The Changing Class Structure in Lebanon

Author(s): Fuad I. Khuri

Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter, 1969), pp. 29-44
Published by: Middle East Institute
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4324393
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 THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURE
IN LEBANON

Fuad I. Khuri

IT IS still inappropriate to use the concept of class to study social structure

in Lebanon, the more so if this study involves power structure. Not that
the Lebanese, as groups, lack class consciousness, but they have been unable
to translate their consciousness into collective, organized power. Family and
sect interests, not class interests, dictate the course of political rivalry.'
Class differences do exist: either in the sense that a community as a whole
is ranked higher or lower than another, as when the Christians are reputed
to be richer than Muslims, or villagers poorer than city dwellers, or that each
community is internally stratified into graded classes, called tabaqat. The
classes of one community overlap with those of other communities-that is,
membership in a class extends across the boundaries of ethnic-religious groups.2
To understand class in Lebanon, therefore, it is necessary to realize two points:
first, that class is a group of people with distinct ways of life; second, that this
grouping is not based strictly on ethnic-religious or rural-urban differences.
Where ethnic-religious or rural-urban differences produce a class, they do so
only in conjunction with differences in income, occupation, education and social
power. Today, the class structure in Lebanon does not conform to the simple
division of minority versus majority or village versus city. Just as the ruling
elites, the upper class, for example, are the product of city tradition and of village
tradition, the village peasants, or fallahdn, migrate to cities and become fused
with the urban lower classes.
In this paper, I intend to discuss ( 1) some of the general factors that have
changed the class structure in Lebanon, (2) the meaning of class and the
number of classes evolved, (3) the distinguishing features of each class and
mobility between classes and (4) the reasons for the lack of antagonism

1. The lack of class conflict in Lebanon and in the Middle East in general has led some Middle
Eastern sociologists either to use the term "class" apologetically as Van Nieuwenhuijze does (1965: 2),
in studying the Middle East, or to exaggerate the peasant character of the area, for peasantry lacks
class struggle. For further information on peasantry and class struggle, see Mehmet Beqiraj (1966:
42-43) and Karl Marx (1957: 109).
2. See E. T. Prothro for his description of a small sample of lower and middle class families
(1961: 39-40). See also C. W. Churchill (1954) and D. Yaukey (1961: 33-43), both of whom
incorporated in the same class people of different ethic-religious background.

A FUAD I. KHuRu is assistant professor of anthropology, American University of Beirut.

29

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30 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

between classes. The general conclusions about the changing class structure
in Lebanon are drawn from specific studies on class, and from public documents.3

The economic factors which began to modify the class structure in Lebanon
can be traced back to the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the
Lebanese peasants were busy raising the silkworm. Unlike subsistence pro-
duction, silk production was a cash crop that enabled the peasants first to
acquire luxuries, such as sugar, coffee and tea, and later, towards the end of the
nineteenth century, to accumulate savings for reinvestment. The acquisition
of luxuries and the accumulation of savings for investment, however small
they were, induced economic and social differentiation. During the second half
of the nineteenth century, silk reeling factories, called karakhanat, were
established in many towns and villages of Lebanon. As a result, the local
market expanded, trade with Europe via the two ports of Beirut and Sidon
increased, a local group of commercial and industrial entrepreneurs (the middle
classes) developed, and a number of workers, mainly peasant girls, who worked
in these karakhanat, earned economic and social independence and consequently
became freer than before from family supervision.4
The silk industry continued to grow until World War I, when the mulberry
trees which fed the silkworm were cut down for timber. In the inter-war
period, because of foreign competition and the development of rayon, the silk
industry was eliminated, only to be replaced by new enterprises. Fruit trees
in Mount Lebanon, tobacco in the South, and hemp in the Biqa' Valley, began
to replace mulberries as cash crops. At the same time, tourism became a
promising industry, stimulating the growth of small native enterprise and
the construction of innumerable hotels and nightclubs.
While World War I brought suffering, including mass starvation, World
War II brought nothing but gain. The expenditure of the allies in Lebanon
and Syria, and the reserves businessmen accumulated, accelerated the process
of economic growth.5 After 1945, Lebanon rapidly developed into a leading

3. The data for this paper are obtained from (1 ) two field researches carried by the author on
class differentiation in three communities in Lebanon, (2) a number of studies on social differentia-
tion in Lebanon and in the Middle East, and (3) from censuses collected by government depart-
ments, especially by IRFED mission. All these sources are specified in the proper place in the
footnotes.
4. In 1827, an official source stated that of the 34 commercial firms dealing with Europe, 15 were
owned by local Christians and 6 by Turks, that is, by Muslims. In 1839, these commercial firms
grew to 67 of which 34 belong to local Lebanese, Christian and Muslim. Concerning silk industry,
in 1862, 33 of 44 silk reeling industries were owned by Lebanese who controlled 1350 of the 2200
pans in use. For further details see the publications of the Ministeres des Affaires Etrangeres,
Correspondance Commerciale (Beyrouth) Vols. 1, 2, and 7.
5. The allied expenditure amounted to 76 million stirling, and the reserves were estimated to be
$100 million. See the United Nations, Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945-54 (New
York, 1955), p. 151.

