CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation

Dave Keevill, P.Eng.

Delcan Corporation
Kingston, Canada
ABSTRACT of which communicates with CCs and Interlockings, to
collect the status of all trains and routes in its control area.
Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) The MAC uses this information to calculate stopping
signaling systems have been reliably and safely carrying point commands for the CCs in its control area, in such a
passengers in revenue service for over a quarter-century. way as to ensure safe train separation and routing. This
Once a futuristic, technological novelty, CBTC is now fine positioning capability is foundational to the
established as the latest generation of mainstream transit achievement of CBTC’s shorter-headway capabilities.
system control. The majority of CBTC systems are based on Moving-
Today’s progressive railroads find themselves block signaling principles, which fully leverage the fine
compelled to consider a CBTC upgrade because of its positioning capabilities of CBTC.
promises of increased safety, reliability, availability and
associated reduction of maintenance costs; increased Functional Architecture
system capacity using the same civil infrastructure and its For the purposes of this paper, a CBTC system is
ability to reduce downtime during an upgrade. But there assumed to provide the classical Automatic Train Control
are costs to consider. Should the full fleet be equipped or (ATC) functions of Automatic Train Protection (ATP),
only part of it? The full railroad, including yards and Automatic Train Operation (ATO), and Automatic Train
depots, only the mainline or only a portion of the Supervision (ATS), generally in accordance with the
mainline? Is a secondary train control system needed, or requirements of [1], summarized as follows:
is CBTC alone adequate? This paper will consider such
 ATP functions provide for fail-safe protection
questions.
against collisions, excessive speed, and other
Whatever the motivation, once a decision is made to hazardous conditions through a combination of
upgrade to CBTC, and the scope of the upgrade is train detection, train separation, and route locking;
defined, the implementation needs to be planned carefully  ATO functions typically include automatic speed
and executed flawlessly to manage the impact on ongoing regulation, automatic programmed station
operations, and to ensure safety throughout the upgrade stopping, and automatic door control; and
process. Should a “big-bang” implementation be planned  ATS functions typically provide all monitoring,
or a staged transition from old to new? If staged, should a control and automation necessary to fully support
fleet-first or an infrastructure-first approach be adopted? and coordinate system wide train movements: this
How can opportunities for “shadow-mode” testing be includes tracking of trains during normal
exploited to minimize system downtime and risk during operations and facilities to support degraded
cutovers? How and when should operations and service due to external conditions such as
maintenance staff be trained? Answering these important equipment failure or environmental factors; the
questions will ensure a successful “brown-field” CBTC adjustments can be to the performance of
system upgrade. individual trains to maintain schedule, or corrective
action to be taken by Control Center staff.
ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Physical Architecture
Communication-Based Train Control (CBTC) System In addition to the functional components
Whereas a conventional signaling system determines (ATS/ATP/ATO), the CBTC can also be organized by
train location using Interlocking Controllers geographical location. CBTC equipment is typically
(“Interlockings”) that monitor track circuits or axle located in the Central Office, in Station Equipment
counters, a CBTC system employs Carborne Controllers Rooms, at the Trackside and aboard the rolling stock.
(CCs) to determine train location primarily from wayside Central Office equipment is typically that associated
devices such as transponder tags or inductive loops. The with ATS functionality, and inclusive of the main
CC typically augments this information by reading finer Human-Machine Interface for System Operations.
positioning devices such as tachometers, speed sensors,
radar and/or accelerometers, and transmits fine-resolution Station Equipment Room equipment includes
position, speed and direction status information to communication backbone switches, MACs and
wayside Movement Authority Controllers (MACs), each

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

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 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
Interlockings (these last two are sometimes combined into d) Control propulsion, brake and door systems
a single, dual-purpose “Zone Controller” or “ZC”). according to commands from the MAC and/or
ATS, to optimize speed profiles and dwell
Trackside equipment includes transponder management, for systems providing ATO.
tags/balises/loops, switch machines, radio transceivers
and transit signals (if required to support Secondary Train If STC is to be included, train stop functionality and
Control (STC)). associated peripheral hardware may be integrated into the
CBTC CC, or may be hosted by non-CBTC equipment.
Carborne equipment comprises a processor-based Train stops implemented for speed or train spacing
controller(s) and its peripherals, capable of determining purposes may need to be disabled for automated CBTC
train position, limiting train movement and supporting trains, which may be subject to different constraints than
Train-to-Wayside Communication (TWC) with the MAC non-CBTC trains.
and ATS.
Train-To-Wayside Communications
Movement Authority Controller
The TWC component of the CBTC provides high-
The MAC is a computer-based ATP controller, availability, low-latency (i.e. time sensitive), continuous
typically located in equipment rooms in the Central Office communication between CCs and MACs. This
and passenger stations hosting interlocking equipment, communication may or may not be safety-critical in itself,
which is responsible to: depending on how much supervision is undertaken at the
a) Monitor the location and status of all application level between the MAC and CC. Some TWC
communicating trains in its control area; systems are configured to account for the physical
location of CCs, whereas others adopt a flat architecture,
b) Monitor switch position and route locking having knowledge only of radio IP addresses, leaving it to
information received from the Interlocking; the CC and MAC alone to manage location-related data.
c) Monitor the status of other wayside elements in
TWC components include radios and antennas
its control area (e.g. Platform Edge Doors,
communicating in free space. The antennas may
Platform Emergency Stop Buttons);
incorporate point-to-point communications or a leaky
d) On the basis of this status, provide each CC in its conductor style medium installed along the guideway.
control area with a Movement Authority Limit They may also include switching, routing and
(MAL), up to which the train is authorized for authentication and/or encryption equipment, depending on
safe travel; and the sophistication of the TWC.
e) Safely transfer trains into and out of its control
area. Primary and Secondary Train Control

