1 Trade and Investment Development Vs CSC
1 Trade and Investment Development Vs CSC
1 Trade and Investment Development Vs CSC
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 of Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TJDCORP) seeking the reversal of the decision 2 dated
September 28, 2007 and the resolution3 dated March 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP. No. 81058. The assailed CA rulings affirmed the resolutions,4 dated January
31, 2003 and October 7, 2003, of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), invalidating Arsenio
de Guzman’s appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV in TIDCORP. The CA
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration that followed.
Factual Antecedents
Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was submitted to the
In a letter6 dated September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman’s
appointment because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included
in the DBM’s Index of Occupational Service.
Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organizational structure and staffing
pattern for officers and employees of the Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon recommendation of its President, appoint and fix their
remuneration, emoluments and fringe benefits: Provided, That the Board shall have
exclusive and final authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and re-assign personnel of
the TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding.
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profitability. TIDCORP shall be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall, however, endeavor
to make the system to conform as closely as possible to the principles and modes provided
in Republic Act No. 6758.
Lastly, Padilla stressed that the 1987 Administrative Code empowers10 the CSC to formulate
policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and implementation of position,
classification and compensation.
In response to the CSC-NCR’s ruling, TIDCORP’s President and CEO Joel C. Valdes sent
CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David a Letter11 appealing Director Padilla’s decision
to the CSC-Central Office (CO). Valdes reiterated TIDCORP’s argument that RA 8494
authorized its Board of Directors to determine its own organizational structure and staffing
pattern, and exempted TIDCORP from all existing laws on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. Citing Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, et
al.,12 Valdes asserted that the wisdom of Congress in granting TIDCORP this authority and
exemption is a political question that cannot be the subject of judicial review. Given
TIDCORP’s functions as the government’s export credit agency, its Board of Directors has
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been provided flexibility in administering its personnel so that it can hire qualified employees
from the private sector, such as banks and other financial institutions.
In addition, prior actions of the CSC show that it recognized TIDCORP’s exemption from all
laws regarding compensation, position classification and qualification standards of its
employees. The CSC has approved prior appointments of TIDCORP’s officers under its July
1, 1998 re-organization plan. It also approved Mayor’s previous appointment as Financial
Management Specialist IV. Further, a memorandum dated October 29, 1998 issued by the
CSC-NCR noted that "pursuant to Sec. 7 of RA 8494, TIDCORP is exempt from existing
laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards."13
In its Resolution No. 030144,14 the CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCR’s decision that De
Guzman’s appointment should have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s.
1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999. Rule III, Section 1(c) is
explicit in requiring that the position title indicated in the appointment should conform with
the Position Allocation List and found in the Index of Occupational Service. Otherwise, the
appointment shall be disapproved. In disallowing De Guzman’s appointment, the CSC-CO
held that Director Bugtong was simply following the letter of the law.
The CSC-CO also supported the CSC-NCR’s invocation of CSC Resolution No. 011495.
Both the charters of the DBP and TIDCORP have similar provisions in the recruitment and
administration of their human resources. Thus, the ruling in CSC Resolution No. 011495 has
been correctly applied in TIDCORP’s appeal.
Lastly, the CSC-CO noted that the government is not bound by its public officers’ erroneous
application and enforcement of the law. Granting that the CSC-NCR had erroneously
approved an appointment to the same position as De Guzman’s appointment, the CSC is
not estopped from correcting its officers’ past mistakes.
TIDCORP moved to reconsider15 the CSC-CO’s decision, but this motion was
denied,16 prompting TIDCORP to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari17 with the CA. The
petition asserted that the CSC-CO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution
No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037.
The CA denied18 TIDCORP’s petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO in Resolution No.
030144 and Resolution No. 031037. The CA noted that filing a petition for certiorari was an
improper recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition for review under Section
1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, brushed aside the procedural defect,
ruling that the assailed resolutions should still stand as they are consistent with law and
jurisprudence.
Citing Central Bank of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,19 the CA stood by the
CSC-CO’s ruling that it has authority to approve and review De Guzman’s appointment. The
CSC has the power to ascertain whether the appointing authority complied with the
requirements of the law; otherwise, it may revoke the appointment. As TIDCORP is a
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government-owned corporation, it is covered by civil service laws and is therefore bound by
the CSC’s jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to personnel, including appointments.
Further, the CA cited the CSC’s mandate under the 1987 Constitution to approve or
disapprove appointments and to determine whether an appointee possesses civil service
eligibility. As TIDCORP’s charter does not expressly or impliedly divest the CSC of
administrative authority over personnel concerns at TIDCORP, the latter is still covered by
the existing civil service laws on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. Its appointment of De Guzman as Financial Management Specialist IV should
have complied with these rules.
The CA thus concluded that the CSC was well-within its authority when it invalidated De
Guzman’s appointment. It held that an appointee’s title to the office does not permanently
vest until the appointee complies with the legal requirements of his appointment. The
requirements include the submission of the appointment to the CSC for the determination of
whether the appointee qualifies to the position and whether the procedure for appointment
has been properly followed. Until these requirements are complied with, his appointment
may still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority.20
TIDCORP moved for reconsideration21 but the CA denied the motion in a resolution22 dated
March 17, 2008.
