THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018

TEODORO C. TORTONA, RODRIGO C. TORTONA, PEDRO C.

TORTONA, ERNESTO C. TORTONA, AND PATRICIO C. TORTONA,
PETITIONERS, V. JULIAN C. GREGORIO, FLORENTINO
GREGORIO, JR., ISAGANI C. GREGORIO, CELEDONIA G.
IGNACIO, TEODOCIA G. CHAN, LEONILA G. CAAMPUED,
CONCORDIA G. MIJARES, ROMEO C. GREGORIO, EDNA S. TAN,
NELIA S. REYES, CECILIA S. FRIEDMAN, LAMBERTO SUANTE,
JULIUS SUANTE, CORAZON YASAY-GREGORIO, DONALDO Y.
GREGORIO, ELMER Y. GREGORIO, AND ROY JOHN Y.
GREGORIO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Documents acknowledged before a notary public are presumed to have

been duly executed. This presumption may be contradicted by clear
and convincing evidence. A notarized Deed of Absolute Sale where the
thumbmark of a party is shown to be a forgery is void.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed Court of
Appeals July 9, 2012 Decision[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 91767 be reversed
and set aside. This assailed Decision reversed and set aside the May
31, 2005 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite,
which ruled in favor of then plaintiffs, now petitioners, in their action
for recovery of real property with damages against then defendants,
now respondents.

This case is an offshoot of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly entered

into by sisters Rufina Casimiro (Rufina), the purported seller, and
Rafaela Casimiro (Rafaela), the purported buyer. Petitioners are the
heirs of Rufina, while respondents are the heirs of Rafaela. [4]
During their lifetime, Rufina and Rafaela co-owned with their other
siblings two (2) parcels of land.[5] They shared in equal, undivided 1/10
shares of a parcel located in Longos, Bacoor, Cavite, covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-923. They also shared in
equal, undivided 1/5 shares of a second parcel in Talaba, Bacoor,
Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-10058. [6]

When Rufina was still alive, she regularly collected her respective 1/10
and 1/5 shares in the income of the two (2) properties. After her
death, petitioners continued to collect and receive their mother's
share.[7]

Sometime in 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of real

property with damages. They alleged that their cousin Emilio Casimiro
(Emilio) offered them a balato[8] of P50,000.00 for the sale of the first
parcel to the Department of Public Works and Highways. Surprised,
they asked why they were not instead given their 1/10 share in the
proceeds of the sale. To this, Emilio allegedly replied that according to
respondents,[9] the two (2) properties had already been sold by Rufina
to Rafaela during their lifetime.[10]

Petitioners proceeded to the Office of the Registry of Deeds to verify

the supposed sale. They learned that OCT No. O-923, covering the first
parcel, had already been cancelled on account of a Deed of Absolute
Sale allegedly executed by Rufina and Rafaela on February 14, 1974.
It appeared that Rufina also sold her 1/5 share over the second parcel
covered by TCT No. T-10058. It also became apparent that some time
after the sales of the two (2) parcels, respondents executed a
Declaration of Heirship and Extrajudicial Partition. Consequently,
Rufina's 1/10 and 1/5 shares in the first and second parcels were
added to the shares of the respondents, as Rafaela's heirs, thereby
increasing their shares to 2/10 and 2/5, respectively. [11]

Petitioners underscored that their mother was illiterate, not even

knowing how to write her own name. They alleged that she only
affixed her thumbmark on documents, and whenever she did so, she
was always assisted by at least one (1) of her children. Thus, they
asserted that if the sales to Rafaela were genuine, they should have
known about them.[12]
In support of their allegations, they presented during trial some
documents,[13] collectively identified as the standard documents,
supposedly bearing the authentic thumbmarks of their mother. These
standard documents also showed that at least one (1) of them assisted
her in executing each document. [14]

Petitioners likewise presented as witness National Bureau of

Investigation fingerprint examiner Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez),
who conducted an examination to determine the genuineness of the
questioned thumbmarks in the Deed of Absolute Sale. [15] He noted that
he compared the questioned thumbmarks with the genuine
thumbmarks of Rufina in the standard documents. In his Technical
Investigation/Identification Report FP Case No. 2000-182-A dated July
13, 2000 (First Report),[16] Gomez noted that "the purported
thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale ...
[were] not identical with her standard thumbmarks in [the standard
documents]" and concluded that "the thumbmarks appearing in the ...
Deed of Absolute Sale ... were not impressed by Rufina Casimiro." [17]

In another report dated May 2, 2001 (Second Report), Gomez

observed that the thumbmarks on the standard documents appeared
to be "faint, blurred and lacking the necessary ridge characteristics to
warrant positive identification."[18] During a subsequent hearing,
however, he clarified that "while the standard thumbmarks lack the
'necessary ridge characteristics to warrant positive identification,['] 'all
the standard are all in the same finger print pattern' and 'they are also
in agreement of the flow of ridges of all the standard."' [19]

