Virtues Natural Law
Virtues Natural Law
Virtues Natural Law
A virtue is a moral habit which generally results in the gaining or maintaining of your
values. Your values are based on your moral standard which should be your own life. Virtues are
pre-thought out methods for achieving your values. This means that with rational virtues, acting
virtuous leads to a happy and successful life.
Virtue, by definition, is the moral excellence of a person. Morally excellent people have a
character made-up of virtues valued as good. They are honest, respectful, courageous, forgiving,
and kind, for example. They do the right thing, and don’t bend to impulses, urges or desires, but
act according to values and principles. Some might say good qualities are innate, but we’re not
perfect. Virtues need to be cultivated to become more prevalent in life. With the habit of being
virtuous, we take the helm of our own life, redirecting its course towards greater happiness and
fulfillment.
Why be virtuous?
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle proposed that humans are social, rational animals
that seek to “live well.” To that end, he proposed a system of ethics designed to help us reach
eudaimonia, a world that means living well or flourishing.
Eudaimonia is reached by living virtuously and building up your character traits until you
don’t even have to think about your choices before making the right one.
Such a person will be happy, but not in the same way as a hedonistic person. They will
strive for self-improvement and will live their lives to the fullest. They will be the kind of person
that others want to be like. Above all else, they will flourish.
Temperance: The virtue between overindulgence and insensitivity. Aristotle would view the
person who never drinks just as harshly as the one who drinks too much.
Liberality: The virtue of charity, this is the golden mean between miserliness and giving more
than you can afford.
Magnificence: The virtue of living extravagantly. It rests between stinginess and vulgarity.
Aristotle sees no reason to be ascetic but also warns against being flashy.
Magnanimity: The virtue relating to pride, it is the midpoint between not giving yourself enough
credit and having delusions of grandeur. It is a given that you also have to act on this sense of
self-worth and strive for greatness.
Patience: This is the virtue that controls your temper. The patient person must neither get too
angry nor fail to get angry when they should.
Truthfulness: The virtue of honesty. Aristotle places it between the vices of habitual lying and
being tactless or boastful.
Wittiness: At the midpoint between buffoonery and boorishness, this is the virtue of a good sense
of humor.
Friendliness: While being friendly might not seem like a moral virtue, Aristotle claims friendship
is a vital part of a life well lived. This virtue lies between not being friendly at all and being too
friendly towards too many people.
Shame: The midpoint between being too shy and being shameless. The person who has the right
amount of shame will understand when they have committed a social or moral error but won’t
be too fearful not to risk them.
Justice: The virtue of dealing fairly with others. It lies between selfishness and selflessness. This
virtue can also be applied in different situations and has a whole chapter dedicated to the various
forms it can take.
NATURAL LAW
Aquinas is often described as a natural law theorist. While natural law is a significant aspect of
his moral philosophy, it is a subject of considerable dispute and misunderstanding. Of course, this
is not the place to adjudicate competing interpretations of Aquinas’s view. Yet recent
philosophers have noted that too many expositors distort Aquinas’s view by treating it
independently of his metaethics and his theory of virtue (see for example MacIntyre, 1990: 133-
135; Hibbs, 2001: 94). While a detailed analysis of natural law and its varying interpretations
would require a separate study, the present article hopes to sketch Aquinas’s view in a way that
is sensitive to other aspects of his thought.
What is the natural law? We might attempt to answer this question by considering both the
meaning of the term “law” as well as the law’s origin. On Aquinas’s view, a law is “a rule or
measure of human acts, whereby a person is induced to act or is restrained from acting” (ST IaIIae
90.1). Elsewhere, he describes a law as a “dictate of practical reason emanating from a ruler”
(ST IaIIae 91.1). At a very general level, then, a law is a precept that serves as a guide to and
measure of human action. Thus whether an action is good will depend on whether it conforms
to or abides by the relevant law. Here we should recall from an earlier section that, for Aquinas,
a human action is good or bad depending on whether it conforms to reason. In other
words, reason is the measure by which we evaluate human acts. Thus Aquinas thinks that the
laws that govern human action are expressive of reason itself (ST IaIIae 90.1).
