Homampour Complaint PDF

PLD-PI-001
SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER:
T.S., et al. v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al.
4. Plaintiff (name):
is doing business under the fictitious name (specify):
and has complied with the fictitious business name laws.

5. Each defendant named above is a natural person
a. X except defendant (name): See Attachment 5 c. except defendant (name):
(1) a business organization, form unknown (1) a business organization, form unknown
(2) a corporation (2) a corporation
(3) an unincorporated entity (describe): (3) an unincorporated entity (describe):
(4) a public entity (describe): (4) a public entity (describe):
(5) other (specify): (5) other (specify):
b. except defendant (name): d. except defendant (name):

(1) a business organization, form unknown (1) a business organization, form unknown
(2) a corporation (2) a corporation
(3) an unincorporated entity (describe): (3) an unincorporated entity (describe):
(4) a public entity (describe): (4) a public entity (describe):
(5) other (specify): (5) other (specify):
X Information about additional defendants who are not natural persons is contained in Attachment 5.
6. The true names of defendants sued as Does are unknown to plaintiff.

a. X 1-160
Doe defendants (specify Doe numbers): _________________________ were the agents or employees of other
named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment.
b. X 1-160
Doe defendants (specify Doe numbers):_________________________ are persons whose capacities are unknown to
plaintiff.
7. Defendants who are joined under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 are (names):
8. This court is the proper court because

a. at least one defendant now resides in its jurisdictional area.
b. the principal place of business of a defendant corporation or unincorporated association is in its jurisdictional area.
c. X injury to person or damage to personal property occurred in its jurisdictional area.
d. other (specify):
9. Plaintiff is required to comply with a claims statute, and

a. has complied with applicable claims statutes, or
b. is excused from complying because (specify):
PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2007] COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Page 2 of 3
Damage, Wrongful Death

LexisNexis® Automated California Judicial Council Forms
PLD-PI-001
10. The following causes of action are attached and the statements above apply to each (each complaint must have one or more
causes of action attached):
a. X Motor Vehicle
b. X General Negligence
c. Intentional Tort
d. X Products Liability
e. Premises Liability
f. Other (specify):
11. Plaintiff has suffered

a. wage loss
b. loss of use of property
c. X hospital and medical expenses
d. X general damage
e. property damage
f. X loss of earning capacity
g. X other damage (specify):
12. The damages claimed for wrongful death and the relationships of plaintiff to the deceased are
a. listed in Attachment 12.
b. as follows:
13. The relief sought in this complaint is within the jurisdiction of this court.
14. Plaintiff prays for judgment for costs of suit; for such relief as is fair, just, and equitable; and for
a. (1) X compensatory damages
(2) X punitive damages
The amount of damages is (in cases for personal injury or wrongful death, you must check (1)):
(1) X according to proof
(2) in the amount of: $
15. X The paragraphs of this complaint alleged on information and belief are as follows (specify paragraph numbers):
General Negligence -1, Products Liability -1, Motor Vehicle -1, Exemplary Damages -1
Date: March 30, 2016
Arash Homampour
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE
NATURE OF PLAINT
PLAINTIFF OR ATTORNEY)
PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2007] COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Page 3 of 3
Damage, Wrongful Death

COMPLAINT²Attachment 5 Page 4
Each defendant named in 3a of the Complaint is a natural person

X Except defendant (name): X Except defendant (name):
TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION TOYOTA MOTOR ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING, NORTH AMERICA, INC.
a business organization, form unknown a business organization, form unknown

a corporation X a corporation
an unincorporated entity (describe): an unincorporated entity (describe):
a public entity (describe): a public entity (describe):
X other (specify): other (specify):

a Japanese Corporation
X Except defendant (name): X Except defendant (name):
TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC. DENSO CORPORATION
X a corporation a corporation
other (specify): X other (specify):

a Japanese Corporation
Except defendant (name): X Except defendant (name):

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA, INC. DENSO INTERNATIONAL AMERICA, INC.
X a corporation X a corporation
other (specify): other (specify):
X Except defendant (name): Except defendant (name):

THE HERTZ CORPORATION
X a corporation a corporation
other (specify): other (specify):
CCP 425.12
COMPLAINT²Attachment 5
Additionally Parties Attachment
Additional Plaintiffs:
Emil Herich, Esq. (State Bar No. 116783)

Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
9720 Wilshire Blvd., Penthouse
Beverly Hills, CA 90212-2018
T: (310) 777-3730 - F: (310) 388-5364
Attorneys for Plaintiff A.E., (by and through her guardian ad litem Karin Levitas)
Mary P. Lightfoot, Esq. (State Bar No. 137477)

Larson, Garrick & Lightfoot, LLP
801 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1750
Los Angeles, CA 90017
T: (213) 404-4100 - F: (213) 404-4123
Attorneys for Plaintiff E.R., (by and through her guardian ad litem Dawn Arnemann)
Additional Defendants:
TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC.;
TOYOTA MOTOR ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING, NORTH AMERICA, INC.;
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA, INC.;
THE HERTZ CORPORATION;
DENSO CORPORATION;
DENSO INTERNATIONAL AMERICA, INC.;
VARTAN BART VARTANIAN; and
DOES 1 through 160, inclusive,
Attachment 3
3. Each plaintiff named above is a competent adult

c. except plaintiff (name): A.R.
(4) a minor
(a) for whom a guardian or conservator of the estate or a guardian
ad litem has been appointed
PLD-PI-001(2)
CASE NUMBER:
SHORT TITLE:
T.S., et al. v. Toyota, et al.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION—General Negligence Page 6

(number)
ATTACHMENT TO X Complaint Cross - Complaint
(Use a separate cause of action form for each cause of action.)
GN-1. Plaintiff (name): T.S., A.E., E.R., by and through their respective guardian ad litems
alleges that defendant (name): TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION; TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC.; TOYOTA
MOTOR ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING NORTH AMERICA, INC.; TOYOTA MOTOR
SALES, U.S.A., INC.; HERTZ VEHICLES, LLC; DENSO CORPORATION; DENSO
INTERNATIONAL AMERICA, INC.; and VARTAN BART VARTANIAN
X Does 1 to 60
was the legal (proximate) cause of damages to plaintiff. By the following acts or omissions to act, defendant
negligently caused the damage to plaintiff
on (date): June 4, 2014
at (place): at or near the Magnolia Boulevard off-ramp of the southbound 170 Freeway in Los Angeles,
California
(description of reasons for liability):
Attachment GN-1
Page 1 of 1
Form Approved for Optional Use Code of Civil Procedure 425.12
Judicial Council of California CAUSE OF ACTION—General Negligence www.courtinfo.ca.gov
PLD-PI-001(2) [Rev. January 1, 2007]

Attachments 1/7
Attachment GN-1
Plaintiffs are informed, believe, and thereon allege that at all times material herein, Defendant
TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION ("TMC") was and is a corporation with its international
headquarters and principal place of business located at 1 Toyota-cho, Toyota, Aichi 471-8571, Japan.
At all times relevant hereto, TMC regularly conducted business within the State of California and
the County of Los Angeles and was and is specifically engaged in the business of designing,
manufacturing, and selling automobiles throughout the State and the County.
TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC. ("TM-NA") was and is a corporation organized and
doing business in the State of California with its principal place of business located at 1114 Avenue
Of The Americas, New York, NY, 10036 (and is an entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
TMC). At all times relevant hereto, TM-NA regularly conducted business within the State of
California and the County of Los Angeles and was and is specifically engaged in the business of
designing, manufacturing, and selling automobiles throughout the State and the County.
TOYOTA MOTOR ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING, NORTH AMERICA, INC.
("TME&M") was and is a corporation organized and doing business in the State of California with
its principal place of business located at 25 Atlantic Avenue, Erlanger, Kentucky 41018 (and is an
entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of TMC). At all times relevant hereto, TME&M regularly
conducted business within the State of California and the County of Los Angeles and was and is
specifically engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, and selling automobiles throughout
the State and the County.
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA, INC. ("TMS-USA") was and is a corporation organized and doing
business in the State of California with its principal place of business located at 19001 South
Western Avenue, Torrance, California 90501 (and is an entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
TMC). At all times relevant hereto, TMS-USA regularly conducted business within the State of
California and the County of Los Angeles and was and is specifically engaged in the business of
designing, manufacturing, and selling automobiles throughout the State and the County.
Plaintiffs are informed, believe, and thereon allege that at all times material herein, Defendant THE
HERTZ CORPORATION ("HERTZ") was and is a corporation organized and doing business in the
State of California with its principal place of business located at 999 Vanderbilt Beach Road, Suite
300, Naples, Florida 34108. At all times relevant hereto, HERTZ was the owner of a certain 2013
Toyota Prius with California license plate 6ZCH532, Vehicle Identification Number JTDKN3DU0D
5584174 ("SUBJECT VEHICLE".)
Attachments 2/7
DENSO CORPORATION ("DENSO") was and is a Japanese corporation with corporate

headquarters and its principal place of business at 1-1, Showa-cho, Kariya, Aichi, 448-8861, Japan.
At all times relevant hereto, DENSO regularly conducted business within the State of California and
the County of Los Angeles and was and is specifically engaged in the business of designing, software
coding manufacturing, and selling of the Brake By Wire - Electronic Braking System ("BBW-EBS")
for Toyota brand automobiles throughout the State and the County.
DENSO INTERNATIONAL AMERICA, INC. ("DIA") was and is a corporation organized and
doing business in the State of California with its principal place of business located at 24777 Denso
Drive, Southfield, Michigan 48086. At all times relevant hereto, DIA regularly conducted business
within the State of California and the County of Los Angeles and was and is specifically engaged
in the business of designing, manufacturing, and selling of the BBW-EBS for Toyota brand
automobiles throughout the State and the County.
VARTAN BART VARTANIAN ("VARTANIAN") was the driver of the SUBJECT VEHICLE,
herein referred to in this Complaint.
On June 4, 2014, Plaintiffs T.S., A.E., and E.R. were returning to school. With a walk sign and green
traffic signal for them, Plaintiffs entered the marked crosswalk in front of the southbound SR-170
freeway off-ramp at or near Magnolia Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. As Plaintiffs crossed in
the crosswalk, they were struck by the SUBJECT VEHICLE driven by VARTANIAN in a
reasonably foreseeable and expected manner.
The SUBJECT VEHICLE was designed, researched, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested,
distributed, prepared, sold, leased, recommended, displayed, advertised, promoted, endorsed,
warned, recalled, retrofitted, provided safety updates for, maintained, serviced, instructed in the use
of, and/or labeled by Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, HERTZ and DOES 1
through 60, inclusive.
At all times mentioned herein, Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, HERTZ and
DOES 1 through 60, inclusive, and each of them, were engaged in the business of, and had a duty
to manufacture, fabricate, design, assemble, sell, distribute, test, inspect, service, repair, market,
warrant, maintain, lease, modify, warn, instruct, install, and/or advertise the SUBJECT VEHICLE
and each and every component part thereof in a reasonable manner, and which Defendants TMC,
TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, HERTZ and DOES 1 through 60, inclusive, and each of them, knew,
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, would be used without inspection for
defects in its parts, mechanisms, manufacture or design.
At all times mentioned herein, Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, HERTZ and
DOES 1 through 60, inclusive, and each of them, by and through their officers, directors, employees
Attachments 3/7
and/or managing agents, negligently, recklessly, and/or carelessly manufactured, fabricated,