The consolidation of MAC and Interlocking functions in a CBTC will assume the role of the primary train
ZC, to minimize hardware, is usually undertaken only control system, having vital/safety critical elements
where no STC is to be provided, since common hardware designed and implemented in accordance with fail-safe
failure modes in the primary and secondary systems is not design principles and internationally recognized
a concern in that case. standards; and designed to achieve high levels of system
availability through component selection, appropriate
Carborne Controller levels of equipment redundancy, and the use of local and
remote diagnostic facilities, generally in accordance with
The CC is a computer-based ATP and potentially [2].
ATO controller, installed on the rolling stock. The CC is
responsible to: A STC System is typically a conventional signaling
system that supplements the CBTC system, in order to
a) Monitor the configuration, location, speed, provide a level of ATP functionality for trains or
direction and other status of its host train, and Maintenance of Way (MOW) equipment that are:
report these to the MAC;
 Not equipped with carborne CBTC equipment;
b) Control propulsion, braking and door systems to and/or
ensure safe train operation, including  Operating with partially or totally inoperative
containment of travel within any speed limits carborne CBTC equipment; and/or
and the MAL;
 Operating within an area of track with partially or
c) Provide cab signaling directions to the driver for totally inoperative wayside CBTC equipment.
attended modes; and

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

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 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
The several, progressive levels of sophistication for  Restricted Manual
the design of STC systems are summarized as follows (for [Manual operation with speed only restricted, by
a comprehensive discussion on the extent to which STC CBTC or other carborne equipment]
should be included in an CBTC upgrade, refer to [3]):  Full Bypass
 Level 0: Either no STC at all, or possibly inclusion [Train operation is protected only by driver’s
of switch position indicators used to supplement adherence to operating rules, sometimes speed-
control operator directions for route traversal, supervised by systems outside CBTC, such as
without enforcement; Propulsion]
 Level 1: Switch deadlocking: power to a switch CBTC may also include an explicit indication of
machine is interrupted when the over-switch block, locations where CBTC operation is permitted (i.e. where
bounded by axle counters or track circuit the driver is authorized to follow the CBTC display on the
boundaries located at or outside the switch’s train, sometimes implemented as a “lunar” aspect or “St.
fouling points, is not assured to be vacant; Andrew’s Cross” aspect on the wayside signals). It may
 Level 2: Level 1 + trackside or cab signal be possible to command the CBTC to prohibit the use of
indication to the train driver that the switch is some modes during exceptional circumstances where a
locked for safe traversal, possibly including full heightened need for driver vigilance is called for (e.g.
switch locking such as route locking, approach poor weather conditions, or suspicion of unauthorized
locking, track locking and flank protection guideway access).
Interlocking functions;
 Level 3: Level 2 + scope to include also non- Shadow-Mode Testing
switch areas, in a contiguous portion of the entire
mainline guideway; For the purposes of this paper, Shadow-Mode Testing
is defined as an early mode of site testing for a CBTC
 Level 4: Level 3 + functionality to safely stop a upgrade (brownfield), whereby some or all of the train
train by the use of mechanical, electromagnetic or
localization and TWC infrastructure is fully
electronic train stops, should the train (a) violate a
commissioned prior to commissioning of the rest of the
wayside or cab signal, or (b) violate a speed limit
supervised by successive train stops. CBTC, and a subset of existing rolling stock is equipped
with carborne CBTC equipment and returned to revenue
Mainline Train Operating Modes service under the ongoing control of the existing signaling
system.
CBTC Systems readily support fully bidirectional
running capability, due to their functional independence For shadow mode testing, the CC is configured to
from wayside signals. Automatic Train Operation (ATO), watch the train’s progress along the line, gathering
by which the CBTC controls the train’s speed profile, is information about positioning and communications
usually included in the CBTC configuration to optimize effectiveness, and reporting this to a subset of the MACs.
headway reduction (hence optimal infrastructure It is configured so as not to interfere with the safe
exploitation). ATO typically includes a subset, in order operation of the train, which continues under the
of decreasing automation, of the following operating protection of the existing signaling system. The benefit is
modes: the relatively unobtrusive gathering of data representing
where the CC “sees” itself, as the train traverses its route,
 Unattended train operation (UTO) based on e.g. transponder tag position and route
[GoA4 (“Grade of Automation” [4]): no driver
information received from MACs.
required on train]
 Driverless train operation (DTO) The goal is to capture data during revenue service,
[GoA3: train attendant controls doors and and then to download it for early-stage offline analysis,
undertakes recovery operations] which can include statistical reliability indications.
 Semi-automatic train operation (STO) Depending on the sophistication of the TWC system, this
[GoA2: driver in cab controls doors and recovery download of data may be supported remotely (e.g. WLAN
operations] or WiFi link) or locally (e.g. USB port on the CC).
In addition to ATO modes, the following modes may
be supported by the CBTC:
 Protected manual operation (ATP-M)
[GoA1: driver controls all motion, subject to ATP
enforcement]

