Roman Cath Moral Funda Theol
Roman Cath Moral Funda Theol
By
Table of Contents
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XXXIII. FUNDAMENTAL OPTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
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LI. EPIKEIA AND THE NORMATIVITY OF THE NATURAL LAW. . . . . . . . . 116
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LXIX. VIRTUE AND MORAL DISCERNMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
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LXXXIX. BIBLIOGRAPHY SUGGESTIONS FOR ADULT EDUCATION. . . . 254
INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
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A M ORALLY COM PLEX W ORLD
Rom an Catholic Fundamental Moral Theology
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE (using Matthew 16:19-22 (The Rich Young Man), which
was used in Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II’s 1993 Encyclical on fundamental moral
theology. The passage introduces key words for opening up this passage in relation to moral
theology
A. “Good”: initially the rich young man asks a question about “doing” a “good deed,” but
Jesus responds with a question of his own which indicates that the source, ground, and
ultimate reference for our understanding of “goodness” is God the Father. A key theme
of Matthew’s Gospel is the necessity of all (including Jesus) to be obedient to the will of
the Father (who is all good). This question of Jesus also shows us that the key criterion of
Christian ethics then is not just “doing” the good or right thing, but “being” in a right
relation with God.
B. “Commandments”: Remember that for the Jewish people the “Ten Commandments”
were not primarily negative boundaries that limited their activities (cf. the cartoon of
Moses coming down the mountain carrying the tablets and saying “It’s just a first draft,
but we’re not going to get away with anything!”). Rather, for the Israelite nation the Ten
Commandments were the Decalogue, the Ten Holy W ords, which were a gift from God to
God’s Chosen People. The Decalogue was a “code” in both senses of the word, i.e., a
collection of laws, but more importantly a way of deciphering God’s own holiness. The
context of the gift of the Decalogue is key to understanding how we are to view the Ten
Commandments, namely given “on the way” (a pilgrimage, a holy journey) from slavery
to freedom, as God’s revelation, and as a sign of God’s special relationship (the
Covenant) with the Chosen People.
C. “Lack/Perfect”: The question about what is lacking is answered by the desire “to be
perfect” and this vocabulary needs to be carefully understand. “Perfect” is a Latin
derivative and often connotes something that is absolutely complete, without any blemish
or deficiency, e.g., a room that is in “perfect” order. This notion of “perfection” is rather
static and certainly is not what the Greek text here primarily means to convey. The Greek
term is derived from ôåëåéïò (teleios) and might be related best to the Hebrew concept of
shalom. This notion is one of wholeness, harmony, health, peace, and in that combined
sense “complete” and “perfect.” The Greek word is related to the moral theory of
“teleology” which stresses the sense of moral striving, becoming, character, and virtue.
D. “Go, sell what you have”: Jesus gives the rich young man a mission, not a moral norm.
The Christian moral life should be understood in the sense of being on a God-given
mission. “Sell what you have” has two meanings here for the young man. Jesus is
inviting him to a new self-understanding that is not predicated on “possessions,” but a
new and more authentic identity. Even without one’s “possessions” (whether these be
material possessions, honors, accomplishments, etc.) the individual is still worthy in
God’s eyes. Secondly, the meaning of divesting oneself of one’s possessions is not meant
to leave one bereft of all means of livelihood, but is explained in the next phrase,
E. “And give to the poor”: Care and concern for the poor is a key Gospel theme, and thus in
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some sense should mark our Christian moral living. W e might see this as an example of
what later has become termed the “preferential option for the poor” but I think we can
also understand this mandate in terms of a key insight in St. Ignatius’ meditation, the
Contemplation to Obtain the Love of God, which comes in the 4 th W eek of the Spiritual
Exercises. Thus, Ignatius suggest that true love is shown more in deeds than words, and
that the one who “has” shares with those who have not. He suggests as a concrete
example the sharing of knowledge.
F. “Treasure in Heaven” In God’s economy there is no zero-sum game. The “selling” and
“giving” of one’s possessions always enriches those who give. “Treasure” indicates a
solid, lasting, and life-long richness. “Heaven” is used in Matthew’s Gospel often in the
sense of the “Kingdom of Heaven” (âáéëåá ôjí ïõñáíjí) and thus serves as a short-hand
expression for the Kingdom itself. The Christian moral life is essentially about living in
accord with the values and expectation of God’s Kingdom to come.
G. “Come, Follow M e” The mission given above to “Go, and sell your possessions” finds its
completion in Jesus’ invitation to return and follow (after) him. The very “follow” in
Greek takes as its object the preposition “after” and so literally means to come and
“follow after” Jesus. This is the discipleship stance, following after Jesus. Discipleship,
and not just “doing” the “right” action, really is the key to Christian moral living.
A. 3 Beginning questions which will be helpful to frame the nature of the discipline and its
study, namely 1) W hat is “moral theology”?; 2) How does it differ from philosophical
ethics? And 3) How is it a part of “theology”? Try and keep these questions in mind
throughout the course, and perhaps again at the time of preparation for the M.Div.
Comprehensive examination.
B. Methodological starting point and presupposition: There is an objective moral order (i.e.,
moral truth with an ontological basis), which can be known (i.e., moral truth with an
epistemological basis), and which also can be done (i.e., moral truth with a normative
basis), and which if lived will help us to be truly human and therefore truly free..
C. Further presupposition from the standpoint of moral theology as theology is the belief that
we can "theologize" about this objective moral truth. This presumes philosophical ethics,
but integrates theology as well, and which can be conceptualized, formulated, and
expressed in a number of ways, two of the most common being as a duty and/or as a goal.
D. These two major ethical theories are usually called deontology and teleology, which
expressions were first combined and contrasted in this sense by C.D. Broad in 1930 in his
Five Types of Ethical Theory (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930). For those unfamiliar
with these basic philosophical terms it might be helpful to consult a dictionary of ethics
such as James Childress and John Macquarrie’s New Dictionary of Christian Ethics.
E. Deontological ethical theory: The word "deontological" comes from the Greek äåïí,
[deon] which means "duty." This duty expressed as moral norm usually comes from a
grounding in an understanding of our moral nature, which enables us to perform those
moral tasks and fulfill those moral responsibilities and obligations which are proper to our
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particular nature. Deontological ethical theory stresses clear moral norms which establish
parameters, or limits, of what must not be done (prohibitions and proscriptions) as well as
prescriptions of what must be done. The latter are given as moral duties or
responsibilities, and often indicate at least a certain basic minimum set of expectations as
to what we must achieve in our moral life.
F. Teleological ethical theory: This is the realm of moral goals, sometimes also called moral
"ends" and/or moral ideals. "Teleological" comes from ôåëïò,[telos] the Greek word for
"end." In general teleological ethics stresses two aspects of a moral telos, end-as-goal,
which should orient proper moral action, and end-as-ideal, which furnishes a goal and a
vision which supports us in our ethical growth and moral striving. Teleological ethical
theory stresses therefore the identification of the "end" proper to each moral being or
aspect (e.g. "faculty") of each moral being, as well as what will lead to the attainment and
fulfillment of that proper end, and what will obstruct or frustrate the realization of that
proper end.
G. Teleological ethical theory also will stress the "becoming" aspect of our moral nature,
such as genuine moral growth and integration, often expressed in terms of moral
character, and what aids this process, such as an understanding of our moral identity (e.g.
as disciples of Jesus), coupled with a guiding moral vision, which in turn is sustained and
nourished by the virtues to be cultivated and the vices to work against and to root out.
I. Introduction to the notion of contra naturam in teleological ethics: “Against nature” and
means “immoral”; if you label some action as contra naturam it is the same as calling this
action morally wrong. But it is important to bear in mind that this does not mean the
same as against the “laws of nature” (i.e., the physical laws of nature, such as gravity, or
what is “found” in nature, such as the birds and the bees). Rather this was understood as
against the proper “end” or goal of the human person, or some aspect (faculty) of the
human person. Thus, contraception was seen as morally wrong since it blocked the
proper “end” of sexual relations which was viewed to be procreation.
J. Some theological questions and themes for Christian ethics (i.e., the "theology" of moral
theology or Christian ethics)
1. W ho is God, and what does God as Trinity mean for us and our moral life?
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a. In this line, see James W alter's article, "The Relation between Faith
and Morality: Sources for Christian Ethics." Horizons 9 (1982): 251-
270. This article outlines a spectrum of six ways of relating faith and
morality used by various theologians. E.g. from morality collapsed into
faith (Barth) to faith collapsed into morality (extreme moral autonomy
school).
4. Christology, i.e., who is Christ for us and our faith community? As well as other
important areas of dogmatic theology, such as W hat is grace and salvation, and
how do these relate to sin, conversion, and reconciliation? Also ecclesiology,
especially in addressing the questions of what is the meaning and mission of the
Church, and what does membership in that body mean?
5. Liturgy and spirituality: W hat does it mean to worship God and live a life of
prayer, both individually and as a community?
a. See Rich Gula’s The Good Life: Where Morality and Spirituality
Converge (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), as well as Marty Stortz’s
1998 GTU Distinguished Faculty Lecture “Discerning the Spirits,
Practicing the Faiths.”
6. Thus, in your ongoing study of moral theology and the other branches of
theology try to make the connections and see the possible inter-relations.
A. For the fuller treatment of this topic see my essay, “Mapping a Moral Methodology,” as
well as the notes/outline which follow here:
B. Introductory note on the role and importance of fundamental moral theology or Christian
ethics, which is meant to be foundational, in presenting a basic methodology and
introduction to concepts and tradition, and which lays the ground for (but is nevertheless
distinct from) applied or special ethics (such as bioethics, sexual ethics, business ethics,
etc.). Perhaps the importance of fundamental moral theology can be caught in the old
axiom, Parvus error in principiis, magnus error in conclusionibus [Small error in the
beginning leads to great error in the conclusion].
2. These “fonts” were utilized and presented according to the mode or genre of the
manualist tradition, which started with the current teaching of the Magisterium at
that particular time on a given issue, and then worked back to Scripture and the
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3. Look briefly at how certain moral teachings have changed throughout the
centuries, e.g., slavery and usury: what was once permitted is not forbidden
(slavery), and what was once forbidden is now permitted (usury).
4. In answering this last question first, the notion of various "languages" can be
helpful, ala W ittgenstein's understanding of language: "W ittgenstein was, in his
later work, extremely sensitive to the different cultures and `language games' in
the world. In the same way that each game has a different set of rules so has
each culture. One cannot be checkmate [sic] in a game of basketball for that is to
confuse the rules of two different games. So, argued W ittgenstein, it is equally
inappropriate to use scientific language in a religious context or for that matter to
judge a non-scientific culture by a scientific western rationality." [Ian S.
Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1994): 137.]
5. W hile W ittgenstein spoke more in terms of different cultures, but I would argue
that the same concept can be applied to the internal language of the individual
source itself. Thus, we need to recognize the diversity of "languages" employed
by the different moral sources. Languages which will have different vocabular-
ies, syntax and grammar, languages which can speak to one another, but which
are NOT identical. Therefore, be careful not to use the language of normative
moral philosophy when speaking of a biblical parable, and vice versa. W e need
to work out a conception of moral theology which allow for a certain amount of
intra-religious dialogue among these different sources.
D. Epistemological considerations for authoritative moral discourse, and in this regard see
John E. Thiel's "Tradition and Authoritative Reasoning." Theological Studies 56 (1995):
627-651. Thiel sses insights from non-foundational epistemology to discuss some of the
problematic relations between argument and authority in magisterial teaching, and also
uses Humanae vitae and Inter Insigniores to illustrate the issue.
IV. THE 6 “C’s” OF MORAL DISCOURSE (Practical considerations for selection and application the
mode(s) of moral theological discourse: the “6 C's" (for a fuller exposition of this section see my
article, “Charting the Common Ground: Moral Discourse and the Abortion Debate”). The outline
follows:
A. Com prehensive in relation to the issue and problem: Does it treat the problem and issue
in its complexity and completeness? Are there aspects, etc., which tend to be ignored,
condemned as irrelevant, etc.? Does it tend to move to a "thick" description rather than
simply a "thin" description of the issue?
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etc.), yet, make sure that key concepts are understood. This involves being sensitive to
the dynamic of "language games" of moral and theological discourse.
C. Consistent and Coherent: Are the modes of argumentation, usage of moral sources,
positions taken, etc. internally coherent and externally consistent with similar issues,
cases, etc.?
D. Credible: in the sense of being "believable. “ i.e., a person of sound reason could logi-
cally hold this position. In this regard, the "credibility" or "plausibility" of our positions
will have to be tested against the experts of a particular field. E.g., if we are to discuss or
pronounce on ecological matter we have to get input from experts in the field, as well as
test our responses with them. This whole area of "expert testimony" is a delicate area in
matters such as marriage, sexual ethics, and the like, including business ethics, politics,
etc.–areas in which the Church has been criticized for not developing a sufficiently
credible and realistic moral discourse. Thus, dialogue, with its concomitant methodology
is key here. No genuine dialogue reduces or eliminates credibility. However, a
reluctance or refusal to dialogue will most likely have only the opposite effect of
rendering one’s argumentation and discourse less credible (and not more credible). As a
“credibility” check I would suggest taking some guidance from both ecumenism and inter-
religious dialogue–endeavors which have developed a certain methodology which strives
to ground real credibility in oneself and the other. In this line, consider the following
passage taken from Complementary Norms to the Jesuit Constitutions in the section
dealing with Ecumenical Activity: (CN#268): “It [ecumenism] seeks, namely, what
unites rather than what divides; it seeks understanding rather than confrontation, it seeks
to know, understand, and love others as they wish to be known and understood, with full
respect for their distinctiveness, through the dialogue of truth, justice, and love.”(The
Constitutions of the Society of Jesus and Their Complementary Norms. St. Louis:
Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1996, emphasis added). This is what I mean about a
“credibility check”–to make sure that our articulation of the “other’s” position reflects a
knowledge and understanding which they would own: “Yes, you have stated my position
fairly, completely, and respectfully.”
E. Convincing: Are the modes of argumentation that move from being merely credible to
one that convinces, in the light of counter-arguments? Is the counter-argument being
stated fairly? W ould its proponents recognize and own the recapitulation presented?
Does the argument convince me/others? W hy? or why not? If an argument or line of
reasoning does not convince, then what is our further response? Recast the argument?
Repeat it, more loudly? Try to invoke sanctions of authority? Recognize that
“convincing” is not a matter of majority acceptance, polls, and/or political correctness.
An otherwise convincing argument may fail to convince because of the sin, hard-
heartedness, lack of intelligence, etc., on the part of those addressed, and therefore would
not be easily corrected by those engaged in the formulation of moral discourse. In this
sense we can say that Jesus Christ failed to “convince” a good deal of his audience as
well!
F. The sixth "C" for moral theology: Christian: Does the moral discourse, position, theory,
response, application, etc. take into account the Christian nature of our moral life? Does
it take into account adequately the aspects of Christian theology, such as creation, sin and
forgiveness, grace, the Cross, redemption, the resurrection, eschatology, Christian moral
community of discipleship, and so on. This sixth "C" does not replace or supersede the
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B. Scripture
1. Important to recognize Scripture first of all as the pre-eminent "sacred text" for
Christians, and therefore for Christian ethics. Its claim is exercised on the faith
community, for whom the sacred text has a special, “sacred” claim. W hile this
claim is “sacred” it is not meant to be simplistic or fundamentalistic. Scripture is
a text, and therefore like all texts written in either a different language or time it
must be translated. Remember basic principle of translation that it is virtually
impossible to translate completely and unambiguously the whole range of
meaning from one language into another. For example consider Matthew 5:48
and the normal translation of ôÝëåéïé and as ôÝëåéüò "perfect." As a text, like all
texts, Scripture must be interpreted (after it is translated). There is no such thing
as a "self-interpreting text"; thus, the science of hermeneutics is fundamental to
our doing Christian ethics. Keep in mind as well that the biblical text is a text of
a community: it arose out of that community, is sacred to that community, and
therefore is formative of the community's self-understanding. I.e., it is normative
for the community's "story" and the story in turn is normative for the community
and the individuals in the community.
b. normativity, e.g., the Norma normans non normata (the norming norm
which norms all other norms and is not normed itself by something
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3. Proper uses for Scripture as sacred text: note the range and modes of this usage,
such as Revelation, liturgical usages, prayer and spirituality, as a guide to praxis,
as embodying a certain wisdom of moral insight, as well as understood as a
"classic" in the hermeneutical sense.
2. Sandra Schneiders summarizes and expresses this fuller notion of the concept of
Tradition as “effective historical consciousness”: "Tradition is the actualization
in the present, in and through language, of the most valued and critically
important aspects of the community's experience, or, more precisely, of the
community's experience itself as it has been selectively appropriated and
deliberately transmitted. Tradition is the primary form and norm of effective
historical consciousness, which is the medium of ongoing community
experience. It includes deliberately formulated belief, that is, dogma, but is by
no means limited to dogma. It includes liturgy, spirituality, the lives and
teachings of exemplary believers, historical experiences, legislation, artistic
creations, customs and much more. One of the tasks of each generation of
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D. Relationship between Scripture and Tradition: The Sacred Claim (or Faith Axis)
1. Because we call ourselves Christians the Scripture, as well as the Tradition out
of which it grew, and which it continues to form and inform, have a special claim
on us. I term this claim a “sacred claim”–not a claim which is counter to reason
or “illogical” but which exercises its logic and persuasiveness primarily through
the arena of faith. All religiously based ethics have this “sacred claim”
dimension (e.g., the Koran for Muslims), but while the Koran may be an
interesting and even inspiring book for us as Christians to read and reflect upon,
it does not have this special “sacred” claim for us in the way it would have for
Muslims. This returns us to the principle of norma normans non normata and
norma normata.
2. And as Sandra Schnieders observes, "In short, the relationship between tradition
and scripture is that of a hermeneutical dialectic. Scripture is produced as part of
and witness to tradition; it // functions as the norm of that tradition; but it can
only function as norm if it is interpreted from within and in terms of tradition."
[Schneiders, pp. 82-83.]
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its abstract and "universal" rational basis and language would be virtually
transcultural and trans-historical, and therefore valid for all peoples. This
philosophical view is often tied to a classicist world-view, and a certain approach
to the natural law. For example, consider Aeterni patris, the Encyclical of Pope
Leo XIII which mandated the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas
(1879).
5. Deductive, which is more easily linked with a classicist, static view of the world.
In the area of methodology, the classicist deductive approach emphasizes norms
as given, often expressed in propositional language, which are considered to be
eternal, universal, immutable and unchanging, etc.
7. Import of the choice of one or the other of these basic approaches for how one
will come to ethics.
1. Experience refers not only the individual and his or her self-awareness and
subjectivity, but also as a member of a number of different human communities.
Thus, the locus for the experience sector is the individuals in relationship to
themselves, to others, and to a multiple set of human communities (from the
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2. The affective dimension can also correct distortions and/or lacunae in the
“reason” sector. As Charles Curran observes, “At times the affective can correct
the errors of reason as illustrated by the change in U.S. public opinion on
Vietnam precipitated by having the war in our living rooms for the first time in
human history.” Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition, p. 184.
3. Curran recognizes that the emotions and intuition can be wrong or erroneously
interpreted, but he notes that the same has to be said for the moral “rational” side
of our perception as well (cf. Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition, p. 185.)
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accessible did not imply that just anyone could reason well.” p. 118.
8. [Quoting Rahner]: "`It is at least possible that the very `detail' of which the
theologian is ignorant, or of which he has only a vague notion, might be the
decisive factor in his case; it might be the very detail which would alter the
whole conclusion.'" [Gustafson, p. 69; Rahner TI 9:225] [Cf. Theological
Investigations 9: 205-24; 225-52]
G. Example of the medieval opinion about the sinfulness of sexual relations during a
woman's menstrual period.
1. In the Old Testament this was considered a capital offense, though no reason is
given, but it seemed to violate the purity laws (or taboos)
2. W e might also observe that it is unlikely (though not impossible) for conception
to occur, and so conclude that these relations were proscribed since they did not
seem “open” to procreation. However, for the early and medieval theologians,
none of these reasons was the ground of their theological objection. Early
Christian writers reacted in various ways, according to John Noonan: "Some
Christian writers repeated the condemnation without analysis (e.g., Chrysostom,
On 1 Corinthians 7, PG 51; Didascalia 6,28). Philo's explanation that
conception was impossible does not seem to have been used. The developed
Christian view was to see the prohibition not as a mysterious and inexplicable
ordinance of God, but as a protection for the child. St. Jerome wrote, `If a man
copulates with a woman at that time, the fetuses conceived are said to carry the
vice of the see, so that lepers and gargantuans are born from this conception, and
the corrupted menses makes the foul bodies of either sex too small or too big'
(Commentary on Ezechiel 6, 18 PL 25: 173). It was a common belief that
children conceived in menstruation were born sickly, seropurulent, or dead
(Pliny, Natural History 7.15.67). The protection of future life became the
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articulated basis for the prohibition of the act as serious sin." p. 85. [From John
T. Noonan, Jr. Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic
Theologians and Canonists. Enlarged edition. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1965, 1986.] In this book Noonan takes great care to investigate the
social context of the various positions in order to demonstrate that while the
"teaching" against contraception may have been "constant" in the Church, the
reasons given for that teaching and the concomitant issues involved have
changed very much throughout the centuries. Thus, bad “biological”
information (i.e., improper attention to human experience) furnished a “wrong”
moral norm, and illustrate for us the necessity of proper attention to all of the
human sciences in interpreting and utilizing the Human Experience
source/resource.
H. Relationship between Human Experience and Normatively Human (the Rational Claim
Axis): In much the same way as we observed the interplay between Scripture and
Tradition along the “Sacred Claim” axis, there is a similar dynamic between human
experience and normative claims which come out of that experience. W e must start from
experience; we cannot impose moral norms from the abstract in an a priori manner. But
once we have established something as “normatively” human, then it functions on the
lives of our human experience as a type of norma normans. For example, once we have
articulated free expression as a fundamental human right, then we say that this should
apply normatively to all peoples, in all places and cultures and in all times. Similarly, if
we proscribe an activity or institution, such as slavery, as offensive to basic human
dignity, then again we say this applies normatively to all peoples. To violate this
normative claim would be to move against the basic claim of reason and rationality. Of
course this has often been done throughout history, but we can see here how the “rational
claim” axis may help correct these deficiencies.
A. The key to understanding how one’s theological world-view functions is the point Charles
Curran describes as one’s “stance”: “As the logical first step stance must be broad enough
to encompass all reality but narrow enough to provide some critical understanding of how
all aspects of reality fit together.” (“Stance,” Ch. 2 in his The Catholic Moral Tradition
Today: A Synthesis): 30.
D. Influence of Classical vs. Historical W orld-view on One's Theological Model and W orld-
view
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discuss in greater detail when we treat the topic of the human person, but which I
asked be read now so as to understand better the framework of contemporary
moral theology.
2. Notion of Classicist (or classical) and Historical (or historicist) world-views was
developed by Bernard Lonergan, and which sets out two extremes in reference to
acceptance/non-acceptance of change, and then in between these two extremes
describes two other major positions in the contemporary world:
3. "One may be named classicist, conservative, traditional; the other may be named
modern, liberal, perhaps historicist (though that word unfortunately is very
ambiguous). The differences between the two are enormous, for they differ in
their apprehension of man, in their account of the good, and in the role they
ascribe to the Church in the world. But these differences are not immediately
theological. They are differences in horizon, in total mentality. For either side
really to understand the other is a major achievement and, when such
understanding is lacking, the interpretation of Scripture or of other theological
sources is most likely to be at cross-purposes." Bernard Lonergan, S.J. "The
Transition from a Classicist W orld-View to Historical-Mindedness," in Law for
Liberty: The Role of Law in the Church Today, ed. James E. Biechler,
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1967): 127.
E. The Physicalist Paradigm, which comes out of the background of Neo-scholasticism and
uses primarily a classicist and essentialist method which stresses faculties and finalities
and in which the understanding of the natural law is often identified too simplistically
with the "order of nature" rather than the "order of reason" (or stating that these two
orders would be morally identical).
1. Found in Janssens' classic article for the expression of the principle of totality in
the personalist model, "Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations."
Louvain Studies 5 (1980): 3-29. Also found more recently in Janssens'
"Personalism in Moral Theology," in Moral Theology: Challenges for the
Future. Essays in Honor of Richard A. McCormick, S.J., ed. Charles E. Curran,
(New York: Paulist Press, 1990): 94-107.
3. How one conceives the moral universe, the natural law, personhood, etc.,
obviously will have important ramifications for how one understands the whole
enterprise of the moral life.
G. This understanding is further mediated also by one's understanding of the key elements of
an adequate contemporary theological anthropology,
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2. Key aspects seen, re-visioned, re-shaped, etc. in this light: e.g., individual,
communal, cultural, ecological. This latter is a more recent "discovery" that we
are part of nature and therefore interdependent, and therefore we need to redo
our theological bias of domination, and consider instead one of stewardship. (W e
will address this whole area in greater depth when we consider Christian
anthropology).
4. Law, normativity, etc. and their function in human society. E.g., the notion of
universal human rights and the "globalization" of ethics
5. The world, which is basically good, positive, etc., yet still has elements which
are evil, sinful, dangerous, impure, etc. (Ignoring or downplaying either
dimension will distort our moral theology).
C. According to Gustafson, "The [4] base points are (a) the interpretation of God and God's
relations to the world and particularly to human beings, and the interpretation of God's
purposes; (b) the interpretation of the meaning or significance of human experience--of
historical life of the human community, of events and circumstances in which persons and
collectivities act, and of nature and man's participation in it; (c) the interpretation of
persons and collectivities as moral agents, and of their acts; and (d) the interpretation of
how persons and collectivities ought to make moral choices and ought to judge their own
acts, those of others, and states of affairs in the world. [Gustafson, Theocentric Ethics, v.
2, p. 143]
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D. This basic process of judgment will also be conditioned by one's basic world-view (in
Lonergan's sense), either classicist or historicist. W e mentioned this notion above, and
will discuss this again in greater detail when we consider the "paradigm shift" in moral
theology, but for now it is sufficient to recall that these different world-views basically
concern the notion of relative change and stability in the world, and especially how this
relates to the knowledge of human nature, and the ability to predicate a universal natural
law applicable to all men and women in every conceivable situation, irrespective of
culture and/or circumstance and trans-historical, therefore valid for all times. The
classicist or historicist world-view will manifest marked differences in apprehension over
the meaning of human person/community, understanding of the "good,”and the role of
the Christian community of the Church in the world. These differences will seriously
condition the use and interpretation of the theological sources, such as Scripture,
Tradition, teachings of the Magisterium, etc.
E. Related to the world-view in one’s judgment it is important to bear in mind the existence
and role of one’s own cultural ethos, especially the notion of “bias” in the Longerganian
sense. Mark O’Keefe describes Lonergan’s notion of bias as “the human tendency to
eliminate from consideration data upon which understanding, judgment, and decision will
be based because the data is perceived to be a potential threat to our well-being or
accustomed ways of viewing the world.” Mark O’Keefe, What Are They Saying About
Social Sin? (New York: Paulist Press, 1990): 77. It is important to bear in mind that
every individual human and every human collectivity or community will have these
biases. The key is to try to be aware of them and to take pains so that they will not
improperly exclude information needed for a balanced judgment.
2. "(b) which sources are decisive when they conflict [or seem to conflict], and
why;
3. "(c) what specific `content' is to be used from these // sources, and what is to be
ignored or rejected, and why; and
G. Potential weakness of an overly strong "organizing" concept which may be too restrictive
or narrow and which may not adequately reflect the range of diversity of human moral
experience, or to allow each and every voice in the various languages to be raised and
heard, and/or may skew some of the information. Thus, the difference between an
"organizing" concept and a "domineering" or "dominating" concept. For example, in
sexual ethics, consider the following from Paul M. Quay who spoke of "each single act of
coition is a natural sign of the full, mutual procreative love of two partners, and that
contraception substitutes a sign of ‘monstrous selfishness’. The woman who uses a
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diaphragm has closed herself to her husband. She has accepted his affection but not his
substance. She permits him entrance but does not suffer him to be master'. The sign and
symbol of wifely submission, of patriarchal authority, is made over covertly to serve the
purposes of a weakly uxorious male and a domineeringly feminist wife....Sometimes the
man will use a condom for the same reasons; sometimes for more characteristically
masculine reasons of selfishness. In either even he no longer dominates his wife as
person, he does not permit his activity to penetrate her; he takes no responsibility for her.
Her helplessness is deceptive--if she is not armored, he is without efficacy. He worships
her with his body--but not enough to share with her his substance." [From Quay's
"Contraception and Conjugal Love." Theological Studies 22 (1961): 35.
A. Need to be attentive to how our moral discourse is basically construed and organized.
E.g., basic ethical theories, such as deontology and teleology, as well as the understanding
of the purpose of moral discourse and ethics as such. Also instrumental here is one’s
wW orld-view, e.g., classicist, historical, devolutionary, evolutionary, revolutionary, etc.
B. Varieties of moral discourse (ala Gustafson). Cf. James M. Gustafson, Varieties of Moral
Discourse: Prophetic, Narrative, Ethical, and Policy, The Strob Lectures, (Grand Rapids:
Calvin College and Seminary, 1988). Gustafson outlines four types of moral discourse:
prophetic, narrative, ethical, and policy, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of
each. His basic point is that no one mode of discourse is sufficient for ethics, and that all
four have to be employed.
C. Prophetic Discourse
a. First, they usually, though not always, address what the prophet
perceives to be the root of religious, moral, or social waywardness, not
specific instances in which certain policies are judged to be inadequate
or wrong.
2. Point or goal of prophetic moral discourse: "... it is used to move us, to stir us to
a deeper moral concern and to action. The more rational and rigorous discourse
of ethics does not communicate the sense of urgency that prophetic discourse
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b. "The utopian allure is, we are told over and over, not only important but
necessary. It provides hope in the midst of despair; it lifts the eyes and
the aspirations beyond what hard realists see as possible to the
possibilities that lie beyond. For Christian theology and ethics, it is
grounded in deep theological convictions: the breaking of the bondage
of death in the accounts of Jesus' resurrection, the assurance of the
coming Kingdom of God in which peace and justice will reign forever."
(Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 14).
D. Narrative Discourse
1. The functional roles of narrative discourse in the moral agent and moral
community. "Narratives function to sustain the particular moral identity of a
religious (or secular) community by rehearsing its history and traditional
meanings, as these are portrayed in Scripture and other sources. Narratives
shape and sustain the ethos of the community. Through our participation in such
a community, // the narratives also function to give shape to our moral
characters, which in turn deeply affect the way we interpret or construe the world
and events and thus affect what we determine to be appropriate action as
members of the community. Narratives function to sustain and confirm the
religious and moral identity of the Christian community, and evoke and sustain
the faithfulness of its members to Jesus Christ." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral
Discourse, pp. 19-20).
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CE 2056 Fundamental Moral Theology
a. "It often assumes an analogy between the story or parable and the
circumstances out of which the question comes. Thus, `Go and do
likewise'." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 21).
E. Ethical Discourse
3. "If there is a common basis, should that not be supported by arguments and
groundings that all human beings can share, rather than those that make
particular appeals to the Bible, to Christian theological themes, and to the faith
of Christians?" (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 34).
4. Christians must take "ethical" discourse seriously, and therefore also moral
philosophy.
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5. Insufficiency of ethical discourse alone: "It does not have the capacities that
prophetic discourse has vividly to point to some devil, some root of evil that
must be extricated, to some deep loyalties and beliefs that systematically distort
human life and human community. Nor does its vocabulary move persons with a
sense of urgency. Ethical discourse cannot shape the ethos of a community in
the way that narratives // can, in part because its language and symbols are
abstract and do not have the evocative power to sustain and cultivate the
nourishing common memories of a community. Its casuistic forms aid precision,
but they can excessively delimit what ought to be taken into account in a good
moral choice. A narrative, at the point of a choice, might help persons see
themselves and circumstances in a broader context of time and history; it might
enlarge the perception and imagination so that features are included that the
concepts and procedures of casuistry conceal." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral
Discourse, pp. 42-43).
F. Policy Discourse
a. "An ethical argument, per se, would have been insufficient. The ethical
had to give direction to the policy but per se could not determine the
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5. Absolute necessity of policy discourse (cf. the interplay with the first five of the
6 "C's”): "Churches and Christians who aspire to affect the course of events with
moral aims and principles need to be able to participate in policy discourse. It is
not that prophets are powerless, but that their power is different from that of
persons whose vocations and roles affect incremental, but important, changes in
the course of events and states of affairs." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral
Discourse, p. 52).
G. Conclusion: Development a sensitivity or awareness for the modes and varieties of moral
discourse at work in a given author, issue, approach, etc. W ork so as to integrate better
this awareness and also the strengths of the four varieties of moral discourse. In this
context attention to the Six “C's” of Christian moral discourse will be helpful.
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corrective. It has effectively repudiated the manualists’ general claims regarding the
unchangeablity of moral truth.” (Keenan, “Moral Theology and History, p. 93.).
B. Bibliographical Footnote: I’ll be using Mahoney primarily in this course, but see below
for some other helpful titles.
1. John Mahoney, S.J. The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman
Catholic Tradition. The Martin D'Arcy Memorial Lectures, 1981-2. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987.
2. Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R. "How Free and Creative W as and Is Moral Theology?"
Chapter Two in Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and
Laity: Volume 1, General Moral Theology, 28-58. Slough: St. Paul
Publications, 1978.
b. Title taken from a line from T.S. Elliot's "Four Quartets" (Burnt
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Norton): "Time present and time past are both perhaps present in time
future and time future contained in time past."
A. Not a branch of theologia moralis really until the 16th century. Early development of the
material would be tied generally with the notion of orthopraxis, i.e., the right living of the
community of Christian disciples. A bit pious, but the biblical expression, "by their love
for one another, they shall know they are Christians," is accurate of the early "moral
theology" of the Church. Certainly we can read much of the Pauline literature in this
light: i.e., what does our identity as followers of Jesus Christ require of us in the concrete?
Thus, it would be correct to say that the early emphasis of moral theology fell in the area
of Christian spirituality as lived in the concrete.
B. Development of a theology of sin and its relation to the development of moral theology.
Here Mahoney's first chapter is key. He notes in particular three negative aspects of the
theological heritage of the Penitentials and the whole of moral theology up to Vatican II:
"a preoccupation with sin; a concentration on the individual; and an obsession with law."
[Mahoney, Making, p. 27]. However, don't vilify the Penitentials; they had many positive
aspects, and represented in particular an important practical reflection on the notion of
moral responsibility and factors which would increase or decrease that responsibility, e.g.,
"ignorance, inadvertence, carelessness, and contempt." [Mahoney, Making, p. 8.], plus
"circumstances" and "intention." Eventually this will be developed into a fairly complex
casuistry, but at the outset it is good to recall the "catechism" teaching on sin and moral
responsibility.
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D. Three aspects for evaluation of moral acts (the so-called fontes moralitatis or “fonts of
morality”)
4. W e will discuss these, as well as the concept of intrinsece malum in se, in much
greater detail throughout the course.
A. See Mahoney's Chapter 2, and we will return to these themes throughout the course. It is
important to read Augustine also in an historical mode, and not deify nor vilify him in the
abstract.
D. Massa damnata: "The melancholy consequence of that original sin is that human nature
is vitiated, and lust and ignorance are its lot, to such an extent that it lacks even the ability
to appreciate the full seriousness of that first wicked act of disobedience which resulted in
the whole human race, which had its roots poisoned in Adam, being a `condemned
throng', a massa damnata." [Mahoney, p. 46.]
E. Augustine's theology of grace and its relation to the moral life: Sanctifying and actual
grace, and the latter would seem to suggest that we are always assisted to do the right and
moral thing, no matter how difficult.
F. Yet, keep in mind another ancient maxim: `Deus impossibilia non iubet' ("God does not
command of man things which are impossible to do"): "The principle that God asks of no
one what is impossible but that his grace is always available thus was confirmed as a
central moral and pastoral principle in moral theology in general and in the Church's
moral teaching." [Mahoney, p. 53.] ..."... applied in 1930 by Pope Pius XI, in his
encyclical on marriage [Casti connubii], as a theological and pastoral comment on his
condemnation of the practice of contraception." [Mahoney, p. 53.]. In short, if something
is virtually “impossible” it is highly doubtful that it is really being commanded by God.
G. Mahoney’s 3 reflections on the maxim Deus impossibilia non iubet (cf. Mahoney, pp. 55-
57)
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3. “For him, grace is almost exclusively isolated in the will of man, in its attempts
to exercise a spiritual mastery over the whole self.” p. 55.
4. Mahoney notes that this view “has result for the Church in an impoverished view
of grace which locates it for all practical purposes in the human will, as enabling
the individual through sheer supercharged will-power to overcome all other
personal and social deficiencies in his attempt to comply with God’s commands.
“Such a separatist view of grace, remote from the totality of the person and
abstracting from other resources, or their lack, can easily sound like maintaining
that a sufficiently high grade of petrol in a car will substitute for a faulty clutch
of even for a lack of viable roads.” p. p. 55. [or to use a more home-spun
metaphor, it gives us a Catholic sense of “guilt” as expressed in Garrison
Keillor’s parish of “Our Lady of Perpetual Responsibility”] So Mahoney argues
for the expansion of the notion of grace, especially into the social dimension.
(Cf. p. 56)
5. “A second reflection on the Augustinian maxim that God does not command the
impossible is to do with the theology underlying this principle, and with noting
that it is primarily a statement God, and not about man’s moral abilities.” p. 56.
7. “The third reflection which the principle that God does not command the
impossible evokes is that, from the beginning to end of the history of the origin
and application of this principle, it appears presumed that we always know
exactly what God’s commands are.” (Mahoney, p. 57.)
8. [This, and the two preceding “reflections” point to many and varied problems
and problematic implications, not the least of which is voluntarism]
H. Augustine's theology of sexuality (which I treat in greater detail in the course on sexual
ethics)
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1. "Ockham contrasted human freedom with the freedom of God. His thought was
dominated by the idea of the divine omnipotence, which enabled him to carry his
idea of freedom to an absolute degree. For him, the divine will was totally free;
it governed moral law itself and all the laws of creation. W hat God willed was
necessarily just and good precisely because he willed it. Law, and all moral
value or qualification, flowed from his will." (Pinckaers, p. 246.)
3. Also very helpful here is Fuchs’ article, "Our Image of God and the Morality of
Innerworldly Behavior" Ch. 3 in his Christian Morality: The Word Became
Flesh (W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1987).
1. "Thus divine and human freedom were conceived as two absolutes, but with this
difference: God was omnipotent in regard to his creatures could, consequently,
impose his will upon us." (Pinckaers, p. 247).
1. Issue arises of relation of God's will to moral goodness, i.e., is something "good"
only because God so wills it and God could will otherwise, or is something good
in itself, which even God could not change without destroying God's own
nature?
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CE 2056 Fundamental Moral Theology
1. "Moral obligation was determined and refined by law. Law therefore confronted
human freedom in the form of obligations issuing from the divine will and, to
some extent, assumed the role of this will." (Pinckaers, p. 248).
2. "Natural law was no longer based, for him, on human nature and its inclinations,
which reason could reveal. It consisted rather in the authority of right reason
presenting directly to the human will the orders and obligations that emanated
from the divine will, without there being any need whatsoever to justify them,
since the justification of law could be found only in the divine will itself."
(Pinckaers, p. 249).
1. Law
2. Conscience
4. Sins
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a. See in Mahoney (p. 23) the good excerpt from Trent, DS 1680-81 on
need to confess sins accurately according to species and number, taking
into consideration circumstances and other mitigating factors as well.
a. I.e., that the Church should have all the basic institutions and structures
of a civil society, (such as law, governmental structures, etc.), and in
that sense be “perfect” (understand as being “complete” and NOT as
being without fault or blemish!)
2. Theological anthropology
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b. Grace
(1) Sanctifying
(2) Actual
E. Implications of the Historical Split between Moral Theology and the Rest of Theology
(and Spirituality): "The moral theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
however, manifested not merely a process of developing theological specialization but a
bifurcation in the inherent relationship of the moral and spiritual dimensions of Christian
living. Catholic moral theology, under the influence of the philosophy of nominalism,
gradually became focused on acts, rules, and casuistry, losing the broader Thomistic
emphasis on virtues in the context of a striving to attain the ultimate end. Discussion of
virtue was reduced almost to providing an organizing structure for discussing the sinful
acts that `opposed' particular virtues. Catholic moral theology--all the way up to the
manuals of moral theology in use before the Second Vatican Council--remained tied to
and more akin with emphases in canon law than to dogmatic theology and spirituality."
[O'Keefe, "Catholic Moral Theology and Christian Spirituality, p. 63]
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5. Some cases of course were extremely profound and important, while others
strike us now as a bit frivolous, such as Stanislaus W oywood's chapter on "False
Teeth and Holy Communion." (cf. his The Casuist: A Collection of Cases in
Moral and Pastoral Theology. Vol. 3. New York: Joseph F. W agner; London:
B. Herder, 1910, 1925.
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CE 2056 Fundamental Moral Theology
a. "The part of theology which deals with human actions and studies the
rules of human conduct in their relationship to the principles of
revelation is called moral theology. Christian ethics does not eliminate,
but embraces and perfects, natural ethics. For this reason, moral
theologians include in their treatises the norms of the natural law. The
field of moral theology embraces natural and supernatural ethics. It is
the function of moral theology to dictate norms for all human activities
in order that they may conform to the principles of reason and Christian
revelation." p. 1219.
2. Further Examples
1. [Need to explain all the following terms, and note that this material will come up
again in the treatment of moral norms and the natural law.]
2. "All agree that the manuals of Catholic moral theology which existed until the
time of the Second Vatican Council employed the legal model as primary.
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a. "Divine law is twofold. First, the laws which // necessarily follow from
God as the author and creator of nature involve the eternal law, which is
the order or plan existing in the mind of God, and the natural law,
which is the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature.
Second, divine positive law comes from the free determination of God
as the author of revelation."
e. "Human law has human beings as its author and can be either church or
civil law.
f. "Note that all law shares in the eternal law of God and that human law
must always be seen in the relationship to and subordinate to the natural
law and the eternal law.
4. "Thus the manuals of moral theology view the moral life as conscience obeying
the various laws." [Charles Curran, Tensions in Moral Theology, pp. 96-97].
a. A bit later on we will discuss the classicist model and the paradigm shift
to a more historical model (seen in Brian Johnstone's article).
2. Homogeneous approach
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b. Thus, for example, in terms of sexual ethics, "Those who advocated this
approach believed that the norm for sexual right or wrong could be
known through the physical/biological nature." [Boyle, Parvitas, p. 46.
b. Largely taken for granted by men of sound mind and good will
5. Dissonant voices tended to be considered only to the point where they could be
refuted, and then usually in a rather summary fashion. Thus, most Protestant
ethicians, for example, dismissed out of hand.
7. Casuistry sought to discover the morally relevant features and their relative
moral weight, and disregard the rest, in order to arrive at a conclusion expressed
in terms of a (re)statement of the relevant moral principle and its concrete
application in this or that sort of case, which conclusion could then be used in
analogous situations (understood in a rather strict sense).
9. Pastoral security of the classicist approach: "This classical world view approach
had the advantage, pastorally speaking, of giving a person, faced with a moral
decision, a high degree of certainty of the rightness or wrongness of an act.
There is a certain clarity that is part and parcel of this approach even when the
conclusions do not agree with a person's wants or desires." [Boyle, Parvitas, p.
46].
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2. Teachers
B. E.g. the University of Paris (and others) passing out sentences of excommunication and
pronouncements of heresy.
C. Later development, especially after the Council of Trent and the creation of a papal
bureaucracy.
1. In this regard, the talk given by Archbishop John Quinn in June of 1996 is
helpful to see how part of this same problematic remains today.
2. See Quinn’s "The Exercise of the Primacy." Commonweal 123 (12 July 1996):
11-20. This point is amplified and developed in his The Reform of the Papacy:
The Costly Call to Christian Unity. Ut Unum Sint: Studies on Papal Primacy.
New York: Crossroad, 1999.
3. Pontificate of Pius IX
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5. Contrast this with Vatican II's Decree on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae,
[#2]: "The Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to
religious freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men should be immune
from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every human power
so that, within due limits, nobody is forced to act against his convictions in
religious matters in private or in public, alone or in associations with others. The
Council further declares that the right to religious freedom is based on the very
dignity of the human person as known through the revealed word of God and by
reason itself.
