitol Square. (Capitol Square
Review Board v. Pinette)
The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend
schoolbooks free of charge, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to What should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequence that
schools. (Board of Education v. Allen) might follow from the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is
essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution, of the late Felix Manalo to the
The entanglement in the Pennsylvania also arises from the restrictions and surveillance culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding of Iglesia ni Cristo.
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role and the state (Manosca v. CA)
supervision of nonpublic school accounting procedures required to establish the cost
of secular as distinguished from religious education. In addition, the Pennsylvania There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations,
statute has the further defect of providing continuing financial aid directly to the church- of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health
related schools. Unconstitutional due to excessive entanglement between gov’t & of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive
religion. (Lemon v. Kurtzman) power to issue halal certifications. (Islamic Da’wah v. Executive Secretary)
The part of the provision of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 providing for The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and
unlimited use of the buildings (for whatever purpose) after 20 years was invalidated as abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith,
amounting to a contribution to a religious body. (Tilton v. Richardson) practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and
having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy
Use of Public Funds/ Facilities- The issuance and sale of the stamps commemorating of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
the International Eucharistic Congress is Valid. The government should not be province of the civil courts. Excommunication of members by a religious Institution is
precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental conclusive upon the courts. (Taruc v. Dela Cruz)
result would be favorable to a religion or sect. (Aglipay v. Ruiz)
Ecclesiastical affair - one that concerns doctrine creed or form or worship of the
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding
religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership.
residents. The fiesta is a socio-religious affair.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and Does the dimissal of a 7th Day Adventist Minister fall within the purview of the NLRC?
which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding What is involved here is the relationship of the Church as an employer and the minister
separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public as an employee. It is purely secular, and has no relation whatsoever with the practice
money or property. (Garcez v. Estenzo) of faith, worship, or the doctrines of the church. (Austria v. NLRC)
The crèche, which sat on the main and most beautiful part of the country courthouse, How do we reconcile the conflicting cases/decisions on the religion clause?
a seat of government, sends an unmistakable message that the country supported and
promoted the religious message. American jurisprudence has had a long history of flip-flopping between applying the
Strict Neutrality/Strict Separation Approach and the Benevolent
The menorah display did not have the prohibited effect of endorsing religion, given its Neutrality/Accommodationist approach to cases involving the religion clause. This has
"particular physical setting". Its combined display with a Christmas tree and a sign led to confusion and uncertainty in the disposition of religion cases in the United States.
saluting liberty did not impermissibly endorse both the Christian and Jewish faiths, but
simply recognized that both Christmas and Hanukkah are part of the same winter- Currently the prevailing approach in the United States is Strict Neutrality by virtue of
holiday season, which has attained a secular status in U.S. society. (County of Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith.
Allegheny v. ACLU)
However, this question has been conclusively settled in Philippine Jurisdiction. In the
By according parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute ensures 2003 and 2006 cases of Estrada v. Escritor, the Supreme Court held that Benevolent
that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a result Neutrality is the approach in our jurisdiction:
of the private decision of individual parents. The sign-language interpreter will neither
add to nor subtract from that environment, hence the provision of such assistance is Estrada v. Escritor (2003)
not barred by the Establishment Clause. (Zobrest v. Catalina)

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The strict neutrality approach which examines only whether government action is for a
secular purpose and does not consider inadvertent burden on religious exercise ISSUES:
protects such a rigid barrier. By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion, jjj. WON a writ of prohibition is the proper remedy
the Filipinos manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach in kkk. WON there was a violation of the Constitution
interpreting the religion clauses, an approach that looks further than the secular HELD:
purposes of government action and examines the effect of these actions on religious
exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people 1. YES
and the elevating influence of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that § Generally, a writ of prohibition is only issued on the performance of judicial or
government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals, however, quasi-judicial functions. But it can be issued, in appropriate cases, to an officer
government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
burden religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation of
these religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these 2. NO
breaches in the wall of separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the 3.
integral purpose of the religion clauses. § What is granted by the Constitution is not mere religious tolerance but
religious freedom. Even the Preamble of the Constitution manifests the
AGLIPAY V RUIZ (POSTAGE STAMPLS INCIDENTAL BENEFIT TO
religious nature of Filipinos.
RELIGION – FOR EUHARISTIC CONGRESS)
§ The Director of Posts issued the postage stamps pursuant to Act No. 4052
DOCRTINE: The Act contemplates no religious position. The issuance of stamps is not Act No. 4052 appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of
inspired by any sectarian domination, nor is it sold for the benefit of the Catholic Church, postage stamps with new designs. The Director of Posts, with the
nor are the profits given to them. The purpose was to advertise the Philippines, and approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communication, is
attract tourists. The event was taken advantage as it was an event with international authorized to dispose of the funds as long as it is deemed
importance. advantageous to the government.
§ There is no religious purpose for Act No. 4052. Even if the stamps featured
RECIT-READY: Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent the International Eucharistic Congress, none of the funds raised would be
Church, filed for a writ of prohibition against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him used for the benefit of the Catholic Church.
from selling postage stamps which commemorated the 33rd International Eucharistic § The final stamp design also showed a map of the Philippines and the location
Congress organized by the Catholic Church in Manila. Petitioner alleges that this of Manila (instead of the original design featuring a chalice). The main purpose
violates the Constitutional provision prohibitting the use of public money for the of the stamp was to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists. The
benefit of any religious denomination. The Court denied the petition. The Director of resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic Church was not the
Posts acted by virtue of Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of purpose of the Government.
printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps themselves featured a map of the § Petition denied.
Philippines. The government’s goal was to promote the Philippines. There was no
religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went to the government GARCES V ESTENZO (ACQUISITION OF SAN VINCENTE FERRER IMAGE)
and no to any church.
Petitioner: Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church DOCTRINE: The assailed resolution does not establish any religion nor abridge
Respondent: Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts religious liberty or appropriate money for the benefit of any sect. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with taxes. The image was purchased in celebration
FACTS: of the fiesta, which is a socio-religious affair to relieve monotony.
§ In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced that he would issue postage
stamps commemorating the celebration of the 33rd International A resolution of the barangay council for soliciting contributions to buy a statue of the
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church in Manila. barangay’s patron saint and the use of such fund for said purpose does not violate the
Constitution’s provision prohibiting use of public funds for religious purpose; statue was
§ Petitioner filed for a writ of prohibition to stop the issuance and sale of the purchased by barangay funds so it belongs to the barangay and not to the parish
remaining postage stamps.
FACTS:
§ Petitioner alleges that this violates Sec. 23, subsection 3, Article VI of the
1935 Constitution16 (now Section 29, par. 2, Article VI of the 1987
§ Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
Constitution) which prohibited the appropriation of public funds for the a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every
benefit or support of any religion. fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente
§ Basically, petitioner is alleging that it is a violation of the principle of Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will
separation of Church and State. be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.

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 b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be FACTS:
the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would § 1949: Pennsylvania statute forced public schools to begin each day with 10
remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. bible verses. In Abington School Dist., students in broadcasting class read the
The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the verses over a public address system. Teachers could be terminated for
celebration of the saint’s feast day. refusing to participate. Students were occasionally segregated from others if
§ These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were they did not join in the daily reading.
implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church § The case arose in 1958, when Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife, and two of
of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused their children, who attended public schools in Pennsylvania, filed suit in U.S.
to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since district court in Philadelphia, alleging that their religious rights under the First
church funds were used in its acquisition. Amendment had been violated by a state law that required public schools to
§ Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the begin each school day with a reading of at least 10 passages from the Bible.
replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 § The Schempps, who were Unitarians, claimed that the law was an
appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his unconstitutional establishment of religion and that it interfered with the free
answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres exercise of their religious faith, in violation of the First Amendment’s free-
Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and exercise clause (“Congress shall make no law…prohibiting the free exercise
Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated. of [religion]”). They asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief (i.e., to
declare the law unconstitutional and to issue an injunction against its
ISSUE: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated. enforcement) and to strike down the school district’s additional requirement
that students recite the Lord’s Prayer at the beginning of each school day.
HELD: NO. § Schempp challenged this practice because they contradicted the religious
§ As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. training they were providing for their 3 children (Summary: they wanted their
The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio children to believe in a ‘peaceful’ God but the school read random passages
fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with and the events in the old testament was bloody and violent for them).
religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. § After the district court found in favour of the Schempps, the school district and
§ Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the the state’s superintendent of schools appealed to the Supreme Court.
acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s § Before the case was heard, however, the Pennsylvania General
custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to Assembly amended the law to permit students to be excused from Bible
borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the readings upon the written request of a parent. The Supreme Court then
council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. vacated and remanded the district court’s judgment for further consideration
§ Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to in light of the amended law.
give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since § After the district court held that the law remained in violation of the
private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the establishment clause, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a new appeal,
expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of consolidating it with a similar case that had arisen in
the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, Baltimore, Maryland, Murray v. Curlett, in which the lower court had found that
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. Bible reading in public schools is constitutional. Oral arguments were heard
on February 27–28, 1963.
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. SCHEMPP (READING OF BIBLE; READING OF TEN § The case of Murray challenged a 1905 Baltimore school board rule requiring
BIBLE VERSES IN SCHOOL) each school day to begin with a bible reading or the Lord’s Prayer, or both.
Murray’s suit originally lost in the state court and is on appeal.
DOCTRINE: Any law hoping to survive the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause § State Officials from Maryland and Pennsylvania argued:
must have a “secular purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
o Denied that Bible reading or prayer had religious nature and requiring
religion.” The non-establishment clause impedes the government from setting up a
it did not violate establishment clause
church or from passing laws, which aid some, all religion, or prefer one over the other.
o Establishment clause only designed to prevent official state religion
The reading of the bible as part of curricular activities is a religious ceremony violating
o Bible reading advanced a legitimate and secular state interest in
the establishment clause’s mandate of maintaining government neutrality.
maintaining order and morals
o Forbidding organized prayer is antireligious and would establish a
RECIT-READY: This is a US case wherein the validity of a state law requiring public
“religion of secularism”
schools to read 10 bible verses at the beginning of the day was challenged as
§ Schempp and Murray argued that:
unconstitutional under the establishment clause. The SC held that such exercise is
o Establishment clause prohibited States from requiring that passages
unconstitutional because the establishment clause withdrew all legitimate power
from the bible be read or that the Lord’s prayer be recited in the public
respecting belief or religion and such activity is clearly a religious exercise.

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 schools, even if individual students could be excused from attending § That is to say that, to withstand the strictures of the
or participating in such exercises upon written request of parents Establishment Clause, there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
ISSUE: WON THE PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE AND THE SCHOOL BOARD nor inhibits religion.
REQUIREMENT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL § That test foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s “Lemon test” for consistency
with the establishment clause, which it fashioned in 1971
HELD: Unconstitutional in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
§ Bible reading is a religion exercise and fails the primary effect prong of the
RATIO: test thus it was no defense for the state to argue that its purposes were
§ In an opinion for an 8–1 majority written by Justice Tom C. Clark, the court secular; the court disagreed that prohibiting prayer is anti-religious.
noted and reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s incorporation of the establishment § The court said that the study of the bible or religion in public schools is
clause in Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940). acceptable but only so long as it is presented objectively as part of a secular
§ It also endorsed the view, supported in numerous precedents, that the program of education.
establishment clause was not intended merely to prohibit Congress § Examining the circumstances of the Bible readings and prayers in the schools
from aiding or preferring one religion at the expense of others but also in Pennsylvania and Maryland, the court found that
to ensure that it does not promote all religions, or religion generally. they constituted religious exercises and were therefore unconstitutional
§ The court noted with approval the dissenting opinion of Justice Robert H. under the establishment clause. The court dismissed as unconvincing the
Jackson in the Supreme Court’s decision in Everson v. Board of Education of argument that the exercises and the laws requiring them served the secular
the Township of Ewing (1947), in which he wrote that “the effect of the purpose of “nonreligious moral inspiration.” Nor was it pertinent that students
religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every could be excused from the exercises upon the request of a parent, “for that
form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the
directly or indirectly be made public business, and thereby be supported Establishment Clause,” as the Supreme Court had held
in whole or in part at taxpayers’ expense.” The court likewise cited Justice in Engel v. Vitale (1962).
Wiley B. Rutledge’s dissent in Everson, according to which “the [First] § Finally, the court denied that its finding amounted to an establishment of a
Amendment’s purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of “religion of secularism” or that by failing to uphold the exercises it was
a single sect, creed or religion…[but] to create a complete and permanent interfering in the free-exercise rights of religious students and their parents.
separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by “While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to
comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.” deny the rights of free exercise to anyone,” the court declared, “it has never
Those principles, the court noted in Schempp, “have been long established, meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice
recognized and consistently reaffirmed.” its beliefs.”
§ However, just as the government may not promote any or all religions, it is
also prohibited from inhibiting or interfering with religion, as the free-exercise § Concurring opinions were filed by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, joined by
clause of the First Amendment establishes. The court again cited Rutledge’s Justice John Marshall Harlan, and by Justices William J. Brennan, Jr.,
dissent in Everson, among other precedents, to support that point: “Our and William O. Douglas.
constitutional policy…does not deny the value or the necessity for religious
training, teaching or observance.” Taken together, therefore, the two religion § Justice Potter Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the
clauses of the First Amendment require the state to be neutral not only record before the court was insufficiently developed to allow it to conclude that
as between different groups of religious believers but also as between the students were coerced into participating in the exercises in violation of the
religious believers and nonbelievers. establishment clause.
§ Neither the State nor the Federal Gov’t may constitutionally force a person to
profess belief or disbelief in any religion, nor can it pass laws that aid all
religions as against nonbelievers.
§ Establishment clause withdrew all legitimate power respecting belief or
expression. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ALLEN (PROVIDING TEXTBOOKS TO SCHOOLS)
§ On the basis of that conclusion, the court in Schempp devised a test to
determine whether a given statute is in violation of the establishment clause: DOCTRINE: The test in determining whether the statute violates the non-
o The test may be stated as follows: establishment clause is: What are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If
§ What are the purpose (must be secular) and the primary either advances or inhibits religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or power. There must be a secular purpose and effect. The statute’s purpose is to further
inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope the educational opportunities available to the youth. The petitioners fail to show that the
of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. effects are contrary to the purpose. The books lent is approved by public school

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authorities, ensuring that they are secular. The financial benefit is to persons and § The Court ruled that the books are not lent to the schools but to the children.
children and not schools. Furthermore, the law provides that only secular books can receive approval
to be loaned to the students. Thus, they can’t be used to teach religion.
RECIT-READY: A law of the State of New York requires public school authorities to Moreover, the law covers all students, even those not attending parochial
lend textbooks for free to all students in Grade 7 to 12, including those in parochial schools.
schools. Petitioners contend that such law violated the Establishment Clause of the § The Court has also recognized the two goals pursued by religious schools:
constitution because public funds are used to private religious schools. The trial court religious instruction and secular education.
ruled in their favor but the New York Court of Appeals and the US Supreme Court § Lending the books to the students helps in their secular education. There was
upheld the constitutionality of the law. The purpose of the law is to further the no violation of the Establishment Clause.
educational opportunities of all students, a secular purpose. The law also applies to all
students regardless of which school they attend. Therefore, there are no public funds Judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
used to help a particular religion. There is no violation of the Constitution.
LEMON KURZMAN (SALARY SUBSIDY TO TEACHERS)
FACTS:
o A law of the State of New York requires local public school authorities to lend DOCTRINE: 3 TESTS: FIRST, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
textbooks free of charge to all students in Grades 7 to 12. Even those in SECOND, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
parochial schools are included. religion. FINALLY, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement
o Petitioners allege that the said law violates the State and Federal Constitution with religion.
because public funds are used for private religious schools.
o The trial court ruled that the law was indeed unconstitutional for violating the A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance of teachers to avail
First and Fourteenth Amendment (non-establishment of religion clause, due of this salary supplement will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are
process). obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot
o The appellate court reversed the ruling and said that the Boards of education be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs
did not have standing. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that there was and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These
indeed standing but the law in question did not violate the constitution. prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state
and church.
ISSUE: WON the law in question violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
RECIT-READY: Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory program that provides financial
HELD: NO
support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way of reimbursement for
RATIO: the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular
§ Establishment Clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an subjects. Rhode Island has adopted a statute under which the State pays directly to
establishment of religion.” teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their annual salary.
§ In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court stated that the Establishment Under each statute state aid has been given to church-related educational institutions.
Clause bars a State from passing “laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, The SC holds that both statutes are unconstitutional for being violative of the
or prefer one religion over another.” Nevertheless, the Court also said that the Establishement and Free Exercise Clauses.
Establishment Clause does not prevent the State from extending the benefits
of state laws to all citizens without regard for their religion. FACTS:
§ The case of Abington School District v. Schempp created a test to distinguish § Two consolidated appeals questioning Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
between forbidden involvements of the State with religion and those which are Statutes granting state-aid to church-related elementary and secondary
permitted. schools, as violative of Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (Sec 5 of
o “What are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the 1987 Phil. Const.) and the due process clause.
the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds § Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act (enacted 1969)
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. o The Act authorizes state officials to supplement the salaries of
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools by
Clause, there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary paying directly to a teacher an amount not in excess of 15% of his
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.” current annual salary
§ The purpose of the law as stated by the New York Legislature is the o to be eligible for the Rhode Island salary supplement, the recipient
furtherance of educational opportunities available to the young. Petitioners must teach in a nonpublic school at which the average per-pupil
have not shown any other effects which are contrary to this stated purpose. expenditure on secular education is less than the average in the
§ Petitioners contend that the books lent to parochial schools can be used to State's public schools during a specified period
teach religion, thus, there is a constitutional violation.

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 o Requirement (one of many): any teacher applying for a salary
supplement must first agree in writing "not to teach a course in 2. Tests developed by the Court:
religion for so long as or during such time as he or she receives any § the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
salary supplements" under the Act. § its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
o Rhode Island's nonpublic elementary schools accommodated inhibits religion
approximately 25% of the State's pupils § the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
§ 95% of these pupils attended schools affiliated with the religion”
Roman Catholic church. 3. The legislatures of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania have concluded that secular and
§ About 250 teachers applied; all employed by Roman religious education are identifiable and separable.
Catholic schools. a. However, they have also recognized that a substantial portion of their
o Federal Court: Although concern for religious values does not activities is religiously oriented
necessarily affect the content of secular subjects, it also found that b. Therefore, they sought to create statutory restrictions designed to guarantee
the parochial school system was "an integral part of the religious the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to
mission of the Catholic Church." ensure that State financial aid supports only the former
§ District Court – Act violated Establishment Clause; it fostered "excessive
entanglement" between government and religion (US SC affirmed) 4. Prior US SC holdings – purpose is not total separation between church and state;
§ Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act total separation is not possible in an absolute sense.
(1968) a. Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of
o Enacted in response to the rising costs of Pennsylvania non-public separation, far from being a "wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier
schools, solution for which is the government support of "those depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship
purely secular educational objectives achieved through nonpublic
education”. 5. In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is
o School seeking reimbursement must maintain prescribed accounting excessive, we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are
procedures that identify the "separate" cost of the "secular benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
educational service." prohibits reimbursement for any course that between the government and the religious authority: (both statutes foster an
contains "any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the impermissible degree of entanglement)
morals or forms of worship of any sect." a. Rhode Island Act
o State has entered into contracts with nonpublic schools who teach § church schools were located close to parishes.
more than 20% of the total number of students in the State; More § 2/3 of the teachers are nuns from various religious orders
than 96% of these pupils attend church-related schools; schools are § Rhode Island Roman Catholic elementary schools are under the
affiliated with the Roman Catholic church. general supervision of the Bishop of Providence and his appointed
o District Court: individual plaintiffs-appellants (Lemon) – had standing representative, the Diocesan Superintendent of Schools iv. Schools
to challenge; organizational appellants residing in the State declaring are governed by the Handbook of School
belief in the separation of church and state – NO standing. § Regulations which state that religious formation is not confined to
§ Held that Act DID NOT violate Establishment Clause (US formal courses
SC reversed) b. Pennsylvania Act
§ church-related elementary and secondary schools are controlled by
ISSUE: WON the Acts are unconstitutional - YES religious organizations, have the purpose of propagating and
promoting a particular religious faith, and conduct their operations to
HELD: fulfill that purpose.
1. Rhode Island District Court decision – affirmed. § schools seeking reimbursement must maintain accounting
2. Pennsylvania District Court decision – reversed; case remanded for further procedures that require the State to establish the cost of the secular
proceedings. as distinguished from the religious instruction

RATIO: 6. Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are
normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but
1. Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection against: political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
lll. Sponsorship First Amendment was intended to protect.
mmm. financial support, and
nnn. active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity 7. The potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and practice is
aggravated in these two statutory programs by the need for continuing annual

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appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations ooo. The Higher Education Facilities Act was passed in 1963 in response to a
grow. strong nationwide demand for the expansion of college and university facilities
to meet the sharply rising number of young people demanding higher
8. The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the education. It provides for construction grants and the state maintains its
family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and interest on the said structures for 20 years.
entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn. ppp. The act is administered by the US Commission of Education and advises that
under the Act no part of the project may be used for sectarian instruction,
TITON V. RICHARDSON (CONSTRUCTION GRANT TO SCHOOLS) religious worship, or the programs of a divinity school. The commissioner
requires assurances that the conditions must be respected before the grants
DOCTRINE: are issued.
qqq. Appellants impugn the grants being used in the following projects; (1) a library
Legitimate Secular objective - Nation's colleges and universities are encouraged and building at Sacred Heart University; (2) a music, drama, and arts building at
assisted in their efforts to accommodate rapidly growing numbers of youth who Annhurst College; (3) a science building at Fairfield University; (4) a library
aspire to a higher education building at Fairfield; and (5) a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus
College. All four institutions are church related.
The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a rrr. Appellants presented the following as evidence, the relations with religious
consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect authorities, the curricula content, and other indications of religious character
advances religion. College students are less impressionable and less susceptible to to prove that the buildings were not used for sectarian purposes.
religious indoctrination. Correspondingly, the necessity for intensive government sss. The district court ruled that the act is constitutional and it does not support or
surveillance is diminished and the resulting entanglements between government promote any religion. They reasoned that the Act makes no reference to
and religion lessened. religious affiliation or nonaffiliation. Under these circumstances "institutions of
higher education" must be taken to include church-related colleges and
A recipient institution's obligation not to use the facility for sectarian instruction or universities. Thus the appeal.
religious worship would appear to expire at the end of 20 years, “the period of federal
interest”. Limiting the prohibition for religious use of the structure to 20 years obviously ISSUE: Whether the Act violates either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of
opens the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that period. To this extent the Act the First Amendment.
therefore trespasses on the Religion Clauses.
HELD: No The act is constitutional except for the 20 limitation on religious use. Case
RECIT-READY: is remanded to the district courts to render a judgment consistent with the SC’s
§ The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provides federal construction decision.
grants for college and university facilities, except for the facility to be used for
sectarian instruction or religious worship. The state has a 20 year interest on RATIO:
the product of the said grant; any violation allows the state to recover the
funds.
§ 4 church related institutions received such grant. Appellant presented
evidence of their relations with religious authorities, the curricula content, and
other indicia of religious character PURPOSE OF THE ACT
§ The colleges introduced testimony that they had fully complied with the
statutory conditions and that their religious affiliations did not interfere with 1. The Act expresses a legitimate secular objective entirely appropriate for
their secular educational functions. governmental action: “xxx to accommodate rapidly growing numbers of youth who
§ District court sustained its constitutionality, finding that the act neither aspire to a higher education”
supporting or promoting a religion
2. Not all financial aid to a church-sponsored activity violates the Establishment of
§ The US S.C. held that the act is constitutional except for the 20 prohibition of
Religion Clause (hereinafter ERC). A federal construction grant to a hospital operated
religious use of projects federally funded. The case was remanded to the
by a religious order was upheld in Bradfield v. Roberts.
district courts to enter a judgment consistent with the U.S. SC.
§ Note: The grant only prohibits the usage of the building or facility for 20 years, 3. The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as
after that, such building may be used for religious purpose. So in effect the a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect
unrestricted use of the property after 20 years is a contribution to a religious advances religion.
body. § The restrictions (structure must only be used for secular purposes) are
enforced in the actual administration
FACTS:

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 § The religious institutions being impugned did not violate any of these statutory
restrictions neither did the petitioners present evidence to the contrary The menorah here stands next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. Although
§ Appellants merely relied on the argument that the state must not support Christmas trees once carried religious connotations, today they typify the secular
institutions that teaches religious doctrines celebration of Christmas. In these circumstances, then, the combination of the tree and
§ There is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these facilities. the menorah communicates, not a simultaneous endorsement of both the Christian and
The evidence presented by the petitioner did not show that those were being Jewish faiths, but instead, a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an
enforced and were characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradition.
rather than religious indoctrination. Thus it does not promote a religion.
§ Unlike subsidy for teachers which requires greater standard because they are RECIT-READY: Respondents filed suit to enjoin county from displaying a crèche in the
not necessarily religiously neutral, the facilities are in themselves religiously county grand staircase and the city government from displaying a menorah on the
neutral. ground that it violates the establishment clause of first amendment. The decision of the
Court of Appeals stating that the actions of petitioners are impermissible governmental
THE 20 YEAR CLAUSE endorsement of Christianity and Judaism is affirmed in part and reversed in part by the
Supreme Court. The crèche is held unconstitutional but the menorah is not. The
1. This 20-year period is termed by the statute as "the period of Federal interest" and Supreme Court stated that the effect of the display depends upon the message that
reflects Congress' finding that after 20 years "the public benefit accruing to the United government’s practice communicates. Nothing in the context of the display detracts
States" from the use of the federally financed facility "will equal or exceed in value" the from the crèche’s religious message. The menorah stands next to a Christmas tree and
amount of the federal grant a sign saluting liberty (both non-religious symbols) creates an "overall holiday setting".
Case is remanded to Court of Appeals to review whether the menorah causes
2. Limiting the prohibition for religious use of the structure to 20 years obviously opens government and religion to be entangled.
the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that period. So after 20 years, the FACTS:
building can be converted into a chapel. § Since 1981, the Holy Name Society of Pittsburgh had placed a crèche on the
grand staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse as a donation.
3. This is not compatible with the ERC. § In 1986, the county also placed poinsettia plants and two Christmas trees
ttt. A part of the statute which is unconstitutional does not render the whole around the crèche. Attached to the manger was an angel carrying a
statute as such. Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission banner, with the words: Gloria in Excelsis Deo!
uuu. The 20 year provision is not important to the statutory provision as a whole § The Pittsburgh City-County Building (serving as City Hall) is separate from the
courthouse, and is jointly owned by the city and county. The city had placed a
[1]
Note: In comparison to Lemon case: (a) there is less danger here than in church related 45-foot Christmas tree in front of the building "for a number of years."
primary & sec. schools dealing w/ impressionable children, (b) the facilities provided § In 1986, the city placed a plaque beneath the tree with the mayor's name,
here are themselves religiously neutral w/ correspondingly less need for gov’t entitled "Salute to Liberty." Below the title, the sign stated: "During this holiday
surveillance, (c) the gov’t aid here is one time single purpose construction grant w/ only season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us
minimal need for inspection. that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom."
Since 1982, the city had also placed a 18-foot Chanukah menorah or
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (CRÈCHE AT candelabrum (nine-branched candleholder) with the 45-foot decorated
COUNTY COURTHOUSE; XMAS TREE AND MENORAH AT GRANT STREET Christmas tree in front of the City-County Building. The city did not own the
ENTRANCE) menorah, but placed, removed, and stored it each year. The menorah was
owned by Chabad House, Pittsburgh's Lubavitch Center.
DOCTRINE: In Lynch it was concluded that the government's use of religious § On December 10, 1986, the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the ACLU and
symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, seven local residents sued the city of Pittsburgh and the county of Allegheny.
and the effect of the government's use of religious symbolism depends upon its The lawsuit sought to enjoin the county from displaying the crèche in the
context. When evaluating the effect of government conduct under the Establishment courthouse, and the city from displaying the menorah in front of the city-
Clause, we must ascertain whether “the challenged governmental action is county building. Chabad was allowed to intervene to defend the menorah.
sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations The plaintiffs argued that the displays violated the Establishment Clause,
as an endorsement, and by the non adherents as a disapproval, of their applicable via the Fourteenth Amendment
individual.” § On May 8, 1987, the District Court denied the injunction to remove either the
crèche or the menorah.
The Establishment Clause does not limit only the religious content of the government's o stating that the “crèche was but part of the holiday decoration of the
own communications. It also prohibits the government's support and promotion of stairwell and a foreground for the high school choirs which
religious communications by religious organizations. The crèche therefore violative of entertained each day at noon.” Regarding the menorah, the court
the clause. concluded that “it was but an insignificant part of another holiday
display.”

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 § The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, is clearly the predominant element in the city's display. The 45-foot tree
stating that the two displays each violated the Establishment Clause as an occupies the central position beneath the middle archway in front of the Grant
impermissible governmental endorsement of Christianity and Judaism. Street entrance to the City-County Building; the 18-foot menorah is positioned
The county, city, and Chabad all subsequently filed petitions for certiorari. to one side.
• Given this configuration, it is much more sensible to interpret the meaning of
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DISPLAY OF THE CRÈCHE AND THE MENORAH, IN the menorah in light of the tree, rather than vice-versa. The combination of the
THEIR RESPECTIVE “PARTICULAR PHYSICAL SETTINGS” HAS THE EFFECT OF tree and the menorah communicates not a simultaneous endorsement of both
ENDORSING OR DISAPPROVING RELIGIOUS BELIEFS the Christian and Jewish faiths, but instead, a secular celebration of Christmas
HELD: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, coupled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous
and the cases are remanded for further proceeding. The crèche is held unconstitutional alternative tradition.
but the menorah is not. • An "explanatory plaque" such as the city’s "salute to liberty" may confirm that
in particular contexts the government's association with a religious symbol
RATIO:
does not represent the government's sponsorship of religious beliefs.
• Framework for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols (from Lynch
• In this particular context, the menorah's display does not have an effect of
v. Donnelly)
endorsing religious faith. Whether the menorah violates either the “purpose”
o Any endorsement of religion is invalid.
or “entanglement” between the government and religion may be considered
o The effect of the display depends upon the message that
by the Court of Appeals on remand.
government’s practice communicates. The inquiry turns upon the
context in which the object appears.
Part I: Justices Blackmun and O'Connor both believed that the Christmas tree is a
o Every government practice must be judged in its unique
secular symbol in American society today. However, Justice O'Connor states that the
circumstances to determine whether it endorses religion.
"menorah standing alone may well send a message of endorsement of the Jewish
• The crèche itself is capable of communicating a religious message. It uses [4]
faith." By placing the menorah with the Christmas tree, she believed that the city is
words as well as the nativity scene to make a religious meaning. The phrase representing the pluralism of the freedom of religion.
“Glory to God in the Highest!” is indisputably religious. Nothing in the context
of the display detracts from the crèche’s religious message. The crèche Part II: Justice Blackmun believed that the menorah has become a secular symbol,
stands alone in the Grand Staircase. The floral frame surrounding the crèche emblematic of the "winter-holiday season." Justice Brennan disagreed with this, stating
[4]
serves only to draw one’s attention to the message of the crèche. The crèche that the menorah retains religious meaning. Justice O'Connor joined in Justice
[2]
also sits on the Grand Staircase, the “main” and “most beautiful part” of the Blackmun's belief.
building that is the seat of the county government. By permitting the display of
the crèche, the county sends a message supporting Christian praise to God Part III: In part III-A, Justice Blackmun discussed the Establishment Clause. In III-B,
that is the crèche’s religious message. Justice Blackmun sets the issue of the case as deciding if the crèche and menorah
• The sign stating that the crèche is owned by a Roman Catholic organization have "the total effect of endorsing or disapproving religious beliefs." Justice Brennan
demonstrates that the government is endorsing the religious message of that dissented from the opinions of Justices O'Connor and Blackmun, which had proposed
organization, rather than communicating a message of its own. that the presence of multiple religious displays, so long as one is not favored over the
• The menorah's message is not exclusively religious. The menorah is the other. Justices Blackmun and Brennan also argue that Hanukkah's social prominence
primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas, has both religious and in America may be due to the proximity to Christmas. Justice Blackmun stated that
secular dimensions. The menorah stands next to a Christmas tree and a sign December is not the "winter holiday season" for Judaism, and believes that the
saluting liberty. No challenge has been made here to the display of the tree presentation of the menorah with the Christmas tree promotes a "Christianized version
[4]
and the sign, their presence is obviously relevant in determining the effect of of Judaism." Justice Brennan questions why the city recognizes a "relatively minor
the menorah's display. The necessary result of placing a menorah next to a Jewish holiday," while not the "far more significant Jewish holidays of Rosh
[4]
Christmas tree is to create an "overall holiday setting". Hashanah and Yom Kippur."
• If the city celebrates both Christmas and Chanukah as religious holidays, then Part IV: Justice Blackmun found that the crèche endorsed a "patently Christian
[1]
it violates the Establishment Clause. If the city celebrates both Christmas and message," and permanently enjoined its display in the context presented. In his
Chanukah as secular holidays, then its conduct is beyond the reach of the dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy believed that the crèche does not fail the second
Establishment Clause. prong of the Lemon test, and its display is therefore constitutional. He also concurred
[5]
that the display of the menorah is constitutional.
• The question is whether the combined display of the tree, the sign, and the
menorah has the effect of endorsing both Christian and Jewish faiths, or rather
Part V: Throughout Part V, Justice Blackmun attacked the reasoning of Justice
simply recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same
Kennedy. Citing Marsh v. Chambers (1983), Justice Kennedy argued that
winter holiday season, which has attained a secular status in our society. The the Constitution allows the display of the crèche. Justice Blackmun disagreed with
Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a religious symbol. The tree

Jlyrreverre|143
Justice Kennedy's logic, arguing that Justice Kennedy advocates a lower level an interpreter would violate both the Arizona and the US Constitutions,
[1]
of scrutiny when evaluating the Establishment Clause. specifically the Establishment Clause, which generally prohibits the
government from establishing, advancing, or giving favour to any religion.
Part VI: Justice Blackmun found that the menorah display did not endorse religion in • The Zobrests filed a case in the Arizona district court, invoking the IDEA
violation of the Establishment Clause. However, the Court remanded the decision to (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act) and the First Amendment, which
the appeals court to decide whether the menorah failed the Lemon test on the require respondent to provide James with an interpreter at Salpointe, and that
[1]
"entanglement" and "purpose" prongs, which were not considered in this case. the Establishment Clause does not bar such relief. On the other hand,
respondent Catalina argues that “a regulation promulgated under the IDEA,
Part VII: Justice Blackmun sums up the opinion, stating that the display of the crèche precludes it from using federal funds to provide an interpreter to James at
in the courthouse is unconstitutional. He also states that the display of the menorah in Salpointe, [that] it is not required by statute or regulation to furnish interpreters
[1]
this "particular physical setting" is constitutional. The cases were remanded to the to students at sectarian schools.”
appeals court for further proceedings in light of this decision. • The district court ruled in favor of Catalina, stating that "[t]he interpreter would
act as a conduit for the religious inculcation of James—thereby, promoting
ZOBREST V. CATALINA (SIGN LANGUAGE INTERPRETER TO DEAF STUDENT) James' religious development at government expense."
• A divided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. It
DOCTRINE: Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of held that providing a sign-language interpreter would have failed the so-called
citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Lemon test. In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) the Supreme Court established a
Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated three-rule test for laws that involved religious establishment, one of which
financial benefit. forbids advancing or inhibiting a religion. The Ninth Court decided that the
interpreter would have been the instrumentality conveying the religious
Because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian message and that by placing the interpreter in the religious school, the local
school, an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to state decision- making. board would have appeared to be sponsoring the school’s activities. The court
Under the IDEA, no funds traceable to the government ever find their way into sectarian pointed out that although denying the interpreter placed a burden on the
schools' coffers. The only indirect economic benefit a sectarian school might receive parents’ right to free exercise of religion, the denial was justified because the
by dint of the IDEA is the disabled child's tuition. government had a compelling state interest in ensuring that the First
Amendment was not violated.
RECIT-READY: James Zobrest is a deaf child who attends Salpointe Catholic High • Hence, this petition.
School. His parents requested Catalina Foothills School District to furnish him with an • NOTE: By the time the case was elevated to the SC, James had already
interpreter. Catalina declined, stating that by doing so, they would violate the graduated high school. The Zobrest parents provided a private interpreter to
Establishment Clause. The district court of Arizona and the US Court of Appeals sided James during his stay in Salpointe. While the case should have been moot
with Catalina. The Supreme Court however reversed the rulings, stating that the and academic, the Zobrests still persisted on the case, on the ground that they
provision of an interpreter to a disabled student is valid under the “Individuals with claim entitlement to governmental reimbursement for the private interpreter
Disabilities Education Act” or IDEA, regardless of the sectarian or nonsectarian nature they hired.
of the school, or the religion of the disabled student. The IDEA also does not give the
school expenses because of the interpreter, because it is the government itself which ISSUE: W/N THE PROVISION OF AN INTERPRETER IN A CATHOLIC SCHOOL
provides for such. Thus, providing James with an interpreter is not violative of the WOULD VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Establishment Clause.
HELD: NO. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court and the Court of
IMPORTANT MUST-READ: The “Establishment Clause” of the First Amendment of Appeals
the US Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.” Basically, the Establishment Clause prohibits (1) the RATIO:
establishment of a national religion by Congress, and (2) the preference by the US
government of one religion over another. ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WERE PRESSED
The US SC only touched on the federal and constitutional issue (that of the
FACTS: Establishment Clause) of the case because the parties chose to litigate on such
• James Zobrest is a deaf child. He attended a private school for the deaf from
issue alone in the hearings under the district court and the Court of Appeals
the first until the fifth grade. He transferred to a public school operated by the
Though the prudential rule was that constitutional questions were better left
Catalina Foothills School District, where he stayed till the eighth grade. During
avoided in hearings, the US SC granted the exception
his stay here, the public school provided him with a sign language interpreter.
• For religious reasons, James transferred to Salpointe Catholic High School
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS CAN TAKE PART IN SOCIAL WELFARE AND
in his ninth grade. The Zobrest parents asked the school to provide him with
SERVICES PROGRAMS
an interpreter, but the school declined, contending that providing James with

Jlyrreverre|144
 • Religious institutions are not disabled from participating in social welfare and • that aiding the student and his parents did not amount to a direct subsidy
services programs of the government. If such were the case, then a church of the religious school because the student, not the school, was the primary
may not be saved by firemen if there was a fire. beneficiary of the IDEA.
• “[G]overnment programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class • that the task of a sign-language interpreter was different from that of a teacher
of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject or guidance counselorin so far as an interpreter would not add or subtract from
to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian the pervasively sectarian environment in which the student’s parents had
institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit.” chosen to place him.
• In Mueller v Allen, the US SC stated that “public funds become available to
sectarian schools ‘only as a result of numerous private choices of individual IMPORTANCE: Zobrest is a significant case because it was among the first that
parents of school-age children.’” marked a shift in the court toward interpreting the establishment clause to allow
• In Witters v Washington Department of Services for Blind, the US SC granted government-paid services for students who attend religiously affiliated nonpublic
aid to a blind man who wanted to become a pastor. "Any aid provided under schools. Similar rulings followed, notably Agostini v. Felton (1997), in which the court
Washington's program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so held that remedial services, which were financed by federal funds under Title I, could
only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid be provided in parochial schools.
recipients."
CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW BOARD V. KU KLUX CLAN (CROSS AT PLAZA;
PUBLIC FORUM)
NON-VIOLATION OF THE IDEA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
• “The service at issue in this case is part of a general government program
Establishment Clause v. Freedom of Expression:
that distributes benefits neutrally to any [disabled] child xxx without regard to
the ‘sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature’ of the school the child When a public area rises to the level of a forum, government actors cannot suppress
attends.” speech by groups on the grounds that it may affect the Establishment Clause, because
o When the government offers a neutral service on the premises of a doing so is an abrogation of the group’s First Amendment freedom of expression.
sectarian school as part of a general program, it is in no way skewed
towards religion. DOCTRINE: Respondents' religious display in Capitol Square was private expression.
o In other words, the IDEA does not discriminate between religious Our precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First
and non-religious schools, and between schools for different Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular
religions. A deaf Muslim student enrolled in a Muslim school is also private expression. The right to use government property for one's private expression
entitled to the benefits under IDEA. depends upon whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status of a
• Parents can freely choose whatever school their child would attend. public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses. t may impose
o “By according parents freedom to select a school of their choice, reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, but it may regulate
[IDEA] ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be present in expressive content only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve
a sectarian school only as a result of the private decision of individual a compelling state interest. These strict standards apply since Capitol Square is a
parents. traditional public forum.
o “the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a
sectarian school, an interpreter’s presence there cannot be attributed There is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
to state decisionmaking.” Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free
• “The IDEA creates a neutral government program dispensing aid not to Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect. By its terms that Clause applies only to the
words and acts of government. It was never meant, and has never been read by this
schools, but to individual handicapped children.”
Court, to serve as an impediment to purely private religious speech connected to the
o Thus, the school would not be burdened financially by the interpreter,
State only through its occurrence in a public forum.
resulting in a loss of income.
o It is the government, through the IDEA, that would furnish an The “transferred endorsement” test (critical mass of communications may be perceive
interpreter to the disabled child in order to further his education. district as endorsing a religion) would also disrupt the settled principle that policies
• Thus, “If a handicapped child chooses to enroll in a sectarian school,” the providing incidental benefits to religion do not contravene the Establishment Clause.
Establishment Clause cannot be violated if an interpreter is hired.
THE ONLY ECONOMIC BENEFIT THE RELIGIOUS SCHOOL MIGHT HAVE Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely
RECEIVED WOULD HAVE BEEN INDIRECT private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly
• that would have occurred only if the school made a profit on each student, if announced and open to all on equal terms.
the student would not have attended the school without the interpreter, and if
the student’s seat would have remained unfilled.

Jlyrreverre|145
RECIT-READY: Respondents applied to the petitioner for a permit to place a cross on • District court and CA found that Capitol Square was a traditional public
the Capitol Square from Dec 8-24, 1993. Petitioner denied it on the grounds that it forum, thus the state has restricted right to limit protected expressive
violated the establishment clause. Respondent sued the petitioner for denying the right activities
to freedom of expression. SC said that for a place for public forum state has restricted • Since this involve content based restriction on the grounds of violation of
power to limit protected expressive activities. For content based restriction there must Establishment clause, court must decide whether or not putting up a cross
be a compelling state interest and the establishment court falls under such interest. on Capitol Square would violate such clause
However since the Capitol Square is equally open to all for and it is for public • Lamb’s Chapel case
forum, the state is deemed not to have sponsored respondent’s expression and o Court ruled that since the school property was open to a wide
any benefit to the latter would be only incidental and the court is not ready to rule variety of uses, the state was not directly sponsoring the
that a law is violative of the Establishment Clause just because it provides religious group and any benefit which the latter received is
incidental benefits to religious groups. merely incidental, thus no violation of the Establishment clause
• Widmar Case
FACTS: o Public university refused accessibility to forum to student
• This case arises from a suit filed by the Respondents, Pinette and other religious group, but court ruled since the forum was open to
members of the Ohio Ku Klux Klan (Respondents), seeking an injunction a broad spectrum it was not volative of the establishment
requiring the Petitioner, the Capital Square Review and Advisory Board clause and any benefit to religious group is just incidental.
(Petitioner), to allow them to erect a cross on the grounds as it had been • Once we determined that the benefit to religious groups from the
traditionally used as a public forum. public forum was incidental and shared by other groups, we
• Capital Square (the Square) is a state-owned plaza surrounding the categorically rejected the State's Establishment Clause defense
Statehouse in Columbus, Ohio. • By its terms that Clause applies only to the words and acts of government.
• Over time, the Square came to be known as a public forum, where speakers It was never meant, and has never been read by this Court, to serve
were allowed to congregate and gatherings held. as an impediment to purely private religious speech connected to the
• A policy developed wherein a variety of unattended displays were allowed. State only through its occurrence in a public forum.
Generally, during the holidays the state would light a tree in the Square and a • RULING: The State did not sponsor respondents' expression (thus not
local rabbi would erect a menorah. violative of the establishment clause), the expression was made on
• This case arose from an application to the Petitioner from the Respondents to government property that had been opened to the public for speech, and
place a cross on the square during the Christmas season. permission was requested through the same application process and on
• The Board determined not to allow the cross, because it could be associated the same terms required of other private groups.
with the nearby capital and thereby could be considered an impermissible • If the court would rule otherwise, it has radical implications for our public
sanction of religion. policy to suggest that neutral laws are invalid whenever hypothetical
• The District Court and Court of Appeals granted judgment in favor of the observers may--even reasonably--confuse an incidental benefit to
Respondents, the Petitioner Appealed. religion with state endorsement.
• TEST on whether or not religious expression violates the
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT APPROVING THE APPLICATION TO PUT UP A CROSS establishment clause
ON THE CAPITOL SQUARE, A PUBLIC PLAZA, CONSTITUTE AN ACT WHICH WAS • Purely private; and
PROHIBITED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
• Occurs in a traditional or designated
public forum, publicly announced and
HELD: NO. Affirmed. Because the Square rose to the level of a public forum, the State
open to all on equal terms
was disallowed from banning private religious speech on the grounds that it may be
misperceived as State-Sanctioned. • Petitioner’s arguments:
RATIO: o Proximity of Capitol Square to the seat of government which
• Right to use government property for one's private expression depends may produce the perception that the cross bears the State’s
upon whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status approval (Transferred Endorsement principle as seen in
of a public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses Allegheny County and Lynch)
o if it has the status of a public forum, the state may impose o SC: We find it peculiar to say that government "promotes" or
reasonable content-neutral limits "favors" a religious display by giving it the same access to a
o The state may regulate expressive content only in a public place public forum that all other displays enjoy. And as a matter of
for public forum if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently held
drawn, to serve a compelling state interest that it is no violation for government to enact neutral policies
§ Violation of the establishment clause is a compelling that happen to benefit religion.
state interest o Allegheny County and Lynch case

Jlyrreverre|146
 § Involves the display of privately sponsored crèche on • Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land
the "Grand Staircase" of the Allegheny County located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area
Courthouse of about 492 square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the
§ Violates the establishment clause as the grand National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of Felix Y.
staircase is not a place where all were free to place Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of
their displays – was not available to everyone to 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land
exercise their freedom of expression unlike in Capitol to be a national historical landmark.
Square where it is a place for public forum • The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports (MECS).
DISSENT. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissented, maintaining that the • Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of
religious display could violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution the measure. In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice
(Constitution) if the reasonable observer would attribute its message to the state. replied in the affirmative.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg) took this dissent further, noting that if • Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the
the aim of the Establishment Clause was to further divide church and state, a Court Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the
should not order the State to display religious symbols. Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI.
• At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of
CONCURRENCE. In their concurrences, Justices David Souter (J. Souter) and an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The
Sandra Day O’Connor (J. O’Connor) both noted that when an intelligent observer motion was opposed by the Manoscas.
could mistake a private, unattended religious display as governmental speech, • After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 3 August 1989, an order fixing
measures should be taken to insure that the observer is made aware of its mistake. the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values
(i.e., a strategically placed sign could serve the purposes of the State in of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property
maintaining its separation from the church.) once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.
DISCUSSION. This case does not serve to abrogate the Establishment Clause, • The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that
but it does hold that it may be secondary to the First Amendment rights of a group the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
seeking to exercise its own expression in a public forum. incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia
MANOSCA V. CA (BIRTH SITE OF FELIX MANALO; EXPROPRIATION) ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2),
Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
DOCTRINE: While it is true that INC members will get more benefit in this • The trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas
expropriation, the advantage is merely incidental and secondary in nature. That moved for reconsideration thereafter but were denied. The Manoscas
only a few would benefit from it does not diminish the character and essence of then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
public use. The property is taken for the distinctive contributions of Felix Manalo to Appeals.
the culture of the country rather than to commemorate his leadership of the INC. • On 15 January 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition/A motion
for the reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court
RECIT-READY: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was on 23 July 1992. The Manoscas filed a petition for review on certiorari
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder with the Supreme Court.
of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis ISSUE: WHETHER THE SETTING UP OF THE MARKER IN COMMEMORATION
that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that OF FELIX MANALO, THE FOUNDER OF THE RELIGIOUS SECT IGLESIA NI
the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the CRISTO, CONSTITUTES “PUBLIC USE.”
use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the
provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: YES
court held that the practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members RATIO:
of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar
• Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less
advantage still remains to be merely incidental andsecondary in nature. Indeed,
frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an
that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does
inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any
not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the
subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of
FACTS:
the power.

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 • Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community could
idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for justify the infringement of religious freedom. No such immediate threat was shown
some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase in this case.
by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within
the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. FACTS:
• It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive • The Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP), a corporation
form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development
qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use License SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends
without just compensation." This prescription is intended to provide a voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual communities.
against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. • It claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active
• The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and the
need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of World Assembly of Muslim Youth.
eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all • The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal2 certifications in the
to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such Philippines. Thus, among the functions IDCP carries out is to conduct
traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications
of "use by the public" has long been discarded. to qualified products and manufacturers. IDCP formulated in 1995
• The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal
Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of certifications.
the Iglesia ni Cristo. • In that same year, IDCP began to issue, for a fee, certifications to
• The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves qualified products and food manufacturers. IDCP even adopted for use
little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine
objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, Patent Office under Patent 4-2000-03664.
the exercise of the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may • On 26 October 2001, the Office of the Executive Secretary issued
be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could Executive Order (EO) 465, series of 2001, creating the Philippine Halal
well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely Certification Scheme and designating the Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA)
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually to oversee its implementation.
benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish • Under the EO, OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
the essence and character of public use. certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. On 8 May
2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal'
ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (HALAL Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of
CERTIFICATION) general circulation.
• In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products
DOCTRINE: To classify as halal is a religious function, as standards are drawn with its official halal certification since those without said certification
from religious beliefs. EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain
organizations to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food is fit for consumption. The pork or its derivatives.
state has forced them to accept their interpretation of the Qu’ran. Only the • OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger can justify the infringement on halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109.
religious freedom, which is accorded a preferred status. As a result, IDCP lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped
securing certifications from it.
RECIT-READY: Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the • IDCP filed a petition for prohibition, praying for the declaration of nullity of
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designated OMA to oversee its EO 46 and the prohibition of the Office of the Executive Secretary and
implementation. This EO gave OMA the exclusive authority to issue halal OMA from implementing the subject EO and argued that it is
certification. Petitioner IDCP, an NGO that extends voluntary services to the unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines
Filipino people especially to Muslim communities, contends that the EO is violative on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only
of the separation of the Church and State and the right to freedom to religion. The religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform
SC held that the EO is unconstitutional because it allows for the State to encroach for the Muslims.
on the religious freedom of the Muslims to interpret for them what products are fit
for their consumption. Further, the SC held that only the prevention of an

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ISSUE: WHETHER THE OMA ENCROACHED UPON THE RELIGIOUS human consumption and are properly labeled and safe without
FREEDOM OF MUSLIM ORGANIZATINOS TO INTERPRET WHAT FOOD encroaching on the religious freedom of the Muslims.
PRODUCTS ARE FIT FOR MUSLIM CONSUMPTION
WON the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion. TARUC V. DELA CRUZ (EXCOMMUNICATION)

HELD: The Court grants the petition. The EO is declared unconstitutional. DOCTRINE: Expulsion of members of a religious organization is best left to the
discretion of the officials, laws and canons of the organization. The courts cannot
RATIO: exercise control, as their membership depends on members conforming to church
• OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order 697 "to ensure the regulations. The court should not touch doctrinal or disciplinary differences. The
integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with power of exclusion is an ecclesiastical matter, which the court has no power over.
due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions."
• OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the RECIT-READY: Petitioners were members of the Philippine Independent Church in
Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a Surigao. They requested for the transfer of Florano (parish priest) because his wife was
religious group. a member of a political family which is against that of Taruc's (petitioner). De La Cruz
• Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and denied such requests. Due to their disagreement, petitioners decided to hold masses
State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely to be led by another priest. This plan was first heard by De La Cruz who vehemently
religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the opposed to such plans. They continued to warn petitioners about the consequences of
"free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the their actions but the latter continued to perform such activities. Because of this, the
1987 Constitution. Bishop had them excommunicated. The petitioners went to the court for relief asking
• Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function for damages and an injunction. Supreme Court ruled that the courts have no jurisdiction
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic over such ecclesiastical matters. The Court did not agree with the petitioners' position
beliefs. that they were not given the chance to be heard before the excommunication because
• By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO several actions were done by De La Cruz to actually warn them of the consequences
46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like if they choose to proceed with their plans.
IDCP to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. FACTS:
• Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the • Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in
State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Socorro, Surigao del Norte
Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. There is no compelling justification for • Respondent De La Cruz was the bishop of that place while Florano was the
the government to deprive muslim organizations of their religious right to parish priest of the church above
classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim • Petitioners sought the transfer of Florano to another parish priest but De La
Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive Cruz denied what they wanted
power to issue halal certifications. o From the records, it appears that Fr. Florano's wife belonged to a
• The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are political party opposed to petitioner Taruc's
already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government o De La Cruz found the reason too flimsy to actually transfer the priest
agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market • Animosity heightened when Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be
are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town's fiesta
these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims. o Upon sharing the plan with De La Cruz, the latter tried to dissuade
• Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the Taruc from pushing through given that the priest was not member of
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as parish
of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the priest were in doubt
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is o De La Cruz instructed the petitioners to refrain from committing acts
constitutionally unacceptable. prejudicial to the PIC; he advised them to air their valid grievances,
o No compelling justification for the State to deprive Muslim if any, to the higher authorities of the PIC
organizations of their religious right to classify a product as halal, • Taruc still pushed through with his plans
even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be o Taruc and his sympathizers proceeded to hold the open mass which
effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power was celebrated by Fr. Ambong
to issue halal certifications. • Subsequently, De La Cruz declared the petitioners excommunicated from
o Government agencies (such as Bureau of Food and Drugs and the PIC for the ff reasons
DTI) are already tasked to ensure that food products are fit for o Disobedience to duly constituted authority

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 o Inciting dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother • According to Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, one area that the Court should not
of Perpetual Help in Surigao when they celebrated an open mass touch is the "doctrinal and disciplinary differences"
o Threatening to forcibly occupy the parish priest causing anxiety and • The power of the excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of
fear membership are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside
• Petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo and sought reconsideration of the the province of the civil courts
bishop's decision vvv. With regard to the claim that they were not heard, the Court does not agree
o The Obispo Maximo opined that Florano should step down • De La Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times not to commit said acts
voluntarily to avert the hostility
• De La Cruz was reassigned to the diocese of Odmoczan and was replaced by • They were warned about the consequences of their actions
Bishop Timbang • Pleas and warnings fell on deaf ears as petitioners went ahead with their
o Like De La Cruz, Timbang did not find any valid reason to transfer plans Therefore, they should now take responsibility for their actions
Florano
o Even if the petitioners were informed of such stand, they continued UCCP V. BRADFORD UCC INC. (SEPARATION OF BUCCI FROM UCCP)
to celebrate masses led by Fr. Ambong
• Because of the excommunication, petitioner filed a complaint for damages DOCTRINE: The SC ruled that the matter at hand is not purely an ecclesiastical affair.
with preliminary injunction against De La Cruz before the RTC of Surigao, BUCCI has the power under the law to effect disaffiliation such that it should be given
Branch 32. legal consequence and granted recognition. UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate
o They impleaded Florano and one Delfin Bordas for having conspired entities and grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC in
with the Bishop to excommunicate them matters that are legal and corporate.
o They contend that expulsion was illegal because it was done without
trial thus violating their right to due process Ecclesiastical matters concerns doctrine, creed, worship of the church and adoption
• Respondents sought to dismiss the case – denied and enforcement within a religious organization of laws and regulations for the
• Appellate court reversed the decision thereby ordering the dismissal of the government of the membership and the power of excluding those unworthy of
membership.
case
FACTS:
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR A CASE
INVOLVING THE EXPULSION/EXCOMMUNICATION OF MEMBERS OF A • Petitioner United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. It is a
confederation of incorporated and unincorporated self-governing Evangelical
HELD: NO, the courts should not interfere with such decisions churches of different denominations, devised for fellowship, mutual counsel
and cooperation.
RATIO: • Respondent Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), is likewise a
• In our jurisdiction, we hold that the Church and the State are separate and religious corporation with a personality separate and distinct from UCCP.
distinct from each other Private respondents are members of BUCCI.
• The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals saying that the excommunication • UCCP has 3 governing bodies: the General Assembly, the Conference and
of members in a religious institution is a matter best left to the discretion of the the Local Churches. BUCCI belonged to the Cebu Conference Inc. (CCI) and
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. enjoyed a peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when BUCCI constructed a
fence that encroached upon the right of way allocated by UCCP for CCI.
• The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and • The General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute and rendered a
the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. decision in favor of CCI. This triggered a series of events, which further
increased enmity and led to the formal break-up of BUCCI from UCCP.
• It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Article of Incorporation and By-Laws,
performance of their discretionary and official functions.
which provided for and affected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved
• Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform
the same. UCCP filed a complaint before SEC to reject the same but SEC
to just church regulations.
dismissed UCCP’s petition. CA affirmed SEC, hence, this petition for review
• “Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
on certiorari.
organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those
rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
ISSUES/HELD:
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or
possession of church property.”
W/N the separation of BUCCI from UCCP is valid. YES.

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SEC defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition as to mislead a person of ordinary care and discrimination. The SC sustained the
of its constitutional freedom to associate and disassociate. SEC also pointed out said rulings.
that since UCCP used the fact of BUCCI’s disaffiliation to consolidate its claim over
the property subject of unlawful detainer case against BUCCI before the RTC, Wherefore, the petition is denied. The decision of the CA is hereby affirmed.
UCCP cannot now deny the validity of said disaffiliation.
IMBONG V. OCHOA (CONTRACEPTIVES FUNDING)
The SC ruled that the matter at hand is not purely an ecclesiastical affair.
•
An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of DOCRINE: The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual
association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
deemed unworthy of membership practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
•
Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion
between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the
religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the
State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government.
attached with religious significance. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
BUCCI has the power under the law to effect disaffiliation such that it should be simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
given legal consequence and granted recognition. UCCP and BUCCI, being establishing a state religion.
corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction
of the SEC in matters that are legal and corporate. The petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
The Court owes recognition to BUCCI’s decision as it concerns its legal right as a contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded
religious corporation to disaffiliate from another religious corporation via legitimate to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies
means is a secular matter well within the civil courts purview. of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his
conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render
W/N the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of BUCCI unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.
made after it separated from UCCP are valid. YES.
FACTS: RA 10354 or the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
SEC also found that UCCP is not the real party in interest to question the 2012 (RH Law) was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after,
amendments made by BUCCI to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. UCCP’s numerous challengers from various sectors of society came to assail the law’s
control an authority over its local churches is not full and supreme; memberships constitutionality.
of the local churches in the UCCP is voluntary and not perpetual; local churches
enjoy independence and autonomy and may maintain or continue church-life with ISSUE: W/N THE RH LAW VIOLATES THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF
or without UCCP. Under the law and UCCP polity, BUCCI may validly bring about ARTICLE 3, SECTION 5 OF THE CONSTITUTION
its disaffiliation from UCCP through the amendment of its Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws. SEC approved the amendments, which approval has in its favor the HELD:
presumption of regularity. This Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, UCCP, not
being a member of BUCCI, has no locus standi to question the amendments. RATIO:

W/N private respondents are entitled to the use of the name Bradford United 1. The Establishment Clause and Contraceptives
Church of Christ, Inc. YES.
The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
SEC upheld the right of BUCCI to continue using its corporate name. The CA also respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
ruled that BUCCI’s history show that it has a better right to use its corporate name contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are
on the ground of priority of adoption. It has acquired the right to make use of its believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring
corporate name. It also held that it is not confusing or deceptively similar to UCCP religious freedom.

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The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. On the other reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.
human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
faith.
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information
purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the
and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the
inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should
for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled
intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle
individual religious beliefs and practices. of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS
They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for SECTION V PART 2
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
establishing a state religion.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, it was held that there are 2 components to the free
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot exercise clause: The absolute freedom to believe and the freedom to act on that belief.
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State a. Freedom to believe
is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being § The freedom to believe is Absolute and beyond control of the State
dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
§ Prohibits the compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between
of any form of worship
Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's
§ ABSOLUTE FREEDOM- The government cannot inquire into a person's
and unto God the things that are God's.
religious pretentions. Men may believe what they cannot prove, they may not
be put to prove their religious doctrines or beliefs.
2. The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
§ The State is precluded from inquiring into the truth of one’s religious beliefs.
Heresy trials are not allowed
While the RH Law manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-
Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections § The absoluteness of the freedom to believe carries with it the corollary that
7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a the government, while it may look into the good faith of a person, cannot
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services inquire into a person's religious pretensions. (US v. Ballard)
under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious b. Freedom to act on such belief-
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. § Free exercise of the chosen religion
§ NOT ABSOLUTE
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by § The moment belief flows over into action, it becomes subject to government
government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with regulation for the protection of society
the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, § While the State may not look into the pretensions of one’s religious belief, he
the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption must practice it in good faith
from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating § The State may prevent a person from exercising his religion in the interest of
a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular
compelling State interest and in the exercise of Police Power
objective.
Ex: the need for uniformity and discipline in the Military
National Security (German v. Barangan)

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 § However, the exercise of Police Power must not be unduly Renovation Solicitation or contribution in general, which may include contribution for
oppressive. It must be Neutral and of General Application religious purposes, may be regulated by general law for the protection of the public and
advancing a legitimate government interest. its citizens from injury and suppress fraudulent solicitations. (Centeno v. Villalon
The free exercise of religious belief is superior to contract rights, in case of conflict, the Pomillos)
latter must yield to the former. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a
fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of The Smith Standard-
values. Contractual rights must yield to religious freedom. (Victoriano v. Elizalde § A law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
Rope Workers Union) compelling government interest even if it has the incidental effect of burdening
a particular religious practice.
A certification exclusively for religious solicitation is in the form of prior restraint or § Laws that burden religious practice do not have to be justified by a compelling
censorship of religion since the determination of whether or not a certification will be governmental Interest if they are:
released depends upon the secretary of public welfare. Even if interests be weighed, • neutral and
there must be a showing of a clear and present danger in order for the state to limit the • of general applicability. (Church of Lukumi
freedom of exercise of religion. (Cantwell v. State of Connecticut) Babalu Ayeh v. City of Heilaeah)
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession The Smith Test is taken from the Leading Case of Employment Division v. Smith. It is
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint the test used under the Separation or Strict Neutrality approach
can only be justified on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any Because we adhere to the Benevolent Neutrality approach, we use a different
substantive evil, which the state has the right to prevent. test in determining whether or not government interference in Religious Belief
is permissible.
The state may not require a license for the dissemination of religious literature unless
the dissemination is done for a business operation (American Bible Society v. Manila) Since the film series would not have been shown during school hours, nor was it
sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, there would be no
Exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion
of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those or any creed. (Lambs Chapel v. School District)
beliefs may seem to others. (Ebranilag v. Div. Superintendent of Schools in Cebu)
Prayer in School Commencement Ceremonies- It is beyond dispute that, at a
The MR for Ebralinag held that a statute that is facially neutral and is of general minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
application may be unconstitutional when applied to a particular group because it support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
violates their right to religious exercise. "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." (Lee v. Weisman)
The Air Force has drawn the line essentially between religious apparel that is visible As where any member of a religious corporation is expelled from the membership for
and that which is not. The AFRs reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the espousing doctrines and teachings contrary to that of his church, such an action is
interest of the military’s perceived need for uniformity. (Goldman v. Weinberger) conclusive upon civil courts. (Loong v. Basa)
Amish - Respondents have amply supported their claim that enforcement of the fired for use of religious peyote, could not get unemployed compensation. Valid
compulsory formal education requirement after the eighth grade would gravely because the religious clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their religious beliefs. Only the interest of with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to religious belief requires or forbids if the law is not specifically directed to religious
the free exercise of religion. (Wisconsin v. Yoder) practice. (Employment Division, Oregon v. Smith)
Respondents assured petitioners that they have never and will never restrict any What Test do we apply to determine whether or not government interference in
person or persons from entering and worshipping at said chapel. They maintain, Religious Exercise is valid?
however, that the intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to
Because we adhere to the Benevolent Neutrality approach, we apply the Compelling
conduct an anti- government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and
State Interest Test also known as the Sherbert Test (because it was used in the US
offices of the President. The reasonableness of the restriction of entry is designed to
case of Sherbert v. Verner). According to this test, the validity of State intrusion with
protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as government officials
the free exercise of religion is determined by:
transacting business in Malacanang. (German v. Baranganan)
www. First, the court must first determine whether an individual’s right to
religious freedom has been burdened.
Free exercise of religion does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and
use tax on sales of religious materials by a religious organization. (Tolentino v. Sec. xxx. Second, the Court must determine whether the individual’s religious belief in
of Finance) Solicitation of the Samahan ng Katandaan ng Tikay for Church the matter is sincere and its centrality in his faith.

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 yyy. If the first two inquiries prove positive, then the Court must require the State § RA 3350 amended RA 875(Industrial Peace Act) – which says "but such
to demonstrate a Compelling State Interest in pursuing the interference or agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
intrusion. affiliation of their members in any such labor organization", hence introducing
zzz. If such interest exists, then the State must prove that its chosen course of a change on the CBA.
action is the least restrictive or least burdensome to the individual’s religious o Appellee presented resignation from the Union. The Union wrote a
freedom. (Estrada v. Escritor) letter to the Company asking that Appellee be separated from the
service because he is resigning from the Union. The Company
VICTORIANO V ELIZALDE (CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENTS) notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could
achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company
DOCTRINE: The purpose of R.A. 3350, not including members of sects prohibiting would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.
affiliation in labor organizations, is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or o Injunction was granted in favor of Appellee to enjoin the Company
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of from ordering his dismissal and the Union was asked to pay Appellee
advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that a sum of P500 as attorney’s fees. Hence this appeal on questions of
certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of law by the Union.
their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
reason of union security agreements. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment of RA 3350 is constitutional.
HELD: YES. Appeal is DISMISSED, prior decision AFFIRMED.
Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid. But if the stage Union’s (relevant) contentions:
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose § RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act
burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without 3350, that membership in a labor organization is banned to all
imposing such burden. When general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with
exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. any labor organization prohibits all the members of a given
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits
or belief is superior to contract rights. affiliations of their members thereto".
§ The privilege given to members of certain religions impairs
SUMMARY: Appellee is a member of Iglesia ni Cristo who is an employee at the existing contracts (CBA).
Elizalde Rope Factory, and a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union. The § The law discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects
company and the union are in a closed shop agreement where all employees must be because it gives them undue advantage as if respecting an
a member of the collective bargaining union in order to maintain employment. RA 3350 establishment of a religion.
was passed which states that CBAs shall no longer cover members of any religious RATIO:
sects which prohibit affiliation in any labor organization. The union assails the
constitutionality of RA 3350 because it infringes on the right of association, impairs § Appelant Union misread the law: Union’s contention that RA 3350 prohibits
contracts and discriminates in favor of such members of religious sects. The court and bans the members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their
upheld the constitutionality of RA 3350 because (1) the Union misread the law, which members with labor unions from joining labor appears nowhere in the wording
actually does not prohibit association, but only reinforces a person’s right to refrain from of the law; neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication
association, (2) the right to religion is superior over contractual rights, (3) the therefrom.
government may pass laws in pursuit of a valid secular cause even though this may be o The law actually recognizes that it is the employee who should
beneficial to some religions. decide for himself whether he should join or not an association. It is
clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to
FACTS: abstain from joining any union.
§ Appellee is a member of Iglesia ni Cristo (which opposes unions), employee o Purpose of RA 3350 amendment clarified:
at Elizalde Rope Factory and a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union § A person’s right to refrain from joining labor organizations is
which had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering all employees of not absolute.
the company. § Before the enactment of the law, in a closed shop
§ Closed Shop Agreement – a form of union security agreement adopted by the arrangement, any person, regardless of his religious
parties under which the employer agrees to only hire union members, and beliefs, must become a member of the collective bargaining
employees must remain members of the union at all times in order to remain union.
employed. (this is legal) § Given that, RA 3350 introduced an exception, when it
added "but such agreement shall not cover members of any

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 religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in freedom to believe and freedom to act.” The Court recognized an absolute freedom
any such labor organization". of belief, placing questions of religious truth outside the Court system.
§ In effect, members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even in closed Cantwell had a First Amendment right to express his religious message. The Court
shop agreements, and members of said religious sects held, “[Cantwell] had a right peacefully to impart his views to others.” “Freedom of
cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as
on the sole ground that they are not members of the the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law ... and [they] safeguard the free
collective bargaining union. exercise of the chosen form of religion.” Neither federal nor state governments could
§ Heirarchy of rights - the free exercise of religious profession or belief is unduly infringe on the right to freely exercise religion without a compelling state
superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield interest.
to the former.
o Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal FACTS: 2 sets of facts for 2 events that led to the convictions herein described:
right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of (1) Newton, Jesse and Russell Cantwell (hereafter, Cantwells) went from house to
values. house in Cassius street, New Haven with books, pamphlets and records. Each person
o It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and that granted permission would be asked to listen to a record and buy the book it
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that describes. If the person wasn’t interested, they would ask for solicitation in exchange
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the for pamphlets. One of the records played was “Enemies”, which attacked the Catholic
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. religion. Cantwells were charged and convicted under Sec. 294 of General Statutes
§ The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of Connecticut, which disallows soliciting “money, services, subscription or any
of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, forestalling valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form cause...unless such cause shall have been approved...Upon application...for
of worship, but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion permit”. Cantwells contest that the law abridges freedom of religion.
within limits of utmost amplitude.
o Aglipay v. Ruiz –the government should not be precluded from (2) Jesse Cantwell approached 2 men on the street and played the record “Enemies”
pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental which said 2 men took as an attack on their religion—Catholicism. He was told to go
result would be favorable to a religion or sect. away and he did. He was convicted based on a common law offense of inciting a
o A statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional breach of beace.
prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Thus, this petition for certiorari and review.

*** Included only those pertaining to free exercise of religion. But just in case asked, ISSUES & HELD
other issues include: dddd. Does Sec. 294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut violate First
1. Non-impairment of contracts (closed shop agreement) – must yield to proper and Fourteenth Amendment?—YES
exercise of police power with the purpose of the law to equalize opportunities among eeee. Was the conviction based on the common law offense proper?—
members of different religious sects (lawful subject) by excluding such members from NO
the coverage of the CBA (lawful means) RATIO
aaaa. Equal protection of laws – law does not discriminate in favor of First Amendment states that Congress shall make no law respecting the
members of certain religious sects. It just gives them the opportunity to be establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Fourteenth
engaged in certain professions regardless of their religious beliefs. Law amendment also prevented State legislatures from doing the same.
passes the test for a valid classification based on a person’s religion.
bbbb. Social justice – not necessary for the entire state to be directly Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to a religious organization or form of
benefited by the law worship embraces 2 concepts:
cccc. Necessity – just because a statute is not necessary does not mean ffff. freedom to believe—absolute and cannot be restricted
it is unconstitutional gggg. freedom to act—subject to regulation for the protection of society.
State may not wholly restrict preaching or dissemination of religious views, but
CANTWELL V CONNECTICUT (PRIOR RESTRAINT: JEHOVAHS WITNESS the time, place and manner of soliciting upon its streets, as well as holding
SPREADING THE FAITH) meetings may be regulated for safeguarding peace and order
ü The statute says that the secretary of the welfare council will issue a permit
DOCTRINE: Because the local ordinance, requiring a permit allowed officials to when it has determined that the cause is a religious one. It is not a ministerial
determine what causes should be considered religious, it violated the First Amendment. duty but one that requires discretion. State may protect its citizens from
The Supreme Court recognized “the [First] Amendment embraces two concepts— fraudulent solicitation and may regulate the time and manner of solicitation in

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 the interest of the public. But to condition the solicitation of aid for the should have been submitted to the jury. The District Court properly withheld from the
perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of respondents' religious beliefs or
rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a doctrines. This course was required by the First Amendment's guarantee of religious
religious cause, constitutes prior restraint. freedom. Respondents may urge in support of the judgment of the Circuit Court of
ü The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of Appeals points which that court reserved, but, since these were not fully presented here
conduct destroying public order and tranquility, leaving to the executive and either in the briefs or oral argument, they may more appropriately be considered by that
judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application. court upon remand. Circuit Court of Appeals’ (CCA) reversal of conviction was reversed
ü Jesse Cantwell was upon a public street, where he had a right to be and where by the US SC. The case was remanded to the CCA for consideration of other questions.
he had a right peacefully to impart his views to others. There is no showing
that his deportment was overbearing or offensive. He requested of two FACTS:
pedestrians permission to play to them a phonograph record. It is not claimed 1. Respondents were indicted and convicted for using, and conspiring to use,
that he intended to insult or affront the hearers by playing the record. We find the mails to defraud.
only an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to contribute
money in the interest of what Cantwell conceived to be true religion. 2. The charge against respondents: certain designated corporations were
formed, literature distributed and sold, funds solicited, and memberships in
In the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as the I Am movement sought "by means of false and fraudulent representations,
constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the pretenses and promises." (Court qualified that they covered respondents'
petitioner's communication raised no such clear and present menace to public peace alleged religious doctrines or beliefs.)
and order as to render him liable to conviction of the common law offense.
3. Guy Ballard (now deceased) was selected and designated as the
In addition, the Court threw out Cantwell’s arrest for a breach of the peace. Cantwell messenger of alleged divine entity, Saint Germain.
had a First Amendment right to express his religious message. The Court held, a. Guy, Edna and Donald Ballard – “by reason of their alleged high
“[Cantwell] had a right peacefully to impart his views to others.” Since there was no spiritual attainments and righteous conduct, had been selected as
evidence that Cantwell personally insulted the men or argued with them, he could not divine messengers through which the words of the alleged 'ascended
be prosecuted for inciting breach of peace. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion and masters,' including Saint Germain, would be communicated to
wrote of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, “Freedom of conscience and freedom mankind under the teachings commonly known as the 'I Am'
to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose movement”
cannot be restricted by law ... and [they] safeguard the free exercise of the chosen form
of religion.” b. Each of the representations enumerated in the indictment was
followed by the charge that respondents "well knew" it was false.
Neither federal nor state governments could unduly infringe on the right to freely
exercise religion without a compelling state interest. c. The indictment contained twelve counts, one of which charged a
conspiracy to defraud.
US V. BALLARD (GOOD FAITH IN BELIEVING; POWER TO HEAL; SOLICIT
FUNDS) 4. Respondents filed a demurrer and a motion to quash, which asserted that
the indictment attacked their religious beliefs and sought to restrict the free
DOCTRINE: Some of their representations might seem extremely improbable to a great exercise of their religion in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
many people, but whether their beliefs are true or not is not the concern of Court and (both denied by the District Court)
is not the concern of the jury. The Amendment embraces two concepts: freedom to
believe, and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second 5. Early in the trial, however, objections were raised to the admission of certain
cannot be. The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not evidence concerning respondents' religious beliefs. The court conferred with
preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury counsel in absence of the jury and, with the acquiescence of counsel for the United
charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious States and for respondents, confined the issues on this phase of the case to the
beliefs of any sect. question of the good faith of respondents.
hhhh. “Some of the teachings of the defendants, representations,
RECIT-READY: The respondents were convicted for using, and conspiring to use, the might seem extremely improbable to a great many people.”
mails to defraud others using the “I Am” movement. They represented that they were iiii. “Therefore, the religious beliefs of these defendants cannot be an
designated as divine messengers of the alleged diving entity, Saint Germain. The only issue in this court."
issue submitted to the jury by the District Court was whether respondents believed the jjjj. Defense panel acquiesced in this treatment of their religious beliefs.
representations to be true. Respondents did not acquiesce in the withdrawal from the However, in their motion for new trial they did contend that the
jury of the issue of the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs, and are not barred by
the rule of Johnson v. United States, from reasserting here that no part of the indictment

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 withdrawal of these issues from the jury was error because it was, in 3. Respondents maintain that the reversal of the judgment of conviction was justified
effect, an amendment of the indictment. on other distinct grounds. However, the Circuit Court of Appeals did not reach those
6. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and granted a new questions. Therefore, the US SC remanded the cause to the Circuit Court of Appeals
trial: so that it may pass on the questions reserved.
a. the restriction of the issue in question to that of good faith was error
b. to prove that defendants devised the scheme described in the indictment, AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY V. CITY OF MANILA (SELLING BIBLES)
“it was necessary to prove that they schemed to make some at least, of the
[eighteen] representations . . . and that some, at least, of the representations DOCTRINE: The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
which they schemed to make were false." profession carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint to
such right can only be justified like other
ISSUE: WON the reversal of conviction was proper on the ground of religious freedom.
– NO. restraints of freedom of expression with the application of the CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER RULE. For religious institutions to be covered by taxes, they must be
HELD: The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of performing business functions. Dissemination of religious information does not need to
Appeals for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion. be approved by an official. Ordinance No. 2529 of the City not applicable since the
merchandise was not sold for profit. Applying taxes would impair its free exercise of
RATIO: religious profession and dissemination of beliefs.

1. The United States contends that the District Court withdrew from the jury's RECIT-READY: American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious
consideration only the truth or falsity of those representations which related to religious missionary corporation distributing and selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines.
concepts or beliefs, and that there were representations charged in the indictment ABS was informed that it has to comply with ORD 3000 (obtain a mayor’s permit) and
which fell within a different category: ORD 2529 (pay municipal license fee for the period covering 1945 to 1953 and
kkkk. A careful reading of the whole charge leads us to agree with the amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid in protest and filed a case to declare said ORD void
Circuit Court of Appeals on this phase of the case that the only issue submitted and a refund. Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled that ORD 3000 is valid as it merely
to the jury was the question, as stated by the District Court, of respondents' requires a mayor’s permit. ORD 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS
"belief in their representations and promises." – Further, US contends that because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of religion. The
defendants acquiesced in the withdrawal from the jury of the issue of the truth constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
of their religious doctrines or beliefs and that the latter should be barred from worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of
insisting on a different course once that one turned out to be unsuccessful (ie, such right could only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the
move for new trial) Johnson v United States grounds that there is clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the state
llll. Johnson rule cannot be applied here. The real objection of respondents is not has the right to prevent.
that the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted
to the jury (Defendants DID NOT ACQUIESCE; therefore, not barred from FACTS;
moving for a new trial). Their demurrer and motion to quash made clear their • American Bible Society’s Philippine agency has been distributing and selling
position that that issue should be withheld from the jury on the basis of the Bibles and gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines and translating
First Amendment. the same into several Philippine languages (dialects in original case). The
2. US SC concludes that the District Court ruled properly when it withheld from the jury acting City Treasurer of Manila informed the Society that it was conducting
all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or doctrines of business without a mayor’s permit and municipal license.
respondents. • The plaintiff protested but the City Treasurer demanded a deposit. Plaintiff
a. Dual aspect of the First Amendment (Cantwell v Connecticut): paid under protest and took the suit to Court, questioning Ordinances No.
i. forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the 2529, 3000, 3028 and 3364 illegal and unconstitutional. The City of Manila
practice of any form of worship maintained that the ordinances were constitutional by virtue of the powers
ii. safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion b. The given to them by the Revised Administrative Code and the Revised Charter of
Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views the City of Manila.
of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the • Plaintiff proved its existence since 1899 and that its real properties are exempt
lack of any one religious creed on which all men would agree. from real estate taxes and that no licenses were required before the war for
c. If those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their selling Bibles. It did not make any profit for the sale of the Bibles. Defendant
truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any contended that they still made profit off the Bibles based on the sale price.
sect. • The Manila CFI ruled that the petitioner’s case was unmeritorious. Plaintiff
took up the matter with the Court of Appeals, which brought the case to the
Supreme Court since the errors assigned to the CA were questions of law.

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 • With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the
ISSUE/S & HELD: obtention the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the
businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, We do not find that it
W/N THE ORDINANCES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution,
nor tax the exercise of religious practices.
Petitioner contends that the Ordinances go against free exercise of religion by • But as Ordinance No. 2529 is not applicable to plaintiff and the City of Manila
restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of the Society’s religious profession. is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff society involved herein,
• Provisions of the ordinance are not directed against religious activities or for the reasons above stated, Ordinance No. 3000 is also inapplicable to said
professions. The necessity of a license / fee applies to all trades and business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
businesses in the City.
• However, the plaintiff’s business is not included in Section 3 of the Ordinance. EBRALINAG V. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT (JEHOVAHS’S WITNESS FLAG
It is directed to retailers and dealers in general merchandise. CEREMONY)
• Ordinances are still in force and effect. They were not repealed by any other
DOCTRINE: The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of
law
religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both
• Municipal taxes on business do not have to be approved by the President to grave and imminent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of petitioners
be effective from the schools cannot be justified.
W/N THE PROVISIONS OF SAID ORDINANCES ARE APPLICABLE OR NOT TO Their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them the right to disrupt
THE CASE AT BAR such patriotic exercises. While the highest regard must be afforded to the free exercise
• Religion – profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man of religion, this does not mean that the school cannot discipline them should they
to its Creator commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend both religious and patriotic
• The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious sensibilities of others.
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. FACTS:
• Any restraints of such right can only be justified like other restraints of § These two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were
• freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger consolidated because they raise essentially the same issue: whether school
of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses
• For religious institutions to be covered by taxes, they must be performing may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account
business functions. of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes
• Dissemination of religious information does not need to be approved by an playing (by a band)or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the
official. Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
• National Internal Revenue Code exempts corporations or associations § All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable or educational public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
purposes, provided that the income of any activity conducted for profit shall national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act
No. 1265 and by Department Order No. 8 of the DECS making the
be liable to tax
flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
• In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant § Jehovah’s Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing
for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature: the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those
o It is a license tax — a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege are “acts of worship” or “religious devotion” which they “cannot conscientiously
granted by the Bill of Rights . . . give... to anyone or anything except God”. They think the action of local
o When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, limitations on the
as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter § State’s power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit, which the
occupy a preferred position. Constitution protects against
• It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other § In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about
religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in
cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.Division
• For this reason, we believe that Ordinance No. 2529 of the City not applicable § Superintendent of Schools issued Division Memorandum No. 108:
since the merchandise was not sold for profit. Applying taxes would impair its 5. Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to
free exercise of religious profession and dissemination of beliefs. participate in the daily flag ceremony or to obey the flag salute

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 regulations spelled out in Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955, § Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give
shall be considered removed from the service after due process. them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. While the highest regard must
§ Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, this should not be
of Jehovah’s Witnesses toobey the memorandum. taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them If they
§ In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor ordered the dropping should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities,
from the rolls of students who opted to follow their religious belief which is both religious and patriotic, of other persons.
against the Flag Salute Law on the theory that theyforfeited their right to attend
public schools. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.
§ The petition in GR 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled
because the Division Superintendent of Schools would not recall the expulsion WISCONSIN V YODER (AMISH STUDENTS NOT REQUIRED TO GO TO SCHOOL
orders of his predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some UPON REACHING 15)
more children of Jehovah’s Witnesses.
§ On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil DOCTRINE: The state’s interest in educating children past the 8th grade does not
actions for Mandamus,Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public outweigh the religious freedom of parents under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave Amendment. States cannot force individuals to attend school when it infringes on their
abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and First Amendment rights. The State provided no evidence showing any great benefit to
hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free having two extra years in the public schools. The Court contended that the Amish
public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. community was a very successful social unit in American society, a self-sufficient, law-
abiding member of society, which paid all of the required taxes and rejected any type
ISSUE: W/N the expulsion of students for refusing to participate in the flag ceremony of public welfare.
due to religious
RECIT-READY: The respondents are members of the Old Order Amish and the
HELD: Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. They were charged and convicted for violating
Wisoncin’s compulsory school attendance law when they declined to send their children
§ Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority to public school after 8th grade. The trial and Circuit Courts convicted the respondents.
and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. The US SC affirmed Wisconsin SC’s decision on
of man to his Creator. the ground of Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment. The Amish has a long
§ Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society and has
flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with
offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the continuing
through the observance of the flag ceremony. Since they do not engage in survival of Old Order Amish communities, and the hazards presented by the State's
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise
of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger FACTS:
of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public • Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law required respondents to
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
cause their children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16,
interest, that the State has a right to prevent. Absent such a threat to
but the respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public
public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not
school after they completed the eighth grade.
justified.
• School district administrator filed a complaint. Respondents were later
§ We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from
charged, tried and convicted for violating the compulsory attendance law in
saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge,
Green County Court, and were fined the sum of $5 each.
this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school
• Respondents believed that by sending their children to high school, they would
population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation
not only expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church
"untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,
community, but, as found by the county court, also endanger their own
patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes". After all, what
salvation and that of their children. The State stipulated that respondents'
the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion
religious beliefs were sincere.
from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic
way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, • Respondents presented witnesses who are scholars on religion and
Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of education. Their testimonies are uncontradicted.
profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, o Dr. John Hostetler - modern high school is not equipped, in
appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral curriculum or social environment, to impart the values promoted by
and spiritual values as part of the curricula. Amish society.

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 § compulsory high school attendance could not only result in particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory
great psychological harm to Amish children, because of the education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to
conflicts it would produce, but would also, in his opinion, the Amish.
ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish • The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit
church community as it exists in the United States today. of secondary education to children regardless of the wishes of their parents
o Dr. Donald A. Erickson - the Amish succeed in preparing their high cannot be sustained against a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by
school age children to be productive members of the Amish this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing evidence that
community accommodating their religious objections by forgoing one or two additional
§ the Amish have an excellent record as law-abiding and years of compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health of
generally self-sufficient members of society. the child, or result in an inability to be self- supporting or to discharge the
• Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract
grounded in these central religious concepts. They object to the high school, from the welfare of society.
and higher education generally, because the values they teach are different
from Amish values and the Amish way of life. PAMIL V. TELERON (ELECTION OF PRIEST; NOT ALLOWED BY ADMIN CODE)
• Trial Court – although the compulsory attendance to age 16 "does interfere
with the freedom of the Defendants to act in accordance with their sincere DOCTRINE: The Admin Code was enacted in 1917. The 1973 Constitution, which was
religious belief,” it was still a "reasonable and constitutional" exercise of operative at that time, provides that “No religious test shall be required for the exercise
governmental power. Motion to dismiss charges – denied. of civil or political rights”. Therefore, the Admin Code provision is considered
• Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed. Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed on the unconstitutional under this Charter.
ground of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
RECIT-READY: Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, was elected mayor of Albuquerque,
ISSUE: WON THE SC OF WISCONSIN’S REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTION WAS Bohol in 1971. The losing candidate, Fortunato Pamil, filed a quo warranto petition for
PROPER ON THE GROUND OF FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE. - YES disqualification. He alleged that Sec. 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
prohibited an ecclesiastic from elected office. Majority of the Supreme Court believed
HELD: The First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling that such provision imposes a religious test on the exercise of a political right. Such a
respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16. Decision test violates the 1935 Constitution and thus, the provision should be held inoperative.
AFFIRMED. However, they lacked 1 vote to rule for unconstitutionality. Thus, the quo warranto
petition was granted and Fr. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the position of mayor.
RATIO:
• The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing FACTS:
process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those • In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato
and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo warranto case against Gonzaga
of their children. questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in
• Respondents have amply supported their claim that enforcement of the Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code:
compulsory formal education requirement after the eighth grade would gravely o …in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office
endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their religious beliefs. ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
• Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a
public works of the municipality.
long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society,
• Pamil alleged that Sec. 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
the Amish have demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the
prohibited an ecclesiastic from elected office.
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and
daily conduct play in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities, • Majority of the Supreme Court believed that such provision imposes a
and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally religious test on the exercise of a political right. Such a test violates the 1935
valid as to others. Constitution and thus, the provision should be held inoperative. However, they
lacked 1 vote to rule for unconstitutionality.
o Beyond this, they have carried the difficult burden of demonstrating
• Thus, the quo warranto petition was granted and Fr. Gonzaga was ordered to
the adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal
vacate the position of mayor.
vocational education in terms of the overall interest that the State
relies on in support of its program of compulsory high school • In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino Teleron
education. In light of this showing, and weighing the minimal ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971
difference between what the State would require and what the Amish which now allows ecclesiastics to run.
already accept, it was incumbent on the State to show with more

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ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 2175 OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE view was correct in the 18th century, but not through the perspective of the American
CODE OF 1917 IS NO LONGER OPERATIVE experience, which has shown no substantial fear for clergymen getting elected into
• WHETHER FR. GONZAGA WAS ELIGIBLE TO BE THE MAYOR office.

HELD: Majority of the Court believed that the provision was impliedly repealed but they RECIT-READY:
lacked 1 vote to declare it repealed so, NO, Fr. Gonzaga may not be mayor. • McDaniels is a Baptist minister who is a candidate for the Tennessee
constitutional convention.
RATIO: • His candidacy is challenged by Paty, also a candidate, for violation of the
• The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, “No membership clause of the constitutional convention statute which bars
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” ministers of the gospel or priests of any denomination for holding office.
• Seven members believed that the provision was impliedly repealed by the Unless he gives up such religious occupation.
1935 Constitution. • District court gave their decision in favor of McDaniels reasoning that his 1st
• The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. The 1935 Constitution and 14th amendment rights are violated. Tennessee SC reversed the
declared: “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political decision.
rights.” • U.S. SC reversed the decision upholding the decision of the District Court U.S.
• If the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, then Section SC elucidated the matter, that such membership provision effectively violates
2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for elective office. the Free Exercise clause (hereinafter FEC) by prohibiting the candidate’s right
However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme Court because to free exercise as a condition for a public office.
it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to • Furthermore, the contention that allowing a minister or a priest to hold office
declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional. For this, the petition will necessarily promote a religion is unfounded. The respondent/appellee has
filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed failed to present evidence to support such.
and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position. • Justice White added that he is denied of equal protection. The government
• It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who may not generally use religion as a basis for classification since it would have
swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state the effect of inhibiting a religion and results to a violation of the FEC.
policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of
the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still FACTS:
stands because there is no implied repeal. mmmm. Appellee Paty, a candidate for delegate to a Tennessee
constitutional convention, filed an opposition for the candidacy of McDaniel.
Dissenting Opinion nnnn. McDaniel is a Baptist minister, was disqualified from serving as
delegate by a Tennessee statute provision that membership for the
J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons constitutional convention is the same as in the State House of
receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds “are obviously now Representatives, thus invoking a Tennessee constitutional provision barring
allowed to run for a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code
"[m]inister[s] of the Gospel, or priest[s] of any denomination whatever."
of 1971 ‘every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
oooo. Petitioner argued that: "Article VI of the US Constitution prohibits
members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease in their office or position on the
any religious tests as qualification for public office of the United States.
date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no longer
Although Article VI applies only to the federal government, religious qualifying
disqualified from running for an elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to
tests are also in violation of the First Amendment, which is applicable to the
the two remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code,
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The clergy disqualification clause
“ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the municipality are allowed to run for
is such a test, in that it disqualifies from public office all those whose religious
municipal elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they
convictions compel them to serve as clergymen of their faith. Although the
being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is not absolute, Tennessee
Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except those
must demonstrate a compelling state interest to infringe on the citizens' right
expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.”
of free exercise of religion, which the state has not done."
pppp. Respondent argued that: "The freedom to act, whether it is in
MCDANIEL V. PATY (ELECTION OF MINISTERS TO THE LEGISLATURE)
accord with one's religious beliefs or not, is not totally free from legislative
restrictions. The clause in question does not restrict an individual's freedom of
DOCTRINE: The statute violated the petitioner’s right to the free exercise of religion belief, nor does it force anyone to embrace religious belief, or to do anything
under the First Amendment of the US Constitution, being made applicable to states by against their religious beliefs. There is no fundamental right to hold political
the Fourteenth Amendment. Tennessee averred that the reason for such prohibition office. The clause serves the compelling state interest to preserve a
was to avoid minister being elected into a legislative seat, only to serve the sect he government neutral toward religion. The government may not participate in
represents, or stand for the detriment of others. However, the Court found that such the affairs of religious organizations, and vice versa."

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 qqqq. That district court held that the statutory provision violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 4. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, The traditional outfitting of military personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the
holding that the clergy disqualification imposed no burden on "religious belief" subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall group
and restricted "religious action . . . [only] in the law making process of mission. Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate
government - where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the outward individual distinctions except rank. he Court held that those portions of
establishment clause . . . ." regulations challenged here reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the
interest of military’s need for uniformity.
ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTE VIOLATES MCDANIEL’S FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION. NOTE: 2 years later, Congress filed a provision in the annual National Defense
Authorization Act that “a member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious
HELD: It violates his first amendment rights of free exercise of religion apparel while wearing the uniform of the member’s armed force.

RATIO: RECIT-READY: Petitioner, an Orthodox Jew serving the military as a clinical

• The Tennessee disqualification is directed primarily, not at religious belief, but psychologist, was enjoined from wearing a yarmulke after he wore one as a defense
witness in a court martial meeting. He was initially ordered not to violate this regulation
at the status, acts, and conduct of the clergy. Therefore, the Free Exercise
when he is outside the military hospital. Petitioner’s lawyer protested to Air Force
Clause's absolute prohibition against infringements on the "freedom to
General Counsel and order was revised to prohibit petitioner from wearing the yarmulke
believe" is inapposite here.
even inside the hospital. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that
• The challenged provision violates appellant's First Amendment right to the
Air Force's strong interest in discipline justified the strict enforcement of its uniform
free exercise of his religion made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
dress requirements. “The military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from
Amendment, because it conditions his right to the free exercise of his religion
civilian society." To accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive
on the surrender of his right to seek office.
obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps. The essence of military service "is
o To condition the availability of benefits upon this appelant’s
the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the
willingness to violate a cardinal principle of his religious faith
service." In 1988, Congress files a provision in the annual National Defense
effectively penalizes the free exercise of his consti liberties.
Authorization Act that “a member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious
• The assertion that if elected to public office members of the clergy will
apparel while wearing the uniform of the member’s armed force.”
necessarily promote the interests of one sect or thwart those of another
contrary to the anti- establishment principle of neutrality, Tennessee has failed
FACTS:
to demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy participation in the
• Petitioner is an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi. He entered the active
political process have not lost whatever validity they may once have enjoyed.
service as a commissioned officer as a requirement of a scholarship grant he
• Tennessee's disqualification provision therefore imposed an unconstitutional
previously received. He served as a clinical psychologist at the mental health
penalty on appellant's free exercise. Moreover, "[t]he fact . . . that a person is
clinic of March Air Force Base at Riverside, California.
not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring
• Until 1981, petitioner was not prevented from wearing his yarmulke on the
him from office by state- imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution.
military base.
• Government generally may not use religion as a basis of classification for the
• But when he testified as a defense witness at a court-martial hearing wearing
imposition of duties, penalties, privileges, or benefits. Specifically, government
the yarmulke but not his service cap, the opposing counsel lodged a complaint
may not fence out from political participation, people such as ministers whom
with Hospital Commander Colonel Joseph Gregory that it was a violation of
it regards as overinvolved in religion.
Air Force Regulation (AFR) 35-10. Colonel Gregory informed petitioner that
• McDaniels is denied of equal protection. Though that disqualification is based
wearing a yarmulke while on duty violates AFR 35-10, and ordered him not to
on the State's asserted interest in maintaining the required separation of
violate this regulation outside the hospital.
church and state, it is not reasonably necessary for that objective, which all
• Petitioner’s attorney protested to Air Force General Counsel, Colonel Gregory
States except Tennessee have been able to realize without burdening
revised his order to prohibit petitioner from wearing the yarmulke even in the
ministers' rights to candidacy.
hospital. Petitioner's request to report for duty in civilian clothing pending legal
resolution of the issue was denied.
GOLDMAN V. WEINBERGER (PROHIBITION ON WEARING YARMULKE IN THE
• Petitioner received reprimand stating that failure to obey AFR 35-10 could
AIR FORCE BY ORTHODOX JEW RABBI)
subject him to court martial. Colonel Gregory also withdrew a recommendation
petitioner's application to extend the term of his active service be approved,
DOCTRINE: The military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian and substituted a negative recommendation.
society. A review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is “far
• District Court enjoined the Air Force from enforcing its uniform regulation and
more deferential” than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations for civilians.
from penalizing petitioner for wearing his yarmulke.
Thus, Courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.