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

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 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
DECIDING BETWEEN CBTC AND  Beyond the actual commissioning of the CBTC
CONVENTIONAL SIGNALING infrastructure, are we prepared to roll out proper
training, to ensure that we leverage the full benefits
Some of the factors that a transit authority has to of CBTC? (CBTC can be operated in such a way
consider when deciding whether to upgrade its signaling that it provides no better service than a
system to CBTC include the following: conventional system.)
 What are the business needs driving the re-  If STC is to be implemented, is there support for
signaling program? Is it purely to maintain the the potentially higher (not lower) maintenance
signaling system in a state of good repair, or is costs of a hybrid system, in the interest of
there a business case for a step-change increase in obtaining the performance advancements
passenger carrying capacity? associated with CBTC?
 Is the signaling system upgrade being considered
as a stand-alone signaling project, or is the re- Philosophical Differences
signaling being considered as one element of an CBTC systems require the continuous transfer of
overall system upgrade program also including, for status information from train to wayside, and of command
example, new vehicle procurements and upgrades
information from wayside to train. To safely manage all
to the operations control centre?
trains in its control area, the MAC must have current
 Is the transit authority prepared to enhance other, information at all times. A positive side effect of this
non-signaling systems, such as power supply and aspect of CBTC is that this information is also
tunnel ventilation, to accommodate more trains in immediately available to the ATS controller(s), as it
high-density sections of the railroad, or station/bus undertakes its mission to optimize fleet performance.
interchange redesign to support the greater
passenger flow (i.e. eliminating the next Moving Block (MB) CBTC systems take a vehicle-
bottleneck, once the signaling system has been centric approach to the generation of MALs, as compared
removed as the primary constraint on headway)? to the guideway-centric approach of conventional, Fixed
 Are there physical, track layout constraints (e.g. Block (FB) signaling systems. This vehicle-centric
direction reversal crossovers placed too far ahead approach, coupled with the finer position resolution of
of reversal platforms) or unique fleet CBTC has the potential to significantly reduce operational
characteristics (e.g. particularly long stopping headways, primarily through the reduction of safety
distances) that might negate the headway benefits buffers ahead of each train, as illustrated in Figure 1.
of CBTC?
In all signaling systems, the safe train separation
 Will automation be seen as a threat or opportunity buffer is calculated based on worst case vehicle braking
by employees and potentially labor unions? The
performance in the context of trackwork features and
enhanced safety and repeatable performance
other obstructions supervised in a defined region. The
associated with CBTC can be seen as protecting
drivers from incidents and from disciplinary practical difference between FB and MB is the following:
actions, but it can also be viewed negatively,  For FB, the calculated safety buffer is implemented
rendering some driver functions as redundant, by selecting a minimum discrete number of fixed-
depending on the nature and history of the length signaling blocks which must be maintained
property. As with any technology evolution, in front of the train. Hence, the resolution of the
employee and union perspectives and expectations safe stopping point command is the length of the
must be carefully managed to ensure a successful signaling block, and a block is deemed fully
CBTC upgrade. occupied if any axle of the train falls within the
 Is the option to retain conventional signaling really block boundaries, either by traversing an axle
less risky than CBTC? During an upgrade of one counter or shunting the track circuit associated
conventional signaling system with another, with the block.
especially where different suppliers or even  For MB, the buffer is represented by a parameter
different divisions of the same supplier are that is calculated dynamically, based on train
involved, can lead to long service outages where an location and often speed, and whose resolution is
overlay solution is not feasible and outright limited only by software constraints. Some CBTC
replacement of hardware is required. CBTC systems can calculate train location to a resolution
solutions can sometimes co-exist with already- (although localization precision is more coarse) as
present conventional signaling solutions to small as 1 mm, with the result that the safety buffer
facilitate a smoother transition throughout the is virtually continuous.
upgrade.

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

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 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
The more dynamic and higher-resolution MB safety  Carborne / recurring hardware, as compared to
buffer adjusts to favorable conditions by reducing train wayside or central hardware, especially for larger
spacing, thereby supporting more frequent service. In fleet sizes; and
some CBTC system designs, the buffer is calculated  Development and testing of software (beware of
offline for each location and the worst-case speed profile, regression testing associated with the above
then applied for all speeds, while in others, it is calculated rework).
dynamically using train speed as an input parameter.
CBTC introduces certain wayside positioning and
In terms of capacity, a fixed-block system can, in communication hardware such as transponder
principal, approach the performance of a moving-block tags/balises/loops, radios, antennas and associated
implementation. However, this is usually cost- cabling. The cost to purchase, install and maintain these
prohibitive, since reduction of block lengths naturally devices is far less than that associated with the signals,
increases the number of blocks, which increases train stop devices and track circuits or axle counters
Interlocking complexity, and quantities of the wayside required for conventional systems. The savings are of
hardware required to implement the block boundaries. course reduced and may actually be reversed where STC
is implemented, especially if the STC configuration is
CBTC offers greater operational flexibility, through
particularly complex or sophisticated.
its inherent, economical support of bidirectional
operation. The high cost associated with adding signals
Operating Concept Differences
and associated logic to a FB Interlocking in support of
reverse-running does not apply for CBTC. Whereas with Apart from capacity improvements due to shorter
FB, transit Properties often have to limit bidirectionality headways, the bidirectional nature of CBTC systems, in
to only certain locations, with CBTC, the difference terms of both train movements and data communication,
amounts mainly to an additional use case that the software provides the Central Control staff with more current status
must accommodate, so it can be implemented universally. information, the ability to command a train directly and
increased flexibility in dealing with traffic disturbances.
One of the other performance benefits of a moving
All CBTC-equipped trains in the system are in continuous
block solution is that it can more rapidly recover from a communication with the Central Office (each commonly
system disturbance, both in terms of implementing
reporting status in the range of once per second), so the
temporary degraded service and in terms of restoring full mimic display can provide a more continuous, less
service, so that overall service reliability is improved. granular representation of their locations. Commands
This factor is further enhanced for driverless systems for
sent to a CBTC train such as speed reductions or stop
which the logistical challenges associated with driver orders can be immediately transmitted even when the
deployment do not apply. train is between stations, due to the continuous data link.
Trains can be easily routed around an area of track
Hardware Differences
suffering from a blockage, even when it depends on
The hardware used in today’s CBTC system reverse-running. With the dramatic reduction in signaling
components is far less costly than that of early CBTC system constraints, limitations on operational flexibility
systems. With the proliferation of high-performance are reduced mainly to trackwork geometry.
computers and data communication networks, hardware is
The repeatability of DTO and UTO functionality, and
no longer the constraint that it used to be. The main costs
to some degree that of STO, removes the uncertainty
associated with a CBTC upgrade are now the following:
associated with driver performance, allowing more
 Engineering effort required to adapt an existing predictable operation and hence more finely-tuned
product to a new Property, in compliance with its schedules with less inherent contingency time. Today’s
unique specification: almost every CBTC system ATS systems often include schedule development, and
is bound to have unique interfaces such as with schedule and headway regulation and simulation
vehicle systems and adjacent territories like yards, capabilities. Some even include “green” energy
but functionally speaking, the closer the CBTC
conservation functionality such as the synchronizing of
design for a new application resembles the last one
train arrivals and departures to optimize rolling stock
implemented by the supplier, the lower the upgrade
project’s risk; regenerative braking capabilities. These can be fully
leveraged by the flexible nature of CBTC.
 Compliance with local codes and standards, if they
are more onerous than previously encountered;
 Accommodation in software of new hardware or
operating system platforms that may be imposed
due to end of life constraints;