designed, assembled, distributed, tested, sold, leased, inspected, marketed, warranted, warned,
instructed, installed, serviced and/or advertised the SUBJECT VEHICLE, and each and every
component part thereof, in a manner such that it was capable of causing and in fact did cause
personal injuries while being used in a manner reasonably foreseeable, thereby rendering the same
unsafe and dangerous for use by the consumer, user, and/or bystander.
Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA DENSO, DIA, HERTZ and DOES 1 through 60,
inclusive were negligent in the manufacture, design, testing, assembly, warning, distribution, leasing,
servicing, inspecting and/or sale of the SUBJECT VEHICLE and are liable for Plaintiffs' injuries,
damages and medical bills by:
(a) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying, and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE in a defective condition;
(b) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system that was in a defective condition;
(c) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with the BBW-EBS in a defective condition which during the intentional
suppression of hydraulic brakes (when the regenerative braking system was active) resulted in
insufficient brake force for the required deceleration;
(d) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE in a defective condition lacking an effective fail-safe backup measure or
mechanism in the event the BBW-EBS failed (such as those incorporated by other vehicle
manufacturers);
(e) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system that was unreasonably dangerous to intended users
and/or bystander;
(f) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system that was not safe for its intended uses and purposes;
(g) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system which lacked the necessary features to make it safe for
its intended use and purpose so that it would function;
(h) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling and supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE and/or braking system which could have been designed more safely;
Attachments 4/7
(i) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system that lacked adequate warnings;
(j) Misrepresenting the safety of the SUBJECT VEHICLE and/or its braking system;
(k) Failing to design, manufacture, sell, lease and/or service the SUBJECT VEHICLE and/or its
braking system and its component parts in a manner so as to render them safe for their intended
purpose by providing a safe and functional braking system;
(l) Failing to warn that the SUBJECT VEHICLE'S BBW-EBS may fail and/or lacked an
effective fail-safe backup measure or mechanism in the event the BBW-EBS fails;
(m) Failing to provide reasonable protection against serious injury in a reasonably foreseeable
accident;
(n) Failing to design, manufacture, sell and/or lease the SUBJECT VEHICLE with a safe and
functional braking system;
(o) Failing to provide sufficient warnings as to the reasonably foreseeable dangers intended in
the use or operation of the SUBJECT VEHICLE and/or its braking system;
(p) Misrepresenting the safety of the SUBJECT VEHICLE including the braking system;
(q) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, supplying and distributing certain component
parts of the SUBJECT VEHICLE, including certain braking system, including the BBW-EBS which
were improperly designed, manufactured, distributed, tested, coded, installed and maintained;
(r) Failing to properly design the braking system that would properly slow and/or stop the
SUBJECT VEHICLE when engaged;
(s) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE that lacked elements necessary to make it safe for its intended use;
(t) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE that contained elements that made it unsafe for its intended use;
(u) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, supplying, leasing and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a defective braking system, in that, the BBW-EBS was susceptible to
malfunction or, "glitches" or "ghosts", caused by various electronic and mechanical failures,
including but not limited to short circuits, software errors, and electromagnetic interference from
outside the SUBJECT VEHICLE, such that the intentional suppression of hydraulic brakes (when
the regenerative braking system was active) resulted in insufficient brake force for the required
Attachments 5/7
deceleration; and/or
(v) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE without the added safety of the Pre-Collision System which came only
bundled with in additional products which were sold as a premium "Package" and was not sold as
standard equipment. Toyota was in possession (and sold) the collision avoidance system which
included: a) Pre-collision Brake Assist (Assisting braking) and b) Pre-collision Brake (Automated
braking) which if installed and functioning as designed and advertised, the SUBJECT VEHICLE
should have and would have stopped prior to its contact with Plaintiffs and prevented Plaintiffs'
horrific injuries.
The injuries complained of herein were directly and legally caused and contributed to by the
negligence of Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, and DOES
1 through 60, inclusive, and each of them, in the following particulars, among others: each of them
knew or should have known in exercise of reasonable care that the BBW-EBS which they designed,
researched, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, distributed, prepared, sold, leased,
recommended, displayed, advertised, promoted, endorsed, warned, recalled, retrofitted, provided
safety updates for, maintained, serviced, instructed in the use of, and/or labeled were in a dangerous
and defective condition since it (a) was insufficiently designed to prevent injury in the event of a
foreseeable brake failure (b) was designed in a manner that would cause injury in the event of a
foreseeable brake failure, (c) was designed so that injury would be exacerbated by the negligence in
the production, design and manufacture of the vehicle, (d) lacked adequate instructions, cautions and
warnings, (e) was improperly designed and manufactured, (g) were untested, improperly tested, and
inadequately tested during manufacture, among other defects and dangerous conditions, (h)
Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, and DOES 1 through 60,
inclusive, and each of them, were negligent in their recall/ retrofit of the subject vehicle.
As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M,
TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, VARTANIAN and DOES 1 through 60, inclusive, and each of
them, Plaintiffs T.S., A.E., and E.R. were injured and hurt in their health, strength, and activity,
sustaining injuries to their bodies, and shock and injury to their nervous systems and persons, all of
which said injuries have caused and continue to cause Plaintiffs great physical, mental, and nervous
pain and suffering, disfigurement and physical disability. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe,
and thereupon allege, that said injuries will result in permanent disability.
TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, VARTANIAN and DOES 1 through 60, inclusive, Plaintiffs
T.S., A.E., and E.R. were compelled to, and did, employ the services of hospitals, physicians,
surgeons, nurses, and the like, to care for and treat them, and did incur hospital, medical,
professional, and incidental expenses. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe, and thereupon
allege, that by reason of their injuries, they will necessarily incur additional like expenses for an
indefinite period of time in the future.
Attachments 6/7
As a further a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M,
TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, VARTANIAN and DOES 1 through 60, inclusive, and as a
direct and proximate result of the defects:
Plaintiff T.S. suffered permanent and catastrophic injuries, including but not limited to, a traumatic
brain injury with diffuse axonal injury; traumatic encephalopathy; occipital skull fracture extending
into the base; intraventricular hemorrhage; subarachnoid hemorrhage; subdural hemorrhage; cranial
nerve 3 palsy; nondisplaced fracture of the right inferior pubic ramus and nondisplaced right-sided
sacral fracture; right side hemiplegia; nondisplaced fracture of the third metatarsal bone on the left
foot; urinary tract infection; malnutrition; feeding problems; status post-gastrostomy, removed;
extropia; hypermetropia; diplopia (double vision.); abrasion to the right thigh; abrasion to the left
medial thigh; abrasion and swelling to the left side of the face; abrasion to the left shoulder; pain,
loss of strength, easily fatigued, memory loss, word loss, learning difficulties, inability to concentrate
for a long period of time, loss of coordination, headaches and migraines, loss of fine motor skills,
and has fear and anxiety of being struck by a car. Plaintiff T.S. will require medical assistance for
the rest of her life.
Plaintiff A.E. suffered permanent and catastrophic injuries including a severely dislocated left hip.
In addition to the severe hip dislocation, edema was present in the soft tissues posterior to the left
hip and a bone island was caused in the right femur. A.E. also suffered a split depressed fracture of
the right lateral tibial plateau on the growth plate of her right knee, several cracks in the intact lateral
tibial condyle, a 3mm bone fragment in the lateral femorotibial joint space, a small cortical fracture
of the proximal fibula and a large liphemarthrosis. In addition to the bone fractures in her right knee,
A.E. suffered a medial collateral ligament tear. She also suffered wounds to the front and back of
her head as well as multiple abrasions over all four extremities including the right hand, left upper
arm, and both knees. In addition to the physical injuries, A.E. was diagnosed with and treated for
multiple psychological complaints including severe nightmares, irritability, acute stress disorder,
mild post concussive stress disorder (headaches, irritability and dizziness, severe anxiety and loss
of memory) and will require medical assistance for the rest of her life.
Plaintiff E.R. was injured and hurt in her health, strength, and activity, sustaining injuries to her
body, and shock and injury to her nervous system and person, all of which said injuries have caused
and continue to cause Plaintiff E.R. great physical, mental, and nervous pain and suffering,
disfigurement, and physical disability, and will require medical assistance for the rest of her life.
Additionally, (per the attached exhibit 1 [Toyota Motor Corporation - Deferred Prosecution
Agreement with the US Department of Justice] found at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/Toyota%20DPA,%20Stat
ement%20of%20Facts,%20and%20Information.pdf and incorporated by reference herein) TMC,
having truthfully admitted to the facts in the Statement of Facts, agrees that it shall not, through its
attorneys, agents, or employees, make any statement, in litigation or otherwise, contradicting the
Statement of Facts or its representations in this Agreement. Consistent with this provision, TMC may
Attachments 7/7
raise defenses and/or assert affirmative claims in any civil proceedings brought by private parties as
long as doing so does not contradict the Statement of Facts or such representations. Any such
contradictory statement by TMC, its present or future attorneys, agents, or employees shall constitute
a violation of this Agreement and TMC thereafter shall be subject to prosecution as specified in
paragraphs 8 through 11, above, or the deferral-of-prosecution period shall be extended pursuant to
paragraph 12, above. The decision as to whether any such contradictory statement will be imputed
to TMC for the purpose of determining whether TMC has violated this Agreement shall be within
the sole discretion of the Office.
PLD-PI-001(5)
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION—Products Liability Page 14

(number)
Plaintiff (name): T.S., A.E., E.R., by and through their respective guardian ad litems
Prod. L-1. On or about (date): June 4, 2014 plaintiff was injured by the following product:
See Attachment Prod.L-1
Prod. L-2. Each of the defendants knew the product would be purchased and used without inspection for defects.
The product was defective when it left the control of each defendant. The product at the time of injury
was being
X used in the manner intended by the defendants.
X used in the manner that was reasonably foreseeable by defendants as involving a substantial danger not
readily apparent. Adequate warnings of the danger were not given.
Prod. L-3. Plaintiff was a
purchaser of the product. user of the product.
X bystander to the use of the product. other (specify):
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY WAS THE LEGAL (PROXIMATE) RESULT OF THE FOLLOWING:

Prod. L- 4. X Count One—Strict liability of the following defendants who
a. X manufactured or assembled the product (names): Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M,
TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA
X Does 61 to 70
b. X designed and manufactured component parts supplied to the manufacturer (names):
Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA
X Does 71 to 80
c. X sold the product to the public (names): Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA,
DENSO, DIA, and HERTZ
X Does 81 to 90
Prod . L-5. X Count Two—Negligence of the following defendants who owed a duty to plaintiff (names):
Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ
X Does 91 to 100
Prod. L-6. X Count Three—Breach of warranty by the following defendants (names): Defendants TMC,
TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ
X Does 101 to 110
a. X who breached an implied warranty
b. who breached an express warranty which was
written oral
Prod. L-7. The defendants who are liable to plaintiffs for other reasons and the reasons for the liability are
listed in Attachment-Prod. L-7 as follows:
Page 1 of 1
Form Approved for Optional Use CAUSE OF ACTION—Products Liability Code of Civil Procedure, § 425.12
Judicial Council of California www.courtinfo.ca.gov

Attachments 1/6
Attachment Prod. L-1
Plaintiffs are informed and believe the SUBJECT VEHICLE was in a defective condition at the time
it left the possession and control of Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA,
HERTZ, and DOES 61 through 110, inclusive, and was not substantially changed prior to the time
of the subject incident. The defects and/or defective condition of the SUBJECT VEHICLE were the
cause or a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs' injuries.
Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, and DOES 61 through
110, inclusive, by their agents, servants, workmen and/or employees are strictly liable for Plaintiffs'
injuries and damages by:
(a) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying, and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE in a defective condition;
(b) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system that was in a defective condition;
(c) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with the BBW-EBS in a defective condition in that the intentional suppression
of hydraulic brakes (when the regenerative braking system was active) resulted in insufficient brake
force for the required deceleration;
(d) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE in a defective condition lacking an effective fail-safe backup measure or
mechanism in the event the BBW-EBS failed (such as those incorporated by other vehicle
manufacturers);
(e) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system that was unreasonably dangerous to intended users
and/or bystander;
(f) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system that was not safe for its intended uses and purposes;
(g) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
Attachments 2/6
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system which lacked the necessary features to make it safe for
its intended use and purpose so that it would function;
(h) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE and/or braking system which could have been designed more safely;
(i) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a braking system that lacked adequate warnings;
(j) Misrepresenting the safety of the SUBJECT VEHICLE and/or its braking system;
(k) Failing to design, assemble, manufacture, sell, lease, supply and/or distribute the SUBJECT
VEHICLE and/or its braking system and its component parts in a manner so as to render them safe
for their intended purpose by providing a safe and functional braking system;
(l) Failing to warn that the SUBJECT VEHICLE'S BBW-EBS may fail and/or lacked an
effective fail-safe backup measure or mechanism in the event the BBW-EBS fails;
(m) Failing to provide reasonable protection against serious injury in a reasonably foreseeable
accident;
(n) Failing to design, manufacture, sell and/or lease the SUBJECT VEHICLE with a safe and
functional braking system;
(o) Failing to provide sufficient warnings as to the reasonably foreseeable dangers intended in
the use or operation of the SUBJECT VEHICLE and/or its braking system;
(p) Misrepresenting the safety of the SUBJECT VEHICLE including the braking system;
(q) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, supplying and distributing certain component
parts of the SUBJECT VEHICLE, including certain braking system, including the BBW-EBS which
were improperly designed, manufactured, distributed, tested, coded, installed and maintained;
(r) Failing to properly design the braking system that would properly slow and/or stop the
SUBJECT VEHICLE when engaged;
(s) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE that lacked elements necessary to make it safe for its intended use;
(t) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE that contained elements that made it unsafe for its intended use;
Attachments 3/6
(u) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing, supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE with a defective braking system, in that, the BBW-EBS was susceptible to
malfunction or, "glitches" or "ghosts", caused by various electronic and mechanical failures,
including but not limited to short circuits, software errors, and electromagnetic interference from
outside SUBJECT VEHICLE, such that the intentional suppression of hydraulic brakes (when the
regenerative braking system was active) resulted in insufficient brake force for the required
deceleration; and/or
(v) Designing, assembling, manufacturing, selling, leasing supplying and/or distributing the
SUBJECT VEHICLE without the added safety of the Pre-Collision System which came only
bundled with in additional products which were sold as a premium "Package" and was not sold as
standard equipment. Toyota was in possession (and sold) the collision avoidance system which
included: a) Pre-collision Brake Assist (Assisting braking) and b) Pre-collision Brake (Automated
braking) which if installed and functioning as designed and advertised, the SUBJECT VEHICLE
should have and would have stopped prior to its contact with Plaintiffs and prevented Plaintiffs'
horrific injuries.
110, inclusive, knew or should have known in the exercise of reasonable care that the SUBJECT
VEHICLE, and vehicles of the same or similar model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE, which it
designed, researched, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, distributed, prepared, sold,
leased, recommended, displayed, advertised, promoted, endorsed, warned, recalled, retrofitted,
provided safety updates for, maintained, serviced, instructed in the use of, and/or labeled was in a
dangerous and defective condition since it(a) was insufficiently designed to prevent injury in the
event of a foreseeable brake failure (b) was designed in a manner that would cause injury in the event
of a foreseeable brake failure, (c) was designed so that injury would be exacerbated by the negligence
in the production, design and manufacture of the vehicle, (d) lacked adequate instructions, cautions
and warnings, (e) was improperly designed and manufactured, (g) were untested, improperly tested,
and inadequately tested during manufacture, among other defects and dangerous condition.
Further, the injuries complained of herein were directly and legally caused by the failure of
110, inclusive, to recall and retrofit the vehicle. After having become aware of the defective
condition of the vehicle, and its component parts, which said Defendants knew or should have
known were likely to present a safety hazard to consumers and users of the SUBJECT VEHICLE.
110, inclusive, failed to adequately warn of the dangerous propensities of their products. Defendants
TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, and DOES 61 through 110, inclusive,
knew or had reason to know that those for whose use of the products were supplied would not realize
the dangerous condition of these products. Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA,
DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, and DOES 61 through 110, inclusive, knew or had reason to know that said
products would be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied. Yet, Defendants TMC, TM-NA,
Attachments 4/6
TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, and DOES 61 through 110, inclusive, provided the
SUBJECT VEHICLE without adequate and sufficient warnings for the danger, nor did they provide
appropriate instructions on the use of these products without sustaining injury.
Plaintiffs are informed, believe, and thereon allege that at all times material herein, Defendants
TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, and DOES 61 through 80, inclusive have
manufactured and assembled the SUBJECT VEHICLE and/or designed and manufactured
component parts and/or supplied component parts to the manufacturer.
Plaintiffs are informed and believe the SUBJECT VEHICLE was sold and or distributed to the
public by Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, and DOES 81-90,
inclusive and was not substantially changed prior to the time of the subject incident.
On June 4, 2014 as a direct and proximate result of the defects in the SUBJECT VEHICLE, and the
conduct of the Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ and DOES
and DOES 90 to 100, inclusive and each of them, the Plaintiffs suffered severe and permanent
injuries and damages, as hereinafter alleged.
Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that at all times herein mentioned,
110, inclusive, and each of them, expressly and/or impliedly warranted that the SUBJECT VEHICLE
and each and every component part thereof, were fit for the purpose for which they were to be used
and were free from design and manufacturing defects to consumers and users thereof, including
Plaintiffs.
The SUBJECT VEHICLE, and each and every component part thereof, were not free from such
defects, nor fit for the purpose for which they were to be used, and were in fact, defectively
manufactured and designed and imminently dangerous to consumers, users, including the Plaintiffs,
and were capable of causing, and in fact did cause, severe injuries to the users and consumers
thereof, while being used in a manner reasonably foreseeable, thereby rendering same unsafe and
dangerous for use by the consumers, users including Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that at all times herein mentioned,
110, inclusive, and each of them, breached express and/or implied warranties, in that the SUBJECT
VEHICLE wasnot of merchantable quality and production, wasnot fit for the purpose for which it
was to be used and wasnot free from design and manufacturing defects to consumers and users
thereof including Plaintiffs.
As a direct and proximate result of the breaches by Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M,
TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, and DOES 61 through 110, inclusive, and each of them, of the
express and/or implied warranties, and each of them, and defective condition of the SUBJECT
VEHICLE, Plaintiffs suffered severe personal injuries.
Attachments 5/6
As a further a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M,
TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, VARTANIAN and DOES 1 through 60, inclusive, and as a
direct and proximate result of the defects:
Plaintiff T.S. suffered permanent and catastrophic injuries, including but not limited to, a traumatic
brain injury with diffuse axonal injury; traumatic encephalopathy; occipital skull fracture extending
into the base; intraventricular hemorrhage; subarachnoid hemorrhage; subdural hemorrhage; cranial
nerve 3 palsy; nondisplaced fracture of the right inferior pubic ramus and nondisplaced right-sided
sacral fracture; right side hemiplegia; nondisplaced fracture of the third metatarsal bone on the left
foot; urinary tract infection; malnutrition; feeding problems; status post-gastrostomy, removed;
extropia; hypermetropia; diplopia (double vision.); abrasion to the right thigh; abrasion to the left
medial thigh; abrasion and swelling to the left side of the face; abrasion to the left shoulder; pain,
loss of strength, easily fatigued, memory loss, word loss, learning difficulties, inability to concentrate
for a long period of time, loss of coordination, headaches and migraines, loss of fine motor skills,
and has fear and anxiety of being struck by a car. Plaintiff T.S. will require medical assistance for
the rest of her life.
Plaintiff A.E. suffered permanent and catastrophic injuries including a severely dislocated left hip.
In addition to the severe hip dislocation, edema was present in the soft tissues posterior to the left
hip and a bone island was caused in the right femur. A.E. also suffered a split depressed fracture of
the right lateral tibial plateau on the growth plate of her right knee, several cracks in the intact lateral
tibial condyle, a 3mm bone fragment in the lateral femorotibial joint space, a small cortical fracture
of the proximal fibula and a large liphemarthrosis. In addition to the bone fractures in her right knee,
A.E. suffered a medial collateral ligament tear. She also suffered wounds to the front and back of
her head as well as multiple abrasions over all four extremities including the right hand, left upper
arm, and both knees. In addition to the physical injuries, A.E. was diagnosed with and treated for
multiple psychological complaints including severe nightmares, irritability, acute stress disorder,
mild post concussive stress disorder (headaches, irritability and dizziness, severe anxiety and loss
of memory) and will require medical assistance for the rest of her life.
Plaintiff E.R. was injured and hurt in her health, strength, and activity, sustaining injuries to her
body, and shock and injury to her nervous system and person, all of which said injuries have caused
and continue to cause Plaintiff E.R. great physical, mental, and nervous pain and suffering,
disfigurement, and physical disability, and will require medical assistance for the rest of her life.
As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA,
DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, and DOES 61 through 110, inclusive, Plaintiffs T.S., A.E., and E.R. were
injured and hurt in their health, strength, and activity, sustaining injuries to their bodies, and shock
and injury to their nervous systems and persons, all of which said injuries have caused and continue
to cause Plaintiffs great physical, mental, and nervous pain and suffering, disfigurement and physical
disability. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that said injuries will
result in permanent disability.
Attachments 6/6
TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ, and DOES 61 through 110, inclusive, Plaintiffs T.S., A.E., and
E.R. were compelled to, and did, employ the services of hospitals, physicians, surgeons, nurses, and
the like, to care for and treat them, and did incur hospital, medical, professional, and incidental
expenses. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that by reason of their
injuries, they will necessarily incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the
future.
PLD-PI-001(1)
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION—Motor Vehicle

