FROM INDEMNITY TO INTEGRATION:

ECONOMIC DECLINE IN LATE HELLENISTIC AITOLIA

Emma Kerstin Minerva Ljung

A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE

BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
ART AND ARCHAEOLOGY
[Adviser: W. Childs]

June 2012
© Copyright by Emma Kerstin Minerva Ljung, 2012. All rights reserved.
 iii

ABSTRACT

In the last two centuries BC, the mountainous region Aitolia on the north shore of the Corinthian

gulf transformed from a densely populated landscape, home to a powerful, influential federation

with an internationally integrated economy, to a dispersed, politically inactive backwater that at the

time of Augustus’ reorganization of Greece showed few overt signs of socioeconomic complexity or

connectivity. Commonly, the Roman indemnity of 189 BC, after which the region disappeared from

the historical narrative, is thought to have caused this decline.

While the ultimate aim is a reconsideration of Aitolia as disconnected and “empty” in view

of the synoicism of Nikopolis, this dissertation investigates the mechanisms and trajectories of the

regional decline through a detailed study of relevant economic tendencies. An inclusive exploration

of Aitolian literary, epigraphic, numismatic, archaeological and topographic data, which has never

before been subjected to comprehensive study, serves to explain the rapid transformation as a

complex socioeconomic phenomenon determined by not one but a series of factors. These include,

among others, preexisting debt, an agrarian countryside in disrepair, unsatisfactory local coin

production, the territorial conditions of the Roman indemnity, and most significantly, the

characteristic structures and problem-solving mechanisms of the regional economy. This

dissertation contextualizes these factors by placing regional change in a broader historical setting.

Aitolian decline was neither immediate nor complete. This study demonstrates that despite

radically altered settlement patterns some Aitolian cities retained the connectivity needed for

survival well into the imperial period. Thereby, it challenges the overly simplistic traditional

reading of the Augustan reorganization of Greece and fills a major gap in modern scholarship on the

Late Hellenistic period.

The transformative Greco-Roman interaction presented the Greek states with a multitude of

problems, many of them socioeconomic in nature. By focusing on a deeply neglected region and its

problem-solving mechanisms, this dissertation emphasizes the need for detailed appreciation of
 iv

their responses, reactions and activity in the last two centuries BC. Simultaneously, it invites

consideration of evidence not commonly discussed in terms of economies and as a result, promotes

a more inclusive approach to the ancient economy.

 v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To write a dissertation is a lonely task: so also this one. Yet, its completion would not have been

possible without the aid of many persons and organizations. I must begin by acknowledging

Princeton’s immense role in this project. Words cannot express my gratitude to my adviser W.

Childs for making me think critically about the ancient world at large and for encouraging me to

trot around the “backwaters” of Aitolia for the better part of my graduate education, thereby letting

me develop into the archaeologist I am today. I am equally thankful to A. Stahl for turning me into a

numismatist and B. Shaw for – perhaps accidentally – making me an economic historian. In my

home department M. Koortbojian proposed I reconsider the mechanisms of socioeconomic

institutions and N. Zchomedlise provided constant inter-carrel support in the important early

stages of writing: I sincerely thank them both.

I thank Princeton’s Graduate School, the Program in the Ancient World, and the Department

for Art and Archaeology for incredibly generous funding, collegiality, a continuously inspiring

intellectual environment and the general support to see this dissertation through. This project

would not have been possible without that support. On a related note, I extend my deepest thanks

to Birgit and Gad Rausings Stiftelse för Humanistisk Forskning and Fredrika-Bremer-Förbundets

Stipendiestiftelse for the princely research grants that enabled me to conduct extensive research in

Greece.

An important part of any dissertation that rarely gets acknowledged is the simple footwork:

in the case of this dissertation, that footwork was perhaps unusually taxing. Therefore, I want to

especially acknowledge the staff at Marquand Library, Firestone Library, the Nordic Library in

Athens, and the incredible people at Princeton’s Interlibrary Loan who constantly amazed me by

meeting the most outrageous requests for never-published, incorrectly cited, entirely unknown

books written in Greek before the formation of the modern state of Greece. Thank you. Moreover, I

wish to thank the Princeton University Writing Center, both for its dissertation writing boot camps
 vi

and the invaluable tools needed for writing cheerfully, every single day. Our graduate secretary

Diane Schulte is owed great praise for making truly everything run smoothly, and for always

looking out for the graduate cohort.

I offer a special ευχαριστώ to all the nameless farmers and homeowners in Aitolia who let

me walk their olive groves, pastures, farmsteads and backyards in my personal hunt for settlement

evidence. The staff at the Archaeological Museum in Agrinion was extremely kind and I sincerely

thank them for their help. The Swedish and Danish Institutes at Athens not only put a roof over my

head but provided me – accidentally – with the perfect colleagues for bouncing ideas and

exchanging homemade plan drawings. In Athens, Daniela Trifirò was my constant companion and

helped me solve some important problems with my coins. Grazie!

Naturally, the idea for this dissertation would never have emerged if I had not been an

Aitolian excavator in the first place. Thus I must thank my teams at Chalkis and Kalydon, and

especially our director S. Dietz whose enthusiasm for Aitolia has remained a constant inspiration. E.

Bollen’s work on our Aitolian pottery has been instrumental for this project and I cannot bear her a

grudge for having got me – me! – seriously interested in pottery analysis.

In Rome, I learned everything I know about sigillata from A. Martin. That knowledge has

proved vital for this dissertation and I extend my warmest thanks to A. M. McCann for sponsoring

the Howard Comfort, FAAR ’29, Seminar in Roman Pottery. My pottery camp cohort in 2007

remains my favorite group of archaeologists in this world; their passion for what we do has been a

constant inspiration while assembling this dissertation. I thank J. Pinto at Princeton for strongly

suggesting I apply to the program. A. Meadows at the American Numismatic Society is also owed

many thanks for his enthusiasm, help and advice in the beginning of this project.

Unsurprisingly, I could not have written this dissertation without the abundant “non-

academic” support with which I have been blessed. Thanks are therefore owed to all my Princeton

friends, those with two legs and those with four; the little graduate cohort in Classical Archaeology
 vii

whose cheer on the homestretch was absolutely great; Ingrid, Alexis, Kellam, Marion, Alex; Sandra,

Adrian, Becca, Kate and the rest of the Dressler barn group; the highly unofficial but somewhat

magical Dissertation Writing Group in Classical Archaeology; the participants in the numismatics

seminars 2009 and 2011; and most of all my friend and fellow hoplite Joanna Papayiannis without

whom the thousands of days at Marquand and McCormick Hall would have been both tragically

unfashionable and substantially less entertaining.

My decision to pursue Classical Archaeology as a profession was made significantly less

problematic by two teachers at Söderport High School, Kenneth Nyström and Gunnel Carlsson. In

teaching me Latin and Greek, they laid the groundwork for an education that would otherwise have

been difficult to obtain in a world where all good students must study Law or Medicine. Moreover,

they instilled in me the conviction that any dream can be achieved through hard work and that

although not all roads lead to Rome, most paths can take you to the Mediterranean – you just have

to start walking. I offer them my heartfelt thanks for that little nudge out the door.

It seems almost rude to thank my family across the sea who never once questioned why

studying a world separated from ours by two millennia, moving across a world ocean to pursue an

advanced degree, traipsing around Mediterranean olive groves and writing a doctoral dissertation

about something as uplifting as the Hellenistic equivalent of the Great Depression during a recession

were good ideas. Their quiet support has been the fuel moving this dissertation toward completion.

I am fully aware that I will spend the rest of my life thanking them.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge my husband Bob’s role in the completion of this dissertation.

He has supported me every step of the way and without his strength, love and understanding, my

fondness for this project would have dwindled long ago. He has been the Sam to my Frodo, only I

have not carried this dissertation around my neck, nor has he stowed away our kitchen in his

backpack. I dedicate this work to him and promise to finally go on vacation whenever he wants to.
 viii

CONTENTS

Abstract. iii

Acknowledgments. v

Abbreviations. xiv

List of figures. xvi

Chapter 1. 1
Aetolia amissa.

1. Aetolia amissa. 1
2. An economic study. 3
3. Issues of economy. 5
4. The temporal setting – “from indemnity to integration.” 8
5. The physical setting – a regional study. 10
6. Source material. 13
7. The downward slope? Chapter foci. 15
8. Exclusions. 17

Chapter 2. 20
Prelude to indemnity.

1. Introduction. 20
2. Land and territory: settlement patterns and territorial expansion. 21
3. Economic institutions. The background constraints. 24
4. Piracy, pirates and plunder. 29
5. Warfare and mercenary service. 31
6. The debt crisis. 34
 ix

Chapter 3. 36
Landscape and settlement.

1. Introduction: landscape and survey. 36

2. Survey and settlement data: Studia Aetolica. 38
3. The Aitolian data. 40
3.1. Habitation sites. 41
3.2. Cemetery sites. 44
3.3. Sanctuary sites. 44
3.4. Unidentifiable sites and towers. 45
4. Interim conclusions. 46
5. Comparative material. 49
5.1. Boiotia. 50
5.2. The Peloponnese. 51
5.3. Melos. 53
5.4. Exceptions. 53
6. Interpretations. 54
7. Landscape, settlement and survey: conclusions. 59

Chapter 4. 62
Towns and monuments.

1. Introduction: what is a town? 62

2. Local socioeconomic structures. 64
2.1. League participation. 64
2.2. Local officials. 66
2.3. Manumissions: town visibility for documentary practices. 68
3. Towns and monuments. 70
3.1. Tombs and burials. 70
3.2. The town and its monuments: Kalydon. 73
3.3. Archaeological evidence from other sites. 80
4. Contextual decline: change, continuity, trajectories and responses. 82
5. Connection despite contraction:
site-to-site connectivity in view of regional decline. 85
 x

6. Some preliminary observations on the synoicism of Nikopolis. 87

Chapter 5. 89
Coin production and the Aitolian indemnity.

1. Introduction. 89
2. The coinage of the Aitolian koinon. 91
3. Minting practices. 92
4. Sizes, volumes and weight. 94
5. The indemnity of 189 BC: monetary aspects. 98
6. Minting trajectory. 101
7. Purpose and end. 102

Chapter 6. 106
Coin circulation and monetary use.

1. Introduction. 106
2. Theory and method: working assumptions for coin circulation. 108
3. Regional circulation and coin use: excavated contexts. 110
4. Regional circulation and coin use: hoards. 112
5. The circulation of foreign coins in Aitolia. 119
6. Money supply and coin use. 123
7. Legal tender and the triobol as the official unit of account. 126
8. External circulation of Aitolian coins. 126
8.1. Central Greece. 127
8.2. Western Greece. 130
8.3. Achaia. 134
8.4. The Peloponnese. 138
8.5. Italy. 143
8.6. Other places. 144
9. External circulation and geographic distribution. 145
10. Economic adaptation and decline. 148
10.1. Adaptation and economic response. 148
 xi

10.2. Decline and the Aitolian economy. 150

Chapter 7. 152
Economic institutions and state interference: the fate of the Aitolian koinon.

1. Introduction. 152
2. Timeline. 152
3. Composition: strategoi, territory and party factions. 153
4. Economic institutions, friendships and foreign policy. 156
5. Territorial loss, occupation and warfare. 160
6. The end of the koinon. 163

Chapter 8. 165
Economic activity and the Aitolian people.

1. Introduction. 165
2. The debt crisis in the 170s BC. 165
3. Distribution of wealth and the Aitolian elite. 169
4. Mercenary service. 172
5. Manumissions. 175
6. The relationship between demographic effects and socioeconomic change. 178
7. Occupation and exhaustion:
Rome and the Aitolian population in the first century BC. 181

Chapter 9. 185
From indemnity to integration.

1. Features of decline. 185

1.1. Mountain and shore: the Aitolian landscape. 185
1.2. The problem-solving koinon. 186
1.3. Exogenous shock. 187
2. Synthesizing the evidence: system collapse? 188
3. The desolation of Late Hellenistic Greece: rhetoric, concept, reality. 190
 xii

4. Integration: Aitolia and Augustus. 192

5. Where now? Suggestions for further study. 195

Appendix 1. Site gazetteers. 199

A. Site gazetteer 1.
B. Site gazetteer 2.

Appendix 2. Activity before 189 BC. 208

A. Aitolian federal grants of isopoliteia, politeia, proxenia, asylia etc. until 189 BC.
B. Delphic grants of proxenia to Aitolians, fourth and third centuries BC.
C. Aitolian plunder in Polybius, 231 – 200 BC.
D. Aitolian mercenary service, fifth through third centuries BC.

Appendix 3. Late Hellenistic activity. 219

A. Origins of Aitolian strategoi in the second century BC.

B. Aitolian federal grants of isopoliteia, politeia, asylia etc. from 189 BC onward.
C. Second-century-BC Delphic proxenia grants awarded to Aitolians.

Appendix 4. Coin hoard composition. 223

1. Agrinion 1968 hoard (CH I, 76)

2. Naupaktos 1967hoard (IGCH 244)
3. Kalydon 1973 hoard (CH IV, 54)
4. Vlachomandra 1886 hoard (AD 1889, E)
5. Agrinion 1959 hoard (IGCH 271)
6. Naupaktos 1967 hoard (IGCH 317)
7. Koniska 1962 hoard (IGCH 266)
8. Makrakomi 1932 hoard (IGCH 214)
9. Oreus 1902 hoard (IGCH 232)
10. Delphi 1907 hoard (IGCH 303)
 xiii

11. Vonitsa 1993 hoard (CH VIII, 431)

12. Stratos 1965 hoard (IGCH 251)
13. Kephallonia 1934 hoard (IGCH 257)
14. Western Greece 1936 hoard (IGCH 260)
15. Lechena 1979 hoard (CH VIII, 417)
16. Lechena 1986 hoard (CH VIII, 358)
17. Patras 1973 hoard (CH VIII, 454)
18. Zougra 1859 hoard (IGCH 261)
19. Diakofto 1965 hoard (IGCH 262)
20. Arcadia 1929 hoard (IGCH 242)
21. Messene before 1937 hoard (IGCH 301)
22. Epidauros 1934 hoard (IGCH 288)
23. Vellies-Monemvasia 1984 hoard (AD 39)
24. Canose before 1995 hoard (Tsangari 2007)
25. Caserta 1890 hoard (IGCH 2053)
26. Greece 1986 or earlier hoard (CH VIII, 338)

Figures. 232

Bibliography. 265
 xiv

ABBREVIATIONS

The journal abbreviations follow those listed by the American Journal of Archaeology 104, 2000.
Other abbreviations used in this study include:

AAAG Annals of the Association of American Geographers

AD Αρχαιολογικὸν Δελτίον

AE Αρχαιολογικὴ Εφημέρις

AncMac Ancient Macedonia

AncSoc Ancient Society

ANSw American Numismatic Society, winter

Archaiognosia Archaiognosia

Archeo-Physika Archeo-Physika

Arctos Arctos

Bommeljé et al Bommeljé, S., P. Doorn, et al. 1987. Studia Aetolica 1. Aetolia and the
Aetolians. Toward the Interdisciplinary Study of a Greek Region. Utrecht.

CH Coin Hoards

CSSH Comparative Studies in Society and History

DHA Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne

EcHR Economic History Review

Ecology Ecology

Geography Geography

G&R Greece & Rome

JCoastR Journal of Coastal Research

JEH Journal of Economic History

JInH Journal of Interdisciplinary History

JPE Journal of Political Economy

 xv

KAF KAF

Ktèma Ktèma

Listy Filologické Listy Filologické

Miletos McCabe, D. F. 1984. Miletos Inscriptions. Texts and List. Princeton.

MünstBeit Münstersche Beiträge zur antiken Handelsgeschichte

NCÅ Ny Carlsbergfondets Årsskrift

NNIA Newsletter of the Netherlands Institute at Athens

PACT PACT

P. Cairo Zenon Cairo Zenon Papyri

PDIA Proceedings of the Danish Institute at Athens

Pharos Pharos

Φωκικά Χρονικά Φωκικά Χρονικά

RIDA Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité

RRC Crawford, M. 1974. Roman Republican Coinage. London.

SBBerlin Sitzungsberichte der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse

für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst

Sfinx Sfinx

SGDI Bechtel, F. and A Bezzenberger. 1844-1915. Sammlung der griechischen

Dialekt-Inschriften. Göttingen.

Syd. Sydenham, E. 1952. The Coinage of the Roman Republic. London.

Syll.3 Gawantka, W. 1977. Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum, 3rd ed.

Hildesheim.

ΤΕΤΡΑΜΗΝΑ ΤΕΤΡΑΜΗΝΑ

TIBGeo Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers

Topoi Topoi

ΧAPAKTHP ΧAPAKTHP: Aφείρωμα στη Μάντω Οικονομίδου (Athens 1996)

 xvi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. The Augustan reorganization of Western Greece (after Alcock 1993, Fig. 48).

Figure 2. Google Earth map of Aitolia and Western Greece.

Figure 3. Aitolia as defined in this study.

Figure 4. Hellenistic settlements in Aitolia (after Alcock 1993, Fig 49).

Figure 5. Sites with Late Hellenistic material; numbers correspond to Appendix 1A.

Figure 6. Mornos reservoir (photo by author).

Figure 7. Plain of Agrinion seen from Church of Agios Giorgios, Angelokastro; Lake
Lysimacheia in the background (photo by author).

Figure 8. Coastal plain west of Kalydon, seen from ancient Halikyrna toward Mesolongi
(photo by author).

Figure 9. Sanctuary of Apollo at Thermon (photo by author).

Figure 10. Sanctuary of Apollo and the Thermon valley; Lake Trichonion in the background
(photo by author).

Figure 11. Macedonian tomb at Naupaktos, Thermon and Athanasopoulos Roads (after AD 53
(1988) B2, Fig. 11).

Figure 12. Grave stele from Trichonion, Agrinion archaeological museum, inv. no 27 (photo by
author).

Figure 13. Grave stele from Trichonion, Agrinion archaeological museum, inv. no 27 (photo by
author).

Figure 14. Grave stele from Arsinoe, Agrinion archaeological museum, inv. no 65 (photo by
author).

Figure 15. Silver statuette of Silenus from Pleuron, Agrinion archaeological museum, inv. no
323 (photo by author).

Figure 16. The Late Hellenistic building on the Akropolis, Kalydon; reconstruction (after Dietz
2011b, Fig. 174).

Figure 17. The Akropolis, Kalydon. Seen from the southwest, area of Heroon (photo by author).

Figure 18. Floors in the Late Hellenistic building on the Akropolis, Kalydon (after Dietz
2011b, Fig. 171).

Figure 19. Heroon, Kalydon (after Dyggve, Poulsen et al 1934, Pl. 3.1).
 xvii

Figure 20. Heroon, Kalydon (after Dyggve, Poulsen et al 1934, Fig.17).

Figure 21. Heroon, Kalydon; klinai with footstools (after Dyggve, Poulsen et al 1934, Fig. 54).

Figure 22. Heroon, Kalydon; close-up of spandrels on footstools (after Dyggve, Poulsen et al
1934, Fig. 55).

Figure 23. Head of Meleager, Heroon, Kalydon; Agrinion archaeological museum, inv. no. 24
(photo by author).

Figure 24. Peristyle Building, Kalydon (after Dietz 2011a, Fig. 109).

Figure 25. Peristyle Building, Kalydon (after Dietz 2011a, Fig. 111 + 112).

Figure 26. Peristyle Building, Kalydon; the north rooms seen from southeast (photo by author).

Figure 27. Kybele, Peristyle Building, Kalydon (after Dietz 2005, Fig. 11).

Figure 28. The lion, Peristyle Building, Kalydon (after Dietz 2005, Fig. 13B).

Figure 29. Lanikos’ herm, Peristyle Building, Kalydon (after Dietz 2005, Fig. 10A).

Figure 30. Miniature altar, Peristyle Building, Kalydon (after Dietz 2011a, Fig. 125).

Figure 31. Sosikles’ statue base, Persistyle House, Kalydon (after Dietz 2011a, Fig. 108).

Figure 32. Multi-phase building, Gribovo plot, Naupaktos (after AD 31 (1976) B1, Fig. 6).

Figure 33. The coastal plain west of Naupaktos, seen from Makyneia toward the Peloponnese
(photo by author).

Figure 34. West side of Chalkis hill, seen from Kato Vasiliki (photo by author).

Figure 35. Mount Varassova, seen from Galatas (possibly the location of Kalydon’s harbor);
typical Aitolian shoreline. On the far side of Varassova is the narrow Chalkis valley
(photo by author).

Figure 36. View of plain and gulf near Pleuron, West of Mesolongi (photo by author).

Figure 37. Lake Trichonion, seen from Analipsi (photo by author).

Figure 38. Roman baths outside Mesolongi (photo by author).

Figure 39. Calculated obverse dies for Fifth series triobols, estimated after Carter 1983. Only
includes issues where n > 3d.

Figure 40. Calculated obverse dies for Fifth series triobols, linear trend included; estimated
after Carter 1983. Only includes issues where n > 3d.
 xviii

Figure 41. Calculated obverse dies for Fifth series triobols, issues 73a to 77b; estimated after
Carter 1983. Only includes issues where n > 3d.

Figure 42. Calculated obverse dies, silver coinage of the Third, Fourth and Fifth series. Third
and Fourth series are grouped together. Estimated after Carter 1983.

Figure 43. Late Hellenistic coin hoards with Aitolian contents.

Figure 44. Aitolian manumissions arranged chronologically and individually, 189-110

BC. Manumissions with unknown prices have been omitted. Arrow marks
150 BC. Linear trend added.
 1

CHAPTER 1.
Aetolia amissa.

1. Aetolia amissa.

The words are Cicero’s.1 Uttered in the mid-50s BC, they are grounded in one of the most dynamic

and transformational periods of classical antiquity. Speaking across the gulf of Greco-Roman

interaction that over the past one and a half centuries had irrevocably impacted both Rome and the

Greek states, the narrative seems less theatrical than it is concerned with the social, political,

cultural and economic repercussions of that interaction. In that sense, Cicero’s concern appears

almost contemporary. Characterized by multi-national warfare, economic trouble, disruptions,

cultural fusion and infusion, civil wars and civic unrest, debt crises, liquidity crises and financial

collapse, the Late Hellenistic period bears close parallels to the modern day. During the two

centuries when Alexander’s world was transforming into what would soon become Augustus’,

many experienced what we would call, euphemistically, a difficult time. In part due to the important

social questions rooted in this context, in part due to the rich source material from the time period,

Late Republican Rome and Late Hellenistic Greece have drawn much attention from scholars in a

variety of fields and continue to do so, yet in this frenzy of scholarship some questions and indeed

some regions tend to be neglected. Cicero’s “lost Aitolia” is one of them.

Indeed, Aitolia is amissa from almost all scholarship centering on this period. Considering

the two major historical events bookending Roman involvement in Greece and their direct

relationship with Aitolia itself, this is curious. The Roman indemnity of 189 BC, laid upon the

Aitolian federation in punishment of having violated treaties and brought Antiochos III into Greece,

has been considered a major turning point for Roman policy in Greece. The synoicism of Western

Greece and the deliberate depopulation of Aitolia for the foundation of Nikopolis in the early 20s BC

1 in Pisonem 96.
 2

similarly function as an end point for most discussion on the freedom of Greece and the coming of

Rome. Very oddly, the region that first felt the sting of the Roman gladius is almost wholly ignored

in scholarly consideration of the last two centuries of Greek independence.

By the same token, scholarship on this transformative period is predominantly slanted

toward questions of sociopolitical interaction and control, macroscopically and microscopically,

from both Roman and Greek points of view. The ancient economy, so hotly debated and still so

poorly understood, and unquestionably one of the most important aspects of ancient studies as a

whole, is rarely addressed in scholarship on this time period. But nothing exists in a vacuum, and to

ignore less known periods and less studied regions is ultimately detrimental to our broader

understanding of classical antiquity. Naturally, economic life existed beyond the Zenon archives or

the building accounts for the Periklean Akropolis yet studies on various aspects of the ancient

economy rarely if ever consider non-canonical data from non-canonical regions and time periods.

An economic study of Aitolia is highly warranted. The broader historical relevance for our

understanding of Early Roman Greece is monumental. In 1993 Alcock published the magisterial

Graecia Capta, a volume that makes it adamantly clear that Greco-Roman interaction, its

manifestations, consequences and results are highly complex, multi-faceted and organic, but

predominantly set in the imperial period Graecia Capta does not address one monumental

question: what happened to what we perceive as “the economy” during the social, political and

economic metamorphosis from libera to capta?2

Similarly important is the scholarly relevance of such a study. The attitude toward non-

canonical Greek regions is changing, but federations and the regions that housed them are still

generally omitted from the overall discussion on the Hellenistic economy. In part, this is due to the

lack of straightforward source material yet these regions participated in the same economic

activities as kings and kingdoms; thus, to exclude them is ultimately to limit our understanding. At a

2 Alcock 1993.
 3

local level, to ask entirely new questions will undoubtedly improve our understanding of a region

whose studies have almost exclusively focused on the political context of its federation in the third

century BC.

Importantly, Late Hellenistic Aitolia is, in effect, a tabula rasa. Its lack of canonical economic

data and scholarly scrutiny does not make it any less useful for our understanding of economic life

in antiquity. Unburdened with the weight of a cumbersome debate on various aspects of the ancient

economy, it allows for a wholly fresh approach. Moreover, the divergent source material invites

new methodologies which ultimately may be useful to other regions and areas, both studied and

unstudied.

2. An economic study.

This is not a mainstream study in economic history. The nature of the available data is such that

ordinary methodologies and sets of questions rarely – if ever – apply. Yet, the increasingly stale

debate on substantivist/formalist or modernizing/primitivist approaches to the ancient economy

ceased to be informative long ago.3 It is clear that the Hellenistic world was a plurality of economic

systems with varying degrees of integration, different kinds of institutions, different demographic

compositions, and widely varied natural resources. It was not a monolith and to speak of a unified

“ancient economy” is entirely misleading.4 Time and place play an important role in that we are

highly unlikely to get the same impression from a Late Hellenistic Greek federation, Ptolemaic

Egypt, or Late Roman Italy. Even within each such system, agency and engagement within the

parameters of economic life differed; economic institutions did not mean the same thing to

everyone, nor did all individuals within that system participate on equal terms, or with equal

3 For a summary of the debate, see von Reden 2002. See also Cartledge 2002.
4 Reger 2003.
 4

means, or even with similar kinds of means.5 Thus, we must refrain from engaging in queries in

black or white, and moreover, avoid grand, unanswerable questions such as “what is the ancient

economy?” Naturally, it is clear that “the economy” was not the same in antiquity as it is today, and

we should consequently not expect to apply the same formal questions to the ancient material as

we do the modern.

Due to the nature of the available source material, this approach is neither quantitative nor

qualitative. Rather, we may call it inquisitive-observational. We must approach each group of

evidence from a relevant point of view and subject it to an inquiry that generates meaningful

answers for that specific set of data. To the historian, concepts of overall impressions can be equally

helpful as numerical increases or decreases in output of consumption and since such numerical

data is unavailable for Late Hellenistic Aitolia, this methodological openness is essential.6 The data

requires a variety of approaches, and the aim to obtain maximum inclusion is paramount.

In 1981, Douglass North wrote “it is the task of economic history to explain the structure

and performance of economies through time” (my emphasis).7 In this dissertation, I seek to fill a

major lacuna in the discussion on a specific, transitional phase of human history by focusing on

economic activity. I choose this focus for a number of reasons. First, both economically and

psychologically, “activity” is more neutral term than “behavior”. Neutral terminology reduces the

foreground noise of preconceived notions and outdated scholarship on the ancient economy, and

encourages a broader approach to the appreciation of economic life in antiquity. Second, such

terminology avoids contamination by the sometimes useful but often confusing preexisting

“models” for the ancient economy.8 In fact, in this inquiry I deliberately avoid all available models,

in part to avoid discipline isolation, in part to broaden the present, far too narrow approach to pre-

5 Foxhall 2007.
6 In fact, Millett (2001) thinks numerical data are less helpful than concepts of overall improvement in
welfare.
7 North 1981.
8 See the telling title of Davies 2008. For a more nuanced approach to models, see essays in Manning and

Morris 2005, especially Davies 2005.

 5

modern economies.9 Moreover, economic activity focuses our study to the economy on its most

basic level; the interaction between human and human, human and environment, state and natural

resources. By studying how these relationships change over time – thereby following North’s

insistence on temporal parameters – we obtain a window into the formulation of economic

strategies that are not readily apparent at first glance. Regardless of ones view on the

primitivist/modernizing debate, no one can deny that the ancient economy possessed an ever-

present agrarian component, the most fundamental economic activity there is. We must therefore

ask whether economic strategies beyond food-survival were in place.10

I take economic activity to be inclusive rather than exclusive, informative rather than

informed. This covers a broad range of transactions both in money and in kind, taxation, legislation

and economic institutions, service and jobs, building and restoration, wealth accumulation and loss,

monetary circulation and coin production. On a regional scale, it involves settlement expansion or

contraction as well as land use and spatial division. Consequently, my approach is both macroscopic

and microscopic, a method warranted by the available data.

3. Issues of economy.

The study of anything economic in classical antiquity is an act riddled with inherent problems. One

such issue is the question of “embeddedness” which brought to light by Finley more recently

emerged in the work of Hopkins and Duncan-Jones.11 Is the economy separate from the rest of

society or is it embedded in a social framework? The answer depends entirely on what cross-

section of society you examine and how you relate to the available data. It cannot be denied that

9 To my knowledge, no serious model for a Hellenistic federation has yet been proposed. An emphasized focus
on models may thus eliminate otherwise useful segments of antiquity – Aitolia being one of them.
10 Foxhall 2007.
11 The scholarship is extensive. See e.g. Duncan-Jones 1990, contra Hopkins 1980; cf. Finley 1999.
 6

economic institutions were socially and politically embedded but so they are today.12 This does not

presuppose, however, that economic institutions lacked sophistication or rationality, but it does

bring attention to the crucial factor of data visibility.

It is a fundamental feature of any economy to produce food.13 The agrarian sector must

necessarily constitute the largest portion of any pre-modern economy. Yet, to a very large extent

evidence of this sector is almost entirely invisible, and the lack of information has turned our

attention to other, more readily informative inquiries that ultimately do not correlate to the

situation in antiquity. Despite the lack of evidence thereof I am convinced that Aitolia was no

different than any other region in ancient Greece. Most people engaged in self-sustaining food

production and thus their mobility and access to the greater world were limited. They may have

paid their taxes in kind and made almost no use of monetary transactions. Nevertheless, they were

not necessarily isolated as the market place provided by their polity functioned as a connection to

the outside world.14 It remains to be seen to what extent the agricultural world was influenced by

market transactions but in this dissertation, our primary assumption is that despite its invisibility,

the agrarian aspect of Aitolia’s economy vastly overshadowed any other feature.

A more visible aspect of ancient economies is their monetary component. While some

visibility derives from the recording of sums and transactions, the largest body of evidence is

undeniably the coins themselves. The discussion on coinage and its role in ancient economies is

however far from straightforward. It is clear that a multitude of types of economic transactions

could occur under the same roof, and the use of money does not mean that barter or payment in

kind have ceased to exist. But visibility is problematic here as well. A deeply monetized society with

significant reliance on money for daily activities may impress upon us a much less positive image

simply by lack of excavation and hoard retention, both of which are seriously affected by non-

12 Foxhall 2007, 23.

13 Reger 2003, 332.
14 Reger 2007.
 7

economic factors.15 Thus, to understand the monetary aspect of any economy we must necessarily

consider other parameters and groups of evidence beyond the coinage itself.

Of paramount importance for any study of the ancient economy is the nature and purpose of

coinage, both of which are still debated.16 The economist must ask “is issuing coin a direct or

indirect economic intervention?”17 In the ancient world, coinage has traditionally been thought to

have been struck chiefly for purposes of army payment and military expenditure.18 This approach is

clearly much too simplistic. Regardless of what coinage was initially invented for, its uses in

antiquity were varied and numerous. Moreover, there is hard evidence that coinage was not struck

solely for military purposes in the time period in question. Aitolia’s large indemnity payment has

traditionally been thought to have been paid in freshly struck money but as chapters 5 and 6 will

demonstrate, this is incorrect.19 Circulation of fractional bronze suggests everyday small

transactions. Of course, finds of bronze coins do not necessitate that everyone used money on a

daily basis; in fact, the percentage of people using coins, or the frequency of that use, can never

wholly be verified. Yet, coins could be and were used for anything.20 The major functions of coinage

– storage of wealth, unit of account, facilitation of trade and functionality as legal tender – were all

active in antiquity and consequently we must take an inclusive approach when evaluating the

monetary aspect of any economy, large or small.

Another issue is directly related to the paradigmatic attitude to economic data. There is no

Zenon archive in Aitolia, nor does the region possess records of account or other types of data

commonly used in economic analysis. Consequently, it cannot answer questions of credit, or capital,

or risk – in fact, the data available may not look like economic data at all to an economist. Yet, the

15 Duncan-Jones 1990, 38.

16 Howgego 1990: 1997; Kraay 1964; Schaps 2004: 2008.
17 Foraboschi 2000.
18 The loudest voice is undoubtedly that of Crawford (1970: 1977: 1985: RRC).
19 For a view that Aitolia’s indemnity was paid in freshly struck coin, see Losada 1965. See also Reger 2003,

348.
20 Today this is admitted by most scholars although few may be as radically modernizing in their approach to

ancient coinage as von Reden 2010.

 8

available material has direct bearing on economic activity on the most fundamental level which an

inclusive approach makes adamantly clear.21

4. The temporal setting – “from indemnity to integration”.

The historical background to 189 BC is well known.22 By accepting the peace terms presented by

Rome, Aitolia bound itself to numerous clauses, clauses which set the tone for its Late Hellenistic

activities. Aitolia had to respect the maiestas of the Roman people, share in Rome’s foreign policy

and send hostages to Rome.23 Large tracts of land were removed from Aitolian control; this

included all of Western Lokris, Phtiothian Achaia, Phokis and affirmed the separation of the

sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi from Aitolia.24 Moreover, the federation was to pay Rome 500 talents.

All three aspects – the financial, geographic and sociopolitical – are intrinsically and extrinsically

linked to the parameters for economic activity outlined above. By adhering to the treaty Aitolia was

prevented from continuing many of its pre-war policies, territorial expansion being the most

noteworthy one. Unsurprisingly, the indemnity of 189 BC constitutes a major historical event and a

turning point in Aitolian history. Except for a few minor stories, the region virtually disappears

from the historical narrative immediately afterward. Similarly, the indemnity is of vital importance

from a broader historical perspective as a watershed in Greco-Roman interaction in the early

second century BC: regardless of ones approach to concepts of Greek liberty and Roman

21 Fortunately, recent scholarship on the ancient economy shows a definite tendency toward moving away
from exclusive approaches; see e.g. Archibald, Davies et al 2001: 2005: 2011.
22 Polybius 21.32; Livy 38.11. For a summary of the events, see Gruen 1984. The scholarship on the early

years of the second century BC and Greco-Roman interaction is immense; see e.g. Eckstein 2006: 2008. See
also chapter 2 of this dissertation.
23 The historically context of this clause is debated, especially from a sociopolitical point of view. Did the

Aitolians understand what deditio in fidem meant? See Freyburger 1982; Gruen 1982; Badian 1984; Piganiol
1950.
24 Delphi had already been removed from Aitolian control by Glabrio in 190 BC. On the Aitolians and Delphi,

see Daux 1936; Flacelière 1937. On Glabrio and the Aitolians, see Eckstein 1995a; Ferrary 1988.
 9

sovereignty, the indemnity plays a central although understudied role in this highly transitional

phase.25

This was but one in a chain of indemnities imposed by Rome upon its enemies, indemnities

that some scholars believe were difficult to pay.26 But not only the financial clauses would have had

an effect on Aitolia; the territorial clauses too are of paramount importance. By removing large

tracts of land from Aitolian control, the treaty reduced both part of the agrarian base of its economy

as well as the federation’s ability to extract taxes there.

For one and a half centuries Aitolia remained largely outside the historical narrative. After

Octavian’s victory at Actium, however, it was forcefully brought back on stage. In founding a city in

memory of his deeds, Octavian subjected the populations of Western Greece to a large-scale

synoicism. By moving the populations of Aitolia, Akarnania and Ozolian Lokris to the newly

founded Nikopolis and the Roman colony at Patras, he forcefully and forcibly altered the

demographic composition of those regions; if we are to believe most sources, they were emptied

(Fig. 1).27 On Aitolia’s end it has been assumed that the process was not particularly involved. In the

second century AD, Pausanias saw some of Aitolia’s cult statues at Patras, and Strabo comments on

the ἑρημία of the region, suggesting that the population had already dwindled into nothing well

before the synoicism.28 Augustus simply moved the scattered remnants of a near-extinct population

to his newly founded city and their cult objects to Patras. Naturally, Strabo’s comments may in fact

25 The issue of Greek independence remains contested. For an early view, see Larsen 1935. The issue was
recently discussed by Eckstein 2008. See also Gruen (1984) who clearly believes that Greece was “free”
essentially throughout the Hellenistic period; his views are supported by Rich 1989 but opposed by
Baronowski 1988.
26 These indemnities include Carthage, Philip V and in 188 BC, Antiochos III. On Carthage’s indemnity, see

Visonà 1988. On the Seleucid indemnity after Apamea, see Polaček 1971. More focused on the monetary
aspects of the Antiochene treaty is Le Rider 1992: 1993. Reger (2003, 252) believes that the Roman
indemnities directly affected local Greek civic finances. On the cost of war in general, see Chaniotis 2005:
2011.
27 Nikopolis and its territory have received rather ample attention since excavation of the victory monument

began. See the edited volumes by Chrysos 1987; Zachos 2007. For the victory monument, see Murray and
Petsas 1989; Zachos 2001. Also relevant are several essays in Isager 2001b. On the synoicism itself and the
demographic composition of Nikopolis, see Kirsten 1987; Saricakis 1970; Ruscu 2006. On the numismatic
and epigraphic evidence for the Roman colony at Patras, see Agallapoulou 1991; Rizakis 1989: 1995.
28 Pausanias 7.18.8-9; Strabo 7.7.6.
 10

be simply rhetorical, and recent archaeological excavation tells us that the eremia is vastly

exaggerated; indeed, the literary topos of oliganthropia was a common feature of the expansionist

rhetoric at the time.29 Moreover, the synoicism itself is poorly understood. Conflating the accounts

of Strabo, Pausanias and Suetonius may not necessarily remove the inherent bias of a victor’s

rhetoric.30 Yet, it is regularly argued that Nikopolis was founded simply as a memento of Augustus’

victory, but there is indeed reason to question to what extent economic explanations may have

played a role.31 Augustus’ reorganization and integration of Western Greece may consequently have

been a much more complicated process than has previously been understood. The depopulation of

Aitolia seems to have had dire consequences for the region as Pausanias notes the altered shoreline

due to the Acheloos river washing down less mud, surely a function of agricultural hiatus – but if

the accounts for the synoicism of Nikopolis and the Augustan reorganization of Western Greece are

largely rhetorical, a new reading of the evidence is undeniably warranted.32

These two major historical and economic events form the temporal framework for this

study. The first changed Aitolia’s place in the world; by the other, Aitolia supposedly ceased to exist.

The fundamental question is, of course, what happens between the two? Our general impression is

one of decline, yet decline without a contextual discussion is meaningless.33 It is the aim of this

dissertation to contextualize and illuminate the complicated process by which one of the most

powerful regions in Hellenistic Greece met its proverbial end.

5. The physical setting – a regional study.

With the temporal parameters in place, we must now delineate the physical limits for this inquiry.

Studies that take a regional approach to a historical problem are quite naturally helped by the

29 Pothecary 1977; Isager 2001a.

30 Strabo 7.7.6, 10.2.2; Pausanias 5.23.3, 7.18.8-9, 10.38.4; Suetonius Aug. 18.2.
31 Hoepfner 1987.
32 Pausanias 8.24.5.
33 Shipley 1993.
 11

application of topographical definition and delineation.34 Yet, to define a region is not a

straightforward task.35 Borders tend to fluctuate; especially so in the dynamic Hellenistic period,

and a region is more than its physical territory. Consequently, ambiguity is likely to occur,

geographically, ethnically and politically. In the latter category we will face the important issue of

some cities within the federation’s territory experiencing periods of foreign control; Pleuron, for

example, was held by the Achaian federation in the 160s BC.36 Are these cities not Aitolian during

their period of occupation? A related problem entails cities well outside the federation providing

league officials.37 Moreover, at times we fill find inscribed records issued by citizens from non-

Aitolian territories dated by the Aitolian strategos, indicating that these individuals may in fact still

recognize an affiliation to the Aitolian league.38 Political delineation for the region thus emerges as

problematic.

Ethnically, we may define Aitolia as the home of those who identify as ΑΙΤΩΛΟΙ yet for the

reasons just mentioned this is difficult. Similarly, it raises issues for the inclusion or exclusion of

certain towns. One of these is Naupaktos which although originally inhabited by Lokrians, was

handed over to the Aitolians by Philip II in the mid-fourth century BC and remained central to the

Aitolian people and their federation throughout its existence.39

Geographically, we may define Aitolia as a specific region on the map of modern Greece (Fig.

2). While some ambiguity is unavoidable, this approach to regional delineation is the least

problematic. The caveat is, of course, that the geographic “Aitolia” in focus here may not have been

considered a similarly delineated area in the Hellenistic period. Largely defined by water, this

region is bordered to the south by the gulf of Corinth and to the west by the Acheloos river.

Everything west of the Acheloos will be considered Akarnanian or non-Aitolian. This includes all

34 Binford 1964.
35 Reger 2011.
36 Pausanias 7.11-14. On Pleuron and Gallus’ visit, see Gruen 1976a.
37 Stratos: strategoi in 178/7 BC, 172/1 BC, 169/8 BC, 161/0 BC, 148/7 BC. See Appendix 3A.
38 Numerous manumission records at Delphi are dated both by the Delphic archon and the Aitolian strategos.
39 See discussion in Grainger 1999. See also Antonetti 1987.
 12

categories of evidence except for the sole instance of Stratos furnishing strategoi for the league.

Another river, the Mornos, will function as our eastern end, although some archaeological data will

be included from its immediate east bank where the river spills into the Corinthian gulf.40 The most

problematic “border” lies to the north beyond Mount Panaitoliko and the related range of

mountains. Having received no direct site autopsy, this area of Greece seems to have been home to

various ethnic tribes that at times in their history were incorporated into the Aitolian koinon, but

the area is poorly understood and our northern border will thus at best be fluid (Fig. 3).41

Characterized by mountains, steep slopes and narrow gulfs, this region was both difficult to

traverse and generally unsuitable for agriculture, a phenomenon that had a profound effect on the

modus vivendi of its people.

Using the physical features of the landscape as our regional delineations enables a closer

look at activity within that region without excluding some overlap between categories. Clearly,

these physical features were not impermeable in antiquity; rivers were crossed, mountains

traversed, ships sailed the seas. Yet, the visibility of these “borders” facilitates a more focused study

on the sometimes less visible activity that occurred between them and while some cross-

contamination of sources is unavoidable, to make use of geographical parameters for this regional

setting is very clearly ideal.

40 The Mornos river originates in the Oiti mountains and traverses several Greek regions before it crosses the
plain of Naupaktos and meets the sea. Several of these regions were under former Aitolian control but were
detached from the federation in 189 BC. The habit of some excavators to label this territory “East Aitolia” is
directly unhelpful; most notably, this includes the work done at Kallion/Kallipolis. Note the revealing titles of
Bakhuizen 1992 and Themelis 1979. To establish a formal “border” between Aitolia and Western Lokris,
Phokis and Doris is not easy.
41 Diodorus 11.3; Strabo 9.5; Xenophon Anab. 1.2; Xenophon Hell. 6.1; Thucydides 5.51; Appian Mac. 1; Appian

BC 2.10; Livy 41.22. Woodhouse (1897) considers the Dolopians, the Ainianes and the Apodotoi Aitolian
tribes. He follows Pliny, who in NH 4.3 calls them Aetolorum populi.
 13

6. Source material.

The material available for this inquiry does not resemble what an economist would perceive as

economic data, and a brief introduction to its inherent problems is necessary. The epigraphic

material mostly derives from the sanctuaries at Delphi, Thermon, Naupaktos and Kalydon; the

geographical distribution is not broad. These documents cover a wide range of activities but only

one is directly relevant for questions of price setting. Importantly, the epigraphic material brings to

light a large group of indirect demographic and geographic data that would not otherwise be

visible. Very often these documents are dated which is fortunate from the perspective of observing

changes through time. On the downside, they represent a very narrow cross-section of society and

beyond the single category that involves prices, do not record transactions that we immediately

perceive as economic.

The literary evidence is problematic for several reasons. The Polybian bias in all questions

related to Aitolia is well known, and Livy often relies on Polybius.42 Yet, a surprising amount of

scholarship accepts Polybius’ accounts at face value – a dangerous attitude indeed.43 An

overarching theme to the literary evidence for economic activity in antiquity is the ancient authors’

disinterest in what we today perceive as economy. Consequently, most information derived from

literary sources is indirect. An important problem in using literary accounts involves quantification

and numerical analysis. It is clear that numbers are often exaggerated or simply formulated to make

a specific impression, thus lacking a fundamental basis in perceivable reality.44

The archaeological record is equally problematic. Systematic excavations are still

uncommon in the region and publication is rare. A prime example of the disconnection between

excavation and publication is Thermon, which has produced no conclusive publication after over a

42 On Polybius in general, see Walbank 1957. On Polybius and Aitolia, see Sacks 1975; cf. the response in
Mendels 1984-1986.
43 The most noteworthy issue, but by no means the most problematic, is Polybius’ insistence on the Aitolians

as brigands and pirates; see Perrier 2008.

44 See e.g. the most illuminating Scheidel 1996.
 14

century of field work.45 Even when systematically excavated material has been published, evidence

for the Archaic period has received considerably greater attention than materials from other time

periods.46 The most common form of excavation in the region takes the shape of short, intensive

rescue operations resulting in only a brief note in the Archaiologikon Deltion, often without

illustrations or more detailed accounts of what was found. Subsequent publication rarely follows. A

more complex issue is the matter of dating locally produced ceramic material. Aitolia’s ceramic

tradition is notoriously difficult to date, leading excavators to either rely on imported wares or coin

finds, both of which are often dated too broadly.47 For a chronologically focused inquiry such as this

one, correct dating is crucial.

Deriving from excavated contexts and non-contextual coin hoards, the numismatic evidence

presents a series of challenges. Unfortunately, some of those are directly related to current

scholarly practice. When published, excavated coins are poorly illustrated and dated too broadly,

which after the magisterial die study carried out by Tsangari is unacceptable.48 Coin finds, however,

are very rarely published. Second, the issue of hoard retrieval is essential. It would be rash to

assume that the known hoards form a representative sample of the situation in antiquity. Moreover,

hoards tend to be retrieved by chance, and mostly due to modern activity. Consequently, their

geographic distribution most closely reflects the practices of our time.49

In sum, the methodological issues inherent in the available categories of data chiefly derive

from a lack of secure dating, a dramatic discrepancy between what has been excavated and what

has been published, and scholarly bias. To avoid confusion, material that cannot be dated securely

has been omitted from discussion in this dissertation. Importantly, an immediate issue that arises

45 For a summary of the first 100 years, see Karytsas 1998. For more recent seasons, see Papapostolou 2009.
46 The Danish excavators at Kalydon in the 1920s and 1930s seem to have ignored most Hellenistic and
Classical layers in their work on the Archaic temple of Artemis Laphria. See Poulsen and Rhomaios 1927;
Dyggve 1948.
47 See note in Alcock 1993, 48. Cf. Vroom 1993.
48 Tsangari 2007.
49 On hoard retrieval, see e.g. Duncan-Jones 1990, 38.
 15

from the combination of these groups of material is the fact that the evidence they provide very

rarely correlate: in fact, they sometimes contradict one another. This strongly emphasizes the need

for a multi-faceted, inclusive approach as outlined above.

7. The downward slope? Chapter foci.

Within the temporal and geographic parameters defined above, I address the relevant material in a

number of ways. My chapter division is both thematic and source-based. Prelude to indemnity

briefly outlines the historical background and touches upon a few economic institutions and events

that have direct bearing for my overall inquiry. Here I focus only on a select set of issues in order to

best illuminate the changes Late Hellenistic Aitolia underwent after the indemnity.

In my first thematic chapter Landscape and settlement I investigate the physical setting for

Aitolian economic activity in the Late Hellenistic period. Contractions and expansions in settlement

patterns can be most illuminating for our understanding of a regional economy, and similarly

important is the issue of how space is allocated and used. Agriculture, I argue, is a fundamental

economic activity that dominated classical antiquity but its traces are largely invisible – yet it can

be surmised through the allocation and distribution of land.

Towns and monuments explores the form and function of surviving sites. Here I focus in part

on site expansion and contraction, in part on building activity within those sites. Beyond surviving

archaeological data I consider the sociopolitical and economic setting of Aitolia’s towns: which were

active in the federation? Which had active economic institutions of their own? Which seem to have

participated in extraneous trade? What factors played a vital role in site survival? Against this

background, I sketch some initial suggestions for the re-evaluation of Western Greece at the time of

the synoicism of Nikopolis.

 16

Coin production and the Aitolian indemnity considers monetization as related to coin striking

and the economic functionality of money. I focus on production volumes and cycles in order to

ascertain in what way and with what frequency Aitolia’s coinage was struck, and thereafter

evaluate the financial clauses of the Roman indemnity. Thereby I present a new angle to the

discussion on Roman involvement in Greece in the second century BC, a discussion that for

numismatically inclined historians has predominantly focused on the chronology of Greek coin

production before and after the destruction of Corinth. Important questions in this chapter include

common numismatic ideas of debasement, inflation and monetary control.

In Coin circulation and monetary use I address the complex data for how Aitolian coinage

may have been used, both internally and outside the region. The changing political climate had

noteworthy effects on Aitolian coin circulation which differs visibly from the previous century.

Hoard composition sheds light on the available coin types in the region and thereby provides

important insight into the functionality of Aitolia’s monetary economy. Again, I address the

imperative question of monetization, this time from a broader perspective.

Economic institutions and state interference first addresses the available evidence for

institutions and their uses. These formal institutions were not arbitrary and in fact formed the

background constraints for economic activity. Most political institutions have economic functions

and the relevant evidence is here subjected to an inclusive study that assumes that market activity

never occurs in isolation; consequently, grants of proxenia, ateleia, isopoliteia and asylia are taken

to have direct bearing on economic activity.50 Issues of foreign policy are discussed through the lens

of dedications, monetary circulation and physical presence. The issue of warfare and occupation is

also discussed here, since warfare clearly had redistributive effects, and occupation has direct

50On New Institutional Economics, see North 1981: 1990. The arguments of NIE are tested in North and
Weingast 1989. Not everyone believes this is a useful approach; Frier and Kehoe (2007) indicate that
hypotheses of NIE can rarely be directly applied to ancient data. On market activity as relating to institutions,
see Rawski 1996; Morley 2007.
 17

consequences for taxation.51 Moreover, I evaluate the composition, size and ultimate end of the

federation.

In Economic activity and the Aitolian people I focus on the activity discernible on an

individual basis. I address legal as well as illegal activities and include the thorny issue of

mercenary service. Records of manumission, the process whereby a slave purchased his or her

freedom, are discussed in terms of price setting. In addition, I investigate the distribution of wealth

visible in a number of sources and thereby add a valuable dimension to the demographic data. This

chapter also includes a study of the debt crisis in the 170s BC and an assessment of the effects of

regional population decline. Finally, I touch upon the Roman involvement in Aitolia in the first

century BC.

From indemnity to integration takes a macroscopic approach to the evidence presented in

previous chapters and generates a synthetic impression of the economic decline Aitolia experienced

in the Late Hellenistic period. By contextualizing this “downward slope”, I offer a comprehensive

reading of evidence previously omitted from most discussions on both the ancient economy and on

Greek and Roman history of this time period, and thereby generate a more lucid explanation for the

mechanisms of the Nikopolitan synoicism. Lastly, I outline a few brief suggestions for further

investigations both for Aitolia per se and this exceedingly transformational period of Greek and

Roman history as a whole.

8. Exclusions.

While my temporal and geographic parameters are strict, I have argued that an inclusive approach

to source material is necessary. By focusing on economic activity, however, I must at times make a

51The relationship between warfare and economy in antiquity is contested. Some scholars believe war to
have been detrimental to economic growth and stability while others believe the opposite. See Foraboschi
2000; Millett 2001, 29; Reger 2007, 479. Contra Cartledge 2002a, 29.
 18

decision on whether or not to include a sociopolitical event that may or may not have indirect

consequences for the period at hand. In order to maintain a strict focus on Aitolia, economy, and the

Late Hellenistic period I have consequently chosen to exclude certain discussions from this

dissertation. These include first and foremost the issue of Delphi. It cannot be denied that third-

century-BC Aitolia gained substantial influence on Greek affairs through its control of the sanctuary

and the amphiktyonic council. Yet, to gain full understanding of what impact that loss had on Aitolia

as a region we would have to evaluate a large number of questions related to the sanctuary and the

council through time, at a scale large enough to include all states, kings and federations that ever

partook in council events. Such an inquiry simply does not fit the scope of this dissertation.

Moreover, since this is first and foremost a study of a region and not of a federation, to exclude

Delphi seems the most rational choice, since I provide no discussion on other territories formerly

controlled by Aitolia.

A related issue pertains to sanctuaries as independent systems or micro-economies

operating on a mode different to the surrounding region. Such an inquiry would be unnecessarily

involved and since Aitolia only possesses one comparatively well-excavated sanctuary, comparative

data simply does not exist. The relationship between active cult and economic productivity will

thus be ignored.

The final exclusion is perhaps the largest one: the eternal question of “Rome vs. Greece”.52

While this issue remains historically relevant, for the sake of this inquiry it matters little whether

the Roman government was actively interventionist or simply observational in the Late Hellenistic

period. Naturally, the study at hand is bookended by two major “Roman” events and I place great

emphasis of the transitional character of this time period. Inarguably, this inquiry sheds light on the

effects of Rome’s presence on the structure and characteristics of this Hellenistic economy – but it

does so indirectly. Clearly, the question of Greco-Roman interaction is much more complex and

52 The question is indeed old: Larsen 1935; Eckstein 2008; Gruen 1984; Baronowski 1988.
 19

nuanced than present scholarship can express, but maybe our understanding of this time period is

best brought forward by refraining from repeating old questions. Indeed, by avoiding the

mainstream debate that is too strongly painted in black and white, the shades of grey generated by

an inquiry such as this one will without a doubt better illustrate the development and decline that

led a Roman in the Late Republic to exclaim Aetolia amissa.

 20

CHAPTER 2.
Prelude to indemnity.

1. Introduction.

How can we seriously discuss continuity and discontinuity between two historical phases, asks

Alcock, if we base all reasoning on the assumption of a decisive break between the two?53

Comparative data is not only illuminating of processual changes whereby it takes a central place in

economic history, but it is in fact vital for any serious study with temporal parameters.54 Historical

events, economic institutions and change cannot be viewed in isolation without losing their

significance. Despite its focus on the Late Hellenistic period, this dissertation aims at maximum

visibility and consequently we must briefly touch upon a few relevant institutions and earlier

events which form vital comparanda for our later material. In some cases we will observe unbroken

continuity; in others, disruption and change. In each case, we must later inquire to the mechanisms

involved and the results thereof.

This chapter focuses on two main themes. The first centers on territory and spatial division

of land. Large tracts of land – in fact, entire regions – were removed from Aitolian control after the

war with Rome and the pre-indemnity expanse of Aitolian territory is thus of some interest. After

the defeat of the Gauls at Delphi in 279 BC, the koinon annexed a series of territories in a drawn-out

process that was neither linear nor organic. I will briefly evaluate the economic merits of that

territorial expansion.

Our second focus is certain economic institutions, their interpretations and historical

context. Some of these are generally considered simple diplomatic tools but this was not necessarily

their sole function. New Institutional Economics dictates that institutions provide the framework

53Alcock 1994.
54“It is the task of economic history to explain the structure and performance of economies through time” (my
emphasis). North 1981, 1.
 21

for all economic activity, an approach to economic studies that is useful for inquiries such as this

one, when data for quantification is lacking.

These two themes focus our attention on important socioeconomic structures which have

not yet been fully explored. To generate a nuanced and more balanced view of these structures and

the institutions that shape them is indeed crucial since little scholarship has moved beyond

superficial observation. By identifying socioeconomic arrangements we are able to position Aitolia

and its people in the wider scope of Hellenistic interaction and activity. This activity cannot be

quantified but by observing how it functioned, and indeed how it was intended to function, we can

better understand the economic decline Aitolia underwent in the Late Hellenistic period, and

thereby further contextualize the coming of Rome and its impact on the Greek world.

2. Land and territory: settlement patterns and territorial expansion.

The settlement patterns of Hellenistic Aitolia diverge greatly from those of any other time period. A

visible takeoff in the Early Hellenistic period generated an intense growth in site numbers; the

Dutch survey counted no less than 214 sites with Hellenistic material.55 The contrast to the

preceding and subsequent periods is profound. A densely populated landscape gave rise to a highly

active, tightly linked settlement configuration which enabled greater inter-site connectivity.56 While

rapidly changing settlement patterns rarely derive from a single impetus, it is likely that the

concomitant territorial expansion was some extent related to the increased settlement density in

Aitolia itself. In fact, greater settlement density may infer population growth.57 No demographic

data is available for Hellenistic Aitolia but fourth-century-BC settlement data from Boiotia indicates

a situation in which the countryside was so densely populated, it reached dangerously high

55 See chapter 3.
56 On the importance of site-to-site visibility, see Horden and Purcell 2000.
57 Yet, Alcock invites caution in equating the two; Alcock 1993.
 22

numbers.58 If Early Hellenistic Aitolia experienced similar demographic growth, its population may

not have been able to sustain itself on available resources, and territorial expansion may thus have

been inevitable.

