Technology vs CA (193 SCRA 147)

Facts:

Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they
received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the
petitioner’s plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office of the mayor
some documents, including the Building permit, mayor’s permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.

Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without notice,
caused the padlock of company’s plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of its operation.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction
against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled
against the company. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant. YES.
(2) Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion. NO.

Ruling:

No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of
the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the
then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor
of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he
may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures
are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the
operation of the business.

The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant
whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so
that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following:

a. Building permit;
b. Mayor's permit; and
c. Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.

This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.

The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made. It found that the fumes emitted
by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been
installed.

Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building
permit issued by an official of Makati.

While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission
on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend
or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of
the residents of the community.

Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must
be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the
economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the
deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy (GR 180771)

Facts:
In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with JAPEX, a 100%
Japanese corporation, which was later converted to a service contract, known as SC-46, for the exploration,
development and utilization of petroleum resources in an area that basically affects the Tanon Strait. The President at
that time was not a signatory to the SC-46 and such contract was not submitted to the Congress for review.

Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of marine life and is declared by laws as
a protected seascape. When JAPEX started its seismic surveys and drilling activities over the area, petitions were filed
assailing the constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the activities for its ecological impact was in the name
of “Resident Marine Mammals” – which are literally toothed whales, turtles and such, joined in by human petitioners
referred to as “Stewards”, in their representative as well as personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was also impleaded as an
unwilling co-petitioner, purportedly because of her express declaration and undertaking under the ASEAN Charter to
protect habitats and other environmental concerns.

FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the area, also questioned the SC-46 on the
ground that service contracts are no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution, and that if it were, SC-46 is still null
and void because it did not comply with the Constitution, most especially the safeguards that the Court laid down in La
Bugal B’laan case.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the “Resident Marine Mammals”, or animals in general, have standing as the real party-in-
interests in this suit
Held:

Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen’s suit. A citizen’s suit under this rule
allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations
yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute
actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
REPUBLIC v. CA and BERNABE (G.R. No. L-40402)

FACTS:

Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral
Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965 such lot was segregated from the forest zone and released
and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an Agricultural Land for disposition under the Public Land Act.

On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 to perfect their
rights and register their titles to said lots. They alleged that they acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of
land by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the herein
respondents, has always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of owners for
more than 30 years.

The Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the above petition but later withdrew the same upon verification of
findings that this portion of the timberland had already been released from the mass of the public forests.
Subsequently, the Acting Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands filed his opposition alleging
that the land is STILL Public Land and as such cannot be the subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496.

The lower court adjudicated in favor or respondent Bernabes, finding that the latter have complied with all the terms
and conditions entitling them to a grant. This decision having become final, the Commissioner of Land Registration
issued the corresponding decrees of registration. On the other hand, petitioner DL through the Solicitor Gen. filed a
petition for review of the decrees. Afterwards, he filed an Amended Petition for Review, adding: that respondents
executed simulated deeds of sale conveying portions of the subject parcels to third parties for fictitious considerations
in order to remove the same from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act 496, but in truth, buyers are mere dummies of
petitioners; hence, not purchasers for value.

The CFI denied this petition and on appeal, the CA affirmed the questioned decision. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the subject of a judicial confirmation of title under
sec. 48 (b) of commonwealth act 141 as amended by r.a. 1942.

HELD: NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public lands.
Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. Thus, possession of forest lands, however long cannot ripen
into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond
the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.

Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not
qualified for a grant under Section 48 (b) of CA 141. They can only be credited with 1 year, 9 mos. and 20 days of
possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965 when the lots involved had been segregated
from the forest zone and released by the BOF as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. As such,
respondents and their predecessors in interest could not have possessed the lots for the required period of 30 years
as disposable agricultural land.
Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture (G.R. No. L-36847)

Facts:

The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less,
situated in Escalante, Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond
purposes, several persons filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes.

The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio
Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then
still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes.

On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the
Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondentsappellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed
their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953.

When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available for
fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the
aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April
10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-
appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal).

Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3,
Rec. on Appeal). "In an order dated April 5,1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question
into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective
applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be
declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the Priority Rule established in FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 is applicable to
fishpond applications
(2) Whether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged
in this case.

Held:

(1) The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954.
It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease
permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their applications. After the area was
opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngson’s application and
rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngson’s priority of application.
We reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the
provision of a statute should be given controlling weight.

All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over
another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to
the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given
some kind of administrative preferential treatment.

(2) The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the
provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The
private respondents, who filed their applications within the one year period, do not object to sharing the area
with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond
leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary’s order states that all three applications must be
considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries
and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. WHEREFORE, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
Petitioner-Appellant.
Tan vs Dir. of Forestry (G.R. No. L- 24548)

Facts:

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15,
CFI rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation
comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine
Government

On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the
necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the
deadline (p. 29, rec.).ch Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-
appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award,
bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by
the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.

On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon - who succeeded Secretary
Cesar M. Fortich in office - issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which
state: SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30, 1963 - 1. In order to acquaint the
undersigned with the volume and Nature of the work of the Department, the authority delegated to the Director of
forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses
where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses
for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of' new licenses ,
including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources shall be considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago
Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for
reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant
thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.

