Chapter III

Socio-Political Condition of Mindanao

Mindanao is the second largest island (next to Luzon)

in the entire Philippine archipelago and home to three major

groups, referred to as the island’s tri-people: Lumads (18

distinct indigenous tribes); Bangsa Moro people(13 Islamized

Natives collectively referred to as Moros); and the Migrants

(at least 9 Christianized natives coming from either Luzon

or Visayas region). Based on the total population of 1995

census, the indigenous people (the Lumads) comprise 5

percent; the Islamized people (the Moros) 28.23 percent; and

the Christians settlers and their descendants 71.77 percent.

The Islamized natives composed of 13 ethno-linguistic

groups, namely: Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Sama, Yakan,

Palawanis, Pullon Mapun, Kalibugan, Molbug, Sangil, Badjao,

Kalagan and Iranun. They are clustered mostly in the

provinces of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM). The Lumads or the 18 indigenous ethnic groups are as

follows: Ata, Bagobo, Banwaon, B’laan, Bukidnon, Dibabawon,

Higaonon, Mamanwa, Mandaya, Manguwangan, Manobo, Mansaka,

Subanon, Tagakaolo, Tasaday, T’boli, Teduray, and Ubo.

 Mindanao’s picture is drawn along the line of conflicts

and violence. Even before, the island’s description is

somehow associated with intermittent hostility, struggle and

peace efforts. The complexity of the situation is so

challenging making it a concern not only among the

authorities but also by most of its constituents. Although

it is true that not all its inhabitants are involved in the

conflict, the intricacy of the issue makes it an imperative

to scrutinize so as to address the root causes of the

Mindanao problem that seemed to reinforce one another.

A. Roots of Moro Struggle

Prior to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines,

Mindanao’s history is engraved differently from the rest of

the country. Historians recognize the existence of two

different types of community throughout the archipelago long

before the wave of exploration reach the Philippine shores.

According to Jose V. Abueva as he describes the pre-Hispanic

Philippines:

Filipinos [in Luzon and Visayas] lived in

scattered barangays1, or communities…. Each Barangay
was independent social, economic, and political unit

1
The Barangay was the typical community in the entire archipelago. It was the basic independent
political and economic unit. The Barangay is a unit of government and consisting of between 30 to 100
families and a small territory. Each Barangay was independent and was headed by a chieftain called the rajah
or Datu. The chieftain had wide powers, for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the
executive, legislator, and the Judge; He was, naturally, the supreme commander in times of war .

20
 that was generally self-contained and economically
self-sufficient.2

He further went on as he quoted notes from Gowing and

McAmis:

…interbarangay and inter-island rivalry and

warfare were common; and…hostility often existed
between highland and lowland, inland and coastal
groups.3

Another notable historian Fr. Horacio dela Costa, as

quoted by Abueva again, noted that:

Those who see nothing in Spanish rule but

unrelieved evil might ponder on the fact that before
the coming of the Spaniards the Philippines was simply
a geographical expression; an archipelago; it was by
first becoming a colony that it became a nation.4

Subsequently, the islands that comprised Luzon and

Visayas at that time were not fully united until Spain able

to organize the entire archipelago into a country known as

Philippines today5. On the contrary, this came with

exemption to the Muslim tribes in Mindanao. These people

were already unified under the banner of Islam way back 13th

century. The Islamized natives were different from their

Filipino counterpart in Luzon and Visayas at that time since

they were governed and organized as one nation under the

Abueva, Jose V. Philippine Ideologies and National Development. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing
2

House,1971
Ibid., p. 25
3

Ibid.
4

Marohomsalic, Nasser A., Aristocrats of the Malay Race, A History of the BangsaMoro in the
5

Philippines, Quezon City Philippines., VJ Graphics Arts, Inc., p. 12, Abueva, P. 28

21
competent leadership of a Sultan or a government known

widely as Sultanate6. This claim was confirmed by Mindanao

historians like Robert D. McAmis and Peter G. Gowing as they

pointed out:

They [Moros7] had achieved the most developed and

cohesive political organizations (sultanate of Sulu
and Mindanao) of any group inhabiting the Islands at
that time.8