Aitolian territorial expansion was neither linear nor direct, but when studied

geographically, it follows a logical trajectory. The aim, it seems, was at locally connected

neighboring states in Central Greece. Since the federation allowed maximum civic and social

independence for its incorporated territories, the archaeological and numismatic records are of

poor help in understanding this expansion; instead, the expansion is most visible in the

composition of the Amphiktyonic council at Delphi. In 277 BC, Aitolia controlled two seats; in 262

BC seven; in 229 BC fourteen; in 226 BC fifteen; and in 220 BC, thirteen or twelve.59 These seats

correspond to polities incorporated into the federation, their territories joined to Aitolia’s own.

While we cannot quantify the importance of the Amphiktyonic council, it seems clear that

the states who held a majority of votes in the council could dictate its policy in a manner best

befitting their own goals. It is generally assumed that involvement at Delphi was a permanent

ambition of the federation, despite Flacelière’s insistence that Delphi itself was never incorporated

in the koinon.60 Nevertheless, control of the Amphiktyonic council and thus greater influence on

panhellenic affairs, ambitious in itself, cannot be a realistic explanation for Aitolian territorial

expansion. Major alliances seem to aim at territorial expansion in general and not only toward

states with seats on the council. Moreover, Aitolian expansion was not immediate; indeed, it

spanned the greater part of the third century BC. Thus, control of the Amphiktyonic council seems

more a bonus than an incentive.61 But why did the federation see fit to expand the territory it

controlled? Political explanations for expansion and growth in the ancient world tend to focus on a

58 See e.g. Bintliff 1991b. The Boiotia data is discussed in Chapter 3.

59 Flacelière 1937.
60 Flacelière 1937. A recent proponent of the Delphi theory is Grainger 1991, ch. 6.
61 The clearest example is of course the alliance between Rome and Aitolia in 212/11 BC which gave Aitolia

the freedom to annex any territory it wanted. See discussion in Grainger 1999. On the council as a peace-
keeping organization, see Larsen 1944.
 23

climate of inter-state competition for hegemony but in Aitolia’s case, reasons for territorial

expansion are best sought in an economic framework.62

Economic systems are sensitive; so especially agrarian systems that lack the transformative

mechanisms of rapid technological improvement. In such systems risk, productivity and general

improvement occur almost exclusively at the margin. Consequently, the least dangerous approach

to continued socioeconomic growth is to avoid decline in marginal productivity by capturing a new

energy subsidy. Ancient states regularly achieved this by territorial expansion.63 New input had the

potential to raise marginal productivity, and Aitolian expansion is best understood in this light. The

mountainous region was ill suited for agriculture and possessed no metal ores; thus, to achieve the

marginal productivity needed for socioeconomic improvement – or even status quo – was near

impossible without new input. Undeniably complex, Aitolia’s territorial growth appears to have

been a built-in problem-solving mechanism whose success rate was almost always guaranteed as

long as it was left unchallenged. It is only logical that the expansion was both gradual and sporadic;

only when marginal productivity was challenged, a new energy source was captured. When this

mechanism was threatened, however, marginal productivity could quickly change to marginal

decline which seriously affected the region’s ability to avoid system collapse. The economic decline

in focus for this dissertation is evidence thereof.

By expanding the territory it controlled, the koinon maintained marginal productivity, but

also obtained several secondary “tools” which could be used for socioeconomic improvement. First

and foremost, a larger territory equaled a greater number of people from whom to exact taxes and

to levy troops for army duty. In turn, this augmented Aitolian political power.64 A larger territory

facilitated greater population movement, both of Aitolians and non-Aitolians – an important factor

for trade. Epigraphic records reveal that some of the foreigners residing in Aitolia were

62 Daux 1955. Hegemony, it seems, remains central to the debate on Greco-Roman interaction in the Late
Hellenistic period; ergo Morstein Kallet-Marx 1995a; Badian 1984.
63 Tainter 1988.
64 Mackil 2003.
 24

merchants.65 Moreover, as Aitolian control of Central Greece grew spatially, so did the federation’s

control of the amphiktyonic council at Delphi. Territorial expansion equaled federal expansion.

Yet, expansion was not simply predatory. Aitolia did not drain surrounding regions of

resources and manpower.66 Inhabitants of annexed territories did not become Aitolians but their

polities did become members of the koinon and thereby, small, previously insignificant states

gained a voice. That this symbiotic relationship was generally considered positive is strengthened

by Aitolian grants of isopoliteia to non-member states, indicating that there were several levels of

incorporation, the highest of which was full membership.67 The importance of federal membership

becomes clear when studying the epigraphic record at Delphi after 189 BC. There, numerous

polities still identify as Aitolian and date their records according to the traditional Aitolian dating

formula – at a time when history tells us that they had been removed from Aitolian control.68

Consequently, while territorial expansion seems to have been a necessity for the population to

maintain a viable socioeconomic balance, we understand that it was not solely beneficial to Aitolia

itself.

3. Economic institutions. The background constraints.

How do we study economic activity without possessing quantifiable economic data? According to a

2007 study, by focusing on the complex relationship between [legal] institutions and the

economy.69 In New Institutional Economics, institutions provide the framework within which

65 For foreigners in Aitolia, see Marek 1984. There are numerous epigraphic attestations of foreigners
residing permanently in Aitolia; see e.g. FdD III 3,186 and 187. For Aitolians living outside Aitolia, see the
grants of asylia discussed below as well as chapters 7 and 8.
66 Contra the interpretive core/periphery model; see Bintliff 1997.
67 The issue is best addressed in Larsen 1968. On the composition of Aitolia’s assembly, see Larsen 1945:

1952.
68 E.g. SGDI II 1765, c. 170 – 150 BC: a manumitting owner from Kallipolis in West Lokris.
69 Frier and Kehoe 2007.
 25

human beings interact and their economic activity occurs.70 These institutions form a set of rules

which are designed to constrain or dictate the behavior of individuals in the interest of maximizing

wealth or utility. Some of these institutions are seemingly political in nature, but since formal

institutions are never arbitrary and in fact form the “rules of the game” for all economic activity,

their economic intent and effect merit attention. Importantly, these institutions formalize

constraints on behavior that the polity finds unacceptable. Thereby, they provide secondary

evidence for economic policy and moreover, their study informs us of the institutional

arrangements needed to achieve economic growth.71

Aitolia made use of several such institutions: isopoliteia, politeia, asylia, ateleia, asphaleia,

and proxenia (Appendix 2A). Known to us through the written records that formalize them, these

unilateral grants have often been taken as evidence for certain types of unwanted socioeconomic

behavior – most readily, piracy and plunder.72 They are either bestowed upon individuals and their

families, or on the population of an entire city. A second group of institutions consists of symbola,

bilateral agreements between two states. These include symmachia and sympoliteia; in Aitolia’s

case, they are exceedingly rare and will not be discussed here.73

The most common institution is that of proxenia given to an individual, sometimes in

combination with grants of isopoliteia or politeia.74 Chiefly displayed at the federal sanctuary at

Thermon, the documents recording the grant illustrate that the award was often sponsored by an

influential Aitolian, even a strategos. Consequently, it is likely that the foreign recipient had already

proven himself a useful person to the awarding polity, perhaps through acts of euergetism, and that

70 On New Institutional Economics in general, see North 1981: 2005. Frier and Kehoe (2007) emphasize that
NIE cannot always be applied to material from the ancient world.
71 Gabrielsen 2011.
72 The examples are numerous. See e.g. McShane 1964; Will 1966. On Aitolian grants as evidence for piracy,

see Benecke 1934. See also Busolt 1920.

73 Gauthier 1972.
74 Fossey 1996. On proxenia in general, Marek 1984: 1985.
 26

the grant was instigated either by the federation itself, or by an Aitolian citizen.75 The addition of

privileges such as ateleia indicates that the services rendered were at least to some extent

economic, as the right to import or export goods without paying taxes created opportunities for

economic activity.76 Yet, evidence from Delos shows that direct economic motives for these grants

were rare.77 Nevertheless, activity in a socially embedded economy is rarely immediately visible,

and it is clear that these institutions had wide-ranging economic consequences: to pay no taxes on

goods, to receive personal security and access to a socioeconomic infrastructure in a foreign polity

have the potential to generate a greater marginal return.

The xenia background to proxenia should not be discounted.78 In an integrated economy

which lacks an independent, self-sustaining “market”, connectivity between individuals – and

through them, between their respective states – is absolutely central. To reward certain services to

the state through grants of civic privileges which themselves aimed at increased connectivity was

only logical, as it both encouraged such positive behavior and served to further integrate useful

individuals into the socioeconomic makeup of the region. Naturally, we cannot quantify or even

estimate what effect these grants had on the Aitolian economy but it is vital to emphasize the

frequency and regularity with which the federation made use of these institutions over the course

of the third century BC. Quite obviously, the koinon found these grants useful, as did the other states

that used them. Interestingly, we note that Aitolians were awarded proxenia by foreign polities –

but not by the same polities to whose citizens Aitolia itself had issued grants (Appendix 2B).

From a historical point of view, the most noteworthy economic institution, and at the same

time the most complex, is that of asylia. The awarding polity granted the recipient inviolability

which some scholars erroneously interpret in the realm of immediate legal responsibility – an error

75 Gauthier 1985.
76 On ateleia see Rubinstein 2009. Cf. Gauthier 1985. See also Reger 2003.
77 Reger 1994.
78 Gerolymatos 1986. The earliest evidence for proxenia is Classical in date. The formula was not fixed until

the fourth century BC. See Knoepfler 2001.

 27

which in turn has given rise to the notion of an Aitolian piratical state.79 In Aitolia’s case, asylia is

almost exclusively given to states and not to individuals. It has been argued both that asylia

represents a collective step away from piratical behavior, and conversely, that the league actively

employed piracy as a means of bullying other states into federal agreements whereby asylia was

granted as a relief.80 Neither approach is satisfactory. First, we note the manner in which the grant

was issued. The foreign state appears to have initiated contact with Aitolia and been granted their

specified request. Thus, Aitolia’s role is a passive one. Second, not a single case of the over 200

known asylia grants makes use of an oath.81 Consequently, the grants are not legally binding, and

moreover, very few grants include some form of repercussions for those breaking it. It is indeed

difficult to determine what the institution really meant: neither legally nor religiously does the

grant of “security from seizure” make much sense without an accompanying oath. Yet, the inherent

ambiguity of the institution may very well have formed part of its attraction. As a cultural

phenomenon firmly anchored in a Panhellenic ideal of diplomacy, neutralization and connectivity,

each state was able to interpret – and use – the grant differently.82

The geographic distribution of Aitolian grants is central to interpretation of how the

federation used these institutions. Crucially, they do not correspond to epigraphically attested

piratical attacks, nor to Polybian accounts of raids.83 To simply correlate asylia to piracy is thus too

simplistic an approach. Importantly, requests seem to almost exclusively have been bestowed upon

geographically distant polities located in places well outside Aitolian territorial control.84 So why

79 Rigsby 1996.
80 Scholten 2000 contra Ormerod 1997.
81 Rigsby 1996.
82 Rigsby (1996) points out that to Rome, the request of Greek asylia meant nothing beyond a general right to

asylum, a very basic assumption that not necessarily held true for a Greek polity.
83 There is only one possible correlation – the case of Lousoi/Lusi in the Peloponnese, whence the Aitolians

stole some sacred furniture when threatening the inviolability of the sanctuary. Rigsby doubts that the
insignificant sanctuary was truly asylon. More importantly, the inscription documenting the grant has been
dated to 220 BC simply because of the Polybian account, but the date cannot be verified. See Rigsby 1996; cf.
Polybius 4.18.11; IG IX 12 1:135.
84 McShane (1964, 52) adds too much weight to his statement that asylia was sought from distant, dangerous

powers.
 28

was Aitolia solicited for asylia, and why did it acquiesce to these requests? The question merits

attention. Initially, we note that Aitolia was by no means the only Hellenistic state that made regular

use of these institutions. To seek out the intervention of other states by appealing to commonly

known institutions, to enter agreements and to establish treaties were frequently occurring

phenomena in the Hellenistic age. A latecomer to the international stage, Aitolia had no rich history

to advance its name and thus it had to make use of existing socioeconomic and political tools to best

situate itself on that stage. Quite simply, the use of known economic institutions generated the

background constraints needed for participation from which the federation might otherwise have

been excluded.

It has been argued that the κατὰ ταῦτα mentioned in several grants insinuates a form of

reciprocity.85 If that is the case, the presumed unilateral grants would in fact be bilateral, and Aitolia

would gain every form of privilege it itself granted to the foreign polity. Τhis would facilitate legal

movement of Aitolians outside the borders of their home polity. Consequently, it is argued, Aitolia

readily agreed to these requests as obtaining legal access to a foreign port helped advance its own

piracy abroad. The argument is unsound. Rather, the readiness with which Aitolia granted

foreigners and other states various forms of politeia, asylia and asphaleia emphasizes a marked,

official stand against non-normative behavior.

Indeed, it is in that setting we must approach the institution of asylia. Aitolia seems to have

used it with the aim of separating its own official policy and federal ideal from the misbehavior of

certain individuals. The region had a longstanding reputation of preying on its neighbors, a mode of

production in “the old way of life” well known in Central Greece.86 This raid mentality, I argue, was

structurally essential for the socioeconomic framework available to the Aitolians, but was

unacceptable to other Hellenistic states and consequently the koinon used these institutions to

85 Gauthier 1972, 251.

86 Thukydides 1.5.1-3.
 29

separate its own policy from the traditional attitude of its people to praeda.87 Cleverly, it did so

without binding legislation. By responding institutionally to other states’ general concern with

safety, the federation achieved improved socioeconomic connectivity at a larger geographic scale

than the territory it controlled itself, and thereby it maximized its potential for marginal growth.

4. Piracy, pirates and plunder.

As noted above, economic institutions have been taken to demonstrate widespread Aitolian piracy;

indeed, to validate the existence of a state whose very foundations were predatory. Clearly

influenced by Polybius’ repeated accusations of Aitolian misbehavior, modern scholars see in

Aitolia a piratical state and consequently attribute to Aitolia several cases of piratical attacks in

which the attackers’ identity is unknown. 88 Such blanket characterizations are uninformative.

Epigraphically attested examples of Aitolian piracy and brigandage beyond the inference of asylia

grants do exist, but are not numerous; in fact, when analyzed closely, these attacks seem to

contradict the notion of an Aitolian piratical state.89 First, the foreign states that were granted asylia

were not the same that were attacked by pirates. Second, states that had already been attacked

(even in cases where the origins of the pirates are unknown) did not solicit Aitolian protection.

Third, and very importantly, the attackers seem to operate on their own, without federal support.

87 Gabrielsen 2001. Note Polybius 18.4.8-5.4, in which the Aitolians boast that they would “rather remove
Aitolia from Aitolia than that custom”.
88 See e.g. Ziebarth (1929) who assigns several “nameless” attacks to the Aitolians; one of these supposed

Aitolian attacks, on Salamis in the mid-third century BC is interpreted by Tarn (1913) to have been carried
out by Cretans.
89 Naval attack on Naxos: IG XII 5,36 = Syll.3 520; Pritchett 1974. Raid on Attica in the 240s BC: IG II2 746. Sea-

borne raid on Lesbos in 208/7 BC: IG IX 12 1: 190; Bakhuizen 1993. Raids on Attica seem to have been
common during the Chremonidean War in the 260s BC. See e.g. Scholten 2000, 109. Several scholars have
attributed an epigraphically attested attack on Aigiale on Amorgos to the Aitolians. Nevertheless, as pointed
out by Scholten, we are only given the name of the pirate captain, and there is nothing to suggest that he or
his crew originated from Aitolia. See Scholten 2000, 109; Pritchett 1974, 277; Benecke 1935, 12-14; Ormerod
1997, 139-140. The inscription is Syll.3 521.
 30

Literary evidence for Aitolian brigandage is more plentiful. Polybius regularly accuses

Aitolia of ignoring established normative behavior. At one point Polybius has Philip V say that the

koinon refused to regulate its members’ “right to take booty from booty”.90 This has been

interpreted as formal federal legislation allowing – or indeed encouraging – Aitolians to raid any

territory they liked at any given time.91 Yet this cannot be so. The koinon did not consent to random

plunder. Some grants of asylia include the added bonus of legal representation and access to

Aitolian law courts for the sake of redress. Such a privilege would not have been granted in a state

that legalized plunder. Indeed, the majority of Polybian accusations is set in a time of war, and it is

within that framework we must situate Aitolian privateering; it was a military strategy that suited

both the participating Aitolians and their federation. Plunder (and the havoc it caused) was a

relevant contribution both to the ambitions of the military campaign – and thus, to the federation –

and to the personal finances of the participating individuals.

In fact, piracy and plunder is best understood on an individual level and in socioeconomic

terms – not on a state-wide level. The pirate is, after all, an individual, who operates outside the

norms of society. The opportunistic attitude inherent in such practice is of paramount importance

for any individual living at the margin. To capture a new energy subsidy, even temporarily, can

make the important difference between decline and improvement (or death and survival). Aitolian

opportunism was firmly anchored in a traditional raid mentality which improved odds of survival.

This mentality was structurally essential for any individual situated in an economic system that was

otherwise poorly suited to increased marginal return.

Aitolians seem to have regularly practiced privateering or looting in wartime, and

moreover, to have been authorized by its federation to engage in such practice.92 Chances are that it

some individuals seized any available opportunity, even in peacetime. Such an “ethnic habit” was

90 Polybius 18.4.8-5.4; Scholten 2000, 21ff.

91 Larsen 1968, 210ff.
92 Perrier 2008.
 31

unacceptable to most other Hellenistic polities. Herein lies an important conflict. The koinon sought

greater integration in the Hellenistic world which it could only achieve by adapting to established

norms. It achieved this in part by relying on economic institutions readily used by other polities and

by “playing the game” when asked to. The Aitolians, on the other hand, were used to an age-old

mode of production which mandated capture of new energy subsidies whenever an opportunity

presented itself. This conflict between socioeconomic tradition and sociopolitical attitude was

never truly resolved. It is clear that some Aitolians engaged in downright piratical activities. The

behavior of such opportunistic individuals, regardless of their ethnicity, forms the general backdrop

to some states’ inquiries for Aitolian asylia.

5. Warfare and mercenary service.

Aitolia spent a significant portion of the third century BC at war. Since Aitolia had no standing army,

soldiers had to be levied among the ordinary citizenry which removed people from their ordinary

place of production in the agrarian-based economy. Agricultural societies are sensitive to shifts in

manpower, and war-induced breaks in agricultural activity could have significantly negative

effects.93 The positive effects of warfare are difficult to ascertain but territorial acquisition provided

the new energy subsidy needed for marginal improvement. Major military alliances almost

exclusively focus on such subsidies.94 Ancient states could use warfare as a means of improving

their own odds but when studying the last three decades of the third century BC, a time period for

which Polybius’ narrative is unusually rich and complete, the chance nature of utilizing warfare for

93 If we envision a Greek family of six members, four of which are at an age where they can contribute a whole
day’s work, the absence of only one of said four members will deprive the family of 25% of manual labor. If
the age distribution is more slanted, in the case of a larger family with a greater number of younger children,
the consequences of a single absentee adult are even greater. The land, too, suffered, both from invasions and
from the simple removal of workers. Cf. Toynbee 1965. See also Chaniotis 2011.
94 Division of booty, for example, was a chief factor in an Aitolo-Illyrian alliance mentioned by Polybius:

4.16.9; 29.5. Cf. the alliance between Rome and Aitolia in 212/11 BC; Muylle 1969.
 32

socioeconomic improvement becomes clear (Appendix 2C).95 Warfare, I have argued, provided

individuals living at the margin with a chance to improve their own odds of survival, but Aitolia was

not constantly at war, nor was such marginal improvement ever guaranteed, and thus, some

individuals resorted to illegal activities such as piracy. Others sought military employment

elsewhere as mercenaries.96

Although by no means a Hellenistic invention, the use of paid non-citizen soldiers was an

integral part of Hellenistic warfare. We find Aitolian mercenary soldiers in every royal army in the

Hellenistic world, armies that had little or no connection with the koinon itself (Appendix 2D). Their

service abroad was so frequent that contemporary authors made note of it.97 During the third

century BC, the great majority of Aitolian mercenaries served the Ptolemies, but whether this is a

result of strong diplomatic ties between kingdom and koinon, or simply an indication of Ptolemaic

habits of military employment, we cannot say. In 200 BC, 6,500 Aitolians were employed in the

Ptolemaic army.98 This is the largest group of Aitolians ever recorded outside the federation’s own

territory. Their recruiter, the infamous Skopas from Trichonion, was paid the monstrous salary of

ten minae per day in addition to his regular mercenary wages.99

Unfortunately, no definitive figures survive for ordinary mercenary pay in the Hellenistic

period.100 Griffith estimates that the composite pay of a citizen soldier may have varied between six

and eight Attic obols per day, and suggests that by the end of the third century BC, mercenary

95 Too simplistically, Finley labeled the accumulation of booty an essential factor for financial growth in the
Greco-Roman world (my emphasis): Finley 1977.
96 I am thankful to the participants of Strangers in a Strange Land, a graduate conference held by the

University of Pennsylvania in 2011 where I presented a work-in-progress paper on Aitolian mercenaries in

the third century BC, for their kind suggestions on the connections between mercenary service and economic
gain.
97 Livy 32.34.5: “contrariae persaepe acies in utraque parte Aetolica auxilia habeant”.
98 Livy 31.43.
99 Polybius (11.25.16) notes that the men next in rank to Skopas, presumably also Aitolians, each received one

mina daily.
100 The treaty between Aitolia and Akarnania notes the local rates for military wages in the first half of the

third century BC. According to this treaty, a cavalryman would make one Corinthian stater per day, a hoplite
12 Corinthian obols, a peltast nine obols and a light-armed soldier seven obols. IG IX 12 1:3.
 33

wages had risen to match that number.101 Such estimates require the Ptolemaic state to pay 6,500

Aitolian mercenaries 23,735 – 31,633 minae annually. Skopas’ own salary, discounting the lowly

base salary, was 3,650 minae. If he was indeed paid regularly throughout his seven-year tenure, we

arrive at 425 talents. It is a positively astronomical sum; close in size to the indemnity of 189 BC

and greater than the fortune of the Aitolian Alexander who Polybius claims was the richest man in

Greece.102 In the second century BC, manumission at Delphi seems to have averaged four minae, the

equivalent of 3 ½ tons of wheat.103 The comparison challenges Polybius’ statement on Skopas’

grossly inflated salary but even if Polybius is correct, Skopas case is truly exceptional.104

Yet, it is clear that mercenary service was attractive to the Aitolians. The base salary may

not have been particularly high but was at least roughly on par with citizen-soldier wages. The

added prospect of booty was naturally present, as was the opportunity for salaried enrichment

through promotion. Numerous inscriptions attest to Aitolians holding high positions in these

foreign armies, and it is likely that generals were paid substantially more than ordinary soldiers. In

fact, the opportunity for personal enrichment seems to have been the main attraction of mercenary

service, whether through plunder or promotion.

Aitolian mercenary service seems to have virtually exploded in the last two decades of the

third century BC. Before this, Aitolian mercenaries are common but do not occur in large numbers.

This surge is best explained in the light of the Social War, which was concluded with the Peace of

Naupaktos in 217 BC. To the Aitolians, the following decade was a period of confusion. Not all

citizens were advocates of peace, and even after the ratification of the peace treaty, some Aitolians

protested against its provisions. 105 The koinon was exhausted, Aitolian cities and sanctuaries had

been destroyed, the agrarian base for the regional economy was harmed, and many people were

101 Griffith 1968.

102 Polybius 21.26.
103 Hopkins 1978.
104 Polybius (18.54.6-55.3) mentions that Skopas’ home in Alexandria was full of money and precious objects.
105 Polybius 5.102.4, V 107.5-7. Scholten 2000, 224-227. Larsen (1968, 356-58) notes that the states involved

simply had had enough. See also Grainger 1999, chapter 14.
 34

greatly in debt. Skopas himself left Aitolia because of debt problems, and his case was not unique.106

Recruiters may have been unusually successful simply because they offered debt-ridden individuals

some cash up front; Polybius tells us that when on a recruitment campaign in Aitolia, Skopas was

given a large sum of money to advance to the newly recruited mercenaries.107 It is indeed likely that

the willingness with which thousands of Aitolians accepted mercenary service was a direct result of

the economic situation in Aitolia in the last decades of the third century BC.

But by accepting service abroad, the Aitolian mercenaries extended their absence from their

regular agrarian duties. This occurred at a time when the agricultural base for the economy was

already seriously hurt by long campaigns abroad and at home. While the individual incentive for

mercenary service was powerfully financial, its economic effects on Aitolia itself were seriously

detrimental, and the debt crisis deepened.

6. The debt crisis.

Comprised of three brief fragments in Polybius, the Aitolian debt problem is poorly understood.108

The Aitolians, Polybius claims, had suddenly and unexpectedly become enmeshed in debt. The

strategoi Skopas and Dorimachos – prominent actors in Polybius unflattering account of the Social

War – were charged with drawing up the legislation needed to solve the problem, but the proposal

met with serious opposition and as a result, Skopas went into exile in Alexandria. That is the entire

narrative.

Situated in the aftermath of the Social War and the following ten years of quarrels, the

sudden emergence of a debt crisis is unsurprising.109 The countryside was in disrepair and the

106 On Skopas’ debt problems, see Polybius 13.2.3.

107 Polybius 15.25.16.
108 Polybius 13.1-3. Polybius considers Skopas’ proposals revolutionary and regards the ability to legislate

away debt an example of constitutional instability; in reality, Grainger (1999, 343) is right in suggesting that
this is evidence of the adaptability to unforeseen circumstances.
109 Cf. Fuks 1974. On subsistence risk in the Greek world, see Gallant 1991.
 35

agrarian base disturbed. Wealthy Aitolians traditionally stored their riches at Thermon but the

sanctuary had been sacked and all goods carried off.110 Some territories had been detached from

the federation, removing both taxable population and natural resources from Aitolian control. For

the agriculturally engaged population, vital marginal return had been seriously affected, clearly to

the point of needing to borrow money. Cancellation of these debts meant that those who had loaned

money would lose it, which the lenders presumably were unwilling to do.111 Consequently, the debt

problem remained unsolved and the gap between lenders and borrowers grew.112 As a result,

Aitolia suffered both a loss of physically available manpower (through voluntary exile for the

purpose of mercenary service) and a reduction in available men for military service, since fewer

men could now afford the equipment needed for warfare. For an economy that was sensitive to

shifts in manpower, in a region where marginal return was of utmost importance for survival, the

effects were profound. This “third-century-BC inheritance” had a serious impact on Late Hellenistic

Aitolia and “the downward slope” must be understood against this background.

In the ancient world, economic crises were chiefly solved by capturing new resources, not

by constitutional reformation or technological improvement. Territorial expansion, I have argued,

was the easiest and most reliable way for Aitolia to obtain such resources. The late third-century-

BC debt crisis indicates why the federation showed such dissatisfaction after 196 BC, and invites a

new reading for the invitation of Antiochos III as autokrator strategos of the league.113 Only by

territorial expansion could the region regain its socioeconomic footing. Unfortunately, the

territorial clauses of the Roman indemnity prevented such expansion and Aitolia was doomed to

economic decline.

110 Pritchett 1992a; Walbank 1940; Polybius 5.8.4-9; 13.1.

111 Grainger 1999, 344ff.
112 Walbank (1940, 109,2) believes that the legislation was passed There might be a connection between the

surge of proxenia grants and the general economic depression at this time.
113 Polybius 18.38.21; 29. 22.
 36

CHAPTER 3.
Landscape and settlement.

1. Introduction: landscape and survey.

To discuss civilization is to discuss space.114 The arrangement of human settlements in a specific

location, their relationship, form and date offer a specific and often cohesive commentary on human

activity and history. Rarely haphazard, this arrangement is dictated by certain rules that constrain

and enable human activity. Such constraints are both immediately physical in nature – the

availability of arable land, soil quality and natural resources – but also include human-induced

constrictions such as political power, socioeconomic circumstances and cultural preferences. The

various ways in which settlements are arranged in, and make use of, their surroundings invariably

reflect changes and oscillations in the socioeconomic arrangement of that culture. This synthesis of

human activity and geological formations, of people and place, is a defining characteristic of a

landscape beyond the oversimplification of “territory”.115 Consequently, a landscape is not simply a

physical space but also a social construct in that it is both an artificial human creation and a

process.116 As a process, the landscape changes as activity therein transforms. This process reflects

social, political, economic and demographic events, both internally and externally.117 Therefore,

landscapes invite assessment of historical structures which if studied diachronically, allows for the

evaluation of human activity over time, both in a Braudelian longue dûrée and as histoire

événementielle: in fact, it can be argued that no study of civilization is complete without detailed

114 Braudel 1994.

115 Gottman 1973. The oldest analysis of the significance of territorial characteristics is Plato’s Laws.
Interestingly, Plato’s definition has much in common with modern attitudes: the territory is the very basis
upon which the state exists. Laws 4.704-10; 5.737.
116 Backhaus and Murungi 2002.
117 Smith 1990; Cosgrove 1985; Bintliff 1982.
 37

understanding of its physical setting.118 Moreover, close examination of a landscape will shed light

on interactions between local communities which can be most informative of socioeconomic

change.119 In this dissertation, I use the term “landscape” in its broadest sense, thereby including

the physical land, the settlements on that land, the activities it generated, and the spatial

arrangement of sites against the backdrop of natural topography.

Any discussion of ancient landscapes must take into account the very specific vocabulary that

existed in antiquity with regards to the land and the people inhabiting it. Strabo speaks of the

eremia of desolate Aitolia in the first century BC and a century earlier, Polybius made note of

general population decline and settlement abandonment all over Greece.120 Desolation and

prosperity are key terms in the landscape vocabulary and despite their obvious moral values, have

often been taken at face value.121 Yet, Alcock has demonstrated that oliganthropia¸ that is,

desolation and population decline, is to a large extent a literary topos that made use of

impressionistic generalizations to advance a specific political rhetoric on behalf of a victor.122 It is

thus important to not automatically accept accounts of Late Hellenistic decline and we must look

beyond the literary topoi. For this study, detailed evaluation of Aitolia’s landscape is essential.

Poorly understood and largely unstudied, the socioeconomic decline in Late Hellenistic Aitolia must

be evaluated organically, and without appropriate understanding of the landscape itself, the decline

will remain detached from the very constraints that shaped its existence. Approaches to regional

studies beyond purely literary analyses are many but the most valuable approach is still the surface

survey.123 Data obtained through intensive and extensive survey form the basis for discussion in

118 Renfrew 1978a. For detailed and still relevant analysis of the Annales School and its applications in
archaeology, see Bintliff 1991a. La longue dûrée is addressed throughout Braudel’s works, but most readily in
Braudel 1972. See also chapters 2 and 3 in Braudel 1994.
119 Renfrew and Cherry 1986.
120 Strabo 7.7.1; 10.2.3; Polybius 36.17.5-9.
121 Cf. Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985. On Strabo’s use of eremia and its relevance for Western Greece, see Isager

2001a.
122 Alcock 1993.
123 The history of surface survey is summarized in Barker 1991. For a summary of the most recent – and in

some cases, still ongoing – surveys in the Mediterranean basin, see Alcock and Cherry 2004.
 38

this chapter. It will generate the physical framework so desperately needed for a contextual reading

of the monuments, coins, inscriptions and literary accounts of Late Hellenistic Aitolia, thereby

defining for us the very landscape in which Aitolian activity took place.

2. Survey and settlement data: Studia Aetolica.

In the 1980s, a Dutch team previously engaged in the 1970s salvage excavations at Kallipolis

conducted an extensive survey of a vast territory they called Aitolia.124 Their chosen area of study

included the Aitolian portion of the prefecture Aitoloakarnania but also a large expanse of land east

of the Mornos river, an area best known as West Lokris in antiquity but referred to as “East Aitolia”

by the Dutch surveyors, as well as the mountainous area around the newly built Mornos reservoir

(Fig. 6).125 Field walking combined with careful site autopsy and evaluation of previous reports and

published accounts formed the basis of their study.126 Selection of sites for intensive field walking

was done with great care, but several factors lead to intensive survey methods only being applied to

select smaller tracts of the large area selected for investigation. Difficulty in accessibility was named

the primary reason. The chosen territory was enormous and also very mountainous. The sheer size

forced the survey to be extensive rather than intensive, as did the inaccessibility of many sites due

to the extreme nature of the terrain. When sampling, the team made careful use of shard density

and noted that the Aitolian landscape under autopsy generated less background noise than other

parts of Greece. This suggested that the region was more densely inhabited – but not necessarily

permanently settled – than other places and had seen substantial physical human activity.127

124 Bommeljé et al 1987. For Kallipolis, see Bakhuizen 1988: 1991: 1992: 1994.
125 This area does not fully correspond to “Aitolia” as defined in this study; see chapter 1.
126 We note that the Dutch team did not produce a cohesive definition of “site” as opposed to a simple scatter.

Ideally, a site should exhibit definable limits but it is not entirely clear whether this was always taken into
account during the Dutch investigations. Cf. Doelle 1977.
127 Gallant 1986.
 39

214 autopsied sites in Studia Aetolica generated datable Hellenistic material but not all

could be securely categorized (Fig. 4).128 48 sites were cemeteries, 66 habitation sites, 29 special

purpose sites, and seven freestanding towers; the rest could not be categorized. Many sites severed

more than one function, where habitation combined with a cemetery was the most common.

Naturally, not all these 214 sites are relevant to this study as few of them have produced securely

datable Late Hellenistic material. Defining dating criteria based on a comparatively small amount of

investigated material can be hazardous, and Northwestern Greece adds another level of difficulty in

that there are no secure typologies for its nearly undatable local ceramics.129 Both terra sigillata and

Hellenistic red slip occur in Aitolia but not at all Hellenistic sites, and any dating system based

solely on ceramic imports can generate a slanted, not to say false chronology: after all, a site

autopsy producing no imported Late Hellenistic wares need not imply that the site was inactive at

the time. Moreover, there may have been problems of sampling; the Dutch team noted that

inaccessibility of terrain sometimes prevented sufficient autopsy.130

The Dutch team was aware of some problems in their first study. A 1995 reinvestigation of

material autopsied from select sites in the large territory examined in the 1980s focused on Early

Roman and Roman material, and allowed for the identification of a clear break between the

Hellenistic and Roman periods.131 More importantly, the Dutch archaeologists detected a vivid

break between the Hellenistic and Late Hellenistic periods. Sites having produced Hellenistic black

glaze pottery but no terra sigillata vastly outnumbered sites that had produced both. Interpreted to

have occurred between the first half of the second century BC and the end of the first century BC,

this decline took place precisely in the time period investigated in this dissertation. Yet, although

128 Observe that this number applies to Aitolia as defined in chapter 1. The Dutch team included a large area
west of the Mornos river that was not under Aitolian control in the second century BC and should more
correctly be considered West Lokris. Thus, the actual number of Hellenistic Dutch “Aitolian” sites is larger
than the number used here.
129 Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.
130 Sampling in surface surveys is statistically problematic and the Dutch investigations did not account for

several relevant statistical factors. Their overall sample may in fact have been too small, which could
influence skewing. For a general overview of the problem, see Cowgill 1975.
131 Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.
 40

the 1995 gazetteer aimed to be all-encompassing, further analysis of the available data is necessary

in order to assess several essential variables. These include the number of sites, their distribution

by date and function, their arrangement according to environmental variables, and their

interrelationship.132 Moreover, the Dutch data itself needs close reevaluation, since some dating and

site identification have been done solely based on travelers’ reports. In addition, several sites have

experienced significant excavation since 1995, thereby providing additional information not

available in the Dutch study. To this we must add coin hoards, which were largely ignored by the

Dutch team, and settlement data obtained through close analysis of inscriptions.

3. The Aitolian data.

We begin with the epigraphic material. The extensive Dutch survey did incorporate inscriptions,

but only as chronological markers, and most often too broadly so. Over 100 Late Hellenistic

inscriptions have been found at eight sites in Aitolia. Many of them can be dated to within a year of

their production simply by means of their own dating formula.133 Importantly, the inscriptions

contain spatial information that cannot be obtained from any other source. They mention a large

number of sites which have not been identified in the archaeological record but must have existed

when the inscription was engraved, or at least slightly before (Appendix 1B). The sites are often

mentioned in their adjectival form as simple demonyms. Thus, they can be tribes, or villages, or

both, but clearly possess a geographic component in addition to their ethnic identity. These

demonyms are used precisely in the same way as the known topographical adjectival forms

“Kalydonian” and “Naupaktian”, which suggests that there is some merit in considering them

localities and not ethnicities. Naturally, one does not identify as “Kalydonian” several generations

after Kalydon has ceased to exist, and there is definite reason to interpret these place names as

132 Cherry and Shennan 1978.

133 On Aitolian dating formulas based on the league’s annually elected strategoi, see Grainger 2000.
 41

living communities. The town Hypata, for example, has yet to be physically identified, but it

furnished a repeat strategos in the second century BC and must have existed in a physical

capacity.134 The second-century-BC inscriptions mention 58 sites in total.135 Thus, caution is indeed

warranted when evaluating the Dutch data, since the epigraphic record broadly demonstrates that

the data obtained from physical site autopsy and surface survey rarely tells the whole tale, an

important point to keep in mind when evaluating said data below.

Careful reevaluation of the Dutch material – with an eye to secure dating – in combination

with subsequently excavated material reveals a total number of 27 sites having produced Late

Hellenistic material (Appendix 1A; Fig. 5). This includes the find spots for the abovementioned coin

hoards which are five in number; two of these come from sites not included in the Dutch

gazetteer.136 Of 27 identified sites, at least ten have a cemetery function, twenty can be considered

habitation sites, eight are sanctuaries and three cannot be assigned an accurate function due to

scarcity of evidence.137 Most sites combine two functions. Most commonly, habitation sites have an

affiliated necropolis which defines them as cemetery sites.

3.1. Habitation sites.

16 sites can be labeled habitation sites. There is a clear tendency toward sites being classified as

habitation sites if they have received scientific excavation, Angelokastro, Kalydon and Naupaktos

being notable examples. Since sites located near modern habitation and infrastructure have

received more attention that inland sites, this may prove to have generated a false bias in the

134 This man, Eupolemos, was commander at Kynoskephalai in 197 BC. He was strategos for the first time in
189/188 BC when he also served as a proxenos sponsor for Athens, and was strategos again in 176/175 BC.
He was denounced as anti-Roman by Lykiskos. Polybius 18.21.5, 28.4.6; Livy 41.25.3; IG IX 12 1:4b; IG IX 12
3:672; SGDI 1745, 1863, 1864.
135 It is not clear whether all 58 sites were located within our strictly defined geographical unit but an

inclusive approach probably generates more reliable results.

136 Agrinion CH I, 76: Koniska IGCH 266; Naupaktos IGCH 244; Naupaktos IGCH 317; Vlachomandra AD 1889,

E. Not included in the Dutch site gazetteer are Koniska and Vlachomandra.
137 Categorization relies chiefly on physical finds. Even when no graves have been found, a site is classified as

a cemetery if it has produced funerary inscriptions.

 42

distribution of settlements. Moreover, these 16 sites do not accurately correspond to the total

number of contemporary habitation sites. To this equation we must add physically unidentified

sites without known names. Therefore, caution is warranted when evaluating the clearly skewed

data from this category. Nevertheless, based on the current archaeological evidence, we observe

that 16 of 66 Hellenistic habitation sites have produced datable Late Hellenistic material. This infers

a decline of roughly 75% and a loss of more than two thirds of Aitolia’s habitation sites.

Several habitation sites have a dual function; a combination of cemetery and habitation is

the most common. Importantly, these 16 habitation sites were all inhabited well before 189 BC. The

surviving habitation sites are distributed with relative evenness across the southern half of Aitolia

and their locations meet at least two of four criteria. First, we observe that habitation sites are

located near water: the coastline itself, a river, or Lakes Trichonion and Lysimacheia. Megali Chora,

the site located the furthest away from a body of water, is still in close proximity of the west bank of

the Acheloos. Second, they tend to control a comparatively large chora independent of one another.

Distance between sites is always so great that visual connectivity is impossible. The only two sites

that not quite meet this criterion are Vomvokou and Naupaktos which are located only a few

kilometers apart. Mutual visibility between the two, however, does not occur. Third, habitation sites

are generally situated in relative proximity to, or directly in, areas with arable soil. The large, fertile

floodplain between Acheloos and Lake Lysimacheia was home to at least four habitation sites in the

Late Hellenistic period, as was the coastal plain west of Naupaktos (Fig. 7, Fig. 33). Fourth, and

most notably, with the single exception of Aspropyrgos, habitation sites are no longer located high

up in the mountains. Located in the rolling hills around Lake Trichonion, Sitaralona, Dafnias and

Gavalou are nevertheless in greater proximity to the lowland and the coast than to the mountainous

hinterland (Fig. 37). Autopsy of the most anomalous habitation site, Aspropyrgos, is unfortunately

lacking.
 43

The marked concentration of habitation sites away from the hinterland toward the coast

presents a sharp contrast to the situation in the earlier Hellenistic period, when habitation sites

were scattered all over the region including the most inaccessible mountainsides. The surviving

sites do not individually provide immediate reasons for their survival, but collectively, their

arrangement across the landscape is of some value. The comparatively great distance between

Aitolian sites suggests that each site controlled a relatively substantial farmable chora. Moreover,

the interspacing of sites appears to take natural formations into some consideration. The habitation

sites located along the coast, for example, are arranged in a way that allows individual access to the

waterways; in other words, each coastal site had its own access point to the gulf, although we

unfortunately do not know how many of them possessed natural or built harbors (Fig. 34 – 35).

The contraction of sites toward the coast and plains in combination with a preference for

sites in control of arable soil indicates better survival odds for those habitation sites that could best

support the agrarian economy. Arable soil and proximity of water, presumably for transport,

ensured that the towns and villages could support their population without the need for long-

distance movement of either workers or of produce. Smaller habitation sites located near the 15

surviving sites give the distinct impression of deliberate abandonment. This is extremely clear in

the hills south of Lake Trichonion but also on the plain between Kalydon and Pleuron (Fig. 8). The

populations of smaller villages may have simply abandoned their homes and relocated to the better

suited larger site nearby in order to obtain optimum odds for survival. Unfortunately, the

settlement data as such does not fully illustrate this process but it is clear that many habitation sites

– 75% of them! – were abandoned, and we must ask which phenomena dictated the survival of

these specific sites, a complex issue that we shall have reason to address throughout this study.

Viewed chiefly as a consequence of the disrupted agrarian economy, the gradual disappearance of

comparatively large fortified poleis in the mountainous hinterland does not seem very peculiar
 44

since the mountains held less arable soil than the plains. This suggestion would also explain the

virtually instant desertion of small, isolated farm sites located in rural areas with poor soil.

3.2. Cemetery sites.

Unsurprisingly, cemetery sites seem to decline at the exact same rate as habitation sites. Of 48

Hellenistic cemetery sites, eleven have produced Late Hellenistic material, which corresponds to a

decline of roughly 80%. Most cemetery sites are located in close proximity to an active habitation

site. In fact, an active cemetery site must necessarily indicate continued activity in the habitation

site even when site autopsy has rendered no contemporary material. Generally, when lacking a dual

function, cemetery sites are located in close proximity to another site. Agios Thomas, for example, is

not located far from Kalydon. Isolated hinterland cemeteries do not survive with the exception of

Kyparissos which is located on the north side of Mount Panaitoliko. Most cemetery sites appear to

have been used continuously and only one appears to be a single-grave site. All Late Hellenistic

cemetery sites were active in the previous period, except for Thermon.

3.3. Sanctuary sites.

In our next category, the decline is similarly marked as rural and nonurban sanctuaries are

abandoned in great numbers. Eight Late Hellenistic sites can be classified as sanctuaries. Only two

of these surviving six sites, Kryonneron and Skala, do not have an instantly identifiable secondary

function, but we note that neither site has received scientific excavation. In fact, epigraphic

evidence from Kryonneron strongly indicates that the ancient town of Phistyon must have been

located in the immediate vicinity. The rest either double as sanctuaries or habitation sites, or in the

case of Naupaktos, both. In general, rural or uninhabited sanctuaries have the poorest survival rate.

Only one rural sanctuary survives, and in that case, in a changed capacity. While still in use as a

sanctuary in the second century BC, the federal sanctuary Thermon saw a dramatic change in

function in the first century BC when several graves were sunk into the floor of a public building.
 45

Thermon was not used as a cemetery during its tenure as Aitolia’s federal sanctuary and no

Classical or Hellenistic graves have been observed there, which emphasizes the dramatic alteration

in the Late Hellenistic period (Fig. 9 – 10). Non-rural sanctuaries are either located intra muros, like

the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria at Kalydon or the temple of Athena Polias at Naupaktos; extra

muros, like the temple of Asklepios at Trichonion; or in a location very close to actively inhabited

sites, like the temple of Asklepios en Krounois at Skala, probably not far from Bouttos and definitely

close to Naupaktos. Urban sanctuaries seem to have fared better than their rural counterparts and

most were active into the first century BC. There is a clear correlation between a sanctuary’s

survival and its proximity to an inhabited site, or at least a site that saw regular human activity.

3.4. Unidentifiable sites and towers.

For three sites, classification is impossible. Two of these are coin hoards whose find context is

unfortunately unknown. One is IGCH 271, the Agrinion hoard, which dating to the 120s BC was

found somewhere near the modern city of Agrinion. Assigning it to Megali Chora is attractive but

cannot be proven. The other, IGCH 266, dates to the early first century BC and was found at the

small village of Koniska 20km northeast of Thermon. No excavations have been conducted in

Koniska which situated on a steep mountain slope bears a strong resemblance to the small, rural

sites that were scattered across the mountainous Aitolian hinterland in the Early Hellenistic period.

The third site, Kato Khrysovitsa, is poorly understood and despite reports of Hellenistic and Roman

finds, no autopsy has been conducted. Its location near Thermon suggests that it was a habitation

site whose population perhaps filled a sanctuary-related function, but no such attribution is

possible at present.

None of the freestanding towers that existed at seven sites in the earlier Hellenistic period

have rendered any Late Hellenistic material, nor do other freestanding towers exist that can be

dated to this period.

 46

Most high intensity Dutch surveying was done in West Lokris, beyond the geographical

limitations for the present study. Thus, it is extremely likely that the above presented site material

would be both more detailed, and the sites greater in number, had intensive survey been conducted

in their surroundings. The epigraphic record certainly strengthens this argument. Moreover,

excavation and detailed site autopsy can greatly elucidate a site’s function and since excavation has

been restricted to a few select sites, our data is highly biased in their favor. Nevertheless, some

basic interim conclusions can be drawn.

4. Interim conclusions.

A comparison of Hellenistic and Late Hellenistic material strongly suggests that the decline was

already in place at the time of Aitolia’s war with Rome. The problematic local ceramic tradition

aside, the discrepancy between sites with both terra sigillata and Hellenistic black glaze or only

Hellenistic black glaze emphasizes this assumption. This is an important observation as Rome’s

involvement in Greek affairs in the early second century BC has traditionally been viewed as the

primary cause for the decline of Greece.138 The settlement data presented above demonstrates that

such an assumption is no longer valid. When Antiochos III arrived in Greece, Aitolia’s landscape was

already in its initial stages of contraction.

The transformation of Aitolia’s landscape was rapid, in fact so rapid that it is difficult to

ascertain its trajectory. Sites were abandoned wholesale regardless of function and location, leading

to a drastically changed landscape. At a glance, it is immediately clear that Aitolia’s Late Hellenistic

settlements are much fewer and spaced further apart than in the previous period.139 Large tracts of

138Gruen 1984.
139It should not be assumed that the Late Hellenistic period equals the definite end of human activity in
Aitolia. Such an assumption is dangerous for interpretation of the material at hand. On the contrary, early
imperial inscriptions and remains do exist. For a summary and brief discussion on Roman Aitolia, see
Petropoulos 1991. Problematically, Petropoulos misreads some of the Dutch survey data from 1987 and
 47

land that had previously been controlled by villages, towns and cities ceased to receive human

activity and were abandoned indiscriminately. Both small and large sites disappeared, and even

very large, fortified poleis ceased to generate visible activity. This abandonment led to the extreme

contraction of a formerly highly dispersed landscape. The mountainous hinterland lost almost all

signs of human activity, but the coastal plains were not immune to the contraction and here, too,

sites seem to no longer have been inhabited or used. Our general impression is one of empty space,

a region in ruins, indeed of silent hills.

In this “empty space”, 27 sites survived.140 Their survival seems to have depended upon two

seemingly paradoxical factors, both directly related to the question of inter-site distance. First, we

get the distinct impression that habitation sites in control of arable soil were best suited to support

their populations and thus continued to exist. Only a small number of habitation sites are not

located in direct proximity of good farmlands and in those cases, other criteria have been met to

ensure their survival. In order for this compartmentalization of space to occur, many habitation

sites located close to the surviving habitation sites were abandoned. This suggests that sites wanted

to avoid sharing the easily farmed land, and that in order to survive, they needed to control a

certain size chora. Yet, there is no direct evidence for surviving sites having absorbed the chora of

abandoned sites which in turn suggests that the surviving population may have been or become

smaller in size. Second, we note that sites with non-habitation functions had a better chance of

survival if they were located relatively close to an active habitation site. In fact, this relative

proximity appears to have been vital for the survival of both cemeteries and sanctuaries. This is

only natural. Cemeteries, sanctuaries and domestic quarters all serve distinctly different functions

for the same population; consequently, the different site types do not compete with one another.

erroneously reports Roman pottery in areas where the Dutch team noted none. For corrections of
Petropoulos’ errors, see Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.
140 Again, we note that this number is by no means exact – sites mentioned in contemporary epigraphic and

literary sources (but without archaeologically visible Late Hellenistic activity) have not been included here.
 48

The distribution of sites across the region enables us to tentatively reconstruct the site-to-

site partitioning of Aitolia’s active landscape.141 To some extent, the partitioning seems to follow

natural boundaries such as hills, ridges and rivers, but in other cases it appears more arbitrary.

Nevertheless, it is clear that habitation sites are arranged in a way that allows for maximum access

to arable farmland. We can say very little about the political partitioning of the landscape in this

period but the importance of distance between habitation sites certainly indicates that dominance

relationships were expressed spatially.142 Here, it is crucial to emphasize that not only were old

sites abandoned in large numbers, but no “fresh” sites were inhabited in this period. The surviving

habitation sites survived because they had something that other sites lacked, and political power,

both locally and regionally, seems to be one such factor. Subsequent chapters will evaluate this

phenomenon. Yet, the arrangement of sites across the landscape does not only speak of general

decline of Aitolian settlements: it also illustrates the highly complex strategies involved in site

survival. Self-subsistence seems to have been a major priority. When the foundation for the

agrarian economy suffered, Aitolia’s surviving habitation sites jealously guarded the available

arable soil. It is in this light that we best view the contracting landscape. It was an involuntary

process, but a process of which the population was acutely aware. The partitioning of Aitolian

farmlands is so logical that it cannot be accidental. But with a greater distance between habitation

sites, the local population became more disconnected from one another. Horden and Purcell

imagine a Mediterranean countryside made up by microregions patterned by ties of mutual

visibility.143 The loss of mutual visibility suggests loss of connectivity which in effect both implies

and causes progressing economic decline as the isolated single sites gradually became fewer and

distanced further apart.144

141 The Aitolian data is unfortunately so small that any attempt at reconstructing the land in terms of
weighted Thiessen polygons will inevitably be inaccurate. See Cherry 1987.
142 Renfrew 1981.
143 Horden and Purcell 2000, 125.
144 Chisholm 1968.
 49

Over the course of two centuries 97% of Aitolia’s Hellenistic sites ceased to generate visible

activity. A great social and demographic change must have occurred. Of the 27 sites that have

produced datable Late Hellenistic material only nine have generated material that dates to the first

century BC. The decline was thus not only rapid, and not only radical, but also continuous. Sites that

managed to survive in the second century BC eventually lost their ability to do so. Unfortunately the

settlement data as such only produces a very broad image of the landscape and fails to illuminate

both the dynamics of inter-site interaction and the complexities of the decline, but we tentatively

note that Strabo’s eremia may not be solely rhetorical. In comparison to the late third century BC,

Strabo’s Aitolia was “empty”.

Nevertheless, a topographical reading of this data as “empty space” is too simplistic an

interpretation, and the imbalance in our data cannot be stressed enough. The lack of a physical

“dot” on a map does not simply imply a definite lack of human activity. It is, however, indicative of

the bias inherent of this kind of query. Due to a lack of site autopsy, bias of survey methods,

problems in dating, or merely absence of modern infrastructure, many ancient sites are

undiscovered and thus lack a “dot”; the epigraphic record makes this adamantly clear. The

importance of intensive surface survey and its merits over extensive survey cannot be stated

enough.145

5. Comparative material.

The extreme contraction noted above is so noteworthy, it needs to be viewed in perspective and

comparisons must be sought.146 The silent hills of Aitolia are not alone in the Late Hellenistic

145 Something as simple as the interspacing of field walkers can make an enormous difference for the data
generated through surface survey. The most relevant discussion of the “blank space” phenomenon is still Plog
et al 1978. For an interesting experiment regarding the impact of distributional biases, see Hamond 1980.
146 Alcock 1993, 54.
 50

landscape, and similar contracting settlement patterns have been noted all over Greece.147 Below, I

review some relevant examples.

5.1. Boiotia.

Carefully crafted and ideal in its intensive approach, the Cambridge/Bradford Boiotian Expedition

combined excavation and intensive site investigation in order to study a landscape that was lacking

both in scientific excavation and modern site activity.148 The diachronic approach generated a

highly detailed picture of an active landscape whose fluctuations through time provided vital

information on the spatial operation of human activity, especially regarding Late Hellenistic Greece.

Boiotia’s settlement pinnacle occurred in the fourth century BC, when the entire region was dotted

with so many sites that site density reached dangerously high numbers. Since settlement density is

in some capacity dependent upon the biotope, harming or overexploiting the biotope can have

drastic consequences.149 This appears to have happened in Boiotia where the landscape was farmed

so intensely that nutrition deficiency occurred in the soil.150 Correlations for this interpretation do

exist elsewhere, where the human impact on the ecosystem is both visible and has been

scientifically ascertained through analysis of alluviation deposits.151 The intensely settled Boiotian

countryside underwent a radical reorganization in the Late Hellenistic period. Settlements declined

exponentially with the result that extremely few sites survived. The rural countryside was almost

entirely abandoned, and the formerly extreme dispersal was replaced by severe contraction.

Moreover, the surviving sites were physically smaller which adds another dimension to the

dramatic reorganization of the landscape. Many larger sites, including actual towns, were fully

147 For an introduction of all surveyed regions in Greece until 1995 with comments and interpretations of
their data, see Bintliff 1997. Summaries of more recent survey data are found in Alcock and Cherry (2004).
148 Bintliff 1985: 1991; Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985: 1988; Snodgrass 1985; Roller 1985: 1987: 1989. See also

Bintliff and Howard 1999.

149 Hudson 1969.
150 Clark 1992. A safe ratio of exploitation to potential carrying-capacity of a landscape is c. 30%. For Boiotia

in the relevant period, Bintliff and Snodgrass (1985) calculate an exploitation rate of 80%.
151 Brückner 1990. Cf. Jones 2004. See also chapter 8.4 in Horden and Purcell 2000.
 51

abandoned. At the site of Askra, for example, Snodgrass identified a clear break in activity during

the second century BC, and the site was not repopulated again until the fourth century AD.152 The

shrinking size of the few surviving settlements affirms that a population decline must have

occurred. The landscape of Late Hellenistic Boiotia seems almost quieter than Aitolia’s silent hills.

Notably, Boiotia’s surviving sites were all located reasonably close to the coast in what appears to

be largely strategic locations.153

5.2. The Peloponnese.

Several survey projects in the Peloponnese confirm the emergence of this contracting settlement

pattern. The Berbati-Limnes survey, for example, identified quick oscillations in the Hellenistic

landscape. In the late fourth or early third century BC, certain surveyed areas of the valley saw a

great increase in settlement density, but then site numbers declined rapidly, and only a single

second-century-BC site is preserved.154 The same oscillations were identified during the Southern

Argolid survey.155 Here, settlement was sharply reduced in the third century BC. By 250 BC, many

rural sites had disappeared and over 50% of small sites were abandoned. This decline lasted well

into the imperial period. Wholesale abandonment of fields must have occurred as illustrated by the

increase of maquis pollen in the sediments of Argive coastal lagoons.156 Dense, uncultivated

shrublands thus replaced formerly farmed uplands. Additional geological evidence for increased

runoff and sediment yield is constant with terrace degradation, which indicates a dramatic change

for the rural Argolid as farming ceased to exist.157 Nearly all Argive sites were abandoned by the

152 Snodgrass 1985.

153 Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, fig. 19.
154 Wells et al 1989; Forsell 1996; Penttinen 1996; Wells and Runnels 1996. I am thankful that Berit Wells †

invited me to discuss the Berbati-Limnes material in the spring of 2008.

155 van Andel et al 1986; Runnels and van Andel 1987; Jameson et al 1994.
156 Sheehan 1979.
157 Pope and van Andel 1984. While there is no reason to question this case, it is important to not interpret all

sediment changes as anthropogenic. For a highly relevant discussion on the contested Younger Fill, see
Wagstaff 1981. On terrace systems in antiquity, see Foxhall 1996; Rackham and Moody 1992. On Greek
agriculture in general, see Wells 1992.
 52

beginning of the Roman period, and only one Classical town – Hermione – showed evidence of

continued habitation.158 The Argive data, then, mirrors that from Boiotia in its extreme contraction,

loss of agrarian activity paired with a countryside in fallow, the abandonment of the rural sites, and

a visible population decline.

