Foreign Affairs November December 2019

WHAT IS OBAMA’S FOREIGN POLICY LEGACY?
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2019
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NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2019 • VOLUME 98 • NUMBER 6 •
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Volume 98, Number 6

Disaster in the Desert 10
Why Trump’s Middle East Plan Can’t Work
Martin Indyk
The Dream Palace of the Americans 21

Why Ceding Land Will Not Bring Peace
Michael S. Doran
There Will Be a One-State Solution 30

But What Kind of State Will It Be?
Yousef Munayyer
The Unwanted Wars 38

Why the Middle East Is More Combustible Than Ever
Robert Malley
The Middle East’s Lost Decades 48

Development, Dissent, and the Future of the Arab World
Maha Yahya
America’s Great Satan 56

The 40-Year Obsession With Iran
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon
C OV E R: L I NC O L N AG N EW
The Tunisia Model 67

Lessons From a New Arab Democracy
Sarah Yerkes
November/December 2019
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ESSAYS
War Is Not Over 74
What the Optimists Get Wrong About Conflict
Tanisha M. Fazal and Paul Poast
The Nonintervention Delusion 84

What War Is Good For
Richard Fontaine
The Unwinnable Trade War 99

Everyone Loses in the U.S.-Chinese Clash—but Especially
Americans
Weijian Shan
The Progressive Case Against Protectionism 109

How Trade and Immigration Help American Workers
Kimberly Clausing
Nowhere to Go 122
How Governments in the Americas Are Bungling the Migration Crisis
Alexander Betts
Let Russia Be Russia 134

The Case for a More Pragmatic Approach to Moscow
Thomas Graham
Beyond Great Forces 148

How Individuals Still Shape History
Daniel Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack
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REVIEWS & RESPONSES
Obama’s Idealists 162
American Power in Theory and Practice
Peter Beinart
How a Caliphate Ends 170

On the Frontline of the Fight Against ISIS
Anne Barnard
What Is White America? 177

The Identity Politics of the Majority
Nell Irvin Painter
The Virtue of Monopoly 184

Why the Stock Market Stopped Working
Felix Salmon
The New Masters of the Universe 191

Big Tech and the Business of Surveillance
Paul Starr
Recent Books 198
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CONTRIBUTORS
Writing in these pages in 2002, MICHAEL DORAN , then a
professor at Princeton, was among the first to argue that the
primary motive behind the 9/11 attacks was to fuel conflict
within the Muslim world. Doran went on to serve in the
George W. Bush administration, working in the White
House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. In “The
Dream Palace of the Americans” (page 21), Doran, now a
senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, argues that only the
Trump administration’s return to blunt power politics
will yield any progress in the Israeli-Palestinian quagmire.
MAHA YAHYA holds the rare distinction of having completed

two doctoral dissertations, both on the connections among
politics, memory, and urban change. From 2012 to 2018,
Yahya led UN efforts to promote development and democ-
ratization in 17 Arab countries. She also advised the World
Bank and the UN Development Program on social and
urban policy across the region. In “The Middle East’s
Lost Decades” (page 48), Yahya, now director of the
Carnegie Middle East Center, discusses why so many Arab
states have stalled politically and economically.
The son of Chinese civil servants, WEIJIAN SHAN grew up at

the height of the Cultural Revolution and as a teenager
spent six years as a forced laborer in the Gobi Desert. After
obtaining several degrees in the United States, he taught
at the Wharton School. Shan quickly rose to become one
of the country’s most successful financiers, serving as
managing director of J.P. Morgan. Today, Shan is chair and
CEO of the Hong Kong–based private equity firm PAG.
In “The Unwinnable Trade War” (page 99), he argues that
U.S. tariffs against China will miss their intended target—
and inflict the most damage on the United States itself.
PETER BEINART was editor of The New Republic from 1999

to 2006 and has written three books on American foreign
policy, including The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American
Hubris. Today, he is a professor of journalism at CUNY’s
Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism and a
professor of political science at the CUNY Graduate Center.
He also is a contributing editor at The Atlantic. In “Obama’s
Idealists” (page 162), Beinart reviews the memoirs of
three foreign policy hands in the Obama administration:
Susan Rice, Samantha Power, and Ben Rhodes.
Return to Table of Contents
T
he Trump administration’s contracted out to Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Middle East policies jumped into The new course is a fiasco, he argues,
the headlines this past summer, and has led directly to the current crisis.
as the region moved to the brink of war. Not so, responds Michael Doran. It
Since the situation is confused and was President Jimmy Carter who aban-
confusing, we’ve compiled a guide for doned Kissinger’s policy, inserting a
the perplexed. personal obsession with the Palestinian
The Middle East has a distinct history, question into the American position.
culture, and geopolitical logic, with local The successes of the peace process, such
powers locked in an eternally shifting as Israel’s treaties with Egypt and
great game. Too weak to avoid temporary Jordan, were sensible material bargains,
domination by outsiders, they are never- not quests for justice. Similar deals with
theless strong enough to resist full Syria and the Palestinians are highly
absorption. As a result, grand schemes for unlikely. Trump’s real crime is acknowl-
regional order inevitably go up in smoke, edging this, shattering long-held illusions.
the exasperated foreigners eventually Israeli power does make a two-state
leave, and the game continues. solution impossible, agrees Yousef
In the mid-twentieth century, the Munayyer—which is a good thing,
United States took over from the United because no Palestinian Bantustan
Kingdom as the outside power of record. achieved through the existing peace
By the 1970s, it had to deal with the process could fulfill Palestinian national
residue of the Six-Day War, in which aspirations. Instead, both peoples
Israel captured territory from Egypt, should live in a single constitutional
Jordan, and Syria. U.S. Secretary of State democracy that would offer equal rights
Henry Kissinger used American diplo- to Jews and Palestinians alike.
macy to facilitate the transfer of land for Beyond the Arab-Israeli issue, things
peace, setting in motion decades of what get even more challenging. Robert
is now known as “the Middle East peace Malley and Maha Yahya sketch the
process.” But by 2016, that process had region’s unique strategic dynamics and
ground to a halt. Most incoming admin- developmental challenges, respectively;
istrations would have tried to get it Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon
going again. Instead, President Donald look at its most persistent headache,
Trump pulled the plug. Iran; and Sarah Yerkes reports on its
Martin Indyk explains how the sole glimmer of hope, Tunisia.
administration abandoned a half century These articles offer a clear window
of U.S. policy for a dream of hegemony onto the Middle East’s stark new land-
on the cheap—continued U.S. with- scape. Read them and weep.
drawal, with the containment of Iran —Gideon Rose, Editor
The Trump
administration
abandoned a half
century of U.S.
Middle East policy
for a dream of
hegemony on the
cheap.
Disaster in the Desert The Middle East’s Lost Decades

Martin Indyk 10 Maha Yahya 48
The Dream Palace of the Americans America’s Great Satan

Michael S. Doran 21 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon 56
There Will Be a One-State Solution The Tunisia Model

L I NC O L N AG N EW
Yousef Munayyer 30 Sarah Yerkes 67
The Unwanted Wars

Robert Malley 38
The indignation was calculated.

Disaster in the
Guided by his boss Jared Kushner, the

president’s son-in-law and senior adviser
Desert on the Middle East, Greenblatt was
trying to change the conversation, to “start
a new, realistic discussion” of the sub-
Why Trump’s Middle East ject. UN resolutions, international law,
Plan Can’t Work global consensus—all that was irrelevant.
From now on, Washington would no
Martin Indyk longer advocate a two-state solution to the
conflict, with independent Jewish and
I
n July 2019, Jason Greenblatt, then Palestinian states living alongside each
U.S. President Donald Trump’s envoy other in peace and security.
for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Greenblatt’s presentation was part of
attended a routine quarterly UN Security a broader campaign by the Trump
Council meeting about the Middle East. administration to break with the past
Providing an update on the Trump and create a new Middle Eastern order.
administration’s thinking about the peace To please a president who likes simple,
process, he pointedly told the surprised cost-free answers, the administration’s
audience that the United States no longer strategists appear to have come up with a
respected the “fiction” of an international clever plan. The United States can
consensus on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. continue to withdraw from the region
Greenblatt went out of his way to but face no adverse consequences for
attack not some extreme or obscure doing so, because Israel and Saudi Arabia
measure but UN Security Council Resolu- will pick up the slack. Washington will
tion 242, the foundation of half a century subcontract the job of containing Iran,
of Arab-Israeli negotiations and of every the principal source of regional instabil-
agreement Israel has achieved within ity, to Israel and Saudi Arabia in the
them, including the peace treaties with Levant and the Persian Gulf, respec-
Egypt and Jordan. He railed against its tively. And the two countries’ common
ambiguous wording, which has shielded interest in countering Iran will improve
Israel for decades against Arab demands their bilateral relationship, on which
for a full withdrawal from occupied Israel can build a tacit alliance with the
territory, as “tired rhetoric designed to Sunni Arab world. The proxies get broad
prevent progress and bypass direct leeway to execute Washington’s mandate
negotiations” and claimed that it had hurt at will, and their patron gets a new,
rather than helped the chances for real Trumpian order on the cheap. Unfortu-
peace in the region. nately, this vision is a fantasy.
In the mid-1970s, even as the United
MARTIN INDYK is a Distinguished Fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations and the author States retrenched after its defeat in
of the forthcoming book Henry Kissinger and Vietnam, U.S. Secretary of State Henry
the Art of the Middle East Deal. He has served as Kissinger successfully laid the founda-
U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Assistant U.S.
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and tions for a new, U.S.-led Middle Eastern
Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations. order. His main tool was active diplo-
10 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Disaster in the Desert
Let’s make a deal: Melania Trump, Donald Trump, and King Salman in Riyadh, May 2017
macy to reconcile Israel and its Arab diplomatic landscape in the Middle
neighbors. In many respects, his efforts East. Any recent administration would
and those that followed were strikingly have responded to this situation by
successful, producing peace treaties going back to basics and painstakingly
between Israel and Egypt and between trying to reconstruct the order Kis-
Israel and Jordan, as well as an interim singer built, since it has, on balance,
agreement with the Palestinians. served U.S. interests well. Instead, the
Progress stalled during the twenty-first Trump administration decided to blow
century, however, as the second intifada up what was left.
U PI / ALAMY STOCK PHOTO
dashed hopes for Israeli-Palestinian This is not reckless mayhem or mere

reconciliation, the Iraq war empowered a domestic politics, goes the official line,
revolutionary Iran, and the Arab Spring but creative destruction—demolition
destabilized the region and triggered the necessary to clear the ground for a grand
rise of the Islamic State, or ISIS. new diplomatic structure opening soon.
Whoever won the presidency in 2016, The brochures look great; they always do.
therefore, would have faced a bleak But it is just another illusion.
November/December 2019 11
Martin Indyk
The Trump administration likes to see missile program, and it did not address
itself as clear-eyed and tough-minded, a Iran’s aggressive efforts at regional
confronter of the hard truths others destabilization. Still, the agreement took
refuse to acknowledge. In fact, it under- the nuclear file off the table and set a
stands so little about how the Middle East pattern for how to resolve contentious
actually works that its bungling efforts disputes. So the obvious next step for
have been a failure across the board. any incoming administration would have
As so often in the past, the cynical locals been to build on the JCPOA and tackle
are manipulating a clueless outsider, the other issues on the docket. Instead, in
advancing their personal agendas at the May 2018, overruling then Secretary of
naive Americans’ expense. State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of
The Trump administration’s Middle Defense James Mattis and blatantly lying
East policies cannot possibly create a new, about Iran’s compliance, Trump shred-
more stable regional order. But they will ded the agreement.
certainly do a good job of continuing the This was partly due to Trump’s
destruction of the old one, and risking all personal obsession with Barack Obama.
that it had gained. And this will fit neatly Anything his predecessor had done
into Trump’s overall campaign to do had to be undone, and the Iran deal was
away with the liberal international order Obama’s signature accomplishment. But
in favor of the law of the jungle. there was more to it than pique. In a
speech soon after the U.S. withdrawal
O JERUSALEM from the deal, Trump’s new secretary of
Each aspect of the Trump administration’s state, Mike Pompeo, unveiled the
supposed new strategic triangle is miscon- administration’s “maximum pressure”
ceived, starting with Iran, a hostile would- campaign of reimposed sanctions to cut
be regional hegemon with a well-ad- off Iran’s oil exports, an effort that was
vanced nuclear program that Washington designed to prevent the country from
has been trying to contain for decades. In having “carte blanche to dominate the
2015, U.S. and European diplomats made Middle East.” Pompeo issued a list of
a major breakthrough by negotiating the demands that together amounted to
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iranian capitulation: no uranium enrich-
(JCPOA), a classic multilateral arms ment, ever; no interference with the
control agreement that finally brought International Atomic Energy Agency’s
Iran’s nuclear program under extensive inspections, anywhere; no development
international supervision. By the time of nuclear-capable missiles; no support
Trump entered office, the agreement was for Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian
functioning well in practice, and its Islamic Jihad, Iraqi Shiite militias, the
inspections provided a high degree of Taliban, or Yemen’s Houthis; no Iranian-
confidence that Iran was not actively commanded forces in any part of Syria;
pursuing a nuclear weapons program. and no threatening behavior toward
The deal was hardly perfect. Its Israel, Saudi Arabia, or the United Arab
terms enabled Iran to resume parts of its Emirates. In case there was any doubt,
nuclear program after ten years, it did Pompeo was explicit: there would be no
not deal adequately with Iran’s ballistic renegotiation of the JCPOA.
These moves were not coordinated publicly with its neighbors. Arab states
with U.S. allies and partners. The are often willing to make common cause
appeals of the other signatories to the with Israel under the table; Saudi
JCPOA—China, Russia, the United Arabia has been doing so since the
Kingdom, France, Germany, and the 1960s. But an open association with the
EU—were ignored, and they were even Jewish state would allow Iran to pum-
threatened with U.S. sanctions if they mel them for their apostasy and gener-
dared to buy Iranian oil, in contradic- ate domestic dissent.
tion to the agreement they had signed. In February of this year, for exam-
Meanwhile, the president was deter- ple, Trump and Israeli Prime Minister
mined to withdraw U.S. forces from the Benjamin Netanyahu attempted to
region even more quickly than his organize an anti-Iran conference in
predecessor had. The administration Poland. Netanyahu tweeted that it was
dramatically increased its demands on “an open meeting with representatives
Iran, in other words, at precisely the of leading Arab countries, that are
same time that it was reducing its ability sitting down together with Israel in
and will to deter Tehran’s nefarious order to advance the common interest
activity in the region. The gap between of combating Iran.” Yet the Arab
rhetoric and reality was best expressed foreign ministers refused to appear on
by Pompeo, who, one month after the same panel with him in the confer-
Trump made clear that he was deter- ence’s general forum. The best the
mined to remove every remaining U.S. Israeli leader could do was post an
soldier from Syria, declared that the illicitly filmed video on YouTube of the
United States intended to “expel every foreign ministers of Bahrain, Saudi
last Iranian boot” from the country. Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
The chasm between intentions and discussing Israel. (The video was
capabilities would not be a problem, the quickly taken down.) As for the United
Trump team insisted, because most of States’ European allies, they mostly
the burden of containing Iran would be sent low-level representatives, whose
borne by Washington’s two powerful fate there was to be publicly chastised
regional partners, Israel and Saudi by U.S. Vice President Mike Pence for
Arabia. There was a superficial logic to attempting to discourage Iran from
this approach, since Israel is now the breaking out of the nuclear agreement.
strongest power in the region and Saudi In Syria, meanwhile, Israel can’t
Arabia is rich and influential. But it achieve its objective of evicting the
cannot stand up to scrutiny. Iranian presence, which includes Iranian-
Israel has formidable military capa- backed militias with some 40,000
bilities and a common interest with troops, without outside help. But with
Sunni Arab states in countering Iran, the United States heading for the exits
but the United States cannot depend on there, Israel has had no choice but to
the Jewish state to promote its interests seek Russia’s assistance, given its mili-
in the Arab world. Israel’s unresolved tary presence and its influence on the
conflict with the Palestinians has placed Assad regime. Repeated visits by
a ceiling on its ability to cooperate Netanyahu to Moscow, however, have
Martin Indyk
gained only Russian President Vladimir with its explicit prohibition on the acqui-
Putin’s qualified acquiescence in Israeli sition of territory by force, which made
airstrikes on Iranian targets. The Israeli clear that the Golan Heights was Syrian
prime minister had hoped to use U.S. sovereign territory. Nevertheless, that UN
pressure and promises of sanctions relief resolution, which Greenblatt was so keen
to persuade Russia to press Iran to leave to disparage before the UN Security
Syria, but that plan didn’t pan out either. Council, allowed Israel to retain posses-
This past June, Netanyahu invited the top sion of the Golan Heights until a final
U.S. and Russian national security advis- peace agreement was reached. That is
ers to Jerusalem to discuss joint action why Israel never annexed the territory,
against Tehran. There, the Russian poured even though it considers it strategically
cold water on the plan, explaining publicly crucial, maintains settlements there, and
that Russia and Iran were cooperating on even has established vineyards and a
counterterrorism issues, that Iran’s inter- robust tourism industry in the area.
ests in Syria needed to be acknowledged, (Instead of claiming sovereignty, in a con-
and that Israeli airstrikes on Iranian assets troversial decision in 1981, Prime Minis-
in Syria were “undesirable.” ter Menachem Begin extended Israeli law
Netanyahu was so alarmed by to the Golan, for which Israel was con-
Trump’s surprise announcement that he demned by the UN Security Council, with
would withdraw residual U.S. troops the United States voting in favor.)
from eastern Syria, where they were Israel and Syria managed to keep their
helping prevent Iran from establishing deal going for generations, even uphold-
a land bridge from Iraq to Lebanon, ing it as the latter descended into civil
that he had to plead with the White war and anarchy. When Netanyahu asked
House to delay the withdrawal. But this for Russia’s help in keeping Iranian-
stopgap measure has done nothing to backed militias out of the Golan Heights
remove Iran’s Syrian strongholds, and in July 2018, he explicitly invoked the
hundreds of Israeli strikes on Iranian disengagement agreement, as did Putin
positions have only increased the risk in his press conference with Trump at
that the conflict will spread to Iraq and their ill-fated Helsinki summit that same
Lebanon and escalate to a full-scale war month. But that was all before Netanyahu
between Israel and Hezbollah. sought Trump’s help in his latest reelec-
Israel’s border with Syria had been tion bid. In what Trump subsequently
quiet for almost four decades after referred to as a “quickie” briefing, he was
Kissinger negotiated the Israeli-Syrian asked on Netanyahu’s behalf by Kushner
disengagement agreement in 1974. The and David Friedman, the U.S. ambassa-
agreement included a carefully negoti- dor to Israel, to recognize Israeli sover-
ated side deal between the United States eignty over the Golan Heights (without
and Syria that committed the Assad even informing Pompeo, who happened
regime to preventing terrorists from to be visiting Israel at the time).
operating against Israel from the Trump was quick to agree. “I went,
Syrian side of the Golan Heights. The ‘bing!’—it was done,” he later told the
disengagement agreement was based on Republican Jewish Coalition at its
UN Security Council Resolution 242, annual meeting in Las Vegas. And so in
Why do efforts to prevent election violence succeed in some cases yet fail in others?
Focusing on three case studies of countries with a history of election violence, Preventing
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Making Peace Possible

Martin Indyk
March of this year, he issued a presiden- ing role in the American-led order.
tial proclamation declaring that the Egypt, Iraq, and Syria were always the
Golan Heights was part of Israel. Trump key players in Arab politics. But with Iraq
boasted that he had done something no battered, Syria in chaos, and a stagnant
other president was willing to do. He was Egypt being whipsawed by revolution and
clearly unaware that no previous Israeli counterrevolution, the way was clear for
government had been willing to do it an ambitious, headstrong, and ruthless
either, knowing that it would violate a core young Saudi prince to stake his country’s
principle of UN Security Council Reso- claim to Arab leadership. Coming to
lution 242 and not wanting to reap the power in 2015, at the age of 29, Crown
whirlwind. Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known
The cheap political gambit wasn’t even as MBS, first consolidated his control
successful. Netanyahu couldn’t secure a over the kingdom’s military and security
majority in national elections two weeks apparatus and then launched an ambitious
later and was forced to take part in economic development program at
another campaign in the fall, in which he home and aggressive interventions abroad,
came up short again. But Trump’s snap including a brutal campaign to suppress
decision will have lasting implications, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.
undermining the disengagement agree- Newly exposed to Middle Eastern
ment, giving Putin justification for his diplomacy on taking office, Trump
illegal annexation of Crimea, and reinforc- jumped at the short-term benefits Saudi
ing U.S. and Israeli diplomatic isolation. Arabia promised to deliver in both
The result is a Tehran now free to security and economics (a $350 billion
establish its militias’ presence on the arms deal that never materialized and the
Syrian side of the border—with the promise of huge investments in the
blessing of Damascus, unconstrained by United States). The young Saudi scion
the antiterrorism commitment that Hafez soon developed a bromance with his
al-Assad made to Kissinger all those American counterpart, Kushner, which
decades ago. Sure enough, by July of this led to Trump’s first trip abroad, to an
year, Israel was finding it necessary to Arab and Islamic summit in Riyadh in
bomb Hezbollah positions in the Golan 2017. This gathering was supposed to
Heights, left with violence as its only facilitate greater cooperation on counter-
tool to prevent Iran from making mis- ing violent extremism across the region;
chief there. its sole tangible result was Trump’s
greenlighting of an Emirati-Saudi deci-
SAUDI STYLE sion to blockade neighboring Qatar, a
Saudi Arabia has proved to be an even crucial U.S. partner in the Gulf because
weaker reed for the United States to it hosts Al Udeid Air Base, the largest
lean on. Riyadh has never before sought U.S. military facility in the Middle East.
to lead the Arab world in war and peace. Instead of focusing on Iran, the Saudis
Recognizing their country’s limitations had duped Trump into taking sides in a
as a rich yet vulnerable state with a local ideological contest, against another
fragile domestic consensus, Saudi rulers American friend to boot. The result was
have preferred to play a quiet, support- to split the Gulf Cooperation Council,
further undermining its already limited murder of the Saudi dissident Jamal
ability to counter Iran in the Gulf, while Khashoggi by Saudi officials in the Saudi
driving Qatar into Iran’s arms, since it consulate in Istanbul in 2018. Trump and
had no other way of maintaining access Netanyahu did their best to shield their
to the world except by utilizing Iranian Saudi partner from international con-
airspace, something which the Iranians demnation, and Trump even restricted
were only too happy to provide. This congressional access to intelligence about
fiasco has bedeviled the administration the murder, sowing further divisions in
ever since, with the Saudis blocking all Washington. With Riyadh so dependent
attempts at patching up the rift. on Washington and MBS momentarily
MBS’s war in Yemen has also created vulnerable to intrafamily rivalries, the
the worst humanitarian crisis in the White House could have used the crisis to
world. Saudi Arabia’s atrocities against insist that MBS take responsibility for the
Yemeni civilians, carried out with murder and rein in his foreign exploits.
U.S.-supplied aircraft using U.S. ord- But Trump didn’t even try, allowing the
nance, have brought global outrage. The efficacy of Saudi leadership of the anti-
damage to the United States’ reputation Iran coalition to be further undermined.
has been so great that a bipartisan Nor has Saudi Arabia helped much on
congressional consensus tried to suspend the peace process. Experienced hands
arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Trump could have told Trump that the Saudis
brushed aside the challenge, but only by would never get out ahead of the Pales-
invoking executive powers, which further tinians. But Trump had given responsi-
infuriated Congress and has jeopardized bility for the peace process to Kushner,
the sustainability of one of the pillars of who was impressed by MBS’s refresh-
the U.S.-Saudi relationship. ingly open attitude to Israel and disdain
MBS’s determination to seek a for the Palestinians and uninterested in
military solution in Yemen has met its the lessons of past failures. In 2017, MBS
match in the Houthis, whose dependence promised Kushner that he could deliver
on Iran has grown with their ambitions to the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas
rule the country. Tehran is now supplying to the negotiating table on Trump’s
them with ballistic missiles and armed terms. He summoned Abbas to Riyadh
drones for use against Saudi targets, and told him to accept Kushner’s ideas in
including civilian airports and oil facili- exchange for $10 billion in Saudi fund-
ties. (Hence initial suspicions of Houthi ing. Instead, Abbas refused and promptly
involvement in a September attack that leaked the details of the exchange, causing
took out almost half of Saudi Arabia’s oil a furor in the Arab world.
production capacity. Although the disrup- MBS also promised Kushner that
tion was short lived, Saudi Arabia’s once Saudi Arabia would acquiesce in Trump’s
stalwart reliability as the world’s largest recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s
oil exporter has been put in doubt by the capital and reassured him that any nega-
unintended consequences of its Trump- tive reaction on the Arab street would
encouraged adventurism.) die down in a couple of months. That
The outrages continued to pile up was enough for Trump to dismiss all
when MBS apparently ordered the objections and announce his decision at
Martin Indyk
the end of 2017 to recognize Jerusalem as them into submission by cutting off aid,
Israel’s capital and to move the U.S. closing down the Palestine Liberation
embassy there. Organization’s office in Washington and
MBS was right about the reaction in the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem,
the Arab street; it was hardly noticeable. and attempting to eliminate the UN Relief
But he had failed to warn Kushner of the and Works Agency for Palestine Refu-
other consequences. The crown prince gees in the Near East. Once again, as
might not have cared about Jerusalem, anybody with experience in the region
but his father certainly did. And while could have predicted, this didn’t work.
MBS may have been in day-to-day Punishing the Palestinians only made
control of the kingdom’s affairs, final say them dig in their heels and rally behind
still lay with King Salman. The al Aqsa their (otherwise unpopular) leadership.
mosque, in Jerusalem, is Islam’s third- Without the Saudis and the Palestin-
holiest shrine; as custodian of the two ians, Kushner had little chance to secure
others, King Salman could not stay Egyptian or Jordanian support for the
silent. He promptly condemned Trump’s crucial part of the plan, the political and
decision and summoned the region’s security arrangements. King Abdullah of
Arab leaders to a meeting the following Jordan, in particular, became increasingly
April to denounce it collectively. King alarmed by the prospect that he might
Salman has repeatedly stated ever since have to choose between Trump and the
that Saudi Arabia will not support any Palestinians if Kushner came forward
settlement that does not provide for an with Trump’s ideas. King Abdullah’s
independent Palestinian state with East largely Palestinian population would be
Jerusalem as its capital—something furious if he accepted the plan, yet he
Trump refuses to endorse. feared alienating Trump and jeopardiz-
The Jerusalem decision and embassy ing his billion-dollar annual aid package
move blew up Kushner’s scheme to have if he rejected it. (The Palestinian Au-
Saudi Arabia play a leading role in the thority was already finding alternatives
peace process. It also drove the Pales- to Trump’s aid cuts, but those sources
tinians away from the negotiating table. weren’t available to Jordan.) Neverthe-
In the wake of the decision, they cut off less, when Kushner made his final ask
all official contact with the Trump this past summer, the king refused—after
administration, with Abbas condemning which the launch of the full plan was
the forthcoming Trump peace plan as “a once again rescheduled for some “more
shameful bargain” that will “go to hell.” appropriate” time. Recognizing that it
When Kushner unveiled the economic had no future, Greenblatt resigned.
dimensions of Trump’s peace plan at a Another Saudi-inspired initiative, the
meeting in Bahrain this past June—de- proposed Middle East Strategic Alliance,
signed to show the Palestinians that they also went nowhere. Riyadh assumed
would benefit from peace—the Pales- that Trump could pull the neighboring
tinians boycotted the conference. Arab states into a coalition to counter Iran.
Bullying was no more effective than Dubbed the “Arab NATO,” it had Egypt,
bribing. Trump thought the Palestinians Jordan, and the Gulf Cooperation
were so weak that he could bludgeon Council coming together under a U.S.
security umbrella to enhance their coop- Up to that point, the Iranians had
eration and, as a White House spokes- been exercising what they termed
person put it, “serve as a bulwark against “strategic patience”—waiting for the
Iranian aggression.” Israel would be a 2020 U.S. presidential election, tough-
silent partner. The project’s internal con- ing things out in the meantime, and
tradictions revealed themselves at the keeping the Europeans onboard by
initial meeting in September 2017, and it sticking to the nuclear agreement. Now,
quickly stalled. Trump eventually Iran decided to retaliate.
appointed Anthony Zinni, a former First, it reduced its compliance with
commander of U.S. Central Command, the JCPOA by expanding its stockpile of
as a special envoy to move things for- low-enriched uranium. Then, it resumed
ward. Given the reluctance of the other higher levels of enrichment. And in
Arab states to bait the Iranian bear, September, it restarted centrifuge
however, Zinni was unable to make any development, shortening the breakout
headway, and he resigned in January. time for nuclear weapons production.
Three months later, Egypt withdrew, and Since Trump was the first to walk away
the initiative died. from the accord, ripping up the pains-
takingly developed international legal
IRAN AMOK consensus that prevented Iran’s acquisi-
Just like its blundering on other fronts, tion of nuclear weapons, the United
the Trump administration’s efforts on States was in no position to say or do
Iran have produced few positive results. It anything to stop it.
seemed for a while that the “maximum Iran’s moves are putting Trump in an
pressure” campaign was reducing Iran’s increasingly tight corner. If he does not
funding of its proxies abroad. Yet those persuade the Iranians to reverse course,
operations have always been run on the he will come under pressure from his
cheap, and with some belt-tightening, they hawkish advisers and Netanyahu to bomb
have continued apace. Hezbollah is still their nuclear program, a dangerous
trying to add precision-guided missiles to adventure. But the only way to persuade
its arsenal in Lebanon, Iranian-backed them is to grant Iran sanctions relief,
militias in Syria are staying put, and the which Trump is clearly loath to do. The
Houthis in Yemen and Hamas and tension is also rising because Iran is now
Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza have striking at U.S. interests across the
actually had their funding increased. region: six oil tankers hit by mysterious
Not content with the maximum, in attacks just outside the Strait of Hormuz,
April of this year, Trump dialed up the an Iranian missile attack on the Golan
pressure even further by designating Heights, confrontations in Gaza pro-
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps voked by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and
as a terrorist organization and denying Saudi oil fields struck by drones.
waivers to China and India for the In May, Trump responded by dis-
purchase of Iranian oil. With its economy patching a carrier strike group and
crashing and the Europeans failing to bombers to the Gulf, but when it came
provide adequate sanctions relief, Tehran to retaliating for the shooting down of a
decided enough was enough. U.S. drone, he blinked. The Iranians
Martin Indyk
got the message: Trump likes to talk its gains or topple its regime. Maintain
war, but he doesn’t like to wage it. They the residual U.S. troop presence in Iraq
understood that he prefers making and Syria. Get back to the JCPOA and
deals. So they cleverly offered to start build on it to address other problematic
negotiations. Sensing another made-for- Iranian behavior, using measured sanc-
television summit, Trump jumped at tions relief as leverage. Resolve the
the offer and invited Iranian President dispute in the Gulf Cooperation Council
Hassan Rouhani to meet on the margins and engage all the relevant parties to
of the UN General Assembly in Septem- try to end the conflict in Yemen. Return
ber, saying of the Iranian problem, “We to the pursuit of an equitable resolution of
could solve it in 24 hours.” the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where
The about-face alarmed Trump’s prospects for a breakthrough may be low
partners, especially Netanyahu, who but engagement is necessary to preserve
spoke out against it. The Saudis became the hope of a two-state solution down
more circumspect in responding to the the road. Treat Israel and Saudi Arabia
September drone attack on their oil as crucial regional partners but not
fields. The Emiratis wasted no time in subcontractors free to do whatever they
hedging their bets, dispatching officials want. And instead of spurning interna-
to Tehran to resume long-stalled tional consensus, try to shape it to align
maritime security talks. For Trump’s with U.S. interests.
Middle Eastern partners, a meeting This alternative path might eventu-
between the impulsive and unpredict- ally lead to a successful renovation of the
able U.S. president and the cool, grand project Kissinger began half a
professional Iranian president was their century ago. But if the United States
worst nightmare. continues to follow Trump’s folly instead,
Almost three years into his term, it should not be surprised to find itself
Trump has nothing to show for his alone in the desert, chasing a mirage.∂
efforts to counter Iran or promote peace
in the Middle East. Instead, his policies
have fueled the conflict between Iran
and Israel, alienated the Palestinians,
supported an unending war and a
humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and split
the Gulf Cooperation Council, possibly
permanently.
There is another path the United
States could take in the region, an
approach far more conducive to the
interests of Washington and all its allies
and partners. It would require stepping
up U.S. diplomacy and scaling back
U.S. objectives to what can plausibly be
accomplished with the means available.
Contain Iran rather than try to roll back
real crime is challenging people’s

The Dream Palace

illusions—and that is an unforgivable
offense.
of the Americans THE ROAD TO 242
Israel’s conflict with the Arabs has long
Why Ceding Land Will Not functioned as a screen onto which outsid-
Bring Peace ers project their own psychodramas.
Actual Middle East politics, meanwhile,
Michael S. Doran churns on relentlessly, following the same
laws of political physics as politics every-
where else: the strong do what they can,
T
he Trump administration’s and the weak suffer what they must.
Middle East policies have been The United States entered the regional
roundly attacked by the U.S. geopolitical game in earnest during
foreign policy establishment. There are World War II, drawn in by the strategic
various lines of criticism, including importance of the oil recently discovered
ones concerning its approaches to under the Arabian Desert and elsewhere.
Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, With postwar power came regional
but the administration’s gravest sin is responsibility, however, and Washington
generally held to be its support for eventually had to decide how to deal
Israel. By moving the U.S. embassy to with the messy residue of the British
Jerusalem, blessing Israel’s annexation mandate for Palestine.
of the Golan Heights, and other ges- In 1948, U.S. President Harry Truman
tures, the Trump team is said to have came under domestic political pressure to
overturned half a century of settled U.S. recognize a soon-to-be independent
policy, abandoned the Palestinians, and Israel. The foreign policy establishment
killed the two-state solution. opposed the move, arguing that U.S.
These are serious charges. But on support for Zionism would alienate the
close inspection, they turn out to say Arab states and drive them into the arms
more about the hysteria of the prosecu- of the Soviet Union. Many of the voices
tors than the guilt of the defendant. making these arguments were diplomats
Some of President Donald Trump’s and experts with deep ties to the Arab
policies are new, some are not, and it is world and little sympathy for Jews,
too early to see much impact. So why however, and Truman was not persuaded
all the hue and cry? Because the admin- by their analysis, so he went ahead and
istration openly insists on playing recognized Israel anyway. The establish-
power politics rather than trying to ment considered it a major blot on his
move the world beyond them. Trump’s record—a gross mistake driven by the
intrusion of amateur domestic politics
MICHAEL S. DORAN is a Senior Fellow at the into professional foreign policy.
Hudson Institute. From 2005 to 2007, he served With the British gone from Palestine,
as Senior Director for the Near East and North
Africa at the National Security Council and as the Arabs attacked, and when the dust
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. cleared, Israel had not just been granted
Michael S. Doran
independence by others but won it on belligerents, placed the Egyptian mili-

the battlefield. This demonstration of tary on high alert, moved troops into
strength did not change any official the Sinai, cut off Israel’s maritime
minds, however, and the Arabist camp access to Asia, and linked up with the
continued to see the United States’ militaries of Jordan and Syria. Israel
commitment to Israel as a strategic responded with a preemptive strike
liability—a sentimental luxury that inter- against its enemies and gained another
fered with serious policy. In 1956, victory, a lightning triumph that left it
Egypt lost a second war to Israel, which in control of territories captured from
was joined in the fighting by France and all three: Egypt (the Sinai and Gaza),
the United Kingdom, and the Israelis Jordan (Jerusalem and the West Bank),
captured the Sinai Peninsula. Reluctant and Syria (the Golan Heights).
to be identified with either Zionism or U.S. President Lyndon Johnson now
imperialism, the administration of U.S. faced the same dilemma as Eisenhower:
President Dwight Eisenhower hastily Should he let Israel keep what it had
stepped in to force its European allies won? Some officials might have pined
to back down and Israel to withdraw, for the traditional policy of appeasing the
quickly and nearly unconditionally. For Arabs at Israel’s expense, but the case
Eisenhower, at least, the decision was was increasingly hard to make. Israel
business, not personal. He was trying to had now won three straight wars against
fight a regional and global Cold War, its supposedly stronger Arab oppo-
and the oil-rich Arabs had a lot to offer. nents, the last one a blowout. The
Weak little Israel, in contrast, had to defeat of powerful Soviet proxies by an
take one for the team. underdog American proxy had embar-
A decade later, things heated up again. rassed the Soviet Union and boosted
Moscow encouraged the Egyptian the United States’ regional standing
leader Gamal Abdel Nasser to start a along with Israel’s. Egypt and its Soviet
crisis with Israel, as explained in a CIA patron had been recklessly provocative,
summary of intelligence from a Soviet and Israel had made them pay for it,
official, “to create another trouble spot dearly. Stepping in once again to punish
for the United States in addition to that the victor and reward the vanquished
already existing in Vietnam.” Moscow was unthinkable.
even passed him fake intelligence Yet if forcing Israel to disgorge the
claiming that Israel was massing troops conquered territories was not an option,
on its northern border in preparation neither was allowing it to annex them
for an attack against Syria. Nasser outright, which appeared to risk provok-
quickly learned the intelligence was false ing yet another war. So the Johnson
but decided to act on it anyway, choos- administration chose a third course,
ing to see Moscow’s move as an invita- turning the crisis into an opportunity by
tion to heat up Israel’s southern border linking the settlement of this particular
in the name of Arab solidarity. war with the broader regional conflict.
So in 1967, purporting to come to Its plan was sensible: the Arab
Syria’s aid, Nasser expelled the UN combatants would get back much of the
peacekeepers separating the former territory they had lost, but only in
The Dream Palace of the Americans
From his lips to God’s ears: Trump at the Western Wall, May 2017
return for recognizing Israel within determine the extent of Israel’s with-
secure boundaries and ending the violence. drawal. In the meantime, Israel would
After months of talks, U.S. negotiators retain and administer the territories.
convinced the Soviets to accept some-
thing close, and the result became the ENTER KISSINGER
famous formula enshrined in UN Security At this point, eager to turn its attention
Council Resolution 242, a call for the back to Vietnam and the home front,
“withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Johnson administration delegated
territories occupied in the recent conflict.” matters to the Swedish diplomat
The wording was deliberately am- Gunnar Jarring, serving as the UN
biguous. The Arab states later insisted special representative for negotiating a
that the sentence meant that Israel must deal. Unfortunately, the talks quickly
immediately withdraw from “all of the” broke down over the irreconcilable
J O NAT HA N E R N ST / R E U T E R S
territories occupied, but the Americans interpretations of Resolution 242. The

had taken pains to ensure that the United States and Israel called for
official text read only “from territories.” direct negotiations between the bellig-
The United States had demanded erents over the terms of a settlement,
language that clearly supported its policy: while the Soviet Union and its Arab
bilateral negotiations between Israel and allies insisted on an Israeli commitment
each of the belligerent states would to full withdrawal as a precondition for
Michael S. Doran
any talks—even as Moscow scrambled surely have been the one to seal the
to rebuild the Egyptian military. A deal. He would have been regarded as a
newly emboldened Nasser soon chal- diplomatic wizard: ending the Egyptian-
lenged Israel along the Suez Canal, the Israeli conflict while simultaneously
Israelis retaliated with airstrikes, and bringing Egypt into the Western bloc.
skirmishing escalated into what is now As it turned out, however, it was the
referred to as the War of Attrition. Carter administration that brokered the
Watching Israel more than hold its Camp David accords, and that fact
own, U.S. President Richard Nixon and greatly influenced the lessons that
his national security adviser, Henry subsequent generations learned from
Kissinger, decided that the Jewish state the triumph.
had earned respect as an ally and eventu- Getting the parties to commit to a
ally built Israel’s new strength into the final settlement was a huge diplomatic
administration’s strategizing. Kissinger accomplishment that required single-
saw Israeli power as a tool for changing minded presidential focus and enormous
the geopolitical map, a lever that could reserves of patience and tenacity, for
flip Egypt, then the most powerful Arab all of which Carter deserves immense
state, from the Soviet camp to the U.S. credit. In the process of finishing what
one. To regain its lost territory and reopen Kissinger started, however, he embed-
the Suez Canal, he reasoned, Egypt had ded his own ideas about the region’s true
to negotiate directly with Israel. The Sovi- problems and solutions into the U.S.
ets could help Cairo make war, but only position—ideas that were less accurate
the United States could help it make than Kissinger’s but would end up
peace. Washington could deliver the sanctified as gospel because they coin-
Israelis and broker a lasting settlement— cided with the success of the earlier,
but only if Egyptian President Anwar more hard-bitten strategy.
al-Sadat would abandon Moscow.
After yet another major war in 1973, ENTER CARTER
the strategy worked. The Sinai Interim Carter and his team were contemptuous
Agreement, signed by Egypt and Israel of the diplomacy that had led to the
in 1975, included a withdrawal of Israeli Sinai Interim Agreement. They believed
forces from land bordering the Suez it was necessary to solve the entire Arab-
Canal—the recent grand reopening of Israeli conflict all at once, in a single,
which had included, at Sadat’s insistence, grand, multilateral forum. It was Kis-
an American warship. The “interim” singer who had first convened such a
part of the deal was a pledge by both conference in Geneva back in 1973, but
sides to negotiate a final peace deal purely in order to raise an international
without resort to war. It laid the ground- umbrella over his personal diplomacy.
work for the historic peace between Carter wanted to reconvene the Geneva
Egypt and Israel that would eventually conference, this time for real, with the
be signed at Camp David in 1978. Soviets playing the role of true partners.
Had U.S. President Gerald Ford The underlying problem in the
defeated his Democratic challenger, Middle East, Carter passionately
Jimmy Carter, in 1976, Kissinger would believed, was the Israeli suppression of
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Michael S. Doran
Palestinian nationalism. He was certain Egyptian-Israeli track, U.S. negotiators

that if Israel could be compelled to give pined for a comprehensive peace and a
back the occupied territories, the Arab full Israeli withdrawal from the West
states would make peace—even Syria. Bank and Gaza. Carter’s national
So his administration turned Kissinger’s security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Bismarckian balancing into a driven called it a “concentric circles approach.”
quest for a comprehensive peace, one in The idea, he explained in his memoirs,
which the Arab states bordering Israel was to begin working for “the Egyptian-
would negotiate a lasting settlement in Israeli accord, then expanding the circle
return for Israel’s withdrawal to its by including the Palestinians on the West
pre-1967 borders and the creation of a Bank and Gaza as well as the Jordanians,
Palestinian homeland. and finally moving to a still wider circle
This policy put all the local parties by engaging the Syrians and perhaps
into an awkward situation. Whatever even the Soviets in a comprehensive
they loudly proclaimed, the Arab states settlement.”
had little interest in the Palestinians. The Carter team built the concentric
Washington’s embrace of the Palestinian circles concept into the Camp David
cause gave them some leverage against accords, which contained both a bilateral
Israel, but it also threatened to derail Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the
progress on important bilateral con- “Framework for Peace in the Middle
cerns. Sadat’s two goals in coming to East.” This second document called for
the negotiating table, for example, had “the resolution of the Palestinian
been to reclaim the Sinai and join the problem in all its aspects” and “full
American camp. Now Carter, hung up autonomy” for the inhabitants of the
on the Palestinians, was bringing the West Bank and Gaza, with the establish-
Soviets into the talks as equals and ment of “a self-governing authority”
wanted to add Syria and the Palestine that would then participate in final-
Liberation Organization to boot—noth- status negotiations. Thus was born the
ing that would advance Sadat’s agenda. peace process that would continue
So the Egyptian leader stole a march forward for decades, all the way to Oslo
and reshaped the diplomatic landscape. and beyond. Imprinted in its very DNA
On November 19, 1977, he became the was a utopian impulse to settle all the
first Arab leader to visit Israel, deliver- conflict in the Middle East by starting
ing his message of “no more war, no with the Palestinian question.
more bloodshed” directly to the Knesset. The Carter administration believed
Carter felt blindsided, and he was that the “Framework for Peace” was a
angry that his dream of a comprehensive crucial part of the overall plan, providing
peace was receding. He eventually political cover to the Egyptians for
turned his attention back to the bilateral making peace with Israel. Sadat played
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. But he along with the “comprehensive settle-
chafed at the effort. And although the ment” game so long as he needed the
administration scrapped plans for a new Americans to pressure Israel to return
Geneva conference, it never changed its the Sinai to Egypt, but once he got
mindset. Even as they supported the that, he displayed little interest in the
Palestinian issue. And a close reading of found a uniquely promising opportunity

the Carter administration’s internal to reach for it.
documents shows that it was the Ameri- By this point, the Soviet Union was
cans, not the Egyptians, who were on the brink of collapse, Iraq had been
obsessed with the “Framework for roundly defeated in the Gulf War, Iran
Peace,” none more so than the president was still recovering from its eight-year
himself. When Israeli Prime Minister slugfest with Iraq, and Syria and the
Menachem Begin fought him on grant- Palestine Liberation Organization were
ing the Palestinians autonomy and weak and broke. With all the rejectionist
refused to commit to a freeze on Israeli spoilers of previous peace efforts hors
settlements in the territories, the de combat, the road was clear to pursue
president became livid. Because Carter a regional settlement on U.S. terms.
had much grander ambitions than The effort began with the Bush admin-
Kissinger, the successful completion of istration’s 1991 Madrid conference,
an Egyptian-Israeli settlement left him continued with the Clinton administra-
deeply frustrated—to him it was a glass tion and the Oslo accords of 1993 and
half empty rather than half full. He 1995, and for a few years really seemed
blamed Begin for the failure on the to be getting somewhere: a temporary
Palestinian track and never forgave him. deal between Israel and the Palestinians,
When Begin and Sadat received the an Israeli-Jordanian treaty, tantalizing
Nobel Peace Prize, Carter wrote in his prospects of success on the Syrian track.
diary, “I sent Begin and Sadat a con- As so often in the 1990s, a beautiful
gratulatory message after they received future seemed just around the corner.
the Nobel Peace Prize jointly. Sadat And then things ground to a halt. In
deserved it; Begin did not.” 1995, trying to derail the process, an
Israeli right-wing extremist assassinated
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PEACE Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
PROCESS Negotiations bogged down as neither
The peace process languished during side made deep enough concessions to
the 1980s, as U.S. President Ronald satisfy the other’s concerns. And then,
Reagan cared more about East-West in 2000, the Palestinians turned back to
issues than Arab-Israeli ones and his violence. The second intifada’s grisly
administration was divided between campaign of terrorist attacks directed
the Israel-as-liability and Israel-as-asset against cafés, pizza parlors, discotheques,
camps, frustrating bold initiatives. A and other civilian gathering places killed
year after Camp David, moreover, the over 1,000 Israelis and injured many
Iranian Revolution upended regional thousands more, leaving deep scars in
politics, shifting the geostrategic center Israel’s national psyche. The median
of gravity (along with attention and Israeli voter became convinced that
resources) eastward to the Persian ceding land to the Palestinians brought
Gulf. But the George H. W. Bush conflict rather than peace, and unsatis-
administration came into office favoring fying withdrawals from Lebanon in
the Carter administration’s goal of a 2000 and Gaza in 2005 only reinforced
comprehensive peace, and in 1991, it the feeling.
Michael S. Doran
In retrospect, the ultimate failure of “Assad told me in late February 2011 that
the Oslo process should not have been he would sever all anti-Israel relationships
surprising. The successes of the peace with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas and
process have come not from Carteresque abstain from all behavior posing threats to
dreams but from Kissingerian realpoli- the State of Israel, provided all land lost
tik. Egypt made a private side deal with by Syria to Israel in the 1967 war—all of
Israel in the 1970s, and Jordan did so in it—was returned.”
the 1990s, but both were hardheaded,
materialistic transactions: Egypt made FACING FACTS
peace to get back the Sinai and a place For 70 years now, many American (and
within the American system, and Jordan European) policymakers have seen it as
did it to keep its place in that system their mission to stabilize the Middle East
and insulate itself from the vicissitudes by constraining Israel’s power and
of the peace process. Both sought to getting the country to give back at the
extricate themselves from the Palestinian negotiating table what it has taken on the
problem, not solve it. battlefield. Over the decades, however,
Since 1994, the main parties without Israel has grown ever stronger and more
a deal have been the Palestinians and able to resist such impositions. It has
the Syrians, and it is difficult to say become a modern industrial power
whether they were ever serious about center, with a thriving economy and a
making peace. They certainly convinced fearsome military backed by nuclear
their U.S. interlocutors that they were, weapons—even as the Palestinians have
and they parlayed that success into remained impoverished wards of the
decades of continued power, status, and international community, with threats
international largess. And yet somehow of terror their chief negotiating tool.
the final settlement was always six Most Arab states moved on long ago.
months away—and always would be. They now treat Israel as a normal
Thus did the Palestinian leader Yasir player in the eternal great game of
Arafat start the 1990s exiled in Tunis yet regional power balancing. So now has
end them as a king in Ramallah. And the Trump administration. And for
thus did the Assad dynasty in Syria that, it has been excoriated.
survive down the decades. The administration’s approach is a
When the peaceful democratic disaster, critics say, because it concedes
revolutions of the Arab Spring broke so much to Israel upfront that the
out in late 2010, the Assad regime came Palestinians will never agree to negoti-
under fire just as its counterparts ate. The critics are correct about the
elsewhere did. But instead of increasing unlikely prospects for a deal anytime
pressure on the Syrian dictator, Wash- soon. But that makes the Trump admin-
ington cut Bashar al-Assad a lot of slack. istration different from its predecessors
Why? In part because he yet again how? U.S. Secretary of State John
dangled before them visions of the elusive Kerry squandered more than a year of
Israeli-Syrian peace. As Frederic Hof, the the Obama administration trying in
official then handling Syria policy at the vain to jump-start peace talks, a quixotic
U.S. State Department, would later write, effort that even his own negotiators
knew would not succeed. Is that the having conquered the staging areas its
benchmark against which Trump is to be enemies regularly used to attack it, will
judged? If so, he will end up failing a lot never give all of them back. Observing
more cheaply. an emerging regional tripolarity, he has
The awkward truth that Washington pulled two of the poles, Israel and
is only gradually beginning to admit to Saudi Arabia, into a de facto alliance to
itself is that the Israeli-Palestinian contain the menacing third pole, Iran.
conflict will not, in fact, be solved with In short, he seems to be embracing an
a two-state solution. It might once have updated version of the “twin pillars”
been, and phalanxes of negotiators over Middle East policy that Washington
half a century tried everything they adopted in the 1970s, with Israel taking
could to bring it off. But the local Iran’s place as the second pillar.
parties to the conflict were never quite This may advance U.S. interests
ready. The moment never got seized, effectively in the long run, and it may
and somewhere along the way the not. But the idea that the administration’s
opportunity passed. approach is a travesty of professional
During the Israeli election campaign diplomacy by a bunch of bumbling
in September, Prime Minister Benjamin amateurs is just a story that veterans of
Netanyahu announced his intention “to lost wars tell to comfort themselves.∂
apply Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan
Valley and the area of the northern Dead
Sea upon the establishment of the next
government.” To the ears of a U.S.
diplomatic establishment raised on
dreams of Oslo, this sounded like the
ravings of a right-wing extremist. But
even Netanyahu’s centrist rivals call for
the retention of the Jordan Valley, a
united Jerusalem, and Israeli control of
major settlement blocs.
It is not obvious how the United
States should deal with this new reality,
and the Trump administration’s plans for
solving the problem are no more likely
to succeed than those of its predecessors.
But give the president his due. He looks
at the Middle East like any other region,
and respects power. Without the ideo-
logical blinders of the professional peace
processors, he has recognized that the
Palestinian issue is not a major U.S.
strategic concern and has essentially
delegated its handling to the local parties
directly involved. He can see that Israel,
end to Israeli settlement building in the