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5. First Vatican Council never concluded due to the Franco-Prussian W ar and the
entrance of the Italian troops into Rome, and Pope flees to the Vatican
C. Attempt to find some central biblical theme, such as Law, Charity, etc., as the organizing
concept for the moral manual.
D. Key works
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a. Taught in India
2. Bernard Häring's watershed work: Das Gesetz Christi. Moraltheologie für Prie-
ster und Laien. Freiburg: Erich W ewel Verlag, 1954.
A. Optatam Totius
B. Dignitatis humanae
1. Is a Declaration.
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C. Gaudium et spes
B. Situation ethics debate occasioned by both Humanae vitae and the publication of Joseph
Fletcher's 1967 Situation Ethics.
B. Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R. (Born 1912, died 3 July 1998) and the Redemptorist School
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CE 2056 Fundamental Moral Theology
1. Transcendental Thomism
2. Rahnerian theology
4. Role of Proportionalism
b. natural law
a. Alfons Auer
b. Franz Böckle
f. And a host of their former students, such as James Keenan, S.J. and
Thomas Kopfensteiner.
1. Personalist morals
3. Other figures
a. Joseph Selling
b. James W alter
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CE 2056 Fundamental Moral Theology
1. Importance of Scripture
1. Joseph Fletcher
2. Other proponents
3. Charles Curran
4. Daniel Maguire
G. Moral Rigorists
2. Carlo Caffarra
4. Germain Grisez
5. John Finnis
6. W illiam E. May
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CE 2056 Fundamental Moral Theology
c. Examples
3. Asia
c. Chopstick countries
(2) Buddhist
4. Africa
b. Bénézet Bujo
2. There is overlap and some theologians obviously could be placed in more than
one school. W e will not take account of all of these theologians during this
course, but I think it is important to have some "name recognition" of these
contemporary figures.
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3. W here I might place myself: educated initially at W eston by Sr. Mary Emil
Penet, I.H.M., a disciple of Josef Fuchs and by W illiam Spohn at JSTB, with
my doctorate done at the Gregorian. Studied under Josef Fuchs and Klaus
Demmer at the Gregorian, though I would not call myself a disciple of either.
Nevertheless, especially due to my years of teaching at the Gregorian, I do know
fairly well the moral autonomy school of Fuchs, Demmer, et. al. I find very
congenial the basic approach of Bernard Häring, H. Richard Niebuhr, and the
early James Gustafson as well as many of the insights of Josef Fuchs and Louis
Janssens and the Louvain School. However, I also think it very important to
move beyond the Anglo-European axis and consider other voices and
approaches. Therefore, I consider important the contribution of the group I
labeled moral theologians of inculturation and other Christians, Protestants and
Orthodox. Of course, we cannot ignore the world which is not explicitly
religious, nor should we discount voices of philosophers, sociologists,
historians, etc.
1. Psychological models
2. Voluntarism
B. Juridical model
1. Minimalism
C. Philosophical models
1. Various, but common point is the pre-eminence given to the philosophical sector
and methodology
D. Scriptural models
E. Social ethical model: "So the idea of social justice curves back to a model of salvation
through the notion of a new creation. All the experiences of tension come back to the call
for a new beginning, a making-new, here in the earth, of all the potentials of all living
creatures. Models of social justice are clearly models of change." [Michael Keeling, The
Foundations of Christian Ethics, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990): 27.]
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2. Clearly in the social ethic model, as well as in the Biblical model and the
inculturation/contextual model.
H. A "Non-Model" would be one which denied or totally eclipsed the function of one of the
4 sectors
1. Magisterial positivism
A. Basic task of Christian ethics is to develop a realistic and complete model of the human
person. One that is realistic and complete, and therefore, particular and universal. Both
aspects are essential to a proper understanding of morality. There is no universal morality
that exists on a meta-human level.
1. Cf. Norbert Rigali's "Christian Morality and Universal Morality: The One and
the Many." Louvain Studies 19 (1994): 18-33.
2. Here, contributions from non-W estern cultures will be important, and as a point
for inculturation. For example, "Francis Hsu claims, for example, that different
patterns of relationship, different ways of conceiving what it is to be `a human
being', in China and Japan compared with Europe and North America account
for the low penetration by Christianity into these societies." [quoted in Michael
Keeling's Foundations, p. 209]
1. How one views the human person will have great impact on how one conceives
morality.
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c. Thus, this complex of affirmations is also the ground for our social
ethics
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CE 2056 Fundamental Moral Theology
c. Communal focus
d. Greater prominence given to both the positive and negative role of the
emotions in moral life and action. Virtues, as they relate to character
formation, will have greater prominence in this theory, as well as
attention to the social particularity of the moral agent. This view has
stronger biblical basis, especially in reference to discipleship, as well as
greater correspondence in other ethical systems, such as Confucianism.
1. Created by God
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Gen 1:31 God saw all that he had made, and it was very good. And
there was evening, and there was morning-- the sixth day. Thus the
heavens and the earth were completed in all their vast array. (NIV)
c. Also interdependent in and with the rest of creation. Again we can refer
to the Genesis account: e.g. cf. Genesis 1:27-30
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created
him; male and female he created them. God blessed them and said to
them, "Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it.
Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every
living creature that moves on the ground." Then God said, "I give you
every seed-bearing plant on the face of the whole earth and every tree
that has fruit with seed in it. They will be yours for food. And to all the
beasts of the earth and all the birds of the air and all the creatures that
move on the ground-- everything that has the breath of life in it-- I give
every green plant for food." And it was so. (NIV)
2. Embodied spirit
a. St. Augustine
4. Reflection of God
a. Book of Genesis: Created in the image of God, male and female (imago
Dei)
b. St. Iranaeus: Gloria Dei Vivens Homo ["The Glory of God is the
Human Person--Fully Alive." Adversus Haereses, Bk IV, ch. 20, sec. 7.
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5. United in Christ
a. Neither Jew nor Greek, male nor female, slave nor free for you are all
one in Christ (Gal. 3:28)
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(1) Argues that the most superior form of moral judgement is one
grounded in and lived in the presence of the mystery of the
Triune God. Jones avers that the primary friendship a person
should have is with God. Also discusses and critiques the
work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, and others.
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these demands now take are not viewed as if they were two levels or
planes running parallel to each other." [Hollenbach, Claims, p. 74.]
3. Dignitatis Humanae
4. Importance and elaboration for these fundamental insights for social ethics.
5. The historical dimension of personhood means that the human person is always a
"`someone who'--a someone with a history." [Meilaender, Faith, p. 46.]
1. The only way we can be human is to be human in a particular culture. There can
be no “acultural” or “non-cultural” human nature in a meaningful sense of the
term. Once you remove culture from a human being the resulting (abstract)
construct ceases to be genuinely “human.”
2. Theologically, Christ’s Incarnation into a particular time and place, into a given
culture, should be interpreted not as God’s canonization of 1 st century Palestine
over against other times and cultures, but as God’s acceptance and ratification of
our way of being human.
4. This observation ties in with the basic thrust of inculturation, which according to
Evangelii nuntiandi (Paul VI’s Apostolic Exhortation on Evangelization) should
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5. The relevant passage reads as follows: “All this may be summarized thus:
evangelization is to be achieved, not from without, as though by adding some
decoration or applying a coat of colour, but in depth, going to the very centre
and roots of life. The gospel must impregnate the culture and the whole way of
life of man, taking these words in the widest and fullest sense which they are
given in the constitution Gaudium et Spes. This work must always take the
human person as its starting point, coming back to the interrelationships between
persons and their relation with God.” (EN #20).
2. Unique
a. Individual
b. Embodied spirit
c. Historical
a. Important to note here that the human person is also a cultural being
b. Concomitantly, moral theology and ethics will have to grapple not only
with ethical systems, but also with various ethoses, which certainly have
their dark sides.
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4. Ecological nature
5. Transcendent
6. Saved in Christ and called to New Life in Christ: Therefore, a person of faith,
living in a community of believers, and thus our identity as disciples will have
some particular sacred claim on our moral life.
8. All of the above points should be kept in mind as we look at one or another
aspect of the Christian understanding of the moral life.
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a. "Our bodily life does not belong to us but to the One who has entrusted
it to us for ourselves and for the service of our brethren." [Häring, ME
p. 67.]
b. cf. Rm 14: 7-8: "For no one of us lives, and equally no one of us dies,
for oneself alone. If we live, we live for the Lord; and if we die, we die
for the Lord."
c. "Life, then, means existence in the saving solidarity of Christ with all
men." [Häring, ME p. 67.]
A. Freedom
a. Gal 5:1 "It is for freedom that Christ has set us free. "Stand firm, then,
and do not let yourselves be burdened again by a yoke of slavery."
(NIV)
b. This theme of "freedom for" is also central to John Paul II's Encyclical
on Fundamental Moral Theology, Veritatis Splendor: "W ithin that
freedom there is an echo of the primordial vocation whereby the
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Creator calls man to the true Good, and even more, through Christ's
Revelation, to become his friend and to share his own divine life. It is
at once inalienable self-possession and openness to all that exists, in
passing beyond self to knowledge and love of the other. Freedom then
is rooted in the truth about man, and it is ultimately directed towards
communion." (Veritatis Splendor, #86).
5. Limitations on freedom: W e are limited from without and we are limited from
within. W e might call this state "facticity" and it is important to recognize basic
facticity as an intrinsic part of being human. Therefore, "absolute" freedom is
not a reasonable or desirable goal (even in some abstract ideal order).
b. However, this concept itself we will discuss a bit later, and to a certain
extent as a way of summing up what we have to say about freedom,
conscience, grace, the moral life, etc.
B. Conscience
1. W hat it is not:
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C. Community: This foundational concept has been too little stressed in traditional moral
theology, yet it is crucial for understanding the nature of the human person, not to
mention its significance for for understanding social responsibility and social sin.
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E. Actus naturae
1. "Natural act"
F. Actus personae
2. E.g., consideration of the moral nature of an act in terms of how it relates to the
whole of the human person.
G. Natura actus
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2. In traditional moral theology this refers to the manner in which a certain act, e.g.,
coitus, is performed. Traditionally, anything that blocked or destroyed the form
of the act would be considered immoral. In the development of Roman Catholic
sexual ethics, the conjugal act was considered moral, even if performed for the
so-called "secondary ends" alone (e.g., pleasure and the unitive dimension) as
long as the manner of the conjugal act did not violate the basic form and
integrity of the act (i.e., the semen still had to be deposited in the vagina).
A. Recall Change of world-view from classicist to historical, which terminology and basic
concept comes from Bernard Lonergan. However, these really are points on a spectrum,
rather than two opposing models.
1. Use this shift in models to indicate some of the current trends and trends in
various aspects of moral theology, such as sexual ethics.
C. Physicalist Paradigm
1. Background of Neo-scholasticism
c. Natural law often identified too simplistically with the "order of nature"
rather than the "order of reason"
a. "The creation was a free act of God's will. But since the creation, so far
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as human reason could // determine did exist, its being must follow
from the nature of the Being of its creator. This creation, which was
infinitely below its creator, nevertheless had the signs of the creator
within it." [Michael Keeling, Foundations, p. 109.]
b. "By looking at what was created, human beings could arrive at true,
though limited, knowledge of their own nature and of the nature of
other created existences, and so could arrive at a knowledge, by
analogy, of the being of God. The problems, of course, lay in the
giving of definition to the particulars of this knowledge." p. 109.
a. "This universal order constituted the fundamental moral law for human
beings. It was not first of all a set of rules, but a recognition of the
good which was the ultimate purpose of the nature of each human
being. God `commanded' certain behaviour only in the sense that such
behaviour would lead to the greatest good for each being according to
its own nature. Equally, other behaviour was `forbidden' because it
lacked the power to fulfil the potential of the human being.
Consequently, to sin against God was always to sin against one's own
nature, to cut the link between the creative intention and the present
reality. To fulfil one's own nature truly was also to be obedient to
God." [Keeling, Foundations, p. 112.]
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b. "In the physicalist paradigm, the moral norm is derived directly from
certain structures of nature, in particular, the structure of faculties or
acts." [Johnstone, p. 72.]
c. These "provide a direct indication of the moral law. Thus, the structures
provide the material content of the norm, while the obligation deriving
from the will of God, which is expressed in the structures, provides the
formal content. The relevant structures of the faculties or acts, in this
way of arguing, are considered in abstraction from the person. Further,
they were sometimes, if not always, identified as the biological
structures of faculties or acts, or the «biological laws» which could be
discovered in such faculties or acts. Again, in certain particular
contexts, these structures were taken to be those which pertained to that
dimension which were human beings had in common with animals.
This latter feature was particularly important in the traditional analysis
of sexuality." [Johnstone, p. 73.]
6. As Johnstone notes, "W hat it came down to, finally, was that performance of the
natural act in the natural way was accepted as the indication of a direction of the
will to the bonum prolis [offspring as end of marriage].
7. This placing of the major accent on the integrity of the physical act itself was a
characteristic of the development of moral theological argument within the
tradition up to recent times. The result of the development was that the nature of
the act, in this case, the nature of the isolated sexual act, became the moral
norm." p. 78.
1. "A major problem here was that the dominant scholastic moral theology focused
narrowly on the «exterior» act, sometimes practically identifying the moral act
with the physical act. The interior dimensions of the moral act, such as intention,
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2. "As Louis Janssens notes, the official commentary // indicates that the meaning
of the text is that a human act must be judged morally insofar as it regards the
person integrally and adequately considered." [Johnstone, pp. 74-75.]
1. Found in Janssens' classic article for the expression of the principle of totality in
the personalist model, "Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations."
Louvain Studies 5 (1980): 3-29.
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a. subject;
b. embodied subject;
f. historical;
(1) on the personal, individual level, but also on the societal and
cultural level.
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p. 106.]
a. "W hat constitutes the self at any particular moment is the outcome of an
inner and outer dynamic of relationships both personal and cultural,
which result from the individual's past history and present location."
[Keeling, Foundations, p. 210].
b. "The problem is that there is a cost in all this. Experiences are negative
as well as positive." [Keeling, Foundations, p. 210].
d. Thus, here we will speak of the moral importance not only of growth
and conversion, but always of forgiveness, reconciliation, and healing.
2. It can be more easily “abused” and is perhaps more open to the deceptive
processes of human rationalization: “My conscience says it’s okay” or “No one
is being hurt by this.”
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3. Thus, many authors have begun to suggest that while personalism is important
for fundamental moral theology and makes a definite contribution, by itself it is
insufficient to ground a full consideration of the natural law and moral norms.
A. “Conscience” as such is not a key biblical theme, but the basic idea is captured well in a
number of places. The obligation to follow one’s conscience since it is heard as the voice
of God is illustrated well in the post-Pentecost account (cf. Acts 5:27-32) of the Peter and
the disciples confronting the officials of the Sanhedrin, the latter group having ordered the
disciples not to preach any more about Jesus. Peter’s response is a classic expression of
the primacy of conscience: “W e must obey God rather than any human authority” (Acts
5:29 [NSRV]).
B. The primary metaphor used by the Church since Vatican II is to call conscience the
“sanctuary” of the human person. The sanctuary of conscience has two basic meanings:
first, a holy place, because that is the most privileged place where the individual meets
God (just as the altar makes the “sanctuary” the sanctuary). Secondly, and grounded in
the first meaning, a safe place: no outside authority, even the “law officers” may
legitimately enter (recall the “right of sanctuary” in the Middle Ages: if an individual
suspected of a crime could reach the church sanctuary then the police could not enter and
remove him or her). This notion of the sanctuary of conscience is taken up as the primary
metaphor in Vatican II (cf. Gaudium et spes and Dignitatis humanae, and repeated in the
Catechism of the Catholic Church (cf. CCC 1776)
"Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but
which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to
avoid evil, tells him inwardly at the right moment: do this, shun that. For man has in his
heart a law inscribed by God. His dignity lies in observing this law, and by it he will be
judged. His conscience is man's most secret core, and his sanctuary. There he is alone
with God whose voice echoes in his depths. By conscience, in a wonderful way, that law
is made known which is fulfilled in the love of God and of one's neighbor. Through
loyalty to conscience Christians are joined to other men in the search for truth and for the
right solution to so many moral problems which arise both in the life of individuals and
from social relationships. Hence, the more a correct conscience prevails, the more do
persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and try to be guided by the objective
standards of moral conduct. Yet it often happens that conscience goes astray through
ignorance which it is unable to avoid, without thereby losing its dignity. This cannot be
said of the man who takes little trouble to find out what is true and good, or when
conscience is by degrees almost blinded through the habit of committing sin." Gaudium et
spes, #16. (Translation from The Documents of Vatican II, trans. and ed. Austin P.
Flannery, O.P., (New York: Pillar Books, 1975).
C. This notion of the sanctuary of conscience leads to the Roman Catholic notion of the
autonomy of the conscience. “Autonomy” comes from the two Greek words nomos (law)
and auto (self). This means that the individual first discerns and then applies the law to
her/himself. It does not mean that the individual “invents” the moral law for her/himself.
The key aspect of the moral autonomy is the sanctity of conscience since obedience to this
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moral voice is the locus of all moral goodness and badness. If the conscience is not the
ultimate moral authority to be obeyed, then whatever is posited as that ultimate moral
authority will of necessity be outside of the person. To posit an external (heteronomous)
moral authority as the ultimate voice which an individual must obey would open up a
huge number of problems concerning authority and mature human action.
D. Heteronomy, the imposition of the moral law from some outside source (“hetero” means
“other” or “different” in Greek) is not the accepted, orthodox, traditional Roman Catholic
position. St. Thomas Aquinas maintained, for example, that even if an individual were to
be excommunicated from the Church for holding a position in conscience, then he said the
individual must follow his or her conscience. Remember that this was said in the context
of the belief that extra ecclesia nulla salus est (Outside the Church there is no salvation).
Therefore, Thomas was not consigning this individual to hell, but underscoring the belief
that the key relationship is between God and the individual, and that if the person (even
erroneously) sincerely believed God was asking him or her to do something, then acting
out of that conviction would demonstrate faith in God and the concomitant fidelity of
action which that faith would inspire.
E. W e will consider these points in detail later on in the course, but it is important to stress
the constant traditional teaching of the Church is that an individual always follow his or
her conscience, even when that conscience might be in “objective” error on what is
morally right. However, it is still a basic teaching of the Church that we are bound to
follow our conscience faithfully in all of our activity even if our conscience be incorrect,
incompletely formed, and we cannot rectify these failings.
F. Therefore no one should be forced to act in a manner which is contrary to her or his
conscience. Of course, we should not minimize or overlook our obligation both to form
and inform our consciences and here Church teaching is important, as well as the other
"fonts" of moral theology, such as Scripture, theological reflection, etc. Nevertheless,
even in the case of a malformed or poorly informed ("erroneous") conscience, the
individual is obliged to follow that conscience and must never be forced to act in a
manner which is contrary to her or his conscience, though this freedom is also limited by
the common good. I.e., one cannot grant one the "right" to follow his/her conscience in
order to hurt seriously oneself or others (two clear examples would be suicide and
murder). Thus, we see this absolute right of conscience socially contextualized.
G. Final point to keep in mind on the sanctity of conscience as interior moral guide.
Conscience is essentially an interior guide, and if it is removed or downplayed as the most
prized guide then some other moral guide will usurp this role. This new moral guide will
be exterior, and there could be a wide variety of potential candidates, such as the state,
political correctness, conventional wisdom, peer pressure, as well as any “sacred” or
religious authority, including the Magisterium of the Church. W hile these guides may
have differing values and roles to play as exterior guides, none should ever be elevated to
the role of highest guide (held by the interior conscience). To do so would violate the
fundamental dignity and whole notion of human personhood, as well as call into question
much of the whole philosophical and theological underpinnings of our understanding of
morality.
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A. Though “conscience” is not primarily a scriptural term, there are certain aspects of
“conscience” that derive from variant spellings of the Greek word(s) óõíåßäçóéò found in
the New Testament and rendered as synderesis and/or syneidesis.. These were interpreted
by scholastic theologians and Thomas Aquinas as referring to two slightly different
aspects of conscience, namely as a “habit” and as an “act” of moral judgment. In Latin
the Greek terms were translated (and combined) as conscientia and from that comes the
English word “conscience.”
B. The traditional approach to moral conscience is an important part of the heritage, and
many theologians still work implicitly out of this background or in reaction to it.
Likewise, many Christians (Catholics) have been educated in this vocabulary, and so from
a pastoral point of view it is important to know. Additionally, the treatment in The
Catechism of the Catholic Church both presumes and follows this traditional teaching,
however, later we will be considering other approaches.
C. Traditionally conscience was seen very much in terms of a "faculty," and somewhat
abstracted or extrapolated from the individual's whole personhood, as can be seen in the
following definition taken from a widely used pre-Vatican II dictionary of moral
theology: "Conscience is a judgment made by an individual concerning the morality of
his actions. More precisely, conscience is a judgment of the practical reason deciding by
inference from general principles the moral goodness or malice of a particular act." [From
Msgr. Giuseppe Graneris. "Conscience." In Dictionary of Moral Theology, 295.
Compiled and edited by Francesco Cardinal Roberti and Msgr. Pietro Palazzini.
Translated from the Second Italian Edition Under the Direction of Henry J. Yannone.
London: Burns & Oates, 1962.]
D. In the manualist tradition there were two kinds of judgement made in conscience. The
first judgement refers primarily to the “objective” nature–the rightness or wrongness of
the moral act in itself, and in the Latin this was called the iudicium de actu ponendo
(judgement concerning the act to be undertaken). The second type of judgement was
called iudicium de positione actus, literally, “judgement about the position of the act.”
This judgement is related more closely to the subjective judgement of the moral agent that
this or that act will be “right” and therefore “good.”
E. In the traditional theology this distinction allowed for the possibility that one could “err”
about the objective moral nature of an act, and yet still be acting in good faith (or
sometimes called good conscience). The “error” would be an error of judgement de actu
ponendo. In acting in good faith though one could not “err” in the second sort of
judgement though de positione actus.
F. Thus, in summary we could say that the person believes that doing “X” is morally good:
this is the iudicium de positione actus. If the person believed that “X” was not morally
good, but did it anyway this would be malicious. However, this “judgement” so far only
has taken into account the “subjective” judgement of the moral agent about the action.
The action itself could in fact be morally (or “objectively”) wrong. This “objective”
moral judgement is the iudicium de actu ponendo (judgement concerning the act to be
undertaken). In sum, for a person acting in good faith, his or her iudicium de actu
ponendo (judgement concerning the act to be undertaken) can be “erroneous” while the
iudicium de positione actus, (judgement about the position of the act) could not in
principle be erroneous–i.e., a person who is acting in good faith will always try to do what
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she or judges be right. This distinction is key to understanding the Church’s teaching on
Right and Erroneous conscience, and Vincible and Invincible Ignorance.
G. Certain or doubtful, which was traditionally defined in this way: "Conscience is certain
or doubtful depending on the degree of assent with which a judgment is made. A certain
conscience judges the morality of an act without prudent fear of erring. A doubtful
conscience gives rise to a positive judgment with a prudent fear of error or simply to a
negative judgment in which one does not know whether an act is lawful or unlawful.”
I. Underscore again the basic principle of responsibility, which includes responsibility for
"unforeseen" effects. Even though we might not "foresee" something, our historical
nature teaches us that we should expect unforeseen effects. This realization should not
necessarily paralyze us from action, but rather school us in greater prudence. Cf. Hans
Jonas' The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethic for the Technological Age.
Translated by Hans Jonas and David Herr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
J. The notions of vincibility, invincibility, certainty and doubt also point to the great need
for continuous conscience formation, information, and conversion. W e can see these
terms as inter-related aspects, grounded in the objective moral order, while recognizing
our own sinfulness and need for ongoing conversion. Veritatis splendor also underlines
the need to form our conscience, "to make it the object the object of a continuous
conversion to what is true and what is good." [VS, 64]
L. Important to bear in mind the "dignity" of even an erroneous conscience, and in this vein,
consider the following point made by Josef Fuchs in speaking of Vatican II's teaching on
the sanctity of conscience: "For the Council, the reason for the appeal to conscience in
our moral decisions, which are always interior, is that norms and commandments, and
hence also the `will of God', are known and acknowledged in the conscience and thereby
become our `interior'; fidelity to the `interior' of the conscience is therefore the morality of
the `interior' of the person (cf. Dignitatis Humanae [DH] 3). In other words, the only
possible reference-point for the inner moral decision is interior knowledge of right
behavior, i.e., the conscience. Therefore the conscience retains its dignity in the realm of
personal morality even when it inculpably considers a false opinion about human conduct
to be correct (GS 16). [From Josef Fuchs, "Vatican II: Salvation, Personal Morality, Right
Behavior," ch. 2 in Idem, Christian Morality: The Word Became Flesh, trans. Brian
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McNeil, (W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; Dublin: Gill and Macmillan,
1987): 21].
A. Remember that a fundamental tenet of Roman Catholic moral theology is that one must
always follow one's conscience, even in cases when that conscience is "erroneous."
However, one has an obligation to form and inform one's conscience. Yet, it is still
important to understand the distinction between "right" and "erroneous" conscience.
C. Josef Fuchs makes the same point in this way: "the one who errs inculpably holds an
objective error to be what is objectively correct; therefore, one is not ethically bad despite
the incorrect judgment and fidelity to it in conduct (Gaudium et Spes 16)." [Josef Fuchs,
"Conscience and Conscientious Fidelity," ch. 10 in Idem, Moral Demands and Personal
Obligations, (W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1993): 162].
D. I have found that the task of trying to explain the concept of invincible ignorance, and its
related concepts of imputable guilt (i.e., moral “innocence”) is quite difficult indeed. It
seems that the ultimate stumbling block for many people is the troubling “logical”
conclusion (which the manualistic tradition has taught since the time of Thomas Aquinas)
that a person who acts in invincible ignorance and does something objectively “wrong”
from a moral point of view, nevertheless incurs no moral guilt (the position of Thomas
Aquinas), and might even be said to gain moral merit (the position of Alphonsus Liguori).
This seems to call into question the whole notion of an objective moral order for these
sorts of people. If my assumption is true, then we might note how this concept is
influenced by incomplete and/or faulty understandings of the natural law and the will of
God. Since people might easily be “scandalized” or dismiss out of hand a position they
deem too “liberal” or “not in conformity with the Magisterium” when I approach this
issue I stress the traditional teaching of the Church in regards to conscience I stress both
the “constant” tradition (since the 13th century), as well as the re-affirmation of this
principle in contemporary magisterial documents such as Veritatis Splendor (see the notes
below for some example).
E. Charles Curran also offers a very helpful example which might help people see the
rational basis for the distinction and relation between vincible and invincible ignorance
and concomitant moral guilt or innocence: “After examining a patient, the doctor believes
that the patient does not have AIDS. In reality, however, the patient does have AIDS.
The doctor’s erroneous judgment is in accord with her sincerely held conviction. Here a
further distinction has been made between vincible and invincible ignorance. If the
ignorance is your fault, your conscience is vincibly erroneous. A doctor who did not
diagnose AIDS in 1970 was invincibly erroneous. She had no idea what AIDS was and
did not know what symptoms to look for. However, today the diagnosis of AIDS is well
known, and a doctor who does not know the symptoms of AIDS is derelict in her duty as
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a doctor and vincibly erroneous. A conscience that is sincere but invincibly erroneous
can and should be followed without any guilt on the agent’s part.” Charles E. Curran,
The Catholic Moral Tradition Today: A Synthesis (W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 1999): 173.
G. Bernard Häring notes that "invincible ignorance" is best not interpreted as "mere
intellectualism," but rather in light of an understanding of conscience which embraces the
existential totality of the individual human person.
H. Häring goes on to define invincible ignorance as "a matter of a person to `realize' a moral
obligation. Because of the person's total experience, the psychological impasses, and the
whole context of his life, he is unable to cope with a certain moral imperative. The
intellectual difficulties of grasping the values which are behind a certain imperative are
often deeply rooted in existential difficulties." [Bernard Häring, "A Theological
Evaluation," In The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, ed. John T.
Noonan, Jr., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970): 140.
I. Vincible (and therefore morally culpable) error is based on ignorance which arises "when
man [sic] shows little concern for seeking what is true and good, and conscience becomes
almost blind from being accustomed to sin." [Gaudium et spes, 16, as quoted in Veritatis
Splendor, 63].
J. It is important to bear in mind the effects of habitual vice and the deadening of both
individual and collective conscience which results from such vice.
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evangelization.
b. Alphonsus also notes that "`the reason is that there must be more care
for avoiding the danger of a formal sin than of material sin. God
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punishes only the formal sin, since He takes only this as an offence'."
[Alphonsus Liguori, Praxis confessari, chap. 1, n. 8 {as quoted by
Bernard Häring in "A Theological Evaluation [of Abortion]," pp. 140-
141}]
b. "Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid
upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to
love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, tells him inwardly at the
right moment: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law
inscribed by God. His dignity lies in observing this law, and by it he
will be judged. His conscience is man's most secret core, and his
sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his
depths. By conscience, in a wonderful way, that law is made known
which is fulfilled in the love of God and of one's neighbor. Through
loyalty to conscience Christians are joined to other men in the search
for truth and for the right solution to so many moral problems which
arise both in the life of individuals and from social relationships. Hence,
the more a correct conscience prevails, the more do persons and groups
turn aside from blind choice and try to be guided by the objective
standards of moral conduct. Yet it often happens that conscience goes
astray through ignorance which it is unable to avoid, without thereby
losing its dignity. This cannot be said of the man who takes little trouble
to find out what is true and good, or when conscience is by degrees
almost blinded through the habit of committing sin." Translation from
The Documents of Vatican II, trans. and ed. Austin P. Flannery, O.P.,
(New York: Pillar Books, 1975).
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1. Autonomy
2. Formation
d. methodology
3. Error
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correction and change, both on the level of the individual and the
community. W e could cite a number of historical examples: such as
changing perceptions on slavery, torture (of heretics), burning "witches"
and so on.
c. Relation to discernment
C. Contemporary moral theology also recognizes that the term “conscience” has a number of
related, yet somewhat distinct aspects. Richard Gula expresses this traditional tripartite
dimension of conscience in the following way: "(1) synderesis, the basic tendency or
capacity within us to know and to do the good; (2) moral science, the process of
discovering the particular good which ought to be done or the evil to be avoided; (3)
conscience, the specific judgment of the good which `I must do' in this particular
situation." [Richard Gula, Reason Informed by Faith, p. 131.]
A. Need to seek the truth, and adhere to it once it is known (Veritatis Splendor, 34).
However, it is still a basic teaching of the Church that we are bound to follow our
conscience faithfully in all of our activity even if our conscience be incorrect,
incompletely formed, and we cannot rectify these failings.
B. Therefore no one should be forced to act in a manner which is contrary to her or his
conscience. Of course, we should not minimize or overlook our obligation both to form
and inform our consciences and here Church teaching is important, as well as the other
"fonts" of moral theology, such as Scripture, theological reflection, etc. Nevertheless,
even in the case of a malformed or poorly informed ("erroneous") conscience, the
individual is obliged to follow that conscience and must never be forced to act in a
manner which is contrary to her or his conscience, though this freedom is also limited by
the common good. I.e., one cannot grant one the "right" to follow his/her conscience in
order to hurt seriously oneself or others (two clear examples would be suicide and
murder). Thus, we see this absolute right of conscience socially contextualized.
C. Sanctity of conscience was always the traditional teaching of the Church though, it must
be admitted, that moral theologians often so accented the need to "inform” one's
conscience through close attention to the Magisterium in such a way that it seemed in
"conflict" situations one actually was not free to follow one's conscience, and that also
certain papal statements led to a certain confusion on absoluteness of this affirmation.
D. For example, recall Gregory XVI's Mirari vos (1832) and Pius IX's Quanta Cura (1864),
the latter had attached to it the “Syllabus of Errors” which listed a number of “errors” of
the day (many connected with the rise of political liberalism). Pius XI wrote: "From
which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous
opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called
by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI [in his 1832 Mirari Vos], an insanity, viz., that "liberty
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of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally
proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; ...". [Translation from
Claudia Carlen, IHM, The Papal Encyclicals 1740-1878, (The Pierian Press, 1990): 382.]
E. Clearly this moral doctrine has undergone both change and developement, and to see this
look at how the principle of sanctity of conscience was both reinforced and expanded by
Vatican II, especially by Gaudium et spes and Dignitatis humanae. Dignitatis humanae
#12 states: "The Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious
freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men should be immune from coercion on
the part of individuals, social groups and every human power so that, within due limits,
nobody is forced to act against his convictions in religious matters in private or in public,
alone or in associations with others. The Council further declares that the right to
religious freedom is based on the very dignity of the human person as known through the
revealed word of God and by reason itself." [Translation from The Documents of Vatican
II, trans. and ed. Austin P. Flannery, O.P., (New York: Pillar Books, 1975).]
F. Freedom of conscience also stressed by John Paul II in both his first encyclical, as well as
many places since. Cf. Redemptor Hominis, (4 March 1979), #17, and Veritatis
Splendor, (6 August 1993), #31, the latter which states "In particular, the right to religious
freedom and to respect for conscience on its journey towards the truth is increasingly
perceived as the foundation of the cumulative rights of the person."
G. W e will present guidelines on the interplay between conscience and Church authority in a
separate section later on. Final point to keep in mind on the sanctity of conscience as
interior moral guide. Conscience is essentially an interior guide, and if it is removed or
downplayed as the most prized guide then some other moral guide will usurp this role.
This new moral guide will be exterior, and there could be a wide variety of potential
candidates, such as the state, political correctness, conventional wisdom, peer pressure, as
well as any “sacred” or religious authority, including the Magisterium of the Church.
W hile these guides may have differing values and roles to play as exterior guides, none
should ever be elevated to the role of highest guide (held by the interior conscience). To
do so would violate the fundamental dignity and whole notion of human personhood, as
well as call into question much of the whole philosophical and theological underpinnings
of our understanding of morality.
A. A fuller picture of conscience-based moral living would involve the following aspects,
which I argue should continue as a progressive process which might be imagined in terms
of a spiral
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6. Reflecting in conscience
8. W hich completes one phase of the spiral, and leads to ongoing formation of
one’s conscience
B. Each aspect of this spiral also has its own particular obstacle which may hinder, mislead,
or even block the authentic conscience process
1. Formation problems
2. Information problems
3. Discernment problems
4. Decision problems
5. Action problems
6. Reflection problems
7. Re-formation problems
2. "It has already been implied that the human being, at his deepest level of
consciousness, which is never fully accessible by way of objective reflection, is
aware of himself; he therefore is also aware of himself as an existence bound by
obligations, a moral being. This is the deepest core of the conscience as
personal subject. This deepest experience of conscience is at the same time, and
to a certain extent, experienced as part of the person's categorial existence, even
in the case of this having been reflected upon and denied; a considered denial is
unable to suppress the existential experience." [Josef Fuchs, S.J. "The
Phenomenon of Conscience: Subject-orientation and Object-orientation," in
idem. Christian Morality: The Word Became Flesh, p. 124].
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infallibly to ethical objectivity. It follows that a discussion about too much subjectivity or
objectivity cannot be referring to the fundamental conscience, but to what is generally
characterized simply as `conscience', chiefly the `situational conscience', and the insight-
experience vis-à-vis concrete ethical norms." Josef Fuchs, Moral Demands, p. 159.
1. “First, Fuchs’ moral theology turns upon the individual’s ground in God and
consequent potential for transcendental moral commitment (conscious or
unconscious) to the Absolute.” (Traina, Feminist Ethics, p. 183)
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itself "on the fourth level of consciousness as a demand for responsible decision
in accord with reasonable judgment. [Conn, Ethical, p. 185]
1. For Lonergan, a "good conscience" is the result of conversion, and which in turn
is itself the criterion of judgments of value. Thus, to be well and truly "human"
means a person who "has achieved the authenticity of normative development."
[Conn, Ethical, p. 186].
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2. Thus, importance for the understanding of the virtues, moral character, and
fundamental option.
2. Describes both moral conscience and the superego, their superficial similarities,
and crucial differences, and concludes with some pastoral reflections on several
areas where the recognition of the difference between genuine moral conscience
and the functioning of the superego can be illuminating, and where a failure to
make such a distinction can result in great harm.
B. Basic Freudian terminology: "Psychologists of the Freudian school tell us that we have
three structures to our personality: the id--the unconscious reservoir of instinctual drives
largely dominated by the pleasure principle; the ego--the conscious structure which
operates on the reality principle to mediate the forces of the id, the demands of society,
and the reality of the physical world; and the superego--the ego of another superimposed
on our own to serve as an internal censor to regulate our conduct by using guilt as its
powerful weapon." [Gula, RIF, p. 124.]
C. Superficial Similarities between Superego and Conscience: "both have been described as
primarily nonverbal, preconceptual; commanding, prohibiting; accusing, approving;
seeking reconciliation if norms are violated." Glaser, p. 30.
1. "The superego deals not in the currency of extroverted love but in the
introversion of being lovable. The dynamic of the superego springs from a
frantic compulsion to experience oneself as lovable, not from the call to commit
oneself in abiding love." [Glaser, p. 32.]
2. "One point should be made clear beyond all misunderstanding: the commands
and prohibitions of the superego do not arise from any kind // of perception of
the intrinsic goodness or objectionableness of the action contemplated. The
source of such commands and prohibitions can be described positively as the
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desire to be approved and loved or negatively as the fear of loss of such love and
approval." [Glaser, pp. 32-33.]
3. Gula summarizes the relation between guilt/goodness and the superego in terms
of metaphor of the attic of a house: "Instead of furniture, it [the superego] stores
all the `shoulds' and `have-tos' which we absorb in the process of growing up
under the influence of authority figures, first our parents but later any other
authority figures--teachers, police, boss, sisters, priests, pope, etc. Its powerful
weapon of guilt springs forth automatically for simple faults as well as for more
serious matter. The superego tells us we are good when we do what we are told
to do, and it tells us we are bad and makes us feel guilty when we do not do what
the authority over us tells us to do." [Gula, RIF, p. 125].
5. Gula notes, that "One of the tasks of moral education and pastoral practice in
moral matters is to reduce the influence of the superego and to allow a genuinely
personal way of seeing and responding to grow. One of the great temptations of
moral // counseling is to `should' on the person seeking assistance." pp. 129-130.
6. However, do not forget that the superego cannot be totally obliterated, and that it
does serve useful roles both individually and socially.
A. Scriptural input
1. Enduring Treasure: Matthew 6:19-21 "Do not store up for yourselves treasures
on earth, where moth and rust destroy, and where thieves break in and steal. But
store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where moth and rust do not destroy,
and where thieves do not break in and steal. For where your treasure is, there
your heart will be also. (NIV)
2. Sound moral vision: Matt 6:22-23 "The eye is the lamp of the body. If your eyes
are good, your whole body will be full of light. But if your eyes are bad, your
whole body will be full of darkness. If then the light within you is darkness, how
great is that darkness! (NIV)
3. Necessity for the choice of the fundamental option: Matt 6:24 "No one can serve
two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted
to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God and Money.
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that God is that greater than which we cannot imagine (Deus semper maior),
coupled with the notion that the true “end” of human beings is in total union with
God (our summum bonum found in our participation in the beatific vision).
2. The fundamental option is the most basic choice (i.e., related to our basic or core
freedom), or direction, in our lives for God or away from God., and in this sense
is not an "option" at all. The basic insight of fundamental option theory is that
normal adults have made such a fundamental choice for, or against, God.
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b. For notes on this article see the section above on Fuchs’ Theology of
Conscience and Moral Action
3. See also Josef Fuchs, S.J. "Good acts and good persons." The Tablet 247 (6
November 1993): 1444-1445.
1. The basic decision, for or against God, is expressed in the everyday acts and
decisions of our lives. The fundamental option is related to these other, concrete
categorical choices of our lives, but is not completely and totally identified in an
absolute one-to-one correspondence with a single choice in such a way that
“Categorical Choice X fully equals and completely instantiates the Fundamental
Option.”
2. Since the fundamental option itself is an individual’s most basic choice for or
against God, it is always more than the mere sum total of these everyday actions
and decisions, just as the love (or absence of love) in a marriage is more than the
sum total of the individual actions performed by the marriage partners.
3. Yet, it would be incorrect to suggest that the particular categorical actions have
no intrinsic significance for the exercise of the fundamental option.
1. Acts consistent with our basic choice and which deepen this choice
2. Acts inconsistent with our basic choice, which in themselves are an expression of
our moral freedom, but which are not understood or desired (willed) as a
cancellation or reversal of our basic choice.
3. Other acts, whether good or bad, which remain only on the edge of our personal
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commitment, i.e., involve only the layer of peripheral freedom, which do not
penetrate the deeper layers of our personal commitment, or other acts which
involve decisions which are usually not deeply “moral” (such as daily clothing
selections).
1. The traditional expression, "being in the state of grace," means having one's
basic direction in life as a movement toward God. The key word here is "basic":
not each and every act will necessarily be seen as moving towards from God. In
the same way, the traditional expression, "being in the state of mortal sin," (or
"not being in the state of grace") means having one's basic direction in life as a
movement away from God.
2. Again, the key word here is "basic": not each and every act will necessarily be
seen as moving away from God, occasionally an individual action might move in
the opposite direction.
1. The Fundamental Option can, and does change, but (and this is important), such
changes are not so frequent as we once thought.
2. Thus, it would be difficult to conceive of someone in the state of grace one day,
who sins grievously and thus is not in the state of grace the next day, who goes to
confession, but then two days later sins again and so is once again not in the state
of grace.
1. "It has been rightly pointed out that freedom is not only the choice for one or
another particular action; it is also, within that choice, a decision about oneself
and a setting of one's own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth,
and ultimately for or against God. Emphasis has rightly been placed on the
importance of certain choices which `shape' a person's entire moral life, and
which serve as bounds within which other particular everyday choices can be
situated and allowed to develop." [Veritatis Splendor, 65]
2. Important to recognize that the Magisterium in fact does accept the basic idea or
import of fundamental option theory, but that it criticizes what it considers
“incorrect” theories of the fundamental option--theories which are held by no
reputable moral theologian, but which may be held mistakenly by some others.
1. People do still make confessions as if this were the case, and usually such people
are troubled severely by scruples. Therefore, it is a help for the
confessor/counselor to recognize the theological difficulties of this self-
description,
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2. However, generally speaking, I would suggest that the confessional (or even a
counseling session) is not the venue to give a mini-course on the fundamental
option. Scrupulous people will think you're trying to get them "off the hook"
while others may misunderstand it (a little knowledge is a dangerous thing).
Instead, and especially with scruples, I believe a more effective approach is to
have the person reiterate the traditional "three things necessary for mortal sin.”
Usually they are well aware of these categories and then all one need to do is
examine if all three were present at the same time, i.e.,
a. grave matter
(1) This is what the scrupulous person believes is always the case
(2) Therefore, not the best place to center one's arguments against
(2) Yet, on the other hand the person does not need to have
"absolute" freedom in order to sin. W e have already seen that
"absolute" freedom does not exist for humans but that one,
fully aware of the hideous nature of this terrible sin, really
wanted to go ahead and do it anyway.
d. Usually one can see, at least "intellectually," that one of these three
conditions was probably lacking in his or her sin.
e. Also helpful is the standard of "If you were God": If you were God
would you condemn someone to eternal damnation for having done this
sin, and then who happened to die, without having the chance to go to
confession. Usually the person will say "no" and if this is the case, then
you could supply the logical conclusion: "God is at least as good as you
are.” This will set up a certain cognitive dissonance, i.e., the person
cannot logically hold both that she or he should be judged “guilty” and
“punished” by a God who is truly loving. This approach does not work
instantaneously nor miraculously, but over time it can be helpful at
chipping away at one of the biggest problems involved in scruples,
namely, a tyrannically false image of God.
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avoided
1. "The basic insight of fundamental option theory is the realization that sin and
grace must be understood not primarily in terms of individual acts for good or
evil, but in light of the person's basic life orientation or direction. The
fundamental option, whether positive or negative, is a response to the innate
human desire for God at our deepest core and to God's offer of live in Christ--at
a level not fully available to our consciousness." [[Mark O'Keefe, O.S.B.,
"Fundamental Option and the Three W ays," Studies in Formative Spirituality 13
(1992): 74]
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b. The superego can block moral growth, and here a proper understanding
of the dynamics of the fundamental option can be a helpful corrective.
4. O'Keefe, Mark. O.S.B. "Fundamental Option and the Three W ays." Studies in
Formative Spirituality 13 (1992): 73-83.
