Reference For Marine

d’AMICO SHIP ISHIMA MARITIME TRAINING CENTRE, MUMBAI
COURSE CONTENTS
SR. NO. TOPICS
1. INTRODUCTION
2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
3. PURPOSE OF VETTING INSPECTIONS
4. PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO A VETTING INSPECTION

CONDUCT OF A VETTING INSPECTION FIRST
5.
IMPRESSION
THE INSPECTION WHAT THE INSPECTOR IS LOOKING
6.
FOR
7. CDI SHIP INSPECTION PROCEDURE
8. OCIMF
OCIMF – SHIP INSPECTION REPORT (SIRE)
9.
PROGRAMME – 2009 EDITION
10. PIT FALLS AND COMMON DEFICIENCIES FOUND
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INTRODUCTION
Vetting Inspections have become an inseparable part of tanker operations today.

Every oil major, prior taking a ship on charter and then periodically during the
tenure of the charter, conducts an inspection to vet the ship to determine whether
the vessel is maintained and operated properly to industry standards of safety and
quality.
The two days course meant for ship officers and shore personnel associated with
tanker operations, deals with the Vetting Inspection requirements of various
bodies, viz OCIMF, CDI, and Oil Majors and provide knowledge and guidelines
on best practices to be adopted for preparation and conduct of these inspections.
The main goal being to confidently and successfully complete the inspection
without any deficiencies recorded.
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AIMS
To prepare for and conduct a thorough and well planned Vetting Inspection of a
tanker and complete it successfully with no deficiencies recorded.
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OBJECTIVES
1. Understanding the purpose of vetting inspections and the repercussions of
deficiencies found and noted by the inspectors.
2. Have knowledge of the areas which will be inspected and accordingly prepare
the vessel for smooth conduct of the inspection.
3. Adopt the correct procedures for conduct of the vetting inspection.
4. Know and understand the rules and requirements governing a vetting
inspection.
5. Be aware of the necessary documentation and record – keeping.
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PURPOSE OF
VETTING INSPECTIONS
THE TOPICS WE WILL COVER:

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1. Introduction /purpose of Vetting Inspections

2. Preparation before arrival at the tanker port
3. Inspector’s first impressions
4. The Inspection
5. Pitfalls and common deficiencies – using SIRE checklist
6. CDI Inspection and checklists.
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS
A VETTING INSPECTION?
The inspection result establishes whether the tanker is operated in a safe way in accordance with
valid rules and regulations.
DEFINITIONS
 INSPECTIONS
The process whereby a vessel is physically inspected
 VETTING
The process whereby a charterer or terminal check out the status of a vessel nominated to
the Oil Major for business
Is this inspection conducted for a safety or commercial reasons?
A safe ship is a commercially profitable venture
A Good Ship must have

 PROCEDURES – Management Systems and Guidance
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 PEOPLE – Experienced & Motivated staff committed to the management systems (both
onboard the ship and ashore)
 SUPERINTENDENCE – Providing self regulating audit and support functions.
A safe ship is what every owner, manager, charterer and the shipping community aspires for
and a safe ship is what each one of you should aim for because you are the ones sailing on that
ship.
Each one of you is responsible for:

 Your own safety
 Your shipmates safety
 Safety of environment
 Safety of the ship
 Safety of the cargo
A small error on tankers is

magnified into large losses in
terms of :
 Life
 Profits
 Financial repercussions
 Reputation
Intertanko statistics state that:

“In the period 1963 to 1996 there were 500 serious tanker casualties”
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240 incidents relate to fire/explosions in engine room, accommodation and cargo

compartments.
 60 incidents relate to groundings
 70 incidents involved collisions
130 incidents were caused by structural failures, loss of stability and/or foundering in heavy
weather.
SIRE PROGRAMME:
History of the SIRE Programme
In 1993, OCIMF established a Ship Inspection Report (SIRE) Programme, which enabled OCIMF
members to submit their ship inspection reports to OCIMF for distribution to OCIMF members
and certain qualifying non- OCIMF members.
Participation in the original programme, as either an inspecting OCIMF Member or a

programme recipient, was strictly voluntary and each programme recipient determined
independently how to evaluate the information contained in the reports received from OCIMF.
Under the SIRE Programme, the operator of any ship that is the subject of a report was given a
copy of that report and the opportunity to submit written comments relating to the report, to
both the inspecting OCIMF Member and to OCIMF.
Report recipients accessed the SIRE System Index by computer and this permitted the index to
be viewed or downloaded. Programme recipients could order reports and any matching
operator comments from the SIRE system. Reports and comments were transmitted by facsimile
to the programme recipient’s pre-registered facsimile numbers on request.
1997 and 2000 Revisions to the Programme
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The original SIRE Programme was first revised in 1997and introduced the means whereby
programme recipients were able to receive reports and any operator comments electronically, as
well as by facsimile.
Two major changes were also introduced in the 1997 Revised Programme. These were:
1. A Uniform Vessel Inspection Procedure; and,
2. A Vessel particular Questionnaire (VPQ)
Under the Original 1993 Programme, the inspecting OCIMF Member was free to choose
whatever inspection protocol and report format it desired. In 1997, the Uniform Vessel
Inspection Procedure changed this. The Vessel Particular Questionnaire was a newly developed
OCIMF document, also introduced in 1997 and was not part of the original programme. The
Vessel Particulars Questionnaire was also revised in 2003 when a Harmonised Vessel Particulars
Questionnaire (HVPQ) was introduced.
The latest 2004 revision makes further important changes to the inspection procedure whilst also
adding numerous new vessel types that are inspected under the programme.
Collectively, these are referred to herein as “Vessels”
The SIRE Programme is now expanded to include the inspection of barges carrying petroleum
products, chemicals, or gas, or vessel’s used in the carriage of packaged petroleum products or
gas, or road tankers carrying the same commodities. Towing vessel’s that are utilized in the
handling of barges carrying the above listed products may also be inspected under the SIRE
Programme. The Inspection of these vessels and associated questionnaires are addressed in
separate questionnaires.
The Inspection Element uses a series of detailed inspection questionnaires as appropriate for the
type of vessel inspected. These questionnaires address issues associated with safety and
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pollution prevention. Inspectors who are employed, or contracted by submitting companies

must (with certain exceptions) answer all these questions.
Questions are, in many cases, accompanied by guidance notes and/or references to source
documents. Their purpose is to aid the Inspector’s response.
The Report Element is developed from the completed electronic questionnaire that is submitted
by the Inspector, either directly to the SIRE website, or to the submitting company for further
processing prior to transmission to the vessel operator and to SIRE.
Uniform Vessel Inspection Procedure
The programme requires that participating submitting companies follow a uniform Vessel
Inspection Procedure. This procedure has an Inspection Element and a Report Element.
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D’Amico Training
The Ship Vetting Decision – BP
OWNER REPUTATION
OWNER AUDITS
SHIP INSPECTION
SIRE REPORTS
CDI REPORTS
THE VETTING Yes/No /
DECISION Unassessed
TERMINAL FEEDBACK
CHARTER
FEDDBACK
FLAG CHANGES
MARKET INTELLIGENCE
CASUALTY DATA
MANNING/MANAGEMENT
CHANGES
CLASSIFICATION SOCIETY
CHANGE
There is an average of 14 to 15 tanker casualties every year.
Vetting Inspections are snapshots of:

 Performance standard
 Procedural practices
 Level of safety onboard
 Whether a safety culture is established
Usually done while the vessel is conducting cargo operations:

Following is observed:
 Equipment performance
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 Familiarity of personnel with equipment (man/machine interface)

 Practical Compliance with standard industry practices
Does Vetting Work?

 Independent measure of effectiveness is achieved through use of Lloyd’s Casualty Data.
 3 times more casualties are reported on ‘No’ status ships than there are on “OK” vessels.
WHEN DOES A VETTING THE INSPECTOR WILL START TO

INSPECTION BEGIN? COLLECT IMPRESSIONS FROM THE
TIME HE TAKES HIS FIRST STEP ONTO
THE GANGWAY.
WHEN THE INSPECTOR TAKES THE LAST

STEP OF THE GANGWAY WHEN LEAVING
THE TANKER AFTER THE INSPECTION.
WHEN DOES THE VETTING

INSPECTION END?
Please remember:
“The inspector is an individual and his first impressions will affect his judgment for the rest of
the inspection”.
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Hence onboard inspection can only be successful if the tanker is prepared for the inspection.
Ideally the vessel should be prepared for an inspection at all times and not because Oil Major
inspection is scheduled.
If ship is always ready why prepare for the inspection?

 Verification that all is in order
 Keeping documents ready for scrutiny by inspector
 Finishing touches
 Briefing of all ship’s staff
What should be prepared for the vetting inspection?

 Administration
 Cargo
 General
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PREPARATIONS
PRIOR TO
A VETTING INSPECTION
PREPARATIONS BEFORE ARRIVAL PORT
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ADMINISTRATION
o Copy of the Vessel Particular Questionnaire (VPQ) ready to hand over to inspector.
o Tanker certificates in original ready at hand for inspector to sight:
 All trading certificates
 Classification document
 IMO certificate of fitness
 Safety construction certificate
 Load line certificate
 IOPP certificate + supplement
 Certificate of financial responsibility
 Crew list
 Drawing of vessel’s cargo tanks arrangement
 Safe manning certificate
 Equipment certificates / test records
 Cargo Hose / piping testing
 Fixed + portable FFA empty service
 Pressure test of SCBA cylinders
 Life raft servicing
 Setting of relief valves
 USCG LOC
 Class quarterly listing all trading certificates
 Approved COW manual
 Approved Ballast Management manual
 Copy of Manager’s DOC
 SMC certificate
 Oil record books
 Inert gas system manual
 SOLAS training manual
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 Vessel response plan/SOPEP

 Shipping document and cargo manifest
Crew certificates in original ready at hand for inspector to sight:

 Officer’s licenses
 Crew’s watch keeping certificates
 Health certificates
 Dangerous Cargo Endorsements
Routine Logs Properly Filled Out and Signed

 LSA/FFA training manual
 Emergency equipment tests record
 Cargo equipment maintenance record
 Gas detection Equipment calibration records
 Cargo Line pressure test record
 Records in the port log
 Timings
 Stoppages
 Hourly rates
 Manifold pressures
 P/V valves test record (oil tankers)
 Garbage management log
 D&A policy random test (onboard)
 Records of unannounced D&A tests carried out
 Various checklists completed at the appropriate time
 Rest periods are observed before taking over watches
All Necessary Publications Readily Available For Reference
 ISGOTT (for oil tankers), preferably a copy in the CCR
 Tanker Safety Guide – liquefied gas (for gas tankers)
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 Tanker Safety Guide –Chemicals (for chemical tankers)