There Will Be a
occupied territories. That was three years

ago. And since then, Israel has continued
One-State to build and expand settlements.
The arrival of U.S. President Donald
Solution Trump in the White House put the
final nail in the coffin. “I am looking at
two-state, and one-state, and I like the
But What Kind of State Will one that both parties like,” Trump
It Be? explained in February 2017. Policy wonks
and seasoned diplomats rolled their eyes
Yousef Munayyer at the reality-TV celebrity turned com-
mander in chief describing the options
F
or nearly three decades, the as if they were dishes on a buffet table.
so-called two-state solution has But the remark indicated a genuine
dominated discussions of the shift: since the current phase of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But the idea of peace process began in the early 1990s,
two states for two peoples in the territory no U.S. president had ever before
both occupy was always an illusion, and in publicly suggested accepting a single state.
recent years, reality has set in. The two- What Trump had in mind has become
state solution is dead. And good riddance: clear in the years that have followed, as he
it never offered a realistic path forward. and his team have approved a right-wing
The time has come for all interested Israeli wish list aimed at a one-state
parties to instead consider the only outcome—but one that will enshrine
alternative with any chance of delivering Israeli dominance over Palestinian
lasting peace: equal rights for Israelis and subjects, not one that will grant the
Palestinians in a single shared state. parties equal rights.
It has been possible to see this Under Prime Minister Benjamin
moment coming for quite a while. As Netanyahu, Israel has abandoned any
he tried to rescue what had become pretense of seeking a two-state solution,
known as “the peace process,” U.S. and public support for the concept
Secretary of State John Kerry told among Israelis has steadily dwindled.
Congress that the two-state solution had Palestinian leaders continue to seek a
one to two years left before it would no separate state. But after years of failure
longer be viable. That was six years ago. and frustration, most Palestinians no
Resolution 2334, which the UN Security longer see that path as viable.
Council passed with U.S. consent in The simple truth is that over the
late 2016, called for “salvaging the decades, the Israelis developed enough
two-state solution” by demanding a power and cultivated enough support
number of steps, including an immediate from Washington to allow them to
occupy and hold the territories and to
YOUSEF MUNAYYER is a writer and scholar create, in effect, a one-state reality of
who serves as Executive Director of the U.S.
Campaign for Palestinian Rights. The views their own devising. Netanyahu and
expressed here are his own. Trump are seeking not to change the
There Will Be a One-State Solution
Waiting for a state: Palestinians at a checkpoint in Bethlehem, August 2010
status quo but merely to ratify it. The occupation with no right to vote for the
question, then, is not whether there government that rules them and around
will be a single state but what kind of two million of whom live in Israel as
state it should be. Will it be one that second-class citizens, discriminated
cements de facto apartheid in which against based on their identity, owing to
Palestinians are denied basic rights? Or Israel’s status as a Jewish state. Two
will it be a state that recognizes Israelis million more Palestinians live in the
and Palestinians as equals under the besieged Gaza Strip, where the militant
law? The latter is the goal that Palestin- group Hamas exercises local rule: an
ians should adopt. The Americans and open-air prison walled off from the
the Israelis should also embrace it. But world by an Israeli blockade.
first they must realize that the status Meanwhile, between 500,000 and
quo will eventually prove unsustainable 700,000 Jewish Israeli settlers live
and that partitioning the land will among millions of Palestinians in the
never work—and that the only moral occupied West Bank. Protecting the
J E PPE SCHILD E R / ALAMY STOCK PHOTO
path forward is to recognize the full settlers and increasing their numbers
humanity of both peoples. have been chief priorities for Israel ever
since it captured territories from the
FACTS ON THE GROUND Arab states it defeated in the Six-Day
Between the Jordan River and the War of 1967. In 1993, the Oslo accords
Mediterranean Sea live approximately 13 started a new phase of the relationship,
million people, all under the control of based on a quid pro quo: Israel would
the Israeli state. Roughly half of them withdraw from parts of the occupied
are Palestinian Arabs, some three territories and abandon some settlements
million of whom live under a military in return for an end to Palestinian
Yousef Munayyer
resistance and the normalization of Israeli occupation of the West Bank

relations with Israel’s Arab neighbors. began. Nevertheless, Israel has forged
But a vast settlement-building project ahead with its expansion and has
never sat easily with that goal and enjoyed unflinching U.S. support, even
created strong political incentives to as Israeli officials periodically warned
avoid it. Today, large numbers of Israelis about its irreversibility.
support keeping much of the occupied Palestinian leaders also made decisions
territories forever. A week before the that reduced the chances for a workable
Israeli election in September, Netanyahu partition—none more significant than
delivered a televised address announcing agreeing to the Oslo framework in the
his intention to annex the Jordan Valley first place. In doing so, they consented
and every Israeli settlement in the West to a formula that encouraged Israel’s
Bank—a move that would eat up 60 expansion, relinquished their ability to
percent of the West Bank and leave the challenge it, and sidelined the interna-
other 40 percent as isolated cantons, tional community and international
unconnected to one another. law. Under Oslo, the Palestinians have
What was remarkable about Netan- had to rely on the United States to
yahu’s announcement was that it was so treat Israel with a kind of tough love
unremarkable: among Jewish Israelis, that American leaders, nervous about
annexation is not a controversial idea. their domestic support, have never
A recent poll showed that 48 percent of been able to muster. In the 26 years
them support steps along the lines of between the 1967 war and the signing
what Netanyahu proposed; only 28 of the Oslo accords in 1993, the popula-
percent oppose them. Even Netanyahu’s tion of Israeli settlers (not including
main rival, the centrist Blue and White those in occupied Jerusalem) grew to
alliance, supports perpetual Israeli control around 100,000. In the 26 years since
of the Jordan Valley. Its leaders’ response then, it has reached roughly 400,000.
to Netanyahu’s annexation plan was to As the failure of the peace process
complain that it had been their idea first. became clearer over time, Palestinians
This state of affairs should not come rose up against the occupation—some-
as a surprise to anyone, especially times violently. Israel pointed to those
policymakers in Washington. In fact, reactions to justify further repression.
one national intelligence estimate drawn But the cycle was enabled by Palestinian
up by U.S. agencies judged that if Israel leaders who resigned themselves to
continued the occupation and settle- having to prove to Israel’s satisfaction
ment building for “an extended period, that Palestinians were worthy of self-
say two to three years, it will find it determination—something to which all
increasingly difficult to relinquish peoples are in fact entitled.
control.” Pressure to hold on to the
territories “would grow, and it would be CONQUER AND DIVIDE
harder to turn back to the Arabs land Arguments about the conflict often
which contained such settlements.” devolve into shouting matches about
That estimate was written more than who bears more of the blame for the
50 years ago, mere months after the failure of the two-state solution. But
such disputes miss the point: any plan be moved around and dismembered,
that saw partition as a means to a just because they were not a people deserv-
solution was always doomed to fail. ing of demographic cohesion. Twenty
The belief in the viability of a years later, the British Peel Commission
two-state solution has depended on a proposed a partition plan that would
flawed assumption that the conflict was have kept together the vast majority of
rooted in the aftermath of the 1967 war. the Jews in Palestine but would have
Peace through partition would be split the Arab population into three
possible, advocates argued, if only the separate political entities: one Arab, one
two sides could break the violent cycle Jewish, and one British. A decade after
of occupation and resistance that took that, in the wake of the Holocaust, a UN
hold after the war. Yet the dilemmas partition plan presented a similar vision,
posed by partition long predate 1967 with borders drawn to create a Jewish-
and stem from a fundamentally insolu- majority state and with the Palestinians
ble problem. For the better part of a again divided into multiple entities.
century, Western powers—first the In 1948, as British rule over Palestine
United Kingdom and then the United came to an end, Zionist militias began to
States—have repeatedly tried to square create a Jewish state on the ground by
the same circle: accommodating the force, relying on the UN partition plan to
Zionist demand for a Jewish-majority legitimize their aims. In the war that
state in a land populated overwhelm- followed, the majority of the land’s
ingly by Palestinians. This illogical Palestinian inhabitants were forced out
project was made possible by a willing- or fled ahead of Israeli incursions; they
ness to dismiss the humanity and rights were never allowed to return. Their land
of the Palestinian population and by was seized by the new state, their villages
sympathy for the idea of creating a were razed, and their urban homes were
space for Jews somewhere outside given to Jewish newcomers. They
Europe—a sentiment that was some- became refugees, their lives thrown into
times rooted in an anti-Semitic wish to limbo. Palestinians refer to this historical
reduce the number of Jews in the moment as the nakba—the “catastrophe.”
Christian-dominated West. The 19 years that followed might be
In 1917, the British government the only time in the past two millennia
issued the Balfour Declaration, outlining that the land of Palestine was actually
the goal of creating a “national home” divided. None of the great powers who
in Palestine for the Jewish people had ruled over the territory—the
without infringing on “the civil and Romans, the Byzantines, the Umayyads,
religious rights of the existing non-Jewish” the Abbasids, the Fatimids, the crusad-
population. This formulation contained ers, the Ayyubids, the Mameluks, the
a fundamental flaw, one that would mar Ottomans, the British—had ever
all future partition plans, as well: it divided Gaza from Jerusalem, Nablus
conceived of the Jews as a people with from Nazareth, or Jericho from Jaffa.
national rights but did not grant the Doing so never made sense, and it still
same status to the Palestinians. The doesn’t. Indeed, when Israel took
Palestinian population could therefore control of the territories in 1967, it
Yousef Munayyer
actually represented a return to a Having led the armed struggle against

historical norm of ruling the land as a Israel for decades, Yasir Arafat’s Palestine
single unit. But it did so with two Liberation Organization was known and
systems, one for Jewish Israelis and the accepted by ordinary Palestinians. By the
other for the people living on the land late 1980s, however, the group had
that the Israelis had conquered. become a shell of its former self. Already
isolated by its exile in Tunisia, the PLO
ARAFAT’S ERROR became even weaker in 1990 after its
What is the problem that the two-state wealthy patrons in the Gulf cut funding
solution seeks to solve? As the Oslo when Arafat backed Saddam Hussein’s
process has dragged on, the answer has grab for Kuwait. On the ground in the
become clear: not so much a conflict territories, meanwhile, the first intifada—
between Israelis and Palestinians but a grassroots revolt against the occupa-
one among Israelis themselves. Israel tion—was making news and threatening
likes to consider itself a democracy even to displace the PLO as the face of Palestin-
as it rules over millions of subjects ian resistance. By embracing the Oslo
denied basic political rights. Endless process, Arafat and his fellow PLO leaders
negotiations have only obscured that found a personal path back to influence
fundamental fact. Actual progress in the and relevance—while trapping the
talks would threaten Jewish control of Palestinian community in a bind that has
the land, something that has proved held them back ever since.
more important to Israel than democ- The PLO’s decision was all the more
racy. That is why the Israelis have regrettable considering the global context
favored Oslo-type negotiations, which in which it was made. The Soviet Union
make it appear they are earnestly trying had just collapsed, fueling a global wave
to deal with the Palestinian issue but of democratization. South Africa was
never force them to actually do so. dismantling apartheid, demonstrating that
The Palestinian leadership, on the a country could willingly abandon a
other hand, has devoted itself to the system of racist oppression in favor of
two-state solution, even though any democracy. The PLO could not have asked
state it could conceivably win through for a more favorable moment in which to
the existing negotiating process would demand equal rights in a democratic state.
fall far short of minimal Palestinian Instead, the leaders of the PLO grasped at
needs. Such a state would not allow immediate relevance and allowed Pales-
Palestinian refugees to return to their tinians’ fundamental rights to be the
ancestral towns and villages, or offer subject of three-way negotiations in which
full equality to Palestinian citizens of they would always be the weakest party.
Israel, or grant Palestinians genuine
independence and sovereignty. Accept- TIME TO MOVE ON
ing a role in this misbegotten exercise The PLO’s choice condemned the Palestin-
was a giant strategic mistake, one driven ians to still more oppression under
less by the basic needs of Palestinian military occupation and misery in refugee
nationalism than the personal interests camps as they waited for a mythical deal.
of Palestinian leaders. Decades later, even after everybody else
has moved on, Arafat’s successors in the not possible (which it isn’t), the status
Palestinian Authority still cling to the quo or one state with equal rights, they
peace process and the two-state solution. chose the latter by a two-to-one margin.
Having sunk so much effort and credibil- The United States has been able to
ity into their state-building project, they secure what it desires most in the
are having difficulty letting go. Middle East—the steady flow of natural
This accommodation should stop. The resources—without a just peace. But
time has come for the Palestinian Au- that has come at the price of perpetual
thority to abandon its advocacy of a instability. A shared state with equal
two-state solution, an idea that has rights for all would serve U.S. interests
become little more than a fig leaf for the even better, because it would finally
United States and other great powers to stabilize the region and generate
hide behind while they allow Israel to broader opportunities for economic
proceed with de facto apartheid. Instead, growth and political reform.
Palestinians should acknowledge the Israelis would benefit from a shift to
reality that there is and always will be such a state, as well. They, too, would gain
only one state between the river and the security, stability, and growth, while also
sea and focus their efforts on making that escaping international isolation and
state a viable home for all of the terri- reversing the moral rot that the occupa-
tory’s inhabitants, Jews and Arabs alike. tion has produced in Israeli society. At the
Some will object that such a shift in same time, they would maintain connec-
strategy would undercut the hard-won tions to historical and religious sites in the
consensus, rooted in decades of activism West Bank. Most Israelis would far prefer
and international law, that the Palestinians to perpetuate the status quo. But that is
have a right to their own state. That just not possible. Israel cannot continue to
consensus, however, has produced little for deny the rights of millions of Palestinians
the Palestinians. Countless UN resolutions indefinitely and expect to remain a
have failed to stop Israeli settlements or normal member of the international
gain Palestinians a state, so they wouldn’t community. The Middle Eastern version
be losing much. And in a one-state of apartheid will eventually be recognized
solution worthy of the name, Palestinians for what it is, and then Israel’s true
would win full equality under the law, so options will be clear: move to one state
they would be gaining a great deal. with equal rights or become a pariah.
The Trump administration will not
embrace the concept of equal rights for A NEW CONSTITUTION
all inhabitants, including the Palestin- Advocates of equal rights for all must
ians. But American voters might. A poll take steps to make sure that “one-state
conducted last year by the University of solution” does not become as empty a
Maryland found that Americans were slogan as “two-state solution.” To focus
roughly evenly split between supporting and ground their vision, they should
a two-state solution and supporting a therefore propose not only a new state but
one-state solution with equal rights for also a new constitution. That would both
all inhabitants. Yet when asked what they demonstrate their commitment to democ-
preferred if a two-state solution were racy and highlight Israel’s lack of the
Yousef Munayyer
same. When the country was founded in In order for such a state to function,
1948, Zionist leaders were trying to those constitutional principles would have
expedite the arrival of more Jews, prevent to be considered foundational, and they
the return of Palestinians, and seize as would be subject to a very high bar for
much land as possible. They had no amendment—say, a requirement of at
interest in defining citizenship criteria, least 90 percent approval in the legislative
rights, or constraints on government branch. This would ensure that basic
power. So instead of writing a constitu- rights could not be altered by means of a
tion, the Jewish state instituted a series of simple majority and would prohibit any
“basic laws” in an ad hoc fashion, and one group from using a demographic
these have acquired some constitutional advantage to alter the nature of the state.
weight over time. A transition to a new system with
In place of that legal patchwork, which equal rights would require a kind of trust
has been used to protect the rights of that cannot be built as long as victims of
some and to deny the rights of others, oppression, violence, and bloodshed over
Israelis and Palestinians should work the decades feel that justice has not been
together to craft a constitution that would done. So the new state would also need
uphold the rights of all. The new constitu- a truth-and-reconciliation process
tion would recognize that the country focused on restorative justice. For
would be home to both peoples and that, inspiration, it could look to past efforts
despite national narratives and voices on in South Africa and Rwanda.
either side that claim otherwise, both Some will dismiss this vision as naive
peoples have historical ties to the land. It or impractical. To them, I would ask:
would acknowledge the Jewish people’s More naive and impractical than un-
history of being persecuted and the scrambling the omelet that the Israeli
paramount importance of ensuring that occupation has created? How many
all citizens, regardless of religion, ethnic- more decades of failure must we endure
ity, or national origin, have a right to before we can safely conclude that
safety and security. And it would also partition is a dead end? How many more
recognize the wrongs done to Palestinian people must we condemn to oppression,
refugees and begin a process to repatriate violence, and death?
and compensate them. The idea of equal rights for Israelis
A new constitution could offer citizen- and Palestinians in a shared state has been
ship to all the people currently living in around for decades, perhaps as long as
the land between the river and the sea and have efforts to partition the land. But it
to Palestinian refugees and would create has always been cast aside to accommo-
pathways for immigrants from elsewhere date the demands of Zionism, even at the
to become citizens. All citizens would expense of peace. Countless lives have
enjoy full civil and political rights, includ- been lost, and generations have had their
ing the freedom of movement, religion, rights denied, all while partition has
speech, and association. And all would become less and less realistic. Neither side
be equal before the law: the state would can afford to go on this way. Now is the
be forbidden from discriminating on moment to adopt the only genuine way
the basis of ethnicity or religion. forward: equal rights for all.∂
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Iran, as a response to debilitating U.S.

The Unwanted
sanctions; or by an Iranian-backed Shiite

militia in Iraq. If Washington decided to
Wars take military action against Tehran, this
could in turn prompt Iranian retaliation
against the United States’ Gulf allies, an
Why the Middle East Is attack by Hezbollah on Israel, or a Shiite
More Combustible Than militia operation against U.S. personnel in
Ever Iraq. Likewise, Israeli operations against
Iranian allies anywhere in the Middle East
could trigger a regionwide chain reac-
Robert Malley tion. Because any development anywhere
in the region can have ripple effects
T
he war that now looms largest is everywhere, narrowly containing a crisis
a war nobody apparently wants. is fast becoming an exercise in futility.
During his presidential cam- When it comes to the Middle East,
paign, Donald Trump railed against the Tip O’Neill, the storied Democratic
United States’ entanglement in Middle politician, had it backward: all politics—
Eastern wars, and since assuming office, especially local politics—is international.
he has not changed his tune. Iran has no In Yemen, a war pitting the Houthis, until
interest in a wide-ranging conflict that not long ago a relatively unexceptional
it knows it could not win. Israel is rebel group, against a debilitated central
satisfied with calibrated operations in government in the region’s poorest nation,
Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza but one whose prior internal conflicts barely
fears a larger confrontation that could caught the world’s notice, has become a
expose it to thousands of rockets. Saudi focal point for the Iranian-Saudi rivalry. It
Arabia is determined to push back has also become a possible trigger for
against Iran, but without confronting it deeper U.S. military involvement. The
militarily. Yet the conditions for an Syrian regime’s repression of a popular
all-out war in the Middle East are riper uprising, far more brutal than prior
than at any time in recent memory. crackdowns but hardly the first in the
A conflict could break out in any one of region’s or even Syria’s modern history,
a number of places for any one of a morphed into an international confronta-
number of reasons. Consider the Septem- tion drawing in a dozen countries. It has
ber 14 attack on Saudi oil facilities: it resulted in the largest number of Russians
could theoretically have been perpetrated ever killed by the United States and has
by the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group, as thrust both Russia and Turkey and Iran
part of their war with the kingdom; by and Israel to the brink of war. Internal
strife in Libya sucked in not just Egypt,
ROBERT MALLEY is President and CEO of the Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the
International Crisis Group. During the Obama United Arab Emirates (UAE) but also
administration, he served as Special Assistant Russia and the United States.
to the President, White House Middle East
Coordinator, and Senior Adviser on countering There is a principal explanation for
the Islamic State. such risks. The Middle East has become
The Unwanted Wars
Rifles and rifts: Houthi rebels in Sanaa, Yemen, December 2018

the world’s most polarized region and, others, none ever truly or fully resolved.
paradoxically, its most integrated. That Today, the three most important rifts—
combination—along with weak state between Israel and its foes, between Iran
structures, powerful nonstate actors, and and Saudi Arabia, and between compet-
multiple transitions occurring almost ing Sunni blocs—intersect in dangerous
simultaneously—also makes the Middle and potentially explosive ways.
East the world’s most volatile region. It Israel’s current adversaries are chiefly
further means that as long as its regional represented by the so-called axis of
posture remains as it is, the United States resistance: Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and,
will be just one poorly timed or danger- although presently otherwise occupied,
ously aimed Houthi drone strike, or one Syria. The struggle is playing out in the
particularly effective Israeli operation traditional arenas of the West Bank and
against a Shiite militia, away from its next Gaza but also in Syria, where Israel
HA N I AL -A N S I / P I C T U R E AL L IA NC E / D PA / AP I MAG ES
costly regional entanglement. Ultimately, routinely strikes Iranian forces and Iranian-
the question is not chiefly whether the affiliated groups; in cyberspace; in Leba-
United States should disengage from the non, where Israel faces the heavily armed,
region. It is how it should choose to Iranian-backed Hezbollah; and even in
engage: diplomatically or militarily, by Iraq, where Israel has reportedly begun to
exacerbating divides or mitigating them, target Iranian allies. The absence of most
and by aligning itself fully with one side Arab states from this frontline makes it
or seeking to achieve a sort of balance. less prominent but no less dangerous.
For those Arab states, the Israeli-
ACT LOCALLY, THINK REGIONALLY Palestinian conflict has been nudged to
The story of the contemporary Middle the sidelines by the two other battles.
East is one of a succession of rifts, each Saudi Arabia prioritizes its rivalry with
new one sitting atop its precursors, some Iran. Both countries exploit the Shiite-
taking momentary precedence over Sunni rift to mobilize their respective
Robert Malley
constituencies but are in reality moved by geometry of the Middle East’s internal
power politics, a tug of war for regional schisms may fluctuate, yet one struggles
influence unfolding in Iraq, Lebanon, to think of another region whose
Syria, Yemen, and the Gulf states. dynamics are as thoroughly defined by a
Finally, there is the Sunni-Sunni rift, discrete number of identifiable and
with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE all-encompassing fault lines.
vying with Qatar and Turkey. As Hussein One also struggles to think of a region
Agha and I wrote in The New Yorker in that is as integrated, which is the second
March, this is the more momentous, if source of its precarious status. This may
least covered, of the divides, with both strike many as odd. Economically, it ranks
supremacy over the Sunni world and the among the least integrated areas of the
role of political Islam at stake. Whether in world; institutionally, the Arab League is
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, or as far less coherent than the European Union,
afield as Sudan, this competition will less effective than the African Union, and
largely define the region’s future. more dysfunctional than the Organization
Together with the region’s polarization of American States. Nor is there any
is a lack of effective communication, regional entity to which Arab countries
which makes things ever more perilous. and the three most active non-Arab
There is no meaningful channel between players (Iran, Israel, and Turkey) belong.
Iran and Israel, no official one between Yet in so many other ways, the Middle
Iran and Saudi Arabia, and little real East functions as a unified space. Ideologies
diplomacy beyond rhetorical jousting and movements spread across borders: in
between the rival Sunni blocs. times past, Arabism and Nasserism;
With these fault lines intersecting in today, political Islam and jihadism. The
complex ways, various groupings at times Muslim Brotherhood has active branches
join forces and at other times compete. in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, the Palestinian
When it came to seeking to topple Syrian territories, Syria, Turkey, the Gulf states,
President Bashar al-Assad, Saudi Arabia and North Africa. Jihadi movements
and the UAE were on the same side as such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State,
Qatar and Turkey, backing Syrian reb- or ISIS, espouse a transnational agenda
els—albeit different ones, reflecting their that rejects the nation-state and national
divergent views on the Islamists’ proper boundaries altogether. Iran’s Shiite
role. But those states took opposite coreligionists are present in varying
stances on Egypt, with Doha and Ankara numbers in the Levant and the Gulf,
investing heavily to shore up a Muslim often organized as armed militias that
Brotherhood–led government that Riyadh look to Tehran for inspiration or sup-
and Abu Dhabi were trying to help bring port. Saudi Arabia has sought to export
down (the government fell in 2013, to be Wahhabism, a puritanical strain of Islam,
replaced by the authoritarian rule of Abdel and funds politicians and movements
Fattah el-Sisi). Qatar and Turkey fear Iran across the region. Media outlets backed
but fear Saudi Arabia even more. Hamas by one side or another of the Sunni-
stands with Syria in opposition to Israel Sunni rift—Qatar’s Al Jazeera, Saudi
but stood with the Syrian opposition and Arabia’s Al Arabiya—have regional reach.
other Islamists against Assad. The The Palestinian cause, damaged as it may
The Unwanted Wars
now seem, still resonates across the region STATES OF CHAOS

and can mobilize its citizens in a way Along with the Middle East’s polarization
that arguably has no equivalent world- and integration, its dysfunctional state
wide. Even subnational movements, such structures present another risk factor.
as Kurdish nationalism, which spreads Some states are more akin to nonstate
across four countries, promote transna- actors: the central governments in Libya,
tional objectives. Syria, and Yemen lack control over large
Accordingly, local struggles quickly take swaths of their territories and popula-
on regional significance—and thus attract tions. Conversely, several nonstate actors
weapons, money, and political support operate as virtual states, including Hamas,
from the outside. The Houthis may view the Houthis, the Kurds, and the Islamic
their fight as being primarily about Yemen, State before it was toppled. And these
Hezbollah may be focused on power and nonstate actors often must contend with
politics in Lebanon, Hamas may be a nonstate spoilers of their own: in Gaza,
Palestinian movement advancing a Pales- Hamas vies with jihadi groups that
tinian cause, and Syria’s various opposition sometimes behave in ways that under-
groups may be pursuing national goals. mine its rule or contradict its goals. Even
But in a region that is both polarized and in more functional states, it is not always
integrated, those local drivers inevitably clear where the ultimate policymaking
become subsumed by larger forces. authority lies. Shiite militias in Iraq and
The fate of the Arab uprisings that Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example,
began in late 2010 illustrates the dynamic engage in activities that their titular sover-
well, with Tunisia, where it all began, eigns don’t control, let alone condone.
being the lone exception. The toppling of Weak states cohabiting with powerful
the regime there happened too swiftly, nonstate actors creates the ideal circum-
too unexpectedly, and in a country that stances for external interference. It’s a
was too much on the margins of regional two-way street—foreign states exploit
politics for other states to react in time. armed groups to advance their interests,
But they soon found their bearings. Every and armed groups turn to foreign states to
subsequent rebellion almost instanta- promote their own causes—that is all too
neously became a regional and then open to misinterpretation. Iran almost
international affair. In Egypt, the Muslim certainly helps the Houthis and Iraqi
Brotherhood’s fortunes and the future of Shiite militias, but does it control them?
political Islam were at stake, and so Qatar, The People’s Protection Units, a move-
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE dove ment of Kurdish fighters in Syria, are
in. The same was true in Libya, where affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’
Egypt, once Sisi had prevailed and the Party in Turkey, but do they follow its
Brotherhood had been pushed out, joined command?
the fray. Likewise for Syria, where the The fact that nonstate actors operate as
civil war drew in all three regional battles: both proxies and independent players
Israel’s confrontation with the “axis of makes it hard to establish accountability
resistance,” the Iranian-Saudi struggle, and for violence or deter it in the first place.
the intra-Sunni competition. A similar Iran might wrongly assume that it will not
scenario has played out in Yemen, too. be held responsible for a Houthi drone
Robert Malley
attack on Saudi Arabia, a Palestinian relative decline. There are also the
Islamic Jihad attack on Israel, or an Iraqi aftershocks of the recent Arab uprisings,
Shiite militia strike on a U.S. target. notably the dismantling of the regional
Saudi Arabia might misguidedly blame order and the propagation of failed
Iran for every Houthi attack, just as Iran states. These are exacerbated by domes-
might blame Saudi Arabia for any violent tic political changes: a new, unusually
incident on its soil perpetrated by internal assertive leadership in Saudi Arabia and a
dissident groups. The United States new, unusual leadership in the United
might be convinced that every Shiite States. All these developments fuel the
militia is an Iranian proxy doing Teh- sense of a region in which everything is
ran’s bidding. Israel might deem Hamas up for grabs and in which opportunities
accountable for every attack emanating not grabbed quickly will be lost for good.
from Gaza, Iran for every attack ema- The United States’ key regional allies
nating from Syria, the Lebanese state are simultaneously worried about the
for every attack launched by Hezbollah. country’s staying power, heartened by the
In each of these instances, the price of policies of the Trump administration,
misattribution could be high. and anxious about them. The president
This is no mere thought exercise: After made it a priority to repair relations with
the attack on Saudi oil facilities in Sep- Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE,
tember, the Houthis immediately claimed all of which had frayed under his prede-
responsibility, possibly in the hope of cessor. But Trump’s reluctance to use
enhancing their stature. Iran, likely seeking force has been equally clear, as has his
to avoid U.S. retaliation, denied any willingness to betray long-standing allies
involvement. Who conducted the opera- in other parts of the world.
tion and who—if anyone—is punished That combination of encouragement
could have wide-ranging implications. and concern helps explain, for example,
Even in seemingly well-structured Saudi Arabia’s uncharacteristic risk-taking
states, the locus of decision-making has under the leadership of Saudi Crown
become opaque. In Iran, the government Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS:
and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard its continuing war in Yemen, its blockade
Corps, the branch of the military that of Qatar, its kidnapping of the Lebanese
answers directly to the country’s su- prime minister, its killing of the dissident
preme leader, at times seem to go their Jamal Khashoggi. MBS perceives the
separate ways. Whether this reflects a current alignment with Washington as a
conscious division of labor or an actual tug fleeting opportunity—because Trump
of war is a matter of debate, as is the might not win reelection, because he is
question of who exactly pulls the strings. capable of an abrupt policy swing that
could see him reach a deal with Iran, and
THREAT MULTIPLIERS because the United States has a long-
A series of global, regional, and local standing desire to extricate itself from
transitions has made these dynamics Middle Eastern entanglements. The
even more uncertain. The global transi- feeling in Israel is similar. The United
tions include a newly present China, a States’ partners in the region are both
resurgent Russia, and a United States in seeking to take advantage of Trump’s
The Unwanted Wars
tenure and hedging against one of his backed one set of Islamist-leaning rebel
sudden pivots and the possibility of a groups, and Saudi Arabia and its allies
one-term presidency, an attitude that backed others. Russia—concerned about a
makes the situation even more fluid and shift in Syria’s orientation and sensing
unpredictable. American hesitation—saw a chance to
Meanwhile, growing Chinese and reassert itself in the Middle East and also
Russian influence have given Iran some intervened, placing it directly at odds
encouragement, but hardly real confi- with the United States and, for a time,
dence. In the event of an escalation of Turkey. And Turkey, alarmed at the
tensions between Tehran and Washing- prospect of U.S.-backed Kurdish forces
ton, would Moscow stand with Iran or, enjoying a safe haven in northern Syria,
hoping to benefit from regional disrup- intervened directly while also supporting
tion, stand on the sidelines? Will China Syrian Arab opposition groups that it
ignore American threats of sanctions hoped would fight the Kurds.
and buy Iranian oil or, in the wake of a With Syria an arena for regional
potential trade deal with the United tensions, clashes there, even inadvertent
States, abide by Washington’s demands? ones, risk becoming flash points for larger
Uncertainty about American intentions confrontations. Turkey shot down one
could be even more dangerous. Iran Russian fighter jet (Moscow blamed Israel
senses Trump’s distaste for war and is for the downing of another), and U.S.
therefore tempted to push the envelope, forces killed hundreds of members of a
pressuring Washington in the hope of private Russian paramilitary group in
securing some degree of sanctions relief. eastern Syria. Turkey has attacked U.S.-
But because Tehran does not know where backed Kurds, raising the prospect of a
the line is, it runs the risk of going too U.S.-Turkish military collision. And Israel
far and paying the price. has struck Iranian or Iranian-linked
targets in Syria hundreds of times.
TWO CAUTIONARY TALES Syria also illustrates why it is so
To understand how these dynamics could difficult for the United States to circum-
interact in the future, it is instructive to scribe its involvement in Middle Eastern
look at how similar dynamics have conflicts. During the Obama administra-
interacted in the recent past, in Syria. tion, Washington backed rebel groups
Saudi Arabia and others seized on a fighting both the Assad regime and ISIS
homegrown effort to topple the Assad but claimed not to be pursuing regime
regime as an opportunity to change the change (despite supporting forces that
regional balance of power. They banked wanted exactly that), not to be seeking
on the opposition prevailing and thereby a regional rebalance (despite the clear
ending Damascus’ longtime alliance impact Assad’s downfall would have on
with Tehran. Iran and Hezbollah, fearful Iran’s influence), not to be boosting
of that outcome, poured resources into Turkey’s foes (despite supporting a
the fight on the regime’s behalf, at huge Kurdish movement affiliated with
human cost. Israel also stepped in, Turkey’s mortal enemy), and not to be
seeking to roll back Iran’s growing pres- seeking to weaken Russia (despite Mos-
ence at its borders. Qatar and Turkey cow’s affinity for Assad). But the United
Robert Malley
States could not, of course, back rebel anti-Houthi fight or get sucked into an
groups while distancing itself from their Iranian-Saudi battle. As in Syria, this
objectives, or claim purely local aims effort largely was in vain. The United
while everyone else involved saw the States could not cherry-pick one part of
Syrian conflict in a broader context. the war: if it was with Saudi Arabia, that
Washington became a central player in a meant it was against the Houthis, which
regional and international game that it meant it would be against Iran.
purportedly wanted nothing to do with.
A similar scene has played out in WASHINGTON ADRIFT
Yemen. Since 2004, the north of the President Barack Obama’s largely fruitless
country had been the arena of recurring attempt to confine U.S. involvement in
armed conflict between the Houthis and the region reveals something about the
the central government. Government unavoidable linkages that bind various
officials early on pointed to supposed Middle Eastern conflicts together. It also
Iranian financial and military aid to the reveals something about the choices now
rebels, just as Houthi leaders claimed facing the United States. Obama (in whose
Saudi interference. After the Houthis administration I served) had in mind the
seized the capital and marched southward United States’ extrication from what he
in 2014–15, Saudi Arabia—dreading the considered the broader Middle Eastern
prospect of an Iranian-backed militia quagmire. He withdrew U.S. troops from
controlling its southern neighbor—re- Iraq, tried to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
sponded. Its reaction was magnified by conflict, expressed sympathy for Arab
the rise of MBS, who was distrustful of popular uprisings and for a time dis-
the United States, determined to show tanced himself from autocratic leaders,
Iran the days of old were over, and intent shunned direct military intervention in
on making his mark at home. Faced with Syria, and pursued a deal with Iran to
intense pushback, the Houthis increas- prevent its nuclear program from
ingly turned to Iran for military assis- becoming a trigger for war. Libya doesn’t
tance, and Iran, seeing a low-cost oppor- fit this pattern, although even there he
tunity to enhance its influence and bog apparently labored under the belief that
down Saudi Arabia, obliged. Washington, the 2011 NATO-led intervention could be
still in the midst of negotiations over a tightly limited; that this assumption
nuclear deal with Tehran, which Riyadh proved wrong only reinforced his initial
vehemently opposed, felt it could not desire to keep his distance from regional
afford to add another crisis to the brittle conflicts. His ultimate goal was to help
relations with its Gulf ally. the region find a more stable balance of
Despite its misgivings about the war, power that would make it less dependent
Washington thus threw its weight behind on direct U.S. interference or protec-
the Saudi-led coalition, sharing intelli- tion. Much to the Saudis’ consternation,
gence, providing weapons, and offering he spoke of Tehran and Riyadh needing
diplomatic support. As in Syria, the to find a way to “share” the region.
Obama administration looked to limit But Obama was a gradualist; he was
U.S. aims. It would help defend Saudi persuaded that the United States could
territorial integrity but not join Riyadh’s neither abruptly nor radically shift gears
The Unwanted Wars
and imperil regional relationships that U.S. presence to countering Iran; in Iraq,
had been decades in the making. As he where the United States wants a fragile
once put it to some of us working in the government that is now dependent on close
White House, conducting U.S. policy was ties to Tehran to cut those ties; in Yemen,
akin to steering a large vessel: a course where the administration, flouting Con-
correction of a few degrees might not gress’ will, has increased support for the
seem like much in the moment, but over Saudi-led coalition; and in Lebanon, where
time, the destination would differ drasti- it has added to sanctions on Hezbollah.
cally. What he did, he did in moderation. Iran has also chosen to treat the region
Thus, while seeking to persuade Riyadh as its canvas. Besides chipping away at its
to open channels with Tehran, he did so own compliance with the nuclear deal, it
gently, carefully balancing continuity and has seized tankers in the Gulf; shot down
change in the United States’ Middle East a U.S. drone; and, if U.S. claims are to be
policy. And although he wanted to avoid believed, used Shiite militias to threaten
military entanglements, his presidency Americans in Iraq, attacked commercial
nonetheless was marked by several costly vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, and
interventions: both direct, as in Libya, struck Saudi oil fields. In June of this year,
and indirect, as in Syria and Yemen. when the drone came down and Trump
In a sense, his administration was an contemplated military retaliation, Iran
experiment that got suspended halfway was quick to warn Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
through. At least when it came to his and the UAE that they would be fair game
approach to the Middle East, Obama’s if they played any role in enabling a U.S.
presidency was premised on the belief attack. (There is no reason to trust that
that someone else would pick up where the domino effect would have ended
he left off. It was premised on his being there; Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria
succeeded by someone like him, maybe a could well have been drawn into the
Hillary Clinton, but certainly not a ensuing hostilities.) And in Yemen, the
Donald Trump. Houthis have intensified their attacks on
Trump has opted for a very different Saudi targets, which may or may not be at
course (perhaps driven in part by a simple Iran’s instigation—although, at a mini-
desire to do the opposite of what his mum, it is almost certainly not over
predecessor did). Instead of striving for Tehran’s objections. Houthi leaders with
some kind of balance, Trump has tilted whom I recently spoke in Sanaa, Yemen’s
entirely to one side: doubling down on capital, denied acting at Iran’s behest yet
support for Israel; wholly aligning himself added that they would undoubtedly join
with MBS, Sisi, and other leaders who felt forces with Iran in a war against Saudi
spurned by Obama; withdrawing from the Arabia if their own conflict with the
Iran nuclear deal and zealously joining up kingdom were still ongoing. In short, the
with the region’s anti-Iranian axis. Indeed, Trump administration’s policies, which
seeking to weaken Iran, Washington has Washington claimed would moderate
chosen to confront it on all fronts across Iran’s behavior and achieve a more
much of the region: in the nuclear and stringent nuclear deal, have prompted
economic realms; in Syria, where U.S. Tehran to intensify its regional activities
officials have explicitly tied the continued and ignore some of the existing nuclear
Robert Malley
deal’s restraints. This gets to the contra- intersecting rifts, where local disputes
diction at the heart of the president’s invariably take on broader significance,
Middle East policies: they make likelier will remain at constant risk of combusting
the very military confrontation he is and therefore of implicating the United
determined to avoid. States in ways that will prove wasteful
and debilitating. De-escalating tensions is
WHAT MATTERS NOW not something the country can do on its
A regional conflagration is far from own. Yet at a minimum, it can stop
inevitable; none of the parties wants one, aggravating those tensions and, without
and so far, all have for the most part abandoning or shunning them, avoid
shown the ability to calibrate their actions giving its partners carte blanche or
so as to avoid an escalation. But even enabling their more bellicose actions.
finely tuned action can have uninten- That would mean ending its support for
tional, outsize repercussions given the the war in Yemen and pressing its allies to
regional dynamics. Another Iranian attack bring the conflict to an end. It would
in the Gulf. An Israeli strike in Iraq or mean shelving its efforts to wreck Iran’s
Syria that crosses an unclear Iranian economy, rejoining the nuclear deal, and
redline. A Houthi missile that kills too then negotiating a more comprehensive
many Saudis or an American, and a reply agreement. It would mean halting its
that, this time, aims at the assumed punishing campaign against the Palestin-
Iranian source. A Shiite militia that kills ians and considering new ways to end the
an American soldier in Iraq. An Iranian Israeli occupation. In the case of Iraq, it
nuclear program that, now unshackled would mean no longer forcing Baghdad to
from the nuclear deal’s constraints, exceeds pick a side between Tehran and Washing-
Israel’s or the United States’ unidentified ton. And as far as the Iranian-Saudi
tolerance level. One can readily imagine rivalry is concerned, the United States
how any of these incidents could spread could encourage the two parties to work
across boundaries, each party searching for on modest confidence-building mea-
the arena in which its comparative advan- sures—on maritime security, environmen-
tage is greatest. tal protection, nuclear safety, and trans-
With such ongoing risks, the debate parency around military exercises—before
about the extent to which the United moving on to the more ambitious task of
States should distance itself from the establishing a new, inclusive regional
region and reduce its military footprint is architecture that would begin to address
important but somewhat beside the point. both countries’ security concerns.
Should any of these scenarios unfold, the An administration intent on pursuing
United States would almost certainly find this course won’t be starting from scratch.
itself dragged in, whether or not it had Recently, some Gulf states—the UAE chief
made the strategic choice of withdrawing among them—have taken tentative steps
from the Middle East. to reach out to Iran in an effort to reduce
The more consequential question, tensions. They saw the growing risks of
therefore, is what kind of Middle East the the regional crisis spinning out of control
United States will remain engaged in or and recognized its potential costs. Wash-
disengaged from. A polarized region with ington should, too, before it is too late.∂
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widely shared view among Western

The Middle East’s
observers of the Middle East: that the

Arab world’s dysfunction was a product
Lost Decades of social and political arrangements that
thwarted human potential, furthered
inequality, and favored a small elite to
Development, Dissent, and the detriment of the broader population.
the Future of the Arab World During the first decade of this
century, progress was slow. Under the
Maha Yahya surface, however, discontent was rising.
This discontent culminated in the protests
S
ince the 9/11 attacks, the Arab of 2010–11, commonly known as the
world’s relative economic, social, Arab Spring. In countries as diverse as
and political underdevelopment Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia, ordinary
has been a topic of near-constant inter- citizens took to the streets to challenge
national concern. In a landmark 2002 their authoritarian rulers and demand
report, the UN Development Program dignity, equality, and social justice. For
(UNDP) concluded that Arab countries a moment, it seemed as if change had
lagged behind much of the world in finally arrived in the Middle East.
development indicators such as political Yet in the aftermath of the Arab
freedom, scientific progress, and the Spring, development stalled. Although
rights of women. Under U.S. President some countries, such as Tunisia, were
George W. Bush, this analysis helped able to consolidate democratic systems,
drive the “freedom agenda,” which authoritarian leaders in much of the
aimed to democratize the Middle region successfully counterattacked. In
East—by force if necessary—in order to Egypt, the military led a coup in 2013
eradicate the underdevelopment and to depose the democratically elected
authoritarianism that some officials in government; in Libya and Syria, dicta-
Washington believed were the root tors responded to peaceful protests with
causes of terrorism. Bush’s successor, violence, precipitating brutal civil wars
Barack Obama, criticized one of the that turned into international proxy
cornerstones of the freedom agenda— conflicts. Even in countries that did not
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003—but descend into violence, autocrats clamped
he shared Bush’s diagnosis. In his first down on dissent and poured resources
major foreign policy speech as presi- into suppressing their own people and
dent, delivered in Cairo in 2009, undermining democratic transitions across
Obama called on Middle Eastern gov- the Middle East. Meanwhile, progress
ernments to make progress in democracy, on the human development indicators
religious freedom, gender equality, and prioritized by both international experts
“economic development and opportu- and U.S. policymakers either stagnated
nity.” Implicit in his remarks was a or went into reverse.
Today, nearly ten years later, the
MAHA YAHYA is Director of the Carnegie situation in the Middle East looks even
Middle East Center. worse than it did before the Arab Spring.
The Middle East’s Lost Decades
Spring is in the air? A protest in Algiers, May 2019

Political repression is more onerous. take to the streets to demand a better
Economic growth is sluggish and unequal. future, even in the face of repression.
Corruption remains rampant. Gender The Arab Spring may not have ushered
equality is more aspiration than reality. in the immediate reforms that many
Yet something fundamental has had hoped for, but in the long run, it may
changed. Arab governments have tradi- have accomplished something more
tionally rested on what political scientists important: awakening the political
call an “authoritarian bargain,” in which energies of the Arab world and setting
the state provides jobs, security, and in motion the long process of Arab
services in exchange for political loyalty. revitalization.
This bargain is based on the assumption
that ordinary people will remain passive. BEFORE THE SPRING
But today, that assumption no longer During the second half of the twentieth
RAMZI BOU DINA / REUTE RS
holds. Citizens no longer fear their century, Washington’s attitude toward

governments. Now more than ever before, Arab development was essentially prag-
ordinary people across the Middle East matic and cynical. Although it favored the
are politically engaged and willing to Middle East’s economic growth, the
voice dissent. And as the massive protest United States believed that the region
movements in Algeria and Sudan earlier was best governed by friendly autocrats,
this year showed, they remain willing to such as Egypt’s Anwar al-Sadat and
Maha Yahya
Iran’s Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who began to come undone. During this
could provide political stability and pro- period, the region came to be defined
tect Western interests. by three key trends: growth without
This attitude changed after 9/11. well-being, lives without dignity, and
Drawing on the work of international liberalization without freedom.
experts, such as those at the UNDP, U.S. On the economic front, many Arab
policymakers concluded that the ex- countries, encouraged by experts at
tremism emanating from the Middle institutions such as the International
East was, in part, a byproduct of the Monetary Fund, began to privatize
Arab world’s dismal development state-owned firms, liberalize their trade
record: its repressive governments, policies, and end price controls in an
entrenched inequalities, and stagnant, effort to spur growth and reduce budget-
state-managed economies, which denied ary pressures on the state. In Egypt, for
opportunities to ordinary Arab citizens. instance, the share of people employed
Democratizing the Middle East and by the government dropped from 32
unlocking the human potential of its percent in 1998 to 26 percent in 2006.
citizens were touted by the Bush Yet although these policies produced
administration as a justification for its some growth, they did not result in the
wars in the region. After invading sort of “trickle down” prosperity prom-
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, ised by their architects. Instead, well-
the United States cast its subsequent connected insiders captured nearly all the
occupation of both countries as an benefits of these reforms. In Tunisia, 220
extended exercise in democracy build- firms affiliated with the family of Presi-
ing. Bush announced the broader dent Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali captured
freedom agenda for the Middle East, close to 21 percent of all net private-sector
creating programs, such as the Middle profits between 2000 and 2010—a fact
East Free Trade Area Initiative, to that was revealed only when the firms
promote free markets and the growth of were confiscated after the revolution
civil society. that began in late 2010. State-connected
The freedom agenda did not work firms also managed to evade $1.2 billion
out as planned. After the United States in import taxes between 2002 and 2009.
deposed the Iraqi dictator Saddam A similar pattern held in Egypt and
Hussein in 2003, Iraq sank into a Lebanon, where insider firms were able
decade of civil conflict that combined to secure lucrative contracts for housing
an anti-U.S. insurgency with a regional and construction projects and receive
proxy war. This led to a decline in many government licenses to invest in key
of the key development indicators that sectors, such as oil and gas and banking.
the UNDP had identified as the source of As part of this push to liberalize their
Iraq’s problems. But the Middle East’s economies, Arab states also ended their
difficulties went deeper than this employment guarantees and scaled back
high-profile debacle. Throughout the on the provision of public services,
first decade of this century, the authori- education, and health care. This led to
tarian bargain that had long been the declining living standards among large
foundation of the region’s governments swaths of the region’s middle class,
which was composed mainly of employ-
ees in the public and security sectors
PARDEE SCHOOL
and which had historically been the
biggest defender of the status quo. By
2010, 40.3 million people in the Arab Your global
region were either at risk of or suffering
from multidimensional poverty, as journey
defined by the UNDP and the Oxford
Poverty and Human Development begins
Initiative (OPHI). Between 2000 and
2009, overall living standards declined
across the region, as did levels of health
and education. In Egypt, the percent-
age of people living below the national
FOR
poverty line rose from 16.7 percent in
M
ER PRESIDENT OF LATV
2000 to 22.0 percent in 2008; in Yemen,
the poverty rate rose from 34.8 percent
in 2005 to 42.8 percent in 2009.
The withdrawal of public-sector
employment guarantees and the reduc- IA,
tion in the range and quality of public

VA
I RA
services resulted in a number of inter-

VI
KE
FR
connected development challenges. EIB
-
ER
GA
, VI
Although literacy and school enrollment SITS
THE PA L.
RDEE SCHOO
increased overall, education did not
translate into opportunity. Between 1998
and 2008, the number of unemployed
Offering a
youth in the Middle East increased by ONE YEAR MA
25 percent, with that increase concen- in International
trated among the better educated. By
2010, one in four of the region’s young
Relations.
people were unemployed, the highest
rate in the world. The paucity of em-
ployment opportunities forced millions
of men and women to turn to the
informal economy, where workers
typically earn low pay, have unstable
incomes, and lack basic social protec-
tions, such as health insurance and bu.edu/PardeeSchool @BUPardeeSchool
pensions. In 2009, at least 40 percent of
nonagricultural workers in Algeria,
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia were Frederick S. Pardee
employed in the informal economy; in School of Global Studies
Syria, the number was 20 percent.
51
Maha Yahya
Yet for most of the Middle East, a restoration since 2011. In Egypt, in 2013,
more liberal economy did not result in a the military overthrew the country’s
more liberal political sphere. Modest first democratically elected government,
protest movements in Egypt and Syria replacing it with a dictatorship under
were quickly suffocated by the govern- the control of President Abdel Fattah
ment. Civic initiatives were stifled, el-Sisi. Since taking power, Sisi has ruled
whereas the work of Islamic charities the country with an iron fist: between
and other faith-based organizations was 2013 and 2018, the security forces
encouraged, especially in social and disappeared over 1,500 Egyptians. And
emergency assistance, poverty allevia- in July 2019, the country’s parliament
tion, and microfinance programs. For approved a draconian law curtailing the
the leaders of these states, economic influence of nongovernmental organiza-
liberalization was not intended to tions by limiting their scope of action
promote free markets and free minds; and freedom of movement.
instead, it was seen as a means to main- The starkest example of autocratic
tain the cohesion and loyalty of the restoration is in Syria. In 2011, the
regime’s elite. As state resources came country saw massive protests against the
under strain, privatization became a dictatorial regime of President Bashar al-
strategy for funneling assets to those Assad. Yet rather than step down or
already in power. meet popular demands for reform, Assad
This unraveling served as the back- ordered his troops to fire on peaceful
drop to the Arab Spring. In December demonstrators, launching a bloody civil
2010, a Tunisian street vendor set himself war that has killed more than half a
on fire to protest his mistreatment at million people and displaced millions
the hands of a local official. His act set more. Today, the once tottering Assad
off a tsunami of protests. In the ensuing regime is mopping up the last remnants
months, people across the region—in of opposition and reestablishing control.
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Thousands of political prisoners have
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, been disappeared or languish in regime
Morocco, Oman, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, dungeons, and the government is pre-
Yemen, and the Palestinian territories— venting around 5.6 million refugees and
took to the streets to demand justice, 6.2 million internally displaced people
equality, and an end to their countries’ from returning home.
repressive political regimes. Meanwhile, the Saudi and Emirati
regimes, faced with domestic criticism
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN of their stalled war in Yemen, have jailed
The economic and political conditions bloggers, human rights activists, jour-
that produced the Arab Spring have nalists, and lawyers for criticizing the
only worsened in recent years. With the government online. In perhaps the most
exception of Tunisia, where the opposi- notorious example of this increased
tion succeeded in establishing a demo- intolerance of dissent, Saudi agents
cratic political system that remains in murdered the journalist Jamal
place today, many countries of the Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in
Middle East have seen an autocratic Istanbul in October 2018. In Lebanon,
often touted as a beacon of freedom in East and North Africa were not in
the region, the government has begun school, a regression to 2007 levels.
to crack down on freedom of speech. In When one takes gender and wealth
2018, 38 people were prosecuted for inequality into account, conditions in
their online posts, four times the the region look even more dismal. Along
number in 2017. Most of these posts with the Palestinian territories, 11 Middle
criticized politicians, the president, or Eastern countries—Algeria, Egypt, Iran,
the country’s security agencies. And Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi
according to Freedom House, freedom Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen—fall
of the press declined in 18 of the into the worst-performing category on
Middle East’s 21 countries between the UN’s Gender Development Index,
2012 and 2017. This regional regression which measures the difference between
is captured by the Economist Intelli- a country’s male and female score on
gence Unit’s Democracy Index, which the UN’s Human Development Index
shows that together the Middle East (HDI), a composite measure of develop-
and North Africa continue to make up ment statistics.
the lowest performing region in the The worst declines have been in
world on all measures of democracy: countries such as Syria and Yemen, which
civil liberties, the electoral process and have both experienced violent conflicts
pluralism, the functioning of the over the past decade. Syria dropped 27
government, political culture, and places between 2012 and 2017 on the
political participation. HDI; Yemen dropped 20 places. Nearly
As political freedoms have eroded, 85 percent of Syrians and 80 percent of
so, too, have the development gains of Yemenis now live in poverty. And in
the past few decades. A 2018 global 2018, 10.5 million Syrians and 20 million
report on multidimensional poverty by Yemenis were food insecure.
the UNDP and OPHI found that nearly This stagnation or regression on key
one-fifth of the population of the Arab development indicators is coupled with
states, or 65 million people, lived in sluggish economic growth. According to
extreme poverty, defined by the World the Economist Intelligence Unit,
Bank as people earning less than $1.9 economic growth in the Middle East
per day. Another one-third was either and North Africa has been steadily
“poor” or “vulnerable.” In fact, the Arab declining following a drop in oil prices
region was the only region in the world between 2014 and 2016. The region
to experience an increase in extreme averaged 3.6 percent growth in 2015–16,
poverty between 2013 and 2015, with but that number fell to 1.6 percent in
the rate rising from around four percent 2017 and 1.3 percent in 2018. This
to 6.7 percent. In Egypt, recent data stagnant growth has put a strain on
indicate that the poverty rate has risen government finances. Lebanon’s public
from 28 percent in 2015 to 33 percent debt is now equal to more than 153
today, largely as a result of austerity percent of GDP, the third-highest level
measures and the devaluation of the in the world. Even resource-rich
Egyptian pound in 2016. In 2016, more countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are
than 15 million children in the Middle feeling the pinch. To refill state coffers
Maha Yahya
and finance its growing budget deficit, Arab Barometer surveys of nationally
the kingdom is planning to issue more representative samples from six Arab
than $31 billion in debt this year. And countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,
earlier this year, Moody’s downgraded Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia) and the
Oman’s credit rating to “junk” status, Palestinian territories, public trust in gov-
citing low oil prices and the country’s ernment has decreased over the past
ballooning deficits. decade. In 2016, more than 60 percent of
Faced with mounting economic the respondents said that they trusted
challenges, governments in the region government “to a limited extent” or
are stressing the need for entrepreneur- “absolutely [did] not trust it,” compared
ship in the private sector. The United with only 47 percent in 2011. On the
Arab Emirates has turned itself into a other hand, 60 percent of the respon-
destination for startups and now boasts dents in 2016 said that they trusted the
major success stories such as the ride- military to “a great extent,” up from 49
sharing app Careem, the e-commerce percent in 2011. In a December 2018
platform Souq, and the real estate Zogby poll, a majority of the respondents
platform Property Finder. Egypt, too, in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia said that they
is a growing regional hub. According to were worse off than they were five years
a report by MAGNiTT, an online earlier. And earlier this year, a BBC
community for Middle Eastern start- survey of ten Arab countries found that
ups, in 2018, Egypt was the fastest more than half of the respondents
growing in the region “by number of between the ages of 18 and 29 wanted to
deals.” And governments from Bahrain emigrate. Thousands of others have been
to Lebanon and Saudi Arabia have conscripted into the region’s wars.
unveiled initiatives, such as Riyadh’s
Vision 2030, to promote private-sector POWER TO THE PEOPLE
investment. In many respects, then, the Middle East
This modest expansion of the private looks worse on many development
sector, however, has not been enough to indicators than it did a decade ago. Yet
provide good jobs for citizens. Unem- there is one key difference. Although
ployment in the Arab states is still the protests of the Arab Spring did not
high—in 2018, it averaged 7.3 percent; lead to the reforms that many had hoped
excluding the oil-rich states of Bahrain, for, they did succeed in fostering a
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, culture of political activism and dissent
and the United Arab Emirates, it sat at among Arabs, especially the young,
10.8 percent. Foreign direct investment that persists today. Governments can no
remains low; in 2018, according to the longer assume that their citizens will
International Monetary Fund, foreign remain passive.
direct investment in Arab countries In 2018 alone, there were protest
amounted to only 2.4 percent of the movements in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
global total. Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. Earlier
It should come as no surprise, then, this year, protesters in Algeria and
that Arab citizens’ confidence in their Sudan forced their countries’ respec-
governments is collapsing. According to tive leaders, Abdelaziz Bouteflika and
Omar al-Bashir, to step down. In both dictator Hafez al-Assad. The regime
countries, the protesters took care to may have won the civil war, but these
remain peaceful—even in the face of demonstrations suggest that it will
violent government responses—while struggle to restore its authority.
at the same time demanding genuine The Middle East today is witnessing
democratic reforms rather than a new a perfect storm: as social and economic
form of military rule. And in both conditions erode and regimes double
countries, the protesters seemed to down on the repressive policies that
have learned from the failed demo- provoked the Arab Spring, a new
cratic transitions in Egypt and Syria. generation is coming to the fore. The
In Sudan, protesters continued to call young Arabs of this new generation are
for a peaceful political transition and an accustomed to voicing their dissatisfac-
accountable government, even after a tion. They have seen both the promise
massacre in June that left at least 100 and the failures of the 2010–11 revolts,
dead and scores injured. On August 17, and they are resistant to their leaders’
the Sudanese military and the opposition attempts at manipulation. Those leaders,
reached an agreement on a three-year moreover, no longer have the means to
transitional period, during which civil- buy off their populations. What today
ians and the military will alternate turns looks like a regional regression since
in power. 2011 may well, in the future, be regarded
In Algeria, despite the resignation of as the initial phase in a much longer
the ailing Bouteflika in April, citizens process of Arab revival. The road to that
have continued to demand the ouster of revival will likely be a difficult one,
key figures of the old guard. Some paved with pain. But if there is one thing
members of Bouteflika’s inner circle that Arab populations know, it is that
have resigned or been arrested, and the status quo cannot be sustained.∂
elections have been announced for
December. Many protesters are skepti-
cal of the elections, which they see as
an effort by the military to bring a
pliant president to power. Yet they have
already shown that they are not willing
to be cowed into accepting a modified
version of the old regime.
This new culture of protest is also on
display in Syria, which has seen a wave
of civilian protests in former rebel
strongholds now under the control of
the Assad regime. Earlier this year, for
example, hundreds of Syrians in the
southern city of Daraa—the birthplace
of the anti-Assad protests in 2011—
turned out to oppose the installation of
a statue of Assad’s father, the longtime
and adopted a policy of “maximum