(number)
Plaintiff (name): T.S., A.E., and E.R. by and through their respective GALs
MV- 1. Plaintiff alleges the acts of defendants were negligent; the acts were the legal (proximate) cause of injuries
and damages to plaintiff; the acts occurred
on (date): June 4, 2014
at (place): at or near the Magnolia Boulevard off-ramp of the southbound 170 Freeway in Los Angeles,
California
MV- 2. DEFENDANTS
a. X The defendants who operated a motor vehicle are (names): Vartan Bart Vartanian
X Does 111 to 120

b. X The defendants who employed the persons who operated a motor vehicle in the course of their employment
are (names):
X Does 121 to 130

c. X The defendants who owned the motor vehicle which was operated with their permission are (names):
Hertz Vehicles, Inc.
X Does 131 to 140

d. X The defendants who entrusted the motor vehicle are (names): Hertz Vehicles, Inc.
X Does 141 to 150

e. X The defendants who were the agents and employees of the other defendants and acted within the scope
of the agency were (names):
X Does 151 to 160

f. The defendants who are liable to plaintiffs for other reasons and the reasons for the liability are
listed in Attachment MV-2f as follows:
Does to Page 21
Page 1 of 1
Form Approved for Optional Use
Judicial Council of California
CAUSE OF ACTION—Motor Vehicle Code of Civil Procedure 425.12
www.courtinfo.ca.gov

PLD-PI-001(6)
CASE NUMBER:
SHORT TITLE:
Smith, et al. Toyota, et al.
Exemplary Damages Attachment Page 22

EX-1. As additional damages against defendant (name): Defendants TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, TMS-USA, DENSO, DIA, HERTZ,
and DOES 61 through 110, inclusive
Plaintiff alleges defendant was guilty of
X malice
X fraud
X oppression
as defined in Civil Code section 3294, and plaintiff should recover, in addition to actual damages, damages
to make an example of and to punish defendant.
EX-2. The facts supporting plaintiff's claim are as follows:

See Attachment EX-2
EX-3. The amount of exemplary damages sought is

a. X not shown, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10.
b. $
Page 1 of 1
Form Approved for Optional Use Code of Civil Procedure, § 425.12
Judicial Council of California Exemplary Damages Attachment www.courtinfo.ca.gov

Attachments 1/8
Attachment EX-2
In the fall of 2009, California Highway Patrol Officer Mark Saylor and his family died in a crash in
a 2009 Lexus ES 350 that could not stop. The 911 call from the car which recorded the horrific
events, their prayers, screams and deaths shocked and alarmed the American public. Their tragic
deaths re-ignited numerous NHTSA investigations, safety recalls, congressional hearings, and both
personal-injury and wrongful-death lawsuits into what is now publically known and accepted as
sudden unintended acceleration ("U-A") incidents.
From 2002 to 2010, TMC continuously denied any problems with their electronic control systems
on their vehicles. Meanwhile, as a Congressional probe uncovered, TMC, TM-NA, TME&M, and/or
TMS-USA (collectively "TOYOTA") received over 37,900 reports from customers describing
unintended acceleration, surging and/or speed control problems across many models and years, and
TOYOTA's own data shows at least 760 crashes.
All TOYOTA vehicles with the electronic control systems (beginning extensively in Model Year
2002, and some dating back to Model Year 1998) contain design defects because they lacked an
effective fail-safe backup measure or mechanism to prevent or mitigate the acceleration of the
TOYOTA vehicles (or brake override systems.)
Internal company documents show that by at least 2007, TOYOTA knew that installing a brake
override system could prevent U-A events. TOYOTA manager Koji Sakakibara stated in a document
dated September 1, 2009 that "during the floor mat sticking issue in 2007 TMS suggested that there
should be failsafe option similar to that used by other companies to prevent unintended acceleration."
However, TOYOTA did not heed that suggestion. Sakakibara stated that "Information concerning
the sequential inclusion of a failsafe system would be given by TOYOTA to NHTSA when
TOYOTA was invited in 2008."
Despite the feasibility and availability of a brake override system, and although TOYOTA's internal
documents show that TOYOTA knew of the U-A problem, TOYOTA negligently and recklessly
failed to install this protective measure in its vehicles.
Even in late 2009 and early 2010 when TOYOTA announced recalls involving a brake override
system, TOYOTA purposely hid that this redesign was safety-related and critical to preventing U-A.
Instead, TOYOTA claimed that the brake override system was "being added as an extra measure of
confidence for TOYOTA owners."
When pressed to explain and implement solutions to U-A, TOYOTA issued recalls to address
alleged mechanical issues, such as defective floor mats and sticky accelerator pedals. While these
problems undoubtedly posed real dangers for some drivers, a far greater number of vehicles were
affected by electronic control systems design defects. The "sticky pedal" and "floor mat" recalls have
failed to adequately address the U-A problem. Drivers continue to report U-A incidents in vehicles
Attachments 2/8
not part of the recalls. Likewise, even among vehicles recalled and repaired, drivers continue to
report experiences of U-A.
TOYOTA used these "floor mat" and "sticky pedal" problems to downplay and divert attention away
from the major design defects and safety problems with the electronic control systems, including the
need for a brake override system. Rather than revealing the truth about its U-A
electronic/software/hardware defects, TOYOTA highlighted and promoted the floor mat and pedal
recalls as a "smoke screen," while misleadingly characterizing the "reflashing" of the computer
software to allow for brake override as merely a "confidence" boost.
"Recalibrate and Reflashing" are vague terms TOYOTA used to disguise their hidden agenda, which
is to re-write, re-code, and re-design the firmware and software computer programs used in
TOYOTA's defective vehicles.
Statements from TOYOTA's leadership at the highest levels reveal that TOYOTA knows and has
known that its vehicles present an unreasonable danger because they are subject to U-A because of
defects in their design and manufacture, and confirm that TOYOTA has acted carelessly and
recklessly in addressing this problem:
a. Koji Sakakibara, a Toyota manager, knew in 2007 that other auto companies had installed
brake override systems to prevent U-A;
b. Toyota Motor Corporation's CEO, Akio Toyoda, acknowledged that Toyota had grown too
quickly;
c. Toyota Motor Sales President, James Lentz, admitted that the floor mat and pedal recalls do
not totally solve the unintended acceleration problem;
d. Toyota North America's President, Yoshimi Inaba, conceded that "Toyota has not lived up
to its high standards"; and
e. Toyota Motor Corporation's Executive Vice President, Shinichi Sasaki concluded that Toyota
did not listen to "many voices" of unintended acceleration.
TOYOTA made inaccurate statements during an investigation initiated by the United States
Congress in or about late January 2010. Consistent with the talking points described above, but
contrary to certain internal documents that TOYOTA had itself produced to Congress among
thousands of other documents, TOYOTA repeated to Congress that it learned of sticky pedal in the
United States in October 2009, when it had been investigating sticky pedal in the United States since
by August 2009.
The SUBJECT VEHICLE is part of the Third generation of Prius model family internally know to
Attachments 3/8
TOYOTA as the XW30 series ("MODEL LINE".) The MODEL LINE was sold beginning in late
2009 until just recently ending in 2015. The model years include 2010-2015.
The MODEL LINE was recalled for faulty brakes. Once again, TOYOTA admitted there was a brake
software problem in 2010 MODEL LINE. TOYOTA later recalled the 2010 MODEL LINE, Lexus
HS 250h and Camry Hybrids due to faulty brakes (437,000 vehicles worldwide).
TOYOTA knew, or should have known, that its electronics (including firmware /software) are not
infallible. Software problems have arisen in other TOYOTA vehicles. On February 8, 2010,
TOYOTA announced a voluntary safety recall on some of its models to "update software" in the
vehicle's anti-lock brake system (ABS), in response to braking problems experienced by drivers. This
recall involves approximately 133,000 Model Year 2010 MODEL LINE vehicles and 14,550 Model
Year 2010 Lexus HS 250h vehicles.
Over the last two decades, various TOYOTA and Lexus vehicles have been recalled due to
electronics and software defects that led to engine surging, engine racing, and unintended
engagement of headlights and taillights, according to a Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2010
article. As far back as 2003, TOYOTA had to "recalibrate" the Electronic Control Modules in certain
2003 Camrys due to engine "surging." Again, "Recalibrate and Reflashing" are vague terms
TOYOTA used to disguise their hidden agenda, which is to re-write, re-code, and re-design the
firmware and software computer programs used in TOYOTA's defective vehicles.
Further, TOYOTA has known for some time that the inherent complexity and unpredictability of
vehicle electronics and software counsels the use of a properly designed brake-to-idle override
system that allows drivers to bring a vehicle under control if a UA incident occurs. According to
documents presented to Congress, and as reported in The Los Angeles Times, in 2007, NHTSA
asked TOYOTA to consider installing software to prevent sudden acceleration in its vehicles after
receiving yet another round of U-A complaints in TOYOTA vehicles.
In an internal August 2007 e-mail, entitled "UPDATE on ES 350 investigation," Chris Santucci, a
Toyota manager, stated that he and NHTSA investigators discussed fail-safe mechanisms used by
other vehicle manufacturers to protect against unintended acceleration, including "[u]sing Electronic
Throttle Control to shut down throttle control" and "cutting off the throttle when the brakes are
applied." Mr. Santucci also noted, "Jeff [Quandt, Chief, Vehicle Controls Division, Office of Defects
Investigation] mentioned that another manufacturer allows the engine to be shut off if you press the
ignition button repeatedly."
Even in the face of growing public and governmental scrutiny and admission of TOYOTA
executives, TOYOTA knew from past U-A failures within their vehicles that TOYOTA should have
(but didn't) include the foreseeable needed effective fail-safe backup measure or mechanism if the
BBW-EBS failed (such as those incorporated by other vehicle manufacturers)
Attachments 4/8
The Justice Department announced on March 19, 2014, criminal charge against TMC and a deferred
prosecution agreement with a $1.2 Billion Financial Penalty against TMC. On March 19, 2014, TMC
admitted to misleading consumers and US regulator about safety issues in its cars.
The Justice Department imposed on TMC an independent monitor to review and assess policies,
practices and procedures relating to TMC's safety-related public statements and reporting
obligations.
TMC admitted and stipulated that certain facts in the Statement of Facts, (per the attached exhibit
1 see, internal exhibit C) and are incorporated herein. In sum, TMC admitted that it misled U.S.
consumers by concealing and making deceptive statements about two safety related issues affecting
its vehicles. For brevity, Plaintiffs, re-allege the following are true and accurate:
1. TMC is an automotive company headquartered in Toyota City, Japan. Assisted by its

subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide, TMC designs, manufactures, assembles, and sells Toyota and
Lexus brand vehicles. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 2010, TMC's revenues from its
automotive business were 17.2 trillion Japanese yen (approximately $184 billion), and its second
largest market, with approximately 29% of its worldwide sales, was North America.
4. According to a January 2010 report of a discussion following a meeting between TMC and
its regulator, one Toyota employee was said to exclaim, "Idiots! Someone will go to jail if lies are
repeatedly told. I can't support this."
5. At least through February 2010, decisions about whether and when to conduct recalls of
Toyota and Lexus vehicles were made by the leadership of a group within TMC called "Customer
Quality Engineering," which was centered in Japan and sometimes referred to as "CQE-J." Customer
Quality Engineering had regional arms responsible for monitoring vehicle quality issues in the "field"
(that is, for vehicles already on the road) in their respective regions. These regional arms regularly
reported field issues and results of vehicle inspections and testing to CQE-J. The U.S. regional arm,
located in Torrance, California, was called "CQE-LA." Technically, CQE-LA was part of TME&M.
In practice, CQE-LA staff reported to CQE-J's leadership.
6. TMS-USA is an entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of TMC and headquartered in