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that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

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 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
Effects on RAMS (Reliability, Availability,  Incorporation of checked-redundancy, and design
Maintainability & Safety) and code diversity to minimize single points of
failure;
The main reliability improvement provided by CBTC
is found in the simple reduction of hardware quantities in  Simplification of the system design (most incidents
are the result of many things going wrong, not just
the system. Assuming appropriate component selection,
a single equipment failure, so more complex
the fewer components that can fail, the better the
systems inherently present more hazard potential);
reliability of the system will be. Highly-competitive and
computer and data communication markets have produced
cost-effective, high-quality, high-reliability network  Simplification of the actions required to manage
equipment and computers that can be used in CBTC uncommon events.
systems, unlike the components of conventional signaling
systems, many of which continue to use high-cost DETERMINING THE UPGRADE SCOPE
proprietary components. The omission of signals and Once the decision has been made to undertake a
trackside hardware associated with axle counters or track CBTC upgrade, there are a number of scope questions
circuits improves system reliability. It is important to pay that will need to be answered:
attention to the trackside devices associated with CBTC  What vehicle operating modes need to be
too, however. For example, wayside radios and supported?
transponder tags or loop cables, need to be sufficiently
 Should the entire fleet be CBTC-equipped, or only
robust for the harsh physical and electromagnetic
part of it? Do maintenance vehicles need to be
environment. Transponder tags are not all created equal:
equipped?
some are powered by the interrogation beam from the
carborne reader, while others are powered by batteries  Should the full railroad be equipped, including
that require periodic replacement to maintain their yards and depots, or should the scope be limited to
function or accuracy. Some TWC configurations have only the mainline or a portion of the mainline?
radios and antennas only at trackside, while others also  What constraints, if any, apply to the TWC?
include integrated network switching devices.  Is STC required, or will CBTC alone be adequate?
Enhanced reliability of the basic system with less
Vehicle Operating Modes
hardware also in itself provides an availability boost, but
this can also be supplemented with operational The decision of which modes of operation need to be
redundancy, such as 2-out-of-3 or 2-times-2-out-of-2 supported is complex, and is based on technical, political
hardware configurations, to improve availability, with a and human-factors considerations. In terms of efficiency
marginal increase in hardware. This can reduce the and cost, more automation is generally better for a
probability of encountering a service-impacting failure to number of reasons. However, most CBTC upgrades are
very low levels, compared with all but the most costly undertaken for existing properties, and funded by
conventional signaling systems. Synchronization of governments that must be able to clearly demonstrate they
multiple processors is complex, however, so any are bringing value for their citizens.
development of such functionality (as opposed to off-the-
The benefits of CBTC can be best leveraged by UTO
shelf application of an existing design) during the project
and DTO, which provide the greatest consistency and
should be closely monitored.
flexibility of operation, resulting in payroll reduction and
With less wayside hardware, especially at track level diminished effects of driver error, performance and
(signals and track circuits or axle counters), CBTC is also personal needs (e.g. shift lengths and break schedules).
inherently more maintainable than conventional signaling. The consistency of driverless operation allows
Data networking equipment can be housed in equipment optimization of system performance, which in turn
rooms with Interlocking and MAC hardware, with only provides the highest passenger transfer capacity, and
wayside radios, transponders/loops and switch machines passenger satisfaction. Conversely, with UTO and DTO,
located at trackside. The main savings are in the no driver may be present to detect and react to anomalous
maintenance of signals and trackside hardware associated conditions on the track ahead of the train (e.g. a passenger
with axle counters or track circuits. falling off the platform or a car driving through a fence
and falling into the guideway from an overpass).
CBTC systems enhance operational safety by the
Protection against such intrusions requires the
following means:
implementation of additional systems, such as Platform
 Reduction of the amount of hardware that can fail, Edge Door Systems (PEDS) and/or Guideway Intrusion
generally leading to a lower system hazard rate; Detection Systems (GIDS) of various types (some

