70PCCMINUTES

Minutes
of
th
70 PCC Meeting
Date: 06.09.2018
Eastern Regional Power Committee
14, Golf Club Road, Tollygunge
Kolkata: 700 033
EASTERN REGIONAL POWER COMMITTEE
MINUTES OF 70TH PROTECTION SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT ERPC,

KOLKATA ON 21.08.2018 (TUESDAY) AT 10:30 HOURS
List of participants is enclosed at Annexure-A.
PART – A
ITEM NO. A.1: Confirmation of inutes of 69th Protection sub-Committee Meeting held on 19th
July, 2018 at ERPC, Kolkata.
The minutes of 69th Protection Sub-Committee meeting held on 19.07.18 circulated vide letter dated
31.07.18.
Members may confirm the minutes of 69th PCC meeting.
Deliberation in the meeting
Members confirmed the minutes of 69th PCC minutes.
PART – B
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION ON GRID INCIDENCES OCCURRED IN JULY, 2018
ITEM NO. B.1: Tripping incidences in 400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri D/C line and subsequent
operation of SPS-II.
A. Tripping of 400 KV Rangpo-Binaguri-I and operation of SPS-II on 10.07.18 at 08:14 hrs.
At 08:14:34:538 hrs R-B phase fault took place in 400 KV Rangpo-Binaguri-I and it tripped from
both end in zone-1 distance protection within 100 msec. Pre fault flow in 400 KV Rangpo-Binaguri
each circuit was around 830 MW.At 08:14:35:648 hrs SPS code-1 generated at Ranpgo S/S and
SPS operated at teesta-III at 08:14:35:678 hrs. Also at Dikchu,Jorethang,Chujachen and Tashiding
one generating unit tripped as per SPS-1 logic. At 08:14:36:348 hrs SPS-2 operated at Rangpo and
400 KV Teesta-III-Rangpo line tripped from Rangpo end. At the same Time 220 KV Tashiding-
Rangpo tripped from Tashiding end, no detail of the tripping received from Tashiding.
Relay indications are as follows:
Name of the elements Relay Indication at end 1 Relay Indication at end 2

400 KV Rangpo-Binaguri-I Z-I, R-B phase fault, 48.11 KM, Z-I, R-B phase fault, 61.61 KM ,
IR=5.6 KA and IB=6.9KA
400 KV Rangpo-Teesta-III SPS-II operated
Load/Generation Loss: 1046 MW Generation loss with No Load loss.
B. Tripping of 400 KV Rangpo-Binaguri-II and operation of SPS-II on 30.07.18 at 20:48 hrs.
Due to Bad Weather in the Sikkim, 400 kV Binaguri-Rangpo 2 tripped on Y-B phase to Phase to
earth fault at 20:42 Hrs due to conductor snapping at 38 km location from Rangpo end. The fault got
cleared in 100 ms as observed from the PMU plot of Binaguri bus voltage. With this, SPS -1 code
operated for 400 kV Binaguri-Rangpo ckts which in turn tripped the all running units of Teesta 3
(Except one Unit) and one unit each of Jorethang (Unit 2), Tashiding(Unit 2), Dikchu, Chujachen
(Unit 1).
However, it was observed that SPS 2 also has operated causing tripping of 400 kV Teesta3-
Rangpo circuit from Rangpo end. At the same time 400 kV Teesta 3-Dikchu circuit also tripped from
Dikchu end. This led to the blackout of Teesta 3 and Dikchu generation complex.
Further, it was observed that at the same time, 220 kV Rangpo-Tashiding circuit also got tripped
from the Tashiding end.
Total Generation Loss: 1057 MW
Due to Generation Loss Frequency dipped from 49.92 Hz to 49.81 Hz (Drop of .11 Hz) and
stabilized at 49.85 Hz.
Issues of Concern:
1. Operation of Both SPS-1 and SPS-2 operation during one line tripping: It is the cause of concern
that both SPS are operating indicating that the line loading of one circuit after tripping of another
circuit and SPS-1 operation is not coming below 850 MW after the SPS-1 operation. A similar kind
of event took place on 10th July 2018 at 08:14 Hrs where phase to phase fault occurred on 400 kV
Bingauri-Rangpo 1 circuit leading to its tripping and operation of SPS-1 as well as SPS 2 causing
loss of 1046 MW of generation.
2. Delay in commissioning of 400 kV Rangpo-Kishenganj D/C: The delay in the commission of 400
kV Rangpo-Kishenganj D/C is leading congestion in evacuation of generation of all the hydro IPPs
in Sikkim. Tripping of Rangpo-Binaguri line with consequent SPS operation and generation outage
is experienced in each rainy season.
3. Phase to phase fault and conductor snapping : The conductor snapping in above case, hot spots
and frequent faults on the 400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri D/C are indicating that continuous high loading
of these lines is not desirable.
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4. Unwanted tripping of 220 kV Rangpo-Tashiding circuit: It was observed that on both days (10
July and 30th July), 220 kV Rangpo-Tashiding circuit got tripped from Tashiding end. No details on
cause of tripping have been received from Tashiding end.
Members may discuss.
ERLDC informed that the tripping of lines and the fault clearing time for both the disturbances were
found to be in order as per disturbance recorder analysis.
Regarding the operation of SPS-II, ERLDC informed that Chujachen, Tashiding, Jorethang and
Dikchu units which remained on bar after SPS-I operation (i.e tripping of one of the 400 kV
Rangpoo-Binaguri D/C line), were over generating at their overload capacities. As a result, the
aggregated inflow of power from the generating stations through one of the remaining 400 kV
Rangpoo-Binaguri D/C was more than 850 MW, which had caused triggering of SPS-II operation.
It was informed that the issue was also discussed in 148th OCC meeting, wherein it was decided to
modify the logic for SPS-2 so that it operates at a line flow of 900 MW instead of at 850 MW. The
time delay for actuation of SPS-2 would continue to be set at 700 ms and might be reviewed in
future, if required.
Regarding tripping of 220 kV Rangpo-Tashiding circuit from Tashiding end on 10.07.18.
It was informed that the tripping was due to incorrect settings in SCADA and the settings were
rectified after the incidence.
Regarding tripping of Teesta-III –Dikchu S/C from Dikchu end on 30.07.18, the tripping was due to
operation of cable protection as per the information received from Dikchu.
PCC opined that the tripping of 400 kV Dikchu-Teesta III circuit for a fault outside of this line section
was discussed many instances in this forum.
PCC once again advised Dansenergy to review the relay settings at Dikchu end to avoid unwanted
tripping.
ERLDC informed that during the above tripping incidences, it has been observed that voltage of
Teesta-III-Rangpo line was increased to a very high value after tripping of Rangpo end breaker on
SPS-II operation.
PCC opined that the overvoltage phenomena could be minimized if the Teesta-III end breakers
could be tripped on SPS-II operation along with Rangpo end breaker.
Powergrid informed that additional channel is not available for sending SPS-II signal to Teesta-III
end.
PCC opined that the opening of breakers at Teesta III end can also be possible by sending DT
signal from Rangpo end during the line breaker operation at Rangpo end.
PCC advised Powergrid to configure the DT settings at Rangpo end accordingly.
ITEM NO. B.2: Repeated Grid disturbances at 400/132 kV Motihari(DMTCL) Substation.
400 kV Motihari – Gorakhpur – II and 400 kV Barh – Motihari D/C were out of service due to tower
collapse for more than one month. Motihari is connected to Indian grid through 400 kV Motihari
Gorakhpur – I which tripped several times in the month of July 2018 due mal operation of SF6 gas
monitoring relay resulted frequent interruption of transnational power supply as well as local power
supply.
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A. Disturbance on 04.07.18 at 10:52 hrs
Motihari was connected with rest of the grid via 400 kV Motihari Gorakhpur – I. At 10:52 hrs 400 kV
Motihari Gorakhpur - I tripped on Gas compartment zone trip signal resulting total power failure at
Motihari S/s. On investigation it is found that Density Monitor used for Bus-duct to Bushing (SF6 to
air) detected false low pressure and sent tripping command to BCU (As per scheme whenever
Density Monitor detect low pressure (except CB DM) it will issue trip command to Main & Tie CB
and send DTT to remote end) though SF6 Gas pressure in respective duct was as per
requirement/specification before fault and after fault. There was no actual fault in the circuit. Line
tripped due to mal-operation of Density Monitor.
Load loss: 200 MW
B. Disturbance on 20.07.18 at 09:10 hrs and on 21.07.18 at 07:11 hrs.
400 kV Motihari - Gorakhpur - I tripped on gas compartment zone protection due to maloperation of
gas monitoring relay which shows low indication despite proper level being maintained.
Load loss: 280 MW (on 20.07.18)