Torrance, California. It is responsible for sales and marketing of Toyota and Lexus brand vehicles
in the United States.
7. TM-NA is an entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of TMC with offices in New York,
New York, and Washington, D.C. The Washington office was responsible for reporting to and
interacting with TOYOTA's U.S. regulator, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA").
10. Against the backdrop of the San Diego accident, press reports of other unintended
Attachments 5/8
acceleration incidents in Toyota and Lexus vehicles, and intensified scrutiny from NHTSA, TMC
agreed to NHTSA's request in or about September 2009 to recall eight of its U.S. models for floor
mat entrapment susceptibility. Meanwhile and thereafter, from the fall of 2009 through January
2010, TMC misleadingly assured customers that it had "addressed the root cause" of unintended
acceleration in its U.S.-sold vehicles by conducting this recall. In truth, the recall TMC had
conducted (a) left unaddressed the Corolla, the Highlander, and the Venza, which shared design
features similar to the models that were recalled for floor mat entrapment, and (b) left unaddressed
a second type of unintended acceleration: the sticky pedal problem.
11. TMC made these misleading statements and undertook these acts of concealment as part of
efforts to defend its brand image in the wake of the fatal San Diego accident and the ensuing
onslaught of critical press.
12. When, in early 2010, TMC finally conducted safety recalls to address the unintended
acceleration issues it had concealed, TMC provided to the American public, NHTSA, and Congress
an inaccurate timeline of events that made it appear as if TMC had acted to remedy the sticky pedal
problem within approximately 90 days of discovering it.
13. TMC is required to disclose to NHTSA if it "learns [a] vehicle or equipment contains a defect
and decides in good faith that the defect is related to motor vehicle safety." "Motor vehicle safety"
is defined as "performance of a motor vehicle ... in a way that protects the public against
unreasonable risk of accidents ... and against unreasonable risk of death or injury in an accident." 49
U.S.C. §§ 30118(c)(1); 30102(a)(8). Such disclosure must be "submitted not more than 5 working
days after a defect in a vehicle or item of equipment has been determined to be safety related" (the
"Defect Disclosure Regulation"). See 49 U.S.C.§ 30118(c) and 49 C.F.R.§ 573.6.
31. On or about September 17, 2009, TMC reproduced sticky pedal in a pedal recovered from
a U.S. vehicle.
32. After the August 2009 fatal floor mat entrapment accident in San Diego, several articles
critical of TMC appeared in U.S. newspapers. The articles reported instances of TMC customers
allegedly experiencing unintended acceleration and the authors accused TMC of, among other things,
hiding defects related to unintended acceleration.
33. Meanwhile, following the San Diego floor mat entrapment accident, NHTSA identified
customer complaints that it believed were potentially related to floor mat entrapment. Based
principally on complaint data that the agency had itself collected, NHTSA identified eight vehicle
models it believed posed an unreasonable risk of floor mat entrapment and should be recalled.
34. As it had in 2007, TMC initially resisted NHTSA's recall suggestions. CQE-J prescribed and
followed a negotiating position with NHTSA with respect to floor mat entrapment consisting of: (a)
a refusal to declare a vehicle defect of any kind, and (b) an effort to narrow the class of vehicles that
Attachments 6/8
would be subject to the recall.
43. In or about late September 2009, TMS-USA employees received a report of sticky pedal in
a Corolla. TMS-USA urged CQE-LA to do something about the issue. Then, in or about October
2009, TMS-USA received three more such reports in U.S. Corolla vehicles, and dispatched
technicians to prepare "field technical reports" (or "FTRs") documenting the incidents. In or about
November 2009, senior executives at TMS learned of these three reports.
45. On or about November 17, 2009, before TMC had negotiated with NHTSA a final set of
remedies for the eight models encompassed by the floor mat entrapment recall, TMC informed
NHTSA of the three Corolla FTRs and several other FTRs reporting unintended acceleration in TMC
model vehicles equipped with pedals manufactured by A-Pedal Company. In TMC's disclosure to
NHTSA, TMC did not reveal its understanding of the sticky pedal problem as a type of unintended
acceleration, nor did it reveal the problem's manifestation and the subsequent design changes in
Europe, the planned, cancelled, and suspended design changes in the United States, the August 2009
Camry and Matrix vehicles that had suffered sticky pedal, the September 2009 Corolla with a similar
problem, or the September 2009 Market Impact Summary.
46. In truth, the cause of the issue reflected in the three Corolla FTRs from October 2009 was
the same sticky pedal problem that had arisen and been addressed on a going-forward basis in
Europe, about which NHTSA remained unaware.
47. In contrast to its public comments in early November 2009 that there was "no evidence to
support" theories concerning "other causes of unintended acceleration" in its vehicles beyond floor
mat entrapment, on or about November 17, 2009, a CQE-J employee wrote an email to a leader of
CQE-J stating: "We have been trying to approach the floor mat issue by treating it as a problem
caused by the all weather floor mat interfering with the pedal; however, our understanding is that we
can no longer separate this problem from the [A-Pedal Company] problem that just began to
surface." He went on: "[I]t has become increasingly difficult to take the position that 'the only
problems in the return of the gas pedal we have confirmed are related to interference with the floor
mat.' Therefore, we are in a subtle situation as to how much we can emphasize the 'floor mat
problems' as the top leaders meet with NHTSA and whether we can get NHTSA to agree with our
position." (per the attached exhibit 1 [Toyota Motor Corporation - Deferred Prosecution Agreement
with the US Department of J ustice] found at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/Toyota%20DPA,%20Stat
ement%20of%20Facts,%20and%20Information.pdf and incorporated by reference herein)
Long before January 2013 (the date the SUBJECT VEHICLE was manufactured ) TMC (and their
related entities) knew of and misled U.S. consumers and NHTSA by concealing and making
deceptive statements about safety-related issues (Toyota vehicles were failing to stop when operators
were applying brakes and causing injuries and deaths) instead of recalling and retrofitting their
vehicles with an effective fail-safe backup measure or mechanism. TOYOTA, DENSO, DIA, and
Attachments 7/8
DOES 1 through 160, inclusive, knew that the SUBJECT VEHICLE's BBW-EBS required the same,
(an effective fail-safe backup measure or mechanism if the BBW-EBS failed) such as those
incorporated by other vehicle manufacturers.
Prior to June 4, 2014, TOYOTA, DENSO, DIA, and DOES 1 through 110, inclusive, knew or should
have known in the exercise of reasonable care that the SUBJECT VEHICLE, and vehicles of the
same or similar model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE, which it designed, researched, developed,
manufactured, assembled, tested, distributed, prepared, sold, leased, recommended, displayed,
advertised, promoted, endorsed, warned, recalled, retrofitted, provided safety updates for,
maintained, serviced, instructed in the use of, and labeled was in a dangerous and defective condition
since it (a) was insufficiently designed to prevent injury in the event of a foreseeable brake failure
(b) was designed in a manner that would cause injury in the event of a foreseeable brake failure, (c)
was designed so that injury would be exacerbated by the negligence in the production, design and
manufacture of the vehicle, (d) lacked adequate instructions, cautions and warnings, (e) was
improperly designed and manufactured, (g) was untested, improperly tested, and inadequately tested
during manufacture, among other defects and dangerous conditions.
None of the above was disclosed to the Plaintiffs (nor the Public) by TOYOTA, DENSO, DIA, and
DOES 1 through 110, inclusive. TOYOTA, DENSO, DIA, and DOES 1 through 110, inclusive,
knew there were reoccurring issues within Toyota vehicles failing to stop with operators who were
applying the vehicle brakes. Rather than incurring the feasible expense of either retrofitting the
SUBJECT VEHICLE, recalling the SUBJECT VEHICLE or accepting that the SUBJECT
VEHICLE'S BBW-EBS was susceptible to malfunction or, "glitches" or "ghosts", caused by various
electronic and mechanical failures, including but not limited to short circuits, software errors, and
electromagnetic interference from outside the SUBJECT VEHICLE, such that the intentional
suppression of hydraulic brakes (when the regenerative braking system was active) resulted in
insufficient brake force for the required deceleration.
TOYOTA, DENSO, DIA, and DOES 1 through 110, inclusive, put profits over safety and in an
effort to sit back and wait for the foreseeable subject incident to occur rather than take reasonable
steps to prevent it. This was despicable conduct which is carried on by TOYOTA, DENSO, DIA,
and DOES 1 through 110, inclusive with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others. TOYOTA, DENSO, DIA, and DOES 1 through 110, inclusive were aware of the probable
dangerous consequences of this conduct and they willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those
consequences.
Attachments 8/8
Because these acts and/or omissions of TOYOTA, DENSO, DIA, and DOES 1 through 110,
inclusive were committed by or authorized, ratified, or otherwise approved by their officers,
directors, and/or managing agents, or were carried out in an oppressive, fraudulent, malicious,
deliberate, callous, intentional, and/or unreasonable manner, causing severe personal injury to
Plaintiffs and were done with a conscious disregard of Plaintiffs' rights, Plaintiffs are entitled to an
award of punitive damages pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 3295 in amount
sufficient to punish the TOYOTA, DENSO, DIA, and DOES 1 through 110, inclusive, in light of
their financial condition and to make an example of them.
EXHIBIT 1
U.S. Department of Justice
United States Attorney

Southern District ofNew York
The Silvio J. Mollo Building

One Saint Andrew's Plaza
New York New York 10007
March 19, 2014
James E. Johnson, Esq.

Matthew Fishbein, Esq.
Helen Cantwell, Esq.
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
919 Third A venue
New York, NY 10022
Re: Toyota Motor Corporation- Deferred Prosecution Agreement
Dear Messrs. Johnson and Fishbein and Ms. Cantwell:
Pursuant to our discussions and written exchanges, the Office of the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York (the "Office") and the defendant Toyota Motor
Corporation ("Toyota"), under authority granted by its Board of Directors in the form of the
written authorization attached as Exhibit A, hereby enter into this Deferred Prosecution
Agreement (the "Agreement").
The Criminal Information
1. Toyota consents to the filing of a one-count Information (the

"Infonnation") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the
"Court"), charging Toyota with committing wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1343. A copy of the Information is attached as Exhibit B. This Agreement shall
take effect upon its execution by both parties.
Acceptance of Responsibility
2. Toyota admits and stipulates that the facts set forth in the Statement of
Facts, attached as Exhibit C and incorporated herein, are true and accurate. In sum, Toyota
admits that it misled U.S. consumers by concealing and making deceptive statements about two
safety related issues affecting its vehicles, each of which caused a type of unintended acceleration.
Financial Penalty
3. As a result of the conduct described in the Information and the Statement

of Facts, Toyota agrees to pay to the United States $1.2 billion (the "Stipulated Financial
Penalty") representing the financial penalty resulting from the offense described in the
Information and Statement of Facts. Toyota agrees that the facts contained in the Information and
Statement of Facts are sufficient to establish that the Stipulated Financial Penalty is subject to
civil forfeiture to the United States and that this Agreement, Information, and Statement of Facts
March 19, 2014
may be attached to and incorporated into the Civil Forfeiture Complaint to be filed against the
Stipulated Financial Penalty, a copy of which is atta~hed as Exhibit D hereto. By this Agreement,
Toyota specifically waives service of said Civil Forfeiture Complaint and agrees that a Final
Order ofF orfeiture may be entered against the Stipulated Financial Penalty. Upon payment of the
Stipulated Financial Penalty, Toyota shall release any and all claims it may have to such funds
and execute such documents as necessary to accomplish the forfeiture of the funds. Toyota agrees
that it will not file a claim with the Court or otherwise contest the civil forfeiture of the Stipulated
Financial Penalty and will not assist a third party in asserting any claim to the Stipulated Financial
Penalty. Toyota agrees that the Stipulated Financial Penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to
the United States government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. Toyota agrees that it
will not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state,
local, or foreign tax for any fine or forfeiture paid pursuant to this Agreement.
4. Toyota shall transfer $1.2 billion to the United States by no later than
March 25, 2014 (or as otherwise directed by the Office following such date). Such payment shall
be made by wire transfer to the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to wire instructions
provided by the Office. If Toyota fails to timely make the payment required under this paragraph,
interest (at the rate specified in Title 28, United States Code, Section 1961) shall accrue on the
unpaid balance through the date of payment, unless the Office, in its sole discretion, chooses to
reinstate prosecution pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 11 below.
Obligation to Cooperate
5. Toyota has cooperated with this Office's criminal investigation and agrees
to cooperate fully and actively with the Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the
Department of Transportation ("DOT"), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA"), and any other agency of the government designated by the Office regarding any
matter relating to the Office's investigation about which Toyota has knowledge or infornmtion.
6. It is understood that Toyota shall (a) truthfully and completely disclose all
infonnation with respect to the activities of itself and its subsidiaries Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc. ("TMS"), Toyota Motor N01ih America, Inc. ("TMA), and Toyota Motor Engineering &
Manufacturing North America, Inc. ("TEMA"), as well as with respect to the activities of officers,
agents, and employees of Toyota, TMS, TMA, and TEMA, concerning all matters about which
the Office inquires of it, which information can be used for any purpose; (b) cooperate fully with
the Office, FBI, DOT, NHTSA, and any other law enforcement agency designated by the Office;
(c) attend all meetings at which the Office requests its presence and use its best efforts to secure
the attendance and truthful statements or testimony of any past or current officers, agents, or
employees of Toyota, TMS, TMA, and TEMA at any meeting or interview or before the grand
jury or at trial or at any other court proceeding; (d) provide to the Office upon request any
document, record, or other tangible evidence relating to matters about which the Office or any
designated law enforcement agency inquires of it; (e) assemble, organize, and provide in a
responsive and prompt fashion, and upon request, on an expedited schedule, all documents,
records, information and other evidence in Toyota's possession, custody or control as may be
2
March 19,2014
requested by the Office, FBI, DOT, NHTSA, or designated law enforcement agency; (f) volunteer
and provide to the Office any information and documents that come to Toyota's attention that
may be relevant to the Office's investigation of this matter, any issue related to the Statement of
Facts, and any issue that would fall within the scope of the duties of the independent monitor (the
"Monitor") as set forth in paragraph 15; (g) provide testimony or information necessary to
identify or establish the original location, authenticity, or other basis for admission into evidence
of documents or physical evidence in any criminal or other proceeding as requested by the Office,
FBI, DOT, NHTSA, or designated law enforcement agency, including but not limited to
information and testimony concerning the conduct set forth in the Information and Statement of
Facts; (h) bring to the Office's attention all criminal conduct by or criminal investigations of
Toyota or any of its agents or employees acting within the scope of their employment related to
violations ofthe federal laws ofthe United States, as to which Toyota's Board of Directors, senior
management, or United States legal and compliance personnel are aware; (i) bring to the Office's
attention any administrative or regulatory proceeding or civil action or investigation by any U.S.
governmental authority that alleges fraud by Toyota; and G) commit no crimes whatsoever under
the federal laws of the United States subsequent to the execution of this Agreement. To the extent
the provisions of this paragraph relate to information or attendance of personnel located in Japan,
the parties to this Agreement acknowledge that the request, provision, or use of such information,
or attendance of personnel, is subject to applicable laws and legal principles in Japan. In the
event the Office determines that information it receives from Toyota pursuant to this provision
should be shared with DOT and/or NHTSA, the Office may request that Toyota provide such
information to DOT and/or NHTSA directly. Toyota will submit such infonnation to DOT and/or
NHTSA consistent with the regulatory provisions related to the protection of confidential
business information contained in 49 C.P.R. Part 512 and 49 C.P.R. Part 7. Nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to require Toyota to provide any information, documents or
testimony protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, or any other
applicable privilege.
7. Toyota agrees that its obligations pursuant to this Agreement, which shall
commence upon the signing of this Agreement, will continue for three years from the date of the
Court's acceptance of this Agreement, unless otherwise extended pursuant to paragraph 12 below.
Toyota's obligation to cooperate is not intended to apply in the event that a prosecution against
Toyota by this Office is pursued and not deferred.
Deferral of Prosecution
8. In consideration of Toyota's entry into this Agreement and its