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 THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURE IN LEBANON 31

financial center and entrepOt for the neighboring coun

made in commerce and finance were frequently reinve
a part of these earnings was also reinvested in industry
several times the country's production and breaking dow
smaller plots.7 The division of the large estates into sm
the authority of the landed aristocracy, thus continuin
of 1840-1860. The service sector, including tourism, m
smuggling, has also been expanding. The number of tourists, for example,
excluding Syrians and passengers in transit, rose from 89,000 in 1951 to
250,000 in 1962, bringing in about $35 million per year as estimated in 1962.8
As a result of this general growth in Lebanon's economy, income per capita
reached about $370 per year in 1962, and urbanization became rapid.9 The
rural population was reduced to only 26.7 per cent of the total population,10
but the country's educational facilities, public works, welfare projects, adminis-
tration, and the army, were all extended to even some of the remotest villages,
opening new outlets for individual mobility.
Of these, education and emigration have perhaps been the main drives for
class mobility and change. It was as early as the beginning of the seventeenth
century that Maronite clerks, graduating from Rome, returned to Lebanon
and started to establish primary schools in the countryside. Muslim instructors,
before them, had been teaching the Qur'an in the mosques of Sidon, Beirut
and, more particularly, Tripoli. These early efforts, however, had no significant
effects on the spread of literacy or advanced knowledge: schools were few in
number, and attendance was the privilege of the rich. Not until the coming
of the Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries did education begin to draw
6. The number of banks with a capital not less than one million Lebanese pounds increased from
7 in 1945 to 21 in 1955, to 43 in 1960, and to 58 in 1962. Current accounts doubled more than
four times between 1950 and 1961, and the savings deposits increased from 215 million Lebanese
pounds in 1950 to 1,082 million Lebanese pounds in 1961. See Minist6re du Plan, Besoins et
Possibilites de Developpement da Liban, prepared by Mission IRFED, Vol. 1 (1960-61), pp. 49-51.
The amount of goods, including oil, which passed in transit through Lebanon rose from about 23
million tons in 1952 to about 34 million in 1963. The number of foreign passengers who left the
country rose from 61,320 persons in 1950 to 718,530 persons in 1963. See Le Ministere du Plan,
Direction Centrale de la Statistique (Beyrouth, 1963), pp. 46-47; 178-79.
7. In agriculture, the cultivated and irrigated land has been increasing at a high rate of 3 per cent
per annum since 1948. More use of fertilizers, pesticides, tractors and selected seeds is being made.
Although cereals production dropped from 118,940 tons in 1956 to 98,275 tons in 1963, vegetable
production rose from 237,350 tons in 1956 to 383,740 tons in 1963 and fruit production rose from
372,895 tons in 1956 to 485,590 tons in 1963. See Le Ministere du Plan, Direction Centrale de la
Statistique (Beyrouth, 1963), pp. 62-67. In industry, the number of firms rose from 430 in 1950
to 2,099 in 1964, and the number of employees rose from 34,214 in 1955 to 44,984 in 1964. See
the daily newspaper of al-Nahar of 17/8/67. Thermal and hydro-electric production rose from 57
million Kw in 1945 to 424 million in 1961. See IRFED, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 201.
8. Check Charles Issawi (1966, 75).
9. It is estimated that between 1959 and 1965, the population of the city of Beirut grew from
600,000 to 737,000; that of Tripoli from 125,000 to 141,000; that of Zahle from 40,000 to 45,000;
and that of Saidon from 30,000 to 34,000. See Institute de Formation en Vue du Developpement,
Le Liban am Tournant (Beyrouth, 1963).
10. See IRFED, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 54.