A. Intention
B. Two types of duty: Negative duty, e.g. negative precepts such as "Do Not Kill" which
always bind semper et pro semper. Positive duty, which is often expressed as an ideal,
which is generally binding (semper, but not pro semper), but which can be excused for
"grave reasons" or competing duties. Important distinction in many areas, such as in
social ethics with help of one’s neighbor and the creation of a just society; and in sexual
ethics, such as the use of periodic continence to avoid procreation (a formerly debated
position which has now been approved by the Magisterium in e.g., Pius XII's 1951
Address to Italian Midwives and Paul VI’s 1968 Humanae vitae.
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1. E.g. in terms of guilt feelings: what O'Connell terms "Posterior conscience": the
"aspect of the human person that is activated by certain sorts of behavior and
provides a sort of gut-level evaluation of that behavior." [O'Connell, p. 104].
2. However, "when the Catholic tradition talks about conscience, it is not talking
about posterior conscience. The use of the term in this way is a peculiarly
modern phenomenon. The tradition, for its part, uses the term to point at anterior
conscience." p. 104.
3. Roles of guilt-feelings: "It may happen that guilt feelings will call our attention
to a situation or an action for which we are and ought to be truly guilty. And if
so, they are to be cherished as helpful guides for human living. But the exact
opposite may also be the case. For whatever reason, I may very well feel guilty
about something that I should in no way repent." p. 105.
(3) "W e have already seen that the term syneidesis is clearly
present in Scripture. But what of synderesis? The simply
and embarrassing fact is that this term does not appear in
Scripture. Indeed, there is no such word in the Greek
language. Rather, it appears that this entire theological
tradition is the result of a massive error." p. 109.
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c. O'Connell says that, "W e shall assert that the word `conscience', as it is
generally used both in theology and in those ordinary conversational
usages that refer to anterior conscience, points at one or another of
three quite different ideas, that there are three distinct facets of this
reality of anterior conscience. And for purposes of simplicity, we shall
refer to these as conscience/1, conscience/2, and conscience/3." p. 110.
B. Conscience/1
C. Conscience/2
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D. Conscience/3
1. Some time later God tested Abraham. He said to him, "Abraham!" "Here I am,"
he replied. Then God said, "Take your son, your only son, Isaac, whom you love,
and go to the region of Moriah. Sacrifice him there as a burnt offering on one of
the mountains I will tell you about." Early the next morning Abraham got up
and saddled his donkey. He took with him two of his servants and his son Isaac.
W hen he had cut enough wood for the burnt offering, he set out for the place
God had told him about. On the third day Abraham looked up and saw the place
in the distance. He said to his servants, "Stay here with the donkey while I and
the boy go over there. W e will worship and then we will come back to you."
Abraham took the wood for the burnt offering and placed it on his son Isaac, and
he himself carried the fire and the knife. As the two of them went on together,
Isaac spoke up and said to his father Abraham, "Father?" "Yes, my son?"
Abraham replied. "The fire and wood are here," Isaac said, "but where is the
lamb for the burnt offering?" Abraham answered, "God himself will provide the
lamb for the burnt offering, my son." And the two of them went on together.
W hen they reached the place God had told him about, Abraham built an altar
there and arranged the wood on it. He bound his son Isaac and laid him on the
altar, on top of the wood. Then he reached out his hand and took the knife to slay
his son. But the angel of the LORD called out to him from heaven, "Abraham!
Abraham!" "Here I am," he replied. "Do not lay a hand on the boy," he said.
"Do not do anything to him. Now I know that you fear God, because you have
not withheld from me your son, your only son." (NIV)
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D. Basic Bibliography
2. Knauer, Peter, S.J. "The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of the Double
Effect." In Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic
Tradition, 1-39. Edited by Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J.
New York: Paulist Press, 1979.
b. In many ways this article can be taken as the beginning of the modern
proportionalist debate.
3. Josef Fuchs, S.J. "Historicity and Moral Norm." Chapter 6 in Idem. Moral
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a. Treats issues of moral norms and normativity, and the relation of the
fact of historicity to such moral norms, as well as the distinction
between moral "goodness" and "rightness" and the importance of this
distinction to an understanding of the proper approach an individual
must take in his or her moral life.
4. McCormick, Richard A., S.J., and Ramsey, Paul, eds. Doing Evil to Achieve
Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations. Chicago: Loyola University Press,
1978.
1. The [moral] good of an act comes from its causal integrity [of act plus intention];
moral evil comes whatever defect [in either act or intention]. However, the full
aphorism reads: Verum et falsum sunt in mente, bonum et malum sunt in rebus;
bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu.
2. Truth and error exist in the mind, good and evil in things; good demands fullness
of being, evil is predicated of any defect. The [moral] good of an act comes
from its causal integrity [of act plus intention]; moral evil comes whatever defect
[in either act or intention] "From this it follows that `a good intention will not
make a bad object good'." [Bernard Hoose, Proportionalism: The American
Debate and its European Roots, (W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, 1987): 107]
3. However the problem lies in how to understand this axiom. Obviously such a
statement also presupposes a certain metaphysics! Those who either do not
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1. Distinction rests on the difference between the objective moral order in itself,
and the individual in his or her (necessarily "subjective" apprehension of that
order) and personal efforts to realize its values in concrete acts performed
according to the lights of one's conscience, which lights will at times be
incomplete and imperfect. Building on this basic insight Josef Fuchs has taken
pains to distinguish, "The right realization of the subject or person is usually (or
at least very frequently) called `moral goodness', or simply personal `morality',
because only the subject or person as such, and one's own attitudes and free
decisions, can be called `moral' in the narrow sense of the word. W ith respect to
morality as such, on can speak only of personal moral goodness--or its negation,
of moral badness or immorality." Josef Fuchs, "Historicity and Moral Norm,"
Chapter 6 in idem, Moral Demands and Personal Obligations, (W ashington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1993): 96.
3. Saying much the same thing, Bernard Hoose says that "Goodness here refers to
the moral goodness of a person. Rightness, on the other hand, refers to the
correctness of the action, whether it be performed by a morally good person or a
morally bad one." [Hoose, p. xi].
4. "G.E. Moore pointed out that what is deserving of moral praise or blame is often
confused with the question as to what is right or wrong." [Hoose, p. 46]. As
Hoose notes, "In other words, the motive may be important for a decision about
moral goodness or badness (sin), but has no part in decisions about the moral
rightness or wrongness of acts. ... Schüller illustrated this point very carefully by
taking as an example a physician who develops a new therapeutic device which,
he sees, will be beneficial to a very large number of people. The physician,
however, is motivated only by selfish ambition. ... Thus his act is morally bad
because it is performed from pure selfishness. At the same time, however, it is
morally right because of its beneficial consequences." p. 46.
5. "A major problem sometimes confronts the good person who is striving to do the
right thing, and that problem is: just what is the right thing to do in these
circumstances? ... If what is morally good is what is morally right and what is
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morally bad is what is morally wrong, we shall have to revise an awful lot of our
thinking on moral matters. Some of the people who burned heretics were
probably morally good in such actions. Are we to assume, therefore, that the act
of burning heretics was morally right? Must rich benefactors seeking //
admiration stop giving their money to the poor? Surely, they should change their
attitude, but continue to give their money." [Hoose, pp. 62-63].
B. Traditional vocabulary of the three "fonts" (sources) of morality (not of moral theology):
1) Action in se; 2) Intention of the agent; and 3) Circumstances
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11).
a. Finis operis
(2) I.e., the moral distinction of the aspect of the finality ("end")
of the action itself, the Finis operis, which is distinguished
from the
b. Finis operantis
(2) i.e., the aspect of the moral agent's own motive for doing a
particular action, which is distinct from the finality ("end") of
the action itself.
2. Example to illustrate the difference between finis operis and finis operantis: A
person who gives a large sum of money to the poor merely in order that s/he
receive praise of others, performs an action which in itself is good (i.e., the finis
operis is good), but whose motive (the finis operantis) is bad (seeking
vainglory). Thus, for the moral agent her/himself this is a morally bad action.
This same point is echoed in The Catechism of the Catholic Church.
3. There remains an ongoing debate among moralists about the whole significance
understanding of what constitutes the actual moral distinction between finis
operis and finis operantis in certain actions which have both good and bad
effects.
5. Thomas' position on the finis operis and finis operantis: He links the definition
of the structure and the morality of human action (actus humanus) to the moral
agent, rather than simply the act in and of itself. As Thomas noted, the finis
operis semper reducitur in finem operantis [the finis operis is always “found” in
{comes down to, is “reduced” to} the fines operantis. From Thomas’
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6. This linkage implies the absolute moral importance of the intention (and by
extension, the circumstances) in any complete evaluation of moral action. "In
other words, the good, which is the appropriate object of the will, can only be
termed an end insofar as it is aimed at by the subject in and through his action; it
is always a finis operantis." [Janssens, Ontic Evil, p. 43.]
E. Intention and moral action with two ends: Example of the person who gives large
donation to the poor, but for the purposes of vainglory. The action has two ends: The end
of the action in itself, in which the poor are helped, and which action is in itself morally
good. However, the end for which the agent performs the action is vainglory, and thus
this end is morally bad for him/her. For the agent the moral meaning of an action with two
ends then depends on the agent's intention. However, in the same breath, it is important
to recognize and acknowledge that our motives will always be mixed to some extent. The
important thing to bear in mind is the basic path towards greater integration and purity of
desire that we are trying to walk. A positive theory of virtues and conversion can be
helpful here. Above all, don’t be paralyzed by scruples in this regard.
1. Often associated with issues which today we would consider in bioethics (and
thus we will consider this principle in greater detail in that part of the course). It
is important here for its relation to the principle of the double effect and the
whole ensuing debate on proportionalism, and especially the distinction between
ontic and moral evil (physical/moral, premoral/moral).
2. Manualist tradition: "As is well known, the principle was initially reduced to a
physicalistic and individualistic understanding. The dominant axiom was simply
pars propter totum. A therapeutic operation for a diseased organ or bodily
function was considered permissible when no other possibility existed to secure
the well-being of the organism. Moreover, this required a correspondence--
which was strictly interpreted--between the employed means and the end they
attempted to reach. Both had to move on the same level; that is, a bodily illness
was answered by a corporeal intervention." [From Klaus Demmer, "Theological
Argument and Hermeneutics in Bioethics," in Catholic Perspectives on Medical
Morals: Foundational Issues, 103-122, ed. Edmund D. Pellegrino, John P.
Langan and John Collins Harvey, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989): 115.].
Thus, according to the manualist tradition no one could ever become a living
organ donor, etc., since this would amount to self-mutilation, which could never
be countenanced in a healthy person. E.g., amputation of a gangrenous limb,
(self-mutilation) was morally acceptable only in the presence of some
pathological condition which would lead to greater injury and/or death unless
performed.
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2. Moral theologians began to apply this principle to other areas as well of ethics,
e.g. marriage, as did Vatican II in its teaching of marriage: Gaudium et spes #51,
when in speaking of conjugal love and procreation, "teaches that the moral
character of any procedure must be determined by objective criteria `based on
the nature of the person and his acts'. To explain how the nature of the person's
acts is morally relevant, the official commentary on the expression that was used
states: `By these terms it is asserted that the acts must also be judged not
according to their merely biological aspect, but insofar as they refer to the human
person integrally and adequately considered'. The comment also declares that
this `is a question of general principle'." [Louis Janssens, "Personalism in Moral
Theology," p. 94].
D. A certain correspondence will be seen with the main tenets of personalism, totality, and
proportionalism.
A. Bibliography
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2. Curran, Charles E. and McCormick Richard A., S.J., eds. Readings in Moral
Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition. New York: Paulist
Press, 1979.
B. Background
3. Recall the three fonts of morality: 1) The moral act itself; 2) Intention; and 3)
Circumstances
1. The Sed contra, in which Thomas gives his own opinion, of this Question reads
as follows:
I answer that [sed contra], Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of
which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their
species [i.e., moral meaning] according to what is intended, and not according to what is
beside the intention [praeter intentionem], since this is accidental [per accidens] as
explained above (43, 3; I-II, 12, 1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two
effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore
this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is
natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though
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http://www.knight.org/advent/summa/306407.htm
2. Thus, in killing the unjust aggressor Thomas maintains that one can never intend,
in the moral sense, to kill the aggressor, rather the killing must always be
“indirect.” In contemporary language we might use instead the distinction here
of “psychological” intent–i.e., I “know” that I will kill the aggressor through my
actions, but it is not the moral purpose of my action to do so. (W hat Thomas
would call “indirect”). Rather, my moral purpose, and thus the moral
“intention” of my action, is to legitimately save my own life or the life of
another. It is important to keep in mind that the force used must be proportional
to the threat (i.e., the moral circumstances come into play here). If there is
commensurate or proportionate reason for the level of force used, then the act is
moral, if there is a lack of commensurate reason for the amount of force used,
then the act would be immoral.
3. The historical problems is that "the axiom was always understood in that way.
An improper understanding of it may have contributed to the tendency to
identify the moral object with the physical object and moral evil with physical
evil." [Hoose, p. 107].
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1. "The traditional understanding of the principle of double effect was that an act
which would foreseeably cause such an evil as well as a good could be
performed if, and only if, all four of the following conditions were fulfilled: (1)
The act (directly) performed is in itself good, or at least indifferent. (2) The good
accomplished is at least as immediate as the evil. (3) The intention of the agent is
good. (4) There is a proportionate reason for causing the harm." [Hoose, p. 101].
A. Bibliography
1. Janssens, Louis. "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil." Louvain Studies 4 (1972): 115-
156.
2. However, Janssens (and others) point to the misunderstanding these terms can
have in contemporary language "because the contemporary meaning of `physical'
corresponds more to the meaning of `material'." [Janssens, "Ontic Evil," p. 60]
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Added to the fact that expressions such as "ontic" or "premoral" good/evil are
not part of the common language of most people, and therefore, will falter at the
"comprehensibility" test of sound moral arguments.
4. Meaning of ontic evil: "W e call ontic evil any lack of a perfection at which we
aim, any lack of fulfillment which frustrates our natural urges and makes us
suffer. It is essentially the natural consequences of our limitation." [Janssens,
Ontic Evil, p. 60].
5. Omnipresence of ontic evil in our concrete lives and acts due to the combination
of our finitude and sinfulness, as well as aspects of our finitude which lead to
ontic evil: "...each concrete act // implicates ontic evil because we are temporal
and [temporality] spatial, [limited also by laws of nature] live together with
others [relationality] in the same material world, are involved and act in a
common sinful situation." [Janssens, Ontic Evil, pp. 60-61].
6. Sense of the social meaning of original sin, as well as the connection between
ontic evil and moral evil [i.e., sin] "... we cause ontic evil when we act
immorally. "... the fundamental source of ontic evil [is] our sinful condition."
[Janssens, Ontic Evil, p. 66].
7. Inevitability of causing some ontic evil: "W e can conclude that we must accept
the inevitable fact that we will run into ontic evil when we act. W e cannot do
away with ontic evil without depriving our actions of their effectiveness and
without sooner or later endangering the realization of our morally good ends."
[Janssens, Ontic Evil, p. 79]. The key for us, in seeking to respond responsibly
to the first principle of the natural law to do and foster the good, while
minimizing and avoiding the evil, therefore leads to a moral obligation to
avoid/reduce as much as possible ontic evil which arises from our actions. As
Janssens observes, "If our actions contain more ontic evil than they must have to
be the proper means, they are not ordered properly to the goals of man and
society. Consequently, they are immoral." [Janssens, Ontic Evil, p. 80.]. And
this is what Knauer would call lack of commensurate reason.
a. Remember the premise that, due to our finitude and sinfulness, every
concrete action will involve the commission of a certain amount of ontic
evil, or the omission of doing some good, or relieving some evil. For
example, going to class today means you could not work to aid the
homeless at this moment, which could be termed ontically bad/evil.
However, the moral question involves less clear-cut situations and the
so-called "limit" cases.
C. Important distinction between premoral and moral values. It is important to note the
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difference between these two realities. Here the description given by Charles Curran can
be helpful: “Premoral goods are those values we pursue in human action such as life,
health, procreation. But these values often can and do conflict with other premoral
values. Moral values, on the other hand, are realities such as justice and integrity that
correspond to what we earlier called the moral object of the act. Justice, however, is quite
generic and doubt often exists whether a particular act is just or not. By the very nature of
human existence, premoral values can never be absolutized because tehy always exist in
connection with other premoral goods in our world.” (Curran, Catholic Moral Tradition,
p. 156.)
2. Recall "The traditional understanding of the principle of double effect was that
an act which would foreseeably cause such an evil as well as a good could be
performed if, and only if, all four of the following conditions were fulfilled: 1.
The act (directly) performed is in itself good, or at least indifferent. 2. The
good accomplished is at least as immediate as the evil. 3. The intention of the
agent is good. 4. There is a proportionate reason for causing the harm." [Hoose,
p. 101].
(1) Procured
(2) Therapeutic
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(b) Or Hysterectomy
5. Re-labeling the death of the fetus as an ontic evil, rather than a moral evil in
these cases.
E. Understanding of intention in the moral sense, which focuses on the distinction between
voluntary act and intended act. In traditional moral theology this distinction involved a
possible consideration of actions which, while “foreseen,” nevertheless were not
“intended” in the moral sense. Such actions (or conseuqences) were said to lie “outside”
of the moral intention ( praeter intentionem), as in the example of killing a molester to
save an innocent child: "In the traditional language of moral theology, the evil of killing
in this case would have been voluntary, but not intended. There is, of course, no
contradiction here. The word `intend' merely has two different meanings." (Hoose, p.
103). "The evil in the act could therefore be intended in the psychological // sense (i.e.,
the usual sense), but had not to be intended directly in the moral sense." (Hoose, pp. 103-
104).
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F. "Proportionate" reason: E.g., on amount of violence use. Any excessive use (i.e.
“unreasonable) would not be "proportionate.” Thus, the combined terminology of
“proportionate reason”–actually “reason” is the key aspect here—if it’s “reasonable” then
it would be ipso facto “proportionate.” “Proportionate” does not mean “greater” in an
utilitarian sense of consequentialist reasoning, in which what is “moral” would be that
which gives the greater benefit to the greater number. If our actions and decisions are
truly reasonable then we have already supplied “proportionate” reason. Thus, we might
look on the term “proportionate” as simply a further specification of what “reason” means
in the concrete. If we understand proportionate reason in this way then I think many of
the “charges” against proportionalism by its critics will be seen as lacking a real
foundation.
A. W atershed work: article of Peter Knauer: "Knauer was of the opinion that the standard
interpretations of the principle of double effect caused many problems. He was also
uneasy about the fragmentation of the human act into unreal parts that seemed normal in
those interpretations. He pointed out that in St. Thomas' definition of self-defense--
which, rightly or wrongly, he saw as the beginning of the principle of double effect--the
term `effect' is not used merely as a correlative to `cause'. The term `aspect' would better
fit what Thomas wished to say. // Having thus interpreted Aquinas, Knauer lined up
behind him, preferring to speak of two aspects of one and the same action, rather than two
effects, thus safeguarding the unity of the human act." [Hoose, pp. 1-2].
B. "But Knauer's version of that principle was a somewhat reduced one: `The moral subject
may permit an evil effect of his act only if this effect is indirect, being counterbalanced by
a proportionate reason." [Hoose, p. 2.]
C. "Sin, says Knauer, consists in allowing an evil without a proportionate reasons. In such a
case the evil is not `accidental'; it enters into the every object of one's act. If, however,
there is a proportionate reason for allowing an evil effect, the evil effect becomes indirect.
A bad effect (or aspect) will be direct or indirect depending on the presence or absence of
a proportionate reason. The difference between direct and indirect, therefore, is not
formally a physical difference." [Hoose, p. 2.]
D. "For Knauer, proportion is lacking when the act performed undermines the very value
being pursued. The protection of innocent life by the unnecessary destruction of innocent
life would surely, on those terms, not be proportionate, because it involves an
undermining of the value being pursued." [Hoose, p. 4.]
A. Example, telling a lie or breaking a secret in order to save a life. In the traditional
teaching of St. Augustine: "that a man should not tell an untruth even to save his
neighbor's life." p. 73. Augustine’s moral logic here would define any such “untruth” as a
Locutio contra mentem, and therefore, contra naturam to the faculty of speech as truthful
communication of what one has in one’s mind, and therefore, since contra naturam, is
also immoral (intrinsece malum in se).
B. However, we can produce many examples which show the difficulty, if not actual
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incoherence of this position, e.g., how to respond to Gestapo at the door who are asking if
you are hiding Jews in the attic (when in fact you are)?
C. Proportional approach and proportional evaluation to this sort of case: "Breaking secrecy
is recognized as a disvalue. The question, therefore, is: when is it legitimate to bring
about that disvalue and why? The authors under discussion insist that the revelation of
secrets is a premoral evil. They are not, therefore, talking about consequences alone.
W hat they are discussing is the proportion between the evil involved and the good that is
being sought. If, however, they say the rightness or wrongness of the action as based on
consequences alone, they would see the revelation of secrets as neutral, not as premoral
evil." p. 77. (Hoose, ?)
A. "The moral goodness of the person is, of course, the chief concern of moral theology.
Proportionalism, however, is concerned only with the secondary aspect, which is, of
course, intimately linked to the primary one, but not to be confused with it. That
secondary aspect is the rightness or wrongness of actions. W hat the church teaches
regarding salvation and moral goodness comes from Revelation, and that she teaches
infallibly. In the area of moral rightness and wrongness, however, mistakes can all too
easily be made. Proportionalism is an attempt to cut down the number of those mistakes,
an attempt to see more clearly." [Hoose, p. 138].
1. Here I follow the work of Josef Fuchs, and his article, "Christian Morality:
Biblical Orientation and Human Evaluation." Gregorianum 67 (1986): 745-763.
Also found as Chapter 1 in Christian Morality: The Word Became Flesh, 1-18.
Translated by Brian McNeil. W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press;
Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987.
2. Need for hermeneutical reading of not only the biblical texts, and the concrete
circumstances of the given situation, but also of inherited norms, which, because
they are abstract need the help of a reasonable judgment concerning concrete
behavior in the present. The use of proportionalism recognizes that there is a
relative character to goods and values and this requires both evaluation and
comparison of the good/ills or values/non-values implied by particular human
conduct since responsible human behavior strives to augment these values. This
is not to be construed as simple utilitarianism nor as calculating
consequentialism since: The entire reality of the moral act is taken into account:
"its own meaningfulness as seen within the context of the meaningfulness which
the entire act and its result represent and signify." (Fuchs, “Biblical Orientation,”
p.762).
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C. As a critique of propotionalist theory I would note that perhaps it could be argued that
one significant weakness of proportionalism, as a theory, is that it seems difficult to
explain clearly to a large number of presumably educated people. A number of this group
even seems to include other moralists. W hy is it that presumably intelligent people of
good will, like Bartholomew Kiely, S.J., have such a difficult time understanding what
proportionalists like Fuchs and McCormick are really saying? Perhaps this problem is due
to antecedent philosophical paradigms employed by these critics, and a rather uncritical
lumping of the theory of proportionalism in with consequentialism and/or utilitarianism.
This may be another example of the problematic addressed by my Second “C” of moral
discourse, namely comprehensibility This question is not being posited in an effort to
assess blame, but rather to summon up a clearer articulation of both the objections and the
answers to these objections of proportionalism. In other words, I believe we need less
polemics and more dialogue on this issue.
A. Scriptural Passage: Matthew 19:16 Now a man came up to Jesus and asked, "Teacher,
what good thing must I do to get eternal life?" "W hy do you ask me about what is good?"
Jesus replied. "There is only One who is good. If you want to enter life, obey the
commandments." "W hich ones?" the man inquired. Jesus replied, "`Do not murder, do
not commit adultery, do not steal, do not give false testimony, honor your father and
mother,' and `love your neighbor as yourself.'" "All these I have kept," the young man
said. "W hat do I still lack?" Jesus answered, "If you want to be perfect, go, sell your
possessions and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come, follow
me." W hen the young man heard this, he went away sad, because he had great wealth.
Then Jesus said to his disciples, "I tell you the truth, it is hard for a rich man to enter the
kingdom of heaven. Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a
needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God." W hen the disciples heard this,
they were greatly astonished and asked, "W ho then can be saved?" Jesus looked at them
and said, "W ith man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible." (NIV)
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B. Avoid the Catholic heresy of works' righteousness and "moral gnosticism." The weakness
of the single truth: moral monism, or an Orwellian desire to abolish "thought crime."
Being "right" is not enough, nor can we expect to always be right, know the right, and do
the right. Don't forget that the Christian moral life calls for a telos (ôåëïò), a trajectory, a
growth in the values of Jesus Christ. Recognition too that the effects of personal and
original sin are perduring. Still, the effort to discern the right, the truly human, is truly
important.
C. Five guidelines given by Rudolf Ginters on comparisons between values and disvalues (as
reported in Hoose). (1) preference should be given to the higher value; (2) quantity must
be taken into account as well as quality (e.g., we should implement the kind of rescue
operation that will save the greatest number of lives); (3) the more fundamental values
should be preferred (life, of course, being one of the most fundamental); (4) the action
which has the better chance of success should be preferred; (5) we should protect the
values which have most urgent need of protection." [Hoose, p. 86]. A hermeneutical
reading and application of these guidelines will necessarily vary according to time, place,
and situation.
A. Scriptural Passage: Locus Classicus (Rm. 2:12-15): "All who sin apart from the law will
also perish apart from the law, and all who sin under the law will be judged by the law.
For it is not those who hear the law who are righteous in God's sight, but it is those who
obey the law who will be declared righteous. (Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the
law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though
they do not have the law, since they show that the requirements of the law are written on
their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts now accusing, now
even defending them.) (NIV)
B. W hile the above passage is the locus classicus in the sense that it is most often quoted as
biblical “proof” for the doctrine of the natural law, we should keep in mind that Scripture
only rarely approached the moral law in this way. Law, in both the Old and New
Testament, was viewed primarily in terms of relation God (or Christ) of both the
individual and the whole faith community of which she or he was a member. Thus, for
the Old Testament moral law was seen primarily in terms of the Covenant, and in the New
Testament the moral law is tied to discipleship and the new creation we are in Christ.
C. Bibliography
1. Curran, Charles E., and McCormick, Richard A., S.J., eds. Readings in Moral
Theology, No. 7: Natural Law and Theology. Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1991.
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2. Jean Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian
Ethics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.
4. Michael Betram Crowe. The Changing Profile of Natural Law. The Hague:
Martinus Nihoff, 1977.
D. Jim Bretzke’s schema for Natural Law Overview (really just an elaboration of the basic
starting point of the affirmation of an objective moral order)
3. Normable
E. Relevance of the Incarnation for the natural law in our context of theological
anthropology: Recap in two words, with reference to Christology, W hat ought I to do? I
must be human because the Lord has embraced that humanity in the incarnation."
[W illiam C. Spohn, What Are They Saying About Scripture & Ethics, p. 13, giving Josef
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A. (From Joseph Selling): “For the ancient and medieval theologians and philosophers, the
order that natural law stood for was cosmic in scope and itself constituted a form of
‘natural revelation’. To deny this was to deny the creation of humankind in the image and
likeness of God. Hence the connection with revelation. Eventually, the notion of natural
law became more and more solidified in western Christianity as philosophers and
theologians attempted to deduce what might flow from the natural law as conclusions.
This solidification took on a particularly rationalistic tone in the post-Newtonian scientific
era. It is this rationalistic, static view of the universe that was recognized by the
participants at Vatican II to be inadequate for providing a basis for morality. Thus,
Vatican II largely abandoned the traditionalistic concept of ‘natural law’. It substituted
for this the concept of personalism which is based not upon ‘scientific facts’ but upon
human experience.” From Joseph Selling, “Magisterial Authority and the Natural Law,”
Doctrine and Life 47 (August 1997): 339.
B. W e’ll look contemporary views of the natural law in greater depth, but to do this we need
to contrast these with a closer investigation of the moral manualist understanding and use
of the natural law.
1. "For the manualists human nature, adequately considered in its relation to self,
neighbor, and God, was the objective foundation of the natural moral law. By
analyzing this nature and its essential relations one could arrive at a knowledge
of general principles and of definite concrete, absolute norms, which could, then,
be applied to specific concrete situations.
2. Remember that the whole natural law theory was originally conceived as an aid
to evangelization, i.e., not wishing to deny anything good in a particular culture,
etc. (see Häring’s Free and Faithful, vol. 1)
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4. Need for a hermeneutics of the natural law, which will work for, as Gula does, a
contemporary profile of the natural law. W e must speak in language which can
be easily understood by contemporary men and women, so as to avoid this sort
of statement (used by one of my students): “W e don’t want to use the natural law
in sexual ethics”).
7. W ith all these caveats in place let us now turn to a consideration of St. Thomas'
treatment of natural law.
A. Overview and Context of Thomas' treatment of the natural law within his treatment on law
as a whole
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a. The eternal law (q. 93), which, according to Jean Porter, Thomas views
as “God’s knowledge of creatures seen in relation to God and to the
good of the universe as a whole. In other words, for Aquinas, the
eternal law is God’s providential wisdom, in directing all things toward
their proper fulfillment in union with God, in the way appropriate to
each kind of creature.” Jean Porter, Natural and Divine Law:
Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics. (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1999): 163.
B. Important theological context of Thomas’ view of grace and the New Law in order to
understand his treatment of the natural law. Much less is Thomas arguing for a “moral
order” based purely on the natural order of God’s creation. This would be the
“naturalistic fallacy.”
1. Thomas, properly understood, is not arguing for some sort of natural moral
knowledge that can exist independently of God’s grace.
2. For a helpful exposition of this point see Eugene F. Roger’s recent article, “The
Narrative of Natural Law in Aquinas’s Commentary on Romans 1.” Theological
Studies 59 (June 1998): 254-276.
3. Rogers discusses how for a full and correct understanding of Thomas Aquinas’
teaching on the natural law one must study his Commentary on Romans 1 (Super
epistolas S. Pauli lectura) since Thomas’ treatment of the natural law refers to a
Pauline context. This Commentary fleshes out Thomas’ understanding of the
relation of the New Law to the natural law, and how reason is influenced by
God’s grace.
2. Question, objections, sed contra (but on the other hand), biblical or tradition-
based text, Thomas’ own development, reply to the objections
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1. "The natural moral law is not an order which of itself is given along with the
nature of things and understanding. Thomas proceeds much more from the
thought that all being is subject to the eternal law (lex aeterna, divine
providence) and, on that account, bears within itself a natural inclination for a
corresponding norm of life. To a particular degree, this holds good of the
essence of the understanding. It also has a natural inclination for a standard of
life which corresponds to the eternal law; not, however, in the passive manner of
an impressed seal, but in the active sense of the particular concern for oneself
and for others (Summa Theologica I-II, q. 91, a. 2: Sibi ipsi et aliis providens).
God does not drive man nor lead him through instinct, but leaves a share of
personal responsibility to every one possessing rational judgment.” [Böckle, ?]
2. This last point is stressed by Fuchs, Demmer, and Häring, three great German
moral theologians of the twentieth century (all of whom taught in Rome).
3. In returning to the distinction about law as based in reason rather than the will,
we need to be clear about what we mean by the “law of God.” This is the point
Fuchs makes in his article on the Image of God and our Innerworldly Behavior
and which Curran puts in the following way: “Thus Christians often speak of the
will of God as the most important law and of our corresponding obligation to
obey God’s will. But for Thomas, law belongs primarily to practical reason and
not to the will. The eternal law is not God’s will but rather divine wisdom
directing all actions and movements to their proper end.” (Curran, The Catholic
Moral Tradition Today, pp. 68-69.)
4. Thus, Curran concludes, “To determine what God wants, one does not go
immediately to God and ask. Rather God gives us reason, which reflecting on
what God has made, can come to know how Gods wants us to act.” ” (Curran,
The Catholic Moral Tradition Today, p. 69.)
1. From Franz Böckle's Law and Conscience, trans. M. James Donnelly, (New
York: Sheed and W ard, 1966).
2. "St. Thomas Aquinas understands the natural moral law principally according to
a kind of natural knowledge (scientia naturalis). Man possesses an innate
tendency through which, without instruction and outside help, he can recognize
whatever fundamental demand is made of him for his own self-realization." p.
81.
G. Recta ratio
1. According to Thomas: "The natural moral law is, therefore, in the first and
proper meaning, an unformulated law (lex indita non scripta, in accord with the
New Testament law of grace, Summa Theologica I-II, q. 106, a.1).
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2. It is founded in the obligation and right given to the rational, spiritual person to
perform actions which correspond to his being which is in the image of God."
[Böckle, p. 82]
3. Veritatis Splendor makes much the same point: "It also becomes clear why this
law is called the natural law: it receives this name not because it refers to the
nature of irrational beings but because the reason which promulgates it is proper
to human nature." [VS, 42]
4. "As the law of freedom, it is an original gift in man, not through inborn, moral
ideas, but formally through the inclination of reason (together with the
corresponding tendencies)." p. 82.
1. W e might say that Recta ratio is a dynamic tendency in the human person in
order to approach the "truth," or in other words to "grasp" reality as it is in its
holistic sense. Therefore, we would argue that such a conception of morality has
its basis and rational standard grounded in reality itself. The function of human
reason, or recta ratio, therefore is to discover moral values in the concrete lived
experiences of the human person.
2. "W ith regard to the question of the material content of the norms of the law of
nature, it will only be said here that one should not envisage the Catholic law of
nature as a collection (Summa) of ready-to-hand, unchangeable directives for
conduct, deducible from an unchangeable order of nature [Böckle].
3. "Ontological foundation for moral knowledge is, in the proper sense, not an
abstract impersonal being, but the concrete, historical man, this person who
allows for no substitute." [Böckle, p. 85].
4. "W e have to understand the so-called natural law as having inner unity with the
law of Christ. Analogous to the law of grace, the natural //law is also principally
no written law (lex scripta), but a law bestowed upon the heart (lex indita). As
we have seen, the rational spiritual person has a natural being formed in the
image of God. W ith this nature there is given a duty and right for corresponding
conduct and it is in this that the natural law is founded. This duty-right quality
united with the concrete man must be seen in unity with the Christian salvation-
existence." [Böckle, p. 107].
1. Classic aphorism for the formulation of the most basic norm of the natural law
according to Thomas (ST I-II, 94:2).
2. Be careful to translate this accurately: The good is to be done and fostered, and
evil is to be avoided.. Avoid a simplistic interpretation or a simply tautology;
the principle is not as self-evident as it might seem at first glance.
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4. This is a fundamental and not a "material" norm: It does not have "content" in
itself, but is better seen as an "indicator" of the proper human dispositions and
directions for human moral potential.
A. Keep in mind that norms in Roman Catholic moral theology are found in “ethics” as well
as in Scripture. These norms therefore are located are different axes: Scriptural norms
exercise their primary mode of normativity on both the individual and the community as
members of a faith community. Scriptural norms are grounded in the Bible as a sacred
text and Tradition as a lived experience of the sacred claim that the faith has on us.
However, “moral” norms are primarily grounded in our humanity. Thus the claim of
moral norms is “rational”–that which exercises its claim on humans by virtue of the
dignity as rational beings. This axis moves from the experience sector to the moral
philosophy sector and exercises its primary claim as an understanding of what is
“normatively human.” The natural law tradition is one mode of reflection on the meaning
of what is normatively human.
B. Bibliography
2. Josef Fuchs, S.J. "Historicity and Moral Norm." Chapter 6 in Idem. Moral
Demands and Personal Obligations, 91-108. W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 1993.
3. Josef Fuchs, S.J. "The «Sin of the W orld» and Normative Morality,"
Gregorianum 61 (1980): 51-76.
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key factor.
4. Curran, Charles E. and McCormick Richard A., S.J., eds. Readings in Moral
Theology, No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition. New York: Paulist
Press, 1979.
5. Gula, Richard M., S.S. What Are They Saying About Moral Norms?. New
York: Paulist Press, 1982.
C. Importance of a proper understanding of the natural law for the formulation of moral
norms
1. This relates to the intention (motives) for a moral action which may be different
from the action in itself. For example, Mr. Smith gives a million dollars towards
the building of a hospital for the poor, which will then be named after him. The
action (donation of money to aid the poor) is “morally right,” but his motives are
“wrong” (vainglory), and therefore for him the performance of the action does
not deepen his moral goodness, but the opposite.
2. Similarly, an individual can perform a morally “wrong” action, but out of “right”
(though mistaken) motives, and therefore for this person the action does not
deepen the person’s moral badness, but the opposite. For example, a person in
the late Middle Ages is sincerely convinced that the burning of heretics is
required for the legitimate defense of the Catholic faith, and so this person does
this. Today we recognize that this action is morally “wrong,” but we would not
say that this person’s own moral goodness was compromised through this action,
but rather the fidelity of acting out of one’s sincere (though erroneous) beliefs
(i.e. “Following one’s conscience”) would mean trying to follow God, and we
would have to call this action as conducive to deepening one’s moral goodness.
3. This sort of conundrum is admittedly very difficult to grasp, yet it does illustrate
some important points both about conscience and the nature of the natural law
and the application of moral norms. W e see this matter in reference to our
discussion on moral action and intentionality and the concepts of finis operis (the
end of a moral action in itself) and finis operantis (the operative intention of the
moral agent for the action performed).
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and the task of conscience--and of the conscience alone--to attempt to form for
itself the most objective (though not, as we have been occasionally but
mistakenly warned, infallible) ethical judgment about the correctness of a
concrete action in the totality of its reality. Attempting this judgment involves
drawing on all available means; for example, the use of previously formulated
norms and traditions in their hermeneutical interpretation, the counsel of wise
persons, and the dicta of theologians." Josef Fuchs, S.J., "The Difficult Golden
Rule," Introduction in Idem, Moral Demands and Personal Obligations,
(W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1993): 4.
5. Thus, there is a moral importance of context for ethical action and evaluation:
As Fuchs notes, "Here one must note the possibility that one's own action and the
action of the other can have an essentially different context, so that it can
perhaps be justified in the one case but not in the other." [Fuchs, Golden Rule, p.
4.]
1. i.e., as a law to be laid down, or as a guide for a search of the truly human.
2. Caveat from Bernard Häring: "Let it be said again, a Christian moral theology is
more than normative ethics; it is the theology of life in Christ Jesus, an effort to
come to a full understanding of what discipleship means for Christians and for
the world. Normative ethics, however, is an indispensable part of Christian
ethics." [Free and Faithful, Vol. I, p. 338].
5. "Norms are necessary for a peaceful life in community and society. They should
educate us to become ever more discerning persons and are indispensable for our
own examination of conscience." Free and Faithful, Vol. I, p. 339].
6. unavoidable tension between a fixed set of norms and freedom for creative and
timely action in fidelity.
7. --> key question: "How do we evaluate, here and now, the adequacy of norms
and rules?" p.340.
1. Universal Norms
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d. Thus, we have need for secondary and tertiary norms, which in turn will
be based on practical reason.
(2) Don't be overly confident that one knows with perfect certainty
what is objectively "right" or "wrong" in a given situation or
behavior.
c. But this same specificity may limit their “universal” or broader usage
across time (history) and space/place (culture, etc.)
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1. Are of necessity and purpose rooted in both time and space, i.e., in particular
cultures and histories. Thus, according to the historical model of reality these
norms will change, and/or fall into desuetude (e.g. norms on usury) on one hand,
and also indicate genuine moral progress (e.g. no further moral acceptance of
slavery) on the other. In this it is important to keep in mind the distinction
between fundamental ideal and the value therein enshrined, and a concrete
material norm which is meant to defend and advance that value/ideal in our
world here and now.
2. According to Thomas "concrete material norms (precepta magis propria) are not
applicable in all cases: valent ut in pluribus." p. 86. Cf. ST I-II, q. 94, a. 4 (an
important section to read carefully). "The concrete norms are relative: they only
forbid that we cause or tolerate ontic evil which exceeds the boundaries of the
measure of means to the actualization of good ends." [Janssens, Ontic Evil, p.
86]. Thus, once again we see that Ut in pluribus is a key concept in moral
theology!
J. Relation of concrete material norms to ontic evil: According to Louis Janssens, "concrete
material norms invite us to bring about the ideal relations which lessen more and more
effectively all forms of ontic evil which by their definition hamper the development of
human beings and communities." [Janssens, Ontic Evil, p. 84]. "The concrete material
norms of morality hold the ideal of the utopia before us and continually suggest a future
which is more suitable for man. These norms are a constant protest against the different
forms of ontic evil, and as we have said already, they pronounce us guilty of immorality
when we bring about or tolerate more ontic evil than is necessary to realize the moral
objectives of our human existence." [Janssens, Ontic Evil, p. 85].
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right reserved to God. Human organs and faculties are seen as having natural ends.
However, the natural ends of only a very few organs and faculties tend to be of interest to
the deontologist. ... In general, we may that the faculty of speech and the genital organs
are those which most interest the Catholic deontologist." [Hoose, pp. 108-109].
B. Obviously related to theory of moral norms and absolutes, and reaffirmed in Veritatis
Splendor, and accepted by proportionalists, such as McCormick, Cahill, Curran. The
disagreement or dissent is over whether some particular norms, such as anti artificial
contraception, can be invested with this sort of mantle. It would be factually false, and
probably tendentious (if not malicious) to accuse the above theologians as teaching that
there are no moral absolutes whatsoever.
E. Understanding of the axiom intrinsece malum in se. The "in se" of the traditional axiom
requires a hermeneutical process, [cf. hermeneutical theory in general, but especially
Klaus Demmer, ch. 5 of his Deuten und handeln: Grundlagen und Grundfragen der
Fundamentalmoral. Studien zur theologischen Ethik, no. 15. Freiburg: Verlag Herder,
1985.] Therefore this required hermeneutical process of the intrinsece malum in se will
necessarily involve an interpretation concerning the intention and circumstances even
though the accent is still maintained on the gravity of the action itself. This keeps us from
the moral conundrum of positing morally evil actions which would be totally abstracted
from the agent, who is always and only a social, contextualized being.
A. Related also to our understanding of theology, Christology, and ecclesiology, i.e., how we
view God, how we understand the salvific mission of Jesus Christ, what power with which
we understand the Church to be invested, and so on.
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any exception therefore negated all value of norms). The “exception” points not to a
“dispensation” from the norm, but rather points out a need for the refinement or
reformulation of the norm.
1. Here Fuchs’ article on the Image of God and Our Inner-world Behavior is
especially helpful, especially his articulation of the notions of a “Ruling God”
and/or a “Commanding God” distinguished from a more theologically sound
notion of God who works in and through us, not sending in “plays” or “rules”
from the outside.
2. "[Josef] Fuchs refers to some of the problems that can arise from such an
excessively anthropomorphic vision of God (while admitting that all our
utterances on the subject are inevitably anthropomorphic and symbolic). Some
people in the church, he notes, go beyond the teaching that the value of norms
and moral judgments is founded ultimately on God. They teach that innumerable
concrete normative statements, products of human intelligence, are precepts or
laws of God. Christian see themselves and their realization of man in the world
compared with divine precepts." [Hoose, p. 110].
4. "Our search for and discovery of right behaviour in this world have the character
of moral norms because God has made man lord of earth. This is true also with
regard to very detailed judgments." [Hoose, p. 110.]
A. Bibliography
2. Couture, Roger A., O.M.I. "The Use of Epikeia in Natural Law: The Early
Developments." Eglise et Théologie 4 (1973): 71-103.
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2. In this sense, for example, the late Medieval Jesuit theologian Francisco Suarez
(died 1617) set out three basic cases where epikeia could be invoked:
a. impossibility of the law: "(a) if the positive law, set out in words is
`beyond our strength' in a certain case, or impossible;
c. not binding according to the mind of the legislator: "(c) if the non-
observation is done `according to the benign intention of the legislator'
(as if he were present here and now)." [Fuchs, "Epikeia," p. 195.]
3. Of these three types of cases, the last mentioned is identified most often with
epikeia. Since epikeia pointed to the perfection or refinement of a positive
(human) law, it was the common opinion that most theologians had argued that it
would be a logically impossible to apply epikeia to the natural law, since the
natural law, as participation in the divine law, was already "perfect" and
therefore incapable of improved reformulation.
4. Yet, Roger Couture traces the use of epikeia by medieval theologians and notes
that a number of theologians, beginning in the late thirteenth century, "were
willing to subscribe to the notion that moral norms, even when grounded in the
nature of man, demand constant reevaluation and can tolerate exceptions. The
theory of epikeia provided a rationale for dealing with these exceptions." (p.
