73rd PCC Minutes

Minutes
of
rd
73 PCC Meeting
Date: 11.12.2018
Eastern Regional Power Committee
14, Golf Club Road, Tollygunge
Kolkata: 700 033
EASTERN REGIONAL POWER COMMITTEE
MINUTES OF 73RD PROTECTION SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT

ERPC, KOLKATA ON 29.11.2018 (THURSDAY) AT 10:30 HOURS
List of participants is at Annexure-A.
PART – A
ITEM NO. A.1: Confirmation of minutes of 72nd Protection sub-Committee Meeting held on
29th October, 2018 at ERPC, Kolkata.
The minutes of 72nd Protection Sub-Committee meeting held on 29.10.18 circulated vide letter
dated 14.11.18.
Members may confirm the minutes of 72nd PCC meeting.
Deliberation in the meeting
ERLDC requested for amendment in the deliberations recorded against agenda item no. C.12 as
follows:
"PCC advised POWERGRID to submit TFR triggering criteria and TFR signal list for all HVDC
station of Eastern region to ERLDC."
Members approved the minutes of 72nd PCC meeting with the above amendment.
PART – B
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION ON GRID INCIDENCES OCCURRED IN OCTOBER, 2018
ITEM NO. B.1: Tripping of 400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri-I and subsequent operation of SPS-I
on 01.10.18 at 15:41 hrs.
At 15:41 hrs, 400 kV Binaguri - Rangpo - I tripped on high resistance R-N fault resulting operation
of SPS - I at Rangpo. The operation of SPS-I led to tripping of running units at Teesta III, Dikchu,
Jorethang, Chujachen and Tashiding HEP. Back up E/F operated at Rangpo end to clear the fault.
Generation Loss: 856 MW
Relay Indication:
Name of the elements End 1 Relay Indication End 2 Relay Indication

400 kV Rangpo-Binaguri circuit-I TEF/ IN>1 Did not trip.
Powergrid may explain.
Powergrid informed that there was a high resistive fault in 400kV Rangpo-Binaguri circuit- I close
to Rangpo end. Rangpo end cleared the fault on DEF protection whereas Binaguri end tripped on
receipt of DT signal from Rangpo end. Powergrid explained that due high arc resistance Binaguri
end failed to identify the fault.
The SPS-I signal initiated after the above tripping and operated correctly.
Powergrid added that they have increased the sensitivity of E/F settings for 400kV Rangpo-
Binaguri D/C lines for better detection of high resistance faults.
PCC advised powergrid to configure In>1 pick up in DR output at Rangpo and Binaguri end.
ITEM NO. B.2: Total Power failure at 220 kV Hatia (JUSNL) substation on 03.10.18 at 17:23
hrs and on 04.10.18 at 00:26 hrs
In both the instances, while closing man bus isolator of 220 kV Hatia PTPS – I at Hatia end, bus
bar protection relay at Hatia operated and all other feeders tripped. 220 kV PTPS – Hatia D/C
were out of service in both the events.
As per JUSNL report, one of the contacts of above mentioned isolator did not work properly at the
time of the events and sent false DC command to bus bar protection panel.
Load Loss: 200 MW(on 03.10.18) ;

130 MW (on 04.10.18)
Generation Loss: 52 MW(on 03.10.18) ;

52 MW(on 04.10.18)
As per PMU data, there was no fault in both the instances.
JUSNL may explain.
JUSNL informed that there was no fault in the substation and the above incidences occurred
during the shifting of PTPS bays to new bus at Hatia Substation. They informed that during closing
of isolator of main bus for charging of the bay, the switching relay burned leading to extention of
DC supply to Busbar relay. This resulted in operation of LBB/busbar relay and tripped all the
feeders connected to Hatia end.
JUSNL informed that the DRs and EL could not be retrieved as the relays are electromechanical
type. PCC advised to install separate relay for DR generation wherever the electromechanical
relays are present. JUSNL added that old EM type relay would be replaced with new numerical
busbar relay by April’ 19.
During discussion it was informed that, Ranchi end relay did not trip during the above busbar
operation due to non-receipt of DT signal from Hatia end. It was also informed that DT signal was
not sent from Hatia end in earlier instances also.
PCC advised JUSNL to test the Bus bar and LBB protection, PLCC and configuration of DT signal
in the relay at Hatia end.
ITEM NO. B.3: Disturbance at 220 kV Purnea (Powergrid) S/s on 07.10.18 at 16:56 hrs.
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At 16:56 hrs, Y phase line CVT of 220kV Purnea-New Purnea-I failed at Purnea end resulting
operation of line differential protection of 220 kV Purnea – N. Purnea – I. In spite of initiation of
inter-trip Tx and Rx, 86 trip relay did not operate at Purnea end though breaker opened at New
Purnea end.
All 220 kV lines connected to Purnea S/S got tripped from remote end to clear the fault. 220 kV
Dalkhola-I feeder tripped from Purnea end also in Zone-IV protection.
Load Loss: 160 MW
Relay indications are as follows:

220 kV New Purnea-Purnea-I Line differential protection RED 670 (Line differential
operated relay) operated, Inter-trip Tx
& Rx initiated but 86 trip
relay not operated
220 kV New Purnea-Purnea-II DEF protection operated No tripping
220 kV Dalkhola-Purnea-I Initially Y-N, Z-II; Later Zone-IV
current increases in all three
phases to 3.4 kA
220 kV Dalkhola-Purnea-II Initially Y-N, Z-II; Later No tripping
current increases in all three
phases to 3.4 kA
Powergrid informed that failure of Y-phase CVT of 220kV Purnea-New Purnea-I at Purnea end
caused the operation of line differential protection for the line. New Purnea end tripped in line
differential protection but the Purnea end circuit breaker did not open due to broken DC wire
terminal in master trip relay. Powergrid added that they have rectified the problem after this
incident.
As the fault was not cleared from Purnea end, 220kV New Purnea-Purnea-II and 220 kV Dalkhola-
Purnea D/C tripped as per the relay indication given in the above table.
Regarding tripping of 220 kV Dalkhola-Purnea-I from purnea end in zone-4 protection, it was
informed that Dalkhola end tripped in zone-II protection in 500msec time. Powergrid explained that
the zone-II timer setting was inadvertently made to 500ms which they have now changed as per
the protection philosophy.
Regarding fault clearance from downstream network, BSPTCL informed that there was no tripping
in their system and added that during the incidence, 132 kV Purnea(BSPTCL) was connected
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radially from Purnea(Powergrid).
ITEM NO. B.4: Total Power failure at Madhepura(BSPTCL) S/s on 20.10.18 at 09:48 hrs.
220 kV Purnea Madhepura – I was under shutdown. At 09:48 hrs 220 kV Purnea Madhepura – II
tripped on R-N fault resulting total power failure at Madhepura S/S.
Load Loss: 62 MW
Delayed fault clearance from Purnea end has been observed in PMU data.
BSPTCL & Powergrid may explain.
BSPTCL informed that at the time of the incidence, 220 kV Purnea Madhepura – I and 220 kV
Purnea-Lokhi D/C were manually kept off due to high voltage condition.
Powergrid informed that 220 kV New Purnea-Madhepura-II tripped from New Purnea end in zone-
4 of distance protection. Powergrid further informed that the zone-4 of relay was erroneously
activated and set for forward direction having reach more than 100 % with time delay of 500 msec.
They informed that they have corrected the settings after this disturbance.
BSPTCL informed that there was no tripping at 220 kV Madhepura end as well as in 132 kV
downstream network of Madhepura.
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As zone-4 was set for 100% reach, PCC viewed that the fault location was in downstream of 220
kV Madhepura S/s. PCC advised BSPTCL to check for any trippings in downstream network.
ITEM NO. B.5: Total Power failure at TLDP-III S/s on 27.10.18 at 10:24 hrs.
220 kV TLDP III - NJP S/C tripped due to Y-B-N fault on 27-10-18 at 10:24 hrs. As TLDP-III HEP
is connected to rest of the grid via this S/C line, all four units at TLDP III got tripped due to loss of
evacuation path.
Generation Loss: 134 MW
Relay indications are as follows:

220 kV TLDP III – NJP – S/C Y-B-I, Z-I, 1.4 KA Y-B-I, Z-I, 57.9 KM from NJP
WBSETCL may explain.
WBSETCL informed that there was a Y-B fault in TLDP III – NJP – S/C near to TLDP-III S/s which
was cleared from both the end in zone-I of distance protection.
NHPC informed that before tripping of above circuit, two units of TLDP-IV got tripped due to
operation of GT neutral O/C protection. It was also seen from disturbance recorder that there was
a high neutral current(i.e. 40 A) flowing in TLDP III – NJP – S/C for about 1 sec before the tripping
of the circuit in Y-B fault.
PCC opined that tripping of generating units before the tripping of evacuating lines is not desirable
and proper protection coordination between TLDP station and NJP station is required.
It was also came to notice that WBSETCL has used IDMT characteristics for E/F protection in NJP
S/s whereas NHPC has definite time settings at TLDP.
PCC advised WBSETCL and NHPC to review the DEF settings for proper protection coordination
between the transmission lines and generating station.
ITEM NO. B.6: Disturbance at 765 kV Jharsuguda S/s on 31.10.18 at 23:52 hrs.
On 31st Oct 2018, at 23:35 Hs 765 kV Dharamjaigarh-Jharsuguda-3 was charged for first time
with initial power flow of 358 MW. Later at 23:52 hrs, during PLCC testing of new 765kV
Dharamjaygarh-Jharsuguda-4 at Jharsuguda S/S, Bus-2 at Jharsuguda S/S tripped along with
following elements.
 765KV, 240MVAR B/R 1