America’s Great
pressure” to strangle the Iranian econ-

omy. Iran, meanwhile, has responded by
Satan heightening tensions, attacking several
oil tankers traversing the Persian Gulf,
shooting down a U.S. drone, and striking
The 40-Year Obsession an oil facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia.
With Iran No U.S. president has been as capri-
cious as Trump, and there is a possibility
Daniel Benjamin and Steven that, after flirting with escalation, he
will pivot toward an accommodation with
Simon Iran. (His recent dismissal of National
I
magine historians a century from now Security Adviser John Bolton, an extreme
trying to decide which foreign power Iran hawk, suggests that this process
the United States feared most in the could already be underway.) But Trump’s
decades from the late Cold War through approach during his first three years in
2020. Sifting through the national security office did not emerge from a void. It was
strategies of successive administrations, an extension of the deep animus toward
they would see Russia first as an archenemy Iran that has plagued U.S. policymaking
of the United States, then as a friend, and for the last 40 years. Previous administra-
finally as a challenging nuisance. They tions had balanced this hostility with
would see China transform from a pragmatism and periodic attempts at
sometime partner to a great-power rival. outreach, often cloaked in the language
North Korea would appear as a sideshow. of confrontation; now, driven by greater
Only one country would be depicted political incentives and intensified
as a persistent and implacable foe: Iran. lobbying by Israel and Saudi Arabia,
In its official rhetoric and strategic Trump has inflated this animus to
documents, Washington has, since Iran’s cartoonish proportions. In doing so, he
Islamic Revolution in 1979, consistently runs the risk of a serious miscalculation.
portrayed the country as a purely hostile Iran is not an existential threat to the
and dangerous actor. In recent months, United States, but a serious conflict
the United States and Iran have once with it—at a time when Washington is
again, as they have many times in the past, threatened by great-power rivals and
approached the brink of conflict: U.S. committed to drawing down its presence
President Donald Trump has ripped up in the Middle East—would be costly
his predecessor’s nuclear deal with Iran and counterproductive.
Faced with the real prospect of a war
DANIEL BENJAMIN is Director of the John
Sloan Dickey Center for International Under-
that would benefit no one, it is time for
standing at Dartmouth College. He served as the United States to rethink some of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. assumptions that have led to the current
State Department from 2009 to 2012.
impasse. It is time to relegate Iran’s
STEVEN SIMON is Professor of International remarkable grip on U.S. strategic think-
Relations at Colby College and served on the
National Security Council in the Clinton and ing—call it “the Persian captivity”—to
Obama administrations. the dustbin.
America’s Great Satan
Don’t believe the hype: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps troops, July 2018
A COUNTRY OR A CAUSE? risk with its September attacks on Saudi
In balance-of-power terms, Washington’s Aramco facilities).
obsession with Tehran is absurd. Iran’s Despite Iran’s paltry conventional
population is one-fourth the size of the capabilities, U.S. policymakers—who
United States’, and its economy is barely have long sought to prevent any regional
two percent as large. The United States state from exercising hegemony in the
and its closest allies in the Middle East— Persian Gulf—have seen Iran as a threat
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab for two interlocking reasons. The first
Emirates—together spend at least $750 is geography: Iran has a long shoreline
billion annually on their armed forces, on the Persian Gulf, through which
about 50 times as much as what Iran about one-fifth of the world’s oil flows.
spends. Both Israel and the United States In theory, it could attempt to block the
can produce state-of-the-art weapons, as flow of oil by closing the Strait of
well as reconnaissance, surveillance, and Hormuz, with potentially disastrous
battle-management technologies. Iran effects on the global economy. Yet practi-
cannot. Its industrial base is aged. Its air cally speaking, this threat is remote. At no
force and navy field outdated weapons time in the last 40 years has Iran man-
systems. It possesses ballistic and cruise aged to close the strait, and even if it did,
missiles and long-range drones that Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
could strike Israel or the Gulf states, but Arab Emirates could all use or develop
S I PA U SA / AP
it cannot use them without inviting alternative export routes. Iran could not.
devastating retaliation (although, The second cause for U.S. concern is
admittedly, it appears to have run this Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran produced
an atomic weapon, it could conceivably It is true that Iran has committed

establish the regional hegemony that more than its share of atrocities. Yet it is
U.S. strategic doctrine seeks to prevent. no longer the same country that it was in
A nuclear-armed Iran would revolution- the 1980s, when its revolutionary Islamist
ize the strategic landscape in the Middle government really was bent on remaking
East and pose a significant threat to the regional order. Iran’s support for
Israel, Washington’s closest ally in the terrorism, for example, has diminished
region. Under U.S. President Barack substantially in the last 20 years. And
Obama, the United States largely solved although Tehran and its proxies still
this problem with the 2015 nuclear deal, occasionally pull off a successful attack,
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, such as the 2012 bus bombing in Burgas,
which for all intents and purposes ended Bulgaria, their attempts are of a smaller
the country’s nuclear program for 15 scale than before, and many of their recent
years. In 2018, however, Trump withdrew plots have been absurdly ineffective. In
from the JCPOA, arguing that a better 2011, for instance, an Iranian plot to
agreement with Iran was possible. Since assassinate the Saudi ambassador in
then, his administration has been using Washington was doomed from the outset
sanctions to try to force Iran’s leaders back because the Iranian agent approached
to the negotiating table. an informant for the Drug Enforcement
Much of the administration’s antipathy Administration to carry out the killing.
toward Iran is explained by what Secre- And in 2012, Iranian terrorists in Bangkok
tary of State Mike Pompeo routinely accidentally set off an explosion in their
refers to as Iran’s “malign activities”—its own safe house. When Thai police arrived
attempts to spread its influence across the at the scene, one of the Iranians threw a
Middle East through terrorism, politi- grenade—which hit a tree, bounced back
cal subversion, and assistance to Shiite at him, and blew off one of his legs.
groups. These activities are the reason why All terrorism is bad, but the hawks
Iran is routinely (and deservedly) referred exaggerate the threat posed by Iranian-
to as “the world’s foremost state sponsor sponsored terrorism, which is relatively
of terrorism.” They are also, for Iran lackluster compared with the jihadi
hawks, the best evidence that the coun- terrorism that has at times been tolerated
try is still a revolutionary power dedicated or even financed by Washington’s Sunni
to undermining the interests of the partners. Iran’s activities are less damag-
United States and its allies. For oppo- ing to global stability than, say, Pakistan’s
nents of the JCPOA, including the Trump support for terrorist groups that target
administration, the deal offered Iran tacit India or Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
recognition as a legitimate interlocutor. yet Washington treats Tehran as a
Iran’s compliance with the deal, these pariah while preserving relations with
opponents argued, was a cynical ploy to Islamabad and Moscow. There is clearly
advance its expansionist objectives within something going on that transcends
the region. (This, of course, was a classic strategic interest.
Catch-22: the hawks saw both compliance One major caveat is that Iran supports
with the deal and any lack of compliance the Lebanese terrorist group–cum–
as evidence of Iran’s malign intentions.) political party Hezbollah, whose large
stockpile of missiles and rockets poses a phrase has been invoked by much lazier
serious threat to Israel. Yet Tehran’s strategists to justify a permanent hard
motivations are as much geopolitical as line against Iran. After all, if your adver-
ideological: the missiles are Iran’s main sary is motivated primarily by ideology,
strategic deterrent against Israel. And then it is less likely to be open to com-
this deterrence has generally prevailed promise or accommodation. The problem
since 2006, when it broke down through is that this framing has blinded many
incompetence and misperception. The American analysts to Iran’s real motiva-
Israeli government has made it clear that tions: maximizing its security interests in
if it ever has to fight another war with a deeply hostile environment.
Hezbollah, it will invade Lebanon and
leave only after it has destroyed Hezbollah BAD BLOOD
and its armory. The situation is obviously The United States’ relations with Iran
delicate, but neither Israel nor Iran has an date back to World War II, when
interest in upsetting the apple cart. thousands of U.S. troops were deployed
Aside from terrorism, many of Iran’s to Iran to secure a rail line essential to
attempts to expand its reach throughout the year-round supply of the Soviet
the Middle East should be seen for Union, then a U.S. ally. Although U.S.
what they are: opportunistic responses to involvement in Iran remained limited in
blunders by the United States and its the early postwar period, Washington did
partners. Hawks often warn of Iran’s participate as a junior partner in a British
influence in Iraq, for instance, but this is conspiracy to overthrow Iran’s elected
fundamentally a result of the U.S. inva- prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq,
sion in 2003, which toppled Saddam in 1953. The overthrow of Mosaddeq was
Hussein’s Sunni minority government and the original sin of the U.S.-Iranian
empowered the country’s Shiite majority. relationship, and Iranian anger at the
Even with increased Iranian influence, coup was later compounded by U.S. and
moreover, successive governments in Israeli support for Mohammad Reza
Baghdad have maintained good relations Shah Pahlavi, whose repressive policies
with both Tehran and Washington—in- and inept attempts at modernization
deed, the current government may be the undermined popular support for his
most pro-U.S. Iraqi government yet. Iran’s regime. The shah’s intimate relationship
backing of the regime of Syrian Presi- with the United States tainted both
dent Bashar al-Assad is an attempt to sus- parties in the eyes of Iranians, contribut-
tain the status quo—and defend a once ing to the resentment that resulted in
reliable ally—after it was threatened by the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Sunni Arab states that were trying to over- The revolution marked a turning point.
throw Assad by arming and funding Syrian In late 1979, Iranian students stormed
rebels. And Iran’s support for the Houthis the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took its
in Yemen has been a largely convenient American staff hostage, leading U.S.
attempt to bleed its Saudi rivals dry. President Jimmy Carter to sever diplo-
The archrealist Henry Kissinger matic relations in April 1980. Soon, U.S.
famously said that Iran must “decide and Iranian interests were clashing across
whether it is a country or a cause.” The the Middle East. In 1980, Iraq attacked
Iran; after repulsing this initial assault, in States’ old hostility has reemerged with
1982, Iran invaded Iraq with the aim of a vengeance.
overthrowing Saddam and spreading the The durability of the United States’
Islamic revolution, sparking U.S. fears of 40-year obsession with Iran is remark-
Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf. In able. Consider that the United States
1983, after a U.S. peacekeeping mission fought and lost a decadelong war in
in Lebanon transformed into an inter- Vietnam that claimed more than 58,000
vention backing the country’s Christian American lives, yet full diplomatic ties
government, Iran and Syria supported between Washington and Hanoi were
Lebanese Shiite militias that attacked reestablished in 1995, only two decades
American diplomats, military personnel, after the last helicopters left Saigon.
and intelligence officers. And although Iranian misdeeds—above all, holding 52
the United States, fearful that an Iraqi U.S. diplomats and other citizens hostage
victory could lead Iran to turn to the for 444 days from 1979 to 1980—have
Soviet Union for help, made efforts during certainly played a role. But the number
the mid-1980s to back Tehran in the of American deaths that can in any way
Iran-Iraq War, by the late 1980s, after be attributed to Iran since 1979 is shy of
the revelation of the Iran-contra scandal 500. On 12 occasions over the last 18
had rocked the Reagan administration, years, the polling organization Gallup has
Washington had decisively thrown its asked Americans the question, “What
support behind Baghdad. one country anywhere in the world do
By the early 1990s, the United States you consider to be the United States’
had painted itself into a corner. Wash- greatest enemy today?” Iran topped the
ington felt that it had to indefinitely list five times, ranking higher than China
suppress the ambitions of both Iran and six times and higher than Russia eight
Iraq, rather than use one to balance the times, despite not having nuclear weap-
other. Yet this policy proved unsustain- ons, a deep-water navy, or the ability to
able. After the United States demol- project power in any serious fashion.
ished Saddam’s regime in 2003, it was How can this hostility be explained?
left with an enemy, Iran, but no local One reason is that Iran fits neatly into
partner to contain it. At the same time, a well-defined American idea of what a
the U.S. invasion of Iraq convinced serious threat should look like. Similar
Iranian leaders—now faced with U.S. to the Soviet Union during the Cold
troops on both their Afghan and their War, Iran has a revolutionary ideology,
Iraqi borders—to take the opportunity an expansionist orientation, and a
to draw U.S. blood by transferring network of allies around the world—in
deadly explosive devices to Iraqi Shiite Iran’s case, the Shiite communities in
militias, further worsening relations the Middle East and in their diasporas
between the countries. For a brief in South America and West Africa.
period during the Obama administration, And until the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
the United States was able to use a Iran had some success in cultivating its
combination of diplomacy and pressure image as a global ideological power,
to create space for the negotiation of the posing as the leader of Muslim resis-
JCPOA. But under Trump, the United tance to U.S. hegemony. With the fall
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> Europe > Washington, DC > China

of Saddam and the empowerment of The distorting effect of Israeli influ-

Iraq’s Shiite community, however, the ence on U.S. policy toward Iran has been
region’s Sunni rulers effectively recast especially pronounced since 2012. That
the Iranian threat as a confessional one year, the Republican candidate for presi-
within the Islamic world. Instead of dent, Mitt Romney, seized the U.S.-
being seen as an anticolonial power, Israeli relationship as a Republican asset,
Iran became the leader of a “Shiite winning a quasi-official endorsement
crescent” menacing the United States’ from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Sunni allies. Netanyahu. Politicians and policymakers
To make matters worse, the United on both sides of the aisle rushed to
States and Iran have dealt with each outdo one another with displays of their
other in a dramatically different manner commitment to helping Israel secure its
than the United States and the Soviet interests. More recently, Saudi Crown
Union did. Cognizant of their respective Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has
nuclear arsenals and global reach, Wash- not so discreetly aligned himself with
ington and Moscow sought to stay Israel while also skillfully courting the
engaged with each other and carefully Trump family, has turned Riyadh into a
avoided interfering with each other’s Republican asset, as well. To a greater
vital interests. Kissinger famously charac- extent than ever before, the United States
terized the Soviet leadership as “essen- under Trump has outsourced its Middle
tially shits,” but that did not stop him— East policy to Israel and Saudi Arabia. In
or other U.S. leaders—from interacting August, for instance, the Trump adminis-
with them. By contrast, the United tration permitted Israel to carry out an
States has refused to engage with Iran, airstrike in Iraq against an Iranian-allied
and the two countries’ relationship has militia—an action that clearly cut against
been one of near-constant irritation the U.S. interest in Iraqi stability.
and provocation. For the United States, this hostility
If anything, U.S. antipathy toward toward Iran is costly. For one thing, it
Iran has grown more intense over the last increases the risk of armed conflict. It is
two decades, even as Tehran has dialed both true and fortunate that since 1987–88,
back its revolutionary ambitions. This when U.S. and Iranian ships clashed in
increased animus has coincided with both the waters of the Persian Gulf, the two
the rising influence of evangelical Chris- countries have avoided open hostilities.
tians within the Republican Party and the But the current proximity of U.S. and
growth of public support for Israel in the Iranian forces, the countries’ history of
United States. In 1989, Gallup found that sustained antagonism, and their leaders’
49 percent of Americans had a favorable tendency to see each other as locked in a
overall view of Israel. Today, the figure zero-sum struggle all heighten the risk
stands at 69 percent. Pro-Israel sentiment of conflict. The absence of diplomatic ties
has risen especially rapidly among conser- and other communication channels
vative Republicans, reaching a peak of makes confrontations even more likely to
87 percent last year. Democrats’ support escalate. Everyone knows what a major
has also grown, but currently sits at only U.S. war in the Middle East would look
62 percent. like, and it is clearly best avoided.
The current U.S. approach to Iran enormous strains on neighboring coun-

also risks driving a wedge between the tries—would be even worse.
United States and Europe. Although the
Europeans have no great love for the WE CAN WORK IT OUT
Iranian regime, they prefer negotiation to Washington and Tehran have rarely
conflict. They are particularly proud of gotten along. Yet Trump’s blanket hostil-
having helped author the JCPOA, which, ity toward Iran represents a departure
apart from its other virtues, was a master- from the norm of previous presidents.
piece of complex diplomatic coordina- From the time of the Islamic Revolution,
tion. The transatlantic disconnect on Iran successive U.S. administrations have had
reaches back at least to the administration an ambivalent relationship with Iran.
of U.S. President Bill Clinton, when Publicly, they have often taken a hard
Congress voted to impose sanctions on line, suggesting that the country harbors
European companies selling equipment an immutable enmity for the United
to Iran’s oil industry. But it has intensified States. In private, however, both Demo-
under Trump. The transatlantic alliance cratic and Republican administrations
may not have the same profound strate- have sought a more pragmatic approach.
gic importance that it did during the Cold None, prior to the Trump administration,
War, but in an era when both China has consistently taken the position that a
and Russia are challenging the West, it working relationship with the clerical
is nonetheless vital. Allowing Iran to regime is beyond the pale.
become a sore point between the United This split between public and private
States and Europe would be staggeringly approaches began under Carter. After
imprudent. the shah fled Iran in January 1979 and
Finally, U.S.-Iranian antipathy poses a requested entry into the United States
threat to regional stability. The majority for medical care, Carter waffled for
of states in the Middle East are fragile; in months before finally admitting him in
the past decade alone, two, Libya and October, against the advice of his ambas-
Yemen, have collapsed, and one, Syria, has sador in Tehran. Behind the scenes, the
come close. The economic, political, CIA continued to provide the new Iranian
and environmental strains on the region government with sensitive intelligence
will only increase over the coming years. until November 1979, when Islamist
For most states, with the exception of a students, outraged at Carter’s decision,
few oil monarchies, there is little prospect seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran. It
of relief. The United States has an was only the hostage crisis, followed by a
interest in helping these countries hold botched U.S. attempt to rescue the
together. But its campaign of maximum hostages in 1980, that finally convinced
pressure on Iran, which is intended to Carter that the revolution had damaged
bankrupt the regime and foster revolu- U.S.-Iranian ties beyond repair.
tionary conditions, runs precisely counter Even President Ronald Reagan,
to this interest. However distasteful the canonized for his moral clarity, was
current government in Tehran may be, willing to work with Iran when it was
the consequences of state collapse in convenient. During Reagan’s first year
Iran—including a likely refugee crisis and and a half in office, the United States
allowed Israel to send Iran a vast quan- it resumed under his successor, Clinton.
tity of American-made weapons to aid in After Washington tightened sanctions,
the war against Saddam. Despite the fact Iran orchestrated the 1996 bombing of
that Iran and Syria colluded in separate the Khobar Towers complex, in Saudi
attacks in 1983 against the U.S. embassy Arabia, then in use by American military
and a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, personnel enforcing a no-fly zone over
killing 17 embassy personnel and 241 Iraq. Nineteen members of the U.S. Air
U.S. troops, Reagan never retaliated. By Force were killed. (As it has under
his second term, he was once again Trump, American pressure invited an
looking for an opening to Iran. His Iranian response.) Yet by the time blame
administration had two main reasons for for the attack could be authoritatively
resuming ties: it needed Iran’s help to pinned on Iran, in 1997, retaliation had
free U.S. hostages held by Iranian lost its attraction—all the more so since
proxies in Lebanon, and it wanted to Mohammad Khatami, who had pledged
increase U.S. leverage in Tehran at a to end Iran’s provocative foreign policy,
time when it seemed as if the Soviets had been elected president in the in-
might try to ingratiate themselves with terim. Clinton moved swiftly to capital-
the clerical regime. In 1985, the United ize on Khatami’s reform program but had
States resumed selling military equip- little leeway to reduce the congressio-
ment to Iran via Israeli intermediaries, nally mandated sanctions, an Iranian sine
an operation that continued for over a qua non for meaningful diplomatic
year, until it was exposed by a Lebanese progress. What might have been an
newspaper. The revelation of these sales opportunity to normalize the bilateral
nearly destroyed Reagan’s presidency— relationship fizzled.
especially once it emerged that the President George W. Bush never
National Security Council staffer Oliver really had chance to implement an Iran
North had used money from the sales to policy before the 9/11 attacks derailed his
illegally fund the Nicaraguan contras. plans. Once Bush regained his balance,
The usual story about the Iran-contra however, the United States and Iran
scandal is that Reagan was desperately cooperated closely in Afghanistan follow-
concerned about the U.S. hostages in ing the 2001 U.S. invasion. But in May
Lebanon, but it may be closer to the truth 2003, U.S. intelligence intercepted a
to say that Reagan’s approach to Iran congratulatory message from al Qaeda
paralleled his approach to the Soviet militants under house arrest in Iran to
Union. He believed that both regimes the terrorists who had assaulted a housing
were unsustainable and that the best compound in Riyadh. Bush promptly
way to hasten their demise was through shut down U.S. cooperation with Iran in
dialogue backed by military strength. Afghanistan, Iran began shipping weap-
His problem, of course, was that Iran had ons to Shiite insurgents in Iraq, and the
no Mikhail Gorbachev, the reformist chance for cooperation vanished.
Soviet premier who became Reagan’s The failures of U.S.-Iranian rap-
negotiating partner. prochement cannot be laid solely at the
Although U.S. Iran policy fell into a feet of Washington, of course. Since 1979,
lull under President George H. W. Bush, Iran has often gone out of its way to
foment tension. Tehran and its proxies
have carried out assassinations, kidnap-
pings, and terrorist attacks against
Americans and U.S. allies. The clerical The 2008 global financial crisis brought the world's
regime has made anti-Americanism a core economy closer to collapse than ever before.
component of its ideology and public Has enough been done to

rhetoric. And although elements of the prevent another crisis?
Iranian leadership have long favored
détente, powerful constituencies within
Tehran—including hard-line clerics and
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Systemic
Corps—have time and again sought to
scuttle efforts at diplomatic outreach. Risk
The Obama administration, how-
ever, demonstrated that Tehran’s in the
belligerence need not be an unsur-
mountable obstacle to progress. Like Financial
Clinton, Obama entered office deter-
mined to get tough on Iran. During his Sector
first term, he used his credibility with
the Europeans to expand multilateral Ten Years after the Great Crash
sanctions on Iran, hoping to force EDITORS
D O U G L A S W. A R N E R
Tehran to negotiate over its nuclear E M I L I O S AV G O U L E A S

DANNY BUSCH
weapons program. Then, Iranian S T E V E N L . S C H WA R C Z
presidential elections in 2013 replaced

the incendiary Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
with Hassan Rouhani, a Western-edu-
AVAILABLE NOW
cated cleric who was willing to ex-
change a long-term freeze on Iran’s Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: Ten Years
after the Great Crash draws on some of the world’s
nuclear weapons program for relief from leading experts on financial stability and regulation
U.S. sanctions. The resulting agree- to examine and critique the progress made since
ment, the JCPOA, was narrowly focused 2008 in addressing systemic risk. The book covers
topics such as central banks and macroprudential
on the nuclear issue: it was not intended policies; fintech; regulators’ perspectives from the
by either side to resolve the myriad United States and the European Union; the logistical
and incentive challenges that impede standardization
other impediments to U.S.-Iranian and collection; clearing houses and systemic risk;
reconciliation. But many supporters of optimal resolution and bail-in tools; and bank
the deal thought that the successful leverage, welfare and regulation.
negotiation of such a complex agree-

ment would set a useful precedent,
CIGI Press books are distributed by McGill-Queen’s University Press (mqup.ca)
allowing for future dialogue on other and can be found in better bookstores and through online book retailers.
issues. After bringing maximal multilat-
eral pressure on Iran in his first term,
Obama left office having laid the
groundwork for improved relations.
65
GETTING BACK TO NORMAL party in office—will want to use U.S.

There are, to be sure, flickering signals power to beat Iran into submission.
that Trump will end up conforming to A second U.S. goal must be to gain
the established pattern on Iran, striving some leverage over Iranian foreign policy
to seem tough in public while seeking a in order to reduce the likelihood of a
private accommodation. His decision not conflict between Washington and Tehran.
to retaliate against Iran’s downing of an This is easier said than done, since a U.S.
American drone in June, his efforts to administration would have to simultane-
arrange a phone call with Rouhani, and ously reach out to the Iranians and
his recent firing of Bolton all point in mitigate the anxieties of U.S. allies. It
this direction. But such an about-face is will also be challenging because of
unlikely. Trump’s Republican backers, potential spoilers on the Iranian side—
both in and out of Congress, still support namely, the hard-liners who have on
a hard line against Tehran, and the several occasions blocked rapprochement.
Iranians will be doubtful that Trump can At a minimum, gaining meaningful
be trusted to stick with any deal. He will influence over Iranian policymaking would
likely leave office as determined to require opening a military-to-military
subjugate Iran as he was on entering it. channel of communication with Iran,
Yet the United States—if not under with the initial goal of preventing
Trump, then under his successor—has a accidental clashes. That link could then
compelling interest in finding a modus progress to quiet multilateral talks on
vivendi with Iran, just as it repeatedly technical questions, move on to higher-
sought to do with the Soviet Union level political discussions regarding areas
during the Cold War. Washington’s of potential cooperation, and finally
most important goal should be to culminate in diplomatic normalization.
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear Only when the U.S. embassy reopens
weapons—a development that could in Tehran will there be enough regular,
destabilize the entire Middle East. The businesslike interactions between the two
most effective way to do this is through sides for the United States to influence
multilateral diplomacy along the lines of Iranian decision-making. Now that the
the JCPOA. This would not only provide war in Syria is effectively over, deterrence
for an inspections regime that would is holding on the Israeli-Lebanese border,
augment Western intelligence gathering Israel has demonstrated its resolve in
but also create incentives for Iranian preventing Iran’s entrenchment near the
cooperation; by contrast, a confronta- Golan Heights, and the United Arab
tional approach will strengthen Iran’s Emirates has walked away from the
hard-liners and produce perpetual Saudi war in Yemen, there is an opportu-
incentives for Iran to cheat. Finding a nity for cautious movement. Trump is
workable arrangement, however, will unlikely to grasp it, largely because the
require bold diplomacy by a future perceived political cost is too high. But
Democratic administration, which will the next administration should, at long
need to overcome the objections of both last, give sustained engagement a try.∂
the Republican Party and an Israeli
government that—regardless of the
footsteps have become mired in civil war,

The Tunisia Model

as has happened in Libya, Syria, and
Yemen. Others, such as Bahrain and
Egypt, have returned to repression and
Lessons From a New Arab authoritarianism. Tunisia, by contrast,
Democracy has drafted a progressive constitution and
held free and fair elections at the presi-
Sarah Yerkes dential, parliamentary and local levels. In
July, when President Beji Caid Essebsi
died at the age of 92, the transition to a
T
he story of how the Tunisian caretaker government was smooth and
revolution began is well known. unremarkable. Several problems persist
On December 17, 2010, a 26-year- and continue to hobble the country, in
old fruit vendor named Mohamed particular a long track record of economic
Bouazizi from the town of Sidi Bouzid mismanagement and a disconcerting lack
set himself on fire outside a local gov- of trust in public institutions. But for all
ernment building. The man’s self- the unfinished business Tunisia still faces,
immolation—an act of protest against its example remains a source of hope
repeated mistreatment by police and local across the region.
officials—sparked protests that quickly In achieving this feat, Tunisia has
spread across the country. Within a few helped dispel the myth that Arab societies
weeks, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali or Islam is not compatible with democ-
had stepped down and fled the country racy. But the country’s story also offers
after 23 years in power, offering Tunisia lessons for beyond the Arab world: that
an unprecedented opportunity for a transitions from authoritarianism require
democratic opening. A massive wave of brave leaders willing to put country above
uprisings soon swept the country’s politics and that such transitions are by
neighbors, reaching all the way to the nature chaotic and halting. For the
Levant and the Persian Gulf. international community, this means that
Less well known is what happened states in transition should be offered the
inside Tunisia next. Even though the diplomatic and, above all, financial
country had become ground zero of the support they need to bear the growing
Arab Spring, its transition was quickly pains of democracy and come away with
overshadowed by events in more popu- as few scars as possible.
lous Arab countries with deeper ties to
the United States and more patently AFTERSHOCKS OF REVOLUTION
cruel rulers. But nearly a decade on, Postrevolutionary Tunisia inherited a
Tunisia remains the only success story to state in disrepair. The Ben Ali regime
have come out of the many uprisings. had been notoriously corrupt. It plun-
Across the Arab world, countries that dered the country’s public coffers and
looked as though they might follow in its stashed the money in bank accounts
belonging to Ben Ali’s wife, Leila
SARAH YERKES is a Fellow at the Carnegie Trabelsi, and her family. The government
Endowment for International Peace. favored certain coastal regions, neglecting
Sarah Yerkes
the south and the interior of the country, alliance with two smaller, secular parties,
from where the revolution would later imposing a semblance of order on the
emerge. Political competition was postrevolutionary chaos. But beneath the
nonexistent, and potential challengers to surface, the situation remained unstable,
Ben Ali’s ruling party, the Democratic in part because many secularists were as
Constitutional Rally, were either banned afraid of Ennahda’s Islamist agenda as
outright or forced to operate under they were of a return to authoritarianism.
restrictions so severe as to permanently In 2013, frustration with the Ennahda-led
keep them on the sidelines. Those who government culminated in a national
ran afoul of the regime were imprisoned crisis. In February of that year, Islamist
and tortured. extremists murdered the prominent
Leaving this dismal record behind was leftist opposition leader Chokri Belaid.
not easy, and in the first years after Ben The assassination sparked mass protests,
Ali’s ouster, the country endured serious with many accusing the government of
setbacks. Debates on the role of religion standing by in the face of violent extrem-
in public life were particularly divisive. ism. The Tunisian General Labor Union,
Ben Ali’s regime had prided itself on its or UGTT, called its first general strike
secular and progressive approach to wom- since 1978, bringing the country to a
en’s rights in a country where 99 percent standstill for days. When another leftist
of the population is Sunni Muslim. leader, Mohamed Brahmi, was assassi-
When a popular Islamist political move- nated a few months later, more large-
ment, Ennahda, emerged in the 1980s, scale demonstrations followed. Protesters
Ben Ali promptly banned it and impris- were now calling for the Constituent
oned or exiled tens of thousands of its Assembly to dissolve.
members. But when Tunisians voted for a The turmoil of 2013 could have easily
constituent assembly to draft a new, derailed the entire transition process.
postrevolutionary constitution in the fall That it did not was largely due to the
of 2011—the country’s first-ever demo- work of four powerful civil society
cratic election—Ennahda received the organizations—the UGTT, the country’s
most votes of any party, setting up a bar association, its largest employers’
fierce fight over the direction the transi- association, and a human rights group—
tion. Among the most contentious issues which came together for talks in the
was women’s standing in civic and summer of 2013. The National Dialogue
political life. For Ennahda, women were Quartet, as the group came to be known,
“complementary” to men—but that term represented constituencies with widely
angered non-Islamists, who feared that differing interests, but its members soon
writing it into the constitution would agreed on a path forward, calling for a
open a back door to gender discrimina- new electoral law, a new prime minister
tion. The critics eventually prevailed. and cabinet, and the adoption of the
But the constitution-drafting process had long-delayed constitution. It then medi-
exposed painful cleavages within Tuni- ated a national dialogue among the major
sian society. political parties. The talks convinced
Ennahda’s win in the 2011 election Ennahda to step down and brought a
allowed it to form a three-way governing new, technocratic government to power.
The Tunisia Model
Good news: a merchant in Tunis, May 2017

The Quartet also helped the Constituent of non-Islamist parties and activists
Assembly resolve sticking points in the united in their opposition to the Islamist
new constitution, and in January 2014, the group and little else.
deputies passed the new text in a near- Essebsi therefore took Islamists and
unanimous vote. secularists alike by surprise when, shortly
It would not be the last time that after the election, he formed a coalition
coalition building allowed postrevolution- with Ennahda. Essebsi, it soon emerged,
ary Tunisia to weather a moment of had been meeting for secret talks with
uncertainty. In late 2014, the country the Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi,
held its first-ever free parliamentary and a remarkable development, given that
presidential elections. The contest was Essebsi had served as foreign minister
fair, but turnout—48 percent of eligible under the regime that had imprisoned
voters for the legislative and 45 percent and tortured Ghannouchi. Their public
for the presidential election—was low for rapprochement sent a powerful message
such a monumental event, suggesting to the public: the days of bitter political
that Tunisia was not the vibrant democ- rivalries were in the past. A democratic
racy many had hoped for. And the results Tunisia could accommodate leaders of all
DANI ELLE VILLASANA / RE DUX
seemed to set Tunisia up for further stripes—Islamists and secularists, conser-

conflict. Essebsi, the presidential candi- vatives and liberals.
date with the most votes, was a staunch Violent extremism, however, still
secularist and longtime member of the punctuated the country’s progress.
pre-revolutionary regime who had run on Terrorist attacks in early 2015, first at the
an explicitly anti-Ennahda platform. His National Bardo Museum, in downtown
party, Nidaa Tounes, was a loose coalition Tunis, and later at a beach resort in
Sarah Yerkes
Sousse, killed a total of 60 people, most Foreign assistance has helped the coun-
of them European tourists. The attacks try in a number of areas, including
were a significant blow to Tunisia’s counterterrorism, but it bears emphasizing
tourism industry, which makes up around that the main drive for change came from
eight percent of the country’s GDP. They within. Before 2011, U.S. ties with
also shed light on the severity of Tuni- Tunisia were as good as nonexistent. U.S.
sia’s problem with Islamist fundamental- President Barack Obama came to power
ism. The chaos of the early transition seeking a new beginning with the Mus-
years had made it difficult for the Tuni- lim world and made clear that, unlike his
sian government to clamp down on the predecessor, he had no intention of
recruitment of extremists, particularly in imposing democracy on the Arab world.
the country’s traditionally marginalized But when grassroots-led democratic
interior. And as democracy flourished movements swept the region, the Obama
without providing real change to the lives administration was determined to protect
of Tunisians—the economy remained them, at least initially. It threw its weight
stagnant and unemployment high—many behind the protests, both rhetorically and
felt they had nothing to lose by joining financially. U.S. Secretary of State
the ranks of extremist groups. By 2015, Hillary Clinton visited Tunisia less than
Tunisia was infamous for being both the two months after Ben Ali’s departure to
sole democracy in the Arab world and the emphasize U.S. support for the transi-
top exporter to Iraq and Syria of foreign tion. U.S. bilateral assistance to Tunisia
fighters for the Islamic State, or ISIS. jumped from $15 million in 2009 to $26
To make matters worse, Tunisia million in 2011. Multilateral programs
shared a porous border with Libya, provided several hundred million dollars
where a chaotic civil war had allowed ISIS more, bringing the U.S. total to over
to flourish. Without much hassle, $1.4 billion since 2011. (The Trump
Tunisian citizens could cross into Libya, administration has tried to make
train in ISIS camps there, and return to dramatic cuts in each of its proposed
Tunisia to carry out attacks at home—as budgets, in line with its effort to slash
the perpetrators of the Bardo and foreign aid globally, but consistent
Sousse attacks had done. To this day, congressional support has kept aid for
extremists also hide out on the other Tunisia steady.) The European Union
side of the country, in the mountainous and its member states also upped their
border area between Tunisia and Alge- support in the years following the
ria, from where they periodically carry revolution, providing $2.65 billion
out small-scale attacks against Tunisian between 2011 and 2017.
security forces. Thanks largely to Despite that assistance, Tunisia still
Western assistance, the Tunisian state faces several major obstacles. Youth
has greatly improved its counterterrorism unemployment hovers around 30 percent,
capabilities. But as the region’s only and inflation is rising. Since the revolu-
democracy, Tunisia has a target painted tion, the suicide rate has nearly doubled,
on its back. This past summer, both and close to 100,000 highly educated and
al Qaeda and ISIS called for fighters to skilled workers have left the country.
refocus their attention on the country. Tunisia recently overtook Eritrea as the
The Tunisia Model
country with the largest number of country’s first-ever local elections, held in
migrants arriving in Italy by sea. To slow May 2018, were a step in the right
this trend and improve Tunisians’ direction. Not only did they introduce
economic prospects, the government will one of the most progressive gender-parity
need to take some unpopular measures, requirements of any electoral law globally,
such as cutting wages in the public sector. with 47 percent of local council seats
This will require confronting the powerful going to women; they also opened the
labor unions—in particular, the UGTT— gates to young candidates, with 37 percent
which at times have effectively shut down of the seats going to those under 35.
the country with massive strikes. But inac-
tion will only turn off international lenders BUILDING THE SHIP AS IT SAILS
and exacerbate the brain drain, mass Tunisians are quick to point out that their
emigration, and extremist recruitment. country doesn’t provide a model that can
Reforming sclerotic government insti- be cut and pasted onto other national
tutions is another priority. The judi- contexts. But their experience still holds
ciary remains largely unreformed. Many important lessons about how to support
judges are holdovers from the Ben Ali democracy. For outsiders, the main
era, and the byzantine legal code is not takeaway is to keep one’s distance at first.
always in line with the constitution. Most Tunisia succeeded thanks not to the
egregious, the country currently has no presence of a pro-democracy agenda led
constitutional court, largely because by other countries but to the absence of
lawmakers cannot agree on whom to such an effort. The transition began with
appoint as judges. The first democratically a grassroots call for change, which
elected parliament, in office from 2014 foreign donors and international partners
to October 2019, struggled mightily to later stepped in to support. This made it
pass legislation and suffered from severe hard for the government to discredit the
absenteeism, with around half its mem- protests as a foreign-driven, neocolonial-
bers missing in action on any given day. ist project. Wherever possible, the United
The most important item on the States and Europe should allow home-
agenda is regaining the confidence of the grown change to occur without prema-
Tunisian public. As of early 2019, only 34 ture interference. Once democratic
percent of Tunisians trusted the presi- transitions take root, outside govern-
dent, and only 32 percent trusted their ments should be quick to offer financial
parliament, according to a poll by the support and training. In places where
International Republican Institute. When change seems unlikely to emerge on its
it comes to voicing their concerns, many own, foreign donors should make use of
of them, especially the young, prefer the conditional aid and provide larger pots
streets over the ballot box. Around 9,000 of funds to countries that meet certain
protests are held each year, the majority political and economic indicators. The
of which originate in the same tradition- Millennium Challenge Corporation and
ally marginalized regions where the the European Union’s “more for more”
revolution started. This problem has no principle, both of which reward coun-
easy solution, but devolving greater tries for political and economic reform,
powers to the local level would help. The are good examples of this approach.
Sarah Yerkes
Young democracies, for their part, can moribund—and the country with a
learn from Tunisia’s brand of consensus broken social contract. For many
politics. Tunisia’s transition could well Tunisians, the new regime has not
have failed in 2013 had two leaders, delivered the dignity they demanded in
Essebsi and Ghannouchi, not put democ- 2010, and as a result, the public distrusts
racy and pluralism ahead of their own the new democratic institutions. But
political ambitions. Budding democratic trying to fix the economy before taking
leaders are often tempted to fall into on the challenge of political reform
autocratic patterns of behavior and could have backfired, too. There was no
promote their own agendas by hoarding guarantee that once the economy im-
power. In the early stages of a democratic proved, transitional leaders would have
transition, however, leaders need to remained committed to democratic
share political space and prioritize plural- reform. Ultimately, economic challenges
ism over exclusion, such that once the are inevitable during democratic transi-
situation has stabilized, there is enough tions, and the only viable solution may be
room for healthy political competition. for outsiders to provide a stronger safety
Likewise, democracies in the making net through loan guarantees, budget
should heed the cautionary tale of support, and foreign direct investment in
Tunisia’s gridlocked Constituent Assem- the hope of maintaining public support
bly. For its first three years, the new for democracy.
government in Tunis operated without a Tunisia is a beacon of hope for pro-
constitution to guide its actions. And democracy movements across the Middle
today, almost six years after the constitu- East, but even for the region’s many
tion’s ratification, much of it has not been autocrats, the country’s successful demo-
implemented. Several of the bodies it cratic transition is more than just a
mandates, such as a constitutional court, cautionary tale—for there are worse
remain to be formed. Tunisia is build- fortunes they could face. Ben Ali’s forced
ing the democratic ship as it sails, retirement in Saudi Arabia may not strike
which has led to public frustration and them as enviable—but it must certainly
confusion. Transitioning countries would seem preferable to the fates of some who
be well served by clearly establishing refused to bow out, be it death at the
the rules of the game from the outset and hands of insurgents (Libya’s Muammar al-
developing an efficient and realistic Qaddafi); seeing one’s country be
timeline for forming the crucial institu- plunged into years of civil war, devasta-
tions to make democracy work. tion, and economic disaster (Syria’s
There are limits, however, to what Bashar al-Assad); or both (Yemen’s Ali
one can learn from Tunisia. In particu- Abdullah Saleh). These divergent fortunes
lar, its experience offers no satisfying will loom large in the minds of rulers if
answer about how to sequence political they are faced with mass protests today.
and economic reforms. Leaders in Tunis As for the region’s many activists, Tunisia
chose to focus first on political renewal, offers a safe haven that is far more
drafting a new constitution, holding accessible than Europe or the United
elections, and creating political institu- States—and an example of Arab democ-
tions. Doing so has left the economy racy to emulate.∂
ESSAYS
The idea that humanity is

past the era of war is
based on flawed measures.
– Tanisha Fazal
and Paul Poast
War Is Not Over Nowhere to Go

T YL E R H I C KS / T H E N EW YO R K T I M ES / R E DU X
Tanisha M. Fazal and Paul Poast 74 Alexander Betts 122
The Nonintervention Delusion Let Russia Be Russia

Richard Fontaine 84 Thomas Graham 134
The Unwinnable Trade War Beyond Great Forces

Weijian Shan 99 Daniel Byman and
Kenneth M. Pollack 148
The Progressive Case Against
Protectionism
Kimberly Clausing 109
War Is Not Over

What the Optimists Get Wrong About
Conflict
T
he political turmoil of recent years has largely disabused us of
the notion that the world has reached some sort of utopian “end
of history.” And yet it can still seem that ours is an unprece-
dented era of peace and progress. On the whole, humans today are liv-
ing safer and more prosperous lives than their ancestors did. They suffer
less cruelty and arbitrary violence. Above all, they seem far less likely to
go to war. The incidence of war has been decreasing steadily, a growing
consensus holds, with war between great powers becoming all but un-
thinkable and all types of war becoming more and more rare.
This optimistic narrative has influential backers in academia and
politics. At the start of this decade, the Harvard psychologist Steven
Pinker devoted a voluminous book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, to
the decrease of war and violence in modern times. Statistic after sta-
tistic pointed to the same conclusion: looked at from a high enough
vantage point, violence is in decline after centuries of carnage, re-
shaping every aspect of our lives “from the waging of wars to the
spanking of children.”
Pinker is not alone. “Our international order,” U.S. President Barack
Obama told the United Nations in 2016, “has been so successful that
we take it as a given that great powers no longer fight world wars, that
the end of the Cold War lifted the shadow of nuclear Armageddon,
that the battlefields of Europe have been replaced by peaceful union.”
At the time of this writing, even the Syrian civil war is winding down.
There have been talks to end the nearly two decades of war in Afghan-
TANISHA M. FAZAL is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of
Minnesota.
PAUL POAST is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and a
Nonresident Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
War Is Not Over
istan. A landmark prisoner swap between Russia and Ukraine has re-
vived hopes of a peace agreement between the two. The better angels
of our nature seem to be winning.
If this sounds too good to be true, it probably is. Such optimism is
built on shaky foundations. The idea that humanity is past the era of
war is based on flawed measures of war and peace; if anything, the
right indicators point to the worrying opposite conclusion. And the
anarchic nature of international politics means that the possibility of
another major conflagration is ever present.
BODY COUNTS
The notion that war is in terminal decline is based, at its core, on two
insights. First, far fewer people die in battle nowadays than in the past,
both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the world population.
Experts at the Peace Research Institute Oslo pointed this out in 2005,
but it was Pinker who introduced the point to a wider audience in his
2011 book. Reviewing centuries of statistics on war fatalities, he argued
that not only is war between states on the decline; so are civil wars,
genocides, and terrorism. He attributes this fall to the rise of democ-
racy, trade, and a general belief that war has become illegitimate.
Then there is the fact that there has not been a world war since
1945. “The world is now in the endgame of a five-century-long trajec-
tory toward permanent peace and prosperity,” the political scientist
Michael Mousseau wrote in an article in International Security earlier
this year. The political scientist Joshua Goldstein and the legal schol-
ars Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro have also argued as much, ty-
ing the decline of interstate war and conquest to the expansion of
market economies, the advent of peacekeeping, and international
agreements outlawing wars of aggression.
Taken together, these two points—fewer and fewer battle deaths
and no more continent-spanning wars—form a picture of a world in-
creasingly at peace. Unfortunately, both rest on faulty statistics and
distort our understanding of what counts as war.
To begin with, relying on body counts to determine if armed con-
flict is decreasing is highly problematic. Dramatic improvements in
military medicine have lowered the risk of dying in battle by leaps and
bounds, even in high-intensity fighting. For centuries, the ratio of
those wounded to those killed in battle held steady at three to one; the
wounded-to-killed ratio for the U.S. military today is closer to ten to
one. Many other militaries have seen similar increases, meaning that
today’s soldiers are far more likely to wind up injured than dead. That
historical trend undermines the validity of most existing counts of war
and, by extension, belies the argument that war has become a rare oc-
currence. Although reliable statistics on the war wounded for all coun-
tries at war are hard to come by, our best projections cut by half the
decline in war casualties that Pinker has posited. What’s more, to focus
only on the dead means ignoring war’s massive costs both for the
wounded themselves and for the societies that have to care for them.
Consider one of the most widely used databases of armed conflict:
that of the Correlates of War project. Since its founding in the 1960s,
COW has required that to be considered a war, a conflict must generate
a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities among all the organized
armed actors involved. Over the two centuries of war that COW covers,
however, medical advances have drastically changed who lives and
who dies in battle. Paintings of wounded military personnel being
carried away on stretchers have given way to photographs of medevac
helicopters that can transfer the wounded to a medical facility in un-
der one hour—the “golden hour,” when the chances of survival are the
highest. Once the wounded are on the operating table, antibiotics,
antiseptics, blood typing, and the ability to transfuse patients all make
surgeries far more likely to be successful today. Personal protective
equipment has evolved, too. In the early nineteenth century, soldiers
wore dress uniforms that were often cumbersome without affording
any protection against gunshots or artillery. World War I saw the first
proper helmets; flak jackets became common in the Vietnam War.
Today, soldiers wear helmets that act as shields and radio sets in one.
Over the course of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq alone, medical
improvements have decreased the number of deaths from improvised
explosive devices and small-arms fire. As a result of these changes,
many contemporary wars listed in COW’s database appear less intense.
Some might not make it past COW’s fatality threshold and would
therefore be excluded.
Better sanitation has left its mark, too, especially improvements in
cleanliness, food distribution, and water purification. During the
American Civil War, physicians often failed to wash their hands and
instruments between patients. Today’s doctors know about germs and
proper hygiene. A six-week campaign during the Spanish-American
War of 1898 led to just 293 casualties, fatal and nonfatal, from fighting
War Is Not Over
but a staggering 3,681 from various illnesses. This was no outlier. In the
Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, nearly 80 percent of the deaths were
caused by disease. Because counting and categorizing casualties in a
war is notoriously difficult, these statistics should be taken with a grain
of salt, but they illustrate a broader point: as sanitation has improved,
so has the survivability of war. The health of soldiers also skews battle
deaths, since ill soldiers are more likely to die in battle than healthier
soldiers. And military units fighting at their full complement will have
higher survival rates than those decimated by disease.
Moreover, some of the advances that have made modern war less
deadly, although no less violent, are more reversible than they seem.
Many depend on the ability to quickly fly the wounded to a hospital.
For the U.S. military, doing so was possible in the asymmetric con-
flicts against insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United
States had almost total control of the skies. In a great-power war,
however, airpower would be distributed much more equally, limiting
both sides’ ability to evacuate their wounded via air. Even a conflict
between the United States and North Korea would severely test U.S.
medevac capabilities, shifting more casualties from the “nonfatal” to
the “fatal” column. And a great-power war could involve chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, which have been used so
rarely that there are no good medical models for treating their victims.
Skeptics may point out that most wars since World War II have
been civil wars, whose parties might not actually have had access to
sophisticated medical facilities and procedures—meaning that the de-
cline in casualties is more real than artifice. Although this is true for
many rebel groups, civil wars also typically involve state militaries,
which do invest in modern military medicine. And the proliferation
of aid and development organizations since 1945 has made many of
these advances available, at least to some extent, to civilian popula-
tions and insurgents. A foundational principle of humanitarian orga-
nizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross is
impartiality, meaning that they do not discriminate between civilians
and combatants in giving aid. In addition, rebel groups often have
external supporters who provide them with casualty-reducing equip-
ment. (The United Kingdom, for example, shipped body armor to the
insurgent Free Syrian Army at the start of the Syrian civil war.) As a
result, even databases that include civil wars and use a much lower
fatality threshold than COW, such as the widely referenced database of
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, may end up giving the erroneous
impression that civil wars have become less prevalent when in fact
they have become less lethal.
Collecting exact data on the injured in civil wars is admittedly diffi-
cult. As a recent report by the nongovernmental organization Action on
Armed Violence argues, fewer re-
sources for journalists and increased
War has not become any attacks on aid workers mean that those
less prevalent; it has only most likely to report on the wounded
become less lethal. are less able to do so today than in the
past, leading to a likely undercount-
ing. Dubious statistics thus come out
of conflicts such as the Syrian civil war, with media reports suggesting a
wounded-to-killed ratio of nearly one to one since 2011. But common
sense suggests that the real number of injuries is far higher.
If one ignores these trends and takes the existing databases at face
value, the picture is still far from rosy. The tracker managed by the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program shows that even according to existing
databases that may undercount conflict, the number of active armed
conflicts has been ticking up in recent years, and in 2016, it reached its
highest point since the end of World War II. And many of today’s
conflicts are lasting longer than past conflicts did. Recent spikes of
violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mexico, and Yemen
show few signs of abating.
To be sure, the decline of battle deaths, when considered on its own,
is a major victory for human welfare. But that achievement is revers-
ible. As the political scientist Bear Braumoeller pointed out in his book
Only the Dead, the wars of recent decades may have remained relatively
small in size, but there is little reason to expect that trend to continue
indefinitely. One need only recall that in the years preceding World
War I, Europe was presumed to be in a “long peace.” Neither brief
flashes of hostility between European powers, such as the standoff be-
tween French and German forces in Morocco in 1911, nor the Balkan
Wars of 1912 and 1913 could dispel this notion. Yet these small conflicts
turned out to be harbingers of a much more devastating conflagration.
Today, the long shadow of nuclear weapons ostensibly keeps that
scenario from repeating. Humanity has stockpiles of nuclear warheads
that could wipe out billions of lives, and that terrifying fact, many
argue, has kept great-power clashes from boiling over into all-out
War Is Not Over
wars. But the idea that military technology has so altered the dynam-
ics of conflict as to make war inconceivable is not new. In the 1899
book Is War Now Impossible?, the Polish financier and military theorist
Jan Gotlib Bloch posited that “the improved deadliness of weapons”
meant that “before long you will see they will never fight at all.” And
in 1938—just a year before Hitler invaded Poland, and several years
before nuclear technology was considered feasible—the American
peace advocate Lola Maverick Lloyd warned that “the new miracles of
science and technology enable us at last to bring our world some mea-
sure of unity; if our generation does not use them for construction,
they will be misused to destroy it and all its slowly-won civilization of
the past in a new and terrible warfare.”
It may be that nuclear weapons truly have more deterrent potential
than past military innovations—and yet these weapons have intro-
duced new ways that states could stumble into a cataclysmic conflict.
The United States, for example, keeps its missiles on a “launch on
warning” status, meaning that it would launch its missiles on receiving
word that an enemy nuclear attack was in progress. That approach is
certainly safer than a policy of preemption (whereby the mere belief
that an adversary’s strike was imminent would be enough to trigger a
U.S. strike). But by keeping nuclear weapons ready to use at a mo-
ment’s notice, the current policy still creates the possibility of an acci-
dental launch, perhaps driven by human error or a technical malfunction.
SMALL GREAT WARS

All in all, recent history does not point to a decline of war at large. But
what about war between great powers? The historian John Lewis Gad-
dis famously referred to the post-1945 era as “the long peace.” De-
terred by nuclear weapons and locked into a global network of
international institutions, great powers have avoided a repeat of the
carnage of the two world wars. When the European Union was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, it was in part for this remark-
able achievement.
There has, indeed, not been a World War III. But that does not
necessarily mean the age of great-power peace is here. In truth, the
last century’s world wars are a poor yardstick, as they bore little resem-
blance to most of the great-power wars that preceded them. The 1859
Franco-Austrian War lasted less than three months; the 1866 Austro-
Prussian War was a little over one month long. Each produced fewer
than 50,000 battle deaths. Even the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War,

which paved the way for a unified German empire, lasted just six
months and resulted in about 200,000 battle deaths. The world wars
were orders of magnitude different from those conflicts. World War I
was over four years long and produced some nine million battle deaths.
World War II lasted six years and led to over 16 million battle deaths.
In other words, World War I and II have severely skewed our sense
of what war is. Scholars and policymakers tend to view these conflicts
as emblematic of war. They are not. Most wars are relatively short,
lasting less than six months. They tend to result in 50 or fewer battle
deaths per day—a number that pales in comparison to the figures
produced during World War I (over 5,000 dead per day) and World
War II (over 7,000 per day). In fact, if one excludes these two outliers,
the rates of battle deaths from the mid-nineteenth century until 1914
are consistent with those in the decades since 1945.
There have, in fact, been a number of great-power wars since 1945.
But they are rarely recognized as such because they did not look like
the two world wars. They include the Korean War, in which the United
States faced off against forces from China and the Soviet Union, and
the Vietnam War, which also pitted the United States against Chinese
forces. In both cases, major powers fought each other directly.
The list of recent great-power conflicts grows much longer if one
includes instances of proxy warfare. From U.S. support for the muja-
hideen fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the Cold War to
the foreign rivalries playing out in Syria and Ukraine, major powers
regularly fight one another using the
military labor of others. Outsourc-
It is far from certain that ing manpower like this is no recent
today’s wars will remain as invention and is in fact a relatively
small as they have been normal feature of great-power war.
Consider Napoleon’s march to Rus-
since 1945. sia in 1812. The invasion is famous
for the attrition suffered by the
Grande Armée as it pushed east. Far less known is that despite its
immense size of over 400,000 men, the force was largely not French.
Foreign fighters, be they mercenaries or recruits from conquered ter-
ritories, made up the overall majority of the troops that set off to in-
vade Russia. (Many of them soon tired of marching in the summer
heat and abandoned the coalition, shrinking Napoleon’s forces by
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more than half before he was yet one-quarter of the way through the
campaign.) Still, his reliance on foreign troops allowed Napoleon to
place the burden of the fighting on non-French, and he reportedly
told the Austrian statesman Klemens von Metternich that “the French
cannot complain of me; to spare them, I have sacrificed the Germans
and the Poles.”
Put simply, most violent conflicts, even among great powers, do
not look like World War I or II. This is not at all to diminish the im-
portance of those two wars. Understanding how they happened can
help avoid future wars or at least limit their scale. But to determine if
great-power war is in decline requires a clear conceptual understand-
ing of what such a war is: one that recognizes that World War I and II
were unparalleled in scale and scope but not the last instances of
great-power conflict—far from it. The behavior of states has not nec-
essarily improved. In truth, the apparent decline in the deadliness of
war masks a great deal of belligerent behavior.
DON’T CELEBRATE TOO EARLY

The idea that war is increasingly a thing of the past is not just mis-
taken; it also enables a harmful brand of triumphalism. War’s ostensi-
ble decline does not mean that peace is breaking out. Certainly, the
citizens of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela would
object to the notion that their countries are peaceful, even though none
is technically at war. As the sociologist Johan Galtung has argued, true
peace, or “positive peace,” must also contain elements of active engage-
ment and cooperation, and although globalization since the end of the
Cold War has linked disparate communities together, there have also
been setbacks. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, there were
fewer than ten border walls in the world. Today, there are over 70, from
the fortified U.S.-Mexican border to the fences separating Hungary
and Serbia and those between Botswana and Zimbabwe.
Even when ongoing wars do come to an end, caution is warranted.
Consider civil wars, many of which now end in peace treaties. Some,
such as the 2016 Colombian peace deal, are elaborate and ambitious
documents that run over 300 pages long and go far beyond standard
disarmament processes to address land reform, drug policy, and wom-
en’s rights. And yet civil wars that end with peace agreements tend to
sink back into armed conflict sooner than those that end without
them. Often, what looks to the international community as an orderly
War Is Not Over
end to a conflict is just a means for the warring parties to retrench and
regroup before fighting breaks out anew.
Likewise, it strains credulity that the better angels of our nature are
winning when humanity is armed to the teeth. Global military expen-
ditures are higher today than during the late Cold War era, even when
adjusted for inflation. Given that countries haven’t laid down their
arms, it may well be that today’s states are neither more civilized nor
inherently peaceful but simply exercising effective deterrence. That
raises the same specter as the existence of nuclear weapons: deter-
rence may hold, but there is a real possibility that it will fail.
FEAR IS GOOD
The greatest danger, however, lies not in a misplaced sense of progress
but in complacency—what U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, in a different context, called “throwing away your umbrella in
a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.” At a time of U.S.-Russian
proxy wars in Syria and Ukraine, rising tensions between the United
States and Iran, and an increasingly assertive China, underestimating
the risk of future war could lead to fatal mistakes. New technologies,
such as unmanned drones and cyberweapons, heighten this danger, as
there is no consensus around how states should respond to their use.
Above all, overconfidence about the decline of war may lead states
to underestimate how dangerously and quickly any clashes can escalate,
with potentially disastrous consequences. It would not be the first time:
the European powers that started World War I all set out to wage lim-
ited preventive wars, only to be locked into a regional conflagration. In
fact, as the historian A. J. P. Taylor observed, “every war between Great
Powers . . . started as a preventive war, not a war of conquest.”
A false sense of security could lead today’s leaders to repeat those
mistakes. That danger is all the more present in an era of populist
leaders who disregard expert advice from diplomats, intelligence com-
munities, and scholars in favor of sound bites. The gutting of the U.S.
State Department under President Donald Trump and Trump’s dis-
missive attitude toward the U.S. intelligence community are but two
examples of a larger global trend. The long-term consequences of such
behavior are likely to be profound. Repeated enough, the claim that
war is in decline could become a self-defeating prophecy, as political
leaders engage in bombastic rhetoric, military spectacles, and coun-
terproductive wall building in ways that increase the risk of war.∂
The Nonintervention
Delusion
What War Is Good For
Richard Fontaine
A
s the casualties and financial costs of the United States’ Mid-
dle Eastern wars have mounted, Americans’ appetite for new
interventions—and their commitment to existing ones—has
understandably diminished. The conventional wisdom now holds that
the next phase in the United States’ global life should be marked by
military restraint, allowing Washington to focus on other pressing
issues. This position seems to be one of the few principles uniting
actors as diverse as foreign policy realists, progressives, nearly all of
the presidential candidates in the 2020 Democratic primary, and
President Donald Trump.
It’s not hard to see why Americans would look at U.S. military
involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya and conclude that such
interventions should never be repeated. The costs of these wars have
been extraordinary: at a rally in Ohio in April 2018, Trump estimated
them at $7 trillion over 17 years and concluded that the country has
nothing to show for the effort “except death and destruction.” Al-
though the precise financial cost depends on how one counts, what is
certain is that more than 4,500 U.S. military personnel have been
killed in Iraq and nearly 2,500 in Afghanistan, plus tens of thousands
injured in both wars—to say nothing of the casualties among allied
forces, military contractors, and local civilians. Critics of these resource-
intensive operations blame them for bogging down the United States
in a region of second-tier importance and distracting Washington
from the greater threats of China and Russia, as well as from pressing
domestic issues.
RICHARD FONTAINE is CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked
at the U.S. State Department, at the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy
adviser for U.S. Senator John McCain.
The Nonintervention Delusion
With the costs so high, and the benefits seen as low, the imperative
is obvious to political leaders in both parties: get out of the existing
conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and avoid starting new ones.
In his State of the Union address this year, Trump declared that “great
nations do not fight endless wars.” Scores of House Democrats have
signed a pledge to “end the forever war,” referring to the global war on
terrorism and U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan,
Niger, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen, as have many of the
Democrats running for president. Joe Biden, the former vice presi-
dent and current presidential candidate, has also promised to “end the
forever wars.” He has described the Obama administration’s with-
drawal of U.S. troops from Iraq as “one of the proudest moments of
[his] life” and has called for pulling U.S. forces out of Afghanistan.
Many experts are of a similar mind. Discussions of “offshore bal-
ancing,” a strategy in which the United States would dramatically
scale back its global military presence and reduce the frequency of its
interventions, were once mostly confined to the halls of academia, but
today the idea is garnering new attention.
Faced with such a sweeping political consensus, one might conclude
that Washington should simply get on with it and embrace restraint.
The problem is that such a strategy overlooks the interests and values
that have prompted U.S. action in the first place and that may for
good reasons give rise to it in the future. The consensus also neglects
the fact that, despite the well-known failures of recent large-scale
interventions, there is also a record of more successful ones—including
the effort underway today in Syria.
To assume that nonintervention will become a central tenet of future
U.S. foreign policy will, if anything, induce Americans to think less se-
riously about the country’s military operations abroad and thus generate
not only less successful intervention but possibly even more of it. In-
stead of settling into wishful thinking, policymakers should accept that
the use of military force will remain an essential tool of U.S. strategy.
That, in turn, requires applying the right lessons from recent decades.
GOODBYE TO ALL THAT?