101).
C. Josef Fuchs on Epikeia and the interpretation and refinement of moral norms.
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5. Fuchs' five cases involve the application of not just an individual's own use of
recta ratio, but "common sense" understood as the "sense-held-in-common" and
which shows the importance of the input and discernment of the larger moral
community as well as human society as a whole.
A. Biblical Passage: Mk 7:5-13 So the Pharisees and teachers of the law asked Jesus, "W hy
don't your disciples live according to the tradition of the elders instead of eating their food
with `unclean' hands?" He replied, "Isaiah was right when he prophesied about you
hypocrites; as it is written: "`These people honor me with their lips, but their hearts are far
from me. They worship me in vain; their teachings are but rules taught by men.' You have
let go of the commands of God and are holding on to the traditions of men." And he said
to them: "You have a fine way of setting aside the commands of God in order to observe
your own traditions! For Moses said, `Honor your father and your mother,' and, `Anyone
who curses his father or mother must be put to death.' But you say that if a man says to
his father or mother: `W hatever help you might otherwise have received from me is
Corban' (that is, a gift devoted to God), then you no longer let him do anything for his
father or mother. Thus you nullify the word of God by your tradition that you have
handed down. And you do many things like that." (NIV)
B. Relation of our image of who God is to our conception of what morality is.
1. Mahoney astutely remarks, that "In thus attempting to identify the character of
God, which is essentially love, and in which will and reason coincide, we may by
way of conclusion consider that it is a remarkable, if largely unremarked, fact
that it should have been thought that in depicting God as a moral lawmaker
anything like the full truth of the matter had been reached." [Mahoney, Making
of Moral Theology, p. 247.]
2. In relation to the virtues we see this in the connection and interrelation between
prudence and charity.
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C. Recall the whole thrust and purpose for moral norms: i.e., to incarnate moral values more
fully into our human lived reality. Norms are guides and helps to this process, not ends in
themselves. Legalism is the result when "norms" are elevated from their true status as
"means-to-an-end" to "ends-in-themselves."
D. Important to understand the role and relationship of law and legal theory to morality and
moral theory through out the centuries. Here Mahoney's Chapter 6 is helpful, as would be
the corrective of Protestant ethics which tries to avoid casuistical moral legalism,
stressing instead God’s saving grace. However, it is important to recall a basic legal
maxim, Lex dubia non obligat, i.e., a doubtful law does not oblige. Thus, in cases of
legitimate doubt about a law (positive or moral), one could argue, under certain
conditions, that such a putative law would not be binding.
E. In this general context of law and morality it is worth highlighting a couple of key and
recurring moral "heresies"
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general and even in every particular instance. It enjoins a respect for power--and
even for possible sanctions not intrinsically connected with the purpose of the
law--rather than for the purpose of law as reasonably furthering the common
good and shared interests and to that extent open to scrutiny and evaluation."
[Mahoney, Making of Moral Theology, p. 243.] The third defect: "at heart it
implies that the most important moral stance and the only moral virtue which
really counts for salvation, is obedience to, and compliance with, the will of
another, and ultimately with the will of God, conceived quite separately from the
mind of God who is ultimate reason." [Mahoney, Making of Moral Theology, p.
244.]
F. Probabilism
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A. Above all in speaking of sin it is crucial to do a lectio continua of the various Scripture
passages in order that our reflections will be truly Christian, i.e., biblically grounded and
scripturally nourished. There are obviously many possible passages, and so here I will
simply highlight a few to focus our discussion. One taken from the Old Testament could
be Hosea 11 (which is the First Reading for the Solemnity of the Sacred Heart, Year B):
“W hen Israel was a child I loved him, out of Egypt I called my son. Yet it was I who
taught Ephraim to walk, who took them in my arms; I drew them with human cords, with
hands of love; I fostered them like who raises an infant to his cheeks; yet, though I
stooped to feed my child, they did not know that I was their healer. My heart is
overwhelmed, my pity is stirred. I will not give vent to my blazing anger, I will not
destroy Ephraim again; for I am God and not a man, the Holy One present among you; I
will not let the flames consume you.”
B. Importance of noting the “starting” point and ground for our moral theology of sin:
namely in God’s revelation of God’s love, forgiveness, and call to conversion and
reconciliation. Therefore, pay attention to the Bible especially here, rather than starting
with an “ethics of failure” and punishment, which might result from emphasizing one of
the other sectors, especially that of philosophical ethics. It is important to keep our
consideration of sin “theological”–otherwise we often will run the risk of speaking of sin
in terms which will ultimately distort its meaning in the context of the Christian gospel
understanding of salvation. For example, we may think of sin as “failure” or
“imperfection” or “lack of personal fulfillment” and/or negative individual integration,
and so on. W hile all of these concepts have a certain amount of validity and importance,
yet in the final analysis none of them captures the depth of the Christian understanding of
what sin is.
C. For the New Testament I think it is important to look primarily to Jesus Christ, who is
God’s definitive and normative revelation of who God is. Consider the various
encounters Jesus had with sin, sinners, and the (self)-righteous. For ourselves we not only
“should” but must make our attitude the same of Christ, and therefore, the encounter with
the woman caught in adultery in John 8 can be a helpful reminder of how Jesus dealt with
both the sinner and those who were ready to condemn another of a particular sin of which
they themselves might not have been guilty.
D. Paul’s writings have often played a crucial role in the Church’s theological reflections on
sin, but I would like to turn our attention to the treatment found in 1 John. Sometimes I
fear that we read this Epistle a bit too quickly or center just on its famous verses on
abiding in God and love. However, sin is taken seriously in this Epistle precisely because
the author recognizes that forgiveness of sin is the central mission of Jesus Christ. A
sharp dichotomy is drawn between abiding in sin or abiding in God. In this understanding
of sin the author calls sin “lawlessness,” and anyone who commits sin a “child of the
devil” (I John 3: 4; 8). In this context we read a verse which might initially make us lose
hope, or strike us as terribly naive and/or romantic: “No one who abides in him [Jesus]
sins; no one who sins has either seen him or known him” (1 John 3: 5). Yet the same
Epistle tells us emphatically that Jesus came to save us from our sins, and so we have to
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accept God’s salvific will realized in Jesus Christ, or in other words, that we called first
and foremost to be released from the bondage of sin, and not that we are called to be free
of all imperfections. Taking sin seriously means taking it as God does, something that is
both real and horrible, but which bonds for humanity in general have been already broken
by Jesus, and that part of our human “vocation,” is to accept this calling to receive this
gift. Only a serious theology of sin, grace and forgiveness will guard us from the
persistent tendency towards self-perfection and thinking that somehow if we only try hard
enough we can become good enough to merit salvation on our own. This is the heresy of
Pelagianism, and as a wise older Jesuit once told me, a particularly “American” heresy.
Reading all of the Scripture passages together (e.g., the technique of the lectio continua)
helps guard against holding up any one passage or verse in a distorted sense.
E. In addition to the many other biblical passages (some examples follow), I believe it can
be quite helpful to consider some of the insights from the Tradition of the Church. In this
vein, consider the following excerpt from a sermon of Augustine on the David and Nathan
encounter (cf. Samuel 12:1-25). Augustine writes on David’s repentance: “Let us never
assume that if we live good lives we will be without sin; our lives should be praised only
when we continue to beg for pardon. But men are hopeless creatures, and the less they
concentrate on their own sins, the more interested they become in the sins of others. They
seek to criticize, not to correct. Unable to excuse themselves, they are ready to accuse
others. This was not the way that David showed us how to pray and make amends to
God, when he said: I acknowledge my transgression and my sin is ever before me [Psalm
51]. He did not concentrate on others’ sins; he turned his thoughts upon himself. He did
not merely stroke the surface, but he plunged inside and went deep down within himself.
He did not spare himself, and therefore was not impudent in asking to be spared.”
(Augustine, Sermon 19, 2-3; CCL 41, 252; [taken from the Office of Readings, 14 th
Sunday]
1. 1 Jn 1:8--2:6
If we claim to be without sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us. If
we confess our sins, he is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and purify
us from all unrighteousness. If we claim we have not sinned, we make him out
to be a liar and his word has no place in our lives. My dear children, I write this
to you so that you will not sin. But if anybody does sin, we have one who speaks
to the Father in our defense-- Jesus Christ, the Righteous One. He is the atoning
sacrifice for our sins, and not only for ours but also for the sins of the whole
world. W e know that we have come to know him if we obey his commands. The
man who says, "I know him," but does not do what he commands is a liar, and
the truth is not in him. But if anyone obeys his word, God's love is truly made
complete in him. This is how we know we are in him: W hoever claims to live in
him must walk as Jesus did. (NIV)
2. 1 Jn 3:7-10
Dear children, do not let anyone lead you astray. He who does what is right is
righteous, just as he is righteous. He who does what is sinful is of the devil,
because the devil has been sinning from the beginning. The reason the Son of
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God appeared was to destroy the devil's work. No one who is born of God will
continue to sin, because God's seed remains in him; he cannot go on sinning,
because he has been born of God. This is how we know who the children of God
are and who the children of the devil are: Anyone who does not do what is right
is not a child of God; nor is anyone who does not love his brother. (NIV)
I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate
I do. And if I do what I do not want to do, I agree that the law is good. As it is,
it is no longer I myself who do it, but it is sin living in me. know that nothing
good lives in me, that is, in my sinful nature. For I have the desire to do what is
good, but I cannot carry it out. For what I do is not the good I want to do; no, the
evil I do not want to do-- this I keep on doing. Now if I do what I do not want to
do, it is no longer I who do it, but it is sin living in me that does it. So I find this
law at work: W hen I want to do good, evil is right there with me. For in my inner
being I delight in God's law; but I see another law at work in the members of my
body, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the
law of sin at work within my members. W hat a wretched man I am! W ho will
rescue me from this body of death? Thanks be to God-- through Jesus Christ our
Lord! So then, I myself in my mind am a slave to God's law, but in the sinful
nature a slave to the law of sin. (NIV)
G. Basic Bibliography
3. Kevin T. Kelly, "Sin, Spirituality and the Secular." The Way 32 (1992): 13-22.
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5. Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. Not the Way It's Supposed to be: A Breviary of Sin.
Grand Rapids, MI: W m. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995.
c. His fuller definition of sin, though, seems to be the following: “All sin
has first and finally a Godward force. Let us say that a sin is any
act–any thought, desire, emotion, word, or deed–or its particular
absence, that displeases God and deserves blame. Let us add that the
disposition to commit sin also displeases God and deserves blame, and
let us therefore use the word sin to refer to such instances of both act
and disposition. Sin is a culpable and personal affront to a personal
God.” p. 13.
6. For a good treatment of the classic Lutheran position on sin and grace see Eric
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1. Consider the following caricature from Norman Tanner: "Another way in which
we try to get round sin is to divide people into the good and the bad, usually
placing ourselves among the former. The neo-Nazis, the racists, the anti-
feminists, the polluters of the environment, they are all the unworthies. W e are
O.K. because we are not like them (at least not like the particular group that
happens to be centre-stage at the time) and would never dream of having such
base instincts." p. 373. [Norman Tanner, S.J. "Sin in the Middle Ages." The
Month 254 (September/October 1993): 372-375]. One of a series of articles on
various theological aspects of sin. Tanner critiques contemporary culture's
efforts to abolish the idea of sin and contrasts this view with a consideration of
sin in the Middle Ages in which there was a greater sense of personal sin, which
in turn opened one up better to the possibility and necessity of divine
forgiveness.
2. Tanner contrasts this and other contemporary views with the theology of the
Middle Ages: "Ultimately the medieval acceptance of sin had effects that were
deeply liberating--for the individual, towards others, and towards God. The
individual was much more at ease with him or herself. Expectations in life were
more realistic, disappointments less bitter. One of the follies of western society
today, fuelled by the media and consumer advertising, is that people are cajoled
into believing that they can, and therefore to some extent should, do everything.
In the domain of religion, the semi-Pelagianism influencing Roman Catholic
theology and religious practice since the Counter-Reformation period has led to
a too great emphasis on attaining perfection by personal striving; people all too
easily give up complete if they cannot achieve everything--an `all or nothing'
mentality which especially in recent years has had a sad consequence upon
Catholics lapsing unnecessarily from the practice of their religion." p. 373.
4. Perhaps a bit over-simplified and exaggerated, but is there more than a grain of
truth in Tanner's remarks? Therefore, need to consider better the theology of sin
and forgiveness.
A. Original Sin,
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2. "mortal sin opposes man's ultimate end, insofar as it destroys the order to that
end, whereas venial sin does not overthrow this order." [Graneris, "Sin
(Actual)." In Dictionary of Moral Theology, p.. 1134]
C. Conditions Necessary for Mortal Sin (cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church #1857)
1. Grave Matter
1. "It is difficult to lay down a universal norm for determining its seriousness.
Moralists limit themselves to formulating it for individual commandments. It
may be noted, however, that certain violations always imply serious matter, but
in others the matter may be serious or light, depending on the greater or lesser
quantity of the matter involved." [Graneris, p. 1134].
2. For a good discussion of the problematic aspect of the term "grave matter" as it
relates to a moral evaluation of masturbation, see Charles Curran's
"Masturbation and Objectively Grave Matter." Chapter 8 in Idem. A New Look
at Christian Morality, 201-221. Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, 1968. Curran
discusses and critiques the traditional theological opinion that masturbation
always involves objectively grave matter. Curran proposes a different stance in
light of fundamental option theory, and a close analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas'
understanding of the difference between mortal and venial sin. Curran's book
does have a Nihil obstat and an Imprimatur, even though Curran advances some
of the theories which eventually led to his 1986 condemnation by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF).
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reason due to youth, dotage, retardation, hysteria, etc., and extreme passion
which blinds reason.
3. See Catechism of the Catholic Church #1860 for its “gloss” on unintentional
ignorance.
1. Presumes full advertence: "Consent is full if given with that ordinary degree of
liberty that we have when we are still exercising control over our decisions,
though we may be under the impulse of some passion. This third element is
often the most difficult one to establish, especially in the case of internal sins or
sins involving a passion. The habitual dispositions of the individual, along with
the circumstances surrounding the situation, will help us to arrive at a judgment
that has the greatest probability of being close to the truth." [Graneris, p. 1134]
2. Palazzini states that in "cases of doubt concerning consent the following are
usually enumerated as signs of imperfect consent. Non-consent is presumed in
the case of: those who are of such good conscience that they abhor mortal sin;
those who, along with the temptation to grave sin, had the opportunity to commit
an external act and who did not do so; those for whom the temptation is a source
of suffering and bitterness." [From Pietro Palazzini, "Sin," in Sin: Its Reality and
Nature: A Historical Survey, ed. Pietro Palazzini, trans. Brendan Devlin.
(Dublin: Scepter Publishers, 1964): 164.]
3. "A sin of omission, on the other hand, is the failure to perform an obligatory act.
It is an offence against a positive precept, such as `Remember the Sabbath day,
to keep it holy'; `Love one another as I have loved you'." [Karl Heinz Peschke,
Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the Light of Vatican II, (Alcester and
Dublin: C. Goodliffe Neale, 1985): 305].
4. Relation to concept of positive and negative duties, which bind in different ways.
E.g., negative duties (prohibitions) bind semper et pro semper (always and in
each instance, e.g., do not murder), while positive duties (prescriptions) are
usually seen to bind as semper sed non pro semper (always, but not in each
instance, e.g., pray always).
H. Capital Sins
1. "They are called `capital' not because they are always necessarily grave, but
because they easily become vices and sources of many other sins. Gregory the
Great (d. 604) drew up a list of seven: ..." [Peschke, p. 306]
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a. “W hen the act is fully deliberate, but the law to which it is opposed is
not essential to the attainment of our ultimate end, we have the kind of
venial sin referred to as ex toto genere suo.” (Peschke, p. 164)
b. ” W hen the law is grave in itself and the act opposed to it is deliberate
but the matter with which the action is concerned is of little importance,
we have venial sin ex parvitate materiae." (Peschke, p. 164).
c. “W hen the precept is a grave one, but the act opposed to it is not
perfectly deliberate, there is the case of venial sin ex imperfectione
actus.” (Peschke, p. 164)
2. "In all these cases the venial sin is a partial de-ordination which mars the
harmony which directs us to our final end and the order of the means thereto,
but which leaves man's own ordination to his final end intact in its substance.
The person who sins venially errs concerning the means to his final end, but not
concerning the end itself." [From Pietro Palazzini, "Sin" in Sin: Its Reality and
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J. Confession of Sins according to the teaching of the Council of Trent, “all mortal sins must
be confessed,...while venial sins must not be confessed, although it is recommendable to
do so (DS 1680). For venial sins do not destroy the state of grace (DS 1537)." Peschke,
"The Morally Bad Action: Sin," Chapter 5 in Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the
Light of Vatican II, (Alcester and Dublin: C. Goodliffe Neale, 1986): 296.
K. W e have to acknowledge here the many problems this whole “act-centered” approach
raises in our understanding of sin. It often does not deal sufficiently the moral character
of the individual, and fails to engage sufficiently an understanding of conversion as an
ongoing process.
L. Notion of Temptation
3. God does not tempt us, but "the possibility of temptation is rooted in the gift of
freedom, with which God endowed man." [Peschke, p. 313].
3. Important terminology in the tradition: e.g., see the traditional act of contrition
and its wording in regards to the “promise to avoid the near occasions of sin” in
the future. Refer rather to relative difficulty of overcoming temptation in this or
that sort of situation. Even though we do have an obligation to avoid the "near
occasions of sin." However, we cannot avoid all occasions of sin, and should be
careful of over-scrupulosity on the one hand, and laxism and habitual sin which
would condition the other hand.
A. Relationship among these terms, but need to make the proper distinctions. Helpful,
though very traditional, treatment by Karl Heinz Peschke, S.V.D. "The Morally Bad
Action: Sin." Chapter 5 in Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the Light of Vatican II,
286-324. Alcester and Dublin: C. Goodliffe Neale, 1986.
B. Seduction (in sin): "Seduction is the deliberate effort to lead others to sin. It constitutes a
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twofold sin, first a sin against charity, and second a sin against the moral duty whose
violation is caused." [Peschke, p. 314].
C. Scandal
3. Passive, often is more subtle. "Passive scandal is the taking of scandal at the
provoking action of another, be this action unbecoming and sinful or be it lawful
and good." [Peschke, p. 316]. "The passive scandal can be either due to bad
example, or it can be a scandal of the weak, or a pharisaic scandal." [Peschke, p.
318]. Or the "scandal of a specific legal minimalism and formalistic piety which
hinders men of other faiths to find the way to Christ or which makes them even
scorn the Church. ... The scandal of spiritual mediocrity constitutes a grievous
obstacle for the growth of the kingdom of Christ." [Peschke, p. 318].
5. Rules for the Permission of Scandal, come out of the casuistical heritage. E.g.,
"The observance of a positive law may be omitted to avoid scandal. Ordinarily
however one is not obliged to do so. A wife or children may miss Sunday Mass
if they can thus prevent an outburst of fury of the husband or father." [Peschke,
p. 320]. Such a case may still be applicable in certain regions, e.g. a Buddhist-
Christian household in Korea. W e need to clarify what and how "scandal"
would work in a case like this. The "sin" would be the father's anger, but this
"stumbling" would be related to the wife and children's attendance at Mass. It is
important to stress that the wife and children are not "culpable" for the husband's
"sin," but would be seen more as a judgment done in prudence and charity to
help this man, and to relieve the wife and children from the burden of any false
guilt about having "missed Mass" on Sunday. Yet, frankly this kind of casuistry
is rather subtle, and has perhaps been used in the past in ways that have led to
the oppression o the weak, and a problematic exhortation to supineness.
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that some amount of "cooperation" in evil is unavoidable for those who live in the real
world, which is morally complex. However, in the textbook sense, "cooperation" in evil
refers to some degree in sharing in the moral guilt of another's sin. A traditional list gives
nine ways this could be done: By counsel, By command, By consent, By provocation, By
praise or flattery, By concealment, By being a partner in sin, By silence [Qui tacit
consentire censetur; "Silence gives consent"], By defending the ill done.
2. Explicit vs. Implicit: "Explicit formal cooperation would be had if the sin of the
other were directly intended...Concurrence in the evil deed of another is
considered an implicit formal cooperation if the assistance offered is of such a
nature that it necessarily joins in the sinful deed of another." [Peschke, p. 321].
"Other authors however regard the implicit formal cooperation as immediate
material cooperation. For, although it is sinful in most of the instances, there are
exceptions possible, while formal cooperation is always sinful." [Peschke, p.
321].
3. Immediate: "It is immediate if one concurs in the evil act itself, as to help a
burglar to empty the jewels that he is stealing into the burglar's wallet."
4. Mediate: "It is mediate if one provides means other helps for the evil deed
without joining the evil act itself, as to supply the burglar with the keys to the
home or with tools for his burglary. Mediate cooperation is often further
subdivided into proximate and remote, according as it is more or less closely
connected with the evil deed." [Peschke, p. 322].
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1. Examples from the medical professions, build on the premise that the overall
work or profession of the person is in general a good work. There is a real
difficulty, if not practical impossibility, of abstracting one sort of assistance (e.g.
in abortions) from other aspects and duties of one's work if one were a lab
technician, for example. The issue becomes more acute, with greater
responsibility, the more “immediate” (e.g., direct) the involvement. For
example, the doctor who actually performs the abortion would have a great
degree of responsibility to make sure that she/he did not cooperate “materially”
in such a procedure.
2. Or of parents with adult children who co-habitate, etc. W e need to make this
distinction to avoid sin and/or scruples.
H. Counseling the Lesser Evil (Minus malum) Or "Advising the lesser sin"
1. "Advising a lesser sin than the one a sinner is about to commit is ordinarily
allowed, provided the sinner cannot otherwise be deterred from committing the
great sin." [Peschke, p. 324].
2. "This is certain if the lesser sin is contained in the greater, e.g. to advise an
infuriated person to beat his enemy rather than to kill him." [Peschke, p. 324.]
3. One can even "lawfully" aid in the commission of such a lesser evil if thereby the
greater evil is avoided, except in the following restricted sense: but it is not
lawful to advise the sinner to do a lesser evil which would result in injustice to a
third person whom the sinner did not have in mind, in order to prevent him from
committing the greater sin. Hence it is not permitted to advise somebody to
commit adultery with his enemy's wife or to mutilate his daughter instead of
killing him." [Peschke, p. 324].
2. Recognition of the fact of our facticity: W e live in a sinful world and none of is
morally omnipotent. Therefore, we will all have to cooperate and/or tolerate evil
situations, an important fact to recognize, especially in terms of dealing with the
scrupulous.
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b. minus malum (lesser evil {among possible “evils” when the only choice
of action seems to involve choosing an action which involves evil).
Minus does not means "without" evil; choosing the "lesser of two evils"
is not choosing the lesser of two sins, and then being sorry for this
smaller sin. The lesser evil chosen does not become a moral sin, even if
it is an "evil" which in other circumstances would be seen as immoral.
Here we see how circumstances and intention are crucial.
1. First of all, we must clarify what moral compromise does not mean. Consider
the following from Josef Fuchs, S.J., who notes that compromise has several
meanings, and for moral theology we are not speaking of “moral compromise,”
which would be the case only “if one were convinced of the correctness of a
judgment made by the object-oriented conscience and, consequently, knew
oneself to be absolutely bound by the subject-oriented conscience: however, and
perhaps in order to avoid a possibly significant difficulty, one believes one
should decide contrarily to the judgment made by conscience.” Fuchs, “The
Phenomenon of Conscience: Subject-orientation and Object-orientation,” p. 131.
2. Fuchs expresses his own analysis of what actual compromise entails in the
following terms: “According to some moralists (the author included), closer
examination of the problems to be solved would show that norms regarding
correct conduct within the world always reflect the earthly, and therefore, the
limited goods/values possessed by human beings. Such limited goods/values
can, of course, prove themselves incompatible in a concrete and confined
situation. The question is then which of the qualities/values that are under
consideration in a situation of incompatibility are to be given precedence by
reason of their hierarchical order or their concrete urgency. A solution to a
problematic situation arrived at in such a way, perhaps in the conscience alone,
would at any rate be a compromise, but not a moral compromise in respect of a
demand which is considered to be absolutely binding: it would be a compromise
made within the limited sphere of human beings good/values that are not
necessarily demanding.” Fuchs, “The Phenomenon of Conscience: Subject-
orientation and Object-orientation,” p. 132.
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D. Elements and Examples of Legitimate Compromise: "One conclusion could well be that
in certain cultures such submission [to paying business "bribes"] is justifiable in the
circumstances for the good which will come of it --with the proviso, however, that one is
also under an obligation to work to remedy the corrupt social system." p. 676. "In other
words, there may be times when one is justified in doing the best in the circumstances, but
only on condition that one is at the same time doing one's best to change the
circumstances." John Mahoney, S.J., "The Challenge of Moral Distinctions," Theological
Studies 53 (1992): 676. Another element to take into consideration is that of
"acculturation" and "inculturation"--coming to a better and more precise understanding of
just which values are in play and how.
E. Tolerance
1. Traditional Understanding
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F. Distinction between compromise and tolerance of sinful situations and the genuine call to
prophetic action.
1. Sin against God and God's will for the people as expressed in the Covenant, thus
personal and collective accountability is cast in the relationship of the
membership and participation of the Covenant.
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2. Recognition of the mystery of sin as being not only an act but also seen as a
power and state.
1. Gloss on the Greek word ðåéñáóìïó (peirasmos) and/or ðåéñáæo (peirazo): The
primary meaning is "test or trial" and only the secondary meaning is "temptation
as enticement to sin." [Cf. Heinrich Seesman's article on "Peira" in the
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Volume 6, edited by Gerhard
Freidrich, translated by Geoffrey W . Bromiley, 23-26. Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1968.]
2. In the Old Testament and later Judaism: Individuals and whole communities are
tempted (cf. Gn 22:1-19 [Abraham], and in W isdom Literature). Humans,
individuals as well as communities also "tempt" God: Israelites in the desert,
Gideon, etc.
3. New Testament
b. Prayer of the disciples: the Our Father ("Lead us not into temptation"):
"W hat is at issue here is in no sense a test. The Lord is rather teaching
his disciples to ask God not withdraw His hand from them, but to keep
them against temptation by ungodly powers." [Seesman, TDNT p. 31.]
4. Less danger of scruples and neurotic guilt with the biblical understanding of
"trials and testings"
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by God
6. In this context, consider the following from Hebrews 12:4-11: In your struggle
against sin, you have not yet resisted to the point of shedding your blood. And
you have forgotten that word of encouragement that addresses you as sons: "My
son, do not make light of the Lord's discipline, and do not lose heart when he
rebukes you, because the Lord disciplines those he loves, and he punishes
everyone he accepts as a son." Endure hardship as discipline; God is treating you
as sons. For what son is not disciplined by his father? If you are not disciplined
(and everyone undergoes discipline), then you are illegitimate children and not
true sons. Moreover, we have all had human fathers who disciplined us and we
respected them for it. How much more should we submit to the Father of our
spirits and live! Our fathers disciplined us for a little while as they thought best;
but God disciplines us for our good, that we may share in his holiness. No
discipline seems pleasant at the time, but painful. Later on, however, it produces
a harvest of righteousness and peace for those who have been trained by it.
(NIV)
1. All men and women are sinners: Simul iustus et peccator (at once both sinner
and justified)
2. Sola gratia (grace alone); yet the need to avoid the seduction of "cheap grace"
4. Thus, avoid the heresy of trying to arrange for the cancellation of one's sins
through one's "merits"
2. Always in the context of God's grace! cf. Rm 5:20 "W here sin was overflowing
there grace was even greater."
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of the separate person, along with the expression of that will in particular acts of
sin become the only two concerns of Catholic morality. Act-analysis and an
evaluation of the individual person are the primary tasks of this view of moral
theology." p. 65.
4. Sin as Crime: "Perceptions of sin as crime and the sinner as a criminal isolate the
"guilty" party from the human community in a rather artificial manner. The
ambiguities of the experience of human evil is ignored or denied and a select
group of persons is identified as the exclusive cause of sin, judged guilty and
(quite logically) sentenced to punishment. In this way the larger group and the
majority of its members is [sic] able to maintain a sort of pseudo--or taboo
innocence. Thus, criminal models of sin cooperate in a disassociative process by
which the community of the "innocent" project the shared experience of moral
and religious evil onto the "guilty." Such a procedure is intrinsically immoral,
radically violent and profoundly unChristian." p. 70.
5. Contrast this with the scandal of Jesus--who ate with sinners and forgave them.
6. Sin as disease: Jesus "argues that the reality of sin is the universal experience of
being alienated from and in need of the loving mercy of God. Thus he shatters
the pseudo-innocence of those around him and calls them to be about the process
of conversion." p. 73
G. Nevertheless, I find this last model partial at best and ultimately unsatisfactory. It leads
into the “therapeutic” response, which is problematic for dealing with sin and genuine
forgiveness and masks the negative aspects of the ethos of our therapeutic culture. In this
vein see the critique of people like L. Gregory Jones, especially his Ch. 2 “Therapeutic
Forgiveness: The Church’s Psychological Captivity in W estern Culture,” in his
Embodying Forgiveness: A Theological Analysis, (Grand Rapids, MI: W m. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1995).
2. Jones goes on to talk about the culture of “victimization” and its impact on the
diminishment of the Christian understanding of confession, repentance and
forgiveness. “...there is plenty of sin to be found (though rarely named as such),
but it almost always lies with others. It is society, or my parents, or my disease,
or all three, and more, that are responsible for the way I am; so I am encouraged
to abdicate responsibility for my own actions.” Jones, p. 45.
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2. L. Gregory Jones adds that “sin and forgiveness have to do with more than pride
and with more than my ‘individual’ guilt. They have to do with the pervasive
brokenness for which we are all, in some measure, culpable and with specific
instances and habits of culpable wrongdoing that undermine not only my
communion but our communion with God, with one another, and with the whole
Creation. Hence forgiveness must involve an unlearning of the habits os sin as
we seek to become holy people capable of living in communion. As Jon Sobrino
rightly insists, ‘the purpose of forgiveness is not simply to heal the guilt of the
sinner but the purpose of all love: to come into communion’.” Jones, p. 63.
[Quoting Jon Sobrino’s “Latin America: Place of Sin and Place of Forgiveness”
Concilium 184 (1986): 51]
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(cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF). "Instruction on Certain
Aspects of the `Theology of Liberation'." Part I. "Instruction on Christian
Freedom and Liberation." Part II. Vatican City, 1984 and 1986.) In this regard
see especially Part I.
2. Fear of the denial of personal sin (cf. John Paul II’s Reconciliatio et Paenitentia.
On Reconciliation and Penance in the Mission of the Church Today. Post-
Synodal Apostolic Exhortation. Vatican City: 1984) which leads to a very
limited acceptance of the notion of social sin and in fact speaks of “one meaning
sometimes given to social sin that is not legitimate or acceptable, even though it
is very common in certain quarters today. This usage contrasts social sin and
personal sin, not without ambiguity, in a way that leads more or less
unconsciously to the watering down and almost the abolition of personal sin,
with the recognition only of social guilt and responsibilities.” RP #16.
3. The major sticking point seems to be the ramifications social sin would have on
the paradigm of individual moral acts: “A situation--or likewise an institution, a
structure, society itself--is not in itself the subject of moral acts. Hence a
situation cannot in itself be good or bad.” RP #16.
4. Related to this is the current Magisterium’s strong desire for strengthening the
paradigm of individual sin (especially in terms of the traditional vocabulary of
mortal and venial sin) and emphasis on individual confession.
5. This approach is echoed in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and is taken
up in some of the various national Catechisms as well.
7. The historical weight of tradition which always tends to make a major paradigm
shift difficult
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4. Thus the problem comes, for social sin, when these cultural narratives both
participate in, and mask, the oppression of the “outsiders” in a group. Betsworth
describes this dynamic as rooted in self deception. Such stories are both
powerful and devious. Betsworth notes that the “real story so painful the we
seek to deny it, yet it continues to assert itself as or basic way of interpreting our
situation.” P. 22
5. The painful nature of the real story leads as to create a second story, the so-
called cover story. “The cover story is another way of interpreting our action; it
is a way that is less painful, more honorable, and also plausible.” P. 22
6. But a cover story must be continually told and retold in order that it both
maintains its primacy and is able to suppress the real story.
1. Sometimes being an “outsider” can be a privileged vantage point, and need not
necessarily involve concomitant oppression. Cross-cultural exchange might
provide one such “outsider’s” view.
3. If the outsiders see our major cultural narratives as deceptive and oppressive that
will be important aspect of their liberation as well as for the creation of a more
just society that these outsiders help to “refashion the cultural stories by drawing
on their own stories, which they have created out of their religious, historical,
and cultural experiences. By turning to their own history to show how each
cultural narrative has been used to justify oppression, they reorder the cultural
vision of the majority. This reordering of the cultural narratives invites all
Americans to envision a nation in which freedom and justice for all can be more
nearly realized.” (Betsworth, p. 21)
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1. Sin against God and God's will for the people as expressed in the Covenant, thus
personal and collective accountability is cast in the relationship of the
membership and participation of the Covenant.
2. Recognition of the mystery of sin as being not only an act but also seen as a
power and state.
a. Not just individuals, but whole communities are tempted and tempt God
as well. In fact the community dimension is paramount in the Old
Testament (rather than the individual temptation/sin).
G. Social Sin and the Vision of God’s Kingdom, ala Roger Haight, S.J, a systematic
theologian who currently teaches at the W eston Jesuit School of Theology in Cambridge,
MA: "The objectification of God's will for the Kingdom must be structured by social
justice; God wills social justice. W hen a person engages in activity that promotes this
justice, he or she becomes one with God in three ways: morally, by a union of wills;
contemplatively, by possessive knowledge of the God who wills justice; ontologically, by
cooperative response to the intimate presence of God's personal Spirit. In this spirituality
a person does not dwell passively in the truth of God, but becomes mystically bound in
ontic union with God through cooperating in God's action in the world." Roger Haight,
S.J. "Foundational Issues in Jesuit Spirituality." Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits
19/4 (September 1987):. 42.
2. "In its aggressive form the sin of the world corrupts human action by funneling it
into mechanisms that destroy human lives. In a subtle form it undermines the
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1. "The concept of social sin actually began to appear in the 1960s in relation to
questions of racism, poverty, war and peace. A realization dawned: structures
and institutions are not neutral in their make-up or operation but embody values
which reflect those held by the people who constructed them. W hat became
evident through social analysis was their great potential for good or evil. It was
at the 1971 Synod of Bishops that the category of social sin found in earlier
teachings was explicitly debated and written about in the synodal document,
Justice in the world." [From Margaret Ellen Burke, "Social Sin and Social
Grace." The Way Supplement 85 (January 1996): 40.]
2. Article discusses how the reality of social sin can be used in spiritual direction
and pastoral action in discerning and responding to unjust structural situations.
J. "Peter Henriot indicates that social sin refers to: (1) structures that oppress human beings,
violate human dignity, stifle freedom, impose gross inequality; (2) situations that promote
and facilitate individual acts of selfishness; (3) the complicity or silent acquiescence of
persons who do not take responsibility for the evil being done'." (Burke, Social Sin, p. 40)
K. Some stipulative definitions of some of these key terms from Mark O’Keefe:
4. Internalization. “In large measure persons learn their attitudes, values and views
of reality from the societal structures in which they are born.
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L. Yet Josef Fuchs raises some important caveats about an overly simplified usage of the
terminology of “structures of sin”:
1. namely “that we will forget that great inequalities and deep structures of injustice
can have other causes than sinful conduct. Appalling societal conditions can
also be the result of error and ignorance; // they may even be attributed to human
persons who have indeed done what is ethically wrong, but who were acting,
nevertheless, out of fully selfless love.” Josef Fuchs, Moral Demands and
Personal Obligations, (W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1993):
69-70
2. Moreover, Fuchs goes on to recall for us that inasmuch as all are sinners, this
vocabulary of “structures of sin” may also be misleading in another important
way: “W hen one speaks of structures of injustice as structures of sin, one should
not overlook the fact or the possibility that the sin need not lie exclusively on the
side of those who are unaffected by the evil of injustice. Not only the ‘haves’,
but the ‘have-nots’ can be the sinful cause (at least in part) of the existing
structures. In the case of individuals who are in need and in the case of
particular asocial groups, organized peoples, and governments, there exists a
fatalistic lack of concern and care, a lack of willingness to work and to help
themselves, in the expectation that others, the ‘haves’ will come to their aid and
take responsibility for overcoming their situation. Such an attitude and such
conduct can also be sinful in the sense that sin is the cause of deficient structures
not being overcome.” Fuchs, Moral Demands, p. 70.
M. Gregory Baum’s contribution to the theology of social sin (following the analysis of Mark
O’Keefe):
1. First we need to distinguish social sin as defined in terms of its object and its
subject.
2. As defined in terms of “object” social sin would refer to the evil acts of
individuals or groups which affect society. But in terms of “subject” social sin
refers to the community or a collectivity involved in the sin.
N. “Baum proposes that social sin be defined primarily in terms of its subject. Social sin, he
argues, resides in groups and in communities. Further, Baum distinguishes four levels of
social sin:
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1. “First is the level of the injustices and dehumanizing trends built into various
institutions--social, political, economic, religious--which embody people’s
collective life.
2. “Second is the level of the cultural and religious symbols, operative in the
imagination and fostered by society, that legitimate and reinforce the unjust
situations and intensify the harm done to people. These symbolic systems Baum
identifies as ‘ideologies’.
3. “Third is the level of the false consciousness created by these institutions and
ideologies through which people involve themselves collectively in destructive
action. The false consciousness convinces them that their actions are in fact
good. Conversion, as a recovery from the blindness caused by false
consciousness, occurs primarily at this level.
O. However, I would note that “false consciousness” can also operate even in ideologies
which aim at correcting social sin.
2. For example, my former student who said that the “cult of forgiveness” had to be
removed from Christian ethics since it oppressed women. Here the Bible would
have to be the norma normans and critique and correct such an extreme view.
2. And corporate guilt and responsibility that is different that a mere sum of the
individuals involved
Q. Social sin indicates another aspect of sin-solidarity and suggests the presence of social
grace as well. "Leonardo Boff describes social grace as: `the presence of God and God's
love in the world and the corresponding human experience. `This grace is at work socially
and liberatively in all the dimensions of human reality'." (Burke, Social Sin, p. 41).
1. These concepts are frankly in need of much further theological reflection and
refinement. However, it is important to recognize first of all the relation of sin to
oppression:
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alienates a person from God, from neighbor, and from self--is the root of all
oppression. This level presents the primary motivation for moving forward in
the struggle for liberation: gratefulness to God who instills hope in place of
fatalism and despair. Moreover, it expresses human beings' deepest needs, the
need for God's forgiveness and for solidarity with all people united in Christ."
Thomas L. Schubeck, S.J., "Ethics and Liberation Theology," Theological
Studies 56 (1995): 120.
S. In this vein the Responsibility ethics of H. Richard Niebuhr might also be helpful
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5. These ideas might be adapted to respond to sinful structures and social sin in the
light of a community response.
2. Consider the following from the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of
Migrants and Travelers, and Pontifical Council Cor Unum, "Refugees: A
Challenge to Solidarity."
4. Gradualism of the law, tied to ongoing conversion. In this context see Paragraph
#9 of Familiaris Consortio, Pope John Paul II’s Apostolic Exhortation on the
Christian Family, given in 1981, which states the following:
U. Need to develop also a spirituality for social sin and social grace
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4. Spirituality of moral theology: Spirituality for the long haul, to deal with, but
also live through, my own sins and the sins of others, and of the institution, and a
spirituality of discernment and dialogue, growth and liberation, and finally a
spirituality of involvement.
V. Philippine Bishops “Pastoral Spiral” which outlines 7 stages, popularized by the Bishops’
Institute for Social Action (BISA). This comes from Msgr. Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.,
D.D. “Formation in the Social Teaching of the Church.” Landas 6 (1/1992): 3-17. In the
Asian context he suggests using a process model of seven stages:
1. 1) Situationality, which aims to scrutinize the signs of the times and necessitates
an “immersion experience” in order to genuinely know the reality which is being
addressed. In this regard in the Asian context “mere social and structural
analysis is not enough. It has to be complemented by cultural analysis which
would explore the cultural underpinnings of the situation of reality under study.”
p. 8
4. 4) Planning. “Praxis is not haphazard” (p. 9), and so before meaningful and
effective concrete action takes place careful planning must be done.
6. 6) Evaluation, which should occur on two levels–first at the level of the action
itself and second at the level of the entire process of analysis.
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to begin anew.
W. This practical approach echoes some of the same basic concerns brought forward by
James M. Gustafson in his “Varieties of Moral Discourse” treated at the beginning of the
course text.
A. Keep in mind that as a sacrament this one probably has the greatest amount of
development over time, as well as changes in the basic understandings of what the
sacrament entailed. (Go back and look at some of the points made about sin and penance
in the history section).
b. Yet this system had many problems, perhaps chief among them the
“one-time” availability of the sacrament, plus the heavy and public
nature of the penances imposed.
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B. Biblical passages
a. Lost sheep
b. Lost Drachma
2. Romans 15
C. Understanding of Conversion
a. Baptism
b. Reconciliation
a. Sanctifying
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b. Actual
3. Recognition and acceptance that no one, not the pastor, nor the moral theologian,
nor even the Pope, will have the complete and final definitive word which will
make all these issues crystal clear.
a. Don't be afraid of asking for advice, telling people, "Let me pray over
that and I'll get back to you.”
a. St. Alphonsus Liguori taught "that confessors should not unsettle the
good conscience of penitents by referring to law, whether natural law or
merely Church or state law, when he can foresee that the penitent
cannot truly interiorize this law or precept." [Bernard Häring, Free and
Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, Volume I:
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c. Thus, a need for great pastoral sensitivity to where the person is here
and now, and what God is enabling this person to do in response to
God's grace.
6. W e are still a pilgrim church, an ecclesia semper reformanda (the Church always
[in need of] being reformed).
A. Bibliography
5. Josef Fuchs, S.J., "Human Authority--between the Sacral and the Secular."
Chapter 7 in Id. Christian Ethics in a Secular Arena, 100-113. Translated by
Bernard Hoose and Brian McNeil. W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, and Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984.
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(1995): 627-651.
7. Quinn, Archbishop John. The Reform of the Papacy: The Costly Call to
Christian Unity. Ut Unum Sint: Studies on Papal Primacy. New York:
Crossroad, 1999.
8. Paul Ramsey, Who Speaks for the Church? Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967.
9. Fagan, Gerald M, S.J. Fidelity in the Church–Then and Now. Studies in the
Spirituality of Jesuits 31 (May 1999).
C. How does the Spirit aid the whole Church to reach the “splendor of the truth” of which
Veritatis Splendor speaks? Here authority can play a positive role, but we must admit
also that there are dangers when authority slips into authoritarianism. A recent unsigned
editorial in The Tablet articulates a potential abuse of authority in these words: “There is
a flawed circular argument behind much of the Vatican’s efforts to police theological
discussion in the Catholic Church at present. Disciple is used to produce a spurious sense
of consensus. Then the existence of the consensus is cited as evidence of the settled
position of the Church. And thus those who speak against that settled position are
accused of disagreeing with a teaching that has the Church’s authority behind it. But this
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is just an exercise in tautology. It convinces nobody. The only consensus that matters is
one that emerges after free and exhaustive debate, without any attempt to silence those
holding different opinions. Only thus can the Holy Spirit be seen to have the time and
space in which to work.” “Freedom to Disagree,” The Tablet (14 July 2001): 1007.
D. Theologically this understanding of fidelity to the Spirit within the Church community is
grounded in the fact that God’s Revelation is addressed to the whole communion of the
People of God (one of the key Vatican II images of the Church). W hile it is true that in
the past Revelation often has been understood as primarily a collection of doctrinal
statements formulated in propositional terms which call for the “assent” of the believers,
we should keep in mind that Vatican II teaching (cf. Dei verbum) understands Revelation
as “first of all an invitation to all people to enter into communion with the triune God.
Revelation is not primarily a body of knowledge or a series of truths communicated by
those with the authority to teach. It is an encounter with God, a self-disclosure of himself
to all and an invitation to a personal relationship of love. Faith is not primarily an assent
to truths, but a response of trust and commitment to God.” Fagan, Fidelity in the
Church–Then and Now, p.11.