 765KV, 240MVAR B/R 2
 765KV Jharsuguda-Anugul-I
 765KV Jharsuguda-Darlipali(NTPC)-I
 765KV Jharsuguda-Darlipali(NTPC)-II
The detailed analysis report is attached in Annexure B.6.
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Powergrid explained with a detailed presentation. Presentation is enclosed in Annexure B.6.1. It
was informed that due to human error during wiring tightness, LBB initiation signal was wrongly
sent to main bay of 765 kV Jarsuguda-Anugul-I resulting the operation of LBB and subsequent
tripping of 765 kV Jarsuguda-Anugul-I and main bus#2.
Powergrid informed that all the tie Breakers also got tripped and Direct trip was extended to the
remote ends due to wrong masking in the output of busbar relay. As a result, Bus reactor 1 and 2
and Jharsuguda- Darlipali D/C tripped. They informed that they have rectified the wiring after
consulting the OEM.
PCC advised Powergrid to configure all bay channels in output of Busbar DR for Bus-II at
Jharsuguda substation.
ITEM NO. B.7: Tripping Incidences in the month of October, 2018.
Other tripping incidences occurred in the month of October 2018 which needs explanation from
constituents of either of the end is given in Annexure-B.7.
In 58th PCC, ERLDC informed that most of the constituents are not submitting the DR and EL
data for single line trippings.
PCC advised all the constituents to upload the details along with DR and EL in PDMS on-line
portal and referred the issue to TCC for further guidance.
In 36th TCC, all the constituents were advised to use the PDMS on-line portal for uploading the
single line tripping details along with DR (comtrade files), EL and other relevant files for all
trippings of August 2017 onwards. Otherwise, it will be considered as violation of compliance of
clause 5.2(r) & 5.9 of IEGC.
Members may discuss.
Members explained the tripping incidences. Updated status is enclosed at Annexure-B7.
PCC advised all the concern constituents to take necessary corrective actions to resolve the
issues.
73rd PCC Minutes

PART- C:: OTHER ITEMS
ITEM NO. C.1: Islanding scheme at IbTPS- OPGC
68th PCC opined that the draft scheme submitted by Odisha was three years old and the draft
scheme is needed to be reviewed with existing network configuration.
PCC decided to discuss the islanding scheme in next PCC Meeting and advised OPTCL to
submit all the relevant details to ERPC and ERLDC.
In 69th PCC, OPTCL presented the revised islanding scheme based on updated network
configuration and power flows. The details are enclosed at Annexure-C.1.
In 70th PCC, OPGC has submitted the updated details which are enclosed at Annexure-C1.a.
It was decided that ERLDC and ERPC will study and finalize the islanding scheme in next PCC
Meeting.
In 72nd PCC, OPTCL and OPGC were advised to prepare a joint presentation highlighting the
below mentioned points in order to have a clarity of the overall scheme.
 The logic for islanding operation such as frequency limit, overvoltage settings, vector shift
settings etc.
 Logic/Actions to be adopted for different grid scenarios for both generator side and
transmission side.
 The actions to be taken at generator side vis-a vis at transmission side for different
conditions.
OPTCL and OPGC may explain.
OPTCL and OPGC explained the scheme with a presentation. During presentation, number of
queries were raised by the PCC forum.
After detailed delibetation, PCC decided to convene a separate meeting on 12.12.18 at ERPC
secretariat in order to have a detailed deliberation on IBTPS islanding scheme. PCC advised
OPTCL and OPGC to present the scheme along with the clarifications sought by PCC in the
meeting scheduled on 12.12.18.
It was also decided to invite representatives of WBPDCL as special invitee to the above meeting
on 12.12.18.
ITEM NO. C.2: Total power failure at 220kV Hatia (JUSNL) S/s on 20.07.18 at 09:10 hrs.
Due to clearance issue with some 11 KV feeder (which has an in feed from Hatia old) repeated
faults occurred in 220 kV Ranchi - Hatia-I and II. As a result total power failed at 220kV Hatia S/s.
In 70th PCC, JUSNL informed that repeated disturbances and total power failure at Hatia
substation on 20.07.18 was due to the clearance issue with 11kV feeder under 220kV Ranchi-
Hatia D/C line. JUSNL informed that the 11 kV feeders were re-routed after the above incidences
to get the sufficient clearance.
PCC advised JUSNL to check the Sag level and clearance of 220 KV lines to avoid this type of
tripping.
From the analysis of PMU plot and disturbance recorders at Ranchi & Hatia end, a number of
protection related issues came into notice.
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PCC analysed the issue & advised JUSNL to take the following actions
 Whenever PLCC will remain out of service, the auto reclose operation should be made to
non-auto mode and zone 2 timing may be reduced (preferably less than 0.35 Sec.) to
minimize the fault clearing time.
 The trip on reclose function should be enabled in the relay whenever autoreclose function
is in operation.
Regarding unwanted tripping of 220/132 kV ATRs at Hatia and Patratu substations and tripping of
Hatia-Patratu line in zone-4, PCC felt that there was a protection coordination issue and advised
JUSNL to submit the corresponding relay settings to ERPC/ERLDC at the earliest.
The issue of delayed opening of breaker at Hatia end i.e.400 msec after zone-I tripping initiation
was remained unexplained. The sequence of operation as well as the details of elements tripped
during the incident could not be explained by JUSNL.
PCC decided to discuss this issue in next PCC meeting and advised JUSNL to explain the issue
in next meeting with all the relevant details.
In 71st PCC, JUSNL was advised the details at the earliest.
JUSNL submitted the tripping details along with the disturbance recorders vide mail dated
06.11.18. The details are submitted in Annexure-C.2.
JUSNL may explain.
JUSNL could not explain the disturbance and PCC could not conclude the same.
PCC advised JUSNL to test the healthiness of the relays at 220kV Patratu and 220/132kV Hatia
S/s.
JUSNL informed that CRITL team doesn’t have any facilities to test the protection relays and they
are doing the testing through third party agency which would take more time.
PCC took serious note of the issue and advised JUSNL to submit the details of procedure being
followed for testing/verification of the relays.
PCC advised JUSNL to test the healthiness of the relays at 220kV Patratu and 220/132kV Hatia
S/s on urgent basis.
ITEM NO. C.3: FOLLOW-UP OF DECISIONS OF THE PREVIOUS PROTECTION SUB-

COMMITTEE MEETING(S)
The decisions of previous PCC Meetings are given at Annexure-C.3.
Members may update the latest status.
The updated status was given in Annexure-C.3.
It was observed that latest status on the implementation of the previous PCC recommendations
were not updated by the constituents regularly. PCC advised all the constituents to update the
latest status of the recommendations as per the list given in Annexure.
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PCC also advised ERPC secretariat to circulate the above annexure of follow up events along
with the notice for PCC meeting among the constituents.
ITEM NO. C.4: Zone 3 settings of ISTS lines
Based on the data available in PDMS, the zone 3 settings of all ISTS lines in Eastern Region were
verified and compared with the corresponding resistive reach of the line thermal loading. Zone 3
settings were also checked with the agreed protection philosophy of ER. The discrepancies
observed in the settings will be presented in the meeting.
In 67th PCC, PRDC presented the list of ISTS lines where they observed the discrepancy in zone-
3 setting.
In 70th PCC, PRDC was advised to resend the list of the lines to all constituents and constituents
were advised to verify the settings at the earliest.
In 72nd PCC, it was informed that some of the constituents have verified the settings. PCC
advised all other constituents to verify the settings by next month and report discrepancy, if any.
Members may update.
Powergrid ER-I had verified the settings. Powergrid ER-II and Powergrid odisha informed that
they will verify the settings at the earliest.
DVC informed that they will verify the settings by next month.
ITEM NO. C.5: Status of Third Party Protection Audit
The compliance status of 1st Third Party Protection Audit observations is as follows:
Total % of
Name of Constituents Complied
Observations Compliance
Powergrid 54 46 85.19
NTPC 16 14 87.50
NHPC 1 1 100.00
DVC 40 26 65.00
WB 68 49 72.06
Odisha 59 42 71.19
JUSNL 34 25 73.53
BSPTCL 16 5 31.25
IPP (GMR, Sterlite and MPL) 5 5 100.00
* Pending observations of Powergrid are related to PLCC problems at other end.
The substation wise status of compliance are available at ERPC website (Observations include
PLCC rectification/activation which needs a comprehensive plan).
Members may note.
Members noted.
ITEM NO. C.6: Non-commissioning of PLCC / OPGW and non-implementation of carrier

aided tripping in 220kV and above lines.
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According to CEA technical standard for construction of electric plants and electric lines -Clause
43(4) (c), transmission line of 220 KV and above should have single-phase auto-reclosing facility
for improving the availability of the lines. However, from the tripping details attached June-
August, 2016 it is evident that the some of 220kV above Inter & Intra-Regional lines do not having
auto-reclose facility either at one end or at both ends. Out of these for some of the lines even
PLCC/OPGW is not yet installed and carrier aided protection including Autorecloser facility is not
yet implemented. Based on the trippings of June- August, 2016 and PMU analysis a list of such
lines has been prepared and as given below:
List of line where auto reclose facility is not available(Information based on PMU data analysis)
Owner Detail Present Status

