Doctrine Uk Air Manoeuver JDN 1 16

Joint Doctrine Note 1/16
Air Manoeuvre
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

Joint Doctrine Note 1/16
Air Manoeuvre
Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/16, dated September 2016,

is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff
Head Doctrine
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JDN 1/16 i
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ii JDN 1/16
Preface
Purpose
1. Air manoeuvre is a joint activity. Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/16, Air
Manoeuvre aims to enable the single Services to develop their own doctrine,
which should be coherent with each others so we can enhance our air
manoeuvre capability. This JDN will:
• propose a definition for air manoeuvre;

• outline the activities and force elements that constitute air
manoeuvre; and
• provide some specific considerations for planning and execution.
Context
2. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Operations describes land manoeuvre

as the combination of air and ground manoeuvre. With the possible
exception of projecting amphibious forces ashore, air manoeuvre will be
initiated and controlled by land forces. Air manoeuvre operations provide
commanders with an ability to rapidly deploy light forces and support
mechanised and armoured ground forces across the battlespace, either
as part of land manoeuvre or as a means of projecting land power in its
own right. It will remain an enduring requirement both tactically and
operationally.1 Effectively employing air manoeuvre requires understanding
and practice. Air manoeuvre must also be instilled across the joint force.
3. This JDN is needed for several reasons. Air manoeuvre has a number of
interpretations, many of which focus solely on using helicopters. However,
these interpretations do not describe the full range of air manoeuvre activity,
nor are they aligned with endorsed joint air terminology used to define joint
air activities. It is important, therefore, to develop agreed terminology across
the component commands on what constitutes air manoeuvre and how air
manoeuvre activities should be conducted. This will reduce the potential for
misunderstanding and confusion, and clarify how air manoeuvre contributes
to operations.
1 Joint Concept Note (JCN) 3/12, Future Air and Space Operating Concept, paragraph 321
and JCN 2/12, Future Land Operating Concept, paragraphs 425 to 427 and 471.
JDN 1/16 iii

Audience
4. JDN 1/16, Air Manoeuvre is aimed at commanders and their staff for
planning and executing air manoeuvre operations. This includes maritime,
land, air and space, and special forces operations.
Structure
5. JDN 1/16 is divided into six chapters.
a. Chapter 1 introduces air manoeuvre, its relation to Defence

policy, terminology, characteristics and fundamentals.
b. Chapter 2 covers the outline roles and capabilities of helicopters,

fixed-wing transport systems and light forces.
c. Chapter 3 suggests uses for air manoeuvre.
d. Chapter 4 details operational considerations for air manoeuvre.
e. Chapter 5 outlines broad considerations for conducting air

manoeuvre in the land environment.
f. Chapter 6 outlines considerations for conducting air manoeuvre

in the littoral environment.
Linkages
6. This JDN should be read alongside a number of publications to provide

wider context. These include:
• Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land

Operations;
• AJP-3.3(A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations;
• Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.2.1, Allied Land Tactics;
• ATP-49, Use of Helicopters in Land Operations;
• Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine;
• Air Publication 3002, Air and Space Warfare;
iv JDN 1/16
• ADP, Operations;
• Army Field Manual (AFM), Volume 1, Part 12, Air Manoeuvre;
• Pamphlet 101, Army Aviation Operations Manual;
• Doctrine Note 15/01, Integrated Action;
• Doctrine Note 15/02, Airmobile Operations;
• Royal Navy Book of Reference (digital) 4487, Amphibious Warfare; and
• US Army Field Manual 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations.
JDN 1/16 v
vi JDN 1/16
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Chapter 1 – Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 – Roles and capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chapter 3 – Uses for air manoeuvre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chapter 4 – Operational considerations for air manoeuvre . . . . . . . . . 33
Chapter 5 – Conducting air manoeuvre in the land environment . . . . . 55
Chapter 6 – Conducting air manoeuvre in the littoral . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Annex A – Air manoeuvre planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Lexicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
JDN 1/16 vii

Introduction
Chapter 1 introduces air manoeuvre, its relation to Defence
policy, terminology, characteristics and fundamentals.
1
Section 1 – Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 1
Section 2 – Air manoeuvre characteristics and

fundamentals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
JDN 1/16 1
Introduction
1
“ For fear of dropping the troops in
the sea, the pilots tended to drop
them too far inland – some of them
actually in the British lines. The
weapon containers often fell wide
of the troops, which was another
handicap that contributed to our
excessive casualties.
”
Kurt Student
2 JDN 1/16
Introduction
Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1. The capabilities offered by air manoeuvre forces have significant
applicability to Defence Tasks 1, 4 and 51 in providing options for rapid
intervention by land and littoral forces over battlefield, intra- and
inter-theatre distances. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine
for Land Operations highlights the role of air manoeuvre forces within the
land force. This is echoed in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-00, Campaign
Execution, which lists air manoeuvre forces as one of three types contributed
by land forces; the others being ground manoeuvre and reconnaissance
forces. 1
1.2. JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine highlights the growing importance of the
role our Armed Forces can play in contributing to deterrence and coercion.
Rapidly deployable air manoeuvre forces provide a capable, credible and
deliverable air landed force at readiness and are therefore a vital source of UK
power and influence.
Section 1 – Terminology
1.3. JDP 0-10, British Maritime Doctrine does not define air manoeuvre.
However, air manoeuvre does fall under the auspices of littoral manoeuvre.2
JDP 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine’s description of air manoeuvre is derived
from land doctrine.3 Our proposed definition for air manoeuvre is:
the movement of forces through the air to positions of advantage

from which force can be applied or threatened.
1 Defence Strategic Direction 2016, outlines Defence Tasks as follows: 1 – Defence

security and resilience of the Homeland and Overseas Territories; 4 – Influence through
international Defence Engagement; and 5 – Overseas Defence activity.
2 Air manoeuvre is a component of ship to objective manoeuvre; itself a component of
littoral manoeuvre.
3 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine, states that air
manoeuvre refers to those operations, conducted principally within the land tactical
battlespace, aimed at achieving decisive advantage through exploiting the third
dimension, within a joint framework as part of an integrated approach.
JDN 1/16 3
Introduction
1.4. Air manoeuvre employs fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, airborne,

air assault, airmobile and amphibious forces. These are integrated with
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, fires and ground forces
to significantly increase the tempo and reach of the land or maritime
component. Air manoeuvre can be divided into three activity areas.
a. Airborne forces. An airborne force is defined as: a force

composed primarily of ground and air units organized, equipped and
trained for airborne operations.4
b. Air assault and airmobile operations. Air assault and airmobile

1 operations are specifically designed to be inserted, resupplied and
extracted using support and attack helicopters as their normal means
of operation.
c. Independent helicopter tasks. Independent helicopter tasks

are those tasks carried out by helicopters independent of other arms.
However, these tasks may be linked to a broader scheme of manoeuvre.
Royal Air Force C-130J Hercules can be used in airborne operations
4 Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
4 JDN 1/16
Introduction
1.5. Aviation has been incorrectly used as the collective noun for
helicopters and associated activities.5 However, it is not defined as such
in Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and
Definitions; AJP-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations; or
JDP 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine. Aviation accommodates all aircraft;
fixed-wing, tilt rotor and helicopters. This Joint Doctrine Note (JDN)
proposes that the collective noun ‘aviation’ is replaced with ‘helicopters’,
which accommodates maritime and battlefield helicopters.
Section 2 – Air manoeuvre characteristics and

1
fundamentals
Air manoeuvre characteristics
1.6. Air manoeuvre forces exploit the core attributes of air power – height,
reach and speed.6 This provides many benefits to a land or amphibious force
with an air manoeuvre capability. Height and reach enables access over
difficult terrain and ground barriers. Combining speed with reach increases
tempo and can give the advantage of surprise. The agility of helicopters
allows an air manoeuvre force to move quickly between tactical actions. This
enables them to exploit more opportunities than ground forces can alone.7
“ The agility of helicopters allows

an air manoeuvre force to move
quickly between tactical actions.
”
5 This is an inter-Service taxonomy issue. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-49, The Use of
Helicopters in Land Operations; ATP-3.2.1, Allied Land Tactics and US Army Field Manual 3-99,
Airborne and Air Assault operations all use ‘aviation’ to mean helicopters. Additionally, Joint
Helicopter Command (JHC) use ‘army aviation’ to cover helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.
6 Op. Cit., JDP 0-30.
7 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Operations, pages 4-9 and Commander JHC’s
strawman paper, Air manoeuvre in the land environment, June 2015, paragraph 4.
JDN 1/16 5
Introduction
1.7. Although offering significant advantages, air manoeuvre forces

can also be vulnerable both in flight and on the ground. They often lack
persistence; aircraft have a limited loiter time and troops are lightly armed
and equipped with limited means of resupply. Therefore, logistic demands
created by air manoeuvre forces are challenging.
Air manoeuvre fundamentals
1.8. Having a common objective will provide the foundation for mission
success. To achieve this, the air manoeuvre force should:
1 • have a unified purpose;
• have clearly defined objectives;
• have effective command and control across the joint force and
conduct planning and battlespace management jointly;
• have sufficient/temporary control of the air;
• have timely, accurate and specific intelligence;
• be able to deliver sufficient mass in the initial wave8 and concentrate

force;
• be able to achieve surprise;
• be able to sustain, reinforce, withdraw or exploit the opportunities

created by air manoeuvre; and
• be able to train and develop familiarity with equipment and

procedures.
8 PR Syms, Air manoeuvre historical analysis, Dstl, 31 July 2015, found that for battlegroup
air manoeuvre operations, the larger the body of troops used, the greater the success rate.
Delivery through waves rather than en-masse reduces surprise. Single wave battlegroup
delivery offers the best chance of success for both airdrop and air assault operations. This
is restricted in the UK by available transport aircraft and helicopters to a sub-battlegroup
delivery option.
6 JDN 1/16
Introduction
Key points
• Rapidly deployable air manoeuvre forces provide a capable, credible
and deliverable air landed force at readiness and are therefore a vital
source of UK power and influence.
• Air manoeuvre employs fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, airborne, air

assault, airmobile and amphibious forces.
• Air manoeuvre forces exploit the core attributes of air power – height,
reach and speed.
1
• The agility of helicopters allows an air manoeuvre force to move
quickly between tactical actions.
• Although offering significant advantages, air manoeuvre forces can

also be vulnerable both in flight and on the ground.
• Having a common objective will provide the foundation for mission

success.
• Logistic demands created by air manoeuvre forces are challenging.
JDN 1/16 7
Roles and capabilities
Chapter 2 covers the outline roles and capabilities of

helicopters, fixed-wing transport systems and light forces.
2
Chapter 2
Section 1 – Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Section 2 – Fixed-wing transport aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 15
Section 3 – Light forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
JDN 1/16 9
2 “ The helicopter is evidence of

how man's imagination can be
given physical form.
”
Howard A. Wheeler
10 JDN 1/16
Chapter 2 – Roles and capabilities

Section 1 – Helicopters
2.1. Battlefield helicopters are designed for, and employed primarily in,
the land environment.9 Agility and mobility characterise the main roles of
battlefield helicopters. Agility allows helicopters to quickly move between
tactical actions. Mobility allows helicopters to rapidly move tactically
and operationally, regardless of conditions on the ground. Additionally,
adaptability allows helicopters with their agility to quickly re-role for
different tasks.
2
2.2. Battlefield helicopters have three main roles.10 These are:
• lift;
• find; and
• attack.
These three roles can be applied across all four types of tactical actions
within the land11/maritime environment – offensive, defensive, stabilising
and enabling.
2.3. Helicopters suited to the role of lift are best used in all tactical actions
that require moving cargo or personnel. This capability also covers
air-enabled tactical casualty evacuation.12 These helicopters are normally
termed support helicopters.13
9 Battlefield helicopters have also been used in the past in the maritime environment,
when required.
10 Some helicopters are also able to perform a command support function.
11 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Operations, 2010, paragraph 0821.
12 This falls within the broader role of air mobility, which lies at the heart of the UK’s
ability to achieve rapid effect. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for
Medical Support details casualty and medical evacuation. Joint personnel recovery is
detailed in AJP-3.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment.
13 NATO uses the term utility helicopter instead of support helicopter and defines it as a:
multi-purpose helicopter that may be armed. Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06,
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
JDN 1/16 11
2.4. Helicopters suited to the role of find are normally termed

reconnaissance helicopters. They are best used to conduct:
• reconnaissance;
• framework security; and
• armed reconnaissance, in some circumstances.
Additionally, these helicopters can also be used to provide command

support functions. During high-tempo operations, the commander can
use these helicopters as a platform to move. This allows the commander
to exercise command and control from the air. In some circumstances,
battlefield reconnaissance helicopters can also perform airborne radio
rebroadcast.
2
2.5. Helicopters suited to the role of attack are normally termed attack
helicopters.14 They are best used to conduct:
• attack;
• raid;
• exploitation;
• pursuit;
• ambush;
• security (through screen, guard, covering force or escort tasks); and
• armed reconnaissance in some instances.
2.6. Attack helicopters are also suited to controlling and directing

firepower. This covers:
• directing indirect (and naval) fire as an air observation post;

• directing close air support as a forward air controller (airborne); and
• controlling and coordinating joint air attack team15 operations.
14 Attack helicopter is defined as: a helicopter specifically designed to employ various

weapons to attack and destroy enemy targets. AAP-06.
15 Joint air attack team is defined as: a combination of attack and/or reconnaissance
rotary-wing aircraft and fixed-wing close air support aircraft, operating together to
locate and attack high-priority targets and targets of opportunity. Joint air attack team
operations are coordinated and conducted to support the ground commander’s scheme
of manoeuvre. AAP-06.
12 JDN 1/16
An Apache attack helicopter firing a Hellfire missile during an exercise conducted

from HMS Ocean
2.7. Maritime helicopters are designed for, and employed primarily in, the
maritime environment. The Royal Navy retains its own maritime helicopters
for maritime force protection. They are not owned by the Joint Helicopter
Command16 and would not routinely be used in air manoeuvre. Maritime
helicopters have three roles: airborne surveillance and control;
anti-submarine warfare; and anti-surface warfare. The Sea King Airborne
Surveillance and Control, Merlin Mk 2 and Wildcat/Lynx Mk 8 helicopters all
contribute to the air manoeuvre fundamentals highlighted in Chapter 1.
2.8. The new helicopter-borne surveillance system, Crowsnest, will deliver:

air surveillance and control to provide force protection to a maritime force;
act as a tactical command and control platform; and provide battlespace
management. It has a data link and radar, both of which contribute to
defensive counter-air by providing control of combat air patrol aircraft and
airborne early warning.
16 A command under the Land Forces top level budget that has operational command of
all battlefield helicopters.
JDN 1/16 13
2.9. Table 2.1 summarises the suitability of using the various helicopters
types.
Type Suitable for Less suitable for

Internal and underslung loads
Shuttling roles
Lift Moving personnel Command support
Air-enabled tactical casualty
evacuation
Intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) Offensive action
Find
Controlling and directing fires Lift
Command support
2 Offensive action
Attack Controlling and directing fires Command support
Some ISR capability
Airborne ISR over land and water Lift
surveillance Command and control for
and control movement of aircraft Moving personnel
Lift
Anti-submarine warfare
Tactical flight in a
Anti-submarine Surface reconnaissance non-benign land
warfare Air-to-surface gunnery environment
Third-party targeting Non-hardened
landing sites
Lift
Surface ISR and strike
Anti-surface Tactical flight in a
warfare Weapon carriage for
non-benign land
anti-submarine warfare
environment
Table 2.1 – Helicopter suitability
14 JDN 1/16
Section 2 – Fixed-wing transport aircraft