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

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 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
technologies in service around the world include electro- implementation of STC where it may not
mechanical, light-based, radar-based and video-based; for otherwise be appropriate.
more detail, refer to [5]).
If there will be no STC, then MOW vehicles will still
Politically, despite the more than 25 industry-years of need to be protected from the movements of automatic
UTO in revenue service (Vancouver SkyTrain first vehicles around them, especially if they operate on
launched UTO service in 1986), some locales may still be revenue track during revenue hours. This protection can
reluctant to embrace UTO and DTO. Whether the local be provided in a number of ways:
climate is optimistic and ambitious or particularly risk-  For small MOW vehicle fleets, or those with
averse may therefore also affect the decision whether or captured MOW vehicles (e.g. monorails), a
not to implement UTO or DTO. permanent carborne monitor can be installed on
For these reasons, some properties elect to support each vehicle that reports occupancy information
(position, speed, direction) to the MAC, and
only STO. This mode retains the driver to detect such
possibly provides ATP supervision of speed and
hazardous conditions, and the repeatable speed profiles of
position akin to Protected Manual operation of
DTO and UTO, but is subject to driver delays such as revenue vehicles.
reluctance to trigger the start of operation (e.g.
commanding doors closed or activating a Start button),  For larger MOW vehicle fleets, or at properties for
and staff scheduling constraints, and of course it lacks the which MOW vehicles are not captured to the
system (e.g. those furnished temporarily by
potential payroll savings of more automated modes. It
subcontractors), a portable or temporary carborne
also requires the provision of an expensive, ergonomic
monitor (e.g. on a trailer) may be used.
driver’s cabin at either end of a basic train unit, which
consumes space that could otherwise be used by  In smaller systems or those with high degrees of
passengers: UTO and DTO trains can be equipped with staff discipline, strict adherence to procedures
relatively simple hostling panels that can be folded out of governing the definition and enforcement of work
zones, for which traversal of automated trains will
the way when not in use.
be permitted only in ATPM or lower mode of
All three of the above require a fully exclusive Right- operation, may be adequate.
Of-Way. If that is unavailable (e.g. LRT tracks running
in the context of an automobile roadway, with potential Coverage of the Line and Yards
shared access with vehicular traffic), then the highest Some transit authorities prefer uniformity of the
level of automatic operation will be limited to Protected system, so the CBTC upgrade is implemented for all parts
Manual, due to the highly unpredictable nature of the of the system, including yards, depots, test tracks and
operational environment. This mode ensures safe train even some maintenance tracks (other maintenance tracks
separation and route locking, but is operationally far less such as pits must remain clear of any wayside equipment
predictable than more automated modes. such as loops and tags). In a driverless or unattended
operation, this arrangement offers the benefit of full
Coverage of the Fleet independence from drivers, for maneuvers required in
Many transit authorities considering a CBTC upgrade preparation for service at initial fleet launch, even from
have been in service for many years, and consequently remote locations such as tail tracks.
have expanded their fleets with new rolling stock models,
Other authorities, in order to limit costs, elect to
perhaps many times over the years. Defining and equip only the mainline with CBTC and to implement a
integrating the on-board interface for ATO is a significant
stand-alone conventional signaling system for yards and
challenge in any case, and can be further complicated by depots. This mandates the use of human drivers to
variations in connectivity and behavior among vehicles.
prepare for service even in a UTO system. It also
However, a decision to exclude a portion of the
introduces the need for a transition zone through which a
operational fleet from the CBTC should be made train must travel to enter into CBTC operation from
carefully, for the following reasons:
“dark” territory. Such a transition zone often incorporates
1. Operational optimization in a short-headway functionality to verify that the train is fit for service. This
condition can suffer from a “weakest-link” arrangement may also provide a portion of the system that
phenomenon, such that the flow of all other can protect non-CBTC-equipped MOW vehicles without
traffic will be affected by one under-performing heightened dependence on procedure.
non-CBTC-equipped vehicle; and Some authorities go still further, equipping only
2. If not even ATPM mode is to be provided for certain portions of the mainline, e.g. higher-density
older vehicles, then this may force the portions only, or areas perceived to be well-suited to