110 MW (on 21.07.18)
DMTCL may explain.
DMTCL informed that the mal-operation of SF6 density monitor was due to moisture ingress in the
connector. All the connectors have been covered after these disturbances to avoid the moisture
ingress.
PCC opined that DMTCL substation at Motihari is an important substation due to its inter-regional
connectivity and major source for power supply to Nepal. Such unwanted tripping of above nature
would pose threat to security and reliability of grid operation.
PCC advised DMTCL to contact OEM to avoid such type of unwanted tripping in future.
ITEM NO. B.3: Disturbance at 220kV Mejia & Kalyansweri S/s on 27.07.18 at 01:42 hrs.
220 kV main bus II at Kalyaneswari and Mejia tripped resulting tripping of all elements connected to
these buses due to LBB operation after non-opening of breakers at both ends on R-N fault at 220
kV Mejia - Kalyaneswari - I
DVC may explain.
DVC explained the disturbance with a detailed presentation. The presentation is attached in
Annexure-B.3. DVC explained that
 There was a transient R phase to ground fault in the 220 kV Mejia-Kalyansweri Line, which
was cleared from both ends on zone-I distance protection.
 The line was connected to bus# 2 at both the substations and during the instant of above
tripping busbar protection operated at both the substations for the bus # 2.
 Regarding busbar operation at Mejia substation, the LBB timer had become instantaneous,
which caused tripping of all the feeders connected to Bus #2.
 DVC informed that they have replaced the faulty timer with a new one after this incident.
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 Regarding busbar operation at Kalyansweri substation, DVC informed that the reason for
operation of busbar protection (in both main zone & check zone) could not be ascertained as
relays, Connected CTs , wiring and settings were found in order after thorough checking.
 The busbar relay at kalyaneswari is of electromagnetic type and as a remedial measure,
they have increased the busbar differential current pickup set value to its maximum i.e. 0.4 A
at Kalyansweri Substation.
PCC advised DVC to replace the old EM type busbar relay at Kalyaneswari with numerical relay.
DVC informed that replacement of old busbar protection at Kalyaneswari had been taken up and it
would be soon.
ITEM NO. B.4: Tripping of 400 kV DSTPS (ANDAL)-Jamshedpur D/C on 28.07.18 at 21:07 hrs.
400 kV Andal – Jamshedpur D/C tripped at 21:07 hrs on R-N fault. At same time, unit II at Andal
tripped on stator E/F protection.
DVC and Powergrid may explain.
DVC explained the tripping incident with the presentation. The presentation is attached in Annexure
B.4.
DVC informed that there was a R phase to ground transient fault in the 400 kV DSTPS-Jamshedpur
circuit-I. At DSTPS end the main breaker cleared the fault in zone-I but the tie breaker of R phase
failed to open, as a result LBB of tie breaker operated after 200ms which tripped all the poles of
main breakers of both the circuits of DSTPS-Jamshedpur line since both the circuits of DSTPS-
Jamshedpur were in same Dia at DSTPS end.
Powergrid informed that the breakers at Jamshedpur end cleared the fault and auto reclose was
initiated. However, the breakers of both the circuit got tripped on receipt of DT signal from DSTPS
end.
DVC informed that tie CB got damaged and the replacement was in process.
DVC further informed that tripping of DSTPS unit # II on stator earth fault was a different incident.
They added that a thorough inspection was carried out but reason for tripping could not be identified.
ITEM NO. B.5: Repeated Grid Disturbances at 220kV Madhepura (BSPTCL) S/s on 19.07.18 at
13:31 hrs.
At 13:15 Hrs , 220 kV Madhepura-New Purnea-II tripped on BN fault. At 13:31 Hrs Purnea –
Madhepura I also tripped duet to Y-B phase fault resulting total power failure at Madhepura S/S.
Time Name of the elements End 1 Relay Indication End 2 Relay Indication
13:15 220 kV New Purnea - B-N B-N
Hrs Madhepura - II
13:31 220 kV New Purnea - Y-B Y-B
Hrs Madhepura - I
Load Loss: 150 MW
BSPTCL may explain.
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For the disturbance on 19.07.18 at 13:15 hrs, Powergrid informed that relay at New Purnea end has
picked up in zone -2.
BSPTCL informed that the 220kV New Purnea-Madhepura circuit-II was tripped in zone-I with relay
indication as B-N fault.
In the mean time, when 220kV New Purnea-Madhepura-II was under shutdown due to above
tripping, 220kV New Purnea-Madhepura Circuit-I got tripped. Powergrid informed that the circuit-I got
tripped from their end on zone-2 with relay indication as Y phase to B phase fault.
BSPTCL added that both the faults were in transient nature and no abnormality was found during
line patrolling.
PCC opined that the tripping of circuit-II on transient fault is highly undesirable. On query from PCC,
BSPTCL informed that though PLCC of the lines are in operation, autoreclosure was not enabled for
the above lines.
PCC advised BSPTCL to check healthiness of PLCC and enable the autoreclosure setting as well as
the carrier tripping settings for both the lines and report to ERPC and ERLDC.
ITEM NO. B.6: Total power failure at 220kV TLDP-III S/s on 04.07.18 at 19:00 hrs.
As per flash report received from WBSLDC, 220 kV TLDP III – NJP – S/C tripped on distance
protection (fault distance 57 km from TLDP – III) resulting in tripping of all running units at TLDP - III
in 51V (under voltage overcurrent protection) due to loss of evacuation path. In PMU data, fault was
observed in R & B phases at the time of the incident. Fault clearing time is less than 100 ms.
Name of the Element Relay Indication at end 1 Relay Indication at end 2
220 kV TLDP III – NJP – Z-I, fault distance 57km Yet to be received
S/C
Generation Loss: 136 MW
WBSETCL may explain.
WBSETCL informed that there was a R-B phase fault on 220 kV TLDP-III-NJP S/C line. The
Distance relay at NJP end cleared the fault on zone-I distance protection with fault distance 10 km
from NJP end. As TLDP-III station had no other evacuation path all the running units were tripped,
total power failure occurred in the station.
ITEM NO. B.7: Total power failure at 220kV Hatia(JUSNL) S/s on 20.07.18 at 09:10 hrs.
Due to clearance issue with some 11 KV feeder (which has an in feed from Hatia old) repeated
faults occurred in 220 kV Ranchi - Hatia-I and II. As a result total power failed at 220kV Hatia S/s.
Detailed report is enclosed at Annexure-B7.
JUSNL may explain.
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JUSNL informed that repeated disturbances and total power failure at Hatia substation on 20.07.18
was due to the clearance issue with 11kV feeder under 220kV Ranchi-Hatia D/C line. JUSNL
informed that the 11 kV feeders were re-routed after the above incidences to get the sufficient
clearance.
PCC advised JUSNL to check the Sag level and clearance of 220 KV lines to avoid this type of
tripping.
From the analysis of PMU plot and disturbance recorders at Ranchi & Hatia end, a number of
protection related issues came into notice.
PCC analysed the issue & advised JUSNL to take the following actions
 Whenever PLCC will remain out of service, the auto reclose operation should be made to
non-auto mode and zone 2 timing may reduced to minimize the fault clearing time.
 The trip on reclose function should be enabled in the relay whenever autoreclose function is
in operation.
Regarding unwanted tripping of ATRs at Hatia and Patratu substations and tripping of Hatia-Patratu
line in zone-4, PCC felt that there was a protection coordination issue and advised JUSNL to submit
the corresponding relay settings to ERPC/ERLDC at the earliest.
The issue of delayed opening of breaker at Hatia end i.e.400 msec after zone-I tripping initiation
was remained unexplained. The sequence of operation as well as the details of elements tripped
during the incident could not be explained by JUSNL.
PCC decided to discuss this issue in next PCC meeting and advised JUSNL to explain the issue in
next meeting with all the relevant details.
ITEM NO. B.8: Tripping Incidences in the month of July, 2018.
Other tripping incidences occurred in the month of July 2018 which needs explanation from
constituents of either of the end is given in Annexure-B8.
In 58th PCC, ERLDC informed that most of the constituents are not submitting the DR and EL data
for single line trippings.
PCC advised all the constituents to upload the details along with DR and EL in PDMS on-line portal
and referred the issue to TCC for further guidance.
In 36th TCC, all the constituents were advised to use the PDMS on-line portal for uploading the
single line tripping details along with DR (comtrade files), EL and other relevant files for all trippings
of August 2017 onwards. Otherwise, it will be considered as violation of compliance of clause 5.2(r)
& 5.9 of IEGC.
Members explained the tripping incidences. Updated status is enclosed at Annexure-B8.
ERLDC informed that constituents not submitted the information on few tripping incidences which
occurred in June 2018.
PCC advised all the concerned constituents to send the relevant details to ERLDC.
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PART- C:: OTHER ITEMS
ITEM NO. C.1: Presentation on “Best Practices and Advanced Diagnostic Solutions for O&M
of Transmission Lines & Substations”.
M/s Taurus Powertronics Pvt. Limited vide a letter expressed their interest to conduct a program on
the best practices and advanced diagnostic techniques for O&M of Lines and Substations in PCC
forum.
Accordingly M/s Taurus Powertronics was advised to give a brief presentation in 70th PCC meeting.
M/S Taurus Powertronics may present.
M/s Taurus Powertronics Pvt. Ltd. gave a detailed presentation on “Best Practices and Advanced
Diagnostic Solutions for O&M of Transmission Lines & Substations”.
PCC appreciated the presentation and thanked M/s Taurus Powertronics Pvt. Ltd. for enriching the
knowledge and sharing the new technology on Advanced Diagnostic Solutions for O&M of
Transmission Lines & Substations.
ITEM NO. C.2: Islanding scheme at IbTPS- OPGC
68th PCC opined that the draft scheme submitted by Odisha was three years old and the draft
scheme is needed to be reviewed with existing network configuration.
PCC decided to discuss the islanding scheme in next PCC Meeting and advised OPTCL to submit
all the relevant details to ERPC and ERLDC.
In 69th PCC, OPTCL presented the revised islanding scheme based on updated network
configuration and power flows. The details are enclosed at Annexure-C.2.
It was decided that ERLDC and ERPC will study and finalize the islanding scheme in next PCC
Meeting.
ERLDC & ERPC may update.
OPGC has submitted the updated details which are enclosed at Annexure-C2.a.
It was decided that ERLDC and ERPC will study and finalize the islanding scheme in next PCC
Meeting.
ITEM NO. C.3: Auto Reclose scheme for 132KV feeders--Powergrid
Powergrid informed that they are planning to enable three phase autoreclose feature for 132kV
lines owned by Powergrid.
PCC recommended to enable the auto reclose scheme for 132 kV lines wherever PLCC system is
in service.
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ITEM NO. C.4: Repeated interruption of power supply at Lalmatia and Sahebgunj area
PCC advised JUSNL to comply the earlier observations/recommendations regarding frequent

tripping incidences at Lalmatia S/s.
In view of repeated uncoordinated trippings and mal-operation of relays at 220/132kV Lalmatia S/s in
the past, PCC decided to form a Committee with members from NTPC, Powergrid, ERLDC and
ERPC. The Committee would visit Lalmatia and adjoining substations for on-site inspection and
Third Party Protection Audit.
Audit Team may place the report. JUSNL may respond.
Audit team presented the report highlighting the major issues with respect to Lalmatia substation.
The report is attached in Annexure C.4.
PCC advised ERPC secretariat to communicate/intimate the audit observations to JUSNL and
NTPC authorities and requesting them for early compliances.
ITEM NO. C.5: Auto-Reclosure on Lines from PPSP Generating station.
It has been observed that, no transmission lines from 400 kV PPSP Plant are having the auto-
reclosure facility in enabled condition. Further, the auto-reclosure facilities are also not enabled at
remote end substation.
Element Name Tripping Date Tripping Time Type of Fault

400KV PPSP-BIDHANNAGAR-I 05-08-16 21:43 R Phase to E/F
400KV PPSP-NEW PPSP-2 25-02-18 12:58 R Phase to E/F
400KV PPSP-BIDHANNAGAR-II 11-03-18 23:45 Y phase to E/F
400KV PPSP-BIDHANNAGAR-II 10-05-18 6:15 B phase to E/F
400KV PPSP-BIDHANNAGAR-II 20-05-18 16:39 R Phase to E/F
400KV PPSP-BIDHANNAGAR-I 01-06-18 11:37 Y phase to E/F
400KV PPSP-BIDHANNAGAR-II 08-06-18 2:32 B phase to E/F
400KV PPSP-BIDHANNAGAR-II 12-06-18 14:34 R Phase to E/F
Non-Implementation of Auto-reclosure results in the non-compliance of CEA Technical Standard for

Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines 43.4.C.
WBPDCL may kindly update on the status of healthiness and enabling of the auto-reclosure on the
transmission lines from PPSP Power plant. It may kindly be noted that, most of the power plant
(Thermal/Hydro/Gas) in the Indian Power System have no issue in enabling single-phase auto-
reclosure for the line emanating from their plant. This has indeed increased their reliability during
bad weather conditions during which transient fault occur on the lines.
The agenda could not be discussed as WBSEDCL representative was not present in the meeting.
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ITEM NO. C.6: Time Setting for Digital Disturbance Recorder in the Relay
Disturbance recorder file is the most important data during any event analysis. Further, it is
essential that the disturbance recorder file should have adequate information about the event. In
order to achieve that, it is desired to have 3-5 seconds as the recording time so that all the
important aspect of event can be captured. However, it has been observed that, most of the
Disturbance Recorder files have very small time window of record ( 0.5-1.5 seconds) and thus
leading to lack of data for events like auto-reclosure, PDR operation etc.
In view of this, it is suggested to adopt a pre-event time window of 0.5 second and Post-event time
window of 2.5 to 4.5 seconds.
PCC advised all the constituents to comply the above suggestion.
ITEM NO. C.7: FOLLOW-UP OF DECISIONS OF THE PREVIOUS PROTECTION SUB-

