Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                

733-Article Text-728-1-10-20100323 PDF

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 15

Holdcroft/WHAT IS RELIGIOSITY?

89

REVIEW OF RESEARCH

WHAT IS RELIGIOSITY?
BARBARA HOLDCROFT
The University of Toledo
Lourdes College

RELIGIOSITY

R eligiosity is a complex concept and difficult to define for at least two


reasons. The first reason is the uncertainty and imprecise nature of the
English language. Colloquially, in Roget’s Thesaurus (Lewis, 1978), religios-
ity is found to be synonymous with such terms as religiousness, orthodoxy,
faith, belief, piousness, devotion, and holiness. These synonyms reflect what
studies of religiosity would term as dimensions of religiosity, rather than
terms that are equivalent to religiosity.
A second reason for this complexity is that current interest in the con-
cept of religiosity crosses several academic disciplines, each approaching
religiosity from different vantage points, and few consulting one another
(Cardwell, 1980; Demerath & Hammond, 1969). For example, a theologian
would address religiosity from the viewpoint of faith (Groome & Corso,
1999), while religious educators could focus on orthodoxy and belief
(Groome, 1998). Psychologists might choose to address the dimensions of
devotion, holiness, and piousness, whereas sociologists would consider the
concept of religiosity to include church membership, church attendance,
belief acceptance, doctrinal knowledge, and living the faith (Cardwell,
1980). This use of different terms across academic disciplines to identify
what could be thought of as like dimensions of religiosity makes it difficult
to discuss without an explicit definition from the viewpoint of religious edu-
cation and the application of that knowledge to the lived experience.

DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOSITY
Glock and Stark (1965) have been influential in defining religious orienta-
tions, origins, and dimensions. In doing so, Glock and Stark identified five
dimensions of religiosity: experiential, ritualistic, ideological, intellectual,
and consequential. The experiential dimension focuses on the personal faith
experience, perhaps a transcendent encounter, while the ritualistic domain
involves the worship experience that is involved in community. The ideolog-
ical dimension is “constituted by expectations that the religious will hold to
Catholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice, Vol. 10, No. 1, September 2006,
89-103 © 2006 Catholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice
90 Catholic Education/September 2006

certain beliefs” (i.e., professed doctrines), and the intellectual dimension


“has to do with the expectation that the religious person will be informed and
knowledgeable about the basic tenets of his faith and sacred scriptures” (i.e.,
history, sacraments, morality; p. 20). Glock and Stark admitted that these lat-
ter two dimensions are closely related, “since knowledge of a belief is a nec-
essary condition for its acceptance” (pp. 20-21). However, they also
acknowledged that belief does not necessarily flow from knowledge, nor
does all religious knowledge accompany belief.
Fukuyama (1960) examined four dimensions of religiosity that he iden-
tified as cognitive, cultic, creedal, and devotional, which are summarized in
Cardwell (1980):

The cognitive dimension is concerned with what individuals know about religion,
i.e., religious knowledge. The cultic dimension makes reference to the individ-
ual’s religious practices, i.e., ritualistic behavior. The creedal dimension is con-
cerned with a personal religious belief, and the devotional dimension refers to a
person’s religious feelings and experiences, i.e., the experiential dimension. (p. 6)

Once again, it is possible to exemplify religiosity through religious knowl-


edge but still be lacking in the other three dimensions: cultic, creedal, and
devotional. And again, acquisition of one dimension of religiosity, perhaps
the cultic dimension, does not guarantee the acquisition of any of the others.
As with Glock and Stark (1965), religiosity in one dimension does not nec-
essarily flow into all dimensions of religiosity.
Allport and Ross (1967) identified two basic dimensions of religiosity:
extrinsic and intrinsic. They interpreted extrinsic religiosity as a self-serving
and utilitarian outlook on religion that provides the believer with comfort in
salvation. These individuals are disposed to use religion for their own ends,
such as status, sociability, and self-justification, and often selectively shape
a creed to fit their own ends. A person with intrinsic religiosity is one who
internalizes the total creed of his or her faith and moves beyond mere church
attendance. These individuals find their master motive for life in religion,
and their other needs are brought into harmony with their religious beliefs:
“The extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsical-
ly motivated person lives his religion” (p. 434). Again, this finding is simi-
lar to previously reported research.
Lenski (1963) identified four different ways in which religiosity might
be expressed: associational, communal, doctrinal, and devotional. In agree-
ment with Glock and Stark (1965), Lenski felt that it is possible to be reli-
gious in one way without being religious in other ways and found data to
support this claim. A person could be highly visible within a church commu-
nity but not truly accept its doctrines; or one could be extremely devotional
Holdcroft/WHAT IS RELIGIOSITY? 91