The first sign that the sweeping consensus around “ending endless
war” is more problematic than it first appears is the telling set of
caveats that emerges even among its most ardent advocates. Consider
the many qualifications that Democratic presidential candidates are
Richard Fontaine
applying to a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Biden has said that he

would bring U.S. combat troops home during his first term but that
he remains open to a “residual presence” to conduct counterterrorism
operations—roughly the same approach as Trump’s. Senator Cory
Booker of New Jersey has promised that as president he would imme-
diately begin a “process” to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, while
somehow ensuring that the country does not again become a safe
haven for terrorists. Pete Buttigieg, the mayor of South Bend, Indi-
ana, who served as a naval officer in Afghanistan, has agreed that “it’s
time to end this endless war,” and yet he envisions a peace agreement
that keeps U.S. special operations forces and intelligence operatives
there. Such concessions, responsible policy though they are, stop well
short of terminating the United States’ longest war.
Even the most committed anti-interventionists continue to come up
with exceptions. The foreign policy manifesto of Senator Bernie Sanders
of Vermont, published in Foreign Affairs in June, is titled “Ending
America’s Endless War,” and yet he has acknowledged that “military
force is sometimes necessary, but always—always—as the last resort.”
His foreign policy adviser has emphasized Sanders’ commitment to
collective defense among NATO allies and has said that genocide and mass
atrocities would “weigh heavily” on Sanders when contemplating mili-
tary action. Advocates of offshore balancing, such as the scholar John
Mearsheimer, favor using force if a regional balance of power is breaking
down, and Mearsheimer has written that his approach would not preclude
operations to halt genocides like the one that befell Rwanda in 1994.
Even at a rhetorical and intellectual level, then, the end of interven-
tion is not nearly as clear-cut as today’s politicians suggest. The reality
of being commander in chief complicates things further: on the cam-
paign trail, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Trump
each pledged to engage in fewer foreign military adventures and redi-
rect resources toward needs at home. In office, each reluctantly pro-
ceeded to not only continue existing wars but also launch new offensives.
The result is that, according to a Congressional Research Service
estimate, the United States has employed military force over 200
times since the end of the Cold War. Many of these operations have
taken place in or around the Middle East, including in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. But other, less frequently
recalled interventions have occurred elsewhere, as in Bosnia, Colom-
bia, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, and the Philippines. What’s more, the
Paved with good intentions: Bernie Sanders at a rally in Michigan, April 2019
tendency to intervene is not simply the product of the United States’

emergence as an unbridled superpower after the Cold War. Between
1948 and 1991, during a time of supposedly stabilizing bipolar compe-
tition, the United States sent its military to fight abroad more than 50
times. American military action is not, as many believe, a feature of
post–Cold War overstretch; it has been a central element of the
United States’ approach to the world for decades.
THE CASE AGAINST

B R I T TA N Y G R E ES O N / T H E N EW YO R K T I M ES / R E DU X
Just because the United States has intervened so frequently over its
history does not mean that it will continue to do so or that it should.
The case against intervention generally takes five forms. And although
there are elements of truth to each, they also threaten to obscure other,
more complicated realities.
The first argument holds that the United States need not employ
military means in response to terrorism, civil wars, mass atrocities,
and other problems that are not its business. Washington has used
force against terrorists in countries ranging from Niger to Pakistan,
with massive human and financial expenditures. And yet if more
Americans die in their bathtubs each year than in terrorist attacks,
why no war on porcelain? The post-9/11 overreach, this camp contends,
Richard Fontaine
endures some 18 years later, having stretched well beyond eradicating

the original al Qaeda perpetrators and their Afghan base. In this view,
as the threats have diminished, so should American attention. The
civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen may be tragic, but they do not
demand a U.S. military response any more than did the atrocities in
Rwanda, eastern Congo, or Darfur.
Adopting such a cramped view of American interests, however, car-
ries its own costs. Terrorism remains a threat, and the effect of successful
attacks on Americans goes beyond their immediate casualties to include
increased pressure to restrict civil liberties at home and wage impromptu
operations abroad—operations that end up being costlier and less effec-
tive than longer-term, better-planned ones would be. After the Islamic
State (or ISIS) took hold in Iraq and Syria and footage of terrorists de-
capitating American hostages horrified the public, Obama undertook a
far larger operation than would have likely been necessary had he left a
residual force in Iraq after 2011. As for genocide and civil war, certain
cases can pose such serious threats to U.S. interests, or be so offensive to
American values, as to merit intervention. Successive presidents have
used military might to prevent, halt, or punish mass atrocities—Clinton
to cease the genocide against Bosnian Muslims in the Balkans, Obama
to protect the Yezidi minority in Iraq, and Trump after Bashar al-Assad’s
chemical attacks against his own people in Syria. There is every reason
to believe that similar cases will arise in the future.
The second argument against intervention highlights its supposedly
poor track record. For all of the United States’ good intentions—
stopping terrorists, ending genocide, stabilizing countries, spreading
democracy—Washington simply is not very successful in its attempts.
Iraq and Libya look worse today than when the wars against Saddam
Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi began, and the Taliban currently
control more of Afghanistan than at any time since 2001. Long gone
are U.S. aspirations to turn these countries into democracies that
would radiate liberalism beyond their borders.
Yet this argument ignores the many other times in which the use of
American force worked. It ejected Saddam from Kuwait, it ended a
war in Bosnia, it stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, it paved the way
for a democratic transition in Liberia, and it helped defeat narcoter-
rorists and bring temporary peace to Colombia. Even in Afghanistan,
it should not be forgotten that Washington denied al Qaeda a safe
haven, and in Iraq and Syria, it eliminated ISIS’ physical presence,
Everyone has different views.
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Richard Fontaine
limited the flow of foreign fighters, and liberated cities from depravity.
Then there are other, harder-to-measure effects of U.S. intervention,
such as enforcing norms against ethnic cleansing and deterring coun-
tries from offering terrorists sanctuary or engaging in wars of aggres-
sion. To get an accurate picture of intervention’s mixed track record,
one cannot cherry-pick the disastrous cases or the successful ones.
The third argument against intervention points to the slippery
slope involved in such efforts: start a military campaign, and the
United States will never get out. After the 1995 Dayton peace accords
formally ended the ethnic conflict in Bosnia, U.S. troops stayed in the
area for ten years, and NATO retains a presence in Kosovo to this day.
The United States seems to be stuck in Afghanistan, too, because
without a peace deal with the Taliban, the U.S.-backed government
could fall. In Iraq, Obama removed all U.S. troops, only to send them
back in when ISIS established a vast presence there. Check in to a
military intervention, and it often seems like you can never leave.
Once deployed, American troops often do stay a long time. But stay-
ing is not the same as fighting, and it is wrong to think of troops who
are largely advising local forces the same way as one thinks about those
who are actively engaged in combat. There is a stark difference between
what it meant to have U.S. forces in Iraq during the peak of the war and
what it means to have U.S. troops there now to train Iraqi forces—just
as there is a massive gulf between deploying troops to Afghanistan dur-
ing the troop surge there and keeping a residual presence to strengthen
the government and its security forces. Some American interests are
worth the price of continued military deployments, and the aim should
be to diminish those costs in blood and treasure as the conditions stabi-
lize. Even once they do, there may remain a case for an enduring role,
particularly when the U.S. troop presence is the only thing maintaining
the domestic political equilibrium, as was the case in Iraq before the
2011 withdrawal and as is true in Afghanistan today.
The fourth argument can be boiled down to the plea, “Why us?”
Why must the United States always run to the sound of the guns,
especially when other countries are capable of taking on such burdens
and may have more skin in the game? Europe is geographically closer
to Libya and Syria, at far greater risk from terrorism and refugee
flows, and possesses capable military forces of its own. Middle East-
ern allies have their own resources, too. The American role might not
be so indispensable after all.
For all the contributions of U.S. partners, however, more often

than not, only the United States has the will and the capability to lead
successful military operations. France led a successful operation in
Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 and in Mali in 2013, and the United Kingdom
led one in Sierra Leone in 2000, but those were exceptions. Iraq would
not have left Kuwait in 1991 had the United States not led the effort;
mass slaughter in the Balkans during the 1990s would not have ended
without a dominant U.S. role, even though it took place on European
soil. In Afghanistan and Syria, U.S. allies have made it clear that they
will stay as long as the United States does but will head for the exit
otherwise. U.S. friends in Europe have proved decidedly uninterested
in taking matters into their own hands, and when Washington has
declined to meaningfully intervene itself, they have often stood idly
by. In Libya after Qaddafi’s fall, the Europeans failed to impose secu-
rity even as growing numbers of refugees and migrants set sail across
the Mediterranean. In Syria before U.S. bombing began, they under-
took no military campaign against ISIS, even as the arrival of Syrian
refugees destabilized European politics. When U.S. allies do take
matters into their own hands, they can make a bad situation worse.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates decided to intervene in
Yemen’s civil war, but their brutal and indiscriminate campaign led to
a humanitarian disaster and strengthened the very Iranian role it
sought to eliminate.
The final reason most frequently offered for getting out of the
intervention business relates to its costs, both direct ones—the lives
lost and damaged, the dollars borrowed and spent—and opportunity
costs. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia represent the fore-
most challenge to the United States over the long term and that the
competition with them has begun in earnest. If that’s the case, why tie
up scarce resources in less important military interventions?
Here, too, a dose of subtlety is in order. The prospect of great-
power competition should indeed structure the United States’ coming
approach to national security, but a focus on counterterrorism is
required, as well. After all, the George W. Bush administration en-
tered office hoping to focus on China, only to see its best-laid plans
upended by the 9/11 attacks. Withdrawing prematurely from terrorist
safe havens such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria would threaten the
great-power emphasis necessary in the next phase of the United
States’ global life. A major terrorist attack on U.S. soil, for instance,
Richard Fontaine
would likely cause Washington to once again embrace counterterrorism

as its chief national security priority, leaving it more vulnerable to
threats from China and Russia. Unless the United States chooses to
give up its global role and instead focus only on Asia and Europe, it
must engage in great-power competition while attending to other
security challenges in other areas.
A SUBTLER STRATEGY
Every possible intervention, past and future, raises difficult what-ifs.
If presented again with a situation like that in Rwanda in 1994—
800,000 lives in peril and the possibility that a modest foreign mili-
tary effort could make a difference—would the United States once
again avoid acting? Should it have stayed out of the bloodbath in the
Balkans or intervened earlier to prevent greater carnage? Should it
have left Qaddafi to attack Benghazi? Pursued al Qaeda after the 1998
attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, perhaps obviat-
ing the need to overthrow the Taliban three years later?
In such discussions, the gravitational pull of the Iraq war bends the
light around it, and for obvious reasons. The war there has been so sear-
ing, so badly bungled, and so catastrophically costly that, according to
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, anyone thinking of a similar
engagement “should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur
so delicately put it.” Almost everything that could go wrong in Iraq did.
What started as a war to eliminate weapons of mass destruction found
none. The impulse to liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny pushed
them into a civil war. The desire to open another front in the war on
terrorism created far more terrorists than it eliminated. A war that
some U.S. officials promised would be a “cakewalk” exacted an unbear-
able toll on U.S. troops, their families, and the Iraqi people themselves.
Ironically, many among Washington’s political and national secu-
rity elite, especially on the Republican side, were for years unable to
admit publicly that the invasion was the mistake it so clearly was.
After the 2003 invasion, politics and a resistance to suggesting that
American sacrifices were in vain kept such observations private. Re-
publican political leaders’ failure to admit that the war’s costs exceeded
its benefits undermined their credibility, which was already tarnished
by their general support for the war in the first place. That, in turn,
may have helped usher in the blunt anti-interventionism so prevalent
today. Washington needs a subtler alternative to it.
U.S. military interventions take diverse forms—an isolated drone

strike in a remote area of Pakistan is as different from a theoretical future
war with China as is possible to contemplate. As a result, there are no
precise rules about when leaders should and should not use force. Context
matters, and human judgment always comes into play. Yet it is possible
to sketch out several principles, informed by the experience of recent
decades, that should guide the general conduct of U.S. decision-making.
The first guideline is to avoid overlearning the supposed lessons of
past interventions. It’s often said that generals are always fighting the
last war, and the same can be said of policymakers. Sometimes, they
draw the right lessons, but sometimes, they do not. President Harry
Truman sent troops north of the 38th parallel in Korea, drawing
China into the Korean War, so in Vietnam, U.S. ground forces re-
mained on their side of the demilitarized zone—which put enormous
emphasis on extensive bombing campaigns against the North. Hop-
ing to avoid a Vietnam-style quagmire, when the George H. W. Bush
administration fought the Gulf War, it sought to limit its objective to
the specific aim of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty. But because Sad-
dam was left in power, the Iraq problem festered. The second Iraq war
was supposed to finish the job—but it showed how a purportedly
short conflict can lead to an indefinite occupation. To prevent that
from happening in Libya, Obama decided to use airpower to help
oust Qaddafi but keep American boots off the ground; he was thus
unable to contain the chaos that followed. And so in Syria, Obama
and Trump would fight terrorists without attempting to remove
Assad. Sticking to rigid lines based on prior errors can easily lead to
new and different pitfalls.
Another guideline is to pick interventions that meet clear condi-
tions and commit to those that are chosen. The United States should
generally undertake interventions only when political leaders—
namely, the president and a majority of Congress—believe that force
is necessary to attain a clearly stated objective. They should have a
reasonable expectation that allies, especially those in the region in
question, will join the effort, and they should make serious efforts to
enlist them. They should conclude that the benefits of a military in-
tervention over the long run are reasonably expected to exceed the
costs. And they should undertake military interventions in which they
are prepared for the possibility that U.S. forces will have to stay for a
long time, indefinitely if necessary.
Richard Fontaine
Guidelines such as these cannot possibly supply all the answers

policymakers might need, but they can point to the right questions.
Requiring decision-makers to clearly define the objectives of the pos-
sible intervention, for example, will force them to distinguish between
managing a problem (such as preventing Afghanistan from becoming
a terrorist safe haven) and solving it (such as rendering that country a
Taliban-free modern democracy). Enlisting allies in the effort should
involve an honest assessment of their strengths and weaknesses,
whether those allies are someone in the nature of Afghan President
Hamid Karzai, or exiles in Iraq, or European troops in Libya, or the
Syrian Democratic Forces. And the judgment about an operation’s
likely costs and benefits should include an analysis of the success or
failure of various approaches in the past, such as targeted counterter-
rorism operations or a full-fledged counterinsurgency campaign.
One traditional way of thinking about intervention is represented by
the Powell Doctrine, developed by General Colin Powell during the
Gulf War, which emphasizes the importance of using decisive force,
having a clear exit strategy, and mobilizing U.S. public support. But the
opposite has proved at least equally important in recent wars: there will
be cases in which the employment of modest force over an open-ended
timeline will be the better strategy. Policymakers’ general unwilling-
ness to contemplate a long-term U.S. presence in a foreign country,
along with their tendency to see conflicts as temporary problems that
can be solved in a limited period of time, often makes them rush for the
exits when the going gets tough. Had the United States not frantically
sought an off-ramp in both Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, its pros-
pects for success in both conflicts would have been brighter—and, para-
doxically, the wars might have ended sooner. Even many years after the
initiation of those conflicts, sustainable, low-cost, and long-term Amer-
ican engagement is preferable to unconditional withdrawal.
A new set of guidelines would also take a more nuanced approach
to determining whether an intervention is politically sustainable.
The usual model holds that presidents should paint a picture of the
threat for Americans and then elicit their support for war, hoping to
wind down operations before the public grows weary of the conflict.
Yet political support hinges less on a war’s duration than it does on
its financial costs, casualties, and perceived progress. Reducing losses
and making concrete steps toward a conflict’s stated objective are
critical to maintaining popular support over the long run. Instead of
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Richard Fontaine
suggesting that ultimate success is just around the corner, policymak-

ers should articulate the case for an enduring engagement and then
work to lower the human and financial costs associated with it.
Perhaps the most difficult guideline is to rigorously estimate the
long-term costs and benefits. Although the need to run a cost-benefit
analysis seems patently obvious, recent experience suggests that it is
not. In the run-up to the Iraq war, for example, U.S. leaders mini-
mized the estimated cost of troops and reconstruction aid and wildly
overinflated their projections of success. During the deliberation over
intervention in Libya, it appears that policymakers ignored the lesson
that would-be nuclear proliferators might draw in watching the United
States topple a leader who had previously turned over his weapons of
mass destruction. Most important is an examination of the specific
case itself, including the history of the people and the forces at play.
Analogies to past wars and unrelated historical experiences, or aspira-
tions to abstract principles—such as needing to be on the right side of
history—add little value.
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

Applying these guidelines would rule some past and potential inter-
ventions in and others out. Intervention in the Balkans and Rwanda
likely would have passed the test, particularly given the limited objec-
tives (in the Balkans, an end to atrocities without toppling govern-
ments) and the military means required (in Rwanda, reinforcing UN
peacekeepers already on the ground or jamming radio broadcasts). The
2001 decision to attack al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan would
have met the mark, too, as would have the anti-ISIS campaign in Iraq
and Syria, given that nonmilitary approaches were unable to shut down
the safe havens. The 2003 Iraq war would not have met the test, given
a realistic projection of the costs and benefits and the ever-changing
objectives. In Libya, these principles would have led Washington to
either mount a limited operation to stop a massacre in Benghazi and
leave Qaddafi in power or stay out of the fight altogether. Instead, the
Obama administration chose to topple the regime and then disengage.
For the ongoing interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the
guidelines would rule in favor of a residual, indefinite troop presence.
Preventing these countries from regressing into terrorist hubs and,
in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, supporting the governments
that keep them from doing so are objectives that merit continued
U.S. engagement. Additionally, the costs of redeploying to these

countries after a descent into terror-ridden chaos—as happened in
Iraq after 2011—would almost certainly be higher than the costs of
remaining. Simply ignoring the emergence of terrorist sanctuaries
could be even more catastrophic.
Several practical changes would help policymakers evaluate possi-
ble military interventions. To ensure that cost-benefit analyses are as
accurate as possible, for example, they must be based on the entire
range of possible costs down the line—not just the expected casualties
and direct expenses associated with operations but also those of con-
tractors and intelligence personnel, as well as longer-term costs, such
as veterans’ care. They should also include the likely effect of military
action on civilians living in the country in question and the likely ef-
fect of military inaction on the U.S. population.
Congress must also play a role far beyond its power of the purse
and its ability to authorize force. For all the focus on the outdated
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which permitted the
use of U.S. military force against the
perpetrators of 9/11, legislators would It’s often said that generals
do better to concentrate on the conduct
of the wars themselves. That means in- are always fighting the last
vestigating on-the-ground conditions, war, and the same can be
measuring progress, interrogating poli- said of policymakers.
cymakers and military leaders, and of-
fering alternative strategies. To do that,
Congress would have to use the full panoply of its informal powers to
engage in oversight: conducting hearings and briefings, sending con-
gressional delegations, initiating investigations, and so on.
Ironically, it is the counter-ISIS mission in Syria—the one that so
frequently elicits calls for its end—that provides a reasonably success-
ful example of how U.S. military intervention can work in practice.
With the deployment of roughly 2,000 special operations forces, the
United States armed, trained, and advised up to 70,000 local Arab and
Kurdish fighters. The operation has banished Iran, Russia, and Syrian
government forces from a third of the country, eliminated ISIS’ physical
caliphate and forestalled its resurgence, deterred a Kurdish-Turkish
clash, and kept refugee flows in check. U.S. casualties and financial
expenditures have been relatively low, and international support rela-
tively high: fewer than ten U.S. troops have lost their lives in Syria, and
Richard Fontaine
U.S. operations there compose only a fraction of the $15 billion budget
for Operation Inherent Resolve, as the military campaign against ISIS in
Iraq and Syria is known. Such financial costs are significant, and the
human losses tragic, but there is reason to believe that they will be much
lower in the future, given the elimination of ISIS’ physical caliphate.
Still, Washington could cut yet more costs by allowing more regular
troops to relieve the burden placed on elite special operations forces.
Over time, it could reallocate expensive military equipment—such as
F-35 and F-22 aircraft—to arenas of great-power competition and in-
stead invest in cheaper aircraft for anti-ISIS bombings in Iraq and
Syria. Doing so would free up resources for missions in other regions
and reduce the financial burden. If calls for disengagement from Syria
prevail, however, it is likely that conditions on the ground will eventu-
ally deteriorate, and the United States may once again have to deploy
ground forces to prevent the reemergence of a terrorist stronghold.
THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

Ultimately, the unpredictability of world events puts a priority on
human judgment and undermines rigid formulas. That is precisely
why it is so unwise for 2020 presidential candidates to make categor-
ical commitments to end the United States’ involvement in Afghani-
stan, Iraq, and Syria and why it is unwise for Trump to focus on an
exit to those conflicts rather than the right conditions that would
safely enable one. This uncertainty is also a reason why voters must
place a priority on the judgment of their would-be leaders.
Amid all the justified frustration with the United States’ post–
Cold War approach and pledges to dial back intervention and end
forever wars, far more subtlety is needed when it comes to consider-
ing if, when, and how the United States should use force abroad. No
grand strategy can be built on the presumption that military inter-
vention is mostly an erroneous activity of yesteryear, rather than an
enduring feature of U.S. foreign policy.
Now, as the world enters its post–post–Cold War phase, Ameri-
cans need to do some hard thinking. Their country remains a global
power, with strongly held interests and values that require defend-
ing. The United States need not look abroad for monsters to de-
stroy. But it must not lull itself into believing that such monsters
have disappeared.∂
The Unwinnable Trade War

Everyone Loses in the U.S.-Chinese
Clash—but Especially Americans
Weijian Shan
I
n late June, the leaders of China and the United States announced
at the G-20 meeting in Osaka, Japan, that they had reached a
détente in their trade war. U.S. President Donald Trump claimed
that the two sides had set negotiations “back on track.” He put on
hold new tariffs on Chinese goods and lifted restrictions preventing
U.S. companies from selling to Huawei, the blacklisted Chinese
telecommunications giant. Markets rallied, and media reports hailed
the move as a “cease-fire.”
That supposed cease-fire was a false dawn, one of many that have
marked the on-again, off-again diplomacy between Beijing and
Washington. All wasn’t quiet on the trade front; the guns never
stopped blazing. In September, after a summer of heated rhetoric,
the Trump administration increased tariffs on another $125 billion
worth of Chinese imports. China responded by issuing tariffs on an
additional $75 billion worth of U.S. goods. The United States might
institute further tariffs in December, bringing the total value of Chi-
nese goods subject to punitive tariffs to over half a trillion dollars,
covering almost all Chinese imports. China’s retaliation is expected
to cover 69 percent of its imports from the United States. If all the
threatened hikes are put in place, the average tariff rate on U.S. imports
of Chinese goods will be about 24 percent, up from about three
percent two years ago, and that on Chinese imports of U.S. goods
will be at nearly 26 percent, compared with China’s average tariff rate
of 6.7 percent for all other countries.
WEIJIAN SHAN is Chair and CEO of PAG, a Hong Kong–based private equity firm, and the
author of Out of the Gobi: My Story of China and America. This article is part of a project of the
Library of Congress’ John W. Kluge Center, supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Weijian Shan
The parties to this trade war may yet step back from the abyss.
There have been over a dozen rounds of high-level negotiations
without any real prospect of a settlement. Trump thinks that tariffs
will convince China to cave in and change its allegedly unfair trade
practices. China may be willing to budge on some issues, such as buy-
ing more U.S. goods, opening its market further to U.S. companies,
and improving intellectual property protection, in exchange for the
removal of all new tariffs, but not to the extent demanded by the
Trump administration. Meanwhile, China hopes that its retaliatory
actions will cause enough economic pain in the United States to make
Washington reconsider its stance.
The numbers suggest that Washington is not winning this trade
war. Although China’s economic growth has slowed, the tariffs have
hit U.S. consumers harder than their Chinese counterparts. With
fears of a recession around the corner, Trump must reckon with the
fact that his current approach is imperiling the U.S. economy, posing
a threat to the international trading system, and failing to reduce the
trade deficit that he loathes.
Trump may back away from his self-destructive policy toward
China, but U.S.-Chinese competition will continue beyond his tenure
as president. Much of the coverage of the conflict makes it seem like
a clash of personalities, the capriciousness of Trump against the im-
placable will of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Com-
munist Party. But this friction is systemic. The current costs of the
trade war reflect the structural realities that underpin the relationship
between the U.S. and Chinese economies. It’s worth tracing that
dynamic as the two great powers try to find a new, fitful equilibrium
in the years ahead.
CONSIDER THE LOBSTERS

The trade war has not produced the desired results for the United
States. Washington first raised tariffs on Chinese imports in 2018. In
the same year, Chinese exports to the United States increased by $34
billion, or seven percent, year-over-year, while U.S. exports to China
decreased by $10 billion, or eight percent. In the first eight months of
this year, China’s exports to the United States dropped by just under
four percent compared with the same period in the previous year,
but U.S. exports to China shrank much more, by nearly 24 percent.
Instead of narrowing the trade gap, the tariffs have coincided with a
Paying the price: at a Black Friday sale in Niles, Illinois, November 2018
widening of the U.S. trade deficit with China: by nearly 12 percent in
2018 (to $420 billion) and by about another eight percent in the first
eight months of this year.
There are at least two reasons why Chinese exports to the United
States have not fallen as much as the Trump administration hoped
they would. One is that there are no good substitutes for many of the
products the United States imports from China, such as iPhones and
consumer drones, so U.S. buyers are forced to absorb the tariffs in
the form of higher prices. The other reason is that despite recent
headlines, much of the manufacturing of U.S.-bound goods isn’t
leaving China anytime soon, since many companies depend on sup-
ply chains that exist only there. (In 2012, Apple attempted to move
GU RIN D E R OSAN / AP
manufacturing of its high-end Mac Pro computer from China to

Texas, but the difficulty of sourcing the tiny screws that hold it together
prevented the relocation.)
Some export-oriented manufacturing is leaving China, but not for
the United States. According to a May survey conducted by the Amer-

Weijian Shan
ican Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, fewer than six percent of

U.S. businesses in China plan to return home. Sixty percent of U.S.
companies said they would stay in China.
The damage to the economy on the import side is even more pro-
nounced for the United States than it is for China. Economists at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and elsewhere found that in
2018, the tariffs did not compel Chinese exporters to reduce their
prices; instead, the full cost of the tariffs hit American consumers.
As tariffs raise the prices of goods imported from China, U.S. con-
sumers will opt to buy substitutes (when available) from other coun-
tries, which may be more expensive than the original Chinese
imports but are cheaper than those same goods after the tariffs. The
price difference between the pre-tariff Chinese imports and these
third-country substitutes constitutes what economists call a “dead-
weight loss” to the economy.
Economists reckon the dead-weight loss arising from the existing
tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese imports to be $620 per household,
or about $80 billion, annually. This represents about 0.4 percent of
U.S. GDP. If the United States continues to expand its tariff regime as
scheduled, that loss will more than double.
Meanwhile, Chinese consumers aren’t paying higher prices for
U.S. imports. A study by the Peterson Institute for International
Economics shows that since the beginning of 2018, China has raised
the average tariff rate on U.S. imports
from 8.0 percent to 21.8 percent and
Much of the manufacturing has lowered the average tariff rate on
of U.S.-bound goods isn’t all its other trading partners from 8.0
leaving China anytime soon. percent to 6.7 percent. China imposed
tariffs only on U.S. commodities that
can be replaced with imports from
other countries at similar prices. It actually lowered duties for those
U.S. products that can’t be bought elsewhere more cheaply, such as
semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. Consequently, China’s import
prices for the same products have dropped overall, in spite of higher
tariffs on U.S. imports.
Beijing’s nimble calculations are well illustrated by the example of
lobsters. China imposed a 25 percent tariff on U.S. lobsters in July
2018, precipitating a 70 percent drop in U.S. lobster exports. At the
same time, Beijing cut tariffs on Canadian lobsters by three percent,
Weijian Shan
and as a result, Canadian lobster exports to China doubled. Chinese

consumers now pay less for lobsters imported from essentially the
same waters.
THE INESCAPABLE DEFICIT

Beijing has proved much more capable than Washington of minimizing
the pain to its consumers and economy. But the trade war would be
more palatable for Washington if its confrontation with China were
accomplishing Trump’s goals. The president thinks that China is “rip-
ping off ” the United States. He wants to reduce the United States’
overall trade deficit by changing China’s trade practices. But levying
tariffs on Chinese imports has had the paradoxical effect of inflating
the United States’ overall trade deficit, which, according to the U.S.
Census Bureau, rose by $28 billion in the first seven months of this
year compared with the same period last year.
The uncomfortable truth for Trump is that U.S. trade deficits don’t
spring from the practices of U.S. trading partners; they come from the
United States’ own spending habits. The United States has run a persis-
tent trade deficit since 1975, both overall and with most of its trading
partners. Over the past 20 years, U.S. domestic expenditures have always
exceeded GDP, resulting in negative net exports, or a trade deficit. The
shortfall has shifted over time but has remained between three and six
percent of GDP. Trump wants to boost U.S. exports to trim the deficit, but
trade wars inevitably invite retaliation that leads to significant reductions
in exports. Moreover, increasing the volume of exports does not necessar-
ily reduce trade deficits unless it is accompanied by a reduction in the
country’s spending in terms of consumption and investment. The right
way to reduce a trade deficit is to grow the economy faster than concur-
rent domestic expenditures, which can be accomplished only by encourag-
ing innovation and increasing productivity. A trade war does the opposite,
damaging the economy, impeding growth, and hindering innovation.
Even a total Chinese capitulation in the trade war wouldn’t make a
dent in the overall U.S. trade deficit. If China buys more from the
United States, it will purchase less from other countries, which will
then sell the difference either to the United States or to its competi-
tors. For example, look at aircraft sales by the U.S. firm Boeing and its
European rival, Airbus. At the moment, both companies are operating
at full capacity. If China buys 1,000 more aircraft from Boeing and
1,000 fewer from Airbus, the European plane-maker will still sell those
1,000 aircraft, just to the United States or to other countries that might
have bought instead from Boeing. China understands this, which is
one reason it hasn’t put higher tariffs on U.S.-made aircraft. Whatever
the outcome of the trade war, the deficit won’t be greatly changed.
A RESILIENT CHINA
The trade war has not really damaged China so far, largely because
Beijing has managed to keep import prices from rising and because its
exports to the United States have been less affected than anticipated.
This pattern will change as U.S. importers begin to switch from buy-
ing from China to buying from third countries to avoid paying the
high tariffs. But assuming China’s GDP continues to grow at around
five to six percent every year, the effect of that change will be quite
modest. Some pundits doubt the accuracy of Chinese figures for eco-
nomic growth, but multilateral agencies and independent research
institutions set Chinese GDP growth within a range of five to six percent.
Skeptics also miss the bigger picture that China’s economy is slow-
ing down as it shifts to a consumption-driven model. Some manufac-
turing will leave China if the high tariffs become permanent, but the
significance of such a development should not be overstated. Inde-
pendent of the anxiety bred by Trump’s tariffs, China is gradually
weaning itself off its dependence on export-led growth. Exports to
the United States as a proportion of China’s GDP steadily declined
from a peak of 11 percent in 2005 to less than four percent by 2018. In
2006, total exports made up 36 percent of China’s GDP; by 2018, that
figure had been cut by half, to 18 percent, which is much lower than
the average of 29 percent for the industrialized countries of the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Chinese lead-
ers have long sought to steer their economy away from export-driven
manufacturing to a consumer-driven model.
To be sure, the trade war has exacted a severe psychological toll on
the Chinese economy. In 2018, when the tariffs were first announced,
they caused a near panic in China’s market at a time when growth was
slowing thanks to a round of credit tightening. The stock market took
a beating, plummeting some 25 percent. The government initially
felt pressured to find a way out of the trade war quickly. But as the
smoke cleared to reveal little real damage, confidence in the market
rebounded: stock indexes had risen by 23 percent and 34 percent on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, respectively, by September 12, 2019.

Weijian Shan
The resilience of the Chinese economy in the face of the trade war
helps explain why Beijing has stiffened its negotiating position in
spite of Trump’s escalation.
China hasn’t had a recession in the past 40 years and won’t have
one in the foreseeable future, because its economy is still at an early
stage of development, with per capita GDP only one-sixth of that of
the United States. Due to declining rates of saving and rising wages,
the engine of China’s economy is shifting from investments and
exports to private consumption. As a result, the country’s growth
rate is expected to slow. The Interna-
Chinese leaders have long tional Monetary Fund projects that
China’s real GDP growth will fall from
sought to steer their 6.6 percent in 2018 to 5.5 percent in
economy toward a 2024; other estimates put the growth
rate at an even lower number. Al-
consumer-driven model. though the rate of Chinese growth
may dip, there is little risk that the
Chinese economy will contract in the foreseeable future. Private
consumption, which has been increasing, representing 35 percent of GDP
in 2010 and 39 percent last year, is expected to continue to rise and
to drive economic growth, especially now that China has expanded
its social safety net and welfare provisions, freeing up private savings
for consumption.
The U.S. economy, on the other hand, has had the longest expan-
sion in history, and the inevitable down cycle is already on the horizon:
second-quarter GDP growth this year dropped to 2.0 percent from the
first quarter’s 3.1 percent. The trade war, without taking into account
the escalations from September, will shave off at least half a percent-
age point of U.S. GDP, and that much of a drag on the economy may
tip it into the anticipated downturn. (According to a September
Washington Post poll, 60 percent of Americans expect a recession in
2020.) The prospect of a recession could provide Trump with the im-
petus to call off the trade war. Here, then, is one plausible way the
trade war will come to an end. Americans aren’t uniformly feeling the
pain of the tariffs yet. But a turning point is likely to come when the
economy starts to lose steam.
If the trade war continues, it will compromise the international
trading system, which relies on a global division of labor based on each
country’s comparative advantage. Once that system becomes less
dependable—when disrupted, for instance, by the boycotts and hostility

of trade wars—countries will start decoupling from one another.
China and the United States are joined at the hip economically,
each being the other’s biggest trading partner. Any attempt to de-
couple the two economies will bring catastrophic consequences for
both, and for the world at large. Consumer prices will rise, world
economic growth will slow, supply chains will be disrupted and labori-
ously duplicated on a global scale, and a digital divide—in technology,
the Internet, and telecommunications—will vastly hamper innovation
by limiting the horizons and ambitions of technology firms.
SILVER LININGS
Trump’s trade war does not seem to simply seek to reduce the trade
deficit. Rather, his administration sees the tariffs as a means to slow
China’s economic rise and check the growing power of a geopolitical
competitor. At the heart of this gambit is the notion that China’s
system of government involvement in economic activities represents
a unique threat to the United States. Robert Lighthizer, the U.S.
trade representative, has insisted that the purpose of the tariffs is to
spur China to overhaul its way of doing business.
Ironically, it is China’s private sector that has been hardest hit by
the trade war, as it accounts for 90 percent of Chinese exports (43
percent of which are from foreign-owned firms). If the trade war
persists, it will weaken the private sector. China may well agree to
commit to purchasing large quantities of U.S. goods as part of a
settlement. But such purchases can be made only by the govern-
ment, not by the private sector. The United States should recognize
that securing such a commitment would basically compel the Chi-
nese government to remain a large presence in economic affairs. The
trade policy of the Trump administration threatens to undermine its
own stated objectives.
U.S. officials should reconsider their analysis of the Chinese econ-
omy. To think that there is a unique “China model” of economic
development, which represents an alternative and a threat to liberal
market systems, is ahistorical nonsense. China has achieved rapid
growth in the past 40 years by moving away from the old system of
state control of the economy and embracing the market. Today, the
market plays a dominant role in resource allocation, and the private
sector accounts for more than two-thirds of the economy.

Weijian Shan
However, the government-controlled sector remains too big, ineffi-

cient, wasteful, and moribund, more of a bane than a boon to the econ-
omy. It is also a source of growing friction between China and the West,
which fears, with good reason, that Chinese government subsidies and
support unfairly advantage state-owned firms. This arrangement needs
to change, both for China and for its trading partners.
China can maintain its economic momentum only by structurally
reforming its economy to move in the direction of a freer, more open
market. If it fails to do so, its growth will hit a ceiling and its rise will
be curtailed. U.S. negotiators should push China to further trim its
state-owned sector, to guarantee equal access to its market for trade
and investment, and to develop a better regime of intellectual prop-
erty protection. These measures would accelerate the trajectory of
reform that China embarked on 40 years ago, which has led to the
rise of a vibrant private sector in China and the country’s economic
integration with the global market. Speeding up this process will not
be painless and will be resisted by vested interests in China. But such
changes will benefit China as well as its trading partners, including
the United States. Beijing and Washington should share these objec-
tives in their trade negotiations. If they succeed in meeting these
goals, both sides will win the trade war.
It is in the best interests of both countries to move away from zero-
sum thinking and put an end to the ad hoc decoupling that the trade
war has threatened. The best path forward is not to close but to tear
down existing barriers and further open up trade. To maintain its global
primacy and technological leadership, the United States needs China—
the biggest and fastest-growing consumer market in the world. To sus-
tain the momentum of its economic ascent, China needs to further its
reforms and continue opening up to the world market. Ultimately, a
mix of cooperation and competition within a rules-based system will
lead to the greatest prosperity for both countries and for the world
economy, as all trading nations have learned throughout history.∂
The Progressive Case

Against Protectionism
How Trade and Immigration Help
American Workers
Kimberly Clausing
I
t has almost become the new Washington consensus: decades of
growing economic openness have hurt American workers, in-
creased inequality, and gutted the middle class, and new restric-
tions on trade and immigration can work to reverse the damage. This
view is a near reversal of the bipartisan consensus in favor of open-
ness to the world that defined U.S. economic policy for decades.
From the end of World War II on, under both Democratic and Re-
publican control, Congress and the White House consistently favored
free trade and relatively unrestrictive immigration policies. Candi-
dates would make protectionist noises to appease various constituen-
cies from time to time, but by and large, such rhetoric was confined
to the margins. Almost never did it translate into actual policy.
Then came the 2016 presidential election. Donald Trump found a
wide audience when he identified the chief enemy of the American
worker as foreigners: trading partners that had struck disastrous
trade agreements with Washington and immigrants who were taking
jobs from native-born Americans. Everyday workers, Trump alleged,
had been let down by a political class beholden to globalist economic
ideas. In office, he has followed through on his nationalist agenda,
withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) and routinely levying higher tariffs on trading partners. On
immigration, he has implemented draconian policies against asylum
KIMBERLY CLAUSING is Thormund A. Miller and Walter Mintz Professor of Economics at
Reed College and the author of Open: The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and
Global Capital.

Kimberly Clausing
seekers at the border and undocumented immigrants within the

United States, as well as reducing quotas for legal immigrants and
slowing down the processing of their applications.
But Trump has not been alone in his battle against economic open-
ness. During the 2016 campaign, he was joined in his calls for protec-
tionism by the Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders, who
also blamed bad trade agreements for the plight of the American
worker. Even the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, who as
secretary of state had championed the TPP, was forced by political
necessity to abandon her earlier support for the agreement. Democrats
have not, fortunately, mimicked Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric,
but when it comes to free trade, their support has often been luke-
warm at best. While some Democrats have criticized Trump’s coun-
terproductive tariffs and disruptive trade wars, many of them hesitate
when asked if they would repudiate the administration’s trade poli-
cies, especially with respect to China. The political winds have
shifted; now, it seems as if those who purport to sympathize with
workers and stand up for the middle class must also question the
merits of economic openness.
American workers have indeed been left behind, but open eco-
nomic policies remain in their best interest: by reducing prices for
consumers and companies, free trade helps workers more than it
hurts them, and by creating jobs, offering complementary skills, and
paying taxes, so do immigrants. Instead of hawking discredited nation-
alist economic ideas, politicians seeking to improve Americans’ eco-
nomic lot—especially progressives focused on reducing inequality
and rebuilding the middle class—should be looking to domestic
policy to address workers’ needs, while also improving trade agree-
ments and increasing immigration. That, not tariffs and walls, is what
it will take to improve the plight of regular Americans.
THE TRADE BOOGEYMAN

Forty years of widening inequality and slow wage growth have left
many Americans searching for answers. It may be tempting, then, to
blame the United States’ trading partners, many of which have expe-
rienced remarkable jumps in GDP and wages. China, perhaps the most
spectacular example, saw its GDP per capita expand more than 22-fold
from 1980 to 2018—in terms of 2010 U.S. dollars, from $350 to $7,750.
Yet during the same period, U.S. GDP per capita grew from $28,600
The Progressive Case Against Protectionism
to $54,500. That’s less in relative terms—advanced economies usually

grow more slowly than poor ones—but far more in absolute terms,
and enough to significantly boost standards of living.
The problem, however, is that the gains have not been evenly
shared. Adjusted for inflation, the average income of the bottom 50
percent of earners stayed nearly flat between 1980 and 2014. For those
in the 50th to 90th percentiles, it grew
by about 40 percent, lagging far be-
hind expectations based on the experi-
American workers have
ence of prior generations. Among the indeed been left behind,
top one percent, meanwhile, average but open economic policies
income has skyrocketed, ballooning by remain in their best
205 percent over the same period. No
wonder so many Americans are disap- interest.
pointed. The U.S. economy has failed
to achieve its most basic aim: generating inclusive growth.
Trade does deserve some of the blame. When the United States
buys goods from labor-abundant countries such as China and India,
the demand for domestic labor falls. This appears to be what hap-
pened after the big surge in Chinese imports to the United States in
the early years of this century. In a series of oft-cited research papers
about “the China shock,” the economists David Autor, David Dorn,
and Gordon Hanson estimated that trade with China may have dis-
placed the jobs of one million to two million Americans during this
period. But it’s important to keep those numbers in perspective. The
U.S. economy is a dynamic place, with more than six million jobs lost
and created every single quarter. Moreover, the share of Americans
working in manufacturing has been declining steadily since 1950,
even as growth in trade has waxed and waned—suggesting that fac-
tors other than trade are also at play.
Indeed, the U.S. economy has experienced other huge changes.
Workers have lost bargaining power as unionization has declined
(from 30 percent of the labor force in 1960 to less than 11 percent
today) and large companies have steadily increased their market
power (corporate profits as a share of GDP are 50 percent higher than
they were in prior decades). Perhaps most important, technology has
disrupted countless industries and lowered the demand for less edu-
cated labor. Most economists believe that technological change is a
far more important factor than international trade in explaining the

Kimberly Clausing
disappointing outcomes in American labor markets. Across all indus-

tries, the returns to education have increased, as less educated workers
are disproportionately displaced by automation and computerization.
And although manufacturing output continues to rise, manufacturing
employment has fallen, as capital takes the place of labor and work-
ers steadily move into the service industry. Yet in spite of all this
evidence about the effects of technological change, politicians still
point fingers at foreigners.
THE MYTH OF BAD DEALS

Critics of trade on both the left and the right contend that much of
the problem has to do with bad trade deals that Washington has struck.
On the left, the concern is that trade agreements have prioritized the
interests of corporations over those of workers. On the right, it is that
trade agreements have focused on the goal of international cooperation
at the expense of U.S. interests. Trump has argued that U.S. trade
deals have been tilted against the United States, contributing to the
large trade deficit (meaning that the country imports more than it
exports) and hollowing out the manufacturing sector. Sanders has
echoed these concerns in the past, for example, claiming that the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) cost 43,000 jobs in
Michigan and is behind Detroit’s urban decline.
But just as trade in general is not to blame for the woes of the
American worker, neither are the specifics of individual trade deals.
In fact, the terms of trade agreements are typically highly favorable
to the United States. That’s because such deals usually require U.S.
trading partners to lower their trade barriers far more than the United
States must, since Washington tends to start off with much lower
trade barriers. Such was certainly the case with Mexico, which, prior
to NAFTA, had tariffs that averaged ten percent, compared with U.S.
tariffs that averaged two percent.
This is not to say that trade agreements cannot be improved; useful
tweaks could counter the excessive prioritization of intellectual prop-
erty and reduce the reach of the mechanism by which investors and
states resolve disputes, which critics allege gives companies too much
power to fight health and environmental regulations. The TPP attempted
to modernize NAFTA by placing a greater emphasis on the rights of
workers and protecting the environment, and future agreements
could go even further.
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Kimberly Clausing
That said, it is easy to overstate the stakes here. Even ideal trade
agreements would do little to address economic inequality and wage
stagnation, because trade agreements themselves have little to do
with those problems. Compared with other factors—the growth of
trade in general, technological change, the decline of unionization,
and so on—the details of trade agreements are nearly inconsequen-
tial. In fact, in the late 1990s, just after the adoption of NAFTA, the
United States saw some of the strongest wage growth in four de-
cades. As studies by researchers at the Congressional Research Ser-
vice and the Peterson Institute for International Economics have
shown, any disruption to the labor market caused by NAFTA was
dwarfed by other considerations, especially technological change.
And even when trade has cost jobs, as with the China shock, the
effect did not depend on the particulars of any trade deal. There was
and is no U.S. trade agreement with China, just the “most favored
nation” status the country was granted when it joined the World
Trade Organization in 2001—a status that it would have been hard
to deny China, given the country’s massive and growing economy.
What really mattered was the mere fact of China’s emergence as an
economic powerhouse.
Critics of trade are also dead wrong when they argue that U.S.
agreements have expanded the trade deficit. In fact, it’s the result of
borrowing. As economists have long understood, trade deficits
emerge whenever a country spends more than it earns, and trade
surpluses arise whenever a country earns more than it spends. Trade
deficits and surpluses are simply the flip side of international bor-
rowing and lending. Some countries, such as the United States, are
borrowers. They consume more of others’ goods than they send
abroad, and they pay the difference in IOUs (which take the form of
foreign investment in U.S. stocks, bonds, and real estate). Other
countries, such as Germany, are lenders. They loan money abroad,
accruing foreign assets, but receive less in imports than they send in
exports. Which country is getting the better end of the deal? It is hard
to say. U.S. households enjoy consuming more now, but they will even-
tually have to repay the debt; German households get returns on their
investments abroad, but they forgo consumption in the present.
What this means is that if policymakers wish to reduce the U.S.
trade deficit—and for now, it is not alarmingly large—they should
reduce borrowing, which they can accomplish by shrinking the budget
The price is right: in a supermarket in Baltimore, Maryland, July 2018
deficit. Instead, policymakers are moving in the opposite direction: the

budget deficit has swelled in recent years, especially after the 2017 tax
cuts. The new U.S. tariffs, meanwhile, have done nothing to improve
the trade deficit. That came as no surprise to economists.
THE PRICE OF PROTECTIONISM

As easily debunked as these myths about trade are, they clearly have a
powerful hold on policymakers. That is troubling not merely for what
it reflects about the state of public discourse; it also has profound real-
A N D R EW MA NGU M / T H E N EW YO R K T I M ES / R E DU X
world implications. As they lambast trade, politicians are increasingly

reaching for protectionist policies. Yet for American workers, such
measures only add insult to injury, making their lives even more
precarious. They do so in four distinct ways.
First and foremost, tariffs act as regressive taxes on consumption.
Although the Trump administration likes to claim that foreigners pay
the price of tariffs, in truth, the costs are passed along to consumers,
who must pay more for the imports they buy. (By this past spring,
the cost of the trade war that began in 2018 exceeded $400 per
year for the average U.S. household.) Beyond that, tariffs fall dis-
proportionately on the poor, both because the poor consume more

Kimberly Clausing
of their income and because a higher share of their spending goes to

heavily tariffed products, such as food and clothing. That is one reason
why progressives in the early twentieth century, outraged by the
inequality of the Gilded Age, pushed for moving away from tariffs
and toward a federal income tax: it was widely recognized that tariffs
largely spared the rich at the expense of the poor. Now, the reverse is
happening. After having championed tax cuts that disproportionately
benefited well-off Americans, the administration has tried to collect
more revenue from regressive taxes on trade.
Second, tariffs and trade wars wreak havoc in U.S. labor markets by
raising costs for American companies. Many large U.S. manufacturers
are heavily dependent on imports. Boeing is a top U.S. exporter, but it
is also a major importer, relying on crucial parts from around the world.
General Motors now pays over $1 billion in annual tariffs, no doubt one
factor behind the company’s recent decision to shutter a plant in Ohio.
When tariffs interrupt global supply chains, they disadvantage U.S.
companies relative to foreign ones. If the goal is to make the United
States a more internationally competitive place to locate jobs and direct
investment, protectionism is a completely backward approach.
Third, trading partners do not sit on their hands when Washington
raises tariffs on their products. Already, the Chinese, the Indians, and
the Europeans have slapped serious retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods.
The victims of these measures include soybean farmers in Iowa and
Minnesota (who have lost market share to Canada as Chinese buyers
look elsewhere) and whiskey distillers in Kentucky and Tennessee
(who have seen their exports to Europe and elsewhere plummet).
Finally, trade wars harm the global economy and U.S. trading
partners, weakening Washington’s network of alliances and jeopar-
dizing the cooperation required to deal with pressing international
problems. Recent meetings of the G-7 and the G-20 have been dom-
inated by discussions aimed at diffusing trade conflicts, distracting
precious diplomatic attention from climate change and nuclear non-
proliferation. It is easy to take peace and international cooperation
for granted, but they are prerequisites for the success of the U.S.
economy in the decades ahead. The world is witnessing another rise
in economic nationalism, which makes it easy for politicians and
publics to embrace nationalist tendencies in other spheres. It is worth
remembering that after the last era of globalization came to a halt,
what followed was the Great Depression and World War II.
PEOPLE POWER
Protectionism is harmful for most American workers, but even more
destructive are policies that make the United States less welcoming to
immigrants. Setting aside the Trump administration’s actions against
refugees and the undocumented—a serious moral stain on the coun-
try—its efforts to limit immigration are also economically harmful.
Immigration has long been an enormous boon for the U.S. econ-
omy. Study after study has shown that it is good for economic growth,
innovation, entrepreneurship, and job creation and that almost all
economic classes within the United States benefit from it. Even
though only 14 percent of the current U.S. population is foreign-
born, immigrants create a disproportionate number of businesses.
Fifty-five percent of the United States’ $1 billion startups were
founded or co-founded by immigrants, and more than 40 percent of
the Fortune 500 companies were founded or co-founded by immi-
grants or their children. In recent decades, immigrants have ac-
counted for more than 50 percent of the U.S.-affiliated academics
who have won Nobel Prizes in scientific fields.
Immigrants also provide countless skills that complement those
of native-born American workers. Highly educated foreigners with
technological skills (such as computer programmers) make up for
persistent shortages in the U.S. high-tech sector, and they comple-
ment native-born workers who have more cultural fluency or com-
munication skills. Less skilled immigrants also fill labor shortages
in areas such as agriculture and eldercare, where it is often difficult
to find native-born workers willing to take jobs.
There is little evidence that immigration lowers the wages of most
native-born workers, although there is some limited evidence that it
may cut into the wages or hours of two groups: high school dropouts
and prior waves of immigrants. In the case of high school dropouts,
however, there are far better ways to help them (such as strengthen-
ing the educational system) than restricting immigration. As for
prior waves of immigrants, given how substantial their economic
gains from migration are—often, they earn large multiples of what
they would have made back home—it’s hard to justify their subse-
quent slower wage growth as a policy concern.
Immigrants have another economic benefit: they relieve demo-
graphic pressures on public budgets. In many rich countries, popu-
lation growth has slowed to such an extent that the government’s

Kimberly Clausing
fiscal burden of caring for the elderly is enormous. In Japan, there

are eight retired people for every ten workers; in Italy, there are five
retirees for every ten workers. In the United States and Canada,
although the budget pressures of an aging population remain, higher
immigration levels contribute to a healthier ratio of three retirees
for every ten workers. It also helps that recent immigrants have
above-average fertility rates.
Many objections to immigration are cultural in nature, and these,
too, have little grounding in reality. There is no evidence that immi-
grants, even undocumented ones, increase crime rates. Nor is there
evidence that they refuse to integrate; in fact, they are assimilating
faster than previous generations of immigrants did.
Given the many benefits from immigration, greater restrictions on
it pose several threats to American workers. Already, the United
States is beginning to lose foreign talent, which will hurt economic
growth. For two years straight, the number of foreign students study-
ing in U.S. universities has fallen, which is a particular shame since
these students disproportionately study science, technology, engi-
neering, and mathematics—areas in which the country faces large
skills shortages. Encouraging such students to stay in the country
after graduation would help the United States maintain its edge in
innovation and promote economic growth. Instead, the Trump ad-
ministration is discouraging foreign students with visa delays and a
constant stream of nationalist rhetoric. Restricting immigration also
harms the economy in other ways. It keeps out job creators and peo-
ple whose skills complement those of native-born workers. And it
increases the pressure on the budget, since restrictions will lead to a
higher ratio of retirees to workers.
A more sensible immigration policy would make it easier for for-
eign students to stay in the United States after graduation, admit
more immigrants through lotteries, accept more refugees, and pro-
vide a compassionate path to citizenship for undocumented immi-
grants currently living in the United States. Promoting U.S. interests
means more immigration, not less.
WHAT WORKS
While reducing trade and immigration damages the prospects of
American workers, free trade and increased immigration are not
enough to ensure their prosperity. Indeed, despite decades of relative
openness to trade and immigration, wages remain stagnant and in-

equality high. This has dire implications. As the economist Heather
Boushey has argued, inequality undermines the U.S. economy by
inhibiting competition and stifling the supply of talent and ideas.
Unmet economic expectations also fuel voter discontent and political
polarization, making it easy to blame outsiders and embrace counter-
productive policies. For the sake of both the country’s economy and
its politics, economic growth needs to be much more inclusive.
To achieve that, the United States needs, above all, a tax system
that ensures that economic prosperity lifts all boats. The Earned In-
come Tax Credit is a powerful tool in that regard. A credit targeted
at lower-income workers that grows as those workers earn more, the
EITC subsidizes their work, making
each hour of it more lucrative. This Immigration has long been
credit should be expanded in size, it
should reach further up the income an enormous boon for the
distribution, and it should be made U.S. economy.
more generous for childless workers—
changes that would particularly benefit those lower- and middle-class
Americans who have seen their wages stagnate in recent decades.
This policy would work well alongside an increase in the federal min-
imum wage, which would help combat the increased market power of
employers relative to employees.
Beyond these steps, the federal government should set up a wage
insurance program, which could make up some of the difference in
lower wages for workers who have been displaced by foreign compe-
tition, technological change, domestic competition, natural disasters,
or other forces. The federal government should also make greater
investments in infrastructure, education, and research, all of which
would benefit workers by increasing their productivity and thus their
incomes. And it should strengthen the safety net, making improved
health-care access and affordability a top priority.
None of this will be cheap, of course. To raise revenue, the U.S. tax
system needs to be modernized. For corporations, Congress should
curb international tax avoidance, closing loopholes and reforming
minimum taxes so as to raise government revenues without chasing
profits offshore. Congress should also strengthen individual and estate
taxation, and it can do so without resorting to extreme rates. For the
income tax, it can cap or end various deductions and preferences; for

Kimberly Clausing
the estate tax, it can raise rates and reduce exceptions. And it can
beef up enforcement of both. Congress should also enact a long-
overdue carbon tax. Coupled with the other policies, a carbon tax
could raise substantial revenue without harming poor and middle-
class Americans, and it would fight climate change.
Finally, policymakers need to reckon with corporations’ growing
market power. They should modernize antitrust laws to put more
emphasis on labor and modernize labor laws to suit the nature of
work today, making sure that they adequately protect those in the
service sector and those in the gig economy. Although large compa-
nies are often good for consumers, their market power narrows the
share of the economy that ends up in the hands of workers. So the
balance of power between companies and their workers needs to be
recalibrated from both ends: policies should empower labor move-
ments and combat companies’ abuses of market power.
In the end, global markets have many wonderful benefits, but they
need to be accompanied by strong domestic policies to ensure that
the benefits of international trade (as well as technological change
and other forces) are felt by all. Otherwise, economic discontent fes-
ters, empowering nationalist politicians who offer easy answers and
peddle wrong-headed policies.
American workers have every reason to expect more from the
economy, but restrictions on trade and immigration ultimately
damage their interests. What those who care about reducing inequal-
ity and helping workers must realize, then, is that protectionism
and nativism set back their cause. Not only do these policies have
direct negative effects; they also distract from more effective poli-
cies that go straight to the problem at hand. On both sides of the
aisle, it’s time for politicians to stop vilifying outsiders and focus
instead on policies that actually solve the very real problems afflicting
so many Americans.∂
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Nowhere to Go
How Governments in the Americas Are
Bungling the Migration Crisis
Alexander Betts
I
n 2015, over 1.2 million asylum seekers arrived in the European
Union. They were fleeing war zones in Afghanistan, South Sudan,
and Syria; economic deprivation in Nigeria and Pakistan; and po-
litical instability in Somalia. The largest group came across the Aegean
Sea; many of them reached European territory in Greece and then
made their way to Germany. Others crossed the Mediterranean on
rickety, overloaded boats or traversed the Bosporus, the Dardanelles,
or the Gibraltar strait. Politicians and journalists labeled the situation
a “crisis” to reflect its unprecedented scale. But this was not a crisis of
numbers. It was a crisis of politics. European leaders initially resorted
to unilateral, quick-fix solutions. German Chancellor Angela Merkel
implemented a short-lived open-border policy. Hungarian Prime Min-
ister Viktor Orban built a razor-wire fence. Other countries sought to
accommodate, sequester, or cast out the migrants—mostly to no avail.
The human consequences were devastating: over 10,000 people have
drowned while crossing the Mediterranean since 2015. Those who
made it were greeted not as survivors but as usurpers, free riders, or
covert extremists; they soon became scapegoats for the radical right.
The political consequences changed Europe forever.
The Western Hemisphere now faces a migration crisis on a similar
scale, with consequences that will likely be just as far-reaching. So far,
this crisis has received a piecemeal treatment. Central American mi-
grants arriving at the U.S.-Mexican border, Venezuelans crossing dry
plains into Colombia, Bolivians seeking work in Argentina and
Chile—these are treated as separate phenomena but are in fact part of
ALEXANDER BETTS is Professor of Forced Migration and International Affairs and William
Golding Senior Fellow in Politics at Brasenose College, both at the University of Oxford. He
is a co-author (with Paul Collier) of Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System.
Nowhere to Go
On the road again: a caravan of migrants from Arriaga, Mexico, October 2018
the same underlying set of problems. To avoid the kind of human and
political toll that the migration crisis produced in Europe, political
leaders and policymakers must treat this new situation holistically and
learn from past examples. Already, policymakers in the United States
and elsewhere in the Americas are repeating European mistakes.
So far this year, the U.S. Border Patrol has apprehended over
800,000 people at the southern border—the highest number in over a
decade. The previous peak in apprehensions occurred in 2000 and re-
sulted mainly from “pull” factors, namely, the high demand for cheap
labor. Today’s migrants, in contrast, are responding to “push” factors,
including many of the same things that inspired masses of people to
flee to Europe four years ago: failed or fragile states, violence, and
economic insecurity. To contend with the new arrivals, the United
States is weighing many of the same approaches that European coun-
U ESLEI MARCELINO / REUTE RS
tries have tried but ultimately found wanting. From border walls to
bilateral deals linking immigration to trade and aid, Washington has
borrowed directly from a playbook that fell short abroad. For instance,
U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” policy, requiring
migrants hoping to gain asylum in the United States to have their claims
assessed while they wait in Mexico, mirrors the EU’s long-standing
failed attempts to set up similar systems in Libya and elsewhere.