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 • Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that the Air Force's One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the
strong interest in discipline justified the strict enforcement of its uniform dress same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy
requirements. or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes
ISSUE: WHETHER FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield
PERMITS GOLDMAN TO WEAR A YARMULKE WHILE IN UNIFORM, and give way to the latter. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise
NOTWITHSTANDING AN AIR FORCE REGULATION MANDATING UNIFORM or even prosecutes the one exercising it”
DRESS FOR AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.
RECIT-READY VERSION: German and company converged at JP Laurel Street in
HELD: Decision of Court of Appeals is affirmed. Manila to hear mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which is near Malacañang. Respondents
Barangan and Lariosa blocked them, saying that (1) their actions show that they are
not there to hear mass, but to stage a demonstration, and (2) the security of President
RATIO:
Marcos is of utmost concern. Petitioners filed a case, saying that Barangan and Lariosa
• Because Goldman alleged that this was a Free Exercise violation, he indicated
impaired their constitutional freedom to exercise religion. The SC held that this freedom
that the defense had to pass the Sherbert test: by demonstrating a
is not absolute. Good faith is required to validly exercise this freedom, and the facts
"compelling interest" for the violation. He then submitted evidence that there
show that the petitioners are not exercising good faith. Also, if the freedom clashes with
was not a compelling interest for preventing the display of religious apparel,
a social or national interest, which in this case is the safety of the President, then the
because it presented no danger to military discipline.
former must yield to the latter. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
• The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society." To accomplish its mission FACTS:
the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit • German and company converged at JP Laurel Street in Manila. They claim
de corps. The essence of military service "is the subordination of the desires that their purpose was to hear mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which is quite
and interests of the individual to the needs of the service." near Malacañang. They were marching down JP Laurel wearing yellow T-
• In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether military needs shirts, raising clenched fists and shouting anti-government statements.
justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must • On the way to St. Jude, the petitioners were blocked by respondents Gen.
give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities Barangan and Major Lariosa. The respondents claim that the chapel was very
concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest. near Malacañang; hence, for security reasons, they had to be blocked.
• The traditional outfitting of military personnel in standardized uniforms • Petitioners filed a case, claiming that the respondents violated their
encourages the subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion. They filed for a
of the overall group mission. The First Amendment does not require the writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting into
military to accommodate such practices in the face of its view that they would and praying in St. Jude. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that the
detract from the uniformity sought by the dress regulations. petitioners’ purpose was “not really to perform an act of religious worship, but
• The dissenters argued that the decision gave too much deference to the to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very
military's judgment and that some judicial scrutiny of military necessity claims residence” of President Marcos. They further said that they would not bar
should be required. anyone from entering the church, but the petitioners’ actions indicated that
• Note: In 1988, Congress files a provision in the annual National Defense they were security threats.
Authorization Act that “a member of the armed forces may wear an item of
religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the member’s armed force.” ISSUE: IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO RELIGIOUS WORSHIP, UNDER
SECTION 5 OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, AN ABSOLUTE FREEDOM?
GERMAN V. BARANGANAN (ATTEND MASS/ DEMONSTRATION NEAR
MALACANANG) HELD: NO. Petition was dismissed.

DOCTRINE: The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, was RATIO:
established in the interest of national security. Petitioners are not denied or restrained • Exercising a right or freedom must be done in good faith
of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they o The Civil Code provides: “Every person must in the exercise of his
had attempted to translate the same into action. Going to mass in the said chapel, as rights and in the performance of his duties ... observe honesty and
contended, only hides the inner intention of getting near the Malacanang to protest good faith” (Art. 19)
against the government. Thus, it poses danger to national security, which can o Petitioners’ actions of protest indicate that they are not in JP Laurel
regulated. to hear mass, but to stage demonstrations, protests, rallies,
uprisings, etc. against Marcos.

Jlyrreverre|163
 • Threats to safety along JP Laurel; non-absoluteness of the freedom of puts a burden to their dissemination of religious doctrine. Following that said argument,
locomotion the increase of tax on the sale of such vestments would be putting a burden on a
o Since this was the era of Marcos, demonstrations have been preacher’s right to sermon.
common along JP Laurel
o “While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT RA 7716 VIOLATES RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous,
unobtrusive security checks.” (courteous daw!) HELD: No, it is still liable to pay tax.
o There is a great need to protect the lives of the Chief Executive and
that of his family, so prohibitions and restrictions on demonstrations RATIO: As a general rule, the press is not exempt from taxation and what the guarantee
along JP Laurel were deemed reasonable of free press prohibits are law which single out the press or target a group belonging to
• Non-absoluteness of the freedom to religious worship the press for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on
o “In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their the basis of the content of the publication, and RA 7716 is none of these. With regard
to the imposition of tax as a violation of religious liberty, the argument that the PBS
freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner
should not be taxed because they distribute free bibles is not enough to excuse them
by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.”
because, despite that, they still also sell some copies to other people. At any rate
o As was held in the US case Gerona v. Secretary of Education: “But whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there it is assessed this tax by the CIR.
is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious
belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the CENTENO V. VILLAON- PORNILLOS (SOLICITATION FOR CHAPEL WITHOUT
law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The PERMIT)
government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even
prosecutes the one exercising it.” DOCTRINE: The statute regulating solicitation is not an abridgement of the freedom of
o The President’s security is of national interest; thus, many freedoms, religion. It may be done in the Exercise of Police Power, while it may be conceded that
including that under Section 5, must yield to it. the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, consequently,
solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. The State
Concurring opinion of Chief Justice Fernando: There is a clear and present danger may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the
in the actions of the petitioners. Thus, the restriction was valid. [It seems that the “clear community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish
and present danger” test also applies to freedom of religion cases.] his identity and his authority to act for the cause, which he purports to represent. The
State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the
Dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee: “In the free exercise of such preferred interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.
rights, there is to be no prior restraint although there may be subsequent punishment
of any illegal acts committed during the exercise of such basic rights.” DOCTRINE: Petitioner, as chairman of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay,
solicited for donations for the renovation of the chapel of Bariio Tikay. He was charged
TOLENTINO V. SEC OF FINANCE (VAT ON BIBLES SOLD) with violation of PD 1564, the Solicitation Permit Law, for soliciting without permit.
Petitioner contends that solicitation for charitable purposes does not include solicitation
DOCTRINE: With regard to the imposition of tax as a violation of religious liberty, the for religious purposes and that regulating solicitation for religious purposes abridges
argument that the PBS should not be taxed because they distribute free bibles is not his right to freedom of religion. Trial Court and RTC of Malolos Bulacan, found him
enough to excuse them because, despite that, they still also sell some copies to other guilty. But SC said that, the express mention of “for charitable purposes or public
people. At any rate whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete welfare” excludes “for religious purposes”. Seeing that the constitution and other
cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the CIR. statutes separated charitable purpose and religious purposes, it seems that the
legislature in enacting PD 1564, by not mentioning “for religious purposes” deemed not
FACTS: The case involves a consolidation of petitions seeking to declare RA 7716, to include the latter. Furthermore penal laws have to be construed in favour of the
also known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, unconstitutional. This is a motion accused. Being so, it is deemed proper by the court that solicitation for religious
seeking reconsideration of the decision initially declaring RA 7716 as unconstitutional. purposes is not punished by PD1564. The court also ruled that though PD 1564 does
The pertinent part of the case involves the issue of the RA 7719 and its effects with not regulate solicitation for religious purposes, the state can nevertheless, through
regard to Religious Liberty. Petitioners contended that by removing the exemption of police power, regulate it to protect the people against fraudulent solicitation (a.k.a.
the press from the VAT while maintaining those exemptions granted to others, the law scams) which would otherwise lessen the confidence of the public to campaign for the
discriminates against the press. In the case at hand, the Philippine Bible Society raising of money for charitable purposes.
contends that although it sells bibles, the proceeds derived from sales are used to
subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to those who cannot afford FACTS:
them and that, by imposing the tax, would be to increase the price. According to the
Philippine Bible Society, this imposition of tax violates their religious liberty because it

Jlyrreverre|164
 rrrr. Petitioner together with Vicente YCO, approached Judge Angeles, a resident • Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of Php1,500 in line with the favor of the accused. Solicitation for religious purposes is in the nature of
fund drive launched by the former’s group of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon charity. But solicitation for charitable purposes, being broader in scope, is not
ng Tikay for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos always religious in nature
Bulacan
ssss. Judge Angeles filed a complaint under PD 1564 (Solicitation PD 1564, a penal law, cannot be given such a broad application since it would be
Permit Law) for soliciting without permit against petitioner Centeno, Yco and prejudicial to petitioners. Penal laws are not to be extended or enlarged by
another person named Religio Evaristo implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to
tttt. Court found Centeno and Yco guilty but recommended pardon since they be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or
acted in good faith multiply felonies.
uuuu. Both appealed to RTC but Yco withdrew
Acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless
vvvv. RTC affirmed trial court’s decision and increase penalty from a fine there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them
of 200 pesos to 6 months imprisonment and 1000 pesos fine such.
wwww. Presidential Decree No. 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law),
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association 2) WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IN REGULATING SOLICITATION MADE FOR
desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public RELIGIOUS PURPOSES WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE
welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION GUARANTEED UNDER THE
Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as CONSTITUTION. No
provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a • It may be done in the Exercise of Police Power, while it may be conceded that the
written application for a permit in the form prescribed by the Regional construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, consequently,
Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development, the solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare.
Regional Director or his duly authorized representative may, in his • The State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a
discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disapprove the stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any
application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he
or revoke any permit issued under Act 4075. purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner
of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or
ISSUES/HOLDING convenience.
• Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE PHRASE "CHARITABLE PURPOSES" SHOULD BE
not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within
CONSTRUED IN ITS BROADEST SENSE SO AS TO INCLUDE A RELIGIOUS
reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. The objectionable practices of
PURPOSE No
unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally
• "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." express mention of one person, suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money for
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others charity is lessened or destroyed. Some regulation of public solicitation is, therefore,
• It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, in the public interest.
treat the words "charitable" and "religious" separately and independently
of each other Constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion (double aspect)
• See Article 6, section 28 (3) – exempt from taxation; 1) Forestall compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
• Sections 26 (e) (corporations exempt from income tax) and form of worship
• 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal
2) Safe guards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion
Revenue Code;
A. Freedom to believe (Absolute)
• Section 88 (purposes for the organization of non-stock corporations) of
B. Freedom to act
the Corporation Code; and
(1) Subject to regulation for the protection of society
• Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local
(2) must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that
Government Code.
protection
• That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and
(3) power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible
"religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely
end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom
stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it
would not have so stated expressly.
LEE V. WEISMAN (PRAYERS AT GRADUATION CEREMONIES; RABBI)

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 o Recommend that public prayers at nonsectarian civic ceremonies be
A public school cannot sponsor clerics to conduct even a non-denominational prayer composed with "inclusiveness and sensitivity," though they
as part of a graduation ceremony as the Constitution guarantees that government acknowledge that
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise or otherwise o "[p]rayer of any kind may be inappropriate on some civic
act in a way, which establishes a state religion, or tends to do so. occasions." o The principal gave Rabbi Gutterman the pamphlet
before the graduation and advised him the invocation and
DOCTRINE: Allowing clergy who offer prayers as part of an official public school benediction should be nonsectarian.
graduation ceremony is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. • 4 days before the ceremony, Daniel Weisman, sought a TRO in the US District
Court for the District of Rhode Island to prohibit school officials from including
CONTROL BY THE STATE - The government may not establish an official or civic an invocation or benediction in the graduation ceremony. This was denied.
religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific
• Deborah and her family attended the graduation, where the prayers were
creeds. State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at secondary
recited.
schools' promotional and graduation ceremonies. Lee's decision that prayers should
• In July 1989, Daniel Weisman filed an amended complaint seeking a
be given and his selection of the religious participant are choices attributable to the
permanent injunction barring petitioners from inviting the clergy to deliver
State. The pamphlet and advice that the prayers be nonsectarian directly controls the
prayers content. invocations and benedictions at future graduations.
• District Court enjoined petitioners from continuing the practice because it
COERCION BY THE STATE - Prayer exercises in elementary and secondary schools violated the Establishment Clause.
carry a particular risk of indirect coercion.
ISSUE: WHETHER INCLUDING CLERICAL MEMBERS WHO OFFER PRAYER AS
RECIT-READY: The school district permitted principals, at their discretion, to invite PART OF THE OFFICIAL SCHOOL GRADUATION CEREMONY IS CONSISTENT
clergymen to offer invocations and benedictions at grad ceremonies. A middle school WITH THE RELIGIONS CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE
principal invited a rabbi during Deborah’s class’ graduation. The principal provided the CONSTITUTION.
rabbi with a pamphlet which contains guidelines for the composition of prayers and that
these be non-sectarian. Defendants sued the school district alleging that there was a HELD: No, including clerical members who offer prayer as part of the official school
violation of the Establishment Clause. ceremony is not consistent with the Religion Clause of the First Amendment of the
Constitution.
The US SC held that invocations led by a clergy at an official public school grad
ceremony is unconstitutional. The SC relied on two factors in deciding the case. First RATIO:
is control by the State which is evident through the power of the principals to invite • The fact that the principle decided that a cleric should offer a prayer at a public
clergymen and through the existence of the pamphlet. Second is coercion which was school graduation, is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must occur.
met through the social and peer pressure to respect such ceremonies and through the • The principal’s act of giving the cleric guidelines for the prayer means the
lack of real sense in the term “voluntary” attendance because the student is not really principal directed and controlled the content of the prayer in direct
free to absent herself from the ceremony. CA decision is affirmed that such is violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, which prohibits the
unconstitutional. preferring one religion over another.
• The court stated that the question is not the good faith of the school in
FACTS: attempting to make the prayer acceptable to most persons, but the legitimacy
• Deborah Weisman graduated from Nathan Bishop Middle School (public of its undertaking that enterprise at all, when the object is to produce a prayer
school in Providence) in June 1989 when she was about 14 years old. to be used in a formal religious exercise, which students, for all practical
• It has been the policy of the Providence School Committee and the purposes, are obliged to attend.
Superintendent of Schools to permit principals to invite members of the clergy • TWO FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE SC IN RULING THE CASE:
to give invocations and benedictions at middle school and HS graduations. o CONTROL BY THE STATE - The government may not establish an
o Not all but most of the principals elected to include prayers as part of official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of
the graduation ceremonies. a religion with more specific creeds.
• Daniel Weisman (Deborah’s father) objected to any prayers during the § State officials direct the performance of a formal religious
graduation but to no avail. exercise at secondary schools' promotional and graduation
ceremonies.
• Petitioner invited a rabbi to deliver prayers at the graduation exercises.
§ Lee's decision that prayers should be given and his
o Rabbi Leslie Gutterman of the Temple Beth El in Providence
selection of the religious participant are choices attributable
• A pamphlet was given to the rabbi entitled "Guidelines for Civic Occasions,"
to the State.
prepared by the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

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 § The pamphlet and advice that the prayers be nonsectarian
directly controls the prayers content. DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence establishes the general proposition that a law that is
o COERCION BY THE STATE - Prayer exercises in elementary and neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
secondary schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion. governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
(Abington School District v. Schempp) religious practice (Smith doctrine). The minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law
§ The school district's supervision of a HS graduation not discriminate on its face. A law fails the facial neutrality test if it refers to a religious
ceremony places subtle and indirect public and peer practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language or context.
pressure on attending students to stand as a group or Suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service as the object of the
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and ordinances is evident. The legitimate governmental interests in protecting the public
benediction. health and preventing animal cruelty could be addressed by restrictions other than the
§ The State may not place the student in the dilemma of prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial practice.
participating or protesting. It may not use social pressure to
The second requirement, general applicability, means that categories of selection are
enforce orthodoxy than it may use direct means.
of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious
• Petitioners argue that the option of not attending the ceremony excuses any
practice. The FEC "protects religious observers against unequal treatment." Inequality
inducement or coercion in the ceremony itself. REJECTED by USSC.
results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance
o HS graduation is one of life's most significant occasions, and a
are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation. The
student is not free to absent herself from the exercise in any real ordinances fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a
sense of the term "voluntary." similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.
o They also contend that prayers are an essential part of these
ceremonies because for many persons the occasion would lack RECIT-READY: Members of the church practice the Santeria religion which practices
meaning without the recognition that human achievements cannot animal sacrifices for various occasions. Sometimes the animal is then eaten,
be understood apart from their spiritual essence. sometimes it is not. They purchased a land in Hialeah and planned to build a worship
§ This argument fails to acknowledge that what for many was site where they could conduct their rituals. Outrage in the community over the animal
a spiritual imperative was for the Weismans religious sacrifices led the city council to ban all animal sacrifices which were not for the purpose
conformance compelled by the State. of food-- trying to suppress the animal killings done by the Santeria people. The
§ Gives insufficient recognition to the real conflict of petitioners asked for relief but it was denied by the district court. However, the SC
conscience faced by a student who would have to choose reversed the ruling saying that such ordinances are not neutral and do not have
whether to miss graduation or conform to the state general application. Instead of targeting all animal killings, it was just the rituals that
sponsored practice. were pointed out.

DISSENT. In holding that the Establishment Clause of the Constitution prohibits Also, the ordinances failed the SMITH test as (1) they do not serve a compelling
invocations and benedictions at public school graduation ceremonies, the Supreme governmental interest given that there are other feasible means of serving public health
Court of the United States (Supreme Court) lays waste to a tradition that is a component and (2) they are not narrowly tailored as they were overbroad and underinclusive.
of an even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at
public celebrations generally. The law here is very underinclusive, because the city’s stated purpose of
promoting public health would be better served if they also regulated disposal of
CONCURRENCE. The government must not engage in religious practices. animals killed by hunters, as well as disposal of restaurant food, and the killing
of pests. Since the city failed to enact such other laws, its purpose could not be
DISCUSSION. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution compelling.
is a specific prohibition concerning forms of state intervention in religious affairs. The
state may not consistent with the Establishment Clause of the Constitution place school FACTS:
age children in a position of participating or protesting prayer at public graduation • The Church of the Lukumi-Babalu Aye, Inc. was a Florida not-for-profit
ceremonies. If the government regulation contains no religious preference it is valid organization that practiced the Santeria religion. The Santeria religion is
under the Establishment Clause of the Constitution if it (i) has a secular purpose; (ii) considered by some to be a "fusion" between the religion of the Yoruba people
has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion and (iii) does not produce of Western Africa, who were brought as slaves to Cuba, and significant
excessive government entanglement with religion. A public school sponsoring a elements of Roman Catholicism. The Cuban Yoruba express their devotion to
nonsectarian prayer at a graduation ceremony is considered excessive government spirits, called orishas, through the iconography of Catholic saints; Catholic
entanglement and is invalid. symbols are often present at Santeria rights; and Santeria devotees attend
the Catholic sacraments. One of the principal forms of devotion in Santeria is
CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI V. CITY OF HIALEAH (ANIMAL SACRIFICES) animal sacrifice. Sacrifices are performed at birth, marriage, and death rites;
for the cure of the sick; for the initiation of new members and priests; and

Jlyrreverre|167
 during an annual celebration. The sacrificed animal is cooked and eaten at not neutral. The Court also held that the ordinances were not of general
some ceremonies. applicability but selectively targeted to conduct motivated by religious belief.
• The Church leased land in the City of Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans • Further the court held that the local laws, which were not neutral or generally
to build a complex that included a house of worship, a school, a cultural center, applied, were not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. The
and a museum. The prospect of a Santeria church was distressing to many interests advanced by the city were protecting the public health and preventing
members of the Hialeah community. In response, the city council held an animal cruelty. The Court found, however, that the city failed to establish that
emergency public session and subsequently passed several resolutions and these interests were compelling because the ordinances only restricted
ordinances aimed at preventing religious animal sacrifice. The local laws conduct by the Church and the Santeria religion and not other similar conduct
prohibited Santeria sacrifices; however, the laws contained exceptions for that created the same type of harm. For example, the laws did not prohibit the
animal killings under comparable circumstances and for other religion-related private slaughter of animals for food or kosher butchering. Further, the Court
purposes, including kosher slaughter. held that, even if the interests were somehow compelling, they could be
• The Church filed an action in a federal district court, alleging that the laws achieved by more narrowly tailored laws that burdened religion to a far lesser
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. degree.
• The district court ruled for the City, concluding that the laws' effect on o The legitimate governmental interest of protecting public health and
religious practice was incidental to the purposes of protecting public preventing cruelty to animals could be addressed by less stringent
health and welfare. The Court of Appeals affirmed. restrictions
§ e.g. General regulations on the disposal of organic garbage
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CITY LAWS DIRECTED AT ANIMAL SACRIFICE AS PART o The ordnances cannot withstand the strict scrutiny that is
OF THE SANTERIA RELIGION VIOLATED THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF required upon failure to meet the SMITH standard
THE FIRST AMENDMENT § NOT narrowly tailored to accomplish the asserted
governmental interests - laws were either overbroad or
HELD: YES. JUDGEMENT REVERSED. underinclusive
§ NOT justified by a compelling governmental interest
RATIO: o The government fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other
• (Kennedy, J.) Justice Kennedy concluded that the local laws violated the Free conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort
Exercise Clause because they were designed to persecute or oppress a
religion or its practices. CONCURRENCE:
• The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law • (Scalia, J.) Justice Scalia asserted that the focus should be on the effects of
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise the law, not the intention of the lawmakers, because it is virtually impossible
thereof." "The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious to determine the singular "motive" of a collective legislative body. Further, he
tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention contended that because the effect of the laws at issue was to single out a
stem from animosity to religion or distrust of it practices, all officials must religious practice for special burdens, the Court need not look at the motivation
pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it in passing the laws.
secures." Accordingly, "legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or • (Souter, J.) Justice Souter asserted that, in his opinion, a law that targets
disguised to persecute or oppress a religion or its practice." religion fails strict scrutiny. However, he noted that the Court did not address
• Under the constitution, a law that is not neutral, but targets a specific action, the more difficult situation of whether the Free Exercise Clause is violated by
and that does not apply generally to all people, but targets a specific group, a law of general applicability that incidentally burdens religious practices.
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored
to advance that interest.
o Under the First Amendment, a law that burdens religious practices LAMB’S CHAPEL V. CENTER MORICHES (USE OF SCHOOL FACILITIES TO
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is SHOW FILM ON CHRISTIAN FAMILY VALUES)
neutral and of general applicablility
§ Where such a law is not neutral and does not apply Free speech clause prohibits schools from discriminating against religious viewpoints
generally (such as in this case), it must undergo the most and that granting religious speech access to public facilities and forums on the same
rigorous scrutiny terms as other speech does not violate the establishment clause
• Must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest DOCTRINE: Although the film is admittedly church related, it was still about child
• Must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest rearing and family values. In other words, its topics fall under social or civic purposes
• The Court held that the purpose of the laws was to suppress the Santeria (Rule 10). Showing of the film would not have been during school hours, would not
religion. The only conduct subject to the ordinances was animal sacrifice, the have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just
central element of the Santeria worship services, and they were therefore to church members. Moreover, there would have been no realistic danger that the

Jlyrreverre|168
community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, District, outside school hours, to show a six-part video series dealing with
and any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been no more than incidental. parenting issues that centered on Christian family values.
o The film series would discuss Dr. Dobson's views on the undermining
RECIT-READY: New York Educ. Law 414 authorizes local school boards to adopt influences of the media that could only be counterbalanced by
reasonable regulations permitting the after-hours use of school property for 10 specified returning to traditional Christian family values instilled at an early
purposes, not including meetings for religious purposes. Pursuant to this law, stage.
respondent school board (District) issued rules and regulations allowing social, civic, • Board officials denied the church’s repeated requests, claiming that the film
and recreational uses of its schools, but prohibiting use by any group for religious was “church related.”
purposes. After the District refused two requests by petitioners, an evangelical church • In 1990 Lamb’s Chapel sued the board, alleging
and its pastor, to use school facilities for a religious-oriented film series on family values various constitutional violations, notably of the First Amendment’s freedom of
and childrearing on the ground that the film series appeared to be church-related, the speech and establishment clauses.
Church filed suit in the District Court, claiming that the District's actions violated, among • Petitioner’s arguments:
other things, the 1st Amendment (religion, free speech, free press). The court granted o Denial of the application as violation of the Freedom of Speech and
summary judgment to the District, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. It reasoned that Assembly Clauses, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Establishment
the school property, as a "limited public forum" open only for designated purposes, Clause of the 1st Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection
remained non-public except for the specified purposes, and ruled that the exclusion of Clause of the 14th Amendment.
the Church's film was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The decision was reversed by • Respondent’s arguments:
the US Supreme Court because it is violative of the 1st Amendment and Rule 7 did not o The premises are “limited public forum” (private property). o
pass the 3-part test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Purposes for which 414 allowed access to school facilities did not
include religious worship or instruction, that Rule 7 explicitly
In it the Supreme Court held that even in a nonpublic forum the state cannot proscribes using school facilities for religious purposes, and that the
discriminate against religious viewpoints when allowing use of public facilities. It also Church had conceded that its showing of the film series would be for
held that permitting religious speech, even in a public school facility, does not violate religious purposes.
the establishment clause as long as religious and nonreligious speeches are treated • A federal district court granted a summary judgment for the school board,
the same. This dual holding of the Court, in which granting religious speech equal dismissing the church’s claims.
access is permissible under the establishment clause and required under the
• The court maintained that the school’s facilities were only a limited public
free speech clause, has been recognized in four other recent cases, demonstrating
forum—a nonpublic forum that the government has opened to the public for
the Court’s commitment to granting full protection to religious speech.
some specified activities—and it noted that the board had not allowed other
religious groups to use the facilities.
FACTS:
• Thus, according to the court, the denial of Lamb’s Chapel’s request was
viewpoint neutral, meaning that the board had exhibited neither a positive nor
New York Education Law 414 – authorizes local school boards to adopt regulations
a negative attitude toward religion. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
for the use of school property for 10 specified purposes when the property is not in use
affirmed in favour of the board.
for school activities. The list of permitted uses does not include meetings for religious
purposes.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DISTRICT REGULATION (RULE 7) IS VIOLATIVE
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT WHICH STATES:
• In 1988 New York state passed a law that allowed school boards to permit “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
groups to use their facilities and property during nonschool hours for a wide prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
array of outside purposes, including social, civic, and recreational meetings the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
and entertainment. Government for a redress of grievances.”
• Pursuant to 414, the District has issued rules and regulations with respect to
the use of school property when not in use for school purposes. The HELD: YES. Court of Appeals decision is REVERSED
rules allow only 2 of the 10 purposes authorized by 414: • It found that insofar as the only reason the board rejected the organization’s
o social, civic, or recreational uses (Rule 10) request was solely that the group was of a religious nature, denying it
o and use by political organizations (Rule 8). access for that reason was a violation of the “viewpoint neutrality”
o Rule 7, however, consistent with the judicial interpretation of state standard.
law, provides that "the school premises shall not be used by any
group for religious purposes." RATIO:
• Lamb’s Chapel, an evangelical church, subsequently requested, on several • The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the board, by allowing school
occasions, to use school facilities at Center Moriches Union Free School facilities to be used by civic and social groups that discuss “family issues and

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 childrearing,” could not then deny access to Lamb’s Chapel, which planned to ground of injurious or inimical causes from church authorities is conclusive upon civil
address similar topics from a religious standpoint. courts.
• The court reasoned that opening school doors for some groups but not
specifically for religious groups violates both the notion of viewpoint FACTS:
neutrality and their rights to free speech as protected by the First Amendment, • A religious group, known as “The Church in Quezon City (Church Assembly
even if the speech has its basis in religion or is made for religious purposes. Hall), Incorporated” was organized in 1973 as an entity of the brotherhood in
o Control over access to a non-public forum can be based on subject Christ. They registered in the SEC as a non-stock, non-profit religious
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are corporation. The Church forwards its “Principles of Faith” that “every member
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, and are or officer” thereof “shall, without mental reservation, adhere strictly to the
viewpoint-neutral. doctrine, teaching and faith being observed by the Church”. According to its
o That Rule 7 treats all religions and religious purposes alike does not by-laws, its affairs and operation shall be managed by a Board of Directors.
make its application in this case viewpoint-neutral, however, for it Moreover, the Board of Directors has the absolute power to preserve and
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by permitting school property protect their faith and to admit and expel a member.
to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and • According to its By-Laws, the procedure for expulsion of a member is as
child rearing except those dealing with the subject from a religious follows:
standpoint. Denial on this basis is plainly invalid, and the government o “If it is brought to the notice of the Board of Directors that any member
violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker has failed to observe any regulations and By-laws of the Institution
solely to suppress the point of view he advocates. (CHURCH) or the conduct of any member has been dishonorable or
• Permitting District property to be used to exhibit the film series would not have improper or otherwise injurious to the character and interest of the
been an establishment of religion under the three-part test articulated in Institution, the Board of Directors may b(y) resolution without
Lemon v. Kurtzman. assigning any reason therefor expel such member from such
o The government's action must have a secular legislative Institution and he shall then forfeit his interest, rights and privileges
purpose; in the Institution.”
o The government's action must not have the primary effect of • The Board of Directors observed that certain members introduced to other
either advancing or inhibiting religion; members teachings, concerning the worship of Buddha and men, which were
not based according to the “Principles of Faith” and of the Holy Bible. The
o The government's action must not result in an "excessive
Board advised the petitioners during their Sunday gatherings to correct their
government entanglement" with religion
ways. They were also warned that if they continue such conduct, they would
• Likewise, the court observed that allowing a group to use school facilities for
be dropped from membership roll. However, petitioner ignored these repeated
religious purposes does not imply that school or board officials promote or
admonitions. Subsequently, the Board removed from membership Alfredo
establish religion.
Long, Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See and Felix Almeria (petitioners) on the ground
• The court pointed out that Lamb’s Chapel would have used the facilities
that they espoused doctrines inimical and injurious to the Church.
during nonschool hours, and the school was not sponsoring the meetings.
• Petitioners contend that the removal of their names in the membership list was
In addition, the meetings were open to the public. there would be no realistic
made without prior notice and consequently, filed a petition to the SEC for the
danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion
annulment of such expulsion. The SEC rendered the expulsion void and
or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or the Church would have
ordered the reinstatement of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the
been incidental. Nor is there anything in the record to support the claim that
SEC order. Hence, this petition.
the exclusion was justified on the ground that allowing access to a "radical"
church would lead to threats of public unrest and violence.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE EXPULSION OF JOSEPH LIM, LIU YEK SEE, ALFREDO
• On the basis of those findings, the Supreme Court overturned the Second
LONG AND FELIX ALMERIA FROM THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE CHURCH BY ITS
Circuit’s decision.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS THROUGH A RESOLUTION ISSUED ON AUGUST 30,
1993 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
LONG V. BASA (BASIS OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION IS THE BELIEF;
NOTICE AND HEARING IN EXPULSION FROM CHURCH ASSEMBLY HALL) HELD: YES. Petitioners’ expulsion was executed with prior notice or due process.
DOCTRINE: The Church’s by-laws do not require the Board to give prior notice in cases RATIO:
of expulsion. Such resolution does not even need to state the reason for such action. • The By-laws of the CHURCH, which the members have expressly adhered to,
It may seem unreasonable and objectionable but this shows the peculiar nature of a does not require the Board of Directors to give prior notice to the erring or
religious corporation vis-à-vis an ordinary, profit- oriented corporation. It must be dissident members in cases of expulsion.
emphasized that the relationship of a religious organization and its members is based • In the By-law provision, the only requirements before a member can be
on the latter’s absolute adherence to a common religious belief. As a general rule, expelled or removed from the membership of the CHURCH are:
there is no room for dissension in a religious corporation. An action for expulsion on the

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 o (a) the Board of Directors has been notified that a member has injurious to the beliefs of the Church. When they deliberately ignored the
failed to observe any regulations and By-laws of the CHURCH, or admonitions, they cannot anymore complain of their subsequent expulsion.
the conduct of any member has been dishonorable or improper or
otherwise injurious to the character and interest of the CHURCH, and SEPARATE OPINION (J. MELO, DISSENTING): There is an exception to the general
o (b) a resolution is passed by the Board expelling the member rule of non-interference that is, the civil courts can review proceedings undertaken by
concerned, without assigning any reason therefor. religious organizations and may interfere, so to speak, with the internal affairs thereof,
• Thus, a member who commits any of the causes for expulsion enumerated in as law and justice so require, when the acts complained of contravene the basic law of
paragraph 4 of Article VII may be expelled by the Board of Directors, through the land and violate the civil rights of its members. The facts of the case clearly show
a resolution, without giving that erring member any notice prior to his that they fall squarely within the exception to the rule. The petitioners were not accorded
expulsion. The resolution need not even state the reason for such action. due process when the Board removed their membership without prior notice. The right
• The CHURCH By-law provision on expulsion, as phrased, may sound unusual to prior notice is a fundamental right entitled to petitioners even when there is no a by-
and objectionable as there is no requirement of prior notice to be given to an law provision to this effect.
erring member before he can be expelled; but that is how peculiar the nature
of a religious corporation is vis-a-vis an ordinary corporation organized INC V. CA (INC SHOW CLASSIFIED AS X BY MTRCB)
for profit.
o It must be stressed that the basis of the relationship between a DOCTRINE: The freedom to act on ones beliefs is a way where the individual
religious corporation and its members is the latter's absolute externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public. His freedom
adherence to a common religious or spiritual belief. to do this is subject to the authority of the State. Any act that restrains speech is
o Once this basis ceases, membership in the religious corporation hobbled by the presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to
must also cease. overthrow this presumption, which it failed to do. The so-called attacks are mere
• Thus, generally, there is no room for dissension in a religious criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
corporation. respondents cannot also rely on the ground attacks against another religion in x- rating
o And where any member of a religious corporation is expelled from the religious program of petitioner because it is not among the grounds to justify an
the membership for espousing doctrines and teachings contrary to order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioners television program. In x-rating the TV
that of his church, the established doctrine in this jurisdiction is that program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger
such action from the church authorities is conclusive upon the civil rule.
courts.
• Obviously recognizing the peculiarity of a religious corporation, the RECIT-READY: The Iglesia ni Cristo operates a TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni
Corporation Code leaves the matter of ecclesiastical discipline to the Cristo.” The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television classified such
religious group concerned. Section 91 of the Corporation Code, which has program as rated X, being not fit for public viewing as it offends and constitutes an
been made explicitly applicable to religious corporations by the second attack against other religions. The Supreme Court held that INC is protected by section
paragraph of Section 109 of the same Code, provides for the termination of 4 of the Bill of Rights. The Board failed to show any imminent or grave danger that
membership. It provides that "Membership shall be terminated in the manner would be brought about by the telecast of the show. Also, the show itself is not an attack
and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. against, but rather a criticism of, other religions. Such ground (criticism) is not a valid
Termination of membership shall have the effect of extinguishing all rights of ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCB’s
a member in the corporation or in its property, unless otherwise provided in power to regulate these types of tv programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v Ruiz
the articles of incorporation or the by-laws." In fact, Long, et al. really have no regarding Director of Post’s power to check w/n publications are of a libelous character.
reason to bewail the lack of prior notice in the By-laws. They have waived
such notice by adhering to those By-laws. They became members of the FACTS:
CHURCH voluntarily. They entered into its covenant and subscribed to its • Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the
rules. By doing so, they are bound by their consent. Even assuming that Long, religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public
et al.'s expulsion falls within the Constitutional provisions on "prior notice" or viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
"due process," still the Court cannot conclude that Basa, et al. committed a Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and
constitutional infraction. constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
• Assuming arguendo that the expulsion falls within the ambit of judicial review, law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its
petitioners were still given more than sufficient notice before such expulsion. “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.
It is undisputed that the Board patiently and consistently advised the • Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board.
petitioners to stop espousing doctrines, teachings and religious belief • Petitioner contends that the Board acted with GADALEJ in classifying the
diametrically opposed to the Church’s Principles of Faith. It is clear that they program as rated X. Petitioner also states that the INC (and its tv show) is
were warned of expulsion should they continue to exhibit acts inimical and protected by Section 4 of the Bill of Rights.

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 • Respondent Board asserts its power which was vested in it by PD 1986. Said
PD provides that the Board can screen, review and examine all tv programs
and approve, delete or prohibit the broadcasting of tv programs which are RESPONDENT BOARD GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
immoral, indecent, and contrary to law. PROHIBITED THE AIRING OF PETITIONER’S RELIGIOUS PROGRAM.
• The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary
permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA [A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should
reversed the RTC. be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow
• The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck
review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board down. It failed in the case at bar.
did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the
exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for
that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also “attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the
found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the
customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by
Supreme Court. the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were
considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs,
ISSUE: W/N THE "ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS CONSTITUTIONALLY hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling
PROTECTED AS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
• Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program? exercise of religion. xxx.
YES
• Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner
when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program? YES but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be.
Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
HELD: YES. protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot
squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
RATIO: religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country.
In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality
RESPONDENT BOARD HAS THE POWER TO REVIEW PETITIONER’S TV of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock
PROGRAM. of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of
Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite
the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged,
will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no law In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held:
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.” worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of
such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground
[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the
its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that
that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave
exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious
clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public danger.”
morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be
seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the
as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify
Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against
religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint
not stand still. on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only

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by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality – grounds for expelling a person from the judiciary. Escritor said that since she’s a
already on ground. Jehovah’s Witness, and since she executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness,”
her relationship with Quilapio is valid when it comes to the beliefs of the
Witnesses. First – court remanded complaint to Court Administrator, and ordered OSG
to intervene, leaving the Court to decide whether any further evidence produced would
DETERMINATION/ REGULATION NOT AN EXCLUSIVE JUDICIAL FUNCTION prove the compelling interest of the state.
xxxx. In Freedman v Maryland, US-SC said that only the courts can
determine regarding issues which are sensitive to the freedom of expression The SC held that Escritor can’t be held liable – benevolent neutrality doctrine. This
rule allows people to exercise religious freedoms, unless such exercise offends compelling
yyyy. However, PH-SC said that following the 1921 case of Sotto v state interests. There is a test for this (mentioned below) and the OSG was unable to
Ruiz, Congress can grant an administrative body (i.e. MTRCB) quasi- adduce enough evidence to fulfill the test for this case. Thus, Escritor cannot be
judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its penalized.
decision subject to review by our courts.
In that case SC said director of Post can determine whether a publication Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She
contains printed matter of a libelous character has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty
Presumption is in favor of the correctness of his action and courts will not five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before
interfere with his decision unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

FREEDOM TO BELIEVE VS FREEDOM TO ACT ON ONE’S BELIEFS Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
• Individual is free to believe or disbelieve as he pleases concerning the According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
hereafter therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
• He has full freedom to believe what he wants and may not be required to
prove it and may not be punished for his inability to do so Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
• But where the individual externalized his belief in acts or omissions that affect Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the state
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
• Inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
inimical to society
Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal
ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR (COURT OFFICIAL WITH LIVE IN PARTNER;
arrangement.
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY)
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
DOCTRINE: The state has the burden of satisfying the compelling state interest to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
justify the sanction:
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
1) The courts should look into the sincerity of the religious belief without
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
inquiring into the truth of the belief
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
2) The state has to establish that its purposes are legitimate and compelling. compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
3) The state used the least intrusive means possible. evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the
The free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
the hierarchy of rights. The state’s broad interest in protecting the institutions of
marriage and family is not a compelling state interest enforcing the concubinage Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
charges against Escritor. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
approach that gives room for the accommodation of religious exercises as secular morality.
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Even assuming that there was a compelling state
interest, the state failed to show evidence that the means adopted in pursuing this The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
interest is the least restrictive to Escritor’s religious freedom. approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation
RECIT READY: Soledad Escritor is a court employee in an RTC. She had been living of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
with a certain man for 20 years, and they had borne a son. Alejandro Estrada, herein Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
petitioner, filed a cimplaint against Escritor citing her “disgraceful and immoral conduct” further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so

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 that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for FACTS :
it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an
492 SCRA 1 investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with
a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
FACTS: Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed
the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five yearsand therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified
had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband
the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge
to legalize their union. of "gross and immoral conduct."

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal HELD:
arrangement.
The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are
RULING: NO. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right anchored on a different reading of the "wall of separation."
to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of
and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be religion and state. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect,
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in programs placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus by the Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced secular society
prohibition.
Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular government practices which
morality.
An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and deliberate efforts
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. constitutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate First, the accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the
goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes language of the First Amendment.
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Second, the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the
First Amendment.
A.M. No. P-02-1651

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 Third, the accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect employees or those belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice
adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, the courts and the public.
which include ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority
The remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be excused from
Fourth, the accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year, is
way to deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic legislative, which is to ask Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them
nation. from compliance with the prescribed government working hours.

The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole RECIT-READY: The Muslim employees of the courts in Iligan City requested that
gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects may FIRST, they be granted the privilege to work on flexi hour (7:30 am to 3:30 pm straight)
be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would during the month of Ramadan and that SECOND, they be excused from work from
protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or 10:00 am to 2:00 pm every Fridays (prayer day of Muslims) of the entire calendar year.
delayed, is therefore necessary They based the requests on an earlier law, PD 291 as amended by PD 322, section 3
of which provides for a provision granting flexi hour during Ramadan. The CSC issued
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to a resolution implementing the PD and the said resolution added a provision on Friday
religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing exemptions (but this is absent from the law). The court granted the FIRST request but
between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and denied the SECOND request for lack of legal basis. The CSC exceeded its authority
practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and when it granted Friday exemptions. The exercise of religious freedom does not exempt
keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service
her free exercise of religion laws. The law requires that civil servants work at least 8 hours per day and this must
be applied equally to ALL civil servants regardless of religion.
The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious
belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice FACTS:
and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid • In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge
punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after Valerio Salazar, RTC Iligan City, several Muslim employees requested that
entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges:
less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against her o (1) to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch
break or coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan;
Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on o (2) to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every
the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year.
the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To • The Muslim employees invoked P.D. No. 291 as amended by P.D. No. 322,
properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the which was issued to reinforce national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing and making them part of our national holidays.
the respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable o Section 3 of the same law, as amended, provides that during the
as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in
the national government, government-owned or controlled
The OSG, since 2003, failed to prove in front of the Supreme Court any compelling corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
interest instrumentalities shall observe office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30
p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no
IN RE REQUEST MUSLIM EMPLOYEES (MUSLIMS EXCUSED FROM WORK diminution of salary or wages, provided, that the employee who is
EVERY FRIDAY) not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this provision.
o It also provides that "regulations for the implementation of this
DOCTRINE: The need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to section shall be issued together with the implementing directives on
enforce them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be Muslim holidays."
disregarded. The said rule enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, • Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated
to render public service of no less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week. Resolution No. 81- 1277 stating that during “Ramadan,” the fasting month (30
days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service official time of 8:00 to 12:00 and 1:00
To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 to 5:00 is hereby modified to 7:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. without noon break and
a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year the difference of 2 hours is not counted as undertime.
would mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours. For then, they • The resolution also declared that during Friday Muslims are excused from
would be rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the civil service work from 10 o’clock in the morning to 2 o’clock in the afternoon. In another
rules for each month. The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim

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 resolution, CSC clarified that the term “Friday” in the above resolution is not • Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 enjoins
limited to the Fridays during the month of Ramadan, but refers to “all Fridays ALL CIVIL servants of whatever religious denomination to render public
of the calendar year.” service of no less than 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week.
o The flexi hour provision for Muslims during Ramadan is based on
ISSUES: Law (PD 291 as amended by PD 322) and does not diminish the 8
hour requirement because it’s from 7:30 to 3:30 straight, HENCE
1. Whether or not the said Muslim Employees have the right to hold office hours from GRANTED.
7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan pursuant to Section o On the other hand, PD 291 as amended by PD 322 makes no
3 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 291, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 322; and mention of Friday Muslim Prayer Day and allowing it means that
Muslims will work below the statutory requirement of 8 hours per
2. Whether or not they have the right to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 day, DENIED.
p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year. • “The CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it declared in Resolution No. 81-
1277 and Resolution No. 00-0227 that Muslim employees are excused from
HELD: The request to allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold office hours work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday subject to certain conditions.
from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan GRANTED. CSC Resolution No. 81-1277 was purportedly issued pursuant to Sections 2
The request that the Muslim employees in the Judiciary be excused from work from and 5 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No 322, but neither of the two
10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar decrees mention “Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day” as one of the
year DENIED for lack of legal basis. recognized holidays.
• The exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from
The recommendation of the Court Administrator with respect to the matter of allowing compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil
the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to service laws.
3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan is well taken. The same has • In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request
statutory basis in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the
GRANTED. entire calendar year, is legislative, which is to ask Congress to enact a
legislation expressly exempting them from compliance with the prescribed
RATIO: government working hours.
• The Court, however, is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the • Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious
request of the Muslim employees to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave
2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day. religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to
• CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it declared that Muslim employees are religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday subject to certain dogma.”
conditions.
• CSC Resolution was purportedly issued pursuant to Sections 2 and 5 of P.D. IGLESIA FILIPINO INDEPENDIENTE V. HEIRS OF TAEZO (SELLING OF
No. 291, as amended by P.D. No 322, but neither of the two decrees mention CHURCH LAND BY BISHOP)
“Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day” as one of the recognized holidays.
• The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section DOCTRINE: There was no consent to the contract of sale as Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga
5, Article III of the Constitution: "No law shall be made respecting an had no authority to give such consent. Under petitioner’s Canons, any sale of real
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The exercise property requires not just the consent of the Supreme Bishop but also the concurrence
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or of the laymen’s committee, the parish priest, and the Diocesan Bishop, as sanctioned
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the by the Supreme Council. However, petitioner’s Canons do not specify in what form the
exercise of civil and political rights." conformity of the other church entities should be made known. Here, the trial court
• The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday found that the laymen’s committee indeed made its objection to the sale known to the
Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the Islamic faith. However, while the Supreme Bishop.
observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary
to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break Even though the free exercise of religion (Article III, Section 5) was not expressly
during the month of Ramadan finds statutory support; there is no such basis mentioned in the case, such was applied by the Supreme Court in observing the rules
to excuse them from work from 10 a.m. to 2: p.m. every Friday, the Muslim and regulation of IFI pertaining to the alienation of land without court interference
Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year. pursuant to the aforementioned Corporation Code provision.
o The state has prescribed government office hours and needs to
enforce them uniformly to ALL CIVIL SERVANTS. FACTS:

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 • In 1976, plaintiff-appellee Iglesia Filipina Independiente, through its then sanctioned by the Supreme Council. However, petitioner’s Canons do not
Supreme Bishop Rev. Macario Ga, sold two parcels of land situt situated at specify in what form the conformity of the other church entities should be made
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to the defendant Bernardino Taeza through known. Thus, as petitioner’s witness stated, in practice, such consent or
installment, with mortgage to secure the payment of the balance. approval may be assumed as a matter of fact, unless some opposition is
Subsequently, the defendant allegedly completed the payments. expressed.
• Meanwhile, the defendant Bernardino Taeza registered the subject parcels of • Here, the trial court found that the laymen’s committee indeed made its
land. Consequently, Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in his name. The objection to the sale known to the Supreme Bishop. The CA, on the other
defendant then occupied a portion of the land. hand, glossed over the fact of such opposition from the laymen’s committee,
• In January 1990, a complaint for annulment of sale was filed by the plaintiff- opining that the consent of the Supreme Bishop to the sale was sufficient,
appellee IFI, through Supreme Bishop Pasco, against the defendant- especially since the parish priest and the Diocesan Bishop voiced no objection
appellant. to the sale.
• RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee. It held that the deed • The Court finds it erroneous for the CA to ignore the fact that the laymen’s
of sale executed by and between Rev. Ga and the defendant-appellant is null committee objected to the sale of the lot in question. The Canons require that
and void. ALL the church entities listed in Article IV (a) thereof should give its approval
• Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA, ruling that petitioner, being a to the transaction. Thus, when the Supreme Bishop executed the contract of
corporation sole, validly transferred ownership over the land in question sale of petitioner’s lot despite the opposition made by the laymen’s committee,
through its Supreme Bishop, who was at the time the administrator of all he acted beyond his powers.
properties and the official representative of the church, reversed and set aside o Art. 1403: The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
the RTC Decision, thereby dismissing the complaint. ratified:
• Hence, this petition is filed. o those entered into in the name of another person by one who has
been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
ISSUE: W/N the contract of sale was valid beyond his powers
• NOTE: Even though the free exercise of religion (Article III, Section 5) was
HELD: NO. There was no consent to the contract of sale as Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga not expressly mentioned in the case, such was applied by the Supreme Court
had no authority to give such consent. in observing the rules and regulation of IFI pertaining to the alienation of land
without court interference pursuant to the aforementioned Corporation Code
RATIO: provision.
• Section 113 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines provides that:
o Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property.—Any corporation ROMULO V PEOPLE (FAILURE TO SECURE MARRIAGE LICENSE; AGLIPAYAN
sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its CHURCH)
church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and may
receive bequests or gifts for such purposes. Such corporation may DOCTRINE: The principle of separation of church and State does not preclude the
mortgage or sell real property held by it upon obtaining an order for State from interfering in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony.
that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province where
the property is situated; Provided, That in cases where the rules, Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and
regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, sect or that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
church, religious society or order concerned represented by such social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount
corporation sole regulate the method of acquiring, holding, selling interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of
and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and
regulations and discipline shall control, and the intervention of the regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the
courts shall not be necessary. commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
• Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner provided in Article IV (a) of its Constitution
and Canons of the Philippine Independent Church, that “all real properties of RECIT-READY: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each
the Church located or situated in such parish can be disposed of only with the other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos
approval and conformity of the laymen’s committee, the parish priest, the Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Diocesan Bishop, with sanction of the Supreme Council, and finally with the Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
approval of the Supreme Bishop, as administrator of all the temporalities of secure a marriage license. As a recourse, they proceeded to the Independent Church
the Church.” of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
• Evidently, under petitioner’s Canons, any sale of real property requires not petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
just the consent of the Supreme Bishop but also the concurrence of the having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage license. The court held
laymen’s committee, the parish priest, and the Diocesan Bishop, as that the State can interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of

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matrimony. Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article
institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere 55 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has with no substantial amendments.
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the
preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws Article 6 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the
commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage. contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
FACTS: husband and wife.”

Joey and Claire were supposed to be married by Fr. Mario Ragaza of the Roman Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a
Catholic Church. The latter, however, discovered that the couple were not issued a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
marriage license, and refused to solemnise their marriage. The couple thus proceeded parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
to the Aglipayan Church nearby, together with the wedding sponsors and guests, and other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
requested Rene, an Aglipayan priest to perform the ceremony. He agreed despite being
told by the couple that they had no marriage license. The choir prepared, Rene Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule
scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date and conducted the ceremony in the was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the
presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors, marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the
as well as the invited guests. After the wedding, Rene was charged with violating Article minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony:
352 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. • first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before
During the trial, witnesses Joseph, veil sponsor and Mary Anne, cord sponsor, testified a solemnizing officer; and
as to the fact of marriage. Florida, mother of Joey, secured a certification from the local • second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that
civil registrar that no marriage license was issued to Joey and Claire. The MTC after they take each other as husband and wife.
trial, convicted Rene as charged, applying Section 44 of the Marriage Law (Act No.
3613) in the imposition of the proper penalty. His appeal to the RTC and the CA denied, As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before
Rene went all the way to the Supreme Court to contest his conviction for the crime. him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find
According to him, the ceremony was not the solemnisation of marriage required by law. that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the
He argues that the husband and wife did not personally declare each other as husband testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each
and wife, as required by the Family Code; the separation of church and state precludes other as husband and wife.
the State from converting a “ceremony” into a “marriage”; he conducted the “blessing”
in good faith hence he had no criminal intent’ and the non-filing of a case for violation The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to
of Article 350 against Joey and Claire precludes filing of a case against him. Florida fails to persuade us. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may
propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
“Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be
are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain
illegal marriage ceremony. truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.

In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its
marriage. failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ALLEGED “BLESSING” BY THE PETITIONER IS In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s
TANTAMOUNT TO THE PERFORMANCE OF AN “ILLEGAL MARRIAGE admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony
CEREMONY” WHICH IS PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 352 OF THE RPC, AS that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as
AMENDED. husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and
wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the
HELD: YES defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any
ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
RATIO:
We also DO NOT AGREE with the petitioner that the principle of separation of
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a “marriage church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church “blessing” into
ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of a marriage ceremony.

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 ‘Team Patay’ and ‘Team Buhay’ with check and X marks indicating their vote for RA
Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 10354 or the RH Law. The very next day, Attorney Majarucon, as Election Officer of
6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the Bacolod, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials within 3 days, addressed to
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect Bishop Navarra. Said Notice was mainly due to the size of the tarpaulin alluding to the
the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the required size of 2 feet by 3 feet promulgated by the COMELEC under its Resolution
requirement that the core requirements of law be observed. No. 9615. 3 days after herein petitioners requested for a definite ruling by the
COMELEC Law Department and that the tarpaulin be maintained pending such
We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as ruling. Thereafter, the COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering immediate
an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that removal of the subject tarpaulin and cautioning the petitioners that an election case
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally may be filed against them. Petitioners, in response to the letter, initiated this case for
interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with the latter being awarded by
constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this the corresponding court as oral arguments were set.
end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, ISSUE: W/N COMELEC NOTICE AND LETTER VIOLATED CONSTITUTIONAL
as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and RIGHTS TO EXPRESSION AND RELIGION OF THE PETITIONERS
mockery of marriage.
HELD: YES. Temporary restraining order is hereby made PERMANENT. Petition by
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a the Diocese of Bacolod is GRANTED.
marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with.
While the petitioner may view this merely as a “blessing,” the presence of the COMELEC has no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens. More
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this “blessing” so, in this case where the tarpaulin addresses a public concern that is only related to
into a “marriage ceremony” as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and the elections, freedom of expression must be upheld. Also, Article 3, Section 4 of the
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. Constitution posits that, “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble and
We come now to the issue of WHETHER THE SOLEMNIZATION BY THE petition the government for redress of grievances”. Though this provision specifically
PETITIONER OF THIS MARRIAGE CEREMONY WAS ILLEGAL. talks about a law, jurisprudence posit that all regulations that will have an impact of
freedom of expression shall be weighed vis-à-vis state interest in order to decide on
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
the constitutionality of a regulatory mechanism.
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that
he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the “blessing” of
The COMELEC mainly assert that the size of the tarpaulin is beyond that which they
their relationship.
prescribe. However, the Court is of the opinion that the size of the tarpaulin is part of
the message/expression it aims to protect. The tarpaulin may discuss election
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that
candidates, but it is not exactly election propaganda, as any candidate, party list, or
the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The
group did not pay it for. In fact, the parties in this case have agreed that these are not
marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence
those clandestine ads paid for by ‘friends’ of the candidates but this is an opinion on a
of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
relevant social issue. Moreover, Section 5 of Article 3 of the Constitution provides that,
“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
We also do not agree with the petitionner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”
requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Clearly, this case is not about the non-establishment but may concern the free exercise
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal
of religion. However, though every act may be motivated by moral or religious
liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an
considerations but the tarpaulin does not convey any religious doctrine. Hence, the
element of the crime.”
petitioners are erroneous in citing Article 3 Section 5 and cases wherein religion and
government neutrality to such has been upheld. Nevertheless, the tarpaulin still needs
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC (BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY)
to be respected under the overarching principle of free speech.
FACTS:
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon
On February 21, 2013, two tarpaulins around 6 feet by 10 feet in size were installed this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
inside San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod on the front walls of the cathedral. The first does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious
tarpaulin contained the message “Ibasura RH Law’ while the second one, the subject speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
of this case, listed candidates for the upcoming 2013 elections under the headings

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precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not but only in accordance with recognized Catholic rites. The person who
religious speech. officiated the ceremony had no license to solemnize marriages under civil
law. While her religious marriage was done before the declaration of nullity of
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality her first marriage, the prevailing jurisprudence at that time was that there was
no need for a judicial decree to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality § When she married for the first time, it was not their intention to live together
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are as husband and wife. They planned a church wedding for later but it did not
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the push through because Richard’s mother was sick and his father, a Chinese
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise would not agree because it was then the Year of the Dragon. They never lived
their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden together as husband and wife.
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion. § They both wanted it quits. Then she met Renato. She realized it was unfair
to live in a marriage that was never consummated. She wanted very much an
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to annulment, but it was a long and tedious process. Then she got pregnant.
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals § Being both religious, they consulted priests who were knowledgeable in canon
whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create law. Because of the separation of Church and State, civil marriages are not
without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may recognised by the Catholic Church; couples who are civilly married are
flourish.” considered living in sin and may be excommunicated. Her marriage to
Richard Tang was not recognised by the Catholic Church.
Lemon test § Further, as a foreign citizen, Richard needed to secure a certificate of legal
A regulation is constitutional when: capacity before she can secure a marriage license. Not having presented the
1. It has a secular legislative purpose; certificate before securing the marriage license, Richard’s marriage to her was
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and void. At that time, there was no need to secure a judicial declaration to
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. establish the invalidity of a marriage. The logical conclusion, according to the
judge, was that there was no impediment for her and Renato to get married,
although she needed to cancel the registration of the first marriage. While
waiting for the outcome of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage, they
PERFECTO V ESIDRA proceeded with the Catholic marriage to continue living in a state of grace. Her
daughter’s pregnancy was very complicated, and it was Renato, a non-lawyer
DOCTRINE: judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another person who prepared the birth certificate. To Renato, their union was blessed by God,
during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious expression. Legal and their daughter was a legitimate child.
implications and obligations attach to any person who chooses to enter civil marriages. § She had always wanted to correct her daughter’s birth certificate, but decided
This is regardless of how civil marriages are treated in that person’s religion against it for the best interest of the child, who may not understand why she
is different from her other siblings. The date of marriage indicated in her birth
FACTS: certificate is the days she and Renato received the sacrament of
§ In his administrative complaint against Judge Alma Consuelo Desales- matrimony. The officiating priest had no license to solemnize marriages in the
Esidera (respondent) of RTC Branch 20 Catarman City, Eladio Perfecto country.
(complainant), accused the judge of being first married to one Richard Tepace § While she is being charged with immorality, the judges argues that the test
on May 7, 1987. of morality are those set by whatever religion one has. In her case, it was
§ During their marriage, Alma gave birth to a daughter with Renato Esidera. Her the Ten Commandments which she violated but which she rectified by
marriage to Richard was later declared void on January 27, 1992, and Alma availing of the Sacrament of Reconciliation and Matrimony.
married Renato on June 3, 1992. § Finally, she never kept the status of her daughter a secret, a fact which could
§ Eladio further added that Alma falsified her daughter’s birth certificate to make not have escaped scrutiny when she applied in the Judiciary. The first civil
it appear that she and Renato were married on March 18, 1990 and their marriage was never consummated; the second marriage was purely a
daughter was a legitimate child. sacramental rite in obedience to the Law of God, and the third marriage was
§ Verification, however, revealed that no marriage took place on that day and to formalize their status in the eyes of the law of man.
Judge Desales-Esidera did not take steps to rectify her daughter’s birth § The Office of the Court Administrator in its findings found that Judge Desales-
certificate. Eladio thus prayed for Judge Desales Esidera condoned the misrepresentation made on her child’s birth certificate
§ Esidera’s dismissal from the service for dishonesty. and engaged in an “illicit affair” and contracted a second marriage while
§ In her Comment, Judge Desales-Esidera claimed that the charges against her another marriage subsisted. She contracted the second marriage knowing
were personal, not judicial. She did not participate in the preparation of her that there were legal impediments to that marriage. Judge Desales-Esidera
daughter’s birth certificate; she had wanted to correct it but did not do so for “did not comport herself according to her Roman Catholic faith.”
the best interest of the child. She admitted being married on Mach 18, 1990,

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ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Desales-Esidera should be held administratively liable. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that we find respondent judge
guilty of immoral conduct based on, among others, her alleged affair and her
HELD: NO failure to comport herself according to the Roman Catholic faith.

RATIO: This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion.
We do not have jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which
Judge Desales-Esidera is also not guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct conduct contradicts religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction over matters of morality
under the Code of Professional Responsibility. only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the public or its interest.

Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges,
“immoral conduct” should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To be
In Estrada v. Escritor, 2 this court described morality as “how we ought to live’ and guilty of “immorality” under the Code of Professional
why.”
Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public’s
Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever this court
prescriptions of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion, as decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court’s
this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 4 is “a profession of faith to an active power that supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.
binds and elevates man to his Creator.” 5 A conduct is religiously moral if it is
consistent with and is carried out in light of the divine set of beliefs and obligations Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of contracting a
imposed by the active power. second marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having an
Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any divine moral alleged “illicit” affair are “immoral” based on her Catholic faith. This court is not a
prescriptions. What is good or right at a given circumstance does not derive its basis judge of religious morality.
from any religious doctrine but from the independent moral sense shared as humans.
We also do not find that respondent judge’s acts constitute immorality for purposes of
The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules, administrative liability. Under the circumstances, respondent judge’s second marriage
moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should and her alleged affair with her second husband were not of such depravity as to reduce
be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. When it forms part of confidence in the Rule of Law. Respondent judge and her first husband never really
our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must lived together as husband and wife. She claimed that her first husband did not want to
be based on a secular purpose. have a church wedding. She and her husband did not have a child. She claimed that
In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is bound this marriage was not recognized by her church. Eventually, their marriage was
to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on secular moral standards. declared void, 12 and she was wed civilly to her second husband, with whom
When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts should be careful not to respondent judge allegedly had an affair.
overlook the distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to keep its part in Moreover, respondent judge’s acts were not intrinsically harmful. When respondent
upholding constitutionally guaranteed rights. 8 judge married her second husband, no harm was inflicted upon any one, not even the
complainant. There was no evidence on the records that the first husband, who was
There is the danger of “compelled religion” 9 and, therefore, of negating the very idea the most interested person in the issue, even objected to the second marriage.
of freedom of belief and non-establishment of religion when religious morality is While we do not find respondent judge administratively liable for immorality, we can
incorporated in government regulations and policies. As explained in Estrada v. determine if she is administratively liable for possible misconduct. The Code of
Escritor: 10 Professional Responsibility directs lawyers to obey the laws and promote respect for
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and the law. 13
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might
regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be We cannot conclude that, for purposes of determining administrative liability,
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to respondent judge disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and her second
a “compelled religion” anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based husband conducted a marriage ceremony on March 18, 1990.
its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and Respondent judge claimed that this marriage was merely a sacramental marriage
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not entered into only to comply with the requirements of their religious beliefs. It was valid
support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all only under the Roman Catholic Church but has no legal effect. Their solemnizing officer
its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are was not licensed to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from the civil
second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government government. 14
be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a second or subsequent marriage
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. 11 before the legal dissolution of a first marriage:

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Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person Comment that she and her husband’s only consideration for their 1990 marriage was
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has the recognition from the Roman Catholic Church. She stated that:
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. from the civil government. Hence, he was not under obligation to register our marriage.
It was a purely sacramental marriage rite, without legal effect but definitely valid and
The second or subsequent marriage contemplated under this provision is the marriage recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It is called “matrimona de conciencia.” 17
entered into under the law. Article 1 of the Family Code defines marriage as “a special However, Article 350 may be of doubtful constitutionality when applied to religious
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance exercise and expression insofar as it prescribes upon individuals and religious
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life[.]” communities formal requirements for the conduct of their religious ceremonies. It puts
18
a burden upon the exercise of beliefs by criminalizing marriages performed in
Thus, the validity of the second marriage, if not for the subsistence of the first marriage, accordance with those beliefs, but lacks some or all the requisites of a valid marriage
is considered one of the elements of the crime of bigamy. The elements of bigamy are: under the law. These requirements include not only age and consent, but also formal
requisites such as marriage license and civil authority of the solemnizing officer even
(a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally though violence, fraud, or intimidation was not present under the circumstances. It may,
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be therefore, limit religious exercise and expression to the formalities of law.
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or Thus, unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage ceremony according
subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential to her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and imminent
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second danger to the society, 19 we cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the for her participation in her religious marriage ceremony. 20
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage. 15 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) In Estrada, 21 this court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of benevolent
Respondent judge’s act of participating in the marriage ceremony as governed only by neutrality should be applied. Under the test of benevolent neutrality, religious freedom
the rules of her religion is not inconsistent with our law against bigamy. What the law is weighed against a compelling state interest:
prohibits is not second marriage during a subsisting marriage per se. What the law Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
prohibits is a second marriage that would have been valid had it not been for the interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
subsisting marriage. Under our law, respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 was invalid possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated
because of the solemnizing officer’s lack of authority. by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 22 (Emphasis
Marriages entered into in accordance with the law may or may not include marriages in the original)
recognized in certain religions. Religious marriages are recognized in and may be
governed by our laws only if they conform to legal requirements. Religious marriages We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent judge’s right
that lack some or all the requirements under the law are invalid. 16 They are not to participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other
considered to have been entered into. They do not enjoy the benefits, consequences, people’s rights and with no legally binding effect. The institution of marriage is not
and incidents of marriage provided under the law. threatened when we accommodate respondent judge’s freedom to participate in such
ceremonies even if they have secular counterparts under our laws.
The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 In any case, respondent judge did not ask that she and her husband be given the same
renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our law. Hence, no second rights as civilly married partners before their civil wedding in 1992. She does not ask
marriage can be imputed against respondent judge while her first marriage subsisted. that our laws recognize her marriage in 1990 as valid. Respondent judge also does not
seem to be against civil marriages. She and her husband were even civilly wed after
However, respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the her marriage with her first spouse was declared void.
Revised Penal Code, which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the
provisions of laws. Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code provides: However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot shield
respondent judge from liability for misconduct under our laws. Respondent
ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. – The penalty of prision judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first husband. She knew
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person its effects under our laws. She had sexual relations with her second husband
who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall contract while her first marriage was subsisting.
marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another
the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. (Emphasis supplied) person during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious
expression. Legal implications and obligations attach to any person who
Respondent judge knew that the solemnizing officer during her and her husband’s chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless of how civil marriages are
marriage in 1990 had no civil authority to solemnize marriages. It is clear from her treated in that person’s religion.

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Moreover, respondent judge, as a lawyer and even more so as a judge, is expected to What qualifies as religion? A creed must meet 4 criteria to qualify as religion under
abide by the law. Her conduct affects the credibility of the courts in dispensing justice. the First Amendment: BG- MC-DS-AT
Thus, in finding respondent judge administratively liable for a violation of her marriage § There must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a
obligations under our laws, this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in central place in the believer’s life.
administering justice. In the words of Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion in Estrada: § The religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belief,
i.e., it cannot be purely subjective.
Court employees, from the highest magistrate to the lowliest clerk, are expected to § A demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the court must not
abide scrupulously with the law. They are held to a higher standard since they are part inquire into the truth or reasonableness of the belief.
of the judicial machinery that dispenses justice. [T]here exists a compelling state
§ There must be some associational ties, although there is also a view
interest to hold Escritor to the same standards required of every court employee. If
that religious beliefs held by a single person rather than being part of the
unsanctioned, Escritor’s unlawful conduct would certainly impair the integrity and
teachings of any kind of groups or sect are entitled to the protection of the
credibility of the judiciary. 23
Free Exercise Clause.
Lawyers are not and should not be expected to be saints. What they do as citizens of
their faiths are beyond this court’s power to judge. Lawyers, however, are officers of
court. They are expected to care about and sustain the law. This court’s jurisdiction The religious freedom doctrines one can derive from Gerona are:
over their actions is limited to their acts that may affect public confidence in the Rule of 1) It is incumbent upon the Court to determine whether a certain ritual is religious or
Law. Our state has secular interests to protect. This court cannot be expected to not;
condone misconduct done knowingly on account of religious freedom or expression. 2) Religious freedom will not be upheld if it clashes with the established institutions of
society and with the law such that when a law of general applicability incidentally
Finally, the Office of the Court Administrator and the Administrators of lower courts burdens the exercise of one’s religion, one’s right to religious freedom cannot justify
should look into the motives of persons who file complaints against our judges and exemption from compliance with the law.
officers of court when allegations point to possible administrative violations. This is not
to say that complainants’ motives are relevant to their causes of actions. However, Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the
complainants who come to court with unclean hands should not be spared from liability elevating influence of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that the
just because they were the first to submit their accusations. government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals, however, the
government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability, which inadvertently
NO RELGIOUS TEST burden religious exercise. It allows these breaches in the wall of separation to uphold
religious liberty, which after all is the integral purpose of the religion clauses. (Estrada
v. Escritor)
No law shall be passed which would require a person to profess a religion to qualify in
the exercise of his civil and political rights.
The performance of religious practices should not prejudice the courts and the public.
Purpose: to discredit the policy of probing into one’s religious beliefs by test oaths or Religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable
limiting public offices to persons who profess to a particular religion requirements of the law, including the civil service laws. (In re. request of Muslim
Employees)
Clergy in Public Office- The religious freedom enshrined in the Bill of Rights simply
means that no public office may be denied to any person, by reason of his religious ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS
belief, including his non-belief. When he becomes an ecclesiastic, he becomes the SECTION VI
official minister of his church with distinct duties and responsibilities which may not be
always compatible with the posture of absolute indifference and impartiality to all SECTION 6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
religious beliefs. UPHELD (Pamil v. Teleron) prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
The right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to safety, or public health, as may be provided by law
preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions, or, in other words, to
be a minister of the type McDaniel was found to be. Under the clergy-disqualification
Liberty granted by the provision
provision, McDaniel cannot exercise both rights simultaneously because the State has
conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. UNCONSTITUTIONAL
1. Freedom to choose and change one's place of abode
(McDaniel v. Paty)
§ may be impaired upon lawful order of the court and within the limits
prescribed by law.
The freedom to act to one's belief is subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare. Therefore, the religious program is not
Liberty of Abode
beyond review by the Board (INC v. CA)

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One can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right 2. The right to travel may also be restricted in interest of national security,
of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city, to force citizens of public safety, or public health, or when a person is on bail, or under a watch-
the Philippine Islands — these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society list and hold departure order.
are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as any other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila Right to Return to One’s Country
to another locality. (Villavicencio v. Lukban) Although the right to return to one’s country is not among the rights expressly
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, it is nonetheless recognized and protected in the
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by Philippines. It is a generally accepted principle of international law, and as such it is
petitioner, are not absolute rights. It can be regulated by a lawful order such as part of the law of the land, pursuant to the doctrine of incorporation. It is different
releasing a petitioner on bail. (Yap v. CA) from the right to travel and is guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
2. Freedom to travel
§ both within the country and outside
o may be impaired by administrative authorities, such as LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL
passport officers, in the interest of national security or public
health -also impaired by bail VILLAVICENCIO V. LUKBAN (DEPORTED PROSTITUTES)

Right to travel DOCTRINE: Forcibly displacing these women from Manila deprived them of freedom
§ The right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's of abode just as if they were imprisoned. They also have no money and personal
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from, belongings that prevented them to go anywhere but Davao. There is no law that
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the UNDHR and the IC- empowers a Mayor to force any citizen of the Philippines to change their domicile from
CPR treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the Manila to any other locality. In fact, Philippine penal law punishes a public officer who,
territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his
one's country as separate and distinct rights. residence.

The right to return to one's country is not covered by the specific right to travel and RECIT-READY: Justo Lukban, the Mayor of Manila, deported 170 prostitutes from
liberty of abode provided for in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, the requirements Manila to Davao. The relatives and friends of the deportees applied for habeas corpus
prescribed in the constitution relative to the right to travel do not apply. (Marcos v. with the Supreme Court. The fiscal of Manila, appearing for the respondents, countered
Mangalapus) that the petitioners had no standing, that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction, and
that the deportees were not restrained in Davao anyway. The writ was granted. The
The right to Travel may be curtailed by Administrative officers in the interest of national petitioners, as relatives, had standing. The SC has jurisdiction over the whole country.
security, public safety or public heath, as may be provided by law. The forcible taking of the deportees from Manila to Davao is a form of deprivation of
liberty and freedom to travel anywhere.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL
FACTS:
Freedom of Movement § After placing prostitutes confined in their houses, Mayor Justo Lukban ordered
170 prostitutes to be rounded up by the constabulary at midnight of Oct. 25,
1. Constitutional Provision. Section 6, Article III provides that “the liberty of abode 1918.
and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired § They were then forcibly deported to Davao aboard two coastguard cutters, the
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired Corregidor and Negros.
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
§ They arrived in Davao on Oct. 29. They were received by Francisco Sales, the
provided by law.”
governor, as laborers.
2. Aspects of the Freedom. Freedom of movement has two aspects: § Some of the women eventually married. Some continued working as
a) Freedom to choose and change one’s domicile, and prostitutes. Some worked in different capacities. Some disappeared and some
b) Freedom to travel within and outside the country. A person’s place of abode found a way to go back to Manila.
or domicile is his permanent residence. § The relatives and friends of the deportees filed a habeas corpus petition with
the SC. The city fiscal, appearing for the mayor, said that the writ should not
Limitations be granted because (1) the petitioners did not have standing, and (2) the
1. Freedom of movement is not an absolute right. It has limitations. Liberty of petition should have been filed in the CFI of Davao. He did admit that the
abode may be impaired or restricted when there is a “lawful court order.” women were sent there without their consent.

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 § On Nov. 4, 1918, the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the o That the persons in question are not restrained of their liberty
mayor to produce the women in court on Dec. 2, 1918. since they are free in Davao and not under any restraint.
§ On Dec. 2, 1918, none of the women were presented in court. Instead, the § The forcible taking of these women from Manila
fiscal reiterated his objections and presented affidavits from some of the deprived them of freedom of locomotion just as if they
women, saying that they are already content with their lives in Davao, and did were imprisoned.
not wish to return. § Because they did not have any money or personal
§ The Court issued another order on Dec. 10, 1918 which ordered the belongings, they were prevented from going to
respondents to bring before the court on Jan. 13, 1919 the women not in wherever they want when they were brought to Davao.
Manila, unless they women, in written statements voluntarily made before the
CFI of Davao, renounce their right to return. § If the respondents can send the deportees away, then
§ On Jan. 13, 1919, the respondents presented the women who returned to they also have the ability to bring them back.
Manila by themselves, and 8 others they were able to bring back to Manila. • At that time, there was no Philippine jurisprudence with similar facts and
As for the others, the respondents reported that 81 women renounced their issues. The SC looked at foreign cases with similar facts and issues for
right to return, 59 returned to Manila by other means, and 26 could not be guidance. These had persuasive effect.
found despite their best efforts. o Justice Cooley (Michigan Supreme Court): “The place of
§ Counsel for petitioners moved that the respondents be held in contempt of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief [of habeas
court. Counsel for respondents requested that the reply to respondent’s corpus], if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by
memorandum be struck from the record. the power of the court, he can be compelled to release his
grasp.”
ISSUE: WON THE ACTS OF THE MAYOR OF MANILA HAD LEGAL BASIS § The 2nd order to produce the deportees was issued by the court in order to
HELD: NO give the respondents another chance to comply even after not complying with
the 1st order. The Court found that there was substantial compliance by the
RATIO: respondents of the 2nd order since they exerted more effort to find the said
§ There is no law which empowers the Mayor of Manila to force any citizen of deportees. They were, therefore, not cited in contempt.
the Philippines to change their domicile from Manila to any other locality. In § However, respondent Lukban was fined 100 pesos as a nominal fine for not
fact, Philippine penal law punishes a public officer who, not being expressly complying with the first order.
authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS (RIGHT TO RETURN IN THE COUNTRY NOT
§ The liberty of abode is a deeply imbedded principle in jurisprudence and ALLOWED)
considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional
sanction. DOCTRINE: Philippines cannot be considered solely based on constitutional
§ Even the Governor-General of the Philippines, or the US President does not provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and right to travel. The right to return is not a
have the power to compel anyone to change their domicile. What more for a part of one’s right to travel. Since it should be properly addressed by the residual power
mayor. of the President, which is her paramount duty to protect and safeguard the people of
§ The remedies for official oppression are the Philippines. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the president
• (1) civil action, since, during the time of the case there were communist insurgencies and allowing
Marcos to come how may only intensify their violence. Also the Philippines is only just
• (2) criminal action, and
starting to recover from the hardship of the Marcoses. Their return can tantamount to
• (3) habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual
economic collapse.
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
§ As to the defense posed by the respondents, RECIT-READY: The petitioners question the constitutionality of the decision of the
o That the petitioners had no standing Philippine President to bar their return to the Philippines. They based their claim on
§ It was impossible for the women to apply for habeas their right to travel on the Bill of Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
corpus themselves. Therefore, their relatives and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. The respondents, on the other
friends had standing. hand, argued that the issue is a political question and, hence, cannot be reviewed under
o That the CFI of Davao, not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction the ambit of judicial review. The SC held that the right to travel is different from the right
§ The SC has jurisdiction over the entire country. to return to his own country. Furthermore, it held that the President wields executive
§ The petitioners and their counsel were in Manila, where power greater than what is enumerated in the Constitution. Hers is the residual power
the SC is. to protect the general welfare of the people. The Court also held that the President did
§ It was not shown that the CFI of Davao was in session. not commit GADALEJ, based on the pleadings and oral arguments, in determining that
the Marcoses’ return posed a great threat to the welfare of the people.

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Facts: 2) Under the judicial power of review, did the President acted arbitrarily or with
1) Petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines posed a serious
and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to threat to national interest and welfare, and decided to bar their return? NO
the Philippines.
2) “This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator HELD: WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did
forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
seeks to return, is in a class by itself.” circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
3) According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
resolution of the certain issues (For the list of the issues, see full text of the case.
Essentially, however, the petitioners dissected the Constitution in the hopes of RATIO:
steering the Court in determining whether or not the President of the Philippines • Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct
committed GADALEJ in barring their return of to the country) : right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
4) The petitioners argued that their right to return is guaranteed under: travel.
a) The Bill of Rights, Sec. 2 and Sec. 6. o The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and
b) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the
i) Article 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."
residence within the borders of each state. [Art. 13(2)]
ii) Article 13 (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his o Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to
own, and to return to his country. choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any
country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)], which rights may be restricted by
c) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as ratified by the
such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order,
Philippines:
public health or morals or enter his own country" of which one cannot be
i) Article 12
(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).]
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose o Therefore, it would be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right
his residence. to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the
(2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. liberty of abode and the right to travel.
(3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions
except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect • It is a well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
national security, public order (order public), public health or morals generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution]. However, it is distinct and
other rights recognized in the present Covenant. separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
(4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.
country.
5) Respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political • The Executive Power
question, which is non-justiciable. The Solicitor General adds: o The Constitution does not define executive power. Hence, petitioners
i) Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without reference argue that "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not
to attendant circumstances. enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio
ii) In its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand alterius”
Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside o However, Corwin concluded that “what the presidency is at any particular
here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that moment depends in important measure on who is President."
such return and residence will endanger national security and public
o Also, “whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
safety.
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.” Springer v. Government of
ISSUE:
the Philippine Islands:
§ The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
two (i.e., legislative and judicial) constitutes logical ground for
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. (YES) Speficically:
concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one
1) Does the President have the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses
among which the powers of government are divided
from returning to the country? YES

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 abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements
• The Power Involved of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
o Having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has
the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the
welfare and advance the national interest. Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to deny his application
o To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the
the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court’s finding that since the filing
of the Information, “the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never
o The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to
general welfare of the people.
show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad
without the knowledge and permission of this Court”. Petitioner’s Motion for
• The Extent of Review Reconsideration was denied.
o Langsang v. Garcia
§ i“[T]he separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL MAY BE IMPAIRED BY
absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of ORDER OF THE COURT
checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the privilege [of the writ of habeas HELD: YES
corpus], but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted
to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether RATIO:
or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department,
which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.” The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to
o The question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates
factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national as a valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So
§ “... from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral it is also that “An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the
chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Court where the case is pending.
Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein
petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the
factual bases for the President's decision.” power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it
restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of
SILVERIO V. CA (CANCELLED PASSPORT FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR IN national security, public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on
COURT) freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

DOCTRINE: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been
the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid
bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing
travel. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad,
writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it
such Court or officer. Silverio has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a
failing to appear before the Court when required. Those orders and processes would warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the
be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his nd
Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2 par. ]).
pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
Securities Act in Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion
posted bail for his provisional liberty. to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security,
public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which
More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the did notappear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when

Jlyrreverre|187
there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing ISSUES:
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his 2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order without any
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing?
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any 3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that
criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue HELD:
delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes 1. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

SANTIAGO V. VASQUEZ (PRAYER FOR CANCELLATION OF BAIL BOND) It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for
the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily
DOCTRINE: The courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court has the inherent jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary appearance of the accused,
power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his
the case, with the more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring
measures where he disobeys a proper order or commits a fraud on the court or the the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering
opposing party, the result of which the jurisdiction of such court would be ineffectual. trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody
By subjecting herself under the obligations of bail bond, petitioner holds herself of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
amenable at all times to the order and processes of the court. As a necessary voluntary surrender.
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond, a condition imposed upon the
petitioner to make herself available at all times whenever the court required her Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
presence operates as a valid restriction on her right to travel. Therefore, she may legally respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash
be prohibited from leaving for abroad during the pendency of her case. Article III section Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having
6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry out their order into effect in required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she
criminal cases before them. is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she
be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Santiago
FACTS: Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
Republic ActNo. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was issued against her with jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated
bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion pleadings she filed therein.
for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing
the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of P15,000.00. Her 2. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the
arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she presiding court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness
be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order against Santiago by reason
of the announcement she made, which was widely publicized in both print and Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that
broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studiesabroad.
Harvard University. She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice
Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC. She argued that the hold departure order. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
not acquiredjurisdiction over her person as she has neither been arrested nor has she
voluntarily surrendered. The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without 3. By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders
notice and hearing. She likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right and processes of the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the
to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech. country during the pendency of the case.

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 Medicine Reports and CT Scan. Another motion was filed by said petitioner stating that
Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself she be allowed to travel to the US or Europe should it be necessary for the treatment
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be of her hypertensive heart disease. Justice Garchitorena asked Dr. Gregoria Patacsil of
prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. Parties with the Philippine Heart Center if (1) petitioner’s condition is life threatening? (2) What are
pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same the necessary (not merely desirable) tests to ascertain and remedy her condition? (3)
courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon Are the tests available here? And (4) Is the present level of expertise in the Philippines
such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are adequate to respond to her conditions? To which Dr. Patacsil answered that the
conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. treatment abroad is not necessary thus not establishing tha need for petitioner’s travel.
This caused the Sandiganbayan to deny Imelda Marcos’ motion. Imelda Marcos filed a
There was no violation on the right to travel. The courts possess certain inherent motion for reconsideration even attaching letters from Vice President Estrada and 24
powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction. members of the HOR saying that they are guarantors for her return. This was again
Furthermore, the court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary denied.
to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with the more reason may a party litigant
be subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order or ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN VIOLATED PETITIONER’S
commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of which the jurisdiction RIGHT TO TRAVEL WHEN IT DENIED HER “MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TRAVEL
of such court would be ineffectual. ABROAD” DUE TO MEDICAL CONCERNS.

In the case at bar, the petitioner does not deny her intentions to leave for abroad, when HELD NO. The Sandiganbayan did not violate petitioner’s right.
in fact such announcement were even published in papers and appeared in broadcast
media. The Supreme Court upholds the issuance of the hold departure order by the RATIO: Right to travel is not absolute and because petitioner was convicted and has a
Sandiganbayan as it is an exercise of the respondent court’s inherent power to pending case in the court for her motion for reconsideration regarding her conviction, it
preserve and maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person dictated greater caution with allowing her to travel abroad. The burden to prove that
of the accused. she needed to go abroad for her medical treatment was on her and it was not
By subjecting herself under the obligations of bail bond, petitioner holds herself established. A person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the
amenable at all times to the order and processes of the court. As a necessary necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. It is within the discretion of the court to
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond, a condition imposed upon the permit her to leave the country for humanitarian reasons.
petitioner to make herself available at all times whenever the court required her
presence operates as a valid restriction on her right to travel. Therefore, she may legally
be prohibited from leaving for abroad during the pendency of her case. Article III section YAP V. CA (NOT DISALLOWED, MERELEY REQUIRING CERTIFICATION FROM
6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent MAYOR PRIOR TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE)
power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry out their order into effect in
criminal cases before them. DOCTRINE: The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked
by the petitioner are not absolute rights. The order of the court of appeals releasing
MARCOS V. SANDIGANBAYAN (IMELDA’S MEDICAL TREATMENT ABROAD) petitioner on bail constitutes lawful order as contemplated in Section 6 Article III. The
condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and
DOCTRINE: The subject lay beyond the competence of the court, and hence, it only function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that the petitioner will make himself available
followed the prudent course available of seeking the opinion of specialists in that field. at all times whenever the court requires his presence.
Courts are allowed to invite amici curiae to shed light on recondite points of law, there
is no reason for denying them assistance on other subjects. The Sandiganbayan FACTS:
disregarded the findings and recommendations of petitioner’s own physicians because § Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for
petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. But a person's right to travel is misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5 Million.
subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the § After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed
system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the a motion to fix bail pending appeal.
jurisdiction for humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound discretion. § The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5
Milion on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Marcos was found guilty in two of the three cases against of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will
her for violating RA 3019 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. She filed a motion remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
for reconsideration for the conviction and then she filed for a “Motion for Leave to Travel residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.”
Abroad” to acquire tests and treatments of Oriental Medicine in China. She claims that § He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to
she has a serious and life threatening condition that requires her to go abroad to get the SC.
treatment which is not available in the Philippines. Dr. Roberto Anastacio of Makati Med o He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount,
ascertained such claims when he prepared her Ambulatory BP Reports, Nuclear effectively denied him his right to bail.

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 o He also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of right to move from one place to another.
abode and travel.
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access
ISSUES: to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation.
1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that
against excessive bail. YES do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right all forms of transport could use it.
to travel. NO
FACTS: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of
RATIO: Public Works and Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited
motorcycles on limited access highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended
1. Right to Bail Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the
§ The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose for bail temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of
is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon
required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.
presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably Petitioners contend that such order restricts the right to travel.
calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil
liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT DPWH ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.1, DO 74
the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended
as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily HELD: NO
await the judgment of the appellate court.
RATIO: AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars
motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode
2. Liberty of abode and right to travel of traveling along limited access highways. Several cheap, accessible and practical
§ The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in
petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of one’s scooter, bicycle, calesa, or
states: motorcycle upon using a toll way.
o The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners
the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the
be provided by law. toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can.
§ The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll
lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.
by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a
bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their
times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the complaint is that these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing claim is true, it hardly qualifies as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement
abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. and travel. The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or
to the most convenient route to his destination. The obstructions found in normal
MIRASOL V. DPWH (MOTORCYCLE REGULATION ON TOLL WAYS) streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers,
etc.), are not suffered by them alone.
DOCTRINE: AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars
motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non- motorized vehicles as the A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access
mode of traveling along limited access highways. Several cheap, accessible and to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation.
practical alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that
oppressive in being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of one’s scooter, do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not
bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a toll way. The right to travel does not mean all forms of transport could use it.

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 OAS V. MACARINE (LACK OF TRAVEL AUTHORITY OF COURT HELD: NO
ADMINISTRATOR)
RATIO:
DOCTRINE: Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s
right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public The exercise of the right to travel is not absolute. Section 6 of Article III allows
safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of
be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law.
lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by
providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent
on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing power of administrative supervision over lower courts.
something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.
The purpose of OCA Circular No. 49-2003 is to ensure management of court dockets
The Court has the inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts, which
and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice
includes regulating the movement of judges in the interest of management of court
dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice. Such regulation is not a
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
violation of the right to travel as it is not an absolute right.
guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave
to travel abroad. o To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something;
FACTS
to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed an administrative case against Judge
Ignacio B. Macarine (respondent) for violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003, which REPUBLIC V. ROQUE (HUMAN SECURITY ACT)
requires that all foreign travels of judges and court personnel, regardless of the number
of days, must be with prior permission from the Court. A travel authority must be DOCTRINE: Human Security Act is constitutional with respect to the impairment of the
secured from the OCA. right to travel of persons suspected of terrorism.

Judges must submit the following requirements: o Application or letter-request FACTS: On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition6 for declaratory relief
addressed to the Court Administrator stating the purpose of the travel abroad; o before the RTC, assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a)
Section 3, for being void for vagueness; (b) Section 7, for violating the right to privacy
Application for leave covering the period of the travel abroad, favorably recommended
of communication and due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent
by the Executive Judge; and o Certification from the Statistics Division, Court relationships; (c)Section 18, for violating due process, the prohibition against ex post
Management Office, OCA as to the condition of the docket facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article
On August 13, 2009, respondent wrote the Court Administrator requesting for authority 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (d) Section 26, for violating the right to
to travel to Hong Kong with his family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where travel; and (e) Section 27, or violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches
he would celebrate his 65th birthday. He stated that his travel abroad shall be charged and seizures.
to his annual forced leave However, he did not submit the corresponding application
for leave. With his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon, respondent ISSUE: The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC
proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. gravely abused its discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss.

