SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-30272. February 28, 1985.]

RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC. , petitioner, vs. CONSUELO C. VILLAREAL,

ISABEL C. VILLAREAL, FLAVIANO C. VILLAREAL, ALFREDO V.
GOMEZ, AURORA V. GOMEZ and the COURT OF APPEALS ,
respondents.

Amanda V. Viray for petitioner.

Luis Ma. Guerrero for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP AND ITS MODIFICATIONS;

POSSESSION; HOW ACQUIRED. — Possession is acquired by the material occupation of
a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact it is subject to the action of our will, or by
the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
2. REMEDIAL LAW EVIDENCE; TAX DECLARATION, SURVEY PLAN OR
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION, NOT CONCLUSIVE PROOFS OF OWNERSHIP. — Petitioner's
evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey plan are not conclusive
and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in question. Assessment
alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of
the property upon the declarant. Settled is the rule that neither tax receipts nor
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes su cient evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be supported by other effective
proofs. Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions prepared at the instance
of the party concerned be considered in his favor, the same being self-serving.
3. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE APPELLATE COURT BINDING ON
APPEAL WHEN SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. — A
painstaking review of the evidence on record failed to disclose any evidence or
circumstance of note su cient enough to overrule said ndings and conclusions. The
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to Us from the Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) is limited to the review of errors of law, said appellate
court's ndings of fact being conclusive upon us except (1) when the conclusion is a
nding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the ndings of fact are con icting; and (6) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee, none of which
obtain in the case at bar. The appellate court did what is required of it under the law and
it cannot be faulted after reaching a conclusion adverse to herein petitioner. The
decision on the merits of the case hinges on the determination of the pertinent facts,
and the ndings of the Court of Appeals when supported by substantial evidence are
beyond our power of review.

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 DECISION

CUEVAS , J : p

Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the defunct Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 36700 which REVERSED the decision of the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal in Land Registration Case No. 1204, LRC Rec. No. N-10480.
Sometime in December 1955, private respondents led with the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, an Application for Registration, alleging, inter alia:
"1. That the said land consists of two agricultural lots bounded and
described as shown on plan Psd-147662 as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 and technical
descriptions attached hereto and made integral part hereof;

2. That Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psd-147662 at the last assessment

for taxation were assessed at a total amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P1,500.00) PESOS per Tax Declaration Nos. 11994 and 11995 in the values of
ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY (P1,190.00) PESOS and THREE
HUNDRED TEN P310.00) PESOS, respectively, in the Land Records of Rizal
Province;

3. That to the best of their knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage

or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said parcels of land nor is there
any person having any estate or interest thereon, legal or equitable in possession,
remainder, reversion or expectancy;

4. That the applicants have acquired said lands by purchase from the
spouses VICTORIANO CERVO and IGNACIA GUILLERMO as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former, before Notary Public for the
City of Manila, Mr. Manuel M. Paredes on the 3rd day of November, 1955, per
Doc. No. 352, Page No. 42, Book No. II, Series of 1955;

5. That the said parcels of land are not occupied by anybody;

xxx xxx xxx

8. That the said lots included in this application adjoins the National
Road and the applicants do not claim any part of the said National Road;

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner then prayed that the aforesaid parcels be brought under the operation
of the Land Registration Act, and to have the title thereto con rmed and registered in
their names.
Petitioner filed an OPPOSITION to said application alleging —
"That the Rizal Cement Co., Inc. is the owner of unregistered three (3)
parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 4, located in Darangan, Binangonan
Rizal, the full technical description and bearing distance of which can be found in
Plan Psu-2260 approved by the Director of Lands in 1912;.

That the land which is the subject of this petition for registration, full
technical description of which are found in Psu-147662 approved by the Director
of Lands in October, 1955, covers portions of Lots 1 and 4 of Psu-2260;
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 That Lot No. 1 under Psu-2260 contains an area of 122,982 square meters,
a portion of which is designated as Lot No. 2 of Psu-147662 containing an area
of 6,133 square meters;

That Lot No. 4 of Psu-2260 contains an area of 27,530 square meters, a

portion of which is designated as Lot No. 1 of Psu-147662 containing an area of
19,916 square meters; and

That the oppositor Rizal Cement Co., Inc. is in possession of said land and
has been religiously paying the real estate tax in the Municipality of Binangonan,
Rizal from the time it had acquired said property from the previous owner (Old
Tax Declaration No. 30662) now 10570."

Petitioner then prayed that the said petition be dismissed.

