Doctrine Uk

Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30.
2
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30.2
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30.2 (JDP 0-30.2),
dated August 2017,
is promulgated
as directed by the Chiefs of Staff
Director Concepts and Doctrine
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JDP 0-30.2 i
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ii JDP 0-30.2, Change 1

Abstract
Purpose
1. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30.2, Unmanned Aircraft Systems guides

operational commanders and planning staff in understanding the terminology,
tasking and employment of the UK’s unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). You should
note that this Edition also includes Change 1 to make it clear that the UK operates UAS
in compliance with national and international law.
Context
2. Over the last five years, the UK military has gained considerable practical
experience in operating a number of different UAS. Reaper has flown over 70,000
hours on military operations over Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria while Watchkeeper was
brought into operational service in Afghanistan. At the same time, systems have
moved from urgent operational requirements, with uncertain long-term support, to
inclusion in the core equipment programme, thereby ensuring they will be properly
supported and updated over their service lifetime. Plans are also now in place to
conduct a high-altitude pseudo-satellite capability investigation using Zephyr and
to replace Reaper with Protector. Unmanned aircraft operations have been at the
leading edge of technology and doctrine development and thinking needs to keep
pace. This document delivers the underpinning doctrine by consolidating current
best practice on operating unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems.
Scope
3. JDP 0-30.2 describes, from a joint perspective, the use of UAS at the operational
level, while recognising that platform capability is provided by the individual
Services. JDP 0-30.2 includes UK and NATO terminology and definitions related to
the operation of unmanned aircraft, and describes how each aircraft type is classified
by size and capability. This publication updates much of the information previously
presented in Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/11, The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, which is now withdrawn. This JDP includes new detail on the UAS tasking
process and explains the need to consider not only the ‘collect’ task, but also the
process, exploit and disseminate (PED) functions. The conceptual elements of
JDN 2/11 have been removed and will, where appropriate, be included in the
forthcoming Joint Concept Note, Future Force Concept.1 Chapter 4 of this publication,
1 The Joint Concept Note, Future Force Concept is designed to build on the Development, Concepts
and Doctrine Centre’s Global Strategic Trends and Future Operating Environment publications and provide
broad guidance for command-level conceptual force and capability development. It is scheduled to be
published in the summer 2017.
JDP 0-30.2, Change 1 iii
covering the legal framework and moral and ethical issues, has been updated
to include detail on the UK’s position on using armed remotely piloted aircraft
and developing automated and autonomous platforms. It provides the key facts
and arguments that support how and why Her Majesty’s Government uses its
unmanned capability.
Audience
4. The guidance contained in this JDP is applicable to all joint and single-Service
personnel and civilians employed in duties relating to procuring, operating and
supporting unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems. The JDP may also
serve as a guide on UK military thinking to politicians, the media and the general
public as well as increasing transparency on UK unmanned and remotely piloted
aircraft capability and operation.
Structure
5. JDP 0-30.2 is divided into four chapters and two annexes.

• Chapter 1 – Introduction. This chapter describes the context for the UK’s
fleets of unmanned aircraft and outlines the questions and issues raised by
the widespread adoption of advanced unmanned aircraft.
• Chapter 2 – Terminology and classification. Outlining standard UK
terminology related to the use of unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft,
as well as some NATO agreed terms for comparison.
• Chapter 3 – Task, employ, counter. A chapter that describes how existing
manned aircraft doctrine, particularly at the operational level, applies
equally to unmanned aircraft. This chapter pulls together best practice
from UK operators, as well as recent ideas from NATO and the United States.
It makes the key point that, while the collect activity is important, how they
are tasked and how the collected data is subsequently exploited, are just as
important.
• Chapter 4 – Legal framework, moral and ethical issues. This chapter
provides an up-to-date UK military view of the legal framework under
which unmanned aircraft systems are operated. It describes the process
for conducting a legal review of a weapon system and considers moral
and ethical issues and counters some of the common arguments levelled
against the use of unmanned aircraft.
• Annex A – UK and NATO unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems.
This annex looks at the different unmanned aircraft systems operated by
the UK military and NATO as well as future platforms.
• Annex B – Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats analysis.
This annex presents an analysis table.
iv JDP 0-30.2, Change 1
Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Chapter 1 – Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 – Terminology and classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chapter 3 – Task, employ, counter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chapter 4 – Legal framework, moral and ethical issues . . . . . . . . . 37
Annex A – UK and NATO unmanned and remotely piloted

aircraft systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Annex B – Unmanned aircraft strengths, weaknesses,

opportunities, and threats analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Lexicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
JDP 0-30.2 v
Introduction
Chapter 1 describes the context for the UK’s fleets of

unmanned aircraft and how that will change over the
next ten years. It further outlines the questions and
issues originally raised by the widespread adoption of
advanced unmanned aircraft and how the experience
gained during that period has provided a firm basis on
which to take the capability forward with confidence. 1
Chapter 1
JDP 0-30.2
1
Introduction
“
The use of drones, or unmanned aerial
vehicles, has increased exponentially in the
1
last 10 years, and this trend is likely to
continue for the foreseeable future. But with
this increased use has come controversy,
in particular closer scrutiny of the legal and
ethical dimensions of the use of armed
drones.
The US Army War College, ”
Lethal and Legal? The ethics of drone strikes,
December 2015
2 JDP 0-30.2
Introduction
Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1. In 2010, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was still learning how best to operate its small
fleet of remotely piloted Reaper aircraft, controlled from Creech Air Force Base in the
Nevada desert, United States. The Royal Navy was experimenting with ScanEagle and
seeking funds to buy the capability. By comparison, the British Army’s unmanned
aircraft operations were relatively mature, based on extensive use of the Hermes
450 and Desert Hawk III across Afghanistan and Iraq – although the introduction of
Watchkeeper was still some way in the future. These systems were procured under
the urgent operational requirement process and the Defence Lines of Development1 1
needed to provide a complete capability were either weak, or absent. Although
system and capability development was rapid, understandably regulations and
standards lagged; very few early systems fully drew on, or fully complied with,
manned aircraft design, build or safety practices.
1.2. It was in this context that Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/11, The UK Approach to
Unmanned Aircraft Systems was published in 2011. JDN 2/11 had many purposes.
First it gathered existing unmanned aircraft doctrine, although there was very little
available, and developed new terminology. Secondly, it proposed concepts for how
unmanned aircraft might be used in future and highlighted the many associated
technical and legal issues. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, its intent was
to generate discussion and promote thinking amongst operators, academics and
interested parties.
1.3. JDN 2/11 was referenced by a number of organisations outside the Ministry
of Defence (MOD). An article in The Economist2 referenced it extensively, as have
academic articles, UK newspapers3 and other nations’ doctrine. It has also been
used to support debate on unmanned aircraft by the House of Commons Defence
Committee, which has since recommended that the JDN be updated. The JDN has
also been quoted on various ‘anti-drone’ websites indicating that it has reached a
wide audience.
1 The UK Ministry of Defence’s (MOD’s) Defence Lines of Development (DLoD) are arranged under the
following groupings: training; equipment; personnel; information; concepts and doctrine; organisation;
infrastructure; and logistics. Although not a DLoD in itself, interoperability is considered an intrinsic part
of the framework.
2 ‘Flight of the Drones’, The Economist, 8 October 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/21531433
3 For example, ‘The air force men who fly drones in Afghanistan by remote control’, The Daily Telegraph,
24 September 2012, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9552547/The-air-
force-men-who-fly-drones-in-Afghanistan-by-remote-control.html
JDP 0-30.2 3
Introduction
1.4. Much has happened in the six years since JDN 2/11 was published. The National
Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 20154 determined, post
Afghanistan, which unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and remotely piloted aircraft
systems (RPAS)5 would be taken into core funding and which would be discontinued.
Since then, announcements have been made that a new system, Zephyr, will be
bought and a fleet of more than 20 Protector aircraft will replace Reaper.
1.5. Barring unexpected developments, we now know the UK’s unmanned and
remotely piloted aircraft order of battle through to the early 2020s. The Army will
operate Desert Hawk III and Watchkeeper, with Black Hornet withdrawn from service
in 2017. The Royal Air Force (RAF) will continue to operate Reaper, until around
1 2020, when Protector will begin to replace it. The Royal Navy will end its contract
for ScanEagle operations in 2017, with alternative options being considered. A small
number of Zephyr aircraft have been bought and will be used to support a capability
investigation into high-altitude pseudo-satellites.
A soldier from the Royal Artillery prepares a Desert Hawk III for flight
4 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf
5 See Chapter 2 for a discussion on unmanned aircraft systems and remotely piloted aircraft systems
terminology usage and meaning.
4 JDP 0-30.2
Introduction
1.6. The last five years have seen much of the business of operating unmanned and
remotely piloted aircraft normalised. Reaper flights are now conducted from their
base at RAF Waddington and from Creech Air Force Base and considered routine
with over 70,000 hours flown. Watchkeeper is operated by 47 Regiment Royal
Artillery, based at Larkhill, and declared operational in Afghanistan in September
2014. ScanEagle routinely operates from Type 23 frigates and Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Cardigan Bay, conducting surveillance tasks for counter-terrorism, maritime security
and counter-drug operations in the Gulf and beyond. We have continued to develop
the doctrine, with the terminology defined in JDN 2/11 being widely accepted and
used. For small systems, tactical thinking has matured with considered tactics,
techniques and procedures in place with UK operators and across the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). For larger systems, experience has shown that they 1
are best tasked and employed in the same way as manned aircraft; the UK’s air and
space doctrine is as relevant for remotely piloted aircraft as it is for manned. Indeed,
in many cases they are considered equivalent capabilities.6 There are differences
though, and these are becoming more widely understood and appreciated as
familiarity and confidence grow as we use them more.
1.7. Significantly, many of the legal and ethical issues raised by JDN 2/11 have been
“
widely discussed. Unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft (although a platform
rather than a weapon) are subject to multiple legal reviews under
Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions before entering Similarly,
service and operate under the same political authority, command chain supervision, there is no
international humanitarian law and rules of engagement as manned aircraft. The evidence that
often-expressed fear that we would create a ‘PlayStation generation’ of operators, the availability
disconnected from the reality of their actions, has been shown to be without of remotely
foundation. Similarly, there is no evidence that the availability of remotely piloted piloted aircraft
aircraft has reduced the threshold for going to war. In fact, there is the heartening has reduced the
possibility that the availability of remotely piloted aircraft better enable compliance threshold for
with international humanitarian law during targeting and also increase the possibility going to war.
”
of taking action to support humanitarian missions that may have been considered
too risky previously.7 We have seen that remotely piloted aircraft crews are subject to
the same psychological stresses as manned aircraft crews. This is recognised within
command chains and appropriate mechanisms are in place to help manage them.
6 Tasking is discussed in Chapter 3, Section 2.