commitment to: (a) accept and acknowledge responsibility for its conduct; (b) cooperate with the
Office, FBI, DOT, NHTSA, and any other law enforcement agency designated by this Office;
(c) make the payments specified in this Agreement; (d) comply with Federal criminal laws; and
(e) otherwise comply with all of the terms of this Agreement, the Office shall recommend to the
Court that prosecution of Toyota on the Information be deferred for three years from the date of
the signing of this Agreement. Toyota shall expressly waive indictment and all rights to a speedy
trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Title 18, United States
3
March 19, 2014
Code, Section 3161, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b), and any applicable Local Rules of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for the period during
which this Agreement is in effect.
9. It is understood that this Office cannot, and does not, agree not to
prosecute Toyota for criminal tax violations. However, if Toyota fully complies with the tenns of
this Agreement, no testimony given or other infonnation provided by Toyota (or any other
information directly or indirectly derived therefrom) will be used against Toyota in any criminal
tax prosecution. In addition, the Office agrees that, if Toyota is in compliance with all of its
obligations under this Agreement, the Office will, within thirty (30) days after the expiration of
the period of deferral (including any extensions thereof), seek dismissal with prejudice as to
Toyota of the Information filed against Toyota pursuant to this Agreement. Except in the event of
a violation by Toyota of any term of this Agreement, the Office will bring no additional charges
against Toyota, except for criminal tax violations, relating to its conduct as described in the
admitted Statement of Facts. This Agreement does not provide any protection against prosecution
for any crimes except as set forth above and does not apply to any individual or entity other than
Toyota and its subsidiaries TMS, TMA, and TEMA. Toyota and the Office understand that the
Agreement to defer prosecution of Toyota must be approved by the Court, in accordance with 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2). Should the Court decline to approve the Agreement to defer prosecution for
any reason, both the Office and Toyota are released from any obligation imposed upon them by
this Agreement, and this Agreement shall be null and void, except for the tolling provision set
forth in paragraph 10.
10. It is further understood that should the Office in its sole discretion
determine based on facts learned subsequent to the execution of this Agreement that Toyota has:
(a) knowingly given false, incomplete or misleading infonnation to the Office, FBI, DOT, or
NHTSA, either during the term of this Agreement or in connection with the Office's investigation
of the conduct described in the Information and Statement of Facts, (b) committed any crime
under the federal laws of the United States subsequent to the execution of this Agreement, or (c)
otherwise violated any provision of this Agreement, Toyota shall, in the Office's sole discretion,
thereafter be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation of which the Office has
knowledge, including but not limited to a prosecution based on the Information, the Statement of
Facts, or the conduct described therein. Any such prosecution may be premised on any
infonnation provided by or on behalf of Toyota to the Office and/or FBI, DOT, or NHTSA at any
time. In any such prosecution, no charge would be time-barred provided that such prosecution is
brought within the applicable statute of limitations period, excluding (a) any period subject to any
prior or existing tolling agreement between the Office and Toyota and (b) the period from the
execution of this Agreement until its termination. Toyota agrees to toll, and exclude from any
calculation of time, the running of the applicable criminal statute of limitations for the length of
this Agreement starting from the date of the execution of this Agreement and including any
extension of the period of deferral of prosecution pursuant to paragraph 12 below. By this
Agreement, Toyota expressly intends to and hereby does waive its rights in the foregoing
respects, including any right to make a claim premised on the statute of limitations, as well as any
4
March 19, 2014
constitutional, statutory, or other claim concerning pre-indictment delay. Such waivers are
knowing, voluntary, and in express reliance on the advice of Toyota's counsel.
11. It is further agreed that in the event that the Office, in its sole discretion,
determines that Toyota has violated any provision of this Agreement, including by failure to meet
its obligations under this Agreement: (a) all statements made by or on behalf of Toyota to the
Office, FBI, DOT, and/or NHTSA, including but not limited to the Statement of Facts, or any
testimony given by Toyota or by any agent of Toyota before a grand jury, or elsewhere, whether
before or after the date of this Agreement, or any leads from such statements or testimony, shall
be admissible in evidence in any and all criminal proceedings hereinafter brought by the Office
against Toyota; and (b) Toyota shall not assert any claim under the United States Constitution,
Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or any other federal rule, that statements made by or on behalf of Toyota before or after
the date of this Agreement, or any leads derived therefrom, should be suppressed or otherwise
excluded from evidence. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive any and all rights in the
foregoing respects.
12. Toyota agrees that, in the event that the Office determines during the
period of deferral of prosecution described in paragraph 8 above (or any extensions thereof) that
Toyota has violated any provision of this Agreement, an extension of the period of deferral of
prosecution may be imposed in the sole discretion of the Office, up to an additional one year, but
in no event shall the total term of the deferral-of-prosecution period of this Agreement exceed
four (4) years.
13. Toyota, having truthfully admitted to the facts in the Statement of Facts,
agrees that it shall not, through its attorneys, agents, or employees, make any statement, in
litigation or otherwise, contradicting the Statement of Facts or its representations in this
Agreement. Consistent with this provision, Toyota may raise defenses and/or assert affinnative
claims in any civil proceedings brought by private parties as long as doing so does not contradict
the Statement of Facts or such representations. Any such contradictory statement by Toyota, its
present or future attorneys, agents, or employees shall constitute a violation of this Agreement
and Toyota thereafter shall be subject to prosecution as specified in paragraphs 8 through 11,
above, or the deferral-of-prosecution period shall be extended pursuant to paragraph 12, above.
The decision as to whether any such contradictory statement will be imputed to Toyota for the
purpose of determining whether Toyota has violated this Agreement shall be within the sole
discretion ofthe Office. Upon the Office's notifying Toyota of any such contradictory statement,
Toyota may avoid a finding of violation of this Agreement by repudiating such statement both to
the recipient of such statement and to the Office within forty-eight (48) hours after having been
provided notice by the Office. Toyota consents to the public release by the Office, in its sole
discretion, of any such repudiation. Nothing in this Agreement is meant to affect the obligation of
Toyota or its officers, directors, agents or employees to testify truthfully to the best of their
personal knowledge and belief in any proceeding.
5
March 19, 2014
14. Toyota agrees that it is within the Office's sole discretion to choose, in the
event of a violation, the remedies contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 above, or instead to choose
to extend the period of deferral of prosecution pursuant to paragraph 12. Toyota understands and
agrees that the exercise of the Office's discretion under this Agreement is unreviewable by any
court. Should the Office determine that Toyota has violated this Agreement, the Office shall
provide notice to Toyota of that determination and provide Toyota with an opportunity to make a
presentation to the Office to demonstrate that no violation occurred, or, to the extent applicable,
that the violation should not result in the exercise of those remedies or in an extension of the
period of deferral of prosecution, including because the violation has been cured by Toyota.
Independent Monitor
15. Toyota agrees to retain a Monitor upon selection by the Office and
approval by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, whose powers, rights and responsibilities
shall be as set forth below.
(a). Jurisdiction, Powers, and Oversight Authority. To address issues

related to the Statement of Facts and Information, the Monitor shall have the authorities and
duties defined below. The scope of the Monitor's authority is to review and assess Toyota's
policies, practices or procedures as set forth below, and is not intended to include substantive
review of the correctness of any of Toyota's decisions relating to compliance with NHTSA's
regulatory regime, including the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, its
implementing regulations, and related policies. Nor is it intended to supplant NHTSA's
authority over decisions related to motor vehicle safety.
(1). Review and assess whether Toyota's policies, practices, or

procedures ensure that Toyota's public statements in the United States related to motor vehicle
safety are true and accurate;
(2). Review and assess the effectiveness of Toyota's policies, practices,

or procedures for making information relating to accidents that take place in the United States
available to Toyota's engineers, Toyota's chief quality officer for North America, and Toyota's
regional product safety executive for Nmih America; and
(3). Review and assess whether Toyota's policies, practices, or

procedures regarding the generation of field technical reports - as opposed to other internal
reporting mechanisms, including, but not limited to, the "intra-company communication"- in the
United States ensure compliance with 49 C.P.R. Part 579.
It is the intent of this Agreement that the provisions regarding the Monitor's jurisdiction, powers,
and oversight authority and duties be broadly construed, subject to the following limitation: the
Monitor's responsibilities shall be limited to Toyota's activities in the United States, and to the
extent the Monitor seeks information outside the United States, compliance with such requests
shall be consistent with the applicable legal principles in that jurisdiction. Toyota shall adopt all
6
March 19, 2014
recommendations submitted by the Monitor unless Toyota objects to any recommendation and
the Office agrees that adoption of such recommendation should not be required.
(b). Access to Infonnation. The Monitor shall have the authority to take
such reasonable steps, in the Monitor's view, as necessary to be fully informed about those
operations of Toyota within or relating to his or her jurisdiction. To that end, the Monitor shall
have:
(1). Access to, and the right to make copies of, any and all non-
privileged books, records, accounts, correspondence, files, and any and all other documents or
electronic records, including e-mails, of Toyota and its subsidiaries TMS, TMA, and TEMA, and
of officers, agents, and employees of Toyota, TMS, TMA, and TEMA, within or relating to his
or her jurisdiction that are located in the United States. To the extent the Monitor believes such
information from Japan is reasonably necessary, Toyota will make its best efforts to request the
information and make it available to the Monitor in the United States consistent with applicable
laws and legal principles in Japan; and
(2). The right to interview any officer, employee, agent, or consultant

of Toyota, TMS, TMA, and TEMA conducting business in or present in the United States and to
participate in any meeting in the United States concerning any matter within or relating to the
Monitor's jurisdiction.
To the extent that the Monitor seeks access to information contained within privileged
documents or materials, Toyota shall use its best efforts to provide the Monitor with the
information without compromising the asse1ied privilege.
(c). Confidentiality.
(1). The Monitor shall maintain the confidentiality of any non-public

information entrusted or made available to the Monitor. The Monitor shall share such
information only with the Office and FBI. The Monitor may also determine that such
information should be shared with DOT and/or NHTSA. In the event of such a determination,
the Monitor may request that Toyota provide the subject information directly to DOT and/or
NHTSA. Toyota will submit such information to DOT or NHTSA consistent with the regulatory
provisions related to the protection of confidential business information contained in 49 C.P.R.
Part 512 and 49 C.P.R. Part 7.
(2). The Monitor shall sign a non-disclosure agreement with Toyota

prohibiting disclosure of information received from Toyota to anyone other than to the Office,
FBI, DOT, or NHTSA, and anyone hired by the Monitor. Within thiliy days after the end of the
Monitor's term, the Monitor shall either return anything obtained from Toyota, or certify that
such information has been destroyed. Anyone hired by the Monitor shall also sign a non-
disclosure agreement with similar return or destruction requirements as set forth in this sub-
paragraph.
7
March 19, 2014
(d). Hiring Authority. The Monitor shall have the authority to employ
legal counsel, consultants, investigators, experts, and any other personnel necessary to assist in
the proper discharge of the Monitor's duties.
(e). Implementing Authority. The Monitor shall have the authority to take
any other actions in the United States that are necessary to effectuate the Monitor's oversight and
monitoring responsibilities.
(f). Miscellaneous Provisions.
(1). Term. The Monitor's authority set forth herein shall extend for a
period of three years from the commencement of the Monitor's duties, except that (a) in the
event the Office detennines during the period of the Monitorship (or any extensions thereof) that
Toyota has violated any provision of this Agreement, an extension of the period of the
Monitorship may be imposed in the sole discretion of the Office, up to an additional one-year
extension, but in no event shall the total term of the Monitorship exceed the tem1 of the
Agreement; and (b) in the event the Office, in its sole discretion, determines during the period of
the Monitorship that the employment of a Monitor is no longer necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Agreement, the Office may shorten the period of the Monitorship.
(2). Selection of the Monitor. The Office shall consult with Toyota,
including soliciting nominations from Toyota, using its best efforts to select and appoint a
mutually acceptable Monitor (and any replacement Monitors, if required) as promptly as
possible. In the event that the Office is unable to select· a Monitor acceptable to Toyota, the
Office shall have the sole right to select a monitor (and any replacement Monitors, if required.
To ensure the integrity of the Monitorship, the Monitor must be independent and objective and
the following persons shall not be eligible as either a Monitor or an agent, consultant or
employee of the Monitor: (a) any person previously employed by Toyota; or (b) any person who
has been directly adverse to Toyota in any proceeding. The selection of the Monitor must be
approved by the Deputy Attorney General.
(3). Notice regarding the Monitor; Monitor's Authority to Act on

Information received from Employees; No Penalty for Reporting. Toyota shall establish an
independent, toll-free answering service to facilitate communication anonymously or otherwise
with the Monitor. Within 10 days of the commencement of the Monitor's duties, Toyota shall
advise employees of its subsidiaries TMS, TMA, and TEMA in writing of the appointment ofthe
Monitor, the Monitor's powers and duties as set forth in this Agreement, the toll-free number
established for contacting the Monitor, and email and mail addresses designated by the Monitor.
Such notice shall inform employees that they may communicate with the Monitor anonymously
or otherwise, and that no agent, consultant, or employee of Toyota shall be penalized in any way
for providing information to the Monitor. In addition, such notice shall direct that, if an
employee is aware of any violation of any law or any unethical conduct that has not been
reported to an appropriate federal, state or municipal agency, the employee is obligated to report
such violation or conduct to Toyota's compliance office in the United States or the Monitor. The
8
March 19,2014
Monitor shall have access to all communications made using this toll-free number. The Monitor
has the sole discretion to determine whether the toll-free number is sufficient to permit
confidential and/or anonymous communications or whether the establishment of an additional
toll-free number is required.
(4). Reports to the Office. The Monitor shall keep records of his or her
activities, including copies of all correspondence and telephone logs, as well as records relating
to actions taken in response to correspondence or telephone calls. If potentially illegal or
unethical conduct is reported to the Monitor, the Monitor may, at his or her option, conduct an
investigation, and/or refer the matter to the Office. The Monitor should, at his or her option, refer
any potentially illegal or unethical conduct to Toyota's compliance office. The Monitor may
report to the Office whenever the Monitor deems fit but, in any event, shall file a written report
not less often than every four months regarding: the Monitor's activities; whether Toyota is
complying with the terms of this Agreement; and ariy changes that are necessary to foster
Toyota's compliance with any applicable laws, regulations and standards related to the Monitor's
jurisdiction as set forth in paragraph 15(a). Such periodic written reports are to be provided to
Toyota and the Office. The Office may, in its sole discretion, provide to FBI all or part of any
such periodic written report, or other information provided to the Office by the Monitor. The
Office may also determine that all or part of any such periodic report, or other information
provided to the Office by the Monitor, be provided to DOT and/or NHTSA. In the event of such
a determination, the Office may request that Toyota transmit such report, part of a report, and/or
non-public information to DOT and/or NHTSA directly. Toyota will submit such report, part of
a report, and/or non-public infonnation to DOT and/or NHTSA consistent with the regulatory
provisions related to the protection of confidential business information contained in 49 C.F .R.
Part 512 and 49 C.P.R. Part 7. Toyota may provide all or part of any periodic written reports to
NHTSA or other federal agencies or governmental entities. Should the Monitor determine that it
appears that Toyota has violated any law, has violated any provision of this Agreement, or has
engaged in any conduct that could warrant the modification of his or her jurisdiction, the Monitor
shall promptly notify the Office, and when appropriate, Toyota.
(5). Cooperation with the Monitor. Toyota and all of its officers,
directors, employees, agents, and consultants, and all of the officers, directors, employees,
agents, and consultants of Toyota's subsidiaries TMS, TMA, and TEMA shall have an
affirmative duty to cooperate with and assist the Monitor in the execution of his or her duties
provided in this Agreement and shall inform the Monitor of any non-privileged information that
may relate to the Monitor's duties or lead to information that relates to his or her duties. Failure
of any Toyota, TMS, TMA, or TEMA officer, director, employee, or agent to cooperate with the
Monitor may, in the sole discretion of the Monitor, serve as a basis for the Monitor to
recommend dismissal or other disciplinary action.
(6). Compensation and Expenses. Although the Monitor shall operate

under the supervision of the Office, the compensation and expenses of the Monitor, and of the
persons hired under his or her authority, shall be paid by Toyota. The Monitor, and any persons
hired by the Monitor, shall be compensated in accordance with their respective typical hourly
9
March 19, 2014
rates. Toyota shall pay bills for compensation and expenses promptly, and in any event within
30 days. In addition, within one week after the selection of the Monitor, Toyota shall make
available, at either TMS, TMA or TEMA, office space, telephone service and clerical assistance
sufficient for the Monitor to carry out his or her duties.
(7). Indemnification. Toyota shall provide an appropriate

indemnification agreement to the Monitor with respect to any claims arising out of the
performance of the Monitor's duties.
(8). No Affiliation. The Monitor is not, and shall not be treated for any
purpose, as an officer, employee, agent, or affiliate of Toyota.
Limits of this Agreement
16. It is understood that this Agreement is binding on the Office but does not
bind any other Federal agencies, any state or local law enforcement agencies, any licensing
authorities, or any regulatory authorities. However, if requested by Toyota or its attorneys, the
Office will bring to the attention of any such agencies, including but not limited to any regulators,
as applicable, this Agreement, the cooperation of Toyota, and Toyota's compliance with its
obligations under this Agreement.
Public Filing
17. Toyota and the Office agree that, upon the submission of this Agreement
(including the Statement of Facts and other attachments) to the Court, this Agreement and its
attachments shall be filed publicly in the proceedings in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
18. The parties understand that this Agreement reflects the unique facts of this
case and is not intended as precedent for other cases.
Execution in Counterparts
19. This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of

which shall be considered effective as an original signature.
10
~ames f.~ J~~nso.n, Esq.
Matthqw Flshbem, Esq.
Helen Cantwell, !:sq.
i\'larch 19,2014
1
lnteeration Clause
20. This Agreement sets forth all the tcm1s of the ·Deferred Prosecution
Agreement between Toyota and the Office. No modifications or additions to this Agreement shall
be vali9 unless they are in writing and signed by the Office, Toyota's <.lttomeys, and a duly
authorizfd representative of Toyota.
PREET BHARARA
Southern District of New York
By:
BONNIE JON
SARA! I E. MCCALLUM
Assistant United States Attorneys
RICHARD B. ZABE ~
Deputy United State·
Christo h . Reynolds
Genera( Counsel and Chief I,ega I Officer,
Toyotarotor North America, Inc.
Group ice President,
T oyoto . oto< Sole, U.S.A .• Inc

