Auditor Independence

in the Public Sector

BY STEPHEN W. BLANN
S
tate and local governments serve a variety of stakehold- report notes that while external auditors can contribute to
ers. Some of these (such as creditors and regulatory achieving an entity’s objectives, they are not actually part of
agencies) are very similar to the kinds of stakeholders an entity’s internal control. Instead, external auditors bring
found in the private sector, while others (such as citizens and an “independent and objective view” that provides informa-
their elected representatives) are unique to the public sector. tion “useful to management and the board in carrying out
To meet the diverse needs of these stakeholders, governments their responsibilities.”3 The role of independent auditors,
produce and disseminate general purpose financial state- then, is to assist state and local governments in demonstrat-
ments. However, by themselves, such financial statements ing their accountability, but not to be a part of the internal
might not prove as useful to their intended audiences as could control structure itself.
be hoped. Questions regarding the reliability and accuracy of
the information could make potential users of the financial DEFINING INDEPENDENCE
statements hesitant to base important decisions on data that Like so many terms in the accounting world, “indepen-
might be misstated (either intentionally or otherwise). To dence” means different things to different people. To some,
address those concerns, governments need an objective third it is simply an acknowledgement that someone is not under
party to lend credibility to their financial reporting process,
the control or influence of another party. To others, the
through an unbiased examination of the financial statements
concept of independence means being objective and free
and underlying accounting information. The independent
from bias or prejudice. In the context of financial state-
auditor serves that role.
ment audits, however, independence
is governed by authoritative standard
UNDERSTANDING The very nature of state
setters.
GOVERNMENTAL and local governments demands
ACCOUNTABILITY All financial statement audits of state
public accountability. and local governments are subject to
The very nature of state and
generally accepted auditing standards
local governments demands public
accountability. The unique elements (GAAS). These standards are promul-
of the governmental environment — gated by the American Institute of
from the power to tax, to the restrictions on the uses of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) through its Auditing
funding sources, to the role of the annual budget as a legal Standards Board. The general standard for auditor inde-
appropriation of public funds — all point to the need for pendence is fairly simple, but it can prove somewhat
governments to provide the public with detailed informa- complicated to put in practice: “The auditor must maintain
tion that meets the principles of transparency and account- independence in mental attitude in all matters relating to
ability. This concept has long been recognized by authori- the audit.”4 These standards go on to describe that an audi-
tative accounting standards, which have emphasized that tor’s independence requires impartiality for his findings to
“financial reporting helps fulfill government’s duty to be be dependable.
publicly accountable,”1 and “the independent audit of state However, it is not enough to simply be independent. For
and local government financial statements is considered an the objective of an audit to be met, the auditor must also
essential element of financial control and accountability.”2 be recognized as independent. Since the independent audit
If transparency and accountability begin with financial is intended to provide users of financial statements with a
reporting, then financial reporting begins with internal con- degree of confidence in the reliability of the information
trol. In its landmark report, Internal Control — Integrated being reported, it would be of little value for an organization
Framework, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations to hire an auditor who is distrusted because of a perceived
(COSO) identifies several parties with responsibility for lack of independence. Accordingly, authoritative standards
internal control, including management, the board of direc- require that auditors not only be independent in fact, but
tors (those charged with governance), internal auditors, that they avoid situations that might lead outsiders to doubt
and other personnel in an organization. However, the COSO their independence.5

