TOLENTINO vs.

SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716

otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate
from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6
of the Constitution and it did not pass three readings on separate days
on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section
26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not
to the revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives
initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in
the Senate.
 SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not
meet the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on
separate days.

ABAKADA vs. ERMITA

Facts:
- Three legislative bills – two in the house and 1 in the senate were
approved to restructure the NIRC. Because of the disagreeing
provision of the bills, BCC was created, and later on created a
report that was passed by the both houses and was transmitted to
the president, who signed it into law on May 24, 2005. The EVAT
law, RA9337, was to become effective on July 1, 2005
- But on the same day, S.C issued a TRO, effective immediately. It is
because of the 5 petitions all alleging the unconstitutionality of the
provisions on the EVAT law – Sec 6,7,8.
- One of the contention of the petitioner was the legality of the
bicameral proceedings and it violated the Section 24, and 26(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution.
- The response of the respondent was that it was already settled on
the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.
ISSUE:
W/ON RA 9337 violated section 24 and 26(2) of Art. VI of the constitution.
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative in regards with the procedural issue.
There has been no irregularity on the proceedings of the BCC. – The powers
of the bcc had been laid down in the internal rules of the house and senate.
The function of the BCC proceedings was to reconcile or harmonize the
provisions. Or they may Adopt specific provisions of either houses, decide
that the provisions in neither the houses would be carried, or lastly try to
arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions.
ESTRADA vs Sandiganbayan
The office of the ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
informations against the petitioner.
Of those criminal cases, the petitioner moved to squash Criminal Case no.
26558 which charged him with violating Republic Act 7080 or the plunder
law for the reason that the facts alleged in the case do not constitute
probable cause for indictment, since the law itself is unconstitutional for
being vague.
Former President Joseph Estrada questioned the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law because he claimed that it also violates constitutional rights of
the accused to due process. Specifically, the law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore considered an ex
post facto law and it violates his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him.
In the petition before the Supreme Court, petitioner raises primarily the
issues of purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law.
ISSUE: WON the plunder law is unconstitutional or not on the grounds of
ambiguity/vagueness
Ruling:
The Court ruled that as long as the law provides a comprehensible guide or
rule that would inform the accused of what actions will render them liable
to penalties, the validity of the law will be sustained. In this case, it can be
sufficiently understood that a public official may be charged with the crime
of plunder if he has accumulated ill-gotten wealth of at least 50 million
pesos.
The information filed against him in fact closely indicated that the various
elements of plunder as provided by the law is present in the case.
(gambling, misappropriation, purchase of stocks, receiving pecuniary
benefits). Simply, the petitioner is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
There is no law requiring the legislator to define each and every word in an
enactment, and failure to do will not necessarily render it uncertain or
result from ambiguity as long as the legislative will IS CLEAR from the
whole act. Moreover, the words of a statute should be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and legislation unless the words
used are technical or possesses a special legal meaning
A statute may only be considered as vague if it fails to accord persons it
targets fair notice of what conduct to avoid and leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions.
Vagueness doctrine mostly applies to free speech laws only.

Civil Code.
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
Facts:
· Petitioner Palanca, as vendor, and Jose Sanicas, as vendee, entered into a
Contract to Sell on Installment of a parcel of land.
· Under the terms of the contract, Jose agreed to pay Palanca the amount of
P9,851.00 as downpayment and the balance of P88,659.00 in 120 monthly
installments with 14% interest per annum on the outstanding balance.
· Jose further agreed to pay the annual real property taxes, and that should
he fail to pay the said taxes, he would have to pay a yearly surcharge or
penalty of 50% of the taxes due plus 12% compounded interest per annum.
·Respondent Edgardo later assumed the account of his brother Jose and he
designated the latter as his authorized representative in dealing with
petitioner.
·Paragraph 11 of the contract contained escalator clause:
That it is further agreed and understood by the VENDEE that in the event
of monetary fluctuation, the unpaid balance account of the herein VENDEE
on the aforecited subdivision lot shall be increased proportionately on the
basis of the present value of P6.72 to $1.00 US dollar.
· Respondent tendered supposed balance payment (44k), but petitioner
rejected it, which prompted the former make a judicial consignment of the
amount.
·Petitioner justified his refusal by asserting the escalator clause in
paragraph 11 of the contract (155k).
Issue:
WoN the contract has been visited by an "extraordinary inflation" as to
trigger the operation of Article 1250.
Held:
            No, the Court holds that while the contract may contain an "escalator
clause” still the autonomy of the parties to provide such escalator clauses
may be limited by law.
            Article 1250 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is not the basis
herein, but R.A. No. 529, as amended, as a ground for violation of said
clause.
            In the case at bench, the clear understanding of the parties is that
there should be an upward adjustment of the purchase price the moment
there is a deterioration of the Philippine peso with the U.S. dollar. This is
the "monetary fluctuation" contemplated by them as would justify the
adjustment, and not "extraordinary inflation" described in Art.1250.
            Thus, the petition is DENIED.
People vs. Crisanto Tamayo

Appelant was convicted at the peace of court of Magsingal, Ilocos sur. With
a violation of Section 2 of the Municipal Ordinance. Upon to the appeal to
the court of first instance it resulted with conviction and fine. So, it
appealed to the S.C
While the appeal is pending at S.C, the Municipal council repeal the section
2 of the ordinance. From being illegal to legal.
Appelant moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of the repeal of the
ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the effect of the repeal absolves him of criminal
liability
HELD:
The intent of the Municipal council was to decriminalize the conduct
formerly prohibited. The repeal here was absolute.
For that reason, the petitioner cannot be liable for a crime that no longer
exists. The proceedings against appellant is dismissed.

People vs. Pastor.

Defendants were charged of the violation of Sec. 1458 and 1459 of the
Revised Administrative Code. For evading paying the percentage tax while
being owners of Magazine Center. 1936-1938.

Defendant defense was that the law accused of him were repealed by CA no.
466 and 503, which were in force in 1939, and which excluded him for
paying taxes.

Issue: Can defendants be charged against a law that has been repealed?

Ruling: Wherefore, it is the judgment of this Court that the order appealed

from be, as it is hereby, affirmed with costs de officio.

Ratio: No. The Supreme Court held that upon the enactment of the
National Internal Revenue Code (CA 466 and 503), the defendants ceased
to be bound in paying taxes. The prevailing doctrine is that where the
repealing law wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense
defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repeal carries with it the
deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence
persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal.

MECANO vs. COA

Facts:
Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of
which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount
of which he is claiming from the COA.

In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested

reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the RAC.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary of Justice.
Finding petitioner’s illness to be service-connected, the Committee on
Physical Examination of the DOJ favorably recommended the payment of
petitioner’s claim.

However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s

claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the
Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC being relied upon
was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of

Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that “the
issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in
its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular
Section 699 of the latter”.

Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary

Bello for favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s
claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same.

COA Chairman however, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that

Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of
1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated
nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented,
however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees’ Compensation
Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after
the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice

Montenegro to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner “elevate the
matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires”.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:  WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated

Section 699 of the RAC

HELD:   The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby

ordered to give due course to petitioner’s claim for benefits.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover
nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are
several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new
Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public
bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits
under Section 699, and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two
Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In
fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness
benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of
statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against
inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.
Civil Code. Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a
civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the
private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
“hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity
and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”.
Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire-tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial
court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not
apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the
statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with
the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where
the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section
1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.