In its May 31, 2005 Decision,[20] the Regional Trial Court concluded
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery and ruled in favor of the
petitioners. It found as credible the First Report, which positively
showed that the questioned thumbmarks in the Deed of Absolute Sale
were not Rufina's:

This Court has examined the said thumbmarks and is convinced and
satisfied that they are very different from her standard thurnbmarks in
the documents Exhibits "F", "G", and "H". This difference is further
enhanced in the enlarged photographs of these thumbmarks (Exhibit
"J"). It is clear by the naked eyes that Rufina's thurnbmarks in the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "D") are really the "circle
type" while those of the standard thurnbmarks in Exhibits "F", "G" and
"H" are the loop type as the NBI expert technically described them. As
the Supreme Court ruled in People vs. Abatayo, 87 Phil. 794, 798,
"Thumbmarks never lie". "A comparison of both the differences and
similarities in the questioned thurnbmarks (signatures) should have
been made to satisfy the demands of evidence" (Licarte vs. CA, G.R.
No. 128899; June 8, 1995).[21]

The dispositive portion of its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro in the Deed of

Absolute Sale dated February 14, 1974, Doc. No. 73, Page 16, Book 1,
Series of 1974 of the notarial registry of Atty. Arcadio Espiritu of
Bacoor, Cavite (Exhibit "D") as forged and hence, null and void and
inexistent.

2. Declaring the Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Extrajudicial

Partition dated August 15, 1996 (Exhibit "E") null and void insofar as
the adjudication of the one-tenth (1/10) share of Rufina Casimiro over
the lot situated in Longos, Bacoor, Cavite, covered by OCT No. O-923;
and the one-fifths (1/5) share of Rufina Casimiro in the lot situated in
Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-10058 both of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite (Exhibits "A" and "B"),
both in favor of the Heirs of Rafaela Casimiro.

3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite is hereby ordered to

cancel TCT No. T-741726, and to revert to the cancelled OCT No. O-
923 and to cancel Entry No. 8449-75 appearing on TCT No. T-10058,
which is the annotation of the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale
(Exhibit "D") that has been declared herein as null and void and
inexistent.

The claim for damages is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[22]

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court.[23] It found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a notarized
document and had in its favor the presumption of regularity. It also
emphasized Gomez's second examination, which appeared to indicate
that the thumbmarks in the standard documents prevent "positive
identification."[24] Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Court's conclusions were suspect. It held that, ultimately,
petitioners failed to prove "by clear and convincing evidence" that the
thumbmarks found on the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. [25]

The Heirs of Rufina then filed the present Petition.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether or not the Deed of Absolute
Sale allegedly executed by Rufina Casimiro, as seller, and Rafaela
Casimiro, as buyer, is void, as Rufina Casimiro never consented to it
and with her apparent thumbmarks on it being fake.

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the ruling of the

Regional Trial Court. The Petition must be granted and the Regional
Trial Court May 31, 2005 Decision must be reinstated.

The matter of the authenticity of Rufina Casimiro's thumbmarks is a

factual issue resting on the evidence presented during trial. Factual
issues are normally improper in Rule 45 petitions as, under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, [26] only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits
of exceptions. In Pascual v. Burgos:[27]

The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised
in petitions filed under Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will
not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate
courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this
[c]ourt" when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of
the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to
this court.

However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions

to these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized
exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding
of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this
court involving civil, labor, tax, or criminal cases. [28] (Citations omitted)

Several exceptions exist in this case. Most evident is how the findings
and conclusions of the Court of Appeals conflict with those of the
Regional Trial Court. More significant than these conflicting findings,
this Court finds the Court of Appeals' appreciation of evidence to be
grossly misguided. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, a more
circumspect consideration of the evidence sustains the conclusion that
Rufina's purported thumbmarks were false and merely simulated to
make it appear that she had consented to the alleged sale to her
sister, Rafaela.

II

Notarization enables a notary public to ascertain the voluntariness of

the party's act and to verify the genuineness of his or her signature. [29]
Through notarization, the public and the courts may rely on the face of
the instrument, without need of further examining its authenticity and
due execution. It is an act that is imbued with public interest. In
Nunga v. Atty. Viray:[30]

[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is

invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of
that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized
to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts,
and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that
the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.[31]

Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are

accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution:

Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight

conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity.[32]

However, any such presumption is disputable. It can be refuted by

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary:

It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as

regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents
enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable.
They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant.[33] (Citations omitted)

The contentious Deed of Absolute Sale in this case is a notarized

document.[34] Thus, it benefits from the presumption of regularity. The
burden of proving that thumbmarks affixed on it by an ostensible party
is false and simulated lies on the party assailing its execution. [35] It is
then incumbent upon petitioners to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the seller's thumbmarks, as appearing on the Deed of
Absolute Sale, are forged and are not their mother's.

