73rd PCC Minutes
73rd PCC Minutes
73rd PCC Minutes
of
rd
73 PCC Meeting
Date: 11.12.2018
Eastern Regional Power Committee
14, Golf Club Road, Tollygunge
Kolkata: 700 033
EASTERN REGIONAL POWER COMMITTEE
PART – A
ITEM NO. A.1: Confirmation of minutes of 72nd Protection sub-Committee Meeting held on
29th October, 2018 at ERPC, Kolkata.
The minutes of 72nd Protection Sub-Committee meeting held on 29.10.18 circulated vide letter
dated 14.11.18.
ERLDC requested for amendment in the deliberations recorded against agenda item no. C.12 as
follows:
"PCC advised POWERGRID to submit TFR triggering criteria and TFR signal list for all HVDC
station of Eastern region to ERLDC."
Members approved the minutes of 72nd PCC meeting with the above amendment.
PART – B
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION ON GRID INCIDENCES OCCURRED IN OCTOBER, 2018
ITEM NO. B.1: Tripping of 400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri-I and subsequent operation of SPS-I
on 01.10.18 at 15:41 hrs.
At 15:41 hrs, 400 kV Binaguri - Rangpo - I tripped on high resistance R-N fault resulting operation
of SPS - I at Rangpo. The operation of SPS-I led to tripping of running units at Teesta III, Dikchu,
Jorethang, Chujachen and Tashiding HEP. Back up E/F operated at Rangpo end to clear the fault.
Relay Indication:
Powergrid informed that there was a high resistive fault in 400kV Rangpo-Binaguri circuit- I close
to Rangpo end. Rangpo end cleared the fault on DEF protection whereas Binaguri end tripped on
receipt of DT signal from Rangpo end. Powergrid explained that due high arc resistance Binaguri
end failed to identify the fault.
The SPS-I signal initiated after the above tripping and operated correctly.
Powergrid added that they have increased the sensitivity of E/F settings for 400kV Rangpo-
Binaguri D/C lines for better detection of high resistance faults.
PCC advised powergrid to configure In>1 pick up in DR output at Rangpo and Binaguri end.
ITEM NO. B.2: Total Power failure at 220 kV Hatia (JUSNL) substation on 03.10.18 at 17:23
hrs and on 04.10.18 at 00:26 hrs
In both the instances, while closing man bus isolator of 220 kV Hatia PTPS – I at Hatia end, bus
bar protection relay at Hatia operated and all other feeders tripped. 220 kV PTPS – Hatia D/C
were out of service in both the events.
As per JUSNL report, one of the contacts of above mentioned isolator did not work properly at the
time of the events and sent false DC command to bus bar protection panel.
JUSNL informed that there was no fault in the substation and the above incidences occurred
during the shifting of PTPS bays to new bus at Hatia Substation. They informed that during closing
of isolator of main bus for charging of the bay, the switching relay burned leading to extention of
DC supply to Busbar relay. This resulted in operation of LBB/busbar relay and tripped all the
feeders connected to Hatia end.
JUSNL informed that the DRs and EL could not be retrieved as the relays are electromechanical
type. PCC advised to install separate relay for DR generation wherever the electromechanical
relays are present. JUSNL added that old EM type relay would be replaced with new numerical
busbar relay by April’ 19.
During discussion it was informed that, Ranchi end relay did not trip during the above busbar
operation due to non-receipt of DT signal from Hatia end. It was also informed that DT signal was
not sent from Hatia end in earlier instances also.
PCC advised JUSNL to test the Bus bar and LBB protection, PLCC and configuration of DT signal
in the relay at Hatia end.
ITEM NO. B.3: Disturbance at 220 kV Purnea (Powergrid) S/s on 07.10.18 at 16:56 hrs.
73rd PCC Minutes
At 16:56 hrs, Y phase line CVT of 220kV Purnea-New Purnea-I failed at Purnea end resulting
operation of line differential protection of 220 kV Purnea – N. Purnea – I. In spite of initiation of
inter-trip Tx and Rx, 86 trip relay did not operate at Purnea end though breaker opened at New
Purnea end.
All 220 kV lines connected to Purnea S/S got tripped from remote end to clear the fault. 220 kV
Dalkhola-I feeder tripped from Purnea end also in Zone-IV protection.
Powergrid informed that failure of Y-phase CVT of 220kV Purnea-New Purnea-I at Purnea end
caused the operation of line differential protection for the line. New Purnea end tripped in line
differential protection but the Purnea end circuit breaker did not open due to broken DC wire
terminal in master trip relay. Powergrid added that they have rectified the problem after this
incident.