On January 28, 2010, respondent was informed by the OCA that his leave of absence Asserting the affirmative, petitioners argue that private respondents failed to satisfy the
for the period of September 9-15, 2009 had been disapproved and his travel considered requirements for declaratory relief and that the Court had already sustained with finality
unauthorized by the Court. His absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits the constitutionality of RA 9372.
but from his salary.
On the contrary, private respondents maintain that the requirements for declaratory
Respondent requested that the matter be reconsidered. In an Evaluation Report, the relief have been satisfied and that the Court has yet to resolve the constitutionality of
OCA found the respondent guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. It RA 9372, negating any grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part.
recommended that the matter re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that
he be fined. HELD: Petitioner should be dismissed, as the requirements for declaratory relief have
not been met.
ISSUES: Whether or not OCA Circular No. 49-2003 infringes on the right to travel.
RATIO: Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory
relief:

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 • The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a
other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to
ordinance; the private respondents exists in the first place.
• Terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require
judicial construction ANNOTATION, SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE CASE:
• There must have been no breach of the documents in question;
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate
• There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of
on the same plane.
one between persons whose interests are adverse;
• The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
• Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
action or proceeding.34 differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first,35 fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
second,36 and third37requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
sixth requirements, however, remain wanting. muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose
to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
or the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case. Pertinently, a justiciable controversy of protected freedoms.
refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. A perusal of private A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.
respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting
demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also
far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Justice Mendoza
which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and over
would remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents’ fear breadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws.
of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal
addressed to the general public.40 They, however, failed to show how these remarks statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the
implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert
or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere: the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 937 2does not abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful,
exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to protected rights. The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable criminal statute may be challenged and underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of
and enforceable.41 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) penal statutes may not be allowed.
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
(or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents’ ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious.
petition for declaratory relief all the same. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively
the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
the above-discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain highly- controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge
speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially,
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my
challenging it.47 This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar. opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that

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can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere safeguards for the sake of national interest. Right attaches ONLY
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, upon final approval of the President.
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.
Internal Manuals- The requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is containing the details and procedure of administering lethal injection with respect to the
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial convict is unduly suppressive for the contents of the same is a matter of public concern.
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. (Echagaray v. Sec. of Justice)

ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS Once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a “definite
SECTION VII proposition” on the part of the government. From this moment, the public’s right to
information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information
SECTION 7: The right of the people on matters of public concern shall be leading to such definite proposition.
recognized. Access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions or decisions as well as to government research data used A consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information.
as basis for policy development shall be afforded to citizens subject to such Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and
limitations as may be provided by law if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. Requiring
a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract becomes a
A. Rights granted by the provision fait accompli.
The right to information and right to access of records and documents is a form of
political right The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
concern is recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a privileged information, military, and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
democracy. In the instant case, while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, national security and public order. (Chavez v. PEA)
the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would
limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligible’s. Recognized limitations on right to information: NS-TS-CD
(Legaspi v. CSC) (a) National Security matters including state secrets on military, diplomatic and
other national security and information on inter-government exchanges prior
Petitioner requested for information on the eligibility of Sanitary standard inspectors: to conclusion of executive agreements or treaties,
(Legazpi v. CSC) P-S-R (b) Trade secrets and banking transactions,
zzzz. Is such information a matter of public concern? (c) Criminal matters or classified law enforcement matters,
(Public Concern- embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the (d) other confidential matters (diplomatic affairs)
public may have a right to know, either because they directly affect their (such as inter-government exchanges prior to consultation of
lives or simply because they arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen) treaties and executive agreement, and privilege speech).
aaaaa. Does petitioner have standing?
bbbbb. If denied, what remedy does he have? Mandamus Requirements of the Presidential Communications Privilege: Q-OP-C
1. The communication must relate to a 'quintessential and non-delegable
" Right may be regulated through standards that have been developed for the regulation power of the President -- the power to enter into an executive agreement with
of speech and press and of assembly and petition and of association are applicable to other countries.
the right of access to information: 2. The communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President under
4. Substantive regulations – to know what is sought is of public concern the “operational proximity test”
5. Statutory regulations – law may exempt documents affecting public interest 3. There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
6. Procedural regulations – officers may regulate the manner by which the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere
person may look through the information by an appropriate investigating authority.
A. Government Contracts- right attaches once the committee makes
its official recommendation, which is a “definite proposition” on NOTE: The right of Congress to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be
the part of the government. equated with the people's right to public information. The former cannot claim that every
B. Treaties w/ other countries- Info on inter-government exchanges legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information.
prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements with
regard to diplomatic negotiations may be subject to reasonable Diplomatic Negotiations - The Nature of diplomacy requires the centralization of
authority and expedition of decision, which are inherent in executive action. Delegates

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from other countries tell you their concerns in confidence, and while the final text of the disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
JPEPA may not be perpetually confidential, the offers exchanged by the parties during safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to assume that the Japanese delegates expect that “historic confidentiality” The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving
would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
negotiations. jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character
of the agreement.
According to the case of Chavez vs. PCGG, the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and process of communication between the government and the people. Corollary to
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. It consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights.
follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the government may not be
disclosed if they fall under “recognized exceptions.” The privilege for diplomatic The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right
negotiations is clearly among the recognized exceptions (Akbayan v. Aquino) to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit
legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents
Presidential Communications Privilege - presidential communications are presumed effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies
privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
security and those which do not, the rationale for this being that “[a] frank exchange
of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by LEGAZPI V. COC (ELIGIBILITY OF SANITARIANS; CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of OF SANITARIANS IN HEALTH DEPT)
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. It bears
emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not DOCTRINE: This does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing
the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that
its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To safeguard
into possible criminal wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is
being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted subject to review by the courts.
in aid of legislation.
In determining whether or not particular information is of public concern there is no rigid
Deliberative Process Privilege - covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which exact definition. It is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the
governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the
“obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if The respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would
each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news,” the objective of the limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We
privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions. The diplomatic take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither
presidential communications is similar, if not identical. unusual nor unreasonable. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public
concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
(GRP) The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, position becomes imperative.
Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of RECIT-READY: Petitioner requested Civil Service Commission information on the
the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas as sanitarians in the Health
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give Department of Cebu City. The CSC denied this request which prompted petitioner to
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the file for writ of Mandamus to compel CSC to disclose requested information. The
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public Supreme Court held that Article III Sec. 7 is operative and enforceable, and petitioner

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based his case on the right to information on matters of public concern. The authority • For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a
to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and protect that
prohibit. Article IX-B Sec. 2 provides grounds for citizens to ensure that government right. Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are access to, information of public concern.
eligibles. There are no existing provisions in the Civil Service Law that would prohibit • Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
petitioner to know those who are civil service eligibles. limitations as may be provided by law"
• The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry
FACTS: with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion
§ Petitioner requested from Civil Service Commission information about
to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to particular information and the
sanitarians employed in the Health Department of Cebu City. Julian
authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded.
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas allegedly represented themselves as civil
o The first limitation upon the availability of access to the information
service eligibles, who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
sought which only the Legislature may impose.
Respondent denied request.
o The second pertains to the government agency charged with the
§ Claiming his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas,
custody of public records to protect damage or loss of public records and
petitioner files for extraordinary writ of Mandamus to compel respondent to
prevent undue interference with duties of government agencies.
disclose said information.
§ Availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the
nature of the information sought:
ISSUES:
o being of public concern or one that involves public interest
§ Solicitor General challenges the petitioner’s standing to sue based on the
o not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
ground that the latter does not have any legal right to be informed of eligibilities
of concerned employees. SolGen also notes that petitioner failed to show his guarantee
actual interest in particular information. SolGen also argues that there is no § Government has burden of showing that information requested is not of public
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the requested concern, or exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.
information. § Article IX-B Section 2 provides grounds for citizens to ensure that government
§ Whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
constitutional guarantee. eligibles.
§ Whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. § Respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would
limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
HELD: eligibles.
• Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the § The Supreme Court also notes that the names of those who pass the civil
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for
Sibonghanoy and Agas for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, various professions, are released to the public. There is nothing secret about
as requested by the petitioner. one’s civil service eligibility.
• The right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and
enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. The right may be VALMONTE V. BELMONTE JR (CLEAN LOAN LIST OF BP FROM GSIS ON
properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding such as this one. The same GUARANTY OF IMELDA)
remedy was resorted to in Tanada v. Tuvera to compel the publication of various
laws in the Official Gazette. DOCTRINE: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the
• Petitioner based his case on the right to information on matters of public
latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.
concern, which is a public right.
• As stated in Subido v. Ozaeta, “"Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with
Properly construed, it embraces every person. To say that only those who have utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It is
a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are
information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted managed properly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the
distinction.” insured government employees. A system of limited government safeguards a private
• When a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner which the state can control.
is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and the government agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be

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invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its § The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte
name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and requesting access to certain documents. Thereafter, the Deputy General
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. Neither Counsel of the GSIS replied in the negative stating that granting such request
can the GSIS through its General manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy would be a violation in the confidential nature of said documents.
of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked only § On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the
by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel,
petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to
The government, WHETHER carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service to the people. Consequently, action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in
that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising proprietary function would NOT pursuance of public interest."On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other
justify the exclusion of transactions from the coverage and scope of right to information. petitioners, filed the instant suit.
§ On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137
Right to Information: An essential element of these freedom is to keep open a former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa,
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be GSIS
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the
people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans
is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in granted by the GSIS by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto
can such bear fruit. HELD:
§ Yes. The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to
RECIT-READY: This case involves involves members of Batasang Pambansa who speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is
were able to secure a clean loan through the intercession of Mrs. Marcos from GSIS, merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of
petitioner asked the Court that GSIS be compelled to furnish petitioner with the names the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information
of the said borrowers. The issue posted is: Can the GSIS refuse access to said goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure.
documents on the ground of confidential relationship/privacy? The Court ruled that § Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not
there can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. When the absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to
information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may
potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. The right to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and conditions prescribed by law." It must be clear that the information sought is
governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical of "public interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the
entities like the GSIS. Neither can the GSIS invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. operation of the constitutional guarantee
The right is purely personal in nature and hence may be invoked only by the person § The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that
whose privacy is claimed to be violated. Even the concerned borrowers themselves certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were
may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February
offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs. Imelda
cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, Marcos. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public
public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a
a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being matter of public interest and concern.
subject to closer public scrutiny. § A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be
enforced through mandamus proceedings,viz., that the information sought
FACTS: must not be among those excluded by law.
§ In this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke the § Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
right to information and pray that respondent be directed:(a) to furnish confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note the law should be.
of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or(b) to furnish petitioners with § When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be
information resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court

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 in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private The decisions of the MTRCB and the individual voting slips accomplished by the
capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are
Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character.
held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co, a corporation
has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy FACTS:
is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would • In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and
have no such ground for relief. Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer
§ Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to
the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review
hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that
violated. films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
§ It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned • Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has
borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of
privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans MTRCB. It was denied on the ground that whenever the members of the board
were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more completely private and personal.
limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being • Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine
subject to closer public scrutiny. are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions
§ Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the
proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination
coverage and scope of the right to information. of the board's records.
§ However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by
petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE VOTING SLIPS ARE PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able IN NATURE.
to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." HELD: NO
§ Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto,
are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord RATIO:
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, • Exceptions applied in RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of Public Officials and Employees) are not applicable to this case
public concern. The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there • The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an
being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested. individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining
§ The instant petition is granted and ordered to allow petitioners access to to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large"
documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former • As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent
Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is
regulations as to the time and manner of inspection as the GSIS may deem character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the
necessary. case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy.
• There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what it sought to
AQUINO-SARMIENTO V. MORATO (MTRCB VOTING SLIPS) be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing
official function.
DOCTRINE: The decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent board supports the • Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips
position that the respondent board’s very existence is public in character. It was created accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their
to serve public interest. Therefore, the respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but
The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which
governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to
be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official OSMENA V. COMELEC (VALIDITY OF RA PROHIBITING MEDIA TO SELL OF
functions. GIVE FREELY PRINT SPACE OR AIRTIME EXCEPT TO COMELEC FOR
CAMPAIGN)

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DOCTRINE: The provision is content neutral and regulatory. The infringement of the “campaign or other political purposes,” and does not restrict news reporting or
freedom of speech is to merely incidental to further such interest, and the interest that commentaries by editors, columnists, reporters, and broadcasters. But the issue here
the state wants to protect be greater than the infringement of speech or expression. is not the freedom of media professionals. The issue is the freedom of expression of
The freedom of speech is not totally suppressed but only regulated. candidates. That the freedom of the press is respected by the law and by the Comelec
is not a reason to trample upon the candidates’ constitutional right to free speech and
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) the people’s right to information. In this light, the majority’s contention is a clear case
of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from of non sequitur. Media ads do not partake of the “real substantive evil” that the state
selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political has a right to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the people’s cardinal right to
purposes, except to the Commission on Elections. The law actually fails to provide the choose their means of expression and of access to information.
equal opportunity for every candidate. Poor candidates lost their only affordable
medium (mass media), while their richer and more affluent rivals have other means ECHEGARAY V. SOJ (NON-DISCLOSURE OF DEATH PENALTY PROCEDURE -
outside the mass media to reach out to the voters. DATE)

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11B of RA 6646 is valid? DOCTRINE: The provisions of the death penalty do not violate the constitutional
guarantee of people’s right to information of public concern. RA 8177 provides that the
HELD: YES. court that designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused. The judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days
RATIO: The Court upheld the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. The provision is content thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
neutral and regulatory. The infringement of the freedom of speech is to merely judgment for execution Regarding the date of execution, Section 15 of the
incidental to further such interest, and the interest that the state wants to protect be implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of
greater than the infringement of speech or expression. The freedom of speech is not R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out not earlier
totally suppressed but only regulated. than 1 year nor later than 18 months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President
The argument regarding the right to information is found in the dissent of Justice of his executive clemency powers at all times. The convict is thus given at least 18
Panganiban. He believes that the media is the most effective mode of the candidates months with which he can seek executive clemency or attend to his spiritual affairs.
to educate their voters. The people must be accorded every access to information
without much effort and expense on their part. The requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the Lethal Injection Manual even
with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the
Justice Panganiban Dissent: Thirty minutes of prime-time for eighty-nine days (89) is convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual
scarcely enough time to introduce candidates to the voters, much less to properly are matters of public concern "which the public may want to know, either because these
inform the electorate of the credentials and platforms of all candidates running for directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest
national office. Let us be reminded that those running for local elective positions will of an ordinary citizen."
also need to use the same space and time from March 27 to May 9, 1998, and that the
COMELEC itself is authorized to use the space and time to disseminate vital election FACTS
information.24 Clearly, "COMELEC Space" and "COMELEC Time" sacrifices the right • On June 25, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner
of the citizenry to be sufficiently informed regarding the qualifications and programs of Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
the candidates. The net effect of Section 11(b) is, thus, a violation of the people's right common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the
to be informed on matters of public concern and makes it a palpably unreasonable said crime.
restriction on the people's right to freedom of expression. Not only this, the failure of • Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues,
"Comelec Space" and "Comelec Time" to adequately inform the electorate, only and on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the
highlights the unreasonableness of the means employed to achieve the objective of first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 (death
equalizing opportunities for public service between rich and poor candidates. penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape. o
It was denied with a finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements
Given the conditions then prevailing, the Court’s ruling in NPC v. COMELEC may have for the reimposition of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law
been valid and reasonable; yet today, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the is not unconstitutional.
prohibition has become a woeful hindrance to the exercise by the candidates of their
• In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of
cherished right to free expression and concomitantly, a violation of the people’s right to
the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic
information on matters of public concern. As applied, it has given an undue advantage
to well-known popular candidates for office. Act No. 8177.
• Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated
The majority also claims that the prohibition is reasonable because it is limited in scope; the Rules and Regulations to Implement (IRR) Republic Act No. 8177 and
that is, it refers only to the purchase, sale or donation of print space and airtime for

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 directed the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in
Injection Manual democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the
• Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary vital issues confronting the nation
Restraining Order to enjoin respondents from carrying out the execution by • Section 19 of IRR deemed VOID
lethal injection under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as there are
unconstitutional and void for being, among other things, an unlawful CHAVEZ V. PCGG (NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PCGG AND MARCOS HEIRS)
delegation of powers by the Secretary of Justice to the Director of Bureau of
Corrections DOCTRINE: Public disclosure of negotiations and agreements may be demanded. “Ill-
gotten” wealth is without a doubt, a matter of public concern and in invested with public
ISSUES: Whether or not there was an undue delegation by the Secretary of Justice to interest therefore, may be demanded.
the Director of Bureau of Corrections.
Although “information” and “transactions” pertained to in the provision of the
HELD: NO Constitution had not been exactly defined and that there are no specific laws indicating
• Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a such limitations as to its scope, there are some recognized restrictions: 1) national
mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the security matters and intelligence information 2) trade secrets and banking transactions
Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the 3) criminal matters 4) other confidential information (diplomatic correspondence,
"administration of the correctional system." Hence, the import of the closed-door Cabinet meetings, executive sessions of either house of Congress, and
phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise internal deliberations of the Supreme Court).
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal
Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health However, The guarantee of access to information covers ongoing negotiations or proposals prior
the IRR suffers serious flaws. Section 19 provides: "SEC. 19. to the final agreement. However, it is limited to definite propositions of the government
EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the procedure prior to, during not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
and after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated
to be prepared by the Director. The manual shall contain details of, or are in the "exploratory" stage.
among others, the sequence of events before and after execution;
procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the FACTS
lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the removal of the • Petitioner Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official
intravenous system. who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who
• Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic
authorized prison personnel." subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to
• In the aforementioned provision, the Secretary of Justice has practically bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of
abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution broadsheets sometime in September 1997.
procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing • These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of
for a mode of review and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making share these assets.
authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental • Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the
responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid. correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
• As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public
of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to the any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
convict unduly suppressive. recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth.
• It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain • He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating
concern "which the public may want to know, either because these effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have
the interest of an ordinary citizen." a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by
• The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to the government.
information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free
flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the same way that free ISSUES: Whether or not the guarantee of access to information covers ongoing
discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement.

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 the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the
HELD: YES accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable
working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.
RATIO:
• The deliberations of the constitutional commissioners show that FACTS
“transactions” as used in the provision is generic and therefore can “cover • In this petition for prohibition and mandamus, petitioner Ramon A.
both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract” Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest (Ople). constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
• The Supreme Court declared that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose consultants, advisers and assistants. o The PCCR was created by
sufficient public President Estrada by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in
• Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise order "to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions
agreement with the to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same."
• Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, • Petitioner also prays for an order compelling respondent Executive
because there is Secretary Zamora to release the names of executive officials holding
• no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list
the Agreements. of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and
• And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any turned over to Malacanang
disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements
have not become effective and binding. ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE RECORDS REQUESTED FOR ARE COVERED
• information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with BY THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION.
the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
• Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the HELD: YES
government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common RATIO:
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the • Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, Art. III of Section 7 is a self-
"exploratory" stage. There is a need to observe the same restrictions on executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts
disclosure of information in general — such as on matters involving • Citing Legaspi vs Civil Service Commission, the Supreme Court said that it is
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other a public right and "when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the assertion of
classified information. a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general ‘public’ which
GONZALES V. NARVASA (NAMES OF EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS – WITH possesses the right."
MULTIPLE POSITIONS AND RECIPIENTS OF LUXURY CARS SEIZED BY • The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning "matters
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS) of public concern", a term which "embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
DOCTRINE: The right to information is classified as a public right and when a lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
therefore, part of the general public, which possesses the right. It is for the courts to relates to or affects the public."
determine in a case-by- case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or • However, Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access
importance, as it relates to or affects the public. to information. Such limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Thus, the Executive Secretary has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer
Officials and Employees," which took effect on March 25, 1989.
petitioner's letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that
• This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public officials
is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property. He is
obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within
limitation required for the orderly conduct of official business. fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility
of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working
hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees," provides that, in the performance of • It is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at
their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

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 • Thus, Zamora has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioner’s • There is a difference between information the law on public bidding requires
letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern – that PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information
is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property. requires PEA to release to the public.
• Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without
• With regard to petitioner’s request for copies of the appointment papers of demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition
certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and of its property. These include the size, location, technical description and
copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the
orderly conduct of official business. disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar
information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public
CHAVEZ V. PEA (SALE OF LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN, MANILA BAY at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the
RECLAMATION) contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If
PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this
DOCTRINE: The constitutional right to information includes official information on on- information at any time during the bidding process.
going negotiations before a final agreement. Requiring a consummated contract will • Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals
keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
Constitution could not have intended. The right covers three categories of information proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation,
which are “matters of public concern,” namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access
research data used in formulating policies. all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition o The
information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions,
evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to
terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to
to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The exercise the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access
of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect
records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
and how to conduct the inspection and copying. documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject
Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to
the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and
information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, how to conduct the inspection and copying
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. • The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the separation of powers. The right does not also
However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting
"definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts
information leading to such definite proposition. have long recognized as confidential. The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.
FACTS: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all • There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is
facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information
Corporation ("AMARI") to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
ISSUES: Whether or not whether the constitutional right to information includes official house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement. cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange
of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
HELD: YES pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
RATIO: Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.

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 papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and
HILADO V. REYES (RECORDS REGARDING COLLECTION OF MONEY AGAINST returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took
DECEASED) place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of
the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions.
DOCTRINE: It is for the Courts to determine on a case-to-case basis whether the • It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other
matter at issue is of interest or importance as it relates to or affect the public. Unlike document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter's
court orders and decisions, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or
need not be matters of public concern or interest. If information sought is not of public electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the
concern or interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen’s constitutional transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it
right to information. has received in a case
• Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents
Access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or interest. For
supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or they are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court
purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests. In thus
the parties. determining which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed to, the
purpose for which the parties filed them is to be considered.
FACTS
• In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the
• Julita Campos Benedicto (private respondent), the surviving spouse of the purpose of establishing their right to a share of the estate. As for the creditors,
deceased Roberto S. Benedicto, was appointed Administratrix of the latter’s their purpose is to establish their claim to the estate and be paid therefor
estate by the RTC of Manila before the disposition of the estate.
• Petitioners had, during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed before the Bacolod City • Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death
RTC two complaints for damages or collection of sums of money against him. and the manner by which his private estate may ultimately be settled is not a
matter of general, public concern or one in which a citizen or the public has
• In the initial inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted in the an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities maybe affected. Granting
case before the Manila RTC, she listed, among other liabilities of the estate, unrestricted public access and publicity to personal financial information may
the claims of petitioners which includes a claim of several sugar planters. constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an individual may have
• The Manila RTC allowed petitioners through their counsel to regularly and an interest in limiting its disclosure or dissemination
periodically examine the records of the case and to secure certified true copies • If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or interest,
thereof. denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen's constitutional right to
• However, one of the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Paredes, was denied access information.
to the last folder-record of the case which, according to the court's clerical • Once a particular information has been determined to be of public concern,
staff, could not be located and was probably inside the chambers of public the accessory right of access to official records, including judicial records,
respondent for safekeeping are open to the public. The accessory right to access public records may,
• Petitioners' counsel thus requested public respondent, by letter to allow Atty. however, be restricted on a showing of good cause.
Paredes to personally check the records of the case. • Access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the
• Acting on the letter, the Officer-In- Charge/Legal Researcher of Branch 21 supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual
advised petitioners' counsel in writing that "per instruction of the Hon. use or purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious
Presiding Judge[,] only parties or those with authority from the parties are prejudice to any of the parties.
allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case pending in this Court," and • In the exercise of such discretion, the following issues may be relevant:
that they may be "allowed to go over the records of the above-entitled case "whether parties have interest in privacy, whether information is being sought
upon presentation of written authority from the [administratrix]." for legitimate purpose or for improper purpose, whether there is threat of
particularly serious embarrassment to party, whether information is important
ISSUES: Whether or not the records of the case are public records to which the to public health and safety, whether sharing of information among litigants
public has the right to access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof would promote fairness and efficiency, whether party benefiting from
confidentiality order is public entity or official, and whether case involves
HELD: NO issues important to the public.
• The Supreme Court in this case ruled that the petitioners are “interested
RATIO: persons” who have a legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records
• The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, of the case.
judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all

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 SABIO V. GORDON (EO 1 EXEMPTING PCGG MEMBERS FROM TESTIFYING) duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”
DOCTRINE: Petitioners have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters
involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, ISSUES: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987
such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to Constitution.
information. The right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling
state interest. As public figures, the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy HELD: YES
a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions
are subject to closer scrutiny. RATIO:
• Citing Arnault v. Nazareno, the Supreme Court said that the power of
The Congress’ conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit inquiry is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
Congress but also the citizenry. The people are equally concerned with its proceedings function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
and have the right to participate therein in order to protect their interests. The right to absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not
and honesty in the public service. itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who possess it."
FACTS • The 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of
• On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is significant because
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455, "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings available to the committees
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
• Citing Senate vs Ermita, the Court added that the power of inquiry is
respective Board of Directors."
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Moreover, the
• Petitioner PCGG Chairman Sabio was invited to be one of the resource operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
persons in the public meeting to discuss the said resolution. Ho declined the proper subject for investigation.
invitation, invoking Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986,
• Considering the jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is repugnant
which provides:
with Article VI, Section 21 as it exempts the PCGG members and staff
o "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or from the Congress' power of inquiry. The Congress' power of inquiry,
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance." of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even
• In a letter to Senator Gordon, Sabio also pointed out that the anomalous extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers
transactions referred to in the P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or
cases before the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.
for which reason they may not be able to testify thereon under the principle of
• Section 4(b) also runs counter to the constitutional provisions ensuring
sub judice.
the people's access to information such as Article II, Section 28 and
• Due to petitioner’s repeated failure to appear before the Senate despite the Article III, Section 7.
issued Subpoena and notices, the Committee on Government Corporations
• These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency
and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order
in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as
directing Major General Jose Balajadia, Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place
provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the
effectively their constitutional rights
Senate.
• Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only
• Hence, Chairman Sabio filed a petition for habeas corpus against the intended to benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The people are
aforementioned Senate committees, their Chairmen, Senators Richard equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate
Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. therein in order to protect their interests.
• Respondents now assail Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 for hampering the • The extent of their participation will largely depend on the information
Senate’s power to conduct legislative inquiry and that it has been repealed by gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to
the 1987 Constitution, specifically by Article VI, Section 21 which provides: information really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full
• “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective public disclosure and honesty in the public service.
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its

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 • Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 ISSUES: Whether or not COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the
Constitution public the names of said nominees.

BANTAY V. COMELEC (RELEASE OF NOMINEES FOR PARTY-LISTS BEFORE HELD: YES

ELECTIONS)
RATIO
DOCTRINE: By refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party- list • While the COMELEC did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to
groups, COMELEC has violated the right to information and free access to documents disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on
as guaranteed by the Constitution. Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right Section 7 of R.A. 7941 (Party- List System Act). This provision, while
to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified
The peoples’ right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full COMELEC not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees
disclosure is confined to transactions involving public interest and is subject to in said certified list.
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. • Section 7 is not a justifying card for COMELEC to deny the requested
disclosure. The prohibition imposed on the COMELEC under said Section
The last sentence of Sec. 7 of R.A. 7941: [T]he names of the party- list nominees shall 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the
not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for the COMELEC to certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling
deny the requested disclosure. The prohibition imposed on the COMELEC under said places on election day.
Sec. 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list • As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits
which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. COMELEC from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other
To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. COMELEC
something that is not intended. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that obviously misread the limited non- disclosure aspect of the provision as
prohibits the COMELEC from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections.
than the Certified List of the names.
• Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is
the constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and
The people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed
judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing transparency in Government
on their choice. • It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the
right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment.
FACTS Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a
• On January 12, 2007, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind
rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the
participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list COMELEC.
system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections.
Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary BERDIN V. MASCARINAS (COPY OF THE TAX ORDINANCE)
manifestations.
• Subsequent events saw petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 BA-RA 7941 and DOCTRINE: The reason for the delay was adequately explained and was even
UP-LR filing with the COMELEC an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, attributed to petitioners failure to pay for the cost of reproduction of the ordinance. Thus,
thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list while access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.
organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the The regulation may come either from statutory law and from the inherent power of an
nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the officer to control his office and the records under his custody and to exercise some
list of nominees. discretion as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the
• Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals record may exercise their rights. The Municipal Treasurer in the case at bar exercised
this discretion by requiring petitioners to pay for the cost of reproduction of Tax
behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should,
Ordinance No. 88-11-36. Such a requirement is reasonable under the circumstances
actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales
in G.R. No. 177314 addressed a letter to Director Alioden Dalaig of the considering that the ordinance is quite voluminous consisting of more than a hundred
COMELEC’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees pages.

While access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.
• COMELEC released a resolution declaring the nominees’ names The regulation may come either from statutory law and from the inherent power of an
confidential. officer to control his office and the records under his custody and to exercise some

Jlyrreverre|204
discretion as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the considering that the ordinance is quite voluminous consisting of more
record may exercise their rights. than a hundred pages
• 2. Whether or not the ordinance was validly enacted for failure to hold
FACTS public hearings and to have the same published pursuant to Sec. 43 of
• Petitioner, as President of the Tubigon Market Vendors Association, the Local Tax Code [No]
wrote to respondent Municipal Treasurer Mascarinas requesting a copy • According to the Local Tax Code, the local board or council has the power
of Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36 which would increase the taxes and fees to impose a tax or fee (1) on a tax base or subject specifically enumerated
of the municipality beginning January 1, 1989. The Association also in the Local Tax Code, (2) on a tax base similar to those authorized in the
requested the suspension of the implementation of the ordinance pending Local Tax Code but which may not have been specifically enumerated
final determination of its legality by appropriate authorities. therein, and (3) on a tax base or tax subject which is not similar or
• Thereafter petitioners elevated their request for a review and suspension comparable to any tax base or subject specifically mentioned or otherwise
of the ordinance to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol who requested provided for in the Local Tax Code. Public hearing apparently is not
Mascarinas to forward as copy of the tax ordinance to the Department of necessary when the tax or fee is imposed on a tax base or subject
Finance for review and approval specifically enumerated in the Local Tax Code.
• On June 2, 1989, Final Demand Letters were sent to petitioners for • No public hearing is necessary as it does not impose any tax or fee. Tax
payment of outstanding rental fees and municipal business taxes due Ordinance No. 89-10-49 is actually a restatement, with illustrations, of the
under the new tax ordinance, with a warning that their provisions of the Local Tax Code on civil remedies for the collection of
stores/establishments will be closed and padlocked the local taxes and fees imposed by Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36.
• Petitioners elevated the matter to the RTC of Bohol. • However, the Code also provides that:
• Meanwhile Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36 was amended by Tax Ordinance o “...within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies
No. 89-10-49 by specifying that the civil remedies available include the of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinance levying or
"padlocking of the establishment and/or seizure of property and imposing taxes, fees or other charges shall be published for
revocation of the permit or license and/or eviction from public property three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper or publication widely
and/or by legal action. circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government, or
posted in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other
• The RTC of Bohol upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance.
conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local
Petitioners now claim that (1) the ordinance does not exist by virtue of
government. In either case, copies of all provincial, city,
respondent officials’ delay in furnishing them with a copy of the
municipal and barrio revenue ordinances shall be furnished the
questioned ordinance and (2) If Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36 did exist, it
treasurers of the respective component and mother units of a
was not validly enacted for failure to hold public hearings and to have the
local government for dissemination.”
same published pursuant to Sec. 43 of the Local Tax Code
• While non-compliance with the foregoing provision of the Code will not
render the tax or revenue ordinances null and void, still there must be
ISSUES: Whether or not the ordinance does not exist by virtue of respondent officials’
publication and dissemination as provided in the Code to obviate abuses
delay in furnishing them with a copy of the questioned ordinance.
in the exercise of the taxing powers and preclude protests from the people
adversely affected. Such publication and dissemination of tax ordinances
HELD: NO
will not only be in consonance with the objectives of the Code to secure
fair, just and uniform local impositions but will also enhance the efficient
RATIO: collection of valid taxes, fees and other charges.
• The right of the people to information on matters of public concern is • Publication is thus a condition precedent to the effectivity and
recognized under Sec. 7, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and is subject enforceability of an ordinance to inform the public of its contents before
to such limitations as may be provided by law. rights are affected by the same. PETITION PARTLY GRANTED
• Thus, while access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly
may be regulated. The regulation may come either from statutory law CHAVEZ V. NHA (SMOKY MOUNTAIN RECLAMATION PROJECT – JVA OF
and from the inherent power of an officer to control his office and the NHA)
records under his custody and to exercise some discretion as to the
manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the record DOCTRINE: The government agencies, without need of demand from anyone, must
may exercise their rights. bring into public view all the steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
• The Municipal Treasurer in the case at bar exercised this discretion by transaction and the contents of the perfected contract. Such information must pertain
requiring petitioners to pay for the cost of reproduction of Tax Ordinance to definite propositions of the government, meaning official recommendations or final
No. 88-11-36. Such a requirement is reasonable under the circumstances positions reached on the different matters subject of negotiation. The government
agency, however, need not disclose intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or

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communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of • Sec. 28, Art. II compels the State and its agencies to fully disclose "all of
being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. its transactions involving public interest." Thus, the government agencies,
without need of demand from anyone, must bring into public view all the
The duty to disclose information should be differentiated from the duty to permit steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction
access to information. The duty to disclose covers only transactions involving and the contents of the perfected contract.
public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information • Such information must pertain to "definite propositions of the
which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter government," meaning official recommendations or final positions
contained in official communications and public documents of the government reached on the different matters subject of negotiation. The government
agency. agency, however, need not disclose "intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common
FACTS assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
• In a petition for prohibition and mandamus, petitioner seeks to compel exploratory stage."
respondents to disclose all documents and information relating to the • The limitation also covers privileged communication like information on
Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the National Housing Authority military and diplomatic secrets; information affecting national security;
and R-II Builders, Inc. and the Smokey Mountain Development and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies
Reclamation Project ––including, but not limited to, any subsequent before the prosecution of the accused; information on foreign relations,
agreements with respect to the different phases of the project, the intelligence, and other classified information.
revisions over the original plan, the additional works incurred thereon, the • The Supreme Court said that in the absence of a “Freedom of Access to
current financial condition of respondent R-II Builders, Inc., and the Information Act”, it would suffice that government agencies post on their
transactions made respecting the project. bulletin boards the documents incorporating the information on the steps
• On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued and negotiations that produced the agreements and the agreements
Memorandum Order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing the themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said information on their
implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan respective websites for easy access by interested parties.
Manila Waste Management Plan. • Without any law or regulation governing the right to disclose information,
• Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to "conduct feasibility studies the NHA or any of the respondents cannot be faulted if they were not able
and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb to disclose information relative to the SMDRP to the public in general.
scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects." • The other aspect of the people’s right to know apart from the duty to
• Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies of the disclose is the duty to allow access to information on matters of public
Smokey Mountain low-cost housing project which resulted in the concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution. The gateway to
formulation of the "Smokey Mountain Development Plan and information opens to the public the following: (1) official records; (2)
Reclamation of the Area Across R-10" or the Smokey Mountain documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). decisions; and (3) government research data used as a basis for policy
• The Project aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a development.
habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across • Thus, the duty to disclose information should be differentiated from the
R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of duty to permit access to information.
the project • There is no need to demand from the government agency disclosure of
information as this is mandatory under the Constitution; failing that, legal
ISSUES: Whether or not respondents can be compelled to disclose all information remedies are available.
related to the SMDRP • On the other hand, the interested party must first request or even demand
that he be allowed access to documents and papers in the particular
HELD: YES agency. A request or demand is required; otherwise, the government
office or agency will not know of the desire of the interested party to gain
RATIO: access to such papers and what papers are needed.
• Article II Section 28 and Article III Section 7 are twin provisions that seek • The duty to disclose covers only transactions involving public interest,
to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter
exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are contained in official communications and public documents of the
essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government government agency.
does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, • Supreme Court found that although petitioner did not make any demand
whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be on the NHA to allow access to information, the petition is treated as a
speculative and amount to nothing written request or demand

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 • Petition is GRANTED. further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused
to answer, invoking "executive privilege".
NERI V. SENATE (ZTE SCANDAL – EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE) • In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
DOCTRINE: The claim of privilege was properly invoked, since it was the head of the directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
department who had control over the matter – protection of economic and diplomatic approve.
relations. • Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to
petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
Presidential communications privilege is the guarantee of the candor of advisors close • However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
to the President; only to those with operational proximity to direct presidential decision- Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with
making are covered. It is fundamental to the operation of government. The presidential petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege; that the
communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a context in which executive privilege is being invoked is “that the
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate economic relations with the People's Republic of China.”
investigating authority.
ISSUES: Whether or not the communications elicited by the three subject
The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation questions are covered by executive privilege. [Yes]
cannot be equated with the people's right to public information. The former cannot claim • Executive privilege is "the power of the Government to withhold
that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people's right to information. information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.”
• In United States v. Nixon, the U.S. Court recognized a great public
FACTS interest in preserving "the confidentiality of conversations that take place
• On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication in the President's performance of his official duties." It thus considered
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications presidential communications as "presumptively privileged." Apparently,
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the the presumption is founded on the "President's generalized interest in
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ confidentiality." The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the President and those
financed by the People's Republic of China. who assist him... with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of
• In connection with the NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would
in the Senate, initiating inquiries in aid of legislation on such project. At be unwilling to express except privately."
the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the • In In Re: Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that there are two
consideration of three pending bills in the Senate. kinds of executive privilege:the presidential communications privilege and
• Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations the deliberative process privilege.
to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. • The former pertains to "communications, documents or other materials
Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he President believes should remain confidential."
attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was "out of town" • The latter includes 'advisory opinions, recommendations and
during the other dates. deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
• In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III decisions and policies are formulated."
testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were • Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the o Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-
NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build- making of the President while, the deliberative processprivilege,
Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA to decision-making of executive officials.
acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be o The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separationof
financed through a loan from the Chinese Government. power and the President's unique constitutional role; the second
• On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process
Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to
Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further materials as well as pre-deliberative ones.
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and o As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed presidential communications privilege is always subject to
greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

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 • Such cases provide the elements of presidential communications • The demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his
privilege: right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a
§ 1) The protected communication must relate to a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to
"quintessential and non- delegable presidential power." information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government
§ 2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual
received" by a close advisor of the President or the citizen.
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must
be in "operational proximity" with the President. SUPLICO V. NEDA (COPIES OF THE NBN CONTRACT THAT WAS
§ 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a ABANDONED)
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought "likely DOCTRINE: It appears that during one of the Senate hearings on the NBN project,
contains important evidence" and by theunavailability of the copies of the supply contract were readily made available to petitioners. Evidently, the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating said prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted.
authority
• In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of The Supreme Court clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the be the basis of its decision which requires a judicial finding of facts.
three questions "fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy FACTS
decision-making process" and, that "the information sought to be • Under consideration is the Manifestation and Motion1 dated October 26, 2007
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which states:
the People's Republic of China." The bases are presidential • “The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to Indorsement dated October 24, 2007, the Legal Service of the Department of
diplomacy or foreign relations. Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has informed it of the Philippine
• Using the above elements, the Supreme Court concluded that the Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband
communications elicited by the three questions are covered by the Network Project. That said, there is no more justiciable controversy for this
presidential communications privilege. Honorable Court to resolve. WHEREFORE, public respondents respectfully
• First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable pray that the present petitions be DISMISSED.”
power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive • Petitioner Suplico filed his Consolidated Reply and Opposition, opposing the
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter aforequoted OSG Manifestation and Motion, arguing that:
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature o “66. Aside from the fact that the Notes of the Meeting Between
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo and Chinese President
• Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the Hu Jintao held 2 October 2007 were not attached to the 26
President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be October 2007 Manifestation and Motion – thus depriving
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's petitioners of the opportunity to comment thereon – a mere
cabinet. verbally requested 1st Indorsement is not sufficient basis for
• Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would the conclusion that the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal has been
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the permanently scrapped.
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. o 67. Suffice to state, said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-
serving, especially without the Notes of the Meeting Between
Whether or not the grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege violates the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of Jintao to support its allegations or other proof of the supposed
public concern. [No] decision to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal. Public
• The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation respondents can certainly do better than that.”
i.e. as may be provided by law. In addition to these laws are what the • Petitioner comes to the Supreme Court praying that it compel respondents,
body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential and what our Constitution upon Writ of Mandamus, to produce and furnish petitioner a certified true copy
considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE
• The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in Corporation
aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to public
information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner should be furnished a certified true copy of the
exercise of the people's right to information. contract or agreement covering the NBN project. [No]

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 § It appears that during one of the Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution. The
of the supply contract were readily made available to petitioners. Evidently, JPEPA was still being deliberated upon by the Senate. At the time the petition was filed,
the said prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted. up to the filing of the petitioners’ Reply, the JPEPA was still being negotiated with the
§ Except for the determination of whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of initial drafts thereof kept from public view. A petition for mandamus was filed by the
preliminary injunction which is now moot, the issues raised in this petition do petitioners. Such was anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters
not call for a clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature; petitioners need not show
any statutory provision that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that
§ Respondent ZTE correctly pointed out that since petitioner Suplico filed his they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.
petition directly with this Court, without prior factual findings made by any Respondents deny that petitioners have such standing to sue.
lower court, a determination of pertinent and relevant facts is needed
§ The Supreme Court clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUCH
cannot be the basis of its decision which requires a judicial finding of facts. INFORMATION, AS WELL AS ACCESS TO THE SAME.

AKBAYAN V. AQUINO (JPEPA NEGOTIATIONS) HELD: NO.

DOCTRINE: The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes RATIO
matters of diplomatic character and under negotiation and review. In this case, the § It is a well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor
privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been categorically invoked and the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit
clearly explained by respondents. The secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is of public concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature. The
not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of categories of information that may be considered privileged includes matters
the freedom of access to information. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese of diplomatic character and under negotiation and review. In this case, the
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been categorically
would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the invoked and clearly explained by respondents particularly respondent DTI
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future Senior Undersecretary. The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as
negotiations. the text which is subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall
under the exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage of
JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such executive privilege. In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were
privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of seeking information from the Presidents representatives on the state of the
information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court
instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it denied the petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with foreign
be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech
information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. Applying the
principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of
FACTS: Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be
taxpayers seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers
respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged
(JPEPA), including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The House Committee Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
requested herein respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino), Chairman historic confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could
of the Philippine Coordinating Committee created under Executive Order No. 213 impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other
(Creation of A Philippine Coordinating Committee to Study the Feasibility of the Japan- foreign governments in future negotiations.
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement) to study and negotiate the proposed § Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this
JPEPA, and to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec. jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears
Aquino did not heed the request. Usec. Aquino, by letter of November 2, 2005, replied emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v.
stating that the Congressmen shall be provided with a copy thereof once the Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean
negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal review of the proposed that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration
agreement has been conducted. Amid speculations that the JPEPA might be signed by of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a
the Philippine government within December 2005, the present petition was filed on public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong
December 9, 2005. The agreement was to be later signed on September 9, 2006 by enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in
Helsinki, Finland, following the President’s endorsement of the agreement to the

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 NORTH COTABATO V. GRP PANEL (MOA-AD CONSTITUTIONALITY) § July 18, 1997—GRP and MILF sign Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities, which contained their desire to pursue peace negotiations and
DOCTRINE: The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, and therefore, the people have avoid attacks while its ongoing
the right to be informed regarding the status of said agreement. § But MILF went on attacking various places in Central Mindanao anyway, so
then Pres. Estrada declared all-out war against them. When PGMA
It involves sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the assumed the presidency, she suspended the military offensive and sought
lives of the public at large. to resume peace talks.
§ March 24, 2001—GRP and MILF met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, signing an
The respondents cannot invoke the doctrine of executive privilege, since explicit agreement to formally resume peace talks and suspend all military attacks
provisions in E.O 3 provides for continuing consultation and dialogue on both national
and local levels. The E.O. even recognizes that public’s right even before the GRP § June 20-21, 2001—formal peace talks in Tripoli, Libya, out of which came
makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite the Tripoli Agreement 2001, containing agenda on such aspects of
propositions. This defense was also waived by the respondents when they showed the
negotiation: Security, Rehabilitation and Ancestral Domain
final draft of the MOA-AD in camera.
§ August 5-7, 2001—second round of peace talks, leading to a ceasefire
between the groups, but still there were many violent incidents between
Recit-ready version : The MOA-AD was a product of peace talks between the GRP
and MILF. It creates the BJE and grants it a wide range of powers. Petitioners assail 2002 and 2003
its validity. The section 7 issue here is very simple: Respondents argued that the § 2005—MOA-AD was crafted in its final form
contents of the MOA-AD are matters of executive privilege, but SC said that people § The petitioners basically pray for the declaration of the MOA-AD as
have a right to information on matters of public concern and public officials have a duty unconstitutional, to enjoin respondents from signing it, and if signed
likewise, of public disclosure. This includes the negotiations and steps leading up to the already, to enjoin them from implementing it. Respondents file motion to
final document. The peace process, as mandated by EO 3, is supposed to involve dismiss.
consultations and dialogue with affected jurisdictions; the MOA-AD was made without Important backgrounds
such. It also violates many constitutional provisions, statutory laws, and international § MILF: It’s a rebel group established in 1984 under the leadership of Salamat
laws. Hashim (now dead), which used to be part of MNLF then headed by Nur
Misuari. The former separated from the latter because MNLF started to
Petitioners: Province of North Cotabato, City Government of Zamboanga, City of become less Islamic-based and more Marxist-Maoist
Iligan, Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Norte—all represented by their § MOA-AD: It basically (1) recognizes the ‘Bangsamoro’ people, which were
elected local officals (i.e. mayor, governor, etc.) Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, the original inhabitants of Mindanao, including adjacent islands. It (2)
Aquilino Pimentel III Various interveners—cities, provinces, elected officials, established the BJE (it’s basically a mini- state), to which it gives authority
organizations over the Ancestral lands and domains of the Bangsamoro people. It discusses
the (3) territory of the BJE as well the plebiscites that need to be made. It
Respondents: Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel on also grants the BJE (4) freedom to establish trade relations with foreign
Ancestral Domain, represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH countries. It also establishes an (5) “associative” relationship with the
ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or Philippines Government.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR. (the latter being the Presidential Adviser for the
Peace process of PAPP) ISSUES:
Nature of petitions: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus Acronyms Procedural:
§ GRP—Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel 1. ripeness
§ MOA-AD—Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain 2. locus standi
§ MILF—Moro Islamic Liberation Front 3. mootness
§ MNLF—Moro National Liberation Front Substantive:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
§ BJE—Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later
§ PAPP—Presidential Adviser for the Peace Process initialed the MOA-AD?—Yes.
§ ICCPR—International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?—Yes.
§ ICESCR—International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
§ UN DRIP—United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples RATIO:
Facts Procedural:
§ It is RIPE for adjudication

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 a. The unsigned MOA-AD doesn’t make the petitions unripe. • E.O. No. 3 manifestly provides the mechanics for the
Respondents contend that the agreement has not been signed and duty to disclose information and to conduct public
so acts have not been executed, and rights have not been made consultation regarding the peace agenda and process.
demandable. However, because the petitions allege abuse of
authority by respondents by violating their duties under laws and • E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and
Constitution, they make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, responsibilities of the PAPP, which includes
and Mandamus conducting regular dialogues with the National Peace
§ Petitioners have STANDING Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek
a. LGU’s. The provinces and cities have standing because their local relevant information, comments, recommendations as
government’s would be directly affected by the territory changes well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the
b. Tax payer. Those who comes as tax payers have standing because progress of the comprehensive peace process
the agreement involves disbursing funds for what is allegedly an - PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion by not carrying
unconstitutional plebiscite out the required consultations
c. Senator Manuel Roxas. He has standing because he is seeking • Invocation of executive privilege untenable. Respondents’
compliance with the Constitutionally mandated duty to disclose invocation of the privilege will not stand against the explicit provisions
information to the public of EO No. 3 mandating consultation and dialogue on national and
d. All the rest have no standing, but because this issue is of local levels
TRANDSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE, the Court relaxes the rule • Local Government Code also requires national agencies and
on standing (So it came down to that.) offices to conduct periodic consultations with LGU’s, NGO’s and
§ Petitions NOT mooted other peoples’ organizations before any project is implemented in
a. Insofar as release of MOA-AD, YES. Petitions are mooted only their respective jurisdiction
insofar as public disclosure of the document because the § The MOA-AD is a program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
respondents eventually released the contents of the MOA-AD to the
which could drastically result to the displacement of a great
public
number of inhabitants from their total environment.
§ All other issues, NO. - IPRA does not grant any government agency authority to delineate
and reorganize ancestral domains by mere compromise or
Substantive: agreement
There was grave abuse of discretion § IPRA has a clear delineation procedure. In proceeding to make
- Art. III, Sec. 7 Right to information on matters of public concern a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying
- This has been recognized as a self-executory right. It is predicated on the with the IPRA, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries
right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern of their authority.
since the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance. The agreement violates the Constitution, statutory law and international law
§ The MOA-AD is of public concern. - Violates provisions under Art. X Local Government
§ Matters of public concern covered by the right to information • The powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to local
include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of governments and even to ARMM. The MOA-AD envisions a
the contract. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right relationship between the Philippines government and BJE as one of
if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it ASSOCIATION—Implies the recognition of the associated entity as
may be too late for the public to expose its defects. a state, given these powers:
- Art. II, sec. 28 Policy of public disclosure § The BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations
- “Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State with foreign countries
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its § the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE’s
transactions involving public interest.” participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
§ Right to information on matters of public concern and policy of specialized UN agencies
public disclosure compliment each other (right of people duty of § the BJE’s right to participate in Philippine official missions
officials) bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental
§ Immediately executory but the Congress is directed to provide protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of
“reasonable safeguards” (no implementing statute needed, but water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
Congress does need to provide safeguards) ancestral domain

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 • According to the MOA-AD, the present geographic area of the ARMM FACTS:
and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted Petitioners cite various recent media reports, among others, as follows:
for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite are
automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite. In 1. Smartmatic-Total Information Management Corporation supplied the wrong
the Constitution, the creation of any entity requires a plebiscite. ultraviolet ink used in the printing of the ballots for the May 2010 elections. The security
• It imparts treaty making power to the BJE when in the Consti, only marks were unreadable by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. This
the President is given treaty-making power prompted Comelec to disable the ultraviolet light detector in the PCOS machines, and
• Art. II, Sec. 22 promotes the rights of indigenous cultural to buy ultraviolet lamps for P30 million. Director Ferdinand Rafanan of the Comelecs
communities within the framework of national unity and legal department, who challenged Comelecs decision to buy ultraviolet lamps, was
development. The MOA-AD does not promote national unity. quoted as saying, Why is Comelec shouldering this expense when it was not its fault
- Violates statutory law, which are IPRA and the Organic Act of ARMM that this deficiency came about.
§ Organic Act
• It distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and 2. Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. then disclosed that election officials
Tribal people. Tribal people are those whose cultural bought nearly two million ballot secrecy folders for the May 2010 elections at an
and societal principles distinguish them from the overpriced rate of P380 each without any public bidding. Comelec promptly canceled
national community. Bangsamoro people are those the awarding of the P690 million contract for the supply and delivery of the ballot
who believe in Islam who have retained their own social secrecy folders, which the Bids and Awards Committee of Comelec had recommended
and political institutions. The MOA-AD lumps the two to be awarded to OTC Paper Supply for 1,815,000 ballot secrecy folders.
together.
• IPRA xxx
§ Has standards for delineation of ancestral land, such as
application to the Ancestral Domain Office, perimeter maps, 8. In an en banc resolution detailing the general instructions on the actual conduct of
consultations, etc. The MOA-AD simply “fixes” the territory of the elections, Comelec specifically instructed BEIs not to key in their digital signatures
BJE by mere compromise or agreement. before the PCOS machines transmit election results. Thus, any PCOS machine,
- Violates international law such as the ICCPR, ICESCR, and UN DRIP including the reserves totaling 10,000 machines, can transmit election results to
§ Basically, these laws allow indigenous peoples the right to Comelecs central server even without digital authentication. The results can still be
internal self-determination tallied as official results. In other words, even ballots that are not officially printed can
§ According to the UN DRIP, indigenous peoples have a right to be used in any PCOS machine. Official ballots are no longer precinct-specific. The
autonomy when it comes to internal and local affairs volume of ballots can no longer be monitored. Petitioners call this Courts attention to
§ The national government does not have a mandate to grant the fact that reserve PCOS machines can be used to transmit pre-loaded results.
them the powers they’re asking for in the MOA-AD (i.e. trade
relations with other nations, etc.) The Court further takes judicial notice of the fact, as widely reported in print and
- The MOA-AD contains the suspensive clause: that its provisions will not broadcast media, that with just six days to go before the 10 May 2010 elections,
come into force until the necessary changes to the current “legal Comelec recalled 76,000 compact flash cards following widespread failure of the PCOS
framework” are effected machines to read and tally the votes during the machine test conducted by Comelec
§ This obviously refers to the fact that the Constitution and laws and Smartmatic. Comelec spokesman James Jimenez was quoted as saying, Right
are so incompatible with the MOA-AD now we are assuming that all of the machines were affected. We have stopped the
§ What happened in effect is that the President promised to testing and are pulling out all memory cards for reconfiguration.
pursue reforms in the Constitution to be able to carry out the
provisions in the MOA-AD—she does not have this power. She’s Prior to this, Comelec unanimously discarded the proposal of information technology
vested with the power and duty to protect the Constitution, not experts for a parallel manual count to safeguard the integrity and credibility of the
to promise changes to it. election results.
§ Motion to dismiss is denied. The Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of In light of the foregoing alarming developments, petitioners pray that the Court order
2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. respondent Comelec to explain the complete details of its preparations for the
impending 10 May 2010 elections.
GUINGONA V. COMELEC (DOCUMENTS ON 2010 ELECTION PREPARATION)
In its Comment filed on 4 May 2010, respondent Comelec contends petitioners have
DOCTRINE: It is a matter of public concern in consonance with transparency. no legal standing to file the present special civil action for mandamus. Respondent
insists petitioners have no valid cause of action against it. Respondent argues there is
no proof petitioners had requested the release of the public documents mentioned in
the petition; hence, the extraordinary writ of mandamus is legally unavailing.

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Respondent Comelec maintains that the issues raised by petitioners have already been implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
decided in Roque v. Comelec, where this Court held that failure of elections consequent interest.
to voting machines failure would, in fine, be a very remote possibility and that although
the AES has its flaws, Comelec and Smartmatic have seen to it that the system is well- In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,the Court explained that the peoples right to
protected with sufficient security measures. Respondent thus prays that the petition be information is limited to matters of public concern. The Court then formulated a broad
dismissed for lack of merit. definition of what constitutes matters of public concern, to wit:

ISSUE: Whether Comelec should explain the complete details of its preparations for In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern, there is no
the impending 10 May 2010 elections. rigid test which can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes
exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
HELD: The Court, after a careful study of the case and mindful of the may want to know, either because such matters directly affect their lives, or simply
transcendental importance of the matters raised, grants the petition in part. because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at
POLITICAL LAW: peoples right to information issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

Coming now to the substantive issues, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 elections is a matter of great public
enshrines the peoples fundamental right to information, thus: concern. On election day, the countrys registered voters will come out to exercise the
sacred right of suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the preservation of our
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be democracy, the coming elections also embodies our peoples last ounce of hope for a
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to better future. It is the final opportunity, patiently awaited by our people, for the peaceful
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used transition of power to the next chosen leaders of our country. If there is anything
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations capable of directly affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so as to come within the ambit
as may be provided by law. of a public concern, it is the coming elections, more so with the alarming turn of events
that continue to unfold. The wanton wastage of public funds brought about by one
In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., the Court explained the rationale of the right to information bungled contract after another, in staggering amounts, is in itself a matter of grave
in this wise: public concern.

The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the It is not enough, however, that the information petitioners seek in a writ of mandamus
people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate is a matter of public concern. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must
within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and guarantee. In this case, respondent Comelec failed to cite any provision of law
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office exempting the information sought by petitioners from the coverage of the governments
is a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of constitutional duty to disclose fully information of public concern.
governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied. Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the
government. constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
POLITICAL LAW: governments constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
transactions involving public interest
POLITICAL LAW: applicable laws
The peoples constitutional right to information is intertwined with the governments
constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Section 52(j) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
For every right of the people, there is a corresponding duty on the part of those who Code, mandates that Comelec shall carry out a continuing and systematic campaign to
govern to protect and respect that right. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution educate the public and fully inform the electorate about election laws, procedures,
succinctly expresses this state policy: decisions, and other matters relative to the work and duties of the Comelec and the
necessity of clean, free, orderly, and honest electoral processes. It provides:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the

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powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have pursuant to the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations, and
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the that all these contracts are performed strictly according to specifications.
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and
shall: Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9369, otherwise known as An Act Amending Republic
Act No. 8436, declares as a state policy a transparent and credible election process,
(j)Carry out a continuing and systematic campaign through newspapers of general thus:
circulation, radios and other media forms to educate the public and fully inform the
electorate about election laws, procedures, decisions, and other matters relative to the SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to ensure free,orderly,
work and duties of the Commissionand the necessity of clean, free, orderly, and honest honest,peaceful, credible, and informed elections, plebiscites, referenda, recall, and
electoral processes. other similar electoral exercises by improving on the election process and adopting
systems, which shall involve the use of an automated election system that will ensure
Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and all election, consolidation, and transmission
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, requires that all public documents documentsin order that the process shall be transparent and credible and that the
must be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public within results shall be fast, accurate, and reflective of the genuine will of the people.
reasonable working hours. It states:
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9525, otherwise known as An Act Appropriating P11
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, Billion as Supplemental Appropriations for an Automated Election System, conditions
all public officials and employees are under obligation to: the disbursement of the funds on the adoption of measures that will guarantee
transparency and accuracy in the selection of the relevant technology of the machines
e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must be made to be used in the elections. It provides:
accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public within reasonable
working hours. Section 2.Use of Funds.- The amounts herein appropriated shall be used for the
purposes indicated and subject to: (i) the relevant special and general provisions of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Republic Act No. 9498, or the FY 2008 General Appropriations Act, as reenacted, and
Reform Act,lays down the following categorical and definitive principles governing subsequent General Appropriations Acts, and (ii) the applicable provisions of Republic
government procurement: Act No. 8436,entitled: An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an
Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in
Section 3.Governing Principles on Government Procurement. subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, Providing Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369:Provided,however, That
All procurement of the national government,its departments, bureaus, offices and disbursement of the amounts herein appropriated or any part thereof shall be
agencies, including state universities and colleges, government -owned and/or- authorized only in strict compliance with the Constitution, the provisions of Republic Act
controlled corporations, government financial institutions and local government No. 9369 and other election laws incorporated in said Actso as to ensure the conduct
units,shall, in all cases, be governed by these principles: of a free, orderly, clean, honest and credible election and shall adopt such measures
that will guaranteetransparency and accuracy in the selection of the relevant
(a)Transparency in the procurement process and in the implementation of procurement technology of the machinesto be used on May 10, 2010 automated national and local
contracts. election.

(b) Competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private contracting Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9369 requires a continuity plan in case of a systems
parties who are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding. breakdown resulting in delay, obstruction, or nonperformance of the automated election
system, thus
(c) Streamlined procurement process that will uniformly apply to all government
procurement. The procurement process shall be simple and made adaptable to SEC. 11. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
advances in modern technology in order to ensure an effective and efficient method.
SEC.13.Continuity Plan. -The AES shall be so designed to include a continuity plan in
(d)System of accountability where both the public officials directly or indirectly involved case of a systems breakdown or any such eventuality which shall result in the delay,
in the procurement process as well as in the implementation of procurement contracts obstruction, or nonperformance of the electoral process.Activation of such continuity
and the private parties that deal with government are, when warranted by and contingency measures shall be undertaken in the presence of representatives of
circumstances, investigated and held liable for their actions relative thereto. political parties and citizens arm of the Commission who shall be notified by the election
officer of such activation.
(e)Public monitoring of the procurement process and the implementation of awarded
contractswith the end in view of guaranteeing that these contracts are awarded All political parties and party-lists shall be furnished copies of said continuity planat their
official addresses as submitted to the Commission.The list shall be published in at least

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two newspapers of national circulation and shall be posted at the website of the chairman and the six commissioners are beholden and accountable to the people they
Commission at least fifteen (15) days prior to the electoral activity concerned. have sworn to serve. This Court, as the last bulwark of democracy in this country, will
spare nothing in its constitutionally granted powers to ensure that the fundamental right
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9369 also mandates that the equipment or device for of the people to information on matters of public concern, especially on matters that
the automated election system shall be open for examination and testing by political directly affect our democratic processes, is fully guaranteed, protected, and
parties, candidates, or their representatives. More importantly, the law provides that implemented.
once a technology is selected for implementation, the Comelec shall promptly make
the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party However, due to the proximity of the 10 May 2010 elections which is less than five days
or groups which may conduct their own review, thus: away, we shall grant only the specific reliefs prayed for by petitioners which by
necessity must be disclosed before the 10 May 2010 elections or are expressly
SEC. 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows: mandated by law to be disclosed or performedin connection with the holding of the 10
May 2010 elections. Petitioners can press Comelec for the other reliefs after the 10
SEC.14.Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of May 2010 elections, and if they still fail to secure such reliefs, they may take such
the Source Code for Review. - The Commission shall allow the political parties and actions as may be allowed under the law.
candidates or their representatives, citizens arm or their representatives to examine
and test: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. Respondent Commission on
Elections is ORDERED, within two (2) days from receipt of this Resolution, to
The equipment or device to be used in the voting and counting on the day of the disclose to petitioners and the public the following:
electoral exercise, before voting starts. Test ballots and test forms shall be provided by 1. The nature and security of all equipment and devices, including their hardware
the Commission. and software components, to be used in the 10 May 2010 automated elections,
as provided for in Section 7of Republic Act No. 9369;
Immediately after the examination and testing of the equipment or device, parties and 2. The source code for review by interested parties as mandated by Section 12of
candidates or their representatives, citizens arms or their representatives, may submit Republic Act No. 9369;
a written comment to the election officer who shall immediately transmit it to the 3.The terms and protocols of the random manual audit, as mandated by Section
Commission for appropriate action. 24of Republic Act No. 9369;
4. A certification from the Technical Evaluation Committee that the entire
The election officer shall keep minutes of the testing, a copy of which shall be submitted Automated Election System is fully functional and that a continuity plan is
to the Commission together with the minute of voting. already in place, as mandated by Sections 9 and 11of Republic Act No. 9369; and
5. The certification protocol and the actual certification issued by the Department
Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall of Science and Technology that the 240,000 Board of Election Inspectors all over
promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested the country are trained to use the Automated Election System, as required by
political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9369.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
In sum, petitioners prayer to compel Comelec to explain fully its preparations for the
coming 10 May 2010 elections finds overwhelming support in the Constitution, ANTOLIN V. DAMONDON (COPIES OF QUESTIONNAIRE TO ACCOUNTING
specifically under Section 7 of Article III and Section 28 of Article II on the peoples right BOARD EXAM)
to information and the States corresponding duty of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest; the jurisprudential doctrines laid down in DOCTRINE: It is for the court to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,andAkbayan Citizens at issue is of interest or of importance, as it relates to or affects the public. The Court
Action Party v. Aquino; as well as Section 52(j) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 otherwise defines matters of public concern as matters that “directly affects [the] lives [of
known as the Omnibus Election Code; Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise those seeking for its disclosure]” or those which “arouse [their] interests.” We
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some
Employees; Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9184 otherwise known as the Government matters. The national board examinations are matters of public concern. The populace
Procurement Reform Act; Sections 1, 11, and 12 of Republic Act No. 9369 otherwise in general would understandably be interested in fair and competent administration of
known as An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436; and Section 2 of Republic Act No. these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the
9525 otherwise known as An Act Appropriating P11 Billion as Supplemental accounting profession.
Appropriations for an Automated Election System.
FACTS: Antolin failed four out of seven of the subjects in the October 1997 CPA Board
Respondent Comelec cannot shirk its constitutional duty to disclose fully to the public Exams. She is asking Acting Commissioner Domondon for the re-correction of her
complete details of all information relating to its preparations for the 10 May 2010 examination. She was shown her Answer Sheet but it consisted merely of shaded
elections without violating the Constitution and relevant laws. No less than the marks. She requested for a.) the questionnaire, b.) her answer sheets, c.) the answer
Constitutionmandates it to enforce and administer election laws. The Comelec key, d.) an explanation of the grading system. It was denied. Domondon contends that

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the PRC Resolution only permits access to the answer sheets and the only grounds for DOCTRINE: The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that “once an
re-correction are mechanical errors and malfeasance. He also claims that he is AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make
precluded by another PRC Resolution from allowing access to such materials as he will the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party
be penalized for doing so. Also, there was no mechanical error found in the grading of or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.” The COMELEC has offered no
her test papers. Undeterred, she filed for a mandamus in the RTC, but the RTC reason not to comply with this requirement of the law.
dismissed it for being moot and academic. She already passed the May 1998 Board SUMMARY: CenPEG requested for the source code of Precinct Count Optical Scan
Exams, therefore, there was no need to grant the relief prayed for. The petitioner asked (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC
for a reconsideration saying that the petition is not yet moot as she was asking only for CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and congressional canvass, the
access to the documents requested. The RTC granted the motion and asked PRC to COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC programs
preserve and safeguard a.) the questionnaire, b.) her answer sheets, and c.) the called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities. They cited Sec. 12 of RA 9369 which
answer key. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision citing the following reasons: directs the COMELEC to “make [the source code] available for review” as the basis for
1.) the petition is moot, 2.) the PRC Resolution constitutes a valid limitation on the their request. Sec. 2 of the same Act explains that the source code reveals how the
petitioner’s right to information, 3.) the information is not of public concern since it only machines will behave and it’s analogous to the procedures provided for the election
concerns the petitioner, 4.) the Board is not under any ministerial duty to disclose such workers as to the things that they should do.
information, and 5.) the petitioner failed to exhaust all her administrative remedies.
COMELEC granted CenPEG’s request except for the source code for the DCS saying
ISSUE AND HOLDING: that it is used for processing the List of Voters which is not part of voting contemplated
by the Act. It also expressed its fears that the code might be changed to benefit
1. Is the petition for mandamus proper in this case? [No.] candidates and party lists.
The Supreme Court held that the Board cannot be compelled to re-correct the Despite the request being granted, COMELEC didn’t release the codes as they “did not
examination papers because it is part of their discretionary functions, not ministerial. exist yet” because 1.) the baseline source code from SmartMatic haven’t been given
For a prayer for mandamus to prosper, there must be a well-defined, clear, and certain because of its payment being still in litigation, 2.) the target date for the completion of
legal right by the petitioner and also a clear duty in the part of the petitioner. The proper the codes is still on Nov. 9, 3.) it still has to be reviewed by "an established international
remedy of Antolin is to appeal to the PRC. The Board’s power to “review” or “approve” certification entity," and 4.) only then would it be available.CenPEG, not being
is not limited to administrative investigations as the petitioner proposes. convinced with the reasons given, filed for mandamus. The COMELEC contends that
for a mandamus petition to prosper, there must be a well-defined, clear, and certain
2. Is the petition already moot? [No.] legal right which is not attendant in this case. They said that having such would
presuppose that they already have the code which they claim is not true. CenPEG
The Supreme Court held that just because the petitioner already passed the refutes this claim by saying that COMELEC has already awarded the international
subsequent Board Exams, her interests in her Examination Papers are only mere certification entity the review and they already started conducting field tests.
superfluities. The Court also recognizes that there is a likelihood of the issue being
repeated to the It moved to proceed with the decision. The COMELEC, afterwards, said that they have already deposited the code with the
BSP. CenPEG said that it is not satisfactory since it complies only with Sec. 11 of RA
3. Does Antolin have the constitutional right to obtain copies of her examination 9369, but not Sec. 12. COMELEC, undaunted, claims that the source codes need to
paper? [Yes.] be reviewed “under controlled circumstances” but said review is already overtaken by
the actual elections. CenPEG still insists on obtaining the source code because it is
The case of Legazpi vs. CSC provides for the Court’s understanding of what “matters said to be important because of admissions of error and fraud.
of public concern” means. It held that these are matters that “directly affects [the] lives
[of those seeking for its disclosure]” or those which “arouse [their] interests.” The Court The Supreme Court held that COMELEC had no reason to not comply with their
is to determine this on a case to case basis. statutory duty and consequently, with the request of CenPEG. Their “excuse” of “review
in a controlled environment” is already stale and therefore cannot stand. The
In this case, the Court held that it is of public concern because the people is entitled to COMELEC is therefore directed to furnish petitioners the source code.
a “fair and competitive administration of the exams” and ensuring that only those who
are qualified would practice the profession. However, the PRC was not impleaded as FACTS: This case concerns the duty of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
party in this petition and it was not given the opportunity to explain why the documents disclose the source code for the Automated Election System (AES) technologies it used
are confidential. in the 2010 national and local elections.

The Court therefore remands this case back to the lower courts. Petitioner, Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-
government organization wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the
CENTER FOR PEOPLE V. COMELEC (SOURCE CODE FOR AUTOMATED source code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of
ELECTION SYSTEM) Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the
municipal, provincial, national, and congressional canvass, the COMELEC server

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programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC programs called the Data and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security reason,
Capturing System (DCS) utilities. under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is already
stale.
CenPEG invoked the following pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.)
9369, which provides: FRANCISCO V. TRB (TOLL OPERATION AGREEMENT OF TRB AND PNCC)

Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall DOCTRINE: The Court believes that the most commercial contracts, including financial
promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any ones, carry a standard of confidentiality to protect its proprietary data and/or intellectual
interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. property rights. However, it may be waived when required by law to be received by
someone authorized by law. The court believes that, even though it is the obligation of
Section 2(12) of R.A. 9369 describes the source code as the human readable the government to make information available to the public, such access to information
instructions that define what the computer equipment will do. does not mean that the government becomes an open house to access such
information.
COMELEC granted the request for the source code of the PCOS and the CCS, but
denied that for the DCS, since the DCS was a system used in processing the Lists of Most commercial contracts, including finance-related project agreements carry
Voters which is not part of the voting, counting and canvassing systems contemplated the standard confidentiality clause to protect proprietary data and/or intellectual
by R.A. 9369. According to COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be property rights. The constitutional right to information does not mean that every
divulged, unscrupulous individuals might change the program and pass off an illicit one day and every hour is open house in government offices having custody of the
that could benefit certain candidates or parties. desired documents. Petitioners need to sufficiently show that they had been
unreasonably denied access to information.
COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of source code that it said it was
approving for release. CenPEG once more asked COMELEC for the source code of FACTS: Before us are four petitions; the first three are special civil actions under Rule
the PCOS, together with other documents, programs, and diagrams related to the AES. 65, assailing and seeking to nullify certain statutory provisions, presidential actions and
implementing orders, toll operation-related contracts and issuances on the
COMELEC claimed that CenPEG did not have a clear, certain, and well-defined right construction, maintenance and operation of the major tollway systems in Luzon. The
that was enforceable by mandamus because COMELECs duty to make the source petitions likewise seek to restrain and permanently prohibit the implementation of the
code available presupposed that it already had the same. CenPEG did not believe that allegedly illegal toll fee rate hikes for the use of the North Luzon Expressway ("NLEX"),
the source code was still unavailable considering that COMELEC had already awarded South Luzon Expressway ("SLEX") and the South Metro Manila Skyway ("SMMS").
to an international certification entity the review of the same and that COMELEC had The fourth, a petition for review under Rule 45, seeks to annul and set aside the
already been field testing its PCOS and CCS machines. decision dated June 23, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig, in SCA No.
3138- PSG, enjoining the original toll operating franchisee from collecting toll fees in
COMELEC claimed that it would make the source code available for review by the end the SLEX.
of February 2010 under a controlled environment. Apparently, this review had not taken
place and was overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections. President Marcos issued PD 1112 authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on
public improvements. It acknowledged the huge financial requirements and the need
CenPEG filed a manifestation and omnibus motion, reiterating its prayer for the to tap the resources of the private sector to implement the government’s infrastructure
issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case notwithstanding the fact that the elections programs. PD 1112 allowed the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public
for which the subject source code was to be used had already been held. It claimed improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments. The same
that the source code remained important and relevant not only for compliance with the decree created the Toll Regulatory Board, vesting it with the power to enter into
law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation of tollways, grant authority
of errors and claims of fraud. to operate a toll facility, issue the necessary Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) and fix
initial toll rates, and adjust it from time to time after due notice and hearing. PD 1113
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC could be compelled to release the source code to CenPEG was issued granting the Philippine National Construction Corporation for a period of 30
years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the North Luzon and South Luzon
HELD: YES Expressways. Subsequently, PD 1894 was issued further granting the PNCC a
franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway and the expanded delineated NLEX and
RATIO: The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES SLEX.
technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the
source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1993, the Government
groups which may conduct their own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a joint venture agreement with
reason not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not private entities without going into public bidding. On February 1994, the DPWH together
disclosing the source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it with other private entities executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private capital

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in the Subic and Clark extension projects. PNCC entered into a financial and technical broader scope of information which embraces not only transactions involving public
JVAs with entities for the toll operation of its franchised areas. Several Supplemental interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public documents of
Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the South Metro Manila Skyway, the government agency.
NLEX Expansion, and South Luzon Expressway Projects.
The duty to disclose information covers only transactions involving public
The petitioners bid to nullify the STOAs in question by foisting on the Court the interest, while the duty to allow access to information on matters of public
argument that the CITRA STOA contained restrictive confidentiality provisions barring concern has a broader scope of information which embraces not only
the public from knowing their contents and the details of the negotiations related transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official
thereto. communications and public documents of the government agency. The
constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
ISSUES AND HOLDING negotiations before a final contract.

1. Was there a grave abuse of discretion by the TRB by inserting confidentiality FACTS: Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently
provisions in its contracts? [No] enjoin the sale of the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water
Resources Corporation (K-Water) which won the public bidding conducted by the
The Supreme Court failed to see how the insertion of the alleged confidentiality clause Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM).
in the CITRA STOA translates into grave abuse of discretion or a violation of the
Constitution, particularly Article III, Section 7[142] thereof. First off, the Court can take Respondent PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by
judicial notice that most commercial contracts, including finance-related project virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry
agreements carry the standard confidentiality clause to protect proprietary data and/or Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA). The EPIRA provided a framework for the restructuring
intellectual property rights. This protection angle appears to be the intent of Clause of the electric power industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National
14.04(l)[143] of the CITRA STOA. And as may be noted, the succeeding Clause 14.04 Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to the desired competitive structure, and the
(2)[144] removes from the ambit of the confidentiality restriction the following: definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities.
disclosure of any information: (a) not otherwise done by the parties; (b) which is Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization
required by law to be disclosed to any person who is authorized by law to receive of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent
the same; (c) to a tribunal hearing pertinent proceedings relative to the contract or Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial
agreement; and (d) to confidential entities and persons relative to the disclosing party obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner, which liquidation is to be
like its banks, consultants, financiers and advisors. The second (item b) exception completed within PSALM’s 25-year term of existence.
provides a reasonable dimension to the assailed confidentiality clause.
Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt
Needless to stress, the obligation of the government to make information available (MW) AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. AHEPP’s main units built
cannot be exaggerated.[145] The constitutional right to information does not mean that in 1967 and 1968, and 5 auxiliary units, form part of the Angat Complex which includes
every day and every hour is open house in government offices having custody of the the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area. A portion of the
desired documents.[146] Petitioners have not sufficiently shown, thus cannot really be AHEPP -- the 10 MW Auxiliary Unit No. 4 completed on June 16, 1986 and the 18 MW
heard to complain, that they had been unreasonably denied access to information with Auxiliary Unit No. 5 completed on January 14, 1993 -- is owned by respondent
regard to the MNTC or SMMS STOA. Besides, the remedy for unreasonable denial of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS).[3] The main units produce
information that is a matter of public concern is by way of mandamus.[147] a total of 200 MW of power while the auxiliary units yield the remaining 46 MW of power.
The Angat Dam and AHEPP are utilized for power generation, irrigation, water supply
PETITION IS DENIED and flood control purposes. Because of its multi-functional design, the operation of the
Angat Complex involves various government agencies, namely: (1) NPC; (2) National
IDEALS V. PSALM - GOCC (PRIVATIZATION OF NPC) Water Resources Board (NWRB); (3) MWSS; (4) respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA); and (5) Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical
DOCTRINE: The court reiterated that the constitutional right to information includes Services Administration (PAG-ASA).
official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover On December 15, 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved the Bidding Procedures
recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and for the privatization of the AHEPP. An Invitation to Bid was published on January 11,
similar matters affecting national security and public order. 12 and 13, 2010 in three major national newspapers. Subject of the bid was the AHEPP
consisting of 4 main units and 3 auxiliary units with an aggregate installed capacity of
Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the Constitution, the 218 MW. The two auxiliary units owned by MWSS were excluded from the bid.
other aspect of the people’s right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain
access to documents and paper of the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose PSALM’s Board of Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award
covers only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a to the highest bidder, K-Water. the present petition with prayer for a temporary

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restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction was filed by the Initiatives NHA or any of the respondents cannot be faulted if they were not able to disclose
for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS), information relative to the SMDRP to the public in general.
Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), AKBAYAN Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN) and The Court, however, distinguished the duty to disclose information from the duty to
Alliance of Progressive Labor. permit access to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the
Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of Constitution, the other aspect of the people’s right to know requires a demand or
the bidding it disregarded and violated the people’s right to information guaranteed request for one to gain access to documents and paper of the particular agency.
under the Constitution, as follows: (1) the bidding process was commenced by PSALM Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only transactions involving public interest, while
without having previously released to the public critical information such as the terms the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not only
and conditions of the sale, the parties qualified to bid and the minimum bid price, as transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official
laid down in the case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority; (2) PSALM refused to communications and public documents of the government agency. Such relief must be
divulge significant information requested by petitioners, matters which are of public granted to the party requesting access to official records, documents and papers
concern; and (3) the bidding was not conducted in an open and transparent manner, relating to official acts, transactions, and decisions that are relevant to a government
participation was indiscriminately restricted to the private sectors in violation of the contract.
EPIRA which provides that its provisions shall be “construed in favor of the
establishment, promotion, preservation of competition and people empowerment so Here, petitioners’ second letter dated May 14, 2010 specifically requested for detailed
that the widest participation of the people, whether directly or indirectly, is ensured.” information regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person or
responsible officer, office address and Philippine registration. But before PSALM could
ISSUES AND HOLDING respond to the said letter, petitioners filed the present suit on May 19, 2010. PSALM’s
letter-reply dated May 21, 2010 advised petitioners that their letter-re quest was
1. Are the petitioners entitled to the disclosure of information regarding the referred to the counsel of K-Water. We find such action insufficient compliance with the
profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder? [Yes] constitutional requirement and inconsistent with the policy under EPIRA to implement
the privatization of NPC assets in an “open and transparent” manner. PSALM’s evasive
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority thus laid down the rule that the constitutional right response to the request for information was unjustified because all bidders were
to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final required to deliver documents such as company profile, names of authorized
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the officers/representatives, financial and technical experience.
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public Consequently, this relief must be granted to petitioners by directing PSALM to allow
order. In addition, Congress has prescribed other limitations on the right to information petitioners access to the papers and documents relating to the company profile and
in several legislations. legal capacity of the winning bidder. Based on PSALM’s own press releases, K-Water
is described as a Korean firm with extensive experience in implementing and managing
In this case, petitioners’ first letter dated April 20, 2010 requested for documents such water resources development projects in South Korea, and also contributed
as Terms of Reference and proposed bids submitted by the bidders. At that time, the significantly to the development of that country’s heavy and chemical industries and the
bids were yet to be submitted at the bidding scheduled on April 28, 2010. It is also to modernization of its national industrial structure.
be noted that PSALM’s website carried news and updates on the sale of AHEPP,
providing important information on bidding activities and clarifications regarding the PETITION IS PARTIALLY GRANTED
terms and conditions of the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) to be signed by PSALM
and the winning bidder (Buyer). PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE V. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, the Court held that pending the enactment of (PUBLIC BIDDING OF GOVERNMENT STOCKS IN PNCC)
an enabling law, the release of information through postings in public bulletin boards
and government websites satisfies the constitutional requirement, thus: DOCTRINE: The courts a quo held that because of the people’s constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern, petitioner has a duty to disclose the derivation
It is unfortunate, however, that after almost twenty (20) years from birth of the 1987 of the indicative price to respondent. It does not follow that respondent is entitled to the
Constitution, there is still no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the award.
compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on government
transactions. Hopefully, the desired enabling law will finally see the light of day if and The right of people to information guaranteed by the Constitution cannot justify
when Congress decides to approve the proposed “Freedom of Access to Information the automatic award of the bid, neither does STRADEC’s submission of the
Act.” In the meantime, it would suffice that government agencies post on their bulletin highest bid and exercise of due diligence. The right to reject any bid and choose
boards the documents incorporating the information on the steps and negotiations that the most advantageous one is reserved to the petitioner.
produced the agreements and the agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to
upload said information on their respective websites for easy access by interested FACTS: Petition for review under Rule 45 filed by PMO. Asset Privatization Trust slated
parties. Without any law or regulation governing the right to disclose information, the the privatization of PNCC in order to generate maximum cash recovery for the

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government. Thus, sometime in July of 2000, it announced the holding of a public on matters of public concern. This is one of the most important reasons as to why the
bidding on 30 October 2000 involving the “as is, where is basis” package sale of stocks, submission is mandatory. A post-election completion of the list of nominees would
receivables, and securities owned by the National Government in the PNCC. Dong-A defeat this constitutional purpose.
Consortium manifested its intention to bid and was announced as a qualified bidder.
APT announced that the indicative price was seven billion pesos. Dong-A’s bid of Php Party lists are required by law to publish their complete list of at least 5 nominees
1.2 Billion (the highest among the bidders) was rejected. on two newspapers of general circulation. This is pursuant to the right of the
public to information of public concern so that they could vote for candidates
STRADEC in behalf of Dong-A filed a complaint. They claimed that the high indicative based on an informed judgment.
price caused it to lose the bid. PMO insisted on its right to reject the bid and that
STRADEC had no legal right over the award. PMO also said that the petition was bound FACTS: Cocofed is a sectoral party that seeks to join the party-list elections. They
to fail because it did not state any cause of action. submitted to COMELEC Calderon and Espina as their only two nominees. The
RTC ruled that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of PMO in refusing to Comminssion held a summary hearing to determine whether Cocofed had continuously
explain the basis of the indicative price. Public bidding, being vested with public complied with the legal requirements. COMELEC cancelled their registration and
interest, is included in the right of the public to information. CA affirmed the decision. accreditation on several grounds and adding that it only submitted two nominees when
the law requires at least five. The party submitted two new names, Avila (as a substitute
for Espina) and Villasenor.

ISSUES AND HOLDING While the case at bar was pending, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Atong
ccccc. Can STRADEC claim the award on the ground of failure to Paglaum and remanded all petitions to COMELEC to determine compliance with the
disclose information? [No] The Supreme Court held that the right to new parameters.
information does not warrant the award of the bid and as such, cannot be used
as a ground to direct the issuance of the award. At most, the right only affords The Commission En Banc cancelled Cocofed’s registration and accreditation and did
access to information for purposes of validating the indicative price. not allow it to participate in the elections. Cocofed alleged that COMELEC gravely
ddddd. Can STRADEC claim the award on the ground of its submission abused their discretion. Their failure to comply with the requirement was in good faith
of the highest bid and/or its exercise of due diligence? [No] These for they believed that it their compliance was sufficient and could be remedied by
matters, according to the Supreme Court, are also irrelevant. During the submitting to additional names. COCOFED also submits that the requirement of
pretrial both parties agreed that a bidder wins only after satisfying and submitting the names of at least five nominees should not be strictly applied “in light of
complying with all the terms and conditions of the ASBR, including matching the nature of party-list representation” which “look[s] to the party, and not [to] the
the indicative price. Article 1326 of the Civil Code provides that nominees per se.”
advertisements for bidders are simply invitations to make proposals, and that
The respondents contend that the petition is already moot for the elections were already
an advertiser is not bound to accept the highest bidder unless the contrary
held, among other grounds.
appears. In the present case, Section 4.3 of the ASBR explicitly states that
APT reserves the right to reject any or all bids, including the highest bid.
ISSUE AND HELD:
Undoubtedly, APT has a legal right to reject the offer of Dong-A Consortium,
eeeee. Is the petition already moot and academic? [No.] The Supreme
notwithstanding that it submitted the highest bid. The RTC’s order unduly
interfered with the judgment of the government agency. PMO is entitled to Court held that though the elections are already done, the petition remains
accept the most advantageous bid which would improve the financial situation justiciable since it a favorable judgment would mean that Cocofed would not
of the government. The very essence of a public bidding is only to place need to go through the registration process again for the next elections.
bidders on equal footing. fffff. Did COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in issuing Cocofed’s
disqualification? [No.] RA 7941 expressly requires that party-lists must
PETITION IS GRANTED submit at least 5 nominees for the election. Cancellation of registration would
only happen when the violation is imputable to the party itself. Cocofed’s
COCOFED V. COMELEC (COCOFED’S ACCREDITATION CANCELLED) failure to comply despite ample opportunity is a violation imputable to the party
since registering and submission of the list is part of the party’s “continuing
DOCTRINE: Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants compliance” with the law to maintain its registration. Cocofed’s previous
cancellation of registration as expressly mentioned in Section 8 of RA No. 7941. registration vests no right that would entitle it to maintain its accreditation.
Although the party-list group is entitled to no more than three seats in Congress, the ggggg. Was there a violation of due process? [No.] Section 6 of RA No.
requirement in Section 8 of RA No. 7941 on the submission of not less than five 7941 requires the COMELEC to afford “due notice and hearing” before
nominees is still mandatory. In another COMELEC resolution, it was mentioned that refusing or cancelling the registration of a party- list group as a matter of
there must be immediate publication of the list in two national papers of general procedural due process. The Court would have demanded an exacting
circulation. The aim here was to satisfy the people’s constitutional right to information compliance with this requirement if the registration or continuing compliance

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 proceeding were strictly in the nature of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. § The petitioner sought relief from the courts to compel CTRM to provide him a
In several cases, however, the Court had already ruled that the registration of copy of the minutes of its May 23, 2005 meeting and copies of all official
party-list groups involves the exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative records, documents, papers and government research data used as basis for
power, particularly its power to enforce and administer all laws related to the issuance of Executive Order (EO) 486.
elections. While COCOFED could have complied after the elections (as it in § Signed in 2006 by then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, EO 486 lifted the
fact did), it should have, at the very least, submitted an explanation justifying suspension of the tariff reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic
its inability to comply prior to the elections. However, COCOFED simply chose products under the ASEAN Free Trade Area-Common Effective Preferential
to ignore the law; this, to us, is a plain disregard of the administrative Tariff scheme.
requirement warranting the cancellation of its registration.
hhhhh. How would you relate the case to the right to information? The ISSUE: Whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the
publication of the list of nominees does not only serve as the reckoning period petitioner with a copy of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the
of certain remedies and procedures under the resolution. Most importantly, constitutional right to information on matters of public concern and the State’s policy
the required publication satisfies the people’s constitutional right to of full public disclosure.
information on matters of public concern. The need for submission of the § The request for information was motivated by his desire to understand the
complete list required by law becomes all the more important in a party-list basis for the CTRM’s recommendation that allegedly caused tremendous
election to apprise the electorate of the individuals behind the party they are losses to the petrochemical industry through the issuance of E.O. No. 486.
voting for. If only to give meaning to the right of the people to elect their .
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment, then the party-list group RATIO:
must submit a complete list of five nominees because the identity of these five § SECTION 7: aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in
nominees carries critical bearing on the electorate’s choice. A post-election the operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the
completion of the list of nominees defeats this constitutional purpose. people of the freedom of expression.
§ LEGAZPI V CSC:
PETITION DISMISSED. o the constitutional guarantee to information “does not open every door
to any and all information.”
SERENO V COMMITTEE (MINUTES OF EO 486) o It is limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
DOCTRINE: Right to information is not absolute, does not open every door to any and o Likewise, the State’s policy of full public disclosure is restricted to
all information but is rather confined to public concern. The State’s policy of full public transactions involving public interest, and is further subject to
disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is tempered by reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
reasonable conditions prescribed by law § The SC held that court relief granting right to information and compelling an
agency to release information has two requisites.
o First, it explained that the information sought must be in relation to
Two requisites that must be complied with before right to information is granted by
matters of public concern or public interest; and
mandamus:
§ no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular
(1) the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or
information is of public concern or public interest: case to
public interest and
case basis
(2) it must be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
§ Petitioner: asserted that the recommendation, which would
be effected through E.O. No. 486, not only brought
In the second requisite, citing Chavez vs Public Estates Authority (PEA), the court said
significant losses to the petrochemical industry that
the constitutional guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover national
undermined the industry’s long-term viability and survival,
security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions
but also conflicted with official government
and criminal matters. Equally excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee
pronouncements, policy directives, and enactments
are diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive session of
designed to support and develop an integrated
either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
petrochemical industry
§ SC: petrochemical industry as an essential contributor to
In case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance between the right of the people
the overall growth of our country’s economy easily makes
and the interest of the Government to be protected. Here, the need to ensure the
the information sought a matter of public concern or interest
protection of the privilege of non-disclosure is necessary to allow the free exchange of
o second, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the
ideas among Government officials as well as to guarantee the well-considered
constitutional guarantee.
recommendation free from interference of the inquisitive public
§ SC: the constitutional guarantee of the people’s right to
information does not cover national security matters and
FACTS:

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 intelligence information, trade secrets and banking guarantee the well-considered recommendation free from interference of the
transactions and criminal matters. inquisitive public.
§ Citing its ruling on Chavez vs Public Estate Authority, the SC reiterated that
that the right to information does not extend to matters acknowledged as ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS
“privileged information under the separation of powers,” which include SECTION VIII
“Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during
closed-door Cabinet meetings.” SECTION 8: The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
o Likewise exempted from the right to information are “information on private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for the purposes not
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national contrary to law shall not be abridged.
security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused Government employees have the right to form unions but this does not include the right
§ Equally excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic to strike. Government employees are denied the same weapons/modes of petitioning
correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of and negotiation that their private sector counterparts have for the betterment of the
Congress, as well as internal deliberations of the high tribunal. terms and conditions of their employment. (SSS Employees v. CA)
§ The SC stressed that the May 23, 2005 meeting of CTRM was classified as a § “this Court had already definitively ruled that employees in the public (civil)
closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee’s composition and the service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike,
nature of its mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy- although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress for the
making. betterment of employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with
§ The SC released the ruling after incoming president Rodrigo Duterte vowed appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such working
to support the Freedom of Information bill in Congress and even implement it conditions as are not fixed by law...” (Manila Public School Teachers Assoc.
through an executive order. v. Laguio Jr.)
§ Records showed that CTRM held a meeting in May 2005 where it resolved to
recommend to then president Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff Who may Exercise the Right.
reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby § The right of association may be exercised by the employed or the unemployed
reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff rates on products covered and by those employed in the government or in the private sector.
by EO 161 from seven percent or 10 percent to five percent starting July 2005. § It likewise embraces the right to form unions both in the government and
§ In June of the same year, the APMP requested CTRM for a copy of the private sector.
minutes of the meeting, which was denied. This prompted APMP to file a § The right of civil servants to unionize is expressly provided in Section 2(5),
petition for mandamus before the Pasig court. Article IX-B: “The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
§ Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted employees.”
to the people, is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against § The right of labor in general to unionize is likewise provided in Section 3,
the claim of confidentiality. Article XIII: “[The State] shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
§ Can executive privilege be invoked over closed-door meetings of organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
CTRM whose two members are not cabinet members? activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”
o No, in the court's ruling of Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, which
states that executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to Right to Strike not Included. The right to form associations or to self-organization
specific categories of the information, not categories of persons does not include the right to strike. Thus, public school teachers do not enjoy the right
hereby means that the fact that some members of the committee to strike even if they are given the constitutional right of association. The terms and
were not part of the President's Cabinet is irrelevant in invoking conditions of employment in the Government, including in any political subdivision or
executive privilege. Closed-door meetings of the Cabinet by virtue of instrumentality thereof and government owned and controlled corporations with original
the committee's composition and nature of its mandate dealing with charters, are governed by law and the employees therein shall not strike for purposes
matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making is within the scope of securing changes
of exemption from disclosure because it is directly related to the
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the President as the Head of the TUPAS V. NHC (MEMBERSHIP IN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS OF NHC
State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as EMPLOYEES)
provided in Sec. 3 (a) of Rule 4 of the R.A. No. 6713. This concludes
that the nature of the information sought to be assessed is the DOCTRINE: The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized
determining factor for invoking executive privilege. and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The right
§ In case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance between the right of the to form unions is a fundamental right safeguarded by the Bill of the Rights under the
people and the interest of the Government to be protected. Here, the need to Constitution. Furthermore, Sec 3 Art. XIII of the Constitution protects the rights of all
ensure the protection of the privilege of non-disclosure is necessary to allow workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations. With respect to
the free exchange of ideas among Government officials as well as to government employees, Par 5, Sec 2 Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides the right to

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unionize wherein it mandates that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to Statutory implementation of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article
government employees. 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:

FACTS: ... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the government
• Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize
a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the
otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.
January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent
(100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the Anyway, whether the NHC is covered by Labor Code or the Civil Service Law is beside
former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock the point. The right to unionize orto form organizations is now explicitly recognized and
are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of
the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Rights provides that the right of the people, including those employed in the public and
Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
Corporation. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services law shall not be abridged.
(TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.
• On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on
election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the
determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized
in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC “being a government- in Paragraph (5), Section 2, ArticleIX-B
owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to
form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining which provides that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations employees. The rationale for this is that thegovernment for all its sovereign functions
Implementing the Labor Code.” also performs mundane tasks such that it is also an employer in the true sense of
• From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor theterm. In fact, it is the biggest employer in the nation.
Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal
and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however,
set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November
21, 1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.
SSS EMPLOYEES V. CA (SSS EMPLOYEES ON STRIKE)
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE EMPLOYEES OF NHA ARE NOT COVERED BY
CIVIL SERVICE LAW, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND HAVE THEREFORE THE DOCTRINE: The 1987 Constitution drafts would show that in recognizing the right of
RIGHT TO UNIONIZE government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the
formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
HELD: YES Considering that the SSS is a government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
RATIO: The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
with original or legislative charters, that is, those created by an act of Congress or by strikes. Hence, the strike was illegal. Instead of resorting to strikes, walk-outs, and other
special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. temporary work stoppages, government employees may through their unions or
The Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions
are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under of employment, which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
the general corporation law. appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those, which are not fixed by
law.
The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions
or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is FACTS: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s
now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action
and the private sectors. for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging
an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution
There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that
a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the

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jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition
involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are Congress for the betterment of employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with
covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such working conditions as
are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners are not fixed by law. Public school teachers have the right to peaceably assemble for
from striking. redress of grievances but NOT during class hours, for then this would be a strike, which
is illegal for them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike FACTS:
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter. § Together with other teachers embracing the Teachers and Employees
Consultative Council (TECC) and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, the
HELD: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice petitioners resolved to engage in mass concerted actions, after peaceful
provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful dialogues with the heads of the Department of the Budget and Management
concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides (DBM), Senate and House of Representatives in public hearings as well as
that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the after exhausting all administrative remedies, to press for, among other things,
government service shall be observed, the immediate payment of due chalk, clothing allowances, 13th month pay for
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum 1989 arising from the implementation of the Salary Standardization Law, the
Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the recall of DECS Order 39 series 1990 directing the oversizing of classes and
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees overloading of teachers pursuant to the cost-cutting measures of the
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees government, the hiring of 47,000 new teachers to ease the overload of existing
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass teachers, the return of the additional 1% real property taxes collected by local
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore government units to education purposes to be administered by the Local
in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited School Boards, and consequent recall of DBM Circulars Nos. 90-4 and 9011
from doing so. and local budget circular No. 47 consistent with RA 5447 and the new
Constitution mandating that education shall enjoy the highest budgetary
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as priority in the national budget, and other equally important demands; The
“government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled dialogues and conferences initiated by the petitioners did not result in the
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its granting of the demands of the petitioners, leaving them with no other
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service recourse but to take direct mass action.
Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. § On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers staged a protest
rally at the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it government to negotiate the granting of demands. There was no response by
is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority the respondent Secretary of Education, despite the demonstration, so the
to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS petitioners began the ongoing protest mass actions on September 17, 1990,
before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is which fell on a Monday, a regular school day. There is no question that the
appropriate. some 800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes
on that day; instead, they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS V LAGUIO (MASS ACTIONS OF PUBLIC whence they proceeded to the National Office of the DECS for a whole-day
SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES) assembly. Three representatives of the group were allowed to see the
respondent Secretary of Education who “brushed aside their grievances,”
DOCTRINE: This Court had already definitively ruled that employees in the public (civil) warned them that they would lose their jobs for going on illegal and
service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike, although unauthorized mass leave. Upon leaving said respondent’s presence, they
guaranteed the right to self- organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of were handed an order directing all participants in the mass action to return to
employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS
agencies for the improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law. officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not
comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the
RECIT READY: A "mass action" was undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days
among them members of the petitioning associations to "dramatize and highlight" the that followed.
teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon § On September 19, 1990, the petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. The petition for prohibition, declaratory relief and preliminary mandatory injunction to
alleges in great detail the character and origins of those grievances as perceived by restrain the implementation of the return-to-work order and the suspension or
the petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate their correction. The court held that dismissal of any teacher pursuant thereto and to declare said order null and
employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have

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 void. The Court rendered judgment declaring the assailed return-to- work eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees
order valid and binding, and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
§ The respondent Secretary of Education had filed motu proprio administrative • Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed.
complaints against the teachers who had taken part in the mass actions and • Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first
defied the return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave misconduct, sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial
gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, absence without employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III,
official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day preventive suspension. The §8 of the Constitution which provides:
respondents were served copies of the charge sheets and given 5 days to • The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
submit answer or explanation. He found 20 respondent teachers guilty of the sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
charges and dismissed them from office, effective immediately. As of law shall not be abridged.
December 3, 1990, 658 teachers were dismissed, 40 were suspended for 1
year, 33 for 9 months, and 122 for 6 months; 398 were exonerated. ISSUES:
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have a right to strike. employees and
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining
HELD: No. or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, §8 of the Constitution.