In Achaia, we observe an overall decline in Roman times, but the situation here is more

complex than in other parts of Greece. This is due in part to Achaia’s situation within the Roman

administration, in part to the available data. The only well-surveyed area is the chora of Patras and

Patras itself, which endured a short final Hellenistic decline succeeded by immediate growth in the

Early Roman period. In fact, maximum settlement density was achieved in this period. Late

Hellenistic Patras expanded toward the sea, but investigation of the town’s periphery showed no

settlement nucleation and the physical expansion of the town itself should reasonably have had

some impact on its surrounding chora. Yet, some disruption is visible in the Hellenistic period and

only 17 of 33 Hellenistic sites continue to exist in the imperial period. Many of the abandoned sites

were never reoccupied again. The territory around Patras, then, must have changed as indicated by

the contracted settlement pattern.159

A similarly interesting case is the town of Phlius on the northern edge of the Argolid. Here,

investigations confirm growth in the Late Hellenistic and Early Roman period. At first this growth

seems directly conflicting with other settlement data, but study of nearby areas attests to a general

decline in this period.160 While Phlius and Patras are anomalous in their “health”, the settlement

data from the Peloponnese seems to generally follow the same trajectory as observed in Boiotia and

Aitolia. Neither Phlius nor Patras has received investigation as detailed as the Boiotia project which

might in part explain their uncharacteristic growth. Yet, Phlius and Patras are both cities and not

regions. Therefore, we should perhaps shift attention to the limited investigation of their chorai,

158 Runnels and van Andel 1987, 318.

159 Bintliff 1997, 4; Petropoulos and Rizakis 1994; Petropoulos 1994.
160 Alcock 1993, 98: 1991; Biers 1971: 1973: 1975.
 53

which in both cases demonstrate a contracting countryside. These two cases clearly demonstrate

the need for an inclusive chora approach when evaluating data from Late Hellenistic sites.

5.3. Melos.

The researchers involved in the Melos survey set out to document all human activity within the

region from the dawn of civilization to present day.161 This diachronic approach enabled the

identification of oscillations within the landscape and thereby provided a long-term overview of the

human use of the land. The island saw several phases of aggregation replaced by dispersal. In the

Classical period, aggregation was limited, but in the Hellenistic period – which in this case “ended”

in 146 BC – rural sites were abandoned in great numbers, and aggregation increased. People seem

to have left the countryside in favor of Melos town. This changed in the Roman period which

witnessed a dispersed, densely packed rural landscape lasting into the 400s. The broad time-span

of studied material makes the Melian data particularly useful as an index against which material

from other surveys can be compared. When viewed against the backdrop of Melos’ oscillating

settlements, the contractions and dispersals observed across Greece emerge as reoccurring

historical trends, and moreover, as natural shifts in the habitation and use of the Greek

landscape.162

5.4. Exceptions.

The impression of general decline and settlement change in the Late Hellenistic period seems

prevalent but there are exceptions. In Epiros, for example, settlements increase exponentially over

the course of the third century BC.163 An intense surface survey is greatly needed in this area, as it

would shed valuable light on several important historical events; Aemilius Paullus’ enslavement of

161 Renfrew and Wagstaff 1982; see esp. Cherry 1982; Wagstaff and Cherry 1982. See also Horden and Purcell
2000, 74-77.
162 The shifts between the dispersed and nucleated landscapes can in some cases be modeled, albeit only

hypothetically. The most persuasive model is still that of Renfrew and Poston 1979.
163 Bintliff 1997, 3; Doukellis 1990; Darkaris 1971.
 54

some 150,000 Epirotes in 167 BC is but one of them.164 Similarly incongruous is the expansion in

both urban and rural settlements in Dalmatia which is Early Roman in date.165 Dalmatia’s

intensification of land use in combination with population growth stands in stark contrast to the

situation in Greece but when viewed in its historical context does not seem so strange. In 33 BC, a

Roman colonia was founded at Zadar, and old hill forts were given municipia status in the early first

century AD.166 A similar takeoff is visible in Albania where rural expansion occurs in the Early

Roman period.167 This dispersal seems inconsistent when compared to our other data. Yet, there is

reason to not view Dalmatia, Epiros and Albania as canonically Greek, especially in topographical

terms. Located on the periphery of the Greek cultural and socioeconomic sphere, these three

regions are geographically closer to Italy, and their “boost” may be related to either Roman

financial interests in the area, or in fact direct Roman presence.168 A socioeconomic approach to

fluctuations in settlement density, then, seems appropriate both in cases of decline and aggregation.

6. Interpretations.

Although exceptions clearly exist, the evidence presented above demonstrates the existence of a

similar situation throughout Greece. A settlement peak in the Classical and Early Hellenistic period

was followed by a widespread decline so rapid it is likely to have been visible to its contemporaries.

Unfortunately, we have only marginal evidence for how the Greeks addressed the tumultuous

change, but we do possess some indication of how they reacted to it. In the Classical period, for

which we have good evidence, relocation was often the response to socioeconomic problems.169

Populations were moved from less desirable locations to cities and regions that were better suited

164 Polybius 30.15; Strabo 7.7.3. See Tartaron 2003.

165 Chapman et al 1987. Chapman and Shiel 1988; 1991.
166 Wilkes 1969.
167 Bintliff 1997, 3; Wilkes 1969; Blagg 1992. Note that no intense surface survey has been conducted in

Albania.
168 Nepos says of Atticus that “all his income came from his possessions in Epiros.” Atticus 14.3.
169 Mackil 2004; Demand 1990.
 55

to meet their needs, at times through large-scale synoicisms whereby populations of multiple

villages and towns were joined into a single physical community. Many small sites thus became a

single, larger entity. Our settlement data suggests that a similar reaction occurred in the Hellenistic

period as some Hellenistic sites were abandoned for the sake of others: for example, the partial

abandonment of the small sites around Patras which occurred simultaneously as the city expanded.

We have few examples of organized synoicism in the Greek mainland, but the rapidly emptying

countryside mandates that the population must have gone somewhere: where and how, however,

we often do not know. Nevertheless, there is some tenuous evidence for communal interference in

the process of abandonment. In the (late?) second century BC, Phokian Medeon entered a territorial

sympoliteia agreement with its neighbor Stiris presumably with the aim to consolidate the two

populations into the chora of Stiris, which was located in a less vulnerable area.170 The local

communities seem to have been aware of the decline, which would explain the rise of oliganthropia

as a literary topos.

Both generally and specifically, clear parallels exist between Aitolia’s settlement decline and

that observed in other regions. Generally, the abandonment of rural sites led to a quick

depopulation of the countryside which in turn caused an escalating contraction of the landscape, a

situation adamantly clear in Boiotia but also at Melos and in the Peloponnese – so also in Aitolia.171

In some instances the contraction is continuous; in the first century BC, the Aitolian landscape was

even more contracted than in the previous century, but in other cases, like Melos, it is slowly halted

and then reversed. Specifically, hinterland sites appear particularly sensitive but urban sites are

also affected by the decline. The chora of Patras seems to have been partially depopulated, and in

Boiotia and the Southern Argolid, even the very largest sites show evidence of contraction and even

abandonment. Here, too, the Aitolian settlement data corresponds closely to the rest of Greece.

170 IG IX 12 1:32 = Syll.3 647; Fossey 1986, 99; Walbank 1981, 151-2; Alcock 1993, 154; text also in Austin
2006.
171 For a detailed summary of all relevant regional data, see Bintliff 1997.
 56

The process of landscape contraction follows similar trajectories all over Greece, and it is

thus unsurprising that the results, too, are similar: fewer sites in a quiet landscape. Reasonably, the

surviving sites will have faced similar socioeconomic problems. As activity dwindled in the

contracting Greek landscape, the important mutual visibility articulated by Horden and Purcell

seems to have ceased to exist, at least in part.172 This loss of connectivity must have had a negative

effect on the surviving sites in the form of socioeconomic decline. If Aitolia’s second-century-BC

sites had possessed adequate collective strength to maintain the regional economic framework,

more sites would probably have survived into the first century BC. The continuous decline in site

numbers suggests otherwise. The surviving second-century-BC sites were simply not equipped

with the tools needed for long-term survival in isolation. It has been argued that economic growth

is directly related to the relative advantage of location, and economic decline is similarly a function

of site isolation.173 Despite their strategic position in locations with fertile soil, Aitolia’s sites were

disadvantaged by their distance to one another. One by one, they ceased to exist. The same loss of

connectivity is observed on Melos, in Boiotia, and in the Berbati valley, where sites most definitely

experienced long-term isolation. We can only speculate to its articulation but it is clear that the

economic framework changed dramatically.

Central to the change in settlement patterns is the disuse of the hinterland as an agricultural

resource. In some cases the abandonment may have had geological consequences and settlement

data clearly suggests that the anthropogenic activity in the natural landscape, even in the short

term, can cause visible geological change.174 This is particularly relevant in a sensitive ecosystem

such as Greece, where the very practice of agriculture in some cases had irreversible effects on the

172 Horden and Purcell 2000, 125.

173 Chisholm 1968.
174 Sheehan 1979. For a detailed analysis of anthropogenic effects on the natural environment in the Bronze

Age, see Bintliff 1977.

 57

countryside.175 Scientific study of riverbeds and lagoons confirms that large tracts of land were no

longer farmed. Aitolia has not received the same intense geological study as the Southern Argolid

but interestingly, Pausanias notes that the Acheloos river “washes down less mud” as a result of the

depopulation of Aitolia.176 If the sedimentation of the Acheloos had truly changed so visibly, human

activity must have been severely altered by the Early Roman period.177 Increased sedimentation

generally corresponds to intensive farming and aggregate settlement, and a visible decrease in

sedimentation thus strongly emphasizes the abandonment of those practices. Against the backdrop

of Argive and Boiotian data there might indeed be reason to consider the “wilderness” of Late

Hellenistic Aitolia as not only a literary topos but also a real indication of a changed natural

landscape. Only more research can elucidate this process locally.

An abandoned hinterland, however, does not always correlate to a loss in population, and

Alcock invites caution in equating site decline and population decline.178 In 1920, 77% of the Greek

population lived in the countryside and roughly half of these in mountainous areas. Over the course

of the twentieth century, a massive population displacement occurred leading to a renewed

depopulation of the mountainous countryside.179 Nevertheless, the modern Greek population as a

whole did not shrink and the abandonment of country villages simply resulted in the rapid growth

of cities. Yet, not only does the geological evidence emphasize the altered nature of the Greek

landscape in the Late Hellenistic period, but it also strongly suggests that populations shrank. The

rise of maquis pollen in the coastal lagoons of the Argolid implies that the basis for subsistence

farming was very greatly reduced. In turn, this presupposes either a population on the brink of

175 We are reminded of Plato’s comment on the deforestation of his native Attica: Critias 3.75. See Wertime
1983.
176 Pausanias 8.24.5.
177 Cf. Vött, Schriever et al 2007.
178 Alcock 1993.
179 Wagstaff 1968. In this case, it is the mountains that corrupt and not the sea; contra Horden and Purcell

2000.
 58

starvation, or a shrinking population; in fact, we can probably assume a combination of the two.180

In Late Hellenistic Boiotia, inhabited sites were much smaller than in the previous period, which

inevitably means that the population, too, was smaller. Consequently, it seems reasonable to

suggest that the Greek landscape saw a contraction both in site numbers and in population size.

This situation may have applied to Aitolia, too, and must be further analyzed.

The landscapes of Greece were already in decline at the time of Aitolia’s quarrels with

Rome. The decline is visible in several regions across Greece, which makes pinpointing it to a

specific historical event difficult. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the extreme change in

settlement dispersal had purely socioeconomic causes, all of which are historically relevant.

Variously related to exactions, warfare and piracy the change is difficult to explain simply in terms

of chance, and it is unlikely to have been coincidental.181 But simply blaming pirates or prolonged

wars for the incredible transformation of the Greek landscape is too one-dimensional. In Boiotia,

agricultural overexploitation led to soil exhaustion, but the reasons for that overexploitation are

highly complex, and both political and demographic parameters must be considered in addition to

its socioeconomic setting. The economic, social, demographic and political decline of Late

Hellenistic Greece is inarguably a poorly understood aspect of classical antiquity, yet, in comparison

to Boiotia – for which the intensive surface survey has provided such detailed evidence – the

complexities of Aitolia’s decline become almost incomprehensible.182 Clearly, the wars with Rome

were not what caused the Aitolian eremia but the situation is perplexing. At face value, the region

seems to have essentially collapsed, but wholesale regional collapses are both unusual and difficult

to understand and studies are therefore lacking.183 It is the aim of this dissertation to elucidate

Aitolia’s complicated decline and to place it within its accurate context, socioeconomically and

180 Garnsey 1988. Garnsey notes that the most serious food crises in antiquity were caused by a combination
of several harvest failures, war and epidemic disease. See also Garnsey 1998.
181 Jameson et al 1994, 396.
182 On the complexities of economic systems and social formations in view of survey data, see Vallat 1991.
183 Renfrew 1979. See also Renfrew 1978b.
 59

historically. Although we will return to this question continuously, some provisional conclusions

are necessary.

7. Landscape, settlement and survey: conclusions.

Close parallels exist between the Aitolian data and data from other Greek regions. Although Aitolia

is the main focus of this inquiry, it is vital to not consider its decline in isolation. Its landscape

transformed along trajectories identified elsewhere and further correlations may thus exist. Other

Greek regions may thus benefit from the same multivariable analysis of socioeconomic factor as

this dissertation subjects Aitolia to.

The survival of certain sites merits closer analysis. Not only are the surviving sites

important as loci for human activity, but they provide invaluable evidence for the contraction of the

Aitolian landscape. It has been argued that the maximum size of a community is determined by

local natural resources and the effectiveness of its subsistence technology.184 In Boiotia, sites were

both fewer and smaller which clearly indicates a smaller population: does this phenomenon apply

to Aitolia as well? An evaluation of Aitolia’s surviving sites may similarly elucidate the complicated

process by which the landscape became “empty”. Here, we are reminded of the decline of smaller

sites in the rural chora of Patras at the same time as the city itself expanded. Clearly, the survival of

certain sites over others mandates closer evaluation both of the chora of those sites and the demise

of their neighbors. Did Phistyon survive at the cost of neighboring Thesteis, or independently

thereof? Here, intensive but very local survey could greatly enhance our understanding of

settlement dynamics as it is clear that settlements both expand (Patras, Phlius) and contract

(Askra) within the contracting landscape. In the immediate urban territory of Kalydon a two-year

surface survey has been conducted, which allowed for excavation of strategically chosen areas

184 Trigger 1978.

 60

within the city.185 A similar city-to-chora approach is indeed warranted for all excavations in Aitolia.

Third, there is clearly room and indeed need for more surface survey as it is evident that the

extensive survey type does not generate sufficiently specific data for detailed inquiry on landscape

change. The intensive approach utilized in Boiotia and at Melos generated exceptionally detailed

data which allowed for the reconstruction of a relatively complete picture, a picture that is sorely

lacking in Aitolia. Due to its sheer size an intensive survey of all of Aitolia is impossible, but

intensive investigation of strategically chosen areas may indeed enable a more complete

understanding of the countryside. Such areas include the plain between Acheloos and Evinos and

certain fortified hilltops around Lake Trichonion which have already rendered archaeological

material.186

In conclusion, the settlement data from Late Hellenistic Aitolia draws a stark picture of a

depopulated landscape where rapidly disappearing sites become more and more isolated from one

another. In fact, the countryside appears so empty it is difficult to envision a functional regional

economic network – at least in the first century BC. Due to several factors all of which are a direct

result of modern archaeological practice, the Aitolian settlement data is not as detailed as that from

other regions and inarguably, a more detailed image is needed. The landscape itself both

constrained and enabled activity, and the contracting settlement pattern is clearly the outcome of

societal adjustments to certain constraints. Yet, our picture is ruefully incomplete. The gap between

the 214 identified Hellenistic sites and Strabo’s eremia is uncomfortably undefined; the decline is

very vivid, but its trajectories, causes and determinants are not. Moreover, one must ask how the

inherent socioeconomic features of landscape contraction manifest themselves in other categories

185 Methenitis 2011. That archaeological excavation can benefit greatly from initial surface survey has long
been known yet the practice remains rare. A noteworthy example is the survey of Megalopolis’ very large
chora which helped elucidate the complicated nature of the city’s synoicism and territorial control: Lloyd,
Owens et al 1985.
186 The site-to-site focus used in a survey at Leukas could be very useful in Aitolia; see Dousougli and Morris

1994. See also Gallant 1986. A similarly useful approach is the careful consideration of a “closed”
geographical unit as conducted in the narrow Agiofarango valley on Crete: Blackman and Branigan 1975:
1977.
 61

of evidence. With careful consideration of excavated material, literary and epigraphic sources and

numismatic evidence I aim to place the socioeconomic factors involved in this decline within their

accurate historical context and thereby simultaneously shed light on one of the more neglected

areas of ancient Greece and address the socioeconomic complexities of this transitional phase in

Greco-Roman history.
 62

CHAPTER 4.
Towns and monuments.

1. Introduction: what is a town?

The contracting settlement pattern had obvious consequences for the region. An abandoned

hinterland, a drop in site numbers and an inferred population decline must have had a serious

impact on surviving sites, and this chapter evaluates the effect of that impact. Our general

impression is of fewer sites existing in a quiet landscape, but how did these sites respond to such a

profound change? How does the socioeconomic decline inherent in a dwindling landscape manifest

itself in the form, function, connectivity and activity of the surviving Late Hellenistic sites? After his

victory at Actium, Augustus allegedly moved the population of Aitolia to the newly founded victory

city and all its cult objects to Patras and Nikopolis; how active were Aitolia’s towns at this time, and

does archaeology confirm or contest our text-based historical narrative?

By viewing these towns as dynamic loci for human activity, interconnected and integrated

in the wider “web” of the landscape, analysis of their content and relationship will contextualize the

regional settlement contraction. Undeniably, towns are both the monuments that constitute their

physical form and the socioeconomic infrastructure that enable activity therein; consequently, they

must be understood organically.187 Regulated by the same wider legal framework, subject to the

same economic rights and privileges, and home to a seemingly homogenous ethnic group, the

towns of Aitolia share numerous characteristics with one another, yet several features set them

apart. They can therefore not be treated as a simple collective, and individual analysis beyond

initial settlement autopsy is crucial.

Several Hellenistic habitation sites have not received enough excavation in the habitation

portion of the town to render any datable Late Hellenistic material, yet their cemeteries have done

187 On cities undertaking direct economic action, see Salmon 1999.

 63

so. The towns must thus reasonably still be active as habitation sites and will be considered as such.

For simple convenience, all habitation sites will be called ‘towns’, but some may be mere villages

and others in fact actual poleis – the distinction is unimportant. 27 sites have produced

archaeological material datable to second and first centuries BC and several of them have known

ancient toponyms; Agrinion, Arsinoe, Boukation, Chalkis, Ithoria, Kalydon, Lysimacheia, Naupaktos,

Pleuron, Thermon, Trichonion (Appendix 1A).188 Notably, the surviving towns have at least

Classical if not Archaic and Bronze Age antecedents.189 Most of these were already substantial,

fortified polis-like settlements with comparably large chorai by the Early Hellenistic period; their

“growth” had consequently already occurred at the time of Antiochos III’s arrival.190

Not all have received autopsy beyond surface survey. 58 sites are only known as toponyms,

as a place of origin for people mentioned in inscriptions and literature, and thus lack a known

physical location (Appendix 1B). Some of these sites are better known than others; Bouttos, for

example, had its own archon and regularly manumitted slaves at the temple of Asklepios at Skala

until the late 130s BC, while Pholas furnished no less than four strategoi in the decades after 189 BC

but then disappeared from the epigraphic record. In some cases we may be reasonably certain of

the town’s location. The townspeople of Bouttos exclusively relied on Skala for their documentary

needs, indicating that the town was located near the sanctuary. 191 In other cases, not even

guesswork is helpful; some sites are mentioned only once and may in fact not even be located in

Aitolia. Being identified as a place of origin these 58 sites will be considered habitation sites and

thus as towns.

188 Sites whose ancient toponyms are known will referred to by their ancient name; thus Arsinoe, not
Angelokastro.
189 Pleuron is an exception; for its synoicism and third-century-BC foundation after the destruction of Old

Pleuron, see Lippman 2004. On the date of its fortification walls, see Dinsmoor and Anderson 1950; cf. the
conflicting date in Winter 1971.
190 In only one case can we approximate the size of the urban chora; Dietz (2011, 81) estimates that Kalydon

comprised some 36 ha. This does not include non-urban/rural farmlands.

191 Near Naupaktos: Eupalion, Histiaia, Istorion, Kaphreia, Oikyleia, Oinastion, Oinoaia, Phyllaion, Potidania,

Porion, Spattos, Thaion; near Phistyon: Daianon, Dardeon, Lecheion, Panphion, Pelene, Philotaion, Proennion,
Proscheion, Rhadeion, Tnimaion, Tragantion; near Kalydon: Oribaton.
 64

2. Local socioeconomic structures.

Analysis of the socioeconomic structures and activity taking place within these Late Hellenistic

towns may provide a window into the formulation of economic strategies that are not otherwise

apparent. Moreover, it can illuminate the complex relationship between archaeological data and

the historical process.192 For the Aitolian population, the greater regional structure was naturally

the federation itself. While largely non-interventionist in local affairs, it did provide certain

socioeconomic features which applied to all member towns. As a legislative body, the koinon

regulated various economic rights and privileges which enabled and constrained activity in local

communities. The most important right was undoubtedly that of property ownership. By extending

the right to own property throughout the region, the koinon provided townspeople access to a

broader range of resources than were available in their immediate chora. Consequently, it offered

member populations the opportunity for individual mobility, a phenomenon vital to economic

success through maintained connectivity.193 Local socioeconomic structures were clearly reliant on

the federal framework for their own functionality.

2.1. League participation.

The assembly of the Aitolian federation met at least biannually and all members were supposed to

attend.194 On the smaller council, member cities were represented in proportion to population.195

All federal magistrates, including the eponymous strategos, were elected annually, presumably by

the assembly but under the influence of the council. Intermittent league affairs included official

agreements such as grants of proxenia and politeia to foreign states and citizens, agreements that

required individual sponsors.196 Aitolia’s towns thus had several options for direct league

192 Vallat 1991.

193 Mackil and van Alfen 2006, 222; Horden and Purcell 2000.
194 Larsen 1952 contra Mitsos 1947. See also Rhodes and Lewis 1997.
195 Larsen 1968, 99.
196 On these institutions, see chapters 2 and 7.
 65

participation, at least in theory. In reality, some towns openly monopolized important federal

magistracies, especially the strategos, and it is clear that the larger towns with larger populations

had a great say in the election of officials. This monopoly is visible throughout the second century

BC, although with some geographic shifts. Between 189 and 167 BC, Trichonion, Stratos, Pleuron

and Pholas held the strategia no less than 17 times. After 167 BC, a faint shift in power occurred

(Appendix 3A). While Trichonion maintained its regular claim on the highest office, Kalydon began

to furnish strategoi on a much more regular basis, and Arsinoe, which had provided no strategoi

before 167 BC, had no less than eight thereafter. The recruitment base for hipparchoi and

grammateis seems to have been broader but so few documents are preserved that conclusions are

impossible.

For a town, there were overwhelming advantages of a townsperson holding the highest

federal office. There is no evidence for tax cuts – indeed, there is no evidence whatsoever for

taxation although it must have existed – yet such benefits may certainly have been expected. There

were distinct possibilities for trade agreements arranged in the town’s favor. Moreover, improved

connectivity was obtained in several ways. First, documents would be dated by the eponymous

strategos, thereby injecting his hometown into numerous documents throughout Aitolia; indeed,

throughout the Greek world. Second, federal agreements arranged under the supervision of the

strategos regularly included sponsorship by people from his hometown. These agreements

(proxenia, politeia, isopoliteia) gave the responsible sponsors an advantage both at home and

abroad in the sponsored city. While the effects of such sponsorship cannot be determined, the

eagerness for participation in federal sponsorship emphasizes its socioeconomic attraction, and it is

evident that strategoi commonly favored sponsors from their own place of origin (Appendix 3B).

Relatively few towns are documented as having regular involvement in the federal

framework but those that did, did so ambitiously, surely with an eye to their own survival. Other

towns may have maintained the same ambition but due to a smaller population, lacked the
 66

necessary power in the council. Indeed, the success with which Arsinoe, Trichonion and Kalydon

monopolized the highest federal office suggests that the populations of these towns were

considerably greater than most others’.

2.2. Local officials.

Naturally, local socioeconomic structures existed parallel to, and independently of, the koinon itself.

The evidence is limited but important. Naupaktos made use of at least two local magistracies; a

grammateus and an agonothetes. These magistrates appear to have been annually elected and both

were eponymous. Interestingly, after the first quarter of the second century BC, Naupaktian

documents are dated exclusively by the local magistrate and there is no mentioning of the

corresponding federal strategos. No less than 38 Naupaktian manumissions are dated by the local

grammateus. This magistracy is attested as late as the late 140s BC, comparably to the agonothetes

in 143 BC.197 The latter magistracy is comparatively uncommon in the epigraphic record of

Naupaktos. The nearby Lokrians had an annually elected agonothetes in addition to the local

boularchos and the emergence of this official at Naupaktos may indicate that the town was under

intense Lokrian influence; in fact, a few local Late Hellenistic inscriptions are dated by means of the

Lokrian boularchos.198 Sherk believes that the agonothetes at Naupaktos was a league official but

the limited epigraphic evidence does not support this view.199 Nevertheless, Naupaktos is unique in

dating its records solely by a local eponymous magistrate, vital testimony to the local importance of

the official and the uniquely self-sufficient town.

Phistyon, Bouttos and Potidania had a local archon, a magistracy that was eponymous. Both

Phistyon and Bouttos date their documents both by federal strategos and local archon.200

197 Agonothetes: IG IX 12 3:639,8; grammateus IG IX 12 3:624c.

198 IG IX 12 3:625a, IG IX 12 3:618. For the agonothetes of Lokris, see e.g. IG IX 12 3:676b.
199 Sherk 1990. Grainger (2000), for example, does not include the grammateus at Naupaktos in his account

of Aitolian federal magistracies. Larsen (1968) is similarly hesitant.

200 Phistyon e.g. IG IX 12 1:97; Bouttos e.g. IG IX 12 3:638,11.
 67

Surprisingly, Bouttians also date documents by the grammateus at Naupaktos.201 The latest

mentioning of the local archon at Bouttos is 141 BC; at Phistyon, 163/2 BC.202 Potidania had three

archontes as head of the city.203 The dating formula emphasizes the local nature of this magistracy

as it clearly states “ἀρχόντων δὲ ἐπὶ πόλιος ἐν Φιστύοι Ἁγήσωνος” – Ageson, archon of the city at

Phistyon.204

Thus, at least four Aitolian towns possessed local political institutions. Crucially, these

magistracies are only known because they are eponymous. Other local offices may have existed,

offices that followed the same general pattern of annual election but filled different functions within

the local community, politically, legally, and socially. Unfortunately, their existence cannot be

attested. Here we note an important discrepancy. Kalydon and Trichonion were both active

participants in the federation, furnishing many strategoi over the course of the second century BC.

To date local documents by a local magistrate during a year when a townsperson held the highest

federal office – an office that in of itself was eponymous – would have made little sense. Naupaktos,

on the other hand, did not participate actively in the federation and consequently relied on its own

chief magistrates for dating purposes. Nevertheless, it seems likely that most sites had some form of

local government and not simply relied upon the federation for its institutional needs. Kalydon, for

example, had a Late Classical/Early Hellenistic magistrate called a damiorgos but no such official is

attested after 300 BC.205

Local magistrates filled a wide range of functions which all fall within our broad definition

of socioeconomic activity. They negotiated contracts, facilitated manumission and other legal

exchanges, organized local taxation, and may have managed the town’s place within the league.

201 IG IX 12 3:639,5.
202 Bouttos: IG IX 12 3:634a+b; Phistyon IG IX 12 1:103.
203 Sherk 1990, 261; SBBerlin 27 (1936), 371.
204 IG IX 12 1:97.
205 IG IX 12 1:138.
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Since the federation was notably non-interventionist in local affairs, their authority may have been

considerable.206

2.3. Manumissions: town visibility for documentary practices.

Manumission documents are our largest body of evidence for town-to-town contacts. Moreover, it

is the only local legal practice with definably socioeconomic characteristics for which written Late

Hellenistic evidence exists.207 Other such documentary practices may certainly have existed but

none are preserved.208 The evidence provided by manumission decrees invites consideration of the

towns and sanctuaries involved in this legal practice, especially from a chronological point of view.

Over 150 Aitolian manumission records are known, and no less than 35 towns engaged in this

widespread activity.209 A peak in the first half of the second century BC was followed by a sharp

decline, and by the end of the second century BC, the practice was almost nonexistent.210 Several

towns are only known through these documents and the decline in practice may indicate a loss of

sites. Naturally, such an assumption is too general to be acceptable but to some extent, evidence for

socioeconomic structures must mirror town survival.

As a documentary practice, the institution sheds light on site reliability. Visibility of the

manumission document was crucial to its success and contracts were consequently only displayed

at sites that the manumitting person and the slave regarded as active and well-connected. In the

decade following the indemnity, Aitolians chiefly made use of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi for

these purposes. The federal sanctuary at Thermon, it must be noted, was never used for

manumission.211 By the mid-second century BC, however, the Aitolians had largely abandoned

206 For a discussion on Aitolia’s federal government, see Larsen 1952.

207 This practice is discussed in detail in chapter 8.
208 These include marriage contracts, loans, property sales and inheritance issues.
209 This does not include Kallion and Delphi whose Aitolian populations kept manumitting as Aitolians for

some time into the second century BC, nor does it include the katoikoi at Naupaktos (IG IX 12 3:639,4).
210 A single document dates to the first century BC; IG IX 12 1:110 (Phistyon).
211 A single imperial (?) inscription does record the manumission of a woman but the inscription is so worn

that no further interpretation is possible. IG IX 12 1:92.

 69

Delphi and increasingly relied on three local sanctuaries; the Asklepeion en Krounois near Bouttos

and Naupaktos, the sanctuary of Syrian Aphrodite at Phistyon, and later, the sanctuary of Artemis

Laphria at Kalydon.212 Of these, the Asklepeion received the most activity with no less than 62

manumission documents dating to the second century BC. This habit mandated that people travel

through the region, sometimes far from their hometowns. Deliberate population movement was an

important factor for socioeconomic connectivity in a region that was otherwise patterned by

inaccessibility and large site-to-site distances, and the documentary aspect of manumission helped

fortify that important connectivity.

Chronological and spatial evidence for this socioeconomic structure is largely homogeneous

but there are important local exceptions. The population of Kalydon, for example, did not engage in

this activity until the 130s BC, and then they simply went to their own local sanctuary which

interestingly was only used by the local population. No Kalydonian ever manumitted a slave away

from home, nor was a non-Kalydonian slave manumitted in the local sanctuary. A similar habit is

apparent at Phistyon. Of the six towns that manumitted slaves there, only one – Arsinoe – had

previously manumitted slaves elsewhere.213 The preference for the sanctuaries of Asklepios and

Syrian Aphrodite signals that these sites were considered reliable at the time of the manumission.

The manumission process improved site-to-site connectivity as well as local site activity,

both for the nearby community and the participants themselves. Participants may have taken the

opportunity to negotiate better personal odds for marginal improvement, an assumption that

seems exceedingly likely considering the frequency with which witnesses traveled across vast

distances to participate in a legal act that itself entailed no immediate personal gain. Similarly, local

212A single manumission document has been found at Arsinoe (IG IX 12 1:131).
213Once at home in 184 BC (IG IX 12 1:131) and once at Delphi in 173 BC (SGDI II 1853). The other towns
manumitting at Phistyon were Phistyon itself (IG IX 12 1:104, 1:105, 1:110), Boukation (IG IX 12 1: 97, 1:99,
1:106), Proscheion (IG IX 12 1:101, 1:108), Philotaion (IG IX 12 1:96b) and Thermon (IG IX 12 1:102).
 70

communities received a socioeconomic boost due to the activity in their urban sanctuaries.214

3. Towns and monuments.

The material evidence from Aitolia’s towns and monuments is both biased and incomplete. This is

largely due to the lack of scientific site autopsy and excavation in the region. In general, excavated

sites tend to render “positive” evidence while sites that have only received brief investigation

generate either “negative” evidence or no evidence at all. In other words, the more excavation a site

has received, the more likely it is to have produced Late Hellenistic material, which is of some

consequence for this inquiry. First, because of the uneven excavation record, physical evidence

cannot reasonably demonstrate the nature of regional site-to-site hierarchies or how wealth was

distributed across the region. Moreover, while it is essential to view site data in the context of

overall landscape contraction, we cannot sensibly take independent sites as characteristic of the

entire region. Consequently, we realize from the start that analysis of excavated contexts will not

accurately contextualize the “downward slope” nor can such analysis demonstrate a region-wide

phenomenon.

3.1. Tombs and burials.

Of the 27 sites that have produced archaeological material, only nine have produced tombs, yet

burials are by far the most commonly excavated Late Hellenistic feature. In 1961, 226 graves had

been excavated at Naupaktos; by now, the number is considerably greater.215 Tombs and burials are

a fortunate category to evaluate as even when reused, they tend not to change functions. Several

tomb types have been identified ranging in size from very large to very small, and in grave goods

from very rich to none at all. Poor burials in unlined pits are the most common, followed by tile-

214 The importance of location for survival is evaluated below as well as in chapter 9.
215 Kolia and Saranti 2004.
 71

lined graves and smaller cist graves. Pithos graves also exist. These smaller, “non-architectural”

graves rarely possess any grave goods beyond sparse ceramics, nor are they commonly used for

multiple, sequential burials.

Mid-size tombs consist exclusively of cist graves. Not rarely are they reused. A 1.90 x 0.80m

tomb in the East cemetery at Naupaktos, for example, was built in the late third century BC but

ceramic finds demonstrate that it was in continuous use into the first century BC.216 A larger mid-

size tomb type, the barrel-vaulted, single-chamber subterranean tomb, is known in a single example

at Kalydon. Misinterpreted as a heroon it is clearly just a tomb without cult offerings, but it is well-

built, constructed by tooled ashlar blocks, and with a side at just over 3m, must be considered

rather large.217

Much larger, however, is the Macedonian tomb type which is represented in five locations.

The Macedonian tomb at Naupaktos measures 7.10 x 6.52m and is constructed of well-fitting blocks

dividing the interior space into an antechamber and two chambers with klinai for the deceased (Fig.

11).218 Constructed in the second century BC, the tomb was used for several sequential burials,

seemingly into the first century BC. A similar tomb at Pleuron is almost identical in size, layout and

construction, with the notable exception that it does not appear to have been reused; moreover, the

grave goods found in the Pleuron tomb were much richer than those found at Naupaktos.219 A third

Macedonian tomb at Agios Thomas is slightly smaller at roughly 3.20 x 3.30m but mimics the

careful construction of the previous examples. The fourth was discovered in 2009, 1 km north-east

of Kalydon, and the fifth belongs to the Heroon at Kalydon.220 The built Macedonian tomb is

uncommon outside Northern Greece; in fact, of the 71 known examples, only seven are in

216 AD 33 (1978), Chron, 65; Stavropoulou-Gatsi and Saranti 2009.

217 Dyggve 1951.
218 AD 53 (1998), B1.
219 AD 44 (1989), B1, 139-141.
220 For Heroon, see section 3.2 below. The fourth tomb is unpublished apart from brief initial mentioning in

Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2010. While certainly Hellenistic, it does not necessarily date to the Late Hellenistic
period.
 72

“Southern” Greece.221 Andronikos maintains that their form was designed to meet funerary customs

that were distinctively Macedonian.222 Their appearance in this part of Greece is difficult to explain

and the type bears no close resemblance to any architectural form represented in Aitolia. Without a

doubt, it is the only new tomb type introduced at this time, but curiously so at a time of general

socioeconomic decline. Perhaps these monumental tombs are best seen as evidence of conspicuous

consumption by an increasingly competitive elite.

In poorer burials, grave goods consist of ceramics ranging from locally produced fine ware

to shards so small that they cannot be studied, and occasionally include a local bronze coin.

Unsurprisingly, most of Aitolia’s built tombs have been at least partially robbed out which prevents

interpretation of the wealth of the deceased person. Yet, some very fine jewelry, precious objects

and inscribed stelai have been recovered in excavation of Aitolia’s cemeteries. From the cemetery at

Trichonion come an elaborately cut cameo inset in gold and a large gold wreath among numerous

other precious objects.223 The same cemetery has provided several inscribed grave stelai, including

a large limestone stele decorated with an elaborate Triton below whom two lions are attacking a

boar (Fig. 12 – 13).224 Leaves from golden wreaths have been found at Arsinoe, whose cemetery has

also produced several grave stelai including one with unusually well-carved architectural moldings

(Fig. 14).225 At the necropolis of Pleuron, silver vessels, gold leaves and gold dust, silver coins and

inscribed stelai have been found, in addition to a statuette of Silenus in solid silver (Fig. 15).226 The

cemeteries at Naupaktos have rendered fewer precious Late Hellenistic objects but in return the

town has produced one of the most important funerary stelai of the period. This non-contextual

stele dates to after 21 BC and chronicles, in Latin, the death of a Roman veteran serving in the legio

221 Andronikos (1993) counts 70, not 71 tombs; unsurprising, since the most recent Macedonian tomb in
Aitolia was only discovered in 2009. On the tomb type in general, see Tomlinson 1987; Miller 1993.
222 Andronikos 1993: 1987.
223 Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2009, 401ff, nos 699 and 702.
224 Agrinion archaeological museum inv. no 27; Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2009, 402, no 700.
225 AD 31 (1976) B1. Agrinion archaeological museum inv. no 65.
226 AD 22 (1967) B2; AD 31 (1976) B1. Agrinion archaeological museum inv. no 323.
 73

XII Fulminata at Patras.227 This is the latest datable Late Hellenistic funerary inscription from Aitolia

and signals an important change around the Corinthian gulf: the permanent installation of three

veteran legions at Patras and Dyme after the foundation of Nikopolis and the inescapable change in

the ethnic makeup of the region.

The tombs and burials of Late Hellenistic Aitolia indicate an extreme division of wealth. The

very wealthy grave goods, itself dating to the Late Hellenistic period (thus, no heirlooms), is

suggestive of the purchasing power of the elite. Moreover, members of the Aitolian elite quite

clearly attempted to emulate elite ideals observed elsewhere which is expressed through their

choice of a highly visible, foreign tomb type.228

In the second century BC, most tombs seem to have been placed in preexisting cemeteries.

Over the course of the first century BC, however, graves begin to appear in locations that had

previously had no cemetery function. The most extraordinary example is naturally Thermon where

graves were sunk into a public building in the agora, but the change in funerary customs is visible

throughout Aitolia. At Naupaktos, for example, numerous Early Roman graves appear in places

whose function had previously been exclusively domestic. In the first years of the first century AD,

for example, 12 pit graves were sunk into a Hellenistic house on Apokakou road, and at the Alonaki

plot, several sparse graves were dug into a preexisting Hellenistic building at the end of the first

century BC.229 This can only be indicative of changing urban conditions.

3.2. The town and its monuments: Kalydon.

Situated in an ideal location on two large hills overlooking the fertile coastal plain and the Evinos

river corridor, Kalydon was a significant city in the Late Hellenistic period and it figures

227 AD 28 (1973) B2 395. See Rizakis 1989.

228 The Aitolian elite is discussed in chapter 8.
229 AD 44 (1989) B1; AD 47 (1992) B1.
 74

prominently in scholarship on the reorganization of Western Greece.230 Its population is thought to

have been forcibly moved to Nikopolis in the late first century BC and in the second century AD,

Pausanias saw the dislocated cult statues of Kalydonian Artemis Laphria and Dionysos in Patras.231

For this inquiry, it is the only site that has received sufficient excavation and site autopsy to provide

the detailed data needed to safely reconstruct the effects of Aitolian decline on an individual town.

At first glance, however, the evidence seems to contradict the socioeconomic deterioration inherent

in landscape contraction.232 Several large building projects took place after the Roman indemnity,

projects that even without the related finds are so substantial in size, quality and decoration that

they can only indicate extensive wealth; moreover, the finds demonstrate a surprising level of

connectivity with the greater Mediterranean world. A detailed review is necessary.

On the Akropolis, a large domestic building was erected in the second century BC.233 Only

partially excavated, its layout has been documented through geomagnetic survey. Its reconstructed

outer dimensions exceed 40 x 30 m, and it is a large enough building to dominate the entire west

portion of the Akropolis (Fig. 16 – 17).234 Elaborately painted architectural terracottas and unfluted

Doric columns with square capitals combined with late second-century-BC mosaic floors give the

unmistakable impression of a very wealthy person’s domicile. The floors themselves are curious as

their construction is rare in the Eastern Mediterranean.235 Consisting of decorated mortar

employing white tesserae for geometric motifs, their construction signals Central Mediterranean,

i.e. Italian, influence (Fig. 18).236 Excavation of the building produced mostly Hellenistic pottery but

230 Dietz 2009; Isager 2009. On the recent excavations, see Dietz 2005; Dietz and Jensen 2006; Dietz, Kolonas
et al 2007; Dietz and Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2009: 2011a: 2011b.
231 Pausanias 7.18.8-9: 7.21.1; Strabo 7.7.6.
232 The only possible testimony to any effect brought about by the upheavals in the early second century BC is

the deliberate abandonment of a pottery kiln. It is, however, more likely that the kiln was taken out of use
when the project for which it provided roof tiles – the Peristyle House – was completed. See Ljung 2011.
233 Dietz 2011b: 2011d.
234 Measurements reconstructed from Dietz 2011, Fig. 174.
235 The type is almost exclusively found in domestic contexts. For examples at Delos, see Bruneau 1972.
236 Dietz 2011b, 244.
 75

also several Early Roman cups and lamps dating to the first century AD, plus a Roman sestertius

dating to 25 BC.237

Dating to roughly 100 BC, the so-called Heroon at Kalydon is one of the most discussed

buildings in Aitolia (Fig. 19 – 20).238 It consists of a peristyle courtyard flanked by a series of

banquet rooms to the east and another row of rooms to the north, where a group of imagines

clipeatae and some freestanding sculpture were displayed. The surviving eight imagines and

sculpture fragments form the basis for almost all discourse on the structure including its contested

date.239 An extension to the north provides access via a staircase to a subterranean vaulted

Macedonian tomb with elaborately carved klinai and footstools which still bear traces of paint (Fig.

21 – 22). Originally interpreted as a shrine to the local hero Leon whose portrait is supposedly

represented among the sculpture fragments, scholars now emphasize the form of the palaestra.240

The supposed portrait of Leon has the cauliflower ears indicative of a wrestler or a boxer,

suggesting that an athletic victory may have originally generated his cult.241 Yet, the overall layout

and lack of infrastructure for other sports prevents the Heroon from having been Kalydon’s chief

gymnasium, which implies that it may in fact have been a clubhouse for a specific athletic

association. Unfortunately, there is no further indication of its function and the activity that took

237 Alexopoulou and Sidiropoulos 2011, no 113; Bollen 2011b; Bollen and Eiring 2011a.
238 Dyggve, Poulsen et al 1934.
239 Agrinion archaeological museum inv. nos 28 – 36. Bol 1988; Ridgway 2002. While most scholars rely on

the excavator’s analysis of Eastern sigillata found in the foundation trenches for the building, others have
interpreted the sculpture group as Roman copies of Greek originals and thus maintain an imperial date for
the entire complex; e.g. Charatzopoulou 2006. Nevertheless, the sculpture group can be dated stylistically to c.
100 – 60 BC and roughly contemporary parallels for the unusual imagines clipeatae do exist. The best known
example is the monument of Mithridates VI Eupator at Delos, dating to 102/1 BC: see Webb 1996. The
Kalydon group has also been compared to the tondi from the Madhia wreck, see von Prittwitz und Gatton
1994. See also von Prittwitz 1988. The freestanding statue of Krateia is closely paralleled by the over-lifesize
statue of Baebia from Magnesia on the Maeander which dates to the last years of the second century BC: Eule
2001; Pinkwart 1973.
240 Dietz 2011a, 155; cf. Hughes 1999.
241 Charatzopoulou 2006.
 76

place at the Heroon although epigraphic evidence suggests that activity lasted at least into the

Augustan period.242

Most of the material used for the construction of the Heroon is local. Yet, the imagines are

made of Pentelic marble, leading Bol to suggest that they were carved in Athens and then exported

to Aitolia.243 But several heads show signs of re-carving; the Meleager (Fig. 23), Apollo and Eros

appear to first have been carved separately in the round, perhaps to be inserted into a bust, and

others have added pieces suggesting that they are not originals.244 Only the head of Leon is freshly

carved from a single piece of marble. Ridgway tentatively suggests that the imagines were carved in

Aitolia by Athenian masters.245 This may certainly have been the case, but the more important fact

is that preexisting sculpture was reused and re-carved for this Late Hellenistic building. While the

building complex was undoubtedly a substantial investment, economic strategies were certainly in

place. The head of Leon demonstrates that import of marble from Athens, or indeed of freshly

carved marble sculpture, was still possible in the early first century BC, yet the commissioners of

the imagines clipeateae chose to use preexisting marble sculpture for the rest of the heads which

undoubtedly was less costly than freshly carved images.

Situated in the central town, the recently excavated Peristyle Building (Fig. 24 – 26) bears

close resemblance to the Heroon despite being smaller in size and predating the later construction

by roughly a century.246 The similarities in form, features and finds indicate a similar or related

function. Just like the Heroon, this building consists of a peristyle courtyard flanked by series of

rooms to the north and east, and a multitude of precious objects, including sculpture, was found in

the north rooms. The unexcavated rooms along the east side were interpreted as banquet rooms, a

242 IG IX 12 1:141 – 1:142. There is no need to follow Charatzopolou’s suggestion that 1:142 dates to the
second century AD.
243 Bol 1998.
244 The head of Zeus shows the groin and thighs of youthful statue from which it was made. See Ridgway’s

(2002) comments.
245 Ridgway 2002.
246 Dietz 2011a: 2011c. See also the preliminary reports in Dietz 2005; Dietz, Kolonas et al 2007; Dietz and

Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2009. The building is securely dated through close analysis of the late third-century-BC
pottery found below its foundations (Bollen 2011a). See also Bollen and Eiring 2011a: 2011b.
 77

conjecture based on evidence from the Heroon. The precious finds are exclusively Late Hellenistic

and include several large objects in imported Parian, Naxian and Pentelic marble. These include a

Naxian marble head of a goddess wearing a corona muralis, whose hair still preserved traces of gold

dust and paint at her recovery in 2003 (Fig. 27).247 The cult statue, interpreted as the goddess

Meter, strongly suggests that the northwest room had religious functions which other finds

confirm. Other marble finds consist of a Pentelic lion (Fig. 28), the separately carved head of a herm

whose limestone shaft and base are inscribed ΛΑΝΙΚΟΣ: ΕΡΜΑΙ (Fig. 29), cult vessels and miniature

herms. While the aforementioned objects have been dated to the first half of the second century BC,

the North rooms in the Peristyle Building have also produced later dedications. The lunate epsilon,

omega and sigma on a miniature limestone altar dedicated by Thrason to Artemis suggest a date

well into the first century BC (Fig. 30), and a large statue base dedicated by Sosikles to the gods and

to the city dates to the late second century BC (Fig. 31). The inscription tells us that the sculptor

was an Alexandros from Sikyon, thus not a local master. Non-precious contextual objects include a

great number of locally made incense burners and drinking vessels. Importantly, the latest locally

made pottery shows a strong influence of sigillata production. The cult was active into the first

century AD and the deposits of finds indicate no decline in either activity or quality of goods until

the building collapsed.

In general, Late Hellenistic material at Kalydon gives a convincing impression of a well-

connected town whose population – or at least its elite – was considerably well off. The expenditure

involved in the construction of the aforementioned buildings must have been substantial, and

materials from all three complexes indicate financial involvement – and thus, storage of wealth –

beyond ordinary expenditures. In fact, Kirsten and Kraiker argue that Kalydon experienced its

absolute height in the second century BC, establishing that the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria in

247 Kalydon notebooks for Area D, 2003.

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many aspects equaled that of Apollo at Thermon in regional importance.248 Moreover, the finds at

Kalydon indicate an unprecedented level of connectivity, both in terms of visibly extraneous

cultural influences and the imported materials themselves. The observed landscape contraction

should entail a gradual loss of connectivity, yet non-regional forms and materials attest to cultural

exchange and trade well beyond the local community. Not only does this apply to the elite

dedications reviewed above, but also to more regular finds throughout the town. Here, a large

amount of foreign coins dating to the first century BC verifies that Kalydon was indeed not isolated

from the greater Mediterranean world despite Aitolia’s supposed eremia.249 This is further attested

by ceramic data. Imported fine wares in a grey fabric, clearly imitating silver, become increasingly

common from the mid-second century BC onward.250 Some can be linked to Corinth and Athens.

Another prominent group of Hellenistic imports are hemispherical, mold-made drinking bowls but

plain table wares were also imported.251 In the early years of the first century AD, imported

Arretine fine ware and Italian-made lamps appear both in the Peristyle Building and on the

Akropolis. There is only limited evidence for imitative sigillata production beyond the finds from

the Peristyle Building, yet many locally produced Late Hellenistic vessels are coated in a dull, red

glaze, an undeniable sign of local potters being influenced by external trends.252

But sustained connectivity is not the only way in which Kalydon contradicts the traditional

understanding of Late Hellenistic Aitolia. Vitally, until its sudden abandonment in the mid-first

century AD, activity at Kalydon was unbroken, its intensity and functions unaltered.253 Contrary to

popular belief, the reorganization of Western Greece in the 30s and 20s BC had no visible effects on

248 Kirsten and Kraiker 1967, 772.

249 Alexopoulou and Sidiropoulos 2011. See also chapter 6.
250 Bollen 2011a.
251 To link these imports to the activities in the Heroon and the Peristyle Building is attractive.
252 On the ways in which ceramic assemblages reflect trade and openness to trade, see Martin 2005. On early

Italian pottery in the Eastern Mediterranean, see Lund 2004.

253 Apart from four sling bolts found in Late Hellenistic contexts, there is no sign of disturbance. Burns 2011.
 79

Kalydon.254 In fact, there is no indication whatsoever of a large-scale removal of its population for

the synoicism of Augustus; indeed, the evidence from Kalydon directly challenges the traditional

historical narrative. Permanent population removal invariably creates a drop in or loss of site

activity, yet the continuity and retained intensity of site activity through the Augustan period can

only indicate that at large, the population of Kalydon was not part of the synoicism of Nikopolis. In

addition, nothing legitimizes the notion that the cult statues from the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria

were moved to Patras at the time of the synoicism of Nikopolis.255 To conflate Pausanias’ and

Strabo’s observations for a single narrative on Roman reorganization of Western Greece can no

longer be consider a pertinent approach.

In addition, the connectivity observed at Kalydon disagrees with the general theory of

settlement contraction generating a loss of connectivity and thus a decline of socioeconomic

activity. Horden and Purcell’s interpretive model dictates that connectivity within microregions was

vital to site survival and puts forth mutual visibility as the key feature for success. Yet, finds at

Kalydon exhibit a high level of inter-regional connectivity at a time when landscape contraction had

robbed surviving sites of a direct line of sight; clearly, the interpretation of connectivity must be

extended to include factors beyond mutual visibility. Indeed, we must consider a more nuanced

approach to the mechanisms of landscape contraction.

In conclusion, recent excavations at Kalydon invite a new reading of the historical narrative

for Western Greece, a reading that will have tremendous consequences for our understanding of

Greco-Roman interaction and Roman territorial reorganization; indeed, for the entire sociopolitical

debate on Cicero’s Aetolia amissa. If Kalydon was not part of Augustus’ “large-scale” reorganization

of Western Greece – and the archaeological material indicates that it was not – what really

happened? How and when was Aitolia integrated into the new provincia, if at all? To what extent is

254Contra Kirsten and Kraiker (1967) who argue that the synoicism of Nikopolis was Kalydon’s terminus.
255The cult of Artemis Laphria seems to have continued until the late third century AD as demonstrated by
lamps found in the sanctuary, and there is indeed reason to question at what time the cult statues were
moved to Patras. Kristen and Kraiker 1967, 772; Dyggve 1948.
 80

Strabo’s eremia simply a literary trope intended to advance a specific political rhetoric? A careful

inquiry into the mechanisms of Late Aitolian decline is undeniably worthwhile.

3.3. Archaeological evidence from other sites.

In contrast to Kalydon, most Aitolian sites are in desperate need of excavation and further site

autopsy. Consequently, the detailed analysis critical for individual assessment cannot be obtained,

which considering the nature of this inquiry is most unfortunate. We have no way of ascertaining

whether Kalydon is unique or in fact reasonably representative. Nevertheless, useful Late

Hellenistic material has been observed at a number of sites. In several cases, the material closely

mirrors the changes visible in the contracting landscape, but other sites retain continuity of form

and function into the Augustan period and beyond.256

We start at Thermon. The sanctuary of Apollo was the official meeting place for the Aitolian

koinon and if the federation had a capital, it was Thermon. The sanctuary itself was central to

Aitolian ethnos with roots in the Bronze Age.257 Hundreds of inscriptions and dedications attest to

its federal importance in the fourth and third centuries BC. On the contrary, the sanctuary received

almost no new construction in the second century BC; only two monumental bases are known,

although inscriptions and coins demonstrate that the site still received regular activity.258

Unfortunately, its Late Hellenistic fate is difficult to assess. A destruction layer reportedly

corresponding to the “disasters” in 167 BC has been found along the side of the East stoa, yet the

connection is tenuous and there is in fact no actual testimony to the debt crisis manifesting itself in

the physical destruction of buildings.259 In the last years of the second century BC there are virtually

no signs of activity at Thermon; in fact, the sanctuary appears to have been essentially abandoned

at the dissolution of the koinon. A Roman denarius dating to c. 90 BC is the only indication that the

256 For a general introduction to Aitolia in the Roman period, see Petropoulos 1991.
257 On Thermon’s earliest structures, see e.g. Papapostolou 2004.
258 Bommeljé et al 1987.
259 Ergon (1991), 35-36.
 81

site still received visitors.260 Later in the first century BC, seven graves were sunk into a public

building in the agora – undeniable testimony to a radical change in function and activity.

The non-rural sanctuaries at Bouttos, Trichonion and Naupaktos have produced several

inscriptions that attest to their activity through the second century BC but since excavation is

lacking at all sites, no further comment is possible.

Archaeological evidence for domestic activity is restricted to a small number of locations. At

Chalkis, dining ware and plates dating to the second and first centuries BC have been found in the

inhabited parts of the town but no buildings can be dated to this period.261 Unsurprisingly, the most

evidence comes from Naupaktos which has received more excavation of Hellenistic levels than all

other Aitolian sites but Kalydon. Several Late Hellenistic domestic buildings have been found in the

center of the modern city. At the Gribovo plot a large building consists of 16 smaller rooms

surrounding a 6 x 6.3m courtyard (Fig. 32). It was constructed in several phases, one of which saw

plenty of Late Hellenistic fine ware combined with early sigillata.262 That ceramic mixture is noted

at numerous plots throughout Naupaktos.263 Another large building, also seemingly domestic, was

found at the corner of Farmake and Bardakoula roads. Five separate phases of construction can be

identified, one corresponding to the Late Hellenistic period. In this phase, the inhabitants made use

of a wide range of locally made pottery, both fine and undecorated, as well as several mould-made

vessels.264 A gold ring was also found in the complex.

At first glance, the archaeological remains in Aitolia seem to follow the general trajectories

of decline inherent in settlement contraction yet it is important not to equate lack of excavated

material to a lack of material. In fact, only sufficiently excavated sites can fully contextualize the

rapidly changing landscape yet this type of data is precisely what is lacking. It stands to repeat the

260 L PISO L F FRUGI = RRC 340.1.

261 Dietz, Kolonas et al 1998.
262 AD 31 (1976) B1,165-166.
263 E.g. AD 48 (1993) B1, 144; AD 44 (1989) B1, 142.
264 A skyphos can be dated to 145-100 BC by comparison to no 336 in Rotroff 1982.
 82

observation that the more scientific excavation a site receives, the greater the chance of it

producing Late Hellenistic material. While the evidence at Thermon most certainly follows a

trajectory of visible degeneration, the case study of Kalydon invites caution for too dramatic an

interpretation. Unfortunately, Aitolia’s towns are still too much of a tabula rasa in terms of scientific

excavation to safely and effectively evaluate their individual Late Hellenistic history and moreover,

cannot be interpreted to collectively have followed a certain trajectory. Nevertheless, when

assessed in terms of local change and connectivity, archaeological data does signal a series of

dramatic changes occurring over the course of the second and first centuries BC, changes that may

be related to regional socioeconomic decline.

4. Contextual decline: change, continuity, trajectories and responses.

Consideration of Aitolia’s towns in isolation enables a valid reading of local changes. When

contrasting the Late Hellenistic data to earlier material, certain local differences become apparent.

These changes manifest themselves both in the function and activity of sites. The most commonly

occurring change is the termination of activity as the town simply ceases to exist. Naturally, this

interpretation rests on halting categories of evidence and may not be as spectacular as at first

glance.265 Yet, while perhaps not as large-scale as we are lead to believe, this scenario is not

unexpected in a sensitive economic system where sustained growth only occurred at the margin.

Prolonged marginal decline equaled extinction. This form of response closely follows the pattern of

settlement contraction. The settlement data observed in the previous chapter gives a distinct

impression of rapid landscape contraction resulting in a silent, uncultivated hinterland and sites too

distant from one another to maintain healthy connectivity. Under such conditions, termination of

activity was inevitable for all but the most self-sufficient, well-connected sites.

265For example, towns are unlikely to have ceased to exist the moment townspeople stopped manumitting
slaves; the epigraphic record does not necessarily reflect immediate changes in habitation.
 83

Several sites were subjected to a change in both form and function, sometimes dramatically

so. At Thermon, we observed first-century-BC graves sunk into a public building in the agora,

signaling not only a change in function from sanctuary to cemetery but also a significant loss of the

activity that until the Late Hellenistic period had defined its very purpose. When the sanctuary lost

its identity as a chief federal location – a direct consequence of the collapse of the koinon itself – it

also lost its function as a sanctuary, a function it had filled since the Late Bronze Age.