2.10. Strategic air transport and tactical air transport are those fixed-wing
aircraft directly employed in the air mobility role.17 They have the
characteristics of speed and reach;18 however, there is always a trade-off
between payload and range. Strategic air transport and tactical air transport
fulfil the following roles within the scope of this publication.
The A400 can conduct strategic air transport
a. Airlift. Airlift covers transporting and sustaining personnel and

equipment inter- and intra-theatre. This will often link to support
helicopter airlift activity and also includes resupply airdrop.
b. Airborne operations. Airborne operations are operations that

transport and sustain airborne forces by airdrop or air land delivery.
c. Aeromedical evacuation. Aeromedical evacuation involves

moving patients, under medical supervision, between medical
treatment facilities. This may flow from tactical casualty evacuation
conducted by helicopters.
d. Special air mobility operations. Special air mobility operations

are those activities undertaken to support special forces operations.
17 Air mobility is one of the four fundamental roles of air power. It is described as moving
personnel, equipment or materiel to create strategic effects and enabling operational and
tactical manoeuvre and sustainment. JDP 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine, paragraph 302.
18 Ibid., paragraph 117.
JDN 1/16 15
2.11. Table 2.2 summarises the suitability of tactical and strategic air support.
Type Suitable for Less suitable for

Intra-theatre
movement of
personnel and materiel Inter-theatre
Tactical air transport movement of very
large equipments
Air landing operations
on unprepared airfields
Inter-theatre
Air landing on
Strategic air transport movement of
unprepared airfields
personnel and materiel
Table 2.2 – Strategic air transport and tactical air transport employment
2
Section 3 – Light forces
2.12. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Operations states that land

forces consist of combat, combat support, combat service support and
combat command support elements.19 Combat forces are composed of
reconnaissance, ground manoeuvre and air manoeuvre forces.
2.13. Ground manoeuvre forces are split into three types: armoured,
mechanised and light. Once on the ground, the air manoeuvre force exhibits
the strengths and weaknesses of a light force.
2.14. Light forces are combined arms groups formed around light infantry,
but may be mechanised or armoured forces operating out of role. They are
task-organised with combat support and combat service support. Light
forces are optimised for operations in mountains, jungles, the littorals
and dense urban areas. They fight dismounted, possibly with some light
vehicles. Their firepower is limited compared to heavier forces, and they are
vulnerable without the protection of dispersion, concealment or fortification.
19 ADP, Operations, 2010, page 4-7 onwards.
16 JDN 1/16
2.15. Light forces can be deployed rapidly and are therefore suited to air
manoeuvre operations. They will, however, usually require frequent resupply
and support from joint fires and airlift aircraft. Light forces can be used in
offensive, defensive, stabilising and enabling actions.20
a. Offensive actions. Examples include: clearing strongholds;

operations in remote or inaccessible terrain; and air manoeuvre
operations to conduct guard, block/hold tasks.
b. Defensive actions. Examples include: providing point and local

area security; route security; and cordon-and-search.
c. Stabilising actions. Examples include: route checking; vehicle

checkpoints; cordons; raids; partnering and mentoring; and security 2
patrolling.
d. Enabling actions. Examples include: reconnaissance in complex

terrain; advancing to contact an enemy force; and crossing rivers. Light
forces can conduct these tasks in certain circumstances, and must be
able to link up with other elements of the ground force.
Key points
• Mobility allows helicopters to rapidly move tactically and operationally

regardless of conditions on the ground.
• Battlefield helicopters have three main roles – lift, find and attack.
• Strategic air transport and tactical air transport are those fixed-wing
aircraft directly employed in the air mobility role.
• Light forces can be deployed rapidly and are therefore suited to air
manoeuvre operations.
20 Offensive, defensive and stabilising actions are detailed in Army Field Manual, Volume
1, Part 2, Battlegroup Tactics, Chapter 1, Annex E. Enabling actions detailed in Allied Tactical
Publication-3.2.1, Allied Land Tactics, page 8-1.
JDN 1/16 17
Uses for air manoeuvre
Chapter 3 details the activity areas associated with air
manoeuvre and looks at how air manoeuvre can be
applied across the operational framework.
Chapter 3
3
Section 1 – Air manoeuvre activity areas . . . . . . . . . . 22
Section 2 – Air manoeuvre in the operational

framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
JDN 1/16 19
3 “ Battles are won by slaughter and

manoeuvre. The greater the general,
the more he contributes in manoeuvre,
the less he demands in slaughter.
”
Sir Winston Churchill
20 JDN 1/16
Chapter 3 – Uses for air manoeuvre

3.1. Land manoeuvre is a combination of ground and air manoeuvre,
enabled by manoeuvre support. It can be further enhanced by littoral
manoeuvre. Synchronising ground, maritime and air manoeuvre within time
and space can create a greater cumulative effect than when they operate
separately. Increasing this synchronicity is key in maximising mission success.
Air manoeuvre forces exploit the mobility of aircraft to provide reach and
agility and, hence, speed of reaction. Air manoeuvre may allow forces to
rapidly deploy into theatre directly from the UK. This gives the UK a rapid
pre-emptive capability, which can create a deterrence effect.
3.2. Figure 3.1 shows the range of air manoeuvre operations that can be
undertaken over inter-theatre to battlefield distances. Airborne operations
can be used for theatre entry, which is one of a number of options that can 3
create a rapid effect over inter-theatre distances. However, all air manoeuvre
operations have applicability over intra-theatre and battlefield distances.
Air assaults can cover significant distances if resourced effectively and
small parachute or air landing operations can be tactically focussed. Air
manoeuvre operations apply to both the land and littoral environments. Air
manoeuvre in the littoral routinely accommodates air assault, air mobile and
independent helicopter tasks.
Air assault
Airborne –
Airmobile
air land
Airborne – Independent
airdrop helicopter tasks
Distance
Inter-theatre Intra-theatre Battlefield
Figure 3.1 – Air manoeuvre spectrum
JDN 1/16 21
Operation BARKHANE
Operation BARKHANE is a French anti-terrorist operation spanning

Africa’s Sahel region. From 7 to 13 April 2015, during Operation
KOUNAMA 2, French forces conducted an offensive reconnaissance
operation in the ‘three borders’ region of northern Niger. This was
launched by a company-level airborne operation over the Salvador Pass.
Ninety parachutists linked up with a ground force of around 50 French
soldiers and 30 Niger soldiers from Madama. Several insurgent logistics
sites were found and destroyed.
Subsequent operations, KOUNAMA 4 (20 July – 1 August) and

KOUNAMA 5 (19 – 29 August) also featured company-level parachute
operations linking up with a ground force to disrupt insurgent lines of
3 communication.
www.defense.gouv.fr
Section 1 – Air manoeuvre activity areas
3.3. In Chapter 1, the three activities of air manoeuvre (airborne forces,

air assault/airmobile operations and independent helicopter tasks) were
introduced. Airborne operations cover both airdrop and air land operations
and is defined as: an operation involving the movement of combat forces
and their logistic support into an objective area by air.21 Airborne operations
are carried out by airborne22 forces – those trained to operate in this role.
21 Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

22 Airborne is defined as: adjective used to describe troops specially trained to carry out
operations, either by paradrop or air landing, following an air movement. AAP-06.
22 JDN 1/16
3.4. Airborne forces are primarily transported by fixed-wing transport

aircraft.
a. Airdrop23 delivery involves the air movement of personnel

and/or cargo by aircraft into an objective area and their subsequent
delivery by parachute.24
b. Air land delivery involves the air movement of personnel

and/or cargo which are landed on or near their objective by a
fixed-wing aircraft.
Airdrop delivery reduces aircraft exposure to threats at the objective because

they remain in flight. This has to be risk balanced with the cost of a relative
dispersal of the ground force and cargo, and an increased risk of injury. Air
land delivery offers greater unit integrity and usually maximises the use of
aircraft cargo capacity. However, air landing requires a suitable airfield or air 3
strip, and exposes the aircraft to threats at the objective.
3.5. Air assault operations. An air assault operation is defined as: an
operation in which air assault forces, using the firepower, mobility, and total
integration of helicopter assets, manoeuvre on the battlefield under the
control of the commander to engage and destroy adversary forces or to seize
and hold key terrain.25
3.6. Airmobile operations. An airmobile operation is defined as: an

operation in which combat forces and equipment manoeuvre about the
battlefield by aircraft to engage in ground combat.26 Examples include:
• moving engineers to clear a defile ahead of an advancing ground

force; or
• moving a ground force to establish a hasty defensive position to

block an enemy advance.
23 NATO differentiates between airdrop and paradrop. Airdrop is defined as: delivery of
personnel or cargo from aircraft in flight. Paradrop is defined as: delivery by parachute of
personnel or cargo from an aircraft in flight. AAP-06.
24 The airdrop of cargo may or may not use parachutes.
25 NATO Agreed.
26 Op. Cit., AAP-06.
JDN 1/16 23
The difference between air assault and airmobile operations is that the
latter does not deliver a ground force expecting to fight for an objective
immediately upon landing.27 The advantage, therefore, is that airmobile
operations require lower levels of training for the ground force and staff.
Operation TELIC 1
In the initial war-fighting stage of Operation TELIC 1, Royal Navy and

Army Air Corps helicopters provided reconnaissance and attack support
to UK ground forces as an independent helicopter task. On 24 March
2003, 847 Naval Air Squadron was supporting 40 Commando, Royal
Marines and elements of the 1st Queen’s Dragoon Guards (1 QDG).
At 0730, a large enemy position was encountered south of Basra and
the aircraft were engaged by enemy artillery. They returned fire with
3 missiles, destroying a D-30 howitzer. The number of aircraft on patrol
was then increased to provide additional support to 1 QDG. After
further engagements, due to the concentration of targets, United States
fixed-wing aircraft were requested to enable UK helicopters to
disengage. Just after 0900, two AV-8B and two A-10 aircraft engaged,
with command and control provided by a forward air controller in a UK
Gazelle helicopter. Several targets were hit and destroyed.
Historical Branch (Army)
3.7. Independent helicopter tasks. Independent helicopter tasks are those

which can be carried out by helicopters independently of other arms, though
they may be part of a broader ground scheme of manoeuvre. They are
primarily focussed on offensive actions. These are most likely to be shaping
tasks but may be mission-decisive tasks in their own right.
“ Independent helicopter tasks are primarily

focussed on offensive actions.
”
27 Note that the NATO definition for an airmobile operation includes reference to
'engaging in ground combat'. This can potentially cause confusion with air assault
operation if interpreted as engaging immediately.
24 JDN 1/16
Soldiers deploy from a Chinook helicopter
3.8. Fixed-wing and helicopter-associated operations. Table 3.1 compares 3

the advantages and disadvantages of fixed-wing and helicopter-associated
operations.
Comparative advantages Comparative disadvantages

Likely to require international
Inter-theatre reach
airspace clearance
Ground force requires specific
Speed
training
Fixed-wing
operations Aircraft failure or loss can
Lift capacity result in losing a large portion
of ground force
Resupply/evacuation is
Massed delivery
difficult
More vulnerable during air
Battlefield reach
movement phase
Tactical persistence Limited lift capacity
Helicopter Communication difficulties
operations Versatility during air movement phase
(line of sight issues)
Access – smaller landing Limited range and
sites performance
Table 3.1 – Fixed-wing versus helicopter operations
JDN 1/16 25
Section 2 – Air manoeuvre in the

operational framework
3.9. Air manoeuvre can be applied across the operational framework which
covers understanding, shaping, decisive action, sustaining and protecting
phases of a concept of operations. Military activities are those that take place
as part of operations, with the primary purpose of combat.
3.10. Understanding. Understanding can be achieved by collecting

and analysing information gained by intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) activity and is a prerequisite for information and
decision superiority. It supports effective decision-making. Air manoeuvre
can contribute to understanding in several ways.
3 a. Direct collection of information by aerial surveillance using

helicopters.
b. Covert delivery of ground reconnaissance forces by parachute

or helicopter. Heavier recce forces can be inserted by air landing if
required, with varying degrees of combat readiness.
c. Providing an airborne command and control platform.
3.11. Shaping. Shaping actions set or preserve the conditions for

mission-decisive actions. Effective shaping increases tempo and should be
planned and executed along with understanding activities. Air manoeuvre
contributes to shaping actions in various ways.
a. Deterrence. The rapid delivery of a combined arms force by air

manoeuvre into a deteriorating situation could demonstrate resolve
and deter further aggression. Such an effect could also be created
through inference or demonstration on exercise.
26 JDN 1/16
b. Vertical envelopment.28 Passing over the enemy’s main defences

to secure a key objective (for example, a logistic or command node) to
keep them off-balance.
c. Precision strike or raid. Destroying a high-value target with a

precision strike or raid conducted by armed helicopters or ground
forces delivered by helicopter.
d. Seizing. Air manoeuvre can be used to seize key terrain, enabling

ground forces to maintain momentum.
e. Deception. Air manoeuvre can be used to influence behaviour or

mislead a target audience, using both its overt presence and its ability
to surprise.
f. Surprise. Air manoeuvre can be used to appear from an 3

unexpected place or direction at an unexpected time to surprise and
fix an adversary. This may tie down reserves, dislocate a headquarters
or disrupt logistic supplies.
Royal Marines with 40 Commando Group run through a smokescreen
28 Envelopment is an offensive manoeuvre in which the main attacking force passes

around or over the adversary’s principal defensive position to secure objectives to their
rear. Air manoeuvre forces may be employed as part of an enveloping force; this is also
known as a vertical envelopment. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Operations, 2010,
paragraph 0836.
JDN 1/16 27
Operation AGRICOLA
The spearhead of the British deployment into Kosovo was a

helicopter-borne force composed of elements of 5th Airborne Brigade,
inserting approximately 1,400 personnel from two infantry battalions,
and supporting artillery, logistic troops and engineers. Their main task in
the initial phase was to secure a terrain feature designated the ‘Kacanik
defile’ and the road leading from Pristina to Skopje, designated Route
HAWK, to prepare the way for follow-on forces. Central to this task was
facilitating forward passage of lines for the British 4th Armoured Brigade,
as well as brigades from Italy, Germany and France. Subsequent phases
continued this process for a United States brigade and other residual
elements.
3 The insertion of 1,400 troops from 5th Airborne Brigade was carried
out in several waves in less than three hours by eight Chinook and six
Puma helicopters flown by the RAF, with US Army Apache helicopters
in support. Prior to the operation, a Phoenix unmanned aerial vehicle
had flown over the area of the defile for three days. Both helicopter and
electronic warfare assets had air defence as their priority tasks, and air
defence was a second priority for artillery assets after close support.
The operation commenced at 0500 on 12 June 1999, with the 1st

Battalion The Parachute Regiment elements being lifted to the far
end of the Kacanik defile from just south of the border between the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo, a distance of
approximately 15-20km. The brigade group successfully conducted
passage of lines with 4th Armoured Brigade. On 13 June, 5th Airborne
Brigade came under operational command of 4th Armoured Brigade and
was engaged in peacekeeping operations in and around Pristina.
3.12. Decisive action. Decisive action seeks to achieve mission-decisive

tasks through either engagement or exploitation. Air manoeuvre offers
opportunities that could give an advantage in situations where our ability
28 JDN 1/16
to manoeuvre is reduced or our ability to achieve surprise is limited. These

could include:
• using armed helicopters to destroy the enemy’s armoured reserve;