Petitioners successfully discharged this burden.

With the aid of an expert witness, they contrasted Rufina's apparent

thumbmarks on the Deed of Absolute Sale with specimen thumbmarks
on authentic documents. They demonstrated disparities that lead to no
other conclusion than that the thumbmarks on the contentious Deed of
Absolute Sale are forged. In contrast, respondents merely harped on a
disputable presumption, and sought to affirm this presumption through
the self-serving testimony of the notary public, whose very act of
notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale is the bone of contention, whose
credibility was shown to be wanting, and who is himself potentially
liable for notarizing a simulated document. They also endeavored to
undermine petitioners' expert witness by dismissively characterizing
him as "just an ordinary employee."[36]

III

Rule 130, Section 49 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that

courts may admit the testimonies of expert witnesses or of individuals
possessing "special knowledge, skill, experience or training":

Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a

matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which
he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts.

However, courts exercise a wide latitude of discretion in giving weight
to expert testimonies, taking into consideration the factual
circumstances of the case:

Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they

may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the
trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of
the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias
in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid
witness, the relative opportunities for study or observation of the
matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to
illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the
facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge
utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am.
Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness
and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial
court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion.[37] (Emphasis supplied)
This analysis applies in the examination of forged documents:

Due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of

forged documents, the expertise of questioned document examiners is
usually helpful. These handwriting experts can help determine
fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics between
the questioned and the standard or sample specimen signatures, as
well as the movement and manner of execution strokes. [38]

Respondents here assail the qualification of National Bureau of

Investigation fingerprint examiner Gomez, pejoratively branding him
as "just an ordinary employee." [39] In support of this dismissive casting
of Gomez, respondents noted that he performed such functions as
securing fingerprints from applicants for National Bureau of
Investigation clearances and taking fingerprints of people involved in
crimes.[40]

Evidence is concerned with "ascertaining . . . the truth respecting a

matter of fact."[41] It is concerned with what can be objectively
established and relies on verifiable actualities. Opinions are, by
definition, subjective. They proceed from impressions, depend on
perception, and are products of personal interpretation and belief.
Hence, opinions are generally inadmissible as evidence. [42]

Opinions, when admissible, must have proper factual basis. They must
be supported by facts or circumstances from which they draw logical
inferences. An opinion bereft of factual basis merits no probative
value. People v. Malejana[43] stated the following regarding expert
opinions:

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a

mere statement of the theory or opinion of the expert, but rather in
the aid that he can render to the courts in showing the facts which
serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic
of his conclusion is founded.[44] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

The witness rendering an opinion must be credible, [45] in addition to

possessing all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
specified in the Revised Rules on Evidence. [46] In the case of an expert
witness, he or she must be shown to possess knowledge, skill,
experience, or training on the subject matter of his or her testimony.
[47]
On the other hand, an ordinary witness may give an opinion on
matters which are within his or her knowledge or with which he or she
has sufficient familiarity.[48]

The testimony, too, must be credible in itself. In Borguilla v. Court of

Appeals,[49] this Court said:

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a

credible witness, it must be credible in itself — such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is
outside of judicial cognizance.[50]

The availability of direct evidence affects the viability of opinions. If

there is a direct evidence to prove the fact in issue, an opinion may be
rendered unnecessary. For instance, in Cebu Shipyard and Engineering
Works, Inc. v. William Lines,[51] where the origin of a fire was at issue,
this Court held that there was no need for the judge to consider expert
opinion:

[T]here is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence.

In the case under consideration, the testimonies of the fire experts
were not the only available evidence on the probable cause and origin
of the fire. There were witnesses who were actually on board the
vessel when the fire occurred. Between the testimonies of the fire
experts who merely based their findings and opinions on interviews
and the testimonies of those present during the fire, the latter are of
more probative value.[52]

Contrary to respondents' dismissiveness towards Gomez, his

performance of such tasks as taking fingerprints, even if, for a time it
was his main duty, does not, per se, discount competence. A history of
performing this function does not negate any "special knowledge, skill,
experience or training" that Gomez possesses. Despite respondents'
protestations, it remains that Gomez personally scrutinized and
compared Rufina's disputed thumbmarks in the contested Deed of
Absolute Sale with her authentic thumbmarks in the standard
documents and detailed his findings in the First Report to which he
testified before the Regional Trial Court. He expounded on his findings
in the Second Report and clarified, contrary to what respondents and
the Court of Appeals harp on, that the findings detailed in it are not in
conflict with or otherwise discount the conclusions stated in the First
Report.

Incidentally, this case is not the first instance that this Court sustained
Gomez's competence and credibility. In Rojales v. Dime,[53] this Court
relied on the examination conducted by Gomez to determine the
genuineness of the thumbmark appearing on the pacto de retro
subject of that case. Rojales' demonstration of Gomez's competence
and credibility is worth reproducing at length:

Petitioner avers that the [Court of Appeals] erred in relying on the NBI
Fingerprint Examination. She alleges that the opinion of one claiming
to be an expert is not binding upon the court.