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32 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

the attention of the layman. This was du

century when these missionaries opened day schools and seminaries, and
established two printing presses, one, the American Press, in 1834, and the
other, the Roman Catholic Press, in 1847. After the Civil War of 1860, the
two missions embarked on more extensive educational schemes, culminating
in the establishment of two important universities, the American University of
Beirut and St. Joseph University." Missionary or otherwise, formal education
remained private until it was made also public by the French in the 1920s.
Although public education during the French Mandate (1920-1943) grew
slowly, it was the foundation upon which further and more ambitious programs
were built, after Lebanon had achieved independence in 1943. Public schools,
primary and secondary, became five times as many in 1959 as they were in
1943; the number of students increased at the same rate; while the number
of teachers was at a doubled rate that is, at a rate ten times as large in 1959
as it was in 1943. Today, Lebanon boasts seven institutions for higher education
with an enrollment of about seven thousand Lebanese students.'2
Varied as they are, educational services have created different social, economic,
political and cultural elites-different organizations, parties and groups, with
dispersed and diffuse orientations. In preparing for different economic rewards,
occupational and professional advancement, education has also prepared for
class mobility and differentiation.
Since 1860, emigration has opened a new phase in the country's class
structure.'3 Its effects are not only noticeable in the large remittances the
emigrants send back, which help to even up Lebanon's balance of payments,
and in the huge capital the returning emigrants have invested in agriculture,
industry, construction and commerce, but also in the changing social order.14
The intermittent coalition of families has been disrupted by the many families
which desert their villages in a body.'5 New families rise to power, others
begin to challenge the authority of the established ones. The rise of a new
leader, often supported by the rich emigrants in his family, signals the beginning

11. For further information on the evolution of the educational system in Lebanon see Kamal
Salibi (1965: 122-140).
12. The number of public schools, primary and secondary, increased from 348 in 1943 to 1500
in 1959; the number of students from 23,000 to 105,000; and the number of teachers from 451 to
5,520. See IRFED, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 62-63.
13. Emigration to Egypt and the Americas started at a rate of 3,000 persons per year between the
period 1860-1900, and increased to 15,000 persons per year between the period 1900-1914. After
1921, the rate of emigration started to decline, reaching an average of 2,850 during the period 1951-
1959. During the last three decades, most of the Lebanese emigrants have gone to West Africa, and
more recently to the Persian Gulf area. It is estimated today that about half of Lebanon (1,089,040
emigrants) live outside Lebanon. Check IRFED, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 49-51; and Elie Safa (1960:
22-23).
14. More detailed information about the effects of emigration on economic growth in Lebanon
can be found in Negib Moussali (1933), Said Himmadeh (1936), Herbert and Judith Williams
(1965: 59-64).
15. For more data on families deserting their villages in a body see John Gulick (1955: 37).

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 THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURE IN LEBANON 33

of this challenge, and also of family conflicts. Fam

thus become acute-sometimes violent, as in the town of Zgharta (North
Lebanon) -not only because of the laxity of the law, but also because of
family mobility. A family moves up the social ladder in Lebanon if it can affor
a sustained conflict with the dominant ones. Indeed, the emigrants have insti-
gated so many conflicts that a Lebanese proverb-"nothing from the West
pleases the heart" (ma fi shi mni l-gharb bisir l-qalb)-is meant to explain
their role in starting troubles.
More relevant to this discussion, however, are the effects of emigration on
individual mobility and class conflict. There is a general belief in Lebanon
that a person, educated or uneducated, can only improve his position by emigra-
tion, not by rebelling against working conditions in the country. The belief
that emigration improves a man's position is demonstrated by the many Lebanese
who have made their wealth abroad, and is reinforced by the fact that among
the many emigrants who live outside Lebanon only the wealthy willingly
return to the country, either for a short visit or permanently. The poor emigrants
(and there are many of them) stay abroad.'6 Hence, while emigration leads
to family mobility and increases family conflicts, it also tends to channel out
social unrest and lessen class conflict.

II

Emigration, education, economic expansion and the growth of native enter-

prise have modified the characteristics and structure of social classes. Briefly,
there are two broad classes: the elites, called al-khassas and the commoners,
called al-'amma. The elites were, in turn, sub-divided into two types: the
aI-khassa proper, composed of the ruling regimes and their officials, normally
of foreign origin; and the ayan, composed of local leaders, acting as inter-
mediaries between the ruling r6gimes and the commoners. Included among
the ayan were also the rich merchants who imitated the former's way of life,
attended their parties, and kept their company. While the rank of the
al-khrssa proper was derived from their politico-military power, that of the
a'yan was derived from their wealth, family background, religious scholarship,
and their admired style of life. After independence, however, these two types
of the Elites merged as the notables of the country, a class whose characteristics
will be discussed in later sections.
The commoners, on the other hand, were composed of trading and working
people who possessed neither office, learning, nor wealth. Although al-'amma
were combined in one class, they were nonetheless arranged in a hierarchy of
occupations. Masons and carpenters, for example, were commoners higher in
rank than brokers, criers or money changers, and these were higher than wine
sellers, cock fighters, dancers, waste scavengers, whose morality was questionable
16. See Fuad I. Khuri (1965: 385-395).

