Plato and 'Imitation'

Author(s): J. Tate
Source: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1932), pp. 161-169
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
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 PLATO AND ' IMITATION.'

IN C.Q., January, 1928, pp. i6 sqq., I examined afresh the t

poetry as imitation which are found in Plato's Republic. I poin
used the term' imitation' (tu/4ro-ts and cognates) in two senses
The only kind of poetry which Plato excludes from his ideal st
imitative in the bad sense of the term. He admits, and indeed welco
poetry which is imitative in the good sense (without discussing the
any such poetry is actually extant), and which he calls either imitat
tive according as he is using the term' imitative' in a good
kind of poetry (briefly summed up in Rep. 607a as consisting o
and eulogies of good men) which is admitted into the ideal state is
and (which is the important point) it is in fact called imitative by P
in 397d Tby TOV -o rLKO f0"S tW~qrqlv <KxpaTov)-of course in the go
Now the tenth book begins by stating that the result of the ea
been the decision to exclude ' so much of poetry as is imitative
obviously that the remainder will not be excluded. (Plainly
such a remainder either exists or will be successfully called into ex
state.) But what are we to call that remainder, unless it be non
sense (the bad sense) in which the word is here used ? Clearly t
admitted is imitative in one sense and non-imitative in another
the distinction between the two senses was not an unconscious
Plato did not always choose to avoid verbal contradictions; why
since they have their uses in stimulating thought ? But he was cert
self-contradictions; and the self-contradiction involved in callin
poetry imitative and non-imitative without distinguishing two mea
would be far too flagrant to escape his notice. The distinction
senses of imitation is in fact, as I have argued, clearly, explicit
made. The alleged contradiction (of which commentators h
between the earlier and later discussion amounts to no more than a
and represents no real inconsistency of thought. No doubt Plat
things easier for the mechanically-minded reader if he had used
distinguish the two senses. But at the time of writing the Rep
descended to such devices.
The kind of poetry (or painting or oratory or any other art) which is imitative in
the good sense is that which imitates the ideal world. It uses ' the divine paradigm'
(cf. Rep. 500-1). It represents its object (whether that object be a man or a bed or
anything else, and also, I think I am justified in adding, whether it be imaginary or
actual or partly one and partly the other) in the object's real aspect (cf. Rep. 597a),
represents it, that is to say, as partaking in, or imitating, the true reality which is the
ideal world. What it produces is not merely a copy of this or that concrete object as
perceived by the deceptive faculties of sense, imagination and opinion, but a copy of
the ideal realities which the object ' imitates ' or ' partakes in ' and whose ' presence ' in
the object constitutes the object's sole reality. This kind of art is therefore but once-
removed from truth; it represents not the object alone or the ideas alone, but ideas
plus object (Rep. 500-I). And this kind of artist must be a man who enjoys the
vision of the ideas of justice, beauty, etc., so that he may embody them in his
L