As the fault was not cleared from Purnea end, 220kV New Purnea-Purnea-II and 220 kV Dalkhola-
Purnea D/C tripped as per the relay indication given in the above table.
Regarding tripping of 220 kV Dalkhola-Purnea-I from purnea end in zone-4 protection, it was
informed that Dalkhola end tripped in zone-II protection in 500msec time. Powergrid explained that
the zone-II timer setting was inadvertently made to 500ms which they have now changed as per
the protection philosophy.
Regarding fault clearance from downstream network, BSPTCL informed that there was no tripping
in their system and added that during the incidence, 132 kV Purnea(BSPTCL) was connected
73rd PCC Minutes
radially from Purnea(Powergrid).
ITEM NO. B.4: Total Power failure at Madhepura(BSPTCL) S/s on 20.10.18 at 09:48 hrs.
220 kV Purnea Madhepura – I was under shutdown. At 09:48 hrs 220 kV Purnea Madhepura – II
tripped on R-N fault resulting total power failure at Madhepura S/S.
Load Loss: 62 MW
Delayed fault clearance from Purnea end has been observed in PMU data.
BSPTCL informed that at the time of the incidence, 220 kV Purnea Madhepura – I and 220 kV
Purnea-Lokhi D/C were manually kept off due to high voltage condition.
Powergrid informed that 220 kV New Purnea-Madhepura-II tripped from New Purnea end in zone-
4 of distance protection. Powergrid further informed that the zone-4 of relay was erroneously
activated and set for forward direction having reach more than 100 % with time delay of 500 msec.
They informed that they have corrected the settings after this disturbance.
BSPTCL informed that there was no tripping at 220 kV Madhepura end as well as in 132 kV
downstream network of Madhepura.
73rd PCC Minutes
As zone-4 was set for 100% reach, PCC viewed that the fault location was in downstream of 220
kV Madhepura S/s. PCC advised BSPTCL to check for any trippings in downstream network.
ITEM NO. B.5: Total Power failure at TLDP-III S/s on 27.10.18 at 10:24 hrs.
220 kV TLDP III - NJP S/C tripped due to Y-B-N fault on 27-10-18 at 10:24 hrs. As TLDP-III HEP
is connected to rest of the grid via this S/C line, all four units at TLDP III got tripped due to loss of
evacuation path.
WBSETCL informed that there was a Y-B fault in TLDP III – NJP – S/C near to TLDP-III S/s which
was cleared from both the end in zone-I of distance protection.
NHPC informed that before tripping of above circuit, two units of TLDP-IV got tripped due to
operation of GT neutral O/C protection. It was also seen from disturbance recorder that there was
a high neutral current(i.e. 40 A) flowing in TLDP III – NJP – S/C for about 1 sec before the tripping
of the circuit in Y-B fault.
PCC opined that tripping of generating units before the tripping of evacuating lines is not desirable
and proper protection coordination between TLDP station and NJP station is required.
It was also came to notice that WBSETCL has used IDMT characteristics for E/F protection in NJP
S/s whereas NHPC has definite time settings at TLDP.
PCC advised WBSETCL and NHPC to review the DEF settings for proper protection coordination
between the transmission lines and generating station.
ITEM NO. B.6: Disturbance at 765 kV Jharsuguda S/s on 31.10.18 at 23:52 hrs.
On 31st Oct 2018, at 23:35 Hs 765 kV Dharamjaigarh-Jharsuguda-3 was charged for first time
with initial power flow of 358 MW. Later at 23:52 hrs, during PLCC testing of new 765kV
Dharamjaygarh-Jharsuguda-4 at Jharsuguda S/S, Bus-2 at Jharsuguda S/S tripped along with
following elements.
Powergrid informed that all the tie Breakers also got tripped and Direct trip was extended to the
remote ends due to wrong masking in the output of busbar relay. As a result, Bus reactor 1 and 2
and Jharsuguda- Darlipali D/C tripped. They informed that they have rectified the wiring after
consulting the OEM.
PCC advised Powergrid to configure all bay channels in output of Busbar DR for Bus-II at
Jharsuguda substation.
Other tripping incidences occurred in the month of October 2018 which needs explanation from
constituents of either of the end is given in Annexure-B.7.
In 58th PCC, ERLDC informed that most of the constituents are not submitting the DR and EL
data for single line trippings.
PCC advised all the constituents to upload the details along with DR and EL in PDMS on-line
portal and referred the issue to TCC for further guidance.