In its present petition for review on certiorari,23 TIDCORP argued that the CSC’s
interpretation of the last sentence of Section 7 of RA 8494 (which mandates it to endeavor
to make the system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided in RA 6758)
is misplaced. This provision does not bar TIDCORP from adopting a position classification
system and qualification standards different from those prescribed by the CSC. TIDCORP
asserts that it is not also duty bound to comply with civil service rules on compensation and
position classification, as it is exempt from all these rules. Instead, TIDCORP is only required
to furnish the CSC with its compensation and position classification system and qualification
standards so that the CSC can be properly guided in processing TIDCORP’s appointments,
promotion and personnel action.
Insisting on its exemption from RA 6758 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998,
TIDCORP emphasizes that the provisions of RA 6758, which the CSC applied to TIDCORP,
is a general law, while TIDCORP’s charter, RA 8494, is a special law. In interpreting
conflicting provisions of a general law and a special law, the provisions of the two laws should
be harmonized to give effect to both. But if these provisions cannot be reconciled, then the
special law should prevail because it is a qualification to the general rule.
Further, RA 8494 is a later expression of Congress’ intent as it was enacted nine years after
RA 6758 was approved, and should therefore be construed in this light in its relation with the
latter. A new statute should be interpreted in connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together
– interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi.
Under these principles, TIDCORP argued that Section 7 of RA 8494, the provision of a
special law, should be interpreted as an exemption to RA 6758. Thus, CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, s. 1998, which was issued pursuant to RA 6758, should not have been
applied to limit TIDCORP’s staffing prerogatives.
In its comment,24 the CSC noted that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, as
amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, was issued in accordance with its
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authority to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of civil service laws
and other pertinent laws (Administrative Code), and not pursuant to RA 6758.
The CSC maintained that Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution includes government
and controlled corporations as part of the civil service. TIDCORP, a GOCC, is therefore
covered by the civil service rules and by the CSC. It should submit its Position Allocation List
to the DBM, regardless of its exemption under RA 6758.
Lastly, the CSC argued that RA 8494 should not prevail over RA 6758 because the latter
also applies to GOCCs like TIDCORP; RA 8494 even makes a reference to RA 6758.
Issues
1) Whether the Constitution empowers the CSC to prescribe and enforce civil service
rules and regulations contrary to laws passed by Congress;
2) Whether the requirement in Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 40, s. 1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, applies
to appointments in TIDCORP; and
Directly at issue is the application of Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No.
40, s. 1998, to appointments in TIDCORP. TIDCORP claims that its exemption, embodied
in Section 7 of its charter, precludes the application of this requirement. The CSC, on the
other hand, maintains its stance that appointments in a GOCC should follow the civil service
laws on appointments, regardless of its exemption from the civil service rules on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
While the CSC has authority over personnel actions in GOCCs, the rules it formulates
pursuant to this mandate should not contradict or amend the civil service laws it implements.
At the outset, we clarify that the CSC’s authority over personnel actions in TIDCORP is
uncontested. Both parties acknowledge this relationship in the pleadings they filed before
the Supreme Court.25 But while TIDCORP asserts that its charter exempts it from rules on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards, the CSC argues that this
exemption is irrelevant to the denial of De Guzman’s appointment because the CSC’s
authority over TIDCORP’s personnel actions requires it to comply with the CSC’s rules on
appointments.
The parties’ arguments reveal an apparent clash between TIDCORP’s charter, enacted by
Congress, and the CSC rules, issued pursuant to the CSC’s rule-making power. Does the
CSC’s constitutional authority over the civil service divest the Legislature of the power to
enact laws providing exemptions to civil service rules?
We answer in the negative. The CSC’s rule-making power, albeit constitutionally granted, is
still limited to the implementation and interpretation of the laws it is tasked to enforce.
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The 1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government
mandated to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. 26 It is a constitutionally
created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
or rule-making powers.
While not explicitly stated, the CSC’s rule-making power is subsumed under its designation
as the government’s "central personnel agency" in Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. The original draft of Section 3 empowered the CSC to "promulgate and enforce
policies on personnel actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of employment except
as to compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law." This,
however, was deleted during the constitutional commission’s deliberations because it was
redundant to the CSC’s nature as an administrative agency:27
MR. REGALADO. This is more for clarification. The original Section 3 states, among others,
the functions of the Civil Service Commission — to promulgate and enforce policies on
personnel actions. Will Commissioner Aquino kindly indicate to us the corresponding
provisions and her proposed amendment which would encompass the powers to promulgate
and enforce policies on personnel actions?
MS. AQUINO. It is my submission that the same functions are already subsumed under the
concept of a central personnel agency.
MR. REGALADO. In other words, all those functions enumerated from line 35 on page 2 to
line 1 of page 3, inclusive, are understood to be encompassed in the phrase "central
personnel agency of the government."
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, except that on line 40 of page 2 and line 1 of the
subsequent page, it was only subjected to a little modification.
