G.R. No.

198860 July 23, 2012

ABRAHAM RIMANDO, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside Decision2 dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP NO. 112152.

The Facts

The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and damages filed before
Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission
Testing Center, Inc., represented by its President, Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) against
Abraham P. Rimando (petitioner), who, at the time material to the case, was the sitting mayor of
the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.

The petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner to issue a
business permit in favor of the respondent.

In support of its plea, the respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of
land which formerly belonged to the national government but later on certified by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. The respondent had operated its business of emission testing on the
land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008, the respondent filed an application for the
renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees therefor.

The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent
executes a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable
to signing such contract subject to some proposed revisions, which, however, were not
acceptable to the petitioner. The parties did not reach a common ground hence, the petition for
mandamus.

The Ruling of the RTC

On May 26, 2009, the RTC denied the petition3 for lack of merit based on the ratiocinations that:
(a) the Municipality of Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of
Tax Declaration No. 002-01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the
Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has the right to require the petitioner to sign a contract
of lease because its business operation is being conducted on a real property owned by the
municipality; and (c) a mayor’s duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature which
may not be enforced by a mandamus writ. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.4

The Ruling of the CA

Unwaivering, the respondent appealed to the CA. In its Decision5 dated March 30, 2011, the CA
held that the appeal was dismissible on the ground of mootness considering Nonetheless, the
CA proceeded to resolve the issues involved in the appeal for academic purposes.

The CA disagreed with the RTC and found that the factual milieu of the case justifies the
issuance of a writ of mandamus. The CA reasoned that the tax declaration in the name of the
municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a contract of lease as a condition
sine qua non for the renewal of a business permit. The CA further observed that Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored its imposition of rental
fees, was void because it failed to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

The CA held that the petitioner may not be held liable for damages since his action or inaction,
for that matter, was done in the performance of official duties that are legally protected by the
presumption of good faith. The CA likewise stressed that the civil action filed against the
petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the expiration of his term as the mayor
of Naguilian, La Union.

Despite its incessant declarations on the mootness of the case, the CA disposed of the appeal
in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 26 May 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, in Special Civil Action Case No. 72-BG, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.6

The petitioner moved for reconsideration7 questioning the pronouncement of the CA that
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81 was void and arguing that a petition for mandamus
is not the proper vehicle to determine the issue on the ownership of the subject land. The
motion was denied in the CA Resolution8 dated September 30, 2011.

The petitioner is now before this Court reiterating the arguments raised in his motion for
reconsideration.

Our Ruling

We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become moot and academic
owing to the expiration of the period intended to be covered by the business permit.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value9 or in the
nature of things, cannot be enforced.10 In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to
which the applicant would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.11 As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.12

The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to grant a business permit in
favor of respondent corporation for the period 2008 to 2009 has already been superseded by
the passage of time and the expiration of the petitioner’s term as mayor. Verily then, the issue
as to whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may be compelled by a writ of
mandamus to release the respondent’s business permit ceased to present a justiciable
controversy such that any ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ be
issued, the petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the effectivity date of the business
permit no longer subsists.

While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise moot appeal of the
respondent, we find that the decretal portion of its decision was erroneously couched.

The CA’s conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land and the invalidity of
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, aside from being unsubstantiated by convincing
evidence, can no longer be practically utilized in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the overriding and
decisive factor in the final disposition of the appeal was its mootness and the CA should have
dismissed the same along with the petition for mandamus that spawned it.

More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since
the exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was
the pronouncement of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor13 where a determination
was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local
Government Code,14 viz:

Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides, thus:

SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the municipal mayor shall:

xxxx

3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same
to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as
provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues
programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and
relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance.
As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is
pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which declares:

SEC. 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to
local governments.1âwphi1Local government units exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that
the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the
same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x

xxxx

Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the
respondent mayor to issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the
delegated police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be
deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is
within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus. 15 (Citations omitted)

Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is
incompetent to compel the exercise of a mayor’s discretionary duty to issue business permits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is REINSTATED.