In 36th TCC, all the constituents were advised to use the PDMS on-line portal for uploading the
single line tripping details along with DR (comtrade files), EL and other relevant files for all
trippings of August 2017 onwards. Otherwise, it will be considered as violation of compliance of
clause 5.2(r) & 5.9 of IEGC.
PCC advised all the concern constituents to take necessary corrective actions to resolve the
issues.
68th PCC opined that the draft scheme submitted by Odisha was three years old and the draft
scheme is needed to be reviewed with existing network configuration.
PCC decided to discuss the islanding scheme in next PCC Meeting and advised OPTCL to
submit all the relevant details to ERPC and ERLDC.
In 69th PCC, OPTCL presented the revised islanding scheme based on updated network
configuration and power flows. The details are enclosed at Annexure-C.1.
In 70th PCC, OPGC has submitted the updated details which are enclosed at Annexure-C1.a.
It was decided that ERLDC and ERPC will study and finalize the islanding scheme in next PCC
Meeting.
In 72nd PCC, OPTCL and OPGC were advised to prepare a joint presentation highlighting the
below mentioned points in order to have a clarity of the overall scheme.
The logic for islanding operation such as frequency limit, overvoltage settings, vector shift
settings etc.
Logic/Actions to be adopted for different grid scenarios for both generator side and
transmission side.
The actions to be taken at generator side vis-a vis at transmission side for different
conditions.
OPTCL and OPGC explained the scheme with a presentation. During presentation, number of
queries were raised by the PCC forum.
After detailed delibetation, PCC decided to convene a separate meeting on 12.12.18 at ERPC
secretariat in order to have a detailed deliberation on IBTPS islanding scheme. PCC advised
OPTCL and OPGC to present the scheme along with the clarifications sought by PCC in the
meeting scheduled on 12.12.18.
It was also decided to invite representatives of WBPDCL as special invitee to the above meeting
on 12.12.18.
ITEM NO. C.2: Total power failure at 220kV Hatia (JUSNL) S/s on 20.07.18 at 09:10 hrs.
Due to clearance issue with some 11 KV feeder (which has an in feed from Hatia old) repeated
faults occurred in 220 kV Ranchi - Hatia-I and II. As a result total power failed at 220kV Hatia S/s.
In 70th PCC, JUSNL informed that repeated disturbances and total power failure at Hatia
substation on 20.07.18 was due to the clearance issue with 11kV feeder under 220kV Ranchi-
Hatia D/C line. JUSNL informed that the 11 kV feeders were re-routed after the above incidences
to get the sufficient clearance.
PCC advised JUSNL to check the Sag level and clearance of 220 KV lines to avoid this type of
tripping.
From the analysis of PMU plot and disturbance recorders at Ranchi & Hatia end, a number of
protection related issues came into notice.
73rd PCC Minutes
PCC analysed the issue & advised JUSNL to take the following actions
Whenever PLCC will remain out of service, the auto reclose operation should be made to
non-auto mode and zone 2 timing may be reduced (preferably less than 0.35 Sec.) to
minimize the fault clearing time.
The trip on reclose function should be enabled in the relay whenever autoreclose function
is in operation.
Regarding unwanted tripping of 220/132 kV ATRs at Hatia and Patratu substations and tripping of
Hatia-Patratu line in zone-4, PCC felt that there was a protection coordination issue and advised
JUSNL to submit the corresponding relay settings to ERPC/ERLDC at the earliest.
The issue of delayed opening of breaker at Hatia end i.e.400 msec after zone-I tripping initiation
was remained unexplained. The sequence of operation as well as the details of elements tripped
during the incident could not be explained by JUSNL.
PCC decided to discuss this issue in next PCC meeting and advised JUSNL to explain the issue
in next meeting with all the relevant details.
JUSNL submitted the tripping details along with the disturbance recorders vide mail dated
06.11.18. The details are submitted in Annexure-C.2.
JUSNL could not explain the disturbance and PCC could not conclude the same.
PCC advised JUSNL to test the healthiness of the relays at 220kV Patratu and 220/132kV Hatia
S/s.
JUSNL informed that CRITL team doesn’t have any facilities to test the protection relays and they
are doing the testing through third party agency which would take more time.
PCC took serious note of the issue and advised JUSNL to submit the details of procedure being
followed for testing/verification of the relays.
PCC advised JUSNL to test the healthiness of the relays at 220kV Patratu and 220/132kV Hatia
S/s on urgent basis.
It was observed that latest status on the implementation of the previous PCC recommendations
were not updated by the constituents regularly. PCC advised all the constituents to update the
latest status of the recommendations as per the list given in Annexure.