There is nothing on record that would compel this Court to believe that
said witness, Fingerprint Examiner Gomez, has improper motive to
falsely testify against the petitioner nor was his testimony not very
certain. His testimony is worthy of full faith and credit in the absence
of evidence of an improper motive. His straightforward and consistent
testimonies bear the earmarks of credibility.

Gomez testified during direct and cross examination, the process of

examination of the fingerprints and his conclusion:

ATTY: BELMI:

Q: Will you kindly tell the court what was the result of your
examination?
A: After having thorough examination, comparison and analysis, the
thumbmark appearing on the [Pacto] de Retro and the right
thumbmark appearing on the original copy of PC/INP Fingerprint
form taken by SPO3 Marcelo Quintin Sosing were impressed by one
and the same person.
....
   
Q: How do you go about this comparison to determine whether that
 thumbmark [was] impressed by the same person?
A: We must locate the three elements of comparing, the number 1 is
type of fingerprint pattern.
....
   
A: There are three elements, after knowing the fingerprint pattern and
they are of the same fingerprint the next step is to know the flow of
the rages of the fingerprint pattern or the shape.
....
   
Q: Then what is next?
A: After number 2, the last is the most important one because you
must locate the number of ridges of characteristics and their
relationship with each other because it is the basis of identification
of the fingerprint.
   
Q: Meaning the description of the ridges?
A: Yes, sir, the identification features appearing on the fingerprint.
   
Q: What did you see?
A: I found that there were 13 identical points to warrant the positive
identification.
   
Q: [Those] 13 points [are] more than enough to determine whether
those thumbmark[s] [are] done by one and the same person?
A: Yes, sir.
....
   
Q: Where did you base your conclusion that the thumbprint on the
Pacto de Retro Sale over and above the name Juana Vda. de
Rojales is genuine thumbprint of the same person?
A: Well, we only respon[d]ed to the request of the court to compare
with the thumbprint appearing on the Pacto de Retro Sale to that of
the fingerprint appearing on the thumbprint form.
   
Q: You mean to say you were provided with the standard fingerprint of
the subject?
A: Yes, sir.
....
 
COURT:
   
Q: Now, with this photograph blown-up, you have here 13 points, will
you please explain to the court how these 13 points agree from that
standard to that questioned document?
A: I found 2x4 bifurcation, it means that single rage splitting into two
branches.
   
Q: You pointed out?
A: I found the bifurcation on the standard that corresponds exactly to
the bifurcation which I marked number 1 in both photograph[s].
   
Q: From the center?
A: As to the number and location with respect to the core, I found that
both questioned and standard coincide.
....
   
Q: Now, but the layer does not change in point 1, how many layer
from the core?
A: From the core, there are 4 intervening layers from number 1 to
number 2 and it appears also the questioned 4 intervening layers
between number 1 and number 2, so, the intervening rages
between ends of th[ese] characteristics are all both in agreement.
....
 
ATTY. SALANGUIT:
   
Q: Can you say that based on the questioned thumbmark, you would
be able to arrive an accurate evaluation between the questioned
thumbmark and standard thumbmark?
A: Yes, [ma'am].
   
Q: Even if the questioned thumbmark is a little bit blurred as to the
standard thumbmark?
A: [Even though] the questioned thumbmark is a little bit blurred but
still the ridge characteristics [are] still discernible.
   
Q: You are telling us that among many people here in the world,
 nobody have the same thumbmark as another person and that
include the thumbmark of a twins?
A: A: Yes, [ma'am].[54]

This Court finds no reason to favorably consider respondents' attempt

at undermining Gomez's competence.

The credibility of an expert witness does not inhere in his or her

person. Rather, he or she must be shown to possess knowledge, skill,
experience, or training on the subject matter of his or her testimony.
[55]
In First Nationwide Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[56] where
the identity of the vehicle in question was in issue, this Court
considered these factors in assessing the credibility of the expert
witness:

We note that Sergeant Agadulin is a police officer who has adequate

knowledge, training and experience to perform macro-etching
examinations. His assertions on this technical matter are, as the
[Court of Appeals] noted, in the nature of expert testimony.
Additionally, as a public officer, he is presumed to have regularly
performed his duty. In the absence of controverting evidence, his
testimony is entitled to great weight and credence. [57] (Citation
omitted)

Standards outlined in American jurisprudence illustrate frameworks

and standards for appraising expert testimonies.

In the 1923 case of Frye v. United States,[58] James Alfonso Frye was
convicted of second-degree murder by the lower court after he was
disallowed to introduce expert testimony relating to the results of
systolic blood pressure deception test. The United States Supreme
Court, in sustaining the lower court, explained:

The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are

admissible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is
such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of
forming a correct judgment upon it, for the reason that the subject-
matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a
previous habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a
knowledge of it. When the question involved does not lie within the
range of common experience or common knowledge, but requires
special experience or special knowledge, then the opinions of
witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the
question relates are admissible in evidence.