Now we will address the law’s origin. According to Aquinas, every law is ultimately derived from
what he calls the eternal law (ST IaIIae 93.3). The “eternal law” refers to God’s providential
ordering of all created things to their proper end. We participate in that divine order in virtue of
the fact that God creates in us both a desire for and an ability to discern what is good (he calls
this ability the “light of natural reason”). According to Aquinas, “it is this participation in the
eternal law by the rational creature that is called the natural law” (ST IaIIae 91.2; Cf. 93.6). On
this view, natural law is but an extension of the eternal law. For by it God ordains us to final
happiness by implanting in us both a general knowledge of and inclination for goodness. Note
here that the natural law is not an external source of authority. Nor is it a general deontic norm
from which more specific precepts are inferred (McInerny, 1993: 211-212; Hibbs, 1988: 61-62).
As Aquinas understands it, the natural law is a fundamental principle that is weaved into the
fabric of our nature. As such, it illuminates and gives us a desire for those goods that facilitate
the kind of flourishing proper to human beings (ST IaIIae 94.3). This point deserves further
discussion.
According to Aquinas, human beings have an innate habit whereby they reason according to what
he calls “first principles.” First principles are fundamental to all inquiry. They include things like
the principle of non-contradiction and law of excluded middle. These principles are
indemonstrable in the sense that we do not acquire them from some prior demonstration. To
put the matter another way, they are not facts at which we arrive by means of argument or
reasoning. They are the principles from which all reasoning proceeds. And while we do not derive
them from some prior set of facts, a moment’s reflection would show that they nevertheless
provide the conditions for intelligible inquiry. In short, human reasoning does not establish the
truth of first principles, it depends on them.
The natural law functions in a way that is analogous to the aforementioned principles. According
to Aquinas, all human actions are governed by a general principle or precept that is foundational
to and necessary for all practical reasoning: good is to be done and evil is to be avoided. This
principle is not something we can ignore or defy. Rather, it is an expression of how practical
thought and action proceed in creatures such as ourselves. Whenever we deliberate about how
we should act, we do so by virtue of a natural inclination to pursue (or avoid) those goods (or
evils) that contribute to (or deter us from) our perfection as human beings. The goods for which
we have a natural inclination include life, the procreation and education of offspring, knowledge,
and a civil social order (ST IaIIae 94.2). Whether there are additional goods that are emblematic
of the natural law will depend on whether they in fact contribute to our rational perfection.
A caveat is in order. While we naturally desire goods that facilitate our perfection, excessive
passion, unreasonable fear, and self-interest can distort the way we construe those goods
(STIaIIae 94.6). For example, sexual pleasure is a natural good. Yet excessive passion can corrupt
our understanding of what sex’s role ought to be in our lives and lead us to pursue short-term
sexual pleasure at the expense of more enduring goods. Also, self-protection is a good to which
we naturally incline. Yet unreasonable fear may deter us from acting for the sake of goods that
trump personal safety. Poor upbringing and the prejudices of society can further undermine a
proper view of what human fulfillment consists in. Whether we can make competent judgments
about what will contribute to our proper fulfillment depends on whether we have the requisite
intellectual and moral virtues. Without those virtues, our intellectual and moral deficiencies will
forestall our rational perfection and the attainment of our final end.
KANTIAN ETHICS
German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was an opponent of utilitarianism. Leading
20th century proponent of Kantianism:
Basic Summary: Kant, believed that certain types of actions (including murder, theft, and lying)
were absolutely prohibited, even in cases where the action would bring about more happiness
than the alternative. For Kantians, there are two questions that we must ask ourselves whenever
we decide to act: (i) Can I rationally will that everyone act as I propose to act? If the answer is
no, then we must not perform the action. (ii) Does my action respect the goals of human beings
rather than merely using them for my own purposes? Again, if the answer is no, then we must
not perform the action. (Kant believed that these questions were equivalent).
Kant’s theory is an example of a deontological moral theory–according to these theories, the
rightness or wrongness of actions does not depend on their consequences but on whether they
fulfill our duty.
Kant believed that there was a supreme principle of morality, and he referred to it as The
Categorical Imperative. The CI determines what our moral duties are.
Morality and imperatives: What does it mean for one's duty to be determined by the categorical
imperative?