This scenario, tombs appearing in an area that had previously had no funerary function

whatsoever, is in fact the most readily identifiable change besides termination of activity. We

witness it across Aitolia but most readily at Naupaktos. Here, numerous Early Roman graves appear

in places whose function had previously been domestic. In the first century AD, for example, 12 pit

graves were sunk into the Hellenistic house on Apokakou road.266 Undeniably, such changes

demonstrate a drastic reorganization of civic space; moreover, it strongly suggests demographic

changes, particularly in terms of population decline. Other non-funerary alterations in local

functions are similarly indicative. At the intersection of the Kapourdeli and Karakoulaki roads in

Naupaktos, an Early Roman bath was installed through the foundations of a Late Hellenistic

domestic building, thereby introducing a foreign type of architecture into an Aitolian town.267

Yet, we must also consider continuity of form and function. At Kalydon, for example, we

witnessed unbroken activity as well as unchanged functions through the Late Hellenistic period and

into the imperial era, a scenario that fundamentally contradicts the traditional view on Aitolian

eremia. In fact, the town was not abandoned until some 70 years after the foundation of Nikopolis

and its infrastructure was in active use until its abandonment. Several plots in Naupaktos retained

similar continuity throughout the Late Hellenistic period. A Hellenistic house on Farmake road, for

example, was in continuous use through the Roman period, as was a large domestic building on the

AD 44 (1989) B1.
266

AD 43 (1988) B1. Another large Roman bath was constructed on the plain between Pleuron and Kalydon,
267

South of Agios Thomas. The complex dates to the later part of the first century AD (Fig. 36). See Katsaros
2004.
 84

corner of Faramke and Bardakoula roads.268 In a domestic complex on Psarrou 15, an Early Roman

building rests on Hellenistic foundations, using the exact same layout.269 Similarly, a Hellenistic

building with a distinct Roman phase has been noticed at Sitaralona East of Lake Trichonion.270

Even in places that have only rendered pottery and no architecture, we often notice a mix of the

same type of Late Hellenistic and Early Roman wares.271

Nevertheless, literary and epigraphic evidence for Aitolia’s towns in conjunction with the

archaeological evidence they have provided generate an image that largely supports the evidence

for landscape contraction. While detailed analysis of these categories of evidence will follow in

subsequent chapters, a short summary of the present evidence is necessary. First, fewer towns

participated in federal activities in the second century BC than before 189 BC; perhaps not at their

own volition, but they did. Most sites that are only known as toponyms vanish from the epigraphic

record before the mid-second century BC; naturally, this is in part a consequence of epigraphic

habits, yet known socioeconomic structures also disappear over the course of the second century

BC, indicating that there is some merit in considering loss of site evidence as a loss of site.

Manumission activity, for example, comes to a gradual halt in the third quarter of the second

century BC and there is no evidence for any government, local or federal, after the 120s BC. Next,

the drastically altered function for several sites reflects a serious social, economic and political

change in local urban environments. In addition, the appearance of graves in numerous locations

that had previously filled a solely domestic function suggests that Aitolia’s population was smaller

at the beginning of the Early Roman era than in the Late Hellenistic period. Undeniably, the rapidly

contracting landscape did affect the towns and sanctuaries in Aitolia, and the gradually loss of

socioeconomic power is visible throughout the region. Yet, some towns fared infinitely better than

268 AD 45 (1990) B1; AD 46 (1991) B1.

269 AD 45 (1990) B1.
270 Bommeljé et al 1987, 106; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.
271 The Gribovo plot and the Messene road in Naupaktos, Megali Chora, Dafnias, Aspropyrgos, Kalydon and

Kato Mammako among others (Appendix 1A); also the West stoa at Thermon: Ergon 1987, 83.
 85

others, successfully adapting to the constraints placed upon them by the rapid regional

socioeconomic decline. Their success relied on a single factor: connectivity.

5. Connection despite contraction: site-to-site connectivity in view of regional decline.

To Horden and Purcell, Mediterranean microregional connectivity is patterned by ties of mutual

visibility, yet as a socioeconomic phenomenon, its manifestations and mechanisms are naturally

more complicated.272 In this context, I take connectivity to mean the distribution and sharing of

resources; the movement of physical goods and people; the coordination and organization of

individuals and groups; the exchange and reception of non-tangible knowledge, influences and

ideas; the legal rights and privileges regulating such phenomena; and the socioeconomic expression

of these connections.

In the previous chapter, we noted that proximity to arable soil and indeed sufficient

distances between sites were vital factors for initial site survival. Nevertheless, such spatial

partitioning does not account for the ways in which towns maintained essential connectivity

despite concomitant landscape contraction. Clearly, the surviving towns were in some way

predisposed for survival in a way that others were not, but the archaeological evidence is not

indicative of what those factors may have been, and further investigation is necessary. Here we

note that lines of communication were not broken despite sites losing lines of mutual visibility.

Reed has successfully showed that dominance relationships are expressed through a hierarchy of

connectivity.273 We may then begin to consider the surviving towns and sanctuaries as not simply

participants but as key controllers within the regional matrix of communication, indeed as

determinant nodes.

272 Horden and Purcell 2000, 125.

273 Reed 1970.
 86

Such a reading is supported by the majority of visible features. First, towns that were deeply

integrated into the larger framework of the koinon – thus placed in key “locations” within the

socioeconomic matrix – and had substantially large populations were initially better equipped to

absorb the exogenous shock of the indemnity. By controlling and manipulating league policy in

their own favor, they managed to adjust the new constraints to best suit their own interests. For a

town to achieve such influence in the league it not only needed a large population but also a

comparatively wealthy, politically active elite. This elite actively engaged in other forms of

distribution within the regional matrix which reinforced the position of their local hometowns

therein. This is quite clearly the case of Naupaktos which never sought to control the federation

through monopolization of its highest offices yet retained sufficient connectivity through the first

century BC. Detailed analysis of the population and the federation itself from the point of view of

socioeconomic structures will invariably illuminate this phenomenon.

But site survival did not only depend on the composition and activities of the local

population and their manipulation of federal offices. Other factors were essential in sustained

connectivity in the long-term although none are readily apparent. A balanced integration of

monetary and agrarian systems may have constituted one such factor which detailed evaluation of

Aitolia’s coin hoards may serve to illuminate. Storage of accumulated wealth is a major factor in

managing risk and unlike grain and olives, silver and bronze do not spoil with extended storage.

Yet, in the case of Late Hellenistic Aitolia, connectivity must also have relied on physical

location, especially after the koinon had ceased to exist. When considering low levels of connectivity

– which is hard to document in any period because of the limited traces it leaves in permanent

records – we observe that the sites that survived the longest had a physical advantage that others

lacked.274 Our analysis of the Aitolian landscape illustrated that location was a chief factor for

survival in the contracting landscape. Clearly, ecological factors must have been essential in this

274 Horden and Purcell 2000, 160.

 87

predominantly agrarian economy. Towns in possession of easily farmed chorai, in relative

proximity of pastoral uphill lands and near corridors, passages and navigable waterways that

facilitated the movement of goods and people were undeniably better suited to meet the

constraints of the contracting landscape (Fig. 36).275

6. Some preliminary observations on the synoicism of Nikopolis.

The evidence presented above demonstrates the need for a new contextual reading of the

synoicism of Nikopolis and the Roman reorganization of Western Greece. Late Hellenistic Aitolia

can no longer be considered an empty, isolated region; while certainly in continuous decline and

vastly different than at the height of its koinon in the third century BC, several sites successfully

maintained connectivity until the synoicism of Nikopolis, connectivity that confirms sustained

contacts and participation in the greater Mediterranean world. Archaeological evidence at Kalydon,

moreover, mandates a complete reconsideration of the mechanisms of the Nikopoliteian synoicism

and indeed of the literary sources that have formed the basis for scholarly consideration of this

event.

First, Pausanias’ interpretations of Augustus’ moving all Aitolian cult objects to Patras and

Nikopolis at the time of the synoicism can no longer be taken at face value.276 The archaeological

material from Kalydon makes a strong claim to that effect. Against the background of the unbroken,

unchanged and regular activity in this important town, I posit that Pausanias may in fact have

conflated a series of events that predated his time and were not necessarily concomitant. In the late

first century BC or early first century AD, the Roman colonists in Patras were supposedly given

some measure of control of the Kalydonian chora although we do not know the legal apparatus

275 There is extensive literature on risk minimization in the Mediterranean agrosystem. See e.g. Butzer 1996;
Garnsey 1988; Gallant 1989: 1991; Foxhall 1996: 2007; Garnsey and Morris 1989.
276 Pausanias 7.18.8-9, 7.21.1.
 88

behind that territorial grant.277 Importantly, this does not seem to have immediately interfered with

activity at Kalydon. Consequently, the cult statues of Artemis and Dionysos may have been moved

across the gulf at the incentive of the colonists themselves at a time when Kalydon was no longer an

active town, perhaps in the middle of the first century AD. There is indeed no reason to immediately

fuse Pausanias’ statements with Strabo’s account of the Nikopoliteian foundation in the late first

century BC. A reexamination of the material from the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria itself could help

inform this new interpretation.

Furthermore, Kalydon invites reconsideration of the manner in which Nikopolis was

founded. Unbroken, unchanged, and indeed undiminished activity in the town can only indicate that

the population was not forcibly moved to Nikopolis and there is consequently no need to

immediately add Aitolia to Strabo’s list of synoicized territories.278 Yet, later sources make clear

that part of Aitolia’s population did, in fact, end up in Augustus’ town.279 This suggests that the

synoicism was more complex than has hitherto been acknowledged and indicates that population

movement may have been continuous yet occasional, spanning several decades if not generations. If

the inhabitants of Aitolia’s largest town refused to leave, what mechanisms enforced the movement

of people in other areas? In Aitolia, were only people not directly living in the surviving towns

asked to leave? Did the synoicism in fact contain a measure of force, as implied by Pausanias and

Cassius Dio?280 What does Strabo’s eremia truly mean – an empty region, or simply a small number

of cities? The chronology, mechanics and rhetoric of the foundation of Nikopolis must be assessed

within a framework obtained through study of regional socioeconomic evidence provide. There is

indeed reason to carefully reevaluate the entire traditional narrative on the reorganization of

Western Greece.

277 Strabo (10.2.1) mentions that the Romans at Patras controlled the fishery in the “lake at Kalydon”.
278 Strabo 10.2: Anaktorion, Stratos, Oiniadai, Palairos, Alyzia, Leukas, Argos Amphilochikon and Ambrakia.
279 Pausanias 10.38.4.
280 Cassius Dio 51.1.3; Pausanias 5.23.3, 7.18.8f. See discussion in Hoepfner 1987.
 89

CHAPTER 5.
Coin production and the Aitolian indemnity.

1. Introduction.

The production of struck metal in the form of coined money is one of the more poorly understood

aspects of economic life in antiquity.281 Considering the sociopolitical implications of coin

production and their historical value, this is surprising. A state’s decision to strike its own coinage is

intimately connected to questions of social and cultural identity as well as governmental practices,

and changes in coinage patterns have at times been used to demonstrate an upheaval in

government or an alteration within the political system.282 Thus, while the disappearance of a

coinage may not necessarily be a deliberate political act – although in some cases it certainly was –

it could clearly be a corollary thereof.283 A study of Aitolia’s Late Hellenistic coinage is therefore of

utmost importance for this inquiry. More hands-on implications include the accessibility of

resources – in this case, metal – and the measure of governmental control needed to maintain a

functional coin production. The value of these categories of information for any historical inquiry is

great and mandates a nuanced approach. Nevertheless, it has been superficially but persuasively

argued that in antiquity, money was struck solely for military purposes, an idea that despite the

lack of solid data, has helped shape modern scholarship on the ancient economy.284 Thus, coin

production has been shifted to the background in the study of economic relationships in antiquity.

281 The connection between coinage and economy is naturally not a newly identified issue but has been
poorly explored: for a surprising lack of consideration, see Finley 1999 and Rostovtzeff 1926. Fortunately,
attempts at clarification are becoming increasingly numerous: Kraay 1964; Howgego 1990; Meadows and
Shipton 2001.
282 Among others, Kremydi-Sicilianou 2004.
283 Meadows 2001.
284 Crawford 1970: 1977: 1985: RRC. Although not entirely, Hopkins (1980) follows Crawford’s conclusions

Crawford and Hopkins focus on Rome, and neither takes into account the many examples of states striking
coins during peace time, Late Hellenistic Aitolia being one obvious example. More recent discussions have
fortunately taken a more nuanced approach both to coin production and to the nature of military expenditure
in antiquity. For one such a discussion focusing on military expenses from the point of view of public finances,
see Migeotte 2000.
 90

Clearly, to equate coin production to military expenditure is too crude an explanation, and

the advantages of an inquiry on the production of coinage are too numerous to not be considered in

detail. For this specific study, coin production is in fact of paramount importance. If the

manufacture of coins necessitates some form of governmental control, a study of Aitolia’s Late

Hellenistic coinage would inevitably shed light on its federation. Since our sources on the

functionality of the koinon after 189 BC are exceedingly few, the numismatic data may prove most

illuminating. Moreover, it is unclear why Aitolia kept striking coins in the second century BC when

it was no longer involved in military conflicts. In addition, a study of Aitolia’s coin production may

elucidate the complicated circumstances of the Roman indemnity, and most importantly, how it was

paid and what consequences it may have had for the production of Aitolian silver coins and as a

result, for the regional economy. Finally, the numismatic data may either corroborate or contest the

gradual decline identified in settlement patterns and site activity.

To study ancient coin production is to rely on statistics. This poses a fundamental question

which in turn has caused a conflict among numismatists: how far can you extrapolate numismatic

data against a statistical formula?285 It is likely that calculated or estimated numbers can never be

exactly right, but nevertheless, a statistically ascertainable number can provide a valuable

framework for further thought as a means by which to visualize and contextualize beyond the

surviving – at times meager – corpus of coins. While certain statistical problems always need to be

considered, for example the matter of random sampling and the sample being large enough, I

believe that the contextualizing abilities of a generated number by far outweigh the issues posed by

said number being “imaginary” or “wrong”.286 Still, I must stress that none of the calculated

285 The most vocal opponent of statistical extrapolation of coin volumes is Buttrey 1993: 1994. See also
Buttrey and Buttrey 1997. Buttrey strongly argues that if a number is not right, it is wrong, and thus should
not be considered. On the other side of the proverbial fence is de Callataÿ 1984: 1995.
286 On random samples, see Esty 1986: 2006. Not specifically tailored to numismatic data but still relevant is

Cowgill 1975.
 91

numbers presented below are absolute.

2. The coinage of the Aitolian koinon.

Throughout the Hellenistic period, the Aitolian koinon struck a series of coins in gold, silver and

bronze on two different weight standards, the Attic and the reduced Aiginetan/Corcyrean. In her

magisterial 2007 publication, Tsangari organized the Aitolian material into five series.287

Corroborated by the composition of coin hoards, these divisions are based on a detailed die-study

which enabled Tsangari to identify not only single out larger groups – that is, series – within the

corpus, but also smaller subsets – issues – within each series.

Date range. Gold issues. Silver issues. Bronze issues.

Series 1. Second half of fourth Triobols Tetrobols
century BC
Series 2. 323 – 300/290 BC Triobols Hemiobols,
tetrobols,
chalkous
Series 3, 300/290 – 220 BC Hemiobols,
i. tetrobols,
chalkous
Series 3, 239 – 229 BC Staters, Tetradrachms, Hemiobols,
iii. drachms triobols tetrobols (both
reduced)
Series 4, 220 – 205 BC Staters, Didrachms, Hemiobols,
i. drachms drachms, tetrobols,
triobols chalkous
Series 4, 220 – 205 BC Hemiobols,
ii. tetrobols,
chalkous
(reduced)
Series 5. 205 – 150 BC288 Triobols Hemiobols

287Tsangari 2007.
288Tsangari’s research does indicate the possibility that the koinon continued to strike coins into the 140s BC
which considering the fine condition of several late Aitolian issues in the Agrinion 1959 hoard cannot be
considered too late a date: in fact, a date in the late 130s or early 120s BC is equally feasible. This is an
important contribution to numismatic scholarship as it contests the traditional bracketing of Aitolia’s coinage
into 279 – 168 BC, a bracketing that is solely based on historical events (the Aitolian defeat of the invading
 92

The surviving corpus is not large. Tsangari accounts for 43 gold, 863 silver and 1752 bronze

coins which gives us a total number of 2,658 coins for all five series. Of these 2,658 coins, some 800

belong to Tsangari’s Fifth series; 367 silver triobols and 456 bronze hemiobols, which correspond

to roughly 30% in total. The Fifth series triobol, struck on the reduced Aiginetan weight standard,

weighs roughly 2.5g, and is similar both in weight and iconography to its third century BC.

antecedents. On the obverse, a female head faces right, wearing a kausia. She is commonly

interpreted as Atalanta. Sometimes a discreet moneyer’s mark is placed behind her head. On the

reverse, the Kalydonian boar stands or runs toward the right above the exergue, which it

sometimes uses as its ground line. The ethnic ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ is placed horizontally above its back, and

we find a spearhead in the exergue. At times, we observe a monogram below the boar’s belly, above

the ground line. All triobols of Tsangari’s Fifth series follow this iconographic standard. The bronze

hemiobol weighs around 4.6g. On the obverse, Athena faces right, wearing a Corinthian helmet. On

the reverse, Herakles stands posed frontally with a club in his outstretched right hand. On his left

we read the ethnic ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ which is placed vertically across the coin.289

3. Minting practices.

It is generally assumed that ancient coinages were minted under a measure of governmental

control. In Aitolia’s case, coin production appears to have been a tightly controlled practice. The

ethnic ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ which marks all Aitolian coins tells us that this is the currency of the Aitolian

Gauls at Delphi and the Third Macedonian war) and has no foundation in numismatic data. This chronological
division was first introduced in 1883 by Gardner and Poole and is still in use today, despite the obvious
problems that such a broad chronology presents.The generic bracketing has been repeated multiple times, in
particular in publications of excavated coins; Thompson 1939; Seltman 1955; Kravartigiannos 1981: 1982:
1993; Alexopolou 2000: 2004. Voices against the traditional chronology include Scheu 1960; Noe 1962; de
Laix 1974; Picard 1981; Scholten 1987; Liampi 1988.
289 These second-century-BC bronze coins form a marked iconographic departure from the well-known

Aitolian motif of a jawbone/spearhead on the reverse and a youthful male head on the obverse. For the third-
century-BC iconography, see Liampi 1998. Tsangari (2007, 255, n. 432) notes that this iconographic type of
Herakles is common on second-century-BC coins of the Oitaiai.
 93

koinon, not that of a specific city within the region.290 Moreover, the coins bear a control mark

which also indicates strict organization, and Tsangari has good reason to believe these to be either

the initials of the magistrates in charge of minting, or an allusion to their name.291 The koinon

maintained this practice of utilizing control marks throughout the entire existence of its coinage

and there is no deviation from this practice, no matter the size of the issue; both very small and

comparatively large issues carry a control mark. Until the end of its production and without

exception, Aitolia’s coinage bore both ethnic and control mark. Unlike in Achaia, where the federal

coins always bear the legend of their minting city, Aitolian coinage reveals nothing of its place of

manufacture. Attempts at locating the federal Aitolian mint have taken place, but so far, without

success.292

Two closely related minting issues warrant attention. First, we must determine whether the

koinon used one mint or several in tandem. Tsangari, for example, speaks of l’atelier in the singular.

Second, in order to better understand the koinon’s practices of production, we must assess the

breaks in manufacture visible in the die-links. Let us begin with the second problem. Several issues

of the Fifth series are closely die-linked and it is clear that they were struck in sequence,

interchangeably, and in close temporal and physical proximity.293 Other issues share no die-links

whatsoever; issue 76a, for example, which survives in a comparatively large number of 19 pieces,

exists without known or identifiable links. “Breaks” like this, in which an issue is not linked to

290 In contrast, member cities of the Achaian koinon minted coins of their own accord within the federation,
and marked them with their own city legends. There is no reason to doubt that the coin “ID” must also be the
place of its manufacture: why would Dyme, for example, strike coins in Megalopolis?
291 Tsangari 2007, 191. It was formerly believed that these marks represented the league’s strategoi, which is

impossible. See Reinach 1911.

292 The excavations at Kalydon launched an investigation in 2003, using ground-penetrating radar with

subsequent excavation; Dietz and Moschos 2003; Ljung 2011. No metal kiln has yet been excavated there. For
a structure interpreted as the mint of Pella, see Oikonomidou 1993.
293 For example, we observe that obverse die D114 was used for issues 66r, 66s and 66v, but not for issue 66t;

66t is however linked to 66s by D116 and D118; D118 was also used for issue 66u.
 94

another, are not uncommon in the Fifth series material.294 A logical reason for their existence is the

possibility that the issues were struck at different points in time. Against the background of die-

links, Aitolia’s coinage in general does not appear to have been struck annually or regularly.

Nevertheless, the relatively common occurrence of die-linkage among the Aitolian triobols seems to

suggest that certain issues were struck very closely in time, perhaps even on the same day; the use

of obverse die D127 for issues 66aa, 66ab, 67b, 67d and 67e indicates that those issues were struck

essentially at the same time, especially since several other dies were shared between the issues.295

Furthermore, it seems exceedingly likely that these multi-linked issues were struck in the same

mint, perhaps even at the same anvil. Buttrey identifies two anvils in the striking of Crepusius’

denarii, and this is a production setting that would make much sense for those tightly linked

Aitolian issues.296 This leads us back to our first concern; the number of Aitolian mints active at any

given time, an issue that is intimately tied to the size and volume of Aitolian coin production.

4. Sizes, volumes and weight.

367 Aitolian triobols of Tsangari’s Fifth series survive, preserving 116 different obverse dies. Using

Carter’s simplified method, we arrive at an original number of 163.65 dies, which we may round off

to 164.297 Initially, we note that this is not a particularly large number. For one of the best studied

294 For the first group of issues, we identify one such “break” between each issue. 65a and 65b are not die-
linked. 66a shares no dies with 66b, 66b shares none with 66c, 66c shares none with 66d, 66d shares none
with 66e.
295 D122 is shared by 66y, 66aa, 66ab; D123 by 66y, 66z, 66ab, 67a, 67c and 67d; D124 by 66z, 66aa, 66ab and

67b. Examples are plentiful and not rarely is a die shared by three or more issues.
296 Buttrey 1976. The Crepusius material is also discussed by Carter 1981.
297 Carter 1983. This method is only one of several proposals for calculating the original number of dies from

die link statistics. Extremely useful but likely too complicated for a non-statistician is Esty 1984 which
unfortunately requires some initial input data that is impossible to obtain from the coinage in question.
Carter’s method is based on computer simulation and takes standard deviation into account, yet it is not
flawless as it cannot account for dies that were used extremely few or extremely many times (my italics).
Moreover, the method becomes unsound when the ratio of coins/dies goes below three. In this case it is
important to note that n > 3d can be used for n = the total number of triobols for the Fifth series and d = the
total number of dies for the Fifth series, but this does not apply to all individual issues within the Fifth series;
 95

groups of ancient coins, the denarii of P. Crepusius struck in 82 BC, a total number of 473 or 479

obverse dies have been estimated against an actual number of 373 known obverses for 1075

known coins.298 The denarii were all struck in the single year Crepusius was vir monetalis and thus,

all dies had to be used for that specific volume of coins.299 In comparison, Aitolia’s second-century-

BC silver coinage survives in comparatively small numbers, and used fewer obverse dies for its

entire production than Crepusius did in a single year.

Estimating the size of any coinage in the pre-modern world beyond the initial calculation of

obverse dies involves consideration of several problematic parameters. First, we do not know for

how long a die lasted, or how equal their distribution was across time and use. Second, it is by no

means safe to assume that all dies struck equal numbers of coins.300 Data for modern, industrially

produced coinages shows great variations in output between dies.301 Moreover, it cannot be

assumed that all dies were used until they broke, that their failure is numerically predicable, or that

the number of dies restricted the quantity of coins that were struck.302 Broad generalizations based

on known and estimated production volumes are not uncommon but unfortunately, most such

generalizations rely on historical rather than numismatic data.303 They certainly warrant the

criticism they have received. Nevertheless, estimations closer to factual numismatic data do exist,

and a 1963 experiment in minting technique has provided useful comparative numbers.304 More

in fact, for issue 66ab, n < 2d, which is of immediate consequence. See criticism in de Callataÿ 1995. For an
average estimate, however, it is a reliable as well as user-friendly method.
298 Buttrey’s estimate of 479 probable obverse dies was adjusted by Carter to 473. Buttrey 1976; Carter 1983,

203. See also Table 5 in Carter 1980.

299 RRC 652.
300 See Esty 1986, 187 on the equal-output hypothesis.
301 Data for the US mint in the late 1900s available to Esty and Carter (1991-92) indicated that some dies

produced over one million quarters but others fewer than 100,000, indeed a very large difference in output.
302 Buttrey (1994, 346) is correct in emphasizing that it is the order of coins that is fixed, not the number of

dies.
303 RRC 694; Hopkins 1980; Mattingly 1977. Crawford, Hopkins and Mattingly primarily make use of historical

data from literary sources and project their estimates backward based on military campaigns. In a study of
the fourth-century-BC amphictyonic coinage at Delphi, Kinns (1983) uses epigraphic evidence to extrapolate
his numbers. Kinns discarded a previous die-study by Raven 1950. In a relatively recent article, Marchetti
(1999) disproves Kinns’ chronology and argues that the output cannot be accurately quantified.
304 Thompson 1961.
 96

importantly, a significantly large hoard found at Apamea struck from a single pair of dies provides

useful corroborative evidence.305 Against the background of this hoard, Sellwood’s experiment and

Thompson’s general observations become quite convincing, as the hoard demonstrates first-hand

that the striking of 6,000 coins from a single die actually happened in antiquity. Consequently, I find

good reason to follow Sellwood’s and Thompson’s estimates.

Kinns Crawford and Mattingly Sellwood Thompson and

Hopkins Apamea hoard
Average output 23,333 –
per obverse die 47,250 30,000 15,000 10,000 6,000
Aitolian Fifth 3 826,612 –
series triobols, 7 749,000 4 920,000 2 460,000 1 640,000 984,000
totals306
Aitolian triobol
issues 65, 66, 3 476,617 – 4 470,000 2 235,000 1 490,000 894,000
67 7 040,250

Even with the largest estimate of coins per die, Aitolia’s coinage was not large. Following

Sellwood’s estimate of circa 10,000 coins per obverse dies, we arrive at roughly 1 ½ million coins

for Aitolia’s entire second-century-BC silver production, or slightly below 1 million if we use the

Apamea hoard as concordance. Inarguably, the coinage was not large enough to warrant two

concomitant mints. Yet, 1 million triobols is a difficult quantity to appreciate as it has no correlation

in the modern world; moreover, the calculated numbers presented above are not easily situated in

a historical inquiry. Instead, Aitolia’s calculated coin production is better illuminated when

translated into weight.

305 de Callataÿ 1995; Sellwood 1963. The latter experiment is problematic in that Sellwood did not keep
striking coins until the die broke; instead, he stopped when his obverse die had reached 7,786 coins, yet
noted that the die itself was not greatly worn out.
306 All numbers are calculated by multiplying the estimated number of obverse dies (per Carter’s simplified

equation 1983) with the estimated average number of coins per die.
 97

[Kinns]307 [Crawford and [Mattingly] Sellwood Thompson and

Hopkins] Apamea hoard
Aitolian Fifth 9, 566.53 –
series triobols, 19, 372.5 12,300 6,150 4,100 2,460
total weight in
kilos308
Aitolian triobol 8,691.54 –
issues 65, 66, 67 17,600.6 11,175 5,587.5 3,725 2,235
weight in kilos

For its entire Fifth series, the Aitolian koinon made use of less than five metric tons of silver:

half of that, if we follow the Apamea hoard evidence precisely. It is not a large weight of metal. In

comparison, the silver mines at Cartagena in south-east Spain yielded the equivalent of 25,000

drachmae per day, or some 35 metric tons per year.309 Pliny tells us that three other regions in

Spain annually produced 20,000 lbs of gold.310 The origins of Aitolia’s metal are unknown but the

federation does appear to have reused old coins and perhaps also metal objects when striking new

issues. This notion is in part based on the absence of mines in the region, but also on the rarity of

surviving third century BC material as well as a visible tendency in Aitolian hoards toward hoarding

very old silver coinages, local and non-local.311 Presumably, the old coins were eventually collected

and used to strike new coins. Important parallels to this practice exist elsewhere. In Ptolemaic

Egypt, for example, foreign coins were collected and used as bullion for the striking of new

Ptolemaic coinage.312 Another corollary of fresh coins struck from metal not immediately derived

from a mine is the Athenian stephanophoric coinage, which was presumably struck from metal

collected through Delian commercial activity.313 Nevertheless, the coins themselves do not

307 Kinns, Crawford and Hopkins, and Mattingly are solely included for comparison.
308 The total weight is calculated on a base average weight of 2.5 grams per triobol, attrition rate not
considered.
309 Strabo 3.2.10.
310 Pliny NH 33.21.78.
311 Ancient mining left visible traces upon the earth and no such traces have been detected in Aitolia. For the

most well-documented mine in Greece, see e.g. Cunningham 1967; Hopper 1953: 1968; Jones 1982; Wilson
2002. For a discussion on the sources of silver in the ancient world, see Panagopoulou 2007.
312 P. Cairo Zenon 59022. See discussion in Howgego 1995, 5-21; Mørkholm 1991.
313 Bresson 2005.
 98

demonstrate to what extent Aitolia engaged in this practice, but the issue remains important as it is

intimately connected to the indemnity payment of 189 BC.

5. The indemnity of 189 BC: monetary aspects.

Polybius tells us that Aitolia was forced to pay 500 Euboic talents on a standard not inferior to the

Attic: “ἀργυρίου μὴ χείρονος Ἀττικοῦ παραχρῆμα μὲν τάλαντα Εὐβοϊκὰ διακόσια”. If they so

pleased, the Aitolians were offered an exchange rate of 1 mina gold to 10 minae silver (“τῶν δέκα

μνῶν ἀργυρίου χρυσίου μνᾶν”). 200 talents were to be paid immediately followed by six yearly

installments of 50 talents.314 The terms seem somewhat unspecific but it is clear that the Romans

are asking for metal of a specific purity and more specifically, of a purity equivalent to the well-

known Attic tetradrachm. Moreover, we note that the talent is a weight measure and not a coin

type: thus, the Romans ask for a specific weight of metal at a certain level of purity, and not for a

number of coins or a sum of money. This must be strongly emphasized as it is commonly but

wrongly assumed that the indemnity specifies coins, that is, minted metal of a certain type.315 The

demand for a specific weight is corroborated by the terms of the Antiochene treaty, which

stipulates that Antiochos III must pay to the Romans 10,000 talents of Attic silver with each talent

weighing no less than 80 λίτρα; in fact, Polybius gives the terms as ἀργυρίου Ἀττικοῦ ἀρίστου:

“best Attic silver”.316 Again, the Romans very specifically ask for a specific weight and purity of

silver; not a coin type. In total, Antiochos III was asked to pay 26,200 kilos of silver per year at a

314 Polybius 21.31. Livy simply follows Polybius: 38.11. The monetary aspect of Aitolia’s indemnity has not
received much attention; the only one that merits mentioning is Losada 1965. The other conditions, however,
as intimately tied to broadly applicable questions of Greek independence and Greco-Roman interactions have
been treated in detail; see e.g. Moschovich 1974; Freyburger 1982; Gruen 1982. See also Piganiol 1950; Gruen
1984; Eckstein 1995a.
315 Losada (1965), for example, believes that the indemnity was paid in freshly minted coin.
316 Polybius 21.42ff. For an old but still relevant discussion on the Apamea treaty, see Polaček 1969: 1971.

For a view on the social consequences of the peace, see Burstein 1980.
 99

total weight of 312,000 kilos. A decade earlier, Carthage had been asked for a similarly large

indemnity; 10,000 Euboian talents.317

An Attic talent weighs roughly 26 metric kilos and weight-wise, can be divided into 60 Attic

minae or 6,000 Attic drachms.318 A Euboic talent, however, is a less straightforward measure.

Appian tells us that a Euboic talent is equal to 7,000 Alexandrian drachmae, and since the Ptolemaic

(Alexandrian) talent is calculated at a weight of 6/7 of the Attic, we understand that the Euboic and

Attic talents weigh roughly the same.319 Thus, The Romans asked the Aitolians for some 13,000

kilos of Attic quality silver. Interestingly, the entire second-century-BC production of Aitolian silver

coinage, calculated above at less than 5,000 kilos, was not nearly large enough to meet the Roman

demands.

Greek weight in Euboic Metric weight in kilos Payment

talents translated
into coin volumes
(local Aitolian
triobols)320
Immediate payment 200 5,200 2 080,000
Annual payment x 6 50 1,300 520,000
Indemnity total 500 13,000 5 200,000

The indemnity must have been paid. Polybius and Livy voice no Roman complaints over late

Aitolian payments, as they do in the case of Antiochos III.321 Yet, the way or ways in which it was

paid is a complicated question without an immediate answer. Based on the “Attic silver” clause it

has been argued that the Aitolian and Seleucid indemnities were paid in coined silver; that is, not in

317 Polybius 15.18.7.

318 There is a difference between the commercial weight of a talent and its coin weight, at least in Classical
Athens. See Mørkholm 1982.
319 Appian 5.2. See Hussey and Collingwood 1836. This is corroborated by two passages by Polybius and

Pliny about Carthage’s 201 BC indemnity which Polybius outlines at 10,000 talents and Pliny at 800,000
[Roman] pounds. Polybius 15.18.7; Pliny NH 33.15.51. Crawford (RRC 590ff) proposes a slightly talent weight
of 25.92 kg. The difference is marginal.
320 Attrition rate not accounted for; triobol calculated at an average weight of 2.5g.
321 The last payment should have come in 177/6 BC but the Seleucids made a payment in 174/3 BC and still

owed Rome 2,000 talents in 162/1 BC. Livy 42.6.6. See also le Rider 1992; Bresson 2005.
 100

ingots.322 This, however, is an assumption. To test the purity of the metal against the required Attic

standard it must have been melted down, and the requested indemnity metal could thus have had

any shape or form. Aitolia consequently seems to have had a number of options as long as the

existing criteria – weight and purity – were met. First, the koinon could have used old coins, both

local and non-local; second, it could have struck new coins or obtained new coins struck by another

federation or city-state; third, it could simply have amassed quantities of metal objects in bullion

form; and fourth, used a combination of the three. Of these options, we have no insight into non-

local coins (new and old). Yet, Losada believes that the indemnity was paid in freshly minted

Athenian tetradrachms, a theory solely based on the existence of Athenian New Style tetradrachms

in the Agrinion hoard.323

Aitolia itself did not strike enough coins over the entire second century BC to pay the

indemnity in freshly minted currency. The estimated metal weight of its Late Hellenistic silver

coinage is too small, and moreover, the coinage was struck over too large a period of time to meet

the Roman time constraints. More importantly, it would have made little sense to strike new coins

for the sole purpose of paying a metal weight indemnity. To strike coins is a costly enterprise and

since the indemnity asked for weight and purity, it is likely that Aitolia simply paid it in bullion,

bullion that may have included both new and old coins, local as well as non-local, but coins that

were treated as bullion and not as coins. This bullion may have included Aitolian third-century-BC

silver coins. Of particular interest here are the Aitolian tetradrachms on the Attic standard, a

standard that was no longer used in Aitolia in 189 BC.324 Larsen believes that the 118,000 Attic

tetradrachms taken as booty from Aitolia and Kephallonia by Fulvius Nobilior in 187 BC were

322 le Rider 1992, 272.

323 Losada’s (1965) reasoning is problematic, especially in terms of chronology. The indemnity was paid in six
years (200 + 50 + 50 + 50 + 50 + 50 + 50 talents) and thus ought to have been paid off by 180 BC, but the
sequence of Athenian tetradrachm in the Agrinion 1959 hoard does not fit that date: Thompson (1968)
identifies an unbroken sequence of Athenian issues beginning in 190/89 BC and ending in 169/8 BC. Even if
one does not account for the correct lower chronology for the New Style silver, Losada’s chronology still fails.
For the lower chronology, see Mattingly 1969. Cf. Lewis 1962.
324 For general commentary on these tetradrachms, see Tsangari 2007; Scheu 1960; Gardner 1883:

1877/1878.
 101

Aitolian.325 If that assumption is correct, we understand that the old tetradrachms had already been

officially collected prior to Nobilior obtaining them, and to consider them bullion for the purpose of

an indemnity payment might not be out of place.

Intense striking occurred in the beginning of the Fifth series. Issues 65, 66 and 67 are

massively die-linked and consist of numerous sets.326 Compared to the rest of the Fifth series, issues

65, 66 and 67 are large: at a calculated obverse die total of 149, they make use of 90% of the Fifth

series obverses. Seemingly struck in great haste, these issues have not been specifically identified as

relating to the indemnity and I do not believe they were struck in order to pay the actual indemnity

for the reasons outlined above. Nevertheless, the heavy die-linkage and speed of production clearly

suggests that the issues may have been struck for a specific purpose. They may relate to the

aftermath of the Antiochene war or even to the war itself; maybe to pay troops, or to repay wartime

loans from other states, or simply for political purposes when international political power had so

visibly just been removed from the koinon.

6. Minting trajectory.

The discrepancy in volume and speed between issues 65, 66 and 67 and the remainder of Aitolia’s

Fifth series brings valuable attention to the trajectory by which Aitolia’s second-century-BC coinage

was struck. The issue of production trajectories is better discussed against the evidence provided

by coin hoards but a few points warrant mentioning here. First, the koinon never debased its silver

coinage. In the early second century BC, the koinon saw intense minting, probably in connection

with the war and related social upheaval in the region. These early Fifth series issues appear both

in early and late hoards and thus remain in circulation for some time. But when studied in

sequence, not all Fifth series issues are similar in size (Fig. 39). We note issues of similar size at the

325 Livy 39.5.14-17; Larsen 1968.

326 Tsangari (2007, 141) notes this peculiarity but does not comment upon it further.
 102

beginning and end of the sequence but the issues in between vary in size. When projected linearly,

the trend is slightly negative but not much; in fact, the silver production does not truly seem to

crash (Fig. 40). Moreover, when isolated to the later Fifth series issues, the linear trend does not

decrease at all (Fig. 41). Production, then, did not gradually become smaller until it ceased to exist

but rather, came to an abrupt, “clean” end. This observation applies primarily to silver coinage as

bronze is more difficult to track. Nevertheless, Aitolia’s bronze coinage does appear to follow the

trajectory of silver production and is at least produced roughly at the same time, if not in the same

year. We assume that the production of bronze ceased when silver striking stopped, but that is an

assumption. Furthermore, if we focus on hoard composition only, bronze disappears before silver:

the latest hoard containing Aitolian bronze is Naupaktos 1967 which dates to 175 – 150 BC. Since

bronze is rarely hoarded, this is nevertheless difficult to assess.

Struck intermittently at least into the 130s BC, Aitolia’s coinage demonstrates that the

koinon must have existed after the Roman “conquest” of Greece, and moreover, that it was relatively

active well past the Achaian war.327 The trajectory of its minting strongly suggests that the koinon

remained fully functional for several decades after the indemnity, a suggestion supported by

epigraphic evidence.328 Unlike the epigraphic evidence, which is less full for the second half of the

second century BC than for the beginning of the century, Aitolia’s coin production does not seem to

shrink when projected over time. This is noteworthy and raises the fundamental question of why it

in fact ended.

7. Purpose and end.

Aitolia struck silver and bronze coinage for roughly half a century after the indemnity.

Consequently, its coinage cannot simply have been minted for war-related expenses as second-

327 Contra Pausanias 7.16.9, who claims that Rome abolished all Greek federations in 146 BC.
328 See chapter 7.
 103

century-BC Aitolia did not engage in regular – or even irregular – warfare.329 Its purposes are

however still unclear but must to some extent be connected to its use.330 Interestingly, the koinon

struck roughly the same number of coins in the second century BC as it had done in the preceding

century (Fig. 42), although it made use of much less metal.331 This suggests that coin production

was not only economic and fiscal in nature, but also sociopolitical. The continued coin production

may have been a matter of prestige, habit or federal identity, something that the federation was

used to doing, and thus kept doing. Of some consequence here is the continued minting practice

which did not change in shape or form whatsoever for the duration of the coinage’s existence. Until

the very end coins are struck on the same legend, with the same iconography, with the same

moneyer’s control marks. There are no unusual issues. This unbroken habit stands in stark contrast

to other groups of evidence. For example, the gradually escalating decline and disruption so visible

in settlement and site data are wholly absent in the coin production data. We observe a slight

decrease in volumes over time but it is marginal. While not surprising this is still an important

observation as it demonstrates that the federation ceased to strike coins before the regional

economy collapsed. Moreover, it provides a general time frame for when the koinon itself ceased to

exist.

The indemnity did not immediately eradicate Aitolia’s coinage nor did the Third

Macedonian war put an end to this federal coinage, but the reasons for the cessation of coin

production are undeniably complex.332 Most signs point to a bullion shortage. Normally, coins were

329 The last known Aitolian altercation dates to 155 or 150 BC and consists of a military attempt at ceasing
Herakleia from the Achaian koinon which had annexed the formerly Aitolian city, located well outside Aitolian
territory. This military expedition is mentioned only by Pausanias (7.14), who is vague at best.
330 See chapter 6.
331 Applying Carter’s simplified method to the surviving material without accounting for statistical deviations

within individual issues, we arrive at a total production of 8.09 obverse dies for the tetradrachms, 46.58 dies
for the didrachms, 38.316 for the drachms and 66.165 for the triobols. Note that n = 2 to 3d for the drachms
and triobols. For the tetradrachms and the didrachms, n > 3d. The didrachms and tetradrachms struck in the
third century BC weigh 10 – 10.5g and c.16.5g on average and are thus significantly heavier than the 2.5g
triobol.
332 Tsangari’s study emphasizes the need to abandon the incorrect chronological bracketing of 278 – 168 BC

for Aitolia’s coinage.

 104

minted, entered into circulation, and then slowly rotated back into state coffers through taxation,

which enabled metal to be recycled for the purpose of minting new coins when needed. This time,

however, the metal left the region permanently which hindered the re-absorption of bullion. The

loss of bullion had explicit economic consequences but these were not immediately apparent as

federal production was neither annual nor regular, nor did the federation presumably utilize

reasonably new coins to strike new issues. Over time, however, bullion shortage had visible effects

as it eventually became both pointless and impossible for the koinon to keep striking new issues;

pointless, because it cost too much to produce a very small issue, and impossible, because there was

simply not enough bullion available to strike large enough an issue. Eventually, Aitolia’s coinage

ceased to exist.

The gradual effects of the indemnity were disastrous but this was unlikely to have been

Rome’s objective. If the senate was intent on destabilizing the region to the point of destruction,

there were easier and more direct ways of achieving that goal.333 Moreover, in comparison to

Antiochos III’s indemnity, Aitolia’s was extremely small. Rome wanted to get paid and thus did not

ask for a fantastical number. Still, the senate was unaware of the federation’s monetary practices

and thus, asked for what Aitolia in the long term could not sustain.

The act of producing a state coinage expresses unity of community and thereby infuses the

socioeconomic framework with symbolic and ideological advantages which while difficult to assess,

were undeniably important. Losing those advantages only served to accelerate Aitolia’s

socioeconomic decline.334 The long-term consequences of the indemnity can only be considered

catastrophic. Bullion leaving Aitolia without returning ultimately caused the end of the federal

silver coinage. When the coffers were depleted, the federation was unable to strike new coins, and

without a silver coinage, Aitolia lost a vital monetary aspect of its economy, a loss from which the

333 The events in Epiros in 168 BC and at Corinth and Carthage in 146 BC provide ample testament to that
effect. See discussion in Gruen 1984.
334 Figueira 1998.
 105

region never recovered. Interestingly, there are indications that the Aitolians were to some extent

aware of this issue and attempted to solve it by equating another currency to their own.335

Yet, the end of Aitolia’s coin production is not solely related to the loss of bullion, but most

likely also connected to the sociopolitical framework of the region’s government. One major aspect

of the koinon’s policy on coin manufacture was the tight control of its production. The currency was

that of the federation of the Aitolians and unlike the practice of the Achaian league, was not

affiliated with a specific city. When the federation eventually lost control both of its territory and its

public policy, the ability to and interest in producing a federal currency also disappeared. Notably,

the last epigraphic reference to a fully functional koinon is roughly contemporary with the last

federal silver issues which further attests to the importance of governmental control in Aitolian

coin production.336 There is no evidence whatsoever that the cities of Aitolia attempted to take over

Aitolian coin production once the koinon ceased to exist, presumably because the thought never

occurred to them, and because they lacked both infrastructure and resources. Without a fully

functional federation, there could be no coinage.

Here a major caveat is necessary. The cessation of Aitolian coin production does not

automatically infer that all Aitolians were poor, nor does it automatically exclude the regional

economy from possessing a functional monetary component. In fact, coin circulation and coin use in

the region suggest the opposite. Other coinages circulated in Aitolia, some in larger numbers than

the Aitolian triobol itself.

335 See chapter 6.

336 The last datable strategia was 129/8 BC; Grainger 2000, 72. See chapter 7.
 106

CHAPTER 6.
Coin circulation and monetary use.

1. Introduction.

Substantial presence of low value coins, argues Howgego, is a reliable indicator of the level of

monetization of any economy.337 If that holds true, Aitolia’s economy cannot be considered to ever

have been fully monetized, despite possessing a valuable monetary component. Its striking was too

sporadic and too irregular, and moreover much too small, to satisfy Howgego’s criterion.338 Still, the

federation did strike coins and its population used money, that much is certain, although the extent

to which money penetrated transactions of daily life can never fully be explored due to the lack of

evidence.339 Yet, the three main characteristics of money – storage of wealth, unit of account, and its

ability to facilitate trade – make it a valuable tool in monetary economics as within the parameters

of these characteristics, we are able to study its behavior. In the ancient world, money was never a

homogeneous entity and local irregularities in use and coin supply were simply structural

characteristics of any economy.340 These irregularities are sometimes, but not always, situated

within historical, pseudo-economic limits – in Aitolia’s case, one such limit is the 189 BC indemnity,

another is the synoicism of Nikopolis. Naturally, the indemnity did not cause or mandate a

deliberate change in monetary policy but in its wake, the Aitolians experienced an economic decline

so dramatic that the population was forced to respond. The ensuing system collapse provides a

central question in this chapter: what happens to a money-using economy when money suddenly

337 Howgego 1992.

338 See chapter 5.
339 Andreau (1999) argues that it is impossible to quantify the gauge of monetization in the ancient world but

reiterates Howgego’s sentiment. For a few very specific places and time periods in the ancient world,
however, we do possess the important “middle step” between the physical coin and the use to which it was
put – the most readily available example being the very detailed accounts for the Periklean building programs
on the Athenian Akropolis; Dinsmoor 1913 and subsequent publications in the AJA.
340 Bresson 2005.
 107

ceases to be available? Were the monetarily engaged Aitolians aware of the decline and if so, how

did they attempt to counteract it?

A related question pertains to the circulation of money. Movement of coinage adds a

geographic dimension to any coin study and consequently, analysis of the patterns which the

coinage follows may provide testimony to trade that cannot otherwise be attested.341 In fact, in

Aitolia’s case, the numismatic data is the sole type of evidence available for an inquiry on trade.

With which areas did the Late Hellenistic federation and its population trade after the Romans had

removed large tracts of annexed territories and physically altered Aitolian space?

Our source material derives from two categories: excavated coins and hoards, neither of

which is unproblematic. From a comparative point of view, hoarding seems to have been a rare

occurrence in the third century BC and the few hoards found in Aitolia all date to the very last

decades of this century.342 Tsangari argues that there was no hoarding before this time because the

coinage was not struck regularly enough and because Aitolia was hard to invade.343 The hoards

themselves, both those found in Aitolia and elsewhere, often suffer from issues of dating, especially

those hoards whose dates rely on Achaian federal triobols, a coin type whose chronology is

notoriously contested.344 Equally problematic is Aitolia’s excavated record. Excavated coin contexts

341 Naturally, trade is but one of numerous explanations for the circulation of coinage.
342 These include the Naupaktos c. 1910 hoard (IGCH 196), the Aitolia? 1957 hoard (IGCH 208), the Naupaktos
1955 hoard (IGCH 174) and possibly the Western Greece? 1964 hoard (IGCH 224) which might have been
found in Antirrion. Clearly, only the two Naupaktos hoards have a definite Aitolian provenance. The
provenance for IGCH 208 is highly contested. A single hoard found in Aitolia has an earlier date. IGCH 72, the
Palaiomania Xiromero hoard, was buried c.350-325 BC but contains no Aitolian material. See IGCH and entry
in Varoucha-Christodoulopoulou 1962.
343 Tsangari 2007.
344 Broadly defined, the “new landscape” in Peloponnesian coinages entails a significant down-dating of

Achaia’s Final group of federal coins. Instead of adhering to traditional, historically driven chronological
divisions, proponents of the “new landscape” argue that the Final group was struck well into the first century
BC. Their discussion is based on the composition of the Poggio Picenze (IGCH 2056) and Caserta hoards (IGCH
2053) in combination with the famous Damon inscription from Olympia (SEG XV, 254). On IGCH 2056:
Campanelli 1991. Despite the hesitancy among many – chiefly Greek – numismatics-driven historians and
numismatists to accept the new chronology, it is clearly accurate. See Boehringer 1991: 1997: 2008. Warren
(1969: 1993b: 1997: 1999a: 1999b: 2007: 2008) has further elaborated and expanded upon Boehringer’s
arguments and conducted the necessary research to demonstrate its accuracy. The reviewers of Warren’s
large 2007 publication agree; Fischer-Bossert 2008. Much of Warren’s argumentation is based on the Megara
 108

are rarely published and when they are, the coins suffer from a broad dating and a distinct lack of

photographs which makes any further analysis impossible. The available data is thus far from

straightforward.

2. Theory and method: working assumptions for coin circulation.

The nature of coinage in the pre-modern world, its purpose, uses and users, indeed the reason for

its very existence remain central to any treatment of the ancient economy but basic statements vary

wildly; therefore, we must initially establish a few working assumptions. In very general terms, we

tend to identify two economic “agents” in the ancient world. The first is the government, state or

city council which in Aitolia’s case constitutes the koinon’s federal government or more broadly, the

federation itself. Responsible for making money, it uses money for military expenditure, public

works, public salaries, federal gifts, federal dedications, governmental infrastructure and the

manufacture of new coins. It obtains money through taxation, war indemnities and booty, and gifts

from other states.345 We assume that the state itself has economic and political contacts with other

states, although only in rare cases does evidence attest to the existence of official economic

policy.346 There were no known fiscal institutions within the Aitolian koinon and socioeconomic

procedure was likely formulated by the annually elected political magistrates.347

The second agent is the individual person. The individual spends money in the market place

on small everyday non-barter transactions, on taxes to its own government, salaries to workers,

well deposit. For its original publication, see Waage 1935. Warren and Boehringer’s research has found
corroborative parallels in the work of Grandjean (1993: 1999: 2003) at Messene. There is no longer any
reason to support the historically convenient argument that the Achaian league ceased to strike coins after
the destruction of Corinth.
345 There is little physical evidence for tax collecting in mainland Greece in the Hellenistic period but study of

the surviving material suggests that the financial obligation of the population to the koinon in the form of
eisphora and telea was legally defined. See the excellent discussion in Mackil and van Alfen 2006.
346 The most obvious example being the economic aims and performance of the Ptolemaic state in the third

century BC; see Manning 2007. Cf. Welles 1949; Rathbone 2002.
347 On these magistracies, their numbers and function, see e.g. Larsen 1952.
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debt payments and loans to others. Literary and archaeological sources tell us that this agent could

become very wealthy.348 There is probably a wide discrepancy within this group in terms of what

ways and how often it used money and moreover, in the volume of coinage that was available at any

given time. It is assumed that these two agents in general – but not always – behave differently.

Similarly, bronze and silver coins are generally presumed to fill different needs.349 While such an

assumption in part rests on the size of the coin in question and in part on the relative value of

metals, one must not immediately attribute silver exclusively to the first agent and bronze to the

second, nor assume a strict agent division within monetary use.350 It is however quite likely that

low-value bronze coins were more often used for small, everyday non-barter transactions,

transactions for which most silver coins were impractical due to their higher value.351

Consequently, bronze coins chiefly circulate locally, a habit not generally applicable to silver.352

It should be noted that in some time periods and regions in the ancient world we can

identify a third agent; a group of people, a guild or a bank, but none such is attested in Late

Hellenistic Aitolia.353

This distinction in agency and the discrepancy in how money might be used invite caution

when evaluating the numismatic evidence, especially in Aitolia’s case where the distinct lack of

literary accounts has deprived us of the visible connection between the surviving coins and the

activity or purchased object we think they was used for and thereby of any commentary on relative

values. Sums are rare in Aitolia’s sparse epigraphic record and while triobols are mentioned in

348 We are reminded of Alexander the Isian’s private fortune of 200 talents: Polybius 21.26. On the social
status of these agents, see Andreau 2002.
349 On bronze as “small change”, see Kraay 1964; Kim 2002. See also Howgego 1990.
350 On the functions of coinage within ancient economies and the micro-economics of monetary use, see von

Reden 2002.
351 Kagan (2006) argues that large denominations were functionally limited to high-value transactions.
352 On the size of bronze vs. silver within the [ancient] economy, see Hopkins 2002.
353 See e.g. Gabrielsen 2005: 2008; Barlow 1978. Cf. Andreau 1999.
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some epigraphic sources, none of these come from Aitolia. Instead, Aitolian transactions use weight

measures.354

Our last assumption details that the movement of coinage attests to its acceptance as a unit

of account.355 As has already been noted, its ability to circulate can provide physical testimony to

trade and trade networks that would otherwise be unknown to us. Thus, in places where Aitolian

coinage appears in sufficient quantities large enough not to be accidental, we presume it was

accepted as legal tender and moreover, that this geographical unit engaged in trade with Aitolians.

The important caveat is, of course, that the coins themselves cannot verify the ethnicity of the

agent: hence, we must consider the quantities and regularity with which coins appear before we

can demonstrate meaningful circulation.

3. Regional circulation and coin use: excavated contexts.

Based on the scanty published evidence, local bronze appears to be the most commonly occurring

coin type in Aitolia. The most glaring example of Aitolia’s lacking publication record is the sanctuary

of Apollo at Thermon where the century-long archaeological investigations have unearthed Aitolian

bronze coins representing all five series and thus cover the entire chronological span of Aitolian

bronze coin production, but have yet to publish any of these coins.356 Considering the wealth of

information otherwise available at Thermon in conjunction with the sanctuary’s extreme

354 This has already been observed to be the case in the indemnity treaty and is in fact not an exceptional case.
Triobols are mentioned in the following Hellenistic inscriptions: IG VII 4139 (second century BC, Boiotia); IG
VII 2420 (late third century BC, Boiotia) and IG VII 3073 (second century BC, Boiotia); SEG 25:501 (first
century BC, Tanagra: this is a list of victors at the Sarapeia games). Triobols also mentioned in three much
earlier documents from Delphi: CID 2:113 (fourth century BC); FdD III 5:85 (fourth century BC); FdD III 5:49
(336 BC). Note that all inscriptions derive from Central Greece.
355 von Reden 2002; cf. the conflicting interpretation of monetary circulation in Giovanni 1978: 1982.
356 For a brief introduction to the more recent excavations, see Papapostolou 2009. On the excavations in

general: Karytsas 1998.

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importance as the federation’s meeting place and chief sanctuary, this is most unfortunate.357 The

only scientifically excavated sites that have published its coins are Chalkis and Kalydon.358

During the excavations of the Classical and Hellenistic portion of the city of Chalkis, 94 coins

were found; only four of these are silver.359 Interestingly, many bronze coins are foreign or non-

Aitolian. The Peloponnese is represented by coins from Agros, Dyme, Elis, Kleitor, Megalopolis,

Sikyon and Corinth and also by four federal Achaian bronzes.360 Most of the material dates to the

third century BC with the inclusion of some Late Classical coins. East and Central Greece is

represented by coins from Atrax, Crannon, Lamia, Histiaia, Eretria, Euboian Chalkis and Phokis.

Here, too, we deal chiefly with fourth- and third-century-BC material; none dates to the second

century BC. A most curious inclusion is a Carthaginian bronze, a coinage almost never found in

Greece and certainly not in Aitolia.361 Similarly odd is a bronze coin from Miletos. In the second

century BC, coins appear to have come exclusively from Sikyon apart from Aitolia itself. The Chalkis

material contains a lot more foreign bronzes than one would usually expect to find in a

comparatively small and supposedly insignificant town and more importantly, these coins have a

broad geographic range. Many coins are worn, and the Classical coins appearing in Hellenistic

contexts signal prolonged circulation, in some cases well over a century.

Generally, there is very little material at Chalkis that dates to the second century BC which

suggests that the city was in decline at this time, and the numismatic record support this thesis.

Nevertheless, in addition to the Sikyonian coins which have a firm date in the second century BC,

357 A few Aitolian triobols have also been found at the sanctuary although bronze seems to be vastly more
common. Tsangari 2007, 238.
358 The Chalkis publication is not without fault as its author relies on the very broad and inaccurate

traditional chronological bracketing of Aitolia’s coinage; Alexopoulou 2000: 2004. Fortunately, this reliance
has been rectified in the author’s treatment of the Kalydonian material; Alexopoulou and Sidiropoulos 2011.
359 Note that all coins were found in trenches with predominantly Hellenistic ceramic material. See trench

notebooks from 1999 and 2000 as well as Alexopoulou 2000: 2004.

360 SNG Cop 299.
361 Obv. Head of Tanit, rev. horse standing r. in front of palm-tree; see Plant 1979, no. 1215, 76. For the

electrum type of the coin, see no. 879 in Head 1887, no. 879.
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some Fifth series bronzes can be identified at Chalkis; Alexopoulou’s 44 is identical to Tsangari’s

issue 87, for example.

