VILMA QUINTOS

vs.
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS
G.R. No. 210252    

FACTS:

Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia
Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late
Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners
of the subject property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C,
Camiling, Tarlac, covered by TCT No. 318717.

The deceased parents left their 10 children ownership over the subject property. In 2002,
respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 02-52 and was raffled to the RTC at Camiling, Tarlac but was later on dismissed
as neither of the parties appeared and appealed.

Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the

Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein
they alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal
properties in favor of their 10 children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they received
the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They had been in
adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over 4 decades
and are allegedly entitled to equitable title. Participation in the execution of the
aforementioned Deeds was denied.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred
by estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share, which is
an admission petitioners’ part that the property is not entirely theirs. The Ibarras allegedly
mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario
had to redeem the property. Not having been repaid, the Candelarios accepted their share in
the subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the
partition of the property.

The RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint, as it did not find merit in petitioners’ asseverations
that they have acquired title over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted there
was no document evidencing that their parents bequeathed the property. Subsequent transfer
of the siblings’ interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was upheld. The CA upheld
lower court decision and held that since the property is co-owned by the plaintiffs- appellants, (
3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (7/10 undivided
interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey building
at the back portion of the property, partition is in order, in accord with the subdivision plan.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches
or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the
partition of the property.

HELD:

PETITION IS PARTLY MERITORIOUS.

Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property. Quieting of
title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title
to real property. 

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: 

(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and 
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
efficacy.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must necessarily
fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not petitioners
sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue that
is generally improper for Us to delve into.In any event, a perusal of the records would readily
show that petitioners, as aptly observed by the courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate
their claim. Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the
subject property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract
of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from the
petitioners. Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise
fatal to the latter’s claim.

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Regrettably, petitioners
failed to discharge the said burden. There is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that all
10 siblings inherited the subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and after the
respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and
respondent spouses became co-owners of the same.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment.

As to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their counterclaim, the petitioners

The Court had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice satisfies one of the elements of
res judicata. It is understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their
claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot
defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual
adjudication of ownership of shares yet. This is pertinent to Article 494 of the Civil Code which
discusses how the law generally does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property
relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners’ specific shares so as to prevent
the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners
under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish
the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a
construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that
a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to
prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without
prejudice.

This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata.
There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same
subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality
by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for
co- ownership does not or no longer exists.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches. We now proceed to petitioners’ second
line of attack. According to petitioners, the claim for partition is already barred by laches since
by 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and yet the respondent
siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in 2002. And since
laches has allegedly already set in against respondent siblings, so too should respondent
spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the same for they could not have acquired a better
right than their predecessors-in-interest.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which––by the exercise of due diligence––could or should have been done earlier. It is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. The principle is
a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon
one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character
of the petitioners’ title, but only with whether or not by reason of the respondents’ long
inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because
to allow them to do so would be inequitable and unjust to petitioners.

As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected to
assert their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have abandoned
their right given that they filed an action for partition. The fact that respondent siblings entered
into a Contract of Lease with Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject property is evidence
that they are exercising rights of ownership over the same.

The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision. There is merit, however, in
petitioners’ contention that the CA erred in approving the proposal for partition submitted by
respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that partition shall either be by
agreement of the parties or in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement
of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners cannot
serve as basis for partition for respondents admitted that the agreement was a falsity and that
petitioners never took part in preparing the same. The "agreement" was crafted without any
consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms with
petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to approve the
agreement in spite of this fact would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to divide
unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on their own whims and caprices.