Issue:

Whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action.

Held:

Petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of his petition
as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of World
Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that if from the
face of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties it claims
to have been levied upon and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the said
complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further held
that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly appears
that the claim of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly,
petitioner-appellant's petition must be dismissed due to lack of cause of action. The welfare of the people is the
supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric
Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit
all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).

As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The
utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry.
However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered
and removed from any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate
officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of
the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of
control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of
subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31,
1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry.
There being supporting evidence, the revocation of petitioner appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the
power of the respondent- appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid. Thus, "this
Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to which the alleged right to
them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so
again" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national
patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS
AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

11 TAN vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY (G.R. No. L- 24548)

Facts:

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued a notice advertising for public bidding a tract of public forest
comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland land situated in Olongapo, Zambales. On May 5, 1961, petitioner Tan
submitted his application.

On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry, that the
area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed purposes and that the bids
received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the timber license in the area during the public bidding conducted
be rejected. Secretary Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings of the Director of Forestry
who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under
certain conditions," to declare the forest area involved as a forest reserve ratify than open it for timber exploitation
under license and regulation would do more harm than of to the public interest.

The area was awarded to petitioner, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry.

On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Gozon — who succeeded Secretary Fortich in
office — issued General Memorandum for the delegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary
timber licenses. Thereafter, Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing
secretary Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on General memorandum Order revoking the
authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, to grant ordinary timber licenses,

On the same date that the memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW)
dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Bernal without the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company, another bidder for the timber license, wrote a letter to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that Ordinary Timber License in the name of Tan be cancelled on the
ground that the grant thereof was irregular, and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.

On March 9, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Tan, as having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and
is therefore void ab initio and that The Director of Forestry is directed to stop the logging operations of Tan, Petitioner
moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion

Petitioner filed the instant case before Court of First Instance, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory injunction, claiming that the respondents unlawfully and acted with grave abuse of discretion
by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property
without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts.

The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss alleges the following grounds: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction;
(2) that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all available
administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and
discretionary functions of administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources joined the motion to dismiss on the ground: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that venue is
improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without its consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere
in purely administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public policy

The trial court dismiss the case on the ground that there is no sufficient cause of action. Petitioner appealed directly
to the SC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action.

2. WON Petitioner has exhausted all his administrative remedies before filing to court.

3. WON the action will prosper against the respondents considering the doctrine of State immunity from suit.

4. Supposing that petitioner timber license is valid, can the respondents still validly revoke his timber license?

HELD:

1. NO. He is estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to
dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the
rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency must be
determined only from the allegations in the complaint.

The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed. It is of
public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water.
As a matter of general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper utilization
of natural resources, which includes the country's watershed.

The Court concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license was signed and released
without authority by then Acting Director Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. petitioner was released
only on January 6, 1964. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to
release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void
license.

2. NO. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No.
238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve.
Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the
failure of the petitioner to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.

3. NO. Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as
officers of the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. This being the case,
petitioner's action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.

4. YES. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation"
Mustang Lumber vs C.A. (G.R. No. 104988)

FACTS:

The authorities got wind of a suspicious stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs that were seen inside the
lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Readily, the said organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumber yard. During the sting operation, the team members
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. On
23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No.
NRD-4- 092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's
permit should not be cancelled.

On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had
already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted. In resolving
the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which
was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber
without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate
that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant.

The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified,
a search of a moving vehicle. The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the
confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant
to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the
directive in the warrant.

On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings
based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber , as opposed
to timber , is not penalized inSection 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the samemay not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue
of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90- 53648 of Branch 35of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then
pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure,raises a prejudicial question.

ISSUE:

Whether the complaint charges an offense.

Held:

Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other
forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands. It
follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private respondents
obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section
68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information
validly charges an offense. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads of narra
shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and
shorts of various species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species.

In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31 of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis
for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705
as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.

The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's
conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession
thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is
penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no
definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and
other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other
finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the
market."32 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33
And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
People vs. Que (G.R. No. 120365)

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705. The facts show that
two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information
that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information,
members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in
Laoag City and eventually saw the truck. There were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson Que, who
was the owner of said truck, and an unnamed person. The police then checked the cargo and found that it contained
coconut slabs, but inserted therein were sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required to show a permit,
Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner violated Section 68 OF P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 that amended Section 68, which penalizes
the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, did not indicate the particular
documents necessary to make the possession legal, and considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at
the time of the enactment of said E.O. – YES.

HELD:

Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer to those laws and regulations which were
already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render
the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer
to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative
Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products.

Thus Que’s possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section
68 of P.D. 705. Also, the court rejected Que’s argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products
and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest
products is legal.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: (1) (1) Cutting, gathering,
collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public and, or from private land without any authority; and (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without
the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations. In the first offense, one can raise as a defense
the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR.

In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest
products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime.
Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession
of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum. On the second and third
assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a
poisonous tree." Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right
against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel. We do not agree.