E. Therefore, in the same vein we need to avoid a sharp dichotomy between the “teaching”
Church (e.g., the hierarchical Magisterium) and the “learning” Church (i.e., everyone
else). Neither the true nature of the Church, nor the nature of knowledge itself could
support such a sharp separation (even if it be true that a pre-Vatican II understanding of
Church teaching and authority would seem to move in that direction). As Charles Curran
has observed, “The total church and all its members are involved in teaching and learning
the theory and practice of the moral life. The Holy Spirit guides the church in this
mission, and every individual Christian through baptism shares in the threefold office of
Jesus as priest, teacher, and ruler.” Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition, p. 197.
F. In the same vein, the response, assent, and commitment of the whole Church community,
as expressed as the sensus fidelium will be a (and not the sole) key principle of
verification of the truth of the teaching as guaranteed by the presence of the Holy Spirit in
the Church.
G. The positive role of Spirit-filled sensus fidelium is expressed in this way by Joseph
Cardinal Ratzinger: “In the process of assimilating what is really rational and rejecting
what only seems to be rational, the whole Church has to play a part. This process cannot
be carried out in every detail by an isolated Magisterium, with oracular infallibility. The
life and suffering of Christians who profess their faith in the midst of their times has just
as important a part to play as the thinking and questioning of the learned, which would
have a very hollow ring without the backing of Christian existence, which learns to
discern spirits in the travail of everyday life.” Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger. "Magisterium of
the Church, Faith, Morality,” in Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2, ed. Charles E.
Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980):186. (German
original: "Kirchliches Lehramt, Glaube, Moral." In Ratzinger, Joseph, Hrsg. Prinzipien
Christlicher Moral, 41-66. Einsiedeln, 1975.)
H. Foundational concept of the munus as a function and office in service to the Church, and
not to be seen as some sort of “upper class” or special prerogative.
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J. Note the reality of power and institution which necessarily functions in any human
exercise of authority. It would be naive to expect of even desire a society or institution
without “authority” institutionalized in some fashion or other. Here, too, it is important to
be aware of the American ethos of “democracy” as being somehow the highest, or an
absolute, moral principle. Pay attention also to the cultural groundings of authority: e.g.
monarchical, aristocratic, oligarchic, "democratic,” as well as the theological paradigms
which frame and interpret the Magisterium, such as the juridical office vs. the charism of
office among the People of God. Recall here the debate at the Council over the sequence
of the chapters contained in Lumen gentium: the Church as People of God comes before
the chapter on the Church is hierarchical. Boyle's book is helpful here.
1. The key texts, I would argue, are not the Petrine “privilege” texts, but rather
those which center on the role of the Holy Spirit within the Church. Thus, recall
the role of the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete according to Jesus in John's Gospel:
b. John 14:26 (the Teacher): “But the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the
Father will send in my name, will teach you everything, and remind you
of all that I have said to you.” [NRSV]
c. John 16: 7-15 (Progressive Revealer): “Nevertheless I tell you the truth:
it is to your advantage that I go away, for if I do not go away, the
Advocate will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you. 8 And
when he comes, he will prove the world wrong about sin and
righteousness and judgment: 9 about sin, because they do not believe in
me; 10 about righteousness, because I am going to the Father and you
will see me no longer; 11 about judgment, because the ruler of this world
has been condemned. 12 “I still have many things to say to you, but you
cannot bear them now. 13 W hen the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide
you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak
whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come.
14 He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and declare it to
you. 15 All that the Father has is mine. For this reason I said that he will
take what is mine and declare it to you. [NRSV]
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3. Matthew 16:14–19
They replied, "Some say John the Baptist; others say Elijah; and still others,
Jeremiah or one of the prophets." "But what about you?" he asked. "W ho do you
say I am?" Simon Peter answered, "You are the Christ, the Son of the living
God." Jesus replied, "Blessed are you, Simon son of Jonah, for this was not
revealed to you by man, but by my Father in heaven. And I tell you that you are
Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not
overcome it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatever you
bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be
loosed in heaven."
4. Gloss on Matthew 16
c. Peter may have been chosen, but he does not stand alone as the solitary
apostle. The New Testament, especially Acts and the Pauline corpus
gives ample evidence of the crucial need for Paul and the others to
complement, augment, and even to correct Peter.
5. Other views on authority: e.g. Mark 10:35-45 (request of James and John to be
seated on Jesus' right and left hand). Here we can see the Christian authority vs.
"worldly" concept of authority: The Christian notion of authority as service, and
thus we could say that this notion has a "sacred claim" and functions as a canon-
within-the-canon corrective.
6. Pastoral Epistles
a. 1 Tim 4:16 W atch your life and doctrine closely. Persevere in them,
because if you do, you will save both yourself and your hearers. (NIV)
b. 2 Tim 4:3 For the time will come when men will not put up with sound
doctrine. Instead, to suit their own desires, they will gather around them
a great number of teachers to say what their itching ears want to hear.
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(NIV)
c. Titus 1:9 He must hold firmly to the trustworthy message as it has been
taught, so that he can encourage others by sound doctrine and refute
those who oppose it. (NIV)
d. Titus 2:1 You must teach what is in accord with sound doctrine. (NIV)
4. E.g., being a “vicar of Christ” in these sense of somehow being “Christ on earth”
1. "Here, it is not so much the person as such, who has the // authority and therefore
can act authoritatively, who is the central concern, but more importantly it is the
function of this person in society, in the service of this society, and made
necessary by the society itself. Thus the person is more servant than lord; he must
carry out the required function and is thereby implicitly the servant of the
creator." pp. 103-104.
2. In this view, the “vicar of Christ” is seen primarily as the servant of Christ (e.g.
Servus servorum [Servant of servants] and/or Primus inter pares [First among
equals]).
3. Implicit relation here of duty to learn first if one is to teach. This presumes that
one could function well or poorly, and that to function well, one must actively
train oneself, not by being "authoritarian" but by informing oneself so that one
can speak "with authority." Thus, in this vein Fuchs continues, "The one who
carries out this function--precisely because he carries it out, and inasmuch as he
carries it out--has the corresponding authority, in the representation of God.
Hence it is not because someone has attained authority that he can make
ordinances, but rather the other way around: inasmuch as someone has to carry
out the function of authority, he has also the corresponding authority. Thus, the
one-sidedly sacral character of the person who bears the authority disappears." p.
104.
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1. Contribution from Sandra Schneiders' The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New
Testament as Sacred Scripture. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991.
3. "In the first class would be all exercises of authority that are finally coercive,
covering a range from the quasi-violence of the command given by a lethally
armed assailant to the self-evidence of a mathematical axiom. In such cases, to
hear the address is to recognize the absolute necessity, for the sake of physical or
intellectually self-preservation, of responding with compliance or assent or both."
[Schneiders, p. 55.]
a. "In this case the address of authority never fully transcends its character
of appeal." [Schneiders, p.56].
b. "In this category are such appeals as the claim of the beautiful to
aesthetic response, the claim of a suffering human being to compassion,
the claim of a parent to filial piety, the claim of a loving rebuke of a true
friend to a hearing and even to a response of repentance and
conversion,..." p. 56.
6. Some tension and confusion over when, where, and how the Magisterium is
invoking its claim of "authority."
7. And I would add that even those “marginalized” from institutional authority often
seek for themselves “coercive” rather than “dialogical” authority, i.e., to replace
the current institutional authority with “their” institutional authority. This is part
of the human condition it seems! And thus we all need a “conversion” to
“dialogical” authority.
8. In this same vein Schneiders notes further that "Because of our natural human
preference for certitude, we spontaneously tend to think that coercive, or at least
evidential, authority is the primary analogue. Such is not the case. True personal
authority is of the second type. This is the type of authority that God exercises
towards humans." [Schneiders, p. 57.]
D. Need for two-way magisterial listening. By this I mean it would be misleading to divide
the Church into two groups, the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens. Rather, these
two terms should interact with one another in a dialogical fashion. I think that a Cardinal
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Ratzinger should be open and listen to a Margaret Farley, but that a Margaret Farley
should also be open and listen to a Cardinal Ratzinger. Probably paradigms in both the
official Magisterium and the theological academy need to shift a bit before this need I’ve
articulated becomes a reality.
B. This charism is related primarily to the interpretation of Revelation, and teachings which
draw on Revelation in some way. As Joseph Selling expresses it, “In preserving the
integrity of the faith, the magisterium exercises an authority which is proportionate to the
seriousness of what is needed to achieve that preservation. This may involve drawing
conclusions from the content of revelation that would appear to be coherently and
integrally connected with that content, such as the teachings about Mary, theotokos, the
Mother of God. It would also include condemning those things that are inimical to the
faith, such as the doctrine of predestination or the idea that human souls preexist real
persons.” Selling, “Magisterial Authority and the Natural Law,” Doctrine and Life 47
(August 1997): 340.
C. In terms of morality though, the Roman Catholic Magisterium for the most part has relied
not so much on biblical “warrants” for ethical positions, as it has on the natural law, which
the Magisterium holds as a sort of “natural morality”--knowable to all people. In principle
there is little debate among Roman Catholic moralists about this basic approach (though
many Protestant ethicians would disagree with this natural law approach).
D. Among Catholics, however, “The question about the content of this ‘natural morality’,
however, is something quite different. It admits of many levels, all of // which are mapped
out according to their relation to revelation. Thus, when the magisterium teaches
something that is closely connected to revelation, such as the wrongness of engaging in
adulterous behaviour or the need to periodically worship and give thanks to God, it is on
very solid ground and should be attended to as such. W hen it teaches about something that
is only remotely related to revelation, its ‘authority’ is proportionately relevant and may
carry lesser weight, as, when it may voice an opinion about something like political
structures or monetary policy.” Selling, “Magisterial Authority,” pp. 340-341.
E. In contemporary applied moral theology, the Church has recently made the claim on
numerous occasions to be an "expert in humanity":
1. E.g., refer to John Paul II’s Sollictudo Rei Socialis, no. 41, which in turn is a
reference to Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio, 42
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this nature and its meaning have been revealed by Christ, the individual person
and his or her sexuality also stand illumined. As the one to whom this revelation
is entrusted, the Church regards herself as an `expert in humanity' and is qualified
to speak accordingly." John S. Grabowski and Michael J. Naughton, "Catholic
Social and Sexual Ethics: Inconsistent or Organic?" The Thomist 57 (1993): 577.
G. It is important not to overlook how the Magisterium itself recognizes that even its
“expertise” has methodological limits, as noted in the section on moral norms. The point
bears repeating here: Pope Paul VI stated in his social encyclical Octogesima Adveniens,
“”in the face of such widely varying situations it is difficult for us to utter a unified
message and to put forward a solution which has universal validity. Such is not our
ambition nor is it our mission.” (OA #4).
H. Keep in mind too the important principle of subsidiarity, which was articulated well by
Pius XI in his social encyclical Quadragesimo anno: “It is a fundamental principle of
social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals
and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and
industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of
right order, to transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be
performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as eery social
activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should
never destroy or absorb them” (QA #79). This same principle has been re-affirmed by
Pope John XXIII in his social encyclical Mater et magistra, who spoke of the “guiding
principle of subsidiary function” (MM #53); by Pope John Paul II in Centesimus Annus,
who stated “the principle of subsidiarity must be respected. A community of a higher
order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving
the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate
its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common
good.” (CA #48); and in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC 1894).
I. A note on the claims and limits of infallibility: As Archbishop John Quinn puts it:
“Infallibility does not guarantee that a papal definition is prudent, wise, or timely. It does
not guarantee that the arguments used to support the definition are cogent or even correct.
The prerogative of infallibility guarantees only that what is defined is true.” Quinn, The
Reform of the Papacy: The Costly Call to Christian Unity, pp. 49-50.
J. Quinn goes on to underscore the important distinction between divine assistance and
“inspiration”: “Catholic doctrine holds that papal infallibility occurs through divine
assistance, not through inspiration. This means that papal infallibility does not come about
because the Pope receives some kind of supernatural illumination or vision or that he has
some personal endowments of insight or intuition not given to others. Papal infallibility
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comes about through the Providence of God over the Church, which means that the Pope
must take all the humanly available means to discover the truth and is obligated to weigh
the prudence of proceeding to a definition.” pp. 50-51.
K. Regrettably, Quinn continues, “the definition of papal infallibility, the reverence for and
focus on the person of the Pope, and increasingly strong centralization by the Vatican have
all tended to expand the idea of divine assistance into a kind of continuing divine
inspiration. This mystique, which has come to surround and engulf the Pope especially
since the nineteenth century, creates a deep psychological barrier to speaking in critical
terms about policies, declarations, or actions of the Pope.” p. 51.
1. Potential for Abuses is clear, however, we need to see clearly how non-
magisterial authorities also function, e.g., the concept of "political correctness"
which creates its own canon and modes of enforcement of orthodoxy.
2. Consider the following caution raised by the Nobel Prize winner novelist, Saul
Bellow: "P.C. [Political Correctness] is really a serious threat to political health,
because where there is free speech without any debate what you have is a
corruption of free speech, which very quickly becomes demagogy. People in
general in this country have lost the habit of debating questions. TV does it for
them. People hold opinions, but the opinions are not derived from either thought
or discussion. They are just acquired, as an adjunct, a confirmation of the
progressive status of the person who holds these opinions--as an ornament, a
decoration. It's like those Russian generals, their chests covered with medals.
People wear these opinions like medals." [As quoted in "Mr. Bellow's Planet" in
the "Talk of the Talk" section of The New Yorker 23 May 1994): 35].
1. Recognition and acceptance of the charism of office and the concomitant aid of
the Holy Spirit. But this office and gift are still received and exercised in a
human way. In this vein recall the scholastic axiom, Quidquid recipitur ad
modum recipientis recipitur {One receives according to his or her own mode of
reception. Thus, there can be no "magical" moral Magisterium, and this may well
be perhaps the strongest heresy to combat.
2. Therefore, along we Josef Fuchs we can agree that "with regard to the teaching
office of the church, that it can have knowledge of morality--despite the support
of the Spirit--only via the conscience of men, or by recourse to such insights. The
teaching office, like the individual, has no direct access to God and to his `divine
law'; from this point of view, it belongs to the realm of divine wisdom which is
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1. Theological significance as "charisms": There are many gifts (coming from the
Spirit), but always it is the Spirit which is one and therefore the source and ground
of unity (which is not to be misconstrued as uniformity). This theological aspect
then puts a greater importance on the genuine discernment of spirits as a moral
task (and a task for moral theology as well). Life according to the spirit becomes
not only the ultimate organizing principle of Christian life, but also the principal
criterion of verification of the authenticity of that life. In order to be open and
receptive to the many gifts of the Spirit we should be wary of eclipsing and/or
neglecting other charisms, which as charisms come from the Spirit, are gifts to the
whole Church, and thus have their own "authority." In this view then the charism
of “authority” is not limited to the charism of the office of the magisterium.
2. Consider the insight from George Tavard, who speaks to the question of
interpretation of Tradition, but whose basic remarks can be applied to the moral
Magisterium as well. Tavard notes that "the Spirit alone is, in final analysis, the
absolute criterion of the Christian faith, and therefore of tradition, and therefore of
the emergence of tradition through the interpretation of the past by theologians or
by the Magisterium of the churches. And the only criterion of this faith and of
this tradition which is at the same time practical, proximate, and ascertainable is
the moral unanimity of the disciples: by this we know that the Spirit has shown
himself. This entails no negative conclusion concerning the Magisterium and its
intrinsic authority. It requires, however, that the Magisterium be set in the
context of the catholicity, the unanimity, the collegiality, the conciliarity, the
sobornost, of the church and the manifestation of this consensus in the sensus
fidelium." [From George Tavard, "Tradition in Theology: A Problematic
Approach," in Robert M. Grant, et. al., Perspectives on Scripture and Tradition,
ed. Joseph F. Kelly, (Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, 1976): 103]
1. Cf. Mahoney's important point about the proper translation of the Tridentine
phrase de fide vel moribus: i.e., "morals" here might be better translated as
"mores" or "customs" (such as liturgical practices).
a. "Nevertheless, the Magisterium does not deduce these truths from the
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faith: it knows them from the exercise of the practical reason that is
enlightened by the faith. Such truths therefore lie outside the realm of
infallibility.
c. "But since such ethical teaching directives have come into being in the
community of the Holy Spirit, and since they have been proposed by the
office-bearers who are called to lead this community and are therefore
assisted by the Spirit, they have a great significance in the church, and
the spirit of fidelity that is required in the church obliges one to be
receptive to them in the internal discourse that is the formation of
conscience, and to give them a certain preference over other
considerations--even one's own. This receptivity is required by the
responsible conscience itself." [Fuchs, Moral Demands, p. 165.]
4. The above points come from Fuchs' "`W hoever hears you hears me': episcopal
moral instruction." Theology Digest 41 (1994): 3-7. [English digest of "`W er
euch hört, der hört mich': Bischöfliche Moralweisungen." Stimmen der Zeit 117
(1992): 723-731.] The article briefly highlights instances where both individual
bishops and different bishops' conferences have issued position statements on a
particular issue, such as PVS, which are not in agreement with one another.
5. Most would agree that it would be an improper role of the moral Magisterium
would be direct intervention and exaggerated specification of the concrete
demands of the moral life. Several official Church texts would support this view
as well.
6. This would then be functioning like a superego or parent, and thus preventing or
impeding the development of moral maturity, as well as an instance of improper
ecclesiology. W e need to reflect on our understanding of the "Church" and its
place in the "world"? In this vein, consider the following from Josef Fuchs: "The
wish--indeed, the demand--is often expressed by a certain type of believer that the
Magisterium of the church intervene with an authoritative word to bring fresh
certainty, or at least a little more certainty, regarding the rightness or wrongness
of certain acts and behavior in the human world, from a moral point of view.
Such a desire or demand would surely be erroneous if one wished to view the
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8. In this same context, keep in mind the point made earlier regarding the
Magisterium’s own recognition of its limitations in speaking about concrete moral
matters: pronouncements cannot be given for every issue and problem which will
have universal validity. (Cf., Pope Paul VI Octogesima Adveniens, #4).
9. Finally, we should recall the basic position of good moral discourse: the 6 C's. In
this vein, Fuchs makes an important point: “Further, since the concrete norms of
conduct are derived from the practical reason illumined by faith, rather than from
the Christian faith itself (and hence are universal in principle), the Magisterium in
its invitation to fidelity should attempt cautiously and persuasively, to make clear
to those who are willing to follow, that such norms are reasonable. They are not
based on a theologically unjustifiable use of scripture, a particular distorting
ideology, a naturalistic fallacy, or an excessively juridical understanding of the
Magisterium (for example, that one must always follow the teaching of one's own
bishop, and not the teaching of another bishop, which may in particular
circumstances be different). Rather, such norms are based on reasons that are
generally plausible and capable of being communicated to others." [Fuchs, Moral
Demands, p. 167].
2. Notion of infallibility is carefully “limited” and “nuanced” in both canon law and
the conciliar documents of both Vatican I and Vatican II (worth rereading the
relevant documents, such as Pastor Aeternus)
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3. The assistance of the Holy Spirit facilitates the need for the Magisterium to
investigate, study, and learn
4. As Josef Fuchs observes, "If one wishes to give moral instructions and teachings
concerning such human realities, inasmuch as they are human, one must acquire
sufficient competence, receiving information from others who are more
competent." Fuchs, "Morality: Persons and Acts," in id. Christian Morality, p.
115.
5. Only a magical "sacral" view of authority would exempt one from such study and
investigation.
A. W ill follow here Archbishop W illiam Levada, who was installed, on 22 September 1986,
as archbishop of Portland, Oregon, and then in 1995 was named Co-adjutor Archbishop of
San Francisco to succeed John Quinn, whom he succeeded as Archbishop in 1996. He was
then named Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 2005 and raised to
the rank of Cardinal by Pope Benedict XVI. Levada was a former member of the
Congregation of the Doctrine for the Faith, and very involved in the drafting and
promulgation of the Catechism of the Catholic Church. He has his STD from the
Gregorian, and did his dissertation under Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., entitled, Infallible
Church Magisterium and the Natural Law. Excerpta ex dissertatione ad Doctoratum in
Facultate Theologiae Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae. Rome: Pontifical Gregorian
Press, 1971.
B. Levada writes that the "...traditional doctrine of infallibility as defined in Vatican I and
explained in ecclesiology: infallibility (considered from the aspect of its object) refers in
general to those statements which are taught as definitive and to be held by all the faithful
in the Church; such definitions are irreformable in the sense that they do not admit of
subsequent contradictory teaching or practice; such definitions are true in the sense that
they correspond to objective Church tradition, and do not merely represent temporary
symbols of faith." [Levada, Infallible Church Magisterium and the Natural Law, p. 75.]
C. Scope of infallibility
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areas
b. Infallible Magisterium
2. "W hen one examines the traditional theological teaching about the secondary
object, one remarks that natural law is not traditionally included within this
category. Even though there is nothing to prevent a council or a pope from
extending this secondary object to questions of the natural moral law from the
point of view of their authority to do so, nevertheless the `prudential' certitude
which characterizes the non-scriptural norms of the natural law argues against
such an extension of this secondary object to include an infallible definition of
this sort." [Levada, p. 78].
3. Accepts the competence of the infallible Magisterium , in the restricted sense "on
the level of transcendental values; when we turn to the level of categorical norms,
on the other hand, we cannot ignore the essential autonomy of the rational process
of human discovery of the natural moral law. And the nature of this moral
autonomy, considered in all its aspects, gives us the ultimate reason why we
should not understand it to fall within the traditional categories of primary or
secondary object of infallibility." [Levada, p. 79].
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"Among the more important duties of bishops that of preaching the Gospel has pride of
place. For the bishops are heralds of the faith, who draw new disciples to Christ; they are
authentic teachers, that is, teachers endowed with the authority of Christ, who preach the
faith to the people assigned to them, the faith which is destined to inform their thinking and
their conduct; and under the light of the Holy Spirit they make that faith shine forth,
drawing from the storehouse of revelation new things and old (cf. Mt. 13:52); they make it
bear fruit and with watchfulness they ward off what errors threaten their flock (cf. 2 Tim.
4:14). Bishops who teach in communion with the Roman Pontiff are to be revered by all as
witnesses of divine and Catholic truth; the faithful, for their part, are obliged to submit to
their bishops' decision, made in the name of Christ, in matters of faith and morals, and to
adhere to it with a ready and respectful allegiance of mind. This loyal submission of the
will and intellect must be given, in a special way, to the authentic teaching authority of the
Roman Pontiff, even when he does not speak ex cathedra in such wise, indeed, that his
supreme teaching authority be acknowledged with respect, and sincere assent be given to
decisions made by him, conformably with his manifest mind and intention, which is made
known principally either by the character of the documents in question, or by the frequency
with which a certain doctrine is proposed, or by the manner in which the doctrine is
formulated. Although the bishops, taken individually, do not enjoy the privilege of
infallibility, they do, however, proclaim infallibly the doctrine of Christ on the following
conditions: namely, when, even though dispersed throughout the world but preserving for
all that amongst themselves and with Peter's successor the bond of communion, in their
authoritative teaching concerning matters of faith and morals, they are in agreement that a
particular teaching is to be held definitively and absolutely. This is still more clearly the
case when, assembled in an ecumenical council, they are, for the universal Church,
teachers of the judges in matters of faith and morals, whose decisions must be adhered to
with the loyal and obedient assent of faith. This infallibility, however, with which the
divine redeemer wished to endow his Church in defining doctrine pertaining to faith and
morals, is co-extensive with the deposit of revelation, which must be religiously guarded
and loyally and courageously expounded. The Roman Pontiff, head of the college of
bishops, enjoys this infallibility in virtue of his office, when, as supreme pastor and teacher
of all the faithful--who confirms his brethren in the faith (cf. Lk. 22:32)--he proclaims in an
absolute decision a doctrine pertaining to faith or morals. For that reason his definitions
are rightly said to be irreformable by their very nature and not by reason of the assent of
the Church, in as much as they were made with the assistance of the Holy Spirit promised
to him in the person of blessed Peter himself; and as a consequence they are in no way in
need of the approval of others, and do not admit of appeal to any other tribunal. For in
such a case the Roman Pontiff does not utter a pronouncement as a private person, but
rather does he expound and defend the teaching of the Catholic faith as the supreme
teacher of the universal Church, in whom the Church's charism of infallibility is present in
a singular way. The infallibility promised to the Church is also present in the body of
bishops when, together with Peter's successors, they exercise the supreme teaching office.
Now the assent of the Church can never be lacking to such definitions on account of the
same Holy Spirit's influence, through which Christ's whole flock is maintained in the unity
of faith and makes progress in it. Furthermore, when the Roman Pontiff, or the body of
bishops together with him, define a doctrine, they make the definition in conformity with
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revelation itself, to which all are bound to adhere and to which they are obliged to submit;
and this revelation is transmitted integrally either in written form or in oral tradition
through the legitimate succession of bishops and above all through the watchful concern of
the Roman Pontiff himself; and through the light of the Spirit of truth it is scrupulously
preserved in the Church and unerringly explained. The Roman Pontiff and the bishops, by
reason of their office and the seriousness of the matter, apply themselves with zeal to the
work of enquiring by every suitable means into this revelation and of giving apt expression
to its contents; they do not, however, admit any new public revelation as pertaining to the
divine deposit of faith." [Flannery, Documents of Vatican II]
C. W e should keep in mind as well that there are various interpretations of what the key term
“obsequium religiosum” ("religious submission of the will") means, both coming out of
Lumen Gentium itself as well as subsequent documents such as the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith Document, Donum Veritatis, on "The Ecclesial Vocation of the
Theologian" (1990); and Pope John Paul II’s encyclical on fundamental moral theology,
Veritatis Splendor (6 August 1993).
D. For some helpful analyses look at some of the commentaries on Vatican II documents for
keys to interpretation, as well as the writings of key theologians. One very respected
individual who has written extensively on this area is the former Gregorian University
professor, Francis Sullivan, S.J. See especially the following works:
1. His book: Magisterium: Teaching Authority in the Catholic Church. Dublin: Gill
and Macmillan, 1983.
2. and in his article, "The Theologian's Ecclesial Vocation and the 1990 CDF
Instruction." Theological Studies 52 (1991): 51-68.
E. See also Charles Curran’s brief treatment in his The Catholic Moral Tradition Today, pp.
208-209, for some important historical background to interpreting this term.
F. Sullivan notes the following in regards to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s
reference made in Donum Veritatis, on "The Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian" to
obsequium religiosum as "`fundamental openness loyally to accept the teaching of the
Magisterium'.
1. W hat is crucial here is that obsequium is not identified with assent as such, but
with a fundamental willingness to submit to the authority of the Magisterium and
an openness to its teaching, attitudes which can very well persist in a theologian
who finds he cannot give his intellectual assent to a particular proposition that has
been taught by this same Magisterium." p. 62. [Here Sullivan references Avery
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Dulles' own article "Question of Dissent" published in The Tablet (p. 1033)]:
2. ‘I [i.e. Dulles] would say that the CDF rules out strident public dissent and
recourse to the media to foment opposition in the church, but that it acknowledges
the value of discreet and constructive criticism of authoritative documents. The
instruction does not seem to me to forbid the airing of such criticisms in scholarly
journals, theological conferences, classroom situations and other appropriate
forums. W hat the authorities do not forbid is, I take it, still permitted.’ [p. 65 in
Sullivan’s Theological Studies article]
G. I [i.e., JTB] would add that this point echoes the well-known hermeneutical principle in
canon law that strictures are interpreted narrowly and favors are interpreted broadly: Odia
restringi, et favores convenit ampliari which means that burdens (odious things) are to be
restricted, and favors (privileges) are to be multiplied (or extended). This principle of
canon law interpretation holds that burdens or strictures are to be interpreted in a narrow
sense of application, while on the other hand favors are to be widely applied. See the Code
of Canon Law CIC #18 for the canon which gives this principle of strict interpretation in
regards to laws which establish either a restriction of rights or impose a penalty. Yet, we
have to be honest in admitting that a “reading” of some current cases involving theologians
and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith might lead to a less sanguine view on
the “reality” of what is “permitted” or tolerated!
H. Consider also the view of Richard McCormick, speaking of nuancing the response to
Lumen Gentium #25, the obsequium religiosum (religious submission of the will): “I
suggest that the proper response is not obedience. Obedience is appropriate when orders
are involved. But teaching should not be conceived in this way--and if it is, it shows that
we have over juridicised the search for truth. Rather, the proper response is first a docility
of mind and will, a cast of mind and bent of will open and eager to make the wisdom of the
teacher one's own, a desire to surmount the privacy and limitation of one's own views to
enjoy the wisdom of broader perspectives. It is, in brief, a desire to assimilate the
teaching.” Richard McCormick, "The Teaching Office as a Guarantor of Unity in
Morality." Concilium 150 (1981): 79.
I. Recall the important point of the different cultural understandings of what “authority” and
"dissent" are, and what their effects are: E.g., as a means of dialogue and common search
for the fullness of the truth, or an "attack" on the Church and its legitimate authority
figures? Cultural context will have a big part to play here in determining what role dissent
itself plays. E.g., is obedience to authority seen as a sine qua non for loyalty and
membership in the Church, or is questioning of authority seen as a necessary part of growth
and assertion of legitimate independence? Either of these above two positions, if
absolutized, would be problematic.
J. In the American context, consider the following observations of George B. W ilson, S.J.
who suggests that “dissent” is really the wrong concept to use in referring to contemporary,
well-educated, adult Catholics in their attempts to dialogue and agree and/or disagree with
magisterial teaching. “Adults don’t ‘dissent’; they discuss and deliberate and converse and
dialogue. Yes, and argue. Sometimes they come to agreement and arrive at a common
position; sometimes they are unable to. In the New Testament it appears that Paul and
Barnabas never did resolve their differences; they just agree to work in different patches of
the vineyard. Talk of dissent, by contrast, implies a prior that some definitive position has
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been arrived at. The question has been answered and the case closed–which, of course,
may be the very point the adult participant finds unconvincing. In church usage the
concept of dissent brings with it a note of moral failure. Those who dissent are viewed, not
simply as disagreeing with the orthodox position, not even as being objectively wrong.
They are view as being morally deficient, having a sort of virus that must be either
controlled or perhaps even eradicated lest it contaminate others.” p. 9. “One final
consideration colors the understanding of the question we started with: W hat is really
going on here? It is the church’s lust for the idol of certitude.” p. 10. [Quotes taken from
George B. W ilson, S.J. “‘Dissent’ or Conversation Among Adults?” America 180 (13
March 1999): 8-10; 12].
2. "Divine law and eternal law are nothing other than an interpretation of natural
moral law (A. Auer)." p. 490.
3. "Nonetheless, the Magisterium also has no `direct' access to the divine, eternal
law, and is thus dependent on human moral knowledge. Correspondingly, it must
be evident that we must arrive at knowledge of the divine law both with the aid of
the Magisterium and also of other teaching as well as by mutual exchange." p.
490.
4. "This is echoed in the statement of Lumen gentium 25 to the effect that the
infallibility of the Magisterium (and hence, no doubt, also the Magisterium itself)
restricts itself to the same limits as those of divine revelation, and thus does not
extend to the whole area of what is morally right. The field of what is morally
right in behavior in the world requires, especially according to Gaudium et spes
and Apostolicam actuositatem, an immense degree of specialized knowledge,
which we can certainly not derive from revelation. W hat is more, as Bishop
Gasser explained in the Relatio he delivered Vatican I, the ethical principles of
natural law are not entirely in the sphere of the doctrine of faith, which is the sole
object of the Magisterium of the Church." p. 495.
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c. "If, in a given but rare instance, it happens in time that some aspect of
that authentic teaching [of the Magisterium] is not completely true, it still
remains here and now a true guide for action, that this is what the Holy
Spirit wants by directing, that is assisting, as a norm for action at this
time. The only way for genuine dissent in theory and practice to be
legitimate is to accept and adopt an illegitimate ecclesiology which not
only changes but also contradicts the teachings of Vatican II about the
nature of sacred and certain Catholic teaching and the very nature of the
Church (LG 25; DV 7-10).
2. Germain Grisez
b. The Way of the Lord Jesus. Volume One: Christian Moral Principles.
Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983.
c. "But we believe that our Lord teaches in and through the Church and
gives us the word of the Father. Hence, our submission to the Church's
teaching is not submission to mere human opinions, but to the very word
of God (see 1 Thes 2.13)." p. 570.
b. Referring to the above quote from Grisez: "It would seem, then, that
Grisez advocates obedience to the pope or bishop even when the pope or
bishop is wrong. If we carry that to its logical conclusion, we find that,
according to Grisez, a person should conform with official teaching even
when his or her conscience dictates otherwise." [Hoose,
Proportionalism: The American Debate and its European Roots,
(W ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987): 112.]
c. "W hat I wish to point out is the fact that Grisez, in holding that Catholics
should always obey the moral teaching of the Magisterium, even when
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d. It would seem that rightness for him is dependent upon the fulfilment of
certain basic goods, except where such fulfilment would conflict with the
will of God as expressed through the Magisterium of the Roman
Catholic Church." [Hoose, "Proportionalists, Deontologists and the
Human Good." The Heythrop Journal 33 (1992): 184].
B. In this last vein, see Maureen Fiedler and Linda Rabben, eds. Rome Has Spoken: A Guide
to Forgotten Papal Statements and How They Have Changed through the Centuries. New
York: Crossroad, 1998.
C. The Magisterium, as is true for all Christians stand under (and not above) the truth
1. Difficult to suppose, even with the charism of office, that one, or one group, can
fully know the truth
W hen Peter came to Antioch, I opposed him to his face, because he was clearly in
the wrong. Before certain men came from James, he used to eat with the Gentiles.
But when they arrived, he began to draw back and separate himself from the
Gentiles because he was afraid of those who belonged to the circumcision group.
The other Jews joined him in his hypocrisy, so that by their hypocrisy even
Barnabas was led astray. W hen I saw that they were not acting in line with the
truth of the gospel, I said to Peter in front of them all, "You are a Jew, yet you live
like a Gentile and not like a Jew. How is it, then, that you force Gentiles to follow
Jewish customs?” W e who are Jews by birth and not `Gentile sinners' know that a
man is not justified by observing the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ. So we, too,
have put our faith in Christ Jesus that we may be justified by faith in Christ and
not by observing the law, because by observing the law no one will be justified.
3. Source criticism
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4. Hermeneutics
b. Frequent repetition
a. Magisterial positivism
b. Magisterial cynicism
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2. Overall premise of hierarchy of truths necessary for salvation, this refers more to
the character of the teaching itself.
2. Conciliar teachings
3. Papal Encyclicals
a. Dogmatic
b. Hortatory
5. Apostolic Constitutions
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b. W ednesday audience
a. with papal approbation in which the pope explicitly takes over and makes
his own (i.e., as if issued in his name) a document promulgated by a
Vatican office.
A. Bibliography
1. Charles E. Curran and Richard A., McCormick, S.J., eds. Readings in Moral
Theology, No. 6: Dissent in the Church. New York: Paulist Press, 1988.
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3. Avery Dulles, S.J. "The Magisterium, Theology and Dissent." Origins 20 (28
March 1991): 692-696.
a. Dulles proposes five ground rules that the Magisterium itself might
observe in its practical exercise of the teaching office.
4. Francis A., Sullivan, S.J. "The Theologian's Ecclesial Vocation and the 1990
CDF Instruction." Theological Studies 52 (1991): 51-68.
5. Quinn, Archbishop John. “Reform and Criticism in the Church.” Ch. 2 in Idem,
The Reform of the Papacy: The Costly Call to Christian Unity, 36-75.. Ut Unum
Sint: Studies on Papal Primacy. New York: Crossroad, 1999.
B. Archbishop Quinn, in his magisterial work on papal primacy, looks at criticism in the
Church as a service to the Church. In fact, he calls criticism the “matrix of reform,” and
notes that criticism of the popes has a long tradition and even includes those who are often
identified as staunch advocates of the papacy (he cites an example of Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger strongly criticizing Pope Paul VI). For Quinn the relationship is axiomatic: “if
the Church is in need of continual reform, she is necessarily in need of continual criticism.
Reform and criticism go together.” Archbishop John Quinn, The Reform of the Papacy:
The Costly Call to Christian Unity, (New York: Crossroad, 1999): 44). However, neither
reform nor criticism is accepted easily: “if there is resistance to reform within the Church,
there is even more resistance to criticism.”(p. 44)
D. Epistemological humility and care for the reputation of the Church's teachers. W e have to
navigate between commitment to the truth, under which all are subject and the respect and
"religious submission" we have to those who exercise office.
E. Pastoral guideline from Josef Fuchs, S.J.: "Occasionally I have said: I do not say anything
I do not stand behind, but maybe I do not say everything behind which I stand. I think it is
generally wrong to want to provoke. In the face of possible difficulties from the
Magisterium a person must get a sense of what may be said under the circumstances, what
must be said, and what should not be said." From his talk, "The Magisterium and Moral
Theology." Theology Digest 38 (1991): 103-107.
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A. Bibliography: Avery R. Dulles, S.J. "Authority and Conscience." Church (Fall, 1986): 8-
15. Also in Readings in Moral Theology, No. 6: Dissent in the Church, 97-111. Edited by
Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. New York: Paulist Press, 1988.
C. Key Distinction between Church Law and Church Teaching: Don't confuse the two! Law
governs (I will/won't). Teaching instructs (I agree/disagree, or I understand/don't
understand/misunderstand)
1. Fulfillment: I must do/not do this (Examples: Do not kill innocent persons. Pay
your taxes). These are related to the axiom semper et pro semper [bind “always
and in every instance”]
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3. Canon law has a further set of important factors which must be taken into
consideration in order to arrive at a proper understanding and suitable application
of the law. Here I would recommend that everyone involved in pastoral ministry
read something like James Corriden’s Canon Law as Ministry: Freedom and
Good Order for the Church, (New York: Paulist Press, 2000). Corriden seeks to
ground the understanding of canon law in both the New Testament and the
theology of the Church, and he clears up many popular misconceptions that many
of us might have about both Church authority and canon law.
5. Desuetude and/or non-reception. For canon law to be a true ius vigens (law in
force) it must be possess three elements: legitimate authority, suitable
promulgation, and acceptance (“reception”) by its users. The law loses its
binding force either by never been “received” and put into practice by those for
whom the law as meant, or by falling into general “disuse” or non-observance.
An example of desuetude would be the teaching teaching on usury, and an
example of non-reception would be Pope John XXIII’s Seminary Instruction in
Latin, Veterum Sapientia, issued on 22 February 1962, which was widely ignored
from the moment of is promulgation (leading some wags to refer to it as an
example of “instant desuetude”). Rarely abrogated, therefore need to look to see
if the teaching is repeated and confirmed, and to be attentive to the language and
nuances of subsequent documents to see if the position has been modified. This is
an accepted point in canon law, and differs widely from Anglo-American law.
For an excellent article on the history and theory of the canonical doctrine of
reception and non-reception see James A. Corriden, “The Canonical Doctrine of
Reception,” The Jurist 50 (1990): 58-82.
F. General Summary Guideline for Conscience and Church Authority: The Church's teaching
is normally and usually a source for positive illumination of one's conscience. But, if after
appropriate study, reflection and prayer a person remains convinced that his/her conscience
is correct, then in spite of a conflict with the moral teachings of the Church, or Church law,
the person not only may, but must follow the dictates of her or his conscience, rather than
the teachings and/or law of the Church. This is the traditional basic teaching of the Church
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on the sanctity of conscience. To date, the Church has never explicitly claimed to speak
infallibly on a moral question, so there is probably no case yet of a conflict between an
individual's fallible decision in conscience, and a teaching of the Church which is immune
from error. No teaching of the Church can hope to account for every moral situation and
circumstance. Each teaching must still be applied in particular cases, and according to the
particular abilities of each moral agent. Here the moral discernment and the virtue of
epikeia are important. The Church teachings themselves are historically conditioned,
especially in their particular formulations. W e all need help from a variety of sources.
Don't go it alone!
A. Basic understanding of virtue theory, and its distinction from a deontological, principle-
based ethics.
3. “Virtue ethics is both individual and corporate. ... But the good is not conceived
solely in individual terms. Virtue theory views relationships and corporate
activity as essential to both the true human end and the journey toward that end.
Thus, for example, the individual’s moral improvement requires the presence of
others. Similarly, the significance of many virtues (e.g., justice and generosity)
depends on social connections.” Kotva, p. 108.
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1. Gula frames the question well in his Reason Informed By Faith in the chapter (10)
on "The Formation of Conscience.
2. "W e can expect, therefore, that the formation of conscience will involve more
than simply answering the practical moral question, `W hat ought I to do?' It must
also address the prior moral question, `W hat sort of person ought I to become?'
This means the aim of the formation of conscience is not simply to increase a
person's knowledge of facts and values, or skills for resolving a moral dilemma.
It must also include the fuller texture of the person's moral character. As long as
we can remember that morality is interested in who we are, as well as in what and
how we choose, then we will not eliminate character from our consideration of the
formation of conscience." [Gula, RIF, p. 137.]
3. "Attention to character has been the sorely neglected side of the formation of
conscience." [Gula, RIF, p. 138].
4. "Moral choices are not made in a vacuum. They are made by people who see the
world in a certain way because they have become particular sorts of people. ...
Character gives rise to choice. Choices in turn confirm or qualify character, for
choices are self-determining." [Gula, RIF, p. 138.]
C. See also Richard Gula’s more recent book, Moral Discernment (New York: Paulist Press,
1997).
E. Again, the contribution of Paul W adell: "Achieving friendship with God demands giving
our life a single-hearted focus. It demands restriction, it calls for certain attachments. In
order to grow in charity-friendship with God, which Thomas sees as the purpose and goal
of our lives, we need to be attached to some things and detached from others, and to foster
a special direction for our lives, and that is what the virtues do; it is in this sense that the
virtues involve self-definition. At least initially, the virtues work to diminish possibilities
by turning us away from some options and toward other options. The virtues narrow down
possibilities so that we can become familiar with the good. The task of the moral life is to
achieve a familiarity with the good, if possible even to become experts of `virtuosos' in the
good, particularly the unsurpassed goodness of God." [W adell, The Primacy of Love: An
Introduction to the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas. New York: Paulist Press, 1992, p. 111].
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a. "The moral life is fashioned over the long term within an evolving life
history. A `moral vision' provides an individual with increasing meaning
and purpose, a sense of ideals, and a future yet to be.
b. W ithin the context of one's life history, then, one is always in the process
of considering the questions:
(1) `W ho am I becoming?'
c. Such questions are rich with a sense of developing moral vision, and we
must do everything possible to help young adults to be attentive to their
personal visions and to evaluate their present actions in light of such
visions." [Charles Shelton, "Helping College Students Make Moral
Decisions." Conversations on Jesuit Higher Education 2 (Fall, 1992):
14].
1. "According to Lawrence Kohlberg, the most influential source for our ideas on
moral development, the basic criterion for understanding morality is to learn how
a person reasons about `justice'.
1. "Properly to understand moral behavior, then, we need to pay attention first to the
images shaping the imagination, and the stories giving rise to these images, before
we consider moral rules.
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2. W e live more by stories than we do by rules. All of this tells us that learning
moral rules is not the first task in the formation of conscience. W e first need to
learn how to see." [Gula, RIF, p. 142].
1. “Virtue theory can voice and expand Christian moral reflection, but Christian
convictions also correct, refine, develop and enhance virtue theory. For example,
Christian belief in God’s reconciling and empowering grace can serve as a
corrective to virtue theory’s potential for ‘works righteousness’, grim
determination, and even despair. Virtue theory calls us to endless moral progress.
W ithout a sense of grace, this call could elicit the stern striving that robs life of its
joy and readily falls victim to despair. It is easy to anguish over the slight moral
progress we sometimes make. It is easy to despair at our backsliding and failure.
2. “The Christian response to this is grace and forgiveness. W e are not alone. God
goes with us and before us, forgiving our failures and empowering us. God
likewise calls our communities to forgive, restore, and empower. Virtue theory
enjoins endless progress. The Christian faith reminds us that any progress is itself
a gift of God and that we may always fall back on God’s grace.” Kotva, p. 174.
A. From St. Jerome's Prologue of the Commentary on Isaiah (Breviary Reading for 30
September, St. Jerome's Memorial Celebration): "I interpret as I should, following the
command of Christ: Search the Scriptures, and Seek and you shall find. Christ will not
say to me what he said to the Jews: Your erred, not knowing the Scriptures and not
knowing the power of God. For if, as Paul says, Christ is the power of God and the
wisdom of God, and if the one [man] who does not know Scripture does not know the
power and wisdom of God, then ignorance of Scripture is ignorance of Christ."