Nasser Marohomsalic author of the book “Aristocrats of

the Malay Race” cited Dean Worcester who also noted:

The Moros exemplify what may be considered the

highest stage of civilization to which the Malays have
attained.9

Primarily, the reason why the Moros were able to block

the growth of Christianity and consequently the territorial

expansion of Spain in southern section of the archipelago it

is because they already established one cohesive identity

oftentimes referred today as Bangsa Moro10 contrary to Luzon

Abueva
6

7
“Moro” is referred here as Muslim Filipinos. This is a term first coined by the Spanish who thought
the indigenous people of Mindanao resembled the “Moros” or Moors, their enemies from Mauritania and
Morocco. The American colonizers who succeeded the Spaniards and eventually subdued Philippine Muslims in
the early twentieth century by means of overwhelming force, continued the usage of "Moro" even though it
had become an epithet among Christian Filipinos, denoting savages and pirates. In a bold semantic shift,
Philippine Muslim separatists during the late 1960s appropriated the term "Moro" and transformed it into a
positive symbol of collective identity-- one that denominated the citizens of their newly imagined nation.
Peter G. Growing and Robert D. McAmis, the Muslim Filipinos: Their History, Society and
8

Contemporary Problems. ed. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974, Abueva, p. 25

Marohomsalic, p.14
9

10
This Bangsa Moro populace is composed of Maguindanao of Cotabato area, Maranao of the Lake
Lanao region and the Tausog of Sulu. Smaller groups include the Yakans of Basilan Island, the Samals of the
Tawi-Tawi island group in Sulu, the Iranuns of the Cotabato coast of Mindanao and the Palawini and Molbog
of Palawan Island. Others are JamaMapun, Kalagan, Kolibugan, Sangil, Badjao or Samal Laut, Muslim Subanun
in Zamboanga and Bukidnons.

22
and Visayas whose organization and political institution

were simple.11

After the American pacification campaign culminated and

the subsequent American tutelage is set in full gear, the

Philippine independence became inevitable by the period

1930’s. The Moros of Mindanao were alarmed for the proposed

plan to merge two nations with different culture, tradition

and religious-political structure. Efforts urging the

American government to re-examine the whole situation are

enforced but all in futile. Among the numerous petitions

expressed are the following: the 57 prominent Moro leaders

who oppose to be incorporated under the new Philippine

republic; June 9, 192112, Sulu Moros declared their

intention to remain part of the United States instead of

being annexed in the independent Philippine nation; and the

Dansalan Declaration of March 18, 1935 forwarded to the U.S.

Congress13. Adverse to their petitions, the territorial

demarcation of the Philippine sovereignty is sealed by the

virtue of treaty of Paris14. With the American apathy to

these pleas in addition to the formal establishment of

11
Majul, Cesar A. Muslims in the Philippines, UP Press, Quezon City, 1973. p. 6

12
Tan, Samuel Dr. (2000) Understanding the Mindanao Conflict: Mindanao at The Crossroad
(Cotabato City Peace and Development Forum) delivered on 20 July 2000
13
Marohomsalic, p. 31-32
14
Under the Treaty of Paris signed December 10, 1898 Spanish authorities ceded the Philippines to
the Americans for US$20 million and continued trade access. After approval by the United States Congress,
the treaty formally converted the status of the Philippines from the Spanish possession to an American colony .

23
transition government known as the Commonwealth under Manuel

L. Quezon in November 15, 1935, integration became certain.

As the Americans succeeded in incorporating Mindanao to

the mainstream Filipino community, there were several

educated Moros who were given chances in the bureaucracy

either in national or local arena. The influence of the

Sultanate was set aside as the central government refuse to

recognize the contribution of the Sultanate in the

consolidation of the Moroland, thus, effectively altering

the socio-political structure of Mindanao. This policy

reflected in the speech of Quezon as:

…The sultans have no more rights than the

humblest Moro and that under my administration the
humblest Moro will be given as much protection as any
datu under the law, and that his rights will be
recognized exactly as the rights of a datu will be,
and that every datu will have to comply with his
duties as citizen to same extent and in the manner
that the humblest Moro is obligated.15