in private. A religious person may not allow some dimensions of religiosity


to invade daily life; a person may know or believe, but not live accordingly.
Attempting to describe the broadest range of religiosity, Bergan and
McConatha (2000) defined religiosity as a number of dimensions associated
with religious beliefs and involvement. In arriving at this definition, they
pointed out that early research associated with religiosity focuses primarily
on the unidimensional concept of religious attendance. These researchers
noted that reliance on religious attendance alone as a measure of religiosity
could lead to incorrect conclusions, especially in studies with older adults for
whom attendance might pose a physical problem. For this population, the
aspects or dimensions of religiosity, such as private devotions and religious
belief systems, may serve as more accurate measures of religiosity (Ellison,
1991; Ellison, Gay, & Glass, 1989; Kristensen, Pedersen, & Williams, 2001).
Other recent studies of religiosity stressed a multidimensional focus of
religiosity that encompassed such concepts as the subjective, cognitive,
behavioral, social, and cultural dimensions (Chumbler, 1996; Ellison, 1991;
Ellison et al., 1989). Aspects of religiosity such as private devotion are also
accepted as important, going beyond the emphasis merely on church atten-
dance. Interest in the measurement of religiosity has led to an exploration of
the relationship among multiple dimensions of religiosity. Ellison et al.
(1989) examined three dimensions of religiosity: private devotion, religious
attendance, and denominational connection. Ellison’s later study (1991)
expanded on and examined four dimensions of religiosity: denominational
ties, social integration, personal sense of the divine, and existential certainty.
Similarities exist in the dimensions of cognitive and intellectual; com-
munal is similar to denominational ties and religious attendance; social inte-
gration is similar to the dimensions of intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity. Many
researchers placed an emphasis on the dimension of religiosity that deals
with religious knowledge (Chumbler, 1996; Fukuyama, 1960; Glock &
Stark, 1965; Lenski, 1963), while only a few focused on the application of
that knowledge (Allport & Ross, 1967; Ellison, 1991).
There has been disagreement regarding the importance of this link
between the cognitive dimension of religiosity and behavior. Beit-Hallahmi
and Argyle (1997) wrote

religious knowledge, that is, the knowledge of a religion’s scripture and tradi-
tion, is not considered a good measure of religiosity, simply because the major-
ity of believers surveyed, in Western countries at least, seem to be quite ignorant
of what are considered basic elements of (their own) religious tradition. (p. 109)

Conversely, Stark and Glock (1968) wrote, “it is obvious that some min-
92 Catholic Education/September 2006

imum knowledge is necessary for religious commitment; the tenets and ritu-
als of a religion must be known if they are to be believed and practiced” (p.
141). Many authors (Allport & Ross, 1967; Cardwell, 1980; Glock & Stark,
1965) agreed that beliefs and religious participation can be practiced in vir-
tual ignorance, yet they also acknowledged that all religious institutions
expect their members to know doctrine, to participate in ritual, and to have
comprehension of both.

MEASUREMENT OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE


Because the term religiosity is widely used, but difficult to define in a man-
ner that is agreed upon by all researchers, there is a wide variety of measure-
ment tools being developed to examine the individual dimensions of religios-
ity. Approaching religiosity from different academic disciplines affects both
the focus and the content of the measurement tool.

Intellectual Dimension/Orthodoxy
The intellectual dimension of religiosity involves the expectation that the reli-
gious person will be informed about the chosen faith; the measurement of this
dimension would be with a test of faith knowledge. For example, Glock and
Stark (1965) suggested that religious literacy tests be constructed that would
include a wide range of questions on the origin and history of the religion.
The intent of Glock and Stark was to assess a view of Christianity over many
different religious traditions using a four-question measure of religious
knowledge designed and administered to adults that covered the basic knowl-
edge of the Ten Commandments, Scripture, and Old Testament prophets.

Extrinsic/Intrinsic Dimension
Approaching religiosity from the lived perspective, Allport and Ross (1967)
originally designed the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS), which was com-
posed of an 11-item extrinsic scale to measure the extent to which individ-
uals use their religion for their own ends and a nine-item intrinsic scale to
measure the extent to which individuals live their religion. Batson and
Ventis (1982) revised the ROS measure by adding a third dimension, one of
quest, which measures the degree to which an individual’s religion involves
an open-ended responsive dialogue with six items. A revised 12-item meas-
ure has been produced by Batson and Schoenrade (1991) and the authors
have now developed four new questionnaire scales that combine versions of
the above three with an orthodoxy scale (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis,
1993) to measure what they now term means, ends, and quest dimensions
of religiosity.
Holdcroft/WHAT IS RELIGIOSITY? 93