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 162 J. TATE
work. He must be a true philos
one able to ' search out the nat
the good upon his works' (4oIb)
That kind of poetry (or other
which copies more or less slavis
gestures, etc.) of its object-tho
perceived by, sense and opinion d
unreal aspect of its object, and
merely ' lays on some colours' o
it represents, knowing and car
externals (60oa). It therefore pr
sqq.). The artist who is imitativ
terized by ignorance. He has n
never been trained by dialectic to
Thus it is clear that Plato's tr
of his doctrine of the oppositio
virtue which is divorced from kn
illusion and a sham, ' slavish an
spurious imitation of genuine v
imitative in the bad sense is sh
bearer,' whereas the genuine poet
(by knowledge of the ideas) and h
Such, then, is Plato's doctrine b
and later discussions in the Re
Favourable comments by distin
this subject encourage me to offe
conclusions.
In the first place, the word ' imitation ' naturally tends to bear a meaning very
much akin to what I call the bad sense of the term in Plato. (I need not encumber
my article with a long list of examples, for the point is obvious enough.) I do not, of
course, claim that this was always the flavour of the word. I do not, for example,
know (though I have my suspicions) whether the Pythagoreans (referred to by
Aristotle' as at least earlier than Plato) meant any particular disrespect for ' things
when they said that ' things exist by imitation of the numbers'; and it is clear tha
Aristotle used the word (e.g. in his definition of tragedy) without any contemptuou
nuance. I merely contend that with the Greeks as with us (' Beware of imitations'
' imitation' could naturally be used to imply (saving the context) a merely external
and sometimes a deceptive, resemblance, and not a real and internal sameness or
similarity. When art was called imitation, it was (at least before Aristotle) ordinaril
so called with reference to the merely outward and apparent resemblance between
work of art and the object represented; in fact, the greater the deception the bette
the art was popularly supposed to be. Hence the surprise of Parrhasius whe
Socrates, according to Xenophon's story, applied the word (with synonyms) to the
expression not of the material but of the invisible: a painting (Socrates said) could
imitate the character of a man's soul and not merely his external appearance. Th
fact that this doctrine was novel shows that the use of the word (as applied to ar
was equally novel. Similarly in the conversation with Cleitophon the sculptor, whic
Xenophon also records, Socrates makes what is evidently a somewhat novel poin

that one must

the actions 'imitate'
of the body (lrpoOELKC~Elv=
but also dGwOpLqty
the activities of the soul.2 eOc,, as the context shows) not merely
These passages from Xenophon help to explain why Plato uses the term s'pyro-cs

1 Met. A. 6, 987b, 7 sqq. 2 Xen. Mem. III. io, i sqq.

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 PLATO AND 'IMITATION' 163

and its cognates in a good sense ' with reserve as a kin

did not expect the reader at the beginning of the tenth
any difficulty in understanding the word in its bad sens
note as to the normal implications of the word; for i
bad, which was felt to be in some degree abnormal an
point to many passages in Plato's own works to show
itself to the condemnatory meaning, the meaning which
external copying, the production not of something really
of reproducing its 'form' or essence or inner meaning) b
appears like it. For example, in the Gorgias 513b Socra
the demos one must be not a mere pt777,ri of the demos b
say, it is not enough for one to copy its external ch
internally unlike it and at variance with its principles: n
it, think its thoughts, accept its ideals, believe its pr
Similarly in the Politicus 3ood it is said that when men o
imitate (in the good sense) the true polity (the ideal arch

tion is not an imitation but the genuine article; that is to

of counterfeit, and such words do not naturally lend the
embodiment (whether by artist or by statesman) of the
they have to bear at times this latter meaning (the
which, in my opinion, leave no room for misunderstandi
Again, although in working out Plato's treatment o
no dialogue other than the Republic itself, in which we f
poetry under that aspect, it nevertheless deserves to
clusions are confirmed by all the other dialogues wh
have already dealt briefly with the relevant portions of
sium and Laws. Here I wish to draw attention to two
which the two senses of the term ' imitation' (the literal
outward and deceptive resemblance, and the metaphor
formal and essential similarity) are explicitly distin
(236abc) the art of imitation (dEI8XorroL*'KI = L/LqrFtLKr
art which produces 'that which is other but like,' and
'that which appears to be like but is not.' (These corr
good and bad senses of the term' imitation' in the Republ
in the literal sense, 'mimicry'-is the term naturally
c4avra0TLK?q where the creator of the appearance uses
imitation, i.e., where the imitator makes himself appe
or in voice. (This is exactly the condemnatory sense
Rep. 393c.)
The second passage, Sophist 265-8, arrives at what is virtually the same dis-
tinction in another way. The man who knows that which he imitates may practise
1 As I wrote in C.Q. loc. cit., p. 18, n. I. They is another sort of Poetry which Plato would not
also explain why, though 'Plato consciously exclude.'
drew this distinction' (between true and false This citation reminds me to add that the
imitation),' he did not emphasize his meaning' refusal of commentators to regard the tenth
(cf. Sikes, The Greek View of Poetry, p. 77), at book of the Republic as supplementary to, and
least in the Refublic (for, as we shall see, he did consistent with, the second and third is the more
emphasize it elsewhere). remarkable in that Plato in 607b (in addition to
The distinction between the two senses of 595a) refers back to the third book and his pre-
imitation was seen (but not worked out clearly) vious decision regarding poetry. Plato certainly
saw no inconsistency between the two discus-
by Finsler, Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik, pp.
19 sqq. It was also virtually seen by Adam, who, sions. (More proof that in writing the tenth
in view of the condemnation of only i7 rpda book he had not forgotten the third is afforded by
6o3c, which refers back to III. 399abc.)
);6oviV 7rOt7tK 7, 607c, and of r Troaab6ry rot??eo,
6o8a, pointed out (n. on Rep. 6o8a, 6) that ' there