Date of
S. Transmission Lines Reason of
Trippin OPGW/P
No name Tripping AR facility
g End-1 End-2 LCC Link
functional
available
will be
220KV BUDIPADAR- 23.06.1 PLCC activated in
13 Y-N FAULT OPTCL CSEB
KORBA-II 6 available consultation
with Korba
17.07.1 EARTH by March
17 220 KV TSTPP-RENGALI NTPC OPTCL
6 FAULT 2018
220KV BUDIPADAR- 21.07.1 EARTH PLCC
18 OPTCL PGCIL
RAIGARH 6 FAULT defective
Yes Old Relay and
not functional.
7-8 months
220 KV FARAKKA- 03.08.1
20 B-N FAULT . NTPC JUNSL required for
LALMATIA 6
auto re-close
relay
procurement.
Voice
established.
220 KV MUZAFFARPUR - 10.08.1
23 B-N FAULT PGCIL BSPTCL For carrier
HAZIPUR - II 6
required
shutdown
Expected to
install
220 KV ROURKELA - 11.08.1 OPGW
24 B-N FAULT PGCIL OPTCL protection
TARKERA-II 6 available
coupler by Jan
17
220 KV BIHARSARIF- 07.09.1 BSPTC
27 B-N FAULT TVNL
TENUGHAT 6 L
220KV Jamshedpur-Jindal-
33
SC
34th TCC advised all the respective members to update the above list along with the last tripping
status in next PCC meeting.
TCC further advised all the constituents to give the latest status of PLCC of other 220kV and
above lines under respective control area.
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OPTCL:
1. 220kV Rengali(PG)-Rengali S/Y (Proposal for Commn. in OPGW is pending): PSDF
appraisal committee accepted the proposal
2. 220kV Indravati(PG)-Indravati(PH) (Proposal for Commn. in OPGW pending): PSDF
appraisal committee accepted the proposal
3. 132kV Baripada(PG)-Baripada ( Tendering in Progress for OPGW): Contract awarded
4. 132kV Baripada(PG)-Rairangpur (Tendering in Progress for OPGW): Contract awarded
BSPTCL:
1. 220kV Purnea (PG)-Madhepura line
2. 220 kV Biharshariff- Begusarai line Work is in progress expected to be commissioned
3. 220 kV Biharshariff- Bodhgaya line by December 2017.
4. 220kV MTPS-Motiari line
5. 220KV Madhepura-New Purnea D/C Auto recloser is out of service at Madhepura
6. 220KV Muzaffarpur-Hajipur D/C line Auto recloser is out of service at Hazipur
7. 220KV FSTPP-Lalmatia-1 Auto recloser is out of service at Lalmatia
8. 220KV Patna-Khagaul-SC Auto recloser is out of service at Khagual
In 67th PCC, BSPTCL informed that they are planning to hire an agency for implementing PLCC
system in all the lines in their network.
Members may update.
Members noted.
ITEM NO. C.7: Disturbance monitoring equipment(DME) standardization
The power system is routinely subjected to faults or disturbances which can range from transient
faults on transmission lines to system-wide disturbances involving multiple control areas, states
and even countries. Investigation of each incident is critical in optimizing the performance of
protection systems with the goal of preventing future incidents from becoming wide-area
disturbances. The tools required to perform post-incident analyses include DME which can
capture pre-event, event, and post-event conditions with a high degree of accuracy.
Recorders can be classified into two categories:
• FR (Fault Recorder)
• Sequence of events Recorder (SER)
For FR (Fault Recorder) following points may be standardized:

a. Deployment
b. Record Length
c. Triggers
d. Sampling Rates
For Sequence of events Recorder following points may be standardized:

a. SER Capability
b. Point Assignments
c. Use of RTUs for SER
Common issues:
a. Data format
b. Power Supply
c. Monitoring
73rd PCC Minutes

Reference documents for this:
1. NERC Standard PRC-002-2 Disturbance Monitoring and Reporting Requirements
2. NPCC Regional Reliability Reference Directory # 11 Disturbance Monitoring Equipment

Criteria
In 72nd PCC all the constituents were advised to submit the settings related to configuring
disturbance recorders to ERLDC.
Members may update.
It was decided that ERLDC, ERPC and PRDC would prepare a draft report on “settings for
configuring disturbance recorders” and place the draft in next PCC Meeting.
ITEM NO. C.8: Issue of Static Overvoltage Relay at 400 kV Binaguri Substation in
Eastern region
400 kV Binaguri Substation recently has seen spurious over voltage tripping of circuit. The details
of these events are given below:
1. On 13th June 2018 at 06:32 Hrs :There was a successful Auto-Reclosure on 400 kV
Binaguri- Bongaigaon 2 circuit due to B phase to earth fault. At the same time , 400 kV
Binaguri-Rangpo circuit 2 which is in same diameter of 400 kV Binaguri-Bongaigaon 2 at
Binaguri end got tripped from Binaguri end on Over voltage stage 2 operation (Y phase
voltage). In addition 400 kV Bingauri-Tala 1 also has tripped on over voltage stage 2
operation from Binaguri end (R phase Voltage). The reason for the transient overvoltage
is not known. Rest of the circuit from Binaguri end did not trip during this event.
2. On 10th Sept 2018 at 11:31 hrs : 400 kV Tala-Binaguri 4 circuit tripped on overvoltage
protection from Binaguri end while the voltage at Binaguri was 407 kV. During this event,
there was no fault in the system.
3. On 11th Sept 2018 2018 at 08:10 Hrs: 400 kvBinaguri-Malbase circuit tripped on
overvoltage protection from Binaguri end while the voltage at Binaguri was 404 kV. During
this event, there was no fault in the system.
The above tripping of lines from Binaguri on spurious over voltage protection when the system is
not having high voltage is serious in view of long outage of 400 kV Purnea-Biharsharif D/C and
400 kV Kishenganj-Patna D/C. PGCIL ERTS-2 has informed that the event 2 and 3 have
occurred due to sensitive over voltage static relay.
In view of the above three events, Following issues need detailed deliberation:
4. Detailed analysis and Reason for Over-Voltage Stage 2 operation at Binaguri in case of
event 1.
5. Why the numerical relay over voltage protection are not being utilised when such mal-
operation are being observed from the static relay.
In 71st PCC, Powergrid informed that the overvoltage issue was due to the static relays used in
those lines. They added that all the static relays have been removed and they had already been
replaced by numerical relays.
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They further informed that the overvoltage function of numerical relays has been enabled but
testing is yet to be done.
Powergrid may update.
Powergrid informed that testing has been completed.
ITEM NO. C.9: Checklist for submission of updated data for Protection Database
The network data in Protection Database needs to be updated on regular basis on account of
commissioning of new elements in the CTU as well as STU networks. Accordingly a checklist has
been prepared which is enclosed in Annexure-C9.
All the constituents requested to submit the checklist on monthly bases in every OCC/PCC
meetings.
Constituents may note.
Members noted.
Meeting ended with vote of thanks to the chair.
***************
73rd PCC Minutes

Annexure-B.6
Tripping of Bus-II at Jharsuguda at 23:52 Hrs on 31st October 2018

Antecedent Conditions: -
 All India Demand: -143000 MW

 ER Demand: - 16900 MW
 Grid Frequency: - 49.99 Hz.
 Flow on 765 kV Dharamjaigarh-Jharsuguda-I,II&III : - 355 MW/ ckt
 Flow on 765 kV Jharsuguda-Angul I&II: - 385 MW/ckt
 Flow on 765/400 kV ICT-I & II at Jharsuguda: - 142 MW each ICT (towards 765 kV
side)
Incident: -
On 31st Oct 2018, at 23:35 Hs 765 kV Dharamjaigarh-Jharsuguda-3 first time charged

with initial power flow of 358 MW. Later at 23:52 hrs, during PLCC testing of new
765kV Dharamjaygarh-Jharsuguda-4 at Jharsuguda S/S, Bus-2 at Jharsuguda S/S
tripped along with following given elements.
Element Outage time and date Revival time and date
1. 765KV, 240MVAR B/R 1 31-10-18 & 23:52 Hrs 01-11-18 & 00:50 Hrs
2. 765KV, 240MVAR B/R 1 31-10-18 & 23:52 Hrs 01-11-18 & 00:55 Hrs
3. 765KV Jharsuguda-Angul-1 31-10-18 & 23:52 Hrs 01-11-18 & 01:14 Hrs
4. 765KV Jharsuguda- 31-10-18 & 23:52 Hrs 01-11-18 & 01:25 Hrs
Darlipali(NTPC)-1
5. 765KV Jharsuguda- 31-10-18 & 23:52 Hrs Kept out due to
Darlipali(NTPC)-2 overvoltage
765 kV Bus-II at Jharsuguda normalised along with 765KV, 240MVAR B/R 1 at 00:50
Hrs on 01st Nov 2018.
Power grid has reported that while testing of PLCC in Dharmajaygarh ckt#4 at
Jharsuguda, tie Breaker (which was in open condition) trip relay operated and LBB
initiation sent to Tie Breaker and wrongly initiation sent to main bay of Angul#1 Main
Bay. Signal sent to main bay was due to wrong wiring configuration. Due to operation
of Main CB LBB of Angul#1, main and tie CB’s of Bus #2 got tripped. Due to which,
Angul#1, NTPC#1&2, Bus Reactor#1&2 got tripped.
Power grid also reported that wrong wiring issue has been resolved and matter has
been referred to O&M department.
Analysis based on SCADA Data
765 kV Dharamjaigarh-Jharsuguda-3 first time charged at 23:35 Hrs (31st Oct 18). Line
MVAR of both the ends is given below in fig 1. Later at 23:52 Hrs, with the tripping of
765KV Jharsuguda-Angul-1 along with BUS-II at Jharsuguda, flow on 765KV
Jharsuguda-Angul-2 rose to 583 MW from 400 MW and voltage at Jharsuguda rose to
802 kV from 789 kV. Power flow on 765KV Jharsuguda-Angul-D/C and voltage of Bus-II
at Jharsuguda is given below in fig 2 & 3 respectively.
Fig 1:- Line MVAR of both ends of 765 kV Dharamjaigarh-Jharsuguda-3
Fig 2: - Flow on 765KV Jharsuguda-Angul-D/C

Fig 3: - Jharsuguda Bus Voltage
Analysis based on PMU.
The nearest PMU is Talcher and Ranchi and it was not reporting at the time of
incident. As per voltage PMU of Raipur, there is only 0.5 kV rise in voltage. The voltage
PMU is given below: -
Fig 4: - Voltage PMU of Raipur

Points of concern: -
 Before commissioning of any new element, all the protection scheme need to
be cross check again by protection engineer/ commissioning expert to avoid
any issue of mal operation.
Annexure
Annexure 1: - Jharsuguda region snapshot before the incident (at 23:50 Hrs).
Annexure 2: - Jharsuguda region snapshot after the incident (at 23:54 Hrs).
Annexure 3: - Jharsuguda SLD before the incident (at 23:50 Hrs).
Annexure 4: - Jharsuguda SLD after the incident (at 23:54 Hrs).