The material from Kalydon differs from that from Chalkis, chiefly in terms of geographic and

temporal distribution. The 162 coins found at Kalydon during the 2002-2005 excavations not only

represent polities in Central Greece and the Peloponnese but also Western Greece, Attica, Asia

Minor and Rome. Moreover, while in the second century BC, only Sikyon and the Aitolian koinon

supplied Chalkis with coins, Kalydon made use of a wider range of coinages. In addition to the

Aitolian Fifth series triobol, these include Athens, Elis, Epiros, Leukas and the Achaian league.

Furthermore, the numismatic data for Kalydon reveals continued influx and circulation of coinage

in the first century BC. Roman republican coins struck by Rome’s moving armies circulate parallel

to coins struck by the Achaian mint at Patras in the 30s BC and coins from Lycia. No less than 15%

of the coins at Kalydon have a secure date in this century.362 Even some early imperial coins appear

at Kalydon, the latest being an issue struck by the colonia in Corinth in 2/1 BC.363

4. Regional circulation and coin use: hoards.

Seven Late Hellenistic hoards have been found in Aitolia to today’s date; five silver, one bronze, and

one with mixed contents. Never studied collectively, there are visible discrepancies in how they

have been dated and consequently detailed analysis of their contents is necessary.

The earliest hoard is Agrinion 1968 [CH I, 76] (Appendix 4.1) which was found in or near

Agrinion in 1968. Consisting of some 100+ silver coins, it was dispersed on the market right away

and not much is known about it. The majority of the coins consisted of Aitolian triobols from

Tsangari’s Fourth and Fifth series but coins from Central Greece and Sikyon were also represented.

362 The number may increase with the creation of a tighter chronology for certain coinages, including
Ainianes, Elis and Epiros.
363 Kalydon no. 158.
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Most coins were reported to be worn but a specimen of Tsangari’s Fifth series 66t is in

comparatively good condition. Notably, this is the latest coin in the hoard.

The Agrinion 1968 hoard has been dated to the first decade of the second century BC.364

Tsangari places the hoard in the context of the Antiochene war.365 Since at least the 66t issue coin is

so notably fresh, it needs not have been in circulation for very long before being buried and it is not

unlikely that this applies to the unknown bulk of Aitolian material in the hoard as well. A tentative

burial date in the first two decades of the second century BC would thus seem appropriate, perhaps

between 190 and 180 BC.

The Naupaktos 1967 hoard [IGCH 244] (Appendix 4.2) is a bronze hoard now housed in the

Numismatic Museum in Athens.366 Predominantly consisting of local Aitolian bronzes, it also

contains seven coins struck by the Oitaians, a local Central Greek tribe. The Aitolian material

belongs to Tsangari’s Third, Fourth and Fifth series although some coins are illegible. Many of the

issues represented in the hoard have been found in excavated contexts throughout Central

Greece.367 Although the hoard is comparatively large, it has not been extensively studied. Grainger

believes that the hoard was deposited by Aitolians who had “deliberately collected local coins”.368

Little is known of the Oitaian coins which all appear to be of an Aitolian type. The IGCH suggests a

burial date of 175 – 150 BC, which Tsangari does not dispute.369 The worn condition of several

coins in the hoard indicates a long period of circulation and despite the fact that many of the coins

seemingly were struck in the second half of the third century BC, the date proposed in the IGCH

seems sufficient.

364 CH I, 76, 24; Picard 1979. See esp. 237ff.

365 Tsangari 2007, 219.
366 AD (1968) Chron. 23, 12.
367 These include Thermon (issues 10, 49, 54, 55, 57, 58) Kallion (issues 10, 52, 58), Delphi (issues 10, 12, 49,

53, 55, 57, 58), Lamia (issues 10, 49), Volos (issue 10), Thessaly (issue 58), Thebes (issue 58) and Stratos
(issue 52). Corinth (issue10) and Olympia (issues 52, 57) also share Aitiolian issues with this hoard.
368 Grainger 1999.
369 Tsangari 2007, 233. Papageorgiadou-Bani (1996) agrees.
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The Kalydon 1973 hoard [CH IV, 54] (Appendix 4.3) consists of 52 silver drachms and

triobols struck by various cities in the Peloponnese and the Achaian league; none of the Achaian

material belongs to the Final group. The hoard contained no Aitolian material and the single non-

Peloponnesian coin was struck by Opuntian Lokris. Its find context is unknown and its association

with Kalydon unsubstantiated. Papageorgiadou-Bani assigns the hoard a burial date of 165 – 147

BC while the editors of the CH take a conventional historical standpoint and place the hoard in

“168/7 BC or later.”370

A mixed hoard containing some 30 silver and four bronze coins was found at Vlachomandra

in 1886 (Appendix 4.4).371 It included issues from Elis, Sikyon, Lysimachos and the Roman republic.

It is not clear if the all the reported material comes from a single deposit, or from several in the

same area. Its whereabouts are unknown and no further information was recorded about its

contents. The coins of Lysimachos point to a date around the First Macedonian War, which

Papageorgiadou-Bani emphasizes in her short assessment of the hoard.372 There is however

nothing that prevents a date anywhere in the second century BC and since the hoard is inaccessible,

no further comment is possible.

Agrinion 1959 [IGCH 271] (Appendix 4.5) is by far the largest hoard found in Aitolia and has

also received the most scholarly attention.373 It contains 1,348 coins from almost every minting

state in Central Greece and the Peloponnese and also two states whose coinages are not ordinarily

found in Aitolia: Athens and Rome. Chronologically and geographically, the material can be divided

into two main groups; early autonomous material from Central Greece (Chalkis, Lokris, Boiotia)

plus a few cities in the Peloponnese (Sikyon, Argos), and later federal material from Aitolia and the

Achaian federation plus Athens and Rome. The early material has a date range from the fourth

370 Papageorgiadou Bani 1996.

371 AD 1889, E. 103, ill. 5.
372 Papageorgiadou-Bani 1996, 219.
373 The original two-part publication: Thompson 1968; Thomsen and Crawford 1968. This publication was

immediately reviewed, not without criticism; Mattingly 1969. Even before its publication, the hoard received
ample attention: Losada 1965; Hersh 1966.
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through the third centuries BC while the later material dates to the second century BC. The hoard’s

highly contested burial date hinges on the later material.

The federal Achaian triobol is the most common coin type in the Agrinion hoard,

represented by 838 specimens of the Early and Late group; in fact, the hoard contains almost every

issue of the Early group and the majority of the Late group but no Final issues.374 Thus, Warren

soundly assumes that the hoard was buried before Achaia began striking its Final issues.375 In her

original assessment of the material, Thompson noted that the Athenian New Style tetradrachms in

IGCH 271 formed an unbroken sequence of issues lasting over twenty years.376 On the corrected

lower chronology for the New Style coinage, this sequence ends in 129/8 BC.377 Mattingly observes

that the Agrinion coins of this Athenian issue were not f.d.c, and consequently had been in

circulation for some time before their burial.378 Several of the Roman coins are in fine condition to

f.d.c and their circulation must thus have been brief.379 The latest denarius in the Agrinion hoard is

Syd. 477.380 It belongs to the moneyer Q. Pilipus whose issue Crawford dates to 129/8 BC.381

The 97 Aitolian triobols are represented by 37 issues. The vast majority belongs to the Fifth

series: only 20 are equally divided between the Third and Fourth series. Not all issues from

Tsangari’s Fifth series are present in the Agrinion hoard but those that are, are often represented

by more than one coin. The last triobol to be struck by the koinon, Tsangari’s 77b, is represented by

not fewer than seven coins.

374 Thus, in IGCH 271 we find an almost complete record of active Achaian mints. These include Corinth,
Sikyon, Patras, Argos, Koronai, Messene, Elis, Antigoneia, Megara, Megalopolis, Sparta, Caphyae, Pheneos,
Pellene, Epidauros, Kleitor, Aegion, Dyme and Aegira. Notably absent are the mints of Pallantion and Tegea,
whose issues occur both in the Caserta and Western Greece hoards. See Thompson 1968, 110-115.
375 Warren 1999b.
376 Thompson 1968, 80.
377 Thompson 1961: 1962. Corrected chronology in Mattingly 1969. See also Lewis 1962.
378 Mattingly 1969, 331. Thompson (1968, 80-82) confirms this.
379 Mattingly 1969, 332; Thompson 1968, 107-108, n. 136.
380 Thomsen and Crawford 1968, Pl. LVI, no. 717.
381 RRC.
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Due to the chronological discrepancies noticeable in the hoard, the burial date of IGCH 271

is debated; yet, there is no reason to assume that it has been adulterated.382 Thompson cautiously

assigned the hoard a burial date in the middle decades of the second century BC which was

subsequently tightened to 145 – 135 BC in the IGCH. 383 The Roman denarius Syd. 477, however,

makes any burial date before 129/8 BC impossible, a terminus post quem supported by the latest

Athenian New Style tetradrachm. Incidentally, a burial date around 129 BC is favored by the two

champions of the lower chronology for the coinages of Achaia, Warren and Boehringer.384 Since the

hoard contains no examples of the Final group of Achaian coins, it must reasonably have been

buried before that group began to circulate, or only shortly thereafter. Since the Agrinion hoard so

clearly possesses an almost complete list of Achaian issues, a burial date at a time when the Final

group was in production would seem strange.385 Thus, a burial date in the 120s BC is not only

reasonable, it is the most accurate estimate we can make based on the numismatic evidence.386

Its sheer size sets IGCH 271 apart from all other Aitolian coin hoards. The complete

sequence of Athenian tetradrachms, the almost complete sequence of Achaian Early and Late issues,

the inclusion of Roman denarii and the addition of very old Central Greek silver, plus the

combination of separate coin standards draw attention to the unusualness of IGCH 271. We must

382 Attempts have been made to disassociate the Roman contents of the hoard from the Greek: Most recently,
Papageorgiadou-Bani (1996, 218-220) has argued that the Roman coins in no way belong with the rest of the
hoard. She assigns the Greek portion of the Agrinion hoard a burial date of 165 – 147 BC and places the
Roman portion shortly after 130 BC. Similarly, Touratsoglou and Tsourti (1991) argue that the Agrinion
hoard in fact consists of two separate hoards that were collected at an interval of 20 years and then buried
together. Yet, Thompson (1968, 2, n. 3) observed that all coins, old and new, were covered with the same
kind of green copper encrustation. Moreover, some of the coins were coated with a dark accretion which
presumably consisted of sulphuric oxide mixed with limestone. The evidence is uncontestable: all the coins
must derive from the same physical context.
383 Thompson 1968, 108.
384 Boehringer 1991, 163, n. 8; Warren 1999, 102-103.
385 Thompson 1968, 86: “Every known issue of what may be called the civic coinage…. is represented.” Had

the hoard contained significantly fewer Achaian coins, and had fewer Achaian mints of the Early and Late
groups been represented, one might have accepted the suggestion that the Final Group was already in
circulation when the hoard was buried, but that is not the case.
386 With regards to the condition of the Aitolian triobols, Tsangari (2007, 231) sees no problem in assigning

the hoard a burial date in c. 129 BC. There is no need to follow Mattingly’s (1969, 331-332) parallels between
the incursion of a horde of Celts down the Adriatic coast in 119 BC and the interment of the hoard. Cf. Florus
iii, 4. 1-3.
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ask why 1,348 silver coins were buried in central Aitolia in the last quarter of the second century

BC, and what this anomalous collection of coins was at the time of its burial. Thompson suggested

that the hoard was a currency deposit; Tsangari simply interprets it as an ensemble of coinages that

circulated in the area at that time.387 Neither answer is satisfactory. The hoard is so much larger

than anything found in Aitolia that we must question its ownership and the manner of its

assemblage. Unfortunately we lack any supporting evidence but it seems likely that the only coin-

using body that would receive coins on a regular, annual basis is the koinon. Annual taxation may

account for the nearly complete year-by-year issues represented in the hoard. If so, the Agrinion

1957 hoard may in fact be part of the koinon’s coffers and would consequently attest to the

existence of a functional federal government in the 120s BC.

Naupaktos 1967 [IGCH 317] (Appendix 4.6) is a small silver hoard, supposedly originating

from Naupaktos. It contains only four coins and is suspected to originally have been part of a larger

hoard.388 The Athenian New Style tetradrachm belongs to series ΗΡΑ-ΑΡΙΣΤΟΦ which on the

corrected lower chronology for the New Style silver dates to 136/5 BC.389 The coin is in good, but

not mint, condition.390 The three Roman denarii are somewhat later in date than the Athenian

tetradrachm. Crawford dates the coin struck by the moneyer Q. MINV to 122 BC, that of C. PLVTI to

121 BC, and that of MN AEMILIO LEP to 114 or 113 BC.391 The last denarius consequently forms the

terminus post quem for the small Naupaktos hoard. It appears to be in very good condition and

cannot have been in circulation for long prior to its interment. Thus, Papageorgiadou Bani supports

the IGCH claim of a burial date at the end of the second century BC and there is no reason to

387 Thompson 1962, 321; Thompson 1968, 108; Tsangari 2007, 230. Tsangari suggests that the Roman
denarii arrived in the area during the Achaian war, which is a chronological impossibility.
388 ADelt 23 (1968) Chron. 13, Pl. 6, nos. 9 – 12.
389 Mørkholm 1984; Thompson 1961, 136, Pl. 34, no. 344.
390 Papageorgiadou-Bani 1996, 215, Pl. 1, no. 1 .
391 RRC 296, no. 277 and 297, Pl. 39; 305, no. 291, Pl. 40. Note that the original entry in the ADelt assigns the

second denarius a date of 137 – 134 BC.

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challenge this.392

The latest hoard found in Aitolia is the Koniska 1962 hoard [IGCH 266] (Appendix 4.7). This

small silver hoard was found in the village of Koniska northeast of Thermon in c. 1962.393 Its

contents are both geographically and chronologically mixed, suggesting that freshly minted Aitolian

coins were no longer available at the time of its burial. This hoard contains the only known coin of

the Final Achaian group found in an Aitolian hoard. Originally dated to the mid-second century BC,

the Aigion issue marked with the name of Aristodamos (APICTO) points to a date in the first

century BC for the hoard.394 This Final federal issue of Aigion with the name Aristodamos in full is

present in the Caserta hoard in an astonishing 63 coins, which makes dating the Koniska hoard to

the mid-second century difficult since the Caserta hoard was buried in the first century BC. While

some coins in the hoard certainly antedate the burial of the hoard by a substantial period of time –

the tetradrachms of Ptolemy I, for example – the evidence presented by the Achaian issues indeed

points to a date in the early first century BC.395

A few brief conclusions on hoarding are necessary. First, in comparison to the numismatic

record of other regions and time periods in classical antiquity, we realize that Aitolia’s seven Late

Hellenistic hoards are few. We have already noted that hoarding did not occur in Aitolia until the

late third century BC. These seven hoards, then, reflect some change in attitudes, indicative of either

internal or external stress. Moreover, we observe that no hoard burial dates correspond to known

historical events. Interestingly, hoards are still being buried after that the federation has ceased

striking its own coinage. Money, consequently, was still used at a time when the government no

longer functioned. Lastly, the hoards unequivocally demonstrate the wide circulation of foreign

silver coins in Late Hellenistic Aitolia.

392 Papageorgiadou-Bani 1996, 216.

393 ADelt 19 (1964), 9-10.
394 Papageorgiadou-Bani 1996, 219; Boehringer 1991, 165. The first-century-BC date is strengthened by the

use of the lunate sigma; see Warren 1993b, 91.

395 On the circulation of Ptolemaic coins in Central Greece, see Varoucha-Christodoulopoulou 1941. On the

Ptolemaic “closed” economic system, see de Callataÿ 1999.

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5. The circulation of foreign coins in Aitolia.

Many foreign states are not represented at all in Aitolia’s numismatic record, Macedonia, Akarnania

and Illyria being the most noteworthy absentees.396 The almost complete absence of Akarnanian

coins is particularly odd in view of the very long physical border shared by the two federations.

Aitolian coins have shown up both in excavated contexts at Stratos and in the Stratos 1967 hoard,

but Akarnanian issues occur neither in excavated Aitolian contexts nor hoards.397 The separation

between the coinages of Aitolia and Akarnania becomes plain when one observes the rarity with

which the two coinages occur together; only one hoard exists in which coins of both regions are

observed.398

Still, as demonstrated both by the composition of hoards and excavated contexts, foreign

coinages circulated in second-century-BC Aitolia in not insignificant numbers. The geographic

representation of coins is comparatively broad. The presence of older foreign coins is a common

feature in most Hellenistic hoards, but the regularity of old silver here is noteworthy. Struck by

various states in Central Greece, these older silver coins derive both from states that used to be part

of the federation and from states that were not. Of varying size and weight, these coins share a

common denominator in that they were all circulated for much longer than expected. We do not

know at what point during their lifetime these coins entered Aitolia but it seems likely that this

396 Coins of Macedonian kings have been observed in Aitolia, but exclusively in Late Classical and Early
Hellenistic contexts. These include the Makryneia 1859 hoard [IGCH 92] which contains coins of Philip II,
Alexander III, and Philip III, and the Aitolia? 1959 hoard [IGCH 208] which contains bronzes of Philip II,
Demetrios Poliorketes, Antigonos Gonatas and Demetrios II. In the second century BC, Macedonian coins do
occur in the areas around Aitolia, e.g. the Lokrian Oiantheia 1969 hoard [IGCH238/CH II, 85], which contains
coins of Philip II, Alexander III, Kassander, Demetrios III, and Perseus. This hoard comes from a Macedonian
shipwreck and is not necessarily indicative of the monetary circulation in the area. The absence of Illyrian
coinage is unsurprising, as it tended circulate only locally.
397 A single coin of Argos Amphilochikon, a city technically in Akarnania but autonomous and not striking

coins for the league, was found in a third-century-BC context at Chalkis; Alexopoulou 2004, 192 – 193: 199,
no. 9. A federal Akarnanian tetrachalkon, dating to the third century BC, has been found at Kalydon;
Alexopoulou and Sidiropoulos 2011, no. 33.
398 This hoard, CH II, 74, reportedly comes from Western Greece and may have been found in 1973. It is not

clear whether it actually contains Aitolian coins; Tsangari (2007, 231) mentions the possibility thereof, but
the contents of the hoard have been seen in trade and the hoard has not been studied. On Akarnanian coinage
in general, see Stoyas 2004.
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happened when most of Central Greece was under Aitolian control, at some point during the third

century BC. Thompson suggests that these older coins were in fact used as currency in Aitolia

before the region began to strike its own coinage.399

But freshly struck foreign coins also circulated in Aitolia. Never common in the Greece, the

Roman denarius was particularly rare before the Sullan period and only occurs in four known

hoards; Vonitsa 1993, Agrinion 1957, Naupaktos 1967 and Stobi.400 In addition, single coins have

been found at Thermon, Kalydon and the Atalante plot in Naupaktos.401 To find denarii in two

Aitolian hoards is unexpected, especially in view of Aitolia’s comparatively sparse numismatic

record and the absence of coinages from states located in greater proximity to the Aitolian

heartland (Akarnania, Thessaly). Their presence has given rise to some debate, but Crawford

remarks that “it would be extremely rash to argue for meaningful circulation of the denarius in

Greece on the basis of these three hoards [Agrinion, Naupaktos and Stobi]”.402 It is inarguably

correct that meaningful circulation of the denarius cannot be attested based on these three hoards

alone yet the concentration of this unusual foreign coinage to Aitolia alludes to active contacts at a

time when the historical record is otherwise silent.403 Similarly anomalous is the appearance of

Athenian New Style tetradrachms which belong to a weight standard that Late Hellenistic Aitolia no

399 Thompson 1939, 118. Since Tsangari has convincingly showed that the Aitolian coinage began in the
second half of the fourth century BC, Thompson’s explanation cannot be accepted, but there is no evidence
whatsoever that the koinon ever legislated against the circulation of foreign coinages.
400 One could argue that the tetradrachms struck by Sulla in Athens are in fact a Greek coinage and not Roman

at all since both denomination and weight standard are Greek. This Stobi hoard was buried in close
chronological proximity to the Agrinion 1959 hoard at some point in the 120s BC; Crawford 1973. It must be
noted that Roman coins do occur elsewhere in Late Hellenistic Greece, albeit in small quantities and poorly
documented contexts. A context at Kalaureia supposedly contained eight Roman coins but the circumstances
of its finding are unknown: see Crawford (1974), 57. A single denarius was found at Thebes; Hackens 1969.
This specific denarius is of the type Syd. 320 dating to c. 155 – 150 BC.
401 Thermon: L PISO L F L N FRUGI, c. 90 BC (RRC 340; no. 340.1). Atalante plot: drachm, L PAULLUS LEPIDUS,

62 BC (RRC no. 415.10). See discussion in Papageorgiadou-Bani 1996, 220ff.

402 Crawford 1985. The Vonitsa hoard, found in 1993, was of course unknown to Crawford at this time.
403 Cf. the early imperial hoard of Roman bronze coins found at Aitolian Gavalou; Alexopoulou 2001.
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longer used. The Agrinion 1957 hoard contains an almost complete annual sequence of Attic silver,

but to assign the coinage of Athens a function within the Aitolian economy is foolish.404

The most common foreign silver coinage in Aitolia is undoubtedly that of Achaia. In the

second century BC, this federal coinage entered Aitolia in unparalleled quantities; in fact, the

Aitolian hoards contain a greater number of Achaian coins than Aitolian. The Achaian coin has the

same weight, size and metal quality as its Aitolian counterpart (and thus the same value, we

assume) and while it is not the same coinage, it is the same currency. Its appearance in Aitolia is

only strange of one accepts Polybius’ assessment of Aitolo-Achaian hostilities wholesale. Clearly,

the Aitolian population had no difficulty accepting the Achaian triobol as payment; otherwise, it

would not have been hoarded.405 Early and Late issues are represented in almost complete

sequences in the Agrinion 1957 hoard but there is a sharp cutoff in the circulation of Achaian

triobols between the Late and Final groups. Final group issues only appear at Kalydon and in the

Koniska hoard.

Circulation of foreign bronze seems to have changed rather dramatically after 189 BC. While

its third century population circulated a wide range of foreign bronze coinages, second-century-BC

Chalkis almost exclusively relied on locally produced bronze, a situation echoed in the Naupaktos

1967 hoard (IGCH 244). The evidence is unfortunately limited but if generally applicable, this

situation would entail a sharp shift in everyday monetary contacts between Aitolians and non-

Aitolians, and perhaps also in the presence of foreign individuals in Aitolia. Yet, circulation of

foreign coinage depended on successful connectivity, which the Kalydon material clearly attests to.

While most of Aitolia had lost that connectivity, some towns apparently maintained it.

How did these foreign coins enter Aitolia? The ways seem as numerous as the coin types

themselves. The composition of bronze coins at Chalkis in the third century BC is both diverse and

404Contra Losada 1965.

405The phenomenon of “bad” money circulating more widely than “good” and “good” money more often being
kept and thus hoarded, a notion commonly referred to as Gresham’s law, is discussed in Rolnick and Weber
1986.
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eclectic enough to suggest the presence of foreigners, perhaps tradesmen moving from port to port.

third-century-BC Aitolia issued several grants of isopoliteia to foreign individuals and there may be

some association between those grants and the presence of foreign bronze coins. Before the end of

the century, the federation halted this practice and no more grants were issued, and foreign bronze

coins became increasingly rare.406 Another possible explanation is the large-scale migration of

Aitolian mercenaries across the Mediterranean in the second half of the third century BC. Some of

these mercenaries returned to Aitolia and could have brought foreign coins along; presumably, they

were paid in coin.407 The old Central Greek silver, by contrast, was likely officially collected through

taxation at a time when a larger area was under Aitolian control and thereby absorbed into the

monetary makeup of the region. Its appearance in second-century-BC hoards is chiefly indicative of

the paucity of circulated silver in Aitolia at this time.

The large quantity of Achaian federal triobols may have entered Aitolia through Naupaktos;

in fact, Papageorgiadou-Bani believes the city to have been under Achaian control between the

Third Macedonian War and the destruction of Corinth, a period of over 20 years.408 Literary

accounts attest to Achaian interests in Aitolia at this time – Pleuron, for example, seems to have

been annexed by Achaia in the mid-160s BC only to be released from that yoke through Roman

interference – and physical Achaian presence on the Aitolian coast would undoubtedly facilitate the

influx of Achaian coinage into the region.409 Thompson suggests that some of the Achaian silver may

have arrived in Aitolia during Achaia’s campaign against Herakleia, and perhaps she is right in that

Achaian presence in Aitolia was military in nature.410 Yet, whatever the manner of its arrival,

Achaia’s triobol filled the same function as its Aitolian counterpart. In combination with its sheer

volume this indicates that it was deliberately circulated in order to support the economy. Its

406 See discussion in chapters 7 and 8.

407 On Aitolian mercenary service, see chapters 7 and 8. On mercenary service in the third century BC, see
chapter 2.
408 Papageorgiadou-Bani 1996, 217.
409 See e.g. Walbank 1957.
410 Thompson 1968, 98.
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circulation in Aitolia seems to have begun in the 180s BC and IGCH 271 illustrates that it remained

regular until the very end of the Late group, that is, through the 130s BC and most likely into the

120s BC. Finds at Kalydon demonstrate continued circulation of the Final group until its very end,

but in significantly smaller, solely locally occurring quantities.

Athenian tetradrachms, on the other hand, are a less straightforward case. Thompson

attributes their presence in the Agrinion 1957 hoard to cordial relations between Athens and

Aitolia.411 Losada argues that Aitolia directly imported Attic tetradrachms for the purpose of paying

the Roman indemnity.412 But the numismatic evidence does not readily support either theory, nor

do we possess any literary accounts to that effect, and the fact that only two hoards contain

tetradrachms – and of those, one only contains a single coin – suggests that the presence of Athens’

coinage in Aitolia is best viewed in terms of individual contacts, and not on a state-wide level.413

The Athenian coins at Kalydon attest to the city’s sustained connectivity through the Late

Hellenistic period.

Least straightforward of all foreign coinages, the presence of the Roman denarius in Aitolia

in the second century BC cannot easily be explained in social, political or even economic terms. The

concentration of Roman first-century-BC coins to Kalydon, however, are reasonably connected to

the movement of Roman armies through the area; unsurprisingly, some of these denarii were

struck by the mint moving with the army.414

6. Money supply and coin use.

The image of coin use and circulation in Late Hellenistic Aitolia is a conflicting one. On the one hand,

coin production was a tightly controlled practice until the very end, but the coin data presented

411 Thompson 1962.

412 Losada 1965.
413 For the ten Aitolians buried at Athens, see Osborne and Byrne 1996.
414 Examples include Kalydon coin 110 = RRC 513, 497/3 Pl. 60 (Octavian, 42 BC); Kalydon coin 112 = RRC

541, 544.25 (M. Antonius, 32/31 BC).

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above illustrates that a very wide range of silver coinages and coin types were accepted. The

willingness with which foreign silver coinage was incorporated suggests that Aitolia’s own silver

coinage was not available in sufficient quantities to meet the demands of the local economy. The

reintroduction of very old Central Greek coins also points in this direction.

At first glance the numismatic evidence hints to the existence of a double currency system.

Such a system, however, necessitates governmental intervention for which we have no evidence.415

Moreover, many Hellenistic states chose a mixed system where both local and regional currencies

were admitted in circulation; in fact, when closely studying hoard composition and reports for

Hellenistic contexts in mainland Greece, a mixed system seems to be the norm.416 Aitolia’s system

was clearly both open and mixed. Flexibility in the mode of exchange was instrumental in

facilitating commerce. Yet, fact remains that foreign silver is more common in Aitolian hoards than

Aitolia’s own coinage, a rather unusual phenomenon which illustrates the economic and fiscal

issues caused by insufficient coin production. Contrary to what has commonly been argued,

Bresson argues that people in antiquity were not unaware of the significance of money supply, and

data for Aitolia mirrors Bresson’s argument.417 What we observe is a population attempting to

maintain its everyday monetary practices and failing to do so with the inadequate coin supply

produced by its own government. Thus, the population was forced to accept a variety of foreign

coins struck on a variety of weight standards, coins both old and new, and a mixed system emerged.

Nevertheless, the insufficient supply may not have been a situation exclusive to the second century

BC. Tsangari argued that there was no hoarding in the third century BC because Aitolia did not

strike enough coins, and Thompson suggested that Aitolia used foreign coins before it began

415 For an insightful discussion of the situation in Thessaly, see Kremydi-Sicilianou (2004) who makes a sharp
distinction between a governmentally controlled inclusion of a second coin type, and when foreign coins are
incorporated into the economic makeup of a state without official authorization. Clearly, our Aitolian case
belongs to the second category. A related discussion touches upon communities within communities, using
different coinages as their primary means of exchange. No such evidence exists for Aitolia but for comparative
data from Macedonia, see Edson 1975.
416 Marcellesi 2000.
417 Bresson 2005. Contra Finley 1999.
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striking its own. The shortage of coin supply was chronic to the ancient world, argues Finley, and

not only restricted to certain regions.418 It does seem likely Aitolia’s own silver supply was never

large enough to meet the demands of its population. If so, the main difference between how the

Aitolians used money in the third and second centuries BC is a simply conceptual one based on the

activity of hoarding.

The supply of bronze must have been similarly small. Here, however, we note the distinct

difference between the century prior to the indemnity and the decades following it. Foreign bronze,

so common at Chalkis in the third century BC, appears to essentially have stopped circulating in

most Aitolian towns; again, Kalydon is an exception. Bronze, I have argued, was chiefly by

individuals for local transactions. Something changed in the supply of foreign bronze coins post-

indemnity; the international dynamic is lost.

The evidence is inconclusive regarding the frequency with which the Aitolians used coined

money. Hoards are not common and excavated contexts rarely published, leaving our data

uncomfortably uneven. The extent to which the local market was infused with coined money cannot

be ascertained. The production of Aitolian coinage and the physical appearance of coined money

throughout Aitolia naturally emphasizes that coins circulated and thus were used. Yet, based on the

present evidence, we cannot say that coinage played a significant role as a means of everyday

exchange. Moreover, the population was financially and economically heterogeneous and while

literary and archaeological sources make it clear that certain groups were comparatively wealthy

and participated monetarily in economic activities on a regular basis, the numismatic evidence for

widespread, everyday coin use simply does not exist.419 With a small available money supply,

sporadic striking and irregular coin use on behalf of its population, Aitolia’s economy cannot

418 Finley 1999.

419 Better attention to the publication of already excavated coins may serve to elucidate this problem.
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reasonably be considered fully monetized.420

7. Legal tender and the triobol as the official unit of account.

In the second century BC, the koinon’s silver production was restricted to triobols alone. Despite the

lack of written records we can conclude that this was Aitolia’s official unit of account. This coinage

was struck on the reduced Aiginetan or Corcyrean weight standard, the same standard as Achaia’s

mass-produced federal triobol. The fact that the coinages were essentially identical enabled the

Achaian triobol to circulate parallel to Aitolia’s own and to be accepted on similar terms. Yet,

regardless of the triobol’s official status as the region’s unit of account, it is clear that the federation

could not and did not control the circulation of foreign silver within its own borders.421 Aitolia’s

triobol, moreover, was part of an economic system that circulated too little silver to meet its own

needs and thus, the agents within that system could not rely on a single unit of account.

Consequently, foreign silver coinages struck on a different weight standard and of different types

had to be accepted as legal tender; if not at face value, most likely by weight – silver, after all, is

silver regardless of form.422

8. External circulation of Aitolian coins.

External circulation of a coinage suggests that the coinage was accepted as legal tender in a region

other than its own, but also sheds light on trade networks, an important aspect of ancient

economies about which we are often poorly informed. In this section, our data almost exclusively

420 Cf. Howgego 1992.

421 For a state that successfully controlled all aspects of its own monetary policy, see Figueira 1998.
422 Finley (1999) argues that coins were almost always weighed.
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derives from hoards.423 Aitolia’s triobol continued to circulate outside its borders well into the first

century BC, long after the koinon had ceased striking. It occurs in Late Hellenistic hoards in Achaia,

Central Greece, the Peloponnese, Western Greece and Italy (Fig. 43). No Aitolian coins have been

identified in hoards in Epiros, Macedonia, Thesssaly, Northern Greece, Attika, Crete or Asia Minor,

nor does it occur in Carthage or Spain.424

8.1. Central Greece.

In Central Greece, Aitolian coins appear in three Late Hellenistic hoards. The Makrakomi 1932 hoard

[IGCH 214] (Appendix 4.8), found in the modern province of Phthiotis, was first reported in 1933

and has received little attention since then.425 Its mixed bronze contents represent various states in

Central Greece and the Peloponnese as well as Macedon and Rome. Its chronology, too, is mixed.

The four Aitolian bronze coins belong to Tsangari’s Fifth series, the latest included being issue 85f.

Other coins date to the third or the second century BC while the Roman bronze coin was randomly

assigned a date in the first century BC in the original report. The IGCH dates the hoard to the end of

the third or the beginning of the second century BC, with which Tsangari agrees.426 Considering the

significant wear, a date well after the first quarter of the second century BC is more reasonable.

The Oreus 1902 hoard [IGCH 232] (Appendix 4.9) is enigmatic. In 1902, a pot hoard

containing some 1300 silver coins was reported to have been found at Oreus on Euboia but

unfortunately, only 646 coins reached the Numismatic Museum in Athens.427 Any evaluation of the

423 The issue of hoard dates cannot be overemphasized. Many of the hoards in which Aitolian coins occur have
been dated based on historical events and not necessarily on the numismatic data itself. The contested dating
of Achaia’s federal triobol and that of other autonomous Peloponnesian coinages – the “new landscape”
discussed above – have also contributed to the issue and caution is thus warranted when assessing external
circulation of the Aitolian triobol.
424 The Larissa hoard (CH VIIII, 517) is a modern collection and not a hoard; Tsangari 2007, 242.
425 See the short notice in Béquignon 1933.
426 Tsangari 2007, 232.
427 Svoronos 1902.
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composition of the hoard will thus be tentative at best. It has however been noted that the known

portion of the hoard shows a curious absence of local coinages.428

The hoard contents are mixed, both chronologically and geographically – the coins of

Chalkis, for example, date to the fourth century BC.429 The Oreus 1902 hoard is the only Central

Greek hoard containing Aitolian silver coins, and Aitolia is only represented by two triobols which

interestingly are rather old; they belong to Tsangari’s Fourth series, issue 34d. Tsangari notes that

these triobols are exceedingly worn, as are other coins in the hoard. Conversely, the federal Achaian

triobols are in very good condition, an interesting contrast since these coins belong to the Early

Group.430 The coins of Perseus are in excellent condition and are reported to be the latest in the

hoard.431 Since they are not on a reduced weight standard, Mamroth places the coins in the early

days of Perseus’ reign and assigns the hoard a burial date of 173 BC.432 Tsangari emphasizes the

danger in assuming that the hoard as originally buried did not contain any late issues of Perseus but

there is nothing in the hoard as preserved that points to a date later than the Third Macedonian

War.433 To assign the hoard a burial date around 171 – 169 BC does consequently not seem out of

place. It is clear that the Aitolian coins have been in circulation for an extended period of time prior

to their burial. The coins of Larissa and Chalkis, the latter with a date in the fourth century BC, show

synonymous wear and add emphasis to the chronological mixture of the hoard.

428 Moreover, the hoard contains an unusually large portion of Rhodian coins which normally do not occur on
mainland Greece in large quantities. See Tsangari 2007, 200.
429 Tsangari 2007, 221.
430 The federal Achaian coins were struck by Patras, Antigoneia and Megalopolis. Thompson assigns the coins

a date between 175 – 168 BC, noting that at least the Megalopolis piece was in a very good state of
preservation Thompson 1968, 91 – 92. The Megalopolitan coin belongs to the very first issue of Dengate’s
Group I. See Dengate 1967, 61: 106.
431 Thompson 1968, 92.
432 Mamroth 1928, 6. n. 2.
433 Tsangari (2007, 221) accepts this fact Relying on the condition of the Achaian coins, Thompson (1968, 92)

assigns the Oreus hoard a burial date between 171 – 169 BC. While de Laix (1974) accepts Thompson’s
suggestion, Touratsoglou and Tsourti (1991, 172) do not.
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The Delphi 1907 hoard [IGCH 303] (Appendix 4.10) may in fact simply constitute a collection

of bronze coins found during the excavations rather than a legitimate hoard.434 The coins are chiefly

regional and only three were struck outside Central Greece. Several of the coins were in very poor

condition when found and 14 of the 34 Aitolian hemiobols are in fact illegible. The Aitolian material

represents Tsangari’s Third and Fourth series. Several of the other coins are similarly worn and

thus difficult to examine. The editors of the IGCH date the hoard to the second century BC, a broad

range that Tsangari readily accepts.435 Based on the poor condition of the hoard, any effort to

tighten its chronology is futile. The worn nature of several Aitolian coins, however, point to an

extended period of circulation and a date somewhere in the second century BC does not seem out of

place.

These three hoards are the only Central Greek hoards that contain Aitolian coins and have a

Late Hellenistic date, and we note that only one of them contains Aitolian silver; Aitolian silver

struck in the third, not the second century BC. The bronze coins, on the other hand, are

comparatively freshly minted. Furthermore, late Aitolian bronze coins are not uncommon in

excavated contexts. We find Aitolian Fifth series hemiobols at various places in Thessaly including

Larissa and Medeon, in Volos, Kallion, Amphissa and of course at Delphi.436 But the circulation of

Aitolian bronze into this part of the Greek mainland did not start with Tsangari’s Fifth series issues;

on the contrary, it follows a longstanding tradition of regional monetary exchange.437 In Thessaly,

for example, we find material from all five Aitolian series.438 Over 300 Aitolian bronze coins have

434 Svoronos 1908. The editors of the IGCH note the lack of proof for the hoard’s genuineness but still choose
to include the group in their publication, thereby legitimizing it. Since no contrary evidence exists – except, of
course, the lack of a known archaeological context or proper study at the time of its acquisition by the
Numismatic Museum – and no other scholar has even questioned its authenticity as a hoard, I have chosen to
interpret it as such. The composition of the hoard, chronological and geographical, suggests that the coins
were found together.
435 Tsangari 2007, 233.
436 Examples of identifiable issues: Thessaly, Delphi, Larissa, Lamia, Medeon (80), Volos (no ID), “Central

Greece” (85b), Kallion (80 mal conservée), Amphissa (80). See Tsangari 2007.
437 Note e.g. the Kallion 1978? hoard. See Tsangari 2007. For excavated coins at Kallion in general, see

Kravartogioannos 1981: 1982.

438 Tsangari 2007, 242.
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been found in the area around Amphissa and Delphi, and they also appear in excavated contexts in

Phokis, Lokris, Boiotia and on Euboia.439 The Late Hellenistic tombs at Livanates in Lokris, for

example, contain Aitolian bronzes of Tsangari’s Third and Fourth series.440

Considering the steady presence of Central Greek silver in Aitolian Late Hellenistic hoards,

the absence of Aitolia’s triobol in Central Greece might be considered surprising. Yet, it is important

to recall that a large portion of the Central Greek silver coinages found in Aitolia has a fourth- or

third-century-BC date and is not contemporaneous with the burial of the hoards in which they

occur. Nevertheless, it is clear that Aitolia’s silver normally did not circulate into Central Greece, but

its bronze coins did, with a regularity that is noteworthy.

The economic ties between Central Greece and Aitolia do not appear to change with the

indemnity. Everyday transactions and minor trade was conducted as usual, and Aitolians relied on

the small individual networks that were already in place. The loss of Delphi in this case seems to

have mattered very little.441 There is no measurable change in how Aitolian bronze coinage

circulated into the neighbor states to the east and northeast. We may thus conclude with some

certainty that the removal of these regions from Aitolian federal authority did not have an

immediate impact on the manner in which individuals traded their goods and services. In the

second century BC, business was conducted as usual, at least for the duration of Aitolia’s coinage.442

8.2. Western Greece.

The Vonitsa 1993 hoard [CH VIII, 431] (Appendix 4.11) consists of an assortment of third- and

second-century-BC silver coins in various states of preservation.443 The contents are somewhat

geographically mixed and include foreign coins that are otherwise rare in this part of Greece; the

439 Tsangari 2007, 243. To this we can add the late third-century-BC Amphissa hoard (CH VIII, 351) and the
Abae hoard (IGCH 195) which dates to 225-220 BC. Tsangari 2007, 232.
440 Onasaglou 1994.
441 For Aitolians as residents of Delphi, see e.g. Roussel 1932; Daux 1936. The most relevant treatment of

Aitolia’s involvement at Delphi is still Flaceliėre 1937. See also relevant parts in Scholten 2000.
442 Even the latest bronze issues from the Fifth series are represented in Central Greece.
443 Warren 1993a.
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tetradrachms from Side, for example. The freshest coin, a tetradrachm of Perseus, is practically f.d.c.

This Macedonian coin is on a reduced weight standard, placing it after 172 BC.444 The single Roman

denarius is possibly the earliest known denarius in a Greek hoard. 445 The Corinthian drachms date

to the later third century, before the first issues of the federal coinage of the Achaian league. The

Athenian tetradrachm is of a type that immediately precedes the New Style coinage, placing it

before the 160s BC. Based on the tetradrachm of Perseus, Tsangari places the hoard in the historical

context of the Third Macedonian War, associating its burial with Roman legates traveling through

Greece in the late 170s BC.446 Both the date and its attributed historical context are generally

accepted.

The Stratos 1965 hoard [IGCH 251] (Appendix 4.12) is a small group of silver coins from

Aitolia, Achaia and Arcadia.447 The latest coins in the hoard are those of the Arcadian league struck

by Megalopolis which belong to Dengate’s group I, period III.448 The Achaian triobols are all early

issues and struck at the mints of Elis and Antigoneia.449 The Aitolian issues have parallels in other

hoards. Tsangari, having studied the material in some detail, notes that the Aitolian coins in this

hoard are in better condition than those of the same issue in the Agrinion 1959 hoard.450 Thus, IGCH

251 is reasonably earlier than IGCH 271. Touratsoglou and Tsourti reject the burial date suggested

in the IGCH and choose to associate the hoard with the Third Macedonian War, thus placing its

burial around 169 BC.451 Indeed, a date in the 160s BC seems to agree with the Arcadian material as

well as the Achaian, and there is nothing in the Aitolian material to contradict this. 452

444 Tsangari 2007, 216; CH VIII, 83; Mamroth 1928.

445 RRC 207, no. 126.
446 Tsangari 2007, 216.
447 Tsangari 2007, 220; ADelt 21 (1996) B1, 10.
448 Dengate’s (1967, 110) traditional dating for group I, period II is c. 182 – 168 BC. This arrangement relies

on the traditional view that the Final Group of the Achaian league was struck between 151 – 146 BC. Note that
these three triobols vary less than 0.03g in weight.
449 Thompson 1968, no. 395.
450 Tsangari 2007, 220.
451 Touratsoglou and Tsourti 1991, 173-174.
452 The early federal issues of the Achaian league seem to begin in the 180s BC, not the late third century BC

as previously believed. Boehringer 2008, 85.

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No Western Greek hoard dating to the second half of the second century BC contains

Aitolian coins. The Kephallonia 1934 hoard [IGCH 257] (Appendix 4.13), most likely dating to the

early 90s BC, however, contains a single, very worn Fifth series Aitolian triobol.453 Dominated by

Achaian federal triobols and autonomous issues from Argos, IGCH 257 is composed of

Peloponnesian and Central Greek coinages that commonly circulate together.454 Several Achaian

issues belong to the Final group and thus form the end date of the hoard, suggesting a lower date

than the original suggestion of 175 – 145 BC.455 The Messenian triobol belongs to Grandjean’s large

series X, which was struck in the second half of the second century BC through the second third of

the first century BC.456 In light of the presence of Final Achaian issues, especially those of Elis, we

must consider a burial date in the first century BC, perhaps in the first decade of the century.

The latest Western Greek hoard in which Aitolian coins occur is Western Greece 1936 [IGCH

260] (Appendix 4.14).457 While very large – the IGCH counts some 677 coins – its composition is

similar to others’; a mixture of Central Greek and Peloponnesian coinages, with Achaia’s federal

triobol being the absolutely largest inclusion. 458 The 21 Aitolian triobols chiefly belong to

453 Lemerle 1935.

454 The Achaian triobols are struck at the mints of Sikyon, Patras, Messene, Elis, Antigoneia, Megara,
Epidauros, Megalopolis, Sparta, Aigeira, Pallantion, Tegea and Dyme with the mint at Elis being represented
by the greatest number of coins (16).
455 Touratsogolou and Tsourti (1991, 175) place the hoard right before the sack of Corinth around 150 BC –

this despite the fact that federal Achaian coins struck at Corinth are missing from the hoard. Tsangari (2007,
222) does not attempt to date the hoard more closely though arranges it chronologically among hoards she
has assigned to the first half of the second century BC.
456 Grandjean 2003, 112.
457 The hoard’s origins are as troublesome as its present whereabouts. It first attracted attention in the spring

of 1937 at the hands of a dealer in Athens who declared its origin to be an island off the coast of Preveza.
Other rumors about its origin had circulated at the time, placing the hoard on the island of Kephallonia and
the city of Patras respectively. No other information has been recorded with regards to its find spot and its
origins will thus remain unknown. It is however noteworthy that the three different suggestions for the
hoard’s origins all point to western Greece and the area connected by the waterways of the Ambrakian gulf,
the Ionian Sea and the Corinthian gulf. The hoard was first published by Thompson in 1939 and remained
part of the J. P. Shear collection until it was stolen in December 1968.It appears that the hoard was not
acquired by the J. P. Shear collection in its entirety since individual coins deriving from the hoard circulated
freely on the market as late as 1972. Its whereabouts are currently unknown. See Thompson 1939, 116; IGCH,
41. Tsangari (2007, 101) mentions that that a coin from this hoard showed up on a list of New York-based R.
J. Myers in September 1972.
458 There is some confusion to the composition of the hoard and the number of coins therein. Dengate (1967,

105) identifies 98 coins of Megalopolis in the hoard, 28 of which were struck for the Achaian league.
 133

Tsangari’s Fifth series with only seven coins being significantly earlier.459 The hoard’s burial date is

disputed and any suggestion must be carefully weighed against the chronologically very mixed

nature of the hoard.460 The oldest coin in the hoard and consequently its terminus post quem is a

Boiotian piece dated 426 – 395 BC.461 The discrepancy in age between this group of coins and the

other contents of the hoard is surprising but not unusual; we recall the very old Central Greek silver

coins appearing in second-century-BC hoards in Aitolia.

To date IGCH 260 is to accept or reject the ‘new landscape” in Peloponnesian coinages.

Followers of the traditional chronology tend to place the Western Greece 1936 hoard in the years

around the destruction of Corinth.462 Believers in the lower chronology, however, will point out that

Achaia is represented by a number of coins of the Final group, both federal and civic issues which

makes such an early date impossible. 463 Moreover, the hoard contains a triobol of Messene which

belongs to Grandjean’s series X.464 The Arcadian issues are also important for the burial date of the

hoard, as it contains 17 coins of Dengate’s group III which Boehringer conclusively demonstrates

were struck in the late second and early first century BC.465 Boehringer consequently assigns the

hoard a burial date around 50 BC.466 Warren chooses to lower the burial date even more and places

it at the time of Actium.467 While the good condition of the majority of the coins is problematic for

accepting such a low chronology, the hoard must have been buried at a time when the striking of

459 Tsangari 2007, 227.

460 The coins from Central Greece, for example, were immediately singled out by Thompson (1939, 130ff) as
belonging to an entirely separate chronological group. She dates the Sikyonian, Phokian and Lokrian coins to
the fourth century BC as well as those of Chalkis; even older are the coins of Boiotia, which Thompson date to
the fifth century BC.
461 Thompson 1939, 117, Pl. I, no. 1.
462 So Thompson 1939; Tourasoglou and Tsourti 1991; and the IGCH.
463 Warren 1999a, 109.
464 Grandjean 2003, 118: series X, n. 170.
465 Dengate 1967, 105. Of these 16 are struck without control marks and only one with the control ΜΕΓ.

Boehringer 1991, 166.

466 Boehringer 1991, 164.
467 Warren 1999a, 109. Warren’s point of departure is the group of Achaian triobols struck by the mint at Elis.

She argues that these federal triobols were struck from the time of Sulla into the 30s BC. Cf. Warren 1997.
 134

Peloponnesian silver was drawing to an end.468 The practice of an older, previously discarded coin

type being buried alongside freshly struck new coinage was thus not exclusive to Aitolia.

Aitolian coins do not commonly occur in excavated contexts in Western Greece. A few

bronze coins have been found at Stratos, but nowhere else in Akarnania.469 Based on the very long

border between the two regions one would have expected some monetary cross-contamination to

occur, but not so. The appearance of Aitolian coins at Stratos and only at Stratos must be viewed in

light of the city’s close ties to the Aitolian league. It continued to furnish league officials in the

second century BC despite the re-attachment of its chora to the Akarnanian league.470 Some Aitolian

strays have been found at Kassope, Dodona and in Ambrakia but no meaningful circulation can be

detected of Aitolian coinage in Epiros.471 Aitolia’s coinage is similarly rare on the Ionian islands but

Fifth series bronzes have been found on Korfu.472 Interestingly, the city of Kranion on Kephallonia

used Aitolian coins for the production of its own coinage; here, overstruck Aitolian coins are quite

common.473 In general, circulation of Aitolian coinage in Western Greece is small: in hoards, only 28

coins are accounted for.

8.3. Achaia.

The Lechena 1979 hoard [CH VIII, 417] (Appendix 4.15) and the Lechena (?) 1986 hoard [CH VIII,

358] (Appendix 4.16) may in fact form a single unit. Both hoards were immediately dispersed on

the market and no information has been recorded of their contents. The two groups have been

connected on supposition alone. Indeed, there is no evidence that the two were even found at

Lechena. The bronze contents are mixed and represent a wide range of origins; states in Central

468 In her original assessment of the hoard, Thompson (1939, 116) emphasized their good state of
preservation. See Warren 1997, 111, n. 16.
469 Both issue 80 and issues from earlier series have been identified at Stratos: Tsangari 2007.
470 Six strategoi and four hieromnemones in the period 200 – 141 BC. See Grainger 2000, 49ff. See also

chapters 4 and 7.
471 Tsangari 2007, 242.
472 E.g. issue 87a: Tsangari 2007, 181.
473 Tsangari 2007, 244-445; Polybius 4.6.2; BMC Peloponnese 82, 62.
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Greece including Aitolia, the Peloponnese, Carthage, Asia Minor, Ptolemaic Egypt, Northwestern

Greece, the Cyclades and possibly also Rome. The burial date of 175 – 150 BC as assigned in the CH

is accepted by Tsangari.474

The Patras 1973 hoard [CH VIII, 454] (Appendix 4.17) contains some 117 Classical and

Hellenistic silver coins which were found in a terracotta vase in the center of Patras.475 While

chronologically heterogeneous, the contents almost exclusively derive from the Peloponnese and

most commonly from Achaia’s federal mints.476 Only a handful of triobols represent mints in central

Greece which includes two Aitolian issues.477 The Achaian issues, by far the most numerous, were

struck at a number of Peloponnesian mints but not at Corinth. The Achaian league is represented by

both Early and Late issues but no Final: in this aspect, the hoard is compositionally similar to IGCH

271. Interestingly, the mint at Megalopolis is represented both by its fifteen autonomous triobols

and several federal coins struck for the Achaian league. Tsangari believes the hoard to have been

buried around 150 BC.478 Yet, the federal Achaian material does not necessarily support that date. A

date post the destruction of Corinth is by no means impossible and any date prior to that of the

Agrinion 1959 hoard, perhaps in the 140s BC or even 130s BC, is absolutely acceptable.

Reportedly found in a bronze vase in a village in ancient Pellene, Achaia, the Zougra 1859

hoard [IGCH 261] (Appendix 4.18) was first said to contain some 9,000 pieces but only 771 are

known today.479 The silver coins were struck by various states in Central Greece and the

Peloponnese and span several centuries in date. No attempts have been made to study the hoard

474 Tsangari 2007, 234.

475 Agallopoulou-Kalliontzi (1981) reports that the vase, a trefoil olpe with a tall vertical handle, was in good
condition with no pieces missing and there is thus no need to suspect that portions of the hoard had escaped
the vase.
476 The oldest coin in the hoard is a triobol from Hermione which dates to the second quarter of the fourth

century BC; Grandjean 1990, group II, issue 4.

477 The latest Aitolian issue is 73b.
478 Tsangari 2007, 223. Agallopoulou-Kalliontzi (1981, 199), too, believes that the hoard was buried around

150 BC and arrives at this date in part because of the absence of Final Group Achaian issues. This conclusion
is however problematic as it relies on Thompson’s outdated view that the Final Group was struck between
151 and 146 BC.
479 See e.g. entry in Noe 1937.
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beyond superficial observation. The 14 known Aitolian coins belong to Tsangari’s Second, Fourth

and Fifth series with issue 76c being the latest in the hoard. Based on the traditional view of

Peloponnesian coinages, the hoard has been assigned a burial date in or around 146 BC.480 In

support of his lower chronology proposed for the coinage of Achaia, Boehringer proposes a date in

the late second century BC. He primarily bases this opinion on the fine condition of the Tegea and

Pallantion triobols.481 Warren suggests that these issues might in fact belong to the beginning of the

first century BC which would have obvious consequences for the burial date of the hoard.482 Her

suggestion is supported by Grandjean’s dating of the two triobols of Messene which also points to a

lower dating of the hoard.483 Since several of the Aitolian issues in the Zougra hoard appear in later

hoards, most notably Agrinion 1959, there is nothing that prevents a lower burial date on their

behalf.

IGCH 262, or the very large Diakofto 1965 hoard (Appendix 4.19), was dispersed on the

market immediately upon its discovery. Some information was recorded by Price in the British

Museum but little data has been retained with regards to the individual coins in the hoard.484 The

Aitolian issues, for example, remain a mystery, and it is not known which issues or indeed which

series are represented here. It is however clear that many, if not all, of the Achaian triobols belong

to the Final period of the league’s silver issues.485 It has generally been observed that the

composition of IGCH 262 is similar to that of IGCH 271 with the important exception that the

Diakofto hoard contains Final issues of Achaian silver. Unsurprisingly, the hoard date is contested.

480 Oeconomides 1968; Oeconomides, Lakakis-Marchetti et al 2007; the latter reviewed by Walker 2008. Both
the IGCH and Touratsoglou and Tsourti (1991, 137) support this date; Tsangari (2007, 224-225), too, believes
that the hoard dates to the middle of the second century BC.
481 Boehringer 1991, 172. The Achaian material is crucial in dating this hoard. Among the represented mints

are Megara, Aigira, Corinth, Dyme, Patras, Sikyon, Elis, Messene, Sparta, Argos, Kleonai, Epidauros, Antigoneia,
Megalopolis, Pallantion and Tegea. See Oeconomides 1968, 136-137.
482 Warren 1997, 110, n. 10.
483 Grandjean 2003, 114 – 116, Pl. V, no. 117. The Messenian triobols belong to Grandjean’s series X.
484 IGCH, 42. See Warren 1993b, Pl. XX, nos. 1, 4, 6 – 9, 23 for rare illustrations of some of the coins from the

Diakofto hoard.
485 Warren 1999b. The Achaian mints represented in the hoard are Patras, Sparta, Dyme, Aigion, Aigeira,

Kleitor, Epidauros, Tegea and Pallantion.

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Touratsoglou and Tsourti date the hoard to the historically convenient year of 146 BC.486 Warren,

however, dates the hoard to the years between the Sullan period and Actium.487 She argues that the

burial of the hoard should be placed closer to that of the Poggio Picenze hoard (ICGH 2056) than the

Western Greece 1936 and Caserta 1890 (IGCH 2053) hoards. In support of her dating, she

emphasizes the fact that the hoard contained all the varieties of the Final Group Achaian triobols

issued at Patras.488 Since so little information has been retained with regards to the contents of the

hoard, it is impossible to assign the hoard a secure burial date, yet the presence of the quinarius in

combination with the Achaian evidence lends itself to a date post 83/2 BC. The distinct difference in

Achaian issues between this hoard and the Agrinion 1959 hoard demonstrates that the Diakofto

hoard must necessarily be placed well after the Agrinion hoard. It is unfortunate that no

information has been recorded with regards to the Aitolian triobols, as the Diakofto hoard contains

one of the larger assemblages of Aitolian coins found in Greece, and the composition of the Aitolian

material could further illuminate the monetary practices of the federation at the very end of its coin

striking.

The coinage of the Aitolian koinon occurs in four Achaian hoards (or possibly five, if the

enigmatic Lechena hoard is indeed two separate burials). The Achaian silver hoards contain the

largest amount of Aitolian coins found anywhere outside of Aitolia, and compositionally, they share

many similarities. In these hoards, Aitolia’s coins appear alongside coins struck by other states in

Central Greece and it is plausible that they crossed the Corinthian gulf in similar ways. The Achaian

hoards contain Aitolian triobols of several issues and series, although Tsangari’s Fifth series is by

far the most common. Thus, Aitiolia’s coinage made its way to Achaia in the second century BC and,

in the case of the Zougra and Diakofto hoards, possibly even later. Whatever the case, the

486 Touratsoglou and Tsourti 1991, 172. They choose to consider the Roman quinarius of 83/2 BC as
intrusive; Syd. 609a. The editors of the IGCH also assign the hoard a burial date of 146 BC.
487 Warren 1999a.
488 Warren 1993b, 98, n. 126. Warren’s suggested date is further supported by Grandjean’s (2003, 112ff, Pl.

IV, no. 109; Pl. V, nos. 125, 126) dating of the series X Messenian triobols.
 138

circulation of Aitolian silver into Achaia in the second century BC seems to have been comparatively

large; in fact, more Aitolian Late Hellenistic silver has been found in Achaia than in Aitolia itself. No

such circulation can be attested for the preceding century.