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164 J. TATE
imitation of either kind, i.e., he
inner and essential characteri
however, will not greatly app
form of amusement (cf. Rep.
ingful form of imitation will
the real nature of what he imita
which deals in outward and a
art of imitation may be divide
the imitation practised by th
(though with the reservation
imitation of the literal kind) wi
tion of inward realities) and i
sentation of external appearan
intelligent (or scientific) and un
(which might have made matt
this passage of the Sophist for
(imitation of appearances); wh
knowledge is called ' IETr' E 47r(
further divided according as
who are unconscious of their
in the second of these subdivi
to 38oeopqt1A-tqK ; for it is cle
those who, having no knowled
virtue, imitate their own noti
267c), and so make it appear t
(in the good sense), as is clearl
but justice itself, the idea of jus

The above remarks, taken

question, are, I think, an ade
Plato's thought on the subject
various points on certain curren
ing Plato's treatment of poetry.
In the first place it is clear th
the use of the word ' imitatio
very often mean ' servile copy
sensible appearances. But it ma
of 'universals.' Plato, no less t
of 'things as they ought to be
statement (such as Polit. 3oocd
Laws 668b (imitation of the b
of the best and noblest life, and
The only difference is that fo
metaphorical use of the word
copied in a form which implie
as a slavish realism, a mechan
This is in fact the conception
far as he is hostile to Homer
simply to his belief that they
Plato requires of painting, for e
it should slavishly reproduce t
an imitation of the idea, so t
1 Aristotle's Theory of Poetr

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 PLATO AND 'IMITATION' 165

imitation or expression of the idea or ideas in some w

original, in order that, like that original, it may be ca
ideal world which is the true reality. Thus I am glad t
when he says that the Platonic doctrine of art as imit
idealization of nature.' I am, however, unable to follo
states that for Plato ' sensibilia could not disclose Reality.'
Reality (Rep. 597-8). They remind us of it (Phaedo 74
that Plato ' did not foresee the answer of the neo-Platonis
through phenomena, the beauty which nature only in
comes from such sources as Diotima's speech in the Sym
Mr. Sikes apparently admits, tells against this critici
401-2, 500-1. In another passage2 Mr. Sikes says that
of by the ' neo-Pythagorean' view 'that sensible things
that ' the whole world is a symbolic poem, a revelation
followed that the poet, being inspired, was no mere copyi
of the non-sensible.' But in the first place, as I have
Pythagorean view was no novelty. It belongs to Pla
writers probably took it from the Timaeus.3 In the s
understand him aright, is here rather inconsistently ascri
very different from ' the idealization of nature.' It is
whom Plato condemns in the Republic. He never said
be nothing more than that. In fact he requires the art
more. It is his continual demand that the poet and eve
revealer of the non-sensible,' above all of beauty (Ref. 4old
(Phaedr. 277-8, Ref. 401-2, Laws 667-9). The neo-Pyth
had nothing to teach Plato on this subject.
At the very least Mr. Sikes has fallen into a far to
his use of the words 'the poet.' It is the same ambigu
ment frequently made (Mr. Sikes of course does not
'poetry' or Ithe poets' from his ideal state. If the state
actual poets whose works Plato knew, then it is probab
mends various passages (and at least one poem) which t
means (as it too often does) that there would be no poe
state, then it is certainly false.
If then we take Mr. Sikes to mean that certain act
were, according to Plato, mere copyists, mere imitators in
two questions arise. Firstly, how does this censure of
of art mean that Plato had a low estimate of art as suc
view that 'an artist may seek, through phenomena, the
part reveals'? The answer is that it means nothing of
that it does are merely assuming that Homer, etc., r
of artistic production, and that Plato's reasoned refusa
ideal artist is something which they are entitled to ig
did the neo-Pythagoreans and neo-Platonists answe
Neo-Platonic views of art appear to me quite in accord
Plotinus and Proclus (whose views are conveniently sum
o5. cit., pp. 90go and 272) recognize the distinction betwee
removed and that which is twice-removed from the id
only in taking a slightly more lenient view of the art wh
tive in the bad sense). But Plotinus' view that' the arts cre