Annexure 5: - B/B DR received from POWERGRID
Annexure-B.6.1
Report on Tripping of 765kV Bus

Bar#2 and Associated Elements at
Sundargarh S/S on 30 Oct’18
th
1
D
2
Bus Bar Trip at Sundargarh
• 765kV Sundargarh- Dharmajaygarh#4 & 765kV Sundargarh-Angul#1

Line are connected in same dia.
• 765kV Sundargarh- Dharmajaygarh#4 was about to be charged on

30/10/2018
• During wiring tightness of Tie Bay, LBB initiation wire was falsely
touched and LBB initiation was sent to Main Bay of Angul#1 at 23:52 hrs
30/10/2018.
• This occurred due to human mistake during wiring tightness
• Since LBB initiation was received and current in the Main Bay of
Angul#1 was above the threshold, LBB trip of Angul#1 Main Bay was
issued and Bus #2 got tripped.
• This caused the tripping of Angul#1 Line & Bus #2.

3
Bus Bar Trip & Tie Trip at Sundargarh
• However, all the tie Breakers also got tripped and Direct trip was
extended to the remote ends. Due to which, Angul#1, NTPC#1&2,
Bus Reactor#1&2 also got tripped.
• After detailed analysis, it was found that configuration was wrong
in Bus Bar relay.
• Same was referred to OEM and they suggested for corrective
action.
• New settings were then implemented as per OEM.
4
Power Interruption
• There was no power interruption as 765kV Sundargarh-

Dharmajaygarh#1,2&3 , Angul#1 & ICT#1&2 were in service
• Power interruption occurred to NTPC #1 for auxiliary & start-up
power for 40 mins
5
Power Flow
Name of Element MW MVAR
1. 765KV SNG-Dharmajaygarh# I -512 MW -181 MVAr
2. 765 KV SNG-Dharmajaygarh# II -503 MW -175 MVAr
3. 765KV SNG-Dharmajaygarh # III -507 MW -178 MVAr
4. 765 KV SNG-Dharmajaygarh # IV - MW - MVAr
5. 765 KV SNG -ANGUL # I 575 MW 156 MVAr
6. 765 KV SNG -ANGUL # II 567 MW 151 MVAr
7. 765 KV SNG -NTPC Darlipali# I .5 MW -57 MVAr
8. 765 KV SNG -NTPC Darlipali# II 0.2 MW -57 MVAr
9. 765/400KV 1500MVA ICT#I 199 MW 44 MVAr
10.. 765/400KV 1500MVA ICT#II 197 MW 43 MVAr
6
D
Tripped
7
Thank You!
8
Annexure-B.7
List of Intra Regional line tripping in the month of October 2018 where violation of protection standard has been observed
DR/EL DR/EL
RESTORATIO RESTORATI Relay Indication Fault Clearance RECEIVED RECEIVED
LINE NAME TRIP DATE TRIP TIME Relay Indication REMOTE END Reason Auto Recloser status Remarks
N DATE ON TIME LOCAL END time in msec FROM LOCAL FROM REMOTE
END END
Miscellaneous: Tripping on DT, No Fault observed in PMU

OVERVOLTAGE TRIPPED AT OVERVOLTAGE TRIPPED AT
400KV INDRAVATI(PG)-INDRAVATI(GR)-SC 10-10-2018 16:49 10-10-2018 17:47 -- PMU Voltage : 413 KV No No OHPC to send the details of the tripping and setting
GRIDCO END GRIDCO END of O/V at Indravati. SLDC GRIDCO to coordinate.
Tripped only at Binaguri, No fault observed in Bhutan to be communicated by ERLDC for getting
400KV MALBASE-BINAGURI-I 13-10-2018 0:16 13-10-2018 0:38 DT received at Binaguri -- No Yes
DT received PMU the details of the tripping.
Issue with Relay contacts at Angul end. It has been
400KV BOLANGIR-ANGUL-SC 16-10-2018 2:54 16-10-2018 3:24 DT received at Bolangir line did not trip from Angul DT received at Bolangir -- No No
corrected as per PGCIL
No fayult observed in Issue with Relay contacts at Angul end. It has been
400KV BOLANGIR-ANGUL-SC 16-10-2018 3:27 16-10-2018 5:17 DT received at Bolangir line did not trip from Angul DT received at Bolangir -- No No
PMU corrected as per PGCIL
No fayult observed in
400KV ALIPURDUAR-BONGAIGAON-II 16-10-2018 10:44 16-10-2018 11:37 R-N Fault DT Recived R-N Fault -- No No
PMU High Resistance Fault.
Autoreclose related issues

No A/R operation found
220KV JODA-RAMCHANDRAPUR-SC 02-10-2018 12:10 02-10-2018 12:36 Y-N,245 A,-1 km from joda y-n,53.71 km,1.99 KA,o/c Y-N Fault < 100 msec No No Need of Revamping of carrier/PLCC scheme by
in PMU OPTCL; OPTCL to provide a plan for upgradation.
Z2 R-N ,FC 1.107 KA,FD not No A/R operation found PLCC Scheme to be checked at Alipurduar by PGCIL
400KV ALIPURDUAR-BONGAIGAON-I 09-10-2018 9:07 09-10-2018 9:18 A/R successful,, Z1,R-N,3.39 KA,FD 30.49 R-N Fault 700 msec Yes Yes
given in PMU ERTS 2
No A/R operation found Issue with A/R could not be identified at Kharagpur
400KV KHARAGPUR-CHAIBASA-I 12-10-2018 13:02 12-10-2018 13:36 R-N, Z-1, 21.72km, 8.3 kA A/R attempted at Chaibasa R-N Fault < 100 msec No No end . WBSETCL shifted A/R to Siprotec from Micom
in PMU
relay at Kharagpur end and now it is working fine.
A/R successful at Barh End,

400KV BARH-MOTIHARI-I 14-10-2018 10:32 14-10-2018 10:56 Zone 2 ,Carrier Received. Y 27.8 KM, YN, 3.3 KA B-N Fault < 100 msec No Yes
in PMU DMTCL to check the A/R at their end; from DR it is
Phase to E/F
not clear. DMTCL to update.
No A/R operation found Issue with A/R could not be identified at Kharagpur
400KV KHARAGPUR-CHAIBASA-II 20-10-2018 11:02 20-10-2018 11:13 B_N Fault A/R successful B-N Fault < 100 msec No No end . WBSETCL shifted A/R to Siprotec from Micom
in PMU
No A/R operation found Carrier is not in service at both ends. OPTCL and DVC
220KV JODA-JINDAL-JAMSHEDPUR-I 22-10-2018 12:52 22-10-2018 13:17 BN, Z1, 49.27 KM B-N Fault < 100 msec No No to take action for implementation of carrier scheme.
in PMU
A detail plan of upgradation of carrier scheme to be
given by OPTCL and DVC
No A/R operation found PGCIL ERTS 1 to confirm whether A/R is in service at
220KV PUSAULI-SAHUPURI-SC 23-10-2018 12:24 23-10-2018 13:53 R-N, 3.5KA, 40KM R-N Fault < 100 msec No No
in PMU Pusauli end or not.
220KV KATAPALLI-BOLANGIR(PG)-SC 23-10-2018 12:35 23-10-2018 13:12 B-N, 5.8KA B-N Fault < 100 msec No No Need of Revamping of carrier/PLCC scheme by
in PMU OPTCL; OPTCL to provide a plan for upgradation.
400KV BINAGURI-ALIPURDUAR-I 28-10-2018 11:20 28-10-2018 11:52 B-N Fault (As per PMU) 800 msec Yes Yes
in PMU High Resistance Fault.
Z1, RN, 25.1 KM, 7.29 KA, A/R successful from Tie Bay as Main Bay No A/R operation found Issue with A/R could not be identified at Kharagpur
400KV KHARAGPUR-CHAIBASA-I 29-10-2018 12:24 29-10-2018 12:36 R-N Fault < 100 msec No No end . WBSETCL shifted A/R to Siprotec from Micom
A/R L/O lockout .RN, 1.70 KA, Z2, 173.5 KM in PMU
Annexure-C.1
ISLANDING SCHEME FOR IB THERMAL –

BUDHIPADAR GSS
ISLANDING SCHEME DESCRIPTION
1. Islanding schemes are implemented by generating stations & transmission

system to isolate the healthy subsystems following a large-scale
disturbance. This is a system requirement under contingency conditions
according to which the power network may be split into healthy and self-
sustaining zones so that cascade tripping of all generating stations in the
entire region is avoided.
2. With a view to protect the generation of IB TPS during sudden and major
disturbance in power system network, one special islanding scheme with
part loads of Budhipadar GSS of OPTCL has been proposed.
3. Two numbers 210 MW generators of IB TPS connect to 220/132/33kV Grid
substation through four numbers dedicated 220kV lines.
4. The islanding scheme envisages segregation of a group of matching 132kV
load in closed loop with the IB generators.
5. 132kV feeders will be arranged radially in order to form islanding

scheme with IB generation.
6. 220kV Budhipadar GSS has system has two main bus and a transfer bus
system. The generation & matching loads put into two buses with bus
coupler in operation.
7. The two numbers 220kV feeders from IB TPS put into Bus –II and the
other two are kept in the other bus as normal arrangement.
8. 220 kV interstate line to Korba-2 & 3 and Raigarh will be in normal
condition distributed to both the buses.
9. The islanding relay Micom P341 is installed at Bus coupler panel of the
220kV system.
10. Inthe event of system disturbance and actuation of islanding

relay:
a. Relay will give command to trip all 220KV feeders connected to
Bus-I and Bus II along with Bus coupler except selected islanding
IB ckts. either (IB -1 & 3)/ (IB-2 & 4) and Auto transformer- I & II.
b. It will also trip non- selected islanding IB ckts. incomer breaker
either (IB -1 & 3)/ (IB-2 & 4).
c. It will send carrier command to Tarkera end and to trip 132kV
Tarkera –Rajgangpur feeder I & II and 132kV Tarkera- Kalunga
feeder so as to feed Rajgangpur , Kuchinda and Kalunga Grid
Load will be in radial arrangement.
d. It will send carrier signal to Lapanga end to trip 132kV Lapanga –
Jharsuguda feeder at Lapanga in order to feed Jharsuguda load
radially.
e. It will send carrier signal to IB thermal to start ramping and adjust
11. The CGP feeders such as Vedanta , Bhusan and Aditya