• capturing key adversary leaders;
• seizing vital ground; and
• delivering humanitarian aid to the civilian population.
3.13. Protecting. Air manoeuvre activities can also fulfil force protection
tasks. These could include:
• using helicopters to screen or guard a ground manoeuvre force,

including counter-reconnaissance operations;
• enabling the movement and infiltration of light forces; and/or
• suppressing enemy combatants.
3
3.14. Sustaining. Sustaining tasks enable land forces to survive, move
and fight. Joint enabling capabilities such as permanent joint operating
bases and joint logistics are, and will remain, fundamental to delivering
and sustaining power projection.29 Air manoeuvre provides air-enabled
movement of casualties, encompassing casualty evacuation and medical
evacuation.30 It can also enable intra-theatre airlift31 by conducting security
tasks along lines of communication thereby allowing:
• tactical resupply of air manoeuvre forces or ground manoeuvre

forces outside of static locations; and/or
• prepositioning of equipment or resources to support an air or

ground manoeuvre force (this could also apply to engineer stores or
air portable artillery and ammunition).
29 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Future Joint Operating Concept-Primer,

page 19.
30 See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support for
details of casualty evacuation and medical evacuation. Strategic aeromedical evacuation
also falls under personnel recovery but would not be considered under air manoeuvre.
31 See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine, page 3-19. Intra-
theatre airlift is a component of air logistic support dealing with the provision of logistics
between bases within theatre using tactical air transport.
JDN 1/16 29
Operation SILVER BAYONET, Vietnam
The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry was tasked to conduct an air assault at the
base of the Chu Pong massif, south of the Ia Drang Valley on
14 November 1965. To support this, a battery of 105mm guns were
moved into a landing zone by Chinook helicopters, 15km east of the
objective. These guns fired on the objective immediately prior to the air
assault, and continued to provide fire support throughout the operation.
A Merlin helicopter carries a 105mm light gun
30 JDN 1/16
Key points
• Air manoeuvre allows forces to rapidly deploy into theatre directly
from the UK.
• Air manoeuvre operations apply to both the land and littoral

environments.
• Airborne forces are primarily transported by fixed-wing transport

aircraft.
• Airdrop delivery involves the air movement of personnel and/or cargo

by aircraft into an objective area and their subsequent delivery by
parachute.
• Air land delivery involves the air movement of personnel and/or cargo
which are then landed on or near their objective by a fixed-wing 3
aircraft.
• Air manoeuvre offers opportunities that could give an advantage in

situations where our ability to manoeuvre is reduced or our ability to
achieve surprise is limited.
JDN 1/16 31
Operational
considerations for air
manoeuvre
Chapter 4 details the considerations required for air
manoeuvre operations, ranging from command through
to sustaining activities.
Chapter 4
4
Section 1 – Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Section 2 – Inform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Section 3 – Prepare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Section 4 – Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Section 5 – Operate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Section 6 – Protect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Section 7 – Sustain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
JDN 1/16 33
Operational considerations for air manoeuvre
“ Strategic air assault is wasted if it is

dissipated piecemeal in sporadic
4
attacks between which the enemy has
an opportunity to readjust defenses or
recuperate.
”
General Henry H. 'Hap' Arnold, USAAF
34 JDN 1/16
Chapter 4 – Operational
considerations for air manoeuvre
Section 1 – Command
4.1. Commanding air manoeuvre operations effectively requires a joint
perspective. This is best achieved with a joint headquarters, with suitably
qualified and experienced single-Service staff embedded at all levels.
Correctly configured, equipped, manned and trained, joint command and
control organisations will be fundamental to success.
4.2. Joint air assets are highly sought after, but as they are generally
limited in numbers there is potential to fragment the joint air effort as
components compete for them. Consequently, control of air assets is often
centralised at a higher level than that of land or maritime forces ensuring 4
competing demands are prioritised and apportioned accordingly. The
execution of joint air operations is usually delegated to the lowest practical
level of understanding, which may be the cockpit or the environmental
headquarters.32 It is, therefore, useful to understand the links and
relationships between the air, land and maritime components through the
chain of command.
4.3. The Joint Force Air Component Commander will establish a Joint
Force Air Component Headquarters with a number of key divisions and
an embedded Air Operations Centre.33 The Air Operations Centre is the
principal centre from which air and space operations are directed, monitored,
controlled, executed and coordinated with the other components. It
produces the air tasking order, airspace control order, air defence plan and
special instructions.
4.4. The Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land) provides air expertise,
allocates support tasks to its associated tactical air control parties, and
32 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine, paragraph 349.
33 Further detail on the Joint Force Air Component Headquarters is in Air Publication
3002, Air and Space Warfare. Divisions are: strategy; combat plans; combat operations;
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and combat support.
JDN 1/16 35
integrates the liaison and coordination functions relating to joint air and
space operations.34 It reports to the Air Operations Centre and will normally
co-locate with the highest tactical level.
4.5. The Air Support Operations Centre is the senior fielded air component.
It provides the full range of air command and control functions at the
tactical level, and is the UK’s principal air command and control agency for
controlling joint air operations supporting ground forces. It coordinates
close air support and processes immediate requests for air support to ground
manoeuvre forces.
4.6. Lower tactical units will also have an air liaison element attached to
them and are formed around the tactical air control parties. Tactical air
control parties will: advise the ground force commander on capabilities and
limitations; coordinate airspace control measures; de-conflict joint air assets
with other fire support; and provide the primary terminal attack control
of close air support. This last role is carried out by a joint terminal attack
4 controller.
4.7. In addition to the tactical air control parties, air staff officers are
permanently established at the lower tactical level.35 They assist with
planning and coordinating battlespace management. Under some
circumstances, the brigade air staff officers may be further augmented by
the Air Support Operations Centre.36
4.8. The Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) Air Manoeuvre Planning, Training
and Advisory Team provides helicopter advice and staff support to the
higher tactical level and to the SO2 Aviation. The Joint Helicopter Force
Headquarters staff supports the brigade, and will provide a liaison officer
to them. If the lower tactical level does not already have an established
SO2 Aviation, they may also receive one to provide helicopter expertise.
Battlegroups do not normally have helicopter liaison; however, the package
34 These include: close air support; air interdiction; suppression of enemy air defence; air
mobility; ISR; and personnel recovery.
35 Adaptive force and reactive force brigades have differing requirements and manning
levels. This example assumes a brigade during pre-deployment training and deployment.
36 Air Publication 3002, Air and Space Warfare.
36 JDN 1/16
commander/air mission commander, and possibly planning team37 support

from the joint helicopter force, will assist the battlegroup staff during the
planning phase of an air manoeuvre operation. 16 Air Assault Brigade are
uniquely staffed for their role, with a wider range of established air posts.38
4.9. Effective liaison between the executing component and air component
is a key factor in the success of air manoeuvre operations. At the highest
level, liaison elements from each component are embedded with the other.
Figure 4.1 outlines the liaison relationship, giving the most extreme example
of a corps deployment in a coalition. Maritime command is detailed in
Chapter 6.
Commander Joint Task Force
JFSFCC JFLCC JFMCC JFACC

ALE ALE ALE LLE
MLE
Corps AOCC (L) MAOC AOCC (M) JFAC HQ 4
BCD
AMPTAT Divison ASOC MCE
JHF HQ Brigade TACP Joint

ASO
Maritime
Helicopter Land
package Battlegroup TACP Air
command
JTAC/
Company FST
ALE Air liaison element JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Command
AMPTAT Air Manoeuvre Planning Training and Advisory Team JFSFCC Joint Force Special Forces Component Command
AOCC (L)/(M) Air Operations Coordination Cell (Land)/(Maritime) JHF HQ Joint Helicopter Force Headquarters
ASOC Air Support Operations Centre JTAC Joint terminal attack controlle
BCD Battlefield coordination detachment LLE Land liaison element
FST Fire support team MAOC Maritime Air Operations Cell
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Command MCE Maritime coordination element
JFAC HQ Joint Force Air Component Headquarters MLE Maritime liaison element
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Command TACP ASO Tactical Air Control Party Air Staff Officer
Figure 4.1 – Command and linkages
37 A planning team may consist of an aircraft operator and a mobile air operations team,
with communications.
38 3 Commando Brigade are also uniquely staffed to support air activities within littoral
manoeuvre.
JDN 1/16 37
4.10. In NATO, a division or a corps could fulfil the Land Component

Command headquarters, with assigned helicopters grouped and organised
under a brigade, division or corps depending on the mission or nature of the
operation. NATO force generation may resource helicopters from a variety
of troop contributing nations, forming a composite force commanded by the
lead nation. Air manoeuvre operations are conducted in a similar manner to
the UK, by ensuring the Ground Tactical Commander has the required aircraft
and planning and liaison staff.
4.11. In the UK, the Military Aviation Authority regulates the risk to life
associated with operating aircraft under the aviation duty holder construct.
Risk to life can be said to be reduced to a level that is 'as low as reasonably
practicable' (ALARP) when the cost of further risk reduction (mitigation)
is grossly disproportionate to the benefits of risk reduction. Determining
whether a risk is ALARP will include the assessment of good practice, a
quantitative assessment and a qualitative assessment. It is a balance of gain
versus the cost (in time, effort and financial terms). Further detail on risk
4 management and air safety can be found in Air Publication 3002, Air and
Space Warfare.
Section 2 – Inform
4.12. Air and land intelligence requirements are often focussed differently.
It is critical to share information within the headquarters to develop an
accurate intelligence picture for all aspects of an air manoeuvre operation.
Intelligence staff of the individual Services39 must interact with each
other and maximise their ability to reach back to their single-Service
intelligence fusion centres and joint intelligence (J2) assets in the operational
headquarters. Joint helicopter force elements must also be provided with a
communications link into their supported headquarters.
“It is critical to share information within the

headquarters to develop an accurate intelligence
picture for all aspects of an air manoeuvre operation.
39 Air intelligence (A2), land intelligence (G2) and maritime intelligence (N2).
”
38 JDN 1/16
4.13. Helicopter force information requirements will extend beyond those

required by the ground manoeuvre force. They will require:
• mission-planning system mapping and imagery;
• environmental and meteorological information (to inform

operational, training and engineering requirements);
• connectivity (for example, voice and data links) to the Permanent

Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and Air Warfare Centre;
• specific legal direction on rules of engagement and targeting

directives; and
• specific airspace management information.
The Watchkeeper – an unmanned air system
JDN 1/16 39
Section 3 – Prepare
4.14. Force generation for tactical air manoeuvre operations is normally

conducted from within a deployed joint helicopter force and ground
manoeuvre force. The overall joint helicopter force package is task-organised
against the required task by JHC/Army Headquarters and where appropriate,
with a coalition headquarters. On occasion, forces are generated for specific
air manoeuvre tasks from the home base. This also applies for airborne and
air land operations.
4.15. PJHQ will develop the operational statement of requirement for

forces. Once endorsed by the MOD, a force generation order will direct the
respective headquarters of Land Forces, Air Command and Navy Command
to generate the most appropriate military capability. Most elements will be
found from units at high and very-high readiness. PJHQ then ratifies and
4 authorises the force elements to deploy.
4.16. The JHC holds the Vanguard Aviation Force elements at readiness,
which consists of three joint helicopter force headquarters and a pool of
helicopters held at readiness.40 Their construct and aircraft allocation will
vary based on the task. Once deployed, helicopter availability will depend
on a number of factors including engineering support, spares provision
and the operating environment. Aircraft will be at graduated readiness to
accommodate this. The total number of available aircraft will likely be lower
than the total number in theatre. As a planning guideline, the Defence Rotary
Wing Capability Study suggests an availability figure of 66%; this figure will
vary and the relevant joint helicopter force headquarters will provide advice
accordingly.
4.17. There are similar constraints on availability of air assets, encompassing

attack aircraft, strategic air transport, tactical air transport and joint
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. Early engagement,
particularly for training activities, is required to ensure all parties’ priorities
are met. Additionally, the Defence Support Chain Operations and
40 Joint Helicopter Force 1 (JHF 1) is based on the Attack Helicopter Force; JHF 2, the
Commando Helicopter Force; and JHF 3, RAF Support Helicopter Force.
40 JDN 1/16
Movements tasks all strategic air transport41 to support Defence activities.

As such, there may also be extra constraints on strategic air transport
availability, particularly for training.
Operation PALLISER
On 5 May 2000, the Cabinet Office agreed to deploy an operational

liaison and reconnaissance team to Sierra Leone in response to the threat
to the lives of British citizens and other entitled persons. Concurrently,
the spearhead lead element, based on the 1st Battalion, The Parachute
Regiment battlegroup, reduced its notice to move on 6 May, moving to
the Joint Air Mounting Centre that evening, and flying to Dakar, Senegal
on 7 May. C Company prepared and executed a tactical air landing
operation onto Lungi airfield in Sierra Leone that day. D Company, 2nd
Battalion, The Parachute Regiment were the last to deploy from Dakar,
waiting until 8 May for a C-130 aircraft to become available. Supporting
the operation were four Chinooks that had self-deployed over 6/7 to 8 4
May, allowing evacuation operations to begin that night.
Section 4 – Project
4.18. Air manoeuvre forces can project directly into theatre to conduct
operations. To do this, air manoeuvre forces will need to be trained and
equipped to a level that alleviates the absence of reception, staging, onward
movement and integration training. This must be completed either in the UK
or at a forward mounting base, if used, depending on the timeline. Very-high
readiness force elements must have reception, staging, onward movement
and integration procedures worked into their deployment plans.
4.19. Inter-theatre and battlespace air manoeuvre occur from either a

forward mounting base in the joint operations area, or from a forward
41 Air Publication 3002, Air and Space Warfare.
JDN 1/16 41
operations base within the area of operations or area of responsibility.

These force elements will have previously conducted theatre entry and the
associated reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI)
training.42
4.20. Staging through a forward mounting base has the main advantage
of extending the range and duration of an air manoeuvre operation. It also
allows reception, staging, onward movement and integration to take place
as well as building up resources and shortening the lines of communication.
The force is, therefore, prepared, but not committed. This may provide a
deterrence effect, though it potentially alerts the adversary to our intentions.
We can also use such perceptions as part of a deception plan with suitable
operations security.
4.21. UK military helicopters can be transported by air transport. However,

planners need to consider rebuild times which vary significantly by
helicopter type, along with the ability to project aircraft engineering
4 capabilities and sustain them. They may also self-deploy, though this will
have an impact on aircraft hours, maintenance and crew rest.
4.22. Helicopters may also be deployed by shipping them to the forward

mounting base or sea port of disembarkation; this is slower and requires
aircraft to be protected from the elements. However, it can deliver a
large number of aircraft in a single journey.43 Helicopters can launch from
military shipping, depending on levels of training, proximity to the target
and the ability to establish and sustain command and control, and lines of
communication. Helicopters require specific equipment and their aircrews
require collective training to operate from shipping on an enduring basis.
4.23. Establishing control of the air is essential to provide freedom of

manoeuvre in the air over a given period of time and is a prerequisite for
successful air manoeuvre operations. However, control of the air is a relative
condition and depends upon available resources and the commander’s risk
42 Reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) may also be conducted
on board ship if transiting to the joint operations area, or preparing to conduct littoral
manoeuvre.
43 Aircraft should not all be carried on the same ship to prevent their loss in the event
of it sinking. The Atlantic Conveyor was sunk in 1982 resulting in the loss of all Chinooks
onboard, destined for the Falklands Task Force.
42 JDN 1/16
appetite. Control of the air may be difficult, even if the adversary only has
ground-based weapons.
4.24. Air manoeuvre operations may need to overcome some form of air
defence.44 This is achieved by conducting counter-air operations, a subset of
control of the air. Counter-air operations in support of air manoeuvre include
all actions taken, by any component, to gain and maintain control of the
air. It requires careful coordination of all elements of the joint and possibly
multinational force. These operations may involve fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft/remotely piloted aircraft, special
forces, air-land-sea electronic warfare, artillery and ground manoeuvre
forces.
4.25. Defensive counter-air operations are responsive and seek to nullify

or reduce the effectiveness of enemy air and missile threats after launch.
Offensive counter-air operations are proactive and seek to dominate the
enemy’s airspace and prevent the launch of threats; they are preferred to
defensive counter-air. Offensive counter-air operations include surface attack 4
operations, air-to-air fighter sweep and escort missions, and suppression of
enemy air defences. Land and maritime forces may be able to contribute to
the latter.
4.26. A large air manoeuvre operation may require extensive resourcing to

achieve control of the air. A composite air operation (COMAO) describes a
force flow or force package45 of a large number of aircraft with a variety of
complementary roles to achieve a task. It may contain fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft. A composite air operation is tasked by the Air
Operations Centre in-line with the priority of the land scheme of manoeuvre.
4.27. A successful composite air operation requires extensive coordination.