Gradually, the prestige and political authority was

denied to the traditional leader and new set of politicians

emerge.16 Right after the liberation up to the period of

Speech of former president Manuel L. Quezon as quoted by Peter Gowing in his article “Mandate
15

in Moroland,” 178.
16
After the Japanese invasion and throughout the subsequent liberation of the Philippines, Muslims
and Christian in Mindanao for once were united as fighting brothers. Soon as war ended, prominent guerilla
leaders such as Salipada Pendatun was appointed Governor of Cotabato and Datu Manalao Mindalano to the
Executive Committee the Philippine Veterans’ Legion in Manila. In the 1946 elections, Salipada Pendatun won a
senate seat and Manalao Mindalano was elected congressmen for Lanao ,

24
1970’s shows a positive success for this merging for it was

the time Robert McAmis recalled as:

There were other sign that Muslim Filipinos were

beginning to wake up and trying to “catch up” with the
rest of the Philippines in the fields of education,
agriculture, economics, politics, and religious
renewal. These and many other factors led to the hope
that the 1970’s would be the period when all Muslims
Filipinos assumed full rights and duties as citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines and would make
possible contributions to the local, national and
international community.17

a. The Spark that Renewed the Conflict

The term “Mindanao Conflict” originated since the

Spanish authorities in Manila attempts to subjugate people

of Mindanao. These efforts are known to them as the campaign

of pacification. The term used by the Spanish government is

“Reconquista” which has a long narrative story of valor,

honor and justice exemplified thru a punishing raids set to

castigate a wrong doer in the past and brought their enemy

under Spanish brand of justice. In the contrary, for the

Bangsa Moro people, the Spaniards were infidels and a threat

to their establish religion. Fighting against the Spanish

conquistadores is a noble task and several among them die

zealously in the process. The American policy of

incorporating the Moroland to the mainstream Philippine

McAmis, Robert D., Muslim Filipinos: 1970-1972* The Muslim Filipinos: Their history society and
17

contemporary problems.

25
community and the succeeding government plan of encouraging

migrants (preferably from conflict stricken areas of Luzon

and Visayas) in settling territories of Mindanao is also

viewed as another pacification effort. Accordingly, Mindanao

was nicknamed “the land of Promise” to attract settlers for

this purpose. Again, for the Moros it is no less than

encroachment to their ancestral domain. With land grabbing

issues started to emerge it became their rallying sentiments

to collectively resent the government particularly the

Christian Manila.

While still in the process of recuperating with the ill

of the past, the veil of distrust once again clouded the

infant rapport established under the tutelage of the

Americans. The feeling of alienation haunted the Moro

people. Incidents like Jabiddah massacre18 made some Moros

worried about the governments’ less regards of their lives.

Charges to Marcos resulted to the reassertion of Moros’

disapproval to be assimilated to the Philippine territory.

Triggered by the manifesto of former governor in Cotabato

Datu Udtog Matalam19 (apparently, after he loses his re-

18
In March 1968, a mutiny on the island was reported where 14 Muslims were killed and 17 others
missing. The government never made the cause of the execution public. The testimony of the lone survivor,
Jibin Arola, made for a shocking and chilling revelation. It was claimed that “they were ordered shot because
they refused to follow orders to attack Sabah.” The military authorities sensing the negative impact of the
leakage of the clandestine plan decided to execute the recruits en masse so that no one could tell the story.
19
One of the most prominent Moro datu politicians and famed guerrilla leader against Japan founded
the Muslim (later Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM). With Cotabato as the core of the movement, Two
months after the alleged execution of the Moro recruits

26
election bid in 1970’s20). Although the overall response of

the Muslim populace was disinterested21 to his plea, fear

and anxiety struck the Christianized settlers. Reports of

Moro preparing for revolt and young Moro radicals undergoing

rigid training in Middle-East and neighboring country such

as Malaysia22 reach an alarming stage. Christian populations

responded in two different ways; some resolved to leave and

seek refuge in a safer place while others determine to hold

their ground by all means. This led to the creation of

Ilaga23 militia conceived “to protect the Christianized

settlers”, which of course later, this group grows into

lawless elements in Mindanao24. This polarization became one

of the reason why Martial Law was imposed hence contributed

further to the deteriorating condition and disparity in the

relationship between Christian and Muslim communities.

