ARTICLE 225 (Formerly Art.

218)

PAL v. NLRC
G.R. No. 120567, March 20, 1998

Martinez J.

DOCTRINE:

On Injuctive Powers: The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor
Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the
rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes
involving strikes or lockout.

It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the
contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute
betweenthe petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for
illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the
petitioner.

FACTS:

Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the
service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong
Kong.

Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petitionfor
injunction.

NLRC RULING:

On April 3, 1995, the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner
to cease and desist from enforcing its February 22, 1995 Memorandum of Dismissal. In
support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the NLRC adopted the view
that: (1) private respondents cannot be validly dismissed on the strength of petitioner's
Code of Discipline which was declared illegal by this Court in the case of PAL, Inc. vs.
NLRC, (G.R. No. 85985), promulgated August 13, 1993, for the reason that it was
formulated by the petitioner without the participation of its employees as required in R.A.
6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code; (2) the whimsical, baseless and
premature dismissals of private respondents which "caused them grave and irreparable
injury" is enjoinable as private respondents are left "with no speedy and adequate
remedy at law'"except the issuance of a temporary mandatory injunction; (3) the NLRC is
empowered under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code not only to restrain any actual or
threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts but also to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute, which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party; and (4) the temporary
mandatory power of the NLRC was recognized by this Court in the case of Chemo-
Technicshe Mfg., Inc. Employees Union,DFA, et.al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc.
[G.R. No. 107031, January 25,1993].

On May 4, 1995, petitioner moved for reconsideration. One of its arguments is that the
NLRC erred in granting a temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to issue
an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the
Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes. The NLRC denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE/S:

Can the NLRC, even without a complaint for illegal dismissal filed before the labor
arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining petitioner
Philippine Airlines, against private respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the
private respondents to their previous positions?

HELD:
In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC-

"(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage
to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party; x x x."

Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of

Procedure of the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows:

"Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute.-A preliminary injunction or a restraining

order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on
the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, involving
or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.”

The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident
to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the
pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strikes or lockout.

It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the
contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute
betweenthe petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for
illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the
petitioner.

The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for
illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition which prays for:
reinstatement of private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary
damages; and attorney's fees. As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor
arbiter who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting
private respondents' petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private
respondents.

Other Notes/ SC Pronouncements:

2. Landbank v. Listana
G.R. No. 182758, May 30, 2011
Ponente
Doctrine:

The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled

Facts:

Severino Listana owned a parcel of land in Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of

Title No. T-20193. Listana voluntarily sold the property to the Department of Agrarian
Reform under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

The DARAB of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine

the amount of just compensation for the property. The DARAB set the amount at
P10,956,963.25. PARAD issued a writ of execution ordering Land Bank Manager and
Agrarian Operations Center Head Alex A. Lorayes to pay Listana ₱10,956,963.25.
Lorayes refused. Thus, Listana filed with the PARAD a motion for contempt against
Lorayes.

LBP filed with the RTC acting as SAC, a petition for judicial determination of the amount
of just compensation for the property. LBP prayed that the amount be fixed at
₱5,871,689.03.

The SAC dismissed LBP’s petition for judicial determination of the amount of just
compensation for the property.
The PARAD ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution, ordering LBP to pay
Listana ₱10,956,963.25.

LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest
against Lorayes for indirect contempt.

The RTC enjoined the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP posted a
₱5,644,773.02 cash bond. Listana filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration. The
RTC denied the motion. Listana filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.

CA Ruling:

In its 11 December 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 29 January and 2
April 2001 Orders of the RTC.

SC Ruling:

LBP filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr., the Court set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals. The Court declared void all proceedings that stemmed from
Listana’s motion for contempt.

On 26 May 2004, LBP filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the ₱5,644,773.02 cash
bond.

