Overview and Country Reports
Overview and Country Reports
Overview and Country Reports
I. Introduction
miracle and quickly dried up when the bubble burst) is decidedly risky.
Indeed, it has been shown that, while extensive external private capital
has played an important role in supporting the development process,
particularly in some of the middle-income countries (the so-called Asian
tigers), over-dependence on such capital has played havoc on their econo-
mies, as illustrated during the Asian nancial turmoil from 1997 to 1998,
a period marked by a severe drop in private foreign capital inows.
The International Monetary Fund reported in its 1998 Annual Re-
port that net private capital ows to emerging market economies reached
a record of US$240 billion in 1996, with Asia attracting more than 40
percent of the total. However, this dropped steeply to US$174 billion in
1997 as the Asian crisis deepened, with net ows to the developing
countries of Asia falling by more than US$60 billion to less than US$40
billion, the lowest inow since 1992.
The Asian crisis also exposed certain weaknesses in the private
sector, particularly with respect to governance, and also in governments,
which had failed to carry out some important roles, particularly regula-
tion and supervision. Poor regulation of banking was seen to have
contributed to the problem, as domestic banks expanded credit and were
deeply exposed to foreign borrowing. Bank lending to the private sector
rose between 14 percent and 48 percent a year depending on the coun-
try, amounting to 116 percent of GDP in Thailand in 1997, according to
a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper.1 The same pa-
per also noted that, at their peaks during the crisis, non-performing loans
(NPLs) as a percentage of total loans were 50 percent in the Republic of
Korea, 35 percent in Malaysia, 55 percent in Thailand, and 75 percent
in Indonesia. Even in 1996, before the crisis hit, NPLs as a proportion
of total lending reached 13 percent in both Thailand and Indonesia, 14
percent in Malaysia, and 8 percent in the Republic of Korea.
Moreover, the liberalization of the Asian nancial markets allowed
banks easier access to international credit. Banks throughout the region
accumulated large amounts of short-term debt denominated in foreign
exchange. (For that matter, total external debt of some of the a¬ected
countries relative to GDP rose from less than 50 percent to as high as
162.7 percent in the case of Indonesia in 1998.)2 Not unexpectedly, this
resulted in the vulnerability of the banking systems, as banks were exposed
1. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, What Caused the Asian Currency and
Financial Crisis?, cited in Improving Global Financial Stability, Draft of Policy
Statement of the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee on Economic
Development, by Kathleen Cooper et al.
2. Batten, Jonathan and Yun-Hwan Kim (2000).
Overview 101
For Hong Kong, China, the surpluses have ranged from 1 percent
to 6.5 percent of GDP, reecting outstanding budgetary performances
from 1991 to 1998. There was a budget decit only in 1995/96, when
nancing for the new airport was undertaken.
does not undertake OMO to inuence interest rates. The policy on the
exchange rate is that it must remain competitive. Singapore eschews the
internationalization of its currency, however. Notwithstanding, a repo
market has developed, thus allowing the emergence of a more respon-
sive yield curve, providing opportunities for investors and banks. However,
the policy of noninternationalization restricts repo transactions with non-
bank and nonresident rms. The MAS has exerted concerted e¬orts to
steer Singapore Government Securities as the benchmark for a viable
yield curve, in a bid to eventually position the Singapore market as a
debt hub in the region.
The other ADCs, excepting the PRC, have Central Banks which
have attempted to use indirect monetary policy instruments to develop
and strengthen their nancial systems and inuence the development of
their burgeoning capital markets, all with varying degrees of success.
The Philippines Central Bank was established in 1948. As in other
countries, the Department of Finance exercised a major role in the early
years, with the Secretary of Finance chairing the Monetary Board of the
Central Bank. The objective of economic growth was dened for the
Central Bank of the Philippines, until this was revised to merely provid-
ing a conducive climate for the pursuit of economic growth in 1972.