August 2010 | Government Finance Review 41

 Auditor independence can be impaired by any number of GAGAS approach potential impairments to auditor inde-
factors, ranging from individual or organizational relation- pendence from three distinct perspectives: personal, exter-
ships to the types of ancillary (nonaudit) services provided nal, and organizational impairments.
to a client. The AICPA has developed a comprehensive set Personal impairments result from relationships or beliefs
of rules (professional ethics) for auditors to follow in estab- that might cause an auditor to limit, weaken, or slant audit
lishing and maintaining their independence. findings in any way. Close family members in key manage-
ment positions, significant financial interests (whether
“GOVERNMENT” AUDITING STANDARDS direct or indirect), or responsibility for management func-
tions could all represent personal impairments to an audi-
The AICPA is not the only standards setter in the area of
tor’s independence, as could preconceived ideas and
auditing rules, however. The Government Accountability
biases towards individuals, groups, or organizations.
Office (GAO) also issues a comprehensive set of standards
for auditors to follow, titled Government Auditing Standards. External impairments to independence arise when audi-
Also referred to as generally accepted government audit- tors are deterred from acting objectively and exercising pro-
fessional skepticism by management or employees of the
ing standards (GAGAS), or the “Yellow Book,” Government
audited organization. External interference with an audit,
Auditing Standards builds on the foundation of GAAS laid
including unreasonable restrictions on access to informa-
down by the AICPA and adds additional ethical principles
tion or the ability to override or influence auditor judgment,
and independence standards beyond those provided by the
would constitute an external impairment.
AICPA for performing financial audits.
Organizational impairments arise
Despite their name, however, gen- The role of independent auditors from the relationship between an
erally accepted government auditing audit organization and the entity being
standards are not followed by all gov-
is to assist state and local
audited, either through the legal struc-
ernments, nor is their application lim- governments in demonstrating ture of the audit organization (e.g., a
ited to governmental units. In fact, their accountability, but not to state audit organization that is admin-
GAGAS may be followed by govern- istratively subject to an agency it is
be a part of the internal control supposed to audit) or through the pro-
ments, non-profits, and even for-profit
entities in certain contexts. Generally, structure itself. vision of non-audit services that might
blur the line between independent
organizations are required to follow
external auditors and management.
GAGAS due to one of the following
conditions:
NON-AUDIT SERVICES
n  hey are subject to a single audit conducted in accor-
T
Both GAAS and GAGAS place limitations on the types of
dance with OMB Circular A-133 (for expending at least
non-audit services an audit organization can perform while
$500,000 of federal awards in a single year) still maintaining its independence. Historically, the AICPA
n They are required to follow GAGAS by the terms has taken a slightly more permissive stance on these services
of a contract or grant agreement than the GAO, which holds auditors to a higher standard of
n  hey are required to follow GAGAS by state law
T independence. GAGAS provides two overarching principles
for auditor independence:
or regulation.
n  udit organizations must not provide non-audit services
A
Accordingly, many smaller governments are not required that involve performing management functions or making
to follow GAGAS, or the more stringent rules for auditor inde- management decisions.
pendence they contain. (In these cases, the Government n  udit organizations must not audit their own work or
A
Finance Officers Association recommends that govern- provide non-audit services in situations in which the
ments still voluntarily hold their auditors to the indepen- non-audit services are significant or material to the sub-
dence standards of GAGAS.6) ject matter of the audits.7

42 Government Finance Review | August 2010

 Any non-audit service that violates either of these overarch-
ing principles would impair an auditor’s independence and
disqualify him or her from performing an audit in accordance
with GAGAS. Non-audit services can generally be divided into
three broad categories:
n  on-audit services that do not impair the audit organiza-
N
tion’s independence.
n  on-audit services that would not impair the audit organi-
N
zation’s independence so long as the audit organization
complies with certain supplemental safeguards.
n  on-audit services that always impair the audit organiza-
N
tion’s independence.

Non-audit services that do not impair an audit organiza-

tion’s independence are generally limited to providing
routine technical advice, or operating in a strictly advisory
capacity. Conversely, the types of non-audit services that will
always impair an audit organization’s independence gener-
ally involve auditors performing management functions or
auditing their own work (i.e., violating the two overarching
principles). Examples include maintaining a client’s basic
accounting records, making management decisions, or serv- ENHANCING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
ing as a voting member of the governing body. As stated previously, auditor independence is as much an
issue of appearance as one of fact. Accordingly, there are
In between these two extremes lies a wide array of non-
several simple steps governments can take to improve the
audit services that are permitted, so long as the two overarch-
perceived independence of their external audits.
ing principles are met, and certain supplemental safeguards
are put in place. These safeguards include: Establish an Audit Committee. Auditors work with man-
n  ocumenting the auditor’s consideration of the non-audit
D agement, but they work for the board. Establishing a direct
services. link between the auditors and the governing board is one
way to enhance both the real and perceived independence
n  stablishing a written understanding with the client
E
of the auditors. An effective audit committee provides a
regarding management’s responsibility for the subject
forum separate from management in which auditors and
matter of the non-audit service and any decision making.
other interested parties can candidly discuss concerns, and
n  recluding personnel who provide significant non-audit
P it provides independent review and oversight of a govern-
services from planning, conducting, or reviewing the ment’s financial reporting processes, internal controls, and
related audit procedures. independent auditors.10
n  ot reducing the scope or extent of audit procedures
N
Periodically Bid Out the Audit. Ideally, auditor inde-
below the level that would be appropriate had the non-
pendence would be enhanced by a policy requiring that
audit service been performed by an unrelated party.8
the independent auditor be replaced at the end of the
GAGAS emphasize the need for auditors to apply pro- audit contract, as is often the case in the private sector
fessional judgment in assessing their independence with (either by changing firms or rotating engagement per-
respect to non-audit services.9 While these supplemental sonnel). Unfortunately, the frequent lack of competition
safeguards can provide auditors with a fair amount of among audit firms fully qualified to perform public-sector
latitude, auditors are reminded that their primary duty is to audits could make a policy of mandatory auditor rota-
serve the public interest and honor the public trust. tion counterproductive. In such cases, it is recommended