RTC Ruling:
Tthe RTC denied LBP’s motion to withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash bond. It ruled that
contrary to Land Bank’s conclusion, this Court holds otherwise that the cash bond did not
become moot and academic upon the finality of the Supreme Court’s decision dated
August 5, 2003. This is so because the underlying reason for the posting of the cash
bond still remains despite the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the
unconstitutionality of the order of arrest issued by PARAD. And that reason is the
distinctive fact that the cash bond was put up in order to secure any damages that the
private respondent Listana may incur by reason of the issuance of the injunction order.
The damages being referred to, that is — the legal right of Mr. Listana to be justly and
promptly paid of his
expropriated property — was not effectively extinguished by the mere decision of the
Supreme Court declaring the illegality of the order of arrest issued by the PARAD against
Mr. Alex Lorayes.

LBP filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. LBP filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

CA Ruling:

The Court of Appeals dismissed LBP’s petition and affirmed in toto the RTC’s Orders.
LBP filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the motion.

Issue:

WON LBP can withdraw the cash bond.

Held:

An applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a bond executed to the party
or person enjoined, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction.

As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the ₱5,644,773.02 bond shall answer for the
damages Listana may sustain if the courts finally uphold the ₱10,956,963.25 just
compensation set by the DARAB. In Republic v. Caguioa, the Court held that, "The
purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled
to it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly."

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, it was held that Special Agrarian Courts are given
original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all
petitions for the determination of just compensation; and (2) the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. x x x The DAR, as an administrative agency,
cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal
cases. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and cannot be lodged
with administrative agencies

Thus, as a rule, the DARAB’s decision setting the amount of just compensation is merely
preliminary and not executory if challenged before the SAC. Execution pending "appeal"
of the DARAB decision is allowed only on meritorious grounds. Even then, it is the SAC,
not the DARAB, that can grant execution pending "appeal" because the SAC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over just compensation cases. The determination of the
amount of just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by
administrative agencies.

In the present case, LBP filed with the SAC a petition for determination of the amount of
just compensation on 6 September 1999. The PARAD issued the alias writ of execution
and warrant of arrest on 27 November 2000 and 3 January 2001, respectively. The writ
of execution and warrant of arrest were invalid because the 14 October 1998 Decision of
the DARAB setting the amount at ₱10,956,963.25 was merely preliminary and not
executory.

FEDERICO S. ROBOSA, ROLANDO E. PANDY, NOEL D. ROXAS, ALEXANDER

ANGELES, VERONICA GUTIERREZ, FERNANDO EMBAT, and NANETTE H. PINTO
vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 176085; February 8, 2012 BRION, J.

DOCTRINE: The labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to

hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect contempt.

FACTS:

Federico S. Robosa, Rolando E. Pandy, Noel D. Roxas, Alexander Angeles, Veronica

Gutierrez, Fernando Embat and Nanette H. Pinto (petitioners) were rank-and-file
employees of respondent Chemo-Technische Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI), the
manufacturer and distributor of Wella products. They were officers and members of the
CTMI Employees Union-DFA (union). Respondent Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc.
(P & GPI) acquired all the interests, franchises and goodwill of CTMI during the
pendency of the dispute.

On July 15, 1991, CTMI, through its President and General Manager Franklin R. de
Luzuriaga, issued a memorandum announcing that territories were demobilized. On the
same day, CTMI issued another memorandum informing the company’s sales
representatives and sales drivers of the new system in the Salon Business Groups
selling operations. The union asked for the withdrawal and deferment of CTMIs
directives, branding them as union busting acts constituting unfair labor practice. CTMI
ignored the request. Instead, it issued on July 23, 1991 a notice of termination of
employment to the sales drivers, due to the abolition of the sales driver positions. On
August 1, 1991, the union and its affected members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice, with a claim for damages, against CTMI, De Luzuriaga and
other CTMI officers.

The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings: The labor arbiter handling the case denied
the unions motion for a stay order on the ground that the issues raised by the petitioners
can best be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the case.

NLRC: It directed CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other company executives to cease and
desist from dismissing any member of the union and from implementing the subject
memorandums and to return to status quo.

Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRCs August 23, 1991 resolution.
They instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the unions petition for preliminary
injunction. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the responsible
CTMI officers in contempt of court. Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge. On
October 31, 2000, it issued a resolution dismissing the charge. It ordered the labor arbiter
to proceed hearing the main case on the merits.