 SOLAS
 MARPOL
 Medical First Aid Guide
 Gas code as appropriate for the ship (LG tankers depending upon age of ship)
 IAMSAR
 Guide for helicopter operations
 Colregs
 STCW 95
 International Code Of Signals
 Ship To Ship Transfer Guide
 Effective Mooring
 Ship Captain’s Medical Guide
 Bridge Procedure Guide
 Bridge Team Management
 Guide to pressure Relief Valve Maintenance and Testing
 Mooring Equipment Guidelines
 Oil Transfer Procedures (CFR 33)
Be prepared to calibrate and/or demonstrate the proper operation of

 Combustible gas detectors
 Fixed gas detection system
 Oxygen analyzer
 Toxic gas detector
 ODME
 Cargo pump trips/ ESD
 High level alarms
 Overfill alarms
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 Quick closing valves

 E/R blower flaps
 Inert gas alarms
 Oily water separator
 Emergency fire pump
 Auto start of EMCY generator
 E/R ventilation shut down
 Steering gear
Additionally the following should be prepared for checking

 Fireman’s outfits
 International shore coupling
 Navigation equipment
 GMDSS walkie-talkies
 EPIRB
 SART
 Pyrotechnics
 Hydrostatic releases
 Flame screens on bunker tanks air pipes
 Suitable paint locker
 Sewage treatment plant
Self assessment copy ready for inspector

Self assessment is the OCIMF or CDI checklist copy completed by the ship staff.
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HOW DOES A SELF

ASSESSMENT HELP?
Self assessment shows the inspector that:

 Ship has prepared for the inspection
 Non-conformities, if any have been identified and corrected
Rules, procedural guidelines are:

 Company’s safety & quality manuals
 Loss prevention bulletins
 Important memorandum
 Regulation updates
 Injury/damage/near miss reporting system
 DNV casualty reports
 MAIB reports
 And various other feedback from office
What will the inspector check from the manuals and other feedback?
 Appropriate for the ship being inspected
 Covers all identified risks
 Ship’s staff are familiar with contents of the guidelines
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CARGO OPERATIONS
 Cargo Experience Factor list-
Copy should be ready for handing over to the inspector
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for Cargo Carried Readily Available for reference on
board.
 Pre Planned Cargo Operations –

Copy Ready for Inspector
 What information should be available on the cargo operation plan?

o Cargo Details
o Restrictions (If any) at Berth
 Draught/depth at berth
 Back pressure
 Number of lines
o Time/Sequence
o Pumps in use
o COW plan (oil tankers)
o Agreed VHF working channel
o Ballast handling details
o Trim/stress at all stages
o Agreed stopping signal
GENERAL
 Each head of department must complete his own inspection before arrival at port
 Any non conformities and deficiencies observed must be reported and corrected
 For effective preparation the self assessment form may be divided into the following areas
of responsibility
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o Master:
 Tanker particulars
 Certification/documentation
 Crew management
 Safety management
 Radio equipment
o Chief Engineer:
 Housekeeping in the E/R
 Safety management
 Inactive emergency equipment
 Steering gear
 Machinery status/ PMS
o Chief Officer:
 Pollution Prevention Equipment
 Cargo & Ballast Systems
 Cow Installation (Oil Tankers)
 Mooring Equipment
 Load Line Items
o First Assistant Engineer:

 Cargo & ballast system
 House keeping in E/room
 Inert gas system
o Second Officer:
 Navigation Equipment
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 Nautical Publications & their

corrections
o Third Officer:
 Life Saving Equipment
 Fire fighting equipment
 Safety Familiarisation
o GMDSS Equipment
o Medical Locker
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CONDUCT OF A
VETTING INSPECTION
FIRST IMPRESSION
FIRST IMPRESSION
AREAS REQUIRING SPECIAL ATTENTION
What areas require special attention while preparing for an inspection?
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Remember:
 The inspector is an individual and his first impressions will effect his judgment for the
rest of the inspection.
 The inspector will receive inputs from the following major areas while walking up from
the tank deck to the ship’s office.
Gangway:
 Properly rigged
 Well illuminated
 Life buoy kept ready near by
 Gangway watch maintained
Signs:
 All warning signs posted?
o No smoking
o No naked lights
o No authorized persons
o No visitors
o Hazardous cargo
o Switch off mobile phones
It gives a good impression and reflects professionalism if all crew have safety helmets
and appropriate personal protective equipment.
Deck watch
 Present at the gangway:
 Ask for inspector
o Who he is?
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o Whom he wants to see?

 Check with duty officer on walkie-talkie if this is in order
 One crew member to escort inspector to ship’s office/officer
Emergency, pollution prevention and fire fighting equipment correctly rigged and ready.
Ensure deck is free of:

 Oil
 Accumulated water
 Other obstructions
 Scupper are blocked
 Emergency air driven pump rigged and ready. Wilden pumps must be earthed!
Cargo Information:
 All persons involved with cargo operations briefed (especially the deck watch
keepers)
 MSDF posted at conspicuous location
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Moorings:
 Ropes in good condition
 Figure-of-8 turns on bitts (first turn should be a round turn around the
leading bitt)
 No lines on winch ends
 All ropes with proper leads
Accommodations:
 All doors closed
 Only one door on offshore side to be used for access (gas tankers)
 Positive pressure inside accommodation
 Clean and tidy
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THE INSPECTION
WHAT THE INPSECTOR
IS LOOKING FOR
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SUCCESSFUL VETTING INSPECTIONS
THE INSPECTION
IMPORTANT:
1. The inspector must be accompanied around the ship throughout the entire inspection
2. Who should accompany the inspector around the ship?
3. The inspection can be divided amongst:
 Master
 Chief Officer
 Chief Engineer
 First Assistant Engineer
4. Aim is to achieve least disturbance to the normal operations onboard.
5. Discuss the inspection schedule with inspector
6. As far as possible avoid disturbing the ship’s operations.
7. Handover copy of vessel’s particulars questionnaire to inspector
ONBOARD INSPECTION PROCESS

First impression
Gangway watch
Visitor briefing for emergency stations
Meetings
DOCUMENTS REQUIRED
1. VPQ
2. Quarterly Listing, Status report of Certificates, SMS, DOC
3. Officer’s matrix, Min. Safe Manning Certificate + Crew List
4. E.S.P. Records
5. Experience factor / Tank-wise history records
ESSENTIAL INFORMATION
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1. Q.I.
2. Tel Nr.
3. Fax Nr.
4. Date – Last Port State Control Inspection
5. Port – Last Port State Control Inspection
6. P & I Club
7. Control maximum working hrs & fatigue reduction

8. Defined max level of blood alcohol content
9. Freq. of; unannounced drug, alcohol test and routine med exam
10. Date last unannounced alcohol test
11. Date last unannounced drug test
12. Training policy exceeding statutory requirements
VPQ 3.19 Operator sponsored training course
VPQ3.24 Courses exceeding, statutory requirements
(Ship handling, BMT, electronics, instrumentation.
Formal ashore or on-board with video)
13. Crew Training records + Record of familiarization

Medicine inventory & medical records
14. Navigation records & UK policy
15. Fire Safety, Operations, maintenance and training manual

16. System to monitor flammable atmosphere in non-cargo spaces
17. SOLAS Training & LSA Maintenance Manuals
18. Lifeboats – date lowered and waterborne
19. Safety Committee meeting.
Identification of critical equip and its PPM program.
Rec. of near misses / hazards
Stowaways search records / Piracy / ISPC
Ship security alert system / S.S.A. / S.S.P.
(approved by flag or R.S.O.)
I.S.S. Cert / Cont. synopsis (rolling) record by flag state
Life saving Appliances Plan (IMO approved symbols)
Fire Fighting Equipment Plan
Lights, Shapes and Sound Signals Plan
20. Date of last SOPEP & EMERGENCY Drills

21. Oil Record Book I & II
22. Ballast Water Management Plan
23. Garbage Management Plan & Garbage Record Book
Expired pyrotechnics and medicines
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MARPOL Annex V (garbage) and Annex IV (sewage)

Cargo Sea chest, valve testing.
24. ESP File.

Part A - Terms & Conditions
Part B - Survey Reports
- Condition Evaluation Report
- Dry Dock Report
- Class Renewal Survey Plan or C.A.S.
B1 - Executive Hull Summary
B2 - Special Survey Reports
B3 - Periodical Survey Reports
A. Annual Survey
B. Intermediate Survey
C. Dry Dock r In-water Survey
D. Occasional Survey (Damage or Alterations)
25. Ballast tanks inspection records. C.A.P. Rating
26. Stress & Stab. Calculations – method / freq. /certification
27. IGS log and manual

28. COW log and manual
29. Dk. Seal + NRV + IG Main Isolating valve, overhaul records
30. Winches Test Policy & Rec. Date of last SPM operation
31. Shore Based Maintenance Policy
32. PMS, inventory control, indent and supply system.

Lub Oil Analysis test records and Boiler water test
33. Date of last STS operation
AFTER THE INSPECTION

Discuss deficiencies & comments
Record written objection if no discussion
Written list of deficiencies
Put remarks if demand necessary
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CDI
SHIP INSPECTION
PROCEDURE
31
SHIP INSPECTION PROCEDURES

Background
The Ship Inspection Report (SIR) has been developed as part of the CEFIC “Safety and Quality
Assessment System for the Management of Ship Operations”. For assessment purposes, the SIR
should be read in conjunction with the Vessel Particulars Questionnaire (VPQ).
The aim of the SIR is to give an accurate assessment of the ship at the time the inspection is
carried out. The SIR is essentially a quality assessment of the ship, its operations and personnel
which also incorporates essential aspects of safety and environment protection. Compliance
with statutory, recommended and desirable items are identified within the SIR.
Observations to negative answers requiring explanation are listed in Section B1 (Inspection

Summary). The Inspector may additionally remark on any answer or section deserving further
expansion and on any conditions or occurrences observed during the inspection which were
contrary to safe working practices.
The SIR does not attempt to pass or fail the ship for any particular purpose but rather to give an
assessment of conformance at the time of the inspection as measured against internationally
accepted standards.
The Inspector
The highest standards of ethical behavior are expected from CDI Inspectors. The findings
presented in the SIR are to be regarded as confidential and the property of the Shipowner and
on no account shall the Inspector discuss the contents of the report with any third party.
The Inspector should be an observer only and should not interfere or become involved in the
operation of the ship or be a party in any discussion between the ship, terminal, port authorities
etc.
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The Inspector shall not operate any equipment or advise on any operational or constructional
matters or give any advice on how a particular non compliance or observation may be corrected.
The Inspector may request equipment to be run or operated under test.
A courteous and considerate approach is expected of the Inspector in all dealings with the
Master, his crew and any representative from the shore. The Inspector should take care to
ensure that his actions do not in any way delay or interfere with the normal operation of the
ship.
The Inspector is expected to set a good example with respect to his own safety procedures
during the period of the inspection. The Inspector must wear, as appropriate for the location,
protective clothing and equipment including boiler suit, safety helmet, safety shoes, safety
gloves, ear protectors and goggles / safety glasses.
The ship’s safety procedures and notices displayed on board the ship must be complied with by
the Inspector. The Inspector shall not enter restricted areas unless the Master’s permission has
been obtained and any relevant permits / checklists have been completed correctly. An
Inspector shall not enter an enclosed space unless the procedures detailed in ISGOTT Chapter 11
are fully complied with.
Structure of the Ship Inspection Report