COMMITTEE MEETING(S)
The decisions of previous PCC Meetings are given at Annexure-C7.
Members may update the latest status.
Regarding disturbance at 400kV Bakreswar on 19.06.2018, WBPDCL informed that Unit #2 CB

unhealthy was appeared during changing over from Main CB to Tie CB due to DC circuit fault. LBB
protection operated and tripped all the lines connected to 400kV bus.
WBPDCL added that the DC circuit fault was rectified after the disturbance.
DMTCL has submitted a action taken report on recommendations of Protection Audit.
PCC advised all the other constituents to comply the PCC observations.
ITEM NO. C.8: Zone 3 settings of ISTS lines
Based on the data available in PDMS, the zone 3 settings of all ISTS lines in Eastern Region were
verified and compared with the corresponding resistive reach of the line thermal loading. Zone 3
settings were also checked with the agreed protection philosophy of ER. The discrepancies
observed in the settings will be presented in the meeting.
In 67th PCC, PRDC presented the list of ISTS lines where they observed the discrepancy in zone-3
setting.
In 70th PCC, PRDC was advised to resend the list of the lines to all constituents and constituents
were advised to verify the settings at the earliest.
Members may update.
PCC advised concerned constituents to verify the settings.
ITEM NO. C.9: Schedule of training program to be conducted by PRDC
As per AMC, PRDC will conduct training on PDMS and PSCT in state utility premises of Eastern
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Region. Tentative schedule is given below:
Training in Month State Date

June'2018 Bihar 11/06/18 To 15/06/18
July'2018 West Bengal 09/07/18 To 13/07/18
August'2018 Odisha 20/08/18 To 24/08/18
September'2028 Jharkhand 17/09/18 To 21/09/18
October'2018 Sikkim 08/10/18 To 12/10/18
Accordingly, training was conducted at Patna from 11th June 2018 to 15th June 2018 and in West
Bengal from 09th July 2018 to 13th July 2018.
In 69th PCC, it was agreed and finalized that the training will be conducted in Odisha from 06.08.18
to 10.08.18 in Bhubaneswar.
PCC advised all the concern state constituents of Odisha to attend the training.
Members may update.
PCC decided to conduct the training at Ranchi, Jharkhand from 10th Septemebr 2018 to 14th
September 2018.
PCC advised all the constituents of Jharkhand to attend the training.
ITEM NO. C.10: Visit to newly commissioned substations by PRDC for data collection
Data of newly commissioned substations in Odisha and Bihar are to be incorporated in Protection
data management system. PRDC is planning to visit newly commissioned substations for data
collection. Tentative schedule for the visit is given below:
Odisha:
NEW SS NAME OWNER Date of visit

TSL-Kalinganagar OPTCL 20-08-2018
Dhenkikote GRIDCO 21-08-2018
Bargarh GRIDCO 23-08-2018
BARGARH NEW OPTCL 24-08-2018
Ghens OPTCL 25-08-2018
Kantabanji GRIDCO 27-08-2018
MUNIGUDA OPTCL 29-08-2018
Podagada GRIDCO 31-08-2018
TRITOL OPTCL 03-09-2018
Bihar:
SL. NO. NEW SS NAME OWNER DATE

1 New Sheikhpura BSPTCL 21-08-2018
2 Chapra(New) BSPTCL 22-08-2018
3 Shahpur - Patori BSPTCL 23-08-2018
4 Amnaur BGCL 24-08-2018
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5 Khijisarai PGCIL/BGCL 25-08-2018
6 Nawada 220KV BGCL 27-08-2018
7 Bakhri BSPTCL 28-08-2018
8 Jamalpur BGCL 29-08-2018
SL. NO. NEW SS NAME OWNER DATE
1 Manihari BSPTCL 23-08-2018
2 Baisi BSPTCL 24-08-2018
3 Barsoi BSPTCL 25-08-2018
4 Laukhi BSPTCL 27-08-2018
5 Jhanjharpur BSPTCL 28-08-2018
Odisha and Bihar may confirm.
PCC advised Odisha and Bihar to finalize the dates.
ITEM NO. C.11: Status of Third Party Protection Audit
The compliance status of 1st Third Party Protection Audit observations is as follows:
Total % of
Name of Constituents Complied
Observations Compliance
Powergrid 54 46 85.19
NTPC 16 14 87.50
NHPC 1 1 100.00
DVC 40 26 65.00
WB 68 49 72.06
Odisha 59 42 71.19
JUSNL 34 25 73.53
BSPTCL 16 5 31.25
IPP (GMR, Sterlite and MPL) 5 5 100.00
* Pending observations of Powergrid are related to PLCC problems at other end.
The substation wise status of compliance are available at ERPC website (Observations include
PLCC rectification/activation which needs a comprehensive plan).
Members may note.
Members noted for compliance.
ITEM NO. C.12: Non-commissioning of PLCC / OPGW and non-implementation of carrier

aided tripping in 220kV and above lines.
According to CEA technical standard for construction of electric plants and electric lines -Clause
43(4) (c), transmission line of 220 KV and above should have single-phase auto-reclosing facility for
improving the availability of the lines. However, from the tripping details attached June-August,
2016 it is evident that the some of 220kV above Inter & Intra-Regional lines do not having auto-
reclose facility either at one end or at both ends. Out of these for some of the lines even
PLCC/OPGW is not yet installed and carrier aided protection including Autorecloser facility is not
yet implemented. Based on the trippings of June- August, 2016 and PMU analysis a list of such
12
70th PCC Minutes
lines has been prepared and as given below:
List of line where auto reclose facility is not available(Information based on PMU data analysis)
Owner Detail Present Status

Date of
S. Transmission Lines Reason of
Trippin OPGW/P
No name Tripping AR facility
g End-1 End-2 LCC Link
functional
available
will be
220KV BUDIPADAR- 23.06.1 PLCC activated in
13 Y-N FAULT OPTCL CSEB
KORBA-II 6 available consultation
with Korba
17.07.1 EARTH by March
17 220 KV TSTPP-RENGALI NTPC OPTCL
6 FAULT 2018
220KV BUDIPADAR- 21.07.1 EARTH PLCC
18 OPTCL PGCIL
RAIGARH 6 FAULT defective
400 KV KOLAGHAT- 03.08.1 WBPDC WBSET
19 Y-N FAULT
KHARAGPUR-II 6 L CL
Yes Old Relay and
not functional.
7-8 months
220 KV FARAKKA- 03.08.1
20 B-N FAULT . NTPC JUNSL required for
LALMATIA 6
auto re-close
relay
procurement.
Voice
established.
220 KV MUZAFFARPUR - 10.08.1
23 B-N FAULT PGCIL BSPTCL For carrier
HAZIPUR - II 6
required
shutdown
Expected to
install
220 KV ROURKELA - 11.08.1 OPGW
24 B-N FAULT PGCIL OPTCL protection
TARKERA-II 6 available
coupler by Jan
17
220 KV BIHARSARIF- 07.09.1 BSPTC
27 B-N FAULT TVNL
TENUGHAT 6 L
220KV Bidhannagar- WBSET
32 DVC
Waria-II CL
220KV Jamshedpur-Jindal-
33
SC
34th TCC advised all the respective members to update the above list along with the last tripping
status in next PCC meeting.
TCC further advised all the constituents to give the latest status of PLCC of other 220kV and above
lines under respective control area.
OPTCL:
1. 220kV Rengali(PG)-Rengali S/Y (Proposal for Commn. in OPGW is pending): PSDF appraisal
committee accepted the proposal
2. 220kV Indravati(PG)-Indravati(PH) (Proposal for Commn. in OPGW pending): PSDF appraisal
committee accepted the proposal
3. 132kV Baripada(PG)-Baripada ( Tendering in Progress for OPGW): Contract awarded
4. 132kV Baripada(PG)-Rairangpur (Tendering in Progress for OPGW): Contract awarded
13
70th PCC Minutes
BSPTCL:
1. 220kV Purnea (PG)-Madhepura line
2. 220 kV Biharshariff- Begusarai line Work is in progress expected to be commissioned
3. 220 kV Biharshariff- Bodhgaya line by December 2017.
4. 220kV MTPS-Motiari line
5. 220KV Madhepura-New Purnea D/C Auto recloser is out of service at Madhepura
6. 220KV Muzaffarpur-Hajipur D/C line Auto recloser is out of service at Hazipur
7. 220KV FSTPP-Lalmatia-1 Auto recloser is out of service at Lalmatia
8. 220KV Patna-Khagaul-SC Auto recloser is out of service at Khagual
In 65th PCC, Powergrid informed that they will replace the Autorecloser relay of 400 kV Rourkela-
Chaibasa 1 and 400 kV Meramundali-Sterlite 1 & 2 by April 2018.
In 67th PCC, BSPTCL informed that they are planning to hire an agency for implementing PLCC
system in all the lines in their network.
Members may update the status.
WBSETCL informed that PLCC was in service for both the ends of 220kV Bidhannagar-Waria-II line.
ITEM NO. C.13: Checklist for submission of updated data for Protection Database
The network data in Protection Database needs to be updated on regular basis on account of
commissioning of new elements in the CTU as well as STU networks. Accordingly a checklist has
been prepared which is enclosed in Annexure-C13.
All the constituents requested to submit the checklist on monthly bases in every OCC/PCC
meetings.
Constituents may note.
Members noted.
Meeting ended with vote of thanks to the chair.
***************
14
70th PCC Minutes
9/7/2018
Annexure-B3
DISTURBANCE AT
KALYANESHWARY AND MTPS
ON 27.07.18 01:45 HRS
EVENT DETAILS, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

• At about 00:45 hrs of 27.07.18 there was a AN transient fault in L #
228[Kly MTPS]. Fault was cleared at both ends in Distance Zone 1.
weather condition during fault was raining and thundering heavily.
• But along with it Kly Bus # 2[Line was in this bus] tripped through
Busbar protection – both Main Zone & Check Zone. And at MTPS Bus
# 2 [Line was on Bus # 2] tripped through LBB protection of the said
line.
• At MTPS end L # 228 LBB timer had become instantaneous and had
tripped the entire bus. Timer was replaced with healthy one.
• At Kly end busbar protection relays, CTs of L # 228, Busbar CT circuit
IR etc. were done and everything was found O.K.
1
9/7/2018
REASON FOR MALOPERATION OF BOTH MAIN

ZONE AND CHECK ZONE
• No clear reason could be furnished.
• Fault was closer to Kly end with RMS current of about 8kA.
• But DR of L # 228 shows fault had occurred nearer to voltage zero and
thus DC offset was very high (about 90% of fundamental) in faulted
phase current.
• Probably such high DC current was responsible for CT saturation. L #
228 current was seen to be peaky in nature. DR of Kly end indicative
of CT saturation.
• Probably lightning fault.
CURRENT TRACES – KLY END
2
9/7/2018
VOLTAGE TRACES – KLY END
REMEDIAL MEASURES – KLY END

• Busbar Differential Pick Up current setting increased from 0.2A to
0.4A [320A Primary] and stabilizing resistance decreased accordingly.
3
9/7/2018
Annexure-B4
DISTURBANCE IN DSTPS ON
28.07.18 AT ABOUT
21:04HRS
EVENT HISTORY
• At about 21:04 hrs of 28.07.18 there was a transient AN fault (IA=
14.5kA) at about 9.8km from DSTPS End on DSTPS JMD Line # 1.
• Fault seen in Zone 1 – cleared by Main CB instantaneously – but Tie
CB(A pole) failed to OPEN – Tie LBB operated after 200ms – JMD Line
# 2 (in other dia) trips 3 pole and Line # 1 also trips 3 pole but A pole
of Tie CB remained stuck. Fault cleared by tripping from other end.
• Tie rod of A Pole found damaged. Replacement in progress.
• Unit # 2 tripping was a separate event which took place after the line
fault was cleared (about 267ms later). Unit tripped through Neurtal
O/V [95% SEF] and 64GIT.
• Some transient fault was present within SEF zone as C Phase voltage
had become almost zero while the other phase voltages rise to LL
value.
1
9/7/2018
VOLTAGE TRACES
CURRENT TRACES
2
9/7/2018
OTHER POINTS
• No fault found in Unit # 2. Unit was synchronised and had run
successfully for about 7 days before going for over hauling.
• Stator Resistance normal, PT ratio / Magnetizing current normal,
Surge capacitor values normal, LA megger values normal, relay check
normal.
3
Annexure-B7
Incident No. 200718/1 Dtd: 01-08-18
Report on the incident in Eastern Region involving JUSNL system
1) Date / Time of disturbance: 20-08-18, 08:44 hrs

2) Category : - GD - I
3) Systems/ Subsystems affected: 220/132 kV Hatia S/S
4) Quantum of load/generation loss: 170 MW load loss with no
5) Antecedent condition:
PLCC of 220 KV Rahchi-Hatia D/C was out of service and System frequency 50:00 Hz
6) Major elements tripped:
220 kV Ranchi Hatia-I & II
220 kV Hatia Patratu-I & II
7) Network across Hatia
Figure 1: Geographical diagram of the network of affected system
1|Page
8) Details of relay flag:
Relay Indication at
Time Name of the elements Relay Indication at End 1 End 2
B-N,IB-4.8 kA, Zone-2 and B-N, IB 6.1 kA, 1.6 km
08:44:14:419 220 kV Ranchi Hatia-I 3phase tripping(also Y phase from Hatia,Zone-1,
loop picked up) single phase tripping
- B-N,IB-6.2 kA , Zone-1
picked up and T1
A/R of 220 kV Ranchi Hatia-I timer started still 3
08:44:15:249
from Hatia end phase tripping took
place after 400ms
approximately
At the same Instant all ATR of Hatia tripped on over current and 220 KV Patratu-Hatia-II and ATR (on o/c)
at Patratu tripped. But DR/EL and relay details not submitted
B-N,IB-3.8 kA, Zone-2 and Y-B-N, IY 1.7 kA IB-
3phase tripping 2.6kA,Zone-1, 3 Phase
09:27:00:351 220 kV Ranchi Hatia-II
tripping phase
tripping
B-N,IB-4.3 kA, Zone-2 and B-N, IB 2.5 kA,
3phase tripping(also Y phase 3.458km from
09:41:28:831 220 kV Ranchi Hatia-I loop picked up) Hatia,Zone-1, single
phase tripping
B-N,IB-1.2 kA, Zone-4 No DR ,Relay
sensing the same fault of 220 indication received
kV Ranchi Hatia-I and reset as
09:41:28:831 220 kV Hatia-Patratu-II
the fault cleared by opening
of Hatia end breaker of 220
kV Ranchi Hatia-I
- B-N,IB-1.7 kA , Zone-1
picked up and T1
A/R of 220 kV Ranchi Hatia-I timer started still 3
09:41:29:657
from Hatia end phase tripping took
place after 350ms
approximately
B-N,IB-1.3 kA, Zone-4 No DR ,Relay
sensing the same fault of 220 indication received
09:41:29:657 220 kV Hatia-Patratu-II
kV Ranchi Hatia-I during it’s
A/R and tripped after 350 ms
O/V stage 1 operated line Not tripped
10:05:13:565 220 kV Hatia-Patratu-I
voltage 255 KV
B-N,IB-3.8 kA, Zone-2 and Y-B-N, IY 1.5 kA IB-
3phase tripping 3.6kA,Zone-1, 3 Phase
12:12:53:342 220 kV Ranchi Hatia-II
tripping phase
tripping
9) Sequence of events & Detailed Analysis:
A. At 08:44:14:419 Hrs: Due to clearance issue with some 11 KV feeder (which has an in feed from
Hatia old) B-N fault took place in 220 kV Ranchi Hatia-I and at the same time Y phase current also
2|Page
increases. 220 KV Ranchi-Hatia- tripped from Hatia end(1 phsae) immediately in Z-1 and from
Ranchi end(3 phase) after 350 ms in Z-2. Then after 800 ms A/R took place from Hatia end and
again B-N fault took place and Z-1 picked up but tripped after 400ms. At the same time all ATR of
Hatia and one ATR of Patratu tripped as per verbal information. Also 220 KV Hatia-Patratu-II
tripped from Patratu of which no details received.
B-N fault in Tripping

220 kV Ranchi Tripping from Ranchi Unsuccessful A/R
Hatia-I from Hatia end(PG) from Hatia end and
end 400ms fault clearing
Figure 2: 400 kV Bus voltage at Ranchi
B. At 09:27:00:351 Hrs: Again due to clearance issue with 11 KV feeder Y-B-N fault took place.
Though in PMU only B-phase voltage dip observed but from DR it is clear Y phase current also
increased. Ranchi end sensed only B-N fault in Z-2 and tripped (3 phase) after 350ms but Hatia
end tripped in Z-1, Y-B-N fault immediately (3 Phase).
3|Page
Figure 3: 400 kV Bus voltage at Ranchi at 09:27:00 hrs
C. At 09:41:28:831 Hrs: Due to clearance issue with some 11 KV feeder (which has an in feed from
Hatia old) B-N fault took place in 220 kV Ranchi Hatia-I and at the same time Y phase current also
increases. 220 KV Ranchi-Hatia- tripped from Hatia end( 1phase) immediately in Z-1 and from
Ranchi end (3 phase)after 350 ms in Z-2. At the same time Z-4 picked up for 220KV Hatia-Patratu-2
,at the same time its R phase current reduced drastically with no change in voltage and again
restored to pre fault value after 350 ms(??) .Then after 800 ms A/R took place from Hatia end and
again B-N fault took place and Z-1 picked up but tripped after 400ms. Again Z-4 of 220KV Hatia-
Patratu-2 picked up and line tripped from Hatia end. Also from DR it is seen voltage is also
becoming zero implying tripping from Patratu end too. But no details received from Patratu end.
Figure 4: 400 kV Bus voltage at Ranchi at 09:41:28:00 hrs
4|Page
D. At 10:05:13:565 Hrs: 220 KV Hatia-Patratu-1 tripped on over voltage stage-1 and voltage was 254
KV as per DR and there was huge Harmonic content in the line current and Voltage.
E. At 12:12:53:342 Hrs: Again due to clearance issue with 11 KV feeder Y-B-N fault took place.
Though in PMU only B-phase voltage dip observed but from DR it is clear Y phase current also
increased. Ranchi end sensed only B-N fault in Z-2 and tripped (3 phase) after 350ms but Hatia
end tripped in Z-1, Y-B-N fault immediately (3 phase).
10) Restoration:
ELEMENT NAME Tripping Time Restoration Time
08:44 09:38
220 KV Ranchi-Hatia-I
09:41 17:27
09:27 10:24
220 KV Ranchi-Hatia-II
12:11 16:52
220 KV Hatia-Patratu-I 10:05 17:34
08:44 09:00
220 KV Hatia-Patratu-II
09:41 10:07
Other 132 KV line from both Patratu and Hatia opened and closed in between to manage the situation
and for doing rectification work.
5|Page
11) Non Compliance Observed during the event:
Issues Regulation Non-Compliance Utility

DR/EL not provided within 24 1. IEGC 5.2 (r)
JSEB,ER-I
Hours 2. CEA grid Standard 15.3
1. IEGC 5.2 (r), 5.9.6.c (VI)
Non-Submission of Details for
2. CEA grid Standard 15.3
the tripping which is required
3. CEA (Technical standards for JSEB
for appropriate analysis for
connectivity to the Grid) Regulation,
GD/GI
2007-6. 4.d
1. CEA Technical Standard for
Construction of Electrical Plants and
Incorrect/ mis-operation /
Electric Lines: 43.4 .A.
unwanted operation of ER-I
2. CEA (Technical standards for
Protection system
connectivity to the Grid) Regulation,
2007: Schedule Part 1. ( 6.1, 6.2, 6.3)
Fault clearance in more than
100 ms at 400 kV level and 1. CEA Grid standard 2010 -3.e
above and 160 ms at 220 kV 2. CEA Transmission Planning Criteria JSEB,ER-1
levels
12) Remedial Measures taken:
Yet to be received from JUSNL
13) Remarks:
JUSNL may share amount of energy unserved and duration of the disturbance and the detail disturbance
report.
14) Issues:
A) Operational: While putting PLCC off, zone-2 timing should be made zero and A/R reclose should
be put in non-auto mode for quick fault clearing. But in this case the same was not followed
which lead to unwanted tripping along with delayed fault clearing.
B) Protection co-ordination:
1) Tripping of ATR for on line fault is not desirable and clearly indicates lack of proper protection
co-ordination. JSEB may immediately look into it for ensuring reliable power supply to the
consumers.
2) During A/R of 220 KV Hatia-Ranchi-I though it is showing zone-1 still why it is taking 400ms to
trip need to be checked. Also to accelerate tripping during A/R Tor function of relay may be
used.
3) Zone-4 timing co-ordination for220 KV Hatia-Patratu-2 line need be checked.
4) In 220 KV Hatia-Patratu-1 line there was huge harmonics coming and over voltage taking
place when it was almost at no load. Whether it is primary side phenomena or not need to be
checked carefully for that system study need to be carried out.
5) At 09:41 hrs during fault, i.e unbalance system configuration ,why 220 KV Hatia-Patratu-2 R
phase current becoming almost zero for 350 ms need to be deeply studied and whether
6|Page
there is any chance of load encroachment during such condition ,when load would be very
high, need to be reviewed .
15) Status of Reporting:
DRs at Hatia end are uploaded in PDMS. ER1 DR received via mail. Patratu end DR not submitted.
7|Page
Annexure-B8
List of line tripping in the month of July 2018 which may be discussed in PCC
DR/EL
DR/EL
RESTORA Fault RECEIVED
TRIP RESTORATI Relay Indication Auto Recloser RECEIVED
LINE NAME TRIP DATE TION Relay Indication REMOTE END Reason Clearance FROM Remarks PCC Comments
TIME ON DATE LOCAL END status FROM
TIME time in msec REMOTE
LOCAL END
END
Multiple tripping at the same time

Bus Bar protection operated
B_N, F.D. 59.7 KM, F.C. 3
400KV MAITHON-MEJIA-II 07-07-2018 12:54 07-07-2018 15:40 B-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation in Mejia & DT Sent to
kA
Maithon
Bus Bar protection operated
B_N, F.D. 74.6 KM, F.C. 4.2
400KV MAITHON-MEJIA-III 07-07-2018 12:54 B-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation in Mejia & DT Sent to
kA
Maithon
B-N FAULT, TRIPPED FROM SAMANGARA Tree Touching issue, Tree
220KV PANDIABILI-SAMANGARA-II 15-07-2018 9:05 15-07-2018 9:41 B-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation
END ONLY cutting done
B-N FAULT,TRIPPED FROM Tree Touching issue, Tree
220KV PANDIABILI-SAMANGARA-I 15-07-2018 9:05 15-07-2018 9:48 B-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation
PANDIABILLI END cutting done
Miscellaneous: Tripping on DT, No Fault observed in PMU

DT RECEIPT AT TALCHER
END. Again tripped at
400KV TSTPP-RENGALI-I 04-07-2018 16:17 04-07-2018 18:42 No tripping at Rengali end DT RECEIPT AT TALCHER -- Yes No Fault observed in PMU Problem solved
16:42 hrs due to DT receipt
at Tstpp end
Ingress of moisture in
400KV GMR-ANGUL-I 06-07-2018 0:56 06-07-2018 2:19 Tripped from only gmr end Tripped from only gmr end -- No Fault observed in PMU
relay contact
400KV MUZAFFARPUR-GORAKHPUR-I 18-07-2018 15:23 18-07-2018 17:03 DT received DT received at MZF -- No Fault observed in PMU Problem solved
TRIPPED FROM RANCHI TRIPPED FROM RANCHI
400KV RANCHI-SIPAT-II 26-07-2018 8:03 26-07-2018 8:37 -- No Fault observed in PMU Problem solved
END ONLY END ONLY
FAULT IN CABLES AT FAULT IN CABLES AT
400KV RANCHI-SIPAT-II 26-07-2018 13:17 26-07-2018 16:10 -- No Fault observed in PMU Problem solved
RANCHI RANCHI
Tripped at Sagardighi end During commisioning DT
400KV BAHARAMPUR-SAGARDIGHI-II 29-07-2018 7:47 29-07-2018 8:15 Tripped at Sagardighi end only -- Yes No Fault observed in PMU
only sent
DT Received at During commisioning DT
400KV BAHARAMPUR-SAGARDIGHI-I 30-07-2018 12:47 30-07-2018 13:04 DT Received Not tripped -- No Fault observed in PMU
Baharampur sent
Autoreclose related issues

B-N,FD 14.7 KM,FC=5.83
220KV RANCHI-HATIA-II 03-07-2018 16:53 03-07-2018 17:46 B-N,FD 10.80 KM,FC IB 1.8 KA B-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation JUSNL to reply
KA, A/R successful
220KV GAYA-SONENAGAR-I 03-07-2018 17:58 03-07-2018 19:32 R-N,22.3 KM,5.35 KA Z1 58.49 KM,IR=1.24 KA R-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation BCU error
Y-N, FC 2.193 KA, DIST 49.49 KM, A/R Auxillary relay contact
220KV BINAGURI-BIRPARA-II 03-07-2018 21:46 03-07-2018 22:58 Y-N, 63.33 KM, FC 2.303 KA Y-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation Yes Yes
successful burned, problem solved
LINE SYNCHRONISED FROM DIKCHU
BN, 25.54 KM, 8.35 KA, BN, 23.82 KM, 3.134 KA, ONLY TIE CB
400KV RANGPO-DIKCHU-I 04-07-2018 21:04 04-07-2018 21:34 B-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation Yes END AT 21:34 WITHOUT INFORMING Dikchu to reply
A/R SUCCESSFUL TRIPPED
ERLDC
Problem will be solved
220KV WARIA-BIDHANNAGAR-II 05-07-2018 3:52 05-07-2018 5:01 RN,Z-2,5.4 KA,19.85 KM R-N Fault 300 msec No A/R operation
during next S/D
400KV RANGPO-DIKCHU-I 05-07-2018 14:46 05-07-2018 15:15 B-N, 22.1KM, 7.7KA B-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation Yes Dikchu to reply
Z1,A/R LOCKOUT IN CHANDIL,112 KM
Audit will be done at
220KV STPS(WBSEB)-CHANDIL-SC 06-07-2018 11:37 06-07-2018 19:26 B-N,36 KM,Z1,3.46 KA REATTEMPTED AT 12;15 A/R LOCKOUT,Z1 B-N Fault 800 msec No A/R operation Fault clearance time very high
B-N,79.81 KM,1.89 KA Chandil
Audit will be done at
11-07-2018 3:40 11-07-2018 3:59 Y-N FAULT Y-N Fault No A/R operation
220KV STPS(WBSEB)-CHANDIL-SC Chandil
Y-N F/D 19.8 KM F/C 6.238 A/R successful at Alipurduar
400KV ALIPURDUAR-BONGAIGAON-II 11-07-2018 14:04 11-07-2018 15:13 Y-N Fault No A/R operation
KA end
400KV JEERAT-BAHARAMPUR-SC 17-07-2018 15:27 17-07-2018 16:20 B-N fault , A/R successful B-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation Relay problem, replaced
ABB relay problem, Malbase
400KV MALBASE-BINAGURI-I 20-07-2018 17:54 20-07-2018 18:57 R-N,92.43 KM,3.876 KA R-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation
will solve the issue
Blocked because multiple
400KV MEERAMUNDALI-STERLITE-I 21-07-2018 16:34 22-07-2018 12:09 Y-N,140.6km, 3.06KA Y-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation
signal is going to Sterlite
Fault clearance time issue
220KV KATAPALLI-BOLANGIR(PG)-SC 23-07-2018 11:53 23-07-2018 12:53 B_N, 4.38 kA, 9 KM B-N fault <100 msec No A/R operation solved, A/R issue is still
persisting
220KV MAITHON-DHANBAD-I 27-07-2018 1:44 27-07-2018 1:50 R_N Fault. A/r successful R-N Fault <100 msec No A/R operation Problem solved
Annexure-C.2
ISLANDING SCHEME FOR IB THERMAL –

BUDHIPADAR GSS
ISLANDING SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1. Islanding schemes are implemented by generating stations & transmission

system to isolate the healthy subsystems following a large-scale
disturbance. This is a system requirement under contingency conditions
according to which the power network may be split into healthy and self-
sustaining zones so that cascade tripping of all generating stations in the
entire region is avoided.
2. With a view to protect the generation of IB TPS during sudden and major
disturbance in power system network, one special islanding scheme with
part loads of Budhipadar GSS of OPTCL has been proposed.
3. Two numbers 210 MW generators of IB TPS connect to 220/132/33kV Grid
substation through four numbers dedicated 220kV lines.
4. The islanding scheme envisages segregation of a group of matching 132kV
load in closed loop with the IB generators.
5. 132kV feeders will be arranged radially in order to form islanding

scheme with IB generation.
6. 220kV Budhipadar GSS has system has two main bus and a transfer bus
system. The generation & matching loads put into two buses with bus
coupler in operation.
7. The two numbers 220kV feeders from IB TPS put into Bus –II and the
other two are kept in the other bus as normal arrangement.
8. 220 kV interstate line to Korba-2 & 3 and Raigarh will be in normal
condition distributed to both the buses.
9. The islanding relay Micom P341 is installed at Bus coupler panel of the
220kV system.
10. Inthe event of system disturbance and actuation of islanding

relay:
a. Relay will give command to trip all 220KV feeders connected to
Bus-I and Bus II along with Bus coupler except selected islanding
IB ckts. either (IB -1 & 3)/ (IB-2 & 4) and Auto transformer- I & II.
b. It will also trip non- selected islanding IB ckts. incomer breaker
either (IB -1 & 3)/ (IB-2 & 4).
c. It will send carrier command to Tarkera end and to trip 132kV
Tarkera –Rajgangpur feeder I & II and 132kV Tarkera- Kalunga
feeder so as to feed Rajgangpur , Kuchinda and Kalunga Grid
Load will be in radial arrangement.
d. It will send carrier signal to Lapanga end to trip 132kV Lapanga –
Jharsuguda feeder at Lapanga in order to feed Jharsuguda load
radially.
e. It will send carrier signal to IB thermal to start ramping and adjust
11. The CGP feeders such as Vedanta , Bhusan and Aditya

Aluminium have their own islanding schemes to cater their
industry load.
12. The general arrangement of 220kV feeder configuration, 132kV

loads for islanding has shown in following slides.
POWER FLOW DETAILS OF 220KV SYSTEM
LOAD PATTERN OF DIFFERENT FEEDERS 12.07.2018 AT 12.00 HRS.
160MVA BUS-1
AUTO-1
BUS-2
+70MW +2MW
BASUNDHARA-2
+70MW +12MW
RAIGARH
160MVA
Idle charged
AUTO-2
KORBA-2
-83X2 MW -83X2MW
IB-2 & 4 IB- 1 & 3
+37MW
-90MW
BUS- KORBA-3
+63MW COUPLER +63MW
TARKERA-2
TARKERA- 2
+0MW
+115X2MW
AAL-2
LAPANGA-1&2
-44x2MW
BHUSAN-1 & 2
-0MW +0MW
VAEDANTA-2 AAL- 1
VEDANTA- 2
-0MW
132kV RADIAL LOAD ARRANGEMENT FOR ISLAND
SCHEME
132kV BUS Budhipadar 10 MW
Brajarajnagar 45 MW
Kalugana 45 MW
Jharsuguda 30 MW
TOTAL 239 MW Sundargarh -1 &2

34 MW
MCL 15 MW
Rajgangpur 60 MW
132KV Connectivity of Budhipadar GSS
Budhipadar GSS Kalunga GSS Tarkera GSS

MCL
Sundargarh GSS
Rajganpur GSS
Brajarajnagar GSS
Jharsuguda GSS
Kuchinda GSS
Lapanga GSS
220 KV BUS - A
ISLANDING LOAD ARRANGEMENT,

220 kV Bus Coupler X Tripping of all 220KV Breakers
220 KV BUS - B
Auto Trf-1
Auto Trf-2
X
Ib-1
160 MVA
160 MVA
X
Ib-3
122MW
122 MW
132 KV BUS
Jharsuguda-2
Jharsuguda-1
Rajgangpur
Brajrajnagar
20 MVA Trf
12.5 MVA Trf
MSP
Lapanga
MCL-1
MCL-2
Kalunga
X X X X X X
SNG-1
SNG-2
X X X X X X X
45 MW 60 MW 17 MW 17 MW 45 MW I/C 15 MW 15 MW 0 mw 4 mw 6 mw
15 mw
X
X
132 KV
X RAJGANGPUR
132 KV KULUNGA GRID S/S
X GRID S/S(LILO)
X X X X X 132 KV Switch Yard at
LAPANGA GRID S/S
X
X 132 KV S/Y OF
TARKERA GRID S/S
132KV Jharsuguda GRID S/S
X X X - CB OPEN
X- CB CLOSED
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF ISLANDING RELAY INSTALLED IN B/C PANEL FOR
TRIPPING OF DIFFERENT FEEDERS AT BUDHIPADAR GRID S/S.
Bus-I
Bus-II
TFR
Bus
89A 89B
Islanding Relay Features
1. >Hz(OF) TRIP SIGNAL TO 132KV

2. <Hz(UF) LAPANGA AT B.PADAR
52BC
3. df/dt/ Vector Shift
Protection (ΔVθ) x 52 B/C
ISLANDING TRIPPING
RELAY TRIP SIGNAL THROUGH CARRIER TO
132KV RAJGANGPUR-1 &2 AND
When KALUNGA
Islanding Relay FEEDER AT TARKERA
TRIPPING OF ALL 220KV
Operates
FEEDERS IN BUS-I & II OTHER
THAN IB 1 & 3 AND AUTO
TRANSFORMERS. Carrier Signal to IB for
Generation ramping.
CONNECTION DIAGRAM OF ISLANDING RELAY (Micom P341) AT BUDHIPADAR SUB-STATION
BUDHIPADAR BUS PT
BUS-1 BUS-2
DC SUPPLY
PT PT
PT SS
ISLANDING RELAY
FUSE &LINK Micom P341 INSTALLED AT
B/C RELAY PANEL
TRIP CKT OF 220KV B/C BREAKER
BO1
SW1
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-1 BREAKER
BO2
SW2
BO3
SW3
BO4
SW4
BO5
TRIP CKT. OF 132KV LAPANGA
BREAKER
BO6 SW5
TRIP CKT. OF ALL 220KV FEEDERS EXCEPT
CMR AT-1,AT-2 AND SELECTED IB CKTS
BO7 PLCC/OPGW TRIP CKT. OF 132KV
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR
AT JHARSUGUDA FEEDER AT
TO LAPANGA
LAPANGA LAPANGA
BO8
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR PLCC/OPGW TRIP CKT. OF 132KV KALUNGA

TO TARKERA AT TARKERA FEEDER AT TARKERA
BO9
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR PLCC/OPGW TRIP CKT. OF 132KV RGP-1 &

TO TARKERA AT TARKERA RGP-2 FEEDER AT TARKERA
BO10
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR PLCC/OPGW COMMAND TO IBTPS END FOR

TO IBTPS AT IBTPS RAMPING OF IB GENERATOR
BO11
PLCC/OPGW
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR COMMAND TO IBTPS END FOR
AT
TO LAPANGA RAMPING OF IB GENERATOR
LAPANGA
BO12
LEGEND
PTSS---- PT SELECTOR SWITCH
SW1-----SW5- ON/OFF SWITCH
CMR– CONTACT MULTIPLICATION RELAY
+220VDC
Reset Push Button
Islanding Channel-1 Command from Budhipadar
Hold ON Contact of X Relay

Islanding Channel-2 Command from Budhipadar
Islanding
X
Multiplication Relay
-220VDC
X1 Budhipadar Islanding Relay Operated Command to Unit#1 GRP
X2 Budhipadar Islanding Relay Operated Command to Unit#2 GRP
X3 Budhipadar Islanding Relay Operated Command to Unit#1
X4 Budhipadar Islanding Relay Operated Command to Unit#2
ISLANDING MULTIPLICATION RELAY CONFIGURED IN IBTPS CONTROL ROOM

Unit#1 Frequency High > TD=
Unit#1 Class A Trip Command to
GCB Unit#1 ON
GRP-1
A
GCB Unit#2 ON N
D Blocking Command to GRP-1 for
Trip Priority Selection Switch on * Delayed U/F and O/F Trip over
Unit#1 the normal setting.
Budhipadar Islanding Relay Alarm in MCR-1: Islanding Relay

Operated Command (X1) Operated
Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
PRIORITY TRIPPING SCHEME CONFIGURED IN GRP-1 NUMERIC RELAY

GCB Unit#1 ON
GRP-1
A
GCB Unit#2 ON N
D Blocking Command to GRP-1 for
Trip Priority Selection Switch on * Delayed U/F and O/F Trip over
Unit#1 the normal setting.

Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.

Trip Priority Selection Switch on * Blocking Command to GRP-2 for

Unit#2 Delayed U/F and O/F Trip over the
A normal setting.
GCB Unit#1 ON N
D
GCB Unit#2 ON
GRP-2
*Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
Alarm in MCR-1: Islanding Relay

Operated
Budhipadar Islanding Relay

TURBINE BYPASS FAST/30% OPEN
Operated Command (X3)
GCB Unit#1 ON A
N STANDBY CEP START
df/dt or dn/dt high > D
Selection ON (Soft Button on

FREQUENCY CONTROL ON
maxDNA)
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURED IN UNIT#1 MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM

Alarm in MCR-2: Islanding Relay
Operated
Budhipadar Islanding Relay

TURBINE BYPASS FAST/30% OPEN
Operated Command (X4)
GCB Unit#2 ON A
N STANDBY CEP START
df/dt or dn/dt high > D
Selection ON (Soft Button on

FREQUENCY CONTROL ON
maxDNA)
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURED IN UNIT#2 MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
NOTES ON INTERCONNECTING RELAY FUNCTION.
Over voltage protection

An over voltage condition could arise when a generator is running but not connected to a power
system, or where a generator is providing power to an islanded power system. Such an over voltage
could arise in the event of a fault with automatic voltage regulating equipment or if the voltage
regulator is set for manual control and an operator error is made. Over voltage protection should
be set to prevent possible damage to generator insulation, prolonged over-fluxing of the generating
plant, or damage to power system loads.
Under frequency protection

Under frequency operation of a generator will occur when the power system load exceeds the prime
mover capability of an islanded generator or group of generators. Power system overloading can arise
when a power system becomes split, with load left connected to a set of ‘islanded’ generators that is in
excess of their capacity. Automatic load shedding could compensate for such events. In this case, under
frequency operation would be a transient condition. This characteristic makes under frequency protection
a simple form of “Loss of Mains” protection on system where it is expected that the islanded load attached
to the machine when the grid connection fails exceeds the generator capacity.
Over frequency protection function
Over frequency running of a generator arises when the mechanical power input to the alternator is
in excess of the electrical load and mechanical losses. The most common occurrence of over
frequency is after substantial loss of load. When a rise in running speed occurs, the governor should
quickly respond to reduce the mechanical input power, so that normal running speed is quickly
regained.
Rate of Change of Frequency Protection (81R)

The two main applications for df/dt protection are network decoupling (loss of mains/loss
of grid) and load shedding. During severe disturbances, the frequency of the system
oscillates as various generators try to synchronize on to a common frequency. The
frequency decay needs to be monitored over a longer period of time and time delayed df/dt
can be used to make the correct decision for load shedding or provide early warning to the
operator on a developing frequency problem.
Voltage Vector Shift Protection (ΔVθ)
The Voltage Vector Shift protection element measures the change in voltage angle over
successive power system half-cycles. The element operates by measuring the time
between zero crossings on the voltage waveforms. A measurement is taken every half
cycle for each phase voltage. Over a power system cycle this produces 6 results, a trip is
issued if 5 of the 6 calculations for the last power system cycle are above the set threshold.
Checking all three phases makes the element less susceptible to incorrect operation due to
harmonic distortion or interference in the measured voltage waveform.
The fast operation of this vector shift function renders it to operate at the instant of a
disturbance rather than during a gradual change caused by a gradual change of power
flow. Operation can occur at the instant of inception of the fault,at fault clearance or
following non-synchronized reclosure, which affords additional protection to the
embedded generator.
Annexure-C21a
ISLANDING SCHEME FOR OPGCL
By
ODISHA POWER GENERATION CORPORATION LTD.
Objective:
Formation of proposed island shall achieve the following objectives:-
i) Prevention from total black out by avoiding effect of cascade tripping of the Power
System.
ii) Fast restoration of supply.
Present Status:
Presently there is no islanding scheme in operation in OPGCL.
Methodology of Proposed Islanding Scheme:

The methodology adopted for the proposed Islanding scheme is as under :-
• Islanding relay out put trip command extended to 220KV budhipadar bus coupler
breaker and 220KV IB Line breakers at Budhipadar connected to non islanded Bus.
• Islanding relay output command extended to IBTPS through OPGW link for load –
generation balance by fast governor/HPBP operation.
• Further two IB line(out of four) should always be connected to Islanded Bus and the
radial Load should be maintained with in 185MW.
2
Date : 23.01.2008 1
ISLANDING SCHEME OF IBTPS AT BUDHIPADAR
Date : 23.01.2008 2
5
ISLANDING MULTIPLICATION RELAY CONFIGURED IN IBTPS SWITCHYARD CONTROL ROOM
Date : 23.01.2008 3
Logic configured in REG670 Relay for Islanding of Unit-I Generator
Logic configured in REG670 Relay for Islanding of Unit- 2 Generator
Date : 23.01.2008 4
• The over – frequency protection is achieved using SAPTOF function block in Generator
Protection relay REG670. There are 3 instances of SAPTOF function in REG670 relay, in which
the 1st is used to confirm the disturbance in the system frequency (As shown in above figure-
red colored), 2nd and 3rd instance is used for delayed operation of the over- frequency
function in line with the logic shown above.
• Function Block and Parameter Settings of Over - Frequency Protection-1st Instance:
Configuration of Delayed Over Frequency and Under Frequency Function
10
Date : 23.01.2008 5
• Above timers are settable and can be adjusted as per requirement. If there is no
trip from islanding relay, over and under frequency protections will operate as per
the times shown without external timers (timer-1 to 4).
• If there is a trip from Islanding relay, over and under frequency protections are
blocked till the time set in corresponding timers as per the above shown
configuration. Hence total tripping time delay will be corresponding timer delay +
over and under frequency protection function set time delay.
11
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURATION IN UNIT#1

MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM
12
Date : 23.01.2008 6
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURATION IN UNIT#2
MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM
13
14
Date : 23.01.2008 7
Annexure-C4
Protection Audit Report of 220/132/33 kV Lalmatia Substation

Date: 16-08-18
Introduction: Due to the multiple tripping of circuits from 220/132/33 kV Lalmatia substation and associated
protection issues, Eastern Region Protection Committee has decided in the 69th PCC meeting to carry out the
Protection Audit of Lalmatia substation. Accordingly, a team comprising of ERPC, ERLDC, NTPC, PGCIL and
JUSNL visited the 220/132/33 kV Lalmatia substation on 16th August 2018 and performed the protection audit. The
Team Members of the Protection Audit Group comprises of following members:
1. ERPC: Pranay P Jena, AEE

2. ERLDC: Chandan Kumar, Sr. Engineer and Laldhari Kumar, Engineer
3. NTPC: Rohit Agarwal, Manager, NTPC Farakka
4. PGCIL: Randhir Kumar Ranu, Engineer, Banka Substation
5. JUSNL: Vinod Gupta (JE), V. K. Bhoi (EEE)
Substation: Lalmatia substation is having a historical background. The substation was created in around 1989 for
catering to the ECL coalmine load. It is 220/132/33 kV substation owned by ECL which was later being maintained
by NTPC Farakka. However, subsequently, with the other distribution load coming up, the switchyard was extended
by JUSNL with augmentation of 220/132 kV ICT, 132 kV lines and 132/33 kV transformers.
The substation is thus subdivided into two parts out of which one looked after by NTPC Farakka and other by
JUSNL. NTPC Farakka is looking after the 220/132 kV switchyard consisting of 220 kV Farakka-Lalmatia ckt and
220/132 kV ICT. While the JUSNL looks after the 220/132 kV ICT 2 (Kanohar Make), 132 kV Kahalgaon(NTPC)-
Lalmatia, 132 kV Kahalgaon (BSPTCL)-Lalmatia, 132 kV Kahalgaon (BSPTCL)-Sahebganj, 132 kV Lalmatia-Dumka
1 & 2, 2 X 50 MVA 132/33 kV ICTs and 33 kV switchyard with 6 33 kV feeders (Godda, Mahagama, Patahargaon,
Meharama, Barijor and ECL) for JUSNL load. The 132 kV buses maintained by NTPC and JUSNL are coupled and
having isolator arrangement decoupling.
Fig: 220/132/33 kV Lalmatia Substation Single Line Diagram
Page 1 of 8
The Protection Audit findings are thus subdivided into two parts i.e. One for 220/132 kV NTPC Maintained section
and other 132/33 kV JUSNL owned section for this substation.
132/33 kV Lalmatia (JUSNL) Section
1. Switchyard and its Maintenance: The whole switchyard was in bad shape. As per the details, the JUSNL part
switchyard was commissioned in 1991 (27 years old). Following were observed when switchyard inspection during
protection audit was carried out:
 Old Equipment: The switchyard equipment’s (Isolator/CT/PT/LA/Breaker) are old and rusty and
need immediate attention. Adequate spare management is also required for any emergency. The bays
which has been commissioned in 2011 onwards were also found in bad shape due to lack of proper
maintenance.
 PCC and Gravelling: Long grasses and weeds were observed throughout the switchyard. Proper
graveling was not observed in entire switchyard which may be hazardous to human safety, equipment
health and can cause unwanted tripping. There is a need for proper PCC and Gravelling in switchyard
along.
 132/33 kV Transformers: Severe oil leakage in one of the 132/33 kV ICT was observed and its oil has
also penetrated the panel box of OTI/WTI and can result in unwanted tripping. The ICT panel box also
needs proper care as gasket was found to be missing and rainwater can ingress which may also result in
unwanted tripping. Silica Gel in 132/33 kV ICTs was found pink and needs to be replaced or recovered
by heating. 2 no’s of the cooling fan in one of the 50 MVA ICT was not working due to non-replacement
of the faulty connector.
 Bay Equipment Nomenclature: Proper Bay equipment numbering and phase segregation for
identification of equipment have not been done which may result in the wrong operation of equipment
and can cause hazard to O & M Personnel.
 Earthing of LA: Proper earthing was not provided to Las in the switchyard.
 O&M Activities: There was no proper O&M for equipment at the substation. This is the major concern
that was observed at the substation. No Records were available for the O&M at the substation level.
Even the JUSNL Testing team were not able to tell regarding the O&M plan of the substation and its
monitoring.
2. Equipment O & M and Testing: During the audit, records were asked for equipment(CT/PT/Breakers) testing
and it was observed that:
 Equipment and relay have been tested only at the time of Commissioning and after that, no routine test
and maintenance has been done. Proper record of the pre-commissioning tests were also not available.
 It was also observed that there was a lack of Testing equipment for Routine testing at the substation level.
 Details of past equipment failure were also not available at the substation.
3. Relay and Associated issues:
Page 2 of 8
 132 kV Transmission Line Protection: It was found that only one numerical relay has been provided
whose Distance and O/C and E/F feature has been utilized to provide the Main as well as backup
protection. Only in 132 kV Sahebganj Circuit, separate electromechanical type backup O/C and E/F
protection have been provided.
A. 132 kV Kahalgaon NTPC(40.3 km)
B. 132 kV Kahalgaon BSPTCL (46.66 km)
C. 132 kV Sahebganj (48.45 km)
D. 132 kV Dumka 1 (95.88 km)
E. 132 kV Dumka 2 (96 km)
The impedance setting for various zones along with time setting was found to be not in order in the line
relays. Further, Power swing blocking philosophy was not found uniform.
 100 MVA 220/132 kV Transformer (Kanoher Make): Differential protection is Numerical relay while
Backup protection is of Electromagnetic type. The REF protection for ICT is of static type and it is a
combined REF for HV/LV rather than separate for 220 and 132 kV. Rest of the protection like
OTI/WTI/OSR/ Buchholz were found for the ICTs. The over flux protection is not enabled in
Numerical relay due to non-extension of CVT wiring from 220 kV adjacent relay panel room of NTPC to
132 kV relay panel room of JUSNL.
 2 X 50 MVA 132/33 kV Transformers (EMCO and Marsen make): Differential protections are
Numerical relay while Backup protections are of Electromagnetic type. Rest of the protection like
OTI/WTI/OSR/ Buchholz were found for the ICTs. The Overflux and REF protection is enabled for
one transformer (Mersan) in its differential relay while the same is not done for EMCO make transformer
where neutral bushing CT is not present.
 LBB and Bus Bar Protection: 132 kV LBB and Bus Bar Protection of static type has been provided in
the substation but it has not operated till now as per the substation staff. The testing and checking has
also not been done for both these protections. That’s why its operational status is also of concern. The
bus bar protection extension is possible or not was also not known to anyone.
 There was no proper record for testing and commissioning of relay along with any relay setting change
done at the substation. The JUSNL team also could not provide the complete details for the substation.
 Two under frequency relays, one each for 132 KV Kahalgaon (BSPTCL) and 132 KV Kahalgaon
(NTPC) feeder has been provided under the Islanding Scheme of Farakka. The relays have been set at
47.7 Hz without any time delay for tripping of these feeders to isolate 220/132 kV Lalmatia substation
and its radial loads with 220 kV Farakka-Lalmatia feeder with Farakka’s Unit. When enquired, the
operators in the Control Room/ Testing team were not aware of this relay and in one of these, alarm was
persisting.
4. AC Distribution Board:
 Overcurrent relay for ACDB protection and Alarm System were not operational.
Page 3 of 8
 Changeover switch for one bus of the ACDB was found in broken condition. This is a serious concern in
case of the failure of one of the AC supply as the operator will not be able to transfer the load on the
alternate source by coupling of the ACDB buses.
5. DCDB and Battery Bank:
 220 V Battery Bank: Make: EXIDE Wet Type, Commissioned in 2016.
 48V Battery Bank: Make: EXIDE Wet type, Commissioned in 2016.
 Alarm System was not operational so any failure of DCDB will not be immediately known to the
operator.
 Exhaust fan in Battery Room was not working and cable trench of Battery room was in damaged
condition and not covered.
6. DC System Healthiness: No major DC earth fault was observed however DC Voltage measurement done
during the audit are as follows:
Measurement Battery Nearest Feeder Farthest Feeder
+ve to -ve 255 V 254 V 244 V
+ve to Earth 108 V 113 V 109 V
-ve to Earth 134 V 139 V 134 V
7. Display Panel:
 Voltage difference was observed in 132 kV feeders connected to the same bus in the control room panel
box. There is a need for CVT testing and metering equipment calibration at the substation so that correct
data can be displayed to the operator.
 For the 220/132 kV ICT, many of the digital display for current and voltage were found not working.
One of the issue with voltage display was the non-availability of CVT extension from NTPC side to
JUSNL side.
8. UFR Relay: As per the data available with ERPC, one UFR relay should have been on the 33 kV Mahagama
feeder, however, the same was not found on Mahagama feeder (Max load 14 MW).
9. Transmission Line Issues: It was observed that the transmission lines from the substation is maintained by
various utilities. 132 kV Kahalgaon NTPC and 132 kV Kahalgoan BSPTCL lines are being maintained by JUSNL
and BSPTCL. While 220 kV Farakka feeder is being maintained by NTPC.
It was intimated that maximum number of tripping has been observed in 132 kV Kahalgaon NTPC and 132 kV
Kahalgoan BSPTCL which are on same towers. For these circuits, 1-48 Towers are maintained by BSPTCL while
49-123 towers are maintained by JUSNL. JUSNL intimated that most of the fault are observed in BSPTCL
maintained section due to large trees and broken/poor condition for earth wire between 21-34 towers. JUSNL
explained that they have recently carried out the complete line patrolling and cut the trees in BSPTCL section
after which the number of faults has reduced.
10. Other Observation:
Page 4 of 8
 132/33 kV ICT II has been tripping on the differential for any 33 kV through fault on several occasion.
This was also observed during the period of Audit. This also necessities the testing of relay and checking
and review of its relay setting.
 It was found that whenever 220 kV Farakka -Lalmatia trips on fault, then 132 kV Kahalgaon (NTPC)
Lalmatia feeder also trip from lalmatia end indicating that the line is tripping on through fault. This may
be due to CT polarity, wrong zone protections setting, PSL logic etc. This also needs immediate action.
 This similar issue was also observed with 132 kV Kahalgaon BSPTCL-lalmatia feeder which trip for
through fault on 132 kV Sahebganj, 132/33 kV ICTs. This indicates the need of checking of CT Polarity,
relay setting, Zone 4 protections setting and time delay and relay testing.
 The JUSNL CRITIL team who were present during the audit were asked regarding the Disturbance
recorder files for tripping however they have not extracted the same for any tripping in this year. This is a
serious concern and violation of Grid code and Grid standards.
11. Manpower Training: Based on the various inputs received , the audit team observed that substation staff, as well
as CRITIL Team of Jharkhand, do not have proper training on O&M, Testing etc. This is one major concern and
there is a need of immediate action at this front.
220/132/33 kV Lalmatia (NTPC)
1. Switchyard and its Maintenance: The whole switchyard was in bad shape. As per the details the NTPC
Maintained section of switchyard was commissioned in 1989 (29 years old). Following were observed when
switchyard inspection during protection audit was carried out:
 Old Equipment: The switchyard equipment’s (Isolator/CT/PT/LA/Breaker) are old and rusty and
need immediate attention. Adequate spare management is also required for any emergency. These were
found in bad shape due to lack of proper maintenance. Severe oil leakage was found in one of the CT in
the substation.
 PCC and Gravelling: Long grasses and weeds were observed throughout the switchyard. Proper
graveling was not observed in entire switchyard which may be hazardous to human safety, equipment
health and can cause unwanted tripping. There is a need for proper PCC and Gravelling in switchyard
along.
 100 MVA 220/132 kV Transformer (Maintained by NTPC): Severe oil leakage was observed in the
ICT. The ICT panel box also needs proper care as gasket was found to be missing and rainwater can
ingress which may also result in unwanted tripping. Silica Gel in ICT was found pink and needs to be
replaced or recovered by heating. 3 Fans of the ICT cooling system were not found in working condition.
 Bay Equipment Nomenclature: Proper Bay equipment numbering and phase segregation for
identification of equipment have not been done which may result in the wrong operation of equipment
and can cause hazard to O & M Personnel.
 Earthing of LA: Proper earthing was not provided to Las in the switchyard.
Page 5 of 8
 O&M Activities: There was no proper O&M for equipment at the substation. This is the major concern
that was observed at the substation. No Records were available for the O&M at the substation level.
Even the NTPC Operating Staff were not able to tell regarding the O&M plan of the substation and its
monitoring.
2. Equipment O & M and Testing: During the audit, records were asked for equipment(CT/PT/Breakers) testing
and it was observed that:
 Breaker Overhauling of 220 kV breakers was done last in 2009 and for 132 kV breakers in 2010. After
that, no testing and overhauling has been done.
 All 220 and 132 kV CTs have been tested in 2014 and after that, there has not been any routine test and
maintenance.
 It was also observed that there was a lack of Testing equipment for Routine testing at the substation level.
 Details of past equipment failure were also not available at the substation.
3. Relay and Associated issues:
 All the protection relay for lines and ICTs are of electro-mechanical in nature and are very old.
 Last relay testing and setting have been done in the year 1999 and after that, it has not been done.
Records for relay setting calculation were available in the substation.
 LBB and Bus Bar Protection: 220 kV & 132 kV Differential as well as LBB is provided but has not
operated till now. The Busbar protection Is combined scheme for both the switchyard, however, no
details on its extension is known to the operator/testing person.
 2 X 50 MVA 132/33 kV Transformers and 100 MVA 220/132 kV Transformer: There was no
Differential relay, REF relay, over flux relay available for both 220/132 kV ICT and 2 X 50 MVA 132/33
kV ICTs.
 LBB and Bus Bar Protection: 132 kV LBB and Bus Bar Protection of static type has been provided in
the substation but it has not operated till now as per the substation staff. The testing and checking has
also not been done for both these protections. That’s why its operational status is also of concern. The
bus bar protection extension is possible or not was also not known to anyone.
4. AC Distribution Board:
 In Good Condition.
5. DCDB and Battery Bank:
 220 V Battery Bank and 50 V Battery Bank: Commissioned in 2011
 Two sets of battery charger for 220 and 50 V are there out of which one set for each voltage level was
found in faulty condition
6. DC System Healthiness: No major DC earth fault was observed however DC Voltage measurement done
during the audit are as follows:
Measurement Battery Nearest Feeder Farthest Feeder 220 kV bay
132 kV bay 132v kv bay
+ve to -ve 239.5 V 237.6 V 238.1 V 238.1 V
Page 6 of 8
+ve to Earth 78.4 V 78 V 78.3 V 77.8 V
-ve to Earth 161.1 V 159.5 V 160.5V 160.3 V
7. Control Room: No AC were found in the control room and relay panel room which are adjoined.
8. Manpower Training: One person from NTPC has been stationed at Lalmatia along with outsourcing of
remaining staff for substation maintenance. It was observed that no hourly record for voltage and various other
parameters are being maintained at the substation by the operating control room staff.
Conclusion from Protection Audit:
1. The substation needs a complete renovation along with resolution of the ownership issue in order to improve
the O & M. The impact due to the lack of O & M has been observed in the entire switchyard which is in
shabby condition. The Human life working in the switchyard is also exposed to threat due to improper
earthing, aging equipment, lack of graveling and PCC etc.
2. JUSNL who is presently owning the major portion of equipment has not done the maintenance leading to
deterioration of newly constructed bays since 2006. Proper O & M practice need to be reinforced by JUSNL
in its own portion to avoid unwanted tripping. JUSNL may kindly take up the same at earliest.
3. A complete check of equipment(CT/CVT/LA/Breakers) and their healthiness through testing need to be
ensured for entire switchyard at earliest to avoid unwanted tripping. JUSNL/NTPC may kindly take up
the same at earliest.
4. The old electromechanical relays in the substation need to be replaced with numerical relays and their
coordinated setting also to be done subsequently. In the present relay, there is need setting review, wiring and
logic check, CT polarity etc. to ensure there is no unwanted tripping as happening on daily basis. Further, the
panels/relays which are not in use need to be removed to improve the space utilization. JUSNL/NTPC
may kindly take up the same at earliest.
5. Existing Manpower need to be properly trained for proper O & M activities, daily operational activity, Record
Maintenance, Extracting of DR for Events and others. JUSNL/NTPC may kindly take up the same at
earliest.
6. AC and DC distribution system also need Maintenance at the substation. JUSNL/NTPC may kindly take
up the same at earliest.
It may kindly be noted that 220/132/33 kV Lalmatia substation is of vital importance for NTPC Farakka, NTPC
Kahalgaon and JUSNL. This substation will help in ensuring the proper coal supply as well as act as a path for the
black start during emergency between these two large generating stations. So, there is a need for immediate attention
in order to improve the condition of this substation at earliest.
Page 7 of 8
Some Pictures from the substation
Page 8 of 8
Annexure-C7
Sl Name of the incidence PCC Recommendation Latest status