The numismatic data demonstrates that the Polybius-based conviction of complete Aitolo-

Achaian disassociation is at best exaggerated. The consistency, regularity and continuity with which

Aitolian silver circulated into Achaia and Achaian triobols into Aitolia cannot be indicative of a long-

standing, deliberate sociopolitical distance between the two populations; rather, they signal the

opposite. Almost every single issue of Achaia’s Early and Late groups occurs in Aitolia. Aitolia’s Fifth

series is similarly well-represented in Achaia, although not with the same extreme consistency.

Small transactions of everyday commodities were most likely carried out in bronze, and the

lack of Aitolian bronze in Achaia indicates the absence of such transactions. In comparison to how

common movement of Aitolian silver into Achaia seems to have been, the lack of Aitolian bronze in

Achaia may seem surprising. It need not be. The parts of Central Greece where Aitolia’s bronze

coinage continued to circulate in the second century BC had a long tradition of contacts with Aitolia

itself. Many places, including Delphi, had been under Aitolian authority until 190 BC and some

places were even inhabited by Aitolians.489 That small merchants and individuals continued their

small-scale trade operations after the indemnity was only natural as the trade network was already

in place; moreover, there was no new law that forbade their business. Such a network simply did

not exist across the Corinthian gulf.

8.4. The Peloponnnese.490

The Arcadia 1929 hoard [IGCH 242] (Appendix 4.20) is one of four Late Hellenistic hoards found in

the Peloponnese that contain Aitolian silver coinage. Its find spot is unknown and there is merit in

489 Delphi is the best documented place, but others exist; manumitters from Amphissa and Kallion, among
others, identified themselves as Aitolians. On manumissions, see chapter 8.
490 This includes the entire peninsula except Achaia.
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suspecting that the hoard had been adulterated while being marketed.491 Consisting primarily of

Peloponnesian issues, both federal Achaian and autonomous city issues, it includes seven Aitolian

triobols, five of which belong to Tsangari’s Fifth series. The latest Aitolian coin is 67f. The Achaian

coins belong to the Early group.492 Crosby and Grace assigned the hoard a burial date of 185 – 182

BC based on the occurrence in the hoard of very fresh Achaian league coins struck at Elis. Since Elis

entered the Achaian league in 191 BC, they saw this as the terminus post quem for the burial of the

hoard.493 This date has however been seriously challenged.494 Touratsoglou and Tsourti prefer a

later date around 160 – 150 BC based on what they believe to be the last issues of the Achaian

league and Megalopolis in the hoard.495 Boehringer places the burial of the hoard in 146 BC, the

final year in which Corinth was able to issue coins.496

On account of the Aitolian issues, nothing prevents a later burial date. The composition of

the hoard seems to indicate a concentration of issues in the first half of the second century BC with

worn outliers in the second half of the fourth century BC (the drachms of Chalkis) in addition to

some material from the last third of the third century BC.497 Consequently, it is not difficult to accept

Boehringer’s date of 146 BC with the caveat that the hoard may, in fact, be neither intact nor

unadulterated.

491 Thompson 1968, 91 – 92. A small bronze figurine of the god Hermes, only 0.045m tall, was supposedly
found with the hoard but no other data is recorded. See Crosby and Grace 1936. The IGCH too doubts the
hoard; for example, the bronze coin of Elis is interpreted as a possible intrusion.
492 Thompson 1968, 91. Several Achaian mints are represented, including Corinth, Sikyon, Patras, Argos,

Koronai, Messene, Elis, Megara, Antigoneia, Megalopolis, Sparta and Aegira.

492 Antigoneia is the best represented mint with a total number of 45 coins while Patras is the second most

common mint with 27 coins. The least represented are Sparta (one coin), Aegira (two coins) and Corinth (two
coins). Several Achaian mints are not represented at all. See Thompson 1968, 110- 115.
493 Crosby and Grace 1936, 1-2.
494 Thompson (1968, 91) argues that it would be impossible that all the Elis issues in the Arcadia hoard were

struck prior to 182 BC as it would imply that Elis alone of all the league’s members struck a regular sequence
of issues on an annual basis immediately upon its entrance into the league. She elects to push Crosby and
Grace’s initial burial date forward 20 – 25 years. In indirect support of her view, Boehringer (2008, 85) has
demonstrated that the majority of Peloponnesian mints struck posthumous Alexanders in the 190s BC, not
federal Achaian issues, and more importantly, that there is no connection whatsoever between the date for a
city’s entrance into the Achaian league and its first federal issues.
495 Touratsoglou and Tsourti 1991, 174.
496 Boehringer 1991, 164.
497 E.g. Aitolian issues 21a and 34d. Tsangari 2007, 223.
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Because of the mixed contents of bronze and silver in the Messene before 1937 hoard [IGCH

301] (Appendix 4.21), Tsangari believes it to be a circulation hoard.498 There is some confusion to

the contents of the hoard which has been permeated by a distinct lack of study, and the editors of

the IGCH are content with a burial date in the second century BC. Comprised of an assortment of

Peloponnesian federal and autonomous coinages the hoard includes a single Aitolian Fifth series

triobol, issue 76c.499 Little is known of the other coins in the hoard. The Achaian mints of Tegea and

Pallantion – especially active mints during the Final Group period – are represented among the

issues of the Achaian league which forms an interesting contrast to the Arcadia 1929 hoard, in

which both mints were notably absent.500 The Arcadian triobols carry the monogram ΜΕΓ on the

reverse, indicating Megalopolis as their mint.

The broad burial date given in the IGCH is of course unacceptable. Based on their estimation

of the date of the latest issue of the Achaian league and Megalopolis, Touratsoglou and Tsourti date

the hoard to 150 BC.501 For the sake of this inquiry, we must however take into consideration the

fact that Aitolian issue 76c occurs in two other Greek hoards that are positively later than 146 BC.502

Consequently, if we accept a burial date of 146 BC for the Messene hoard, we must also accept the

fact that issue 76c remained in circulation at least until the burial of the other hoards. Moreover, the

Messenian silver triobol is of Grandjean’s series X which points to a later date.503 This coin appears

to be if not the latest, one of the latest coins in the hoard and we can thus discard a date in the mid-

second century BC and tentatively place the hoard some 50 years later, perhaps around 100 BC.

498 Tsangari 2007, 224.

499 Tsangari 2007, 165, Pl. LXXXI, no. 1373.
500 Thompson 1968, 115; Tsangari 2007, 224. Two of the six triobols from Patras are of the type SNG Cop. 154

which presumably dates to shortly before 146 BC.

501 Touratsoglou and Tsourti 1991, 184, Fig. 1. Tsangari (2007, 224) assigns the hoard a somewhat later

burial date in 146 BC.

502 Zougra 1859 (IGCH 261) and Agrinion 1959 (IGCH 271).
503 Grandjean 2003, 112, Pl. V, no. 133. The Messenian bronzes belong to Grandjean’s series XI, XII and XIV.

See Grandjean 2003, 205ff for their second century BC dating.

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The worn Epidauros 1934 hoard [IGCH 258] (Appendix 4.22) was found during the

excavations of Epidauros Limera.504 Consisting of worn Peloponnesian issues and a single Aitolian

triobol, its wear demonstrates prolonged circulation at the time of burial.505 A number of mints are

represented among the Achaian coins.506 The Achaian contents are relevant for the discussion of

Achaia’s Final group, since several of the federal mints striking these issues are represented in this

hoard, as are those mints striking civic issues of the same period.507 Unsurprisingly, the hoard’s

burial date is contested.508 Tsangari places the hoard in her chronological hoard group of “146 BC

or shortly thereafter” but without further comment.509 Considering the poor condition of all coins in

the hoard, this date is inadequate. In view of the “new landscape” in Peloponnesian coinages, the

hoard must have a burial date in the first century BC. The poor condition of all the coins, the

presence of the final issues of Tegea and Pallantion and Grandjean’s date for the Messenian triobols

all support Boehringer’s lower chronology and I would consequently suggest a burial date in the

early first century BC. This would however require the single Aitolian triobol to have remained in

circulation for more than a century, but the worn condition of the coin reveals that it has been in

circulation well beyond its expected life time.

The latest Peloponnesian hoard to contain Aitolian material is the Vellies-Monemvasia 1984

hoard (Appendix 4.23). This hoard of fractional silver was found at Vellies in 1952 but was not

purchased by the Numismatic Museum until 1984. It is highly likely that the 72 coins are only one

part of a larger hoard which was dispersed on the market prior to its relocation to Athens.510 All

Aitolian coins belong to Tsangari’s Fifth series; the latest in the hoard is issue 76c. Chronologically,

504 AA 1935, 177; Lemerle 1935, 243.

505 The Aitolian triobol, issue 34a of the Third series, is noted to be exceedingly worn; Tsangari 2007, 225.
506 Messene, Elis, Antigoneia, Corinth, Dyme and Tegea are all represented by one coin each, Patras and Elis by

two, Megalopolis by three, and Pallation and Sparta by four.

507 Warren 1993b, esp. 89.
508 In the IGCH, Thompson assigned the hoard a burial date between 175 – 145 BC. Touratsoglou and Tsourti

(1991, 183) elect to view the hoard’s burial in the context of the upheavals of 146 BC and consequently assign
it a burial date in this year.
509 Tsangari 2007, 225.
510 ADelt 34 (1984) B1; Pl. 1, nos. 5-11.
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the hoard is very mixed.511 The latest coins in the hoard are Final Achaian and its burial date must

consequently suit the controversial group.512 Despite the evidence in support of the lower

chronology, the hoard has been assigned a traditional burial date of 146 BC.513 Tsangari draws

attention to the fact that the composition of this hoard is highly similar to that of the Agrinion 1959

hoard yet the Agrinion hoard contains no Achaian coins of the Final Group whatsoever, and the

mints of Pallantium and Tegea are not represented therein.514 Thus, Boehringer’s suggestion of 80 –

50 BC as repeated by Tsangari is perfectly acceptable.

Except for at Corinth and Olympia in whose records most coin-striking states are

represented, Aitolian Late Hellenistic coins do not frequently occur in excavated contexts in the

Peloponnese. A few Aitolian bronze coins have however been found at Megalopolis.515 Earlier issues

have been found at Corinth where Aitolian tetradrachms are part of a third-century-BC hoard.516

Circulation of Aitolian bronze coins is essentially invisible outside larger sanctuaries, and Aitolian

silver is similarly rare in Peloponnesian hoards. To interpret the presence of such a small number

of Aitolian coins as meaningful circulation is insensible. Moreover, we note that several of the

Aitolian coins recorded in Peloponnesian hoards have been in circulation for an extended period of

time. In comparison to Achaia itself which appears to have received Aitolian currency rather

regularly and in comparatively large quantities, the rest of the Peloponnese does not seem to have

accepted or used the Aitolian triobol in the same manner. The Aitolian triobol seems to have

511 The drachm of Chalkis, for example, dates to the last third of the fourth century BC; Picard 1979, group 1,
issue 2. The single triobol of Hermione is similarly early, dating to the second quarter of the fourth century
BC; Grandjean 1990, group 2, issue 8. The Rhodian didrachm is in very good condition and dates to c. 190 BC;
Tsangari 2007, 227.
512 The mints of Patras, Antigoneia, Tegea, Corinth and Pallantion are represented; Tsangari 2007, 226. The

Corinthian issue must have been struck before 146 BC but this is not true for the Final Group issues.
Boehringer has argued that the final federal issues struck at Tegea and Pallantion should be associated with
the Mithridatic war; Boehringer 1991, 165.
513 Touratsoglou and Tsourti 1991, 184.
514 Tsangari 2007, 227; Thompson 1968, 115.
515 Megalopolis: issue 86, Tsangari 2007, 178. Corinth: non-marked issues found in the Agora, Tsangari 2007,

186. Olympia: issue 87a among others; Tsangari 2007, 181.

516 Corinth 1938 hoard (IGCH 187). Earlier issues have been found in several places in ancient Corinth

including the South Stoa, Temple E, and the Agora; see Tsangari 2007, 244.
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managed some movement simply because of its similarity to the Achaian triobol; in the

Peloponnese, the Aitolian triobol never appears without its Achaian counterpart.

8.5. Italy.

Aitolian coins appear in two Italian hoards. The first, the Canose before 1995 hoard (Appendix 4.24),

was briefly mentioned by Tsangari but it has not yet been published.517 Tsangari notes that the

Aitolian bronze coins belong to the Fifth series but cannot further specify their issue. The coins of

Lucanian Herakleia date to 278 – 250 BC and the Apulian coins of Caelia and Arpi date to the last

quarter of the third century BC. Tsangari believes the hoard to have been interred in the first

quarter of the second century and assigns it a burial date of 190 – 175 BC. It is noteworthy that no

other Central Greek coinages are represented in the hoard.

The Caserta 1890 hoard [IGCH 2053] (Appendix 4.25) was first published in 1908 and is one

of the largest collections of Greek coins found in Italy.518 Three of the four Aitolian triobols belong

to Tsangari’s Fifth series with 76b being the latest issue. The hoard contents are chronologically

mixed but exclusively consist of Peloponnesian and Central Greek coinages, the federal Achaian

triobol being the most commonly represented.519 IGCH 2053 plays an important role in the down-

dating of Achaian coin chronology and those in support of the traditional chronology of Hellenistic

coinage prefer a mid-second-century-BC burial date.520 Still, the hoard contains the latest issues of

both federal and civic triobols belonging to the Final group of Achaian silver which makes it difficult

to accept the traditional dating.521 Moreover, the Final group of federal triobols of Elis occur fully

517 Tsangari 2007, 233.

518 Löbbecke 1908.
519 The drachms of Chalkis, for example, are significantly older than the Achaian silver. They belong to

Picard’s issue 26 which dates to 290 – 273/1 BC. Even older according to Löbbecke’s observations in 1908 is
the Theban coin dated to c. 400 BC This kind of hoard composition with a small group of much older coin
being added to a larger group of younger coins is not unique to the Caserta hoard; we have already observed
the same phenomenon in a number of Greek coin hoards, e.g. IGCH 271, IGCH 260 and IGCH 232.
520 Löbbecke 1908, 278; Touratsoglou and Tsourti 1991, 184.
521 Warren 1993b, 89. Represented within the hoard are the mints of both Tegea and Pallantion whose issues

Boehringer associates with the Mithridatic war.

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f.d.c: this group of Elean issues dating to the period between Sulla and Actium leads Warren to

suggest a burial date roughly contemporary with that of the Western Greece 1936 hoard. 522

Boehringer also favors a later date in the first century BC and tentatively assigns the hoard a burial

date in 40/30 BC.523 While generally not persuaded by Boehringer and Warren’s lower chronology

for the coinages of the Peloponnese, Tsangari does not present any further suggestions of her own.

The worn second-century-BC Aitolian coins, one of which is so worn that it is in fact illegible, point

to an extended period of circulation and in that aspect, Warren and Boehringer’s suggestion of a

mid/late first-century-BC date is not out of place.

Late Hellenistic Aitolian coins do not appear in Italy outside these two hoards. If the 13,000

kilos of silver sent to Rome as payment for the war indemnity were indeed coined money, chances

are that they were immediately melted down and re-issued as Roman coinage. There is certainly no

indication that Aitolian coins ever circulated into Italy in any purposeful or significant numbers.524

8.6. Other places.

The Greece 1986 or earlier hoard [CH VIII, 338] (Appendix 4.26) lacks a precise find location and

was dispersed on the market without further investigation.525 Little is known of its contents. The

two Aitolian triobols are both Late Hellenistic, the latest being issue 73a. The contents are

otherwise chronologically mixed; the coin of Philip II, for example, is believed to have been struck

at Pella in 323/2 – 315 BC. 526 The Achaian coins belong to the mints at Megara, Aigina, Antigoneia,

Argos, Corinth, Megalopolis, Patras, Sikyon and Sparta, and there is some confusion to whether the

Messenian triobol is an autonomous issue or a federal one belonging to the Achaian league:

522 Warren 1993b, 90. Löbbecke himself observed that the Elean issues were among the freshest coins in the
hoard: Löbbecke 1908, 277; Warren 1997, 111; Warren 1999a, 109.
523 Boehringer 1991, 164. Grandjean’s (2003, 112 – 122, Pl. IV, no. 110; Pl. VI, no. 182) dating of the issue X

Messenian triobols does in no way conflict with a late date. Not all Caserta issues are illustrated.
524 The Enna 1966 hoard (IGCH 2232), dating to the third century BC, contains a single Aitolian Third series

tetradrachm.
525 Tsangari 2007, 221. See CH VIII, Pl. XLII, nos. 4 – 38 and XLIII, nos. 1 – 6 for illustrations.
526 Le Rider 1977, no. 539.
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Tsangari and Grandjean believe the coin to be autonomous but the original publication in CH lists it

as an Achaian issue.527

The date of CH VIII, 338 is disputed. The editors of CH suggest a burial date in the early

years of the second century BC without closer examination. Dengate’s study of the coinage of the

Megalopolis sheds no real light on the hoard’s date. Grandjean’s dating of the Messenian triobol to

the late second or even into the first century BC is not accepted by Tsangari, who finds a historically

convenient date around 168 BC to be reasonable.528 It certainly seems handy to group the Greece

1986 hoard with others belonging to the period of the Third Macedonian War, and the condition of

the coin of issue 73a suggests that the coin had not been in circulation for an extended period of

time. Still, the Messenian triobol points to a date well past the 160s BC. Moreover, it should be

noted that Aitolian issues 67f and 73a occur in the much later Agrinion 1959 hoard. Consequently,

the hoard was likely buried in the late second century BC rather than the earlier years of the

century.

Aitolian coins are rare in contexts beyond those discussed above. A few coins have been

found at Knossos but none dating to the second century BC.529 Excavations in the Athenian Agora

have unearthed a few Late Hellenistic Aitolian specimens including issue 65c but the numbers are

not meaningful.530

9. External circulation and geographic distribution.

The evidence presented above emphasizes the limited circulation of Aitolia’s triobol beyond its

native land. Overall circulation is small and in the few hoards that Aitolian coins occur, they are

always in the minority. Circulation of a coinage, I have argued, mirrors its relevant monetary

527 Grandjean 2003, 121, no. 209d.

528 Tsangari 2007, 222.
529 Tsangari issues 24a, 36i.
530 Tsangari 2007.
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system and can closely correspond to the area with which the coin-striking agent (and its

population) traded. Moreover, the geographic distribution of a coinage indicates where it was

accepted as legal tender. By abandoning the dual weight standard preferred in the later third

century BC, Aitolia focused accessibility of its coinage to a monetary sphere occupied by coinages

struck on the reduced Aiginetan weight standard.531 Yet, few Aitolian coins survive in preserved

hoards, indicating that broad external circulation of Aitolian silver was only marginally successful.

In Aitolia’s case, there is a visible geographic difference in how bronze and silver circulate.

First of all, outward circulation of bronze coins is not much changed. Bronze still appears in former

Aitolian territories in Central Greece, continuing a tradition of circulation begun long before the

indemnity. The unbroken circulation pattern attests to the sustained movement of Aitolians

conducting smaller business transactions on a local level, outside their own region. In fact, the

reorganization of Central Greece after the Antiochene and Macedonian Wars seems to have had

little impact on small-scale trade and transactions between individuals. Chances are that the

Aitolian merchants trading with the former federal holdings in Lokris and around Delphi simply

retained their existing trading networks when Delphi was officially removed from the koinon’s

control. The frequency with which Aitolian bronze occurs affirms the continued presence of

Aitolians in this area at a time when Aitolia’s own territory had been much reduced; in that aspect,

external monetary circulation – and thus, trade – was unchanged and unharmed by the Roman

treaty.

While circulation of Aitolian bronze did not change geographically after the indemnity,

Aitolian silver did. This, however, is a natural consequence of the weight standard chosen by the

531 See discussion in Psoma and Tsangari 2003. The federation’s abandonment of the dual weight standard
used in the third century BC and reversal to a single silver coin type may simply be a rational response to the
transactional dynamic inherent in smaller silver coins. Whatever the reason, Aitolia did not simply choose the
triobol for its ability to circulate into a specific region.
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koinon.532 The third-century-BC tetradrachm had circulated in the monetary sphere – and thus,

geographic region – best suited to it, and the Fifth series triobol similarly circulated within the

appropriate weight standard system. Coins struck on the Corcyrean weight standard moved in a

sphere dominated by Achaia’s very large federal coinage and circulation of Aitolia’s triobol thus

followed the geographic limitations of that system. Overall external circulation of Aitolian silver is

quantitatively small but geographically broad. In hoards the triobol is always in the minority and is

sometimes present in only a single specimen, yet it appears everywhere within that system.

Nevertheless, only on the north coast of Achaia do we find evidence for meaningful circulation of

Aitolian silver. There, Aitolian silver occurs in larger quantities than in Aitolia itself, and both its

regularity and the quantities with which it occurs emphatically demonstrate successful

transmission of one coinage into another region. In fact, even the very last Aitolian issue circulated

into Achaia, establishing that this specific circulation pattern remained unbroken until the end of

Aitolia’s coinage. The preceding century had seen essentially no cross-circulation of coins in the two

regions. It is here, then, that we observe the greatest visible change in the circulation of Aitolian

Late Hellenistic silver.

What is the nature of Aitolo-Achaian monetary exchange in the second century BC? The

evidence for physical Achaian presence in Aitolia as noted above hints to the means by which

Achaian coins entered Aitolia but the regularity of regional cross-circulation cannot solely be

explained against the background of military occupation of a specific city. The Achaian federation

most likely exacted taxes from the annexed Aitolian cities but the quantity of Aitolian coins on the

south shore of the Corinthian gulf is simply too large to be pinpointed to Pleuron and Herakleia

alone. Moreover, Achaian presence in Aitolia was neither permanent nor particularly long, if we are

to trust our ancient authors, and thus does not correspond to the length of the monetary exchange

as evidenced by the numismatic data. Unfortunately, this is where the trail ends. Polybius’ arch

532 The fact that Aitolia’s coinage only occurs in a handful of third-century-BC hoards makes any comparison
difficult.
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enemy and his native Achaia clearly engaged in a monetary exchange that was both regular and

large-scale, but whatever the reason for its inception and the manner of its existence – trade, gifts,

federal grants, individual transactions –, it essentially came to an end before Achaia began

production of its Final group.533

10. Economic adaptation and decline.

Over the course of the second century BC Aitolia experienced a visible economic decline. At some

point in the 130s the federation lost the ability to strike new coins and Aitolian coin production

came to an end, never to be resuscitated again. But archaeological evidence demonstrates that the

decline was gradual and moreover, not everywhere present. In conjunction with the archaeological

and epigraphic data, the numismatic evidence suggests that the population was not only aware of

this economic decline, but it in fact attempted to adapt to it.

10.1. Adaptation and economic response.

Our first agent, the individual, was initially able to maintain his everyday affairs and business

transactions as the circulation of Aitolian bronze coins in Lokris and around Delphi illuminates the

presence of unbroken trade networks. Naturally, not every Aitolian traded with Delphi nor should

we assume that every individual member of the federation used coined money on a daily basis. Still,

outward circulation of Aitolian bronze was not affected by the Roman peace treaty but importantly,

Aitolia’s own production of bronze coins appears to have been unsatisfactory. If indeed too little

bronze was in circulation to enable daily, private transactions to be carried out, the population had

to make use of what little silver it had. The fractional triobol was small enough to enable

comparatively small transactions, and consequently facilitated a wider range of transactions than

533 Again, Kalydon is a local exception.

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the tetradrachm.534 But without sufficient quantities of coinage in circulation, the size and weight of

the federal coins did not matter. Individuals may eventually have had to resort to selling stored

goods in order to obtain the physical coins needed for their own purchases. Epigraphic records

indicate that this response is precisely what happened.535

As the quantity of coins in circulation dwindled, Aitolia’s population responded by infusing

the economy with old, formerly discarded coins which until that moment had not been acceptable

as legal tender. More importantly, hoard composition demonstrates that the population accepted

essentially any kind of silver currency, including freshly minted coinages struck on a wholly

different weight standard than their own. The Achaian triobol, however, virtually identical to

Aitolia’s own, seems to have been the most readily available and possibly also most easily

acceptable coin type, but silver was silver and in a declining economy the Aitolians could not afford

to be picky. For roughly 50 years, the Achaian triobol was the most commonly occurring coin type

in Aitolia parallel to the federation’s own silver and it remained regular until the early 120s BC,

when the Aitolio-Achaian monetary exchange came to an abrupt end.536

Our second agent, the federation or state itself, was forced to accept the economic

responses of its population. If not, tax collection would have been impossible. The federation may

or may not have played part in the rapid and regular interchange of coinage with Achaia, but it had

no choice but to accept any silver coinage that was available to its population – or collect no taxes.

Nevertheless, the federation maintained tight control of its own monetary production and despite

the influx of foreign silver into its economy, never deviated from its own standards. Moreover, the

koinon never resorted to the two most common approaches to circumventing an economic problem

534 Aitolia’s tetradrachm weighs on average c. 17.2g; roughly seven times as much as its 2.5g triobol. Tsangari
(2007, 254) argues that the koinon chose the triobol simply for financial reasons as it lacked the monetary
means to produce a larger coinage. See chapter 5.
535 See chapter 8.
536 From a chronological perspective, a connection between the influx of Achaian silver and the rapidly

escalating debt-problems in the 170s BC seems attractive although tenuous.

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in the short term; it did not devaluate its own currency, nor did it debase it.537 Thus, Aitolia seems

to have avoided inflation.538 The Roman peace treaty had stripped Aitolia of most of its annexed

territories, areas that traditionally paid tax to the koinon. Consequently, the koinon collected less

money in tax than prior to the indemnity. Further territories were removed in 167 BC and the

situation escalated.539 Decline was followed by collapse.

10.2. Decline and the Aitolian economy.

Without sufficient quantities of coins in circulation, Aitolia’s economy suffered. Eventually, when

bullion was no longer available, coin production became impossible. Roughly at the same time

foreign coinages stopped circulating into Aitolia in any noteworthy quantities. Silver became

unavailable. The federation could no longer meet the needs of its population in terms of monetary

production and conversely, the population could not meet the demands of its federation in terms of

taxation. Ancient populations often solved economic problems by annexing new territories, an

economic response with which Aitolia was very familiar.540 But the peace treaty forcibly prevented

Aitolia from engaging in such activities and thus, the koinon’s hands were tied.

Over the course of the second century BC, Aitolia’s economy became increasingly

demonetized. Less coinage in circulation led to diminished economic activity. The population had

less purchasing power and taxation became problematic. The government became poorer and may

have had to raise taxes; if it did, the population was not able to meet the demands of taxation and

tax evasion may have become an issue.541 It is clear from literary and epigraphic sources that

economic decline was a tangible problem which not only caused turmoil within the federal

537 On debased coinages in antiquity, see e.g. Howgego 1992; Harl 1996. On debt and debasement, see brief
notes in Fredriksen 1966.
538 The negative effects of inflation in the ancient world remain poorly understood, and especially in the pre-

Roman world. For an explanatory overview from a wider historical perspective, see Cagan and Lipsey 1978.
For a Rome-specific treatment, see Wassink 1991.
539 Diodorus 31.8.6; Grainger 1999, ch. 23.
540 Tainter 1988.
541 There is no hard evidence to that effect. On the effects of tax evasion on a small economic system, see

Tainter 1988; Parkinson 1960.

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government but in fact lead to drastic social upheavals and ultimately to a political revolution.

Already in the 170s BC, Aitolia witnessed a dramatic debt crisis among its elite whose members

suddenly lacked the means to repay their loans.542 The financial crisis had serious sociopolitical

consequences as the members of the elite traditionally served as magistrates within the federation,

but with the debt problem unsolved, the situation escalated into civil war. For the non-elite, lack of

coin was also detrimental as it impeded commercial activity, which in turn had a negative impact on

social, political and legal infrastructure. Moreover, the financial problems of the elite deeply

affected the functionality of the federal government which ultimately ceased to exist, and both

economy and polity collapsed. With the end of the federation, the region lost its monetary

functionality entirely.

We are ill informed of what happened next. In the wake of economic collapse, a barter

system may have resurged. The lack of evidence for regional monetary circulation in the first

century BC suggests that the population may have resorted to a non-monetized method of

exchange. But despite the complete demonetization of the regional economy, archaeological

evidence suggests that parts of the population remained in comparatively good financial standing.

Some individuals indeed seem to have been wealthy. The economy thus cannot have collapsed

completely. Large building projects would not have been possible in a state of complete anarchy for

a population existing in financial vacuum. The Heroon at Kalydon, for example, built in c. 100 BC,

was built with much reused material, but the workers still had to be paid, and some of the sculpture

is original work.543 The loss of a functional coinage contributed to the collapse of the Aitolian

economy but not all smaller local city economies or indeed individuals were equally affected.

542 See chapter 8.

543 See chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 7.
Economic institutions and state interference: the fate of the Aitolian koinon.

1. Introduction.

Since its emergence in fourth century BC, the federation had furnished the population of Aitolia

with an economic framework that allowed greater connectivity – and thereby easier access – to the

Mediterranean world. By striking coins, making policy, negotiating treaties, awarding various

grants, voting on war and carrying out military campaigns the federation provided the Aitolians

with the infrastructure necessary for economic activity, and through that infrastructure, with the

possibility for obtaining improved marginal return on an individual basis. Not synonymous with the

economy itself, the federation was nevertheless the engine that drove the socioeconomic machinery

forward, individually and collectively. Consequently, the fate of the koinon is of utmost importance

for a contextual reading of the region’s decline.

2. Timeline.

Epigraphic records confirm that the federation remained fully functional through the first half of

the second century BC. The last full list of magistrates dates to 141/0 BC, demonstrating that the

league was not dissolved in 146 BC, and both coin production and the dating of documents by the

annually elected strategos continue beyond that list.544 Even the very last Aitolian manumission is

dated by that year’s strategos, although we do not know the exact year.545 Unfortunately, the last

strategiai cannot be dated more closely than to the late second century BC, and after 141/0 BC, the

544 IG IX 12 1:34d. No serious study of Late Hellenistic Greece will now take Pausanias 7.16.10 at face value;
see e.g. Warren 1999b.
545 IG IX 12 1:137f. This document might date to 119/8 BC, although it is not clear whether this was the year

when Satyros from Arsinoe was strategos.

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evidence is sporadic.546 No grammateis or hipparchoi are known after that year, and the centuries-

long sequence of strategoi is broken in the mid-130s BC. The latest epigraphic mentioning of the

koinon itself, but without the strategia dating formula, is IG IX 12 1:139 which consisting of a

dedication to Sulla, can be dated to 84 BC. This document, found at Kalydon, must be considered the

terminus for the Aitolian league. A single inscription from the imperial period makes use of the

traditional phrase “κατὰ τοὺς Αἰτωλῶν νόμους” but the document is fragmentary and cannot be

dated; in fact, the only reason for its supposed imperial date is its inclusion of a Roman name.547

The epigraphic record does not provide us with a definitive end and this is likely a realistic

portrayal of the federation’s timeline. Its end came about gradually as its power diminished and its

territories shrank. It is clear that in the early first century BC, it no longer existed in any form.

Importantly, no other agency attempted to fill the vacuum created by its disappearance, either

locally or regionally. There is indeed no evidence for local authorities assuming the responsibilities

formerly held by the federation.

3. Composition: strategoi¸ territory and party factions.

A crucial factor for the federation’s success was the democratic process by which it integrated

newly annexed territories into its political apparatus. This is best exemplified by the office of

strategos. In the third century BC, strategoi were regularly recruited from cities in territories that

had recently joined the federation.548 This openness to new members made federal membership

attractive and facilitated both negotiation of foreign policy and use of economic institutions. After

189 BC, however, that openness drastically changed. In two decades between 189 and the 169 BC,

six men held the office of strategos no less than fifteen times (Appendix 3A). In that same time

546 IG IX 12 1:72 and 1:36a.

547 IG IX 12 1:82.
548 Grainger 2000.
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period, only four men held the office a single time. Repeated strategia was not unheard of in Aitolia

but this dramatic change is noteworthy. These strategoi came from Trichonion, Pholas, Pleuron,

Stratos, Hypata, Kalydon and Kallipolis. Most of these were large poleis in the heartland of Aitolia

and had been members of the federation since its creation.

This new climate has been explained as the rise of an oligarchic elite which ran the federal

government to best suit its own narrow interests. This oligarchic elite, Grainger argues, was deeply

invested in the late third-century-BC debt problem – we assume as creditors – and had successfully

prevented the passing of any legislation that would solve that crisis.549 This hostile political climate

gave rise to dissatisfaction and conflict. Livy-based scholarship maintains that the Aitolian citizenry

was split into two political factions, one pro-, the other anti-Roman, but the reality was more

complex than that, and more importantly, the strife was between individuals and not between two

formulated political parties.550 The political discord culminated in 167 BC when 550 Aitolian

principes were slaughtered at the instigation of Lykiskos.551 What happened to the oligarchic regime

is unclear, but after 167 BC, the highest magistracy was rarely repeated, signaling that the balance

of power within the league had been restored.552 In fact, until the end of the league only two people

were strategoi more than once.553 Nevertheless, the strategoi came almost exclusively from the

heartland of Aitolia, a similar situation as in the previous two decades. Kalydon furnished no less

than nine strategoi after 167 BC, Arsinoe eight, and Trichonion six. The remaining strategoi came

from cities that only provided a single individual (Phytaion, Sosthenes, Oaxos, Agrinion).

Consequently, while certain towns (Pholas, Hypata) no longer controlled the important office,

thereby indicating a shift in power distribution within the region, the highest office was still very

549 Grainger 1999.

550 Livy 41.25, 42.2; Polybius 30.11.
551 Livy 45.28.6-7.
552 Grainger (1999, 538) argues for a combination of “new men” and members of old Aitolian families but just

because an individual is unknown prior to holding office, one cannot necessarily consider him a political
outsider.
553 Dorimachos II from Trichonion in 147/6 and 140/39 BC, and Satyros from Arsinoe in 143/2, 136/5 and

129/8 BC.
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much monopolized by a small group of towns. The difference between the recruitment of strategoi

pre- and post-indemnity demonstrates quite clearly both the success and the failure of the koinon.

As an inclusive, pseudo-democratic body, it had been attractive, powerful and dynamic, but when

dominated by an oligarchic regime, it lost both attraction and functionality. While our records are

too few to ascertain whether this pattern applies to grammateis and hipparchoi as well, the

monopolization of the federal strategia invariably demonstrates how sensitive the federal

framework was to corruption.

Constant re-election of league officials was detrimental to both the internal democratic

process and the outward perception of the league. Whether the oligarchy successfully managed to

drive public policy in its own best interest we cannot tell, but chances are that the debt crisis in the

170s BC was exacerbated by political discord.554 Moreover, the inclusiveness traditionally

associated with the federation was seriously challenged which damaged its reputation in the long

term. Active members ceased to be active when federal policy became the provenance of a small

group of individuals, and indeed stopped wanting to be active. The composition of the league was

thus irrevocably altered. The only cities interested in active membership were those located close

to Thermon, in the heartland of Old Aitolia.

But not only party politics and an uneven distribution of power within the league affected

its composition. Territorial losses also had bearing for the radically changed patterns of political

recruitment. In the third century BC, magistrates had been recruited from newly annexed

territories, sometimes in obscure areas far from the federation’s meeting place at Thermon. Only

two of these cities continued to furnish magistrates after having been separated from the federation

in 189 BC; Kallion (once) and Stratos (six times). In all other cases, former members no longer

participated in league politics – even when still dating their own records by Aitolian strategic year.

Consequently, the sudden emergence of a small group of men controlling the supreme magistracy

554 See chapter 8.

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in the federation must be viewed in the greater context of the Roman indemnity. By removing

formerly annexed territories from the federation, Rome damaged the distributary mechanism

which had both maintained the balance of power within the federation and made federal

membership so attractive.

4. Economic institutions, friendships and foreign policy.

In the third century BC the federation made use of Panhellenic economic institutions to advance

economic connectivity at the regional and international level. Unsurprisingly, it continued to rely on

the same institutions in the decades following the indemnity (Appendix 3B). Several proxenies

were granted in the 180s BC. The recipients came from Thebes, Corinth, Patras, Rhodes and

Alexandria; to Grainger, these were “important commercial cities”.555 Notably, the grants included

proxenia only and none of the other privileges whose functions were distinctly economic in nature –

not a single case includes ateleia, for example. Most grants were given to individuals but the very

first proxenia after the indemnity was awarded collectively to the population of Athens. Athens had

been instrumental in negotiating the conditions for the indemnity on Aitolia’s behalf and was

probably considered an unusually good friend at that point in time.556 Only one other grant was

bestowed collectively rather than individually, and in that case, asylia given to the sanctuary of

Athena Nikephoros at Pergamon, the federation appears to have responded to Pergamon’s request

for recognition.557 No known grants date to the 170s which is unsurprising in light of the regional

discord occurring in that decade. A few grants date to the 160s BC but oddly, one of them was given

to a man from Hypata, a city that had furnished the league with two strategoi in the period 189 –

169 BC. This suggests that Hypata had been removed from the league, and in conjunction,

555 Grainger 1999, 506.

556 Polyb. 21.1, 21.9, 30.7, 31.5-16. Ferrary (1988) finds it remarkable that Polybius mentions no other agents
but Athens and Rhodes negotiating with Rome on Aitolia’s behalf. The evidence for Aitolo-Athenian relations
does not warrant the suggestions made by Losada 1965.
557 Roussel 1932.
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emphasizes the way the federation used proxenia; to best make use of important individuals who

could not otherwise be integrated into the regional framework. The other proxeniai dating to this

period were given to men whose origins are so obscure, they cannot be placed on a map even very

generally. In the late 140s, some contact was established with Naxos and Dyme in Achaia. In at least

two cases the federation reverted to its old habit of combining proxenia with asylia and the

economic privilege of asphaleia. The very last grants date to 129/8 BC and an unknown year in the

late second century BC.

In the second century BC, the federation made use of distinctly fewer grants than in the

previous century. This suggests a change in the broad connectivity earlier provided by these

economic institutions; moreover, it brings up the important question of whether overall economic

strategies had changed, deliberately or accidentally. Here we note that Aitolia relied almost

exclusively on proxenia grants, and moreover, that their process was unchanged. Proxenoi were still

sponsored by leading Aitolians who presumably put their names forward to the assembly. The

granting formula remained unaltered, and records were still displayed at the sanctuaries of

Thermon and Delphi. Clearly, individual connectivity and the market access it provided remained

central to how the federation sought to negotiate its place in the Hellenistic economy. These

economic institutions had proved useful in the past; to cancel that practice would have been

unwise. On a side note, the mere fact that proxenia was still awarded suggests a continued

movement of people into and out of Aitolia which in turn emphasizes a sustained tradition of trade,

euergetism and ordinary economic activity. The indemnity did consequently not immediately

prohibit the federation from utilizing its preexisting socioeconomic infrastructure.

Grainger argues that Aitolia relied on proxenia for commercial purposes, actively looking for

“new friends” to replace its former allies Rome and Antiochos III.558 Yet, the grants were

558 Grainger 1999.

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significantly fewer after the indemnity, and their geographic distribution is distinctly narrower.559

The institution itself was unchanged, as was the federation’s means of using it, but the sudden drop

in both asylia and those privileges that had purely economic purposes merits attention. In the third

century BC, the federation had actively entered agreements which enhanced its own odds of

improved marginal returns by increasing overall connectivity, but after the indemnity, federal

behavior appeared significantly more passive, which raises an important question: who were

Aitolia’s “friends”? With which regions did Aitolia successfully connect when its former territories

had been removed? Unfortunately, the grants are too few, and foreign circulation of Aitolian

coinage not large enough to demonstrate a deeper, more strongly pronounced connection between

the federation and another community. Only two collective grants were issued in the second

century; a stark contrast to the previous century.

Nevertheless, two major dedications at Delphi in the 180s BC demonstrate that the

federation understood the importance of state-sponsored connectivity for survival. Dedicated in

182 BC, the Aitolian monument to Eumenes II is testimony to the inherent adaptability of the

koinon.560 Eumenes II was the arch-enemy of Antiochos III, Aitolia’s former ally, and his support of

Rome not a decade earlier had been greatly rewarded.561 The federation had eagerly responded to a

recent Pergamene request for asylia and by erecting a monument at Delphi, they displayed to the

world their new friendship with a powerful ruler – the same ruler who had profited from their own

defeat. That very year the federation had completed its indemnity payments to Rome, and may in

Eumenes II have looked for a powerful ally to help improve its tarnished reputation after the Greco-

Roman conflict. The monument to Prusias II of Bithynia is also believed to have been dedicated in

this year.562 This is the only known connection between the federation and Bithynia in this century

and the dedication is best viewed as an intelligent design for the federation to gain the friendship of

559 Delphic grants of proxenia to Aitolians were also fewer in this century (Appendix 3C).
560 IG IX 12 1:183. The document is discussed in Daux 1836; Pollitt 1986.
561 Polybius 21.42-4; Livy 38.38. See further le Rider 1992; Polaček 1969: 1971; Walbank 1959.
562 IG IX 12 1:184 = FdD III 4.1, no 76.
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the newly crowned king. Both monuments were displayed at Delphi, a strategic location that

announced Aitolia’s good intentions and through its visibility as a Panhellenic sanctuary could

facilitate greater connectivity.

The federation and its members had a long history of Delphic dedications, some to itself and

its own members, others to foreign rulers.563 Naturally, a similar tradition was upheld at Thermon,

where numerous monuments announced Aitolian friendship with powerful rulers and states.564

That tradition came to an abrupt end at the conclusion of the war, clearly an effect of the gradual

loss of federal power. The federation’s choice of Delphi for the display of its “friendship” with

Eumenes II and Prusias II signals the importance of visibility in order to achieve wider integration

in the Panhellenic framework – and integration was paramount for survival.

But whether such displays of friendship had any real effects on Aitolian affairs, the

federation certainly did not rely on the two eastern kings. In the 170s BC, the federation appealed

to other states to help solve its debt crisis.565 First it approached Macedon, then Rome.566 Third

party mediation was a common feature of the Hellenistic world and was readily used when two

parties could not solve a problem, yet to find the koinon first soliciting the help of its major

opponent in the previous century, then that of the very state that had robbed it of important

territories has been found noteworthy. It has been argued that Aitolia’s relationship to Macedon

became friendlier after the Roman war, but the string of appeals to Pergamon, Bithynia, Macedon

and Rome in combination with proxenia grants to individuals from various polities rather suggests

that the federation could not afford to discriminate.567 Internal problems dictated that the

federation maintained an outward state of positive neutrality and thus it cultivated relationships

563 Scholten 2000. The examples are numerous. See e.g. IG IX 12 1:181; 1:200, 1:202, 1:203; Syll.3 514.
564 Perhaps most noteworthy is the large exedra hosting a statue group of the Ptolemies; IG IX 12 1:56. On its
date, see Bennett 2002.
565 Two doreai voted to the federation by the Delians in the late 180s or early 170s BC may have some

relationship to the tumultuous debt crisis. ID 442 – 443. On the Delian epigraphic corpus and its economic
implications in general, see Reger 1994. Cf. Baslez and Vial 1987.
566 Appian Mac. 1.7; Livy 41.25, 42.2, 42.4.
567 Grainger 1999,507. Cf. Walbank 1940. On the Aitolo-Macedonian background, see Bosworth 1976.
 160

with foreign states when it could. In fact, the position of neutrality was of paramount importance

from a standpoint of recovery. Further marginal decline caused by exogenous factors could be

disastrous. Unfortunately, the altered composition of the federation prevented it from using those

relationships to improve odds of marginal return.

5. Territorial loss, occupation and warfare.

The Roman treaty removed large tracts of land from the koinon, thereby altering the composition of

the koinon. That territorial loss came to gradually impact the federation as territorially-induced

civil unrest among the population had a negative impact on the reliability and the very functionality

of the league. In fact, that shift in internal balance damaged overall federal management of the

territory it still controlled, accidentally providing other agents access to Aitolian resources. Decline

was inevitable.

That loss of reliability is most visible in Aitolian manumission records. These documents

were always private and may consequently provide indirect evidence for how the population

viewed the federation. After the first quarter of the second century BC, manumissions at Naupaktos

and Bouttos were no longer only dated by the eponymous federal strategos, but more often by local

grammateis thearois and the agonothetes.568 These two towns were not necessarily detached from

the league but the changed dating formula indicates a general lack of confidence in the

federation.569 Moreover, the documents bring up the important question of foreign agency and

indeed of occupation. Literary sources indicate that at least two Aitolian cities were held by the

Achaian league, although the timeframe for that occupation is unknown. Herakleia which controlled

Thermopylai and thus was essential for the movement of people through central Greece had been

568 An example of dating by local grammeteus: IG IX 12 3:639,6; of agonothetes IG IX 12 3:638,9. On this

practice in general, see Sherk 1990.
569 Papageorgiadou-Bani (1996) believes that Naupaktos was occupied by Achaia between the Third

Macedonian War and the destruction of Corinth but there is no firm evidence to that effect.
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an important member of the Aitolian koinon but had been removed from the federation by the time

of the Achaian War in 147/6 BC. It appears to have been made a member of the Achaian league

against its will. It rebelled, clearly dissatisfied with its new “owners”, but was made a member

anew.570 Similarly, membership in the Achaian league was forced upon Pleuron in the heartland of

Aitolia. When visiting Aitolia in the 160s BC, the Roman ambassador Gallus was approached by a

group of Pleuronians who begged to be removed from the Achaian league. Gallus appears to have

granted that wish.571 The occupation of Pleuron is visible in the recruitment patterns for federal

strategoi; between 189 and 174 BC, it provided no less than three magistrates, but none thereafter

(Appendix 3A). Unattested beyond these references, occupation of the Aitolian heartland is poorly

understood but if real, its consequences for regional decline may have been significant. Resources

would have been removed from Aitolian control, the basis for taxation and military recruitment

disturbed, and the potential for marginal improvement further decreased. Foreign agents are likely

to have treated occupied territories harshly, perhaps exacting far more taxes than the Aitolian

population could manage. Such occupation would have had dire consequences for the survival of

the league. The loss, temporary or permanent, of two majorly active cities further destabilized the

already unstable federation, and chances are that other cities suffered the same fate although the

literary and epigraphic records are silent to that end.

Warfare, too, played its part in the gradual loss of federal power and control. After the

indemnity, the koinon fought no wars of its own, but it did support Rome against Perseus – perhaps

because it had no other choice. Grainger considers the Aitolian assembly “anti-Roman” yet its

stance seems primarily have been “anti-war”.572 Most Greek states, in fact, sought a stance of

neutrality and attempted to stay out of the conflict, convinced that whatever the outcome, it would

570 Pausanias 7.14.1; Grainger 1999, 532.

571 Pausanias 7.11-14; Grainger 1999, 532; Gruen 1976a.
572 Grainger 1999, 526; Livy 43.17-22; Polybius 28.4.
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be bad for the Greeks.573 Eventually, the Aitolian federation sent its cavalry to Rome’s aid, consisting

of 500 men.574 In comparison, Achaia sent three times as many. If this was indeed the federation’s

entire cavalry, and Livy explicitly says it was, the basis for military recruitment had shrunk

dramatically in only some thirty years.575 Moreover, the koinon was clearly not enthusiastic about

renewed Roman involvement in Greece as it allowed its own citizens to enlist with Perseus.576

The federation was not rewarded for supporting Rome; in fact, it was blamed for the minor

defeat at Kallikinos and the Aitolian cavalry commanders were sent off to Rome as prisoners. These

men were all former strategoi – important political figures intimately connected to the machinery

of the federation.577 Additionally, the federation was dealt further territorial losses after Pydna

when most notably, Amphilochia was detached from the league. Thereby the federation lost

physical contact with the Ionian Sea.578 Roman involvement in Greece had no positive effects on the

federation, and it is unsurprising that the Aitolians diligently stayed out of the Greco-Roman

conflicts culminating in the destruction of Corinth in 146 BC.579 Warfare was too costly and too

uncertain an enterprise for the crumbling koinon, and moreover, the Roman treaty prevented it

from using warfare to best suit its own territorially-driven interests.

573 Polybius 28.7.4; Gruen 1975; 1976a; 1984. On Perseus’ involvement in Greece and how it was portrayed,
see Mendels 1978; Champion 2007; Eckstein 1988.
574 Livy 42.55.9.
575 Some 6,500 Aitolian mercenaries had been in service to the Ptolemies in the late third century: Livy 31.43.

See Chapter 2.
576 Polybius 27.15.14; Livy 42.60.8-9; Appian Mac. 12. See Gruen 1984.
577 Livy 42.60.8-10.
578 Diodorus 31.86.
579 On Greece after the destruction of Corinth, see Morstein Kallet-Marx 1995. The important question is

whether Rome formally converted Greece into a province in 146 BC. Accame (1946), Badian (1968) and
Ferrary (1988) think so, but Gruen (1976, 1984) dissents. For criticism on Gruen, see Baronowski 1988.
Whatever the case – and the evidence is not conclusive either way – it is clear that the Greek leagues were not
dissolved in 146 BC, contra Pausanias 7.16.12.
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6. The end of the koinon.

The koinon remained fully functional through the 130s BC, that much is clear from epigraphic and

numismatic records. Its end, however, was not a distinct event at a certain point in time. Rather, it

petered out, gradually losing its attraction, functionality, reliability, and use. An inscription dated to

165 BC emphasizes the way in which that decline manifested itself.580 The document is a list of

citizenships awarded to a single individual and includes Aitolia, Doris, Eastern Lokris, Oitia and

Ainianes, all counted separately. Some fifty years earlier, the grant of Aitolian citizenship would

have covered all these. Oitia and Ainianes had never been formally detached from the league yet

one by one, members abandoned their affiliation with the no longer attractive koinon.

The evidence for that gradual decline as outlined above shows that the process was as

complex as it was unfortunate.581 Internal conflicts prevented economic recovery, and social unrest

made for poor adaptation to Aitolia’s new order post-189 BC. While clearly not intending to

eradicate the Aitolian koinon, the indemnity, it seems, was an instrumental factor for the

federation’s end. Had the Romans not insisted on detaching important territories from the koinon’s

control, financially induced civic strife may not have persisted. The territorial clause was seriously

detrimental to the federation and its population as it not only reduced its chances of improved

marginal return, but also changed the very ways in which the Aitolians operated. The koinon was no

longer able and indeed not allowed to solve socioeconomic problems by capturing a new energy

subsidy, nor could it extend its power territorially by offering membership to small polities.

Seriously reduced, Aitolia would have needed a “big friend” to recover in the same manner that the

federation itself had been the voice for small, annexed polities in the third century BC. Perhaps such

royal sponsorship was sought in Eumenes and Prusias. Yet, its attempts failed, and the structural

580Syll.3 653 = FdD III 1,218; Grainger 1999, 534.

581Oddly, Grainger (1999, 535) blames a single individual, Lykiskos (who died in c. 157 BC; Polyb. 32.4.1-3),
for the decline and eventual end of the league.
 164

damage was too great for the federation to adapt to the new conditions set upon it by the indemnity

and civic unrest. Its ultimate end was inevitable.

The federal machinery was intimately connected to the population and the loss or

weakening of one was detrimental to the other. Without the federation, the population of Aitolia

had little chance of continued connectivity with the outside world; indeed even of continued

connectivity within Aitolia. Without the economic infrastructure provided by the koinon, the

Aitolians were doomed to an existence without their own coinage, without a monetized economy,

without any means of negotiating economic strategies beyond their own household. While Aitolia

never lost all economic activity – the archaeological record attests that much – its population had

almost no options for that vital connectivity after the collapse of the federation.
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CHAPTER 8.
Economic activity and the Aitolian people.

1. Introduction.

After 189 BC, Aitolia faced a new order in which its problem-solving mechanisms were severely

restricted. Important territories had been removed from the federation’s control, and the peace

treaty prevented it from the territorial expansion necessary to avoid marginal decline. While the

socioeconomic infrastructure was still in place – the federation and its institutions as well as local

governments and networks – the Aitolian population faced problems that it was unable to solve.

Over the course of the second and first centuries BC, the Aitolians witnessed their landscape

contract, their monetary circulation weaken, and their international connectivity decline; all signs

of significant loss of sociopolitical complexity.582 Unsurprisingly, focused examination of the

Aitolian people generates a similar image in which population decline and site abandonment

indicate a gradual system collapse. Naturally, the population responded in different ways to this

“downward slope” and a detailed reading of select socioeconomic features provides the context

necessary for Cicero’s Aetolia amissa. This chapter evaluates the relevant evidence.

2. The debt crisis in the 170s BC.

After accepting the clauses for the Roman indemnity, the Aitolians disappeared temporarily from

the historical narrative. Despite the lack of written information, the 180s and early 170s BC appear

to have been relatively stable years for the federation and its people. There seems to have been no

immediate change for day-to-day conditions. Federal meetings were attended as usual; economic

institutions remained unchanged; coins were struck and circulated. In fact, the Aitolians seem to

582 Tainter 1988.

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have experienced several peaceful, seemingly stable years until the late 170s BC when a violent,

disruptive debt crisis suddenly arose.583 The crisis is interpreted either as a political or an economic

problem when in fact it was neither; it was financial in nature.584 At the heart of the problem lay

debt but the indebted were not the poor, like Grainger thinks, but rather men of property and

influence.585 Disputes among privileged citizens often arose when large sums were borrowed

against the security of land, and this was clearly the case in Aitolia.586 In Thessaly, a similar conflict

emerged when illegal interest made debt payments impossible, a possible explanation for the

mechanisms of the Aitolian conflict.587

Civil unrest and growing violence characterized the crisis. While simply fiscal in origin, the

debt problem quickly became a political issue as involved parties used their influence in the

federation to manipulate the situation to their own advantage – an approach not foreign to the

Aitolians, who in the late third century BC saw Alexander the Isian thwart Skopas’ proposed debt

legislation by similar manipulation.588 Jealous monopolization of federal offices at this time is

emblematic of the severity of the situation.589 The indebted clearly could not pay their loans, but

were not willing to give up the property on which their elite status was based. Violent reactions

ensued, causing the federation to reach out to third parties for mediation; first to Perseus, who sent

a garrison; then twice to the Roman senate, who sent two embassies.590 Neither external agent

583 Naturally, its emergence is only sudden because Livy and Polybius have nothing to say about Aitolia prior
to its breakout. Livy 41.25, 41.47, 42.2, 42.5, 42.12, 42.38, 42.40, 42.42, 43.17, 45.28; Polybius 28.4, 30.11,
30.13, 32.4-5, 39.11; Appian Mac. 11.1, 11.7; Diodorus 29.33.
584 Habicht 1989; Gruen 1976a: 1984; Walsh 2000. Oddly, the event has received little attention among

economic historians.
585 Grainger 1999 contra Gruen 1976a.
586 Shipley 2000.
587 Habicht 1989. The Aitolian crisis was thus not simply a local phenomenon; Thessaly and Perrhaebia, too,

suffered debt crises at this time. Diodorus (29.33) indicates that the problem in Thessaly was that debts had
been cancelled, thus causing an outrage among the lending parties whose loans were never repaid.
588 Polybius 13.1.
589 See chapter 4.
590 Rome appears to have become the “to-go” state for third party mediation at this time. In the 160s BC, the

inhabitants of Pleuron approached the Roman ambassador Gallus with a request for third party mediation:
they wanted their city to be removed from the Achaian league. Paus. 7.11-14. See e.g. Champion 2007. On
Perseus in this situation, see Eckstein 1988.
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could solve the problem as the issue had escalated beyond repair. In fact, the Roman ambassadors

reported that the Aitolian madness was incorrigible.591 Some form of internal agreement was met

but civil unrest arose anew, culminating in the murder of 550 Aitolian principes at a meeting in 167

BC.592 Properties were confiscated and proscriptions enforced as other citizens were driven into

exile, thus ending the conflict.593

All complex societies are problem-solving organizations which settle issues of growth and

decline by adapting and adjusting to immediate constraints. The Aitolian debt crisis is best

understood in these terms. In the third century BC, socioeconomic instabilities were corrected

through territorial expansion. By capturing a new energy subsidy, the federation prevented its

population from the “downward slope” leading to marginal decline. The population, too, avoided

marginal decline by engaging in a variety of activities synonymous with energy capture; paid

mercenary service, piracy, and freebooting while on military campaigns. Such problem-solving

mechanisms had tangible and immediate effects both collectively and individually. Yet, the

incessant wars in the late third and early second centuries BC had upset the regional credit

structure which depended on the value of land, which in turn drove up interest rates.594 In addition,

the Romans had not only removed vital territories from Aitolian control and prevented further

expansion, but the monetary component of their requested indemnity drove large quantities of

bullion and coined money out of Aitolia, leading to less coinage in active circulation. Consequently,

the people who had borrowed money against the security of their land were physically unable to

pay back their loans. Moreover, the region had not had time to restore its exhausted agricultural

countryside. Farmlands could simply not produce large enough a profit for their indebted owners.

Their hands tied by the indemnity, the Aitolians could no longer rely on their traditional problem-

591 Livy 41.27.

592 Livy 45.28.7; Polybius 30.11.5.
593 Some disenfranchised Aitolians approached Aemilius Paullus in 167 BC, asking for redress after the

slaughter, but were not given the legal help they requested. Livy 45.28 – 31; Polybius 30.13.
594 Hollander 2005.
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solving methods, and the crisis was unavoidable. The violent reactions illustrate how sensitive

Aitolia’s economy was to shifts in its structure and moreover, demonstrate the severe outcome of

exogenous shock on a small, agrarian-based economy. Its manifestations of violence were, in effect,

a problem-solving mechanism emerging in a situation when traditional solutions were no longer

possible. Naturally, any problem-solving mechanism that is self-predatory in nature will harm the

equilibrium of the collective and thereby cause further damage to socioeconomic frameworks, and

in less dire circumstances such mechanisms rarely occur. In its appearance we thus identify a

combination of the “new world order” in which Aitolia’s old strategies were rendered

nonoperational, and the “inheritance” of the unresolved financial problems of the late third century

BC.