B. Recall the Four-Sector Grid proposed as basic methodology, and in this context consider
the call of Optatam totius #16: "...Students should receive a most careful training in holy
Scripture, which should be the soul, as it were, of all theology. ...They [seminarians]
should learn to seek the solution of human problems in the light of revelation, to apply its
eternal truths to the changing conditions of human affairs, and to express them in language
which people of the modern world will understand. "In like manner the other theological
subjects should be renewed through a more vivid contact with the Mystery of Christ and
the history of salvation. Special care should be given to the perfecting of moral theology.
Its scientific presentation should draw more fully on the teaching of holy Scripture and
should throw light upon the exalted vocation of the faithful in Christ and their obligation to
bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world."
C. Suggestions for further study of Scripture and Ethics, (and preparation for the
comprehensive exam)
1. Spohn, W illiam C. What Are They Saying About Scripture and Ethics?. 2nd ed.
New York: Paulist Press, 1984, 1995.
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4. Hays, Richard B. The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross,
New Creation. A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics. San
Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1996.
6. Bretzke, James T., S.J. Bibliography on Scripture and Christian Ethics. Studies
in Religion and Society, 39. Lewiston NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997.
b. The entries themselves are arranged both according to the Old and New
Testament, as well as the individual books and/or authors of the New
Testament. Entries are also given according to certain key thematic
issues, such as methodology of the interplay and usage of the Bible in
ethics, liberation theology and Scripture, biblical authority, feminist
issues in biblical hermeneutics, as well as a number of theological
themes such as justice and righteousness, the love command, law and
gospel, sin and reconciliation, etc. Finally, entries are provided which
cover a number of particular ethical themes such as ecology, economics,
medical ethics, sexual ethics and gender issues, war and peace. A final
section gathers titles which were published prior to the Second Vatican
Council (1962-1965) which marked a watershed for the greater
appropriation of Scripture in the discipline of Roman Catholic moral
theology.
D. Hermeneutical problem: which images, themes, etc. are the appropriate ones to guide our
moral theology?
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E. General guidelines for the selection and appropriation of biblical images to ethics:
3. The images should be consistent with God's definitive revelation in Jesus Christ.
E.g. "Crusading W arrior" image of the Holy W ar would seem inconsistent with
the New Testament character of Jesus. The images should be appropriate to the
situation and shed light upon it. Finally, these images should indicate courses of
action that concur with the standards of ordinary human morality. I.e, Christians
are not called by God to behavior that is patently harmful to themselves or others.
This criterion introduces the practice of a public test to check any suspension of
the moral law in the name of personal inspiration.
1. Any coherent moral argument should draw on the four sources of Christian ethics
in an integrated manner. Thus, our "selection of biblical material must be jus-
tified by the other sources we use: theological validity in the tradition, consistency
with the normative portrait of the human person found in ethics, and relevance to
the factual situation as determined by the best empirical analyses available."
[Spohn, W ATSA, p. 84.]
2. Niebuhr warns against "evil imaginations of the heart": i.e., "symbols that send us
down false ways and evoke self-centered affections. They obscure the truth of
who we are and what we are doing, thus leading to a future not of life, but of
death. Evil imaginations of the heart are detected by the consequences they lead
to, just as concepts are invalidated by their erroneous results." [Spohn, p. 84].
3. [In this context cf. Ignatius' Rules for Discernment in the Second W eek]
4. Spohn offers here the example of apartheid, nationalism, and commercialism [e.g.
when you pray for your Motor Home, be sure to tell God what color you want].
a. Kingdom of God
b. Lordship of Jesus
c. Eschatology
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e. Discipleship Community
3. Kingdom of God
4. The Lordship of Jesus: "The Lordship of Jesus Christ is an important theme and
perspective in a distinctively [proprium] Christian ethics. It exposes all the
enslaving cosmic powers, the «authorities and potentates of this dark world» (Eph
6:12). Jesus, the Lord who becomes Servant, teaches us the right use of authority
and points the way to healthy authority structures in the Church and in the world."
Bernard Häring's Chapter 1 of Free and Faithful, vol. 1 p. 21.
b. Häring's Sin-solidarity
c. Positive points
d. Negative points
(1) Fatalistic
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7. Discipleship Community
A. Proof-Texting
1. Can happen to the best of us; and can be of two varieties, negative and positive
(3) Other examples: for capital punishment, (let he who lives by the
sword, die by the sword) etc.
c. Consider the following from the Apostolic Exhortation of John Paul II,
Catechesi tradendae [Catechesis in Our Time], 16 October 1979,
following up on the 1977 Synod of Bishops, which had catechesis as its
theme: #64. "... I beg you, ministers [priests] of Jesus Christ: Do not, for
lack of zeal or because of some unfortunate pre-conceived idea, leave the
faithful without catechesis. Let it not be said that `the children beg for
food, but no one gives to them'."
d. Lamentations 4:4 speaks of the context of exile and ruin in Israel, not of
catechesis!, as just two additional verses would make abundantly clear:
e. "Even the jackals offer the breast and nurse their young, but my people
has become cruel, like the ostriches in the wilderness. / The tongue of the
infant sticks to the roof of its mouth for thirst; the children beg for food,
but no one gives them anything. Those who feasted on delicacies perish
in the streets; those who were brought up in purple cling to ash heaps."
{Lamentations 4:3-5} [New RSV]
2. Proof-texting either runs the risk of blunting or skewing the biblical message, or,
as we see in the case of Catechesi tradendae, of "spiritualizing" it overly much,
or, as in the case of the Gay-Bashing, helping to present an untenable, unsound,
and untheological portrait of God and God's relations with humankind.
3. However, make the distinction between proof-texting and legitimate brief uses of
Scripture
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a. illustrative, illuminative
B. Fundamentalism
2. This approach views Scripture as a revelation of strict moral norms and behavior.
4. Does play into a certain human need for clear and strict rules, boundaries, etc.
2. By its very nature the language of ideals does not translate easily into the lan-
guage of norms.
3. A third issue concerns how moral ideals can be applied in a particular historical
situation which differs considerably from the original scriptural context.
2. Positive
c. Go and do likewise
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1. "A fourth use of scripture is looser than the first three. It could be stated as
follows:
2. Scripture witnesses to a great variety of moral values, moral norms and principles
through many different kinds of biblical literature: moral law, visions of the
future, historical events, moral precepts, paranetic instruction, dialogues, wisdom
sayings, allegories. They are not in a simple way reducible to a single theme;
rather, they are directed to particular historical contexts. The Christian
community judges the actions of persons and groups to be morally wrong, or at
least deficient, on the basis of reflective discourse about present events in the
light of appeals to this variety of material as well as to other principles and
experiences. Scripture is one of the informing sources for moral judgments, but it
is not sufficient in itself to make any particular judgment authoritative." [pp. 164-
65.]
3. Recognizes the need for discernment in any and every use of Scripture in moral
theology.
3. Lebacqz uses biblical images and models to portray divine justice and God's call
for us to heed the cry of suffering and to work for justice in an unjust world.
1. "But here the pitfalls are particularly great, for the temptation is to look to
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Scripture for rules of justice: `give away half', `leave the edges of the fields for
gleaning by the poor', and even `do unto others as you would have them do unto
you'.
2. "The approach to justice proposed here does not permit such a use of Scripture.
The Bible is not a rule book. It is the living memory of a people. It is a col-
lection of stories and poems and laws and sayings that give expression to a
people's understanding of God's response to injustice and the people's response to
God. The Bible must be used accordingly.
3. It provides stories that illumine justice. Part of the power of biblical stories is that
they have stood the test of time. They have relevance today. It is not wrong,
therefore, to look for contemporary situations that appear to provide parallels to
biblical stories.
4. "At the same time, even those stories are subject to the distortions of the human
community. The history of rue suggest that the Bible itself, as the record of the
human community, will be limited by that community. Thus, biblical stories are
illustrative of justice, but they do not provide that theory. They offer windows
through which we might glimpse injustice and justice, but they do not offer a plan
for the perfectly just world." [Lebacqz, Justice, p. 154.]
1. Recall earlier assertion of the need for the interpretation of any text (no text is
self-interpreting). Much the same can be said for the moral case, and the larger
world in which it is located. No such thing as a self-evident or self-interpreting
moral case. Thus, there will always be the need for casuistry to a certain extent.
2. Notion of "reading the world" (in tandem with "reading the text") developed by
Stephen Fowl and L. Gregory Jones: "W e have argued that Scripture is best read
in and through Christian communities. Such communities, however, find themsel-
ves within the political arrangements of wider societies. They need to understand
these larger contexts and the ways in which they impinge on Christian
communities if Christians' readings of Scripture are to enable them to live
faithfully. Hence faithful interpretation requires not only `readings of the texts' but
also `readings of the world'." Stephen E. Fowl, and L. Gregory Jones, Reading in
Communion: Scripture and Ethics in Christian Life. Grand Rapids: W illiam B.
Eerdmans, 1991: p. 44.
3. Similar to reading the "signs of the times", which has now been canonized by
Gaudium et spes.
1. Logic caveat: no one can consider every possible Scriptural text for each and
every ethical issue. However, need to be aware of, and seek to mitigate the
natural tendency to create a "canon-within-a-canon" to such an extent that a major
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part of the Bible, plus the historical experience of the whole Christian community
(i.e., Tradition) are ignored or sidestepped as "irrelevant."
4. Pay particular attention to those Scripture passages which have stood the test of
time in selection for ethical use, e.g., Sermon on the Mount.
5. Make sure you have a complete "unit" and a passage of suitable length
b. No Proof-Texting!
1. be able and willing to do the research and reflection that this requires!
2. Logical corollary: not every moral theologian will be able to master these
scholarly requirements; therefore, need for both specialization and cooperation.
2. Aid here from work done in both hermeneutical theory in general, and more
specifically in biblical hermeneutics
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E. Application of the Text to the Ethical Situation: Scripture as a Source for Moral Theology
1. "No situation in which Christians (either now or in the past) find themselves is
self-interpreting. The process of faithfully embodying an interpretation of
Scripture presupposes that Christian communities have already analysed and
diagnosed the contexts in which they find themselves. Such analysis must be
informed and directed by Scripture, but it is not simply an interpretation of
Scripture." [Fowl & Jones, p. 45].
2. Involves the whole problematic of the use of models in Scripture, plus the added
problem/concern of Fundamental Moral Theology on the notion of "Sources" for
Christian ethics.
A. Bibliography
1. Lisa Sowle Cahill. Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of
Sexuality. New York: Paulist Press; and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.
2. Lisa Sowle Cahill. Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics. New Studies in Christian
Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
3. Lisa Sowle Cahill. "Catholic Sexual Ethics and the Dignity of the Person: A
Double Message." Theological Studies 50 (1989): 120-150.
4. Kelly, Kevin. New Directions in Sexual Ethics: Moral Theology and the
Challenge to AIDS. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1998.
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5. Nelson, James B., and Longfellow, Sandra P., eds. Sexuality and the Sacred:
Sources for Theological Reflection. Louisville: W estminster/John Knox Press,
1994.
6. Farley, Margaret A., RSM. "Sexual Ethics." In Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources
for Theological Reflection, 54-67. Edited by James B. Nelson and Sandra P.
Longfellow. Louisville: W estminster/John Knox Press, 1994.
7. James P. Hanigan. What Are They Saying About Sexual Morality?. New York:
Paulist Press, 1982.
a. This book is a good survey of the general themes and conflict areas in
Roman Catholic sexual ethics today. Special attention is given to the
work of Philip Keane, André Guindon, the CTSA Study on Human
Sexuality (Anthony Kosnik, et. al.), as well as Humanae Vitae and
Persona humana, the 1975 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
Declaration on Sexual Ethics. Hanigan, a former Jesuit, is married and
teaches moral theology at Duquesne University.
8. Philip Keane, S.S. Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective. New York: Paulist
Press, 1977.
1. Scripture
2. Tradition
3. Ethics
4. Experience
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a. Here the experience of married people will have to be taken more into
consideration. And in other problematic areas, e.g. homosexuality, the
experience of these people as well.
5. Let each sector have its voice, but be careful of collapsing one sector, or over-
inflating another.
6. The Six "C's" of good pastoral moral theology, with reference to sexual ethics:
a. Comprehensive
b. Comprehensible
(2) Yet, make sure that key concepts are understood, such as
“intrinsically disordered inclination,” e.g., in homosexuality. It
is crucial to note that the person is not equated with the
orientation!
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f. Credible
h. and Christian:
C. Historical Considerations
1. Pre-Vatican II Understanding
(2) "St. Jerome, for example, wrote that he praised marriage, but
only because it caused virgins to be born." p. 54.
(3) Augustine:
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(b) Thus, for Augustine, original sin became the first STD:
sexually transmitted disease. Moreover, Augustine
deeply distrusted the power of sexual desire.
b. "W hat thus entered Christian theology was a fundamental reason for
mistrusting sexuality, a mistrust fed by the fact that Christian teachers
were now almost exclusively celibate males." [Keeling, Foundations, p.
93].
b. Use of the concept contra naturam, which in turn was interpreted largely
through the physicalist paradigm, which comes out of the background of
Neo-scholasticism and uses primarily a classicist and essentialist method
which stresses faculties and finalities and in which the understanding of
the natural law is often identified too simplistically with the "order of
nature" rather than the "order of reason" (or stating that these two orders
would be morally identical).
a. Bernard Hoose expresses the problem in these terms: "The belief that
there is a healthy continuity with the teachings of the ancients can, of
course lead to problems. Any changes of direction have to be presented
as developments rather than as breaks with the past. In the case of
sexual ethics, however, such a procedure leaves us with a very important
question. If there has been no break with those teachings of St. Jerome
and others that we have discussed above, are we to conclude that
present-day teachings have the same foundation as those earlier ones? In
other words, are we to conclude that the teachings of those Christian
bodies which have not made a break with clearly erroneous teachings of
another age are based on a belief that sex and sexuality are basically
evil? One can imagine howls of protest greeting such a suggestion, but it
is difficult, to say the least, to see how one can claim to be faithful to an
unchanging tradition unless one does have such a basis for one's sexual
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(3) See also John T. Noonan’s brief article, “On the Development
of Doctrine.” America 180 (3 April 1999): 6-8, which details
changes in the Church’s teaching in five areas: adultery, the
death penalty, religious liberty, slavery, and usury.
5. Remember too that our knowledge of, and sensitivity to, the complexity of these
issues is growing. Therefore, we do not have all the answers here and now. W e
are probably in a "liminal" stage. This factor might well be admitted in pastoral
situations.
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7. Personalism in general
b. and that healthy personal relations and community structures are more
important than merely biological or other «laws» pertaining to the sub-
human world'." [Hoose, "Recent Trends" p. 57.
a. In this context, see the introductory paragraphs which treat the Sixth
Commandment in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2331-2350.
These paragraphs are generally quite positive and express a good ethic of
sexuality.
c. Reidy contends that sexuality should be seen "`as central to the human
condition, and sexual desire as in some sense a fundamental human need
and gratification which is not to be excluded without doing some damage
to the human person. Being a man or woman is not an accidental
dimension to what we are, and having the sexual needs of a man or
woman is not something to be understood simply in terms of control, or
even use. Sexuality reaches into the soul, and our knowing of human
desire and human love owes much to the proper and healthy
development of the sexual gift in each of us'." [Hoose, p. 57; Reidy,
Freedom to Be Friends: Morals and Sexual Affection, (London: Collins,
1990): 18].
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p. 34].
c. Yet, we must note that both Paul VI and John Paul II emphatically reject
that these two ends can ever be separated. Thus, current magisterial
teaching would tend to disallow this last point of Hanigan. W e can
return to this notion of responsible parenthood a bit later.
a. Humanae vitae [1968] and Donum vitae [Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith 1987 Instruction on Reproductive Technologies] reiterated
the principle that the two aspects or ends of the conjugal act are
inseparable, and therefore any activity which would separate these would
be seen as immoral.
b. Physicalist paradigm
(2) "Once the road to the separation between procreation and the
act of conjugal love has been taken, the possibility of arresting
the series of applications that stem from it is out of the question.
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4. W hile I do not agree with Archbishop Sgreccia's application of the slippery slope
argument in this case, his views are helpful for understanding how many in the
Vatican think about these matters.
A. Historical context
2. "W here there is a clearly felt moral obligation to limit or avoid parenthood, the
method must be decided on Christian principles. The primary and obvious
method is complete abstinence from intercourse (as far as necessary) in a life of
discipline and self-control lived in the power of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless in
those cases where there is a clearly-felt moral obligation to limit or avoid
parenthood, and where there is a morally sound reason for avoiding complete
abstinence, the conference agrees that other methods may be used, provided that
this is done in the light of the same Christian principles. The Conference records
its strong condemnation of the use of any methods of conception control from
motives of selfishness, luxury, or mere convenience."
5. Discussion of marriage at the Council and the "reservation" of this issue by Paul
VI to the Commission
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b. Doctrinal Principles
c. Pastoral Directives
3. Doctrinal Principles
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(3) ... "one cannot invoke as valid reasons the lesser evil, or the fact
that such acts would constitute a whole together with the fecund
acts already performed or to follow later, and hence would
share in one and the same moral goodness."
(1) "Let them consider, first of all, how wide and easy a road would
thus be opened up towards conjugal infidelity and the general
lowering of morality."
(2) Also on the level of public policy: "W ho will stop rulers from
favoring, from even imposing upon their peoples, if they were
to consider it necessary, the method of contraception which they
judge to be most efficacious?"
4. Pastoral Directives
d. Paragraph 25. Counsel to married couples: "And if sin should still keep
its hold over them, let them not be discouraged, but rather have recourse
with humble perseverance to the mercy of God, which is poured forth in
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e. Counsel to Priests:
a. Principles
b. Expectations of "practice"
2. Key moral issue of how and why natural family planning is morally acceptable
and artificial means of birth control are intrinsically evil
c. “So it is not the intention of the agent, the intention not to procreate,
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which makes the practice of birth control sinful. Then what does make it
sinful? Certainly not an intention (finis operantis) extrinsic to the act of
intercourse itself, but rather an alteration introduced into the very
exercise of that act, which turns it away from its finality in its very
excellence. (For example: the case of Onan).
“So let us suppose that one day science invents a product which,
taken orally in the form of a pill or subcutaneously by injection, renders
a woman sterile for a given period of time. W ill spouses who use this
drug for a proper and acceptable motive and in order to have a child only
when their reason tells them it is good to do so be guilty of a moral
failing? By no means! Their human reason intervened actively at the
same point where with the Ognino [rhythm] method human reason
calculated very simply to profit by what nature was doing on its own: it
is impossible to see how this could in any way be culpable.” [Quote from
a 1948 letter of Maritain to Abbé Charles Journet, a Swiss theologian:
Mariatan’s letters, Volume III, 977a Bernard Doering, Bernard. “Silent
Dissenter: Jacques Maritain on Contraception.” Commonweal (18 May
2001): 18.
c. Important to bear this in mind in light of the John Ford/ Germain Grisez
thesis that the Encyclical is infallible
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A. Bibliography
1. Lisa Sowle Cahill. "Catholic Sexual Ethics and the Dignity of the Person: A
Double Message." Theological Studies 50 (1989): 120-150.
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3. Textual analysis presumes the exegesis stage: W hat exactly does the text say?
W hat are the genres employed? How have other sources been employed and
redacted? E.g. Scripture, the Patristic authors, other Magisterial documents.
W hat is the level of authority ascribed to the text itself?
5. Analysis of the philosophical and theological aspects of the text. W hat are the
"truth claims" advanced? W hat is the nature of the truth claims? W hat are the
levels of the truth claims? W hat is the interplay and distinction between levels of
principles and/or applications?
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1. Curran's remark that questions of sexual ethics are first ecclesiological questions
involving
D. Classicist--physicalist paradigm
3. "The official teaching still rests on the innate purpose and finality of the sexual
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faculty. The faculty has a twofold purpose--procreation and love union. Every
sexual act or actuation must express this twofold finality. This understanding of
the sexual faculty and the sexual act forms the basis for the condemnations of
masturbation, contraception, sterilization, and homosexual acts." [Curran,
Tensions, p. 75].
5. Criticism of such conclusions, in light of criticism of the paradigm itself: "In this
light I have pointed out that the primary problem with the official hierarchical
teaching is its physicalism or biologism. ... The physical becomes absolutized."
[Curran, Tensions, p. 76].
E. Further relevant factors regarding this mode of moral discourse and argument
2. "In a legal model the primary question is the existence of law. If something is
against the law, it is wrong; if there is no law against it, it is acceptable and good.
W ithin such a perspective there is very little gray area. Something is either
forbidden or permitted." [Curran, Tensions, p. 106]
1. W ithin a relationality-responsibility model there are more gray areas. Here one
recognizes that in the midst of complexity and specificity one cannot always claim
a certitude for one's moral positions." p. 106.
3. However, this model too has its obvious shortcomings, specifically in loose
approach to normative behavior.
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2. "The document as we have it is mainly the work of three people, Fr. Lio, O.F.M.,
a well-known Franciscan theologian, Cardinal [Pietro] Palazzini, formerly
professor of theology in the Lateran, and Fr. Visser, C.Ss.R., professor of moral
theology at Propaganda Fide. The document reproduces in large part a chapter in
a book recently published by Cardinal Palazzini on Christian life and virtue. In
this book Cardinal Palazzini follows the old methodology--principles are stated,
and conclusions are drawn more or less independently of human persons and the
complexities of human existence. The document reproduces, almost verbally,
what Cardinal Palazzini says in this book." p. 232. [Palazzini's book is Vita e virtù
cristiane, Roma, 1975]
I belong to my lover, and his desire is for me. Come, my lover, let us go to the countryside,
let us spend the night in the villages. Let us go early to the vineyards to see if the vines
have budded, if their blossoms have opened, and if the pomegranates are in bloom-- there I
will give you my love. The mandrakes send out their fragrance, and at our door is every
delicacy, both new and old, that I have stored up for you, my lover. (NIV)
1. Here a lectio continua which would recall biblical works such as the Song of
Songs would be helpful to correct a negative view of sexuality.
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3. Human! not animal: "W hat is unique about human sexuality, in contrast to animal
sexuality, is that human beings are hyper-sexual. They are not dependent on their
instincts and natural biological rhythms for sexual arousal and performance.
Accordingly sexuality is a much larger factor in human life than in animal life and
much more important to human well-being than to animal well-being. Human
beings need to become more, not less, sexual." [Hanigan, W hat, p. 104].
4. In touch with the Signs of the Times and in distinction with the spirit of the age
(Zeitgeist)
5. Thus, an ethics of response and discernment more than simply an ethic of rules
and prohibitions.
6. Aware of human fulfillment, and human finitude and sinfulness: "The human fear
of intimacy and the ever present possibility of lust threaten to turn the sexual
dynamic toward intimacy and personal communion into the impersonal
satisfaction of sexual desire. The twofold task, then, of sexual morality is to
guard against lust, but also to promote intimacy." [Hanigan, W hat, p. 112].
2. Technological advances
4. Promiscuity
1. "One of the still unresolved issues in morality is the precise way of relating the
deontological and consequentialist features of sexual acts, and so whether moral
rules bind generally or absolutely, are replete with exceptions or are virtually
exceptionless." [Hanigan, W hat, p. 107].
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107.
4. However, this is not the primary thrust of John Paul II's language. Nor, could we
find this as the central thrust of the biblical message.
E. Fundamental values of sexual ethics within marriage: "This relationship called marriage
has as its distinctive characteristic the total, mutual self-giving of spouse to spouse. The
giving of self in sexual intercourse is both an expression and a realization of this total,
mutual self-giving, though it surely does not exhaust the meaning of self-giving. The aim
or goal of mutual self-giving is the mutual perfection of the partners and the formation of a
true community of life and love. Consequently there is no dispute that mutual fidelity
[bonum fidei] and indissolubility [bonum sacramenti] ought to be basic characteristics of
this relationship." [Hanigan, W hat Are ?, p. 49]
F. Responsible Parenthood
1. Part of the paradigm shift mentioned above. A critical factor is what one
understands the content of responsible parenthood to be. According to the Birth
Control Commission, the love of the married couple itself is placed at the center
of the ethical reflections, therefore, the married couple's responsibility before God
is seen in a different light.
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born, the family and society, in accordance with objective moral norms
as well as their own cultural and religious traditions." p. 760.
c. Psycho-sexual problems
(1) Cf. Mitch Finley's article, "The Dark Side of Natural Family
Planning" America 164 (23 February 1991): 206-207.
(2) See subsequent issues for Letters to the Editor, pro and con.
(1) I.e., the Magisterium cannot decree that NFP (Natural Family
Planning) is a practical means for all married couples.
1. Fundamental Option Theory: Approach used by Philip Keane and others. "As
Keane puts it, `The term «fundamental option» means the stable orientation or life
direction that exists at the core level of the human person'. Effected by grace it is
this stable orientation which constitutes our relationship to or against God. A
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stable orientation toward God and the good would be what was traditionally
meant by being in the state of grace. A core orientation against God and the good
would constitute the state of moral sin." [Hanigan, W hat, p. 91].
c. "Given the existence of ontic goods and evils, the meaning of moral
good and evil can be expressed. Moral evil consists in willingly to allow
or cause an ontic evil to occur in the world unnecessarily or without a
proportionate reason. A morally good act would be one for which there
was a proportionate reason." p. 93.
d. "W hat makes a choice morally good is the presence, in the total concrete
context of the choice, of a proportionate reason. The absence of a
proportionate reason would make the choice morally evil." p. 94.
a. "W hen this method of ethical analysis is applied to sexual morality, the
first task is to specify the ontic goods associated with sexuality. As we
have seen the primary goods associated with sexuality in the Christian
tradition were the procreative good of children and the unitive good of
the loving communion of the sexual partners." p. 94.
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1. Try to treat all these areas in terms of a pastoral approach (therefore, not seeking
to enter into academic polemics).
2. Need for a revised pastoral sexual ethics in light of the change of the Church's
teaching on procreation as being the principal end of marriage. W hile formerly,
all sexual activity outside of marriage could be forbidden on the grounds that it
lacked the procreative intention, now justification of sexual activity can occur
outside of the procreative setting and/or possibility. Therefore, "those actions that
were judged to be immoral because they lacked a procreative orientation, actions
like masturbation, homosexual acts, bestiality, petting to orgasm and so on, have
to be evaluated in different terms and in different ways." [Hanigan, W hat, p. 57].
4. Artificial Contraception
b. "...in approving of the rhythm method of birth control and other forms of
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natural family planning, the Church had already taught that it was
permissible to intend explicitly the unitive purpose of sex and to exclude
intentionally the procreative purpose. To allow artificial means as well
as natural means of birth control does not change this teaching. It merely
develops it to a logical conclusion." [Hanigan, W hat, p. 57]
5. Masturbation
6. Homosexuality
d. "For in the traditional view such acts are seriously and intrinsically
disordered since they lack all procreative possibility and orientation.
Hence the homosexual was condemned to a life of involuntary celibacy,
and all // too often a life of secrecy and guilt." pp. 77-78.
(1) "In short, the ideal is for human sexuality to have both unitive
and procreative meaning. But since the ideal is not always
possible for everyone, `it may be necessary at times to accept,
albeit reluctantly, homosexual expressions and unions as the
lesser of two evils, or as the only way in which some persons
can find a satisfying degree of humanity in their lives'. In short,
stable, faithful homosexual unions would be morally
permissible though never the ideal of what human sexuality
ought to be." [Hanigan, W hat, p. 79.]
(2) This is the view advanced by Charles Curran, and goes hand-in-
hand with his theory of compromise.
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(3) Some criticisms of this view: "...if the ideal is not capable of
realization because of factors that are simply unchangeable,
factors of one's own selfhood, how can it be an ideal for such
persons? Something else must be an ideal for them." [Hanigan,
W hat, p. 79.]
b. "...Eastern Orthodoxy has dealt with this possibility both canonically and
liturgically without imperiling the Church's witness to the indissolubility
of Christian marriage." [Hanigan, W hat, p. 116].
A. Abortion
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1. Teaching on Abortion
a. Virtue ethics may hold an important key to the whole abortion debate.
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7. Vision ethics
a. As Stanley Hauerwas has put it, "Modern moral philosophers have failed
to understand that moral behavior is an affair not primarily of choice but
of vision. They see all moral agents as inhabiting the same world of
facts; thus they discriminate between the different types of morality only
in terms of acts and choices. But differences of moral vision or
perspective may also exist." p. 34.
9. "Just Say No" might be a catchy slogan, but it isn't enough to sustain moral
growth and/or perseverance in conflict situations. W e need to help the self and
community appropriate and integrate the moral vision of the Christian story so
that abortion can be rejected. Moral norms are important, but so often we work
out of mixed motives, and desires, etc. often conflictual and often not completing
conscious. Norms do not furnish always the effective means by which we can act
on what we regard as moral truth. Here the skill of virtue, and the coherence of a
moral/ethical narrative may be of invaluable aid.
10. In the case of the "Pro-Choice" movement perhaps a retrieval of the classic
concept of "invincible error" might be of some help.
c. The question then becomes a pragmatic one: what are the best means to
bring these people to the truth? Here I would suggest that on the
prudential level the polemical language and posturing connected with
this conflict is in fact counter-productive, and therefore in a certain sense
"im-moral"
B. AIDS
3. Condom use by married couple in which one is infected and the other not.
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A. Bibliography
1. Curran, Charles E., Farley, Margaret A., McCormick, Richard A., S.J., eds.
Readings in Moral Theology No. 9: Feminist Ethics and the Catholic Moral
Tradition. New York: Paulist Press, 1996.
3. Cahill, Lisa Sowle. Women and Sexuality. New York: Paulist Press, 1992.
a. The Church and the Second Sex. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
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10. Donna Steichen, Ungodly Rage: The Hidden Face of Catholic Feminism. San
Francisco : Ignatius Press, 1991.
B. Feminist Critique
1. Liberal Feminism
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b. "For while moralities are conventional, they are part of the human
struggle for liberation. The dominant class determines the moral and
political norms of a society (and the structures that make norms
convincing), but the voices and actions of the oppressed can bring about
revolutionary change. The introduction of a feminist point of view will
not, then, be irrelevant to the liberation of women and the achieved
equality of all persons." [Farley, Universal p. 174.]
3. Radical Feminism
b. Radical feminists "are convinced that the most basic form of all
oppression is patriarchy, and that patriarchy is neither a mere anomaly in
an otherwise liberal justice nor a form of domination that is solely
derivative of economic power." [Farley, Universal Morality, p. 174]
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e. others seek to highlight the gender differences between men and women,
while revaluing women's differences positively.
f. "The radical feminist agenda, then, is both to free women's bodies from
the power of men [abortion rights] and to free women's minds and hearts
from the cultural and psychological bonds of patriarchy. This turns out to
be one task, for the human person is an organic whole." [Farley,
Universal Morality, p. 175]
4. Socialist Feminism
2. Another key contribution is bringing in voices that had been ignored or excluded
in the past.
3. The Feminist Case for a Common Morality: "If it is a theory of common morality,
it must somehow be accessible to men, somehow cross the boundaries of
gendered experience and understanding as well as the boundaries of culture and
race and class. Some feminist theories are therefore less suited to address issues
of common morality than others. For example, proposals like Carol Gilligan's
regarding the moral development of women come close (despite repeated caveats
// ) to sanctioning one set of norms for women and another for men." [Farley,
Universal Morality, pp. 179-180.]
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a. A good analysis of causes and stages of feminist anger in and with the
Church. Osiek also suggests some important pastoral considerations on
dealing with and moving through this anger, as well as some strategies
for continuing to live in a Church whose reality will continue to be very
painful for committed feminists.
A. This is a recent field in the sense of the larger history of moral theology. In the whole area
of bioethics so much depends on how we “read,” use, and interpret scientific data, and we
have to be very careful as to how our presumptions and predominant model, world-view
interact with each other. The area of bioethics contains so many new possibilities,
problems, etc., that we also run the risk of being “paralyzed” into non-response and/or non-
action. For example, how should we deal with the myriad issues raised by the discovery of
stem cell technology discovery (which only dates from November 1998)?
B. It is key to know some science in order to do bioethics in a responsible manner. This may
sound like a truism, but we should guard against presumptiveness, that we are in a position
to speak authoritatively about an issue if we lack the requisite scientific background. Also
we need to adopt a somewhat critical attitude towards “science”–it is not value-free or self-
interpreting. Scientists are not necessarily well-versed in ethics, so there is a real need for
reciprocal interaction.
C. So many new questions require a serious reconsideration of some of our basic moral
principles. For example, the phrase “life is sacred from the moment of conception” needs
to be clarified in light of the fact that “conception” does not occur in a “moment” but rather
in the space of some 12 hours before the union between the sperm and the egg is
completed.
D. Basic Bibliography
1. John Mahoney, S.J. Bioethics and Belief. London: Sheed and W ard, 1984.
b. Note the date of publication, 1984, and remember that this was before
the 1987 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith document, Donum
vitae, which condemned in-vitro fertilization.
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3. Reich, W arren T., ed. Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New York: Free Press, 1978,
1982.
4. Shannon, Thomas A., ed. Bioethics. 4th Edition. New York: Paulist Press, 1993.
a. Essays divided into four parts: Abortion and Reproduction; Death and
Dying; Consent, Therapy and Research; and Public Policy Issues.
5. Verhey, Allen and Lammers, Stephen E., eds. Theological Voices in Medical
Ethics. Grand Rapids: W illiam B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993.
7. Gula, Richard M., S.S. Euthanasia: Moral and Pastoral Perspectives. New
York: Paulist Press, 1995.
a. The human being does not have a body, but, in the words of Bernard
Häring, "is an embodied spirit; he is a live body. The nature of man is
not limited to a mere summation of biological and personal
characteristics; human existence on earth is truly biological and wholly
personal in the sense that these two aspects pertain to the same reality
and not to separate parts." [Häring, Medical Ethics, p. 50.]
2. Recall the methodology of the 4-sector grid: Importance of the data from the
sciences, but equally important is the interpretation of this data, and finally,
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remember that the interpretation of the data must be applied in the context of a
Christian and professional ethos. In bioethics, perhaps more clearly than in some
other areas, we can see the function of "liminality" as new concepts and
refinements find their place in the moral tradition.
F. Four central principles which taken together are often referred to is “principalism” and
govern much of the contemporary biomedical moral reflection
1. The principle of respect for autonomy of the patient, i.e., the obligation to respect
the decision-making capacities of the patient as an autonomous person. (Make
sure that this principle is not equated or confused with the notion of moral
autonomy in the sense of following one’s conscience).
b. The common good requires that we all take into account the good of all.
For example, in bioethics certain procedures and lines of research will
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1. W e have already discussed this several times, especially in reference to the shift
from physicalism to personalism, as well as its application to marriage,
responsible parenthood, and regulation of births (birth control).
2. To rehearse the historical background: "As is well known, the principle was
initially reduced to a physicalistic and individualistic understanding. The
dominant axiom was simply pars propter totum. A therapeutic operation for a
diseased organ or bodily function was considered permissible when no other
possibility existed to secure the well-being of the organism. Moreover, this
required a correspondence--which was strictly interpreted--between the employed
means and the end they attempted to reach. Both had to move on the same level;
that is, a bodily illness was answered by a corporeal intervention." From Klaus
Demmer, "Theological Argument and Hermeneutics in Bioethics." In Catholic
Perspectives on Medical Morals: Foundational Issues, 103-122. Edited by
Edmund D. Pellegrino, John P. Langan and John Collins Harvey. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic, 1989. at p. 115.
3. "In earlier years when the nature of organ transplants was still in the realm of
discussion only, a number of Catholic moralists // asserted that each partial act
had first to be judged according to its own ethical significance." [Häring, Medical
Ethics, pp. 21-22.]
6. Paradigm shift in principle of totality in medical ethics: Came with Pius XII who
permitted a medical intervention even on a healthy organ for preventive or
therapeutic reasons. New discoveries and technological advances, such as organ
transplants, required a paradigm shift in which the principle of totality could no
longer be understood strictly in physicalist and/or individualistic terms. Rather
the paradigm moved on to the level of interpersonal and personal goods.
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Illustrative example from the film Steel Magnolias, in which the mother (played
by Sally Fields) donates a kidney to her diabetic daughter (played by Julia
Roberts).
b. Note once again the notion of the common good in this regard
c. “In view of the breadth and depth of the human vocation, man can and
must use his knowledge and art to manipulate the chaotic forces of the
physis for the creation of a more humane order not only in the physical
world but also in his psychosomatic nature. If it is more humane, it is
also more pleasing to God. The mere observance of the impersonal //
and sub-personal laws and tendencies of `nature' cannot guarantee such
an increasingly humane order of development." [Häring, Medical Ethics,
pp. 62-63.]
A man with leprosy came to him and begged him on his knees, "If you are willing, you can
make me clean." Filled with compassion, Jesus reached out his hand and touched the man.
"I am willing," he said. "Be clean!" Immediately the leprosy left him and he was cured.
Jesus sent him away at once with a strong warning: "See that you don't tell this to anyone.
But go, show yourself to the priest and offer the sacrifices that Moses commanded for your
cleansing, as a testimony to them." Instead he went out and began to talk freely, spreading
the news. As a result, Jesus could no longer enter a town openly but stayed outside in
lonely places. Yet the people still came to him from everywhere. (NIV)
Is any one of you sick? He should call the elders of the church to pray over him
and anoint him with oil in the name of the Lord. And the prayer offered in faith
will make the sick person well; the Lord will raise him up. If he has sinned, he
will be forgiven. Therefore confess your sins to each other and pray for each other
so that you may be healed. The prayer of a righteous man is powerful and
effective. (NIV)
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a. Sapp, Stephen. Full of Years: Aging and the Elderly in the Bible and
Today. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1987.
c. Thus, to live beyond this "fulfillment," beyond the time when one was
`full of years', lacks a certain meaning.
g. Yet, M. realizes these ideas are not without their problematic aspects.
B. Quality of life
C. Utilitarianism
F. Slippery Slope
A. Important distinction to master, as it is easily and often misunderstood, yet may well be an
area that many will have to encounter in some form or another, and continues to be a locus
of some considerable debate to which the principle of equiprobabilism may be legitimately
invoked. For a good article giving an overview of these issues see Kevin W ildes, S.J.’s
“Ordinary and Extraordinary Means and the Quality of Life.” Theological Studies 57
(1996): 500-512.
B. “In the traditional manuals of moral theology a variety of factors were offered to guide the
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prudential judgment of the patient: the reasonable hope of recovery, the ability to interact
in familiar surroundings, the bearable level of pain and discomfort, and the tolerable
hardship or inconvenience entailed in the provision of life support.” Thomas
Kopfensteiner, “Death with Dignity: A Roman Catholic Perspective,” Linacre Quarterly
63 (November 1996): 67.
C. Contemporary formulation of the distinction goes back to Pius XII on the ordinary and
extraordinary means of preserving life.
D. "At times the distinction can be misunderstood, as when ordinary is understood as routine
and standard medical practice, and extraordinary is taken to refer to unusual or heroic
measures or measures involving considerable risk. However, the point of Pius XII's
distinction was not to make distinctions between medical procedures but between their
effects on the patient--and not their effects on any patient, but on this particular patient."
[John Mahoney, "The Challenge of Moral Distinctions." Theological Studies 53 (1992):
676].
E. "For the distinguishing mark was how burdensome a procedure would be to this patient,
and that consideration of personal burdensomeness can make even the most routine
procedure extraordinary in certain circumstances." [Mahoney, Challenge, p. 677.]
F. Good extended "exegesis" of the term "extraordinary means" is given by Mahoney is his
chapter on Death and Dying in Bioethics and Belief. See especially pp. 44-47.
1. Keep in mind this important philosophical and theological distinction about the
real meaning of the relationship between “subjectivtiy” and “objectivity.” In the
real world, ontologically speaking, there is no “objectivity” “out there”
somewhere that can be isolated or abstracted from its relation to this or that
individual subject. Thus, objectivity properly considered must always take into
moral account the subjectivity of the individual. Thus, the
“ordinary/extraordinary” means will always be dependent on persons, place, time
and culture for its proper evaluation. This principle was enunciated in this way by
Pius XII in 1957 when he spoke of "means that do not involve any grave burden
for oneself or another."
2. Need to take account of both scientific and economic possibilities. For example,
a century ago a blood transfusion would have been “extraordinary” means from a
scientific perspective. Even now, in war-torn places today a blood transfusion
may also be extraordinary means from an economic perspective (i.e., extreme
disproportion between scarce supply and high demand).
3. The principle refers primarily to the effects on this particular patient (not patients
“in general”). Here too we must be attention to the ethical paradigm for assessing
these effects. Obviously the physical effects are first and foremost, but since the
person is a relational being we must also take into account the personal and inter-
personal effects, which will include effects on the patient's loved ones, family,
relatives, friends, etc., as well as society at large. These considerations may
provide a wider and better picture of how certain therapies in fact impact on
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patients.
6. Finally keep in mind some basic moral theological principles: There will always
be evil (and sin) in the world. Therefore, we have to confront moral tragedy in
our lives. Also keep in mind that our physical death is a part of our life, but that
death is not the final word. Therefore, quality of life arguments have to be
evaluated within the context of the quality of death considerations.
1. "The o/e [ordinary/extraordinary means] principles in their classic form state that
there is an obligation to use ordinary means to preserve life, but no strict
obligation to use extraordinary means. Extraordinary means // are all medicines,
treatments, and operations that (1) do not offer a reasonable hope of success or
(2) cannot be obtained or used without excessive hardship--i.e., excessive pain,
cost, or other inconvenience." [W arren Thomas Reich, "Life, Prolongation of," in
The New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. James F. Childress and John
Macquarrie, (Philadelphia: W estminster Press, 1967, 1986): 351-352.
2. "W hile these principles have served for centuries to remind us chiefly that there
are limits to the duty to preserve life, their principal service to the current era may
be to convey a presumption of a duty to preserve life." [Reich, p. 352].
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A. Bibliography
1. Magisterial statements
b. Example seen in the 31 July 1994 Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith (CDF) Response to Questions concerning Uterine Isolation and
Related Matters
b. Kevin Kelly, "A Medical and Moral Dilemma." The Month 26 (April
1993): 138-144.
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2. Term coined in 1972 by two neurologists, B. Jennett and F. Plum in their article
"Persistent Vegetative State after brain damage: a syndrome in search of a name."
Lancet 1972 (1:734-7).
a. A coma, "in which patients have their eyes closed and lack sleep-wake
cycles, and from the `locked in' syndrome, in which patients are aware of
themselves and their environment but have lost motor function and
speech."
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functions."
c. These cases highlight the debate over the precise meaning of the ut in
pluribus principle in issues such as these.
C. Dispute over artificial hydration and nutrition: "Elements in the latter dispute include
whether hydration and alimentation viewed as medical therapies may become
disproportionately intrusive means of artificial life support, or whether giving food and
water is always an obligatory, minimal support because of the symbolism of this basic
human gesture." [Reich, p. 352.].
1. In general
2. "Euthanasia by omission"
2. Thus, the danger of prematurely closing off discussion and debate through
imposition of a magisterial gag order. Yet, we should attend to what the
Magisterium is saying in this area, and I would note here that some very good
insights into over-looked aspects of the issue can be found by consulting broadly.
For example, consider the following statement found in the Catechism for
Filipino Catholics which gives an insight into the moral considerations of
extraordinary means which might easily be overlooked in the medical culture of
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the United States: “However, when there is no real hope for the patient’s genuine
benefit, there is no moral obligation to prolong life artificially by the use of
various drugs and machines. In fact, using extraordinary means to keep comatose
or terminally ill patients artificially alive seems clearly to lack objective moral
validity, especially in a society where the majority of the population do not enjoy
even adequate elementary health care.” Catechism for Filipino Catholics, #1039
(Manila, 1997). It seems clear what position the Philippine Bishops would take
on the artificial hydration/nutrition debate, and I would emphasize what seems to
be for them the key morally relevant feature, namely the “justice” issue of
distribution of limited medical resources in a society marked by great disparity
between the rich and the poor as is the case in the Philippines at present. The
bishops remind us to consider this justice aspect in our consideration of the usage
or non-usage of extraordinary means.
b. Yet, this sort of case shows up graphically the limitations of their basic
approach.