All questions are written as statements and are categorized as either Statutory (referenced to
International Regulations), Recommended (referred to industry Codes of Practice), or Desirable
(required by CDI participants). In addition, questions are asked which are for information only
and are non-scoring.
Within a hard copy SIR, statutory questions are identified by “S”, recommended questions by
“R”, desirable questions by “D” and non-scoring questions by “NS”. Within the electronic
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version of the SIR, check boxes for statutory questions are highlighted in red, recommended
questions in yellow, desirable questions in green and non-scoring questions in white.
A “No” answer to a question which is graded statutory does not necessarily imply that the ship,
Master or crew are not in compliance with flag or port state requirements. When a non-scoring
question is answered “No”, this should not be interpreted that the ship, Master, crew or
operation is deficient in anyway. Some non-scoring questions are used as lead questions to other
questions which are scoring. Non-scoring questions, in general, do not have a N/A option.
When a non-scoring question is marked “No”, then any follow on supplementary questions are
to be marked N/A, unless other specific instructions are given in the question.
Questions within the SIR which clearly do not apply to the ship should be marked as N/A.
Examples of non applicable questions are where an operational assessment is required of
equipment fitted and the ship does not carry the equipment listed.
Questions categorized as statutory and recommended are cross referenced in the SIR to the
relevant IMO Convention, codes, resolutions and marine industry recommendations.
Requirements of individual Flag States are not identified.
Questions are divided into three groups VPQ, SI and I and are identified by shading around the
answer boxes:
VPQ (Heavy shading) Vessel Particulars Questions may be completed by the Shipowner or
shipboard personnel, at any time prior to the inspection. VPQ are not subject to inspection but
the Inspector may change answers and enter observations or remarks where contrary evidence
is noted.
SI (Light shading) Self-Inspection questions may be completed by the shipboard personnel of
ships having two previous reports, under the same Technical Operator, active on the database.
Ships eligible for Self-Inspection carry the suffix (S) on the database. SI questions will be subject
to audit by the Inspector.
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I (No shading) Inspection questions are for full inspection by the Inspector. Following upload of
the SIR by the Inspector, The CDI electronic database gathers the results from the three scoring
categories and produces a report summary with graphical performance diagram. At this stage,
the Shipowner may enter comments against the Inspector’s observations and remarks.
The report summary, performance diagram, summary of observations and remarks, and the
Ship owner’s comments are available to users of the CDI system having electronic access to the
completed report.
Inspection Procedures
Inspections using the CDI system shall only be carried out after the inspection has been initiated
on the CDI database. Inspections can only be initiated by the Charterer who is a participant in
the CDI scheme, or a Shipowner who has an agreement with CDI. Inspectors cannot initiate an
inspection.
A report from an inspection carried out prior to it being initiated on the CDI database may not
be accepted by CDI for entry onto the database. Consecutive inspections of the same ship with
the same Inspector are not permitted where the technical management of the vessel has
remained unchanged. This includes occasions when an Inspector has carried out a “pre-
inspection” on the vessel prior to the vessel undergoing a CDI inspection. It is the responsibility
of the Inspector to verify that he did not carry out the previous inspection.
Prior to the inspection taking place, the Shipowner should enter the ship’s VPQ to the database.
VPQ data need only be entered once and can be updated by the ship owner at any time. SIRs of
ships having no VPQ, cannot be accepted onto the “active” database and will remain
inaccessible until such time as the minimum VPQ data is entered. Questions making up the
minimum VPQ data are clearly marked in the VPQ. In cases where no VPQ data has been
entered and the ship presents a hard copy VPQ, arrangements could be made through the
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Inspector to enter the data. Inspectors may allow the VPQ to be completed during the
inspection; it should be noted however, that this may increase the time span of the inspection.
Prior to an inspection being carried out, the Inspector shall download from the CDI database the
“initiated” SIR. The initiated report will contain the VPQ (if entered) and pertinent information
regarding the ship which will be of assistance to the Inspector during the inspection.
Prior to the inspection being carried out, the Shipowner must declare to the Inspector as to
whether the ship is eligible for Self- Inspection. It is the responsibility of the Inspector to verify
the eligibility. It is the responsibility of the Shipowner to ensure that the semi-completed SIR
will be presented to the Inspector on boarding. Failure to provide a semi-completed SIR will
result in total inspection.
Where the Inspector finds that SI questions have been completed incorrectly, the Inspector has
the right to revert the entire inspection or just the specific section, at his discretion, to total
inspection. The time taken for inspection can be greatly reduced by the state of preparedness of
the ship. The latest edition of the SIR should be on board and, as applicable, VPQ and SI
questions should have been completed. To help expedite first time inspections the Shipowner
may consider having a representative on board during the inspection.
An inspection shall not normally be carried out during the night when the ship’s key personnel
may be expected to take a period of rest. The only exception to this is when special
arrangements have been made with the Shipowner and the Master prior to the Inspector
boarding the ship.
For additional general information on the conduct of inspections, reference should be made to
the “Code of Practice for the Organizing and Conducting Inspections of Tankers” which is
jointly published by CEFIC, SIGTTO, ICS, INTERTANKO, IPTA and others.
Opening Meeting
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On boarding the ship, the Inspector shall identify himself / herself to the Master (or his
representative). The Inspector shall outline the objectives and requirements of the inspection.
For whatever reason, it remains the prerogative of the Master to decline the inspection. The
Inspector and the Master (or his representative) should agree the sequence for the inspection.
The Inspection should be planned and carried out in a manner which will not conflict with the
safe operation of the ship. Regulations concerning the working hours of the crew shall be
respected by the Inspector. The Inspector should establish when key crew members will be
available to assist with the inspection.
During the inspection, it is recommended that the Inspector is accompanied at all times by a
responsible and suitably qualified person(s), nominated by the Master. Proper planning at the
Opening Meeting will enable the inspection to be carried out efficiently and with the
minimum of disruption to the normal working of the ship.
Should a superintendent (representing the Shipowner, Technical or Commercial Operator) be

present, then the Inspector will liaise with the superintendent. The superintendent
Must not however interfere with the inspection procedure or answer questions which are
addressed to the Master, officers or crew. Information provided by the superintendent, of which
the Master and Officers have no apparent knowledge will be disregarded.
The Inspection
It is a requirement that all questions (statements) in the SIR are answered. Sampling of questions
within the report, other than audit of SI questions, is not permitted. However, sampling within a
particular question is permitted. For example, when assessing the question on the condition of
lifejackets, the Inspector is not expected to examine all lifejackets on board, but only a sufficient
number to make an assessment on the condition overall.
37
When the ship is in operation, some areas may not be capable of inspection, e.g. cargo and
ballast tanks. When any question is not addressed due to operational reasons, the N/A check
box should be marked and a note made in the relevant Remarks section.
Each question must have one of tits check boxes marked. This includes questions which are for
Information only. Items in the report which are marked “Information only” and require data to
be entered, must be completed.
If certain items of information are not available, a comment shall be made in the relevant
Remarks section. With the exception of “familiarity” type questions which by their nature are
subjective, answers, observations and remarks must be based on objective evidence. Objective
evidence is defined as qualitative or quantitative information, records or statements of fact
which is based on observation, measurement or test and which can be verified.
The assurance of ship’s staff should not be accepted by the Inspector as compliance with a
particular question, without objective evidence being produced to support their assertions.
Where a question requires ‘a procedure’, evidence will be sought to verify that the procedure is
implemented. Similarly, evidence will be sought to verify written records. In both these cases,
where inspection evidence is contrary to the procedure and/or written record, the initial
question will be marked as No.
An Inspector may request the demonstration or test of a particular piece of equipment. Should
the request be refused, then this should be noted in the relevant Remarks section, together with
the reason for refusal.
Requests for a test of equipment should not be made where this will result in a major disruption
to the ship’s normal operations. i.e. stopping cargo operations, blackout etc.
Closing Meeting
38
On completion of the inspection, the Inspector will hold a closing meeting with the Master (or
his representative). At the closing meeting the Inspector shall provide the Master with the
Record of Negative Answers matrix form detailing all questions answered “No” and the
Summary of Observations and Remarks as per Section B of the SIR.
The Inspector shall discuss with the Master (or his representative) the answers given in the SIR
and if requested to do so, explain how the answers have been determined. Should a “No”
answer, an observation or a remark be contested, then the Inspector shall giv e the Master the
opportunity to produce objective evidence to satisfy the requirement. If satisfactory evidence of
compliance is produced, then the answer to the question may be amended. Answers to
questions, or the Summary of Observations and Remarks, should not be amended after the
Inspector leaves the ship.
The Master should be requested to sign the Record of Negative Answers matrix form and the
Summary of Observations and Remarks to signify he has received them. The Master’s signature
is for receipt only and does not infer that the Master agrees with assessment of observations.
The Master (or his representative), must be given the opportunity to comment in writing on the
contents of the SIR and the Summary of Observations and Remarks. Any written comments
from the Master (or his representative) shall be recorded on, or attached to, the Summary of
Observations and Remarks. Where the Master (or his representative), chooses to make written
comment, this must be accompanied by his signature.
The Inspection does not result in a pass or fail. The SIR is for consideration by a potential
Charterer only. The Inspector shall not indicate to the Master, Superintendent or any other
person, the standard of the ship or the possible eventual outcome of the inspection.
Processing the Report
39
During, or on completion of the inspection, the Inspector shall enter all the inspection data, list
of Observations and Remarks (together with any comments from the Master), into his computer
terminal and then up-load the report to the CDI database in accordance with the procedures
governing control of the CDI database system.
The SIR must be uploaded to the CDI database as soon as is practically possible after the
inspection. Except in exceptional circumstances (or when instructed by CDI), copies of the
Record of Negative Answers matrix form and list of Observations and Remarks should not be
faxed, or transmitted by any other means, to any person or business who is not the Shipowner
or Charterer initiating the inspection.
SIR data is privy to the accredited Inspector (which includes persons employed by the Inspector
or under the direct control of the Inspector), the Shipowner and if the inspection is initiated by a
Charterer, the charterer. Persons, who do not have approved access to the SIR data on the
electronic database, are not permitted to sight the SIR data in hand-written or typed hard copy.
The use of the electronic database provides a level of security for the SIR data which is easily
compromised if information is faxed or mailed to uncontrolled third parties. The Inspector is
responsible for the security of the SIR data between the time of carrying out the inspection and
uploading the data to the CDI database. The Inspector shall ensure that a back up of the SIR
Data is available in the event that the original SIR Data is lost prior to uploading to the CDI
Database.
After uploading SIR data to the CDI database all hard copy SIR data which includes the
completed questionnaire, Record of Negative Answers matrix form and, if applicable, the
Summary of Observations and Remarks shall be retained by the Inspector for a period of
thirteen months. Thereafter, the documents may be disposed of in safe and secure fashion.
40
The Inspector will be advised by CDI if hard copy SIR data is to be forwarded to CDI for review
or other purposes.
Validity of Report
The report is normally valid for thirteen months, after which it is archived. If at any time within
the thirteen month period, the technical management of the ship is transferred, the SHIP
OPERATOR is required to advise CDI and, subject to verification of the ISM Certification, the
report may be prematurely achieved.
PIT FALLS
41
AND
COMMON
DEFICIENCIES
FOUND
PIT FALLS AND COMMON DEFICIENCIES FOUND