While neither Polybius nor Livy show interest in its outcome, the disruptive debt crisis

could have had no positive effects on the population. Proscription of property left fields untilled

which caused an escalating agrarian loss and advanced landscape contraction. The federation was

similarly negatively impacted as it failed to prevent problems escalating into civil war, thus losing

vital reliability and power. Taxation may have been halted, leading to shrinking federal coffers

which in turn had a negative effect on subsequent coin production. Property rights had previously

been regulated by federal law, but failure to maintain that legal framework may have seriously

challenged the legislative apparatus.595 Local governments were also affected when prominent

citizens were removed, either through forced exile or through murder. For the regional economy,

there is no doubt that the debt crisis was seriously detrimental. Embedded socioeconomic

structures need to be reliable in order not to injure the very activities that constitute economic life,

but the kind of unconstitutional problem-solving characterized by the debt crisis damaged those

structures and had a negative effect on their reliability. Consequently, a problem of debt restricted

595For ἒνκτησις γῆς καὶ οἰκίας in Aitolia, see e.g. IG IX 12 1:3A; 1:6, 1:8, 1:10b. Regulations for property rights
are also visible in some grants of politeia or isopoliteia that include “right to land and house”. See Mackil and
van Alfen 2006, 222f. Enktesis is generally poorly understood in Hellenistic koina; for the better investigated
Athens, see Pečírka 1966.
 169

to the elite had a profound, negative impact on all levels of society, and its harmful effects were

irreversible.

3. Distribution of wealth and the Aitolian elite.

Fiscal problems in the highest stratum of society could have long-lasting, unfavorable effects on the

entire population, and a closer look at Aitolia’s elite is necessary. In 189 BC, this group was visibly

wealthy. Alexander the Isian had a reported personal fortune of some 200 talents, and funerary

material signals the existence of a profoundly rich, small elite.596 Unsurprisingly, the remainder of

Aitolia’s population seems to have been comparatively poor; engaged primarily in agrarian

activities aiming at subsistence, they may not even have regularly used coined money.597 While a

natural feature of many agrarian economies, this division of wealth hinders the distribution of

resources, prevents growth, and moreover, neither stimulates socioeconomic activity nor forces

advances in technology.598

While there is no explicit evidence, it is exceedingly likely that social stratification was

based on wealth.599 At the basis for this plutocratic stratification lay property, in particular

ownership of land. In the late third and early second century BC, some citizens evidently borrowed

money against the security of their property, a loan that took the form of crude credit. The property

was needed as a guarantee against risk.600 For the lending party, that security was an important

concern in formulating economic strategies as it safeguarded against permanent loss of capital.601 It

is thus likely that these loans were chiefly available to persons with substantially large, important

properties. For the borrower, the loan was risky as losing property entailed a permanent loss of

596 Polybius 21.26.

597 On agriculture and oikos models for subsistence farming, see Burford Cooper 1978. On the
primitivist/substantivist debate in relation to oikos-farms, see Cartledge 2002.
598 See e.g. Scheidel 2007.
599 Cf. the plutocratic division of society in archaic Athens or Republican Rome.
600 Gabrielsen 2005.
601 Foxhall 2007.
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status, yet the loan was clearly important enough to warrant the risk. Why did the wealthy Aitolians

see fit to borrow money against the security of their important lands?

Funerary evidence suggests that Aitolia’s elite was seriously engaged in an internal

competition for visibility. Deeply embedded in elite identity throughout the Greek world, this

visibility was important in several ways; politically, socially, but also financially. A better known

person had a better chance of holding public office, perhaps thereby qualifying for consideration for

federal office and in extent, vastly improving the odds for personal gain. Consequently, elite families

striving for improved visibility in their local communities invested in what can only be labeled

conspicuous consumption.602 Naturally, fine dedications in sanctuaries and elaborate funerary

monuments were costly, but the social standing obtained through enhanced visibility justified such

financial investments. Conspicuous consumption consequently reflects a conscious socioeconomic

strategy that while seriously dangerous, had a distinct, long-term goal in mind. Unfortunately, that

specific strategy could have disastrous effects on society as a whole, which the Aitolian debt crisis

so clearly illustrated.603

Nevertheless, the elite competition for visibility may have to some extent stimulated

important connectivity. The physical manifestations of their consumption required manpower,

skilled labor, and resources, all of which mandated the movement of people and encouraged skill

specialization. Such investments were important for a centralized economy and encouraged market

exchange.604 Yet, there is no evidence that elite competition had a measurable positive impact on

the regional economy, and their self-serving competition for visibility did not stop the population

on the “downward slope”.

But elite activities did not solely serve elite interests, even though personal aggrandizement

was certainly their aim. Through acts of euergetism, elite members participated in the Panhellenic

602 On elite families, see O’Neil 1984-1986.

603 Carney 1973.
604 Renfrew 1979.
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ideal of generosity and thereby influenced the socioeconomic activities of others.605 In Aitolia, a

preserved inscription documenting a local benefaction unsurprisingly deals with debt. The

Kalydonian Lykos personally absolved the city of Pleuron from its public debt and received an

honorific statue at Thermon in return.606 The example is indicative both of the sharp division of

wealth within Aitolia and the purchasing power available to the elite. An example from Kalydon

simply labels the honorand euergetes but it is clear that the man is from the same city whose

population collectively honors him.607 Two other Aitolians were honored with statues at Delphi for

their services to the temple and to the city, although the nature of that service is unknown.608

Several Aitolian citizens were granted various honors at Delphi, including proxenia, presumably for

services of benefaction rendered to the sanctuary (Appendix 3C). In several cases, the honorand

come from well-known Aitolian families who had actively participated in federal affairs which

suggests an elite status.609 Clearly, the Aitolian elite partook in a well-known Hellenistic institution

that when directed toward a community – like in the case of Pleuron – could have an immediate,

positive effect on the personal finances of the local population.

Yet, random acts of euergetism meant little for the Aitolian population as a whole. In fact,

elite focus on self-aggrandizing consumption intensified the inequalities within society. By

monopolizing federal offices for the sake of their own visibility, elite families barred less wealthy

members of the population from important opportunities for marginal improvement, thereby

reinforcing the plutocratic structure of Aitolian society. Consequently, elite behavior only served to

accelerate the “downward slope”.

605 See e.g. Bresson 2000; Davies 2005. On money and benefactions, see von Reden 2010.
606 IG IX 12 1:70, late third century BC.
607 IG IX 12 1:140, second century BC.
608 Syll.3 621 to Pantaleon from Pleuron, 180s or 170s BC; FdD III 1,576 to a man from Naupaktos, c. 150 BC.
609 E.g. Aristonymos from Naupaktos in FdD III 1,151 – see Grainger 2000.
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4. Mercenary service.

In the ancient world, the masses routinely lacked economic power.610 Individuals consequently had

little influence over collective problem-solving mechanisms within the local or regional economy.

That does not mean that none were available to them. Piracy and brigandage had always been part

of the Aitolian way of life, an opportunistic approach toward personal gain which was absolutely

essential for any individual situated in an economic system that was otherwise incapable to

improve marginal returns. Mercenary service was another such problem-solving mechanism. At the

end of the third century BC, a massive exodus of Aitolian mercenaries coincided with a regional

debt crisis, suggesting that mercenary service was utilized to alleviate financial and socioeconomic

pressure on an individual basis.611 Importantly, several of the late third-century-BC Aitolians

embarking on a new career were deeply enmeshed in private debt.612 Undeniably, the Aitolians

viewed mercenary service as a personal problem-solving mechanism in the same manner as piracy

or freebooting. Curiously, there is no evidence for such service in the period following the

indemnity, not even during the deeply troubling debt crisis in the late 170s BC, and we must ask

why.613

After the battle of Apamea, the Roman general Acilius barred the Aitolians from crossing

into Asia.614 This was not a clause in the indemnity yet oddly, the Aitolians seem to have obeyed. On

the other hand, there were few employers in the 180s and early 170s BC. To seek service with

Antiochos III was out of the question as the Roman peace treaty explicitly forbade him from

continuing previous engagements.615 Ptolemaic Egypt succumbed to civil war in the mid-180s BC.

610 Carney 1973.

611 See chapter 2; Griffith 1968.
612 Skopas and Dorimachos are the two most notable examples. Polybius 13.1.
613 The lack of evidence for Aitolian piracy in the second century BC is not a factor of Polybius losing interest

in the region but rather, suggests that piracy was no longer considered a reliable problem-solving
mechanism. See e.g. Ormerod 1997; Perrier 2008.
614 Polybius 20.10.4; Livy 36.38.3; Eckstein 1995a.
615 Burstein 1980.
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Neither Pergamon nor Bithynia was in need of additional troops.616 In fact, the two decades

following the clash between Rome and the Seleucids were largely peaceful, a stark contrast to the

constant warfare in the late third century BC. In the ancient world, mercenary service seems to

have resulted from a combination of local conditions and external incentives.617 In the early second

century BC, the external incentives were visibly lacking. Nevertheless, the federation not only

seems to have complied with the indemnity clauses, but also actively sought to improve its image in

the Panhellenic world.618 It may have strongly suggested that no Aitolians seek employment abroad,

passed legislation against the recruitment of mercenaries in its territory, gone to great measures to

prevent piracy, or penalized anyone whose behavior threatened to irritate Rome.

Consequently, Aitolian mercenaries were noticeably fewer in the Late Hellenistic period. A

Ptolemaios served Antiochos IV in Palestine in the late 170s BC.619 In 171 BC, Perseus held a census

of his army which at that time included a band of 500 Aitolian and Boiotian mercenaries

commanded by the Achaian Lykon.620 The mixed company is strongly indicative of the participants’

mercenary status. The Aitolian general Archidamos from Pholas fled with Perseus after Pydna, but

his fate is unknown.621 Interestingly, Archidamos had been the Aitolian strategos no less than four

times in the period 191 – 175 BC, and had commanded the Aitolian army both at Thaumakoi and

Kynoskephalai; moreover, he had served as an official envoy to the Achaian league and to

Glabrio.622 Archidamos was undoubtedly a member of the Aitolian elite and his choice of mercenary

service at the end of his career suggests his involvement in the escalating debt crisis. Slingbolts at

616 See Launey 1949. The early second century BC stands in stark contrast to the early third century BC, the
heyday of Greek mercenary activity. See Griffith 1968. On mercenaries in earlier times, see Parke 1933;
McKechnie 1989.
617 Archibald 2011.
618 See chapter 7.
619 I Macabees 3:38; Josephus Ant. Jud. 12.298; Launey 1949, 1136.
620 Livy 42.12.51.
621 Livy 44.43; Plutarch Aem. 23.3; Grainger 2000, 109.
622 Livy 32.4.2, 39.1.4; Polybius 18.21, 20.9, 28.4; IG IX 12 1:97, 1:31o, 3:629; SGDI II 1786, 1795, 1843, 1986,

1987, 2036, 2037, 2047, 2132, 2134; SEG XII 295.

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Numantia inscribed ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ indicate Aitolian participation in a Roman campaign.623 Since no

Aitolian federal army ever served outside Greece, the Aitolians at Numantia must have been

mercenaries. In the case of Ptolemaic service, we hear of a Melankomas who was governor of Kition

on Cyprus and his son – also named Melankomas – who was hipparchos, hegemon and governor of

Kition in 145 – 116 BC.624 A third Aitolian, Andramachos, was strategos for the whole island. Bagnall

suggests that this Andramachos was the same individual as the ambassador to Rome for Ptolemaios

Philometor in 154 BC.625

The first century BC is similarly meager. Sulla held a small recruiting campaign in Thessaly

and Aitolia. The Kalydonian Ladames, presumably a Sullan mercenary, dedicated a statue in his

honor.626 Ladames came from an old local family which can be traced at least into the third century

BC, and his father was one of the last documented federal strategoi.627 Decades later, Caesar’s

general Cn. Domitius Calvinus used Aitolian and Epirote mercenaries in an attack on Thessaly.628

Pompeius Magnus recruited heavily in Western Greece; in fact, Petropoulous argues that he

occupied Kalydon in 49 BC.629 Caesar used light-armed Aitolian troops at Pharsalos at which point

the Aitolian mercenary leaves the historical narrative.630

In contrast to his third-century-BC predecessor, the second-century-BC Aitolian mercenary

was a professional. The sparse evidence indicates that service extended well beyond a series of

campaigns. The Aitolians at Kition held a permanent position – which in fact was inherited from

father to son – and Perseus’ company of Aitolo-Boiotian mercenaries was an integrated part of his

standing army. The first-century-BC evidence is less informative but it is likely that the locally

recruited bands of Aitolians did not consist of professionally trained soldiers; after all, the koinon

623 González 1996.

624 OGIS 134; Launey 1949, 1136; O’Neil 2006.
625 CIG 2626; Launey 1949, 1133; Bagnall 1976.
626 IG IX 12 1:137; SGDI II 1418; Appian Bell. Mith. 30.
627 IG IX 12 1:36j; Grainger 2000, 15.
628 Cassius Dio 41.51.3.
629 Caesar BC 3.61; Petropoulos 1991.
630 Appian BC 3.70.
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no longer existed and Aitolia had not gone to war for several generations. Archibald argues that

Hellenistic mercenaries were selectively recruited in areas that combined large populations with

well-established traditions of professional warfare but in the first century BC, Aitolia’s population

appears to have been neither large nor maintained such traditions; moreover, Roman generals

simply seem to have recruited mercenaries locally, wherever the Roman army happened to be.631

Rural Greece had always exported young men and Aitolians had regularly left their

homeland for paid service abroad since the Classical period.632 By the second century BC,

mercenary service had become a deeply integrated problem-solving mechanism for the Aitolian

population, a mechanism that alleviated socioeconomic problems through the temporary

dislocation of involved parties. This temporary removal helped restore regional equilibrium, at

least on the surface. That equilibrium was structurally essential for the federation and consequently

formed an intrinsic part of the socioeconomic framework for Aitolia’s population.

Private debt appears to have been a major factor for discord in Late Hellenistic Aitolia.

When the external incentive for mercenary service was no longer available and piracy was no

longer deemed a viable choice, local conditions forced the involved parties had to resort to other

forms of problem-solving. Unfortunately, these included political manipulation, revolts, and

violence – options that only caused further harm to the region, the federation, the population and

their economy.

5. Manumissions.

A group of inscribed documents records the process of manumission and thereby attests to tangible

economic transactions. They chiefly date to the first half of the second century BC and verify that

631 Archibald 2011, 50.

632 Shipley 2005; Ducrey 2000.
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the legal structure necessary for such economic transactions was still in place.633 In addition to

constituting the only available evidence for price setting in Late Hellenistic Aitolia, this group of

documents provides important demographic information that serves to further contextualize the

“downward slope”.

The data is straightforward. In the Late Hellenistic period, Aitolians manumitted some 166

slaves. 71 were men, 69 women, 15 boys and 11 girls. While the majority was manumitted in the

sanctuaries at Delphi and Skala/Naupaktos, inscriptions at Phistyon, Kalydon and Arsinoe

demonstrate that these towns, too, were used for manumission. Most slaves were “homeborn”.634

Foreign-born slaves did exist and in addition to various Greek peoples, included Thracians, Gauls,

and an Arab. Roughly 21% of these slaves were manumitted conditionally. The conditions were

always in favor of the former owner and illuminate a crude economic strategy aimed at maximizing

profit. Most commonly, the manumitted slave had to remain in service to his former owner – for a

specified time, for an unspecified time, of for the remainder of the former owner’s life – but other

conditions involve performing commemorative rites as well as the slave’s property being inherited

by the former master.635 In some cases, the freedman could break the conditions of his contract in

exchange for a certain sum of money.636

The average price of manumission by an Aitolian owner was just below 4 minae which was

slightly lower than at Delphi (Fig. 44).637 It has been argued both that market prices for slaves were

633 Several manumission records demonstrate that Aitolian law regulated a slave’s status in his polis. In IG IX
12 1:96a, a manumitted woman is said to be eleuthera, anephaptos and aphorologetos which gives her a legal
status equal of citizen rights. IG IX 12 1:82c holds the freed slave to be isoteles and entimos according to
Aitolian law. SGDI II 2133 gives a slave right to politeuein, ie, to be a citizen (!). Clearly, a sophisticated legal
system allowed for the integration of former slaves into Aitolian society. See Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005.
Consequently, while manumission per se is a private act, in Aitolia, it was also an integrated socioeconomic
institution. Cf. Morris and Papadopoulos 2005.
634 A slave manumitted at Phistyon is said to be το γένος εκ τας χώρας – of local origin. IG IX 12 1:96b.

Presumably, that indicated being born in a nearby town but not at Phistyon.
635 Commemorative rites: IG IX 12 1:137a; property inheritance: IG IX 12 3:624d – cf. the late third-century-BC

IG IX 12 1:96a which also details property inheritance. On the paramone clause, see e.g. Westermann 1945:
1948: 1955; Samuel 1965; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005.
636 SGDI II 1811; Samuel 1965.
637 Blavatskaja 1972. See also Duncan-Jones 1984; Wayne Tucker 1982.
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close to release prices, and conversely, that the release price was substantially higher.638 Price is the

most important factor in determining profit yet the price point must match what the buyer – in this

case, the slave – psychologically finds reasonable; otherwise, incentive for purchase is lost.639

Consequently, the price setting visible in Aitolian manumissions indicate that on average, 4 minae

were considered reasonable both for the seller and the buyer, which in turn suggests that release

prices was higher than market prices but only marginally so. Yet, from a subsistence point of view,

the difference is irrelevant. Comparing the cost of manumission to the cost of wheat, Hopkins

demonstrates that 4 minae, roughly the equivalent of 3 ½ tons of wheat, could feed a poor family

engaged in subsistence farming for three years.640 A majority of the Aitolian population probably

lived off small, rural farming operations run by an extended family unit; under such living

conditions, 3 ½ tons of wheat would make a substantial difference toward survival.

Yet, there is definite reason to believe that subsistence farmers did not engage in

manumission. The occupation of slaves was often defined by the livelihood of their owners.641

Consequently, their ability to accumulate and store wealth was dependent on the owners’ status,

income, and profession. This suggests that manumitting slave owners were not engaged in

subsistence farming; indeed, the institution was probably restricted to individuals of a certain

economic status.642 Female slaves manumitted at the sanctuary of Syrian Aphrodite at Phistyon had

several male owners each, suggesting that they may have been hetairai.643 Unfortunately, few other

documents indicate what the professions of owners were, and although we hear of the

638 Hopkins 1978 contra Westerman 1955.

639 See e.g. Parkinson 1960.
640 Hopkins 1978. While the comparison is illuminating, it is clear that coined money was involved at the time

of transaction: SGDI II 1953; Westermann 1948, 10.

641 Zeyrek 2006.
642 Blavatskaja (1972) believes all Aitolian manumittors to be members of noble and distinguished families.
643 IG IX 12 1:96a, 1:97 – 1:99, 1:106, 1:108. See Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005).
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manumission of a “skilled baker”, in most cases it is impossible to more closely determine how

slaves accrued and stored the wealth needed to purchase their own freedom.644

Unsurprisingly, manumission follows the now well-known Aitolian trend of intense activity

followed by rapidly escalating decline. Over 80% of Aitolian manumission documents date to the

first half of the second century BC, thus coinciding with the debt crisis. It seems likely that at this

time, slaves were manumitted at least in part to free up cash. The phenomenon did not lose its

cultural significance thereafter but rather, the sharp shift in manumission practices reflects familiar

socioeconomic changes.645 First, numismatic data has demonstrated that significantly less coinage

was in circulation in the latter half of the second century BC. The loss of monetary circulation thus

physically hindered slaves from accumulating and storing the wealth necessary for manumission.

Second, fewer people possessed the accrued wealth necessary to meet the risk involved in parting

with the income-generating labor of a trained slave. Most manumitted slaves were homeborn which

suggests that fewer slaves were purchased on the market or obtained – for free – through piracy

and warfare; in turn, this indicates an overall declining economy.646 Connectivity dwindled. Finally,

the sharp drop points to a fact also emphasized by Polybius: population decline.

6. The relationship between demographic effects and socioeconomic change.

Several scholars have cautioned against misreading Polybius 36.17, a passage whose objective is at

least partially moral: to demonstrate why the depopulation of Greek states was taking place.647

Population decline in the ancient world has been explained as a literary topos that utilized

oversimplified, impressionistic generalizations to advance a specific rhetoric, and this, too, applies

644 IG IX 12 3:630a.
645 Cf. the situation at Delphi where the tradition continued unbroken into the imperial period. See Zelnick-
Abramovitz 2005; Hopkins 1978; Bloch 1914.
646 Blavatskaja 1972.
647 Reger 2007; Tarn and Griffith 1952; Rostovtzeff 1941; Austin 2006, 148-149; Walbank 1957. On moralism

in Polybius, see Eckstein 1995b.

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to Polybius’ oliganthropia.648 Nevertheless, landscape contraction and site loss combined with a

lack of settlement nucleation strongly indicate a smaller population; moreover, the decline in site

activity – observed, for example, through the distinct drop in manumissions and the gradual

abandonment of formerly important socioeconomic institutions – is highly suggestive of a shrinking

population. At the time of Augustus’ arrival, the population of Aitolia was undeniably smaller than

150 years earlier. Corresponding evidence from Boiotia supports this conclusion.649

Naturally, population numbers are rarely static, and Roman census figures demonstrate a

decline in capita civium between 164 and 136 BC by no less than 6%.650 In the following period,

however, the Roman population bounced back. Such fluctuations are a natural demographic feature

as populations tend to increase when small and decrease when large.651 They may depend on

epidemics, war and food shortage.652 Yet, Late Hellenistic Boiotia did not experience the same

response but rather, its population decline was continuous. This depopulation has been explained

as a consequence of agricultural over-exploitation.653 Population growth in the fourth and third

centuries BC exerted too much pressure on subsistence and the biotope could simply not sustain

such a large population. In Boiotia’s case, then, population numbers were regulated by ecological

constraints.654

Despite noteworthy parallels, the depopulation of Aitolia cannot simply be explained in

terms of ecology and landscape constraints. The Aitolian countryside was never easily farmed like

Boiotia; therefore, its population relied on outside energy subsidies so greatly that their raid

mentality eventually became structurally essential for their survival. Rather than ecologically

648 Alcock 1993.

649 Binfliff 1997; Clark 1992. On Boiotian settlement contraction, see chapter 3.
650 Nicolet 1994; Brunt 1971.
651 Hixon, Pacala et al 2002; Engels 1984. The ancient world was embedded with numerous restraints on

population growth; warfare and migration were but two of them. See Chaniotis 2011: 2005.
652 Garnsey 1988.
653 Clark 1992.
654 Reger 2007;Hixon, Pacala et al 2002. Cf. Walsh (2000) who argues that the 170s BC debt crisis was a

regional, ecologically driven farm crisis.

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induced, the depopulation of Aitolia results from a complex process involving a multitude of

socioeconomic factors, all components of the “downward slope”.

The very complexity of the process is what made it so powerful. The mass exodus of Aitolian

mercenaries in the late third century BC had temporarily alleviated financially induced social

problems, but that same problem-solving mechanism deprived the exhausted landscape of the

manpower essential for agricultural restoration. Even if the majority of mercenaries eventually did

return home, their temporary dislocation had initiated landscape contraction. The conditions of the

Roman peace treaty hindered traditional problem-solving mechanisms from counteracting

escalating agro-economic problems, effectually causing a domino effect. Once in motion, negative

change was rapid. Ancient societies were ill-equipped for counteracting marginal decline since they

were structurally lacking in incentives toward technological invention and advancement in

agriculture.655 Thus, when traditional methods were no longer available to the Aitolians, they were

forced to replace them with less structurally suitable mechanisms. Yet, despite outside energy

subsidies no longer being available, the population could not disengage from their age-old raid

mentality which when turned inward, had disastrous effects. Debt crisis manifesting itself in civil

war was one such result. In this structurally imbalanced economy, new problem-solving

mechanisms emerged which were unsuitable both for the region and the population, population

decline being at the same time the most logical and the most impactful. Since demographic

conditions are major determinants of economic performance, sustained population decline can

have lasting negative effects on a society; so also Aitolia.656

If only two children reach adult age instead of four, the population is cut in half in a single

generation.657 If only one child reaches adult age, population decline occurs at a staggering 75%

within one generation. While astounding at first glance, such variations are not unreasonable in the

655 Tainter 1988; Burford 1993; Weber 1976.

656 Scheidel 2007.
657 This precludes that a rise in immigration or other population-regulating mechanisms take place.
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short-term as stability in population rates tends to correct itself over two or three generations.658 In

Aitolia’s case, however, recovery was impossible and although there is no numerical data

whatsoever, the general effects are apparent. When the population shrank, the farmed landscape

lost vital manpower. This lead to a smaller area in agricultural production which resulted in a

contracted energy subsidy; consequently, the only way for the population to remain within the vital

margin was to shrink. In this way, Aitolia adapted to the new conditions and constraints placed

upon it. Of course, the Aitolian population is unlikely to have possessed collective insight into

demographic checks and controls, but as a natural response it was perfectly logical. As a problem-

solving mechanism, however, it was poorly suited to the Aitolian landscape.

The effects of a smaller population were disastrous, especially in terms of sociopolitical

complexity.659 Economic institutions became difficult to manage and eventually ceased to exist,

depriving the region of vital socioeconomic connectivity. The agricultural base for economic life

became challenging to maintain. Eventually, the population had to transition to a lower level of

sociopolitical integration, abandoning the very structures that had previously characterized and

formalized their society.660 This is the background for Cicero’s Aetolia amissa; a population

demonstrating vital signs of system collapse.

7. Occupation and exhaustion: Rome and the Aitolian population in the first century BC.

The Aitolian people were not strangers to foreign occupation of their territory. Already in the

fourth century BC, Achaians had occupied Kalydon and Naupaktos.661 In more recent years, Pleuron

658 Engels 1984. The best studied example besides the city of Rome is Roman Egypt whose data verifies that
fluctuations overall corrected themselves: Bagnall and Frier 2006.
659 Tainter 1988.
660 Renfrew 1979.
661 Merker 1989.
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had been attached to Achaia; Herakleia had been occupied and then lost to the same koinon.662 Such

occupation was unlikely permanent albeit undoubtedly injurious to the socioeconomic framework

of individual town. In the second century BC, the Aitolians diligently stayed out of trouble, avoiding

participation in the Achaian War and only supporting Rome with a small contingent against

Perseus.663 The population and the federation appear to have maintained a policy of active

neutrality. Consequently, the Aitolians were spared such atrocities as the plundering of Epiros in

167 BC or the destruction of Corinth in 146 BC.664 Yet, between Khaironeia in 84 BC and the battle

of Actium in 30 BC, Greece was the scene for all decisive Roman campaigns, campaigns that can only

be described as lengthy, and even non-involved states were affected.665 As the setting for these

major Roman conflicts, the Greek states and their populations experienced the usual negative

effects of prolonged warfare without a chance of marginal improvement. Indeed, Greece became a

battlefield, and Aitolia too felt the effects, for example when Pompeius Magnus placed large

garrisons at Kalydon and Naupaktos.666 While the Roman army technically fed itself, food convoys

were brought in from afar, yet local resources could quickly become exhausted when an army

remained stationary. There are no detailed accounts for the events at Kalydon and Naupaktos

beyond the fact that Caesar’s general Calvisus threw out the enemy garrisons and then “possessed

himself of the whole country”, but numismatic evidence at Kalydon demonstrates the length and

intensity of Roman presence in the region. Some Aitolians were recruited into the large Roman

armies; we have already observed them in the armies of Sulla, Pompeius and Caesar.667 Such service

may have been forced rather than voluntary, a strong indication of the hardship of Roman military

662 See chapter 7; Grainger 1999, 534. Aymard (1938, 37.9 n. 3) believes that Pleuron was annexed by Achaia
in 168 BC but there is no direct evidence to this date.
663 See e.g. Grainger 1999, chapters 22 and 23. The literature on the Achaian war is extensive; see e.g. Gruen

1976b; Fuks 1970.

664 On the enslavement of the 150,000 inhabitants of Epiros, see Ziolkowski 1986; Oost 1954; Scullard 1945.

See also Gruen 1984.

665 Grainger 1999, 542.
666 Caesar BC 3.35.
667 See section 4 above.
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presence. For example, recently levied Aitolian troops deserted Pompeius for Caesar.668 It is clear

that the Aitolian people at large did not benefit from the lengthy presence of Rome’s troops. We are

ill informed of how Roman armies behaved during this time but the exhaustion of taxes, supplies,

forced labor and in some cases plunder can only have led to further decline.669 Cicero repeatedly

remarked on the desolate state of the Corinthian gulf in the 50s BC, arguing that Roman generals in

many ways were responsible for that desolation.670 Both Caesar and Pompey installed veteran

colonies on the north coast of the Peloponnese; after his successful campaigns in Cicilia, for

example, Pompeius settled a colony of pirates (!) at Dyme west of Patras.671 No such colonies were

officially established in Aitolia yet the introduction of a new permanent population suggests that

the local populations had become too small to successfully farm all available farmland; colonies

were rarely, if ever, established in the middle of active, productive centers.

Other Roman generals also injured Greece. Sulla, for example, is said to have extorted

money and equipment in Aitolia and Thessaly.672 Yet, other foreign, non-Roman groups also caused

harm to Central Greece. In c. 84 BC, a large contingent of raiding Thracians sacked the sanctuary at

Delphi and marauded their way through Greece.673 Moreover, the battle of Pharsalos was not the

end of Roman military presence. In the late 30s BC, Marcus Antonius stationed his armies and navy

along the west coast of the Peloponnese and Western Greece.674 Octavian’s general Agrippa

successfully harassed Antonius’ food convoys in a prolonged sequence that in many aspects

resembled guerilla warfare.675 While it is not clear whether Aitolia was part of these events, the

greater area of Western Greece was undoubtedly affected. Antonius’ army comprised nineteen

legions, perhaps totaling some 75,000 foot. His headquarters were at Patras, but when Agrippa took

668 Caesar BC 3.61.

669 Grainger 1999, 542.
670 in Pisonem 91, 96.
671 Plutarch Pompey 1.28.4.
672 Diodorus 38.9.7; Plutarch Sull. 12.3-6, 19.6; Appian Mith. 30.54. See also Shatzman 1975.
673 Appian BC 2.70; Grainger 1999, 542.
674 Plutarch Ant. 57.1, 58.1; Cassius Dio 50.9.2-3; Murray and Petsas 1989.
675 Cassius Dio 50.11.3; Vellius 2.84.2; Orosius 6.19.6; Murray and Petsas (1989).
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Patras and Corinth, thus cutting off Antonius from the Peloponnese, he was forced to move his

armies north toward the gulf of Ambrakia.676 The road to Actium went through Aitolia.

For the composition and size of Antonius’ troops, see Tarn 1932. On the campaign in general, see Tarn and
676

Charlesworth 1989.
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CHAPTER 9.
From indemnity to integration.

1. Features of decline.

The most illuminating features of Aitolian decline are the landscape itself, the structure of the

regional economy, and the series of exogenous shocks. While not powerful enough individually to

cause economic decline, their combination resulted in what I have labeled “the downward slope”.

1.1. Mountain and shore: the Aitolian landscape.

Aitolia’s landscape was an intrinsic feature of the region’s development in the Hellenistic period. As

the setting for civilization, the mountains and rocky shores were both constraining and enabling;

constraining, since the landscape was generally not suitable for farming; enabling, since it forced a

certain modus operandi upon the population which over the centuries enabled the formation of the

koinon and contributed to its success. The basis for economic activity was always agrarian, yet at

the time of the indemnity, the regional agriculture was exhausted. Constant warfare and loss of

manpower had led to a serious disruption of farming activities, a disruption of a type that causes

settlement contraction and thus demands time for recovery.

The indemnity happened at a most inopportune time. The inability to capture a new energy

subsidy forced reactivation of the exhausted countryside, depriving it of its necessary recovery

time. Importantly, the Aitolian landscape had never been able to fully sustain the needs of its

population, and the contracting countryside had long-term negative effects for all who dwelled in it.

For a population structurally dependent on expansion, population decline was the only long-term

solution to the new constraints. By compressing the shrinking population into areas best suitable

agriculturally and pastorally, the Aitolians resorted to the most natural form of problem-solving:

subsistence survival. In fact, in the Late Hellenistic period, the Aitolians may have had to rest on
 186

pastoralism to a greater extent than before. Due to settlement contraction, formerly farmed uplands

were now available for grazing again, a fact that may have facilitated survival for the best connected

sites.

1.2. The problem-solving koinon.

In this dissertation I have argued that the Aitolian federation was an important economic agent

which in fact formed the framework for most economic activity in the region. As a problem-solving

socioeconomic organization, the koinon was structurally formatted toward territorial expansion

and energy capture. This essential feature of its economy had grown out of the population’s

traditional way of life and constituted a coping mechanism that worked to reduce risk in the face of

preexisting ecological and geographical constraints.677 In fact, its expansionistic tendency was an

intrinsic part of its success. By integrating foreign territories into its organization, the federation

provided small, unimportant communities with both an international voice and a network that

offered improved connectivity and thereby, a socioeconomic upswing. For its own population, it

offered the opportunity for organized energy capture whenever agricultural constraints made

wealth accumulation impossible and survival difficult.

The failure of the Aitolian koinon almost exclusively depends on its expansionistic

characteristics; more so than on its stresses.678 The indemnity restricted its growth mechanism and

moreover, removed already captured subsidies that had been integrated into the economy. While

sufficiently sophisticated to negotiate relationships with the outside world, the federation lacked

the self-awareness to adjust structurally to internal problems. Consequently, the federation ceased

to be a problem-solving organization and as an obsolete, dysfunctional institution, its structural

collapse was inevitable.

677 Gallant 1991.

678 Renfrew 1979, 488.
 187

The loss of federal socioeconomic institutions held clear disadvantages for the population.

Aitolia could not sustain its population size and wealth when problem-solving mechanisms were

restricted and eventually lost. Without the koinon, Aitolia was transformed into a region of

relatively isolated towns – not even city-states. These local communities relied on each other for

resources and managed to sustain status quo, yet certain integral aspects of their economy could no

longer be maintained. Without the federation that had brought the people of the mountains to the

forefront of Greek affairs and offered access to international networks of exchange, the Aitolians

had to revert to a local system. No other organization could negotiate their relationship with the

outside world; no local polity was large and strong enough to assume the problem-solving role of

the collapsed federation.

1.3. Exogenous shock.

Persson has demonstrated that the smaller the economy, the more vulnerable it is to exogenous

shock.679 Never large, Aitolia’s agrarian-based economy was particularly sensitive to changes in its

structure. Reliant on expansion, it took a great deal of investment to maintain a delicate balance

between marginal improvement and full-fledged decline. All forms of external trauma had the

potential to affect such a system in the long-term; consequently, the federation sought to eliminate

the sources for such traumas, for example by incorporating large territories as shock-absorbers

against outside threats. Still, when rattled by exogenous shock, the system had to compensate for

the loss of energy – most often, through capture of a new energy subsidy. Yet, Aitolia had not had

time to compensate for the extended warfare in the late third century BC. Taking the form of

physical damage of buildings, removal of goods, agrarian decline, population removal and

landscape contraction, the wars can only be considered monumentally disruptive, and it would

679 Person 1988: 39, 127; Millett 2001.

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have taken a serious investment of energy to restore the equilibrium.680 The federation was

structurally equipped with the mechanisms to achieve that end, and had done so before.

Unfortunately, a second major exogenous shock – the indemnity of 189 BC – pushed the region

further into disrepair. This economic trauma was less straightforward in nature and it is not clear

whether the Aitolians completely comprehended the consequences. Not only were annexed energy

subsidies removed and bullion vital for a functional monetary economy driven out, but the

indemnity changed the very structure of federal coping mechanisms.

I have made the argument that the indemnity of 189 BC was not intended to cause the

“downward slope” evaluated in this dissertation. The conditions of the peace were not unbearably

harsh; in fact, in comparison to other polities, Rome asked very little of the Aitolian koinon. Yet, this

exogenous shock set in motion a complex chain-reaction from which the Late Hellenistic Aitolians

could not escape. Generally, exogenous shock had a physical effect – damaged goods, destroyed

farmlands, stolen booty – but the indemnity changed the very mechanisms of Aitolian problem-

solving; thus, its effects were structural. Such trauma could only be met with serious reorganization

of socioeconomic structures, but as an ancient state, Aitolia did not possess the sophistication or

complexity to meet that challenge.

2. Synthesizing the evidence: system collapse?

With a seriously restricted federation, socioeconomic institutions ultimately became obsolete.

Connectivity dwindled although was never entirely lost. Loss of local coin production restricted

monetary exchange which in return limited trade. The economy was never entirely demonetized

but the evidence suggests that significantly fewer people were integrated into the monetary

economy than in the late third century BC. Nevertheless, for a minor part of the population, the

680 There is plenty of comparative evidence for the serious disruptions of warfare; see Chaniotis 2005:137.
 189

monetized feature of exchange was evidently important enough to maintain at any cost. They

responded to the new monetary constraints by adopting foreign currencies. This signals a

surprisingly high level of monetary reliance for small pockets of the population and emphasizes the

range of integration within the population. Importantly, we find these monetarily engaged

individuals in the same towns that show the strongest signs of sustained connectivity.

In many aspects, Late Hellenistic Aitolia displays serious signs of loss of sociopolitical

complexity, the hallmark of system collapse.681 The most important feature of that collapse was the

fall of the federation at the end of the second century BC. Yet in its wake, a new system arose.

Significantly less complex, it consisted of individual towns and local communities who shared in no

larger, communal socioeconomic structures, yet they retained sufficient site-to-site connectivity to

survive. These communities predominantly relied on barter although pockets of the population

retained monetary integration. Importantly, any foreign coinage seems to have been acceptable

legal tender. While locally self-sufficient in terms of socioeconomic infrastructures, they seem to

have lacked the larger features necessary for greater integration; common legal structures being

the most essential. Thus, these communities lacked the ability to negotiate relationships with other

polities who maintained a higher level of socioeconomic complexity. Moreover, as less complex

societies, they were ill equipped to defend themselves against exogenous shock; thus, the

disastrous effects of Roman presence on the smaller Greek states in the first century BC.

A collapsed federation consequently did not equate a collapsed region – only a changed one.

From a broader chronological perspective, the Aitolian population quite successfully adapted to the

new constraints. The poor landscape had never been able to successfully sustain a large population

in the long-term, but could more easily support a small population partially engaged in pastoral

activities. By returning to a less complex form of society, smaller amounts of energy had to be

681 Tainter 1988; Renfrew 1979; Heitland 1962.

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invested in managing socioeconomic infrastructures. In fact, low levels of complexity are the norm;

seriously complex societies are recent in human history and thus unusual.682

What we observe in first-century-BC Aitolia is not a lost civilization but a natural and logical

response to new conditions: problem solving at its most organic. It is a rational economizing

process that seems to have evolved spontaneously. It is only in our modern eyes that a less complex

society is “bad”. Invariably, such bias is unhelpful and I invite caution when assessing negative

concepts such as “collapse” and “decline” in the ancient world. In Aitolia’s case, perhaps we should

no longer talk about “decline” but rather, about “change”.

3. The desolation of Late Hellenistic Greece: rhetoric, concept, reality.

The concept of desolation has determined how scholars view Greco-Roman interaction in the Late

Hellenistic and Early Roman periods. It has therefore influenced not only our interpretation of

interstate interaction but also generated a skewed image of the history of less researched Greek

states. Moreover, it has reinforced the idea of Roman hegemony in the East and thereby had a

profound effect on the eternal question of Greek freedom.683 In short, it is a singularly powerful

concept yet we can no longer support such broad generalizations resting on too narrow a reading of

eremia.

Desolation has been an intrinsic characteristic of the traditional narrative on Roman

involvement in Greece since the moment Romans first set foot on Greek soil, but only in more

recent years have scholars begun to reevaluate it as a literary topos. Often part of a victor’s

vocabulary, it is not a singularly Roman concept. Generally, eremia – desolation – and the closely

connected concept of oliganthropia are advanced as negative features of a location in opposition to

682 Tainter 1988, 198.

683 See e.g. Larsen 1935.
 191

the positive polyandria.684 As a rhetorical tool, desolation explains why something is done to a place

and outlines the moral justification for why the place does not attempt to defend itself against that

action. Strabo jokingly refers to Megalopolis as a desert but Polybius tells us that the city was

difficult to defend because of its eremia, thus offering a morally acceptable explanation for its

capture.685 Desolation is similarly a negative comment on the person causing it to happen. This is

part of Cicero’s ferocious attack on Piso in which he adds Aetolia amissa to a long list of regions on

which Piso has supposedly inflicted eremia.686 Naturally, Cicero’s statement cannot be taken at face

value as it is his aim to destroy his enemy, thus presenting Piso with great fictionality.687 Yet, the

Romans believed that they had the right to exploit their provinces but should do so with restraint;

clearly, there was an acute awareness that overexploitation could lead to eremia.688 At large, this is

how a morally charged concept achieved its rhetorical use.

It is difficult to ascertain what Strabo envisions when commenting on the eremia of Western

Greece or indeed the extent to which his use is rhetorical. Yet, Gallo has successfully demonstrated

that Strabo chiefly connects desolation with the absence of cities.689 Moreover, to Strabo, the turn to

pastoral activity, away from farming, constitutes a regression in the social and economic

development expected in a historical region. As such, Strabo’s rhetoric extrapolates economic

tendencies from superficial observation and assigns a lesser moral value to a region that has

allowed this “desolation” to happen. It is in this light that we must view the rhetorical use of eremia.

A landscape devoid of cities and thus of people is assumed to be poorly connected and thus possess

a lower level of socioeconomic complexity. Yet, this inquiry has demonstrated that despite

settlement nucleation and a visibly altered landscape, all features of civilization are still in place in

684 Alcock 1993.

685 Strabo 8.38.8; Polybius 2.55.2, 5.93.5.
686 In Pisonem 96. See Dugan 2001.
687 Nusbet 1961; Shatzman 1975.
688 Brunt 1988: 53-4.
689 Gallo 1979: 1980: 1984.
 192

“desolate” Aitolia. Aetolia amissa may consequently serve to reshape the concept of desolation and

thereby offer a reformed attitude toward Greco-Roman interaction in the first century BC.

The Aitolian landscape was undeniably less active at the time of Strabo than in the third

century BC, and the traces of that change were visible. Ruins of smaller sites could probably still be

seen among untilled fields, and the significantly smaller population appears to have concentrated to

a select few towns. These towns, I have demonstrated above, display overwhelming signs of

successful connectivity, but also signs of Late Hellenistic change. This, I believe, is the context for

Strabo’s interpretative eremia: it is the visible change that enables the rhetoric, not the supposed

failure of the surviving towns.

The desolation and emptiness of Aitolia can no longer be taken as historical fact.690 It is

rhetorical, conceptual and interpretative, but not an accurate reflection of the situation.

Fluctuations in settlement density are natural features of any landscape, as are fluctuations in the

level of sociopolitical and socioeconomic complexity of any civilization. In Graecia Capta, Alcock

poses the important question: how often is genuine depopulation actually intended in literary

sources?691 In the case of Aitolia, the answer is simultaneously positive and negative; negative,

because in the time of Strabo, the region was significantly different from two centuries earlier; but

also positive, because despite the depopulation of its countryside, Aitolia was not eremos. Neither

was it amissa.

4. Integration: Aitolia and Augustus.

The archaeology of Aitolia – especially at Kalydon – demonstrates that the region is unlikely to have

been part of a large-scale population resettlement in the early 20s BC. We may therefore begin to

re-examine the complicated process of Augustus’ reorganization of Western Greece in a more

690 See discussion in Petropoulos 2007.

691 Alcock 1993.
 193

nuanced manner. The Aitolian data indicates that the process aimed at improving sociopolitical

complexity through enhanced socioeconomic connectivity, not at simply moving people in an overt

display of power.692 By placing economic incentives at the forefront of the debate, we may now

appreciate the reorganization of Western Greece as an elaborate but poorly understood form of

problem solving. This dissertation has showed that Aitolia’s part in that problem solving is both

less involved and more complicated than has previously been assumed.

Not part of the synoicism, Aitolia must consequently have been considered adequately

complex to fit Augustus’ scheme, and perhaps also sufficiently populous. In fact, not depriving an

entire region of its population was distinctly advantageous. The erasure of whole territories was

terrible sociopolitical strategy: it made governmental control impossible and provided brigands,

pirates and outlaws with an unreachable base for operation.693 The region that held the important

road from Patras to Nikopolis had to maintain a satisfactory level of population density and thus

connectivity.694 Moreover, in the same way that Aitolia itself had used annexed territories as shock-

absorbers and energy sources, Augustus used Aitolia and other surrounding territories as

protection against potential damage, internal and external, of his newly founded settlements.

Despite our focus on Aitolia, it is vital to view no aspects of the synoicism of Nikopolis in

isolation. The roughly concomitant foundation of Nikopolis and the colony at Patras required a

complex reorganization of large tracts of land, the negotiation of urban and rural space, and the

detailed arrangement of administrative infrastructures.695 Such a multifaceted process had to

account for local features, assets and constraints, or it would invariably fail. It is in this light that we

must view the Aitolian integration into Augustus’ “New Greece”. The process was pragmatic, careful

692 On synoikistic resettlement in view of the foundation of victory cities, see Jones 1987.
693 Historically, Western Greece had been a notorious energy drain for the Romans; Illyrian and Epirote
pirates, quarrelsome Aitolians inviting Seleucid kings into their territory, incorrigible federal states – the list
is long. To leave Aitolia empty – and thus open to pirates – would have made little sense from a historical
perspective.
694 Petropoulous 2007.
695 There is some evidence that colonia Aroe Augusta Patrae was officially founded in 16 BC, at the time of

Agrippa’s travels in the East, although the veteran settlement may have arrived earlier. Castrén 1974: Frei-
Stolba 1978-79; Grant 1946; Keppie 1983. For the name of the colony, see Agallapoulou 1991; Rizakis 1989.
 194

and evaluative; each involved polity was treated differently, and to assume a similar approach to

populations and cities that varied tremendously in size, composition and complexity is to

underestimate the sophistication of the Roman apparatus.

Yet, despite its lack of involvement in the Nikopolitean synoicism and function as a

territorial shock-absorber, Aitolia was not excluded from the Augustan plan. In comparison to

Aitolia’s size as an energy subsidy, the Aitolian population was deemed small enough that the

Roman government saw fit to inject the region with the manpower needed to make use of untapped

resources. Consequently, part of Kalydon’s chora was handed over to the Roman colonists at Patras,

probably soon after the arrival of the new settlers.696 This was a logical decision. Having identified

an easily maintained energy source for the new settlers across the gulf, Augustus safeguarded

against marginal decline in the new colony, and simultaneously improved connectivity for the

Aitolian coastal cities. In view of the unbroken, unaltered activity at Kalydon, this phenomenon can

only mean that the resource was large enough to share, and simultaneously, confirms what the

landscape contraction has already indicated: that local populations were substantially smaller than

in the third century BC. Such injection of “labor” sought to stimulate trade and make use of easily

obtainable resources. It is likely to have happened elsewhere, although Kalydon and Naupaktos are

our only known examples.697

This new reading invites reconsideration of Pausanias’ account of Patras, an account that

has been used in the traditional interpretation of the Augustan reorganization of Western Greece.

There, the traveler saw the cult statues of Artemis and Dionysos originally housed in the sanctuary

at Kalydon, leading modern scholars to conflate Strabo’s and Pausanias’ accounts of the Roman

integration into a single Augustan narrative.698 Against the background of sustained activity at

Kalydon, I posit that the cult statues were not moved at the time of the foundation of Nikopolis, but

696 Strabo 10.2.21.There is no physical evidence of this “large lake full of fish”. For geological investigations in
the area, see Strand Pedersen 2000: 2004.
697 For Naupaktos, see the funerary inscription AD 28 (1973) B2 395.
698 Pausanias 7.18.8-9; Osanna 1996; Imhoof-Blumer and Gardner 1984; Arafat 1996.
 195

rather, at some point in the first century AD, perhaps the middle of the century when activity at

Kalydon came to a halt – indeed, after the Augustan period. At that time, it was only natural that the

sculpture be taken to Patras rather than to Nikopolis, since the colonists across the water had been

present in Kalydon’s chora for at least a generation. This may have coincided with the last remnants

of Kalydon’s population moving to Amphissa.699

5. Where now? Suggestions for further study.

In this dissertation, Aitolia has been the case study for a detailed appreciation of the applicability of

New Institutional Economics. This method can no longer be considered inappropriate for ancient

material; in fact, to successfully study the ancient economy and thus ancient society we must

include regions and time periods that are not represented by canonical economic data. The road

ahead is clear. In chapter 3, I outlined the extreme similarities between Aitolian landscape

contraction and the concomitant loss of settlement density in other Greek regions in the Late

Hellenistic period. Not all regions had the same level of involvement with Rome as Aitolia, and

history tells us that they suffered different forms of endogenous and exogenous shock. Yet,

considering the similarities in settlement nucleation, a formal inquiry into the mechanisms of their

decline according to the same parameters as the present study is very much worthwhile as this

would generate a litmus test for the effects of Roman involvement in Late Hellenistic Greece. In

Aitolia, the exogenous shock of 189 BC caused a structural collapse of the socioeconomic

framework, but other regions may have responded differently. A closer study of Achaia may be

especially meaningful considering the violent destruction of Corinth in 146 BC and the first-

century-BC Roman colonies at Corinth, Dyme and Patras, but closer examination of Akarnania, too,

699 Pausanias 7.18.8-9, 10.38.4.

 196

is vital. Here, Hoepfner identifies physical destruction in connection with the synoicism.700 Detailed

analysis of Akarnanian sites can shed invaluable light on the economic features of the Nikopolitean

synoicism and at the same time, improve our understanding of the rhetorical or interpretative use

of eremia. Collapse, I have argued, is generally dependent on the characteristics of a society rather

than on its stresses. A close examination of the reaction to decline invites a more nuanced

understanding of the problem-solving mechanisms of these non-royal Hellenistic states, their

institutions and socioeconomic framework. Consequently, the formal reading of decline presented

in this dissertation can both shed light on poorly understood Hellenistic states as well as further

contextualize the historical narrative of Late Hellenistic Greece and the arrival of Rome.

Beyond the focus on Late Hellenistic Greece, this study has illuminated the importance of

giving proper attention to conflicts, especially in the Braudelian medium-term.701 When studying

war in the ancient world we often lose interest after its conclusions. The historical narrative tends

to follow the army and the victor, not the defeated, and so, too, scholarly attention. Yet, it is the

defeated who may inform us of the social, political, economic, demographic and ecological effects of

warfare – precisely the kind of information necessary for a deeper understanding of the ancient

world at large, which this study has illustrated. Moreover, the present study invites careful

reconsideration of the long-term mechanisms of war indemnities from an economic point of view.

Between 201 and 188 BC, Rome subjected foreign polities to no less than six large indemnities;

ancient literature is studded with countless more examples.702 Their short-term and long-term

effects are still poorly understood, as are their socioeconomic functions and sociopolitical uses.

Considering the disastrous effect the indemnity of 189 BC had on the Aitolian federation, omitting

indemnities from the discussion on ancient economies can no longer be accepted.

700 Hoepfner 1987.

701 Bintliff 1997: Braudel 1972a: 1972b: 1994.
702 201 BC: Carthage, 10,000 talents | 196 BC: Philip V, 200 + 1,000 talents | 195 BC: Nabis of Sparta, 500

talents | 189 BC: Aitolia, 200 + 300 talents | 188 BC: Antiochos III, 12,000 talents | 188 BC: Ariarathes of
Kappadokia, 300 talents. See Visonà 1988. List of indemnities in le Rider 1992.
 197

Aitolia itself still needs closer examination. There is some evidence that the reorganization

of Western Greece was incomplete – that is, not fully developed politically. In the first century AD,

the Naupaktian Gaius Aristodamos was honored with a statue at Delphi. The inscription fails to use

the ethnic of Patras, which would be expected for a Roman in the area.703 Kirsten and Kraiker

interpret this as conclusive evidence that Naupaktos did not belong to the Roman population in

Achaia and thus invite caution in assessing the “Roman” status of Central Greece in the Early Roman

period.704

By applying the same formal inquiry to the region after the Augustan integration of Western

Greece, we may develop the microscopic approach necessary to fully elucidate the complicated

scenario in which Kalydon was finally abandoned. Detailed evaluation of Early Roman remains will

invariably help illuminate the Aitolian tabula rasa, both specifically, for example, the time frame for

when the cult objects from Kalydon were moved to Patras, and generally, for example the manner

in which the region responded to the reorganization of surrounding territories and the infusion of

settlers across the gulf. Thereby, we may evaluate Kirsten and Kraiker’s suggestions on the

incomplete political reorganization of Greece against physical evidence. Moreover, deeper

appreciation of Early Roman Aitolia may help contextualize the network of communication

between Nikopolis and Patras, a not insignificant factor for the greater appreciation of Graecia

Capta (1993).

Yet, certain aspects of Late Hellenistic Aitolia are still poorly understood, leaving this

inquiry partially inconclusive. Further excavation of Aitolian towns is essential to fully

contextualize the complicated issue of its second- and first-century-BC history. I have argued

against the blanket statement of complete desolation and instead interpreted the evidence as the

emergence of a new, less sociopolitically complex system, yet further excavation is vital to truly

determine whether this phenomenon was region-wide, or simply restricted to the few sites that

703 FdD III 1,1929 = SEG 26 (1976-77) no. 626; BCH 100 (1976) 759; Petropoulos 1991.
704 Kirsten and Kraiker 1967.
 198

have received the most excavation. Only then can we fully appreciate the complicated path Aitolia

took on its “downward slope” from indemnity to integration.

 199

APPENDIX 1
A. Site gazetteer 1.

Sites with physical Late Hellenistic remains. [Brackets] indicate the site number assigned by
Bommeljé et al 1987.1 Site number corresponds to those in Figure 5.