5. Important caveat here related to the odium theologicum, i.e., the conflict among
different theological positions: try not to let your general preference or
disinclination for this or that theologian decide your position on this or that issue.
Perhaps you might be generally more sympathetic to the position of theologian X
rather than theologian Y, but in this particular issue it might be that the latter
rather than the former has the better arguments.
G. Utilization of Probabilism
2. For a good example see the McCormick/W illiam Smith exchange of letters
following McCormick’s PVS article (“Moral Considerations Ill-Considered”) in
America.
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LXXXIII. ABORTION
1. Philosophical issues on what constitutes a human person, and when this takes
place
B. Fundamental values at stake, such as "...(1) the recognition of the right of each human
being to the most basic conditions of life and to life itself; (2) the protection of this right to
live, especially by those who have cooperated with the creative love of God; (3) the
preservation of a right understanding of motherhood; (4) the ethical standard of the
physician as one who protects and cares for human life and never becomes an agent of its
destruction. "The vigour of the argument derives from our belief in the dignity of each
human person created in the image and likeness of God and in man's calling to universal
brotherhood in mutual love, respect and justice." [Häring, Medical Ethics, p. 98.]
4. For a brief treatment of one program which responds pastorally to women who
have suffered an abortion see James T. Bretzke, S.J. and Monika Rodman, “After
The Choice: The Church’s Post-Abortion Outreach to W omen.” America 181 (6
November 1999): 14-19.
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1. Remember to let the voice of each sector speak in its "native" language. Look at
organizing concepts used, and note the paradigms used in philosophical and
theological systems. Be attentive to hyper-inflation of one or more sectors, as
well as atrophy of other sectors. In this vein be especially aware of "missing
elements" in moral theology, such as sin, grace and forgiveness, moral
development, virtue, character, as well as norms and deontological parameters.
2. Be attentive to what David Tracy calls the "publics" of theology: Church, the
Academic Community, and W ider society. Keep in mind that no one “public” is
self-sufficient or free-standing. Each “public” will have its own “canon” and
“authorities” and sometimes these need to be resisted, broadened, nuanced,
contextualized, etc. Interaction with the other “publics” can be helpful in this
regard. Is the methodology utilized capable of speaking to all three of these
publics?
3. Do the positions, arguments, etc., fulfill the test of the 6-C's? (Comprehensive,
Comprehensible, Coherent and Consistent, Credible, Convincing, Christian), as
well as being open to change and conversion?
1. Belief in the Promise of the Spirit and its relationship to the Church: keep in mind
that the promise of the Spirit was given to the whole Church, and not just to this
or that sub-set. W e see this point especially in the sacraments of initiation:
baptism (which in a very real sense “ordains” everyone into the priesthood of
believers), and confirmation (which seals us all with the Holy Spirit).
2. Scriptural clues (Presence and ongoing role of the Spirit in the whole Church, and
the whole world)
a. John 14:16-17 And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another
Counselor to be with you forever--the Spirit of truth. The world cannot
accept him, because it neither sees him nor knows him. But you know
him, for he lives with you and will be in you.
b. John 14:26 But the Counselor, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will
send in my name, will teach you all things and will remind you of
everything I have said to you.
c. John 16:7-15 But I tell you the truth: It is for your good that I am going
away. Unless I go away, the Counselor will not come to you; but if I go,
I will send him to you. ... I have much more to say to you, more than you
can now bear. But when he, the Spirit of truth, comes, he will guide you
into all truth. ...
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3. Historical Dimension
c. Certainly mistakes have been made, and the pendulum will swing.
4. Theological Dimension
a. But we must have hope and believe in Christ's promise of his abiding
spirit.
b. Besides those selections already read from John, consider the final
verses from Matthew [28: 18-20]
And Jesus came and said to them, "All authority in heaven and on earth
has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything that I have commanded you.
And remember, I am with you always, to the end of the age."
c. Don’t forgot either the indefectibility of the Church, which is tied to this
promise of Christ and his abiding presence, as well as in the Church's
own obedience to mission given her by Christ.
LXXXV. TIE-IN W ITH THE LITURGICAL AND SACRAMENTAL LIFE OF THE CHURCH
b. Guroian notes that "The beatitudes are compelling for Christians not
because they are precepts that are somehow or other metaphysically true
but because Christ lived them. They are evangelical because he who
taught and practiced them did so for our sakes. Those who in gratitude
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for this become his disciples must be for others what Christ is for them.
W e know that it is possible to live the beatitudes because the church
exists." p. 65.
2. Need to address better therefore, the role of Scripture in both moral theology and
the larger life of the Christian community. In this last sense, we should stress
more the context in which Scripture is "performed", namely the liturgy
1. Neglected for too long, due to concentration on casuistry and the philosophical
elements of moral action. W e see here once again the importance of the interplay
between one's definition of moral theology, and how Scripture then might (or
might not) fit in.
2. I will merely "touch down" upon these following areas, in an attempt to indicate
lines for further reflection, development and integration.
D. Connection between the Christian aspect of the moral community of character and
characters, and the normative functions of Scripture and Tradition as fonts of moral
theology.
2. In terms of Scripture and the Church's liturgical life Guroian puts the matter this
way
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a. Taken from the readings for the Saturday of the First W eek of Ordinary
Time, Year I.
"God's word is living and effective, sharper than any two-edged sword.
It penetrates and divides soul and spirit, joints and marrow; it judges the
reflections and thoughts of the heart. Nothing is concealed from him; all
lies bare and exposed to the eyes of him to whom we must render an
account. ..."
(1) with refrain from Jn 6:64, "Your words, Lord, are spirit and life.
5. Homily focus
c. Evaluative knowledge though lets the W ord of God cut and penetrate.
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i. Rather, it is Jesus who calls us, and then we are the ones who must
respond or not.
j. So, in terms of the this course, the penetrating W ord of God is not really
seen best in terms of the "Use of Scripture in Moral Theology"
F. Sacraments
1. Philip Rosato,
2. Bernard Häring: "The sacraments do not monopolize the signs of God's gracious
presence and his call to adoration. Rather, as privileged signs, they lead us to
discover the countless ways in which God comes into our life and calls us to
honour him by a right ordering of our relationships and by participation in the
ongoing work of creation and redemption." Free and Faithful in Christ, [?] p.
482.
G. Prayer
1. Frankly, this fundamental aspect of moral theology is given rather short shrift by
most moral theologians.
2. Hopefully, our prayer would at least change our moral vision, and therefore
prayer would be key to the moral life.
1. This idea reflects on our “final end” of beatitude--resting with God, as our
summum bonum (highest good).
2. Insights of Häring
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fills the people with holy // awe and reverence, and is an impelling invitation to
adore him in all their life." pp. 473-374.
5. "The spirit of adoration is not only an essential note of faith, hope and love; it
also gives shape, direction and strength to all moral life. As Thomas Aquinas
expresses it, «The virtue of religion commands all other virtues» [S.Th. II II, q.
81, a. 4 ad 1]. For Thomas, moral life can be virtuous in the full sense only if it
receives its final form and strength from the spirit of adoration." p. 478.
a. Dynamic of grace
b. Häring: "By sending us the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of glory, Christ takes
us into his mission of glorification which is fulfilled if we live in the
freedom to love as Christ did." p. 476.
(1) Argues that the most superior form of moral judgement is one
grounded in and lived in the presence of the mystery of the
Triune God. Jones avers that the primary friendship a person
should have is with God. He also discusses and critiques the
work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, and others.
(3) I'd say that his Trinitarian theology, while interesting, is a bit
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2. "As a product of the Holy Spirit, the evangelical imagination is a work of grace.
This work of grace incorporates humanity into a new reality, identified by the
story and images of the Gospel, which shows itself in new ways of living. As we
participate in the new reality of God's everlastingly actual redemption, we learn to
practice that reality by learning, for example, to give thanks, to be forgiven and to
forgive, to live sacrificially, to confess our sin, to bear one another's burdens. ...
These and other practices in the Church both signify our participation in God's
redemptive-creative work and also train us to see God's work and participate in
it." Jonathan R. W ilson, "By the Logic of the Gospel: Proposal for a Theolory of
Culture" Modern Theology 10 (1994): 404.
4. Resonance with the basic insights of a moral theology which accents more vision,
virtue, character, and narrative.
2. Value of St. Ignatius' Rules for the Discernment of Spirits, especially the Rules
for the Second W eek.
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c. Persons discern: "and persons have histories that affect their discern-
ment." p. 24.
d. Their character too affects their discernment [and their vision: cf. St Ig-
natius in his own life]
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5. In this whole context the presence and work of the Holy Spirit is obviously an
important factor. Recall the role of the Holy Spirit as Paraclete to "recall" what
we've forgotten, and "teach" us what we could not earlier bear. Therefore,
meditation on Scripture is key for the moral life of both the individual and the
community. Plus the importance of moral dialogue, to see where the wind (the
Spirit) is blowing in other communities.
A. Bibliography
1. Richard M. Gula, S.S. The Good Life: Where Morality and Spirituality
Converge. New York: Paulist Press, 1999.
b. Gula grounds and develops his work in Scripture and the rich tradition of
moral theology, and draws as well on the best of contemporary work in
the field.
b. "Failure to attend to their relationship will cut them off from their own
traditions and fail to provide the most authentic guidance to holistic
growth in Christian living. The present study examines the historical
relationship of the two disciplines up to their current state in the effort to
identify useful insights from the past and to suggest some challenges for
the future [p. 61]."
1. "Spirituality, then, is the quest, under the direction of the Holy Spirit but with the
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cooperation of the believer, for holiness. It is the pursuit of the live lived to the
glory of God, in union with Christ and out of obedience to the Holy Spirit."
[Stanley J. Grenz, Revisioning Evangelical Theology: A Fresh Agenda for the
21st Century, (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993): 42].
D. Implications of the Historical Split between Moral Theology and the Rest of Theology
(and Spirituality)
(3) Supererogation
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(2) Deontological
(3) Minimalistic
2. Community of Discipleship
a. "Häring's work was fueled largely by the belief that there are two basic
and inseparable forms of the human response to God's gratuitous self-
offering: worship (both private and communal) and moral living. The
two responses cannot be separated in the lives of the individual
Christian." (O'Keefe, "Catholic Moral Theology and Christian
Spirituality, p. 66)
4. "In short, while the contemporary, ongoing renewal of Catholic moral theology
has largely reclaimed the discipline's theological and biblical foundations, it has
still not progressed to the point of manifesting the connection between moral and
spiritual striving. It must be said, then, that Catholic moral theology is still cut off
from the full dynamism of authentic Christian living. It does not yet fully reflect
the actual lives of Christians who must pray in order to become truly good and
who must become morally good in order to grow in prayer and holiness."
((O'Keefe, "Catholic Moral Theology and Christian Spirituality, p. 67)
1. "First, Catholic moral theology must continue to reclaim the broader and even
transcendent context provided by its relationship with spirituality. Moral theology
cannot be restricted to norms and decisionmaking [sic], nor even to virtue and
character. Moral theology serves the Christian life aimed at sharing together in
the divine life of the Trinity--a life with our sisters and brothers in triune
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3. "Third, contemporary spirituality cannot lose touch with the insights discussed in
the traditional treatises on ascetical theology. This requires that contemporary
spirituality recover notions of purgation and asceticism that are authentically and
appropriately world-affirming and creation-serving and that guide Christian
women and men in the integration of all of their desires into their striving after
God." p. 70.
4. "Fourth, the ongoing renewal of Christian spirituality seems well served by the
contemporary discipline's attention to experience. The most fundamental human
experience which is the focus of both spirituality and moral theology is the drive
to authentic self-transcendence in prayer and action." p. 70.
7. "It is unfortunate that in recent centuries Catholic theology has tended to split
morality and spirituality, enervating the former and isolating the latter. Once this
occurs morality tends to be minimalistic and spirituality elitist. An ethics divorced
from the Christian spiritual life is unlikely to be overly juridical and legalistic,
asking not what should we do to become as much like God as we possibly can,
but what must we avoid if we are not to sin.
8. The second question is important, but it does not go far enough. W e learn from it
what to avoid, but not what to embrace; it teaches us what we should not choose,
but says nothing of what we must deeply love." [Paul W adell, C.P., The Primacy
of Love: An Introduction to the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas, (New York: Paulist
Press, 1992): 17].
G. Post-Vatican II Directions
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(1) As one commentator notes "The text [of Part Three of the
Catechism which treats of morality and moral theology] does
not begin with a review of `thou shalt nots'.
3. Evangelization
2. Contemplation in Action
3. Magis
4. Discipleship
1. A greater attention to spirituality within the discipline of moral theology will help
avoid the pitfall of substituting "theologizing" for a personal faith commitment.
J. Spirituality of the Common Search for the Truth (cf. Veritatis Splendor)
1. Often this is not really seen as something connected with “spirituality” but I think
it is important and helpful to view the search for truth in this way
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b. And also important to counter the negative aspects of our individual and
collective ethoses, etc.
3. Epistemologically, none of us, or even the Church, Magisterium, etc. can perceive
"the whole truth and nothing but the truth"
4. Dialogue Approach for Mutual Aid and Enrichment in the spirituality of the
common search for the truth
c. Here the voices and critiques from feminist ethics and theology are very
important
5. Remember too, the presence and influence of sin; we are all, even confessionally
simul iustus et peccator
6. Need for confession, both of praise and belief, as well as sin and repentance,
which implies a need for conversion, sustained by our constant need for grace!
K. Revision of Notion of Dissent seen in regards to the spirituality of the common search for
the truth
2. By the Magisterium in realizing that their charism does not dispense them from
study, learning, and listening, and that truth is not essentially propositional, and
therefore the plenitude of truth requires participation of all.
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independence) seem to be negated, and so on. Yet, we know that this stage does
not last forever. And this stage is a key factor at achieving maturity. Perhaps
many of the difficulties and conflicts associated with the various paradigm shifts I
have touched on above can be likened to this stage of liminality. W e are in the
process of regaining our bearings, but in this process I believe we shall all emerge
as more mature Christians. For example, in bioethics, perhaps more clearly than
in some other areas, we can see the function of "liminality" as new concepts and
refinements find their place in the moral tradition.
4. This needs to happen in our sexual ethics as well, and this is a point stressed by
Lisa Cahill in her article "Sex and Gender: Catholic Teaching and the Signs of
Our Times," Milltown Studies 34 (1994): 31-52.
M. Ignatius' Presupposition
1. Spiritual Exercises, Introductory Annotation, #22: "In order that both the one
who is giving the Spiritual Exercises, and the one who is receiving them, may
more help and benefit themselves, let it be supposed that every good Christian is
to be more ready to save his neighbor's proposition than to condemn it. If he
cannot save it, let him inquire how he means it; and if he means it badly, let him
correct him with charity. If that is not enough, let him seek all the suitable means
to bring to mean it well and save himself."
2. This "Presupposition" is not just for retreats, but for our whole life.
3. This odium theologicum has done great damage to Christian unity and the whole
project of coming to a fuller understanding of human morality.
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distinctions as satisfying or helpful at least for the time being, while keeping an
open mind to the possibility of their being further refined or eventually
superseded." p. 664.
4. But if anger gets locked into moral outrage it will become problematic for both
the individuals and the Christian community
5. Helpful pastoral book on this issue is Carolyn Osiek's Beyond Anger: On Being a
Feminist in the Church. New York: Paulist Press, 1986.
a. A good analysis of causes and stages of feminist anger in and with the
Church.
P. A note about spirituality and the sacramental work of the all the priests in the Christian
community of the priesthood of all believers. All of us, regardless of gender and ordination
status, is genuinely called to be a priest.
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Q. I think there is much wisdom in what Diana has said, and also much challenge. If we don’t
accept and nurture our common call to priesthood first we will never be good priests of any
stripe. In summary here are three key aspects for such a spirituality: first, that it is always
grounded in the community (there is no independent ecclesial “I” that is not a person who
finds his or her primary identity as a disciple within the community of believers; second,
our spirituality must be one “for the long haul,” i.e., a spirituality able to deal with, but also
live through, my own sins and the sins of others, as well as the social sins and structural
evil of the institution. Finally, our spirituality must be a spirituality of the Spirit, which
means it is essentially practiced and informed through discernment, and leads, in the sense
of the Ignatian “Rules for the Discernment of Spirits,” to both individual and communal
growth and liberation. Recall here Jesus’ own statement of his mission in John 10:10: “I
have come that they may have life and have it to the full.
B. Try to build on what the people already know and build on the earlier catechesis and
instruction they may have received.
E. Try to help people see the moral complexity of concrete situations, and move them beyond
looking for simple “clear-cut” black and white answers
5. For all of the above it would be helpful to have a few good illustrative examples
of constancy, inconsistency, error, and development in the Church’s moral
teaching
6. In this vein see Maureen Fiedler, and Linda Rabben, eds. Rome Has Spoken: A
Guide to Forgotten Papal Statements and How They Have Changed through the
Centuries. New York: Crossroad, 1998.
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7. See also John T. Noonan’s brief article, “On the Development of Doctrine.”
America 180 (3 April 1999): 6-8, which details changes in the Church’s teaching
in five areas: adultery, the death penalty, religious liberty, slavery, and usury.
This article might be helpful in adult education settings as well.
9. Try to use these examples judiciously, and not in a belittling manner, but as a way
to illustrate that the Church, like any human institution, has grown, is historical,
and needs to correct mistakes made.
1. Try to establish yourself as working within the Church and its Tradition, etc.
4. Help people to make and “own” adult decisions; to take responsibility for their
own choices in this area as well
5. Avoid setting up yourself or any other external authority as the “higher” authority
in these personal areas.
I. Use examples, and if at all possible, case studies using issues which will be likely to be real
life issues for this particular group.
K. Give time for questions, but you may need to control this, and perhaps end this period.
Some people can dominate a group, and you may need to say, “Let’s talk about this at the
break, but we need to move on now...”
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L. Indicate readable and relatively short works for further reading and ongoing education
1. Gula, Richard M., S.S. Moral Discernment. New York: Paulist Press, 1997.
2. Overberg, Kenneth R., S.J. Conscience in Conflict: How to Make Moral Choices.
Cincinnati: St. Anthony Messenger Press, 1991.
3. Keenan, James F., S.J. Virtues for Ordinary Christians. Kansas City: Sheed &
W ard, 1996.
3. McCormick, Patrick, C.M. Sin as Addiction. New York: Paulist Press, 1989.
4. O'Keefe, Mark, O.S.B. What Are They Saying About Social Sin? New York:
Paulist Press, 1990.
5. Gula, Richard M., S.S. Euthanasia: Moral and Pastoral Perspectives. New
York: Paulist Press, 1995.
6. Curran, Charles E. and McCormick, Richard A., S.J., eds. Readings in Moral
Theology No. 8: Dialogue About Catholic Sexual Teaching. New York: Paulist
Press, 1993.
7. Hanigan, James P. What Are They Saying About Sexual Morality?. New York:
Paulist Press, 1982.
8. Cahill, Lisa Sowle. Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of
Sexuality. New York: Paulist Press; and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.
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Moralia
Félix Boix, 13
E-28036 Madrid
SPAIN
Studia Moralia
Located in the GTU Library in the stacks (not with the other periodicals) at BJ1249 .S88
Louvain Studies
********
255
256
Glossary of Moral Terms
Compiled by
James T. Bretzke, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology-at-Berkeley
ACCULTURATION
ACTUS HOMINIS AND ACTUS HUMANUS (See Bretzke’s Consecrated Phrases: A Latin Theological
Dictionary for definition of these terms)
AUTONOMY (Moral)
CASUISTRY
CHARISM
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Glossary of Moral Terms
COMPROMISE, MORAL
CONSCIENCE
CONSTANCY OF TRADITION
CONSCIENCE, CERTAIN
CONSCIENCE, DOUBTFUL
CONSCIENCE, ERRONEOUS
CONSENT, SUFFICIENT
CONSEQUENTIALISM
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Glossary of Moral Terms
CULTURE
DEONTOLOGY
DESUETUDE
DEUS IMPOSSIBILIA NON IUBET (See Consecrated Phrases for definition of this term).
DISCERNMENT, MORAL
DISPENSATION
DISSENT, THEOLOGICAL
DISTINCTION BETW EEN MORAL GOODNESS & BADNESS, AND MORAL RIGHTNESS &
W RONGNESS
259
Glossary of Moral Terms
DUTIES, CONFLICT OF
ENCULTURATION
EPIKEIA
ETHOS
EUTHANASIA
EVIL, INTRINSIC
260
Glossary of Moral Terms
EVIL, MORAL
EVIL, ONTIC
FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO
FORUM, INTERNAL/EXTERNAL
261
Glossary of Moral Terms
FUNDAMENTAL OPTION
GOOD, ONTIC
GOOD, MORAL
GRADUALISM
HABIT, MORAL
HERMENEUTICS
262
Glossary of Moral Terms
INCULTURATION
INFALLIBILITY
IN FORMA SPECIFICA, COMMUNI (See Addenda to Consecrated Phrases for this term).
INTENTION, MORAL
LAW , DOUBTFUL
LAW , ETERNAL (LEX AETERNA) (See Consecrated Phrases for definition of this term).
LAW , POSITIVE
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Glossary of Moral Terms
LEGALISM
LEX DUBIA NON OBLIGAT (See Consecrated Phrases for definition of this term).
LEX INDITA, NON SCRIPTA (See Consecrated Phrases for definition of this term).
MATERIAL NORMS
264
Glossary of Moral Terms
MIDDLE AXIOMS
NATURAL LAW
NATURALISTIC FALLACY
NORMA NORMANS (NON) NORMATA (See Consecrated Phrases for definition of this term).
NORMS, UNIVERSAL
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Glossary of Moral Terms
NORMS, CONCRETE
OBLIGATION, MORAL
PARS PROPTER TOTUM (See Consecrated Phrases for definition of this term).
PARVITAS MATERIAE IN SEXTO (See Consecrated Phrases for definition of this term).
PERSONALISM (PARADIGM)
PHYSICALISM (PARADIGM)
PROBABILISM
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Glossary of Moral Terms
PROPORTIONALISM
REASON
REASON, PRACTICAL
REASON, SPECULATIVE
RIGORISM
SCANDAL
SCRUPLES
267
Glossary of Moral Terms
SIN
SIN, ORIGINAL
SIN, SOCIAL
SOCIAL SIN
STRUCTURAL EVIL
SUPER EGO
268
Glossary of Moral Terms
TELEOLOGY
TEMPTATION
TOTALITY, PRINCIPLE OF
TRADITION
TUTIORISM
[LEX VALET] UT IN PLURIBUS (See Consecrated Phrases for definition of this term).
UTILITARIANISM
269
VICE
VIRTUE
VOLUNTARISM
********
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APPENDIX 2: PASTORAL COUNSELING GUIDELINES
Some Pastoral Counseling Do’s and Don’ts
By James T. Bretzke, S.J., S.T.D.*
In general I suggest the following “questions” to help guide pastoral responses to a particular person
(s) whom you meet for any sort of pastoral counseling (outside of confession). The overall purpose of these
questions is to help surface the concrete “issues” in a particular situation, and then to identify and help
formulate an appropriate pastoral response to the person(s) whom the issues involve. One doesn’t have to
“answer” or “address” these questions in a programmatic fashion, but I think they are helpful in formulating
a response that is both concrete and pastorally helpful. After the questions I indicate some further
observations as points to ponder. Neither the questions nor the following points are absolute rules or
invariable principles; use them judiciously to the extent that they are helpful, and leave this or that question
or point aside if it doesn’t seem to apply or is not appropriate in a given concrete situation.
8 Starting Questions: Designed to get at and the address the real issue(s) involved
1) W hat is my pastoral role in this case and what am I being asked to do?
2)W hat are the morally relevant features of this case?
3) W hat are the presuppositions both I and the other(s) bring to this case?
4) W hat further information is needed in order to respond to this case?
5) W hat are the moral principles operative in this case?
6) W hat kind of a pastoral response should I make in this case? and
7) W hat kind of pastoral strategies would I use in my response?
8) And perhaps the most important pastoral question: W ho and/or what is most in need of reconciliation in
this situation?
Take an appropriate am ount of tim e. W atch trying to rush a session. People need time to tell their
stories, and it’s probably best to let them do so in their own way, in their own words, and in their own speed.
Yet, this is not an absolute “rule”— some people will need help in bringing the session to both a close and
closure. Don’t feel that everything must be either addressed or solved in one session. Don’t be afraid to set
up a follow-up session (or more).
Track your questioning carefully and please be judicious in your use of questions. W hy are you
asking this or that question? Certainly ask a question for clarification if there is some item which seems
crucial to your understanding of the person’s story, but which isn’t clear to you (yet) in their telling of the
story. However, I’d avoid asking questions just in order to have the “full picture” or “all the facts,” since the
purpose of the session really is healing and not some after-the-fact adjudication of responsibility or
criminality. I think this last point is particularly important in dealing with situations involving a long-past
event which continues to haunt someone, such as abortion. Rather than go into great detail about just how
the pregnancy came about and the circumstances which led to the abortion decision I think it probably would
be more helpful to stay with the person where she or he is here and now. W hat do they feel “now”? W hy?
How can we bring God more tangibly into this person’s life and self-awareness here and now?
Try to focus not merely on the “intellectual” but also on the em otional and affective dim ensions.
The heart, more than the head, is probably crucial in our moral living. Questions like “Do you believe God
can forgive you?” may elicit an intellectual “yes” (a notional assent), which has not reached the depths of the
person’s heart which is still crying out “No! God can’t forgive me!” Effective pastoral counseling will have
*
These are based on my own pastoral experience and not on a degree in counseling!
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to try and convince and change the heart more than the head, so try and keep this in mind in devising your
pastoral strategies.
Take their Problem Seriously, but watch the Problem -Solving tendency. This guideline calls for a
definite balancing act. The person must feel that she or he is being taken seriously and that you really do
understand their issue (even if it is not or would not be a troubling issue for you). Be careful not to homilize
or too easily present a solution based on generalities like “God will hear and answer your prayers.” On the
other hand, try not to get sidetracked into a discussion of how to resolve the issue in a social service mode.
This is a natural tendency for those in the helping professions–to try and resolve the pastoral issue by
“solving” the problem which brings the person to you. Try and stick with the pastoral issue itself, and bring
the person into a deeper relation with God, which is usually should be the focus of the encounter. Remember
too that some problems just cannot (or will not) be solved this side of heaven. Entrusting the person and his
or her problem to God’s loving Providence may be the only (and/or best) thing that can be done at this point
in time.
Keep God in the picture. Even if He has to remain in the background for the person you’re talking
to (if that person would not be “ready” for a more explicit referencing of the discussion to God and God’s
loving presence), you should keep in mind that God is very much present and working with and through you.
Stay in the present tense. Many pastoral issues obviously will have their roots in the past, but we
cannot go back in time and change whatever action, decision, event, etc., that had a part to play in bringing
the person to you. However, you can deal with the person in the present and move them to the future. God
forgives the past, He doesn’t “erase” it so that we can then “re-record” our lives in a different way.
Forgiving the past allows us to move ahead (not back) into our present and future.
Be careful of using technical jargon or abstract principles. W hile it is important that you do
know these things, it probably is not overly useful to bring them into your pastoral conversation, except in
rare circumstances when you might want to clarify a key point with the person you’re speaking with.
Be careful of suggesting an action-plan if you don’t know the person’s situation adequately.
One size doesn’t fit all in pastoral counseling, and total honesty may not always be the best policy. For
example, in dealing with a woman who has underwent an abortion some years before she married her present
spouse it may not always the best thing for her to tell her husband. Much would depend on this woman, her
relationship with her husband, and a host of other issues. A related principle would be to try and keep a
number of possible options open or various pastoral strategies so that if one line or approach doesn’t seem to
be working you can then fall back on Plan B or Plan C, and so on.
Track your own feelings and reactions. This is always important, but is absolutely crucial when
dealing with someone whose problem, character, politic leanings, etc., rub you the wrong way. Remember
that your pastoral role rarely (if ever!) would call for you to “judge” the person or get them to ascribe to your
political leanings. This also applies even in cases where you know that you’re “right” and/or in complete
agreement with what the Church clearly teaches on a certain matter. Pastorally the key is to facilitate God’s
working in this person, and God often convinces in subtle and slow ways, so it is important to keep the
person open to God’s Spirit. Remember that true conversion takes time, and may involve a number of
detours.
Don’t feel you have to go it alone. You can make referrals and you can ask others for advice. A
trusted mentor that you check in with periodically can also be helpful as you reflect on your pastoral
experiences and approaches. Nevertheless, remember that the person did come to you, and if you make a
referral too quickly or too easily they may feel either rejected or that their problem is so great or that their sin
is so terrible that they cannot easily find help or forgiveness. Yet, do not try to handle a situation or question
which you realize is clearly beyond your competence. You can say “Let me pray about this a bit and let’s
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meet again,” or “Part of your issue involves a technical question (e.g., a point in canon law) that I am not
sure of, and I’ll need to clarify this point with someone better versed (assuring them that this will be done in
both an anonymous and confidential manner!).” Don’t be afraid to ask one of your old teachers or someone
in the parish or diocesan office for help in these sorts of cases.
A Final Note: Keep the person in your prayers. Not everyone will be in a place where they might
feel comfortable to actually pray with you, or to be prayed over, but I think with most people you can let
them know that you will continue to keep them in your prayers–which means that you are telling them that
God continues to keep them (and you!) in His provident care, concern, and love. Please remember that as
God’s minister you are also in His special care as well!
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APPENDIX 3: EXEGESIS AND INTERPRETATION OF M AGISTERIAL DOCUM ENTS
Prepared by James T. Bretzke, S.J., S.T.D.
a. No text is self-evident, nor self-interpreting, nor self-applying (all texts need to be first
translated, read, understood, interpreted and only then applied)
b. All texts are not created equal (just as the Church is hierarchical, so some texts are more
authoritative than others depending on the character of the content, the manner in which
the text is presented and under whose authority the text is given)
c. The “latest” text is not necessarily the most authoritative (one needs to look carefully at the
manner and level of authority of the text)
d. There is no “The Vatican” which exists as a monolithic entity (one needs to look carefully
at who authors the text and at the type of authority the text itself carries)
e. The language used in the text does not necessarily mean the same as in general idiomatic
usage (one needs to be clear on technical meanings of certain words, concepts, formulae,
and so on)
b. W hat do all the words mean in that language? Do they mean exactly the same in this
language? W here might be some changes in nuance, loss and/or confusion of meanings?
c. Are there differing possible translations? (E.g., for obsequium religiosum [Lumen gentium
#25]or intrinsece inhonestum [Humanae vitae #14]
d. Are there technical meanings which might be different from the usual vernacular usage?
E.g., “human act” (actus humanis) or “intrinsically disordered” or sub secreto.
93. After Translation Move to Exegesis, Using the Basic Tools of Exegesis
94. Guidelines for Interpreting Magisterial Teaching Given in Vatican II (Lumen gentium #25)
i. Not all truths are of the same importance, and thus the Church explicitly states
there is a hierarchy of truths necessary for salvation.
ii. The character of the teaching and the manner of teaching may be on different
levels (e.g., we can have a “lower” doctrine on the hierarchy of truths, yet have it
proclaimed at the highest level of authority, such as the Marian doctrine of the
Assumption.
274
b. Frequency of repetition
i. Errors are “corrected” and/or teaching is “changed” not by saying “we were
wrong” but by ceasing to repeat a certain position, e.g., the teaching that interest-
taking was intrinsically evil.
ii. Even some teachings that have been “frequently repeated” over a long period of
time still can be changed (e.g., the teaching on freedom of religion, which was
explicitly condemned by Gregory XVI and Pius IX, but which was affirmed by
Vatican II in Dignitatis humanae).
iii. Under whose authority is this text issued, even if it is meant to explain something
else? (E.g., the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Responsum to the
presumptive infallibility of John Paul II’s Ordinatio Sacerdotalis)
a. Distinction (where applicable) between “ideal” and “fulfillment” commands and legislation
c. Legal world-view of Roman (Italian) law; minimalism is not necessarily a vice nor the
same as laxism according to this legal culture.
96. Levels of authority of Magisterial teaching based on the manner in which it is proposed:
b. Conciliar teachings, which themselves have differing levels of authority (e.g., Constitution,
Decree, Declaration)
c. Papal Encyclicals (addressed to all people? to the whole Church? to a particular area or
group?)
f. Apostolic Letters given "motu proprio" (e.g., a personal letter written by a pope either to
the whole church, a local church, or some particular group or body; or used to issue norms,
establish a new institute, restructure various situations, etc.)
275
97. Documents of Roman Dicasteries (Offices of the Vatican)
98. Mode of dicasterial promulgation, e.g. issued In forma communi or In forma specifica
a. In forma communi: without specific papal approbation, through with his approval. The
vast majority of Vatican documents issued by the various congregations and dicasteries are
in this mode. Dominus Iesus is an example.
b. In forma specifica: with papal approbation in which the pope explicitly takes over and
makes his own (i.e., as if issued in his name) a document promulgated by a Vatican office.
This is rare, and the most recent example is the 1997 Vatican “Instruction on Some
Questions Regarding Collaboration of Nonordained Faithful in Priests’ Sacred Ministry”
99. Magisterial teachings of individual bishops and Bishops' Conferences likewise must be looked at in
terms of the above considerations of exegesis and manner of teaching, etc.
a. Nisi clauses (the exception is the rule!) The law often states an ideal, and the application is
found through the stated exceptions and modifications.
b. Odia restringi et favores convenit ampliari (This principle of canon law interpretation
holds that burdens or strictures are to be interpreted in a narrow sense of application, while
on the other hand favors are to be widely applied. [cf. Canon 18])
c. Automatic and imposed penalties and extenuating circumstances (i.e., latae and ferendae
sententiae). One size does not fit all! and the focus is on the pastoral care of the individual
involved rather than the punishment of the crime.
d. Vacatio legis (delay between promulgation and implementation; this is done so that proper
refinements, exceptions, dispensations might be obtained before the law goes into effect)
e. Custom has the force of law: Consuetudo optima legum interpres. People(s) and their
lived history are what counts.
276
papal document, nor is it a collegial document of all the bishops of the Church in the sense
of a conciliar document.
b. The stated primary purpose of the Catechism is to provide an aid for bishops and bishops’
conferences (the designated primary audience) in the preparation of catechetical materials
better adapted to the needs of their individual dioceses. The Catechism is not meant to be
the universal, exhaustive, and ultimate highest authority of Church teaching for each and
every person(s), place or situation.
c. The Catechism often uses brief excerpts from other Church documents to make its points,
and therefore, it is crucial to pay attention to the footnotes given in the Catechism as these
will give the fuller text that the passage in the Catechism is treating. These individual texts
in turn would enjoy their own “authority” based on the principles outlined above. Thus,
other things being equal a quotation from Matthew’s Gospel in reference to a certain point
would have greater weight than the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s Persona
humana.
d. The Catechism generally speaking does not claim to be “new” Church teaching, and it
would be misleading to suggest that the sum of the many different parts which make up the
Catechism would somehow be greater than the individual texts themselves or that the
Catechism supercedes any major Magisterial document outlined above.
a. All of the above considerations are part of the Tradition of the Church in the official
exercise of the Magisterium and thus are explicitly recognized and accepted by the
Magisterium itself.
c. Technical skill is certainly necessary to do the above, but a more apt metaphor would be an
artistic performance rather than a mechanical operation. Seen in this metaphor a given
magisterial text might function a bit like a musical score: the notes, time value, key, etc.,
are all given, but the level of “perfection” in the execution of the score depends much on
the virtuosity of the performer. A computer, Jim Bretzke, and Glenn Gould might all
“perform” a Bach variation, with reasonable “accuracy” in terms of sticking to the musical
score. However, there is little doubt that most if not all listeners could easily discern
whose performance was whose, and probably there would be widespread, if not
unanimous, agreement about which performance is “best” (Jim Bretzke’s grandmother
being long dead!).
d. Remember the ultimate norma normans non normata: It is God’s definitive revelation of
God’s self in Jesus Christ, and Jesus’ own ministry and Gospel message which stand above
the whole Church, including all of its members, regardless of their rank and office.
Bretzke, James T., S.J. Consecrated Phrases: A Latin Dictionary of Theological Terms.
Collegeville: Liturgical Press: 1998.
277
This book-length dictionary compiles, translates, and explains the meaning of a large number of
Latin terms employed in the various branches of theology: moral, biblical, canon law, systematic,
liturgical, and historical). Going beyond a simple dictionary, this work indicates the meaning,
context, and tradition for these phrases, and serves also as a concise theological encyclopedia,
though limited in scope to Latin terms.
Sullivan, Francis A., S.J. Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the
Magisterium. New York: Paulist Press, 1996.
Very good for developing an understanding of how to exegete and interpret the various levels of
teaching contained in Vatican documents. Helpful in dogmatic theology as well. Good historical
examples are used to illustrate the various points.
278
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INDEX
N.B. This Index was largely prepared using key terms and word searches. Therefore, to
obtain as many references as possible consult synonyms for various terms. For example,
see both “birth control” and “contraception” to obtain all the entries in this area.