7 “UAVs do a better job in protecting civilians because they provide real-time pictures of situations as
they develop on the ground. You can act more quickly and more decisively.” United Nations Head of
Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous. Available at: http://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/
unmanned-aerial-vehicles-are-effective-protecting-civilians%E2%80%94herv%C3%A9-ladsous
JDP 0-30.2 5
Introduction
1.8. An early concern, voiced by some, was that RPAS originated weapon attacks
could lead to an increased number of civilian casualties. Experience shows that
RPAS operators may actually be better placed than manned aircraft in this respect.
The persistence of these aircraft means that crews can observe targets for long
periods before an attack and ensure that they are considerably more aware of the
detail of the target and its environment. Further, RPAS crews are not subjected
to the physiological demands and stresses of manned flight, resulting in less
fatigue. Additionally, access to legal and political advice throughout a sortie helps
to ensure that informed decisions are made to achieve the best outcome. Of the
UK’s unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft fleets, only Reaper is weaponised and
historically, more than 80% of Reaper missions have been tasked on intelligence,
1 surveillance and reconnaissance rather than strike. 8
‘If used in strict compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law,
remotely piloted aircraft are capable of reducing the risk of civilian casualties in armed
conflict by significantly improving the situational awareness of military commanders.’
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism8
September 2013
1.9. The context for unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft operations has evolved
over time, and this publication reflects that. It updates the information in JDN 2/11
and introduces new doctrine gathered from best practice in the UK, NATO and allied
nations. It is, though, primarily a doctrine document and reflects the normalisation
of unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft operations – the conceptual element of
JDN 2/11 is not included in this JDP. Many of the issues raised in JDN 2/11 have been
resolved and conceptual issues are better dealt with in other Development, Concepts
and Doctrine Centre documents9 where they can be placed in the appropriate
context.
8 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, A/68/389, 18 September 2013. This can be found
at http://unispal.un.org.
9 For example, Future Operating Environment 2035 and Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045, all available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/development-concepts-and-doctrine-centre
6 JDP 0-30.2
Introduction
Key points
• Early unmanned aircraft systems were bought under the urgent
operational requirement process; the supporting processes needed to
provide a complete capability were less comprehensive than normal, as
the procurement process was accelerated.
• At the tactical level, tactics, techniques and procedures developed
rapidly, but operational doctrine lagged behind systems’ operational use.
• The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review
2015 determined which systems would be core funded and which
discontinued.
1
• The UK unmanned aircraft system order of battle is known through to the
early 2020s, providing further opportunities to normalise their use.
• The last five years have seen much of the business of operating
unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft normalised.
• Earlier issues raised by some pressure groups surrounding the operating
ethos, legality, morals, and ethics of unmanned aircraft use have been
widely discussed.
• The Reaper remotely piloted aircraft is now tasked and employed in the
same way as its manned equivalent.
• The context for unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft operations has
evolved over time, and this publication reflects that.
JDP 0-30.2 7
Terminology and
classification
Chapter 2 outlines standard UK terminology related

to the use of unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft,
as well as some NATO agreed terms for comparison. It
details the Military Aviation Authority classification
system and shows how this is applied to current UK
systems. Finally, related terms are explained as well as
Chapter 2
a brief discussion of the importance of developing a 2

disciplined intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
tasking and delivery process.
Section 1 – Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Section 2 – Related terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Section 3 – Intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance terms . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Section 4 – Classification and regulation . . . . . . . . 18
JDP
JDP0-30.2
X-XX (X Edition)
9
Terminology and classification
2 “...the Committee also argued that the

MOD needed to rise to the challenge
of overcoming public suspicion
of RPAS and developing public
understanding of the capability.
House of Commons Library Briefing Paper,

Number 06493,
”
October 2015
10 JDP 0-30.2
Chapter 2 – Terminology
and classification
Section 1 – Terminology
2.1. This chapter covers UK terminology and describes the way that unmanned
aircraft are classified. Common alternatives used by other nations and organisations
are also described, as they may use the same terms but with a different meaning.
Terms related to unmanned aircraft operations are then detailed. Particular
care should be taken with the terms ‘automated’ and ‘autonomous’, which differ 2
considerably between countries and equipment manufacturers. The way the
UK defines these terms is important as they are tied to UK policy on the use of
autonomous weapons and our interpretation of international law.10
A Royal Air Force Reaper at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan
Standard terminology
2.2. The UK developed the term ‘remotely piloted’ in 2011 to emphasise the human
involvement in all critical decisions made during a mission. UK terminology was
developed in recognition of our operating procedures and regulations, which may
10 These terms are discussed further in Chapter 3.

JDP 0-30.2 11
differ from those used by other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations.
Current standard UK terminology is shown in Table 2.1.
Term UK definition11
An aircraft that does not carry a human operator, is operated remotely

Unmanned aircraft
using varying levels of automated functions, is normally recoverable, and
can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.12
Unmanned aircraft A system, whose components include the unmanned aircraft and all
system equipment, network and personnel necessary to control the unmanned
aircraft.
An aircraft that, whilst it does not carry a human operator, is flown

Remotely piloted
remotely by a pilot, is normally recoverable, and can carry a lethal or
aircraft
non-lethal payload.
2 The sum of the components required to deliver the overall capability
Remotely piloted and includes the pilot, sensor operators (if applicable), remotely piloted
aircraft system aircraft, ground control station, associated manpower and support
systems, satellite communication links and data links.
Table 2.1 – UK standard terminology
2.3. Although military personnel may tend to use the term unmanned to describe11
Class I and II platforms13 and remotely piloted to describe Class III, either term may
be encountered. The British Army and Royal Navy, which currently operate Class I
and II aircraft, prefer the term unmanned aircraft system (UAS), while the Royal Air
Force (RAF), which currently only operates Class III, prefers remotely piloted aircraft
system (RPAS). The Military Aviation Authority (MAA) refers to all classes as being
remotely piloted.
2.4. Unlike the UK, NATO has only agreed definitions for unmanned aircraft system
and remotely piloted aircraft. These are shown in Table 2.2, where it can be seen
that in NATO an unmanned aircraft system is broadly the same as in the UK, while
the remotely piloted aircraft definition is more to do with pilot qualifications. It
should be noted that in the United States, an unmanned aircraft ‘is capable of flight
with or without human remote control’,14 whereas the UK definition simply requires
remote operation.
11 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1, United Kingdom Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database,
8th Edition.
12 In the UK, cruise and ballistic missiles are not considered unmanned aircraft. The guiding rule is that
if a system is designed principally for warhead delivery and is not designed to be recoverable, then it is
not an unmanned aircraft.
13 See Table 2.5, page 18.
14 United States Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, February 2014.
12 JDP 0-30.2
Term NATO definition15
Unmanned aircraft A system whose components include the unmanned aircraft, the
system supporting network and all equipment and personnel necessary
to control the unmanned aircraft.
An unmanned aircraft that is controlled from a remote pilot

Remotely piloted aircraft station by a pilot who has been trained and certified to the same
standards as a pilot of a manned aircraft.
Table 2.2 – NATO standard terminology
Section 2 – Related terms 2
Other terms relevant to remotely piloted aircraft
2.5. As previously noted, it is important to understand the difference between15

automated and autonomous systems, particularly when talking to external agencies
and the media. The definitions, used by UK Armed Forces are shown below in
Table 2.3.
Term Definition
In the unmanned aircraft context, an automated or automatic
system is one that, in response to inputs from one or more
Automated system sensors, is programmed to logically follow a predefined set of
rules in order to provide an outcome. Knowing the set of rules
under which it is operating means that its output is predictable.
(JDP 0-01.1)
An autonomous system is capable of understanding higher-level

intent and direction. From this understanding and its perception
of its environment, such a system is able to take appropriate
action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of deciding
Autonomous system a course of action, from a number of alternatives, without
depending on human oversight and control, although these may
still be present. Although the overall activity of an autonomous
unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual actions may not
be. (JDP 0-30)
Table 2.3 – Automated and autonomous system definitions
15 Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2016.
JDP 0-30.2 13
2.6. For a number of years it has been common for unmanned and remotely piloted
aircraft to have automated functions. Examples of these might include take-off and
landing, height, speed or station keeping and automatic sensor operation. These
functions are designed to:
• reduce operator workload;
• increase reliability;
• increase capacity to control or monitor the most important elements of the
mission; and
• speed up decision-making.
Equipment manufacturers can use any terminology they wish in order to describe
their products and will often describe systems as autonomous even though the UK
military would consider them to be automated. Manufacturers’ and non-UK forces’
2 descriptions should always be checked to see exactly how the term is being used.
The UK does not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of
developing them. Such systems are not yet in existence and are not likely to be for
many years, if at all.
2.7. Remote and automated systems. The trend toward unmanned systems in
all three environments (maritime, land and air and space), together with increased
automation and the need to emphasise the presence of human control and oversight,
“
means that the terms ‘unmanned’ and ‘remotely piloted’ look dated as umbrella
terms for the capability. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre’s (DCDC’s)
For a number publication Future Operating Environment 203516 introduced the term ‘remote and
of years it has automated system’ as a concept that covered all physical operating environments.
been common ‘Remote’ and ‘automated’ capabilities are often taken to be interchangeable.
for unmanned However, an important distinction is that automated systems need not operate at
and remotely range, and remote capabilities need not be automated (they could be controlled, at
piloted aircraft a distance, by a human operator). While the term ‘remote and automated system’ is
to have generic, each environment has its own specific sub-classification. As an example, the
automated air environment would use the term remote and automated air system. Proposed
functions. definitions for these terms are shown in Table 2.4.
”
16 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-operating-environment-2035.
14 JDP 0-30.2
Term Proposed definition
A system comprising the platform, control and sensor equipment,

Remote and automated
the supporting network, information processing system and
system
associated personnel where the platform may be operated
remotely and/or have automated functionality.
Remote and automated A remote and automated system designed to operate in the air
air system environment.
Table 2.4 – Remote and automated terminology specific to the air environment
2.8. Visual line of sight. Visual line of sight is the maximum distance, with the
unaided eye, at which the aircraft pilot is able to safely operate the aircraft, while
maintaining the correct separation and collision avoidance from other aircraft 2
(manned or unmanned), persons, vessels, vehicles and structures. In the UK this
generally means the aircraft must remain within 500 metres horizontally and 400
feet17 vertically of the pilot.18 Note that a clear, unimpeded line of sight must be
maintained between operator and aircraft at all times. When operating in complex
terrain, such as the urban environment, these distances may be greatly reduced.
2.9. Sense and avoid. In manned flight, maintaining separation by visual means is
called ‘see and avoid’. When a remotely piloted aircraft is operated beyond visual
line of sight, the pilot is unable to comply with see and avoid rules. To overcome
this, sensor systems are being developed that provide an equivalent capability that
is known as ‘sense and avoid’. None of the current unmanned and remotely piloted
fleets have this capability, but it is expected that Protector will. An accredited sense
and avoid system should allow an unmanned or remotely piloted aircraft to access
the day-to-day national airspace structure.19
2.10. Segregated airspace. Where, and how, we can operate unmanned and remotely
piloted aircraft depends on a range of factors that include their class, sensor fit,
operating area and operating altitude. Without accredited sense and avoid systems,
aircraft must be operated either within visual line of sight of the operator, so that they
can obey the rules of the air or, if beyond visual line of sight, in segregated airspace.20
This is a block of airspace created specifically for unmanned and remotely piloted
aircraft operations and to which entry is strictly controlled.
17 Horizontal distance is measured in metres and height in feet.

