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16 Heirs of Amunategui Vs Director of Forestry

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8/14/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 126

VOL. 126, NOVEMBER 29, 1983 69


Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

*
No. L-27873, November 29, 1983.

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, petitioners, vs.


DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, respondent.
*
No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.

ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN,


petitioners, vs. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF
MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE, respondents.

Civil Law; Land Registration; Forest lands, scope and nature


of; Rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless
land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation.—A
forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it

________________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may


actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish
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or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The


classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Same; Same; Possession of forest lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership.—This Court ruled in the leading
case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we
granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the
patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of
the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab
initio.
Same; Same; Positive act of government needed to convert
forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.—lt bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as
forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
Same; Same; Fact that no trees are found on lot does not
divest land as forest land or land of the public domain; Reasons.—
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such
land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the
public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land
must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber's
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must
have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde.
The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by
the appellate court's finding that timber licenses had to be issued
to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the
trouble to ask f or a license to cut timber within the area. It was
only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into
fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District
Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified
as "public forest."

71

VOL. 126, NOVEMBER 29, 1983 71

Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

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Same; Same; Confirmation of imperfect title; Burden of proof


in confirmation of imperfect title cases is upon applicant that he
meets the requirements of the law, CA 141 as amended, and must
overcome the presumption that land is part of public domain.—In
confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old
Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership
for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.

PETITIONS for certiorari to review the decision of the


Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The two petitions for review on certiorari before us


question the decision of the Court of Appeals which
declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to
titling in favor of private persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application
for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed
with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of
land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of
645,703 square meters.
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and
Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In
due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R.
No. L27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque
and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that
the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre
containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and
registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.

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72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

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The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of


Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for
registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove
swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956
square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said
portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner
Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may
have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan, The latter also filed
an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot
registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz
adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber
and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters
was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel
Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of
Forestry filed their respective appeals with the Court of
Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:

"x x x the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private


litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885
are, as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956
square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of
527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but
the last question that must have to be considered is whether after
all, the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did
not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and
evidence of the Director of Forestry; x x x.
"x x x turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when
the application was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact
must have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a
classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be
issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even
Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the

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VOL. 126, NOVEMBER 29, 1983 73


Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had
stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as
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indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively


indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into
a fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before
the filing of the application; but only after there had been a
previous warning by the District Forester that that could not be
done because it was classified as a public forest; so that having
these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act
1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case
had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for applicant to
be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown

" 'open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of


agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing
of the application;'

the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not
one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the
required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act
1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the
entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he
had been in

" 'open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of


agricultural lands of the public domain',

it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its


claim all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even
before and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit
recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these
applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled
notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions
of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them had
demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees
that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it
is always better that the findings be as complete as possible to
enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is
hereby reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions
with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is
hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to
costs."

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74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

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A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of


Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had
been in the possession of private persons for over thirty
years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No.
1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person in
accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land
Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for
review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre
complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute
sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs
of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis
of the Court of Appeals' decision that the disputed lot is
part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the
relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its
final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the
public domain classified as forest land.
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque
Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in their petition depends on
the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is,
whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not
capable of registration in the names of the private
applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No.
885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not
thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp". Although
conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the
classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820
of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue
that no big treos os classified in Section 1821 of said Code
as first, second and third groups are found on the land in
question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it
is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual
possession of private persons for many years, and
therefore, said land was already "private land" better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than
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VOL. 126, NOVEMBER 29, 1983 75


Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

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for forest purposes and not required by the public interests


to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of
Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership, And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we
granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by
the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being
a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said
area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive
act of Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly
wellgrounded in the instant petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the
Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does
not divest such land of its being classified as forest land,
much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court
found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest
as stated by Emeterio Bereber's witness Deogracias
Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a
thickly forested area as
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76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director


of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court's
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finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain


licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the
trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It
was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted
into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the
District Forester that the same could not be done because it
was classified as "public forest."
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant
shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the
public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient
to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect
title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that
he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely
on the presumptions implicit in Commonwealth Act No.
141 as amended. The records show that Lot No. 885 never
ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands


that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors-in-interests since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest,"

In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case


does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had
always been public land classified as forest.
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VOL. 126, NOVEMBER 29, 1983 77


Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:

"x x x The possession of public land however long the period


thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can
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prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of


ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."

We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property


Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public
forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other
issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this finding.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. L-30035 and
G.R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

     Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Relova, JJ., concur.


     Teehankee (Chairman), J., in the result.

Petition dismissed

Notes.—Until public lands are released as alienable or


disposable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of
Fisheries may lease or otherwise dispose of said lands.
(Yngson us. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 123
SCRA 441.)
A Torrens Title issued out of a patent has the force of a
title issued under the Land Registration Act. (Iglesia ni
Cristo vs. CFI of Nueva Ecija, Branch l, 123 SCRA 516.]
Courts have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of who has
prior possession of public lands. (Espejo vs. Malate, 120
SCRA 269.)
Action for reversion may be filed by the State where
public land was promised to be sold in a compromise
agreement entered into within the 5-year prohibited period.
(Zambales vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 897.)

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78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


G.A. Machineries, Inc. vs. Yaptinchay

A sale of homestead land on execution is valid where sale


was held 7 years from issuance of the original certificate of
title. (Amper vs. CFI, Branch 111, Misamis Oriental 122
SCRA 327.)

——o0o——

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