Private respondents, in REPLY to said OPPOSITION, countered that the whole
three (3) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 4 of Plan Psu-2260 do not belong
to the petitioner; that a portion of Lot No. 1 consisting of 6,133 square meters and
portion of Lot No. 4 consisting of 19,916 square meters belong to them; that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse and open possession
of said portion since time immemorial; and that they have been religiously paying the
real estate taxes thereon.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance on April 28,
1965 which was amended on May 21, 1965, denying the application for registration and
ordering the issuance of a decree of registration after nality of said decision in the
name of Rizal Cement Company. llcd

Respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the lower court's decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the appellate
court denied the motion in its Resolution of February 11, 1969.
Hence, the present petition alleging that the Court of Appeals, in reversing the
decision of the trial court, has arrived at grossly mistaken, absurd and impossible
conclusions of law and has decided the appeal in a manner totally at war with and
entirely contrary to law and the applicable decisions of this Court. In ne, petitioner
submits the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court for Our review
and consideration:
a) Reliance on the Deed of Sale purporting to have been executed by
Maria Certeza in 1924 in favor of Apolonia Francisco, the due execution of which
have been duly established, and made capital of this deed of sale as having
effected the transfer of rights over the lots in question, successively from the
original vendor down to herein private respondents;
(b) Giving much weight to private respondents' evidence to the effect
that former Justice Mariano de Joya and one Gonzalo Certeza were former
owners of the property in question, and that they are the predecessors-in-interest
of the applicants-respondents. However, the Court of Appeals failed to consider
the fact that these persons who were then available and were the best witnesses
to substantiate applicants' claim, were not presented as witnesses thereby giving
rise to the legal presumption that their testimonies would have been adverse had
they testified in this case;

c) Failure of the Court of Appeals to consider the fact that the two (2)
lots sought to be registered by private respondents were not listed in the inventory
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 of Maria Certeza's properties submitted to the court;
d) Failure of the Court of Appeals to rule that private respondents were
not able to prove that the properties covered by Exhibit "H" were the same
properties covered in Exhibit "I". The Court of Appeals has acted contrary to the
doctrine laid down in land registration cases to the effect that an applicant must
prove not only the genuineness of his title but also the identity of the land applied
for;
e) Stressing that the evidence of petitioner (then oppositor) was weak
to substantiate its claim but failed to apply the doctrine that the burden is upon
the applicant for registration of land to prove satisfactorily that he is the owner
and it is not enough to prove that the property does not belong to the opponent.
The evidence must be absolute and not merely preponderant; and
f) In stating that applicants by themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest have an unbroken adverse possession under claim of ownership for over
thirty years thus failing to consider that petitioner has also been in possession of
the properties since 1911, while several portions thereof were only under lease to
several persons.

Based on respondents-applicants' testimonial and documentary evidence, it

appears that the property applied for, designated as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-
147662, have a total area of 26,015 square meters; that these lots originally belonged
to one Maria Certeza; that upon her death, the property was involved in a litigation
between her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza and that the lots were given by the
latter to former Justice de Joya as the latter's attorney's fees; that the lots were then
sold by de Joya to Filomeno Sta. Ana who, in turn sold the same to spouses Victoriano
Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1939; that sometime in November 1955, the said
spouses sold the said lots to the herein applicants as shown by a duly notarized deed
of sale; 1 that the spouses Cervo declared the property for taxation purposes in the
name of the wife, Ignacia Guillermo, and paid for the realty taxes due thereon; that prior
to the sale, the spouses Cervo had the two parcels surveyed rst in 1950 and then in
1955.
Upon the other hand, oppositor, (now petitioner) Rizal Cement Company, claims
to be the owner of the subject lots, having bought the same from Maria Certeza, and to
have been in continuous and adverse possession of the property since 1911. To
substantiate its claim, petitioner submitted documentary evidence, the most important
of which are the following —
(a) Plan Psu-2260 which covers the survey of a big tract of land for the
company designated as Lots 1, 2 and 4 of the Plan with a total area of 210,644
square meters. The survey was made in 1911 and the plan was approved in 1912;

(b) A sketch plan of the geographical position of the real properties of

Madrigal and Company;

(c) Tax Declaration No. 1066 secured in 1949 from the Rizal Provincial
Assessor which is a consolidation of all lands of the Rizal Cement Company
located in Darangan with a total area of 2,496,712 square meters and which
includes the land in litigation;
(d) Tax Declaration No. 10570 which cancels Tax Declaration No.
1066; and
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 (e) Real estate tax receipts issued for Madrigal and Company, covering
among others the land applied for.

As to who had been in actual possession of the land in question, the Court of
Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents applicants,
namely:
(a) Santiago Picadizo — one of the tenants of the land from the time it
was owned by Maria Certeza up to the present. He stated that he knew for a fact
that the lots in question were given to Justice Mariano de Joya as attorney's fees,
who in turn sold the same to Ignacia Guillermo; that from the time he started
working as tenant, he successively gave the share of the harvests to Maria
Certeza; and that during all the time that the parcels of land were possessed by
the previous owners, no other persons ever claimed ownership of the property.
(b) Isaac Reyes — who started working on one-half of the 2 parcels of
land since 1934 up to the present, and declared that there was no other person
other than Ignacia Guillermo who claimed ownership of the parcels in litigation;
and

(c) Mr. Valentin Marquez — a rebuttal witness who averred that he

begun to live in Darangan, Binangonan, Rizal, since 1910; that he bought a
portion of his land from Maria Certeza when he was working with Rizal Cement
Company in 1924; that the sale was evidenced by an absolute Deed of Sale; that
he occupied the portion sold to him up to 1924; that ever since he possessed the
property there were no other adverse claimants thereto; that he saw a small house
on a portion of the land of Maria Certeza built by Rizal Cement Company who
intended to make a location where it could built a factory; that after 4 to 5
months, the small house was removed, after which, the witness purchased that
portion from Maria Certeza; that during his stay in Darangan, the company did not
take possession of the land; that Maria Certeza had the possession of the land
until her death and that the tenants gave the harvest of the land to Maria Certeza.