18 See Civil Aviation Publication 722, Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in UK Airspace – Guidance.
19 During operations in military controlled airspace, the air component commander will determine the
airspace structure and operating rules which are promulgated through the airspace control order and
special instructions.
20 Royal Navy rules stipulate that unmanned aircraft systems must operate in Class G airspace and either
within segregated airspace, a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) area, or as detailed on the air tasking order (ATO).
JDP 0-30.2 15
2.11. Remote-split operations. Remote-split operations refer to the geographical

separation of the launch and recovery crew from the mission crew who, in turn,
employ the aircraft at a location other than where the aircraft is based.21 As an
example of remote-split operations, a RAF mission crew could be connected via
fibre-optic link to a satellite ground station in Germany that is connected, via satellite
link, to a Reaper launched from a base in the Mediterranean and which was employed
over the Middle East. This is illustrated at Figure 2.1. Due to the complicated and
expensive assured command and control networks required to enable remote-split
operations, few nations have this capability.
Satellite
Interface to external systems
2
UK or allied base
Terrestrial
links
Remotely piloted aircraft
Ground control station Satellite relay
Video
picture
Launch and recovery element Target
Ground forces
Aircraft sensor data Aircraft control data
Figure 2.1 – Remote-split operations illustrate the complexity of the command and data links
required for some remotely piloted aircraft system operations
21 As described in United States Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations,
February 2014.
16 JDP 0-30.2
2.12. Lost-link. Most aircraft will have a lost-link procedure that determines what
the aircraft will do following loss of the command or communication link.22 This
might involve circling or climbing above the current position to re-establish the link,
returning to the departure base or even flying in a safe direction or to a safe area so
that the aircraft can be subsequently recovered. All armed remotely piloted aircraft
have an assured lost-link procedure.
Section 3 – Intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance terms
Terms related to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks 2

2.13. An unmanned or remotely piloted aircraft is just one element of a much
broader intelligence system. For that reason, staff officers should be familiar
with the terminology and doctrine associated with intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) conducted within an intelligence cycle. The UK’s intelligence
and understanding doctrine is contained in JDP 2-00, Understanding and Intelligence
Support to Joint Operations.23 UK intelligence doctrine describes a coordinated cycle
of the following activities: direct, collect, process and disseminate (known as DCPD).
Within the context of ISR operations, NATO doctrine refines this to task, collect,
process, exploit and disseminate (TCPED)24 as shown in Figure 2.2. When TCPED
activities are carried out in a coordinated process as part of an intelligence cycle, they
are known as joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR).25 If any part of
the JISR process is not resourced, a nation cannot achieve effective ISR operations.
Task Collect Process Exploit Disseminate
Figure 2.2 – The joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance process
22 When talking to external agencies or the media, staff officers should be clear that lost-link does not
mean the aircraft is completely uncontrolled as the aircraft will fly using its own sensors. Normally, the
first response to lost-link will be for the aircraft to follow a flight path designed to help it re-establish the
link connection.
23 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jdp-2-00-understanding-and-
intelligence-support-to-joint-operations
24 Also used by United States forces.
25 See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-2.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance, Chapter 2.
JDP 0-30.2 17
2.14. The JISR provides the framework to synchronise and integrate intelligence
and operational requirements into collection requirements. These are then further
processed within the intelligence cycle to create the products required to meet the
commander’s objectives. This is described in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-2.7, Allied
Joint Doctrine for Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
2.15. JISR asset versus joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability.
A remotely piloted aircraft is an example of a JISR asset, which is defined as: an
individual, detachment, unit, sensor, or platform, which can be tasked by respective
authorities to achieve JISR results.26 It is not until supporting activities are brought
into play that it becomes a JISR capability. A JISR capability is defined as: an asset
supported by organizations, personnel, collectors systems, supporting infrastructure,
processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) processes and procedures to
achieve a designated JISR result.27
2
Section 4 – Classification and regulation
UK classification and regulation methodology
2.16. In the UK, the MAA regulates the operation of military manned, unmanned and
remotely piloted aircraft through a series of regulatory articles. Table 2.5 shows MAA
classification categories together with their NATO equivalent.28
Maximum take
NATO class Common taxonomy Starting MAA category
of weight
<200g Nano Class I(a)
Micro < 2kg Class I(b)

200g – 20kg Class I < 150kg
Mini 2 – 20kg Class I(c)
20kg – 150kg Small > 20kg Class I(d)
>150kg Class II 150kg – 600kg Tactical > 150kg Class II
>600kg Class III >600kg Male/Hale/Strike Class III
Table 2.5 – NATO class, common taxonomy and starting MAA category
26 AJP-2.7, Chapter 1, Section 1.4.
27 Ibid.
28 Taken from Regulatory Article 1600, Remotely Piloted Air Systems, Issue 4, page 12, dated 8 July 2016.
18 JDP 0-30.2
2.17. With the exception of Class I(a) aircraft, all unmanned and remotely piloted
aircraft are placed on the military register under the authority of the person
responsible for their military use. Unmanned aircraft in Class I(b) or I(c) are not
individually registered; instead, each aircraft type is given a one-off collective
military aircraft registration number. For Class I(d), II and III aircraft, each airframe
is registered separately.29 The MAA uses the term RPAS to describe all unmanned
aircraft regardless of class or function. The MAA regulatory article that governs each
aircraft type’s class is Regulatory Article 1600, Remotely Piloted Air Systems, where the
main criterion for classification is the potential risk to life that each platform presents
to third parties during operation. The primary factor that affects this is aircraft
maximum take-off weight (MTOW), which is then considered alongside other factors
such as where and how the aircraft will be operated.
2.18. The MAA regulations require aviation duty holders30 and accountable managers
(military flying) to be appointed for each aircraft type on the register. Their 2
duties include promulgating the criteria for the award, or recognition, of aircrew
qualifications. This means that to fly, or operate, a remotely piloted aircraft, aircrew
must have either an appropriate military flying badge or an approved remotely
piloted air system pilot/operator qualification.31 In addition, they must hold a valid
certificate of qualification on type. Questions arising over the operation, training
or support of remotely piloted aircraft should be directed to the relevant duty
holder. There are also different levels of duty holder – delivery, operating and senior.
Individual posts rather than organisations hold these positions.
29 Further detail in Regulatory Article 1120: Military aircraft registration.

30 Further detail on the duties of aviation duty holders is contained in Military Aviation Authority (MAA)
Regulatory Article 1020, Roles and responsibilities: aviation duty holder (ADH) and ADH-facing organisations.
31 Further detail in Regulatory Article 2101, Aircrew qualifications.
JDP 0-30.2 19
Key points
• UK military users tend to call Class I and Class II platforms unmanned aircraft
and Class III platforms remotely piloted aircraft.
• The MAA uses the term remotely piloted aircraft to describe all systems.
• Other countries and NATO have some different definitions to the UK.
• The terms ‘automated’ and ‘autonomous’ have specific meanings in the
UK, which have legal, command and moral implications. Other countries
and industry often have very different definitions or use the terms
interchangeably.
• A new generic term, remote and automated systems, may be more useful in
future.
2 • UAS and RPAS have associated specific terminology to describe them and
how they are operated.
• UAS and RPAS must be resourced and operated as coherent task, collect,
process, exploit and disseminate (TCPED) capabilities.
• UAS and RPAS ‘collect’, in isolation of effective, prioritised ‘tasking’ and the
enabling PED, will not produce effective ISR results.
• In NATO doctrine, adopted by the UK, the TCPED cycle is known as the joint
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance process or JISR.
• Unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems are classified by the UK
Military Aviation Authority (MAA) into Class I (with four sub-classes a,b,c,d)
and Class II and III.
• Classification is primarily determined by the aircraft’s take-off weight, which
is then considered alongside other factors such as where and how the aircraft
will be operated.
• The NATO classification system has the same classes as the UK, but only the
weight is used to determine classification.
20 JDP 0-30.2
Notes
JDP 0-30.2 21
Task, employ, counter
This chapter describes how existing manned aircraft

doctrine, particularly at the operational level, applies equally
to unmanned aircraft. Specific UK unmanned doctrine is still
developing and will continue to change as experience grows
and the battlespace changes. This chapter pulls together
best practice from UK operators, as well as recent ideas from
NATO and the United States. It makes the key point that,
while the collect activity is important, how it is tasked and
how the collected data is subsequently exploited are just
Chapter 3
as important. It finishes by looking at how to counter the

threat posed by an adversary’s unmanned aircraft.
Section 1 – Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Section 2 – UK doctrine and planning considerations . . 27
Section 3 – Countering unmanned and remotely

piloted aircraft systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
JDP X-XX
0-30.2(X Edition)
23
“ ...the effects we create with manned

and unmanned aircraft are essentially
3 the same, so remotely piloted air
systems change the way that we
deliver air power rather than its more
fundamental outputs or capabilities.
Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30,

UK Air and Space Doctrine
”
24 JDP 0-30.2
Chapter 3 – Task, employ,

counter
Section 1 – Introduction
3.1. Existing doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. Little published
operational doctrine is specific to unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems.
In general though, the principles of warfighting that apply to manned aircraft apply
equally to unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft. Planning and execution of
aircraft missions should, therefore, be in-line with the doctrinal guidance contained
in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine and other accepted
doctrine.32
3
3.2. Doctrine development. Small tactical systems, which are mainly used to support
the activities of the units flying them, are operated under rules that keep them clear
of other air users, removing the need for integration or coordination in most cases.
Such systems are operated using locally agreed tactics, techniques and procedures
rather than higher-level doctrine. More complex systems can either be tasked and
employed using existing manned aircraft procedures, or bespoke procedures that
support specific operations. Such arrangements tend to be captured in doctrine
slowly, or may be relevant only to a specific operation and, therefore, not formalised.
3.3. Operational-level doctrine. At the operational level, Allied Joint Publication

(AJP)–3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (Edition B) addressed
unmanned aircraft doctrine for the first time within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Detail in Edition B is limited, but should increase in the next
iteration, as NATO gains experience with its variant of the Global Hawk remotely
piloted aircraft, procured as part of the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)
programme.33
3.4. Tactical pocket guide. The NATO Joint Capability Group on Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles34 has developed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) UAS
32 For example, Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations,
Edition B and Air Publication (AP) 3002, Air and Space Warfare (3rd Edition).
33 A brief overview of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) is at
Annex A.
34 Many NATO nations use the terms unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aircraft systems in
preference to remotely piloted aircraft.
JDP 0-30.2 25
Tactical Pocket Guide shown at Figure 3.1 below. Despite its title, it will be useful to
operational-level staff.35
Figure 3.1 – Staff officers will find the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) UAS
Tactical Pocket Guide useful
35 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) UAS Tactical Pocket Guide is still in final draft and the
publication date is unknown.
26 JDP 0-30.2
3.5. Interoperability. The key doctrinal issue for unmanned and remotely piloted
aircraft systems is interoperability, the air platform should be considered as a part
of a broader intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) effort that must be
enabled by a sufficient level of interoperability to cue, and be cued by, other ‘collect’
and ‘process, exploit and disseminate’ (PED) capabilities. This collect capability itself
forms but one element of a larger intelligence cycle that starts with an information
or intelligence request36 and ends with a joint intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (JISR) result.37 Effective ISR operations will therefore only be possible
if the capability can be interoperable with its complementary tasking, processing,
exploitation and dissemination activities. Because there is no UK operational-level
doctrine for ISR, this JDP includes relevant detail, because understanding of this area
is central to exploiting unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems. At a national
level, this doctrine will be developed further either in a future UK ISR doctrine
publication, or as UK national elements to NATO’s AJP-2.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for
Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
Section 2 – UK doctrine and planning considerations3

3.6. Tasking mechanisms. Black Hornet is tasked and employed at the lowest
tactical level, within company and/or platoon formations. Desert Hawk III (DH3) is
deployed with tactical command given to supported formations and units for use
at that level. Although data from Class I aircraft is analysed and exploited locally in
real time, headquarters staff should be aware which Class I assets are in theatre and
where, and how, they are employed. Watchkeeper should not be tasked through the
normal air tasking order (ATO) process. Recent experience has shown that the tactical
employment of Watchkeeper requires flexibility and agility in the tasking process.
The inherent flexibility in the ATO allows changes at all stages of the plan, refine and
execute process. However, Watchkeeper operations may not be planned in the same
timeframe, or to the same level of detail as traditional manned assets, but should be
annotated on the ATO similar to other Land assigned assets (for example, aviation);
their details should be appended to the ATO for other users awareness.
36 Once an information or intelligence request has been refined to its essential elements that can be
individually answered, should information not already exist, the requirement can be developed into an
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) request. AJP-2.7 defines an ISR request (ISRR) as: a
formal request from the operations staff to initiate ISR collection, with a specified capability or asset to
support prioritized requirements for a specific mission. The ISRR is intended to deliver a Joint ISR result.
Although this term appears in AJP-2.7, it is still awaiting NATO agreed status.
37 AJP-2.7 defines a JISR result as: the outcome of the JISR process disseminated to the requester in the
requested format. Although this term appears in AJP-2.7, it is still awaiting NATO agreed status.
JDP 0-30.2 27
3.7. Remotely piloted aircraft considerations. As there are relatively few remotely
piloted aircraft available, they are often in high demand and the Joint Force
Commander and Joint Force Air Component Commander must make carefully
considered judgements on apportionment and allocation decisions. These must
aim to meet the needs of individual component commanders, while ensuring the Air
Component Commander can also satisfy joint tasks across the joint operating area.
Above all, commanders should be discouraged from requesting specific platforms;
they should submit requests for information through the intelligence requirements
management process. Where information is not already available, subsequent
collection requirements should specify the desired ISR effect, rather than seeking an
asset-based solution. The required support can often be provided by already planned
manned missions.
3.8. Intelligence/analysis issues. Specialist advice from the operational intelligence