The air and executing component planning teams should be aware of a
potential disconnect between themselves due to differences in battle
44 Now incorporated under the term anti-access and area denial (A2AD), covering
defence against entry operations in all environments (urban, air, littoral and so on).
JDP 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine, page 3-4.
45 Force flow consists of missions to attack separate targets against a common objective,
synchronised by time. A package targets one target or objective within a window of time:
concentration of effect.
JDN 1/16 43
procedure, notably different planning timelines.46 This is particularly

significant when planning to integrate JHC rotary-wing aircraft with
fixed-wing aircraft into a composite air operation as each aircraft type has
different operational parameters.
Operation MOSHTARAK
On 13 February 2010, the International Security and Assistance Force

(ISAF), in cooperation with units of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), initiated an operation intended to remove the Taliban from the
town of Marjah and other remaining strongholds in central Helmand
province.
The operation itself began with the launch of command and control
Sea King aircraft, followed by conditions-setting US and UK attack
helicopters to ensure the security of helicopter landing sites. Precision
infrared flare drops by KC-130 and A-10 aircraft ensured helicopter
4 landing sites were suitably lit, with imagery provided to the Bastion Joint
Operations Centre by three unmanned aircraft/remotely piloted aircraft
lines and four Tornado aircraft.
In total, 37 helicopters from three nations lifted troops into the area of
operations. The operation commenced at 0400, and in the space of two
hours 1,200 combined force troops were delivered into 16 helicopter
landing sites across Nad-e-Ali and western Babaji, previously secured by
ISAF and ANSF special operations forces. The insertion was carried out in
11 waves during darkness and was completed as planned by first light.
Waves were sequenced and separated by time and height, with each
national element having its own allocated airspace. Additionally, a
discrete corridor was established for the use of medical evacuation and
supporting aircraft.
46 Pamphlet 101, Army Aviation Operations Manual (which uses Air Publication 3002
as its source), Chapter 8, paragraph 808, provides detailed guidance for land aviation
commanders participation in planning composite air operations. Timelines refer to
a ‘typical’ 48-72 hour land planning cycle compared to a potentially much shorter air
planning cycle. See Annex A for further details on planning cycles.
44 JDN 1/16
4.28. When projecting airborne forces, communications may be required

back to the UK and/or the forward mounting base while in flight. Some
aircraft may have beyond-line-of-sight capability, although this may not
always be achievable. The Boeing E-3D Sentry aircraft, an airborne warning
and control system (AWACS), can provide the command element during
projection. The E-3D Sentry can communicate with the package aircraft and
is capable of reaching back to its command, giving better communication
reach during the air movement phase.
4.29. The air movement phase is planned primarily by the air staff within
the land formation. However, joint parallel planning remains essential as
this phase is derived from the landing and ground tactical plan; timings and
sequencing will all be built from these two elements. As joint planning is
often done concurrently, the ground force element of the air manoeuvre
force must ensure that it arrives at a workable solution specifying the
effect to be created with enough time to allow the air component to plan
effectively. The ground force element should also attempt to minimise
significant changes to the plan once it has been issued. 4
A joint approach – Apache helicopters on deck
JDN 1/16 45
Section 5 – Operate
4.30. Planners must be aware of the complexities inherent within air
manoeuvre operations, particularly within a coalition environment. This can
include:
• congested airspace;
• different airspace management procedures;
• complicated command chains; and
• disjointed air and land planning procedures.
An outline planning guide is contained in Annex A.
Operating in a complex battlespace – Operation HERRICK
4 Number 1 Air Control Centre (1 ACC) is the UK’s deployable airspace

management command and control asset and it was deployed to
Afghanistan from 2006-2010. 1 ACC established the RAF’s Air Support
Operations Centre whose remit is to provide dynamic procedural
airspace control. The Marine Air Ground Task Force deployed into
Helmand from late 2009 and established the Direct Air Support Centre
(DASC), (call sign ‘OVERLORD’) and executed procedural control of the
Helmand airspace. 1 ACC then supplemented the US Marine Corps
(USMC) manning at both the DASC and the Tactical Air Operations
Centre. The control of airspace in Regional Command (South-West) was
therefore based on USMC procedural airspace management doctrine
and UK forces had to adapt to integrate.
It is unlikely that UK aircraft will enjoy the same freedoms on future

operations as they did on Operation HERRICK. Effective airspace
management remains a risk for contingency if not redressed in future
training activity.
46 JDN 1/16
4.31. Battlespace management has become increasingly important as we

look to operate in congested and potentially coalition environments with a
rising number of unmanned aircraft being used. Battlespace encompasses
the electromagnetic, information and time dimensions, in addition to air and
space, land and maritime dimensions.
4.32. The range of battlespace management activities is broad. Joint

battlespace management includes land, air and space, maritime
and electromagnetic spectrum management. Maritime battlespace
management is covered in Chapter 6; electromagnetic spectrum
management is outside the scope of this publication.
4.33. Land battlespace management combines air and ground measures,

and considers four aspects: manoeuvre; fire support coordination
measures; air defence requirements; and airspace control. Land battlespace
management controls are split into terrain management (restrictions on
movement, boundaries and so on) and fire support coordination measures,
(restrictions and freedoms in using joint fires). Airspace management is the 4
integration and use of airspace by indirect surface-to-surface, air-to-surface,
surface-to-air weapons and air platforms.47
4.34. All components will invariably require access to airspace. However,

component airspace requirements may often conflict. Consequently, all
airspace requirements are considered at the joint force level and an airspace
control plan is constructed to provide the best compromise in-line with the
joint force commander’s operational priorities.
4.35. Airspace control is directed by the Airspace Control Authority (usually

the Joint Force Air Component Command) with the goal of increasing
combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient and flexible use of
airspace through the airspace control plan. It also helps prevent fratricide in
airspace that may be used by all component and civilian air traffic.
4.36. The airspace control plan is implemented by issuing the airspace

control order, which contains various control measures. This can be modified
47 Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.3.5.1, Joint Airspace Control Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures and JDP 3-70, Battlespace Management.
JDN 1/16 47
by airspace control means requests48 which allow components access to the

airspace that they require. These are promulgated by special instructions
when approved by the Airspace Control Authority.
4.37. The land/maritime component may not control the airspace above it.
Therefore, all activity in or through the air, must be coordinated between all
battlespace users. A portion of airspace can be delegated to a formation;
enabling faster decisions. During air manoeuvre operations the airspace
control means used include the following.
a. The coordination level. This is essentially a ‘stay above’ level for

fixed-wing aircraft and ‘stay below’ for helicopters.
b. High density airspace control zone. This zone allows the control
of a number of aircraft, fires and ground manoeuvre forces. This is
likely to be used within the area of operations.
4 c. Restricted operations zone. This zone is smaller than a high

density airspace control zone (HIDACZ), and allows temporary exclusive
use of an area of airspace. This is likely to be used on an objective for
air manoeuvre forces.
Additionally, air manoeuvre operations may use air corridors, air routes,
transit corridors and slow aviation asset flight routes49 to move aircraft.
Section 6 – Protect
4.38. Air manoeuvre forces are light by design, creating vulnerabilities that
must be considered. Organic firepower and mobility is relatively limited. The
firepower of fixed-wing attack aircraft and attack helicopters can offset this
to some degree. Due to distance limitations, air manoeuvre forces are reliant
on aircraft to sustain them. Air manoeuvre forces are particularly vulnerable
to poor weather conditions which will impact on casualty evacuation and the
48 Known as an ACMREQ. Airspace control means are methods used to control airspace
– high density airspace control zone, restricted operations zone and so on. Allied Joint
Publication (AJP)-3.3.5(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control, page 2-4.
49 Ibid., slow aviation asset flight routes are described on page A-7.
48 JDN 1/16
logistics chain. An inability to reinforce or withdraw the air manoeuvre force

may lead to isolation and mission failure.
4.39. Combat identification is critical. This applies to control of the air,

air defence and interaction with aircraft and ground forces. Combat
identification consists of three related elements:
• situational awareness;
• target identification; and
• tactics, techniques and procedures.50
4.40. Air identification can be achieved using positive or procedural means

and effective battlespace coordination. Air defence can be coordinated with
battlespace management measures supported by identification, friend or foe
(IFF) systems.
4.41. Air manoeuvre aircraft are susceptible to many weapons systems

but tactics and equipment can mitigate their effectiveness. Air platform 4
protection measures, including defensive aids, jammers, exhaust suppression
and expendable countermeasures, can defeat many modern weapons.
Continual weapons development requires air platform protection systems to
be continually upgraded. Commanders must consider the assessed threat in
theatre balanced against the capabilities of defensive systems, taking advice
from the deployed helicopter subject matter experts and/or the Air Warfare
Centre.
“ Air manoeuvre aircraft are susceptible to many

weapons systems but tactics and equipment can
mitigate their effectiveness.
”
50 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) 3-62, Combat Identification,
paragraph 105. Target identification can be improved with recognition training.
JDN 1/16 49
Section 7 – Sustain
4.42. Joint logistics51 and lines of communication support air manoeuvre
forces, particularly aircraft. This relies on capability coherence, commonality
in equipment and supplies and appropriate preparation time. These factors
are increasingly important due to the consistent paucity of strategic and
tactical air transport and support helicopters. They should be planned for
accordingly.
4.43. Aircraft and aircrew availability is a key consideration for the duration
of an air manoeuvre operation. Due to their mechanical complexity and
environmental sensitivity, aircraft require regular maintenance, which is
resource intensive. This means the number of available aircraft will be less
than the number deployed whilst maintenance is carried out. Aircrew must
also be adequately rested to operate effectively.
4 4.44. The joint helicopter force provides its own first-line combat service
support including supply,52 basic repair and maintenance. The heavy
emphasis on fuel, ammunition and spares requires ground lines of
communication. Hard standings are preferred with covered and well-lit
engineering environments. These offer the best opportunity for timely
maintenance. There is also a significant requirement for connectivity and
bandwidth for engineering and mission planning information technology.
4.45. The capacity of second and third line sustainment is a major

consideration when deploying air manoeuvre forces. Sustainment
requirements beyond two days will be drawn from second and third line
enablers, or a joint combat service support element such as the RAF Tactical
Supply Wing. Access to these resources is most likely by ground lines of
communication.
4.46. Projecting the air manoeuvre force requires priming equipment packs
to be issued to those ground and helicopter forces involved. This will include
ammunition, medical equipment and other spares and consumables. The
51 JDP 4-00, Logistics for Joint Operations.
52 Supplies are defined as: all material and items used in the equipment, support and
maintenance of military forces. Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary
of Terms and Definitions.
50 JDN 1/16
first line priming equipment packs is scaled at three days consumption.

Second and third line packs53 are deployed once forward logistic elements
are in position to receive them. Joint helicopter forces also require deployed
spares packs to be held at first line to enable maintenance. A land deployed
spares pack is resourced for 15 days use; a maritime deployed spares pack for
28 days use.
Supplying the newly landed force with vital equipment
53 A first line priming equipment pack contains three days combat supplies and materiel;
second line has three days of each; third line has six days combat supplies and 22 of
materiel.
JDN 1/16 51
4.47. UK operational-level planning includes developing sustainability

requirements using the '4D' framework.54 The 4Ds are: distance; destination;
demand; and duration.
4.48. When planning and conducting air manoeuvre operations, there are
many factors to consider within the 4D framework.
a. Distance considerations could include: transportation mode;

endurance; and lines of communication – air, land and sea.
b. Destination considerations could include: geography; altitude;

weather; infrastructure; technical support; road networks; and civilian
contractors.
c. Demand considerations could include: size of forces; transport

capacity; fuel (quality and quantity); spares; and personnel.
4 d. Duration considerations could include: logistic support; rotation;

replacements; and maintenance.
The above factors, which may overlap in the framework, represent an

indicative example only and will be far more detailed in the operational
environment. The 4D framework is vital for sustaining air manoeuvre
operations.
54 JDP 4-00, Logistics for Joint Operations, (4th Edition), page 156.
52 JDN 1/16
Key points
• Effective liaison between the land and air component is a key factor in
the success of air manoeuvre operations.
• It is critical to share information within the headquarters to develop

an accurate intelligence picture for all aspects of an air manoeuvre
operation.
• Air manoeuvre forces can project directly into theatre to conduct

operations.
• Staging through a forward mounting base has the main advantage of

extending the range and duration of an air manoeuvre operation.
• A large air manoeuvre operation may require extensive resourcing to

achieve control of the air. 4
• Planners must be aware of the complexities inherent within air
manoeuvre operations, particularly within a coalition environment.
• Air manoeuvre forces are light by design, creating vulnerabilities that

must be considered.
JDN 1/16 53
Conducting air
manoeuvre in the land
environment
Chapter 5 outlines broad considerations for conducting air
manoeuvre in the land environment.
Chapter 5
Section 1 – Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5
Section 2 – Shaping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Section 3 – Decisive action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Section 4 – Protecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Section 5 – Sustaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
JDN 1/16 55
Conducting air manoeuvre in the land environment
“ This operation is not being planned

with any alternatives. This operation
is planned as a victory, and that's the
way it's going to be. We're going down
5 there, and we're throwing everything we
have into it, and we're going to make it a
success.
”
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
56 JDN 1/16
Chapter 5 – Conducting air

manoeuvre in the land environment
5.1. An air manoeuvre force is capable of conducting the core functions
(find, fix, strike and exploit) across the operational framework. It offers
particular utility at the divisional level when conducting decisive and shaping
operations distant from the main force. Air manoeuvre gives the commander
the ability to conduct tactical activity at reach, free from the constraints of
the terrain and over a wider area than that afforded to purely ground forces.
It cannot be conducted without effective air land integration.55
5.2. An air manoeuvre force package may be significant in terms of

manpower and aircraft. A key role for the higher commander is to plan for,
and accommodate, enablers with long lead times ensuring the executing
unit is resourced and informed appropriately. The following considerations
will allow the higher commander to support the executing unit and to
synchronise air manoeuvre as part of land manoeuvre. 56 5
Section 1 – Understanding
5.3. Intelligence gathering and developing situational awareness can be
achieved with both piloted aircraft and unmanned/remotely piloted aircraft.
Reconnaissance and, to an extent, attack helicopters, have intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) gathering capabilities. Helicopters,
other piloted aircraft and unmanned/remotely piloted aircraft can be
synchronised with ground manoeuvre forces to improve the intelligence
picture. However, consideration must be given to transmitting and
processing information in the absence of real-time air-to-ground links.
55 The higher land commander (Land Component Commander) could range from a corps
to a brigade. The larger the higher commander, the more air manoeuvre resources it is
able to control. The executing unit may be a brigade or battlegroup.
56 Guidance for planning and conducting air manoeuvre operations at brigade and
battlegroup level can be found in Doctrine Note 15/02, Airmobile Operations and Doctrine
Note 14/07, Tactical Air Landing Operations.
JDN 1/16 57
5.4. The executing unit will be unlikely to possess tactical unmanned