Alexander Betts
Despite some differences between the two cases, there are a few
strategies that the New World could draw on from the Old World. The
key lesson from the European experience of 2015 is that when it comes
to migration, there are limits to unilateralism and bilateralism. The
sense of crisis began to abate only when the EU adopted a multipronged
approach grounded in cooperation among the migrants’ countries of
origin, transit, and destination.
SEEING DOUBLE
The European and American crises are alike in a number of ways. The
total number of people apprehended at the U.S. border or deemed in-
admissible at a U.S. port of entry since October 2018 is now nearly the
same as the number of asylum seekers who arrived in Europe in the
whole of 2015. Observers on both sides of the Atlantic have also stum-
bled on eerily similar scenes. The widely published photograph of the
bodies of Óscar Martínez and his 23-month-old daughter, Valeria, who
drowned while attempting to cross the Rio Grande in June, resembles
the picture of Alan Kurdi, a Syrian toddler who drowned while trying
to cross the Mediterranean in 2015. Both images have come to symbol-
ize the awful toll of transnational migration in a world of closed borders.
The effects of migration on the European and American political
systems are likewise comparable. The rhetoric of xenophobic right-
wing figures in the United States echoes—and, in some cases, draws
on—the pronouncements of their European counterparts. In Europe,
such rhetoric fueled anti-immigrant sentiment and encouraged sup-
port for right-wing parties. It has had similar effects in the United
States, where rising xenophobia has underwritten the Trump admin-
istration’s punitive approach to migrants.
There are more parallels between the two crises when it comes to
their causes, their consequences, and governments’ responses. Both
crises resulted from state collapse. In Europe, the immediate trigger
was the Syrian civil war. State fragility in Afghanistan and Iraq also
contributed to mass displacement, and the chaos in Libya created a
transit option and haven for smugglers facilitating movement from
sub-Saharan Africa across the Mediterranean. In the Americas, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have grown highly unstable in
recent years. Guatemala appears on the “high warning” list of the
Fragile States Index; Honduras is just one grade below. In these states,
governing capacity is low, corruption is high, and organized crime
Nowhere to Go
dominates business, politics, and society. Since the summer of 2018,

all three countries have experienced severe drought. Crop failure rates
have reached higher than 80 percent; as a result, food insecurity has
become a major cause of outmigration. On the opposite side of the
Caribbean, Venezuela has crumbled under its president and would-be
strongman, Nicolás Maduro. Over four million people have fled the
country, the majority bound for Colombia, Ecuador, or Peru, making
this the second-largest displacement crisis in the world.
The Americas are also witnessing a human tragedy as dramatic as
the one that engulfed Europe in 2015, when more than 3,700 people
drowned while crossing the Mediterranean. The number of those dy-
ing at the U.S.-Mexican border is considerably smaller—around 400
in the first eight months of this year—but the figure is still significant.
What is more, that statistic does not account for the thousands of
people who have been subjected to inhumane conditions or have suf-
fered injuries on the journey north. Meanwhile, the fact that the rich-
est country in the world has resorted to indefinitely detaining migrant
children signals a lapse in the application of human rights standards
similar to what Europe witnessed in 2015.
Europe’s initial response to the crisis was characterized by unilater-
alism rather than international cooperation. In 2015, the 28 EU states
struggled to agree on a common response. Merkel’s plea for open bor-
ders fell on deaf ears, as Austria and Hungary quickly shut their doors.
A major source of frustration for northern European states was the
sense that southern European states were largely indifferent to the
problem, simply waving migrants through in the hope that they would
move northward. The Mexican government also stood by when mi-
grant caravans originating in Central America crossed Mexico en route
to the United States in late 2018. And just as richer northern European
countries were unable to force their southern neighbors to take more
responsibility for the problem, Washington’s unilateral efforts to bully
or bribe Mexico to respond more energetically have come to naught.
Although South American countries have been far more receptive to
Venezuelan migrants than their northern neighbors have been to those
fleeing Central America, they have similarly struggled to develop stan-
dardized responses or mechanisms for regional collaboration. The dis-
tribution of migrants across the region is highly uneven: by the end of
2018, there were around 1.3 million in Colombia, 768,000 in Peru,
288,000 in Chile, 263,000 in Ecuador, 168,000 in Brazil, and 130,000

Alexander Betts
in Argentina. Each of these countries handles work permits, public

services, and refugee status differently. In light of the xenophobic back-
lash in several countries, some governments have put in place deter-
rence measures similar to those that European states used back in 2015;
Ecuador, for instance, has introduced a policy requiring Venezuelans to
present their criminal records at the border in response to an upsurge
in anti-immigrant violence in late 2018.
DITCH THE DICTIONARY

The crisis in the Americas—like the European one before it—has raised
questions about the usefulness of conventional categories such as “refu-
gees” and “economic migrants.” The UN’s 1951 Refugee Convention de-
fined a refugee as someone who has “a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.” In the 1980 Refugee Act, the
U.S. Congress enshrined that description in U.S. law, as well. But the
1951 definition was written to address the upheavals of the early Cold
War, especially the emigration of Soviet dissidents. Today, most migrants
are not fleeing powerful regimes that are out to get them. Nor are they
simply seeking better economic opportunities. Rather, they are running
from states that have failed or that are so fragile that life has become dif-
ficult to bear for their citizens. What Europe saw in 2015 and what the
Americas are witnessing today are not simply refugee flows or market-
driven population movements but rather “survival migration”—a term I
initially coined to describe the exodus of Zimbabweans from Robert
Mugabe’s regime in the early years of this century. Between 2003 and
2010, around two million Zimbabweans fled to South Africa and other
neighboring states. Most of them wanted to escape hyperinflation, ban-
ditry, and food insecurity—the economic consequences of the underly-
ing political situation—rather than political persecution per se. Because
the majority of these migrants could not be described as either refugees
or economic migrants, humanitarian action around the crisis stalled.
Many of the migrants who arrived in Europe in 2015, notably those
from Syria, were clearly refugees under the 1951 convention. Others—
including some Albanians and Kosovars who used the Balkan routes
toward Germany alongside the Syrians—were plainly economic mi-
grants. But significant numbers of those crossing the Aegean were flee-
ing fragile states such as Afghanistan and Iraq. European governments
were, by and large, unsure of how to label these migrants. In the first
Nowhere to Go
quarter of this year, 46 percent of Iraqi asylum seekers received recog-

nition in Germany, compared with 13 percent in the United Kingdom.
Petitioners from failed or fragile Middle Eastern or sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries faced—and still face—a sort of recognition lottery whose
outcome depends on whether judges and bureaucrats are prepared to
shoehorn today’s circumstances into Cold War categories. But few Eu-
ropean governments wanted to abandon the old terminology and cate-
gories. Governments led by right-of-center parties did not want to
open themselves up to possibly greater obligations; those led by left-of-
center parties did not want to risk jeop-
ardizing the 1951 convention.
A similar dynamic seems to be at
The rhetoric of xenophobic
work in the Americas today, where outright-wing figures in the
dated notions obscure the reality of sur- United States echoes the
vival migration. Nowhere is this truer pronouncements of their
than in Central America. In the first
eight months of this year, around 508,000 European counterparts.
people left the so-called Northern Tri-
angle region, which consists of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Hondu-
ras, bound for the United States. This represents almost double the
number who made that trip in any single year since 2014, an increase
that has played a major role in the dramatic spike in U.S. border ap-
prehensions. Meanwhile, in the past six years, there has been a more
than tenfold increase in the number of U.S. asylum applications from
these three countries.
The reasons Central American migrants have for emigrating are
often complex. Poverty levels are high across the Northern Triangle.
Drought has contributed to large-scale crop failure, undermining live-
lihoods and food security in these predominantly agricultural societies.
The UN has suggested that climate change is in part to blame. Mean-
while, weak governance contributes to pervasive corruption and vio-
lence in the absence of public services.
The most visible manifestation of survival migration from the
Northern Triangle has been the migrant caravans that have periodi-
cally tried to enter the United States through Mexico. A survey by the
International Organization for Migration of 800 people in the first
caravans of 2019 revealed the complicated motives of the Central
Americans who have participated in the northern exodus, with 45 per-
cent of those polled indicating that they had moved mainly for better

Alexander Betts
economic conditions, nine percent because of violence and insecurity,

and 45 percent because of a combination of both. Sixty-eight percent
also said that they had had to change their residence in their country
of origin in the previous year due to violence or insecurity. As Wash-
ington has stepped up enforcement and detention, many Central
American migrants have opted to surrender to the U.S. Border Patrol
in order to claim asylum rather than try to sneak across the border—
contributing to a growing backlog of claims at the U.S. border.
AN UNEASY WELCOME
Central America is not the only source of the Western Hemisphere’s
migrants, and the United States is hardly their only destination. Un-
rest in Venezuela has also driven massive numbers of people from
their homes to seek refuge in many other places in the region. Under
Maduro’s increasingly authoritarian rule, the country has been beset
by violence and economic upheaval since late 2015. Venezuela now has
one of the highest murder rates in the world. Ninety percent of the
population lives below the poverty line. There was close to 1.7 million
percent hyperinflation in 2018.
The exodus ramped up in 2017, when the full weight of the eco-
nomic crisis came to bear. Since then, up to four million Venezue-
lans—at least seven percent of the country’s population—have left.
This is an unprecedented development in the region, arguably sur-
passed only by the period between 1979 and 1992, when over 25 per-
cent of El Salvador’s population fled a civil war.
Venezuela’s neighbors have responded in vastly different ways. Co-
lombia’s approach has been the most progressive. The country opened
its doors to roughly 1.5 million Venezuelans and has granted them the
right to work and to receive basic services. It has recognized Vene-
zuelan immigration as a development opportunity, receiving a $31.5
million grant from the World Bank earlier this year, alongside addi-
tional concessional finance, to provide jobs and improved social ser-
vices to the migrants and the communities that host them. But
Colombia’s government refuses to call these Venezuelans refugees,
since doing so might exacerbate a bureaucratic backlog in the asylum
system and risk a political backlash in a country where anti-immigrant
rhetoric is growing in the border regions.
Other countries have been less welcoming. At first, Peru opened its
borders, allowing Venezuelans to apply for short-term stays or for asy-
Nowhere to Go
lum and, from January 2017 until December 2018, offering Venezuelan
migrants temporary access to work, education, and banking services.
But by the end of 2018, Peru suspended that practice amid concerns
that it was creating an incentive for more Venezuelans to come. In 2017,
Brazil began offering Venezuelan migrants two-year residency visas
and gave all asylum seekers from Venezuela access to work permits and
basic services. In 2018, however, the governor of Roraima State ap-
pealed to the Supreme Federal Court to close the border until the
conditions for “humanitarian reception” were in place. (The court dis-
missed the case.) Brazil has also tried,
with limited success, to carry out an in- Most South American
ternal relocation scheme, in which
around 5,000 Venezuelans in the border
migrants rely on their kith
area have been transferred to 17 other and kin to survive.
states across the country. For its part,
Ecuador initially welcomed fleeing Venezuelans but eventually intro-
duced stricter border controls in August 2018. In January, the country
witnessed a xenophobic backlash after a Venezuelan migrant killed his
pregnant Ecuadorian girlfriend; in the face of the resulting anger and
violence, many Venezuelans left Ecuador for Colombia.
Meanwhile, international organizations have struggled to even de-
fine the crisis in South America, much less deal with it. Until this past
spring, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had only vaguely
noted that the region was experiencing a “migrant crisis.” But on May
21, under pressure from human right activists, the UNHCR released a
statement suggesting that most Venezuelan migrants were actually
refugees in need of international protection. The World Bank has
characterized the Venezuelan migration as “mainly based on economic
reasons but with the characteristics of a refugee situation in terms of
the speed of influx and levels of vulnerability.”
And yet everyone dealing with the situation on the ground agrees that
a humanitarian tragedy is unfolding. On the border in Cúcuta, Colom-
bia, around 50,000 people cross the checkpoint each day at the Simón
Bolívar International Bridge. They set out with suitcases, bags, and hand
trolleys to collect food and basic provisions that cannot be easily found
in Venezuela. They buy and sell in Cúcuta’s La Parada market or eat at
the soup kitchens run by organizations affiliated with the World Food
Program, which serve a total of 8,000 meals per day. Up to 3,000 of those
who cross every day wind up staying in Colombia. Those with passports

Alexander Betts
can regularize their status, access public services, and find work. By con-
trast, those without papers cannot get even the most basic entitlements.
Competition and a lack of adequate coordination among UN agencies
and nongovernmental organizations is palpable. For example, during my
recent visit to the border, some organizations pushed for unrestricted
cash assistance to Venezuelans, while others—among them, the Colom-
bian government—strongly counseled that this would merely exacerbate
existing tensions between migrants and locals. Several agencies com-
plained that other agencies initiated schemes without consulting relevant
partners, despite the existence of an inter-agency coordination platform.
There are, of course, some guiding lights. In beleaguered Cúcuta, a
“one-stop shop” border point operated by UN agencies and nongov-
ernmental organizations offers emergency relief and guidance to those
who most need it. Here, and at other points along the border, UNICEF
provides vaccines to the youngest migrants. And a few reception cen-
ters offer overnight housing, but only on a temporary basis. Most
migrants, however, rely on their kith and kin to survive.
LESSONS FROM THE PAST

A new approach is needed to handle this situation—one that recognizes
the contemporary realities of survival migration and relies on interna-
tional cooperation rather than unilateralism. In 2016, Europe belatedly
began to find solutions by strengthening international cooperation both
among and beyond the 28 EU member states. The drop in Mediterra-
nean crossings between 2016 and 2019 is due in part to improvements in
the security situation in Syria. But the change has also come from stra-
tegic reforms aimed at strengthening internal and external cooperation.
In March 2016, the EU signed an agreement with Turkey, which dur-
ing the crisis was the last place that millions of migrants passed through
on their way to Europe. The EU offered Turkey around two billion eu-
ros of assistance in exchange for hosting and integrating refugees while
limiting their outward movement. (Although criticized for making
some migrant journeys even more dangerous, the deal has reduced Ae-
gean Sea crossings for Greece and supported Turkey’s capacity and
willingness to host 3.7 million refugees. Unfortunately, due to the
growth of anti-immigrant sentiment in Turkey, officials in Ankara have
recently started resettling refugees in the Levant.) The EU also created
an emergency assistance fund for Africa in late 2015 and dedicated more
than four billion euros to support collaboration in the broad area of
Nowhere to Go
“migration and development” with African states. Agreements that the

EU forged with countries such as Ethiopia and Jordan have created jobs,
supported existing enterprises, and provided more sustainable oppor-
tunities for refugees and migrants in those countries. Europe’s approach
has been far from perfect—that much is clear. But it is also undeniable
that the crisis ended in part owing to policies that created sustainable
development opportunities and removed some of the “push” factors
that had caused the migrant surge. If U.S. policymakers are serious
about developing more sustainable immigration policies, perhaps they
ought to borrow European tactics, creating multilateral deals with coun-
tries in Latin America that aim to ensure the safety and economic op-
portunity of migrants in their countries of origin, transit, and asylum.
The Western Hemisphere could also look to its own past for inspi-
ration. In 1984, the countries of the region issued the Cartagena Dec-
laration on Refugees, which extended the definition of “refugee” to
include people fleeing “massive violations of human rights or other
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.” This def-
inition aptly describes the circumstances of many of the region’s con-
temporary survival migrants. But until now, nearly all states have
refrained from applying this extended definition to the plight of Cen-
tral Americans or Venezuelans.
Policymakers could also draw lessons from the 1989 International
Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA)—which identi-
fied regional solutions for around two million displaced people across
the hemisphere, more than half of whom were displaced across bor-
ders. CIREFCA is, in short, one of the most successful historical ex-
amples of cooperation on refugees anywhere in the world. The
conference set standards for recognizing and responding to different
categories of migration. And through CIREFCA, countries created sus-
tainable sanctuaries closer to home for the region’s migrants.
The impetus behind the conference was just as dramatic as the
migration crisis that is troubling the political landscape in the present
day. By the end of the 1980s, after a decade of regional conflict that
had produced around 160,000 casualties, there were millions of dis-
placed people in Central America. Of these, around 150,000 were
recognized as refugees, around 900,000 were displaced across borders
but not regarded as refugees, and around 900,000 were considered
internally displaced. CIREFCA aimed to remedy this problem as part of
the region’s peace process at the end of the Cold War. The initiative for

Alexander Betts
the conference came from the UN, working closely with the Contadora
Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) and major donors
such as the United States and the EU. As part of the process, the
UNHCR and the UN Development Program established a joint secre-
tariat, based in San José, Costa Rica.
The aim of CIREFCA was to address forced displacement through a
development-based approach. Conference attendees called for the
CIREFCA secretariat to implement 36 initial projects that would re-
quire $375 million over a three-year period. Most of the projects
aimed to ensure that, rather than having to migrate long distances in
search of security and opportunity, migrants could receive protection
and achieve prosperity closer to home. For example, through CIREFCA,
the Mexican government undertook the development of large parts
of the Yucatán Peninsula, including Campeche and Quintana Roo,
states that at the time hosted tens of thousands of Guatemalan refu-
gees. The project created agricultural jobs and other opportunities
for Guatemalan refugees to build sustainable lives in Mexico, while
simultaneously supporting the development of relatively impover-
ished areas of the peninsula. A number of other CIREFCA projects
encouraged self-reliance on the part of refugees, empowering them
to access opportunities both at home and in neighboring countries.
For example, 62,000 Nicaraguans, 45,000 Guatemalans, and 27,000
Salvadorans returned home because integrated development projects
cropped up in their local communities, schemes aimed at improving
employment, infrastructure, and social services.
In the end, CIREFCA is estimated to have channeled more than $422
million in additional resources to the region, most of it from the United
States and the EU. But CIREFCA was not just a one-off pledging confer-
ence: it was an ambitious political undertaking that lasted from 1987 to
1995. It led to sustainable solutions even for those who were not offi-
cially refugees, using the term “externally displaced persons” to capture
the needs of people in migration situations that the traditional termi-
nology failed to describe. Ultimately, CIREFCA did more than just ad-
dress a migration crisis: it laid the foundations for two decades of
relative peace in Central America.
ANCHORS, NOT WALLS

What the Americas need today is a revival of the spirit of international
cooperation that drove CIREFCA. The recently forged Global Compact
Nowhere to Go
on Refugees—endorsed at the UN General Assembly last year—is a

step in the right direction. The agreement calls for responsibility shar-
ing on refugee issues and encourages what could be termed “solidarity
summits,” gatherings at which countries faced with major displacement
challenges can present projects and proposals to the global donor com-
munity. Such summits would provide a platform for governments to
agree on policies and norms around migrants, refugees, and those who
fall in between. The summits would allow governments to pilot new
approaches to forced displacement, creating mutually beneficial growth
opportunities for both displaced populations and host communities.
The most obvious place to start would be a solidarity summit to ad-
dress Venezuelan refugees and migrants, since there is a clear consen-
sus in South America on the need for cooperation and an existing
institutional mechanism through which to achieve it. Such a meeting
could be hosted by the so-called Quito Group, 11 countries that signed
a declaration in 2018 in the Ecuadorian capital calling for “substantially
increased” resources to deal with the crisis. Whichever countries from
the group that were prepared to move forward with the initiative could
do so. The UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration
would play a key role. (Eduardo Stein, the two organizations’ joint
special representative for Venezuelan refugees and migrants, called for
a “coherent, predictable, and harmonized regional response” in Au-
gust.) Ideally, the summit would lead to a sustained process resembling
the one employed by CIREFCA, run by an intergovernmental secretariat
and backed by donor countries in the global North. The main purpose
of the process would be twofold: to channel international funding into
development projects that will benefit both migrants and host-country
citizens and to commit to common regional standards for the reception
and recognition of migrants across countries. Rich countries such as
Canada and the United States have strong incentives to contribute,
given the risk that an anti-immigrant backlash across Latin America
may spread populist and even revolutionary politics.
The goal, above all, must be to expand some of the provisions tra-
ditionally available only to refugees to the survival migrants that are
the face of today’s crisis. CIREFCA proved that such an approach can
work, and its legacy is indisputably positive—the sustainable inte-
gration of thousands of refugees and other displaced populations. It
is high time that the region embarked on a similar project, focused
on building anchors rather than walls.∂

Let Russia Be Russia

The Case for a More Pragmatic Approach
to Moscow
Thomas Graham
S
ince the end of the Cold War, every U.S. president has come into
office promising to build better relations with Russia—and each
one has watched that vision evaporate. The first three—Bill
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama—set out to integrate
Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community and make it a partner in
building a global liberal order. Each left office with relations in worse
shape than he found them, and with Russia growing ever more distant.
President Donald Trump pledged to establish a close partnership with
Vladimir Putin. Yet his administration has only toughened the more con-
frontational approach that the Obama administration adopted after Rus-
sia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Russia remains entrenched in
Ukraine, is opposing the United States in Europe and the Middle East
with increasing brazenness, and continues to interfere in U.S. elections.
As relations have soured, the risk of a military conflict has grown.
U.S. policy across four administrations has failed because, whether
conciliatory or confrontational, it has rested on a persistent illusion: that
the right U.S. strategy could fundamentally change Russia’s sense of its
own interests and basic worldview. It was misguided to ground U.S.
policy in the assumption that Russia would join the community of liberal
democratic nations, but it was also misguided to imagine that a more ag-
gressive approach could compel Russia to abandon its vital interests.
A better approach must start from the recognition that relations
between Washington and Moscow have been fundamentally competi-
tive from the moment the United States emerged as a global power at
the end of the nineteenth century, and they remain so today. The two
THOMAS GRAHAM is a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and
served as Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the
George W. Bush administration.
Team of rivals: Putin and Trump at the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, July 2017
countries espouse profoundly different concepts of world order. They

pursue opposing goals in regional conflicts such as those in Syria and
Ukraine. The republican, democratic tradition of the United States
stands in stark contrast to Russia’s long history of autocratic rule. In
both practical and ideological terms, a close partnership between the
two states is unsustainable.
In the current climate, that understanding should come naturally to
most U.S. policymakers. Much harder will be to recognize that ostra-
cizing Russia will achieve little and likely prove to be counterproduc-
tive. Even if its relative power declines, Russia will remain a key
player in the global arena thanks to its large nuclear arsenal, natural
resources, geographic centrality in Eurasia, UN Security Council veto,
and highly skilled population. Cooperating with Russia is essential to
grappling with critical global challenges such as climate change, nu-
clear proliferation, and terrorism. With the exception of China, no
country affects more issues of strategic and economic importance to
the United States than Russia. And no other country, it must be said,
is capable of destroying the United States in 30 minutes.
A more balanced strategy of restrained competition would not only
E VA N V U C C I / A P
reduce the risk of nuclear war but also provide the framework for the
cooperation needed to tackle global challenges. Smarter relations with
Russia can help guarantee European security and strategic stability,

Thomas Graham
bring a modicum of order to the Middle East, and manage the rise of
China. As U.S. policymakers demand that Russia moderate its behav-
ior, they must be prepared to scale back their near-term goals, espe-
cially in settling the crisis in Ukraine, to forge a more productive
relationship with Moscow.
Above all, U.S. policymakers will need to see Russia plainly, with-
out sentiment or ideology. A new Russia strategy must dispense with
the magical thinking of previous administrations and instead seek in-
cremental gains that advance long-term U.S. interests. Rather than
trying to persuade Moscow to understand its own interests differ-
ently, Washington must demonstrate that those interests can be more
safely pursued through both considered competition and cooperation
with the United States.
END OF THE ILLUSION

Washington’s initial post–Cold War emphasis on partnership and in-
tegration fundamentally misread the reality in Russia, positing that
the country was in the midst of a genuine democratic transition and
that it was too weak to resist U.S. policies. To be sure, the premise
that Russia was shedding its authoritarian past did not appear unrea-
sonable in the early 1990s. In the U.S. view, the Cold War had ended
with the triumph of Western democracy over Soviet totalitarianism.
The former Soviet bloc countries began to democratize after the revo-
lutions of 1989. The rising forces of globalization fed the belief that
free-market democracy was the pathway to prosperity and stability in
the decades ahead. The leaders of the new Russia—President Boris
Yeltsin and the dynamic young reformers around him—declared their
commitment to sweeping political and economic reforms.
Yet even in the 1990s, there were signs that these assumptions
were wrong. Contrary to the dominant Western narrative, the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union marked not a democratic breakthrough
but the victory of Yeltsin, a populist, over Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, who ironically was a more committed democrat, having
overseen what remain the freest and fairest elections in Russian his-
tory. Russia had few enduring native democratic traditions to draw
from and only a shaky sense of political community on which to
base a well-functioning democracy. To make matters worse, the state
institutions fell prey to rapacious oligarchs and regional barons.
Ruthless cliques competed, often violently, to carve up the assets of
a once totally nationalized economy. Political chaos spread as old-

time Communists and Soviet patriots battled more progressive forces.
The disorder intensified throughout the 1990s to the point that
many observers feared Russia would crumble, just as the Soviet Union
had earlier in the decade. The task of restoring order fell to Yeltsin’s
successor, Putin. Even as he packaged his plans in democratic rheto-
ric, Putin made clear in a document called “Russia at the Turn of the
Millennium” (released on December 30, 1999) that he intended to
return to the traditional Russian model of a strong, highly centralized
authoritarian state. “Russia,” he wrote, “will not soon, if ever, become
a version of the United States or England, where liberal values have
deep historical roots. . . . For Russians, a strong and sturdy state is not
an anomaly to be resisted. To the contrary, it is the source and guaran-
tor of order, the initiator and driver of any change.”
U.S. officials were not blind to the obstacles to democratic reform
or to Putin’s intentions, but in the afterglow of the Cold War victory,
they insisted that partnership with Russia had to be grounded in
shared democratic values; mere common interests would not suffice.
To build public support for its policies, each administration assured
Americans that Russia’s leaders were committed to democratic re-
forms and processes. From the 1990s on, the White House measured
the success of its approach in large part in terms of Russia’s progress
toward becoming a stronger and more functional democracy, an un-
certain enterprise over which the United States had little influence.
Not surprisingly, the strategy collapsed when it proved impossible to
bridge the gap between that illusion and Russia’s increasingly authori-
tarian reality. For Clinton, the moment of truth came when Yeltsin
installed a new government of conservatives and Communists after the
1998 financial collapse in Russia; for Bush, it came when Putin cracked
down on civil society in reaction to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine
in 2004; and for Obama, it came when Putin announced in 2011 that,
after having served as prime minister, he would reclaim the presidency.
The second flawed premise—that Russia lacked the strength to
challenge the United States—also appeared sensible in the early
post-Soviet years. Russia’s economy contracted by nearly 40 percent
between 1991 and 1998. The once feared Red Army, starved of in-
vestment, became a shadow of its former self. Russia was dependent
on Western financial support to keep both its economy and its gov-
ernment afloat. In these circumstances, the Clinton administration

Thomas Graham
for the most part got its way, intervening in the Balkans and expanding
NATO without serious pushback from Russia.
This premise, however, became less plausible as Russia’s economy
rapidly recovered after Putin took office and restored order by clamping
down on the oligarchs and regional barons. He subsequently launched a
concerted effort to modernize the military. Yet the Bush administration,
convinced of Washington’s unparalleled might in the “unipolar moment,”
showed little respect for renewed Russian power. Bush withdrew from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, expanded NATO further, and welcomed
the so-called color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, with their anti-
Russian overtones. Similarly, the Obama administration, although less
certain of American power, still dismissed Russia. As the upheavals of
the Arab Spring unfolded in 2011, Obama declared that Syrian Presi-
dent Bashar al-Assad, a Russian client, had to go. Washington also paid
little heed to Russia’s objections when the United States and its allies
exceeded the terms of the UN Security Council–backed intervention in
Libya, turning a mandate to protect an endangered population into an
operation to overthrow the country’s strongman, Muammar al-Qaddafi.
Both the Bush and the Obama administrations were brought crash-
ing down to earth. The Russian incursion into Georgia in 2008 dem-
onstrated to the Bush administration that Russia had a veto over NATO
expansion in the guise of the use of force. Similarly, Russia’s seizure
of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine in 2014 shocked the
Obama administration, which had earlier welcomed the ouster of Vik-
tor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian Ukrainian president. A year later,
Russia’s military intervention in Syria saved Assad from imminent
defeat at the hands of U.S.-backed rebels.
WILL TO POWER
Today, nearly everyone in Washington has dropped the pretense that
Russia is on the path to democracy, and the Trump administration
considers Russia to be a strategic competitor. These are overdue
course corrections. Yet the current strategy of punishing and ostra-
cizing Russia is also flawed. Beyond the obvious point that the United
States cannot isolate Russia against the wishes of such major powers
as China and India, this strategy makes some grave mistakes.
For one thing, it exaggerates Russian power and demonizes Putin,
turning relations into a zero-sum struggle in which the only acceptable
outcome of any dispute is Russia’s capitulation. But Putin’s foreign
policy has been less successful than advertised. His actions in Ukraine,
aimed at preventing that country’s westward drift, have only tied
Ukraine more closely to the West while refocusing NATO on its original
mission of containing Russia. Putin’s meddling in U.S. elections has
complicated relations with the United States, which Russia needs to
normalize to win greater foreign investment and to create a long-term
alternative to its excessive strategic dependence on China.
In the absence of concerted Western action, Putin has inserted
Russia as a major player in many geopolitical conflicts, most notably
in Syria. Nevertheless, Putin has yet to demonstrate that he can bring
any conflict to an end that consolidates
Russia’s gains. At a time of economic
stagnation and spreading socioeconomic
Putin’s foreign policy has
discontent, his activist foreign policy been less successful than
now risks overstretch. In these circum- advertised.
stances, Putin needs to retrench. And
that imperative should open up possibilities for the United States to
turn to diplomacy and reduce the burden of competition with Russia
while protecting U.S. interests.
Another flaw in the current strategy is that it imagines Russia as a pure
kleptocracy, whose leaders are motivated principally by a desire to pre-
serve their wealth and ensure their survival. To work, this policy assumes
that sanctioned officials and oligarchs will pressure Putin to change his
policy in Ukraine, for example, or unwind Russia’s interference in Amer-
ican domestic politics. Nothing of the sort has happened because Russia
is more like a patrimonial state, in which personal wealth and social
position are ultimately dependent on the good graces of those in power.
U.S. policymakers are also guilty of not reckoning seriously with
Russia’s desire to be perceived as a great power. Russia is indeed weak
by many measures: its economy is a fraction of the size of the U.S.
economy, its population is unhealthy by U.S. standards, and its invest-
ment in the high-tech sector is far below U.S. levels. But Russian
leaders cling to the conviction that to survive, their country must be a
great power—one of the few countries that determine the structure,
substance, and direction of world affairs—and they are prepared to
endure great ordeals in pursuit of that status. That mindset has driven
Russia’s global conduct since Peter the Great brought his realm into
Europe more than 300 years ago. Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russian leaders have focused on restoring Russia’s great-power

Thomas Graham
status, just as their predecessors did after the national humiliation of

the Crimean War in the 1850s and then again after the demise of the
Russian empire in 1917. As Putin wrote two decades ago, “For the first
time in the past two to three centuries, [Russia] risks sliding to the
second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states. To prevent
this, we must exert all our intellectual, physical, and moral forces. . . .
Everything depends on our ability to grasp the dimensions of the
threat, to rally together, and to commit to this long and difficult task.”
Part of that task is countering the United States, which Putin sees
as the primary obstacle to Russia’s great-power aspirations. In con-
trast to what it imagines as Washington’s unipolar ambitions, the
Kremlin insists on the existence of a multipolar world. More con-
cretely, Russia has sought to undermine Washington’s standing by
checking U.S. interests in Europe and the Middle East and has tried
to tarnish the United States’ image as a paragon of democratic virtue
by interfering in its elections and exacerbating domestic discord.
RUSSIA’S WORLD
In its quest for great-power status, Russia poses specific geopolitical chal-
lenges to the United States. These challenges stem from Russia’s age-old
predicament of having to defend a vast, sparsely settled, multiethnic
country located on a landmass that lacks formidable physical barriers and
that abuts either powerful states or unstable territories. Historically, Rus-
sia has dealt with this challenge by maintaining tight control domesti-
cally, creating buffer zones on its borders, and preventing the emergence
of a strong coalition of rival powers. Today, this approach invariably runs
against U.S. interests in China, Ukraine, Europe, and the Middle East.
No part of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has loomed
larger in the Russian imagination than Ukraine, which is strategically
positioned as a pathway into the Balkans and central Europe, blessed
with tremendous economic potential, and hailed by Russians as the
cradle of their own civilization. When a U.S.-supported popular
movement in 2014 threatened to rip Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit, the
Kremlin seized Crimea and instigated a rebellion in the eastern re-
gion of the Donbas. What the West considered a flagrant violation of
international law, the Kremlin saw as self-defense.
When they look at Europe in its entirety, Russian leaders see at once
a concrete threat and a stage for Russian greatness. In practical terms,
the steps Europe took toward political and economic consolidation
raised the prospect of an enormous entity on Russia’s borders that, like

the United States, would dwarf Russia in population, wealth, and
power. Psychologically, Europe remains central to Russia’s great-
power sensibilities. For the past three centuries, Russia has demon-
strated its prowess on Europe’s great battlefields and through its
grand diplomatic conferences. After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814,
for example, it was the Russian emperor Alexander I who received
the key to the city of Paris. Europe’s consolidation and the continued
expansion of NATO have had the effect of pushing Russia out of Eu-
rope and diminishing its voice in continental affairs. And so the
Kremlin has accelerated efforts to exploit the fault lines within and
between European states and to stoke doubts in vulnerable NATO
members about their allies’ commitment to collective defense.
In the Middle East, Russia has returned after an absence of some
30 years. At first, Putin intervened in Syria both to protect a long-
standing client and to prevent the victory of radical Islamist forces
with ties to extremists inside Russia. But after saving Assad and see-
ing the absence of a strong U.S. role, his ambitions grew. Russia de-
cided to use the Middle East as an arena to showcase its great-power
credentials. Largely bypassing the UN-sponsored peacemaking pro-
cess, in which the United States is a central player, Russia has teamed
up with Iran and Turkey to seek a final political resolution of the crisis
in Syria. To reduce the risk of a direct conflict between Iran and Israel,
Russia has strengthened its diplomatic ties to Israel. It has rebuilt
relations with Egypt and worked with Saudi Arabia to manage oil prices.
It has also grown closer to China in developing a strategic counter-
balance to the United States. This relationship has helped Russia
resist the United States in Europe and the Middle East, but the
greater concern for Washington should be how it enhances Beijing’s
capabilities. Russia has aided China’s commercial penetration of Cen-
tral Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the Middle East. It has
given China access to natural resources at favorable prices and has
sold the country sophisticated military technology. In short, Russia is
abetting China’s rise as a formidable competitor to the United States.
Moscow’s more assertive foreign policy today is a reflection not of
the country’s growing strength—in absolute terms, its power hasn’t
increased much—but of the perception that U.S. disarray has magnified
Russia’s relative power. The country’s behavior is also driven by a per-
sistent fear that guides Russian foreign policy: the sense that in the long

Thomas Graham
run, Russia will fall dangerously behind both the United States and
China. The Russian economy is stagnating, and even official projections
see little hope for improvement in the next ten years. Russia cannot
invest as much as its two competitors in the critical technologies, such
as artificial intelligence, bioengineering, and robotics, that will shape
the character of power in the future. Putin may be pressing hard now, at
the time of Russia’s heightened relative power, to better position the
country in the new multipolar world order he sees emerging.
BETWEEN ACCOMMODATION AND RESISTANCE

The challenge Russia now poses to the United States does not echo
the existential struggle of the Cold War. Rather, the contest is a more
limited competition between great powers with rival strategic impera-
tives and interests. If the United States was able to reach accommoda-
tions with the Soviet Union to strengthen global peace and security
while advancing American interests and values, surely it can do the
same with Russia today.
Beginning in Europe, U.S. policymakers should give up any ambi-
tions of expanding NATO farther into formerly Soviet spaces. Rather
than courting countries that NATO is unwilling to defend militarily—
note the limp responses to Russian attacks on Georgia and Ukraine—
the alliance should strengthen its own internal cohesion and reassure
vulnerable members of its commitment to collective defense. Halt-
ing NATO expansion eastward would remove a central reason for Rus-
sia’s encroachments on former Soviet states. But the United States
should still cooperate on security matters with those states, a kind of
relationship that Russia tolerates.
So far, the United States has insisted that the possibility of NATO
membership remains open to Ukraine. Washington has categorically
rejected Russia’s incorporation of Crimea and insisted that the conflict
in the Donbas be brought to an end on the basis of the agreement
signed in Minsk in 2015, which stipulates a special autonomous status
for separatist regions inside a reunited Ukraine. This approach has
made little headway. The Donbas conflict continues, and Russia is
putting down deeper roots in Crimea. Distracted from reform by the
struggle with Russia, Ukraine is beset by corruption, political volatil-
ity, and economic underperformance.
The recent election in Ukraine of a new president, Volodymyr
Zelensky, whose supporters now dominate the parliament, has created
an opening for a comprehensive resolution of the crisis. Two tradeoffs

are essential. First, to allay Russian concerns, the United States should
tell Ukraine that NATO membership is off the table, while deepening
bilateral security cooperation with Kiev. Second, Kiev should recog-
nize Russia’s incorporation of Crimea in exchange for Moscow’s
acceptance of the full reintegration of the Donbas into Ukraine with-
out any special status. In a comprehen-
sive agreement, Ukrainians would also
receive compensation for lost property
After defeating Napoleon,
in Crimea and Ukraine would be af- the Russian emperor
forded access to offshore resources and Alexander I received the
guaranteed passage through the Kerch
Strait to ports on the Sea of Azov. The
key to the city of Paris.
United States and the EU would incre-
mentally ease their sanctions on Russia as these arrangements took
effect. At the same time, they would offer Ukraine a substantial as-
sistance package aimed at facilitating reform in the belief that a
strong, prosperous Ukraine is both the best deterrent against future
Russian aggression and a necessary foundation for more constructive
Russian-Ukrainian relations.
Such an approach would be met initially with great skepticism in
Kiev, Moscow, and elsewhere in Europe. But Zelensky has staked his
presidency on resolving the Donbas conflict, and Putin would wel-
come the chance to redirect resources and attention to countering
spreading socioeconomic unrest in Russia. Meanwhile, European
leaders are suffering from Ukraine fatigue and want to normalize rela-
tions with Russia while still upholding the principles of European
security. The time is ripe for bold diplomacy that would allow all sides
to claim a partial victory and accommodate the hard realities on the
ground: NATO is not prepared to accept Ukraine as a member, Crimea
is not going back to Ukraine, and a separatist movement in the Don-
bas is nonviable without Moscow’s active involvement.
A smarter Russia strategy would also better reckon with the impli-
cations of the Kremlin’s military intervention in the Middle East. It is
Iran—not Russia—that poses the main challenge there. When it
comes to Iran, Russia has diverging, but not necessarily opposing,
interests from those of the United States. Like the United States,
Russia does not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons—that was why it
supported the nuclear deal with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan

Thomas Graham
of Action, from which the Trump administration withdrew in 2018.

Like the United States, Russia does not want Iran to dominate the
Middle East; Moscow seeks to forge a new equilibrium in the region,
albeit with a different configuration than the one sought by Washing-
ton. The Kremlin has worked to improve relations with other regional
powers, such as Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, none of
which is especially friendly with Iran. Russia has paid particular at-
tention to Israel, allowing it to strike Iranian and Hezbollah positions
in Syria. If the United States deferred to Russia’s limited security in-
terests in Syria and accepted Russia as a regional player, it could likely
persuade the Kremlin to do more to check aggressive Iranian behavior.
The Trump administration is already moving in this direction, but a
more vigorous effort is warranted.
Washington must also update its approach to arms control. What
worked for the last 50 years no longer will. The world is shifting toward
a multipolar order, and China in particular is modernizing its forces.
Countries are developing advanced conventional weapons capable of
destroying hardened targets once vulner-
able only to nuclear weapons and cyber-
When it comes to Iran, weapons that could put at risk nuclear
Russia has diverging, but command-and-control systems. As a re-
not opposing, interests from sult, the arms control regime is breaking
those of the United States. down. The Bush administration with-
drew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty in 2002, which the president de-
scribed as an obsolete relic of the Cold War, and in 2018, the Trump
administration withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, which it had derided as ineffective and out of date.
Nevertheless, the United States should prolong New START—the
strategic arms reduction treaty signed in 2010 that is set to expire in
2021—a move that Russia supports despite the Trump administra-
tion’s hesitation. The treaty fosters transparency and trust between
the two countries—essential qualities in a time of strained rela-
tions—but it does not restrain the accelerating arms race in increas-
ingly sophisticated and powerful weapons. The most promising
systems—hypersonic weapons and cyberweapons, for example—fall
outside the New START treaty’s purview. Policymakers need to de-
velop a new arms control regime that encompasses novel, rapidly
developing technologies and includes other major powers. Although
it is necessary to bring China into the process at some point, the

United States and Russia should take the lead, as they have before—
they possess unique experience in considering the theoretical and
practical requirements of strategic stability and corresponding arms
control measures. Together, Washington and Moscow should develop
a new arms control regime and then bolster it with multilateral support.
On strategic nuclear issues and other matters, the United States
cannot prevent the rise of China, but it can channel growing Chinese
power in ways that are consistent with U.S. interests. It should make
Russia part of this effort rather than drive Russia into China’s em-
brace, as the United States is now doing. It is impossible, of course,
to turn Russia against China; Russia has every reason to pursue good
relations with a neighbor that has already surpassed it as a major
power. But the United States could deftly encourage a different balance
of power in Northeast Asia that would serve U.S. purposes.
To do so, U.S. policymakers should help multiply Russia’s alterna-
tives to China, thereby improving the Kremlin’s bargaining position
and reducing the risk that its trade and security agreements with Bei-
jing will be tilted heavily in China’s favor, as they are now. As U.S.-
Russian relations improve in other areas, the United States should
focus on removing those sanctions that prevent Japanese, South Ko-
rean, and U.S. investment in Russia’s Far East and that block joint
ventures with Russian firms in Central Asia. Increasing Russia’s options
would give the Kremlin greater leverage in dealing with China, to the
United States’ advantage.
U.S. efforts to moderate competition on regional issues could incline
Russia to curb its electoral meddling, but the problem won’t go away
easily. Some level of interference, from Russia and from other states, is
unavoidable in today’s interconnected world. Because European de-
mocracies face similar challenges, the United States should work with
its allies to develop joint and reinforcing responses to these cyberthreats.
There should be some redlines regarding Russian behavior; for instance,
U.S. officials should take a strong stance against hacking that aims to
weaponize stolen information or corrupt data, including voter rolls and
vote counts. With better-coordinated exchanges of intelligence, the
sharing of best practices, and occasional joint action, the United
States and its allies must harden critical electoral infrastructure, push
back against Russia with criminal prosecutions and targeted sanctions,
and, when appropriate, launch cyber-counterstrikes.