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

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 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
CBTC implementation. This approach can save CBTC system with the longest history in the world, the
equipment costs, but the added complexity of Vancouver SkyTrain, safely operates without STC: in the
implementing zone-based CBTC, including potentially rare case of full CBTC failure, adherence to strict
complex entry-exit functionality in the context of ongoing operating procedures protects trains operating in degraded
revenue service, has to be carefully managed: it can mode, until the CBTC is restored. Monorail systems and
actually turn out to be more costly than implementing full Automated People Movers also commonly exclude STC
line coverage, due to the associated implementation risk. from their configuration. A tradeoff study may need to be
undertaken to decide the extent of fallback capabilities to
TWC Characteristics be implemented, given the associated costs, benefits and
risks.
Some TWC factors that should be considered when
specifying and selecting the CBTC include the following: Collaboration between the CBTC and the CBTC-
 What data transfer capacity and latency ready Interlocking, including switchovers of control and
requirements need to be met by the TWC? The ongoing interface during normal operation, is critical to
amount of basic CBTC data capacity required for reliable operation of a CBTC system with STC. If either
different systems can vary widely, older systems the CBTC or STC system suppliers do not have
typically requiring the transfer of less data due to experience integrating the two specific products being
historical data link technology constraints. implemented (even if one supplier is supplying both of
 Is there a preference to use licensed or unlicensed them), then it is important to identify and manage
frequency bands? Do local Authorities Having associated implementation risks throughout the upgrade.
Jurisdiction impose explicit requirements in this Operationally, if it is decided to include STC in the
area, or is there a choice to make?
system configuration, the following must be borne in
 Is there a high risk of interference from the public mind: a STC system will most likely support a
domain that must be tolerated (e.g. a flood of significantly lower train density than the CBTC.
potentially conflicting cellular communication at Therefore, when STC service commences in a fallback
certain times of the year, as in Makkah, Saudi scenario, there is a strong likelihood that it will begin with
Arabia during the annual Hajj pilgrimage) that may trains closer together than its own interlocking rules
represent a denial of service condition?
would allow. It will be critical to design the CBTC-ready
 Is there a high risk of malicious intrusion by Interlocking to gracefully handle this scenario, and later
“hackers,” and to what extent should more on, to allow transition back into CBTC operation without
sophisticated and costly defense mechanisms be widespread controller restarts or the like.
considered?
 Is there opportunity to share other communication Inclusion of STC in a CBTC upgrade can appear a
backbones in the system for certain CBTC less risky operational choice, but it does introduce
communication links, TWC or otherwise? To what additional hardware that can fail, which can actually
degree can critical and non-critical data be result in a lower availability and higher maintenance costs
effectively segregated within the shared medium than CBTC alone, if not done carefully.
(noting that CBTC data must be granted priority
over other data like CCTV image or VoIP data, PLANNING THE CBTC UPGRADE
due to its time-sensitivity and mission-criticality)?
The public is highly dependent on the service
 Is there a preference for current technology such as provided by an operational mass transit system, so most
WiFi, or would older technology be an acceptable transit authorities do not have the luxury of shutting down
solution? Depending on locale, it may be system operations for weeks or months at a time, in
appropriate to conduct a tradeoff analysis to
support of a “brownfield” upgrade. Even in the case of a
answer this question, given the diverse associated
“greenfield” implementation, where no pre-existing
factors, such as openness of vendor selection, end
of life considerations, rapidity of obsolescence, system exists, the logistics surrounding rolling stock
mechanical robustness, impacts on train dynamic manufacturing, land appropriation and the securing from
envelope and track maintenance. Authorities Having Jurisdiction of authorizations to
proceed can all render a “big-bang” implementation,
Fallback Capabilities where the entire fleet and line begin CBTC operation all
at the same time, impractical if not impossible. The
With a proper Systems Engineering approach, the majority of CBTC upgrades involve staged
CBTC can usually be designed to be adequately reliable implementations, the most complex being brownfield
and fault-tolerant, such that incorporation of STC for projects, so this portion of the paper will focus on these.
fallback can be deemed unnecessary. The unattended

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

8 of 12
 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
The overall sequencing of a CBTC upgrade will associated with the introduction of a new, connecting line
depend on the context of related contracts and supporting or extension.
retrofits. A sample schedule is included in Figure 2.
Once the CBTC requirements and design are
Some factors to consider include the following:
complete, and the first articles of MACs and CCs have
 Will the upgrade include supply of new rolling been produced and factory tested, installation and testing
stock? How does the rolling stock delivery in the field can begin: both for carborne and wayside
schedule correlate with the CBTC supply components.
schedule? Should CBTC commissioning start with
the new fleet, the old or both at once?
Upgrading the Central Office Equipment
 To what extent and how will compatibility between
the new CBTC system and existing systems be For a CBTC MB upgrade, it is likely that the ATS
ensured? This is especially important in terms of will be replaced, since a conventional signaling system
the safety assurance of original equipment that is subject to replacement is unlikely to be driven by a MB-
no longer supported by the supplier (one of the compatible ATS. The central ATS upgrade can be a
main reasons that Properties embark on an single event (if there are remote ATS workstations near
upgrade). Consider existing ATS, rolling stock the existing Interlockings, they may be subject to staged
and Interlocking systems to be retrofitted or upgrade), however the replacement or upgrade of existing
replaced. Interlockings happens in stages: one zone at a time.
 Will the system include a geographical extension If the existing Interlockings are being upgraded to
so that the project involves both greenfield and support CBTC, then they can be designed to communicate
brownfield zones?
with both the existing and new ATS, and it will be best to
 Will it be feasible to implement “shadow-mode” introduce the new ATS after all the Interlockings have
testing, to find and correct data problems earlier? been implemented. If not, it is typically more feasible to
Although extended shifts may occasionally be made upgrade the ATS first, ensuring that the new ATS is
available on weekends or holidays for particularly compatible with the existing Interlockings, since the non-
complex test activities, most installation and testing safety-critical software of the ATS is cheaper to design,
activities associated with a brownfield CBTC upgrade construct and qualify than the safety-critical Interlocking
must be accomplished during non-revenue hours, so- software. This approach will provide operators with
called “engineering” or “maintenance” shifts, between say advance exposure to their new, CBTC-compatible
2:00 am and 5:00 am. Effective planning during this interface, prior to commencement of actual CBTC
period is essential to ensure efficient use of the precious operation, which will itself require a conceptual
time available. It must accommodate not only installation adjustment. Separating these two adjustments, HMI and
and test activities (so-called “screwdriver time”), but also CBTC, can lessen the impact on operations staff, but note
setup and vehicle transfer activities, not to mention the that it will also spread out the adjustment period, which
sharing of portions of the system with ongoing preventive may or may not be desirable, depending on the nature of
maintenance activities of the railroad. For this reason, it operation and the collective personality of the affected
is important while planning the upgrade to maximize teams. There are many factors that may lead to selection
simulation and shadow-mode testing, and to mitigate the of the alternate option, including availability of
risk of schedule over-runs associated with shifts requiring documentation and programmers able to work with the
precious site access, through the careful planning of existing interface software. Managing this interface is
cutover installation and test activities, including a strategy essential to effective project risk management.
for the backing out of unsuccessful changes wherever Installation of the main HMI, ATS servers, backbone
possible. All staff, including those of Subcontractors, switches etc. in the Central Office can typically proceed
who will participate in site commissioning should be with a minimum of disruption, up to the point of
required to attend weekly site planning meetings. replacement of hardware in the Control Room (i.e.
In principle, installation and commissioning of much operator workstations: keyboards, monitors, pointing
of the CBTC-specific infrastructure, and associated devices). At this point, depending on the scope of the
training of O&M staff, can be readily accomplished in Control Room upgrade, it may become necessary to
parallel with ongoing revenue operations. The main relocate Control Room operations staff, to implement the
exceptions relate to “cut-in” activities that require upgrade quickly and efficiently. Some options for
modifications to existing systems, such as the retrofit of relocation may be to a new or existing backup Control
Interlockings (to render them “CBTC-ready,” if they Room, or to a simulation room used for Operations
themselves are not to be replaced); upgrades associated training, if such is available. Some factors to consider in
with the central HMI; or introduction of new trackwork the Control room upgrade are consistency of user screens