b. The MNLF, the MILF and the Evolution of the Peace

Process

The condition of Mindanao provides fertile ground for

the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to surface from an

Ibid.,
20

Ibid., p. 45, Marahomsalic, p. 156, The Nasserites who were trained in Egypt under the auspices of
21

Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser depicted from the PNP and AFP post after the Jabiddah Massacre issue”,
p. see ibid., 166, the top 90s were trained in Malaysia by Malay speaking foreigner , see also ibid.
Ibid., p. 46
22

23
Ilaga is a Visayan term for rat. This elements left trademark upon their victim. Most account
believed that Ilaga was an acronym stands for Ilongo/Ilocano Land Grabbers Association. Some Christian
political leaders began meeting together to take appropriate actions to what they perceived as a Moro
uprising. In September 1970, seven Christian Ilongo political leaders calling themselves “Christian datus”
organized the Ilaga Movement which was later led by Feliciano Luces better known as “Toothpick.”
Ibid.
24

27
underground movement and assume leadership over several

Muslim fronts. Attempts were initiated to heal the injury

but the scar is deep and efforts were constantly in vain.

The Philippines initiated several peace-making efforts to

address the Bangsa Moro problem. From 1976, Pres. Ferdinand

Marcos signed the Tripoli Agreement25 on December of that

year. In August 1989, Republic Act 6734 (Organic Act for the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) was signed into law by

Pres. Cory Aquino26. Pres. Fidel Ramos and MNLF Chairman Nur

Misuari signed the Final Agreement between the GRP and the

MNLF in September 2, 199627. Although prior to the signing,

a breakaway group exists already from the MNLF, the Moro

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed under the

leadership of Hashim Salamat28. The MILF refused to

25
Peace Treaty between the Philippine government and the MNLF. The agreement provided for
autonomy to be granted to 13 of the 23 provinces in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan islands. The autonomous
regional government would have its own executive, legislative and judicial branches, and a regional security
force independent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) ., Jubair, Salah BangsaMoro: A Nation Under
Endless Tyranny, SDN BHD Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (1999),p. 130

26
On November 19, 1989, a referendum was conducted in the proposed areas of regional autonomy
(as provided for in the Tripoli Agreement): 13 provinces and the nine cities in those provinces. Only four of
the provinces, and none of the cities, voted for inclusion.
27
It was signed on 2 September 1996. It provided for new institutions, led by the MNLF and
supported by the government, to oversee a major development effort in a Special Zone of Peace and
Development (SZOPAD) covering the territory stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement. The institutions – the
Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and its Consultative Assembly – would have
three years to make an impact. At the end of this period, the population of the SZOPAD would vote on a
proposal to establish an autonomous regional government with greater powers and a larger territory than the
existing four provinces ARMM. Ramos, Fidel V. (1996) Break not the Peace: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace
Negotiations 1992-1996, Friends of Steady Eddie.

28
Jubair, Salah BangsaMoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny, SDN BHD Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
(1999), p. 120

28
recognize the political settlement engrained in the GRP-MNLF

final Peace Agreement and continue to resist the government.

Estrada’s policy of “All-out war” against MILF was indeed a

setback while Arroyo’s administration was characterized by

inconsistent approach. Aquino’s pursues the talks and come

up with the Bangsa Moro Basic Law (now in the hands of the

Philippine Legislative department for further honing and

scrutinizing)