CONSEQUENCES OF RELIGIOSITY
The positive effects of religiosity, in both the social and educational realms,
are attracting the attention of many researchers. The application of a variety
of the dimensions of religiosity to specific situations in everyday life is the
subject of much research. Bergan and McConatha’s (2000) study of adoles-
cents, young adults, and adults in later life, demonstrated a small positive
relation between religiosity and happiness across all three age groups:
“Overall, the results of studies examining religiosity and life satisfaction
generally indicate that people who express stronger religious faith and
involvement also report fewer stressful life events and greater life satisfac-
tion” (p. 25). Religious affiliation was found to be a significant predictor of
general life satisfaction and a sense of belonging and purpose in life, as is
indicated in a number of studies, including recent studies regarding the ben-
efits of religiosity by Dezutter, Soenens, and Hutsebaut (2006), Walker
(2003), and Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, Corveleyn, and Hutsebaut (2005).
Religiosity affects not only specific demographic groups, but individu-
als as well. Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997) wrote extensively about the
individual effects of religiosity, which include: developing a sense of com-
passion, honesty, and altruism as well as happiness and quality of life, health,
and mental health. Walker (2003) analyzed extensive research which
involved many aspects of the intersecting of religion and morality, conclud-
ing that the religious experience is important in moral functioning. A study
by Roccas (2005) concluded that there is a high correlation between religios-
ity and values.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION OF


RELIGIOSITY TO BEHAVIOR
By measuring altruism and empathy, several researchers (Batson et al., 1993;
Watson, Hood, Morris, & Hall, 1984) found a link between religiosity and
behavior. A study investigating volunteerism among adults, measured in a
Gallup poll, found that 46% of “highly spiritual” people were committed to
working with the poor (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997). A study among 142
high school students (Hardy & Carlo, 2005) identified religiosity as a signif-
icant predictor of kindness, as well as anonymous and altruistic prosocial
behavior. They based their research on recent advances in which multiple
types of prosocial behavior have been identified: compliant, public, anony-
mous, dire, emotional, and altruistic.
Focusing on the cognitive dimension of religiosity, a study by Dezutter
et al. (2006) found that religious orientation and social-cognitive approach-
es to religion were significantly related to well-being. A review of the effect
94 Catholic Education/September 2006

of formal religious training on moral development in Beit-Hallahmi and


Argyle (1997) referred to a study by Kedem and Cohen (1987), which found
positive effects of formal religious education at school, especially for older
children. However, Rest (1986) chronicled conflicting evidence regarding
the link between moral behavior and moral judgment resulting from moral
education. In outlining the conflicting results of several studies, Rest wrote
that the “impact of formal religious education depends on the quality of that
education” and that the “success of religious education programs in promot-
ing moral judgment development is perhaps best understood as an interplay
of the educational environment and student characteristics” (p. 57). Rest
found that “religious education shows an unclear, mixed relationship; and
religious knowledge tends to correlate significantly with moral reasoning,
but both may be related in part to cognitive ability” (p. 130).

MORAL DEVELOPMENT
Recently, there has been a focus on moral development in particular within
the context of the school environment. An increase in social problems with
school-aged youth since the mid-1950s has resulted in demands that schools
address moral issues and assume the responsibility of instilling a commit-
ment to basic social values. Such values as honesty, hard work, and social
responsibility are being identified as traditional values that should be advo-
cated.
Current approaches to moral education tend to focus on different aspects
of social and moral functioning based on differing theories of moral devel-
opment and socialization. “Socialization refers to the development process
through which individuals learn” sociomoral values and acquire the knowl-
edge and skills necessary to function effectively and meet their own needs
within the social community (Battistich, Schaps, Solomon, & Watson, 1991,
p. 94).
One method for assessing the effectiveness of moral education involves
the application of moral judgment or moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1969)
revised and extended Piaget’s theory of developmental stages by providing a
detailed outline of moral development describing a sequence of distinct
stages of cognitive organization. Through the use of an interview instrument
that offered hypothetical situations, Kohlberg determined that an individual’s
moral orientation progresses from one that operates in conformity with
authority, through one of identification with the norms of society, to moral-
ity in which the individual holds to, and acts upon, self-chosen and abstract
principles of justice. These principles of personal justice may or may not be
formed by knowledge of one’s faith or the cognitive dimension of religiosi-
ty. Kohlberg posited that the goal of moral education is not only the acquisi-
Holdcroft/WHAT IS RELIGIOSITY? 95

tion of the cognitive knowledge of a faith tradition, but also the stimulation
of the natural development of the individual child’s own moral judgment
capacities allowing him or her to use moral judgment to control his or her
behavior (Kohlberg, 1981).

PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
The behavioral goal of school programs that foster sociomoral development
is behavior that is commonly termed prosocial (Solomon, Watson, Schaps,
Battistich, & Solomon, 1990), which includes helping, sharing, and other
seemingly intentional and voluntary positive behaviors for which the motive
is unspecified, unknown, or not altruistic (Eisenberg, 1982). The common
foundation of these behaviors is that an individual’s actions are oriented
toward protection, maintenance, or enhancement of well being of an external
social object.
Interest in the development and maintenance of prosocial behaviors
“increased dramatically in the 1960s and early 1970s” (Eisenberg, 1982, p.
2) and continues to expand, indicating an increasing interest in prosocial
behavior, its study, and methodologies. The literature focuses on the roots
and determinants of prosocial thought and behavior, the “emergence of
prosocial behaviors in childhood” (p. 3).
Current educators approach prosocial behavior from different theoretical
perspectives (Battistich, Watson, Solomon, Schaps, & Solomon, 1991).
Philosophers, such as Aristotle (Frankena, 1965) and Kant (1959), have
taken the position that in order for behavior to be classified as moral it must
be motivated by rational cognitions that are related to duty and responsibili-
ty. Other philosophers argued for an affective as well as a cognitive basis for
moral actions (Blum, 1980). Yet another major theory is rooted in social
learning theory and emphasizes overt and observable behavior. Current
researchers have increasingly examined the relation between the cognitive
and the behavioral domains of morality, developing prosocial behavior
(Eisenberg, 1987).
Efforts to outline the factors involved in the acquisition of prosocial
behavior were studied by Eisenberg (1987). Such factors include: the inter-
nalization of humanistic values and patterns of prosocial behavior; model-
ing; and moral reasoning. She wrote of the interrelatedness of these factors,
stating that “socialization experiences undoubtedly affect cognitive func-
tions” and that the cognitive factors “undoubtedly influence the child’s reac-
tions to socialization experiences” (p. 34). More recently, Eisenberg (2004)
examined the input of genetic inheritance as well as the family environment
in the development of prosocial behavior.
96 Catholic Education/September 2006

LEARNING PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORAL


DEVELOPMENT
Much is written regarding the conceptualization and socialization of proso-
cial behavior within the larger context of moral development (Eisenberg,
1982, 2004; Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002). Approaches to moral development
are of great interest in contemporary education, as attempts are made to
develop methods of moral learning that will produce positive behavioral out-
comes (i.e., prosocial behavior). Research centers around which method of
moral development will lead to prosocial behavior, particularly in the ele-
mentary school setting.
Internalization of social norms and values is often labeled as sociomoral
development. Since sociomoral development has become a major area of
theoretical interest during the last 20 years, there is a focus on creating a
more comprehensive model of moral education that can guide education in
these areas. Two general models have developed: the societal-transmission
perspective (Bandura, 1977; Durkheim, 1925/1961; Freud, 1923/1976) and
the self-construction model (Kohlberg, 1969, 1976; Piaget, 1932/1965).
The societal-transmission proponents see socialization as a unilateral
process in which adults pass on the values and norms of society in an attempt
to shape children’s behavior. Many theories of socialization are based on the
societal-transmission model of sociomoral development, including
Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory and Freud’s (1923/1976) psychoan-
alytic theory as well as Durkheim’s (1925/1961) sociological theory of social
integration. The societal-transmission point of view focuses on socialization
as a unilateral process in which adults communicate societal norms and val-
ues to children, thereby shaping their behavior through instruction. This is a
precursor to formal classroom moral education.
The self-construction proponents favor the concept that sociomoral
development is achieved through interaction in which the student develops a
commitment to social norms through experience (Battistich, Schaps, et al.,
1991). The self-construction model is associated with cognitive developmen-
tal theory (Kohlberg, 1969, 1976; Piaget, 1932/1965). Sociomoral values are
actively constructed by the individual through interaction with others and
through participation in social groups. According to Piaget, a definition of
socialization emphasizes the child’s developing awareness of the conditions
that lead to cooperation with peers. Through this interaction in problem solv-
ing and negotiation, the child comes to realize that the values for operating
in society are motivated by mutual respect and working for the benefits of
all. “With advances in social cooperation and the corresponding operatory
progress, the child arrives at new moral relationships based on mutual
respect which lead to a certain autonomy” (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 127).
Holdcroft/WHAT IS RELIGIOSITY? 97

The contemporary contention is that neither model is complete in its own


right, and that neither offers a complete account of the processes that accom-
pany sociomoral development. Some of the noted theorists (Bandura, 1977;
Kohlberg, 1969) recognized the interdependence of both traditions and the
interconnectedness of the individual and the group in this development.
Researchers (Gibbs & Schnell, 1985; Rest, 1986) saw the complementary
perspectives of the societal-transmission and self-construction models.

THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL: PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR


THROUGH MORAL EDUCATION
Eisenberg (1987) wrote that “American educators have traditionally claimed
that ‘moral education’ is one of their primary objectives” but that current
teaching of morality in schools has been restricted to preaching on virtues (p.
97). Eisenberg lamented the fact that for years there were very few “concert-
ed efforts to integrate prosocial values, ideals, and behaviors into the curricu-
lum in American elementary schools” (p. 98).
The purely cognitive emphasis of education during the 1950s fostered a
strong emphasis on academic achievement. The social climate from the
1950s to the 1970s “was one of increasing concern for the rights of the indi-
vidual and a declining emphasis on obligations to the community, and these
social trends were reflected in educational practice” (Battistich, Schaps, et
al., 1991, p. 93). The school setting switched from one of shaping character
and developing traditional values to one of promoting personal growth.
Criticism of that educational system has led to calls for reform and demands
are being voiced for the school system to once again address moral and
social issues.
Current theory in education has led to a return to advocacy of tradition-
al values. The last 15 years have witnessed a focus on moral development, in
particular within the context of the school environment (Battistich, Schaps,
et al., 1991). Boyatzis (2005) chronicled a “conspicuous surge” of interest in
research on child development and religion, explaining how this trend
“exploded in the 1990’s” (p. 124) and continues through the present day. An
increase in social problems with school-aged youth since the mid-1950s has
resulted in demands that the schools address moral issues and assume the
responsibility of instilling a commitment to basic social values. Such values
as honesty, hard work, and social responsibility are being identified as tradi-
tional values that should be advocated.
Contemporary approaches to moral education tend to focus on different
aspects of social and moral functioning based on differing theories of moral
development and socialization. “Socialization refers to the developmental
process through which individuals learn” sociomoral values and acquire the
98 Catholic Education/September 2006

knowledge and skills necessary to function effectively and meet their own
needs within the social community (Battistich, Schaps, et al., 1991, p. 94).
This socialization process is facilitated by providing the students with oppor-
tunities to experience positive relationships, and to develop the skills and
knowledge to function competently in school and in the larger society.
Battistich, Schaps, Solomon, and Watson (1991) felt that socialization
“is a constructivist process of active accommodation to the social environ-
ment that is pursued by the child in order to become increasingly
autonomous and effective” (p. 98). This suggests that schools can best devel-
op sociomoral values when they provide students with opportunities to expe-
rience positive relationships with adults and peers while they develop the
knowledge and skills necessary to function in the school and societal envi-
ronment.

If children are intrinsically motivated to establish and maintain attachments to


others, and if adherence to the norms and values of the group is instrumental to
social adaptation, they will naturally come to accept and adopt as their own the
norms and values of those with whom they are attached. (p. 99)

The role of the teacher is to be a socializing agent by providing a supportive


environment within the educational setting. In general, the implications for
education and sociomoral development center on a model of the ideal school
environment as a caring community that is characterized by a clear commit-
ment to fundamental prosocial values. Eisenberg wrote, “the weight of the
evidence clearly indicates that children are likely to imitate the altruistic
actions of models they observe and thus enhance their own prosocial behav-
ior” (1987, p. 69). Thus, the implications of the research on moral develop-
ment point to the conclusion that many factors are involved in acquiring
morality and that could lead to prosocial behavior.
Since the early 1970s, Rest (1986) has described a number of education-
al programs and interventions aimed at developing moral values or moral
development in the school setting. Although some of the studies reported a
level of success, the duration of all of the interventions was too short to effect
a permanent change in individual lifestyle. These studies ranged from 32
hours to the length of a semester, with ages ranging from elementary school
through graduate programs. The net result is that these studies have produced
meager or conflicting results. Rest indicates that no “studies have demon-
strated directly that changes wrought by these moral education programs
have brought about changes in behavior” (p. 131). Each of the programs
described in the meta-analysis may have been effective within a small setting
for a short period of time.
Holdcroft/WHAT IS RELIGIOSITY? 99

A recent study by Ji (2004) examined the association between religiosi-


ty and moral development. The results showed that education does play a role
in shaping that relationship and that intrinsic religiosity is an important pre-
dictor of moral reasoning.
Although the general conclusion is that religiosity leads to good conse-
quences in life, few studies find a correlation between the cognitive dimen-
sion of religiosity and prosocial behavior, or the connection between knowl-
edge and moral behavior.

PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR THROUGH AFFECTIVE


EDUCATION
Walker and associates (Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1999) are con-
cerned with what they call “gappiness,” or the fact that moral action does not
always flow from moral thought and that morality has both intrapersonal and
interpersonal components. Eisenberg was also concerned with the relation-
ship between moral judgment and moral conduct, opining that although they
are associated, “there is not a one-to-one correspondence between them. An
individual with mature sophisticated concepts and judgments about moral
issues may or may not ordinarily behave in prosocial ways” (Eisenberg &
Mussen, 1989, p. 6).
Contemporary educators have become increasingly aware of the impor-
tance of providing students with educational opportunities that develop char-
acteristics and skills in the cognitive, and behavioral aspects of moral judg-
ment, as well as the affective domain (Graczyk et al., 2000). Today’s schools
are the setting in which affective education is advanced and promoted in an
effort to go beyond the quest for purely academic achievement. It is within the
school setting that opportunities for students to develop, practice, and receive
recognition for emotionally appropriate and socially competent behaviors can
be addressed and nurtured. By educating children in how to cope with stress-
ful situations and assisting children in feeling that they are in control of their
emotions and actions, children develop skills that will be useful for a lifetime,
including increased social and academic competence. “Effective efforts to
address students’ social and emotional needs can promote academic perform-
ance and citizenship, and decrease the likelihood that students will engage in
maladaptive and risky behaviors such as violence, substance use, and early
and unprotected sexual activities” (Graczyk et al., p. 391). This educational
process takes place within a positive environment, an affective school setting,
where students’ emotional education is a part of the curriculum.
Educators are in a position in which they are faced with a variety of the-
oretical perspectives and programs that claim to reintroduce sociomoral
learning to the classroom in an effort to foster prosocial behavior. Although
100 Catholic Education/September 2006

the goal is similar—the socially and emotionally balanced student who will
be an asset to society—the focus of each program is slightly different, each
built on a slightly different foundation. Some approach this goal from the
direction of values and morals, while others focus on the end point of a spe-
cific behavior, prosocial behavior.

THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: MORAL


EDUCATION + AFFECTIVE EDUCATION
The goal of religious education is to produce religious persons who are capa-
ble of acting in Christian (prosocial) ways in everyday life (Groome, 1998).
The General Directory for Catechesis (GDC) states that “the aim of catechet-
ical activity consists in precisely this: to encourage a living, explicit and
fruitful profession of faith” (Congregation for the Clergy, 1997, §66). While
the goal remains to teach people a sound knowledge of their faith, “knowl-
edge alone is not enough: our primary intent is that people choose to live
it….We must explicitly invite people—as part of the curriculum—to make
choices that are Christian, encouraging them to practice their faith” (Groome
& Corso, 1999, p. 13). The goal of religious education is to combine moral
education with affective education, through religious education (i.e., the
study of faith values) in an attempt to produce Christian behavior.
Many of the aspects of the programs and projects described earlier
reflect the goals and structure of religious education. A basic component of
education that takes place within a religious setting is the development of
values and norms that mirror the tenets of the faith, most significantly,
prosocial behaviors. The goal is to “create an environment that promotes the
nurturing of the faith and its practice” offering samples of community build-
ing activities for the students: senior citizen pen pal, clothing collection,
nursing home visits, community service projects (Schuttloffel, 2000, p. 112).
Creation of this vital Christian community marked by “the observance of
Jesus’ new commandment to love each other as he has loved us is not an
optional or unimportant part of the Catholic school, but central to its pur-
pose” (Hoffman, 1985, p. 3). Further, a central theme of religious education
is that it occurs within the context of a caring community that stresses the
value, worth, and potential of each individual student. Catholic education is
focused on the development of social skills that reflect moral values in a
Christian faith community (Groome, 1980).
The cognitive dimension of religiosity, religious education, is “not just
one aspect of education but is the binding force in education and is central
to the educational process as a whole” (Sealey, 1985, p. 41). Sealey writes
that this is so because a sense of religious understanding provides an insight
into every other way of thinking. This religious foundation becomes a vehi-
Holdcroft/WHAT IS RELIGIOSITY? 101