On this score, the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision held and rightly so —
"Being an attribute of ownership, appellants' possession of the land in
question goes far to tip the scale in their favor. The right to possess ows from
ownership. No person will suffer adverse possession by another of what belongs
to him. Were the oppositor-appellee rightful owner of the land in question, it would
not have allowed the tenants to cultivate the land and give the owner's share to
appellants and/or their predecessors. It would have opposed the survey for
applicants' vendors on May 21 and 28, 1950 and July 31, 1955, but did not as
shown in the surveyor's certi cate, Exhibit E. If oppositor really bought Lot 2 from
Maria Certeza in 1909 as claimed, it has not been explained how she could sell a
portion thereof to Apolonia Francisco, married to Valentin Marquez for P100.00
on April 15, 1924 by deed, Exhibit R, — an ancient document - as con rmed by the
husband in his deposition who as employee of oppositor would have known of its
acquisition. On the other hand, applicants' vendors in mortgaging the two lots to
Pedro Picones in 1952, Exhibits O and O-1, for P11,000.00, exercised a dominical
act; and Aniano Bautista's testimony that the Cervos were not owners of the land
challenges belief since Bautista was a witness to Exhibits O and O-1, being uncle
of Picones." LLpr

Very signi cantly petitioner did not present any witness in actual possession of
the land in question.
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 As aptly found by the appellate court, respondents possess the property in the
concept of an owner.
"Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the
exercise of a right or by the fact it is subject to the action of our will, or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right." 2

Petitioner's evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey plan
are not conclusive and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in
question. Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does
not vest ownership of the property upon the declarant. 3 Settled is the rule that neither
tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes
su cient evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be
supported by other effective proofs. 5
Apropos thereto is the appellate court's finding that —
"Against the chains of tax declarations presented by the applicants-
appellants which originated beyond 1920 from Maria Certeza, undisputably the
original owner of Lots 1 and 2, the oppositor-appellee presented no tax
declaration which could refer speci cally to the two lots in question. Tax
Declaration No. 10570 (Exhibit 35-1949) for the oppositor-appellee admittedly
does not indicate any of the two lots in question. Indeed, the senior deputy
assessor of Rizal, as witness for the oppositor-appellee, categorically declared
that his o ce refused to issue tax declaration for the land covered by its Plan
Psu-2260, for the reason that the same had been in possession of various
persons in Darangan."

Anent the allegation of petitioner to the effect that the subject lands, full
technical description of which are found in Psu-147662 approved in October 1955,
covers portion of Lots 1 and 4 of Psu-2260, the Court of Appeals correctly observed —
"The only documentary evidence which the oppositor-appellee may
capitalize for its claim of ownership is the notation in applicants' plan Exhibit D
that the lots in question are portions of a previous survey made in 1911 for
oppositor, Plan Psu-2260. The survey plan however has no original record in the
Bureau of Lands. Be that as it may, survey plans merely delimit areas sought to
be registered. Besides, the annotation relied upon by the lower court in its
judgment in favor of the oppositor is nothing more than what it imports — a
previous survey. Neither the plan nor its approval carried with it any adjudication
of ownership. The Director of Lands through approval merely certi es that the
survey has been made in accordance with approved methods and regulations in
force." (Philippine Executive Commission vs. Antonio, CA-G.R No. 8456, February
12, 1943)

A painstaking review of the evidence on record failed to disclose any evidence or

circumstance of note su cient enough to overrule said ndings and conclusions. The
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to Us from the Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) is limited to the review of errors of law, said appellate
court's ndings of fact being conclusive upon us except 6 (1) when the conclusion is a
nding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the ndings of fact are con icting; and (6) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings went beyond the issues of the case and the
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 same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee, none of which
obtain in the case at bar.
The appellate court did what is required of it under the law and it cannot be
faulted after reaching a conclusion adverse to herein petitioner. The decision on the
merits of the case hinges on the determination of the pertinent facts, and the ndings
of the Court of Appeals when supported by substantial evidence are beyond our power
of review.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision dated January 6,
1969 of the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ ., concur.

Makasiar, J ., no part.

Footnotes

1. Exhibit "I".

2. Article 531, New Civil Code.

3. Province of Camarines Sur vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 613; Elumbaring vs.
Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384.
4. Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 600; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562; Elumbaring
vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 385; Province of Camarines Sur vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil.
600, 613; Banez vs. CA, 59 SCRA 30.
5. Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 740.

6. Luna vs. Linotoc, 40 Phil. 15; Bongco vs. People. 96 Phil. 453; Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93
Phil. 257; Castillo vs. CA, 124 SCRA 808; People vs. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 643; Ramos vs.
CA, 63 SCRA 331.

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