B. Communism and the Emergence of the Partido

Kumunista ng Pilipinas

The so called Mindanao Problem is never a monopoly by

the Moro separatist group. The island is also riddled with

another ideology-based insurgent, the CPP-NPA-NDF, and for

decades has attracted the attention of hundreds of peace

oriented organization all throughout the world. Although

this group originated in Luzon and with its nationwide

coverage, Mindanao became a hotbed of its armed struggle and

a springboard for their strategic protracted war. The

Partido Kumunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) as its forerunner was

formally set up on August 26, 1930 at the Templo del Trabajo

by mostly laborer associates. Later on by November of the

same year Crisanto Evangelista along with 60 members

officially proclaim its existence in Plaza Moriones Tondo,

29
labeled as the center of the “working class district” of

Manila. The Communist was drawn into action when they

organized an armed wing HUKBALAHAP in defense against the

advancing Japanese Imperial Army on the onset of World War

II. After the Philippine liberation culminated with the

surrender of Japan the PKP renamed Hukbalahap as Hukbong

Magpapalaya ng Bayan or HUKS and envisioned delivering the

country to genuine independence from their perceived

American imperialism.

a. The Rebirth of Communism by the CPP-NPA

The PKP led by the Lavas suffered a tremendous defeat due

to their ill-planned of early seizure of power and the

single line policy described as self liquidation policy.

Hence, the need to reestablish a communist party had become

critical by the mid-sixties.29 The Partido Komunista ng

Pilipinas (Communist Party of the Philippines), according to

Sison, failed for more than 30 years to provide strategic

theoretical and political guidance, it had degenerated as a

revolutionary party.30 In 1955, the Communist Party begun to

preach “the parliamentary road to socialism”31 abandoning

the fundamental Leninist principles on the utilizing

Guerrero, Amado. Philippine Society and Revolution. access [April 10, 2015] Available at
29

http://www.philippinerevolution.net/documents/philippine-society-and-revolution
Ibid.
30

Ibid
31

30
violence as a tool for the destruction of the bourgeois

state machine.32 As a result the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng

Bayan or Huks was disintegrated, as the former “people’s

army”, into a number of roving rebel bands specializing in

extortion and protection rackets in the red-light districts

surrounding U.S. military bases in Luzon.33 Marcos’ crack-

down response that eventually led to the declaration of

Martial Law favorably affects the NPA’s recruitment drive in

the 70’s. Despite the eventual capture of Jose Maria Sison

and Bernabe Buscayno in 1976-1977 the Communist organization

continuously expands its influences.34 By 1986 a new

political landscape transforms the Philippine society due to

EDSA revolution that catapulted Corazon C. Aquino into

power.35 Despite peace-talks, released of Political prisoner

and the declaration of cease fire with the insurgents, their

fanaticism to eventually grab the political power set the

whole things complicated. From an initial strength of 95

fighters at its onset, the New People’s Army (NPA) reached

an all-time high of over 25,000 NPA regulars deployed in 66

guerrilla fronts by the time of the peace talks in 1987.

From 1987 down to 1991 Military’s Oplan Lambat Bitag takes

Ibid.
32

Ibid.
33

Santos, Paz Verdades M. The Communist Front: Protracted People’s War and Counter-insurgency in
34

the Philippines (Overview), p. 21

Ibid., p. 21
35

31
its toll on the NPA’s membership reducing their peak

strength to 14,800 militias.36 The NPA used to be active in

20% of 41,818 barangays (village units) nation-wide with a

total mass base at that time of over 2 million people. The

remarkable growth of its strength and number was made

possible due to socio-economic and political issues

observable in the Philippine settings even up to now.

Recently, in irreversible decline as what the Armed Forces

of the Philippines describe, the NPA suffers external and

internal constraints with its 46 years of existence.

As of 1st semester 2010, the NPA was estimated to have

less than 5,000 fighters and firearms, wielding varying

degrees of influence in about 2.4% of the total barangays

nationwide.37 Their strategy almost unswerving; they draws

strength from the populace in line with the spirit of Mao

Tse Tung’s thought; mass base comes from communities

radicalized using both real and perceived inequities in

society.38 Kumander Ramil explained to the researcher how

this relationship made possible, he explicates that prior to

the establishment of a guerilla front in a remote community

a psychological/political unit of the NPA, the Sandatahang

Ibid., p. 21
36

Internal Peace and Security Plan: Oplan Bayanihan. access on [4/27/2015] Available at
37

http://www.army.mil.ph/ATR_Website/pdf_files/IPSP/IPSP%20Bayanihan.pdf
Ibid
38

32
Yunit Pampropaganda or SYP39, shall lay down the necessary

mass support base for the Sandatahang Regular or SR unit.