Numerous cases are cited in support of this rule. Just when a scientific
principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained
such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and
experiments thus far made.[59] (Emphasis supplied)

In 1993, the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. departed from the Frye standard and articulated
a new framework for assessing the admission of expert testimony. [60]
In that case, plaintiffs Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller attributed their
serious birth defects to the drug Bendectin, manufactured by
defendant Dow Chemical Company. They submitted expert testimonies
on animal studies showing a link between Bendectin and
malformations, pharmacological studies, and reanalysis of previously
published epidemiological studies. The district court ruled in favor of
the defendant and stated that scientific evidence is admissible only if
the principle upon which it is based is "sufficiently established to have
general acceptance in the field to which it belongs." [61] The Ninth
Circuit Court affirmed this Decision after finding that the plaintiffs'
evidence had not yet been accepted as reliable technique by scientists
who had an opportunity to scrutinize and verify the methods.

However, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case after
finding the Frye standard to be mooted by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, Ru1e 702, which stated:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.

The United States Supreme Court observed that Rule 702 did not
require "general acceptance" of the Frye standard before expert
testimony is admitted. Instead of following the strict Frye standard, it
placed on the judge the duty to act as "gatekeeper" when faced with a
proffer of expert scientific testimony. Thus, the judge must make a
preliminary determination of whether or not the offered testimony is
scientific knowledge and whether or not it will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue. The following are the
standards that should be considered by the judge:

Many considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the

theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether
it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or
potential error rate, and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread
acceptance within a relevant scientific community. [62]

However, the standards are not exclusive:

The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.
Throughout, the judge should also be mindful of other applicable
Rules.[63]

Thus, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case for the
application of its enumerated standards.

In this case, the Regional Trial Court's May 31, 2005 Decision detailed
the circumstances leading to the National Bureau of Investigation's
examination of the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale, respondents'
incessant attempts at preventing the examination, and how Gomez
took the witness stand and presented his findings. The Regional Trial
Court's recollection indicates, most notably, that Gomez was not
handpicked by petitioners. Rather, following petitioners' request,
Gomez appeared to have been designated by the National Bureau of
Investigation itself to conduct the examination. Thus, any such
determination of Gomez's expertise was not borne by petitioners'
innate preference for him or of their insistence upon him, but by the
National Bureau of Investigation's own confidence in him. This
institutional reposition of confidence can only bolster Gomez's
credibility:

To prove that their mother's thumbmarks on the disputed deed of

absolute sale were forged, plaintiffs filed a motion to refer the
questioned document to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
examination. An Order was issued by this Court directing the Office of
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite to submit to this Court
the original copy of the said title and upon receipt of the same ordered
the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the same to the NBI. An
Omnibus Motion was filed by the defendants informing this Court that
the questioned document was already lost and/or missing pursuant to
the Certification dated April 5, 2000 issued by the Office of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite (Exh. 8). Hence, the order
to transmit the questioned document became unavailing and
academic. That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court transmitted
the questioned document to the NBI. Defendants insinuated that the
original questioned document came from an illegitimate and spurious
source. However, it was explained by a representative of the registry,
Mr. Agusto Vasquez, that the registrar asked him to bring the
questioned document to the Court and the same was received by one
of the employees of the Court. Further, the said issue has been
resolved by this Court in its Order dated August 14, 2000, pertinent
portion of which states that:

"Therefore, the allegations (sic) of the defendants that the said

document came from a spurious [source] is without any basis. This
Court assures the defendants and/or any litigant for that matter that
this Court will not allow spurious document[s] to be admitted by this
Court.

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion filed by the defendants is hereby

DENIED for lack of merit."
As basis of the comparison[,] plaintiffs presented, the Kasulatan sa
Bilihan ng Lote dated February 19, 1979 (Exhibit "F"); Kasulatang
Paghahati sa Labas ng Hukuman na may Lakip na Bilihan ng Lupa
dated March 31, 1982 (Exhibit "G"); and the Residence Certificate of
Rufina Casimiro dated July 21, 1971 (Exhibit "H") and a receipt issued
by the Rural Bank of Zapote (Exhibit "H-1"), which documents
contained the genuine thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro.