CA: It opined that the dismissal is not subject to review by an appellate court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers;

RULING:

Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending
party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance
with law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the
degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is against the Commission or the
labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to
deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate
indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only
when there is no law granting them contempt powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of
the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to
hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect contempt. The petitioners,
therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect contempt charges against the
respondents before the NLRC.

JOLO’S KIDDIE v. CABILLA, November 29, 2017

CRISPIN S. FRONDOZO, DANILO M. PEREZ, JOSE A. ZAFRA, ARTURO B. VITO,

CESAR S. CRUZ, NAZARIO C. DELA CRUZ, and LUISITO R. DILOY v. MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY.

Doctrine: The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC did not make a distinction
between decisions or resolutions decided by the Labor Arbiter and those decided by the
Commission in certified cases when an order of reinstatement is involved. Thus, even
when the employer had perfected an appeal, the Labor Arbiter must issue a writ of
execution for actual or payroll reinstatement of the employees illegally dismissed from
the service. The Court of Appeals also cited Article 223 of the Labor Code which
provides that the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter's Decision is immediately
executory.

FACTS:

The case originated from a Notice of Strike (first strike) filed on 16 May 1991 by the
MERALCO Employees and Workers Association (MEWA), composed of MERALCO’s
rank-and-file employees, on the ground of Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). Conciliation
conferences conducted by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) failed
to settle the dispute and resulted to a strike staged by MEWA on 6 June 1991. In an
Order dated 6 June 1991, then Acting Secretary·Nieves R. Confesor of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration, ordered all the striking workers to return to work, and directed MERALCO to
accept the striking workers back to work under the same terms and conditions existing
prior to the work stoppage.

On 26 July 1991, MERALCO terminated the services of Crispin S. Frondozo (Frondozo ),

Danilo M. Perez (Perez), Jose A. Zafra (Zafra), Arturo B. Vito (Vito ). Cesar S. Cruz
(Cruz), Nazario C. dela Cruz (N. dela Cruz), Luisito R. Diloy (Diloy), and Danilo D. Dizon
(Dizon) for having committed unlawful acts and violence during the strike.

On 25 July 1991, MEWA filed a second Notice of Strike (second strike) on the ground of
discrimination and union busting that resulted to the dismissal from employment of 25
union officers and workers. Then DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued an Order
dated 8 August 1991 that certified the issues raised in the second strike to the NLRC for
consolidation with the first strike and strictly enjoined any strike or lockout pending
resolution of the labor dispute. The Order also directed MERALCO to suspend the effects
of termination of the employees and re-admit the employees under the same terms and
conditions without loss of seniority rights.

The labor dispute resulted to the filing of two complaints for illegal dismissal. The NLRC
consolidated the two illegal dismissal cases with NLRC NCR CC No. 000021-91 (In the
Matter of the Labor Dispute at the Manila Electric Company) and NLRC NCR Case No.
00-05-03381-93 (MEWA v. MERALCO). NLRC modified its final decision ordering
respondent MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY to reinstate to their former or equivalent
positions DANILO DIZON and LUISITO DILOY, without loss of seniority rights and
payment of backwages computed from the time of their dismissal.

Two petitions for certiorari were filed before the Court of Appeals. Pending the case in
CA, the NLRC issued an entry of judgment. MERALCO informed the NLRC of the payroll
reinstatement of the 14 respondents. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals Special Second
Division found that the strike of 6-8 June 1991 was illegal because it occurred despite an
assumption order by the DOLE Secretary and because of the commission of illegal acts
marred with violence and coercion. In view thereof, MERALCO stopped their payroll
reinstatement. Labor Arbiter Guerrero ruled that the Court of Appeals’ 30 May 2003
Decision had not attained finality and as such, respondents should be reinstated from the
time they were removed from the payroll until their actual/payroll reinstatement based on
their latest salary prior to their dismissal. Court of Appeals Fourteenth Division rendered
its decision that respondent MERALCO is ordered to pay the petitioners full backwages
computed from July 26, 1991, when they were illegally dismissed, up to the date of their
actual reinstatement in the service. The respondents moved for the issuance of an Alias
Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of their accrued wages arising from the recall of their
payroll reinstatement. On 10 June 2004, Labor Arbiter Guerrero granted the motion.