(J2) community will be required to ensure that all components of the intelligence
cycle are in place, or planned for, so that unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and
remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS) capability can be fully exploited. This
3 may include the need to burden share analysis between different platforms and,
potentially, the wider intelligence community. Common to both communication
“
and intelligence functions will be difficulties caused by a lack of common systems
for aircraft control, sensor data processing and for intelligence and information
exchange. The lack of common interfaces and ground control stations means that
Data extracting raw or processed information from a system and making it available to
communication other analysts or users can be impossible in a useful timescale. In the worst case, the
links for only solution may be to manually export information from the originating system and
remotely
import it into another system across an air gap. This is particularly likely to happen
piloted
when transferring information between systems operating at different classification
aircraft tend
to be more levels, or between different alliance members. If the exporting and importing
complex and systems are not in the same geographical location, delays will occur until procedures
critical than and systems are in place for rapid transfer. It is incumbent on all future unmanned
for manned and remotely piloted programmes that interoperability is designed in, and resourced,
systems. at the earliest stages of capability development.
” 3.9. Communication link issues. Data communication links for remotely piloted
aircraft tend to be more complex and critical than for manned systems. Although
remotely piloted aircraft are programmed to carry out a range of flight manoeuvres if
control data is lost, including in extremis returning to base, they rely on a continuous
stream of communications to successfully complete each mission. Therefore,
communications security, specifically bandwidth protection, from both unintended
friendly interference38 and adversary action, is imperative.39 In remote areas with
38 Adapted from United States Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.
39 Different nations’ equipment may use common frequencies for different purposes which may lead to
mutual interference.
28 JDP 0-30.2
poor infrastructure, distributing collected data may be difficult and data use limited
initially to local exploitation. If planning indicates a requirement for RPAS, then early
input should be sought from communication and information systems (J6), or the
environmental equivalent, to ensure provision is made for assured and adequate
“
Aircraft
sensors
generate very
communication systems. large amounts
of data and
3.10. High-latitude operations. High latitude geographical areas may have limited it is easy for
satellite communications coverage or restricted bandwidth availability, making one system’s
Class III aircraft operations difficult in these areas. Again, if planning for operations analysts to be
away from familiar areas, communications planning advice should be sought from a overwhelmed
communication and information systems (J6) specialist. while
another’s may
be underused.
”
3.11. Data volumes and analysis sharing. Aircraft sensors generate very large
amounts of data and it is easy for one system’s analysts to be overwhelmed
while another’s may be underused. Procedures aimed at pooling such resources,
particularly when they are geographically separated, are immature and may need
to be developed on a case-by-case basis. To optimise opportunities for greater PED
burden sharing, future Class II and Class III programmes should ensure that all sensor 3
data outputs are compliant with the relevant standardization agreement (STANAG).40
3.12. Long duration flights and coordination. The ATO was designed around the
operating cycle and flight times of manned aircraft. Very-long duration remotely
piloted aircraft sorties may lead to coordination issues if they take place across
several air planning cycles, including the ATO, which have not yet been agreed and
promulgated. Long duration sorties are also more likely to service the requirements
of several different tasking authorities, which will require additional planning, and
coordination beyond the current ATO process. Clear procedures should be agreed
for transferring authority or control. Full use should be made of the ability to add
amplifying coordination and command instructions in the special instructions (SPINS)
that accompany the ATO. These principles equally apply to the reconnaissance,
surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) annex, which provides tasking to RPAS
sensor operators, and the PED tasking order for the assigned intelligence analysts.
40 A standardization agreement (STANAG) is defined as: a NATO standardization document that

specifies the agreement of member nations to implement a standard, in whole or in part, with or without
reservation, in order to meet an interoperability requirement. Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06,
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2016.
JDP 0-30.2 29
3 Zephyr can fly for two weeks and will require extra coordination across air tasking order
cycles and between tasking authorities
3.13. Complex multi-unit operations and coordination. In complex air scenarios the
mix of friendly, adversary and neutral aircraft, both manned and unmanned, together
with any mission constraints in place, will require the Joint Force Commander to
strictly control air battlespace management to maximise each aircraft’s freedom to
operate. Adherence to the ATO, airspace control order (ACO) and SPINS by remotely
piloted aircraft will be paramount in order to maintain safe operations. In such
circumstances, the Air Component Commander may elect to augment theatre-based
air system elements with additional planning personnel and training. In particular,
either a remotely piloted aircraft subject matter expert or a liaison officer can
facilitate the flow of information between operators and supported units, ensuring
the supported units best understand the system’s capabilities and how to get the
most out of them. Additionally, sensitive tasks might require specialist political,
legal and operating advice before and during a mission. Headquarters staff should
consider how this advice would be coordinated so that it is consistent between the
operators and the headquarters.
3.14. Weather. Weather can be a major factor in planning successful unmanned and
remotely piloted aircraft missions. Planners may have to consider the weather at
several geographically disparate locations, including satellite ground stations, the
launch and recovery element, 41 en route transit and the operating area (including
potential diversion airfields and or lost-link recovery areas). In addition, space
41 Detailed localised meteorological information for launch and recovery operations is vital.
30 JDP 0-30.2
weather, including sun activity, will affect high frequency, ultra-high frequency and
satellite communication links as well as global positioning system availability and
accuracy. Access to a reliable forecasting and weather distribution system should be
established before operations commence.
3.15. Emergency planning. Detailed contingency planning is required to allow for

lost-link events. It should include actions to be taken in the event of lost control
links, lost sensor links and loss of Global Positioning System (GPS) derived position,
navigation and timing signals, which may be required for operation of the aircraft.
Pre-programmed recovery profiles must be safe and consistent with the guidance
in the ACO and avoid other airspace users detailed in the ATO. De-confliction and
safety are key priorities. Diversion requires careful thought as the diversion airfield
must have compatible launch and recovery systems and, potentially, handle armed
aircraft. If no suitable diversion airfields are available, consideration should be given
to recovery areas controlled by friendly forces so that sensitive equipment or data can
be recovered after landing.
3.16. Logistics considerations. For tactical UAS, the entire capability will deploy 3
forward including pilots, sensor operators, image analysts and maintainers. For
RPAS, with only maintenance personnel and a launch and recovery element in
theatre, there will be a reduced forward logistics footprint. This has the advantage
of reducing the load on in-theatre life-support systems allowing rapid deployment
and redeployment. From a force protection perspective, keeping the main body of
“
operators, analysts and other support personnel to the rear, exposes fewer personnel
to enemy action. Overall though, the number of personnel required, rear and
forward, is likely to be the same as, or greater than, that for manned systems. Weather can
be a major
3.17. Contractor support to operations. Unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft factor in planning
operations frequently use contractor support to operations (CSO). Common roles for successful
contractors include: unmanned
and remotely
• aircraft transportation; piloted aircraft
• assembly and disassembly; missions.
”
• maintenance and launch; and
• recovery duties.
Operational planners should liaise with logistics staff (J4) to determine the likely
contractor footprint in theatre and also determine any constraints to their use. This
may include contractors’ legal status in theatre and the MOD’s liability to them for
issues such as force protection and providing medical support. They should also be
aware that contractors may be directly participating in hostilities, not have combatant
status and be required to have training in the Law of Armed Conflict.42
42 Relevant UK doctrine for logistics support is contained in JDP 4-00, Logistics for Joint Operations.
JDP 0-30.2 31
3
In-theatre civilian contractors unload a Reaper from its transit container
3.18. Stress and trauma. Personnel operating tactical UAS will be deployed forward
and will conform, where possible, with promulgated harmony guidelines.43 Stress and
trauma issues will be dealt with in the same way as for the other forward deployed
forces that they are working alongside. Rear-based RPAS crews operate somewhat
differently to their manned equivalents, whose time on operations is also managed
by harmony guidelines. RPAS crews’ only break from operations during a three year
tour might be leave or essential courses. Operating from a home base introduces
unique stressors as crews balance work and family life. While United States Air Force
studies show that unmanned crews seem to suffer no more stress-related incidents
than manned crews, 44 supervisors should monitor personnel carefully for indications
of stress and fatigue. Fatigue in itself can exacerbate most other stresses and must be
mitigated wherever predictable; this includes the diligent setting of, and adherence
to, shift work schedules. Supervisory chains should also ensure that normal Trauma
Risk Management (TRiM) processes are in place.
43 Harmony guidelines are intended to strike a balance between time at work and time at home.
44 See Chapter 4, paragraph 4.24.
32 JDP 0-30.2
Section 3 – Countering unmanned and remotely

piloted aircraft systems
3.19. Potential adversaries are also developing highly capable unmanned aircraft in
all classification categories. Both Class I and Class II friendly and enemy unmanned
aircraft present a detection challenge to air defence systems, as many have a low
radar cross-section and fly at relatively slow speeds. This makes them hard to detect
on radar systems optimised to detect manned aircraft or missiles approaching at
high speed. Since not all friendly unmanned aircraft carry identification, friend or
foe capability, it is very important that they follow promulgated airspace control
and air defence identification procedures to prevent friendly fire incidents. Class
I and II aircraft can be difficult to detect visually; smaller systems are hard to see
from a distance of more than around 400 metres, or less, depending on whether
the background is clear sky, cloud or terrain. These systems can also be inaudible
at a range of as little as 40 metres, depending on wind direction and ambient noise 3
levels. Since their sensor range is potentially greater than either of these figures, it
is possible for hostile aircraft to monitor friendly activity without being noticed by
ground personnel. Raising awareness of the threat can be difficult, as ground troops
will expect to hear the background noise of manned and unmanned aircraft, and to
see them overhead, as a regular activity. The appearance of an adversary in these
conditions is unlikely to be noticed as unusual.
3.20. Passive and active countermeasures. In most cases, the problem of enemy
unmanned aircraft can be treated as a force protection issue similar to that posed by
manned missions. If a threat assessment indicates it is necessary, standard tactical
measures such as concealment and camouflage should be implemented. The UK has
adopted AJP-3.14, Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection (with UK national elements).
Force protection specialists will advise on available measures for any particular
theatre of operations. Once detected, slow moving unmanned aircraft are relatively
easy targets for ground and helicopter weapons; control measures should consider
how to avoid restricting their ability to engage. Other active countermeasures are in
their infancy, but Defence contractors are developing technical solutions that could
deny data links or damage sensors used by unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft.
Friendly, unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft can be used to increase situational
awareness around an operating base or forward patrol and to identify potential
enemy launch and operating positions.
JDP 0-30.2 33
Key points
• Class I and most Class II missions are conducted at the tactical level and tasked
directly by the operating unit or supported commander.
• Some Class II and all Class III missions are best tasked using standard air tasking
procedures.
• AJP-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) UAS Tactical Pocket Guide provide the NATO
perspective, while Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air
Operations describes United States joint doctrine.
• Effective ISR operations will only be possible if the capability can be
interoperable with its complementary tasking, processing, exploitation and
dissemination activities.
• The task, process, exploit and disseminate elements of the JISR process are just
as important as collect.
• Assured data links with sufficient bandwidth are essential to some Class II and
3 all Class III missions.
• The use of UAS/RPAS subject matter experts or liaison officers will enable the
capabilities of these systems to be understood more easily and result in more
effective planning.
• Emergency procedures for Class II and III operations need careful thought.
• Weather can more adversely affect unmanned and remotely piloted missions
than it will for manned missions.
• Force protection from hard-to-detect enemy UAS is paramount. This is
achieved, initially, through passive countermeasures.
• All arms air defence can contribute to the destruction of enemy unmanned
aircraft and control orders should maximise opportunities for this.
34 JDP 0-30.2
Notes
JDP 0-30.2 35
Legal framework,
moral and ethical
issues
This chapter provides an up-to-date UK military view

of the legal framework under which such systems are
operated. It describes the process for conducting a
legal review of a weapons system and discusses how the
Chapter 4
UK opposes the development of armed autonomous

systems. The second half of the chapter considers moral
and ethical issues and counters some of the common
arguments levelled against the use of unmanned aircraft.
Section 1 – Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Section 2 – Legal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Section 3 – Moral and ethical issues . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Section 4 – Commonly presented arguments

against the use of ‘drones’ and factual
responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
JDP 0-30.2
37
Legal framework, moral and ethical issues
“
The need for transparency and
compliance with the legal, moral
and ethical principles that uphold
the legitimacy of the employment
4 of force will guide and limit the
scope of future air and space
operations.
Joint Concept Note 3/12,