Based on the data available in PDMS, the zone 3 settings of all ISTS lines in Eastern Region were
verified and compared with the corresponding resistive reach of the line thermal loading. Zone 3
settings were also checked with the agreed protection philosophy of ER. The discrepancies
observed in the settings will be presented in the meeting.
In 67th PCC, PRDC presented the list of ISTS lines where they observed the discrepancy in zone-
3 setting.
In 70th PCC, PRDC was advised to resend the list of the lines to all constituents and constituents
were advised to verify the settings at the earliest.
In 72nd PCC, it was informed that some of the constituents have verified the settings. PCC
advised all other constituents to verify the settings by next month and report discrepancy, if any.
Powergrid ER-I had verified the settings. Powergrid ER-II and Powergrid odisha informed that
they will verify the settings at the earliest.
DVC informed that they will verify the settings by next month.
The compliance status of 1st Third Party Protection Audit observations is as follows:
Total % of
Name of Constituents Complied
Observations Compliance
Powergrid 54 46 85.19
NTPC 16 14 87.50
NHPC 1 1 100.00
DVC 40 26 65.00
WB 68 49 72.06
Odisha 59 42 71.19
JUSNL 34 25 73.53
BSPTCL 16 5 31.25
IPP (GMR, Sterlite and MPL) 5 5 100.00
* Pending observations of Powergrid are related to PLCC problems at other end.
The substation wise status of compliance are available at ERPC website (Observations include
PLCC rectification/activation which needs a comprehensive plan).
Members noted.
List of line where auto reclose facility is not available(Information based on PMU data analysis)
34th TCC advised all the respective members to update the above list along with the last tripping
status in next PCC meeting.
TCC further advised all the constituents to give the latest status of PLCC of other 220kV and
above lines under respective control area.
BSPTCL:
1. 220kV Purnea (PG)-Madhepura line
2. 220 kV Biharshariff- Begusarai line Work is in progress expected to be commissioned
3. 220 kV Biharshariff- Bodhgaya line by December 2017.
4. 220kV MTPS-Motiari line
5. 220KV Madhepura-New Purnea D/C Auto recloser is out of service at Madhepura
6. 220KV Muzaffarpur-Hajipur D/C line Auto recloser is out of service at Hazipur
7. 220KV FSTPP-Lalmatia-1 Auto recloser is out of service at Lalmatia
8. 220KV Patna-Khagaul-SC Auto recloser is out of service at Khagual
In 67th PCC, BSPTCL informed that they are planning to hire an agency for implementing PLCC
system in all the lines in their network.
Members noted.
The power system is routinely subjected to faults or disturbances which can range from transient
faults on transmission lines to system-wide disturbances involving multiple control areas, states
and even countries. Investigation of each incident is critical in optimizing the performance of
protection systems with the goal of preventing future incidents from becoming wide-area
disturbances. The tools required to perform post-incident analyses include DME which can
capture pre-event, event, and post-event conditions with a high degree of accuracy.
• FR (Fault Recorder)
• Sequence of events Recorder (SER)
Common issues:
a. Data format
b. Power Supply
c. Monitoring
In 72nd PCC all the constituents were advised to submit the settings related to configuring
disturbance recorders to ERLDC.
It was decided that ERLDC, ERPC and PRDC would prepare a draft report on “settings for
configuring disturbance recorders” and place the draft in next PCC Meeting.
ITEM NO. C.8: Issue of Static Overvoltage Relay at 400 kV Binaguri Substation in
Eastern region
400 kV Binaguri Substation recently has seen spurious over voltage tripping of circuit. The details
of these events are given below:
1. On 13th June 2018 at 06:32 Hrs :There was a successful Auto-Reclosure on 400 kV
Binaguri- Bongaigaon 2 circuit due to B phase to earth fault. At the same time , 400 kV
Binaguri-Rangpo circuit 2 which is in same diameter of 400 kV Binaguri-Bongaigaon 2 at
Binaguri end got tripped from Binaguri end on Over voltage stage 2 operation (Y phase
voltage). In addition 400 kV Bingauri-Tala 1 also has tripped on over voltage stage 2
operation from Binaguri end (R phase Voltage). The reason for the transient overvoltage
is not known. Rest of the circuit from Binaguri end did not trip during this event.
2. On 10th Sept 2018 at 11:31 hrs : 400 kV Tala-Binaguri 4 circuit tripped on overvoltage
protection from Binaguri end while the voltage at Binaguri was 407 kV. During this event,
there was no fault in the system.