RATIO: HELD: YES and NO

§ The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners have a
right to strike, which it is clear they do not, however justifiable their reasons. RATIO: As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: (1) Top
§ This Court had already definitively ruled that employees in the public (civil) management; (2) Middle Management; and (3) First-line Management [also called
service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike, supervisors].
although guaranteed the right to self- organization, to petition Congress for
the betterment of employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with FIRST-LINE MANAGERS — The lowest level in an organization at which individuals
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such working are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management. First-
conditions as are not fixed by law. Also, that it was prima facie lawful and line managers direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other managers.
within his statutory authority for the respondent Secretary of Education to take Examples of first-line managers are the “foreman” or production supervisor in a
the actions complained of, to wit: issue a return-to- work order, prefer manufacturing plant, the technical supervisor in a research department, and the clerical
administrative charges against, and place under preventive suspension, those supervisor in a large office. First-level managers are often called supervisors.
who failed to comply with said order, and dismiss from the service those who
failed to answer or controvert the charges. MIDDLE MANAGERS — The term middle management can refer to more than one
level in an organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and
UPCSU V. LAGUESMA (RIGHT OF MANAGERS TO JOIN LABOR ORGS) sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle managers’ principal
responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their organizations’ policies
DOTRINE: The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their subordinates.
should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational A plant manager in an electronics firm is an example of a middle manager.
basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor
organizations. Note: only managerial not supervisory employees are prohibited. TOP MANAGERS — Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top
management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. It
FACTS: establishes operating policies and guides the organization’s interactions with its
• Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, environment. Typical titles of top managers are “chief executive officer,” “president,”
1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route and “senior vice-president.” Actual titles vary from one organization to another and are
managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was not always a reliable guide to membership in the highest management classification.
denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise, implement and
employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first control strategic and operational policies (top and middle managers) and those whose
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides: task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file
• Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes
supervisory employees. — Managerial employees are not eligible to join, them from the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the interest of the employer in
assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be supervising such rank-and-file employees.

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“Managerial employees” may therefore be said to fall into two distinct categories: the The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because
“managers” per se, who compose the former group described above, and the their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or
“supervisors” who form the latter group. supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set by those above them.

#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous determinations While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire people
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, in accordance with which this case
was decided by the med-arbiter. (the evidence shows that they only “recommended” or “endorsed” the taking of
disciplinary action against certain employees), this is because thisis a function of the
To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the exercise of Human Resources or Personnel Department of the company.
managerial attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor Code as amended.
Designations or titles of positions are not controlling. As to the route managers and # 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
accounting manager, we are convinced that they are managerial employees. Their job
descriptions clearly reveal so (Worker’s Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715,
Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991) otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the
provisions of the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re: Petition for Direct definitions of the terms “managerial” and “supervisory employees,” as follows:
Certification and/or Certification Election-Route Managers/Supervisory Employees of
Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc. Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings (m) “managerial employee” is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
Thus, we have in this case an expert’s view that the employees concerned are down and execute management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
managerial employees within the purview of Art. 212. discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in
the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the
for the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above
as defined by law in the absence of anything to show that such determination is without definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.
substantial evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of Labor is indeed The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy, and
supported by substantial evidence. The nature of the job of route managers is given in front-line supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring that such policies are
a four-page pamphlet, prepared by the company, called “Route Manager Position carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the present definition. 30 When read in
Description,” the pertinent parts of which read: relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out
the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, §8 of the fundamental
A. BASIC PURPOSE law.
A Manager achieves objectives through others. *Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you achieve this is to insert between the words “people” and “to” the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED
objective through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section will
MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE. now read as follows: “The right of the people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within these functions OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations, unions, or societies for
— managing your job and managing your people — you are accountable to your District purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.”
Manager for the execution and completion of various tasks and activities which will
make it possible for you to achieve your sales objectives. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed by a ban against
managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to
Xxxx the condition that its exercise should be for purposes “not contrary to law.” In the case
of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming
Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them apart from or joining labor organizations.
supervisors in general. Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct operating
employees in line with set tasks assigned to them, route managers are responsible for PETITION is DISMISSED.
the success of the company’s main line of business through management of their
respective sales teams. Such management necessarily involves the planning, The guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 not infringed by a ban against
direction, operation and evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the work managerial employees forming a union
of supervisors does not entail.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FACTS

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 iiiii. United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) is a union of supervisory injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court
employees (route managers). They sought a certification election but they against petitioners Sta Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA).
were denied on the basis that route managers are managerial employees and, • The complaint alleged that the private respondents purchased their lots in Sta.
therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 Clara Subdivision and at the time of the purchase, there was no mention or
of the Labor Code requirement of membership in any homeowners’ association. From that time
jjjjj. Petitioners then challenge the constitutionality of the first sentence of Art. 245 on, they have remained non-members of the SCHA. They also stated that
by being contrary to Art III Sec. 8 Rule an arrangement was made wherein homeowners who were non-members of
kkkkk. LABOR CODE ART. 245 - Ineligibility of managerial employees to the association were issued non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles
join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial for identification by the security guards manning the subdivision’s entrances
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. and exits. This arrangement remained undisturbed until sometime in the
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor middle of March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution which
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form decreed that only its members in good standing were to be issued stickers for
separate labor organizations of their own. use in their vehicles.
lllll. 1987 CONST. ART. VIII SEC. 8 - The right of the people, including those • Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court had no
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or jurisdiction over the case as it involved an intra-corporate dispute between
societies for the purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. SCHA and its members. The proper forum must be the Home Insurance and
Guarantee Corporation (HIGC). They stated that that the Articles of
ISSUES AND HOLDING: Does a ban on managerial employees in forming a union Incorporation of SCHA, which was duly approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission , provides that the association shall be a non-tock
violate Art III sec. 8 of the Constitution? No.
corporation with all the homeowners of Sta. Clara constituting its
membership. Its by-laws also contains a provision that all real estate owners
The guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 not infringed by a ban against
automatically become members of the association. Moreover, the private
managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in sec. 8 should not be
respondents allegedly enjoyed the privileges of membership and abided by
contrary to law, by express
the rules of the association, and even attended the general special meeting of
provision in the Constitution.
the association members.
• In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial
employees from forming or joining labor organizations. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE MEMBERS OF
• Philips Industrial Development v NLRC; elaborated in Bulletin Publishing Co., SCHA
Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez - “. . . The rationale for this inhibition has been
stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be HELD: NO
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the
Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become RATIO:
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union • The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom
membership.”
not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is
PETITION DISMISSED the very foundation and essence of the partnership. It should be noted that
the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It does not compel
STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS V. GASTON (PURCHASE OF LOT BEFORE others to form or join one.
CREATION OF HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION)
• Private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of SCHA by
the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-
DOCTRINE: The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the
Laws without their express or implied consent. True, it may be to the mutual
freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to band themselves together to
the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the promote their common welfare. But that is possible only if the owners
provision guarantees the right to form, an association. It does not include the right to voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the
compel others to form or join one. association. True also, membership in homeowners’ association may be
acquired in various ways – often through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or
Private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of the SCHA by the other forms of evidence of property ownership.
simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws without • However, when private respondents purchased their property and obtained
their express or implied consent. Transfer Certificates of Title, there was no annotation showing automatic
FACTS: membership in the SCHA.
• Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia Gaston, the private respondents, filed • Other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing
a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction/preliminary mandatory that private respondents have agreed tobe SCHA members.

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 • Thus, no privity of contract arising from the title certificate exists between • PADCOM failed to pay and the corporate books of respondent
petitioners and private respondents. showed a total of 639,961.47 pesos of unpaid dues, interests, and
penalties from April 1983 to June 1993
PADCOM V ORTIGAS CENTER (AUTOMATIC MEMBERSHIP OF BUYER) • Letters exchanged between the parties through the years showed
repeated demands by respondent; request for extensions and even
DOCTRINE: The provision on automatic membership was annotated in the Certificate a settlement scheme proposed by PADCOM in 1990
of Title and made a condition in the Deed of Transfer in favor of PADCOM. § In view of PADCOM’s failure and refusal to pay, respondent filed a case in the
Consequently, it is bound by and must comply with the covenant. PADCOM’s RTC of Pasig
contention that the automatic membership clause is a violation of its freedom of • Ortigas Center Assoc averred that purchasers of lands within
association is misplaced. PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It could Ortigas Center from OCLP are (1) obligated under their contract of
have avoided such membership by not buying the land from TDC. Nobody forced it to sale to become member of the Association and (2) this obligation
buy the land when it bought the building with the annotation of the condition or lien on was passed on to PADCOM when it bought the lot from TDC, its
the Certificate of Title thereof and accepted the Deed. PADCOM voluntarily agreed to predecessor-in-interest.
be bound by and respect the condition, and thus to join the Association. • PADCOM contends that (1) it is a nonstock/profit association, and
for it to become a special member of the Association, it should first
RECIT-READY: Tierra Devl’t Corp (TDC) bought a parcel of land from Ortigas & apply for and be accepted for membership by the latter’s BOD; (2)
Comp., Ltd Partnership (OCLP). Included in the conditions of sale is a provision on no automatic membership was apparently contemplated in the
automatic membership to the association (Ortigas Center Association, Inc) and Association’s By-Laws. (3) It could not be a member without violating
collection of fees. Said condition was annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate its right to freedom of association and that since it was not a member
of Title (TCT). TDC later sold the lot to PADCOM. The association tried to collect fees it was not liable for membership dues, interests and penalties.
from PADCOM but it failed. The latter asked for extensions and even negotiated means § 1 Sept 1997: RTC dismissed complaint by Association. Case was appealed
through which it may settle the fees. Later, Association filed a case in RTC. PADCOM in the CA.
contends that it is not a member of the association thus not bound to pay. RTC § 30 June 2000: CA reversed and set aside RTC decision.
dismissed case. They appealed to the CA and won. CA held that PADCOM is a member • PADCOM became an automatic member of the Association and the
of the Association and was made to pay the fees. PADCOM filed petition for review in intent to pass the obligation to prospective transferees was evident
the SC. The issue was whether PADCOM can be compelled to join the association from the annotation of the same clause at the back of the Transfer
pursuant to the condition of automatic membership as stated in the annotated TCT. SC Certificate of Title (TCT) covering the lot when PADCOM purchased
said YES. PADCOM must comply with the provision on automatic membership as it it from TDC.
was annotated in the TCT. Also Civil code provides that parties to a contract include • Ordered to pay 639, 961. 47 and 25,000 in attorney’s fees
assigns and heirs. As successor-in- interest of TDC, PADCOM is obliged to obey the
• PADCOM’s membership in the Association was evident from these
conditions of the contract. ALSO, it is not violative of the freedom of association
facts:
because PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It signed the contract with
§ PADCOM was included in the list of bona fide members as
said condition voluntarily.
of 30 March 1995
FACTS: § Narciso Padilla, PADCOM’s President, was one of the
Association’s Incorporators
§ 4 Sept 1974: Tierra Development Corporation (TDC) acquired a piece of land
§ Having received demands for payment, PADCOM not only
from
acknowledged them, but asked for and was granted
§ Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (OCLP) o Among the conditions of
repeated extensions, and even proposed a scheme for the
the Deed of Sale was the requirement that the settlement of payment.
§ transferee and its successor-in-interest must become members of an § PADCOM filed this petition for review
association for reality owners and long-term lessee in the area later known as
ISSUE: Whether PADCOM can be compelled to join the association
the Ortigas Center. § pursuant to the provision on automatic membership appearing as a
• The above stipulation was likewise annotated at the back of the condition in the DEED of Sale of 4 Sept. 1974 and the annotation
Transfer Certificate of Title (457308) issues to TDC. thereof on TCT 457308.
§ 25 Feb 1975: Said lot purchased by TDC was conveyed to PADCOM (herein
petitioner) . HELD: YES, Petition Denied.
§ 1982: Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (herein respondent) was organized.
• It sought the collection of membership dues in the amount of RATIO:
2,724.20/month from PADCOM. § AUTOMATIC MEMBERSHIP IN ASSOCIATION

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 • When the land was bought by PADCOM’s predecessor-in-interest Expropriation in General; Reversion
(TDC) from OCLP, the sale bound TDC to comply with the conditions
of the Deed of Sale. Eminent Domain
§ It was agreed that dues shall be collected from an automatic • Ultimate right of sovereign power to appropriate, not only public, but also
member private property within the territorial sovereignty, for public purposes.
§ The stipulation was annotated in at the back to the TCT • Inherently possessed by the State through the National government
issued to TDC (legislature) and may be delegated to:
• When TDC sold the land to PADCOM, the Deed of Transfer o local government units, pursuant to an ordinance enacted by
expressly stated that “...for and in consideration of the foregoing respective legislative bodies.
premises, the DEVELOPER, by these presents, cede, transfers and o Public utilities, as may be delegated by law.
conveys unto the COPORATION the above mentioned parcel of land
evidenced by TCT 457308, as well as the Common and Limited Requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain:
Common Areas of the Condominium project mentioned and mmmmm. The property taken must be private property;
described in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions, free nnnnn. There must be genuine necessity to take the private property;
from all liens and encumbrances, EXCEPT those already annotated
ooooo. The taking must be for public use;
at the back of the said TCT 457308.
§ As the provision on automatic membership was ppppp. There must be payment of just compensation; and
annotated in the TCT and made a condition of the Deed qqqqq. The taking must comply with due process of law.
of Transfer in favour of PADCOM; consequently, Requisites for the LGU to exercise eminent domain
PADCOM is bound by and must comply with the • Valid and definite offer previously made to the owner but was not accepted
covenant. • Ordinance enacted authorizing such exercise
§ The reason for this is that when a lien is annotated in the • Power enacted for public use, welfare, purpose or for the benefit of the poor
TCT it is carried over to the new TCT. It disregards change and landless
in personality of owner because it is a right in rem, thus • Payment of just compensation
inseparable.
§ PARTIES TO A CONTRACT VDA. DE OUNA V. REPUBLIC (REVERSION; EXPANSION OF LAHUG AIRPORT)
• Also, ART 1311 of Civil Code provides that contracts take effect
between parties, their assigns, and heirs. Since PADCOM is the The abandonment of the public use for which the subject properties were expropriated
successor-in-interest of TDC, the stipulation on automatic entitled the petitioners Ouanos, et al. and respondents Inocian, et al. to reacquire them.
membership with the Association is also binding on the former. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent
§ LOT OWNERS ARE REGULAR MEMBERS OF ASSOCIATION domain is subject to two mandatory requirements:
PURSUANT TO AUTOMATIC MEMBERSHIP CLAUSE 1. That it is for a particular public purpose; and
• As lot owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the Association and 2. That just compensation be paid to the property owner.
no application is necessary.
§ AUTOMATIC MEMBERSHIP CLAUSE IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied
OF ASSOCIATION with to enable the condemn or to keep the property expropriated. The taking of private
• PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It could have property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is
avoided such membership by not buying the land from TDC. always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public
• PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not
condition, and thus to join the Association. initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners,
• By signing the contract, PADCOM in effect has agreed to all its terms if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the
and conditions. amount of just compensation received.
§ From the facts enumerated by the CA, PADCOM is barred from disclaiming
membership in the Association Power to Undertake Expropriation Case

ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY V. CA (SUBSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC)
SECTION IX
Iron and Steel Authority, created through PD 272, was vested with some of the powers
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just or attributes normally associated with juridical personality but did not possess general
compensation. or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the
Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or

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instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ISA may thus be taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. When the the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
statutory term of a non- incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed filing of the complaint.
by, the Republic of the Philippines. The Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party- plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA SUMMARY: Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) leased property of
having expired. respondent Castellvi near Basa airbase on a yearly basis. On 1956 respondent decided
to terminate the lease contract and asked the petitioner to vacate the place. Petitioner
Right of Owner Before Expropriation did not as such respondent filed an ejectment suit against petitioner. Respondent
however filed expropriation proceedings warranting the dismissal of the ejectment suit.
GREATER BALANGA V. MUN. OF BALANGA (RIGHTS PRIOR TO For the other respondent Gozun, her land was also being expropriated but there was
EXPROPRIATION) no prior lease agreement with petitioner unlike the case of Castellvi.

Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12, s-88 annulling the Mayor's With regard to the expropriation proceedings, Petitioner claims that the lands to be
permit issued to petitioner and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit "to operate a expropriated should be compensated at Php 0.20 per square meters since the fair
public market."The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for market value should be based on the time they first took possession of the land which
expansion of the Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't actually was in 1947. Respondents however claim that it should be Php 15.00 based on current
maintain a public market on the area. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in prices. Court gave a provisional order granting the Php 0.20 per square meters price
court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land. and ordered that petitioner deposit the price. Petitioner deposited the total price of
P259,669.10 on July 1959 and on August 10, 1959 and the land was placed on the
REPUBLIC V. SALEM (TITLE NOT CANCELLED UNTIL PAID) latter’s possession. Court created a commission which fixed the fair market value of the
property at Php 10.00 per sq m. Republic filed for retrial citing that there was new
The expropriation consists in 2 stages: evidence discovered. This was denied. Thus they appealed SC.

1) determination of the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and propriety SC said that prices of 1959 will apply since in 1947, they did not possess the property
of its exercise in the context of the facts involved. It ends with an order, if not a with a permanent characteristic seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly basis.
dismissal, declaring that the government has a lawful right to take the property sought, Their possession did not also deprived the owner of the benefits of the land since they
upon payment of just compensation. were paying rent. It was only in 1959 when they filed the expropriation proceedings that
they gained possession of a permanent characteristic when the lower court granted
2) The determination by the court of the just compensation. It is only upon the them such possession. The price of Php 10.00 however was quite high taking in
completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Until consideration that the said properties could be sold on a range of Php 2.50 – 4.00 per
the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over he sq meters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. The proper price is now
property remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all at Php5.00 per square meters.
rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to
the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation. FACTS: This case involves the expropriation of two properties one owned by
Respondent Castellvi and the other by Respondent Toledo-Gozun. (Both of the
Elements of "Taking" properties are located near Basa Air Base in Pampanga Castellvi Property

REPUBLIC OF VDA. DE CASTELVI (RENT BY MILITARY) Antecedent Facts

• the Republic of the Philippines through the Philippine Air Force entered into a
The requisites for taking are: one year lease contract (see full text for the contents of the contract) with
1. The expropriator must enter a private property; respondent for the use of their land.
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period; • The lease started on July 1, 1947 (renewable on a yearly basis)
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities; • After the perfection of the lease contract, the republic constructed
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or improvements on said lots amounting to approximately Php 500, 000.
injuriously affected; and • June 30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner stating that they will be selling their property already.
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. • After the expiration of the contract republic did not vacate the property despite
repeated demand by the respondent prompting the latter to file a case for
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined ejectment.
as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the

Jlyrreverre|230
 • While the ejectment case was on-going, the republic started expropriation commission’s decision of Php10.00 per square meters (see full text for trial
proceeding on the respondent’s property. court decision) and granted interest rate of 6% per annum for the unpaid
• The ejectment case was later withdrawn after a compromise agreement (see balance until full payment
full text) was entered into by both party stating that the republic will pay rent • Republic filed for a new trial citing that there are new evidences that was
from June 30 1956 to 1959 when the lower court granted possession of the discovered. Lower Court denied citing that it was irrelevant facts.
land to petitioner.
ISSUES: Republic contend lower court erred:
Expropriation rrrrr. In holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced
• Petitioner claims that according to the committee on Appraisal for the Province with the filing of this action
of Pampanga the price that they should pay should be Php 0.20 per square sssss. HELD: SC affirmed Trial court’s ruling
meters. ttttt. In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of the instant
• According to the petitioner, the prices of 1947 should be the basis since it is proceedings as just compensation
the time when they entered and took possession of the property. uuuuu. HELD: Too high, changed to P 5.00 per square meters
• They contend that it was their intention to enter the property with permanency vvvvv. In ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay 6% interest on the adjudged
(see requisites discussed below) which is supported by their subsequent act value of the Castellvi property to start from July of 1956
of placing improvements worth half a million pesos. wwwww. HELD: Changed to July of 1959 because respondent agreed to
• Respondent claims otherwise citing that their contract was on year to year allow republic to lease the land while expropriation proceeding was
basis which is a characteristic of non-permanency. Being so, she claims that being held
the fair market value should be Php 15.00 per square meters.
xxxxx. In denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for new trial based on newly
• On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of
discovered evidence.
the lands at P259,669.10.
yyyyy. HELED: SC affirmed Trial Court’s ruling saying that petitioner
• The Republic was actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10,
did not exercise due diligence in looking for those “new” evidence
1959 after the latter had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga
RATIO:
the amount of P259,669.10
TAKING on expropriation proceeding (when? – for determination of price)
Toledo-Gozun Property
• Petitioner contends that they took permanent possession in 1947 which
• Petitioner claims that the land should be priced at Php 0.20 (probably market
should be the basis
value of agricultural land) according to the committee on Appraisal for the
Province of Pampanga.
ELEMENTS OF TAKING:
• Respondent Toledo-Gozun claim that their lots are residential already thus the
• EXPROPRIATOR MUST ENTER A PRIVATE PROPERTY.
market price of Php 15.00 per square meters should be paid as compensation.
o This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of
the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took
Trial Court:
possession of the property of Castellvi.
• November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as
• THE ENTRANCE INTO PRIVATE PROPERTY MUST BE FOR MORE THAN
provisional value of her lands.
A MOMENTARY PERIOD
• May 16, 960 the trial Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga o The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year,
to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the
the land under her administration, and ordered said defendant to deposit the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The word
amount with the Philippine National Bank under the supervision of the Deputy "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real)
Clerk of Court. property should be construed to mean "a limited period" — not
• The trial Court appointed three commissioners to determine the property indefinite or permanent.
value: o If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy
o Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of Court, as commissioner for the permanently Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease
court; entered into on year to year basis? Why was the lease agreement
o Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, counsel of the Philippine renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic expropriate
National Bank Branch at Floridablanca, for the plaintiff; and this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself,
o Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same
Base, for the defendants. time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a
• The commissioners recommended that the price of the lands in issue should jet air base?
be no less than Php 10.00 per sq meters the lower court adopted the

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 o Intention cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the • Commissioner’s report:
lease contract. o The commissioners, appointed by the court to appraise the lands that
§ Intent is to be deduced from the language employed by the were being expropriated, recommended to the court that the prices
parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous, of P10.00 per sqm would be the fair market value of the lands.
as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of o The commissioners made their recommendation on the basis of their
averment and proof of mistake or fraud observation:
§ they said that they intended to occupy the land permanently § After several ocular inspections of the lands
because they placed permanent improvements on the land § Of their own personal knowledge of the land values in the
worth half a million province of Pampanga
§ Of the testimonies of the owner’s of the lands
• THE ENTRY INTO THE PROPERTY SHOULD BE UNDER WARRANT OR § And other witnesses
COLOR OF LEGAL AUTHORITY. § And of documentary
o Yes, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as o finding of the lower court ( that the price should be Php 10 per square
lessee. meters) is supported not only by the unanimous opinion of the
commissioners, as embodied in their report, but also by the
• THE PROPERTY MUST BE DEVOTED TO A PUBLIC USE OR Provincial Appraisal Committee of the province of Pampanga
OTHERWISE INFORMALLY APPROPRIATED OR INJURIOUSLY • Commissioner’s report not binding:
AFFECTED. o The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation
o devoted to public use is present because the property was used by proceedings are not binding, but merely advisory in character
the air force of the AFP. o Supreme Court, may change or modify the report of the
commissioners by increasing or reducing the amount of the award if
• FIFTH, THE UTILIZATION OF THE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE MUST the facts of the case so justify.
BE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO OUST THE OWNER AND DEPRIVE HIM OF o Grounds for modifying report of commissioner (Manila Railroad Co.
ALL BENEFICIAL ENJOYMENT OF THE PROPERTY. vs. Caligsihan)
o No, Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously § where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the evidence submitted to them, or
the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the § where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of
lease contract whereby the evidence, or where the amount allowed is either palpably
o Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease inadequate or excessive.
was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial o price of P10.00 per square meter, as recommended by the
enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to commissioners and adopted by the lower court, is quite high. It is Our
pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals considered view that the price of P5.00 per square meter would be a
until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June fair valuation of the lands in question and would constitute a just
26, 1959 compensation to the owners thereof
§ Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of
COMPENSATION: Pampanga informing, among others, that in the year 1959
• just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the the land of Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00
complaint per square meter, while the land of Toledo-Gozun could be
• compensation of the owner is to be estimated by reference to the use for sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square meter
which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or § the value of the Philippine peso has considerably gone
wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the down since the year 1959
immediate future
• the owners of these lands have the right to their value for the use for which Payment of Interest
they would bring the most in the market at the time the same were taken • Castellvi had agreed to receive the rentals from June 30, 1956 to August 10,
from them 1959, she should be considered as having allowed her land to be leased to
• lands involved in the present case, might have a fair market value of P.20 per the Republic until August 10, 1959, and she could not at the same time be
square meter in 1949, it cannot be denied that ten years later, in 1959, when entitled to the payment of interest during the same period on the amount
the present proceedings were instituted, the value of those lands had awarded her as the just compensation of her land.
increased considerably. The evidence shows that since 1949 those lands • The Republic, therefore, should pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per
were no longer cultivated as sugar lands (confirming Toledo-Gozun claims) – annum on the value of her land, minus the provisional value that was
it became residential

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 deposited, only from July 10, 1959 when it deposited in court the provisional feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest
value of the land. tree.
• The use by the US of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1,
Retrial: 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30,
• To warrant the granting of a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is
evidence, it must appear that the evidence was discovered after the trial; that
earlier.
even with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence could not have been
• The US’s four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the
discovered and produced at the trial; and that the evidence is of such a nature
as to alter the result of the case if admitted. property, and have very bright lights.
• SC said that the republic, despite it having plenty of lawyers, did not exercise • Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop, because 150 chickens
due diligence in looking for those “new –evidence” before the trial. Thus no were killed by flying into walls from fright. Production also fell off.
retrial can be granted on such Ground o The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a
commercial chicken farm.
US V. CAUSBY (NAVIGABLE AIRSPACE) o Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep, and the family
has become nervous and frightened.
The United States had conceded in oral argument that if flights over the Respondents’ o No airplane accidents on respondents' property, there have been
property rendered it uninhabitable then there would be a taking compensable under the several accidents near the airport and close to respondents' place.
Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property taken is the owner’s loss, • On the basis of these facts, Court of Claims found that respondents' property
not the taker’s gain. The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the had depreciated in value. o US had taken an easement over the property on
landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement
the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then taken was $2,000. o It made no finding as to the precise nature or duration of
landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences. Flights over private land the easement.
are not a taking, unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and • The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted.
immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land.
ISSUE: WON respondents' property was taken within the meaning of the Fifth
SUMMARY: Respondents owned a dwelling and a chicken farm near a municipal Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over
airport. The safe path of glide to one of the runways of the airport passed directly over respondents' land at low altitudes.
respondents' property. The Government leased the use of the airport for a term of one
month from June 1, 1942, with a provision for renewals until six months after the end HELD: Yes. Case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement
of the national emergency. Various military aircraft used the airport and these frequently and whether the easement was permanent or temporary.
came so close to respondents' property that they barely missed the tops of trees. This
destroyed the use of the property as a chicken farm and caused loss of sleep, RATIO:
nervousness, and fright on the part of respondents. They sued in the Court of Claims • The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending
to recover for an alleged taking of their property and for damages to their poultry to the sky above the land. (AD COELUM)
business. The Court of Claims found that the Government had taken an easement over • However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given the United
respondents' property, and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement States exclusive national sovereignty over the air space. (Air Commerce
taken was $2,000. The SC reversed the decision stating that the US had taken the Act of 1926 as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938)
properties of Respondents within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment because the flights • US has "complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space"
in question are not within the navigable airspace, as provided by the Civil Aeronautics over this country.
Act. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they are so low and o Grants to any citizen of the United States "a public right of
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air
Hence, the case is remanded back to the COC for determination of the value and space of the United States."
duration of the easement—whether it’s temporary or permanent. o Navigable air space - airspace above the minimum safe
altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
FACTS:
• The court noted that common sense made the common law doctrine
• Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North
inapplicable. The court found that the common law doctrine did not control
Carolina.
the present case.
• Respondents’ property contained a house and a chicken farm. o To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog the
• The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents’ highways, seriously interfere with their control and development
property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to
which only the public has a just claim.

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 • The United States had ceded in oral argument that it fights over the PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION V. NY CITY (NOT TAKING, THERE IS STILL
Respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable then there would be a CONTROL OF OWNER)
taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
o If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, There restriction of the Landmark Preservation Commission on Penn Central’s request
respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss to construct a building on top of the terminal does not constitute a taking of property. If
would be complete. a law or rule interferes with the present use of the property, it constitutes as a taking.
• The navigable airspace which Congress has placed in the public domain In this case, the law, which the LPC follows simply prohibits the petitioner from
is airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the occupying portions of the airspace above the terminal.
Civil Aeronautics Authority.
o Agency prescribed 83 feet as the minimum safe altitude, then SUMMARY: Penn Central owns the Grand Central Terminal (GCT). They entered into
we would have presented the question of the validity of the a contract with UGP Properties for the construction of a 55-story office building on top
regulation. But nothing of the sort has been done. of the terminal. The Landmarks Preservation Commission and the NYC’s Board of
o The altitude required for that operation is not the minimum safe Estimate disallowed this pursuant to the Landmarks Preservation Law, whose goal is
altitude of flight which is the downward reach of the navigable to preserve and protect the historic landmarks in the city—GCT is one of them. Penn
airspace. Central assails this because not being able to use the “air space” above GCT
o The minimum prescribed by the authority is 500 feet during the constitutes taking of private property without just compensation. The US SC ruled that
day and 1000 feet at night for air carriers and from 300 to 1000 compensation is not necessary here because (a) the prohibition was pursuant to a
feet for other aircraft depending on the type of plane and the substantial government interest and (b) there was no disruption to the ‘primary
character of the terrain. expectation’ use of the property, which is as a terminal. What is only prohibited is the
o Hence, the flights in question were not within the navigable construction of the building above it. Furthermore, they had a reasonable return on their
airspace, which Congress placed within the public domain. investments—the terminal itself was a source of income; their real estate holdings
around the area were also making money because they’re strategically located near
• The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is
the GCT.
to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of
the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true
FACTS:
then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences.
• The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part
NYC adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law in 1965.
of the public domain.
• Why: comprehensive measures to safeguard desirable features of the existing
o The court does not set the precise limits of the line of urban fabric would benefit its citizens in a variety of ways: fostering civic pride,
demarcation. protecting and enhancing the city's attractions, stimulating business and
o Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they industry, and promoting the use of historic landmarks for the education,
are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate pleasure and welfare. (This is kind of the legitimate government interest)
interference with the enjoyment of the land. • Method: by providing services, standards, controls, and incentives that will
encourage preservation by private owners and users—to ensure the owners
REPUBLIC V. PLDT (REQUIRING PLDT TO CONTRACT WITH THE GOVT) of any such properties both a "reasonable return" on their investments and
maximum latitude to use their parcels for purposes not inconsistent with the
The parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where there is no agreement. preservation goals.
However, The Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, • People enforcing: Landmarks Preservation Commission (the Commission)
require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone identifies and designates lands which have special significance or value as
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, part of the state’s or nation’s development, after giving interested parties an
subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. There is no opportunity to be heard. New York City’s Board of Estimate (the Board) then
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a may approve or modify such designation, subject to judicial review. Once a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. place is designated a landmark, the owner is imposed restrictions on the use
of the land and the duty to maintain it in good repair.
If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of
national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just 3 procedures if an owner wishes to alter the landmark (all subject to judicial
compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render review):
services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, zzzzz. "certificate of no effect on protected architectural features"—an order
the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone approving the improvement or alteration on the ground that it will not change
systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. or affect any architectural feature of the landmark and will be in harmony
therewith.

Jlyrreverre|234
 aaaaaa. “certificate of appropriateness"—granted if the Commission without compensation, in order to save another which, in the judgment of the
concludes that the proposed construction on the landmark site would not legislature, is of greater value to the public." (Miller v. Shoene)
unduly hinder the protection, enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the • It is unlawful taking when the economic harm is such that it would no longer
landmark; if it is denied, applicant may submit an alternate proposal be compatible with reasonable expectations on the use of property—such as
bbbbbb. “certificate of appropriateness on the ground of insufficient return"— a statute that would make it impossible to mine coal, when mining coal was
to ensure that designation does not cause economic hardship the right reserved by the owner of the land in the first place. (Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon)
Penn Central owns Grand Central Terminal (GCT) located it midtown
Manhattan. It has been regarded an ingenious solution to NYC traffic and is also ARGUMENTS:
a magnificent example of the French beaux-arts style. The Commission
designated GCT a ‘landmark’ and the entire block it occupies as a ‘landmark site’, A: They are being deprived of their airspace rights above the GCT without just
against which Penn Central did not seek judicial review compensation
• SC: You cannot divide a parce into segments (land space and air space).
Penn Central entered into a contract with UGP Properties, Inc. (UGP) to construct a When the court decides WON the law has unduly restriced property rights, it
55-story office building on top of the terminal, so they applied to the commission for a decides based on the property as a whole. Here, the Commission decided
"certificate of no effect on protected architectural features" and “certificate of based on GCT as a whole.
appropriateness"—both were denied, because this would be detrimental to GCT’s
façade and the view. The building would overwhelm the beauty of GCT. Appellants did A: The taking has significantly diminished the value of the GCT site
• SC: Jurisprudence shows that diminution in the value of property does not
not seek judicial review
constitute taking when it was done pursuant to a legitimate purpose: appellant
do not dispute the power of the Government to protect and preserve
Instead, they filed a case for declaratory judgment with the New York SC (trial)
landmarks.
asserting that the law was a violation of the Fifth (our Art. III sec. 9) and Fourteenth
Amendment (which is the law that makes the Fifth Amendment applicable to local
A: The decision to designate a structure as a landmark is a matter of taste and arbitrary
states). New York SC (appellate) reversed, which decision was affirmed by the New
• Hollow argument because appellants never questioned the designation of the
York Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal with the US SC
GCT as a significant landmark; furthermore, Courts can determine
arbitrariness when the need arises
ISSUES: WAS THERE A “TAKING” BY NYC THAT NECESSITATED JUST
COMPENSATION FOR PENN CENTRAL
A: This is an an incident in which the government, acting in enterprise capacity, has
appropriated part of their property for some strictly governmental purpose—not allowed
HELD: NO.
in jurisprudence
• There is no governmental appropriation for other purposes. It is simply a
RATIO:
prohibition from using the airspace in a certain manner, leaving the owner with
freedom to use all other aspects of the parcel freely
What the Fifth Amendment protects. Fifth Amendment's guarantee is designed to
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
Just compensation not needed. The law does not interfere in any way with the
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole
present uses of the Terminal. The law does not interfere with what must be regarded
as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel— which is the
How taking without just compensation will be determined. We have frequently
terminal. More importantly, on this record, we must regard the New York City law as
observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the
permitting Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a
government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely
"reasonable return" on its investment—it cannot be denied that some profit obtained by
upon the particular circumstances of the case
some real estate holdings that Penn Central owns close to GCT was due to the
operation of the terminal
Doctrines from jurisprudence on the matter
• In instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that "the health, OSG V. AYALA (FREE PARKING)
safety, morals, or general welfare" would be promoted by prohibiting particular
contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land use regulations that
Title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the
destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property interests. (Nectow v.
prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said
Cambridge)
facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State
• The State might properly make a choice between the preservation of one class
is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use
of property and that of the other and the State would not exceed its
as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking
constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property
spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of

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respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their • The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the proceeding it being
properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even a controversy of public welfare; 2) a petition for declaratory relief is proper
just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the since all the requisites are present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR does not
required parking facilities. necessarily impose that parking spaces shall be free of charge and providing
parking spaces for free can be considered as unlawful taking of property right
The total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons without just compensation; and 4) there was no sufficient evidence to justify
who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. any award for damages. They deemed that the respondents are not obligated
The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, to provide parking spaces free of charge.
since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without payment of • OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred in holding that the
just compensation. National Building Code did not intend the parking spaces to be free of charge.
On the otherhand, respondent SM filed a separate appeal to the CA,
FACTS; contending that: 1) RTC erred in failing to declare Rule XIX of IRR as
• This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in failing to declare IRR ineffective for not
of Court, filed by petitioner seeking the reversal and setting aside of the having been published as required by law; 3) RTC erred in dismissing the
decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC, which denied the Motion OSG’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) RTC
for Reconsideration of OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land erred in failing to declare that OSG has no legal standing as it is not a real
Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), party-in-interest.
Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM • CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents on the following
Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to grounds: 1) OSG did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies and that an
their patrons and the general public. administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the
• The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of question in dispute is purely a legal one and nothing of an administrative
parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to National Building Code and nature is to be or can be done; 2) the validity of National Building Code IRR
figuratively speaking, the Code has “expropriated” the land for parking. Also, cannot be proceeded as it was not discussed in RTC and the controversy
Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would be against Article could be settled on other grounds without touching the issue of validity since
II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to the State’s policy of the courts should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a law; and
protecting the interest of consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the National 3) Section 803 of National Building Code and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that
Building Code gives the responsibility for the administration and enforcement they are only intended to control the occupancy of areas and structures, and
of the provisions of the Code, including the imposition of penalties for in the absence of provision of law, respondents could not be obliged to provide
administrative violations thereof to the Secretary of Public Works. This is not parking spaces free of charge.
being strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked to discharge the regulatory • As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for Review.
powers of DPWH instead of DPWH instead.
• As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor General ISSUES:
should institute the action to enjoin the collction of parking fees and enforce 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are not obliged
the sanctions for violation of National Building Code; 2) DTI pursuant to RA to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.
7394 should enforce the provisions of Code relative to parking; and 3) 2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid
Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to prohibit the exercise of the police power of State.
collection of parking fees and its waiver of liability.
• Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the Committee and HELD:
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of
Court against DPWH and local building officials, contending that: 1) Rule XIX 1. No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are
of Implementing Rules and Regulations of National Building Code is not obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC found no merit in the OSG’s
unconstitutional and void; 2) respondent has the legal right to lease parking petition:
spaces; and 3) National Building Code IRR is ineffective as it was not
published for 3 consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation as Sec 803 of National Building Code.
mandated by Section 211 of PD 1096.
• OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Percentage of Site Occupancy states that maximum site occupancy shall be governed
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC by the use, type of construction, and height of the building and the use, area, nature,
against respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the local zoning requirements
contending that their practice of charging parking fees is violative of National and in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
Building Code.
RULE XIX – PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS

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Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all-
maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building
requirements shall be observed: officials in the name of life, health, property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and
specific uses/occupancies for buildings/structures: requirements for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code,
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters are complied with.
by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for
parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at a minimum of Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum
3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and the total requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that
number of which shall be indicated on the plans and specified whether or not parking such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not
accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See Section 2 for computation of parking covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the implementing
requirements). rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be confined to details for
xxxx regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted,
and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center – 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be
SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and
control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and 2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid
structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and exercise of the police power of State.
control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy,
and maintenance. • It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control
the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with
The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to the it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this
aim of safeguarding “life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees within the power
principles of sound environmental management and control.” Adequate parking spaces of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law
would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when complemented by quick in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental
and easy access thereto because of free-charge parking. Moreover, the power to competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the
regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of
carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control — partially or, as in specific measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals
this case, absolutely — the imposition of such fees. but also as between private parties and the political society. True, if the
The explicit directive of the above is that respondents, as operators/lessors of regulatory agencies have the power to impose regulatory fees, then
neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces with the conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is
minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition by the
nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondents. In fact, the term “parking fees” cannot even be found at all in the entire respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons
National Building Code and its IRR. One rule of statutory construction is that if a statute who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the
is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over
attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities,
of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether
collection of the same allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the action of the
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic
coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of
the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 the ends sought to be accomplished.
of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State “to safeguard life, health, • Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to
property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local
management and control”; but totally ignores the second part of said provision, which building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection
reads, “and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for
structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting
control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond
and maintenance.” While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays the bounds of police power.
down the State policy, it is the second part thereof that explains how said policy shall

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 • Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and The “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. As long as the
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. In
power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, this case, “socialized housing” comes within the ambit of public purpose. Housing is a
the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly
does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general
few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to welfare.
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the
general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, SUMMARY: NHA filed an expropriation complaint for petitioners’ land, which was
such as opium and firearms. granted by Buenaventura. Petitioners said that “socialized housing” was not “public
• When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the use,” and that PD 1224, the law which the NHA used was unconstitutional. The SC held
State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, that the expanded notion of public use, supported by Constitutional provisions on social
namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly justice and land reform include the concept of socialized housing. They also held that
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just eminent domain cannot be restricted just because the property is small – individual
compensation to the owner. interests must be subordinated to state/public interest. However, SC said that just
• Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or compensation must take into account ALL factors – the NHA’s valuations did not take
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no into account individual factors. Also, to deny petitioners the opportunity to challenge the
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to correctness of the valuations of just compensation is a denial of due process. The SC
impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title remanded the case back to the court of origin in order to determine the proper
and possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total compensation.
destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title
remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine FACTS:
whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a • On 5 December 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint
compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately 25 hectares, (in
use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, Antipolo Rizal) including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-
unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters
justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that respectively.
unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business • The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per
purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in
therefor. accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in
• Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was a motion for
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking immediate possession of the properties.
fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a • The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National
taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject 25 hectares of land,
respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use as parking pursuant to Presidential Decree 1224 which defines "the policy on the
spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just
spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights compensation."
of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion • On 17 January 1978, Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued the order issuing
of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from a writ of possession in favor of NHA. Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing filed a
its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the
and operation of the required parking facilities. possession of their property without due process of law. This was, however,
• In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in
the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same ISSUES: Whether the taking of private property for “socialized housing,” which would
prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts benefit a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for “public use.”
to a taking of respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.
RATIOS:
"Public Use" • The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations
imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private property shall not be taken
SUMULONG V. GUERRERO (HOUSING IS FOR PUBLIC USE) for public use without just compensation" (Art. IV, sec. 9); and that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws" (Art. IV, sec. 1).

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• The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent Thus, the writ of possession cannot yet be issued. There are THREE REQUISITES for
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. the writ of possession.
The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the cccccc. 1) Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance
literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has dddddd. 2) Provisional determination of just compensation made by the trial
been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. court
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost eeeeee. 3) Deposit of such amount
housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded
concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the The case is remanded to the court of origin to determine just compensation.
Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to
establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing
PHIL. COLUMBIAN ASSN. V. HON. PANIS (HOUSING PROJECT)
[Art. II, sec. 7]. Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a
matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health,
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to
safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character
acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to
of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects
bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low- salaried employees of
cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed
the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property
qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide
does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once
housing for all who need it, all at once.
land and shelter for all who need them.
• "Socialized housing" falls within the confines of "public use". Provisions on
economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum
SUMMARY: Philippine Columbian Association (PCA) owns a parcel of land adjacent
clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the
to the lot where it operates its business. The said lot is occupied by private respondents
public purpose of the project. Herein, the use to which it is proposed to put the
in this case. PCA instituted an ejectment proceeding and this was granted by the lower
subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in
court and affirmed by the SC. However, the city of Manila passed an ordinance
question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong
expropriating the said lot. Believing Manila to have no power to expropriate private
Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried
lands, PCA filed for execution of judgment and a writ of demolition was later issued.
government employees.
Residents of the said lot filed for an injunction at RTC br 27. Meanwhile, the City of
• The Supreme Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Presidential
Manila filed with the RTC br 41 a complaint against PCA for expropriation of the said
Decree 1224, as amended by Presidential Decrees 1259 and 1313,
lot. RTC br 41 issued an order of condemnation declaring the expropriation by Manila
constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation. However, as previously
of said lot to be valid. Because of this, RTC br 27 granted the injunction to residents.
held by the Supreme Court, the provisions of such decrees on just
The orders were appealed to the CA but were denied. The SC upheld the validity of
compensation are unconstitutional. Herein, the Court finds that the Orders
expropriation citing the revised charter of Manila which expressly authorizes the city to
issued pursuant to the corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing
expropriate private lands for public use.
immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process.
• As to the taking of private property, the power of eminent domain cannot be
FACTS:
determined on a quantitative basis – no reason why government should only
• Philippine Columbian Association is a non-stock/prof profit domestic corp. and
deal with large scale lands. Individual interest should not stand in the way of
interest of the country. If there’s no showing of fraud, bad faith, or GAD, Court is engaged in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its
gives weight to NHA’s choice. Owner may not object just because they think members.
some other property can be used. o Office and facilities located in PACO MANILA
o ADJACENT to said location is a 4, 842.90 sqm lot owned by
• As to just compensation, the SC already ruled on this matter, in a case
petitioner
dealing with the same expropriation complaint. The just compensation
§ This lot is occupied by private respondents
provisions were declared unconstitutional. This is because “just
compensation” means the fair and full equivalent of the loss sustained – ALL • In 1982, Philippine Columbian Association instituted an ejectment proceeding
THE FACTS must be considered. NHA’s valuation is uniform for very wide before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
areas, not taking into account any individual differences. Thus there is no just o Judgment was rendered ordering occupants to vacate the lot and
compensation. pay reasonable compensation.
• As to due process, the SC also relied on its previous ruling. Due process is o This judgement was affirmed by the RTC, the CA, and the SC.
violated because the owner is denied opportunity to prove that the valuation • May 23, 1989 Manila passed ordinance 7704 expropriating the said 4,842.90
is wrong. “it is repulsive to basi concepts of justice and fairness to allow the sqm lot.
haphazard work of minor bureaucrats or clerks to prevail over judgment of a • 1990, Philippine Columbian filed a motion for execution of judgment which
court.” was granted. A writ of demolition was later prayed and likewise granted on
May 1990

Jlyrreverre|239
 • June 8, 1990 residents filed with the RTC br 27 a petition for injunction and o Thus, Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has express
prohibition w/ preliminary injunction and restraining order against petitioner to power to aquire private lands in the city.
enjoin their ejectment from and demolition of their houses. • On the validity of exercise
• June 28, 1990, City of Manila filed a complaint against Philippine Columbian o Petitioner argues that expropriation is invalid because it is not for
before RTC br. 41 for expropriation of the 4,842.90 sqm lot subject of the public use.
ejectment proceeding. § SC reasoned that just because only “a few could benefit
• Philippine Columbian filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Manila had no from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its
power to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for public use public use character’ (Sumulong v Guerrero)
and welfare and, the deposit of 2 million (representing the provisional value of § Expropriation is no longer “confined to vast tracts of land
the land) was insufficient made under PD 1533, a law declared and landed estates..” (Camarines Sur v. CA)
unconstitutional by the SC. § Hence, it is of no moment that the land being expropriated
in this case is half a hectare only.
• Sept 14, 1990 RTC br 41 denied motion to dismiss and entered an order of
o Public use now includes “the broader notion of indirect public benefit
condemnation declaring that the expropriation proceeding was properly
or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and
instituted.
housing. o This concept is specifically recognized in ART XIII, Sec 9
o Philippine Columbian filed a motion for reconsideration and motion
to defer. These were later denied of the 1987 Constitution
• On Due Process
o Instead, the RTC br 41 issued the writ of possession
o This had been complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by
• Sept 21, 1990 RTC br 27 granted the writ of preliminary injunction to residents
petitioner was not set for hearing as required by law, never
in view of the expropriation proceedings questioned the lack of hearing before the trial and appellate courts.
• Philippine Columbian appealed the orders of Br 41 and 27 or RTC manila but It is only now that the petitioner has raised the issue
was denied by the CA o Nevertheless, due process was afforded when the court granted
• Hence this petition. motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s order
• On the 2M provisional value
ISSUE: o The amount is not only fixed by the court but also accepted by both
• Whether the City of Manila can expropriate the 4,842.90 sqm lot. YES parties
• Whether such power was exercised validly. YES
• Whether due process was afforded the petitioners. YES PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. CA (EXPROPRIATION TO ESTABLISH A
• Whether the 2 million value was just. YES PILOT FARM FOR NON-TRADITIONAL CROPS)

RATIO: There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public purpose” or
• On the power of Manila to expropriate “public use” for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept
o Petitioner argues that under the 1987 constitution, there must be law was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public before
authorizing local governments to undertake urban land reform (Art the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement if “public use”. Under the
XII, Sec9). new concept, “public use” means public advantage, convenience, or benefit, which
§ The Revised Charter of the city of Manila RA 409 is one tends to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the community.
such law.
• Said law expressly authorizes Manila to “condemn The establishment if a pilot development center would be to the direct benefit and
private property for public use (sec 3) and to aquire advantage of the people of Cam Sur. The court stresses that the power of expropriation
private land xxx and subdivide the same into home is superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program. Ordinarily, it
lots for sale on easy terms to city residents (Sec is the legislative branch of the LGU that shall determine whether the use of property
100). sought to be expropriated shall be public. The courts defer to such legislative
§ The Revised Charter of Manila expressly grants Manila the determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real relation
general powers over its jurisdiction, including the power of to public use.
eminent domain:
• “...may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, SUMMARY: Respondents in this case are successors-in-interest of the original owners
convey , and dispose of real property for the of Lot No. 988 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. The said lot was acquired by
general interest of the city, condemn for public expropriation by the government in 1949 for the purpose of the expansion of Cebu
use..” (SEC 3) o “...acquire private lands in the city Lahug Airport. Since the expansion program never came to be, respondents,
and to subdivide the same ..” (SEC 100) represented by Lydia Adlawan, demanded that they be allowed to repurchase the said
lot from MCIAA, the petitioners. Respondents filed a case for this purpose with the

Jlyrreverre|240
Cebu RTC. They claim that the original owners were assured that the lots would be § Petitioners argue that since these promises were not written, they are
returned to them if they cease to be used for airport purposes. They presented unenforceable due to the Statute of Frauds.
witnesses who attested to this claim. MCIAA, on the other hand, allege that there was § SC ruled that the Statute of Frauds will only apply to executory contracts. When
no such condition in the expropriation orders of the court which allowed the NAC to there is partial performance, as in this case, the Statute of Frauds will not apply.
acquire the land. Since it wasn’t written, such condition would be unenforceable due to There was already partial performance because payment was already made.
the Statute of Frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the RTC and the CA § While MCIAA is obliged to reconvey Lot No. 988 to the respondents,
which ordered that the lots be returned to the respondents. The Statute of Frauds does respondents must also return the just compensation they received for the
not apply because there was partial performance already. (Please read the end of the expropriation of the lot, with interest.
digest for the other SC orders.) § Respondents must also pay the MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have
incurred in sustaining the lot.
FACTS:
§ Pursuant to Art. 1187 of the Civil Code, MCIAA may keep whatever income or
• Predecessors-in-interest of respondents were the owners of a parcel of land
fruits it may have obtained from the lot. Case remanded to the Cebu RTC to
in Cebu City, identified as Lot No. 988 of the Banilad Estate.
• In 1949, the National Airports Corporation, a public corporation of the Republic determine the amounts which the respondents will have
of the Philippines, initiated a program to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport.
Several adjoining lots, including Lot No. 988, were acquired. Just Compensation
• By a judgment of the CFI, Lot No. 988 was expropriated acquired by the NAC.
(This is an exercise of the power of eminent domain.) The TCT No. 26792 was CITY OF MANILA V. ESTRADA
cancelled and TCT No. 27919 was issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. No structure was built on the lot in question. The general rule that the market value of the land taken is the just compensation to
• The lot was subsequently transferred to the Air Transport Office and then to which the owner of condemned property is entitled under the law meets with our
the present petitioner, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) in unqualified approval. "Just compensation," therefore, as used in section 246 of the
1990. Code of Civil Procedure, means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained." The
• Cebu Lahug Airport was eventually abandoned when the Mactan International compensation must be just to the public as well as to the owners.
Airport was opened. Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. bought the land of the old
airport. SUMMARY: The property of Balbina Estrada was sought to be appropriated by the City
of Manila for the purpose of building a new market. The appropriation was assailed
• Lydia Adlawan, as attorney-in-fact of the original owners, wrote the general
mainly on that part of the lower court’s decision reducing the fair market value of the
manager of MCIAA to demand to repurchase Lot No. 988. There was no
land in question to P15 per sqm. The Supreme Court, invoking its authority, as provided
reply. Adlawan filed a complaint before the Cebu RTC for reconveyance and
by Section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to modify the recommendation of the
damages. commissioners to fix the price of the property at P20 per sqm., set the price at P10 per
• Herein respondents claimed that the NAC assured the original owners and sqm. The P10 per sqm. price was predicated mainly on the testimonies of Brias and
their successors-in-interest (herein respondents) that they would be entitled Sellner, who testified on the sales of similar property situated in the same vicinity as
to repurchase the lot when it was no longer used for airport purposes. the subject property. The Court also held that evidence of the price paid for neighboring
• The MCIAA filed a counterclaim and said that the court decision which allowed properties subject to eminent domain proceedings are not admissible because they are
the NAC to acquire the lot did not contain any condition that the lot would compulsory sales to the government and are, therefore, not representative of the fair
revert to their owners. market value of the properties.
• Herein respondents proved their claim by presenting witnesses who said that
the NAC did promise the original owners that it would be returned to them if Facts: (take note that the SC decided this case on Feb. 18, 1913 but opted to release
they seized to be used for airport purposes. an extended version of the decision only on Sept. 9, 1913)
• The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The CA affirmed this decision,
hence this petition. 1. The city of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its
improvements for use in connection with a new market at that time being erected in
ISSUES: WON THE CA AND THE RTC ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LOT BE the district of Paco
GIVEN BACK TO THE RESPONDENTS.
2. Complaint was filed; commissioners were appointed
HELD: NO • Commissioners viewed the premises and delivered 2 reports to the court.
• Court confirmed the majority report as to the improvements but reduced the
RATIO: price of the land from P20 per square meter, as fixed by the majority report,
§ Witnesses testified that there was indeed an assurance from the NAC to the to P15 per square meter.
original owners that the lot will be given back when it ceases to be used for
airport purposes.

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 • Both parties submitted motions for new trial but were denied by the court; the remained, due to depriving it of its Herran frontage, to be P4.50
concomitantly, they appealed the part of the decision that reduced the value per square meter. These consequential damages were included in
of the land at P15 per sq. m. the price paid by the city for the land taken, making the apparent
• The record was therefore elevated to this court for a review of the evidence price of the 353.21 square meters P7,002.05, or P19.85 per square
and assigned errors of the parties. meter.
• This court (Supreme Court) held that P10 per square meter was just • Ariston Estrada, one of the defendants, testified:
compensation for the land, and rendered its decision accordingly. o “whatever may be its price on the market, in my opinion, by
comparing previous sales of land in the same or similar conditions
3. The court justifies such action on the following grounds (elucidated under the and circumstances,”
Issues/Ratio sections): o “I believe that it is all that can serve as a standard to ascertain the
• Upon the great preponderance of the evidence submitted to the value in the market of the land in question.”
commissioners showed that P10 per square meter was just o “I estimate that the land in question should be worth on the market
compensation for the land taken, and at this time P25 per square meter for the reason that about
• Upon the power of the court to revise the report of the commissioners P19.85 per square was paid for Mr. Clarke's land and this was
when the amount awarded is grossly inadequate or grossly excessive. three years ago; property values have increased in the last three
years; and with the opening of the market, property values along
4. Evidence in regard to the value of the land: Calles Herran and Looban have increased.”
• The land was bounded by Calle Herran, the Paco Estero, the market site, and • From the record it appears that the improvements on the land consisted of a
Calle Looban. camarin in fairly good condition, appraised at P4,500; a dwelling house in very
• George C. Sellner, a real estate agent, testified that he was familiar with real bad condition, appraised at P1,500; the former being occupied by tenants and
estate values in the city of Manila. the latter by the defendants Estrada and his family. The remaining
o He stated that the land in question, fronting as it did on Calles Herran improvements consisted of a stone wall surrounding the lot, appraised at
and Looban and the Paco Estero, was worth 60 per cent more than P1,020, and some trees, appraised at P150
other land near by, and placed its value at P10 per square meter. He • The majority report of the committee, fixing the value of the land at P20 per
stated that he had carried on negotiations with regard to a parcel of square meter, states:
land situated on the opposite side of the estero and fronting Herran; o And lastly, with respect to the value of the land, the evidence is very
that he was offering this land for sale at P5.50 per square meter, but contradictory. While the evidence of the plaintiff tends to show that
that the owner succeeded in obtaining P6 per square meter, and that the value of the land does not exceed P10 per square meter, that of
the sale had been consummated only about thirty days prior to the the defendants, on the contrary, maintains that the value of the land
date of the hearing. The witness stated that this land was of about is more than P19.85 per square meter, and it is contended by the
the same elevation as the parcel sought to be expropriated, but that defendants that the true market value of the land in question is P25
it had no improvements, being used for the storage of coal. per square meter.
• Enrique Brias, another real estate man, testified that P10 was a good price for • The lower court, in arriving at its decision to reduce the price of the land to
the land. He stated that he was the owner of the land on the opposite side of P15, discussed the Clarke transaction at some length and concluded as
the estero which had been sold for P6 per square meter about one month prior follows:
to the hearing, but that this land was not in such a good commercial location. o The court therefore understands that the price which the plaintiff
• Mr. Powell, of the Internal Revenue Bureau, testified that the Estrada land was accepted three years ago for a piece of land less suited for
appraised for taxation at P6 per square meter; that prior to 1911 it had been commercial purposes than that in question, without proof that since
appraised at about P4 per square meter. then the price of land in the place where the tract here considered is
situated has fallen, ought to serve as criterion for fixing the value of
• The president of the Municipal Board of the city of Manila testified that a
the land that is the subject matter of the present expropriation.
parcel of land on the opposite side of Calle Herran but on the same side of
§ xxx xxx xxx So, the court holds it just and equitable to
the Paco Estero, owned by one Clarke, had been expropriated by the city in
take as a compromise between the two conflicting
1908.
majority and minority opinions of the three
o In this case, the portion desired by the city compromised the entire
commissioners the average of the two prices they have
Herran frontage of the owner.
fixed per square meter for the land in question, P20 and
o The commissioners appraised the total area, consisting of 1,399.03 P10, respectively, fixing upon P15 per square meter.
square meters at P6.50 per square meter. 5. The general rule that the market value of the land taken is the just
o The city desired only 353.21 square meters facing on Calle Herran, compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled under
and the commissioners therefore found consequential damages to the law meets with SC’s unqualified approval.

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 • Packard vs. Bergen Neck Ry. Co o Defendant Estrada testified that upon learning that the property which was the
o The difficulty is not with the rule, but with its application. For the subject of the present litigation was to be condemned, he offered to pay a real
determination of the market value of land, which is that sum of estate agent P15 per square meter for a piece of land situated in the locality
money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy and with relatively similar commercial location. This was improper evidence and
an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a should not have been considered by the commissioners.
price to be given and received therefore, is beyond doubt difficult.
The test is logically and legally correct, but it cannot be applied to Second issue:
land with the accuracy with which it can be applied to stocks, bonds, o Aledo Terminal Ry. Co. vs. Butler
and personal property generally. Still, it is this test which admittedly o Such evidence is admissible BUT the value of such testimony
must be applied, even when the value of the land and the damages depends upon:
are found in separate sums. § the similarity of the land to that in question
• The supreme court of Missouri has also formulated an exceedingly clear § time when such sales were made; and
statement of the matter in the Stock Yards case: § the distance such lands are from those the value of which
o The market value of the property means its actual value, independent is the subject of inquiry.
of the location of plaintiff's road thereon, that is, the fair value of the o Fourth National Bank vs. Com.
property as between one who wants to purchase and one who wants o in the assessment of damages where lands are acquired by
to sell it. eminent domain evidence is admissible of the price received from
• Lewis on Eminent Domain (2d ed.), paragraph 478: sale of land similar in character, and situated in the vicinity, if the
o The market value of property is the price, which it will bring when it transactions are not so remote in point of time that a fair
is offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obliged to sell it, and comparison practically is impossible.
is brought by one who is under no necessity of having it. o Peoria Gas Light Co. vs. Peoria Term. Ry. Co.
o The theory upon which evidence of sale of other similar property in
ISSUES: the neighborhood at about the same time, is held to be admissible is
1. Whether testimony as to mere offers for the property desired or for contiguous that it tends to show the fair market value of the property sought to
property is not admissible. – Depends on circumstances be condemned.
2. Whether or not testimony relative to real estate transaction in the vicinity of o “The testimony as to the sale of a parcel of land on the opposite side of the
the land desired can be accepted. – YES, but with reservations. stereo from the condemned land at P6 per square meter we think was properly
3. Whether or not evidence showing prices paid for neighboring land under admitted, and should have been given much greater weight by the
eminent domain proceedings are admissible. – NO. commissioners and the court below.”
4. Whether or not the view of the premises conducted by the commissioners was o Sellner and Brias arrived at the conclusion that P10 per square meter (a
controlling. – NO. difference of more than 66 per cent) was a fair price for the land condemned.
These witnesses were professional real estate agents, both had been active
RATIO: in the vicinity at about the time they testified before the commissioners, and
were therefore peculiarly qualified to appraise the land in question. [The
First Issue: improvements on the Estrada property were deemed separate and distinct]
o Keller vs. Paine
o Its [testimony] value depends upon many circumstances. Third Issue:
o Lewis on Eminent Domain (par. 447):
o If evidence of offers is to be received it will be important to know
o What the party condemning has paid for other property is
whether the offer was made in good faith, by a man of good
incompetent. Such sales [sale to government under eminent
judgment, acquainted with the value of the article and of sufficient
domain proceedings] are not a fair criterion of value, for the
ability to pay; also whether the offer was cash, for credit, in
exchange, and whether made with reference to the market value of reason that they are in the nature of a compromise
o Peoria Gas Light Co. vs. Peoria Term. Ry Co. sustained the rule that sales of
the article; or to supply a particular need or to gratify a fancy
property in the vicinity are admissible as evidence
o Private offers can be multiplied to any extent for the purposes of a
o But it seems very clear that to have that tendency, they (sales of
cause, and the bad faith in which they were made would be difficult adjacent land) must have been made under circumstances
to prove. The reception of this class of evidence would multiply where they are not compulsory, and where the vendor is not
the issues upon questions of damages to an extent not to be compelled to sell at all events, but is at liberty to invite competition
tolerated by court aiming to practically administer justice among those desiring to become purchasers.
between litigants.

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 o The rule excluding evidence of prices obtained for neighboring land under § "Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the
eminent domain proceedings is in the nature of an exception to the rule that land (property) taken.
sales of such land may be offered in evidence § "Just compensation” as used in section 246 of the Code of
o Testimony of Estrada in regard to the Clarke transaction was umeritorious. Civil Procedure, means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
o Clarke transaction: the apparent price of P19.85 for the land taken sustained."
by the city was in reality made up of P6.50 per square meter for the § The compensation must be just to the public as well as to
land itself and consequential damages to the remaining portion of the owners.
Clarke's and at the rate of P4.50 per square meter. § "To assess" is to perform a judicial act. The commissioners'
o The value of the property taken and the damages to the remainder power is limited to assessing the value and to determining
of the property are two distinct and separate things. the amount of the damages.
o SC said: There were no consequential damages to the § Section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly
defendant in the present case for the reason that his entire authorizes the court to "accept the report in part and reject
holding was taken. The market value of the land taken from it in part." Court can modify the award provided for in
Clarke did not include the consequential damages to the the committee’s report, at its own discretion.
remainder.
Fourth Issue: MUNICIPALITY OF DAET V. CA (CONVERSION INTO A PUBLIC PARK)
o he view of the premises is made for the purpose of better enabling the
appraisers to understand the evidence presented by the parties, and The value of lands expropriated must be reckoned as of the time of the actual
giving it its proper weight. possession not as of the time of the filing of the complaint. Where property is taken
o “A view may sometimes be of the highest importance, where there ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
is a conflict of testimony.” enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken, the entry of the plaintiff upon the
o C. K. & W. R. Co. vs. Mouriquand property may have depreciated its value thereby, or there may have been a natural
§ the court approved of the practice of instructing the jury that increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint
their view of the premises was to be sued in determining the is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of the private property should
value of conflicting testimony be compensated only for what he actually loses it is not intended that his compensation
§ ii. South Park Comrs. vs. Ayer shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his
• "The jury view the premises, and the law is well property at the time it is taken. This means that the value of the property may increase
settled in this State that in a condemnation or decrease from the time the case fro expropriation is filed. Just compensation requires
proceeding, where the jury have viewed the that the owner be compensated for what he actually loses. The compensation should
premises and where the evidence is conflicting, be valued at P36,500, which is the value at the time of the judgment by the trial court.
and where the amount is within the range of value
as testified to on the trial, and does not appear to EPZA V. DULAY
have been the result of prejudice, passion, undue
influence, or other improper cause, the verdict will Under P.D. No. 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market
not be disturbed.” value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market
o SC held that the viewing is intended solely for the purposes of better value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more
understanding the evidence submitted need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
o The commissioners, being disinterested landowners of the province, selected and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to
by the court for their ability to arrive at a judicious decision in the assessment determine just compensation.
of damages, their report is entitled to greater weight than that of an ordinary
trier of facts. But there are instances where the report of commissioners The Court is constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation
was set aside [full text cited various cases]. unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.
o There is a considerable difference between Brias’ and Sellner’s The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
valuation and P25 per sqm., as fixed by Estrada, or of the price fixed impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court
by the majority report of the commissioners of P20 per sqm. inutile in a matter, which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
o The price of P10 per square meter is 66 per cent greater than The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
that obtained for land on the opposite side of the estero, and
this difference would seem amply sufficient to compensate for SAN ROQUE V. REPUBLIC
the more favored location of the condemned land. That P10 per
square meter is a just compensation is shown by a great
Without full payment, there can be no transfer of title from the land owner to the
preponderance of the evidence.
expropriator. Thus, the Republics failure to pay just compensation precluded the

Jlyrreverre|244
perfection of its title over the lot sought to be expropriated. In fact, the Court has upheld ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the (a)validity of the expropriation
the right of the unpaid owner to recover the property if within 5 years from the decision, proceedings; (b) respondent had a better right to the subject properties and (c)
the expropriator fails to effect payment. Eminent domain cases are strictly construed respondent is not guilty of laches
against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation is an indispensable
requisite for the exercise of the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain. HELD: YES

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes RATIO:
or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. One • The CA disregarded relevant facts and ignored the evidence, noteworthy among
exception is when the strict application of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of a which is that when the Republic filed its complaint with the RTC, it alleged that
policy adopted to protect the public such as the Torrens system the CFI Decision in Civil Case No. 781 had long become final and executory.
However, this assertion would compound the Republic’s predicament, because
Facts: the Republic could not adequately explain its failure to register its ownership
• The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City. It was originally over the subject property or, at least, annotate its lien on the title. Trying to
owned by Ismael D. Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. extricate itself from this quandary, the Republic belatedly presented a copy of
Subject parcels of land, together with seventeen (17) others, were the subject an Exception and Notice of Intention to Appeal dated July 9, 1940, to show that
of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the an appeal filed by the original owners of Lot No. 933 effectively prevented the
Philippines docketed as Civil Case No. 781. Judge Felix Martinez ordered the Republic from registering its title, or even only annotating its lien, over the
initial deposit of P9,500.00 as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought property.
to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a Decision was rendered condemning • The CA’s categorical pronouncement that the CFI Decision had become final as
the parcels of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not no appeal was perfected by SRRDC’s predecessor-in-interest is, therefore,
transferred to the government contradicted by the Republic’s own allegation that an appeal had been filed by
• Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was cancelled and the original owners of Lot No. 933. Not only did the CA fail to resolve the issue
new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels covered of the Republic’s failure to register the property in its name, it also did not give
by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933-B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were any explanation as to why title and continuous possession of the property
acquired by defendant-appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun remained with SRRDC and its predecessors-in-interest for fifty-six years. The
construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land. CA ruling that disregards these established facts and neglects to reconcile the
• Plaintiff-appellant filed the present case (Records, pp. 1-15) alleging that it is contradiction mentioned above does not deserve concurrence by this Court.
the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the • In Republic v. Lim, Court emphasized that no piece of land can be finally and
expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. 128197 and 128198 are null and void. It irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation in paid.
argued that defendant-appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties • Without FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer
because it was not its lawful owner. of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure to pay
• In its Answer, defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It just compensation precluded the perfection of its title over the lot sought to be
also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by expropriated. In fact, we went even further and recognized the right of the unpaid
the executive branch without legislative approval. It also alleged that the owner to recover the property if within 5 years from the decision of the
expropriation was never consummated because the government did not expropriation court, the expropriator fails to effect payment of just
actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation. compensation.
• Time and again, we have declared that EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be
• The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint and strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation
upholding SRRDC's ownership over the subject properties as supported by for private property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the
SRRDC's actual possession thereof and its unqualified title thereto. It also exercise of the State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe
found that there was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed
showing that consideration was paid for the subject properties. public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental
• Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting on its power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights.
absolute ownership over the subject properties. • From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related case, the
• The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal from the Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full
CFI Decision in the expropriation case was never perfected by the original payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. More
owners of the subject properties, and thus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation,
became final and binding on the original owners, and SRRDC, which merely in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or
stepped into the latter's shoes, is similarly bound. at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate
of title.

Jlyrreverre|245
 • The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from
the exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages.
Registration Act. There is no showing that the Republic complied with the Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining
51
aforesaid registration requirement. property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. The rules on
• From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause expropriation clearly provide a legal basis for the award of consequential damages
the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of
expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject Facts:
properties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years. • DPWH filed with RTC Las Piñas a case for expropriation against portions of
• LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length the properties of BPI and of Bayan Villanueva, situated in Pamplona, Las
of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been Piñas.
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable o DPWH needed 281 square meters of BPI’s lot and 177 square
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has meters from Villanueva’s lot for the construction of the Zapote-
abandoned it or declined to assert it. Alabang Fly-Over.
• The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the • Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the propriety of the expropriation.
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of • RTC constituted a Board of Commissioners to determine the just
exceptions. One exception is when the strict application of the rule will defeat compensation.
the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public, such as the Torrens o In the Report, the mount of P40,000 per square meter was
system. recommended as the fair market value.
• Very telling of the Republic's silence and inaction, whether intentional or by § RTC, in its decision, set the fair market value at P40,000
sheer negligence, is the testimony of Infante, the Republic's witness in the per square meter.
proceedings before the RTC, testifying that several surveys were conducted on • BPI: 281 sq. m. x P40,000 = P11,240,000
a number of expropriated lots, which surveys showed that the subject lot was • Villanueva: 177 sq. m. x P40, 000 = P7,080,000
still registered in the name of the original owners. As such, Infante • The acting branch clerk of court issued a Certification, stating that the said
recommended in his report that legal action be taken. Yet despite aforesaid decision has become final, executory and unappealable.
recommendation, title to subject lot remained registered in the name of the
• BPI filed a Motion for Partial New Trial to determine the just compensation of
original owners, ans subsequently, its transferees. This silence and unexplained
the building, which was not included in the RTC decision.
inaction by the Republic clearly constitute laches.
o RTC granted partial new trial.
• The trial court correctly held that title registered under the Torrens system is
• Due to the failure of counsel for petitioner, despite notice, to appear during the
notice to the whole world. Every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will not oblige him to scheduled hearing for the determination of the just compensation of the
go beyond what appears on the face thereof to determine the condition of the building, RTC allowed BPI to present its evidence ex-parte.
property. o After an ocular inspection of the building, Leticia Agbayani,
• An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, commissioner, reported the following findings:
bought the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other § A new building was constructed, and said building was
person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price attached and made as an integral part of the original
for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before ha has notice of the claim building.
or interest of some other person in the property. § The building was moved back when it was constructed to
• WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED conform with the requirement of the Building Code.
§ Improvements were introduced around the building.
REPUBLIC V BPI (CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES PROPER IF OTHER PARTY • RTC ruled that just compensation for the building was due, and ordered
IMPAIRED) petitioner to pay the additional amount of P2.6M.
• Petitioner moved for MR, on the ground that the proceeding fixing the just
The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned compensation of the building is null and void for not complying with the
property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a mandatory procedure laid out in the Rules of Court.
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to o RTC granted MR of petitioner; BPI filed MR, stating that there was
sell, would agree on as a price to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. substantial compliance with the Rules; RTC denied MR of BPI.
• RTC gave petitioner and BPI ten days to submit their respective nominees
The general rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is and their oaths of office.
expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion o BPI nominated Roland Savellano.
actually taken; he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the o Petitioner, instead of submitting its nominee, filed a Manifestation
remaining part of the property. and Motion, objecting to the propriety of paying just compensation

Jlyrreverre|246
 for BPI’s building and praying that BPI’s claim for additional just • SC held that no actual taking of the building is necessary to grant
compensation was denied. consequential damages.
§ Petitioner claimed that the building was never taken by the • Consequential damages are awarded if, as a result of the expropriation, the
government. remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in
• In support, petitioner attached a letter from the value.
DPWH: • To determine just compensation, the trial court should first as certain the
o x x x the original plan affecting the market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential
subject property was not implemented. damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benefits which may
The width of the sidewalk at the premises arise from the expropriation.
under consideration was reduced from • If the consequential benefits should exceed the consequential damages,
2.5m to 2.35m to avoid the costly these items are regarded altogether as the basic value of the property, which
structure of the bank. should be paid in every case.
• BPI claimed that it was not aware that the original plan was not implemented.
NPC V. MALASTAS
• After being ordered to submit its nominee, petitioner nominated Romulo
Gervacio, the OIC of the City Assessor’s Office in Las Piñas City. Just Compensation
o BPI’s Savellano recommended the amount of P2.6M, based on the The formula for determination of just compensation to landowners does not include the
appraisal conducted by an independent professional business and factor for inflation rate, as inflation is properly accounted for through payment of interest
property consultant. on the amount due to the landowner, and through the award of exemplary damages
o Petitioner’s Gervacio recommended P1.9M, which was the market and attorney's fees in cases where there was irregularity in the taking of property.
value indicated on the tax declaration of said building.
• RTC adopted the recommendation of Gervacio. Estoppel inoperative against Government
o Petitioner filed an appeal with CA, stating that the previous decision Estoppel generally finds no application against the State when it acts to rectify
which was declared final and executory has attained finality. mistakes, errors, irregularities, or illegal acts, of its officials and agents, irrespective of
§ CA dismissed appeal, and affirmed the RTC ruling; rank. This ensures efficient conduct of the affairs of the State without any hindrance on
petitioner filed the present petition before SC. the part of the government from implementing laws and regulations, despite prior
mistakes or even illegal acts of its agents shackling government operations and
Issue: W/N the award of additional just compensation for BPI’s building is allowing others, some by malice, to profit from official error or misbehavior.
unfounded and without legal basis.
FACTS:
HELD: No. • Petitioner, a government-owned and controlled corporation involved in the
development of hydro-electric generation of power and production of
RATIO: electricity, and the construction, operation and maintenance of power plants,
• Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take transmission lines, power stations and substations, on respondents' parcel of
private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and land affecting an area of 26,919 square meters. Petitioner entered said land
payment of just compensation. without the knowledge or consent of respondents, without properly initiating
• Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriation proceedings, and without any compensation to respondents-
expropriated. landowners. Because of said transmission lines, respondents alleged that
• The general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the they could no longer use their land as part of a subdivision project as originally
condemned property is entitled to is the market value. intended, which ultimately caused financial loss to their family. Thus,
• Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled respondents filed a complaint against petitioner and its officers with the
to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a Regional Trial Court. Respondents demanded the removal of the power lines
price to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. and its accessories and payment of damages, or in the alternative, payment
• The general rule is modified where only a part of a certain property is of the fair market value of the affected areas totalling 26,000 square meters
expropriated. In this case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the of respondents' land at P800.00 per square meter.
• RTC issued a Decision ordering defendant NAPOCOR to pay plaintiffs the
portion actually taken, as he is also entitled to recover the consequential
amount of P92,827,351.00, by way of just compensation and to pay an
damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property.
Attorney's fees.
• In the present case, petitioner contends that BPI’s building was never taken
• On appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued that the RTC erred in factoring
by petitioner, and that to award consequential damages for the building was
the devaluation of the peso in the computation of the fair market value of
unfounded and without legal
respondents' land. Petitioners maintain that such inclusion of the inflation rate
• basis.
in arriving at the value of just compensation has no legal basis. None of the

Jlyrreverre|247
 parties contest the finding that the fair market value of the property at the time the full amount of just compensation is paid—in order to eradicate the issue
of taking was Php170.00 per square meter. of the constant variability of the value of the currency over time. In the Court's
• The CA affirmed the RTC judgment with modification, reducing the award to own words:
P1,678,908.00. The CA ruled that petitioner could no longer assail the • The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests
valuation that petitioner itself recommended, the same being a judicial on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner
admission. instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September
1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of
ISSUES: the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective
1. Does the Court committed an error when it includes the inflation rate of the forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the
Philippine Peso in determining the just compensation due to respondents? constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time x
YES x x.
2. Is estoppel operative against the Government rendering it unable to assail the • The foregoing clearly dictates that valuation of the land for purposes of
valuation it recommended, the same being a judicial admission? NO determining just compensation should not include the inflation rate of the
Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of the price of expropriated
HELD: land is sufficiently recompensed through payment of interest on the market
value of the land as of the time of taking from the landowner.
1. Yes. The formula for determination of just compensation to landowners does not
include the factor for inflation rate, as inflation is properly accounted for through 2. No. Estoppel generally finds no application against the State when it acts to rectify
payment of interest on the amount due to the landowner, and through the award of mistakes, errors, irregularities, or illegal acts, of its officials and agents, irrespective of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in cases where there was irregularity in the rank. This ensures efficient conduct of the affairs of the State without any hindrance on
taking of property. the part of the government from implementing laws and regulations, despite prior
• Just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that is mistakes or even illegal acts of its agents shackling government operations and
controlling for purposes of compensation. The State is not obliged to pay allowing others, some by malice, to profit from official error or misbehavior. The rule
premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter's property; it is only holds true even if the rectification prejudices parties who had meanwhile received
bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due benefits. Even granting that the persons representing the government were negligent,
consideration of the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. the doctrine of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic.
More, the concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the • The fact that it was petitioner's own counsel below that recommended the
property owner alone. Compensation must also be just to the public, inclusion of the inflation rate in the determination of just compensation should
which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. The Court recognize that not be taken against petitioner. After all, it is ultimately the courts' mandated
the owner's loss is not only his property but also its income-generating duty to adjudge whether the parties' submissions are correct. It is the courts,
potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must not the litigants, who decide on the proper interpretation or application of the
immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the law and, thus, only the courts may determine the rightful compensation in
potential income lost. The rationale for imposing the interest is to accordance with the law and evidence presented by the parties. It is
compensate the petitioners for the income they would have made had incongruous for the court below to uphold a proposition merely because it was
they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the recommended by a party, despite the same being erroneous.
taking. • The cases cited by the lower court to justify its ruling that petitioner is bound
• The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum by the recommendation made by its counsel before the trial court, are all
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the inapplicable to the present case as said cases do not involve agencies or
price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of instrumentalities of the State.
legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one
who receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual Judicial Review
taking by the government.
• Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is Note: Aspects of the exercise of eminent domain subject to judicial review:
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final ffffff. Adequacy of the compensation
compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed gggggg. Necessity of the taking
from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is hhhhhh. Public use character of the purpose
actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of
the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to DE KNECHT V. BAUTISTA (EDSA EXTENSION)
place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position
he was in before the taking occurred.The just compensation due to the The necessity of taking is a question of fact, subject to judicial review. The government
landowners amounts to an effective forbearance on the part of the State—a may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken. A
proper subject of interest computed from the time the property was taken until

Jlyrreverre|248
landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It is a mandate the Philippines, through Minister Aquino, “to take and enter upon the
of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness. It is the antithesis of any governmental act that possession of the properties sought be condemned.”
smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an oppressive manner. It • Petitioner had the case elevated to the Supreme Court, on the ground that
is, as had been stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting idea off air play. In Bautista acted with GADALEJ in issuing the writ of possession. She also said
that sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be met by that there was bad faith in the choice of the new plan, because Aquino wanted
any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. to save a line of motels located along Cuneta Avenue. By saving the motel
The Solicitor General justifies the change to Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets on the and not the residents would violate the EPC. Minister Aquino countered this
ground that the government "wanted to minimize the social impact factor or problem by saying that the government would save two million pesos in expenditures
involved." It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be with the new plan, and that “it wanted to minimize the social impact factor or
objected to on the ground of social impact. The improvements and buildings along problem involved.”

Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the extension are mostly motels.. It is clear that the ISSUE: W/N JUDGE BAUTISTA ACTED WITH GADALEJ IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF
choice of Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets as the line through which the EDSA should POSSESSION
be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that HELD: YES. Writ of possession was set aside.
it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of
functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan RATIO:
Streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the • Power of eminent domain does not imply arbitrariness
residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice o “[T]he government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what
between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be private property should be taken.”
remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the o According to Tuazon v. Land Tenure Administration: whether the
people. party adversely affected is a victim of partiality or prejudice (or, in
other words, a violation of EPC) is a judicial question.
SUMMARY: Aquino, as the Minister of Public Highways, made a plan for the extension o The SC, in order to see whether the new plan could be justified,
of EDSA. The original plan was that the extension would cut through Cuneta Avenue. looked at the findings and the recommendations of the Human
He changed this plan to a new one, wherein the extension would cut through Fernando Settlements Commission.
Rein and Del Pan Streets. Petitioner De Knecht is a resident that will be affected of the
• Findings of the Human Settlements Commission
new plan. She went to Pasay CFI to file a case, in order to enjoin Aquino and the
o Functionality
Republic to go through with the new plan. Respondent Judge Bautista issued a writ of
§ The original plan was shorter than the new plan (by three
possession in favor of the Republic. The SC set aside the writ saying that respondent
meters!)
judge acted with GADALEJ in issuing the writ. To justify its decision, the SC used the
• A shorter route would be better so that energy may
recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission as basis. The Commission
be saved.
said that although the original plan was more expensive, it was a better choice, taking
§ The original plan had a straighter structure, while the new
into consideration the progress and development of the country.
plan had an “unnatural curvature”
FACTS: o Social impact
• The government, through the Baltazar Aquino (the Minister of Public § There were more residents that will be badly affected by the
original plan. (547 for the original plan, 290 for the new plan)
Highways), made a plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard. Such
o Costs
extension, called the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (refer to Chavez v
§ The relative value of properties affected (or the right-of-way
PEA), would pass Cuneta Avenue. Aquino directed the City Engineer of Pasay
acquisition cost) was computed:
to refrain from issuing building and construction permits along Cuneta Avenue.
• However, there was a change of plan. Instead of passing by Cuneta Avenue, • Original plan – P15.2M
the extension would pass by Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, which was • New plan – P14.9M
a residential area. Petitioner de Knecht lived in one of those streets. De • The difference is around 269K pesos.
Knecht wrote to President o The original plan would be more expensive than the new plan.
• Marcos, asking him to tell Aquino to go with the original extension plan. o However, the Human Settlements Commission said that the
Marcos referred the case to the Human Settlements Commission, and said difference of 269K was “so minimal as to be practically nil.”
Commission recommended that the original plan be followed. Aquino still • Recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission
insisted on the new plan. o The original plan was better in a technical viewpoint, yet it is more
• A case was then filed in Pasay CFI. Respondent Pedro Bautista was the expensive than the new plan.
presiding judge. Bautista issued a writ of possession, granting the Republic of

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 o Thus, it all boiled down to “the soul-searching and heart-rending • A fire razed almost the entire Tambunting Estate. o Following the said
choice between people on one hand and progress and development calamity, the President and the Governor of Metro Manila made public
on the other” announcement that the national government would acquire the property for
o The original plan, being for progress and development, and the fire victims. NHA was also designated to negotiate with the owners of the
ultimately for public welfare, was finally recommended. property for the acquisition of the same.
• Preconditions and one other recommendation • However, this did not materialize, since the negotiations failed.
o The Commission recommended “absolute, binding and imperative” • Proclamation 1810 was issued, declaring all sites identified by Metro Manila
preconditions before the appropriate the properties in lieu of the LGUs and approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements to be included in
original plans: the ZIP upon proclamation of the President.
§ The residents to be relocated must be relocated to a self- • The subject properties were among the sites included.
sufficient community, complete with schools, churches, • PD 1669 and 1670 were issued, providing for the expropriation of the
markets, etc. Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area, respectively.
§ “The prompt payment of fair and just compensation through • NHA wrote Register of Deeds of Manila, requesting that the certificates of title
the negotiated sale approach.” covering the properties in question be cancelled, and new certificates of title
o Finally, the Commission also recommended that “the Department of be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Public Highways conduct public hearings before undertaking on • Register of Deeds requested the submission of the owner’s copy of the
future expropriations of private properties for public use” certificates of title in question, to enable her to implement PD 1669 and 1670.

MANOTOC V. NHA • Petitioner received from NHA a letter informing that the latter had deposited
amounts representing annual installments for the properties in question.
The government, in taking of personal/private property, must show a reasonable or • Petitioner was also informed that she was free to withdraw her share in the
practical necessity. In this case, there is no showing whatsoever as to why the properties, upon surrender of the said titles.
properties involved were singled out for expropriation through decrees or what • If petitioner failed to avail herself of the offer, NHA would be constrained to
necessity impelled the particular choices or selections. The area where the property is take the necessary legal steps to implement the decrees.
located is well developed, there are no squatters and it is a thriving commercial area. • Petitioner wrote to NHA, alleging that the amounts of compensation for the
expropriation of the properties do not constitute the just compensation
The determination of just compensation based on respondent’s contention under PD envisioned by the Constitution.
1533, which states that the market value of the property prior to the recommendation • She also expressed veritable doubts about the constitutionality of the said
or decision of the appropriate Government Office to acquire the property, is not fair. decrees.
The reckoning point for the value of the property for the purpose of just compensation • Some officials of the NHA instructed tenants-occupants of the properties in
must be based from the time a formal notice was made known to the owner of the dispute not to pay their rentals to the petitioners for their lease-occupancy of
property. Such formal notice contemplates a hearing or a judicial proceeding laid down the properties in view of the passage ofPD 1669 and 1670.
by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. In this case, the Presidents public • Hence, the present petitions before the SC. The case at bar involves two
announcement that the government shall acquire subject properties for the fire victims petitions:
is not sufficient. NHA can only acquire property through a proceeding, judicial or o First: challenging the constitutionality of PD 1669, which provides for
otherwise. In addition, the market value stated by the city assessor alone cannot the expropriation of the property known as the Tambunting Estate.
substitute for the court’s judgment in expropriation proceedings. Such would be a o Second: challenging the constitutionality of PD 1670, which provides
violation of the due process and eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. for the expropriation of the property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog.
FACTS:
Facts:
Issues and Holding:
• President Marcos issued LOI 555, instituting a nationwide slum improvement
and resettlement program.
W/N PD 1669 and 1670 is violative of the right to due process and equal protection of
• LOI 557 was also issued, adopting slum improvement as a national housing
the law because by the mere passage of the said decrees, petitioner’s properties were
policy.
automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and
• In compliance with LOI 555, the Governor of Manila issued EO 6-77, adopting
possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation or to
the Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which included the
contest the just compensation to which they are entitled. Yes.
Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area in its priority list for a zonal
• The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and
improvement program (ZIP) because the findings of the representative of the
directly expropriated by decree, without the slightest semblance of a hearing
City of Manila and NHA described these as blighted1 communities. or any proceeding whatsoever.

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 • The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the • In the present case, a television or news announcement or the mere fact of
signing of the decree. the property’s inclusion in the ZIP cannot suffice because for the
• Subsequent developments in jurisprudence have shown that a disregard for compensation to be just, it must approximate the value of the property at the
basic liberties and the shortcut methods embodied in the decrees on time of its taking and the government can be said to have decided to acquire
expropriation do not achieve the desired results. or take the property only after it has, at the least, commenced a proceeding,
• Although due process does not necessarily demand that a proceeding be had judicial or otherwise, for the purpose.
before a court of law, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice • In the subject PDs, there is no mention of any market value declared by the
and reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to protect his owner. The market value stated by the city assessor alone cannot substitute
property rights. for the court’s judgment in expropriation proceedings.
• While there are exceptional situations when, in the exercise of the power of • It is violative of the due process and the eminent domain provisions of the
eminent domain, the requirement of due process may not necessarily entail Constitution to deny to a property owner the opportunity to prove that the
judicial process. valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or prejudiced. o The maximum
• However, where it is alleged that in the taking of a person’s property, his right amounts which were provided for in the questioned decrees cannot
to due process has been violated, the courts will have to step in and probe adequately reflect the value of the property and, in any case, should not be
into such an alleged violation. binding on the property owners for, as stated in the above cases, there are
• The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is necessity. other factors to be taken into consideration.
• City of Manila v Chinese Community of Manila: the very foundation of the right
to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must REPUBLIC V. DE KNECHT (EDSA EXTENSION)
be of a public character.
• City of Manila v Arellano Law Colleges: a necessity must exist for the taking An expropriation proceeding that was determined by final judgment of this Court could
of private property for the proposed uses and purposes, but SC also be subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation. While it is true that said final
accepted the fact that modern decisions do not call for absolute necessity. judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties,
• It is enough if the condemnor can show a reasonable or practical necessity, it is equally true that the right of the Republic to take private properties for public use
which, of course, varies with the time and peculiar circumstances of each upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our
case. laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic not only by
• In the instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as to why the voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action
properties involved were singled out for expropriation through decrees or what or by legislation. B.P. Blg. 340, expropriating the subject properties, therefore
necessity impelled the selections. effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of this Court.