1. Agios Ilias [511-157]

Located near the Acheloos river, identified with ancient Ithoria. The fortified settlement is
located on a hilltop; remains of Hellenistic buildings are preserved. The Mycenaean tholos
tombs in the cemetery have received the most attention but Hellenistic graves exist. The only
datable Late Hellenistic material is the funerary stele IG IX 12 1:134 – first century BC.
Site function: habitation, cemetery.2

2. Agia Sofia [225-86]

Located NW of Thermon. IG IX 12 1:33 – 184/3 BC; IG IX 12 1:35 – 142/1 BC; IG IX 12 1:92 –
second century BC. Blocks from Hellenistic temple to Artemis Hegemone built into Byzantine
churches of Agios Nikolaos and Agios Taxiarchis. Excavations have revealed a small
monumental tomb containing Late Hellenistic pottery.
Site function: sanctuary, cemetery.3

3. Agios Symeon/Chilia Spitia [371-125]

Identified with ancient Halikyrna. Located between Kalydon and Pleuron. Excavation and
survey have revealed mostly Hellenistic material, some seemingly Late Hellenistic.
Site function: habitation.4

4. Agios Thomas [428-132]

Located on plain near Mesolongi. Richly built Macedonian tomb containing second century
BC Sikyonian coins. Survey noted nearby scatter of Hellenistic pottery and architectural
remains.
Site function: cemetery, [habitation?]. 5

5. Agrinion [X]
Coin hoards: CH I, 76 – early second century BC; IGCH 271 – c. 120 BC.
Site function: ?6

6. Angelokastro [509-156B]
Identified with ancient Konope/Arsinoe, located centrally on the Lake Lysimacheia plain.
Excavations have revealed a built tomb dating to the second century BC, finds including leaves
from a golden wreath and an inscribed lead vessel. Inscribed stele possibly contemporary.
Associated with this site is Kakkavaria [515-159B] which appears to have served as the local

1 AD and related bibliography is only given when not cited in Petropoulous 1991, Bommeljé et al 1987, or Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.
2 Petropoulos 1991, 101; Bommeljé et al 1987, 74; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 86; Woodhouse 1897, 154ff.
3 AD 44 (1989) Chron. 139; Bommeljé et al 1987, 73; Woodhouse 1897, 206-8.
4 Bommeljé et al 1991, 74; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 86; Woodhouse 1897, 114.
5 AD 44 (1989) Chron 139, Ill. 13, Plates 87b, 88a, 88b. Very similar to Nea Pleuron tomb.
6 Thompson 1968.
 200

necropolis. Excavation and survey have revealed Hellenistic and Roman remains, plus the
inscription IG IX 12 1:131 – 184/3 BC.
Arsinoe strategoi: Straton 166/5 BC, Straton 159/8 BC, Ladikos 158/7 BC, Ladikos 151/0
BC, […]as 144/3 BC, Satyros 143/2 BC, Satyros 136/5 BC, Satyros 129/8 BC.
Arsinoe hipparchoi: Ladikos 166/5 BC, Philoxenos 143/2 BC, Menelaos 142/1 BC.
Arsinoe proxenia sponsorship: 185/4 BC – IG IX 12 1:32, 185/4 BC – IG IX 12 1:71b.
Site function: habitation, cemetery.7

7. Aspropyrgos [582-194]
Located in southern section of modern prefecture of Evrytania in Panaitoliko mountains.
Dutch team noted a single fragment of Late Hellenistic/Early Roman terra sigillata among
Hellenistic and Roman surface pottery.
Site function: habitation.8

8. Dafnias [471-141]
Located on south bank of Lake Trichonion. Reported buildings unverified; Dutch survey
team noted Western terra sigillata among Hellenistic surface pottery on a terrace near scattered
tooled Hellenistic blocks.
Site function: habitation.9

9. Gavalou [463-137]
Identified with ancient Trichonion. Located south of Lake Trichonion. IG IX 12 1:121 – mid-
second century BC. Elaborate tomb dating to very early second century BC. Excavation of
cemetery has revealed rich Late Hellenistic finds including stelai and gold wreaths. The nearby
sanctuary site must be the temple of Asklepios, where recent excavation has revealed several
buildings and votive offerings including clay limbs. Ruins of ancient city were detected during
work on temple.
Trichonion strategoi: Nikandros 190/89 BC, Dikaiarchos 187/6 BC, Nikandros 184/3 BC,
Proxenos 183/2 BC, Thoas 181/0 BC, Nikandros 177/6 BC, Thoas 173/2 BC, Teisippos 163/2
BC, Damotimos 160/59 BC, Kritolaos 157/6 BC, Teisippos 156/5 BC, Dorimachos II 147/6 BC,
Dorimachos II 140/39 BC.
Trichonion hipparchoi: Alexomenos 185/4 BC, Kritolaos 165/4 BC, [name unknown] 141/0
BC.
Trichonion grammateis: Alexandros 142/1 BC.
Trichonion proxenia sponsorship: 185/4 BC – IG IX 12 1:32, 184/3 BC – IG IX 12 1:33, 141/0
BC – IG IX 12 1:34d.
Site function: habitation, cemetery, sanctuary. 10

7 AD 31 (1976) Chron. 171; Petropoulos 199, 100; Bommeljé et al 1987, 77, 94; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 89, 91; Cohen 1995, 109-110;
Woodhouse 1897, 209ff; Pritchett 1989, 136-137.
8 Bommeljé et al 1987, 78; Petropoulos 1991, 100; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 93.
9 Bommeljé et al 1987, 79; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 93.
10Antonetti 1990, 239; Bommeljé et al 1987, 83; Petropoulos 1991, 107; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 89; AD 52 (1997) B1: 300; AD 54

(1999) B1; 271; Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2009; Zapheiropoulou 2000; Woodhouse 1897, 232ff; Pritchett 1989, 132-133.
 201

10. Kalydon [411-127]

Identified with ancient Kalydon. Located on the west bank of the Evinos. Excavation has
revealed extensive Late Hellenistic structures including an inner town sanctuary, a Heroon, a
subterranean barrel-vaulted tomb and domestic complexes. Datable Late Hellenistic finds
consist of statuary, coins, inscriptions, pottery, architectural terracottas and votive offerings
dating through the first century BC into the first century AD. IG IX 12 1:137 – 130/120 BC, IG IX
12 1:140 – mid-second century BC, IG IX 12 1:145 – second century BC; IG IX 12 1:139 – 84 BC, IG
IX 12 1:147 – first century BC.
Kalydon strategoi: Alexandros I 185/4 BC, Phylax 162/1 BC, Phylax 155/4 BC, Alexandros II
154/3 BC, Arkison 150/49 BC, Phylax 149/8 BC, Phylax 142/1 BC, Phylax 135/4 BC, Lykopos
late second century BC, Nikias late second century BC.
Kalydon proxenia sponsorship: 185/4 BC – IG IX 12 1:32, 129/8 BC – IG IX 12 1:137b.
Site function: habitation, urban sanctuary, cemetery.11

11. Kato Khrysovitsa [240-90A]

Located SE of Thermon. Hellenistic and Roman finds reported; site now largely destroyed.
Site function: ?12

12. Kato Mammako [22-4A]

Possibly ancient Makyneia, located on a hilltop overlooking the plain West of Naupaktos.
Dutch survey team noted Hellenistic and Roman surface pottery among earlier buildings,
including Late Hellenistic/Early Roman terra sigillata.
Site function: habitation.13

13. Kato Vasiliki [10-2B]

Located on a hilltop in the narrow valley east of Mount Varasova, identified with ancient
Chalkis. Excavation and survey have revealed an active Hellenistic site with pottery dating to
the second and first centuries BC and some coins dating to the second century BC. Some Early
Hellenistic graves have no Late Hellenistic counterparts.
Site function: habitation.14

Koniska [X]
Northeast of Thermon. Coin hoard: IGCH 266 – early first century BC. The small modern
village has received no autopsy.
Site function: ?15

14. Kryonneron [219-84]

Possibly identified with temple of Syrian Aphrodite ‘en Hieridais’ of Phistyon, located north
of Lake Trichonion. IG IX 12 1:96b – c. 150 BC; IG IX 12 1:97 - IG IX 12 1:109, IG IX 12 1:111 – first

11 Petropoulos 1991, 110; Bommeljé et al 1987, 86; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 90; Dyggve 1934; Bollen 2011a: 2011b; Dietz 2005:
2011a: 2011b; Dietz, Kolonas et al 2007; Dietz and Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2009: 2011a: 2011b; Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2010; Woodhouse 1897,
91ff.
12 Woodhouse 1897, 247-8; Petropoulos 1991, 111; Bommeljé et al 1987, 89; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 94.
13 Petropoulos 1991, 111; Bommeljé et al 1987, 93; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 94; Stiros, Psimoulis et al 2005.
14 Alexopoulou 2000; Alexopolou 2004; Bommeljé et al 1987, 112; Dietz 1998.
15 ADelt 19 (1964) Chron. 9-10.
 202

half of second century BC; IG IX 12 1:110 – first century BC. Dutch team noted Hellenistic surface
pottery. The town of Phistyon, whose Late Hellenistic activity is known through the
aforementioned inscriptions, must be located nearby, possibly at Neromanna [220-84A].
Phistyon had its own local archon (e.g. IG IX 12 1:99 – 103).
Site function: sanctuary, [habitation].16

15. Kyparissos [161-72]

Located on the North side of Mount Panaitoliko. Reports of Hellenistic graves and of
funerary inscriptions dating to second and first centuries BC.
Site function: cemetery. 17

16. Lysimacheia [515-159A]

Identified with ancient Lysimacheia. IG IX 12 1:130 – possibly Late Hellenistic. The walled
settlement is in desperate need of excavation.
Site function: habitation.18

17. Megali Chora [325-118A]

Identified as ancient Agrinion by Early Hellenistic inscriptions. Remains of Roman building;
mix of Late Hellenistic pottery with terra sigillata.
Agrinion strategoi: Hybistas 165/4 BC.
Site function: habitation.19

18. Naupaktos [1-1A]

Identified as ancient Naupaktos. Rescue excavation has yielded plenty of Hellenistic and
Early Roman remains including graves located in two cemeteries, the [Classical] sanctuary of
Athena, portions of the ancient city wall and numerous domestic structures, but no systematic
investigation of the town has been carried out. A large Macedonian tomb dates to the second
century BC. Coin hoards: IGCH 244 – c. 175-150 BC, IGCH 317 – c. 110 BC. IG IX 12 3:631 – 643,
IG IX 12 3:645 – second century BC, ADelt 28 (1973) Chron. 1975 – post 23/21 BC. Naupaktos
had at least two known local magistrates; grammateus and agonothetes.
Naupaktos hipparchoi: Lykos 181/0 BC.
Naupaktos proxenia sponsorship: 185/4 BC – IG IX 12 1:32.
Site type: habitation, urban sanctuary, cemetery.20

19. Paralova [294-111]

A large fortified settlement located on the north shore of Lake Trichonion, identified as
ancient Boukation. Graves noted during Dutch survey. No datable Late Hellenistic material
except for IG IX 12 1:114 – second century BC which is funerary in nature.
Site type: cemetery, [habitation].21

16 Bommeljé et al 1987, 91.

17 Antonetti 1987, 106ff; Bommeljé et al 1987, 91; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 94.
18 Bommeljé et al 1987, 94; Pritchett 1989, 131; Cohen 1995, 114-115; Pritchett 1989, 136.
19 ADelt 31 (1976) Chron. 166 – 169; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 91; Wodhouse 1897, 169.
20 Petropoulos 1991, 113; Bommeljé et al 1987, 99; Stavropoulou-Gatsi and Saranti 2009; Kolia and Saranti 2004; Woodhouse 1897,

309ff. AD after 1991: AD 47 (1992) B1; AD 48 (1993) B1; AD 49 (1994) B1; AD 52 (1997) B1; AD 53 (1998) B1; AD 54 (1999), B1.
 203

20. Pleuron [406-126A]

Located on tall outcrop above Mesolongi plain. Very well preserved remains of a fortified
Hellenistic settlement with a theater, cistern, lengthy walls with towers, stoas and other
buildings, all presumably built after the destruction of “Old Pleuron”.22 Datable Late Hellenistic
material is exclusively funerary and includes a large Macedonian type tomb.
Pleuron strategoi: Pantaleon 186/5 BC, Pantaleon 180/79 BC, Pantaleon 174/3 BC.
Site type: cemetery, habitation.23

21. Sitaralona [224-85C]

Located at the East end of Lake Trichonion. Reports of an early Roman brick building atop
Hellenistic foundations.
Site type: habitation?24

22. Skala [59-18A]

Located North of Naupaktos near the river Ska, identified as the Asklepeion “en Krounois”,
possibly in the vicinity of unidentified ancient Bouttos. IG IX 12 3:631-643, IG IX 12 3:645 –
second century BC, IG IX 12 3: 646 – first century BC.
Site function: sanctuary.25

23. Thermon [190-78]

Identified as ancient Thermon. Second century BC monumental bases, first century BC
graves sunk into corner of western stoa. IG IX 12 1:4; IG IX 12 1:32 – 36; IG IX 12 1:46 – 48; IG IX
12 1:69; IG IX 12 1:71 – 76 – second century BC. IG IX 12 1:78 – possibly first century BC.
Site function: federal sanctuary; changed to cemetery in first century BC.26

24. Velvina [33-7A]

Located on hillock overlooking western end of Naupaktos plain, identified with ancient
Molykreion. IG IX 12 3:607 – early second century BC. Hellenistic surface pottery. The Doric
temple and structures are earlier in date.
Molykreion hipparchoi: Phrikon 168/7 BC.
Molykreion proxenia sponsorship: 142/1 BC - IG IX 12 1:35.
Site function: habitation, sanctuary?27

25. Vlachomandra [30-6]

Located on the east bank of the Evinos, Northwest of Naupaktos. Coin hoard: ADelt 1889, E –
second century BC. Hellenistic surface pottery.
Site function: habitation.28

21 Bommeljé et al 1987, 101; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 94; Woodhouse 1897, 190ff.
22 Strabo 10.2.4.
23 Bommeljé et al 1987, 104; AD 44 (1989): B1. 139-141; Woodhouse 1897, 115-24.
24 Bommeljé et al 1987, 106; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 92; Woodhouse 1897, 242.
25 Bommeljé et al 1987, 106; Woodhouse 1897, 331ff.
26 Bommeljé et al 1987, 109; Petropoulos 1991, 109; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 92; Woodhouse 1897, 243ff; Pritchett 1989, 128;

Papapostolou 2004; Papapostolou 2009.

27 Bommeljé et al 1987, 112; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 93; Woodhouse 1897, 324ff.
28 AD (1889), E; Bommeljé et al 1987, 112.
 204

26. Vomvokou [34-8B]

Located northwest of Naupaktos. Dutch team noted Late Hellenistic/Early Roman pottery.
Site function: habitation?29

29 Petropoulos 1991, 106; Bommeljé et al 1987, 113; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 41; Woodhouse 1897, 337.
 205

B. Site gazetteer 2.

Sites mentioned in Late Hellenistic sources but without a known physical location. All sites, being
used as toponyms, are considered habitation sites.

Name Epigraphy: Epigraphy: place League official Latest

mentioned as place of origin for datable
of origin, for manumitting S = strategos mentioni
example for a owner31 G = grammateus ng of site
witness in H = hipparchos
manumission or
sponsor of federal
proxenia [P] (origin
of inscription)30
1 Aithaneia SGDI II 1949 185 BC
(Delphi)
2 Akotion 3:634a 141 BC
(Naupaktos)
3 Ambrysion SGDI II 1810 170 BC
(Delphi)
4 Apeirikos SGDI II 1949 S – 1: Nikidas 141/0 141/0 BC
(Delphi) BC
G – 1: Alexandros
168/7 BC
5 Axios SGDI II 1951 184 BC
(Delphi)
6 Boukation 1:101, 1:103 (both 1:97, 1:99, 1:106 163 BC
Phistyon) (all Phistyon)
7 Bouttos 3:638,9, 3:638,11- 136 BC
-probably near 12, 3:638,7,
Skala [59-18A] 3:639,6-7,
3:639,5-6,
-town had own 3:639,3, 3:639,9-
archon, e.g. 11, 3:634b,
3:638,11 3:638,1-2,
3:638,6, 3:638,8,
3:635a-b
(all Naupaktos)
8 Chaleius/ SGDI II 2037, SGDI 167 BC
Chaleieus II 1734, SGDI II
1726, SGDI II
1729 (all Delphi)
9 Daianon 1:100 (Phistyon) 170 BC
10 Dardeon 1:99 (Phistyon) 170 BC
11 Dexieus SGDI II 1818 170-156 BC
(Delphi)
12 Dryopaios SGDI II 1863 176 BC
(Delphi)
13 Erinaios SGDI II 1949, SGDI 167 BC

30 IG IX 12 unless otherwise noted.

31 IG IX 12 unless otherwise noted.
 206

II 1786, SGDI II
1783, SGDI II
1888 (all Delphi),
14 Erythrai 1:32 [P] (Thermon) G – 1: Agathon 185/4 185/4 BC
BC
15 Euantheia SGDI II 1951 184 BC
(Delphi)
16 Eupalion 3:640a 148/7 BC
(Naupaktos)
17 Herakleia SGDI II 1959 184 BC
(Delphi)
18 Hermattos SGDI II 1843 174 BC
(Delphi)
19 Histiaia 3:638,5 Mid-2nd
(Naupaktos) cent. BC
20 Hypata/ 1:4b [P] (Thermon) S – 2: Eupolemos 176/5 BC
Hypataion 189/8 BC,
Eupolemos 176/5 BC
21 Isos SGDI II 1949 185 BC
(Delphi)
22 Istorion 3:638,5, 3: 634b 3:638,3 141 BC
(both Naupaktos) (Naupaktos)
23 Kaphreia/eis 3:633 (Naupaktos) 3:632, 3:639,12 150 BC
(both Naupaktos)
24 Kyteinion? FdD III 6,13 Late 2nd
(Delphi) cent. BC
25 Lamia SGDI II 2234 184 BC
(Delphi)
26 Lechoion 1:102 (Phistyon) 166 BC
27 Lilaia SGDI II 2234 SGDI II 1747 170-156 BC
(Delphi) (Delphi)
28 Machatos/ G – 1: Stomios 168/7 168/7 BC
Machetion BC
29 Medeonion SGDI II 2057 182 BC
(Delphi)
30 Myaneus/eis? SGDI II 2076 180 BC
(Delphi)
31 Oaxos S – 1: A[ntochos] 164/3 BC
164/3 BC
32 Oiantheia SGDI II 2245, SGDI 156-151 BC
II 1997, SGDI II
1908 (all Delphi)
33 Oikyleia 3:618 (Naupaktos) 200-180 BC
34 Oinastion 3:640a 148/7 BC
(Naupaktos)
35 Oinoaia FdD III 3,54 160 BC
36 Oribaton 1:137a (Kalydon) 130-120 BC
37 Panphion 1:105 (Phistyon) 162 BC
38 Peleos SGDI II 2135 177 BC
(Delphi)
39 Pelene 1:97 (Phistyon) 184 BC
40 Phalikaia SGDI II 2134, SGDI 140-100 BC
II 2136 (both
Delphi)
 207

41 Philotaion 1:97, 1:100, 1:108 1:96b (Phistyon) 142 BC

(Phistyon)
42 Pholas S – 4: Archedamos 171/0 BC
188/7 BC,
Archedamos 182/1
BC, Archedamos
175/4 BC, Proandros
171/0 BC
43 Phyllaion 3:634a 3:639, 3:633, 140 BC
(Naupaktos) 3:639,2
(Naupaktos)
44 Phytaion S – 1: Panaitolos 167/6 BC
167/6 BC
45 Phyrtaion SGDI II 1949 185 BC
(Delphi)
46 Potaneia/ SGDI II 2137 SGDI II 2058 140-100 BC
Potanaion (Delphi) (Delphi)
47 Potidania 3:632 (Naupaktos) 153 BC

-town had own

archons
48 Porion 3:638,13, 140 BC
3:640b, 3:639,1
(Naupaktos)
49 Proennion 1:109 (Phistyon) Mid-2nd
cent. BC
50 Proscheion32 1:101, 1:108 Mid-2nd
(Phistyon) cent. BC
51 Rhadeon 1:96b (Phistyon) 1:108 (Phistyon) 142 BC
52 Skarphis SGDI II 1996, SGDI 170 BC
II 1756 (Delphi)
53 Sostehenes 1:71c [P] S – 1: Polemarchos 168/7 BC
(Thermon) 168/7 BC
54 Spattos 3:638,11 151 BC
(Naupaktos)
55 Thaion 3:638,13 Mid-2nd
(Naupaktos) cent BC
56 Tnimaion 1:105 (Phistyon) 170-150 BC
57 Tragantion 1:109 (Phistyon) Mid-2nd
cent BC
58 Triteus SGDI II 1730, SGDI 170-156 BC
II 1818, SGDI II
1734 (Delphi)

32 Strabo (10.2) notes that the Homeric Pylene was renamed Proscheion by the Aitolians.
 208

APPENDIX 2
Activity before 189 BC.

A. Aitolian federal grants of isopoliteia, politeia, proxenia, asylia etc. until 189 BC.

Inscription Date Origin of Isopoliteia Politeia Proxenia Asylia Other35

33 recipient34

1:3 262 BC Akarnania X Symmachia

1:4c-d 224/3 BC Magnesia X X
1:5 290/89 BC Chaleis, X
Korinth
1:6 300-250 Achaia X X X Asphaleia
BC
1:7 263/2 BC Phokis X
1:8 300- Pronnion X X Asphaleia
250 BC on
Kephallonia
1:9 300- Aleios X
250 BC
1:10a 273/2 BC ? X
1:10c ? X
1:10b II ? X X
1:11a 245 BC Korinth X X
1:11c 245 BC Ambrakia X X
1:11d 245 BC [I] X X
1:11e 245 BC [I] X X Asphaleia
1:11f 245 BC [I] X X
1:11g 245 BC Phokis X
1:12a 272 BC Amphissa, X X
Lysimachei
a
1:12b 272 BC [I] X
1:12c 272 BC [I] X
1:12d 272-60 BC Aigion X X X Asphaleia
(Achaia)
1:12e 272-60 BC Bouras X X X Asphaleia
(Achaia)
1:12f 272-260 X
BC
1:12h 272-60 BC Messene? X
1:12i 272-60 BC X

33 IG IX 12 if not otherwise noted.

34 Bold denotes that grant was awarded to an entire city or population, not simply to an individual. [I]
indicates that grant appears to have been awarded to an individual although his or her place of origin, and
name, are unknown.
35 Asterisk denotes honor not preserved.
 209

1:13 I 271/0 BC X X
1:13 II 271/0 BC Athens X X
1:13 III 271/0 BC Megalopolis X X
1:13 IV 271/0 BC Megalopolis X X
1:13 V 271/0 BC Glauka? X X Asphaleia
1:13 VI 271/0 BC Phiale X X Asphaleia
1:13 VII 271/0 BC Knidos X X Asphaleia
1:13 VIII 271/0 BC Gergethieus X X
1:13 IX 271/0 BC Thessaly? X X Asphaleia
1:13 X 271/0 BC Dyme X X Asphaleia
1:13 XI 271/0 BC Histiaia X X
1:13 XII 271/0 BC Histiaia X X
1:14 287-262 Adaneis X X X Asphaleia
BC
1:16a 300-250 X X X Asphaleia
BC
1:16c 300-250 X X X Asphaleia
BC
1:16 b.b 300-250 X
BC
1:17a I 260 – 230 Athens, *
BC Eresia,
Melitaion,
Messene,
Larisa
(several),
Megalopolis
, Sikyon,
Karystion,
Amphipolis,
Mitylene,
Macedonia
(several),
Pellene,
Echina,
Peparethio
n (several),
Eretria,
Rhodes
(several),
Torthyneus
?, Challkis
(several),
Kalkadonia,
Ambrakia,
Athens,
Sikyon,
Olkaion
1:17a II 260 – 230 Rome, *
 210

BC Pellene,
Achaia,
Kalchadoni
on, Thasos,
Elaita,
Kyzikinos,
Messene,
Epiros,
Syracusae,
Pella
(several),
Chalkis,
Metaponto,
Sparta,
Sikyon
(several),
Akarnia,
Korinth,
Athens
(several),
Eleutherna
on Crete,
Akragas
1:17b 260 – 230 Orchomeno *
BC s (several),
Ephesos,
Magnesia,
Anthedonio
n?
1:17c 260 – 230 Peparethio *
BC n?, Patras
1:18a 262-260 [I] X X Asphaleia
BC
1:18b 262-260 Histiaia X X Asphaleia
BC
1:18c 262-260 Megara X X Asphaleia
BC
1:18d 262-260 Kassandrei X X Asphaleia
BC a
1:18e 262-260 Messene X X Asphaleia
BC
1:18f 262-260 X X Asphaleia
BC
1:19 300- [I] X X
250 BC
1:19b 300-250 [I] X X
BC
1:21 Byzantium, *
Boiotia
 211

1:22 Mid-3rd Phoenicia? X X Asphaleia

cent. BC

1:24a Mid-3rd Arsinoe, *

cent. BC Korinth,
Sikyon
1:24b Mid-3rd Sidon, *
cent. BC Pholas,
Tarent,
Athens,
Kyzikinos
1:24c 245 – 236 *
BC
1:25a 245 – 235 Agreion, X
BC Eretria
(several),
Mitylene,
Orchomeno
s, Megara
(several),
Athens
(several)
1:25b 245-236 Agreion
BC
1:25c 245-236 Aigion *
BC
1:25d 245- Hermione, X
236 BC Zakynthos,
Athens
(several)
1:27 Late 3rd Anthedonio *
cent. BC n
1:28 207-205 Sparta X X[?] X Asphaleia
BC
1:29 210/9 BC Aigina, X
Koronai,
Athens,
Molossos,
Syracusae,
Thessaly,
Aigion,
Athens36
1:30a 196/5 BC Boutaion, X
Naupaktos,
Pleuron,
Dyme
1:30b 196/5 BC Agreion *

36 This Athenian is the sculptor Polykles.

 212

(several)
1:31 Aa Late3rd Delphi *
cent. BC
1:41 Ab 204/3 BC Larisa X
1:31 Ac Late 3rd Thourion *
cent. BC
1:31 Ad 192/1 BC Messene X X
1:31 Ae Late 3rd Kalydon, *
cent. BC Proschion
1:31 Af 223/2 BC Messene X
(several),
Bouttos
1:31 Ag [mentions Stratos, *
Skopas, Herakleia
not as on the
strategos] Pontus,
Thesprota,
Eleutherna
on Crete,
Koronai
1:31 Ah Late 3rd Koronai, *
cent. BC Thespiai,
1:31 Ai 209/8 BC Chalkis X
1:31 Ak 207/6 BC Megalopolis X
, Paleus,
Tarentum,
Delphi,
Polyrene,
Thelousios?
1:31 Al Sostinos,
Pronos?
1:31 Am 223/2 BC Argouri?, X
Eleutherna
on Crete
1:31 An 205/4 BC X
1: 31 205/4 BC Boiotia, X
Ap/q …..?
1: 31 Bs 214/3 BC Chalkis, X
Chios,
Corcyra,
Meaichmos,
Gontrynioi?
,
Antioch,
Aigion,
Histiaia,
Athens,
Rhodes
1:31 Bt 244/3 BC [I] X
 213

1:31n 205/4 BC Herakleia X

on Pontus,
Pyrgita ?
1:31b 196/5 BC Larissa X X
1:31d 192/1 BC Messene X X
1:37 300-250 X X X Asphaleia
BC
1:38 263-255 X X
BC
1:39 Mid-3rd ? X
cent. BC
1:135 220 BC37 Lousoi X
1:136 After 206 Trikka X X Asphaleia,
BC ateleia
1:173 250s BC Herakleia X
1:176 228 BC? Athens X Symmachia
, asphaleia
1:185 250 BC Delos [x] Asphaleia
1:18638 206/5 BC Magnesia X [x]
on the
Maeander
1:190 209/8 BC Mytilene X
1:191 Mid-3rd Tenos X Asphaleia
cent. BC
1:192 204/3 BC Teos X Asphaleia

1:193 Late 3rd Axos X X

cent. BC?
1:195a 255 BC Chios ?
1:201 Late 3rd Athens X
cent. BC
FdD III 235 BC Chios Asphaleia
3:218
FdD III 247/6 BC Chios X Ateleia
3:214
IG XII, 5 220s BC Keos X
526 –
527, 532
Miletos 35 240/39 BC Miletos X Symbola,
asphaleia

37 This date is contested; see Rigsby 1996. Cf. discussion in Bugin 2010.
38 Referred to in 1:187 (194/3 BC).
 214

B. Delphic grants of proxenia to Aitolians, fourth and third centuries BC.

Year Person/town Source (FdD III)

356/5 BC Xenippos 1, 146
334/3 BC Leontomenes fr. Strombochios 1,147; 148
329/8 BC “Aitolian from Makyneia” BCH 1899, 254
320-10 BC Alexander + brothers Leon & 4,387
Nikostratos
Lykidos 1,142
Klearchos 3,90
1,145
SEG XVIII 175
Late 4th cent. BC “Aitolian from Kallion” 1,422
BCH 1944/5, 99
4,407
? 4th cent. BC Agathion Klio XV 48, n 67
290-80 BC Pittias 1,149; 150
Dikaios (or Lykaios) 1,143; 144
BCH 1944.3 p 101
Butheras from Iritrai 3,199
(Erythrai?) 3, 84
276/5 BC Kleosthenes SGDI 2659
273/2 BC Teisandros 3,203
SGDI 2515
269/8 BC Stratolaos + Satyros 4,415
269/8 BC Pleisteinos SGDI 2595
3,201
Mid-3rd cent. BC Teleson SGDI 2589, 2590
Apollonios + Menekles from SEG I 207
Erythrai
Late 3rd cent. BC Pantaleon from Arsinoe SGDI 1926, 126
Aristarchos from Kyphaira Syll.3 534
SGDI 2672
 215

C. Aitolian plunder in Polybius, 231 – 200 BC.

Date. Place. Booty/nature of Loss/gain (other

event. victor)
231 BC Medion39 Men, arms, baggage Loss (Illyria)
221 BC Off coast of Kephallonia40 Macedonian ship + Gain (sold in Aitolia)
crew
221 BC Megalopolis41 Sale of booty Gain
220 BC Sikyonia42 Pillaging Gain
220 BC Illyro-Aitolian treaty to divide
booty43
220 BC Kynaitha44 Property, cash, pottery, Gain
people, herds
220 BC Lousoi45 Sacred furniture, cattle Gain
220 BC Aitolia46 Plunder of coast Loss (Achaia)
220 BC Achaians authorized laphyron
on Aitolians47
220 BC Achaia (three towns)48 Considerable booty Gain
219 BC Pieria49 Considerable booty Gain
219 BC Dodona50 Destruction Gain?
219 BC Typaneai51 Plundered houses Gain
218 BC Thermon52 Enormous booty; Loss (Philip V)
destruction
217 BC Aitolia53 100 men, crews of Loss (Achaia)
three ships
217 BC Aitolia54 Raids on coast Loss (Achaia)
217 BC Akarnania, Epiros55 Pillaging without Gain
opposition
212/11 BC Roman-Aitolian alliance
211 BC Antikyra56 Sold inhabitants into Gain (Rome and Aitolia)
slavery

39 Polybius 2.37.
40 Polybius 4.6.1.
41 Polybius 4.6.3.
42 Polybius 4.13.5.
43 Polybius 4.16.9; 29.5.
44 Polybius 4.18.8.
45 Polybius 4.18.11.
46 Polybius 4.19.9.
47 Polybius 4.26.7.
48 Polybius 4.59.1.
49 Polybius 4.62.1.
50 Polybius 4.67.2.
51 Polybius 4.79.2.
52 Polybius 4.8.4-9; 13.1.
53 Polybius 5.94.7-9.
54 Polybius 5.95.11-12.
55 Polybius 5.96.1.
56 Polybius 9.39.2.
 216

D. Aitolian mercenary service, fifth through third centuries BC.

Year Place Monarch. Specified service Name of

(if known) individual (if
known)

5th cent. BC Sicily Sicilian

expedition/Athens57
4th cent. BC Asia Alexander the Great58
331 BC Egypt Lykidas59
280 BC Asculum Pyrrhus60 Cavalry, infantry
277 BC Kassandreia Antigonos Gonatas61 “10 pirates”
Campaign Demetrios Peltasts
against Poliorketes62
Seleukos
? [no date] Tralles Names attested in
lists of soldiers63
? [no date] Chios/Erythrai Names attested in
lists of soldiers64
260 BC Miletos Tyrant, possibly in Timarchos
Ptolemaic
service65
235 BC Egypt Ptolemies66 Pentekosioarchos […], son of
Lichas
Mid-230s BC Eleusis Lysimachos [??]67 Garrison member
230s BC Egypt68 Menippos
227/226 BC Egypt Ptolemies69 Chiliarchos Nikasiboulos
225 BC Egypt Ptolemies70 Epilochagos Polemon
219 BC Coele-Syria Ptolemies71 Governor Theodotos
from Kalydon
219 BC Egypt Ptolemaios IV72 General Nikolaos
219 BC Egypt Ptolemies73 Hipparchos Neandros

57 Thukydides 7.57.9.
58 Launey 1949.
59 Arrian 3.53.
60 Dion. Hal. 20.1.
61 Polyainos 4.6.18.
62 Polyainos 4.9.2.
63 Launey 1949, 188.
64 Ibid.
65 Polyainos 4.25; Frontinus 3.2.11; Appian Syr. 65.
66 Launey 1949, 1133.
67 IG II2 1299, line 112.
68 Launey 1949, 1134.
69 Ibid.
70 Launey 1949, 1131.
71 Polybius 5.46.3; FdD III 1,519; Launey 1949, 184.
72 Polybius 5.61.8-10
 217

219- 217 BC Tyre,74 Syria75 Ptolemaios IV Hipparchos Dorymenes

217 BC Raphia Ptolemaios IV76
217 BC Syria Ptolemaios IV77 Hipparchos Panaitolos
217 BC Syria Ptolemaios IV78 Commander Nikolaos
215/14 BC Egypt Ptolemies79 Pentekosioarchos Theogonos
214 BC Sardis Antiochos80
Antioch Antiochos III81 Contingent of
Aitolians, Cretans
and Euboians
? [no date] Samos82 Nikias, Pheidias
? [no date] Egypt Ptolemies83 Ilarchos, Sosandros
hipparchos
212 BC Egypt Ptolemies84 Epigonos Sosibos
210 BC Iran Antiochos III85 Commander of Nikolaos86
light troops
209 BC “the East” Antiochos III87 Panaitolos88
208 BC Phokis Attalos I89 Garrison member ? from Pleuron
Late 3rd cent. BC Hellespont Philip V90 Mercenary pirate Dikaiarchos
given 20 ships
Late 3rd cent. B.C Egypt Ptolemies91 General, recruiter Skopas of
into 2nd cent. BC or troops Trichonion
Late 3rd cent. BC Egypt Ptolemies92 Tax collecting Dikaiarchos
into 2nd cent. BC
Late 3rd cent. BC Ptolemies93 Hipparchos Lamios
200 BC Egypt Ptolemies94 Charimortos95

73 Launey 1949, 1133.

74 SEG VII 326
75 Polybius 5.61.9
76 Ibid.
77 Polybius 5.62.2
78 Polybius 5.61.8; 66.1; 68.2-6.
79 Launey 1949,1134.
80 Polybius 7.16.7
81 Liban. Orat. XI 119; Launey 1949, 196.
82 Launey 1949, 193.
83 Launey 1949, 1136.
84 Launey 1949, 1134.
85 Polybius 10.29.6.
86 Grainger (1999) believes this is the same Nikolaos who served Ptolemaios IV in Syria in 219 BC.
87 Polybius 10.49.11-12.
88 This is the same Panaitolos who first served the Ptolemies in Syria. He lived a long life and became

strategos of the koinon in 167/166 BC: SGDI 1729; 1783; 1854.

89 Launey 1949, 193.
90 Polybius 18.54.8-10; Diodorus 28.1.
91 Polybius 15.25.16: 16.18.2: 18.93.1; Livy 31.43.5; Launey 1949, 1135.
92 This is the same individual who caused havoc in Messenia during the Social War and subsequently served

Philip V as some kind of naval captain/mercenary pirate on the Hellespont. For his tenure in Egypt, see
Westermann 1929, 22-25.
93 IG IX 1.202.
94 OGIS 86; Strabo 16.4.15.
 218

200 BC Xanthos Ptolemaios V96 Hegemon Euphrainetos

200 BC Panion Ptolemaios V97 Commander of Ptolemaios98
Aitolians
200 BC Ptolemies99 6,500 Aitolians

95 At a later date, Charimortos occurs in Polybius’ (18.55.2) accounts of Skopas in Alexandria. See also Launey
1949, 1136-1137.
96 OGIS 91; Launey 1949, 1135.
97 Polybius 16.18.8.
98 Not necessarily an Aitolian himself, as pointed out by Grainger 2000, 290.
99 Livy 31.43.
 219

APPENDIX 3
Late Hellenistic activity (189 BC onward).

A. Origins of Aitolian strategoi in the second century BC.

Year Name Origin Source IG IX 12 Source SGDI /

Other
190/189 Nikandros Trichonion 1:97 1981, 2004, 2024
Livy 38.4.7
189/188 Eupolemos Hypata 1:4b
188/187 Archedamos Pholas 2132
187/186 Dikaiarchos Trichonion [assumed]
186/185 Pantaleon Pleuron 1844, 1949
185/184 Alexandros I Kalydon 1:32, 71b 1950, 1951, 1952,
1959
184/183 Nikandros Trichonion 1:33, 1:131 1869, 2053
183/182 Proxenos Trichonion 1:179 2133
182/181 Archedamos Pholas 1:31o, 3:629 2036, 2037, 2047,
2134
181/180 Thoas Trichonion 2076
180/179 Pantaleon Pleuron [assumed]
179/8 Lochagos Kallipolis 1917
178/7 Lykiskos Stratos 2051, 2135
177/6 Nikandros Trichonion 1855, 1869, 2927,
2058
176/5 Eupolemos Hypata 3:672 1745, 1864, 1863
Livy 41.25.3
175/4 Archedamos Pholas 1:31r 1786, 1843, 1987
174/3 Pantaleon Pleuron 1856
173/2 Thoas Trichonion 1730, 1853
172/1 Lykiskos Stratos Livy 42.38.3
171/0 Proandros Pholas 1739, 1740, 1756,
1810
170/169
169/8 Agelochos Stratos 1:69
168/7 Polemarchos Sosthenes 1:71c, 3:708
167/6 Panaitolos Phytaion 1729, 1783, 1854
166/5 Straton Arsinoe [assumed]
165/4 Hybistas Agrinion 1818
164/3 A[ntochos] Oaxos 1:99
163/2 Teisippos Trichonion 1:101, 1:102,
1:103,
3:361
162/1 Phylax Kalydon 1:105, 1:106
 220

161/0 Trichas Stratos 1:1

160/159 Damotimos Trichonion AM 27
159/8 Straton Arsinoe [assumed]
158/7 Ladikos Arsinoe 1:368-11
157/6 Kritolaos Trichonion 1:108
156/5 Teisippos Trichonion [assumed]
155/4 Phylax Kalydon AM 20
154/3 Alexandros II Kalydon 3:638-9 1903
153/2 Trichas Stratos 1:109, 2:638-
12
152/1 Kleandros ? 3:627a
151/0 Ladikos Arsinoe AM 18, no 11
150/149 Arkison Kalydon 3:633
149/8 Phylax Kalydon [assumed]
148/7 Lyson Stratos 3:640
147/6 Dorimachos II Trichonion 1:137e
146/5
145/4
144/3 […]as Arsinoe Grainger 2000
143/2 Satyros Arsinoe 1:137b 2136
142/1 Phylax Kalydon 3:639-7
141/0 Nikiadas Apeirikos 1:34d, 3:634b SEG XII 299
140/139 Dorimachos II Trichonion 1:137e
139/8
138/7 Damotimos ? 2:635a
137/6 Antiochos ? 3:634a SEG XII 300
136/5 Satyros Arsinoe 2305
135/4 Phylax Kalydon

129/8 Satyros Arsinoe 1:137f

End 2nd Lykopos Kalydon 1:72

cent. BC
End 2nd Nikias Kalydon 1:36j SEG XII 303
cent. BC
 221

B. Aitolian federal grants of isopoliteia, politeia, asylia etc. from 189 BC onward.

Inscription Date Origin of Origin of Origin of

100 recipient101 Aitolian strategos

Proxenia102
witnesses

Isopoliteia

Other103
Politeia

Asylia
1:4b 189/8 Athens Hypata Hypata X
BC
1:32 185/4 Corinth, Arsinoe, Kalydon X
BC Patrai Erythrai
(several), (several),
Thisbe, Trichonion
Epiros (several),
(several), Kalydon,
Rhodes Stratos,
(several), Naupaktos
Alexandria
(several)
1:179 = 185/4 Pergamon, None are Kalydon – X
FdD III - 182 (Athena Aitolian, all Trichonion
are
3:240; Syll.3 BC Nikephoros) – Pholas
international
629
(Delphi)
1:71b 185/4 Thebes Arsinoe Kalydon X X
BC
1:33 184/3 Neapolis Trichonion Trichonion X
BC
1:31 Ar 182/1 Alexandria Stratos Pholas X
BC
1:31 Ao 182/1 Naupaktos None Pholas X
BC preserved
1:71c 168/7 Hypata Sosthenes Stratos X
BC Sosthenes
Phytaion
1:36 I 160 Macheutieu Stratos Stratos X
BC s?
1:36 II 160 Aiklymios? Stratos Stratos X
BC
1:34a ? ? None [X] X AS
preserved
1:34c ? ? None [X] X AS
preserved

100 IG IX 12 if not otherwise noted. All inscriptions come from Thermon unless otherwise noted.
101 Bold denotes that grant was awarded to an entire city or population, not simply to an individual.
102 [Brackets] denote that grant is inferred but text is corrupted.
103 AS = asphaleia, AT = ateleia.
 222

(after
143/2
BC)104
1:35 142/1 Naxos Molykreion Kalydon X
BC (several)
1:34d 141/0 Dyme Trichonion Apeirikos X X AS
BC
1:137b 129/8 Sparta[?] Kalydon Arsinoe X X AT
(Kalydon) BC
1:36 a Late ? Stratos ? [X]
2nd
cent.
BC
1:46 2nd Larisa None ? X X
cent. (Thessaly) preserved
BC
1:48105 2nd ? None ?
cent. preserved
BC

C. Second-century-BC Delphic proxenia grants awarded to Aitolians.

Year Person/town Source (FdD III)

188/7 BC Stratios fr. Naupaktos Syll.3 583
187/6 BC Philon fr. Trichonion n 69
IG IX 12 1:32 line 18
171/0 BC ? fr. Proscheion 4,213
158/7 BC Aristonymos fr. Naupaktos 1,151
153-143 BC Pyrrhos fr. Naupaktos 1,153
150/49 BC Biaios fr. Naupaktos 1,152
139-121 BC Antileon fr. Arsinoe 4,170

104Inscription located directly above on inscribed block is dated to this year.

105Ascertained as a proxenia decree through the formula ἔδοξε τοῖς Αἰτ οῖς·; no other information is
preserved.
 223

APPENDIX 4
Coin hoard composition.

1. Agrinion 1968 hoard (CH I, 76)

100+ AR.

 Aitolian league: 10+ didrachms, 2 drachms, 100+ triobols

 Chalkis: undetermined number of drachms
 Lokris Opuntii: undetermined number of triobols
 Boiotia: undetermined number of hemidrachms
 Sikyon: undetermined number of
hemidrachms
Central IGCH 244
Greece
10%
2. Naupaktos 1967 (IGCH 244)
71 AE.
Aitolia
 Aitolian league: 64 90%
 Oitaia: 7

Central
Greece
CH IV, 54
3. Kalydon 1973 (CH IV, 54) 2%
52 AR.
Peloponnese
Peloponn
67%
 Sikyon: 17 drachms ese Achaian
67% league
 Lokris Opuntii: 1 31%
 Achaian league: 16 triobols
 Argos: 16
 Megalopolis

4. Vlachomandra 1886 (AD1889, E)

30+ AR?, 4 AE.

 Chalkis
 Sikyon
 Elis
 Lysimachos
 Roman Republic: 1 bronze
 Uncertain: 3 worn bronzes
 224

5. Agrinion 1959 (IGCH 271)

1348 AR.
Rome
 Aitolian league: 97 triobols 3%
others Aitolia
 Ainianes: 2 triobols Central Athens 0% 7%
 Lamia: 4 triobols Greece 3%
9%
 Oitaia: 1 triobol
 Thessalian league: 1 triobol Peloponnese
16%
 Lokris Opuntii: 17 triobols
 Phokis: 1 triobol Achaian
league
 Boiotia: 11 triobols, 4 drachms 62%
 Chalkis: 72 drachms
 Histiaia: 6 drachms
 Athens: 39 tetradrachms
 Aigina: 1 drachm
 Achaian league: 838 triobols
 Sikyon: 50 triobols
 Messene: 2 triobols IGCH 271
 Argos: 10 triobols
 Megalopolis: 151 triobols
 Cyme: 2 tetradrachms
 Roman Republic: 39 denarii
IGCH 317

6. Naupaktos 1967 (IGCH 317)

4 AR. Athens
25%
 Athens: 1 New Style tetradrachm
 Roman republic: 3 denarii Rome
75%

7. Koniska 1962 (IGCH 266)

16+ AR. IGCH 266
Achaian
 Ainianes: 1 triobol others
league
12%
 Phokis: 1 triobol 13%
 Lokris Opuntii: 1 triobol
 Chalkis: 2 drachms
 Aigina: 1 drachm Peloponnese
Peloponnes
 Sikyon: 1 drachm, 3 triobols Central
37%e
Greece
 Achaian league: 2 triobols 38%
37%
 Aigai: 1 triobol
 Elis: 1 triobol
 Ptolemy I: 2 tetradrachms
 225

8. Makrakomi 1932 (IGCH 214)

13 AE. IGCH 214

 Aitolia: 4 hemiobols
others
 Antigonos Gonatas: 2 25%
Aitolia
34%
 Macedonia: 1
 Eurea, Thessaly: 1
 Argos Amphilochion: 1
Peloponnese
 Lokris: 1 Rome
8%
 Corinth: 1 8%

 Sikyon: 1 Central Peloponne

Peloponnese
 Roman Republic: 1 Greece 8%
se
25% 8%

9. Oreus 1902 (IGCH 232)

1300 AR.
Achaian Aitolia
league
 Aitolian league: 2 triobols 1%
0%
Central
 Alexander III: 1 tetradrachm Greece
 Philip V: 13 didrachms, 1%
11 drachms
 Perseus: 9 tetradrachms,
1 didrachm
 Macedonia: 1 tetrobol
 Lysimachos: 1 drachm others
 Larissa: 1 triobol 98%
 Chalkis: 2 drachms IGCH 232
 Histiaia: 1 drachm, 5 tetrobols
 Achaian league: 3 drachms
 Rhodes: 595 drachms
Central
Peloponnese
Peloponn Greece
7%ese 12%
10. Delphi 1907 (IGCH 303) 7%

42 AE.
Aitolia
 Aitolian league: 34 hemiobols 81%
 Phokis: 3
 Lokris Opuntii: 2
 Sikyon: 1 IGCH 303
 Aigeira: 1
 Phlious: 1
 226

11. Vonitsa 1993 (CH VIII, 431)

C. 148 AR. Aitolia
Rome 1%
1%
 Aitolian league: 1 tetradrachm, others
1 triobol 7%
Achaian
 Alexander III: 5 tetradrachms league
 Perseus: 1 tetradrachm Central
Greece
41%
 Argos Amphilochikon: 1 tetrobol 41%
 Magnetia: 1 drachm
 Boiotia: 1 triobol
 Histiaia: 58 triobols
 Athens: 1 tetradrachm
 Corinth: 12 drachms
 Achaian league: 61 triobols Peloponne
Peloponnese
 Arcadia: 1 triobol 9% se CH VIII, 431
9%
 Side: 4 tetradrachms
 Rome: 1 denarius

12. Stratos 1965 (IGCH 251) Peloponnese

Peloponn
ese
12 AR. 25%
25%
Aitolia
42%

 Aitolian league: 5 triobols

 Achaian league: 4 triobols
 Arcadia: 3 triobols Achaian
league IGCH 251
33%

13. Kephallonia 1934 (IGCH 257)

146 AR.
Central
Greece Aitolia
 Aitolian league: 1 triobol 1% 1%
 Lokris Opuntii: 1 triobol
 Boiotia: 1 triobol
 Sikyon: 7 triobols
 Achaian league: 75 triobols
 Messene: 1 triobol Achaian
 Sparta: 3 triobols league
51%
 Argos: 41 triobols
 Arcadia: 16 triobol
Peloponnes
Peloponnese
e
47%47%
IGCH 257
 227

14. Western Greece 1936 (IGCH 260)

677 AR.106
Central
Aitolia
 Aitolian league: 21 triobols Greece
3%
 Lokris Opuntii: 13 triobols 8%
 Phokis: 5 triobols
 Boiotia: 6 triobols
 Chalkis: 31 drachms Achaian
league
 Achaian league: 429 triobols Peloponn
Peloponnese 63%
 Sikyon: 53 triobols 26%
ese
 Patras: 1 triobol 26%
 Messene: 1 triobol
 Sparta: 2 triobols IGCH 260
 Argos: 35 triobols
 Arcadia: 80 triobols

15. Lechena 1979 (CH VIII, 417)

80? AE

 Aitolian league: 1
 Antigonos Gonatas: 2
 Philip V: 3
 Macedonia?: 2
 Epirus, Athamanes: 8
 Ptolemies: 7
 Carthage: 1
 Elis?: 1
 Miletos: 1
 Phokis: 1
 Corinth: 5
 Uncertain: 7

16. Lechena 1986 (CH VIII, 358)

550+ AE.

 Mainland Greece: many

 Macedonia: many
 Seleucids: many
 Ptolemies: many
 Cyclades
 Asia Minor
 Carthage: 3
 Tarentum: 1
 Roman Republic: 1

There is some confusion to the composition of the hoard and the number of coins therein. Dengate (1967,
106

105) identifies 98 coins of Megalopolis in the hoard, 28 of which were struck for the Achaian league.
 228

17. Patras 1973 (CH VIII, 454)

117 AR.

 Aitolian league: 2 triobols Central

Aitolia
 Lokris Opuntii: 1 triobol Peloponnese
Peloponne Greece
2%
 Boiotia: 3 triobols 18% se 3%
 Sikyon: 4 triobols 18%
 Argos: 3 triobols
 Achaian league: 88 triobols Achaian
 Hermione: 1 triobol league
77%
 Megalopolis: 15 triobols

CH VIII, 454

18. Zougra 1859 (IGCH 261)

985 AR.107

 Aitolian league: 14 triobols Central

Greece
Aitolia
5%
 Lamia: 1 triobol Peloponnese 2%
 Lokris Opuntii: 11 triobols 18%
Peloponnes
e
 Boiotia: 10 triobols, 21 drachms 18%
 Aigina: 3 drachms
 Corinth: 1 triobol Achaian
 Sikyon: 11 triobols league
75%
 Achaian league: 654 triobols
 Messene: 2 triobols
 Argos: 96 triobols
 Megalopolis: 47 triobols
IGCH 261

107 These numbers given in this list are those provided by Tsangari 2007, 224. They do correspond to those given
in the IGCH. Original numbers as given by de Witte are Aitolia: 421 triobols, Epirus: 1 diobol, Thessaly: 13
triobols, Lokris: 146 triobols, Boiotia: 289 triobols and drachms, Aigina: 14 drachms, Achaia: 5,689 triobols and
tetrobols, Elis: 1 triobol, Messene: 3 triobols, Argolis: 1,409 triobols, Arcadia: 1,185 triobols.
 229

19. Diakofto 1965 (IGCH 262)

3000+ AR.

 Aitolian league: 63 triobols Central

Aitolia
Greece
 Lamia: 1 triobol 5%
Rome 2%
0%
 Lokris Opuntii: 12 triobols
 Phokis: 4 triobols
 Boiotia: 28 triobols
 Thebes: 7 triobols
 Chalkis: 92 drachms
 Histiaia: 6 tetrobols Achaian
league
 Sikyon: 459 triobols Peloponnese 55%
 Aigai: 1 triobol Peloponnese
38%
 Achaian league: 1601 triobols 38%

 Messene: 6 triobols
IGCH 262
 Koronai: 2 triobols
 Argos: 391 triobols
 Megalopolis: 226 triobols
 Roman republic: 1 quinarius

20. Arcadia 1929 (IGCH 242)

230 AR, 1 AE.

 Aitolian league: 7 triobols Central

others
Aitolia
Greece 3%
 Lokris Opuntii: 5 triobols 7% 0%
 Phokis: 1 triobol
 Boiotia: 2 drachms, 6 triobols
 Chalkis: 2 drachms Peloponnese
Peloponnes
 Aegina: 1 drachm 24% e
24% Achaian
 Achaian league: 152 triobols league
 Sikyon: 1 drachm, 10 triobols 66%
 Elis: 1 bronze
 Argos: 4 triobols IGCH 242
 Kleonai: 2 triobol
 Arcadia/Megalopolis: 37 triobols
 Rhodes: 1 didrachm
 230

21. Messene before 1937 (IGCH 301)

c. 168 AR, 12 AE.108 Pelopon
Peloponnese
Central Aitolia
Greece 1%
nese
24 % 1%
 Aitolian league: 1 triobol 24%
 Chalkis: 2 triobols
 Sikyon: 13 triobols, 1 bronze
 Patras: 6 triobols Achaian
league
 Achaian league: 133 triobols, 74%
1 bronze
 Arcadia: 8 triobols
 Messene: 1 triobol, 7 bronze IGCH 301
 Sparta: 2 triobols
 Argos: 2 triobols
 Methana: 1 bronze
 Kleitor: 1 bronze
 Tegea: 1 bronze
Central
Greece Aitolia
3% 3%
22. Epidauros 1934 (IGCH 288)
33 AR.

 Aitolian league: 1 triobol

 Boiotia: 1 drachm Achaian
 Sikyon: 1 triobol league
 Achaian league: 21 triobols 64%
 Sparta: 1 triobol
 Argos: 1 triobol Peloponnes
Peloponnese
 Hermione: 1 triobol 30% 30%
e
IGCH 288
 Arcadia/Megalopolis: 6 triobols

23. Vellies-Monemvasia 1984 (AD 39)

72 AR. Central
Aitolia
Greece
5% 2%
 Aitolian league: 7 triobols
 Lokris: 2 triobols
 Phokis: 1 triobol
 Boiotia: 1 triobol, 1 drachm Achaian
 Chalkis: 1 drachm league
75%
 Sikyon: 2 triobols
 Argos: 1 triobol Peloponnese
Peloponne
18%se
 Achaian league: 51 triobols
18%
 Hermione: 1 triobol Vellies-Monemvasia 1984
 Arcadia: 2 triobols
 Rhodes: 1 didrachm

108ICGH reports the total number to be 167 AR, 13 AE. Tsangari (2007) on the other hand gives 159 AR, 12 AE.
The numbers given here are the sums of the coins reported to belong to the hoard, as I have not been able to
access the coins themselves. There is some additional confusion with regards to the acquisition of the hoard.
 231

24. Canose before 1995 (Tsangari 2007)

11 AE.
 Aitolian league: 2 bronzes Canose 1995
 Herakleia: 2
 Arpi: 1 Aitolia
 Caelia: 1 18%
 Ballaios: 2
 Apulia (uncertain): 1

others
82%

25. Caserta 1890 (IGCH 2053)

499 AR.
 Aitolian league: 4 triobols Central
Greece
 Ainianes: 2 triobols 2% Aitolia
Peloponnese 1%
 Oitaiei: 1 triobol Peloponnese
33%
 Lokris: 1 triobol 33%

 Boiotia: 2 triobols Achaian

 Thebes: 2 triobols league
64%
 Chalkis: 3 drachms
 Achaian league: 322 triobols
 Patras: 18 triobols
 Sikyon: 38 triobols
 Messene: 13 triobols IGCH 2053
 Sparta: 23 triobols
 Argos: 49 triobols
 Arcadia: 26 triobols

Central
Aitolia
26. Greece 1986 or earlier (CH VIII, 338) Greece
2% others 5%
45 AR. 2%

 Aitolian league: 2 triobols

Achaian
 Philip II: 1 hemidrachm league
 Lokris Opuntii: 1 hemidrachm 78%
 Achaian league: 35 triobols
 Arcadia: 5 triobols
 Messene: 1 triobol

Peloponnese
Peloponn
13%ese CH VIII, 338
13%
 232

FIGURES

Figure 1.
The synoicism of Nikopolis and Patras.
 233

Figure 2.
Central and Western Greece, Google Earth.
 234

Figure 3.
Aitolia as defined in this study. (Not to scale)
 235

Figure 4.
Hellenistic settlements in Aitolia, including “East Aitolia”.

Figure 5.
Sites with Late Hellenistic material (site numbers correspond to those in Appendix 1A).
 236

Figure 6.
Mornos reservoir.

Figure 7.
View of Agrinion plain, seen from Church of Agios Giorgios
in Angelokastro/ancient Arsinoe. Lake Lysimacheia in the background.
 237

Figure 8.
View of coastal plain West of Kalydon, seen from ancient Halikyrna toward Mesolongi and Pleuron.

Figure 9.
Sanctuary of Apollo at Thermon.
 238

Figure 10.
Sanctuary of Apollo at Thermon and the Thermon valley; Lake Trichonion in the background.

Figure 11.
Macedonian tomb at Naupaktos.
 239

Figure 12.
Grave stele from Trichonion (Gavalou). Agrinion Archaeological Museum, inv. no. 27.
 240

Figure 13.
Closeup of grave stele from Trichonion (Gavalou). Agrinion Archaeological Museum,
inv. no. 27.
 241

Figure 14.
Grave stele from Arsinoe (Angelokastro). Agrinion Archaeological Museum, inv. no. 65.
 242

Figure 15.
Silver statuette of Silenus from Pleuron. Agrinion Archaeological Museum, inv. no. 323.
 243

Figure 16.
The Late Hellenistic building on the Akropolis, Kalydon. Reconstruction.
 244

Figure 17.
The Akropolis, Kalydon. Seen from the South-West, area of Heroon.

Figure 18.
Floors in the Late Hellenistic building on the Akropolis, Kalydon.
 245

Figure 19.
Heroon, Kalydon.
 246

Figure 20.
Heroon, Kalydon in the 1930s.
 247

Figure 21.
Heroon, Kalydon. Klinai with footstools.

Figure 22.
Heroon, Kalydon. Detail of spandrels on footstool.
 248

Figure 23.
Back view of head of Meleager from Heroon, Kalydon. Agrinion Archaeological Museum,
inv. no. 24.
 249

Figure 24.
Peristyle Building, Kalydon.
 250

Figure 25.
Peristyle Building, Kalydon.
 251

Figure 26.
The North rooms in the Peristyle Building, Kalydon.
 252

Figure 27.
Kybele, Peristyle Building, Kalydon.
 253

Figure 28.
Lion, Peristyle Building, Kalydon.
 254

Figure 29.
Lanikos’ herm, Peristyle Building, Kalydon.
 255

Figure 30.
Miniature altar, Peristyle Building, Kalydon.
 256

Figure 31.
Sosikles’ statue base, Peristyle House, Kalydon.
 257

Figure 32.
Multi-phase building, Gribovo plot, Naupaktos.

Figure 33.
The coastal plain West of Naupaktos, seen from Makyneia toward the Peloponnese.
 258

Figure 34.
West side of Chalkis hill, seen from Kato Vasiliki.

Figure 35.
Mount Varassova, seen from Galatas (possibly location of Kalydon’s harbor). Typical Aitolian
shoreline. On the far side of Varassova is narrow valley of Chalkis.
 259

Figure 36.
View of plain and gulf near Pleuron, West of Mesolongi, exemplifying the successful combination of
arable farmland and proximity of navigable water (either the gulf itself or the rivers) for sustained
connectivity. Note the nearness of pastoral uphill lands.

Figure 37.
Lake Trichonion, seen from Analipsi.
 260

Figure 38.
Roman baths outside Mesolongi, South of Agios Thomas.

12

10
Number of obverse dies

6
Calculated obverse dies

0
65b 65c 66j 66r 66t 66v 73a 76a 76b 76c 77b

Figure 39.
Calculated obverse dies for Fifth series triobols: estimated after Carter 1983.
Only includes issues where n > 3d.
 261

12

10

8
Triobols

6 Calculated obverse dies

Linear trend.
4

0
65b 65c 66j 66r 66t 66v 73a 76a 76b 76c 77b

Figure 40.
Calculated obverse dies for Fifth series triobols: die numbers after Carter 1983.
Only includes issues where n > 3d.

10
9
8
7
6
Triobols

5 Calculated obverse dies.

4 Linear trend.
3
2
1
0
73a 76a 76b 76c 77b

Figure 41.
Calculated obverse dies for Fifth series triobols: die numbers after Carter 1983.
Only includes issues where n > 3d.
 262

160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
tetradrachms didrachms drachms triobols 5th series
triobols

Figure 42.
Obverse dies, silver coinage of the Third, Fourth and Fifth series. Third and Fourth series are
grouped together.
 263

1. Agrinion 1968 6. Naupaktos 1976 11. Patras 1973 16. Epidauros 1934
2. Makrakomi 7. Lechena 12. Greece 1986 17. Diakofto 1859
1968 1979/1986
3. Vonitsa 1993 8. Delphi 1907 13. Messene 1937 18. Vellies-
Monemvasia 1984
4. Stratos 1965 9. Arcadia 1929 14. Kephallonia
1934
5. Oreus 1902 10. Agrinion 1959 15. Zougra 1859

Figure 43.
Late Hellenistic coin hoards with Aitolian contents.
 264

14

12

10
Price in minae.

8
Series1
6 Linear trend.

0
1
8

22
15

29
36
43
50
57
64
71
78
85
92
99
106
113
120
127
134
141
148 Figure 44.
Aitolian manumissions arranged chronologically and individually, 189-110 BC. Manumissions with
unknown prices have been omitted. Arrow marks 150 BC. Linear trend added.
 265

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