Then in 1993, as mandated by a new constitution, a new Central Bank
Act dened the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), as the monetary
authority of the Philippines, with responsibility for providing policy
directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit, with supervisory
powers over banks and regulatory authority over nonbanks. Its primary
objective was the maintenance of price stability conducive to balanced
and sustainable economic growth. The BSP is a key player in a coordi-
nating body for investment and scal planning, that includes the
Department of Finance, Department of Budget and Management, Na-
tional Economic Development Authority (NEDA), and the Bureau of
Treasury. O¹cials from these agencies (except NEDA) constitute the Auction
Committee for government securities. Up until 1995, when the new law
took e¬ect, BSP had a scal agency function, which meant that it handled
the issuance, servicing, and payment of public sector debt on behalf of
the Government. BSP has extensively used OMO and rediscounts as
important tools to inuence monetary aggregates, and thus interest rates
and economic growth or recovery. It has also used the more direct in-
strument of changes in reserve requirements when more immediate action
has been needed. BSP a¬ects the development of the capital market by
enhancing the e¹ciency of nancial intermediation, and is one of the
four government agencies that, together with four private sector institutions,
constitute the Capital Market Development Council.
110 Government Bond Market Development in Asia
ket and deepening the market for government securities to ensure the
e¹cacy of OMO as a monetary instrument. BNM is responsible for the
issuance of government bonds, being one of the ve statutory bodies
under the Ministry of Finance. In this aspect, Malaysia di¬ers from other
ADCs, notably the Philippines and Indonesia, whose Central Banks are
independent.
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) is responsible for monetary
policy, and its main objectives are stabilization of the domestic and
external value of the rupee and promotion of economic growth. It uti-
lizes both direct and indirect instruments, in recent years having preferred
indirect ones such as OMO. It acts as the issue manager of government
securities in the domestic market through weekly auctions of Treasury
bills. OMO use rates based on yields of T-bills in the primary market,
but the underdeveloped state of the secondary market for government
securities renders such operations less than e¬ective. The introduction
of repo agreements, and reverse repos in 1993 and 1995, however, pro-
vided the CBSL with additional instruments to inuence interest rates.
As in the Philippines and Indonesia, the Central Bank of China
(CBC) is the highest monetary authority in Taipei,China, with complete
independence over monetary policies. Its main functions include the
regulation of nancial conditions, implementation of foreign exchange
regulations, examination of nancial institutions, issuance of currency,
and provision of check clearing services. It also performs scal agency
functions for the Government, conducting the issuance of government
bonds, although this source of funding has not been developed until
recently, and is still not very actively utilized. The banks main policy
instruments are OMO, rediscounts, reserve requirements, and selective
credit controls. OMO is the most important and exible monetary tool,
and CBC has adopted an intermediate targeting strategy with M2 as its
target variable. Since 1979, the New Taiwan (NT) dollar has been al-
lowed to oat, but balance of payments constraints inhibit the inuence
of monetary policy.
The Bank of Thailand (BOT) was established in 1942, and is man-
dated to conduct monetary policy in accordance with the following policy
objectives: (i) to stabilize the countrys scal balance to consolidate the
budget decit and control debt repayment over the medium-term; (ii) to
build a management mechanism to minimize nancing cost and avoid
bunching of government debt, and (iii) to develop a bond market to
promote public and private saving and support debt management. BOT
is thus responsible for the maintenance of monetary stability, as well as
being a major advisor to government on economic policy. BOT is thus
apparently a key player in both scal and monetary policy.
112 Government Bond Market Development in Asia
BOX 1
Asian Developing Countries Efforts in the Use of Credit Rating
spectrum is the PRC, where the only debt is government debt, since
only state-owned enterprises other than central government may issue
debt. Domestic bonds dominate the market, and debt issuance is an im-
portant source of nance, next to bank loans. Initially, bond issuance
was introduced very cautiously, mainly to meet the scal decit. The
Asian nancial crisis brought about a change, however, which led to the
use of debt as a tool for stimulating the economy, as well as an impor-
tant macroeconomic adjustment mechanism. The PRC has a long way to
go, however, as it slowly moves away from its very closed and insular
system. Any development of its bond market will have to go along with
scal reforms, as well as reforms in the nancial sector and resolution of
the issue on market liberalization.