Thomistic, 7
6 C’s, 5, 11, 21, 164, 174, 193, 205, 236 apartheid, 184
Abelard, 91 Apostolicam actuositatem, 170
abortion, 5, 87, 98, 99, 132, 196, 201, 215-217, approved authors, 120
221, 224, 235 Aristotle, 45, 117
Absolute, 53, 55, 74, 78 arms industry, 135
absolutes Arregui, Antonio, 30
moral, 61, 115 artificial insemination, 59
abusus non tollit usum, 199 ascetical theology, 47
accidents, 90, 94, 100, 197 assent
acculturation, 134, 140 authority, 158, 167
actus hominis, 54 believers, 154, 167
actus humanis, 274 conscience, 65
actus humanus, 27, 54, 91 faith, 167
actus naturae, 55 intellectual, 168
actus personae, 55 obsequium, 168
adaptation, 50 See also obsequium religiosum, 65
addiction Auer, Alfons, 39, 170
sin, 124 Augustine, 24, 25, 46, 58, 100, 194
Address to Italian Midwives, 83 Confessions, 77
adult education, 252, 254 sermon on sin, 122
adultery, 193, 196, 253 authority, 9, 63, 67, 70, 72, 77, 106, 152, 154,
Advocate, 155 155, 157, 165, 169
Aeterni patris, 10 absolute, 158
affective dimension, 11 apostolic, 36
affectivity, 222, 243 authoritarianism, 153
After The Choice biblical, 4, 156, 183, 188
post-abortion program, 235 bishops, 164, 167, 171, 175, 233, 276
aggressor breakdown, 204
unjust, 94, 95 charisms, 162
aging, 228 Christian, 156, 185
AIDS, 66, 132, 217 confessors, 177
AIH, 207 conscience, 62, 72, 177, 178, 253
allocutions dialogic, 158
papal, 275 dissent, 169
Always Our Children, 198 levels of, 174, 275
America, 255 levels of , 275
anathema, 36 Magisterium, 5, 33, 63, 69, 72, 104, 152,
anger, 128, 130, 223, 251 153, 155, 159, 160, 162, 164,
anointing of the sick, 227 166, 168, 169, 200, 202, 203,
Anselm of Canterbury, 91 206, 231
anthropology moral, 63, 70
cultural, 15, 51, 105 of reason, 27
philosophical, 173 papal, 34, 167
theological, 14, 15, 28, 33, 43, 45, 46, patriarchal, 17
48, 70, 77, 104, 224, 237 Protestant, 153
295
public, 95 brain death, 225, 232, 250
religious, 157 Brave Sinning, 125, 137
sanctions of, 6 Bretzke, James, 37, 50, 54, 72, 235, 274, 277
spousal, 210 Natural Law Overview, 104
superego, 82, 83 bribery, 134
teachers, 34, 167 Broad, C.D., 2
textual, 205 Brody, Baruch, 88
autonomy, 4, 42, 43, 62, 70, 166, 219, 220, 222 brotherhood, 123, 235, 246
bioethics, 225 Buddhism, 41
conscience, 62 Bujo, Bénézet, 41
moral, 62 burdens, 169
avarice, 128 Burggraeve, Roger, 51
Baptism, 150, 203, 236 Burke, Margaret Ellen, 143, 145
Barnabas, 169 business ethics, 6, 134
Barth, Karl, 4, 215 Caffarra, Carlo, 40, 170
Baum, Gregory, 144 Cahill, Lisa Sowle, 40, 115, 191, 204, 218, 221,
beatitudes, 237, 238, 248 222, 250, 254
Beauchamp, Tom, 223 Callahan, Daniel, 216, 228
Bellah, Robert, 53 canon, 7, 161, 184, 188, 190, 236
Bellarmine, Robert, 28 canon law, 27, 30, 47, 151, 169, 178, 215, 245,
Bellow, Saul, 161 276
beneficence, 225 canon-within-the-canon, 7, 8, 156, 189, 190
bestiality, 213 canonicity, 7
bias, 16 canons of fidelity, 235
biblical interpretation, 252 capital punishment, 87, 186
bioethics, 12, 46, 56, 92, 98, 135, 173, 192, 216, Caravaggio, 239
223-229, 235, 250 Casti connubii, 24, 25, 36, 199
Biblical, 227 casuistry, 18-20, 23, 27, 29, 30, 33, 113, 130,
birth control, 204, 210, 212, 213, 226 189, 238, 245
Birth Control Commission, 38, 199, 210 Catechesi tradendae, 186
Birth Control Commission, 38, 199, 210 Catechism for Filipino Catholics
bishops, 34, 163, 164, 167, 168, 175, 204, 231 extraordinary means, 233
Bishops Conferences, 163, 175, 190, Catechism of the Catholic Church, 90, 91,
203, 276 125-128, 197, 205, 225, 248
Pennsylvania, 231 common good, 225
Synod, 123, 143, 186, 248 conscience, 62, 64
Bishops’ Institute for Social Action finis operis/operantis, 91
BISA, 148 fonts of morality, 90
Black, Peter, C.Ss.R., 198 grave matter, 126
Bland, Tony, 232 homosexuality, 198
Böckle, Franz, 39, 104, 108, 109 Ignatius' Presupputio, 205
Boff, Leonardo, 145 Levada, 165
Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum morality and spirituality, 247
vitandum, 109, 112, 133 mortal sin, 126
Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque nature and authority of, 276
defectu, 88 personal sin, 125
bonum fidei, 58, 210 sexuality, 197
bonum prolis, 58 social sin, 139
bonum sacramenti, 58 subsidiarity, 160
indissolubility, 210 sufficient awareness, 126, 127
Boyle, John P., 152, 155 venial sin, 128
Boyle, Patrick, 33, 105, 115 celibacy, 214
296
Celtic penance, 149 Chrysostom, John, 12
Centesimus Annus, 35 Cicero, 45
subsidiarity, 160 circumstances, 15, 18, 20, 23, 24, 28, 70, 74, 89,
certitude, 170 90, 92, 94, 95, 101, 102, 111,
change 114, 115, 127, 133, 134, 164,
moral teachings , 5 176, 177, 187, 199, 207, 212,
character, 3, 18, 27, 44, 45, 55, 60, 68, 76, 129, 213, 229
180, 181, 185, 236, 238, 242, civil disobedience, 135
243, 246 classicist world-view, 10, 14, 16, 17, 32, 33, 56,
charism 195, 205, 206
of infallibility, 167 cloning, 198
of office, 161, 172, 249 coitus, 16, 56, 213
charisms, 162 coma, 232
charity, 29, 36, 37, 101, 118, 130, 133, 180, 182, Comblin, Joseph, 41
202, 247, 250 commandment
chastity, 201 fulfillment, 177
Childress, James, 2, 223 goal, 177
Chosen People, 1 commensurate reason, 95, 97
Christ, 4, 124, 237 Commentary on Romans
authority, 167 Thomas Aquinas, 107
Body of, 9, 36 commercialism, 184
command, 182 Commission, 276
disciples, 167, 185, 238 common good, 44, 45, 63, 71, 95, 120, 132, 147,
doctrine, 167 179, 225, 227
faith, 172 law, 106
freedom, 52, 241 Common Ground, 5
grace, 125 common morality, 221
Holy Spirit, 241 communion
image, 244 bishops, 167
Imitation, 186 freedom, 53
kingdom, 130 God, 47, 139, 154
law, 109 God and the Church, 149
mission, 115, 237, 241 Holy, 30
morality, 52 people, 139
Mystery of, 37, 182 People of God, 154
name, 167 person, 44, 209, 212
New Life in, 51, 54, 112, 194, 247 saints, 8
person, 208, 244 Scripture, 189
Peter, 156 sexual, 212, 213
promise, 237 communitarianism, 222
revelation of, 160 community, 4, 6-8, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 44, 51, 54,
Saved in, 51 60, 71, 75, 85, 112, 118, 130,
servant of, 157 135-139, 163, 179, 182-184,
solidarity, 52 186, 188-190, 197, 208, 210,
teaching, 202 217, 227, 230, 236, 238, 243,
United in, 47, 146, 245 244, 246-248, 251, 252
vicar of, 157 compromise, 40, 132-135, 214
vocation of the faithful in, 37 conception, 223
way, 130 condom, 17, 132, 217
Christiansen, Drew, 244 confession, 28, 54, 67, 68, 80, 81, 83, 122, 123,
Christlikeness, 124 128, 129, 138, 148, 149, 151,
Christology, 4, 51, 104, 115 177, 214, 227, 242, 249
297
individual, 140 sufficient, 23, 81, 126-128
Confirmation, 236 consequentialism, 100-102, 209
Confucianism, 41, 45, 51, 105, 144 Constitution, 275
Congregation, 276 Constitutions of the Society of Jesus and Their
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 59, Complementary No, 6
82, 126, 140, 165, 168, 169, Consuetudo optima legum interpres, 276
175, 176, 192, 198, 209, 223, Contemplation in Action, 248
231, 275, 277 Contemplation to Obtain the Love of God, 2
fundamental option, 82 continence
Liberation Theology, 139 periodic, 83
conjugal love, 17, 93, 198, 210 contra naturam, 3, 59, 100
Conn, W alter E., 74-76 contraception, 3, 13, 16, 17, 24, 101, 115, 178,
conscience, 32, 53, 54, 61-64, 67, 69-74, 76, 196, 199, 201, 207, 213
82-84, 89, 103, 108, 111, 112, Familiaris Consortio, 147
115, 120, 126, 127, 161, 166, finitude, 102
168, 171, 177, 178, 180, 182, gradualism, 147
197, 253, 254 conversion, 4, 61, 65, 75, 92, 121, 129, 135, 136,
(not) burdening, 151, 177 138, 139, 142, 148, 150, 158,
and superego, 76, 77, 82 185, 194, 249
anterior, 84, 85 gradualism, 147
autonomy, 62, 225 cooperatio in malum, 132
Bretzke's "Spiral of", 72 cooperation in evil, 129-131, 134, 135
Catechism of the Catholic Church, 62, formal, 131, 134
64 material, 131, 134
certain, 65 coram Deo, 78
Church authority, 171, 177, 178 Corriden, James, 178
collective, 67 cost benefit analysis, 228, 230
compromise, 133 Council, 276
delicate, 130, 177 Couture, Roger, 116, 117
Dignitatis humanae, 62 Covenant, 1, 112, 135, 136, 142
doubtful, 65 moral law, 103
erroneous, 65-67, 74, 85, 177 cover stories
error, 62, 63, 69-71 social sin, 140
formation, 65, 67, 70, 163, 177, 180, creation, 6, 13, 26, 42, 45, 48, 56, 162, 183, 194,
182 209, 240, 247
freedom of, 34, 72, 253 stance, 13
Fuchs, 73, 74 credibility, 6, 11, 200, 204, 216, 236
fundamental, 73 criticism, 176
Fundamental Option, 78 Cross, 6, 183, 187, 190
Gaudium et spes, 62 cross-cultural, 7, 141, 144, 181
Lonergan, 74, 75 Crowe, Michael, 104
manualist tradition, 27 cult of forgiveness, 145
O'Connell, 84-86 cultural narratives, 140
personalism, 61 social sin, 141
posterior, 84 culture, 5, 10, 13, 16, 23, 33, 49, 50, 52, 60, 61,
sanctity of, 62, 63, 65, 70-72, 168, 179, 67, 70, 104, 105, 113, 114,
253 125, 147, 155, 169, 176, 211,
sanctuary, 62 221, 222, 224, 229, 235, 242
situational, 73 American, 144
consensus Confucian, 144
false, 153 non-W estern, 43, 105, 134
consent social sin, 140
298
therapeutic, 138 discourse
curia, 275 biblical, 188
Curran, Charles, 11, 15, 32, 40, 43, 47, 66, 70, ethical, 19, 20
98, 102, 103, 106, 108, 115, moral, 5, 11, 17-21, 51, 163, 164, 204,
126, 152, 154, 168, 175, 207, 221, 228
204-207, 214, 218, 254 narrative, 18, 19
custom policy, 20
law, 276 prophetic, 17
Daly, Mary, 218 Six-C's, 5, 6, 21, 164
David varieties, 17-21, 149
and Nathan, 122 disease, 138
Davis, Henry, 31 disordered, 59, 214
Day of Atonement, 142 dispensation, 116-118, 120, 177, 178
de fide, 162, 174, 275 dissent, 70, 104, 115, 169-171, 175-177, 206,
death, 18, 92, 99, 118, 123, 184, 216, 223, 249
228-230, 250 Maritain, Jacques, 203
dignified, 231 divorce, 215
death penalty, 196, 253 doctrine
Decalogue, 1 development of, 35, 196, 253
Declaration, 275, 276 Doepfner, Cardinal, 208
Decree, 275 Doering, Bernard, 203
deductive approach, 10, 105, 206, 208 Dominus Iesus, 276
definition Donum Veritatis, 168
irreformable, 36 Donum vitae, 198, 223
Dei verbum, 154 dotage, 127
Demmer, Klaus, 39, 42, 92, 108, 115, 116, 173, double effect, 87, 88, 92-94, 96, 98-100, 133
226 Dublanchy, 30
demography, 200 Dulles, Avery, 28, 169, 176, 177
deontology, 2, 17, 94, 114, 115, 177, 179, 181, Dunwoodie, 170
209, 236, 246 Dussel, Enrique, 41
DeParle, Jason, 216 duties, conflict of, 177
deposit of faith, 159, 165, 167, 168 duty, 83
despair negative, 83
sin of, 78 positive, 83
desuetude, 114, 178, 276 Easter Duty, 28
Deus impossibilia non iubet, 24 ecclesia discens, 158
Deus semper maior, 78 ecclesia docens, 158
dialogue, 5, 6, 8, 86, 102, 148, 169, 188, 223, ecclesia semper reformanda, 148, 152
244, 249 ecclesiology, 4, 115, 163, 165, 171, 246
inter-religious, 6 ecology, 6, 15, 51, 177, 183
dicastery, 276 economics, 139, 183, 220, 229, 235
Dignitatis humanae, 35, 37, 48, 49, 61, 65, 72, ectopic pregnancy, 98
168, 275 ecumenism, 6, 252
discernment, 3, 71, 85, 118, 119, 135, 148, 152, Editio typica, 274
153, 161, 179, 180, 184, 188, education
209, 230, 240, 242-244, 248, adult, 252, 254
254 Edwards, Jonathan, 243
Rules for (Ignatian), 184, 242, 252 ego, 76
discipleship, 2, 6, 45, 112, 184-186, 239, 244, Elliot, T.S., 22
246, 248 emotions, 11
culture, 49 Enlightenment, 44
moral law, 103 ensoulment, 235
299
envy, 128 expert in humanity
epikeia, 39, 99, 116-118, 134, 178, 179 Magisterium, 159, 160
equiprobabilism, 120, 228, 234 extra ecclesia nulla salus est, 63
error extraordinary means
objective, 63 justice, 234
eschatology, 6, 18, 134, 184, 185 facticity, 53, 132
ethical discourse, 19-21, 51 Fagan, Gerald M, S.J., 153, 154
ethnocentrism, 140 failure
ethos, 18, 20, 23, 50, 51, 67, 68, 106, 138, 155, moral, 170
161, 224, 230, 242, 249 faith, 4, 8, 9, 19, 36, 51, 154, 159, 162-165, 167,
ethos critique, 144 170, 172, 211, 227, 241, 248
euthanasia, 87, 224, 230, 231, 233, 254 virtue, 78
evangelical counsels, 245 faith and morals, 36, 162, 167, 211
Evangelii nuntiandi false consciousness, 145
inculturation, 49 Familiaris Consortio, 147
Evangelium vitae, 87 contraception, 147
evangelization, 49, 68, 105, 248 Farley, Margaret, 40, 159, 192, 218-222
Evans, Michael, 48 feminism, 7, 11, 17, 125, 145, 216, 218-223, 249,
evil 251
intrinsic, 5, 39, 90, 94, 98, 100, 114, Liberal, 219, 220
115, 138, 193, 198, 201, 214, Marxist, 220
226 Radical, 220
lesser of, 3, 94, 132, 133, 166, 201, 214 Socialist, 221
moral, 68, 88, 91, 92, 95-97, 99, 115, ferendae sententiae, 276
133, 212, 213 fertility, 210, 223
ontic, 91, 92, 96-99, 114, 115, 133, fetus, 12, 99, 235
212-214 fide vel moribus, 162
ex cathedra, 36, 167, 174, 275 fidelity, 63, 153, 171
ex imperfectione actus, 128 authority, 153
ex parvitate materiae, 128 bonum fidei, 58
ex toto genere suo, 128 Church, 153
excommunication, 34, 38 conscience, 65, 66, 111
exegesis, 172, 176, 190, 205, 229, 234, 274 creative, 22, 112, 152, 207, 243, 278
Magisterial documents, 274 Häring, 22, 112, 207, 243
existentialism, 45 Magisterium, 152, 164, 171, 278
exitus et reditus, 107 obsequium religiosum, 153
experience, 160, 192, 233, 247 Spirit, 154, 163
American, 38 Fiedler, Maureen, 172, 252
community, 8, 190 Fields, Sally, 93, 227
conscience, 73 filial piety, 144, 158
conversion, 139 Finding God in all things, 248
data, 13 finis operantis, 91, 92, 111
evil, 138 birth control, 202
hermeneutics of, 15 finis operis, 91, 111
human, 10, 11, 16, 23, 67, 105, 109, birth control, 202
119, 139, 145, 151, 166, 195, finis operis semper reducitur in finem operantis,
217, 247 91
lay people, 11 finitude, 102
liminality, 249 Finley, Mitch, 211
marginalized, 11 Finnis, John, 40, 103, 234
married people, 193 Fletcher, Joseph, 38, 40
women's, 220, 221 flourishing, Christian, 124
300
fontes moralitatis, 24 Gill, Robin, 15
fonts Gilléman, Gerard, 36
of moral theology, 4, 63, 71, 238 Gilligan, Carol, 54, 218, 221
fonts of morality, 24, 90, 94 Gilson, Etienne, 57
Ford, John, 203 Ginters, Rudolf, 103
forgiveness, 6, 61, 121, 125, 138, 146, 148, 182, Glaser, John, 54, 76, 77, 82, 83
194, 236 globalization of ethics, 15, 50
cult of, 145 Gloria Dei Vivens Homo, 46
forma communi, 175 gluttony, 128
forma specifica, 175 goodness, 1
formal cooperation, 131, 134 Gould, Glenn, 277
fornication, 193, 194 Grabowski, John, 160
Fowl, Stephen, 189, 191 grace, 4, 6, 24, 25, 29, 51, 53, 79, 80, 82, 108,
Francis de Vitoria, 29 109, 125, 129, 137, 142, 143,
Franco-Prussian W ar, 36 145, 150, 152, 182, 194, 209,
Frankena, W illiam, 88 211, 236, 241, 242, 247-249
Frankl, Victor, 51 actual, 24, 29, 151
freedom, 52, 53, 59, 63, 68, 71, 78, 79, 81, 109, and sin (Lutheran), 124
112, 120, 129, 143, 205, 206, and the natural law, 107
241 sanctifying, 24, 29, 150
basic or core, 53, 78, 80 social, 25, 145, 147
of debate, 164 gradualism, 147
peripheral, 80 Graneris, Giuseppe, 31, 64, 66, 126, 127
religious, 35, 61, 72, 252, 275 Greene, Graham, 30
friendship Gregory the Great, 127
marriage, 200 Gregory XVI, 34, 71, 275
with God, 48, 180, 241, 242 Grenz, Stanley, 245
Fuchs, Josef, 3, 26, 39, 42, 43, 58, 65, 66, 73, 78, Grisez, Germain, 40, 103, 171, 203, 234
87, 89, 93, 99, 101-103, 105, Gritsch, Eric W .
108, 110-112, 115-118, 144, (not) burdening, 125
152, 157, 161-165, 170, 176 guilt, 54, 67, 68, 76, 77, 82, 114, 130, 136, 138,
compromise, 133 139, 214
conscience, 133 corporate, 145
fundamental option, 53, 77, 123, 126, 180, 193, false, 130
211, 212 neurotic, 136
Congregation for the Doctrine of the shared, 131
Faith, 82 guilt-feelings, 84, 177
Magisterium, 80 Guindon, André, 192
Persona humana, 82 Gula, Richard, 32, 45, 71, 77, 85, 104, 106, 111,
fundamentalism, 187 180, 182, 224, 244, 254
Galileo, 253 Guroian, Vigen, 237, 238
Gallagher, John, 22 Gury, Jean Pierre, 94
Gallagher, Raphael, 23 Gustafson, James, 12, 16-21, 39, 42, 187, 188,
Gasser, Bishop, 170 238, 242
Gaudium et spes, 38, 48, 50, 52, 55, 59, 66, 67, Gustafson, James M., 149
69, 72, 93, 123, 163, 168, 170, Haight, Roger, S.J., 142
189, 246 Hamel, Ronald, 22
gender, 183, 191, 192, 196, 204, 219-221, 250 Hanigan, James, 151, 192, 197, 209, 210,
General Congregation 212-215, 254
34th Jesuit, 153 Häring, Bernard, 22, 37, 38, 42, 51, 67, 69, 83,
genetics, 226 108, 112, 120, 123, 151, 185,
genocide, 140
301
197, 207, 211, 224, 226, 227, Hunthausen, Raymond, 192
235, 240, 241, 243, 246 Hürth, Francis, 36
harmatia, 135 hydration, artificial, 231, 233
Harrison, Beverly W ildung, 218 hysterectomy, 99
Hauerwas, Stanley, 19, 23, 45, 48, 103, 217, 238, hysteria, 127
241 id, 76
Hayes-Moore, Louis, 233 ideology, 145
Hays, Richard, 183 Ignatius of Loyola, 2, 184, 205, 242, 250
health care, 234 ignorance
Healy, Edwin, 31 invincible, 65, 66
Henriot, Peter, 143 vincible, 65, 67
heresy, 34, 87, 103, 137, 161 imagination, 11
heretics evil, 184, 248
burning of, 111 imagination, moral, 19, 20, 181, 184, 242
hermeneutics, 7, 15, 50, 92, 101-103, 106, 112, imago Dei, 46
115, 169, 173, 183, 190, 205, impediment, 177
234, 274 imperfectione actus, 128
heteronomy, 63 imperialism, 140
hierarchy of truths, 274 impossibility
Higgins, Gregory, 254 physical or moral, 177
Himes, Kenneth, 22 Imprimatur, 126, 192
historical world-view, 14, 16, 17, 32, 56, 205 In forma communi, 276
holiness, 1 In forma specifica, 276
Hollenbach, David, 40, 44, 47, 48 in-vitro fertilization, 223, 226
Holy Office, 34 incarnation
Holy Spirit, 8, 9, 21, 38, 54, 124, 154, 155, 159, culture, 49
161-163, 167, 171, 199, 202, stance, 13
203, 236, 241, 242, 244, 245 inculturation, 41-43, 51, 105, 134
consensus, 154 indefectibility
fidelity, 153, 154 Church, 237
Holy W ar, 184 indissolubility
Holy Year, 275 bonum sacramenti, 210
Homilectic and Pastoral Review, 170 individualism
homosexuality, 59, 193, 207, 208, 213-215 rugged, 144
Always Our Children, 198 inductive approach, 10, 206
Catechism of the Catholic Church, 198 infallibility, 36, 152, 154, 163-165, 167, 170,
Hoose, Bernard, 88, 89, 93-96, 98-101, 103, 115, 203, 252
116, 171, 172, 194-197, 214 bishops, 167
hope claims and limits, 160
virtue, 78 definition, 161
Hosea, 121 Magisterium, 154
Hsu, Francis, 43 natural law, 165, 166
hubris, 135 Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, 275
Hughes, Gerard, 103, 217 Pastor Aeternus, 164
human action, 10, 27, 59, 63, 69, 70, 87, 91, 98, Vatican I, 34, 35
106, 119, 142 Vatican I , 164
human acts injustice, 7, 12, 132, 143-145, 188, 189, 221
finitude, 102 subsidiarity, 160
manualist tradition, 27 institution, 143, 148
human rights, 15, 44, 48, 49 Institutiones theologiae moralis, 29, 245
Humanae vitae, 5, 38, 83, 87, 153, 192, 198, 199, Instruction, 276
202, 204, 274
302
Instruction on Some Questions Regarding John
Collaboration of Nonorda, 175, sin, 121
276, 293 John Paul II, 1, 35, 36, 52, 72, 87, 123, 159, 186,
intention, 23, 24, 58, 59, 79, 83, 88, 90-92, 198, 210, 275, 276
94-99, 102, 111, 115, 117, 126, Centesimus Annus, 160
131, 133, 167, 213 Familiaris Consortio, 147
lawgiver, 117 John XXIII, 199
procreative, 213, 214, 253 Mater et magistra, 160
Inter Insigniores, 5, 153 Seminary Instruction in Latin, 178
inter-religious dialogue, 6 Johnstone, Brian, 13, 32, 56, 58, 59
intercourse, 195, 199, 210, 211, 213 Jonas, Hans, 65
internalization, 143 Jone, Heribert, 30
intoxication, 126 Jones, L Gregory, 138
intrinsece inhonestum, 201, 274 Jones, L. Gregory, 48, 139, 189, 191, 241
intrinsece malum, 24, 39, 100, 115 Journet, Charles, 203
intuition, 11 Jubilee, 136
involvement, 148 justice, 18, 98, 139, 179, 181, 183, 188, 189, 220,
Iranaeus, 46 222, 225, 235
Irish Theological Quarterly, 255 bioethics, 225
iudicium de actu ponendo, 64 extraordinary means, 234
iudicium de positione actus, 64 legal, 117
ius naturale, 106 social, 42, 124, 142, 143
ius vigens, 178 Kaczor, Christopher, 94
IVF, 226 Kant, Immanuel, 44, 217
Jaggar, Alison, 219 karma, 43
Jansenism, 120 Keane, Philip, 192, 211, 212
Janssens, Louis, 14, 39, 42, 59, 87, 91-93, 96, 97, Keeling, Michael, 42, 43, 57, 60, 61, 195
114, 123 Keenan, James, 21, 39, 88, 254
Jennett, B., 232 Keillor, Garrison, 25
Jenson, Robert W ., 125 Kelly, Kevin, 123, 191, 215, 231, 232
Jerome, 12, 85, 182, 194, 195 Kennedy, Terence, 103
Jesus, 6, 102, 118, 122, 123, 156 Kiely, Bartholomew, 102
authority, 237 Kingdom of God, 18, 102, 130, 139, 142, 156,
disciples, 3, 18, 23, 47, 210, 237 184, 185
discipleship, 112, 240 Kingdom of Heaven, 2
faith, 172 Knauer, Peter, 87, 93, 94, 97, 100
Grisez, 171 knowledge
Holy Spirit, 8 sufficient, 23, 81, 126, 128
James and John, 156 Kohlberg, Lawrence, 54, 181
leprosy, 227 Kopfensteiner, Thomas, 39, 83, 229-231
Lordship, 184, 185 Koran
Magisterium, 164 sacred claim, 9
ministers, 186 Kosnik, Anthony, 192
mission, 115 Kotva Jr., Joseph J., 179, 182
Peter, 156 Lambeth Conference, 199
revelation, 184 Lambino, Antonio, 41
risen, 9, 18 Lamentabili, 35
sin, 138, 239 Lammers, Stephen, 224
Spohn, 183 Langan, John P., 10
temptations, 136 Lanza, Antonio, 31
Trinity, 47 latae sententiae, 276
values, 103 Latin, 1, 54, 64, 135, 178
303
law, 106 Lumen gentium, 47, 69, 155, 167, 169, 170, 205,
common good, 106 246, 274
custom, 276 lust, 24, 25, 128, 209, 218
divine, 32, 68, 87, 117, 119, 161, 170 Lustigier, Cardinal, 132
doubtful, 119, 120 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 44, 45, 48
eternal, 32, 57, 107, 108, 170 MacNamara, Vincent, 83
human, 32, 68, 107, 117 Macquarrie, John, 2, 104
impossibility, 117 Magis, 248
inhumanity, 117 Magisterium, 4, 7, 9, 16, 33, 63, 71, 72, 83, 93,
lawgiver, 117-119 152-155, 158-164, 168,
manualist tradition, 27 170-172, 176, 198-200,
natural, 10, 14, 16, 27, 28, 31, 32, 39, 202-204, 206, 211, 233, 235,
53, 56, 57, 87, 96, 103-109, 249, 253
111, 116-118, 133, 151, 159, authority, 159
162, 165, 166, 170, 200, 207, concrete moral norms, 114
218, 235, 247 expert in humanity, 159, 160
New, 107, 108 fundamental option, 80
of nature, 106, 109 monetary policy, 159
Old, 107 natural law, 87, 104, 159, 162, 163, 165,
reason, 106 166, 170, 171
laxism, 120, 129, 225, 275 obsequium religiosum, 168, 171
Lebacqz, Karen, 188, 189 sensus fidelium, 154
lectio continua, 8, 190, 208, 238 social & personal sin, 140
sin, 121, 122 Maguire, Daniel, 40
Leers, Bernardino, 41 Mahoney, John, 22-25, 28, 29, 87, 104, 113,
legalism, 57, 76, 118, 119 118-120, 134, 135, 162, 164,
Leo XIII, 10, 35 196, 223, 225, 229, 235, 250
Letter, 276 Mandate of Heaven, 105
Levada, W illiam, 165, 166 Manichaeism, 24
lex aeterna, 108 manualist tradition, 4, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 36, 92,
lex dubia non obligat, 119 94, 105, 123
lex indita non scripta, 108 manualistic tradition, 66
lex scripta, 109 Maritain, Jacques, 44, 47, 103
liberalism, 34, 71 birth control, 202
liberation, 148 Markham, Ian S., 5
Liberation Theology, 7, 11, 41, 42, 123, 145, 183 marriage, 55, 58, 59, 79, 82, 93, 143, 178, 194,
Congregation for the Doctrine of the 196, 197, 199, 200, 202, 210,
Faith, 140 213, 215, 226, 253
social sin, 139 second, 215
Liguori, Alphonsus, 38, 68, 69, 120, 151 unitive end, 56, 197, 198, 212, 214
invincible ignorance, 66 Marxism, 123, 220, 221
liminality, 225, 249, 250 Liberation Theology, 139
Lio, Rev., 208 social sin, 139
liturgy, 4, 8, 162, 190, 215, 219, 237, 238, 240 Mary, 159
locutio contra mentem, 100 massa damnata, 24
Lonergan, Bernard, 14, 16, 32, 54, 56, 74, 75 masturbation, 101, 126, 207, 208, 213, 214
Longfellow, Sandra, 192 Mater et magistra, 160
Lordship of Jesus, 184, 185 material cooperation, 131, 134
Louvain School, 39, 42 material norms
Louvain Studies, 255 See norm, material, 61
love matter
virtue, 78 grave, 23, 81, 126, 128
304
light, 126, 128 Murray, John Courtney, 38, 104
matter, sinful, 23, 77, 81, 126, 168, 214 Mystical Body , 47
May, W illiam E., 40, 104, 234 narrative, 17-20, 45, 217, 238, 242
McCormick, Patrick, 124, 137-139, 254 nationalism, 184
McCormick, Richard, 22, 39, 50, 88, 90, 102, natura actus, 55
103, 115, 152, 169, 218, 224, natural family planning, 59, 211, 214
231, 233, 234, 254 natural law, 10, 11, 14, 16, 27, 31, 32, 39, 53, 66,
McInerny, Ralph, 103 87, 96, 104, 106, 107, 110,
McManus, James, 207 133, 195, 207, 218, 247
means and grace, 107
direct/indirect, 98 and the New Law, 107
ordinary/extraordinary, 228-230, 233 Bretzke's schema, 104
media, 201 Christology, 104
medical ethics, 52, 93, 183, 211, 223, 224, 226, confessors, 151
227, 232, 235 dispensation, 118
Meilaender, Gilbert, 47, 49, 228 epikeia, 39, 99, 116, 117
metanoia, 135, 150 eternal law, 108
Middle Ages, 12, 91, 117, 125 evangelization, 105
middle axioms, 113 Exitus et reditus, 107
migration, 210 hermeneutics, 106
minimalism, 42, 47, 76, 120, 130, 246, 247, 275 history, 104, 105
Minjung theology, 41 inculturation, 105
minority, 141 law of nature, 106
minus malum, 132, 133 lex indita, 109
Mirari Vos, 34, 71 Magisterium, 159, 162, 165, 166, 170,
mission, 2 200
Modernism, 35 moral manuals, 105
monetary policy moral norms, 103, 109, 111, 118, 165,
Magisterium, 159 166
Moore, G.E., 89 Nominalism, 27
moral absolutes normatively human, 110
See absolutes, moral, 33 order of nature, 56
moral act, 94, 95, 100, 101, 115, 212 personalism, 62, 105
social sin, 140 physicalism, 57
moral action, 91, 92 probabilism, 235
moral agent, 44, 45, 54, 86, 91, 115, 179, 217, Protestant, 27, 159
246 recta ratio, 118
moral autonomy, 4, 42, 43, 62, 70, 166 reformulation, 118
moral norm, 1, 13, 39, 54, 55, 58, 88-90, 110, revelation, 103
119, 135 scientia naturalis, 108
moral norms, 18, 21, 31, 87, 89, 97, 103, Scripture, 103
110-112, 115-117, 119, 166, secondary principles, 207
187, 188, 211, 217, 220 sexual ethics, 87, 106
moral theology, 1, 2 ST I-II, q. 94, 107
moral vision, 3, 19, 77, 181, 183, 184, 216, 217, St. Paul, 107
240, 242 Veritatis Splendor, 109
Moralia, 255 naturalistic fallacy, 59, 107
Moser, Antonio, 41 Naughton, Michael, 160
motherhood, 227, 235 Nelson, James, 192
motu proprio, 174, 275 Neo-platonism, 24
munus, 154 Neo-scholasticism, 14, 22, 56, 195
murder, 63, 68, 71, 102, 177 New Law
305
and the natural law, 107 Eastern, 42, 215, 237
NFP, 211 orthodoxy, 35, 161
Nichomachean Ethics, 117 orthopraxis, 23
Niebuhr, H. Richard, 18, 39, 42, 146, 184, 243, Osiek, Carolyn, 223, 251
248 Outside the Church there is no salvation, 63
Nihil obstat, 126 Overberg, Kenneth, 254
nihilism, 43 O’Keefe, Mark, 16, 143-145
Nisi clauses, 276 Palazzini, Pietro, 31, 127-129, 208
nominalism, 26, 27, 29, 157, 245 parable, 5, 19, 150
nonmaleficence, 225 Paraclete, 155, 244
Noonan, John T., 13, 67, 196, 253 paradigm, 13, 33, 48, 50, 55, 56, 102, 106, 112,
norm 155, 236
ecclesial, 174, 275 personalist, 14, 59, 93
material, 23, 61, 114, 166 physicalist, 14, 55-57, 195
norma normans, 13, 24, 145 sexual ethics, 206
norma normans non normata, 7, 9, 277 shift, 16, 28, 32, 56, 69, 249
norma normata, 9 sin, 123
norms paradigm shift, 139
concrete, 74 social sin, 139, 140
Notification, 276 parenthood
nutrition responsible, 178, 197-200, 210, 226
artificial, 231, 233 pars propter totum, 92, 226
O'Connell, Timothy, 84, 85 particularity, 74
O'Donnell, Thomas, 231 parvitas materiae, 128
O'Keefe, Mark, 29, 82, 83, 244-246, 254 parvitas materiae in sexto, 33
O'Riordan, Sean, 38, 207 parvus error in principiis, 4
obedience, 24, 26, 62, 70, 87, 116, 119, 120, 123, passion, 127, 201
135, 136, 169, 171, 202, 237, Pastor Aeternus, 36
245 infallibility, 164
objectivity, 74, 229 Pastoral Spiral, 148
obsequium religiosum, 153, 168, 169, 274 patient, medical, 225, 232, 233
See also assent, 153 autonomy, 225
occasion of sin, 129 care of, 226, 229
proximate, 129 patriarchy, 17, 220, 221
remote, 129 Paul, 169
Ockham, W illiam of, 26 sin, 121
Octogesima Adveniens, 114, 160, 164 Paul VI, 49, 83, 87, 114, 159, 160, 164, 198, 199
Odia restringi et favores convenit ampliari, 276 Paul VI, Pope
Odia restringi, et favores convenit ampliari, 169, Ratzinger, Joseph, 176
178 peccatum/a, 135
odium theologicum, 234, 250 peira, 136
Office, 276 peirasmos, 136
Ognino method, 203 peirazo, 136
Onan, 203 Pelagianism, 122
oppression, 141, 145 Semi-, 125
Optatam Totius, 37, 182, 190 Pelikan, Jaroslav, 8
Opus Dei, 41, 170 penalty, 169
order of nature, 56 penance
order of reason, 56 Celtic, 149
ordination, 251 public, 149
orgasm, 213 tariff, 149
Orthodox Penance, Sacrament of, 28, 202
306
Penet, Mary Emil, 42 prayer, 8, 129, 136, 178, 227, 240, 246, 247
Penitentials, 23 pre-marital sex, 208, 209, 213
Pennsylvania Bishops, 231 precepta magis propria, 114
People of God, 155, 171, 246 preferential option for the poor, 2
per accidens, 94, 99 presumption
Perfect Society sin of, 78
Church, 28 pride, 128
perfection, 1, 42, 44, 47, 97 priesthood, 251
Persistent Vegetative State, 231, 232 ministerial, 28
Persona humana, 82, 192, 207, 277 of believers, 236, 251, 252
personalism, 13, 14, 39, 48, 56, 59, 60, 93, 105, Primacy, Papal, 34, 176
191, 197, 204, 206, 208, 226 primum non nocere, 225
weaknesses, 61 Primus inter pares, 157
Peschke, Karl Heinz, 127-132 principalism
Peter Lombard, 91 bioethics, 225
petting, 213 privileges, 169
Philippines, 234 Pro-Choice Movement, 216, 217
Philo, 12 Pro-Life Movement, 216
philosophia perennisis, 9 probabiliorism, 42
physicalism, 13, 44, 48, 55-59, 92, 195, 198, 206, probabilism, 42, 65, 94, 120, 225, 228, 231, 234,
207, 226 235
physis, 227 extrinsic, 120
Pieris, Aloysius, 41 intrinsic, 120
Pilarczyk, Daniel, 175 procreation, 3, 12, 25, 59, 83, 93, 195-200, 207,
pilgrimage, 1 209, 210, 212, 213
Pinckaers, Servais, 26, 27, 40, 90 premoral value, 98
Pius IX, 28, 34, 71, 275 professional ethics, 134
Pius X, 35 promiscuity, 209
Pius XI, 24, 36, 160 proof-texting, 82, 156, 190
Pius XII, 36, 83, 226, 229 prophetic discourse, 17, 19-21, 135, 238
Place, Michael, 248 prophets, 17, 21, 136, 142, 156
Plantinga, Cornelius, Jr., 124 proportionalism, 38, 39, 87, 88, 90, 92-94, 96,
Pliny, 12 99-101, 115, 131, 177, 180,
Plum, B., 232 214, 230
pluralism, 134, 216 critique, 102
policy discourse, 20, 21 proprium, 19, 21, 70, 185
Political Correctness, 6, 63, 72, 161, 216 Protestant ethics, 22, 23, 33, 42, 47, 88, 119, 137,
politics, 6, 10, 19, 20, 34, 71, 82, 139, 153, 159, 153
187, 189, 216, 220, 221, 234 natural law, 159
Pontiff, Roman, 36, 167, 168 providence
Pontifical Council Cor Unum, 147 eternal law, 107
Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of prudence, 65, 68, 118, 130, 133, 134, 225
Migrants, 147 Psalm 51, 122
poor, 1 punishment, 121, 138, 217
population, 210 capital, 87, 186
Populorum Progressio, 159 purity laws, 12
Porter, Jean, 104, 107 PVS (Persistent Vegetative State), 163, 231-233
positivism, 43, 69 Quadragesimo anno, 160
possessions, 2 quality of life, 228, 230, 233
postmodernism, 222 Quanta Cura, 34, 71
praeter intentionem, 94, 99 Quay, Paul, 16
praxis, 8, 23 Quevido,Msgr. Orlando O.M.I., D.D., 148
307
qui tacit consentire censetur, 131 repentance, 138, 148, 150, 158
quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur, Augustine on David, 122
161 Rerum Novarum, 35
Quinn, Archbishop John, 34, 153, 176 responsibility, 23, 49, 54, 65, 84, 85, 108, 130,
infallibility, 160 133, 139, 145, 181, 205-207,
Rabben, Linda, 172, 252 210
racism, 140 Responsum, 275
Rahner, Karl, 12, 50, 54, 78 resurrection, 6, 18, 46, 187, 190
Ramsey, Paul, 88, 153, 235 resurrection destiny
Rational Claim, 13 stance, 13
rationalization retardation, 127
personalism, 61 Revealed Reality, 18, 40
Ratzinger, Joseph, 102, 154, 159, 176 Revelation, 4, 8, 9, 31, 32, 37, 53, 101, 103, 154,
reason, 12, 109, 110, 118, 127, 201, 219, 222, 159, 160, 165, 167, 168, 170,
239 182, 184, 187, 203, 241
circumstances, 90 rhythm method, 201, 209, 211, 213
human, 15, 57, 109, 113 Rich Young Man
law, 106 Mt 16:19-22, 1
moral, 32, 51, 56, 85, 113, 181, 199 Rigali, Norbert, 43
order of, 56 Rigorism, Moral, 40, 120, 126
practical, 64, 113, 163, 164 Risorgimento, 28
proportionate, 95, 96, 98-100, 115, 212, Robb, Carol, 218
213 Roberts, Julia, 93, 227
speculative, 113 Rodman, Monika, 235
reception/non-reception Rogers, Eugene F., Jr., 107
canon law, 178 Roma locuta, causa finita, 9, 203
Reconcilatio et Paenitentia, 123 Romans, 107
Reconciliatio et Paenitentia Rosato, Philip, 240
social sin, 139 Ruether, Rosemary Radford, 218
reconciliation, 4, 61, 76, 121, 139, 148-151, 183, Rules for Thinking with the Church, 153
185, 194 Rynne, Xavier, 38
Reconciliation, Sacrament of, 149-151 sacraments, 27, 30, 47, 150, 215, 240
recta ratio, 87, 108, 109, 118, 133 Sacred Claim, 9
redemption, 6, 185, 240, 242 Sacred Heart, 121
stance, 13 salvation, 4, 34, 37, 42, 46, 65, 71, 101, 109, 115,
Redemptor Hominis, 72 120, 164, 174, 182, 241, 274
Redemptorist School, 38 Trinity, 47
reform sanctity, 86
criticism, 176 conscience, 62, 63, 65, 70-72, 168, 179,
papacy, 34, 176 253
Reformation, Catholic Counter, 29, 125, 245 of life, 235
Reformation, Protestant, 27, 29 sanctuary
refugees, 48 right of, 62
Regan, Augustine, 83 sanctuary of conscience, 62
Reich, W arren, 192, 224, 230, 233 Sanhedrin, 62
Reidy, Maurice, 197 Sapp, Stephen, 228
relationality, 97, 222 scandal, 129, 130, 138
Trinity, 47 active, 130
relationality-responsibility model, 207 of the weak, 130
relativism, 11, 90 passive, 130
religious liberty, 34, 196, 253 scandalum pusillorum, 130
remarriage, 215 Schasching, Johannes, 36
308
Schneiders, Sandra, 8, 9, 158, 183 institutional, 142
Schrage, W olfgang, 183 John, 121
Schubeck, Thomas, 145, 146 lectio continua, 121
Schüller, Bruno, 39, 88, 89, 103, 239 Lutheran position, 124
scientia naturalis, 108 mortal, 140
Scripture, 4, 7-9, 14, 16-18, 37, 40, 47, 63, 71, occasion of, 129
84, 164, 182-184, 186-192, of commission, 127
196, 205, 237, 238, 240, 244 of omission, 127, 147
sacred claim, 9 original, 24, 97, 103, 125, 195
scruples, 32, 54, 81, 92, 127, 129, 130, 132, 136 Paul, 121
secrets personal, 140
revelation of, 101 serious or mortal, 23, 24, 80-82, 125,
sed contra, 94, 107 127, 128
seduction, 129 sin-solidarity, 136, 139, 145, 185
Seesman, Heinrich, 136 social, 41, 54, 65, 137, 139, 140, 143,
self-defense, 94, 95, 100 145, 254
self-mutilation, 92, 226 stance, 13
Selling, Joseph, 39, 105, 159 venial, 24, 125, 126, 128, 140, 195
semi-wakefulness, 126 Sin-solidarity, 142
semper et pro semper, 83, 127, 177 Situation Ethics, 38, 40, 90
semper sed non pro semper, 127, 177 slavery, 5, 13, 52, 71, 114, 196, 253
sensus fidelium, 154, 162, 203 slippery slope, 198, 199, 201, 228
Servus servorum, 157 sloth, 128
sexism, 219 Smith, W illiam, 40, 170, 171, 234
sexual ethics, 6, 16, 25, 33, 46, 55, 56, 82, 83, 87, Sobrino, Jon, 139
106, 159, 160, 183, 191, 192, social analysis, 139
194, 195, 198, 204-210, social grace, 145, 147
212-215, 250, 252, 254 social location, 11
sexuality, 25, 58, 160, 191, 192, 195, 197, 198, social sin, 139, 142, 144, 147, 254
204, 208, 209, 212, 214, 215, cover stories, 140
218, 254, 255 sola gratia, 137
Augustinian, 25, 195 sola scriptura, 28
New Testament, 196 solidarity, 52, 146, 147
Patristic views, 194, 195 Sollictudo Rei Socialis, 159
Song of Songs, 196, 208 soteriology, 139
Sgreccia, Elio, 198, 199 source criticism, 172, 274
shalom, 1 species
sin as disturbance of, 124 circumstances, 90
Shannon, Thomas, 224 moral, 90, 94, 99
Shelton, Charles, 181 sin, 28
signs of the times, 189, 209 Spiritual Exercises, 2
simul iustus et peccator, 28, 137, 249 spirituality, 4, 8, 23, 29, 47, 123, 124, 147, 148,
sin, 4, 6, 23, 24, 57, 62, 67, 69, 81, 82, 86, 89, 152, 192, 218, 220, 236,
95, 97, 100, 103, 110, 120-125, 244-249, 251, 252
127, 129-132, 134-138, 145, Ignatian, 248
151, 155, 177, 183, 185, 190, Spohn, W illiam C., 19, 40, 42, 104, 182, 184,
194, 195, 201, 209, 215, 227, 187, 243
230, 236, 239, 247-249, 252, Stafford, Francis, 215
254 stance
Biblical understandings, 121, 141 Charles Curran, 13
capital, 127 Curran and Gustafson, 15
habitual, 129 Steel Magnolias, 93, 227
309
Steichen, Donna, 219 theologia moralis, 23, 68
Steinbeck, John, 68 theologians
stem cell, 223 role of, 112, 152, 168, 175, 176, 206
sterilization, 201, 207 Theological Studies, 255
Stoicism, 24 Theology and Sexuality, 255
Stortz, Martha Ellen, 4 theotokos, 159
Stratton, Henry, 207 therapeutic culture, 138
structure Thiel, John, 5, 152
social, 143 Thomas Aquinas, 7, 10, 11, 26, 30, 32, 33, 45,
structures of sin, 144 53, 55, 63, 77, 82, 85, 87, 88,
Studia Moralia, 255 90, 91, 94, 96, 98, 100, 103,
Studies in Christian Ethics, 255 104, 106-109, 113, 114, 117,
Suarez, Francis, 29, 117, 245 126, 133, 180, 207, 241
sub secreto, 274 conscience, 64
subjectivism, 11 Thomas de Vio, 29, 245
subjectivity, 73, 74 threefold office of Jesus, 154
subjectivtiy, 229 tien-ming, 105
submission tolerance, 132, 134, 135
of the will, 167, 168, 171, 176, 205 totality, 59, 67, 92-94, 112, 200, 226, 227
wifely, 17 Tracy, David, 236
subsidiarity, 160 Tradition, 4, 5, 7-9, 16, 28, 110, 162, 190, 192,
Catechism of the Catholic Church, 160 238, 252, 253
Centesimus Annus,, 160 Magisterium, 277
Mater et magistra, 160 sacred claim, 9
Quadragesimo anno, 160 Traina, Cristina, 11, 74
suicide, 63, 71, 177 Transcendental Thomism, 39, 54, 74
Sullivan, Francis, 104, 152, 168, 174, 176, 278 Trent, Council of, 27, 34, 129
Summa Theologiae, 24, 29, 55, 88, 90, 92, 94, Trible, Phyllis, 218
103, 106, 109, 113, 114 Trinity, 3, 47, 154, 241
summum bonum, 26, 78, 240 tutiorism, 42, 87, 94, 119, 120
Super epistolas S. Pauli lectura, 107 unitive end, 56, 197, 198, 212, 214
superego, 53, 54, 76, 77, 83, 84, 163 universal morality, 218-222
supererogation, 245 universal saving will, 78
Syllabus of Errors, 34, 71 unjust
symbolic systems, 145 see injustice, 143
synderesis, 64, 71, 84 unrighteousness, 122, 135
syneidesis, 64, 84 Untener, Kenneth, 204
system, 143 usury, 5, 114, 178, 196, 252, 253
Tablet, 255 ut in pluribus, 98, 99, 114, 230, 233
taboos, 12 uterine isolation, 231
Tanner, Norman, 125 utilitarianism, 100, 102, 228
tariff penances, 149 utopia, 18, 114
tautology, 109, 154 Vacatio legis, 276
Tavard, George, 162, 164 vainglory, 111
taxes, payment of, 135 values
Teaching, 169 premoral and moral, 97
technology, 230 Vatican I, 36, 165, 170
teleology, 2, 3, 17, 177, 179, 245 infallibility, 34, 35, 164
temptation, 129, 136 Vatican II, 28, 35, 37, 38, 47, 48, 59, 65, 69, 72,
Ten Commandments, 1, 31, 245 92, 123, 129, 154, 163, 168,
tenenda, 36 171, 173, 197, 209, 246, 274
Tertullian, 46, 194 morality, 105
310
Verhey, Allen, 224
Veritatis Splendor, 52, 55, 65, 67, 71, 72, 79, 80,
87, 109, 115, 153, 163, 168,
248
fundamental option, 79
Fundamental Option theory, 79, 82
Mt 16:19-22, 1
Vermeersch, Arthur, 36, 95
Veterum Sapientia, 178
vice, 3, 12, 31, 67, 127
victimization, 138
Vidal, Marciano, 38
Vietnam, 11
virtually exceptionless norms, 115, 209
virtue, 3, 27, 29, 31, 45, 59, 70, 76, 82, 118, 120,
134, 150, 167, 177-181, 185,
208, 216, 217, 225, 236, 241,
242, 245-248, 254
ethics of, 179, 181
virtues, 92
virtuosity, moral, 242, 243
Visser, Rev., 208
vitalism, 230
Voluntarism, 25, 26, 32, 42, 57, 67, 69, 87, 119,
157
W adell, Paul, 82, 180, 247
W alter, James, 4, 39
war, 183, 215
W eakland, Rembert, 35
W ear, Diana, 251
W eber, Helmut, 134
W hitehead, Alfred, 243
W ildes, Kevin, 228
W ilson, George B., S.J., 169, 170
W ilson, Jonathan, 242
wisdom
God, 107
W ittgenstein, Ludwig, 5
W ollstonecraft, Mary, 220
W oods, W alter J., 149, 150
works rigtheousness, 182
W orld Council of Churches, 153
W oywood, Stanislaus, 30
Yoder, John Howard, 113
Yom Kippur, 136, 142
youth, 127
Zalba, Marcelino, 30, 40
Zeitgeist, 209
Zielgebot, 177
311