Future Air and Space Operating Concept
”
38 JDP 0-30.2
Chapter 4 – Legal framework,

moral and ethical issues
Section 1 – Introduction
4.1. Despite best efforts by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to explain why and
how unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are used, some, often vocal, opposition
continues. Given that manned aircraft regularly conduct, without issue, all of
the tasks undertaken by remotely piloted aircraft, this can seem illogical to the
military user. Arguments against using unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft
are centred on worries that systems will be misused, or used illegally. But such
concerns are not unique to UAS, and the use of armed force - whether delivered by
manned or unmanned systems – will always be consistent with the UK’s national
and international legal rights and obligations.45 However remotely piloted aircraft
activities are, in fact, closely scrutinised, simply because of the way they work, with
in-mission and often post-mission analysis of all activities undertaken. All missions,
including attack, are conducted under exactly the same rules of engagement and
legal authority as manned missions.
4.2. There is a further concern that weapon delivery from a distance would leave
operators mentally divorced from the consequences of their actions. In reality,
remotely piloted aircraft operators can be far more aware of the consequences of
their actions than their manned equivalent, since they will often remain on task after
any weapon is fired to conduct damage assessment and to continue their mission.
Additionally, there is an argument that these aircraft make conflict unfair or too one-
sided. This is hard to understand from a military viewpoint; a fundamental tenet of
Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine is to seek an asymmetric
advantage against any adversary. The concept of deliberately putting personnel in
harm’s way may be indefensible to the Government, the public and our Armed Forces
and their families when an equivalent effect could be achieved remotely.
4.3. All military and civilian personnel who work in areas associated with procuring,
tasking, operating or supporting unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems
should be aware of the legality of such systems. In particular, the legal basis for
their use should be understood and considered and where appropriate their use
45 Attorney General’s Speech at International Institute for Strategic Studies: The modern law of self-
defence 11 January 2017 available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/583171/170111_Imminence_Speech_.pdf
JDP 0-30.2, Change 1 39
explained and justified. The UK has a balanced and informed position regarding its
employment of unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems.46
Section 2 – Legal framework

4.4. Unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems are operated in accordance
with the same domestic and international legal framework (including international
humanitarian and international human rights law) that regulates conventional
manned aircraft, other weapons and other means or methods of warfare.
4.5. Weapon reviews. Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions

requires states to determine whether new weapons, means and methods of warfare
may be lawfully employed under international law. The UK ratified Additional
Protocol 1 in 1998. Article 36 weapon reviews ensure that commanders, military
personnel, politicians, the UK public and our allies can be assured that UK weapons
are lawful. UK weapon reviews are undertaken by Service lawyers with operational
experience on the staff of the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).
The UK weapon review process has been published by DCDC.47
4
4.6. Means or method of warfare. The expression ‘means or method of warfare’
includes weapons in the broader sense of the word but it also includes ways in which
weapons are used and warfare conducted. For example, this may include data links
and software used for processing target data in a platform such as a remotely piloted
aircraft system. Whilst an unarmed remotely piloted aircraft may not be a weapon
per se, because weapons systems are a connected and integral part of the platform, a
weapon review would still be undertaken.
4.7. Article 36 and new technologies. Article 36 requires new technologies to be

assessed against all relevant rules of international law. While the text of relevant
treaties and rules of customary law are applied, DCDC lawyers also take into account
secondary sources, including relevant International Committee of the Red Cross
commentary, academic and scholarly publications and reports and investigations
together with the UK’s own reservations, its own interpretations and records of
negotiation.
4.8. Foreign sourced equipment. Where the UK seeks to acquire equipment that is
already in service with the armed forces of another state, even though that state may
46 Other states have different interpretations of international law and different practices for their armed
forces and agencies.
47 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/507319/20160308-UK_weapon_reviews.pdf.
40 JDP 0-30.2
have conducted its own weapon review, the UK still conducts its own comprehensive
legal review.
4.9. Weapon review information requirements. Service lawyers undertaking

weapon reviews of remotely piloted aircraft under Article 36 will need comprehensive
information on what data is, or is not, presented to the mission crew, to understand
the level of situational awareness that can be achieved together with full disclosure
of information on the platform and its weapons such as the technical design
specifications, statements of intended use and results of performance tests. Although
a remotely piloted aircraft will respond to commands in the same way as any manned
aircraft, any system-induced delays between control input, aircraft response and
feedback to the pilot will need to be quantified and understood. A remotely piloted
aircraft with an automated control system that is designed to reduce pilot workload,
so that it is monitored48 rather than being directly controlled, may well react rapidly
to self-generated inputs, but the operator will be less aware of what the platform
is doing on a real-time basis. These factors, and others, are all considered during a
weapon review.
4.10. System of systems issues. Remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) are even
more reliant on a ‘system of systems’ approach than manned aircraft. Each element
of the system that delivers the end capability has to work before, during and after 4
a mission if the aircraft is to be controlled effectively. There are, therefore, many
more safety critical elements relevant to the operation of a remotely piloted aircraft
system.49 For example, a communications link that was only mission critical for a
manned system may well be a safety critical issue for a remotely piloted aircraft, as
it may provide a legally acceptable fail-safe mechanism. This will be considered by
Service lawyers when conducting a weapon review.
4.11. During operations. Where a weapon is to be used in an armed conflict, the Law
of Armed Conflict (LOAC) requires that our UK Armed Forces operate in accordance
with the principles of humanity, proportionality, military necessity and ensuring that
only appropriate military targets are selected. The same strict rules of engagement
that govern use of conventional military aircraft also apply to RPAS and targets must
always be positively identified as legitimate military objectives. One advantage of
RPAS is they can provide better, more accurate intelligence to facilitate targeted
decision-making.
4.12. Pre-attack activity. Before an attack is cued by Watchkeeper or executed using

a remotely piloted aircraft, targets must be verified as military objectives. All feasible
48 So called on-the-loop rather than in-the-loop.

49 Although this view could be considered over-simplistic when comparisons are made with some
modern aircraft that require inputs from ground-based planning and maintenance systems if they are to
be effective.
JDP 0-30.2 41
precautions must be taken to minimise civilian losses and attacks must not cause
disproportionate incidental losses. This process is the same as for a manned aircraft.
4.13. Additional information. The official UK position on the LOAC is contained

in Joint Service Publication (JSP) 383, The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed
“
Conflict, and guidance on rules of engagement in JSP 398, United Kingdom Manual of
National Rules of Engagement. JSP 900, United Kingdom Joint Targeting Policy should
also be considered.
There is
inaccurate
reporting 4.14. Automation and autonomy. There is inaccurate reporting and misleading
and misleading debate about the meaning of automated and autonomous in relation to weapons
debate about systems. The UK military definitions are explained in Chapter 2; however, many
the meaning alternatives will be found in the media, academic literature and industry. It is
of automated worth remembering that an automated weapon system is capable of carrying out
and autonomous complicated tasks but is incapable of complex decision-making.50 The limitation
in relation in such complex decision-making is the development of appropriate algorithms.
to weapons Notwithstanding such limitations, there is no doubt that automated weapons
systems. systems are becoming more complex and sophisticated. Current UK policy is that
”
the operation of our weapons will always be under human control as an absolute
guarantee of human oversight and authority and of accountability for weapon usage.
4 This information has been put on record a number of times, both in parliament
and international forums.51 Although a limited number of defensive systems can
currently operate in automatic mode, there is always a person involved in setting the
parameters of any such mode.
4.15. Existing automated systems. Some automated weapon systems such as Phalanx
entered service in the 1980s. For such systems, the required timeliness of response
can make compliance with the LOAC easier to demonstrate if it can be clearly shown
that there is insufficient time for a human initiated response to counter incoming fire.
For example, Phalanx and a development of it called Counter-Rocket, Artillery and
Mortar (C-RAM) have automatic modes that are designed only to destroy incoming
rockets in self-defence, using self-destruct rounds, within very limited parameters.
4.16. Future development. While some companies and research organisations are
trying to develop autonomous systems, the UK’s view is that increasing automation,
not autonomy, is required to improve capability. Potential improved capabilities that
could be made through increased automation include greater assistance to pilots and
operators, and in-system survivability in non-permissive, contested and congested
50 Birmingham Policy Commission, The Security Impact of Drones: Challenges and Opportunities for the UK,
page 66. Available at http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/research/policycommission/remote-
warfare/final-report-october-2014.pdf
51 Overseas Conflict: Explosive Weapons, available at http://www.theyworkforyou.com/
wrans/?id=2014-02-24a.221.0&s=explosive+weapons
42 JDP 0-30.2
battlespace. For example, a mission may require a remotely piloted aircraft to

carry out surveillance or monitoring of a given area, looking for a particular target
type, before reporting contacts to a supervisor when found. A human-authorised
subsequent attack would be no different to that by a manned aircraft and would
be fully compliant with the LOAC, provided the human believed that, based on
the information available, the attack met LOAC requirements and extant rules of
engagement.
4.17. Autonomous development. Fully autonomous weapons systems as we describe

them (machines with the ability to understand higher-level intent, being capable
of deciding a course of action without depending on human oversight and control)
currently do not exist and are unlikely in the near future. Commanders and politicians
are also highly unlikely to want fully autonomous systems as this could both impede
and limit their decision-making both strategically and on the battlefield. The growing
recognition that narratives and information are of increasing importance further
underlines this reluctance to hand control of lethal force to autonomous systems
– no matter how sophisticated they may become. The MOD, with the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO), is currently engaged in discussions on autonomous
weapons systems at the United Nations (UN) Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons. We believe that building improved understanding at the international level
is important for an informed debate on the issues. 4
4.18. UK policy. It is clear from the information above that the UK does not possess
“
armed autonomous aircraft systems and it has no intention to develop them. The
UK Government’s policy is clear that the operation of UK weapons will always be
under human control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight, authority and
accountability. Whilst weapon systems may operate in automatic modes there is ...the UK
always a person involved in setting appropriate parameters.52
does not
possess armed
autonomous
4.19. Accountability. Civil and criminal legal responsibility for any military activity
aircraft
may lie with the government, the chain of command and with the last person to systems and it
issue the command authorising a specific activity. This assumes that a system’s basic has no intention
principles of operation have, as part of its release to service, already been shown to to develop
be lawful, but that the individual giving orders for use will ensure its continued lawful them.
”
employment throughout any task. This process has an implicit assumption that a
system will continue to behave in a predictable manner after commands are issued;
clearly this becomes problematical as systems become more complex and operate
for extended periods and the need for ongoing testing and assessment becomes
important. In reality, predictability is likely to be inversely proportional to mission
and environmental complexity. For long-endurance missions engaged in complex
52 UK delegation statement to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons

Systems, Geneva, April 2015.
JDP 0-30.2 43
“
scenarios, the authorised entity that holds legal responsibility will be required to
exercise some level of supervision throughout. If so, this implies that any fielded
New military system employing weapons will have to maintain a two-way data link 53 between the
regulations were aircraft and its controlling authority.
published in
2015 by the
4.20. Current civilian and military guidance. Current guidance for civil aviation is laid
MAA, which
down in Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 722, Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in
recognised
the broad range UK Airspace – Guidance54 and for military aviation in the Military Aviation Authority
of remotely (MAA) Regulatory Article 1000 series. New military regulations were published in
piloted aircraft 2015 by the MAA, which recognised the broad range of remotely piloted aircraft types
types and the and the appropriate level of regulation for each of them. These can be expected to
appropriate change over time to reflect technological developments, particularly as sense and
level of avoid systems approach maturity. The MOD’s capability areas and integrated project
regulation for teams need to ensure that the specification for new systems remains flexible enough
each of them. to accommodate such changes.
” 4.21. Airworthiness standards. New manned aircraft are being built to well-defined
European Aviation Safety Agency airworthiness standards. This is to both protect
the crew/passengers of the aircraft and minimise third-party risk to people on the
ground in the event of an accident. As there are no requirements to protect crew or
4 passengers, few remotely piloted aircraft to date55 have been built to any defined
airworthiness standard, mostly being operated under a limited clearance. Whilst
this may explain the different build standards, it does not address the question
of minimising third-party risks on the ground. If unmanned and remotely piloted
aircraft systems are to be integrated into civil unsegregated airspace, then it must be
proven that they are at least as safe as manned aircraft and that the third-party risk is
mitigated as much as possible.
4.22. Export of remotely piloted aircraft system technology. Export licence

applications for all remotely piloted aircraft systems are assessed by the
Government on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and National
Arms Export Licensing Criteria (the Consolidated Criteria). Included within this
criteria is assessment against the requirement to comply with the UK’s international
commitments; principally in the case of remotely piloted aircraft systems, the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR); and the Wassenaar Arrangement.56 Although
missile focused, the MTCR limits the export of unmanned and remotely piloted
53 Although this link may not need to be continuous.