Between these two extremes lie the seven other ADCsIndonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, and
Taipei,China. Hardest hit by the Asian nancial crisis were Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, and Republic of Korea. Indonesias bond market is
quite simply shallow and illiquid. This underdevelopment is the result
of past scal policy, which relied heavily on foreign loans to nance
budget decits, and undue reliance on government subsidies by state-
owned enterprises. Battered by the nancial crisis and the e¬ects of
continued political di¹culties, Indonesia has to address many issues,
including harmonization of scal and monetary policies, its debilitating
debt burden, governance issues, and developing the appropriate infra-
structure for the emergence of a bond market. Malaysia too su¬ers from
an underdeveloped bond market, which could be partly ascribed to a
confused regulatory structure. It has, however, taken an initial step with
the mandate given to Khazanah, a wholly owned government subsidiary,
to issue Benchmark Bonds. It is hoped these will be useful as a guide to
pricing corporate bonds. While Malaysia still has to improve its market
infrastructure, it has begun to set up a modern and e¹cient settlement
system, has made some progress with a scriptless system, and opened
two credit rating agencies. Its secondary market, however, has so far
failed to take o¬. Thailand, the other crisis-hit ADC, issued government
bonds to fund successive budgetary decits. These were absorbed by a
captive market that held these to maturity, and the secondary market
thus failed to develop. A number of impediments to the development of
the bond market have to be addressed, chief among which is probably
the need for e¬ective issuance planning. For secondary market develop-
ment, market infrastructure issues have to be tackled. The Republic of
Koreas bond market, meanwhile, developed di¬erently, in that it emerged
without the benet of a benchmark government bond, and has been led
by corporate bonds. The countrys precrisis aversion to decit accounts
120 Government Bond Market Development in Asia
for the underdeveloped state of the government bond market. The Asian
crisis, however, served as a catalyst for the development and deepening
of the government bond market, with the move to using three-year Trea-
sury bonds as the benchmark, the introduction of a PD system, and the
opening up of noncompetitive participation in the bond market to indi-
viduals of up to 20 percent of the volume of the auction, thus latter
providing a venue for long-term public savings. The Republic of Korea
still has to address various issues, however, important among which are
the absence of liquidity, and coordination of scal and monetary issues,
including tax and interest policy issues, as well as governance issues,
which were highlighted during the Asian crisis.
The Philippines, Taipei,China, and Sri Lanka were less a¬ected by
the Asian nancial crisis. Their government bond markets, while rela-
tively undeveloped, have nonetheless made some important strides, with
the governments seemingly committed to making them play leading roles
in their economies capital market development. The Philippines and Sri
Lanka have both introduced market-oriented long-term bonds to provide
a rudimentary yield curve, although the latter still has to do away with
its nonmarketable rupee loans to be able to concentrate on government
bonds. For the Philippines, the market for short-term government securi-
ties (T-bills) constitutes the largest market for debt instruments, even as
attempts to deepen the securities market and broaden investment alter-
natives are being made to help develop a long-term yield curve. For
both, continuing structural reforms and improvements in market infra-
structure are necessary, as well as greater coordination between monetary
and scal policies. Taipei,China, on the other hand, provides a good
example of how a government bond market can be made to develop in
a short time. It was only in the early 1990s that the Government began
to use scal policy for infrastructure development, using government
bonds as the funding source. Short- and medium-term government bonds
were issued, with longer-term bonds gradually included, 20-year tenors
being introduced in 1998. There is a well-spaced maturity range that
provides a good basis for establishing a risk-free benchmark yield curve.
C. Types of Securities
The size of domestic bond markets varies across the ADCs, ranging
from 5 percent of gross national product (GNP) in Indonesia to 97 per-
cent in Singapore. The Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore are
the largest relative to GNP, as well as, surprisingly, the Philippines, de-
spite its lack of a corporate bond market.
The size of the bond markets may be taken in the context of the
nancial depth of the ADCs. The Philippines and Indonesia have the
shallowest markets compared with similar economies such as Thailand
122 Government Bond Market Development in Asia
TABLE 1
Comparison of Domestic Bond Markets
and Malaysia, using the ratio of nancial assets to GDP. The Asian crisis
reduced the value of the equities markets, and induced a marked shift to
bank assets, except in the Republic of Korea, where the corporate sector
accessed the bond market during the crisis. As of 1998, the nancial
assets and depth of the ADCs are shown below.
TABLE 2
Financial Assets and Depth of Financial System in Selected ADCs, 1998
(US$ billions)
E. Investors
F. Issuing Process
starts at a low price and gradually increases it until demand and supply
meet, after which the entire issue is sold at that single market clearing
price; (iv) descending price auctions, where the auctioneer starts at a
high price which is gradually decreased until someone buys a certain
amount, and further decreased until the entire quantity is sold; (v) non-
competitive auctions, which are organized for specic investor groups,
with debt securities sold at a price resulting from the auction, usually
open to smaller, retail investors and not intended for PDs; and (vi) when-
issued trading, where governments dispose of another instrument to reduce
the winners curse for competitive bidders, with bidders starting to trade
the securities as soon as the Treasury announces the amount it will issue
with a certain maturity, and until the moment they are actually issued.
