PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON DUMADAG et. al.

G.R. No. 194336 March 11, 2013

Facts: On July 1, 2002, Pilar Development Corp. filed a Complaint for accion publiciana with damages
against Dumagdag and others for allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and consent,
in its 5,613-square-meter property located at Daisy Road, Phase V, Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza, Las
Piñas City. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 481436 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, was designated as an
open space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for
subdivision residents. In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents denied the material allegations of
the Complaint and briefly asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction
and authority over them.

Trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint, finding that the land being occupied by respondent Dumagdag
are situated on the sloping area going down and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the
three-meter legal easement; thus, considered as public property and part of public dominion under Article
502 of the New Civil Code (Code), which could not be owned by petitioner. The court held:

x x x The land title of [petitioner] only proves that it is the owner in fee simple of the respective real properties described
therein, free from all liens and encumbrances, except such as may be expressly noted thereon or otherwise reserved by law x x
x. And in the present case, what is expressly reserved is what is written in TCT No. T-481436, to wit "that the 3.00 meter strip of
the lot described herein along the Mahabang Ilog Creek is reserved for public easement purposes. (From OCT 1873/A-50) and
to the limitations imposed by Republic Act No. 440. x x x

It also opined that Dumagdag and others have a better right to possess the occupied lot, since they are in an
area reserved for public easement purposes and that only the local government of Las Piñas City could
institute an action for recovery of possession or ownership.

CA affirmed the decision referring to Sec. 2 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 99-21 of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the appellate court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed
is located along the creek which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion.
It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact, which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-
meter strip was indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the TCT, it is then estopped from
claiming ownership and enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court, however, the CA noted that the
proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of the contested portion is not the City of Las Piñas,
but the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Section
10111 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 (otherwise known as The Public Land Act).

Issue: 1. Whether the three meter strip along Mahabang Ilog creek is an easement. YES

2. Whether the local government or the republic is the proper party to institute an action for recovery of the
three meter strip. BOTH

Held: 1. Yes. While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner of the servient
estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in
such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "all
matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws
and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title Title VII on
Easements or Servitudes."

DENR A.O. No. 99-21 dated June 11, 1999 provides that: 2.3 Survey of Titled Lands:

2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands:

The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be observed as the above. However, when these lands are to
be subdivided, consolidated or consolidated-subdivided, the strip of three (3) meters which falls within
urban areas shall be demarcated and marked on the plan for easement and bank protection.
The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in the technical description and annotated in the title.
xxxx
2.3.3 Complex Subdivision or Consolidation Subdivision Surveys for Housing/Residential, Commercial or
Industrial Purposes:
When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-subdivided into lots for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes the segregation of the three (3) meter wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams
shall be observed and be made part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216.

Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines which provides:
Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire
length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and
forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the
interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this
zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind.
Thus, the above prove that petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with
respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court cannot
agree with the trial court’s opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have a better
right to possess the subject portion of the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public
easement purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is
public land.

2. BOTH. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local government of Las Piñas City, may
file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of
action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant
provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992). Under R.A. 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the
communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of squatting in
the metropolis, all local government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities
occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways,
and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.

Yet all is not lost for petitioner. It may properly file an action for mandamus to compel the local
government of Las Piñas City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the eviction, demolition, and relocation
of respondents and any other persons similarly situated in order to give flesh to one of the avowed policies
of R.A. 7279, which is to reduce urban dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public health,
safety, and ecology.
 ALICIA B. REYES v. SPOUSES VALENTIN RAMOS, FRANCISCO S. AND ANATALIA
G.R. No. 194488 February 11, 2015
Facts: Petitioner Alicia B. Reyes through Dolores B. Cinco filed a Complaint for Easement of right of way
before the RTC, Bulacan against respondents Spouses Francisco Valentin and Anatalia Ramos. Reyes was the
owner of a 450-sqm. parcel of land in Barangay Malibong Bata, Pandi, Bulacan, which was surrounded by
estates belonging to other persons. She alleged that respondents’ 1,500 sqm. property surrounded her
property, and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. She points out that 113
sqm. portion of the respondents’ property was the point least prejudicial to the easement sought – a vacant
portion near the boundary of respondents’ other lot.

Reyes insisted that her property was not isolated because of her own acts. According to her, both lots were
previously owned by her mother. The respondents’ lot was originally given to one Dominador Ramos, who
was allegedly respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, her mother’s brother and at the same time, the
caretaker of the property. Only 500sqm of the property was given to Dominador who conveyed to himself
the whole lot, including that which was supposed to be access to the barangay road.

Despite demands and willingness to pay the amount, respondents refused to accede to petitioner’s claims.
Respondents contended that:

(1) the isolation of petitioner’s property was due to her mother’s own act of subdividing the property
among her children without regard to the pendency of an agrarian case between her and her
parents.
(2) Property chosen as easement was also most burdensome for them, as there was another open space
which connected the petitioner’s property to another public road.

An ocular inspection was agreed upon and a report was made which was made the basis of the RTC’s
decision: Dismissing the complaint for easement of right of way. The RTC found that the petitioner’s
proposed right of way was not the least onerous to the servient estate of respondents, as there were
improvements (garage, garden, and grotto) placed upon it. It also noted the existence of an irrigation canal
that limited access to public road, where a nearby landowner was able to construct a bridge to connect a
property to the public road. Hence the way through the irrigation canal would appear to be the shortest
and easiest way to reach the barangay road.

Petitioner appealed the RTC’s decision. The CA denied the appeal and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the requisites for the grant of easement.
Petitioner argued that RTC and CA failed to consider that it was not her property that was adjacent to the
irrigation canal but her sister’s. The fact that she had to construct a bridge over the irrigation canal
supported her position that there was indeed no adequate outlet from her property to the public road.

Issue: Whether the petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over the respondents’ property.
NO

Held: NO. Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements for the easement of right of way under the Civil
Code.
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. Based on these provisions these are the requisites needed to be established
before a person becomes entitled to demand a compulsory right of way:

1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway;
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.

Petitioner is bound by her predecessor-in-interest’s act of causing the isolation of her property. Due to her
mother’s own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency of an
agrarian case between her and her parents
Assuming, however, that petitioner or her mother did not cause the isolation of petitioner’s property,
petitioner still cannot be granted the easement of right of way over the proposed portion of respondents’
property. This is because she failed to satisfy the oher requirements for an easement of right of way under
the Civil Code
Proposed easement is not the least prejudicial to servient estate

This court explained in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos that the convenience of the dominant estate's owner is not the
basis for granting an easement of right of way, especially if the owner's needs may be satisfied without
imposing the easement.

The court is not bound to establish what is the shortest distance; a longer way may be adopted to avoid
injury to the servient estate. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. Petitioner would have
permanent structures — such as the garage, garden, and grotto already installed on respondent's property
— destroyed to accommodate her preferred location for the right of way. The cost of having to destroy
these structures, coupled with the fact that there is an available outlet that can be utilized for the right of
way, negates a claim that respondents' property is the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

There is an adequate exit to a public highway.

A neighboring land owner was able to construct a short concrete bridge wide enough even for vehicles to
pass through the irrigation canal from his property to the barangay road. The Court sees no reason why
plaintiff could not do the same and why it would not be allowed if carried in accordance with the
requirements set by NIA. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, a reading of the August 17, 2005 National
Irrigation Administration Letter-Response to petitioner's query regarding the possibility of constructing a
concrete bridge over the irrigation canal shows that petitioner was not really disallowed from constructing a
bridge. She was merely given certain conditions.