W/N the questioned decrees suffers infirmity in the determination of just compensation. SUMMARY: Republic wanted to extend EDSA to Roxas blvd and also construct an
Yes. outfall for flood waters. Along the planned extension route is De Knecht’s property who
does not want to sell her property. Lower court granted writ of possession of said
• In the petitions, a maximum amount of compensation was imposed by the
property to Petitioner after it deposited the required amount. De Knecht filed a case
decrees, and these amounts were only a little more than the assessed value
titled De Knecht v Bautista which she won in 1980. Court cited social impact factor
of the properties in 1978, when, according to the government, it decided to
making expropriation of the land arbitrary. 1983, Batasang Pambansa Passed BP340
acquire said properties. The fixing of the maximum amounts of compensation
expropriating said property. Lower Court granted Petitioner’s petition of dismissing
and the bases thereof which are the assessed values of the properties in 1978 expropriation proceeding citing said law. SC affirmed said ruling stating that since
deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to prove a higher value, because the residents have moved already the social impact factor which was the basis in De
actual or symbolic taking of such properties occurred only in 1980 when the Knecht v Bautista have already disappeared making the expropriation proceedings not
question decrees were promulgated. arbitrary anymore. The court also said that expropriation proceedings may be
• According to the government, the cut-off year must be 1978 because it was in undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owner but
this year that the government decided to acquire the properties, and in the also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
case of the Tambunting Estate, the President even made a public
announcement that the government shall acquire the estate for the fire FACTS:
victims. The decision of the government to acquire a property through • Relation with De Knecht v Bautista Case
eminent domain should be made known to the property owner through a o This case involves the case De Knecht v Bautista (same De Knecht)
formal notice wherein a hearing or a judicial proceeding is contemplated as o After the court ruled in favour of De Knecht in 1980, the Batasang
provided for in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Pambansa passed BP blg 340 in Feb 17, 1983 expropriating the land
• This shall be the time of reckoning the value of the property for the purpose of of De Knecht thereby superseding the 1979 decision
just compensation. • The case:

Jlyrreverre|251
 o This case involve the extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard (to o Expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not
ease traffic) and the construction of EDSA outfall (to solve the flood only by voluntary negotiation with the land owner but also by
problem in the area) taking appropriate court action or by legislation
o February 20, 1979 – Republic Filed expropriation proceeding in the • Republic acquired through negotiated purchase
CFI Rizal in Pasay City expropriating lands, including De Knecht’s, about 80% to 85% of the lands involved
along the planned extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard • Only 10-15% which petitioner cannot negotiate
o After making the required deposit in June ’79, on the 14th of June through sales agreement (de Knecht 5%)
1979 lower court issued a writ of possession to the Republic and • DPWH’s Choice
created a three man committee to determine just compensation for o Social impact factor cited by the Human settlement commission
the lands involved has disappeared already
o 10-30-80 SC decided in favor of respondent in a case filed by the § All residents in the area have been relocated and duly
latter against the writ of possession issued by the lower court in 1979 compensated.
and against the expropriation of her lands § Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to
§ Court ruled: “choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets the project that will solve not only the drainage and flood
(along which de Knecht’s property is located) as the line control problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in
through which the EDSA should be extended to Roxas the area
Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial • BP 340
approval o Effectively superseded the decision in De Knecht v Bautista
§ Based on recommendation of Human Settlement § Primary reason because of disappearance of social impact
commission choosing Cuneta Street since it is mostly factor mentioned above
composed of motel establishments rather than residential
§ Q: So if residents have not yet moved, would the court’s
minimizing social impact
decision be the same???(probably not? see also concurring
o 9-2-83, Republic filed motion to dismiss the expropriation action
opinion)
citing BP blg 340 expropriating same properties for same purpose,
which the lower court granted o Said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the government
o Respondent appealed to CA which the latter granted citing the 10- in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the
30-80 decision which the latter said to be the law between the circumstance then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the
parties. expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting
o This prompted the Republic to appeal to SC the corresponding legislation as it did in this in this case.
ISSUE: underlying question: Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined
by a final judgement of this court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for Expropriation’s Public USE:
expropriation 1) Easing traffic congestion in the Baclaran and outlying areas
• W/N the enactment of BP 340 is the proper ground for the dismissal of the 2) Controlling flood by the construction of the outlet for the Estero Tripa de Gallina
expropriation case (which drains the area of Marikina, Pasay, Manila and Paranaque)
• HELD: YES, CA’s decision overturned 3) Completing the Manila Flood and Control and Drainage Project
• W/N the DPWH’s choice of land to be expropriated is still an issue under the
circumstances, said choice having been supplanted by the legislature’s Cruz, J. Concurring Opinion
choice • BP 340 not a legislative reversal of De Knecht v Bautista (which was
• HELD: NO, choice proper already, most residents moved already making the decided under a different set of facts)
social impact factor issue in De Knecht v Bautista moot • Supervening events have changed the factual basis justifying the
• W/N the law of the case theory should be applied to the case at bar enactment of the statute We are sustaining the legislation because we
• HELD: NO, it is right of the petitioner to expropriate private lands for public ourselves have found that under the changed situation, the present
use expropriation is no longer arbitrary

RATIO: ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS

• Law of the Case SECTION X
o “ true that said final judgment of this court on the subject becomes
the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the SECTION 10: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
right of petitioner to take private properties for public use upon the
payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and
When does law impair obligations of contracts:
our laws”

Jlyrreverre|252
 iiiiii. If it changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract wither as to the time Includes franchises but not licenses or permits since these are special privileges,
or mode of performance marriage contracts, public office
jjjjjj. If it imposes new conditions or dispenses with those expressed
A provision of law prohibiting the use of the allotted modernization funds for payment
kkkkkk. If it authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that
of a contract already entered into by the government is violative of the Constitutional
provided in its terms.
Prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts. (Philconsa v.
Enriquez)
A mere change in procedural remedies which does not change the substance of the
contract and which still leaves a remedy for enforcement does not impair obligations of Contracts of labor are impressed with public interest and may be subject to state
contracts. (Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell; Rutter v. Esteban) regulation and must yield to the common good. Matters involving the public interest and
welfare cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and
Police Power- All contracts are made subject to an implied reservation of the protective control. (CMMA v POEA)
power of the state and that therefore statutes, which validly exercise this, reserved
power does not impair contracts (Del Rosario v. Delos Santos) In all cases: The police power is superior to contractual stipulations between parties on the use of
• Impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to substantive right, lands sold by subdivisions even if said conditions are annotated on the Torrens Title. It
• State must postpone the enforcement of obligation but cannot destroy it by should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
making the remedy futile and guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since has to be reconciled with the legitimate
• The alteration or change that the new legislation desires to write must not be exercise of police power, i.e., “the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy hard to morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people”.
pursue. Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers,” the
exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious,
Therefore, police power may only be invoked and justified by: whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
1) an emergency, violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. vs.
2) temporary in nature, FEATI)
3) can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions.
A tax exemption contained in the Certificates of Registration is far from being
The contract may be altered validly if it involves the public interest, to which private contractual in nature in the sense that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
interests must yield lies a postulate of the existing social order. In Norman vs. Baltimore, can rightly be invoked. (Republic v. Caguioa)
the court stressed that every contract involving the public interest suffers infirmity and
may be changed if required by public interest. (Philippine Veterans Bank Employees v. Contractual tax exemptions versus franchise tax exemptions: Contractual tax
Philippine Veterans Bank) exemptions must not be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A
franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-
Legislation appropriate to safeguard said interest may modify or abrogate contracts impairment clause of the Constitution. Under the Constitution, a franchise is always
already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
obligations as between the parties but the reservation of essential attributes of Congress when the common good so requires. Contractual tax exemptions, however,
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. may invoke the non-impairment clause. (MERALCO v. Prov. of Laguna)

To come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must effect a change in the rights Endorsement billboards of an electoral candidate may be regulated/removed by
of the parties with reference to each other and not with reference to non-parties. (Abella COMELEC without violating the non-impairment clause as a valid exercise of police
v. NLRC) power because the billboards assumed partisan political character when he filed for
candidacy. (Chavez v COMELEC)
Municipal Resolution- although not strictly an ordinance is a zoning regulation which
is a police power measure which the municipality has the power to pass. (Presley v. A mortgage involving inalienable land is void ab initio and cannot be the source of
Bel- Air Village Assn. also held in Ortigas v. FEATI Bank) rights. The non-impairment clause may not be invoked, because the state’s restraint
on private individuals from holding ownership or vested rights on the said land (Forest)
The requirement of notice of the rescission under the Maceda law doesn’t change the is a valid exercise of police power. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Republic of the
time or mode of performance or impose new conditions or dispense with the stipulations Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands)
regarding the binding effect of the contract. Neither does it withdraw the remedy for its
enforcement. At most, it merely provides for a procedure in aid of the remedy of HOME BUILDING AND LOAN ASSN. V. BLAISELL (EXTENDED MORTGAGE
rescission. Therefore, it doesn’t impair the obligations of a contract. (SISKA REDEMPTION)
Development v. Office of the President)

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The Minnesota law, extending the time in which mortgagers could pay back their debts, such time as the court may deem just and equitable, but in no case beyond
was a legitimate use of its police powers since Minnesota faced massive economic May 1, 1935.
difficulties. • The application is to be made on notice to the mortgagee.
• The court is to find the reasonable income or rental value of the property, and,
The Contract Clause was established to counter the “ignoble array of legislative as a condition to any extension allowed, is to order the applicant to pay all,
schemes” of State legislatures which were designed to defeat the obligations of debtors
or a reasonable part, of that value, in or towards the payment of taxes,
owed to creditors by interfering with contractual arrangements. The Framers feared that
insurance, interest and mortgage indebtedness, at such times and in such
if private contracts were not respected, the destruction of credit would result, and credit
manner as to the court, under all the circumstances, shall appear just and
was essential to the prosperity of the Nation’s economy. The Contract Clause was not
equitable.
intended to confer absolute rights onto private parties entering into contracts. Rather,
it was intended to serve as qualified right, over which the State retained some power • If the applicant default in any payment so ordered, his right to redeem shall
to control, for the benefits of the Nation as a whole. The question to be asked is whether terminate in 30 days.
legislative action is reasonably appropriate to the achievement of a legitimate end. • The court is empowered to alter the terms of extensions as change of
conditions may require.
SUMMARY: Minnesota passed a law declaring an emergency and saying that during • The Act automatically extends, to 30 days from its date, redemption periods
the emergency period courts could extend the time periods in which mortgagers could which otherwise would expire within that time.
pay back their debts to their lenders. Pursuant to the statute, Blaisdell’s period of • It is to remain in effect only during the emergency, and in no event beyond
redemption was extended, unquestionably modifying the lender’s contractual rights of May 1, 1935.
foreclosure. The constitutionality of the law was brought into question. The USSC • Prior to that date, no action shall be maintained for a deficiency judgment until
upheld the validity of the law stating that there exists an emergency at the time of the the period of redemption, as allowed by existing law or as extended under the
declaration of the law that would allow for the valid interference of the state. Further,
Act, shall have expired.
the legislation has a legitimate end and the means adopted were reasonable to attain
• In a proceeding under the statute, it appeared that the applicants, man and
such “end”.
wife, owned a lot in a closely built section of a large city on which were a house
FACTS: and garage;
• A Minnesota statute, approved April 18, 1933 (Great Depression), declares o That they lived in part of the house and offered the remainder for
the existence of an emergency demanding an exercise of the police power for rent; that the reasonable present market value of the property was
the protection of the public and to promote the general welfare of the people, $6,000, and the reasonable value of the income and of the rental
by temporarily extending the time allowed by existing law for redeeming real value, $40 per month;
property from foreclosure and sale under existing mortgages. o That, on May 2, 1932, under a power of sale in a mortgage held by
a building and loan association, this property had been sold for
• In support of this proposition, it recites:
$3,700, the amount of the debt, and bid in by the mortgagee, leaving
o That a severe financial and economic depression has existed for no deficiency;
several years, resulting in extremely low prices for the products of o That taxes and insurance since paid by the mortgagee increased this
farms and factories, in much unemployment, in almost complete lack amount to $4,056.
of credit for farmers, business men and property owners, and in • The court extended the period of redemption, which would have expired May
extreme stagnation of business, agriculture and industry; 2, 1933, to May 1, 1935, upon condition that the mortgagor pay $40 per month
o That many owners of real property, by reason of these conditions,
from date of sale throughout the extended period, to be applied on taxes,
are unable and, it is believed, for some time will be unable, to meet
insurance, interest and mortgage indebtedness.
all payments as they come due, of taxes, interest and principal of
mortgages, and are, therefore, threatened with the loss of their • Appellant contests the validity of Chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of
property through foreclosure sale; 1933 called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to
o That much property has been bid in on foreclosure for prices much the contract clause (Art. I, § 10) and the due process and equal protection
below what it is believed was its real value, and often for much less clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Federal Constitution.
than the mortgage indebtedness, resulting in deficiency judgments; • The statute was sustained by the SC of Minnesota; hence, the appeal to the
that, under the existing conditions, foreclosure of many real estate USSC.
mortgages by advertisement would prevent fair, open and
competitive bidding in the manner contemplated by law. ISSUE/HELD: WON the Minnesota law violated the provision of the US Constitution
• The Act then provides, inter alia, as to foreclosure sales, that, where the period which prohibits a state from impairing the obligations of contracts? –NO, it is NOT
for redemption has not already expired, the mortgagor or owner in possession, violative of the CONTRACT CLAUSE. (SC of Minnesota’s decision is affirmed)
by applying to a state court before its expiration, may obtain an extension for
RATIO:

Jlyrreverre|254
• In determining whether the provision for this temporary and conditional relief Constitution, if it were not appropriate to the emergency and granted
exceeds the power of the State by reason of the contract clause, the relation only upon reasonable conditions.
of emergency to constitutional power, the historical setting of the contract o REASONABLENESS: The conditions upon which the period of
clause, the development of the jurisprudence and the principles of redemption was extended are reasonable.
construction must be taken into consideration. § The initial 30-day extension is to give opportunity for the
• Relation of emergency to constitutional power: application to the court.
o Emergency does not increase constitutional power, nor diminish § The integrity of the mortgage indebtedness is not impaired;
constitutional restrictions. It may, however, furnish occasion for interest continues to run; the validity of the sale and the right
exercise of power possessed. of the mortgagee-purchaser to title or to obtain a deficiency
o In the case, an emergency existed furnishing proper occasion for judgment, if the mortgagor fails to redeem within the
exertion of the reserved power of the State to protect the vital extended period, are maintained, and the conditions of
interests of the community. redemption, if redemption there be, stand as under the prior
o The findings of emergency by legislature and state supreme court law. The mortgagor in possession must pay the rental value
cannot be regarded as subterfuge, or as lacking adequate basis, of the premises as ascertained in judicial proceedings, and
this amount is applied in the carrying of the property and to
but are, indeed, supported by facts of which this Court takes judicial
interest upon the indebtedness. The mortgagee-purchaser
notice.
thus is not left without compensation for the withholding of
• GR: When the provisions of the Constitution, in grant or restriction, are possession.
specific, no question is presented. E: But where constitutional grants and o Important to the question of reasonableness is the fact, shown
limitations of power are set forth in general clauses, which afford a broad by official reports of which the Court takes judicial notice, that
outline, the process of construction is essential to fill in the details. mortgagees in Minnesota are, predominantly, not home owners
o The clause providing that no State shall pass any law impairing or farmers, but are corporations concerned chiefly with the
the obligation of contracts is not to be applied with literal reasonable protection of their investment security. The
exactness, but is one of the broad clauses of the Constitution legislature was entitled to deal with this general or typical situation,
which require construction to fill out details. though there may be individual cases of another aspect.
o The necessity of construction of the contract clause is not obviated o The relief afforded by the statute has regard to the interest of
by its association in the same section with other and more specific mortgagees as well as to the interest of mortgagors.
provisions which may not admit of construction. o The procedure and relief provided are cognate to the historic
• The exact scope of the contract clause is not fixed by the debates in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction in cases of mortgage foreclosure.
Constitutional Convention or by the plain historical reasons which led to o Since the contract clause is not an absolute and utterly
the adoption of that clause and of other prohibitions in the same section of the unqualified restriction of the States' protective power, the
Constitution. legislation is clearly so reasonable as to be within the legislative
• To ascertain the scope, jurisprudence must be examined. competency.
o The obligation of a contract is not impaired by a law modifying • State power may be addressed directly to the infringe the contract clause
the remedy for its enforcement, but not so as to impair only when these contracts may be denounced as hostile to (1) public
substantial rights secured by the contract. morals, (2) public health, safety or welfare, (3) where the prohibition is
o The contract clause must be construed in harmony with the merely of injurious practices
reserved power of the State to safeguard the vital interests of • But, interference with the enforcement of other and valid contracts according
her people. Reservation of such essential sovereign power is read to appropriate legal procedure, although the interference is temporary and for
into contracts. a public purpose, is not permissible.
o The legislation is to be tested not by whether its effect upon contracts • The principle of harmonizing the contract clause and the reserved power
is direct or is merely incidental, but upon whether the (1) end is precludes a construction permitting the State to repudiate debts,
legitimate, and the (2) means reasonable and appropriate to the destroy contracts, or deny means to enforce them. i.e. Economic
end. LEGITIMATE END: The legislation was addressed to a
conditions may arise in which a temporary restraint of
legitimate end, i.e., it was not for the advantage of particular • enforcement of contracts will be consistent with the spirit and purpose of the
individuals, but for the protection of the basic interest of contract clause, and thus be within the range of the reserved power of the
society. State to protect the vital interests of the community. Marcus Brown Co. v.
o In view of the nature of the contracts affected -- mortgages of Feldman; Block v. Hirsh, id
unquestionable validity -- the relief would not be justified by the • Whether the emergency still exists upon which the continued operation
emergency, but would contravene the contract clause of the of the law depends is always open to judicial inquiry. The Court ruled
that the legislation is temporary in operation -- limited

Jlyrreverre|255
 • to the emergency. The period of postponement to May, 1935, may be • Section 3 of said Act provides that should the provision of section 2 be
reduced by order of the state court, under the statute, in case of change of declared void and unenforceable, then as regards the obligation affected
circumstances, and the operation of the statute itself could not validly outlast thereby, the provisions of Executive Order No. 25 relative to debt moratorium,
the emergency or be so extended as virtually to destroy contracts. shall continue to be in force and effect. In short, the nullification of Sec. 2 of
R.A. 343 will have the effect of reviving the previous moratorium orders issued
RUTTER V. ESTEBAN (UNREASONABLE DELAY OF 8 YEARS) by the President of the Philippines.

Moratorium laws have been adopted "during times of financial distress, especially when ISSUE: Is Republic Act No. 342 valid?
incident to, or caused by, a war." The Moratorium Law is a valid exercise by the State HELD: No. R.A. 342 and EO 25 and 32 should be declared null and void.
of its police power, being an emergency measure. Although the obligations of the
contract were impaired, the impairment was within the police power of the State as that RATIO:
power was called into exercise by the public economic emergency, which the • A moratorium is a postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the
legislature had found to exist. The State also continues to possess authority to state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the
safeguard the vital interest of its people. Not only are existing laws read into contracts application of the sovereign power. In the United States, many state
in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential legislatures have adopted moratorium laws "during times of financial distress,
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal especially when incident to, or caused by, a war”.
order. • The test, therefore, of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute lies in the
determination of the period of a suspension of the remedy. It is required
The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a moratorium statute lies in the that such suspension be 1) definite and 2) reasonable, otherwise it would
determination of the period of suspension of the remedy. It is required that such be violative of the constitution.
suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the • On the argument that it impairs the obligations of contracts, it is justified as a
constitution. valid exercise by the State of its police power as provided for in the case of
Home Building v Blaisdell where the statute was sustained as an emergency
FACTS: measure.
• On August 20, 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Placido J.Esteban two parcels • The court in Home Building v Blaisdell rested its decision on the ground that
of land situated in the city of Manila for the sum of P9,600. Half of which was laws altering existing contracts constitute impairment within the meaning
paid outright, and the balance of P4,800 was made payable as follows: P2,400 of the contract clause only if they are unreasonable in the light of the
(half of the half) in 1942, and P2,400 in 1943, with interest at the rate of 7% circumstances. (Application of this rule was justified on the theory that all
per annum. contracts are made subject to an implied reservation of the protective
• Placido J. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as well as the interest power of the state, and that therefore statutes which validly exercise this
and so in 1949, Rutter instituted this action to recover the balance due, the reserved power, rather than impairing the obligations of an existing contract,
interest due thereon, and attorney's fees are comprehended within them.)
• Placido J. Esteban admitted to the charges but set up as a defense the • But the ruling in the Blaisdell case has its limitations. It must be noted that the
moratorium clause in Republic Act No. 342 He claims that this is (1) a prewar application of the reserved power of the State should be limited to its
obligation contracted in August 20, 1941; (2) that he is a war sufferer, having proper bounds and must be addressed to a legitimate purpose. Such
filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he limitations are: (1) impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to
had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that (3) under section 2 of a substantive right. The State may postpone the enforcement of the
R.A. No. 342, payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the obligation but cannot destroy it by making the remedy futile. And (2) propriety
lapse of eight years from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine War of the remedy – any alteration or change that the new legislation desires to
Damage Commission, and that this period has not yet expired write into an existing contract must not be burdened with restrictions and
• The court held that the obligation which plaintiff seeks to enforce is not yet conditions that would make the remedy hardly pursuing
demandable under the moratorium law. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration • In short, the Blaisdell case postulates that police power may only be invoked
was denied; hence, this appeal. Plaintiff argues that if this act is declared and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be
applicable to the present case, it will be unconstitutional for violating the exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the
constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligations of constitutional provision against impairment of contracts. Laws altering existing
contracts. contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of the
• Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that all debts and other monetary Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances
obligations contracted before December 8, 1941, x x x , shall not be due and occasioning their enactment.
demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the • Next question to ask: “Is the period of eight (8) years reasonable under the
war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission; present circumstances?”

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 • It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to (1) debtors and affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision because (1) the right to non-impairment of
of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and (2) contracts is not absolute, what is prohibited is unreasonable impairment only, (2)
who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. legislation may impair contracts when its purpose entails public welfare executed
• The purpose of the law is to afford prewar debtors an opportunity to through lawful means, (3) respondents were not parties to petitioner’s lease contract.
rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay
their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized by their FACTS:
creditors. • Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land in Monteverde, Negros Occidental,
• But because of Executive Order Nos. 25 and 32, the creditors would have to known as Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for a period of 10 years, renewable, at
observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could effect a her option, for another 10 years. In 1970, she opted to extend the lease
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. (E.O. 25 and 32 contract for another 10 years
became effective 1945. If after 8 years pa pwede mag-collect assuming na • During the existence of the lease, she employed herein private respondents:
nagclaim ng losses with Philippine War Damage Commission yung debtor as
early as 1945 when the law became effective, eh di 953 na pwede magstart • Ricardo Dionele, Sr. – has been a regular farm worker since 1949 and he was
mag-collect yung creditors. 12 years or more after the debt was contracted promoted to Cabo (higher farmer rank) in 1963.
kasi debts before December 8, 1941 yung covered ng R.A. 342) • Romeo Quitco – started as a regular employee in 1968 and was promoted to
• This period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. The relief accorded • Cabo in November of the same year.
works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. • Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed private
• The continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners thereof.
present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a
• Private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry of
minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and
Labor and Employment, Bacolod City District Office, for (1) overtime pay, (2)
without effect. And what we say here with respect to said Act also holds true
illegal dismissal and (3) reinstatement with backwages.
as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32.
• Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Lucas, Jr. ruled that the dismissal is warranted by the
ABELLA V. NLRC cessation of business, but granted the private respondents separation pay.
• NLRC affirmed the decision and dismissed petitioners’ appeal for lack of merit.
A separation pay law can be given retroactive effect to apply to existing contracts. Art. o Case elevated to the First Division of this Court.
284 of the Labor Code’s (granting separation pay) purpose is the protection of the • Labor Arbiter’s legal basis:
worker whose employment is terminated because of the closure of the establishment. • Art. 284 of the Labor Code as amended by BP 130
Without said law, employees like private respondents in this case will lose benefits to • Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may
which they are entitled for their long years of service. Although they were absorbed by also terminate the employment of any employee ... or the closing or cessation
the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter of operation of the establishment ... (1) by serving a written notice on the
has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least 1 month before ...
new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing. (2) when due to redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to
The guarantee on non-impairment is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is a separation pay equivalent to at least his one 1 month pay or to at least one
not to read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits 1 month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher...
unreasonable impairments only. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State • Petitioner’s arguments:
continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation • Lease agreement had already expired, hence she is not liable for payment of
appropriate to safeguard said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in separation pay. Neither could she reinstate the complainants in the farm as
effect. Therefore, Art. 284 is not violative of the non-impairment clause. this is a complete cessation or closure of a business operation, a just cause
for employment termination under Article 272 of the Labor Code.
SUMMARY: Petitioner Rosalina Perez Abella leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona, a farm • Provision violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of
in Monteverde, Negros Occidental where she employed Ricardo Dionele Sr. and obligations and contracts, because when she leased Hacienda Danao-
Romeo Quitco as farmers. After the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner Ramona, neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation
dismissed private respondents, who in turn filed a suit at the Ministry of Labor and to pay separation pay to workers at the end of the lease
Employment against petitioner asking for (1) overtime pay, (2) illegal dismissal and (3)
reinstatement with backwages. Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Lucas Jr. ruled that the ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay.
dismissal of the respondents is warranted by the cessation of business but granted the
respondents separation pay pursuant to Art. 284 of the Labor Code as amended. HELD: YES. Petition deovoid of merit. The instant petition is dismissed.
Petitioner appealed saying such provision impairs her original contract with the lessor
which did not make mention of any separation pay for the dismissal of workers. The RATIO:
NLRC and subsequently the First Division of the Supreme court dismissed the petition

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Anucension v. National Labor Union – issue has been laid to rest in this case. It Since the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual
should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of obligations freely entered into by the parties, they are valid and can be enforced against
contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is not to read with literal the petitioner. However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if
exactness like a mathematical formula for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. said conditions are annotated on the torrens title can be impaired if necessary to
• Legislation – appropriate to safeguard said interest may modify or abrogate reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power.
contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into contracts
in order to fix the obligations as between the parties but the reservation of The Court upholds the Sangalang doctrine (absolving the Ayala Corporation, finding
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a that is not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the general public given that had
postulate of the legal order. reclassified Jupiter Street into a 'high density commercial zone’), seeing no reason why
o Limit – no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under the petitioner should be singled out and prohibited from putting up her hot pan de sal
all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be store since the area has been long commercialized and the records indicate that
measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores have already sprouted in this said
be determined upon its own circumstances. area.
o Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained
when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the SUMMARY: Jupiter Street was reclassified into a commercial zone (C3) from its former
people, and when the means adopted must be legitimate. designation as a residential zone (R1). Presley, who leases the property owned by the
• All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation Almendrases in Jupiter street, operates a pandesal store in that address. BAVA notified
under the police power must be understood as made in reference to the them to shut it down pursuant to their agreement annotated in the TCT that the property
possible exercise of that power. Otherwise, important and valuable reforms would be used for residential purposes only. The Court, pursuant to its ruling in the
may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the Sangalang case, held that there was no violation. Although the contract is binding
purpose of doing that which otherwise maybe prohibited. between the parties, this may be impaired by a lawful exercise of police power—in this
case, the reclassification of Jupiter into a commercial zone.

Application to present case FACTS

• Art. 284 of Labor Code as amended: purpose is the protection of the works • The Almendrases are owners of a house and lot at 102 Jupiter Street, BelAir
whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and Village, Makati. They became members of the BAVA pursuant to the Deed of
reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondents Restrictions contained in their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). The Deed
in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled: provided that the lot must be used only for residential purposes because the
o For the 33 years of service in the case of Dionele and 14 years in the entire BelAir subdivision is classified as a purely residential area. Lessee of
case of Quitco. Although they were absorbed by the new the house Presley is the owner and operator of the ‘Hot Pan de Sal’ store
management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the located in the same address.
latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they • When BAVA found out about the store, they sent letter to Presley to stop
will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind operating. The Almendrases had also not been paying their membership fees
them would amount to nothing. (amounting to Php 3,802.55). BAVA filed a case against the Almendrases for
• Contract must be between parties – to come under the constitutional specific performance (payment of the dues) and preliminary injunction (stop
prohibition, the law must effect a change in the rights of the parties with operations of the store). Trial court ruled in favor of BAVA. CA affirmed.
reference to each other and not with reference to non-parties.
o Article 284 as amended refers to employment benefits to farm hands DEATH
who were not parties to petitioner's lease contract with the owner of • Pending the case filed against Teofilo and Rosario Almendras, they both died.
Hacienda Danao-Ramona. That contract cannot have the effect of So they were substituted by Enedina Presley (the lessee). Pending this case
annulling subsequent legislation designed to protect the interest of in the SC, she died. So she is now substituted by her daughter, Olivia Pizzaro
the working class. and Consuelo Lacson.
• In the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code
and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the ISSUES AND HELD
primordial and paramount consideration. • WON the CA erred in ruling in favor of BAVA given the current ruling in
Sangalang—YES. (When the CA promulgated their decision in November
PRESLEY V. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSO (DEED OF RESTRICTIONS STATING 1988, Sangalang ruling hadn’t come out yet. It came out December 1988)
THAT THE LOT BE USED ONLY FOR RESIDENTIAL AND NOT COMMERCIAL
PURPOSES) RATIO
• Sangalang case: Jupiter street was reclassified by the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) into a high density commercial (C-3) zone, from its former

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 classification as a residential (R-1) zone, pursuant to Ordinance No. 81-01. involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for
This was a police power measure legitimately adopted by the government. large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals.
Residential owners started converting their homes into commercial • DENR Secretary issued Administrative Order No. 57 which stated that all
establishments despite their Deeds of Restrictions stating that their lots should existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity
be used for residential purposes only. This was upheld by the Court. of the 1987 Constitution, except small scale mining leases and those
• BAVA had a right to enforce the Deed of Restrictions (use of house and lot for pertaining to sand and gravey quarry resources covering an area of 20
residential purposes only) because said Deed was a contractual obligation hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within
validly 1 year from the effectivity of these guidelines. He issued Administrative No.
• entered into by the parties. However, these contractual stipulations on the use 82 that laid down the procedural guidelines on the award of mineral production
of the land even if said conditions are annotated on the torrens title can be sharing agreements. It enumerates the persons or entities required to submit
impaired if necessary to reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power. Letter of Intent and Mineral Production Sharing Agreements within two years
• Doctrine: Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to from the effectivity of the DENR Administrative Order 57. Failure to do so
be the ‘law between the contracting parties but while it is so, it cannot within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry
contravene ‘law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.’ and sand and gravel claims.
Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed
precisely to promote health, safety, peace and enhance the common ISSUES: W/N Administrative Order No. 57 and 82 are constitutional?
good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary.
• BAVA asserts that the Court made a mistake in the Sangalang case. However, HELD: YES
no new zoning reclassification, ordinance, certification to the effect or
jurisprudence for that matter was brought to the attention of this Court which RATIO:
would necessarily compel us to take a second look at the Sangalang Case. • Petitioner contents that these orders are in excess of the rule-making power
• The specific performance issue became moot because it was shown that under EO 279
Presley eventually paid all the membership dues owed o AO 57 violates the non-impairment of contract provision under Art.
3, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Admin. Order
MINERS ASSOCIATION V. FACTORAN 57 unduly pre-terminate existing mining agreements and
automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements
The prohibition contained in the constitutional provisions against impairing the within 1 year from its effectivity date
obligation of contracts is not an absolute one. Such provisions have no application to o AO 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral
statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of Production-Sharing Agreements within two years from the date of
the State and involving the public rights and welfare of the entire community affected effectivity shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and
by it. They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police powers. sand gravel permits
• Such administrative rules rightfully followed what was prescribed in the
The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources are statutes they seek to implement.
matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people. Accordingly, • Article 12, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to
the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the "license, concession or lease" granted by the government under the 1973
constitutional restriction on non- impairment of contract from altering, modifying and Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, AO 57
amending the mining leases or agreements granted under EO 211. applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements, which were granted
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to EO 211.
• The prohibition contained in the constitutional provisions against impairing the
obligation of contracts is not an absolute one. Such provisions have no
FACTS: application to statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the
• On July 10, 1987, President Aquino, promulgated EO 211 prescribing the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and
interim procedures in welfare of the entire community affected by it.
• the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development • They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police powers.
and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure • The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources
the continuity of mining operations and activities to hasten the development are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people.
of mineral resources. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard,
• She also issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-
conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and mining leases or agreements granted under EO 211.
prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements

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 • Nowhere in AO 57 is there any provision, which would lead us to conclude o Parcel of land subject of the deed could only be used for residential
that the questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining purposes (this is most important)
leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, o All improvements/buildings on the lot shall be of strong materials and
pursuant to EO 211, to production-sharing agreements. painted, with sanitary installations, and not be at a distance of less
• AO 57 could not possibility contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of than 2 meters from boundary lines (less impt)
the government that all existing mining leases and agreements are • Eventually, FEATI BANK, defendant, acquired the lots, buying them directly
automatically converted into production-sharing agreements. from Chavez.
o Feati Bank, of course, had plans for the land. This is where the
ORTIGAS V. FEATI BANK conflict begins.
• Ortigas said – restrictions annotated on the TCT were imposed as part of its
The limitations on the use of land imposed by contract yield to a reasonable exercise general building scheme in order to beautify and develop Highway Hills
of police power, hence, zoning regulations are superior to contractual restrictions on subdivision
the use of the property.While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally • Feati said – the area where the lots were had been declared a commercial
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate and industrial zone pursuant to RESOLUTION 27 of the MUNICIPAL
exercise of police power. The exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and COUNCIL of Mandaluyong.
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been • So the basic conflict is in the use of the land – residential vs commercial.
a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. o Trial Court ruled that the restrictions in the TCT were subordinate to
Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should prevail through Municipal Resolution number 27.
the state's exercise of its police power.
o “private interest should bow down to general interest”
The Municipal Council of Mandaluyong was reasonably justified under the o Trial Court thus upheld the classification of the ara asa commercial
circumstances in passing the subject resolution, declaring the western part of Highway and industrial zone, not a residential
54, now EDSA, from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and • This brings us to the issues taken up by the SC
commercial zone. The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being
reasonable, and it being a "legitimate response to a felt public need," not whimsical or ISSUE:
oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the • Whether or not Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power YES
municipality's proper exercise of the power. Herein, the municipality of Mandaluyong • Whether or not the said resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual
exercised police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order obligations assumed by the defendant. YES
and general welfare of the people in the locality. EDSA, a main traffic artery, which runs
through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless RATIO:
stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to • Yes. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act,
the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. empowers a Municipal Council „to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulation for the municipality
SUMMARY: Ortigas sold two lots in a subdivision along EDSA to Emma Chavez. • Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an
These lots were supposed to only be used for residential purposes, and this stipulation ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it
was annotated on the TCT. Chavez sold the lots to Feati, who wanted to use the lots certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word
for commercial stuff. Their basis was Mandaluyong Municipal Council’s Resolution 27, regulation under the provision.
classifying that area as commercial/industrial. The SC said that the non-impairment • As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists any
clause must be balanced with the proper exercise of police power, and that the provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. An examination of Section 12
stipulations should be subordinate to the resolution. If the exercise of police power is of the same law which prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise
done properly, the individual interests must be subordinate to the general welfare. reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be liberally construed
in its favor and that any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the
FACTS power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be
• In 1952, Ortigas sold two lots in Highway Hills subdivision to Augusto and presumed to exist. The same section further mandates that the general
Natividad Padilla. welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more
• Ten years later, the Padillas transferred their rights and interests over the lots power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social
to one Emma Chavez welfare and material progress of the people in the community. The only
• The deeds of sale in favor of Chavez had restrictions and stipulations – exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract
sometime later, these restrictions were ANNOTATED on the backs of the between a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the
TCTs other, in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should
govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.

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 As recounted by SWS and Pulse Asia, on February 15 to February 17, 2013, SWS
• Yes. it should be stressed, that while non- impairment of contracts is conducted a pre-election survey on voters’ preferences for senatorial candidates.
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be Thereafter, it published its findings.
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e. the power to
10
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good In his letter, Tiangco asked COMELEC to "compel [SWS] to either comply with the
order or safety and general welfare of the people. Invariably described as the directive in the Fair Election Act and COMELEC Resolution No. 9[6]1[5] and give the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers and in a sense, the greatest names or identities of the subscribers who paid for the [pre-election survey
and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of the power may be conducted from February 15 to February 17, 2013], or be liable for the violation
11
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust thereof, an act constitutive of an election offense."
or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of
any other applicable constitutional guarantee. SWS and Pulse Asia recounted that during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S.
• In the case at bar, Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Brillantes, Jr. (COMELEC Chairman Brillantes) stated that the proceeding was merely
Highway 54, now EDSA, from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an a clarificatory hearing and not a formal hearing or an investigation
industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or On April 23, 2013, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 9674 ordering SWS
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the to submit the names of all subscribers of those published surveys. Such
people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing information/data shall be for the exclusive and confidential use of the Commission;
19
in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. à basis COMELEC cited Article IX-C, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution and
20
• The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial Sections 5.1 to 5.3 of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election
21
complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which Act, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 9615.
runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area,
supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and On July 26, 2013, petitioners Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc. filed
34
pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents the present Petition. They assail Resolution No. 9674 as having been issued ultra
in its route. vires. They are of the position that Resolution No. 9674, in requiring the submission of
• The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being information on subscribers, is in excess of what the Fair Election Act
35
reasonable, and it being a legitimate response to a felt public need, not requires. Likewise, they assert that Resolution No. 9674 transgresses the Fair
36
whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Election Act in making itself executory immediately after publication. Moreover,
Constitution will not bar the municipality’s proper exercise of the power. they claim that it violates the non-impairment of contracts clause of the
37
• Thus, subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee Constitution, and was enforced in violation of their right to due process (as they
of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer were charged for its violation despite not having been properly served with its copies
38
Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual obligations so or of the complaint filed against them). Petitioners pray for the issuance of a
39
assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the interim.
Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through the said
resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 ISSUES:
and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.
First, whether Resolution No. 9674 is invalid in that it requires the disclosure of the
SWS V. COMELEC names of "subscribers" of election surveys; NO

SWS V. COMELEC (2015) Second, whether the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the
requirement to submit the names of their subscribers; NO
FACTS: Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social
Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as "other survey Third, whether Resolution No. 9674, insofar as it compels petitioners to submit the
4
firms of similar circumstance" to submit to COMELEC the names of all commissioners names of their subscribers, violates the constitutional proscription against the
and payors of all surveys published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including impairment of contracts (Article II, Section 10); NO
5
those of their "subscribers."
Fourth, whether at the time petitioners were required by COMELEC to reveal the
SWS and Pulse Asia are social research and public polling firms. Among their activities names of the subscribers to their election surveys, Resolution No. 9674 was already in
is the conduct of pre-election surveys.
6 force and effect; and

Lastly, whether COMELEC deprived petitioners of due process of law when it: YES
a) failed to provide them with a copy of Resolution No. 9674 and the criminal complaint
for an election offense; and

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b) refused to specify the election offense under which they were being prosecuted. contract may be compelling, but so are the normative frameworks demanded
by law and the provisions of the Constitution.
RATIO:
• Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 9674 violates Article III, Section 10 of SECTION 2: The right of people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and
the 1987 Constitution.131 They claim that it "unduly interferes with [their] effect against unreasonable searches and seizure or whatever nature and for any
existing contracts . . . by forcing [them] to disclose information that, under the purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issued
contracts, is confidential or privileged."132 except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
• For its part, COMELEC argues that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he may
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes sought to be achieved by the produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
government."133 It adds that "[petitioners' existing contracts with third parties to be seized.
must be understood to have been made in reference to the possible exercise
of the COMELEC's regulatory powers."134 REQUSITES OF A VALID WARRANT:
• It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment... is limited by 1) Issued upon probable cause
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, 2) Personally examined by the judge
safety, morals and general welfare."135 "It is a basic rule in contracts that the 3) Examined under oath and affirmation
law is deemed written into the contract between the parties."136 The 4) Particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
incorporation of regulations into contracts is "a postulate of the police power be seized (Sec. 2 Art. III, Uy v. BIR)
of the State."137 5) warrant must not be for more than one offense (Revised ROC)
• The relation of the state's police power to the principle of non-impairment of
contracts was thoroughly explained in Ortigas and Co. V. Feati Bank:138 WHEN IS A SEARCH A “SEARCH”?
• [W]hile non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is
not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police Valmonte v. De Villa – checkpoints – Section 2 is a personal right invocable only by
power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, those whose rights have been infringed or threatened to be infringed; reasonableness
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." is determined by a fixed formula but from the circumstances of the case; not all
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of searches and seizures are not allowed; between the inherent right of the state to protect
powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of its existence and promote public welfare and an individual; right against warrantless
government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and search which was reasonably conductedm the former should prevail
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable SSS v DDB (MANDATORY DRUG TESTING, REQUIREMENT OF A VALID
constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon SEARCH)
in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. police power "is
elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined FACTS:
within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it • The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al, requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
when We declared: "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain
exercise of its police power."139 (Citations omitted) offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
• This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable"140 regulation. We have demonstrated that not only an ASSAILED LAW: 3 petitions assail constitutionality of Sec 36 of RA No 9165
important or substantial state interest, but even a compelling one anchors (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), insofar (isf) as it requires
Resolution No. 9674's requirement of disclosing subscribers to election mandatory drug testing of:
surveys. It effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to a. candidates for public office. Sec 36(g)
opportunities for public service"141 and is impelled by the imperative of "fair" b. students of secondary and tertiary schools. Sec 36(c)
elections. c. officers and employees of public and private offices. Sec 36(d); and
• As a valid exercise of COMELEC's regulatory powers, Resolution No. 9674 is d. persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. Sec 36(f)
correctly deemed written into petitioners' existing contracts.
• Parenthetically, the obligations of agreements manifested in the concept of PERTINENT SECTION:
contracts are creations of law. This right to demand performance not only
involves its requisites, privileges, and regulation in the Civil Code or special Sec 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized Drug Testing. – Authorized drug
laws, but is also subject to the Constitution. The expectations inherent in a testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of

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test results. The DOH shall take steps in setting the price of the drug test with DOH they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the
accredited drug testing centers to further reduce the cost of such drug test. The drug manner of drug testing.
testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which • Also encroaches on EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE as they can be used to
will determine the positive result as well as the type of the drug used and the harass students and employees deemed undesirable.
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. Xxx The following shall • Also breaches constitutional right against unreasonable searches
be subjected to undergo drug testing:
c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. – Students of secondary LASERNA PETITION
and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as • Petitioner is a citizen and taxpayer and seeks to strike down Sections c, d, f
contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, and g for being contrary to due process and equal protection guarantees, as
undergo a random drug testing: xxx well as to the right against unreasonable search and seizure

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. – Officers and ISSUES:
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall • PIMINTEL PETITION: Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's COMELEC Resolution No. 6486: WON it impose an additional qualification
work rules and regulations, xxx for purposes of reducing the risk in the for candidates for senator, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution
shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or • SJS PETITION: Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law; xxxxx privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of
PETITIONS: legislative power?
PIMENTEL PETITION HELD: Paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL. Par. (f) is
• Assails constitutionality of Sec 36(g) of RA 9165, isf as it requires that “all UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
candidates for public office xxx shall undergo a mandatory drug test,” as well
as COMELEC Res. No. 6486. RATIO:
• 12/23/2003 - COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486 (implementing rules and • Court is of the view that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
regulation = IRR of RA 9165) in relation with the 5/10/2004 national/local random and suspicionless drug testing of students is CONSTITUTIONAL.
elections. (Cited Veronia and Board of Education cases, see originals)
• Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. – candidate for reelection in the 5/10/2004 o A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools
elections is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and
• Petitioner seeks to (1) nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 for imposing additional interest of the student population, doubltless a legitimate concern of
qualifications to those already provided in the 1987 Constitution, and (2) enjoin the government, are to be promoted and protected.
COMELEC from implementing Res. 6486. o In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases
• Adds that there is NO PROVISION in the Constitution authorizing the and applied to this jurisdiction are:
Congress or COMELEC TO EXPAND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS of § (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis
senatorial candidates. with respect to their students;
• ISSUE: Do Sec 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Res. 6486 impose § (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an
additional qualification for senatorial candidates? adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
• HELD: Yes. Both are unconstitutional. parents, guardians, and schools;
• RATIO: Sec 3, Art VI of the Constitution only requires the following: § (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard
Citizenship, Voter registration, Literacy, Age, Residency the health and well - being of their students and may adopt
• Legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
(Bill of Rights) and constitutional limitations. discharge such duty; and
• The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall § (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.
SJS PETITION • Mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers
• SJS – REGISTERED POLITICAL PARTY – seeks to prohibit DDB and PDEA and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for
from enforcing par. (c), (d), (f) and (g) of Sec 36 of RA 9165 on the ground the same reasons (Petitioners SJS and Laserna failed to justify how Section
that these provisons constitute undue delegation of legislative power when

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 36 (c) and (d) violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or 3. Compelling State Interest— must be met by the
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. search
o To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal o A procedure shall employ two testing methods (screening test and
drug in the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, the confirmatory test)— the screening test which will determine the
especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory
The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, test which will confirm a positive screening test
of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in o PURPOSE:
the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. § to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the
o To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal results.
drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy § shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
interest under the premises controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of
• In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a Health (DOH)
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless; To impose § to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a accurate chain of custody
medical test as a toll for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives § access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know"
of RA 9165. basis;
o The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to o CONSLUSION
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not 1. [T]herefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by and is relatively minimal. (constitutional)
the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and 2. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
right to privacy. the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
• ON UNREASONABLE SEARCHES that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
o “REASONABLE” limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
§ As the warrantless clause – "reasonableness" is the constitutional.
touchstone of the validity of a government search or 3. If RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
intrusion. employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for
§ whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required
standard is judged by the balancing of the government - to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
against the promotion of some compelling state (constitutional)
interest. 4. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
§ In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
§ Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons'
students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
administrative search needing what was referred to in Constitution. (Unconstitutional)
Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," • ON LOCUS STANDI
the probable cause standard is not required or even o Power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on bona fide controversy. But even with the presence of an actual case
the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review
in question. UNLESS the constitutional question is brought before it by a party
§ Factors to Consider: having the requisite standing to challenge it.
1. Nature of Privacy Interest— expectation of o REQUISITES OF STANDING:
privacy § she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
2. Character of Intrusion— “is the enabling law result of the
authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly § allegedly illegal government conduct
focused" § injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action

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 § injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action • Veloso refused to be searched and resisted arrest claiming that search
o However, rule on standing is PROCEDURAL; hence, can be relaxed warrant was invalid for it stated that the person to be searched was John Doe
for non- traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and • Everyone arrested was charged with Gambling, but except for Veloso, they
legislators when the public interest requires, such as when the matter were acquitted for lack of proof
is: • Veloso was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house and sentenced to
§ Of transcendental importance pay 500 pesos
§ Of overarching significance to society, or • Veloso was also found guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the
§ Of paramount public interest authority in violation of article 252 or the Penal Code (the issue on appeal in
o Sen. Pimentel = Senator, so has standing this case)
o Standing of Laserna and SJS = Court relaxed the rule on locus standi
because the matter at hand is of transcendental importance ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant used against Veloso was invalid, thereby
justifying his resistance
REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT
HELD: CFI decision that search warrant was valid is affirmed, but CFI’s finding that
PEOPLE V. VELASCO (JOHN DOE WARRANT, DESCRIPTION PERSONAE; there was abuse of public position (aggravating circumstance) is reversed meriting the
PARTICULARITY) reduction of penalty 10

People v. Veloso – parliamentary club - JOHN DOE WARRANTS – Valid IF the best RATIO:
description possible is given in the arrest warrant – it must be sufficient to indicate TEST:
clearly on whom it is to be served by stating his occupation, personal appearance or 1) Issued upon Probable Cause
peculiarities, place of residence or other circumstances which he may be identified • Club as gambling house was reported to Det Geronimo by a reliable
person
RECIT-READY: Veloso resisted arrest when Police raided the “Parliamentary Club,” a • He have watched the forgoing premises and believed it to be a gambling
gambling house managed by Veloso. He contends that his resistance was lawful house and a place where instruments and devices used in gambling
because the police had an invalid search warrant that stated person to be search as games
only John Doe and not Jose Veloso. Supreme Court said that though it is required that 2) Probable Cause must be determined personally by a judge
the person to be search must be named, if there is description of said person sufficient • Yes, determined by Hon. Garduño of Muncipal Court Manila
for the Police to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be 3) Such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the
served, such warrant would still be valid. In this case, the search warrant followed this witness he may produce
requirement when it stated that “John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession
• Yes, the decision quoted an affidavit and a Q & A portion between
in the building occupied by him at 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila.”
Garduño and Geronimo under oath
4) The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
FACTS:
person or things to be seized
• Manila Police had reliable information that the “Parliamentary Club” was a
• Place: No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands
gabling house. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of
• Person/things: John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in
Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the
thebuilding occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila
club. The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called
(John Doe being the Manager, Veloso)
Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house.
• May 19, 1923 - J.F. Townsend (Chief of Gambling squad) went to the club
PHILIPPINE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
and verified this fact
• "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon
• May 25, 1923 – Detective Andres Geronimo (Secret service of City of manila)
application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched
applied and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño (Municipal Court)
and the person of thing to be seized."
• Search warrant was based on Det. Geronimo’s testimony that he had good
• A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown
reason to believe that Parliamentary Club was a gambling house
(John Doe Warrant) is void, without other and further description of the person
• Police then Raided the Club and apprehended 50 people including Velos
to be apprehended
• Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not • The SC held that, as a general rule, a warrant must specifically describe the
John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend persons or things to be seized. Aside, of course, from a finding of probable
answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was cause and supported by oath of affirmation
bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to
• However, if the name of the person to be seized is unknown, a John Doe
show him the evidence of the game.
warrant may still be valid. Such a warrant must (John Doe Warrant), in
addition, contain the best description personae possible to be obtained of

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 the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be • Petitioners alleged that the warrants were null and void (against the
sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the Constitution and Rules of Court):
warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and o They do not describe with particularity those to be seized
peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other o Cash money, not mentioned in the warrant, were seized
circumstances by means of which he can be identified. o Warrants were issued to "fish" evidence against them
o In this case, the description of the place to be searched was explicitly o Search and seizures were made in an illegal manner
provided and once inside, the officers could arrest those who were o Documents, papers, and money seized were not delivered to the
presumably engaged in illegal acts. courts that issued the warrants to be disposed of in accordance to
o Affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself law
described the building to be searched • Petitioner raised this complaint to the Supreme Court praying that
§ “No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands” o Warrants be declared null and void
§ Being so, police were authorized to raid the place and had o Return the things seized
the right to • Respondents response
§ arrest persons presumably engaged in a prohibited game o Contested warrants were valid
and to confiscate evidence o Defects, if any, were cured by the petitioners consent
§ 10 From 4 months and 1 day and 200 pesos to 2 months o In any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence
and one day regardless of the alleged illegality of the searches and seizures
o Police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty
§ search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE WARRANTS, AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him WERE VALID
at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John
Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the HELD: NO
police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without
difficulty. RATIO:
• The court divided the documents into two groups
OTHER SUPPORTING ARGUMENT OF ATTY-GEN: • (1) found in the offices and
• “Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" • (2) Found in the residences
warrant, on the other hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer
liable, because under such circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant ON DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE OFFICES
should have been issued.” – EXAMPLE OF A WARRANTLESS ARREST • The SC held that petitioners cannot assail the legality of the warrants as
• The SC also held that there was no justification for excessive violence in regards the corporations because the same have their own respective
resisting arrest because upon a lawful arrest, the officers may take from the personalities
arrested things or effects used to perpetrate the crime or the fruits thereof – • The SC further held that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
search incidental to lawful arrest party whose rights have been impaired thereby
o These must be challenged by corporate officers in their capacity as
STONEHILL V. DIOKNO (GENERAL WARRANTS; RULE ON EXCLUSION) such, not in their individual capacity
• The objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
FACTS: be availed of by 3rd parties
• Petitioners (Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl • Court restrained the respondent-prosecutors from using them as evidence
1
Beck), who were officers of certain corporations , assailed the issued against against petitioners; two questions must be answered:
the them and the corporations of which they are officers for violation of Central o Valid warrants, searches, seizures?
Bank Laws, Tariff & Customs Laws, the Internal Revenue Code, and the o If no, can the documents seized be used as evidence?
Revised Penal Code
• The warrants mandated the seizure of all papers and documents pertaining to ON DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE RESIDENCES
the said businesses, regardless of the legality of the transactions, in the offices • The SC held that the warrants were general, and general warrants are
and residences of petitioners outlawed by the Bill of Rights
• There was no specific offense charged and no reference to any particular • Warrants provided for the search and seizure of ALL business transactions,
provision of the law that was violated. regardless of whether or not they were illegal

1
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic
News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business

Jlyrreverre|266
 o It is provided in the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be
particularly described FACTS:
o General warrants must be eliminated • February 14, 1962 – Central Bank announced that corporations which claim
o Fishing for evidence is indicative of the absence of evidence to to be “savings and loan associations”, including First Mutual Saving and Loan
establish probable cause Organization, have never been authorized by the Monetary Board of the
• Also, a search warrant shall only issue upon probable cause in connection Central Bank of the Philippines to accept deposit of funds from the public nor
with one specific offense to engage in the banking business or activity.
o Probable cause presupposes the introduction of competent proof o Section 2 of General Banking Act (RA 337) – violated by any
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular institution involved with such activity (receiving deposits of money,
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of disbursement, safekeeping, transacts the business of a savings and
our criminal laws. mortgage bank and/or building and loan association) without
• Under the rules of court, no search warrant shall issue for more than one authority from Monetary Board
specific offense • April 23, 1962 – Bank directed the investigation and gathering of evidence on
• In fact, the SC found that it should have been impossible for the judges who savings and loan associations operating contrary to law
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause • May 18, 1962 – Bank’s intelligence division filed with the Court of Manila a
verified application for a search warrant against Organization, alleging that
ON INADMISSIBIITY OF EVIDENCE “after close observation and personal investigation, the premises are being
• Respondent prosecutors, relying on Moncado v. People's Court moved that used unlawfully” by illegally engaging in illegal banking transactions.
they be allowed to use such evidence against the petitioners even if the o Within the same day, the warrant was issued by Judge Cancino
warrants were void commanding search at premises No. 2745, Rizal Avenue, Manila
• Court ruled otherwise, they said that such ruling must be abandoned and the seizure of the foregoing articles intended to be used for the
• We must now follow the exclusionary rule – FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS commission of the offense there being "good and sufficient reasons
TREE DOCTRINE to believe" upon examination, under oath, of a detective of the Manila
• Declaring that all evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures are Police Department and said intelligence officer of the Bank
deemed inadmissible o On the same date, Organization filed for prohibition with writ of
• This is so to protect the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable preliminary injunction or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (in
searches and seizures case seizure has already been commenced) to annul warrant
• Moreover, what was committed was, in fact a fishing expedition, making the because:
evidence obtained from the said search inadmissible a. search warrant is a roving commission general in its terms
b. use of the word 'and others' in the search warrant permits the
CENTRAL BANK V. MORFE (GENERAL PATTERN OF BUSINESS V. SPECIFIC unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have
TRANSACTIONS) no relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act
c. no court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal
case against a corporation
RECIT-READY: Judge Morfe of the CFI nullified a search warrant issued against the • July 2, 1962 – Hon. Jesus P. Morfe as presiding judge of the CFI of Manila
FIRST MUTUAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ORGANIZATION, which allegedly engaged in issued such order
banking practices without authority from the Monetary Board, in violation of the o Judge finds the search unreasonable. If the applicant for such
CENTRAL BANK ACT. The search warrant issued by the Municipal Court authorized warrant claims that he personally knows that the premises were
the search and seizure of books of original and final entries, accounting records, being used illegally, he should have known specific banking
financial statements, and other effects. Morfe stated that, assuming that the deponent transactions and applied for a warrant to search and seize only
has personal knowledge on the matter, he should have stated the specific illegal acts relevant books and not all of the records as this would harass the
and transactions and their respective perpetrators and victims, so that only books and petitioner.
records pertaining thereto are to be seized from the said FIRST MUTUAL. The SC held • August 7, 1962 - Hence the current petition, elevated to the Supreme Court
that the failure of the witness to mention the particular individuals does not disprove his on reconsideration by the Bank.
knowledge of the specific acts of the FIRST MUTUAL. That is because the records
clearly suggested that the illegal transactions constituted the general pattern of ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
business of the organization. The case would have been different had information excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order.
alleged an isolated transaction, in which identification of the parties involved would be
necessary. Thus, that no victims were named is immaterial. The SC also held that the HELD: YES. Petition GRANTED. Warrant of search and seizure is VALID.
law sought to protect the public not only from actual but also potential injury that may
be caused by the illegal banking practices of the corporation. RATIO:

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• Unreasonableness is a condition dependent upon the circumstances
surrounding each case and the question whether or not "probable cause" FACTS:
exists is one which must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in • Misael Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), wrote a letter to
given situations. respondent Judge Vivencio Ruiz (CFI Rizal), to request the issuance of a
o The failure of the witness to mention particular individuals does not search warrant against petitioner Bache & Co., Phil., Inc., for violating Sec.
necessarily prove that he had no personal knowledge of specific 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to other sections. It
illegal transactions of the Organization, for the witness might be also authorized Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the
acquainted with specific transactions, even if the names of the search warrant.
individuals concerned were unknown to him. • De Leon, with his witness Arturo Logronio, went to CFI Rizal bringing with
o The aforementioned order would seem to assume that an illegal them an application, Logronio’s deposition and an already accomplished
banking transaction, of the kind contemplated in the contested action search warrant but without Ruiz’s signature yet.
of the officers of the Bank, must always connote the existence of a • Judge Ruiz was in a different hearing at the time so he told the Deputy Clerk
"victim." If this term is used to denote a party whose interests have of Court to take the depositions of the applicant. After his hearing, he told the
been actually injured, then the assumption is not necessarily stenographer to read to him the notes from the deposition. He then warned
justified. Logronio that if his deposition were found to be false, he would be charged for
o The law requiring compliance with certain requirements before perjury. He then signed the application and then issued the search warrant.
anybody can engage in banking seeks to protect the public against • Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) agents then went to serve the said warrant
actual, as well as potential, injury. against petitioners’ contention that no formal complaint and transcript of
o Transactions objected to by the Bank involves general pattern of testimony were attached to the warrant. The search yielded 6 boxes of
the business of the organization and not isolated transactions. It is documents.
not necessary to specify or identify the parties involved in said o Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no
isolated transactions, so that the search and seizure be limited to the formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the
records pertinent thereto. warrant.
o There is probable cause that the Organization had violated Sections • Petitioners filed a petition in the CFI Rizal praying that the search warrant be
2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question, quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
the search and seizure complained of have not been proven to be writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void,
unreasonable. which Judge Ruiz dismissed.
• CASE: THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE— transactions of the Organization do • In the meantime, BIR made tax assessments on the petitioner, partly based
not amount to " banking," as defined in RA 337 on the documents seized. And so the present petition for prohibition and
o Purpose of Organization: "to extend financial assistance, in the prohibitory injunction.
form of loans, to its members," with funds deposited by them.
o The Organization is, in effect, open to the "public" for deposit ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WARRRANT ISSUED WAS VALID
accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent by the Organization.
Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds is placed under the HELD: NO.
exclusive authority of the "founder members," and "participating • Respondents enjoined from enforcing the warrant; documents seized are
members" are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted for, their ordered returned; BIR is enjoined from enforcing the tax assessments against
"privileges and benefits," if any, being limited to those which the petitioner and using them against petitioner in future cases.
board of trustees may, in its discretion, determine from time to time. RATIO: Petition granted for the following reasons:
As a consequence, the "membership" of the "participating members"
is purely nominal in nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with 1. RESPONDENT JUDGE FAILED TO PERSONALLY EXAMINE THE
the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No. 337 seeks to COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESS.
forestall, by exacting compliance with the requirements of said Act, • SC: Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his
before the transactions in question could be undertaken. witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-
• Requisites of a valid warrant: existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the
1. Issued upon probable cause - YES Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of
2. Probable cause determined personally by the judge - YES which prohibit the issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause."
3. Judge examined under oath or affirmation complainants and The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the
witnesses - YES exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be
4. Describes the place to be searched and the person or things to be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
seized – YES

BACHE & CO. V. RUIZ (DEPOSITIONS MADE BY CLERK)

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 • CASE: While the application and deposition were sworn to before Judge • The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests.
Ruiz, he didn’t ask them any questions or observe their demeanor to help If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
him determine WON there was probable cause. committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence,
o The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles
led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, strengthen such evidence.
to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, • In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant
and to administering the oath to the complainant and his should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other
witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks
there was an examination at all of the complainant and his and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and
witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of
2. SEARCH WARRANT WAS ISSUED FOR MORE THAN ONE SPECIFIC foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
OFFENSE
• The warrant issued was for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax RESPONDENTS CONTEND THAT CORPORATIONS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE
Code. PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
o Filing of income tax returns • A corporation is an association of individuals under an assumed name
o Withholding of income taxes as source and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it
o Unlawful pursuit of business or occupation waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property
o Failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against
value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon by due process of law, and is protected against unlawful discrimination.
• Respondents argue that Stonehill v. Diokno, is not applicable, because
there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR (JUDGE NOT REQUIRED TO PERSONALLY EXAMINE)
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here “Libel against Cory Aquino” (personal examination vs. personal determination)
Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one code, i.e.,
the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent than FACTS:
real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which • President Aquino sued Beltran for libel for having written that the she hid
occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on under her bed during an attempted coup d’etat
January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting • Warrants for his arrest were issued pursuant thereto by the judge without
therein the phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding personally examining the complainant and the witnesses
the sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific • Petitioners contend that probable cause was not properly determined due
offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. to the absence of a personal examination by the issuing judge
3. WARRANT DOES NOT PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THE THINGS TO BE
SEIZED ISSUE:
• Rules of Court, Rule 126 Sec. 3 and 4; and Art. III, Sec. 1 Par. 3 of the 1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for
1935 Philippine Constitution (which is now Art. III, Sec. 2, 1987 Philippine libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima
Constitution) facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently
o Why the requirement of particularly describing the things to be by the President
seized: To limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, • MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioner’s motion for
particularly described in the search warrant—to leave the reconsideration
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they • APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
shall seize, that abuses may not be committed. Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice
• TEST WHEN A SEARCH WARRANT MAY BE SAID TO • MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary,
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
• when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will • MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
ordinarily allow; or Secretary
• when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law • Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.
— by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
and seizure; or affidavits, he filed a “Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed”, in effect,
• when the things described are limited to those which bear direct waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. • Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal
2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary

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 investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the o The judge may require the submission of supporting affidavits
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is should he find the fiscal’s report to be insufficient
so minded. • The SC also held that the rationale behind the rule is that to require the
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF BELTRAN judges to personally examine the complainants, judges would be unduly
WERE VIOLATED WHEN RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE ISSUED A laden with preliminary investigation instead of concentrating on deciding
WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST WITHOUT PERSONALLY EXAMINING THE cases
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES, IF ANY, TO DETERMINE • Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly
PROBABLE CAUSE laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a before their courts.
complaint-affidavit • On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No.
• Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The
President’s filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s • It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the
jurisdiction. àThis would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
• This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any LIM, SR V. JUDGE FELIX (CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY JUDGE)
other person in the President’s behalf.
• The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the • Certification by the fiscal of the existence of probable cause does not bind the
President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and judge.
imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would • Preliminary inquiry – determines probable cause for the issuance of a search
prevent the President from waiving the privilege). warrant (prosecutor);
ADDITIONAL ISSUE: • Preliminary examination (judge) - investigation for the determination of a
• Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest;
privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel • Preliminary investigation proper – ascertains whether the offender should be
case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom. held for trial or be released.
• Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at
this stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point. RECIT-READY:
o March 17, 1989 (7:30 am) in Masbate, congressman Moises Espinosa Sr and
HELD: NO his security escorts were killed by a lone gunman, only one escort survived.
Petitioners were accused of said murders in a complaint with MTC Masbate.
RATIO: MTC found probable cause and issued order to arrest the accused.
• The SC held that the Constitution does not require the judge to personally Respondent-prosecutor affirmed findings of MTC with some adjustments. The
examine the complainant and the witnesses. accused later posted bail and petitioner Lim filed and was granted by SC for
• What the Constitution underscores is personal determination of the change of venue to Makati RTC to avoid miscarriage of Justice. Respondent-
existence of probable cause, which is simply the exclusive and personal judge Felix was assigned to the case and later issued a warrant of arrest on
duty of the judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause the sole basis of the certification made by MTC Masbate and Prosecutor
o The addition of the word "personally" after the word Alfane. Supreme Court held that though the Judge does not have to personally
"determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the examine the complaint and his witnesses and may rely on the certification
1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers made by the prosecutor, judge must go beyond the prosecutor’s certification
as may be authorized by law” convinced petitioner Beltran that and investigation report whenever necessary. Here Judge solely relied on the
the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine certifications and since the records were still in Masbate when he issued the
the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of warrant, respondent judge had no basis to make his own personal
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest determination.
• The sanctioned procedure is as follows:
o The judge must personally evaluate the report and supporting FACTS:
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of • March 17, 1898, at about 7:30am, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
probable cause Masbate Domestic Airport congressman Moises Espinosa Sr and his security
o And on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or escorts were killed by a lone gunman, only one escort survived.

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 • Designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal • Yes, the persons to whom warrant was to be served was named and was
Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended identifiable (this part is just implied, no discussion in case)
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing petitioners,
among others, of the murders • Judge may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted
• MTC Masbate found proable cause and issued the order to arrest petitioners. the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
They posted bail for 200,00, except Jimmy Cabarles • There should be a balance:
• All 261 pages of the records of the case were transmitted to Provincial o Judge shouldn’t spend most of his time reading the records word per
prosecutor and respondent Alfane affirmed MTC-Masbate findings but said word to find probable cause to issue warrant of arrest
that they should be charged with murder for each victim and not Multiple o Judge cannot ignore clear words of 1987 constitution that he needs
murder and physical injuries and not frustrated murder for the surviving escort. to personally determine probable cause
• Petitioner Lim filed and was granted by SC for change of venue to Makati RTC • The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes
to avoid miscarriage of Justice and Judge Felix was assigned to the case • To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and
• Lim then requested for the transmittal of the initial records of preliminary investigation report whenever necessary.
inquiry or investigation in Masbate so that judge Felix can make his own • Though recantation of witnesses is not given much weight,” the respondent
personal determination, but respondent judge denied motion. Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have
• Judge Felix issued warrant of arrest against accused including petitioners gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the
citing the certification made by MTC Masbate and Fiscal Alfane as basis. light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the
o Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty "political undertones" prevailing in the cases”
was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, • Indubitably, [with the records of the preliminary investigation still in Masbate],
each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the
visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990
the prosecutor's certification in each information without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of
• Lim later presented to the judge that the witnesses whose testimonies used the existence of a probable cause.
to establish a prima facie case against them recanted. The Judge still did not
reinvestigate the case JURISPRUDENCE:
• Placer v Villanueva (1983 case under 1973 constitution)— “judge may rely
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGE MAY ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the
WITHOUT BAIL BY SIMPLY RELYING ON THE PROSECUTION'S CERTIFICATION basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not
AND RECOMMENDATION THAT A PROBABLE bind the judge to come
1) Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of
HELD: NO, there was grave abuse of discretion by respondent judge probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the
o The respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may
Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the
without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
the existence of a probable cause. existence of a probable cause.
• Soliven v Makasiar (1988 under the 1987 constitution)— 1987 constitution
RATIO: added the word “personally” after the word determined (see Art 3 sec 2)— the
1) Issued upon Probable Cause Constitution underscores the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
• Probably? No discussion on the case for this part, but since MTC- issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
Masbate and Fiscal Alfane said there’s probable cause, there probably satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
is a probable cause. warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
• Problem is mainly procedural under 2 and 3. complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
2) Probable Cause must be determined personally by a judge procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
• No, Judge solely relied on the certifications and since the records were documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
still in Masbate when he issued the warrant, respondent judge had no and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof
basis to make his own personal determination he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require
3) Such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
witness he may produce conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
• No, just used certification of MTC – Masbate and Fiscal Alfane o The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its
4) The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot
person or things to be seized determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's

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 examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion • Accused/appellant filed a motion to quash the search warrant and contends
for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the that materials seized cannot be used as evidence against her.
Constitution. • RTC (applying the doctrine in People v. Veloso) dismissed motion to quash
o To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and found appellant guilty.
and investigation report whenever necessary. • Thus, the present appeal
• People v. Honorable Enrique Inting
1) the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge ISSUE: WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANT IS VALID; WHETHER THE SEARCH
2) the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE WAS REASONABLE
Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable
cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor HELD: Decision of RTC is reversed and set aside; accused/appellant is acquitted.
presents to him.
§ By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is RATIO:
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT ARE:
documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are (1) probable cause is present;
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination. (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;
3) Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally
inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them;
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. and
§ Two types of Preliminary Investigation (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to
1) Preliminary Investigation Proper— Made by be seized
Fiscal, executive in nature, to determine probable cause
w/n to file a case The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the
2) Preliminary Investigation to issue warrant— Made search warrants. The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for
by Judge, Judiciary in nature, to determine probably there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more
cause w/n to issue warrant cause exists distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in
• People v. Delgado (1990)— judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be
to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the certification construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy.
made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
issuance of the warrant of arrest. We, however, also reiterated that . . . the undertakes to justify it.
court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted
to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance • Issued upon Probable Cause (YES)
of a warrant of arrest. o The court did not discuss the issue but the presence of this requisite
can be inferred from the fact that applicants were police officers who
PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO (DIFFERENT ADDRESS OF HOUSE) conducted surveillance against the accused-appellant.
• Probable Cause must be determined personally by a judge (YES)
FACTS: o The court did not discuss the issue but the presence of this requisite
• Frederic Verona and Annabelle Francisco were placed under surveillance can be presumed from the facts.
after police confirmed that they were selling shabu through a test-uy operation • Such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the
• They lived in the in one of the units of a 3-unit compound at 120 M Hizon St., witness he may produce (YES)
Caloocan City o The court did not discuss the issue but the presence of this requisite
• Thereafter, SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 San Juan applied for search warrant can be presumed from the facts.
before Branch 23 of RTC of Manila to authorize them to search the premises • The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. This was accompanied by an affidavit by person or things to be seized (NO)
Dante Baradilla who was one of the runners in the drug operations. o Main Issue
• The warrant was issued and consequently, No. 120 was searched for about o In People v. Veloso, a description of the place to be searched is
an hour and the police seized shabu, shabu paraphernalia, and other items sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort,
including jewelleries, ATM cards, set of keys, car documents, etc. ascertain and identify the place intended.
• Accused/appellant was charged and tried for violation of RA 6425 or the o The doctrine does not apply in this case
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972

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 o SPO2 Teneros cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertainand identify dismissed and ordered to return seized goods. Respondents then sued for damages.
the place. SC affirmed CA and lower court’s decision, granting indemnity for damages citing Art
1) His description of the house in the application matched that 32 Civ Code on the grounds that the seizure was illegal for there was no warrant issued
located in No. 122, not 120. and the circumstances were not proven to fall under valid warrantless searches – from
2) Consequently, the warrant issued was for No. 122 the progression of time from receipt of information and the raid, Petitioner had time to
3) In the return of the search warrant, Teneros informed the apply for warrant
judge that the warrant was properly served at 122 although
they knowingly and actually searched a different house FACTS:
located at no. 120. • 22 Feb 1983— MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the
• SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that he thought the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts
house to be searched bore the address 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias, including such undertaking of
instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St. illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies."
• The Court ruled that “the particularity of the place described is essential in the • October 1983— petitioner received information that private respondents
issuance of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling
discretion.... The controlling subject of the search warrants is the place Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority.
indicated in the warrant itself and not the place identified by the police.” • 25 October 1983— Petitioner de Guzman, Captain Penafiel and 2 other men
• The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or of the Reaction Force battalion, without warrant, seized the boy and girl scouts
modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls in Marikina Public
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a Market.
change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search • A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the respondents but during its pendency, Larry exacted from respondent
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power Lugatiman P3,100.00 in order to be dropped from the complaint. However,
of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be delineated in the after the preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the
warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant complaint against all the private respondents and ordered the return of the
to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite
has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of demands. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of
the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only business to recover their goods, and even then, not all the seized items were
in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers returned and the other items returned were of inferior quality.
conducting the search." • Private respondents filed a civil case for sums of money and damages against
• On another note, the court held, after observing that other properties were MHP and Larry (note: the PC officers were not sued for damages). The RTC
seized other than drugs and drug paraphernalia that “a search warrant is not ruled in favor of the private respondents which was later on affirmed by CA.
a sweeping authority empowering a reading party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SEIZURE WAS ILLEGAL THEREBY GIVING RISE FOR
relating to a crime.” DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE
• This Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this constitutional
provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied HELD: Seizure was illegal, CA’s decision affirmed
with. To quote from the landmark American decision of Boyd v. United States:
"It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, RATIO:
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta
principiis." 1) Probable Cause: No
• facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation,
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition
MHP V. CA (BOY SCOUT; ENOUGH TIME TO APPLY FOR THE WARRANT; and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
DAMAGES) 2) Probable Cause must be determined personally by a judge: No
• Did not even apply for warrant to the judge
RECIT-READY: MHP was granted exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy 3) Such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the
Scouts uniforms, supplies badges and insignias. MHP received information that private witness he may produce:
respondents were selling boy scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. • Did not even apply for warrant to the judge
Phil Constabulary and Petitioner De Guzman, without warrant, raided and seized the 4) The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person
Boy Scout stuff in respondents’ stalls. Petitioner filed for unfair competition but was or things to be seized:

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 • NO warrant was issued since no application was filed items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the
• Search was not even justified under warrantless search and seizure same extent as the officers themselves.
• In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages
• Art 3 sec 2 protects people from unreasonable search and seizure for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private
§ “protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who individual. The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or
appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until criminal. It is NOT necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad
the contrary is proved” faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32
• Evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private which is the effective protection of individual rights.
respondent’s goods • In, Aberca vs. Ver, the court held that in Art. 32, the law speaks of an officer
§ Rules of Court 126 - Sec. 12. or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of
§ Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article
be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
search warrant. injury caused to the aggrieved party… it should nonetheless be made clear in
§ progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who
of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant and tortfeasors.
they did not apply for one
§ facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to Did CA err in finding that the seizure was done in a tortious manner but penalized
justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary the petitioners who did not commit the act of confiscation?
investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for • NO. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents.
unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private
• Letter of Instruction No. 1299: respondents against unreasonable search and seizure:
§ Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, • FIRST, They instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the
to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal
of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the sources of scouting supplies.
Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest • SECOND, Under Letter of Instruction No. 1299, petitioners miserably failed to
and/or search warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the
may be authorized by law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be Philippines for the proper application of a warrant.
used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body. • THIRD, If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a
Orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions. third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other
• Article 32 of the civil code grants the payment of damages for any impairment of relief, in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with
rights and liberty of another person enumerated in said article Damages. Again, they did not.
§ The right to be secured in one’s person, house, papers and effect against
unreasonable searches and seizures PEOPLE V. CFI (MOVING VEHICLE; DODGE CAR CHASE; VALID
§ Moral damages were also awarded because they were embarrassed and WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
humiliated by the actions of PC and De Guzman (see full text for
testimonies of respondents) FACTS:
• One week before February 9, 1974, an undisclosed informer told RASAC
Did CA err in imputing liability for damages to petitioners who did not effect the (Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center) that dutiable (taxable) – contraband
seizure? goods will be transported from Angeles to Manila on a BLUE DODGE car.
• NO. While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have • Agents Manuel and Sabado waited in the North Diversion Road tollgate on
been included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents' that day.
constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners. Despite • When they saw the car, they chased it and stopped the said car.
the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods • In the car were Sgt. Hope and Medina and RASAC Agents found 4 boxes in
of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in the rear seat and 7 more in the compartment, which contained untaxed
case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents wristwatches
against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search • Hope and Medina claimed to be unaware of the contents of the boxes.
and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure. o Respondent Medina said that they were bringing the boxes to the
• The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los Santos
de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts

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 • The RASAC proceeded to the drop-off spot, but aborted the mission given the • The SC held that it is a settled rule that Customs searches do not require a
fact that the suspected receivers never came warrant for the enforcement of customs laws, except for those conducted in
• They opened it in Camp Aguinaldo and found 4,441 wristwatches and 1,075 the dwelling of persons
bracelets of assorted brands. • The SC also noted US jurisprudence, which recognized the distinctive feature
• The Bureau of Customs issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against of a warrantless search of a vehicle where it is not practicable to secure a
the articles and the car. warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
• Seizure proceedings were instituted and a certain DEL ROSARIO intervened jurisdiction
and claimed ownership of the said items. • The SC also held that the RASAC could not have possibly secured
• He claims to have bought it from BUENAFE TRADING and asked MEDINA to a warrant based on their intelligence reports, which are not fully
deliver the said items to Mr. Peter in Tropical Hut. certain
• Hope claimed that he never knew that these are untaxed commodities that • But in this case, the information was more than just hearsay as the informer
he consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car even went with them to the rendezvous point
upon request of his girlfriend Monina as a personal favor; that he was not • The SC further held that when officials see the existence of probable
present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their cause, coupled with the fact that the case involves motor vehicles,
contents on the way. searches need not be justified by a warrant
• Monina Medina, testified that what she did was only in compliance with the
agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the boxes and deliver them to a CAROLL DOCTRINE: Searches and seizures without warrant are valid if made upon
certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted probable cause, that is, upon a belief reasonably arising out of circumstances known
price; that Mr. Del Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which she to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
came to know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp Aguinaldo. subject to seizure and destruction
• Antonio was able to show a receipt and swore that he did not know that said • The search and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties
items were smuggled. and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from
• The collector of customs held that the articles were NOT subject of forfeiture. a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose
• Meanwhile, the City Fiscal after doing its own preliminary investigation found of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence
prima facie evidence to convict HOPE and MEDINA for being guilty of against him, The two things differ in toto coelo. In the one case, the
smuggling but the trial court declared the evidence inadmissible on the ground government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.
that they were seized without a warrant
• Respondents contend that the watches found in the box cannot be used as CASE: It is quite true the ASAC received one such information several days or a week
evidence against them because the Collector of Customs already said that before the encounter; but the fact that its agents failed to obtain a warrant in spite of
they were not subject to forfeiture. the time allowance is not a sign that they have been remiss in their duty.
• Not even the trial court has made any findings that ASAC has established with
ISSUE/RATIO: WON THE SEARCH WAS VALID exactitude the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
• Lacking this essential determination, the agents could not have possibly
HELD: YES secured a valid warrant even if they had foreseen its compelling necessity.
For one thing, the information could have been just another false alarm.
RATIO: Providentially, however, things turned out differently when in the morning of
• The State holds on the proposition that the rules governing search and seizure February 9, 1974, the undisclosed Informer himself went along with the agents
had been liberalized when a moving vehicle is the object of the search and to the rendezvous point where at the appointed time he positively Identified
the necessity of a prior warrant has been relaxed on the ground of practicality, an approaching car as the one described by him a week earlier to be the
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and suspected carrier of untaxed merchandise. Clearly therefore, the agents acted
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing not on the basis of a mere hearsay but on a confirmed information worthy of
judge — a requirement which borders on impossibility in the case of smuggling belief and probable cause enough for them to adopt measures to freeze the
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from fleeting event.
one place to another with impunity.
• RESPONDENTS: maintain that the decision of the Collector of Customs in (1) WON the warrantless seizure by the agents of the boxes are valid. YES
their seizure cases which has now become final and unappealable has made • The Tariff and Customs Code grants persons duly commissioned to do
no pronouncement that the subject articles are smuggled items— that they warrantless searches if there is reason to suspect that the code being violated
were also entirely cleared of any liability (i.e. suspecting the existence of smuggled items)
• Impairment of their liberty to travel • The agents may do so as long as it is NOT in the dwelling of a person.
• Petitoners had one-week time to secure the necessary warrant • Unreasonable searches or seizures – judicial question, determinable from the
circumstances involved.

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 • “Searches and seizures w/o warrant are valid if made upon PROBABLE § Articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in his
CAUSE, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known prosecution of illegal possession of firearms
to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which • Warrant was issued of May 10,1984
by law is subject to seizure and destruction.” (Carroll v. US) • Petitioner's house was searched 2 days after
• The fact that they did this to a MOVING CAR justified such seizure all the
more. ISSUE:
1. WON the warrant is valid? NO
(2) WON the items found in the seizure can be admitted as evidence in the 2. WON the consent of the voluntary submission of the petitioner to the search
criminal proceedings. YES cures the voidness of the warrant? NO
• A seizure case is a CIVIL and ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING which is 3. WON the Magnum and the bullets could be confiscated given that it is a
different and independent from a criminal proceeding. violation of a malum prohibitum crime? NO
• The Collector of Customs is concerned with the RES (property) while the 4. WON this case falls under the accepted exceptions pertaining to warrantless
• Prosecutor is concerned with the PERSONA. searches and seizures? NO
• Probable guilt CANNOT be negated simply because he was not held
administratively liable. RATIO:
• The Collector’s final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture • The SC held that a search warrant must not be issued based on mere hearsay
does not detract his finding that untaxed goods were transported in • The SC also held that the judge must not merely rehash the statements in the
respondents’ car and seized from their possession by agents of law. affidavits, but must examine them closely and ascertain the existence of
• A separate criminal action, from which criminal responsibility must be proven probable cause
beyond reasonable doubt, must be instituted. o Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are insufficient
o The examining judge has to take depositions in writing of the
Dissent of Justice Teehankee: complainant and witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
• In the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant must be procured record
• Given that they had the information one week in advance, there was • The SC further held that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
ample time to procure a warrant and not simply rely on bare merely routinary, if the claimed probable cause is to be established
information given by an unidentified source • In this case, not only did the respondent judge not take Capt. Quillosa’s
• Moreover, they could have delayed actual seizure until the warrant depositions at all, the depositions taken from the witnesses were restatements
has been secured because they already had actual possession of of their own allegations, except that they were made in the form of questions-
the vehicle and-answers
• In this case, the search was remote to the arrest and, hence, a • Last but not least, prohibited articles may be seized, but only as long as the
search warrant must have been secured search is valid
• What was committed was a typical “shortcut” in enforcing the law o In this case, that the said guns are illegally possessed by Roan is of
no moment
ROAN V. GONZALES (CUSTODIAL LEGIS— “WRONG GUNS WERE FOUND” o In other words, just because items are illegal items does not mean
(EXHAUSTIVE EXAMINATION IS NECESSARY BEFORE ESTABLISHING that the same can be summarily seized without due process
PROBABLE CAUSE TO CAUSE THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT) o But pending resolution of the case, the items must remain in custodia
legis
FACTS: 1. Warrant is VOID
• Respondent Judge issued a search warrant based on the mere affidavit of • Petitioner claims
Capt. Quillosa and some witnesses o There was a violation of the rules of court as there was no
• Capt. Quillosa himself did not have personal knowledge of the facts of the "examination of the applicant" (3rd requisite for a valid warrant)
offense, but simply relied upon the statements of the witnesses o No depositions were taken by respondent judge in accordance
• The witnesses stated that they saw 8 men deliver arms to Roan’s house with this 3rd requisite
• Upon search pursuant to the warrant, the officers did not find any of the articles • Abovementioned claim is not entirely true
mentioned in the warrant, but instead found a Colt Magnum Revolver and 18 o Depositions were taken of the complainant's 2 witnesses in
live bullets, which became the bases of the charges against Roan addition to the affidavit executed by them
• Roan contended that the procedure in issuing a search warrant was not o Respondent Judge said that— When PC Capt. Quillosa filed an
properly observed application for a warrant, he appeared with 2 witnesses, Esmael
• Petitioner claims Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented
§ He was a victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by military their respective affidavits
authorities

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 • Defect 1: HOWEVER, No deposition of the complainant (Quillosa) himself fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves
was taken, only his affidavit was examined (Violation) recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons
o Court Held in Mata v. Bayona: Mere affidavits of the complainant the petitioner was suspected of possessing.
and his witnesses are not sufficient. The examining judge has to 4. This case does not fall under the exceptions, therefore, the evidence
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses confiscated cannot be admissible for evidence (Stonehill doctrine)
he may produce and attach them to the record. i. Plain view rule does not apply
o THEREFORE, it seems that the applicant was asking for the ii. The weapon did not just “appear”
issuance of the warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of iii. The military authorities actually searched for it
information personally known to him (these are violations to iv. *Incidental to a lawful arrest
what jurisprudence requires)
§ Rationale of the requirement: ground for perjury if PEOPLE V. MALMSTEDT (BUS TO SAGADA)
statements are found to be false
• Defect 2: Also, examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely FACTS:
routinary, if the claimed probable cause is to be established • Malmstedt (defendant) entered the Philippines in 1988. In 7 May 1989,
o A study of the depositions of the witnesses who claimed to be defendant went to Baguio and the following day, went to Sagada and stayed
"intelligence informers" shows that what they were saying were there for 2 days.
mere restatements of what is in their affidavits, except that they • 11 May 1989, 7am: Defendant boarded a Skyline Bus which was bound for
were in "answer form" to the judge's questions Baguio City.
o The meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were • Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command
suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
did not excite the judge. This should have put him on guard as Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent
to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and
misrepresentations by the,. other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a
o The judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner • In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and
in his house in May 2, 1964 CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the
§ Six of the weapons were 45 caliber pistols NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection
§ Two were 38 caliber revolers CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on
§ (He could have asked questions like how far were accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other
they? How were they able to know the type of guns identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him
without anyone noticing them? Etc etc) to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to
o The 2 defects above render the search warrant invalid be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed
2. Voluntary submission to the search DOES NOT cure the voidness four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained
• Petitioner had no choice but to submit hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
o Coerced by military authorities • Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But
o Presumptive authority of a judicial writ before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags.
3. Items cannot be confiscated The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags
• Prohibited items can only be seized of there is a valid search. In this case, that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a
the search was invalid stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.
i. No valid search warrant • 15 June 1989, Defendant was charged before RTC of Benguet Branch 10 for
ii. Absent such warrant, the rights involved were not validly violation of Dangerous Drug Act of 1972.
waived • Defendant raised the issue of illegal search. He also claims that the hashish
iii. by the petitioner was planted and the pouch bag and the 2 travelling bags were not owned by
• It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the him (but this is belied by the fact that defendant failed to raise this issue at the
subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala earliest opportunity; he did not inform the fiscal or the investigating attorney).
prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily • 12 October 1989, RTC found defendant guilty.
seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still • Seeking reversal, the accused argues that search of his personal effects was
necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could illegal hence drugs discovered during said search are inadmissible as
have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept evidence.
by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The

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ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL • In warrantless search, probable cause is not determined by fixed formula but
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE is resolved according to facts of each case.
• NOTE: NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus and
HELD: VALID the passengers therein and no extensive search was initially made.
o The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when
RATIO: ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer
• The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court that accused was trying to hide his identity.
provides:
• “Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, NOTE: Read the dissenting opinion. It argues that it was the fact of illegal possession
without a warrant, arrest a person: which retroactively established probable cause. They argue that the search was not
a. When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is conducted during a lawful arrest. Instead the process was reversed; a search was done
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; before the arrest was effected. At the time the officers searched Malmstedt’s pouch
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has and bags, they were simply “fishing” for evidence because there was no sufficient
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested circumstance to create a reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be
has committed it; and committed.
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or POSADAS V. CA (STOP AND FRISK)
temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another” FACTS:
• Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A • Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom
crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra
flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City.
under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a • While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
• Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful.
has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense • They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1)
are in the placed sought to be searched. caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds
• In the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two
that accused was then and there committing a crime. Probable cause which (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.
justified the warrantless search arose from these circumstances: • They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the
o Persistent reports of drugs being transported from Sagada course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license
o Information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that day had or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but
drugs he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and
o There was a bulge on the waist of defendant and he failed to present the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the
his passport officer then on duty.
o ALSO: • He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the
§ where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
owned by the accused, or
§ where the accused was acting suspiciously, and ARGUMENTS:
§ attempted to flee. • Petitioner’s argument:
• The case therefore falls under paragraph 1 where defendant was caught in o The search and seizure was invalid because there was no warrant
flagrante delicto because he had with him prohibited drugs; he was actually of arrest. Therefore, the evidence is not admissible.
committing a crime. Was there lawful arrest? YES. Implication: no need of • Respondent (thru the Solicitor General) argument:
search warrant. o Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court says that a person lawfully
• When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no as proof of commission of an offense even without a search warrant
time to obtain a search warrant. o Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows
• They were lawfully arresting the defendant, and thus, there was no need for a a peace officer or a private person to arrest a person who “has
search warrant for them to search him. committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense” even without a warrant. Also applies if the peace officer has

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 personal knowledge of facts that the person to be arrested committed
an offense. ANIAG V. COMELEC (GUN BAN; CHECK POINT)
o SolGen argues that at the time the policemen approached the
petitioner, he was already committing illegal possession of firearms RECIT-READY: In preparation for the 1992 national elections, COMELEC issued a
so the warrantless arrest and search was valid. resolution ordering a GUN BAN and the summary disqualification of candidates found
to be engaged in gunrunning, using/transporting firearms, etc. Due to this, petitioner
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE WARANTLESS SEARCH IS VALID. was asked by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Reps to surrender the firearms
issued to him by such office. Petitioner ordered his driver, Arellano, to deliver the
HELD: YES firearms to the Batasan Complex. However, the PNP already set up a check-point
about 20m. from the Batasan entry. The car was searched, the firearms seized and
RATIO: Arellano was detained (but later released for his meritorious sworn explanation.
• The SC held that at the time the peace officers in this case identified Petitioner Congressman then went to the Office of the City Prosecutor to explain that
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did the driver was just returning the firearms and that Arellano was neither a
not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of bodyguard/security officer. However, COMELEC still ordered the filing of Information
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he against petitioner and his driver. The SC ruled that the search and seizure was invalid.
was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents It may be valid even if not authorized by authority, provided that the “search conducted
were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed
o However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle
can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of
foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.” Also, a warrantless search could only
at military or police checkpoints be resorted to if the officers have probable cause to believe BEFORE the search that
o This case is similar to a “stop and search” or “stop and frisk” either 1) the motorist was an offender searched.
situation
§ This was similar to the case of Valmonte v. de Villa (i.e. FACTS:
checkpoints in Valenzuela) • 11 December 1991, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323 – “Gun Ban”—
§ A reasonable search is not prohibited. But what is promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of
“reasonable” is determined on a case-to-case basis. firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on
§ Considered as a security measure to maintain peace and bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and
order for the benefit of the public. organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period.
• In the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable o Resolution 2327: summary disqualification of candidates engaged in
considering that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted strike forces and establishing checkpoints.
to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing • 10 January 1992— Mr. Taccad, Sgt at Arms, HoR requested Cong. Aniag of
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers first district of Bulacan to return the two (2) firearms issued to him by HoR.
to inspect the same. o 13 Januray 1992—Cong. Aniag immediately instructed driver
• SC agreed with the SolGen’s position that this is similar to a “stop and frisk” Ernesto Arellano to pick up the firearms from Valle Verde and return
• situation illustrated in the US case of Terry v. Ohio where the United States them to Congress
Supreme Court held: § 5PM same day, PNP headed by Senior Superintendent
o A police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex
appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of 20meters away from the entramce.
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no § 30 minutes later, the car driven by Arellano was flagged
probably cause to make an arrest.” down and was searched. They found firearms neatly
• DOCTRINE: A “stop and search” situation is a valid exception to Sec. 2, packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk
Art. III. of the car.
• It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the § Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search explained that it was an order by Cong. Aniag.
warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and • 15 January 1992— the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after
much too late. finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious
• Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions • 28 January 1992— the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the
heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation.
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

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 o Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to • SC RULED THAT—
confirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor WARRANTLESS SEARCH
urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not o GR: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly
violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when issued by an appropriate authority.
apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he o EX: Some exemptions to this rule:
was petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard— § a search incident to a lawful arrest
Prosecutor then recommended that the case be dismissed. § search of moving vehicles
• 6 April 1992— COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing § seizure of evidence in plain view
of information against Cong. Aniag and Arellano for violating the Omnibus § search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we
Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166 declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the
o Petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as
running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
No. 2327 subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
• 13 April 1992 – Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, vehicle is merely limited to a visual search
• this petition. o Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist
• The issue on the disqualification was rendered moot when petitioner lost his nor placed within his reach, and that they were neatly packed in gun
bid for a seat in Congress in the elections that ensued cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car.
§ COMELEC did not rebut this claim
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ANIAG CAN BE VALIDLY PROSECUTED FOR § There was no mention either of any report regarding any
INSTRUCTING HIS DRIVER TO RETURN TO THE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS OF THE nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THE TWO FIREARMS ISSUED TO HIM ON THE when the car was stopped and searched.
BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE GATHERED FROM THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF § Therefore, the PNP could not thoroughly search the car
HIS CAR lawfully as as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction.
HELD: NO o An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the
officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
RATIO: believe before the search that:
• PETITIONER ARGUES THAT— § the motorist was a law offender or
o The manner of search which was done without a warrant and without § that they would find the instrumentality or evidence
informing the driver of his fundamental rights and the yielded pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be
evidence for the prosecution was violative of Sec 2 and 3 par (2) Art searched
III of the Constitution. o Valid and recognized is the stop-and-search without warrant
§ NOTE: the firearms was not tucked in the waist nor within conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential
the immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant
their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of matters.
the car § Checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the
o He was not pleaded as respondent in the preliminary investigation entrance to the Batasan Complex
nor in the charge sheet and consequently making him a respondent § There was no evidence to show that the policemen were
in the criminal information would violate his constitutional right to due impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading
process them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching
o He did not violate Sec. 33 of RA 7166 because he did not engage the description furnished by their informant were engaged
the services of security personnel or bodyguards because Arellano in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special
was a civilian employee assigned to him as driver strike forces.
• COMELEC claims that— § There wasn’t any indication from the package or behavior
o “principals, accomplices and accessories shall be criminally liable for of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the
election offenses” à this points out to the instruction given by ANiag policemen.
to Arellano § Therefore the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's
o Right to be heard not violated because he was invited by the City right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
Prosecutor to explain his side purpose in any proceeding.
o Violation of the gun ban is mala prohibita and that the intent of the DUE PROCESS
offender is immaterial o It may be argued that the acquiescence of Arellano to the search
constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner's right to question the

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 reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the • They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group,
firearms. comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
§ Driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast.
courage to protest against the extensive search conducted • Yu and his group observed the group for about 30 minutes and later on, one
in the vehicle. policeman approached the group and the group fled in different directions.
o The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs • Yu caught up with Malacat and upon searching petitioner, Yu found a
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line."
§ Facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by • PO Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. revolver was recovered.
§ Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a • Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of
preliminary investigation for the abovementioned offense. Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza
§ Therefore, the non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the Miranda.
petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary • Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise
investigation is violative of due process which requires that at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a
the procedure established by law should be obeyed grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased
o “While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch any
constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established of the latter.
by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice... • Petitioner defense: The petitioner was brought to and detained at Precinct
It is a substantive right...” No. 3, and accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the
o The petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained. Petitioner was denying this as he said
cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate he just arrived in Manila.
preliminary investigation for himself
• Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following
his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a
MALACAT V. CA (FAST MOVING EYES)
lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available
• RTC Decision: RTC ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of
RECIT-READY: In response to a bomb threat, Yu of the WESTERN POLICE
petitioner was akin to it a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can
DISTRICT and other officers stationed themselves near the Mercury Drugstore in Plaza
be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose
Miranda where they observed 2 groups of Muslim-looking men, who were acting
object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer
suspiciously and with eyes moving very fast. As the officers approached the said
seeks to obtain more information."
groups, they ran, but were apprehended, and a search of their persons yielded a hand
o RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were confronted with
grenade and a .38 caliber pistol. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade. They
an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant,
were charged with illegal possession of explosives and the Trial Court sustained the
threatens the destruction of evidence.
search. Respondents argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to the absence
of any of the conditions for valid warrantless arrests. The SC held that in a search • In the CA petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to
incidental to a lawful arrest, the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental absence of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
search and the law requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search. Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote, were the arrest was illegal and the
Assuming a valid arrest, the officer may search a) the person of the arrestee and b) the item seized is an inadmissible evidence.
area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy. Personal • CA, however, affirmed the RTC decision.
knowledge on the part of the arresting officer and an overt physical act on the part of
the arrestee is necessary. In a stop-and-frisk, a limited protective search of outer ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS LEGAL
clothing for weapons is conducted. Although probable cause is not required, mere
suspicion or hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. In this case, the respondents were HELD: NO
not in flagrante delicto when they were arrested and searched because the allegation
that they had “eyes moving very fast” was very doubtful and could not have justified the RATIO:
existence of probable cause. Stop-and-frisk would also not hold sway as nothing in the
accused’s behavior then would warrant any suspicion, all the more that he was hiding ON JURISDICTION
a grenade. • The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who
shall unlawfully possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
FACTS: to reclusion perpetua.
• 27 August 1990— 6:30PM, in response to bomb threats reported seven days • CA – 17y 4m 1d to 30 years
earlier, Rodolfo YU was on foot patrol (all of them in uniform)

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 • The term "life imprisonment" as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the o Search incidental to a lawful arrest – the arresting officer may search
Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money
• Which means the SC has the jurisdiction. or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or
the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
ON WARRANTLESS ARREST: might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
Petitioners guilt not proven: violence.
o Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. The § (1) first a lawful arrest
grenade presented in court and identified by police officer in charge § (2) lawful search
(Ramillo) of ascertaining the grenade did not immediately submitted o No valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search
it to be examined after petitioner's arrest, but nearly seven (7) months in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, since
later. Further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo petitioner’s actions did not reflect that a crime had been committed
received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner or was about to be committed.
o If indeed the petitioner had the grenade with him and he was part of § Therefore, invalid arrest
the group who detonated a bomb in Plaza Miranda, it was then o “stop-and-frisk”—
unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply § "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,"
stood there in proximity to the police officers § Probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"
o Even assuming that he acquired the grenade during his custodial it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
investigation, admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in
2 3
taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
the Constitution. conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
§ Even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived has weapons concealed about him.
his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was § 2-fold reason: (1) the general interest of effective crime
invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
presence of counsel. that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
Possession of the grenade: and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
• As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest
• Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal officer.
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has • Why the search was invalid:
committed it; and (1) we harbor grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that petitioner was a member of
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This
• Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated
1. customs searches; by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. (chain of
2. search of moving vehicles; evidence)
3. seizure of evidence in plain view; (2) there was nothing in petitioner’s behavior or conduct which could have
4. consent searches; reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
5. a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and “moving very fast” – an observation which leaves us incredulous since
6. a "stop and frisk Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already
• DOCTRINE:SC said, RTC confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were
a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly trouble.
effected and in their allowable scope. (3) there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that
petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for

2 3
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

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 as he admitted, the alleged grenade was “discovered” “inside the front 3) Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
waistline” of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4) Consented warrantless search;
PEOPLE V. ARUTA (SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST) 5) Customs search;
6) Stop and Frisk; and
FACTS: 7) Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
• 13 December 1988— P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by Benie, his informant, that
a certain “Aling Rosa” would be arriving Baguio City from the following day • The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a
with a large volume of marijuana. warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
o He composed a team which proceeded west to Olongapo and at • In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a
around 4pm, deployed themselves near PNB and the near Caltex sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
o At around 6:30PM, a Victory Liner Bus (BGO474) stopped in front of
PNB and 2 females and 1 male got off. The informant then pointed JURISPRUDENCE:
out Aling Rosa who was carrying a traveling bag. • In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from
• The team, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, approached Aling their informant regarding Aruta's alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen
Rosa and she handed over the bag. Upon inspection, the bag was found to were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that
contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked "Cash the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their "business
Katutak." address". More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His
o The same was confiscated together with the Victory Liner bus ticket actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably
so which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single
• Accused Alibi and Defense: indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
o She had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the • Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In
movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old woman asked present case, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure
her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. a search warrant. Second, Aruta's identity was priorly ascertained. Third,
Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a
to the NARCOM Office. moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement.
o Illegality of search and seizure therefore, inadmissible. No search Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
warrant • In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable
• RTC convicted the accused. cause necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The following have been
established:
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH WAS VALID o (1) In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement
officers received information from an informant named "Benjie" that
HELD: NO a certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for Baguio City on December
14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day
RATIO: carrying with her a large volume of marijuana;
• This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches o (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant
and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a traveling bag even as the
seizures. informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers;
o (3) The law enforcement officers approached her and introduced
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES themselves as NARCOM agents;
1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest o (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her traveling bag,
2) Seizure of evidence in "plain view," she gave the same to him;
a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police o (5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves;
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; o (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to investigation.
be where they are; • In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a
c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and warrant of arrest.
d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; o Aruta was not actually committing a crime/ offense

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• Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents it is feasible.
to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. o The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the
• The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into
it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.
the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect o Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search
that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing becomes admissible upon failure to object thereto during the trial of
finger of the informant. the case, records show that accused-appellant
• Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on • While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may
evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be be held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most
unlawful, for being contrary to law. jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is "the only practical
• In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse.
the search and seizure of accused- appellant's bag would also not be justified
as seizure of evidence in "plain view" , as the marijuana was not immediately ASUNCION V. CA (SHABU IN VEHICLE)
apparent.
• Nor would it be justified as search of moving vehicle, as there was no moving RECIT-READY: While patrolling, Malabon Police- Anti Narcotics Unit flagged a gray
vehicle. She was accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the Nissan Sentra driven by Asuncion upon an informant’s tip that the occupant of said car
vehicle. had drugs in his possession. (Asuncion had a previous encounter with police but he
• In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have was able to evade them.) Police asked if they can inspect the car and the petitioner
aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to "stop and voluntarily acceded to it. Police found a plastic packet suspected to contain shabu
frisk" accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing under the driver seat. Petitioner claimed he just borrowed the car. Police brought him
the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, to the station and when frisked they found another plastic packet with shabu in his
accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when underwear. In a press conference, Petitioner admitted that the shabu found was for his
the latter identified themselves as such. personal use in his shooting. Petitioner later claimed that it was a frame up and also
• The same does not fall under exigent and emergency circumstances— ie. claimed search was illegal because there was no warrant. However, SC affirmed RTC
intelligence reports that the building was being used as headquarters by the and CA’s decision saying that he committed a crime under the dangerous drug Act. SC
RAM during a coup d' etat. said that searching a moving vehicle is one of the exceptions - that it did not need
• The accused also did not voluntarily submit herself to search and inspection warrant to be search because it is not practicable (time is of the essence) for they could
that would constitute as waiver of her constitutional right. just easily get away to another locality or court jurisdiction if police would wait for a
o Cannot apply Malasugui case because in that case there was warrant to be issued.
probable cause
o Also, The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could FACTS:
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under • December 6, 1993: in compliance with the order of Malabon Municipal mayor
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no to intensify campaign against drugs, Malabon Police (Anti Narcotics Unit; SPO
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 1 Advincula, PO3 Parcon, PO3 Pilapil and a police aide) conducted a patrol
o We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption in Barangay Tañong around 11:45 pm
against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do • They were ordered to look for a certain vehicle and to watch out for a certain
not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." drug pusher named Vic Vargas which they previously had an encounter with
• Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have but the latter escaped
secured one without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the • While patrolling along Leoño street confidential Informant pointed to the said
Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been particularized car (a Gay Nissan Sentra) and told them the occupant had drugs in his
and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained possession
to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be • Police then flagged the car along First street and found Petitioner Asuncion
accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was as the driver a movie actor – Vic Vargas, Binggoy)
identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely • They asked petitioner if they can inspect said car which he voluntarily acceded
positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally thereto
unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to • Upon Inspection by SPO 1 Advincula, police found a plastic packet with white
particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing substance suspected to be Methamphetamine hydrochloride (a.k.a. Shabu)
a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any under the driver seat
case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place • Petitioner claim he just borrowed the car, nevertheless police brought him to
Police HQ for his identification

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 • He was frisked by Advincula and found another plastic packet with white trade, they were uncertain as to the time he would show up
substance in his underwear in the vicinity.
• The white substance was later examined by NBI and found to be Shabu § Secondly, they were uncertain as to the type of vehicle
• A press conference was conducted where petitioner admitted that the shabu petitioner would be in, taking into account reports that
were for his personal use in his shooting petitioner used different cars in going to and from the area.
• Advincula testified that they already had previous encounter but the accused § Finally, there was probable cause as the same police
was able to evade them and that no search warrant was secured because officers had a previous encounter with the petitioner, who
accused uses different vehicle and can’t get his exact identity and residence was then able to evade arrest.
• Petitioner claim he was framed - that police abducted him at gun point brought • Sol Gen: “operatives had to act quickly[,] [o]therwise, they would again lose
him to a hospital for a check-up (drug test but only his blodd pressure was their subject whom they reasonably believed to be committing a crime at that
checked) and then to the station instance. There would be no more time for them to secure a search warrant.”
• Petitioner, nevertheless was charged and found guilty of violation of section • It might also be important to take note that the accused voluntarily acceded to
16 article 3 RA 6425 (dangerous drug act) by the Malabon RTC ( 6-14-94) the inspection which might indicate waiver of right against unreasonable
and was affirmed by CA (4-30-96) with modification as to penalty imposed search and seizure but the waiver was not discussed in this case
• RE: Frame up - evidence must be clear and convincing to uphold defense of
ISSUE: W/N SEARCH WAS ILLEGAL THEREBY MAKING THE EVIDENCE Frame Up
INADMISSIBLE o Only defense was a medical certificate – not sufficient

HELD: SEARCH WAS LEGAL AS IT WAS A VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH PEOPLE V. CANTON (AIRPORT SEARCH)

RATO: FACTS:
• THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE • February 12, 1998 at NAIA - Canton was a departing passenger bound for
o “Police had a previous encounter with the petitioner who was able Saigon, Vietnam.
to evade arrest” • She passed through a metal detector which emitted a beeping sound.
o car was identified [to have drugs on board] by a confidential • CABUNOC, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking
informant and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty called her attention and
• The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that checked Canton. ("Excuse me ma’am, can I search you?")
the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle petitioners • Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her
vehicle was flagged down by the apprehending officers upon identification. hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several times and
Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching the petitioners noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules.
automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate action. • When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSAN’s
o People vs Lo Ho Wing – “not practicable to secure a warrant genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or latter refused and said: "Money, money only."
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought” • Canton was requested to head to a comfort room for physical examination
• The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search wherein she was asked to take her clothes off.
the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered o Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped
by virtue of a valid warrantless search and the petitioner himself freely gave and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily
his consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were handed to them.
admissible in evidence. o The first was taken from SUSAN’s abdominal area; the second, from
• In contrast to People v Idel Aminnundin Y Ahni in front of her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh.
o Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant • The packages were examined and they turned out to be SHABU of
was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed approximately 998 grams.
or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest • RTC found Canton guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 16 of Art.
o No urgency, as the Phil Constabulary knew the vehicle (MV Wilcon III of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act).
9) on which suspect would be on and when it would arrive – they had • Canton filed for an MR but was denied.
two days to apply for a warrant
o In this case (Asuncion), ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SUSAN SHOULD BE CONVICTED
§ First of all, even though the police authorities already
identified the petitioner as an alleged shabu dealer and HELD: YES
confirmed the area where he allegedly was plying his illegal
RATIO:

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 o An Offense has just been committed and he has probably cause to
(1) WON the search conducted on Canton was incidental to a lawful arrest. – NO. believe based on personal knowledge of the facts or circumstances
• Susan’s arrest did not precede the search. She was arrested after the shabu that the person to be arrested has committed it;
was discovered by the authorities. o Person to be arrested is an escaped prisoner
• The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were • The search conducted on her resulted in the discovery and recovery of the
the packages concealed on SUSAN’s body. packages.
o Such restraint during the time she was being frisked/search is not • Such search was legal because the airport security personnel and police
tantamount to an arrest (taking of a person into custody) officers had knowledge of the crime being committed given the circumstances
• Prior to the strip search in the ladies’ room, the airport security personnel had • As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was
no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN’s body; hence, they did not justified, since it was effected up
know yet whether a crime was being committed.
• In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, there must first be a lawful arrest (5) WON the constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial
before a search can be made. The process cannot be reversed. investigation was not violated. – NO.
• Custodial investigation – questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
(2) WON the scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his freedom of action
confined only to search for weapons under the TERRY SEARCH doctrine. – NO. in any significant way. Presupposes that he is suspected of having committed
• Terry search – stop and frisk situation where a police officer approaches a a crime.
person who is acting suspiciously for the purposes of investigation possibly • Right to counsel attaches upon start of investigation.
criminal behavior. Police officer may conduct a carefully limited search of the • No custodial investigation was conducted.
outer clothing of such person. • She was affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her
• The search was made pursuant to airport security procedure which is allowed after being informed that she had the option not to sign it.
in RA 6325 • No statement was taken from her during her detention and used in evidence
• Another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and against her.
seizures.
o Notice to All Passengers" located at the final security checkpoint at (6) WON the admission of the medical report was erroneous. – YES.
the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the • It was not properly identified.
search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. • Immaterial in the case
Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or
substances. (7) WON Canton’s conviction and the penalty imposed are correct. – YES.
• CASE: It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further searched • Lawful and within range prescribed by law.
because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, • She was fined c1,000,000, which is within the range of 500,000-10million
coupled by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the pesos for violation of RA 6425.
packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that
SUSAN was hiding something illegal. (8) WON the other items seized from the appellant should be returned. – YES.
o The strip search in the ladies’ room was justified • The passport, tickets, girdles, etc must be returned.