Op. cit., p. 86. 3 See e.g. T. Whittaker, The Neo-Platonists, pp.

P. 238. 54 sqq., 264 sqq.

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 166 J. TATE
is simply the Platonic attitude t
that the art of Homer is imita
regarded it as imitative. Procl
principles he differs from Pl
does not attempt to justify r
writers do not impugn Plato's
form; let us ask not what is tr
but what is true of this partic
there any of these later writers
the Homeric variety meant kn
mere opinion, and that there
not in the bad ?
I can find no trace of any. A typical instance is Strabo.1 Strabo thought
Homer a very wise philosopher. But by philosophy he meant not a way of life or a
science of first principles but the possession of multifarious information. Homer
was a philosopher because he knew a great many useful facts, for example, about
geography; and it was by conveying this kind of knowledge that he aimed at the
moral improvement of his readers. Strabo's only argument against Plato is to the
effect that one who is ignorant of life could not imitate it so well as Homer did;
since, then, Homer imitated life so well, he must have been a very wise man. This
is not a serious criticism for Plato to meet. But where did Strabo get it ? Evidently
from the same source from which come so many criticisms of Plato, namely, Plato
himself. Strabo was drawing upon Rep. 598e, where this argument of his is not
merely put but answered. The fact that Strabo draws on Plato for an 'answer' to
Plato's attack on Homeric imitation is a pretty good indication that the Stoics had
left this subject severely alone. Proclus is also typical. He tries to commit Plato
to an esotericism (in the matter of the interpretation of the myths of the poets)
of which Plato obviously disapproved. He repeats that Homer was 'inspired';
but he has no answer to Plato's attack on the inspiration which is divorced from
knowledge. He does not attempt to prove that Homer's inspiration was of the other
kind, which consists in the vision of the ideas. It is clear that, as I have already
written elsewhere, these later writers made no serious attempt to deal argumenta-
tively with Plato's attack on Homer.2 They do not seem even to have thought
of the answer that not reason but opinion, feeling and imagination are the true
instruments of knowledge. For that view to be seriously advanced in mistaken
defence of poetry the world had to wait till Plato had been temporarily eclipsed by
Kant, and the romantic movement broke loose upon literature.
We find also in Proclus the remark, still common nowadays (it seems to Mr.
Sikes 3 successfully to 'turn the tables on Plato'), that Plato and his dialogues would
have been expelled from the ideal state because they are as highly imitative as
Homer. This may be a neat enough gibe, though it ignores the two senses of the
word ' imitative'; but it has no argumentative value. In the first place Plato was
not writing his dialogues in an ideal state or to be read by the citizens of such a state.
In the second place it is not so clear, as is generally assumed, that Plato would
have been expelled from his own republic for imitating Thrasymachus and suchlike
persons. When Plato in the Refpublic, Phaedrus and Laws laid down principles about
writing, it need not be thought that he entirely exempted his own writings from those
principles. What, then, are his dialogues meant to be according to his own account
of the matter? Not text-books of philosophy (for philosophy cannot be learned
from text-books), but memoranda and a form of amusement.4 But is not all amuse-
ment forbidden to the Guardians ? By no means. They are allowed to imitate (i.e.,
1 I. 2, 2 sqq. 3 P. 238.
2 C.Q., January, 1930, p. 4. 4 Phaedr. 276d.