Each method has its advantages and disadvantages.10
The 10 ADCs presently utilize the auction method to issue govern-
ment securities. Some have evolved from methods of direct allocation
through various underwriting techniques, and currently use either the
Dutch or English/American auction methods according to their specic
needs. They have also evolved to a system whereby securities have been
dematerialized, and electronic book entry means are increasingly uti-
lized, especially for T-bills and T-bonds. Other types of government
securities (such as those issued by state-owned institutions, or special
types of issues) are issued in bearer form, but the general rule is now for
a scriptless environment. The Central Bank, except in the case of the
Philippines, where the Central Bank has turned over this function to the
Bureau of Treasury, is usually the issue manager. There is some sort of
dealer network in every ADC, with each country calling it by an o¹cial
name, except in Indonesia, where it appears a PD network is still being
proposed.
G. Benchmark
For the government bond market to ourish and set the standards
for the bond market as a whole, interest rates should be at or near the
market value. Hong Kong, China and Singapore, clearly the most devel-
oped of the ADCs, have embraced market direction. Singapore SGS T-bonds
o¬er coupon rates which vary according to market interest rate and tenor,
with maturities now moving out to 10 years. Positive yield curves pre-
vail most of the time. Hong Kong, China likewise provides a reliable
dollar benchmark yield curve, the credibility of which is based on the
exchange rate system under which the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to
the US dollar. The benchmark yield curve tracks closely that of US
Treasuries. In contrast, interest rates in the PRC continue to be regulated
by the authorities, although institutions had been given the exibility
of 20 percent over oating, according to risk, since 1998, which was
raised to 30 percent in 1999. Moreover rural bank cooperatives were
given a higher range of 10 percent to 40 percent. This authority was
only given to short-term loans, with mid- and long-term loans having to
adopt the regulatory xed interest rate.
The seven other ADCs recognize the importance of the develop-
ment of a benchmark yield curve. Indonesia uses the average time deposit
rate (for six-month tenor) as a basis for oating-rate bonds of state-
owned banks, with average spread between 100 basis points to 400 basis
points over the benchmark rate. The disadvantage, however, is that these
time deposit rates do not reect market interest rates. Likewise, the prac-
tice of rate di¬erentiation between small depositors and large institutional
depositors is discriminatory. Malaysia shows a transition in interest rate
126 Government Bond Market Development in Asia
I. Taxation
Among the particular incentives that ADCs provide for the devel-
opment of their bond markets are tax concessions, exemptions, holidays
and similar perks, especially to nonresident investors. Many ADCs have
observed that taxation policies have not been conducive to the devel-
Overview 127
K. Rating Agencies
own credit rating agencies between 1982 (Philippines) and 1999 (Sri
Lanka). Some have recently established second institutions.
L. Primary Market
M. Secondary Market
BOX 2
The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation
1. Primary Market
2. Secondary Market
3. Benchmarking
4. Hedging Instruments
5. Market Participants
7. Credit Rating
BOX 3
Bond Market Reforms in Singapore (19981999)
Reforms Implemented
Singapore Government Securities Market
Increased Singapore Government Securities (SGS) issues (1998/99)
Announced regular calendar of issues (July 1998)
Issued 10-year SGS (January 1999)
Statutory Board Bonds
Jurong Town Corporation bond issues (1998/99)
Housing and Development Board (HDB) bond issues (1999)
Land Transport Authority bond issues (1999)
MAS Notice 757Non-Internationalization of S$ (1998)
Allowed foreign entities to issue S$-denominated bonds (1998)
Allowed banks to transact S$ repo of up S$20 million with nonbank
nonresidents (1998)
Removed S$ repo limit
Allowed banks to transact S$ currency and interest rate swaps with
special purpose vehicles for securitizing mortgages
Central Provident Fund (CPF) Investment Scheme (1998)
Allowed CPF Unit Trusts to invest in high-grade bonds
Tax Incentives (1998/99)
Introduced tax incentives to encourage debt origination and trading of
debt securities in Singapore
16 nancial institutions accorded Approved Bond Intermediary status (1999)
Reforms to be Implemented
Promote Asset-Backed Securities market
Resolve legal and regulatory issues relating to asset-backed securities
HDB may issue mortgage-backed securities
Introduce regulatory guidelines for underwriters and dealers and trading
rules for debt securities
Develop e¹cient clearing system for corporate bonds
References
Country Papers
Other References