The Problems found
42
05 June 95 to 05 June 97 – Sample Total = 1.962 Ships (Failure rate 57.8%)

IIR Risk Management Conference 1988 – BP Group Ship Vetting
Inspection & Vetting
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
43
Ships Inspected 962 978 799 745 1,013 1,225

Ships Failed 299 356 366 380 602 749
Ships Passed 663 622 433 365 411 476
Failure Rates 31.1% 36.4% 45.8% 51.0% 59.4% 61.1%
Total Enquiries 11,469 15,386 15,535 15,082 18,368 20,567
“OK” Vets 1,690 2,754 2,784 2,440 3,245 3,807
Turndown Rate 14.7% 17.9% 17.9% 16.2% 17.8% 18.5%
CERTIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION

 Trading Certificates
 Out of date
 Periodical inspection not done
 Severe shortage of operating instructions
 Stability info invalid / missing
 No enhanced survey program
 5 year old
 Product – 30,000dwt
 Crude – 20,000dwt
 No SOPEP / VRP onboard and / or senior officers
completely unfamiliar with its use.
CREW MANAGEMENT
 Under manned with respect to minimum
safe manning cert
 Severe language and communication
difficulties
 Insufficient crew actually on board to
handle cargo work, moorings & emergencies
NAVIGATION
 Passage plan only pilot to pilot and inadequate
44
 Missing publications
 Old editions when new edition is issued
 Masters standing orders and night orders missing
SAFETY MANAGEMENT
 Lack or contravention of smoking restrictions
 Non compliance with hot work & enclosed space entry permits
 Use of non-intrinsically safe electrical Equipment – phones, pagers
 Poor maintenance of LSA Equipment
Following not working:

 Fixed smothering system
 Fire detection system and ship on urns
 Emergency fire pump and Emergency generator
CARGO CONTROL ROOM AND TANK DECK

 No cargo/ballast plan available
 Hydraulic leaks on deck
 Officers & crew not wearing safety helmets & PPE
 No policy for entering tanks
 No screens inside the vents for ballast tanks
 No calibration gas for gas detection instruments
 Persons involved with operation not familiar with plan
 Open loading & discharging
 Significant leaks from pipelines, glands and pumps
 Pump/ motor room ventilation not working / effective
 Gas proof lighting or wiring in poor or unsafe condition
45
 Slip tubes in use for sounding

 Gas leaks readily apparent
 Motor room (positive pressure) and / or compressor
room (extraction) vent system inoperative or incorrectly used
 Cable / pipe penetration through pump / motor not gas
tight
 Personnel unaware / unfamiliar with operational
restrictions on ships with limited GM and stability problems
 Cargo vent flame screen in poor condition
 ODME not fully operational
 Oil record book incomplete
 First aid equipment not available
 Scuppers not adequately plugged
 Spill gear not ready
 Moorings in overall poor condition
 Splices in mooring wires/ropes in
 Poor condition
 Insufficient tucks (min. five)
 Emergency towing arrangements in poor condition
ENGINE ROOM AND STEERING GEAR

 No procedures / instructions displayed for:
 Important machinery
 Emergency equipment – Emergency Gen, Emergency fire
p/p, foam system
 Immobilizing ship alongside without permission
 Soft patches on pipelines
46
 Significant bilge accumulation from leaks

 Officers not familiar with emergency steering change-over
 Emergency steering procedures not posted
 Hot work procedures not used / not in guidelines
 Safety guidelines for welding not posted
 No eye protection warning notices posted – e/r workshop
 No clean goggles near grinders and lathe
 Oily jute and rags lying around
 Oily / missing / soaked lagging
 Drip leaks from rams and steering gear
ACCOMMODATION AND GALLEY

 Untidy
 Galley overhead vent greasy
 Accommodation ventilators with no
identification labels
47
WHY DO THESE HIGH RISK OBSERVATIONS OCCUR?
A LACK OF PROPER GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT OF

THE VESSEL – i.e. PROCEDURES
A LACK OF COMPETENT PERSONNEL ONBOARD AND ASHORE TO CARRY OUT

THOSE DUTIES – PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OPERATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF THE VESSEL.
WHAT A GOOD SHIP MUST HAVE?
PROCEDURES WHICH ARE:

 Properly documented
 Comprehensive
 Easily accessible
 Understood by those onboard
PEOPLE WHO ARE:

 Properly trained for their duties
 Motivated
 Safety conscious
 Committed to using management systems
SUPERINTENDENCY:
 Support to the vessel
 Ensure properly maintained
 Ensure properly operated
48
BP’s STATISTICS ON HIGH-RISK FAILURE
Category % Examples
Closed Operations 19% “hi-jet” type tanks vents wedged open, fixed
Ullaging systems inoperable with no back-up
available, tank lids open to sight the cargo etc.
Charts and Navigation 18% Inadequate passage plan, important navigational
equipment not working, out of date charts etc.
Pollution Prevention 17% ODME not fully operational, discrepancies in
disposal/oil record book, unauthorized overboard
discharge pipe work etc.
Certificates and Manning 11% Inappropriate trading certificates, lack of DCE’s,
Severe lack of company operating instructions
regardless of any ISM certification etc.
Pumps and Pipes 10% Pumps and line in poor overall condition (e.r.
seawater, fire/foam, cargo and inert gas system)
Soft patches, leaks, sprays etc.
Smoking 6% Not controlled at all, smoking rooms not
designated, physically unsuitable or ignored etc.
Enclosed Space Entry 6% Failure to fully meet the requirements of ISGOTT
etc. in terms of entry test permits, safety precautions
etc.
Hot Work 5% Failure to fully meet the requirements of ISGOTT
etc. in terms of entry test, permits, safety
precautions, notifications etc.
Mooring 4% Poorly maintained or used incorrectly
Doors and Ports 4% Not controlled or have been ignored
OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS VETTING REPORTS
49
CHAPTER -1 : GENERAL INFORMATION (Ships’ details)

1. The VPQ dated 14/8/2007 uploaded into the SIRE database has to be amended on some items
CHAPTER -2 : CERTIFICATE AND DOCUMENTATION

1. Aggregated experience time of C/E + 1 A/E in the company and Master + C/O in rank both less than 5
years.
2. The type of the vessel on the Security Certificate was Oil / Chemical Tanker. The GT on the Security
certificate was 25400. The type of the ship on the SMC was Oil / Chemical tanker. The Form B of the
IOPP contained item 10.1 checked, therefore the noxious liquids & the attachment of the noxious liquids
was attached to the IOPP Form B.
3. CLC had incorrect P & I Club. P & I Club changed from Steamship Mutual to Britannia on 17th April,
2007.
4. The number of immersion suits on board was not rectified, even the last annual survey was completed
after the 01/07/06.
5. The safety equipment annual was outside of the range by more then three months – the vessel had an
extension until March 2007. The safety equipment certificate had not been corrected to reflect the
additional immersion suits added in July 2006.
6. CSR No.3 was issued, but Index of Amendment to CSR was not recorded for the past change reason of
CSRs.
7. The International Sewage Pollution Prevention Certificate was not available on board. Vessel held only
a Statement of Compliance.
8. Scanned copy of CLC 92 cert was onboard other than original cert onboard.
9. The last visit to the vessel by a representative of the operator was more than 6 months ago and was in
May, 2006
10. Survey Status Report, reports following outstanding recommendations endorsed on 19th June’06 at
Genoa: Damaged transom plate to be repaired with next scheduled docking. Due date 27th Sept. 07
11. The last COT inspection was carried out on 26 Nov 2006 that exceeded the Company required
frequency of six months.
12. The condition evaluation report was not available on board for inspection
13. The IMO publication Inert Gas was not provided on board.
50
14. The IMDG Codes were out of date.
15. Publication ‘Recommendation for ship’s fitting for use with tug’ was not onboard.
16. Aggregated experience time of C/E + 1 A/E in the company and Master + C/O in rank both less than 5
years.
17. Record of Safely Equipment Certificate issued by Flag authorities stated in paragraph 5.2.2: "Number
of persons accommodated by them (liferah)": Sesseantaquafro. It was only in Italian language. (VIQ
Point 2.1)
18. Maximum throughput of 15ppm oily water separator not endorsed on IOPP form B.
19. Class Notation assigned as +100 A1 oil and chemical tanker, IOPP B describes her as Crude oil /
Product carrier ( Reported since taken over - vessel certificate endorsed only for oil Tanker )
20. Safety Management Certificate (SMC) was issued for Oil and Chemical tanker. Chemical notation not
yet deleted from statutory certificates. Engine air pollution prevention certificate, with supplement was
not available. The vessel was not issued with Green Award.
21. The safety equipment annual was outside of the range by more than three months – the vessel had an
extension until March 2007. The safety equipment certificate had not been corrected to reflect the
additional immersion suits added in July 2006.
22. The Recovery Oil tank, placed in between the Slop Tanks, was not endorsed in the IOPP supplement.
The ROT, connected to the IG and cargo pipeline was supposed to receive cargo drainage from the
cargo lines and manifolds, cargo tank's washing residuals. At the time of the inspection it was empty
23. In the P & A Manual the approval date was corrected with liquid paper corrector.
24. Certificate of register in Italian language only, Suggest to have available a notary translation in
English.
25. The operator took over the vessel on 16th August 2006 and an Internal audit had not been carried out
at the time of our attendance. External audit under present managers had not been made. Vessels SMC
and ISS were interim issues.
26. The last Internal audit dated 21 April 2006, did not specify the time limit for the corrective actions.
27. The Master's Review had NOT been carried out since the new vessel Operator took over management
on 17 July 2007.
28. Vessel carried out an underwater inspection in lieu of DD on the 7-9-05
51
29. The latest Class Status report was over 4 months old at the time of inspection.
30. Carried out a review of the last Class Survey Status of 28 February 2007.
The vessel was issued one (1) BV Class Recommendation as follows:
7.1 Damaged transomplate to be repaired with next scheduled dry-docking.
Due: 21 September 2007.
31. Following conditions of class were in place:

1. Findings related to remote operation of sea direct valves in engine room to be brought in order.
Meanwhile engine room to be manned all the time at sea.
2. Ballast pump (both) casing temperature monitors were missing.
3. Findings related to the following items to be dealt with:- auxiliary engine, main fire pump
suction valve, port & stbd lifeboat oxygen reservoirs.
All 3 conditions were due on 10 Oct 2006.
The survey report issued after the last annual survey indicated item 3 as follows:
Auxiliary engine aft jacket cooling water was leaking from liners.
Forward port auxiliary engine exhaust pipe insulation i.w.o turbocharger was partially deteriorated.
Auxiliary engines were found with excessive oil leakages.
Fire water supply control & monitoring system - main fire pump suction valve to main sea water
manifold was found defective.
One air reservoir valve at each lifeboat was found seized and inoperable.
32. ESP file was not available onboard. The vessel was due for first special survey by April 2007 i.e. in
two months time.
33. Planning document for last special survey not available on board.
34. Ship was required to hold a CAS survey in conjunction with the first due SS or items after 5th April
2005.
35. The following publications were not onboard

a. Guidance for the control of drugs and alcohol on board ships.
b. International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers & Terminal.
36. The ISGOTT edition 5 was not onboard.
37. Publication (2.24.8) Guidance manual for Tanker Structure was not onboard.
38. SOLAS - out of date publication (requisition order for same sighted).
39. Guidance Manual for Tanker Structures - not held.
CHAPTER- 3 : CREW MANAGEMENT
52
1. It was noted that the Chief Officer did not have at least 6 consecutive hours of rest for five days
between 5th December and 10th December 2006, both days included.
2. Neither REGULATED use of videos nor computer based training programs have been implemented
on board. Set of various training videos was provided by the Operator.
3. The Master had no ship-handling training certificate.
4. ECDIS training was not part of the training policy. 2nd mate had not been trained in ECDIS use.
5. The operator did not have chemical specific medical checks for the officer’s and crew.
6. Chief Engineer had only an Italian general tanker safety certificate issued in 1990 with no
endorsement since. No oil tanker endorsement on the flag state certificate.
7. Defined intervals for external D & A and onboard alcohol test could not be determined from the
operators policy.
8. The Company’s D&A policy defined the vessel as " white ship ", but did not define in terms of
quantity the maximum level of blood alcohol content
9. The shipboard alcohol test kit was 3 monthly calibrated by 3rd officer. The maker's recommended
alcohol test kit calibration interval was every month.
10. The D&A policy was not declaring maximum allowed BAC. The policy stated that the consumption
of the alcohol on board was not allowed and that the ship was the "white ship". There were no
instructions in case of the shore personnel or ship's crew consummated alcohol ashore and
returning/joining the vessel.
11. Notwithstanding the on board alcohol test was carried out monthly, the frequency requested was not
reported on the Company manuals.
12. The ECDIS was noted as part of the safety equipment within safety equipment certificate form E,
but no electronic chart was provided on board.
13. The total experience in rank of the two senior deck officers was less then five years.
14. The Master did not keep a record of hours of rest.
15. Deck crew periodically converse in Indian language on portable radios during cargo operations; 1
deck officer & 1 engineer
16. Master & Third Officer onboard for over 3 months & did not possess the flag issued COR
( Application letters sent over 3 months prior)
53
17. Master and Chief Officer have both served less than 1 year in rank. Second officer, third officer and
chief engineer do not hold flag state endorsements to their licenses, applications for same sighted.
Three months grace period expired on the 13th of September, 2006 (now out of date).
18. Chief Engineer and First Engineer joined on same day. Very short familiarization was allowed for
First Engineer and no onboard Familiarization was allowed for Chief Engineer.
19. The Master and the Chief Officer had aggregate time with the Operator of less than two (2) years &
the Chief Engineer and the First Engineer had aggregate time with the Operator of less than two (2)
years.
CHAPTER -4: NAVIGATION
1. There was no reference to the AIS in the operator’s pre-arrival and pre-departure checklists.
2. There was no permanent record maintained of the vessel’s positions during pilotages.
3. Official language of the ship was not specified / recorded in Deck log book.
4. The bridge watch condition was not recorded on the bridge log book as requested by Company
procedures.
5. Pilot card in use did not include information about the type and way of turn of the propeller.
6. Vessel's maneuvering characteristics. Information of shallow water turning diagram in loaded

condition was not available.
7. The magnetic compass deviation errors obtained by observations differed from deviation card by up
to 6 deg on some headings.
8. The tide tables were out of date & the tide tables were not for the current year.
9. VOYAGE CHARTS BA 122 & 132, PORT ROTTERDAM AND APPROACHES, WERE NOT
CORRECTED / MARKED WITH T&P NOTICES 5511, 4756, 4058 / 06 APPLICABLE FOR THE
CHART.
10. The last Navigational warning received via Navtex was dated the 30th March 2007. System had not
printed any nav warnings / weather reports since the 30th March and was presumed to be faulty.
11. BA chart 3480 for the last laden voyage has 2nos T&P (4893/05, 2724/05), but not properly
monitored as not plotted in the chart nor recorded in T&P file.
54
12. There was no procedure to regular test the navigation lights failure alarm.
13. The Operators policy regarding the safety rounds required hourly rounds between the hours of 1700
& 0600, which would mean the watchman leaving the bridge. The vessel was carrying out rounds
every 4 hours, after the watch. There was an Operators letter which stipulated hourly rounds of
certain areas but not all areas of the accommodation.
14. The procedure to be followed in case that minimum allowed could not be maintained did not clearly
indicate that the Company must be informed before any future action.
15. The Chartco system was out of order at the time of the inspection. Notices to Mariners were received
and corrected until 25/07
16. The ECDIS was noted as part of the safety equipment within safety equipment certificate form E,
but no electronic chart was provided on board.
17. On the last voyage chart 442 approaching the casquets which was the best scale for the area was not
in use.
18. The ship's passage plan on page (4) stated that navigation from floating navigational aids was
acceptable. Observed positions being taken from floating navigational aids (buoys) for a total of
fourteen (14) positions - as follows: four (4) consecutive positions from buoys, seven (7) consecutive
positions from buoys, and three (3) consecutive positions from buoys. In between the bouy positions
observed several positions from "Racon" fixed navigational aids. On chart no: 3458 observed NO
positions taken between 1111 hrs to 1205 hrs. on 03 September 2007 - entrance / pilotage to New
Jersey berths.
19. The position fixing intervals were not specifically provided to each Ieg of voyage (way point to way
point). (VIQ Point 4.20)
20. Vessel's position was not always carried over from the previous onto the next voyage chart. (VIQ
Point 4.21)
21. All ships position within Skikda (loading port) were by GPS system. (VIQ Point 4.21)
22. Passage plan required position fixing at 15 min intervals for courses 168 and 184 deg on BA chart
no. 3543, however, chart showed that the position fixes were actually taken at hourly intervals.
23. BA chart 3480 for the last laden voyage has 2 nos T&P (4893/05, 2724/05), but not properly
monitored as not plotted in the chart nor recorded in T&P file.
24. The Navtex warnings are not filed as the Navtex is not fitted with a printer.
25. Observed the Navtex receiver was switched off while the vessel alongside to berth.
55
26. The AIS was located in the chart room and not interfaced with the radars.
27. Automatic Identification System - ARPA radar screen not visible from AIS position. Operator
requires AIS to be switched off whilst in port.
CHAPTER -5: SAFETY MANAGEMENT
1. There was no documented evidence to indicate that the designated Safety Officer (Chief Officer) had
completed a formal Safety Officers training course.
2. The Chief Officer and 3rd officer were designated as ship safety officer and they had neither in-
house safety officer training certificate nor external safety officer training certificate.
3. A senior officer accompanying the inspector was unable to satisfactorily test / check the breathing
apparatus air bottles. 30 bar of pressure was lost during the test.
4. RECORDS INDICATED THAT ONLY ONE NEAR MISS HAD BEEN REPORTED SINCE JUNE
2006, IE. WITHIN LAST 5 MONTHS.
5. There was no procedure to record PSC deficiencies as non- conformities (The last 2 PSC inspections
had resulted in 4 deficiencies)
6. The non-conformity form did not indicate the required time limit for corrective action.
7. The operator provided ship/shore safety checklist form was not revised follow by 5th edition of
ISGOTT ship/shore safety checklist.
8. AIS BRIDGE STATION WAS FOUND IN OPERATION ON HIGH POWER TRANSMISSION