Aluminium have their own islanding schemes to cater their
industry load.
12. The general arrangement of 220kV feeder configuration, 132kV

loads for islanding has shown in following slides.
POWER FLOW DETAILS OF 220KV SYSTEM
LOAD PATTERN OF DIFFERENT FEEDERS 12.07.2018 AT 12.00 HRS.
160MVA BUS-1
AUTO-1
BUS-2
+70MW +2MW
BASUNDHARA-2
+70MW +12MW
RAIGARH
160MVA
Idle charged
AUTO-2
KORBA-2
-83X2 MW -83X2MW
IB-2 & 4 IB- 1 & 3
+37MW
-90MW
BUS- KORBA-3
+63MW COUPLER +63MW
TARKERA-2
TARKERA- 2
+0MW
+115X2MW
AAL-2
LAPANGA-1&2
-44x2MW
BHUSAN-1 & 2
-0MW +0MW
VAEDANTA-2 AAL- 1
VEDANTA- 2
-0MW
132kV RADIAL LOAD ARRANGEMENT FOR ISLAND
SCHEME
132kV BUS Budhipadar 10 MW
Brajarajnagar 45 MW
Kalugana 45 MW
Jharsuguda 30 MW
TOTAL 239 MW Sundargarh -1 &2

34 MW
MCL 15 MW
Rajgangpur 60 MW
132KV Connectivity of Budhipadar GSS
Budhipadar GSS Kalunga GSS Tarkera GSS

MCL
Sundargarh GSS
Rajganpur GSS
Brajarajnagar GSS
Jharsuguda GSS
Kuchinda GSS
Lapanga GSS
220 KV BUS - A
ISLANDING LOAD ARRANGEMENT,

220 kV Bus Coupler X Tripping of all 220KV Breakers
220 KV BUS - B
Auto Trf-1
Auto Trf-2
X
Ib-1
160 MVA
160 MVA
X
Ib-3
122MW
122 MW
132 KV BUS
Jharsuguda-2
Jharsuguda-1
Rajgangpur
Brajrajnagar
20 MVA Trf
12.5 MVA Trf
MSP
Lapanga
MCL-1
MCL-2
Kalunga
X X X X X X
SNG-1
SNG-2
X X X X X X X
45 MW 60 MW 17 MW 17 MW 45 MW I/C 15 MW 15 MW 0 mw 4 mw 6 mw
15 mw
X
X
132 KV
X RAJGANGPUR
132 KV KULUNGA GRID S/S
X GRID S/S(LILO)
X X X X X 132 KV Switch Yard at
LAPANGA GRID S/S
X
X 132 KV S/Y OF
TARKERA GRID S/S
132KV Jharsuguda GRID S/S
X X X - CB OPEN
X- CB CLOSED
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF ISLANDING RELAY INSTALLED IN B/C PANEL FOR
TRIPPING OF DIFFERENT FEEDERS AT BUDHIPADAR GRID S/S.
Bus-I
Bus-II
TFR
Bus
89A 89B
Islanding Relay Features
1. >Hz(OF) TRIP SIGNAL TO 132KV

2. <Hz(UF) LAPANGA AT B.PADAR
52BC
3. df/dt/ Vector Shift
Protection (ΔVθ) x 52 B/C
ISLANDING TRIPPING
RELAY TRIP SIGNAL THROUGH CARRIER TO
132KV RAJGANGPUR-1 &2 AND
When KALUNGA
Islanding Relay FEEDER AT TARKERA
TRIPPING OF ALL 220KV
Operates
FEEDERS IN BUS-I & II OTHER
THAN IB 1 & 3 AND AUTO
TRANSFORMERS. Carrier Signal to IB for
Generation ramping.
CONNECTION DIAGRAM OF ISLANDING RELAY (Micom P341) AT BUDHIPADAR SUB-STATION
BUDHIPADAR BUS PT
BUS-1 BUS-2
DC SUPPLY
PT PT
PT SS
ISLANDING RELAY
FUSE &LINK Micom P341 INSTALLED AT
B/C RELAY PANEL
TRIP CKT OF 220KV B/C BREAKER
BO1
SW1
TRIP CKT OF 220KV IB-1 BREAKER
BO2
SW2
BO3
SW3
BO4
SW4
BO5
TRIP CKT. OF 132KV LAPANGA
BREAKER
BO6 SW5
TRIP CKT. OF ALL 220KV FEEDERS EXCEPT
CMR AT-1,AT-2 AND SELECTED IB CKTS
BO7 PLCC/OPGW TRIP CKT. OF 132KV
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR
AT JHARSUGUDA FEEDER AT
TO LAPANGA
LAPANGA LAPANGA
BO8
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR PLCC/OPGW TRIP CKT. OF 132KV KALUNGA

TO TARKERA AT TARKERA FEEDER AT TARKERA
BO9
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR PLCC/OPGW TRIP CKT. OF 132KV RGP-1 &

TO TARKERA AT TARKERA RGP-2 FEEDER AT TARKERA
BO10
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR PLCC/OPGW COMMAND TO IBTPS END FOR

TO IBTPS AT IBTPS RAMPING OF IB GENERATOR
BO11
PLCC/OPGW
PLCC/OPGG AT BUDHIPADAR COMMAND TO IBTPS END FOR
AT
TO LAPANGA RAMPING OF IB GENERATOR
LAPANGA
BO12
LEGEND
PTSS---- PT SELECTOR SWITCH
SW1-----SW5- ON/OFF SWITCH
CMR– CONTACT MULTIPLICATION RELAY
+220VDC
Reset Push Button
Islanding Channel-1 Command from Budhipadar
Hold ON Contact of X Relay

Islanding Channel-2 Command from Budhipadar
Islanding
X
Multiplication Relay
-220VDC
X1 Budhipadar Islanding Relay Operated Command to Unit#1 GRP
X2 Budhipadar Islanding Relay Operated Command to Unit#2 GRP
X3 Budhipadar Islanding Relay Operated Command to Unit#1
X4 Budhipadar Islanding Relay Operated Command to Unit#2
ISLANDING MULTIPLICATION RELAY CONFIGURED IN IBTPS CONTROL ROOM

Unit#1 Frequency High > TD=
Unit#1 Class A Trip Command to
GCB Unit#1 ON
GRP-1
A
GCB Unit#2 ON N
D Blocking Command to GRP-1 for
Trip Priority Selection Switch on * Delayed U/F and O/F Trip over
Unit#1 the normal setting.
Budhipadar Islanding Relay Alarm in MCR-1: Islanding Relay

Operated Command (X1) Operated
Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
PRIORITY TRIPPING SCHEME CONFIGURED IN GRP-1 NUMERIC RELAY

GCB Unit#1 ON
GRP-1
A
GCB Unit#2 ON N
D Blocking Command to GRP-1 for
Trip Priority Selection Switch on * Delayed U/F and O/F Trip over
Unit#1 the normal setting.

Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.

Trip Priority Selection Switch on * Blocking Command to GRP-2 for

Unit#2 Delayed U/F and O/F Trip over the
A normal setting.
GCB Unit#1 ON N
D
GCB Unit#2 ON
GRP-2
*Hardware single selection switch (3 position: I, OFF, II) for both units installed on one GRP.
Alarm in MCR-1: Islanding Relay

Operated
Budhipadar Islanding Relay

TURBINE BYPASS FAST/30% OPEN
Operated Command (X3)
GCB Unit#1 ON A
N STANDBY CEP START
df/dt or dn/dt high > D
Selection ON (Soft Button on

FREQUENCY CONTROL ON
maxDNA)
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURED IN UNIT#1 MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM

Alarm in MCR-2: Islanding Relay
Operated
Budhipadar Islanding Relay

TURBINE BYPASS FAST/30% OPEN
Operated Command (X4)
GCB Unit#2 ON A
N STANDBY CEP START
df/dt or dn/dt high > D
Selection ON (Soft Button on

FREQUENCY CONTROL ON
maxDNA)
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURED IN UNIT#2 MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
NOTES ON INTERCONNECTING RELAY FUNCTION.
Over voltage protection

An over voltage condition could arise when a generator is running but not connected to a power
system, or where a generator is providing power to an islanded power system. Such an over voltage
could arise in the event of a fault with automatic voltage regulating equipment or if the voltage
regulator is set for manual control and an operator error is made. Over voltage protection should
be set to prevent possible damage to generator insulation, prolonged over-fluxing of the generating
plant, or damage to power system loads.
Under frequency protection

Under frequency operation of a generator will occur when the power system load exceeds the prime
mover capability of an islanded generator or group of generators. Power system overloading can arise
when a power system becomes split, with load left connected to a set of ‘islanded’ generators that is in
excess of their capacity. Automatic load shedding could compensate for such events. In this case, under
frequency operation would be a transient condition. This characteristic makes under frequency protection
a simple form of “Loss of Mains” protection on system where it is expected that the islanded load attached
to the machine when the grid connection fails exceeds the generator capacity.
Over frequency protection function
Over frequency running of a generator arises when the mechanical power input to the alternator is
in excess of the electrical load and mechanical losses. The most common occurrence of over
frequency is after substantial loss of load. When a rise in running speed occurs, the governor should
quickly respond to reduce the mechanical input power, so that normal running speed is quickly
regained.
Rate of Change of Frequency Protection (81R)