What is an imperative? An imperative is a command. So, "Pay your taxes!" is an imperative, as
are "Stop kicking me!" and "Don't kill animals!"
Hypothetical Imperatives: these imperatives command conditionally on your having a relevant
desire. E.g. “If you want to go to medical school, study biology in college.” If you don’t want to
go to medical school, this command doesn’t apply to you. Another example, your father says, "if
you are hungry, then go eat something!" - if you aren't hungry, then you are free to ignore the
command.
Categorical Imperatives: These command unconditionally. E.g. “Don’t cheat on your taxes.”
Even if you want to cheat and doing so would serve your interests, you may not cheat.
What is the connection between morality and categorical imperatives? Morality must be based
on the categorical imperative because morality is such that you are commanded by it, and is such
that you cannot opt out of it or claim that it does not apply to you.
How does the categorical imperative work? The categorical imperative has three different
formulations. That is to say, there are three different ways of saying what it is. Kant claims that
all three do in fact say the same thing, but it is currently disputed whether this is true. The second
formulation is the easiest to understand, but the first one is most clearly a categorical imperative.
Here is the first formulation.
1) First formulation (The Formula of Universal Law): "Act only on that maxim through which you
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [of nature]."
a) What is a maxim? A maxim is the rule or principle on which you act. For example, I might
make it my maxim to give at least as much to charity each year as I spend on eating out, or I might
make it my maxim only to do what will benefit some member of my family.
b) Basic idea: The command states, crudely, that you are not allowed to do anything yourself
that you would not be willing to allow everyone else to do as well. You are not allowed to make
exceptions for yourself. For example, if you expect other people to keep their promises, then
you are obligated to keep your own promises.
c) More detail: More accurately, it commands that every maxim you act on must be such that
you are willing to make it the case that everyone always act on that maxim when in a similar
situation. For example, if I wanted to lie to get something I wanted, I would have to be willing to
make it the case that everyone always lied to get what they wanted - but if this were to happen
no one would ever believe you, so the lie would not work and you would not get what you
wanted. So, if you willed that such a maxim (of lying) should become a universal law, then you
would thwart your goal - thus, it is impermissible to lie, according to the categorical imperative.
It is impermissible because the only way to lie is to make an exception for yourself.
Kant on Moral Worth
The Moral Worth of Persons: Kant also has something to say about what makes someone a good
person. Keep in mind that Kant intends this to go along with the rest of his theory, and what
one's duty is would be determined by the categorical imperative. However, one can treat this as
a separate theory to some extent, and consider that one's duty is determined by some other
standard. Keep in mind that what is said below has to do with how one evaluates people, not
actions. A person's actions are right or wrong, a person is morally worthy or lacks moral worth
(i.e., is morally base). A person's actions determine her moral worth, but there is more to this
than merely seeing if the actions are right or wrong.
a) Background concepts: This chart should help explain the basics.
b) The basic idea: Kant argues that a person is good or bad depending on the motivation of their
actions and not on the goodness of the consequences of those actions. By "motivation" I mean
what caused you to do the action (i.e., your reason for doing it). Kant argues that one can have
moral worth (i.e., be a good person) only if one is motivated by morality. In other words, if a
person's emotions or desires cause them to do something, then that action cannot give them
moral worth. This may sound odd, but there is good reason to agree with Kant.
c) Why motivation is what matters: Imagine that I win the lottery and I'm wondering what to do
with the money. I look around for what would be the most fun to do with it: buy a yacht, travel
in first class around the world, get that knee operation, etc.. I decide that what would be really
fun is to give the money to charity and to enjoy that special feeling you get from making people
happy, so I give all my lottery money away. According to Kant, I am not a morally worthy person
because I did this, after all I just did whatever I thought would be the most fun and there is
nothing admirable about such a selfish pursuit. It was just lucky for those charities that I thought
giving away money was fun. Moral worth only comes when you do something because you know
that it is your duty and you would do it regardless of whether you liked it.
d) Why consequences don't matter: A reason why Kant is not concerned with consequences can
be seen in the following example. Imagine two people out together drinking at a bar late one
night, and each of them decides to drive home very drunk. They drive in different directions
through the middle of nowhere. One of them encounters no one on the road, and so gets home
without incident regardless of totally reckless driving. The other drunk is not so lucky and
encounters someone walking at night, and kills the pedestrian with the car. Kant would argue
that based on these actions both drunks are equally bad, and the fact that one person got lucky
does not make them any better than the other drunk. After all, they both made the same choices,
and nothing within either one's control had anything to do with the difference in their actions.
The same reasoning applies to people who act for the right reasons. If both people act for the
right reasons, then both are morally worthy, even if the actions of one of them happen to lead
to bad consequences by bad luck.
e) The wrong interpretation: Consider the case described above about the lottery winner giving
to charity. Imagine that he gives to a charity and he intends to save hundreds of starving children
in a remote village. The food arrives in the village but a group of rebels finds out that they have
food, and they come to steal the food and end up killing all the children in the village and the
adults too. The intended consequence of feeding starving children was good, and the actual
consequences were bad. Kant is not saying that we should look at the intended consequences in
order to make a moral evaluation. Kant is claiming that regardless of intended or actual
consequences, moral worth is properly assessed by looking at the motivation of the action, which
may be selfish even if the intended consequences are good.
f) Kant does not forbid happiness: A careful reader may notice that in the example above one of
the selfish person's intended consequences is to make himself happy, and so it might seem to be
that intended consequences do matter. One might think Kant is claiming that if one of my
intentions is to make myself happy, that my action is not worthy. This is a mistake. The
consequence of making myself happy is a good consequence, even according to Kant. Kant
clearly thinks that people being happy is a good thing. There is nothing wrong with doing
something with an intended consequence of making yourself happy, that is not selfishness. You
can get moral worth doing things that you enjoy, but the reason you are doing them cannot be
that you enjoy them, the reason must be that they are required by duty. Also, there is a tendency
to think that Kant says it is always wrong to do something that just causes your own happiness,
like buying an ice cream cone. This is not the case. Kant thinks that you ought to do things to
make yourself happy as long as you make sure that they are not immoral (i.e., contrary to duty),
and that you would refrain from doing them if they were immoral. Getting ice cream is not
immoral, and so you can go ahead and do it. Doing it will not make you a morally worthy person,
but it won't make you a bad person either. Many actions which are permissible but not required
by duty are neutral in this way.
g) Summary: According to Kant a good person is someone who always does their duty because
it is their duty. It is fine if they enjoy doing it, but it must be the case that they would do it even
if they did not enjoy it. The overall theme is that to be a good person you must be good for
goodness sake.
A Problem for Kant’s Theory
Kant’s view is that lying is always wrong. His argument for this is summarized by James
Rachels as follows:
(1) We should do only those actions that conform to rules that we could will be adopted
universally.
(2) If we were to lie, we would be following the rule “It is permissible to lie.”
(3) This rule could not be adopted universally, because it would be self-defeating: people would
stop believing one another, and then it would do no good to lie
(4) Therefore, we should not lie.
The problem with this argument is that we can lie without simply following the rule “It is
permissible to lie.” Instead, we might be following a rule that pertains only to specific
circumstances, like “It is permissible to lie when doing so will save a life.” This rule can be made
a universal law without contradiction. After all, it is not as though people would stop believing
each other simply because it is known that people lie when doing so will save lives. For one thing,
that situation rarely comes up—people could still be telling the truth almost all of the time. Even
the taking of human life could be justified under certain circumstances. Take self-defense, for
example. There appears to be nothing problematic with the rule “It is permissible to kill when
doing so is the only available means of defense against an attacker”.
It is not necessary to interpret Kant’s theory as prohibiting lying in all circumstances (as
Kant did). Maxims (and the universal laws that result from them) can be specified in a way that
reflects all of the relevant features of the situation. Consider the case of the Inquiring Murderer
(as described in the text). Suppose that you are in that situation and you lie to the murderer.
Instead of understanding the universalized maxim as “Everyone Always lies” we can understand
it as “Everyone always lies in order to protect innocents from stalkers”. This maxim seems to
pass the test of the categorical imperative. Unfortunately, complicated maxims make Kant’s
theory becomes more difficult to understand and apply.