August 2010 | Government Finance Review 43

 cial statements in conformity with GAAP, both to enhance
auditor independence and to minimize the likelihood of
control deficiencies being reported in connection with the
annual audit.12

CONCLUSION
Auditor independence can be a complex and occasion-
ally murky issue. At its core, however, having an indepen-
dent external audit is a key element in governments, dem-
onstrating their accountability to the public and upholding
the public trust. By maintaining their status as objective
outsiders, auditors lend a degree of credibility to the work of
government finance managers that would otherwise be dif-
ficult to obtain. Together, governments and their indepen-
dent auditors can do what neither can accomplish alone
— assure the public that the financial information provided
by their government is both accurate and reliable. y
Notes
1. GASB Concepts Statement 1, paragraph 3.
2. NCGAS 1, paragraph 168.
that a governmental entity actively seek the participation of
3. COSO Internal Control — Integrated Framework, 2002.
all qualified firms, including the current auditors, assuming
4. AICPA Codification of Statement on Auditing Standards, Section 220.01.
that the past performance of the current auditors has proven
5. AICPA Codification of Statement on Auditing Standards, Section 220.03.
satisfactory. 11
6. GFOA Best Practice, Audit Procurement (2002).
Don’t Use the Audit as a Bookkeeping Service. 7. Government Auditing Standards, paragraph 3.22 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Accountability Office, 2007).
Sometimes, governments rely inappropriately on the annu-
8. Government Auditing Standards, paragraph 3.30.
al external audit as the primary mechanism for getting
9. The GAO has developed a comprehensive Q&A guide related to inde-
their books properly stated in accordance with generally pendence issues for auditors, which is available at http://www.gao.
accepting accounting principles (GAAP). Rather than gov/govaud/ybk01.htm. While the GAO has announced that the 2007
edition of the Yellow Book will be updated in 2010/2011 with a more
taking responsibility for their internal accounting records, principles-based approach to auditor independence that will eliminate
these governments instead view the process of closing this specific guidance, the new principles are expected to be consistent
the books as the auditor’s responsibility. While auditors with the spirit of the current rules.
10. GFOA Best Practice, Audit Committees (2008).
can certainly provide assistance in the preparation of a
11. GFOA Best Practice, Audit Procurement (2002).
government’s external financial state-
12. GFOA Best Practice, Mitigating the Negative
ments, a government’s internal con- Effects of Statement on Auditing Standards
trols should be sufficient to main- Auditors work with management, No. 112 (2007).
tain its books and records accurately but they work for the board.
throughout the year, without auditor
Establishing a direct link between STEPHEN W. BLANN, CPA, CGFM, is a
assistance — especially since financial
data is used by the governing board the auditors and the governing principal with Rehmann, a regional CPA firm
year round, not just at year’s end. The board is one way to enhance both specializing in governmental and non-profit
GFOA recommends that governments auditing. Mr. Blann is the firm’s director of
the real and perceived indepen-
establish and document a system of governmental audit quality and an advisor
financial reporting that is sufficient dence of the auditors. to the GFOA’s Committee on Accounting,
to provide reasonable assurance that Auditing, and Financial Reporting. He can be
management is able to prepare finan- contacted at stephen.blann@rehmann.com.

44 Government Finance Review | August 2010