The two main applications for df/dt protection are network decoupling (loss of mains/loss
of grid) and load shedding. During severe disturbances, the frequency of the system
oscillates as various generators try to synchronize on to a common frequency. The
frequency decay needs to be monitored over a longer period of time and time delayed df/dt
can be used to make the correct decision for load shedding or provide early warning to the
operator on a developing frequency problem.
Voltage Vector Shift Protection (ΔVθ)
The Voltage Vector Shift protection element measures the change in voltage angle over
successive power system half-cycles. The element operates by measuring the time
between zero crossings on the voltage waveforms. A measurement is taken every half
cycle for each phase voltage. Over a power system cycle this produces 6 results, a trip is
issued if 5 of the 6 calculations for the last power system cycle are above the set threshold.
Checking all three phases makes the element less susceptible to incorrect operation due to
harmonic distortion or interference in the measured voltage waveform.
The fast operation of this vector shift function renders it to operate at the instant of a
disturbance rather than during a gradual change caused by a gradual change of power
flow. Operation can occur at the instant of inception of the fault,at fault clearance or
following non-synchronized reclosure, which affords additional protection to the
embedded generator.
AnnexureC1.a
ISLANDING SCHEME FOR OPGCL
By
ODISHA POWER GENERATION CORPORATION LTD.
1
Objective:
Formation of proposed island shall achieve the following objectives:-
i) Prevention from total black out by avoiding effect of cascade tripping of the Power
System.
ii) Fast restoration of supply.
Present Status:
Presently there is no islanding scheme in operation in OPGCL.
Methodology of Proposed Islanding Scheme:

The methodology adopted for the proposed Islanding scheme is as under :-
• Islanding relay out put trip command extended to 220KV budhipadar bus coupler
breaker and 220KV IB Line breakers at Budhipadar connected to non islanded Bus.
• Islanding relay output command extended to IBTPS through OPGW link for load –
generation balance by fast governor/HPBP operation.
• Further two IB line(out of four) should always be connected to Islanded Bus and the
radial Load should be maintained with in 185MW.
2
ISLANDING SCHEME OF IBTPS AT BUDHIPADAR
3
4
5
ISLANDING MULTIPLICATION RELAY CONFIGURED IN IBTPS SWITCHYARD CONTROL ROOM
6
Logic configured in REG670 Relay for Islanding of Unit-I Generator
7
Logic configured in REG670 Relay for Islanding of Unit- 2 Generator
8
• The over – frequency protection is achieved using SAPTOF function block in Generator
Protection relay REG670. There are 3 instances of SAPTOF function in REG670 relay, in which
the 1st is used to confirm the disturbance in the system frequency (As shown in above figure-
red colored), 2nd and 3rd instance is used for delayed operation of the over- frequency
function in line with the logic shown above.
• Function Block and Parameter Settings of Over - Frequency Protection-1st Instance:
9
Configuration of Delayed Over Frequency and Under Frequency Function
10
• Above timers are settable and can be adjusted as per requirement. If there is no
trip from islanding relay, over and under frequency protections will operate as per
the times shown without external timers (timer-1 to 4).
• If there is a trip from Islanding relay, over and under frequency protections are
blocked till the time set in corresponding timers as per the above shown
configuration. Hence total tripping time delay will be corresponding timer delay +
over and under frequency protection function set time delay.
11
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURATION IN UNIT#1
MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM
12
LOAD-GENERATION BALANCE SCHEME CONFIGURATION IN UNIT#2
MAXDNA CONTROL SYSTEM
13
14
15
MONTHLY INTERRUPTION REPORT FOR THE MONTH OFJULY2018
TRANSMISSION SUB DIVISION HATIA-II Annexure-C.2
FEEDER :- 220KV PGCIL-I

Sl. Date Time of Time of Durat Cause Relay Remarks
No. tripping closing ion
1. 03.07.18 16:56 18:02 01:06 F Active Gr.-1,Started Ph –BCN,Trip Ph- C, Start Elts Distn. O/C Start I > 1 2,E/F
Start IN 1 2,Distn. Trip Zone-1, Sys Freq.- 50.01 HZ, FAul Duration -4.999 ms,
Relay Trip Time -79.98 ms, Fault Location -15.35KM, IA -482.1A, IB- 2.456 KA,
IC – 4.522 KA, VAN -103.2 KV,VBN – 63.34 KV, VCN – 47.88KV, Fault
Resistance -13.23Ω,Fault in Zone-1
2. 20.07.18 08:46 09:38 00:52 F Active Gr.-1,Started Ph –BCN,Trip Ph- C, Start Elts Distn. O/C Start I > 1 2,E/F
Start IN 1 2,Distn. Trip Zone-1, Sys Freq.- 49.99 HZ, FAult Duration -0.00 ms,
Relay Trip Time -80.01ms, Fault Location -1.664KM, IA -602.4A, IB- 1.176 KA,
IC – 6.075 KA, VAN -131.8 KV,VBN – 111.7 KV, VCN – 54.63KV, Fault
Resistance -9.223Ω,Fault in Zone-1
3. 20.07.18 09:45 17:27 07:42 F MICOM RELAY-Active Gr.-1,Started Ph –BCN,Tripped Ph- C, Start Elts Distn.
O/C Start I > 1 2,E/F Start IN 1 2,Distn. Trip Zone-1, Sys Freq.- 50.00 HZ,
FAult Duration -71.58 ms, Relay Trip Time -79.91ms, Fault Location -
3.836KM, IA -876.08A, IB- 1.657 KA, IC – 2.532KA, VAN -128.3 KV,VBN –
113.7 KV, VCN – 46.16KV, Fault Resistance -29.51Ω,Fault in Zone-1
DC Supply SUPVN.Source -1 80A & 80B,,TC1 Ckt SUPVN. Y-Ph-195Y , B-Ph -
195B, R- Ph-195R, TC2 ckt SUPVN Y-PH -295Y ,R-Ph-295R,
FACIA RELAY-Protection DC Fail MCB Tripp OFF,Carrier Face /out of
Service ,M1/M2 Protection In Operative /DC Fail.
FEEDER :- 220 KV PGCIL -II
1 03.07.18 16:56 17:49 00:53 F Active Gr.-1,Started Ph –BCN,Trip Ph-ABC, Start Elts Distn. O/C Start I > 1
2,E/F Start IN 1 2,Distn. Trip Zone-1,AR Lockout Shot >, Sys Freq.- 50.01 HZ,
FAul Duration -4.999 ms, Relay Trip Time -78.98 ms, Fault Location -10:80ms,
IA -638.11A, IB- 404.65 K, IC – 1.828 KA, VAN -103.7 KV,VBN – 59.81 KV, VCN
– 52.52KV, Fault Resistance -9.764Ω,Fault in Zone-1
2. 20.07.18 9:27 10:24 00:57 F Active Gr.-1, ,Started Ph –ACN,Trip Ph-ABC, Start Elts Distn. O/C Start I > 1
2,E/F Start IN 1 2, O/V Start IN 1 2,Distn. Start V>1, Distn. Trip Zone-1, Sys
Freq.- 49.99 HZ, FAul Duration -451.7 ms, Relay Trip Time -80.09 ms, Fault
Location -3.886KM, IA -11.76A, IB- 11.78 A, IC – 4.997 KA, VAN -155.0
KV,VBN – 155.34 KV, VCN – 6.33KV, Fault Resistance XY -5.427Ω,Fault in
Zone-1
TC1 ckt SUPVN R-Ph-195R,195RC,Y-Ph-195Y,195YC,B-Ph-195B,195BC,DC
Supply SUPVN. Source-1, 80A,TC2 ckt R-Ph-295R,Y-Ph-295Y,B-Ph-295B
3. 20.07.18 12:16 16:52 04:36 F Active Gr.-1, ,Started Ph –BCN,Trip Ph-ABC, Start Elts Distn. O/C Start I > 1
2,E/F Start IN 1 2,Distn Tripped 2, Distn. Trip Zone-1,AR Lockout Shot >, Sys
Freq.- 50.03 HZ, FAul Duration – 61.63ms, Relay Trip Time -79.95 ms, Fault
Location -9.035KM IA -793.4A, IB- 1.538K A, IC – 3.785 KA, VAN -128.4
KV,VBN – 98.88KV, VCN – 68.62KV, Fault Resistance - 19.8Ω,Fault in Zone-1
FEEDER :- 220 KV PTPS-I

1. 04.07.18 13:15 18:44 05:29 S/D
2. 12.07.18 16:16 18:30 02:14 S/D
3. 19.07.18 10:45 14:01 03:16 S/D
4. 20.07.18 10:08 17:34 07:26 F Facia- TC1 SUPVN,R-PH-195R
Active Gr.-1, Started Ph –BC,O/V Start V>1, ,Sys. Freq.-50.06 HZ, Fault
duration-783.0 ms, Relay trip Time -0.00s,fault in Zone none.
5. 30.07.18 12:33 13:15 00:42 M
FEEDER :- 220 KV PTPS-II
1. 19.07.18 14:07 17:45 03:38 S/D
2. 20.07.18 09:47 10:24 00:37 F Active Gr.-1, ,Started Ph –BCN, Start Elts Distn. O/C Start I > 2,E/F Start IN
1 2, O/V Start V>1,Distn. Trip Zone-4,Sys Freq.- 50.06 HZ, FAul Duration –
1.217s, Relay Trip Time -0.00 s, Fault Location -3.458KM IA -254.6A, IB-
119.5 A, IC – 1.179 KA, VAN -124.2 KV,VBN – 132.7KV, VCN – 26.95KV, Fault
Resistance - 5.576Ω,Fault in Zone-4
FEEDER :- 132KV Hatia-I