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 PLATO AND ' IMITATION' 167
to represent dramatically) baser men than themselves occ
amusement.' Let us then allow to Plato the same license
dians. As I understand Rep. 369,1 Mr. Sikes is too sweep
Plato's ' Guardians must imitate only the virtuous.'2
This reference to Rep. 396 raises another question. Is
Mr. Sikes that the limitations laid down in Rep. 392-8 '
comedy' ?" Or is such an exclusion necessarily implied b
that only hymns to the gods and eulogies on good men w
ideal state ? I see no reason why these hymns and eulogie
forms of dramatic representation which are allowed to t
poet may imitate good men like himself. There is noth
writing a dialogue between two good men as a part of his
would be drama of a sort. He may also on occasion imp
as I have mentioned above; there, surely, is a chance fo
comic element. (Nor, by the way, is it true that Plato r
altogether 'shorn of the speeches.') Let us suppose,
hymn of some length, interspersed with a good deal of
dialogue, the whole making an organic unity in acco
of the Phaedrus. Is there any reason for refusing t
of tragedy ? At any rate, to say that Plato refused to a
means that he excluded all dramatic representation; wh
what Plato himself wrote in Rep. 396. And it is clear th
to exclude what he meant by tragedy; compare that pass
he confesses to being an imitator (in the good sense), and no
a tragic poet, for in depicting the lineaments of the id
imitation (Laws 817b, t'rqtrs) of the best and noblest li
is, he says, essentially the same thing as this. (It is obv
Plato did not need to be told by anyone that his dialog
unlike his critics he was aware of the fact that he used the word in more than one
sense.)
Considerably less than justice is as a rule done to the poetry which Plato would
admit into his ideal state. Professor Saintsbury,4 for example, wrote that Plato's
ideal poet was ' at the very best' ' a sort of Board-Schoolmaster.' Evidently he shared
the common view that the poetry of the ideal state would be uninspired, unpleasing,
mechanical and full of trite moralization-something like most of the formal odes of
poets laureate. I hope to deal elsewhere with Plato's attitude towards the moralizing
or didactic view of poetry. Here I wish merely to point out (without sharing Saints-
bury's evidently low regard for the profession of pedagogue) that Platonic poetry is
not meant to be a text-book of information (for the Platonic theory of education dis-
counts the text-book), nor is his ideal poet meant to be a pedant but a man of genius5
-a philosopher and an enthusiast whose influence would be good for the old as well
as the young. Even his second-best poet (in the Laws) retains his spontaneity and
his natural gifts, and is merely subjected to restrictions in matters which do not affect
the essence of poetry. Such criticisms are founded on an erroneous notion of what
philosophy is or was meant by Plato to be. They assume that philosophy is some-
thing merely dry and abstruse and entirely remote from life, or at least from all that
makes life worth living. They assume that morality is an essentially uninteresting
business, and that Plato's ideal realm is (as perhaps it is-but Plato did not think so)
a colourless blank. But for Plato philosophy meant a life to be lived. Its prin-
1 See my analysis in C.Q., 1928, p. i8. does not mean that I deny the obvious merits of
2 P. 75. his book.
3 Ibid. I should like to add that my disagree- 4 History of Criticism, I., p. 19.
ment with Mr. Sikes on the points indicated 5 Rep. 40IC. Cf. Phaedr. 269-70.