With this, the NPA gains access to safe havens, intelligence

information and a pool of recruits and resources.40 Each

guerilla unit has the ability to arouse, organize, and

mobilize communities, conduct ideological, political, and

organizational works, launch tactical offensives and acquire

resources through revolutionary tax levied to the people.

b. Talks with the NDF

Compare to the Moro secessionist movement the communist

insurgency is described as low-intensity conflict due to its

sporadic activities. Yet, for some reason, the Armed Forces

of the Philippines (AFP)

held them constantly on top

among the ideology-based

threat to the integrity and

security of the country.

(Note: CTM stand for

Communist Terrorist

Movement otherwise known in

this research as NPA or the Figure 2 Proportion of violent incidents by group from January
2005 to August 2008.
Source: http://portal.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/Conflict%20Mapping%20in%20Mindanao.pdf

39
Composed of 8-15 highly mobile propaganda unit specialized in opening up new areas and
expanding existing ones in guerilla zones.
ibid
40

33
armed wing of the CPP) This was reflected in its Internal

Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) dubbed as “Oplan Bayanihan”

under the Aquino administration.41

The National Democratic Front (NDF) emerged in 1973

served as an umbrella organization encompassing other

communist-inspired groups. Its role is to provide the CPP

with its necessary legal support and procurement of

substantial logistics essential for the war. Since 1986 the

NDF continuously represents the CPP-NPA on the negotiating

table. For more than 25 years that the NDF negotiates in

behalf of the CPP-NPA yet up till now no substantive

settlements achieved.42 As noted earlier, the CPP-NPA-NDF

suffers an internal drawback. Several of its core and

experienced cadre already lost the confidence of the CPP

leadership43. The NPA as its armed group split into two

owing to ideological differences and internal purges that

takes its toll on their number. The CPP leadership of Jose

Maria Sison known as Re-Affirmist (RA) adheres to the

Ibid., A Survey Mapping the Conflict in Mindanao: 1 st January 2005-20th August 2008, Technical
41

Assistance to the Mindanao Health Sector Policy Support Programme. Report to the Delegation of the
European Commission in the Philippines. p. 52, the survey indicated that from January 2005 to August 2008
there were 1,235 officially reported conflict related violent incidents in Mindanao. The Communist Terrorist
Movement (CTM) appear to have initiated 69.47% (n=858) of the incidents, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) 20.40% (n=252), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF ‐MBG) 2.43% (n=30) and the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) 7.69% (n=95) MNLF) 2.43 % (n=30)., accessed [9/31/2015] available at
http://portal.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/Conflict%20Mapping%20in%20Mindanao.pdf
Crisis, p. 26
42

Talks and Tactics, P 6, the politburo boycott decision on the snap election of 1986 described as
43

major tactical blunder made many regional units question the wisdom and authority of the party leadership.
Criticism ranged from the bias of the party against the middle class to refuting the orthodoxy of the
Philippines being a “semi-colonial and semi-feudal”.

34
continuation of the revolution and securing the political

power by means of violent struggle. RA maintained:

“Negotiations are tactics to be pursued alongside

the “protracted people’s war”, not a replacement for
the latter.44

From 1992 up to the present they incessantly wage the

“people’s protracted war” against succeeding Philippine

administration alongside with intermittent peace

negotiations: Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), Joseph Estrada (1998-

2001), Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010) and current

administration of Benigno S. Aquino Jr. (2010-2016).45

Repetitively, skepticism and lack of sincerity spoil both

sides, except under Ramos administration wherein Joint

Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) was

signed in 1995 to ensure the safety of NDFPs panel’s various

negotiators.46 By 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on the

Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

(CARHRIHL) was signed as a confidence building measure and

litmus test of sincerity. The Rejectionists (composed of

either expelled or those who resigned from the party), on

the other way around, are pursuing a different thrust. Some

formed owned parties, continued the armed struggle in their

owned territories, invest in peace negotiation and

Tactics, p.26
44

45
Ibid
Ibid
46

35
parliamentary struggle, people’s organization, cooperatives

and legal means of struggle for reform.47

47
Santos, p.22

36