aircraft or have sufficient lead time to conduct an ISR soak.57 The higher
command must bid for and employ ISR assets to develop a broad
understanding of the objective area. Given that this may be in the deep
battlespace, the commander may have to request assets outside of their own
command.
5.5. In addition to the objective area, ISR may be required on landing sites
and on segments of air movement corridors. There is potential for a large
number of ISR assets to be tasked to an air manoeuvre operation. To that
end, the burden of controlling and interpreting ISR may fall to the higher
command as it may be beyond the capability of the brigade to do so.
5.6. The higher command must link in with air intelligence (A2), and should
request a liaison officer to achieve this. Air intelligence will have access to
the Air Operations Coordination Centre and by reachback to the Air Warfare
Centre in the UK. This allows air intelligence to conduct immediate analysis
of threats in the area. This will determine if UK aircraft are able to mitigate
the threat with existing weapons or defensive aid suites, or whether the
5 threat will significantly affect air operations. The higher command will
therefore be able to determine the feasibility of the mission prior to starting
detailed planning.
5.7. The Land Component Commander is responsible for liaising with the
Air Operations Centre to ensure that the requirements for all land force
elements (notably helicopters) are reflected in the air tasking order special
instructions (SPINS). SPINS provides identification, friend or foe (IFF) codes
and laser codes, as well as covering frequency management.
5.8. The higher command must ensure that all force elements are
supported by sufficient information technology and bandwidth. The Joint
Helicopter Force Headquarters will require links to air intelligence; helicopter
operations rely heavily on information technology for mission planning and
equipment support functions.
57 Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance soak describes the use of various

complementary surveillance and reconnaissance systems to gather information about an
area or objective for an extended timeframe.
58 JDN 1/16
5.9. A commander’s critical information requirements should support the

entire air manoeuvre operation and force collaboration. Considerations for
the location and states of tactical landing zones, drop zones and helicopter
landing sites must be made early, along with options for forward arming and
refuelling points and identifying air defence assets to advise the operational
risk management process.
Section 2 – Shaping
5.10. The air support operations cell is likely to be embedded within
a division. They will work with the Air Manoeuvre Planning Team to
synchronise the air tasking cycle. Divisional planners must accommodate the
48-hour cycle required to produce the air tasking order. This is best achieved
by articulating clear requirements and engaging with the air support
operations cell in sufficient time. However, divisional planners must also be
flexible enough to accommodate shorter notice tasks using aircraft available
at higher readiness states.58
5
5.11. Deception for air assault operations can be achieved using helicopters
and troops; an airmobile operation taking place on a flank could mislead the
enemy as to the true objective. However, this goes against the principle of
delivering sufficient mass within the first wave of an air assault, which may
result in loss of surprise. Deception may be better achieved with the use of
ground manoeuvre forces within a scheme of manoeuvre.
5.12. The higher command must interpret the theatre targeting directive and
rules of engagement to accommodate nuances with helicopter weaponry.
For example, Apache can generate a firing solution using just the radar, and
fire on it. The directive may allow this, or demand that it visually confirms
the target. Deconfliction measures (separation by height, time or space)
will be required for effectively integrating helicopters into a composite air
operation.
58 Joint Helicopter Force (JHF) Headquarters or Joint Aviation Group (JAG) may hold
aircraft at readiness to accommodate short notice tasks. The air tasking order will have
aircraft configured for close air support that can react to short notice tasking using the
joint tactical air request process.
JDN 1/16 59
5.13. Planning for the use of a forward arming and refuelling point may
require a lead time beyond the planning cycle of the brigade. Forward
arming and refuelling points operate in a matrix – opening, closing and
moving – with two to three operating for an attack helicopter regiment.
They will require accommodation with battlespace management to move
and also to accommodate other aircraft. This is particularly relevant if the
ground forces are manoeuvring.
5.14. Advance forces will require robust communications, an extraction

plan and access to offensive support. This may require divisional support,
especially if they are deployed at significant ranges: for example, Pathfinders.
Frequent training is essential to retain familiarity and competence with air
manoeuvre. This applies equally to ground forces and aircrew.
Single-Service and joint training is essential for developing a competent air
manoeuvre force.
“ Single-Service and joint training is essential for

developing a competent air manoeuvre force.
5
”
Section 3 – Decisive action
5.15. Specialist forces such as 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando
Brigade are more suited to the wider range of air manoeuvre tasks. The
former is optimised for airborne and air assault. However, all light forces
are capable of airmobile operations with a small amount of training. As a
minimum, this will require unit familiarisation training coordinated by the
Joint Helicopter Force Headquarters, including staged trooping drills. A basic
level of air manoeuvre training should be conducted during the training year
for all light forces. Table 5.1 summarises the use within the spectrum of air
manoeuvre of specialist forces against general light forces.
60 JDN 1/16
Specialist air manoeuvre forces Generalist light forces

Familiar with emplaning/deplaning
Routine use of helicopters
techniques
Familiar with specialist insertion/ Can operate from a helicopter
landing techniques landing site or tactical airstrip
Require air planning team to
Expert in integrating air and land
support battlespace management/
fires
fires planning
May also be mechanised or
Conducted by specialist light forces armoured forces operating out of
role
Headquarters manned and
Headquarters manned and trained
trained to conduct air manoeuvre
to conduct airmobile operations
operations
Table 5.1 – Specialist air manoeuvre forces and generalist light forces
5.16. Tactical command of air manoeuvre operations will normally sit with
the ground tactical commander who commands the ground elements of
the air manoeuvre force. However, abort authority may be delegated to the 5
package commander during the air movement phase. For helicopter-only
tasks, the package commander retains command throughout. If a composite
air operation is used, the package leader, who may be fixed-wing or helicopter
package commander, will fulfil a similar role.
5.17. Air manoeuvre operations (less helicopter-only tasks) consist of

five phases. These phases are planned in reverse to fully sequence and
synchronise the constituent parts; the phases are listed below.
a. The staging phase involves moving troops and equipment to

the Joint Air Mounting Centre, a forward mounting base or helicopter
landing site. It can also mean moving troops and equipment on to a
ship, like the landing platform helicopter (LPH).
b. The loading phase covers the embarkation of troops and

equipment onto the aircraft.
JDN 1/16 61
c. The air movement phase begins when an aircraft leaves the Joint
Air Mounting Centre, forward mounting base or helicopter landing site
and ends when troops and equipment are delivered to the landing site.
d. The landing phase begins with troops and equipment exiting the
aircraft and includes rallying procedures to form tactical groupings.
e. The ground tactical phase covers achieving initial objectives and

extends until the mission is completed and the air manoeuvre force is
relieved or reinforced.
5.18. Once the mission is complete, a final consideration should be whether

to extract the air manoeuvre force or to integrate it with the ground
manoeuvre force. Integration gives continuity and improves combat power.
Extraction preserves the force and retains flexibility for the joint force
commander.
Staging phase
5 5.19. Staging essentially involves the mass movement, sustainment and

protection of air manoeuvre forces to the point of embarking aircraft. For
airmobile and most air assault operations, this is within the capabilities of
the executing brigade. Airborne and larger air assault operations launching
from a forward mounting base overseas may require additional resources
such as:
• ammunition transport and storage;
• proximity to appropriately sized landing sites for all aircraft to be

used, plus associated fuel and equipment support elements;
• space for accommodation, feeding, rehearsals, briefings, rigging of

loads; and
• personnel and equipment transport.
62 JDN 1/16
Loading phase
5.20. Site selection is linked to the

staging phase. Sequencing aircraft
loading is viable; however, this will
then require aircraft and embarked
troops to take off and circle whilst
waiting for the others.
Air movement phase
5.21. Aircraft and ground forces

should be able to communicate
directly but complications caused
by range and terrain masking
requires a robust command
and control plan. The higher
command can support this by
requesting command and control
aircraft; providing additional radio 5
rebroadcast capabilities and more
liaison officers. However, the
higher command must be aware Paratroopers line up to board
that command and control aircraft a Royal Air Force Hercules
are unlikely to be available beyond
initial insertion of air manoeuvre
forces, so the communications plan must be able to endure using other
methods (for example, high frequency, tactical satellite or radio rebroadcast).
5.22. During inter-theatre operations, communications for the ground

tactical commander and assault troops is difficult and, therefore, mostly
done via the aircrew. These communications can be between aircraft, to the
Boeing E-3D Sentry aircraft or to the UK and may be restricted by emissions
controls in place for the operation.
5.23. Each chalk commander and the embarked ground tactical commander
should have communications with their aircrew. Communications between
JDN 1/16 63
troops in different helicopters may be achievable if the aircraft have radio

capacity to set up an ‘assault frequency’ net for the embarked commanders
to use.
Landing phase
5.24. Landing sites include drop zones (parachute and aerial resupply);
tactical landing zones (air landing) and helicopter landing sites.59 Landing
site sizing and geographic considerations should be sought from suitably
qualified personnel.60 Aside from facilitating the safe ingress and egress
of aircraft and the proximity to the objective, there are several general
considerations for selecting landing sites.
a. The threat level and the weather, including wind, dust and light
levels, for example.
b. Landing sites should be flat or rolling, with the minimum of

obstacles – no obstacles for a tactical landing zone. Obstacles on a
drop zone will not prevent landing but could increase jump casualties.
5
c. Constructing and maintaining landing sites should demand the
minimum amount of engineering support, reducing the burden on
aircraft and resources.
d. The altitude of potential landing sites may not be supportable

due to operating restrictions of certain aircraft, in particular helicopters.
Temperature and humidity will also be a constraint as they affect air
density and, therefore, the ability to generate lift. High altitude and
high temperatures have the worst effect.
e. Landing sites will ideally use terrain that is easily defendable,

offering cover and concealment nearby.
59 See the lexicon for definitions of landing site, landing point and landing zone.
60 For example: appropriate aircrew; mobile air operations teams; defence helicopter
handling instructors; tactical air traffic controllers; and air despatchers. The operational
situation will determine how long a landing site will take to recce and clear for use.
64 JDN 1/16
f. If tactically viable, proximity to a road network can ease the

movement of troops and equipment from the landing site. It also
allows more rapid movement of a link-up force to it.
Of course, some of these considerations may also give advantage to an

adversary. Landing site selection should balance our own benefit against the
possible loss of surprise.
16th Air Assault Brigade jumping
5.25. A Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) study61 found that
within the battlegroup scale of air manoeuvre operations, larger operations
were more successful. Parachute and air assault operations should aim
to deliver a battlegroup in a single wave to achieve surprise. The higher
command will be required to allocate or bid for sufficient aircraft to permit
mass.
5.26. Air manoeuvre works best if it is synchronised with other ground

manoeuvre or ship to objective manoeuvre. However, air manoeuvre
61 Dstl conducted a historical analysis of air manoeuvre operations since the Second
World War to support a series of air manoeuvre war games with 16 Air Assault Brigade held
during March 2015.
JDN 1/16 65
objectives must be mutually supportable and within the span of command

and achievable range of influence for the commander. There may be a
temptation to over-reach with air manoeuvre forces, relying too heavily on
the principle of surprise to maintain initial success.
Operation SABRE TOOTH, Borneo
In March 1964, the 2nd Battalion, 10th Gurkha Rifles (2/10 GR) attempted
to intercept a mixed force of Indonesian infantry which had crossed the
border into Malaysian Borneo. The pursuit by C Company failed to locate
the enemy, but intelligence was received which led them to expect
another incursion. B Company was tasked with setting an ambush along
the Indonesians’ route, whilst C Company was ordered to block the
enemy’s retreat.
On 26 March, A Company of the Indonesian ‘Black Cobras’ Battalion

crossed the border into Sarawak, heading straight into B Company, 2/10
GR’s waiting ambush. To guarantee the enemy’s successful interception,
5 the commanding officer decided to reinforce the pursuing units with
D Company, the assault pioneer and reconnaissance platoons and
the recently attached independent Gurkha Parachute Company. This
meant that 2/10 GR’s battalion area was held only by A Company and
an attached token force. These units were moved to establish a cordon
to prevent the Indonesians’ escape, and the rough terrain meant almost
all movement was undertaken by helicopter. Helicopters were used to
lift small units to tactical points, and, as the enemy retreated from the
ambush sprung by B Company, they were used to conduct small-scale
tactical lifts to bar potential escape routes. Throughout the three weeks
of Operation SABRE TOOTH, helicopters flown by 825 Naval Air Squadron
were used to lift 2,236 men and 152,050lbs of supplies in 164 flying
hours.
66 JDN 1/16
5.27. A composite air operation, in support of an air manoeuvre operation,

will have aircraft assigned to counter-land operations, for example, close air
support or strike. However, the air tasking order will also allow for additional
close air support aircraft to support operations. These aircraft can be tasked
using the joint tactical air request process and allows for dynamic targeting.
5.28. Planning must include the extraction or relief of air manoeuvre forces,
and so synchronisation with wider ground manoeuvre is essential. This is
particularly important for link-up operations, with clear rules of engagement
and methods of combat identification. Extraction also requires sufficient
mass of aircraft to move the air manoeuvre force – including advance forces
in the minimum number of waves.
Section 4 – Protecting
5.29. Threats can be mitigated through control of the air, defensive aids and
tactics, techniques and procedures. These are all enabled with robust joint
intelligence (J2) hinging on effective fusion of ground and air intelligence (G2
and A2). 5
Patrolling
JDN 1/16 67
5.30. Airfields require force protection.62 This should be provided by

ground forces63 that will support establishing local control of the air by
employing ground based air-defence, airspace control means and securing
terrain around the airfield. Protection can also be provided by the maritime
component if they are in range.
5.31. Local control of the air may be required to defend a tactical landing
zone. This will be achieved organically by the brigade using all arms air
defence and any attached short-range air defence assets. The division
should accommodate this by providing the brigade with a high density
airspace control zone.
5.32. Control of the air is a relative condition and may change. Sufficient
control of the air will be a go/no-go criterion for launching air manoeuvre
operations.64 Assessing the required level of control of the air is a necessity
for the whole operation, and not just the insertion and extraction. Although
led by the air component, the land and maritime components can contribute
to control of the air by supressing enemy air defences using their associated
weapon systems, for example, special forces, artillery or cruise missiles.
5
5.33. The identification method of ground forces must be established –
using correct tactics, techniques and procedures – and an appropriate
weapon control state set. Situational awareness and a clear understanding
of both weapon effects and the rules of engagement reduce the risk of
fratricide.
5.34. Military engineering support to air manoeuvre operations is most likely

to be found from tactical ground close support engineering units. Using
light equipment, these units are capable of clearing obstacles and creating
defences; the latter being constrained by limits on manpower, resources and
time.
62 Allied and UK force protection considerations can be found in Allied Joint