MattheJ, Fish be. in, Esq.
Helen dantwell, Esq.
Attomets for TOYOTA
II
James E. Jt!hnson, Esq.
Matthew F shbein, Esq.
Helen Can well, Esq.
March 19,, 014
Integration Clause
. 20. This Agreement sets forth all the ten11S of the Deferred Prosecution
Agreement between Toyota and the Office. No modifications or additions to this Agreement shall
be vaJ id un~ess they are in writing and signed by the Office, Toyota's attorneys, and a duly
authorized r~presentative of Toyota.
PRDET BHARARA
By:
~JJM1mfls"~l~~
SARAH E. MCCALLUM
Assistant United States Attorneys
~f!!lJ,/~
L I
RICHARD B. ZAB
Deputy United States Allorney
Accepted a d agreed to:
Christophe P. Reynolds
General Co nsel and Chief Legal Otlicer,
Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
Group Vied President,
Toyota Major Sales U.S.A., Inc.
II
Exhibit
A
CERTIFICATE OF CORPORATE APPROVAL
I, Nobuyori Kodaira, Representative Director and Executive Vice President of'royota
Motor Corporation, hereby certify that:
1. On March 19,2014, a meeting was held ofthe Board ofDirectors of Toyota
Motor Corporation. I am a member of the Board and attended the meeting.
2. At the March 19, 2014 meeting, the Board approved Toyota Motor
Corporation's entry into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the Office of the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York ("Agreement") and authorized all
necessary steps to be taken to effectuate and finalize the Agreement. Tbe approval has not
been amended or revoked in any respect and remains in full force and effect.
3. Under the Japanese Companies Act, each Representative Director is
authorized to carry out the directions of the Board. In this case, I, as one of the
Representative Directors, am authorized to carry out the directions of the Board.
4. I hereby delegate and authorize Christopher P. Reynolds, Chief Legal
Officer and General Cmmsel of Toyota Motor North America" Inc., and Group Vice President
of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., to execute and deliver the Agreement in the name and on
behalf of Toyota l'vfotor Corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed this Certificate of Corporate Approval on

·l'v1arch 19,2014.
Nobuyori Kodaira
Representative Director and
Executive Vice President
Toyota Motor Corporation
Exhibit
B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INFORMATION
-v.-
14 Cr.
TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION,
Defendant.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
COUNT ONE
(Wire Fraud}
The United States Attorney charges:
1. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION ("TOYOTA") is an
automotive company headquartered in Toyota City, Japan.
Assisted by its subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide, TOYOTA
designs, manufactures, assembles, and sells Toyota and Lexus
brand vehicles. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 2010,
TOYOTA's revenues from its automotive business were 17.2
trillion Japanese yen (approximately $184 billion), and its
second largest market, with approximately 29% of its worldwide
sales, was North America.
2. TOYOTA is responsible for unlawful activities
committed by certain TOYOTA employees that resulted in
misrepresentations and the hiding of information from the
public. As evidenced in part by internal company documents,
individual employees not only made misleading public statements

to TOYOTA's consumers, but also concealed from TOYOTA's
regulator one safety-related issue (a problem with accelerators
getting stuck at partially depressed levels, referred to as
"sticky pedal") and minimized the scope of another (accelerators
becoming entrapped at fully or near-fully depressed levels by
improperly secured or incompatible floor mats, referred to as
"floor mat entrapment").
3. Contrary to public statements that TOYOTA made in
late 2009 saying it had "addressed" the "root cause" of
unintended acceleration through a limited safety recall
addressing floor mat entrapment, TOYOTA had actually conducted
internal tests revealing that certain of its unrecalled vehicles
bore design features rendering them just as susceptible to floor
mat entrapment as some of the recalled vehicles. And only weeks
before these statements were made, individuals within TOYOTA had
taken steps to hide from its regulator another type of
unintended acceleration in its vehicles, separate and apart from
floor mat entrapment: the sticky pedal problem.
4. When, in early 2010, TOYOTA finally conducted
safety recalls to address the unintended acceleration issues it
had concealed, TOYOTA provided to the American public, its U.S.
regulator, and the United States Congress an inaccurate timeline
of events that made it appear as if TOYOTA had acted to remedy
2
the sticky pedal problem within approximately 90 days of
discovering it.
Statutory Allegations
5. From at least in or about the fall of 2009 up to
and including at least in or about March 2010, in the Southern
District of New York and elsewhere, TOYOTA, the defendant,
willfully and knowingly, having devised and intending to devise
a scheme and artifice to defraud/ and for obtaining money and
property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses,
representations, and promises, did transmit and cause to be
transmitted and aid and abet the transmission, by means of wire,
radio, and television communication in interstate and foreign
commerce 1 writings/ signs, signals, pictures, and sounds for the
purpose of executing such scheme and artifice, to wit, TOYOTA
defrauded U.S. consumers into purchasing its products by
concealing information and making misleading statements about
unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus brand vehicles, as
described in paragraphs 2 through 4 above.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 2.)
FORFEITURE ALLEGATION
6. As a result of committing the offense alleged in
Count One of this Information/ TOYOTA 1 the defendant, shall
forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United
States Code, Section 981(a) (1) (C) and Title 28, United States
3
Code, Section 2461, any property, real or personal, which
constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to such
offense.
Substitute Asset Provision
7. If any of the above-described forfeitable
property, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant:
(a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due
diligence;
(b) has been transferred or sold to, or
deposited with, a third person;
(c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of
the Court;
(d) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(e) has been commingled with other property
which cannot be subdivided without
difficulty;
it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title
18, United States Code, Section 982(b) and Title 21, United
States Code, Section 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any
4
other property of said defendant up to the value of the
above forfeitable property.
(Title 18 United States Code Sections 981 and 982; Title 21

1 1
United States Code/ Section 853; and

Title 28 United States Code Section 2461.)
1 1
~_t- 'fO h CVLM-0---

PREET BHARARA
5
Exhibit
c
Statement ofFacts
1. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION ("TOYOTA") is an automotive company

headquartered in Toyota City, Japan. Assisted by its subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide,
TOYOTA designs, manufactures, assembles, and sells Toyota and Lexus brand vehicles. For the
fiscal year ending March 31, 2010, TOYOTA's revenues from its automotive business were
17.2 trillion Japanese yen (approximately $184 billion), and its second largest market, with
approximately 29% of its worldwide sales, was North America.
2. As set forth in more detail below, TOYOTA is responsible for unlawful activities
committed by certain employees that resulted in circumstances in which information was hidden
from the public. As evidenced in part by internal company documents, individual employees
not only made misleading public statements to TOYOTA's consumers, but also concealed from
TOYOTA's regulator one safety-related issue (a problem with accelerators getting stuck at
partially depressed levels, referred to as "sticky pedal") and minimized the scope of another
(accelerators becoming entrapped at fully or near-fully depressed levels by improperly secured or
incompatible floor mats, referred to as "floor mat entrapment").
3. Contrary to public statements that TOYOTA made in late 2009 saying it had
"addressed" the "root cause" of unintended acceleration through a limited safety recall
addressing floor mat entrapment, TOYOTA had actually conducted internal tests revealing that
certain of its unrecalled vehicles bore design features rendering them just as susceptible to floor
mat entrapment as some of the recalled vehicles. And only weeks before these statements were
made, individuals within TOYOTA had taken steps to hide from its regulator another type of
unintended acceleration in its vehicles, separate and apart from floor mat entrapment: the sticky
pedal problem.
4. According to a January 2010 report of a discussion following a meeting between

TOYOTA and its regulator, one Toyota employee was said to exclaim, "Idiots! Someone will go
to jail if lies are repeatedly told. I can't support this."
TOYOTA and Related Entities
5. At least through February 201 0, decisions about whether and when to conduct
recalls ofToyota and Lexus vehicles were made by the leadership of a group within TOYOTA
called "Customer Quality Engineering," which was centered in Japan and sometimes referred to
as "CQE-J." Customer Quality Engineering had regional arms responsible for monitoring vehicle
quality issues in the "field" (that is, for vehicles already on the road) in their respective regions.
These regional arms regularly reported field issues and results of vehicle inspections and testing
to CQE-J. The U.S. regional arm, located in Torrance, California, was called "CQE-LA."
Technically, CQE-LA was part of Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America,
Inc. ("TEMA"), an entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of TOYOTA headquartered in
Kentucky and principally responsible for North American manufacturing of Toyota and Lexus
vehicles. In practice, CQE-LA staff reported to CQE-J's leadership.
6. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. ("TMS") is an entity that is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of TOYOTA and headquartered in Torrance, California. It is responsible for sales and
marketing of Toyota and Lexus brand vehicles in the United States.
7. Toyota Motor North America, Inc. ("TMA") is an entity that is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of TOYOTA with offices in New York, New York, and Washington, D.C. The
Washington office was responsible for reporting to and interacting with TOYOTA's U.S.
regulator, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA").
Overview ofthe Unlawful Conduct
8. From the fall of2009 through March 2010, TOYOTA misled U.S. consumers by
concealing and making deceptive statements about two safety-related issues affecting its
vehicles, each of which caused a type ofunintended acceleration.
9. In the fall of2009, TOYOTA faced intense public concern and scrutiny over the
safety of its vehicles after a widely-publicized August 28, 2009 accident in San Diego, California
that killed a family of four. A Lexus dealer had improperly installed an unsecured, incompatible
rubber floor mat (an "all weather floor mat" or "AWFM") into the Lexus ES350 in which the
family was traveling, and that A WFM entrapped the accelerator at full throttle. A 911 emergency
call made from the out-of-control vehicle, which was speeding at over 100 miles per hour,
reported, "We're in a Lexus ... and we're going north on 125 and our accelerator is stuck .. .
there's no brakes ... we're approaching the intersection ... Hold on ... hold on and pray .. .
pray." The call ended with the sound of the crash that killed everyone in the vehicle.
10. Against the backdrop of the San Diego accident, press reports of other unintended
acceleration incidents in Toyota and Lexus vehicles, and intensified scrutiny from NHTSA,
TOYOTA agreed to NHTSA's request in or about September 2009 to recall eight of its U.S.
models for floor mat entrapment susceptibility. Meanwhile and thereafter, from the fall of2009
through January 2010, TOYOTA misleadingly assured customers that it had "addressed the root
cause" of unintended acceleration in its U.S.-sold vehicles by conducting this recall. In truth, the
recall TOYOTA had conducted (a) left unaddressed the Corolla, the Highlander, and the Venza,
which shared design features similar to the models that were recalled for floor mat entrapment,
and (b) left unaddressed a second type of unintended acceleration: the sticky pedal problem.
11. TOYOTA made these misleading statements and undertook these acts of
concealment as part of efforts to defend its brand image in the wake of the fatal San Diego accident
and the ensuing onslaught of critical press.
12. When, in early 2010, TOYOTA fmally conducted safety recalls to address the
unintended acceleration issues it had concealed, TOYOTA provided to the American public,
NHTSA, and Congress an inaccurate timeline of events that made it appear as if TOYOTA had acted
to remedy the sticky pedal problem within approximately 90 days of discovering it.
Background to the Unlawful Conduct
13. TOYOTA is required to disclose to NHTSA if it "learns [a] vehicle or equipment

contains a defect and decides in good faith that the defect is related to motor vehicle safety."
"Motor vehicle safety" is defined as "performance of a motor vehicle ... in a way that protects
the public against unreasonable risk of accidents ... and against unreasonable risk of death or
injury in an accident." 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118(c)(1); 30102(a)(8). Such disclosure must be
"submitted not more than 5 working days after a defect in a vehicle or item of equipment has
2
been determined to be safety related" (the "Defect Disclosure Regulation"). See 49 U.S.C.
§ 30118(c) and 49 C.F.R.§ 573.6.
14. The required disclosure is to be made by filing a "Defect Information Report," or

"DIR."
15. Although TOYOTA is not required to notifY NIITSA of any engineering and design
changes it made to Toyota and Lexus models sold in the United States, it is required to file a
DIR for any safety-related defect addressed by such an engineering and/or design change.
Events Prior to 2009: Floor Mat Entrapment
16. In or about the fall of2007, TOYOTA successfully avoided a potential vehicle recall
to address floor mat entrapment in certain Toyota and Lexus brand vehicles.
17. In 2007, following a series of reports alleging unintended acceleration in Toyota and
Lexus vehicles, NHTSA opened a defect investigation into the Lexus ES350 model (the vehicle
that was subsequently involved in the tragic 2009 San Diego accident), and identified several other
Toyota and Lexus models it believed might likewise be defective. Floor mat entrapment can pose
a high risk to human life and safety because, when unsecured or incompatible, the A WFM can
entrap the accelerator pedal and it can result in high speed, uncontrolled acceleration.
18. Throughout the summer and fall of2007, TOYOTA denied the need for any
vehicle-based recall related to floor mat entrapment. TOYOTA resisted a recall even though an
internal investigation being conducted at the time revealed that certain Toyota and Lexus models,
including most of the ones that NHTSA had identified as potentially problematic, had some
design features, including an absence of clearance between a fully depressed accelerator pedal
and the vehicle floor, that rendered entrapment of the pedal by an unsecured or incompatible
A WFM more likely. TOYOTA did not share these results with NHTSA.
19. In or about September 2007, having kept to itself the results of some of its initial
internal investigation related to floor mat entrapment, TOYOTA negotiated with NHTSA a
limited recall of 55,000 A WFMs that had been designed for the ES350 and Camry. There was no
recall of or fix to the vehicles themselves, just the limited recall of A WFMs. Inside TOYOTA,
the limited recall was touted as a major victory in a contemporaneous email: "had the agency ...
pushed for recall of the throttle pedal assembly (for instance), we would be looking at upwards
of$100 million+ in unnecessary costs."
20. Shortly after TOYOTA announced its A WFM recall, TOYOTA engineers
studying floor mat entrapment revised TOYOTA's internal design guidelines to provide for,
among other things, a minimum clearance of 10 millimeters between a fully depressed
accelerator pedal and the floor. Engineers also determined that newly designed models would
have to undergo vehicle-based tests using unsecured genuine A WFMs to determine whether they
had appropriate resistance to floor mat entrapment.
21. The determination was made, however, that these revised guidelines and
procedures would apply only in circumstances where a model was receiving a "full model
redesign"- a redesign to which each Toyota and Lexus model was subjected approximately once
3
every three to five years. As a result, even after the revised guidelines had been adopted
internally, many new vehicles produced and sold by TOYOTA were not subject to TOYOTA's
2007 guidelines.
Events Immediately Preceding the