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168 J. TATE
ciples were meant to be not re
They were not to be mere rul
principles informing the who
appropriate them either (at best)
putting them into practice. Th
the ideal world in his own ch
such a requirement seemed to S
The difficulty in dealing with
have not thought out, or at least
implications inherent in their
Platonic theory of imitation con
seeing that the poet's duty . . .
as they are not,' I must confes
criticism a more nearly 'uninte
which Saintsbury apparently fou
understand the Platonic view tha
tion or reflection of the ideal
does not mean that according
Mr. Sikes3 asks why Plato faile
a valuable instrument of know
cannot impart knowledge (Rep. 5
harmoniousness of character and
with right opinions. The ideal
is produced in the light of i
beautiful; but it is not an instr
what one reads but by testing it
The works of the philosopher-
the ideas, can produce poetry w
naturally have an ethically goo
reason, for dwelling on the eth
(even of the merely external v
the qualities which he imita
sympathetically with the hero
There was no reason why Plat
ethical implications. There was
the ethical problem. It was no
opinion' that youths should be sa
was justified (as by Protagoras
boys who had learned from th
would in later life obey those
example, according to Xenopho
heart the poems of Homer in o
Achilles and as wise as Nestor.5
out Homeric heroes, it certain
attacked by Plato in Rep. X. S
largely on ethical grounds, it w
education, to criticize their vi
circumstances of the time, com
his attempt to save his contem
Platonic. Homeric ethics may
1 C.Q., 1928, p. 19. 5 Cf. Laws 81o-i; Prot. 326; Xen. Symp. III.
5, IV. 6-7; Girard, L'P8ducation A thinienne, pp.
2 Op. cit., pp. 18-Ig.
o 0. cit., p. 86. 1514sqq. Phaedr. 277-8 ; Pr

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 PLATO AND 'IMITATION' 169

exist for all that; and they were of considerable imp

the fifth and fourth centuries.
Plato, then, took up the ethical problem of the imitation of poetic characters
from others who had already dealt with it incorrectly. He accepted the common
belief that the poets set before us examples to imitate, and at the same time deepened
and corrected that belief, holding that poetry was not to incite the reader to be like
such models as Achilles and Odysseus in every respect, but should help both reader
and poet to be truly virtuous men. The distinction between intelligent and unintelli-
gent imitation was thus of great ethical importance-especially as the Greeks seem
to have been particularly prone to imitating their favourite poetic characters.
Plutarch, centuries later, found it still necessary to advise that young readers of
poetry should be warned against regarding heroes like Achilles as paragons of virtue
to be scrupulously imitated in one's own conduct. Their good and evil traits must,
he says, be distinguished, and the former alone emulated. Plutarch writes as a
Platonist who has to put up with non-Platonic poetry; if poetry cannot be found
which is intelligently and Platonically written, then such poetry as is available must
be intelligently and Platonically read. He lays down rules for the reader and not
(like Plato) for the poet; for the question for him is what kind of imitation the
reader should permit himself to practise. I should like to quote here the very apt
example which he uses to illustrate the two kinds of imitation : it would be an unin-
telligent way of attempting to become a genuine philosopher if one set out to imitate
Plato's stoop or Aristotle's stammer. On the other hand, the intelligent imitation of
them-i.e., the imitation not of mere externals but of the ideas expressed in their
thought and lives-would involve making their ideals one's own and tend in some
degree to bring about their actualization in one's self.
Let me say in conclusion that I am not defending Plato's treatment of poetry as
though it represented my own views. I am defending it against certain criticisms
which appear to me premature because they are not based on a correct statement of
Plato's attitude. Unless Plato's views are correctly and clearly stated it is of little
use to attack them. My point is that Plato's treatment of poetry is in accord with
his general metaphysical position. If I do not accept the former (as is in fact the
case) it is in so far as I reject the latter. I suggest that literary critics who are
anxious to overturn Plato's views on poetry should begin with a reasoned criticism
of his metaphysics, or at least with a reasoned statement of their own. There is no
point in dragging Plato before the bar of 'opinion'; he would refuse, and rightly, to
recognize the court.
J. TATE.
THE UNIVERSITY, ST. ANDREWS.

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