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Wright Vs Manila Electric

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G.R. No.

L-7760             October 1, 1914 The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's
negligence was not as great as defendant's and under the authority of the
E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant,  case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co.  (7 Phil. Rep., 359) apportioned the damages
vs. and awarded plaintiff a judgment of P1,000.
MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., defendant-appellant.
The question before us is stated by the defendant thus: "Accepting the
W. A. Kincaid, Thomas L. Hartigan, and Jose Robles Lahesa for plaintiff. findings of the trial court that both plaintiff and defendant were guilty of
Bruce, Lawrence, Ross & Block for defendant. negligence, the only question to be considered is whether the negligence of
MORELAND, J.: plaintiff contributed t the 'principal occurrence' or 'only to his own injury.' If
the former, he cannot recover; if the latter, the trial court was correct in
This is an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained in an apportioning the damages."
accident which occurred in Caloocan on the night of August 8, 1909.
The questioned as stated by plaintiff is as follows: "The main question at
The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street issue is whether or not the plaintiff was negligent, and, if so, to what extent.
railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of If the negligence of the plaintiff was the primary cause of the accident then,
Caloocan. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along of course, he cannot recover; if his negligence had nothing to do with the
which defendant's tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street accident but contributed to his injury, then the court was right in
plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the night mentioned apportioning the damages, but if there was no negligence on the part of the
plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his plaintiff, then he should be awarded damages adequates to the injury
premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle sustained."
with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehicle
and caused the injuries complained of. In support of the defendant's contention counsel says: "Defendant's
negligence was its failure properly to maintain the track; plaintiff's
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the negligence was his intoxication; the 'principal occurrence' was plaintiff's fall
night in question not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties from his calesa. It seems clear that plaintiff's intoxication contributed to the
upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their fall; if he had been sober, it can hardly be doubted that he would have
depth out of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 crossed the track safely, as he had done a hundred times before."
inches or more above the level of the street.
While both parties appealed from the decision, the defendant on the
It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as ground that it was not liable and the plaintiff on the ground that the
described, but it is contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he damages were insufficient according to the evidence, and while the plaintiff
was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was made a motion for a new trial upon the statutory grounds and took proper
unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the exception to the denial thereof, thus conferring upon this court jurisdiction
primary cause of the accident. to determine the question of fact, nevertheless, not all of the testimony
taken on the trial, so far as can be gathered from the record, has been
brought to this court. There seems to have been two hearings, one on the
31st of August and the other on the 28th of September. The evidence taken amount of travel, the plaintiff was no less negligent, he not having abstained
on the first hearing is here; that taken on the second is not. Not all the from his custom of taking more wine than he could carry without disturbing
evidence taken on the hearings being before the court, we must refuse, his judgment and his self-control, he knowing that he had to drive a horse
under our rules, to consider even that evidence which is here; and, in the and wagon and to cross railroad tracks which were to a certain extent
decision of this case, we are, therefore, relegated to the facts stated in the dangerous by reason of the rails being elevated above the level of the
opinion of the court and the pleadings filed. street.

A careful reading of the decision of the trial court leads us to the conclusion If the plaintiff had been prudent on the night in question and had not
that there is nothing in the opinion which sustains the conclusion of the attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would
court that the plaintiff was negligent with reference to the accident which is certainly have avoided the damages which he received, although the
the basis of this action. Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. company, on its part, was negligent in maintaining its tracks in a bad
It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to condition for travel.
prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is
drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to Both parties, therefore, were negligent and both contributed to the
damages resulting to the plaintiff, although the plaintiff, in the judgment of
him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one. If one's
conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is the court, contributed in greater proportion to the damages that did the
defendant.
immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. (Ward vs. Chicago etc., R. R. Co.,
85 Wis., 601; H & T. C. R. Co. vs. Reason, 61 Tex., 613; Alger vs. Lowell, 3 As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which
Allen, Mass., 402; Central R. R. Co. vs. Phinazee, 93 Ga., 488; Maguire vs. warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that
Middlesex R. R. Co., 115 Mass., 239; Meyer vs. Pacific R. R. Co., 40 Mo., 151., if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by
Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. vs. Drake, 33 Ill. App., 114.) the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have
If intoxication is not in itself negligence, what are the facts found by the trial fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the
railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves
court and stated in its opinion upon which may be predicated the finding
that the plaintiff did not use ordinary care and prudence and that the aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the
vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this
intoxication contributed to the injury complained of? After showing clearly
and forcibly the negligence of the defendant in leaving its tracks in the might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his
condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man
condition in which they were on the night of the injury, the court has the
following to say, and it is all that can be found in its opinion, with reference would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion
which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.
to the negligence of the plaintiff: "With respect to the condition in which
Mr. Wright was on returning to his house on the night in question, the It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to
testimony of Doctor Kneedler, who was the physician who attended him an discuss the question presented by the appellant company with reference to
hour after the accident, demonstrates that he was intoxicated. . . . . the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co.,  above; and we do
not find facts in the opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict
If the defendant or its employees were negligent by reason of having left
the rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a street where there is a large than the one found.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.

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