No.
69th PCC Meeting:
Disturbance at 400kV The agenda item could not be

1. Bakreswar S/s on discussed as WBPDCL representative
19.06.2018 at 10:10 hrs. was not present in the meeting.
2. Repeated Grid PCC advised Powergrid and BSPTCL

Disturbances at Madhepura to take the following corrective actions:
S/s.
• Distance relay Zone 2 settings
at New Purnea end should be
set or incorporated as per the
ERPC Protection philosophy
• Healthiness of PLCC and inter
tripping scheme at both the
ends should be examined and
report.
• Since 220 KV Madhepura-
Laukhi D/C lines were idle
charged from Madhepura end,
the timing of all forward zone
settings including directional
O/C & E/F settings should be
revised to “Instantaneous”
immediately.
• The line parameters of 220 KV
Madhepura-Laukhi D/C lines
should be measured. The zone
reach settings should be
revised as per the actual line
parameters.
• At the time of charging 220 KV
Madhepura-Laukhi D/C lines
from both ends, the timing of all
forward zone settings including
directional O/C & E/F settings
should be revised as per ERPC
protection philosophy to avoid
mismatch regarding
coordination with adjacent line
protection relays.
3. Total power failure at PCC advised BSPTCL to check &

220/132 kV Sipara S/s analyse the disturbance recorders of
(BSPTCL) on 15.06.2018 at all the feeders along with the timing of
10:58 hrs.
relay operation and Circuit breaker
opening time in order to ascertain the
cause of busbar relay operation.
68th PCC Meeting
4. Disturbance at Hatia at PCC advised JUSNL to rectify the CVT

18:22 hrs on 30-05-2018 polarity connection as well as to test
the CVT in normal condition and
submit a report on this tripping within
seven days.
5. Issues related with PCC advised Powergrid to explore for Regarding inclusion
Generation Backing down inclusion of pole block with ground of pole block with
during Talcher-Kolar SPS return mode signal in the SPS logic. ground return mode
operation on 16th May 2018.
signal in the SPS
PCC advised NTPC, GMR and JITPL
to ensure the generation reduction as logic, Powergrid
per the SPS logic. informed that the
issue was referred to
OEM.
PCC advised NTPC also to explore for
inclusion of pole block with ground
return mode signal in the SPS logic.
6. Issue of Protection PCC advised Bhutan representatives

Coordination Observed to submit a detailed report on the
during Blackout of Tala on above disturbance to ERPC and
23rd May 2018.
ERLDC at the earliest.
7. Total power failure at PCC advised DMTCL to comply the DMTCL informed
400/132 kV Motihari protection audit party observations at that they have
substation on 07-04-2018 at the earliest. referred the
09:56 hrs
observations to
Siemens for
necessary action and
M/s Siemens would
visit the stations in
next week.
8. Non-Operation of 400 kV PCC advised Powergrid to ensure the Regarding

Binaguri-Rangpo D/C SPS relevant data availability of SPS implementation of
on 9th May 2018 operation to ERLDC through SCADA. SPS through SAS,
Powergrid informed
that the
implementation
would complete by
July 2018.
9. Disturbance at 400/220 kV PCC advised BSPTCL and Powergrid BSPTCL informed
Biharshariff S/s on 28-03- to ensure proper relay coordination that they are in the
2018 at 18:43 hrs and 19-03- between 400kV and 220 kV system process of
2018 at 02:02 hrs.
including ICTs at Biharshariff S/s. implementing the
revised settings.
10. Disturbance at 220/132 kV In 65th PCC, JUSNL was advised to

Patratu S/S on 09-02-2018 at take the following measures:
15:00 hrs
• Check the healthiness of the
DC system including end to
end cables at 220/132kV
Patratu S/s
• Check the healthiness of all
Circuit Breakers at 220/132kV
Patratu S/s
• Check the healthiness of all the
relays installed at 220/132kV
Patratu S/s including
220/132kV ATRs
• Check Kanke end relay and CB
of 132kV Patratu-Kanke line
• Check the Directional feature
of 132 kV Hatia I – Sikidri and
132 kV Namkum - Hatia I line
relays at Hatia-I
11. Disturbance at 220 kV OPTCL informed that Busbar

Budhipadar S/s on 01-10-17 protection maloperated and tripped all
at 09:25 hrs the elements connected 220kV bus 1
at Budhipadar. OPTCL added that the
issue has been referred to OEM
(Siemens) for rectification.
Annexure-C13
Checklist for Submission of new transmission elements for updation in Protection Database
NAME OF ORGANISATION:
FOR THE MONTH OF:
SUBSTATION DETAIL:
Status of
Sl No DETAILS OF ELEMENTS DATA TYPE Submission Remarks
(Y/N)
1 TRANSMISSION LINE LINE LENGTH, CONDUCTOR TYPE, VOLTAGE GRADE
2 POWER TRANSFORMER NAMEPLATE DETAILS
3 GENERATOR TECHNICAL PARAMETERS
4 CURRENT TRANSFORMER NAMEPLATE DETAILS
5 VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER NAMEPLATE DETAILS
6 RELAY DATA MAKE, MODEL and FEEDER NAME
NUMERICAL RELAYS: CSV or XML file extracted from Relay
7 RELAY SETTINGS
ELECTROMECHANICAL RELAYS: SNAPSHOT of RELAY
8 REACTOR NAMEPLATE DETAILS
9 CAPACITOR NAMEPLATE DETAILS
9 UPDATED SLD
SIGNATURE:
NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE:
DESIGNATION:
CONTACT:
E-MAIL ID:

70PCCMINUTES

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Minutes

MINUTES OF 70TH PROTECTION SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT ERPC,

List of participants is enclosed at Annexure-A.

Members may confirm the minutes of 69th PCC meeting.

Deliberation in the meeting

Members confirmed the minutes of 69th PCC minutes.

A. Tripping of 400 KV Rangpo-Binaguri-I and operation of SPS-II on 10.07.18 at 08:14 hrs.

Relay indications are as follows:

Name of the elements Relay Indication at end 1 Relay Indication at end 2

Load/Generation Loss: 1046 MW Generation loss with No Load loss.

B. Tripping of 400 KV Rangpo-Binaguri-II and operation of SPS-II on 30.07.18 at 20:48 hrs.

Total Generation Loss: 1057 MW

Members may discuss.

Deliberation in the meeting

Regarding tripping of 220 kV Rangpo-Tashiding circuit from Tashiding end on 10.07.18.

PCC advised Powergrid to configure the DT settings at Rangpo end accordingly.

ITEM NO. B.2: Repeated Grid disturbances at 400/132 kV Motihari(DMTCL) Substation.

Load loss: 200 MW

B. Disturbance on 20.07.18 at 09:10 hrs and on 21.07.18 at 07:11 hrs.

Load loss: 280 MW (on 20.07.18)

DMTCL may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

DVC may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

DVC and Powergrid may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

Relay indications are as follows:

Load Loss: 150 MW

BSPTCL may explain.

Relay indications are as follows:

Name of the Element Relay Indication at end 1 Relay Indication at end 2

Generation Loss: 136 MW

WBSETCL may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

JUSNL may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

ITEM NO. B.8: Tripping Incidences in the month of July, 2018.

Members may discuss.

Deliberation in the meeting

Members explained the tripping incidences. Updated status is enclosed at Annexure-B8.

M/S Taurus Powertronics may present.

Deliberation in the meeting

ITEM NO. C.2: Islanding scheme at IbTPS- OPGC

ERLDC & ERPC may update.

Deliberation in the meeting

ITEM NO. C.3: Auto Reclose scheme for 132KV feeders--Powergrid

Members may discuss.

Deliberation in the meeting

PCC advised JUSNL to comply the earlier observations/recommendations regarding frequent

Audit Team may place the report. JUSNL may respond.

Deliberation in the meeting

ITEM NO. C.5: Auto-Reclosure on Lines from PPSP Generating station.

Element Name Tripping Date Tripping Time Type of Fault

Non-Implementation of Auto-reclosure results in the non-compliance of CEA Technical Standard for

Members may discuss.

Deliberation in the meeting

Members may discuss.

Deliberation in the meeting

PCC advised all the constituents to comply the above suggestion.

ITEM NO. C.7: FOLLOW-UP OF DECISIONS OF THE PREVIOUS PROTECTION SUB-

The decisions of previous PCC Meetings are given at Annexure-C7.

Members may update the latest status.

Deliberation in the meeting