2009 Floor Mat Entrapment Recall
22. As described above, on August 28, 2009, the driver and three passengers of an
ES350 sedan fitted with an A WFM intended for another, larger Lexus sport utility vehicle model
were killed in an accident resulting from floor mat entrapment in San Diego, California. The
accelerator pedal in this vehicle, the tip of which was designed to reach the floor when fully
depressed, got trapped under the ill-fitting, incompatible A WFM and could not be freed. The
ES350 vehicle did not have a brake override system, which, under certain circumstances, may
provide an additional safety benefit by closing the throttle upon firm and steady application of
the brake pedal.
23. On or about the same day the San Diego accident occurred, staff at CQE-LA in
Torrance, California, sent a memorandum to CQE-J identifying as "critical" an "unintended
acceleration" issue separate and apart from floor mat entrapment that had manifested itself in an
accelerator pedal of a Toyota Matrix vehicle in Arizona. The condition, called "sticky pedal,"
had already arisen in the European market, and entailed the accelerator pedal "sticking" in a
partially depressed position.
24. Sticky pedal, a phenomenon affecting pedals manufactured by a U.S. company ("A-
Pedal Company") and installed in some Toyota brand vehicles in North America as well as Europe,
resulted from the use of a plastic material inside the pedals that could under certain circumstances
result in the accelerator pedal becoming mechanically stuck in a partially depressed position.
The pedals incorporating this plastic were installed in, among other models, the Camry, the
Matrix, the Corolla, and the A val on sold in the United States.
25. The August 2009 report about the "critical" sticky pedal issue in the Arizona
Matrix was not the only report of the condition that TOYOTA received from U.S. technicians in
the field in the summer of2009. On or about August 4, 2009, a dealer technician made a similar
report about a pedal in a Camry vehicle.
26. Reports of the same sticky pedal problem in Europe in or about 2008 and early 2009,
where the problem had become apparent earlier, reflected, among other things, instances of
"uncontrolled acceleration" and unintended acceleration to "maximum RPM," and customer concern
that the condition was "extremely dangerous."
27. In or about early 2009, TOYOTA circulated to European Toyota distributors

information about the sticky pedal problem and instructions for addressing the problem if it
presented itself in a customer's vehicle. These instructions identified the issue as "Sudden RPM
increase/vehicle acceleration due to accelerator pedal sticking," and stated that should a customer
complain of pedal sticking, the pedal should be replaced with pedals manufactured by a company
other than A-Pedal Company.
4
28. Contemporaneous documents internal to TOYOTA reflect at least a preliminary
assessment by CQE engineers that the sticky pedal problem, as manifested in the above-
described European reports, was a "defect" that was "[i]mportant in terms of safety because of
the possibility of accidents." TOYOTA did not then inform its U.S. regulators or conduct a
recall. Beginning in or about the spring of2009, TOYOTA quietly directed A-Pedal Company to
change the pedals in new productions of affected models in Europe, and to plan for the same
design changes to be rolled out in the United States beginning in the fall of 2009. The design
change was to substitute the plastic used in the affected pedal models with another material and
to change the length of the friction lever in the pedal.
29. By no later than September 2009, TOYOTA recognized internally that the sticky
pedal problem posed a risk of a type of unintended acceleration- or "overrun," as Toyota
sometimes called it- in many of its U.S. vehicles. A September 2009 presentation made by a
CQE-LA manager to TOYOTA executives gave a "current summary ofO/R [overrun] types in
NA market" that listed the three confirmed types as: "mat interference" (i.e., floor mat
entrapment), "material issue" (described as "pedal stuck and ... pedal slow return/deformed"),
and "simultaneous pedal press" by the consumer. The presentation further listed the models
affected by the "material issue" as including "Carmy, Corolla, Matrix, Avalon."
30. On or about September 9, 2009, a TMS employee who was concerned about the sticky
pedal problem in the United States and believed that TOYOTA should address the problem,
prepared a "Market Impact Summary" listing (in addition to the August 2009 Matrix and Carmy)
39 warranty cases that he believed involved potential manifestations of the sticky pedal problem.
This document was circulated to TOYOTA engineers and was later sent to members ofCQE-J,
and designated the sticky pedal problem as priority level "A," the highest level.
31. On or about September 17, 2009, TOYOTA reproduced sticky pedal in a pedal
recovered from a U.S. vehicle.
32. After the August 2009 fatal floor mat entrapment accident in San Diego, several articles
critical of TOYOTA appeared in U.S. newspapers. The articles reported instances ofTOYOTA
customers allegedly experiencing unintended acceleration and the authors accused TOYOTA of,
among other things, hiding defects related to unintended acceleration.
33. Meanwhile, following the San Diego floor mat entrapment accident, NHTSA
identified customer complaints that it believed were potentially related to floor mat entrapment.
Based principally on complaint data that the agency had itself collected, NHTSA identified eight
vehicle models it believed posed an unreasonable risk of floor mat entrapment and should be
recalled.
TOYOTA's Negotiations with NHTSA About Floor Mat Entrapment
34. As it had in 2007, TOYOTA initially resisted NHTSA's recall suggestions.

CQE-J prescribed and followed a negotiating position with NHTSA with respect to floor mat
entrapment consisting of: (a) a refusal to declare a vehicle defect of any kind, and (b) an effort to
narrow the class of vehicles that would be subject to the recall.
5
35. During a meeting on September 25,2009 NHTSA requested that TOYOTA
immediately file a DIR with respect to A WFM entrapment risk in eight specific models, with the
understanding that remedial action for each affected model would be negotiated in the ensuing
months. NHTSA stated that it would open an investigation if TOYOTA declined the request. On
or about September 28,2009, TOYOTA notified NHTSA that it agreed to file the DIR. That
document, filed on or about October 5, 2009, identified as the "affected" models just the eight
that NHTSA had specified.
36. Shortly before TOYOTA filed its DIR, NHTSA asked TOYOTA to disclose to the
agency "any production changes" that had "been made to pedal geometry." NHTSA had
expressed to TOYOTA its view that design features related to pedal geometry- including
clearance between the fully depressed pedal and the floor- were important factors in evaluating
floor mat entrapment. NHTSA also asked TOYOTA whether it had "a metric for determining
which vehicles" to include in the floor mat entrapment recall. TOYOTA did not, at this time,
respond to these requests.
Cancellation and Suspension of Sticky Pedal Design Change
37. As noted, TOYOTA had developed internal plans to implement design changes
for all A-Pedal-Company-manufactured pedals in U.S. Toyota models to address, on a going-
forward basis, the still-undisclosed sticky pedal problem that had already been resolved for new
vehicles in Europe. As ofthe date ofNHTSA's request for information about "pedal
geometry" in connection with the floor mat entrapment recall, implementation of these pedal
design changes had not yet begun in the United States. On or about October 5, 2009, TOYOTA
engineers issued to A-Pedal Company the first of the design change instructions intended to
prevent sticky pedal in the U.S. market. This was described internally as an "urgent" measure
to be implemented on an "express" basis, as a "major" change- meaning that the part number
of the subject pedal was to change, and that all inventory units with the old pedal number should
be scrapped.
38. On or about October 21, 2009, however, engineers at TOYOTA and the
leadership of CQE-J decided to cancel the design change instruction that had already been
issued and to suspend all remaining design changes planned for A-Pedal Company pedals in
U.S. models. TEMA employees who had been preparing for implementation of the changes
were instructed, orally, to alert the manufacturing plants of the cancellation. They were also
instructed not to put anything about the cancellation in writing. A-Pedal Company itself would
receive no written cancellation at this time; instead, contrary to TOYOTA's own standard
procedures, the cancellation was to be effected without a paper trail.
39. TOYOTA decided to suspend the pedal design changes in the United States, and to
avoid memorializing that suspension, in order to prevent NHTSA from learning about the sticky
pedal problem.
TOYOTA's Internal Entrapment Investigation
40. Meanwhile, in the fall of2009, as had occurred in 2007, TOYOTA undertook an
internal investigation of floor mat entrapment. That investigation revealed, among other
things, the following, some of which echoed the findings from two years prior:
6
a. All but one of the eight models that NHTSA had identified were designed
with 10 millimeters or less of clearance between a fully depressed accelerator pedal and a
vehicle floor. Two unrecalled models, the Corolla, one of the best-selling Toyota vehicles in the
United States, and the Venza, had 0 millimeters' clearance. One contemporaneous document
summarizing measurement and testing data and evaluating the relationship of certain design
features to floor mat entrapment contained the following notation related to these clearance
measurements: "10 [millimeters] or less is high risk."
b. When CQE-LA engineers subjected Toyota and Lexus models to testing in

which an A WFM was unhooked from its secured position and moved forward by hand in small
increments, all but one of the eight models that NHTSA had identified experienced entrapment
with the A WFM intended for that model. In the eighth model, the Prius, a compatible A WFM
did not trap the pedal. The A WFM used in that particular testing was a recent model that had
benefited from a 2006 design change to address floor mat entrapment susceptibility.
c. A notation contained on a CQE-LA document summarizing the testing

results (the "Score Chart") for three Toyota models (the Corolla, the Camry, and the Avalon) and
two Lexus models (one ofwhich was the ES350) read as follows for each ofthese models: "The
shape of floor underneath A pedal is concave shape and a mat may become bent and easily
retained." CQE-LA presented its Score Chart to a senior Toyota executive in mid-October 2009.
d. A CQE-LA engineer involved in the floor mat entrapment testing reported

to CQE-J that among the three "worse" vehicles was the Corolla, a model not among those that
NHTSA had identified as the potential subjects of a recall.
e. On or about October 27, 2009, TOYOTA engineers in Japan circulated to

CQE-J a chart showing that the Corolla had the lowest rating for floor mat entrapment under that
analysis.
f. An internal memorandum prepared by a CQE-J leader on or about

November 12,2009 stated: "In the competitor benchmarkings conducted at TMS and CQE-LA,
Toyota vehicles tended to have more models that use pedal tips as stoppers [and therefore tend
to have zero clearance from the floor], and from the viewpoint of robustness for improper mat
use, we would have to say that it is inferior compared to other companies."
41. TOYOTA did not inform NHTSA of its internal analyses concerning models not
among those identified by NHTSA, which showed that the top-selling Corolla, the Highlander,
and the V enza shared design features similar to several of the eight models for which NHTSA
had requested a recall.
Misleading Disclosures to NHTSA About Sticky Pedal
42. Throughout the fall of2009, following reports in August of sticky pedals in a Matrix
and a Camry, and following reproduction of the problem by TOYOTA in a pedal from a U.S.
vehicle on or about September 17, 2009, as referenced above, TOYOTA became aware of other
manifestations of the problem in the United States.
7
43. In or about late September 2009, TMS employees received a report of sticky pedal
in a Corolla. TMS urged CQE-LA to do something about the issue. Then, in or about October
2009, TMS received three more such reports in U.S. Corolla vehicles, and dispatched technicians to
prepare "field technical reports" (or "FlRs") documenting the incidents. In or about November
2009, senior executives at TMS learned of these three reports.
44. On or about November 12, 2009, the leadership ofCQE-J discussed a plan to
disclose the sticky pedal problem to NHTSA. CQE-J's leadership was aware at this time not only
of the three Corolla FTRs but also of a problem with the Matrix in August 2009. It was also
familiar with the sticky pedal problem in Europe, the design changes that had been implemented
there, and the cancellation and suspension of similar planned design changes in the United
States. Knowing all ofthis, CQE-J's leadership decided that (a) it would not disclose the
September 2009 Market Impact Summary to NHTSA; (b) if any disclosure were to be made to
NHTSA, it would be limited to a disclosure that there were some reports of unintended
acceleration apparently unrelated to floor mat entrapment; and (c) NHTSA should be told that
TOYOTA had made no fmdings with respect to the sticky pedal problem reflected in the Corolla
FlRs, and that the investigation of the problem had just begun.
45. On or about November 17, 2009, before TOYOTA had negotiated with NHTSA a
final set of remedies for the eight models encompassed by the floor mat entrapment recall,
TOYOTA informed NHTSA of the three Corolla FTRs and several other FTRs reporting
unintended acceleration in Toyota model vehicles equipped with pedals manufactured by
A-Pedal Company. In TOYOTA's disclosure to NHTSA, TOYOTA did not reveal its
understanding of the sticky pedal problem as a type of unintended acceleration, nor did it reveal
the problem's manifestation and the subsequent design changes in Europe, the planned,
cancelled, and suspended design changes in the United States, the August 2009 Camry and
Matrix vehicles that had suffered sticky pedal, the September 2009 Corolla with a similar
problem, or the September 2009 Market Impact Summary.
46. In truth, the cause of the issue reflected in the three Corolla FlRs from October 2009
was the same sticky pedal problem that had arisen and been addressed on a going-forward basis in
Europe, about which NHTSA remained unaware.
47. In contrast to its public comments in early November 2009 that there was "no
evidence to support" theories concerning "other causes of unintended acceleration" in its
vehicles beyond floor mat entrapment, on or about November 17, 2009, a CQE-J employee
wrote an email to a leader of CQE-J stating: "We have been trying to approach the floor mat
issue by treating it as a problem caused by the all weather floor mat interfering with the pedal;
however, our understanding is that we can no longer separate this problem from the [A-Pedal
Company] problem that just began to surface." He went on: "[I]t has become increasingly
difficult to take the position that 'the only problems in the return of the gas pedal we have
confirmed are related to interference with the floor mat.' Therefore, we are in a subtle situation
as to how much we can emphasize the 'floor mat problems' as the top leaders meet with NHTSA
and whether we can get NHTSA to agree with our position."
48. Despite this November 17, 2009 email, TOYOTA took no further steps to
disclose to NHTSA what it knew about sticky pedal. In fact, at a meeting on November 24, 2009
8
between NHTSA and TOYOTA executives about the floor mat entrapment recall, the sticky
pedal problem went unmentioned.
TOYOTA's Misleading Statements and Acts of Concealment Following