MR. REGALADO. May we, therefore, make it of record that the phrase ". . . promulgate and
enforce policies on personnel actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of employment
except as to compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law" is
understood to be subsumed under and included in the concept of a central personnel
agency.
The 1987 Administrative Code then spelled out the CSC’s rule-making power in concrete
terms in Section 12, Book V, Title I-A, which empowered the CSC to implement the civil
service law and other pertinent laws, and to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines
for the civil service.29
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory
authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform
its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making
power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed,
the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed
to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian
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of the people's sacred right of suffrage — the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful
change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability. [citation omitted]
But while the grant of the CSC’s rule-making power is untouchable by Congress, the laws
that the CSC interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an
administrative agency, the CSC’s quasi-legislative power is subject to the same limitations
applicable to other administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates must not
override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement. 31
For example, in Grego v. Commission on Elections,32 we held that it was improper for the
COMELEC, a constitutional body bestowed with rule-making power by the Constitution, to
use the word "shall" in the rules it formulated, when the law it sought to implement uses the
word "may." While rules issued by administrative bodies are entitled to great respect, "the
conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. The function of promulgating
rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into effect. x x x Administrative regulations cannot extend the law nor
amend a legislative enactment; x x x administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law," and in a conflict between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, the former must prevail.33
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, and CSC Resolution No. 15, s. 1999, which
were issued pursuant to the CSC’s rule-making power, involve rules on position classification
Two questions logically follow our conclusion on the extent of the CSC’s rule-making power.
The first is whether Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, was
issued pursuant to the CSC’s rule-making power; the second is whether this provision
involves compensation, position classification and/or qualification standards that TIDCORP
claims to be exempt from. We answer both questions in the affirmative.
We agree with the CSC’s position that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, and CSC
Resolution No. 15, s. 1999, were all issued pursuant to its rule-making power. No less than
the introductory clause of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, confirms this:
Both these memoranda govern appointments and personnel actions in the civil service. CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, or the "Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments
and Other Personnel Actions," updated and consolidated the various issuances on
appointments and other personnel actions and simplified their processing. This was
subsequently amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999.
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Further, the CSC admitted in its comment that RA 6758 was the basis for the issuance of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 15, s. 1999. The CSC said:
The abovecited Sections 4 and 6 of R.A. No. 6758 are the bases for respondent’s issuance
of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 15, series of 1999. To reiterate, the Circulars mandate that appointments should
conform to the approved Position Allocation List (PAL) and at the same time be listed in the
Index of Occupational Service (IOS).38
To comply with Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998,
TIDCORP must conform with the circulars on position classification issued by the DBM.
Section 7 of its charter, however, expressly exempts TIDCORP from existing laws on
position classification, among others.
In its comment, the CSC would want us to disregard TIDCORP’s exemption from laws
involving position classification because RA 6758 applies to all GOCCs. It also noted that
Section 7 of RA 8494, the provision TIDCORP invokes as the source of its exemption, also
directs its Board of Directors to "endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible
with the principles [and modes provided in] Republic Act No. 6758." 39 This reference of RA
6758 in Section 7 means that TIDCORP cannot simply disregard RA 6758 but must take its
principles into account in providing for its own position classifications. This requirement, to
be sure, does not run counter to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution which provides
that "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters." The CSC shall still enforce position classifications at TIDCORP, but must do this
under the terms that TIDCORP has itself established, based on the principles of RA 6758.
To further expound on these points, the CSC’s authority over TIDCORP is undisputed. The 1âwphi1
rules that the CSC formulates should implement and be in harmony with the law it seeks to
enforce. In TIDCORP’s case, the CSC should also consider TIDCORP’s charter in addition
to other civil service laws. Having said this, there remains the issue of how the CSC should
apply the civil service law to TIDCORP, given the exemptions provided in the latter’s charter.
Does the wording of Section 7 of RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow issued
requirements pursuant to RA 6758 despite its exemption from laws involving position
classification?
The phrase "to endeavor" means to "to devote serious and sustained effort" and "to make
an effort to do." It is synonymous with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek.41 The use
of "to endeavor" in the context of Section 7 of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORP’s
exemption from laws involving compensation, position classification and qualification
standards, it should still strive to conform as closely as possible with the principles and
modes provided in RA 6758. The phrase "as closely as possible," which qualifies TIDCORP’s
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duty "to endeavor to conform," recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from RA
6758, but it should still try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the intent of
Congress been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply with RA 6758, it
would have so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to
endeavor to conform to the principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this
law.
With TIDCORP exempt from Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s.
1998, there remains the issue of whether De Guzman’s appointment as Financial
Management Specialist IV is valid. Since Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 40, s. 1998,is the only requirement that De Guzman failed to follow, his appointment
actually complied with all the requisites for a valid appointment. The CSC, therefore, should
have given due course to De Guzman's appointment.
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, and REVERSE and
SET ASIDE the decision dated September 28, 2007 and the resolution dated March 17, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 81058, as well 'as Resolution No. 030144 and
Resolution No. 031037 of the Civil Service Commission that the Court of Appeals rulings
affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.
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