cle of communication within the location of living that spiritual dimension,


and involves the overt teaching and strengthening of the Christian faith
through inculcating doctrine and a way of life.
Groome (1998) wrote that religious education in the Catholic school pro-
vides communities that prepare students to be citizens who care for the com-
mon good. Their faith identity, being committed to the reign of God in the
world, leads to their ability to function as one who has a social commitment
enlivened by faith. Groome also outlined aspects of religious education that
encompass the relational aspect of the faith, the affective dimension, the
behavioral dimension, the lifelong process as well as the cognitive dimension
involved in believing. Hyde (1990) described religious education as “gaining
information and, to some extent, understanding Christian discourse” (p. 361).
Hyde also posited that “adequate religious learning in childhood arises only
from the spontaneous religion which children create for themselves out of
religious material which they are taught, and only by their own religious activ-
ity can full religious understanding be achieved” (p. 364).
The religious school has always been involved in the internalization of
norms and values, that being its purpose from the outset (Lee, 1985). By
developing a community setting in which the student feels welcome, the
socialization process serves as the foundation of religious education. Further,
all three categories of learning—cognitive, behavioral, and affective—have
been interwoven within religious education as students address cognitive
development in the academic setting, behavioral development in the practic-
ing of faith rituals, and affective development in the building of social rela-
tionships. Schluttloffel (2000) describes the tenets of a Catholic educational
philosophy as: (a) an opportunity to learn faith knowledge; (b) a community
where the faith is lived; and (c) a holistic approach to the student. Religious
education provides the context in which the components of the caring com-
munity, the emotional competence, and the development of prosocial behav-
iors can be freely developed and related to a cognitive foundation.

REFERENCES
Allport, G., & Ross, J. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 5, 432-443.
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Batson, C., & Schoenrade, P. (1991). Measuring religion as quest: 1) Validity concerns. Journal for
the Scientific Study of Religion, 30, 416-429.
Batson, C., Schoenrade, P., & Ventis, W. (1993). Religion and the individual. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Batson, C., & Ventis, L. (1982). The religious experience: A social-psychological perspective. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Battistich, V., Schaps, E., Solomon, D., & Watson, M. (1991). The role of the school in prosocial
development. In H. Fitzgerald (Ed.), Theory and research in behavioral pediatrics (pp. 89-
127). New York: Plenum Press.
102 Catholic Education/September 2006

Battistich, V., Watson, M., Solomon, D., Schaps, E., & Solomon, J. (1991). The Child Development
Project: A comprehensive program for the development of prosocial behavior. In Handbook
of moral behavior and development (Vol. 1, pp. 1-33). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Beit-Hallahmi, B., & Argyle, M. (1997). The psychology of religious behavior, belief and experi-
ence. New York: Routledge.
Bergan, A., & McConatha, J. T. (2000). Religiosity and life satisfaction. Activities, Adaptation and
Aging, 24(3), 23-34.
Blum, L. (1980). Friendship, altruism and morality. London: Routledge & Kegan.
Boyatzis, C. A. (2005). Religion and spiritual development in childhood. In R. F. Paloutzian & C.
L. Park (Eds.), Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality (pp. 123-143). New
York: Guilford Press.
Cardwell, J. D. (1980). The social context of religiosity. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Chumbler, N. R. (1996). An empirical test of a theory of factors affecting life satisfaction:
Understanding the role of religious experience. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 24, 220-232.
Congregation for the Clergy. (1997). General directory for catechesis. Washington, DC: United
States Catholic Conference.
Demerath, N. J., III, & Hammond, P. E. (1969). Religion in social context. New York: Random House.
Dezutter, J., Soenens, B., & Hutsebaut, D. (2006). Religiosity and mental health: A further explo-
ration of the relative importance of religious behaviors vs. religious attitudes. Personality and
Individual Differences, 40(4), 807-818.
Durkheim, E. (1961). Moral education. New York: Free Press. (Original work published 1925)
Eisenberg, N. (1982). The development of prosocial behavior. New York: Academic Press.
Eisenberg, N. (1987). The relation of altruism and other moral behaviors to moral cognition:
Methodological and conceptual issues. In N. Eisenberg (Ed.), Contemporary topics in devel-
opmental psychology (pp. 165-189). New York: Wiley.
Eisenberg, N. (2004). Prosocial and moral development in the family. In T. A.Thorkildsen & H. J.
Walberg (Eds.), Nurturing morality (pp. 119-135). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum
Publishers.
Eisenberg, N., & Mussen, P. H. (1989). The roots of prosocial behavior in children. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Eisenberg, N., & Valiente, C. (2002). Children’s prosocial and moral development. In M. Bornstein
(Ed.), Handbook of parenting: Vol. 5 (2nd ed., pp. 111-142). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Ellison, C. (1991). Religious involvement and subjective well-being. Journal of Health and Social
Behavior, 32(1), 80-99.
Ellison, C., Gay, D., & Glass, T. (1989). Does religious commitment contribute to individual life
satisfaction? Social Forces, 68, 100-123.
Fontaine, J. R. J., Duriez, B., Luyten, P., Corveleyn, J., & Hutsebaut, D. (2005). Consequences of a
multidimensional approach to religion for the relationship between religiosity and value pri-
orities. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 15(2), 123-143.
Frankena, W. K. (1965). Three historical philosophies of education. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.
Freud, S. (1976). The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (J.
Strachey, Ed.). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1923)
Fukuyama, Y. (1960). The major dimensions of church membership. Review of Religious Research,
2, 154-161.
Gibbs, J., & Schnell, S. (1985). Moral development “versus” socialization. American Psychologist,
40, 1071-1080.
Glock, C. Y., & Stark, R. (1965). Religion and society in tension. San Francisco: Rand McNally.
Graczyk, P., Weissberg, R., Payton, J., Elias, M., Greenberg, M., & Zins, J. (2000). Criteria for eval-
uating the quality of school-based social and emotional learning programs. In R. Bar-On & J.
D. Parker (Eds.), Handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and
application at home, school and in the workplace (pp. 391-410). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Groome, T. H. (1980). Christian religious education. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
Groome, T. H. (1998). Educating for life. Allen, TX: Thomas Moore Press
Holdcroft/WHAT IS RELIGIOSITY? 103