(3) WON the ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the case. – YES. DECISION: Canton is guilty beyond reasonable doubt; affirmed the RTC’s decision.
• Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure
of their persons or property to the public such as in airport security checks. DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
• Stare Decisis - given that the facts of this case and that of Johnson’s are
similar, the rulings made therein are also applicable. FACTS:
• Materials acquired legitimately in airport security checks are admissible as • Petitioner’s assail the constitutionality of the Cybercrime Law— the pertinent
evidence. sections relevant to art II are
o Section 12 (Real-time collection of data)
(4) WON THE APPELLANT, HAVING BEEN CAUGHT FLAGRANTE DELICTO, WAS o Section 14 (Disclosure of computer data)
LAWFULLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT. – YES. o Section 15 (Search, seizure and examination of computer data)
• A peace officer or a private person may without warrant arrest a person when o Section 19 (Restricting or blocking access to computer data)
• the person to be arrested is:
o Actually committing or attempting to commit an offense; ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THE SAID SECTIONS VIOLATE SECTION 2

HELD: YES and NO

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 SECTION 14 – UPHELD
RATIO: • Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities,
upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any
SECTION 12 – UNCONSTITUTIONAL person or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s
o Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control
enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a
collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and
real-time associated with specified communications the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of
transmitted by means of a computer system. investigation.
o Petitioners— that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do o Likened to the issuance of a subpoena
not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and § Not exclusively a judicial function; executive agencies as
invading the people’s right to privacy well as an adjunct of their investigatory powers
§ certain constitutional guarantees work together to create o The Court upheld the provision such that it merely laid down the
zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not procedure of the enforcement of a duly issued warrant.
intrude, and that there exists an independent constitutional § Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
right of privacy.
§ Decisional Privacy— right to independence in making SECTION 15 – UPHELD
certain important decisions • Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where
§ Informational Privacy—interest in avoiding disclosure of a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement
personal matters authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
• right not to have private information disclosed • Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception,
• right to live freely without surveillance and as defined in this Act, and:
intrusion a. To secure a computer system or a computer data storage
o Petitioners: "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence medium;
and that whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of b. To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
the police c. To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
o The Court saw that the phrase “due cause” with regard to the real- d. To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer
time collection of data (general gathering of data) was vague, and data storage medium; and
that such was akin to a general warrant. In addition, the Court did e. To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the
not see a connection between the collection of such data and the accessed computer or computer and communications network.
probable commission of a crime. o This section was assailed for allegedly supplanting search and
o The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too seizure procedures. However, the Court saw that it only enumerated
sweeping and lacks restraint. Nothing can prevent law enforcement the duties of law enforcement to ensure proper collection,
agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the preservation and use of data seized by virtue of a warrant.
identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains and § does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure
will expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion rules but merely supplements them.
from certain bad elements in these agencies.
o Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those SECTION 19 – UNCONSTITUTIONAL
"associated with specified communications." The power is o Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.—
virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of
"fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified communication the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to
they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy. restrict or block access to such computer data.
o The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize o The Court saw that the DOJ’s power to issue an order to restrict or
collection of traffic data "in real time" because it is not possible to get block access to data when there is a prima facie violation of the act
a court warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a was that the government, in effect, was seizing the computer data,
"moving vehicle." But warrantless search is associated with a police and putting it under its control and disposition without a warrant.
officer’s determination of probable cause that a crime has been § Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention,
committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established
unless the search is immediately carried out, the thing to be to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
searched stands to be removed. These preconditions are not o It further held that the DOJ order cannot replace a judicial warrant.
provided in Section 12. Not to mention, such provision violates the freedom of speech.

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 o Plaintiff not entitled to the production and inspection of the originals
because according to his supplemental motion, he needed it only to
find out if there was falsification
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES “OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR WHATEVER • 27 September 27, 1947— respondent judge denied the motion for
PURPOSE” reconsideration
• Sarreal's reasons to believe that there was no GADALEJ
MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS V. NATIVIDAD (RULES OF COURT— PRODUCTION o Motions of Sarreal contained allegations of the ultimate fact that the
OF DOCUMENTS) books and papers mentioned in the motions constitute or contain
evidence material to the matters involved in the case and are in
RECIR-READY: Sarreal filed a complaint, seeking a money judgment against possession, custody, or control of herein petitioners
petitioners. Sarreal also filed a Motion for the Production and Inspection of books, o Art 46 of the Code of Commerce has been repealed already
papers, letters of and between Material Distributors and Lyons. Judge Natividad o Neither would the inspection of the books and papers constitute a
granted Sarreal’s Motion, despite the objection of petitioners because, according to violation of the inviolability of correspondence - they were sought
them, there was no good cause and that Sarreal was simply fishing for evidence. through the proper order of a trial court
Petitioners contend that Judge Natividad violated their right to unreasonable searches § creates no new right, being merely a re-enforcement of the
and seizures, as well as their constitutional rights against self-incrimination. The SC Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
held that the Order was issued by virtue of the provisions of Section 1, Rule 21, which and seizures
pertains to a civil procedure that cannot be identified with unreasonable searches o Not a fishing expedition - it is with a view to enable the respondent
prohibited by the Constitution. Section 1, Rule 21 allows a court where an action is to designate with particularity of the subpoena to be obtained with
pending to either a) order a party to produce items, not privileged, which contain trial of the case on its merits the specific books and papers containing
material evidence to any matter involved in the action, or b) order a party to permit entry the entry of receipts and payments of the petitioners
upon designated areas in his control for the same purpose. The Order shall specify the § At any rate, "fishing expedition" is allowed and is precisely
time, place, and manner of the inspection and shall prescribe just conditions. In this contemplated in Rule 21 of our Rules of Court as a weapon
case, the SC said that justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the of discovery
controversy are before the court. The SC also held that the guarantee of privacy of o Documents falsified relevant not only to the case of the defendants
communication and correspondence will not be violated because the court has power but also to the plaintiff in Civil Case 2059
and jurisdiction to issue the Order. In this case, it was an express exception in favor of o Not against self-incrimination
the disclosure of communication and correspondence upon lawful order. § the Constitutional prohibition is one against compelling a
person to be a "witness against himself",
FACTS: • testimonial compulsion or extraction of admission
• 24 March 1947— Lope Sarreal filed a complaint seeking for a money form the person's own lips
judgment against Material Distributors and Harry Lyons o Corporate records are not covered by the constitutional prohibition
• 27 May 1947— Sarreal filed for the production and inspection of: against self-incrimination
o Certain books or papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. o Production and inspection of documents have been allowed and
o Certain books and paper of defendant Harry Lyons sustained in decided cases
• 4 June 1947— Sarreal filed a supplemental motion for the production and o Judge gave both parties to engage in oral arguments and written
inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B of Complaint memoranda
• 12 June 1947— Petitioner filed a memorandum and opposition to Sarreal’s
motion on the ground that he failed to show good cause and the that the ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT the respondent Judge commit GADALEJ in his
motion was filed for the purpose of fishing evidence decisions
• 16 July 1947— Respondent judge granted both motions and required
Petitioners to produce the said documents and annexes HELD: NO
o On account of the absence in the PH of Harry Lyons, petitioner
moved to postpone inspection RATIO:
• 13 August 1947— petitioners moved for the reconsideration • The production and inspection of documents here in question call for the
o Article 46 of the Code of Commerce prohibits the delivery, interpretation and application of Section 1 of Rule 21 - Motion for production
communication and general examination of the correspondence of or inspection
merchants, a substantial right, as well as the constitutional right to o SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. — Upon
the inviolability of their correspondence motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to
o Production of the documents requested would amount to a fishing all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order
expedition any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or

Jlyrreverre|288
 photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any • Inspector confronted appellant and demanded inspection of the premises,
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, which appellant refused for lack of search warrant. Inspector returned some
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which time later and was again refused. Appellant was then required to appear at
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the the district attorney’s office, for which he didn’t show. Inspectors again went
action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) to his house informing him that he was required to submit to the inspection
order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other pursuant to Sec. 503 of the Housing code:
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, o Authorized employees..., so far as may be necessary for the
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any performance of their duties, shall,...have the right to enter, at
designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall reasonable times, any...premises in the City to perform any duty
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.
taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and • Appellant still refused without a warrant. He was charged with violation of the
conditions as are just. Code, arrested and released on bail. His demurrer to the criminal complaint
• Upon showing of good cause, the judge may: was denied and so this petition for prohibition.
o Order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or • Appellant assails the constitutionality of Sec. 503 of the Housing Code for
photographing of any document which contains evidence being violative of the 4th and 14th amendments.
o Order any party to permit entry to a designated land for the purpose
of inspection PETITIONER ARGUES THAT—
• Good cause was shown by Sarreal in the allegations: • it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search
o Original Motion: that the books and papers therein mentioned warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the
"constitute or contain the evidence material to the matters involved Housing Code exists therein
in the above entitled case." CA RULED THAT—
o Supplemental Motion: direct conflict between the allegations of the • "is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil, rather than criminal
complaint and amended complaint and those of the answer and in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is
amended answer limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions."
§ WON the names of Puyat and Lehmann appear in any
document - if YES, there is forgery because it was made ISSUES: WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTION PROGRAMS, AS
without the consent and knowledge of Sarreal PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED AND CONDUCTED, VIOLATE FOURTH AMENDMENT
• The court sees no reason why the inspection of the documents would amount RIGHTS AS THOSE RIGHTS ARE ENFORCED AGAINST THE STATES THROUGH
to self-incrimination THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
• The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21,
th
pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with HELD: YES. Violative of the 4th and 14 amendment
the unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution • 4th amendment: (like Art. III Sec. 2 Bill of Rights)
o But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production and inspection o The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
of books and documents in question is tantamount to a search and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
warrant, the procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
respondent judge place them outside the realm of the prohibited supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
unreasonable searches. place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
§ Sarreal has an interest in the books and documents in • It is enforceable against the States through the 14th amendment.
question (material and important to the issues)
• Constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence RATIO
will not be violated - the trial court has the power and jurisdiction to issue • General rule: Except in certain carefully defined cases, a search of private
orders for the production and inspection of such documents property without proper consent is “unreasonable” unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant.
CAMARA V. MUNICIPAL COURT (HOUSING INSPECTOR) • Frank v. Maryland (This was the governing doctrine, which the Court, in this
case, overturned so it’s landmark):
FACTS: o Facts: Appellant refused warrantless search of private premises for
• An inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Dept. the purpose of locating and abating a public nuisance. He was
of Public Health entered herein appellant’s apartment building to do routine convicted for refusal and the Court upheld it.
annual inspection for possible violations of the Housing Code. The building o Ratio—justifications for permitting administrative health and safety
manager informed the inspector that appellant had been using the rear of his inspections without warrant:
leasehold as personal residence, which the occupancy permit did not allow.

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 § Merely to determine: whether physical conditions exist o Routine inspections aren’t so urgent as to have to take effect
which do not comply with minimum standards prescribed in immediately without warrant. Furthermore, citizens usually allow
local regulatory ordinances. routine inspections of their premises anyway even without warrant. It
§ Municipal fire, health and housing inspection programs are is believed that warrants need only be sought when the citizen has
merely to determine if the premises is complying with the refused the warrantless search, unless there has been citizen
minimum standards set in municipal ordinances and not to complaints or other compelling reasons to effect immediate entry.
search for “evidence of criminal action”. The 4th • Appellant had constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant
amendment interests at stake here are merely peripheral. to search and appellant may not be convicted for refusing consent to the
• Anomalous to say that the individual and his inspection.
private property are only protected when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior. IN THE MATTER OF THE PERITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS:
• Possibility of criminal entry under the guise of HARVEY V. SANTIAGO (WARRANTS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS)
official sanction is a serious threat to personal and
family security RECIT-READY: PEDOPHILES; VALID; DEPORTATION IS NOT A CRIMINAL
§ They are designed to make the least possible demand on PROCEDURE. Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were aliens arrested upon Order by the
the individual occupant COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION for having engaged in pedophilia. They were
• Hedge with safeguards under surveillance for months and upon their apprehension, various effects, such as
• Decision to enter must comply with standard of videotapes and photographs were seized. Afterwards, deportation proceedings were
reasonableness then instituted against the said aliens and they were detained pendente lite. The aliens
§ The warrant process could not function properly in this filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus and assailed the arrest and seizure for
field— Inspections of entire municipal areas are based on being a violation of the Constitution. The SC held that a warrantless arrest may be
broad factors such as the area’s age and condition effected when an offense has, in fact, been committed and the police officer has
§ Public interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
argued that the health and safety of entire urban In this case, the arrest was based on probable cause after 3-months worth of
populations is dependent upon enforcement of minimum surveillance. Moreover, the seizure of the photographs were incidental to a lawful
fire, housing, and sanitation standards, and that the only arrest. The SC also held that because deportation proceedings have been instituted,
effective means of enforcing such codes is by routine then their detention has become legal, even assuming arguendo that it was illegal at
systematized inspection of all physical structures. the outset. Thus, habeas corpus can no longer apply. Moreover, the filing of a petition
• Q: whether they may be made without a warrant to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity in the arrest.
• OVERTURNED: Under this system, the occupant has no way of knowing what The SC further held that the COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION is authorized by the
the search is about, what the limits are, and WON the agent is acting upon REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE to issue warrants, but it is essential that: There is
proper authorization. He must first question the search and risk a criminal a specific charge against the alien; A fair hearing be conducted; The charged be
conviction for not allowing it. The practical effect is to give the official wide sustained by competent evidence; Last but not least, the rule that only a judge may
discretion in the field. issue valid warrants does not apply to deportation proceedings, as the same is not a
o Fire, housing and sanitation inspections may still be made. What we criminal procedure, but a preventive measure that is administrative in character.
are disallowing is making them without warrant. There is no
evidence that these types of inspection programs cannot achieve FACTS:
their goals within the standards of the warrant process. • PETITIONERS:
• Thus, warrantless searches of these kinds, like the case at bar, are o Andrew Harvey, 52— American
violative of the 4th amendment. o John Sherman, 72— American
• Need for probable cause o Adriaan Van Elshout, 58— Dutch citizen
o Unlike searches pursuant to criminal investigation, the purpose of § all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna
these kinds of warrants is citywide compliance with the minimum • Only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation of the 22 suspected
physical standards for private property. The governmental interest pedophiles who were apprehended after 3 months of close surveillance
here is the prevention of conditions, which will become a hazard to o 1— working w/o a valid working visa; 17— self-deportation; 1— lack
public health and safety. of evidence
• The only way to implement this is through routine periodic inspections of all • Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and
structures. Probable cause then is based on an appraisal of a certain area as photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as
a whole. What is required is probable cause arising from knowledge of boys and girls engaged in the sex act.
condition of the district or area, and not necessarily individual buildings. o posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes
• When a warrant must be sought • The Operation Report and After Mission Report on Petitioners—

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 o Andrew Mark Harvey was found together with two young boys. o CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners
o Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. were committing pedophilia
o Van Den Elshout— There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which • Even if not punishable under RPC, it is behavior offensive to public morals,
subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite and violative of the State Policy protecting our youth. (Art 2, Sec 13, Consti)
sometime. • At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should
• The Warrant be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops
o Warrants were issued by respondent Defensor-Santiago them from questioning its validity
(Commissioner of CID) for violation of the Immigration act, and the • Deportation Proceedings—
Revised Administrative Code o It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not
§ petition for bail denied constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a
punishment
PETITIONERS QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THEIR DETENTION o The deportation proceedings are administrative in character,
• Commissioner has no authority under Immigration Act or Admin Code to arrest summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance
and detain petitioners PENDING DETERMINATION of probable cause with the ordinary court proceedings
• Respondent violated Sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, since CID agents had no valid o The warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about
warrants of arrest, search and seizure the charges against him, relating the facts relied upon.
• Confidential Information made to CID (Commission on Immigration and • Warrants of arrest in deportation proceedings are solely for the purpose of
Deportation) agents that petitioners were pedos is not a valid ground for arrest investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued
unless they were caught in the act. o did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should
• They also allege that it is not a crime to be a pedo (not punishable by any Phil not be deported
law) o issued specifically "for violation of Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code."
ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THE DETENTION OF THE PETITIONERS WERE VALID o Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare
ground for his deportation
HELD – PETITION DENIED, RESPONDENT ACTS UPHELD • Morano v. Vivo— "The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by
a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings."
RATIO o In deportation cases, probable cause had already been shown to
• LAW: The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.
a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) • The right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of
when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been • As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said
to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5). proceedings
• CASE— probable cause was determined after close surveillance for 3 • Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its
months. territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or
• This probable cause justified the arrest and the [seizure of the evidence public interest
without warrant] • The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the
o These articles were incident to a lawful arrest (i.e, andun lang sila authority of the sovereign power
when the arrest was made) and thus are admissible as evidence
• Even if we assume that the arrest was invalid (remember, this is a petition for PEOPLE V. AMINNUDIN (WARRANTLESS ARREST OF VIOLATORS OF DDA)
habeas corpus)
o "were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order RECIT-READY: The PC officers received a tip from an informant that Amminnudin was
in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, bound for Iloilo onboard MV WILCOM 9 carrying marijuana. Aminnudin was searched
his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot and academic" and arrested after disembarking from the vessel. The PC officers found 3 kilos of
o a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is marijuana in his bag. He was charged and found guilty of illegally transporting
or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the marijuana by the CFI of Iloilo. The decision was appealed to the SC. The SC ruled that
beginning there was no valid search and arrest so the evidence against him was inadmissible.
• “That the petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest The SC held that mere information does not amount to probable cause. In this case,
illegal.” Aminundin was not in flagrante delicto when he was arrested and searched – he was
o They were caught with young boys in their respective rooms, in one merely disembarking from a and the informant pointed him out. Also, the PC had 2 days
case, they were naked. to obtain a warrant, but no effort was exerted to comply with the law, despite having

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knowledge of Aminudin’s name, the vehicle he was on, and his date of arrival. The SC o Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you
also held that since the arrest was invalid, the search made incidental thereto was do not need a search warrant anymore?
likewise invalid. He was acquitted. o A Search warrant is not necessary. (Lt. Querol)
• BUT the Supreme Court ruled that:
FACTS: o (1) Amminudin was not caught in flagrante delicto nor was a crime
• 25 June 1984, PC officers approached Aminnudin as he was disembarking about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the
M/V Wilcom 9 in Iloilo City after the former received a tip from an informant warrantless arrest allowed in RULE 113.
that the latter was bound for Iloilo. They found three kilos of marijuana leaves § In various court decisions, warrantless arrest was allowed
in his bag. when offenders were caught red handed
o The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted § In Amminudin’s case, it was not shown that at the moment of
him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana his arrest, he was committing, about to commit or has just
leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. committed a crime.
o NOTE: He was Identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for § He was simply descending from the ship and there was no
him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he outward indication calling for his arrest
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to § It was only when the informant pointed at him that he suddenly
him. became a suspect and so subject to apprehension
• He was charged for illegally transporting marijuana. In the defense, Aminnudin § The identification of the informant was the probable cause
disclaimed the marijuana. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and which is arbitrary.
immediately handcuffed. Further, his bag was confiscated without a warrant. o (2) Even expediency could not be invoked because the case did not
At the PC Headquarters, he alleged that he was manhandled, beaten up and present urgency
forced to admit he was carrying marijuana. § Amminudin was coming to Iloilo onboard MV Wilcon 9.
• The trial court was unconvinced noting that Aminnudin alleged that he went to § His name was known
Iloilo to sell watches but carried only 2 watches, traveling from Jolo for that § The vehicle was identified
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. § The date of arrival was certain
• He was found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana and was sentenced with § From such info, they could have convinced a judge to issue
life imprisonment plus a fine of 20,000. the necessary warrants
• Thus the present appeal • It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest.
• The SC did not reverse the factual findings of the lower court but examined • The arrest was illegal and the subsequent search also illegal. The EVIDENCE
the validity of the arrest and search without warrant. cannot be admitted. Because of that exclusion, Amminudin’s guilt was not
o The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's proven BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really beaten up
because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a UMIL V. RAMOS (CONTINUING OFFENSE)
medical examination.
UMIL v. RAMOS (main and reconsideration) Summary: This consolidated case of 8
ISSUE: WHETHER AMINNUDIN’S ARREST AND SEARCH WAS VALID petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the
military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the “confidential information” that the
HELD: Decision of Trial Court is REVERSED, Appellant ACQUITTED. authorities received. Except for one case where inciting-to-sedition was charged, the
rest are charged with subversion for being members of the New People’s Army. The
IMPORTANT: The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor SC held that the arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were
General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was legal since subversion is a form of a continuing crime (together with rebellion,
valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion), and crimes committed in
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest. furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting-to-sedition case, the
arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests
RATIO: were not “fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe-
• The PC officers had no warrant. Their only justification was the tip they had houses pinpointed by similar NPA members” as pointed out by the Solicitor General.
received from a reliable and regular informer that Amminudin was arriving at
Iloilo by boat carrying marijuana. The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as
o The testimonies varies as to the time the received the tio (2 days, possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of
two weeks, weeks before June 25) information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid
• It was argued by the solicitor general that arrest warrant was not necessary judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
and that the search was also valid as it was incidental to a lawful arrest.

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DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The “confidential information” was nothing but hearsay. The 3. PETITION 1 - Umil vs. Ramos
searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were a. 1 February 1988 - (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information
not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in about a
their fishing expeditions. b. member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a
gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
The doctrine emphasized by this case is that when the crime is a continuing City
crime (rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crime, the c. Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
offenders may be arrested without a warrant. The same doctrine is reiterated in squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day
the resolution of this case. before
d. 4 February 1988 - Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses
“Arrested while confined in hospital” (valid warrantless arrest; rebellion is a as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol
continuing crime) car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldier
e. Petitioner was charged with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon
Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA, shot and killed 2 policemen in furtherance of Agents of Persons in Authority.
rebellion. He was confined in ST. AGNES HOSPITAL when he was arrested without a f. 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
warrant. Dural assailed a) the validity of the arrest, as it violated his constitutional rights behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva
and b) the g. (1988) – Feb 9 Court issued writ of habeas corpus. Feb 12 petitioners filed
doctrine that rebellion is a continuing crime. The SC held that mere membership with Return of the Writ. Feb 15 the parties were heard.
the NPA is a continuing crime, making the warrantless arrest lawful because the h. 26 February 1988 - Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail. The
arrestee would be committing an offense at that time of his arrest. In this case, Dural petition for habeas corpus as regards them became moot and academic
did not cease to be or became less subversive just because he was confined in a since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a
hospital. The SC also held that subversion and rebellion are different from common criminal case who has been released on bail
offense, which generally end upon their commission, because the former are anchored i. Rolando Dural not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM
on an ideological base, which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness but a day after the said shooting
until the objective of overthrowing the government is attained. In other words, a rebel a. However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the
will not stop until the overthrow of the government is achieved, making him always in New People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization
flagrante delicto. b. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid committing an offense when arrested.
considering that the arrests were made without warrants. c. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
FACTS/HELD/RATIO: furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
1. This is a consolidation of 8 petitions submitted praying for the issuance of the assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing
writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the crimes
bodies of the petitioners, on the ground that their arrests were made without 4. PETITION 2 - Roque vs. De Villa
valid arrest warrants. a. Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, were arrested without warrant.
2. Warrantless arrests, when lawful (Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court): b. (Former admitted to ownership of subversive documents. Latter admitted
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private to being an NPA member)
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: c. Violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque and
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is Wilfredo Buenaobra
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; d. 24 August 1988 - a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has e. At the hearing of the case, however, Buenaobra opted to stay detained
committed it; and so the issue as regards him became moot and academic.
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a f. The arrest without warrant of Roque was a justified as she was in
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or possession of ammunitions without license to possess them at the time
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while of arrest (similar to Dural decision)
being transferred from one confinement to another. 5. PETITION 3 - Anonuevo vs. Ramos
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested a. Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casipl were arrested for possessing a
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or bag
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section b. containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and
7. ammunition

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 c. for which they had no license to possess or carry. b. Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive
d. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were
frisked, found in the car
e. the agents found them to be loaded guns c. 17 May 1988 - a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
f. Petitioners were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 behalf of Vicky Ocaya
g. (Illegal possession of firearms) d. Petitioner was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a
h. 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because
behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said she was arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the
Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7,
that the informations filed against them are null and void for having been Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.
filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation 7. PETITION V
i. Contention of invalid arrest is without merit because Domingo a. Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to
firearms and ammunition in their person when they were have been found in their possession when they were arrested, did not
apprehended belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their
§ Also, the argument that information filed against them were illegal arrest
null and void for want of preliminary investigation is b. However, they have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid
unmeritorious because the filing of an information, without claim
a preliminary investigation is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. c. SC held that no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers,
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court: which would cause the said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the
§ Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. petitioners falsely, has been shown.
— When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for d. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a
an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in- depth
complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former
peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement.
having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of 8. PETITION VI - Espiritu vs. Lim
the offended party or arresting officer or person. a. Petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng
§ However, before the filing of such complaint or information, Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON)
the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation b. 23 November 1988 – Petitioner was awakened by his sister telling him
by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must thatsome people wanted to hire his vehicle. However, he was immediately
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised put under arrest by the same people
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer c. He was charged with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code
and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible (Inciting to Sedition).
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may d. Petitioner was heard saying: “Bukas tuloy ang welga natin... hanggang sa
apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the magkagulo na.”
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days • Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance
from its inception. with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that
§ If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the
investigation having been first conducted, the accused may competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may,
within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we
the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and
same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
prescribed in this Rule. 9. PETITION VII - Nazareno vs. Station Commander
ii. Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article a. 14 December 1988 - Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended Alabang,
iii. Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the b. One suspect, Regal, was arrested and pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one
informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners of his companions in the killing
cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their c. Police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought
constitutional right to due process. him to the police headquarters for questioning
6. PETITION IV - Ocaya vs. Aguirre d. 13 January 1989 - a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
a. Vicky Ocaya was arrested for possession of unlicensed ammunition behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the
writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional

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 Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the 1. Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, and
case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition. nearly bumped the car of herein petitioner Rolito Go at the corner of Wilson St.
e. 1 February 1989 - the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan and Abad Santos St. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot
issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that Maguan inside his car.
the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason 2. The next day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting and was informed
of a valid information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of that petitioner had dined at Cravings bakeshop shortly before the shooting. The
Makati security guard of the said shop identified Go as the shooter and the Police
f. SC upheld the RTC decision: the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the conducted a manhunt.
police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after 3. On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station
he was positively implicated by his co- accused Ramil Regala in the killing to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police. The police forthwith
• Cited People v Ancheta: The obligation of an agent of authority detained him and An eyewitness positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as 4. The police and Provincial prosecutor filed a frustrated murder case against the
a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable petitioner. Before the information was filed Maguan died and the prosecutor
existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is changed the charge to murder upon filing in the RTC. The Prosecutor certified
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did
has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same Code
grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained 5. On the same day counsel for petitioner filed a motion for immediate release and
participated therein. proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner
10. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the
of an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is or on bail.
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. 6. Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct
11. In Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, the Cour held that "in all petitions for habeas corpus preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991
the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention- from until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
the moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes 7. On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge recalled the grant of bail and
upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court ordered the petitioner to surrender within 48 hours. When the petitioner
satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been surrendered, the judge issued an order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal
satisfied. to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date,
petitioner was arraigned.
GO V. CA (MURDER ON A ONE-WAY STREET; ARRESTED WITHOUT 8. CA denied petitioner’s motion to restrain the arraignment on the ground that it has
WARRANT SIX DAYS AFTER COMMISSION) become moot and academic. stating the reason that the warrantless arrest is valid
since the crime has been “freshly committed”.
RECIT-READY: While driving, Go nearly collided with Maguan, who was driving in the
opposite direction on a one-way street. Go shot Maguan and sped away, but his plate ISSUE:
number was identified by a security guard who, upon being shown a sketch of the
perpetrator, confirmed that it matched the appearance of Go. The police launched a 1. WON the warrantless arrest is valid
manhunt and 6 days after the shooting, Go showed up at the station, accompanied by 2. WON petitioner waived his right in the preliminary investigation
2 lawyers, and inquired as to what was going on – Go was arrested on the spot. Go
assailed his warrantless arrest on the ground that the crime had not been “just HELD: Petition granted, CA and RTC decisions SET ASIDE. ORDERED the
committed”. The SC held that to fall under the exception that an offense had just been Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation and a trial be conducted after the
committed and the officer has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the investigation.
person to be arrest has committed it, the arrest must immediately follow the commission
of the crime. In other words, there is no valid warrantless arrest if the crime had not SOLICITOR GENERAL—
“just been committed”. In this case, it was 6 days ago. Moreover, there was no § Petitioner was valitdly arrested six (6) days later. Invoked Nazareno v.
personal knowledge, as what the police had was a Station Commander, etc., et al., (Umil v. Ramons)— here a majority of
statement from an alleged eyewitness. The SC also held that unlike the case of Umil v. the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen
Ramos, where the accused was arrested 14 days after the commission of the offense (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been
of subversion, murder is not a continuing crime and is completed after the act. arrested

FACTS: RATIO:

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1. UMIL—Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply
organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when
which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that
had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime." petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
§ The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning § The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
of Section 5(a) of Rule 113, at the time petitioner had allegedly shot bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably
had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right.
shot Maguan.
i. Petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan NOTE—
Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed § The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on
implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his
he was otherwise guilty of a crime. arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari,
ii. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a before being forced to stand trial.
preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable § We consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation
cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be
Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was accorded to petitioner.
applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a PEOPLE V. MENGOTE (LOOKING SIDE TO SIDE; UNLAWFUL ARREST AND
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner SEIZURE)
was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have
been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since RECIT-READY: Based on a phone call regarding suspicious persons in Manila, the
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was police stationed a surveillance team who noticed 2 men, Mengote and Morellos, looking
also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing from side to side and one of them holding his abdomen. The police approached them
at the preliminary investigation. and introduced themselves as such, but the 2 men tried to run away. Mengote and
2. The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary Morellos were caught and the search thereafter yielded a .38 caliber gun. Respondents
investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 assailed the admissibility of the evidence obtained from them because it was illegally
August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when seized. The SC held that a warrantless may be effected when: (1) In his presence, the
the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an
22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to offense. (2) In this case, the accused were merely “looking from side to side” and
preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, “holding his abdomen”, which both do not constitute any offense under the law. (3)
petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and When an offense has just been committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts
mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, there was no
stand trial. personal knowledge because all the authorities knew was hearsay information from a
§ In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by phone call about a crime yet to be committed. When the person to be arrested is a
posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived final judgment
their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their
arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming FACTS:
that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.” § On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a phone call stating
§ In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or that there were suspicious men lurking in the corner of Juan Luna and North
on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had Bay Boulevard in Tondo. A surveillance team of policemen went there at 11:30
thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent am and saw two men looking from side to side while one was holding his
Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his abdomen. The police chased them and caught them.

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 § The two suspicious men were Nicanor Morellos accused-appellant Rogelio • The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting
Mengote. Upon searching the suspects, they found a .38 caliber Smith and officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen.
Wesson revolver held by the accused, while Morellos was holding a fan knife. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
The RTC of Manila charged them with violation of PD 1866 or illegal offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least
possession of firearms. being attempted in their presence. (diff with P v Malmstedt and P v. Claudio).
§ During their prosecution, a certain Rigoberto Danganan came forward and o Similar to Aminnudin.
accused the accused for robbery. Danganan alleged that the accused robbed
his house, and one of the stolen articles is the revolver. Mengote made no § It is argued that Mengote had just committed robbery on Danganan’s house,
effort to prove that he owned the revolver. He instead kept on claiming that but this fact came forward only after Danganan came forward. As for
his arrest was unlawful, and that the revolver was planted on him. illegal possession of firearms, this was only discovered after Mengote was
searched. The policemen should have known these facts before arresting
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest was lawful – NO Mengote in order for the arrest to be lawful.
HELD: Accused-appellant was acquitted. § As ruled in People v Burgos: “In arrests without a warrant xxx it is not enough
that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
RATIO: committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
(1) Arrest without warrant, when lawful xxx The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.”
§ Pertinent sections of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of court are as follows: § As ruled in Alih v Castro: “The officer making the arrest must have personal
A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: knowledge therefor.”
i. When, in his presence, to person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense MANALILI V. CA (DRUG USER WITH RED EYES AND SWAYING SIDE TO SIDE)
ii. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be RECIT-READY: Facts are disputed. Prosecution claims that petitioner was found by
arrested has committed it Police walking in a swaying manner and had reddish eye in front of the Kaloocan City
iii. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped Cemetery. Police approached him and introduced themselves as such. Police asked
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the police
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or to examine it. (Basically they stopped and frisked him). Police found suspected
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to marijuana residue inside which was later on confirmed by the NBI. On the other hand
another the defense claims that the police flagged the tricycle on which the petitioner was riding.
§ The third situation is obviously not applicable to Mengote, because he is not The police searched the driver and petitioner and found nothing. Police then released
an escaped convict or has evaded sentence. the driver but brought petitioner to the station and planted evidence in his pants to extort
§ The first situation is also inapplicable. Mengote was not committing or is money. RTC, CA and SC however sided with the prosecution. Petitioner also claimed
attempting to commit an act. The acts of looking from side to side and holding that the search was illegal because there was no warrant thus making the evidence
one’s abdomen is certainly not sinister, considering the time of day (11:30am) inadmissible. The court however said that petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of
and that there were many people in the area. If the two were caught in an inadmissibility of the evidence during the trial meant that he effectively waived his rights
ungodly hour, then it would be a whole different situation. In other words, there to it. Furthermore, SC said that “stop and frisk” (what the police did) is another exception
is nothing in their acts that would be able to excite suspicion, or if suspicion to the warrant rule (art 3 sec 2). What is only required is that the police, based on his
was excited, it has not been shown what the policemen’s suspicion was all experience, must have probable cause to “stop and frisk” a person, in this case
about. There was no probable cause for the warrantless arrest. petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner – characteristics of
§ As to the second situation, the prosecution has not shown that the arresting a high drug addict; reason – practicality, for safety purposes
policemen had personal knowledge of the facts that Mengote committed an
offense. All they had was hearsay information, and as ruled earlier, their DISPUTED FACTS:
suspicion was not well-founded.
PROSECUTION— (ruled by the SC as correct facts)
SG: actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts § April 11, 1988, 2:10pm, upon an information that drug addicts was roaming
"created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in around the area, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant Police Station (Patrolman {pat} Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and
had committed it." (what offense?) a driver named Arnold Enriquez ) were conducting a surveillance in front of
• No sinister acts. Accused was crossing the street at 11:30 in the morning. Nothing the Kalookan City Cemetery.
clandestine. § They then chanced upon petitioner observed to have reddish eyes and to be
• The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he walking in a swaying manner.
elaborate on the impending crime. § Petitioner tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers.

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 § Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked petitioner if he could see what he had in his hands. § seizure in plain view,
Though resisted at first, he showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo § customs search, and
Espiritu to examine the same. § waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable
§ When examined Police found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside § search and seizure.
which NBI later confirmed as such.
PEOPLE V ENCINADA: In these cases ( valid warrantless search and seizure), the
DEFENSE— search and seizure can be made only with probable cause as the essential
§ Police flagged the tricycle on which the petitioner was riding in front of the requirement
Kaloocan cemetery.
§ The police said petitioner had marijuana and searched the driver and the latter POSADA V CA
but found nothing. § Adds “Stop and Frisk” to the list of exception under People vs Lacerna
§ Police then released the driver but brought petitioner to the station § “to require the Police officer to search the bag only after they had obtained a
§ Petitioner saw a neighbour and told him to accompany him to the station search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
§ He was then asked to takeoff his pants, again police found no drugs when circumstances”
they
§ searched it CASE: Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that
§ Though neigbor asked for the release of petitioner, the latter was placed in a appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City
cell and later on was told there was marijuana residue found in his pants Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts.
§ Police later told petitioner to call his parents to ‘settle’ the case From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City
Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high."
ISSUE (MAIN) AND HELD: Whether or not the search and seizure was invalid – NO, The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was
“stop and frisk” when there’s probable cause is a valid warrantless search actually high on drugs.
§ Petitioner also claimed that CA acted with error in upholding the finding of § petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of inadmissibility of the evidence during the trial
facts of RTC and finding him guilty meant that he effectively waived his rights to it
§ Requisite in waiver – SC found to been complied with
RATIO: (1) the right to be waived existed;
(2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and
TEST: (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right
1) Probable Cause: YES § RE: disputed facts
a. Petitioner was walking in a swaying manner and had reddish eye • SC RTC assessment of Facts when affirmed y CA is accorded with great
b. Experience of the policemen dictates that such “behaviour was weight and respect, unless substantial facts and circumstances have been
characteristic of drug addicts who were high” overlooked
2- 4) Not applicable since “stop and frisk” is a valid warrantless search • There was presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
• Petitioner did not deny possession of marijuana
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING A STOP-AND-FRISK • Inconsistency in witness testimonies were not found to be substantial
• If it was really extortion petitioner should have filed administrative/criminal
TERRY VS OHIO (US JURISPRUDENCE) case against policemen, however in this case they didn’t do so
§ “(W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him • It was easy to create/fabricate/concoct facts/alibi
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and COJUANGCO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION)
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own determination —
assault him.” independent of that of the prosecutor — of whether there is probable cause to issue a
§ excused only by exigent circumstances. warrant of arrest, based on the complainant's and his witnesses' accounts, if any.
Supporting evidence other than the report and recommendation of the investigators
PEOPLE VS LACERNA (VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE) and the special prosecutor should be examined by the court
§ search incidental to a lawful arrest, FACTS:
§ search of moving vehicles,

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1. January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General 14. On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging
before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner, that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of probable
former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondent
former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant case.
for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage ISSUES:
of their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, 1. WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and
connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos void, or should now be lifted if initially valid? YES
and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted 2. WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
a donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the petitioner? YES
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using RATIO:
PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, 1. Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to
advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and issue the warrant of arrest against the accused:
gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino a. the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the
people and to the Republic of the Philippines. Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the Information and
2. Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary b. the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special
investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will
directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the Office of the warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had
Ombudsman for appropriate action. nothing more to support its resolution.
3. In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended 2. The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally
the filling of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. determining the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of
4. Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman arrest. The 2 cited document above were the product of somebody else’s
Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the
and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information. Sandiganbayan.
5. In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor 3. In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, the Court struck down as invalid an order for
affirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2, the issuance of a warrant of arrest which were based only on "the information,
1992. amended information and Joint Resolution", without the benefit of the records
6. August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by 4. In Ho vs. People, the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuse
respondent Lobregat. of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole
7. In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and without
recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted. determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other
8. On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to than such bare findings and recommendation.
the Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1, 5. With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of
1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the
question. jurisdiction of the court. By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim
9. On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While
respondent Sandiganbayan. petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance
10. On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated
filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing
prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.
Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution 6. In La Naval Drug vs. CA , Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
which he filed. may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily
11. In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
barred petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court. court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
12. On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise,
the Information. he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover,
13. In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate
the filing against petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case. The purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
on November 15, 1996. of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person.

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 • Purpose of this provision is to bar Philippine jurisprudence from the
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion; distinction made in American jurisprudence which requires two
As a consequence of the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the Sandiganbayan did not requirements before giving free access to courts.
acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner. • Interest sought to be protected must be fundamental.
The posting of a bail bond by the petitioner despite the nullity or irregularity of the • Objectively impossible to protect the interest except in a court of law.
issuance of the warrant for his arrest should not be equated with "voluntary • The expansion of the free access clause in the 1987 Constitution had
appearance" as to cloak the respondent court with jurisdiction over his person. Truly, in mind free access to labor courts.
his "appearance" in court was not "voluntary." It should be noted that immediately upon
learning of the filling of the Information and the issuance of the warrant, petitioner filed RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTY ACOSTA
an "Opposition to [the] Issuance of [a] Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF SHERIFF’S EXPENSES, AM 11-
Motion for Reconsideration of [the] Ombudsman['s] Resolutions." Said Opposition was 10-03-O, JULY 30, 2013
based on the inadequacy of the respondent court's basis for determining probable
cause. It was essentially an express and continuing objection to the court's jurisdiction (SHERIFF’S EXPENSES AS HINDRANCE TO ACCESS TO COURT)
over his person.
When petitioner posted his bail bond, he expressly manifested at the same time that The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) sought clarification with the Office of the Court
such was "without prejudice” to his Opposition. Administrator (OCA) on whether PAO’s clients were exempt from the payment of
sheriff’s expenses amounting to one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) when civil actions
SECTION 11: FREE ACCESS TO COURT are filed in court. The PAO alleged that its clients should be exempt from paying sheriff’s
expenses since Sec. 6, R.A. 9406, An Act Reorganizing and Strengthening the Public
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal Attorney’s Office, “specifically exempts them from the payment of docket and other fees
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies.”

NOTES: The OCA clarified that notwithstanding PAO’s exemption in R.A. 9406 from payment of
docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action, it was not exempt from the
RA No. 9999 (FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2010) payment of sheriff’s expenses. The OCA explained that sheriff’s expenses, strictly
o Legal services – any activity which requires the application of law, legal speaking, are not considered as “legal fees” under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court since
procedure, knowledge, training and experiences which shall include, among they are not payable to the government; they are payable to the sheriff/process server
others, legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and to defray his travel expenses in serving court processes in relation to the litigants case.
contracts, including appearance before the administrative and quasi-judicial
offices, bodies and tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar Not satisfied with the clarification of the OCA, the case was referred to the Supreme
services as may be defined by the Supreme Court Court (SC) for resolution. The SC agreed with the OCA and held that the exemptions
granted to PAO are specifically limited to the payment of fees and cannot be extended
The significance of having an explicit “free access” provisions in the Constitution may to sheriff’s expenses –
be gathered from the rocky road which “free access” seems to have traveled in
American jurisprudence. The American constitution does not have an explicit free [f]ees is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain privileges or
access provision and, hence, its free access doctrine has been developed as implicit services. Viewed from this context, the phrase “docket and other fees incidental to
from both the equal protection clause and the due process clause. [Bernas] instituting an action” refers to the totality of the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court . . . [i]t includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance
FREE ACCESS TO COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, AND ADEQUATE of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees and
LEGAL ASSISTANCE commissioner’s fees. These are the fees that are exacted for the services rendered by
• Who are protected: the court in connection with the action instituted before it.
• Those protected include low paid employees, domestic servants
and laborers. Sheriff’s expenses, however, cannot be classified as a “fee” within the purview of the
• They need not be persons so poor that they must be supported exemption granted to PAO’s clients under Section 6 of R.A. 9406. Sheriff’s expenses
at public expense. are provided for . . . to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server
• It suffice that plaintiff is indigent. or other court-authorized persons in the service of summons, subpoena and other court
• Difference between paupers and indigent persons is that the processes that would be issued relative to the trial of the case.
latter are persons who have no property or sources of income
sufficient aside from their own labor through self?supporting In In Re: Exemption of Cooperatives from Payment of Court and Sheriff’s Fees Payable
when able to work and in employment. to the Government in Actions Brought Under R.A. 6938, the Court also clarified that
sheriff’s expenses are not considered as legal fees. Aware of the burden given to PAO
clients due to this non-exemption of sheriff’s expenses and the Constitution’s mandate

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to extend “free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance” to the less unconstitutional. A witness/accused has these rights even during such investigation
privileged, the Court reiterated that PAO officials and employees are given the authority (Galman).
to serve summons, subpoena, and other court processes in cases involving their client
in lieu of a sheriff pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In effect, this II. CITIZENS RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 12 (ISIP)
allows the sheriff’s expense to become an operating expense of PAO, chargable to 1. Right to be informed of rights (#2 & #3 below)
PAO’s client’s adversaries – 2. Right to remain silent
3. Right to have competent and independent counsel.
Authorizing the officials and employees of PAO to serve the summons, subpoenas and 4. Right to proper treatment of those under investigation
other court processes in behalf of their clients would relieve the latter from the burden
of paying for the sheriff’s expenses despite their non-exemption from the payment III. Miranda Rights
thereof under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. The amount to be defrayed in the service of
summons, subpoena, and other court processes in behalf of its clients would A. Reason for the rule:
consequently have to be taken from the operating expenses of PAO. In turn, the amount • It recognized the fact that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of
advanced by PAO as actual travel expenses may be taken from the amount recovered custodial investigations, in the absence of proper safeguards, is inherently
from the adversaries of PAO’s clients as costs of suit, attorney’s fees or contingent fees coercive.
prior to the deposit thereof in the National treasury
B. The Miranda Rights (Procedure) (1) Miranda v. Arizona2
SECTION 12: 1. The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and
1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent 2. After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his used against him in court.
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must 3. He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during the interrogation. He
and in the presence of counsel. does not have to ask for a lawyer. The investigator should tell him that
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means he has the right to counsel at that point.
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention 4. He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention but also that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
are prohibited.cralaw 5. Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section counsel, the moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation,
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this 6. If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during
section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of the trial to have been observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained
torture or similar practices, and their families. as a result of the interrogation can be used against him.

I. CASES SUMMARY: IV. Right to Counsel

• Right of counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer;
Section 12 gives the new rights to accused which was not provided prior to the passage rather it means efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple
of the 1973 Constitution. More particularly this is the right to be informed of his right to perfunctory presentation. (2) People v. Sunga
be silent and to an attorney (Miranda). Being so, such right was held to be apply • Not independent counsel (SPCMMBO)
prospectively (Magtoto). With regard to the right to independent and competent o Special Counsel
counsel, the court held that a city legal officer which provides free legal aid o Public/Private Prosecutor
services for the promotion of peace and order cant be considered as an o Counsel of the Police
independent legal counsel seeing that there’s a conflict of interest between such o Municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the
officer and the accused (Sunga). Rights under Section 12 are not also available accused.
during identification through police line ups except when the accused is already o A mayor unless the accused approaches him as counselor or
under custodial investigation (Gamboa, Escordial). It was also held that there is adviser.
no hard and fast rule with regard to the place where police line ups can be held. Thus o A barangay captain.
even if it was done outside the police station, as long as done property, o Any other whose interest may be adverse to that of the accused.
identification is valid (Teehankee). On the last case assigned, the court held
that a law restricting the right to remain in silence (against right to V. When Right Attaches
selfMincrimination) during an investigation conducted by a panel is • Application of right

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 o Applied prospectively after the effectivity of the 1973 constitution VII. When Rights Ends
when right to be informed of rights first appeared. (3) Magtoto v. • Section 12(1) applies only to the investigation prior to the filing of
Manguera charges, after which Sections 14 and 17 comes in to protect the accused.4
• Availability of rights to a person being investigated
o Bernas1 said that the Gaiman case says that the right attaches VIII. Waiver of Rights under Section 12
when a person is being investigated already and not necessary that • There’s a presumption that the accused did not waive the right; burden of
he is in custody. proof on prosecution.5
o Recent jurisprudence states that rights under Section 12 is • Can only waive if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and in writing
available only when the person is already in custody.2 and in the presence of counsel.6
§ Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated • However, failure to object or raise the violations as early as possible (during
by law enforcement officer after a person has been trial), it shall be deemed that accused waived his rights under Section 12.7
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way. It is only after the Custodial Investigation— Questioning initiated by law enforcement officer after one
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an is taken into custody or deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
unsolved crime and beings to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police Rights: (1) to remain silent (2) to counsel and (3) to be informed of rights
carried out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule beings to PEOPLE V. CAMAT (DEFINITION; CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS)
operate.
o However, R.A. 7438 extended the guarantee to situation in Amboy Camat and Willie Del Rosario were accused of robbery with homicide and
which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely admitted to it in custodial investigation. The Supreme Court ruled that the extrajudicial
been “invited” for questioning. There is therefore a broader statutory confession was obtained without advising accused of their Constitutional rights and is,
guarantee. hence, inadmissible.
• Availability of rights to a person witnessing
o Provision covers not only “confessions” but also admissions, SUMMARY: Camat and Del Rosario were charged with the complex crime of robbery
whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused with homicide and frustrated homicide – for robbing and stabbing/attempting to kill
in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the Penalver and for killing Sinoy. During the police investigation, the police investigator
commission of an offense. Because the witnesses were compelled testified on the witness stand that Camat admitted that Del Rosario was a co-
to testify, a coMextensive protection in the form of an immunity must conspirator in the crime. SC held that even though the Court could not convict Del
be offered. (6) Galman v. Pamaran Rosario based on Camat’s extra-judicial confession, there are other pieces of evidence
sufficient to sustain a conviction (i.e. Penalver’s testimony).
VI. NonTapplicability of rights
• Section 12(1) does not apply to a situation where a person presents FACTS:
himself to the police and in the process make his admissions.3 • Armando Rodriguez Camat (aka Amboy Camat) and Wilfredo Tanyag Del
• Parrafin Test " Such tests is not a communicative action or testimonial Rosario (aka Willie) were charged with the complex crime of robbery with
compulsion. Police Line Up (4) Gamboa v. Judge Cruz; (5) People v. homicide and frustrated homicide.
Escordial • Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo Penalver are members of the Philippine Marines.
o Exception. When there is a move on the part of the investigators They were walking along Quirino Avenue when they noticed 2 men trailing
to elicit admissions. them closely.
o Exception. When the person is already under custodial investigation. • Sinoy and Penalver crossed the street to avoid the men following them, but
Totality of Circumstances Test (to determine validity of out of court Del Rosario rushed to Sinoy, and kicked the latter while Camat followed Del
identification): Rosario and stabbed Sinoy.
1. 1.The witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time • Penalver kicked Camat, who in turn, stabbed the former. When Penalver fell
of the crime. to the ground, Del Rosario grabbed the clutch bag.
2. The witness’ degree of attention at that time. • Sinoy and Penalver, despite their injuries, ran away and were brought by a
3. The accuracy of any prior description given by the witness. policeman to the hospital. Sinoy died in the hospital, but Penalver survived.
4. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the • Camat and Del Rosario interposed the defense of alibi.
identification. o Camat claimed that he was already in his house, and before
5. The length of time between the crime and the identification. going home, he worked as a card dealer in the saklaan. This
6. The suggestiveness of the identification procedure. was corroborated by his mother-in- law, who claimed she was
with Camat at the time the latter was at home.

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 o Del Rosario claimed that he was with his wife during the time b. There was also no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part
the crime was committed, and they sold vegetables along a of Penalver that might have led him to give fabricated testimony
sidewalk of Quirino Ave. in Baclaran. Upon going home, he against the appellants. He, and even Camat, declared in open court
claimed that he never left the house again. His mother supported that they did not know each other before the incident. And where
his story. there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the
o Both claimed they did not know each other prior to the date of prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that
the commission of the crime. he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
• Patrolman Odeo Cario, to whom the case was assigned, testified on the credit.
following: c. The appellants’ alibis could not also be given credence even if they
o That Camat orally admitted to him their participation in the killing are corroborated by other witnesses. The witnesses in this case are
of the soldiers. Cario also testified that Camat gave the names the mother and mother-in-law, who are naturally expected to make
of Del Rosario and a certain person named “Roland” as his co- statements in his favor. The positive identification of the malefactors
conspirators in the crime charged. made by Penalver negates appllants’ submissions on their
o That Camat admitted that Del Rosario was the one who actually respective alibis.
stabbed Sinoy. 4. The accused’s constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face is limited
o That when he and another policeman traced the whereabouts of to proceedings before the trial court. Accordingly, appellants’ reliance upon
Del Rosario and brought him for questioning, Del Rosario this constitutional right is misplaced as the same is available to him at the trial
admitted his involvement in the crime, and that the electric tester and not during a custodial investigation.
they stole from Penalver can be recovered from his relatives. a. It is the prerogative of each party to choose its own witnesses in
o That they were able to identify Camat with the help of a vendor accordance with its own assessment of the evidence it needs to
who witnessed the incident, and said witness identified Camat prove its case. If appellants felt that the vendor might have a grudge
as the one who killed Sinoy. against Camat, there was nothing to prevent them from determining
• The lower court found both Camat and Del Rosario guilty of the crime of that fact on the witness stand by calling said vendor via compulsory
robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. process available to them both under the Constitution and the Rules
• Appellants now argue that the trial court cannot reply solely on Camat’s of Court.
extrajudicial confession as a basis of their conviction because it was obtained
during custodial investigation, in violation of their constitutional rights. DOCTRINE: PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS
• Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, et al.,
ISSUES: o At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
1. W/N their constitutional rights were violated — NO. officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
2. W/N Camat’s admission is binding on Del Rosario — NO. shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
3. W/N evidence is sufficient to support a conviction — YES. o He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
4. W/N the appellants were deprived of their right of confrontation when the prosecution to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
failed to produce the informer who allegedly pointed to/identified Camat — NO. against him.
o The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
RULING: CA affirmed. lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
RATIO: means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall
1. The lower court cannot just rely on the testimony of Camat because there is be the duty of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
no showing that the appellants were duly advised of the mandatory accomplished.
guarantees under the Bill of Rights. o No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
2. No reliance can be placed on the imputation therein because it violates the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
rule on res inter alios acta (a thing done between others does not harm or person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
benefit others) and does not fall under the exceptions thereto, especially since either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
it was made after the supposed homicidal conspiracy. An extrajudicial o The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
his co-accused. As against the latter, the confession is hearsay. in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory
3. The testimony of a single witness, if found convincing and trustworthy by the or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These rights begin to be available where the investigation is no longer a general
a. Penalver’s testimony was found to be categorical and candid, inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect, the
untainted by inconsistencies, contradictions or evasions. It creditably suspect has been taken into police custody, and the police carry out a process of
chronicles the material details in the commission of the crimes in interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements.
question, and should accordingly be given full credence.

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 • Tt is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during the trial that, prior • right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
rights because the presumption of regularity of official acts dues not either retained or appointed
apply during in-custody investigation. • “Custodial investigation” is defined as questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
DOES NOT INCLUDE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION: deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
• Peopls v. Jose, et al: "criminal prosecutions" in the said constitutional • The US SC laid down the following rules to be observed during custodial
provision shall be interpreted to mean proceedings before the trial court, which investigation:
in its most expanded concept is from arraignment up to the rendition of the o The person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent
decision. o That statements he make may be used as evidence against him
• 1964 Rules of Court, and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure—the right of o That he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
confrontation is specified as a right of the accused at the trial. or appointed
• We accordingly reiterate that an accused's constitutional right to meet the o That he may waiver effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver
witnesses face to face is limited to proceedings before the trial court. is made voluntarily, knowingly, willingly, and intelligently
Accordingly, appellants' reliance upon this constitutional right is evidently o There can be no questioning, if he indicates, in any manner and at
misplaced as the same is available to him at the trial and not during a any stage of the process, that he wishes to consult with an attorney
custodial investigation. before speaking
o The police may not question him, if the individual is alone and
MIRANDA V. ARIZONA (RATIONALE OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS; indicates, in any manner, that he does not wish to be interrogated
MIRANDA RIGHTS DOCTRINE) o The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police right to refrain from answering any further inquiries, until he has
do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned
compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to • The US SC also held that no statement obtained from the defendant can truly
undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from be the product of his free choice, unless adequate protective devices are
the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings
particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by • The US SC further held that the practice of incommunicado interrogation is at
in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanours as they are by odds with the principle that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate
questioning of persons suspected of felonies. himself

• In this case, the US SC examined and discussed the common practice of DEFINITIONS:
ominously securing extra-judicial and incriminating confessions from persons 1. Exculpatory - Evidence that establish the guilt of an accused. It indicates that
under custodial investigation a defendant committed a crime.
o The accused was placed in a secluded room with no access to the 2. Inculpatory – Evidence that shows, or tends to show, a defendant's
outside, in an obviously police-dominated atmosphere involvement in an act.
o Interrogators are often directed to use trickery or threat to extract 3. Custodial interrogation - Questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
confessions after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
o The persons are misinformed that their refusal to talk may suggest freedom of action in any significant way.
guilt
o The person is deprived of any outside support; his will is undermined FACTS:
and he is led into affirming a preconceived story concocted by the
police 1. A number of similar instances was raised in the SC to rule on its
o Many succumb to this tactic and render self-incriminating statements constitutionality.
• The US SC held that the prosecution may not use statements, whether • In Vignera v. New York, the petitioner was questioned by police, made oral
exculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant, unless it admissions, and signed an inculpatory statement all without being notified of
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the his right to counsel.
privilege against self-incrimination • In Westover v. United States, the petitioner was arrested by the FBI,
• The SC held that Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he interrogated, and made to sign statements without being notified of his right
has a to counsel.
• In California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated the defendant for
five days without notification of his right to counsel.

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 II. Whether or not the right against self-incrimination is applicable – Yes
2. Miranda
• Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a Phoenix HELD:
police station. He was there identified by the complaining witness. The police 1. Miranda v. Arizona – Violation of his constitutional right because he was not
then took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of the detective bureau. warned of his rights
• The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his 2. VIgnera v. New York - Vignera was not warned of any of his rights before the
right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged questioning by the detective and by the assistant district attorney. No other
accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. steps were taken to protect these rights.
• When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, 3. Westover v. US - Westover knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
you did it," (referring to Miranda’s case) they handcuffed him and took him to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel prior to the time he made
an interrogation room. the statement. Hence, acquitted.
• While handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for 4 hours until he 4. California v. Stewart - In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not
confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that
his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the his privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a
police station, from consulting with him. His confession was used for his trial. record that does not show that any warnings have been given or that any
effective alternative has been employed. So aquitted.
3. Vignera
• Petitioner, Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York police on October 14, RATIO:
1960, in connection with the robbery three days earlier of a Brooklyn dress
shop. They took him to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan, Admissibility of confession
then was taken to the 66th Detective Squad 1. All the cases share the salient feature of incommunicado interrogation of
• The detective was asked on cross-examination at trial by defense counsel individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
whether Vignera was warned of his right to counsel before being interrogated. statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. Such secrecy creates
• At Vignera's trial on a charge of first degree robbery, the detective testified as a gap on the knowledge of the judges on what happens in the interrogation
to the oral confession. The transcription of the statement taken was also room.
introduced in evidence 2. In a series of cases decided by this Court long after these studies, the police
resorted to physical brutality - beating, hanging, whipping - and to sustained
4. Westover and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions.
• Carl Calvin Westover, was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect 3. CJ Warren stresses that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
in two Kansas City robberies. A report was also received from the FBI that he psychologically rather than physically oriented, "Since Chambers v. Florida,
was wanted on a felony charge in California. The local authorities took him to this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical,
a police station and placed him in a line-up on the local charges, and at about and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
11:45 p. m. he was booked unconstitutional inquisition.” Alternative ways are available and written in the
• Westover and that the FBI could proceed to interrogate him. There is nothing manual such as, Mutt and Jeff (Good cop, Bad cop) and reverse line up.
in the record to indicate that Westover was ever given any warning as to his 4. In each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere
rights by local police. In the afternoon 3 FBI agents interrogated him and after and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for
2 1⁄2 hours he signed confession to 2 separate robberies. compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example, in Miranda, where the indigent
Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced
5. California sexual fantasies.
• Roy Allen Stewart, was pointed out to Los Angeles police as the endorser of 5. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of
dividend checks taken in one of the robberies. At about 7:15 p. m., January Nation's most cherished principles - that the individual may not be compelled
31, 1963, police officers went to Stewart's house and arrested him. to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to
• During the next five days, police interrogated Stewart on nine different dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
occasions. Except during the first interrogation session, when he was obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice
confronted with an accusing witness, Stewart was isolated with his
interrogators. Self Incrimination
• Records did not show if he was or was not informed of his rights 1. We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to
• At his trial, transcripts of the first interrogation and the confession at the last informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody
interrogation were introduced in evidence questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques
ISSUE: of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
I. Whether or not the confession is admissible - No speak.

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 2. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made. during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
A confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to police appointed to represent him.
officers, while in custody, and in answer to an examination conducted by them. (v) If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he
But a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; if he states that
have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was he wants an attorney, the questioning must cease until an attorney
applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise. Thus it will apply. Wan v. US; is present.
Bram v. US. (vi) Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
Rationale of the Declaration Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
1. An explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution - that "No intelligently waived his right to counsel.
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against (vii) Where the individual answers some questions during incustody
himself," and that "the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel" interrogation he has not waived his privilege and may invoke his right
Escobedo v. Illinois to remain silent thereafter.
2. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and (viii) The warnings required and the waiver needed are, in the absence of
freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any
if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime statement, inculpatory or exculpatory, made by a defendant.
under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume 2. The limitations on the interrogation process required for the protection of the
an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to individual's constitutional rights should not cause an undue interference with
browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to a proper system of law enforcement, as demonstrated by the procedures of
entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the FBI and the safeguards afforded in other jurisdictions.
the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, 3. In each of these cases the statements were obtained under circumstances
the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege against
for its total abolition. Brown v. Walker self- incrimination.

Procedural safeguard The need to interrogate v. Constitutional protection

1. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, • This Court, while protecting individual rights, has always given ample latitude
stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person to law enforcement agencies in the legitimate exercise of their duties. The
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an
any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement. As we have
effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. noted, our decision does not in any way preclude police from carrying out their
(i) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation traditional investigatory functions. Although confessions may play an
as it exists today is inherently intimidating and works to undermine important role in some convictions, the cases before us present graphic
the privilege against self- incrimination. Unless adequate preventive examples of the overstatement of the "need" for confessions.
measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be TANENGGEE V. PEOPLE (WHEN PRESENCE OF COUNSEL IS REQUIRED)
the product of his free choice.
(ii) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and FACTS:
expansive historical development, is the essential mainstay of our
adversary system and guarantees to the individual the "right to 1. Five separate Information for estafa through falsification of commercial
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise documents were filed against petitioner.
of his own will," during a period of custodial interrogation as well as a. The appellant, being then a private individual, and being then the
in the courts or during the course of other official investigations. manager of the Commercio Branch of Metropolitan Bank & Trust, Co.
(iii) The decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, stressed the need for protective (Metrobank), was accused of estafa through falsification of
devices to make the process of police interrogation conform to the commercial documents by Metrobank by obtaining a loan using the
dictates of the privilege. name of Romeo Tan, making it appear that the latter had participated
(iv) In the absence of other effective measures the following procedures in the preparation, execution and signing of a Metrobank Promissory
to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be observed: The Note and the signing and endorsement of the said Metrobank
person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed Cahier’s Check and that he obtained a loan of P16,000,000.00 from
that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will Metrobank when in truth and in fact, it was the appellant who
be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has performed such actions by feigning and signing the documents using
the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him the name of Romeo Tan with intent to defraud, damage and

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 prejudice of the Metrobank in the sum of P15,363,666.67, by • Constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession
misappropriating it to his own personal use and benefit. of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is
2. The said Information portray the same mode of commission of the crime as in applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the • Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
checks and promissory notes involved and the dates and amounts. authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
3. In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit freedom of action in any significant manner.
of the Commercio Branch for more than a week. o A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights
4. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-Chan, which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz:
senior vice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the § (1) to remain silent,
following day. § (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably
5. When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were of his own choice, and
seven other people present: two senior branch officers, two bank lawyers, two § (3) to be informed of the two other rights above
policemen (one in uniform and the other in plain clothes), and a representative • In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an
of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank, Valentino Elevado. uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the
a. Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper in branch he managed, the following are clear:
connection with the audit investigation; that he inquired what he was o (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement
made to sign but was not offered any explanation; that he was authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank;
intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be and,
brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to o (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of the significant manner during the questioning.
meeting; and that ―just to get it over with he signed the paper which • Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to
turned out to be a confession. have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his
b. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but written statement.
was unable to find the latter. • DOCTRINE: Remolona v CSC & Carbonel v. CSC— right to counsel "applies
c. He also tried to phone him but to no avail. only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those
d. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his made in an administrative investigation."
rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of • CASE: Petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative
his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity
the first two rights. he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. There is no
e. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
him.
6. RTC found the petitioner guilty of the crimes charged and was later on PETITIONER’S WRITTEN STATEMENT WAS GIVEN VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY
affirmed by the CA. AND INTELLIGENTLY.
• The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which cannot be
ARGUMENTS: associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied.
• PETITIONER—
• Defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute
o He was forced to sign the written statement without reading the
any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where
contents.
no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement
• PEOPLE—
shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed
o Written statement admissible since the constitutional proscription
• Petitioner has a masteral degree— expected to understand and comprehend
does not apply to inquiries made in the context of private employment
the significance of signing an instrument.
but is applicable only in cases of custodial investigation
OTHER ISSUES
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WRITTEN STATEMENT IS INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE
AND THUS VIOLATING HIS RIGHT UNDER SEC. 12 ART. III OF THE • Forgery duly established.
CONSTITUTION. – NO • No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution
• Petitioner’s denial is unavailing
HELD: Admissible in evidence. • Elements of falsification of commercial documents established
• Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa
RATIO: • PETITION DENIED

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 PEOPLE V. SUNGA (CITY LEGAL OFFICER; EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT however, granted a motion to discharge (hehe) Locil Cui to be a state witness. This
COUNSEL DEFINED) was opposed by the counsel of the other accused, but the motion was granted
nevertheless.
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom, but also efficient and decisive legal assistance; a suspect is denied his Locil’s testimony: She was onboard a tricycle with an unnamed lesbian and Jocelyn
right to counsel where the lawyer who assisted him was the City Legal Officer. Tan. The tricycle was driven by Sunga and Pascua (they took turns driving the tricycle).
Upon reaching a forested area, the accused succeeded in raping Jocelyn, and Locil
RECIT-READY: Sunga, Lansang, Pascua and Locil Cui were arrested and charged witnessed everything. She was told by the accused (as well as the lesbian) to keep her
with rape with homicide. The victim was Jocelyn Tan, a high school student. Locil Cui, mouth shut about the incident. It was only during Locil’s arrest when she relayed to
an accomplice, later applied to be a state witness, which the court granted. During another person what she had witnessed.
Sunga’s arrests, police officers conducted a custodial investigation. Sunga was later
given a choice to have a lawyer assist him, and he chose Atty. Rocamora, a city legal The prosecution presented three witnesses:
officer from Puerto Princesa. More investigation was done. The statements were 1. Oscar Devilleres – He saw Lansang walking back and forth in the area where
embodied in Exhibit A. Another sworn statement was executed, Exhibit I, wherein Jocelyn’s body was found
Sunga waived his right to counsel, without the presence of a lawyer to assist 2. Igleceria Gabinete – Three men went to her sari-sari store to inquire about a
him. The Supreme Court ruled that both Exhibit A and Exhibit I are inadmissible in corpse found. One of the men was accused Lansang.
court, because (1) Atty. Rocamora, being a city legal officer, had a conflict of interest 3. Galahad Tan (Jocelyn’s dad) – Lansang went to the wake of Jocelyn. He told
with Sunga, (2) the custodial investigation done by police officers in the precinct should Galahad that he knew who committed the crime, but he did not follow up on
have been done in the presence of a lawyer, and (3) the waiver was not valid, as it was his statement. This led Galahad to be suspicious.
also not done in the presence of a lawyer.
The prosecution also adduced documentary evidence consisting mainly of the two
FACTS: supposed extrajudicial confessions made by Sunga (Exhibit A and Exhibit I).
• In 1994, accused-appellants Sunga, Lansang and Pascua were arrested and
charged as principals, along with Locil Cui as accomplice, for the murder and The defense presented twenty witnesses (see full text), and they were basically saying
rape of Jocelyn Tan, a high school student. Her body was found mutilated at that Locil was the one who killed Jocelyn, that Locil did not know who the accused-
a coffee plantation in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. The information charged appellants were, and that Locil could not properly identify the accused. They all
against the accused was that Sunga, provided for alibis for the accused.
• Lansang and Pascua conspired and succeeded in raping Jocelyn Tan, and
with the help of Locil Cui, and by taking advantage of superior strength, Notwithstanding the alibis, the trial court convicted Sunga, Lansang and Pascua of rape
stabbed the body and smashed the head of Jocelyn. Autopsy reports that her with homicide. The death penalty was imposed on Sunga and Lansang, while Pascua
official cause of death is intracranial hemorrhage secondary to multiple was to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Octac’s guilt was not proven beyond
fractures of the skull. reasonable doubt, so he was acquitted.
• Sunga was later arrested. He was brought to the precinct wherein SPO2
Janoras was in charge. Two policemen, Pantollano and Bolos, questioned ISSUES/HELD:
Sunga whether he knew anything about Jocelyn’s death. Sunga replied in the 1. W/N the discharge of Locil as a state witness was valid – YES
affirmative. Also, he signified his desire to avail the services of a lawyer. He 2. W/N the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt – NO
chose Atty. Rocamora from a list given by SPO2 Janoras. Atty. Rocamora is 3. [Corollary issue to #2] W/N Section 12 of the Bill of Rights was violated – YES
the city legal officer of Puerto Princesa.
RATIO:
Two extrajudicial confessions (in a custodial investigation) were made by Sunga:
1. Exhibit A, executed before SPO2 Janoras in the precinct, and with the I. Discharge of Locil Cui as a state witness
assistance of Atty. Rocamora, stated that he rode to the forested area in a A. There was nothing irregular therewith.
jeep owned by a certain Octac. And that he did not participate in the rape of B. “Her discharge was ordered xxx after the prosecution had presented severalof
Jocelyn. In subsequent queries, Sunga said that he merely held Jocelyn’s its witnesses and submitted Locil’s sworn statement”
hand during the rape, and that Octac participated in the rape. C. A motion to discharge “could be done at any stage of the proceedings, and
2. Exhibit I, written in the presence on Special Investigator Abordo, revealed discharge can be effected from the filing of the information to the time the
that Sunga participated in the dumping of Jocelyn’s body. Sunga also defense starts to offer any evidence”
mentioned in this statement that he waived his right to counsel. Exhibit I was D. Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites of a valid
basically made “in connection with his desire to apply as state witness” motion to discharge:
a. The discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be
The accused filed a petition for bail, and they contended that there is not enough a state witness;
evidence to convict them. The city prosecutor actually agreed with them. The trial court, b. His testimony is absolutely necessary;

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 c. No other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the B. Exhibit I
offense committed except his testimony; 1. Like Exhibit A, Exhibit I is inadmissible for having been executed without the
d. His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; presence of a counsel
e. He does not appear to be the most guilty; and 2. The waiver of right to counsel was invalid, because in the Constitution, the
f. He has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral right to counsel “cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of [a
turpitude. competent and independent] counsel” (Sec. 12, Art. III)
E. “So long as the trial court was able to receive evidence for and against the 3. “The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
discharge, its subsequent order granting or denying the motion for discharge courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections;
is in order notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing on said motion” rather, it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple
F. However, her testimony must still be carefully scrutinized, especially since it perfunctory representation”
is an eyewitness account, and that Locil was the only one who actually saw
what happened. DOCTRINE:
• Atty. Rocamora utterly did nothing in defense of Sunga’s cause. While Sunga
II. INADMISSIBILITY OF EXHIBITS A AND I – VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL was being asked by the judge a barrage of questions calling for answers which
could and did incriminate him, Atty.
HELD: A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed • Rocamora did not offer the slightest objection to shield his client from the
the following rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to have damning nature thereof. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation
competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and to be provided with one if and while he did have a counsel, for the latter’s lack of vigilance and
he cannot afford the services of counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of these rights. commitment to Sunga’s rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel.
• The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit "A" - admission courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections;
before the police on the ground that the counsel who assisted him, Atty. Agustin rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple
Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa. perfunctory representation.

A. Exhibit A III. NOT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

1. Exhibit A is NOT admissible as evidence, because Sunga’s right to counsel A. Rule on testimonies of a co-accused
was violated a. The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed
2. As was held in People v Bandula, the independent counsel for the accused accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his
in custodial investigations cannot be: co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded
a. a special counsel as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated
b. public or private prosecutor in the commission of the crime.
c. counsel of the police b. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material
d. a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and
accused. must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest
3. A legal officer of the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and support B. The evidence of the prosecution failed to corroborate Locil’s testimony
to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the C. “The fatal injury on Jocelyn’s head is supportive only of the fact that the victim
people, which includes maintenance of peace and order and, as such, his was hit with something on her head which caused her death, but this by no
office is akin to that of a prosecutor who unquestionably cannot represent the means is evidence that [accused-appellants] inflicted said fatal injury.”
accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of interest. (in other D. While the general rule is that testimonies of an accomplice or co- conspirator
words, Rocamora’s interests are admittedly adverse to the accused) must be corroborated, an uncorroborated testimony is “sufficient as when it is
4. Atty. Rocamora also did not extend help to safeguard the rights of Sunga shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a
5. Also, what happened during the interrogation by Pantollano and Bolos in the straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not
precinct was basically a custodial investigation have been the result of deliberate after thought”
a. Custodial investigation is the stage “where the police investigation is E. Locil’s manner of answering the questions were marked with tentativeness,
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to uncertainty, and indecisiveness
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who a. Her voice was not convincing enough, as it was very soft and
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit sounded really weak
incriminating statements” b. Her identification of Pascua, one of the accused, was doubtful. She
6. It is a requirement that in a custodial investigation, there must be a lawyer described Pascua as “singkit,” but Pascua wasn’t.
present. There was no lawyer present in the precinct when Pantollano and F. Given this, the evidence presented by the prosecution was very weak and
Bolos interrogated Sunga, so such interrogation is not admissible as evidence. highly unreliable

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 G. “This Court thus finds her uncorroborated account to have failed the
jurisprudentially established touchstone for its credibility and sufficiency, that JURISPRUDENCE: PEOPLE V. ALGARME—
of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant appellants’ • Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done
conviction.” thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are
ACQUITTED. shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where
a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
PEOPLE V. IBANEZ (DUTY OF COUNSEL TO EXPLAIN) purpose.
• In order to resolve the admissibility of a line-up, the following circumstances
FACTS: must be considered: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the
• Ibañez went to Weapons System Corporation in an old car and told Hennessy time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
Auron that he bought a gun barrel at the company’s gun show in SM accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of
Megamall. He inquired from Henessy about the schedule and rates of the certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
firing range and the amount of membership. He asked the peak days for the time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of
range and whether Hennessy was the only female employee. the identification procedure. Lino failed to state relevant details surrounding
• Hennessy arrived at 9 AM of July 26, 2004 at WSC and rang the doorbell but the line up, thus rendering the out-of-court identification inadmissible.
no one opened the door. She went to the firing range and called Zaldy Gabao,
another employee. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the company’s CASE:
operations manager, and informed him that Zaldy’s hands had been tied. After • Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring
one hour, the police arrived; they opened the gate at the back using acetylene. omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-ofcourt identification.
When Henessy and the police entered the premises, they saw that Zaldy had
been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that the company’s DOCTRINE:
gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered the • Extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following
firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex.4 Dr. Voltaire Nulud conducted requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with
an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the
gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol. confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."
• NBI received an information that the Cachuela group was involved in the • CASE: Nabilgas’ confession is also inadmissible because it was not
robbery and that they had been looking for prospective firearm buyers. NBI accomplished with the assistance of competent and independent counsel.
formed an entrapment team and proceeded to Bacoor to execute the Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he
operation. Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them they were sent by executed the confession. It was the same agency that provided the counsel,
Cachuela and appellant Ibanez to look for buyers of firearms. Police thus, there were no safeguards. Effective and vigilant counsel requires that
introduced themselves and told Nabilgas they were conducting an the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time
entrapment. Nabilgas surrendered and gave the names of other persons the confessant answers the first question asked by the police until the signing
involved in the crime. of the extrajudicial confession. Furthermore, Atty. Go was not presented to
• The NBI asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had corroborate the testimony.
already talked to the buyers and that they would like to see the firearms sold. • At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
Cachuela met them at a gas station in Naic. Cachuela brought them to his against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides
house and showed firearms. The agents arrested him when he showed the that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
guns. The NBI did a follow up entrapment on Ibañez and arrested him when omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only
he showed the unlicensed firearms. on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused
• At the NBI Main Officer, Zaldy pointed to the appellants during a police-line because it is considered as hearsay against them.
up. Nabilgas executed a handwritten confession implicating appellants and
Zaldy in the crime. Zaldy died during trial. RTC found them guilty and the Court *Appellants still found guilty because other evidence pointed sufficed to show that they
of Appeals affirmed the guilt of the accused. committed robbery with homicide.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION AND IMPORTANT—

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION WERE ADMISSIBLE • Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer
when she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a
HELD: NO mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records to show
that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’ confession was made voluntarily,
RATIO:

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 and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence of his rely on, and did not even refer to, any of the statements made by Chavez’s
extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights. mother.
• To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial
investigation. "An ‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and logically ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CHAVEZ IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY
requires that the lawyer be present and be able to advise and assist his client WITH HOMICIDE (irrelevant— NO, only homicide)
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the • WHETHER OR NOT THE STATEMENTS OF CHAVEZ’S MOTHER IS
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." In ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE (NO)
addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a
witness who was present at the time the written confession was made. We HELD:
note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness • The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial
stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be evidence, that the accused had indeed killed the victim.
presented. • SC: "[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery
with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to take
PEOPLE V. CHAVEZ (VOLUNTARY SURRENDER) personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide
is actually carried out." In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively
FACTS: prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no
• On October 28, 2006, Peñamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide. (no intent)
from work as a janitor in Eastwood City. When he was about to go inside his • Chavez’s mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-phones and averred that
house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person (Chavez) her son Mark Jason told her that said cellphones belong[ed] to victim Barbie.
wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding something . . [that] NOY was wounded in the incident and that the fatal weapon was put
while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon in a manhole infront[sic] of their residence."
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters across Peñamante’s house. • The records are silent on whether Chavez objected to his mother’s
• There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite statements. The records also do not show why the police proceeded to get his
haircutter, so Peñamante stated that he was able to see the face of Chavez mother’s testimony as opposed to getting Chavez’s testimony on his voluntary
and the clothes he was wearing. surrender.
• Chavez could not close the door of Barbie’s house/parlor so he simply walked • At most, the lower court found that Chavez’s mother was informed by the
away. However, he dropped something that he was holding and fell down investigating officer at the police station of the consequences in executing a
when he stepped on it. He walked away after, and Peñamante was not able written statement without the assistance of a lawyer. She proceeded to give
to determine what Chavez was holding. Peñamante then entered his house her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her son’s confession of the crime
and went to bed. despite the warning.
• At around 11:00 a.m., Peñamante’s landlady woke him up and told him that • The statement of Chavez’s mother is, however, inadmissible in evidence. She
Barbie was found dead at 9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that he saw was only informed of her rights and the consequences of executing a
Chavez leaving Barbie’s house at 2:45 a.m. statement without the assistance of a lawyer. The right to counsel applied
• On November 5, 2006, accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily during custodial investigation, which begins when the police investigation is
surrendered. Chavez was then 22 years old. His mother told the police that no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
she wanted to help her son who might be involved in Barbie’s death. a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
• The next day, Peñamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
from a line-up the person he saw leaving Barbie’s house. Peñamante statements.
immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his • R.A. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to include
written statement. There were no issues raised in relation to the line-up. invitation to persons investigated in connection offenses he is suspected to
Chavez said he was trying to patch things up with Barbie because Barbie have committed. Even those who voluntarily surrendered before police
suspected that he was having a relationship with Barbie’s boyfriend, Maki. officers must be apprised of their Miranda rights. Chavez is also being
• The Trial court found Chavez guilty of the special complex crime of robbery questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional
with homicide. CA Affirmed. pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who
accompanied him to the police station.
RELEVANT: As regards his mother’s statement, Chavez argued its inadmissibility as
evidence since his mother was not presented before the court to give the defense an GAMBOA V. JUDGE CRUZ (POLICE-LINE UP)
opportunity for cross-examination. He added that affidavits are generally rejected as
hearsay unless the affiant appears before the court and testifies on it. If the police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, an accused is not yet
• On the argument made by Chavez that his mother’s statement was entitled to counsel, however, if there would be an urge of the investigators to elicit
inadmissible as hearsay, plaintiff-appellee explained that the trial court did not admissions or confessions from the accused, he should be entitled to counsel, unless

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 he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel. RATIO:

SUMMARY: Gamboa was arrested and detained without warrant for vagrancy. He was RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
“lined up” together with 5 detainees and complainant BERNAL pointed to him saying, • This ONLY attaches upon the start of an investigation (i.e. when the
“that one’s a companion.” He was then made to sit down in front of the complainant, investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information or
while the latter was being interrogated. The “line-up” was made without the presence confessions).
of counsel and, thus, its validity is being assailed. The SC held that the right to counsel o At that stage, the person being interrogated MUST be assisted by
attaches upon the start of investigation, which is the time when the officers start to counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
interrogate and elicit information or confessions from the accused. At such point, the admissions.
person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice o At any instance, counsel must assist one who is under investigation.
of exhorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person • In the case at hand, the police line-up (at least for this case) was not part of
undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. In other words, any person the custodial inquest; hence, the petitioner was not entitled to a counsel at
under investigation, must be assisted by counsel and while the right may be waived, such stage.
the same shall not be valid, unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. The o When the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
SC also held that the police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, and, hence, accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession,
no right to counsel yet attaches. In this case, GAMBOA did not have to give any the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer.
statement to the police nor was he interrogated, as it was actually the complainant who o The line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense.
was being interrogated by the police. Thus, the police did not, at that stage, exact a o The confrontation between the State and the accused had not yet
confession to be used against him. Under US jurisprudence, the Constitutional rule begun.
requiring the exclusion of evidence derived from out-of-court identification procedures o He was neither interrogated nor coerced to answer questions.
conducted in the absence of counsel did not apply to pre-indictment identifications. The • JURISPRUDENCE: Kirby v. Illinois—
exclusionary rule relating to out-of-court identifications in the absence of counsel did o ISSUE: No attorney was present when the Identification was made,
not apply to identification testimony based upon a police station show- up, which took and neither the petitioner nor his companion had asked for legal
place before the accused had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any assistance or had been advised of any right to the presence of
criminal offense counsel.
o HELD: the constitutional rule requiring the exclusion of evidence
*However, the moment that there is even a slight move to elicit information, as in an derived from out-of-court Identification procedures conducted in the
accusatory process, then the accused should then be assisted by counsel. absence of counsel did not apply to pre- indictment Identifications

FACTS: ON DUE PROCESS.

• 19 July 1979 – (7:00am) Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant • The petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this right as a counsel duly
of arrest by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. He was later on brought to Precinct 2, represented him.
Manila where he was booked for vagrancy and detained with several others. • He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
• 20 July 1979 – During the lineup of 5 detainees, complainant Bernal identified substantiate his defense; but he chose not to and opted to file a Motion to
Gamboa to be a companion in a robbery While the complainant was being Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.
interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front
of her. 3 days after, an information for robbery was filed against him. DECISION: The petition was DISMISSED. The case is remanded back to the
• 22 August 1979 – Petitioner was arraigned. Hearings were held and the respondent court for further proceedings to afford the petitioner-accused the
prosecution formally offered its evidence. opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.
• 14 July 1980 – Petitioner, through counsel, filed for a Motion to Acquit or
Demurrer to Evidence predicated on the ground that the conduct of line-up, PEOPLE V. LINSANGAN (MARKED MONEY)
without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional
rights to counsel and to due process. Although he was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the
• 23 October 1980 – the respondent court denied said motion on the grounds police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated
that the motion was without merit. Hence the petition at hand. for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of the
prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes.
ISSUE: WON the conduct of line-up violated the constitutional rights to counsel and
due process of petitioner. SUMMARY: LINSANGAN initialed the P10.00 bills found tucked in his waist without
the presence of counsel. He acquired the marked money from the sale of marijuana
HELD: NO, on both grounds. The petition has no merit. during a buy-bust operation. The SC held that law enforcers are presumed to have

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performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of convincing evidence to • His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the P10 bills,
the contrary. In this case, LINSANGAN’s possession of the marked bills did not but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen that
constitute the crime, as what constituted the crime was his act of selling marijuana. they arrested him while he was actually engaged in selling marijuana
Thus, his right against self-incrimination was not violated by his possession of the cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more
marked bills. credence to their categorical declarations than to the appellant's denials.
• That is as it should be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to have
FACTS: performed their official duties in a regular manner. Their task of apprehending
• This is an appeal from the decision dated April 26, 1988, of the Regional Trial persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and
Court , finding the accused guilty of the crime of Violation of Section 4 of Article procedural technicalities to make it doubly so.
II in relation to Section 21, Art. IV of Republic Act 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs
Law), as amended, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua PEOPLE V. ANG CHUN KIT (BOOKING SHEETS)
with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of P20,000 plus
costs. When an arrested person signs a booking sheet at a police station, he does not admit
• It was established during the trial that in early November, 1987, police the confession of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance since it is
operatives of the Drug Enforcement Unit, Police Station No. 3 of the Western merely a statement of the accused’s being booked which accompanies the fact of an
Police District were informed that there was rampant drug using and pushing arrest.
on Dinalupihan Street, Tondo, Manila. The pusher was described to them as
a boy of about 20 years, 5'5" in height, and of ordinary build. He allegedly sold Custodial Investigation – any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
marijuana to anybody, regardless of age. person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
• In light of these reports, Police Lieutenant Manuel Caeg and the other any significant way.
members of the unit organized a "buy-bust" operation, to effect the arrest of
the notorious drug pusher. On November 13, 1987 at 10 o'clock in the Booking Sheet – a mere statement of the accused, of being booked which accompanies
morning, before the group left the office for the area of operation, two (2) ten- the arrest.
peso bills were given to Pat. Corpuz who had marked them with his initials
"T.C." He gave one of the marked bills to the informer. The said marked bills The booking sheet is no more than a record of arrest and a statement on how the arrest
was then found tucked in the waist of the accused after he was frisked and is made. It is simply a police report, and it has no probative value as an extrajudicial
arrested by the police for handing over to the informer and police poseur- statement of the person being detained. The signing by the accused of the booking
buyer ten (10) cigarette sticks of hand rolled marijuana. sheet and arrest report is not a part of the custodial investigation which would otherwise
• Linsangan denied the charge. He alleged that at around 10:30 in the morning require the presence of counsel to ensure the protection of the accused's constitutional
of November 13, 1987, he was in the vendor's stand of his neighbor Emeterio rights.
Balboa, alias Rey Galunggong, on Dinalupihan Street to buy his breakfast, for
he had just awakened. He lived with his widowed mother, Erlinda, on the FACTS:
ground floor of a two-storey house on the alley at 1284 Dinalupihan Street, • Ang Chun Kit is a Chinese National and is reputed to be a member of a
Tondo, Manila. The upper floor was occupied by his mother's brother, Geosito Hongkong-based drug syndicate.
Diaz, who is engaged in the second-hand tire business. Although once in a • On November 9, 1991, at three o’clock in the afternoon, a confidential informer
while, his uncle helped them financially, he earned his living by driving a reported, to the Chief Investigator Avelino Razon, that he arranged a
tricycle on a 5 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. shift. He admitted that he had witnessed transaction with a drug dealer and agreed to consummate the sale at 7:00 in
some men in Dinalupihan engaged in drinking sprees and smoking marijuana. the evening at the lobby of the Cardinal Santos Medical Center to which the
Chief Investigator immediately arranged a buy-bust operation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that when the policemen • After 15 minutes past seven, SPO2 Jacobo was met by the informer at the
required him to initial the P10-bills, they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to lobby and introduced to the accused as the person interested to buy the drugs,
remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while under custodial investigation. they then proceeded to the parking lot and the accused took out the drugs,
out of the car’s trunk, wrapped in a blue plastic bag. After checking, there was
HELD: The appeal has no merit. The appellant was not denied due process during the exchange of the object and the money.
custodial investigation. • SPO2 Jacobo lit his cigarette as a signal for the buy-bust team to move in for
the arrest. They also searched the vehicle of the accused and found 3 packets
RATIO: more of crystalline substance in a tissue box. The substances were led to the
• Although he was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that crime laboratory for examination and were confirmed to be “shabu”, 983.27
the police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not grams and 293.70 grams respectively (the one in the [SM] plastic bag and the
violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the packets in the tissue box [Kleenex]).
subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes.

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 • The accused disproved the charges. He said that he was at the hospital that submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place between the
time because someone texted him that his friend was hospitalized and he was seller and the poseur-buyer
going to visit him first before going to a dinner with some other friends. Two 2. Yes. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The court finds it difficult
persons in plain clothes suddenly appeared from nowhere, with guns drawn, to believe the statements of the accused. Ang Chun Kit failed to present the
and arrested him without informing the reason for the arrest. persons he told that would substantiate his version of the story; he also did
• The security guard on duty said that there was no untoward incident at the not reveal the name of the person he was visiting at the hospital.
hospital lobby or its vicinity because if there is, it will be reflected in their
logbook, the statement was confirmed by his supervisor. MACASIRAY V. PEOPLE (WHEN MUST OBJECTION BE RAISED)
• Ang Chun Kit also signed in the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at the police
station. Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered, and in the
• The RTC of Pasig, giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party
witnesses, found appellant Ang Chun Kit also known as Romy Ang guilty of making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose which the evidence is being
selling shabu, sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered him to pay a offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary
fine of Php30,000.00. evidence may be made.

ISSUES: FACTS:
• Whether or not Ang Chun Kit’s action of signing in the Booking Sheet at the • Petitioners Melecio Macasiray, Virgilio Gonzales, and Benedicto Gonzales are
Police Station is an act of admitting the commission of the offense. — NO the accused in Criminal Case No. 33 of the RTC of San Jose City. The case
• Whether or not the Decision of the RTC – Pasig will be affirmed in this present is for the murder of Johnny Villanueva, husband of private respondent
appeal. — YES Rosalina Rivera Villanueva, on February 9, 1986.
• It appears that in the course of the trial of the case, the prosecution introduced
HELD: in evidence an extrajudicial confession executed by petitioner Benedicto
1. No. The act of signing in the Booking Sheet at the police station is merely a Gonzales, in which he admitted participation in the crime and implicated
statement of the accused’s being booked and a fact of the date when the petitioners Melecio Macasiray and Virgilio Gonzales, his co-accused. Also
incident happened. It is only an accompaniment to the arrest. presented in evidence was the transcript of stenographic notes taken during
a. We however agree with the accused that his signature on the receipt the preliminary investigation of the case on April 8, 1986 before the fiscals
or lists of items confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence as office. This transcript contained statements allegedly given by Benedicto in
there is no showing that he was then assisted by counsel. answer to questions of the fiscal, in which he affirmed the contents of his
b. With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we already said extrajudicial confession.
in People v. Morico that "when an arrested person signs a Booking • When the extrajudicial confession was offered at the conclusion of the
Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station he does not admit the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, petitioners objected to its
commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating admissibility on the ground that it was given without the assistance of counsel.
circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the The transcript of the preliminary investigation proceeding was similarly
accused's being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact objected to on the same ground. Trial court sustained the objections and
of an arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges of declared the two documents to be inadmissible.
arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra- • When it was the turn of the defense to present evidence, Gonzales was asked
judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of about his extrajudicial confession. On cross-examination, he was questioned
conviction." not only about his extrajudicial confession but also about answers allegedly
c. But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang Chun Kit's given by him during the preliminary investigation and recorded in the transcript
conformity to the questioned documents has not been a factor in his of the proceeding. As he denied the contents of both documents, the
conviction since his guilt has been adequately established by the prosecution presented them as rebuttal evidence, allegedly to impeach the
detailed and unshaken testimonies of the officers who apprehended credibility of Gonzales. Petitioners once more objected and the trial court
him. Hence even disregarding the questioned documents we still find again denied admission to the documents.
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. • Private respondent then sought the nullification of the trial courts orders and
d. The alleged inconsistencies do not detract from the established fact succeeded. The CA declared the two documents admissible in evidence and
that the accused was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy- ordered the trial court to admit them. Hence, this petition for review of the
bust operation since the arresting agents were able to give an appellate courts decision.
otherwise clear and convincing account of the circumstances leading
to the arrest of the accused. And, in every prosecution for illegal sale ISSUE: W/N the assailed documents are admissible in evidence
of dangerous drugs what is material and indispensable is the
HELD: NO

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 defense adopted the confession by introducing it in evidence, the
RATIO: defense waived any objection to the admission of the same in
evidence.
The question is whether petitioners waived objection to the admissibility of the • Third. Private respondent justifies the use of the confession and TSN on the
documents, either by failing to object to their introduction during the trial or by using ground that they are necessary for the purpose of impeaching the credibility
them in evidence. of Benedicto Gonzales and not for the purpose of presenting them as
evidence in chief. But as already stated, there was really no need for Gonzales
We think the Court of Appeals erred. to deny the contents both of the confession and the TSN since they had
already been excluded in evidence. There was therefore no use for
• First. Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally impeaching his credibility.
offered. In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the
witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose SECTION 13: RIGHT TO BAIL
for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
o In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the documents sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
when they were formally offered. Contrary to the ruling of the to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
appellate court, petitioners did not waive objection to admissibility of corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
the said documents by their failure to object when these were
marked, identified, and then introduced during the trial. That was not I. RIGHT TO BAIL
the proper time to make the objection. Objection to the • Another means of immediately obtaining liberty. Enables the accused to
documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally prepare his defense. Purpose: To guarantee appearance of the accused at
offered, not earlier. Thus, it has been held that the identification the trial. (1) Yap v. CA
of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not
constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the II. SETTING UP BAIL
4
party presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of • Court cannot require a strictly cash bond.
the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it • Amount should be high enough to assure presence when required, but
is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit. • If it is unreasonably excessive, it is tantamount to denial of bail (1)
• Second. Nor is it correct to say that the confession was introduced in evidence Yap v. CA
by Benedicto Gonzales himself when it was his turn to present evidence for • Bail should not be excessive. If it were excessive, it becomes
the defense. What happened is that despite the fact that in its order of April meaningless since the accused won’t be able to afford it. (3) De La
14, 1988 the court sustained the objection to the admissibility of the Camara v. Enage
confession and the statements given by Benedicto Gonzales at the • Guidelines (ANONRAEPNFFB): (3) De La Camara v. Enage
preliminary investigation, the defense nonetheless asked him questions 1. Ability of the accused to give bail
regarding his confession in reference to his denial of liability. It was thus not 2. Nature of the offense.
for the purpose of using as evidence the confession and the alleged 3. Penalty for the offense charged.
statements in the preliminary investigation but precisely for the purpose of 4. Character and reputation of the accused.
denying their contents that Gonzales was asked questions. Gonzales denied 5. Age and Health of the accused.
he ever gave the answers attributed to him in the TSN allegedly taken during 6. Character and strength (weight) of the evidence.
the preliminary investigation. 7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial.
o The defense did not really have to ask Gonzales questions regarding 8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
his confession inasmuch as the court had already declared both the 9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested.
confession and the transcript of stenographic notes to be 10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
inadmissible in evidence, but certainly the defense should not be
penalized for exercising an abundance of caution. In fact, the III. DEGREE OF EVIDENCE
defense did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits, which is • When offense charged is capital in nature.
proof of the fact that it did not adopt it as evidence. There is, o Burden is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
therefore, no basis for the appellate courts ruling that because the required quantum (strong evidence). The prosecution must be

4
Almeda v. Villaluz

Jlyrreverre|315
 given opportunity to present evidence, otherwise grant of bail is case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail
void. pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in
• Strong evidence. the amount of P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure “a
o Means accused will probably be punished; not whether the certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a
evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant.”
IV. AVAILABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL • Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory
A. When available amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis
• Bail must be available to one who is detained even before formal charges are of respondent court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the
5
filed. amount of his civil liability to private complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing
• Bail is available to defendant in extradition proceedings as well as Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil
deportation proceedings (provided he is not a flight risk), because it liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount
involves a prolonged restraint of liberty. (2) Government of Hong Kong v. of bail. He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he
Olalia appealed to the Supreme Court. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at
a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contested
B. When not available the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty,
• Right to bail is not available to military personnel because of the unique claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
structure of the community, and because it will be paid out from the taxes. (4)
Commendador v. General de Villa ISSUE: Whether the bail may be fixed at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of
which the accused is charged.
V. WAIVER OF BAIL
• Right to bail may be waived even implicitly in an irrecoverable manner HELD: NO
as in the case when accused agreed to remain in legal custody during
the pendency of the trial of his criminal case. RATIO:
• The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the
YAP V CA (EXCESSIVE IF EQUAL TO CIVIL LIABILITY) Constitution. The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la
Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
SUMMARY: YAP was convicted by the RTC for estafa, but he appealed the Decision meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abao, this Court made the
and prayed for provisional liberty pending appeal. The CA required him to post bail pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over
amounting to P5.5 million corresponding to the amount he allegedly embezzled, as well lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail,
as to secure a certification from the Mayor that he was a resident of the area in which effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting
he resides, and that should he transfer, he should inform the Court and the complainant. unreasonable conditions.
YAP prayed that the amount be reduced to P40,000 according to the Bail Bond Guide, • The Supreme Court find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the
but the CA denied his petition. The apparent rationale of the CA is to prevent him from bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of
leaving the country during the pendency of the case considering that he himself the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court
admitted having gone out several times. The SC held that the prohibition against of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in
requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution and, according to the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find
jurisprudence, imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive,
to bail, such that the SC will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over the and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.
lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny • The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
the same by: (1) Imposing a prohibitory sum and (2) Exacting unreasonable conditions. or whenever so required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to
In this case, although the SC conceded that an increase in the amount of bail while the assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is
case is on appeal may be meritorious, P5.5 million was unreasonable, and thus, the reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
bail bond was reduced to 200k. • To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which Yap is charged
(in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid
FACTS: as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this the
• Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for Court cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a
misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the

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Herras Tehankee v. Rovira

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 satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the • The means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the
appellate court. “machinery of Criminal Law”
In addition, the SC held while our EXTRADITION LAW does not provide for the grant
GOV’T OF HONGKONG V. HON. OLALIA of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him from filing a motion for bail,
(NEW TRENDS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW; a right to due process under the Constitution
RIGHT TO BAIL IN EXTRADITION CASES)
Furthermore, the SC held that pacta sunt servanda does not necessarily mean that in
SUMMARY: MUNOZ was charged before the HK Court with three counts of the offense keeping with its treaty obligations, the RP should diminish a potential extradite’s rights
“accepting an advantage as agent” under HK Law. The DOJ received from its HK to life, liberty, and due process
counterpart a request for the provisional arrest of MUNOZ. HK filed with the RTC a
petition for the extradition of MUNOZ and the latter filed a petition for bail, which was Last but not least the SC held that “clear and convincing” evidence should be the
denied. standard used in granting bail in extradition cases, which is:
• Lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
The SC held that while it has ruled that bail is available only in criminal proceedings • Higher than preponderance of evidence
and does not apply in extradition proceedings, it cannot ignore the modern trend in The applicant must prove by “clear and convincing” evidence that he is not a flight
PUBLIC INTERNATIONL LAW, which places primacy on the worth of the individual risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court
person and the sanctity of human rights.
• The Philippines has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of Under PD 1069, THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW:
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or • “Extradition” is defined as the removal of an accused from the RP with the
arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable the latter object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release requesting State or Government to hold him in connection with any criminal
if justified. investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on
• The RP authorities are under obligation to make available to every person him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting State or Government
under detention such remedies that safeguard their fundamental right to • Extradition is characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty,
liberty, which includes the right to bail to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its
territorial jurisdiction and the correlative duty of the other State to surrender
The SC also held that: him to the demanding state
• The exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not • The object of extradition is:
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings • To prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime
o Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and and
quarantine, have likewise been detained • To secure his return to the State from which he fled, for the purpose
• To limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close its eyes to of trial or punishment
jurisprudential history
FACTS:
The SC has already admitted the right to bail to those persons who are not involved in • An “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons” was
criminal proceedings. If bail can be granted in deportation cases on the basis of the entered into by the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter PHL) and then
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, then there is no justification as to British Crown Colony of Hong Kong (hereinafter HK) which took effect in 1997.
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Both deportation and extradition • Private respondent Munoz was charged in HK for 3 counts of “accepting an
cases are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person advantage as agent” and 7 counts of “conspiracy to defraud.” Warrants of
detained is not an issue arrest were issued by HK court against Munoz in 1997 and 1999 and if
convicted, faces jail term of 7 to 14 years for each charge
The SC further held that the right of a prospective extradite to apply for bail in this • Upon receipt of request for provisional arrest by PHL through the DOJ, the
jurisdiction must be viewed in light of the various treaty obligations of the RP concerning NBI filed with the RTC an application for provisional arrest and the same was
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights granted in Sept 23, 1999. On same date, NBI agents arrested and detained
• The presumption lies in favor of human liberty Munoz.
• Initially, Munoz filed with the CA a petition questioning the validity of the order
Moreover, the SC held that an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, of arrest in which the CA declared such as void. But, the SC reversed this and
bears all earmarks of a criminal process: declared the order of arrest valid. This decision became final and executor in
• It entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extradite April 2001.
• The extradite is subjected to arrest, prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced • Meanwhile, as early as Nov 22, 1999, HK has filed with the RTC of Manila a
to transfer to the demanding State following the proceedings petition for extradition of Munoz. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed

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 by Munoz. Judge Bernardo, Jr. (a.k.a Mr. NBA Fantasy) denied the petition o Also, the right of an extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the
for bail but upon reconsideration, Judge Olalia granted bail subject to certain light of various treaty obligations of PHL. What is important is that the
conditions on Oct. 30, 2001. right to liberty must not be impaired.
• An urgent motion to vacate the order was denied by Judge Olalia, hence this • Extradition is “the removal of an accused from PHL with the object of placing
instant him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or gov’t
• Petitioner HK contended that Judge Olalia committed GADAJEL and that to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him
there is nothing in the constitution or statutory law providing that a potential or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under penal or criminal law of
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal the requesting state.”
proceeding o It is a right of a foreign power created by a treaty
• Private Respondent maintained that right to bail extends to prospective o It is NOT A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING even if the potential extraditee
extraditee and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged is a criminal in another state
deprivation of liberty o IT IS SUI GENERIS tracing its existence on treaty obligation between
states
ISSUES: (1) Whether the right to bail extends to a prospective extraditee (considering o It is neither a trial nor a civil action. It is merely administrative in
that extradition is an administrative case and right to bail involves criminal cases). character.
• While ostensibly administrative, extradition bears all earmark of criminal
HELD: YES, Case Dismissed process.
o Potential extraditee is subject to arrest, prolonged restraint of liberty,
RATIO: and forced to transfer to the demanding state
• The court has previously ruled in Gov’t of USA v. Puraganan that the o Extradition is characterized by (a) deprivation of liberty and (b) the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings; it is means employed to attain purpose of extradition is “the machinery of
available only in criminal proceedings. The SC in that case reasoned: criminal law”
o The use of word “conviction” in the constitution applies only to • Records show that Munoz was arrested on Sept 23, 1999 and remained
persons arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal incarcerated until Dec 20, 2001, a period of over 2 years without having been
laws. Court does not render a judgment of conviction in extradition convicted of any crime. This is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right
o The right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favour of to liberty by any standard!
every accused before judgement. The presumption of innocence is • While the Philippines must honor its obligation under the extradition treaty, it
not an issue in extradition thus it follows that right to bail is not should not diminish a potential extraditee’s right to life, liberty and due process
contemplated which are guaranteed not only by the constitution but also by international
• HOWEVER, the court took note of the current trends in international law which conventions to which the PHL is party thereto.
gives primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human • While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
rights. neither is there a prohibition. Constitutional provision on due process however
o There is growing importance of the individual in PIL guarantees this right.
o Higher value is given to human rights in the international sphere o Since this is not a criminal proceeding where there is a presumption
o There is corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal of innocence and that in extradition proceedings, there is a
human rights in treaty obligations presumption that an extraditee is a fugitive from justice, Munoz (the
o There is the duty of the courts to balance the rights of the individual prospective extraditee) has the burden of proof of showing that he is
under our constitution and the law on extradition on the other. not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
• THUS, the court in light of the various international treaties re-examined the o An extradition proceeding being sui generis the standard of proof
ruling in Puragan. required is “clear and convincing evidence” which is below proof
o First, deprivation of liberty is not limited to criminal proceedings. beyond reasonable doubt but above preponderance of evidence.
Respondents in admin cases such as deportation and quarantine • Thus Munoz must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a
have likewise been detained. flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of extradition court.
o Second, Philippine jurisprudence prior to Puragan has not limited the • WHEREFORE, case DISMISSED and REMANDED to trial court to determine
exercise to bail to criminal proceedings only. There have been cases if Munoz is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence
where right to bail was granted in admin cases mostly deportation
proceedings. ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN ( DICRETIONERY)
• If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should
not also be allowed in extradition cases. Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good
o The court applied the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
the constitution says is part of the law of the land

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subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
at trial. strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
• The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense,
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of shall be bailable.
the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal • Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with
Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of strong.
guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.” • Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that
the evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail
FACTS: may be granted according to the discretion of the court.
• On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in • Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority i. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application
2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
surrender. filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the
• Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the
heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to • Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
• If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
ISSUES: (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is following or other similar circumstances:
strong. a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua. reiteration;
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
strong. sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
2) Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk. justification;
c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
HELD: conditional pardon;
1. YES. d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight
• Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence. if released on bail; or
• Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary the pendency of the appeal.
is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be • The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
released on bail. the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party
• The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at in either case.
trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the • Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life
presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In
be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be
• Bail as a matter of discretion exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of
• Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs.
i. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence
life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital of guilt against the accused is strong.
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life • The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

Jlyrreverre|319
 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients
the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require with asthma or COPD.Chronic Hypertension
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the • Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion—
Rules of Court as amended); Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra) was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the allow petitioner to post bail].
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused DE LA CAMARA V. ENAGE (10 GUIDELINES)
upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied. SUMMARY: DE LA CAMARA was arrested for multiple murder and multiple frustrated
• People v. Dacudao— a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted murder. He applied for bail claiming that there was no evidence to link him to the crime
to an accused who is charged with a capital offense and the prosecution failed to present evidence but JUDGE ENAGE fixed the bail at
some P1.2 million. DE LA CAMARA assailed the Order of the ENAGE, but he later
2. YES. escaped from jail and, thus, his petition to nullify the said Order has become moot.
• Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail—The Supreme Nevertheless, the SC held that excessive bail shall not be required. The right to bail
Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international flows from the presumptions of innocence in favor of every accused. The SC also held
community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of that where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and that is excessive. If there were no such prohibition on excessive bail, then the right to
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for bail becomes meaningless; The SC further held that under Villasensor v. Abano, that
detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental the guidelines in the fixing of bail are as follows:
right to liberty. 1. Ability of the accused to give bail
o This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human 2. Nature of the offense.
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has 3. Penalty for the offense charged.
authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal 4. Character and reputation of the accused.
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing 5. Age and Health of the accused.
showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a 6. Character and strength (weight) of the evidence.
danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, 7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial.
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. 8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
• CASE: Enrile not a flight risk— 9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested.
o social and political standing and volunatary surrender 10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
o personal disposition his indictment for plunderhas demonstrated
his utter respect for the legal processes of this country FACTS:
o when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and • Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the
bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato,
a flight risk. Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968.
• CASE: There exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstance— • Thereafter, on November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with
o uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder 2 and another
heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; for multiple murder 3 against petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan
o arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; January 14, 1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower
o coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, court
because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under • Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's
stressful conditions; and application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the
o exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity,
certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of

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 P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production
• Then came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that
respondent Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be
reasonable. There was likewise a motion for reconsideration to reduce the I. Citizens Rights Under Section 14 (DIHIMSWA)
amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this petition. 1. Right to due process of law
• Case set for hearing. No appearance. Submit memorandum. Instead of a 2. Right to be presumed innocent
reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a supplemental answer 3. Right to be heard by himself and counsel
wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 4. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
1971 and had since then remained at large. against him
5. Right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial
ISSUE : WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO BAIL IS VIOLATED 6. Right to meet the witness face to face
7. Right to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
HELD: Petition Moot. witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf

• Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital II. Due Process of Law
offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong.
• Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by A. General Principles
requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. As • Requires the procedure established by law be followed. U.S. v. Ocampo
construed in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of • Due Process here is procedural due process. U.S. v. Grant
money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that "bail • Due Process is satisfied if the accused is
set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill thus o Informed as to why he is proceeded against
purpose is "excessive" o Informed what charge he has to meet
• The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of o With his conviction [passed by a court with competent
Justice Sanchez, as follows: jurisdiction] being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with
(1) ability of the accused to give bail; falsity.
(2) nature of the offense; o After full opportunity for him to rebut it
(3) penalty for the offense charged; o The sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. Nuñez
(4) character and reputation of the accused; v. Sandiganbayan
(5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the evidence; B. Right Against Trial by Publicity
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; • There’s a presumption of impartiality towards the judge.
(8) forfeiture of other bonds; • To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be...
(9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and o Allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced.
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. o Not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity Webb v.
• Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing De Leon
at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called • Effect of publicity on judges cannot be presumed especially since, unlike
upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where jurors, judges are trained professionals. People v. Teehankee Jr.
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate C. Due Process and Military Tribunals
to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." • Ordinarily, the Supreme Court cannot review the rulings and proceedings
of the military commission
SECTION 14: o Generally, this court does not exercise over military commissions
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without the supervisory jurisdiction which it possesses over civil trial courts.
due process of law. Buscayan v. Military
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed • Civilian Jurisdiction of military commission or tribunal. Olaguer v. Military
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be Commission No. 34
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and

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 o No Jurisdiction à cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even respect to the existence of a crime, but more importantly, of
during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses the identity of the accused as the author of the crime.
allegedly committed by them. o Prosecution’s case must rise and fall on its own merits and
§ As long as the civil courts are open and functioning. cannot draw its strength from the weakness of the defense.
§ Any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military IV. Right to be Heard
tribunal.
o Olaguer reversed Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission where it A. General Principles
was held that military courts have jurisdiction over civilians during • The Hearer
martial law. o Quality demanded: fairness and impartiality
o This case did not acquit the convicted accused but ordered § Judge may not play the double role of prosecutor and judge
rehearing. in one and the same case.
• The one being Heard
III. Presumption of Innocence o Right to present evidence and to be present at the trial
• Burden of Proof o The right to be assisted by counsel
o Prosecution has the burden to overcome such presumption of o Right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required (proof witness in his behalf.
beyond reasonable doubt) • Right to present evidence.
o The prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely o Right to testify in one’s favor and the right to be given time to
on the weakness of the defense. call witnesses.
• Reasonable Doubt • One has the right also, if being accused of two offenses, for trial of each of the
o That doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof case.
and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest
upon the certainty of guilty. B. Right to be tried by an impartial judge
• The presumption • Imperative character of the safeguard of due process connotes, at the very
o Presumption of innocence includes that of morality and decency least, an impartial tribunal. Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz
and chastity (i.e. presumption of virginity). Valdepenas v. People • Ground in which judge can disqualify himself (PRMPO): Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz
o If accused appeals after being convicted by lower court, the 1. Pecuniary interest.
presumption of innocence still applies. Mangubat v. 2. Relationships
Sandiganbayan 3. Previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication
• Legislation 4. Other just or valid reason which erodes trait of objectivity
o Congress has the power to define what shall constitute prima facie • Examples of when judge is partial:
evidence of guilt for a crime and such power is not violative o Line of questioning showed his hostility against the accused
of right against presumption of innocence, since such prima who was a notorious criminal. People v. Opida
facie evidence can easily be rebutted. U.S. v. Luling o Judge convicted the petitioner of arson, he attributed the act to
o A law stating that one shall be disqualified to run for office on the desire of petitioner to destroy evidence of malversation, the
the ground alone that charges have been filed against him judge was disqualified from subsequently trying the petitioner for
before the court is considered as violative of the right to be malversation. Ignacio v. Villaluz
presumed innocent. Dumlao v. COMELEC • Judge who inherit a case from another judge, even though he was not able to
o In Marquez Jr. v. COMELEC, the Court upheld the hear all the witnesses presented, still have the presumption of being impartial.
disqualification of a candidate on the grounds that he is a
fugitive from justice. The court here said that fugitive applies to C. Right to Counsel
those who was not yet convicted but was running away from • Basic elements of the right to counsel:
trial. This did not violate the presumption of innocent as o Court is duty bound to inform the defendant that he has a right
disqualification is not a penalty and that Congress is allowed to an attorney before he is arraigned.
to prescribe reasonable qualifications for local candidates. o The Court must ask him if he desires the service of counsel.
• What prosecution must do before there can be a conviction. People v. Ming o If he does, and is unable to get one, the Court must assign counsel
o The accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence de officio
until final conviction; conviction requires no less than evidence o Or, if the accused wishes to procure private counsel, the court
sufficient to arrive at a moral certainty of guilt, not only with must give him time to obtain one. If appointed counsel’s

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 interests are divided between prosecutor and the defense, his 4. if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the
appointment constitutes reversible error. court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him. (People v.
o Where duly authorized members of the bar are not available, the Agbayani)
court may appoint any person resident of the province and of good
repute for probity and ability. V. Right to be informed
• The Right • Cardinal requisite: accused be informed of facts that are imputed to him.
o Accused must be informed by the court that he has a right to o Information must describe the act with sufficient particularity.
have counsel before being arraigned, and must be asked if he o Descriptive terms used must be sufficient in their common and
desires the aid of counsel. If he desires and is unable to employ ordinary acceptation to show with certainty to the common
counsel, the court must assign counsel (counsel de officio) to defend understanding of intelligent men what the property was and to fully
him. U.S. v. Gemino identify it.
o It is essential that the court should assign one de officio if he o Qualifying circumstances must be alleged.
desires and if he is poor, and grant him a reasonable time to o The right to assail the sufficiency of the information or the
procure an attorney of his own. admission of evidence may be waived by the accused if he fails to
o Denial such right would be sufficient cause for the reversal of the object to its sufficiency during the trial and the deficiency is cured
case. U.S. v. Seradoy by competent evidence presented therein.
o Counsel de officio must be a qualified lawyer. o Need not allege the precise time of the commission of the
• Presumption of Regularity offense, unless time is an essential element of the crime charged.
o There is a presumption that the court did the said acts above. o Time of commission of the offense must be alleged as near to
People v. Miranda the actual date as the information of complaint will permit
• When right attaches. Sayson v. People (Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
o Time of arraignment o Due process requires that not only he (accused) needs to be
o Before arraignment, rights under Article 12 shall apply to the accused informed, he must be able to understand what the law commands
• Cases where there’s no denial of right to counsel or prohibits (otherwise its void for vagueness)
o The accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial o Right to sufficient information is a right in criminal proceedigns
with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the presentation and not in administrative proceedings, which only requires that
of evidence for the defense has arrived, he appears by himself alone the respondent be given the opportunity to be heard.
and the absence of his counsel was inexcusable. Sayson v. People • An information filed must contain all the valid charges against the
o A counsel de officio was appointed during the absence of the accused as it is the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
accused counsel de parte pursuant to the court’s desire to finish the and the cause of accusation against him. People v. Regala
case as early as practicable under continuous trial system
o Petitioner was represented by counsel de parte at the VI. Speedy, impartial and public trial
arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed
duty`bound to appoint a counsel de officio for the continuation of A. Impartial Trial
his cross examination. • Right to impartial trial is not a bar to a judge’s intervention in cross-
• Waiver of right to counsel examination.
o Accused said that he did not want a counsel. People v. Sim Ben • It is the duty of a trial judge to examine witnesses when it appears necessary
o Accused went to trial alone and conducted his own defense for the elucidation of the record.
after being asked if he wanted a counsel.
o Presumption is always against the waiver. B. Speedy Trial
o Prosecution must prove with strong evidence waiver was made • Denial of the right to speedy trial shall entitle the accused to the
willingly and voluntarily. dismissal of the case filed against him. Conde v. Rivera
• Pre-arraignment duties of the Judge • What constitution prohibits are unreasonable delays.
1. TO inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel • Thus if delay was reasonable it does not violate right to speedy trial (See
before being arraigned; examples)
2. after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the o Absence of the complainant due to medical reasons. People v.
aid of counsel; Gines
3. if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must o Four days in the transmission of appeal papers.
grant him reasonable time to do so; and o War/Liberation
o Typhoon

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 • If accused raise the defense of denial of speedy trial only on appeal, it’s 1. That the witness is really material
deemed to have been waived. 2. That he is guilty of no neglect in previously obtaining
• Waiver or abandonment may be presumed only when the postponement of attendance of said witness.
the trial has been sought and obtained by the accused himself or by his 3. That the witness will be available at the time desired.
attorney. 4. That no similar evidence could be obtained.
• Remedy of an accused when there’s a violation of right to speedy trial • The following are kinds of compulsory processes available to the accused:
is dismissal which is equivalent to acquittal, thus double jeopardy applies 1. Subpoena duces tecum. Summon documents in court.
to habeas corpus if detained. 2. Subpoena ad testificandum. Summon witnesses to testify in
court.
C. Public Trial 3. Contempt. Punishment for disobedience or dishonor to the
• When anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the court; may be direct or indirect.
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. 4. Bench Warrant. Compels the attendance in court of key witness
• Exception: general public may be excluded when the evidence to be different from an arrest or search warrant, thus, no need for
presented in the proceeding may be characterized as offensive to decency probable cause.
or public morals. • Since preliminary investigation can result in an arrest, the accused
o But even in such instances, the constitution demands that the should not be denied access to evidence favorable to him. Webb v. De
accused should be allowed to at least have his friends, relatives, and Leon
counsel present no matter with what offense he may be charged.
• Right is a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as B. Trial in Absentia
instruments of persecution. • Accused was so noisy, disorderly and disruptive during the trial that it
was impossible for the trial to proceed. The judge ordered accused to
VII. Right to Confrontation be removed. SC said he forfeited his right to be present throughout the
• Right to meet the witness face to face trial. Illinois v. Allen
• Two-fold purpose: • Requisites for trial in absentia
o Afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the o Accused has been arraigned
witness by cross-examination. o Notice of the trial was duly served to him and properly returned
o Secondarily to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the o His failure to appear is unjustified
witness. • Why after arraignment
• A doctor who executes the medical certificate must be presented for o During arraignment, the information is read to the accused
cross examination. U.S. v. Lorenzana and he enters his plea.
• Agreement between prosecution and the defense to the effect that o Trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person.
certain witnesses, if presented, would testify to certain facts can deprive • There is statutory rule which requires the presence of the accused at
the defendant of the right of confrontation is not completely disallowed. U.S. promulgation of judgment.
v. Donato • Trial in absentia can be made voluntarily but he may be compelled to
• Testimony not subject to cross examination must be excluded from appear for purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution.
consideration. • If he really does not want to appear, he must unqualifiedly admit that every
o Exception. When cross examination was started, but was not time a witnesses mentions a name by which he is known, the witness
finished, before witness can come back, he dies. Testimony is to be understood as referring to him. Carredo v. People
already made is admissible. People v. Seneris.
• The provision which allows the sharia court to render a decision based US V. LULING (PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; RIGHTS OF THE STATE)
on an unexamined oath made by the defendant without any other
evidence, denies a party his right to confront the witnesses against him Accused alleges that Section 316 of Act No. 355 is unconstitutional because it says
and to cross-examine them, thus it is a violation of due process. Tampar v. that certain facts only shall constitute prima facie proof of guilt; it is established in
Usman criminal law that every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is proved beyond
• Right of confrontation is recognized during preliminary investigation reasonable doubt but many States have established a different rule and have
proper (whether or not to file a case), but not during preliminary examination provided that certain facts only shall constitute prima facie evidence.
(whether or not to issue a warrant). Marinas v. Siochi
RECIT-READY: Luling assails the validity of Act No. 355 as it provides for prima facie
VIII. Compulsory Process evidence for its violation, and that the burden is upon the accused to prove innocence.
• To establish the right to continuance by reason of absence of He uses the constitutional provision that “the accused shall be proven innocent until the
witnesses, the accused must show (MMNAE): contrary is proved” as legal basis. The SC denied his motion, stating that the Congress

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“has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what o To put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act/s are
proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt.” innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent
• Because Luling was unable to rebut the prima facie evidence, the conviction
FACTS: by the CFI was upheld.
• Luling is a wharf watchman. He was arrested on the ground that he solicited
P100 from a certain man named Rufino Elorz, and that it was done to secure DUMLAO V. COMELEC (PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; CHARGED V.
through customs brokers the delivery of rolls of paper with opium to Elorz. This CONVICTED)
was a violation of Act No. 355 (An Act to Constitute the Customs Service of
the Philippine Archipelago and to Provide for the Administration Thereof). The provision of Election Code that the filing of charges for the commission of crimes
Luling was later convicted by the court of first instance and was sentenced to before a civil or military court shall be prima facie evidence of the commission of an
six months imprisonment and was ordered to pay a P1,000 fine. act of disloyalty to the State was declared void as it condemns before one is fully
• Luling assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 355 insofar as it requires the heard, in contravention of constitutional presumption of innocence.
accused to prove his innocence, and that “the state is without right or authority
to enact a law by virtue of the terms of which certain facts only shall constitute RECIT-READY: BP 52 disqualifies a candidate charged either before the civil or
prima facie proof of guilt.” (Basically, his contention was that it is against the military tribunals for acts of disloyalty, subversion, insurrection, rebellion, and such
principle that the accused is innocent until the contrary is proved) other crimes
o LULING assailed the validity of Section 316 of the said law for
making the “mere receiving” of certain gifts from importers or The SC held that explicit is the Constitutional provision that, in all criminal proceedings:
exporters prima facie evidence of violation, alleging that it (1) The accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (2) The
violates his right to presumption of innocence by transferring accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. The SC also held that
the burden of proof to the accused an “accusation” according to the Constitution, is not synonymous with “guilt”. In this
• Pertinent section of Act No. 355: “[Any] evidence of such soliciting, case, the challenged proviso contravenes the presumption of innocence, as a
demanding, exacting, or receiving, satisfactory to the court in which such trial candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
is had, shall be regarded as prima facie evidence that such soliciting, have been filed against him – it condemns before proper hearing. Also, no distinction
demanding, exacting, or receiving was contrary to law, and shall put upon the is made between “a person convicted of acts of disloyalty” and “a person against whom
accused the burden of proving that such act was innocent and not with charges have been filed for such acts”. The SC further held that a legislative or
unlawful intention.” administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to substitute for a judicial
determination of the same. In this case, evidence regarding such acts of disloyalty
ISSUE/HELD: W/N Act No. 355 is unconstitutional by violating the principle that the should be presented before the courts and not before administrative bodies, such as
accused is innocent until proven guilty – NO COMELEC.

Ratio: FACTS:
• The SC held that no rule has been better established in criminal law than the • Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
reasonable doubt elections of January 30, 1980.
o In a criminal prosecution, the burden is upon the State to prove every • He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged, for the Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
purpose of showing the guilt of the accused guarantees of the Constitution.
• However, the SC also held that in cases of statutory crimes, no constitutional • S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received
provision is violated by the statute that provides: payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and
o Proof by the State of some material fact of facts shall constitute prima who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
facie evidence of guilt office to which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the
o In proving so, the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose same elective local office from which he has retired.
of showing that such act is innocent and committed without unlawful • He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him,
intention and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary
• The SC also held that in the RP, no act is a crime, unless it is made so by grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
statute and the State has the right: • His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of
o To declare what acts are criminal, within well-defined limitations a person who was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for
o To specify what act/s shall constitute a crime conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the
o To specify what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt commission of such crimes.

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 • He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent • The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared
is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by
a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of • It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application
office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
Sec 1 of BP 52. protection, neither does it permit such denial.
• In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all
ISSUE: legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
1. Did petitioners have standing unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution? classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.
HELD: • The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
1. No governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted. cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the
Petition granted objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

RATIO: IMPORTANT: ASSAILED PROVISION:

1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine Sec. 4. ... Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including
judicial review, three requisites are present: acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not
a. actual case and controversy be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate
b. proper party in any partisan political activity therein:
c. existence of a constitutional question
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission
for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question. of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.
been adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for • Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional
resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
would require that his suit be dismissed. innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
the imminent elections. constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is
• If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom
can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to
public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified run for public office.
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject • A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have
to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
retirable. already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it
• The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term
reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to of the sentence.
politics. • And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence,
• But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that
there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one
for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the
prima facie evidence against him.

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 • A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed • Rule 112 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court state that: “If the defendant appears
to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was without attorney, he must be INFORMED by the court that it is his RIGHT TO
meritorious. HAVE AN ATTORNEY being arraigned and must be asked if he desires such
PEOPLE V. HOLGADO (RIGHT TO COUNSEL; DUTIES OF THE JUDGE) aid. If so, the Court must assign an attorney to defend him. A reasonable time
must be allowed for procuring attorney.” Violated.
Slight illegal detention – When an accused unaided by counsel qualifiedly admits
his guilt to an ambiguous or vague information, it is not prudent for the trial court to ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ANY IRREGULARITY IN THE
render a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense without PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case;
The Constitution guarantees:
When a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to • “No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
comply with: of himself”
1. It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being • The accused “shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.”
arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid The qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not
of an attorney; prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney the accused guilty of a capital offense, without absolute any evidence to determine and
de oficio to defend him; and clarify the true facts of the case.
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant
him a reasonable time therefor. NOTE THAT In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
RECIT-READY: HOLGADO was charged for slight illegal detention for kidnapping and • The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of the
detaining FABREAG for 8 hours without any justifiable reason. During arraignment, he accused.
was asked, “Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?” He did not have o The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have
an attorney and pleaded guilty, saying that a certain OCAMPO had instructed him to an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?"
do so. The SC held that under Section 3, Rule 112 of the RoC, when the defendant o The question was so framed that it could have been construed by the
appears without an attorney, the court has four duties to comply with: (1) Inform the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had
defendant that it is his right to have an attorney before being arraigned (2) After giving no attorney.
the said information, ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney (3) If he chooses to • The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo
avail but is unable to employ an attorney, the court must assign an attorney de oficio to was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to
defend him. Such that it is not enough for the court to merely appraise an accused of making of the plea of guilty.
his right to have an attorney. (4) If the defendant chooses to procure an attorney of his • The court on this matter in the presence of the accused opened no
own, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so. investigation and there is no way of determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the
In this case, none of these duties have been complied with. The SC also held that in confession.
criminal cases, there can be no fair hearing, unless the accused is given an opportunity • The court was satisfied with the fiscal’s information that he had investigated
to be heard by counsel. “Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill Mr. Ocampo and found that the latter had nothing to do with the case.
in the science of law, particularly in the rules of evidence, and, without counsel, he may • Such attitude was wrong for the simple reason that a mere fiscal’s statement
be convicted not because he is guilty, but because he does not know how to establish is not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused.
his innocence.
• Further, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by
counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the
FACTS:
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
• Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of
• It is NOT enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it
Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information,
is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he
being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive,
is poor, and grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal
DECISION: The judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and remanded to the lower
liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just
court for new arraignment and new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to
instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the
have and to be assisted by counsel.
latter.
• The trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded PEOPLE V. REGALA (RIGHT TO BE INFORMED)
in the information.

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 man at 12:30 AM did they find out that Desilos was stabbed. They said that
Murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority – defective Regala was just in the canteen the whole time.
information— When a crime is not properly alleged in the body of the information, • Regala and Flores testified that they were not at the spot of the commission
the fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence of the prosecution of the crime and that they did not know each other. Regala just danced with
without any objection as the part of the accused can’t likewise cure the aforestated the queen, Carol Bataga, and some other princess, and then he returned to
defect in the information since it is a violation of his constitutional right to be informed the canteen to drink. Regala alleged that he was maltreated by the PC and
of the malice and cause of the accusations against him. that he never admitted to the crime. Flores stated that he was boxed by a
certain man, prompting him to draw his knife, but the police confiscated the
RECIT-READY: REGALA and FLORES were charged for murder with assault upon an knife.
agent of a person in authority for having stabbed and killed SGT. DESILOS. But the • The trial court held that Regala and Flores were guilty of the complex crime of
information failed to allege the crucial element of knowledge – that the accused had murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Flores was found
knowledge of the fact that the victim was indeed an agent of a person in authority. The as an accessory. Regala was sentenced to death.
SC held that, in this case, the accused cannot be convicted of the complex crime of
homicide with the assault upon an agent of a person in authority because the ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED WERE PROPERLY INFORMED OF
information filed did not allege the essential elements of assault. In this case, the fact THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM
that the victim was engaged then in the exercise of his duties does not suffice and
knowledge of his authority must be alleged in the information. Also, there are no other HELD: NO
allegations in the information that would clearly point to the fact that the accused had
knowledge. The SC also held that, in this case, the fact that the crime of assault was RATIO:
established by the evidence of the prosecution without any objection on the part of the
accused cannot cure the defect in the information and validly convict the accused ON RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL
thereof. To rule otherwise would be to convict the accused of a crime not properly • SC did not agree with counsel de officio that the trial court failed to accord
alleged in the body of the information, which would violate his right to be informed of appellant Rudy Regala a fair trial. Appellant has not pointed, and We have
the found none, to any part or stage of the trial betraying the trial Judge's hostility,
nature and cause of the accusations against him. bias and prejudice against the appellant after the prosecution had brought
forth the fact of appellant's previous criminal conviction.
NOTE: The facts must be alleged in the information so as to allow the defense to • In fact, prosecution brought out accused-appellant's conviction of malicious
prepare evidence or arguments to contradict the same. The defense should not be mischief and slight physical injuries only through their last witness
surprised by the introduction of new averments during trial, especially those that they • Contrary to the claim of the counsel, the judge gave due consideration to the
were not given the chance to prepare for evidence shown and examined extensively the testimonies all the 8 witnesses
of the defense
FACTS: • Trial court correctly rejected defense of alibi and denial
• Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with the crime of murder with o Such defenses cannot prevail over affirmative testimonies
assault upon an agent of a person in authority in an information filed by the o Appellant has not shown any evidence of evil motive on the part of
provincial fiscal of Masbate with the CFI. The defendants pleaded not guilty. the prosecution witnesses to testify in the manner they did
• Prosecution witnesses testified that the victim, Juan Desilos, Jr., a o It is a recognized principle that on the matter of credibility of
Constabulary sergeant was guarding the Magallanes Gate of Masbate witnesses, the observation of the trial court must be accorded
because there was a coronation dance that night. Desilos was trying to clear respect and great weight - in terms of demeanor
the gate since it was an exit but Flores and Regala were trying to enter it. § The witnesses for the prosecution seemed trustworthy
Regala became angry and got his knife and stabbed Desilos. Desilos was hit o There were minor inconsistencies - better left to the appreciation of
in the abdomen and fell down. Another witness said that he heard one of the the trial court which ruled that the inconsistencies were not sufficient
Constabulary agents rush to the stage and asked for medical assistance to destroy the probity of Tidon
because someone was stabbed. Desilos died in the Masbate Provincial o According to jurisprudence, it is a common phenomenon to find
Hospital. One witness said that the crime scene was cordoned off and that the inconsistencies especially on minor details
knife allegedly used to stab Desilos was taken to the Constabulary office.
• The defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that ON RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
the prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of Flores. The • VERDICT OF KILLING QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
prosecuting fiscal objected. The trial court denied the motion. PREMEDITATION—In this case, both the qualifying circumstances cannot be
• The defense said that Rudy Regala was drinking beer with companions in a appreciated. Treachery and evident premeditation in murder must be
canteen owned by a priest. It was only through the announcement of a PC sufficiently alleged and proven. The prosecution was not able to prove that
there was cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the

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 criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. • Appellant was formally charged of the crime of rape of an 8-year old girl. He
The accused did not seem to plan to kill anyone that night. The killing of pleaded not guilty.
Desilos cannot be qualified by murder. It was simple homicide. • AAA, victim, testified when she was already 14 years old, stating that while
o ON TREACHERY— CASE: By prosecution's own evidence, she and appellant were alone in the house, appellant was sharpening his bolo
appellant was enraged because the deceased (Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.) while her mother, BBB, was out getting talapang.
pushed his companion Delfin Flores and admonished him not to get o She was not aware that appellant had closed the door and windows
in through the exit gate, then pulled out his knife and stabbed the of the house.
victim in the abdomen. o Appellant approached AAA and removed her shirt, panties and bra.
o Treachery cannot therefore be appreciated as the attack made by Appellant also removed his shorts and briefs and laid AAA down on
appellant Rudy Regala was merely an immediate retaliation for the the bamboo bench
pushing made by the deceased, which act placed him on his guard. o With the bolo placed on his right side, appellant placed himself on
Moreover, deceased Juan Desilos Jr. at the time had a sidearm and top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina.
was free to defend himself with it. If appellant's design was to be safe o AAA tried to fight back and resisted but appellant was too strong,
from a possible defense that the victim might make, he could have kissed her and touched her breasts
disarmed the victim first before stabbing him. This he did not do. o AAA felt pain and blood oozed out of her vagina.
Certainly, these circumstances negate treachery. o After satisfying himself, appellant warned AAA that he would kill her
o ON PREMEDITATION— CASE: There is no evidence pointing to the and her mother BBB if she would tell anybody about the incident
fact that appellant planned to kill any person who ma cross his path. • Sometime in Nov 1998, AAA told her mother, claimed rape 4 times – 8 years
His act of bringing with him a knife in going to the plaza is not an old, grade 3, 4, 5.
indication that he did plan to kill anybody. • BBB brought daughter to the DSWD and found pertinent facts (e.g. lacerations
• VERDICT OF ADDING "WITH ASSAULT UPON AN AGENT OF A PERSON on AAA’s hymen were caused by penetrations of an erected and turgid sex
IN AUTHORITY"—The appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime organ)
of homicide with direct assault because the information did not allege that the • Appellant denied and asserted that he treated AAA and her siblings as his
alleged knew that Desilos was an agent of a person in authority. The defense own children since he started living with their mother.
was not informed of such an allegation. To convict them would be in violation • He further testified that from 6am to 6pm that same date, he was at the
of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the coconut plantation of Apolinarion Malaluan husking coconuts.
accusation against them. o The distance of his house and coconut plantation is 30 minute walk.
• Even if the crime of direct assault can be established be evidence, it would o There was never a time he left the workplace since he took his lunch
not cure the defect in the information. and snacks there.
• Lack of objection cannot cure this deficiency— To do so would be convicting • This was corroborated by Camilo and Reynaldo, his witnesses.
the accused of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information in • RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory
violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of rape aggravated by the fact that victim is below 18 yrs old and offender
the accusation against him common law husband of BBB
o The trial court ruled that it was not physically impossible for appellant
FINAL VERDICT to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
• Homicide aggravated by • CA affirmed judgment
o In contempt or with insult to the public authorities OR in disregard of
the respect due to the offended party due to his rank PROVISIONS
o Recidivism Article 266-A and Article 266-B provide:
§ Due to slight physical injuries ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
PEOPLE V. BEGINO (RELATIONSHIP) following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If not, it would be b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and unconscious;
consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
convicted of its qualified form, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
which he was arraigned. is present;
xxx
FACTS:

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ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be in the qualified form as he was not properly informed of the
punished by reclusion perpetua. nature and cause of accusation against him.
xxx 1. This is to enable the accused to properly prepare his
defense
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the c. The qualifying circumstance of relationship, not having been
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: properly pleaded, appellant should be convicted only of statutory
rape under par d of Art 266-A.
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third DISPOSITION: Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape
civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
PEOPLE V. CHING (DATE OF COMMISSION OF CRIME)
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT APPELLANT DENIED OF RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
CHARGE AGAINST HIM The date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the
offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in
HELD: YES, IN TERMS OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ONLY rape cases need not be accurately stated.
• We hold that appellant could not be indicted for qualified rape and penalized
under paragraph 1 of Article 266-B. FACTS:
• CA affirmed with modification the RTC conviction of accused-appellant
RATIO: William Ching from three counts of rape committed against his minor
• That the circumstances that qualify a crime should be alleged and proved daughter, AAA who was only 12 years old when the alleged crime was
beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself. committed.
1. Yes, only in terms of the qualifying circumstance. • CA reduced the penalty from death penalty to reclusion perpetua.
a. Appellant could not be indicted for qualified rape and penalized under par • The prosecution presented AAA, AAA's mother, BBB, among others as
1 of Art 266-B witnesses. The AAA was the third child in eight children born to appellant and
i. Under said law, death penalty shall be imposed if crime of rape BBB. Sometime in the year 1996, the appellant instructed AAA's four other
is committed when the victim is under 18 years old and offender siblings to play outside, while AAA was cooking inside then Ching instructed
is a “parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by AAA to go in his bedroom and thereafter inserted his penis to the victim's
rd
consanguinity or affinity within 3 degree, or common law vagina after removing her shorts and panty. The victim screamed for help but
spouse of parent of victim”; these must be alleged and proved to no avail as the appellant also threatened the girl of killing her. AAA did not
beyond reasonable doubt reported the incident to anybody. For the second time and third time in 1998,
§ the Information stated that appellant is the "stepfather" of Appellant had carnal knowledge with the girl when her sibling was asleep.
AAA. • Meantime, Ching was arrested from June 1998 to February of 2009 for drug
1. In said case, age of victim sufficiently proved. pushing. When he was subsequently released he went to the place where
2. Accused is not a stepfather, but a common law spouse AAA was employed and asked for money, AAA refused and reported not just
of BBB – no proof of marriage between BBB and the commotion caused by Ching but the times when she was raped.
appellant. • During the trial, appellant maintains that the approximate time of the
ii. Since appellant is not stepfather of AAA, the prosecution’s commission of the offense must be stated in the complaint or information; that
failure to prove the qualifying circumstance bars conviction for the information in the instant case do not state the approximate time of the
rape in its qualified form. alleged rapes; that the information are fatally defective; that the date and time
b. What was proved was that appellant was common law spouse of BBB, of the alleged rapes are so indefinite thereby depriving appellant of the
but such was not alleged in the information. opportunity to prepare for his defense; and that appellant’s constitutional right
i. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him was violated
only as aggravating circumstances since the latter admit of • In the petition for review before the Supreme Court, the appellant asserted
proof even if not pleaded. that CA erred in not considering the information filed against accused-
ii. it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of appellant as to the approximate date of the commission of the alleged rapes.
the charges against him and consequently, a denial of due
process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of ISSUE: WHETHER THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
its qualified form, although the attendant circumstance qualifying INFORM OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS
the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not VIOLATED
alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
iii. Since qualifying circumstance of “common law spouse” was not HELD: NO. The contention was devoid of merit.
alleged in information for rape, he could not be convicted of rape

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RATIO: NOTE: Dismissal of the case due to a violation of the right to speedy trial is also a bar
• An information is an accusation in writing, to be valid and sufficient, an to another prosecution for the same offense. Thus, it is practically an acquittal
information must state the name of the accused, the designation of the
offense, the acts complained of as constituting an offense and the FACTS
approximate date and time of its commission and the place. • Aurelia Conde, a former municipal midwife in Tayabas, has had to answer to
• The purpose of the requirement for the information’s validity and sufficiency is 5 informations for various crimes, appeared with witnesses and counsel 8
to enable the accused to suitably prepare for his defense since he is presumed times, required to come to the SC 2 times for protection, and now after one
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. year since the filing of the first information, is farther from a resolution than
• With respect to the time, it is expressed in Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised when she first started. Once before she has come to the SC for redress of her
Rules of Criminal Procedure that it is not necessary to state in the grievances. Until now, it’s not settled.
information the precise date of the offense except when it is a material • These are the only facts in the case. She filed an original case for mandamus
ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may be alleged to have and prohibition with the SC. There aren’t really any issues. The Court here
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its lays down a legal proposition.
commission.
• Especially in rape cases, where failure to specify the exact dates and times HELD
does not ipso facto make the information defective. As held in People vs. • Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute
Purazo, date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen the accused pursuant to informations the charges now pending before the
of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated.
• This Court has upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape RATIO
which merely alleged the month and year of its commission. • Aurelia Conde has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may
• The allegations in the informations which stated that the three incidents of go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. By the use
rape were committed in the year 1996 and in May 1998 are sufficient to affirm of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the
the conviction of appellant in the instant case. The imposition of death penalty appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary
was proper, however due to RA 9346, CA was just proper in reducing the said examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious,
penalty. Hence, CA decision AFFIRMED in toto. No costs. capricious, and oppressive delays. The Court is thus under a moral and legal
obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused
NOTES: is discharged from the custody of the law.
• The first rape incident in 1996 was covered by Article 335 of the Penal Code • LEGAL PROPOSITION: where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
amended by RA 7659 secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
• The subsequent rape incidents were covered by the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the
which states that death penalty shall be imposed where a victim is a minor accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
and the offending party is a parent. dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom.
CONDE V. RIVERA (RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL)
MATEO V. VILLALUZ (RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL)
Municipal midwife of Laguna – Philippine organic and statutory law expressly
guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a The cold neutrality of an impartial judge – Due process cannot be satisfied in the
speedy trial; Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to assure
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable litigants of his being fair and just; What a trial requires is an impartial and
time, accused is entitled relief through mandamus or habeas corpus. disinterested tribunal.

RECIT-READY: CONDE had to respond to 5 separate informations and had to make RECIT-READY: MATEO, among others, was tried before JUDGE VILLALUZ for
court appearances for over a year already. Even so, there has still yet to be any robbery in a band w/ homicide. Later, REYES executed an extra-judicial statement
resolution of the case. Thus, she came before the SC to seek redress. The SC held implicating MATEO and the statement was subscribed and sworn to before VILLALUZ.
that where the prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponement of the But REYES later repudiated the said statement claiming that he made the statement
trial of a defendant against the latter’s protest beyond a reasonable period of time, the under intimidation from a “government agent”. In short, it is possible that VILLALUZ
accused is entitled to relief by: had something to do about it and, thus, MATEO prayed that the former disqualify
• Proceeding in manadamus to compel a dismissal of the information himself from the case, to which the JUDGE refused. The SC held that due process
• Proceeding in habeas corpus to obtain his freedom cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the party of a judge

Jlyrreverre|331
sufficient to reassure litigants of his being just. There is the legitimate expectation that RATIO:
the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts, as found by a 1. ON DUE PROCESS AND IMPARTIALITY: Due process cannot be satisfied
judge who does not play favorite and who considers the parties to stand on equal in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the judge sufficient to reassure
footing litigants of his being fair and just.
a. Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
Due process of law requires: disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less
• A hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal than cold neutrality of an impartial judge
• That every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an b. A judge should at all times be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
impartial judge independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering the decision and
the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to
Thus, a judge has the duty: its fairness and as to its integrity (Geotina v Gonzales)
• To render a just decision c. SC may order a new trial if it deems it necessary in the interest of
• To render a just decision completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and justice.
integrity 2. ON THE GROUNDS IN WHICH A JUDGE CAN DISQUALIFY HIMSELF: A
judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
Under jurisprudence, if it appears that the accused was not given a fair and impartial in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above..” (Rules
trial because of the trial judge’s bias or prejudice, then the SC will order a new trial, if it of Court)
deems necessary, in the interest of justice. The SC also held that under the RoC, a a. Aside from (1) pecuniary interest, (2) relationship, or (3) previous
judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there may be
case, for just or valid reasons (that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity). In other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus
such cases, not only is the judge’s reputation for probity and objectivity preserved, but calling for inhibition.
more importantly, that the ideal of an impartial administration of justice lived up to and, b. In Pimentel v. Salanga, court said that when suggestion is made of
thus, due process is vindicated record that judge might be induced to favour one party, he should
conduct a careful self-examination and exercise discretion in a way
FACTS: that people’s faith in court of justice is not impaired
• June 4, 1971: American Express Bank was robbed and an American 3. ON THE POWER OF SC TO REVIEW : There is respectable authority for the
serviceman was killed on its occasion. 4 criminal actions were filed against view that with the possibility of trial tainted by partiality, the SC can step in to
petitioners herein. In June 24, Mateo and Cruz were arraigned while Marinez assure for the demands of due process
filed a motion to dismiss 4. ON WHETHER THE CASE MADE BY PETITIONER WOULD SUFFICE TO
• Meantime, another suspect Rolando Reyes was arrested. It appears that he NEGATE THAT DEGREE OF OBJECTIVITY THAT CONSTITUTION
executed an extra-judicial statement in October 1, 1971 and had signed and REQUIRES: YES, respondent judge could not be immune to what apparently
sworn to its truth before respondent judge Villaluz. The statement implicated was asserted before him in such extrajudicial statement.
the petitioners and Judge Villaluz was aware of this and it was for this reason a. it is unlikely that he was not offended by Reyes’s sudden turnabout
that he had deferred ruling on Martinez’s motion until the prosecution has with his declaration that there was intimidation by a government
presented and rested evidence against Reyes. agent
• Prosecution then filed a motion to present additional evidence which was later b. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could be easily be
granted on December 24, 1971. When Rolando Reyes was called as blunted
additional witness, he repudiated his statement and claimed that he made it c. It was Judge Villaluz that attested the due execution of the statement
due to threat by a government agent. made by Reyes. At that time, there was a motion to dismiss pending
but Judge Villaluz deferred its resolution until after the prosecution
• Petitioners then filed a motion for disqualification of respondent judge because
had presented and rested its evidence against Reyes who was
Roland Reyes had repudiated the statement that he had sworn to before
likewise charged and indicted for the same offense, but in a separate
Judge Villaluz and the latter perforce would have to pass upon that
proceeding.
repudiation.
d. It cannot be doubted then that Judge Villaluz in effect ruled that such
• Respondent Judge denied petitioner’s motion for disqualification
extra-judicial statement was executed freely. But, with its repudiation
• Hence, the present petition on the ground that it was not done freely (having been made under
threat), there arises the situation of a judge having to pass on a
ISSUE: WHETHER JUDGE VILLALUZ SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM question that by implication had already been answered by him. He
HEARING THE CRIMINAL CASE is being asked to review a matter on which he had previously given
his opinion.
HELD: YES, petition for prohibition GRANTED e. It is this inroad to one’s objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the
law on disqualification

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 f. Hence, it requirement of a cold and impartial judge has not been met RATIO:
5. ON AVOIDING FURTHER CONTROVERSIES OF THIS NATURE: The lower
court judges are advised by the SC to limit themselves to the task of ON SECRECY AND PUBLIC TRIAL—
adjudication and leave to others the role of notarizing declarations. • HISTORY— Michigan judges may still in their discretion summon grand
juries, but we are told by the attorney general that this discretion is rarely
WHEREFORE, petition for prohibition granted exercised and that the 'One-Man Grand Jury' has taken the place of the old
Michigan 16 to 23- member grand jury, particularly in probes of alleged
IN RE OLIVER (RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL; MICHIGAN'S UNIQUE ONE-MAN misconduct of public officials.
GRAND JURY SYSTEM) • Grand juries investigate, and the usual end of their investigation is either a
report, a 'no-bill' or an indictment. They do not try and they do not convict.
RECIT-READY: The SC held that the Constitution requires that all the criminal trials be They render no judgment. When their work is finished by the return of an
open to the public. The guarantee has always been recognizes as a safeguard against indictment, it cannot be used as evidence against the person indicted. Nor
any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that may he be fined or sentenced to jail until he has been tried and convicted
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion after having been afforded the procedural safeguards required by due
is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. The SC also held that all process of law.
courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, • In an opinion written by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that the secrecy
relatives, and counsel present, no matter what offense he may be charged. Thus, of Oliver’s trial for criminal contempt violated the due process clause of the
secret trials are a menace to liberty. They are instruments for the repression of religious Fourteenth Amendment because the reasons advanced to support the
and political heresies and allow the government to act arbitrarily. secrecy of grand jury investigative proceedings were not justified in the trial
of a defendant accused of an offense for which he may be fined or sent to jail.
FACTS: o Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial
• Michigan state law provided for the powers of a grand jury to be exercised in be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee
secret by a “one-man grand jury” investigation of crime. (alleged gambling has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to
and official corruption) employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge
• Under these rules, a Michigan circuit court judge, acting as a “one-man grand that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the
jury” issued a subpoena to appear before him. William Oliver appeared as forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of
ordered, and gave testimony in a secret proceeding. judicial power
o Two other circuit judges were present in an advisory capacity. • Furthermore, the Court held that an accused is entitled to a public trial, at
o The public was excluded-the questioning was secret in accordance least to the extent of having his friends, relatives and counsel present -- no
with the traditional grand jury method. matter with what offense he may be charged. The failure to afford Oliver a
• (still in secret session) Acting in the belief that his testimony was false and reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charge of giving false
evasive (which belief was based partly on testimony given by at least one and evasive testimony was a denial of due process of law. As a minimum,
other witness in petitioner's absence), the judge summarily charged him with due process requires that an accused be given reasonable notice of the
contempt, convicted him, and sentenced him to sixty days in jail. charge against him, the right to examine the witnesses against him, the right
• As the proceedings were secret, Oliver had no opportunity to secure counsel, to testify in his own behalf, and the right to be represented by counsel.
to prepare his defense, to cross-examine the other grand jury witness, or to o The investigation became a 'trial,' the grand jury became a judge,
summon witnesses to refute the charge against him. and the witness became an accused charged with contempt of
• That the petitioner's attorney had not been allowed to confer with him and court-all in secret.
that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, the petitioner was not held in jail o Following a charge, conviction and sentence, the petitioner was led
under any judgment, decree or execution, and was 'not confined by virtue of away to prison-still without any break in the secrecy.
any legal commitment directed to the sheriff as required by law.' o Even in jail, according to undenied allegations, his lawyer was
denied an opportunity to see and confer with him. And that was not
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT OLIVER’S QUESTIONING AND SUBSEQUENT the end of secrecy. His lawyer filed in the State Supreme Court this
JAILING FOR CONTEMPT A VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S habeas corpus proceeding. Even there, the mantle of secrecy
GUARANTEE TO A PUBLIC TRIAL AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S enveloped the transaction and the State Supreme Court ordered him
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS sent back to jail without ever having seen a record of his testimony,
• Can an accused be tried and convicted for contempt of court in grand jury and without knowing all that took place in the secrecy of the judge's
secrecy? NO chambers.

HELD: YES. ON REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND HIMSELF—

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 • A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an of discretion. The SC upheld the dismissal of the case based on Sec. 1, Rule 131 of
opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in the Rules of Court, and not based on the oath made by the defendant. Such provision
our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right in the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts violates the constitutional right of
to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be the litigant to due process since it deprives them of the right to confront witnesses
represented by counsel. against them and to cross-examine them.
• Michigan, not denying the existence of these rights in criminal cases generally,
apparently concedes that the summary conviction here would have been a FACTS:
denial of procedural due process but for the nature of the charge, namely, a • Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for “Annulment of Sale in an
contempt of court, committed, the State urges, in the court's actual presence. Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate” before the Shari’a District Court, 5th Shari’a
• Contempt Case— but that the judge must have personal knowledge of it District, Cotabato City.
acquired by his own observation of the contemptuous condut • Petitioners allege ownership over a parcel of land in Kalangan, Cotabato. The
• The Court explained the Terry rule as reaching only such conduct as created deed of sale sought to be annulled was purportedly executed between
'an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such a flagrant petitioners and respondent Esmael Usman for a sum of P1,000. (extra-judicial
defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public' that, if 'not settlement) Usman then sold the land to his co-respondents.
instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court's authority will • Petitioners claim that they never into such agreement and that Usman forged
follow.' their signatures. Usman denied this.
o Except for a narrowly limited category of contempts, due process of • The Shari’a court then directed both parties to present 2 witnesses to prove
law as explained in the Cooke case requires that one charged with their claims. The petitioners’ witness withdrew, leaving them with no
contempt of court be advised of the charges against him, have a witnesses. Instead, they challenged Usman to take an oath (“yamin”)
reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or declaring that the charges against him were false. This was grounded on
explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have Section 7 of the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts:
a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by o The plaintiff (mudda’i) has the burden of proof, and the taking of an
way of defense or explanation. oath (“yamin”) rests upon the defendant (mudda’aalai). If the plaintiff
• CONCLUSION— The judge-jury was obviously appraising the truth of Oliver's has no evidence to prove his claim, the defendant shall take an oath
testimony in light of testimony given the same day in petitioner's absence by and judgment shall be rendered in his favor by the Court. Should the
Hartley and possibly by othe witnesses. The Terry case and others like it defendant refuse to take an oath, the plaintiff shall affirm his claim
provide no support for sustaining petitioner's conviction of contempt of court under oath in which case, judgment shall be rendered in his favor.
upon testimony given in petitioner's absence. This case would be like the Terry Should the plaintiff refuse his claim under oath, the case shall be
case only if the judge there has not personally witnessed Terry's assault upon dismissed.
the marshal but had nevertheless sent him to jail for contempt of court after • Usman opposed the challenge and argued that the petitioners should take the
hearing the testimony of witnesses against Terry in Terry's absence. oath first. The shari’a court overruled the opposition and made Usman take
o Nor is there any reason suggested why 'demoralization of the court's an oath.
authority' would have resulted from giving the petitioner a reasonable • The shari’a court subsequently ruled in favor of the respondents and
opportunity to appear and offer a defense in open court to a charge dismissed the complaints against them.
of perjury or to the charge of contempt. • Petitioners now assail the decision of the Shari'a court as having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They contend that the cognizance by
NOTE: In re Oliver (1948) was the first Supreme Court case that incorporated the Sixth the court of the "yamin" of respondent Usman is not only "unprocedural," but
Amendment’s guarantee to a public trial as well as the Sixth Amendment’s right to likewise amounts to a deprivation of their constitutional right to be heard.
notice of accusations.
NOTE: Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Court: "in classical Islamic legal theory,
TAMPAR V. USMAN (RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION, TO CROSS-EXAMINE OR, an individual cannot be a witness in favor of his own case, and the only legal remedy
TO MEET WITNESS FACE TO FACE) for him is to demand an oath from the defendant."

RECIT-READY: Petitioners in this case filed a complaint to annul a deed of sale against ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SHARI'A COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
the respondents. They allege that they did not enter into such agreement and that their OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF PETITIONERS BY VIRTUE
signatures were forged by the respondents. Usman denied this. The petitioners, OF THE "YAMIN" TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT
however, did not have a witness to present to court. Pursuant to special rules of
procedure in shari’a courts (read the highlighted part in the digest), they challenged the HELD: NO
respondent to make an oath, declaring that there was no forgery. Shari’a court thus
ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the case after he made the oath. RATIO:
Petitioners assail this decision and allege that the lower court committed grave abuse

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 • Under Sec. 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which apply in a suppletory NOTE: In the bail system under the Constitution, the accused is granted provisional
manner in shari’a courts, each party must prove his own affirmative liberty, subject to the condition that he appears during trial. Thus, his failure to do so
allegations. When the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) failed to adduce any would make the previous warrant of arrest sufficient for his re-confinement
evidence to support the complaint, then the complaint must be dismissed.
o The dismissal by the court must be upheld on this basis, not on the FACTS:
“yamin” made by the respondent. • Feb. 3, 1983 - petitioner was charged with malicious mischief before the
• Section 7 of the Special Rules of Procedure prescribed for Shari'a courts Municipal Trial Court of Malabuyoc, Cebu City. He deposited a cash bond for
aforecited provides that if the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his claim, the his provisional liberty. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and
defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be rendered in his favor by thereafter he filed a written waiver of appearance dated May 14, 1984 which
the Court. On the other hand, should defendant refuse to take an oath, plaintiff reads as follows:
may affirm his claim under oath, in which case judgment shall be rendered in o “accused... admits that he could be identified by witnesses who are
his favor. testifying at the time that said accused was not present.”
o The quoted provision in the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a • At the hearing on August 14, 1985 the prosecution moved for the recall of its
Courts deprives the litigant of his constitutional right to due process. principal witness for the purpose of identifying the accused-petitioner who was
It denies a party the right to confront witnesses against him and to not then present. Hence, the hearing was re-scheduled on October 9, 1985
cross-examine them. and a subpoena was issued to petitioner who failed to appear on said date.
• The Supreme Court ruled that a committee be formed to review the said o The defense counsel justified petitioner's absence in that the latter's
procedures and recommend needed changes. presence can no longer be required as he already filed a written
waiver of appearance.
CARREDO V. PEOPLE (TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; RIGHT TO BE PRESENT) • Municipal judge issued an order dated May 27, 1986 ordering the arrest of
petitioner, the confiscation of the cash bond, and at the same time ordering
RECIT-READY: CARREDO was charged for malicious mischief. After arraignment, he the bondsman, who is the petitioner himself, to show cause why no judgment
posted bail and waived his right to appear during trial. During trial, the prosecution should be rendered against the bondsman.
witnesses were presented, but hearing was postponed because • MR was denied and the case was elevated to the RTC of Cebu City. Petition
they could not identify the accused. Thus, the trial judge summoned CARREDO and was also denied. Hence, this case.
after his failure to appear during trial, the judge ordered his arrest and the forfeiture of
his cash bond. The SC held that accused may waive his right to be present during the ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AN ACCUSED WHO, AFTER ARRAIGNMENT, WAIVES
criminal proceedings, except at the stages where identification of his person by the HIS FURTHER APPEARANCE DURING THE TRIAL CAN BE ORDERED ARRESTED
prosecution witnesses is necessary. Thus, his presence may be compelled when he is BY THE COURT FOR NON-APPEARANCE UPON SUMMONS TO APPEAR FOR
to be identified. Also, it is possible that a witness may not know the name of the PURPOSES OF IDENTIFICATION.
accused, but can identify him if seen again. The accused may waive his right, but not • whether or not petitioner can be compelled, on pain of being arrested and his
his duty or obligation to the court cash bond getting confiscated, to be present during the trial for purposes of
his identification by the prosecution witnesses in a complaint for malicious
The SC also held that trial in absentia is permitted, even of capital offenses, provided mischief despite his written waiver of appearance— YES
that, after arraignment:
• The accused may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by HELD: YES. WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DENIED WITHOUT
the witnesses of the prosecution PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS.
• The accused unqualifiedly admits, in open court, that he is the person named
as the defendant in the case on trial RATIO:
1. Section 19, Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution: “...after arraignment, trial may
In this case, petitioner only admits that he can be identified by the prosecution proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
witnesses in his absence Thus, he did not admit that he is the very person name as been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.”
defendant. If allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving 2. Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2
the People’s witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, then he may, in his a. "Six justices were of the view that petitioner may waive his right to be
defense, say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and, present at all stages of the proceedings, while five justices were in
therefore, is entitled to an acquittal. The SC further held that trial in absentia of the agreement that he may so waive such right, except when he is to be
accused, in case of his non-appearance, means that he waives his right to meet the identified. The result was that the order of the respondent military
witnesses face-to-face, among others commission requiring his presence at all times during the
proceedings before it should be modified in the sense that
petitioner's presence shall be required only in the instance just
indicated.” [petitioner may be required to identify himself]

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3. People vs. Presiding Judge witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a
a. The accused was charged with murder before the Regional Trial right of the accused does not mean a release of the accused from his
Court of Pangasinan. Upon his arraignment he manifested orally in obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The
open court that he is waiving his right to be present during the trial. accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court.
The prosecuting fiscal moved that the accused be compelled to SECTION 15: HABEAS CORPUS
appear and be present at the trial so that he can be identified by the • The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
prosecution witnesses. This court sustained the position of the except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
accused on the strength of the ruling of this Court in Aquino.
b. However, the Court made a disquisition: I. Writ of Habeas Corpus Defined
i. “The present Constitution certainly has not made a dent on • It is defined as a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding
the traditional and correct concept of a bail as given to allow him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with
the release of a person in the custody of the law on condition the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive
that he would appear before any court whenever so required. whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.
Upon failure to do so, the warrant of arrest previously issued • An essential requisite for the availability of the writ is actual deprivation of
can be a sufficient justification for his confinement." personal liberty.
ii. The 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in • It requires deprivation of personal liberty:
absentia even of capital offenses, provided that after o Physical compulsion or coercion o Duress
arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose o External moral compulsion
of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or o Founded or groundless fear
provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his o Erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in imposter to cause harm if not blindly obeyed
the case on trial. The reason for requiring the presence of the o Any psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of
accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all choice or the unhampered exercise of the will
the stages of the proceedings without giving the People's
witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in II. Privilege of writ of habeas corpus
his defense say that he was never identified as the person • Right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the
charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to an deprivation of physical liberty
acquittal. • What is suspended is the privilege and not the writ
iii. Court reiterated the rule in Aquino that the accused may waive • It is the president who suspends
his presence at the trial of the case his presence may be
compelled when he is to be identified. III. Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
c. Petitioner, however, argues that he should not be ordered arrested
• The President may suspend the privilege for a period not exceeding 60 days
for non-appearance since he filed a written waiver that "he admits
• The grounds for the suspension of the privilege are:
that he could be identified by witnesses who have testified at the time
o Actual invasion or actual rebellion
that said accused was not present" following the ruling of this Court
o When the public safety requires the suspension
in People vs. Presiding Judge
§ The suspension shall apply only to persons judicially
i. What is stated in Presiding Judge as an exception is when the
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
accused "unqualifiedly admits in open court after his
connected with invasion
arraignment the he is the person named as defendant in the
• The criminal charge has to be filed in court within
case on trial," no more no less. In the present case petitioner
only admits that the prosecution witnesses can identify him in 3 days because, otherwise, the person shall be
his absence. He did not admit that he is the very person released
named as defendant in the case on trial. His admission is • Thus, the suspension of the privilege will not apply
vague and far from unqualified. He cannot therefore seek the until such persons are placed in the custody of a
benefit of the exception recognized in Presiding Judge. judicial officer
4. The provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the • Congress is given the power to revoke the suspension and the President may
accused in case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice not set aside such revocation
simply means that he thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to • Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may also extend the suspension
face among others. An express waiver of appearance after arraignment, as in • The Supreme Court, upon the initiative of any citizen, may review the
this case, is of the same effect. However, such waiver of appearance and trial sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension and must promulgate its
in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right decision thereon within 30 days from filing
to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its • The Supreme Court has the power:

Jlyrreverre|336
 o To determine arbitrariness in the manner of arriving at the • Remedy if there has been unreasonable delay in the resolution of a case:
suspension Dismissal through mandamus (Roque v. Ombudsman)
o To determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension • In the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy
• The SC is empowered to determine whether, in fact, actual invasion and disposition of cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
rebellion exists and whether public safety requires the suspension circumstances peculiar to each case. Well-settled is the rule that the right to
• Habeas corpus cannot be used when: a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
o To question the conditions of confinement violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
o Once charges have been filed in court oppressive delay. In the determination of whether or not that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of
SECTION 16: SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right
• All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. • The concept of “speedy disposition of cases” is flexible and is consistent with
reasonable delay. (Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr.)
I. General Principles • The right to a speedy trial as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution
or statute, except when otherwise expressly so provided by law, may be
A. Speedy Disposition of Cases waived. It must therefore be asserted. Thus, if there was a delay in the trial of
• This provision covers the periods before, during, and after trial. the case, petitioners are not entirely without blame.
• It gives a broader protection than Section 14 which guarantees merely the • Furthermore, the right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by
right to a speedy trial. the Constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a
• This provision applies to all civil, criminal, and administrative cases. reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. A party's individual rights
• It also applies to all judicial or quasi=judicial proceedings. should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to
public justice. (Guiani v. Sandiganbayan)
B. “Speedy” as a Relative and Flexible Term
• The concept of “speedy disposition” such as “speedy trial” is relative BINAY V. SANDIGANBAYAN (REASONABLE DELAY; RIGHT TO SPEEDY
and must necessarily be flexible. DISPOSITION OF CASES)
• It is consistent with reasonable delay.
• In determination of whether or not the right has been violated, the FACTS:
following factors may be considered and balanced. (1) Guiani v. • Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity)
Sandiganbayan against Mayor Binay of Makati for ‘Illegal Use of Public Funds’(RPC A220)
1. Length of delay and ‘Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act’(RA 3019) on September
2. Reason for the delay 1994. The informations filed constituted crimes which were committed by the
3. Assertion of the right or failure to assert it petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.The petitioner filed a motion to
4. Prejudice caused by the delay quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of
his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in
II. Proper Remedy: Mandamus abeyance pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued
• The remedy for violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash and further the latter’s motion
is dismissal through mandamus. for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to
suspend the accused ‘pendente lite’ (benefits) which was later granted and
III. Speedy Disposition of Cases v. Speedy Trial ordered for a 90-day suspension. Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor
Binay in the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion for
SPEEDY DISPOSITION SPEEDY TRIAL (14) reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of his rights
(16) when the suspension was ordered even before he could file his reply to the
Begins from the preliminary Begins from the moment the petitioner’s opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file said
investigation charge is filed reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after
the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of
SB took effect on May 1995 so much so that the petitioner filed before SB a
SANDY-CRAB—
motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no
jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension
NOTE: Speedy trial in Section 14 covers only the trial phase of criminal cases whereas
order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioner’s
Section 16 covers all phases of any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
motion. Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning
proceeding.
the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal cases.

Jlyrreverre|337
 • In another petition, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San o examination of cash and accounts covering April 1987 to January
Pascual, Batangas and Victor Cusi, then Vice Mayor of San Pascual charged 1988 and post- audit of selected accounts for the last quarter of 1987.
then Mayor Mario Magsaysay and other officials with violation of R.A. 3019. o The Tanodbayan was informed that this COA audit report of January
The complaint charged the municipal officials of overpaying petitioner Vicente 11, 1988 was not yet released since the Mayor of Makati was given
de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of San Pascual thirty days within which to explain the findings in the report and is
Central School. In June 1996, the accused – herein petitioners – filed with the subject to change or modification depending upon the explanation/
SB a motion to quash the information based on the following grounds: the SB clarification to be submitted by the Mayor of Makati. In March 1989,
had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the the first part of the final report of the audit was received by the OMB
same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings in the SB would and was transmitted for preliminary investigation. A supplemental
expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The SB denied the accused’s motion. report dated July 1989 followed. After securing the findings,
However, proceedings were suspended until the Supreme Court resolved the Prosecutor Gervacio issued a subpoena directing Binay and others
question of the SB’s jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition. to submit their counter-affidavits. Then Mayor submitted in May
• Petitioner Binay averred that his right to speedy disposition has been violated 1990. Clarificatory examinations were conducted in September,
by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases. October, and November of that year.
o In January 1991, Binay submitted a copy of this petition for certiorari,
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION with a manifestation that said petition was submitted to support
HAS BEEN VIOLATED Binay’s stand against the COA findings. In April 1992, Marissa Chan
filed an affidavit incriminating Binay. In August 1993, the
HELD: NO Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor its
Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of the case. The
RATIO: Resolution was approved by the Special Prosecutor, who forwarded
• The Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject the same and the entire records to the Office of the Ombudsman for
cases. review and final action. In August 1994, the Ombudsman approved
• As a rule, the constitutional right to “a speedy disposition of cases” is not some of the recommendations of the Review Panel and directed the
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all preparation and filing of the informations.
cases, civil and administrative, and in all proceedings, including judicial and • Furthermore, the prosecution was not bound by the findings of the COA. It
quasi-judicial hearings. Any party to a case may demand expeditious action must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable
on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. However, the cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct its own review of the COA
right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed findings. Hence, the delay was caused by the complexity of the case. Ten
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and charges were involved in these cases. The preliminary investigation of all 10
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked cases was terminated in merely two years and four months from the date
for and secured, or when without justifiable cause a long period of time is Mayor Binay filed his last pleading on April 30, 1992.
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. SECTION 17. NO PERSON SHALL BE COMPELLED TO BE A WITNESS
• The concept of speedy disposition is relative and flexible. The balancing test AGAINST HIMSELF.
is used to weigh the violation of the right against the length of the delay, the
reasons thereof, the assertion or failure to assert such right, and the prejudice UNITED STATES V. NAVARRO (RATIONALE)
caused by delay. A mathematical computation of the time involved would
therefore be an insufficient basis. Particular regard of the facts and RECIT-READY: Subject for review in this case were 2 provisions of the Penal Code.
circumstances peculiar to each case must be taken. Art. 481 punishes unlawful deprivation of liberty, while Art. 483 provides that a person
• The Court found that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject who detained another, who fails to give information as to his whereabouts or does not
cases. Judging from the findings, the court found that the cases were prove that the same has been set free shall be punished by a higher penalty, Therefore,
sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their resolution. The in order for the accused to lessen the penalty he stands to incur, he is forced to divulge
proceedings conducted before the OMB adequately explained the length of the whereabouts of the detainee or declare that the same has been set free, which is
delay, summarized as follows: practically an admission that he in fact detained another. If he opts not to speak, then
o In July 1988, Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan he incurs a more severe criminal liability. The SC held that the right against self-
(now OMB) an affidavit-complaint charging Jejomar Binay and others incrimination was established on the grounds of both public policy and humanity. Public
the following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) policy because if the party were required to testify, then it would place the witness under
Multiple Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury. Humanity because it would
Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) prevent the extorting of confessions by duress. The very object of the provision is to
of R.A. 3019. Brillante’s complaint was based on initial findings and wipe out the practice of requiring the accused to submit to judicial examinations and to
observations of the COA on the give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were charged. In this case, the
evidence required to absolve him under Art. 483 has the effect of convicting him under

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Art. 481. Also, under Art. 483, the fact of guilt follows the mere silence of the accused, punished withcadena temporalin its maximum degree to life
which cannot be permitted. imprisonment.

Under Emery, the principle was held to apply to any compulsory disclosure of the guilt ISSUE: W/N ARTICLE 483 IS STILL VALID.
of the offender himself, whether sought:
• Directly as the object of the inquiry HELD: NO, VIOLATION OF RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION/
• Indirectly and incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts involved in an PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
issue between the parties
RATIO:
The disclosure would be an accusation against himself, if it would be capable of • Article 483, in other words, says for failure on the part of the defendant to
being used against him: testify regarding the whereabouts of the person deprived of his liberty, or to
• As a confession of a crime prove that he was set at liberty, the punishment may be increased from
• As an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of the crime imprisonment for a term of six years to life imprisonment.
• This has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own
It is possible that a witness, by declaring a single fact, may complete the testimony behalf or to take a much severer punishment.
against himself as entirely as he would by stating every circumstance which would be • burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the penalty
required for his conviction. US jurisprudence has also held that a compulsory because the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that
production of man’s private papers to establish a criminal charge against himself is the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a confession that the defendant
unconstitutional. The SC also held that a law, while permitting a person accused to be unlawfully detained the person
a witness in his own behalf, should, at the same time, authorize a presumption of guilt • evidence necessary to clear the defendant under article 483 of the Penal
from his omission to testify would be a law that adjudges without evidence and one that Code, would have the effect of convincing him under article 481.
reverses the presumption of innocence. The SC further held that it is the duty of the • note before, there was still no right against self incrimination provided to
prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused cannot be called upon, either by express words • TWO PRINCIPAL PARTS
or acts, to assist in the production of evidence. The silence of the accused should not o Summary Trial
be taken as proof against him. The accused has the right to rely on the presumption of § inquire whether a criminal act has been committed and to
innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with determine by whom the act has been committed
which he is charged § get all relevant facts for the case
§ this part was secret
FACTS: § all records on this proceeding is sent to prosecuting
• Defendants Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano (alias attorney or private accuser
Bulag) here are charged with the crime of illegal detention o Plenary Stage (Penalty Stage)
• They kidnapped Felix Punsalan and Gregorio Mendoza in the middle of § prosecuting attorney will determine what crime does the act
November 1902 constitute then file the charges for further proceedings
• Felix Punsalan, according to a witness, died after a week after being § purpose is a contradictory discussion of the question of the
kidnapped due to ill treatment received. Victim’s family and the court, guilt or innocence of the defendant, and the rendition of a
however, still has no proof/evidence/idea of his or his body’s whereabouts judgment of conviction or acquittal.
• Gregorio Mendoza was released on the same night he was kidnapped, he § This part is conducted publicly
later became a witness in this case • Article 544 of the royal decree of May 6, 1880,
• Witnesses: Teodoro Pangan (servant of victim-Punsalan), Gregorio o The defendant can not decline to answer by questions addressed
Mendoza (second victim), and Flaviano Punsalan (brother of the victim) him by the judge, or by the prosecuting attorney, with the consent of
• Defendant de Leon also testified as a witness that they abducted the victim the judge, or by the private prosecutor, even though he may believe
• Lower court found the three defendant guilty and sentenced them to life the judge to be without jurisdiction, in which case he may record a
imprisonment based on article 483 of the penal. (not yet revised) protest against the authority of the court.
o Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who o Escriche (commentator): his (defendant’s) silence is unfavorable to
shall lock up or detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty him, that it is an indication of his guilt
shall be punished with the penalty of prision mayor. • Applying above rules to this case
o The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally o Once court have reason to believe that someone was kidnapped they
detains another and fails to give information concerning his proceed to conduct a summary trial, arrest suspects and demand
whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall be from him information (which he can’t refuse)

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 o If suspect provide relevant information, i.e. that he released the law. It has been demonstrated that the omission which, under the former law
victim, prosecutor can only charge him under article 481, if not, constituted the two remaining elements, is no longer penalized but is nothing
prosecutor can charge him under art 483 (which provide for a higher more than the exercise of one of the most essential rights pertaining to an
penalty) since he didn’t liberated the victim or provide information of accused person.
his whereabouts
o Looking at such examination, no prosecution under this article (483) REASON for right against self-incrimination
would have ever been possible without a concomitant provision of 1) Public policy
the procedural law which made it the duty of the accused to testify a. because if the party were required to testify, it would place the
and permitted the prosecution to draw an unfavorable deduction from witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of
his refusal to do so perjury
§ Again, to be able to have a lower penalty, the law requires 2) Humanity
you to provide incriminating information (i.e. whereabouts a. Because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress
of the victim or proof that you released the victim.)
§ Otherwise, if later you are found guilty of illegal detention, ORIGINS/PURPOSE
you will be punished with a higher penalty (i.e. life • origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the
imprisonment vs 6 years) accused person, which had long obtained in the continental system
§ So you are forced to incriminate yourself so that you can • object of adopting this provision of law was to wipe out such practices as
serve a lighter penalty formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to
judicial examinations, and to get testimony regarding the offense with which
• Act of July 1, 1902 (section 5)— no person shall be compelled in any they were charged
criminal case to be a witness against himself. • principle applies equally to any compulsory disclosure of the guilt of the
• General Orders #58 (Sec 57)— defendant in a criminal case shall be offender himself,
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved • BOYD V US (US CASE)
• General Orders #58 (Sec 59)— burden of proof of guilt shall be upon the o There was a requirement that an individual is required to provide
prosecution documents (i.e. invoice, books, papers to show quality of goods
imported for tax purposes), if he does not do so there’s presumption
ELEMENTS OF ARTICLE 483 OF THE PENAL CODE of confession of guilt
a. The illegal detention of a person by the accused. o Violation of right against self-incrimination
b. Lack of evidence up to the time of the summary investigation that this person o any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath . . . to convict
had recovered his liberty. him of a crime . . . is contrary to the principles of free government
c. A failure on the part of the accused in the course of the summary proceeding • PEOPLE V COURTNEY (US CASE)
to prove that he had liberated the person detained, or to give information at o presumption of guilt from his omission to testify, would be a law
that time of his whereabouts, or a refusal to give any evidence at all which left adjudging guilt without evidence
him in the same position as would an unsuccessful attempt to prove the facts o it reverses the presumption of innocence, and would violate the
above mentioned, and which were necessary to overcome the prima facie fundamental principles binding alike upon the legislature and the
case made out by the proof of the first two elements. courts.
o the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to
SC: OBVIOUSLY, EXERCISE OF A RIGHT CANNOT FORM PART OF A CRIME produce evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (burden
• We have now a right against self-incrimination is not the other way around)
• Exercising such right by remaining in silence should not create a presumption o accused has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the
of guilt as provided by laws mentioned above one of the elements in art 483 prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with
requires that offender has not provided information about the whereabouts of which he is charged
the victim
• with passage of new laws providing right against self-incrimination, UNITED STATES V. TAN TENG (GONORRHEA; SUBSTANCES EMITTED TO
accused/offender are given the right not to provide such information which PROVE STD INFECTION)
would otherwise incriminate them
• elements (b) and (c), being made part of a citizen’s right, cannot form to be a RECIT-READY: Prosecuted for rape, TAN TENG was physically examined after his
part of a crime anymore, thus Art 488 can’t be committed anymore. arrest and a substance was taken from his body for the purpose of testing him for
• It is impossible for the Government to prove the other elements of the crime, gonorrhea and he tested positive. TAN TENG assailed the admissibility of the evidence
because the acts necessary to constitute them must be anterior in point of claiming that it was obtained in violation of his right against self incrimination. The SC
time to the trial, and must constitute some breach of duty under an existing held that “the right against self-incrimination” is a prohibition of the use of physical or

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moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused. The Constitutional incumbent upon the defense to bring it within the
guarantee does not include the body of the accused as evidence, when the same may exception.”
be material. Thus, the provision is against legal processes that extract from the § Offended party testified that he had rested his private parts
defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. The kernel of the privilege upon hers for some moments.
is testimonial compulsion and not any other compulsion. As held in People v. § Lower court concluded that the disease was communicated
Gardener, the purpose of the provision is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of to Oliva through such contact. However, this does not prove
prisoners before or upon trial for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or his guilt. It only corroborates the truthfulness of Oliva’s
declaration, implicating them in the commission of a crime. In this case, the examination declaration.
does not call upon the accused to be a witness, nor does it compel him to render o Defendant testifed and brought other Chinamen to support his
testimony or answer question. Also, the evidence obtained from him is not testimonial declaration that the sister of Oliva threatened to have him prosecuted
in nature and is not covered by the right. Moreover, Tan never objected to the extraction if he did not pay her the sum of P60.
from his body of said substances. By analogy, a physical examination for evidence is § Court said that it seems impossible to believe that the sister,
similar to introducing stolen property taken from the person of the thief. after having been outraged, would consider a settlement for
the paltry sum of P60.
FACTS: § “Honest women do not consent to the violation of their
• Defendant was charged with the crime of rape. bodies nor those of their near relatives, for the filthy
• The complaint alleged that: consideration of mere money.”
o On or about September 15, 1910, Tan Teng did willfully, unlawfully o Defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination
and criminally, and employing force, lie and have carnal intercourse made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his
with a certain Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in
• 15 Sept. 1910 - Oliva Pacomio, girl of 7 years of age, was staying on the house evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea.
of her sister in Ilang-Ilang street in Manila. That to admit such evidence was to tantamount to a violation to his
o A number of Chinamen were gambling habitually visited the said right against self-incrimination.
house § Lower Court said that he was not compelled to make any
o After taking a bath, Oliva returned to her room and was followed by admission or answer any questions.
defendant to ask for some face powder. § Said substance was taken without his objection and the
o After using said powder upon his private parts, he threw Oliva upon examination was made by competent medical authority.
the floor and placed his private parts upon hers. He stayed in that • After hearing the evidence, Hon. Lobingier, judge of the Lower Court of
position for some time. Manila, found the defendant guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos
• A week or two after – Older sister of Oliva discovered the latter to be suffering (ABUSE OF CHASTITY).
from gonorrhea. • He was sentenced to be imprisoned for 4 years 6 months and 11 days of
o An investigation to find the Chinaman was put on foot. prision correccional with costs
o During the first line-up, defendant was not present. • Defendant appealed to the SC.
o Defendant arrived later on and was immediately identified by Oliva
as the one who attempted to violate her. ISSUE: WON the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendant’s
o He was then arrested and taken to the police station, stripped of his rights against self-incrimination.
clothing and examined.
o The policeman who examined defendant swore that the latter had HELD: No, it does not violate his right against self-incrimination.
gonorrhea. They took a portion of the substance emitting from
defendant’s body and turned it over to the Bureau of Science to have RATIO:
it examined. The results turned out to be positive. • Justice Holmes: the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be
• During the Trial, defendant strongly objected to the admissibility of the a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
testimony of Oliva given that she is of tender years. compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body
o Trial court held that she had sufficient intelligence and discernment as evidence, when it may be material.
to justify the court in accepting her testimony • Similar case on use of one’s body/clothing as evidence:
o Defense tried to show that gonorrhea may be obtained through other • State vs. Miller: Placing the hand of the accused on the wall with bloody prints
ways other than by such contact of private parts. of a hand in order to check if these matched, comparing the shoe prints in the
§ Judge Lobingier said that: “The medical experts, as well as sand at the commission of the crime was also permitted in that case. The
the books, agree that in ordinary cases it arises from that clothing of the defendant was used as evidence against him.
cause, and if this was an exceptional one, we think it was • The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall
not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition

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 against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, - Argument without merit: to say that taking any substance, article, or whatever
an admission of his guilt. from the accused amounts to self-incrimination is a forced construction of the
• Main purpose: prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial provision.
or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations - Purpose of the law: Prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination
implicating them in the commission of a crime.
• The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, particularly relative to the
the fact of a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, members of the secret service. On point
Inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, cannot violate only requires consideration.
the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon
the accused as a witness — it does not call upon the defendant for his Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled
testimonial responsibility. to be a witness against himself. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the
• The doctrine contended for by the appellant would prohibit the sanitary accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth. No case exactly in point can be
department of the Government from examining the body of persons who are found. But, by analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in
supposed to have some contagious disease. U. S. vs. Tan Tan ([1912] 23 Phil.. 145), following leading authorities, and the
• In a case like the present it is always difficult to secure positive and direct persuasive decisions of other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a prohibited
proof. Such crimes as the present are generally proved by circumstantial drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit
evidence. In cases of rape the courts of law require corroborative proof. This himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the
was done through the testimony and the acquired results of the substance room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance
from the body of the defendant. from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced
• DECISION: Tan Tang is convicted for the crime of abusos deshonestos and construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any
is sentenced to receive the maximum penalty (aggravating circumstance of article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in
dwelling). SC modified his penalty from 4 years 6 months and 11 days with evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial
costs to six years with costs. compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners
implicating them in the commission of a crime. (Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.)
UNITED STATES V. ONG SIU HONG (DISCHARGE)
Following the practice of this court in cases of this character, the judgment of the lower
RECIT-READY: ONG was forced to discharge a certain amount of morphine from his court is modified by imposing the minimum penalty provided by law, i. e., three months
mouth. The substance was appreciated as evidence against him. He assailed the imprisonment and a fine of P300 or, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
admissibility of such evidence, invoking his right against self-incrimination. The SC held imprisonment, with costs. (U. S. vs. Lim Sing, [1912], 23 Phil. 424; U. S. vs. Sy Liongco,
that the main purpose of the Constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial [1915], 33 Phil., 563.) So ordered.
compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions that
would implicate the accused in the commission of a crime. It would be a forced Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur. U.S. vs Tan Teng:
construction to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused rape case.
of crime could not be given in evidence. In this case, ONG was no different from TAN
TENG, where the accused was subjected to a test to obtain substances from his body CONTENTION: In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the
as evidence to prove his guilt. Also, the evidence is admissible. scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his
body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of
FACTS: the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to
• Ong Sui Hong was convicted by the lower court. Evidence used to convict him compel the defendant to testify against himself
was morphine taken out of his mouth
• Counsel for Ong Sui Hong contends that the morphine taken from his mouth DOCTRINE: Such an application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not
cannot be admissible as evidence against him as it can be considered a be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses,
violation of his constitutional right (cannot be compelled to be a witness can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call
against himself) upon the accused as a witness — it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial
responsibility
ISSUE: Is taking morphine out of your mouth tantamount to self incrimination?
VILLAFLOR V. SUMMERS (ADULTERY; PREGNANCY TEST)
HELD: NO, morphine taken is admissible as evidence
RECIT-READY: VILLAFLOR and SOUINGCO were charged for adultery. The trial
RATIO: court ordered VILLAFLOR to be examined by physicians to determine if she was
pregnant and the latter refused, which led her to be cited for contempt. VILLAFLOR
invoked her right against self-incrimination. The SC held that the prohibition of

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compelling a man, in a criminal court, to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of HELD: NO
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him. It is not an • The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is DENIED.
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. Thus, the Constitutional • The order of the trial judge to have the woman examined may be phrased in
guarantee is limited to a prohibition against to compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. absolute terms but it should be understood as subject to the limitations herein
On other hand, upon a proper showing and under an order of the court, an ocular mentioned, and therefore legal.
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. In this case, while to compel
a woman to submit to the examination of her private parts amounts to great RATIO:
embarrassment and shame, nevertheless, the SC applied the constitutional provision • Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of
in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by sentimental influences. law clause of the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to
Thus, physical examinations are not covered by the right. But due care must be the possession and control of his own body.
exerted at least not to embarrass the accused any more than necessary in carrying out • It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to
the test. decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be
invaded by exposure to another's gaze.
FACTS: • To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit
- Petitioner prays for a writ of habeas corpus to restore her to her liberty. to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault,
and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of
ANTECEDENT FACTS: truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public
• Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
adultery pending before the CFI of Manila. • Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense,
• The court, through Hon. Pedro Concepcion, ordered the defendant Emeteria which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless
Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy
to determine if she was pregnant or not. and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences.
• The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination • The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self- case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
incrimination. compulsory testimonial self-incrimination.
• She was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid o An ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
Prison until she should permit the medical examination required. o The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided (decided on a
• Conservative view: case to case basis).
1. Humanitarianism of the constitutional provisions extends the o It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable
privilege to any fact that the accused is compelled to make evidence and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use
against himself. violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is
2. People vs. McCoy – in a case where the accused was convicted of absolutely necessary.
infanticide, the court revoked the conviction because evidence was • Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are
obtained by ordering doctors to examine the woman’s body to her then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No accused
objection. The court said that the proceeding was compelled the person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish
woman to be a witness against herself. the truth.
• Progressive view: • Mr. Justice Gray – “To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare
- Holt v. US - "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an
to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical indignity, an assault, and a trespass."
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an o However, even superior to the complete immunity of a person to be
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." let alone is the inherent which the public has in the orderly
- Philippine jurisprudence – seemed to limit the protection to a administration of justice.
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The o Such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does
constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition against not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of
legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a
will, an admission of his guilt." disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and
justice cannot hesitate.
ISSUE: Whether compelling a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians
to determine if she is pregnant, violates a person’s constitutional right to not be JURISPRUDENCE:
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against oneself. • US v. TAN TENG— The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two
decisions, has seemed to limit the protection to a prohibition against

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 compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The constitutional limitation was translated): Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
said to be "simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the against himself.
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt."
ISSUE: WON the constitutional provision prohibits respondents from compelling
BELTRAN V. SAMSON (POSITIVE TESTIMONIAL ACT VS. MECHANICAL Beltran to produce the writing ordered
EXAMINATION; WRITING)
HELD: YES. Respondents must desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
That is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is submitting the latter for comparison.
the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to
giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other RATIO
means than by word of mouth • Construction. It is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor
of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their
RECIT-READY: BELTRAN was ordered by the RESPODENT JUDGE to appear before invasion.
the FISCAL for the purpose of taking a sample of his handwriting to determine if he was • What the privilege covers. The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely
the one who wrote certain falsified documents. There was yet no information filed to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by
against him and it was merely an investigation, not a prosecution. Nevertheless, other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact, which
BELTRAN invoked his right against self-incrimination. The SC held that the the accused has a right to hold secret.
Constitutional guarantee is not limited to a declaration, but also to be a witness
against oneself This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this
• Testifying privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing
• Furnishing evidence of evidence. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or
• Being a witness the fingers. Writing is not a purely mechanical and attention.
Thus, the privilege is not limited precisely to testimony or giving of oral testimony, • the present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's
but extends to all furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth o It possession
includes the divulging of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret. The SC
also held that it is the duty of the courts to liberally construe the prohibition in NOTE: this case cannot be compared with the following cases:
favor of personal rights and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their • Cross-examination— Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case,
invasion. In this case, the SC held writing to be something more than a mechanical testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his
act, as it requires application of intelligence and attention. Also, the present case is own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court
more serious as the witness is compelled to write, create, make, or prepare, by means in order that the jury maybe able to compare his handwriting with the one in
of the act of writing, evidence which does not yet exist and will be later on used against question.
him as falsifier. Simply put, what is required in the instant case is for the petitioner to • Bradford v People— defendant, in offering himself as witness in his own
perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for behalf, waived his personal privileges.
the purpose of comparison, which sets it apart from other cases, where the accused • Sprouse v. Com.— where the judge asked the defendant to write his name
did not have to do anything but be examined. For the purpose of the Constitutional during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document • CASE— This is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view
and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting because, in both to filing it.
cases, the person is required to furnish evidence against himself. Thus, the JUDGE o Defendant's right to decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily
and FISCAL are thus ordered to cease and desist therefrom wrote.