On 14 June 2004, a Second Alias Writ of Execution was issued directing the Sheriff to
cause the reinstatement of the respondents and to collect backwages from 14 December
2001 to 15 January 2003 and from 1 June 2003 to 1 June 2004. MERALCO filed a
motion to quash the Second Alias Writ of Execution but it was denied on 2 July 2004. On
20 July 2004, the Sheriff reported that the amount of ₱2,879,967.53 garnished funds had
been delivered to and deposited with the NLRC Cashier for the satisfaction of the
monetary award. However, the reinstatement portion of the judgment remained
unimplemented due to the failure of MERALCO to reinstate the respondents.

Meanwhile, MERALCO filed two motions before the NLRC: (1) a motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal filed on 5 July 2004 assailing the 10 June 2004 Order of
Labor Arbiter Guerrero granting the issuance of the Second Alias Writ of Execution and
directing the payment of backwages of ₱2,851,453 to respondents and ordering their
reinstatement actually or in the payroll, which was accompanied by a bond equivalent to
the amount of the accrued backwages; and (2) an urgent motion for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed on 13 July 2004 directed
against the Second Alias Writ of Execution pending the resolution of its first motion.

NLRC RULING: The NLRC granted the prayer for preliminary injunction of MERALCO.
The NLRC considered the difficulty in proceeding with the execution given the conflicting
decisions of the Court of Appeals' Special Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 and
the Court of Appeals' Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R.

COURT OF APPEALS RULING: NLRC ruling upheld. CA concurred with the NLRC's
pronouncement that MERALCO has no speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the preservation of its rights and interests, at least insofar only and
solely as to avoid the injurious consequences of the 2nd alias writ of execution relative to
the reinstatement aspect of the final decision in CA-G.R. No. SP 72509.

PETITION TO THE SC:

Petitioner's Contention: Petitioners alleged that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in upholding the 28 February 2006 and 26 May 2006 Resolutions of
the NLRC, in not passing upon the issues of reinstatement and release of the garnished
amount against MERALCO, and in ruling that the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 is
considered a bar in the implementation of the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in upholding the NLRC in
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MERALCO.

The Ruling
HELD: Petition has no merit. The Court of Appeals cited the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC which provides that "[u]pon issuance of the entry of judgment,
the Commission, motu proprio or upon motion by the proper party, may cause the
execution of the judgment in the certified case." According to the Court of Appeals, the
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC did not make a distinction between
decisions or resolutions decided by the Labor Arbiter and those decided by the
Commission in certified cases when an order of reinstatement is involved. Thus, even
when the employer had perfected an appeal, the Labor Arbiter must issue a writ of
execution for actual or payroll reinstatement of the employees illegally dismissed from
the service. The Court of Appeals also cited Article 223 of the Labor Code which
provides that the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter's Decision is immediately
executory.

In this case, the applicable rule is Article 263 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Manual
on Execution of Judgment, as amended by Resolution No. 02-02, series of 2002. Section
1, Rule III of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:

Section 1. Execution Upon Final Judgment or Order. Execution shall issue only upon a
judgment or order that finally disposes of an action or proceeding, except in specific
instances where the law provides for execution pending appeal.

Article 263(i) of the Labor Code, on the other hand, provides:

The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator
shall decide or resolve the dispute within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of
the assumption of jurisdiction or the certification or submission of the dispute, as the
case may be. The decision of the President, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory
ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.

A judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC may be filed before the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but the
petition shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining
order is issued by the Court of Appeals.

The situation in this case is analogous to a change in the situation of the parties
making execution unjust or inequitable. MERALCO's refusal to reinstate petitioners
and to pay their backwages is justified by the 30 May 2003 Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 72480. On the other hand, petitioners' insistence on the execution of judgment is
anchored on the 27 January 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals' Fourteenth
Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509. Given this situation, we see no reversible error
on the part of the Court of Appeals in holding that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings.

Clearly, the NLRC did not act in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic
manner. It suspended the proceedings because it cannot revise or modify the
conflicting Decisions of the Court of Appeals.

Final ruling: The Supreme Court's Third Division adopted the findings and
conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 which
dismissed petitioners from the service.