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34 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Peasants and sharecroppers were considered a separate group in a special

way: their rank was determined on a local scale at the village level-a scale
of two classes, composed of landlords and peasants.
Instead of this rigid, broad two-class division (elites and commoners in
cities, landlords and peasants in villages), there evolved a fluid class structure
composed of four main classes, and there is reason to believe that the number
of classes is rising. My research on social class in "Cedarstown," a community
of growing economic differentiation, shows that of the thirty-five local
informants, twenty-five grouped a representative sample of families into four
classes, seven into more than four classes, and three into three classes.17 The
tendency to group the people of Cedarstown into four classes agrees with
Georges Hakim's grouping, and with Manfred Halpern's hypothetical grouping
in the Middle East, when he speaks of a "would-be-middle class" in addition
to the professional, salaried middle class, and the upper and lower classes.18
Other classifications, those based on mere occupation or income, do not correlate
strictly with class rankings.'9 The Lebanese conceive of class, tabaqah, as a
social category of distinct social position, not just an occupational or income
group. Income, occupation, expenditure, education, and other related criteria,
become class indices only if translated collectively into a social position, a way
of life. For example, not all tailors in Cedarstown belong to the same class:
of the nine tailors in this town, two belong to class IV (the needy), five to
class III (the lower middle class), and one to class II (the upper middle class).
The latter owns and manages his own shop. He is not an employee, but an
employer of four other tailors. "He is independent," an informant from
Cedarstown stated, "and has a honeyed tongue (lisan ma'sid) which, together
with his wealth, enables him to keep the company of class II of which he is
a full member." By the same token, not all those who earn the same income
belong to the same class. In Aramti (South Lebanon), the village shopkeeper,
while he earns as much money as the bus driver, is nonetheless grouped in
a higher class; the former owns and manages his shop, the latter serves his
patron, the bus owner.20

17. Cedarstown is the name the author had chosen for the town of Amyuin (North Lebanon)
where he carried research in 1959-60 on social class and education. A great part of this research was
written as the author's M.A. thesis to the Department of Education, American University of Beirut.
The thirty-five informants were consulted as a preliminary step to determine the number of classes
in Cedarstown. A panel composed of ten judges was then selected and asked to rate all the families
living in town into four classes, the determined number of classes. A detailed description of the
method of classification is included in Fuad I. Khuri's unpublished M.A. thesis, Education as a
Function of Social Stratification in Cedarstown, Department of Education, American University of
Beirut (1960).
18. Georges Hakim (1966: 57-68); Manfred Halpern (1965: 62).
19. For occupational rankings see Morroe Berger (1964: 246-247), and L. Armstrong and
Gordon Hirabayashi (1956; 429-434). For income ranking see Charles Issawi who mentions five
income groups: wretched, poor, medium, well off and rich (1966: 77).
20. In 1965, the author carried research on rural migration from the two villages of Douma
(North Lebanon) and Aramti (South Lebanon). Among other things, this research focused on the

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 THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURE IN LEBANON 35

III

Class I is called the notables (a/-wujaha') or the known (al-ma'riRfrn); class

II the affluent (al-mubhabahin); class III the honorable poor (al-mastrirfn);
class IV the needy (al-muhtaftn). Since the notables and the needy represent
the two extremes of the social ladder, they are best described, as classes, together.
The notables, strictly speaking, are not members of a class which has achieved
eminence through its own unaided efforts. They are distinguished from the
affluent not by education, expenditure or profession, but by belonging to
"testablished houses," called biy&t mar;gfi. Used in this sense, an established
house refers to a preeminent extended family, a part of a larger kin who trace
descent to a known ancestor after whom they are named. The preeminence
of an extended family is derived from wielding community power for at least
three generations.2' After three generations of preeminence, the modest origin
of a house tends to be forgotten, and this house is established among the
notables in the community. But the preeminence of one house in a kin group
does not automatically turn all the kin into a cluster of established houses;
it does nonetheless affect class mobility within it. Thus, if his kin is distinguished
by an established house, a person may achieve a position of leadership within
a single generation; but a person whose kin lack such established houses
would require a longer period of time to achieve a position of leadership,
even when he fulfills the other qualifications for this role.22
The notable is a leader of some sort, not just a potential one. His leadership
is generally derived from his control of people, not of land, which means,
first, that the upper class is not necessarily a landed aristocracy and, second,
that mechanized agriculture, which replaces labor on the farm, reduces the
political influence of landlords. Some notables control their kin only; others
control a larger social group. The latter type, who control kin and non-kin
alike, are the zuama' who exercise regional influence and practice national
politics. Regional or local, however, all notables exert political influence
(nufth). They are called "the possessors of influence" (as'4ab nufi6th), the
possessors of popularity (ashab sha'biyyi), the front of the town (sidir 1-baldi),

changing status of migrants and on the ties they maintained with the mother village.
21. In his study of rank and status in a Muslim Shi'ite village in South Lebanon, Emrys Peters
mentions that three men of peasant stock have acquired status of upper class in 50 years (1967:
169), and that there is a difference of about three generations between the upper class genealogies
and the commoners' genealogies (Ibid.: 183-187). The author believes that this three-generation
difference indicates the time a "house" takes to establish its preeminence. What supports this opinion
is the fact that most informants in Cedarstown have traced the preeminence of a single house of a
patri-kin to three generations. There is, however, one exception to this rule in Cedarstown where a
person has achieved a notables status within a single generation despite the fact that his father had
belonged to the mastirin. This person is a prominent leader in an ideological party with tremendous
influence in his region.
22. Muhammad Atif Ghaith mentions about Egypt that a landless person who belongs to a
dominant patri-kin is higher in status than another landless person who belongs to a less dominant
one (1964: 299). Naim Attiyeh mentions the same principle about Cedarstown (1964: 370).

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36 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

election keys (maffafti intikhabiyyi), men

tectors of people (bumot n-nas). These term
larly of the needy class, also called the sha'bi
"the people" (al-sha'b). The non-kin whom
to the needy class, but the kin he controls
needy, the mastuirgn (honorable poor), o
affluent supports a notable, he does so be
or has rendered the former special politi
mastur or the affluent's support, unlike
subject to change.
The needy class comprises those who are
The term dependence here is used broadly
and on relatives. They include sharecroppers
watchmen, barbers, leatherworkers, servants
They also include those craftsmen and trade
because they work as employees or apprenti
a taxidriver, for example, who works for an
the taxidriver who owns and drives his own
Sharecroppers and peasants predominate
servants, watchmen and others included
cities and towns. The status of sharecropp
that of commoners in the two-class divisi
lower class status of today. They represen
way; they employ traditional tools and meth
costumes, practice traditional customs, liv
on a major staple food (bread), suffer fr
hardship period that normally precedes the
whatever income they produce. Subsisten
modest savings they accumulate defray the
birth, baptism, marriage, funerals and fest
Today, as a result of mechanized agricult
the relatively advanced market facilities,
replacing the peasant (fallah) in Lebanon
sufficient households, is disappearing fas
interdependence. In Cedarstown, for exam
munity, only about twenty-five per cent
in the needy class, including, in addition
the day laborers and the tradesmen mention
Because of their limited income and res
laborers of the needy class rely on family
the head of the family alone is inadequat
standard of living; it has to be subsidized,

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 THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURE IN LEBANON 37

brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, and sometimes parents-a

class aims to attain by living in extended family households. Reliance on
family labor for survival degrades the status of the family for two reasons.
First, it involves the employment of women and children outside the house,
which exposes the family to disgrace; second, the reliance on women and
children's income shames the men. Still important is the fact that the needy
engage not only in the least productive jobs, but also in the ones least respected
socially. Day laborers, for example, are considered to be low; barbers effeminate;
servants, leatherworkers and dustmen, on the other hand, immodest. The reason
is that the first do menial work, the second deal with perfume, while the last
must concern themselves with the naiis, the unclean.
The two middle classes, the mastLrin and the affluent, compose the majority
of the Lebanese population. In Cedarstown, for example, they constitute 70
per cent of the families: about 22 per cent (39 of 180 families) in the class
of mastarin.3 These mastuirin include small landowners and shopkeepers,
teachers, technicians, tradesmen and those who earn their living independently
by owning and managing their own capital and resources. They also include
minor clerks, secretaries and ordinary soldiers, often employed by the central
administration, the commercial and industrial firms, and the army. Implied
in the term mastarn is the honorable means by which these men earn their
living. No social stigma is attached to their jobs, and the income of the head
of the nuclear family is enough for its support without the labor of women
and children. Today, however, there are women in this class who work outside
their houses without exposing their families to disgrace. These are women with
modern skills who work to advance their own interests, not that of their families.
When they support a relative, such as financing a brother in college, they
serve a "noble" purpose, and are not working for mere survival.
The affluent class, on the other hand, includes wealthy landowners and
merchants, university graduates and the professional class of medical doctors,
engineers and lawyers. Except for the wealthy landowners and some merchants
who have inherited their wealth, most of these men have achieved their status
through education or emigration. Their emphasis on achievement makes them
receptive to modernization more than any other class.24
These two middle classes are emerging ones, in which membership is
achieved by individual initiative, and mobility is very high.25 Because the two
middle classes are distinguished from each other basically by economic criteria-

23. See Fuad I. Khuri (1960: 42).

24. When Western social scientists speak of the modernizing middle class and their conflict with
the traditional upper class, they must have only this professional class in mind. See Leonard Binder
(1966: 301-304); Raphael Patai (1962: 338); and Manfred Halpern (1963: 73-78).
25. One measure of high mobility in these two classes is indicated by the lesser agreement among
the ten "judges" in Cedarstown on who belong to the affluent and the masrtrin classes. For further
details, see Fuad I. Khuri (1960: 43).

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 38 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

the masti-r-n living in austerity, the afflu

former to the latter class requires nothing
mastirfn and the affluent are distinguished
emphasis they place on the nuclear family and on social and economic inde-
pendence, mobility from the class of the needy to either the class of the mastifr-n
or of the affluent requires, in addition to wealth, social and psychological
mobility. In other words, it requires first a change from the extended family
sub-culture to that of the nuclear family and, second, a change from social
and economic dependence to social and economic independence. The change
from the extended family sub-culture to that of the nuclear family does not
imply the loss of family ties and duties. Family ties and duties, no doubt,
continue, but in new forms. Instead, for example, of having a single fund
for the extended family of which the individual nuclear families partake, each
nuclear family develops its own fund. And when a nuclear family assists
another one, or cooperates with it to form a single enterprise, its assistance
or cooperation is specified-that is, the rights of each nuclear family are
exclusively preserved. This is how a soldier, by detaching himself from his
peasant father's household to live independently with his wife and children,
becomes a mastnr instead of a needy. He, alone, supports his nuclear family
from which he also derives his social and emotional gratifications. Within it,
he spends his income and his spare time.
Although the mastorn and the affluent classes both emphasize the nuclear
family, each class stresses different aspects of it. Whereas the mastuirin desire
to build up the welfare of the nuclear family as a whole in the larger society,
the affluent seem to lay greater emphasis on the independent achievement of
its individual members. Of course, the prosperity of the affluent class permits
its individual members each to pursue his own interests. The mastfirin class,
on the other hand, because of their austerity, cannot pursue their individual
interests without sacrifice on behalf of other family members. In Cedarstown,
many mastrfin had to sell their land or mortgage their houses in order to
send their sons to college.
IV
Finally, what reasons account for the lack of conflict between classes? One
reason lies in the continuity of the traditional ties of allegiance-this despite
rural-urban migration, change in family structure, or the acquisition of modern
skills, careers and professions. Many Lebanese of upper, middle or lower
standing in society, who have migrated to the city, still, like peasants, retain
their former family connections and also their village political commitments.26
They maintain their former family connections through two ways: either
through living together in the same sections of the city, and often holding
26. In her work on rural migrants in Cairo, Janet Abu-Lughad coins the term "ruralizing" to
refer to this phenomenon of retaining village customs (1960: 209-221).

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 THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURE IN LEBANON 39

the same job, as the rural migrants from Aramti to B

between the village and the city, as thousands of Lebanese do every year.
During winter, they live in the warm coastal cities and, during the summer,
they retreat to their mother villages in the mountains.
The migrants' village political commitments, on the other hand, continue
because of the methods they use to secure jobs in the city, and because of the
way they exercise their political rights there. Even though he qualifies for a
job, a migrant is unlikely to get it without mediation. To take place, mediation
requires that the intermediary and the employer share family, friendship or
business relations. Any of these relations, if used by the intermediary to
persuade the employer to hire the employee, earns the employer the loyalty
of the employee, and the employee the comforts of work. Mediation also
earns the intermediary, often a man of notable standing, honor and prestige.
It is honorable to intermediate (yitwasat) not only because mediation means
that the intermediary is a man of contacts and of influence, but also because
it creates a client-patron relationship between the intermediary (the notable)
and the employee (the job-seeker) in which the former offers protection against
the legal and illegal exactions of authority (the employer), and the latter in
turn pays back in intangible assets. He may support the notable with his vote,
inform him of the plots and machinations of others and, more important,
praise him in public, thus helping to raise his status. The employee (the
job-seeker) pays the intermediary (the notable) back in the former's village
of origin where he exercises his political rights and where the notable exercises
his political influence and control. In the city of residence, the migrant's
political importance is practically nil.
This reversion to village-based politics first restricts the effects of rural
migration on the changing power structure, and second stifles the political
force of labor unions. When one regards the impact of rural migration on
the system of political loyalty and structure, one is struck by the lack of change
despite the high rate of rural-urban migration and the reduction of the rural
population to about only one-third of the total population in Lebanon. If rural
migrants exercise their political rights in the city of destination, not in the
village of origin, and thus liberate themselves from their village political
allegiances, the system of political loyalty and structure in the country would
undoubtedly be modified. But as long as the electoral law in Lebanon makes
it possible for rural migrants to exercise their political rights in the village
of origin, the migrants' village allegiances will continue.
Torn by diversified loyalties, family coalitions and village-based politics,
the labor unions to which these migrants normally belong serve the patron-

27. Many of the El-Hajj migrants from Aramti to Beirut are taxidrivers or policemen, the Mizhirs
vegetable peddlers, and the Haidars had been tramdrivers before 1965, when trams ceased to operate
in the city of Beirut.

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40 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

politician's interests, not the union's. Loyalty to patrons, relatives or non-

relatives, takes precedence over loyalty to labor unions. This is to be expected
in a country where the finding of jobs and the improvement of work depend
on sponsorship, not on union membership, which shows why only twenty-five
per cent of the labor force in Lebanon is recruited in unions.28 When these
unions go on strike, they do so to promote the political aims of their sponsors,
the patrons, as the unions did in the fall of 1966 when a series of strikes was
quietened only after the resignation of the Yafi government. The Yafi govern-
ment was not particularly against these unions, nor was the succeeding
government particularly for them. Not all trade or professional associations,
however, conform to this rule; some, especially those dominated by the middle
classes, pursue their interests with a degree of efficiency and independence.
The pursuit of their interests with a degree of efficiency and independence,
however, does not turn the middle classes into a distinct political force-distinct
from the upper and lower classes. Like loyalty to unions, loyalty to trade and
professional associations comes second to loyalty to family, sect or region.
Indeed, the middle class ties of family, sect or region are entwined together
to form a network of "many-stranded coalitions,"29 a network that gives men
security in many different contexts, but it also stiffens resistance against change
and reform. In other words, the economic and political behavior of the middle
class is determined by their family, sect or region relations; these relations are
in turn sanctioned by their social customs and values; and these customs and
values are again reinforced by their economic and political behavior.
In addition to the continuity of the traditional ties of allegiance, the pro-
hibition of ideological parties by law and the less serious attitude of the Lebanese
towards ideologies also account for the lack of conflict between classes. Most
of the ideological parties, those based on non-sectarian, non-regional principles,
such as the Communists, P.P.S., and Ba'th parties, are unlicensed in Lebanon.
Their few supporters have been persecuted and their assemblies banned.
Because they see in ideological parties a threat to their power, the notables
class, who dominate the political life in the country, suppress ideological-party
affiliates. The notables normally* refuse to intermediate for a man of ideology,
or to intercede on his behalf. As a result, ideological-party affiliates find it
difficult to secure jobs in the central administration, the army, and in many
commercial and industrial firms.
This prohibition of ideological parties by law and the suppression of their
supporters mirror the general attitudes of the Lebanese towards ideologies. In
general, the Lebanese are cynical about politics and they lack anti-bourgeois

28. See al-Nahir of November 3, 1967.

29. The term "many-stranded" is borrowed from Eric Wolf (1966: 91).
' With a few outstanding exceptions.

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 THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURE IN LEBANON 41

feelings.30 To be serious about ideologies, images of future societies, one has

to take ideas seriously, which the Lebanese generally do not do. To them, an
idea is something to talk about, not something to try to accomplish. They
recognize an ideology to be a rationale, a reasoned plan, but that which opposes
family, sect or regional ties-the ties they trust. While the Lebanese place
trust in the leadership of the notables, who belong to established houses, they
suspect the leadership of the few alienated, self-appointed, ambitious leaders
who belong to politically uprooted families, and who, according to one in-
formant, "assert their unfounded leadership by upholding ideological prin-
ciples." "Since custom does not favor them," the informant continued, "they
create their own custom." In general, this informant's observation is correct.
More Greek Orthodox and Shi'a join ideological parties than either Maronites
or Sunni: the former groups are alienated from the established political order;
the latter reign in the country.
Nothing, perhaps, shows the less serious attitude of the Lebanese towards
ideologies better than their attitude towards crime. While civil crimes, including
murder, may receive popular sympathy, crimes against the established order
of the state are disdained and ridiculed. Committed not in defense of family
honor or in revenge, crimes against the political order become socially mean-
ingless and subsequently receive no popular sympathy. Nor do they receive
court sympathy; it is the defense of family honor or revenge, according to
the current criminal laws, which constitute mitigating circumstances that may
lead to crime.
The prohibition of ideological parties by law and the less serious attitudes
of the Lebanese towards ideologies make it difficult for the middle class to
develop into a political force. This is for the reason that only through ideological
parties can the middle class weaken family, sect or regional allegiances, which
thus far dictate the struggle for power in the country, and which continuity
strengthens the influence of the notables.
There still remains one other reason that accounts for the lack of conflict
between classes-namely, the recruitment of middle class people in family,
sect or regional associations, not class associations, and also in a number of
intermittent clubs and assemblies that absorb social unrest. About 95 per cent
of the licensed voluntary associations (778 of 824 associations), often
dominated by the middle classes, are founded on traditional ties of allegiance
The voluntary associations to which many of the middle classes belong requir

30. A good account of political cynicism in Lebanon is found in Iskander Rayyashi's book, Before
and After (qabi wa ba'd), (1953).
31. There are two publications: one, by the Ministry of Social Affairs (1966), includes the
registered family associations, and the other, by the Ministy of Planning (1965: 94-111), includes
all the licensed associations which serve public purposes. On the basis of their requirements for
membership, the latter associations were classified by the author into two categories: those based on
family, sect or regional ties, and those which are not.

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42 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

therefore, prescribed criteria (family,

voluntary associations," and there are 116 of them in Lebanon, which sound
contradictory in terms to students of sociology, are, acceptably, consistent
terms to Lebanese: these associations are voluntary only within the same
family, sect or region.
In addition to these licensed associations, there is a number of intermittent
clubs and assemblies, including the Lebanese Cenacle, which dilutes the
seriousness of failure, and reduces a national crisis into a mere intellectual
exercise. Immediately after the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, a large group
of college and university professors were unofficially called upon to assemble
in the Bristol Hotel to plan for national mobilization against further Israeli
threats. Not unexpectedly, the number of assembled professors started to
decline proportionally to the decline in the urgency of the Israeli threat. Their
assemblies were eventually discontinued as national mobilization became less
urgent and national tension more tempered. In brief, the absorption of national
tension by intermittent clubs and assemblies, and the recruitment of middle
class people in family, sect or region associations, not class associations, means
that social classes in Lebanon lack class organization, which fact dilutes class
consciousness, lessens class conflict, and handicaps the rise of classes as political
forces.
Conclusion
Two themes are discussed in this paper: the themes of mobility and the
lack of conflict between classes. Mobility from one class to another varies
with the criteria by which each class is distinguished. While mobility from
the needy to the honorable poor class requires change in family structure (from
the extended family sub-culture to that of the nuclear family), and in economic
and social life (from economic and social dependence to economic and social
independence), mobility from the honorable poor to the affluent class requires
only wealth. By contrast, mobility from the affluent to the notables class requires
preeminence in family background, which can be achieved in at least three
generations. But mobility from the needy class to either the honorable poor
or to the affluent classes, or from the honorable poor to the affluent class can
be achieved in a single generation. The reason that mobility to the notables
class takes more generations than mobility to the middle classes is that the
latter type of mobility requires individual initiative only, while the former
requires both individual initiative and the translation of the person's achieve-
ment into social preeminence.
The second theme deals with the reasons that account for the lack of conflict
between classes. Although they are distinguished socially and economically,
the four social classes in Lebanon have not been instituted in class associations
with distinct interests. True, certain associations, as those dominated by the
professional class, pursue their interest with a degree of efficiency, but they

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 THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURE IN LEBANON 43

do so only if this pursuit does not conflict with their family, sect or region
loyalties. As a matter of fact, formal associations, in general, require family,
sect or region criteria for membership, which perpetuate the traditional ties
of allegiance despite migration from the village to the city, change in family
structure, and the acquisition of modern skills and techniques. The perpetuation
of the traditional ties of allegiance, in turn, slows down political reform and
limits the spread of ideological parties. Combined, these factors-the lack of
class associations, the continuity of traditional allegiances, the lack of political
reform, and the prohibition of ideological parties-all inhibit the rise of
conflict between classes.

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