Thomas Graham
Russian propaganda outlets, such as the television channel RT,

Sputnik radio, and social media accounts, pose a trickier problem. A
confident, mature, and sophisticated democratic society should be
capable of containing this threat with ease without frantically trying
to shut down offending websites and Twitter accounts. Amid hyper-
partisan rancor in the United States, however, the media and the
political class have exaggerated the threat, blaming Russia for do-
mestic discord and dangerously narrowing the room for critical de-
bate by insinuating that opinions that might align with official
Russian preferences are part of a Kremlin-inspired influence cam-
paign. A more constructive approach would be for the United States
and other democracies to foster greater awareness of the arts of me-
dia manipulation and help raise the critical reading skills of their
publics, without dampening the vigorous debate that is the lifeblood
of democratic societies. Some Scandinavian countries and Baltic
states have devoted considerable effort to these tasks, but the United
States has lagged behind.
As the United States hardens its systems and educates its citizens,
it should also involve Russia in establishing rules of the road in cyber-
space. Even if such rules are not fully observed in practice, they could
act as a restraint on the most troubling behavior, much in the way the
Geneva Conventions have constrained armed conflict.
On all these issues, the proposed mix of accommodation and resis-
tance takes into account the hard realities of Russian interests and
American power. This approach stands in sharp contrast to the ones
U.S. administrations have pursued since the end of the Cold War,
which misread Russia and refused to recognize U.S. limitations. In
many ways, this strategy would represent a return to the tradition of
U.S. foreign policy before the end of the Cold War.
That grand tradition was forward-looking, pursuing foreign policy
with patience over time and satisfied in the short term with incre-
mental gains. The United States did not fear making accommoda-
tions with Moscow because it was confident in its values and its
future, aware of its great power but mindful of its limitations and
respectful of its rival’s power. This subtle understanding marked the
strategies that all U.S. Cold War–era presidents pursued to master
the challenge from Moscow. By recapturing the virtues of its past,
the United States can master that challenge again today.∂
B U I L D I N G D E M O C R AC Y
C R E AT I N G O P P O R T U N I T Y
P R O M OT I N G P E AC E
November 22—24, 2019 • Halifax Nova Scotia • HalifaxTheForum.org

Beyond Great Forces

How Individuals Still Shape History
H
istory used to be told as the story of great men. Julius Caesar,
Frederick the Great, George Washington, Napoléon
Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, Mao Zedong—individual leaders,
both famous and infamous, were thought to drive events. But then it
became fashionable to tell the same stories in terms of broader struc-
tural forces: raw calculations of national power, economic interde-
pendence, or ideological waves. Leaders came to be seen as just
vehicles for other, more important factors, their personalities and
predilections essentially irrelevant. What mattered was not great
men or women but great forces.
In his 1959 classic, Man, the State, and War, the scholar Kenneth
Waltz made the case for this new approach. He argued that focusing
on individual leaders or human nature more broadly offered little
purchase when it came to understanding global politics. Instead, one
should look at the framework of the international system and the
distribution of power across it. In the midst of the Cold War, Waltz
was contending that it mattered little whether Dwight Eisenhower
or Adlai Stevenson occupied the White House, or Joseph Stalin or
Nikita Khrushchev the Kremlin. The United States and the Soviet
Union would pursue the same interests, seek the same allies, and
otherwise be forced by the pressure of Cold War competition to act
in a certain way.
Academics embraced the “structuralist” Zeitgeist, and in subse-
quent decades, although some theorists expanded their list of the
primary movers in international relations to include regime types,
institutions, and ideas, they continued to downplay leaders. Today, at
DANIEL BYMAN is a Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and
a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
KENNETH M. POLLACK is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Beyond Great Forces
a time when vast impersonal forces appear to define our world, that
bias against the individual might seem justified. Economics, technol-
ogy, and politics are all changing in ways that seemed unimaginable
only decades ago. Developments in communications, transportation,
climate, education, cultural values, and health have fundamentally
altered relationships among people within communities and across
the globe. The information revolution has given rise to the super-
empowered individual and the superempowered state and pitted
them against each other. Meanwhile, power is being redistributed
across the globe, with the unipolar era of American primacy that fol-
lowed the Cold War giving way to an unpredictable multipolarity.
Such are the faceless beasts wreaking havoc today.
Structural factors and technological change no doubt drive much of
states’ behavior, but they are not the only pieces of the puzzle. Even
today, individual leaders can ride, guide, or resist the broader forces of
international politics. And so there are still some men and women who
are charting their nations’ paths—some beneficial, some disastrous,
but all inconceivable without those leaders’ individual characters.
THE REVOLUTIONARIES
Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman,
or MBS, is the most obvious example of a leader defying the pressure
of both domestic politics and international circumstances and, in so
doing, redefining both, for better and worse. For decades, change in
Saudi Arabia moved at a glacial pace. The question of whether women
should be allowed to drive, for example, had been debated since 1990
with no resolution. Saudi leaders ruled collectively, ensuring that any
policy changes were accepted by all the major branches of the sprawl-
ing royal family and the religious establishment. Although the ruling
elite talked about the importance of fundamental reform for years,
they did little to nothing, thwarted by conservative clerics, powerful
economic interests, and a consensus-oriented political culture.
Then came MBS. MBS means to upend Saudi Arabia’s economy
and society (but, crucially, not its political system), and he has begun
secularizing Saudi society, overhauling the kingdom’s traditional ed-
ucational system, and reforming its stunted economy. Like an earlier
generation of autocratic modernizers—Benito Mussolini of Italy,
Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, Stalin, and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
of Iran—he is determined to drag his country into the new century

and isn’t put off by the human cost of doing so. Whether he succeeds
or fails, MBS has defied the risk-averse logic of Saudi politics and is
betting everything on his far-reaching reforms.
On foreign policy, MBS has also broken with decades of tradi-
tion. From 1953 to 2015, under Kings Saud, Faisal, Khalid, Fahd,
and Abdullah, Saudi Arabia had a modest international role. It
mostly relied on others, primarily the United States, to secure its
interests, tossing in a little checkbook diplomacy from time to time.
It rarely fought wars, and when it did, it was only as a bit player fol-
lowing someone else’s lead. It kept its squabbles with its Arab allies
under wraps and hewed closely to the American line. MBS has
charted a radically different course. Holding Lebanon’s prime min-
ister hostage to force him to resign, intervening in the Yemeni civil
war, isolating Qatar, killing the Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in
Turkey, cozying up to China and Russia, threatening to acquire nu-
clear weapons, forging a tacit alliance with the Israelis at the ex-
pense of the Palestinians—all represent breathtaking departures
from past policy. Although the kingdom’s changing international
circumstances make some of this understandable, MBS has consis-
tently chosen the most radical option, at the far extreme of what
international incentives alone would have predicted.
It is useful to consider what might have happened if the system
had worked as it traditionally had. In 2017, King Salman, who had
ascended to the throne two years earlier, sidelined the incumbent
crown prince, his nephew Mohammed bin Nayef, and replaced him
with MBS, one of his younger sons. Nayef was a close U.S. counter-
terrorism partner and an establishment man who favored stability
above all. Indeed, his initial appointment as crown prince was in part
meant to calm any fears that King Salman would take the country in
a dramatically different direction. It is hard to imagine that Nayef
would have risked alienating the clerical establishment while em-
barking on high-risk gambits across the Arab world. But owing to
some combination of ambition, vision, ego, youth, risk tolerance,
insight, and ruthlessness, MBS has done exactly that.
Such top-down revolutionaries are few and far between. Yet when
they appear, they are transformative. Stalin turned the Soviet Union
into an industrial power, slaughtering tens of millions of people in
the process. Mao tried to do something similar in China, successfully
uniting the country and destroying the power of traditional elites,
Beyond Great Forces
Prince Charming: Mohammed bin Salman in London, March 2018
but at the cost of millions of lives. His successor, Deng Xiaoping, trans-
formed the country again by dumping Mao’s state-centric economic
model, thus enabling China’s remarkable rise.
THE DECIDERS
Across the Persian Gulf, MBS’ great rival is a very different kind of
leader, but one who also exercises an outsize impact. Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, is a cautious old man. If MBS is
defying the impersonal forces of both Saudi Arabia’s domestic politics
and its traditional foreign policy, Khamenei sits at the crossroads of
Iran’s intersecting domestic and international pressures and directs
the traffic as he sees fit.
Today, it is simplistic, but not entirely inaccurate, to say that Ira-
nian politics is a struggle between two opposing camps. A group of
reformists and pragmatists seeks to reform Iran’s foreign and economic
AL ASTAI R G R A N T / AP
policies to address the dire needs of the Iranian people. Their ap-
proach represents a natural response to Iran’s circumstances: it is a
resource-rich country that has been impoverished and immiserated
by its own aggressive behavior. Opposing the pragmatists is a group
of hard-liners devoted to both aggression abroad and repression at

home, and they dominate Iran’s domestic politics. This camp is mo-
tivated more by its Persian nationalism and revolutionary zeal than
by a cool-headed examination of how to grow Iran’s economy or end
its diplomatic isolation.
Khamenei is the pivot. He weighs the international pressure push-
ing Iran in the direction of the reformists and pragmatists against the
domestic pressure from the hard-liners. With these impersonal forces
more or less in balance, it is Khamenei who gets to choose which way
to tack as each issue comes before him. Sometimes, he sides with the
hard-liners—for instance, doubling down on the support of militias
in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. At other times, he sides with the pragma-
tists, as when he accepted the 2015 nuclear deal brokered by the United
States, an agreement that promised to revive Iran’s economy through
international trade in exchange for limits on its nuclear program.
It was not inevitable that an Iranian leader would act this way. After
the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1989, one leading candi-
date to succeed him was Mohammad Reza Golpaygani. Anyone cho-
sen would have agreed with the general
contours of the revolutionary frame-
There are still some men work established by Khomeini, but
and women who are within those guidelines, much remained
charting their nations’ unsettled. Compared with Khamenei,
paths—some beneficial, Golpaygani was a more traditional
conservative, skeptical of what he saw
some disastrous. as the regime’s social tolerance by al-
lowing music on radio and television,
yet far less revolutionary in his foreign policy views. In the end,
revolutionary legitimacy trumped scholarly strength, and the mul-
lahs—with Khomeini’s blessing—selected Khamenei.
How might Golpaygani have ruled? Given his preferences, he
would likely have erred more on the side of social conservativism
and less on the side of aggressive foreign policy. Similarly, he prob-
ably would have favored more limits on the clergy’s role in politics,
taking a more traditional view that religious leaders should stick to
issues of morality. In this scenario, Iran since 1989 would have fo-
cused more on enforcing social mores at home and less on stirring
the pot abroad. Yet it was Khamenei that ascended to Khomeini’s
throne, and so it has been he who has chosen among the competing
strands of Iranian policy.
Beyond Great Forces
If Khamenei is the most obvious example of a leader who makes

the ultimate choice of which current to ride when the impersonal
forces are in conflict, he is hardly the only one. In different circum-
stances, German Chancellor Angela Merkel plays the same role.
During the eurozone crisis, the international economic forces affect-
ing Germany consistently called for a more proactive approach to
Greece’s insolvency and the economic troubles of Germany’s other
eurozone partners. Yet Merkel instead took the more conservative
path, which resonated with Germany’s domestic politics, even though
this ended up dragging out the crisis. At the same time, on the issue
of refugees, she embraced liberal international norms and took in
hundreds of thousands of Syrians at a time when domestic politics in
Germany and the rest of Europe was turning against charity to
foreigners. Another chancellor might have made different choices:
indeed, the politician who held the number two position in Germany
at the time, Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, favored a more generous
approach toward the Greek government, but on refugees, he bowed to
domestic pressure and called for caps on admissions.
THE SURVIVORS
Bashar al-Assad and Nicolás Maduro are marked men. When it
comes to both Syria’s president and Venezuela’s, there are many
people who want them out of power, if not dead. And yet by re-
maining alive and in office, they have compromised the best inter-
ests of their countries.
Both Syria and Venezuela are desperate nations, racked by internal
conflict, tormented by starvation, shedding refugees in epic quanti-
ties, and beset by various external powers. There is nothing about the
power or the international position of either Syria or Venezuela that
has caused its anguish. Both suffered a horrific breakdown in their
internal politics, but in both cases, there were fixes that could have
been made long ago to end the misery. Getting rid of Maduro would
have been a huge step toward alleviating Venezuela’s pain, just as get-
ting rid of Assad could have made it possible to reach a compromise
to end the Syrian civil war.
It’s not that simple, of course: many Venezuelan elites, particularly
the military, are unwilling to depose Maduro, and many Syrian mi-
nority groups, particularly the ruling family’s own Alawite community,
feel the same way about Assad. Yet there is also no question that the

principal grievance of the Venezuelan opposition, and of the United

States, has become Maduro himself, and should he find a comfort-
able exile on a Caribbean island, it would be far easier to resolve the
conflict. Likewise, in years past, both the Iranians and the Russians
at times floated to the United States the idea that they were willing
to sacrifice Assad as long as their own interests—and those of the
Alawites—were protected. If Assad had found himself on the wrong
end of an assassin’s knife or under an enforced vacation during a visit
to Tehran, a new leader might have proved willing to make more
concessions to the opposition and lay the groundwork for a negoti-
ated peace. Yet both leaders’ continued hold on power, in the face of
both international and domestic pressure to go, has locked their
countries into needless agony.
Some might scoff at this argument, contending that vast imper-
sonal forces—the ruthless domestic politics in a country roiled by
civil war and a regime’s inherent desire to survive—make it unimag-
inable that any leader in such a position would ever step down. Yet it
is worth remembering that South African President F. W. de Klerk
did just that. De Klerk had plenty of incentives to fight for apartheid to
remain in power, just as his predecessors did. Indeed, when de Klerk
assumed power, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, an antiapartheid activ-
ist, said that the leadership change was “just musical chairs.” If de
Klerk had remained committed to apartheid, the most likely out-
come would have been South Africa’s descent into even greater racial
violence or quite possibly an all-out civil war, not much different
from what is happening in Syria and Venezuela today. Yet de Klerk
did the opposite, dismantling apartheid, allowing free elections in
1994, and yielding power when he lost. Despite a background that
suggested he would fight to preserve the apartheid system, he recog-
nized both the need to avert civil war in South Africa and the oppor-
tunity to bring his country into the ranks of civilized nations.
THE OPPORTUNISTS
Fortune favors the bold, and some leaders are skilled at seizing oppor-
tunities as they arise. Russian President Vladimir Putin exemplifies
how a wily leader can parlay a relatively weak position into a much
stronger one. In 1999, Putin replaced Sergei Stepashin as Russia’s
prime minister, becoming the fifth person to occupy the post in two
years. Few expected this creature of the Russian system to shake things
Beyond Great Forces
up, but within weeks, he capitalized on violence in Chechnya to renew

the war there, gambling (correctly) that a no-holds-barred fight would
increase his popularity, and soon succeeded Boris Yeltsin as president.
Putin represented a sharp break with the past. Yeltsin and the pre-
Putin prime ministers under him had favored accommodation with
the West, acquiesced in NATO interventions in the Balkans, recog-
nized Russia’s seemingly irreversible military weakness, and largely
abandoned Russia’s former friends, such as Syria. Putin offered
something new. Fearing that parts of the former Soviet Union were
becoming too close to the West, he supported separatist movements
in Georgia and Ukraine, annexing Crimea outright. Farther afield,
he has backed Assad with limited military commitments to showcase
Russian power, and he is even taking sides in Libya’s civil war. Most
dramatically, Putin rolled the dice and covertly backed the U.S.
presidential campaign of Donald Trump as part of a broader effort to
intensify polarization in the United States and other Western coun-
tries. It’s hard to imagine all of this as part of any long-term plan.
Rather, Putin has proved a master of Russian and international poli-
tics, cutting and thrusting whenever his foes present an opening.
A different faceless bureaucrat coming to power after Yeltsin might
have shifted course, too. Russia’s weakness abroad and economic col-
lapse at home left the Yeltsin regime with few enthusiasts. Yet the
course of such change probably would have been more modest, with
less emphasis on adventurism abroad. Stepashin, for example, had
little interest in renewing the war in Chechnya, and he ended up join-
ing a political party that favors improved ties with the United States
and even membership in the EU. Putin, by contrast, has evinced a
combination of pride, cynicism, nationalism, and comfort with risk, all
of which have made him willing to take on the West around the world
at a time when many observers have considered his country weak.
THE EGOISTS
L’état, c’est moi (I am the state), words often attributed to Louis XIV,
may seem to reflect a bygone age, when the purpose of the state was
to reflect the glory of one person. But Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, who has dominated his country’s politics for nearly
two decades, embodies how egoism can still shape foreign policy. For
decades, different Turkish regimes had pursued the country’s complex
set of interests in largely similar ways: trying to stay out of the

imbroglio in the Middle East, aligning Turkey with NATO and the
United States, and portraying the country as a secular, westernizing
nation that deserved membership in the EU. By the turn of this cen-
tury, Turkey seemed to be growing ever more stable and westernized
as it moved away from domestic military dominance. Long friendly
toward the West, it was now on the path to democracy, turning into
a normal European state, with strong institutions.
Erdogan had other plans. Since he became prime minister, in
2003, Turkish policies have repeatedly whipsawed. The regime sup-
ported its Kurdish citizens and then persecuted them; worked with
Assad, tried to overthrow him, and then cooperated with him again;
rejected Russia and then embraced it; cooperated with Israel and
then denounced it. Domestically, Erdogan shelved democratic reforms
and heightened his repression.
Part of the about-face can be attributed to opportunism and real-
politik, but much of it reflects Erdogan’s response to perceived per-
sonal slights and his pursuit of glory. In 2010, an Israeli raid on a
flotilla trying to break the blockade of the Gaza Strip led to the deaths
of ten Turks on the ship the Mavi Marmara. Despite decades of close
strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel, Erdogan demanded
an apology, recalled the Turkish am-
Russian President Vladimir bassador to Israel, and moved closer to
Hamas in Gaza. A year later, he viewed
Putin exemplifies how a Assad’s crackdown on demonstrators
wily leader can parlay a as yet another slight, since it gave the
relatively weak position lie to his claim that he could temper
the Syrian dictator, prompting Erdogan
into a much stronger one. to back an array of opposition forces
against Assad. An analysis of the Turk-
ish leader’s verbal output by the scholars Aylin Gorener and Meltem
Ucal found that he scored high in believing he can control events and
in distrusting others but also that he sees the world in black and
white, is hypersensitive to criticism, and has trouble focusing on the
implementation of policies. Erdogan seems convinced that he and
only he is equipped to save Turkey from its enemies.
An alternative leader, even one who managed to channel the same
anti-Western political coalition that Erdogan has, would probably
have pursued a remarkably different foreign policy. Indeed, members
of Erdogan’s own party have espoused different views on the Kurds,
Beyond Great Forces
Syria, and other core issues. Had one of them taken power instead,
that leader might still have pivoted to the Middle East and away
from Europe, but it is far less likely that he would have acted so er-
ratically or personalized politics to such a degree. A more pragmatic
head of state might have cracked down sooner on the Islamic State
(or ISIS)—for years, Erdogan allowed the group to use Turkey as a
jihadi highway to Syria—cooperated more with Saudi Arabia and
other opponents of Assad, or even tried earlier to strike a deal with
the Syrian dictator.
At times, egoists can approach absurdity and drag their countries
into outright disaster. Idi Amin, who seized power in Uganda in a
1971 coup, took on more and more titles as his ego ballooned, eventually
becoming “His Excellency President for Life, Field Marshal Alhaji
Dr. Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC, CBE.” Uganda’s foreign policy swung
wildly: a country that had taken a pro-Western, pro-Israeli stance
soon struck up a close relationship with the Soviet Union and Muam-
mar al-Qaddafi’s Libya and openly supported terrorists. At home,
Amin expelled Uganda’s Asian minority and killed hundreds of thou-
sands of civilians from rival ethnic groups. With his circle of support
steadily shrinking, he blamed Tanzania for his country’s problems
and, in 1978, invaded it. Tanzania promptly counterattacked, driving
Amin into exile.
LIABILITIES AND ASSETS

Some leaders drag their countries or causes down, needlessly reduc-
ing their performance on account of their own particular weaknesses.
On paper, Ayman al-Zawahiri has the perfect résumé for the head of
a terrorist group. As the journalist Lawrence Wright has recounted,
Zawahiri formed his first terrorist cell in 1966, when he was only 15
years old, to plot against the Egyptian regime. He then spent several
years in Egypt’s jails, moved to Pakistan to aid the anti-Soviet jihad
in Afghanistan, and was by Osama bin Laden’s side in Pakistan when
al Qaeda was founded, in 1988. So when U.S. forces finally caught up
to bin Laden in 2011, Zawahiri was the obvious successor as leader of
the terrorist group.
Yet al Qaeda’s star has dimmed under Zawahiri’s leadership. Al-
though the fall of secular autocrats, such as Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak, and the outbreak of civil wars around the Arab
world presented a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for jihad’s leading

brand, it was a rival group—ISIS—that seized the day. Whereas bin

Laden tried to transcend the divisions within the jihadi movement,
Zawahiri often aggravates them, especially by denouncing his rivals.
Zawahiri’s public statements betray a pedantic tone, an overbearing
manner, and impatience with critics. Those who met bin Laden often
described him as charismatic. No one says that about Zawahiri. Not
surprisingly, al Qaeda has stagnated on his watch: the core organization
has not conducted a major attack in the West for over a decade, and its
affiliates tend to shun the global jihadi agenda in favor of local concerns.
The United States has hunted Zawahiri since the mid-1990s, and it
is useful to consider what might have happened had it knocked him
out. His replacement might have tried to make the movement more
appealing by establishing his own credentials as a warrior. Perhaps he
might have made al Qaeda more like its
Even mature liberal eventual rival, ISIS, by coming out of
hiding to join the fight directly, plan-
democracies are not ning more attacks in the West, or en-
immune to the charms of gaging in more gruesome behavior, such
a dominant personality. as beheadings. Or another leader might
have moved away from al Qaeda’s global
agenda, embracing the local and regional politics favored by many
al Qaeda affiliates. But it seems unlikely that he would have done what
Zawahiri has: giving uninspiring speeches while ISIS takes over the
leadership of the global jihadi movement.
Other leaders, by contrast, punch above their weight. Exhibit A
might be Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, or MBZ, the crown prince
of Abu Dhabi and the de facto leader of the United Arab Emirates.
Once, the country’s foreign policy consisted of trying to keep its head
down and get even richer, following Saudi Arabia wherever it went.
Although the UAE has a population of just ten million (only a tenth of
whom are actually UAE citizens), under MBZ, it has reshaped the
Middle East. MBZ helped engineer the 2013 coup in Egypt, inter-
vened in Yemen to turn back the advance of the Houthi rebels, pushed
the blockade of Qatar, and backed a warlord in Libya’s civil war who
is now banging on the gates of Tripoli. Thanks to MBZ’s military
reforms, UAE forces demonstrated surprising competence in the fight-
ing in Yemen, which made the UAE, for a time, the dominant player in
much of the country. In a chaotic region, MBZ has managed to lever-
age his country’s wealth and military prowess to make the UAE thrive.
Beyond Great Forces
PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST

Individuals aren’t everything, of course: countries still have national
interests, domestic politics, bureaucracies, and other forces that can
play profound, even overwhelming, roles in shaping foreign policy.
Yet it is equally facile to use such terms as “national interests,” “domes-
tic politics,” and “bureaucratic resistance” without recognizing how
leaders create, bend, exploit, override, or succumb to these factors.
Consider how individuals interact with institutions. If MBS had
somehow come to power in a Saudi Arabia that was a mature liberal
democracy, for example, he would no doubt have had a harder time
fundamentally reorienting his country. In autocracies, which by defi-
nition lack democratic checks and balances, it is particularly easy for
leaders to dominate policymaking. But autocracies can also produce
weak leaders who merely reflect the impulses of their countries’ bu-
reaucracies, militaries, or ruling elites. Algerian President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika remained in power for years even though he was nearly
comatose, serving as a front for the country’s political elite until he
resigned at the age of 82, earlier this year. Meanwhile, the likes of a
Putin or an Erdogan can step into a more pluralistic system and bend
it to his will.
Even mature liberal democracies are not immune to the charms
of a dominant personality. Today, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt
is revered as a demigod, but in his day, he was denounced for all
manner of highhanded and dictatorial behavior, ranging from trying
to pack the Supreme Court to enacting supposedly socialist eco-
nomic policies. Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt
shaped popular sentiment when he rearmed the country, offered the
United Kingdom military aid, and pushed Japan to the brink, pav-
ing the way for the eventual U.S. entry into World War II. Roosevelt
remade the United States’ institutions as much as he was constrained
by them, using his economic policies to expand the federal govern-
ment’s power and the war to lay the groundwork for the country’s
subsequent global military dominance. As the philosopher Ralph
Waldo Emerson wrote, “An institution is the lengthened shadow of
one man.”
In his own way, Trump has also laid bare the limits of institutions.
Whereas Roosevelt cajoled, guided, and shaped American institu-
tions, Trump has derided and corroded them, largely on behalf of his
own ego and prejudices. Yes, the American bureaucracy has saved

this president from some of his worst instincts—for instance, talking

him out of withdrawing troops from Syria and quitting NATO. Yet
contrary to his appointees’ advice, his party’s long-standing prefer-
ences, and even his own political interests, Trump has dramatically
altered the course of U.S. foreign policy. He has rejected the Paris
climate accord and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, walked away from
the Iran nuclear deal, raised tariffs on China, rooted for far-right
candidates in European elections, and moved the U.S. embassy in
Israel to Jerusalem. At home, Trump has revealed that many sup-
posed traditions of American politics—such as refusing to hire your
relatives, pretending to be upset by corruption, revealing your personal
financial activities, not threatening to arrest your political opponents,
and promptly filling important cabinet positions—are powerless against
a wrecking ball. His tenure has been marked by thoughtlessness and
chaos; this does not appear to be a well-crafted plot.
Individuals can rise above institutions, norms, systemic forces, and
domestic politics, leaving their countries stronger or weaker than they
might otherwise have been. Leaders can create new enemies or friends,
weaken or strengthen alliances, disregard norms, or take risks when
others might have balked. They can fundamentally alter the national
aspirations and overarching strategies of a country. Otto von Bismarck
rendered Germany peaceful and a pillar of the European status quo;
his successor, Kaiser Wilhelm, made Germany the greatest threat to
European stability and the main instigator of World War I.
Once the role of individuals is taken into account, politics becomes
less certain and more contingent than simple models of international
relations might have it. In good times, this insight should make one
cautious, since one man or woman in the wrong place at the wrong
time can set a country on a dangerous course. In bad times, however,
faith in the power of individuals can serve as a source of hope. For
although leaders can make the world more dangerous, they can also
make the world safer and more prosperous. In a democracy at least,
this means that while choosing leaders is a burdensome task, it is also
one that everyone should welcome.∂
REVIEWS & RESPONSES
The disasters
in Libya and
Syria have
helped Trump
jettison the
notion that the
United States
has any real
responsibility
for human
rights beyond
its borders.
– Peter Beinart
Obama’s Idealists The Virtue of Monopoly

Peter Beinart 162 Felix Salmon 184
How a Caliphate Ends The New Masters of the Universe

E VA N V U C C I / A P
Anne Barnard 170 Paul Starr 191
What Is White America? Recent Books 198

Nell Irvin Painter 177
fight the plague. To convince other

Obama’s Idealists nations to join the effort, she, President
Barack Obama, and various cabinet
officials “made scores of calls to incredu-
American Power in Theory lous counterparts” in foreign govern-
and Practice ments. For her part, Power, then ambas-
sador to the United Nations, disregarded
Peter Beinart the pleas of her young son—who cried,
“Mommy, I’m certain you will bring back
Bola”—and flew to Liberia and Sierra
Leone under strict medical supervision
Tough Love: My Story of the Things to help oversee the effort. Back at the
Worth Fighting For White House, in an attempt to counteract
BY SUSAN RICE. Simon & Schuster, mounting hysteria about the disease,
2019, 544 pp. Obama hosted Nina Pham, a Texas
nurse who had been successfully treated
The Education of an Idealist: A Memoir for Ebola. When she arrived at the Oval
BY SAMANTHA POWER. Dey Street Office, he greeted her with a hug.
Books, 2019, 592 pp. During the Obama administration,
U.S. policymakers afforded Africa a
The World as It Is: A Memoir of the level of concern and respect that was
Obama White House unprecedented in American history and
BY BEN RHODES. Random House, is unimaginable in the Trump era. This
2018, 428 pp. attention to Africa reflected not merely
a geographic orientation but an ideo-
T
he events that Susan Rice and logical one: a belief that human security,
Samantha Power describe in even in the poorest and weakest of
their new memoirs of their time states, matters to U.S. national security.
in the Obama administration occurred Rice, who began her career working
only a few years ago. But they belong to on Africa policy in the Clinton admin-
a different age. istration, made eight official trips to
“That chart shook up the Principals the continent while serving as Obama’s
Committee like nothing I have seen first ambassador to the UN. When
before or since,” Rice writes in Tough South Sudan gained independence, in
Love. The chart estimated the number 2011, she hosted “a loud, super-sweaty
of people the Ebola virus might kill in dance party on the twenty-second floor
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. of the new U.S. mission building where
Rice, then national security adviser, Americans, South Sudanese, African
goes on to describe how she helped delegates and many others boogied long
convince the Pentagon to send almost into the evening.” Before the Obama
3,000 U.S. troops to West Africa to administration, no U.S. cabinet official
had ever visited the tiny Central
PETER BEINART is a contributor to The
Atlantic, a columnist at the Forward, and a African Republic. In an effort to
Professor at the City University of New York. contain religious violence there, Power,
Obama’s Idealists
who became UN ambassador when Rice human lives.” For Power, it starts
took over the National Security Council during her time as a war correspondent
(NSC), visited four times. Try to imag- in Bosnia, where the besieged residents
ine that happening under President of Sarajevo asked her to “tell Clinton”
Donald Trump. about the horrors she had seen. For
But while it’s poignant that less than Rhodes, it begins with 9/11 and the Iraq
a decade ago top U.S. officials cared war, which left him yearning to harness
enough about South Sudan to dance the the idealism he felt the Bush adminis-
night away celebrating its indepen- tration had squandered.
dence, American goodwill didn’t keep In each book, three moments during
the newborn country from collapsing the Obama administration play outsize
into civil war. Rice doesn’t hide her roles in chastening this youthful ideal-
disappointment. In fact, disappoint- ism: the decision to bomb Libya in
ment is a theme of the memoirs by Rice 2011, the decision not to bomb Syria in
and Power, as well as of the one pub- 2013, and the 2016 election.
lished in 2018 by Obama’s top foreign As Rice notes, the Arab Spring
policy speechwriter, Ben Rhodes. The opened a generational divide within the
three books intimately evoke the per- Obama foreign policy team. When an
sonal journeys of Obama’s former uprising began in Libya, and Muammar
advisers and their frustration in en- al-Qaddafi’s forces closed in on the city
countering what Rhodes, in his title, of Benghazi to crush it, the administra-
calls “the world as it is.” In so doing, tion’s Gen-Xers, who had come of age
the memoirs end up chronicling both during the genocides in Bosnia and
the decline of American power and the Rwanda, pushed for military action. In
decline of American exceptionalism: the a meeting in the Situation Room,
belief that the United States is immune Power handed Rhodes a note warning
to the tribalism and authoritarianism that, as he paraphrases it, Libya would
that plague other parts of the world. be “the first mass atrocity that took
place on our watch.” Rice, then UN
YES WE CAN? ambassador, recalls telling Obama that
In different ways, each book traces a he “should not allow what could be
narrative arc that begins with a vow, perceived as his Rwanda to occur.” A
made in young adulthood, to use the phalanx of older policymakers—Vice
United States’ might for good and ends President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary
with a sober realization about how Robert Gates, National Security Ad-
hard fulfilling that vow actually is. For viser Thomas Donilon, and White House
Rice, the arc begins with her failure, as Chief of Staff William Daley—warned
a young NSC aide, to rouse the Clinton against entering another Middle
administration to halt the 1994 Rwandan Eastern war. But aided by Secretary of
genocide, after which she pledged “to State Hillary Clinton, the young
go down fighting, if ever I saw another idealists won. The United States and
instance where I believed U.S. military its allies saved Benghazi and helped
intervention could . . . make a critical topple Qaddafi. The New York Times
difference in saving large numbers of reported that Libyan parents—who had

Peter Beinart
seen Rice vote at the UN to authorize appetite for a protracted commitment

military action—were naming their once Qaddafi was gone.
children after her. There’s a reason Rice isn’t more
Then, as in South Sudan, things fell forthright. In her prologue, she an-
apart. As Rice admits, post-Qaddafi nounces, “Tell-all books, which sell copies
Libya became “a state without an at the expense of others, are tacky and
effective government, and an exporter not my style.” Power and Rhodes are
of refugees.” Rival militias have now equally polite. Unfortunately, their good
carved up the country, and the chaos manners come at the reader’s expense.
has proved fertile ground for the The problem isn’t that Rice, Power,
Islamic State, or ISIS. Given the effort and Rhodes shade the truth to make
that Rice, Power, and Rhodes devoted themselves look good. To the contrary,
to ensuring that the United States all three are, at various points, admirably
intervened in Libya—and the importance frank about their mistakes. The prob-
each accorded to humanitarian inter- lem is that by refusing to reveal what
vention in general—their explanations happened behind closed doors, they fail
for postwar Libya’s woes are frustrat- to help readers understand what lessons
ingly skimpy and vague. Rhodes dis- to draw from the Libya debacle. Is the
cusses the 2012 attack on U.S. facilities lesson that presidents who lack the
in Benghazi that ensnared him and stomach for nation building shouldn’t
Rice in a Fox News–fueled pseudo- topple regimes? Is it that the United
scandal, but he says virtually nothing States needs greater diplomatic capacity?
about what happened to postwar Libya Is it that brutal dictatorships are better
itself. Rice acknowledges that the than failed states? By not explaining
administration “failed to try hard Libya’s lessons, liberal internationalists
enough and early enough to win the like Rice, Power, and Rhodes make it
peace.” Power suggests that it “could easier for nativist bigots like Trump to
have exerted more aggressive, high- proffer a lesson of their own: that
level pressure on Libya’s neighbors to Washington should care less about
back a unified political structure” after people overseas, especially if they are
Qaddafi’s fall. not Christian or white.
But why didn’t it? Rice offers a clue The second event that dampens the
when she writes, “in Washington, idealism of all three authors is Syria, a
lingering ambivalence among some catastrophe over which, Rice writes,
Principals about the original operation led “my heart and my conscience will
the NSC to convene few Principals forever ache.” Rhodes supported
Committee meetings at a time when our Obama’s decision to pull back from the
efforts might have had a maximum military strikes he had authorized in
impact” in stabilizing post-Qaddafi Libya. response to Bashar al-Assad’s chemical
Since the national security adviser weapons attack in 2013. Rice and Power
convenes such meetings, that sounds opposed it, the former more forcefully.
like a dig at Rice’s predecessor in the job, But the more significant divergence
Donilon. It can also be read as a veiled came not over how the United States
jab at Obama himself, who showed little should respond to one chemical attack
Obama’s Idealists
In these brief statements, one can

glimpse the embryo of a debate about
state sovereignty, U.S. interests, and
human rights. To protect Syrians from
their murderous regime, Power proposed
effectively dismembering the Syrian
state. The obvious question is whether
the American people—who didn’t even
support missile strikes in retaliation for
Assad’s use of chemical weapons—
would have backed a U.S. commit-
ment to, essentially, defend a
chunk of Syrian territory
against the Syrian government.
Rice, by contrast, seems to
have reluctantly moved toward
the view that if brutal leaders
like Qaddafi and Assad
threaten their own citizens but
not the United States, then it
but over how it should is better to let them quash
respond to Syria’s dissent than to launch an
ghastly civil war itself. intervention that Washing-
Power urged “a no-fly ton can’t sustain and that
zone over select areas of may produce a failed state.
Syria that were under At times, it appears that
opposition control,” Obama agreed. “Maybe we
even though that would never would have done Rwanda,”
have required destroying he tells Rhodes at one point.
Syria’s air defenses, This shadow debate is important.
which, according to the Pentagon, were Among the lessons young liberals such
five times as strong as Libya’s. Rice, by as Rice, Power, and Rhodes took from
contrast, suggests that the mistake lay Bosnia and Rwanda is that defending
not in doing too little but in promising human rights can require infringing on
too much. Perhaps, she proposes, the state sovereignty. Among the lessons
Obama administration should “have of Libya and Syria is that state collapse
I L L U ST R AT I O N BY B R IA N C RO N I N
avoided declaratory statements such as can be as brutal as state repression.

‘Assad must go’ or red lines as on chemical These disasters have helped Trump
weapons that raised expectations for jettison the notion that the United
actions that may not have served U.S. States has any real responsibility for
interests.” Rhodes wearily concurs. He human rights beyond its borders, and
calls Syria “a place where our inaction they have helped him outline an
was a tragedy, and our intervention would international vision in which sover-
only compound the tragedy.” eignty is king.

Peter Beinart
What Democrats think about sover- also as chronicles of America’s declin-

eignty is less clear. Rice and Rhodes ing exceptionalism. In retrospect, the
appear more willing than Power to belief in democracy promotion and
declare the end of the era of humanitar- humanitarian intervention that Rice,
ian military intervention. But the debate Power, and Rhodes embraced early in
is not just about military force. In an their careers rested on a faith that
age of declining U.S. power, is it mor- democracy was stable at home. With
ally necessary or strategically productive that faith now eroded—and the United
for the United States to challenge other States battling its own rising tribalism,
countries’ sovereignty—in such places as authoritarianism, and brutality—it is
Hong Kong, Xianjing, and Kashmir— hard to imagine a book like Power’s “A
in the name of human rights? The next Problem From Hell,” a critique of the
Democratic president will face a version country’s repeated failure to stop
of that question but won’t find much genocide, becoming the sensation it did
guidance in these three books. in 2002. As Americans have grown
In each, the saga of disillusionment more preoccupied with, and more
reaches its nadir in 2016, with Russia’s pessimistic about, their own country’s
electoral interference and Trump’s moral condition, they have turned
election. After witnessing the limits of inward. As a young woman, Power
the United States’ ability to defend helped expose concentration camps in
democracy and human rights abroad, Bosnia. Today’s young activists are
Rice, Power, and Rhodes realize to their exposing them in Texas. As of Septem-
horror the limits of its ability to defend ber, foreign policy has barely figured in
those principles at home. When Obama the Democratic presidential debates.
asks Mitch McConnell, the Republican Rice, Power, and Rhodes also end up
Senate majority leader, to issue a joint chronicling the United States’ declin-
statement condemning Russian interfering power. In Libya in 2011, Russia
ence in the election, McConnell refuses, stood aside and let Washington and its
a move that Rhodes calls “staggeringly NATO allies wage war unimpeded, a
partisan and unpatriotic.” Near the end continuation of a unipolar pattern
of her book, Power acknowledges, established in the 1990s by U.S.-led
“While I once viewed the conflict in interventions in the Persian Gulf and
Bosnia as a last gasp of ethnic chauvinism the Balkans. By 2015, Russia was not
and demagoguery from a bygone era, it only thwarting the U.S. effort at
now seems more of a harbinger of the regime change in Syria in the UN
way today’s autocrats and opportunists Security Council; it was sending its
exploit grievances . . . in order to troops to do so on the battlefield. By
expand their own power.” Rice, in the 2016, Russia had brought its counter-
final pages of her book, veers from offensive to American soil. Apparently
foreign policy to a call for unity, civility, convinced that Washington was trying
and decency at home. to foment political revolution in
Although none of the authors puts it Russia, President Vladimir Putin
this way, it’s possible to read their books helped foment a political revolution
not only as tales of tempered idealism but inside the United States.
Even more striking than what Rice,
Power, and Rhodes say about Russia is
what they don’t say about China. That
Beijing figures so little in all three
Erdogan’s Empire
books is the clearest indication that they Turkey and the Politics
chronicle a different time. In retrospect, of the Middle East
By Soner Cagaptay
the entire post–Cold War era that 9781788317399 • $27.00
“Soner Cagaptay is an astute and honest
framed the careers of Rice, Power, and chronicler of the mercurial Turkish
Rhodes—an era in which U.S. foreign President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His
latest book, Erdogan’s Empire, is a com-
policy focused on counterterrorism, prehensive look at the Turkish leader’s
nuclear nonproliferation, democracy “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy…”
—The Washington Post
promotion, economic liberalization, and
humanitarian intervention—may turn The Lion and the Nightingale
A Journey Through Modern Turkey
out to have been merely a parenthesis By Kaya Genç
between superpower competitions. 9781788314961 • $24.95

“In this masterful chronicle of Turkey,
Genç sketches extraordinary lives in an
PORTRAITS AND MEMORIES extraordinary time. Intimate, intelligent,
detailed, full of life: It will become a
Rhodes offers the most intimate por- classic.”
—Andrew Greer, author of ‘Less’
trait of Obama. He describes the 2019-Nov-Dec-FA-Celik-Turkey_Foreign Affairs2018 Pulitzer
9/20/19Prize9:42
winner
AM Page 1
former president as conscientious,
decent, and intellectually curious but Find us on Twitter @ibtauris
not exactly warm—a man easier to
admire than to feel close to. At times,
Obama’s almost inhuman discipline and
self-control make him intolerant of the Celebrating 36 Years of Independent Publishing
limitations of others. After Rhodes
loses his razor on a 2011 trip to Latin
America, Obama scolds him for not “helps
This major contribution
the reader to sort out the
shaving. Rhodes fumes that the presi-
dent “seemed oblivious to the work I confusion around contemporary
was doing out of his sight, work that Turkish politics
left me no time to buy a razor. But as I and society. It is
calmed down, I realized that . . . being full of invaluable
composed and professional—doing the insights and solid
job—was how he managed to take empirical analy-
everything in stride. I hadn’t just failed ses of Erdoğan’s
to shave. I’d deviated from his ethos of ‘New Turkey.’”
unflappability.” In another scene, —M. Hakan Yavuz,
University of Utah
Rhodes reflects that Obama’s tendency
to eat the same meal again and again
(salmon, brown rice, and broccoli) “said hc $85 $42.50 for Foreign Affairs readers!
something about his discipline—food
was something that sustained his health T EL : 303-444-6684 • www.r ienner.com
and energy in this job, not something
167
Peter Beinart
to be enjoyed.” Rhodes, by contrast, of a Sunday show. But she, too, writes

douses his anxiety with late-night affectingly about a childhood that
drinking and TV binge watching. combined deep love and deep trauma.
Unlike Rhodes, neither Rice nor The similarities between Rice’s and
Power discusses the Obama administra- Power’s upbringings are striking. Each
tion in detail until the second half of woman’s mother battled to build a career
her book. In both cases, it’s a shrewd in a punishingly sexist milieu. Each
decision. Because both women are loath woman’s brilliant but controlling father
to offend former colleagues, they can’t objected, which spawned affairs, which
offer an unvarnished portrait of the spawned an ugly divorce, which each girl
personalities and struggles behind witnessed up close. As her parents’
Obama’s foreign policy. Each compen- fighting grew more violent, Rice remem-
sates for this literary problem in the bers worrying that her mother would kill
same way: by offering a strikingly herself. Power writes about getting on
unvarnished portrait of her own life. her knees and saying Hail Marys and
Power’s talent as a writer comes Our Fathers while her parents hurled
through most eloquently in the book’s dishes at each other in the kitchen.
opening chapters, when she describes Terrified and precocious, each girl
her relationship with her magnetic, tried to save her parents’ marriage.
alcoholic father. “Guinness,” she writes, “Starting at seven years old,” Rice writes,
“the dark brown, silky stout with the “I appointed myself chief firefighter,
thick, pillowy head—was not just his mediator, and judge, working to defuse
drink; it was his craft.” She recounts the arguments, broker compromises, and
long afternoons she spent as a child bring rationality to bear when emotion
reading, singing, and basking in her overwhelmed reason.” Power remem-
father’s love in Hartigan’s, a Dublin bar bers brandishing a 50-pence piece she
that “had a smell that mingled urine, had been saving and telling her parents,
chlorine disinfectant, and the swirl of “Whichever of you doesn’t argue with
barley, malt, and hops.” When Power’s the other will get this.” She added, “I
mother, fearful that Ireland’s sexist legal will be watching.” It’s easy to see the
system would not allow her to divorce, foreshadowing. If Rice and Power
snuck out of the country with Samantha endured bitter disappointment when
and her brother in tow, her father began their best efforts couldn’t prevent Libya,
a slow suicide that ended with the Syria, or South Sudan from disintegrat-
discovery of her “dad’s decomposing ing, they were at least well prepared.
body amid the stench of vomit and
human waste.” Thirty years later, when WHAT’S LEFT UNSAID
Power—now a famous author and At times, it’s frustrating that Rice and
Obama adviser—returns to Hartigan’s, Power aren’t as self-reflective about
she asks a longtime bartender why her American foreign policy as they are
father let alcohol take his life. The about themselves. When describing how
bartender’s answer: “Because you left.” Afghan President Hamid Karzai ac-
Rice lacks Power’s literary gifts. At cused U.S. soldiers of abusing Afghan
times, her prose reads like the transcript civilians, Rice calls it a “typical but
Obama’s Idealists
never tolerable rant” without presenting Israel can imperil a policymaker’s hope
any evidence that Karzai was wrong. of ever serving in government again, it is
She boasts about having “spearheaded not surprising that Rice, Power, and, to
efforts to prevent Palestine from being a lesser degree, Rhodes play it safe in
admitted prematurely to the UN as a full their books. But in so doing, they fail
member state (a status it sought in to acknowledge the uncomfortable ways
order to bypass negotiations for a in which Trump’s disregard for human
two-state solution)” and about having rights represents a continuation of—
vetoed a 2011 resolution declaring rather than a break from—the policies
Israeli settlements illegal because it was of the government in which they
“an unhelpful diversion that could set served. The price of entry for contin-
back efforts to press the two parties to ued public service is discretion. The
negotiate directly.” price of entry for serious policy discus-
This is wildly unconvincing. Given sion is honesty. Both are legitimate
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin choices. But there’s a tension between
Netanyahu’s blatant hostility to the the two. Rice, Power, and Rhodes chose
creation of a viable Palestinian state, the discretion, which undermines the
Palestinians—having lived without basic quality of their analysis.
rights for a half century—had every Perhaps it is fitting that in memoirs
right to appeal to the UN. It’s depress- that describe the many constraints
ing that, even now, Rice won’t grapple under which the Obama administration
with the moral perversity of the policy labored, Rice, Power, and Rhodes
she carried out. Power, for her part, manifest those constraints themselves
avoids Israel almost entirely, even by failing to challenge one of the most
though her abstention on a later settle- politically treacherous, and least
ment resolution, in the Obama adminis- morally defensible, aspects of American
tration’s waning days, was among the foreign policy. This too, evidently, is
most controversial actions of her UN part of what Power, in her book’s title,
tenure. Israel doesn’t even have its own calls “the education of an idealist.” One
heading in her book’s index. Rhodes can only hope that in the future, it’s an
comes closest to acknowledging that in education that able and decent policy-
making policy toward Israel, political makers like them will feel comfortable
expediency often trumped conviction. doing without.∂
“Netanyahu,” he writes, “had mastered a
certain kind of leverage: using political
pressure within the United States to
demoralize any meaningful push for
peace.” But even Rhodes never gives
himself the intellectual and moral license
to imagine a U.S. policy unfettered by
political limitations.
It’s easy to understand these choices.
Since questioning the United States’
virtually unconditional support for

results from many months on an

How a Caliphate extremely dangerous assignment. To
cover the pivotal fight to dislodge the
Ends Islamic State, or ISIS, from Mosul, a
city of one million to two million
people in northern Iraq, he embedded
On the Frontline of the Fight with Iraqi government troops, who, for
Against ISIS all the years, money, and lives that
Washington spent training them as U.S.
Anne Barnard proxies, tend to be cheerfully uninter-
ested in basic force-protection measures
such as setting perimeters and over-
watch points.
They Will Have to Die Now: Mosul and Arriving late also means seeing the
the Fall of the Caliphate conflict with fresh eyes. Many American
BY JAMES VERINI. Norton, 2019, journalists of my generation who shipped
304 pp. out to Central Asia and the Middle East
after President George W. Bush’s declara-
T
he origin story that James Verini tion of the dubiously named “war on
tells about his new book, They terror” are now pushing two decades on
Will Have to Die Now, is about the beat. The intervening years have
guilt—his guilt for not having gone to brought distance—even freedom, if one
Iraq earlier. On 9/11, in his first newspa- dares use that Iraq-war-tainted word—
per job, he covered the collapse of the from the post-9/11 confusion in which
Twin Towers. He writes that a couple of “America, in its fear, in its shame,” as
years later, he “could have, should have, Verini writes, attacked Iraq. The original
gone to Iraq but didn’t.” He was, he sin of the U.S. invasion and the mis-
says, “too scared.” takes of the occupation that we reported
It’s just as well that Verini waited on are now, while not beside the point,
until 2016 to “face Iraq” and start almost as distant from today as the
reporting on what he calls the central Vietnam War was from the United
American war of our time. For one thing, States’ first Iraq adventure, in 1990–91.
obviously yet still shockingly, even Verini thus arrives in medias res to a
arriving 13 years late, he didn’t miss it. country “whose story,” he writes, “had
For another, he eventually learned a key been entwined with my country’s story
lesson for a reporter: being scared for a generation now, for most of my life,
doesn’t make you the wrong person for so entwined that neither place any longer
the job. Verini’s deeply reported, made sense without the other.” True,
beautifully written first-person account although most Americans fail to think
much about the war’s effects on their own
ANNE BARNARD is a reporter at The New York country. Iraqis do not have that luxury.
Times, where she was Beirut Bureau Chief from In today’s Iraq, American intervention
2012 to 2018. Earlier, she served as Baghdad
Bureau Chief and Middle East Bureau Chief at is less an event than a condition, less
The Boston Globe. an alien encounter than a problematic
How a Caliphate Ends
The boys are back in town: Iraqi security forces liberating the village of Khalidiya, October 2016
marriage. The Iraqi troops and civilians So his account of Iraqis, both soldiers
Verini befriends and profiles have lived and civilians, feels fresh, and it presents
lives permeated by the war far more an occasion to examine the broader
deeply than are those of Americans who questions posed by the conflict’s recent
have spent entire military careers fighting events: What works and what doesn’t,
it. Their generosity in trying to forge after 16 years of attempts by foreigners
mutual understanding with Verini, “a and locals to pacify Iraq? What happens
person from the place that had made their on the ground as the United States
lives a hell,” was, he writes, “humanity outsources the foot soldiering of its
itself.” At first glance, his book reads like wars? Is ISIS really defeated, or are years
any narrative of life with the troops, full of violence in the name of fighting
of worm’s-eye details on war’s chaos and terrorism likely to continue unrolling
boredom and absurdity, with vivid portraits new, expanding chapters of conflict with
of soldiers and their black humor. But that group and others?
T HAI E R AL-SU DANI / REUT E RS
these are Iraqi troops, and Verini inter-

sperses the scenes with historical research FROM WASHINGTON TO BAGHDAD
from the earliest annals of war—some As he follows one mostly Muslim army
visible in Mosul’s own archaeological into a war against another, Verini doesn’t
past—to records of more recent episodes bother with tired questions about Islam
that explain why many citizens offered and whether there is something uniquely
at least passive support to ISIS. pathological about Arabs or Muslims.

Anne Barnard
He does situate the rise of ISIS in age-old if to say, as he puts it, “See, I knew all
atavistic impulses. Not Islamic ones or along there was something horrible
Middle Eastern ones but human ones— lurking in the desert there.”
the violence that springs from power But it is instructive to look even more
struggles, revenge, bloodlust. In the gory broadly at the successes and failures of
battle scenes memorialized in Assyrian writers who have tried to make sense of
friezes in Nineveh, the ancient city the chaos consuming Iraq and Syria. Too
that lay near modern-day Mosul, Verini often, we approach it like the proverbial
sees parallels to the gruesome photos blind men assessing an elephant: the one
and videos Iraqis shared by smartphone. at the tail thinks it is like a rope, the
“Everyone knew someone who’d been one at the leg says it is like a tree, and so
killed on the Internet,” he writes. on. Each arena of the sprawling conflicts
Verini seeks to temper the hype poses its own challenges of access and
about ISIS, and he cuts it down to size, safety. Few people have seen every
portraying it as just the latest insurgent aspect from the ground, and no book has
group to use terrorism as a tool for satisfyingly pulled it all together. Verini
political goals. He recalls that it has focuses on Iraq and men. A recent
been over a century since jihadism book by Azadeh Moaveni looks mainly at
became a vehicle for anticolonialism, women who joined ISIS in Syria.
reminding readers of the Royal Air Yet neither Iraq nor Syria fully makes
Force’s efforts to put down the Iraqi sense without the other. The details of
revolt that began in 1920, a movement the hostilities in Syria, where the
that, like the rebels who fought the conflict began not with ISIS but with
British in Sudan decades earlier, in- President Bashar al-Assad’s violent
voked the Almighty against an occupier. repression of a civilian protest move-
“Fifteen years before Guernica,” Verini ment, are very different from those of
writes, “the British were bombing the war in Iraq. At the same time, Iraqis
unarmed Iraqis.” Nor is ISIS even the first and Syrians share a sense of abandon-
insurgent group to promote an apocalyp- ment and abuse by their governments and
tic worldview. He mentions the Jewish the world, and their conflicts have
rebels who fought the Romans in the first become inseparable. The Bush adminis-
centuries BC and AD and ultimately tration’s misadventure in Iraq was the
committed mass suicide on Masada. reason the Obama administration was
As Verini notes, many news organi- unable or unwilling to take decisive action
zations milked the ISIS story for its to stop atrocities in Syria: the United
“luridness,” yielding shallow coverage States was constrained by depleted
“on the same spectrum as the Caliph- resources, a war-weary population, the
ate’s own blood porn.” (He acknowl- discrediting of its rhetoric about de-
edges “a few exceptions”; in fact, there mocracy and human rights, and its own
are many brave journalists who reported undermining of international institutions
with context and measure.) Some and multilateralism. During the U.S.
outlets, he muses, may have sought to occupation of Iraq, Assad’s weaponiza-
absolve themselves of their lack of tion of Syrian extremists to harass
skepticism before the U.S. invasion, as American soldiers in Iraq helped seed
what became ISIS. Assad later imprisoned militias as de facto allies in Iraq but as
some of those same fighters, only to enemies in Syria, where U.S. proxies,
reuse them later on. Early in the Syrian in turn, are led by Kurdish groups that
revolt, even as he vacuumed civilian Turkey, a fellow NATO member, consid-
activists and army defectors into his ers terrorists.
torture dungeons, he released jihadis who Moreover, combat books can only go
went on to lead hardcore militant groups, so far in documenting the plight of
making it easier for him to claim that the civilians; in Verini’s, anecdotes of
world had to choose between him and officers jauntily disregarding danger, or
“the terrorists.” of the soldiers obscenely taunting one
Going back further, had the United another about their sisters, sometimes
States not invaded Iraq, the country blur together or narrowly avoid cheer-
would almost certainly not have become leading. (I pine for a frontline book by a
a breeding ground, and later a sitting female serial embedder, such as Jane
duck, for ISIS. In fact, it’s possible to Arraf, Arwa Damon, or Kathy Gannon,
imagine that without the invasion, the although the Iraqi military lags behind
uprisings that swept the Arab world its U.S. counterpart in letting women
beginning in late 2010, or at least the reporters take equal risks as men.)
one that swept Syria, would have gone To bridge these epistemological
somewhat better. Perhaps—dream for a gaps, journalists have new tools: social
moment—an Iraqi revolt against media and other digital communications.
Saddam Hussein could have taken root However misused these have been,
organically, in partnership with the civilians, activists, and rank-and-file
Syrian one. Instead, in the rubble left fighters, in Syria especially, have turned
by invasion, Iraq was riddled with Sunni them into an unprecedented platform to
extremists, who dispatched emissaries tell the story of their own conflicts in
across the border into Syria to radicalize real time, making Syria arguably history’s
the population there. A weak Iraq most documented war. I wish in hind-
permeated by Iranian power also made sight that in the early years of the Iraq
it easy for Iran to recruit legions of Iraqi war, then faceless insurgents and the
Shiite militants and dispatch them civilians caught between them and U.S.
across the border into Syria to help firepower could have contacted us
Assad put down the revolt. directly. Yet even in recent years, online
There is more to learn on the ground communications have not been used as
that requires the whole picture. There early or as extensively in Iraq, perhaps for
has yet to be a systematic study of as simple a reason as that different
whether the United States’ ordnance teams of reporters typically cover the
has really done better than Assad’s at two countries, and those working in
sorting fighters from civilians, especially Iraq were not as used to those tools. And
since the Trump administration loos- in Syria, social media have sometimes
ened the rules of engagement. There is obscured important dynamics. Before
also a need for a closely observed the 2013 takeover of Raqqa by ISIS and
account of the United States’ messy alli- the subsequent beheadings, foreign jihadis
ances. The country treats Iran-backed heralded the arrival of the group with

Anne Barnard
goofy selfies, making it initially appear been the last point of identification with
to be a buffoonish sideshow in a crowded the Islamic State.”
field of more conventional actors. This observation hits home in the
In Iraq, however, where ISIS and its operatic story of two middle-aged,
predecessors had incubated for years, middle-class brothers in a refugee
the group’s rise was plain to see amid camp who initially welcomed ISIS. Abu
Iraq’s political disorder. Journalists saw Omar’s wife was killed by al Qaeda
it, but strained news budgets meant militants in 2005. His brother Abu
shrinking coverage as the United States, Fahad, a former army medic, also lost
briefly it turned out, withdrew. his wife, who was killed the next year
when U.S. and Kurdish troops shot up
WHY THEY FIGHT the family car at a checkpoint. After
Verini does an excellent job of describ- they beat him, Abu Fahad found his
ing the Iraqi leg of the elephant and his eldest daughter “in the backseat of the
starting point: guilt. He assigns much car trying to eat shards of window
of it to U.S. policies and the leaders in glass”; she had just “watched her mother’s
Iraq and elsewhere whom those policies head explode.” “Abu Fahad wasn’t a
have supported or tolerated. Yes, the zealot,” Verini writes. “He wasn’t even
United States helped create ISIS, not in particularly devout.” He continues:
the literal way that conspiracy theorists
But he had watched his country
believe but by destabilizing Iraq, ruling
invaded, occupied, turned upon
it clumsily, and then supporting the itself; his city degraded from a
scorched-earth, sectarian approach of “paradise,” as he described the
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Mosul of his youth, to a hell; his
Verini reminds readers of how, during wife killed; himself and his family
the run-up to the invasion, U.S. Secre- and friends humiliated by soldiers of
tary of State Colin Powell elevated the the army he’d once nursed to health;
obscure Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who his children driven mad, denigrated,
would found the group that became denied futures. To a man like that,
ISIS, to a jihadi celebrity by citing him sane as he is, talk of a millenarian
in his famous speech before the UN utopia, of any utopia, of any improve-
Security Council. And Verini explains ment of life beyond the malediction
how ISIS exploited the Maliki govern- it has become, holds promise.
ment’s corruption, bribing or co-opting
officials as it raised money, infiltrated Verini also gives deserved attention
institutions, and amassed weapons, even to the heavy sacrifices and bravery of
as it denounced graft to gain popularity. the Iraqi forces. Twenty thousand Iraqi
By the time ISIS took over Mosul in 2014, troops died between 2014 and 2016
the group was the only real alternative to alone. One gunner, known as “Sponge-
Maliki, and some Moslawis, given their Bob,” a nickname bestowed on him by
lived experience, decided it was worth a his young son, had earlier survived
try. Amid their political, security, and torture by a Shiite militia, despite being
economic rationales, one researcher tells Shiite himself. During the fight for
Verini, “religious ideology might have Mosul, he was evaporated by a suicide
bomb—recalling, in my mind, a line best Iraqi units summarily execute

from the World War II poet Randall prisoners. One of Verini’s most likable
Jarrell: “When I died they washed me characters, a chubby-cheeked major
out of the turret with a hose.” named Hassan, casually admits to one
Verini travels mostly with the such killing and then shows Verini the
Counter Terrorism Service, a group of body. The episode comes near the end
special operations forces that reports to of the book and gets short shrift. I
Iraq’s prime minister and that U.S. wanted more on how Verini assimilated
officials viewed as the most competent the execution into his understanding of
and least politicized Iraqi unit. Yet at his frontline companions and on how
every turn, he finds the unevenness of common such killings were.
twenty-first-century warfare—the same
type of disconnect and confusion that AFTER ISIS
leads sophisticated drones to hit wed- They Will Have to Die Now documents
ding parties in Afghanistan and Yemen. the practical application of a popular
The Iraqis working on the ground theory informing much of U.S. policy:
beneath high-tech U.S. jets carry that having locals fight wars engenders
homemade mortar tubes, forget to take less resentment. But this doesn’t always
the wrapping off grenade launchers, hold true. Just like U.S. forces, Iraqis
wear misspelled shoulder patches, and have struggled with the difficulty of
shun body armor. Verini watches them saving a city without destroying it, and
work with Western special forces they have met with similar results. As
officers to call in airstrikes from an Verini writes, “The more Moslawis
alarmingly exposed command post, were killed, the more they resented the
communicating on WhatsApp. Opera- soldiers, and the more soldiers were
tional security concerns aside, Verini killed, the more they resented the
wonders about uncounted civilian Moslawis.” In some ways, the Iraqis’
casualties. Watching impact clouds challenge is worse than the Americans’,
bloom across Mosul, he observes that in since they need to somehow live to-
the Pentagon’s claim of scrupulous gether, to envision shared citizenship
precision, “you had to smell horseshit.” with mortal enemies.
Verini doesn’t dig deeply into this Mosul was recaptured in the summer
but cites others’ reports: one airstrike of 2017, and the city is now in the
said to target an ISIS position during throes of a slow rebuilding. Today, ISIS
the battle for Mosul killed as many as has been defeated militarily as a territo-
150 civilians, according to Amnesty rial entity and discredited by its misrule
International and local witnesses quoted among those who gave it a chance as a
in several news outlets; a New York government. But the political problems
Times investigation published in 2017 that allowed it to gain a foothold haven’t
found that one in five airstrikes by the begun to be solved. And although its
anti-ISIS coalition resulted in unin- true believers have been dealt a set-
tended civilian deaths, 31 times the rate back, they are still available as recruits
the Pentagon claimed. The book also for decentralized attacks in Iraq, Syria,
adds to growing evidence that even the and worldwide.