3. On 11th Sept 2018 2018 at 08:10 Hrs: 400 kvBinaguri-Malbase circuit tripped on
overvoltage protection from Binaguri end while the voltage at Binaguri was 404 kV. During
this event, there was no fault in the system.
The above tripping of lines from Binaguri on spurious over voltage protection when the system is
not having high voltage is serious in view of long outage of 400 kV Purnea-Biharsharif D/C and
400 kV Kishenganj-Patna D/C. PGCIL ERTS-2 has informed that the event 2 and 3 have
occurred due to sensitive over voltage static relay.
In view of the above three events, Following issues need detailed deliberation:
4. Detailed analysis and Reason for Over-Voltage Stage 2 operation at Binaguri in case of
event 1.
5. Why the numerical relay over voltage protection are not being utilised when such mal-
operation are being observed from the static relay.
In 71st PCC, Powergrid informed that the overvoltage issue was due to the static relays used in
those lines. They added that all the static relays have been removed and they had already been
replaced by numerical relays.
ITEM NO. C.9: Checklist for submission of updated data for Protection Database
The network data in Protection Database needs to be updated on regular basis on account of
commissioning of new elements in the CTU as well as STU networks. Accordingly a checklist has
been prepared which is enclosed in Annexure-C9.
All the constituents requested to submit the checklist on monthly bases in every OCC/PCC
meetings.
Members noted.
***************
Incident: -
765 kV Bus-II at Jharsuguda normalised along with 765KV, 240MVAR B/R 1 at 00:50
Hrs on 01st Nov 2018.
Power grid has reported that while testing of PLCC in Dharmajaygarh ckt#4 at
Jharsuguda, tie Breaker (which was in open condition) trip relay operated and LBB
initiation sent to Tie Breaker and wrongly initiation sent to main bay of Angul#1 Main
Bay. Signal sent to main bay was due to wrong wiring configuration. Due to operation
of Main CB LBB of Angul#1, main and tie CB’s of Bus #2 got tripped. Due to which,
Angul#1, NTPC#1&2, Bus Reactor#1&2 got tripped.
Power grid also reported that wrong wiring issue has been resolved and matter has
been referred to O&M department.
Analysis based on SCADA Data
765 kV Dharamjaigarh-Jharsuguda-3 first time charged at 23:35 Hrs (31st Oct 18). Line
MVAR of both the ends is given below in fig 1. Later at 23:52 Hrs, with the tripping of
765KV Jharsuguda-Angul-1 along with BUS-II at Jharsuguda, flow on 765KV
Jharsuguda-Angul-2 rose to 583 MW from 400 MW and voltage at Jharsuguda rose to
802 kV from 789 kV. Power flow on 765KV Jharsuguda-Angul-D/C and voltage of Bus-II
at Jharsuguda is given below in fig 2 & 3 respectively.
The nearest PMU is Talcher and Ranchi and it was not reporting at the time of
incident. As per voltage PMU of Raipur, there is only 0.5 kV rise in voltage. The voltage
PMU is given below: -
Annexure 2: - Jharsuguda region snapshot after the incident (at 23:54 Hrs).
Annexure 3: - Jharsuguda SLD before the incident (at 23:50 Hrs).
1
D
2
Bus Bar Trip at Sundargarh
• During wiring tightness of Tie Bay, LBB initiation wire was falsely
touched and LBB initiation was sent to Main Bay of Angul#1 at 23:52 hrs
30/10/2018.
• This occurred due to human mistake during wiring tightness
• Since LBB initiation was received and current in the Main Bay of
Angul#1 was above the threshold, LBB trip of Angul#1 Main Bay was
issued and Bus #2 got tripped.
• However, all the tie Breakers also got tripped and Direct trip was
extended to the remote ends. Due to which, Angul#1, NTPC#1&2,
Bus Reactor#1&2 also got tripped.
• After detailed analysis, it was found that configuration was wrong
in Bus Bar relay.
• Same was referred to OEM and they suggested for corrective
action.
• New settings were then implemented as per OEM.
4
Power Interruption
5
Power Flow
Name of Element MW MVAR
1. 765KV SNG-Dharmajaygarh# I -512 MW -181 MVAr
2. 765 KV SNG-Dharmajaygarh# II -503 MW -175 MVAr
3. 765KV SNG-Dharmajaygarh # III -507 MW -178 MVAr
4. 765 KV SNG-Dharmajaygarh # IV - MW - MVAr
5. 765 KV SNG -ANGUL # I 575 MW 156 MVAr
6. 765 KV SNG -ANGUL # II 567 MW 151 MVAr
7. 765 KV SNG -NTPC Darlipali# I .5 MW -57 MVAr
8. 765 KV SNG -NTPC Darlipali# II 0.2 MW -57 MVAr
9. 765/400KV 1500MVA ICT#I 199 MW 44 MVAr
10.. 765/400KV 1500MVA ICT#II 197 MW 43 MVAr
6
D
Tripped
7
Thank You!