54 Civil Aviation Publications are produced by the UK Civil Aviation Authority.
55 Watchkeeper is the first UK system to be fully airworthiness certified to the same standards as a
military manned aircraft. In the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Global
Hawk is the only system so certified.
56 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies is a multilateral export control regime with 41 participating states that includes the UK,
United States, China and the Russian Federation.
44 JDP 0-30.2
aircraft systems and associated technologies and includes ‘complete unmanned

aerial vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, UAVs and RPAS) capable of
delivering at least a 500 kilogram payload57 to a range of at least 300 kilometres.58
On 5 October 2016, the British Foreign Secretary signed a Joint Declaration for the
Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles along
with 49 countries. The Declaration recognised that existing international regimes
(International Humanitarian Law, Law of Armed Conflict, national export control
mechanisms) also apply to armed drones. This Declaration will serve as the basis
for discussions on a more detailed set of international standards for the export and
subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled UAVs. The UK remains supportive and is
keen to ensure that any additional regulation will be in keeping with the UK’s own
stringent export controls and international obligations, notably through the MTCR.
Section 3 – Moral and ethical issues
4.23. Moral and ethical issues would normally be discussed elsewhere, but what some
pressure groups see as the contentious nature of unmanned and remotely piloted
aircraft systems merits a brief discussion of some of the key arguments made against 4
such systems. Public discussion of these issues can lead to heated and emotional
arguments; unfortunately, many of these arguments are based on subjective opinions
“
or ‘what ifs’ rather than objective facts. Part of the remit of this document is to
increase transparency, and understanding of how remotely piloted aircraft are used
and to help ‘debunk’ the mythology associated with this subject. If challenged, and it Part of the
is appropriate to respond, personnel should be careful to give only factual comment remit of this
and avoid discussing non-fact based opinions. document is
to increase
4.24. Stress and trauma. Care must be exercised in the use of unmanned aircraft transparency, and
such that they do not unnecessarily subject innocent populations over which they understanding of
are flown to unease. Manned and unmanned operations normally take place from
how remotely
piloted aircraft
a deployed base, with the aircrew and operators maintaining intense flying rates
are used and to
for up to six months at a time. During this period, supervisors monitor them closely
help ‘debunk’
for fatigue and indications of stress. Normally, the subsequent recovery to home the mythology
base will include a decompression period, followed by further monitoring for signs associated with
of stress or trauma. Harmony rules, developed through experience of the effects of this subject.
57 The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) defines payload as: the total mass that can be
carried or delivered by the specified rocket system or unmanned aerial vehicle system that is not used to
maintain flight. It includes munitions, countermeasures, recording equipment and recovery equipment
(for example, parachutes) amongst others.
58 MTCR, Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, 11 June 2010, page 16.
”
JDP 0-30.2 45
operations, aim to limit the time that can be spent deployed versus time spent at the
home base.
4.25. Stress and trauma – remotely piloted aircraft crews. Remotely piloted aircraft
crews work differently. Operating from their home base, the only break from
operations might be annual leave or courses. Concerns have been expressed in the
past over both the cumulative effect of operations over a long period of time and the
psychological effect of conducting, for example, attack operations in the morning
followed by normal family life in the afternoon. Operators have acknowleged these
issues – crews based at Creech Air Force Base, in the Nevada desert, United States,
have spoken of the useful travel time between their base and housing area, which
allows for reflection and readjustment. United States Air Force studies in 201359
found no difference in the rates of mental health issues between manned and
unmanned aircraft pilots, believing that a rigorous selection process and ongoing
medical monitoring, better equipped aircrew to cope with stress issues. While this
juxtaposition of work and home life is not without precedent (UK aircrew have flown
combat missions directly from their homebase to theatres of operation, for example,
during the NATO air campaign in Kosovo), it is a distinct variation from the more
common immersive experience on operations. A study of UK Armed Forces in 201760
indicated that the chain of command should closely monitor cumulative fatigue and
4 the potential emotional impact in personnel who conduct this type of operation.
4.26. Further reading. Several studies have been carried out recently to examine
a range of issues associated with unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft. Areas
considered include:
• contribution to UK security;
• effectiveness of command;
• control and oversight methods; and
• issues relating to the use of remote and automated systems.
In October 2014, the Birmingham Policy Commission published its report entitled
The Security Impact of Drones: Challenges and Opportunities for the UK.61, 62 The report
covers the issues discussed in this document, and more, and is recommended to
59 Medical Surveillance Monthly Report March 2013, Challenges in monitoring the health of pilots engaged
in telewarfare and Mental health diagnoses and counselling among pilots of remotely piloted aircraft in the
United States Air Force, available at https://health.mil/Reference-Center
60 Submission to the All Party Parliamentary Group in Drones, dated 12 June 2017.
61 Birmingham Policy Commission, The Security Impact of Drones: Challenges and Opportunities for the
UK, available at http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/research/policycommission/remote-warfare/
final-report-october-2014.pdf
62 The phrase ‘drone’ (or even ‘killer drone’) has become a colloquial term that is used in the media, by
opponents, pressure groups and the All Parliamentary Group. From a military perspective this is an
out-dated term and incorrect in this context. Military drones, historically, followed a pre-programmed
flight path and did not have a human in control.
46 JDP 0-30.2
those who wish to consider this subject in more detail. Similarly, the cross-party
House of Commons Defence Committee recently studied remotely piloted aircraft
and its report,63 and the Government’s subsequent response64 add useful ideas
and information to the public domain. These reports cover existing systems, while
also considering evidence on future technologies and the strategic choices to be
made in partnering with other nations. The House of Commons Library Briefing
Paper, Overview of military drones used by the UK Armed Forces, 65 also provides further
useful detail and analysis as does the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint
Committee on Human Rights, The Government policy on the use of drones for targeted
killing, Second Report of Session 2015-16.66
Section 4 – Commonly presented arguments

against the use of ‘drones’ and factual responses
4.27. This final section lists allegations that are commonly levelled against remotely
piloted aircraft systems and some of the facts and study findings that refute them.
Argument 1 – Remotely piloted aircraft systems are used, or could be 4

used, illegally. Civilian casualties are disproportionate.
4.28. Response. The first section of this chapter describes the legal review process
undertaken to ensure that weapon systems used by the UK comply with the law.
This process has been exposed to a weapons review forum held at DCDC and is well
regarded. Often the legal review will help guide the development of a system from
conception to delivery to ensure it complies with the law when it is in service. While
any system could, potentially, be used illegally the UK employs a series of checks and
balances to reduce the possibility of this happening.
a. Pilots and operators are trained and certified according to MAA regulatory
requirements and supervised by the command chain in the same way as
manned aircraft.
b. On operations, systems are operated under the same domestic law, Law of
Armed Conflict and the same rules of engagement as manned aircraft.
63 Remote Control: Remotely piloted air systems – current and future UK use. Available at http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/772/772.pdf
64 Remote Control: Remotely piloted air systems – current and future UK use: Government response to the
committee’s tenth report of Session 2013-14. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence/611/611.pdf
65 Available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06493.pdf
66 Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/574/574.pdf
JDP 0-30.2 47
c. Because of the way that the aircraft is flown and the way that its sensor
outputs displayed, the crew’s actions are very visible to the command
chain and it is common for headquarters staff to monitor live sensor feeds
from the aircraft.
d. During missions, operators have access to trained and experienced legal

and policy advisors.
The United Nations appointed Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism reported in
September 2013.67
“If used in strict compliance with the principles of international

humanitarian law, remotely piloted aircraft are capable of
reducing the risk of civilian casualties in armed conflict by
significantly improving the situational awareness of military
commanders.”67
Argument 2 – We have created a disconnected ‘PlayStation’ generation

4 of operators who are divorced from the reality of their activities and kill
indiscriminately.
4.29. Response. To address the matter of operators being divorced from the reality
of their activities, the greater endurance of remotely piloted aircraft over their
manned equivalent often gives remote crews more time to evaluate and understand
a situation on the ground. Persistence over a target, combined with the lower speed
of a remotely piloted aircraft when compared to a manned fast jet, means crews
usually observe the target area for a significant period prior to, and following an
engagement. This allows them to assess target validity and the likelihood of collateral
damage.68 Often, remotely piloted aircraft crews are tasked to conduct post-attack
analysis of their own attacks, making them very aware of the consequences of their
actions. They may also receive ground reports from local forces or special forces.
Removing the physical and mental challenges of manned flight, particularly the high
workload associated with single-seat aircraft, increases the operator’s capacity to
make informed decisions. Operators will have access to legal and political advisors
during armed missions (including as part of a targeting board) to ensure that their
activities comply with the LOAC, published rules of engagement and with policy
and political intent. As part of its study into remotely piloted aircraft operations, the
67 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, A/68/389, 18 September 2013. Available at:
http://unispal.un.org
68 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine, paragraph 215.
48 JDP 0-30.2
House of Commons Defence Committee visited a Reaper squadron and noted the
following.
“It was very clear … that all were experienced professional

personnel with a clear purpose and keen understanding
of the rules of engagement which govern their operations.
Despite being remote from the battlespace they exhibited
a strong sense of connection to the life and death decisions
they are sometimes required to take. This was in stark
contrast to the image portrayed by some commentators of
‘drone’ pilots as video gaming ‘warrior geeks’. We record
here our appreciation for the important role they continue to
perform in Afghanistan.”69
Argument 3 – Remotely piloted aircraft systems should be banned

because their availability lowers the threshold for conflict.69
4.30. Response. Any UK international military operation that uses armed force will
require political authorisation. This authorisation is subject to parliamentary scrutiny
and its associated checks and balances. The remotely piloted aircraft force elements 4
are just a part of the inventory available to UK Armed Forces and operational planners
will allocate the best asset for each task, manned or unmanned, land, maritime or air
based, as appropriate. The Birmingham Policy Commission noted70 the following.
“We do not consider that the threshold for the use of force will
be lowered by the availability of RPA (remotely piloted aircraft)
to UK Armed Forces, as long as Parliament plays its proper
oversight function.”
On the other hand it also noted the following.
“Nor should it be forgotten that there are cases where the