MODE DURING DISCHARGING WHILE ALONGSIDE.
9. It was demonstrated that even if AIS was manually switched to low power it went back to high
power automatically.
10. Ash trays found in use in the crew's smoke room were not of the approved closed type.
11. The schedules of emergency drills conducted did not include emergency towing and helicopter
operations.
12. A senior office accompanying the inspector was unable to satisfactorily start the lifeboat engine.
13. No documented evidence of risk assessment being carried out before issuing hot work and enclosed
space entry permits.
56
14. Last record of fixed gas detector test or inspection was dated 17.10.2006, as per ship's records. Ship's
staff was not able to present any recent test records.
15. The fixed system to monitor flammable atmospheres in non-cargo spaces was found to be
inoperative ( waiting spare parts )
16. Only one oxygen instrument suitable for measuring O2 content at the bottom of tanks.
17. There was no H2S tube provided for used with toxic gas instrument.
18. Ships hull must be utilized for welding return current. Only one welding extension cable on board.
19. There was no maintenance and test schedule for the lifeboat on load release gear – An application by
the company to flag state had been done and an extension was granted till the 08th June 2007.
20. During inspection of the lifeboat, emergency lights at the port & starboard lifeboats could not be
turned on. It was believed that the fault was failed light bulbs.
21. Self-activating smoke float on stbd side bridge wing was wrongly attached to a lifebuoy that made
impossible quick release of the lifebuoy with the float.
22. The fire safety operational booklets did not contain correct information.
23. The international ship shore connection was located inside the accommodation.
24. Forward stores and bow thruster room have not been covered by fire detection plant.
25. There was a non intrinsically safe torch, in the Master Cabin.
26. The non-conformity form did not indicate the required time limit for corrective action.
27. Smoking regulation was not complied with. Junior officer found with cigarette and mechanical
lighter on the bridge.
28. The last SOPEP drill was carried on 20.07.2006. The drill scenario appeared too concise and did not
include the referenced check list.
29. The Inspector was not asked to provide identification when boarding. (VIQ Point 5.22)
30. "Cleaned and Inspected in May 2007" was stenciled on the bulkhead of the starboard fresh water
tank, but no Enclosed Space Entry Permit could be located to support the use of the permit system
on board.
31. On enclosed space entry permit toxic gas checked were not specified.
57
32. Personnel working in pump room were provided with personal gas monitor but equipment was not
switched on.
33. The fixed system to monitor flammable atmospheres in non-cargo spaces was found to be
inoperative ( waiting spare parts )
34. Only one oxygen instrument suitable for measuring O2 content at the bottom of tanks.
35. Only 1 Personal H2S / Ox Monitor carried (vessel regularly loads low Sulphur fuel oil cargoes).
36. No pocket O2 and H2S anazilers were provided.
37. Junior officer on watch was not familiar with the calibration of oxygen and gas meters.
38. The span gas for the multigas portable personal analyzers was out of date.
39. The vessel had on MSA type of toxic hand pump together with test tubes. In addition the vessel had
two Kitigawa pumps, but without tubes. There only one hand pumps could be used for
measurements.
40. Ships hull must be utilized for welding return current. Only one welding extension cable on board.
41. The short length of piping from the cylinder head to the manifolds within the storage space for the
oxygen bottle room is made of copper and this copper pipe is brazed at two places.
42. There was no maintenance and test schedule for the lifeboat on load release gear – An application by
the company to flag state had been done and an extension was granted till the 08th June 2007.
43. During inspection of the lifeboat, emergency lights at the port & starboard lifeboats could not be
turned on. It was believed that the fault was failed light bulbs.
44. The lifeboats had not been maneuvered in the water to date.
45. Brake lever securing toggle pins had seized in closed position both on port & starboard lifeboat
winch brake levers. This was corrected prior to the inspector leaving the vessel.
46. One limiter pin of the rescue boat crane was bent / deformed.
47. Vessel has no certification regarding life-boat / rescue boat launch test as per IMO
48. The lifebuoy lights in gas zone on tank deck were not approved for use in gas hazardous areas.
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49. Port and starboard MOB ropes were shot, approx 2.30 meters. According manufacture instructions
(Pains Wessex Safety Systems MOB 360), line between lifebuoy and smoke float must be 4 meters
long. (VIQ Point 5.53)
50. The lifebuoy lights in gas zone on tank deck were not approved for use in gas hazardous areas.
51. Self-activating smoke float on stbd side bridge wing was wrongly attached to a lifebuoy that made
impossible quick release of the lifebuoy with the float.
52. IMO symbols for the LSA & FFA did not indicate the total numbers if it is more than one at a
particular location
53. Fire Detection Panel noted with “disabled” light lit. (Reported that 1 sensor in the engine room
above the boiler was defective & had been isolated.
54. Forward stores and bow thruster room have not been covered by fire detection plant.
55. Torches for fireman’s outfits in steering flat were not in place. This was corrected before the
completion of the inspection.
56. There was no a certificate on board proven that the BA air-charger compressor had been annually
serviced by a shore company to ensure that the air quality of the unit is satisfactory.
57. The vessel's port gangway rigged to the pier at the time of the ship inspection. However the gangway
safety net was not fully covered the port gangway.
58. No non slip walkway from pilot boarding area to main deck non slip walkway.
59. The original Halon system had been replaced with a High Ex foam system. It was noted that the
Halon bottles were still pressurized.
60. Marking of necessary safety signs and displaying of other important information has not been
completed, it was in progress.
61. A portable VHF radio set used on deck by ship's crew had damaged antenna and it became non
intrinsically safe type. Damaged units: even though they made be capable of operation, should not be
used. It was changed. (ISGOTT 4.3.4)
CHAPTER -6: POLLUTION PREVENTION
1. Weekly entries of residues retained on board in Oil Record book Part I, ( under the Code C – sludge
residues ) included the bilge tank that did not contain sludge and was not listed in the table of
designated sludge tanks in part B section 3.1. of the IOPPC
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2. Last bunkering in Oil record book part I on 12 Feb ’07 and on 29 Jan ’07 was recorded in use of
Code H item 27 other than item 26 as per the revised Marpol annex I.
3. The discharges of bilge water from machinery spaces in Special Area were recorded as non-
automatic in Oil Record Book 1.
4. The sludge and the bilge tanks designated in form B of the I.O.P.P and those listed in the Engine oil
record book did not agree in that the M/E stuffing box was being used (and recorded in the oil
record book), but not recorded in the I.O.P.P. certificate.
5. Cargo was dripping through 2S cargo pump delivery valve stem seal, one drop per each second
6. ODME was repaired by expert agency during inspection, but the ODME condition before repair was
not recorded in Oil record book part II.
7. The ballast water management plan did not contain any procedure for dealing with sediment.
8. Sequence of ballast water exchange, time to complete this procedure, stability, bending moments and
sheer forces calculations were not developed as part of Ballast water management plan. Records of
ballast water operations (Ballast handling log) have not been maintained as required by Ballast water
management plan.
9. The manhole of 12 bolts has to be removed in order to check the ballast water surface.
10. There were no records available to suggest that the ballast water had ever been checked prior to
being discharged overboard.
11. Emergency bilge suction was not properly sealed with easy breakable numbered seal. Rectified
during inspection.
12. OWS suction line was provided w/ 25A sea water dilution line. Other Inspector Comments USCG
letter '16711 G-PC V Policy letter 06-01' on 20 Jan '06 reads, 'Enclosure (1) PC V Policy letter 06-
01, (iii) Regardless of the manufacturer's operation manual... (b) The fluid entering the OWS for
processing comes directly from the bilge holding tank or rose box and is not diluted by open sea or
fresh water connections.'
13. The stop time of the garbage incinerator was not recorded on the garbage record book.
14. According Garbage record book, the vessel discharged many times garbage category #5 at sea. But
garbage category #5 (food waste) was found mixed with category #1 (plastics), in the main deck
marked container.
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15. Sopep manual not updated with latest edition. Electronic version was onboard and updated to
manual during inspection.
16. Starboard scupper at be after end of the main deck was observed to be leaking water during cargo
operations. 11 were corrected. (VIQ Point 6.12)
17. The only portable pump rigged at aft end of main deck was not operative. It was corrected 30
minutes later. (VIQ Point 6.14)
18. Pneumatic pump (wilden pump) used for pollution control aft main deck was not grounded,
immediately rectified on pointing out.
19. There were no records of testing the ballast lines passing through the cargo tanks.
20. Heavy fuel oil and diesel bunker pipeline manifold drain lines are not capped, only 1 valve
separation.
21. One spill container around two engine vent tanks was found unplugged. (VIQ Point 6.23)
22. The oil saves all height of Cyl. Oil tank, Generator sett. Tank, M/E LO storage tank, main LO sett.
tank and diesel oil storage tank located at port and starboard side of accommodation areas were
higher than the subject vents height
23. The foc's'le store bilge overboard valve was not locked in the closed position
24. The ballast water management plan did not contain any procedure for dealing with sediment.
25. Sequence of ballast water exchange, time to complete this procedure, stability, bending moments and
sheer forces calculations were not developed as part of Ballast water management plan. Records of
ballast water operations (Ballast handling log) have not been maintained as required by Ballast water
management plan.
26. The vessel cannot easily check or sample segregated ballast prior to deballsting. The only access
being via multi-bolted manholes covers. (VIQ Point 6.3 1)
27. Emergency bilge overboard valve from the Fire pump was pad-locked. The pad locks were removed
during the inspection. The emergency bilge overboard valve from the Fire pump was not provided
with a notice warning against accidental opening.
28. Emergency bilge suction was not properly sealed with easy breakable numbered seal. Rectified
during inspection.
29. OWS suction line was provided w/ 25A sea water dilution line.
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30. Other Inspector Comments USCG letter '16711 G-PC V Policy letter 06-01' on 20 Jan '06 reads, -
'Enclosure (1) PC V Policy letter 06-01, (iii) Regardless of the manufacturer's operation manual... (b)
The fluid entering the OWS for processing comes directly from the bilge holding tank or rose box
and is not diluted by open sea or fresh water connections.'
31. A number of accommodation and galley waste receptacles were observed to be constructed of a
flammable material (not identified "for wet waste, glass bottles and metal cans only"). Requisition
order for galvanized receptacles sighted.
32. Many garbage containers provided with openings in the bottom. (VIQ Point 6.40)
33. The stop time of the garbage incinerator was not recorded on the garbage record book.
CHAPTER -7: STRUCTURAL CONDITION
1. Main fire line support i.w.o. manifold was found rusted and cracked at the base.
CHAPTER -8: CARGO AND BALLAST SYSTEM