8
Annexure-B.7
List of Intra Regional line tripping in the month of October 2018 where violation of protection standard has been observed
DR/EL DR/EL
RESTORATIO RESTORATI Relay Indication Fault Clearance RECEIVED RECEIVED
LINE NAME TRIP DATE TRIP TIME Relay Indication REMOTE END Reason Auto Recloser status Remarks
N DATE ON TIME LOCAL END time in msec FROM LOCAL FROM REMOTE
END END
No A/R operation found Issue with A/R could not be identified at Kharagpur
400KV KHARAGPUR-CHAIBASA-I 12-10-2018 13:02 12-10-2018 13:36 R-N, Z-1, 21.72km, 8.3 kA A/R attempted at Chaibasa R-N Fault < 100 msec No No end . WBSETCL shifted A/R to Siprotec from Micom
in PMU
relay at Kharagpur end and now it is working fine.
No A/R operation found Issue with A/R could not be identified at Kharagpur
400KV KHARAGPUR-CHAIBASA-II 20-10-2018 11:02 20-10-2018 11:13 B_N Fault A/R successful B-N Fault < 100 msec No No end . WBSETCL shifted A/R to Siprotec from Micom
in PMU
relay at Kharagpur end and now it is working fine.
No A/R operation found Carrier is not in service at both ends. OPTCL and DVC
220KV JODA-JINDAL-JAMSHEDPUR-I 22-10-2018 12:52 22-10-2018 13:17 BN, Z1, 49.27 KM B-N Fault < 100 msec No No to take action for implementation of carrier scheme.
in PMU
A detail plan of upgradation of carrier scheme to be
given by OPTCL and DVC
No A/R operation found PGCIL ERTS 1 to confirm whether A/R is in service at
220KV PUSAULI-SAHUPURI-SC 23-10-2018 12:24 23-10-2018 13:53 R-N, 3.5KA, 40KM R-N Fault < 100 msec No No
in PMU Pusauli end or not.
No A/R operation found
220KV KATAPALLI-BOLANGIR(PG)-SC 23-10-2018 12:35 23-10-2018 13:12 B-N, 5.8KA B-N Fault < 100 msec No No Need of Revamping of carrier/PLCC scheme by
in PMU OPTCL; OPTCL to provide a plan for upgradation.
No A/R operation found
400KV BINAGURI-ALIPURDUAR-I 28-10-2018 11:20 28-10-2018 11:52 B-N Fault (As per PMU) 800 msec Yes Yes
in PMU High Resistance Fault.
Z1, RN, 25.1 KM, 7.29 KA, A/R successful from Tie Bay as Main Bay No A/R operation found Issue with A/R could not be identified at Kharagpur
400KV KHARAGPUR-CHAIBASA-I 29-10-2018 12:24 29-10-2018 12:36 R-N Fault < 100 msec No No end . WBSETCL shifted A/R to Siprotec from Micom
A/R L/O lockout .RN, 1.70 KA, Z2, 173.5 KM in PMU
relay at Kharagpur end and now it is working fine.
Annexure-C.1
-44x2MW
BHUSAN-1 & 2
-0MW +0MW
VAEDANTA-2 AAL- 1
VEDANTA- 2
-0MW
132kV RADIAL LOAD ARRANGEMENT FOR ISLAND
SCHEME
Brajarajnagar 45 MW
Kalugana 45 MW
Jharsuguda 30 MW
MCL 15 MW
Rajgangpur 60 MW
132KV Connectivity of Budhipadar GSS
Sundargarh GSS
Rajganpur GSS
Brajarajnagar GSS
Jharsuguda GSS
Kuchinda GSS
Lapanga GSS
220 KV BUS - A
Auto Trf-1
Auto Trf-2
X
Ib-1
160 MVA
160 MVA
X
Ib-3
122MW
122 MW
132 KV BUS
Jharsuguda-2
Jharsuguda-1
Rajgangpur
Brajrajnagar
20 MVA Trf
12.5 MVA Trf
MSP
Lapanga
MCL-1
MCL-2
Kalunga
X X X X X X
SNG-1
SNG-2
X X X X X X X
45 MW 60 MW 17 MW 17 MW 45 MW I/C 15 MW 15 MW 0 mw 4 mw 6 mw
15 mw
X
X
132 KV
X RAJGANGPUR
132 KV KULUNGA GRID S/S
X GRID S/S(LILO)
X X X X X 132 KV Switch Yard at
LAPANGA GRID S/S
X
X 132 KV S/Y OF
TARKERA GRID S/S
132KV Jharsuguda GRID S/S
X X X - CB OPEN
X- CB CLOSED
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF ISLANDING RELAY INSTALLED IN B/C PANEL FOR
TRIPPING OF DIFFERENT FEEDERS AT BUDHIPADAR GRID S/S.