Bisig Manggagawa Sa Concrete Aggregates v. NLRC

16 September 1993

Doctrine: To be sure, the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order in a

labor dispute is not per se prohibited. Its issuance, however, should be characterized
by care and caution for the law requires that it be clearly justified by considerations
of extreme necessity, i.e., when the commission of unlawful acts is causing
substantial and irreparable injury to company properties and the company is, for the
moment, bereft of an adequate remedy at law.

Facts:

Petitioner union struck protesting issues ranging from unfair labor practices and
union busting allegedly committed by the private respondent Concrete Aggregates
Corporation. The union picketed the premises of the private respondent at
Bagumbayan and Longos in Quezon City; Angono and Antipolo in Rizal; San
Fernando, Pampanga and San Pedro, Laguna. The private respondent corporation
then filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction to stop the strike which it denounced
as illegal.
The petition was set for hearing. The union, however, claimed that it was not
furnished a copy of the petition and allegedly, the company misrepresented its
address. Consequently, the NLRC heard the evidence of the company alone. The ex
parte hearing started and after some 30 minutes, an Ocular Inspection Report was
submitted by an unnamed NLRC representative, providing therein that the
barricades were put up 50 meters more or less away from the main gate; and the
business operation was completely paralized, as ingress to and egress from the
company is presumed to be not free. The respondent NLRC (First Division) issued a
TRO against the union. No copy of this Order was furnished the Union, learning the
same only when it was posted on April 15, 1992 at the premises of the company, or
two days after it was issued.

On April 21, 1992, it filed its Opposition/Answer to the petition for Injunction. Among
others, it alleged that the question of strike legality is outside the original jurisdiction
of the NLRC; except only if the labor dispute has been certified to it for compulsory
arbitration. On April 24, 1992, the union also led its own Petition for Injunction to
enjoin the company "from asking the aid of the police and the military officer in
escorting scabs to enter the struck establishment."

On April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction wherein it alleged that the respondents are still committing
illegal acts. The union got wind of the motion only on May 4, 1992. The next day,
May 5, 1992, it opposed the motion, alleging that they were never furnished by the
petitioner with a copy of the original petition for injunction filed on April 8, 1992 and
they came to know only of the same when Commission issued a temporary
restraining order dated April 15, 1992 which was served to them at the picket line on
April 15, 1992 and thus they opposed the same on April 20, 1992.

Ruling of lower courts:

The respondent NLRC issued the disputed order granting the company's motion for
preliminary injunction on May 5, 1992. Hence, the union then filed the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus.

Issue:

Whether respondent NLRC can issue a preliminary injunction, as it did issue after
the lapse of a 20-day temporary restraining order without regard to the specific
provision of Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code?

Ruling:

NB: The TRO was issued on April 14, 1992, and the first day of the implementation
of the restraining order was on April 20, 1992. Preliminary injunction issued May 5,
1992.

NO. Records will show that the respondent NLRC failed to comply with the letter and
spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code in issuing its Order of May 5,
1992.
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. — The Commission shall have the power and
authority:
xxx xxx xxx

To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all

prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any
labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after
hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in
support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in
opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the commission, to
the effect:

That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
and will be continued unless restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except
against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or
committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same
after actual knowledge thereof;

That substantial and irreparable injury to complainants property will follow;

That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon
complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting of relief;

That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants property
are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

The affiants of the affidavits presented by the company in support of their allegations
themselves controverted the allegations of claim of prohibited acts committed by the
union against the non-striking employees. They innocently divulged having signed
the prepared affidavit without first reading the same. Moreover, no less than the
Assistant Manager for Operations of the Company, testified that after the issuance of
the ex parte temporary restraining order, the barricade blocking the gates were
removed and people were allowed free ingress and egress. Furthermore, Atty. Elmer
Jolo, the Personnel Manager joined by Mr. Mercado, disclosed that the public
authorities charged to protect the company's properties were neither unwilling or
unable to furnish adequate protection. As a matter of fact, the police regularly
patrolling the area, was never requested assistance.

Moreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair strategies to secure ex
parte temporary restraining orders against striking employees. Consequently, the
petitioner was denied the right to attend the hearing.