Publication-3.14, Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection, 2015.
63 Protection may be provided by host nation forces.
64 These are elaborated on in Doctrine Note 15/02, Airmobile Operations.
68 JDN 1/16
5.35. Specialist units can undertake limited airfield and airstrip repair.
General support units will be required for more sophisticated defences and
for constructing or extensively repairing airfield or airstrip sites.
Dhofar
In 1962, a rebellion broke out in Oman’s Dhofar region. With British help,
the Sultan’s armed forces successfully defeated the rebellion by January
1976.
One vital part of the campaign in the early 1970’s was the protection of
the vital Salalah region. This required constructing a number of fortified
defensive lines and outposts stretching some 30 miles from the coast to
the inland. A number of strongholds were also built in the inland north.
All this was created in rough roadless terrain and was made possible with
both helicopter and fixed-wing airlift.
In 1974, the RAF sent a detachment of four 72 Squadron Wessex

helicopters, primarily to assist with constructing the ‘Hornbeam’ 5
defensive line. In six months they logged a total of 1,487 flying hours
and carried 2,750 tons of freight and 15,000 personnel. They participated
in six large artillery moves and six large offensive operations. The region
was protected and the rebels never really penetrated and threatened
Salalah.
Historical Branch (Air);

5.36. The higher command must interpret the theatre policy for joint
personnel recovery. If the division forms the land component command,
it is responsible for resourcing the joint personnel recovery plan. Planning
considerations for joint personnel recovery can be found in NATO Allied Joint
Publication (AJP)-3.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile
Environment.
JDN 1/16 69
5.37. The higher command is the main conduit for meteorological

information. Timely and accurate weather forecasting is crucial to planning
and sustaining air manoeuvre operations.
Section 5 – Sustaining
5.38. Sustaining the air manoeuvre force is one of the major constraints
on the amount of time the force can be deployed. Sustainment relies
on helicopter internal or underslung loads, air land or airdrop. In turn,
this depends on aircraft availability, weather and threat levels. Effective
allocation of limited medical and technical manpower and resources is
critical in air manoeuvre operations.
5.39. Deployed helicopters will operate from a helicopter forward operating

base. The size of a helicopter forward operating base depends on the size
of the force, logistic requirements, the threat and the environment, amongst
other considerations. A very large helicopter forward operating base is likely
5 to be accommodated within a larger main operating base; smaller footprints
may be incorporated into a ground manoeuvre force forward operating base,
or removed entirely if sea-basing is a viable option.
5.40. If the division and the joint helicopter force are advancing, helicopter
sustainment will most likely need to be moved by vehicle. Planners must
note that attack helicopter ammunition requirements are significant, and will
require a substantial number of palletised load system vehicles.
5.41. Helicopter activity will be restricted until the support chain is

established. This is still relevant for inter-theatre and, to an extent, tactical
operations, and has notable relevance for ground manoeuvre brigades which
have no organic combat service support capability to support helicopter
activities. Accurate forecasting of helicopter activity, based on effective
planning, will allow for proactive sustainment.
70 JDN 1/16
A Chinook helicopter
5.42. In the event of a theatre entry operation, fuel capacity will be severely
limited. A joint helicopter force headquarters can temporarily deploy its own 5
forward arming and refuelling point65 to permit extended missions. Forward
arming and refuelling point sizes vary; a small one could fit within a 100
metre perimeter clearing. An air land arming and refuelling point provides
a similar service that is air portable. The capacity of the aviation fuel supply
chain, and the quality of the fuel within it, is a critical factor in maintaining
the tempo of air manoeuvre operations. Though delivery of aviation fuel
during the initial period by air transport may be feasible, it would place
significant demand on air transport resources. Fuel may therefore be
supplied by contractors or the host nation but joint staff will need coherent
planning and close control to ensure reliability and quality of supply.
65 Or forward refuelling point if no arming is required.
JDN 1/16 71
Key points
• A commander’s critical information requirements should support the

entire air manoeuvre operation and force collaboration.
• An airmobile operation taking place on a flank could mislead the

enemy as to the true objective.
• Specialist forces such as 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando

Brigade are more suited to the wider range of air manoeuvre tasks.
• All light forces are capable of airmobile operations with a small amount
of training.
• Landing sites include drop zones (parachute and aerial resupply);

tactical landing zones (air landing) and helicopter landing sites.
• Landing site selection should balance our own benefit against the
5 possible loss of surprise.
• Parachute and air assault operations should aim to deliver a

battlegroup in a single wave to achieve surprise.
• Sustaining the air manoeuvre force is one of the major constraints on

the amount of time the force can be deployed.
• The capacity of the aviation fuel supply chain, and the quality of
the fuel within it, is a critical factor in maintaining the tempo of air
manoeuvre operations.
72 JDN 1/16
Notes:
JDN 1/16 73
Conducting air
manoeuvre in the littoral
Chapter 6 outlines considerations for conducting air
manoeuvre in the littoral environment.
Chapter 6
Section 1 – Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Section 2 – Inform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 6
Section 3 – Prepare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Section 4 – Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Section 5 – Operate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Section 6 – Protect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Section 7 – Sustain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
JDN 1/16 75
Conducting air manoeuvre in the littoral
“ A landing on a foreign coast in the face

of hostile troops has always been one of
the most difficult operations of war.
6 ”
Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart
76 JDN 1/16
Chapter 6 – Conducting air manoeuvre

in the littoral
6.1. Air manoeuvre in the littoral is not a means within itself; air manoeuvre
facilitates littoral manoeuvre.66 Littoral manoeuvre aims to generate a
military effect on land. This chapter does not describe how to conduct
littoral manoeuvre. Rather, the chapter highlights the extra considerations,
opportunities and constraints when conducting air manoeuvre in the littoral
environment.
6.2. Littoral air manoeuvre is achieved using ship to objective manoeuvre.

This uses mobility and firepower to launch directly against an objective from
the sea. This is different to a traditional amphibious operation, where the
beachhead is an essential tactical node; this remains the case for surface
offload.
6.3. The littoral manoeuvre headmark67 provides the contextual framework

for air manoeuvre within the action phase of an amphibious operation. In
outline, it states that the UK amphibious force should be able to conduct ship 6
to objective manoeuvre over distances of up to 110 nautical miles. The initial
assault wave can be delivered simultaneously by air and sea. The whole
landing force can be sustained by air and surface means from a sea base
located up to 30 nautical miles offshore.
6.4. Amphibious operations have two distinct phases. The initial phase is
commanded, executed and supported from the sea. If the landing force is to
be established ashore upon transfer of authority between the amphibious
task force and the land force commanders, the second phase will see
command and execution ashore, with support from the sea.
66 Littoral manoeuvre is the term used to describe the manoeuvrist approach to

amphibious operations; concentrating on seizing the initiative and applying strength
against weakness and vulnerability, while protecting the same on our own side. A full
description of littoral manoeuvre can be found in Royal Navy Book of Reference (digital)
(BRd) 4487, Fighting Instructions, Volume 2-2.
67 The description of the required amphibious capability derived by the Royal Navy from
Government policy. Full description available in BRd 4487, Amphibious Warfare, page 3-1.
JDN 1/16 77
Section 1 – Command
6.5. An amphibious task force delivers a landing force to the joint

operations area, potentially followed by projecting the force ashore. The
nature of littoral manoeuvre is complex and requires amphibious forces
to be commanded using a unique co-equal relationship between 1*
land and maritime force commanders. They work together to create the
required effect on land. At sea, the naval Commander Amphibious Task
Force shapes the environment and delivers the landing force to a position
of advantage. This function usually falls to Commander Amphibious Task
Group, who commands all the specialist amphibious and support shipping
within the task force. The Commander Landing Force owns the ground
force element and is responsible for delivering tactical success on the
ground. This is usually Commander 3 Commando Brigade. There may also
be a 1* Commander Carrier Strike Group, who commands an aircraft carrier,
associated shipping and aircraft. All work to the Maritime Component
Commander under the Joint Force Commander.
JFC
6 CATF Commander Amphibious Task Force
***
CLF Commander Landing Force
JFC Joint Force Commander
MCC Maritime Component Commander
MCC
**
Carrier
CATF CLF Strike
* * Group
*
Assault Afloat Advance Mine Tailored Air Lead

shipping support force counter- Group Commando
measures (helicopter) Group
Figure 6.1 – Command structure
78 JDN 1/16
6.6. The helicopter command element is embedded with the land and
maritime force commanders and will provide advice and guidance during
the planning phase.68 They are located on the primary command and control
ship. This is usually the landing platform dock (LPD). During the execution
phase they will provide command and control of air manoeuvre assets from
the supporting arms coordination cell aboard the command ship.
6.7. The Joint Helicopter Force 2 Headquarters commands helicopters and

supporting assets used for ship to objective manoeuvre. This headquarters
is drawn from the Commando Helicopter Force. Helicopters can be drawn
from throughout Joint Helicopter Command to form the Joint Helicopter
Force 2 Tailored Air Group.69 Additional maritime helicopters remain under
Royal Navy command and are used for maritime force protection.70 These
aircraft will be referred to as maritime helicopters in this publication. These
maritime helicopters may support air manoeuvre tasks if maritime force
protection threat levels permit.
6.8. The Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)71 comprises a scalable and

modular task force, the composition of which will vary in accordance with the
mission and availability. It includes the UK Amphibious Task Force.
6
Section 2 – Inform
6.9. Intelligence is fused within the task force by the maritime and land
intelligence staff (N2 and G2) embarked in the command ship. The Joint
Helicopter Force 2 Headquarters will provide joint intelligence with a staff
that is split between the command ship and the designated landing platform
68 As the Joint Helicopter Force 2 Headquarters will be drawn from the Commando
Helicopter Force, who are the subject matter experts for air manoeuvre in the littoral
environment, it is unlikely an air manoeuvre planning team will deploy with the
Commander Amphibious Task Force/Commander Landing Force staff.
69 Merlin 3/4 and Wildcat battlefield reconnaissance helicopter from the Commando
Helicopter Force are earmarked, as well as elements of the Apache and Chinook forces.
70 Force protection provided by airborne surveillance and control, anti-surface warfare
and anti-submarine warfare.
71 The Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime) replaces the Responsive Force Task Group as
the maritime commitment to the Joint Expeditionary Force.
JDN 1/16 79
helicopter (LPH) ship.72 This ensures effective flow of information to the

aircrew while supporting the helicopter command element and liaising with
maritime and land intelligence staff.
6.10. Airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets,
particularly unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft, may be limited to
those contained within the task force. This means that there will likely be
fewer ISR assets than those available during land operations. Intelligence
soaks of objective areas prior to an operation may be limited to ground
reconnaissance forces; together with experts from 30 Commando
Information Exploitation Group Royal Marines and, potentially, UK Special
Forces. This will include Royal Navy mobile air operations teams.73 Inserting
these forces before landing may be a task for helicopters, possibly detached
ahead of the main amphibious task force on a frigate or destroyer.
6.11. Using a voice radio network is currently the only way to promulgate
situation updates to helicopter aircrews during a mission. This may require
commanders to dedicate one of the embarked helicopters to voice reporting
and communications relay.
6.12. Air mission planning demands a lot of digital information. Bandwidth

and physical space for communications equipment is extremely limited
6 onboard ships, so information flow must be efficient. This requires using
common types of equipment and message formats between all aircraft types
and ships in the task force.
Section 3 – Prepare
6.13. Force generation for littoral operations may be conducted from the UK
or from a deployed task force. Helicopters may self-deploy or use strategic
air transport to meet up with a deployed task group. However, embarking
support equipment and personnel may require the task group to go
alongside in a permissive environment, affecting the planning timeline.
72 The landing platform helicopter (LPH) is the primary helicopter platform. While the UK
currently operates HMS Ocean as the sole LPH, the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers
will have a scalable configuration, and may operate in a dedicated LPH role.
73 Royal Navy Mobile Air Operations Teams are part of the Commando Helicopter Force
and are trained as reconnaissance operators.
80 JDN 1/16
6.14. Troops, equipment and aircraft assigned to air manoeuvre may not
necessarily be co-located within the task force, due to a rapid, unplanned
embarkation or due to availability of space, particularly for vehicles.
Helicopter support personnel will usually be prioritised over landing force
troops in the landing platform helicopter ship.
Falkland Islands
The Falklands Task Force was dispatched very quickly, long before
any landing planning had been conducted. Consequently the
cross-loading of troops and their equipment along with the re-loading
of most ships was done at Ascension Island, the forward mounting
base for the operation.
Doctrine Note 15/09, Joint Theatre Entry
6.15. The planning asumption for assault operations is that a company group
can be lifted in a single wave. Numbers will be based on an assumed aircraft
availability of 95% for a pre-planned assault, reducing to 75% for 14 days high
intensity operations and 66% for sustained operations. Attack helicopter 6
availability is assumed as 66% when planning for all operations. These
numbers are higher than for the land environment due to the necessity to
make the maximum use of limited embarked aircraft, allied to the
well-founded maintenance organisation and equipment onboard.
6.16. While assigned forces are held at high readiness, force integration
training will be conducted during the transit to the joint operations area.
Such training begins with troop/aircraft familiarisation and culminates in a
wet and dry mission rehearsal. A rehearsal is also required to validate the
plan.
JDN 1/16 81
Section 4 – Project
6.17. It is preferable for helicopters to operate for sustained periods from
ships equipped with hangars as they provide environmental protection and
are easier for maintenance. However, deploying a large number of aircraft
may result in helicopters being dispersed around the task group. The
following are the primary ships used to launch air manoeuvre helicopters.
a. Landing platform helicopter. The LPH provides

the deck and hangar space required to enable air
manoeuvre.74 It is the principal helicopter platform
with the associated command and control and
support functions. The LPH also enables the surface
assault by operating four Landing Craft Vehicle
Personnel (LCVP). The Queen Elizabeth Class carrier,
which is being re-roled to function as an LPH, will
A landing platform helicopter not have a surface manoeuvre capability.
b. Landing platform dock. The LPD is unique in

that it supports all the key amphibious functions.
6 Critically, it provides the command, control and
communications necessary for a battle staff
with maritime, land and air elements. It can
accommodate a landing force and conduct limited
A landing platform dock helicopter operations from its flight deck; however,
it has no hangar. The LPD has a dock and davits,
carrying four landing craft utility and four LCVPs.
c. Landing ship dock (auxiliary) (LSD(A)). The LSD(A)

provides the major part of the landing force, vehicle
and freight capacity. Each platform can also carry a
landing craft utility in its dock. An LSD(A) also has
one spot from which to operate helicopters, but no
A landing ship dock (auxiliary)
hangar.
74 HMS Ocean can embark, support and operate a tailored air group of 16 medium
support helicopters plus six light helicopters. Chinooks can be embarked on the flight
deck only (lack of powered blade fold prevents routine hangar use).
82 JDN 1/16
Queen Elizabeth Class carrier
6.18. Aircraft which are not cleared or equipped to operate from ships, such
as the Puma, may still be transported by sea with minimal preparation.75 On
arrival in the operating area, they will be expected to disembark and base
ashore.
6.19. Air manoeuvre helicopters will be involved in shaping operations, 6

particularly in the absence of fixed-wing aircraft. The Wildcat maritime attack
helicopter may perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks,
and attack helicopters can provide pre-landing fires and support the insertion
of pre-landing forces.
6.20. The range at which helicopters will be launched to an objective will

depend on a variety of factors including adversary anti-access and area denial
(A2AD) capabilities.76 Positioning must balance the need to create effect
ashore with mitigating the threat to the Amphibious Task Force. Shipping
will generally position within a fixed operating box for ease of air and surface
assault operations prior to, and during, ship to objective manoeuvre.
75 Main rotor blades would normally be removed to allow the aircraft to be stowed
below decks out of the salt laden environment to minimise salt corrosion/environmental
degradation.
76 Coastal defences and shallow water will drive the launch point away from the coast. The
distance of the objective inland, as well as availability and speed of both surface and air lift,
will push it closer.
JDN 1/16 83
The Pebble Island raid
Having seized the Falkland Islands in 1982, the Argentines were quick
to establish a small airbase on Pebble Island, to the north-west of
West Falkland. The Pucara ground attack aircraft based there posed a
significant risk to the planned amphibious assault onto East Falkland.
On the night of 14 May 1982, 45 members of the D Squadron 22 SAS,