Bus-I
Bus-II
TFR
Bus
89A 89B
Islanding Relay Features
BUS-1 BUS-2
DC SUPPLY
PT PT
PT SS
ISLANDING RELAY
FUSE &LINK Micom P341 INSTALLED AT
B/C RELAY PANEL
TRIP CKT OF 220KV B/C BREAKER
BO1
SW1
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-1 BREAKER
BO2
SW2
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-2 BREAKER
BO3
SW3
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-3 BREAKER
BO4
SW4
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-4 BREAKER
BO5
TRIP CKT. OF 132KV LAPANGA
BREAKER
BO6 SW5
TRIP CKT. OF ALL 220KV FEEDERS EXCEPT
CMR AT-1,AT-2 AND SELECTED IB CKTS
BO7 PLCC/OPGW TRIP CKT. OF 132KV
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR
AT JHARSUGUDA FEEDER AT
TO LAPANGA
LAPANGA LAPANGA
BO8
LEGEND
PTSS---- PT SELECTOR SWITCH
SW1-----SW5- ON/OFF SWITCH
CMR– CONTACT MULTIPLICATION RELAY
+220VDC
Islanding
X
Multiplication Relay
-220VDC
Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
*Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
GCB Unit#1 ON A
N STANDBY CEP START
df/dt or dn/dt high > D
GCB Unit#2 ON A
N STANDBY CEP START
df/dt or dn/dt high > D
The fast operation of this vector shift function renders it to operate at the instant of a
disturbance rather than during a gradual change caused by a gradual change of power
flow. Operation can occur at the instant of inception of the fault,at fault clearance or
following non-synchronized reclosure, which affords additional protection to the
embedded generator.
AnnexureC1.a
By
ODISHA POWER GENERATION CORPORATION LTD.
1
Objective:
Formation of proposed island shall achieve the following objectives:-
i) Prevention from total black out by avoiding effect of cascade tripping of the Power
System.
ii) Fast restoration of supply.
Present Status:
Presently there is no islanding scheme in operation in OPGCL.
3
4
5
ISLANDING MULTIPLICATION RELAY CONFIGURED IN IBTPS SWITCHYARD CONTROL ROOM
6
Logic configured in REG670 Relay for Islanding of Unit-I Generator
7
Logic configured in REG670 Relay for Islanding of Unit- 2 Generator
8
• The over – frequency protection is achieved using SAPTOF function block in Generator
Protection relay REG670. There are 3 instances of SAPTOF function in REG670 relay, in which
the 1st is used to confirm the disturbance in the system frequency (As shown in above figure-
red colored), 2nd and 3rd instance is used for delayed operation of the over- frequency
function in line with the logic shown above.
9
Configuration of Delayed Over Frequency and Under Frequency Function
10
• Above timers are settable and can be adjusted as per requirement. If there is no
trip from islanding relay, over and under frequency protections will operate as per
the times shown without external timers (timer-1 to 4).
• If there is a trip from Islanding relay, over and under frequency protections are
blocked till the time set in corresponding timers as per the above shown
configuration. Hence total tripping time delay will be corresponding timer delay +
over and under frequency protection function set time delay.
11
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURATION IN UNIT#1
MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM
12
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURATION IN UNIT#2
MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM
13
14
15
MONTHLY INTERRUPTION REPORT FOR THE MONTH OFJULY2018
TRANSMISSION SUB DIVISION HATIA-II Annexure-C.2
3 23.07.18 10:52 11:01 00:09 O/C Facia -Main PROTN OPTD E/F-Axu Distance PROTN 21X
Micom-Active Group-1,Started Phase ABC,Tripping Phase
ABC,O/Current- I>1,O/C Trip I>1,system frequency 49.75Hz,F/Duration
213.8ms,Relay Trip Time -80.36ms,IA-256.3A,IB-245.3A,IC-251.8A,VAN-
69.38KV,VBN-73.78KV,VCN-72.93KV,Fault in zone none.