use of force to protect civilians is the right option, ethically
speaking. And the availability of armed RPA (remotely piloted
aircraft) makes it easier for governments in that circumstance
to do the right thing.”
69 House of Commons Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems – current and
future UK use, page 21, paragraph 57. House of Commons report 772, 25 March 2014.
70 Birmingham Policy Commission Report, page 11.
JDP 0-30.2 49
Key points
• Every new UK weapon system is subject to a legal review before it enters
service, to ensure compliance with the law.
• Foreign sourced new weapon systems are subject to an independent UK
legal review before entering service.
• Remotely piloted aircraft are operated under the same political authority,
command chain oversight, domestic and international law and rules of
engagement as manned aircraft.
• Automation features, such as take-off, landing and route following are
designed to reduce pilot workload not replace the pilot and to help make
better and safer decisions.
• The UK does not own, and has no intention of developing, autonomous
weapon systems as it wants commanders and politicians to act as the
decision makers and to retain responsibility.
• Automated and autonomous mean different things to different
organisations. Always check what is being described and use the UK terms
as listed in publication.
• Export of certain remotely piloted aircraft technology is controlled by
4 international agreements.
• Crews always seek to minimise civilian casualties in accordance with the
Law of Armed Conflict; the United Nations Special Rapporteur noted that
when used lawfully, commander’s increased situational awareness reduces
civilian casualties.
• Operators have ‘a strong sense of connection to the life and death decisions
they are sometimes required to take ... in stark contrast to the image
portrayed by some pressure groups’.
• For the UK, there is no evidence that availability of remotely piloted aircraft
has lowered the threshold for the use of force.
50 JDP 0-30.2
UK and NATO unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft systems
Annex A – UK and NATO

unmanned and remotely
piloted aircraft systems
Section 1 – General
A.1. The UK military currently operates five different unmanned and remotely piloted
aircraft systems. The Royal Navy operates ScanEagle, the Army; Black Hornet, Desert
Hawk III and Watchkeeper, while the Royal Air Force operates Reaper. Despite the
media’s ‘killer drone’ image, the first four systems are unarmed and carry out only
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Although Reaper is
armed, it is tasked mostly on ISR missions. For example, during sorties conducted
over Iraq between October 2014 and September 2015, Reaper expended weapons on
only 20% of missions71 and fewer in total than manned UK missions during the same
period.
A.2. As we covered in Chapter 2, the UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA) introduced A

a new classification system for unmanned aircraft in January 2015.72 Each type’s
classification is included in this publication. The allocated class determines the exact
rules and regulations under which each type is operated and the level of supervision
required.
A.3. Following the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review
2015, the UK Government announced that it intends to buy two more unmanned
aircraft systems. Three Ministry of Defence (MOD) procured Zephyr high-altitude
pseudo-satellites are currently being used to investigate a range of (ISR) capabilities
for future use. Reaper will be replaced by a new platform, called Protector,73 from
around 2020.74 These are briefly described in the future systems section, toward
the end of this annex, but details may change as the programmes develop. QinetiQ
71 Taken from figures released into the public domain by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) following
freedom of information requests.
72 More information at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/maa-regulatory-publications
73 The programme to replace Reaper was originally called Scavenger, but this was recently changed to
Protector.
74 France and the UK have committed to jointly develop an unmanned Future Combat Air System. The
programme is expected to produce a prototype system that could serve as the basis for a platform that
may provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, targeting and strike capabilities beyond 2030.
JDP 0-30.2 51
also provide Mirach 100 series target drone services to all three Services under the
Combined Aerial Target Service contract, but these are not described here.
A.4. This annex concludes with a description of the new North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) variant of Global Hawk. UK personnel posted to NATO
positions may expect to encounter and work with this system and the UK will receive
intelligence data from it, alongside other NATO nations.
A Watchkeeper remotely piloted air system on a test flight over the UK
52 JDP 0-30.2
Section 2 – UK unmanned aircraft systems
Black Hornet
British Army personnel launch a Black Hornet in Afghanistan

Operator and class British Army – Class I(a)
Weight 16 grams
Speed 10 metres per second
Range 300 metres
A
Endurance 20 minutes
Operating altitude n/a
Power source Electric battery with a recharge time of 20 minutes
Sensors Live video/still imagery
Launch/recovery
Hand-launched
method
Weapons Nil
Number of systems 160
Other users Norway
• The system packs into a single ruggedized briefcase that contains
two aircraft, a recharging system, a hand-held observation screen
and controller
Notes
• Wind speed can limit when it can be operated
• Included for completeness, however, withdrawn from service
in 2017.
JDP 0-30.2 53
Desert Hawk III
A 32 Regiment Royal Artillery operator launches a Desert Hawk III

Operator and class British Army – Class I(c)
Weight 3.2 kilograms
Speed 32 knot cruise, 44 knot dash
Range Up to 15 kilometres, but must be within line of sight of control station
Endurance Up to 60 minutes
Operating altitude Normally between 200 feet and 1,000 feet
A Power source Electric battery
Sensors 360 degree colour electro-optical camera or thermal imager
Launch/recovery
Hand-launched
method
Weapons Nil
Number of systems 34 (each system has between 8 and 10 aircraft)
Other users United States
• Provides tactical video and still imagery with day/night capability

• Maximum wind speed of 25 knot and must remain clear of rain and
Notes
thunderstorms
• Recovery and re-launch time of less than five minutes
54 JDP 0-30.2
Desert Hawk III considerations
A.5. Employed at the tactical level, Desert Hawk III should be used as part of an
integrated ISR plan that includes all assets available. Given the small footprint of
its sensors it is best tasked against specific areas of interest, unless other wide area
sensors are available to provide cueing. Staff officers responsible for ISR matrix
development should be aware of which units have attached Desert Hawk III capability
and consider how its product is best processed, evaluated and disseminated when it
collects information that has wider use. Desert Hawk III is particularly useful for:
• overwatch of patrols and route reconnaissance;
• force protection;
• deterrence and information activities;75
• targeting;
• battle damage assessment; and
• monitoring of improvised explosive device related activities and explosive
ordnance disposal.
A 32 Regiment Royal Artillery Desert Hawk III ground station
75 Information activities are described in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for
Information Operations.
JDP 0-30.2 55
ScanEagle
ScanEagle being used during operations in the Gulf
Operator and class Royal Navy – Class I(d)

Weight 22 kilograms
Range Up to 70 nautical miles from the controlling ship
Endurance 12 – 16 hours depending on the task
Normal operating altitude 1,500 feet, but can operate up to 15,000
Operating altitude
feet
Power source Internal combustion engine
A
Sensors Stabilised day/night optical sensor
Launch/recovery
Pneumatic launcher, Skyhook recovery system
method
Weapons Nil
Number of systems Two task-lines provided on a service basis
Australia, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United States
Other users
and others
• Regularly deployed on Royal Navy Type 23 Frigates and Royal Fleet

Auxiliary ships
Notes • 700X Naval Air Squadron personnel direct operations but the
aircraft is flown and maintained by civilian contractors
• Unfunded after 2017
56 JDP 0-30.2
A ScanEagle is launched from the deck of HMS Kent – once its mission is complete, ScanEagle is
recovered using a suspended cable
JDP 0-30.2 57
Watchkeeper
A Watchkeeper being manoeuvred in Afghanistan

Operator and class British Army – Class II
Weight 450 kilogram take-off weight, includes up to 150 kilogram payload
Range Up to 150 kilometres, but must be within line of sight of control station
Endurance 12 – 16 hours depending on the task
Operating altitude Up to 15,000 feet
A Power source Internal combustion engine
Electro-optical and infra-red high definition day/night video and

Sensors still imagery, laser range-finder, designator and target marker,
synthetic aperture radar, ground moving target indicator
Launch/recovery
Semi-prepared strip, arrestor cable landing
method
Weapons Nil
Number of systems 12 x Task Lines, 54 aircraft
Other users N/A
• Maximum 15 knot crosswind and 25 knot headwind for launch

• IFF transponder modes 3 and 3C
Notes
• Automated radar based system for take-off and landing with INS/
GPS backup
58 JDP 0-30.2
Watchkeeper considerations
A.6. The role of Watchkeeper is to provide tactical level imagery and intelligence to
unit and formation commanders in the land environment. Its electro-optical and
infrared sensors provide high definition still and video imagery with day and night
capability and up to ten times optical zoom. The laser subsystem can range-find,
designate or mark targets. The aircraft also has a synthetic aperture radar sensor
that provides high quality strip map and spotlight images. In ground moving target
indicator mode, commonly referred to as GMTI, the radar can track moving targets
such as foot patrols and vehicles. The aircraft is operated by 47 Regiment Royal
Artillery.
A Watchkeeper in its transportation container awaits assembly at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan
A.7. Watchkeeper is capable of producing large amounts of tactical and operational

level information and intelligence. Joint staff officers in headquarters should
understand how it is being tasked and how it fits into a wider ISR collection plan.
Liaison may be required on tasking and support provided. Also, consider the
need to establish, or arrange for, appropriate external processing, evaluation and
dissemination capabilities.
JDP 0-30.2 59
MQ-9A Reaper
© PA
A Reaper pilot and sensor operator controlling an aircraft
Operator and Class Royal Air Force – Class III
Weight Maximum gross weight 4,760 kilograms
Speed 160 knot cruise, 250 knot dash, 120 knot loiter
Range Approximately 5,900 kilometres depending on payload
Endurance Around 18 hours depending on payload
Operating altitude Normally 25,000 feet and below with a maximum of 50,000 feet
A Power source Turboprop
Infrared sensor, colour/monochrome daylight camera and image

Sensors intensifier, Lynx II synthetic aperture radar and ground moving
target indicator, laser rangefinder and designator
Launch/recovery
Runway take-off and landing
method
Up to four Hellfire missiles and two 500 pound Paveway II guided
Weapons
bombs
Number of systems 10 aircraft
Other users France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United States
• Controlled via satellite datalink

Notes
• Separate colour nose camera to assist pilot with flight control
60 JDP 0-30.2
Reaper considerations
A.8. Reaper is primarily tasked in the intelligence and situational awareness role to
provide real-time data to commanders and intelligence specialists at the tactical,
operational and strategic levels. It provides an armed ISR capability equivalent
to that of many manned aircraft. Reaper can also provide geographic location
information to commanders on the ground or to other systems capable of employing
global positioning system guided weapons. Tasking Reaper requires careful
thought and input from subject matter experts is essential. Providing the Reaper
intelligence product to external agencies and internally to processing, exploitation
and dissemination analysts and experts is likely to be challenging, particularly if not
accounted for in the early planning stages.
A.9. The Royal Air Force’s ten MQ-9A Reaper are operated by No 13 Squadron, based
at Royal Air Force Waddington, and No. 39 Squadron, based at Creech Air Force Base
in the United States. A complete Reaper system includes four aircraft, two ground
control stations, communications equipment and links, spares and personnel from all
three Services supported by contractor ground crew.
A Royal Air Force Reaper being assembled by civilian contractors at Kandahar airfield, Afghanistan
JDP 0-30.2 61
Section 3 – Future UK unmanned aircraft systems

Zephyr
A Zephyr high altitude surveillance aircraft takes to the air

Operator and Class To be confirmed, Class I(d)
Weight 60 kilograms, payload five kilograms
Speed 30 knot
A Range n/a
Endurance Three months
Operating altitude Over 70,000 feet
Power source Solar electric
Sensors To be confirmed
Launch/recovery
Hand-launched (requires up to five people)
method
Weapons Nil
Number of systems Two, possibly three
Other users N/A
• This type of unmanned aircraft is also known as a ‘high-altitude
pseudo-satellite’
• Potential payloads include: high definition optical and infrared
Notes video and still imagery; mobile communications and automatic
identification system
• Still in development, details may change
• Expected in service in 2017
62 JDP 0-30.2
Zephyr considerations
A.10. Zephyr was originally developed by QinetiQ in the UK, but is now part of
the Airbus high-altitude pseudo-satellite (HAPS) programme. An earlier Zephyr 7
development aircraft holds the official endurance record of 14 days airborne and
attained an altitude of over 70,000 feet.
A.11. While the payload is small, current technology allows capable video or
communications equipment to be carried. As an example, during test flights of
Zephyr 7 above 65,000 feet, high-definition video with a ground resolution of
50 centimetres was downlinked in real-time.76 Because the aircraft operates in the
stratosphere, it is largely unaffected by weather and can be ‘parked’ for prolonged
periods over a fixed position on the Earth’s surface to provide satellite-like services.
This is why such systems are often referred to as ‘pseudo-satellites’. Weather would,
however, potentially limit where and when the aircraft could be launched and
recovered and cloud cover below the aircraft would affect the amount and type of
imagery that could be collected.
A.12. Because of the time taken to deploy and recover the aircraft (one day to climb to
70,000 feet) and its slow transit speed, the aircraft is likely to be tasked in support of
specific operations or specific geographical areas. It will take some time to achieve a
new orbit if repositioning is required; as an example, relocating by
700 miles would take a day. As it is solar powered, year round operations should be
achievable up to latitudes of 40 degrees north and south, with operating periods A
restricted increasingly to just the summer months as operations move toward the
poles. By operating above the upper limit of Class A airspace, which extends up to
60,000 feet, de-confliction with normal air traffic is greatly eased, although national
restrictions will still limit where the aircraft can operate during climb and descent
and for overflight of third-party nations. Several civilian technology companies are
considering using similar systems that aim to provide broadband services to remote
locations that are not connected to the fixed communications infrastructure.
Protector
A.13. In April 2016, the MOD announced that it had selected the General Atomics
Aeronautical Systems Certifiable Predator B aircraft for its Protector programme.
More than 20 Protector will replace the current Reaper fleet approximately 2020.
Details may change as the programme matures, but in comparison with Reaper, the
Protector airframe is expected to have an increased wingspan and greater endurance,
with a slightly lower flying speed. It is expected to have a certified sense and avoid
system to allow it to fly in UK and European airspace, alongside general aviation.
76 More information is available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-35478489

JDP 0-30.2 63
Section 4 – NATO
NATO RQ-4B Global Hawk
© Northrop Grumman Corporation

NATO AGS Global Hawk first flew in December 2015
Operator and Class North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Class III

Weight Maximum take-off weight 14,628 kilograms
Range 12,000 nautical miles
A Endurance Up to 32 hours
Operating altitude Up to 60,000 feet
Power source Turbofan
Optical and infrared sensors, ground moving target indicator, synthetic
Sensors aperture radar with air track information and high resolution ground
mapping
Launch/recovery
Runway take-off and landing
method
Weapons Nil
Number of systems Five
Other users Australia, Japan, South Korea, United States (different variants)
• Controlled via satellite datalink

Notes
• Known as NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance System
64 JDP 0-30.2
NATO RQ-4B Global Hawk considerations
A.14. Fifteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are procuring
the Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS), known as NATO AGS. It consists of
five RQ-4B Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft and associated ground command
and control stations. NATO will operate and maintain the system on behalf of all 28
members. Although the UK is not one of the procuring nations, its contribution in
kind, information from UK operated ISR aircraft, means that it will have access to the
capability. The first flight took place in December 2015 and the system in-service date
is expected in the 2017 to 2018 timeframe.77
A.15. The main operating base for AGS will be at Sigonella Air Base, in Italy, which will
serve a dual purpose as a NATO joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(JISR) deployment base and data exploitation and training centre. UK staff officers
working in NATO headquarters or deployed on NATO operations should expect to
encounter, and hence should be familiar with NATO AGS.
77 More information is available at http://www.nato.int/cps/sl/natohq/topics_48892.htm.

JDP 0-30.2 65
Notes
66 JDP 0-30.2
Unmanned aircraft strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis
Annex B – Unmanned aircraft

strengths, weaknesses, opportunities
and threats analysis
Strengths Weaknesses
• Useful for dull, dirty, dangerous tasks. • Vulnerability to data link attacks.
• Class I and II can support tactical activity • Weak in contested airspace.
where manned assets would not be
• Smaller systems constrained by weather.
available.
• Slow speeds may limit the extent of re-tasking.
• Class I and II operations cheaper than
manned. • Requirement for new systems to be built to
airworthy standards driving up cost.
• Class III (and potentially II) removes risk to
manned aircrew. • Overall manpower footprint can be higher.
• Class III operations reduce theatre footprint • Sense and avoid still not available, limiting
compared to manned. operations to segregated airspace.
• Persistence gives improved situational • Public opposition (though gaining wider

understanding. acceptance through increased exposure).
• Class III operation from home base reduces • Lack of long air carriage life weapons.
harmony issues.
• Can be hard to detect and counter, Class I
and II in particular.
• Class III good with time-sensitive targets.
Opportunities Threats B
• Conceptual ideas still hard to translate into • 3D printing solutions (cheap, easy mass attack).
practice.
• Easy availability to adversaries.
• Pseudo-satellite capabilities could be a
• Class III unaffordable as airworthiness standards
game changer.
drive up costs.
• Civil use.
• Cyber attack.
• Make use of commercial solutions for non-
• Competition for spectrum and bandwidth.
lethal purposes.
• Still uncertainty over manned/unmanned mix.
• Cross governmental cooperation,
particularly once certified sense and avoid • Difficulty with long-term planning.
arrives.
• Increasing complexity removes flexibility in
• 3D printing solutions (quick, cheap, throw development.
away).
• Reduce opposition through transparency
and education.
JDP 0-30.2 67
Unmanned aircraft strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
Notes
68 JDP 0-30.2
Lexicon
Lexicon
Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations
AAP Allied administrative publication
ACO airspace control order
ADH aviation duty holder
AGS Alliance Ground Surveillance programme
AJP Allied joint publication
ATO air tasking order
DCDC Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

DCPD direct, collect, process and disseminate
DLoD Defence Lines of Development
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

ISTAR intelligence, surveillance, targeting and reconnaissance
JDN joint doctrine note

JDP joint doctrine publication
JISR joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
MAA Military Aviation Authority

MOD Minstry of Defence
MTOW maximum take-off weight
PED processing, exploitation and dissemination

PTO PED tasking order
RAF Royal Air Force

RPA remotely piloted aircraft
RPAS remotely piloted aircraft system
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition annex
SPINS special instructions

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO)
JDP 0-30.2 69
Lexicon
TCPED task, collect, process, exploit and disseminate

TRiM trauma risk management
UAS unmanned aircraft system

UN United Nations
70 JDP 0-30.2
Lexicon
Part 2 – Terms and definitions

This section is divided into three areas. First, we list terms and their descriptions used
as reference for this publication only. We then list proposed new definitions that will
be added to the UK Terminology Database. We finish by listing endorsed terms and
their definitions (source in brackets) that may be helpful to the reader.
A fuller reference to extant terminology is provided by Allied Administrative

Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions and Joint Doctrine
Publication (JDP) 0-01.1, The UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database.
Terms used for reference in this publication only
lost-link
Temporary or permanent loss of the command and control link between a control
station and aircraft.
remote-split operations
Unmanned aircraft operations where there is geographical separation of the launch
and recovery crew from the mission crew who, in turn, employ the aircraft at a
location other than where the aircraft is based.
sense and avoid

A sense and avoid system has one or more sensors that can detect other airspace
users or hazards and take appropriate action to maintain safe separation.
segregated airspace
Airspace that is specifically designated for remotely piloted aircraft system operation.
(Military Aviation Authority Regulatory Article 2320).
visual line of sight operation

An operation in which the remote pilot or remotely piloted aircraft observer
maintains direct unaided visual contact with the remotely piloted aircraft.
(Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 722, Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in UK
Airspace – Guidance, March 2015). Note: Visual line of sight is normally taken to be
within 500 metres horizontally and 400 feet vertically of the remote pilot or observer.
JDP 0-30.2 71
Lexicon
New definitions
remote and automated system
A system comprising the platform, control and sensor equipment, the supporting
network, information-processing system and associated personnel where the
platform may be operated remotely and/or have automated functionality.
(JDP 0-30.2)
remote and automated air system

remote and automated system designed to operate in the air environment.
(JDP 0-30.2)
Endorsed definitions
automated system
In the unmanned aircraft context, an automated or automatic system is one that, in
response to inputs from one or more sensors, is programmed to logically follow a
pre-defined set of rules in order to provide an outcome. Knowing the set of rules
under which it is operating means that its output is predictable. (JDP 0-01.1)
autonomous system
An autonomous system is capable of understanding higher level intent and direction.
From this understanding and its perception of its environment, such a system is able
to take appropriate action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of deciding
a course of action, from a number of alternatives, without depending on human
oversight and control, although these may still be present. Although the overall
activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual actions
may not be. (JDP 0-01.1)
intelligence
The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information
regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order
to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers.
(AAP-06)
joint force commander

A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise operational command
or control over a joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)
72 JDP 0-30.2
Lexicon
logistic footprint
The impact of logistic activity in the joint operations area. It identifies the utilisation
of real estate and the consumption of resources, including manpower, equipment,
infrastructure, supplies and Host-nation Support that logistic activity in support of an
operation will require. (JDP 4-00 4th Edition)
Note: It includes those resources that are deployed along lines of communication,
where they are required for logistic activity and any liability for additional force
protection assets.
reconnaissance
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,
information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy,
or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic
characteristics of a particular area. (AAP-06)
remotely piloted aircraft

A remotely piloted aircraft is defined as an aircraft that, while it does not carry a
human operator, is flown remotely by a pilot, is normally recoverable, and can carry a
lethal or non-lethal payload. (JDP 0-01.1)
remotely piloted aircraft system

A remotely piloted aircraft system is the sum of the components required to deliver
the overall capability and includes the pilot, sensor operators (if applicable), remotely
piloted aircraft, ground control station, associated manpower and support systems,
satellite communication links and data links. (JDP 0-01.1)
surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or sub-surface areas, places, persons
or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. (AAP-06)
targeting
The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate
response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities.
(AAP-06)
unmanned aircraft
An unmanned aircraft is an aircraft that does not carry a human operator, is operated
remotely using varying levels of automated functions, is normally recoverable, and
can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. (JDP 0-01.1)
unmanned aircraft system

An unmanned aircraft system is a system, whose components include the unmanned
aircraft and all equipment, network and personnel necessary to control the
unmanned aircraft. (JDP 0-01.1)
JDP 0-30.2 73
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ii JDP 0-30.2, Change 1

1. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30.2, Unmanned Aircraft Systems guides

5. JDP 0-30.2 is divided into four chapters and two annexes.

Chapter 2 – Terminology and classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter 3 – Task, employ, counter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Chapter 4 – Legal framework, moral and ethical issues . . . . . . . . . 37

Annex A – UK and NATO unmanned and remotely piloted

Annex B – Unmanned aircraft strengths, weaknesses,

Chapter 1 describes the context for the UK’s fleets of

6 Tasking is discussed in Chapter 3, Section 2.

Chapter 2 outlines standard UK terminology related

a brief discussion of the importance of developing a 2

Section 2 – Related terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Section 3 – Intelligence, surveillance and

Section 4 – Classification and regulation . . . . . . . . 18

2 “...the Committee also argued that the

House of Commons Library Briefing Paper,

A Royal Air Force Reaper at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan

10 These terms are discussed further in Chapter 3.

An aircraft that does not carry a human operator, is operated remotely

An aircraft that, whilst it does not carry a human operator, is flown

Table 2.1 – UK standard terminology

Term NATO definition15

An unmanned aircraft that is controlled from a remote pilot

Table 2.2 – NATO standard terminology

Section 2 – Related terms 2

Other terms relevant to remotely piloted aircraft

2.5. As previously noted, it is important to understand the difference between15

An autonomous system is capable of understanding higher-level

Table 2.3 – Automated and autonomous system definitions

Term Proposed definition

A system comprising the platform, control and sensor equipment,

17 Horizontal distance is measured in metres and height in feet.

2.11. Remote-split operations. Remote-split operations refer to the geographical

Interface to external systems

Ground control station Satellite relay

Launch and recovery element Target

Aircraft sensor data Aircraft control data

Section 3 – Intelligence, surveillance

Terms related to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks 2

Task Collect Process Exploit Disseminate

Figure 2.2 – The joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance process

Section 4 – Classification and regulation

UK classification and regulation methodology

<200g Nano Class I(a)

Micro < 2kg Class I(b)

20kg – 150kg Small > 20kg Class I(d)