Anne Barnard
As for the rest of Iraq, short of real It pursues policies on Israel that, by
trust, the best hope is the sharing of tolerating the expansion of Jewish
spoils and power. The country has a settlements in the West Bank and adopt-
semblance of real politics—debate on ing an increasingly one-sided approach
governance that transcends sect—after to negotiations, have enshrined the
the fight against ISIS created at least a indefinite occupation of the Palestinian
partial sense of shared purpose. The territories. And by supporting or
absence of violence is a kind of success; tolerating repressive governments, it
in the city of Samarra, for instance, the has given a green light to the suppression
Shiite militia run by Muqtada al-Sadr, of the very forces in the region—the
who rose to prominence fighting Ameri- young and educated and motivated—
can troops, is now keeping peace with a who briefly had the temerity to believe
mostly Sunni population, partly by in and act on the universal ideals of
offering lucrative business opportunities freedom, human rights, and dignity that
to local Sunnis. In Syria, however, American rhetoric promoted, only to be
relative quiet has come through Assad’s crushed. Victory via maximum violence
wholesale doubling down on repression. against both militants and civilians is no
Elsewhere in the Middle East, Leba- recipe for stability. What’s worse, the
non’s rickety yet durable system, with example from Assad and others in the
sectarian mafias sharing rents a genera- region has offered authoritarians around
tion after the country’s own civil war the world a grisly playbook for how to
ended, somehow passes as a decent win. It also spurred a wave of refugees
outcome. But it depends on perpetuat- that sent racist identity politics rippling
ing sectarian mistrust and precludes through Europe and the United States.
basic infrastructure investment, let alone So Verini is right to talk about an
a functional state, a shared political or entwined Iraq and America. Indeed, it
physical public space, or meaningful is not too far a stretch to see versions
levers for ordinary citizens to effect of Iraqis’ dilemmas within U.S. borders.
change. And that is in a country that is a How can armed fanatics and gunmen,
fraction of the size of Iraq. who make common cause in the dark
More important, instability and corners of social media and capitalize
extremism will rear their heads in the on its blurring of facts, be stopped? Are
Middle East as long as its people are Americans facing their own apocalypse,
denied a voice in how they are governed. from the climate? How can grievances
The biggest long-term threat in the and divisions be healed in a country, in
region is neither ISIS nor Iran but the a world, where people don’t agree on
continued de facto insistence by its own the nature of reality? And after years of
leaders that the path to security and fear, what concerns are shared? Who is
stability is through rule by force. “them,” and who is “us”?∂
Decades of U.S. policy have implicitly
endorsed that view. Washington main-
tains so-called counterterrorism alliances
with despotic rulers in Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
citizens who happen to be white voting

What Is White first and foremost as white people. In
the immediate aftermath of the election,
America? commentators rushed to ascribe Trump’s
victory to economic disarray in the
heartland and to a subset of voters
The Identity Politics of lamenting their loss of jobs and stability.
the Majority It took a couple of years for journalists,
pollsters, and scholars to find a sounder
Nell Irvin Painter explanation: by and large, most white
Trump supporters were not voting out
of economic self-interest; rather, they
were resentful of social changes that
White Shift: Populism, Immigration, and threatened their taken-for-granted
the Future of White Majorities position atop a social hierarchy—despite
BY ERIC KAUFMANN. Abrams Press, the fact that the vast majority of those
2019, 624 pp. who held political power were white
(and male), white families’ wealth was
White Identity Politics still six and a half times as great as black
BY ASHLEY JARDINA. Cambridge families’ wealth, and black families
University Press, 2019, 384 pp. headed by college graduates had about
33 percent less wealth than white
Dying of Whiteness: How the Politics of families headed by high school dropouts.
Racial Resentment Is Killing America’s Three new books seek to validate this
Heartland explanation and to answer a few crucial
BY JONATHAN M. METZL. Basic questions. What do these white people
Books, 2019, 352 pp. want? According to these authors, they
want Trump, Brexit, guns, tax cuts,
Republicans, Social Security, and
T
he U.S. presidential election of Medicare. More than anything else, they
2016 altered the prevailing want to protect their place atop society.
American ideology of race. And what don’t these white people
Donald Trump’s coy, borderline white want? Immigrants, Obamacare, and
nationalism helped turn people who money for public schools. And above all,
previously happened to be white into they don’t want to be called bigots by
“white people”—coded as white in an multiculturalists; that kind of talk
essential way, just as, for instance, black threatens them and encourages them to
people are coded as black in an essen- embrace white nationalism. They cannot
tial way. Many observers were slow to imagine a multiracial society in which
grasp the political ramifications of white people—however defined—
peaceably take their place among others
NELL IRVIN PAINTER is Edwards Professor of who are not white.
American History Emerita at Princeton
University and the author of The History of And who are these white people?
White People. That’s what these books are about, and

Nell Irvin Painter
that’s what makes them both interesting disconnected from economic (and, in
and, ultimately, vexing. All three the case of Metzl, biological) self-interest,
authors seem to believe that it is possible politicians will remain free to pursue
to understand whiteness ontologically, policies that benefit corporations and
as a thing. But race is better understood the wealthy but that do ordinary white
as an ongoing discourse, not as a people little good. But political issues
physical reality. Although racism and that matter beyond white identity—for
the discrimination that accompanies it instance, voting rights and equal treat-
clearly have measurable social and ment under the law—hardly appear in
economic effects, race is a concept that these books. And none of the three
should be described with verbs such as books offers a convincing path out of the
“to seem,” as opposed to “to be.” The dangerous territory into which the
belief in the reality of race as a biologi- United States has been thrust by white
cally or otherwise fixed characteristic, identity politics.
however, is like the belief in witchcraft,
as the sociologist Karen Fields said IF YOU’RE WHITE, YOU’RE ALRIGHT
years ago: there’s nothing one can say to Kaufmann is a professor of politics at
disprove it. And, I would add, that Birkbeck, University of London. He is
belief produces clear political outcomes. an expert on the politics of Northern
If there is no such thing as a stable, Ireland and thus brings a sense of
freestanding category of whites, how history to the subject of white identity,
can one make convincing claims about which he terms “white ethno-tradition-
whiteness and white identity politics? alism.” His book deals mostly with the
The solution to this problem, for these United States, but Canada and Europe
authors and many others, is to turn to also come into view. By his reckoning,
data, measurements, charts, and graphs. race is a genetic fact, and in a manner
Eric Kaufmann and Ashley Jardina reminiscent of nineteenth- and early-
analyze data from opinion surveys to twentieth-century scientists’ belief in
make arguments about the roots of white temperamental differences based on race,
resentment. Jonathan Metzl examines he perceives a “white arch-type” that has
medical statistics and conducts inter- certain recognizable cultural manifesta-
views with individuals to understand tions. He calls multicultural and multi-
why white-identifying people support a racial populations in Western countries
conservative political agenda that has “mixed-race” and uses the term “unmixed”
had a deleterious effect on their own with scare quotes but without irony.
health and well-being. Kaufmann and Kaufmann explores the attitudes of
Jardina focus on white identifiers’ white people who oppose immigrants and
conservative politics but minimize the refugees and voted for Brexit or Trump
Republican Party’s strategy of exploiting and argues that most of them are not
the enormous emotional power of power hungry or antiblack. They’re just
whiteness to advance regressive taxation, normal human beings who, feeling
limit the social safety net, and disem- threatened, are engaging in cultural
power workers. All three authors recog- self-defense. To prove that his claims rest
nize that so long as white identity is on sound science, Kaufmann displays
What Is White America?
Majority rule: supporters at a Trump rally in New Hampshire, August 2019

data in dozens of charts and graphs. But Kaufmann’s main argument is that
too often, they reduce or distort the the kind of white identity politics that
reality they are supposed to represent. has taken the form of right-wing popu-
One chart, for example, shows two lines lism results from two threats: diversifica-
relating to the probability of someone tion through immigration, which reduces
voting for right-wing populists in a given the size of the white majority, and an
country, correlated with whether the “anti-majority adversary culture” of
voter says safety is very important. The “left-modernism,” whose “most zealous
caption asserts that other variables were exponents” inhabit college campuses,
controlled for, but the reader is left where they pursue their “mission of
wondering how that control has affected replacing ‘whiteness’ with diversity.”
the stated probabilities. The graph offers Kaufmann claims that the “anti-white
no evidence for the direction of causation narrative” of “radical left-modernists”
among the highlighted variables: the has pushed some white people beyond
percentage of Muslims in the population, mere opposition to immigration into
a person’s level of concern for safety, extremist theories of “white genocide.”
J O NAT HA N E R N ST / R E U T E R S
and that person’s propensity to vote for To help white-identified people pull
right-wing populist parties or candidates. back from such extremes, Kaufmann
But Kaufmann nonetheless suggests a proposes remedies for the short and the
particular causal direction, implying that long term. In essence, Kaufmann wants
the presence of Muslims stokes con- to save white people from themselves.
cerns about safety, which then encourage But some of his proposals seem less
support for right-wing populists. like antidotes to extremism and more

Nell Irvin Painter
like accommodations to it. Take, for To Kaufmann, the worries of “ethno-

example, his suggestion for how to deal traditional nationalists” about “losing
with the problems posed by refugees: the country they know” are legitimate
keep them away from the majority white and not automatically worthy of con-
population and house them “on a long- demnation. Those who condemn such
term basis” in “camps” offering refuge thinking, he suggests, are peddling the
but no prospect of permanent settlement. “anti-white narrative” of the white-
Such camps could be set up in “a less hating “modernist-left” and driving new
prosperous non-EU country like Albania.” followers into the arms of right-wing
Western countries that oppose refugees white nationalists. If these critics would
would be willing to fund such camps, he just shut up, white people would settle
writes, because “they care more about down and admit other people into
the cultural impact of refugee settlement their world—provided they are light-
than the economic costs.” skinned enough and willing to identify
Kaufmann’s long-term solution to as white. But Kaufmann doesn’t ex-
prevent the spread of extremist white plain how nonwhite people would fit
identity politics is to speed what he sees into this new polity, with its newly
as an inevitable “white shift”: the entrenched and enlarged white majority.
emergence of a new definition of “white” Nor, crucially, does he reflect on how
that would include light-skinned people such a polity would fare when it comes
with heterogeneous ancestry and, at the to protecting the fundamental values of
same time, would conserve the “core liberal democracy.
myths and boundary symbols” of white-
ness. Of course, this is a phenomenon FEAR FACTOR
that has appeared in U.S. history many Less polemic and more modest than
times and in many guises. Over the Kaufmann’s book, Jardina’s study applies
centuries, as Kaufmann notes, definitions multiple regression, the most widely
of whiteness have come to incorporate used of all statistical methods, to opinion
formerly denigrated groups, such as Irish polling data. Jardina, an assistant profes-
Americans, Italian Americans, and sor of political science at Duke Univer-
Jewish Americans. Consider, too, the sity, controls for variables representing
centuries-old practice of members of the resentment of blacks, partisanship,
many-hued African American popula- gender, region, and political ideology
tion passing for white in a deeply racist and proposes to measure the influence of
society—a topic Kaufmann ignores. the degree to which white Americans
Kaufmann is surely correct that ideas identify as white, stripped of all other
about who counts as white are bound to characteristics. Her measure of white
change. In Kaufmann’s view, this shift identity has five categories, ranging
will help maintain white supremacy. from “being white is not at all impor-
However, as I’ve written elsewhere, such tant to my identity” to “being white is
an enlargement is in fact already weak- extremely important to my identity.”
ening white supremacy by benefiting Then she checks whether this measure
wealthy and educated people who do not of white identity allows her to predict
identify as white. political attitudes. It does.
She writes that perceived threats to for example, Jardina’s assertion that
white supremacy—a nonwhite U.S. “desires to preserve Social Security and
president, a Latina justice of the U.S. Medicare are rooted in white racial
Supreme Court, affirmative action, solidarity”—a claim that seems to ignore
college courses on race—have made the role of class and age in support for
white people feel “outnumbered, such programs.
disadvantaged, and even oppressed.” Perhaps Jardina’s most important
Political responses have followed, as argument is that “white identity is not
white voters have supported strict defined by racial animus, and whites who
immigration controls and voter identifi- identify with their racial group are not
cation laws that reduce minority turn- simply reducible to bigots.” Without
out. According to Jardina’s analysis, a passing judgment, Jardina writes that
strong sense of white identification many white identifiers resent the notion
predicts negative attitudes toward that “expressing their identity would be
immigration and positive attitudes seen, unfairly, as problematic or even
toward Social Security, Medicare, and racist.” She cites as an example of this
the policies of the Trump administra- dynamic an episode in 2015 when a deli
tion. But, Jardina contends, white owner in New Jersey posted a sign at
identification alone does not predict his business reading, “Celebrate your
opposition to policies and programs White Heritage in March. White His-
often viewed through a racial lens, such tory Month.” The deli owner was baffled
as affirmative action, welfare, and when some of his neighbors excoriated
Medicaid. Rather, opposition to those his sign as racist. But it’s difficult to
things correlates with a strong sense of accept that support for a hypothetical
racial resentment that is distinct from White History Month would indicate
merely identifying as white. nothing more than a blameless expression
Jardina’s methodology of applying of white racial solidarity, portending no
multiple regression to opinion polling ill will toward other groups. After all,
data is widely used in political psychology what might be celebrated during White
and other social sciences. But its pitfalls History Month? Would it highlight
are well known, the most obvious being heroic white people such as the Founding
the problem of determining causality Fathers, even though they are already
when the effects of certain variables are broadly celebrated? Would it commemo-
very small and predictions are there- rate events in U.S. history such as the
fore hard to make with confidence. A American Revolution, which very much
second pitfall lies in this methodology’s included people of color? Would it
inability to characterize change over herald the ethnic cleansing of Native
time—to capture changing behaviors as Americans justified by Manifest Destiny?
populations adjust to one another. There Answering the question of what White
is, further, the temptation to search History Month might look like in
among possible control variables or practice would reveal the antidemocratic
among variables to predict in order to dimension of white identity and dem-
find positive results. These pitfalls onstrate why it cannot be celebrated as
suggest that one should be skeptical of, though it were historically neutral.

Nell Irvin Painter
WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH threats posed by Mexicans and “welfare

WHITE PEOPLE? queens.” Metzl calculates that “Tennes-
It’s not hard to see how ethnic and racial see’s refusal to expand Medicaid cost
minorities—and the polity at large— every single white resident of the state 14.1
might be harmed when white-identify- days of life,” presumably on average.
ing citizens decide to vote and organize Metzl also examines the health conse-
specifically as white people. But to quences of Missouri’s 2016 “constitu-
what extent does such political behav- tional carry” bill, a piece of legislation
ior actually benefit white people on an that dramatically widened an individual’s
individual level? Metzl explores that right to bear arms in that state. He
question and finds that, at least in reports on conversations he had with
Kansas, Missouri, and Tennessee, white members of a support group for people
identity politics has resulted in physical who have lost a loved one to suicide.
and intellectual harm to some white Kim’s father committed suicide with a gun
people. Metzl, a medical doctor and a after “he got worried about protection,
professor of sociology and psychiatry at security, you know, and terrorism and
Vanderbilt University, has produced a intruders.” For Metzl, “terrorism and
data-driven book that alternates be- intruders” translates into fears associ-
tween narrative and analysis. Metzl also ated with immigrants and the country’s
relies on personal interviews to shed first African American president. His
light on how public policy affects par- nonwhite interviewees, less fearful of the
ticular people and how they process the unknown, are less attached to their
conflicts between their physical well- rights to own and carry firearms. Kim
being and their political convictions. joins all the others in her suicide support
He wants to know why “lower- and group in rejecting proposals to
middle-class white Americans vote strengthen gun control, even given the
against their own biological self-interest near certainty that someone attempting
as well as their own economic priorities.” suicide with a gun—statistically most
Metzl begins in Tennessee with a likely to be a white man—will succeed.
white man he refers to as Trevor (Metzl “It’s not the gun’s fault,” says one of the
uses pseudonyms throughout), who is group’s members. “Guns are important to
poor, lacks health insurance, and suffers us and to our liberties.”
from an inflamed liver, hepatitis C, and But Metzl cannot come up with
jaundice. Trevor staunchly supports his concrete means of saving white people’s
state’s refusal to embrace Obamacare by lives within the logic of whiteness. His
expanding Medicaid coverage, even main advice is that white people should be
though that refusal deprives him of the less fearful of social change; they should
care he needs to save his life. “Of what understand that it is not a zero-sum game.
was Trevor dying?” Metzl asks. The
answer, he says, is the “toxic effects of NO WAY OUT?
dogma” and “American notions of white- Racial identity, these three authors
ness.” That dogma, according to Metzl, realize, is a gut-level belief that’s very
equates Obamacare with intrusive govern- hard to shake. U.S. history has shown
ment and intrusive government with the difficulty of getting masses of white
people to further their economic self- It is true that vast numbers of white-
interest by banding together with identified people are unhappy with their
nonwhites—which might explain why all loss of privileges. But those privileges
three balk at advocating fundamental depended on distortions of Western
political change, at least in the short run. democratic values that produced a kind
All three of these books portray of hereditary aristocracy of whiteness.
white identity politics as conservative The question before Americans at this
and Republican, as if being white- time concerns the value they place on
identified leads in only one direction their democracy when one of the coun-
politically. Although they evince vary- try’s two main political parties has
ing degrees of sympathy for such embraced antidemocratic leadership and
politics, all three concur that they are policies. Democracy will suffer as long
harming American society. Even as the Republican Party continues to
though Kaufmann and Jardina see white function as a white people’s party, as it
identity politics as a normal response to increasingly does. The presidential
perceived threats, they also see a need election of 2016 offered some hope for
to pull back from a reactionary trend. the future, as some three million more
Kaufmann says white people need voters opposed Trump than supported
“reassurance,” which will open the way him. Now, three years later, the choice
“for a return to more relaxed, harmoni- between Trump’s white nationalism and
ous and trusting societies,” as when the multiculturalism of the Democrats
white people sat securely on top. appears even starker. One can only hope
Jardina is more fearful, seeing aggrieved that increasing numbers of Americans
whites as an “untapped well . . . ready will conclude that standing at the top
to be stoked by politicians willing to go of a racial hierarchy is not worth the loss
down a potentially very dark path.” of American democracy.∂
Although she believes that an enlarge-
ment of whiteness (along the lines of
Kaufmann’s white shift) will most likely
occur, she sees it as insufficient. Like
Metzl, she wishes white identifiers would
become less fearful of social change. But
she doesn’t suggest any particular means
of encouraging that outcome. For his part,
Metzl concludes with a plea for what he
terms “white humility” and asks, “What
might American politics look like if
white humility was seen not as a sellout
or a capitulation but as an honest effort
to address seemingly intractable social
issues?” If only white Americans would
attempt cooperation rather than
domination, American society might
move away from “a biology of demise.”

(HFTs), none of which bore any visible

The Virtue of fruit. For the truth is that even with
the rise of high-frequency trading since
Monopoly the early years of this century, actual
mom-and-pop investors have never had
it so good. Armed with online accounts
Why the Stock Market offering trades for minuscule fees, they
Stopped Working see their transactions go through instan-
taneously, without the sorts of delays
Felix Salmon that can allow the market to move against
them before their order is filled. If the
stock market is broken, it’s not broken in
a way that is obvious to retail investors.
Darkness by Design: The Hidden Power in Yet Lewis was right to worry about
Global Capital Markets HFTs; he just misidentified their main
BY WALTER MAT TLI. Princeton victims. This is the revelation at the
University Press, 2019, 264 pp. heart of Walter Mattli’s masterful
Darkness by Design. Great books make you
reexamine your assumptions, and this one
Y
ou’ve heard the story many delivers in spades. It not only offers a
times. The stock market is compelling critique of how the stock
rigged. A highly secretive group market has evolved over the past 15
of opaque financial institutions is years; it also forces readers to reconsider
making billions of dollars from socially the idea that competition is good and
useless high-frequency trading—plac- monopolies are bad. What has truly tilted
ing and withdrawing stock orders the playing field in favor of a handful of
hundreds of thousands of times per financial behemoths and HFTs, Mattli
second—with all those profits coming, argues, is the growing fragmentation of
in one way or another, from the rest of stock markets, a process actively en-
us. The biggest losers of all? Small, couraged by misguided government
mom-and-pop, or retail, investors, who regulators. The biggest losers of that
cannot hope to compete. development are not retail investors, who
Perhaps the best-known proponent tend to be fairly well-off, but pension
of this narrative is the author and funds, insurance companies, and other
financial journalist Michael Lewis. In major institutional investors.
his 2014 book, Flash Boys, Lewis painted Those financial behemoths are, in
the stock market as a battle in which fact, the proverbial little guy. One of the
the good guys were losing to the bad paradoxes of financial terminology is
guys. The book sold well and even that terms such as “retail investor” and
instigated a handful of criminal investi- “small business owner” connote the
gations into high-frequency traders relatively impecunious, whereas in fact
those investors and owners are dispro-
FELIX SALMON is Chief Financial Correspon- portionately likely to be in the top one
dent for Axios. percent of the wealth distribution. The
The Virtue of Monopoly
big investors—pension funds, insurance preferences when it comes to market

companies, mutual funds, and exchange- structure and rules. When those mem-
traded funds—are much more likely to bers have similar amounts of power, the
be holding the wealth of the 99 percent. result is often a democratic compro-
Ordinary investors are being ripped off mise in which the greater good prevails.
every day; they just don’t see it, be- But when financial institutions garner
cause it is happening behind the scenes for themselves an outsize degree of
of their life insurance policies and their power and influence, they can end up
index-fund investments. skewing the market structure in their
favor, at the expense of ideals such as
A FATEFUL BATHROOM BREAK liquidity and trustworthiness. That, in a
Mattli is a political scientist, and his nutshell, is what has happened in the
great insight is to consider the stock global stock market—with the largest
market more as a political entity than banks and brokerage companies refash-
an economic one. To Mattli, markets ioning markets to serve their own ends.
are first and foremost “political institu- Mattli’s book is the result of years of
tions governed by power relations.” research into the history of the New
Different members have differing York Stock Exchange and its member
companies. Granular
detail about market
regulation might not
sound like the stuff of
a great read. But
Mattli spent a lot of
time in the NYSE’s
archives and inter-
viewed many of its
former employees
and traders. As a
result, Darkness by
Design has an uncom-
mon richness to it.
Take a story that
neatly illuminates
how much has
I L L U S T R A T I O N B Y D AV I D P L U N K E R T
changed for the worse

under today’s regula-
tory regime. Bob
Seijas, a 33-year
employee of the NYSE,
told Mattli about a
coworker who in the
1980s was fined
$50,000 (well above

Felix Salmon
$100,000 in today’s dollars) because he market in which, as Mattli writes,

left his post to go to the men’s room for almost everybody was “socialized into
eight minutes and gave inadequate the value system of the Exchange” and
instructions to his assistant. The man in had strong financial and reputational
question worked as a specialist—an incentives to live up to those values.
employee at the exchange who serves as
an intermediary between buyers and WHEN BAD GOVERNANCE PAYS
sellers. Part of his job was to buy into Those days are over. When the NYSE
selling pressure—buying stocks even as was a monopoly, before 2005, a single
their prices were falling so as to ensure rogue specialist could destroy the
smoothly continuous trading. But when reputation of the entire franchise, and
the specialist went to the bathroom, his so the exchange was always working to
assistant didn’t keep buying, and the improve its governance standards. But
price of the stock he was charged with the NYSE is no longer the only game in
overseeing fell sharply, by 75 cents. town. Today, there are 23 different
Seijas later defended the specialist, registered “national securities ex-
saying that the man had spent four hours changes” in the United States, of which
performing superbly before taking a the NYSE is merely the second largest,
bathroom break. A colleague simply accounting for about 12 percent of the
retorted, “Don’t tell me he stopped at 20 total U.S. market. It competes directly
red lights and only passed one.” with exchanges bearing names such as
Indeed, the specialist himself likely MIAX, Cboe BYX, and Nasdaq MRX (not
expected a penalty and understood that if to be confused with Nasdaq BX, Nasdaq
negligence went unpunished, the conse- GEMX, Nasdaq ISE, or Nasdaq PHLX—
quences for his chosen vocation would be none of which is the main Nasdaq
much worse than a one-off $50,000 hit. exchange that ordinary investors know
From the 1980s all the way to the early about). And because it has to compete,
years of this century, any such breach of the NYSE has gone from a powerful
protocol was almost certain to be norm setter and regulator in its own
punished, reinforcing the trust that all right to just another market partici-
participants had in the market. pant, trying to bolster its position at
Specialists played a central role in any cost. Today, stock prices move up
maintaining that trust. They under- or down by 75 cents almost every
stood trading patterns, knew who the minute of every day, and the NYSE has
big buyers and sellers were, and knew neither the ability nor the inclination
how best to match the two without to stop that from happening.
affecting prices. They made money, but “In the new era of fragmented mar-
they did so transparently, surrounded kets,” Mattli writes, “costly investments
by traders who watched their every move. in good governance and commitments
Attempts to front-run the market— to fairness, equality, and transparency
buying or selling ahead of a client’s have to be balanced against an overriding
pending order to pad one’s own profits new mandate to attract liquidity to
at the expense of the client—were survive.” Exchanges do everything they
almost always detected. The result was a can to attract the business of the major
players, who do millions of trades per
second, often accommodating them in
ways that benefit those players at the INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE
expense of other participants in the REPORT NO. 77
market. Although no playing field is
entirely level, today the market is much
more tilted toward a handful of ultra-
sophisticated traders than it ever was
during the days of the NYSE’s monopoly.
The state bodies monitoring the
exchanges suffer from the same lack of
cohesion, with predictable results:
when an economic sector is governed by Innovation
multiple regulators, actors will con-
stantly engage in regulatory arbitrage, and National
Security
rewarding the most lenient regulators
while diverting their activities away
from the most stringent. Before the
2008 financial crisis, for instance, two
U.S. bank regulators—the Office of Keeping Our Edge
Thrift Supervision and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency—com-
peted with each other to attract banks, Without an ambitious new
which could choose which agency’s strategy, the United States risks
regulation to submit to. That never made losing its leadership in science
much sense, and lawmakers merged the and technology.
two as part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act. But to this day, the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) compete READ THE REPORT
with each other to regulate markets. cfr.org/KeepingOurEdge
(Blame congressional politics: the CFTC
is governed by the House and Senate
Agriculture Committees, whereas the
SEC is governed by the House Financial
Services Committee and the Senate
Banking Committee.)
In earlier days, the concentration of
market power at the NYSE made up for
this regulatory confusion. When it came
to stock trading, the exchange proved a
much more capable regulator than the
187
Felix Salmon
SEC or any other federal agency ever did. Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, and
The NYSE enforcement arm had deep Merrill Lynch—that had spent limitless
institutional knowledge. It knew, for hours and dollars on lobbying the SEC
instance, that if a broker placed a trade to push Reg NMS through. Rather than
in IBM stock at 12:04:45 PM, he would being a utility owned by its members,
need at least 22 seconds to walk over to the NYSE was now a profit-maximizing
a different specialist to place a different entity like all the other exchanges.
trade. The NYSE used this kind of On top of there being competition
information to conduct forensic exami- among the many new exchanges, every
nations of suspicious transactions, major broker-dealer also engages in
examinations that the SEC would find “internalization”—effectively acting as
completely impossible to perform. its own mini-exchange and fulfilling
Today, however, the regulators are on orders with its own inventory of shares
their own; the individual exchanges rather than sending them on to any
have all but abdicated even the pretense exchange at all. Not so long ago, if you
of having a governance structure with phoned up a broker and placed an order
any teeth. And as Mattli points out, to buy 100 shares of IBM, that order
“The creation of exploitative schemes by would likely be filled on the NYSE.
particularly powerful actors to benefit Today, HFTs compete with one another
themselves is rational in a system of bad to pay your broker for the privilege of
governance because the chances of getting taking the other side of your trade. This
caught are tiny and the reputational or fragmentation benefits HFTs, who are
material consequences of such behavior constantly searching for order flows
are largely insignificant while the profits that they can keep for themselves rather
from such schemes are high.” than having to compete for them on an
open market. It also helps the major
THE END OF AN EMPIRE global securities firms that orchestrated
What caused this enormous change? the end of the NYSE monopoly in the
The short answer is the Regulation first place, since they are paid for—or
National Market System, or Reg NMS, a take direct advantage of—the retail
rule promulgated in 2005 by the SEC in order flow that they generate. Between
the name of market efficiency. It osten- them, these huge companies now have
sibly modernized markets by moving a market share north of 70 percent.
stock trading away from the NYSE and The big test of any stock market is
toward numerous other exchanges, but whether it has depth: whether it’s
it also marked the death of the old possible to buy or sell a large number of
NYSE. Up until that point, the exchange shares in a small amount of time without
was a mutual society: firms could buy moving the market. Traders will natu-
seats, and the exchange was owned by rally flock to such a market, creating even
its members. After 2005, it demutual- more depth—a virtuous cycle that results
ized, stopped selling seats, and became in monopolies, such as the one the NYSE
just one among many exchanges, most enjoyed until 2005. The NYSE’s monopoly,
of which were owned and operated by in turn, allowed it to be technically
enormous global broker-dealers—think innovative, introducing everything from
The Virtue of Monopoly
the first stock ticker (1867) and the first markets and jurisdictions. No regulator
trading-floor telephones (1878) to a can hope to keep up, so these highly
system capable of processing four billion secretive companies effectively operate
shares a day (1999). No other stock with no code, no morals, and no values.
exchange in the world could come close. Their only motivation is profit.
Today’s internalization, by contrast, Investors once hoped that so-called
has created a classic tragedy of the dark pools would offer a way out of the
commons: big banks free-ride on the depth problem. Dark pools exploded in
NYSE’s ticker, trading at the prices it popularity after 2005, since large
publishes in real time, without contribut- institutions could no longer count on
ing to its liquidity. The consequences the NYSE’s specialists to provide ample
became clear during the “flash crash” of liquidity and found themselves being
May 2010, when billions of dollars of outpaced by HFTS on smaller exchanges.
value suddenly evaporated, only to Because orders placed in dark pools are
reappear minutes later. Without the deep not visible to other traders until they
liquidity and oversight of the old NYSE have been executed, the hope was that
there was no one to prevent thousands of HFTs would not be able to make money
stocks from collectively plunging and front-running these transactions. In
then rebounding. Worse still, that kind of reality, however, even dark pools are
event happens every day in individual infested with HFTS, whose trade volume
stocks; the only unusual thing about the the pools rely on to remain profitable.
flash crash was that it took place in many
stocks simultaneously. HIGH-FREQUENCY MANIPULATORS
As the flash crash proved, today’s The HFTs are in control of the markets
market lacks depth. Large investors now. They are the must-have customers
want to move billions of dollars in and for any exchange, because they drive
out of the stock market but cannot do most of the volume and liquidity in the
so without prices moving against them, market. The exchanges, many of them
their orders being front-run by HFTs. created to serve the HFTs, cannot
The HFTs who benefit from this system themselves prevent the latter’s domi-
are the embodiment of what Adair nance. Nor can regulators, who are
Turner, then chair of the United King- confined to single markets in single
dom’s Financial Services Authority, countries, whereas HFTs roam globally.
famously characterized as “socially By the time a regulator has found a
useless” financial activity. They reinvest vaguely suspicious transaction, the
their profits into machines that can algorithms HFTs use have long since
trade in microseconds rather than moved on to something new.
milliseconds; those profits would surely Even when blatantly illegal activity
serve a higher purpose if they were happens right under their noses, regula-
invested in other parts of the economy. tors generally ignore it. From 2006 to
And as these outfits become bigger and 2010, the NYSE gave HFTs a physical
more sophisticated, they trade increas- trading-speed advantage by openly
ingly complex financial products—all allowing them to place their trading
invented by banks—across dozens of computers right inside the exchange.

Felix Salmon
This practice was, as Mattli notes, a market events per day. Its computers
patent violation of securities law. But flag about one percent of those—500
instead of punishing the NYSE, the million events per day—and a single
regulators simply waited for the exchange flag can create weeks of work for a team
to ask permission, which eventually it of regulatory investigators. The vast
did. Then the SEC granted that permis- majority of suspicious transactions
sion. Other cases involve special order likely go uninvestigated.
types, or SOTs—extremely arcane forms A couple of glimmers of hope
of placing a trade, designed to give HFTs remain. The European Union has made
an extra advantage over real-money decent strides in improving investor
investors. On rare occasions, the SEC has protections with a 2018 directive called
levied fines on exchanges for implement- MiFID II, a new version of the Markets
ing SOTs without permission, but the in Financial Instruments Directive,
fines are tiny compared with the profits which forces exchanges to be much
the SOTs generate. more transparent about conflicts of
Mattli has a whole chapter on various interest in their disclosures to investors.
forms of market manipulation that are In 2012, France implemented a 0.1
unequivocally harmful but ubiquitous. percent tax on the value of canceled or
There are the ways that banks have modified orders, which is a strong disin-
allowed HFTs into dark pools even after centive to engage in quote stuffing or
promising large investors that they spoofing. And there are even occasional
would not, for instance. There is quote discussions, so far confined largely to
stuffing—placing millions of essentially academia, about moving to so-called
fake orders for stocks, at prices far discontinuous markets, where stocks
enough removed from the market price would be allowed to trade a mere ten
that the orders won’t ever be filled— times per second—slow enough that HFTs
which makes it impossible to see how could not front-run orders.
much liquidity there is in any given Ironically, the greatest hope of all
security. That happens 125 times per may be that the technological arms race
day, on average, across 75 percent of all between HFTs and exchanges will
U.S.-listed equities. And there is spoof- become so astronomically expensive
ing—investors placing and then imme- that it will force the world’s biggest
diately withdrawing orders near the exchanges into megamergers with one
market price that they never actually another, resulting in a new global
intended to see through—which also monopoly spanning countries and
happens every day in every major stock. markets. The idea of a single trading
The nefarious activity is clear to all, venue for stocks, bonds, currencies, and
as is the lack of any real enforcement. derivatives, operating 24 hours a day,
The regulators are not only captured by oblivious not only to regulators but also
the big banks; they are also completely out to time zones, admittedly sounds
of their depth technologically. By some terrifyingly dystopian. But the lesson of
counts, the Financial Industry Regula- Mattli’s book is that sometimes giants
tory Authority, a private regulator can be relatively benign. It is when they
overseen by the SEC, monitors 50 billion break apart that chaos results. ∂
new market form pioneered by Facebook

The New Masters and Google. In The Age of Surveillance
Capitalism, she argues that capitalism is
of the Universe once again extending the sphere of the
market, this time by claiming “human
experience as free raw material for
Big Tech and the Business of hidden commercial practices of extrac-
Surveillance tion, prediction, and sales.” With the
rise of “ubiquitous computing” (the
Paul Starr spread of computers into all realms of
life) and the Internet of Things (the
connection of everyday objects to the
The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Internet), the extraction of data has
Fight for a Human Future at the New become pervasive. We live in a world
Frontier of Power increasingly populated with networked
BY SHOSHANA ZUBOF F. devices that capture our communica-
PublicAffairs, 2019, 704 pp. tions, movements, behavior, and rela-
tionships, even our emotions and states
I
n his 1944 classic, The Great Trans- of mind. And, Zuboff warns, surveil-
formation, the economic historian lance capitalism has thus far escaped
Karl Polanyi told the story of the sort of countermovement described
modern capitalism as a “double move- by Polanyi.
ment” that led to both the expansion of Zuboff ’s book is a brilliant, arresting
the market and its restriction. During analysis of the digital economy and a
the eighteenth and early nineteenth plea for a social awakening about the
centuries, old feudal restraints on enormity of the changes that technol-
commerce were abolished, and land, labor, ogy is imposing on political and social
and money came to be treated as com- life. Most Americans see the threats
modities. But unrestrained capitalism posed by technology companies as
ravaged the environment, damaged matters of privacy. But Zuboff shows
public health, and led to economic panics that surveillance capitalism involves
and depressions, and by the time more than the accumulation of personal
Polanyi was writing, societies had rein- data on an unprecedented scale. The
troduced limits on the market. technology firms and their experts—
Shoshana Zuboff, a professor emerita whom Zuboff labels “the new priest-
at the Harvard Business School, sees a hood”—are creating new forms of power
new version of the first half of Polanyi’s and means of behavioral modification
double movement at work today with that operate outside individual awareness
the rise of “surveillance capitalism,” a and public accountability. Checking this
priesthood’s power will require a new
PAUL STARR is Professor of Sociology and countermovement—one that restrains
Public Affairs at Princeton University and the
author of Entrenchment: Wealth, Power, and surveillance capitalism in the name of
the Constitution of Democratic Societies. personal freedom and democracy.

Paul Starr
THE RISE OF THE

MACHINES
A reaction against the
power of the technol-
ogy industry is already
underway. The U.S.
Justice Department and
the Federal Trade
Commission are con-
ducting antitrust
investigations of Ama-
zon, Apple, Facebook,
and Google. In July, the
FTC levied a $5 billion
fine on Facebook for
violating promises to
consumers that the
company made in its
own privacy policies
(the United States,
unlike the European
Union, has no general
law protecting online
privacy). Congress is
considering legislation
to limit technology
companies’ use of data and roll back the of this year, there was a viral panic
broad immunity from liability for user- about FaceApp, a mobile application for
generated content that it granted them in editing pictures of faces that millions of
the Communications Decency Act of Americans had downloaded to see
1996. This national debate, still uncertain projected images of themselves at older
in its ultimate impact, makes Zuboff’s ages. Created by a Russian firm, the app
book all the more timely and relevant. was rumored to be used by Russian
The rise of surveillance capitalism intelligence to gather facial recognition
I L L U ST R AT I O N BY T H E P RO J E C T T WI N S
also has an international dimension. data, perhaps to create deepfake videos—

U.S. companies have long dominated rumors that the firm has denied. Early
the technology industry and the Internet, last year, a Chinese company’s acquisition
arousing suspicion and opposition in of the gay dating app Grindr stirred
other countries. Now, chastened by the concern about the potential use of the
experience of Russian interference in app’s data to compromise individuals and
the 2016 U.S. presidential election, U.S. national security; the federal
Americans are getting nervous about Committee on Foreign Investment in the
stores of personal data falling into the United States has since ordered the
hands of hostile foreign powers. In July Chinese firm to avoid accessing Grindr’s
The New Masters of the Universe
data and divest itself entirely of Grindr improve user services. Together with
by June 2020. It is not hard to imagine the company’s formidable capabilities in
how the rivalry between the United artificial intelligence, Google’s enor-
States and China could lead not only to a mous flows of data enabled it to create
technology divorce but also to two what Zuboff sees as the true basis of the
different worlds of everyday surveillance. surveillance industry—“prediction
According to Zuboff, surveillance products,” which anticipate what users
capitalism originated with the brilliant will do “now, soon, and later.” Predicting
discoveries and brazen claims of one what people will buy is the key to
American firm. “Google,” she writes, “is advertising, but behavioral predictions
to surveillance capitalism what the Ford have obvious value for other purposes,
Motor Company and General Motors as well, such as insurance, hiring
were to mass-production-based manage- decisions, and political campaigns.
rial capitalism.” Incorporated in 1998, Zuboff ’s analysis helps make sense
Google soon came to dominate Internet of the seemingly unrelated services
search. But initially, it did not focus on offered by Google, its diverse ventures
advertising and had no clear path to and many acquisitions. Gmail, Google
profitability. What it did have was a Maps, the Android operating system,
groundbreaking insight: the collateral YouTube, Google Home, even self-
data it derived from searches—the driving cars—these and dozens of other
numbers and patterns of queries, their services are all ways, Zuboff argues, of
phrasing, people’s click patterns, and so expanding the company’s “supply
on—could be used to improve Google’s routes” for user data both on- and
search results and add new services for offline. Asking for permission to obtain
users. This would attract more users, those data has not been part of the
which would in turn further improve its company’s operating style. For instance,
search engine in a recursive cycle of when the company was developing
learning and expansion. Street View, a feature of its mapping
Google’s commercial breakthrough service that displays photographs of
came in 2002, when it saw that it could different locations, it went ahead and
also use the collateral data it collected recorded images of streets and homes in
to profile the users themselves according different countries without first asking
to their characteristics and interests. for local permission, fighting off opposi-
Then, instead of matching ads with tion as it arose. In the surveillance
search queries, the company could match business, any undefended area of social
ads with individual users. Targeting ads life is fair game.
precisely and efficiently to individuals is This pattern of expansion reflects an
the Holy Grail of advertising. Rather underlying logic of the industry: in the
than being Google’s customers, Zuboff competition for artificial intelligence
argues, the users became its raw-material and surveillance revenues, the advantage
suppliers, from whom the firm derived goes to the firms that can acquire both
what she calls “behavioral surplus.” vast and varied streams of data. The
That surplus consists of the data above other companies engaged in surveillance
and beyond what Google needs to capitalism at the highest level—Amazon,

Paul Starr
Facebook, Microsoft, and the big processes of personalization, however,

telecommunications companies—also can be used to modify behavior and
face the same expansionary imperatives. beliefs. This is the core concern of
Step by step, the industry has expanded Zuboff ’s book: the creation of a largely
both the scope of surveillance (by covert system of power and domination.
migrating from the virtual into the real
world) and the depth of surveillance MAKE THEM DANCE
(by plumbing the interiors of individu- From extracting data and making
als’ lives and accumulating data on their predictions, the technology firms have
personalities, moods, and emotions). gone on to intervening in the real
The surveillance industry has not world. After all, what better way to
faced much resistance because users like improve predictions than to guide how
its personalized information and free people act? The industry term for
products. Indeed, they like them so shaping behavior is “actuation.” In
much that they readily agree to oner- pursuit of actuation, Zuboff writes, the
ous, one-sided terms of service. When technology firms “nudge, tune, herd,
the FaceApp controversy blew up, many manipulate, and modify behavior in
people who had used the app were specific directions by executing actions
surprised to learn that they had agreed as subtle as inserting a specific phrase
to give the company “a perpetual, into your Facebook news feed, timing
irrevocable, nonexclusive, royalty-free, the appearance of a BUY button on your
worldwide, fully-paid, transferable phone, or shutting down your car engine
sub-licensable license to use, reproduce, when an insurance payment is late.”
modify, adapt, publish, translate, create Evidence of the industry’s capacity
derivative works from, distribute, to modify behavior on a mass scale
publicly perform and display your User comes from two studies conducted by
Content and any name, username or Facebook. During the 2010 U.S. con-
likeness provided in connection with gressional elections, the company’s
your User Content in all media formats researchers ran a randomized, con-
and channels now known or later trolled experiment on 61 million users.
developed, without compensation to Users were split up into three groups.
you.” But this wasn’t some devious Two groups were shown information
Russian formulation. As Wired pointed about voting (such as the location of
out, Facebook has just as onerous terms polling places) at the top of their
of service. Facebook news feeds; users in one of
Even if Congress enacts legislation these groups also received a social
barring companies from imposing such message containing up to six pictures of
extreme terms, it is unlikely to resolve Facebook friends who had already voted.
the problems Zuboff raises. Most The third group received no special
people are probably willing to accept voting information. The intervention
the use of data to personalize their had a significant effect on those who
services and display advertising predicted received the social message: the research-
to be of interest to them, and Congress ers estimated that the experiment led to
is unlikely to stop that. The same 340,000 additional votes being cast. In a
second experiment, Facebook research-
ers tailored the emotional content of
users’ news feeds, in some cases reduc-
ing the number of friends’ posts ex-
pressing positive emotions and in other
cases reducing their negative posts.
They found that those who viewed
more negative posts in their news feeds Assistant Editor
went on to make more negative posts
themselves, demonstrating, as the title
Foreign Affairs is looking for
of the published article about the study
Assistant Editors to join our
put it, “massive-scale emotional contagion
editorial team.
through social networks.”
The 2016 Brexit and U.S. elections
The Assistant Editor position
provided real-world examples of covert
is a full-time paid job offering
disinformation delivered via Facebook.
exceptional training in serious
Not only had the company previously
journalism. Previous Assistant
allowed the political consulting firm
Editors have included recent
Cambridge Analytica to harvest personal
graduates from undergraduate and
data on tens of millions of Facebook
master’s programs. Candidates
users; during the 2016 U.S. election, it
should have a serious interest in
also permitted microtargeting of
international relations, a flair for
“unpublished page post ads,” generally
writing, and a facility with the
known as “dark posts,” which were
English language.
invisible to the public at large. These
were delivered to users as part of their
Assistant Editors work for one year,
news feeds along with regular content,
starting in June.
and when users liked, commented on,
or shared them, their friends saw the
For more information about how
same ads, now personally endorsed. But
to apply for the 2020–21 Assistant
the dark posts then disappeared and
Editor position, please visit:
were never publicly archived. Micro-
targeting of ads is not inherently
illegitimate, but journalists are unable to www.foreignaffairs.com/Apply
police deception and political opponents
cannot rebut attacks when social media Applications are due by
deliver such messages outside the public January 28, 2020.
sphere. The delivery of covert disinfor-
mation on a mass basis is fundamentally
inimical to democratic debate.
Facebook has since eliminated dark
posts and made other changes in
response to public criticism, but Zuboff
is still right about this central point:
195
Paul Starr
“Facebook owns an unprecedented means Such aspirations imply a radical

of behavior modification that operates inequality of power between the people
covertly, at scale, and in the absence of who control the play list and the people
social or legal mechanisms of agree- who dance to it. In the last third of her
ment, contest, and control.” No law, for book, Zuboff takes her analysis up a level,
example, bars Facebook from adjusting identifying the theoretical ideas and
its users’ news feeds to favor one general model of society that she sees as
political party or another (and in the implicit in surveillance capitalism. The
United States, such a law might well be animating idea behind surveillance
held unconstitutional). As a 2018 study capitalism, Zuboff says, is that of the
by The Wall Street Journal showed, psychologist B. F. Skinner, who re-
YouTube’s recommendation algorithm garded the belief in human freedom as an
was feeding viewers videos from ever illusion standing in the way of a more
more extreme fringe groups. That harmonious, controlled world. Now, in
algorithm and others represent an Zuboff’s view, the technology industry is
enormous source of power over beliefs developing the means of behavior modifi-
and behavior. cation to carry out Skinner’s program.
Surveillance capitalism, according to The emerging system of domination,
Zuboff, is moving society in a funda- Zuboff cautions, is not totalitarian; it
mentally antidemocratic direction. With has no need for violence and no interest
the advent of ubiquitous computing, in ideological conformity. Instead, it is
the industry dreams of creating trans- what she calls “instrumentarian”—it
portation systems and whole cities with uses everyday surveillance and actuation
built-in mechanisms for controlling to channel people in directions pre-
behavior. Using sensors, cameras, and ferred by those in control. As an exam-
location data, Sidewalk Labs, a subsid- ple, she describes China’s efforts to
iary of Google’s parent company, introduce a social credit system that
Alphabet, envisions a “for-profit city” scores individuals by their behavior,
with the means of enforcing city their friends, and other aspects of their
regulations and with dynamic online lives and then uses this score to deter-
markets for city services. The system mine each individual’s access to services
would require people to use Sidewalk’s and privileges. The Chinese system
mobile payment system and allow the fuses instrumentarian power and the
firm, as its CEO, Dan Doctoroff, ex- state (and it is interested in political
plained in a 2016 talk, to “target ads to conformity), but its emerging American
people in proximity, and then obvi- counterpart may fuse instrumentarian
ously over time track them through power and the market.
things like beacons and location
services as well as their browsing activ- NO FUTURE?
ity.” One software developer for an The Age of Surveillance Capitalism is a
Internet of Things company told powerful and passionate book, the
Zuboff, “We are learning how to write product of a deep immersion in both
the music, and then we let the music technology and business that is also
make them dance.” informed by an understanding of
The New Masters of the Universe
history and a commitment to human provoke—not only in the United States

freedom. Zuboff seems, however, but also around the world. The global
unable to resist the most dire, overreach of American surveillance capital-
the-top formulations of her argument. ism may be only a temporary phase.
She writes, for example, that the indus- Nationalism is on the march today, and
try has gone “from automating infor- the technology industry is in its path:
mation flows about you to automating countries that want to chart their own
you.” An instrumentarian system of destiny will not continue to allow U.S.
behavior modification, she says, is not companies to control their platforms for
just a possibility but an inevitability, communication and politics.
driven by surveillance capitalism’s own The competition of rival firms and
internal logic: “Just as industrial political systems may also complicate any
capitalism was driven to the continuous efforts to reform the technology indus-
intensification of the means of produc- try in the United States. Would it be a
tion, so surveillance capitalists are . . . good thing, for example, to heavily
now locked in a cycle of continuous regulate major U.S. technology firms if
intensification of the means of behav- their Chinese rivals gained as a result?
ioral modification.” The U.S. companies at least profess
As a warning, Zuboff ’s argument liberal democratic values. The trick is
deserves to be heard, but Americans passing laws to hold them to these
are far from mere puppets in the hands values. If Zuboff ’s book helps awaken a
of Silicon Valley. The puzzle here is countermovement to achieve that
that Zuboff rejects a rhetoric of result, we may yet be able to avoid the
“inevitabilism”—“the dictatorship of no dark future she sees being born today.∂
alternatives”—but her book gives little
basis for thinking we can avoid the new
technologies of control, and she has
little to say about specific alternatives
herself. Prophecy you will find here;
policy, not so much. She rightly argues
that breaking up the big technology
companies would not resolve the prob-
lems she raises, although antitrust action
may well be justified for other reasons.
Some reformers have suggested creating
an entirely new regulatory structure to
deal with the power of digital platforms
and improve “algorithmic accountabil-
ity”—that is, identifying and remedying
the harms from algorithms. But all of
that lies outside this book.
The more power major technology
platforms exercise over politics and
society, the more opposition they will

of liberalism. Mill insisted that politi-

Recent Books cal institutions had to manage the
tradeoffs between liberty and equality
and foster the social conditions for
Political and Legal individuals to flourish. In the United
States, the reformist ideas of Theodore
G. John Ikenberry Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and other
progressives in the early twentieth
century brought these impulses into the
What Was Liberalism? The Past, Present, industrial age, but only through Presi-
and Promise of a Noble Idea dent Franklin Roosevelt and the New
BY JAMES TRAUB . Basic Books, 2019, Deal did modern liberalism find a way
320 pp. to bridge a Jeffersonian appeal to
citizenship and a Hamiltonian commit-
A
s liberals grapple with rising ment to an activist state. Traub argues
populism and authoritarianism, that liberalism lost its way in the 1990s,
Traub turns to history and aligning itself with globalization and
theory to reclaim liberalism’s principles. losing its deeper commitment to a
His book mounts one of the best efforts progressive vision of nationalism and
of this kind yet, tracing liberalism’s core the common man.
ideas from the age of democratic
revolutions to the grand ideological Empire of Democracy: The Remaking of the
struggles of the twentieth century to the West Since the Cold War, 1971–2017
convulsions of the current vexed mo- BY SIMON REID -HENRY . Simon &
ment. Traub shows that liberalism is an Schuster, 2019, 880 pp.
amalgam of often conflicting ideas:
classical republican principles, Lockean In this massive, kaleidoscopic history of
individualism, the commitment to the current democratic age, Reid-Henry
popular sovereignty, and evolving finds the roots of the crisis of modern
notions of rights and progressive social liberal democracy in the early 1970s. He
ideals. Various settings and figures argues that a series of small changes in
populate the narrative, but Traub sees economic, social, and political life
John Stuart Mill as the pivotal thinker across the Western world conspired to
linking the classical and modern strains erode the consensus-oriented model of
WALTER RUSSELL MEAD has retired as reviewer of the section on the United States,
and we thank him for his outstanding contributions. We are fortunate to have as his suc-
cessor JESSICA T. MATHEWS , a distinguished fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. From 1997 to 2015, she served as Carnegie’s president. Prior to that,
she was director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Washington Program and a senior
fellow at CFR. Earlier in her career, she served as deputy to the U.S. undersecretary of
state for global affairs during the Clinton administration and as director of the Office
of Global Issues at the National Security Council during the Carter administration.
Recent Books
democracy that had emerged after globalization, the fact remains that the
World War II. The Bretton Woods world is more intensely interconnected
regime collapsed, triggering shifts in than ever before. From financial mar-
how governments cooperated and kets to refugee flows to production
managed their economies. The OPEC oil networks, there is no escaping the ways
shocks ushered in stagflation and an in which modern societies are vulner-
end to the early postwar commitments able to one another. Weiss and Wilkinson
to full employment. New forms of argue that scholars must urgently make
identity politics followed the cultural the case that international cooperation
upheavals of the 1960s. Crucially, strengthens rather than weakens people’s
centrist forces and institutions across ability to take control of and improve
the Western system began to break up their own lives.
in this era as the old compromises
between labor and capital frayed. In the This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the
battle of ideas, the postwar Keynesian War Against Reality
consensus gave way to conservative BY PETER POMERANTSEV .
theories about monetarism and the PublicAffairs, 2019, 256 pp.
deregulation of markets. Many of these
stories are familiar, but Reid-Henry is Combining personal memoir with
particularly good at revealing the subtle investigative reporting, Pomerantsev
social and cultural transformations that shares vivid and chilling reports from the
unfolded in dozens of countries, including frontlines of the disinformation wars.
some often overlooked places. He explores the worlds of hackers, trolls,
and purveyors of fake news, making
Rethinking Global Governance stops in the Philippines, Russia, Serbia,
BY THOMAS G. WEISS AND Turkey, Ukraine, and a number of
RORDEN WILKINSON . Polity, 2019, countries in Latin America. The dark
160 pp. arts are evolving as authoritarian
regimes learn to speak in the vernacular
Coined in the 1990s, the term “global of the digital age, spreading fake news
governance” tried to capture the multi- through social media, talk shows, and
faceted ways in which governments, reality TV shows. “Digital vigilantes”
companies, transnational groups, and employed by hostile governments flood
international organizations worked in Western societies with conspiracy
concert in a time of growing interde- theories and “alternative facts” to sow
pendence. Today, talk of global gover- confusion and erode faith in democratic
nance is out of fashion. Many people institutions. Through many anecdotes
hear the phrase and think it is some sort and colorful stories, Pomerantsev tells a
of elite form of “globalism.” This short, depressing morality tale of the age: it
pithy book makes the case for a new was thought that technology and infor-
scholarly focus on international coop- mation would strengthen democratic,
eration. Weiss and Wilkinson argue that liberal, and open societies; make public
although resurgent populism and debate more informed; and generate
nationalism have prompted attacks on cooperation across borders—but the

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opposite has happened. Information is

now weaponized, and one country can Economic, Social, and
come close to destroying another “almost Environmental
without touching it.”
Richard N. Cooper
Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO
and the Postwar Global Order
BY TIMOTHY ANDREWS SAYLE .
Cornell University Press, 2019, 360 pp. The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a
Competitive Economy
Why is NATO the longest-lasting alliance BY JONATHAN B. BAKER. Harvard
of the modern era? Scholars have University Press, 2019, 368 pp.
typically pointed to the shared demo-
B
cratic values of its members, which many aker, a former director of the
believe forge a unique bond. In his Federal Trade Commission,
carefully researched history, Sayle believes that the U.S. govern-
inverts this conventional understanding. ment has gone much too far in relaxing
In NATO’s early decades, government the enforcement of its century-old
elites maintained the pact as a buffer antitrust laws. He places a substantial
against the whims of fickle democratic measure of blame on the so-called
electorates that might too quickly Chicago school of economics, whose
succumb to Soviet peace overtures and free-market theories have wielded
undermine the balance of power in the substantial influence over agencies
Cold War. Drawing on extensive archival entrusted with the enforcement of
records, Sayle rehearses in detail the financial regulations and over the courts,
founding of NATO and its early opera- particularly the Supreme Court. The
tions, highlighting the importance of results of lax enforcement include an
intergovernmental elites—ministers, increased concentration of market share
diplomats, commanders—working in both new and old industries, the
outside public view to manage and growth of corporate profits as a percent-
protect the alliance’s integrity. NATO’s age of total income, and a decline in
resiliency is rooted in the day-to-day overall productivity. In Baker’s view,
efforts of this multinational corps of contrary to what others claim, these
officials, dedicated to keeping the outcomes are not justified by any
alliance afloat. What is NATO’s future? resulting innovation: indeed, many
Sayle argues that the underlying rationale acquisitions by large firms are intended
for the alliance still holds, although to suppress upstarts. The book’s detailed
updated slightly for today: keeping the analysis draws almost entirely on U.S.
Russians out, the Americans in, and the laws, institutions, and court decisions,
Europeans together. albeit with a favorable nod to competition
policy in the EU. But Baker’s arguments
apply to all modern economies, which
must establish and maintain competition
in order to thrive.
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The Sex Factor: How Women Made the awareness, and effective government. Free
West Rich markets and advancing technologies
BY VICTORIA BATEMAN. Polity, provide the basis for material well-being;
2019, 248 pp. a free press and strong governance check
uncontrolled greed and protect against
This provocative book mounts a feminist social and environmental harms. McAfee
critique of much modern economic theory favors social democracy over socialism,
and policy, which the author claims has a insisting on a sharp distinction between
strong and continuing male bias. Bateman the two. His most surprising finding
seeks to widen the discipline’s focus on concerns the U.S. economy. Over the past
marketable goods and services to include two decades, the material standard of
other social and personal activities that living of Americans has continued to rise
affect economies. The most striking thesis even as Americans consume fewer
of the book is that the “rise of the West” physical resources, such as water, metals,
during and after the Industrial Revolu- and building materials. McAfee sees these
tion—a development that still puzzles trends spreading to the rest of the world.
many economic historians because Europe
had long lagged behind China, India, and Digital Transformation: Survive and
the Islamic Middle East—was due to the Thrive in an Era of Mass Extinction
way women were treated differently in BY THOMAS M. SIEBEL .
western European societies. Although RosettaBooks, 2019, 256 pp.
women are subordinate to men in most
societies, women enjoyed relatively greater The “mass extinction” of the subtitle
freedom in western Europe (particularly refers to business firms that fail to
in Protestant northwestern Europe) than digitize their operations. Successful
in other parts of the world at the time. digitization, according to Siebel, involves
Women married later, had fewer children, mastering four key technologies: flexible
and were better educated. This greater cloud computing, big data, artificial
freedom led to more saving and more intelligence, and the Internet of Things.
productive investment. In the public sector, digitization will
allow governments to reduce costs and
improve services. Siebel details useful
More From Less: The Surprising Story of case studies of U.S. and European firms
How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer that have benefited from digitization,
Resources—and What Happens Next such as John Deere, 3M, and Italy’s Enel.
BY ANDREW M C AF EE. Scribner, 2019, He also examines the U.S. Air Force’s
352 pp. use of artificial intelligence to anticipate
maintenance requirements for airplanes.
McAfee offers an optimistic outlook for The book sounds a note of warning in
the future of mankind—or at least for tracing the ambitious pace of digitization
those who live in wealthy, democratic in China, which is virtually at war with
countries. This unusual book highlights the United States and other Western
“four horsemen of the optimist”: effective countries in developing and exploiting
capitalism, technological progress, public new technologies.