A fingerprint examiner of the NBI, Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr., took the

witness stand. He testified that pursuant to the order of this Court he
conducted an examination to determine the genuineness of Rufina
Casimiro's thumbmarks on the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale by
comparing them with her genuine thumbmarks as appearing on
Exhibits "F", "G" and "H". These documents, containing the genuine
thumb marks of Rufina Casimiro were executed on the dates prior to
and after the execution of the questioned documents. Mr. Gomez
prepared enlarged photographs of the questioned and standard
thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro for better examination and comparison
(Exhibit "J"). After examining these thumbmarks, Mr. Gomez
concluded in his Technical Investigation/Identification Report FP Case
No. 2000-182-A (Exh. "I") that the purported thumbmarks of Rufina
Casimiro in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "D") are not
identical with her standard thumbmarks in Exhibits "F", "G" and "H"
and that the thumbmarks appearing in the said Deed of Absolute Sale
(Exhibit "D") were not impressed by Rufina Casimiro. [64]

IV

Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,[65] outlined standards for

establishing forgery:

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,

positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the
party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an
instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged
signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison
between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have
been forged. Without the original document containing the alleged
forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which
would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy or
reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce
reliable results.[66] (Citation omitted)

Here, petitioners submitted for comparison three (3) standard

documents bearing the genuine thumbmarks of Rufina: (1) Kasulatan
sa Bilihan ng Lote (Exhibit "F"); (2) Kasulatang Paghahati sa Labas ng
Hukuman na may Lakip na Bilihan ng Lupa (Exhibit "G"); and (3) the
Residence Certificate of Rufina (Exhibit "H"). [67] After examination,
Gomez submitted to the Regional Trial Court his Technical
Investigation/Identification Report FP Case No. 2000-182 dated July
13, 2000:

6. RESULT OF EXAMINATION: After having a thorough examination,

comparison and analysis, questioned thumbmarks mentioned in item
nos. 5A and 5B are found not identical with the standard thumbmarks
mentioned in item nos. 5C, 5D[,] and 5E.

7. OPINION: In view of the foregoing result of the examination,

questioned thumbmark mentioned in item nos. 5A and 5B were not
impressed by Rufina Casimiro.[68]

This Report could not be any clearer. The questioned thumbmarks on

the Deed of Absolute Sale do not belong to Rufina. The questioned
thumbmarks were of the "circle type" while the genuine thumbmarks
of Rufina were of the "loop type." [69]

Upon personally perusing the documents, Regional Trial Court Judge

Novato T. Cajigal (Judge Cajigal) reached a similar conclusion:

This Court has examined the said thumbmarks and is convinced and
satisfied that they are very different from her standard thumbmarks in
the documents Exhibits "F", "G"[,] and "H". This difference is further
enhanced in the enlarged photographs of these thumbmarks (Exhibit
"J"). It is clear by the naked eyes that Rufina's thumbmarks in the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "D") are really the "circle
type" while those of the standard thumbmarks in Exhibits "F", "G"[,]
and "H" are the loop type as the NBI expert technically described
them. As the Supreme Court ruled in People vs. Abatayo, 87 Phil. 794,
798, "Thumbmarks never lie". "A comparison of both the differences
and similarities in the questioned thumbmarks (signatures) should
have been made to satisfy the demands of evidence" (Licarte vs, CA,
G.R. No. 128899; June 8, 1995).[70]

Judge Cajigal's observations and conclusions are in keeping with the

settled principle that judges exercise independent judgment in
appraising the authenticity of a signature, or of a fingerprint placed in
a signature's stead:

A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the

signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity and this cannot be done without the original copy being
produced in court.[71]

In reversing the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals emphasized

Gomez's Second Report, which indicated that faint and blurred
features of the thumbmarks appearing on the standard documents
prevented "positive identification." [72] Thus, it concluded that "no
comparison may be made between the thumbmarks found in the Deed
[Absolute of Sale] and those found in the standard documents." [73]

However, the Court of Appeals failed to consider that Gomez clarified

that all the requisites for comparing the thumbmarks—(1) fingerprint
patterns, (2) flow of ridges, and (3) location and relationship of their
characteristics—had been satisfied. He specifically stated that first,
"[a]ll the standard [thumbmarks] are all in the same fingerprint
pattern";[74] second, "they are also in agreement [as to] the flow [of]
ridges";[75] and third, there is no discrepancy as to their ridge
characteristics[76]:

ATTY. CORTEZ

Q Can you tell us, Mr. Witness, the requirements before you can
render an opinion in the identity of the standard thumbmark?

WITNESS

A Well, in comparing the prints there are three requirements, (1) to

determine the type of the finger prints pattern; (2) the flow of the
ridges; (3) the location of each characteristics and their relationship to
each other, sir.

ATTY. CORTEZ

Q Now with respect to the first requirements (sic) that you mentioned
"the general pattern"?
....

ATTY. CORTEZ

Q Would you say that this standard thumbmark, what can you say
about the general pattern of the thumbmark?

WITNESS

A All the standard are all in the same finger print pattern, sir.

ATTY. CORTEZ

Q How about the second requirements (sic) which is the flow of the
ridges, what can you say about this standard?

WITNESS

A Well, they are also in agreement of the flow [of] ridges of all the
standard, sir.