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that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

9 of 12
 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
and monitors with existing layouts, levels of sound and If geographic expansion of the line is included in the
heat generated by new hardware, and other human factors. project, then installation and commissioning of the cut-in
points, especially if the introduction or relocation of
Upgrading or Replacing Station Room Equipment turnouts is involved, will require an extended period of
down-time, every detail of which must be meticulously
If the existing Interlockings are nearing End of Life,
planned, avoiding high-demand periods in the calendar,
they should be replaced with new, CBTC-compatible
and rigorously executed, to minimize service impact.
Interlockings. If not, they will need to be upgraded to
support CBTC-compatibility. In either case, it may make
Upgrading the Rolling Stock
sense to replace the Interlockings with CBTC ZCs that
incorporate Interlocking and MAC functionality together For existing rolling stock, three cases are considered:
in the same controller, with a minimum of hardware. This where space can be allocated on cars to allow the
consideration should be the topic of a trade-off analysis. installation of new CBTC equipment without the
decommissioning of existing controllers that are required
If independent Interlockings are to be retained, then
to support ongoing revenue service, both with and without
their control boundaries must be coordinated with those of
cutover capability; and where no such space is available.
the MACs, to both facilitate train transfer among zones
and allow coordination of testing. Full compatibility must  Where space is available: cars can be taken out of
be ensured between the new or upgraded Interlockings service one by one, retrofitted with the additional
and the CBTC. This requires some knowledge of both the CBTC hardware and returned to service,
Interlocking and CBTC functionality from the start, and independent of the deployment of wayside CBTC
can result in a coordination challenge similar to that faced components. This equipment would be configured
when purchasing rolling stock in advance of other, initially to function in a read-only configuration, in
interfacing systems. The associated complexity is support of “shadow mode” testing.
amplified if different suppliers are selected for  For consists for which cutover capability is also
Interlockings vs. CBTC. These options may optionally be possible, they may be configured to temporarily
rolled into the scope of the CBTC upgrade, as CBTC allow CBTC control, to support type and
suppliers often have some experience with Interlocking integration testing, then returned to shadow-mode
interfaces. In any case, MACs, like Interlockings, are testing configuration. The remainder of the fleet
installed and tested one zone at a time, unless schedule would require subsequent retrofit to convert from
recovery calls for parallel activity in multiple guideway shadow-mode to full-CBTC configuration. Even
locations, which increases project complexity. those having cutover boxes should be consolidated
when commissioning is complete, to eliminate
If integrated Interlockings are to be introduced, then superfluous hardware that can impact reliability.
there will be a period of time during which a part of the
operational system will be controlled by the CBTC and  Where no space is available, decommissioning of
the rest will be controlled by the existing Interlockings. It existing carborne signaling equipment will be
is advisable to minimize the number of portals through necessary to make space for the carborne CBTC
which trains may pass to transfer between the old and new equipment. In this case, the CBTC retrofit of the
territories, to keep the operations strategy simple, fleet should wait until later in the program, apart
from a dedicated test train or two, until the wayside
especially since the condition occurs during a transition
CBTC components have been fully tested and
phase of the project.
verified to be fit for revenue service.
Upgrading the Trackside Equipment For new rolling stock, CCs will typically be shipped
to the vehicle manufacturer’s premises, and installed prior
Most trackside equipment will have to be installed in
to vehicle shipment to the transit property. The vehicle
locations that are required to support ongoing revenue
production schedule and the level of sophistication of the
service throughout the upgrade. In this case, installation
vehicle manufacturer’s facilities will determine the extent
must take place under work or occupancy permits, and
to which vehicles can be pre-shipment tested. At a
normally during the non-revenue window.
minimum, static “post-installation checkout” tests are
Trackside equipment unique to the CBTC system, typically undertaken, including wiring ring-outs, etc., but
such as transponder tags/balises and radio transceivers with appropriate test facilities, dynamic testing and burn-
and associated cabling, can be installed relatively quickly, in may also be possible pre-shipment.
where it does not detract from the function of the existing
Site testing of rolling stock for CBTC functionality
signaling system.
(primarily ATP and ATO) can be subdivided into tests
that must or need not be completed to support shadow-

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

10 of 12
 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation
mode and later system-wide testing. The Automatic delays. If non-revenue DSO is planned, the potential
Speed Control component of the ATO function, for associated perception, political issues and media exposure
example, is highly dependent on the correct functioning will have to be carefully managed, when empty trains are
of all other carborne systems, and is therefore likely not observed traveling at high frequency for an extended time
be complete until later than the start of zone-based CBTC period, which in the minds of some may appear wasteful.
testing, whereas verification of the CCs’ capability to
communicate with MACs is essential from the outset. Safety Planning
The safe operation of the railroad has naturally to be
Training
assured throughout the upgrade, from the moment the first
It is important to deliver training to the O&M staff at new equipment is installed until the issuance of the Final
the right point in time: not too early, such that the Acceptance Certificate when the upgrade is complete.
concepts and material may be forgotten, nor too late, such There will be periods during which interim system
that staff are expected to use something they have not yet configurations are in place, which are similar but not
been trained to use. identical to either the original or final configurations.
These interim configurations may include temporary
The training of operations and maintenance staff can
equipment such as cutover boxes to transfer control of
begin once the designs are mature (i.e. first articles
portions of the railroad between new and old systems.
produced and tested, and major design issues rectified)
Such equipment needs to be analyzed in the context of
and should be complete prior to the start of system-wide
railroad operation, to ensure that acceptable levels of
testing, relocation to the main Control Room, whichever
safety are maintained for every step of the upgrade. Most
comes first. It can be beneficial for operators to be given
safety incidents are encountered during times of
high-level CBTC training prior to initial exposure to
uncommon operation, of which a signaling upgrade is a
CBTC functionality during zone testing, followed by
significant one, so it will be important to exercise
more comprehensive functionality training throughout the
heightened safety sensitivity during this period, perhaps
zone testing period and prior to the start of system-wide
conducting safety refresher training for operations and
testing and demonstration of system operation.
maintenance staff and contractors just prior to
A key benefit of CBTC is the typically sophisticated commencement of the commissioning phase of the
simulation capabilities that are available to be included in upgrade.
the system configuration. These can be used for off-line
The sequencing of system upgrades is important. For
staff training and certification, and some components may
example, if the Tunnel Ventilation System (TVS) can
also support backup Control Centre facilities.
support the current minimum train spacing based on
existing block lengths, but needs to be upgraded to handle
Go-Live Planning
increased train density, then it may be necessary to
A scheduled Demonstration of System Operation upgrade TVS first, then traction power sections, then the
(DSO) prior to carrying passengers in revenue service signaling system. Driverless operation is likely not to be
may be advisable, with or without passengers, with authorized prior to PEDS or GIDS deployment, so this
discounted trips, for a number of reasons: needs to be reflected in the program schedule.
1. It allows the Project Company (not necessarily
the same as the Operating Company) to ensure
CONCLUSIONS
the supplier has met its obligations prior to The decision to implement a CBTC upgrade depends
granting final acceptance. on various technical, political and human factors. The
success of a CBTC upgrade will depend on following a
2. It gives control operators the opportunity to
proper systems engineering approach, starting with needs
experience the new functionality in a lower–risk
definition, continuing with comprehensive tradeoff
environment than normal revenue service
analyses and applying rigorous project and risk
The DSO period may apply to all CBTC-equipped management throughout. CBTC has the potential to
trains or a subset of trains, depending on the fleet significantly increase the performance and reduce the
commissioning schedule. If a revenue (i.e. carrying operating and maintenance costs of the railroad, and if
passengers) DSO is planned, it may advisable to properly implemented, promises to bring many years of
implement trip discounts, or to plan to take interim delay benefits to the Railroad and the riding public.
compensation measures, in recognition of the potential for

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

11 of 12
 CBTC Upgrade Scope Definition and Implementation

Fixed Block Signaling – Guideway Centric
Line Speed Driver Braking

Buffer  Block Occupied Block Occupied Block

Stop

Moving Block Signaling – Vehicle Centric

Line Speed Supervised Braking
Safety Buffer

Figure 1: Fixed Block vs. Moving Block – Concept

Figure 2: Example Level 1 Schedule for CBTC Upgrade

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] IEEE 1474.1, "IEEE Std 1474.1™: IEEE Standard for CBTC Performance and Functional Requirements," 2004.
[2] IEEE 1474.3, "IEEE Std 1474.3™: Recommended Practice for CBTC System Design and Functional Allocations," 2008.
[3] Dr. Alan F. Rumsey, P.Eng., "Paper: So who really needs a "Fall-Back" Signaling System with Communications Based
Train Control?," APTA, 2012.
[4] IEC 62267, "IEC 62267: Railway applications - Automated Urban Guided Transport (AUGT) - Safety requirements,"
2009.
[5] Jonathan Hulse, P.Eng., "Paper: Intrusion Detection and Prevention Technologies available to Rail Transit," APTA, 2013.

This paper has been prepared for the 2013 APTA Rail Conference & International Rail Roadeo. APTA, its officers and employees are in no way responsible for the contents of this paper and
that any and all liability arising out of publication or presentation of this paper and/or its contents rests with the author.

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