Announcement of the Floor Mat Entrapment Remedies
49. On or about November 25, 2009, TOYOTA, through TMS, announced its floor mat
entrapment resolution with NHTSA. In a press release that had been approved by TOYOTA, TMS
assured customers: "The safety of our owners and the public is our utmost concern and Toyota
has and will continue to thoroughly investigate and take appropriate measures to address any
defect trends that are identified." A TMS spokesperson stated during a press conference the same
day, "We're very, very confident that we have addressed this issue."
50. In truth, the issue of unintended acceleration had not been "addressed" by the
remedies announced. A-Pedal Company pedals which could experience stickiness were still on
the road and still, in fact, being installed in newly-produced vehicles. And the best-selling
Corolla, the Highlander, and the Venza-which had some design features similar to models that
had been included in the earlier floor mat entrapment recall-were not being "addressed" at all.
One of the vehicle-based remedies that TOYOTA agreed to implement in the eight models
subject to the floor mat entrapment recall was a "cut" of the accelerator pedal to improve
clearance from the floor. TOYOTA had been concerned throughout much of the fall of2009 that
NHTSA would require TOYOTA to offer replacement pedals to owners of the subject vehicles
as part of the recall, and further require that such replacement pedals be made available as early
as January 2010.
51. On or about November 26, 2009, CQE-J issued a directive to engineers at

TOYOTA not to implement any design improvements for the North American market related to
floor mat entrapment in models other than the eight subject to the recall unless the subject model
was already undergoing a full model redesign. The justification offered for the directive was that
design changes would "most likely mislead the concerned authorities and consumers and such to
believe that we have admitted having defective vehicles." (Emphasis in original).
52. On or about December 10, 2009, only after the floor mat entrapment recall
remedy had been fully negotiated with NHTSA and announced to the public, TOYOTA fmally
issued to A-Pedal Company renewed pedal design change instructions to address sticky pedal in
newly produced vehicles in the United States. Whereas the single design change instruction that
had issued for the U.S. market on or about October 5, 2009 (and then been cancelled on or about
October 21, 2009) had called for a "major" change that would have entailed scrapping of old
parts, the new design change instructions were issued as "minor" changes a designation that
entailed no part number change and allowed for use of old, defective parts until inventory was
exhausted. TOYOTA engineers decided to characterize the changes as minor to prevent their
detection by NHTSA. The newly issued design change instructions were to go into effect in or
about mid-January 2010, around the same time that TOYOTA would be implementing pedal
design changes for models encompassed by the floor mat entrapment recall.
53. At or about the same time that TOYOTA was issuing renewed design change
instructions to remedy sticky pedal in newly produced U.S. vehicles, CQE-J instructed TMS that
issuance of a "technical service bulletin" to Toyota dealers alerting them to the sticky pedal
9
problem and explaining how it should be remedied for vehicles in the field was "not permitted."
Under NHTSA regulations, any such communication would have to have been disclosed to
NHTSA.
54. On or about December 10,2009, the date upon which TOYOTA issued renewed
design change instructions for sticky pedal in the United States, a statement appeared on TMS 's
website, in response to a Los Angeles Times editorial dated December 5, 2009. Toyota asserted
misleadingly, that "[b ]ased on the comprehensive investigation and testing, we are highly
confident that we have addressed the root cause of unwanted acceleration- the entrapment of the
accelerator pedal."
55. In truth, TOYOTA had not "addressed the root cause of unwanted acceleration."
TOYOTA had not recalled the Corolla, the Highlander and the Venza, which shared design
features similar to the models that had been the subject ofthe recall.
56. Again, on or about December 23, 2009, TOYOTA responded to media

accusations that it was continuing to hide defects in its vehicles by authorizing TMS to publish the
following misleading statements on TMS's website: "Toyota has absolutely not minimized public
awareness of any defect or issue with respect to its vehicles. Any suggestion to the contrary is
wrong and borders on irresponsibility. We are confident that the measures we are taking address
the root cause and will reduce the risk of pedal entrapment."
57. These statements were misleading because TOYOTA had "minimized public
awareness of' both sticky pedal and floor mat entrapment. Further, the measures TOYOTA had
taken did not "address the root cause" of unintended acceleration, because TOYOTA had not yet
issued a sticky pedal recall and had not yet recalled the Corolla, the V enza, or the Highlander for
floor mat entrapment.
TOYOTA Is Forced to Disclose Sticky Pedal
58. By in or about early January 2010, TOYOTA had received additional reports of sticky
pedal in the United States. The news media, meanwhile, was reporting two incidents of unintended
acceleration in Toyota vehicles apparently unrelated to floor mat entrapment. One news outlet in
particular was preparing to run a feature about an Avalon vehicle in New Jersey that had
experienced what appeared to be sticky pedal three times but had not been involved in an accident.
59. On or about January 16, 2010, TOYOTA finally disclosed to NHTSA that
TOYOTA had recently begun implementing design changes to prevent sticky pedal in the United
States, and that, in fact, TOYOTA had implemented the same changes to European pedals many
months before in response to reports of "uncontrolled acceleration" and unintended acceleration
to "maximum RPM."
TOYOTA's Misleading Statements to NHTSA in January 2010
60. On or about January 19, 2010, representatives ofTOYOTA, including executives

from TMS and TMA, delivered to NHTSA representatives in Washington, D.C. a presentation
that had been developed in large part by the leadership and staff of CQE-J. One of the
chronologies used for this presentation purported to present a history of sticky pedal reports in
10
the United States. It omitted any reference to the August 2009 sticky pedals in the Camry and the
Matrix, the September 2009 Corolla, and the September 2009 Market Impact Summary.lt also
stated that TOYOTA began arrangements to implement design changes for sticky pedal in the
U.S market in January 2010 after sticky pedal was reproduced in December 2009. In fact,
TOYOTA began considering design changes to address sticky pedal in or about spring 2009,
which ultimately were to be implemented in the United States; TOYOTA had also reproduced
sticky pedal in a pedal recovered from a U.S. vehicle no later than September 17, 2009.
61. The presentation that TOYOTA gave to NHTSA on January 19, 2010
downplayed the seriousness of reports of sticky pedal in Europe. When, after the presentation, a
TOYOTA employee who attended the presentation reviewed the actual reports from Europe, and
saw that they included such phrases as '"out of control"' and "'safety issue,"' he was said to
exclaim "Idiots! Someone will go to jail if lies are repeatedly told. I can't support this."
62. On or about January 21,2010, TOYOTA filed a DIR in which it recalled all
vehicles in the United States fitted with the accelerator pedals from A-Pedal Company that could
experience a sticky pedal. In that filing, TOYOTA stated that it had begun receiving "field
technical information" from the U.S. market about sticky pedal in "October 2009." In truth,
TOYOTA had received information no later than in or about August 2009 and, in October 2009,
had cancelled the U.S. fix for the sticky pedal problem so as to avoid its disclosure to NHTSA.
TOYOTA Recalls the Corolla, the Highlander, and the

Venza For Floor Mat Entrapment
63. Also on or about January 21,2010, NHTSA informed TOYOTA that it had
received additional complaints suggesting possible floor mat entrapment in vehicles that had not
been recalled in 2009, including the Corolla. Rather than have NHTSA open an investigation,
TOYOTA immediately agreed to "amend" its 2009 DIR to add the Corolla, the Highlander, and
the Venza to the recall. As one leader ofCQE-J explained internally injustifying his decision to
so readily agree to this amendment: "Is it really in our best interest to report, 'We found a
problem' after conducting an inspection? Or maybe we won't say, 'We found a problem' but if
we say, 'Everything is the same as Camry, etc.', they may come after us by saying 'Why didn't
you report when we agreed last time? Considering the background that we have been cornered
with regard to the [A-Pedal Company] issue [i.e., sticky pedal], I think they might assert we have
been hiding something. Don't you think so?"
TOYOTA's Statements to the Public and Congress

About Its Knowledge Timeline
64. In or about late January and early February 2010, TOYOTA, based on talking
points approved by TOYOTA executives and distributed to TOYOTA's U.S. personnel, made
several public statements that asserted, misleadingly, that the "fall of 2009" or "October 2009"
was the first time TOYOTA learned of sticky pedal in the United States when in fact TOYOTA
had received reports of sticky pedal in August 2009.,For example, TOYOTA told a reporter on or
about January 25,2010 that "[i]solated reports of sticky accelerator pedals have only recently
come to light, in the fall of2009 to be a little more precise." Later, TOYOTA told the public it
first discovered sticky pedal in the United States after the floor mat recall and that it had started
investigating the problem in October 2009. TOYOTA further claimed that it had moved quickly
11
to investigate and fix the sticky pedal problem within 90 days of TOYOTA's discovery of the
problem. During this time period, TOYOTA also acknowledged that sticky pedal, though
"rare," was "a grave safety concern."
65. TOYOTA made inaccurate statements during the course of an investigation

initiated by the United States Congress in or about late January 2010. Consistent with the talking
points described above, but contrary to certain internal documents that TOYOTA had itself
produced to Congress among thousands of other documents, TOYOTA repeated to Congress that it
became aware of sticky pedal in the United States in October 2009, when in fact it had been
investigating sticky pedal in the United States since no later than August 2009.
TOYOTA Admits Earlier Knowledge
66. On or about February 16,2010, N1ITSA opened inquiries into the timeliness of the
recalls that TOYOTA had conducted to address floor mat entrapment and sticky pedal in 2007,
2009, and 2010.
67. On or about March 25,2010, in response to NHTSA's inquiries, TOYOTA

submitted a timeline of events that listed, among other sticky pedal incidents in the United States, the
August 2009 Camry and Matrix incidents.
12
Exhibit
D
PREET BHARARA
United States Attorney for the
By: SHARON COHEN LEVIN

Assistant United States Attorney
One Saint Andrew's Plaza
New York, New York 10007
Tel. (212) 637-1060
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
-v.- VERIFIED CIVIL COMPLAINT
14 Civ.
$1,200,000,000 IN UNITED STATES
CURRENCY,
Defendant-in-rem.
-------------------------------------X
Plaintiff United States of America, by its attorney Preet Bharara, United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, for its verified complaint, alleges, upon
information and belief, as follows:
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This action is brought pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981
by the United States of America seeking the forfeiture of approximately $1,200,000,000 in United
States currency (the "Defendant Funds" or the "defendant-in-rem").
2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section
1355.
3. Venue is proper under Title 28, United States Code, Section 1355(b)(l)(A)
because certain actions and omissions giving rise to forfeiture took place in the Southern District
ofNew York and pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1395 because the
defendant-in-rem has been transferred to the Southern District of New York.
4. The Defendant Funds constitute property constituting and derived from
proceeds of wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 2, and
property traceable to such property; and are thus subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant
to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(l)(C).
II. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR FORFEITURE
5. Toyota Motor Corporation ("Toyota"), an automotive company
headquartered in Toyota City, Japan, entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the
United States, wherein, inter alia, Toyota agreed to forfeit a total of $1.2 billion , i.e., the
Defendant Funds, to the United States. The Defendant Funds represent proceeds ofToyota's wire
fraud offense. The Deferred Prosecution Agreement, with the accompanying Statement of Facts
and Information to be filed, is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein.
III. CLAIM FOR FORFEITURE
6. Incorporated herein are the allegations contained in paragraphs one through
five of this Verified Complaint.
7. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(l)(C) subjects to forfeiture
"[a]ny property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to ... any
offense constituting 'specific unlawful activity' (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this title), or a
conspiracy to commit such offense."
8. "Specified unlawful activity" is defined in Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1956(c)(7), and the term includes, among other things, any offense listed under Title 18,
2
United States Code, Section 1961 (1 ). Section 1961 (1) lists, among other offenses, violations of
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 (relating to wire fraud).
9. By reason of the foregoing, the defendant-in-rem is subject to forfeiture to
the United States of America pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(l)(C),
because there is probable cause to believe that the defendant-in-rem constitutes property derived
from wire fraud, in violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffUnited States of America prays that process issue to
enforce the forfeiture ofthe defendant-in-rem and that all persons having an interest in the
defendant-in-rem be cited to appear and show cause why the forfeiture should not be decreed, and
that this Court decree forfeiture of the defendant-in-rem to the United States of America for
disposition according to law, and that this Court grant plaintiff such further relief as this Court may
deem just and proper, together with the costs and disbursements of this action.
Dated: New York, New York

March 19, 2014
PREET BHARARA
United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York
Attorney for the Plaintiff
United States of America
By:
SHARON COHEN LEVIN
Assistant United States Attorney
One St. Andrew's Plaza
New York, New York 10007
Telephone: (212) 637-1060
3
VERIFICATION
STATEOFNEWYORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK )
BRIAN O'HARA, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a Special Agent
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and as such has responsibility for the within
action; that he has read the foregoing complaint and knows the contents thereof, and that the same
is true to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.
The sources of deponent's information on the ground of his belief are official
records and files of the United States, information obtained directly by the deponent, and
information obtained by other law enforcement officials, during an investigation of alleged
violations of Title 18, United States Code.
. .~-·- ~===-==:::-~:::y / '/

<~-~ S;q Fl55
BRIAN O'HARA
Special Agent
Federal Bureau oflnvestigation
MARCO DASILVA
Notary Public, State of New York
No.01DA614~60
Qu~lif~ed in I'J.assau
My Commtsston Exptres
unt~ 11
. ~;..-
oty

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PLD-PI-001

SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER:

T.S., et al. v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al.

and has complied with the fictitious business name laws.

(4) a public entity (describe): (4) a public entity (describe):

(5) other (specify): (5) other (specify):

b. except defendant (name): d. except defendant (name):

(4) a public entity (describe): (4) a public entity (describe):

(5) other (specify): (5) other (specify):

6. The true names of defendants sued as Does are unknown to plaintiff.

8. This court is the proper court because

9. Plaintiff is required to comply with a claims statute, and

PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2007] COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Page 2 of 3

Damage, Wrongful Death

T.S., et al. v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al.

11. Plaintiff has suffered

Date: March 30, 2016

PLD-PI-001 [Rev. January 1, 2007] COMPLAINT—Personal Injury, Property Page 3 of 3

Damage, Wrongful Death

T.S., et al. v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al.

Each defendant named in 3a of the Complaint is a natural person

a business organization, form unknown a business organization, form unknown

a public entity (describe): a public entity (describe):

X other (specify): other (specify):

a public entity (describe): a public entity (describe):

other (specify): X other (specify):

Except defendant (name): X Except defendant (name):

a public entity (describe): a public entity (describe):

other (specify): other (specify):

X Except defendant (name): Except defendant (name):

a public entity (describe): a public entity (describe):

other (specify): other (specify):

Emil Herich, Esq. (State Bar No. 116783)

Mary P. Lightfoot, Esq. (State Bar No. 137477)

3. Each plaintiff named above is a competent adult

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION—General Negligence Page 6

ATTACHMENT TO X Complaint Cross - Complaint

(Use a separate cause of action form for each cause of action.)

LexisNexis® Automated California Judicial Council Forms

DENSO CORPORATION ("DENSO") was and is a Japanese corporation with corporate

and/or managing agents, negligently, recklessly, and/or carelessly manufactured, fabricated,

T.S., et al. v. Toyota, et al.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION—Products Liability Page 14

PLAINTIFF'S INJURY WAS THE LEGAL (PROXIMATE) RESULT OF THE FOLLOWING:

LexisNexis® Automated California Judicial Council Forms

Attachment Prod. L-1

T.S., et al. v. Toyota, et al.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION—Motor Vehicle

ATTACHMENT TO X Complaint Cross - Complaint

(Use a separate cause of action form for each cause of action.)

X Does 111 to 120

X Does 121 to 130

X Does 131 to 140

X Does 141 to 150

X Does 151 to 160

LexisNexis® Automated California Judicial Council Forms

Exemplary Damages Attachment Page 22

EX-2. The facts supporting plaintiff's claim are as follows:

EX-3. The amount of exemplary damages sought is