1 04.07.18 12:49 13:45 00:56 M
2 20.07.18 09:47 10:38 00:51 M Made off due to

all transformer
was tripped
3. 20.07.18 18:12 18:35 00:23 F Started Ph-ABC, Tripped Ph-A, O/C Start I> 1,O/C Trip I> 1, Active GR.-1, Sys.
Freq.-50.08HZ, Fault Duration – 47.24ms, CB Operate time – 55.00ms, Relay
trip time – 4.664s, IN Measd – 504.6ma, IN Derived – 505.4ma, VAN – 57.97V,
VBN – 57.42V, VCN – 57.96V, UN Derived -955.7mv,
Freq.-50.03HZ, Fault Duration – 5.399s, CB Operate time – 55.00ms, Relay trip
time – 5.339s, Fault location -15.27mi,IA-1.586A,IB-1.069A, IC- 1.0784,VAB -
98.66V,VBC- 99.76V, VCA- 98.57V,IN Measd – 473.8ma, IN Derived – 481.2ma,
VAN – 57.01V, VBN – 57.10V, VCN – 57.96V, UN Derived -1.042v,
Freq.-50.01HZ, Fault Duration – 5.091s, CB Operate time – 55.00ms, Relay trip
time –5.0315 s,Fault location -14.36mi,IA-1.620A,IB -1.074A, IC- 1.049A,VAB -
101.0V,VBC -102.2V, VCA -101.3V, IN Measd – 492.4ma, IN Derived –
499.5ma, VAN – 57.97V, VBN – 57.42V, VCN – 57.96V, UN Derived -939.1mv,
FEEDER :- 132KV Hatia-II

1 05.07.18 14:38 16:28 01:50 M
2. 20.07.18 09:47 10:39 00:52 M Made off due to
all transformer
was tripped
3. 20.07.18 18:12 18:35 00:23 F Started ph –ABC,Tripped ph-C,O/C start I>1,O/C Trip I>1,Actie Gr.-1,Sys Freq-
50.07 Hz,Fault duration-7.490s,Fault Location-36.81 Mi,IA-350.5A,IB-
618.2A,IC-638.7A,VAB-119.7KV,VBC-120.3KV,VCA-120.3KV,IN Measured-
292.6A,In Derived-297.1A,In Sensitive-0A,VAN-69.41KV,VBN-69.18KV,VCN-
69.39KV,VN Derived-683.3V
50.02 Hz,Fault duration- 8.687s,CB Operatr time-55.00ms,Relay trip time -
8.627S,Fault Location-29.52 Mi,IA-333.0A,IB-567.7A,IC-626.4A,VAB-
118.3KV,VBC-119.7KV,VCA-118.3KV,IN Measured-275.9A,In Derived -
277.8A,In Sensitive-0A,VAN-68.08KV,VBN-68.83KV,VCN-68.81KV,VN Derived-
0.00V
50.01 Hz,Fault duration- 8.290s,CB Operatr time-55.00ms,Relay trip time -
8.230S,Fault Location-31.17Mi,IA-338.1A,IB-566.1A,IC-603.7A,VAB-
121.1KV,VBC-122.7KV,VCA-121.6KV,IN Measured-277.1A,In Derived -
275.9A,In Sensitive-0A,VAN-69.94KV,VBN-70.38KV,VCN-70.67KV,VN
Derived379.2V
FEEDER:- 132KVHatia-III

1. 18.07.18 15:05 15:25 00:20 F Started Ph ACN, triped Ph-N, O/C start I > 12, E/F -2,Start In2>12,E/F-2,Start IN
2>12 ,E/F -2 Trip phase IN 2 >2 , Super vision VTS , Active Gr.-1, Sys. Freq. – 50.02
Hz, Fault Duration -170.0ms, CB Operation Time – 55.00 ms, Relay trip time-110.0
ms, Fault Location - 6.490ms, IA – 4.457KA, IB –426.1A, IC – 868.4A, VAB –
80.78KV,VBC-67.10KV,VCA-34.59KV IN –Measurd -3.218KA, IN Drived – 3.241A,
VAN -34.52KV, VBN – 67.16KV, VCN – 0.000V,VN Drived - 69.86KV.
2. 20.07.18 08:46 09:19 00:33 F Started Ph N, triped Ph-N, O/C start I > 1, E/F -2, trip IN 2 > 2,E/F -2 Trip IN 2 > 2,
E/F -2, Start Trip IN 2> 2, Super vision VTS F/R, Active Gr.-1, Sys. Freq. – 50.04 Hz,
Fault Duration -310.0ms, CB Operation – 55.00 ms, Relay trip time- 250.0 ms, Fault
Location - -36.62mi, IA – 217.0A, IB –37.2A, IC – 452.2A, VAB – 121.1KV, VBN -
68.13 KV, VCA – 66.58 , IN –Measurd -908.2A ,IN Drived – 900.4A,IN Sensitive –
0.00A, VAN -66.55 K V, VBN – 68.12KV, VCN – 0.000V,VN Drived - 58.93 KV.
3. 20.07.18 18:12 18:16 00:04 F Started Ph AB, triped Ph-A, O/C start I > 1,O/C Trip I>1, Super vision VTS , Active
Gr.-1, Sys. Freq. – 50.08Hz, Fault Duration -271.1s, CB Operation – 55.00 ms, Relay
trip time- 271.1 s, Fault Location - -60.53mi, IA – 898.5A, IB –795.4A, IC – 817.7A,
VAB – 118.2KV, VBC -68.49 KV, VCA – 68.03 , IN –Measurd -45.22A ,IN Drived –
41.82A,IN Sensitive – 0.00A, VAN -68.00 K V, VBN – 68.50KV, VCN – 0.00V,VN
Drived - 68.30 KV.
4. 20.07.18 18:51 18:59 00:08 F Started Ph-AC , triped Ph-A, O/C start I > 1, O/C Trip I>1, Super vision VTS Active
Gr.-1, Sys. Freq. – 50.01 Hz, Fault Duration -271.1s, CB Operation – 55.00 ms, Relay
trip time – 27.1 s, Fault Location - -60.53mi, IA – 908.9A, IB –810.2A, IC – 882.8A,
VAB – 118.0KV, VBC -68.80 KV, VCA – 67.39 , IN –Measurd -36.87A ,IN Derived –
Derived - 67.93 KV.
5. 20.07.18 19:20 19:26 00:06 F Started Ph-AC , triped Ph-A, O/C start I > 1, O/C Trip I>1, Super vision VTS Active
Gr.-1, Sys. Freq. – 49.93Hz, Fault Duration -161.9s, CB Operation – 56.00 ms, Relay
trip time – 161.9 S, Fault Location - -58.68mi, IA – 899.0A, IB –825.4A, IC – 798.9A,
VAB – 120.5KV, VBC -69.70 KV, VCA – 69.50 , IN –Measurd -31.84A ,IN Derived –
Derived - 69.71 KV.
FEEDER :- 132KV Lohardaga-I

1. 04.07.18 15:45 15:54 00:09 F Active Group-1,Trip phase ABC,E/F started in ,E/F Trip in-2,Fault
Alarm-No,System Frequency-49.95Hz,Fault duration-2.062ms,Relay
Trip Time-80.08ms,IA-546.4A,IB-74.56A,IC-108.8A,VAN-
74.01KV,VBN-75.16KV, VCN-73.25KV,Fault in zone-None
2. 20.07.18 09:47 10:32 00:45 M Made off Due to
3. 20.07.18 12:16 13:18 01:02 M all transformer
tripped
FEEDER:- 132KVLohardaga-II

1. 04.07.18 15:45 15:55 00:10 F Trip Relay-86,Dir E/F Protection-67N
2. 20.07.18 09:47 10:32 00:45 M Made off Due to all
transformer
3. 20.07.18 12:16 17:15 04:59 M Made off Due to
Restricted Power.
FEEDER :- 132KVNamkum

1 20.07.18 09:47 10:29 00:42 M Made off Due to all
transformer tripped
2 20.07.18 18:51 19:24 00:33 O/C Started Phase ABC ,Tripped phase ABC,Over current start-I>1,Over
current trip-I>1 Active Group-1,VT faid
Alarm,System frequency-49.96Hz,Fault duration-266.9ms,Relay trip
time-80.06ms,IA-1.385KA,IB-1.393KA,IC-1.400KA,VAN-28.53KV,VBN-
67.74KV,VCN-66.33KV,Fault time zone None.
3 23.07.18 10:52 11:01 00:09 O/C Facia -Main PROTN OPTD E/F-Axu Distance PROTN 21X
Micom-Active Group-1,Started Phase ABC,Tripping Phase
ABC,O/Current- I>1,O/C Trip I>1,system frequency 49.75Hz,F/Duration
213.8ms,Relay Trip Time -80.36ms,IA-256.3A,IB-245.3A,IC-251.8A,VAN-
69.38KV,VBN-73.78KV,VCN-72.93KV,Fault in zone none.
4 23.07.18 14:32 15:40 01:08 S/D
5 30.07.18 13:01 15:34 02:33 S/D
220/132KV 150 MVA ICT-I
1. 20.07.18 08:46 09:00 00:14 F Dir E/F Protn. Gr A -86A2,Gr. B-86B1,Trip relay 86
220/132KV 150 MVA ICT-II
1 20.07.18 08:46 09:02 00:16 F Trip relay Gr.A 86 A, Trip relay Gr. A & B 86 A2,86B1 & 86B2,Traffo Diff
Protn 87
2 20.07.18 09:45 10:30 00:45 F Trip relay Gr. 86 A, Trip relay Gr. A & B 86 A2 & 86B2,Traffo Diff Protn
87,Trip relay 86
220/132KV 150 MVA ICT-III