4 23.07.18 14:32 15:40 01:08 S/D
5 30.07.18 13:01 15:34 02:33 S/D
220/132KV 150 MVA ICT-I
Sl. Date Time of Time of Durat Cause Relay Remarks
No. tripping closing ion
1. 20.07.18 08:46 09:00 00:14 F Dir E/F Protn. Gr A -86A2,Gr. B-86B1,Trip relay 86
220/132KV 150 MVA ICT-II
Sl. Date Time of Time of Durat Cause Relay Remarks
No. tripping closing ion
1 20.07.18 08:46 09:02 00:16 F Trip relay Gr.A 86 A, Trip relay Gr. A & B 86 A2,86B1 & 86B2,Traffo Diff
Protn 87
2 20.07.18 09:45 10:30 00:45 F Trip relay Gr. 86 A, Trip relay Gr. A & B 86 A2 & 86B2,Traffo Diff Protn
87,Trip relay 86
220/132KV 150 MVA ICT-III
1. Disturbance at 220/132 kV PCC advised JUSNL to check the JUSNL informed that
Chandil S/s on 08.08.18 at details of tripping of 220kV Chandil – zone-4 timing was
05:49 hrs. STPS S/C and also to review the reviewed and set to
zone-4 timer settings for all the lines 500 msec.
as per PCC recommendations.
5. Disturbance at 400/132 kV PCC observed that there is a need of The agenda will be
Motihari(DMTCL) S/s on SPS implementation to avoid the discussed in the next
22.08.18 at 14:59 hrs. overloading of other ICT, in case of TCC meeting to be
one ICT tripped. PCC advised Bihar to held on 16.11.2018.
formulate a draft scheme of SPS and
submit it to ERLDC/ERPC for further
discussion.
5. Total power failure at PCC advised BSPTCL to check & BSPTCL informed
220/132 kV Sipara S/s analyse the disturbance recorders of that the busbar
(BSPTCL) on 15.06.2018 at all the feeders along with the timing of protection is now out
10:58 hrs.
relay operation and Circuit breaker of service for Sipara
opening time in order to ascertain the S/s. A new
cause of busbar relay operation. busbarprotection
system is under
implementation.
7. Issues related with PCC advised Powergrid to explore for Regarding inclusion
Generation Backing down inclusion of pole block with ground return of pole block with
during Talcher-Kolar SPS mode signal in the SPS logic. ground return mode
operation on 16th May 2018.
PCC advised NTPC, GMR and JITPL to signal in the SPS
ensure the generation reduction as per the logic, Powergrid
SPS logic. informed that the
issue was referred to
PCC advised NTPC also to explore for OEM.
inclusion of pole block with ground
return mode signal in the SPS logic.
10. Disturbance at 400/220 kV PCC advised BSPTCL and Powergrid BSPTCL informed
Biharshariff S/s on 28-03- to ensure proper relay coordination that they are in the
2018 at 18:43 hrs and 19-03- between 400kV and 220 kV system process of
2018 at 02:02 hrs.
including ICTs at Biharshariff S/s. implementing the
revised settings.
71st PCC advised BSPTCL to
configure the zone-2 timings as 250-
300 msec for the lines which do not
have PLCC operational so that a
proper relay coordination will be
ensured between ICTs and the lines.
Annexure-C9
Checklist for Submission of new transmission elements for updation in Protection Database
NAME OF ORGANISATION:
FOR THE MONTH OF:
SUBSTATION DETAIL:
Status of
Sl No DETAILS OF ELEMENTS DATA TYPE Submission Remarks
(Y/N)
1 TRANSMISSION LINE LINE LENGTH, CONDUCTOR TYPE, VOLTAGE GRADE
2 POWER TRANSFORMER NAMEPLATE DETAILS
3 GENERATOR TECHNICAL PARAMETERS
4 CURRENT TRANSFORMER NAMEPLATE DETAILS
5 VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER NAMEPLATE DETAILS
6 RELAY DATA MAKE, MODEL and FEEDER NAME
NUMERICAL RELAYS: CSV or XML file extracted from Relay
7 RELAY SETTINGS
ELECTROMECHANICAL RELAYS: SNAPSHOT of RELAY
8 REACTOR NAMEPLATE DETAILS
9 CAPACITOR NAMEPLATE DETAILS
9 UPDATED SLD
SIGNATURE:
NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE:
DESIGNATION:
CONTACT:
E-MAIL ID: