2 - DBP v. Guarina PDF

9/19/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 713
G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.*

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Civil Law; Contracts; Loans; Under the law, a loan requires

the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party
to another who acquires ownership thereof, on the condition that
the same amount or quality shall be paid.—The agreement
between DBP and Guariña Corporation was a loan. Under the
law, a loan requires the delivery of money or any other
consumable object by one party to another who acquires
ownership thereof, on the condition that the same amount or
quality shall be paid. Loan is a reciprocal obligation, as it arises
from the same cause where one party is the creditor, and the
other the debtor. The obligation of one party in a reciprocal
obligation is dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the
performance should ideally be simultaneous. This means that in a
loan, the creditor should release the full loan amount and the
debtor repays it when it becomes due and demandable.
Same; Same; Mortgages; By its nature, a mortgage remains
an accessory contract dependent on the principal obligation, such
that enforcement of the mortgage contract will depend on whether
or not there has been a violation of the principal obligation.—
DBP’s actuations were legally unfounded. It is true that loans are
often secured by a mortgage constituted on real or personal
property to protect the creditor’s interest in case of the default of
the debtor. By its nature, however, a mortgage remains an
accessory contract dependent on the principal obligation, such
that enforcement of the mortgage contract will depend on whether
or not there has been a violation of the principal obligation. While
a creditor and a debtor could regulate the order in which they
should comply with their reciprocal obligations, it is presupposed
that in a loan the lender should perform its obligation — the
release of the full loan amount — before it could demand that the
borrower repay the loaned amount. In other words,
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000174ae3bfa4a20690502003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
293
Guariña Corporation would not incur in delay before DBP fully

performed its reciprocal obligation.
Mercantile Law; Banks and Banking; Being a banking
institution, DBP owed it to Guariña Corporation to exercise the
highest degree of diligence, as well as to observe the high
standards of integrity and performance in all its transactions
because its business was imbued with public interest.—Being a
banking institution, DBP owed it to Guariña Corporation to
exercise the highest degree of diligence, as well as to observe the
high standards of integrity and performance in all its transactions
because its business was imbued with public interest. The high
standards were also necessary to ensure public confidence in the
banking system, for, according to Philippine National Bank v.
Pike, 470 SCRA 328 (2005): “The stability of banks largely
depends on the confidence of the people in the honesty and
efficiency of banks.” Thus, DBP had to act with great care in
applying the stipulations of its agreement with Guariña
Corporation, lest it erodes such public confidence. Yet, DBP failed
in its duty to exercise the highest degree of diligence by
prematurely foreclosing the mortgages and unwarrantedly
causing the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties despite
Guariña Corporation not being yet in default. DBP wrongly relied
on Stipulation No. 26 as its basis to accelerate the obligation of
Guariña Corporation, for the stipulation was relevant to an
Omnibus Agricultural Loan, to Guariña Corporation’s loan which
was intended for a project other than agricultural in nature.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Law of the Case; Words and
Phrases; Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered
on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be
the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue
to be the facts of the case before the court.—Law of the case has
been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and
means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts
on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of
the case before the court. The concept of law of the
294
case is well explained in Mangold v. Bacon, an American case,

thusly: The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal
conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the general
law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribe
the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience
and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law of
the case in all other steps below or above on subsequent appeal.
The rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and reason.
Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, reagitation,
reexamination, and reformulation. In short, there would be
endless litigation. It would be intolerable if parties litigants were
allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on
the chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on
solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case. An
itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result
in the foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn
to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act like
ordinary sensible persons. The administration of justice is a
practical affair. The rule is a practical and a good one of frequent
and beneficial use.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of law of the case
simply means, that when an appellate court has once declared the
law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case
even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus
laid down may have been reversed in other cases.—The doctrine of
law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate
court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration
continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal,
notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been
reversed in other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once
the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point that
was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been
accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as
the law of the case and should not be reopened on remand of the
case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the
law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions
or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
295
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Office of the Legal Counsel for petitioner.
Marie Karen C. Jiz for respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The foreclosure of a mortgage prior to the mortgagor’s

default on the principal obligation is premature, and
should be undone for being void and ineffectual. The
mortgagee who has been meanwhile given possession of the
mortgaged property by virtue of a writ of possession issued
to it as the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may be
required to restore the possession of the property to the
mortgagor and to pay reasonable rent for the use of the
property during the intervening period.
The Case
In this appeal, Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) seeks the reversal of the adverse decision
promulgated on March 26, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491,
[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the judgment
rendered on January 6, 1998[2] by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, in Iloilo City (RTC) annulling the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the real estate and chattel mortgages at the
instance of DBP because the debtor-mortgagor, Guariña
Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation
(Guariña Corporation), had not yet defaulted on its
obligations in favor of DBP.
_______________
[1] Rollo, at pp. 36-44; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez,
Jr. (retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico
(retired) and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam (retired/deceased).
[2] CA Rollo, at pp. 23-34; penned by Judge Bartolome M. Fanuñal.
296
Antecedents
In July 1976, Guariña Corporation applied for a loan
from DBP to finance the development of its resort complex
situated in Trapiche, Oton, Iloilo. The loan, in the amount
of P3,387,000.00, was approved on August 5, 1976.[3]
Guariña Corporation executed a promissory note that
would be due on November 3, 1988.[4] On October 5, 1976,
Guariña Corporation executed a real estate mortgage over
several real properties in favor of DBP as security for the
repayment of the loan. On May 17, 1977, Guariña
Corporation executed a chattel mortgage over the personal
properties existing at the resort complex and those yet to
be acquired out of the proceeds of the loan, also to secure
the performance of the obligation.[5] Prior to the release of
the loan, DBP required Guariña Corporation to put up a
cash equity of P1,470,951.00 for the construction of the
buildings and other improvements on the resort complex.
The loan was released in several instalments, and

Guariña Corporation used the proceeds to defray the cost of
additional improvements in the resort complex. In all, the
amount released totalled P3,003,617.49, from which DBP
withheld P148,102.98 as interest.[6]
Guariña Corporation demanded the release of the
balance of the loan, but DBP refused. Instead, DBP directly
paid some suppliers of Guariña Corporation over the
latter’s objection. DBP found upon inspection of the resort
project, its developments and improvements that Guariña
Corporation had not completed the construction works.[7]
In a letter dated February 27, 1978,[8] and a telegram
dated June 9, 1978,[9] DBP thus de-
_______________
[3] Rollo, p. 37.
[4] Records, Vol. 1, p. 8.
[5] Id., at pp. 9-10.
[6] Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[7] Id., at p. 38.
[8] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 23-24.
[9] Id., at p. 25.
297
manded that Guariña Corporation expedite the completion

of the project, and warned that it would initiate foreclosure
proceedings should Guariña Corporation not do so.[10]
Unsatisfied with the non-action and objection of Guariña
Corporation, DBP initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings. A notice of foreclosure sale was sent to
Guariña Corporation. The notice was eventually published,
leading the clients and patrons of Guariña Corporation to
think that its business operation had slowed down, and
that its resort had already closed.[11]
On January 6, 1979, Guariña Corporation sued DBP in
the RTC to demand specific performance of the latter’s
obligations under the loan agreement, and to stop the
foreclosure of the mortgages (Civil Case No. 12707).[12]
However, DBP moved for the dismissal of the complaint,
stating that the mortgaged properties had already been
sold to satisfy the obligation of Guariña Corporation at a
public auction held on January 15, 1979 at the Costa Mario
Resort Beach Resort in Oton, Iloilo.[13] Due to this,
Guariña Corporation amended the complaint on February
6, 1979[14] to seek the nullification of the foreclosure
proceedings and the cancellation of the certificate of sale.
DBP filed its answer on December 17, 1979,[15] and trial

followed upon the termination of the pre-trial without any
agreement being reached by the parties.[16]
In the meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a writ
of possession by the RTC. At first, the RTC denied the
application but later granted it upon DBP’s motion for
reconsideration. Aggrieved, Guariña Corporation assailed
the granting of
_______________
[10] Rollo, p. 38.
[11] Id.
[12] Records pp. 1-7.
[13] Id., at pp. 30-31.
[14] Id., at pp. 40-46.
[15] Id., at pp. 55-57.
[16] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
298
the application before the CA on certiorari (C.A.-G.R. No.

12670-SP entitled Guariña Agricultural and Realty
Development Corporation v. Development Bank of the
Philippines). After the CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari, DBP sought the implementation of the order for
the issuance of the writ of possession. Over Guariña
Corporation’s opposition, the RTC issued the writ of
possession on June 16, 1982.[17]
Judgment of the RTC
On January 6, 1998, the RTC rendered its judgment in

Civil Case No. 12707, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby

resolves that the extra-judicial sales of the mortgaged
properties of the plaintiff by the Office of the Provincial
Sheriff of Iloilo on January 15, 1979 are null and void, so
with the consequent issuance of certificates of sale to the
defendant of said properties, the registration thereof with
the Registry of Deeds and the issuance of the transfer
certificates of title involving the real property in its name.
It is also resolved that defendant give back to the
plaintiff or its representative the actual possession and
enjoyment of all the properties foreclosed and possessed by
it. To pay the plaintiff the reasonable rental for the use of
its beach resort during the period starting from the time it
(defendant) took over its occupation and use up to the time

possession is actually restored to the plaintiff.
And, on the part of the plaintiff, to pay the defendant the
loan it obtained as soon as it takes possession and
management of the beach resort and resume its business
operation.
Furthermore, defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff’s
attorney’s fee of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[18]
_______________
[17] Id., at p. 39.
[18] CA Rollo, p. 34.
299
Decision of the CA
On appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491), DBP challenged
the judgment of the RTC, and insisted that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING DBP’S
FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTIES
AS INVALID AND UNCALLED FOR.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THE GROUNDS INVOKED BY DBP TO JUSTIFY
FORECLOSURE AS “NOT SUFFICIENT.” ON THE
CONTRARY, THE MORTGAGE WAS FORECLOSED BY
EXPRESS AUTHORITY OF PARAGRAPH NO. 4 OF THE
MORTGAGE CONTRACT AND SECTION 2 OF P.D. 385
IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTIONED PAR. NO. 26
PRINTED AT THE BACK OF THE FIRST PAGE OF THE
MORTGAGE CONRACT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SALES
OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTIES TO DBP AS
INVALID UNDER ARTICLES 2113 AND 2141 OF THE
CIVIL CODE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND
COMMITTED [REVERSIBLE] ERROR IN ORDERING
DBP TO RETURN TO PLAINTIFF THE ACTUAL
POSSESSION AND ENJOYMENT OF ALL THE
FORECLOSED PROPERTIES AND TO PAY PLAINTIFF
REASONABLE RENTAL FOR THE USE OF THE
FORECLOSED BEACH RESORT.
300
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY’S FEES AGAINST DBP WHICH MERELY
EXERCISED ITS RIGHTS UNDER THE MORTGAGE
CONTRACT.[19]
In its decision promulgated on March 26, 2003,[20]

however, the CA sustained the RTC’s judgment but deleted
the award of attorney’s fees, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision

dated January 6, 1998, rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25 in Civil Case No. 12707 for
Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the award for
attorney’s fees is deleted.
SO ORDERED.[21]
DBP timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the

CA denied its motion on October 9, 2003.
Hence, this appeal by DBP.
Issues
DBP submits the following issues for consideration,

namely:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS DATED MARCH 26, 2003 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 9, DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
WERE ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW,
PREVAILING JURISPRUDENTIAL DECISION AND
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE;
_______________
[19] Id., at pp. 49-51.
[20] Supra note 1.
[21] Rollo, p. 43.
301
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS ADHERED TO THE USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN DECIDING C.A.-G.R. CV
NO. 59491 AND THEREFORE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE “LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE.”[22]
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
1.
Findings of the CA were supported by the
evidence as well as by law and jurisprudence
DBP submits that the loan had been granted under its
supervised credit financing scheme for the development of
a beach resort, and the releases of the proceeds would be
subject to conditions that included the verification of the
progress of works in the project to forestall diversion of the
loan proceeds; and that under Stipulation No. 26 of the
mortgage contract, further loan releases would be
terminated and the account would be considered due and
demandable in the event of a deviation from the purpose of
the loan,[23] including the failure to put up the required
equity and the diversion of the loan proceeds to other
purposes.[24] It assails the declaration by the CA that
Guariña Corporation had not yet been in default in its
obligations despite violations of the terms of the mortgage
contract securing the promissory note.
Guariña Corporation counters that it did not violate the
terms of the promissory note and the mortgage contracts
because DBP had fully collected the interest
notwithstanding
_______________
[22] Id., at p. 23.
[23] Id., at p. 25.
[24] Id., at pp. 28-29.
302
that the principal obligation did not yet fall due and
become demandable.[25]
The submissions of DBP lack merit and substance.
The agreement between DBP and Guariña Corporation
was a loan. Under the law, a loan requires the delivery of
money or any other consumable object by one party to
another who acquires ownership thereof, on the condition
that the same amount or quality shall be paid.[26] Loan is a
reciprocal obligation, as it arises from the same cause
where one party is the creditor, and the other the debtor.
[27] The obligation of one party in a reciprocal obligation is
dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the
performance should ideally be simultaneous. This means
that in a loan, the creditor should release the full loan
amount and the debtor repays it when it becomes due and
demandable.[28]
In its assailed decision, the CA found and held thusly:
xxxx
x x x It is undisputed that appellee obtained a loan from
appellant, and as security, executed real estate and chattel
mortgages. However, it was never established that appellee
was already in default. Appellant, in a telegram to the
appellee reminded the latter to make good on its
construction works, otherwise, it would foreclose the
mortgage it executed. It did not mention that appellee was
already in default. The records show that appellant did not
make any demand for payment of the promissory note. It
appears that the basis of the foreclosure was not a default
on the loan but appellee’s failure to complete the project in
accordance with appellant’s standards. In fact, appellant
refused to release the remaining balance
_______________
[25] Id., at pp. 127-137.
[26] Article 1953, in relation to Article 1933, Civil Code.
[27] IV Tolentino, The Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 175 (1999).
[28] Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 192885,
July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 758, 766.
303
of the approved loan after it found that the improvements

introduced by appellee were below appellant’s expectations.
The loan agreement between the parties is a reciprocal
obligation. Appellant in the instant case bound itself to
grant appellee the loan amount of P3,387,000.00 condition
on appellee’s payment of the amount when it falls due.
Furthermore, the loan was evidenced by the promissory
note which was secured by real estate mortgage over
several properties and additional chattel mortgage.
Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same
cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of
the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon
the obligation of the other (Areola vs. Court of Appeals, 236
SCRA 643 [1994]). They are to be performed simultaneously
such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the
simultaneous fulfilment of the other (Jaime Ong vs. Court
of Appeals, 310 SCRA 1 [1999]). The promise of appellee to
pay the loan upon due date as well as to execute sufficient
security for said loan by way of mortgage gave rise to a
reciprocal obligation on the part of appellant to release the
entire approved loan amount. Thus, appellees are entitled
to receive the total loan amount as agreed upon and not an
incomplete amount.
The appellant did not release the total amount of the

approved loan. Appellant therefore could not have made a
demand for payment of the loan since it had yet to fulfil its
own obligation. Moreover, the fact that appellee was not yet
in default rendered the foreclosure proceedings premature
and improper.
The properties which stood as security for the loan were
foreclosed without any demand having been made on the
principal obligation. For an obligation to become due, there
must generally be a demand. Default generally begins from
the moment the creditor demands the performance of the
obligation. Without such demand, judicial or extrajudicial,
the effects of default will not arise (Namarco vs. Federation
of United Namarco Distributors,
304
Inc., 49 SCRA 238 [1973]; Borje vs. CFI of Misamis

Occidental, 88 SCRA 576 [1979]).
xxxx
Appellant also admitted in its brief that it indeed failed
to release the full amount of the approved loan. As a
consequence, the real estate mortgage of appellee becomes
unenforceable, as it cannot be entirely foreclosed to satisfy
appellee’s total debt to appellant (Central Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 46 [1985]).
Since the foreclosure proceedings were premature and
unenforceable, it only follows that appellee is still entitled
to possession of the foreclosed properties. However,
appellant took possession of the same by virtue of a writ of
possession issued in its favor during the pendency of the
case. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled when it ordered
appellant to return actual possession of the subject
properties to appellee or its representative and to pay
appellee reasonable rents.
However, the award for attorney’s fees is deleted. As a
rule, the award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather
than the rule and counsel’s fees are not to be awarded every
time a party wins a suit. Attorney’s fees cannot be recovered
as part of damages because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate (Pimentel vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 307 SCRA 38 [1999]).[29]
xxxx
We uphold the CA.

To start with, considering that the CA thereby affirmed
the factual findings of the RTC, the Court is bound to
uphold such findings, for it is axiomatic that the trial
court’s factual findings as affirmed by the CA are binding

on appeal due to the Court not being a trier of facts.
_______________
[29] Supra note 1, at pp. 41-43.
305
Secondly, by its failure to release the proceeds of the

loan in their entirety, DBP had no right yet to exact on
Guariña Corporation the latter’s compliance with its own
obligation under the loan. Indeed, if a party in a reciprocal
contract like a loan does not perform its obligation, the
other party cannot be obliged to perform what is expected
of it while the other’s obligation remains unfulfilled.[30] In
other words, the latter party does not incur delay.[31]
Still, DBP called upon Guariña Corporation to make
good on the construction works pursuant to the
acceleration clause written in the mortgage contract (i.e.,
Stipulation No. 26),[32] or else it would foreclose the
mortgages.
DBP’s actuations were legally unfounded. It is true that
loans are often secured by a mortgage constituted on real
or personal property to protect the creditor’s interest in
case of the default of the debtor. By its nature, however, a
mortgage remains an accessory contract dependent on the
principal obligation,[33] such that enforcement of the
mortgage contract will depend on whether or not there has
been a violation of the principal obligation. While a creditor
and a debtor could regulate the order in which they should
comply with their
_______________
[30] Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126083, July 12, 2006, 494
SCRA 570, 576.
[31] Article 1169, Civil Code; IV Tolentino, op. cit., at p. 109.
[32] Records, Volume 2, at p. 646-a.
Stipulation No. 26 reads:
26. That the Mortgagee reserves the right to reduce or stop
releases/advances if after inspection and verification the accomplishment of the
financed project does not justify giving the full amount, or if the conditions of
the project do not show improvement commensurate with the amount already
advanced/released. In such an event or in the event of abandonment of the
project, all advances/releases made shall automatically become due and
demandable and the Mortgagee shall take such legal steps as are necessary to
protect its interest.
[33] Rigor v. Consolidated Orix Leasing and Financing Corporation,

387 SCRA 437, 444 (2002).
306
reciprocal obligations, it is presupposed that in a loan the

lender should perform its obligation — the release of the
full loan amount — before it could demand that the
borrower repay the loaned amount. In other words,
Guariña Corporation would not incur in delay before DBP
fully performed its reciprocal obligation.[34]
Considering that it had yet to release the entire
proceeds of the loan, DBP could not yet make an effective
demand for payment upon Guariña Corporation to perform
its obligation under the loan. According to Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Licuanan,[35] it would only be
when a demand to pay had been made and was
subsequently refused that a borrower could be considered
in default, and the lender could obtain the right to collect
the debt or to foreclose the mortgage. Hence, Guariña
Corporation would not be in default without the demand.
Assuming that DBP could already exact from the latter
its compliance with the loan agreement, the letter dated
February 27, 1978 that DBP sent would still not be
regarded as a demand to render Guariña Corporation in
default under the principal contract because DBP was only
thereby requesting the latter “to put up the deficiency in
the value of improvements.”[36]
Under the circumstances, DBP’s foreclosure of the
mortgage and the sale of the mortgaged properties at its
instance were premature, and, therefore, void and
ineffectual.[37]
Being a banking institution, DBP owed it to Guariña
Corporation to exercise the highest degree of diligence, as
well as
_______________
[34] Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. United
Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 165662, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 125,
138.
[35] G.R. No. 150097, February 26, 2007, 516 SCRA 644.
[36] Supra note 8.
[37] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Licuanan, supra, note 35,
at p. 654.
307
to observe the high standards of integrity and performance

in all its transactions because its business was imbued
with public interest.[38] The high standards were also
necessary to ensure public confidence in the banking
system, for, according to Philippine National Bank v. Pike:
[39] “The stability of banks largely depends on the
confidence of the people in the honesty and efficiency of
banks.” Thus, DBP had to act with great care in applying
the stipulations of its agreement with Guariña
Corporation, lest it erodes such public confidence. Yet, DBP
failed in its duty to exercise the highest degree of diligence
by prematurely foreclosing the mortgages and
unwarrantedly causing the foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged properties despite Guariña Corporation not
being yet in default. DBP wrongly relied on Stipulation No.
26 as its basis to accelerate the obligation of Guariña
Corporation, for the stipulation was relevant to an
Omnibus Agricultural Loan, to Guariña Corporation’s loan
which was intended for a project other than agricultural in
nature.
Even so, Guariña Corporation did not elevate the
actionability of DBP’s negligence to the CA, and did not
also appeal the CA’s deletion of the award of attorney’s fees
allowed by the RTC. With the decision of the CA
consequently becoming final and immutable as to Guariña
Corporation, we will not delve any further on DBP’s
actionable actuations.
_______________
[38] Comsavings Bank (now GSIS Family Savings Bank) v. Capistrano,
G.R. No. 170942, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 72; citing Philippine
National Bank v. Chea Chee Chong, G.R. Nos. 170865 and 170892, April
25, 2012, 671 SCRA 49, 62-63; Solidbank Corporation v. Arrieta, G.R. No.
152720, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 711, 720; and Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121413,
121479 and 128604, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 446, 472.
[39] G.R. No. 157845, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 328, 347.
308
2.
The doctrine of law of the case
did not apply herein
DBP insists that the decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R. No.

12670-SP already constituted the law of the case. Hence,
the CA could not decide the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
59491 differently.
Guariña Corporation counters that the ruling in C.A.-

G.R. No. 12670-SP did not constitute the law of the case
because C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP concerned the issue of
possession by DBP as the winning bidder in the foreclosure
sale, and had no bearing whatsoever to the legal issues
presented in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically,
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court.[40]
The concept of law of the case is well explained in
Mangold v. Bacon,[41] an American case, thusly:
The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal

conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the
general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not
only prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court
to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become
and remain the law of the case in all
_______________
[40] Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246
SCRA 540, 559, citing People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992, 999 (1958).
[41] 237 Mo. 496, cited and quoted in Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 747,
750 (1919).
309
other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule

is grounded on convenience, experience, and reason.
Without the rule there would be no end to criticism,
reagitation, reexamination, and reformulation. In short,
there would be endless litigation. It would be intolerable if
parties litigants were allowed to speculate on changes in the
personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting
propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and
handed down as the law of a given case. An itch to reopen
questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in the
foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn
to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to
act like ordinary sensible persons. The administration of
justice is a practical affair. The rule is a practical and a
good one of frequent and beneficial use.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore,