FACTS: PROFESSOR WIGMORE (SOMEONE EMINENT):

• Provincial fiscal Jose prayed to the court for order for Beltran to appear before llllll. What is not within the privilege. Measuring or photographing the party is not
him to write down things he would dictate. Beltran’s handwriting would be within the privilege. Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or
compared with the allegedly falsified document to determine if he was indeed shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the
the one who wrote it. Judge Samson granted the order based on jurisprudence foregoing things to be done.
and authority from Administrative Code, sec. 1687 which says: the fiscal, and mmmmmm. What is covered. Production or inspection of documents and
the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be chattels— because even though the documents are already in existence, he
present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. would be treated as a witness and would have to testify to the authenticity of
• Petitioner came to SC for prohibition, seeking refuge in the Jones Law and these. Producing the writing is covered. According to the Court, there is a
incorporated in General Orders, No. 58. Jones Law (in Spanish but herein similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who

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 is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the Thus, in this case, the question is about the nature of the proceedings. The SC also
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. held that forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. “Forfeiture” is a
divestiture of property, without compensation, in consequence of a default or an
For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who offense. It is imposed by way of punishment, not by the mere conviction of the parties,
is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen but by the law-making power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. Proceedings
of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal and, thus, the right against
against himself. self-incrimination is applicable. A witness or party called as witness cannot be made
to testify against himself to matters that would subject his property to forfeiture.
Here, it is worse than just production or inspection of chattels and documents. The Forfeiture proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where there person
witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceedings
does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier—to create something, which is in the nature of a punishment. Suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal
may seriously incriminate him. nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of the
Constitutional protection against self-incrimination Thus, the right against self-
Court also stated that since Beltan is a municipal treasurer, there are other ways to incrimination attends:
figure out what his handwriting looks like from other, existing documents. And even if • When the person is liable criminally to prosecution and punishment
they don’t find any, there’s no reason to trample upon his constitutional rights. • When the answer of the person would tend to expose him to a forfeiture
• Criminal
JURISPRUDENCE: • Quasi-criminal
• People vs. Badilla— does not appear that the defendants and other • Penal proceedings
witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not • Proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the
refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional commission of an offense
privilege, as they could certainly do.
• United States vs. Tan Teng— were the defendant did not oppose the In this case, the proceeding for forfeiture, while administrative in character, possess a
extraction from his body of the substance later used as evidence against him. criminal or penal aspect. However, the SC held that the privilege against self-
• Villaflor vs. Summers— examination of the body— she was not compelled incrimination is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses
to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined to answer. The privilege is simply an option or refusal and not a prohibition of inquiry.
from something preventing the examination; all of which is very different from A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate. The
what is required of the petitioner of the present case, where it is sought to possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring
compel him to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer the question. But where a witness
of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. exercises his Constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether
• United States vs. Ong Siu Hong— defendant was not compelled to perform the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the
any testimonial act, but to take out of his mouth the morphine he had there. It witness is improper. And where the witness is the accused, he may invoke the privilege
was not compelling him to testify or to be a witness or to furnish, much less for a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions
make, prepare, or create through a testimonial act, evidence for his own
condemnation. The SC further held that a person may not be compelled:
• To testify in an action against him for a penalty
CABAL V. KAPUNAN, JR. (FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS IS QUASI-CRIMINAL) • To answer any question as a witness that would subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture
RECIT-READY: COL. MARISTELA of the Army filed a letter-complaint to the Sec. of Even though the action or proceedings for its enforcement is not brought in a criminal
National Defense, charging Chief of Staff CABAL for graft and corruption, unexplained court, but is prosecuted through the modes of procedures applicable to ordinary civil
wealth, and other reprehensible acts. MARISTELA did not seek the removal of CABAL, remedy. Last but not least, the right to self-incrimination extends to all cases in which
but rather the forfeiture of Cabal’s unexplained wealth. The President ordered the the action prosecuted is to try and punish persons charged with the commission of
formation of a COMMITTEE to investigate the matter. The COMMITTEE then ordered public offense. It applies whenever the proceeding is not purely remedial or intended
CABAL to take the witness stand, but the latter refused to be sworn and invoked his as a redress for a private grievance, but primarily:
right against self-incrimination. • To punish a violation of duty or a public wrong
• To deter others from offending in a like manner
The SC held that in a criminal case, the accused may refuse: It applies when the proceeding is not to establish, recover, or redress private and
• To answer incriminatory questions civil rights
• To take the witness stand
FACTS:

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 • On August 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed a letter- Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
complaint with the Secretary of National Defense. It charged Manuel Cabal government may not force to surrender to his detriment. That right is the hallmark of
with “graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an our democracy.
officer and gentleman, giving false statements in his 1958 SALN.”
• On Sept. 6, 1961, the President created a committee of 5 members composed RECIT-READY: PASCUAL was being tried administratively before the BOARD for
of former Justices and Generals. They were tasked to investigate the said alleged immorality and malpractice. The result could be the cancellation of his license
charges. to practice his medical profession. He was then ordered by the BOARD to take the
• At the beginning of the investigation, the committee, upon request of Col. witness stand. PASCUAL refused and invoked his right against self-incrimination. On
Maristela, asked Cabal to take the witness stand and be a witness for the other hand, the BOARD argued that the right is available only when a question
Maristela. (He was being asked to be a witness against himself.) calling for an incrimination answer is asked of a witness and that the same can simply
object when such circumstance arises. The SC held that the right against self-
• Cabal refused and invoked his right against self-incrimination. The Committee
incrimination must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the
referred the matter to the City Fiscal of Manila. The Fiscal then filed contempt
person invoking it. Under US jurisprudence, the right extends even to lawyers as well
charges under Sec. 580 of the Revised Administrative Code against Cabal. as to other individuals. The SC also held that the accused has a perfect right to remain
This was filed in the CFI of Manila, presided by respondent Judge. (Docketed silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of guilt against him. The
as Criminal Case No. 60111.) accused has the right to forego testimony and remain silent, unless he takes the witness
• Cabal filed a Motion to Quash. He alleged that the committee had no power stand out of his own free will. The SC further held that the right against self-
to order and require the petitioner to take the witness stand and be a witness incrimination now comes within the right to privacy. The 5th Amendment in its self-
for Maristela. incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
• The motion was denied. Hence the current petition. may not force to surrender his detriment. Last but not least, in this case, the SC held
• It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only that the ruling in Cabal vs. Kapunan is applicable. The BOARD, in an administrative
to answer questions, but also, to take the witness stand. proceeding that could result to the loss of the privilege to practice the medical
profession, cannot compel PASCUAL to take the witness stand without his consent.
ISSUE: Whether the proceedings before the Committee a civil or criminal in character. Also, the cancellation of license to practice medicine, as a consequence, acquires the
nature of a penalty and, thus, the right against self-incrimination and the right to refuse
HELD: Quais-criminal to take the witness stand accrue.

RATIO: NOTE: The right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by
• In the said proceedings, Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of Cabal law, which include investigations conducted by special boards or committees. Thus, if
from office. (After all, he was no longer the Chief of Staff during the pendency the proceedings are criminal in nature and may result to the imposition of penalties, the
of the case.) The purpose of the proceedings is to apply the Anti-Graft Law. accused may refuse to take the witness stand altogether.
That law allows the State to forfeit property of a public officer which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary. FACTS:
• Forfeiture has been held by jurisprudence to partake of the nature of a penalty. • The recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan,5where it was held that a respondent
in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law cannot be required
to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in
• Therefore, the proceedings in the Committee are considered criminal of penal. this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that
Cabal is entitled to the rights of the accused. Cabal is exempted to be a he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being
witness against himself. the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. That
• Respondent Judge is enjoined from proceeding further in the contempt case was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.
filed against Cabal.
A. Prefatory part of the case:
After an extensive examination of pertinent cases, concludes that said constitutional a. Bermudez v. Castillo: "This Court is of the opinion that in order that
provision applies whenever the proceeding is not "purely remedial", or intended "as a the constitutional provision under consideration [self-incrimination
redress for a private grievance", but primarily to punish "a violation of duty or a public clause] may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it
wrong and to deter others from offending in likewise manner. must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the
person invoking it."
PASCUAL, JR. V. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS (REVOCATION OF b. As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The
LICENSE; MALPRACTICE; IMMORALITY) provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the
utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. served."

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B. Facts proper: • August 2, 1965 - Lower court issued a decision “finding the claim of
• February 1, 1965 – Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed before the Court of First petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the
injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners complainant in said investigation without his consent and against
• It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case himself."
for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would • Hence, this appeal.
present as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the
respondent in such malpractice charge. ISSUE: WON petitioner-appellee can invoke the right against self-incrimination.
• Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his
HELD: YES— WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is
objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a
affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs. [The petitioner-appellee cannot be
witness against himself.
made to take the witness stand in the administrative case filed against him
• Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a without his consent.]
plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on
February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as RATIO:
such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order 1. SC affirms the lower court in that its decision manifested fealty to the principles laid
from a competent authority. down in Cabal v. Kapunan:
• Petitioner-appellee’s argument: 7. In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge
o In ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Kapunan, it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth
Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act, the complainant
discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the
self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, witness stand, which request was granted.
which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi- 8. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt
criminal in character. was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to
o With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief demanded quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the
consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a
compelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but,
readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ also, to take the witness stand."
of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of 9. It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that
prohibition. while the matter referred to an a administrative charge of unexplained
• February 9, 1965 - lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property
be issued against the respondent Board commanding it to refrain from a public officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his
hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await salary and his other lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a
the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character
bond in the amount of P500.00. thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect.
• Respondent Board’s answer: nnnnnn. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be
o The Board said, while admitting the facts stressed that it could similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property
call petitioner-appellee to the witness stand and interrogate him, but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some an
the right against self-incrimination is available only when a even greater deprivation.
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a oooooo. Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination
witness. Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth,
o Petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals,
witness stand and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of
o Denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion. disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting
• Intervenors: it."
o They sustained the power of respondent Board, which for them pppppp. We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a
is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the
distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel a medical profession.
witness to incriminate himself. 2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board
• They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be and intervenors- appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination
availed of in an administrative hearing.

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should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment
could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or
10. It is true that one aspect of such right s the protection against "any inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt
disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used with by law.
in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that
might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. PEOPLE V. ESTOISTA (RECOMMENDED EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY)
11. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. "The
accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be RECIT-READY: As punishment for illegal possession of firearms, the term of
used as a presumption of his guilt. imprisonment for 5 to 10 years is neither cruel nor unusual, especially considering the
12. Chavez v. CA – reaffirmed the doctrine that it is the right of a defendant prevalent circumstances, such as rampant lawlessness and the promiscuous carrying
"to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the of weapons. The SC held that it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the
genuine will.” punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. To
13. Chief Justice Warren - "the constitutional foundation underlying the come under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the
privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and
community. Cruel and unusual, barbarous or excessive to the extent of being shocking
integrity of its citizens."
to public conscience. The SC also held that if in a given case the imposition of the full
14. It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the extent of the penalty would be too harsh considering the intention and the degree of
principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it malice of the perpetrator, the courts are allowed to recommend to the Chief Executive
does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, for clemency
current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the
right to privacy. Guides in determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual (Furman vs.
i. Chief Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self- Incrimination Georgia):
clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force to surrender to his detriment." US SC Justice Brennan:
ii. Judge Frank spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may • The punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity
lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." • The punishment not be applied arbitrarily
• The punishment not be unacceptable to contemporary society
SECTION 18. (POLITICAL BELIEFS; INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDES) • The punishment must not be excessive
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and o A punishment or fine is excessive when, under any circumstance, it
aspirations. is disproportionate to the offense
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. US SC Justice Marshall:
• There are certain forms of punishment which involve too much pain and
Involuntary Servitude – every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them
another no matter under what form such servitude may be disguised. • There are unusual punishments in the sense of being previously unknown for
a given offense
Exceptions: (1) if such is punishment where the party is convicted, (2) in the interest • A penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no
of national defense, citizens may be compelled to render personal military or civil legislative purpose
service, (3) a return to work order, (4) merchants and marines compelled to remain until
• A punishment that is not excessive and serves a legislative purpose may still
the end of voyage, (5) a posse comitatus – a male at a certain age may be validly
be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it
pressed into service for the apprehension of criminals through legitimate exercise of
police power, (6) parental authority
FACTS:
• Feb 10, 1949, Defendant, in their 27-hectare estate, took a shot at a wild
rooster and hit Diragon Dima (their laborer)
SECTION 19. DEATH PENALTY
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman • The gun used was owned by his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a legal
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, permit for it. o defendant did not have such permit.
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress • Bruno testified at the constabulary headquarters that Alberto (defendant)"went
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be to hunt for wild rooster;" that "later on my son Alberto came to inform me that
reduced to reclusion perpetua. he had accidentally hit our laborer;" He was alone when it happened

Jlyrreverre|348
 • Defendant also testified in the constabulary headquarters that he was alone o out hunting in other places and for target practices Supported by the
and his father was in the house fact that Bruno admitted that Alberto was a sharpshooter
• Also, defendant admitted that he had been in the habit of going out hunting in
other places and for target practices 2. RULING: AFFIRMED CONVICTION
• Defendant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for homicide • RA 4 is directed against any person who possess any firearm, ammunition
through reckless imprudence and illegal possession of firearm under one therefor etc..
information, o Possession includes carrying and holding
o the appellant was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the o Whether owner or borrower of the weapon, both can be penalized
second, § Ownership of the weapon is necessary only insofar as the
• In the trial Bruno testified that after being told by alberto that there were wild ownership may tend to establish the guilt or intention of the
chicken destroying their crops, he handed over his rifle to alberto for him to accused
shoot the chicken since he shoots better. He further added that he was 20 o Punishes those not only with intention to own but also intention to
meters away from alberto when the latter accidentally shot Dima use.
• Defendant basically said the same thing as Bruno did in the trial • temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is
• From above clearly Bruno's testimony at the trial is in direct contradiction to not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind
of weapon (sanderson v state)
his and his son's statements at the Constabulary headquarters on the same
o example of such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon
morning of the shooting, and sworn to by them before the justice of the peace
or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment, or to shoot
soon after
at some object
o Appellant's case does not meet the above test. His holding or
ISSUE: Relevant: whether or not 5-10 years imprisonment for illegal possession of
carrying of his father's gun was not incidental, casual, temporary or
firearm cruel or unusual.
harmless. Away from his father's sight and control, he carried the gun
for the only purpose of using it, as in fact he did, with fatal
HELD: No, basis: prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb.
Court however recommended to the president for the reduction of sentence to six consequences.
months considering the defendant’s degree of malice o Unlike in Samson case, Samson carried the gun solely in obedience
to its owner's order or request without any inferable intention to use
OTHER ISSUES it as a weapon
• Which fact should be followed (trial or statements in the Constabulary HQ)—
Statements in the Constabulary HQ 3. 5-10 YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM IS NOT
• Does the fact support ruling?— Yes CRUEL OR UNUSUAL (IMP!!)
o The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security
of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous
RATIO: carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal
circumstances might appear excessive.
1. ISSUE OF FACT: o Though looking at the degree of malice of defendant, 5-10 years of
imprisonment is out of proportion, however law is not to be declared
The statements taken at the constabulary headquarters after the accident should be unconstitutional for this reason. Thus court recommends Executive Clemency
followed to the president making penalty to six months of imprisonment
• Affidavits were executed immediately upon their arrival at the Constabulary
headquarters, there is no hint of any undue pressure brought to bear upon RESOLUTION:
either of them, and, above all, they stood to gain nothing from the statement o In branding imprisonment for five years too harsh and out of proportion in this
that the accused was unaccompanied. case, we had in mind that six months was commensurate and just for the
appellant's offense, taking into consideration his intention and the degree of
• In contrast, Bruno's testimony in court was interested, given with his son's
his malice, rather than that it infringes the constitutional prohibition against the
acquittal in view. infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
• In US v Samson carrying a gun by order of the owner does not constitute o Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the public interest at
illegal possession of firearm (that’s why Bruno is saying that he handed over stake, we do not believe that five years' confinement for possessing firearms,
the gun to alberto and told the latter to shoot the chicken) even as applied to appellant's and similar case, can be said to be cruel and
• Court also looked at previous act of defendant unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public
o Defendant admitted that had been in the habit of going conscience. Procedural: issue of constitutionality was only raised during
appeal

Jlyrreverre|349
 o Court pointed out that previous conduct was relevant in determining his motive
and intention, and to disprove the claim that his father followed his son so as In order to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in
not to lose control of the firearm imposing the appropriate penalty. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or
o RA #4 talked about confiscation of the illegal firearms repeal the provisions of the RPC relating to aggravating circumstance. Likewise, RA
o No deprivation of property without due process 7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to
o ownership or possession of firearms is not a natural right protected be punished by that maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the
by the Constitution aggravating circumstances under the RPC. Thus, the provisions on the aggravating
circumstances under the RPC subsist and affect criminal liability. In this case, rape,
o right to private property may be limited, restricted and impaired so
especially one perpetrated against one’s own daughter, is an intrinsically evil act and
as to promote the general welfare, public order and safety (POLICE is outrageous to dignity and decency and deserves to be punished by death
POWER)
Construing RA 7659 in pari materia with the RPC, death may be imposed when:
• Aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make
operative the provision of the RPC regarding the imposition of the maximum
PEOPLE V. ECHEGARAY (DEATH PENALTY) penalty
• Other circumstances attend the commission of the crime, which indubitably
RECIT-READY: Under US Jurisprudence, punishments are “cruel” when they involve characterizes the same as “heinous” in contemplation of RA 7659 that justify
torture or a lingering Death. But the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning the imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
of that word as used in the Constitution. “Cruel” implies something inhuman and death
barbarous and something more than the mere extinguishment of life. The SC held that
courts are not the for a for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death Last but not least, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes:
sentence, where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined acts. It is • Because the perpetrators have committed a) unforgivably execrable acts that
the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law, regardless of their have so deeply dehumanized a person or b) criminal acts with severely
private opinions: destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty
• As long as that penalty remains in the statute books through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest
• As long as criminal law provides for its imposition on certain cases citizenry
The SC also held that the Constitution vests in Congress the power to re-impose the • Because the perpetrators have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to
death penalty subject to certain requisites: both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual
• Congress must define or describe what is meant by “heinous crimes” threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, such that
• Congress must specify and penalize by death only those crime that qualify as they must be permanently prevented from doing so
heinous in accordance with the definition set in the bill AND/OR designate
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, in which the latter can only MAIN DECISION
be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that FACTS:
characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition set in o The trial court rendered a decision convicting Leo Echegaray of rape,
the bill aggravated by relationship (Leo being either the father or stepfather of the
• Congress, in enacting a death penalty bill, must be singularly motivated by complainant, Rodessa Echegaray, ten years old and living with him). The
“compelling reasons involving heinous crimes” penalty he would suffer is death. Pursuant to law, SC obtained automatic
“Heinous crimes” are those which are grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which, jurisdiction over the case.
by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity
are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and Testimony of complainant, Rodessa Echegaray: Leo succeeded in having carnal
morality in a just, civilized, and ordered society relations with her a total of five times, all without her consent. Leo threatened her that
• “Haineus” means hateful and abominable (Sparta) if she would tell anyone, he would kill her mother. But after the fifth time, she went to
• “Haton” denotes acts so hatefully or shockingly evil (Greek) her grandmother and made sumbong.
The SC further held that the criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances
of the: Testimony of accused-appellant, Leo Echegaray: Leo asserted that the counts of
• Victim rape were a product of the mind of Rosalie, Rodessa’s mother. He insinuated that
• Accused Rosalie and her mother were eyeing the land owned by the accused in Quezon City,
• Time and that Rosalie’s mother (the grandmother) wants to be the sole owner of such land.
• Place Such land was transferred to the accused by a guy named Conrado Alfonso. He also
• Manner of commission of the crime said that he was working at a paint job in Paranaque, and the distance between
• Proximate consequences and effects on the victim and society Paranaque and their house is too long so he could not have been home at the time the

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rape was said to have occurred. Also, “[he] asserted that he has a big sexual organ (2) Leo had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided for
which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa, the said female organ will be her food, clothing, shelter and education
'mawawarak.'” (3) Even if he is not the father or stepfather, he falls squarely under the
term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in convicting Leo of rape
RESOLUTION: Leo Echegaray filed a Motion for Reconsideration, with the services of
HELD: NO. Death penalty was affirmed. the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the
Philippines (FLAG). Leo fired his former counsel, Atty. Julian Vitug, and hired the
RATIO: services of FLAG.
I. Principles in evaluating evidences for rape cases
A. An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more ISSUES: The Motion for Reconsideration contained three main issues:
difficult for the accused though innocent to disprove I. Mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and
B. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are findings
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme II. Alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel
caution III. Constitutionality of RA 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on
C. The evidence for the prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and Certain Heinous Crimes), on the ground that the death penalty is a
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the severe and excessive penalty in violation of Art III Sec 19 (1)
defence.
HELD: Motion for reconsideration dismissed for lack of merit.
II. Jurisprudence – People v Jaymalin
A. Minor inconsistencies in the narration of a witness do not detract from its RATIO:
essential credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically
I. Matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings
believable.
below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme
B. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has
Court.
not been rehearsed as it is not to be expected that he will be able to remember
A. The SC tackled the issue that Rodessa signed an Affidavit of Desistance
every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.
a. An Affidavit of Desistance signifies the lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court to have proceeded with the prosecution of the
III. SC rulings on the testimonies of Rodessa and Leo
accused- appellant, considering that the issue of jurisdiction
a) It seems that Rodessa’s hymen was not totally broken, but there were
over the subject matter may be raised at any time, even during
lacerations in her vaginal wall.
appeal
(1) A broken hymen is not an essential element of rape.
b. However, Rodessa strongly pointed out that she is not
(2) A mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda by the penis of the
withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter
accused suffices to constitute the crime of rape
might do the same sexual assaults to other women
b) That the grandmother wants the piece of land co-owned by Leo is immaterial
c. This is a situation where an affidavit of desistance must be
(1) A determination of which version earmarks the truth as to how the regarded with disfavor
victim's grandmother learned about the rape is inconsequential to B. Besides, the evidence and alibi of the defense cannot outweigh the
the judgment of conviction. positive identification and convincing testimonies given by the
(2) Besides, the SC believes “that no grandmother would be so callous prosecution
as to instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case
against her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over II. Incompetency of Atty. Julian Vitug
the disputed lot.” A. It is a rule that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his
c) The defense is inherently weak and is uncorroborated by other material facts counsel.
(1) The defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by other witnesses, B. However, the SC considered Atty. Vitug competent, contrary to what the
should be completely disregarded. defense thought of him
(2) The defense of alibi becomes even weaker in the face of positive C. Besides, the alleged errors committed by the previous counsel could not
identification of the accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of have overturned the judgment of conviction against the accused-
rape by his victim . appellant.
d) Leo claims he is neither the father nor stepfather of Rodessa. SC ruled that
he was. III. History of the death penalty
(1) Rodessa uses the surname of Leo A. Jurisprudence on the death penalty [prior to 1987]

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 a. Harden v. Director of Prison – Punishments are cruel when they ii) However, not all felonies punishable by death shall remain
involve torture or a lingering death. Clearly, the death penalty punishable by death. Only certain heinous crimes would
cannot be considered cruel under the wordings of the law. be punishable by death.
b. People v. Limaco – The Supreme Court is not the forum to discuss b) The bill to be presented was merely a bill amending certain
on the morality of the death penalty. As long as it is the law, then the provisions of the RPC.
SC has to apply it. 3) Opposition to the reimposition of the death penalty
B. Constitutional Commission deliberations a) Senator Lina: “There [are] still numerous reforms in the criminal
a. Original wording of Sec 19 is as follows: “Excessive fines shall not justice system that may and must be put in place”
be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, or the b) Other abolitionists in Congress: “All criminal reforms first must
death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed shall be be pursued and implemented before the death penalty be re-
commuted to reclusion perpetua.” (This wording was first drafted by imposed in case such reforms prove unsuccessful.”
Fr. B) 4) Nature of heinous crime
i. The reason for this wording was that majority of the a) Senator Tolentino said that heinous crimes are heinous by
members of the Bill of Rights Committee saw that the nature
imposition of the death penalty is inhuman to both the b) “The nature of the offense is the most important element in
convict and his family considering it heinous but, at the same time, we should consider
ii. Human life is more valuable than an institution intended the relation of the offense to society in order to have a complete
precisely to serve human life idea of the heinous nature of these offenses.”
b. The original wording received criticisms c) Whether a crime is heinous or not (as well as whether the reason
i. There was a high incidence of crimes at the time of the provided for the reimposition of the death penalty is compelling
Constitutional Commission, so Commissioner Rama found or not) is a matter of opinion
the death penalty necessary 5) Due process cannot be questioned
ii. Commissioner De Los Reyes suggested that "although we a) “Due process cannot be questioned by an accused in the
abolish the death penalty in the Constitution, we should enactment of the law, but only whether the Congress had the
afford some amount of flexibility to future legislation.” authority to enact such law”
iii. Commissioner [Bishop] Bacani said that the Church does b) I think that what this is means is that the Congress thinks that
not condemn capital punishment, and that the right of the the Supreme Court will think that the reimposition of the death
State to impose death penalty is not [morally] forbidden.
penalty is a valid exercise of police power
iv. After much deliberation, the current wording of Section 19
6) Not violative of international law (at that time, not sure for now)
was adopted, following the suggestion of Commissioner De
Los Reyes. a) Senator Tatad, pointed out that the death penalty bill violated
c. Immediate consequences of the present wording our international commitment in support of the worldwide
i. In People v. Gavarra, the Supreme Court held that Sec 19 abolition of capital punishment
completely abolished the death penalty i) The Philippines is a signatory to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
ii. In many criminal cases, there was confusion in the
b) Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in the United
imposition of the death penalty in lieu of the Indeterminate
Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different
Sentence Law
committees which vote on them for consideration in the plenary
iii. However, in People v. Munoz, the SC re-examined its ruling
session.
in Gavarra, and held that nothing in the wording of Sec 19
c) He stressed that unless approved in the plenary session, a
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty
declaration would have no binding effect on signatory countries.
C. Reimposition of the death penalty by the Congress
1) Votation
a) Senate: 17-7 d) In this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably
bound by the ICCPR, considering that these agreements have
b) House of Reps: 123-26 (2 abstained)
reached only the committee level
2) Purpose of the reimposition
a) Senator Arturo Tolentino said that the main purpose was for the
IV. Constitutionality of RA 7659
reinstatement was convenience
i) Many articles of the RPC would be completely repealed by A. Conditions entailing Sec 19 – The constitutional exercise of this limited power
the abolishment of the death penalty to re-impose the death penalty entails:
1. That Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;

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 2. That Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify c. “A plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their happiness under a
as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the regime of justice and democracy, and without threat that their
death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion loves ones will be kidnapped, raped or butchered.”
perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed D. Death penalty is NOT cruel, degrading nor inhuman
upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that 1. Echegaray states that the death penalty for statutory rape is cruel,
characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition degrading and inhuman, in blatant violation of the Constitution a. He
or description set in the death penalty bill; and cited a case, Furman v Georgia, to support his claim.
3. That Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly a. The US SC, in the Furman case, did not outlaw death penalty
motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.” b. It declared unconstitutional certain death penalty statutes
B. Definition and specifications of heinous crimes (first two conditions) because such statutes vested unbridled discretion on the
1. Heinous crimes were defined under RA 7659 as: “[G]rievous, odious judiciary to impose the death penalty (in other words, such
and hateful offenses which, by reason of their inherent or manifest statutes did not have proper procedural and/or substantive
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and safeguards)
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and c. Thus, the Furman case cannot be applied to the case at bar.
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.” 2. Echegaray also said that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or
2. There are two kinds of crimes under the death penalty bill: degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter,
a. Those punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (treason, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life a.
parricide, murder, infanticide, etc) a. He cited another case, Coker v. Georgia, to support his claim
b. Those punishable by death (i.e. death is the mandatory penalty) i. In that case, the US SC held that the imposition of the
(qualified bribery, rape when attended by any of the ten death penalty for a rape case is excessive.
circumstances under 266-B, statutory rape included, etc) ii. The SC also said that, “the [American] public has
[NOTE: See full text of the case or RA 7659 for full list of heinous crimes] manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper
punishment for the crime of rape through the willful
3. Given the exclusive enumeration in RA 7659, there is a valid and well- iii. omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their
defined list of heinous crimes; thus, the first two conditions were met. new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman.”
4. RA 7659 is replete with procedural and substantive safeguards. b. However, our SC said, “[W]e fail to see how this could have any
a. The SC is aware that the trial courts may ruthlessly impose bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own
death penalties on the accused. culture.” (ohsnap!)
b. The exclusive enumeration of heinous crimes in RA 7659, and 3. “[T]he death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the
the proper procedure in the imposition of the death penalty (only perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that
when aggravating or qualifying circumstances are present as to have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely
warrant the imposition of death) “reduce to nil the possibility of destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject
executing an innocent man or one criminal but not heinously poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a
criminal.” disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused
C. Compelling reason (third condition) irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and
1. Nothing in Art III Sec 19 imposes a requirement that for a death penalty a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of
bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently
of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the prevented from doing so.” (Sorry, I couldn’t paraphrase this one. Ganda
suspension of the death penalty. ng pagkakasulat eh.)
2. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted 4. Besides, in the earlier case of Harden v Director of Prisons, as mentioned
to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate earlier, the SC ruled that punishments are cruel when they involve torture
criminality in society. or a lingering death.
3. What suffices is that the Congress finds compelling reasons to impose a. The death penalty, as long as it does not involve the convict dying
the death penalty. What is compelling is a matter of opinion. a slow and painful death, with the grip of the Grim Reaper slowly
4. Debates in the Congress provided some of the (compelling?) reasons: choking his very soul, ripping it apart painstakingly slow, is not
a. The violent manner and the viciousness in which crimes are now cruel.
committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a patent
disregard of the law and a mockery of public peace and order.
CORPUZ V. PEOPLE (DUTY OF THE COURTS)
b. “The Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses,
and many more, are all crying for justice.”

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RECIT READY: Danilo Tangcoy and Lito Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino in expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the
Olongapo. Tangcoy used to lend money to casino players. Upon hearing that Tangcoy pieces of jewelry.
had pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him and offered to sell the jewelry 5. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the
on commission basis. The private complainant agreed. They both agreed that the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no
petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale and/or, if unsold, to return the same items avail.
within 60 days. The period expired without remitting the proceeds or returning the
pieces of jewelry. Corpuz promised to pay the former the value of the said items, but 6. The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone
did not follow through. An information for estafa was filed against petitioner and he was testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the
found guilty of such. He was ordered imprisoned and to pay an indemnity of P98,000 lone testimony of petitioner
as actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification. RTC: found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa
CA: denied the motion for reconsideration of Corpuz and affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE: W/N imposing penalties on persons convicted of crimes involving property is
valid ISSUE(S): WON CA erred in ruling against Corpuz

THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT—There seems to be a perceived injustice HELD: NO. But with modification in the imposition of penalty. Corpuz is found by SC
brought about by the range of penalties continued to impose on crimes against property guilty for the crime of Estafa. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, Copy of
committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money in SC Decision is ordered to be be furnished the (1) President of the Republic of the
1932, when the RPC was enacted. However, the Court cannot modify the said range Philippines, through the Department of Justice (2) President of the Senate and (3)
of penalties because that would be judicial legislation. Where the legislature fails to Speaker of the House of Representatives.
amend, the Courts cannot step in. The Court can still find relief through Art. 5 of the
RPC, which allows the Court to report to the President through the DOJ whether certain RATIO:
penalties are excessive. The execution of such sentence still cannot be suspended,
however, the President can suggest to Congress amendments or revisions to penal ARTICLE 5 (Duty of the Court)
laws. The RPC was not meant to be a self-amending law that would change with • There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
inflation. Furthermore, in the crimes of theft and estafa, the present penalties do not penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of corresponding penalties. committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of
Penalties are harsh in general to deter criminality, but when punishment is “flagrantly money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the
and plainly oppressive” and “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
shock the moral sense of community,” it would be unconstitutional. Moreover, if the legislation.
Court applied the 1:100 suggested penalty, the gap between the minimum and • What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for
maximum amounts would be too large. Even if Dean Diokno found the incremental in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that
penalty in the RPC unconstitutional, he concedes that the remedy is still to go to would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government.
Congress. On the other hand, civil indemnity is not a penalty or fine, hence, it can be This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can
increased by the Court when appropriate. be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
FACTS: • ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed
1. Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner (Corpuz) met at the but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. -
Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
2. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision,
casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. subject of penal legislation.
3. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to • In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
petitioner the following items: Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
• an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
• one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
date. by the offense.
4. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, • The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts borne
if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to

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 repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the written demand as evidence is not fatal.
reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The • The law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence
premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any of the crime of embezzlement (estafa). It so happens only that failure to
penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial
need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by
• The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.
the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed
by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is Doctrine of Separation of Powers
not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief • The Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent
non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious
inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court
the proper penalty. dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
• No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem
it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
will be entirely powerless to punish such act 1. (Primary Issue) DUTY OF THE COURT TO APPLY LAW: Verily, the
• Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it
a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the
Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise
such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant
which it believes to be harsh. to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect
o First Paragraph of Article 5 refers to the duty of the court is merely to to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and
report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this
to be harsh. This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers
crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no by means of judicial legislation.
punishable act except those previously and specifically
st nd
provided for by penal statute. Article 5 1 Par Art 5 2 Par
o The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian The first paragraph of the The second paragraph is
principle that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the above provision clearly similar to the first except for
courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties states that for acts borne the situation wherein the act
fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon out of a case which is not is already punishable by law
conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not punishable by law and the but the corresponding
severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law court finds it proper to penalty is deemed by the
may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of repress, the REMEDY is to court as excessive. The
the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given render the proper REMEDY therefore, as in the
penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel decision and thereafter, first paragraph is not to
and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be report to the Chief suspend the execution of the
addressed to the Chief Executive. Executive, through the sentence but to submit to
Department of Justice, the Chief Executive the
Interpretation of Penal Law as to the word DEMAND the reasons why the same reasons why the court
• With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand act should be the subject considers the said penalty
under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court of penal legislation. The to be non-commensurate
observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in Estafa premise here is that a with the act committed.
under Art. 315 1(b). deplorable act is present Again, the court is tasked to
• When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written but is not the subject of any inform the Chief Executive,
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word penal legislation, thus, the this time, of the need for a
"demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both court is tasked to inform the legislation to provide the
Chief Executive of the need proper penalty

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 to make that act punishable wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do
by law through legislation. not make the latter fatally defective.
2. ESTAFA; TYPE OF DEMAND: No specific type of proof is required to
show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be
verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to
the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount
to a demand.

First Paragraph of Article 5 The second paragraph of Art. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of
refers to the duty of the 5 is an application of the petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of
court is merely to report to humanitarian principle that Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the
the Chief Executive, with a justice must be tempered Regional Trial Court finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
recommendation for an with mercy. Generally, the Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
amendment or modification courts have nothing to do are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the
of the legal provisions with the wisdom or justness indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2)
which it believes to be of the penalties fixed by law. MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15)
harsh. This provision is "Whether or not the penalties YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
based under the legal prescribed by law upon
maxim "nullum crimen, conviction of violations of Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
nulla poena sige lege," particular statutes are too furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of
that is, that there can exist severe or are not severe Justice.
no punishable act except enough, are questions as to
those previously and which commentators on the Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the
specifically provided for law may fairly differ; but it is Speaker of the House of Representatives.
by penal statute. the duty of the courts to
enforce the will of the SECTION 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll
legislator in all cases unless tax.
it clearly appears that a given
penalty falls within the LOZANO V. MARTINEZ (CHECK; IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT; BAD DEBT LAW
prohibited class of excessive V BAD CHECK LAW)
fines or cruel and unusual
punishment." A petition for RECIT-READY: In this case, the constitutionality of BP 22, the BOUNCING CHECKS
clemency should be LAW, was assailed for violating the Constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
addressed to the Chief non-payment of debt. It is allegedly a “bad debt law” rather than a “bad check law”, as
Executive. the offense under the BP is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of
the check when it is presented to the drawee bank. The SC held that the “debt”, under
Secondary Doctrines Section 20, covers prison liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The prohibition
1. TIME OF OCCURRENCE NOT A MATERIAL INGREDIENT in ESTAFA: under Section 20 does not include:
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally • Damages arising in an action ex delicto
defective Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does o Because damages recoverable therein a) are considered
not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be punishment and b) do not arise from any contract entered into
returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one between the parties, but are imposed for the wrong done
testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did • Fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as
not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in punishments for the commission of crime
reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the In this case, what the law punishes with imprisonment is not the failure to pay the debt,
Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the but rather the act of making and issuing worthless checks. Also, the purpose of the law
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph is to protect the public interest from the deleterious effects of the proliferation of bad
(b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property checks by making the same and putting them in circulation, but not necessarily to
received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a coerce a debtor to pay his debt . Moreover, acceptance of checks is based on
material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the confidence, as they are not legal tender. If that confidence is shaken, then the
usefulness of checks as substitutes for currency would be greatly diminished. A check

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flasher injures not only the payee, but also the public interest. The SC also held that has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment
while it is Constitutionally impermissible for Congress to penalize a person for non- for debt, were intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for
payment of a debt ex contractu, it is within the prerogative of the same to proscribe liabilities arising from actions ex contractu The inhibition was never meant to
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare/ In this case, BP 22 was include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages
enacted by Congress, as a valid exercise of the police power. Also, the enactment of recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the
BP 22 is a declaration by Congress that, as a matter of public policy, the making and parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and
issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the
imposition of penal sanctions. courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime."
• The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
FACTS: issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
• Consolidation of 8 cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP 22 or the for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
bouncing checks law. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
• The defendants in all the cases moved to quash the informations on the thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
ground that the statute is unconstitutional. worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious
• (basically walang specific facts about the cases and the SC said that they effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
weren’t necessary) punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of BP 22 • What is prohibited by the constitution is for the legislature to penalize a person
for non-payment of debt ex-contractu. However, the state can punish those
HELD: BP 22 is Constitutional acts that inflict harm on the community as mala prohibitum. The state can do
this in the exercise of its police power.
RATIO: • The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of
public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public
History of BP 22 nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. (basis of public
• In 1932, Art 315 of the RPC punished the crime of issuing worthless checks. order: bouncing checks decreased from P200M per day to P50-80M when CB
However, paragraph 2 “(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in prohibited overdraft checks)
payment of an obligation the offender knowing that at the time he had no funds 2) It impairs freedom of contract;
in the bank, or the funds deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the a) Bouncing checks are “unlawful” contracts not subject to the protection.
amount of the cheek without informing the payee of such circumstances” b) Checks are money substitutes and should be regulated.
deemed to exclude checks in payment of pre-existing obligations. The 3) It contravenes the equal protection clause;
rationale is that the creditor already parted with his money or property before a) the drawer and the payee should be punished because the crime is
the issuance of the check so there was no element of “prior” or “simultaneous” completed upon presentation of the check)
deceit. b) Held substanstial distinction between a drawer and a payee.
• RA 4885 revised Art.315 to include that failure to pay within 3 days after 4) It unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
receipt of notice would be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting the crime a) Petitioners argued that the legislative and executive powers are transferred to
of estafa through false pretenses or deceit. But still the SC decided in People the payee because the crime is executed by the act of the payee of presenting
v. Sabio, Jr. that it did not cover the payment of pre-existing obligations. Thus the check for payment. This is absurd because the statute does not delegate
the creation of BP 22. the power to define the crime and set the penalty to the payee.
5) Its enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the
Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.
1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; NO. a) No merit. The congress itself created a committee regarding the confusion of
• Constitutional inhibition of non-imprisonment of debt was adopted from U.S. some members regarding this and submitted that it was in fact authorized and
the three readings complied with.
constitution. It was a protection that was given to the people in the early 19th
century, in the various states of the American Union to curb the cruel and
SECTION 21: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
inhumane practice of permitting creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors
who did not pay their debt. At common law, money judgments arising from No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by writ of capias shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
ad satisfaciendum.
ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
• Mr. Justice Malcolm speaking for theSupreme Court in Ganaway vs. Queen,
22 stated: "The 'debt' intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty

Jlyrreverre|357
To raise the defense of double jeopardy: a conviction, after issue properly joined, when the case is dismissed or
• A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second otherwise terminated before judgement without the consent of the accused
• The first jeopardy must have terminated • Due to this, the court dismissed the case
• The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first • Hence, this appeal from the government

NOTE: To determine if the offenses charged are the same, it is important to observe ISSUE: WON DOUBLE JEOPARDY CAN BE APPLIED?
if the offense alleged is merely:
• An ingredient or element of the other, or HELD: YES
• An attempt for frustration of the other
RATIO:
PEOPLE V. YLAGAN (WHEN FIRST JEOPARDY ATTACHES) • A defendant in a criminal procedure is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial
under the ff. circumstances
RECIT-READY: For a defendant in a criminal prosecution to be placed in jeopardy, he 1. In a court of competent jurisdiction
must be placed on trial under the following conditions: 2. Upon a valid complaint or information
• In a court of competent jurisdiction 3. After he has been arraigned
• Upon a valid complaint or information that is sufficient in form and substance 4. After he has pleaded to the complaint or information
to sustain a conviction • Given the standard above, it is obvious that the defendant has been once put
• After the defendant has been arraigned in jeopardy for the offense which she is now prosecuted
• After the defendant has pleaded to the complaint or the information, such that • The view that there is no jeopardy until the investigation of the charges has
the issue is properly joined actually been commenced by calling a witness (U.S. v. Ballentine, People v.
The SC held that the rule against “double jeopardy” protects the accused against being Belisario, et. al.) should now be abandoned
again tried for the second offense and not against the peril of second punishment. o There is no provision or principle in law requiring such a condition for
Without this safeguard, the fortune, safety, and peace of mind of the accused would be the existence of legal jeopardy
entirely a the mercy of the complaining witness, who might repeat his accusation as o Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after
often as dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit. the accused has entered a plea
• The rule on double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of
The SC also held that the accused, after being notified of the Order dismissing the second punishment, BUT AGAINST being tried again for the same offense
complaint may either: • If there was no such rule, the court said that the fortune, safety, and peace of
• Rest assured that he will not be further molested mind of the accused would be entirely at the mercy of the complainant who
• Prepare himself for the presentation of a new complaint might repeat the accusation anytime (Julia v. Sotto)
• Counsel for the government argues that the previous case against the
FACTS: accused was dismissed with her consent, on the theory that the phrase
• A complaint for serious physical injuries was filed in the justice of peace court "without the consent of the accused" used in the rules should be construed to
of Batangas against herein respondent mean "over the objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused"
• After preliminary investigation, the case was forwarded to the CFI where the o Court does not accept this theory.
fiscal filed an information against her o The court said that it is a sound rule to say that the mere silence of
• Upon arraignment, defendant pleaded not guilty the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case does
• The private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, not constitute a consent within the meaning of sec 28 of the rules
moved for the dismissal of the case - granted; attorney for defendant did • This right should be put on the same level as other constitutional rights
not say anything about it • Its waiver cannot be predicated on mere silence
• 11 days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information in the
same justice of peace court, charging the same defendant with the same TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY
offense
• Upon arraignment, defendant pleaded double jeopardy (sec 28 of the rules on To satisfy the defense of double jeopardy, the first jeopardy must be terminated:
criminal procedure) • By acquittal
• Sec. 28—A person cannot be tried for an offense, nor for any attempt to • By final conviction
commit the same or frustration thereof, for which he has been previously • By dismissal without express consent of the accused
brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or • By dismissal on the merits
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
NOTES:

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 • When the dismissal of the case clearly constitutes GADALEJ, the dismissal, • September 12, 1958 – Agaton Bulaong was arrested.
even if made on the merits, is invalid and is not a bar to a reinstatement of the • October 1, 1958 – information for rebellion filed with the CFI of Laguna was
case amended with the following information:
o When the judgment of acquittal is void for having been given without o Accused Agaton Bulaong alias “Ka Era” – organizer and leader of
jurisdiction, then the judgment cannot be a basis for a plea of double the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) and the "Hukbong
jeopardy Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" (HMB), otherwise known as the
• The decision of a military tribunal is merely recommendatory and subject to Hukbalahaps (HUKS), the latter being the military arms of the former,
review by the convening authority and, thus, for purposes of double jeopardy, whose aims and purposes are to remove people and territory of the
it does not terminate a case Republic of the Philippines and to overthrow it eventually by the use
• An Order of dismissal in a preliminary investigation does not, in any way, of force and arms.
terminate case o Have risen publicly and taken up arms, making armed raids,
• The discharge of an accused in order to be a State witness, even if there is ambuscades and attacks upon the Philippine Constabulary, Armed
failure to comply with all the requirements of Section 9, Rule 111, is equivalent Forces of the Philippines, Police Forces and other military
to an acquittal and is a bar to a reinstatement of the case against him, except detachments of the government.
when the accused so discharged fails • October 1, 1958 (same day) – another information was filed before the CFI of
Manila charging Agaton Bulaong of the crime of subversion defined in Section
qqqqqq. BULAONG V. PEOPLE (REBELLION AND SUBVERSION”; FIRST 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act with the following information:
JEOPARDY NOT YET TERMINATED) o That in or about the month of July, 1957, and for the time subsequent
thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which he had
chosen as the nerve center of all his activities in the different parts of
RECIT-READY: BULAONG was charged for rebellion before the CFI of LAGUNA in
the Philippines
1956 o Trial did not proceed until 1958 because he remained at large. The ANTI-
o Accused – an officer and/or a ranking leader of the Communist Party
SUBVERSION ACT took effect in 1957. And in 1958, he was charged before the CFI
of the Philippines (CCP) and its Military Arm, the Hukbong
of MANILA for the crime of subversion. While his case for subversion was pending, he
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) formerly known as Hukbalahaps,
was convicted of the crime of rebellion. BULAONG invoked his right against double
which organizations have aimed to overthrow the Government of the
jeopardy, alleging that the facts alleged in both charges were the same. The SC held
Republic of the Philippines by means of force.
that under Section 9, Rule 113 of the RoC, the defense of double jeopardy is available o Have taken arms against the Government of the Philippine Republic,
to the accused only where: by making and conducting raids, ambuscades and armed attacks
• He was convicted against and upon the Philippine Constabulary, Armed Forces of the
• He was acquitted Philippines and local police forces.
• The case against him was dismissed on the merits • The case for subversion is still pending in the CFI of Manila; while the case
• The case against him was terminated without his consent for rebellion has already been decided by the CFI of Laguna adversely against
It is the conviction, acquittal, dismissal, or termination of the case that bars further the accused.
prosecution of: • Accused Bulaong appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the
• The same offense decision of the CFI of Laguna. At bar is his appeal from said judgment of the
• Any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof Court of Appeals. Accused contends:
• Any offense that necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the o That rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is
a lesser cognate offense to that defined in Section 4 of Republic Act
offense charged in the former complaint or information
1700
In this case, BULAONG was not convicted or acquitted of subversion and neither was
o That since the facts alleged in the informations for rebellion and
the case terminated or dismissed without his consent o Thus, double jeopardy does
subversion are the same he cannot be legally prosecuted for both
not attach o Simply put, when BULAONG was convicted for rebellion, his jeopardy for offenses without being placed twice in jeopardy of being punished
subversion has yet to be terminated. One of the requisites for invoking the right against for the same acts.
double jeopardy is that the first jeopardy must have terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused can interpose the defense of double jeopardy in this
FACTS: case in view of the filing against him of the information for subversion in the CFI of
• May 31, 1956 – Agaton Bulaong and others were charged before the CFI of Manila which allegedly involves the same facts obtaining in this case.
Laguna with the crime of rebellion. Trial did not proceed with respect to Agaton
Bulaong until 1958 for he was then at large. HELD: Petition is DENIED, judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
• June 20, 1957 – Congress enacted the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act
1700) RATIO:

Jlyrreverre|359
 • Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court – the defense of double jeopardy o “An offense is necessarily included in another” when all the
is available to the accused only where he was either convicted or acquitted or ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his constituting the latter
consent. Such is not the situation in this case. o “An offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily
• Accused has not been convicted or acquitted in the case filed in the CFI included in another offense” when both offenses were in existence
against him for subversion. during the pendency of the first prosecution
• Neither was the said case dismissed or terminated without his consent, for as One who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or
stated, it is still pending in said court identical offense, though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. In this case, the
• It is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination second offense was not in existence during the time of the first prosecution because
of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt the accused could not possibly have been convicted of an
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily offense that was still inexistent. The victim then was still alive and, thus, no case for
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former consummated homicide could prosper and it was, at most, frustrated homicide o Even
complaint or information. assuming that the second offense is identical to the first, as the first being a mere
frustration of the second, nevertheless, the right against double jeopardy is not violated
SUPERVENING FACTS by the filing of the amended complaint. Supervening events took place that changed
the character of the offense, and, thus the accused cannot be said to be placed under
MELO V. PEOPLE (CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE OFFENSE AND double jeopardy for being prosecuted for the new offense. The amended complaint
CONSTITUTE A NEW (DISTINCT) OFFENSE) should, thus, be allowed to stand. But MELO’s service of the first penalty however
should be credited in case of conviction of the second offense
RECIT-READY: MELO was charged for frustrated homicide for stabbing and inflicting • The SC further held that when a person who has already suffered his penalty
fatal wounds on OBILLO. MELO pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the victim died and, for an offense is charged with a new and greater offense, said penalty may
thus, the next day, an amended information was filed against MELO charging him, this
be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense
time, with consummated homicide. MELO invoked double jeopardy. The SC held that
NOTE: Also take note that the first jeopardy has not yet terminated and, thus, no double
under Section 13, Rule 106, if it appears at any time before judgment, that a mistake
jeopardy can attach
has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may:
• Discuss the original complaint or information, and
CONSTITUTION IN EFFECT— 1935 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1 (20): "No person shall
• Order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense be twice put in jeopardy of punishment f or the same offense,"
• Provided that the defendant would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy FACTS
Thus, it is proper for the court to dismiss a first information and order the filing of a new • Conrado Melo was charged in CFI Rizal with the frustrated homicide of
one for the reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter Benjamin Obillo. Former had inflicted with a knife several serious wounds in
did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense different parts of the latter’s body requiring medical attendance for more than
“Double jeopardy” generally means that when a person is charged with an offense and 30 days and incapacitating him from habitual labor for the same period. At
the case is terminated either by acquittal, conviction, or in any other manner without 8:00 am of Dec. 29, 1949 he pleaded not guilty to the offense. At 10:15 pm
the consent of the accused, the person cannot again be charged with the same or that same day, Obillo died. The prosecution amended the charge to
identical offense consummated homicide.
• The inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense • Melo filed a motion to quash alleging double jeopardy, which CFI denied. He
• The exception to the rule is when the same act is punished by a law and an comes to the SC for Prohibition to enjoin the CFI from further entertaining the
ordinance because conviction or acquittal under one will be a bar to case.
prosecution under another
“Same offense” has been construed to mean: ISSUE: WON the amending of the information after Obillo died constitutes double
• The second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first jeopardy
information
• The second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof HELD: NO. Petition dismissed.
• The second offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information Ratio
o “An offense necessarily includes another” when some of the • Rules of Court, Rule 106, section 13: "If it appears...that a mistake has been
essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original
constitute the latter complaint or information and order the filing of a new one...provided the
defendant would not be placed in double jeopardy...”

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 • Double jeopardy. When a person is charged with an offense and the case is were no supervening events that would justify the filing of an amended
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the complaint. The fractures already existed during the time of the first examination, but it
consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or was just that they were only discovered during the subsequent examination. Thus, an
identical offense— founded on justice, law and conscience and is one of the amended complaint cannot be validly filed against the accused without violating his
fundamental rights of citizens. constitutional right against double jeopardy. The SC also warned that before filing
• Meaning of ‘same offense’. This is tested through the "same-evidence test", appropriate informations in cases of physical injuries, thorough medical examinations
which is restated by the Rules of Court must be conducted to avoid such circumstances, where the accused could not be held
o Same-evidence test. There is identity between two offenses not liable for the more severe but rightful liability, as he is shielded by the guarantee against
only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but double jeopardy
also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily NOTE: Also, take note that the first jeopardy has already terminated because the
included in the offense charged in the first information. accused had, in fact, fully served his sentence
o “Necessarily includes”. An offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former FACTS
as alleged in the information constitute the latter, and vice-versa • On Dec 7, 1956, Buling was charged in the Justice of the Peace court of
(Rule 116, sec. 5.) Cabalian, Leyte for the crime of less serious physical injuries inflicted on Isidro
• Rule does not apply here. In this case, there is definitely identity between Balaba.
the first and second charge. However, this case is an exception to the rule • The complaint said such injuries would require medical attendance for 10-15
above because THE SECOND OFFENSE CHARGED WAS NOT YET IN days, and will incapacitate Balaba from his customary
EXISTENCE WHEN THE PROSECUTION FOR THE FIRST OFFENSE • labor for same period of time.
BEGAN (Because Obillo only died after the frustrated homicide charge). • Buling pleaded guilty, and served his sentence. (1 month and 1 day)
o In the cases of Diaz v. US and People v. Espino: where after the first • However, Balaba’s injuries did not heal in the period estimated.
prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is • On Feb 20, 1957, Provincial Fiscal filed an information against Buling for
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, Serious Physical Injuries.
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and • Information alleged that the wounds on Balaba required medical attendance
distinct offense, which does not put the defendant in double jeopardy. and incapacitated him for 1.5-2.5 months.
o In short, the rules earlier mentioned only apply when both offense • Accused was found guilty, and sentenced to 4 months arresto mayor as
were already present at the time the first charge was made. In the
minimum, to one year of PC as max, with indemnity to Balaba
present case, the first charge had already been made before the
victim died, which death led to the amending of information creating • This is the questioned order.
the second charge. There is therefore, no double jeopardy.
• Rationale. If after committing the crime, the defendant claims his right to ISSUE: Whether prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious PI is a bar to the
second prosecution for Serious PI
speedy trial, the prosecuting officer will have file the information immediately
in obedience to mandate of law. If supervening facts occur and the resulting
HELD – YES, THIS CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDY
offense is graver, without the above exception, there is no way he can
penalize the defendant in proportion to his guilt. Furthermore, it could result to
RATIO
collusion between prosecuting officers and accused to the detriment of
administration of justice. • The SC cited Melo vs People
o Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which
PEOPLE V. BULING (WOUNDS DID NOT HEAL) the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the
offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes
RECIT-READY: BULING was charged for less serious physical injuries for having a new and distinct offense
inflicted wounds upon BALABA. The findings of the medical examination showed that o NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY if indicted for new offense
the BALABA was to be incapacitated and would require medical attendance for some • In this case – there was no new fact that supervened or came into existence
10 to 15 days. BULING pleaded guilty and served sentence that same day. Prior to the o First physician examined the offended party WITHOUT AN X-RAY
filing of the subsequent amended complaint, BULING has fully served his sentence. o Second physician examined hContrast with im with x-ray, and found
Later, BALABA’s wounds did not heal. A second medical exam was committed and, a fracture, which resulted in the diagnosis calling for a longer period
this time, an X-ray machine was used, where fractures were found in the victim’s hand, of healing
which would take him some 90 days to heal. An amended information was filed against o SC agreed with appellant that the injury and condition of the offended
BULING, this time, for serious physical injuries. The prosecution invoked supervening party was the same in the first and second examination – the failure
events to justify the filing of the new complaint. The SC held that, in this case, there to disclose the fracture in the first exam was due to the incompetence

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 of the physician. – essentially, andun na yung fracture when it • RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PD 1866
was first examined, hindi lang nakita nung doctor. Thus, no (illegal possession) and Murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced to
supervening event. life imprisonment.
• Contrast with people vs Manolong • Accused filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, hence the present
o In that case, the first examination showed injuries that would take petition
20-30 days to heal. • The facts of the case (not that important):
o Subsequent examination showed injuries that would take 90 days to o On Feb 24 1989, accused went to house of deceased at around
heal, and caused deformity and loss of the use of said member. 11pm. He was very drunk but was was nevertheless invited inside.
o In the first exam, no finding was made that the injuries caused Accused showed his gun to the deceased and the latter played with
deformity and loss of the use of his right hand. it. The wife of the deceased saw all this and she got irritated
o Thus, it’s assumed that the fact was noto apparent and indiscernible (because his husband would rather play with a gun than with her)
at the time of the first exam and so she walked away. Later on, the two stepped outside and two
o “The course (not length) of the healing of an injury may not be gunshots were heard. The wife of the deceased then heard the
accused knocking at their house saying “OMG nabaril ko si Pare
determined beforehand, it can only be definitely known after the
(deceased).” The wife called her sister in law and they went to the
period of the healing has ended.” – reason why there was a
body. It was bloody and facing up but it was still warm. They tried to
supervening fact accdg to the SC
bring the body to the hospital and the accused even helped in
• Facts are diff in this case carrying but he later desisted saying that it was too late, the
o “If x-ray shows existence of fracture on Jan 17, 1957, then it must deceased was, well deceased. Police officers then responded to the
must have existed when first examination was made on Dec 10, scene and the accused was placed in custody. The day after, the
1956” accused was accompanied by police officers at the scene of the
o The new finding was attributed to the superficial and inconclusive crime and the former located the gun. Tests were conducted on the
examination accused to see if there were nitrites in his hand (gunpowder from
firing the gun) but it was negative.
PEOPLE V. TIOZON o The defense had their version. Accused was just passing by the
house of the deceased when the latter called him up. The accused
RECIT-READY: Accused was charged and found guilty by the RTC of violation of PD avers that the gun was owned by the deceased and at some point
1866 qualified by murder. The accused went to the house of the victim and showed his he grabbed it from the deceased. At that instance, the wife emerged
gun to the latter. Later they went outside and two gunshots were heard. Since there from the room and saw the accused holding the gun. The accused
was no eyewitness, the RTC relied on circumstantial evidence (allowed in Rule 133 of returned the gun and the deceased tucked it in his waist. Later they
revised rule of court) to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was the killer. went out to buy more beer. The accused excused himself because
On appeal in the SC, the court revised the decision. Accused is guilty of Homicide. In he urinated and while in the process heard two gunshots. He saw the
reasoning for their decision, the SC discussed double jeopardy and said that it is only deceased lying and a gun on the ground. He got the gun but realized
applicable for similar offenses. But, as in this case, when an act offends against two that the police might see him holding it so he threw it away. He ran
distinct and unrelated provisions of law (PD 1866 and RPC), and if one requires proof to the house to tell the wife that her husband got shot. When the
of an additional fact or element (PD 1866 requires illegal possession) while the other police arrived, he was arrested. He said that he never saw the
does not, an acquittal or conviction or dismissal of one does not bar prosecution under gunman and that he did not accidentally shoot the deceased.
the other. The SC did not find accused guilty of illegal possession since the prosecution • In holding the accused guilty, the RTC relied on
never proved this in trial. Also, instead of murder, accused was convicted merely with circumstantial evidence because prosecution failed to present an eyewitness.
homicide since the qualifying circumstances were never sufficiently proved.

FACTS: • It considered the following circumstances which it deemed sufficient to convict

• Information was filed with RTC in Caloocan in Feb 27, 1989 charging accused accused pursuant to Rule 133 of revised rules of court:
for “... hav[ing] in his possession, custody and control one .38 cal. revolver, o The widow saw the accused holding a gun immediately before the
shooting incident
marked Squires Bingham with SN 180169 with three live ammunitions without
o Accused was last person seen in company of victim
authority of law, which firearm was used with treachery and evident
o It was accused who purposely went to house of victim on that fatal
premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused
evening
death..”
o It was the accused that guided the policemen as to the place where
• Accused pleaded not guilty and trial was conducted.
the fatal gun was recovered

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 o The testimony of the wife that after hearing two successive gunshots, • To be guilty of violation of PD 1866, aside from the elements provided in the
accused went back to her house and informed her that he RPC for Homicide or Murder, there must be illegal possession of firearm as
accidentally shot the husband well.
o Testimony of wife that accused immediately after the shooting • The fact of illegal possession of firearm was not proven. The prosecution
incident took place admitted to her having accidentally shot the victim never proved that the accused had no license. Thus accused cannot be guilty
is admissible as evidence of violating PD 1866.
o Testimony of accused that deceased is owner of gun is not credible • But, the accused can still be liable for MURDER or HOMICIDE.
o The SC ruled HOMICIDE because evident premeditation and
ISSUE: Whether RTC erred in convicting the accused of the crime of illegal possession
treachery were not proven. The RTC accepted the qualifying
with murder as defined in section 1 of PD 1866
circumstance of Treachery only. But, the SC was not satisfied by the
amount of proof provided by the prosecution. The fact that the bullet
HELD: Yes, Judgment of RTC modified
wounds entered from the back did not prove treacherous means
because there was no witness to the crime.
RATIO:
• The court revised the decision of the RTC. The accused was charged with
HOMICIDE only because the other elements were not proven. This does not
On Double Jeopardy..
constitute double jeopardy because the single act of the accused (could)
• Homicide or murder merely qualifies the offense in PD 1866 because it is a
violate two distinct provisions of law, one being a special law and the other the
circumstance which increases penalty.
RPC. He was tried for the same act and was charged for the crime in which
• Homicide or murder is not absorbed The killing of a person with the use of an
the elements were duly proven. In this case, only homicide.
unlicensed firearm may give rise to
• separate prosecutions for (a) violation of PD 1866 and (b) either ART 248 SAME OFFENSE
Murder, or ART 249 Homicide.
• The rule on double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished • In order to determine whether the two charges are identical, the test is:
by a special law while the second is punished by the RPC.
• Whether one offense is identical with the other
• People v. Domiguez: Protection for double jeopardy may be invoked only for
• Whether the offense is an attempt or frustration of the other
the same offense or identical offenses. An act may offend against two distinct
• Whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one requires proof of an additional fact
the other
or element while the other does not, and acquittal or conviction or dismissal
• The identity of offenses does not require one-to-one correspondence between the
of one does not bar prosecution under the other.
facts and the law involved in the two charges
• People v. Bacolod: Protection for double jeopardy is only for the same
offense. However, in order to justify the qualifying circumstance of murder or • But it is necessary that one of the offenses is complete included in the
homicide, it must be alleged in the information. The court ruled that such was other offense
complied with in the information (“which firearm was used with treachery and
evident premeditation in shooting...) PEOPLE V. RELOVA (ORDINANCE AND STATUTE) “DIFFERENT OFFENSE,
BUT SAME ACT IN VIOLATION OF BOTH AN ORDINANCE AND A NATIONAL
On Circumstantial evidence... STATUTE” (IDENTITY OF OFFENSE VS. IDENTITY OF ACT)
• A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only
if the circumstances proven constitute “an unbroken chain which leads to one RECIT-READY: OPULENCIA was charged for violating Ordinance No. 1 Series of
fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the defendant, to the exclusion 1974 of BATANGAS CITY for having made unauthorized installations and wirings in
of all others, as the guilty person.” his ice plant to lower his power bill fraudulently (jumper). He pleaded not guilty, although
• The SC agreed with the RTC that the 1st to 6th circumstances (listed in the he admitted to the presence of such unauthorized installations within his ice plant. But
facts) duly established and constituted an unbroken chain which leads to on given the fact that the case against him has prescribed, the trial court was constrained
fair and reasonable conclusion that accused and no other else shot the victim to dismiss the case against him on the ground of prescription. Being a light felony, the
offense prescribed 2 months after the discovery and the ASSISTANT FISCAL filed the
case 9 months thereafter, which was way beyond the prescriptive period. Eventually,
On the penalty imposed
the FISCAL again filed a case against OPULENCIA, this time for theft of electric power,
• The SC revised the penalty to HOMICIDE. As explained above, even if the
punishable under the Revised Penal Code. OPULENCIA answered with a Motion to
accused was charged on information of violation of PD 1866, the court can
Quash. The SC held that the rule on double jeopardy in the Constitution:
review the whole case, and impose a different ruling if a fact or circumstance
• As a general rule, the protection against double jeopardy is not available
is not proven.
where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the

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 offense charged in the first prosecution, although both the first and • The question of identity of acts which are claimed to have generated a liability
second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts both under an ordinance and a national statute is addressed by examining the
• The exception to the general rule is that the protection against double location of such acts in time and space
jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an o When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are
Ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a so related to each other in time and space, as to be reasonably
National Statute, such as the RPC, provided that both offenses spring regarded as:
from the same act or set of acts § Having taken place on the same occasion
o In other words, even if the offenses charged under the § Have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing,
Ordinance and the Law are different, if the charges under both intent or voluntary design or negligence
of them are based on the same act, then double jeopardy o Such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole
applies capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different
In this case, there is obviously only one act sought to be punished, although different legal enactments
offenses are alleged Thus, the BoR deals with two kinds of double jeopardy: Under jurisprudence, it has been discussed that if the second sentence of the double
• The first deals with that involving the same offense jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, then conviction or
o Prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another
o One may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by an
provided that he is charged with different offenses or the offense ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute and, thus, the two
charged in one case is not included in or does not include the crime offenses would never constitute the same offense, having been promulgated by
charged in the other case different rule-making authorities. The SC also held that the while the rule against double
§ So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, the accused should also be
informations charging the said offense, the defense may be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out of a single act.
available in the other case involving the same offense, even Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give rise to several prosecutions depending
if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as
case can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting elements. The
• The second deals with the same act that is punishable by a law and an acts of a person that physically occur a) on the same occasion and b) are infused by a
ordinance common intent or design or negligence and, thus, a moral unity should not be
o Contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act segmented and sliced. But the SC held that the extinction of criminal liability, whether
o Applies even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy, does not carry with it the extinction of
fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a civil liability arising from the offense charged
violation of a statute
Facts:
§ If the two charges are based on one and the same act,
• Feb. 1, 1975 – Members of the Batangas City police together with personnel
conviction or acquittal under either the ordinance or the law
from Batangas Electric Light System validly searched the premises of
shall bar a prosecution under the other
Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage, owned by private respondent.
Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
They discovered electrical wiring, devices and contraptions “architecturally
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of the offense
concealed inside the walls” which were meant to reduce the electric current
charged
consumption. Opulencia admitted that he did cause their installation to reduce
• The Constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where
his electricity bill.
an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses
• Nov. 24, 1975 – an Information was filed against Opulencia with the City Court
charged
of Batangas. It was for a violation of a city ordinance which outlawed the
• The question of identity of offense is addressed by examining the essential installation of such electrical wirings and devices to lower power consumption
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out without the proper authorization. Opulencia pleaded not guilty but later on filed
in the respective definitions of the offenses involved a motion to dismiss on the ground that it had prescribed. Motion granted since
Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance, while the other is penalized it was a light felony which prescribed after 2 months.
by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts, which the accused is said • April 20, 1976 – another Information was filed against Opulencia. This time, it
to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses was for Theft of Electric Power under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the
• The Constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as RPC. Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the grounds that
the acts that constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal he had already been acquitted of the same offense and such Information was
ordinance are the same acts that constitute or have given rise to the offense a violation of his right against double jeopardy.
charged under a statute • Motion to Quash granted. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

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Issue: WON respondent’s right against double jeopardy was violated. • When an accused appeals a conviction, the reviewing court may impose on
Held: YES. The filing of the second Information violated his right against double him a penalty higher than that imposed in the decision appealed by him
jeopardy. • When an accused appeals his conviction, he waives his right to the plea of
double jeopardy and whatever benefit he may have obtained from the prior
RATIO: judgment
• The constitutional provision has a general rule (1st sentence) and an
exception (2nd sentence). REMINDERS
• GENERAL RULE: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from • Always take note of the elements of double jeopardy
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and o If the first jeopardy has yet to attach due to the lack or defect of any
second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. of the elements (court of competent jurisdiction, valid information,
• EXCEPTION: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is arraignment, valid plea), then double jeopardy cannot yet be invoked
available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different • Even if the first jeopardy has attached, the same would have to terminate,
from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the otherwise to invoke double jeopardy would be premature (Bulaong v. People)
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or
set of acts. • If the dismissal of the case is with the consent of the accused, the dismissal
• The first sentence refers to 2 offenses (arising from the same set of acts) does not bar a subsequent prosecution, unless, the dismissal was based on
penalized under national laws. the merits, such as failure to prosecute or lack of evidence
o If the elements of the offenses are identical, there is double jeopardy. • If the dismissal of the case was due to a violation of the right to speedy trial, it
amounts to an acquittal and bars a subsequent prosecution for the same
• The second sentence refers to 2 offenses (arising from the same set of acts), offense
one penalized by a national law, and the other by a municipal ordinance.
o Not essential to look at the elements of both laws. It is sufficient to SECTION 22: EX POST FACTO LAW
look at the acts penalized. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
o If the charges are brought about by the same set of acts, double
jeopardy can attach. • An ex post facto law is one that is defined as
• The present case falls under the 2nd sentence of the provision. • Which makes an action done, before the passing of the law and which
o The first Information alleged the violation of a municipal ordinance was innocent when done, criminal and punishes such action
while the 2nd Information alleged a violation of the RPC, a national
• Which aggravates a crime
law.
o The dismissal of the 1st Information on the ground of prescription is o Makes it greater than when it was committed
tantamount to an acquittal. Art. 89 of the RPC provides that • Which changes the punishment
prescription of the crime is a ground for “total extinction of criminal o Inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
liability.” Therefore, double jeopardy already attached for the act it was committed
alleged in the Information. • Which alters the legal rules of evidence
• There is still the aspect of civil liability. The extinction of criminal liability o Receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time
whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant
the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. • Assumes to regulate civil and remedies only, but, in effect, imposes a
• The SC denied the petition for certiorari and mandamus BUT remanded the penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful
case back to the CFI of Batangas City for further proceedings on the civil • Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he
liability aspect. has become entitled
• Ex post facto prohibition applies to:
APPEALS o Criminal legislation that affects the substantial rights of an accused

• The prosecution may not appeal a judgment of acquittal o Criminal procedural law that is prejudicial to the accused
• No error committed by the court against the State can be reserve by it for o The test in procedural matters is – whether particular statutes, by
decision by the SC, when the defendant has once been placed in jeopardy their operation, take from an accused any right that was regarded, at
and discharged, even though the same was the result of the error committed the time of the adoption of the Constitution:
• But where the prosecution has not been given due process, acquittal or § As vital for the protection of life and liberty
dismissal is no bar to a refilling of the case § Which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the
offense charged against him

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 Dissenting Opinion Justice Fernando: A “bill of pains and penalties” is a bill of
PEOPLE V. FERRER (SUBVERSION ACT; BILLS OF ATTAINDER) attainder, where the penalty imposed is less than death. Within the meaning of the
Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties o In cases of bills of
RECIT-READY: The ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT outlaws the COMMUNIST PARTY OF attainders, the legislature:
THE PHILIPPINES and other “subversive organizations” and punishes any person who • Exercises the powers and office of a judge, as the former assumes judiciary
“knowingly and by overt acts” affiliates himself, becomes, or remains a member of the magistracy
said Party or any similar subversive organization after the passage of the Act. The Act • Pronounces upon the guilt of the party without any of the forms or safeguards of
is alleged to be a bill of attainder. The SC held that a “bill of attainder” is a Legislative trial
act that inflicts punishment without trial.Its essence is the substitution of a legislative
• Determines the sufficiency of the proofs produces, whether conformable to the
act for a judicial determination of guilt o It suffices to stigmatize a statute as a bill of
attainder: rules of evidence or otherwise
o There is a singling out of a definitive class • Fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with its own notions of the enormity
of the offense
o There is an imposition of a burden on the said class
In bills of attainders, there is a legislative enactment creating the deprivation, without
o There is a legislative intent behind the said imposition
any of the ordinary forms and guards provided for the security of the citizen in the
The SC held, in this case, that the Act does not specify the COMMUNIST PARTY for administration of justice by the established tribunals
the purpose of punishment, but merely uses the same for definitional purposes. The
Act focuses on the conduct prohibited and not on the individuals. The issues are FACTS
resolved as follows: 1. Congress passed the Anti-Subversion Act:
(1) The mere fact that the Act singles out the CPP and imposes a burden upon it a. it outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and
is insufficient to deem it a BoA, as the said law does not apply solely to the b. it punishes any person who “knowingly and willfully and by overt acts
CPP but to any other organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing affiliates himself with, becomes a member” of the Party or other
the government. Under the Act, the guilt of the accused must still be judicially similar “subversive organizations.” (Take note of the words
determined.In other words, the court must still prove that the accused joined “knowingly” and “willingly”)
the Party “knowingly” and with intent to attain its specific objective to overthrow Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag were charged with violation of the Act.
the government 2. Upon filing of the informations, the two respondents moved to quash, based
(2) The judgment expressed in the legislation regarding the criminal nature of the on these ground
CPP is so universally acknowledged as to be certain and “judicially noticeable” a. The act is a bill of attainder
The SC, on many occasions, has found the CPP to be an illegal organization, b. It is vague
engaged in armed struggle for the purpose of overthrowing the government,
c. It embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title
etc. When the judgment express in legislation is so universally acknowledged
to be certain as to be “judicially noticeable”, the legislature may apply its own d. It violates the equal protection clause
rules and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination They argue that such membership must be coupled with direct participation by the
(3) If a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is necessarily also an ex post facto law. The defendant in the illegal activities of the organization.
said law, however, punishes acts committed after the enactment of the law. In 3. Judge Ferrer (respondent Judge) struck the statute down as unconstitutional
other words, it applies prospectively, not retroactively. Also, members of the for being a bill of attainder and for being broad. Ferrer also dismissed the
CPP have the opportunity to renounce their affiliation or discontinue their information.
criminal acts and, hence, the penalties are not inescapable
The SC further held that a statute becomes a bill of attainder only when it applies either ISSUES: Is the Anti-Subversion act really a bill of attainder?
to a) named individuals or b) easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way
as to inflict punishment on them, amounting to a deprivation of any right, civil or political, HELD: No
without judicial trial. Last but not least, a bill of attainder must apply retroactively and
reach past conduct. A bill of attainder is doubly objectionable because of its ex post RATIO:
facto features Thus, a bill of attainder is also an ex post facto law o If one objection to
the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must Bill of Attainder Requisites:
be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be such: Reaches past conduct, and The 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups.
penalties it imposes are inescapable. So long as the incidence of legislation is such 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct
that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct can escape regulation merely
by altering the course of their own present activities, there can be no complaint of an • The Anti-Subversion act does not specify the Communist Party of the
attainder Philippines. What it does is simply declare the party to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the government of the Philippines. The term
“Communist Party” is used solely for definitional purposes (under section 4).

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 If the Anti-Subversion act really were a bill of attainder, then it would be members and/or stockholders of the corporations controlled by Kokoy, Imelda
unnecessary to charge Communists in court. The fact remains that their guilt and Ferdinand.
still has to be judicially established.
• The statute specifically requires that the membership must be knowing or B. GENERAL AVERMENTS OF DEFENDANTS’ ILLEGAL ACTS
active. There must be specific intent to further the objectives of the 1. Marcos took undue advantage of his power and position as President of
organization. Mere membership is not punishable, there must be proof of the Philippines.
direct participation in the organization’s unlawful activities. 2. Marcos withdrew and transferred a massive amount of funds, assets and
• Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership securities from the Central Bank.
makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Thus this is an act of conspiracy, it is 3. Marcos appropriated for themselves large private enterprises, converted
the conspiracy which the law punishes for threatening national security. government corporations to private enterprises which they subsequently
• And even if the act specifies individuals and not activities, such a feature is owned, awarded government contracts to relatives and close associates,
not enough to render the act a bill of attainder. Only when a statute applies sold and conveyed property to the prejudice of the Filipino people, etc.
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment without a judicial trial does it become a bill
of attainder. 4.Marcos concealed his acts of plunder and kept massive amounts of
• The Stature is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed plundered money in various banks.
after approval of the act. It also necessary that the act apply retroactively and C. SPECIFIC AVERMENTS OF DEFENDANTS’ ILLEGAL ACTS
reach past conduct in order for it to become a bill of attainder. This is the 1. Gave Meralco undue advantage by increasing power rates and, with
reason why “ex post facto” and “bill or attainder” were combined into one collaborator of herein petitioner Cesar Virata, reduced the electric
clause. A bill of attainder is necessarily an ex post facto law. franchise tax and tariff duty on fuel oil imports, resulting in substantial
• Those who were members of the Party or any other subversive organization savings for Meralco without benefit to its consumers.
at the time of the enactment of the law were given the Opportunity to purge 2. Secured the approval by Marcos and his cabinet of the so- called Year
themselves of liability by renouncing in writing or under oath any membership. Program for the Extension of MERALCO's Services to Areas Within the
60-Kilometer Radius of Manila, which required government capital
VIRATA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (PCGG CHARTER) investment amounting to millions of pesos
3. Manipulated, also with the help of Cesar Virata, the formation of Erectors
RECIT-READY: Petitioners in this case were impleaded as defendants in a complaint Holdings Inc., which would assume the obligation of Erectors
filed by the PCGG in Sandiganbayan. The complaint was about the ill-gotten wealth of Incorporated in the amount of 527M pesos so that Erectors Inc would
the Marcoses and of Kokoy Romualdez, and that the petitioners assisted them in obtain more money from Philguarantee (total debt amounted to 2B pesos)
acquiring funds and property which belongs to the Republic. The petitioners basically
assail (1) the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, which is a ground for D. CAUSES OF ACTION
the dismissal of the complaint and (2) the constitutionality of the PCGG Charter, as 5. Breach of public trust – The funds were acquired in breach of public trust
such Charter is alleged to be void for being a bill of attainder. The SC held that the 6. Abuse of right and power – Marcos and friends obtained such funds through
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. Also, the PCGG Charter is not a bill of
abuse of right and power. They acquired a whole lot of funds and properties
attainder because it does not automatically declare the accused guilty, nor does it even
which they should return to the Republic.
provide for the infliction of punishment on the accused. Also, the Charter does not alter
7. Unjust enrichment – Marcos and friends unjustly enriched themselves so
the quantum of proof required in civil and criminal cases.
they have a joint and several obligation to return what they obtained to the
FACTS Republic.
• In 1987, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted 8. Accounting – Basically the PCGG said that Marcos and friends had the
by the Solicitor General, filed a case in Sandiganbayan (herein respondent) burden of proof to show that they acquired the funds and property lawfully.
against Kokoy Romualdez and 44 others for recovery of ill-gotten wealth which 9. Liability for damages – The Filipino people are entitled to damages.
they acquired by blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, etc. during the Marcos
Regime. The complaint underwent three amendments. Pertinent to our E. THE COMPLAINT THEN PRAYS FOR MARCOS AND FRIENDS TO RETURN
discussion is the Second Amended Complaint. Below is a summary of the said WHAT THEY HAVE UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED, AND TO PAY DAMAGES.
complaint: • Kokoy and friends then filed a motion to dismiss, which the Sandiganbayan
denied. Petitioners of this case now come to the Supreme Court, asking them
A. PARTIES to review the acts of the Sandiganbayan, that the Sandiganbayan acted erred
• Impleaded in the complaint are dummies, nominees and agents of Kokoy, in denying the motion to dismiss. They pray that the SC enjoin the
Imelda and Ferdinand Marcos. They are incorporators, directors, board Sandiganbayan from further acting on the case.

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ISSUES/HELD: 2. To justify nullification of a law, it must be shown that the violation is
1. W/N the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action against petitioners – clear and unequivocal.
YES B. Definition of bill of attainder
2. W/N the PCGG and the Solicitor General have the authority to file the 1. A bill of attainder is legislative act which inflicts punishment without
complaint and to prosecute the same – YES judicial trial.
3. W/N the PCGG has become functus officio – NO 2. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial
4. W/N the PCGG Charter is violative of the EPC – NO determination of guilt.
5. W/N the PCGG Charter is void as a bill of attainder – NO C. Jurisprudence
1. PCGG v Peña
RATIO: a. There is an imperative need of the government to recover
ill-gotten wealth
I. CAUSE OF ACTION – This is the main issue of the case 2. BASECO v PCGG
A. Requisites of cause of action a. Nothing in the Charter “can be reasonably construed as
1. Legal right of the plaintiff a determination or declaration of guilt.”
2. A correlative obligation of the defendant [to respect the plaintiff’s right] b. The Charter “make[s] it perfectly clear that any judgment
3. An act or omission of the defendant which violated the plaintiff’s right of guilt in the amassing acquisition of 'ill-gotten wealth'
B. If a motion to dismiss is filed on the ground that the complaint failed to state a is to be handed down by a judicial tribunal, in this case
cause of action, the main question the court must answer is W/N the complaint the Sandiganbayan, upon complaint filed an prosecuted
is sufficient. by the PCGG.”
C. If a complaint is vague, then a motion to dismiss on that ground is not the c. The Charter doesn’t even provide for the infliction of
proper remedy. punishment.
D. Anyway, the SC held that, while the complaint may have been sort of vague D. Quantum of proof
in parts, it was sufficient in form and substance. 1. Petitioners contend that the Charter allows the PCGG to alter the
quantum of proof required for a judgment of conviction.
II. PCGG AND SOLICITOR GENERAL’S JURISDICTION 2. SC held that nothing in the Charter gave it authority to alter the quantum
A. Basically PCGG and the Solicitor General had the jurisdiction. of proof.
B. It was not taken away by the 1987 Constitution’s provisions on the 3. The plaintiff has the burden to establish a preponderance of evidence or
Tanodbayan. proof beyond reasonable doubt, as the case may be.
C. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Tanodbayan may no longer conduct a LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (JURISDICTION OF SB)
preliminary investigation, unless duly authorized by the Ombudsman.
D. Although under Article XVIII Section 26 of the Constitution, the PCGG only rrrrrr. RECIT-READY: The accused, in this case, are being prosecuted as
has eighteen months to issue sequestrations or freeze orders, “it cannot be accessories
construed thereby that its power investigation had thereby been revoked” by ssssss. for multiple murder with regard to the KURATONG BALELENG rubout.
the Constitution. Under the old law, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. However, RA 8249
was enacted expanding the jurisdiction of the SANDIGANBAYAN. Under the old law,
III. FUNCTUS OFFICIO only “principals” for offenses cognizable by the SB may be tried by it. Under the new
A. PCGG has not become functus officio. law, “accomplices” and “accessories” may also be tried by the SB, not only principals.
B. The PCGG is a separate entity from its members, so while the original RA 8249 was made to apply to “cases pending in any court over which trial has not yet
members have gone, it does not mean that the office of the PCGG ceased to begun”, such as the case of the accused where evidence has yet to be presented and,
exist. thus, their case was transferred to the SB. The accused alleged that the law is an ex
post facto law because the new law deprives him of the “two-tiered appeal” before
recourse to the SC. The SC held that generally, an ex post facto law prohibits
retrospectivity of penal laws. In this case, RA 8249 is not a penal law, but a substantive
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE law on jurisdiction, which is not penal in character. The SC also held that “penal laws”
• No explanation here. Basta the PCGG Charter does not violate the EPC are:
o Those acts of the Legislature that prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
V. BILL OF ATTAINDER / EX-POST FACTO for their violations
A. Presumption of validity o Those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
1. The constitutionality of laws is presumed punishment.

Jlyrreverre|368
The SC further held that the right to appeal is not a natural right, but only statutory in o this means as long as an accused has the rank of chief-superintendent,
nature. Thus, the right to appeal can be regulated by law.The mode of procedure for etc... even though he is just an accessory, sandiganbayan has
the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. jurisdiction
In this case, RA 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, does not mete out a • on March 5, 1997 –Sandiganbayan denied reconsideration but later on the
penalty, and did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. Also, RA 8249 has same day issued ADDENDUM saying that it reversed its earlier decision and
preserved the right of the accused to appeal before the SC, which has the power to returned the case’s jurisdiction to Sandiganbayan
review the case in order to determine if the presumption of innocence has been • Petitioner now question constitutionality of RA 8294
overcome
RELEVANT ISSUE: whether or not RA 8294 is an ex post facto law?
FACTS:
• May 18, 1995: 11 persons believed to be members of the kuratong Baleleng HELD: NO, ex post facto law applies to substantive penal laws only
gang were slain by authorities along common wealth avenue.
o Kuratong Baleleng gang is reportedly anorganized crime syndicate MAIN ISSUE: Who has original jurisdiction of the case?
which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in MM
• The 11 people were slain by elements of Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence HELD: Regional Trial Court
Task Group (ABRITG), which was composed of police officer from different
law enforcement groups. One of those groups was headed by petitioner and RATIO: RA 8294 not an Ex Post Facto Law
each of the two petitioner-intervenors also headed a group.
• SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes exposed to the media that what actually Ex Post Facto Law
transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot out a. which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which
• SP02 Reyes was part of the Criminal Investigation Command who was was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
headed by Petitioner-intervenor Acop b. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
• This prompted Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to create a panel headed by the c. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor to investigate annexed to the crime when it was committed.
d. which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony
the incident
that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to
• Panel initially absolved all people involved in the incident convict the defendant.
• A review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified e. Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple situation of a person to his disadvantage.
murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and f. that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
intervenors imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
• Petitioner was among those charged as principal, but later ombudsman g. deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he
changed the information making petitioner only as an accessories together has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal,
with petitioner- intervenors (march 1, ’96) Ammended information was filed to or a proclamation of a amnesty.
the Sandigan Bayan March 5-6, 1996, petitioner challenge the jurisdiction of
the Sandigan bayan to try the case citing RA 7975 Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws R.A. 8249 is
o said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where not penal law but a substantive law on jurisdiction
one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with • Penal Laws
Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief o acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. penalties for their violations or those that define crimes, treat of their
o The highest ranking principal accused in the amended information has nature, and provide dor their punishment
the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least • Procedural Statute:
SG 27. o prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all
• Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), Sandiganbayan kinds can properly administer justice
admitted the amended information and transferred the jurisdiction to the • Court has already ruled before that RA 7975 (the law which RA 8294
Quezon City-RTC since none of the principal accused were Chief- amended) which talks about Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal
superintendent or higher and other procedural matters is a procedural statute (Subido, Jr. v.
• May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a Sandiganbayan)
reconsideration • Being so retroactive application of RA 8294 is not unconstitutional since it is
• February 5, 1997 - RA 8294 was signed into law amendeing RA 7975 not a penal law
removing the word “principal” from “principal accused

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 • R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
prohibition Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: -xxx-
xxx-
Right to a two-tiered appeal (e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of
• Case at RTC first, its ruling can be appealed to 1) Sandiganbayan then after provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.
to the 2) Supreme Court
• right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated • “Other offenses or felonies....” covers Murder
by law • Murder must be in relation to their office
• mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included § People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been
in the prohibition against ex post facto laws committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately
• R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was
in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation between
to review questions of law.
the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged
• On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still in the informations
has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been § To prove that it is in relation to their office, facts must be alleged in the
convincing overcome. information which supports such conclusion. The allegation must not be
a conclusion of law
Equal Protection Claus – valid classification § In the information it was just stated that the murders were committed in
• There’s substantial distinction between cases whose trial has not yet relation to his office, no other facts support such statement.
commence and cases whose trial had already started as of the approval of § the phrase committed in relation to public office ( a conclusion of law) is
the law not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
• In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas § What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information
in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
examined witnesses and presented documents. accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public
On perceived bias against petitioner during committee hearing office.
• Petitioner contend that the law was directed against him
• Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed NOTE:
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the o Cases decided by the SB may be appealed to the SC
graft court o Cased decided by the RTC may be reviewed first by the CA before being
• Part of congress’s power of inquiry in aid of legislation reviewed by the SC
o But it must be noted that the CA may determine questions of fact, while the
One-title-one-subject rule SC, generally, may only rule upon questions of law
• emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its
jurisdiction
• The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered
as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because
such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.

MAIN ISSUE: JURISDICTION: RA 8249 APPLICABLE LAW— RTC

RA 8249 section 4: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in

all cases involving: -xxx-xxx-
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.

Relevant parts of subsection a:

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