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American and Chinese Energy Security: describes how the decision was made.
A Grand Strategic Approach For Bush, the alternative to the surge was
BY RYAN OPSAL. Lexington Books, defeat. He met with considerable opposi-
2019, 228 pp. tion at high levels of his own administra-
tion but skillfully managed the process of
The survival of any country as a func- winning broad support for his view. The
tioning society depends on having book features some dissenting voices, but
reliable sources of energy. Preserving most of the interviewees approved of
access to energy is not simply an eco- both the handling and the outcome of the
nomic matter but a question of grand surge. Conspicuous in their absence are
strategy. This informative book focuses Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
on how China and the United States, and General George Casey, commander
both large importers of oil, secured their of U.S. forces in Iraq. They stayed
energy supplies between 1992 and 2013. committed to their established strategy
It compares the evolution of both even though it was widely judged to be
countries’ strategies for guaranteeing oil failing. Indeed, the book leaves one
security through shifts in policy and wishing that the original decision to
advances in technology. Opsal claims invade Iraq had been taken with as much
that the United States is well ahead of care as the decision to change course.
China in oil security on many fronts, Although repetitive at times, this is a
but China is rapidly catching up. fascinating contribution to the history
of the war.
Military, Scientific, and The Nuclear Spies: America’s Atomic

Technological Intelligence Operation Against Hitler and
Stalin
BY VINCE HOUGHTON. Cornell
Lawrence D. Freedman University Press, 2019, 248 pp.
The atom bomb was never a high priority

The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush’s for the Nazis, at least when compared
Decision to Surge in Iraq with their development of long-range
EDITED BY TIMOTHY ANDREWS cruise and ballistic missiles. A major U.S.
SAYLE, JEF F REY A. ENG EL, HAL intelligence operation during World War
BRANDS, AND WILLIAM INBODEN. II confirmed that the German nuclear
Cornell University Press, 2019, 416 pp. threat was not as great as had been
feared. Specialist teams followed the
I
n early 2007, as U.S. troops struggled Allied armies into Italy and Germany,
to contain a raging civil war in Iraq, gathering information on the German
President George W. Bush announced atomic project but also trying to secure
a “surge” of five additional brigades to the relevant scientists, materials, and
the country. Based on interviews with papers before they could fall into Soviet
many of the key participants, including hands. Intriguingly, U.S. intelligence
the president, the first part of this book officials also hoped to keep the French
Recent Books
at a distance because of the feared Pirates: A New History, From Vikings to

communist sympathies of France’s Somali Raiders
leading nuclear scientists. In this neat, BY PETER LEHR. Yale University
enthralling study, Houghton wonders Press, 2019, 272 pp.
why this successful intelligence opera-
tion was followed by the failure to Marque and Reprisal: The Spheres of
anticipate the first Soviet nuclear test in Public and Private War
August 1949. He points to the incoher- BY KENNETH B. MOSS. University
ence of the U.S. intelligence system Press of Kansas, 2019, 464 pp.
after the war and the complacent
underestimation of the capacities of a In his lively, vivid history of pirates, Lehr
communist government. finds some striking continuities from
ancient to modern times. Although
Power to the People: How Open pirates are motivated above all by greed,
Technological Innovation Is Arming creed and religion have often influenced
Tomorrow’s Terrorists their choice of targets. The lure of large
BY AUDREY KURTH CRONIN. rewards from little effort has always
Oxford University Press, 2019, 440 pp. attracted the impoverished. Careers tend
to be short, as much because of the
Alfred Nobel’s invention of dynamite hazards of the sea as the threat of legal
was a boon to major infrastructure sanction and punishment. Most pirates
projects around the world, but the have preferred to ambush their prey,
explosive was also adopted by anarchists frightening the crew into surrender and
determined to blow up heads of state. only fighting their way onboard if neces-
A young sergeant named Mikhail sary. The best defense against pirates is
Kalashnikov figured out how to improve having a vessel faster than theirs. Regions
the standard assault rifle used by the plagued by weak governance and local
Soviet army in World War II. The gun corruption enable piracy. Certain coast-
that still bears his name is easy to use, lines have long been favorable hunting
reliable, and durable—and became the grounds: in the 1990s, Somali pirates
weapon of choice for terrorists and “loitered in the approaches of the Bab
militias around the world. In this el-Mandeb in the Gulf of Aden,” just as
meticulously researched book, Cronin John “Long Ben” Avery did in the
shows how groups such as the Islamic seventeenth century.
State (or ISIS) exploit new technologies There has always been a fine line
such as the Internet, smartphones, between piracy and privateering. Queen
autonomous vehicles, and artificial Elizabeth I declared Sir Francis Drake to
intelligence. Cronin hardly wants be “her” pirate because the rival Spanish
innovation to stop just because of suffered the most from his depredations.
potentially malign applications. Instead, Moss’ account overlaps with Lehr’s book
she argues that governments must in showing how otherwise illegal acts
develop countermeasures to preempt could be sanctioned in the name of the
militants from co-opting innovations state under letters of marque and reprisal.
to catastrophic effect. This thorough and thoughtful history

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focuses on the pivotal role of privateers Johnson’s, excluding purely private

in the struggles for control of the sea behavior or actions that the authors judged
and the spread of European empires. to be merely partisan or ideological. Their
Moss highlights the legal and political work has now been reissued with added
issues raised by privateering, including reviews of eight more administrations
the right of privateers to defend (Nixon’s through Barack Obama’s). The
themselves, the ownership of the booty new volume was spearheaded by Banner, a
they seized, and their relationship to member of the original team, who de-
the states that gave them licences. scribes it as an exercise of “historians’ civic
Privateers remain active today, just in office.” The result is a fascinating glimpse
different forms. The private sector has into a largely unstudied aspect of U.S.
expanded to fill in gaps left when political history and a look at the disap-
all-volunteer armies handle the complex pointing, if not depressing, weaknesses of
demands of counterinsurgency. Con- the political, legal, and constitutional
tractors have joined the fighting in Iraq, remedies available to deter or punish
for instance, often to detrimental effect. presidential malfeasance. Particularly
Moss brings the book right up to the rewarding are overviews written by
present with a discussion of the private Woodward and Banner, which include the
sector’s participation in cyberconflict. sort of judgments that the authors of the
individual reviews were directed to avoid.
The United States Kissinger on Kissinger: Reflections on

Diplomacy, Grand Strategy, and Leadership
Jessica T. Mathews BY WINSTON LORD. All Points
Books, 2019, 176 pp.
Presidential Misconduct: From George Henry Kissinger has written about his
Washington to Today time in government in lengthy books that
EDITED BY JAMES M. BANNER, JR. often go into excruciating detail. This
New Press, 2019, 528 pp. little volume, his only foray into oral
history, does the opposite: it distills—and
I
n 1974, John Doar, special counsel to therein lies its attraction. As one man’s
the House committee handling view of events, it does not pretend to be a
impeachment proceedings against balanced history. But Kissinger’s accounts
U.S. President Richard Nixon, decided of the strategies that he and U.S. Presi-
that the committee’s work would benefit dent Richard Nixon pursued in a series
from expert analysis that would compare of crucial events—the opening to China,
Nixon’s wrongdoing to that of past the 1972 summit with Soviet leader
presidents. In an astonishing eight weeks, Leonid Brezhnev, the first arms control
a team of 15 scholars, recruited and led by negotiations with the Soviets—make for
the historian C. Vann Woodward, pro- fascinating reading and serve as a timely
duced a volume of brief, factual reviews of reminder of what serious, farsighted
misconduct by every administration from diplomacy looks like. Participants must
George Washington’s through Lyndon from the outset be able to answer the
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question, “What are we trying to do help avoid a repetition of those blunders

here?” They must be deeply versed in and misdeeds. Ironically, Mazarr himself is
the other side’s history and present unable to pinpoint when and how the
interests, demonstrate steely patience, decision to go to war was made. But his
and know that the precondition for a story is an important one, and well told.
successful negotiation is “victory for both
sides.” Kissinger’s insightful conversa- Ill Winds: Saving Democracy From
tions with Lord, a veteran diplomat who Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and
worked as a close aide to Kissinger, are American Complacency
refreshingly stripped of the formal BY LARRY DIAMOND. Penguin Press,
language of a published memoir, allowing 2019, 368 pp.
his insights to shine through.
If We Can Keep It: How the Republic
Leap of Faith: Hubris, Negligence, and Collapsed and How It Might Be Saved
America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy BY MICHAEL TOMASKY. Liveright,
BY MICHAEL J. MAZARR. 2019, 288 pp.
PublicAffairs, 2019, 528 pp.
Diamond and Tomasky, both longtime
Mazarr begins with the pundit George students of democracy, have produced
Will’s assessment that the decision to similarly impassioned works on the
invade Iraq in 2003 was “worse than current democratic crisis. Diamond’s view
Vietnam, and the worst in American is global, describing the worldwide slide
history.” Yet, he notes, we still don’t know toward authoritarianism over the past two
when or how the decision to go to war was decades. Tomasky focuses on what is
made: our understanding of why this happening in the United States, tracing
catastrophe took place is “radically incom- the country’s current woes back almost to
plete.” His attempt to close the gaps puts a its founding. The global trends Diamond
great deal of the story into one thoroughly chronicles predate the election of U.S.
researched and eminently readable President Donald Trump, but his analysis
volume. Mazarr attributes the decision to rests heavily on his “anguished knowledge”
invade to a characteristically American of what the Trump presidency means for
“missionary impulse” combined with governance around the world. By contrast,
“intuitive, value-driven judgment.” That’s Tomasky writes that “most of this book
a polite way of saying that the war was could have appeared just as it now stands”
conceived by men and women who, no matter who won the 2016 election.
although not evil, were so sure in their Notwithstanding such differences, both
convictions regarding a country about authors identify the same ultimate saviors:
which they knew hardly anything that they not politicians or legal or constitutional
excused themselves from rigorous thought changes but, in Diamond’s words, “the last
about what they were doing and why they line of defense: ‘We the People.’”
were doing it and indulged in egregious Diamond compellingly traces a
distortions of the facts regarding Iraq’s “twelve-step program” that autocrats use
weapons programs. It’s not obvious that to solidify their power. But he inflates the
there are lessons in this sorry tale that will conventional military threats that the

Recent Books
United States faces from China and Russia. has not spent his entire career studying
As his own analysis shows, the more the American Revolutionary War. Yet
pressing threat from both countries comes Atkinson is best known as the author of
from their efforts to exploit fractures in acclaimed volumes on World War II.
the U.S. political system and the polariza- Like those books, his new one is mostly
tion of American society. His solutions a military history, and less an account of
include ranked-choice voting to strengthen the broader revolution. Still, Atkinson
candidates who appeal to the political displays a remarkable ability to bring
center and independent commissions to leaders and unnamed soldiers alike into
put a stop to extreme gerrymandering. three-dimensional clarity. Wonderful
Tomasky notes that most adults living maps enrich the narrative and capture
in the United States today were born the reader’s imagination, distinguishing
between 1945 and 1980, a period he terms taverns from churches and rail fences
“the Age of Consensus”—a brief inter- from stone walls. Although the narra-
regnum in 200 years of otherwise intense tive at times wallows in the sheer physical
partisan division. As a result, they are misery of fighting and dying in a brutal
taken aback by today’s polarization even war, few who read the prologue will
though it represents a return to the want to put the book down until they’ve
historical norm. The difference, however, finished the whole thing.
is that in earlier eras, the two main parties
were “divided within themselves as much
as with each other.” Those broad, unstable Western Europe
coalitions had to negotiate positions
internally. Today, a “near-total absence of Andrew Moravcsik
intraparty polarization” has allowed the
country to devolve into political tribalism.
Tomasky convincingly describes how this The Unsettling of Europe: How Migration
happened but not why; nor can he explain Reshaped a Continent
why members of Congress compete so BY PETER GATRELL . Basic Books,
fiercely to dedicate their lives to an 2019, 576 pp.
institution that gets almost nothing done.
T
Tomasky’s list of fixes is almost identical his important book puts today’s
to Diamond’s, but he concedes that many levels of migration to Europe in
of those measures will take a very long historical perspective. Far from
time, or will make relatively little being unprecedented, large population
difference, or are merely “pies in the sky.” movements have been the norm since
World War II, after which over 12
The British Are Coming: The War for million people fled Eastern Europe and
America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775–1777 the Soviet Union. From the 1950s on,
BY RICK ATKINSON. Henry Holt, Eastern Europeans steadily left the
2019, 800 pp. Soviet bloc. In the 1960s, decolonization
led millions to head for metropoles in
It is hard to believe that the author of the West, and guest workers came
this sparkling, minutely detailed history northward to Germany from countries
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such as Turkey (although the great place greater value on intellectual diver-
majority of these Gastarbeiter returned sity, tolerant leadership, and grassroots
home). The end of the century saw organization within left-wing politics.
further displacement caused by wars in Hobsbawm’s writings helped revolution-
the former Yugoslavia and waves of ize the historical profession. He wrote
economic immigration. The author, a omnivorously, on banditry, Luddism, local
demographic historian, concludes with a anarchism, rural uprisings, agricultural
dose of idealism: Europe should embrace collectives, and other forms of working-
immigration and diversity, which have class and peasant resistance to the march
made the continent what it is. Yet this of industrialization. In later life, as a
seems to ignore political reality. Recent respected university professor and BBC
migration rates are the highest Europe lecturer, he penned a series of revisionist
has seen since the postwar movement of Marxist histories of Europe’s industrial-
Germans. The percentage of foreign- ization, revolutions, and empires that
born people in France, Germany, Italy, became bestsellers—not least in the
Sweden, and the United Kingdom is developing world, which was then under-
substantially higher than it was decades going similar upheavals.
ago. In a period of low economic growth,
European societies are grappling with Protest and Power: The Battle for the
tricky questions of cultural integration Labour Party
and difference. This book does surpris- BY DAVID KOGAN . Bloomsbury, 2019,
ingly little to illuminate how many 448 pp.
governments today face the political
pressure to restrict immigration. Two decades after the triumph of “New
Labour” under Tony Blair, why is the
Eric Hobsbawm: A Life in History British Labour Party run by a left-wing
BY RICHARD J. EVANS . Oxford radical who favors nationalization, coddles
University Press, 2019, 800 pp. autocrats, flirts with anti-Semitism, and
lacks either the will or the ability to
This biography traces the life of Eric oppose Brexit outright? Based on detailed
Hobsbawm, one of the greatest historians interviews and crammed with juicy
of the twentieth century and an unrepen- anecdotes, this book is in many ways the
tant communist. His story, with all its definitive chronicle of Jeremy Corbyn’s
contradictions, parallels that of many unlikely march from backbench obscurity
radical leftist intellectuals in Europe during to party leadership. Like many accounts
the middle of the century. A lower-class by insider journalists, however, its under-
Jewish orphan who grew up in Vienna lying explanation rests almost entirely on
and Berlin during the 1930s, Hobsbawm personalities, accidents, errors, and dumb
took to the streets to fight fascists and luck. From this perspective, the reemer-
reasonably concluded that strict solidarity gence of the Labour left resulted from a
with a radical party was the only way to backlash against Blair’s involvement in the
make political change. He never re- Iraq war, changes that “democratized”
nounced communism, as so many other Labour party rules and boosted radicals
leftists ultimately did. But he did come to over moderates, and New Labour’s

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mismanaged privatization policies. Kogan that aren’t rarely add anything new. Yet
neglects to trace the larger forces—includ- this vivid and painstakingly researched
ing globalization, inequality, deindustrial- volume revises fundamentally how
ization, and nationalism—that have under- historians ought to view the geopolitical
mined the political order in every Western motivations of the Nazi leader. Simms
democracy, not just in the United Kingdom. argues that Hitler did not see the Soviet
Union as the primary obstacle to his
The Silk Road Trap: How China’s Trade expansionist ambitions. From the start,
Ambitions Challenge Europe his real enemies were the United King-
BY JONATHAN HOLSLAG . Polity, dom and the United States, the victors of
2019, 232 pp. World War I, the conflict that had deci-
sively shaped his worldview. These
Holslag claims that China poses a mortal countries were (from Hitler’s perspective)
economic threat to Europe and the West. racially pure “Anglo-Saxon” superpowers
The topic is timely, since the EU is cur- that possessed significant air and naval
rently considering following the United power, lorded over colonies, and molded
States in tightening controls on Chinese the “plutocratic” system of international
trade and investment. Of course, this book finance. Hitler’s supposedly controversial
is hardly the first to list Beijing’s sins: strategic choices—such as diverting
bilateral trade surpluses, unfair treatment military resources to the Balkans, declar-
of foreign investors and firms, and forced ing an apparently needless war on the
technology transfers. Nor does it contain United States, launching a brutal attack
original data or rigorous analysis. For on the Soviet Union, and even attempt-
example, nowhere does Holslag explain ing to exterminate the Jews—were far
why bilateral deficits and debt should more rational than most critics allow,
matter to a region that runs a net external given his often idiosyncratic assumptions.
surplus or specify exactly what political All these actions were part of a larger
threats a competitive China poses to mobilization of resources and popular
Europe. The author argues, however, that support for an inevitable war of attrition
what is needed is less theory and more against the Anglo-Saxons. Some will
policy analysis: in the introduction, he dispute this thesis. Nevertheless, the
suggests that European countries need to book is engaging and essential reading for
band together and act decisively in order anyone interested in Hitler’s policymaking.
to maximize their economic growth. It is
surprising, therefore, that the conclusion The Future of British Foreign Policy: Security
proposes no specific policies except, in just and Diplomacy in a World After Brexit
one sentence, the adoption of stronger BY CHRISTOPHER HILL . Polity,
but fewer European standards. 2019, 256 pp.
Hitler: A Global Biography This book by a respected Cambridge
BY BRENDAN SIMMS . Basic Books,
professor seeks to predict how Brexit will
2019, 704 pp. affect the United Kingdom’s diplomacy
Too many books are written about Hitler. and geopolitical standing. A classic
Many are amateur efforts, and even those academic policy book, it proceeds at a
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leisurely pace. It takes a hundred pages to rulers and rebels (“sword”), and cynical,
reach the central question: Will Brexit compromised religious institutions
actually make any difference to British (“stone”) have perennially plagued the
foreign policy? Or can London and its region. The Aztecs, the Incas, and the
partners simply replicate their current Spanish were all bloody-minded peoples
levels of cooperation by other, perhaps tamed only by brutal despots; home-
more informal means? Here, Hill seems grown revolutionaries inevitably became
unsure. On the one hand, he persuasively “tinpot dictators, insatiable caesars.”
dismisses as nonsense the rhetoric of Arana’s bleak vision sees no enduring
Brexiteers about renewing special relation- success stories, no emerging middle-
ships with English-speaking peoples and class democracies, no meaningful social
forging bilateral agreements with China, progress. Latin America is defined only
India, Russia, and others. On the other by “the essential exploitation at its
hand, he recognizes that EU foreign policy core, the racial divisions, the extreme
is still decentralized, with member states poverty . . . the corrosive culture of
allowed to set their own agendas, and that corruption.” By perpetuating such
the United Kingdom has always played a profoundly negative (and poorly sub-
“semi-detached” role in the making of EU stantiated) stereotypes, Arana inadver-
foreign policy. How much will actually tently provides ammunition for U.S.
change? This fine overview concludes with President Donald Trump’s disparaging
more questions than answers. comments about the region.
In sharp contrast to Arana, who uses
lurid, florid prose, Townsend employs the
Western Hemisphere meticulous language of a scholar who has
immersed herself in primary texts.
Richard Feinberg Townsend mined the accounts written in
the Aztec language, Nahuatl, by indig-
enous historians in the decades immedi-
ately following the Spanish conquest.
Silver, Sword, and Stone: Three Crucibles These texts present an invaluable counter-
in the Latin American Story point to the self-serving narratives of the
BY MARIE ARANA . Simon & Schuster, Spanish conquistadors and their priests.
2019, 496 pp. Townsend rejects the portrayal of the
Aztecs as driven by blood lust, supersti-
Fifth Sun: A New History of the Aztecs tion, and fatalism. Instead, she shows that
BY CAMILLA TOWNSEND . Oxford the Aztec emperor Montezuma II be-
University Press, 2019, 336 pp. haved rationally, drawing on his extensive
intelligence-gathering system, carefully
I
n trying to weave a coherent narra- weighing his policy options, and tending
tive of centuries of Latin American to the responsibilities of government. The
history, Arana too often relies on a Spanish forces’ superior weaponry and
handful of thin sources and simplifies access to reinforcements from Spain—
complicated events. In her telling, venal, coupled with the devastation wreaked by
self-interested elites (“silver”), violent smallpox—eventually led to the defeat of

Recent Books
the Aztecs. Other histories have also The Caribbean Policy of the Ulysses S.
shown how the Spanish conquistador Grant Administration: Foreshadowing an
Hernán Cortés skillfully exploited Informal Empire
divisions among the indigenous tribes, BY STEPHEN M CCULLOUGH.
who aligned with the Spanish often out Lexington Books, 2017, 230 pp.
of spite for the Aztecs. But Townsend’s
book is still a landmark masterpiece, After the Civil War, the United States
powerful in its precision and subtle in its embraced its “manifest destiny” to
weaving of tragedy and glory. expand not only westward to the Pacific
Ocean but also southward into the
Lost Children Archive: A Novel Caribbean. U.S. leaders actively
BY VALERIA LUISELLI. Knopf, 2019, considered the annexation of Cuba and
400 pp. the Dominican Republic, spurred by the
lobbying of wealthy pro-annexation
The daring fiction and nonfiction of elites from both nations, who found a
Luiselli, a New York–based, Mexican-born ready audience in corrupt, Gilded Age
writer, combine literary brilliance, empa- Washington. The case for annexation fell
thetic politics, and a dazzling imagination. apart after wrangling between Congress
She has the intellectual firepower to be and the Grant administration; however,
her generation’s Susan Sontag (whose a consensus emerged in Washington that
interest in collection, documentation, and the United States should replace Spain
memory Luiselli references) but possesses and the United Kingdom as the domi-
an even wider, more global sensibility. In nant foreign power in the Caribbean and
her novel Lost Children Archive, Luiselli that it was necessary to set up naval
conjures a couple with two young chil- bases and coaling stations across the
dren, aged ten and five, on a long road basin to protect an eventual transoceanic
trip from New York to the southwestern canal in Central America. U.S. officials
United States in search of the grave of the differed on how to achieve these goals.
Apache leader Geronimo. The novel’s Some argued for direct military inter-
“lost children” include the last Apaches as vention; others preached patience in
well as today’s desperate young migrants allowing U.S. commercial power to
from Central America. Eventually (spoiler organically secure greater influence in the
alert), the couple’s two children go Caribbean. These opposing visions of
missing. Luiselli envisions the Southwest how the United States should project its
as desolate and haunted by genocide, a power in the world still lie at the heart
xenophobic wasteland occupied by a of foreign policy debates today.
brutal border patrol. The loving interplay
between the two children lightens the Rojo
brooding atmosphere. Miraculously, the DIRECTED BY BENJAMIN
children never quarrel during long hours NAISHTAT. Bord Cadre Films, 2018.
of driving, instead amusing themselves
with songs, word games, and fantasies. In This thoughtful, disturbing melodrama
Luiselli’s deft hands, children are our is set in a nondescript provincial town
shame and our redemption. in Argentina in 1975. The film’s action
Recent Books
occurs just prior to the 1976 military coup

that launched the “Dirty War,” a period Eastern Europe and Former
of repression that would end up killing Soviet Republics
thousands of Argentines. Naishtat
focuses on the silence and complicity of Maria Lipman
average citizens more interested in
safeguarding their own modest, quiet
lives than in resisting the atrocities
visited on their neighbors and peers by We Need to Talk About Putin: How the
right-wing death squads, which were West Gets Him Wrong
already “disappearing” opponents even BY MARK GALEOT TI . Ebury Press,
before the coup. The film is dedicated to 2019, 160 pp.
a recently deceased legal defender of
G
political prisoners. The protagonist is aleotti is an established authority
Claudio, an aloof, rather haughty lawyer, on Russia’s criminal underworld
well respected in his community. He and on the country’s formidable
gradually becomes aware of the horrors security service and other uniformed
occurring all around him, but he does not agencies. His new book, however, follows
get involved. Claudio’s moral center a trend among studies of Russia by
collapses utterly when he decides to make seeking to explain what President Vladi-
quick profits from the empty properties mir Putin really stands for. But unlike
of victims of state terrorism. Naishtat most such accounts, Galeotti’s manages to
skillfully mixes mundane scenes of daily completely overturn the conventional
life (birthday parties, tennis matches) wisdom. The result is easily the shrewdest
with noir atmospherics and absurdist and most insightful analysis yet of Putin’s
comedy. Could it happen here? The film policymaking. Putin is not a “cool genius,”
reminds viewers everywhere that, indeed, Galeotti writes; rather, he is an opportun-
it did happen in Argentina and that it ist without a master plan. His system is
was all too easy for many Argentines to an “adhocracy,” in which lackeys do not
avert their gaze from the state-sponsored receive direct instructions but instead rely
violence of the Dirty War. on hints and guesses to determine what
will please the boss. Putin is not a cham-
pion of conservatism; indeed, he holds no
particular philosophy. There is one thing,
however, Putin feels strongly about on a
gut level: he is a patriot, committed to
making outsiders treat Russia as a great
power. Putin is not a kleptocrat, says
Galeotti: wealth may be important to him,
but the thing that drives him is power, not
money. Some of Galeotti’s insights may
not be new to close observers of Russia.
But nonexperts will appreciate his brevity
and his reader-friendly style.

Recent Books
Catherine and Diderot: The Empress, the An Impeccable Spy: Richard Sorge, Stalin’s
Philosopher, and the Fate of the Enlightenment Master Agent
BY ROBERT ZARETSKY . Harvard BY OWEN MAT THEWS . Bloomsbury,
University Press, 2019, 272 pp. 2019, 448 pp.
Zaretsky is a historian of France and, as Richard Sorge was a German enraptured

he admits, a newcomer to Russian with communism. In 1929, he became a
history. Hence, his short and entertaining Soviet spy in the Far East. Operating in
book tells readers more about Denis Japan from 1933 until his arrest in late
Diderot than about the Russian empress 1941, Sorge became a close adviser to
who invited the leading Enlightenment the German ambassador in Tokyo and
philosopher to St. Petersburg. When the built a formidable espionage machine at
60-year-old Diderot arrived in Russia in a time when all foreigners were under
1773, it was the first time he had ventured close scrutiny from Japanese authorities.
far from home. He shared with other Sorge’s main mission was to find out
French philosophers of his time a view whether Japan was planning to attack
of Catherine the Great as the embodi- the Soviet Union. But his most famous
ment of enlightened despotism, a report was one that warned of Germa-
leader driven by a faith in reason and ny’s imminent invasion in 1941—a
progress and dedicated to ensuring the warning that was dismissed by his
happiness of her subjects. As the book bosses, who were fearful of contradict-
makes clear, the philosopher initially ing Stalin’s belief that Hitler would not
seemed poised to realize his dream of breach the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression
playing mentor to the monarch. Cath- Pact. Matthews’ meticulously researched
erine eagerly engaged in debates with book draws in particular on materials
Diderot. She was enthralled by his from Soviet intelligence archives that
audacious thinking, and he respected her have never before been accessed by a
devotion to Enlightenment ideals. Western historian. These documents
Mutual disenchantment was, of course, show that, despite the vital intelligence
inevitable. Diderot eventually concluded he provided, the Soviets always re-
that the concept of enlightened despotism garded Sorge as a potential traitor. Mat-
was an oxymoron and that Catherine, alas, thews’ book is a spy thriller that dou-
was merely a despot. Catherine, mean- bles as an enthralling history of
while, gradually came to see philosophers revolutionary Germany in the 1920s,
as useless, their writings paving the way Tokyo during the country’s prewar
to endless calamities. Sill, Zaretsky cannot militarization, and Moscow in the
help but admire Catherine and Diderot’s 1930s, where Stalin’s mass terror con-
mutual affection, which their mutual sumed, among others, seven of Sorge’s
disappointment did not diminish. military intelligence bosses.
Recent Books
The Russian Job: The Forgotten Story of How Vasily Grossman and the Soviet Century
America Saved the Soviet Union From Ruin BY ALEXANDRA POPOF F . Yale
BY DOUGLAS SMITH . Farrar, Straus University Press, 2019, 424 pp.
and Giroux, 2019, 320 pp.
Vasily Grossman was a humanist
By the early 1920s, the Bolsheviks had bearing witness to an inhuman age. The
won an outright victory over their class Russian writer’s dispatches from the
enemies within Russia. But the devasta- Battle of Stalingrad described Red
tion caused by the four years of civil war Army soldiers as freedom fighters facing
eventually forced them to turn for help down the fascist menace, and they
to their class enemies abroad. Smith tells cemented his literary fame. In 1944,
the story of how the American Relief Grossman was among the first to report
Administration rescued Soviet Russia on the Nazis’ Treblinka death camp.
when it was struck by the worst famine After the war, Grossman extended his
Europe had ever known. Based on rich lens to depict Stalin’s regime as a foe of
archival materials, his book focuses on humanity, as well. He went further
a group of young Americans who set still, taking aim at all the parties to the
off for Russia, lured by the exotic and Cold War that were amassing weapons
the unknown, and found themselves in of mass destruction. Unfortunately,
the middle of a horrific tragedy. ARA Grossman’s universal concerns take a
members and the Soviets they hired back seat in Popoff ’s biography, which
operated in a vast territory where whole presents the writer as a Western-style
villages were dying of hunger, corpses dissident in conflict with the Soviet
were being left unburied along the state. Her account flattens Grossman’s
roads, and reports of cannibalism were complex humanism, in which progres-
not uncommon. Rare photos included in sive nineteenth-century traditions
the book lend Smith’s account an eerie mixed with the pathos of the Soviet
vividness. During the two years the revolution and—later in his life—west-
ARA spent there, it saved millions of ernizing impulses. Drawing a straight
lives in some 28,000 towns and villages line from the Stalinist past to the
by providing food, medical supplies, present, Popoff claims that Russia under
and disinfectants, as well as restoring Vladimir Putin is once more sidelining
hospitals, purifying water, and organizing Grossman. But she makes no mention
mass inoculations. The ARA’s head, of a serialized production of his novel
Herbert Hoover, believed that by Life and Fate that aired on official
rescuing Soviet Russia from hunger, the Russian television in 2012 and garnered
U.S. government could also rescue it prizes and rave reviews. This book is a
from communism. He left deeply missed opportunity to more fully
disappointed. But to the young Ameri- engage with a writer whose abiding moral
cans who staffed the ARA, the experience concerns reached far beyond the Soviet
delivered an existential intensity that, Union and remain vital after the pass-
once back home, they longed for but ing of the communist state.
could never quite find again. JOCHEN HELLBECK

Recent Books
Understanding Russia: The Challenges of

Transformation
Middle East
BY MARLENE LARUELLE AND JEAN
RADVANYI . Rowman & Littlefield, John Waterbury
2018, 184 pp.
Instead of rekindling Western powers’ Assad or We Burn the Country: How One
historical fears of Russia, Laruelle and Family’s Lust for Power Destroyed Syria
Radvanyi present the country as an BY SAM DAGHER . Little, Brown, 2019,
“ambivalent” nation—part of a con- 592 pp.
tinuum of Western politics rather than
an outlier. The authors skillfully place Syria’s Secret Library: Reading and
Russia’s 30-year transformation since Redemption in a Town Under Siege
the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s BY MIKE THOMSON . PublicAffairs,
perestroika reforms in the context of 2019, 320 pp.
broader developments in Europe, North
T
America, and elsewhere. This slim but hese two books offer wildly
wide-ranging volume comes at a crucial contrasting portrayals of the
time, as growing domestic unrest tests regime of Syrian President
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Bashar al-Assad and the hugely destruc-
20-year rule and as opposition mounts tive civil war that has raged in Syria
to his repression of dissenting voices. since 2011. Dagher started reporting
At the same time, the book is also a from Damascus for The Wall Street
forceful reminder that “Russia is much Journal in 2012. He interviewed key
more than its president” and that actors and dissidents, among them
understanding the country requires Manaf Tlass, once a close friend of the
nuanced consideration that goes beyond ruling Assad family. Manaf’s father was
merely analyzing Putin. The authors a regime stalwart, a longtime defense
explain, for instance, how the Kremlin minister, and a key liaison between the
has channeled both nationalism and Alawite Assads and the majority Sunni
globalism in addressing a slew of population of Syria. Manaf eventually
Russia’s problems, including the dispari- defected from the regime after Assad
ties between urban and rural life and a brutally suppressed the largely Sunni
persistent brain drain. Laruelle and opposition. Dagher tells a story of
Radvanyi argue that although Russia paranoia and unbridled violence. He is
wants to advance an alternative to the unequivocal in his condemnation of the
current world order, its motivations are Assad regime and catalogs the world’s
more complicated and less sinister than acquiescence in the regime’s brutality,
many Western pundits assert. enabled in part by the focus on battling
NINA KHRUSHCHEVA the Islamic State (or ISIS). Dagher
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Recent Books
interviewed some survivors of Assad’s Bashar al-Assad in 2011. It takes some

torture centers, who afford hope for a mental gymnastics to see how Hezbollah’s
better future, but otherwise, this book role in Syria either mounts resistance to
chronicles the triumph of evil. Israel or defends the territory of Leba-
Some of those torture survivors are non. Daher has spent years in the Bekaa
the subject of Thomson’s moving chroni- Valley close to Hezbollah strongholds.
cle of the four-year siege of Daraya, a Her portrayal of the organization is
suburb of Damascus that was once home rather sympathetic. The book’s strongest
to 90,000 people. Thomson, a BBC feature is its analysis of the charismatic
correspondent, learned that among those appeal of Hezbollah’s secretary-general,
who remained in the suburb were a num- Hassan Nasrallah. Daher’s superficial
ber of young Darayans who collected treatment of the organization’s finances—
books to establish a secret, underground and the group’s consequent ability to
library, sheltered from the barrel bombs, eschew corruption and rent seeking—is
snipers, and tanks of Assad’s forces. less satisfying. The author refutes accusa-
The library became the embodiment of tions of terrorism leveled at Hezbollah,
both resistance and the hope for a more particularly the findings of the interna-
humane future. Thomson never visited tional tribunal that investigated the 2005
Daraya and knew his heroes only assassination of former Lebanese Prime
through Skype and WhatsApp. Still, he Minister Rafiq Hariri. She challenges the
became fast friends with the insurgent evidence that Hezbollah was behind this
librarians. Rebels in Daraya held out for killing and other violent incidents.
four years, enduring famine and trauma.
In the summer of 2016, they were Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the
evacuated by the regime to Idlib prov- Shia State
ince, which itself is now under attack by BY MAHAN ABEDIN. Hurst, 2019, 272 pp.
Assad’s forces. Syrian troops unearthed
and looted the secret library. Abedin packs an extraordinary amount
into this compact and lucid survey of
Hezbollah: Mobilization and Power regime dynamics and grand strategy in
BY AURÉLIE DAHER . Hurst, 2019, Iran. The author is a British Iranian
432 pp. journalist who writes with the style of
an insider. He riffs on the regime’s
Daher considers how the Shiite militant internal politics and traces the roles and
group Hezbollah gained legitimacy decision-making of key players. Much of
through its resistance to Israeli incursions the book is devoted to Iran’s foreign
in Lebanon. Hezbollah went from policy, particularly in the Middle East.
strength to strength after Israel withdrew Abedin stresses that Iran’s relationship
from southern Lebanon in 2000 and after with Syria is no mere tactical alliance.
its partial victory against an Israeli To force Iran out of Syria is “an impos-
incursion in the summer of 2006. Her sible task.” Syria is Iran’s only formal ally
book was first published in French in 2014 and the linchpin of Iran’s “axis of resis-
and does not investigate how Hezbollah tance,” an anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli
decided to go to war in Syria on behalf of alliance spanning Iran, Syria, Hezbollah
Recent Books
in Lebanon, Iraqi militias, and the ideological terms of jihadis can counter
Houthis in Yemen. With or without their appeal, and counterterrorism
nuclear weapons, Iran can project power strategists must consider using the
through much of the Arab world. What it Internet in ways they have not yet tried.
lacks in advanced weaponry it makes up
for in granular knowledge of the region,
experience fighting various kinds of wars, Asia and Pacific
and superior intelligence gathering.
Although Iranians are weary of sanctions, Andrew J. Nathan
the government remains strong, and in
the absence of an invasion by an outside
power, regime change seems unlikely.
China’s New Red Guards: The Return of
Spear to the West: Thought and Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong
Recruitment in Violent Jihadism BY JUDE BLANCHET TE . Oxford
BY STEPHEN CHAN. Hurst, 2019, 176 pp. University Press, 2019, 224 pp.
This small tome is packed and requires Minjian: The Rise of China’s Grassroots
some rereading to fully grasp the argu- Intellectuals
ment. Chan, the founding dean of the BY SEBASTIAN VEG . Columbia
University of London’s School of Orien- University Press, 2019, 368 pp.
tal and African Studies, dismisses the
A
notion that violent jihadism feeds off contentious struggle between
poverty and marginalization. Rather, reformers and conservatives
jihadism draws from a line of reasoning marked Chinese politics in the
that is “modernist” and poses a stark first decade of Deng Xiaoping’s re-
alternative to liberal globalization. Chan forms. That battle seemed to have
dips in and out of brief sketches of influen- disappeared after the 1989 Tiananmen
tial thinkers (including the medieval crackdown, but in fact it had migrated
Sunni theologian Ibn Taymiyyah and from politics to intellectual life. As the
the twentieth-century writer and activist post-Deng leadership was busy shrink-
Sayyid Qutb); he selects them based on ing the role of state-owned enterprises
the number of clicks each figure gets in and pushing China deeper into the
Internet searches. He undermines some global trading economy, intellectuals on
of his argument by conceding that the left used academic conferences and
contemporary jihadis don’t always read the Internet to mount critiques of
these thinkers. The author outlines the neoliberalism and globalization, arguing
12 steps that lead to the online recruit- that these policies coddled capitalists,
ment of jihadis, but he offers no evi- hurt workers, and sold out China’s
dence that this method is especially sovereignty. Although some leftists called
prevalent or important. Chan’s argument for a “second Cultural Revolution,” they
can be a bit hard to follow, but it has at did not use violence, as the Red Guards
least two major implications: only had done in an earlier era. But they
those capable of speaking within the shared with the Red Guards the same

Recent Books
veneration of Mao Zedong as the avatar leftist students who try to support
of an egalitarian, anti-Western develop- workers’ strikes. Yet on the evidence of
ment model. With his rich description these two books, it is unlikely that even a
of personalities and issues, Blanchette regime as repressive as Xi’s can com-
brings these sometimes windy debates to pletely stifle Chinese intellectual life.
life, revealing a little-known inner script
of Chinese politics. Special Duty: A History of the Japanese
During the same period, other thinkers Intelligence Community
retreated from the ambitious theorizing BY RICHARD J. SAMUELS . Cornell
that had been fashionable in the 1980s to University Press, 2019, 384 pp.
focus on the concrete problems of migrant
workers, sex workers, petitioners, and In the early twentieth century, adven-
victims of Maoist persecution. Veg turous Japanese businessmen, diplo-
thoughtfully situates these “grassroots mats, and military officers produced
intellectuals” in a social history of Chinese on-the-ground information that helped
thinkers and delves into their personal Japan defeat Russia and invade China.
histories, their work, and their debates But Japanese intelligence gathering
with one another. They used fiction and went into decline thereafter. Military
essays, newspaper reports, oral history, domination of intelligence work fos-
documentary films, blogs, and lawsuits to tered groupthink, which led to spec-
argue for creative freedom, expose the tacular mistakes, such as underestimat-
crimes of the Mao years, and promote ing the U.S. response to the attack on
social justice and the rule of law. Their Pearl Harbor. After World War II,
program converged with that of the Japan’s intelligence agencies suffered
Maoist left in its concern for the under- from weak public support, turf battles,
privileged, but they did not share the left’s a failure to share information, and
hatred of the West or its endorsement constant leaking. With the end of the
of authoritarianism. The authorities for Cold War, the rise of China, the grow-
the most part tolerated the leftists—partly ing threat from North Korea, and the
because many of them came from elite relative decline of U.S. power, a series
Communist families—but subjected the of Japanese prime ministers started
grassroots liberals to censorship, tax strengthening the system. They tight-
investigations, closings of publications ened classification rules, invested in
and think tanks, detentions, and arrests. cybersecurity, and established the
Since he came to power in 2012, Xi Defense Intelligence Headquarters and,
Jinping has acted on the belief of later, the National Security Council to
Blanchette’s “new Red Guards” that improve communication among agen-
the state must be dominant in order to cies. This engrossing history of Japanese
withstand attacks from enemies at home intelligence demonstrates how such
and abroad. He also shares their view that changes have made Japan a better
any criticism of Mao is an attack on the security partner for the United States
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist while preparing the country to stand on
Party. The regime clamps down hard on its own if the U.S. security guarantee
liberal writers and activists and arrests loses its credibility.
Recent Books
Nightmarch: Among India’s Revolutionary since the country’s transition in 1990

Guerrillas from communism to a troubled but still
BY ALPA SHAH . University of Chicago functioning democracy. Whatever the
Press, 2019, 320 pp. state of Mongolia’s domestic politics,
the enduring geostrategic reality is the
Over years of fieldwork, the anthropolo- presence of two large, intrusive neigh-
gist Shah gained unusual access to the bors, China and Russia. Mongolia’s “third
leftist Naxalite insurgency that has neighbor” policy offsets their influence
persisted in the hills and forests of central by pursuing relations with as many
and eastern India for over 50 years. She other countries and institutions as pos-
builds her analysis around a dramatic sible, including the United States, the
narrative of a seven-night, 155-mile march EU, and Asian democracies—and also
she took with a platoon of guerillas. The North Korea, which Mongolian officials
Maoist movement is rooted in disadvan- see as a potential transit route to the
taged Adivasi, or tribal, communities and Pacific, and Iran and Turkey, two
led by educated, middle-class cadres from countries seeking to diversify their own
elsewhere in the country. Shah dismisses foreign relations. Mongolia has been less
theories that peasants join insurgencies for successful in avoiding economic depen-
economic benefits or for protection, dence on China. The collapse of the
emphasizing instead the emotional bonds Soviet Union led to the “renomadization”
the guerillas form with young Adivasis by of much of the Mongolian workforce
treating them as equals. She balances her when trade and aid from Moscow
mostly favorable picture of the insurgency ended, leaving the economy increas-
with accounts of how movement leaders ingly reliant on Chinese investments
insinuate themselves alongside bureau- in and purchases from the country’s
crats and politicians into the informal coal, copper, and iron mines and oil
economy of protection payoffs and illegal fields. The only way out of this depen-
logging, how some guerillas join merce- dency would be to strengthen links
nary gangs that cooperate with the police, with other economies, which ironically
and how the movement’s Maoist doctrine would depend on persuading Beijing
on gender repression blinds it to the to include Mongolia in its Belt and
relatively egalitarian reality of Adivasi Road Initiative.
gender relations. Her recurring theme is
the unending cycle of violence among The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
exploitative landlords, the oppressed tribal Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War
people, and the military, whose frontline BY JEREMY A. YELLEN . Cornell
soldiers are also young Adivasis. University Press, 2019, 306 pp.
Mongolia’s Foreign Policy: Navigating a The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Changing World Sphere, a supranational framework
BY ALICIA CAMPI . Lynne Rienner, promoted by Japan from the 1930s to
2019, 349 pp. 1945, has a bad reputation in history as a
Campi provides a richly informative thin disguise for World War II–era
survey of Mongolian foreign policy Japanese imperialism. But Yellen shows

Recent Books
that it was an authentic vision—however “informationized local wars,” recogniz-

murky and evolving—for a new kind of ing the importance of information and
regional order. Drawing on what were data to modern warfare. The authors of
then widely accepted ideas about racial this edited volume are leading observers
hierarchies, regional economic blocs, and and analysts of the PLA and Chinese
economic planning, the sphere’s advo- defense affairs. Eighteen meticulously
cates envisioned Asia as a “familial researched chapters examine all aspects
community” that would free itself from of the reforms, including their motiva-
European exploitation under the leader- tions, the changes to command struc-
ship of an advanced Japan. Each nation tures they have brought about, and their
would perform its economic role accord- effect on civil-military relations. The
ing to its natural abilities, coordinated by reforms are unprecedented in their scale
a planning system that would ensure a and scope, abolishing the old general-
share in common prosperity for everyone. staff system, strengthening the party’s
Nationalist elites in Burma and the Central Military Commission, and
Philippines—two case studies Yellen uses creating new theater commands to make
to illustrate Asian responses to this the armed forces more agile in war.
vision—thought they would be freer in an M. TAYLOR FRAVEL
empire run according to those principles
than in the British and American empires,
to which their countries belonged, Africa
respectively, at the time. This study
suggests that Japanese thinking during Nicolas van de Walle
the war was not so different from that of
other ambitious powers throughout
history, which believed they were helping African Americans and Africa: A New
other peoples by dominating them. History
BY NEMATA AMELIA IBITAYO
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing BLYDEN . Yale University Press, 2019,
Chinese Military Reforms 280 pp.
EDITED BY PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS,
ARTHUR S. DING, ANDREW SCOBELL,
B
ANDREW N. D. YANG, AND JOEL lyden has produced a fascinating
WUTHNOW. National Defense book on the relationship be-
University Press, 2019, 782 pp. tween African Americans and
the African continent from the era of
This terrific book definitively assesses slavery, to the late-nineteenth-century
the ongoing reforms to China’s armed movements to return African Ameri-
forces that General Secretary Xi Jin- cans to West Africa, to the twentieth-
ping announced in late 2015. The century civil rights movement, to the
reforms seek to strengthen the People’s eventual presidency of Barack Obama
Liberation Army’s operational effective- in the twenty-first century. She skill-
ness and ability to conduct joint opera- fully reveals the emergence and evolu-
tions in what Chinese strategists call tion of a distinctly African American
Recent Books
identity through the writings and lives inequality is one of the motivations for
of black intellectuals, ranging from the young Africans to undertake the very
eighteenth-century ex-slave and poet dangerous trip to Europe but suggests
Phillis Wheatley to later figures such as that a “sense of adventure” spurs their
the historian and activist W. E. B. Du journeys, as well. Although he laments
Bois and the author Richard Wright. A the region’s poverty, he views sharp
recurring theme of the book is that increases in the number of African
African Americans have looked to Africa immigrants to Europe as inevitable, even
when their prospects in the United if African economies continue their
States have seemed particularly bleak recent acceleration. Greater access to
and unpromising. Blyden also notes the funds and closer links with Europe will
ambiguity of that longing for Africa; for strengthen both the ability and the
many African Americans, engagement desire of would-be immigrants to make
with the continent has sparked a recogni- the trip. The book ends on a sour note,
tion of their distinctly American identity arguing that this scramble for Europe
as much as it has engendered a sense of will only sap Africa of the energy it
solidarity with Africans. Over a million needs to confront its own challenges and
Africans have immigrated to the United will increase unemployment and under-
States in the last 30 years, a trend that mine welfare states in Europe.
may again remake black America.
Amílcar Cabral: A Nationalist and
The Scramble for Europe: Young Africa on Pan-Africanist Revolutionary
Its Way to the Old Continent BY PETER KARIBE MENDY . Ohio
BY STEPHEN SMITH . Polity, 2019, University Press, 2019, 238 pp.
200 pp.
This accessible biography of Amílcar
In this sometimes rambling but always Cabral will not satisfy readers wanting to
interesting long essay, Smith directly better understand why some consider
tackles the issue of African immigration him one of the most thoughtful left-wing
to Europe only in the last couple of rebels of the twentieth century, rivaling
chapters. The preceding sections focus Lenin and Mao in his analyses of state
on recent socioeconomic trends in power and revolutionary struggle. Mendy
Africa, with a particular emphasis on often draws such grandiose comparisons
the continent’s demographics. Smith but fails to substantiate them. But he
makes the familiar idea of an African does succeed in following the fascinating
“youth bulge” (in which high fertility arc of Cabral’s life. Cabral went from an
results in a very young population) impoverished youth in the Portuguese
more compelling by documenting a new colonies of Cape Verde and Guinea-
dividing line when it comes to inequality Bissau to a university scholarship in
in the region: age. Today, in countries Lisbon. He had a brief but illustrious
across the continent, a minority of older career as an agricultural engineer for the
people is trying to retain its political Portuguese colonial government before
and economic privileges at the expense he became a revolutionary advocate of
of a younger cohort. Smith argues that independence and the leader of an

Recent Books
armed guerrilla movement in Guinea- Patriotic Front (the party currently in

Bissau. He was gunned down in myste- power), and a vice president under the
rious circumstances by a disgruntled presidency of Michael Sata. Scott
lieutenant a year before the country briefly became acting president, for
won its independence, in 1974. Cabral three months, in late 2014, after Sata’s
tirelessly sought international support death. In this engaging and often witty
for his movement, and Mendy ably memoir surveying his career, Scott revels
describes the pace and spirit of the in the fact that this last credential makes
international anticolonial circuit of the him the only white person to have served
1960s and early 1970s, with Cabral as president in an African electoral
jetting to endless rounds of consultations democracy. His memoir is particularly
in capitals such as Havana and Bucha- entertaining concerning recent Zambian
rest and addressing the UN’s Special politics, with its nasty personal rivalries
Committee on Decolonization, all while and underhanded conspiracies. Scott
trying to outwit Portuguese intelligence recounts with great insight the rise of
services. the Patriotic Front through two national
elections. He is a modest narrator, and
Adventures in Zambian Politics: A Story in the real hero of his story is Sata, his
Black and White political patron and mentor. Although
BY GUY SCOT T . Lynne Rienner, 2019, observers of Zambia often criticize Sata
259 pp. as an unscrupulous populist whose
election in 2011 began the current
Born in what was then Northern Rhode- democratic backsliding, he emerges from
sia to British parents, Scott renounced this book as an eccentric but brilliant
his British citizenship and chose to political entrepreneur who cared deeply
remain in Zambia after the country won about Zambia and its people.∂
its independence in 1964. He has been a
government economist, a farmer, a
leader of a farmers’ union, a democracy
activist, one of the founders of the
IB OHLSSON has retired as Foreign Affairs’ contributing artist. Beginning in 1994,

Ohlsson produced more than 300 drawings for our pages. His wit and artistry have
provided flashes of illumination and delight among the endless gray columns of text,
and his gentle mockery has kicked the pedestals out from under legions of the high
and mighty. We thank him for his contributions.
Foreign Affairs (ISSN 00157120), November/December 2019, Volume 98, Number 6. Published six times annually (January, March, May,
July, September, November) at 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065. Print subscriptions: U.S., $54.95; Canada, $66.95; other
countries via air, $89.95 per year. Canadian Publication Mail–Mail # 1572121. Periodicals postage paid in New York, NY, and at
additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Foreign Affairs, P.O. Box 324, Congers, NY 10920. From time to
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Was the War in Afghanistan a Mistake?
Foreign Affairs Brain Trust
We asked dozens of experts whether they agreed or disagreed that Washington should not have
committed to a sustained, large-scale military presence in Afghanistan. The results from those who
responded are below.
20
10
0
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
DISAGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 10 AGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 8
Husain Haqqani Vikram Singh

Director for South and Central Asia at the Senior Adviser to the Asia Program at the
Hudson Institute and former Pakistani U.S. Institute of Peace and former Deputy
Ambassador to the United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan at the U.S. State Department
“The United States could have left sooner had it
actually committed to a sustained military presence. “A sustainable and relatively small mission—
The war has been prolonged because the Taliban, and consisting of Special Forces, intelligence, and
the Pakistani generals who back them, thought they training and support efforts—in pursuit of a
could wait out the Americans, who constantly talked political solution to the Afghan civil war is, and
about getting out.” always was, the best approach.”
See the full responses at ForeignAffairs.com/AfghanistanWar

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