Groome, T. H., & Corso, M. J. (1999). Empowering catechetical leaders. Washington, DC: National
Catholic Educational Association.
Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2005). Religiosity and prosocial behaviors in adolescence: The mediat-
ing role of prosocial values. Journal of Moral Education, 34(2), 231-249.
Hoffman, J. (1985). Pastoral letter on Catholic schools. Toledo, OH: Diocese of Toledo.
Hyde, K. H. (1990). Religion in childhood and adolescence. Birmingham, AL: Religious Education
Press.
Ji, C. C. (2004). Religious orientations in moral development. Journal of Psychology and
Christianity, 23(1), 22-30.
Kant, I. (1959). Foundations of the metaphysics of morals (L. W. Beck, Trans.). New York: Macmillan.
Kedem, P., & Cohen, D. W. (1987). The effects of religious education on moral judgment. Journal
of Psychology and Judaism, 11, 4-14.
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence, the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In
D. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 347-480). New York:
Rand McNally.
Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach. In T.
Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior: Theory, research, and social issues (pp. 31-
53). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Kohlberg, L. (1981). The meaning and measurement of moral development. Worcester, MA: Clark
University Press.
Kristensen, K., Pedersen, D., & Williams, R. (2001). Profiling religious maturity: The relationship
of religious attitude components to religious orientations. Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion, 12, 75-86.
Lee, J. (1985). The content of religious instruction. Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press.
Lenski, G. (1963). The religious factor. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Lewis, N. (1978). The new Roget’s thesaurus in dictionary form. New York: Putnam.
Piaget, J. (1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. (Original
work published 1932)
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The psychology of the child (H. Weaver, Trans.). New York: Basic
Books.
Rest, J. R. (1986). Moral development. New York: Praeger.
Roccas, S. (2005). Religion and value systems. Journal of Social Issues, 61(4), 747-759.
Schuttloffel, M. (2000). Promises and possibilities: The Catholic elementary school curriculum. In
J. Youniss, J. Convey, & J. A. McLellan (Eds.), The character of Catholic schools (pp. 103-
123). Notre Dame, IN: The University of Notre Dame Press.
Sealey, J. (1985). Religious education: Philosophical perspectives. Boston: George Allen University.
Solomon, D., Watson, M., Schaps, E., Battistich, V., & Solomon, J. (1990). Cooperative learning as
part of a comprehensive classroom program designed to promote prosocial behavior. In E.
Sharan (Ed.), Cooperative learning: Theory and research (pp. 231-260). New York: Praeger.
Stark, R., & Glock, C. Y. (1968). American piety: The nature of religious commitment. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Walker, L. J. (2003) Morality, religion, spirituality—the value of saintliness. Journal of Moral
Education, 32(4), 373-384
Walker, L. J., Pitts, R. C., Hennig, K. H., & Matsuba, M. K. (1999). Reasoning about morality and
real-life moral problems. In M. Killen & D. Hart (Eds.), Morality in everyday life:
Development perspectives (pp. 371-407). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Watson, P., Hood, R., Morris, R., & Hall, J. (1984). Empathy, religious orientation, and social desir-
ability. Journal of Psychology, 117, 211-216.

Barbara Holdcroft teaches at The University of Toledo, Lourdes College, and St. Francis de Sales
High School. Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Dr. Barbara Holdcroft, The
University of Toledo, 2801 W. Bancroft St., Foundations of Education Department, Mail Stop 923,
Toledo, OH 43606.

You might also like