1. The loading computer was tested correctly for accuracy.
2. Cargo plan had did not mentioned initial discharge rate.
3. Float sensors of fixed gauging system for COT 6 wings and 3 port were found out of order. The
vessel was awaiting for spares and service. Manual gauging by portable UTI was in place to
compensate.
4. At the time of inspection, all cargo tanks monitoring system (gauging, pressure) was not working.
5. The lower temperature sensor of stbd slop was faulty. Ballast tank level gauges 2P, 2S, 4P, 6S were
indicating 2m up to 17m over the normal level and the gauges of the FP, 1S, 3S, 4S, and 5S were
indicating -1m to -2m. Mentioned gauges appeared faulty. Two valves in the cargo line system and 4
valves in the ballast line system were isolated and operated manually. The fault of the solenoids was
suspected by the ship's staff.
6. Vessel was fitted with framo submersible pumps in all cargo tanks Cargo pump in No 1 Starboard
could not be run which required usage of the emergency submersible pump. This had been lowered
through the forward butterworth cover and had a cement box built around it to prevent the escape of
IG onto the main deck.
7. Temperature and IG pressure gauge of 1S cargo tank was in mal function.
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8. One electric motor for C OP hydraulic power pack in E/R was removed condition as Landed to shore
for repair (other 3 nos power pack motors were in normal working condition for COPs running).
9. Cargo pump trip device in case of low IG pressure in tank, working at 100mm WG, was by-passed
other than normal position for the cargo tank protection (Solas C h.II-2, Reg.63 paragraph 19.8.)
10. Cargo lines were annually pressure tested at the designed working pressure only.
11. At the time of inspection, the cargo tanks pressure monitoring system was not working: there was no
secondary system to the PV valves to prevent over or under-pressurizing of the cargo tanks.
12. IG pressure gauge of 1S cargo tank on the Saab panel was in mal function.
13. IT WAS NOTED THAT PRESSURE ALARM SETTINGS WERE EQUAL TO PRESSURE AT
WHICH P/V VALVES WERE DESIGNED TO OPEN. THIS COULD NOT WORK AS A MEAN
OF SECONDARY VENTING TO ALARM IN CASE PRIMARY VENTING SYSTEM FAILURE.
14. Randomly checked it was noted that IG stop valves for COT 5 & 6 wings had been unlocked in open
position. Locks were readily available next to the valves.
15. Senior deck officer was not familiar with the IG policy.
16. IG oxygen and pressure recorder was found out of order during discharging operation as reported
due to paper jam. Hourly IG log was maintained to compensate.
17. The inert gas generator was not in operation. Record of the last operation indicated oxygen content
of between 3.3 to 3.7 % in the line.
18. Records show I.G Oxygen analyzer was being tested on a monthly basis instead of immediately prior
to commencement / use of the inert gas system.
19. The vessel was suitable equipped for the emergency inert of the D/H spaces; however, procedures
for such operation were not available within the company manuals.
20. The vessel has a Statutory Memoranda issued by RINA Class, 16 November 2001, related to the
requirement to check the effectiveness of the COW system within one year after the tanker was first
engaged in the trade of carrying crude oil or by the end of the third voyage, which ever occurs later.
21. The vessel has now carried 3 crude oil cargoes, one cargo in 2004, one cargo in 2005 and one cargo
in 2006, and carried out COW, but to date the effectiveness of the COW system has not been
ascertained by Class.
22. No Fairleads on each side directly in line with the forward and aftermost cargo presentation flange
were provided ( as per OCIMF Recommendation for oil tanker manifolds and associated equipment)
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23. Vessel fitted with two vapour return manifolds. However, those vapour return manifolds were not
suitable for use at SPM : No closed chocks at the ship's sides , No Cruciform bollards in line with
manifold were fitted
24. The cargo plan did not include the details of the ballast transfer and spill emergency procedures.
25. Cargo plan had did not mentioned initial discharge rate.
26.
a. Temperature and IG pressure gauge of 1S cargo tank was in mal function.
b. 2. One electric motor for C OP hydraulic power pack in E/R was removed condition as
Landed to shore for repair (other 3 nos power pack motors were in normal working condition
for COPs running).
c. 3. Cargo pump trip device in case of low IG pressure in tank, working at 100mm WG, was
by-passed other than normal position for the cargo tank protection (Solas C h.II-2, Reg.63
paragraph 19.8.)
27. At the time of inspection, all cargo tanks monitoring system (gauging, pressure) was not working.
28. Temperature readout not fitted to sensors of C.O.P. bearing & Casing. Only temperature alarm fitted.
29. Float sensors of fixed gauging system for COT 6 wings and 3 ports were found out of order. The
vessel was awaiting for spares and service. Manual gauging by portable UTI was in place to
compensate.
30. No records of testing the cargo tank high level alarms were found. The system was seen to be
operational.
31.
a. Individual cargo tank pressure monitoring system - low and high pressure alarm was not
functioning.
b. Pressure monitor for tank Nos. 4C & 6P were defective.
c. Pressure of tank Nos. 2C, 3C & 6C were showing variation of more than 100 mmHw when
compared with the main line.
32. Cargo lines were annually pressure tested at the designed working pressure only.
33. The vessel was fitted with no class approved / certified vapour lock system.
34. It was noted that there was a slight weeping from the tank lid of number one port cargo tank. When
examined it was found that the packing was wet and was smelling of kerosene.
35. IG pressure gauge of 1S cargo tank on the Saab panel was in mal function.
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36. Remote pressure sensor for cargo tank I port (secondary means to prevent over and under
pressurization) was out of service. (VIQ Point 8.30 & 56)
37. At the time of inspection, the cargo tanks pressure monitoring system was not working: there was no
secondary system to the PV valves to prevent over or under-pressurizing of the cargo tanks.
38. IT WAS NOTED THAT PRESSURE ALARM SETTINGS WERE EQUAL TO PRESSURE AT
WHICH P/V VALVES WERE DESIGNED TO OPEN. THIS COULD NOT WORK AS A MEAN
OF SECONDARY VENTING TO ALARM IN CASE PRIMARY VENTING SYSTEM FAILURE.
39. Randomly checked it was noted that IG stop valves for COT 5 & 6 wings had been unlocked in open
position. Locks were readily available next to the valves.
40. The vessel did not make tank cleaning plans.
41. Records of starting and stopping the inert gas plant were not being kept.
42. No.1 fixed oxygen analyser for the IGS was not working.
43. Bottom ‘stop cock’ (isolation valve) on the sight glass to the IG deck seal was defective, spring
function not working & cock easily removed, which resulted in water leaking from the seal.
44. Slops line at 2nd lowest level in pump room contain a pin hole leak at a welded joint between 2
sections of pipe. While there are records to show that the independent COT overfill & high level
alarm system is checked on a regular basis, there are no records available to show that the high level
alarms associated with the fixed ullage system are similarly tested on a regular basis.
45. The SBT’s could be inerted using an inert gas to ballast line by flexible pipe. However there was no
spare P/V valve or blanks that could be fitted on the ballast tank vent heads so that tanks could be
maintained I an inerted condition.
46. The vessel has a Statutory Memoranda issued by RINA Class, 16 November 2001, related to the
requirement to check the effectiveness of the COW system within one year after the tanker was first
engaged in the trade of carrying crude oil or by the end of the third voyage, which ever occurs later.
The vessel has now carried 3 crude oil cargoes, one cargo in 2004, one cargo in 2005 and one cargo
in 2006, and carried out COW, but to date the effectiveness of the COW system has not been
ascertained by Class.
47. Remote pressure sensor for cargo tank I port (secondary means to prevent over and under
pressurization) was out of service. (VIQ Point 8.30 & 56)
48. Two fairleads having a working load of 25 Tonnes on each side directly in line with forward and
aftermost cargo presentation flanges were not provided
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49. No Fairleads on each side directly in line with the forward and aftermost cargo presentation flange
were provided ( as per OC IMF Recommendation for oil tanker manifolds and associated equipment)
50. We noted that No.1 offshore manifold guage was showing pressure.
51. Two (2) of the offshore manifold blanks were not of an equivalent rating to that of the manifold
pipelines.
52. Closed chock was not provided in line with the vapor recovery system.
53. Vapor return manifolds not designed for operation at SBM; no closed chocks fitted at ship’s side in
line with the VR manifold pipelines, and also no cruciform bollard fitted on deck in way of the VR
manifold
54. The vessel carried three (3) FRAMO pump emergency cargo hoses on board, 4" x 18 meters in
length rated at 16 Kg. No documentation was observed and No evidence that pressure testing had
been carried out (since delivery) - was available on board.
55. The vessel carried two (2) emergency frame pump cargo hoses 4" x 18 meters rated at 16 Kg. No
annual pressure tests had been carried out on the cargo hoses.
56. The annual checks (by an expert) of the B.A. sets required by the IBC code, were checked on board
by the Master. There was no evidence that he had had a training (certificate) for this. The last
inspection by shore experts was over one year old.
57. Open rollers at the forecastle bulwark was not fitted with jumper bars.
58. No training records for crane operators on board. No risk assessment done for jobs requiring the use
of the lifting gear. No checklists in use before using the lifting gear.
59. Material datasheet for current cargo not supplied by supplier (Master issued adequate note of protest
to the load. terminal)
CHAPTER -9: MOORING

1. Bow stopper certificate attesting to the safe working load was not provided.
2. Although render calculations for 60% of the lines MBL had been done, the brakes had been tested to
the brake holding capacity only (about 80% of the lines MBL)
3. Within the regular mooring equipment inspection reports, some ropes were noted as poor. They
actually appeared as in poor condition. Spare were ordered but not supplied at that time.
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4. The arrangement required the use of three pedestal fairleads to lead the hawser to the winch storage
drum.
5. Bow stopper certificate attesting to the safe working load was not provided.
6. It was noted that both for head and stern lines the vessel had run two Amstel blue mooring ropes
with one Tiptoe 8 rope. The ropes were of different construction and breaking strength.
7. 1: Hydraulic seal of port aft port side hydraulic brake seal was leaking.
2: Controller valve seal and block of forward main deck port side winch was leaking.
8. Brake linkage at starboard windlass was noted bent.
9. 1) Poop deck and aft starboard main deck winch has thinned down considerably.
2) Drum under the brake lining at poop deck had rust and minor pitting.
10. The pedestal rollers were not marked with their SWL. The SWLs were marked in paint, instead of
the recommended weld bead outlining.
11. The SWL of the escort bollard was 52 ton and the SWL of the escort chock was 64 ton.
12. The forward emergency towing apparatus chaffing chain was observed with laminated corrosion
throughout.
13. The pickup line connecting shackle to the closed socket of the aft emergency towing wire pendant
was seized.
14. 1) MBL of fire wire was 389.00 KN, not 50Tons

2) Fire wire on board were of dia 28mm of 6x24 wire of fiber core and not wire core.
15. Aft fire wire eye was about four meters above the water. The eye of the tire wire must be always
maintained one to two meters above the water. (VIQ Point 9.32) (Mooring Equipment Guidelines
3.11)
16. According ship's Mooring Equipment Inspection Report several ropes placed on mooring winches
were in use from 2001 and 2002, but the book notation "end for end date" was indicated N/A. Winch-
mounted synthetic lines should be end-for-ended after about two years. (Mooring Equipment
Guidelines 6.3.5)
17. Manifold not comply with OCIMF, distance between F.0 and D.0 lines was 122 cm, distance
between cargo line #1 and F.0 lines is 122 cm. (must be 200 cm). Mooring Equipment Guidelines
9.3)
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18. No specific method to set up the designed BHC on the mooring drums (recommended torque
wrenches or other means)
CHAPTER -10 : COMMUNICATION
1. There was no on load / off load test being conducted on the sealed low maintenance GMDSS radio
emergency batteries to check the internal condition of the batteries.
2. There was an intermittent fault on the DSC transmitter. A shore technician was onboard to rectify this
situation.
CHAPTER -11 : ENGINE AND STEERING COMPARTMENT
1. Vessel certified for UMS, but operated manned due to short voyage
2. The incinerator was not working
3. The Chief Engineer had not written his own standing orders.
4. Planning of bunker operations needed to be improved with following information: Loading rates for
the start loading, bulk loading and topping off; Communication procedures including emergency
stop: Procedures for determining the presence of H2S and Hydrocarbons vapours;
5. The PMS was not class approved.
6. There was no list of the minimum spare parts to be retained on board far all equipment and
particularly for the critical equipment.
7. Engineers calling alarm: there was no evidence of being regularly tested as no record was available.
8. Engineers were not able to test the oil mist detector on the spot. The alarm did not sound and the led
indication was not triggered.
9. Hydraulic aggregate pumps located within the eng compartment had not an oil mist detector fitted.
10. There was no planned maintenance or inspection for the small lifting equipment such as chain block/
wire slings.
11. There were no records on board to show that the chain blocks had been inspected nor had they been
landed for certification
12. There was no program in place for the inspection of wire slings nor had they been landed ashore for
certification.
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13. One electric motor for hydraulic power pack in E/R was removed condition as landed to shore for
repair.
14. During inspection insulation resistance on 220 V panel was 0.5 megohms.
15. There was a significant earth fault on the 220V at that time, explained by recent rough weather. Both
220V and 440V earth fault alarm settings were at 0.02 Megohms, much below the recommended 0.4
and 0.2 Megohms.
16. The steering gear emergency reserve tank level gauge was not working.
17. The access from the compartment entrance to the steering gear itself had no raised gratings or
handrails. The deck was painted with non-slip paint. If there was an oil release it is doubtful that the
surface would remain non-slip
18. The company did not have cleaning procedures (incd. soot blowing) for turbochargers, exhaust gas
boiler/boiler and other relevant equipment in order to prevent sparks from the funnel (with special
focus on in port).
19. Vessel was certified for unmanned operation but being manned at all the time from 12 Dec.06
onwards due to automation (MF 08) not working. Same on order.
20. Following conditions of class were in place:

1. Findings related to remote operation of sea direct valves in engine room to be brought in order.
Meanwhile engine room to be manned all the time at sea.
2. Ballast pump (both) casing temperature monitors were missing.
3. Findings related to the following items to be dealt with:- auxiliary engine, main fire pump
suction valve, port & stbd lifeboat oxygen reservoirs.
21. The survey report issued after the last annual survey indicated item 3 as follows:
a. Auxiliary engine aft jacket cooling water was leaking from liners.
b. Forward port auxiliary engine exhaust pipe insulation i.w.o turbocharger was partially
deteriorated.
c. Auxiliary engines were found with excessive oil leakages.
d. Fire water supply control & monitoring system - main fire pump suction valve to main sea
water manifold was found defective.
e. One air reservoir valve at each lifeboat was found seized and inoperable.
22. Dead man alarm fitted, not in use only tested.
23. Planning of bunker operations needed to be improved with following information:

a. Loading rates for the start loading, bulk loading and topping off;
b. Communication procedures including emergency stop:
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c. Procedures for determining the presence of H2S and Hydrocarbons vapours;
24. The vessel had an in house computerized planned maintenance system in force, not approved by
class that covered the entire vessel.
25. Engineers calling alarm: there was no evidence of being regularly tested as no record was available.
26. Make shift draining arrangement fitted to drain F.O. purifier.
27. Crankcase oil mist was not fitted
28. Hydraulic aggregate pumps located within the eng compartment had not an oil mist detector fitted.
29. However at the base area (within the housing) were two float type high-level (leak) alarms. Also
fitted at the deck-head in the “hydro-power pack” room, was a smoke sensor.
30. 'One double bottom spring loaded type closing device was found wired in open position. It was
corrected. (VIQ Point 1I .29)
31. The rest on one of the vessels grinding wheels was approximately 30mm from the wheel giving
enough space for a tool to be dragged between the rest and the wheel.
32. A test certificate is not available for the engine room crane mono-rail.
33. There was no program in place for the inspection of wire slings nor had they been landed ashore for
certification.
34. The engine room chemicals were stored on open shelves in the steering gear compartment. The
appropriate PPE was observed nearby. However there was no arrangement to prevent uncontrolled
access to chemicals. They were not located in a cage, cabinet, storage locker or other such secure
enclosure.
35. No. 1 & 2 generators were soiled with fuel leaks. Savealls were oily.
36. 2. Steering gear noted with leaks. Savealls were oily.
37. Bilge high alarm of Engine room was not operational due to automation (MP08) not being
operational.
38. Temporary repair noted on fridge cooling water pump inlet line.
39. 1. IG scrubber, atmospheric condensate and fire/bilge pumps were leaking continuously from shaft
seal.
2. Sewage drain line from ECR platform to tank was temporarily replaced with flexible hose.
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40. Scrubber overboard line was holed and continuously leaking. Temporary bandage repair was carried
out to reduce the leakage.
41. The steering gear room mechanical ventilation motor / fan were noisy and vibrating.
42. 1. No.3 generator had been dismantled for repairs.

2. Starboard boiler auto water level control was not working.
43. 1: Crank case cover of no.1 A.E had minor leak

2: Fuel oil supply pump seal in purifier room was leaking
44. One electric motor for hydraulic power pack in E/R was removed condition as landed to shore for
repair.
45. We noted that the tachometer on the emergency generator was not working.
46. There was temporary cooling for the topping up air compressor. (VIQ Point 11.45)
47. The steering gear reserve tank was not fully charged. Only filled to 1/4 capacity.
48. The steering gear emergency reserve tank level gauge was not working.
49. The access from the compartment entrance to the steering gear itself had no raised gratings or
handrails. The deck was painted with non-slip paint. If there was an oil release it is doubtful that the
surface would remain non-slip
CHAPTER -12:
1. Non slip areas have to be generally better maintained all over the deck. Spot areas of no-sand were
evident all over.
2. Several sections of main deck area (from accommodation to stbd manifold, from COT 2C to forward
on stbd side, inboard from accommodation to port manifold) were moderately rusted / pitted.
3. Deck areas have not been identified with non-slip surfaces.
4. – Aft mooring winch hydraulic line was noted scaly.
5. Hydraulic branch line supports forward of pump room were wasted. Sections of pipe were resting on
the deck.
6. 12.11 – General condition was satisfactory. Cable supports were noted with rust at places around
superstructure.
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7. Electrical conduit pipes to high level alarm system were heavily scaled at the sections secured with
U-bolts.
8. Galley - The galley range oven was NOT operational and the galley "Air-o-Steam" oven was
partially operational. The "steam" function of the "Air-o-Steam" oven was NOT operational.
9. In the refrigerated provisions lobby area, observed a sheet metal drip tray system fitted of approx.
3.5 meters x .5 meters with a copper tubing drain fitted on the aft end. Refrigeration piping
insulation (lagging) was deteriorated, waterlogged, and continuously dripping with condensation.
Black mold was observed growing on the broken down insulation in the refrigeration spaces lobby
and also on the refrigeration piping in the vegetable room.
10. Observed the evaporator coils drain heater tape in the meat freezer room was not operating. The
drain drip tray was frozen and plugged with ice.
11. Additional comments – Despite the vessel having recently left Dry dock, 21.06.06, the condition of
the weather decks, pipe lines / stands and deck houses can only be described as fair. There is general
breakdown of coatings on the edges of tank stiffeners ( tank top stiffening external to tanks on this
vessel), pipe racks, catwalks, tank access lids, etc. & localized hard scale pitting over 5 to 10% of
deck area.
12. The cosmetic appearance of the superstructure is also only fair condition. Rust staining is evident
around ports and openings and corrosion prevalent on vents, brackets, cable trays, etc.
MISCELLAEOUS
1. GARBAGE MANAGEMENT PLAN: DISPOSAL OF GARBAGE NOT

UPDATED
2. CONTINIOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD: NO SIGNATURE BY MASTER
3) SELF CLOSING DEVICE OF BRIDGE FIRE DOOR : DOOR CLOSING SLOWLY.
4) WEEKLY INSPECTION FOR LSA INSUFFICIENT- BOAT NOT MOVED FROM STOWAGE
POSITION.
5- There was no evidence that any vessel’s Officer had been trained in incident investigation. (OCIMF-
TMSA Element 8B stage 1) (RepsolYPF Rules and Procedures 2007).
6 - Gangways and accommodation ladders were not clearly marked with the maximum permitted angle of
use and maximum safe loading in both number of persons and total weight (ILO 8.1.16).
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7- REPORT OF WEEKLY INSPECTION FOR LSA NOT ENTERED IN LOG

BOOK.
8- OIL RECORD BOOK PART (1) NOT RECORDED AS PER NEW INSTRUCTIONS
9 -A COUPLE OF LAMP ON ENGINE CONTROL ROOM PANEL NOT GLOWING.
10- A LAMP ON ME EMERGENCY LOCAL CONTROL FUSED.
11 - A LOCAL SEA WATER COOLING PR GAUGE OF A.E NO3 NOT WORKING.
12- LOCAL WATER LEVEL INDIACTOR FOR BOILER DIRTY
13 -. The master used on main deck one GMDSS portable radio. However certificate proven that GMDSS
walkies were intrinsically safe type was not available.
14. Ear defenders were not available at engine room entrance, and therefore not used within the E/R by
ships staff.
15. The flying Spanish flag did not comply with regulations.
16 - The air-conditioning was correctly run with accommodation under positive pressure, however there was
no hydrocarbon detector in the accommodation to give warning of HC vapors.
17 - Navigational audit by suitably qualified staff were not carried out regularly.
18 - Mooring winches should were not included in the planned maintenance system.
19 - There were not two staff member on board trained in incident investigation and analysis, capable of
conducting an incident investigation.
20 - A fixed fire detection and alarm system has not been provided in Cargo Pump Room.
21 - Cargo pump room bilge high-level alarm was not provide with two (2) sensors (dual safety), located at
port and starboard side.
22-Certificate of register in Italian language only, Suggest to have available an notary translation in English.
23-D/A policy (alcohol limit instructions to be amended due to typing mistake)
24- No specific method to set up the designed BHC on the mooring drums
73
PLEASE NOTE:
THERE ARE THREE TIMES MORE CASUALTIES
BEING REPORTED ON “NO” STATUS SHIPS THAN
THERE ARE ON “OK” STATUS SHIPS.
74

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What are the main areas inspected during a vetting inspection?

What are the main areas inspected during a vetting inspection?

What documentation is required for a vetting inspection?

What documentation is required for a vetting inspection?

d’AMICO SHIP ISHIMA MARITIME TRAINING CENTRE, MUMBAI

SR. NO. TOPICS

2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

3. PURPOSE OF VETTING INSPECTIONS

4. PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO A VETTING INSPECTION

7. CDI SHIP INSPECTION PROCEDURE

Vetting Inspections have become an inseparable part of tanker operations today.

tanker and complete it successfully with no deficiencies recorded.

1. Understanding the purpose of vetting inspections and the repercussions of

deficiencies found and noted by the inspectors.

the vessel for smooth conduct of the inspection.

3. Adopt the correct procedures for conduct of the vetting inspection.

4. Know and understand the rules and requirements governing a vetting

5. Be aware of the necessary documentation and record – keeping.

THE TOPICS WE WILL COVER:

1. Introduction /purpose of Vetting Inspections

A Good Ship must have

Each one of you is responsible for:

A small error on tankers is

Intertanko statistics state that:

240 incidents relate to fire/explosions in engine room, accommodation and cargo

History of the SIRE Programme

Participation in the original programme, as either an inspecting OCIMF Member or a

1997 and 2000 Revisions to the Programme

pollution prevention. Inspectors who are employed, or contracted by submitting companies

There is an average of 14 to 15 tanker casualties every year.

Vetting Inspections are snapshots of:

Usually done while the vessel is conducting cargo operations:

 Familiarity of personnel with equipment (man/machine interface)

Does Vetting Work?

WHEN DOES A VETTING THE INSPECTOR WILL START TO

WHEN THE INSPECTOR TAKES THE LAST

WHEN DOES THE VETTING

If ship is always ready why prepare for the inspection?

What should be prepared for the vetting inspection?

PREPARATIONS BEFORE ARRIVAL PORT

 Vessel response plan/SOPEP

Crew certificates in original ready at hand for inspector to sight:

Routine Logs Properly Filled Out and Signed

 Tanker Safety Guide –Chemicals (for chemical tankers)

Be prepared to calibrate and/or demonstrate the proper operation of

 Quick closing valves

Additionally the following should be prepared for checking

Self assessment copy ready for inspector

HOW DOES A SELF

Self assessment shows the inspector that:

Rules, procedural guidelines are:

 Pre Planned Cargo Operations –

 What information should be available on the cargo operation plan?

o First Assistant Engineer:

 Nautical Publications & their

AREAS REQUIRING SPECIAL ATTENTION

What areas require special attention while preparing for an inspection?

o Whom he wants to see?