that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a
case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case
even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule
thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases.[42]
For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate
court has issued a pronouncement on a point that was
presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having
been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be
regarded as the law of the case and should not be reopened
on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case,
like damages.[43] But the law of the case, as the name
implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby
adjudicated in the former appeal.
The foregoing understanding of the concept of the law of
the case exposes DBP’s insistence to be unwarranted.
To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP’s
application for the issuance of the writ of possession was
entirely independent from the judicial demand for specific
performance herein. In fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP, being
the interlocu-
_______________
[42] Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 747, 750 (1919).
[43] Bachrach Motor Co. v. Esteva, 67 Phil. 16 (1938).
310
tory appeal concerning the issuance of the writ of

possession while the main case was pending, was not at all
intertwined with any legal issue properly raised and
litigated in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491, which was the appeal
to determine whether or not DBP’s foreclosure was valid
and effectual. And, secondly, the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No.
12670-SP did not settle any question of law involved herein
because this case for specific performance was not a
continuation of C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was limited
to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession in
favor of DBP), and vice versa.
3.
Guariña Corporation is legally entitled to the
restoration of the possession of the resort complex
and payment of reasonable rentals by DBP
Having found and pronounced that the extrajudicial
foreclosure by DBP was premature, and that the ensuing
foreclosure sale was void and ineffectual, the Court affirms
the order for the restoration of possession to Guariña
Corporation and the payment of reasonable rentals for the

use of the resort. The CA properly held that the premature
and invalid foreclosure had unjustly dispossessed Guariña
Corporation of its properties. Consequently, the restoration
of possession and the payment of reasonable rentals were
in accordance with Article 561 of the Civil Code, which
expressly states that one who recovers, according to law,
possession unjustly lost shall be deemed for all purposes
which may redound to his benefit to have enjoyed it
without interruption.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on March 26, 2003; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr. and

Reyes, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.

311
Notes.—It is a basic legal principle that whatever is

once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or
decision between the same parties in the case continues to
be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court. (Albaña vs. Belo, 602 SCRA 140 [2009])
The principle of the law of the case holds that whatever
has been irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule between the parties in a case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be facts of the case before the Court. (Penta
Capital Finance Corporation vs. Bay, 663 SCRA 192 [2012])
——o0o——
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9/19/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 713

G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.*

Civil Law; Contracts; Loans; Under the law, a loan requires

Guariña Corporation would not incur in delay before DBP fully

case is well explained in Mangold v. Bacon, an American case,

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The foreclosure of a mortgage prior to the mortgagor’s

The loan was released in several instalments, and

manded that Guariña Corporation expedite the completion

DBP filed its answer on December 17, 1979,[15] and trial

the application before the CA on certiorari (C.A.-G.R. No.

Judgment of the RTC

On January 6, 1998, the RTC rendered its judgment in

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby

(defendant) took over its occupation and use up to the time

In its decision promulgated on March 26, 2003,[20]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision

DBP timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the

DBP submits the following issues for consideration,

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

In its assailed decision, the CA found and held thusly:

of the approved loan after it found that the improvements

The appellant did not release the total amount of the

Inc., 49 SCRA 238 [1973]; Borje vs. CFI of Misamis

We uphold the CA.

court’s factual findings as affirmed by the CA are binding

Secondly, by its failure to release the proceeds of the

[33] Rigor v. Consolidated Orix Leasing and Financing Corporation,

reciprocal obligations, it is presupposed that in a loan the

to observe the high standards of integrity and performance

DBP insists that the decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R. No.

Guariña Corporation counters that the ruling in C.A.-

The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal

other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule

The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore,

tory appeal concerning the issuance of the writ of

Corporation and the payment of reasonable rentals for the

Sereno (CJ.), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr. and

Notes.—It is a basic legal principle that whatever is

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