ATTY. CORTEZ

Q And how about the third requirements, the number of ridge

characteristics?

WITNESS

A The number of the ridge characteristics because [of:] the none

clarity (sic) of th[ese] characteristics. I only locate[d] one or two
points and it is not sufficient for positive identification. I must locate
seven or more ridge characteristics to warrant positive identification,
sir.

ATTY. CORTEZ
Q But will you agree, Mr. Witness that with respect to this point, there
is no discrepancy among the standard thumbmark?

WITNESS

A Well, if I have not meet (sic) all the requirements then I cannot
make an opinion regarding the identification of the standard finger
print, sir.

ATTY. CORTEZ

Q My question is not about the identity. My question is pertaining to

any discrepancy or any disagreement?

WITNESS

A There is none, sir.[77] (Emphasis supplied)

The faint and blurred features of the thumbmarks appearing on the

standard documents may have made them less than ideal. Still,
Gomez explained that they remained to be sufficiently consistent, and
therefore, suitable for a comparison with the thumbmarks appearing
on the disputed Deed of Absolute Sale. Gomez, too, was particular in
rejecting respondents' counsel's suggestion that the Second Report
should "supersede"[78] the First Report:

ATTY. DELA CUEVA

Q Mr. Witness, this document now marked as Exh. "K" which we are
adopting as our Exh. "6" was prepared by you subsequently to a
previous report which is now marked as Exh. "I", does this report
supersede your previous report, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS

A No, Sir.[79]

Thus, Gomez was steadfast on the findings he detailed in his First

Report. The First Report already established that the questioned
thumbmarks appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale were not
Rufina's, as their genuineness is belied by thumbmarks appearing on
the authentic, standard documents. Despite the flaws in the
thumbmarks appearing in the standard documents, the inherent
deficiencies of the thumbmarks affixed in the Deed of Absolute Sale
remain.

VI

Respondents' lone witness was Atty. Arcadia Espiritu (Atty. Espiritu),

the notary public who notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. [80] Atty.
Espiritu asserted that the parties to the Deed of Absolute Sale
personally appeared before him and that Rufina affixed her
thumbmarks in his presence.[81]

However, Atty. Espiritu's credibility is highly questionable. It was

established during trial that he notarized an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication in favor of a certain Victor Guinto (Guinto), where Guinto
declared that he was the sole heir of his deceased sister, to the
exclusion of their other siblings. [82] This was despite Atty. Espiritu's
personal knowledge, as a longtime neighbor of Guinto's family, that
there were other brothers and sisters.[83] During trial, he even
admitted that "he was not 'concerned about the truth and falsities of
entries in the document."'[84]

The Regional Trial Court's observations are on point. It was right to not
lend credence to Atty. Espiritu's testimony:

Thus, the presumption of regularity in the execution of notarial

documents [cannot] apply in this case, despite the testimony of the
notary public who notarized the said Deed of Absolute Sale, whose
credibility is in itself doubtful considering his admission that he
prepared and notarized an affidavit of self-adjudication of inherited
properties from a deceased sister (Exhibit "M") inspite (sic) of his
personal knowledge that the affiant was not the sole heir of the said
deceased, who has other surviving brothers and sisters as they were
once his neighbors in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite. No amount of
testimonial evidence could ever alter or detract from the cold physical
fact that the questioned thumbmarks are not identical with the
standard thumbmarks. Testimonial evidence cannot prevail over
physical facts.[85]

VII
Petitioners were able to discharge their burden of proving forgery by
clear and convincing evidence. Petitioners themselves recounted in a
straightforward manner that their mother, being illiterate, never dealt
with her properties without the assistance of any of her children. [86] To
attest to this, they presented documents bearing the thumbmarks of
their mother, where it appeared that at least one (1) of them was
present to assist her.[87] These same documents, when compared with
the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale, demonstrated the falsity of the
thumbmarks appearing on the latter. Respondents' cause may have
been supported by the general presumption that notarized documents
were duly executed; however, this presumption must crumble in light
of the significantly more compelling evidence presented by petitioners.
As against petitioners' evidence, all that respondents presented was
the testimony of the notarizing lawyer, whose own acts are clouded
with suspicion.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The

July 9, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91767
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 31, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite in Civil Case No. BCV
97- 183 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ.,

concur.