supported by naval gunfire from HMS GLAMORGAN, were inserted
onto Pebble Island by Sea King helicopters of 846 Naval Air Squadron
embarked on HMS HERMES. Total surprise was achieved and the raid
was a complete success with all 11 Argentine aircraft being destroyed at
no loss to the SAS, who withdrew by helicopter back to HMS HERMES.
BRd 4487, Amphibious Warfare
6.21. While aircraft performance will not be affected by altitude on launch,

it will still be affected by temperature, wind and air pressure. To mitigate the
conflicting requirements of landing craft and helicopters, landing craft may
be moved to other amphibious ships or embarked prior to conducting air
6 manoeuvre.
6.22. Air manoeuvre helicopters will be at their most vulnerable when

approaching the land over the sea as there is no terrain to mask their
approach, though aircraft defensive aids suites may mitigate some threats.
Both sea and land routing constraints directed by airspace management may
also hamper manoeuvre.
6.23. The Amphibious Task Force can provide some local control of the air.
Suppression of enemy air defences can be provided by naval fires and ship air
defence missiles may be able to engage targets overland. Escorting attack
helicopters can also provide support to an assault package, as can fixed-wing
aircraft, if available.77 Complete control of the air is unlikely, so commanders
will need to balance the risk of aircraft loss against mission success.
77 Either carrier-based or launched from a nearby friendly country.
84 JDN 1/16
6.24. Composite air operations planning is not generally used in littoral

manoeuvre. Coordinating aircraft outside of the organic assault package is
achieved by synchronising aircraft activity and battlespace management.
This is planned and conducted by the component commands at the
operational level.
A Merlin helicopter supporting littoral air manoeuvre operations
6
Section 5 – Operate
6.25. Ship to objective manoeuvre is the operational technique used by

the landing force to project ashore. It seeks to create a decisive effect by
using the agility of amphibious forces to strike at the points of greatest
opportunity. This is achieved using a combination of surface manoeuvre,
using landing craft, and air manoeuvre. Air manoeuvre is fundamental to
ship to objective manoeuvre, as it gives the ability to reach beyond the shore
and strike directly on the objective or secure key terrain. Air assault is the
primary type of air manoeuvre used. Ship to objective manoeuvre avoids
the delay typical of a classic amphibious assault where there is a requirement
to build up combat power in a beachhead before moving to the objective.
Figure 6.2 compares traditional amphibious assault and ship to objective
manoeuvre.
JDN 1/16 85
Elements of a traditional amphibious

assault
• Extensive naval gunfire

• Seizure of beachhead
• Build up of combat power ashore
• Strike inland to seize objective
• Limited manoeuvre
Elements of ship to objective manoeuvre
• Requires sea based/networked fires,

logistics and command and control
• Focus on the objective
• No initial beachhead
• Rapid tempo
• Reduced footprint
• Integrated fires and high mobility
• Access to joint capabilities
6
Figure 6.2 – Different types of littoral assault
6.26. Ship to objective manoeuvre planning is conducted by the Commander

Amphibious Task Force staff. They produce helicopter assault landing tables
that detail how the force will use and synchronise its helicopters and landing
craft to support the Commander Landing Force’s preferred scheme of
manoeuvre.
6.27. Detailed mission planning will then be conducted by helicopter aircrew,

along with assigned elements of the landing force. Given the complex nature
of littoral battlespace, it is likely that both sea and air transit to the objective
will use prescribed routes. Helicopters78 may not have complete tactical
freedom of manoeuvre until approaching, or even at, the objective area.
78 Some coalition partners use tilt-rotor aircraft for littoral air manoeuvre. The UK has no
plans to procure such aircraft but they can operate from some UK shipping.
86 JDN 1/16
6.28. One of the key limiting factors in littoral air manoeuvre operations is
‘deck tempo’. This is the speed at which it is possible to complete a deck
cycle of range,79 launch and recover aircraft. The main constraint is that there
are many more aircraft than deck space available. The landing platform
helicopter ship has six spots designed for medium support helicopters.
Chinooks each use one and a half spots while attack helicopters may require
two spots clear behind during arm/disarm operations due to weapon danger
areas. Efficient sequencing of loads and troops is essential to maintain deck
tempo.
6.29. The number of helicopters required to provide an escorted move of a

company group in one wave80 requires three range and launch cycles to be
completed from the landing platform helicopter ship. Ranging and launching
can take more than 30 minutes, during which time the aircraft that have
already launched will need to stay airborne. The first aircraft launched are
likely to need fuel before they can depart on the mission. This can be reduced
to two launch cycles by distributing aircraft onto other ships, known as spare
decks.
6.30. To ensure effective battlespace management during the action phase,

watchkeepers from all airspace users operate from the Combined Operations
Room onboard the command ship. Helicopter packages liaise with the joint 6
helicopter force watchkeeper in the ship to objective manoeuvre cell who
de-conflicts with the adjacent supporting arms coordination cell. This latter
cell integrates battlespace users that include naval fires, artillery, mortars and
fixed-wing aircraft.
6.31. Commander Amphibious Task Force may establish a discrete

operating area, known as the amphibious objective area, in which they have
coordinating authority. The amphibious objective area is a three-dimensional
area, which contains the landing force objectives. If task force commanders
do not have the resources to control all activity within an amphibious
objective area, they may instead use an area of operations, with a high density
79 Move an aircraft from a stowed position, such as the hangar, to a deck spot and
configure it for flight.
80 Wave is defined as: in amphibious operations, a formation of forces, landing ships and
craft, amphibious vehicles or aircraft, required to beach or land at about the same time.
Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
JDN 1/16 87
airspace control zone. In this instance, the Maritime Component Commander

will usually manage the air, surface and subsurface environments.
The Amphibious Landing, Operation MUSKETEER, Suez
The leading waves of 40 and 42 Commando came ashore at 0450 hours

on 6 November 1956 facing light opposition. The marines were followed
at 0500 hours by four landing craft tank that landed 14 waterproofed
Centurion tanks of C Squadron, 6 Royal Tank Regiment in four and a half
feet of water.
At 0520 hours 45 Commando was ordered to land within the beach area
already secured by the marines. In 89 minutes, 22 helicopters flew in
a total of 425 men and 23 tons of stores in four waves from the carriers
situated nine miles offshore.
In many respects this was a remarkable operation. It was the first

time in history that helicopters had been used in this manner during
an amphibious operation. The US Marine Corps had pioneered
developments in this field, but had not yet had the opportunity to put
them into practice on the battlefield. Even given the improvised nature
6 of the British force, and the rather conservative way in which it was used,
the potential for helicopters to add speed and flexibility to amphibious
operations was readily apparent.
Amphibious Assault, Manoeuvre from the Sea
6.32. A standing operational task air helicopter order will cover airspace
control measures, communication procedures, routes, close air support and
fixed-wing aircraft procedures to enter and exit the amphibious objective
area. It also contains the airspace control means, airspace control order and
special instructions for operating for the amphibious objective area. The
procedures and instructions contained within the standing operational
task air helicopter order are disseminated to the Joint Force Air Component
Commander to include in the airspace control order/airspace control means
where appropriate.
88 JDN 1/16
6.33. Commander Landing

Force may deploy ashore to
exert influence directly on
the land battle. 81 The Joint
Helicopter Force Headquarters
staff will also move ashore to
continue their role of directing
operations. The decision to
disembark helicopters and
their life support largely
depends on the ability of
the shipping to remain in
close proximity, driven by the
maritime threat. Long ship
to shore transits will favour
forward basing. Logistic
challenges ashore, such as
fuel availability and poor
maintenance conditions, will
see helicopters operate more
efficiently from afloat.
Operating from field locations in harsh (jungle)
climate conditions 6
6.34. Air manoeuvre helicopters should be capable of disembarking

and operating from field locations in harsh climatic conditions. One of
the greatest constraints to disembarked air manoeuvre operations is the
shipping space required to carry additional support vehicles alongside those
needed by the landing force.
“ Air manoeuvre helicopters should be capable

of disembarking and operating from field
locations in harsh climatic conditions.
”
81 Remaining afloat will give better situational awareness; useful during a raid, for
example.
JDN 1/16 89
Section 6 – Protect
6.35. Air defence of the amphibious task group will normally be allocated
to a destroyer through the ‘Green Crown’ procedure. 82 All aircraft entering,
or launching into, the amphibious objective area must verify their identity
through identification, friend or foe (IFF)83 with the ‘Green Crown’ destroyer.
All other battlespace management is planned in the command ship and
executed in the combined operations room by the ship to objective
manoeuvre cell, supporting arms coordination cell and the group warfare
officer. This officer manages force protection for the Amphibious Task Force.
6.36. Force protection is the responsibility of the maritime force commander.

Force protection air tasks will generally fall to the dedicated maritime
helicopters. Air manoeuvre helicopters may also be called upon to augment
maritime helicopters, although they are not optimised for the role. Wildcat84
and attack helicopters are commonly used to find and attack sea surface
threats – for example, fast attack craft.
A Wildcat helicopter
82 ‘Green Crown’ is listed as a US-only procedure in Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-8(C),

Amphibious Operations, but has now been adopted by UK maritime forces.
83 An automatic system which allows radar operators to identify friendly aircraft.
84 Wildcat battlefield reconnaissance helicopters are primarily operated in the littoral by
847 Naval Air Squadron, part of the Commando Helicopter Force.
90 JDN 1/16
6.37. If there are no fixed-wing aircraft, attack helicopters may be the only
fires platform beyond the range of naval gunfire support. 85 Attack helicopters
have limited endurance; launching from distant shipping will impact on its
ability to support the landing force. Wildcat may be tasked to provide direct
support to troops through surveillance and coordination of indirect fires.
Section 7 – Sustain
6.38. The Amphibious Task Force can sustain itself for 90 days, giving time
to establish the Defence Support Chain from the UK. Joint helicopter force
elements should embark with a deployable spares pack for 28 days flying
operations. Logistics support for the return of unserviceable parts is crucial
to maintaining the support chain, particularly for enduring deployments. This
can be managed by Royal Fleet Auxiliaries exchanging large parts at friendly
ports. Small parts can be dropped off and collected by helicopter.
6.39. First- and second-line aircraft maintenance can be conducted while

embarked in a ship. 86 Where necessary, some third-line tasks may be
undertaken to maintain aircraft availability. This includes battle damage repair
carried out by 1710 Naval Air Squadron, a UK-based deployable engineering
support organisation held at high readiness. 6
6.40. Due to the limited number of air manoeuvre helicopters and deck space,
joint personnel recovery and casualty evacuation tasks are unlikely to be
supported by dedicated aircraft, particularly during assault operations. All
aircraft will be able to support these tasks as a secondary role and can be re-
tasked while airborne.
6.41. A forward arming and refuelling point can be established ashore to

improve helicopter support to the landing force. However, this requires
helicopters to transport and sustain it. Fuel bowsers and supply vehicles can
be delivered by landing craft once a permissive environment is achieved.
They will need to be returned to shipping for refilling until the bulk fuel
installation is established.
85 Mk 8 gun fires to a maximum of 22km.
86 Depending on the aircraft contractual support arrangements. Some aircraft can
only receive first line maintenance. This is sometimes referred to as ‘forward and depth’
maintenance, where depth covers second- to fourth-line activities.
JDN 1/16 91
Key points
• Littoral air manoeuvre is achieved using ship to objective manoeuvre.
• It is preferable for helicopters to operate for sustained periods from

ships equipped with hangars as they provide environmental protection
and are easier for maintenance.
• Air manoeuvre helicopters will be at their most vulnerable when

approaching the land over the sea as there is no terrain to mask their
approach.
• Complete control of the air is unlikely, so commanders will need to

balance the risk of aircraft loss against mission success.
• Ship to objective manoeuvre is the operational technique used by the

landing force to project ashore. It seeks to create a decisive effect by
using the agility of amphibious forces to strike at the points of greatest
opportunity.
6 • Attack helicopters have limited endurance; launching from distant

shipping will impact on its ability to support the landing force.
• A forward arming and refuelling point can be established ashore to

improve helicopter support to the landing force.
92 JDN 1/16
Air manoeuvre planning
Annex A – Air manoeuvre planning

Planning cycles
A.1. Planning for air manoeuvre operations will draw on both the air and
land planning processes. Joint air planning is conducted as part of a joint air
tasking cycle. The purpose of the air tasking cycle is to plan, task, execute
and assess a 24-hour period of flying operations. Planning commences
48 hours ahead of the start of flying operations and concludes with a 24-hour
air tasking order (ATO), which is flown and combat assessed. A complete
cycle typically covers a 72-hour time frame; however, it may be compressed
to 48 hours where circumstances allow. This process is outlined below in
Figure A1.
Direction
guidance and
objectives
Target
Assessment
development
Execution Weaponeering
and allocation
A
Air tasking order
production and
promulgation
Figure A1 – The joint air tasking cycle

A.2. Targets are prioritised against the Joint Force Commander’s objective.
Approved targets are then ‘weaponeered’ giving detailed target and weapon
information to allow capabilities to be best allocated. This is translated
into detailed tactical information that is issued through the ATO, special
instructions and the airspace control order. This direction is then executed
and assessed.
A.3. The joint air tasking cycle is a continual process. Each air tasking order
covers a 24-hour period, so there will be three of them in use or production
JDN 1/16 93
at any one time. The Joint Helicopter Force uses land planning processes but
coordinates with the ATO process.
A.4. It may be possible to compress timelines further, particularly for time

sensitive targets. The Joint Helicopter Force Headquarters has authority to
re-task assets at short notice. It may also hold force elements at readiness
for this eventuality. The air planning cycle will have close air support aircraft
allocated on the ATO awaiting tasks. These can be tasked at shorter notice
using a joint tactical air request. Air staff officers will be able to provide
advice on the detailed procedures for a particular theatre.
A.5. The UK uses Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for
Operational-level Planning (with UK national elements) and NATO Allied
Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)
for joint planning. Land planning at the tactical level will also use the
combat estimate. This process is captured within the land publication, The
Staff Officer’s Handbook and will be included in the Command and Staff Army
Field Manual. Land planning will incorporate the Joint Helicopter Force
Headquarters and the ground manoeuvre unit headquarters providing
the ground manoeuvre element of the force. It will often follow a 72-hour
planning cycle so it can inject into the joint air tasking cycle, though it may
be reduced if the situation demands it. A small operation with minimal
requirement for fixed-wing support can be planned and executed in a
A shorter time frame.
Staff synchronisation
A.6. The land and air component staff must ensure they are embedded
in each other’s planning cycle to prevent any disconnect. Once fixed-wing
aircraft or their units have been aligned to an air manoeuvre task, they will
link in with the land planning process during three events.
A.7. Synchronisation of effort is ensured through the conduct of three

