VOL.

314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 603

Miranda vs. Aguirre

*
G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999.

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H.

AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R.
CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON.
EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local
Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.
BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela,
THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN
OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as
Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in
his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents,
GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

Constitutional Law; Statutes; It is now an ancient rule that

the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.—The
challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is
now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be
challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City
when he filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and
not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the
city council of Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the change
of status of the city of Santiago from independent component city
to a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will
be shown hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the
enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a
mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago
City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a
firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of
Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of
their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The
denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to
strike the law as unconstitutional.
_______________

* EN BANC.

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604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miranda vs. Aguirre

Same; Same; Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government.—The plea that this court back off from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that
it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea
has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as
including “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.” To be sure, the cut between a political and
justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases and
need no longer mystify us.
Same; Same; The petition at bar presents a justiciable issue.—
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue.
Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No.
8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-
evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a
legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by
Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose
questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that
this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of
the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Nelia P. Natividad for petitioners.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
     Aggabao & Sto. Domingo for intervenor.
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Miranda vs. Aguirre

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for

preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago,
Isabela from an independent component city to a
component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted
the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent
component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, 1 the
people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was
enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it
changed the status of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city, viz.:

“AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC

ACT NUMBERED 7720—AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT
COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO.
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
“SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby
amended by deleting the words “an independent”thereon so that
said Section will read as follows:

‘SEC. 2. The City of Santiago.—The Municipality of Santiago shall be

converted into a component city to be known as the City of Santiago,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present
territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial
jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of
the Municipality of Santiago.’

“Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended

deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the
following:

‘SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang

Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective

_______________

1 See Section 4 of R.A. No. 7720.

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606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miranda vs. Aguirre

Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela.—The voters of the City of

Santiago shall be qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial
Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other
elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such
qualified voter can be a candidate for such provincial positions and any
elective provincial office.’

“Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.—All existing laws or parts thereof

inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
“Sec. 4. Effectivity.—This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
“Approved.”
2
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.
They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No.
8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of
Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda
was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the
petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the
Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners
Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago
City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of
Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.
They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition
at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a political
question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for
the respondent public officials. The Solicitor General also
contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest.
More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528
merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent
component city to a component city. It allegedly did not
involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units,” hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary.

_______________

2 See Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.

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Miranda vs. Aguirre

A third Comment similar in tone 3

was submitted by
intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao,
4
a member of the
provincial board of Isabela. He contended that both the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do
not require a plebiscite “to approve a law that merely
allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial
elections. The rules implementing the Local Government
Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that
petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the
respondents and the intervenor. They defended their
standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit
the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners
cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the
constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will5
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when
he filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and
not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent
of the city council of Santiago City. It is also indubitable
that the change of status of the city of Santiago from
independent component city to a mere component city will
affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The
injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A.
No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere
generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago
City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests
on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the
city of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the
conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by
the COMELEC.

_______________

3 The intervention was granted on June 30, 1998.

4 After R.A. No. 8528 was enacted, COMELEC reallocated the seats for
the provincial board in Isabela. It added one (1) seat to the 4th district
where Santiago City belongs. The intervenor won the additional seat in
the May 11, 1998 elections.
5 Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976).

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Miranda vs. Aguirre

The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper
standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming
jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it
involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This
plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1
of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines
judicial power as including “the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.” To be
sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has
been made by this Court in many6 cases and need no longer
mystify us. In Tañada v. Cuenco, we held:

“x x x
“The term ‘political question’ connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers ‘to those
questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.’ It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.”
7
In Casibang v. Aquino, we defined a justiciable issue as
follows:

“A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally

demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such
right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said
breach of right.”

Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue.

Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or
disapprove R.A.

_______________

6 100 Phil. 1101 (1957).

7 92 SCRA 642 (1979).

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 VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 609
Miranda vs. Aguirre

No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought

to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the
said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or
not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements
of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can
decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate
arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution
need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is
unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the
conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city should be submitted to
its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the
Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution provides:

“No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”

This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10,

Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160),
thus:

“Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be

created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”

The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially

alter boundaries
8
of local government units belongs to
Congress. This power is part of the larger power to 9enact
laws which the Constitution vested in Congress. The
exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate
of the Consti-

_______________

8 Mendenilla v. Onandia, 115 Phil. 534 (1962).

9 Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

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Miranda vs. Aguirre

tution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the

downgrading of Santiago City from an independent
component city to a mere component city requires the
approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The
resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the
downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will
reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator—material change in
the political and economic rights of the local government
units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is
precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the
approval of the people “in the political units directly
affected.” It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of
this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution,
more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more
reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out
of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its
Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in
the past whereby local government units were created,
abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of
politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the
consent of the people of the local government unit directly
affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to
any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing,
abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local
government units. It is one instance where the people in
their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects
them—direct democracy of the people as opposed to
democracy thru people’s representatives. This plebiscite
requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to local government
units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of
the city of Santiago from an independent component city to
a component city are many and cannot be characterized as
insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a
political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be
placed
611
 VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 611
Miranda vs. Aguirre

under the administrative supervision of the provincial

governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council
of San-tiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial
Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city
will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners
pointed out these far reaching changes
10
on the life of the
people of the city of Santiago, viz.:

“Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that

R.A. No. 8528 had “merely re-classified” Santiago City from an
independent component city into a component city, the effect
when challenged (sic) the Act were operational would be, actually,
that of conversion. Consequently, there would be substantial
changes in the political culture and administrative
responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of Isabela.
Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to
the Province of Isabela, geographically, politically and
administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of Santiago City
will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela.
This will be to the benefit or advantage of the Provincial
Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of
its share from the internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the
National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area and
population of local government units, provinces included.
“The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by
the City Government, and which taxes shall accrue solely to the
City Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160),
and may be shared with the province such as taxes on sand,
gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160),
professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement
taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government
will allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would
be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations of the City
Government because of reduced shares of the IRA in accordance
with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of the R.A. No. 7160.
The City Government’s share in the proceeds in the development
and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain
portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292,
R.A. No. 7160).

_______________

10 Reply of Petitioners, pp. 7-9.

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Miranda vs. Aguirre

“The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be
voted as provincial officials (Sections 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No.
7160).
“The City Mayor will now be under the administrative
supervision of the Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to
ensure that every component city and municipality within the
territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 [b] [2] [i],
R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all
executive orders submitted by the former (Section 455 [b] [1] [xii],
R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the
local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 [b] [1]
[xx], R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials will also be effectively
under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No.
7160). Such will be the great change in the state of the political
autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A.
No. 7720, it is the Office of the President which has supervisory
authority over it as an independent component city (Section 25,
R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 [ARTICLE X], 1987 Constitution).
“The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468 [a] [1] [i], 468 [a] [2]
[vii], and 469 [c] [4], R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the decisions in
administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted
upon by the latter (Section 67, R.A. No. 7160).”

It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the

status of Santiago City from a municipality to an
independent component city, it required the approval of its
people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is
neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be
called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City
when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city.
Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a
law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6,
paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord
with the Constitution when it provides that:

“(f) Plebiscite—(1) no creation, conversion, division, merger,

abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall
take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite
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VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 613

Miranda vs. Aguirre

called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite
shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the
law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date.
“x x x.”

The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or

downward in character, so long as they result in a material
change in the local government unit directly affected,
especially a change in the political and economic rights of
its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed
brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the
ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter
of Santiago City. This power of amendment, however, is
limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite
clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation,
merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory. He also
contends that the amendment merely caused a transition
in the status of Santiago as a city. Allegedly, it is a
transition because no new city was created nor was a
former city dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above,
the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls
for the people of the local government unit directly affected
to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change
in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the
downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere
transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that
the transition will radically change its physical and
political configuration as well as the rights and
responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice
Mendoza, posits the theory that “only if the classification
involves changes in income, population, and land area of
the local government unit is there a need for such changes
to be approved by the people x x x.”
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against
the letter and spirit of Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution which, to repeat, states: “No province, city,
municipality,
 614

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miranda vs. Aguirre

or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or

its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.” It is clear
that the Constitution imposes two conditions—first, the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundary of a local government unit must
meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on
income, population and land area and second, the law must
be approved by the people “by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”
In accord with the Constitution, Sections 7, 8, and 9 of
the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and they
involve requirements on income, population and land area.
These requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the
economic viability of the local government unit concerned.
They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a
plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code
does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its
requirements on income, population and land area have
been satisfied. On the contrary, Section 10, Chapter 2 of
the Code provides: “No creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the
votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall
be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or
ordinance effecting such action, 11
unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date.” Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
the principal author of the Local Government Code of 12
1991,
opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory.

_______________

11 See also Rule II, Article 6, par. F(1) of the Implementing Rules of the
Local Government Code.
12 Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to National
Development, p. 36.

615
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Miranda vs. Aguirre

It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of

the Constitution have different purposes. The criteria fixed
by the Local Government Code on income, population and
land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose.
They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, Section
7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that
these “indicators shall be attested by the Department of
Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources.” In contrast, the people’s plebiscite
is required to achieve a political purpose—to use the
people’s voice as a check against the pernicious political
practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check
against this excess committed by the political
representatives of the people themselves than the exercise
of direct people power. As well-observed by one
commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries are “x x x basic to
local government, it is also imperative that these acts be
done not only by Congress but also be approved by the
inhabitants of the locality concerned. x x x By giving the
inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will also
eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize
legislative action designed for the benefit of a few
politicians. Hence,13 it promotes the autonomy of local
government units.”
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City
was opposed by certain segments of its people. In the
debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No.
8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to an
independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2)
years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of
14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the
sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as
there had been no significant change in its socio-economic-
political status. The only reason given for the downgrading
is to enable the people of the city to aspire for the
leadership of the province. To say the

_______________

13 Hector S. de Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, 1991 ed., p.

509.

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Miranda vs. Aguirre

least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is the

essence of an independent component city that its people
can no longer participate or be voted for in the election of
officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were
aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted to
be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an
attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government
to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people
via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to
be voted upon when a recess was called. After the recess,
the chairman of the Committee announced the withdrawal
of the amendment “after a very enlightening conversation 14
with the elders of the Body.” We quote the debates, viz.:

“BILL ON SECOND READING

H.B. No. 8729—City of Santiago

“Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House

Bill No. 8729 as reported out under Committee Report No. 971.
“The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being
none, the motion is approved.
“Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the
permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of
the bill without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text
thereof.
“The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, e