March 1, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on January 17, 2018 a Decision, copy

attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-
entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on
March 1, 2018 at 9:18 a.m.
 Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO
  V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of
Court
[1]
Rollo, pp. 7-30.
[2]
Id. at 31-43. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Florito
S. Macalino and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon
and Abraham B. Borreta of the Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals,
Manila.
[3]
Id. at 44-49. The Decision, docketed as Civil Case No. BCV 97-183,
was penned by Judge Novato T. Cajigal.
[4]
Id. at 45.
[5]
Id. at 111-112, Memorandum for the Petitioners.
[6]
Id. at 44.
[7]
Id. at 111-112.
[8]
Id. at 112, Petitioners' Memorandum. "Vicassan's Tagalog-English
Dictionary defines the word 'balato' 'as a small amount of money given
away in goodwill'."
[9]
The Heirs of Rafaela are Julian C. Gregorio, Florentino Gregorio, Jr.,
Isagani C. Gregorio, Celedonia G. Ignacio, Teodocia G. Chan, Leonila
G. Caampued, Concordia G. Mijares, Romeo C. Gregorio, Edna S. Tan,
Nelia S. Reyes, Cecilia S. Friedman, Lamberto Suante, Julius Suante,
Enrico Suante, Felipe Suante, Cesar Suante, Corazon Yasay-Gregorio,
Donalda Y. Gregorio, Elmer Y. Gregorio, and Roy John Y. Gregorio. See
rollo, p. 7.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[11]
Id. at 45.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 47. These documents were: Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lote
dated February 19, 1979; Kasulatang Paghahati sa Labas ng Hukuman
na may Lakip na Bilihan ng Lupa dated March 31, 1982; Rufina
Casimiro's Residence Certificate dated July 21, 1971; and a receipt
issued by the Rural Bank of Zapote.
[14]
Id. at 45.
[15]
Id. at 46-47.
[16]
Id. at 15.
[17]
Id. at 47.
[18]
Id. at 16-17.
[19]
Id. at 17. Petition for Review on Certiorari.
[20]
Id. at 44-49.
[21]
Id. at 47.
[22]
Id. at 48-49.
[23]
Id. at 31-43.
[24]
Id. at 128.
[25]
Id. at 42.
[26]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to

appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
[27]
Pascual v. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016 <
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/171722.pdf > 10-11 [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division].
[28]
Id. at 10-11.
[29]
Aquino v. Manese, 448 Phil. 555 (2003) [J. Carpio Morales, Third
Division].
[30]
366 Phil. 155 (1999) [J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
[31]
Id. at 160-161.
[32]
Basilio v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 120, 124 (2000) [J. Pardo,
First Division] citing Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 171 (2000)
[J. Quisimbing, Second Division].
[33]
Heirs of Trazona v. Heirs of Cañada, 723 Phil. 388, 397 (2013) [C.J.
Sereno, First Division].
[34]
Rollo, p. 46.
[35]
Basilio v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 120, 124 (2000) [J. Pardo,
First Division] citing Sumbad v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 52 (1999)
[J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[36]
Rollo, p. 98.
[37]
Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 263 Phil. 1068, 1077
(1999) [J. Medialdea, First Division].
[38]
Spouses Ulep v. Court of Appeals, 509 Phil. 227, 240 (2005) [J.
Garcia, Third Division].
[39]
Rollo, p. 98.
[40]
Id.
[41]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, sec. 1.
[42]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 48-50:

Section 48. General rule. — The opinion of a witness is not admissible,

except as indicated in the following sections.
Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which
he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness

for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding
—

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,

behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
[43]
515 Phil. 584 (2006) [J. Azcuna, Second Division].
[44]
Id. at 596.
[45]
See Borguilla v. Court of Appeals, 231 Phil. 9 (1987) [J. Paras,
Second Division].
[46]
See Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System v. Republic, 707 Phil. 109 (2013) [J. Villarama, Jr.,
First Division].
[47]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 49.
[48]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 50.
[49]
231 Phil. 9 (1987) [J. Paras, Second Division].
[50]
Borguilla v. Court of Appeals, 231 Phil. 9, 22 (1987) [J. Paras,
Second Division].
[51]
366 Phil. 439 (1999) [J. Purisima, Third Division].
[52]
Id. at 454-455.
[53]
G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016 <
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph.pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/february2016/194548.pdf > [J. Peralta,
Third Division].
[54]
Id. at 9-11.
[55]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 49.
[56]
376 Phil. 701 (1999) [J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[57]
Id. at 712.
[58]
54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
[59]
Id.
[60]
509 US 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
[61]
Id.
[62]
Id.
[63]
Id.
[64]
Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[65]
360 Phil. 753 ( 1998) [J. Purisima, Third Division].
[66]
Id. at 763.
[67]
Rollo, p. 47.
[68]
Id. at 15-16.
[69]
Id. at 47.
[70]
Id.
[71]
Mendoza v. Fermin, 738 Phil. 429, 442 (2014) [J. Peralta, Third
Division].
[72]
Rollo, p. 127.
[73]
Id. at 38 and 40.
[74]
Id. at 127.
[75]
Id. at 128.
[76]
Id. at 128-129.
[77]
Id. at 127-129.
[78]
Id. at 129.
[79]
Id. at 129-130.
[80]
Id. at 45-46.
[81]
Id. at 93-97.
[82]
Id. at 21-22.
[83]
Id.
[84]
Id. at 22.
[85]
Id. at 47-48.
[86]
Id. at 114-115.
[87]
Id. at 45.

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