events during the planning process: joint mission orders; rehearsal of
concept; and the conditions check. These events are of less value for
independent helicopter tasks, and apply primarily to air manoeuvre
operations that deploy a ground manoeuvre force. This is outlined in more
detail in Figure A2.
94 JDN 1/16
Joint planning Joint Rehearsal
Joint orders
JDN 1/16
Helicopter Note 1 Note 2 Note 3 Aviation
Force Seven questions rehearsal Execute
Receipt of
Asset allocation Joint Manifest
Orders Orders Conditions (Including
mission conference
group group check 2 conditions
Seven questions orders (if required) Rehearsal check 1)
Brigade of
concept
Receipt of
orders brief orders brief
May be held Rehearsal of Coordinate
at brigade concept may with
be held at brigade
brigade, or as
Notes part of a
1. Orders groups may not occur sequentially. Constrained timelines may see the Joint Helicopter Force plan mostly
wider brigade
completed before the brigade has done so. The package commander may not be in attendance for the brigade orders,
having gleaned the required information in the planning process.
rehearsal
2. Joint mission orders are most likely to occur with the complexity of larger operations (inserting a battlegroup or above).
They may occur for battlegroup level operations (inserting a company) if time and opportunity permits. However, the
Air
package commander will take the required information back to the Joint Helicopter Force after completion of the Ground
battlegroup estimate process, therefore joint mission orders may not be essential. Joint
3. Manifest confirmation is required at all levels, however a formal conference is only required if the level of complexity
demands it.
Figure A2 – Air manoeuvre operations staff synchronisation overview. Example

of a joint helicopter force planning with a ground manoeuvre brigade
95
A
Planning events
A.8. Joint mission orders. This occurs after the ground manoeuvre unit and
joint helicopter force have delivered their orders. It acts as a cross brief to
fully inform the pilots of the ground tactical plan and ground manoeuvre
force of the air plan. It also defines abort criteria for the mission and confirms
go/no-go criteria for the conditions checks.
A.9. Manifest conference. The manifest conference confirms the air

movement table by finalising the loading plan and confirming the landing
plan. Its purpose is essentially to finalise the allocation of troops and
equipment to available aircraft. The conference should take place no later
than 24 hours before the troop carrying aircraft depart from the ground force
pick up point (based on a 72-hour planning timeline). This conference is less
likely to be required the smaller the executing element. A single company
operation may not require one – internal confirmation is sufficient.
A.10. Rehearsal of concept. This confirms the understanding of the plan,

and is the most important planning event. The rehearsal of concept should
include all pilots taking part in the operation. As a minimum the package
commander should attend. The rehearsal of concept must cover the air
movement and landing plans.
A A.11. Conditions check. The conditions check is a pre-designated list

of criteria required to set the conditions for a successful air manoeuvre
operations. The criteria are known as go/no-go criteria. These are basic
requirements that must be met to allow the mission to take place; some
will be matched to decision points. These criteria are developed during the
planning process and refined during wargaming, 87 then briefed at the end of
the joint mission orders, along with the abort criteria. The conditions checks
are valuable in air manoeuvre operations due to their complexity and the
distances involved. There are two conditions checks that can be used.
87 Wargaming remains a vital component. The process is outlined in Allied Joint

Publication (AJP)-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning (with UK national
elements). It must include interaction between the joint helicopter force and ground force
used in the operation.
96 JDN 1/16
a. Condition check 2 reviews the go/no-go88 criteria. It must be

completed no later than two hours before the troop-carrying aircraft
departs from the ground force pick-up point. It gives commanders the
opportunity to recommend the execution of the mission.
b. Condition check 1 is given in flight. It should be conducted

between the ground tactical commander and the air package
commander, who should be on the same aircraft. Condition check 1
consists of a quick review of the abort, delay and divert criteria.
A.12. Abort criteria. Abort criteria are considerations that occur when a
change of one or more conditions in the objective area or landing site
seriously threatens mission success. They require the commander to make
a decision to continue, abort, divert or delay the mission. Examples could
be weather changes, aircraft failure, discovery of enemy air defence or only
having the minimum troops required on the ground to complete the mission.
An abort decision can apply to elements of, or the whole mission. A divert
decision would usually involve switching to alternate landing sites.
Air manoeuvre in the littoral
A.13. The challenges of maritime operations necessitate significant planning

differences to that outlined above. This is particularly relevant to timelines,
rehearsals and synchronisation of ground and air briefings. Air manoeuvre A
planning in the littoral is detailed within amphibious battle procedure. This
is described in Royal Navy Book of Reference (digital) (BRd) 4487, Amphibious
Warfare, Volume 2.2, which should be used as a guide for planning air
manoeuvre in the littoral.
88 These are not 'abort' criteria.
JDN 1/16 97
Air assault and airmobile groupings
A.14. A wave consists of all aircraft assigned to deliver troops or equipment

that land on the landing site at the same time. A serial is a tactical grouping
of two or more aircraft separated from other serials by time or space.
Figure A3 details air assault and airmobile groupings. A chalk comprises
all personnel and/or equipment to be moved by a specific aircraft for each
wave. A wave of four aircraft will have chalks 1-4. Each further wave will have
four chalks.
• Preliminary wave – recce, artillery, for example, (may not be

required).
• Assault wave – escort (attack helicopter), assault (ground force),

echelon (additional troops and/or equipment) serials.
• Follow-on wave – further troops/equipment (may not be required).
Recce
Preliminary wave
Assault wave
A Escort serial
Assault serial
Echelon serial
Follow-on wave
Figure A3 – Air assault and airmobile groupings
98 JDN 1/16
Air movement plan
A.15. The air movement plan provides the information required to move
ground force from the staging helicopter landing site to the drop-off
helicopter landing site. The plan consists of five stages as shown in Figure
A4. These are:
• initial rendezvous point;

• initial point – start of final run-in;
• final run in;
• landing; and
• post landing rendezvous point. 89
Chalks/serials
Initial Post landing

rendezvous Initial point* Final run in Landing rendezvous
point point
Chalks/serials
* Initial point is used as the last reference point before the final run in.
Figure A4 – Air movement plan stages
89 The area used to hold casualty evacuation aircraft, airborne reaction forces and
immediate resupplies.
JDN 1/16 99
100 JDN 1/16

Lexicon
Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations
AAP Allied administrative publication
ADP Army doctrine publication
AFM Army field manual
AJP Allied joint publication
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
AOC Air Operations Centre
ATO air tasking order
ATP Allied tactical publication
AWACS airborne warning and control system
BRd Book of reference (digital)

BRH battlefield reconnaissance helicopter
COMAO composite air operation
DCDC Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

Dstl Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone
IFF identification, friend or foe

ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
JCN joint concept note

JDN joint doctrine note
JDP joint doctrine publication
JHC Joint Helicopter Command
JHF joint helicopter force
LPD landing platform dock

LPH landing platform helicopter
LSD(A) landing ship dock (auxiliary)
JDN 1/16 101

MOD Ministry of Defence
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement and integration
SPINS special instructions
102 JDN 1/16

Part 2 – Terms and definitions
This section is divided into three areas. First, we list terms and their
descriptions that we use as reference for this publication only. We then list
new definitions proposed by this publication and finally we list endorsed
terms and their definitions which may be helpful to the reader.
Terms used for reference in this publication only
air assault
Combined arms operations that employ helicopters to deliver an assault
force onto an objective.
airdrop delivery
The air movement of personnel and/or cargo by aircraft into an objective
area and their subsequent delivery by parachute.
air land delivery

The air movement of personnel and/or cargo which are landed on or near
their objective by a fixed-wing aircraft.
air mission commander

The title given to the pilot in command of the aircraft package allocated to an
air manoeuvre operation. (Joint Helicopter Command)
air mobility
Deploying, sustaining and recovering military and civilian personnel and
materiel by air.
composite air operation

(COMAO)
The composite air operation concept involves packaging a large number of
joint air assets, with a variety of roles, to complement each other to achieve a
task. (Air Publication 3002)
JDN 1/16 103

joint helicopter force
An organisation consisting of a headquarters and a pool of helicopters held
at readiness.
land manoeuvre
A combination of ground and air manoeuvre, enabled by manoeuvre
support.
This term is likely to be replaced by combined arms manoeuvre in the future
publication of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Land Operations
light forces
Light forces are combined arms groups formed around the light infantry, but
may be mechanised or armoured forces operating out of role. They are task-
organised with combat support and combat service support. Light forces are
optimised for operations in mountains, jungles and dense urban areas. They
primarily fight dismounted.
littoral manoeuvre
The exploitation of the sea as an operational manoeuvre space from which a
sea-based or amphibious force can influence situations, decisions and events
in the littoral regions of the world.
(Littoral manoeuvre Joint Capability Concept, 2008).
operational framework
The arrangement of activities by purpose and effects within the battlespace.
(ATP-3.2.1)
package commander
A pilot in command of the aircraft package allocated to an air manoeuvre
operation.
ship to objective manoeuvre

(STOM)
The operational technique used by the landing force to project ashore. It
seeks to create a decisive effect by using the agility of amphibious forces
to strike at the points of greatest opportunity. This is achieved using a
combination of surface manoeuvre, using landing craft, and air manoeuvre.
104 JDN 1/16

vertical envelopment
Passing over the enemy’s main defences to secure a key objective (for
example a logistic or command node) to keep them off-balance.
(ADP, Operations)
New definitions proposed by this publication
air manoeuvre
The movement of forces through the air to positions of advantage from
which force can be applied or threatened. (JDN 1/16)
Endorsed definitions
air assault operation

An operation in which air assault forces, using the firepower, mobility, and
total integration of helicopter assets, manoeuvre on the battlefield under the
control of the commander to engage and destroy adversary forces or to seize
and hold key terrain. (NATO agreed)
airborne
Adjective used to describe troops specially trained to carry out operations,
either by paradrop or air landing, following an air movement. (AAP-06)
airborne force
A force composed primarily of ground and air units organized, equipped and
trained for airborne operations. (AAP-06)
airborne operation
An operation involving the movement of combat forces and their logistic
support into an objective area by air. (AAP-06)
airdrop
Delivery of personnel or cargo from aircraft in flight. (AAP-06)
JDN 1/16 105

airfield
An area prepared for the accommodation (including any buildings,
installations and equipment), landing and take-off of aircraft. (Note that
NATO’s preferred term is aerodrome). (AAP-06)
air landed
Moved by air and disembarked or unloaded, after the aircraft has landed or
while a helicopter is hovering. (AAP-06)
airmobile operation
An operation in which combat forces and equipment manoeuvre about the
battlefield by aircraft to engage in ground combat. (AAP-06)
airstrip
An unimproved surface which has been adapted for take-off or landing of
aircraft, usually having minimum facilities. (AAP-06)
attack helicopter
A helicopter specifically designed to employ various weapons to attack and
destroy enemy targets. (AAP-06)
battlegroup
An operational grouping which is usually based on either an infantry or tank
battalion, each with at least a squadron or company of the other arm and
with elements of other supporting arms and services allocated according to
need. (AAP-39)
casualty evacuation
(CASEVAC)
The non-medicalised evacuation of patients without qualified medical
escort. (AMedP-13(A))
combined arms
The synchronised or simultaneous application of several arms, such as
infantry, armour, field artillery, engineers etc to achieve an effect on the
enemy that is greater than if each arm were used against the enemy in
sequence. (AAP-39)
Also used to describe the construct of an organisation that consists of several
arms.
106 JDN 1/16
component command
In the NATO military command structure, a third-level command organisation
with specific air, maritime or land capabilities that is responsible for
operational planning and conduct of subordinate operations as directed by
the NATO commander. (AAP-06)
component commander
A single service or functional component commander at the third level of the
NATO military command structure. (AAP-06)
control of the air

Freedom, over a given period of time, to use a volume of airspace for our own
purposes while, if necessary, denying or constraining it’s use by an opponent.
(JDP 0-30)
forward arming and refuelling point

(FARP)
A temporary facility organised, equipped and deployed by a Joint Helicopter
Force commander to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the
employment of helicopter units. Normally located in the main battle area
ahead of the Joint Helicopter Force’s normal combat service support area.
(AAP-39)
high-density airspace control zone

Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace control authority,
in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied
weapons and airspace users. (AAP-06)
joint air attack team

A combination of attack and/or reconnaissance rotary-wing aircraft and
fixed-wing close air support aircraft, operating together to locate and
attack high-priority targets and targets of opportunity. Joint air attack
team operations are coordinated and conducted to support the ground
commander’s scheme of manoeuvre. (AAP-06)
landing point
A point within a landing site where one helicopter or vertical take-off and
landing aircraft can land. (AAP-06)
JDN 1/16 107

landing site
A site within a landing zone containing one or more landing points. (AAP-06)
landing zone
A specified zone used for the landing of aircraft on land, water or the deck of
a ship. (AAP-06)
medical evacuation
(MEDEVAC)
The medically supervised process of moving any person who is wounded,
injured or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities as an integral
part of the treatment continuum. (AMedP-13(A))
paradrop
Delivery by parachute of personnel or cargo from an aircraft in flight.
(AAP-06)
restricted operating zone

(ROZ)
Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace control authority
in response to specific situations and/or requirements, within which the
operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. (AAP-06)
utility helicopter
Multi-purpose helicopter that may be armed. (AAP-06)
108 JDN 1/16

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Joint Doctrine Note 1/16

Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/16, dated September 2016,

2. This information may be subject to privately owned rights.

The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

Telephone number: 01793 31 4216/4217/4220

All images, or otherwise stated are: © Crown copyright/MOD 2016.

LCSLS Help Desk: 01869 256197

• propose a definition for air manoeuvre;

2. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Operations describes land manoeuvre

JDN 1/16 iii

5. JDN 1/16 is divided into six chapters.

a. Chapter 1 introduces air manoeuvre, its relation to Defence

b. Chapter 2 covers the outline roles and capabilities of helicopters,

c. Chapter 3 suggests uses for air manoeuvre.

d. Chapter 4 details operational considerations for air manoeuvre.

e. Chapter 5 outlines broad considerations for conducting air

f. Chapter 6 outlines considerations for conducting air manoeuvre

6. This JDN should be read alongside a number of publications to provide

• Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land

Chapter 2 – Roles and capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter 3 – Uses for air manoeuvre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Chapter 4 – Operational considerations for air manoeuvre . . . . . . . . . 33

Chapter 5 – Conducting air manoeuvre in the land environment . . . . . 55

Chapter 6 – Conducting air manoeuvre in the littoral . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Annex A – Air manoeuvre planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

JDN 1/16 vii

Section 2 – Air manoeuvre characteristics and

the movement of forces through the air to positions of advantage

1 Defence Strategic Direction 2016, outlines Defence Tasks as follows: 1 – Defence

1.4. Air manoeuvre employs fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, airborne,

a. Airborne forces. An airborne force is defined as: a force

b. Air assault and airmobile operations. Air assault and airmobile

c. Independent helicopter tasks. Independent helicopter tasks

Royal Air Force C-130J Hercules can be used in airborne operations

4 Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

Section 2 – Air manoeuvre characteristics and

Air manoeuvre characteristics

“ The agility of helicopters allows

1.7. Although offering significant advantages, air manoeuvre forces

Air manoeuvre fundamentals

1 • have a unified purpose;

• have clearly defined objectives;

• have sufficient/temporary control of the air;

• have timely, accurate and specific intelligence;

• be able to deliver sufficient mass in the initial wave8 and concentrate

• be able to achieve surprise;

• be able to sustain, reinforce, withdraw or exploit the opportunities

• be able to train and develop familiarity with equipment and

• Air manoeuvre employs fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, airborne, air

• Although offering significant advantages, air manoeuvre forces can

• Having a common objective will provide the foundation for mission

• Logistic demands created by air manoeuvre forces are challenging.

Chapter 2 covers the outline roles and capabilities of

Section 2 – Fixed-wing transport aircraft . . . . . . . . . . 15

Section 3 – Light forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2 “ The helicopter is evidence of

Chapter 2 – Roles and capabilities

2.4. Helicopters suited to the role of find are normally termed