1. 20.07.18 08:46 09:24 00:38 F 86A X & 86 BX Trip (Multi pilation), GR.- A & GR.- B Master Trip Relay 86A
& 86B,, Started PH-BC, Tripped Ph-poc,Start 2 Restricted E/F Start REF >
HV, Restricted E/F Trip REF > HV Active Gr. 1, Sys Freq. 50.00HZ, I.A. – I
Mag. 371.1A, IB- I Mag-790.0A, IC – I Mag- 564.7A, IA – 2 Mag. – 0.000A,
IB – 2 Mag – 0.000A, IC- 2 Mag.– 0.000A, IA- 3 Mag. – 434.2A, IB-3 Mag.–
909.5A, IC.-3 Mag.-519.8A, IA – HV Mag.- 371.1A , IB – HV Mag. – 790.0A,
IC – HV Mag. – 564.7A, IA – LV Mag- 434.2A, IB- LV Mag.- 909.5A, IC- LV –
519.8A , I 2 – HV mag -130.0A, I 2 – LV –mag – 226.4A, IN- HV meased
mag – 232.2A , IN – LV meased mag- 0.000A,VX mag – 226.4KV, IA Diff –
0.013PV, IB Diff. – 0.014PV, IC Diff. – 0.07PV, 1A BIAS – 0.305PV, 1B BIAS –
0.272PV, IC BIAS – 0.142PV, REF. HV L 0Z Diff – 1.745K A,REF HV LOZ BIAS
– 464.8A.
Assistant Executive Engineer

Transmission Subdivision, Hatia-II
Annexure-C.3
Sl Name of the incidence PCC Recommendation Latest status

No.
72nd PCC Meeting
1. Repeated disturbances at PCC advised Powergrid to properly Powergrid informed

220/132 kV Purnea(PGCIL) & coordinate the relay settings from that relay settings
132 kV Purnea(BSPTCL) 400kV side to 132kV side at has properly
substation.
Purnea(PGCIL). PCC also advised coordinated at all
Powergrid to verify 220 kV New level.
Purnea-Purnea (PGCIL) D/C line on
DEF at 15:38 hrs.
2. Disturbance at Tenughat PCC advised TVNL to change the

(TVNL)S/s on 27.09.18 at 13:14 timer settings of O/C and E/F relay at
hrs. TTPS end as per IEC curve in order to
have a proper coordination among the
stations.
3. Repeated tripping of 220 kV PCC advised DANS energy to review

Jorethang-New Melli D/C and the relay settings for both the lines.
Tashiding-N. Melli S/C
71st PCC Meeting
1. Disturbance at 220/132 kV PCC advised JUSNL to check the JUSNL informed that
Chandil S/s on 08.08.18 at details of tripping of 220kV Chandil – zone-4 timing was
05:49 hrs. STPS S/C and also to review the reviewed and set to
zone-4 timer settings for all the lines 500 msec.
as per PCC recommendations.
2. Disturbance at 220/132 kV PCC advised BSPTCL to check the

Motipur(BSPTCL) S/s on disturbance recorders of all the lines in
15.08.18 at 13:00 hrs. 220 kV Motipur S/s and communicate
the findings to ERPC/ERLDC at the
earliest.
3. Disturbance at 400 kV Farakka PCC advised NTPC to replace/divert

S/s on 19.08.18 at 15:26 hrs. Micom P437 relay to avoid unwanted
tripping of such important transmission
line. PCC also advised to check the
reason for not sending carrier from
Farakka to Kahalgaon and non-
operation of Autorecloser.
4. Disturbance at 400 kV MPL S/s PCC advised Powergrid to share the
on 19.08.18 at 15:47 hrs. procedure/directives regarding
implementation of the POP scheme
with ERPC/ERLDC.
5. Disturbance at 400/132 kV PCC observed that there is a need of The agenda will be
Motihari(DMTCL) S/s on SPS implementation to avoid the discussed in the next
22.08.18 at 14:59 hrs. overloading of other ICT, in case of TCC meeting to be
one ICT tripped. PCC advised Bihar to held on 16.11.2018.
formulate a draft scheme of SPS and
submit it to ERLDC/ERPC for further
discussion.
70th PCC Meeting
Tripping incidences in 400 kV Dikchu informed that

Rangpo-Binaguri D/C line and the issue can be
1. subsequent operation of SPS-II PCC once again advised Dansenergy attributed to
on 10.07.18 & 30.07.18 to review the relay settings at Dikchu saturation of HV side
end to avoid unwanted tripping. CT in Generating
. Transformer. Dikchu
added that they are
going to test the CT
very soon and if
required, it will be
replaced with a new
one.
3. Repeated Grid Disturbances at PCC advised BSPTCL to check BSPTCL informed

220kV Madhepura (BSPTCL) healthiness of PLCC and enable the that the PLCC was in
S/s on 19.07.18 at 13:31 hrs. autoreclosure setting as well as the healthy condition.
carrier tripping settings for both the Regarding
lines and report to ERPC and ERLDC. autoreclosure and
carrier tripping
scheme, they
informed that they
are under process of
implementing the
same.
69th PCC Meeting:
5. Total power failure at PCC advised BSPTCL to check & BSPTCL informed
220/132 kV Sipara S/s analyse the disturbance recorders of that the busbar
(BSPTCL) on 15.06.2018 at all the feeders along with the timing of protection is now out
10:58 hrs.
relay operation and Circuit breaker of service for Sipara
opening time in order to ascertain the S/s. A new
cause of busbar relay operation. busbarprotection
system is under
implementation.
68th PCC Meeting
7. Issues related with PCC advised Powergrid to explore for Regarding inclusion
Generation Backing down inclusion of pole block with ground return of pole block with
during Talcher-Kolar SPS mode signal in the SPS logic. ground return mode
operation on 16th May 2018.
PCC advised NTPC, GMR and JITPL to signal in the SPS
ensure the generation reduction as per the logic, Powergrid
SPS logic. informed that the
issue was referred to
PCC advised NTPC also to explore for OEM.
inclusion of pole block with ground
return mode signal in the SPS logic.
8. Issue of Protection PCC advised Bhutan representatives

Coordination Observed to submit a detailed report on the
during Blackout of Tala on above disturbance to ERPC and
23rd May 2018.
ERLDC at the earliest.
9. Non-Operation of 400 kV PCC advised Powergrid to ensure the Regarding

Binaguri-Rangpo D/C SPS relevant data availability of SPS implementation of
on 9th May 2018 operation to ERLDC through SCADA. SPS through SAS,
Powergrid informed
that the installation
and testing work
have already been
completed. The SPS
through SAS will be
in service after
availing the next
shutdown.
10. Disturbance at 400/220 kV PCC advised BSPTCL and Powergrid BSPTCL informed
Biharshariff S/s on 28-03- to ensure proper relay coordination that they are in the
2018 at 18:43 hrs and 19-03- between 400kV and 220 kV system process of
2018 at 02:02 hrs.
including ICTs at Biharshariff S/s. implementing the
revised settings.
71st PCC advised BSPTCL to
configure the zone-2 timings as 250-
300 msec for the lines which do not
have PLCC operational so that a
proper relay coordination will be
ensured between ICTs and the lines.
Annexure-C9
Checklist for Submission of new transmission elements for updation in Protection Database
NAME OF ORGANISATION:
FOR THE MONTH OF:
SUBSTATION DETAIL:
Status of
Sl No DETAILS OF ELEMENTS DATA TYPE Submission Remarks
(Y/N)
1 TRANSMISSION LINE LINE LENGTH, CONDUCTOR TYPE, VOLTAGE GRADE
2 POWER TRANSFORMER NAMEPLATE DETAILS
3 GENERATOR TECHNICAL PARAMETERS
4 CURRENT TRANSFORMER NAMEPLATE DETAILS
5 VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER NAMEPLATE DETAILS
6 RELAY DATA MAKE, MODEL and FEEDER NAME
NUMERICAL RELAYS: CSV or XML file extracted from Relay
7 RELAY SETTINGS
ELECTROMECHANICAL RELAYS: SNAPSHOT of RELAY
8 REACTOR NAMEPLATE DETAILS
9 CAPACITOR NAMEPLATE DETAILS
9 UPDATED SLD
SIGNATURE:
NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE:
DESIGNATION:
CONTACT:
E-MAIL ID:

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MINUTES OF 73RD PROTECTION SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT

List of participants is at Annexure-A.

Members may confirm the minutes of 72nd PCC meeting.

Deliberation in the meeting

Generation Loss: 856 MW

Name of the elements End 1 Relay Indication End 2 Relay Indication

Powergrid may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

Load Loss: 200 MW(on 03.10.18) ;

Generation Loss: 52 MW(on 03.10.18) ;

As per PMU data, there was no fault in both the instances.

JUSNL may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

Load Loss: 160 MW

Relay indications are as follows:

Name of the elements End 1 Relay Indication End 2 Relay Indication

Powergrid may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

BSPTCL & Powergrid may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

Generation Loss: 134 MW

Relay indications are as follows:

Name of the elements End 1 Relay Indication End 2 Relay Indication

WBSETCL may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

 765KV, 240MVAR B/R 1

The detailed analysis report is attached in Annexure B.6.

Powergrid may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

73rd PCC Minutes

ITEM NO. B.7: Tripping Incidences in the month of October, 2018.

Members may discuss.

Deliberation in the meeting

Members explained the tripping incidences. Updated status is enclosed at Annexure-B7.

73rd PCC Minutes

OPTCL and OPGC may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

In 71st PCC, JUSNL was advised the details at the earliest.

JUSNL may explain.

Deliberation in the meeting

ITEM NO. C.3: FOLLOW-UP OF DECISIONS OF THE PREVIOUS PROTECTION SUB-

The decisions of previous PCC Meetings are given at Annexure-C.3.

Members may update the latest status.

Deliberation in the meeting

The updated status was given in Annexure-C.3.

73rd PCC Minutes

ITEM NO. C.4: Zone 3 settings of ISTS lines

Members may update.

Deliberation in the meeting

ITEM NO. C.5: Status of Third Party Protection Audit

Members may note.

Deliberation in the meeting

ITEM NO. C.6: Non-commissioning of PLCC / OPGW and non-implementation of carrier

73rd PCC Minutes

Owner Detail Present Status

73rd PCC Minutes

Members may update.

Deliberation in the meeting

ITEM NO. C.7: Disturbance monitoring equipment(DME) standardization

Recorders can be classified into two categories:

For FR (Fault Recorder) following points may be standardized: