Marsilio Ficino Platonic Theology Volume 3 Books Ix Xi I Tatti Renaissance Library 2003 2 PDF

THE I TATTI R E N A I S S A N C E LIBRARY
James Hankins, General Editor
Editorial Board
Michael J. B. Allen
Brian P. Copenhaver
Vincenzo Fera
f Albinia de la Mare
Claudio Leonardi
Walther Ludwig
Nicholas Mann
Silvia Bdzzo
Advisory Committee
Joseph Connors, Chairman
Robert Black David Marsh

fLeonard Boyle John Monfasani
Virginia Brown John O'Malley
Salvatore Camporeale David Quint
Caroline Elam Christine Smith
Arthur Field Rita Sturlese
Anthony Grafton Francesco Tateo
Hanna Gray Mirko Tavoni
tCecil Grayson J> B* Trapp
Ralph Hexter Carlo Vecce
Jill Kraye Ronald Witt
Francesco Lo Monaco Jan Ziolkowski
[fiffilB
mBamaBm
ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
M I C H A E L J+ B. A L L E N
with John Warden
LATIN TEXT EDITED BY
JAMES HANKINS
with William Bowen
THE I TATTI R E N A I S S A N C E LIBRARY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
LONDON,ENGLAND
2003
Copyright © 2003 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
Series design by Dean Bornstein
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ficino, Marsilio, 1433-1499.

[Theologia Platonica. English & Latin]
Platonic theology / Marsilio Ficino ; English translation by Michael J.B. Allen
with John Warden ; Latin text edited by James Hankins with William Bowen.
p. cm. — (The I Tatti Renaissance library ; 2)
Includes bibliographical references (v. 1, p. ) and index.
Contents: v. 1. Books I-IV. v. 2. Books V - V I I I . v. 3. Books I X - X L
ISBN 0-674-00345-4 (v. I : alk. paper)
ISBN 0-674-00764-6 (v. 2 : alk. paper)
ISBN 0-674-01065-5 (v. 3 : alk, paper)
i.Plato. 2. Soul. 3. Immortality. I. Allen, Michael J. B.
II. Warden, John, 1936- III. Hankins, James.
IV. Bowen, William R.
V. Title. VI. Series.
B785.F433 T53 2001
186'.4 — dc2i 00-053491
Contents
Book I X 8
Book X 106
Book X I 198
Notes to the Text 333

Notes to the Translation
Bibliography 357
Index 359
T H E O L O G I A PLATONICA
DE IMMORTALITATE
ANIMORUM
Capitula librorum Theologiae
de immortalitate animorum
Marsilii Ficini Florentini
divisae in libros xvni
Nonus liber. Quod sit immortalis efficacius non modo ex eo

quod est indivisibilis, sed etiam ex eo quod a corpore non
depended
Cap. i Probatur per rationalem virtutem animam non

modo esse formam individuam, verumetiam a
corpore non pendere, ut evidentius immortalitas
demonstretur. Prima ratio: quia mens reflectitur in
se ipsam.
Cap. II Secunda ratio: mens quo magis separatur a corpore,
eo melius se habet.
Cap. HI Tertia ratio: mens repugnat corpori.

Cap. iv Quarta ratio: anima libere operatur.
Cap. v Quinta ratio: mens absque corpore operatur.

Cap. vi Sexta ratio: anima convenit partim cum divinis,
partim vero cum brutis.
Cap. vn Obiectio Epicureorum et responsio de rerum

temper atione.
Decimus liber. Quod sit immortalis quantum ad ordinem rerum.
Cap. i Prima ratio: sicut ultimum in ordine corporum est

incorruptibile, sic et ultimum in ordine mentium.
Cap. ii Obiectio Epicuri et responsio de rerum serie.
2
The Theology on the Immortality of Souls
by Marsilio Ficino the Florentine
Divided into Eighteen Books:
Chapter Headings
Ninth Book: What is immortal is more efficacious not only

because it is indivisible, but also because it is not dependent
on the body.
Chapter i To demonstrate more clearly its immortality, the soul

is proved by way of the rational power to be not only
undivided but independent of the body. First proof:
that the mind reflects upon itself.
Chapter 2 Second proof: the more the mind is separated from

the body, the better its condition.
Chapter 3 Third proof: the mind resists the body.
Chapter 4 Fourth proof: the soul acts freely.
Chapter 5 Fifth proof: the mind operates without the body.
Chapter 6 Sixth proof: the soul conforms partly with things

divine, but partly with animals.
Chapter 7 An objection from the Epicureans and its rebuttal.

On the tempering of things.
Tenth Book: That the soul is immortal in respect of

the natural order.
Chapter 1 First proof: as the last in the order of bodies is

incorruptible, so is the last in the order of minds.
Chapter 2 Epicurus objection and its rebuttal. On the chain of

being.
3
• FICINO •
Cap. HI Secunda ratio: sicut in rebus naturalibus fit

resolutio1 ad primam materiam immortalem, sic ad
formam ultimam immortalem.
Cap. iv Obiectio Epicuri et responsio de formis deo

simillimis.
Cap. v Responsio planior de formarum gradibus.
Cap. vi Obiectio Lucretii et responsio, quod mens potest

absque corpore operari.
Cap. vn Obiectio Epicuri et responsio, quod deus non facit
mentem nisi ex seipso et per seipsum.
Cap. VIII Obiectio Panaetii et responsio, quod anima sine

medio est ex deo.
Cap. ix Tertia ratio: quale est obiectum, talis est potentia.
Undecimus liber. Quod sit immortalis in quantum unitur cum

obiectis aeternis, et species inde accipit absolutas.
Cap. i Prima ratio: mens unitur obiecto perpetuo et species

suscipit absolutas rationesque sempiternas.
Cap. II Obiectio Epicureorum2 et responsio. De unione

mentis cum speciebus absolutis et rationibus
sempiternis.
Cap. HI Obiectio Epicuri et responsio, quod species innatae

sunt menti.
4
• PLATONIC THEOLOGY •
Chapter 3 Second proof: as resolution reverts in natural objects

to prime immortal matter, so it reverts to ultimate
immortal form.
Chapter 4 Epicurus' objection and a response to it. On the

forms most resembling God.
Chapter 5 A more detailed response concerning the levels of
the forms.
Chapter 6 Lucretius' objection and its refutation. That the

mind can act without the body.
Chapter 7 Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal. That God does
not make mind except from Himself and through
Himself.
Chapter 8 Panaetius' objection and its rebuttal. That the soul

comes from God without any intermediary.
Chapter 9 Third proof: as is the object, so is the power.
Eleventh Book: that the soul is immortal insofar as it unites with

eternal objects and receives the immaterial species from them.
Chapter 1 First proof: the mind is united with an eternal object

and receives the immaterial species and the
everlasting rational principles.
Chapter 2 An Epicurean objection and its rebuttal. On the

union of the mind with the immaterial species and
eternal rational principles.
Chapter 3 Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal. The species are
innate in the mind.
5
• FICINO •
Cap. iv Confirmatio superiorum atque insuper de ideis.

Cap. v Confirmatio superiorum per signa.
Cap. vi Ratio secunda: mens est subiectum veritatis
aeternae.
Cap. vn Obiectio Scepticorum et responsio, quod aliquid

certum sciatur.
Cap. VIII Obiectio Peripateticorum et responsio, quod Veritas

animum familiar iter habitat.
6
Chapter 4 Confirmation of the above. Further discussion of the

Ideas.
Chapter 5 Confirmation of the above by way of signs.

Chapter 6 Second proof: the mind is the subject of eternal
truth.
Chapter 7 An objection from the Skeptics and its rebuttal.
Knowledge of something certain is possible.
Chapter 8 An objection from the Peripatetics and its rebuttal.

That the truth is at home in the soul.
7
LIBER NONUS 1
: I :
Probatur per rationalem virtutem animam non modo esse

formam individuam, verumetiam a corpore non pendere,
ut evidentius immortalitas demonstretur.
Prima ratio: quia mens reflectitur in seipsam.
1 Hactenus probavimus per virtutem rationalem animam esse for-

mam individuam immortalemque. Deinceps probandum est earn a
corpore non pendere, unde proprie concluditur immortalitas.
2 Res divisibiles in seipsas minime reflectuntun At si quis dixerit
rem aliquam divisibilem in se revolvi, sic statim interrogabimus:
utrum pars huius rei alia vertatur in aliam, an pars in totam, an
tota in partem, an tota potius in ipsam totam? Si datur primum,
non aliquid idem vertitur in seipsum, cum inter se diversae sint
partes. Si secundum conceditur aut tertium, sequitur idem. Aliud
enim pars est, aliud totumu Solus restare videtur modus quartus,
id est quod totum vertatur in totum. Hoc non aliter quam si om-
nes partes vertantur in omnes. Esto. Tandem nos, conversione
huiusmodi facta, quaeremus utrum pars aliqua in ea re remaneat
extra aliam vel ab alia discrepans, an nulla? Si remaneat, alia pars
in hoc erit situ vel modo, in illo alia, atque ita in se invicem
conversae nondum erunt; sin nulla, certe nulla in ea re pars dista-
bit discrepabitve a parte. Quod tale est, individuum est omnino,
ita ut neque ex partibus quantitatis, neque ex materia et forma
8
BOOK IX
: I :
To demonstrate more clearly its immortality, the soul is proved

by way of the rational power to be not only undivided but
independent of the body •
First proof: that the mind reflects upon itself
By way of the rational power we have thus far proved that the soul i
is an undivided and immortal form. We must next prove that it
does not depend on the body; and from this we can properly con-
clude its immortality.
Divisible things do not reflect upon themselves. But if someone 2
were to argue that some divisible thing does reflect upon itself, we
will immediately ask: Is one part of this object reflecting upon an-
other, or a part upon the whole, or the whole upon a part, or the
whole rather upon its whole self? If the first, then the same part is
not reflecting upon itself, since parts differ among themselves. If
the second or third, the same conclusion follows, for a part is one
thing, the whole another. Apparently, the fourth possibility is the
only one left: that the whole is reflecting upon the whole. This is
tantamount to saying that all the parts are reflecting upon all the
parts. Grant this. But after such reflecting is complete, let us then
ask whether in the object some part remains outside another part
or differs from another, or whether no part does? If a part re-
mains, then one part will exist in this position or in this manner,
another part in that, and so they will not yet be reflecting in turn
upon each other. But if no part remains, then assuredly no one
part in that object will be separate, or be distinguished, from an-
other. This object is so entirely indivisible that it is constituted
9
constituatur. Itaque aut non reflectitur res aliqua in seipsam aut, si

reflectitur, est individua.
3 Animam in se revolvi modis quatuor alias diximus, scilicet per
intellectum in naturam suam, quando quaerit, invenit conside-
ratque seipsam, per voluntatem in naturam eandem, quando se
afFectat et amat, per intellectum in actum ipsum intellegendi,
quando et rem intellegit et se intellegit intellegere, per voluntatem
in voluntatis actum, quando et vult aliquid, et vult se velle. Atque
has rotas quatuor Plato animae currui tribuit, et hunc esse fontem
ilium quadruplicem arbitror naturae perpetuae, quem Pythagoras
inquit animae hominum ab love tributum. Si nulla res dividua re-
meat in seipsam, profecto nostra haec quadriga rationalis, quae per
rotas quatuor in se recurrit, atque ipse fons intimus, qui per qua-
tuor gurgites refluit in se ipsum, simplex est et prorsus indivisibi-
lis. Huiusmodi vero conversio non est a corpore ad corpus, sed ab
anima est ad animam, quae et2 ex multis aliis supra, et hie ex
eo probata est indivisibilis esse, quod in se redeat. Quapropter
conversio talis a corpore libera est, cum neque exordiatur ab ipso,
neque in ipsum regrediatur. Multo magis animae substantia libera
est a corpore, si conversio, quae eius est motus, est a corpore li-
bera. Itaque rationalis anima nullo modo pendet ex corpore in es-
sendo, sicut neque in movendo et operando.
4 Item, si per operationem in se reflectitur, reflectitur etiam per
essentiam. Ita essentia animae in se convertitur. Quo autem
cuiusque rei conversio fit, illinc est et profectio atque contra. Igitur
ex se est anima quae in se vertitur. Ex se, inquam, tribus praecipue
modis. Primo secundum formam, quia per formam aliam non for-
matur; alioquin non ad se, sed ad illam recurreret. Deinde secun-
dum fundamentum, quia non sustinetur ab alio. Non enim inniti-
10
• B O O K IX • C H A P T E R III •
neither from quantitative parts nor from matter and form. There-
fore an object either does not reflect upon itself, or, if it does, it is
indivisible.
Elsewhere we said that the soul reflects upon itself in four ways: 3
through the intellect upon its own nature when it seeks, finds, and
considers itself; through the will upon the same nature when it de-
sires and loves itself; through the intellect upon the very act of un-
derstanding when it understands an object and understands it is
understanding; and through the will upon the act of the will when
it wills something and wills itself to will. Plato attributes these
four wheels to the souls chariot;1 and I think that this is that four-
fold fountain of perpetual nature, the fountain which Pythagoras
says was granted by Jupiter to the soul of men.2 If no divided thing
reflects upon itself, then our rational four-horse chariot, which
turns upon itself via its four wheels, and the fountain itself within,
which flows back upon itself by way of its four streams, is simple
and completely indivisible. But reflection of this kind does not
turn back from body to body, but from soul to soul; and the soul
has been proved, both by the many earlier arguments and by this
argument here, to be indivisible because it reflects upon itself. So
self-reflection is free of the body, since it neither begins from nor
returns to it. The souls substance is even freer of the body, if its
reflection, which is its motion, is free of the body. Hence the ratio-
nal soul, in being as in moving and in doing, does not depend in
any way on the body.
Again, if the soul reflects upon itself via its operation, it also 4
does so via its essence. So the souls essence reflects upon itself.
But each things turning back is linked to its setting out and the
reverse. So the soul which reflects upon itself exists from itself,
and exists from itself principally in three ways: firstly in terms of
its form, because it is not being formed via another form (other-
wise it would return not to itself but to that form); secondly in
terms of its foundation, because it is not being sustained by an-
11
tur alteri forma haec, quae sibimet innititur, quando adnititur ad

seipsam. Tertio secundum simplicitatem, quia non constat ex par-
tibus. Nam quo pacto explicatur ea forma per partium superfi-
ciem, quae in suum centrum penitus replicatur? Quod ita est ex
se, est semper, quoniam quod desinit esse, id aut quia a causa for-
matrice derelinquitur, aut quia a fundamento deseritur, aut quia
dissolvitur in partes, esse desinit. Quod vero ad seipsam converti-
tur, quia individuum est, non dissolvitur, quia sui ipsius est forma,
a formatrice causa non relinquitur,3 quia in seipso manet, num-
quam a fundamento deseritur.
: II :
Secunda ratio: mens quo magis separatur

a corpore, eo melius se babet4
1 Si anima5 originem ullam a corpore traheret, quanto coniunctius

haereret corpori, tanto melius se haberet. Quaelibet enim res ab
origine sua servatur atque perficitur. Nunc vero contra6 contingit.
2 Praestantissimae animae partes7 sunt intellectus atque voluntas.
Quando circa corporalia occupamur, intellectus aut nihil cernit
omnino aut non sincere discernit, sensibus et phantasia deceptus;8
voluntas affligitur, dum multis inde vexatur curis.9 Contra, quando
corporalia despicit et, sopitis sensibus expulsisque phantasmatum
nubibus,10 animus per se aliquid speculatur, tunc intellectus sin-
cere discernit claretque11 maxime. Quod etiam in his apparet qui
aut per somni quietem12 aut aliam quamvis alienationem a corpore
12
• BOOK IX • C H A P T E RIII•
other (for this form which is resting on itself when it strives for it-
self does not rest on another form); and thirdly in terms of its
simplicity, because it is not compounded from parts (for how can
that form be unfolding across a surface of parts when it is wholly
folding back upon its own center?). What thus comes from itself
exists forever, because, when something stops existing, it stops ei-
ther because it is being abandoned by its forming cause, or because
it is losing its foundation, or because it is being dissolved into
parts. But what turns back upon itself, because it is undivided, is
not dissolved; and because it is the form of itself, it is not aban-
doned by the forming cause; and because it remains in itself, it is
never without its foundation.
: II :
Second proof: the more the mind is separated

from the body, the better its condition•
If the soul took its origin in any way from the body, then the more i
closely it was united with the body, the better would be its condi-
tion. For every thing is preserved and perfected by its origin. But
in reality the contrary happens.
The soul's most outstanding parts are the intellect and the will. 2
When we are preoccupied with corporeals, the intellect either per-
ceives nothing at all or does not discern truly, since it is deceived
by the senses and by the phantasy; and the will is afflicted so long
as it is vexed by many bodily cares. Contrariwise, when the soul
despises corporeals and when the senses have been allayed and the
clouds of phantasmata dissipated, and it perceives something on
its own, then the intellect discerns truly and is at its brightest. We
see this in the case of those who prophesy during the quiet of
13
vaticinantur. Ideo nonnulli, ut in Critone et Apologia inquit Plato,

prope mortem cum sunt, futura praedicunt, quasi tunc ilia videant
in supernis numinibus13 praescripta, quibus suapte natura iungitur
animus, modo non impediatur14 a corpore. Unde Socrates, tractus
a falsis accusatoribus in iudicium, primo praedixit iudicibus futu-
ram paenitentiam, accusatoribus ruinam, civitati seditionem,
deinde in carcere mortis suae diem praesignavit, monstratum sibi a
numine per quietem. Ita Theramenes, cum esset coniectus in car-
cerem biberetque venenum, Critiae adversario suo proximam mor-
tem est auguratus, quae brevi consecuta est. Rhodius quidam mo-
riens, ut scribit Posidonius Stoicus, sex aequales nominavit
dixitque qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinceps moriturus
esset. Scribit et Aristoteles Eudemum Cyprium familiarem suum,
cum venisset Pheras, Thessaliae oppidum, graviter aegrotasse,
eique visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem, qui diceret fore ut
brevi convalesceret, paucisque diebus Alexander oppidi illius ty-
rannus interiret, ipseque Eudemus quinquennio post domum redi-
ret; paulo post convaluisse ilium, tyrannum fuisse interemptum,
Eudemum peracto quinquennio obiisse atque ita eius animam in
patriam remeasse. Nonne Callanus Indus iam iam moriturus ci-
tam Alexandro regi mortem praenuntiavit et Pherecides Syrus
moriens Ephesiis victoriam contra Magnesios vaticinatus est? Le-
guntur alia multa generis eiusdem. Non solum vero intellectus,
dum seorsum a corporis contagione vivimus, cernit multa per-
spicue, sed et voluntas impletur, neque perturbationibus ullis affli-
gitur, sed divinis gaudet summopere tamquam sibi simillimis.
3 Hinc sequitur non esse corpus originem animi,15 si16 quo Ion-
gius animus17 discedit ab illo, eo se perfectius habet. Sequitur et
14
• B O O K IX • C H A P T E RIII•
sleep or some other alienation from the body. Hence many, as

Plato declares in the Crito and Apology,3 as they approach death
predict future events: it as if they saw at that moment those events
written beforehand in the higher spirits to which the rational soul
is naturally joined if only it is not impeded by the body.4 Whence
Socrates, having been brought to judgment by false accusers, first
predicted to the judges their future penitence, to his accusers their
downfall, and to the state sedition; and then in prison he an-
nounced beforehand that the day of his death had been shown
him by a spirit during repose. Thus Theramenes, when he had
been cast into prison and was drinking the poison, predicted to
his adversary Critias that his death was nigh, which happened a
short time later.5 Posidonius the Stoic writes that a dying citizen
of Rhodes called out the names of six contemporaries and declared
who among them would die first, who second, and so on.6 Aris-
totle too writes that his friend Eudemus of Cyprus, when he had
arrived at the city of Phaerae in Thessaly, fell gravely ill and saw
in his sleep a youth of surpassing beauty who declared that he
would shortly recover; that Alexander, the tyrant of that city,
would die in a few days; and that Eudemus himself would return
home five years later. Aristotle says that Eudemus did improve a
little afterwards, that the tyrant was killed, and that Eudemus died
five years later and thus his soul returned to its native soil!7 Didn't
Callanus the Indian when he was on the point of dying predict
a speedy death to the king, Alexander [the Great],8 and the dy-
ing Pherecydes of Syros prophesy to the Ephesians a victory over
the Magnesians?9 One can read many other accounts of the same
kind. But not only does the intellect see many things clearly when
we live apart from the bodys contagion, but the will too is
fulfilled: it is no longer afflicted by any disturbing passions but ar-
dently rejoices in things divine as in things most resembling itself.
It follows that the body is not the origin of the rational soul, if 3
the further away the soul travels from it, the more perfect its con-
15
hoc, si quanto magis mens in hoc corpus mergitur,18 tanto deficit

magis, et quo discedit longius, eo magis et proficit, tunc fore per-
fectissimam mentem, quando19 penitus20 ab hoc corpore evolaverit.
Non est autem inde interims, unde summa perfectio, sed integra
vita, usque adeo ut sit perpetua. Qua21 enim mutatione animus
umquam deficiet, quando non perit exeundo e corpore, qua22 nulla
ipsi23 maior potest esse mutatio?
: III :
Tertia ratio: mens repugnat corporis
1 Nulla res sponte sua potest suae origini repugnare. Alioquin

sponte ad sui ipsius24 ferretur25 interitum qui necessario sequitur,
origine perdita. Quinetiam quicquid effectus aliquis operatur,26
suae originis vi et auxilio facit. Si ergo adversus causam pugnaret,
in ea colluctatione causa ilia sibi ipsi adversaretur.27 Anima repu-
gnat adversaturque28 corpori nostro, immo corporibus omnibus.
Igitur a nullo corpore ducit originem.
2 Duo praecipua sunt illius officia: speculari et consultare. In
utroque repugnat corporibus. Primum videamus quomodo repu-
gnat in speculando. Multis quotidie modis externa corpora varie
disposita nostri corporis instrumenta sensibus assignata ita mo-
vent ut ad tempus fallant. Quam fallaciam emendat et corrigit29
ratio, ut alias diffusius enarravimus, ubi ratio aliter iudicat quam
aut externum corpus annuat, aut corpus proprium nuntiet, ac
saepe iudicat modo contrario. Qua in re tam sui corporis quam
16
• BOOK IX • C H A P T E R III •
dition. It follows too that, if the more the mind is immersed in

this body the more it is enfeebled, and the more distant it is the
more it is perfect, then the mind will be most perfect when it has
soared completely beyond this body. Total perfection, however,
does not have the same origin as death: it is life in its entirety, so
entire as to be perpetual. Will the rational soul become enfeebled
in this change of its condition when it does not perish in exiting
the body, given that no more radical change than this is possible
for it?10
: III :
Third proof: the mind resists the body•
No thing can oppose its origin of its own accord, otherwise it i

would be voluntarily borne towards its own death which necessar-
ily follows once its origin is lost. Moreover, whatever some effect
achieves, it accomplishes by the force and aid of its origin. So if it
fought against its cause, in the struggle the cause would be fighting
against itself. The soul opposes and fights against our body, or
rather against all bodies. Therefore it does not originate from any
body.11
The soul's principal offices are two: to contemplate and to de- 2
liberate. In both it opposes bodies. First let us see how it opposes
them in the process of contemplation. Daily and in many ways, ex-
ternal bodies, variously disposed as they are, so move our body's
instruments, those allotted to the senses, that for the moment
they beguile them. The reason amends and corrects the deception,
as we have elaborated elsewhere, when it arrives at a judgment
differing from that indicated by an external body or announced by
its own body; and often it judges in an opposite way. In this it
17
aliorum damnat affectionem, Mittamus in praesentia ceterarum

rerum speculationes, accipiamus summam summi contemplation
nem, ut cognoscamus quantum in ea mens naturam redarguat
corporalem* Phantasia sensus externos sequitur, sensus corporis
sui aliorumque corporum dispositionem* Quapropter sensuum et
phantasiae iudicium corporum dispositioni tribuimus dicimusque
ipsum secundum affectionem fieri corporalem* Quando animus
noster, quid deus sit cupiens invenire, a magistris huiusmodi scis-
citatur, phantasia praeceptor et faber nimium temerarius statuam
aliquam machinatur ex quinque materiis, quas aliarum omnium
pulcherrimas externi sensus ipsi obtulerint, acceptas a mundo, eo
tamen pacto ut materias illas excellentiores reddat quodammodo
quam a mundo per sensus acceperit*30 Offert igitur phantasia no-
bis lumen adeo clarum ut nullum aliud videri possit fulgentius,
adeo ingens ut nullum amplius, ac ferme per immensum inane31
diffusum, quod innumerabilibus sit coloribus exornatum et in cir-
culum revolvatur (ob quam revolutionem dulcissimis resonet mo-
dulis tam implentibus quam demulcentibus aures). Iucundissimis
redoleat odoribus, saporibus quoque omnibus abundet, qui pos-
sint effingi omnium suavissimi, tactu molle mirum in modum, de-
licatum, lene et temperatum. Hunc esse deum praedicat phanta-
sia. Nihil dat nobis pulchrius mundi corpus. Nihil corporeus
sensus aut attingit melius aut nuntiat excellentius. Nihil arnica
sensuum phantasia effingit sublimius.
3 Sed ratio interim e summa mentis specula despiciens phan-
tasiae ludos, ita proclamat: 'Cave animula, cave inanis istius so-
phistae praestigias* Deum quaeris? Accipe lumen tanto clarius lu-
18
condemns the affection of its own body and that of others alike.
Let us dismiss for now the examination of other things and take
up the supreme contemplation of what is supreme, so that we can
learn how far in this the mind contradicts corporeal nature. The
phantasy succeeds the external senses, and the senses follow on
the disposition of their own body and of other bodies. So we at-
tribute the judgment of the senses and the phantasy to the dispo-
sition of bodies, and we say the judgment is in accord with the
corporeal affection. When our rational soul, desiring to find out
what God is, inquires from such masters, then the phantasy,
which is too rash a teacher and artisan, fashions a statue from five
materials which the external senses have presented to it as being
the most beautiful of them all. These materials it has received
from the world, yet in such a way that it renders them more excel-
lent in some measure than it has received them from the world
through the senses. So the phantasy offers us a light which is so
clear that nothing seems brighter, so immense that nothing seems
more immense, one which is diffused as it were through the
infinite void and decked with countless colors and which revolves
in a circle (and on account of this revolution it echoes with the
most dulcet measures filling and charming the ears). The phantasy
imagines it as redolent of the most fragrant odors, abounding too
with all the tastes, the sweetest of all imaginable, and as being
wonderfully soft to the touch, delicate, smooth, and duly tem-
pered. The phantasy proclaims that this is God. The world s body
offers us nothing more beautiful. Corporeal sense comes into
contact with nothing better and proclaims nothing more excel-
lent. The phantasy, friend of the senses, fashions nothing more
sublime.
But the reason meanwhile from the height of the mind s watch- 3
tower looks down on the phantasy's childish games and exclaims,
"Be careful little soul, beware of the tricks of this idle sophist. Do
you seek God? Take a light which is brighter than the suns light
19
mine solis quanto lumen solis est lucidius tenebris, ad quod, si

solis lumen comparetur, etiam si millies milliesque clarius sit, esse
videatur umbra. Atque etiam tanto subtilius accipe ut aciem visus
effugiat. Neque ipsum per inane diffundas, ne partibus constet
atque ita sustentatione indigeat partium ac loco. Collige totum, si
potes, in punctum, ut ex hac infinita unione infinite sit potens. Sit
deinde, si lubet, ubique praesens, non sparsum loco, sed integrum
loco cuilibet adstans, neque colorum multiplici varietate inficiatur
(splendidius enim est lumen purum quam coloratum lumen),
neque volvatur aut sonet (nolo enim moveri illud vel collidi vel
frangi, et statum esse arbitror motu perfectiorem). Auferas quoque
odores, sapores, mollitiemque tractabilem, ne crassiori sit natura
compositum. Hie fulget quod non capit locus. Hie sonat quod
non rapit tempus. Hie olet quod non spargit flatus. Hie sapit
quod non minuit edacitas. Hie haeret quod satietas non divellit.'
4 'Dei32 faciem rursus33 intueri desideras? Mundum conspice uni-
versum, solis lumine plenum. Lumen conspice in materia mundi
plenum omnibus rerum omnium formis atque volubile. Subtrahe,
quaeso,34 materiam lumini,35 relinque cetera, subito36 habes ani-
mam, incorporeum videlicet37 lumen, omniforme, mutabile. Deme
rursus lumini38 huic animali39 mutationem. Es iam intellectum an-
gelicum consecuta, incorporeum scilicet40 lumen, omniforme, inva-
riable.41 Detrahe huic earn diversitatem per quam forma quaelibet
diversa est a lumine et aliunde infusa est lumini, ita ut eadem lu-
minis et formae cuiuslibet42 essentia sit, atque ipsum lumen43 sese
formet perque formas suas formet omnia. Lumen hoc infinite lu-
cet, quia natura lucet sua, neque alterius mixtione inficitur vel con-
trahitur. Per omnia est, quia in nullo. In nullo est, ut abunde44 per
20
in the same degree that the suns light is brighter than the shad-
ows; if you compare it to the suns light, the latter, even if it is a
thousand thousand times clearer, appears as a shadow Take too a
light which is so much more refined that it eludes the eyes gaze.
Do not extend it through emptiness, lest it be compounded from
parts and so need the prop of parts and space. Gather the whole if
you can into a point so that from this infinite union it can be
infinitely powerful. Then let this point be everywhere present if
you will, not scattered in space but wholly present in any point in
space; not dyed with the endless variety of colors (for pure light is
more splendid than polychrome light), and not revolving or re-
sounding (for I do not wish this point to be moved or to be struck
or to break, and I deem rest more perfect than motion). Subtract
odors too and tastes and being soft to the touch, lest it be com-
posed of too gross a nature. At this juncture we arrive at a reful-
gence no space contains, a resonance no time bears away, a fra-
grance no gust of wind dispels, a savor no gluttony deadens, an
intimate softness that satiety never strips away."
"Do you want to gaze upon the face of God again? Look at the 4
universal world full of the light of the sun. Look at the light in the
world's matter full of all the universal forms and forever changing.
Subtract, I beg you, matter from the light and put the rest aside:
suddenly you have soul, that is, incorporeal light, replete with all
the forms, but changeable. Again subtract change from this soul-
light. Now you have arrived at angelic intellect, at incorporeal light
filled with all the forms but [now] unchanging. Subtract from this
the diversity by means of which each form is different from the
light and brought into the light from elsewhere, with the result
that the essence of the light and of each form is now the same, and
the light forms itself and through its forms forms all. This light
shines out infinitely, since it is naturally radiant, and it is neither
sullied nor constrained by the admixture of anything else. Because
it dwells in no one thing, it is poured through all things. It dwells
21
omnia fulgeat. Vivit ex se et vitam praestat cunctis, quandoqui-

dem umbra eius, qualis est lux ista solis, sola in corporibus45 est vi-
vifica. Sentit quaelibet sensumque largitur, si umbra eius sensus
omnes omnibus excitat. Amat denique singula, si maxime sua sunt
singula. Ergo quid solis est lumen? Umbra dei.46 Ergo quid deus
est? Sol solis est deus. Solis lumen est deus in corpore mundi.
Deus est sol47 super angelicos intellectus. Hie tuus est, o anima,
hie tuus est deus. Huius umbram tibi ostenderat phantasia.48 Talis
umbra dei49 est50 ut sensibilium51 pulcherrima sit. Qualem esse
dei52 lucem existimas? Si tantum dei53 lucet umbra, quantum lux
dei54 fulget? Amas lucem solis55 ubique prae ceteris, immo solam.
Ama deum56 solum, solam, o anima, lucem; infinitam57 benefici
dei58 lucem59 infinite60 ama. Fulgebis iam et oblectaberis infinite.
Quaere igitur, obsecro, faciem eius et gaudebis in aevum. Sed ne
movearis, precor ut earn tangas, quia stabilitas ipsa est; ne distra-
haris per varia ut apprehendas, quia61 unitas ipsa est. Siste mo-
turn, collige multitudinem. Deum protinus assequeris, iamdiu te
penitus assecutum.'
5 In hac indagatione, pro deus immortalis! quantum repugnat
mens cunctis corporibus, quantum disperdit eorum imagines et
fallacias, quantum damnat phantasiam sensusque comites corpo-
rum! Profecto ipsa, sicut per se est substantia, nullam a corpore
ullo ducens originem, ita per se agit quandoque proprium opus
absque ullo corporum adminiculo, immo vero, quod est mirabi-
lius, contra quaelibet corporum machinamenta. Haec certe num-
quam operando se ab omni secerneret labe corporea, nisi multo
magis in essentia ab omni corporea stirpe esset alienissima. Et quia
non potest per vim aliquam corporis universae naturae corporum
22
in no one thing in order that it may blaze in its fullness through all
things. It lives from itself and it gives life to all, since its shadow,
like the suns light, is alone what gives rise to life in bodies. It
senses all and gives sense to all if its shadow awakens all the senses
in alL Finally, it loves individual things if they are preeminently
its own. So what is the suns light? Gods shadow. So what is
God? God is the Sun of the sun. The suns light is God in the
body of the world. [But] God is the Sun above the angelic intel-
lects. O soul, here, here is your God! The phantasy shows you
His shadow. The shadow of God is such that it is the most beauti-
ful of sensible things. What do you think Gods light is like? If
God's shadow shines so dazzlingly, how much more intensely does
Gods light shine? You love the suns light everywhere before all
else, or rather you love it alone. Love God alone, His light alone, o
soul. Love infinitely the infinite light of God in His beneficence.
You will then be radiant and experience infinite joy.12 So, I beseech
you, seek His face and you will rejoice for eternity. But do not
move, pray, in order to touch it, because it is stability itself. Do
not perplex yourself with things various in order to apprehend it,
because it is unity itself. Cease motion and take the many and
bind them into one. Straightway you will comprehend God who
long ago utterly comprehended you."13
In this quest —what a marvel, immortal God! —how much 5
does the mind shrink from all bodies, does it scatter their images
and deceits, does it condemn the phantasy and the senses, the
bodies companions! Certainly, just as it is a substance through it-
self, taking its origin from no body, so through itself it performs
its own work at various times without the assistance of any body,
or rather —and this is even more wonderful—it performs it in op-
position to all the apparatus of bodies. In doing its work it would
never cut itself off from all corporeal blemish, unless it were in its
essence still more cut off from all corporeal roots. And because it
cannot oppose the universal nature of bodies through any power
23
repugnare, non enim surgit particula supra totum, sequitur ut per

vim propriam in praesenti agat absque subsidio corporalium,
ideoque multo magis in posterum id possit efficere, Quomodo re-
pugnat mens corpori speculando, satis iam diximus* Dicamus
deinceps quantum in consultando*
6 Saepe62 esuriente63 stomacho vel sitiente pulmone sive per som-
num cerebro gravescente, sive genitalibus membris semine tumes-
centibus, sensus, corporis comes, ad cibum, potum, somnum invi-
tat et coituiru Incitat, inquam, vel potius corporis incitamenta
nuntiat animo. Ratio vero contemplationis honestatisve gratia ad
iis iudicat abstinendum et, ut iubet, saepenumero abstinemus,
Quando infertur contumelia vel iniuria circa praecordia sanguis ad
vindictam accenditur. Tunc vis animae motrix, comes hospesque
corporis, pedes et manus mo vet ad ulciscendum; ratio nonnum-
quam pacis et otii causa sistere iubet et cohibet* Obiectis saepe pe-
riculis cor trepidat, sed occurrere proelio ratio64 praecipit tutandae
patriae causa, unde, invito etiam corde, itur in hostes* Fines autem
ad quos ratio ita deliberat incorporei65 sunt, Veritas scilicet et ho-
nes tas- Cum66 Plato noster, vir caelestis,67 domandi corporis gra-
tia, academiam68 insalubrem69 Atticae locum habitandam elegit,
nonne animus eius corporis naturae70 adversabatur? Cum Xeno-
crates, dilectus Platonis discipulus, et Origenes eorum sectator
exusserunt sibi virilia quo libidinis incendia prorsus extinguerent,
nonne invictus71 animus bellum membris corporis indicebat?72
Ante hos Magi Persarum, Aegyptii sacerdotes, Pythagorici philo-
sophy ut Venerem enervarent,73 mero et carnibus abstinebant*
Mitto priscos illos sacerdotes Magnae Matri74 consecratos aut Sa-
turno- Illi castrabant se, isti se excarnificabant, Mitto primitias
24
of the body —for a tiny part does not rebel against the whole —it
follows that it operates in the present via its own power without
the aid of corporeal things; and so in the future it should be able
to do this even more. We have now said enough about how the
mind in contemplating opposes the body. Next let us talk about
how much it opposes it in deliberating.
Often when the stomach is hungry or the lung thirsty14 or the 6
brain grows heavy with sleep or the genitalia swell with seed, then
the sense, the body's companion, incites us towards food, drink,
sleep, and coition — incites us, I say, or rather announces the
body's excitements to the rational soul. But the reason makes a
judgment that it must abstain from these for the sake of contem-
plation or decency, and at its behest we often do abstain. When
we endure contumely or injustice, the rage for vengeance boils in
our breast. Then the soul's motive power, the companion and
guest of the body, moves the feet and hands to take revenge. At
times, for the sake of peace and quiet, the reason orders them to
desist and restrains them. Often the heart quakes in the face of
perils, but to defend our native land reason orders it into battle,
whence, though unwillingly, it marches out against the foe. But the
ends governing the reason's deliberation are incorporeal, namely
truth and honor. When our Plato, a man of heaven, chose an un-
healthy place to house the Academy for the sake of mastering
the body, wasn't his rational soul opposing the body's nature?15
When Xenocrates,16 the beloved disciple of Plato, and Origen17
their follower burned their own genitalia in order to completely
extinguish the fires of lust, wasn't the invincible soul declaring
war on the body's members? And prior to them the Magi of Per-
sia, the priests of Egypt and the Pythagorean philosophers, to
weaken Venus, abstained from wine and meat. 18 1 leave aside those
ancient priests who were consecrated to the Great Mother or to
Saturn: the former castrated themselves,19 the latter mutilated
25
Christianorum, quibus nihil fortius, nihil mirabilius umquam vi-

dit mundus.
7 Quapropter nemo nobis obiiciat vel paucos olim fuisse vel esse
hodie paucissimos qui corporis75 resistant affectibus. Immo vero
resistimus omnes quotidie, alii sanitatis, alii honoris, alii pacis, alii
iustitiae, contemplationis dei, beatitudinis gratia. Ac etiam si
numquam corporis impetus frangeremus, satis tamen esset76 pu-
gna ipsa, quae est in nobis continua, ad ostendendum animam
corpori repugnare. Si nulla in nobis alia esset natura quam corpo-
rea,77 statim cum corporis affectio ad aliquid traheret, proruere-
mus ut bruta, neque pensi quicquam haberemus consultaremusve
numquid esset illud ad quod allicit corpus efHciendum. Nihil enim
secum78 pugnat. Semper tamen ferme in omnibus79 est pugna il-
lata nobis a corpore to to. Est igitur in nobis aliquid praeter ipsum,
ab eius stirpe semotum. Semotum inquam, turn ab omni humo-
rum elementorumque natura, quo cunctis horum inclinationibus
possit obsistere easque cogitatione et affectu transcendere, turn
etiam ab omni natura caelesti, ab ipso caelo humoribus his infusa
ad eorumque perducta proprietatem, quo etiam caelestibus incli-
nationibus quandoque valeat adversari (quod astrologi nobis ipsi
concedunt) atque substantiam quandam caelo longe praestantio-
rem excogitare semper et colere. Mitto quod quicquid per corpo-
ream mobilemque caeli virtutem efScitur, et corporeum est et
penitus mobile, neque potest corpoream mobilemque naturam
exuperare. Quapropter animus turn ab elementali, turn a caelesti
natura elementis infusa seorsum vivere potest. Quod si quis Plato-
nicorum dicat eum in caelesti vehiculo semper esse, respondebi-
mus non animum a vehiculo, sed vehiculum ab animo dependere
26
20
themselves. I omit too the very first Christians, than whom the
world has witnessed nothing braver, nothing more marvelous.
Wherefore nobody should object to us that in the past few have 7
resisted, and today even fewer resist the body's desires. To the con-
trary, we resist them all daily for various reasons: some for the sake
of health, others of honor, others of peace, others of justice, the
contemplation of God, [and] blessedness. But even if we can never
stem the body's attack, yet the struggle, which in us is continual,
would be enough to show that the soul is combating the body. If
there were no other nature in us than the corporeal, as soon as the
body's desire drew us towards something, we would hurtle for-
ward like brutes, and neither care at all nor deliberate whether
what the body draws us towards can be achieved. For nothing
fights itself. Yet almost always and in all things we are struggling
against an assault by the whole body. So there exists in us some-
thing beyond the body, something apart from its very roots,21
apart, that is, from the whole nature of the humors and elements,
something by which we can oppose all their inclinations and tran-
scend them in thought and in desire. And it is something apart
too from the whole celestial nature infused by the heavens them-
selves in the humors and diffused through the property of the hu-
mors, something by which we can even at times fight against their
celestial inclinations (which the astrologers themselves concede to
us), and perpetually think about and reverence a substance more
outstanding far than the heavens. I omit the fact that whatever is
produced by the heavens' corporeal and mobile power is corporeal
and entirely mobile and cannot exceed corporeal and mobile na-
ture. So the rational soul is able to live apart from both the ele-
mental and the celestial nature infused in the elements. But if
some one of the Platonists were to say that it always rides in a ce-
lestial vehicle, we would retort that the soul does not depend on
the vehicle but the vehicle on the soul, and that according to the
27
sempiternumque animum apud Platonicos sempiternum vehicu-

lum semper vivificare. Sed ad institutum ordinem redeamus*
8 Neque nos turbet quod anima saepe obsequitur corpori, quia
non vi obsequitur, sed amore quo corpori per ipsam viventi tarn-
quam filio et suo operi afficitur,80 Mater filium tamquam suum
opus amat. Filius parvulus81 cibum praeter modum cupit. Absti-
nere iubet mater. Tacet inde quiescitque puer, si bene fuerit educa-
tus; sin male, clamat domumque perturbat* Miseretur plangentis
filii mater quem amat nimium, nondum tamen ut cibum capiat as-
sentitur, nisi secum ipsa prius82 consultando, iudicet posse ilium
gustare aliquid absque corporis detrimento, aut si quid damni illa-
tum fuerit, per medicinam83 facile posse succurrL Turn demum ci-
bum accipit natus* Non cogitur mater a filio parvulo, sed operis
sui dilectio matrem allicit ut filio obsequatur* Obtemperat tandem
prout censet obtemperandutru Iudicat autem saepe vere, quan-
doque fallitur, quia obtemperandi nimium cupida non satis dili-
genter eventus examinat* Eadem est animae ad corpus similitudo*
Proinde si naturale esset animam succumbere corpori, omnis
anima ac semper sensibus cederet. Quoniam vero resistit saepenu-
mero consultando, si quando consentit, non natura vel violentia
obsequitur, sed amore. Quo summa84 vis animae afficitur mediae,
media infimae, infima vitali complexioni, vitalis complexio cor-
pori,85 siquidem Platonici putant ab animae rationalis substantia,
tamquam sole, effundi vitam corporis irrationalem, tamquam lu-
men, illamque erga hanc aifici quasi prolem* Ad quam prolem su-
scipiendam corpus, ut Timaeus docet, per caelestes animas dispo-
natur. Quid vero dicemus ad illud, quando animus aliquis suum
28
Platonists the everlasting soul always gives life to the everlasting

vehicle.22 But let us return to our intended argument.
It should not trouble us that the soul often yields to the body, 8
because it does not yield to force but to the love whereby it is
drawn to the body (which is alive because of it) as to its son and
handiwork. A mother loves her son as her handiwork. As an in-
fant the son longs immoderately for food. The mother tells him to
leave it be. If the boy has been well brought up, he then becomes
quiet and sits still; but if he has been badly brought up, he kicks
up a fuss and disturbs the house. The mother has pity on her
wailing son whom she much loves, but she does not yet consent to
his taking food, unless, having communed with herself, she first
decides that he can have a snack without harming his body, or, if
something harmful happens to him, that he can easily be helped
by medicine. Only then does the child receive the food. The
mother is not compelled to yield by the infant: delight in her
handiwork rather induces the mother to yield to her son. She fi-
nally yields to the degree she decides she should yield. Often she
decides correctly, but at times she is wrong because she is too eager
to yield and does not examine the consequences carefully enough.
The souls relationship to the body is the same. Therefore, if it
were natural for the soul to yield to the body, every soul would al-
ways surrender to the senses. But since quite often it opposes
them in the process of reflecting, whenever it does consent, it
yields, not because it is compelled to or because of its nature, but
out of love. It is love whereby the highest power of the soul is im-
printed on the middle power, the middle on the lowest, the lowest
on the vital complexion,23 the vital complexion on the body; and
this is because the Platonists think that from the substance of the
rational soul, as from the sun, the irrational life of the body is
poured out like light, and that the soul behaves towards this life as
towards a child. The body is disposed by way of the celestial souls
to receive this child, as Timaeus teaches.24 But what shall we say
29
corpus interimit sive consilio sive indignatione seu metu id faciat

vel dolore? Quomodo id umquam aggrederetur, si corpus animi
esset origo, cum non possit appetitus aliquis in natura contra ip-
sammet surgere? Nullum brutum sponte seipsum interimit, quia
non potest in eorum animam a corpore pullulantem stimulus ali-
quis contra corpus oriru Homo autem, licet sit prudentius animal,
tamen id saepe facit, vaticinans, ut arbitror, se superfore post cor-
pus ac se potius corporis sarcina exonerare quam perdere.
: IV :
Quarta ratio: anima libere operatur.
1 Maxime vero non oriri ullo modo ex corpore hominis animam co-
gnoscemus, si quam liberum sit in ea arbitrium ratione propria
comprehenderimus• Nam quod corpori, cuius natura determinata
est, alligatur, operationem habere non potest liberam et solutam.
Profecto a communi aliqua consideratione nulla provenit actio,
nisi intercedat aliqua particularis existimatio, quia motus actio-
nesque circa particularia fiunt, ceu cum quis communiter conside-
rat exercitationem corporis utilem esse, licet ita consideret, non-
dum tamen exercetur, nisi consultet prius quot sint exercitationis
modi et qui magis conducat* At quando unam quandam particu-
larem exercitationem prae multis elegerit, tunc opus aggreditur. Si
deambulationem, deambulat; si equitationem, equitat*
2 Intellectus natura sua in86 universalium rationum conceptione
versatur* Quapropter ut ex eius apprehensione aliqua proveniat ac-
30
• B O O K IX • C H A P T E R IV •
when a rational soul [actually] kills its own body, whether it does
so by design or out of wrath or fear or grief? How could it ever
embark on such an act if the body were the origin of the soul,
since a desire cannot naturally rebel against itself? No beast will-
ingly kills itself, because an animus against the body cannot arise
in the soul of beasts which itself arises from the body. But man,
though he is an animal with more discretion, often kills himself,
predicting, I suppose, that he will outlive the body and that, rather
than destroying himself, he is discharging himself of the body's
burden.
: IV :
Fourth proof: the soul acts freely.
For the most part we will know that the human soul does not I
arise in any way from the body if we have understood on the basis
of a specific argument how free in it the freedom to choose is. For
what is bound to the body whose nature is determined cannot
have an operation that is free and separate. Indeed, from some
general consideration no one action proceeds unless some particu-
lar estimation intervenes, because motions and actions occur with
regard to particulars. Take the similar case when someone consid-
ers the exercise of the body in general to be useful. Though he
considers it useful, he does not take exercise yet, unless he has first
debated about the number of possible ways of exercising and
which way is best. And when he has elected one particular kind of
exercise among the many, then he takes up the task. If it is walk-
ing, he walks, if riding, he rides.
The intellect is naturally busy with the conception of universal 2
reasons. Wherefore, in order for its apprehending to issue forth
3i
tio, oportet universalem eius conceptionem ad particularia quae-

dam deducL Universalis autem notio vi sua multa, immo infinita,
singularia continet, ut exercendi commune genus modos exercita-
tionis innumerabiles. Igitur potest universalis ilia notio ad diversa
pariter singularia derivari. Derivationem huiusmodi sequitur iudi-
cium de agendis. Diversum igitur sequi potest iudicium- Itaque iu-
dicium intellectus de rebus agendis non est natura sua ad aliquid
unum determinatum. Est igitur liberum*
3 Iudicii siquidem libertate carent aliqua, quia nullum habent iu-
dicium, ut plantae; aliqua quia, licet habeant, habent tamen a na-
tura ad unum aliquid determinatum, ut bruta. Naturali enim exis-
timatione iudicat ovis lupum sibi perniciosum ac fugit, neque
potest non fugere, impellente natura. Naturali instinctu feruntur
hirundines ad nidum conficiendum, apes ad alvearia, ad telas
araneae. Ideo omnes eiusdem speciei animantes eodem modo sua
fabricant semper, neque discunt aliquando, neque variant urn-
quam, quia species naturalis qua ducuntur ab initio in est atque ea-
dem permanet. Homines autem et discunt et opera sua variant
semper: unam tamen et ab initio naturam habent. Non igitur na-
tura trahuntur ad agendum, sed ipsi suo consilio alias aliter seip-
sos agunt. Unde enim contingere id putamus, quod arbores bes-
tiaeque in suis quibusdam motibus, artibus, electionibusque
numquam aberrant; homo vero saepissime. Non quidem ex eo
quod intellectus insit illis perfection quibus nec intellectus quidem
inest ullus, sed quia ab intellectu divino numquam errante trahun-
tur• Homo vero a suo, qui errare potest, ducitur, qui etiam si
quando ab actionibus propriis otium agit ad tempus, tunc ipse
quoque deo87 ducitur, neque errat: quod ex vaticiniis et miraculis
declaratur. Ac si semper duceretur sicut alia, tanto minus erraret
32
into some action, its universal conception must be guided towards

certain particulars. But a universal notion potentially contains
many, nay infinite, particulars, just as the common genus of exer-
cise embraces countless ways of exercising. The universal notion,
therefore, can be distributed into equally different particulars.
A decision on what to do follows on such distribution. A different
decision can hence ensue. So the intellect's judgment about things
to do is not naturally confined to just one thing. It is there-
fore free.
Certain things lack liberty of judgment because they possess no 3
judgment at all, plants for instance. Others, though they have it,
have it linked to some one object, beasts for instance. Its natural
canniness makes a sheep judge a wolf to be a danger to itself and it
runs away: with its nature compelling it, it cannot but flee. Natu-
ral instinct leads swallows to build their nests, bees their hives,
spiders their webs.25 So all the animals in the same species always
fashion their own particular works in the same way without ever
learning and without ever varying, because the natural species that
directs them is present from the onset and remains unchanging.
But men both learn and are always doing different things, yet they
have one nature and have it from the beginning. So they are not
impelled to action by their nature: rather, using their judgment,
they themselves do various things in various ways.26 Whence, in
our opinion, it happens that the trees and the animals never err in
their particular motions, in what they make, in what they choose;
but that man repeatedly errs. This is not because a more perfect
intellect is present in these trees and animals — they do not possess
any intellect at all —but rather because they are impelled by the
divine intellect that never errs. But man is guided by his own intel-
lect that can err. Whenever he rests from his own actions for a
while, he too is guided by God and does not err, as we can see
from prophecies and miracles. If he were always led like the other
animals, he would err even less to the degree that he is a more per-
33
quam ilia quanto esset88 perfectius89 instrumentum, Rursus, si alia

seipsa ducerent sicut homo, tanto magis errarent quanto minus
perfectam sortita sunt speciem. Cum igitur homo iudicium de re-
bus agendis non habeat a natura ad unum determinatum, est ne-
cessario liber. Quod autem iudicet libere, ex eo coniicimus quod
seipsum ducit ad iudicandum. Quod seipsum ducat, ex eo quod in
iudicium suum se reflectit. Quod se reflectat, ex eo quod se iudi-
care cognoscit iudiciumque definite Quam quidem libertatem in-
tellects ipsius virtute sortitur. Intellectus enim non modo hoc90
aut illud apprehendit bonum, sed ipsum commune bonum. Quo-
niam vero intellectus per apprehensam a se formam movet volun-
tatem atque in omnibus motor et mobile proportione invicem con-
gruunt, voluntas rationalis non est a natura determinata, nisi ad
ipsum commune bonum. Sub ipso communi bono bona singula
continentur. Quicquid igitur voluntati offertur ut bonum potest in
illud inclinari voluntas, nulla inclinatione naturali in contrarium
prohibente. Quod quidem significatur per ea quae supra diximus,
quod multa eligit contra naturae corporalis usum et voluptatem.
Praescribit sibi vitae ordinem saepissime corpori noxium, odit cor-
pus, extenuat, enecat. Quod numquam bestiae faciunt, quarum
omnis impetus actioque servit corporis usui.
4 Operaepretium est considerare quaedam a philosophis necessa-
ria, quaedam impossibilia, quaedam media, scilicet possibilia, nun-
cupari. Et possibilia quaedam ut plurimum evenire, quaedam ra-
rius, quaedam vero aequaliter ferme contingere. Hunc ordinem
universo congruere potissimum arbitrantur. Affirmant rursus alia
quidem naturalia, alia vero voluntaria esse. Addunt insuper nus-
quam fore potentiam ullam ad utrumque contingentium aequaliter
se habentem, nisi voluntariis agentibus insit. Naturalia enim agen-
da potius esse determinata quam voluntaria. Denique naturalia
34
feet instrument. Again, if the animals guided themselves as man

does, they would err more than men in that they have been allot-
ted a less perfect species.27 Since in doing things man does not
naturally possess a judgment confined to one action, he is there-
fore necessarily free.28 That he judges freely we deduce from the
fact that he guides himself to judging; that he guides himself,
from the fact that he reflects on his own judgment; that he re-
flects, from the fact that he knows he is judging and is establishing
a limit to judgment. This liberty the intellect is allotted by its own
power. For the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but
the common good. Since the intellect moves the will, however, by
a form apprehended by itself, and since in all things the mover and
the moved are in proportional and mutual agreement, the rational
will is not naturally determined except for the common good. Par-
ticular goods are contained under the general good. Therefore
whatever is offered to the will as good, the will can be drawn to, as
long as no natural inclination for the contrary prevents it. This is
shown by what we said above, namely that the will chooses many
things that are counter to the benefit and pleasure of the corporeal
nature.29 It prescribes an order of life that is frequently harmful to
the body: it hates the body, enfeebles it, and torments it. And this
beasts never do, whose every impulse and action is for their body's
benefit.
It is worthwhile bearing in mind that certain things are said by 4
the philosophers to be necessary, other things impossible, other
things in between (possible in other words); and that of the possi-
ble some usually happen, others more rarely, but others do and do
not happen almost equally. They think this arrangement is suited
for the most part to the universe. They also affirm that some
things are natural, but others are the result of the will. They add
moreover that nowhere will a potency exist that is equally dis-
posed to each of two contingencies unless it is present in agents
governed by the will. For natural agents are more determined than
35
speciei cuiusque officia probant vana esse non posse, officium au-
tem hominis esse consilium. Frustra tamen illic ad opposita
consultari, ubi nequeat91 alterutrum, prout coniectura designat,
eligi atque tractari.
5 Praecipue vero ex hoc invenietur animi nostri libertas, si planius
quomodo moventur bestiarum animae videamus. Quando animal
brutum esurit, si cibus suus oculis eius offertur, eius anima iudicat
pabulum tale sibi fore conveniens, appetitus cupit movetque ad ip-
sum membra. Quaerimus unde sit motus ille membrorum. Pro-
culdubio est ab appetitu. Appetitionis motus unde? A iudicio. Ex
eo enim quod cibum convenire sibi iudicavit, illico concupivit.
Unde iudicium? A forma tali vel tali cibi ipsius oculis apparente et
ab interna talis corporis egestate. Quotiens enim tale corpus esu-
rit, et pomum tale monstratur aspectui, totiens anima ilia conve-
nire sibi illud iudicat atque appetit. Cernis motus illius principium
non esse in anima, sed in corpore: in corpore, inquam, pabuli sic
dispositi, et corpore bruti sic affecto. Itaque non proprie anima ilia
ducit corpus, neque proprie ex seipsa movetur, sed tam cibi quam
sui corporis natura trahit illam, ad cuius tractum membra etiam
rapiuntur.
6 Cuius rei signa quatuor afferemus. Primum, quod tali quodam
cibo monstrato et sic affecto corpore, statim ita92 iudicat et appetit
anima. Neque, postquam pabuli figuram aspexit, tempus aliquod
vel brevissimum differt iudicium et cupidinem, quasi anima ilia
paene nihil ex sua virtute in medium afferat, sed posita ilia iudicii
causa, statim iudicandi sequatur effectus. Nec iniuria. Forma enim
agendi principium est, ut ignis calor calefaciendi principium. For-
36
voluntary ones. Finally, they assert that the natural offices of each
species cannot be in vain, but that mans duty is to take counsel;
and yet that it is pointless to deliberate over opposites when nei-
ther of them, on the mere basis of conjecture, can be chosen or
adopted.30
Our souls freedom, however, can be principally discovered if 5
we see more clearly how the souls of animals are moved. When a
beast is hungry and if its particular food is set before its eyes, its
[irrational] soul decides that this food is going to be good for it,
[and] its appetite desires it and moves the limbs towards it. We
want to know whence derives this movement of the limbs? Doubt-
less from the appetite. The appetites motion, whence does that
come? From a decision: because it decided the food was good for
itself, it desired it. Whence the decision? From the form of one
food or another appearing before the animals eyes and from its
body's inner hunger. For whenever an animal's body is hungry and
this particular food comes into view, the irrational soul decides
whether it is good for it and desires it. You can see that the princi-
ple of the movement is not in this soul but in the body: in the
body of the food provided and in the body of the animal affected.
Therefore this soul does not properly guide the body nor is it
properly moved by itself; rather the nature alike of the food and of
its body attracts this soul, and the limbs too are subject to the
attraction.
We will adduce four proofs of this. The first proof is that, 6
when a special food appears and its body is thus affected, the irra-
tional soul immediately decides and desires. After it has seen the
shape of the food, it does not delay its decision or desire for a
length of time, even the briefest. It is as if this soul were bringing
almost nothing to bear from its own power: rather, once the par-
ticular reason for a decision has been set before it, then the effect
of deciding immediately follows. And this is not inappropriate.
For a form is the principle of doing just as the heat of fire is the
37
marum vero aliqua est a natura impressa, ut igni calor et levitas,

aliqua est apprehensa, ut species cibi per visum. Appetitio ignis ac
motus formam impressam sequitur. Iudicium et appetitio bestiae
sic affectae formam illam cibi sequitur apprehensam. Huius ergo
motus principium est cibus eiusque forma. Et sicut ignis non per
se movetur, quia non potest non ascendere cum nihil obstat, non
potest non urere cum aliquid adest urendum, sic bestia non per se
movetur, quia non potest non ferri in ea quae sic aut sic offerun-
tun
Secundum signum est quod irrationalis anima numquam aliter
iudicat, cupit, prosequitur, quam ad corporis pertineat usum. In
omni eius actione finis est corporis commodum. Finis autem in re-
bus ultimus idem est ferme quod et principium. Principium ignis
est lunae concavum, concavum lunae ignei motus est finis, quia
causa quaeque ad sui finem agit et movet. Ergo in bruto princi-
pium actionum est corporis natura sive anima. Non anima mera,93
sed corporalis, et ut servit toti naturae vitaeque artifici naturalium,
postquam in natura vitaque corporea conservanda est finis agendi.
Tertium, quod bestia numquam paenitet sic aut sic egisse,
neque retractat quicquam neque emendat. Quod significat unicum
ibi esse agendi principium, postquam nulla est repugnantia. Cor-
porea certe vita movet, tamquam finis proprius. Ergo nihil aliud
proprium inest ibi praeter corpoream vitam quod moveat.
Quartum, quod, ut supra diximus, in operibus brutorum eius-
dem speciei non est diversitas. Non aliter aranea alia telam texit
quam alia. Omnes quoque hirundines nidum similiter faciunt, et
singulae singulis annis eodem pacto, quemadmodum omnis ignis
38
principle of heating. But with forms, one has been imprinted by

nature, as heat and levity in fire, while another has been appre-
hended, like the species of food via the sight. Fire's appetite and
motion is the result of the imprinted form. The decision and de-
sire of the animal affected [by the sight of food] is the result of the
apprehended form of the food. Therefore the principle of this mo-
tion is the food and its form. Just as fire is not moved of itself be-
cause it cannot not ascend as long as nothing stops it, and cannot
not burn as long as something combustible is there, so the animal
is not moved of itself, because it cannot not be drawn towards
those things which are variously offered to it.
The second proof is that the irrational soul never decides, de- 7
sires, or pursues except in response to the body's need. In all its
action the end is what is best for the body. But universally the ulti-
mate end is virtually the same as the beginning. The beginning of
fire is the moon's concavity and the moon's concavity is the end of
the motion of fire because each cause acts for and moves towards
its own end. So in an animal the principle of [its] actions is the
body's nature or soul, not the pure soul but the corporeal soul, the
one that preserves the nature and life, the artificer of natural
things, in its entirety, since in nature and corporeal life preserving
things corporeal is the end of acting.
The third proof is that an animal never regrets having done this 8
or that, nor does it retract or correct anything. This shows that in
the animal there is just one principle of action inasmuch as no
conflict is ever present. As its proper end, certainly, corporeal life
moves. So nothing else is properly present in the animal except the
corporeal life because it moves.
The fourth proof is that, as we said above, in the works of ani- 9
mals of the same species no diversity occurs. One spider does not
weave a web any differently from another. Swallows too all make
similar nests, and individual swallows in successive years make
them in the same way, just as all fire heats in the same way, every
39
similiter calefacit, omnis lapis descendit similiter, omnis planta pro

sua specie similiter pullulat. Natura siquidem rei cuiusque una
quaedam est affixa sibi forma et certa vis ab initio insita, per quam
unam similemque semper unum opus fit semper et simile, Idcirco
bestiarum anima, instinctum secuta naturae, tenorem servat spe-
ciei suae familiarem. Idem et nobis accidit quotiens torpet ratio et
ad nutum sensuum phantasiaeque vivimus. Verum expergefacta et
intenta ratione, consultamus in rebus agendis diu et nutum phan-
tasiae damnamus, et aliter facimus quam vel externorum corpo-
rum vel membrorum nostrorum poscat natura. Ac si quando iis
indulgemus, paenitet nos, atque emendare conamur domamusque
saepe naturam corporis et subiicimus. Agimus enim non modo
per imagines illas obiectu corporum acceptas sive conceptas, sed
etiam per universales rerum species et rationes, quae partim insunt
animo, partim eius peculiari vi pariuntur. Ubi agendi principium
nostra forma est, non corporis: a nobis parta, non accepta a cor-
pore, ad animi modum potius quam ad modum corporum pro-
creata, communis ad infinitos agendi modos. Ideo non uni agendi
modo adstringimur, sed per omnes libere pervagamur. Habemus
enim in mente commune quoddam bonorum exemplar, ad quod
singula comparantes, sive reiicimus, sive magis minusve probamus,
non ipsi quidem tracti a rebus ipsis vel corpore, sed trahentes res
ipsas potius ad exemplar et corpus ad mentem. Ideo etiam dum si-
milis permanet rerum corporisque affectio, saepe eligimus dissimi-
liter, alias scilicet aliter. Et dum fit dissimilis, eligimus saepe simi-
liter, immo in eodem paene momento propter varias coniecturas a
ratione propositas, etiam dum corporalia manent similia, variae
40
B O O K IX • C H A P T E R IV
stone descends in the same way, and every plant sprouts alike ac-
cording to its species. Each things nature indeed is a certain form
attached to it and a certain power planted in it from the onset; and
by way of this nature that is always one and the same issues an ac-
tion that is always one and the same. Therefore the soul of ani-
mals, having followed natures instinct, preserves the familiar tenor
of their species. The same happens to us whenever the reason is
lulled asleep and we live at the whim of the senses and the
phantasy. But when the reason has been roused and quickened we
take time to deliberate about what needs doing and we condemn
the pull of the phantasy; and we act otherwise than the nature of
external bodies or of our members demands. And whenever we in-
dulge them we are sorry and we try to remedy it; and often we
master and subject the bodys nature. For we act not only through
those images accepted or conceived from the objective presence of
bodies, but also through things universal species and rational
principles which are partly present in our thinking soul and partly
produced by its peculiar force. Here the principle of acting is our
form, not the body's: it has been produced by us, not accepted
from the body, and procreated according to the measure of the
soul rather than of bodies, and it is common to infinite modes of
activity. Therefore we are not constrained by one mode of acting
but rove freely through all modes. For we have in our mind a cer-
tain universal model of things good, and when we compare indi-
vidual instances to it, whether we reject them or approve them
more or less, it is not because we ourselves have been drawn by
things themselves or by the body, but rather because we are draw-
ing things themselves to the model and the body to the mind.
Thus even when the condition of things and of the body stays
[unchangingly] the same, we often choose differently, now in one
way, now in another; and when it changes to something different,
we often choose in the same way. Or rather, in the same moment,
almost, and on account of the various options proffered by the
4i
contrariaeque quodammodo fiunt electiones* Consultatione

namque fit, ut non animam rebus, sed res animae nostrae subiicia-
mus*
10 Profecto ut saepe Plotinus ait Proclusque confirmat, huius indi-
cium habemus in scientiis et moribus- In scientiis hoc pacto:
quando sola veritatis speculatione contenti sumus, nihil prorsus
communicantes cum corpore, neque agere aliquid extra nos affec-
tantes, quis non videat contemplationem illam nostram esse peni-
tus nullo modo a corpore dependentem? In moribus iterum hoc
modo: cum omnia vitae studia ad animum nostrum dirigimus mo-
ribus exornandum, quis non intellegat tunc officiorum nostrorum
finem esse animam, atque ideo eorundem animam esse princi-
pium? Harum actionum non humores principia sunt, quoniam
humores non invitant ad aliquid contra corpus eorum et supra
corpora; non caelum, quod per humores movet; corpus quippe
caeli longe remotum, neque prius movet quatuor humores nostros
quam moveat quatuor elementa, neque movebit animam nisi hu-
moribus agitatis. Humorum vero agitationi animus adversatur,
dum illorum impetus speculationis intentione contemnit; morum
studio cohibet; artium industria frangit. Nemo aut Socrate ad
amorem, aut Alciphrone Megarico ad libidinem ebrietatemque na-
tura proclivior fuit, nemo iis evasit studio continention Nonne
Xenocrates, Demosthenes et Cleanthes naturae impedimenta dili-
gentia repulerunt? Si humoribus resistimus, obsistimus et elemen-
tis et caelo; immo etiam si non subiicimur caelo, multo minus ce-
teris corporibus subdimur*
42
reason, and even as the corporeal conditions remain the same,

we arrive at various and in a way contrary choices. For we deliber-
ate in order to subjugate, not our soul to things, but things to
our soul.
Certainly, as Plotinus often says and Proclus reaffirms, we have 10
proof of this matter in the sciences and in morals.31 In the sciences
as follows. When we are content with meditating alone on the
truth, having no contact at all with the body and not yearning to
do anything external, is there anyone who cannot see that our con-
templation is utterly independent of the body? And in morals in
this respect. When we direct all our life's attention to adorning
our rational soul with virtues, is there anyone then who cannot
grasp that the goal of our duties and offices is the soul, and thus
that the principle of these same offices is the soul? The principles
of these actions are not the humors, because the humors never in-
duce [us] to do anything contrary to the body they are in, or any-
thing over and beyond bodies; and they are not the heavens which
move the body, far removed as it is from the heavens, through the
humors. The heavens do not move our four humors until they
have first moved the four elements, and they will not move our
soul unless they have first agitated the humors. But the rational
soul is opposed to the agitation of the humors: intent on medita-
tion, it scorns their onslaughts; it hems them in by its devotion
to ethical behavior; and it shatters them by its art and industry.
No one was naturally more inclined to love than Socrates,32 or to
lust and drunkenness than Alciphron of Megara,33 but no one
emerged more continent than they as a result of study. Didn't
Xenocrates, Demosthenes and Cleanthes overcome with their dili-
gence their natural impediments?34 If we resist the humors, we
are opposing both the elements and the heavens, or rather if we
are not subject to the heavens, much less are we subject to other
bodies.
43
Caelo vero non subiici hominis animum, hinc apparet quod fu-
tures casus primo scientia praevidet, deinde aut prudentia vitat,
aut magnanimitate nihili pendit, quasi non ad ipsum hominem,
qui ipse est animus, pertineant quicquam, sed ad animi carcerem.
Accedit quod prospera fortuna propter temperantiam feliciter uti-
tur, adversa propter tolerantiam optime, ita ut utraque sibi aeque
ad virtutem proficiat et salutem. Quo autem pacto aut sequitur ca-
sus qui praecedit, aut suscipit necessario qui diligentia vitat, aut
horret natura qui saepe despicit? Aut bonis vincitur qui ad felicita-
tem propriam ilia dirigit, aut superatur malis qui mala convertit in
bona, aut necessitate aliqua cogitur qui dum propter pietatem li-
benter cum divina voluntate consentit, ilia etiam quae necessaria
sunt terribiliaque videntur, voluntaria efficit atque levia?
Idem rursus ita per intellectum monstramus et voluntatem.
Primo sic per intellectum. Caeleste corpus formam habet corpora-
lem, singularem, localem et temporalem. Forma per quam mens
omnis intellegit est incorporalis, universalis et absoluta. Haec ergo
a caelo non nascitur. Forma enim quae alicubi clauditur formam
non generat absolutam; ideoque caelum formam aliquam in intel-
lectu non generat. Num forte in eo gignit intellegentiam? Nequa-
quam. Haec enim formam sequitur intellectus. Quod ergo dare
formam nequit, non dabit intellegentiam. Omnino vero nullum
corpus per suam formam quicquam intellegit. Talis enim forma
singularis est omnino. Multo minus in alio intellegentiam genera-
bit. Quoniam igitur intellectus neque actionem propriam neque
actionis principium habet a caelo, corpori caelesti non subditur,
44
That mans thinking soul is not subject to the heavens is obvi- n

ous from the fact that he uses knowledge in the first instance to
foresee future events, and then either prudence to avoid them or
magnanimity to account them as nothing (as though they per-
tained, not to man himself at all, who is rational soul, but to that
soul's prison). Moreover, through temperance man makes happy
use of a prosperous fortune, and through endurance best use of an
adverse fortune, to the extent that he can profit from both equally
to live virtuously in health and safety. But how can he who stands
above misfortunes either follow them, or endure them by necessity
when he deploys diligence to avoid them, or naturally dread them
when frequently he spurns them? How is he shackled by good
things when he turns them to his own happiness, or vanquished
by bad things when he converts the bad into the good, or con-
strained by some necessity, when, living freely by virtue of his pi-
ety in accord with the divine will, he takes even those things which
are necessary and apparently terrifying and renders them voluntary
and of little import?
The same point can be demonstrated by way of the intellect 12
and the will. First by way of the intellect. The heavens' body has a
single corporeal form in space and time. But the form by which all
mind understands is incorporeal, universal, and absolute. So this
does not derive from the heavens. For a form confined to a partic-
ular place does not generate an absolute form. Thus the heavens
do not beget any form in the intellect. Do they perhaps beget un-
derstanding in it? Not at all. For understanding follows the form
of the intellect. Therefore what cannot bestow form will not be-
stow understanding. But no body through its own form ever un-
derstands anything at all. For such a form is entirely particular.
Much less will it generate understanding in another. Since, there-
fore, intellect derives from the heavens neither its own action nor
its principle of action, it is not subject to the heavens' body. This is
especially because our rational soul, by virtue of the power by
45
praesertim quia noster animus secundum earn vim qua iungitur

his quae supra caelum esse dicuntur, non modo non subest caelo,
sed praeest. Hie autem, quatenus intellegit veritatem, angelis qui
praesunt caelo coniungitur* Eatenus enim intellegit, quatenus in-
tellectual lumen inde sortitun
13 Sic ergo constat intellectum caelo non subiicL Sic rursus con-
stabit non subiici voluntaterru Ea profecto quae natura fiunt, de-
terminatis mediis, perducuntur ad finem, unde semper eodem
paene modo proveniunt- Natura enim ad aliquid unum determina-
tur* Electiones autem hominis diversis viis tendunt ad finem tam
in moribus quam artificiis*
14 Praeterea, quae in eadem specie sunt in naturalibus actionibus,
quae sequuntur speciem ipsam, inter se minime discrepant. Sicut
enim omnis hirundo, ut dixitnus, similiter construit nidum, sic
omnis intellectus similiter intellegit prima ilia artium morumque
principia, quae nota sunt cuique per naturam* Et omnis voluntas
similiter appetit ipsum bonum, quia bonum secundum naturam
voluntas desiderata Ea siquidem hominis natura est, ut sicut se in-
tellectus habet ad speculandi principium, quale est id quod ubique
est manifeste verum, ita voluntas ad agendi principium, quale est
ipsum bonum, ac necessario utrisque omnes assentiamur* Electio
vero est actio quaedam sequens humanam speciem, sicut discursio
rationis* Haec enim duo sunt hominis propria* Sicut ergo si homi-
nes naturae instinctu ratiocinarentur, eadem omnium hominum in
singulis rebus esset opinio, ita si ducente natura eligerent, una om-
nium esset electio. Nunc autem alii modis aliis eligunt alia, sicut et
ratiocinando iudicant varie- Quamobrem caeli voluntatem nostram
46
which it is united with those things that are said to be above the
heavens, not only is not subject to the heavens but holds sway over
them. But this soul, inasmuch as it understands the truth, is
united with the angels who rule over the heavens. For it under-
stands to the degree it has been allotted an intellectual light by
them.
Agreed then that the intellect is not subject to the heavens. 13
That the will is not subject will be agreed for the following reason.
Those things that are made by nature are led by pre-determined
means towards their end; hence it is that they always proceed in
virtually the same way. For nature is pre-determined towards some
one goal. But mans choices opt for various ways to reach their end
whether in the practice of ethical behavior or in that of the arts.
Moreover, the members of the same species do not differ 14
among themselves in the natural actions that are the result of the
species. For just as every swallow makes its nest in the same way,
as we said, so every intellect understands in the same way the first
principles of the arts and of moral behavior which are naturally
known to each person. Every will similarly desires the good be-
cause the will naturally desires the good itself. For the nature of
man is such that, just as the intellect concerns itself with the prin-
ciple of contemplating, that is, with what everywhere is manifestly
true, so the will concerns itself with the principle of doing, that is,
with the good itself; and all of us necessarily assent to both. But
choosing is a certain action tied to the human species like discur-
sive reasoning. For these two are proper to man.35 So, if men by
natural instinct were to reason discursively, they would all have the
same opinion in individual matters. In the same way, if they were
to choose under the guidance of nature, the choice of all would be
one and the same. But in actuality various men choose various
things in various ways just as in discursive reasoning they come to
various judgments. So the heavens do not move our will by natu-
ral instinct, though they do so move the body. The sense follows
47
instinctu naturae non movent, movent tamen corpus. Corporis

motum sequitur sive nuntiat sensus. Hinc saepe voluntas allicitur.
Non est autem incitamentum hoc electionis causa necessaria, quia
illi alias assentitur, alias minime. Neque tamen a caelestibus dum-
taxat corporibus humanum corpus sensusve94 movetur. Nam et
Ptolomaeus ipse concedit particulates effectus circa materiam
haudquaquam absolute sequi caelestia, quae universales remo-
taeque causae sunt, sed quatenus causae mediae tribuunt, et mobi-
lis dispositio materiae contrariis subditae causis alias et alibi aliter
accipit. Quod quidem quotidie experientia ipsa probamus in his
praesertim quae, cum simul nascantur, naturam potius speciei et
individui, loci quoque et nutrimenti, consuetudinisque sequuntur,
ut diverso modo se habeant, quam idem nascendi momentum, ut
se omnino similiter habeant. Merito igitur praecipit Ptolomaeus
astrologis ut communem potius atque possibilem, quam distinc-
tam necessariamque sententiam ferant. Addit sapientem astris vel
minantibus repugnare vel pollicentibus posse favere.
15 Non igitur credendum est assertoribus fati, dicentibus singula a
determinatis causis proficisci, causaque posita effectum necessario
sequi. Primum quidem a causa remota, quamvis necessaria, effec-
tus non necessario provenit, nisi causa insuper media fit necessa-
ria, quemadmodum in argumentationibus ex maiori propositione
necessaria atque minori contingenti necessaria conclusio sequi non
solet. Sed inter caelestes causas atque terrenos effectus mediae
causae sunt virtutes elementales, sive simplices sive mixtae, sive ac-
tivae sive passivae, quae quidem contingentes mutabilesque sunt et
impediri invicem saepissime possunt. Deinde non est necessarium,
posita hac vel ilia effectus causa determinata atque etiam suffi-
cienti, statim effectum sequi, cum possit ex concursu causae alte-
48
or announces the body's motion. Hence the will is often tempted.

But this incitement is not the necessary cause of choice, because
the will surrenders to it at some times, but not at others. Yet nei-
ther the human body nor the sense is moved only by the celestial
bodies. For even Ptolemy himself concedes that particular effects
in matter do not follow without mediation on [the motion of] the
celestials (which are universal and remote causes), but insofar only
as intermediate causes bestow them and as matter s mobile dispo-
sition, having submitted to contrary causes, receives them, some in
one way and others in another.36 Daily our experience proves this,
and especially in the case of those things which, though they are
born at the same time, develop instead according to the nature of
the species, of the individual, of the locality too and the means of
nourishment, and of custom, so that they comport themselves in a
different way rather than being tied to the same birth moment and
consequently comporting themselves in an entirely similar way. So
Ptolemy is right to tell the astrologers to deliver an opinion that is
common and possible rather than particular and necessary. He
adds that the wise man can repel the stars that threaten him and
favor those that hold out promises.37
So we should not believe those who assert the power of fate, 15
arguing that individual events proceed from necessary causes and
that, given the cause, the effect necessarily follows. In the first
place, an effect does not necessarily proceed from a remote cause,
even if it is necessary, unless the immediate cause becomes neces-
sary too. In syllogistic arguments likewise a necessary conclusion
does not usually proceed from a major necessary proposition and a
minor contingent one. But midway between celestial causes and
earthly effects are intermediate causes, the elemental powers,
whether simple or compound, active or passive, which are contin-
gent and mutable and which can frequently impede each other.
Next, given this or that determined and even sufficient cause of an
effect, it is not necessary that the effect should follow immediately,
49
rius impediri. Saepe enim sufficiens hinc causa est ad bilem, sed
inde causa quaedam sufficiens ad pituitam, atque invicem impedire
se possunt. Postremo non omnium determinatas causas possumus
designare. Quod enim sis albus causam habes propriam; item pro-
priam alteram quod sis grammaticus. Quod autem albedo gram-
maticaque concurrant, propriam non habes causam. Si enim duo-
rum quae dixi concursus ex communi quadam determinataque
causa proveniret, aliquem certe ordinem inter se haberent. De
quolibet ergo effectu dicemus non necessario apud nos ex sua
causa proficisci, quoniam impediri poterat ex alia quadam causa
per accidens concurrence. Et quamvis causam concurrentem ali-
quis in causam reduxerit altiorem, ipsum tamen concursum qui
impedit in causam quandam reducere nemo potest, ut inde
convincat impedimentum huiusmodi ex aliquo caelesti principio
proficisci. Quapropter si quae ad corpus pertinent non necessario
sequuntur astra, multo minus animi eorumque actiones stellis su-
biiciuntur.
16 Neque audeat quisquam dicere mentes hominum a supernis
mentibus moveri per caelum, tamquam per instrumentum aliquod
atque medium. Magis enim conveniunt mentes cum mentibus
quam cum corporibus, ideo inter illas mentes ac nostras caelum
non interponitur, sed potius inter mentes illas ac caelum nostrae
mentes medium obtinent. Proptereaque caeli a numinibus per
mentes hominum movendi essent potius quam nostrae inde per
caelos.
17 Dixerit forte quispiam, mentes nostras a mentibus illis absque
medio agitari. Agitent ergo, si placet, nos immo ducant.95 Sic enim
divinae erunt hominum mentes, si moventur proxime a divinis.
Erunt namque illis proximae per naturam, alioquin per naturam
aliam illis propinquiorem quasi per medium moverentur. Erunt
50
B O O K IX • C H A P T E R IV
since it can be impeded by the concurrence of another cause. For

often a cause sufficient for the bile derives from A and a cause
sufficient for the pituitary derives from B, and they are able mutu-
ally to impede each other. Finally, we cannot trace out the deter-
mined causes of all things. You have your own cause for being
pale; you have another cause likewise for being a teacher of gram-
mar and literature. But you do not have a cause of your own for
the fact that paleness and philology concur in you. For if this
aforesaid concurrence of the two came from some common and
determined cause, the two would surely have some order among
themselves. So concerning any effect we will say that it does not
necessarily proceed in us from its cause, because it could be im-
peded by some other cause concurring accidentally. And however
much someone has traced the concurrent cause back to the higher
cause, yet nobody can trace the intervening concurrence itself back
to some cause in order to prove from it that the impediment pro-
ceeded from some celestial principle. So if the things that pertain
to the body do not necessarily depend on the stars, still less are ra-
tional souls and their actions subject to the stars.
No one should dare to say that mens minds are moved by su- 16
pernal minds by way of the heavens as though the heavens were
some instrument and medium. For minds accord more with
minds than with bodies and so between those minds and our
minds the heavens are not interposed: rather, our minds occupy a
middle place between those minds and the heavens. By this ac-
count the heavenly beings should move the heavens via mens
minds rather than move our minds via the heavens.
Perhaps someone has declared that our minds are moved by the 17
supernal minds without an intermediary. Let the supernal minds
move us, if you will, or rather lead us. For mens minds will be di-
vine if they are moved directly by the divine minds. For by nature
they will be closest to the divine minds, otherwise they would be
moved as by some mean by another nature still closer to them.
5i
certe illis propinquiores quam caeli globus, postquam inde moven-

tur sine caelo. Quod si caelum putant fore perpetuum, cur non
etiam hominis animum sempiternum esse, cum sit divinis proprin-
quior? Proinde infusio, quae in mentes inferiores a superioribus
angelicisque96 transit, illuminatio potius est dicenda quam motus.
Illae siquidem suo modo tradunt, hae quoque suscipiunt suo
modo. Utrique vero sunt intellectus. Ergo intellectuale lumen est,
et quod datur et quod accipitur. Munus huiusmodi non prohibet
animum nostrum ad lumen illud suo modo converti, pro natura
sua uti, ac per illud libere ratiocinari atque eligere, praesertim quia
noster animus interdum ad deteriorem partem in consiliis sese
confert, instinctus autem mentium divinarum traheret semper ad
optimum. Quapropter humanus animus inspirationem numinum
in naturam suam trahit. Illinc quippe descendit stabilis. Ipse mo-
bilem reddit, cum ipse sit mobilis, ac deinde mobiliter agit. Itaque
nihil obstat quo minus libera sit animi actio, cum nulli proprio
moventi97 subiiciatur.
18 Plotinus, Proclusque et Avicenna disputant caelestes motus non
esse inferiorum causas, sed instrumenta potius divinis motoribus
velut artificibus obsequentia, quorum varias cogitationes caelesti-
bus corporibus figurisque et motibus, tamquam oculis nutibusque
suis, indicari nobis et futura portendere. Addunt divinorum notio-
nes caelestibus dispositionibus quasi litteris explicari, et sicut aves
volatu atque garritu auspicibus auguribusque non quae agant
ipsae, sed quae significent, creduntur ostendere, ita caelos figuris et
motibus, quae aliunde fiant, quotidie nobis significare. Quod qui-
dem ostendunt astrologi, quando in alicuius genesi iudicanda plu-
rima proferunt quae ad patres avosque et fratres, uxores, amicos
inimicosque pertinent, quorum fortuna ab alterius genesi non de-
52
Certainly they will be closer to the divine minds than the heavens'
sphere, since they are moved by them without the heavens. But if
they believe the heavens to be perpetual, then why too isn't the
soul of man everlasting, since it is closer to the divine? Conse-
quently, the influence that crosses over from higher and angelic
minds to lower minds should be called an illumination rather than
a motion. The former bestow in their own way, and the latter also
receive in their own way. But both are intellects. So the light that
is given and that which is received is intellectual. Such a gift does
not stop our thinking soul from being turned towards the light in
its own way, to use it according to its nature, and through it to rea-
son and to choose freely (especially since our thinking soul occa-
sionally turns aside in its decisions towards the worse part); but
the instinct of the divine minds would always draw [it] up towards
the best. So our human soul drags the inspiration of the divine
spirits down into its own nature. It thence descends as some-
thing stable. But the soul makes it mobile, since the soul is mobile
itself, and then it acts in a mobile way. So nothing prevents the
soul's action, since it is not subject to any mover of its own, from
being free.
Plotinus, Proclus, and Avicenna argue that the celestial motions 18
are not the causes of lower things, but rather instruments obedient
to the divine movers and craftsmen whose various thoughts are
shown to us by the celestial bodies, their figures, and motions, like
winks and nods, portending future events.38 They add that the
thoughts of the divine movers are unfolded, like letters, by celestial
dispositions, and that, just as birds are believed to disclose to
soothsayers and augurs by their flight and chattering not what
they themselves are doing but the things they signify, so the heav-
ens daily signify to us by their figures and motions what is being
enacted elsewhere. The astrologers demonstrate this when in read-
ing the birth chart of someone they adduce a number of things we
must take into consideration which pertain to fathers, uncles,
53
pendet, sed tantum significatur. Si ergo corporea, quod etiam su-

pra probavimus, neque proprie neque omnino caelestibus superio-
rum motorum instrumentis subiiciuntur, multo minus mens ipsa
subiicitur, cuius mores et artes, si quando ab astrologis praedicun-
tur, tamquam per signa potius quam per causas proferuntur. Si-
quidem superni motores non solum ilia quorum ipsi sunt causae,
sed etiam quorum mentes nostrae futurae causae sunt, et excogi-
tant ipsi secum et caelestibus nutibus saepe demonstrant. Non su-
biici autem tunc declarat maxime mens nostra voluntasque,
quando usque adeo effertur ut p e n e < s > se velit solam. Tunc
enim se quodammodo a ceteris liberat creaturis, seque ipsa ferme
contenta est. Rursus, quando in suum actum circulo se reflectit.
Circuitus enim spiritalis termino non servit extraneo. Praeterea,
quando non modo propter aliam coniecturam vult, propter aliam
non vult, sed etiam vult quod possit velle pariter atque nolle. Qua
in re videtur indifferens ad volendum pariter et nolendum, ac nulli
prorsus astricta. Item, quando eligit summam desiderii cuiusque
vacationem, nam tunc tractum proprii obiecti cuiusque dissolvit.
Potentia haec quae actum omnem interimit, proprio nulli servit
obiecto. Sed totum hoc ita planius explicemus.
19 Quotiens aliquod nobis bonum proponitur, totiens potest ani-
mus ita ratiocinari. 'Quia maximum bonum est libertas, volo earn
in me experiri quandoque. Itaque malo nunc eligendi actum reti-
nendo mei iuris esse quam huic vel illi servire volendo.' Eligit ta-
men libertatem tamquam bonam, quam saepe alias propter alia
bona postponit. Nullum igitur bonorum eligimus necessario,
quamvis necessario velimus ipsum bonum. Denique aut nusquam
motus est liber, aut liber est ubi primus. Primus in anima. Oportet
54
brothers, wives, friends, and enemies, those whose fortune does

not depend on, but is only signified by, the birth chart of another.
So if corporeals, as we also showed above, are neither properly nor
entirely subject to the celestial instruments of higher movers, still
less subject is the mind itself whose behavior and skills, whenever
astrologers predict them, are set forth by way of signs rather than
causes. This is because the supernal movers consider within them-
selves those things of which not only are they themselves the
causes but our minds are the future causes, and often they declare
them by means of celestial signs. But our mind [along with] the
will declares it is not subject principally when it reaches the point
of wanting to be alone and under its own control. For then it lib-
erates itself in a way from the rest of creatures and is quite content
just with itself. And it does so again: (a) when it bends itself in a
circle round on its own act —for a spiritual circuit is not subject to
an external end; (b) when it not only wills in response to one in-
ference and not another, but also wills the fact that it can equally
will and not will — in this event it seems to be indifferent equally
to willing and not willing and totally bound to neither; and (c)
when it chooses the total emptying of every desire—for then it re-
leases itself from the attraction of every special object. This power
which destroys all act is subject to no object of its own. But let us
explain the whole matter more clearly.
Whenever some good is set before us, the thinking soul is able 19
to reason as follows: "Because the greatest good is liberty, I wish
to experience liberty at some point in myself. Therefore at present
I prefer by retaining the act of choosing to be independent rather
than by willing [some particular action] to be subject to what I
choose," Yet the soul is choosing liberty as the good, liberty that it
often puts aside in other instances because it chooses other goods.
So we do not necessarily choose any goods, although we necessar-
ily want the good itself. Finally, motion is either nowhere free or
free where it is first. The first motion is in the soul. But the first
55
autem primum esse liberum, si modo quicquid primo tale est, per
se est tale. Quid enim dubitet actionis motum inde incipere de-
scendendo quo quaestionis motus desinit ascendendo? Desinit
vero in animi ipsius imperium, ceu cum dico me agere hoc propter
istud, istud propter illud, illud quia volo. Velle, quia placet. Pla-
cere autem mihi et insuper velle, quod placeat. Addo quinetiam
quod si forte nollem, nolle vellem. Id saepe appellat Plato per se
moveri, id est per se ac libere agere. Hinc effici vult ut liber vivat
qui agit et libere; ut nullius particularis sive boni sive mali subiicia-
tur impulsui98 qui vivit liber; ut non perdatur umquam qui violen-
tia non pulsatur.
: V :
Quinta ratio: mens absque corpore operatur.
1 Operandi modus modum sequitur existendi. Quare si anima

modo aliquo per corpus existit, nihil sine corpore umquam vel
auxilio corporis agit. Nunc autem contra contingit. Non igitur est
per corpus.
2 Audiamus primum Platonis mentem de modo quo cognos-
cendo hominis anima operatur. Quoniam anima multo est prae-
stantior corpore, et quod assidue format aliquid, est formato prae-
stantius, ideo nulla corpora, sive extra nos sint sive intra, formas
vel imagines suas pingunt in anima, sed suis quibusdam qualitati-
bus sive viribus sive imaginibus vaporem ilium pulsant calentem
atque vitalem, qui quodammodo corporis est nodus et animae, et
56
motion must be free if only [because] what is first as such is first

through itself For who doubts that the motion of action begins by
descending from the exact place where the motion of questioning
halts in its ascent? But it halts at the command of the soul: for in-
stance when I say I am doing this because of that, and that be-
cause of something else, and the latter because I want to, and I
want to because it pleases me, and it pleases me to want to because
it pleases me. Furthermore, I add that if perhaps I do not want to,
I want not to want to. Plato often calls this being self-moved,39
that is, acting through oneself and freely. Hence he intends it to
come about: (a) that he who also acts freely might live as a free
man; (b) that he who lives as a free man might be free from the vi-
olent impulse of any particular thing whether good or bad; and (c)
that he who is not shaken by violence might never be destroyed.
: V :
Fifth proof: the mind operates without the body.
The mode of operating follows on the mode of existing. So if the i

soul exists in any way through the body, it never acts without the
body or the body's help. But in fact the opposite happens. So it
does not exist through the body.
First let us listen to Plato's view on how man's soul operates in 2
knowing.40 Since the soul is far more excellent than the body and
what continually forms something is more outstanding than what
is formed, bodies, whether outside us or within, do not embroider
their forms or images at all on the soul. Rather, with their particu-
lar qualities or powers or images, they strike upon that warm liv-
ing vapor which is in a sense the knot of the soul and body and
called the "spirit" by the natural philosophers. For if those bodies
57
spiritus a physicis appellatur. Si enim corpora ilia cum spiritu hoc

conveniunt in materia, cum anima vero non conveniunt, rationa-
lius est spiritum ab illis formari quam animam. Quae tam longe
abest quod formetur a corpore, ut ipsa potius revera sit et forma
corporis et formatrix: formatrix quidem sui corporis per naturam;
aliorum vero per artem." Anima igitur rationalis, quae fons est
corporalium motionum, movet quidem ipsa corpora, a corporibus
non movetur. Moveretur autem ab illis, si formaretur inde. Sed
spiritus qui est animae currus, a corporibus quibusque pulsatur.
Pulsatio huiusmodi non latet animam. Ut talis quaedam passio
sive agitatio spiritus animam non latet, sentire dicimur. Statim
vero ex hoc subito sentiendi actu vis interior animi ad opus aliud
huic persimile excitatur. Nam ubi per oculi spiritum colores, per
aurium spiritus sonos, perque alios alia attingit, ipsa sua quadam
vi, per quam praeest corporibus eorumque semina possidet non
minus in cognoscendi quam in alendi virtute, mox colorum sono-
rumque et reliquorum simulacra penitus spiritalia vel denuo conci-
pit in seipsa, vel olim concepta parturit colligitque in unum. Hanc
imaginationem in superioribus nuncupavimus. Posuimus postea
phantasiam paulo hac superiorem, per corporum imagines ferme
similiter pervagantem; intellectum denique longo intervallo emi-
nentiorem, quemadmodum declaravimus.
3 Quando anima sentit quippiam, apud Platonicos dicitur operari
per corpus, non quia ipsa simul et corpus sentiat. Sicut enim
anima fons est vivendi (ut Plato ait), ita et sentiendi. Praeterea
oculis auribusve saepe obiecta sua praesentia sunt. Si tamen ani-
mus attentius quicquam intra se secum agitat, non prius sentiun-
tur quam animus ad talia revertatur, quasi non membra haec, sed
58
make contact with this spirit in matter, but do not make contact
with the soul, it is more reasonable for the spirit, not the soul, to
be formed by them. The soul is so far from being formed by body
that it is rather in truth both the form of, and the formgiver to,
the body, the giver of form to its own body naturally and to other
bodies by way of art and skill. So the rational soul, the source of
all corporeal motions, does indeed move the bodies themselves but
is not moved by them. It would be moved by them, however, if it
were formed by them. But the spirit which is the soul's chariot is
assailed by every body. These blows are not hidden from the soul.
Insofar as this particular passion or agitation of the spirit is not
concealed from the soul, we say it feels. As a result of this sudden
action of feeling, the soul's internal power is immediately aroused
to perform another action similar to this one. For the soul comes
into contact with colors through the spirit in the eye, and with
sounds through the spirits in the ears, and with other sensations
through the other senses, and does so with the particular power
which gives it control over bodies and possession of their seeds in
its cognitive no less than in its nutritive capacity. When it does so,
either it conceives in itself anew the entirely spiritual images of
colors, of sounds, and of the rest; or it gives birth to old concep-
tions and gathers them into one. In the above we called this power
the imagination. Afterwards we posited the phantasy as a little
higher than the imagination, wandering as it does in the same way
almost through the images of bodies. Finally, there is intellect,
which is vastly superior, as we have shown.
When the soul senses something, the Platonists say that it is 3
operating through the body, but not because it and the body per-
ceive simultaneously. For just as the soul is the fount of living, as
Plato says,41 so too is it the fount of sensation. Moreover, its ob-
jects are often present to its eyes or ears. Yet if the thinking soul is
more attentive to something it is mulling over inside itself, then
such objects are not perceived until the soul reverts to them. It is
59
interior ipsa animi nostri natura vim habeat sentiendi. Quae ta-
men vis sentiendi non sentit, nisi dum corporalis spiritus a corpo-
ribus agitatur. Quando per imaginationem vel phantasiam agit, di-
citur per corporis auxilium operari, quia revolvitur per imagines
singulas, quae singula referunt corpora et per impulsum corporalis
spiritus a corporibus factum conceptae fuerunt. Ac etiam quia
tanta est inter has internas imagines spiritumque cognatio, ut re-
volutionem imaginum factam intrinsecus sequatur semper spiritus
ipsius vibratio, atque vicissim spiritus huius vibrationem comitetur
ut plurimum imaginum revolution Quando per intellegentiam ali-
quid speculatur et eligit, dicitur et sine corpore et sine auxilio cor-
poris operari, quoniam etiam absque impulsu illo spiritus et
absque imaginibus inde collectis aliquid videt eligitque ab illis
prorsus alienissimum. Mitto in praesentia quod Peripatetici vires
sentiendi omnes in anima quidem secundum originem, in compo-
sito vero secundum formam ponunt; intellegendi autem in sola
anima collocant. Atque hoc pacto illas per corpus agere, hanc vero
etiam sine corpore arbitrantur, verumtamen naturaliter se ad ima-
gines corporalis sensus tamdiu convertere, quamdiu animus cor-
pus naturaliter habitat. Quod autem postrema haec operatio
quandoque sine corporali subsidio fiat et priores illae semper per
corporis auxilium, haec quae subiiciam signa nobis ostendent.
4 Primum. Vis ipsa animae quae corpore utitur,100 quaecumque
ilia sit, instrumentum suum non percipit. Quis enim gustu lin-
guam suam gustat? Quis per imaginationem vel phantasiam co-
gnovit spirituum imaginumque naturam, quae vix post diuturnas
60
as though it were not the sense instruments but the inner nature
of our rational soul that has the power of sensation. Yet this
power of sensation does not perceive except when the bodily spirit
is set in motion by bodies. When it acts by way of the imagination
or the phantasy, we say it is acting with the body's help, (a) be-
cause it is cycled through the individual images (which refer to in-
dividual bodies and were conceived through the impact made by
bodies on the corporeal spirit); and (b) because the bond between
these internal images and the spirit is so close that a vibration of
the spirit always follows on the cycling of the images enacted
within, and in turn the cycling of the images usually accompanies
the vibration of this spirit. When the soul contemplates or elects
something through the intelligence, we say that it is acting without
the body or the body's help, because even without that impulse of
the spirit, and without the images collected from it, it sees and
chooses something totally different from them. At the moment I
will ignore the fact that the Aristotelians put all the powers of sen-
sation in the soul in terms of their origin, but in the soul com-
pounded [with body] in terms of their form; but they put the
power of understanding in the soul alone.42 For this reason they
suppose that the powers of sensation operate through the body,
but the power of understanding operates even without the body,
and yet that it naturally turns itself back towards the images of
bodily sense as long as the rational soul naturally inhabits the
body. Several proofs I am about to present will show us that the
last operation does on occasion take place without the help of the
body, while the prior operations always require the body's assis-
tance.
First proof. The power of the soul that uses the body, whatever 4
that power might be, does not perceive its own instrument. For
who in tasting tastes his own tongue? Who knows the nature of
spirits and images by using the imagination or the phantasy, when
that nature can scarcely be known even after the mind's long in-
61
mentis discussiones agnoscitur? Pateret autem cuique et facillime,

si per imaginationem et phantasiam cognosceretur.
5 Secundum signum. Vis talis quam uti diximus corpore neque
seipsam noscit neque propriam actionem. Si visus proprie101 ex eo
quod videt perciperet se videre, semper dum videmus aliquid, vi-
dere adverteremus. Quod minime fit. Saepe namque praesentem
hominem patentibus oculis videmus; quoniam vero tunc vis inte-
rior animae ad aliud intenta est, videre nos nequaquam animadver-
timus, quasi actus huiusmodi non a visu, sed a vi quadam inte-
riori, quando expedita est, percipiatur. Praeterea, actus videndi ac
similes quodammodo incorporales sunt; sensus autem illi sola cor-
poralia noscunt. Si actiones suas hae vires ignorant, ignorant
quoque seipsas. Quid enim aliud certa quaedam vis est, nisi prin-
cipium certo modo quodam et proprio operandi? Ergo qui opera-
tionem nescit, nescit et operandi modum. Nescit quoque pro-
prium sic operandi principium. Itaque sensus quinque seipsos
ignorant. Sed neque etiam imaginatio et phantasia se noscunt.
Nam cum omnes duabus his animae viribus semper utantur, om-
nes facillime quam naturam hae vires habent cognoscerent. Nunc
vero vix illi ista noverunt, qui diuturno mentis examine quaesivere.
6 Tertium signum. Quando vehemens aliquid viribus iis obiicitur
quod nos violentius agitet, ita eas occupat ut res debiliores non
bene percipiantur, neque ipso eodem tempore, neque postea ad
tempus. Oculus noster adversis quandoque solis radiis obrutus,
colores alios neque tunc neque postea per aliquod temporis spa-
tium dispicit.102 Idem accidit auribus ex strepitu et tonitru vehe-
menti; idem quoque sensibus ceteris. Idem imaginationi et phan-
62
quiry? But the nature would be obvious to everyone and very eas-
ily so, if it could be known through the imagination and the
phantasy.
Second proof. Such a power as we have described using the 5
body does not know itself or its own activity. If sight perceived
that it was seeing specifically from the fact that it was seeing, we
would always realize that we were seeing whenever we saw any-
thing. This does not happen. Often we see a man present in front
of our eyes, but because the soul's inner power is concentrating on
something else, we do not realize we are seeing at all. This sug-
gests that this act of seeing is perceived not by the sight but by an
inner power when it is not otherwise occupied. Furthermore, the
act of seeing and similar acts are in a way incorporeal; but the
senses know only the corporeal. If the [sensory] powers do not
know their own actions, then they also do not know themselves.
For what is a particular power other than the principle of acting in
a fixed and peculiar way? So a sense that does not know [its] ac-
tion does not know its mode of acting and also does not know its
own principle of acting. So the five senses do not know them-
selves. But neither do the imagination and the phantasy know
themselves. For, since all men always use these two powers of the
soul, they should all know, and know with the utmost ease, what
nature these powers possess. In point of fact however, those who
have spent long periods turning such matters over carefully in
their minds hardly know about them.
Third proof. When something powerful enough to set up a vio- 6
lent disturbance in us confronts these [sensory] powers, it seizes
hold of them to the point that they cannot well perceive weaker
objects either at the same moment or for some time afterwards.
When our eye has been blinded at some point by the direct rays of
the sun, it cannot distinguish various colors clearly either then or
for some interval of time afterwards. The same thing happens to
the ears deafened by excessive noise or violent thunder; and to the
63
PLATONIC THEOLOGY
tasiae, quotiens horrendis quibusdam imaginibus occupantur.

Quod ostendit huiusmodi virium actum cum spiritus vibratione
concurrere atque e converso. Quemadmodum sensus motusque
araneae in media tela manentis, tensis undique filis et advolantibus
muscis, tremorem telae undique sequitur atque contra, telae tre-
mor araneae motum. Profecto hoc monstrat eas vires materiae esse
propinquas, cum saepe ab obiecto quasi vincantur et corporalium
passionum reliquiae103 in spiritu remanentes ad tempus eas
confundant.104
7 Quartum signurru Ab obiecto potentiori non modo actus dis-
cernendi confunditur, sed laesio fit in nobis atque molestia, quasi
laeso spiritu corporali; his quoque a viribus ex mutuo quodam usu
nonnulla contingat offensio.
8 Quintum. Qualitatem imaginemque sibi familiarem non appre-
hendunt. Candor em suum vel imaginem per quam intuetur, non
videt oculus. Calorem suum tactus non iudicat, ac etiam si calor
aliquis alienus evadat ipsi familiaris, non sentit. Quod fieri solet in
iis qui ethica febre laborant, quorum tactus nequaquam persentit
febrem. Vim suam et habitum et conceptas imagines imaginatio
quoque et phantasia prorsus ignorant. Vix enim ratio talia reperit.
9 Sextum. Post aetatis septimum vel octavum septenarium,
quando complexio corporis ad terrestrem qualitatem paulatim in-
cipit declinare, resolutis aut nimium densatis tepefactisque spiriti-
bus, hebescit visus, auditus obtunditur, olfactus obstruitur, riget
gustus, tactus arescit, imaginationis phantasiaeque solita velocitas
retardatur.
io Septimum. Quanto diutius laborant sensus, tanto magis debili-
tati sentiunt peius atque confusius. Si enim per horam aliquid
64
other senses also. The same happens to the imagination and the
phantasy whenever they are seized by particularly frightening im-
ages. This shows that the action of such powers coincides with the
vibration of the spirit and vice versa. It is as though a spider were
lurking at the center of its web when the threads are drawn tight
and flies fly into it; its feelings and movements respond to the
webs every tremor and likewise the web trembles in response to
the movement of the spider. This shows without question that
these powers are close to matter, since they are often overwhelmed
as it were by an object, and the remnants of corporeal passions lin-
gering in the spirit for a while confound them.
Fourth proof. Not only is the act of perceiving confounded by a 7
more powerful object, but hurt and annoyance trouble us, as
though our bodily spirit were hurt. We incur some injury from
these [sensory] powers too because of a shared use of the spirit.
Fifth proof. The senses do not apprehend a quality and image 8
that is their own. The eye does not see its own brightness or the
image that enables it to see. The sense of touch does not judge its
own warmth, and even if some other warmth becomes its own, it
does not feel it. This usually happens to people suffering from
hectic fever43 whose sense of touch does not feel the fever at all.
The imagination and the phantasy too have no knowledge of their
power, their habitual condition, or the images they have conceived.
For the reason scarcely considers these things.
Sixth proof. After the age of seventy-seven or seventy-eight, 9
when the [humoral] complexion of the body begins gradually to
tip toward the terrestrial quality, and when the spirits become dis-
persed or else too concentrated and overheated, then our sight
grows dim, our hearing impaired, our sense of smell dulled, our
ability to taste less sharp, our touch less sensitive, and our imagi-
nation and phantasy lose their customary speed.
Seventh proof. The senses, the longer they have to work, the 10
weaker they become and the more imperfectly and confusedly they
65
fixus inspexeris, caligabis, quia resolutis spiritibus vel obscuratis,

non clarent in eis rerum sensibilium qualitates imaginesque quas
sentias.
11 Octavum. Certum quoddam rerum genus attingunt, non omnia
genera. Quinque sensus sua quisque, ut patet, genera qualitatum,
imaginatio phantasiaque proprias harum qualitatum conditiones.
Haec et huiusmodi alia viribus animae utentibus corpore solent
accidere; contraria vero accidunt intellectui. Ergo intellectus non
utitur corpore. Quod autem contraria menti contingant, animad-
verted05 Vires illae seipsas ignorant; mens autem se novit. Invenit
enim se esse, et in qua rerum specie sit, et quam vim habeat. Vires
illae instrumenta quaedam habent atque ilia ignorant. Intellectus
instrumentum habet nullum, et si quod haberet, cognosceret,
postquam et seipsum cognoscit et alia, ac inter se et alia instru-
mentum illud collocaretur.
12 Quod si quis mentem habere dixerit instrumentum, perconta-
bimur numquid illud corporale sit an se aliter habeat. Si corporate
respondent, ita per argumentationem peripateticam refelletur.
Omne instrumentum corporale in aliqua specie corporum conti-
netur per formam aliquam sibi propriam. Si tali quodam instru-
m e n t intellectus utatur, non sincere de rebus corporalibus feret
sententiam. Nam quicquid per tale instrumentum percipietur,
qualitate illius infectum, non tale penitus apparebit quale revera
ipsum fiierit, sed quale fuerit instrumentum, ut per rubentes ocu-
los apparet aer rubens, per croceos vero croceus. Quo factum est
ut pupilla omni careat colore, quo possit omnes colores pure susci-
pere. Sic omni corporea qualitate carere oporteret mentis instru-
mentum, ut sincere per ipsum discerneret omnes. Non tamen ca-
66
perceive. If you look at something steadily for an hour, your sight

will blur because the spirits are dispersed or lose their brightness,
and the qualities and images of the sensible objects you perceive
will no longer stand out so distinctly in them.
Eighth proof. The senses do not come into contact with every n
kind of object, but only with a particular kind. Each of the five
senses obviously has contact with its own kinds of qualities; and
the imagination and the phantasy [each] perceives the proper con-
ditions of these qualities. These and the like customarily happen
to the souls powers using the body, but the opposite happens to
the intellect. Thus the intellect does not use the body; but note
that the opposite happens to the intellect. The powers do not
know themselves, but the mind does know itself. For it discovers
that it exists, in what species it exists, and what power it has. The
powers make use of certain instruments yet do not know them.
The intellect has no instrument at all, but if it did, it would know
it, since it knows itself and others; and that instrument would be
located between itself and others.
If anyone were to claim that the mind has an instrument [as in 12
the first proof above], we would ask him whether it is corporeal or
in some other condition. If the answer is that it is corporeal, we
would use the Peripatetic argument to prove him wrong as fol-
lows. Every corporeal instrument is contained in some species of
body through some form proper to it. If the intellect uses such an
instrument, it will be unable to make unbiased judgments about
corporeal objects. For anything which is perceived by means of
such an instrument will be infected by its quality and so it will not
appear as it really is, but rather as the instrument is, just as air
looks red through red eyes and yellow through yellow eyes. Ac-
cordingly, the pupil lacks all color, so that it can simply and purely
receive all colors. Thus the minds instrument would have to lack
every corporeal quality in order for the mind to use it truly to dis-
cern all things. Yet it would not lack every quality if it were a
67
reret omni, si corpus esset, haberet igitur aliquam. Quam vero

haberet, non acciperet. Itaque illius similes qualitates per illud
mens non cognosceret, quemadmodum tactus, cuius instrument
turn certam habet caliditatem, similem omnino caliditatem non
sentit. Sed neque etiam qualitates illius dissimiles pure discerne-
ret, quia illae per illius qualitatem prius inficerentur, quam mens
adverteret. Denique per instmmentum quod esset corpus, quod
esset in certo aliquo genere corporum, quod esset aliquid singulare
loco ac tempore circumscriptum, non cognosceret mens praestan-
tius aliquid quam corpora, neque ilia quidem omnia, sed certum
quoddam genus rerum corporearum, quemadmodum singuli
quinque sensus per singula instrumenta singula sentiunt genera
corporalium- Postremo universale aliquid per singulare instrument
turn non comprehenderet.
13 Experimur tamen nos per mentem universalia nosse, quando
quae diversa videntur convenire simul in natura aliqua reperimus,
quando singula quaeque in unam reducimus speciem, quando rem
singularem ac propriam cum communi comparantes, differre uni-
versale a particulari censemus, Comparare autem invicem duo
haec non possumus aliter quam per virtutem unam quae utraque
comprehendat. Quotiens recta ratione genus quoddam rerum ve-
rissimarum ab omni corporum genere ita secernimus, ut in illo ni-
hil corporale cernamus, totiens quicquid dici potest corporale reii-
cimus. Non tamen possumus per corporeum instrumentum
cuncta reiicere corporalia, quia ipsum saltern instrumentum per
ipsummet instrumentum repelli non potest. Et quando abstractam
conspicimus speciem perque illam unimus, turn nos formis ratio-
nibusque abstractis, turn nobis easdem, tunc corporeum instru-
mentum iis interpositum impedimento esset potius quam adiu-
68
body: thus it would have some one quality. But the quality it
would have, it would not itself interpret. So the mind would not
know the qualities like the instrument through the instrument,
just as the sense of touch, whose instrument possesses a kind of
warmth, does not feel a like warmth at all. The mind would not
even perceive clearly the qualities that were unlike the instrument s
quality, because they would be infected by the instrument's quality
before the mind could discern them. Finally, if it were using an in-
strument, (a) which was a body, (b) which was in a particular class
of bodies, and (c) which was something confined to a particular
place and time, then the mind would not know anything higher
than bodies. It would not even know all bodies, but just one par-
ticular class of bodies, just as the five senses each perceive the indi-
vidual classes of body through their individual instruments. Even-
tually the mind would not grasp anything universal through its
particular instrument.
Nevertheless, we do attempt through the mind to know univer- 13
sals when we discover that apparently diverse objects coincide si-
multaneously in some nature, or when we reduce a number of par-
ticulars to a single species, or when we compare what is specific
and individual with what is general and thus move to separate the
universal from the particular. We could not compare these two to-
gether except by way of some one power that comprehended both.
Every time, using right reasoning, we distinguish a class of truly
existent entities from every class of body in such a way that we
perceive nothing corporeal in the former, we are at the same time
rejecting whatever can be called corporeal. But we cannot reject ev-
erything corporeal by way of a corporeal instrument because the
instrument at least cannot be rejected by itself. When we contem-
plate an abstract species and through it try either to unite our-
selves with the abstract forms and principles or them with us, then
any corporeal instrument interposed between us and them would
be a hindrance rather than a help. It would be totally different
69
mento. Nam et diversissimum est ab illis et inferius admodum et

distantiam affert multo magis quam unionem.
14 Cum haec ita se habeant, mens uti non potest instrumento ali-
quo corporali. Sed numquid alio? Prorsus nullo. Nam si quis illi
aliud quodvis instrumentum adiunxerit, sciscitabimur utrum pos-
sit absque ipso intellegere aliquid an nihil? Si potest, instrumento
non eget. Sed dicet aliquis non posse; nos contra posse asseverabi-
mus. Iam enim quisque fatebitur intellectum nosse seipsum, in
qua cognitione nullo utitur instrumento. Nam si aliquo uteretur
ad se capiendum, illud certe caderet medium inter mentem et
mentis ipsius essentiam, quae ab ipsa per illud comprehenderetur.
Ubi extraneum aliquid esset menti propinquius quam essentia
mentis. Et quando potentia mentis reflectitur in potentiam sive ac-
tus in actum, nullum ibi interponitur instrumentum. Medium
enim assumi solet propter convenientiam cum extremis. Nullum
vero instrumentum cum potentia et actu magis quam potentia ac-
tusque convenit. Quisque etiam confitebitur intellectum, si habeat
instrumentum, ipsum non ignorare. Nam ob id in primis videmur
ipsum non ignorare,106 quod esse ipsum asseveramus, et tale esse
addimus ut intellectui serviat. Quinetiam, si intellectus noscit
seipsum ac etiam externa107 obiecta, necesse est ut instrumentum
quoque nonnunquam noverit per quod a se transit in obiecta intel-
legendo. Praeterea, quando per obiecta iam nota in actum suum se
vertit, perque actum in virtutem atque substantiam, nonne cogitur
in hac ipsa regressione etiam in instrumentum suum, si quod ha-
bet, incurrere, cum illud inter actum mentis et virtutem sit me-
dium? Ubi instrumentum suum agnoscere cogitur. Sed utrum
70
• B O O K IX • C H A P T E R V •
from them and very much inferior, and produce separation rather
than union.
Given this situation, the mind cannot use any corporeal instru- 14
ment. But what about some other kind? Absolutely not. For if
somebody were to attach some other instrument to the mind, we
would ask whether without it the mind can understand anything
or nothing. If it can understand something, then it does not need
the instrument. But were someone to argue it cannot, we would
maintain to the contrary that it can. For everyone acknowledges
that the intellect knows itself and in this knowing does not use an
instrument at all. For if the mind did use an instrument to know
itself, then that instrument would inevitably intervene between the
mind and the mind s essence that was comprehended by the mind
through the instrument. In that case, something external to the
mind would be closer to the mind than the minds essence. But
when the minds potentiality reflects on its potentiality or its act
on its act, no instrument intervenes. Ordinarily, the reason for
positing an intermediary is that it is compatible with the two ex-
tremes. But no instrument is more compatible with potentiality
and act than potentiality and act. Everyone also admits that if the
intellect had an instrument it would not be ignorant of it. For we
are obviously not ignorant of the instrument in that our main as-
sertion is that it exists and additionally that it exists to serve the
intellect. Moreover, if the intellect knows both itself and external
objects, it must of necessity at some point know the instrument
too by means of which, in the process of understanding, it passes
out of itself into the objects. Furthermore, when the mind reverts
to its act by way of the objects it now knows, and then by way of
the act reverts to its power and substance, is it not compelled in
this process of reflection to come into contact with its instrument
too if it has one, since it would be the intermediary between the
act of the mind and its power? In which case it is compelled to
know its instrument. But does the mind know or not know its
7i
mens agnoscit instrumentum suum per instrumentum aliquod

necne? Si per aliquod, quaero de alio atque alio rursus in infini-
tum. Si per nullum, ergo non eget instrumento ad cognoscendum,
postquam ipsum sine instrumento cognoscit. Ibi sane quod instru-
mentum dicitur obiectum quiddam potius est quam medium, Ac
si ab hoc in aliud transeat cognoscendo, non de medio in obiec-
tum, sed de obiecto priori in posterius currit obiectum.
15 Sed dixerit forte quispiam instrumentum a mente cognosci,
non per instrumentum aliquod, sed per ipsummet instrumentum.
Ego autem quaeram utrum per ipsam essentiam instrumenti an
per ipsius imaginem? Non primum, quia mens semper illud co-
gnosceret, cum semper ad illud similiter comparetur. Quod si per
imaginem fiat, iam illud quod instrumentum appellabatur obiec-
tum est potius quod cognoscitur quam instrumentum per quod
aliquid cognoscatur. Atque imago ipsa cognosci potest nullo in-
strumento intercedente, cum ipsum necessario antecedat, prout in-
ter ipsum animamque est media. Iam igitur intellectus tam seip-
sum quam quod extra ipsum est absque aliquo instrumento
cognoscit. Proinde eo ipso quod vere simplicia veramque simplici-
tatem excogitamus, concludunt Platonici, id quod ita in nobis ex-
cogitat, neque ex intellectu et instrumento constitui, neque ex
anima corporeque componi, sed mentem simplicem solamque
existere. Per se igitur mens operatur, et hoc etiam pacto nuncupat
Plato per se moveri. Ergo per se vivit vivitque semper.
16 Pergamus ad signum tertium. Vires illae a vehementi obiecto
confunduntur ut non discernant debiliora. Mens contra quando
magnifica et ardua videt, turn in illis, turn post ilia clarius et faci-
72
own instrument through some instrument? If it is through an-

other instrument, then I shall inquire about that other and about
another ad infinitum. If it is not through one at all, then it does not
need an instrument for knowing, since it [now] knows the instru-
ment without an instrument. What is called an instrument is in
fact an object rather than a means. And if, in the process of know-
ing, the mind were to proceed from one instrument to another,
then it is moving, not from a means to an object, but from a prior
object to a posterior one.
But perhaps someone will argue that the mind gets to know the 15
instrument not through some other instrument but through the
instrument itself [as in the second proof above]? But I will ask
whether it does so through the instrument's essence or its image?
Not the first, because the mind would always know it, since it is
always linked with it in the same way. But if it occurs through the
image, then that which was called the instrument is itself the ob-
ject which is known rather than the instrument through which
something else is known. And the image itself can be known with-
out any mediating instrument because it would necessarily precede
it insofar as it is the mean between the instrument and the soul.
So the intellect knows both itself and what lies outside itself with-
out the use of any instrument. Consequently, because we think
about things which are truly simple and about true simplicity, that
which thinks in us, the Platonists conclude, is neither constituted
from the intellect and an instrument, nor compounded from the
soul and a body, but exists as pure and simple mind. So the mind
acts through itself, and this is also why Plato calls it a self-mover.44
Thus it lives through itself and lives forever.
Let us take up the third proof [above]. The sensory powers are 16
so confounded by a powerful object that they cannot make out
weaker objects. Contrariwise, the mind, when it sees things that
are noble and sublime, discerns lesser and more trivial objects
73
lius minora et leviora discernit, utpote quae magna sit, magnisque

pascatur et crescat,
17 Pergamus ad quartum et reliqua. Vires aliae potenti offendun-
tur obiecto, mens nullius rei vel immensae consideratione offendi-
tur, quasi certae cuidam humorum commensurationi non sit ob-
noxia, Tardius quidem maxima reperit, quoniam alienis implicata
non indagat, Expedita invenit ocius,108 et inventis turn clarescit
mirifice tamquam parata prorsus ad ilia, turn incomparabili volup-
tate completur, tamquam illis quam proxima, Quis hie non videat
infinitam quodammodo esse vim mentis quae nullo finito supere-
tur obiecto?
18 Aliae praeterea vires, qualitates imaginesque sibi familiares
ignorant; mens autem quidnam familiarium nesciat? Quae et fa-
miliaritatem ipsam definit, et semetipsam videt, actum suum intel-
legendo, ac speciem per quam intellegit, et habitum et virtutem,
Secum igitur habitat mens, Sui ergo ipsius est domicilium. Res
quaelibet loco naturali servatur, ideo servatur a seipsa mens ma-
netque inde semper incolumis, Accedit quod robustiores, quan-
tum spectat ad operationes naturales, semper sensualesque saepe
aliis se melius habent; quantum vero ad intellegentiam, neque
semper neque saepe, quasi intellegentia corporis non sit comes,
Adde quod sensuum naturae per senectutem in operatione defi-
ciunt; mentis vero oculus tunc cernit clarius, fiigatis nebulis iuveni-
lium vitiorum. Divine enim Plato: 'Non florescit, inquit, virtus
animi, nisi virtus corpore deflorescat,' Non acuitur mentis acies,
nisi corporis acies hebetetur. Tunc divinarum rerum sapientia vi-
74
more distinctly and easily both in and subsequent to the powers:

being mighty itself, it feasts and waxes on mighty things.45
Let us proceed to the fourth proof and the remaining proofs 17
[above]. Other powers are shaken by a powerful object. But the
mind is not shaken by the consideration of anything, however
vast: it is as though it were not subject to a particular balancing of
the humors. Admittedly, it discovers the greatest objects more
slowly because it is not looking for them, being immersed in unre-
lated matters; but once freed, it finds them rapidly. Having found
them, it shines with a wonderful brilliance as if totally prepared
for them; and it is filled with an incomparable joy as if it were as
close to them as possible. Who cannot see in this that the power
of the mind is in a way infinite since a finite object never over-
comes it?
Moreover, the other powers ignore the qualities and images that 18
are part and parcel of them, but does the mind not know some-
thing of its own? It defines the very state of having as ones own; it
sees itself when it understands its own act; it sees the form by
which it understands; and it sees its own habitual condition and
power. So the mind dwells within itself. So it is its own domicile.
Any object is protected in its natural location, so the mind is pro-
tected by itself and remains there always unharmed. Moreover,
with regard to natural activities the physically strong always, and
the sensual often, are better off than others; but with regard to un-
derstanding they are neither always nor often so: it is as if under-
standing were not the body's companion. Then too, with age the
natures of the senses grow weaker in their operation, but the
mind's eye sees more distinctly after the clouds of youthful vices
have been put to flight. Plato puts it in his divine manner: "The
power of the rational soul does not blossom until the power in the
body decays."46 The mind's edge is not sharp until the body's edge
is blunted. Then wisdom concerning matters divine is at its most
resilient, prudence in human affairs attains its peak, and modera-
75
get, humanarum prudentia consumatur, aequitas pollet atque

cons tan tia. Et quod maius est, neque vis etiam ipsa proprie sen-
tiendi, quae est in anima, senio vel morbo deperditur, quamvis
oculo laeso actus eius intermittatur, ex eo quod non satis sincere
repraesentantur obiecta. Nam et calamo fracto cess at actus scri-
bendi; ars vero scribendi in animo remanet integra. Quod ars de-
trimentum inde nullum susceperit, hinc patet, quod interim in
seipso scribit et calamo restituto arbitratu scribit suo. Idem fieret
si elingui curaretur lingua, et si pes claudo; idem si caeco vel lippo
oculus curaretur, quasi in corpore damnum fuerit, non in anima.
Saepe enim purgato oculo mox videmus. Quod aut non fieret, aut
iam, etiam sanato corpore, fieret sero, si ipsa videndi109 vis defecis-
set, quae certum restitutionis suae tempus exigeret, postquam cor-
pus exegit suae. Scite Aristoteles: 'Si praestes,' inquit, 'seni iuvenis
oculum, videbit penitus sicut iuvenis. Si sensus, qui certis partibus
corporis adscribuntur, neque laesis partibus ipsis neque senio vim
amittunt, mens, quae adscribitur nullis, neque laeso toto corpore
neque umquam deficiet.'
19 Hie succurrit nobis ratio ilia quam affert in decimo De republica
Socrates apud Platonem, quod per nullum corporis morbum ra-
tionalis animus moriatur. 'Quo enim pacto,' inquit, corporis
morbo peribit qui proprio morbo non deficit?' Corpus siquidem
nostrum non alieno perit morbo, sed suo. Quod si cibi vitio et ae-
ris putredine interit, non prius per hoc perit quam ex hoc in
proprium incidat morbum, quo proprie morbo dissolvitur. Ac si
morbo proprio non periret, numquam etiam alieno. Nam si non
76
tion and constancy prevail* More importantly, even the power of

perceiving, being in the soul, is not strictly speaking destroyed by
old age or disease, although, if the eye is injured, its activity may
be interrupted because objects are not being represented distinctly
enough. For, if the pen breaks, the act of writing stops; but the
writing skill remains intact in the soul. It is obvious that this skill
suffers no harm at all because, within itself, it continues to write
meanwhile; and once the pen has been restored, it writes at will.
The same thing would happen if the tongue of a mute or a lame
mans leg were healed; and the same if the eyesight of a blind or
half-blind man were restored. It is as if the damage were in the
body, not in the soul. Often after the eye has been bathed we see
immediately. Either this would not happen, or it would happen
much later after the body too had been healed, if the actual power
of seeing had failed: it would need a certain period of time to re-
cover, since the body needs to recover. Aristotle shrewdly observes:
"If you give an old man a young mans eye, he will see just like a
young man. If the senses which are allocated to specific parts of
the body do not lose their power because of damage to those
parts or through old age, then the mind, which belongs to no par-
ticular part, will not fail either when the whole body is damaged
or at any time."47
At this point we can avail ourselves of the argument that Socra- 19
tes, in Plato's account, sets forth in the tenth book of the Republic,
to the effect that the rational soul does not die because of any dis-
ease of the body. "How will it die of a disease of the body," he
asks, "when it does not succumb to its own disease?"48 Our body
does not indeed die of any alien disease, but of its own. If it dies
from contaminated food and putrid air, it does not do so until
through them it has first succumbed to its own disease: strictly
speaking, it is destroyed by its own disease. If it did not perish
from its own disease, it would never do so from an external dis-
ease. If it were not laid low by a fever, it would not be laid low by
77
laedatur febre, insalubri cibo vel aere non laedetur. Animus autem
propria labe, id est iniquitate, non pent. Iniquus enim animus non
minus est animus et vitalis quam sit aequus. Ergo non perit corpo-
ris 110 morbo. Accedit quod corporis morbus animo non infert vi-
tium ipsius animi proprium, quoniam animus, corpore aegrotante,
non fit iniquior, sed emendatur saepe et morum studio proficit.
20 Quapropter morbus corporis non modo non perdit, sed neque
vitiat animum. Ac si quandoque, aegrotante corpore, laedi mens
videatur, non tamen est ita. Otiatur mens ibi forte etiam vel in
seipsa agit vel circa humana negotiatur; non laeditur. Socrates
quando vel ludebat cum liberis vel eos curabat languentes, philo-
sophiae sublimioris habitum quidem non amittebat, licet vel 111
non philosopharetur tunc ullo modo, vel non philosopharetur
egregie, dum scientiae actum ad viliora consideranda distraheret.
Animus noster in corporis oblectamentis ludit cum ipso saepe; in
eius languoribus regit et curat. In utroque statu intermittitur vel
remittitur sublimis ilia rationis consideratio, quia vel otiatur ad
tempus, vel anxie nimium circa viliora negotiatur; re vero pacata
resurgit. Ita natura comparatum est, ut ad diversa simul opera
quantum ad humanas vires attinet, non satis sufficiamus. Convivae
epulis intenti non bene lyrae modulos audiunt. Dum anima mul-
turn concoquit cibum in stomacho, humanae contemplationis
munus remittit, ideo tunc hebetari videmur. Dum attentius specu-
lator, aegre cibus concoquitur. Hinc saepe corpore languent philo-
sophantes, non languent animo, sed intellegentia tantum excellunt,
quantum deficiunt corpore.
78
bad food or air. The soul, however, does not perish from its own
harm, that is, from iniquity or injustice; for an unjust soul is no
less a soul and no less alive than a just one. So it does not perish
from a disease of the body. Furthermore, a disease of the body
does not introduce into the rational soul a vice that is the souls
own, because the soul does not become any more unjust when the
body is sick: often it is corrected rather and studies to improve
morally.
So a bodily disease does not destroy the soul or even corrupt it. 20
But if the mind seems on occasion to be afflicted when the body is
sick, it is not really so. The mind is resting at that moment per-
chance or is active within or tending to human affairs, but it is not
afflicted. When Socrates played with children or tended them
when they were sick, he did not give up his habitual engagement
with higher philosophy, even though he was not at that moment
philosophizing in any way, or not philosophizing at a very high
level when he was distracted from the act of knowing by the con-
sideration of more trivial matters. Our rational soul often sports
with itself in the body's pleasures: in the body's sicknesses it gov-
erns and cures. In either condition the sublime philosophizing of
the reason is suspended or relaxed, since it is either resting for a
while or dealing too anxiously with lesser matters. When calm is
restored, it is revived. It has been established by nature that what-
ever human power we possess is not enough for us to do several
things at the same time. Banquet guests intent on their food do
not hear well the measured strains of the lyre. When the soul is
digesting a large meal in the belly, it abandons the duty we have of
contemplation and so we then seem to be dimwitted. When it
contemplates with heightened attention, its food is digested with
difficulty. Hence philosophers often fall sick in body, but not in
soul; the weaker they become in body, however, the more they ex-
cel in understanding.
79
Ergo quid mirum si corpore febricitante, anima sustinendo cu-

randoque aegroto intentissima cessat a contemplando, et in pueri
corpore fabricando, in decrepiti quoque corpore sustinendo occu-
patissima minus utitur intellectu? Et cum vapores atri cerebri spi-
ritum occupaverint atque eo vibrato moverint horribiles in phanta-
sia species, unde tetri spectaculi novitate tota fere vis animae
in phantasiam intenditur, mirabere si interim opus intermiserit
contemplandi, quod tandem vaporibus resolutis instaurat? Saepe
etiam vaporibus fervescentibus ratio ipsa pervigil imaginum illu-
siones redarguit; quod in his accidit qui cerebri vertiginem patiun-
tur, quorum ratio negat caelum aut terram ruere, licet sensus id as-
serat. Rursus, qui propter morsum canis concitantur rabie aut
furore daemonis instigantur, nonnumquam etiam in ipsa furoris
incursione imminentem insaniam animadverterunt* Et qui in som-
niis terrentur horrendis reclamant adversus phantasiam, saepe se
somniare dicentes* Ergo mens non semper indiget inferioribus vi-
ribus, quae saepe illis vigentibus otiatur, otiantibus autem viget,
garritum earum damnat iubetque silere.
Si quis autem dixerit mentem illis egere ut excitetur, ideo sine
ipsis nihil penitus operari, ita respondebo*112 Quoniam anima,
dum corpus habitat, eius sustentatione semper est occupata atque
circa plurima a divinis remota distrahitur, ideo113 ad divinorum in-
tuitum non convertitur, nisi quantum expressiores aliquas eorum
similitudines per vires eius pedissequas (quibus plurimum utitur)
comprehendens excitatur ad ipsa. Postquam vero satis conversa
est, et per crebram conversionem apte parata divinorum infusioni,
non amplius ad earn contemplationem illarum obsequio indiget,
80
B O O K IX • CHAPTER V
So what wonder if, when the body has a fever, the soul aban-
dons its contemplating, totally intent instead on ministering to
and curing the sick body; or if, when it is preoccupied in develop-
ing a child's body or in keeping an old man's body alive, it makes
less use of the intellect? And when the brain's black vapors have
filled the spirit and, with the spirit vibrating, have set into motion
horrible forms in the phantasy so that very nearly the soul's entire
power is struck by the novelty of the hideous spectacle and is con-
centrated in the phantasy, are you surprised if it interrupts its
work of contemplating for a while and resumes it only when the
vapors have finally dispersed? Often the reason stays alert even
when the vapors are boiling, and refutes the images' illusions. This
happens with people who suffer from dizziness of the brain: their
reason tells them that the sky or the earth is not falling down,
even though the senses say it is. Contrariwise, people who are
shaken by rabies from a dogbite or goaded by the frenzy of a
demon sometimes notice insanity coming on even as the frenzy is
rushing upon them. And people who are terrified in nightmares
cry out against the phantasy, often declaring that they are dream-
ing. So the mind does not always need the lower powers: often it
rests when they are active and is active when they are at rest; it re-
proves their chattering and commands their silence.
Were someone to suggest that the mind needs the [sensory]
powers to be aroused and therefore does absolutely nothing with-
out them, my reply would be as follows. Because the soul, while it
inhabits the body, is always preoccupied with sustaining the body
and is distracted by a whole host of matters far removed from
things divine, accordingly it does not turn its gaze back to the di-
vine except insofar as, comprehending certain particularly expres-
sive images of them through the subordinate powers it uses most
often, it is roused to do so. Once the soul has been sufficiently
converted to things divine, and become through repeated conver-
sion suitably prepared for the infusion of the divine, for that con-
81
immo eas sopit pro viribus, ne ab ipsis impediatur* Ac semper li-

bens in eo statu perseveraret, nisi curandi corporis urgeret necessi-
tas. Quod significat mentem posse per se speculationem conti-
nuare et, quando ab hoc non amplius propter curam corporis
retrahetur,114 libere speculaturam per se sine aliarum virium mini-
sterio, cui satis fuerit ante ab illis minime impedirL Sed quamdiu
corpore clauditur, propter illud sensuum ministerium quo paratur
conversioni, accidit ut —laeso corpore spirituque obnubilato, quia
neque perspicue obiecta repraesentantur115 neque fit clara in sensi-
bus et phantasia perceptio — mens inde ad veram speculationem
non facile excitetun
23 Fit etiam ut alii aliis ingeniosiores appareant propter spirituum
diversitatem, quamquam differentiam hominum in artibus addis-
cendis non tam ingenii quam voluntatis diversitati116 censeo tri-
buendam* Quilibet enim maxima quaeque, si studiose contendit,
assequitur* Fit insuper, ut quidam dicantur amentes, quia vel non
utantur mente vel abutantur, quippe cum omnis intentio animi in
his 117 sit circa vehementiores phantasiae illusiones nimium occu-
pata* Sed vacuata bile vel atra vel crocea, quae causam praebet illu-
sionis, resipiscunt118 subito, utpote qui mentem non amiserunt.
Mitto quod Origenes Plotinusque disputant, animas humanas
esse quodammodo mentes ex sua puritate delapsas, quando videli-
cet ab intentione mentis circa ideas ad intentionem potentiae vi-
vificae corporum prolapsae in corpora deciderunt* Et quanto aliae
magis aliis intentius profundiusque ad materiam conversae119 sunt,
tanto minus (ut aiunt) intellectualis retinent luminis* Unde magna
82
templation it no longer needs the service of those powers. Rather,

it lulls them to sleep as best it can in order not to be hindered by
them. It would gladly remain in that condition forever except that
the necessity of looking after the body oppresses it. This means
that the mind can continue contemplating by itself, and when it is
no longer hindered from contemplation by the need to look after
the body, it will contemplate freely by itself and without the minis-
try of the other powers (it was enough beforehand not to be im-
peded by them). However, as long as it is encased in the body, and
because of the senses' ministry which prepares it for conversion,
then it happens —when the body has been injured and the spirit
clouded, and since the objects are not represented distinctly and
no clear perception exists in the senses and phantasy—that the
mind is not easily aroused thence to true contemplation.
It also happens that some people seem more clever than others 23
because of the diversity of their spirits, although I think the
difference in learning skills between people should be attributed to
the diversity not so much of the intellect as of the will. For every
person can achieve the things which matter most if he tries dili-
gently. Moreover, it happens that some people are called mindless
because they do not use or they abuse their mind, since in them
the soul's whole attention is totally preoccupied with the more vio-
lent illusions of the phantasy. But once they have voided their
black or yellow bile (which supplies the cause of illusions), they
immediately come to their senses inasmuch as they have not yet
lost their mind. I pass over the fact that Origen and Plotinus
argue49 that human souls are in a way minds that have somehow
lapsed from their purity: having fallen from their mind's concen-
tration on the ideas down towards a concentration on the life-giv-
ing power of bodies, they have descended into bodies. And to the
extent some have been converted towards matter more attentively
and profoundly than others, the less, they say, they retain of the
intellectual light. Hence arises the huge diversity of intellectual
83
in ingeniis moribusque inter animas diversitas provenit. Ad quam

etiam conducunt aetherea corpora animarum diversis caeli figuris
sideribusque accommodata. Denique varietas geniorum varietatem
adducit ingeniorum.
24 Si quis autem animas exstitisse per tempus ante corpora non
concesserit, voluerit tamen ex parte quadam Platonicos imitari,
poterit forsitan dicere animas saltern eo ipso momento quo crean-
tur corporique iunguntur ita, ut Origenes Plotinusque disputant,
ferme affici atque disponi. Profecto, mentes angelicas alias ad infe-
riora prolapsas, alias minime, et earum quae ceciderunt, alias qui-
dem magis, alias vero minus. Sed mentes hominum tamquam infi-
mas omnes naturali instinctu cum primum creantur ad naturalem
partem et corpora vergere, aliasque aliis profundius sese120 in Le-
thaeum flumen, id est materiam, mergere. Atque hoc quidem
pacto Pamphilus Origenem, quoad potuit, emendavisse videtur.
Sed de his alias. Iam igitur ad propositum revertamur.
25 Si quis parte capitis quadam laesa memoriam videatur amittere,
respondebunt Peripatetici confundi rerum imagines quae in cere-
bri spiritu retinentur, sed species quae in mente sunt non laedi
proprie, immo, ut ita dixerim, otiari. Oportere enim mentem
quamdiu corpus habitat, incorporalium species non sine corpora-
lium imaginibus contueri. Addent Platonici, quatenus animae in-
tentio circa laesi curationem membri vehementius occupatur, eate-
nus cognitionem memoriamve remitti atque intermitti. Avicenna
et Algaêles dicent mentem ad inferiora conversam a divina qua-
dam mente diverti, unde omnem intellegentiae actum putant
continue dependere.
26 Quoniam vero Lucretius immortalitati ob earn causam difSdit
maxime, quod imminente morte vires animi deficere videantur,
84
ability and moral virtue among souls; and contributing to this

diversity is the fact that the aethereal bodies of souls are adapted
to the different figures and constellations of the heavens. Lastly,
the variety of guardian spirits leads to the variety of intellectual
abilities.50
But if someone refused to concede that souls existed for a time 24
before bodies, yet wanted partially to follow the Platonists, per-
haps he could say that souls, at the moment at least when they are
created and attached to the body, are affected and disposed to-
wards it or almost so, just as Origen and Plotinus argue.51 Un-
questionably he might say that [whereas] some angelic minds fell
towards lower things, while others did not, and of those who fell,
some plunged further and others less so, yet mens minds, as the
lowest, all incline by a natural instinct and directly they are created
towards the natural part and bodies, and some immerse them-
selves more deeply than others in Lethe's stream, that is, in matter.
In this regard Pamphilus seems to have corrected Origen insofar
as he could.52 But I shall deal with this matter elsewhere. Let us
return to the subject in hand.
If someone appears to lose his memory from a head injury, the 25
Peripatetics will respond that the images kept in the cerebral spirit
are thrown into confusion, but that the species themselves that are
in the mind are not really damaged; rather, one might say they are
at rest. For as long as the mind inhabits the body, of necessity it
does not gaze upon the species of incorporeals without the images
of corporeals. Platonists will add that, to the extent the soul's at-
tention is fiercely preoccupied with the cure of the injured part,
then cognition and memory are relaxed or suspended. Avicenna
and Algazel will maintain that a mind turned towards lower mat-
ters is turning away from some divine mind upon which, in their
view, every act of understanding continuously depends.53
Since Lucretius does not believe in immortality, however, 26
mainly on the grounds that, with the approach of death, the ratio-
85
animadvertendum est vitam corporis in humoris et caloris tempe-

ratione consistere, ideoque mori corpus quando vel calor resolvit
humorem vel calorem humor extinguit. Quoniam autem humor
caloris121 pabulum est, calor vehiculum spiritus, spiritus est animae
ad corpus conciliator, fit ut quando resolvitur humor in membris
corporis paulatim, anima quoque membra deserat paulatim* Et
quia122 tunc regendo corpore minus quam soleat occupatur, in
mentem suam se colligit, cernit arcana praesagitque fiitura* Absit a
nobis Lucretiana suspicio, animam scilicet cum corpore moritu-
ram, quae debilitato corpore roboratur, Et cum unio dissolutioni
opposita sit, longissime tunc abesse a dissolutione putandus est
animus, quando se maxime colligit in seipsum ac deposita animali
natura surgit in mentem. Atque id in morte quae propter resolu-
tionem fit manifeste contingit. In morte vero quae fit propter ex-
tinctionem vitalis animae vis humoribus tumoribusque curandis
intenta est, sensus doloribus iudicandis, phantasia spectandis si-
mulacris quae ab humorum vaporibus concitantur* Quapropter ra-
tio ad tempus remittit officium, sicut solet in somno nonnum-
quam, quod resumat post mortis strepitum, sicuti consuevit post
insomnia vigilare*
27 Quod autem in eo ipso tempore vires dotesque suas nequa-
quam amittat, illud nobis argumento est quod multi qui diligentia
medicorum ab imminente morte revocantur ad vitam, corporis
quidem vires vel numquam vel sero recipiunt, animi vero mox hu-
more purgato, quasi corporis vires extinctae fuerint, animi autem
lumen latuerit potius, tamquam sub cineribus ignis, quam evanue-
rit. Quis dixerit eundem fore a vita exitum corporis atque animae,
cum non sit idem reditus? Redit enim corpus vix seroque; redit
86
nal souls powers seem to fail,54 we must note that the life of the
body consists of a tempering of moisture and of heat, and that the
body dies when either the heat disperses the moisture or the mois-
ture extinguishes the heat. Now since moisture is the food of heat,
and heat the vehicle of spirit, and spirit the reconciler of soul to
body, it follows that when moisture gradually dissipates in the
body's limbs, the soul too will gradually abandon them. At that
time, since it is less occupied than usual with governing the body,
it gathers itself into its own mind and perceives mysteries and
foretells future events. So let us not share Lucretius' suspicion that
the soul will die with the body, the soul which gets stronger when
the body weakens. Since union is the opposite of dissolution, the
soul must be considered most distant from dissolution at the time
when it most gathers itself into itself, and, having cast off its ani-
mal nature, ascends into its mind. This is clearly what happens in
the death that occurs because of release. But during the death that
occurs because of extinction, the soul's life-giving power is intent
on curing the humors and [their] commotions,55 the senses in as-
sessing pains, and the phantasy in gazing on the images excited by
the humors' vapors. For a while, therefore, reason does not do its
duty, as is sometimes the case in sleep. But after the din and
tumult56 of death, it resumes its office, just as it customarily
awakes after dreams.
A proof that at that moment it does not lose its powers and 27
mental gifts comes to us from the fact that many people who have
been restored to life from the brink of death by the effort of doc-
tors never recover their body's powers, or only after a long time;
but they do recover their soul's powers as soon as the [excess] hu-
mor has been purged. It is as if the body's powers have been extin-
guished, but the light of the rational soul has merely been hidden,
like fire under the ashes, instead of vanishing away. Who would
claim that the exit of body and soul from life is the same when
their return to life is not the same? The body returns with diffi-
87
animus facile atque subito. Neque quicquam eo tempore amisit

sui, cum et naturales et acquisitas dotes subito rursus edat in lu-
cem, non minus quam antea consueverit, utpote qui sua tunc col-
legerat supellectilia, non disperserat, paratusque fuerat tamquam
serpens ad exuvias exuendas, non aliter iis claustris egressurus in
lucem vivens et integer, quam olim materno utero cum est emissus
in lucem. Putat123 autem sapiens quando relinquit corpus, se non
parte privari sua, sed molestissimo onere liberari. Ac de sexto si-
gno iam satis.
28 Accipe septimum illud signum. Sensus diuturno opere fatigan-
tur; mens vero numquam. Quanto diutius inspexeris, eo cernes
obtusius. Quanto diutius indagaveris intellectu, eo intelleges cla-
rius. Omne corporis sensusque opus usu defatigatur; mentis vero
corroboratur. Solet tamen diuturna cogitatione gravari caput, et
oculus caligare, quia mentis exercitium comitantur saepenumero
phantasia motus, hos autem vibratio spiritus, hanc laesio cerebri
aut oculi; ipsa vero mentis acies fit levior et acutior. Quae certe
sine intermissione ulla124 sursum directa maneret, nisi miserata
corpus hoc ipsi commendatum, eius recreandi gratia opus pro-
prium intermitteret. Quod in iis125 plane conspicitur, qui dum126
speculantur attentius aliquid, fatigari corpus aegre ferunt, in qui-
bus mens invita quodammodo cessat ab opere; corpus autem sen-
susque cessant quam libentissime, quasi non mens fatigetur ope-
rando, sed ilia. Quod vero indefessum est, est etiam immortale.
29 Octavum signum est quod vires aliae127 alicui rerum generi sunt
adscriptae, mens nulli. Quid est enim in eorum numero quae esse
88
B O O K IX • C H A P T E R V
culty and tardily; the soul returns easily and at once. At that
time the soul has lost nothing of itself, since it brings its talents,
natural and acquired, immediately back into the light again; and
no less so than it used to beforehand, inasmuch as it had then
gathered its goods and possessions together, not dispersed them. It
had made itself ready, like a snake, to slough its skin and to
emerge from its prison-house into the light, alive and unharmed,
as when it emerged into the light from its mother s womb. But the
wise man, when he leaves his body, does not suppose he is losing
part of himself, but rather that he is being set free from an ex-
tremely heavy burden. Enough concerning the sixth proof.
Now to the seventh proof. The senses get tired when they 28
work for a long time, but never the mind. The longer you look at
something, the less distinctly you see it. The longer you study
something with your intellect, the more clearly you understand it.
All the work of the body and the senses becomes exhausted with
use, but the minds work is strengthened. Nevertheless, the head
usually becomes heavy with prolonged thinking and the eye is
dimmed, because movements in the phantasy very often accom-
pany mental exercise, vibration of the spirit accompanies these
movements, and injury of the brain or eye accompanies this vibra-
tion. But the cutting edge of the mind becomes quicker and
sharper; and it would certainly continue uninterruptedly to direct
its thoughts upward if, out of pity for this body entrusted to it, it
did not interrupt its proper task for the sake of reviving the body.
This is very obvious with people who, when they are contemplat-
ing something particularly intently, become annoyed that the body
is tiring. In them the mind is unwilling in a way to halt its work,
but the body and the senses are very glad to. It is as if the mind
were not exhausted by working, but that they were. But what is
never wearied is also immortal.
The eighth proof is that the other powers are appointed to a 29
particular class of objects, but the mind to none. For in the num-
89
dicuntur, ad quod mentis acies dirigi nequeat? Quae ipsius quod

dicitur ens, essentia, esse, naturam et vim descriptione compre-
hendit; sub iis vero ea quae sunt omnia continentur. Reperit
quoque differentiam inter esse atque non esse, itaque novit
utrumque et esse dividit quodammodo in partes suas atque parti-
culas, dum quaelibet rerum genera speciesque sub esse disponit.
Et quod maius est, super esse ipsum ascendit et sub esse descen-
dit, quando ipsum unum ipsumque128 bonum statuit super esse, et
materiam sive privationes rerum sub esse locat. Nulli rerum generi
mens astringitur, si ambit omnia. Nihil extra se habet a quo peri-
matur, quod intra se quadammodo claudit omnia.
30 Concludamus disputationem hoc pacto. Animus hominis, si
per corpus esset aliquo modo, nihil ageret umquam sine corporis
instrumento vel auxilio. Agit autem sine corporis usu intellegendo
atque volendo, ut per octo signa exposuimus. Non igitur est per
corpus. Ergo est aut per se aut per divina. Si per se, numquam se
deserit. Si per divina, ergo per aeternas causas est aeternus.
: VI :
Sexta ratio: anima convenit partim cum

divinis, partim vero cum brutis•
1 Si anima hominis ex materia quam fluvium vocant Lethaeum sea-

turiret, numquam cum divinis, quae ex eo fluvio non scaturiunt, in
90
ber of those things purported to exist what cannot be the object

of the mind's eye? The mind comprehends in a description the
essence, being, nature, and power of that which is called an entity.
But all that exist are contained under these. It discovers the
difference too between being and not-being, and so has knowledge
of both; and in a way it divides being into its parts and sub-parts
when it establishes all classes and species of entities under being.
What is more, it ascends above and descends below being itself
when it puts the One and the Good itself above being, and locates
matter or universal privation below being. The mind is confined to
no one class if it embraces all. It has nothing outside itself by
which it can be destroyed, because in a way it includes all things
within itself.
Let us end this discussion as follows. If the human soul existed 30
in any way through the body, it would never do anything without
the instrument or aid of the body. But it does act without using
the body in understanding and in willing, as we have shown by
way of the eight proofs. Therefore it does not exist through the
body. It exists either through itself, therefore, or through things
divine. If it exists through itself, it never abandons itself. If it ex-
ists through things divine, then through eternal causes it is eternal.
: VI :
Sixth proof: the soul conforms partly with

things divine, but partly with animals.
If mans soul gushed out of matter, which they call the river Lethe, 1
it would never in its activity be joined with things divine that do
not flow out of this river. But we will now demonstrate that it is
91
operatione coniungeretur. Congruere vero cum illis in operatione,

immo etiam in essentia et vita, sic ostendemus.
2 Quoniam videmus omnia tunc maxime aliquid operari, quando
in sua specie adulta sunt atque perfecta, cogimur asserere Deum,
quia est omnium perfectissimus, non otiosum esse, sed aliquid
agere, postquam operatio perfectionis est signum. Immo vero
neque nos aliquid ageremus, nisi ageret ille, quo movente move-
mur, sicut quo faciente sumus, et quo afflante vivimus et spira-
mus.129 Sed quaenam130 est operatio deif Non quae aliunde inci-
piat aut alio quopiam tendat, ne cogatur deus aliunde pendere.
Est igitur operatio dei perpetua quaedam in seipsum conversio,
per quam seipso fruatur et gaudeat* Itaque contemplatur seipsum;
se contemplando suam videt potentiam; hanc intuens quaecumque
potest discernit. Ergo et seipsum simul et universum, opus suum,
actu unico speculatur; speculando in se concipit cuncta; conci-
piendo extra se quaecumque vult parit.
3 Similis ferme est in sanctis ministris eius caelestibusque spiriti-
bus operatio. Se namque ipsos illi quoque et sua opera speculan-
tur; speculantur et deum operaque divina. Speculatio certe illis
sola conveniens est, quia operationum omnium perfectissima.
Quod etiam in nobis apparet. Haec non externa eget materia ut
fabricatio, neque corporalibus instrumentis ut sensus, neque
aliunde movetur aut alio tendit ut operationes aliae, neque figurat
materiam alienam, sed colit ornatque mentem. Quando non alio
terminatur, sed desinit in seipsam, neque fatigatur cito ut aliae,
sed permanet indefessa, neque molesta est vel indiga ut sunt illae,
sed facilis plenaque et gaudio perfusa incomparabili.131 Si qua igi-
92
joined with the divine in its activity, and even in its essence
and life.
Since we see that all things perform most effectively when they 2
are fully grown and perfect in their species, we must affirm that
God, being the most perfect of all, is not at rest but active, since
activity is a sign of perfection. Or rather, we would not do any-
thing ourselves unless God acted: because He moves, we move;
similarly, because He creates, we exist; and because He breathes
upon [us], we live and breathe.57 What then is the activity of
God? It cannot start from elsewhere or be directed towards an-
other, otherwise God would be forced to depend on something
other than Himself. So God s activity is a kind of perpetual turn-
ing back upon Himself: through this conversion He takes pleasure
and delight in Himself. So He contemplates Himself; and in
contemplating Himself, He sees His own power; and in gazing
upon it, He discerns everything it can do. So in a single act He
simultaneously contemplates Himself and the universe, His cre-
ation. In contemplating, He conceives all things within Himself;
and in conceiving, He gives birth outside Himself to whatever He
wishes.
Activity for His sacred ministers and celestial spirits is more or 3
less similar. They too contemplate themselves and their works;
they also contemplate God and [His] divine works. Certainly,
contemplation alone is appropriate to them, since it is the most
perfect of all activities. This is clear even in our own case. Con-
templation does not need either any external material, as making
something does, or bodily instruments as the senses do. Nor is it
initiated from without or directed towards another like other ac-
tivities; nor does it give shape to alien material, but cultivates and
embellishes the mind. Since it is not determined by another, but
comes to rest in itself, contemplation is not rapidly exhausted like
other activities, but remains unwearied. Nor does it become irk-
some and wanting as the other activities do, but is effortless and
93
tur ex iis operationibus quae nobis insunt, supernis est numinibus

tribuenda, contemplatio certe tribuenda est, operationum omnium
felicissima. Ex iis patet hominis animam in contemplatione cum
divinis congruere.
4 Congruere quoque cum bestiis in nutritione sensuque et corpo-
ris affectu non dubitamus. Certae autem operationes ad conve-
nientia sibi directae132 obiecta certas convenientesque requirunt
virtutes atque substantias, et quae proportio est obiecti unius ad
alterum, eadem operationis unius ad alteram. Eadem quoque vir-
tutis est et essentiae ad virtutem et essentiam comparatio. Itaque
sicut in nobis, quoad corporis usum pertinet, est operatio cum
brutis communis ad commune cum illis obiectum, ita natura cum
illis communis apparet. Haec est nutriendi sentiendique operatio,
et potentia atque complexio corporis, quae in nobis ferme sicut in
bestiis sunt caduca. Oportet quinetiam reperiri in nobis potentiam
et substantiam cum caelestibus illis communem, ex qua nascatur
operatio ilia quam habemus cum illis communem, ad commune
nobis illisque obiectum. Quamobrem sicut in nobis quodammodo
caducae sunt nutriendi sentiendique natura et complexio corpora-
lis, quae circa caduca versantur et cum caducis animalibus sunt
communes, ita immortalis erit contemplandi potestas quae circa
immortalia versatur et cum immortalibus est communis, quia non
potest operatio eadem nisi ab eadem natura et potentia proficisci.
Quis autem dubitet contemplationem nostram supernis esse persi-
milem, cum per earn animus, ut caelestes illi, seipsum et opera sua
consideret, investiget quoque supernas causas earumque effectus,
item ab efFectibus inferioribus per medias causas usque ad causam
supremam ascendat, atque vicissim a suprema causa usque ad infi-
94
abundant and filled with incomparable joy. If any one activity from
those present in us should be conceded, therefore, to the powers
above, assuredly contemplation, the most blessed of all activities,
should be granted them. Hence it is obvious that in contemplation
mans soul is in harmony with things divine.
We are not in doubt either that in nutrition and sensation and 4
in our body's feeling we are also in harmony with the animals. But
specific activities directed at objects in harmony with themselves
require particularly harmonious powers and substances. The pro-
portion of one object to another is the same as the proportion of
one activity to another. This goes too for the comparison of power
and essence to power and essence. So just as with us, insofar as it
pertains to the use of the body, we have an activity in common
with the animals, one directed towards a common object, so obvi-
ously we share a common nature with them. This nature is the ac-
tivity of nourishing and sensing, and it and the power and com-
plexion of the body, which exist in us as they do in the animals or
almost so, are perishable. But in us a power and substance has to
be found which is also common with things divine. From it is
born the activity which we have in common with them and which
is directed towards an object common to us and to them. There-
fore, just as in us, in a way, the nature of nourishing and sensing
and the corporeal complexion are perishable, being concerned with
perishable things and shared in common with mortal animals, so
the power of contemplating will be immortal, being concerned
with immortal things and shared in common with the immortals.
This is because the same activity cannot begin unless it proceeds
from the same nature and power. For who can doubt that our con-
templation is very similar to that of divine beings, since through it
the rational soul, like the souls above, considers both itself and its
works, and also examines the higher causes and their effects, and
ascends from the lower effects up through the intermediary causes
all the way to the supreme cause, and returns in a circle from the
95
mos eventus circulo remeet? Ubi videtur universam divini operis

seriem non alia virtute quam divina complecti, et tamquam deus
aliquis circumlustrare. Non solum vero intellegentiam cum numi-
nibus communem habet, sed etiam voluntatem, cum illorum affec-
tet beatitudinem. Habet praeterea similem actionem, quatenus
agit libere et suo imperat corpori ferme sicut ilia. Ex omnibus iis
colligitur animum nostrum cum caelestibus essentia convenire. Si
essentiam habet cum illis communem et proximam, et ilia nullam
habent originem a materia, sequitur ut nullam quoque animus
noster talem originem habeat.
5 Praeterea, si numina ilia sempiterna sunt, quia mundi sphaeras
eodem semper movent ordine, neque fatigantur133 umquam, sequi-
tur ut sit mentis essentia sempiterna, quoniam terminata mobi-
lisque vita nullo modo interminatae immobilique vitae est
proxima. Tanto autem magis convenit cum illis immortalitate vitae
quam intellegentia veritatis et beatitudinis desiderio, quanto vita
ipsa prior est quam intellegentia vel voluntas. Ac si voluntas est
nixus intellegentiae, intellegentia vero summum adolescentis vitae
fastigium, animus non aliter dirigitur ad voluntatem rectam quam
per veram intellegentiam. Ad hanc quoque non aliter quam per ve-
ram adultamque vitam. Voluntatem habet rectam, quia ad pri-
mum totumque bonum sese confert. Intellegentiam veram, turn
quia quatenus intellegentia est non fallitur, turn quia veras om-
nium intus possidet rationes, quod alias ostendemus. Habeat ergo
necesse est veram adultamque vitam. Talis est quae non est ob-
noxia morti.
6 Huic nostrae argumentation! ilia Origenis favet summopere,
ubi inquit: 'Omnes naturae quae eiusdem principii participes sunt,
inter se sunt similes, ceu oculi, quia omnes lucis participes sunt,134
cum ad lucem natura sua similiter convertantur, omnes sunt simi-
96
supreme cause down to the lowest effects? In this it seems to em-

brace the whole sequence of the divine creation with a power one
can only call divine: it ranges across it like some god. The soul
shares not only understanding but the will as well with the divine
spirits, for it aims at their blessedness. It has moreover a similar
activity in that it acts freely and gives commands to its own body
almost as they do. The conclusion from all this is that our rational
soul is proximate to the divine beings in essence. If it has an es-
sence in common with and closest to theirs, and they never origi-
nate from matter, it follows that our soul too does not derive from
a material origin at all.
Furthermore, if those spirits are eternal, since they move the 5
worlds spheres always in the same order and never tire, it follows
that the mind's essence must be everlasting, because a life that is
limited and changeable is in no way akin to the unlimited and un-
changing life. But the mind accords with these spirits more in the
immortality of life than in the understanding of truth or the long-
ing for blessedness; and it does so to the degree that life itself is
prior to understanding or the will. If the will is the striving of un-
derstanding, but understanding the topmost summit of the ma-
ture life, then the rational soul cannot be directed to right willing
except through true understanding, and not directed to this un-
derstanding except through the true, the already matured life. It
has right will because it sets its course for the prime and universal
good; and it has true understanding both because, as understand-
ing, it cannot err, and because it possesses within itself the true ra-
tional principles of all things (as I will show elsewhere). Therefore
it necessarily possesses the true, the fully developed life. Such a life
is not exposed to death.
Origen offers valuable support to this argument of ours when 6
he says: "All natures which are participants of the same principle
are mutually alike, just as eyes, because they are all participants of
light (as they all naturally turn towards the light in a similar way),
97
les, sed tamen pro diversa lucis participatione alius alio est acutior/
Omnes rationales substantiae dei participes sunt, cum omnes
convertantur ad deum, ergo similes sunt turn inter se, turn illL
Itaque sicut supremae sunt immortales ut angeli, sic et inferiores
ut animae, Immortales vero sunt omnes, quia deo persimiles im-
mortals Quam similitudinem ostendit ilia ipsa in deum conver-
sio, in quem quidem velut in solem tamquam stellae superiores
convertuntur angeli, anima vero in eundem ceu luna, quae quam-
vis vicissitudine quadam divini luminis permutetur, ideoque modo
quodam mutabili capiat; inextinguibili tamen percipit ratione, si-
quidem et inextinguibile ipsum esse, et qua ratione sit inextingui-
bile, certis rationibus comprehendit.
: VII :
Obiectio Epicureorum et responsio

de rerum temperatione•
1 Reluctabitur iis Dicaearchus aut Epicureus aliquis, quasi monstro

id simile sit, rem scilicet aliquam partim incorruptibilem esse, par-
tim corruptioni obnoxiam. At nos affirmabimus naturae ordinem
sine hoc servari non posse.
2 Sunt aliqua corpora ab omni penitus corruptione semota ut
caeli, quorum neque sphaera ipsa, neque particula ulla corrumpi-
tur. Sunt et corpora iis prorsus opposita, scilicet omnino caduca,
puta ligna, lapides, metalla, ceteraque ex quatuor elementis com-
posita. Ligni siquidem particulae nonnullae quandoque putres-
cunt, deinde etiam totum lignum ipsum desinit esse lignum
(quamvis quicquid ita compositum est, ob id saltern ex incorrupti-
98
are all alike; and yet one may be sharper than another because it
participates in the light differently/'58 All rational substances par-
ticipate in God since they all turn towards God, and thus they are
similar both to each other and to Him, Thus, just as the highest
rational substances, like angels, are immortal, so too are the lower
ones like souls. They are all immortal because they are all most
similar to immortal God. The conversion itself to God manifests
this likeness: angels turn back towards Him like the higher stars
towards the sun, but the soul turns like the moon towards the
same sun. Though the soul may change with the particular chang-
ing of the divine light and so receive it in a changeable manner,
nonetheless it perceives it with its imperishable reason, since it
comprehends both imperishable being itself and why it is imper-
ishable with reasons that do not change.
: VII :
An objection from the Epicureans and its rebuttal

On the tempering of things.
Dicaearchus59 or some Epicurean will battle these arguments as i

though the view that anything is partly incorruptible and partly
subject to corruption is a kind of monster. But we will affirm that
without this [duality] the order of nature cannot be preserved.
Some bodies are totally free from all corruption, like the heav- 2
ens, of which neither the sphere itself nor any lesser part is cor-
ruptible. Other bodies are the exact opposite, that is to say, they
are completely perishable, like wood, stones, metals, and the rest
compounded of the four elements. Various bits of timber will
eventually rot and then the whole thing will cease to be a piece of
wood (although any such compound does at least consist of the
99
bili constet et corruptibili, quod primam in se materiam habet

perpetuam, formam vero mortalem, quapropter coniunctio morta-
lium cum immortalibus neque impossibilis est, neque rara; sed re-
deamus ad ordinem institutum). Sunt etiam corpora media, ele-
mentorum videlicet quatuor sphaerae partim incorruptibilia,
partim corruptibilia. Ipsa quidem tota elementi sphaera suam spe-
ciem, suum situm, suum servat tenorem; particulae vero eius non-
nullae quandoque hinc perduntur, inde instaurantur. Cum vero
corpora vel a spiritibus vel spirituum gratia fiierint constituta, or-
dinem corporum oportet ab ordine spirituum proficisci aut saltern
spirituum ordinem imitari. Sunt ergo spiritus aliqui penitus im-
mortales ut angeli, quorum neque tota ipsa substantia commuta-
tur, neque ulla vis, neque etiam operatio. Sunt alii mortales om-
nino, ut communis fert opinio, brutorum scilicet animae, quarum
permutatur vis operatioque, permutatur et tota substantia. Sint in-
super oportet spiritus utrorumque medii, ut unus sit absque inter-
missione totius naturae contextus. Hi per totam substantiam per-
manebunt, per particulas aliquas135 mutabuntur. Tales erunt
animae nostrae praecipue, quarum substantias cogit esse perpetuas
communis ilia cum caelestibus contemplatio voluntasque et actio.
Potentias vero aliquas sive operationes quandoque cessaturas indi-
cat nobis ilia communis cum brutis mortalibus operatio, cultui
mortalis corporis penitus mancipata.136 Quippe cum naturales
affectus in naturis propriis fundentur diversique affectus in diver-
sis naturis, videamus autem nostras animas affectum ad aeterna
habere, affectum quoque ad temporalia, merito dicimus eas ex na-
turis duabus, aeterna videlicet et temporali, compositas esse.
Quemadmodum si videremus corpus aliquod natura sua quasi ae-
qualiter sursum deorsumve moveri, diceremus ipsum ferme aequa-
liter ex gravitate et levitate componi.
100
corruptible and the incorruptible precisely because it contains in

itself prime eternal matter but perishable form; so the combina-
tion of mortal and immortal is neither impossible nor unusual —
but let us return to our line of argument). There are also interme-
diary bodies, namely the four elemental spheres, that are partly
corruptible and partly incorruptible. The sphere of an element
taken as a whole preserves its form or species, its position, and its
steadfast course. But various parts of it at any given moment are
being destroyed here and restored there. Since bodies have been
constructed by spirits or for the benefit of spirits, their order
should proceed from the order of spirits or at least imitate the
spirits' order. Some spirits are completely immortal like the angels,
whose entire substance itself does not change and neither does any
[of its] power or even activity. Other spirits are completely mortal,
it is commonly believed; namely the souls of animals, whose pow-
ers and activity changes, and whose entire substance changes.
Moreover, there have to be spirits that come in between the two so
that the fabric of all nature may be uninterruptedly one. These
will remain the same in their substance as a whole, but particular
parts will be changed. Such, preeminently, will be our souls: the
contemplation, will, and action they share with the heavenly spir-
its demand that their substances be eternal. But the activity they
have in common with the animals, entirely enslaved as it is to the
care of the mortal body, tells us that at some point some of their
powers or activities will cease. Since natural desires are rooted in
their own natures, and diverse desires rooted in diverse natures,
but since we see that our souls have a desire for things eternal and
a desire for things temporal as well, then properly we declare that
they are compounded from two natures, the eternal and the tem-
poral. Analogously, were we to see some body naturally moved up-
ward and downward in almost equal measure, we would say that it
is compounded almost equally of gravity and levity.
IOI
3 Tria vidimus corpora, tres quoque spiritus. Tres nunc accipia-

mus species animalium. Animalia utrinque tam ex anima quam ex
corpore sempiterna, ceu mundi sphaeras stellasque, ita ut Plato
existimat, animatas, ut tam corpus earum quam anima sit procul a
morte. Item animalia utrinque mortalia, ceu bruta. Interponamus
homines ex anima immortales, mortales ex corpore. Multi vero
etiam multos daemones heroesque similes interponunt. Neque
servari aliter ordo naturae potest, nisi caelesti animae ferme peni-
tus immutabili corpus omnino incorruptibile tribuatur, atque
bruti animae penitus corruptibili corpus omnino mortale. Animae
autem hominis, et immortali simul et quadam ex parte mutabili,
corpus detur utrumque: aethereum unum secundum Platonem,
elementale alterum, ut hominis anima aethereo immortalique cor-
pore, qua parte immortalis est, caelitus induta descendat; in terris
vero, qua parte mutabilis,137 mutabili elementorum corpore vestia-
tur.
4 Ac merito hominis animae, licet immortali, corpus corruptibile
congruit, propter earn sui partem, qua esse mutabilis demonstra-
tur. Nihil igitur obstat quin possit animal unum in naturae ordine
reperiri ex anima immortale, ex corpore corruptibile, idque mani-
festius homo sit, ut et superior ratio demonstravit et Anaxagorae
sententia comprobat, quatuor rerum gradus inducens, immorta-
lem aeternitatem, immortale tempus, mortalem aeternitatem,
mortale tempus. Primum esse arbitror mentem, secundum cae-
lum, tertium rationalem animam, quartum irrationalem. Ideo de
homine dixit divinum illud:
0vr)To<; aicov FXTPOS eêt Oeov TLVOS
id est: 'Mortalis aeternitas dei partem habet.' Hominem aeternita-

tem quidem vocat, turn propter animae substantiam, turn propter
02
We see three bodies then and three spirits. Let us now accept 3
three species of living creatures: (a) creatures that are everlasting
in soul and body alike, like the spheres of the world and the stars
animated, so Plato believes,60 in such a way that their body and
soul are both remote from death; (b) creatures that are subject to
death, in soul as in body, like the animals; and (c) let us interpose
between them men who are immortal because of their soul, but
mortal because of their body. Many people would also interpose
a host of demons and of heroes like them. The order of nature
cannot be maintained unless we grant a completely incorruptible
body to the celestial soul, which is well-nigh completely immuta-
ble, and a completely mortal body to the animal soul, which is en-
tirely corruptible. But to the soul of man, which is simultaneously
both immortal and partially mutable, can be given a twin body,
one aethereal according to Plato,61 and the other elemental, so that
mans soul (the part of it which is immortal) can descend from
heaven clothed in the aethereal and immortal body, but that the
soul on earth (the part that is mutable) can be dressed in the mu-
table body of the elements.
Harmonizing with mans soul, although immortal, there is 4
properly then a corruptible body: it harmonizes by way of that
part of it wherein it is demonstrably mutable. So nothing stands
in the way of the possibility of our finding a single creature in the
order of nature that is compounded from an immortal soul and a
corruptible body. Clearly man is such a creature as the proof above
has demonstrated. Anaxagoras's opinion confirms it: he posits
four universal levels: immortal eternity, immortal time, mortal
eternity, and mortal time. I think the first is mind, the second
heaven, the third rational soul, and the fourth irrational soul.
Hence that divine saying about man: "Mortal eternity, he pos-
sesses a part of God."62 It calls man "eternity" because of the soul's
substance and because of understanding, and yet "mortal" because
of the mutable part or action of the soul and because the body is
103
intellegentiam; mortalem vero turn propter mutabilem animae

partem vel actionem, turn propter corpus elementis138 composi-
turn. Neque absurdum esse Platonici putant, ut in anima actionis
motio una cum substantiae immutabilitate concurrat, quandoqui-
dem et in caelo, quod animae fert imaginem, haec duo manifeste
concurrunt; nihil enim inter corporea caelo mutabilius, nihil con-
tra stabilius invenitur. Talem quoque putant esse primam mundi
materiam, quae sic naturalibus subest formis, quemadmodum
mens nostra divinis. Putant autem mutationem rebus ex ipsarum
multiplicitate contingere, ita ut quae essentiam habent multiple
cem, motionem in essentia sortiantur, quae vero virtutem actio-
nemque solam, in iis dumtaxat mutationem aliquam sustinere.
5 Sed ut capitulum concludamus, nihil prohibet quo minus
animae quamvis indissolubili corpus dissolubile congruat, praeser-
tim cum etiam caeli corpus ex eo dissolubile nominent, quod par-
tibus constet extensis, proptereaque se ipsum continere non possit,
sed virtute animae connectatur. Idem contigisset et nobis, si
animae nostrae similiter atque caelestes a divina unitate139 non
recessissent.
104
compounded of elements. Platonists do not think it absurd that

mobility of action occurs in the soul along with immutability of
substance, since these two do manifestly occur together also in the
heavens, which bear the image of soul; for among bodies we find
nothing more subject to change than the heavens and yet nothing
more stable. They think that the worlds prime matter is also like
this, being subject to natural forms as our mind to divine forms.
However, they hold that change in things is contingent upon their
plurality in that those that have a multiple essence are allotted mo-
bility in [that] essence, while those that have power and action
alone [not multiplicity] sustain some mutation only in them.
But to conclude this chapter. Nothing prevents a destructible 5
body from according with a soul although it is indestructible, par-
ticularly since they call even the heavens' body destructible in that
it consists of extended parts and so cannot keep itself together but
is linked by the power of [its] soul. The same would have befallen
us, if, like the celestial souls, our souls had not departed from the
unity divine.
105
LIBER DECIMUS 1
: I :
Prima ratio: sicut ultimum in ordine corporum est

incorruptibile, sic et ultimum in ordine mentium.
1 Quoniam ordo corporum sub ordine intellectuum collocatur pen-

detque inde, ideo corporum ordo non aliter ordinem sequitur in-
tellectuum quam pedis vestigium ipsum pedem, et umbra corpus.
Itaque qualem videmus ordinem in corporibus, talem paene debe-
mus in mentibus coniectari.
2 Videmus in corporum ordine sublime corpus, videlicet supre-
mum caelum, in natura sua cunctas vires formarum omnium effi-
ciendarum continere, per quas utique vires, tamquam activas et
efficaces, inferiora corpora ad varias formas suscipiendas disponit.
Quapropter variis naturae suae viribus et variis motionis suae con-
figurationibus corpora inferiora varie movet et format, ut2 merito
dici possit sublime caelum formas corporum reliquorum vel actu
vel activa virtute complecti. Corpora vero sequentia affirmare pos-
sumus illi adeo subiici ut ipsa quidem in potentia quadam suscep-
tiva, ut dicitur, et passiva easdem habeant formas atque actu ab illo
suscipiant, Verum talis ordo servatur, ut quo sublimius sub illo
corpus est, eo magis activam potentiam habeat minusque passi-
vam. Quod enim primo est proximum, ab unico primo suscipit
atque patitur, agit in multa. Quod sequenti ponitur gradu patitur
etiam magis, agit minus, quoniam a duobus iam, primo videlicet et
secundo, patitur; in sequentia quae accepit effundit, quousque3 ad
infimam quandam materiam veniatur, quae cum a superioribus
10 6
BOOK X
: I :
First proof: as the last in the order of bodies is incorruptible

so is the last in the order of minds.
Since the order of bodies is subordinate to and depends on the or- i

der of intellects, the order of bodies therefore follows the order of
intellects exactly as the footprint follows the foot and the shadow
its body. So whatever order we witness among bodies such, or
nearly so, we must suppose among intellects.
We see that the highest body in the order of bodies, namely 2
heaven on high, naturally contains all the powers for producing all
the forms, and uses these powers, which are active and productive,
to prepare the lower bodies to receive various forms. So it vari-
ously moves and forms the lower bodies by the various powers of
its own nature and by the various configurations of its own mo-
tion. Consequently one could fairly say that the highest heaven en-
compasses the forms of the rest of the bodies either in act or in its
active power. We can maintain, however, that subsequent bodies
are subject to that heaven insofar as they possess those same forms
in a power that is, so to speak, receptive or passive; and they re-
ceive them from that heaven in act. But the enduring order is such
that the higher a subcelestial body is, the more it has of the active
power and the less of the passive. For what is closest to the first is
sustained by and submits to the first alone [but] acts on the many.
What is located on the level following submits still more and acts
less because it is now subject to the two, the first and the second.
It showers what it has received upon those succeeding it, until one
comes to the lowest kind of matter, which, since it receives from
107
omnibus capiat, ipsa tribuat4 nulli. Itaque in potentia passiva ha-

bet quidem formas omnes, quas per successionem a superioribus
suscipit patiendo. In virtute autem effectiva habet nullam.
3 Idem in mentibus cogita, quarum principium deus omnes in-
tellegibiles species uno et proprio habet actu, distribuit omnibus,
capit a nullo. Sequentes ilium mentes inde omnes accipiunt et in-
vicem ita se habent, ut superior inferiori ideas illas lumenque quasi
distribuat. Ergo quo altior mens est, eo paucioribus subiecta pluri-
bus praesidet. A paucioribus igitur patitur capiendo, agit in plures
distribuendo. Infima denique mens talis debet esse, ut primo ilia-
rum principio sit opposita: capiat ab omnibus, tribuat nulli, secun-
dum naturam suam ideas illas in potentia quidem habeat passiva,
nullas activa, postquam ideas non transfundit in aliquem ipsi sub-
ditum intellectum. Quippe in primo potentia sola activa est idea-
rum; in sequentibus activa per ordinem et passiva; in infima mente
passiva. Ordinem igitur primi caeli obtinet deus; vicem sequen-
tium corporum mediae tenent mentes; locum materiae infimae
infimus intellectus. Qui per naturam suam successione quadam
omnes intellegibiles rationes accipiat actu sive videat, neque omnes
actu simul intueatur, quemadmodum corporum formas materia
suscipit ab alia in aliam succedendo.
4 Materia haec, quia ex nulla antecedente materia fit, unde crea-
tore indiget infinito, idcirco a solo creatur sive manat deo. Par est
enim ut potentia simplex a simplici fiat actu, qui quoniam actio-
nem suam ultra agentium reliquorum actiones protendit, solus fa-
cit materiam, quae gradum tenet ultimum in natura. Si solus deus
creat materiam quae est infimum corporalium, solus creat earn
mentem quae est infimum intellectuum. Si materia opus est om-
108
• BOOK X • C H A P T E R I •
all above it, gives to none. So it possesses all forms in the passive
power, receiving them passively, one after another, from those
above it. But it possesses none in the active power.
Suppose the same in minds. Their principle, God, has all the 3
intelligible species in one act proper to Himself: He gives them to
all, and He receives them from none. The minds that succeed
Him receive them all from Him and are mutually disposed in such
a way that a higher mind distributes, as it were, the ideas and the
[accompanying] light to the lower. So the higher the mind is, the
more minds it presides over and the fewer it is subject to. So in re-
ceiving it is acted upon by fewer minds, and in distributing it acts
on more. The lowest mind must be such that it is the opposite of
the first principle of minds: it receives from all and gives to none
and according to its nature possesses the ideas in the passive power
but has none in the active power, since it does not transmit the
ideas to any intellect subordinate to itself. In the first [intellect]
the power of ideas is active only; in the minds that follow, it is
both active and passive in turn; in the lowest mind, it is passive.
So God governs the order of the first heaven, the intermediary
minds the alternation of the succeeding bodies, and the lowest in-
tellect the position of the lowest matter. Through its nature the
lowest intellect receives in act or sees all the intelligible reasons in
succession: it cannot gaze upon all of them in act simultaneously,
just as matter receives the forms of bodies one upon the other in
succession.
This matter, because it is not created from any preceding mat- 4
ter, therefore requires an infinite creator, and so is created by or
proceeds from God alone. It is proper for simple potency to come
from simple act, which, since it extends its action beyond the ac-
tions of all other agents, alone makes the matter that is on the
lowest rung in nature. If God alone creates the matter that is the
lowest of bodies, He alone creates the mind that is the lowest of
intellects. If of all the divine works matter is the one most re-
109
PLATONIC THEOLOGY
nium divinorum operum a deo5 remotissimum, intellectuale vero

genus est proximum, et ilia fit seorsum a mente, multo magis po-
test mens seorsum fieri a materia. Si talem ordinem habet intellec-
t s ultimus in rerum intellectualium genere qualem materia in ge-
nere naturalium, et materia a nulla re naturali potest fieri, sequitur
ut postremus intellectus a nulla specie intellectus, quae in eo sit
genere, possit fieri. Quod si intellectus huiusmodi a nullo generis
eiusdem intellectu vel multo praestantiore dependet, multo minus
putandus est a genere naturalium, multo insuper minus a materia
dependere.
5 Hinc sequitur postremam mentem e materia non educi, sequi-
tur etiam esse incorruptibilem. Nam cum mentium ordo sit ordine
corporali praestantior atque ordo rerum corporalium tandem de-
scendat in materiam sempiternam, siquidem materia ilia num-
quam corrumpitur, quis usque adeo demens erit ut concedat men-
tium ordinem, qui stabilior est diviniorque corporibus, in mentem
postremo desinere corruptibilem? Sit ergo perpetuus oportet ulti-
mus intellectus, qui ita comparatur ad intellegibiles formas, quem-
admodum ad sensibiles prima materia. Materia vero neque per
aliquam sensibilem formam corporali corruptione corrumpitur —
per has enim formatur — neque per aliquam intellegibilem spe-
ciem—ab his enim perficitur. Ergo mens ultima neque per ali-
quam intellegibilem speciem spiritali corruptione destruitur — his
namque perficitur — neque per aliquam sensibilem formam corpo-
rali perit corruptione — praeest enim mens, non subest, corporali-
bus speciebus. Neque transit in mentem corruptio corporalis, sicut
non transit in materiam corruptio spiritalis. Immo vero, si non
transit in mentem violentia spiritalis, multo minus propter corpo-
rum crassitudinem transibit in earn violentia corporalis. Immo
no
BOOK X • C H A P T E R I
moved from God, and the intellectual class is the one that is clos-
est, and if matter is made separately from mind, then a fortiori
mind can be made separately from matter. If the lowest intellect
occupies the same rank in the class of intellectual entities as mat-
ter does in the class of natural entities, and if matter cannot be
produced by any natural object, it follows that the lowest intellect
cannot be made by any species of intellect which is in the intellec-
tual class. But if this intellect does not depend on any intellect ei-
ther of the same class or even greatly superior to it, much less can
we suppose that it depends on the class of natural objects and still
less so on matter.
It follows that the lowest mind does not emerge from matter 5
and it follows too that it is incorruptible. For, since the order of
minds is superior to the corporeal order and the corporeal order
eventually descends to everlasting matter, and since that matter is
never corrupted, who would be stupid enough to concede that the
order of minds, which is more stable and divine than bodies, ends
eventually in a corruptible mind? So the lowest intellect must be
everlasting as it stands in the same relationship to the intelligible
forms as prime matter does to the sensible forms. But matter is
subject to bodily corruption neither through any sensible form, for
through them it is formed, nor through any intelligible form, for
by them it is perfected. The lowest mind, therefore, is not de-
stroyed by corruption in the spirit1 by way of any intelligible spe-
cies, for it is perfected by the species; nor does it perish by corrup-
tion in the body through any sensible form, for the mind rules
over corporeal forms and is not subject to them. Nor does corpo-
real corruption cross over into the mind anymore than corruption
in the spirit crosses over into matter. Or rather, if violence in the
spirit does not cross over into the mind, much less will corporeal
violence cross over into the mind given the grossness of bodies. Or
rather, if the corruption of bodies does not impinge on the matter
etiam, si corruptio corporalium subiectam illis materiam non at-

tingit, multo minus altiorem illis mentem coinquinabit.
6 Esto perpetuus intellectus ultimus. Sed quis iste? Iste inquam,
est intellectus humanus. Quod intellectus in nobis sit, quis dubi-
tat, cum non possimus nisi per vim intellectus de intellectibus dis-
putare? Et sicut oculus solis lumen non capit, nisi per proprium
quoddam sui lumen internum, ita anima nostra divinos intellectus
nec investigat nec intuetur, nisi per proprium intellectum, Sed
qualis hie noster est intellectus? Hoc ego non euro amplius; qua-
liscumque enim sit, sempiternis erit. Intellectus namque superio-
r s proculdubio perpetui sunt, si infimus est perpetuus. Ego vero
arbitror nostram mentem idcirco esse postremam, sicut et pluribus
placuit antiquorum, quoniam non simul agit sua, sed versat in se
vicissim tamquam Proteus formas atque intelleget succedendo,
quemadmodum luna, quae ultima stellarum est, vicissim mutat
lumen ceteris non mutantibus.
7 Sit ergo nostra mens ultima, sit etiam sempiterna. Quia sempi-
terna est, semper inhiat sempiternis, et ilia, quotiens a corpore
non turbatur, attingit illico solisque gaudet ut suis atque6 domesti-
cis. Motus autem cuiusque rei ille est naturalis, qui fit statim, im-
pedimenta subtracto. Fit autem ad simillimum terminum. Quia
vero est ultima, amat corporum naturam; quasi propinquam acce-
dit, vivificat et gubernat.
112
• BOOK X • C H A P T E R I •
subject to them, still less will it defile the mind that is superior to
bodies.
So let the lowest intellect be everlasting. But what is it? It is, I 6
claim, the human intellect. Who doubts that an intellect exists in
us, since we cannot argue about intellects except through the intel-
lect's power? The eye does not perceive sunlight except through its
own inner light. Similarly, our soul does not search out or gaze
upon the divine intellects except through its own intellect. What is
this intellect of ours like? I do not need to pursue this further be-
cause whatever it is like it will be eternal. For the higher intellects
are undoubtedly eternal if the lowest is eternal. I therefore believe
that our mind is the lowest (and it is a view shared by many of the
ancients) because it does not perform all its actions at the same
time but in itself turns from one to another, as Proteus changes
forms, and understands them in succession. The moon, the lowest
of the stars, similarly changes its light in turn while the other stars
do not change.
Let our mind then be the lowest and be everlasting. Being ever- 7
lasting, it always covets everlasting things and as long as it is not
troubled by the body it attains them instantly and rejoices in them
alone as though they were all members of its own family. But the
movement of each thing is natural if it occurs instantly once any
obstacle has been removed, and our mind is directed towards the
goal most like itself. Since it is the lowest mind, however, it loves
the nature of bodies: it approaches it as kin, fills it with life, and
takes it under its rule.
113
: II :
Obiectio Epicuri7 ct rcsponsio de rerum serie.
1 Temere hie rursus Epicurus exclamat portentum esse hoc, ut di-

vina mortalibus haereant, utpote qui non videat absque divinorum
stabiliumque consortio non posse constare mortalia. Latuisse il-
ium puto oportere rerum seriem ita in suis partibus digeri, ut cum
multi variique sint rerum ordines in natura, semper superioris
cuiusque ordinis infimae partes supremis partibus ordinis inferio-
r s proxime subsequentis quodammodo copulentur. Hoc nos docet
aetheris cum elementorum natura cognatio. Siquidem luna, pars
aetheris infima proxima elementis, elementale8 nonnihil habere vi-
detur, turn crebra ilia mutatione figurae, turn ipsa lucidi fuscique
corporis sui varietate. Rursus, ignis altissimum elementum caelum
proximum imitatur, quoniam caeli instar movetur et fulget. Idem
ostendit et ipsa inter se naturalis elementorum quatuor dispositio,
ubi pars infima ignis tumidior est et quasi tepescit ut aer. Suprema
regio aeris tenuatur et quasi fervet ut ignis. Ibi ignis aereus est,
igneus aer, atque ita in unam compagem copulantur. Idem infima
plaga aeris et aquae suprema faciunt, ubi aer obnubilatus liquescit
ut aqua, aqua item extenuata vaporibus exhalat ut aer. Terra rur-
sus altior pinguis et lubrica fit instar aquae. Aquae imum turgescit
in terram et saepe glaciatur ut terra.
2 Ultra elementa, vapores ipsi crassi fumique, corpora iam com-
posita sunt, sed proxima elementis. Postea paulo solidius glutinan-
114
BOOK X • C H A P T E R II
: II :
Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal On the chain of being.
Here Epicurus rashly exclaims, to the contrary, that to have things i

divine attached to things mortal is monstrous,2 inasmuch as he
does not see that mortal things cannot endure without the partici-
pation of the divine and the unchanging. I believe he is unaware
that the chain of being has to be so arranged in its parts that, since
many different orders of things occur in nature, the lowest parts
of each higher order must always be linked in some way to the
highest parts of the lower order immediately subsequent.3 The re-
lationship between the aether and the nature of the elements
teaches us this.4 The moon, which is the lowest part of the aether
and closest to the elements, seems to possess something elemental
both in the frequent changing of its shape and in the variety of its
body's brightness and darkness. Likewise fire, which is the highest
element, imitates the heaven it is closest to because it moves and
blazes like that heaven. The point is further illustrated by the nat-
ural and mutual disposition of the four elements where the lowest
region of fire becomes increasingly damper and cooler as if it were
air. The highest region of air becomes thinner and hot as though
it were fire. Fire is airy there and air fiery, and they are thus
seamlessly joined. The same thing happens with the lowest region
of air and the highest region of water where air turns to cloud and
liquefies into water, and water becomes less dense and rises in va-
pors like air. Again the higher level of earth becomes oozy and
muddy like water, while the lowest level of water thickens into
earth and often freezes like earth.
Below these elements, dense vapors, and smokes are bodies al- 2
ready composite but still very close to the elements. After a while
they become more solid and compress into sponge-like and porous
115
tur fluntque lapides aliqui spongiosi et rari, propinqui vaporibus,

Postmodum lapides reperiuntur duri ferme speciosique sicut me-
talla. Ex metallis ferrum plumbumque sunt propinqua lapidibus,
argentum et aurum propinquiora sunt plantis, quoniam horum ni-
tor et splendor flores referunt candidos et purpureos. In plantis tu-
ber excedit metalla, quia manifestius nutritur et augetur, paulum
tamen, quia non habet varium partium ordinem. Nobilissimae ar-
bores propinquae sunt brutis, radices oris loco habent, ramos et
crura, brachia et similia. Sexum habent utrumque nonnullae arbo-
res, masculinum et femininum,9 unde prope sitae uberius pullu-
lant. In brutis ostrea uno tantum superant plantas, quod sensum
habent tactus, sed fixa10 terrae paene nutriuntur ut arbores.
Multae quoque bestiolae sine coitu sponte11 nascuntur, ut herbae.
Sunt et simiae, canes, equi et elephantes et aliae bestiae hominibus
in quibusdam figuris, gestibus, artificiisque persimiles. Sunt stolidi
homines et ignavi, ut apparet, his quoque quam proximi. Sunt he-
roici homines, aliorum duces, supernis numinibus cognatissimi.
3 Esse rursus oportet spiritus hominibus familiaritate coniunctos,
quorum instructione magicae artis Plato vult reperta fiiisse mira-
cula, quemadmodum et12 instructione hominum bestiae nonnullae
nobis propinquiores mira saepe supra suam speciem operantur.
Atque hos13 daemones heroesve ita esse nobis affectu proximos, si-
cut natura atque situ, adeo ut quibusdam perturbationibus affi-
ciantur humanis atque alii aliis faveant personis et locis, alii insu-
per aliis adversentur. Siquidem Egyptii, quos sequuntur Origenes
et Numenius et Porphyrius, multos aiunt esse daemones qui ad
superiora animos erigunt, multos etiam qui ad inferiora detor-
quent, pessimos autem in occidente daemones esse, in septentrio-
116
B O O K X • C H A P T E R II
rocks closely allied to vapors. Next come rocks that are almost im-
penetrable and glitter like metals. Among metals, iron and lead are
closest to rocks, while silver and gold are more akin to plants, their
luster and brilliance reminding us of white and purple flowers.
Among plants, the tuber is clearly superior to metals because it
shows more obvious signs of nutrition and growth, but it does not
exceed them by much because it has no order of various parts.
The noblest trees are close to animals: they have roots instead of
a mouth and branches as arms, legs, and the like. Some trees
have both sexes, male and female, and when planted side by side
they reproduce more abundantly. Among animals, the oysters are
superior to plants only in that they have a sense of touch, but
they stay rooted to the bottom and are nourished more or less
like trees. Many tiny creatures too come to life spontaneously,
without intercourse, like plants. There are also monkeys, dogs,
horses, elephants, and other beasts that resemble men in their var-
ious shapes, gestures, and accomplishments. There are dullwitted,
lazy men too who obviously closely approximate to these animals;
[and] there are heroic men, leaders of others, who are next of kin
to the divine spirits.
In return there must be spirits who are familiarly linked to 3
men and under whose instruction, says Plato, we have discovered
the miracles of the art of magic5 (just as certain animals, having
learned from mens instruction and being particularly close to
us, do remarkable things, often beyond the scope of their species).
These daemons or heroes are so close to us in their feeling, as
in their nature and location, that they are affected by particular
turbulent human emotions, and some favor some people and
places, while others are hostile to others. Indeed, the Egyptians
maintain—and they are followed by Origen, Numenius, and
Porphyry6 — that there are many daemons who lift their rational
souls towards higher things and many others who deflect them to-
wards lower things. They assert that the worst daemons are in the
117
nali etiam plaga14 malos, bonos in meridionali, optimos orientalem

colere regionem, Daemonibus autem apud illos inferioribus supe-
riores praesunt, his quoque alii, quos angelos nominant, Item an-
gelis archangelos, archangelis principatus Platonici praeferunt,
principatibus autem intellectus quosdam qui dii iam participatione
quadam denominentur, summo semper deo pleni divinoque nec-
tare ebrii,
4 Si in omnibus rerum generibus confitemur infima quaeque an-
tecedentis ordinis cum supremis ordinis succedentis esse coniuncta
et invicem quoquo modo confundi, cur non fateamur infimum in-
tellectum cum suprema animarum sensitivarum ita esse coniunc-
tum ut cum haec, quamvis mortalis, imaginem aliquam habeat in-
tellectus (quod est in bestiis sagacissimis manifestum), intellectus
quoque postremus licet divinus sit, sensitivam tamen quandam ha-
beat brutamque naturam, per quam convenienter ad corpora ter-
rena declined Praesertim cum deceat non humanam modo men-
tem, sed alias quoque omnes, quaecumque impurae quodammodo
sunt, cum purioribus corporibus conspirare, Impurae vero mentes
animae omnes rationales sunt, quae licet purae animae sint, ideo
tamen sunt mentes impurae, quia mentes sunt animates. Mentes
inquam, ita movendis corporibus deditae, ut vestigia sua vitalia
animaliaque corporibus imprimant. Purae vero mentes sunt quae
mentes sunt solum, neque animalia ex se fundunt simulacra, re-
gendis immersa corporibus.
5 Pura vero corpora sunt apud Platonem duodecim ipsae mundi
sphaerae, caeli octo et elementa sub caelo quatuor, Quinetiam par-
tes quaedam in iis sphaeris singulis pretiosissimae. Animae itaque
rationales sphaeris omnibus insunt, gradatim pro sua dignitate
dispositae, Sed ipsam unam unius machinae animam Iovem nun-
cupat Plato, animas autem duodecim sphaerarum duodecim vocat
118
BOOK X • C H A P T E R II
west; that those in the north are bad too; that the good are in the
south; and that the very best inhabit the east. Higher daemons
rule over the lower ones among them, and over these rule others
whom they call angels. Above angels likewise the Platonists locate
archangels and above archangels principalities and above principal-
ities certain intellects, who, by way of a certain participation, are
now called gods, filled as they always are with God on high and
drunk with His nectar divine.7
If we agree that in all the classes of things the lowest individuals 4
of the preceding order are linked with and in a way become in
turn mingled with the highest of the order that follows, why can
we not accept that the lowest intellect is linked with the highest of
the sensitive souls; and linked in such a way that, since the soul
(though mortal) has an image of the intellect (as is obvious in the
most intelligent animals), yet the lowest intellect too (though di-
vine) has a sensitive and animal nature, through which it bends in
an appropriate manner towards earthly bodies? This is especially
so in that it is appropriate not only for the human mind but for all
other minds which are in some manner impure to unite with purer
bodies. But all rational souls are impure minds. Though they may
be pure souls, yet they are impure minds in that they are animate
minds, that is to say are minds so dedicated to moving bodies that
they leave their vital and animate imprints on them. But pure
minds are those that are minds alone: they do not produce ani-
mate replicas from themselves and imprint them in the bodies
they have to govern.
According to Plato, however, the bodies that are pure are the 5
twelve spheres of the world, that is, the eight spheres of heaven
and the four elements below heaven.8 Moreover, in these individ-
ual spheres are certain superlatively precious parts. So rational
souls are present in all the spheres arranged step by step in order
of their dignity. But Plato calls the one soul of the one machine
Jupiter, but the twelve souls of the twelve spheres he calls the gods
119
deos Iovis pedissequos. Sphaerarum partibus purioribus similiter

attribuit animas mentis participes, stellis scilicet et planetis, quos
etiam vocat deos. Ignis partibus daemones heroesque igneos, aeris
clari aereos, aeris caliginosi aquaticos daemones atque heroes. Pu-
rioribus postremo terrae15 partibus mentes copulat, quae humi
habitantes homines appellantur. Interdum etiam daemones he-
roesque in terra ponuntur. Neque sub luna tantum, sed etiam in
caelis ultra stellas daemonum heroumque turbas quamplurimas
collocat. Sed in omnibus sphaeris ultra daemones heroesque prin-
cipes animas ponit particulates, sive daemonicas heroicasque sive
humanas. Quae non semper aeterna sequantur ut principes illi,
sed aeterna temporaliaque vicissim et corpora vitamque mutent,
turn ascendendo in melius, turn in deterius descendendo. Proinde
quot stellae sunt, totidem subesse daemonum heroum anima-
rumque turbas. Sub Saturno Saturnias, sub love Iovias, Martias
vero sub Marte, similiterque deinceps. Mitto quod omnia putat in
omnibus esse, sed in terra modo terreno, in aqua aquatico, simili-
terque in aere atque igne, in caelo quoque pro caelesti natura.
Omnia in luna pro natura lunari, in sphaerisque aliis eodem pacto,
adeo ut sphaera quaelibet suo modo et propria qualitate totus sit
mundus.
6 Sed ut iam propositum concludamus. Sic erunt aliqui spiritus
extra corpus atque perpetui, item aliqui iis oppositi in corpore
atque mortales. Sint ergo oportet medii, qui vel extra corpus sint
et mortales, quod fieri nequit, vel in corpore quidem, sed immor-
tales. Primi illi sunt supernae mentes, quos vocant purissimos an-
gelos, qui et gradibus inter se quamplurimis distinguuntur. Illis
oppositae sunt animae bestiarum. Medium obtinebunt rationales
120
B O O K X • C H A P T E R III
in Jupiter's train.9 To the purer parts of the spheres, that is, the
stars and planets, he similarly attributes souls that participate in
mind, and these too he calls gods. To the parts of fire he allocates
fiery daemons and heroes, to those of the clear air airy ones, and
to those of the misty air watery daemons and heroes. Finally, to
the purer parts of earth he attaches minds, which are called
human because they dwell on the humid ground.10 Occasionally
too, daemons and heroes are located on earth. He puts countless
throngs of daemons and heroes not only under the moon but also
in the heavens beyond the stars. But in all the spheres, besides the
daemons and heroes, who are the princes, he places individual
souls, whether daemonic, heroic, or human, who do not always
pursue things eternal like the princes, but switch back and forth
between things eternal and things temporal and change [their]
bodies and life, now rising towards the better, now sinking to-
wards the worse. Consequently, the number of the throngs of dae-
mons, heroes, and souls is equal to the stars above them. Under
Saturn, they are Saturnian, under Jupiter Jovian, under Mars
Martian, and so on. I set aside the fact that Plato thinks that
things are all in all, but in earth in an earthly way, in water in a
watery way, and in air and fire similarly, and in heaven according
to the nature of heaven; and that all are in the moon according to
the nature of the moon, and in the other spheres similarly such
that each sphere, in its own way and according to its own quality,
is the whole world.
But let us now conclude the argument. There are going to be 6
spirits outside the body who are everlasting and likewise spirits
opposed to them inside the body who are mortal. So intermediate
spirits have to exist who would be either outside the body and
mortal (which is impossible) or inside the body but immortal. The
first are supernal minds, whom they call the angels in their utmost
purity, and they are distinguished in many degrees among them-
selves. Opposed to them are the souls of animals. Rational souls
121
animae, quae sunt quasi angeli quidam inferiores. Neque absur-

dum est esse spiritum in corpore aliquo immortalem, cum etiam
reperiatur corpus aliquod immortale, quod est caelum (et tota ipsa
quaelibet universi sphaera) . Immo decet omnibus praecipuis
mundi corporibus spiritus adesse perpetuos,16 quasi formas, siqui-
dem omnibus, ut plerique putant, perpetua inest materia. Oportet
autem a formis quibusdam ubique materiam superari.
7 Conducit ad idem Aegyptiorum opinio ilia a Platonicis quidem
omnibus, praesertim a Proclo confirmata, videlicet ad consonan-
tiam mundi perfectam esse oportere non solum animalia quaedam
rationalia immortaliaque atque contra animalia irrationalia et mor-
talia simul, verumetiam multa inter haec media rationalia quidem,
sed mortalia, non in terra solum, sed etiam in ceteris elementis.
Non tantum igitur homines in corpore mortali habere animos
sempiternos, verumetiam multos daemones, partim propinquos
nobis, partim longe sublimiores, quorum corpora gignantur atque
intereant, quamvis diutius quam nostra gradatim ditiusque17 vi-
vant. Non enim decere putant, ut a caelestibus animalibus, ratio-
nalibus, sempiternis, felicissimis ad animalia terrena rationalia
quidem, sed infelicissima vitaque brevissima, subito descendatur,
immo per gradus quosdam animalium rationalium, quae feliciora
quidem sint et diuturniora quam homines, non tamen sempiterna,
corpore vel animo beatissima.
8 Idem quoque Plutarchus et familiares eius, Demetrius philoso-
phus, Emilianusque rhetor affirmant. Testantur enim ex multis
prodigiis quae suis temporibus18 contigerunt, Pana, magnum dae-
monem aliosque multos daemones eiulasse primum, deinde etiam
obiise. Itaque sempiternae mentis cum corpore humano quamvis
caduco consortium haud ita absurdum est, ut Epicurus Lucre-
tiusque existimant, praesertim cum nostra mens ita sit ultima
mentium, sicut stellarum est ultima luna, atque ut luna ad solem,
sic nostra mens referatur ad Deum. Luna circa solem ita revolvitur
122
BOOK X • C H A P T E R III
are going to hold the middle position, being as it were certain

lower angels. There is nothing absurd about an immortal spirit be-
ing in a body, since we have even found an immortal body, namely
the sky (and each entire sphere of the universe). Or rather, it
seems appropriate that everlasting spirits, in the role of forms,
should be present to all the principal bodies of the world, since ev-
erlasting matter, most people suppose, is present in them all. But
everywhere matter has to be ruled by particular forms.
The Egyptians' theory, supported by all the Platonists, espe- 7
daily Proclus,11 leads to the same conclusion. They say that not
only must rational immortal creatures and at the same time irra-
tional mortal creatures exist for the world's perfect harmony, but
also many rational but mortal creatures in between them, not only
in earth, but also in the other elements. So not only do men have
eternal souls in a mortal body, but many daemons do as well,
some of them close to us, others far superior to us, whose bodies
come into being and gradually pass away although they live longer
than our bodies and more splendidly. The Egyptians suppose that
a sudden descent from creatures that are celestial, rational, eternal,
and utterly blessed to creatures that are earthly, rational, yes, but
without happiness and with the briefest of lives, would be inap-
propriate. Rather one should descend by way of the levels of ratio-
nal souls who are happier and far longer-lived than men, but not
yet eternal or totally blessed in body and soul.
Plutarch, and his friends Demetrius the philosopher and 8
Aemilianus the rhetorician, assert the same: among the many
prodigies which occurred in their day, they bear witness that Pan,
the great daemon, along with many other daemons, first broke
into lamentation and then died.12 So the companionship of an
eternal mind with a human body though perishable is not the ab-
surdity Epicurus and Lucretius suppose,13 especially since our
mind is the lowest of minds, just as the moon is the lowest of
stars; and just as the moon looks to the sun so does our mind look
123
ut alias luceat aliter et varie figuretur, numquam tota luminis red-

piendi facultate privetur. Habet insuper nitidum in se quiddam;
habet et fuscum. Habet denique opacum quiddam, quod impedit
ne tota refulgeat- Mens humana similiter divini sol is radio fulget
quidem semper, sed alias aliter, mutatque figuram, numquam19
tota resplendet, Neque quod in ea splendet, splendet aequaliter:
praeter divinam eius rationalemque virtutem subest pars quaedam
opaca et vacua ratione, quae tamquam lunaris ilia opacitas ad ele-
mental sic ipsa ad naturam corpusque declinans, relinquitur lumi-
nis expers.
9 Ergo naturali rerum ordini consentaneum esse videtur, mentem
ultimam, quamvis sempiterna sit, cum corpore quodam licet ca-
duco posse coniungi. Mitto quod Xenocrates et Speusippus, Iam-
blichus et Plutarchus putant ab ipsa sempiternitate vim procedere
sempiternam, non solum usque ad mentes ultimas quae re-
flectuntur in ipsam, sed etiam usque ad animas bestiarum, Nume-
nius insuper ad plantas usque producit, Plotinus denique etiam ad
naturam. Nos autem Porphyrium Proclumque sequamur, eatenus
putantes vitam cognitionemque procedere sempiternam, quatenus
propria in eandem conversio reperitur, Ilia enim quandam in se
aeternitatis retinent rationem, quae in ipsam ipsius turn ratione
turn gratia, nec solum motu alieno atque communi, sed etiam suo
et proprio reflectuntur,
10 Sed numquid humanum corpus ea est dignitate donatum ut
mentem perpetuam excipere hospitem mereatur? Proculdubio,
Neque turbari ex hoc debemus quod natura variis propugnaculis
instruxit corpora bestiarum et adiumenta suppeditavit ad victum,
nobis nihil tribuit tale. Non enim voluit delicatam aequalitatem
nostri corporis deformare, neque potuit infinitis actionibus homi-
nis, quae infinitam sequuntur cogitationem, innumerabilia vel pro-
124
to God. The moon circles the sun so that it variously shines out at
different times and alters its shape, but it is never totally deprived
of its ability to receive light. It has a sort of brightness within and
also a darkness. And it has a sort of cloudiness that prevents it
from being all ablaze. Similarly, the human mind always shines
with the ray of the divine sun, but in varying ways; it changes its
shape and is never totally resplendent. What shines in it does not
shine out equally; in addition to its divine and rational power, part
of it is subject to a cloudiness that is devoid of reason. Like the
opacity of the moon declining towards the elements, this part de-
clines towards nature and the body and is left deprived of light.
It seems then to be consistent with the natural order of things 9
that the lowest mind, though it is eternal, can be joined with a
body, though it is perishable. I shall pass over the theory of
Xenocrates, Speusippus, Iamblichus, and Plutarch that eternal
power proceeds from eternity itself, not only as far as the lowest
minds, who turn back to this eternity, but as far as the souls of an-
imals too.14 Numenius extends it as far as plants besides15 and
Plotinus as far even as nature.16 But we follow Porphyry and
Proclus, who believe that eternal life and cognition proceed as far
as one can find conversion proper to them.17 For those things re-
tain in themselves a kind of rational principle of eternity that are
converted to this principle by its reason and its grace, not only by
an outside and common motion but also by their own particular
motion.
Is not the human body worthily endowed with enough dignity 10
to deserve to receive an eternal mind as its guest? Undoubtedly so.
We should not be upset by the fact that nature has equipped the
bodies of animals with every kind of defense and supplied them
with special means for feeding themselves but has not given them
to us. She did not wish to mar the delicate balance of our body;
nor for mans infinite activities (which attend his infinite process of
thinking) could she provide a limitless number of defenses or in-
125
pugnacula vel instrumenta suppeditare. Sed, ut inquit Aristoteles,

dum mentem manumque dedit, artes omnes atque omnia instru-
menta concessit. Bestias autem facile finitis munimentis instruxit,
quibus determinatas actiones phantasiae ad certum quiddam na-
tura directae exsequerentur. Arbitramur vero corpora nostra esse
idonea mentis hospitia, turn propter figuram erectam, non humi
sed superne spectantem et caelum quasi patriam suam proprius
agnoscentem, turn propter membrorum variorum decorem om-
nino mirabilem, turn quia ignis et aer elementa purissima in nobis
valent quamplurimum, quod etiam indicat agilitas corporis, proce-
rus habitus et erectus aspectus. Maxime vero propter complexio-
nem temperatissimam, quae significatur ex delicata, leni, firma et
nitida carnis mollitie, quae non fit nisi exactissima elementorum
temperatione.
II Aquila visu hominem superat, multae aves auditu, canis olfactu,
nullum vero animalium gustu vel tactu. Quod plane perspicitur ex
eo quod homines in epulis, poculis et venereis immoderatius pro-
funduntur quam bruta, licet ratione nonnumquam cohibeantur.
Par est enim ut avidius quam bestiae eas voluptates asciscant, quas
sentiunt et acutius. Tres illi sensus superiores tunc expeditissimi
sunt, quando siccum est cerebrum. Quam siccitatem non tradidit
deus homini, cuius cerebrum quiescit numquam, ne forte si esset
natura siccum, etiam continua agitatione arescens,20 citius quam
decet exsiccaretur. Gustus nihil aliud est quam tactus aliquis
linguae. Tactus cum universalis sit sensus, turn omnis animalis,
turn corporis universi, ubi acutissimus est, declarat optimam inesse
corporis complexionem, ob id potissimum, quod cum fiat in nervis
126
struments. However, as Aristotle says, when she gave us a mind

and a hand, she gave us all the skills and all the instruments.18 But
it was easy for her to equip the animals with finite means of pro-
tection in order for them to pursue the actions determined by
their phantasy (which is naturally directed towards a particular
end). But we consider that our bodies are suitable lodgings for the
mind, (a) because of their upright shape with the eyes gazing not
at the ground but up to heaven as if recognizing it more particu-
larly as their native land; (b) because of the utterly marvelous
beauty of the body's different parts; (c) because the purest ele-
ments, fire and air, mightily prevail in us, as the body's agility, its
tall and slender build, and its erect appearance indicate; and (d)
most importantly, because of its superlatively well-tempered com-
plexion, which is revealed by the skin's delicate, smooth, firm, and
glowing softness impossible without the most exact tempering of
the elements.
The eagle excels man with its sight, and so do many birds with n
their hearing and the dog with its sense of smell; but no animal is
superior to man in taste or touch. This is quite obvious from the
fact that men immoderately give way to eating, drinking, and
making love much more than animals do, even though they are re-
strained at times by reason. It is not surprising that they indulge
more avidly than animals in the pleasures they feel more keenly.
The three superior senses are at their sharpest when the brain is
dry. God has not given dryness of the brain to man whose brain is
never at rest, lest if it were naturally dry, or even drying up from
continuous agitation, it would dry out faster than perhaps it
should. Taste is nothing other than a sort of touch of the tongue.
Since touch is the universal sense both of every creature and of the
universal body, then where it is keenest it indicates the presence of
the body's complexion at its best; and especially because, since it
occurs in the nerves, which sense poorly when they are too dry, it
127
qui, quando aridiores sunt, sentiunt male, ubi acutus est tactus, si-
gnificatur inesse mollitiem, quae temperet nervorum ariditatem*
12 Praeterea, sensuum instrumenta numquam actu eas qualitates
habere debent, quas sensus est percepturus. Pupilla enim colori-
bus, auditus sonis, olfactus odoribus caret, lingua saporibus. Cum
vero tactus versetur circa quatuor qualitates21 elementorum, opor-
tet ut vel careat illis omnino, quod fieri nequit in composito cor-
pore, vel ab earum excessu procul absit, ita ut in eius instrumento
nulla videatur qualitas dominari, sed quasi quaedam expulsis qua-
litatibus harmonia. Opus fuit tamen multum terrae et aquae
secundum molem nobis inesse, ut vim ignis aerisque longe vehe-
mentiorem aqua et terra molis abundantia22 temperaret. Datum
quoque nobis est maius cerebrum et cor calidius quam ceteris ani-
mantibus, Illud quidem ut per varia instrumenta speculationi sup-
peditet, hoc autem ut et multi et clari spiritus adsint cerebro* Sus-
pensum etiam caput est, ne gravium humorum sordes descendant
ad cerebrum et inquinent spirituum puritatem. Vehemens quoque
turn cerebri frigiditas humiditasque, turn cordis caliditas atque
siccitas tam se invicem quam membra omnia temperant. Ideo in
homine videtur esse complexio omnium temperatissima* Quae si
terrea esset, ut bestiarum fere omnium, cornibus, dentibus, ungui-
bus, rostrisque durioribus, aspera et hirsuta pelle, squamis esse-
mus obductL Nunc vero contra ita affectum est corpus humanum
ut neque caloris et siccitatis excessu sit asperum, neque frigore ni-
mio rigidum aut pigrum, neque humore superfluo fluxum et lubri-
cum, sed delicatum pariter atque solidum* Quod etiam intellegitur
ex alimentis quibus assidue vescimur, aereis, dulcibus, attritis, te-
nuatis, liquefactis, concoctis, temperatissimis; bestiae vero contra-
riis. Qualis autem complexio est, talia alimenta cupit, et qualibus
utitur alimentis, talis evadit.
128
• B O O K X - C H A P T E R II •
signifies when it is keen the presence of the moist softness19 which

tempers the nerves' dryness.
Moreover, the instruments of the senses should never possess 12
in act the qualities that a sense is about to perceive. The pupil of
the eye lacks colors, the hearing sounds, the smell odors, and the
tongue tastes. But since touch is concerned with the four qualities
of the elements, it must either lack them completely, which is im-
possible in a composite body, or else be so far from having them in
excess that in an instrument of touch no quality obviously domi-
nates, but a kind of harmony prevails with the qualities sup-
pressed. Yet it proved necessary for much earth and water to be
present in us as a mass: the abundance of its bulk could then tem-
per the far more vehement force of fire and air. We were also given
a larger brain and a hotter heart than other creatures: the brain so
that via our various instruments it might further speculation; the
heart so that many vivid spirits would be present in the brain. And
the head was put on top to prevent the dregs of the heavy humors
from descending into the brain and polluting the purity of the
spirits. Also the intense cold and dampness of the brain and the
heat and dryness of the heart temper each other and all the limbs
alike. In man there seems to be the most tempered complexion of
all. If it were earthy, like that of most animals, we would be envel-
oped by horns, teeth, hooves or claws, hard beaks, rough and
shaggy hair, or scales. But in fact the human body is so endowed
that it is neither prickly from too much heat and dryness, nor stiff
or torpid from too much cold, nor wet and slimy from too much
moisture; rather it is delicate and sturdy equally. The same lesson
is learned from the foods we eat continually, whether they be light,
sweet, ground up, chopped, pulped, cooked, carefully blended.
Animals consume quite the opposite foods. A certain complexion
desires certain foods, and whatever kind of foods it enjoys it be-
comes that kind.
129
13 Concludamus igitur hominem ad contemplandum esse natum,

ut Anaxagoras inquit, postquam ita in eo tam cerebrum quam reli-
quum corpus constitutum est, ut continuo contemplationis officio
serviat* Quod et cerebri requirit mollitiem et complexionem cor-
poris temperatam: illam ne speculando nimium exsiccetur, hanc ne
humorum tumultu a contemplando detorqueatur* Cum vero tanta
sit et tam sublimis nostri corporis moderatio ut caeli temperan-
tiam imitetur, nihil mirum est si caelestis animus hanc ad tempus
aedem habitat caelo simillimam, Neque tamen carni infunditur
primum, sed mediis ducitur competentibus, ut Magi Persarum
docent* Primo quidem in ipso descensu caelesti aereoque involvi-
tur corpore,23 deinde spiritu ex corde genito, qui in nobis caeli in-
star temperatissimus est et lucidissimus* His24 mediis corpore
clauditur crassiore* Atque iis omnibus aeque fit proximus, licet per
aliud in aliud se transfuderit, sicut calor ignis aeri et aquae haeret
proxime, quamvis per aerem trahatur ad aquam* Ac merito irn-
mortalis anima per immortale corpus illud aethereum mortalibus
corporibus iungitur* Perpetuum quidem illud colit semper, haec ad
breve tempus mortalia, ut merito appellari animus debeat deus
quidam25 sive Stella circumfusa nube sive daemon: non incola
terrae, sed hospes,
14 Hospes, nosce teipsum; scito te esse caelestis patriae civem, ci-
vem natum ad caelestia contemplanda* Memento, si finis tuus est
contemplatio, vitam tuam augeri ac perfici contemplando. Cum
vero ex hoc ipso vita corporis quodammodo remittatur, sequitur26
ut in ipso vitae corporeae27 detrimento atque interim non decres-
cat tua vita, sed crescat.
130
• B O O K X • C H A P T E R II •
Let us conclude, then, that man is born for contemplation, as 13

Anaxagoras says,20 since in him both the brain and the rest of the
body are so constituted as to serve continually the office of con-
templation. This requires a moist softness of the brain and a tem-
pered complexion of the body: the former so that man does not
become desiccated from too much thinking, the latter so that he is
not distracted from contemplating by the tumult of the humors.
But since the moderation of our body is so remarkable and ele-
vated that it imitates the tempering of heaven, we should hot be
surprised if the heavenly soul lives for a while in this lodging that
most resembles heaven. Yet the soul does not at first mingle with
the flesh: it is brought down through the appropriate intermediate
stages, as the Persian Magi teach.21 First, in the actual descent, it
is enveloped in a celestial body of air and afterwards in a spirit
generated from the heart, which in us is perfectly tempered and
dazzlingly bright like heaven. With these as intermediaries, it is
enclosed in the coarser body. It becomes equally close to all three,
although it transfers itself through one to another; similarly the
heat of fire is drawn most closely to air and water, though it is
drawn to the water through the air. Appropriately then, the im-
mortal soul is joined to mortal bodies by means of that immortal
aethereal body. It lives in that everlasting home always, while it
lives in these mortal bodies for a brief time. In justice, the rational
soul should be called a kind of god, or a star ringed with cloud, or
a daemon: not an inhabitant of earth, but a guest.
Guest, know yourself, know you are a citizen of a heavenly 14
country, a citizen born to contemplate things celestial. Remember,
if your end is contemplation, that your life should be enriched and
perfected by contemplating. But since from this contemplating the
body's life in a way loosens its hold, it follows that in this very
weakening and death of the corporeal life, your [authentic] life
grows not fainter but stronger.
131
: III :
Secunda ratio: sicut in rebus naturalibus fit

resolutio ad primam materiam immortalem,
sic ad formam ultimam immortalem.
1 Ordo naturalium corporum ita est institutus ut in primam descen-

dat materiam et in ultimam ascendat formam, et quo magis mate-
ria quaevis ad materiam primam accedit, eo potior materia sit, id
est verior puriorque materia. Quo magis aliqua forma ad ultimam
formam, eo sit forma perfection Materia enim prima materiarum
materia est. Forma ultima est forma formarum.
2 Accipe hoc exemplo quod volumus. Corpus animalis in mem-
bra quasi materiam suam dividimus, membrum quodlibet in hu-
mores quatuor, qui sunt quaedam membri materia; similiter hu-
morem quemlibet in quatuor elementa. Elementum vero in
materiam simplicem ad quam devenire tandem oportet, ne descen-
damus in infinitum neve compellamur e converso ascendere sine
fine. Nusquam enim erit actus mixtus, si nusquam mixta potentia
fuerit; nusquam rursus actus purus invenietur, si nusquam poten-
tia pura valeat reperiri. Et cum actio ab actu puro exordium ha-
beat, passio a pura potentia, actiones passionesque nusquam
erunt. Sit ergo oportet materia simplex. Haec utique materia sim-
plex, quae subiecta est elementi formae, prima materia nominatur,
quoniam ipse naturae artifex in corporibus fabricandis principio
hanc materiam suscipit28 nudam, mox elementorum vestit qualita-
tibus atque formis, turn elementa in speciem producit humorum,
deinde humores in formas membrorum digerit. Membris addit
speciem nutriendi; huic sentiendi formam; huic tandem intelle-
gendi.
3 Intellectiva vero natura est duplex. Una quae adeo est a corpori-
bus aliena ut nullam illis vitam praestet. Haec ideo materiae vel
132
• B O O K X • C H A P T E R III •
: III :
Second proof: as resolution reverts in natural objects

to prime immortal matter, so it reverts
to ultimate immortal form.
The order of natural bodies is so disposed that it descends to i

prime matter and ascends to ultimate form, and the closer some
matter approaches to prime matter, the better, the truer, the purer
matter it is. The closer a form is to ultimate form, the more per-
fect it is as form. For prime matter is the matter of matters, ulti-
mate form the form of forms.
Here is an example of what we mean. We divide the animate 2
body into its limbs as its matter; then each limb into the four hu-
mors that serve as the limbs matter; then likewise each humor
into the four elements. But [each] element we divide into simple
matter, which we have to reach eventually lest we descend ad
infinitum, or conversely are forced endlessly to ascend. For nowhere
will mixed act exist if mixed potency nowhere exists. Contrariwise,
nowhere will pure act be found, if pure potency can nowhere be
found; and since action takes its origin from pure act and passion
takes its origin from pure potency, actions and passions will no-
where exist. Therefore simple matter must exist. This simple mat-
ter, which underlies an element s form, is called prime matter, be-
cause the Artificer of nature, in creating bodies, first takes this
naked matter, and clothes it with the qualities and forms of the el-
ements. Then He introduces the elements into the species of the
humors, and distributes the humors into the forms of the limbs.
To the limbs He then adds the nutritive species, and to this the
form of feeling, and to this the form of understanding.
The intellectual nature is twofold. One nature is so remote 3
from bodies that it does not provide them with life at all. It is not
133
corporis forma non dicitur et ordo ille corporum in hanc mentis

naturam ceu propriam formam non desinit. Hunc gradum apud
Platonem sublimes obtinent angeli. Sed est altera natura mentis,
quae corpori iuncta, quodam quasi foedere cum ipso conspirat, in
quam velut ultimam materiae formam ascendit progressio corpo-
rum. Progressionis huius duo sunt termini: materia29 infimus,
mens ista supremus. Si longissime inter se distant, conditiones in-
ter se oppositas habent. Ergo sicut materia prima, mera materia
est, natura sua expers omnino formae, omnibus subiecta formis
atque materiis, ita ultima ilia forma, scilicet mens, mera forma est,
scilicet expers omnino materiae, formis omnibus earumque mate-
riis praesidens. Item, sicut materia prima a primo esse distat lon-
gissime atque est proxima nihilo, unde inter esse et nihil ponitur a
Platone, ita ultima forma longissime distat a nihilo atque est
primo esse quam30 proxima.
4 Hinc tria sequuntur: primum, quod ultima forma nulla ex
parte pullulat a materia; secundum, quod a solo fit deo; tertium,
quod permanere poterit immortalis. Primum horum concluditur
ex prima comparatione quam hie induximus, secundum ex se-
cunda, tertium ex prima sequitur et secunda. Ex prima sic: si est
expers omnino materiae corporalis, quae perniciosae mutationis
initium est, procul est a pernicie, ac si mutabilium rerum caput
est, neque mutabilibus rebus succumbit, neque mutationem susci-
pit aliquam, nisi vitalem. Ex secunda vero sic: si terminus nihilo
proximus non tendit in nihilum, quid mirum terminum a nihilo
remotissimum et primo esse proximum neque ab esse extrudi um-
quam neque trudi in nihilum? Rursus, perfectior est formae quam
materiae natura, cum materia a forma perficiatur atque ornetur.
Ergo quemadmodum de materia in materiam descendentes grada-
tim ad materiam primam corporum devenimus sempiternam, ita
etiam de forma ascendentes in formam, paulatim in ultimam cor-
134
called the form of matter or of body; and the order of bodies does
not culminate in this, the nature or proper form of mind* In Plato
the higher angels occupy this leveL22 But a second intellectual na-
ture exists which is joined to the body and collaborates closely
with it in a kind of league. The progression of bodies ascends to it
as to the ultimate form of matter. There are two termini for this
progression, matter at the bottom and this kind of mind at the
top. If they are very far apart, they possess mutually opposite con-
ditions. Just as prime matter is pure matter and by its very nature
is entirely devoid of form though subject to all forms and matters,
so the ultimate form, or mind, is pure form, entirely devoid of
matter but ruling over all forms and their matters. Again, just as
prime matter is as far distant as possible from prime being and
closest to non-being (whence Plato puts it between being and
nothing23), so ultimate form is as far distant as possible from
nothing and closest to prime being.
Three consequences follow from this: (i) that that ultimate 4
form in no way springs from matter, (2) that it is made by God
alone, and (3) that it could remain immortal. The first of these re-
sults from the first comparison we introduced here, and the second
from the second; the third follows from the first and the second. It
follows from the first thus: if ultimate form is entirely devoid of
corporeal matter, which is the origin of ruinous change, it is far
distant from destruction; and if it presides over mutable things, it
does not yield to them, nor does it sustain any but vital change. It
follows from the second thus: if the terminus closest to nothing
does not proceed to nothing, is it surprising that the terminus
most distant from nothing and closest to prime being is never ex-
pelled from being or driven into nothing? Again, the nature of
form is more perfect than that of matter, because matter is made
perfect and adorned by form. Just as we descend step by step,
therefore, from matter to matter until we reach the prime eternal
matter of bodies, so too do we ascend from form to form until we
135
• P L A T O N I C THEOLOGY •
porum formam sempiternam provehimur, ne ascensus sit imper-

fectior quam descensus ac supremus terminus imperfectior sit
quam infimus. Decet earn intellectualem formam ad quam tam-
quam finem totus universae naturae tendit conatus, usque adeo
absolutam consummatamque esse ut sit procul a morte. Medias
vero formas immortales esse non est necessarium. Eas enim parvi-
facere natura videtur, cum illas non tam propter ipsas quam prop-
ter ultimam eligat. In quo sane videntur praeparationes quaedam
materiae ad formam ultimam capiendam potius quam formae
principales existere. Per illas quasi vias transit ipse motus impe-
tusque naturae. In ilia sistit natura motum. Merito igitur illae ab
esse in non esse transibunt, ilia quiescet in esse, ut naturae finis
maneat sine fine. Dicimus autem totum universae naturae cona-
tum ad id potissimum dirigi, ut animal intellectuale sit, ex eo quod
intellectus adsit corpori. Ut autem intellectus ipse in se sit, actio-
nem dumtaxat divinam posse conferre, et cum ab ipsa dumtaxat
aeternitate dependeat, aeternum fore.
5 De intellectuali autem animali quidnam dicemus? Magi non
dubitant id quoque in sua temperantia permansurum fiiisse: ut
Plato in Charmide scribit, si modo animus in sua, id est divina,
temperantia permansisset. Ab ipso enim omnem turn consonan-
tiam, turn dissonantiam corporis proficisci. Idem prorsus lex Mo-
saica Christianaque docet. Verum quod universus ordo ob inordi-
natum animi motum olim amisit, ipso tandem ordine praevalente
rursus in ordinem redigendum, non Moyses solum, sed Zoroaster,
Mercurius, Plato consentiunt.
6 Sed de his alias. Nunc iam quod erat propositum concludamus.
Sint igitur termini corporalis ordinis utrique perpetui, et infimus
et supremus. Supremum vero terminum ultimamque formam esse
rationalem animam prisci theologi putaverunt, quibus cum Aristo-
136
are gradually brought to the ultimate eternal form of bodies, lest

the ascent be less perfect than the descent and the upper terminus
less perfect than the lowest. It is fitting that the intellectual form
towards which the whole endeavor of universal nature is striving as
its goal should be so perfect and complete that it is far removed
from death. But it is not necessary for the intermediate forms to
be immortal. Nature deems them apparently of little value, since
she does not choose them for their own sakes but for the ultimate
form. They seem to be matter s particular preparations for receiv-
ing the ultimate form rather than existing themselves as the princi-
pal forms. The movement and impulse of nature passes through
them as conduits. But in the ultimate form nature arrests [its] mo-
tion. Rightly therefore, in order that natures end may endlessly
endure, they will pass from being to non-being while the form will
rest in being. However, we assert that the whole endeavor of uni-
versal nature is directed above all to the goal of being an intellec-
tual animal, in that intellect is present in [its] body. Only divine
action makes it possible for the intellect to exist in itself, and since
this intellect depends only on eternity itself, it will be eternal.
What are we to say then about some living creature possessing 5
intellect? The Magi are in no doubt that it too would have sur-
vived in its tempered state—as Plato puts it in the Charmides,24 if
only the rational soul had persisted in its original, its divine, tem-
perance. For all the harmony or disharmony of the body stems
from it. The Mosaic and Christian law teaches exactly the same.
However what the universal order once lost because of the inordi-
nate motion of the soul must be restored to it again when order
eventually prevails [in the soul]. Not just Moses,25 but Zoroas-
ter,26 Hermes Trismegistus,27 and Plato too,28 agree on this.
But of these matters, more elsewhere. Let us now conclude the 6
theme under discussion. Let the termini of the corporeal order
both be eternal, the lowest and the highest. The ancient theolo-
gians supposed that the highest terminus and ultimate form is the
137
teles consentit in libro De divinis duodecimo, ubi de causis effi-

cientibus et formalibus disputans, inquit causas quidem moventes
materiam praecedere, formas minime. 'Si autem post materiam
forma aliqua maneat, esse perscrutandum. Nam in quibusdam ni-
hil prohibere, ut si est anima tale — non omnis, sed intellectus/
Idem in libro De naturalibus secundo inquit philosophi naturalis in-
vestigationem usque ad illam formam protendi, quae separata qui-
dem sit simul et in materia. Quam esse hominis animam ipse ibi
significat et ita Peripatetici omnes exponunt. Nos autem putamus
turn priscos theologos, turn Aristotelem tali quadam ratione in
hanc sententiam concurrisse, quod sicut complexio temperata est
finis ad quem diriguntur omnes motiones complexionesque natu-
rales, ita rationalis anima, cui subest temperata complexio,finisest
formarum omnium naturalium.
7 Rursus, ilia est ultimae formae conditio, ut neque omnino sit
absoluta, neque omnino immersa corporibus. Si omnino esset li-
bera neque quicquam per corpus operaretur, corporis forma non
esset. Si obrueretur omnino, neque ageret aliquid absque corpore,
non esset ultima forma. Esset enim hac ulterior ilia, quaecumque
talis esse reperiretur ut partim quidem iungeretur corpori, partim
non iungeretur. Qualem profecto esse aliquam oportet, ut inter
substantiam illam angelicam a corpore omnino seiunctam perque
illud nihil agentem, atque formam aliam omnino coniunctam cor-
pori perque corpus agentem omnia (qualis est anima bestiarum),
forma quaedam sit media, partim iuncta corpori, partim etiam se-
parata, ut aliquid per corpus efficiat, aliquid per seipsam. Talis est
autem rationalis anima omnis, quia et regit corpus et speculatur.
Humana quoque talis est proculdubio, quae nutriendi et sentiendi
opera per corporis exsequitur instrumenta, intellegendi autem et
138
rational soul, and Aristotle agrees with them in book twelve of his
work On Things Divine [the Metaphysics], where, in discussing the
efficient and formal causes, he says that the moving causes are
prior to matter, but the forms are not: "But we must examine
whether any form can survive after matter. Now in some cases
nothing prevents it, for instance, if soul —not all soul, but the
intellective part—is such a form/'29 In book two of his work On
Things Natural [the Physics], he says that the study of natural phi-
losophy should extend as far as the form that is separate and yet
simultaneously in matter.30 He means this to be the human soul,
and all the Peripatetics have interpreted it in this way. But we be-
lieve that the ancient theologians and Aristotle (deploying this
kind of argument) agreed with the opinion that, just as a tem-
pered complexion is the end towards which all motions and natu-
ral complexions are directed, so the rational soul, to which the
tempered complexion is subject, is the end of all natural forms.
Again, the condition of the ultimate form is such that it is nei- 7
ther completely independent of, nor completely immersed in, bod-
ies. If it were completely free and never acted through the body, it
would not be the form of the body. If it were completely engulfed
[in the body], it would never do anything without the body and
would not be the ultimate form. For if a form could be discovered
such that it were partly joined and partly not joined to the body, it
would be higher than this engulfed form. Some form must exist
such that, between the angelic substance completely separate from
the body and never acting through it, and another form completely
attached to the body and doing all things through it (like the soul
of animals), there has to be an intermediate form partly attached
to the body and partly separate from it, so that it can do one thing
through the body and another on its own. All rational soul is such
a form, because it rules over the body and contemplates alike. Un-
doubtedly the human soul is also such: it performs the functions
of nutrition and sensation using the organs of the body, but it ac-
139
eligendi actum perficit per seipsam. Sic angelus tam per substan-
tiam quam per operationem est a materia separatus et in aeterni-
tate totus, quia totus in statu. Brutorum animae per utrumque
coniunctae et totae in tempore, quia per utrumque mutantur. Ra-
tionales animae, quia partim coniunctae esse debent,31 partim
etiam separatae, neque esse possent per aliquid separatae, si con-
iunctae per substantiam essent, necessario sunt per substantiam
separatae sive separabiles, quia scilicet nullam habent originem a
materia vel ab agentibus instrumentisque corporeis. Sunt autem
coniunctae per operationes, non quidem per omnes operationes
sed infimas, et id quidem non violentia sed amore. Unde secun-
dum Chaldaeos in confinio sunt aeternitatis et temporis. Per sub-
stantiam quidem in aeternitate sunt, per operationes in tempore,
siquidem ilia manet, istae mutantur. Decet enim inter id quod om-
nino est aeternum atque id quod32 penitus temporale, esse aliquid
partim aeternum, partim etiam temporale. Et inter id quod sem-
per est atque id quod fit aliquando, esse aliquid quod fiat semper.
Tale quidem est caelum, et permanens substantia semper et mo-
bile. Rursus, talis ipsa33 mundi materia atque ipsa etiam (ut ita
dixerim) corporeitas. Praeterea, ferme talis est anima, quae fluit
semper afFectu et actu, quamvis substantia maneat. Unde declinat
ad corpora quae fluunt insuper per substantiam.
8 Talis profecto anima ideo forma est corporis ultima, quia for-
mat quidem regitque corpus, verum ita paene excedit naturam
corporis, ut in ipso sit limine, ac paulum quid praetergressa, limi-
tes corporis sit penitus relictura.34 Nempe multo magis separata
est quam coniuncta. Communicat namque illi partem sui sive po-
tentiam inferiorem, quam habet cum brutis plantisve communem.
Partem vero praecipuam, divinis persimilem, in qua tota consistit
140
complishes on its own the act of understanding and choosing.

Thus the angel is separate from matter both in substance and ac-
tivity, and is completely in eternity because it is completely at rest.
The souls of animals are attached to body in both respects and are
completely in time, because they change in both respects. Rational
souls, because they have to be partly attached and partly separate,
and if they are attached through their substance cannot be sepa-
rated through something else, necessarily are separated or are sep-
arable through substance, because, as we know, they do not origi-
nate from matter or from bodily agents or instruments. However
they are attached through their activities, not through all activities
but the lowest ones, and not by force but by love. That is why, ac-
cording to the Chaldaeans, they are on the borderline of eternity
and time.31 Through their substance they are in eternity, through
their activities in time, because their substance is unchanging
while their activities are subject to change. Between what is com-
pletely eternal and what is utterly temporal it behooves there to be
something partly eternal and partly temporal; and between what
always exists and what sometimes comes into being, there has to
be something that is always coming into being. Such are the heav-
ens, always permanent in substance, yet mobile. Such too is the
world's matter and its corporeity if I may use the term. And such
in a sense is soul, which is always flowing in its being affected and
in its act, though its substance is unchanging. So it sinks towards
bodies, which by reason of their substance are also in flux.
Clearly then such a soul is the ultimate form of the body be- 8
cause it forms and rules over the body, but it well-nigh exceeds the
body's nature in that it is on the very threshold; and if it went just
a little further, it would leave the limits of the body entirely. Cer-
tainly it is much more separated from than attached to the body. It
imparts to the body the lower part or power of itself it has in com-
mon with animals and plants. But its most important part, which
resembles the divine and in which consists the entire rational prin-
141
rationalis animae ratio, semotam35 habet a corpore in essentia,

quia etiam in actione. Et quotiens operatur per intellectum, primo
naturalique instinctu ad separatas rationes sese confert, quod qui-
dem omnes Peripatetici confitentur. Ad singulas vero coniunc-
tasque formas non primo aut recto, sed secundo et obliquo quo-
dam actu se torquet, quatenus ad simulacra, unde species
intellegibiles procreavit, se reflectit. Quis ergo non viderit vim ra-
tionalem magis separatam esse quam coniunctam, siquidem ad se-
parata recte et primo, ad coniuncta oblique et actu sequenti se ver-
tit? Quae tunc maxime quod vult assequitur, quando longissime
discedit a corpore. Contra, quando per sensus descendit ad cor-
pora, tunc fallitur et innumeris passionibus perturbatur. Non po-
test autem rerum mortalium esse similis, si illarum praesentia falli-
tur et turbatur. Immo vero similis est divinarum ut in Phaedone
docet Plato, quia quo illis haeret propinquius, eo clarescit magis et
gaudet. Quiescit autem in loco sibi naturali res quaelibet, angitur
in alieno. Unde apud Platonicos apparet non esse in corporibus
mortalibus, quatenus mortalia sunt, naturalem intellegentiae se-
dem. Ergo paululum quid36 abest ut rationalis anima sit prorsus a
corpore separata. Est igitur forma ultima, cum super earn non sit
forma alia corporis, infra vero sint multae, ita dispositae ut grada-
tim huic animae propinquantes quasi super materiam eleventur.
142
cipie of the rational soul, it keeps separate from the body in es-
sence, because separate too in action. Whenever it acts through
the intellect, it directs itselffirstby a natural instinct to the sepa-
rate rational principles; all the Peripatetics admit this. But it turns
itself towards individual forms attached [to the body] in an act
that is not primary or direct, but secondary and oblique insofar as
it is turning itself towards the images from which it has procreated
the intelligible species.32 So isn't it obvious that the rational power
is more separated than attached, since it turns directly and primar-
ily towards what are separate, but indirectly and in a posterior act
towards what are attached? It most achieves what it desires when
it is distanced as far as possible from the body. Contrariwise, when
it descends to bodies through the senses, it makes mistakes and is
thrown into turmoil by numberless passions. But it cannot be like
mortal things if it is deceived and confused by their presence.
Rather, it resembles things divine, as Plato tells us in the Phaedo,33
because the closer it clings to them, the brighter it shines and the
more it rejoices. But every object is at rest when it is in its natural
place, but ill at ease when it is in a strange place. From this it is
clear to Platonists that the natural seat of understanding is not in
mortal bodies inasmuch as they are mortal. So very little is want-
ing for the rational soul to be completely separate from the body.
So it is the ultimate form because no other form of the body is
above it, but many forms are below; and they are so disposed that,
in approaching this soul step by step, they are raised as it were
above matter.
143
: IV :
Obiectio Epicuri et responsio
deformis deo simillimis•
i Somniare nos Epicurus inquit quando formas excedere ullo modo

materiam qua sustinentur asserimus. Absorberi eas usque adeo a
materia putat ut impossibile sit aliquam, licet excellentissimam,
formam aliquid ultra materiam operari. Nos autem omnia naturae
opera, sicut Plato in Philebo scribit Aristotelesque confirmat, a di-
vina quadam perfici arbitramur intellegentia, quae quidem caelos
velut instrumenta sua revolvens et citans (ut Plato inquit) caeles-
tem currum, inde inferiorem hanc elementorum format materiam.
Atque ut in arte operis forma triplicem habet gradum, est enim
primum in artificis animo, secundo <in> 37 instrumentis ab eo
agitatis, tertio in materia inde formata,38 ita formae rerum quas
deus per caeli motus vel traducentes vel praeparantes hie generat
aut creat, primum in ipso sunt deo, deinde in caelis tamquam39 ri-
vulis aut sedibus, postremo in hac inferiori materia. Oportet au-
tem materiam hanc, quandoquidem a divina intellegentia sic agita-
tur, suscipere ac prae se ferre exactissimam aliquam divinae
intellegentiae formam. Quod etiam in natura et artibus fieri cerni-
mus. Vitalis siquidem natura animae per calorem naturalem tam-
quam aliquod instrumentum materiam agitat alimenti a nobis
sumpti redditque vitalem. Vita haec alimento tributa non caloris
illius imitatur formam, sed animae. Calor enim ex se vitam non
generat. Pictor etiam per instrumentum suum penicillum formam
aliquam signat in pariete non penicilli similem, sed animi sui po-
tius, qui earn in se prius conceperat et postea parit. Igitur tam se-
144
: IV :
Epicurus objection and a response to it.
On the forms most resembling God.24
Epicurus says that we are dreaming when we claim that forms in i

any way exceed the matter by which they are sustained. He thinks
rather that they are so totally absorbed by matter that it is impos-
sible for any form, even the most outstanding, to do anything be-
yond matter. Our view, however, is that all natures works, as Plato
writes in the Philebus35 and Aristotle confirms,36 are brought to
perfection by some divine understanding, which, turning the heav-
enly spheres as its instruments (impelling the celestial chariot
forward, as Plato puts it37), thereby forms this lower matter of the
elements. Just as in art the form of a work exists on three levels —
first in the mind of the artificer, second in the instruments put
into motion by him, and third in the matter formed from it—so
the forms of things, which God generates or creates here on earth
using the movements of the heavens as the means of transmission
or preparation, existfirstin God Himself, second, in the heavens
as in their channels or foundations, and lastly in this inferior
matter. It behooves this matter, since it is moved thus by the di-
vine understanding, to sustain and display the most precise form
of that understanding. And this in fact is what we see in nature
and the arts. The vital nature of the soul, using its natural heat as
an instrument, moves the matter of the food consumed by us and
makes it vital again. This life imparted to the food does not imi-
tate the form of the heat but of the soul. For heat does not pro-
duce life from itself. A painter too uses his brush as an instrument
to trace some form on the wall: the form resembles not the brush
but rather his soul, whichfirstconceived it within itself and after-
wards brought it forth. Both in nature and in art, therefore, the
145
cundum naturam quam secundum artem operis forma formam re-

fert agentis. At enim in hoc gradum triplicem reperimus: aliam
formam videmus propinquiorem materiae quam agenti, aliam
agenti propinquiorem quam materiae, mediam vero nonnullam.
2 Accipe primum exemplum aliquod in natura. Anima quippe
per instrumentum illud suum, calorem scilicet naturalem, cibo di-
gesto triplicem tribuit formam. Nam crassioribus cibi partibus
formam tribuit ossium, ossa namque ex illis generat atque nutrit.
Tenuissimis vero partibus ut plurimum spiritus ipsius adhibet for-
mam, quia ex illis spiritum recreat. Mediis denique formam prae-
stat carnis atque nervorum. Haec omnia exsequitur naturalis ille
calor, non sua virtute, sed animae. Ipse enim urit tantum natura
sua atque dissolvit, sed ad huiusmodi opera per virtutem animae
temperatur. Forma ossium remotissima est ab anima et materiae
proxima; nullus enim fit sensus in ossibus. Forma carnis atque
nervorum propinquior est animae quam ossium; sensus enim per
haecfiunt.Sensus, inquam, hi quinque, qui nondum tamen lon-
gissime discedunt a corpore, cum nihil umquam40 nisi praesenti-
bus externis corporibus agant. Forma denique spirituum est
animae proxima, quippe cum hi iam imaginationi et phantasiae,
excellentioribus animae viribus, modo quodam subserviant. Exem-
plum habes in natura.
3 Accipe insuper exemplum in artibus. Instrumenta profecto qui-
bus utuntur artifices suam quandam dumtaxat habent naturam
atquefiguram,non tamen habent ipsam artificis intellegentiae pul-
chritudinem. Verum per haec artificis animus tria quaedam exse-
quitur: nonnulla sibi quam proxima, remotissima alia, alia media.
Omnia sane artificis opera quae ad aspectum pertinent aut audi-
tum totum paene artificis declarant ingenium. Quae ad sensus tres
reliquos, minime. Nam in odoribus saporibusque conficiendis aut
stratis lavacrisque temperandis paulum aut vix artificis apparet
intentio. In picturis autem aedificiisque consilium et prudentia
146
BOOK X • C H A P T E R IV •
form of the work refers to the form of the agent. But here too we
find three levels: we see one form closer to matter than to the
agent, another closer to the agent than to matter, and another in
between.
Considerfirstan example in nature. The soul uses its own in- 2
strument, natural heat, to give a triple form to digested food. For
it gives to the foods coarser parts the form of bones, for from
them it produces and nourishes bones. It usually gives to the finest
parts the form of the spirit because from them it recreates the
spirit. Finally to those in between it gives the form offleshand
sinews. This natural heat does all three, not through its own
power, but through the power of soul. For in its own nature it
only burns and dissolves, but it is tempered to perform such works
through the power of soul. The form of bones is most distant
from soul and closest to matter, for no sense quickens in bones.
The forms offleshand sinews are closer to soul than the form of
bones, for via them the senses function, thefivesenses, that is,
which are still not very far distant from the body as they can never
do anything without the presence of external bodies. Finally, the
form of spirits is closest to soul, because the spirits in a way al-
ready serve the imagination and phantasy, the soul's superior pow-
ers. Here you have an example in nature.
Now take an example in the arts. The instruments which 3
craftsmen or artists38 use merely have their own nature and shape:
they do not possess the beauty itself of the artificer's understand-
ing. His rational soul uses them to make three sorts of product,
some being the closest possible to it, others at the furthest remove,
others in between. All the works of an artist that pertain to seeing
and hearing reveal his natural genius almost entirely; but those
pertaining to the other three senses not at all. In concocting fra-
grances andflavorsor in designing couches and baths, the inten-
tion of the maker is scarcely or hardly apparent. But in paintings
and buildings the artist's forethought and good sense are made
147
41
lucet artificis. Dispositio praeterea et quasi figura quaedam animi
ipsius inspicitur. Ita enim seipsum animus in operibus istis expri-
mit et figurat, ut vultus hominis intuentis in speculum seipsum
figurat in speculo. Maxime vero in sermonibus, cantibus atque so-
nis artificiosus animus se depromit in lucem. In his enim tota
mentis dispositio et voluntas planissime designatur, et qualis est
affectus artificis, talem nobis affectum opera eius solent excitare,
flebilis vox flere, furiosa furere, lasciva lascivire saepe compellit.
Haec igitur opera cum ad visum turn ad auditum spectantia artifi-
cis menti sunt proxima; ilia vero quae ad tres reliquos perti-
nent sensus, ut diximus, remotissima. Mediae autem illae opera-
tiones sunt, quae ad corporis exercitationes, ludicras aut bellicas
pertinent.
4 Undenam ars et natura ita ad dispositionem suorum operum
temperantur, nisi a deo naturae artiumque institutore? Deus
itaque opera sua in corporibus similiter temperat, ita ut etiam ipse
in materia sibi subiecta triplicem formarum generet gradum, vide-
licet sibi proximas formas, remotissimas atque medias. Et quo-
niam quicquid movet materiam, non alia ratione movet, quam ut
earn extollat ad sui vultus imaginem, nec falli dei sententia potest,
necesse est alicubi in materia diutius agitata faciem artificis42 dei
expressius relucere, ac ferme tanto expressius quam in aliis mate-
riis aliorum moventium facies, quanto in movendo atque trahendo
deus est potentior aliis. Ideo dei vultum tam similem denique in
materia effiilgere oportet, ut nequeat similior emicare. Quamdiu
resultat mortalis, consummatam non implet imaginem. Sane simi-
lior foret, si semper esset similis, id est si surgeret immortalis. Fit
ergo aliqua forma in materia immortalis. Si qua talis erit, ilia erit
quae est ultima, quae sicut remotissima est a materia, ex eo quod
148
manifest, and additionally the disposition and shape as it were of

the soul itself is perceived. For in these works the rational soul ex-
presses and delineates itself, just as a mans face gazing in a mirror
forms itself in the mirror. But the soul as a maker steps most into
the light in discourses, in songs, in instrumental music. Here the
minds entire disposition and will are most manifestly depicted,
and the artist s works usually arouse in us the same emotional re-
sponse as existed in the artist: a mournful word often forces us to
weep, angry words to rage, lascivious words to yield to lust. So
these works that look now to sight and now to hearing are closest
to the mind of the artist; but those that pertain to the other three
senses are, as we said, at the furthest remove. In between are those
activities that pertain to bodily exercises, whether recreational or
military.
Whence is it that art and nature are so tempered as to dispose 4
their works in this way unless it is from God who has established
nature and the arts? Therefore God similarly so tempers His
works in bodies that He too generates in the matter subject to
Himself three levels of forms, those closest to Him, those furthest
away, and those in between. Since whatever moves matter does so
for no other reason than to elevate it to the point of being the im-
age of its own countenance, and since God s judgment can never
be deceived, then necessarily somewhere in matter, when it has
been set into motion for a long time, the countenance of God the
Artist must shine out more radiantly than the faces of other mov-
ers elsewhere in other portions of matter; and the more so because
God is more potent in moving and attracting than others. Even-
tually then Gods countenance must project its likeness so radi-
antly into matter that no comparable radiance can exist. As long as
an image is mortal, it is not a perfect and complete image. For it
will more resemble God, if it is always like Him, that is, if it
emerges as immortal. So some form is made immortal in matter.
Whatever this form is going to be, it will be the form which is the
149
ultima est, ita est proxima deo, ideoque simillima* Talem esse
rationalem animam non est dubiuiru Sed planius rem ipsam
aperiamus.
: V :
Responsio planior deformarum gradibus.
i Principio Deus materiam primam certo modo ad rerum natura-

lium species producendas afficit per qualitates primas atque dispo-
nit per raritatem, densitatem, levitatem, gravitatem, caliditatem,
frigiditatem, humiditatem, siccitatem, Quae quidem vocantur qua-
litates praeparationesque materiae potius quam formae principales
et species. Propterea quod harum quaelibet pluribus competit spe-
ciebus et saepe intenduntur et remittuntur, rerum tamen species,
ut placet physicis, non ita mutantur, saepe accedunt atque rece-
dunt, dum species permanent. Quis neget multis arborum et ani-
malium speciebus communem esse caliditatem et frigiditatem
atque has qualitates in animantibus secundum magis minusve va-
riari, dum eadem permanet species animantis? Sunt igitur ma-
teriae quam simillimae, cum instar materiae pluribus speciebus
subiiciantur, neque ipsae sua dumtaxat praesentia species rerum
inter se distinguant* Affectiones igitur praeparationesque materiae
ad suscipiendas species nuncupentur. Ergo materia per extensio-
nem quantitatis sibi familiarem et ad multa communem qualitati-
bus huiusmodi pandit sinuiru Per has vero ad suscipiendas species
praeparata statim a mente divina, mundi totius opifice, formas
speciesque accipit elementorum. Speciem ignis, quando parata
fuerit per caliditatem, siccitatem, raritatem, et levitatem; speciem
terrae, quando per frigiditatem, siccitatem, spissitudinem, gravita-
150
BOOK X • C H A P T E R V •
highest, and which, at the furthest remove from matter, being the
highest, is thus the closest to God and hence most like Him. The
rational soul is undoubtedly this form. But let me explain this
point more fully.
: V :
A more detailed response concerning the levels of the forms.
In the beginning God conditions prime matter in a certain way to i

produce the species of natural things by means of the prime quali-
ties, and He prepares [it] by way of rarity, density, lightness,
heaviness, heat, cold, wetness, and dryness. These are called the
qualities or preparations of matter rather than the principal forms
and species. Because they are each compatible with many species
and are often intensified and remitted, and yet the natural species
do not so change (according to the natural philosophers), these
qualities often come and go, while the species abide. Who would
deny that heat and cold are common to many species of trees and
animals, and that in animals these qualities vary in intensity while
the species of the animal remains the same? They are thus very
similar to matter, because, like matter, they are subject to many
species, and these species are not mutually distinguished only by
their presence. Let them be called then the affective conditions or
states of matter preparatory for receiving the species. Matter,
therefore, by way of quantitative extension (which is its compan-
ion and common to many things) opens its bosom to these quali-
ties. Prepared through them to receive the species, it immediately
accepts the forms and species of the elements from the divine
mind, the craftsman of the whole world. It accepts the species of
fire when prepared through heat, dryness, rarity, and lightness; the
151
rem, et reliquas sua singulas ratione. Hae formae elementorum eo

suas illas praeparationes superant, quod illarum sunt fines quodve
proprias distinguunt species et permanent quodammodo firmio-
res. Citius enim aquae frigiditas permutari videtur quam species
aquae similiterque in aliis. Sunt tamen materiae prorsus immersae,
quia non resolvuntur in species alias formasve principales, sed mox
per qualitates affecta materia inducuntur deformi materiae gremio
proximae. Unde propter naturam passivam materiae vix unius sunt
participes actionis. Quid agit aliud ignis, nisi quod urit? Neque
aliquid operantur, nisi quatenus praeparationes illae materiae adiu-
vant, quia nihil agunt ultra quam possit calor, frigus, siccum et re-
liqua. Unicum praeterea motum habent et unum situm. Est tamen
ordo aliquis inter formas elementorum. Nam forma ignis, quia a
materia liberior est quam aliae propter mirabilem raritatem, effica-
cior est in agendo et a passionis infectione remotior.
2 Congregat deinde mens quatuor elementa haec in unum eo-
rumque temperationibus variis varias conficit lapidum species et
metallorum atque similium quae mixta dicuntur. Quorum formae
in hoc excellunt formas elementorum, quod in formas alias quo-
dammodo praecipuas resolvuntur, neque in materia nisi diligentius
elaborata fiunt, et aliquid operantur ad quod elementorum formae
et dispositiones illae materiae non sufficiunt. Non enim per ele-
mentorum qualitates iaspis provocat partum, phantasmata noxia
pellit; zaphirus cohibet sudorem, confert ad gratiam; smaragdus
extinguit libidinem; amethystus sedat ebrietatem. Nam et alia
multa, quae similes habent qualitates, idem efficerent. Faciunt au-
152
species of earth when prepared through cold, dryness,39 density,

and weight; and the rest of the species each accordingly. The forms
of the elements are superior to these their preparatory conditions
in that either they are the limits of these conditions, or they dis-
tinguish the species proper and in some manner endure more
stably. For it is obvious that the coldness of water changes more
quickly than the species of water, and similarly with the rest. Yet
these elemental forms are totally immersed in matter because they
are not resolved into other species or principal forms: rather, di-
rectly matter has been affected by way of the qualities, they are
drawn into its formless lap. Hence because of matter s passive na-
ture these forms participate in barely one activity. For what else
does fire do but burn? And the elemental forms do nothing except
insofar as, being preparatory states, they aid matter, because they
do nothing beyond what heat, cold, dryness, and the rest can do.
Furthermore, they have only one movement and only one location.
Yet there is a kind of ranking among these forms of the elements.
For the form of fire, being more independent of matter than the
others because of its remarkable rarity, is more efficacious in action
and further removed from the stain of being itself acted upon.
Next, the mind brings the four elements together into one, and 2
from their differing blends makes the various species of stones,
metals, and other objects referred to as composite. The forms of
these composites are superior to the forms of the elements in that:
(a) they are resolved into other, in a way principal, forms; (b) they
do not come into being except in matter that has been carefully
worked over; and (c) they do something for which the forms of
the elements and those preparatory states of matter do not suffice.
For it is not through the qualities of the elements that jasper stim-
ulates childbirth and expels harmful phantasms, that sapphire
stops sweating and confers grace, that emerald quenches lust, that
amethyst allays drunkenness.40 For many other things, which have
similar qualities, do the same. These forms do these things, how-
153
tem haec ex quadam virtute speciebus talibus ab animis sphaera-

rum tributa. Sed a materia non longe absunt, quoniam virtus
huiusmodi corporalis est atque per corpora sphaerarum traducitur.
Ac licet operationem aliquam qualem diximus agant, nullum ta-
men opus ab illis tali virtute perfectum restate Atque unum haec
motum habent locumque unum, quantum elementum hoc aut il-
lud43 in eorum praevalet mixtione.44 Omnino autem inter has for-
mas illae efEcaciores sunt, in quarum mixtione elementa puriora
crassioribus dominantur.
3 Sequuntur formae plantarum, his idcirco praestantiores, quia
per elementorum qualitates, ut instrumenta, opus vivum efficiunt,
quod illae non possunt. Propagant similes sibi plantas in specie,
quod mixtorum illorum formis non datur. Nutriendo motus
peragunt in omnes locorum partes, contra naturam gravium ele-
mentorum. Quae in earum mixtione excellunt corpus nactae sunt
secundum membra inter se diversa distinctum, ramos, surculos,
stipitem et radices, quasi sint multae in his formis virtutes, ad qua-
rum officia explenda multis et variis opus sit instrumentis. Simili-
tudinem quoque prae se ferunt aliquarum turn virtutum caeles-
tium, turn motionum. Virtutum, quatenus aliqua operantur ad
quae elementorum non sufficiunt qualitates. Motionum, quia mo-
tus edunt undique, quasi in circulum, atque ab intrinseco princi-
pio caelorum instar sua movent corpora. Ordinant praeterea mem-
bra sua omnia ad principale aliquid sui, sicut mundi agitator
sphaeras omnes in unum. Verum nimis adhuc vergunt in elemen-
torum materiam, quia opus nullum peragunt, nisi elementorum
formis utantur calefaciendo, frigefaciendo et in45 reliquis eodem
pacto.
4 Accedunt brutorum animae, plantarum animabus praestantio-
res, quoniam similes sunt caelesti naturae non in movendo solum,
sed quodammodo etiam in cognoscendo. Cognoscunt omnia cae-
154
ever, through a power bestowed on such species as these by the

souls of the spheres. Yet they are not far removed from matter,
because this kind of power is corporeal and transmitted by way
of the bodies of the spheres. And though they perform the sort of
activity we have described, yet no work brought to completion by
them using such a corporeal power remains perfect. They also
have one motion and one location insofar as this or that element
is dominant in their composition. But among these [elemental]
forms the more effective are invariably those in whose mixture the
purer elements dominate the coarser.
The forms of plants follow. They are superior because they per- 3
form the work of giving life using the qualities of the elements as
instruments, which the composites' forms cannot do. They propa-
gate plants like themselves in the same species; which is not
granted to the forms of composites. By taking nourishment they
move in every direction, contrary to the nature of the heavy ele-
ments. Those which excel in their mixture acquire a body distin-
guished by the diversity of its parts — branches, twigs, a trunk,
roots —as though many powers were in these forms which re-
quired many different instruments to perform their functions.
They also display a likeness to some celestial powers and motions:
powers, insofar as they do things for which the qualities of the ele-
ments do not suffice; motions, in that they move in every direction
as in a circle, and move their bodies from an internal principle just
as the heavens do. Moreover, they order all their members in ac-
cordance with some principal end of their own, just as the world-
mover moves all the spheres for one end. Yet they still incline too
much towards the matter of the elements, because they can do
nothing without using the forms of the elements in heating, cool-
ing, and likewise with the rest.
The souls of animals come next. They are superior to the souls 4
of plants as they are like the heavenly nature not only in moving
but also in a way in knowing. The celestial powers know all
155
testes illae virtutes, cognoscunt aliquid et animae bestiarurn, ope-

rationem habent spiritalem. Sensus enim imaginationisque actus
spiritalis est per has46 ipsas obiectorum imagines spiritales. Neque
peragunt sentiendi actum per aliquam qualitatem elementorum,
quia cum sentiunt aliquid, neque calefaciendo, neque frigefaciendo
sentiunt. Versantur autem et istae formae adhuc circa materiam,
quia per corporalia instrumenta sensuum actus exercent, neque
quicquam nisi corporale et particulare percipiunt, semperque ob-
temperant corporis usui.
5 Has omnes denique supereminet hominis anima, quae non in
cognitione dumtaxat, sed in genere etiam cognitionis caelestibus
fit mentibus similis. Intellegit namque haec sicut et illae. Ad quam
operationem neque elementorum qualitates, neque instrumentum
aliquod corporale ex illis compositum concurrit. Quod quidem si-
gnificat prae ceteris mentis huius naturam a materiae vinculis ex-
clusam esse, cum operationem sortita sit a materiae commercio li-
beram. Materia47 siquidem vim impedit cognoscendi, quod ex hoc
apparet, quia formae elementorum, mixtorum, plantarum, quae48
materiae vicinae sunt, nihil noscunt. Et in animalibus illae partes
sensibus pluribus serviunt, ad quas materia crassior minus ascen-
dit, quale est caput, et ibi fit49 sensus acutior, ubi purius instru-
mentum est et spiritus plurimus. Unde visus, quia est purior reli-
quis, sentit celerius et acutius altiusque nobis infingit rerum not as.
Ideoque per ea quae ad visum spectant, clarius post longum tern-
pus agnoscimus quaelibet quam per sensuum aliorum indicia.
Atqui et in somnis saepius nobis visa sese offerunt quam audita.
6 Neque solum cognoscendi vim materia impedit, sed rem etiam
cognoscendam. Idcirco quando moles ipsa rerum premit sensum
aut nullo modo aut aegre sentimus. Formae quoque rerum in pri-
156
things; the souls of animals know something and have a spiritual

operation in that the action of the sense and the imagination is
spiritual by way of the spiritual images themselves of objects. They
do not perform the act of sensing through some quality of the ele-
ments, because when they sense something they do not sense by
heating or cooling. And yet these animal forms are still involved
with matter because they use bodily instruments to perform the
activities of the senses. They do not perceive anything unless it is
corporeal and particular, and they always obey the needs of the
body.
Finally, mans soul is superior to all of these souls, being like the 5
minds of heaven not only in knowing but even in its kind of
knowing. For it understands just as they do. And neither the qual-
ities of the elements nor any bodily instrument compounded of el-
ements contribute to this activity. This is the clearest evidence that
the nature of this mind of ours is free from the bonds of matter,
since it has been allotted an activity free from any dealings with
matter. For matter obstructs the power of knowing as is evident
from the fact that the forms of the elements, of compounds, and
of plants, which are neighbors to matter, know nothing. In ani-
mals, too, serving the many senses are those parts to which grosser
matter rises least, such as the head; and the sense becomes acutest
there where the instrument is purer and the spirit most present.
Hence sight, which is purer than the other senses, perceives more
swiftly and sharply, and impresses the marks of objects more
deeply on us. And so through the evidence that comes through
sight, we recognize things after the passage of time more clearly
than we do via the evidence of the other senses. In dreams as well
visual images more often present themselves to us than auditory
ones do.
Matter not only impedes the power of knowing, but also the 6
object to be known. When the sheer bulk of things weighs on a
sense, we cannot perceive at all or only with difficulty. Also the
157
mis sese nobis offerunt perque illas materiam quasi subintellegi-

mus> Privationes praeterea per habitus materiamque per relatio-
nem quandam ad formam necessario coniectamur. Non omnes
tamen formas per relationem ad materiam cogitamus, quod si-
gnificat materiam a formarum genere dependere atque esse formas
aliquas a materia liberas. Rursus, tunc res clarissime firmissimeque
cognoscimus, quando rationes ipsas rerum absque materiae condi-
tionibus cogitamus. Si materia tam virtuti quam obiecto cognitio-
nis impedimento est, sequitur animam quae sentit quippiam ima-
ginaturque, non esse compositam ex materia, immo neque esse
formam quantitate divisam, si modo in ipsa cognitione mutua mi-
rabilisque unio et penetratio fit inter formam apprehensam et po-
tentiam apprehendentem. Id vero totum quantitatis dimensio pro-
hiberet.
7 Ac si per cognitiones inferiores concludimus animam ex mate-
ria non esse, per cognitionem supremam, scilicet per intellegen-
tiam, animam non esse a materia concludere possumus. Ut quem-
admodum quod sine materia noscit, est sine ipsa, ita quod absque
materiae conditionibus comprehendit, ab ipsius passionibus procul
existat. Nam si anima hominis talis forma esset ut ad materiam
quasi suam originem referretur, non cognosceret formas ullas, nisi
per relationem aliquam ad materiam. Nunc autem tamquam ma-
teriae domina earn subiicit formis, dum ipsam refert ad formas ac,
tamquam deo similis, formas sequentes ad primam refert formam
ipsumque deum. Atqui in hoc ipso surgit supra materiam maxime,
quod earn tollit supra seipsam. Deo quoque fit proxima, quod for-
mas omnes reducit in deum.
8 Ex quibus liquido constat quod iamdudum quaerimus, rationa-
lem scilicet animam ex omnibus formis corporis deo simillimam
158
forms of things present themselves to us first, and through them

we get some inkling of matter. Furthermore, we necessarily infer
privations by way of habitual conditions, and matter by way of a
relationship to form. Yet we do not think of all forms by way of
the relationship to matter, and this shows that matter depends on
the genus of forms and that some forms are free of matter. Again,
we learn about objects most clearly and most reliably when we
think about their rational principles in isolation from the condi-
tions of matter. If matter, then, is an impediment both to the
power and to the object of knowing, it follows that the soul that
perceives and imagines something is not composed of matter. Or
rather, it is not a form divided by quantity, if only because, in the
actual process of knowing, a mutual and remarkable union and
penetration takes place between the apprehended form and the ap-
prehending power. But the dimension of quantity would totally
prevent this.
If we conclude, by way of inferior kinds of knowing, that soul 7
does not derive from matter, then we can conclude by way of the
highest kind of knowing, namely understanding, that soul does
not derive from matter. Just as what acquires knowledge without
matter exists without matter, so what achieves understanding
without the conditions of matter must exist far removed from its
passions. For if mans soul were the kind of form that one would
refer to matter as to its origin, it would not acquire knowledge of
any forms except by way of a relationship to matter. But in point
of fact, as the sovereign of matter the soul subjects matter to
forms when it refers matter itself to them, and, like God, refers
the subsequent forms to the prime form and to God Himself. It
rises above matter principally in the very fact that it lifts matter
above itself; and it comes closest to God because it leads the forms
back to God.
Hence the answer to the question we have been asking for some 8
time becomes crystal clear. Of all the forms of body, the rational
159
evadere, usque adeo ut nequeat alia similior fieri, postquam non

potest fieri ulterius alia in materia, cum haec in ipso extremo emi-
neat corporis limine. Exprimi vero oportuit aliquam in natura for-
mam deo simillimam, si modo divinus artifex materiam sit supera-
turus, ut Plato tradidit in Timaeo: talem vero esse vult mentem
quae est in corpore, a mente quae est extra corpora delibatam,
quasi quendam mentis illius vultum in sublimioris materiae spe-
culo relucentem. Considera ad quantam sui similitudinem ignis
materiam extollat et quibus gradibus. Sphaera ignis qualitatem tri-
plicem possidet: calorem,50 lumen et levitatem ad superiora ver-
gentem. Movet sphaera ilia corpora infima et crassissimis ineptissi-
misque corporibus calorem infundit solum, ut plerumque fit in
lapidibus. Purioribus calorem atque lumen, quod facile facit in li-
gnis. Tenuissimis denique ultra calorem atque lumen, etiam levita-
tem illam ad superna trahentem. Quod efficit in chartis et lino, ita
ut statim in se horum assumat substantiam quasi sibi simillimam.
Ideo forma ignis in lapide fusca fit et inepta, in ligno inepta qui-
dem sed clara, in lino clara simul51 et agilis. Eodem quasi modo di-
vina mens corporibus inferioribus vitam praebet solam tamquam
calorem, praestantioribus etiam sensum tamquam lumen, prae-
stantissimis insuper intellectum tamquam levitatem per quam
anima surgit in deum. Ita divinus ille radius omnia penetrans, in
lapidibus est quidem sed non vivit, in plantis vivit quidem sed non
fulget, in brutis fulget sed non replicatur in seipsum neque redit
in fontem. In hominibus est, vivit, fulget, replicatur in seipsum,
primo per quandam sui ipsius animadversionem, deinde in deum,
fontem suum, reflectitur, originem suam feliciter cognoscendo. Ut
autem ascensus ignis certum aliquem habet finem, quem consequi
possit, atque hie est in sphaera sua52 quies, ita nostrae mentis as-
census, perpetuo directus in deum, statutum finem habet cuius
160
soul turns out to be the most like God; and to such an extent that
no other can become more like, inasmuch as no other form in
matter can be further removed from matter, since this one is
perched right on the extreme limit of body. But some form very
like God must have been imprinted in nature if the divine artificer
is going to rule in any way over matter, as Plato taught in the
Timaeus, where he maintains that this form is the mind which is in
the body but which has been plucked from the mind outside the
body, as though it were a reflection of that mind blazing in the
mirror of a higher matter.41 Consider how far fire can raise matter
to its own likeness and by what degrees. The sphere of fire has
three kinds of quality: heat, light, and the levity that always aims
at things above. This sphere sets lower bodies into motion and im-
parts heat alone to the coarsest and least receptive ones, as is the
case for the most part with stones. But it imparts heat and light to
purer bodies, as it easily does in the case of wood. Finally, in addi-
tion to heat and light, it imparts to the least material bodies the
levity that lifts to things supernal. It does this with sheets of paper
and with linen in such a way that it immediately assimilates their
substance into itself as most like itself. So the form of fire in stone
is dark and slow-moving, in wood is still slow-moving but bright,
in linen is bright and at the same time nimble. In the same sort of
way the divine mind bestows on lower bodies life alone like heat,
on higher bodies sense [too], which is like light, and on the high-
est bodies intellect in addition like the levity through which the
soul rises to God. Thus the divine ray penetrates everything: it ex-
ists in stones but does not live; it lives in plants but does not
shine; it shines in animals but does not reflect on itself or return
to its source. In men it exists, lives, shines, and first reflects on it-
self through a sort of observing of itself, and then returns to God,
its source, blessed in coming to know its own origin. Just as the as-
cent of fire has a specific goal it can attain, and this is rest in its
own sphere, so our minds ascent, directed perpetually towards
161
quandoque fiat compos, neque aliud quicquam is finis erit, nisi

quies in deo, quam non prius animus assequetur quam hinc
abierit.
: VI :
Obiectio Lucretii et responsio, quod mens

potest absque corpore operari•
1 Interturbabunt disputationem nostram impii duo, Lucretius et

Epicurus, ut solent, non ratione aliqua, sed clamore- Nos quidem
duo potissimum hie asserimus: quod Deus creat animam sibi simi-
lem; quod in materia. Contra primum Lucretius obiiciet: si tam
divinus est animus, primum contra naturam eius est coniungi cum
corpore ad conficiendam speciem animalis, deinde et si iungitur,
cur numquam mens aliquid speculatur, phantasia non cogitante?
Contra secundum sic obiiciet Epicurus: si deus creat animam in
materia, ergo etiam ex materia, ideoque mortalem. Nos ad pri-
mam obiectionem respondimus, et respondebimus diffusius alias,
nunc breviter hunc in modum.
2 Quoniam ultima in universo virtus intellegendi per operationes
sensuum et phantasiae ad speculationem propriam expergiscitur,
sensus vero et phantasia per spiritus agunt corporeos, sequitur non
esse contra mentis naturam, ut corpori huic uniatur ad humanam
speciem in terra complendam; praesertim cum mens nostra non
simplex, sed animalis mens esse dicatur, ultima mentium corpo-
rumque vivifica. Et si in generica ratione mentis non sit ulla ad
corpora inclinatio, tamen in specifica mentis ultimae ratione incli-
162
God, has an appointed goal it can someday attain; and this goal is
nothing other than that rest in God, which the rational soul will
not enjoy until it has abandoned its abode here.
: VI :
Lucretius' objection and its refutation. That the

mind can act without the body•
Those two ungodly figures, Lucretius and Epicurus, will roil our I
current discussion not with any cogent argument, but with their
usual clamor. We are advancing two principal points: that God
creates the soul like Himself, and that He creates it in matter.
Lucretius will object to the first (a) that, if the soul is so divine, it
is contrary to its nature to be united with body for the purpose of
creating a species of animal; and (b) that, if it is united, why does
the mind never contemplate anything when the phantasy is not
imagining? To the second Epicurus will object that, if God creates
the soul in matter, He therefore creates it out of matter, and so it
is mortal. We have answered the first objection, and elsewhere we
will do so at greater length.42 For the moment we will deal with it
briefly in the following way.
Since the lowest power of understanding in the universe is 2
aroused to its proper work of speculation by the activities of the
senses and the phantasy, but the senses and the phantasy operate
through the corporeal spirits, it follows that it cannot be contrary
to the nature of mind for it to be united with this body for the
purpose of bringing the human species to fulfillment on earth; and
especially since our mind is not simple mind but what is called an-
imated or ensouled mind, in other words the lowest of minds,
what gives life to bodies. Even if in the generic rational principle of
163
natio eiusmodi quodammodo tamquam ipsi naturalis includitur,

quatenus videlicet in confinio mentium animarumque creata mens
animalis evasit atque inde ad proxima corpora vivificanda proclivis.
Et quia res quaeque secundum modum suae substantiae operatur,
substantia vero mentis humanae incorporalis quidem est omnino,
sed unita materiae, hinc fit ut incorporalia intellegat quidem, sed
ea, dum corpus habitat, saepe una cum aliquo quodammodo cor-
porali conspiciat,53 hoc est simulacro phantasiae* Ideo huiusmodi
plerumque eget simulacris* Verum quando hoc deposito corpore
redacta fuerit in seipsam, intelleget in seipsa* Sed nunc alio modo
se habet mens haec ad phantasiae simulacra antequam ipsa in se
universalem concipiat speciem, alio modo posteaquam concepit.
Ante eget illis, ut eorum instigatione excitetur ad universalem spe-
ciem pariendam. Postea vero si illis eget, eget quidem, ut arbitran-
tur Peripatetici, tamquam fundamento vel comite aliquo specieL
Atque etiam secundum intellectus imperium formatur saepe no-
vum in phantasia simulacrum universali illi speciei conveniens, in
quo resplendet species ilia mentis universalis, sicut in imagine
splendet exemplar*
3 Quamquam non eget forte mens phantasiae simulacro, ut Pla-
tonici opinantur, postquam semel invitante illo speciem peperit et
retinet propriam, Sed ea est oculorum geminorum natura in ea-
dem radice fixorum sive a cardine uno pendentium, ut aperiantur
simul atque claudantur, eodemque inspiciant-54 Ita mens et phan-
tasia, qui gemini oculi sunt eiusdem animae atque admodum
proximi, simul aperiuntur atque eodem pro modo suo conspiciunt*
Et dum phantasia hunc cogitat hominem, mens universalem ho-
minem cogitat et converso* Atque haec est concursio naturalis. Po-
164
mind there is no inclination at all towards bodies, nevertheless in

the specific rational principle of the lowest mind such an inclina-
tion is included as in a way natural to it, in that the created,
ensouled mind has emerged on the border-line of minds and souls
and is stooping down from it to give life to the bodies closest to
it. Because each thing acts according to the manner of its sub-
stance, but the substance of the human mind is completely incor-
poreal though united with matter, it follows that our mind under-
stands incorporeals, but sees them, so long as it inhabits the body,
in the company often of something in a way corporeal, an image of
the phantasy in other words. Accordingly it usually needs such im-
ages, But once this body has been laid aside and the mind has re-
turned to itself, it will understand in itself. At this present time, it
behaves in one way with regard to the images of the phantasy be-
fore it has conceived the universal form within itself, but in an-
other way after it has conceived it. Beforehand, it needs the images
so it can be excited by their stimulus to give birth to the universal
species; if it needs them afterwards, it does so, the Peripatetics
think, only as a kind of foundation or companion for the species.
And in fact, following the intellect's command, a new image is of-
ten fashioned in the phantasy conforming to that universal species,
an image in which the mind's universal species is blazingly re-
flected (just as a model is reflected in its image).
Nonetheless, perhaps the mind does not need the phantasy's 3
image, as the Platonists think, once it has given birth, at the im-
age's prompting, to that species and retains it as its own. But the
nature of the twin eyes (fixed as they are in the same root or sus-
pended from one hinge) is that they open and shut together and
look in the same direction. Thus the mind and the phantasy, the
twin eyes of the same soul and next to each other, open together
and look in the same direction, but each in its own way. When the
phantasy thinks of this particular man, the mind thinks of the
universal man, and conversely. This concurrence is natural. Yet it
165
test tamen, adhibita manus opera, oculus alter55 absque altero in-
tueri; sic et studio quodam ardentiore56 non minus mens ad
universales species flecti, cessante phantasia, quam saepe per ali-
quam turbationem accidat phantasiam intentius per corporalia
pervagari, mente cessante. Potest insuper anima, quando seipsam
considerat, tunc actum suum vimque et essentiam sine phantasiae
simulacro intueri. Maxime vero quando et animadvertit se intelle-
gere, et rursus quod animadvertat intellegit replicaturque similiter
absque fine, praesertim si, ut quidam putant, speciem suam
intellegibilem suumque actum per ipsammet speciem ipsumve ac-
tum animadvertat. Ubi certe neque simulacro neque instrumento
egeret; potest etiam simulacri ipsius naturam sine alio simulacro
iudicare.
4 Quod si quis convicerit intellegentiam, dum rerum naturalium
rationes considerat, earundem simulacris indigere, hoc forsitan
disputationis gratia concedemus, propterea quod sicut humanita-
tem ipsam communio ad singulos homines comitatur, sic humani-
tatis intellegentiam huius vel illius hominis cogitatio. Non tamen
in rebus divinis id facile concedemus, ut quotiens angelicas essen-
tias speculamur, totiens cogamur corporalia simulacra intueri.
Quia sicut essentiae tales ad materiam hanc aut illam non decli-
nant, ita speculationes nostrae quibus illis aequamur quodam-
modo cognoscendo, non necessario corporalibus imaginibus as-
tringuntur. Earum enim cognitionem non a corporibus proprie
animus mutuatur, sed ab ideis vel ingenitis quando revertitur in
seipsum, vel infusis quando supra se surgit. Sed quisnam dixerit
mentem in ipsa divinorum exacta contemplatione simulacrorum
adminiculo indigere, cum illorum sive occursu sive interventu ab
166
is possible with the help of a [blocking] hand for one eye to gaze at
works without the other. So too and with a more ardent zeal, it is
possible for the mind to be turned towards the universal species
when the phantasy is inactive; and when the mind is inactive, it is
often no less possible for the phantasy via some perturbation to
range more intensely through corporeals. Furthermore, when the
soul contemplates itself, it can gaze at its own act and power and
essence without the phantasy's image. This is especially true when
it is aware that it understands, and understands that it is aware,
and so on back and forth to infinity; and especially if, as some
people think, it becomes aware of its own intelligible species and
its own act through the said species or act. In this case certainly it
would not need an image or an instrument: it is able to judge the
nature of the image itself without any other image.
But if someone is convinced that the understanding, when it 4
considers the rational principles of natural things, needs their im-
ages, let us perhaps concede the point for the sake of argument; in
which case just as association with particular men attends our hu-
man nature, so thinking about this or that individual person ac-
companies our understanding of that nature. In the case of divine
objects, however, we shall not readily concede that every time we
contemplate angelic essences we have to look at corporeal images.
For just as angelic essences do not sink down to this or that partic-
ular matter, so our speculative thoughts, by which we are made in
a way equal in knowing to the angels, are not bound by necessity
to corporeal images. The rational soul does not borrow its knowl-
edge of the angels properly from bodies, but from ideas, either in-
nate ideas, when it reflects on itself, or ideas imparted to it when it
rises above itself. But who would maintain that the mind needs
the aid of images in the precise contemplation of things divine,
since contact with or intervention by these images vehemently
blocks the mind off from such speculation and often leads it into
167
eiusmodi speculatione vehementer impediatur saepeque fallatur;

ac si falli non vult, ilia tamquam nubes discutere57 compellatur?
5 Forte vero quando per sensus animus a se digreditur, attingit
solum sensibiles qualitates, Quando per phantasiam ad se regredi-
tur, insensibiles intentiones imaginum sensibiliutru Quando per
rationem in se revertitur, insensibiles rationes ad intentiones in-
sensibiles declinantes* Quando per mentem supra se surgit, instar
angeli, insensibiles rationes iam ab imaginariis58 intentionibus se-
gregatas* Quid quod philosophica mens intuetur in universo et in
seipsa cognitionem quandam angelicam et divinam a simulacris li-
beram? Primo quidem probat eiusmodi cognitionem esse debere,
et cuius sit, et qualis, et quare, et quomodo fiat in seipsa describit*
Ac etiam assequitur earn secundum formam experiturque descri-
bendo* Profecto, descriptio eiusmodi conceptio quaedam animae
est ab omni simulacro libera. Nequit enim per simulacrum cogni-
tionem a simulacro liberam intueri atque definire* Deinde in
conceptionem eiusmodi se convertit, dum se agnoscit ita iam
concepisse. Quae quidem conversio multo magis est a simulacris
absoluta* Denique in conversionem hanc iterum atque iterum se
convertit semperque longius gradatim a simulacris pervolat,
6 Mitto notiora ilia, videlicet quando mens, dimissis individuis,
non modo specialissimas species, sed subalternas et genera subal-
terna generalissimaque ac denique transcendentia perspicit, divi-
dit, componit, definit, argumentatur* In iis certe simulacra praeter-
mittere non solum nititur, sed compellitur, Operaepretium est hoc
insuper animadvertere: infimam animae vim magis corpori quam
mediam, mediam quam supremam coniungL Quando suprema ra-
tiocinandi vis per humanae intellegentiae voluntatisque actum
obnixe se colligit in seipsam, tunc infima vis magna ex parte59
168
error; or if it does not want to be deceived, it has to dispel the im-

ages like clouds?
But perhaps, when the rational soul diverges from itself by way 5
of the senses, it only attains sensible qualities* When it turns back
towards itself by way of the phantasy, it attains the non-sensible
intentions of sensible images* When it returns into itself by way of
the reason, it attains the non-sensible rational principles that reach
down to the non-sensible intentions* When it rises above itself by
way of the mind, like an angel, it attains the non-sensible rational
principles now separated from the imaginations intentions* How
is it that the philosophical mind sees in the universe and in itself
an angelic and divine mode of knowing, free from images? First it
proves that such a mode of knowing has to exist, and it describes
whose it is and what and why and how it can be in itself* And it
also attains it formally, and in describing it comes to know it* To
be sure, such a description is a conception of the soul freed from
any image* For it cannot by way of an image look at and define a
mode of knowing free of an image* The mind then turns towards
this conception while realizing it has already conceived it as image-
less* This conversion indeed is even more image-less* Finally it
turns itself back to this conversion again and again, and gradually
flies ever farther away from images*
I will pass over briefly some rather familiar arguments, namely 6
that when the mind, having set aside individuals, perceives not
only the most specialized of the species, but the middle rank ones
too, next the middle rank genera, then the most generalized gen-
era, and finally the transcendentals,43 it divides, compounds, de-
fines, and adduces* In all this certainly it is not only trying, but be-
ing compelled to leave images behind* It is important to note, fur-
thermore, that the souls lowest power is more closely linked to the
body than is the intermediate power, and the intermediate more
than the highest* When the highest power of reasoning, via the
act of human understanding and the will, resolutely gathers itself
169
seiungitur ab opere corporali, quia tunc officium regendi, mo-

vendi, concoquendi, digerendi, expurgandi dimidiam sui partem,
immo etiam maiorem solet amittere, Si ita fit, necesse est poten-
tiam mediam ex parte multo maiori tunc a materia semoveri, quod
patet in abstractis inter contemplandum hominibus nihil penitus
sentientibus,
7 Ex hoc sequitur, ut suprema potentia quandoque in hoc ipso
actu corporalia relinquat omnino, cuius virtute reliquae vires magis
magisque relinquunt, Quippe quod adolescit potest aliquando pe-
nitus consummari, eo videlicet consummato quo60 ipsum crescente
crescebat, Ipsa igitur animi a corpore abstractio, quae invalescente
speculationis intentione vehementius invalescit, ilia quoque inten-
tione impleta prorsus impletur, Impletur ilia, quando ceteris om-
nino posthabitis solum primum, verum bonumque summa mentis
flagrantia amatur et cogitatur, Tunc ergo consummatur abstractio
finisque abstractionis huius, quae nos segregat a mortalibus, Tan-
dem non separatio erit a vita, sed primae consecutio vitae. Quae
enim se vicissim comitantur itinere, comitantur et termino, Qua-
propter idem portus animam a corpore fugientem excipit, qui acci-
pit speculantem, Hie portus est ipsa Veritas, Veritas aeterna est,
immo est aeternitas ipsa, Haec ad Lucretium dicta sint, Pergamus
ad Epicurum,
170
into itself, then the lowest faculty is for the most part cut off from
bodily activity, because at that time it usually loses half, or even
more, of its function of ruling, moving, digesting, distributing,
and purging. If this is so, the intermediate power must necessarily
be to a far greater extent divorced from matter, as indeed is evi-
dent from the fact that men abstracted in the midst of contem-
plating sense nothing at all.
It follows from this that from time to time the highest power 7
in this act [of contemplation] entirely abandons corporeals, and
by virtue of this the rest of the powers abandon them more and
more. For in fact what is growing up is able at some point to ma-
ture, namely when it has achieved the goal towards which it was
steadily growing. So the soul's abstraction from the body, which
waxes more vehemently as the intention of speculation waxes, is
also totally fulfilled by the fulfillment of that intention. But that
intention is fulfilled when other things have been put totally aside
and only thefirst,the true, and the good are loved and contem-
plated by the incandescent yearning of the mind. For abstraction is
then complete and we have attained the goal of this abstraction
which sets us apart from mortal things. Eventually there will be,
not separation from life, but attainment of the highest life. For
those who keep company on the journey are together at its close.
Wherefore the same haven receives the soul inflightfrom the
body and the soul in contemplation. This haven is truth itself.
Truth is eternal, or rather is eternity itself. So much for Lucretius.
Let us turn to Epicurus.
171
: VII :
Obiectio Epicuri et responsio, quod deus non
facit mentem nisi ex seipso et per seipsum•
1 Quonam pacto, inquit Epicurus, producit deus hanc animam in

materia, nisi etiam ex materia? Nos autem interrogamus eum,
quonam pacto producit sol lumen in aere, non tamen ex aere, vul-
tus in speculo imaginem, non ex speculo, mens loquentis significa-
tionem vocis in aere, non tamen ex aere* Proinde sicut sol calorem
quidem in aere gignit ex aere, lumen tamen non ex ipso aere licet
in ipso, et mens loquentis ex aere gignit sonum, significationem
vero soni non ex ipso aere, sed in ipso; ita deus alias formas ex
materiae visceribus eruit, intellectum vero qui forma ultima est,
super materiae faciem pandit, non trahit e sinu*
2 Considerare debuit Epicurus materiam ipsam nullam habere
virtutem propriam formatricem sui (nihil enim informe se for-
mat)* Habere tamen virtutem preparationemque formabilem,
quam formarum vocamus incohationem et prisci theologi chaos
antiquum* Cui deus, ut Timaeus docet, formatricem virtutem ap-
plicat, non tamquam materiae propriam, sed tamquam dei ipsius
instrumentum; aliquod ad formandum huic virtuti influxum cae-
lestem elementalemque accommodat* Forte vero divinus influxus
ex deo manans, per caelos penetrans, descendens per elementa, in
inferiorem materiam desinens, ilia ipsa est formatrix virtus, quam
Plato vocat divinae intellegentiae rationem* Per cuius infusionem
machina mundi ex necessitate constat et mente, id est ex materia
corporibus necessaria et ex formis pulcherrimo quodam ordine di-
vinam mentem bonitatemque referentibus* Hanc virtutem Peripa-
tetici turn instrumentum dei vocant, turn naturam, turn poten-
172
: VII :
Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal That God does not make
mind except from Himself and through Himself
But how, asks Epicurus, does God produce this soul in matter un- i
less it is also from matter? Let us ask Epicurus in return how does
the sun produce light in the air but not from the air, a face its re-
flection in the mirror but not from the mirror, a speaker's mind
the meaning of a sound in the air but not from the air? Just as the
sun produces heat in the air and from the air, yet light though in
the air not from it, and just as a speaker s mind produces sound
from the air, but the meaning of a sound though in the air not
from it, so God extracts some forms from the entrails of matter,
but He extends the intellect, which is the highest form, over the
face of matter without dragging it from matters coils.
Epicurus ought to have considered the fact that matter itself 2
does not have power to give itself form (nothing that is without
form can give itself form). It has the power or preparation to re-
ceive form, which we call the inchoation of forms and the ancient
theologians call primeval chaos. As the Timaeus teaches, God ap-
plies a formative power to chaos, not as the proper power of mat-
ter, but as the instrument of God Himself.44 To form something
He takes the celestial and elemental influence and matches it to
this power. Perhaps the divine influence flowing from God, pene-
trating the heavens, descending through the elements and halting
in inferior matter is this formative power, which Plato calls the
reason of the divine understanding.45 Through its infusion, the
world machine is composed of necessity and mind, composed that
is from the matter necessary to bodies and from the forms which,
in a most beautiful order, reproduce the divine mind and its good-
ness.46 The Peripatetics variously call this power Gods instrument
173
tiam seminariam. Huic formatrici virtuti subest formabilis ilia

natura materiae. Deus igitur per vim huiusmodi formatricem, per
machinam mundi difFusam, formabili ipsius materiae virtuti for-
mas illas accommodat, quas materiae proximas, et quas medias
collocavimus.
3 Hie autem Platonicus quisque ordinem quendam in quatuor
tam formarum quam subiecti gradibus observabit. Animae ratio-
nales per solum purumque dei radium super puram indivisibilis
materiae faciem accenduntur. Animae irrationales per caelestem
quoque animalemque influxum radio illi divino adhibitum e sinu
materiae nondum extenso exprimuntur in lucem. Formae elemen-
torum mixtorumque familiares per familiares etiam elementorum
qualitates educuntur ex materiae gremio iam extenso — extenso,
inquam, per dimensiones non terminatas. Formae eorundem per-
egrinae per qualitates insuper peregrinas elementorum eruuntur
ex alvo materiae, extenso iam per terminatas quasdam dimensio-
nes. Has autem formas praeter rationales animas esse materiae as-
trictas ideo arbitramur, quia nullam prorsus operationem habent
ad quam non aliquo modo concurrat corporis vel natura vel in-
strumentum, etfinemsemper sibi proponunt corporis usum, ut-
pote quae ex corpore pendeant, dum per instrumentum caeleste
sive elementale formativum formabili virtuti materiae accommo-
dantur. Cuius rei signum est, quia nulla illarum in deum converti-
tur, quasi deus non sit illarum proxima causa, sed potius aliena.
Animam vero rationalemfieria deo sine instrumentis ullis ex eo
potissimum coniectamur, quod in deum proxime vertitur, quod in
sequentibus declarabimus. Concurrunt igitur instrumenta non ad
animae humanae productionem, sed ad materiam praeparandam,
quam sit anima hominis habitatura.61 Deus vero per se illam mate-
174
or nature or the seminal potency The formable nature of matter is

subject to this formative power. So God uses this formative power,
which is diffused through the world machine, to accommodate to
matter's own formable power both the forms we have located clos-
est to matter and those in between.
Every Platonist will perceive an order here in the four levels of 3
forms and of substrate. Rational souls are set on fire by Gods
pure ray alone [shining] on the pure face of indivisible matter. Ir-
rational souls are brought into the light from the folds, as yet
unextended, of matter by both the celestial and the animate influ-
ence added to that divine ray. The familiar forms of the elements
and compounds are led by way of the elements' also familiar quali-
ties out of the lap of matter, which is now in extension (in exten-
sion yes, but undetermined by way of dimensions). The unfamil-
iar forms of the same elements and compounds are torn by way
of the elements' unfamiliar qualities out of the womb of matter,
which is now in extension by way of particular and determined
dimensions. But we believe these forms (excepting the rational
souls) are bound to matter because they perform absolutely no
activity that does not involve in some way either the nature of the
body or an instrument of it; and they always set themselves the
goal of serving the needs of the body, in that they are the forms
that depend on body as long as they are accommodated through
the formative celestial or elemental instrument to matter's
formable power. A proof of this is that none of them is turned
back towards God, and this suggests that God is not their proxi-
mate cause, but a remote one. But we suppose that the rational
soul has been created by God without any instruments principally
on the grounds that it is turned directly back towards God, as we
will argue below. So the instruments contribute, not to the pro-
duction of the human soul, but to the preparation of the matter
which man's soul is going to inhabit. But once the matter has been
prepared, God on His own produces the soul. Plato teaches us
175
62
ria praeparata producit* Quod Plato in libro De natura docet, ubi
vult animam rationalem a solo mundi opifice63 tribui; irrationales
vero etiam a ministris eius operi huic faventibus*
4 Aristoteles quoque, in hoc secutus magistrum, in libro De am-
64
malibus secundo inquit: 'Quando generatur homo, intellectum in-
fundi forinsecus, ac solum esse divinum cuius operatio non explea-
tur per aliquid corporale*' Quasi non expromatur ex intimo
materiae gremio, sicut alias formas putat expromL Ergo hanc sine
instrumento ipse deus infundit*
5 Exemplum habes in solis lumine et in anima* Lumen solis per
calorem tamquam medium dissipatis nubibus serenat aerem; sere-
num aerem illuminat per seipsum* Anima per calorem naturalem
coquendo cibum praeparat ipsum ad vitae formam* Cocto et prae-
parato cibo, non per calorem, sed ipsa per se vitae tribuit formam*
Anima rursus per linguam tamquam instrumentum frangit aerem;
fractus aer sonat; sonando significat* Sonus ille est quasi quoddam
animal constitutum ex aere fracto tamquam corpore atque ex ipsa
significatione tamquam anima* Quae quidem significatio instar
animae latet in vocibus, et quasi vita quaedam est non audita vocis
auditae* Undenam datur sono talis signification Ab ipsa loquentis
hominis anima* Sed numquid anima significationem dat voci per
linguam? Minime* Lingua enim corpus est et corporate dat munus
solum atque sensibile, neque significationem dat per se ullam,
quotiens animo ad rem non attendente casu quis loquitur* Signifi-
catio vero res est incorporalis et insensibilis*65 Alioquin qui-
cumque vocem audiret, statim quid significatur voce cognosceret*
Quapropter significatio, quae insensibile quiddam est, fit tam-
quam anima quaedam in voce, id est aere fracto ceu corpore* Fit,
176
this in his book On Nature [the Timaeus] where he affirms that the
rational soul is given by the demiurge alone, but that the irrational
souls are given also by His ministers who assist Him with the
work.47
Aristotle too, following his master in this respect, says, in the 4
second book of his work on animals, "When man is born, his in-
tellect is poured into him from without; and that intellect, whose
activity is not completed by way of something corporeal, is alone
divine/'48 It is as though it were not brought forth from matter's
inmost womb, as Aristotle believes is the case with the other
forms. So God imparts this form Himself without using any in-
strument.
You have an example in the sun's light and in the soul. The 5
sun's light uses heat as its means of scattering the clouds and clear-
ing the sky. But by itself it illuminates the clear air. Soul uses nat-
ural heat to digest food and to prepare it for the form of life. Once
the food has been digested and made ready, the soul gives it the
form of life, not through heat but through itself. Likewise the soul
uses the tongue as an instrument to break up the air. The frac-
tured air resounds and its resounding has meaning. That sound is
a sort of living creature, composed of the fractured air as its body
and of the meaning as its soul. This meaning, like soul, lies
hidden in the words we utter: it is the particular unheard life as
it were of the heard word. Whence comes the meaning in the
sound? From the soul itself of the man who is speaking. Does the
soul give meaning to the word through the tongue? Of course not.
For the tongue is a body and only gives a corporeal and sensible
gift: of itself it does not give any meaning when someone is talking
at random and his soul not paying attention. But meaning is
a non-corporeal and non-sensible thing. Otherwise anyone who
heard a voice would immediately know what was meant by the
voice. So meaning, which is something non-sensible, comes into
being, like a soul in the voice, in the fractured air as its body; and
177
inquam, ab animae ipsius cogitatione sola, non per linguae obse-

quium. Atque ideo dum PLATONEM pronuntias, aer ille fractus
plures in partes dividitur, PLA-TO-NEM, quae per tria temporis mo-
menta percurrunt. Significatio vero non per partes dividitur, quia
in loquentis mente indivisibili, antequam pronuntietur, momento
concipitur. Et significat saepe res ingentissimas, quarum molem
non potest ipsa per magnitudinem adaequare; significat etiam mo-
turn tempusque saepe sine motu vel tempore. Et quando pronun-
tiatur sono, soni ipsius parte pronuntiata, plurimum nondum ab
audiente comprehenditur, neque percipitur paulatim, sed omnibus
syllabis pronuntiatis, quid ex illis cunctis significatur, e vestigio in-
tellegitur. Quae quidem significatio in audientis intellectu perpe-
tua saepe remanet syllabis pereuntibus, sicut in loquentis mente
fuerat antequam loqueretur. Significatio igitur ab anima loquente
sine medio producta incorporalis est. Est et vocis anima simplex et
quodammodo immortalis; sonus autem per linguam mediam fa-
bricatus in partes dissipatur et interit.
6 Si sol et anima sine instrumentis aliquid efficiunt in materia,
multo magis deus poterit formam aliquam, nullo intercedente
instrumento, materiae tradere. Atque ea maxime erit rationalis
anima, quae nonnihil sine instrumento cogitat atque eligit. Quod
numquam valeret, si esset per instrumenti operam fabricata. Si per
nullum medium a deo fit, non fit ab eo, nisi per deum. Deus ipsa
aeternitas est. Fit ergo per ipsam aeternitatem. Quod per aeterni-
tatem fit est aeternum. Et quod summo statui proximum est, ita
est stabile ut a mutatione mortali sit remotissimum. Haec enim est
summa mutatio. Merito sicut in ceteris rerum generibus praeter id
quod per se tale est, sunt et alia quae per aliud talia sunt, ita in ae-
ternitatis ordine ultra deum, qui per se est aeternus, multa sunt
178
it comes, I say, solely from the souls cogitation and not through
the tongues compliance. When you pronounce the word
PLATONEM, the fractured air is divided into several parts —PLA-
TO-NEM — that fill three moments of time. The meaning, however,
is not divided into parts, because in the mind of the speaker it is
conceived in a single, indivisible moment prior to its being spoken.
And often the word signifies things that are absolutely huge whose
mass it cannot possibly equal in size, and often too it signifies
movement and time without itself being in motion or in time.
When it is pronounced aloud but only part of the word is pro-
nounced, it is not yet understood for the most part by an auditor,
nor is it understood little by little. But once all the syllables have
been pronounced, he immediately grasps what they all mean. Of-
ten the meaning remains forever in the auditor s intellect when the
syllables have passed away, just as it existed in the mind of the
speaker before he uttered it. Meaning then is produced by a
speakers soul without an intermediary and is incorporeal. It is the
word's simple and in a way immortal soul. But the sound made by
means of the tongue dissipates and dies.
If the sun and the soul can make something in matter without 6
instruments, still more can God give a form to matter without the
intervention of any instrument. And that form will principally be
the rational soul, which can consider and choose without an in-
strument. It could never do this if it were fashioned by the work of
an instrument. If it is created by God without any intermediary,
it is not created by Him unless it is through Him. God is eternity
itself. So the soul is created through this eternity. What is created
through eternity is eternal. And what is closest to the highest
state is so stable as to be furthest removed from mortal change.
For that is the most extreme form of change. Properly then, just as
in the remaining classes of things beyond that class which is such
through itself, other classes exist that are such through another, so
in the order of eternity beneath God, who is eternal through
179
quae per ilium aeterna fiunt. Talia vero esse ilia Timaeus docet,
quae a deo absque medio procreantur. Erit igitur hominis anima et
immortalis, et huic corpori tamquam significatio aeri66 a loquente
deo inserta. Quam significationem si quis animadverterit, dei lo-
quentis intellegit mentem.
: VIII :
Obiectio Panaetii et responsio, quod

anima sine medio est ex deo.
1 Dabit forsitan Panaetius nobis posse aliquid a deo in materia sine

materia et instrumento creari, sed animam nostram ita fieri non
concedet, nisi manifestatiori aliquo signo hoc iterum ostendamus.
Arbitratur67 enim tam animam nascentis ab anima parentum,
quam corpus a corpore generari, quia et corpore et ingenio similes
genitoribus68 filii saepe nascantur. Sed coniectura Panaetii parum
momenti habere videtur quia saepe dissimiles corpore nascuntur,
saepissime animo. Et qui mores sequuntur paternos, consuetudine
eos imbibunt potius quam genitura. Et si qui eos usu non acqui-
runt, imitantur tamen, non ideo imitantur, quia animus nascatur
ab animo, sed quia animus a tenera aetate blanditur proprio
corpori, in quo propter genitorum complexionem similia quaedam
fiunt incitamenta. Sed procedente aetate arbitratu suo et in
peius et in melius mutant mores. Itaque abiicienda est coniectura
Panaetii.
2 Quoniam vero signum a nobis exposceret, per quod anima a
deo venire clarius ostendatur, signum nobis erit huiusmodi.
180
BOOK X • C H A P T E R V I I I
Himself, many things exist which are made eternal through Him*
The Timaeus says that these are the things created by God without
an intermediary*49 The human soul will be immortal, then, and it
has been inserted in this body, like meaning in the air, by God
speaking* Whoever attends to this meaning understands the mind
of God speaking*
: VIII :
Panaetius' objection and its rebuttal That the soul
comes from God without any intermediary •
Panaetius will grant us perhaps that God could create something i

in matter without the use of matter or an instrument, but will not
concede that our soul is created like this unless we can provide a
clearer proof* For he thinks that the soul of a newborn child is
produced from the soul of its parents as a body from a body, be-
cause children are often born resembling their parents both in
body and in natural ability*50 However Panaetius' view seems of
little moment, because children differ from their parents often in
body and most often in soul* Those who do succeed to their par-
ents' behavior patterns acquire them by habituation rather than by
birth* If those who do not acquire these patterns by upbringing,
nonetheless copy them, they do not copy them because soul is
born from soul, but because the soul from an early age pampers its
own body, and in this body certain similar inducements occur ow-
ing to the parents' complexion* However, as they grow older, they
use their own judgments, and they change their behavior patterns
for better or for worse* So we should reject Panaetius' view*
However, since he asked us for a clearer proof of the fact that 2
the soul comes from God, our proof is as follows* Whenever
181
Anima rationalis, quotiens aliqua sibi res occurrit, perscrutatur

non modo quid res ilia sit et qualis, sed etiam quae sit eius origo.
Neque cessat umquam nisi causam eius invenerit. Neque tamen in
quavis causa sistit gradum, sed indagat semper causae causam, ita
ut non prius quiescat quam supremam causam fuerit consecuta.
Unaquaeque res in proprio sui fine quiescit. Proprius finis rei est
eius causa propria. Ibi enim perficitur; perfectionem vero natura-
lem appetunt omnia tamquam finem. Quod si communem finem
expetere videantur, non tamen ipsum asciscunt nisi quantum ipsis
congruit et accommodatur propriusque evadit. Talis evadit,
quando suscipitur in causa proxima, sufficiente, superius ordinata.
Non petit aer Venerem aut Iovem, licet etiam inde ducat originem,
sed appetit ignis concavum, ubi principium eius proprium est lo-
cusque domesticus. Cetera quoque similiter non quamlibet sui
causam expetunt. Nullae enim res prius cessarent quam in deum
transformarentur, qui primum omnium est principium, aut si
numquam transformarentur in deum, frustra et temere moveren-
tur. Non igitur quamlibet quaerunt causam, sed propinquam.
Sufficit enim cuique speciem suam incorruptam integramque ser-
vare. Haec autem servatur a causa propria, quae sufficiens sit et su-
perius ordinata. Causa vero altissima speciem rei a se remotioris
mutaret in naturam sublimiorem, ubi cessaret res ilia esse quod
erat atque periret.69 Non autem res id appetunt, sed incolumes in
suo statu manere. In quo quatenus permanent, eatenus primae
quoque causae similitudinem assequuntur.
3 Quorsum haec? Ut intellegas rem quamlibet solum cum proxi-
mam attigerit causam, quiescere protinus neque ultra perquirere.
Atque ideo mentem quae in re nulla quiescit nisi in prima, nullam
habere propriam causam nisi primam. Cuius rei signum est quod
182
BOOK X • C H A P T E R VIII
something comes its way, the rational soul examines not only what
it is and what it is like, but what is its origin. And it never stops
until it has found its cause. Nor does it stop at any cause but it so
keeps on hunting for the cause of the cause that it does not rest
until it has reached the supreme cause. Everything comes to rest in
its proper end. Its proper end is its proper cause. For there it is
made perfect. But all things strive towards natural perfection as
their end. If they appear to be seeking a common end, yet they do
not adopt it except to the extent that it suits them, is adapted to
them, and becomes more properly theirs. A common end becomes
theirs when it is received in a cause that is proximate to them,
sufficient, and ordered from on high. Air does not seek Venus or
Jupiter even though it originates [ultimately] from them. It seeks
the [nearer] concave vault of fire where its own rational principle
exists and its own home. Similarly, other things do not seek just
any cause of themselves. Otherwise they would either never stop
until they were transformed into God, who is the first principle of
everything; or, if they were never transformed into God, they
would keep moving pointlessly and at random. So they do not
seek just any cause, but the proximate one. For it suffices for each
thing to preserve its own species uncorrupted and whole. But the
proximate cause is preserved by its own cause, which must be
sufficient and ordered from on high. But the highest cause would
change the species of something far removed from itself into a
higher nature, and there the thing would cease to be what it was
and perish. This is not what things seek for: rather they seek to
remain secure in their own state. To the extent that they remain in
this state, they acquire a likeness too to the first cause.
All this is to what end? That you might understand that only 3
when each thing reaches its proximate cause does it come to a
complete rest and not seek further. And so the mind, which comes
to rest in no one thing unless it is the first, has no cause of its own
except the first. A proof of this is that mans mind is turned to-
183
hominis mens in deum convertitur sine medio* Sic enim res

convertuntur in causam ut procedunt* Quae per medium proces-
ses, per medium convertuntur; quae sine medio processerunt,
convertuntur etiam sine medio* Anima sine medio in Deum re-
flectitur, quando deum neque in aliqua creatura, neque imagine
sensus et phantasiae, sed super omnia creata absolutum nu-
dumque suspicit* Suspicit vero talem, quando argumentatur deum
esse adeo infinitum ut omnia, quae cadere in cogitationem pos-
sunt, infinito superemineat intervallo, ubi nihil creatum inter
deum et animam interponitur* Quo autem modo intuitus animae
in deum absque medio figeretur, nisi etiam intuendi virtus ab illo
absque medio processisset?
4 Quod si videatur anima quibusdam ad id mediis indigere ex eo
quod per mundi dispositionem et ordines angelorum ascendit ad
deum, scito non uti his70 mediis animam ut deum in his aut per
haec, quasi solem in aqua aut per vitrum intueatur, sed quasi qui-
busdam gradibus, ut ipsa quae infra se olim delapsa est, per hos
gradus in arcem suam redeat* Quo regressa, deum absque medio
videt* Porro per mundi dispositionem invitatur ut, dimisso corpo-
ris cultu, in suam redeat rationem; per angelorum indagationem
sive inspirationem admonetur ut, dimisso consueto rationis dis-
cursu, ad lumen sibi quondam divinitus infusum sese recipiat*
Quo reflexa per ipsum iam dei lumen suspicit deum, ut ille qui
per solis radium, non colores amplius corporum, sed ipsum suspi-
cit solem* De quo inquit Zoroaster:
X/0T7 ere cnrevSeiP iRPOS TO <£AO? KCLI 7RPOS Trarpos AVYA?,

evOev E7RE/X<^>077 CTOL ^JWXV 7TOXVV ecrcrafjievr} vovv*
id est: Ascendendum tibi est ad lumen ipsum et patris radios*

Unde infusa est tibi anima multo mentis lumine circumfusa*'
184
BOOK X CHAPTER VIII
wards God without an intermediary. For things are converted to-

wards their cause in the same way as they proceed from it. Those
that proceed through an intermediary are converted through an in-
termediary, and those that proceed without an intermediary are
converted too without an intermediary. The soul reflects on God
without an intermediary when it sees God, not in any creature or
in any image of the sense or phantasy, but above all created things
as absolute and unadorned. It sees Him like this when it proves
that God is so infinite that He surpasses everything we can think
of by an infinite distance and where no created thing is interposed
between God and the soul. But how can the souls gaze be fixed on
God without an intermediary unless the power of gazing also
comes from God without an intermediary?
Should it appear, however, that the soul does need certain in- 4
termediaries for this in that it ascends to God through the struc-
ture of the world and the orders of the angels, then be aware that
the soul does not use these intermediaries in order to see God in
them or through them like seeing the sun in water or through
glass. It uses them rather like steps in order that, having once
fallen below its own level, it might return to its own citadel via
these steps. Having returned there, it sees God without an inter-
mediary. Through the worlds order, moreover, and having set
aside the cultivation of the body, it is induced to return to its rea-
son, and then through the searching out or inspiration of the an-
gels, and having set aside its customary discourse of reason, it is
admonished to return again to the light formerly bestowed on it
from on high. Having returned thither, it sees God through what
is now the very light of God like someone who uses the suns ray
to look at the sun itself and no longer at the colors of bodies. Zo-
roaster puts it like this: "You must ascend to the light itself and to
the rays of the father, whence soul, enveloped in the ample light of
the mind, flowed into you."51
185
5 Quod autem animus ad hunc quandoque statum perveniat,

inde coniicimus, quod usque adeo se ab omni rei creatae cogita-
tione secernit, ut super omnem rei cuiusque creandae conceptum
quantumcumque sublimem extare divinum verticem per infinitum
asserat spatium. Dum vero deum ita describit, pro viribus capit
deum. Habet ergo vim aliquam absque medio dei capacem. Haec
autem a solo tributa est deo. Qui enim format solus, ipse solus
disponit. Qui implet, ipse amplificat, sicut et visus radium ilium
intimum et insitum ab origine, quo solis lumen proxime videt,
quotidie ab ipso eodem lumine solis accepit. Atque ita vis ilia dei
capax medio indiget nullo ultra deum ad deum suscipiendum, si-
cut neque visivus radius ad radium solarem accipiendum ullo indi-
get medio, quia et radius a radio, et vis dei capax a deo nullo me-
dio interposito.
6 Probavimus hactenus propositum nostrum praecipue per intel-
lectum. Rursus ita probamus idem praecipue per voluntatem.
Omnis appetitus causae suae impletur possessione. Sitim enim ap-
petitionis extinguit perficiendo res eadem quae accendit efficiendo.
Voluntas solius infiniti boni possessione potest impleri. Eousque
enim affectat bonum quousque ipsi bonum porrigit intellectus.
Intellectus communem boni ipsius rationem invenit ab omnibus
rei participantis angustiis segregatam, quae propter hoc ipsum
infinita permanet in seipsa. Diffunditur quoque in infinitum, cum
possit bonitas rebus innumerabilibus per infinitos modos commu-
nicari. Si voluntas eousque affectat bonum quousque intellectus
offert, hie autem offert infinitum bonum et infinita bona, sequitur
ut totidem voluntas affectet. Ergo solius infiniti boni impletur pos-
sessione. Ad haec, sicut obiectum intellectus est ens ipsum sub ra-
186
We deduce that the rational soul at some point attains this 5

state from the fact that it divorces itself from all consideration of
what is created so far as to assert that beyond every conception,
however sublime, of each thing to be created there rises through
the infinite distance the peak divine. When it describes God like
this, the soul apprehends God to the best of its ability It has,
then, a power capable of apprehending God without an intermedi-
ary This power has been granted by God alone. He alone who
gives form is He alone who disposes form. He who fills is He who
magnifies. Similarly the sight daily receives from the same light of
the sun the ray by which it sees the light of the sun directly—that
ray which is internal to it and implanted in it from the beginning.
And thus the power of apprehending God needs no intermediary
other than God in order to receive God, just as the visual ray
needs no intermediary in order to receive the solar ray. For the one
ray comes from the other without an intermediary and so does the
power of apprehending God come from God.
Till now we have pursued our proposition largely by way of the 6
intellect. Now for some proofs based mainly on the will. All appe-
tite is satisfied by possession of its cause. The same thing that
arouses the appetites thirst by creating it, allays it by satisfying it.
The will can only be satisfied by the possession of the infinite
good alone. It continues to desire the good so long as the intellect
continues to offer it the good. The intellect discovers the common
rational principle of the good itself, which set apart from all the
confines of a participating object remains forever infinite in itself
on account of this good. It is also infinitely diffused, because good-
ness can be communicated to innumerable objects in infinite ways.
If the will desires the good as long as the intellect offers it, and the
intellect offers the infinite good and infinite goods, then it follows
that the will must desire it infinitely. So it is perfected by the pos-
session of the infinite good alone. Moreover, just as the object of
the intellect is being itself considered in terms of the truth, so the
187
tione veri, ita voluntatis obiectum ens ipsum sub ratione boni.
Quia vero vis quaeque eo solo contenta esse potest in quo integra
obiecti sui ratio reperitur, sequitur ut intellectus et voluntas solo
deo satiari possint, in quo solo est integra veritatis bonitatisque ra-
tio. Et quia ille ab aliis veris semper discurrit ad alia, haec ab aliis
bonis fertur in alia, satis constat quietem his ex eo solo obtingere
posse quod talia cuncta complectitur. Habitus enim sistit motum
et motum quodammodo interminatum habitus infinitus.
7 Postremo legitimus intellectus est ille qui res intelligit sicuti
sunt, legitima voluntas ilia quae res appetit sicuti sunt appetibiles.
Sunt autem res ut ordinantur a deo, appetibiles vero sunt ut ordi-
nantur ad deum. Ergo neque intellectus, neque voluntas in rebus
ipsis quiescere potest. Sed ille resolvit in deum, haec refert ad
deum. Illi solus deus conspiciendus naturali instinctu proponitur,
huic solus deus amandus. Si sola infinita bonitas implere volunta-
tis capacitatem valet, nimirum sola71 infinita bonitas naturam pro-
creat voluntatis, praesertim cum ipsa quoque voluntas in bonita-
tem infinitam quandoque se conferat sine medio. Quod tunc facit
evidentissime, quando intellectus voluntati non amplius bonum
hoc proponit aut illud, sed aut cunctorum simul bonorum osten-
dit cumulum aut bonitatis ipsius fomitem, unde talis cumuli sege-
tes pullularunt.72
8 Denique nullus effectus ultra suam causam se extendit. Huma-
nus animus rem quamlibet finitam transgreditur, quia quod-
cumque finitum verum bonumve obtuleris, intellectus magis intel-
legere potest, voluntas ulterius affectare. Nulla ergo finita res est
animi causa. Quod hinc potissimum confirmari videtur, quia causa
motorque particularis virtutem inclinationemque ad universale
tendentem non potest efficere. Et quia in intellectu73 virtus est ad
188
object of the will is being itself considered in terms of the good.

But because each power can rest content only in that in which its
objects entire rational principle is found, it follows that the intel-
lect and the will can be satisfied by God alone; for in Him alone is
the entire rational principle of truth and of goodness. And because
the intellect races from truths to truths and the will is borne from
goods to goods, it is sufficiently clear that they can obtain rest only
from that which embraces all such things. For possession puts a
stop to motion, and infinite possession puts a stop to motion that
is in a sense endless.
Finally, the proper intellect is that which understands things as 7
they truly exist, and the proper will is that which desires things as
they are desirable. But things exist as they are set in order by God,
but they are desirable as they are ordered towards God. So neither
the intellect nor the will can come to rest in things themselves. But
the intellect resolves into God, the will gives back to God. 52 To the
intellect God alone is presented by natural instinct as the due ob-
ject of contemplating, and to the will God alone is presented as
the due object of loving. If infinite goodness alone can satisfy the
capacity of the will, certainly infinite goodness alone procreates the
nature of the will, especially since the will on occasions also be-
takes itself to infinite goodness without an intermediary. This is
most evident when the intellect no longer presents the will with
this good or that good, but displays either the harvest of all the
goods together or the shoots of goodness itself whence sprouts the
corn of such a harvest.
Finally, no effect extends beyond its cause. The rational human 8
soul transcends each finite object, because whatever finite true or
good thing you offer, the intellect can understand more and the
will can desire further. So no finite thing is the cause of soul. The
best proof of this seems to be that a particular cause and source of
motion cannot produce a power and inclination directed towards
the universal. And since power in the intellect exists for the uni-
189
universale verum, in voluntate inclinatio ad universale bonum,

constat plane intellectum et voluntatem a nulla re creata fieri vel
moveri. Quicquid enim creatum est, verum bonumque est dum-
taxat particulare* Nonne animus quodlibet particulare bonum
respuere potest, licet bonum universale non possit? Quidnam hoc
significat, nisi ipsum solius universalis boni actioni et imperio
subiici?
9 Concludamus igitur per intellectus et voluntatis actus conver-
sionesque hominis animam a deo nullo medio interiecto in lucem
ex nihilo prodiisse, atque earn dei vim infinitam, qua ita producta
est, ipsi animae ita quodammodo inseri ut ipsi quasi propria et na-
turalis evadat, per quam ipsa, quotiens vult, in deum se vertit*
Non minus ferme74 infinita virtute opus esse putant Platonici, ut
quis ad deum se conferat infinitum atque infinitum esse sub certa
ratione infinitatis agnoscat et amet, quam ad hoc ut aliquid fiat ex
nihilo* Infinita virtute sua deus animam creavit ex nihilo, infinita
dei virtute anima dei virtutem eandem infinitam attingit, quae ip-
sam ex nihilo procreavit* Quae quidem infinita virtus, sive semel
animae sit infusa, sive potius iugiter infimdatur serveturque a deo,
demonstrat earn virtutis infinitae participem et (ut ita loquar) ca-
pacem ita esse, ut per hanc ipsam dei attingat infinitatem* Infinita-
tem dei esse scimus totam simul et integram; infinitatem temporis,
quia evanescit continue, continue quoque instaurari: fluxisse par-
tim, partim quoque fluxuram, neque habere umquam in praesentia
nisi momentum* Momentum ab integra infinitate innumere supe-
ratur* Quo fit ut infinitas dei infinitatem temporis innumerabiliter
per distantiam superet infinitam* Anima illam attingit* Hanc ergo
longissime supereminet* Quamobrem omnes excedit terminos
temporis vivitque perpetua* Quod hinc maxime confirmatur, quod
190
versal truth, and inclination in the will for the universal good, ob-
viously the intellect and the will cannot be brought into being or
set into motion by any created thing. For what has been created is
only a particular truth or good. But surely the rational soul can re-
ject a particular good, although it cannot reject the universal
good? What does this mean except that it is subject to the action
and command of the universal good alone?
Let us conclude, then, from the acts and the conversions of the 9
intellect and the will that from nothing and without any interme-
diary mans soul was brought into the light by God, and that the
infinite power of God which thus produced it has in a way been so
implanted in the soul that it has become virtually part of its own
nature. It is this that enables the soul to turn to God whenever it
wills. Platonists believe that infinite power is needed to make ones
way to the infinite God, to recognize Him as infinite under the
precise rational principle of infinity, and to love Him—a power no
less infinite, almost, than the power needed to create something
out of nothing. By His infinite power God created the soul out of
nothing, and by God's infinite power the soul attains the same
infinite power of God that created it out of nothing. This infinite
power it possesses, whether it is imparted to the soul only once,
or whether rather it is continuously being imparted and sustained
by God, proves that the soul participates in infinite power, and
is so capacious, if I may use the word, that it attains God's infinity
through that power. We know that God's infinity is simulta-
neously complete and absolute, while the infinity of time, because
it is continuously fading away, is also being continuously restored:
partly it has flowed away, partly it is still to come, and it never
has but a moment in the present. A moment is exceeded times
without number by absolute infinity. Hence it is that the infinity
of God measurelessly exceeds the infinity of time by an infinite
distance. The soul attains God's infinity. So it surpasses time's
infinity to the greatest possible extent. So it exceeds all the bound-
191
si deus earn non facit per angelicas caelestesque virtutes, multo

minus per materialia semina; ideoque pestiferam non subit muta-
tionem.
10 Si ergo tuum colere parentem desideras, ipsum solummodo cole
bonum. Parentem quaeris? Non75 corporis natura parens est tibi,
o Anima.76 Tanto enim melior es, quanto parenti magis obtempe-
ras; es autem tanto praestantior, quanto magis corpori adversaris.
Bonum tibi omnino77 est esse cum patre; malum tibi quodammo-
do78 est esse cum corpore. Non animus aliquis te genuit, Anima.79
Animi operatio mobilis est. Si ergo per earn facta fuisses, substan-
tiam omnino haberes mutabilem; ideoque in ipsa animi mutabili-
tate sisteres gradum, neque stabilem prorsus naturam exigeres,
neque quicquam super animum cogitares.80 Non intellectus aliquis
multiplex te creavit, non enim simplicitatem summam attingeres
atque81 intellectus ipsius tibi sufficeret consecutio. Nunc autem ad
ipsam vitam, ad ipsam essentiam, ad ipsum esse absolutum intelle-
gendo amandoque82 ascendis super quemlibet intellectum. Neque
satis tibi intellegentia est, nisi et bene et bonum intellegas. Bonum
vero ipsum tibi satis est absque dubio: non enim alia ratione83 re-
quiris quodlibet, nisi qua bonum. Bonum igitur ipsum procreator
tuus est, Anima; non bonum corpus, non bonus animus, non bo-
nus intellectus, sed bonum ipsum, bonum inquam,84 quod85 in
seipso consistit extra subiecti cuiusque86 limites infinitum, infini-
tamque tibi tribuit vitam, vel ab aevo in aevum, vel saltern ab initio
quodam in sempiternum.
192
• BOOK X * C H A P T E R VIII •
aries of time and lives forever. The clearest proof of this is that if
God did not use angelic or celestial powers to make the soul,
much less did He use material seeds; and therefore the soul is not
subject to pestilential change.
If you wish to respect your father, honor the good, and the 10
good alone. Are you searching for your father? The53 body's nature
is no father to you, o soul. The more you obey your father, the
better you are, but the more you struggle against the body, the no-
bler you are. To be with your father is in all respects good; to be
with your body is in some respects bad. Some rational soul did
not beget you, o soul. The soul's activity is one of movement; so if
you had been made through this activity, you would have an en-
tirely mobile substance. You would have come to a halt in the
soul's own mutability, not demanded a nature that was wholly at
rest; and you would not have considered anything above the ratio-
nal soul. Nor did some manifold intellect create you, for then you
would not attain the highest simplicity, and attaining the intellect
alone would have been enough for you. But in fact you ascend by
understanding and by loving beyond any intellect to life itself, to
essence itself, to absolute being. Nor does understanding suffice
for you unless you understand well and understand the good. In-
dubitably, however, the good itself does suffice, for you desire
whatever you desire for no other reason than that it is the good.
So the good itself is what begat you, o soul: not a good body, not a
good soul, not a good intellect, but the good itself, the good that
dwells in itself beyond the boundaries of any substrate and is
infinite. And the life it bestows on you is infinite, either from ever-
lasting to everlasting, or at least from some beginning to eternity.
193
: IX :
Tertia ratio: quale est obiectum, talis est potentia.
1 Quatuor haec: essentia, virtus, operatio, obiectum, hunc habent

ordinem, ut ab essentia profluat virtus, ab hac operatio, operatio
obiectum petat, et talis quaedam essentia per talem quandam vir-
tutem, id est virtutem propriam, certo modo circa obiectum sibi
conveniens operetur. Non est putandum ab essentia aliam virtu-
tem fluere quam sibi familiarem, neque a virtute aliam edi opera-
tionem quam naturalem, neque operationem versari circa obiec-
tum aliquod, nisi simile, commodum et conveniens. Nam cur
naturalis ilia essentiae virtus operando appetit obiectum aliquod
tale potius quam tale, nisi quia tale aliquid ipsi familiarius est, ap-
tius et commodius? Nisi enim conveniret magis cum tali quodam
quam cum aliis, vel appeteret nullum, vel aeque omnia peteret. Sic
intimus virtutis visivae radius per radium solis coloratos radios as-
picit. Intimus aurium aer, per externum aerem, aerem87 haurit
fractum, id est sonos. Olfactus in vapore aeris caliginoso genitus
per vaporem talem in aere crasso a pomo diffusum vaporem in
pomo odoriferum percipit. Gustus in salivae humore submersus
per liquefactionem cibi in ore, sapores vel natura liquidos vel ibi
iam liquefactos attingit, Tactus terrenis nervis accommodatus ter-
rena et solida sentit facile et corporales admodum qualitates.
2 Vides obiecta semper cum operationibus et virtutibus naturali-
bus convenire. Idem in mente cogeris confiteri, ut mens libera sit a
194
B O O K X • C H A P T E R IX
: IX :
Third proof: as is the object, so is the power.
Essence, power, activity, and object, these four are ordered in such i
a manner that power flows from essence, activity from power, and
activity aims at an object; and that such an essence acts by means
of such a power—its own proper power, in other words —and
does so in a specific way with regards to an object which is congru-
ent with it* It must not be supposed that from essence flows any
power other than the one akin to it, nor from the power any activ-
ity other than the one natural to it, or that the activity is directed
towards any object other than one that is similar, suitable, and
congruent* For in its activity why should the essences natural
power seek as an object one sort of thing rather than another, un-
less such a thing were more closely related to it, more apt, and
better suited? If it were not suited better to it than to others, ei-
ther it would desire none of them, or it would seek them all
equally* Thus the inner ray of the power of sight perceives colored
rays by means of the ray of the sun* The inner air within the ears
takes in fractured air, or sounds, by means of the external air* The
sense of smell, which is generated in the air s misty vapor, detects
the fragrance in fruit by means of this misty vapor diffused in the
heavy air by the fruit* Taste, which immerses itself in the moisture
of the saliva, detects flavors through the liquefying of the food in
the mouth, the flavors being either naturally liquid or liquefied at
that point* Touch, which is connected with nerves that are earthy,
easily perceives solid earthy objects and qualities that are particu-
larly corporeal*
So you can see how the objects always conform to the activities 2
and the natural powers* And you have to admit that the same is
true with mind: to wit, that a mind whose object is free from mat-
195
materia, cuius obiectum est a materia liberum, Talis est autem rei
cuiusque universalis ratio et idea, Obiectum eiusmodi primum
Platonici vocant atque Peripatetici, quia primo rectoque aspectu se
obiicit, Obiectum vero adaequatum esse totam entis88 ipsius latitu-
dinem arbitrantur, quia per universum ens intellectus abstrahendo,
dividendo, componendo, definiendo percurrit, Ens autem tam in-
corporeis omnibus quam corporeis est commune atque infinitum,
Ac ne quis ita fallatur, ut dicat intellectum forte in alia quadam re
cum universali ratione potius quam in ipsa separatione congruere,
considerare debemus in eo congruere maxime, quod necessario
ipse facit ad hoc, ut intellegat. Quid autem facit potissimum?
Certe et seipsum, et ipsam a materiae passionibus segregat, Neque
quicquam magis impedit vel hunc intellegere, vel hanc intellegi,
quam materiae passivae coniunctio, Proinde si non modo talis po-
tentia tale petit obiectum, sed etiam obiectum tale potentiam suo
accessu multo magis efficit talem (quemadmodum visus natura lu-
cidus et lucem petit et accedente luce fit lucidior), sequitur ut
mens non solum ex eo remota sit a materia atque ampla, quia na-
turaliter assidueque ad remota et ampla se confert, verumetiam ut
multo etiam inde fiat remotior ampliorque, quod quae remota am-
plaque sunt, illam pulsant, rapiunt, occupant, Sed quantum potest
a materia segregari? Tantum videlicet, ut effugiat materiae passio-
nes, Rationem namque ideamque turn rei cuiusque, turn entis ab
his absolutam naturaliter avet. Potest autem per eandem naturam
ipsam consequi per quam movetur ad ipsam, Et ipsa denique idea-
lis ratio quae in aeternitate est omnino, cum sit in deo, mentem
sese ad earn pro viribus elevantem potest omnino supra limites loci
temporisque extollere.
196
B O O K XI • C H A P T E R III
ter is free from matter. But such an object is each things universal
rational principle or idea. Platonists and Peripatetics call this the
first object, because it presents itself directly and at first glance.
But they suppose the mind s adequate object is the whole breadth
of being itself, because the intellect traverses the whole of being by
abstracting, dividing, compounding, and defining. Being, however,
is common to all incorporeal and corporeal objects alike, and it is
infinite. And should someone be so mistaken as to claim that the
intellect agrees perchance with a universal rational principle in
some other thing rather than in absolute separation, we should
ponder the fact that agreeing occurs most when the intellect neces-
sarily does what it does in order to understand. And what does it
do most? Above all, it separates itself and the universal rational
principle from the passions of matter. Nothing more prevents the
intellect from understanding and the rational principle from being
understood than conjunction with passive matter. Accordingly, if
such a power not only seeks for such a [rational] object, but this
object enhances the power by its approach (just as sight which is
naturally bright both seeks light and becomes brighter when light
approaches), then it follows not only that the mind is remote from
matter and sublime precisely because it naturally and continually
turns towards remote and sublime objects, but also that it be-
comes even more remote and still more sublime because remote
and sublime objects strike, enrapture, and occupy it. How much
can it be separated from matter? To the degree it can escape the
passions of matter. For it naturally longs for the rational principle
and idea both of each object and of being, the idea that is totally
free from these passions. But it can use the same nature that
moves it towards the idea to attain the idea. Finally, the ideal ratio-
nal principle that is entirely in eternity, since it is in God, can lift
the mind completely beyond the boundaries of time and space as
long as the mind is lifting itself, to the best of its powers, towards
that principle.
197
LIBER UNDECIMUS 1
: I :
Prima ratio; mens unitur obiecto perpetuo

et species suscipit absolutas
rationesque sempiternas.
i Ratio ipsa rei penitus absoluta illud ipsum est quod actu a nobis
primo rectoque et proprie intellegitur. Quod intellegitur actu, ma-
gis fit unum per intellectualem speciem cum intellectu, quam quod
videtur actu per visibilem speciem cum visu, et tanto magis quanto
ex purioribus arctior provenit copula. Copula haec augetur rursus
ex eo quod visibile quidem est extra visum; ratio vero ipsa intelle-
gibilis, quae adest et omni mundi materiae ab ipsa formabili et
omni loco (cum situm proprium non respiciat), proculdubio inest
mentium penetralibus, ipsi per naturam quam proximis. Unde et
ab ilia2 et ad illam semper afficiuntur. Si ex intellectu intellegente
et specie ilia intellectuali sive ratione per speciem significata fit
unum, ac species ilia et ratio, ut talis est, est a loco et tempore et
ceteris materiae passionibus separata, intellectus in hoc ipso actu
ab iisdem semotus erit. Actus huiusmodi intellectus ipsius est pro-
prius. Proprius actus essentiam propriam comitatur atque e
converso. Itaque intellectus non per actum modo proprium, veru-
metiam per essentiam propriam erit ab omni materiae contagione
seiunctus. Et sicut ratio ilia communis, quantum in se est, univer-
sum locum tempusque ambit, quamvis ut materiam respicit ad lo-
198
BOOK XI
: I :
First proof: the mind is united with an eternal

object and receives the immaterial species and
the everlasting rational principles J
The entirely immaterial rational principle of a thing is that which i

in act is primarily, directly, and properly understood by us* What
is understood in act is more at one, by way of the intellectual spe-
cies, with the intellect than what is seen in act is at one, by way of
the visible species, with the sight; and the more so to the extent
that a stronger bond exists between purer things* This bond is
strengthened still more in that what is visible is external to vision
whereas the intelligible rational principle itself, which is present
both to all the world s matter that is formable by it and to every
place (since it does not look to a location of its own), is undoubt-
edly present in the inmost recesses of minds, which are by nature
as close to itself as possible* Hence minds are always affected by
the rational principle and drawn towards it* If a union occurs be-
tween the understanding intellect and the intellectual species or
the rational principle signified through the species, but if that spe-
cies and rational principle as such is separated from space, time,
and the other passions matter endures, then in this act of under-
standing the intellect will be far removed from the same passions*
Such an act is proper to the intellect* The proper act accompanies
the proper essence and the reverse* So the intellect will be isolated
from all of matter s contagion not only through its own act but
also through its own essence* And just as that universal rational
principle, insofar as it is able, encircles universal space and time—
199
cum temp usque declinet, ita mens illi per naturam accommodata,3
quamquam ut respicit corpus sese ad partes loci ac temporis cohi-
bet, tamen quantum in se est quodammodo totum ambit
utrumque, Praesertim quia non potest species secundum signifi-
candi virtutem esse absoluta, si mens, quae eius turn subiectum
turn fons est, absoluta non sit, cum omne subiectum pro natura
sua suscipiat qualitates et fons saporem suum infundat rivulis inde
manantibus. Hinc duo sequuntur: unum, quod substantia mentis
non editur ex materiae latebris; alterum, quod est immortalis ex eo
quod fit unum cum specie ilia rationeque universali, quae prout
universalis est, locum fugit et tempus.
2 Ad idem vero sic rursus argumentemur. Ipsum intellegibile pro-
pria est intellectus perfectio, unde intellectus in actu et intellegibile
in actu sunt unum. Intellectus4 siquidem quamdiu potentia est in-
tellecturus5 nondum cum re potentia intellegenda coniungitur, sed
quando actu intellegens est cum re actu iam intellecta. Coniungi-
tur autem cum ea, ut volunt Peripatetici, quoniam rei illius forma
inhaeret menti. Quorum vero una forma est, ipsa sunt unum.
Unum ergo fit ex mente intellegente ac re intellecta, quandoqui-
dem rei huius forma, ut talis est, format mentem. Quod ergo
convenit intellegibili, quantum intellegibile est, convenit intellec-
tui, quantum intellectus, quia perfectio et quod perficitur unius
sunt generis et semper invicem proportione mutua vinciuntur.
Intellegibile vero quantum tale est necessarium et perpetuum.
Quippe in speculando nullius existimamus corruptibilia, quia nos
scire non arbitramur quicquam nisi certam rei rationem et neces-
sariam teneamus. Et quae necessaria sunt, ea perfecte intellectu
comprehenduntur; contigentia vero quantum huiusmodi, imper-
200
B O O K X I • C H A P T E R III
though in its relationship to matter it inclines towards space and

time—so mind, which naturally conforms to that principle, even
though with regard to the body it is confined to the parts of space
and time, nevertheless insofar as it is able it encircles both in their
entirety in some manner. This is particularly because the species
could not be independent in its power to signify, if mind, which is
both its subject and its source, were not independent. For every
subject receives qualities according to its nature, and every spring
imparts its own taste to the rills flowing out of it. We can draw
two conclusions: one, that the substance of mind is not produced
from the hidden recesses of matter; and two, that it is immortal
because it is made one with the species, the universal rational prin-
ciple, which, being universal, shuns space and time.
Let us argue the same point again as follows. The intelligible is 2
the proper perfection of the intellect whence the intellect in act
and the intelligible in act are one. For the intellect as long as it is
about to understand potentially is not yet joined with the object
that is potentially to be understood, but when it understands ac-
tually it is joined with the object now actually understood. But it
is joined with it, in the Aristotelians' view, because the form of
that object adheres to the mind. But those that share a single form
are themselves one. So from the understanding mind and the ob-
ject understood one thing emerges, because the form as such of
this object forms the mind. So what conforms to the intelligible,
to the extent that it is intelligible, conforms to the intellect, to the
extent that it is intellect. For perfection and what is perfected are
one in genus and are always bound together in mutual proportion.
But the intelligible, to the extent that it is such, is necessary and
everlasting. In contemplating we are not thinking of anything per-
ishable, because we do not believe we know a thing unless we pos-
sess its rational principle, which is definite and necessary. Neces-
sities are grasped by the intellect perfectly but contingencies, to
the extent they are such, imperfectly. For when the intellect affirms
201
fecte. Quando enim contingentia intellectus affirmat, saepe falli-

tun Si falli non vult, ambigit- Uterque actus imperfectus est: et
falli et ambigere. Merito quando contingentia cogitat, dubitare so-
let, ne interim permutentur, et aliter de illis atque aliter momentis
aliis sit iudicandum, momentis namque singulis permutantur.
Puta, dum dicimus 'Platonem sedere,' potest enim interim sur-
rexisse.
3 Definitiones autem rerum universales perpetuae sunt, ut homo
est animal rationale. Proprietates quoque specierum, quae proprie
definiuntur sunt sempiternae, ut omne rationale potest ratiocinari.
Semper enim definitiones proprietatesque tales aeque sunt verae,
etiam si nullus in terris homo spiret. Has intellectus perspicue cer-
nit tenetque firmiter et asserit sine errore vel dubio. Et si qua
contingentia intellegit, maxime sub his rationibus universalibus
comprehendit, ubi corruptibilia cogitat non ut talia, sed ut ae-
terna. Intellectus ergo perpetuus est, qui rationibus sempiternis
unitur solisque perficitur. Si intellectus eas capit et quod capit pro-
portionem aliquam habet cum eo quod capitur, congruentiam
certe cum his rationibus intellectus habebit. Hae neque princi-
pium habent neque finem. At si mens habet utrumque, nullam
cum his habebit proportionem, quoniam ab eis omnino per condi-
tiones oppositas distinguetur. Quapropter mens aut fu.it semper
et erit ut ipsae, aut si esse coepit quandoque, non tamen desinet
umquam.
202
contingencies, it often errs. If it does not wish to err, it remains

undecided* Each act, making a mistake or failing to decide, is im-
perfect* Appropriately then, in thinking about contingent things
the intellect is accustomed to doubting lest they change in the
meantime and require different judgments about different matters
at different moments; for they alter moment by moment* For ex-
ample, while we are saying "Plato is sitting down," it is possible in
the meantime he has risen to his feet*
Universal definitions of things, however, are everlasting: man, 3
for instance, is always a rational animal* The properties of the spe-
cies too, properly defined, are unchanging: for example, every ra-
tional creature is able to reason* For such definitions and proper-
ties are equally true even if no one man is living on earth* The
intellect sees these clearly, grasps them firmly, and asserts them
without error or hesitation* And whatever contingencies it under-
stands, it comprehends in the main under these universal rational
principles, where it thinks about perishable things not insofar as
they are perishable but as they are eternal* So that intellect is ever-
lasting which is united with the everlasting rational principles and
perfected by them alone* If the intellect grasps them, and if what
grasps bears some proportion to what is grasped, then the intellect
will certainly be congruent with these rational principles* They
have neither beginning nor end; were the mind to have both, how-
ever, then it would bear no proportion to the principles, because
by way of these contrary conditions it would be completely sepa-
rated from them* Therefore either the mind has existed and will
exist always, like the principles, or, if it began to exist at some
point, it will never come to an end*2
203
: II :
Obiectio Epicureorum et responsio•

De unione mentis cum speciebus absolutis
et6 rationibus sempiternis.
1 Neque nos hie obtundat Epicureus aliquis, obiiciens lumen qui-

dem solis ab oculo suscipi, oculum interire, lumen vero solis inco-
lume7 superesse, similiter speciem illam universalem, id est univer-
saliter significantem, rationemque sempiternam capi ab intellectu,
intellectum perire quandoque, speciem vel rationem remanere.
2 Respondemus solis lumen ab oculo minime suscipi, quoniam
ab eo ne momentum quidem tenetur et, occidente sole, visus mo-
mento lumen amittit. Qui si quid luminis suscepisset, retineret
utique illius aliquid vel parumper, sicut aqua calorem retinet ali-
quantisper igne subtracto* Itaque adesse oculis lumen possumus
affirmare; inesse vero et suscipi minime. Mens vero speciem illam
rationemque universalem hominis et aliorum ideo suscipere dici-
tur, quoniam absente etiam homine memoriter retinet. Adde quod
lumen hoc ipsum, quod lumen est et quod visibile, ab oculis non
sortitur. Est enim suapte natura tale et oculi inde ut clarescant et
videant assequuntur. Species autem ilia hominis universalis, hoc
ipsum quod universalis est, non ab ipsis singulis hominum habet
personis, in quibus quicquid est, particulare est. In mente tamen
est ilia universalis. Igitur ut universalis sit, habet8 a mente. Sed
quonam pactof Hoc maxime, ut Aristoteli placet. Duas nostra
mens habet vires: agentem unam, alteram vero capacem. Agens
est quae species agit universales; capax quae eas capit ab agente
204
: II :
An Epicurean objection and its rebuttal

On the union of the mind with the immaterial
species and eternal rational principles.
Let no Epicurean come dinning our ears here, objecting that sun- i
light is received by the eye, but that the eye perishes while the
sunlight survives unharmed; and that similarly the universal spe-
cies (that is, the species that signifies universally) and the everlast-
ing rational principle is grasped by the intellect, but that the intel-
lect perishes at some point while the species or rational principle
remains.
Our retort is that the sunlight is not received by the eye, for it 2
is not retained by it even for a moment; and, once the sun sets, the
sight loses the light in a twinkling. If the eye had taken in any part
of the light, it would surely have retained something of it at least
for a while, just as water retains heat for a while after the fire has
been removed. So we can say that the light is present to the eyes,
but not that it is inside them or received by them. But the mind is
said to take in the species and universal rational principle of man
and of other things precisely because it retains it in the memory
even when a man is not present. Furthermore, the fact that it is
light and it is visible it does not owe to the eyes. For light is such
by its own nature, and the eyes acquire from it their ability to illu-
minate and to see. But the universal species of man does not de-
rive the fact that it is universal from the individual human beings
in whom whatever exists is particular. Yet that universal species is
in the mind. So it acquires from the mind the fact that it is univer-
sal. How can this happen? According to Aristotle chiefly in the
following way: Our mind has two powers, one active, the other re-
ceptive. The active power is what conceives the universal species;
205
PLATONIC THEOLOGY
conceptas. Quando igitur phantasia in se hominis huius, ut Socra-

tis, hoc tale simulacrum contuetur, mox lumen virtutis illius agen-
tis simulacrum istud pulsat, non aliter quam solis radius aquam.
Atque ut radius hie solis ab aqua repercussus in oppositum parie-
tem ibi circulum procreat splendidum atque tremulum, ita lumen
ipsum virtutis agentis pulsans particulare simulacrum hominis
phantasia conceptum atque ex eo simulacro in vim intellectus ca-
pacem reflexum, in hac ipsa inde speciem quandam parit, quae
non amplius Socratem hunc in hoc loco et tempore positum refert,
sed hominis naturam singulis personis aeque communem, a certis
loci et temporis limitibus absolutam. Ubi et species ipsa universa-
lis est et natura quae per earn refertur universalis. In hoc mirabilis
vis intellectus apparet.
3 Nempe qui speciem creat a materia, loco et tempore absolutam
atque ideo quodammodo sempiternam et creatam recipit in seipso,
per quam etiam naturam similem apprehendit, cur non et ipse ab
iisdem absolutus sit atque perpetuus? Denique ea quae intellectus
attingit ita separata, si natura sua sunt talia, talis quoque est intel-
lectus, nam cum attingit separata, ibi tunc est ubi sunt ipsa; igitur
et ipse est9 separatus. Sin autem natura illis passionibus mancipata
sunt, sed intellectus sua vi ilia liberat, multo prius ac magis ipse est
liber, ut cetera liberet. Die age: cur forma rei cuiusque non potest
unum quiddam fieri cum intellectu, antequam omnino a materia
separetur, nisi quia intellectus ipse multo prius magisque est a ma-
teria separatus?
4 Quo autem modo fiat unum ex ilia specie et intellectu docet
comparatio ilia quam de radio induximus atque aqua. Quippe cir-
culus, ille inde natus splendidus ac tremulus, parieti non satis uni-
20 6
the receptive power is what receives them after they have been
conceived by the active power. So when the phantasy observes
within itself the image or likeness3 of a particular man, say Socra-
tes, the light of the active power immediately strikes on this image,
like the ray of the sun hitting water. And just as the suns ray re-
flected off the water creates on the opposite wall a splendid quiver-
ing circle, so the light of the active power, striking a particular im-
age of a man conceived in the phantasy and reflected off that im-
age onto the receptive power of the intellect, then gives birth
within this power to a species which no longer refers to this partic-
ular Socrates located in this place at this time, but to the nature of
man which is common equally to all individual human beings, in-
dependent of fixed limits of place and time. Here is the universal
species and the nature that is referred to because of it as universal.
In this the wondrous power of the intellect is manifest.
Now the intellect, which creates the species absolutely free from 3
matter, space, and time, and so in a way receives the eternal and
created species in itself, and also apprehends through it the like
nature, why may it not be absolutely free itself from these same
passions and everlasting? Finally, if the objects that the intellect at-
tains are thus separated and naturally so, then separate too is the
intellect, for, when it attains the separate objects, it is there where
they are and so is separate itself. But if they are naturally subject
to these passions, but the intellect frees them by its power, then
the intellect is itself free for it to be able to set them free, and free
at a far earlier stage and to a much greater degree. Tell me, why it
is that the form of each object cannot become united with the in-
tellect prior to its having been completely separated from matter,
unless it is because the intellect itself has been separated from
matter at a far earlier stage and to a much greater degree?
The comparison we made to the suns ray off the water teaches 4
us how the unification of the species and the intellect may occur.
The circle of quivering reflection they produce is not sufficiently
207
tur, quia splendoris illius et parietis est nimium diversa natura. At

si in speculum incident, arctius unietur. Tandem si in lumen solis
idem redierit, unde radius ille demissus fuerat, qui splendidum cir-
culum procreaverat, coibit prorsus in unum. Quid autem ilia10 spe-
cies est apud Peripateticos quam peperit intellectus, nisi scintilla
quaedam, turn simulacri illius quod a rebus collegerat phantasia,
turn virtutis illius agentis per quam mens illam peperit f Quid au-
tem nostra mens est, nisi scintilla quaedam mentis superioris?
Ergo species ilia ita nostrae menti infunditur, ut scintilla rerum
scintillae mentis superioris, et ut circulus ille splendidus solis lu-
mini cuius radio fuerat procreatus. Quapropter ex mente atque
specie ita fit unum, ut ex duabus scintillis una coniunctis flamma
una, sive duarum candelarum radiis unum lumen, sive ex circulo
illo splendido et lumine solis fulgor unus. Quod autem per spe-
ciem ita sempiternis unitur, fit sine controversia sempiternum, ea
praesertim ratione quod intellectus forsitan intelligendo non modo
cum re aeterna intellecta coniungitur, sed ille quoque res ipsa est
aeterna quae intellegitur. Idem enim radius est quodammodo qui
ab alto verberat aquam, qui fulget in aqua, qui in aerem repercuti-
tur, ubi in seipsum refusus, si videndi vim nanciscatur, videbit sta-
tim fulgorem ilium suum qui redundavit ab aqua. Idem faciet si ab
auro resultaverit vel argento. Semper enim fulgorem suum videbit,
licet variis modis affectum pro obiectorum varietate a quibus fuerit
repercussus.
5 Si exemplum convenientius de duabus illis viribus intellectus et
hac unione desideramus, consideremus muscipulae11 oculum, in
quo paene sicut in mente nostra duae sunt vires. Est in eo vitrea
208
BOOK X I • C H A P T E R III
united with the wall, because the nature of the reflected light is
too different from that of the walL But if the reflection strikes a
mirror, it will be more intimately united with the mirror. Finally, if
it darts back to the light of the sun, which had dispatched the ray
creating the circle of light, then it will be completely united to it.
For the Peripatetics what is the species that the intellect has given
birth to but a spark both of that image the phantasy has culled
from physical objects, and of the active power via which the mind
produced it? And what is our mind but a spark of a higher mind?
So the species is imparted to our mind just as the spark of objects
is imparted to the spark of the higher mind, or the circle of light
to the light of the sun by whose ray it had been created. So from
the mind and the species comes a union, just as one flame results
from two sparks joined together, or a single light from the rays of
two tapers, or one splendor from the circle of reflected light and
the light of the sun. No one can dispute that what is united
through the species with things eternal is made itself eternal, espe-
cially when you consider that the intellect, in the act of under-
standing perhaps, is not only united with the eternal understood
object, but is itself too the eternal object which is being under-
stood. For in a sense it is the same ray which strikes the water
from above, which sparkles on the water, and which is reflected
back into the air; and there, having been poured back into itself,
and if it could acquire the power of seeing, it would immediately
see its own dazzling brightness which has bounced off the water. It
would do the same, if it reflected off gold or silver. For it will al-
ways be seeing its own brightness, even though that brightness has
been affected in various ways in accordance with the variety of ob-
jects from which it has been reflected.
If we wish for an example that is more appropriate for the two 5
powers of the intellect and this union, let us consider the eye of a
mousing cat in which two powers are present more or less as is the
case in our mind. The eye has the transparency of glass and it has
209
perspicuitas, est et scintilla. Ilia vis capax; haec agens. Scintilla

nocte emicat foras, trahit coloris12 huius aut illius imaginem a cor-
poribus ipsi oppositis, imprimit earn virtuti perspicuae,13 quae per
earn corpus obiectum perspicit. Immo fortasse non tam corpus op-
positum perspicit quam sui ipsius radium, qui explicatus fuit et re-
plicatus, et quando replicabatur, resilivit in oculum, iam pictus
imagine corporis. Ideo licet cernere videatur modo hunc colorem,
modo ilium, semper tamen seipsum cernit quodammodo, sed va-
rio modo a variis coloribus refulgentem. Quid prohibet virtutem
illam agentem, quae nostrae mentis est radius, in aliis et aliis
phantasiae simulacris aliter et aliter emicantem, inde reflecti in se-
metipsam, seque videre diverso modo affectam pro diversitate si-
mulacrorum? Ubi species ilia sive ratio, quam intellegimus absolu-
tam atque perpetuam, nihil est forte aliud quam radius intellectus
reflexus in semetipsum. Qui tunc facile seipsum animadvertit
quando in simulacra sese dirigit, sicut vultus se non videt nisi in-
tueatur in speculum, unde etiam varius repercutitur pro speculo-
rum ipsorum varietate, quemadmodum et mentis radius a simula-
cris pro diversitate simulacrorum divers<i>us reverberatur in
mentem. Sed de his14 absolutius in sequentibus.
: III :
Obiectio Epicuri et responsio,

quod species innatae sunt menti•
i Negabit fortisan Epicurus species illas quas quotidie concipit in-

tellectus esse perpetuas, quia et esse incipiant quando pariuntur, et
desinant quando mandantur oblivioni. Nos autem ex Platonis nos-
210
a spark. The first is its receptive power, the second its active. At
night the spark shoots out of the eye, selects the image of one
color or another from the bodies in front of it, and imprints the
image on the transparent receptive power, which through it per-
ceives the body in front of it. Or rather, it perceives not the body
in front so much as its own ray, which was beamed out and then
retracted, and, as it was being retracted, it leaped, adorned now
with a body's image, back into the eye. So though it seems to be
seeing now this color and now that, yet it is in a sense seeing itself,
but itself blazing in a varying way and in various colors. What pre-
vents that active power which is our mind's ray from shining out
in different ways in the phantasy's different images and thence,
having been reflected onto itself, from seeing itself variously
affected according to the diversity of the images? Here that species
or rational principle, which we understand as being immaterial
and everlasting, is nothing other perhaps than the ray of the intel-
lect reflected on itself. It easily recognizes itself [only] at the mo-
ment when it directs its attention to images, just as a face does not
see itself unless it gazes into a mirror, and it is also variously re-
flected according to the variety of the mirrors. Similarly, the
mind's ray is diversely reflected back into the mind from images
and likenesses and in accordance with their diversity. I shall give a
fuller account of these matters in the following pages.
: III :
Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal

The species are innate in the mind•
Perhaps Epicurus will deny that these species which the intellect I
daily conceives are everlasting on the grounds that they come into
being when they are brought to birth and cease to exist when they
211
tri sententia satis in hoc habere putamus, quod species illae, si nas-
cuntur, a rationibus animi perpetuis pariuntur et ideas super ani-
mum referunt sempiternas.
2 Ratio prima, Profecto sentire et intellegere, quia vitales opera-
tiones sunt, a principio vitali intrinsecoque proficiscuntur, princi-
pio inquam activo. Sunt enim operationes quaedam viventibus et
carentibus vita communes, ut generatio, alteratio, mutatio loci. Ea
quae vita carent operationes huiusmodi patiuntur potius quam
agant. Non enim se ullo modo generant aut alterant aut mutant
loco. Viventia vero eas in seipsis agunt, quia sese nutriendo augen-
doque alterant et generant aliquid in seipis, et iudicando appeten-
doque locum mutant. Si natura viventia ad proprias actiones
melius instruere debet quam ad communes (melius autem
instructum est quod est agens quam quod patiens) atque ad com-
munes operationes eis activum principium tradidit, multo magis
ad proprias actiones, sensum videlicet intellegentiamque, sic ilia
disposuit ut agerent per eas magis quam paterentur. Quapropter
neque mens neque etiam sensus, ut pluribus placet Platonicorum,
ut percipiat quicquam ab extrinsecis formatur corporibus. Sed
quemadmodum pars vivifica per insita semina alterat, generat, nu-
trit et auget, ita interior sensus et mens per formulas innatas
quidem et ab extrinsecis excitatas omnia iudicant. Neque aliud
quicquam est hoc iudicium quam transitus formulae a potentia
quadam in actum. Non enim debet operatio ulla agentis transcen-
dere limites. Vitalis igitur et intus permanens operatio non est ab
extrinseco principio vita carente, sed ab intrinseco et vitali. Si-
gnum vero quod sensus interior est admodum efficax, inde capitur
212
BOOK XI • C H A P T E R III
are given over to oblivion.4 I believe a sufficient retort to this, fol-

lowing our Plato's view,5 is that, if these species are born, they are
produced by the souls eternal rational principles and refer indeed
to the eternal ideas above the soul
The first proof. Sensation and understanding, being vital oper- 2
ations, surely proceed from a vital and internal principle — from
an active principle that is. For certain activities are common to
both living beings and to objects wanting life, such as generation,
change of state, and change of place. Lifeless objects are subject to
these activities; they do not perform them. For in no way do they
generate themselves or change their state or place. But living crea-
tures do perform them in themselves, since they change their state
by nourishing and growing themselves, and they generate some-
thing in themselves, and change place by choosing and desiring. If
nature ought to equip living creatures better for their own particu-
lar than for common activities (and an agent is better equipped
than a patient), and if nature has given them an active principle
for their shared activities, a fortiori it must have designed them for
their own activities, namely sensation and understanding, in order
that through them they might act more than be acted upon.
Wherefore neither the mind, nor even the sense as most
Platonists believe, in order to perceive anything is formed by exter-
nal bodies. But just as the life-giving part [of the soul] brings
about change, generates, nourishes, and causes growth by means
of inborn seeds, so the internal sense and the mind make all their
judgments by means of innate formulae, and yet aroused by exter-
nal objects. Judgment indeed is nothing other than the formula's
passage from some potency into act. For no activity should exceed
the limits of its agent. Thus a vital activity that remains internal
does not proceed from a principle that is external and lacking life,
but from one that is internal and vital. The proof that the inner
sense is a more effective agent derives from the fact that it com-
pounds, divides, proceeds discursively, and at will directs the body
213
quod componit, dividit, discurrit, suoque affectu vertit corpus in

contrarias qualitates. Signum quod mens sit maxime efficax, a
Boetio contra Stoicos hinc accipitur, quod ultra ilia quae facit sen-
sus, ipsa praeter obiectorum naturam15 universales excogitat regu-
las, descendit componendo, ascendit et resolvendo, ac sese referens
sibi veris falsa redarguit. Denique cum rem eandem aliae vires
animae aliter iudicent (aliter enim imaginatio sive phantasia, aliter
ratio iudicat), consentaneum est ut iudicium ipsum iudicantis for-
mam naturamque sequatur, non iudicati. Et quia iudicium iudi-
cantis actus existit, probabile est ut quisque iudex operam suam
non ex aliena, sed ex propria potestate perficiat.
3 Ratio secunda. Sed ut revertamur ad mentem: sicut simulacra
singularium a corporibus phantasiae non inuruntur, ut etiam pro-
bavimus alias, ita universalium species a simulacris non signantur
in mente, sed ita mens illas per vim suam efficit, sicut phantasia
fingit simulacra per seipsam. Quo enim pacto simulacrum (quod
etiam phantasma vocatur) rem aliquam procreabit seipso liberio-
rem et ampliorem? Ipsum quidem singulare est et materiae condi-
tionibus est astrictum; species vero, quia universalis est, ideo libe-
rior est et amplior. Si non fit species haec (quae etiam universale
nuncupatur) a simulacris, multo minus fit a rebus externis, quae
non possunt per aliud medium formare mentem, quam per simu-
lacra. Rursus unius spiritalisque speciei unam esse oportet causam
spiritalem vel saltern unitam et spiritali modo ordinatam. Singula
vero quae extrinsecus sunt, plurima sunt et corporea. Atqui nul-
lum illorum, per se acceptum, cum propriae16 solum corporalisque
naturae sit, speciem procreabit incorpoream et naturae communis
significatricem. Sed neque etiam omnia singularia simul iuncta is-
tud efficient (sparsa enim sunt), neque ordinem aliquem talem
214
towards contrary qualities. And the proof that the mind is the
most effective agent is provided by Boethius in his argument
against the Stoics6 to the effect that, over and beyond what the
sense does, the mind formulates general rules which transcend the
nature of objects: it moves downwards in compounding and up-
wards in resolving, and by referring to itself uses the true to reject
the false. Lastly, given that the soul's different powers judge the
same thing in different ways (for the imagination or phantasy
judges in one way, the reason in another), we can agree that judg-
ment itself follows the form and nature of the power judging not
of the thing being judged. And because judgment is an act of the
power judging, the probability is that each judge performs his task
not through someone else's power but through his own.
The second proof. Let us return to the subject of mind. Just as 3
the images of individual objects are not branded on the phantasy
by bodies, as we have also shown elsewhere, so the species of uni-
versal are not imprinted on the mind by images. The mind makes
them through its own power, just as the phantasy fashions images
through itself. For how will an image (which is also called a phan-
tasm)7 create something that is freer and more extensive than it-
self? It is singular itself and limited by the conditions of matter;
but a species, being universal, is accordingly freer and more exten-
sive. If a species (which is also called a universal) does not derive
from images, much less does it derive from external objects, which
cannot inform the mind through any other means except through
images. Again the cause of a species, which is one and consists of
spirit, must itself be one and consist of spirit, or at least must be
united and ordered in a spiritual way. But individual, externally
derived objects are a corporeal multitude. And yet not one of them
taken in itself, since it is of a particular only and of a corporeal na-
ture, will beget an incorporeal species, the signifier of a common
nature. Nor will they even do so if they are all individually joined
together (for they are separate from each other); and they do not
215
habent, ut talia subnexa aliis unam seriem digerant causarum.

Idcirco sicut lapidum coniunctione unum quiddam simplex non
fit, sed cumulus, ita per singularium turbam fiet forte quaedam si-
mulacrorum confusio potius quam una species atque simplex.
4 Praeterea, in quolibet singulari tria reperiuntur, natura speciei,
accidentia quae non sunt necessaria speciei, et ipsum ex utrisque
compositum, ut in Socrate est humanitas quae natura speciei voca-
tur, est albedo talis talisque figura, quae forte accidunt speciei et
adventitia nominantur; ex utrisque Socratis persona componitur.
Numquid ab his personis imprimitur in mente species ilia com-
munis, quae est omnium hominum aequalis similitudo? Certe ex
accidentibus personarum non imprimetur; referret enim hominis
accidentia, non substantiam. Neque etiam ex ipsa natura quae su-
biicitur accidentibus; ilia enim non tota persona alicuius est homi-
nis, sed pars eius. Ideo17 natura talis de nullo homine enuntiatur.
Quis dixerit; Socrates est humanitas? Dicimus autem Socratem
esse hominem. Homo igitur enuntiatur de Socrate, de Socrate in-
quam to to, non de humanitate solum vel accidentibus. De Platone
toto similiter atque aliis omnibus. Ubi apparet hominem ipsum
quem mens nostra communiter enuntiat de integris quibusque
personis, in seipsa conceptum multo ampliorem esse hac vel ilia
personae cuiusque natura. Quod vero comprehendit aliud et am-
plius est, non fit ab eo quod et comprehenditur et est angustius,
praesertim cum natura ilia fiat in singulis hominibus singularis.
Quod autem singulare factum est, non creat universale.
5 Sed numquid ab integris cunctisque personis species ilia nobis
infer tur? Nequaquam. Quippe innumerabiles personas aeque ilia
216
possess any order such that so joined to others they may constitute
a single chain of causes. Wherefore, just as no one simple entity
emerges from the piling up of stones, merely a heap, so the result
of a crowd of individual objects will be a chance jumble of images
and likenesses rather than one simple species.
Furthermore, in every individual object we discover three 4
things: the nature of the species, the accidents that are not neces-
sary to the species, and the object itself compounded from both.
For instance, in Socrates dwells human nature which we call
the nature of the species; there is his whiteness and such and such
a shape which are chance additions to the species and called
accidentals; and the person of Socrates is compounded from the
two together. Can we really believe that from such individual per-
sons the common species, which is the shared likeness of all men,
is imprinted on the mind? It will certainly not be imprinted from
these persons' accidents, for then it would refer to a man's acci-
dents, not his substance. Nor will it be imprinted from the nature
itself that is subject to the accidents; for that is not the whole
person of some man, but a part of him. That is why such a nature
tells us nothing about any one particular man at all. [For] who
would declare Socrates is human nature? But we do say, Socrates
is a man. Hence the term "man" points to Socrates, the whole
of Socrates, not just to his human nature or his accidents. The
same applies to the whole of Plato and all the others. This shows
that the term "man," which our mind uses as a general term for
all complete persons, conceived in itself is much broader than a
given person's particular nature. What comprehends another and
is broader is not fashioned by that which is itself comprehended
and narrower, especially since human nature is made singular in
individual human beings. But what has been made singular does
not create the universal.
But do we derive the species from all persons taken as a whole? 5
The answer is no; for the species refers equally to an unlimited
217
species respicit. Innumerabiles vero nusquam inspeximus, neque

ex quibusdam personis accepimus earn, quae infinitas insuper alias
comprehendit. Neque potest ullus satis tuto a quibusdam singula-
ribus regulam communem perscribere;18 falleretur enim quisquis
id tentaret. Perinde ac si quis cum sola terrae animalia considera-
ret atque ilia videret spirare, animal omne spirare concluderet.
Cum igitur species neque a singularibus personis neque ab earum
simulacris generetur, reliquum est ut fiat ab intellects Intellectus
earn non generat ex phantasmate vel in phantasmate. Phantasma
enim, quia et in essendo et in significando singulare est, si fieret
materia locusve speciei, earn redderet similiter singularem. Cete-
rum dubium est, num ipsam generet per phantasma tamquam per
causam mediam inter intellectum et speciem generandam. Quod
quidem fieri non posse ex hoc opinamur quod causa media et
effectui proxima cum effectu magis quam remotior causa convenit,
ut in hominis generatione, quia sol per hominem medium generat
hominem, magis homo generans cum homine genito quam ipse
sol congruit. Si igitur phantasma esset proxima causa speciei, spe-
cies phantasmati similior quam intellectui nasceretur. Hinc duo
sequerentur absurda. Unum, quod species huiusmodi statim nata,
phantasma ipsum et phantasiam,19 utpote sibi propinquiora, ascis-
ceret tamquam naturalem sedem potius quam intellectum. Alte-
rum, quod et si earn intellectus acciperet, per talem speciem intel-
legeret singulare aliquid et magis et prius quam universale. Ilia
siquidem singulare nuntiaret in primis, quia esset phantasmati sin-
gulari cognatior.
6 Neque audiendi sunt illi qui phantasma inter intellectum et
speciem quasi instrumentum aliquod interponunt. Nonne virtus
218
BOOK X I • C H A P T E R III
number of persons. But we have never seen an unlimited number

of persons, nor have we derived from particular people the species
which includes numberless others besides. Nobody can with toler-
able safety lay down a general rule on the basis of particular in-
stances; for anyone who tried to do so would be in error. For in-
stance, if someone were to consider terrestrial animals alone and
saw them breathe, he would conclude that every animal breathed.
Since then the species is not generated from individual persons
nor from their images, the only remaining possibility is that it
comes from the intellect. The intellect does not generate it from a
phantasm or in a phantasm. For a phantasm, since it is singular in
its being and signifying, would similarly make the species singular
were it to become matter or the seat of the species. There is still
the question whether the intellect generates the species through
the phantasm as through a cause midway between itself and the
species to be generated. In my view this cannot be, given that a
cause that is intermediate and proximate to the effect must have
more in common with the effect than a cause that is more remote.
In human generation for instance, because the sun generates man
through the medium of a man, the begetting man has more in
common with the begotten man than the sun does. So if the
phantasm were the proximate cause of the species, the species
would be born more like the phantasm than like the intellect.
Two absurd consequences would follow: one, that such a species
directly it was born would claim the phantasm itself and the
phantasy as its natural seat, rather than the intellect, because they
would be closer to it; and two, that even if the intellect did receive
the species, then it would understand some singular thing through
this species better than and prior to a universal. For the species,
because it would be more closely related to the singular phantasm,
would announce the singular first.
Nor should we lend an ear to those who interpose the phan- 6
tasm as a kind of instrument between the intellect and the species.
219
mentis agens cum capace magis congruit quam phantasmal Quo

igitur pacto agens capacem per extraneum phantasma formabit,
cum oporteat instrumentum formationis inter formatorem atque
formabile interponi; phantasma vero extraneum inter duas illas vi-
res invicem germanas nequeat interponi? Quamobrem intellectus,
quando formam illam creat, neque ex simulacro neque in simula-
cra neque per simulacrum procreat. Forte vero radium aliquem
seu vim inserit simulacro phantasiae, per quam ipsum simulacrum
tamquam formator mentis formam huiusmodi generat (quam
speciem vocamus intellegibilem) ? Sed neque hoc fieri posse puta-
mus. Nempe vis ilia suscepta simulacro iisdem20 materiae condi-
tionibus astringetur quibus simulacrum, Itaque formam intellegi-
bilem quae ab illis conditionibus est absoluta non generabit. Ac si
quis dixerit formam illam modo absoluto capi ab intellectu, quam-
vis phantasma ipsam non creaverit absolutam, ex hoc ipso nos
concludemus quod exoptamus in primis: intellectum non subiici
phantasiae tamquam formabile formatori, postquam praestantiore
modo formas habet quam ipsa tribuere valeat. Quo fit ut forma in-
tellectuals, si nascitur, a solo intellectu nascatur et sine medio. Si
enim mens formam illam generat et generando earn in se absque
medio suscipit, certe per se gignit illam et gignit alio nullo interce-
dente. Ex omnibus his concluditur intellectum formare seipsum.
Et quoniam si esset prorsus informis, seipsum formare non posset,
necesse est ante eas formas vel notiones, quas per omnem aetatem
paene momentis singulis in se parit, latere in animi penetralibus
formas alias animo naturales, totidem numero quot sunt in mundo
220
Surely the active power of the mind has more in common with its
receptive power than a phantasm has. How then will the active
power use an extraneous phantasm to form the receptive power,
since that would require the instrument of forming being inter-
posed between what forms and the formable, and the extraneous
phantasm cannot be interposed between two such twin powers? It
follows that the intellect, when it creates the form, produces it nei-
ther from an image nor in an image nor through an image. Per-
haps it sows some ray or power in the phantasy's image, which en-
ables the image as the mind's form-giver to generate a form of this
kind (which we call the intelligible species)? But we think this too
is impossible. For the power received by the image would be con-
strained by the same material conditions as the image itself. So it
would not generate the intelligible form that is totally free from
these conditions. And if anyone suggests that the form is received
by the intellect absolutely, even though the phantasm did not cre-
ate it as absolute, we shall then conclude what we were intending
to prove in the first place: namely, that the intellect is not subject
to the phantasy, as the formable to what bestows form, since it
possesses forms in a manner superior to that in which the
phantasy is able to confer them. Consequently the intellectual
form, if it is born, is born from the intellect alone without an in-
termediary. For if the mind generates the intellectual form and in
doing so receives it in itself without an intermediary, then it cer-
tainly gives birth to it on its own and gives birth without any in-
termediary at all. The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that
the intellect forms itself. And since if it were entirely formless it
could not form itself, then, prior to these forms or conceptions
which it gives birth to in itself throughout its existence almost
minute by minute, there must necessarily lie hidden within the re-
cesses of the rational soul other forms that are natural to this soul;
and they must be equal in number to the species of created objects
221
rerum species creatarum, quibus possit formas illarum specierum

intellegibiles parere*
7 Ratio tertia* Certae namque res certis egent seminibus* Non fa-
cit natura ex quolibet quaelibet; non facit ex nihilo aliquid* Idcirco
non potest essentia animae, quae et una est ac ferme omnia respi-
cit aeque, multas et varias specie formas producere et alias aliis
temporibus, nisi per plures formulas insitas specie differentes, qui-
bus aliis temporibus alias potius quam alias procreet21 aut promat*
8 Ratio quarta* Has enim saepenumero, etiam nulla consulta-
tione vel voluntate antecedente, solo quodam naturali instinctu re-
pente promit in lucem* Effectus vero qui naturali fiunt ordine, for-
mam praeferunt talem qualem causae possident* Calida enim ab
igne fiunt calente, quia causa quae ex suo esse aliquid efficit natu-
raliter, talem (licet inferiori modo) effectum facit qualis est ipsa*
Mens igitur, quae per suum esse naturaliter generat universales re-
rum omnium species, in ipsa quoque sua essentia ab origine nacta
videtur universales species omnium, ut similia similibus generen-
tur* Nam si illarum specierum una est efficiens causa, scilicet intel-
lectus, et subiectum unum, intellectus scilicet idem, nulla ratio as-
signari potest cur multae et differentes fiant secundum speciem,
nisi quia intellectus per diversas rationes sibi naturales eas promit
diversas* Non enim sufficit ad hanc varietatem efficiendam22 simu-
lacrorum diversitas, quae nihil ad hanc fabricam aliud afferunt,
quam occasionem aliquam operandi, dum per illorum praesentiam
mens ad promendas species excitatur* Hoc autem nihil aliud est
quam rationes illas otiosas reddere promptiores*
9 Ratio quinta* Proinde si divina mens, idearum omnium plena,
per essentiam suam adeo plenam absque medio animam procreat,
222
• BOOK X * C H A P T E R VIII •
that exist in the world, and by them the soul must be able to give
birth to the intelligible forms of those species.
The third proof. Particular entities require particular seeds. 7
Nature does not make anything from just anything, and it does
not make something from nothing. The essence of soul, which is
one and looks to all things almost equally, cannot therefore pro-
duce multiple forms varying in species some at one time, others at
another, except by means of the many innate formulae, which vary
in species and by which it may create or produce various forms at
various times.
The fourth proof. [Soul] often suddenly brings these forms to 8
light even without any preceding deliberation or act of will but
merely through some kind of natural instinct. But effects that
come about in the natural order of things display the same form as
that possessed by their causes. Things are made hot by fire heating
them, since a cause that produces an effect naturally as a result of
its own being produces an effect (though in an inferior manner)
that is like itself. Mind, therefore, which naturally generates the
universal species of all things through its own being, in its own es-
sence too seems to have originally possessed the universal species
of all things in order for it to generate like from like. For if there is
one efficient cause of these species, namely the intellect, and one
subject, again the intellect, then we can assign no reason why they
become plural and different as species, unless it is because the in-
tellect produces them as different species by means of the different
rational principles that are natural to it. For the diversity of images
is not sufficient to produce this variety, as they bring nothing to
the production other than an occasion for operating, when the
mind is stimulated through the presence of the images into pro-
ducing the species. But this is nothing else but rousing those quiet
rational principles to greater readiness.
The fifth proof. If the divine mind, which is filled with all the 9
Ideas, through this fullness of its essence begets the soul without
223
oportet animam inde idearum plenam effluere. Nempe Deus cum

in efficienda anima a nullo prorsus impediatur, tam perfectam effi-
cit, quam perfecta in tali genere ilia effici potest. Perfectior certe
prodit, si in provinciam tam difficilem notionum plena descendat
quam si vacua. Est autem notionum capax ab initio ex ea parte qua
cum angelis convenit. Sicut enim ex parte sua temporali habet ut
continue quaerendo discurrat, sic ex aeterna ut possederit < notio-
nes> ab initio, praesertim cum ipsa propinquior Deo sit quam
prima materia. Ideoque si materia omnes inde species accipit et,
cum primum parata est, capit, necesse est animam quoque omnes
suscipere. Parata vero est anima ad omnes suscipiendas cum pri-
mum a Deo accipit esse. Siquidem eius essentia simplex est et23
stabilis supra tempus, ideoque24 non potest augeri aut per tempora
paratior fieri. Quod ita cecinit Zoroaster:
SvfjLfioXa TrarptKos voo<$ ecrireipev TOLLS TFOXAIS25
id est: 'Paterna mens inseruit animabus coniecturalia signa.' Et

Orpheus ita:
Yidvra yap IIPCOT€L 7rp(orr] (f>v<ri<; eyKareOiqKev
ita est: 'Omnia enim Proteo prima natura indidit.' Theologia or-
phica Proteum appellat essentiam tertiam, animarum rationalium
sedem. Archytas quoque Tarentinus in libro De sapientia: 'Homi-
nem,' inquit, sapientissimum cunctorum animantium esse natum,
quippe cui Deus rerum omnium ideas infiiderit, per quas mente
valeat notiones rerum non aliter procreare quam ore per linguam
rerum nominafingere/Haec ille.
10 Ratio sexta. Profecto (ut platonice loquar) in materia formarum
omnium suscipiendarum latent inchoationes. In natura quoque
per quam ad formas movetur materia, formarum semina delites-
cunt. Unde in complexione arboris naturali clauditur semen ad ar-
borem similem propagandam. In semine arbor generanda tota
concluditur. Idem accidit in complexione naturali et semine ani-
224
an intermediary, then the soul must issue from the divine mind
full of the Ideas. Of course, since God is impeded by absolutely no
one in creating the soul, He makes it as perfect as anything in this
kind can be. The soul certainly issues with greater perfection if it
descends laden with rather than empty of conceptions into its ex-
ceedingly difficult sphere of action. From the beginning it is capa-
ble of conceptions that issue from the part it has in common with
the angels. For just as it owes to its temporal part its unending
search via discursive reasoning, so it owes to its eternal part its
possession from the onset [of conceptions], especially since it is
closer to God than prime matter is. And so, if matter receives all
the species from God, and accepts them as soon as it has been
prepared for them, it must follow that the soul can receive them all
too. But the soul is prepared to receive them all as soon as it re-
ceives its being from God. For its essence is simple and at rest and
outside time, so it cannot grow or become better prepared over
time. Zoroaster sang to this effect, "The paternal mind sowed the
inferential signs in souls,"8 and Orpheus intoned, "Prime nature
imparted all things to Proteus."9 Orphic theology calls Proteus the
third essence, the seat of rational souls. Archytas of Tarentum too,
in his book On Wisdom, says: "Man was born the wisest of all crea-
tures, because God implanted in him the ideas of all things, and
he can use them to create the conceptions of things in [his] mind
in the same way as he uses his tongue to fashion the names of
things in his mouth."10 Thus Archytas.
The sixth proof. To put it Platonically, in matter the inchoate 10
origins for receiving all the forms lie hidden. In nature too, by
means of which matter is moved towards the forms, the seeds of
the forms lie hidden away. Hence in the natural composition or
temperament of a tree is hidden the seed for propagating another
similar tree. In the seed is enclosed the whole of the tree to be gen-
erated. The same happens in the natural temperament and seed of
an animal. So in the part of the soul which nourishes the body,
225
malis. Igitur in ea parte animae quae alit corpus et natura utitur

velut instrumento ad movendam formandamque materiam, insunt
(et multo quidem praestantius) formarum omnium rationes, ut ex
ratione capitis quae in anima est, exoriatur semen illud capitis
quod est in natura; ex hoc autem semine pullulet forma haec
capitis quae conspicitur in materia, atque idem fiat in pectore,
brachiis membrisque ceteris. Si pars haec infima animae fecunda26
est formatque ipsa corpora et a corporibus non formatur et forma-
rum generandarum continet rationes, numquid mens, quae pars
est animae summa, sterilis erit? Aut solum formabitur a corpori-
bus? Aut carebit rationibus ad species producendas? Nullo pacto.
Immo vero sicut pars infima quae singulis corporibus proxima est,
per insitas sibi ab origine rationes singula gignit et corporalia, ita
mens, quae incorporalibus ac penitus absolutis mentibus proxima
est, rationes inde insertas habet, per quas producat species illas a
corporum passionibus absolutas.
11 Septima ratio. Sic enim anima inter divina et corporalia me-
dium obtinebit, si utrorumque particeps apparebit habebitque
intus utrarumque formarum, et intellegibilium et sensibilium,
rationes.
12 Octava ratio. Neque decet earn corporibus esse deteriorem.
Ergo si corpora ante adventitias qualitates qualitates possident na-
turales, multo magis animus formulas habet in mente proprias an-
tequam excipiat peregrinas.27 Duplex materiae communitas conve-
nit: naturalis et adventitia. Naturalis est natura ilia in qua singula
sub eadem specie invicem congruunt, sicut humanitas in qua sin-
guli congruunt homines, quae communitas, ut plerique putant,
perpetua est et singulis quibusque praestantior. Adventitia est no-
226
and which uses nature as an instrument for setting matter in mo-

tion and giving it form, are present in a much superior way the ra-
tional principles of all the forms. From the rational principle of the
head that is in the soul, for instance, comes the seed of the head
that is in nature. From this seed, however, springs the form of the
head that is seen in matter; and the same thing happens in the
case of the chest, arms, and other parts of the body. If this lowest
part of the soul is productive and forms the bodies and is not
formed by them, and if it contains the rational principles for gen-
erating forms, are we to suppose that mind, which is the highest
part of the soul, will be barren? Or will it only be formed by bod-
ies? Or will it lack the rational principles for producing the spe-
cies? Quite the reverse. Or rather, just as the lowest part, which is
closest to individual bodies, uses the rational principles innate in
itself from the beginning to bring forth individuals and corporeals,
so the mind, which is closest to the incorporeal and absolutely free
minds, has rational principles implanted in it from the beginning,
and through them it can produce from the passive conditions of
bodies the species which are absolutely free.
The seventh proof. The soul will occupy a midway position be- n
tween the divine and the corporeal if it is going to appear a partici-
pant of both and have within itself the rational principles of both
types of form, the intelligible and the sensible.
The eighth proof. It is notfittingfor the soul to be worse than 12
bodies. So if bodies possess natural qualities prior to adventitious
qualities, then a fortiori the rational soul must have its own proper
formulae in its mind before receiving external ones. The commu-
nity or universality proper to [corporeal] matter is twofold: natu-
ral and adventitious. The natural consists of that nature whereby
individuals in the same species are in accord with each other, as
with human nature whereby individual men are in accord; and this
natural universality is, in the view of most, everlasting and supe-
rior to the individual instances. But the adventitious universality is
227
tio ilia universalis, quam de naturali communitate mens cogitat,

singulis quibuscumque seclusis. Quae non modo quoad materiam
spectat28 adventitia est, sed quoad mentem. Si ante hanc adventi-
tiam communitatem materia possidet alteram naturalem, mens
quoque materia melior ante hanc alteram similiter possidet. Opor-
tet enim communem formam in mente aliquam praestantiorem
esse quam in materia. Est autem naturalis perfectior quam contin-
gens. Igitur oportet inesse menti communes formas ante illas quas
corporalium rerum fingit occursu. Saepe vero dum ingenitas for-
mas inspicimus, putamus propter inscitiam nos adventitias vel ex-
ternas prospicere, non aliter atque illi qui vel somno vel morbo
quodam cerebri oculorumve affecti arbitrantur se videre quaedam
extra suos oculos hue et illuc saepe volantia, quae tamen et versan-
tur et videntur intrinsecus.
13 Nona ratio. Cur bruta rebus singulis inspectis communem non
excogitant notionem, homo autem ex natura sua rationali qua dif-
fert a brutis, id agit, nisi quia ipsa sua natura sigillum possidet ta-
lium figurarum? Si enim formas procreat per naturam speciemque
propriam, eas profecto per naturam procreat formatricem. Natu-
ram vero talem carere quis dixerit characteribus?
14 Decima ratio. Praeterea, quando in scientiis perfectas demons-
trations conteximus, ex principiis quibusdam praestantioribus et
latioribus solemus de speciebus proprietates aliquas demonstrate.
In illis autem notionibus quae denuo finguntur ab animo, quae la-
tior est, ea est remotior a substantia. Proptereaque speciei notio ad
substantiam accedit propinquius quam notio generis. Quo fit ut
quae in illis minus communis est, ea praestantior iudicetur. Aliae
igitur notiones sunt in animo praeter istas quae latiores sunt simul
228
that universal conception which derives from the natural univer-

sality and which the mind ponders after it has excluded all individ-
uals whatsoever; and it is adventitious not only as regards matter,
but also as regards the mind. If matter possesses prior to this ad-
ventitious universality the other, the natural universality, then the
mind too, being superior to matter, likewise has the natural prior
to the adventitious universality. For any universal form in the
mind has to be superior to the form in matter. But the natural
[form] is more perfect than the contingent. So there must be uni-
versal forms present in the mind prior to those it fashions from
contact with corporeal objects. When we look at the innate forms,
we often think, through ignorance, that we see adventitious or ex-
ternal forms, just as people who are asleep or suffering from some
disease of the brain or eyes think they see objects often flitting
hither and thither in front of their eyes, when in fact they are
flitting about within and being seen within.
The ninth proof. Having looked at individual objects, why do 13
animals not think of a common conception, but man by virtue of
his rational nature (by which he differs from the animals) does
think of it, unless it is because his very own nature possesses the
imprint or stamp of such figures [or conceptions] ? For if he cre-
ates forms through his own nature and species, then he creates
them through an informing nature. But who would assert that
such a nature lacks the stamps or characters [of the forms] ?
The tenth proof. Furthermore, when we weave perfect demon- 14
strations together in the branches of learning, we normally dem-
onstrate particular properties with regard to the species by starting
from principles that are superior and more embracing. But with
the conceptions fashioned anew by the rational soul, the broader
the conception, the further removed it is from the substance. Con-
sequently the conception of the species is closer to the substance
than the conception of the genus. The result is that the less uni-
versal conception in these instances is adjudged the superior. So
229
atque praestantiores, ex quibus demonstratio vera conficitur* Quo-

niam vero demonstratio non ab universalibus tantum, sed ab uni-
versalibus causis proficiscitur, notiones autem quae menti innatae
sunt, non sunt demonstrati effectus causae, rursusque formae in
corporibus universales esse non possunt, sequitur ut super formas,
et quae in corporibus et quae in nostris mentibus sunt, quaerendae
sint formae aliae in mente divina omnium conditrice, quae univer-
sal es omnium causae sint* Quarum formulas humana mens habet,
ut per has tamquam causarum similitudines ad illas tamquam
effectuum causas conclusiones referat demonstrando* Sed alias
de ideis*
15 Undecima ratio* Atque haec ipsa demonstratio semper aliqua
nobis ignotiora ex propositionibus notioribus infert, illas rursus ex
aliis, quousque ad principia quaedam menti per se nota perveniat,
ne aut irritusfiatin infinitum progressus, aut ab eisdem ad eadem
retexatur circulus temerarius* Quae vero per se nota sunt menti,
per naturam mentis effulgent mentis aspectui* De singulis autem
speciebus rerum ex propriis earum principiis propriaefiuntde-
monstrationes, et in variis facultatibus variae* Igitur secundum va-
rias species et varias facultates adsunt menti diversa doctrinae
principia ex naturali mentis lumine cognita* In ipsis vero principiis
cuncta sequentia continentun Hinc efficitur ut animus per natu-
ram omnibus doctrinis abundet*
16 Duodecima ratio* Ut quemadmodum et arbores et animantes
earumque membra ex propriis seminibus pullulant, ita scientiae
ex intimis initiis oriantur, ne mens sit sterilior quam natura,
quae ex seminibus insitis suos foetus educit, non casus effundit
impulsibus*
230
other conceptions besides those that are simultaneously more em-

bracing and superior dwell in the soul, and out of them a valid
demonstration is constructed. But since a demonstration pro-
ceeds, not just from universals, but from universal causes, and yet
the conceptions which are innate in the mind are not the causes of
the effect being demonstrated, and since no universal forms can
exist in bodies, it follows that we must seek above the forms that
exist in bodies and in our minds for other forms existing in the di-
vine mind, the author of all things, forms which are the universal
causes of all. The human mind possesses their formulae so that
through these, the causes' likenesses so to speak, it can (in demon-
strating) refer conclusions to the universal causes as the causes of
effects. But I will discuss the Ideas elsewhere.
The eleventh proof. Scientific demonstration itself always infers 15
things less known to us from better known propositions, and these
in turn from others until we reach certain principles which are
self-evident to the mind; otherwise we would vainly proceed ad
infinitum, or circle thoughtlessly round and round through the
same things. Things known per se to the mind are set ablaze
in the mind's sight by the mind's nature. With regard to the indi-
vidual species of things, demonstrations proper to them derive
from their own principles and various ones from their various ca-
pabilities. So in accordance with the various species and their vari-
ous capabilities different disciplinary principles, known from the
mind's natural light, are present in the mind. But all subsequents
are contained within these principles. Hence it comes about that
the mind naturally abounds in all branches of knowledge.
The twelfth proof. As trees and living creatures and their parts 16
grow from their own seeds, so too the branches of learning arise
from inner origins, otherwise the mind would be more sterile than
nature which produces its offspring from inborn seeds, and does
not toss them out on a chance impulse.
231
17 Tertia decima ratio. Quando inter nos verum quaerimus inter-

rogando et respondendo, quomodo posset ad summam pervenire
quae concluditur ratio, nisi aliquid prius concederetur? Concedi
autem recte quid posset, quod nesciretur? Ita ista ratio, ut Augus-
tinus Aurelius inquit, nisi inveniret in nobis aliquid cognitum quo
innitens ad incognitum duceret, nihil omnino per illam discernere-
mus. Inest ergo nobis ante ratiocinationem intellegentia quaedam,
unde ratiocinatio sumat exordium.
18 Quarta decima ratio. Nonne ratiocinatio nostra mobilis est, et
dum veritatem29 inquirit, ab alio descendit30 in aliud, et quando
aliquid inventum examinat, in aliud ascendit ab alio? Motus vero
omnis a quiete sive stabili aliquo exorditur ac tendit ad stabile.
Motus autem huiusmodi notionum complexio est. Res vero quae-
libet principium habet proprium suumquefinem.Quapropter ra-
tiocinatio, quia notionum31 progressio est, in notiones reducitur,
quia mobilis, in aliquas stabiles notiones, quarum impulsu quaerat
quod cupit, indiciis inveniat quod quaesivit, luce examinet quod
invenit,firmitatequiescat inventis. Inde ergo coepit quaerendo, in
idem redit examinando. Sunt ergo in mente stabiles quaedam et
perpetuae notiones, quae et principia sunt etfinesratiocinandi.
19 Quinta decima ratio. Neque ratiocinandi solum, verumetiam
quomodocumque intellegendi. Nam sicut sensus qui per adventi-
tias formas, quae dicuntur accidentales, cognoscit semper, acciden-
tia quoque semper attingit, ut Platonici putant, ita converso mens,
quae essentias rerum definit, per essentiales formas intellegit. Et
quia sensus, qui fallacibus confidit rerum imaginibus et subito va-
nescentibus, saepe fallitur neque imaginem a re vera discernit, sed
232
- B O O K X I • C H A P T E R III •
The thirteenth proof. When we search for the truth amongst 17

ourselves by asking questions and answering them, how could
reason reach any final conclusion unless something prior was
granted? But what, if it were unknown, could be granted cor-
rectly? As Augustine tells us, unless this reason found something
in us already known, and used it as a basis to lead us towards the
unknown, we would learn nothing at all through reason.11 Present
in us, therefore, prior to reasoning, is an understanding which rea-
soning takes as its point of departure.
The fourteenth proof. Our reasoning is mobile, isn't it, and 18
when seeking truth, doesn't it descend from one thing to another,
and when examining what it has found, ascend from one thing to
another? All movement starts from a state of rest or from some-
thing at rest and moves towards what is at rest. But reasoning's
movement is a comprehending of conceptions. Now everything
has its own proper principle or starting point and its own end or
goal. So reasoning, because it is a progression out of conceptions,
is led back into conceptions; and, being mobile, it is led back to
certain stable conceptions through whose impulse it seeks what it
desires, through whose evidence itfindswhat it has been seeking,
through whose light it examines what it has found, and through
whose stability it comes to rest in things found. So whence it
started its search, thence it returns in its examination. Thus there
are certain stable and everlasting conceptions in the mind that are
the principles and goals of reasoning.
Thefifteenthproof. This is not only true of reasoning, but of 19
any kind of understanding. For just as the sense always acquires
knowledge through adventitious forms called "accidentals," and al-
ways makes contact with accidents too, as the Platonists believe,
so conversely the mind, which defines things' essences, acquires
knowledge by means of essential forms. Because the sense, which
puts its trust in things' images, which are deceptive and totally
ephemeral, is often deceived and does not distinguish between the
233
opus est ad hoc iudicio rationis. Idcirco mentem oportet essentiali-

bus, ut ita dixerim, rationibus inniti, ne ipsa quoque fallatur et iu-
dicio virtutis alicuius superioris indigeat.
Sexta decima ratio. Praeterea, si cognoscimus angelos, neque
eos nosse valemus per species a sensibus haustas (quae cum pen-
deant a corporibus, non referunt angelicas formas quae ad corpora
non declinant), sequitur ut eos per insitas species cognoscamus.
Quo enim pacto iudicamus angelos esse naturas non vergentes ad
corpora, nisi per species a corporibus minime dependentes?
Decima septima ratio. Denique inter cognitionem divinam et
sensitivam cognitio intellectuals est media, ergo et medias habet
conditiones. Deus cognoscit per essentiam suam immobilem, sen-
sus per mobiles qualitates, id est species peregrinas. Quapropter
mens cognoscet per qualitates immobiles, quae species innatae vo-
cantur. Ordo denique universi requirit ut quemadmodum purae
mentes in se respiciunt, sensus autem in alia solum, sic anima,
mentis sensusque particeps, non modo extra se formas, sed in se
quoque respiciat. Ubi autem Aristotelis more mentem dicere sole-
mus novas species procreare, possumus etiam proprius more plato-
nico dicere innatas species ex mentis penetralibus erui. Germana-
rum virium ea est natura ut se mutuo comitentur in operando,
sicut in existendo, et se vicissim suscitent ad agendum. Germanae
vires sunt olfactus et gustus, unde saepe animus per odoratum in-
vitatur ad gustum. Germanae concupiscendi virtus et irascendi na-
tura; facile igitur ex libidine irritamur ad iram. Germanitas etiam
oculorum facit ut ambo simul vertantur ad idem. Germanitas sen-
sus et phantasiae efficit ut operante sensu ad aliquid, ad idem ope-
retur et phantasia. Propter similem germanitatem, quando phanta-
234
BOOK X • C H A P T E R IX
image and the authentic object (for to do so needs the judgment of

the reason), so the mind needs to rely on what we might call the
essential rational principles, or else it too would be deceived and
need the judgment of some superior power*
The sixteenth proof* Furthermore, if we know the angels but
cannot know them via species derived from the senses (which, be-
ing dependent on bodies, do not refer to the angelic forms which
do not descend to bodies), then it follows that we know the angels
through innate species* For how could we adjudge that angels are
natures that do not descend into bodies except through species
that do not themselves depend on bodies?
The seventeenth proof* Next, half-way between divine and sen-
sory knowledge is intellectual knowledge; so it possesses the inter-
mediary conditions* God knows through His own unmoving es-
sence; the senses know through mobile qualities, that is, through
external species* So the mind will acquire knowledge through im-
mobile qualities that are called innate species* The ordering of the
universe requiresfinallythat just as pure minds look only to them-
selves, but the senses look only to other things, so soul, which
shares in both mind and sense, should look not only to forms out-
side itself but to those too inside itself* When we normally say, in
the Aristotelian way, that the mind creates new species,12 we could
also say more properly, in the Platonic way, that innate forms are
sparked from the innermost recesses of the mind*13 It is the nature
of sister powers to accompany each other in doing something just
as they do in existing together, and to arouse each other to action*
The smell and the taste are sister powers whence the soul through
the smell is often drawn towards the taste* The power of desiring
and the nature of being angry are sister powers; so we are easily
roused from desire to anger* That the eyes are twins means they
both turn together towards the same object* That the sense and
phantasy are sisters means that when the sense is working to some
end the phantasy is working for the same end* Because of a like
235
sia species suas profert in actum, mens quoque suas educit in

lucem. Non generantur proprie tunc mentis species, sed quae an-
gustius coarctabantur, patent latius etflorescunt;quae tepebant,
fervent; quae in solo mentis vertice per se lucebant, rutilant emi-
nus et in ratione quae mentem sequitur, iam facta sereniore, reful-
gent. Itaque quam Aristoteles creationem vocaret in speciebus,
Plato coruscationem cognominabit, per quam expergefactus ocu-
lus rationis speciebus mentis irradiatur. Prima ilia in mente corus-
catio intellegentia ipsa est; sequens irradiatio est ipsa rationis32
discursio. Per intellegentiam essentiae rerum definiuntur. Per ra-
tionem componuntur essentiae definitae et argumentations confi-
ciuntur. Veras autem definitiones essentiarum non potest mens
per accidentalia rerum simulacra fabricare, sed eas construit per
infiisas ab origine rerum omnium rationes.
22 Decima octava ratio. Infusas, inquam, a rationibus rerum quas
habet deus. Quae quidem in deo sunt ipsa dei essentia ab ipso
deo sub variis rationibus intellecta. Formae igitur omnium in deo
sunt, ibique nihil aliud sunt quam essentia ipsa dei, atque omnes
habitu simul et actu. Omnes quoque formae sunt in angelo. Non
quidem essentia ipsa sunt angeli, sed rationes quaedam essentiales,
id est quae semper essentiam comitantur. Ubi vigent habitu, simul
omnes et actu, quia, secundum omnes actu, omnia simul intellegit.
Praeterea sunt omnes in hominis intellectu, in quo etiam essentia-
les rationes cognominantur; habitu cunctae simul sicut in angelo,
non simul actu, quia non simul utitur universis. Propterea intellec-
tus infimus appellatur et materiae quodammodo similis, quia ta-
men est praestantior quam materia, ideo effectivo habitu formas
236
sisterly bond, when the phantasy brings its species into act, the
mind too brings its species into the light. Strictly speaking the
mind's species are not generated at that moment; rather those that
were narrowly constrained open out and blossom, those that were
luke-warm grow hot, and those that of themselves were only glow-
ing in the summit of the mind now blaze up as from afar, and are
reflected in the reason, rendered now more tranquil, that attends
the mind. So what Aristotle would call in the case of the species
"creation'14 Plato will call "coruscation"15; and through it the eye of
reason is roused and irradiated with the minds species. The prime
coruscation in the mind is understanding itself, the subsequent ra-
diation is the discursive movement of the reason. Through under-
standing things' essences are defined. Through the reason the de-
fined essences are woven together and arguments assembled. But
the mind cannot fashion true definitions of essences using the ac-
cidental images of things: it fashions them using the universal ra-
tional principles infused in it from the beginning.
The eighteenth proof. [If they are] infused, I say, by the univer- 22
sal rational principles which God Himself possesses, [then] the es-
sences in God are God's essence itself understood under various
rational principles by God Himself. Thus the forms of all things
are in God, and they are nothing there other than God's very es-
sence and all are simultaneously in habit16 and in act. All the
forms are also in the angel; they are not the essence itself of the
angel, but certain essential rational principles, in other words,
which always accompany the essence. In the angel they all flourish
simultaneously in habit and in act, because, in that they are all in
act, the angel understands all things simultaneously. Moreover, all
the forms are in man's intellect wherein too they are called the es-
sential rational principles; they are all simultaneously in habit as in
the angel, but not simultaneously in act, because the intellect does
not use them all at once. That is why the intellect is called "the
lowest" and like matter in some respects; yet being superior to
237
habet, quod materiae33 non conceditur* Qui habitus appellatur vis

mentis agens, quia sese confert ad actum; vis quoque capax, quia
suscipit actus perfectionem* Postremo omnes formae sunt in
materia* Ubi etiam rationes essentiales ideo nominantur, quia sunt
fomites sive habitudines quaedam sive respectus ad formas, essen-
tiam materiae perpetuo comitantes* Quae quidem formarum po-
tentiae sunt, potentiae inquam, capaces formarum, non efficaces,
et formae quodammodo ipsae, sed imperfectae* Unde omnes
quoque sunt in materia modo perpetuo, secundum quidem poten-
tiam, non tamen secundum efficacem habitum aut actum*34
23 Decima nona ratio* Quis neget animum statim a tenera aetate
vera, bona, honesta, utilia exoptare? Optat autem intellectus nul-
lus incognita* Ergo insunt35 istorum aliquae etiam antequam appe-
tat in animo notiones per quas, ceu formas rationesque ipsorum,
ea iudicat appetenda* Idem ab inquisitione et inventione probatur*
Si in turba hominum quaerat Socrates Alcibiadem, sitque ilium
aliquando inventurus, necesse est Socratis menti aliquam Alcibia-
dis figuram inesse, ut sciat quem hominum quaerat prae ceteris
atque inventum in coetu multorum Alcibiadem ab aliis discernere
valeat* Ita neque indagaret ea quatuor animus, neque aliquando in-
veniret, nisi haberet illorum (id est veritatis, bonitatis, honestatis,
utilitatis) aliquam notionem, per quam ilia quaereret inventurus,
ut quotiens invenit quae investigaverat, agnoscat atque ab eorum
discernat contrariis*
24 Neque solum ab appetitu, indagatione, inventione, sed etiam a
iudicio id probamus* Quicumque enim aliquem sibi amicum iudi-
cat vel inimicum, quid amicitia quidve malivolentia sit non igno-
238
matter, it possesses the forms "in effective habit/'17 and this is not
granted to matter. This habit is called the mind's active power, be-
cause it concerns itself with action; it is also called its receptive
power, because it receives the act's completion. Lastly, the forms
are all in matter. Here too they are called the essential rational
principles because they are like kindling awaiting the forms, or like
particular pre-dispositions for, or glances back towards, the forms;
and they perpetually accompany the essence of matter. They are
the potentialities for forms, by which I mean they are capable of
receiving the forms, but not of producing them: they are forms in
a way but imperfect forms. So all the forms always exist in matter
too, but potentially, not habitually or actually.
The nineteenth proof. Who would deny that the soul, from a 23
very early age, immediately desires the things that are true, good,
noble, and useful? But no intellect elects the unknown. So some
conceptions of these desiderata prior even to its desiring them are
present in the soul by means of which (as via their forms and ra-
tional principles) it judges them desirable. The same point is
proved in searching out and finding. If Socrates is looking for
Alcibiades in a crowd of men, and if he is ever going to find him,
then some shape of Alcibiades must be present in Socrates' mind,
so that he may know the man he is looking for from all the rest
and having found him in the press of the throng be able to distin-
guish Alcibiades from the others. The soul would never search for
those four [desiderata], and never find them, therefore, unless (a)
it possessed some conception of them, that is, of truth, goodness,
honor, and utility; and (b) it could use this conception to look for
them in the future, so that whenever it found the ideals it was
looking for it might recognize them and distinguish them from
their opposites.
We can prove the point not only from desire, searching, and 24
discovery, but from judgment as well. For whoever judges some-
one a friend or enemy to himself, cannot be ignorant of what
239
rat. Quonam igitur pacto multa vera vel falsa, bona vel mala, ut
solemus, quotidie iudicaremus et recte iudicaremus, nisi esset no-
bis Veritas quodammodo bonitasque ab initio cognita? Quomodo
rursus structurae, musicae, picturae et artium ceterarum opera,
necnon inventa philosophorum multi etiam in iis artibus non ver-
sati probarent saepenumero recte et reprobarent, nisi illarum re-
rum forma quaedam esset et ratio illis a natura tributa? Compara-
tio quoque idem nobis ostendit. Quicumque enim mel vino
comparans alterum altero pronuntiat dulcius, quis dulcis sit sapor
agnoscit; et qui Speusippum et Xenocratem conferens ad Plato-
nem, Xenocratem censet Platonis similiorem quam Speusippum,
Platonis figuram proculdubio novit. Eodem modo cum e multis
bonis aliud alio melius recte existimemus, et maiori minorive bo-
nitatis ipsius participatione aliud alio melius deteriusve appareat,
necesse est bonitatem non ignorare. Praeterea, cum e multis et di-
versis philosophorum aut etiam aliorum opinionibus, quae veri sit
similior et probabilior, saepe optime iudicemus, oportet non
deesse nobis aliquem veritatis intuitum, ut quae sint illius simi-
liora non nesciamus. Quapropter nonnulli in adolescentia, aliqui
etiam sine praeceptore plerique ex paucissimis doctrinae rudimen-
tis a praeceptoribus demonstratis, doctissimi evasisse traduntur.
Quod numquam nisi multum, ut diximus, iuvante natura fieri po-
tuisset. Hoc abunde Socrates Phaedoni, Menoni, Theaeteto ado-
lescentibus demonstravit, docuitque posse pueros recte in singulis
artibus respondere, si quis prudenter eos interroget, cum a natura
sint artium disciplinarumque omnium rationibus praediti.
240
friendship or enmity is. So how, as we usually do, could we daily

judge, and correctly judge, many things as true or false, good or
bad, unless truth and goodness were in a way known to us from
the beginning? And how with the works of architecture, music,
painting, and the rest of the arts, and even with the findings of the
philosophers, could many people even with no experience in these
arts both judge (often correctly) and censure, unless nature had
given them a form and rational principle of such works? Compari-
son too shows us the same thing. For whoever in comparing honey
to wine pronounces the one sweeter than the other is recognizing
which is the sweet taste; and he who compares Speusippus and
Xenocrates to Plato, and decides Xenocrates looks more like Plato
than Speusippus does, obviously knows what Plato looks like. In
the same way, when we estimate correctly that one good, out of a
whole number, is better than another, and that one thing appears
better or worse than another because it participates to a greater or
lesser extent in goodness itself, then we must not be ignorant of
goodness. Furthermore, since out of a number of different philo-
sophical or even other views we often judge quite correctly which
view is more like the truth and more probable, then some intuition
of truth must not be wanting in us in order for us not to be igno-
rant of what resembles it. That is why some people when they are
still young, even though, in some cases, they are completely untu-
tored, or for the most part have received only the barest rudiments
of instruction from their teachers, are said to have ended up very
learned. This could never have happened unless nature, as we
said, was aiding them. Socrates abundantly demonstrated this to
Phaedo, Meno and Theaetetus in their youth, and taught that
children can answer correctly in the case of specific arts if someone
questions them carefully, since they are by nature endowed with
the rational principles of all the arts and disciplines.18
241
: IV :
Confirmatio superiorum atque insuper de ideis.
1 Possumus autem ex tribus illis Platonis libris, Phaedone, Menone,

Thcaeteto atque insuper ex Parmenide, Timaeo et Convivio sic rursus
argumentari. Si capite proprie atque praecipue alter quidem maior,
alter vero minor denominetur, absurdum id quidem. Primo, quo-
niam per idem et maior erit et minor. Deinde per aliam speciem in
alia specie aliquid collocabitur, puta per capitis speciem in maioris
minorisve specie. Praestat autem capite capitatum quam maius aut
minus denominare. Denique absurdum est per aliquid parvum
maius aliquid dicere. Igitur si formalis afferenda causa est, maiori-
tate maius, minoritate minus cognominabitur. Similiter denarium
numerum novenario plurem non unitate proprie appellabimus, si-
quidem ab unitate proprie unum denominamus, immo pluralitate
plurem et alium paucitate pauciorem esse dicemus. Item dualem
numerum fieri asseremus non divisione unius in duo, quia etiam
coniunctione interdum huius rei atque illius fieri contendetur. Et
omnino idem proprie oppositis effici causis non est dicendum.
Ergo dualem numerum dualitatis ipsius participatione fieri secun-
dum formam potius asseremus. Sed haec tamquam leviora mitta-
mus; pergamus ad graviora.
2 Si color vel figura est ipsum pulchrum, quonam pacto erit color
aliquis vel figura deformis? Item, quanam ratione multa subiecta
pulchritudinis unius tamquam communis participarent, nisi una
quaedam pulchritudinis natura communis et inesset singulis et
242
BOOK X • C H A P T E R IX
: IV :
Confirmation of the above. Further discussion of the Ideas.
From three books of Plato, the Phaedo, the Meno and the i
Theaetetus, and also f r o m the Parmenides, the Timaeus and the Sym-
posium,19 we can also argue as follows* If someone were said to be
taller and another shorter by a head in the proper and principal
sense of the word, it would be absurd: first because someone
would be both taller and shorter via the same thing; and next be-
cause something would be located in one species via another spe-
cies — in this case, in the species of taller or shorter via the species
of the head* One should say that he is "headed" or "ahead" by a
head, not is taller or shorter by a head* In short, it is absurd by
way of something small to call something taller* So if the formal
cause is brought to bear, something will be denominated taller by
tallness, shorter by shortness* Similarly we call the number ten
more than the number nine not strictly speaking by oneness — for
one properly comes from oneness —but rather by moreness; and
we will say that the nine is less by lessness* Likewise we will say
that the number two does not come into being by the division of
the one into two; because we could also maintain that the two is
produced every now and then by the addition of this and that
thing, and what is entirely the same cannot be said to result,
strictly speaking, from two opposite causes* So in terms of form,
the number two results from the participation in twoness itself*
But let us leave these as trivial matters and turn to more weighty
ones*
If the beautiful itself is color or shape, how will any color or 2
shape be ugly? Or again, why would many subjects participate in a
single beauty as the universal beauty, unless the nature of some
beauty, which is single and universal, were present in individual
243
praeesset, ut ab ea quae praeest dependeat et quae inest? Proinde

aliud est ipsa bonitas quam res quae bonitatis participatione fiunt
bonae, aliud pulchritudo quam res pulchrae similiterque de ceteris
speciebus quas Plato vocat ideas. Corpora enim pulchra multa
sunt, ipsa vero pulchritudo una est; nam omne primum sum-
mumque in aliquo rerum36 genere unum est solummodo. Rursus
haec pulchra duas habent naturas, turn materiam37 corporalem,
quae fit particeps pulchritudinis, turn pulchritudinis qualitatem;
ipsa vero pulchritudo nihil est aliud quam pulchritudo, quoniam
quicquid est in genere aliquo primum tale nihil aliud est quam
tale. Item, corpora haec partim pulchra sunt, partim etiam turpia,
nam ex ipsa sua materia, quae aliud aliquid est quam pulchritudo,
deformia iudicantur; ipsa vero pulchritudo turpitudinem non ad-
mittit, si modo opposita vicissim se fugiunt. Corpora quoque pul-
chra mutantur38 et modo pulchra sunt, modo contra. Pulchritudo
vero ideo immutabilis39 est, quia et nihil est aliud quam pulchri-
tudo, et quantum pulchritudo est, non mutatur, quia sic neque
vertitur in contrarium, neque privatur quandoque fundamento et
sustentaculo, cum seipsa sustineat. Adde quod corporalia quaeque
aliis pulchra videri possunt, aliis vero non pulchra; ipsa vero pul-
chritudo carere pulchritudine cogitari non potest. Praeterea cor-
pora formosa divisibilia sunt, pulchritudo autem indivisibilis. Non
parva est, quia magna corpora non formaret; non magna, quia par-
vis corporibus non congrueret. Denique non est corporea, quo-
niam rebus spiritalibus40 non competeret. Non est etiam tempora-
lis, quia rebus non inesset aeternis. Inest autem multo magis
animabus et mentibus quam corporibus. Sed neque in illis est
prima, turn quia illae secundum se deformes sunt, nisi formentur a
bono cuius splendor est pulchritudo, turn quia illae veritatem ap-
petunt tamquam pulchram, pulchritudo vero non expetit semetip-
244
objects and at the same time preeminent; and this in order that
the beauty which is present may depend on the beauty which is
preeminent? So goodness itself is other than the objects which be-
come good by participation in goodness; beauty is other than
beautiful objects, and so on for the rest of the species which Plato
calls Ideas. For there are many beautiful bodies, but only one
beauty itself; for everything that is first and highest in some uni-
versal genus is one in one way alone. Again, beautiful things have
two natures, the corporeal nature which becomes a participant in
beauty, and the quality of beauty. But beauty itself is nothing
other than beauty, because whatever is first in some genus is noth-
ing else but such. Again, bodies are partly beautiful and partly
ugly; for they are adjudged ugly because of their matter, which is
something other than beauty; but beauty itself does not admit of
ugliness if only [because] opposites in turn shun each other. Beau-
tiful bodies also change: they are beautiful at one moment and not
at another. But beauty is unchangeable precisely because it is noth-
ing other than beauty, and to the extent that it is beauty, it does
not change because it neither turns towards its opposite, nor is
ever deprived of its basis and support since it. sustains itself. More-
over, some corporeal objects can seem beautiful to some people
but not to others; but beauty itself cannot be conceived of as lack-
ing beauty. Beautiful bodies are divisible, beauty is indivisible: it is
not small, because then it would not form large bodies; it is not
large, because then it would not accord with small bodies; and it is
not corporeal, because it would not accord with things spiritual. It
is not temporal even, because it would not be present in things
eternal. Yet it is in fact present to a far greater extent in souls and
minds than it is in bodies. But even in them it is not prime beauty,
(a) because in themselves souls and minds are ugly, unless they are
formed by the good whose splendor is beauty; (b) because they
desire truth for its beauty, but beauty does not desire itself; and (c)
because what we yearn for as worthy of love, absolutely and uni-
245
PLATONIC THEOLOGY
sam, turn denique quia simpliciter et communiter amabile est non

esse quidem animale vel intellectual sed bene bonumque esse*
Cum vero bonum summe alliciat, summa est pulchritudo* Itaque
idea ipsa pulchrorum est super corpora, animas, mentes. Est una,
simplex, pura, immutabilis, indivisibilis, incorporea41 et aeterna*
Atque eadem idearum omnium est natura, quod hinc quoque
alio42 exemplo probamus*
3 Hie homo quando ilium generat hominem, non proprie spe-
cificam humanitatem ipsam, quae communiter in utroque conside-
ratur, gignit* Gigneret enim et seipsum, qui per humanitatem ex-
tat* Praeterea, terminata natura, naturam interminatam generare
non potest* Non ergo causa est hie homo ut simpliciter humanitas
sit, sed ut in ilia materia propagetur* Oportet autem naturae hu-
manae communis esse communem causam atque etiam per se
agentem, quod ostendit ordinatissima eius et stabilis compositio*
Quamobrem super agenda in speciebus particularia extare oportet
universale agens, speciem respiciens atque dirigens* Quod etiam
apparet in iis quae absque manifestis seminibus generantur, ut
alias demonstravimus*
4 Argumentantur rursus multi Platonicorum a mentis obiectis
hunc in modum* Cum intellectus noster naturaliter formas capiat
rationesque intellegat vel separatas vel separando, sequitur ut com-
munes ipsae rerum separataeque a materia rationes naturalia sint
eius obiecta* Quoniam vero obiecta eiusmodi movent, formant,
perficiunt intellectum, ideo in praestantiori veriorique universi
gradu sunt constitutae; longissimeque a figmentis absunt, ne
mens, et veritatis iudex et sensuum emendatrix, a veritate remo-
tior sit quam sensus* Quamobrem rationes illae merito43 sublimio-
res, veriores, efficaciores naturae existimantur quam intellectus
qui inde formantur* Sed numquid illae rursus intellectuals sunt
appellandae? Non quidem proprie* Siquidem rationales animae se-
246
BOOK X I • C H A P T E R I V
versally, is not ensouled or intellectual being, but rather well-being

and being good. But since the good attracts in the highest degree,
it is the highest beauty. The Idea itself of beautiful things is there-
fore above bodies, souls, and minds. It is one, simple, unmixed,
unchanging, indivisible, incorporeal, and eternal. And this is the
identical nature of all the Ideas, as we will also prove from another
example.
When this man begets that man, he does not, in the strict 3
sense, beget the specific human nature that is contemplated as
common to them both. For in that case he would beget himself
because he exists through human nature. Moreover, the finite na-
ture cannot generate the infinite nature. So this man is not the
cause of human nature simply being but rather of its being propa-
gated in that particular matter. The cause of universal human na-
ture has to be universal and also self-acting as its highly ordered
and stable composition demonstrates. Wherefore above the partic-
ular agents in the species there must be a universal agent that
watches over and directs the species. The point is also evident in
the case of those things that are generated without any apparent
seeds, as I have shown elsewhere.20
Many of the Platonists argue also from the objects of the mind 4
in the following way. Since our intellect naturally receives forms
and understands rational principles either as separate or by sepa-
rating them, it follows that these universal [forms] of things and
the rational principles separated from matter are its natural ob-
jects. But since these objects move and form and perfect the intel-
lect, they are placed at a higher and truer level of the universe and
are as far away as possible from illusory images, lest the mind, the
judge of truth, the rectifier of the senses, be further away from the
truth than the senses. Wherefore the rational principles are with
good reason considered to be natures that are more sublime, more
true, and more powerful than the intellects that are formed from
them. Should they in turn be called intellectual? Strictly, no! For
247
cundum participationem intellectuales sunt; angeli vero intellec-

tuals secundum formam; rationes denique illae atque ideae intel-
lectuales quidem secundum causam, intellegibiles vero secundum
formam. Intellectuale enim ad intellegibile ita ferme se habet, ut
appetens et mobile atque formabile ad appetibilem motorem atque
formatorem. Sed ubinam sunt?
Sane ideas minus communes in ideis communioribus generatim
Platonici collocant ac demum44 omnia idearum genera in ipso ente
primo, communissimo entium atque perfectissimo, quod sum-
mum intellegibile vocant—intellegibile quidem45 secundum for-
mam, intellectuale vero secundum causam, cui proxime subdunt
mentes quam plurimas intellectuales secundum formam, intellegi-
biles vero secundum participationem. His autem rationales
subiiciunt animas, intellectuales iam participatione quadam, intel-
legibiles vero nequaquam. Proinde censent ens ipsum ipsumque
intellegibile idem esse, quoniam ens sit naturale et adaequatum
intellectus ipsius qua ratione est intellectus obiectum. Praeterea,
intellegibile ipsum sub primo rerum principio collocant. Illud
enim tale est, ut comprehendi quodammodo possit; hoc vero ne-
quaquam. Principium primum appellant proprie unitatem ipsam
atque bonitatem. Et quia unitas eminentiam lucemque procul ab
omnibus segregatam refert, intellegibile vero refert lumen quod-
dam iam intellectibus proportione quadam accommodatum, ideo
unitatem et aliud et superius quam intellegibile esse putant. Rur-
sus, quia mentes tam intellegere quam intellegibile appetunt, non
simpliciter sed et bene et bonum; bonum vero simpliciter appe-
tunt, idcirco hac etiam ratione bonum, id est deum summum, ipsi
enti, quod et intellegibile est, praeponunt. Mitto quod intellegibile
respicit intellectum; bonum vero respicit voluntatem. Itaque non
solum hoc ab illo est differens, sed praestantius, quippe cum
248
BOOK XI • C H A P T E R IV
rational souls are intellectual in terms of participation, angels are

intellectual in terms of form, and the rational principles and Ideas
finally are intellectual in terms of cause but intelligible in terms of
form. For the intellectual has more or less the same relationship to
the intelligible as something that feels desire, is mobile, and re-
ceives form to what is desired, is a mover, and is what forms. But
where are they located?
Platonists generally place the less universal within the more 5
universal Ideas, and ultimately all the genera of Ideas in the prime
being itself, the most universal and perfect of all beings, which
they call the highest intelligible — intelligible at any rate in terms
of form though intellectual in terms of cause. Directly below it,
they place minds, which are to the highest degree intellectual in
terms of form but intelligible in terms of participation. And below
them they place rational souls, which are intellectual by a sort of
participation, but are in no sense intelligible. The Platonists also
suppose that being itself and the intelligible itself are the same,
since being is the natural and sufficient object of the intellect itself
qua intellect. Moreover, they subordinate the intelligible itself to
the first principle of things. For the intelligible is such that it can
in a sense be comprehended, whereas the first principle cannot.
Properly they call the first principle unity itself and goodness. And
since unity refers to a preeminence, a light far removed from every-
thing, while the intelligible refers to a light already adapted in a
certain proportion to intellects, they believe that unity is different
from and superior to the intelligible. Again, because minds desire
understanding and the intelligible alike, not absolutely but to un-
derstand well and to understand the good, but they desire the
good absolutely, they accordingly prefer the good, that is, God on
high, to being itself which is the intelligible. I need hardly mention
that the intelligible concerns the intellect, but the good the will.
So not only does the good differ from the intellect but it is supe-
rior, insofar as what seizes hold of the will is more eminent than
249
praestantius sit quod voluntatem rapit, quam quod ab intellectu

comprehenditur. Quapropter ens ipsum ab intellectu pro viribus
percipi opinantur; bonum vero per voluntatem potius ad seipsum
animam trahere atque tractam in se quoque transfundere. Et si
quo pacto ab anima iam occupata suo modo tangitur, tangi proprie
per unitatem mentis caput, quam ab initio nobis deus, qui est
unitas universi princeps, inseruit.
6 Ceterum, ut ad propositum revertamur, in ipso quidem bono
ideas per causae modum esse solum relativis quibusdam rationibus
tantum inter se distinctas; in ipso vero intellegibili per formam
proprie atque absolutis insuper formis invicem differentes; in se-
quentibus mentibus, sive a corpore separatis sive coniunctis, parti-
cipatione iam quadam et gradatim magis magisque distinctas; in
natura vero semina quaedam infima formarum ab ideis infusa; in
materia denique umbras. Ipsum quidem bonum Plato in Epistolis
deum patrem nominat, ipsum vero intellegibile deum filium. Plo-
tinus quoque et deum de deo, et de luce lumen, et rationem ver-
bumque dei. Rursus, Plato in Epinomide per rationem huiusmodi
divinam sive verbum, quem mundum vocat intellegibilem, affirmat
mundum fuisse sensibilem exornatum. Quoniam vero ideae in
primo quidem una forma sunt, in secundo vero multae formae
(non enim putant in prima forma absolutam diversitatem esse for-
marum), ideo Plato contemplatus et colores in lumine circa lucem
et lineas in circulo circa centrum, inquit in Epistolis multiformes
ideas absolute distinctas circa primum rerum principium esse po-
tius quam in primo. Similiter in libro De republica septimo ideam
inquit boni, id est ipsum bonum, in cuius forma omnes ideae una
forma sunt, pulchrarum esse causam idearum, videlicet illarum
250
what is understood by the intellect. Wherefore they opine that be-

ing itself is perceived by the intellect with all its power, whereas
the good draws the soul to itself through the will, and also takes
the soul thus drawn and brings it into itself. And if in some man-
ner the good is touched by the soul it has already possessed in its
own way, then it is touched, strictly speaking, by way of the unity
which is the mind's head, and which God, who is the prime unity
of the universe, implanted in us from the beginning.
But to return to the subject in hand. We declare that in the 6
good itself the Ideas are only distinguished from each other by
way of cause and solely for particular, relative reasons. But in the
intelligible they differ both properly by way of form and mutually
besides as absolute forms. In the subsequent minds, whether sepa-
rated from a body or joined, they are now rendered different by a
certain participation, and gradually more and more so. In nature
they become the lowest, the particular seeds of forms, seeds in-
fused in her by the Ideas. Lastly, in matter they are shadows. Plato
in his Letters calls the good itself God the father, but the intelligi-
ble, God the son.21 Plotinus calls the intelligible both the God
from God, and the light from light, and the reason and word of
God. 22 Again in the Epinomis Plato affirms that the sensible world
was adorned through this divine reason or word, which he calls
the intelligible world.23 But because in the first [hypostasis] the
Ideas are one single form, but in the second are multiple forms
(for Plato and Plotinus do not believe an absolutely independent
diversity of forms dwells in the first form), so Plato, having con-
templated both the colors in the light around a light and the lines
in a circle around a circle, says in his Letters that the multiform, ab-
solutely distinct Ideas are "around" the first universal principle
rather than in it.24 Likewise in the Republic book seven, he says
that the Idea of the good, that is, the good itself, within whose
form all Ideas are one single form, is the cause of the beautiful
251
quae in sequentibus multae formae sunt absolutae invicem diffe-

rentes.
7 Superioribus rationibus Plotinus et Proclus ideas confirmant et
aliter in deo, ut aiunt, primo ponunt, aliter in secundo. Alii vero
nonnulli ad idem ita procedunt. In materia quidem postrema idea-
rum umbra resultat, super materiam vero idearum omnium lucet
facies, quarum fons est deus, rerum auctor, ut Platonis Timaeus
planissime docet ac liber De republica decimus et Parmenides. Si
enim mens et natura plenae formarum sunt perque illas agunt,
quod in naturalibus artificiisque apparet, merito et deus, qui na-
turae mentisque formator est, informis esse non debet. Per formas
igitur agit, quas appellamus ideas. Has Plotinus et Proclus non so-
lum exemplares, sed etiam essentiales formas appellant; putant
enim opificem mundi nulla in fabricando mundo consultatione
uti—talem enim imperfectam operationem esse. Atque eum qui
de opere perficiendo consultat, prius in se imperfectum opus
quodammodo concepisse, deinde de illius absolutione perquirere;
quod a mente perfecta est alienum. Item, si universum mutabili
solum providentiae discursu disponeretur, non esset usquam46 sta-
bile quicquam, neque perpetuus esset mundi motus et stabilis. Igi-
tur deus universum per esse suum facit atque disponit, praesertim
cum eiusmodi actio et prima et communissima et facillima sit om-
nium actionum, ideoque a causa quadam prima, communissima,
felicissima47 sit, ubicumque sit, eique in primis conveniat. Omnis
autem causa quae ipso esse facit, talem sequenti gradu facit effec-
tum, qualis est ipsa primo. Cum igitur mundus sit cunctarum
complexio specierum, sequitur ut mundi opifex, modo quodam
252
BOOK XI • C H A P T E R IV •
Ideas,25 those in other words which are many in what succeeds

and which differ absolutely from each other.
Using the arguments above, Plotinus and Proclus affirm the 7
Ideas and place them in one manner in the first God, as they call
Him, and in another in the second.26 Several others reach the
same conclusion by the following argument. In matter is the re-
flection of the ultimate shadow of the Ideas, while above matter
shines forth the countenance of all the Ideas whose source is God,
the author of all things, as Plato's Timaeus manifestly teaches and
the tenth book of the Republic and the Parmenides.27 For if mind
and nature are full of forms, and operate by means of them (and
this is evident in matters both natural and artificial), then it is log-
ical that God, who is the form-giver to nature and to mind, should
not be without form. So He acts by means of the forms that we
call the Ideas. Plotinus and Proclus call them not just the exem-
plary, but the essential forms,28 for they believe that the creator of
the world does not need consultation in fashioning the world, for
such would make the operation imperfect. Moreover they say that
anyone who consults someone about perfecting a work must have
first conceived it in himself as imperfect in a way, and then he in-
quires about perfecting it; and this is foreign to a perfect mind.
Again, if the universe were ordered solely by the mutable discur-
siveness of providence, nothing anywhere would be unchanging,
nor would the world's movement be everlasting and unchanging.
So God creates the world and sets it in order through His own
being, and especially because such an action is the first, most uni-
versal, and most effortless of all actions, and comes from a first,
most universal, and most blessed cause wherever it is and wherever
it primarily accords with Him. For every cause which operates
through its own being produces an effect at the next level down
that resembles what it is itself at the first level. Since therefore the
world is a combination of all the species, it follows that the Cre-
ator of the world, in a manner far beyond our capacity to conceive,
253
supra quam cogitari possit praestantiore, specierum omnium com-

plexio sit et omnium formas habeat exemplares sibiquemet, ut illo-
rum more loquar, essentiales. Quod iterum ita confirmant: si ars
naturam imitatur perque operum rationes efficit opera, ergo et na-
tura suorum operum possidet rationes. Rursus, natura, cum ex
seipsa careat ratione et moveatur perficiaturque a deo, rationes ac-
cipit ab ipsis divinae mentis ideis. Et quanto naturae rationes inte-
riores ipsi naturae sunt quam rationes artis arti, tanto saltern ratio-
nes divinas interiores oportet esse deo quam naturae rationes ipsi
naturae.
8 Addunt quod formae sensibiles haud omnino vereque sunt tales
quales cognominantur. Sane aequalitates et similitudo passim
inaequalitatis dissimilitudinisque fit particeps. Formositas autem
vera in subiecto per se deformi informique esse non potest. Bo-
num quoque verum ubi defectus et proclivitas est ad malum esse
nequit. Quinetiam in caelestibus nolunt esse veram lineam superfi-
ciemque, verum centri polorumque punctum, siquidem quorum
ratio est impartibilis, ipsa in re partibili esse non possint. Sed ani-
mus noster veras habet gignitque formas, per quas alias falsi redar-
guit, quantum a veris distent animadvertens. Quamobrem multo
magis anima universi veras formarum possidet rationes et gignit.
Ubi enim virtus intellegentiaque praestantior, ibi expressiorum
formarum conceptio atque partus. Denique mundi opifex certiores
etiam perfectioresque formas in seipso gignit atque (ut Procli ver-
bis utar) dum se animadvertendo seipsum gignit, in se simul gene-
rat omnia.
9 Accedit ad haec quod cum universi membra perpetuo quodam
ordine inter se conspirent, non casu sed ratione conciliantur atque
reguntur. Ratio ilia quae ordinat omnia seipsam ignorare non po-
254
BOOK X I • C H A P T E R IV
is a combination of all the species, and has for Himself the exem-
plary forms, or to use the language of Plotinus and Proclus, the es-
sential forms, of alL They confirm this again with the argument
that if art imitates nature and uses the rational principles of works
in order to fashion them, then nature too possesses the rational
principles of its works. Again, since it lacks reason of itself and is
moved and brought to perfection by God, nature receives the ra-
tional principles from the very Ideas of the divine mind. And to
the degree that nature s rational principles are more internal to na-
ture itself than those of art to art, then, to say the least, the divine
rational principles must be more internal to God than those of na-
ture to nature.
Plotinus and Proclus add that sensible forms are not completely 8
and truly what they are said to be. For instance, equalities and
similarity always partake of inequality and difference. But true
beauty29 cannot exist in a subject that is ugly and without form of
itself. True good too cannot exist where defect and a proclivity for
evil dwell. Moreover, they do not wish there to be a true line or
surface among celestials, or a true point of the center or of the
poles, since the things whose rational principle is indivisible can-
not exist in what is divisible. But our soul possesses and gives
birth to the true forms, and uses them to convict other forms of
falsehood by noting how far they deviate from the true ones.
Wherefore to a much greater degree the soul of the universe must
possess and bring to birth the forms' true rational principles. For
where the power and understanding are more eminent, there we
find the conception and birth of clearer forms. Lastly, the worlds
Creator begets within Himself even more certain and perfect
forms; and, to quote Proclus, while He begets Himself in observ-
ing Himself, simultaneously He generates all within Himself.30
Furthermore, since the parts of the universe mutually cohere in 9
an eternal order, they are reconciled and ruled not by chance but
by reason. That reason which orders all things cannot be ignorant
255
test, alioquin ratio summa foret irrationalis, si nullam rationem sui

ipsius haberet. Rationalior enim ratio est quae seipsam cognos-
cendo complectitur, quam quae ignorando se deserit. Ilia igitur se
tamquam rationem omnium ordinatricem intellegit, quo efficitur
ut quibus rationibus modisque singula disponantur, semper intel-
legat. Quamobrem in summa omnium ratione sunt omnium ratio-
nes. Utrum igitur, quia deus facturus erat omnia, cuncta cogno-
vit? Non certe, alioquin essentialem operationem ipsamque ad
seipsum conversionem ad externa referret atque aliunde penderet.
Igitur quemadmodum sol in se lucendo illuminat omnia, sic deus
intellegendo atque volendo seipsum et scit et efficit omnia. Quis
non viderit, si videndo se videt facitque cuncta, sequi ut in sub-
stantia sua substantiates formae sint quae exemplaria causaeque
sint omnium?
10 Semper enim in ipso naturae ordine ita se res habet ut ab inte-
riori actione procedat exterior, atque inde opus actioni persimile,
quemadmodum a luce48 illuminare, ab illuminatione illuminatum
illuminationi lucique simile. Proinde plantae et animalia ex semi-
nibus generantur. Oportet autem in semine rationes esse quodam-
modo animantis inde rationaliter procreati. Non tamen sunt in se-
mine corporeo nisi potentia. Uniforme enim semen est ac paene
informe; quod autem inde gignitur, multiforme atque formosum.
Item, si semen dividatur, plura inde49 tota, quae nascuntur, quasi
in partibus tota lateant, quae gignuntur. Hinc patet vim semina-
rian! in semine ipso latentem esse quodammodo incorpoream,50 in
qua sit huius motus generationisque51 principium. Oportet autem
multiplicis animantis rationes multiplices seminariae inesse virtuti
quam vocamus naturam. Idem enim, prout idem est, diversitatem
256
of itself, otherwise, if it had no rational principle of itself, the

highest reason would be irrational. For the reason that includes
knowing itself is more rational than the reason that by not know-
ing detracts from itself So it understands itself as the reason that
gives order to all things; and hence it always understands by what
rational principles and modes individual objects are arranged.
Thus the rational principles of all things are in the highest reason
of all. So is it that God, who was about to create all things, knew
them all? For a certainty no, otherwise He would be referring to
things external His own essential activity and conversion to Him-
self, and be depending on something else. Thus, just as the sun by
lighting in itself gives light to all, so God by understanding and
willing Himself knows and effects all. Isn't it obvious, that, if, in
the process of seeing Himself, He sees and makes all, then the
substantial forms that are the patterns and causes of all must exist
in His substance?
For things are so arranged in the order of nature that the exter- 10
nal always proceeds from the internal action, and hence the prod-
uct closely resembles the action. For example, from a light comes
illumination, and from illumination the thing illuminated which
resembles both the illumination and the light. Similarly animals
and plants are propagated from seeds. But in the seed must exist
in some way the rational principles of the animal rationally procre-
ated from it. Yet they are not in the corporeal seed except poten-
tially; for the seed is uniform and almost without form, but what
is born from it is multiform and beautiful.31 Again, if the seed is
divided, a number of wholes results, and these are born as though
they were begotten wholes lying hidden in the parts. It is evident
that hiding in the seed is a seminal force, which is in a way incor-
poreal, and in which dwells the principle of this motion and gener-
ation. The multiple rational principles of the multiple living being
must be present in the seminal power we call nature. For the same
qua the same could not [otherwise] directly produce such a great
257
tantam proxime generare non posset. Insuper inesse actu necessa-

rium est. Quod enim est potentia tale, tamquam imperfectum, in,
aliquid actu tale non aliter quam per aliquid, quod actu tale sit
perfectiusque, produci potest. Insunt ergo singularum animantis
partium specie differentium singulae rationes, quibus suo singula
tempore locoque et ordine procreentur atque excisa, si fieri potest,
saepissime recreentur.
Sed numquid seminariae vires in seminibus animantium
summae causae sunt? Nequaquam. Non enim ab ulla illarum fit
species ipsa, sed quiddam potius particulare sub specie, et quaeli-
bet illarum ab alio sub eadem specie ducit originem. Ideo ad uni-
versalem naturam confugiendum,52 in qua universales sint suarum
specierum omnium rationes — ad naturam inquam terrae, terreno-
rum procreatricem, praesertim cum saepe plantis et animalibus
passim sponte nascentibus semina corporalia desint. Quo fit ut ad
eorum productionem seminibus incorporeis opus sit. Atque ut
convenienti ordine procedamus, singulas terrenorum species ad
universalem referamus terrae naturam, similiterque in ceteris ele-
mentis, deinde quatuor elementorum naturas proxime ad lunae
naturam, in qua sint elementalium omnium rationes, naturam
vero lunae ad naturam sphaerae superioris similiterque deinceps.
Cunctas denique naturas ad ipsam universi naturam, in qua neces-
sario sint tam naturalium quam naturarum omnium rationes; ra-
tiones inquam et exemplares et efFectrices, ut naturas omnes cer-
tis regulis ad certa dirigat et perducat.
Non potest autem natura esse ratio causaque rerum summa,
turn quia per se irrationalis est, quod in nostra natura patet, nam
neque se neque alia novit, turn quia est causa efFectui mixta, pe-
rinde ac si faber lignis infusus tractet ligna. Tali enim causa opus
258
diversity. Furthermore, this force must be actually present. For

what is potentially such, being imperfect, cannot be educed into
something actually such except by way of something that is ac-
tually such and [so] more perfect. Thus the individual rational
principles of the individual parts of a living creature, parts
differing in species, are present [in the seminal power]. By virtue
of these principles the individual [members] can be produced each
at the right time and place and in due order; and once severed,
most often they can, if it is at all possible, be recreated.
Yet surely the seminal powers in the seeds of living things are n
not the highest causes? Certainly not! For issuing from any one of
the powers is not the species itself but rather seme particular in
the species; and each of the powers originates from another partic-
ular in the same species. One must have recourse then to the uni-
versal nature wherein are the universal rational principles of all the
species —to the nature of the earth I mean, the procreator of
things earthly; and especially since corporeal seeds are often miss-
ing in plants and animals that are born spontaneously everywhere.
Hence incorporeal seeds are needed for their production. In order
to proceed in the proper order, let us refer the individual species of
things earthly to earth's universal nature, and similarly with the
other elements; then refer the natures of the four elements directly
to the nature of the moon, which contains the rational principles
of all the elements; and then the nature of the moon to the nature
of the sphere above it, and so on. Finally, let us refer all these na-
tures to the nature of the universe, which necessarily contains the
rational principles alike of all natural objects as of all natures, [i.e.]
the exemplary and productive principles, in order that it might di-
rect and guide all the natures by set rules to fixed ends.
However, nature cannot be the highest principle and cause of 12
things, both because it is in itself irrational, as is clear in our own
nature which is aware neither of itself nor of another, and also be-
cause it is a cause mixed in with its effect, just like a carpenter em-
259
erat, ut quae ab alio extrinsecoque et communi moventur, familia-

rem quandam intrinsecamque virtutem a separata causa posside-
rent. Quippe cum et haec non aliter proprie, distincte, accommo-
date ducantur, quam per virtutem ipsis propriam, distinctam,53
accommodatam, et causa tandem excellentissima, quae pure et ab-
solute operi dominatura est, ab ipso opere per essentiam et esse et
virtutem oporteat esse secretam, sicut in aere videmus calorem
quidem a sole superno misceri, lumen vero nequaquam. Oportet
autem naturam, etsi per se irrationalis est, tamen corporalium ra-
tiones habere, quibus possit intrinsecus singula congruis modis
ad finem convenientem rationaliter ordinare, movere, formare,
cumque per se irrationalis sit,54 ab eo quod per se rationale est
duci debet rationibusque formari. Nempe irrationale est naturae55
per se irrationali ordinem universi committere. Igitur in causa su-
periore necesse est rationes rerum adeo rationaliter esse, ut causa
ipsa se suaque animadvertens et sui et rationum suarum certam
habeat rationem. Absurdum certe foret, cum nos turn nostri, turn
nostrorum operum, turn universi rationes habeamus, causam uni-
versi neque sui neque suorum rationes habere. Quamobrem, si
mundi conditor omnia novit, certe non respexit in alia ut ilia per-
ciperet, siquidem cognitio eius alia ipsamet cognitione producta
proculdubio antecedit. Quis enim ignoret externum opus sequi
intrinsecam actionem? Itaque Deus in seipsum respiciens novit
omnia. Quo fit ut in ipso sint omnium species, per quas cuncta
cognoscat et faciat. Atque, ut summatim dicam, quemadmodum
in hoc materiali mundo materiae omnes in unam tandem inti-
260
B O O K X I • C H A P T E R IV
bedded in the wood working the wood.32 Such a cause was needed
so that the objects that are moved by another universal external
cause might possess from a separate cause an internal power pecu-
liar to them. This is because: (a) such objects are not led properly,
distinctly, and appropriately except by way of a power which is pe-
culiar, distinct, and appropriate to themselves; but (b) in the end
the all-excelling cause, which is going to rule the work purely and
absolutely, must be set apart through [its] essence, being, and
power from the work itself. In the air, analogously, we [actually]
see the heat indeed being mixed in by the supernal sun but not the
light. But even though nature is irrational in itself, it must contain
the rational principles of corporeal objects for it to be able to or-
der, move, and form individual entities from within, in ways that
suit them, towards a goal that is appropriate, and in accordance
with reason; and since it is in itself irrational, it ought both to be
guided by what is in itself rational and to be formed by rational
principles. It is indeed irrational to entrust the order of the uni-
verse to a nature that is in itself irrational. So the rational princi-
ples of things must be rationally present in the higher cause, in
such a way that the cause, being aware of itself and its own, pos-
sesses a definite rational principle of itself and of its own rational
principles. It would be quite absurd for us to have rational princi-
ples of ourselves, of our works, and of the universe, if the cause of
the universe did not have rational principles of itself or of its own.
Wherefore, if the Creator of the world knows all things, He cer-
tainly did not look to others in order to perceive them, since un-
doubtedly His knowledge precedes the objects that are created by
that knowledge. For who does not know that an external work fol-
lows on an internal action? So by looking to Himself, God knows
all. Consequently the species of all are in Him, and by means of
them He understands and creates all. To sum up, just as all the
matters in this material world eventually are reduced to one inner
261
mamque materiam, sic et multo magis in mundo formali formae

omnes in unam intimamque formam necessario56 reducuntun
13 Quod hinc rursus argumentari licet, quod omnis vita prolem
suam penes seipsam prius generat quam seorsum, et quo praestan-
tior vita est, eo interiorem sibimet generat prolem. Sic vita vegeta-
tiva tam in arboribus quam in animalibus semen quasi arborem et
quasi animal in corpore proprio prius generat, quam aut iaciat ex-
tra, aut arborem inde animalve externum producat. Sic sensitiva
vita, quae est vegetativa praestantior, per phantasiam in se simula-
crum intentionemque rerum parit prius quam in externa materia
fabricet. Sed foetus ille phantasiae primus quia in ipsamet anima
est, ideo propinquior est animae quam foetus vegetativae vitae, qui
non fit in anima, sed in corpore. Sic vita rationalis, quae est excel-
lentior sensitiva, parit in seipsa rationem turn rerum, turn sui ip-
sius quasi foetum prius quam vel loquendo vel agendo promat in
lucem. Primus ille foetus propinquior est animae quam phantasiae
foetus. Vis enim rationalis in foetum suum perque ilium in seip-
sam reflectitur, quod non efficit phantasia. Sic angelica vita notio-
nes57 sui ipsius et rerum promit in se antequam depromat in
mundi materiam. Proles haec interior est angelo quam rationi sua,
quia neque ab externis incitata est neque mutatur. Quamobrem di-
vina vita eminentissima et fecundissima omnium universam hanc
mundi machinam tamquam prolem suam in se generat priusquam
pariat extra. Oportet autem huiusmodi prolem, quam Orpheus
Palladem vocat Iovis capite natam, magis intimam, ut ita dixerim,
esse deo, quam angeli notionem angelicae menti. In angelo
quippe, cum sit esse aliud quam intellegere, notio quae generatur
intellegendo aliud est quam angeli ipsius essentia. In deo autem,
quia esse et intellegere idem sunt, notio quam deus intellegendo
seipsum gignit tamquam exactissimam sui ipsius imaginem idem
262
matter, so to a far greater extent all the forms in the formal world
are necessarily reduced to one inner form.
One may also argue from the fact that every life generates its 13
progeny first within itself and then externally, and the more emi-
nent the life, the more it generates for itself an inner offspring.
Thus the vegetative life in trees and animals alike generates a seed
like a tree or an animal within its own body before it either ejacu-
lates it or produces an external tree or animal from it. Similarly
the sensitive life, which is more eminent than the vegetative, pro-
duces through the phantasy an image or intention of things in it-
self before giving them shape in external matter. But the first
offspring of the phantasy, since it is in the soul itself, is more akin
to the soul than is the offspring of the vegetative life that is not
fashioned in the soul but in the body. Similarly the rational life,
which is superior to the sensitive, produces in itself the rational
principle of objects and of itself as if the principle were a child,
before presenting it to the light in speaking or acting. Its first
offspring is more akin to the soul than the offspring of the
phantasy. For the rational power reflects on its offspring and
thereby on itself; and this the phantasy does not do. Similarly the
angelic life marshals in itself notions or conceptions of itself and
of things before conducting them into the worlds matter. This
progeny is more internal to the angel than the reasons progeny to
the reason, because it is unaffected by external objects and it does
not change. So the divine life, which is the most sublime and most
fecund of all, first engenders the world s universal machine within
itself as its child before bringing it to birth outside itself. This
child, whom Orpheus calls the Pallas born from the head of Jupi-
ter,33 is more internal to God, if one may say so, than is the angels
conception to the angelic mind. For in the angel, since being is
other than understanding, the conception that is generated by un-
derstanding is other than the actual essence of the angel. But in
God, since being and understanding are the same, the conception
263
est atque ipse deus. Quoniam vero generationem voluptas comita-

tur, Timaeus Platonis inquit deum opere suo mirifice delectari.
In prole autem ilia dei intima, quae universale semen est mundi,
insunt propria semina membrorum omnium quae in mundo hoc
prole eius externa gignuntur. Semina ilia essentia inter se conve-
niunt, ne deus sit substantia multiplex. Differunt ratione, ne quic-
quid in mundo sit, sine ulla varietate sit unicum. Age sic ultra
procede.
14 Cum deus vim habeat infinitam et res quae sequuntur eum
cunctae finitam, ideoque divina virtus non sit determinata ad ea
solum agenda quibus finitae res possunt subministrare, sed queat
absque illis insuper innumerabilia opera etiam incorporalia facere,
an non necessarium tibi videtur in deo horum operum formas,
quae absque instrumentis certisque subiectis facere potest, ita rela-
tione saltern distinctas esse, ut propriam illic habeant rationem?
Nam cum ab uno, quantum unum omnino est, absque medio sub-
iectove certo non fiant multa, nulla est ratio ob quam formae tales
possint ex deo multiplices emanare nisi multiplex, ut ita dicam, et
quodammodo multiformis sapientia dei. Quinetiam quicquid re-
liquae causae agunt, id omne operantur tamquam primae causae
instrumenta, atque ita agunt, ut temperantur ab ilia. Temperantur
autem ducunturque a deo certis modis ad certas formas in materia
generandas, non per aliud quam per certas formarum rationes
quae sunt in deo, quemadmodum instrumenta artis atque naturae
per formas agentis diriguntur ad formas. Atque ut formae turn ar-
tificiosae, turn naturales perspicuae magis sunt in agente quam in
opere vel instrumentis, ita mundi totius formae expressiores modo
suo in deo sunt quam in sequentibus causis et materia. Quam-
obrem Mercurius putat mundum esse omniformis dei imaginem
omniformem. Et Plato in Timaeo inquit divinam virtutem, cum
264
that God creates by understanding Himself, as the most faithful

copy of Himself, is the same as God Himself. Since delight at-
tends generation, God, as Plato's Timaeus tells us,,34 wonderfully
rejoices in His work. But within the innermost child of God,
which is the universal seed of the world, are the specific seeds of
all the parts produced in this world by its external offspring. In es-
sence these seeds accord together, lest God be multiple in sub-
stance; but they differ in rational principle, lest whatever exists in
the world be of one kind and without any variety. But to proceed.
Since God has infinite power while all that follow Him have 14
finite power, and since the divine power is not limited solely to do-
ing those things to which finite objects can contribute, but can
effect innumerable additional- works, certainly incorporeal ones,
without them, doesn't it seem necessary to you that in God the
forms of those works which He can create without instruments or
definite subjects must be so distinguished, at least in terms of rela-
tion, that they have in Him their own rational principle? For since
the many cannot issue from the one, insofar as it is entirely one,
without an intermediary or a definite subject, no rational principle
can account for such manifold forms being able to emanate from
God, unless it is God's manifold and multiform wisdom, if I may
call it so. Furthermore, whatever the other causes do, they do it all
as instruments of the first cause, and they act as they are tempered
by the cause. But they are tempered and led by God in certain
ways to generate definite forms in matter exclusively through the
definite rational principles of the forms that are in Him, just as
the instruments of art and nature are guided towards forms by
means of the agents forms. And just as both artificial and natural
forms are more perspicuous in the agent than in his work or in his
instruments, so the forms of the whole world are more perspicu-
ous in their own way in God than they are in subsequent causes
and in matter. That is why Mercury [Trismegistus] thinks of the
world as the omniform image of the omniform God. 35 And Plato
265
bonitatis suae gratia vellet mundum quam pulcherrimum facere,

decrevisse eum ad exemplar illud quod est omnium excellentissi-
mum figurare. Ideoque mundum ita ad sui similitudinem effecisse
ut mundi partes ad sui ipsius formarit ideas. Ex iis quorundam ca-
num rabies condemnatur latrantium Platonem ideas extra divinam
intellegentiam posuisse.
15 Caelum unum siderum plenum torrentem58 noctu figurat suo-
rum siderum imaginibus, quae quidem imagines neque sunt si-
dera, licet esse infantibus videantur, neque manent, sed iugiter in-
novantur aqua fluente, quamvis manere vulgo putentur. Similiter
deus unus, idearum exuberans plenitudo, materiam fluctuantem
fingit semper simulacris idearum. Quae sane simulacra neque
verae species sunt apud Platonicos, quamquam veras esse quidam
physici arbitrantur. Neque quiescunt umquam, ut Heraclitus ait,
labente materia, etsi quiescere eas ignorantes existimant. Atque hie
est modus per quem res temporales, ut vult Parmenides Pythago-
reus, aeternarum fiunt participes idearum. Profecto sicut aeterni-
tas, quae unum dumtaxat momentum est manens idem semper et
eodem modo, tempus omne quod per innumerabilia diffluit mo-
menta, quiescendo metitur, et sicut centrum stabile puncta su-
perficiei circumcurrentis, ita idea quaelibet, in aeternum una ea-
demque consistens, res eas temporales metitur omnes quae in ea-
dem inter se specie sunt, ideae unius eiusdemque59 participes.
Quod de una dicam, de omnibus est ideis intellegendum.
16 Pulchritudo ipsa pulchrorum omnium est mensura, quia per
accessum ad pulchritudinem primam et recessum ab ipsa res se-
quentes magis minusve pulchrae60 existimantur. Et quod cadit ab
omni pulchritudine, ab omni cadit essentia, et quod totam possi-
266
says in the Timaeus that the Power Divine, since He wished for the
sake of His goodness to make the world as beautiful as possible,
decided that it should be modeled after the paradigm that is the
most excellent of alL36 He therefore so fashioned the world in His
own likeness that He formed its parts in accordance with His very
own Ideas. The madness of those dogs that yelp that Plato placed
the Ideas outside the divine understanding is hereby condemned.
The one sky by night fills a rivulet full of stars with the images 15
of its stars, which images indeed are not the stars, although they
seem to be so to children, and they do not stay but are eternally
renewed in the flowing water, though the vulgar think they stay
there. Similarly the one God, the superabundant plenitude of
Ideas, adorns matter, which is in flux, with the Ideas' images. They
remain just images for the Platonists, not the true species, al-
though some natural philosophers think they are the true. And
the images are never at rest, as Heraclitus tells us,37 matter slip-
ping as it does away, though the ignorant think they are still. Ac-
cording to Parmenides the Pythagorean, this is the way in which
temporal things become participants in the eternal Ideas.38 Cer-
tainly, just as eternity, which is only a single moment remaining
the same in the same way forever, in staying at rest measures the
whole of time as it flows through moments without number; and
just as a stable center measures the points of a circumambient sur-
face, so too every Idea, in remaining one and the same to eternity,
measures all those temporal things which exist together in the
same species as participants in one and the same Idea. What I am
saying about a single idea should be understood to apply to
them all.
Beauty itself is the measure of all beautiful things, since things 16
subsequent are considered more or less beautiful depending on
how close they come to prime beauty or how far they are distant
from it. What falls away from all beauty, falls away from all es-
sence, and what possesses all beauty possesses all essence, for
267
det pulchritudinem, totam habet essentiam, quia prima essentia et

prima pulchritudo sunt idem. Quaecumque homo in specie aliqua
iudicat, iudicat ad speciem referendo. Puta quando iudicat solem
aut ignem esse pulchrum, tunc duo pulchra refert ad unam pul-
chritudinis speciem absolute. Et quando solem esse igne pulchrio-
rem pronuntiat, ad eandem refert ideam, non absolute, sed compa-
rando. In utraque relatione pulchrum solem et ignem pulchrum
per eandem metitur ideam, sed in prima utrumque per totam
ideam mensurat, in secunda per alterum ideae gradum illorum
metitur alterum. Neque audiendi sunt barbari quidam, qui res
pulchras mensurari non posse putant per accessum ad purum pul-
chritudinis actum, quia ille sit infinitus, ideoque non possint res
aliae aliis propius61 ad ipsum accedere. Volunt autem per recessum
a pura pulchritudinis privatione mensuram talem excogitari. Hi
enim ob id errare videntur, quod si purus actus est infinitus affir-
matione, similiter pura privatio est infinita negatione. Neque fit
pulchrorum comparatio ad divinam essentiam penitus- infinitarn,
sed ad pulchritudinis ipsius ideam, quae quodammodo finita est
quantum respicit creaturam, quia est determinatio quaedam di-
vinae perfectionis, facta quidem a mente divina, confirmata vero a
voluntate. Accedunt autem ad earn propius, quae similitudinem
eius suscipiunt purius; recedunt vero quae contra. Merito autem
inde mensura accipitur pulchritudinis in rebus pulchris, unde
ipsa suscipitur pulchritudo. Haec autem ab idea capitur, non a
pura pulchritudinis privatione. Denique quid stultius quam pul-
chritudinis habitum per privationem velle discernere, cum fieri e
converso tam natura quam ratio cogat? Quapropter absque dubio
fateamur humanam mentem pulchra62 referre ad ipsam pulchritu-
dinis rationem.
268
prime essence and prime beauty are the same. Whatever a man
judges within some species, he does so by referring to the species.
For instance, when he says the sun or the fire is beautiful, he is
relating two beautiful things absolutely to the single species of
beauty. But when he pronounces the sun more beautiful than the
fire, he is referring both to the same idea, not absolutely, but com-
paratively. In both cases he is measuring the beautiful sun and the
beautiful fire by way of the same idea, but in the first case he is
measuring both by way of the whole idea, in the second he is using
the level of the idea in one of them to measure the other. We
should not listen to certain barbarians39 who believe that beautiful
things cannot be measured by way of their proximity to beauty's
pure act, because this act is infinite and some things cannot be
closer to it therefore than others. Rather, they want this measure-
ment to be seen in terms of their distance from beauty's pure pri-
vation. Where they seem to be making their mistake is that if pure
act is infinite by way of affirmation, pure privation is infinite simi-
larly by way of negation. Anyway we do not compare beautiful
things to the divine essence that is completely infinite, but to the
Idea of beauty itself, which with regard to the creation is in a way
finite, because it is a sort of determination of divine perfection,
created indeed by the divine mind, but confirmed by the will.
Things which receive its likeness more purely approach it ever
more closely, things which do the reverse recede from it. But it is
reasonable to suppose that the measure of beauty in beautifiil
things is received from the same source as beauty itself. But this is
received from the Idea, not from the pure privation, of beauty.
Could anything be more stupid than to want to discover the habit-
ual possession of beauty by means of privation, when nature and
reason both demand the opposite? So let us accept, beyond any
shadow of a doubt, that the human mind refers beautiful objects
to the rational principle itself of beauty.
269
17 Quoniam vero quod mensurat praestantius est quam quod

mensuratur, mens humana, quantum per relationes ad ideas res
omnes temporales metitur quae sub ipsis continentur ideis, rebus
illis est excellentior. Atque ideo ideis est proxima, quia metitur
quaecumque illas sequuntur, utpote quae cadit media inter idea-
rum fontem et rivulos inde manantes. Verum licet mensuret ad
ideas, non tamen per ideas ipsas mensurat tamquam per propria
quaedam et proxima media. Non enim sunt universales ideae pro-
prium instrumentum huius aut illius mentis humanae, neque inter
mentem singularem63 et res alias singulares ullo modo universales
ideae cadunt mediae. Quia vero non potest animus singularia uni-
versalium idearum simulacra aliter metiri quam per formulas idea-
rum animo proprias et quasi declinantes ad singularia, necesse est
menti idearum formulas inhaerere, per quas ideis simulacra confe-
rat. Quae congruunt formulis probet; reprobet quae non con-
gruunt.
18 Sed unde adveniunt hae formulae menti? Numquid a simula-
cris an ab animi fictione, an forsitan ab ideis? Non a simulacris,
nam per eas formulas animus mensurat simulacra, unde formulae
simulacra antecedunt, et tanto praestantiores sunt quanto ideis
propinquiores. Ac si fierent a simulacris, non vere mensurarent
ilia, sed ab eis potius mensurarentur. Mensura enim adaequatio
est. Causa adaequat effectum; effectus causam non adaequat. Nus-
quam in corporibus perfectas unitatis, bonitatis, pulchritudinis ra-
tiones invenimus; oportet enim eas suis contrariis non esse per-
mixtas. In corporibus autem unitas miscetur partium multitudini,
bonitas vitio, pulchritudo deformitati. Nusquam rectas figurarum
rationes inspeximus in materia corporum; eas tamen ipsi tenemus,
alioquin neque de ipsis loqui possemus, neque per ipsas quasi exa-
270
Since what measures is superior to what is measured, the hu- 17

man mind, to the extent that it measures all temporal things
which are contained under the Ideas by referring them to the
Ideas, is superior to such temporal things* So it is closest to the
Ideas, because it measures all that follow upon them, since it falls
midway between the Ideas' source and the streams that flow from
that source* Though it measures against the Ideas, however, it does
not measure through the Ideas as its own particular and direct in-
struments* For the universal Ideas are not the personal instrument
of this or that human mind, nor are they in any way located mid-
way between a particular mind and other particular objects* Since
the rational soul cannot measure the particular images of the uni-
versal Ideas other than by means of the Ideas' formulae belonging
to the soul (which sink down as it were towards particulars), the
Ideas' formulae must inhere in the mind* Through them it can
compare images to the Ideas, approving those that conform to the
formulae, and rejecting those that do not*
But whence come these formulae to the mind? Is it from images 18
or from the rational soul's invention or haply from the Ideas?
They cannot come from images, for the soul uses the formulae to
measure images; so the formulae must be prior to and nobler than
images to the degree they are closer to the Ideas* If they did come
from images, they would not measure them truly, but rather be
measured by them* For measurement is matching* The cause
matches or equals the effect, but the effect does not equal the
cause* Nowhere in bodies have we found the perfect rational prin-
ciples of unity, goodness, or beauty; for they must not be com-
bined with their opposites, whereas unity in bodies is combined
with plurality of parts, goodness with wickedness, beauty with ug-
liness* Nowhere in the matter of bodies have we observed the true
rational principles of figures, yet we ourselves possess them, other-
wise we would not be able to talk about them, or use them as a
criterion for rejecting the deficiency of corporeal forms* Appar-
271
men defectum formarum corporalium redarguere. Non igitur eas a

corporibus accepisse videmur, essent enim illis deteriores.
19 Neque dicendum est eas esse nusquam, quia nequit mens in-
tellegere per seipsum quod nihil est omnino. Nam et privationes
per habitus cogitat, et falsae opiniones non ex eo fiunt in nobis,
quod ipsum quod omnino nihil est cogitemus, sed quod vel co-
niungamus res invicem vel disiungamus praeter ordinem natura-
lem. Immo vero, si existunt alicubi obiecta sensuum, sunt et ratio-
nes, obiecta mentis, si modo et mens sensibus est nobilior, et quod
omnino nihil est neque movet animi aciem neque contrahit neque
terminat. Non igitur finguntur ab animo: sane figmenta mentiun-
tur,64 res veras non metiuntur.65 Figmenta animi res ipsas sequun-
tur confiisius etiam quam umbrae corpora. Corpora per umbras
non discernuntur. Quis ergo per ficticium extraneumque simula-
crum pulchritudinis, odoris, saporis, caloris horum ipsorum essen-
tiales definitiones proprietatesque latentes inspiciet?
20 Praeterea, figmentum animi est animo ipso deterius; formulae
vero illae ideo praestantiores sunt animo, quia per ipsas animus
etiam iudicat corrigitque seipsum. Nempe per rationes unitatis,
bonitatis et pulchritudinis animus de seipso iudicat saepe: quam
sit ipse aut partibus multiplex aut affectibus dissidens; item, quan-
tum vel natura deficiat vel vitio depravetur; rursus, quantum vel
natus sit deformis vel turpis evaserit. Nonne per pulchritudinis si-
gillum pronuntiat esse se corporibus pulchriorem, et hanc partem
sui ilia, et hunc habitum illo pulchriorem esse? Immo vero et an-
gelis sublimiores esse videntur, quia per sigillum idem angelum66
mens nostra designat, quando angelum animo pulchriorem esse
affirmat, et alio angelo alium angelisque deum. Non tamen meti-
tur deum, sed ipsum tamquam mensuram relinquit immensurabi-
272
• BOOK XI • C H A P T E R IV •
endy, then, we have not received these formulae from bodies, for
they would be inferior to bodies.
Nor should we say that they exist nowhere, for of itself the
mind cannot understand what is completely nonexistent. It thinks
about our defects by way of our [good] habits, and false opinions
occur in us, not because we think about what is completely nonex-
istent, but because we join things together or separate them in an
unnatural order. Rather, if objects of the senses somewhere exist,
then rational principles, which are the objects of the mind, exist, if
only because the mind is nobler than the senses, and what is en-
tirely nothing does not move or focus or limit the rational souls
attention. So these [formulae] are not feigned by the soul: indeed,
figments lie, they do not measure things true. The souls figments
follow upon things true in a more confusing way than shadows fol-
low their bodies. Bodies are not discerned by way of their shad-
ows. So who would use an extraneous and fictitious image of
beauty, or odor, or taste, or heat to look at their essential defini-
tions and hidden properties?
Moreover, a figment of the rational soul is inferior to the soul
itself. But those formulae are more excellent than the soul, because
the soul even makes judgments about itself and corrects itself by
means of them. It often uses the rational principles of unity, good-
ness, and beauty to judge of itself: how multiple it is in its parts,
how conflicted in its feelings, how far it is naturally deficient or
depraved by vice, how ill-formed it was at birth or how ugly it has
become. By the seal of beauty stamped upon it, doesn't it pro-
nounce itself more beautiful than bodies and one part of itself
more beautiful than another, and this habit more beautiful than
that? Or rather, the formulae seem to be even more sublime than
the angels, because our mind uses the same seal to designate the
angel when it affirms the angel is more beautiful than the rational
soul, or one angel is more beautiful than another, or God is more
beautiful than an angel. Yet it does not measure God: it leaves
273
lem. Sicut enim sapientia non fit sapiens et motus non movetur,
ita prima mensura non mensuratur. In eo igitur quod illae for-
mulae angelos metiuntur, tamquam regulae expressae ab ideis su-
per angelos existentibus, certe sublimiores sunt angelis. Et animus
in hoc ipso actu quo metitur angelos excellentior est quam ea ipsa
natura angeli quam apud seipsum metiendo designate Quamvis et
angelus animam metiatur per regulas quodammodo rectiores, et
eo ipso actu magis excedit animum, quam per actum animi exce-
datur ab animo.
21 Quo autem pacto sigilla huiusmodi (quas et formulas appella-
mus), si sunt animo et angelis altiora, finguntur ab animo ? Quin-
immo sunt in animo ante omne commentum animi. Animus enim
sua inventa omnia ad sigilla talia confert, siquidem veritatis sigillo
discernit quae vera inventa sint, quae veriora, quae falsa. Item,
quod per novos temporalesque actus animi fabricatur, mobile est
omnino. Quod enim motu fit, nimirum fit et mobile; sigilla vero
talia sunt immobilia; haerent enim animo immobiliter, quoniam
quicquid singulis momentis occurrit animo vel fit ab animo arbi-
tratu nostro, ad ilia referimus tamquam firmiter inhaerentia.
Porro, si ilia quoque nutarent, essent ad alia referenda et alia rur-
sus ad alia, neque esset in nobis principium aliquod iudicandi. Si-
gillum per quod de statu huius rei aut statu illius aut etiam de ae-
ternitate sententiam ferimus, mobile esse nequit, siquidem in
sigillo ratio illius exprimitur quod eo significatur. Ratio vero status
ipsius aeternitatisque est a ratione motus alienissima. Quinetiam
stabile et aeternum non aliter quam sub rationibus status aeterni-
tatisque definimus. Rationes huiusmodi omnis sunt mutationis
274
Him as the measure that is beyond measure. Just as wisdom does

not become wise, and motion does not move, so the prime mea-
sure is not measured. Insofar as the formulae measure the angels
therefore, being as it were rules produced by the Ideas existing
above the angels, they are certainly more sublime than the angels.
Indeed, in the act itself by which it measures the angels the ratio-
nal soul is superior even to the nature itself of the angel which it
traces out in itself in measuring, though the angel too may mea-
sure the soul by using rules which are in a way more accurate, and
in this act it exceeds the rational soul by a larger margin than it
may be exceeded by the rational soul in its act.
How, then, are such seals (which we call formulae) contrived by 21
the soul if they are more exalted than the soul or than angels?
Rather, they are present in the soul before the soul contrives any-
thing. For the soul refers all its discoveries to such seals, since it is
with the seal of truth that it discerns which discoveries are true,
which more true, which false. Again, anything fashioned by way of
new and temporal acts of the soul is entirely mobile. For what de-
rives from motion is of course mobile. But these seals are immo-
bile and unchanging; for they inhere unchangeably in the rational
soul, since we refer whatever occurs in the soul at individual mo-
ments or is created by our souls decision to these seals as though
they were inhering unchangingly [in us]. Indeed, if they too were
to falter, then they would have to be referred to others, and others
to yet others, and a first principle for making judgments would not
exist in us. The seal we use to produce an opinion about the sta-
bility of this thing or the stability of that, or even about eternity,
cannot be subject to change, since in the seal is expressed the ratio-
nal principle of that which is signified by it. But the rational prin-
ciple of stability itself and eternity is totally alien from the rational
principle of motion. We define the stable and the eternal only in
terms of the rational principles of stability and eternity. Such prin-
ciples are free from all change, since stability precedes motion.
275
expertes, siquidem status antecedit motum. Quod vero in natura

prius est, est a posteriore solutum. Atqui has rationes per quas ta-
lia definimus intus habemus. Non enim per aliena mens loquitur.
Ac si extra nos essent, egeremus adhuc aliis rationibus rationum,
quibus quasi mediis rationes illas hauriremus per quas essemus de
statu aeternitateque locuturi. Aliae illae rationes ideo immobiles
essent, quia essent rationes immobilium rationum.
22 Itaque quacumque gradiamur, ad immobiles rationes nobis in-
natas perveniemus. Scite Plotinus quando de aevo disputat, in-
quit: 'Haecne67 de aeternitate loquimur, quasi de extraneis rebus
testificantes ac de alienis agentes? Nequaquam. Non enim intelle-
gimus, nisi tangamus, neque extranea tangimus. Itaque oportet
nos aeternitatis esse participes.'68 Haec ille. Talia69 ergo sigilla sunt
immobilia. Immo etiam sigillum motionum est immobile. Quando
enim de rerum motibus iudicamus, illos ad aeternam motus ideam
per motionum sigillum nobis insitum comparamus. Si hoc quoque
foret motus aut mobile, esset per sigillum aliud comparandum.
Non enim motus ad aeternitatem nisi per medium competens reli-
gatur, quod neque motus sit, neque mobile. Item, si foret mobile,
non recte per illud motiones iudicaremus. Motio namque tunc iu-
dicatur recte, quando refertur ad terminos et spatia quae perman-
serint; nam iis non manentibus, neque fit motus neque motus
progressio cernitur. Ipsum quoque tempus, quod est proprietas
quaedam et perduratio motionis, non aliter mensuratur quam si
per stabilem servetur memoriam et stabili aeternitatis momento
circumscribatur. Si motionis sigillum stabile est, multo magis sta-
bilia sunt sigilla omnia reliquorum.
276
And what comes first in nature is independent of what comes sub-

sequently* The principles by which we define such things we have
within. For the mind does not speak through what does not be-
long to it. If they were outside us, we would need still other ratio-
nal principles of principles [within] to use as a means of imbibing
those principles that would then enable us to speak about stability
and eternity. Those other principles would be unchanging, because
they would themselves be the rational principles of unchanging
principles.
So by whatever route we proceed we end up with unchanging 22
principles innate in us. When Plotinus discusses eternity, he says
wisely: "In saying these things of eternity, are we testifying to
things external and dealing with things alien? Far from it. We do
not understand unless we come into contact, and we do not come
into contact with what is alien to us. It follows then that we must
be participants in eternity."40Thus Plotinus. So these seals are un-
changing. Or rather, even the seal of movement does not move.
For when we make judgments about things' movements, we refer
them to the eternal Idea of movement, using the seal of movement
innate in us. If this too were movement or subject to movement, it
would needs be referred to another seal. For motion is not tied to
eternity except through some appropriate medium that is neither
movement nor subject to movement. Again, if it were subject to
movement, we would not judge movements correctly by it. For
movement is only correctly judged when it is referred to bound-
aries and to spaces that remain stationary: if these do not remain,
then no movement occurs, and no progression of motion is wit-
nessed. And time itself too, which is a property and duration of
movement, is only measured if it is preserved by means of an un-
changing memory, and bounded by the unchanging moment of
eternity. If the seal of movement is unchanging, even more so are
the seals of all the other principles.
277
23 Ex iis omnibus duo pariter concluduntur, quod scilicet sigilla

talia et ab ideis animo inserantur et ipsi haereant immobiliten
: V :
Confirmatio superiorum per signa•
1 Huius autem rei signa multa comperimus. Primum, quod rustici

homines qui numquam de ideis aliquid cogitaverunt, et adolescen-
tuli qui nihil de iis audiverunt, cum primum eorum sensibus occu-
runt corpora pulchra, modo ratione utantur, ea referunt ad ideas
duobus ut diximus modis. Uno, quando affirmant hoc esse pul-
chrum, quod non faciunt nisi ex eo quod talis corporis figura qua-
drat sigillo pulchritudinis intus ingenito. Altero, quando affirmant
hoc isto et istud illo esse pulchrius, quantum aliud alio accedit
propius70 ad sigillum. Tales sigillum neque per doctrinam neque
per inventionem prius acquisivere, quia neque cogitaverunt de illo
quicquam neque audiverunt. Neque etiam tunc ex singulis pul-
chris corporibus ipsum colligunt, siquidem per ipsum minime fal-
lax singulorum fallaciam defectumque redarguunt. Neque ex na-
tura quadam communi quae est in singulis, nam quod in rebus
iacet fallacibus, ipsum quoque fallax evadit fallacemque ex se pro-
creat notionem. Praeterea, quando de illo diligentius cogitant, in-
veniunt ipsum vel esse vel referre aliquid unum supra multa in
seipso consistens. Nam super naturam illam quae una quodam-
modo est in multis, oportet esse naturam talem quae una sit ante
multa, ut communis sit aeque multorum. Tale sigillum quia nullo
278
BOOK XI C H A P T E R VIII
Two conclusions alike can be drawn from all this: (i) that such 23
seals are implanted in the rational soul by the Ideas; and (2) that
they adhere to it unchangeably.
: V :
Confirmation of the above by way of signs.41
We find many signs of this. The first sign is that uneducated peo- 1
pie who have never thought about the Ideas at all, and young peo-
ple who have heard nothing about them, as soon as beautiful bod-
ies impact their senses, straightway use their reason to refer them
to the Ideas in the two ways we have mentioned: first, when they
affirm that a thing is beautiful, which they would not do except for
the fact that the shape of some body conforms with the seal of
beauty that is innate in us; and second, when they affirm that this
is more beautiful than that, and that than another, insofar as one
thing conforms more closely to the seal than another. These peo-
ple did not acquire the seal in advance by way of being taught or
by finding it, because they never thought or heard anything about
it. Nor do they then cull it from particular beautiful bodies, be-
cause they use the seal that is infallible to reject the fallible and de-
fective character of particulars. Nor do they derive it from some
common nature that is in particulars, for what resides in fallible
things also becomes fallible itself and produces from itself a fallible
concept. Furthermore, when they ponder it more carefully, they
find that the seal either is or refers to a unitary something existing
on its own above plurality. For above the single nature that is in a
manner the one in the many, there has to be the nature that is the
one before the many, so that it can be equally common to the
many. And because this seal is not limited in any respect by the
279
modo clauditur rerum singularium multitudine, ab ea multitudine

nullo modo colligitur* Neque etiam cogitationis machinatione
concipitur, nam per ipsum invenimus super mobilem multipli-
cemque cuiusque animi pulchritudinem unam esse pulchritudi-
nem in seipsa manentem. Ergo sigillum vim suam tollit altius su-
per animos* Machinamenta vero animi nihil animis eminentius
fabricant. Si ergo cum primum utimur ratione, res plurimas ad
huiusmodi sigilla referimus quae neque didicimus ante, neque tunc
colligimus aut fingimus, praesertim cum comparationis signum
praecedere semper res illas oporteat quae comparantur, sequitur ut
ante omnem rationis usum ea possideamus-
2 Secundum signum est, quod subito hunt relationes utraeque,
saepe etiam nulla praecedente aut intentione voluntatis aut ratio-
nis discursione* Quod significat non esse animo regulam relatio-
num huiusmodi nuper aut extrinsecus acquirendam, sed iamdiu71
intrinsecus possideri, qua totiens uti72 pro arbitrio potest quotiens
se ad earn intenderit*
3 Tertium signum est, quod omnes in seipsis experiuntur: quo-
tiens volunt alicuius rei definitionem et causam invenire, nihil
aliud conantur, quam ut omnibus sensus et phantasiae submotis
obstaculis, profundae mentis intima penetrent, quibus tunc pri-
mum clarissime fulget quod venantur, cum primum in arcanae
mentis adyta penetraverint, quasi intus scientiarum thesauri deli-
tescant. Quod ita Pythagoras cecinit:
'AkXa cri) dapcrei, €7rei Oeiov yevos ecrri fipoToicriv

Ol? tepa Trpofyepovcra <$>vcri<; SELKWO-LP eKacrra
id est: 'Tu autem confide, quoniam divinum genus est hominibus,

quibus sacra natura proferendo in lucem omnia monstrat/ Ergo
mirabimur Homerum et Didymum aliosque permultos vel natura
vel ab infantia caecos ita scripsisse, ut perspicue vidisse omnia vi-
deantur? Mirabimur Zoroastrem aliosque sapientiae inventores
280
BOOK X I • C H A P T E R VI
plurality of particular things, it is not assembled at all by that plu-

rality. Nor is it conceived even by the machinery of thinking, for
through it we discover that above the changeable and multiple
beauty of each rational soul there is one beauty that remains in it-
self. So the seal extends its power far above souls. But the souls
stratagems fabricate nothing higher than souls. So if, as soon as
we use reason, we are referring the multitude of things to these
seals which we have never learned about before, nor at that time
assembled or devised, and especially since the sign or seal of com-
parison always has to precede those things which are being com-
pared, then it follows that we possess the seals before we ever uti-
lize our reason.
The second sign is that both kinds of referring occur instanta- 2
neously, often without any preceding intention of the will or dis-
cursive process of the reason. This shows that a standard or rule
for this referring does not have to be acquired by the soul shortly
before or from outside, but that the soul has possessed it internally
for a long time, and can use it at will whenever it turns its atten-
tion to it.
The third sign is that all people experience [them] in them- 3
selves. Whenever they want to discover the definition or cause of
something, they attempt, having removed all the obstacles pre-
sented by the sense or the phantasy, to do nothing else than pene-
trate the minds innermost recesses. As soon as they have pene-
trated into the mind s hidden shrine, they see the dazzling light of
their quarry, as though the treasures of knowledge lay concealed
within. Pythagoras sang of this as follows, "Be of good cheer, for
that race of men is divine to whom sacred nature reveals all things
by bringing them into the light."42 Should we be surprised, then,
that Homer and Didymus and many others, who were blind from
birth or from childhood, could write as though they had appar-
ently seen everything clearly? Should we wonder that Zoroaster
and other discoverers of wisdom, only by spending a long time in
281
diuturna dumtaxat solitudine solaque animi totius in mentem so-

lam conversione rerum omnium scientiam peperisse?
4 Quartum signum ab approbatione sumitur* Complexio corporis
quae abundat sanguine, suos quosdam postulat turn sapores turn
ceteros rerum usus, quae bili alios, alios quae pituita. Quando
cuique complexioni quod suum est offertur, non aliter oblatam
rem natura talis asciscit quam ipse ignis escam sulphuream. Hinc
sanguineus commendat dulcia, acuta acriave cholericus, acida me-
lancholicus, mollia phlegmaticus et insipida. Quod de sanguineo
dicemus similiter est ad alios transferendum* Nescit sanguineus
quam ob causam dulcia probet, quia non commendat consilio, sed
naturali complexionis instinctu* Sane per naturalem instinctum
quinque appetit genera qualitatum, rubra et virida visu, auditu
laeta, dulcia gustu, temperata tactu atque olfactu* Si has quinque
qualitates per complexionem affectat et probat, necesse est in ipsa
complexionis conflatione quinque inesse fomites harum quinque
probationum- Sicut enim illarum quinque qualitatum alia inter se
est et alia ratio, ita a tali complexione sub alia et alia ratione pro-
bantur. Igitur in unoquoque homine quinque sunt fomites natura-
les ad quinque qualitates congruas quinque sensibus comproban-
das* Et quia in aliis hominibus aliae sunt complexiones humorum,
ideo rerum concupiscentiae corporalium inter homines sunt di-
versae* Quoniam vero una humana species est in omnibus, cum sit
mentis species una, idcirco communis est eorum quae ad mentem
pertinent approbation Omnis mens figuram laudat rotundam in re-
bus statim consideratam et cur laudet ignorat* In aedificiis quoque
similiter talem vel quadraturam aedium vel parietum aequalitatem
lapidumve dispositionem, angulorum oppositionem, fenestrarum
figuram atque occursum* Laudat insuper eodem pacto certam
282
BOOK XI - C H A P T E R V •
solitude,43 and only by converting the whole of their soul into

mind alone, gave birth to the knowledge of all things?
The fourth sign is derived from what we approve of. A body's 4
temperament abounding in blood demands its own particular
tastes and other sensations, [whereas] that abounding in bile
claims others, and that in phlegm others stilL When each temper-
ament is offered what is its own, it appropriates the thing offered
just as fire feeds on sulphur. Hence the sanguine person com-
mends things sweet, the choleric, things tart or bitter, the melan-
cholic, things piquant, the phlegmatic, things bland and tasteless.
What I am going to say about the sanguine person apply similarly
to the others. The sanguine person does not know why he likes
sweet things since he does not approve of them as a result of delib-
eration, but by an instinct natural to his temperament. And
through this natural instinct, he desires five classes of qualities: red
or green colors to look at, joyful sounds to listen to, sweet things
to taste, and tempered things to touch and smell. If he desires and
approves of these five qualities through his temperament, then the
kindling for igniting these five kinds of approval must be present
in the makeup of his temperament. For just as the rational princi-
ples of these five qualities differ among themselves, so a given tem-
perament approves of them for different reasons. So in every indi-
vidual man are five natural propensities for approving five qualities
congruent with the five senses. And since the humors are tem-
pered in different ways in different people, the desires for corpo-
real things are different among men. But since one human species
is present in all men, there being a single form of mind, men's
approval of things pertaining to mind is universal. Every mind
praises the circular shape in things as soon as it observes it, with-
out knowing why it praises it. Likewise in buildings too, [it
praises] the roundness or squareness of simple edifices [or rooms],
the evenness of walls, the arrangement of stones, the opposition of
angles, or the shape and positioning of windows. In the same way
283
quandam sive membrorum humanorum proportionem sive nume-

rorum vocumque concordiam. Commendat morales gestus et ha-
bitus tamquam decoros. Commendat sapientiae lucem et veritatis
intuitum. Si quaelibet mens haec omnia semper et ubique asciscit
illico, et quam ob causam asciscat ignorat, neque potest non ascis-
cere, instinctu asciscit necessario prorsus et naturali. At quia eo-
rum quae hie affectantur diversa inter se ratio est, oportet ut a
mente ex diversis naturae suae rationibus turn quasi fomitibus ap-
petantur, turn quasi formulis et regulis approbentur, ita ut ex
eisdem regulis illorum contraria reprobentur. Siquidem contraria
illorum, cum primum nobis obiiciuntur, offendunt natura sua,
etiam si causam nesciamus. Sunt ergo rationes illorum simi-
liumque ingenitae menti.
5 Quintum signum a definitione artis accipitur. Omnis ars quia
certa ratione ad certum finem ordinat opus, rationalis facultas est.
Facultas rationalis, si omni naturae irrationali est ingenita, multo
magis ingenita est omni rationali. Elementa, quam artificiose si-
tum repetunt suum! Quanta geometriae arte rectam lineam in as-
censu servant atque descensu! Quanta architecturae industria plu-
via se in orbiculares guttulas cohibet! Quanta aer sagacitate rerum
naturae succurrit, ne quid in ea vacuum relinquatur! Complexio
quoque plantarum et animalium, quam mirabili medicinae artis
solertia utitur in conservando habitu naturali aut recuperando!
Ipsae quoque brutorum animae singulis in speciebus singulas artes
exercent: laneam telam insecta sericia,73 lineam araneae, hirundi-
nes figulinam, musicam olores, apes architecturam, civilem ci-
coniae, bellicam vero leones, vulpes denique venatoriam. Quis
autem dixerit, modo ista consideret, solam naturam rationalem
inertem fuisse atque ex inertia irrationalem ab initio constitutam?
284
BOOK XI • C H A P T E R VI
the mind also lauds a particular proportion in the parts of mens

bodies or a particular harmony of musical measures and voices. It
commends as most becoming moral attitudes or habits. It com-
mends the light of wisdom and the contemplation of truth. If ev-
ery mind approves of all these things whenever and wherever it
finds them, and without knowing why it approves of them, and if
it cannot not approve of them, then it must do so through an in-
stinct that is entirely necessary and natural. But because the ob-
jects desired here have different rational principles, they must be
desired by the mind reacting to the different principles in its na-
ture as if they were kindling, and they must be approved as by for-
mulae or rules in such a way that their opposites are rejected by
the same rules. For their opposites, as soon as they are presented
to us, naturally offend, even if we do not know why. Thus the ra-
tional principles of these and like things are innate in the mind.
The fifth sign comes from the definition of art. All art, since it 5
organizes its work with a definite reason towards a definite end, is
a rational faculty. This rational faculty, if it is innate in all irratio-
nal nature, a fortiori is innate in all rational nature. How artfully do
the elements make for their proper location! With what skill in ge-
ometry do they keep a straight line in their ascent and descent!
With what architectural diligence does the rain contract itself into
spherical drops! With what cunning does the air come to the aid
of nature, lest some vacuum be left in her! The complexion too of
plants and animals what marvelous skill in the medical art does it
use in preserving and restoring their habitual and natural condi-
tion! The souls of animals also practise arts, different ones in
different species: silk worms use a wool-like thread, spiders a line,
swallows clay, swans use music, bees architecture, storks govern-
ment, lions practise the art of war, and wolves the art of hunting.
Who, in considering these matters, would maintain that rational
nature alone was without art and because of this artlessness made
irrational from the onset? Or rather, if a rational recipient is much
285
Immo vero si debet rationalis sedes multo prius et magis artem ca-
pere rationalem quam sedes irrationalis, oportet omnes rationali
hominum speciei artes innasci, postquam singulae innatae sunt
singulis irrationalium speciebus, Omnes enim ferme in genere
brutorum universo congregantur, sed aliae species artium per alias
animalium species disperguntur. Omnes ergo in unica rationali
hominum specie colliguntur, licet per singulos dividantun Omnes
iterum in uno speciei angelicae singulari, in quo tamen dividuntur
secundum formas, quoniam multiformis est angelus. Cunctae de-
nique in uno singulari deo atque una dumtaxat dei forma. Qua-
propter artes dividuntur invicem in brutorum genere secundum
habitum atque actum, quoniam nulla brutorum74 species aut artes
omnes exercet actu aut omnes infusas habet, sed quaelibet eorum
species unica utitur arte et possidet unicam. Artes igitur dividan-
tur oportet in hominum specie secundum actum, quia alii alias
meditentur, non tamen secundum habitum, quia singuli cunctas
possideant, Siquidem in angelo quolibet uniuntur cunctae habitu
atque actu. Quilibet enim illorum quaslibet meditatur,75 sed divi-
duntur executione, quoniam alii aliter gubernant mundum.
Cunctae in Deo modis omnibus uniuntur, quia et habet, et videt,
et exequitur universas. 'Nam in omnibus operantibus,' ut inquit
theologus Paulus, omnia operatur/
6 Sextum signum ab assecutione artium ducitur, quas non illi so-
lum qui praeceptore carent per se assequuntur, sed illi etiam qui
magistros vel libros vel homines habuisse traduntur. Nam et qui
legendo discunt, non a litteris corporalibus vitaque carentibus spi-
ritalem vivamque scientiam hauriunt, sed ipsi per litteras provocati
pariunt in seipsis. Et qui discunt audiendo, non prius discunt
286
• BOOK X I • C H A P T E R V •
better suited to receive, and to receive first, a rational art than an

irrational recipient, then all the arts have to be innate in the ratio-
nal species of men, since individual arts are innate in individual
species of irrational entities• For nearly all the arts are included in
the genus of animals taken as a whole, but the various kinds of
arts are dispersed among the various species of animals. All the
arts are included within the single rational species of men, al-
though they are divided among individuals. Again all the arts are
present in any one single angel in the angelic species, but within
that angel they are divided according to forms, since the angel is
multiform. Finally they are all in God, who is one and unique, and
in His unique form alone. Therefore in the genus of animals, the
arts are mutually divided in terms of both habit and act, since no
animal species either practises all the arts in actuality or has them
all implanted within it, but each species uses one art and possesses
one alone. So the arts have to be divided in the species of men ac-
cording to act, because different people occupy themselves with
different arts, but not according to habit, because individuals pos-
sess them all. In any angel, they are all united in habit and in act,
for each of the angels has all the arts in his thoughts, but they are
divided in terms of execution, because various angels govern the
world in various ways. In God, they are all united in all ways, since
He possesses, regards, and practises them all. As Paul the theolo-
gian says, "In all those who perform works, it is God who worketh
all in all."44
The sixth sign comes from our acquiring the arts. Not only do 6
those who have no teacher acquire the arts through their own
efforts, but so do those who are reported to have had books or
teachers. Those who learn from reading cannot imbibe knowledge,
which is spiritual and alive, from letters, which are corporeal and
lifeless; rather, provoked by way of the letters, they produce
knowledge within themselves. And those who learn from listening
do not actually learn until they have reviewed in themselves and
287
quam ipsi audita apud se recolant, examinent, approbent. Non fit

autem examinatio approbatioque verorum, nisi intus praefulserit
regula veritatis. Et qui docere dicuntur, neque scientiam eandem
quam ipsi habent omnino transfundunt in alium. Nam docendo
alios, ipsi evaderent ignorantes, et scientiae qualitas de alia mente
in aliam quasi de subiecto in subiectum transiret, quod non conve-
nit qualitatibus. Neque aliam quandam specie similem scientiam
in discipulo ipsi per propriam generant. Talis enim generatio ad
qualitates pertinet corporales, non ad humanam scientiam, cuius
actio clauditur intus et operantem perficit potius quam externa.
7 Ceterum quonam pacto magister discipulum edocet? Duo sunt
artium genera. Aliae sunt quarum materia circa quam versantur
nullum habet in se principium operis effectivum, sicut lutum aut
saxum ita subesse videntur figulo et sculptori ut manum dumtaxat
expectent artificis, ipsa vero suapte natura nihil momenti habeant
ad opus efficiendum. Aliae vero artes sunt quarum materia per
formam quandam motum agit ad opus, quod quidem naturale est
potius quam artificiale dicendum. Sic terra subest agricolae, sic
medico corpus humanum. Quippe fecunditas soli ad segetes pro-
ducendas agricolae et corporis humani complexio ad sanitatem re-
cuperandam medico confert quamplurimum, usque adeo ut saepe
ager absque cultura producat segetes et76 complexio corporis nostri
sine medentis opera pellat morbos. Quod significat et agro inesse
semina segetum per naturam et complexioni semina sanitatis.
Ergo in primo artium genere artifex ille dominus materiae vocatur
atque magister, in secundo vero excitator naturae atque minister.
Artem docendi ad secundum id genus spectare hoc nobis testimo-
nio esse potest, quod animus qui tamquam materia videtur su-
288
B O O K X I • C H A P T E R VI
examined and accepted what they have heard. And the examina-
tion and approval of what is true cannot occur unless the rule or
standard of truth has first blazed within. When people are said to
teach, they do not altogether transmit the same knowledge they
have to someone else. For in teaching others, they would become
knowledge-less, and the quality of knowledge would pass from one
mind to another, as from one subject to another; and this is inap-
propriate for qualities. Nor do teachers use their own knowledge
to generate in the pupil some other knowledge alike in species. For
such generation pertains to corporeal qualities, not to human
knowledge, whose action is confined within, and which perfects
the agent rather than external objects.
In short, how does a teacher teach a pupil? Arts are of two 7
kinds. Some are concerned with a material that does not have the
works effective principle within itself. Clay or stone, for instance,
are subject to the potter or sculptor in such a way that they have
to await the artist's hand: they do not possess in their own nature
any impulse to effect the work. But there are other arts whose
matter, with the help of some form, is actually moved to effect the
work, which in this case should be called a natural rather than an
artificial work. Thus earth submits to the farmer, the human body
to the doctor. The fertility of the soil for producing crops and the
role of the body's complexion or temperament in recovering health
are what most help the farmer and the doctor, and so much so
that often a field produces crops without cultivation and our
body's complexion fights off diseases without a doctor's attention.
This indicates that the seeds of crops are naturally present in the
field, and the seeds of health in the complexion. In the first kind
of arts, therefore, the artist is called the lord and master of the
matter, but in the second, he is just the stimulator and minister of
nature. That the art of teaching belongs to the second kind can be
proved from the fact that the rational soul, which seems to submit
to the teacher as his material, sometimes anticipates things it is
289
besse docenti, nonnumquam antequam audiat, praesagit audienda

et, postquam audivit, audita reddit uberiora et meliora; et saepe,
licet non audiat, ex se parit, quippe qui semina scientiarum non
minus quam ager segetum possidet. Unde qui docet minister est
potius quam magister. Quapropter Socrates apud Platonem in li-
bro de scientia Theaeteto inquit se filium obstetricis esse et obste-
trici persimilem, utpote qui in erudiendis hominibus non inducat
scientiam, sed educat, sicut obstetrices conceptas iam foetus edu-
cunt. Ideo quando doctor aliquis contendit ex pluribus argumentis
audienti aliquid demonstrare, qui audit non paulatim formatur,
ut lutum a figulo aut saxum aliquod a sculptore. Sed post multa
indicia veritatem subito intuetur, etiam absente magistro, quando
sufficienter fixerit provocatus. Sicut ager cultus a rustico post diu-
turnos illius labores suo ipse tempore edit foetus, agricola nihil
agente. Quis oculos videre docuit? Aures quis audire? Oculis non
praestat visum medicus, sed vel superinfusas77 caligines discutit vel
dirigit in obiectum. Ita menti praeceptor scientiam non infundit,
sed purgat aciem aut dirigit. Nemo canibus sagacitatem praestat
venatoriam, nemo equis currendi virtutem, nemo robur bellicum
elephantibus, saepe tamen homines eas ipsas virtutes latentes et
dormitantes in membris usu78 expergisci compellunt.
8 Idem facit in mente praeceptor, ut Plato in septimo libro De re-
publica docet. Mens enim virtutem suam, quae est veritatis intui-
tus, non minus habet firmam et naturalem quam sensus et anima-
lia suam. Earn sciscitando provocat Socrates, docendi lux;79 ipsa
recte interrogata vera respondet. Respondere non potest vera, nisi
cognoverit. Quoniam vero res ipsae invicem connexae sunt simili-
terque rationes rerum coniunctae sunt invicem, unde facile de una
290
going to hear before it hears them, and having heard them, en-
riches and enhances them; and often, without hearing them, it
produces them from itself, since it possesses the seeds of knowl-
edge no less than the field does of crops. So the teacher is a helper
rather than a master. That is why in Plato, in the Theaetetus, the
dialogue on knowledge, Socrates declares he is the son of a mid-
wife and most like a midwife in that he does not stuff knowledge
into people when he teaches them, but rather elicits it, just as mid-
wives deliver the babies who have already been conceived.45 So
when a teacher tries to prove something to his listener by using a
number of arguments, the listener is not formed little by little, like
clay by a potter, or a lump of stone by a sculptor. Rather, after sur-
veying many bits of evidence and when he has been stimulated
sufficiently, the pupil suddenly sees the truth, even if his instructor
is absent. In just the same way a field cultivated by a farmer, after
his endless labors brings forth its crops in its own time and with
the farmer doing nothing. Who taught the eyes to see? Who
taught the ears to hear? The doctor does not provide sight to the
eyes; rather he disperses the mists enshrouding them, or directs
them towards their object. Similarly, the teacher does not put
knowledge into the mind, but polishes and sharpens its acuity. No
one has given dogs their hunting skills, or horses their capacity to
race, or elephants their strength in battle, though men often use
rigorous training to awaken these powers lying dormant in their
limbs.
The teacher does the same in the mind, as Plato teaches us in 8
the seventh book of the Republic.46 For the mind has its own
power, which is intuitive of the truth; and it is no less strong and
natural than that of the senses or of animals. Socrates, the
beacon47 of teachers, stimulates that power by asking questions:
rightly questioned the mind answers with the truth. It cannot do
so unless it knows the truth already. Now, since things are inter-
connected and their rational principles are likewise linked together
291
transitur in multas, saepe fit ut ex uno quodam vestigio a praecep-

tore monstrato sagax animus propriis naribus venetur longo ordine
plurima. Adde quod non imbecilliorem habet mens videndae veri-
tatis aspectum, quam pedes progrediendi potentiam. Socrates in-
fantem porrecta ducit manu quo gradiatur; adolescentem quo dis-
cat interrogate Infanti non praestat eundi virtutem, sed et provocat
et tutius perducit ad terminum. Adolescenti non largitur intelle-
gentiam, sed efficit ad effectum sui operis promptiorem. Ipse au-
tem Socrates scientiam suam si quando adeptus dicitur tamquam
novam, aut per inventionem aut per disciplinam est adeptus. Si
ipse per se res invenit, numquam rebus inventis fuisset usus, nisi
utendi modum antea80 cognovisset; utendi modum non tenet, qui
rei ipsius non tenet naturam. Sin ab alio audivit, non prius ex au-
ditu concepit scientiam, quam sciret numquid docentis rationes
veritati congruerent; non intellegit hoc, nisi qui ipsam inspicit veri-
tatem. Igitur antequam inveniat quicquam aut audiat, veritatis est
compos. Et qui docuit Socratem Archelaus, vel per se invenit vel
accepit ab Anaxagora. Quicquid fuerit, scivit et ante. Atqui81 licet
et Anaxagoras ab Anaximene, et ille ab Anaximandro, et Anaxi-
mander acceperit a Thalete, Thales denique vel alius quivis sacer-
dos Aegyptius aut saltern Persicus magus caruit praeceptore. Qui
hominis caret doctrina, discit docente natura, immo vero scit iam-
diu docente Deo. Quapropter Socrates apud Platonem in libro De
sapientia inquit Theagi: 'Nemo umquam didicit a me quicquam,
quamvis mea consuetudine multi evaserint doctiores, et me exhor-
tante et bono daemone inspirante. Tu quoque brevi multum profi-
cies, si Deus faverit.'
292
and it is easy therefore to cross over from one thing to many

things, it often happens that, having been shown one particular
trail by a teacher, the clever soul uses its own nostrils to hunt
down a long line of numerous quarries. The minds power to gaze
at and to contemplate the truth is no less than the feet's ability to
walk. Socrates leads a child by the hand to help him walk; he asks
a young man questions to help him learn. He does not supply the
child with the power to walk, but fosters the ability and leads it
more safely to its goal. He does not bestow understanding on the
young man, but makes him more ready to accomplish the work of
understanding. But Socrates himself, if he is said to have acquired
his knowledge at some point as something new, acquired it either
by discovery or by being taught. If he discovered things himself,
he could never have used his discoveries unless he learned a way of
using them from nature; [since] he who does not grasp the nature
of an object itself will not know how to use it. If Socrates heard
his knowledge from another, he did not understand it merely from
hearing it prior to knowing whether his teacher's arguments con-
formed to the truth. Nobody knows this unless he has seen the
truth itself. So before anyone can discover or hear about anything,
he is in possession of the truth. As for Socrates' teacher,
Archelaus, either he found his knowledge out for himself, or he
learned it from Anaxagoras. In either case he knew it beforehand.
Perhaps Anaxagoras got it from Anaximenes, and he from
Anaximander, and Anaximander from Thales, but eventually
Thales or some Egyptian priest or other, or, if not that, a Persian
magus, was without a teacher. He who has no man to teach him
learns from nature as a teacher, or rather he knows from God who
taught him long ago. That is why in Plato, in the dialogue on wis-
dom, Socrates says to Theages: "No one ever learnt anything from
me, although many have become wiser by consorting with me, and
with my good daemon encouraging and inspiring them. You too,
God willing, will gain much benefit in a brief time."48
293
Praeterea narrat Socrates ibidem, quemadmodum nonnulli,

dum eius consuetudine uterentur illique propinquarent, ipso etiam
tacente, acutiores evaderent, recedentes vero hebetiores subito red-
derentur, quasi ad divinum quendam influxum a deo per genium
mentemque Socratis in familiarium animos penetrantem vis ilia
ingenii pertineret* Et Orpheus Musas esse dicit Iovis et Memoriae
filias, quia videlicet scientiae in profunda memoria lateant nobis
olim a deo tributae- Quinetiam haec de memoria tradidit,
TLavra voov crvviypvcra Bporcov ifjvx'fjo'L CTVVOLKOV
V7r0fJLvr)crK0v<Ta re Travra
S)v av eKCMTTOs del crTepvoLS yvco/JLiqv Karddr}raL
iireyeipovcra (frpeva TTOLCTLV
id est: 'Totam mentem contines humanorum animorum familiaris.

Commemoras omnia quorum notionem quisque semper animi si-
nibus occulit, mentem suscitas omnibus/
Concludemus iam praesentem disputationem, si prius nos ipsos
admonuerimus, ut quando audimus artes nobis inesse natura, non
intellegamus vel a natura caelesti corporalique impressas vel a mera
animae essentia fluere, siquidem a tali natura impressas habent
bestiae, ab essentia autem mera manantes solus possidet deus.
Sed intellegamus nostris mentibus statim ex deo natis infusas
fuisse species rerum et regulas artium, ut in Timaeo tradit Plato,
non aliter quam angelicis mentibus infundantur. Est autem diffe-
rentia triplex inter nos et bestias quoad artes pertinet. Prima,
quod a deo sine medio nos eas accipimus, illae natura caelesti in-
tercedente. Secunda, quod quisque nostrum accipit cunctas, bes-
tiarum species singulae singulas* Tertia, quod bestiae necessario
quodam impulsu naturae ad suae artis usum certo tempore com-
pelluntur, nos autem libero rationis iudicio turn artis unius, turn
plurimarum usum eligimus.82 Convenimus autem, quantum ad
species rerum et regulas artium attinet, cum angelis atque deo
294
• BOOK XI • C H A P T E R V •
Moreover, in the same work, Socrates tells how some people, 9

when they shared his company and were close to him, and even
though he said nothing, became more acute; similarly, when they
left him, they suddenly became duller again. It was as if this their
wits power belonged to some divine influence, which, having
streamed down from God, was penetrating the souls of Socrates'
friends through the genius and mind of Socrates. Orpheus says
that the Muses are the daughters of Jupiter and Memory, obvi-
ously because the sciences, once given to us by God, lie concealed
in the depths of the memory. And he wrote the following verses
on Memory: YDU contain the whole of mind, friend as you are of
the souls of men. "You remember all those things whose concep-
tion each person hides forever in the recesses of his soul. You
awaken the mind in all men."49
We will now bring this discussion to a close if we first remind 10
ourselves that, when we hear that the arts are present in us by na-
ture, we should not suppose either that they have been imprinted
by celestial and corporeal nature or that they flow from the pure
essence of soul, since beasts have them imprinted by such a nature,
while God alone possesses those emanating from pure essence.
Rather, we should understand that the species of things and the
rules of the arts are imparted to our minds as they issue from God
at the moment of our birth, as Plato tells us in the Timaeus,50 just
as they are imparted to the minds of angels. But when it comes to
the arts, this threefold difference separates us from the animals.
First we receive the arts directly from God, whereas animals need
a celestial intermediary. Second, we each receive them all, whereas
animals receive only one per species. Third, animals are necessarily
obliged, by a natural impulse, to the practice of their art at a par-
ticular time, whereas we can choose to practise one or many on
the basis of a free decision by our reason. But as regards the spe-
des of things and the rules of the arts, we conform with the angels
and with God in various respects, but mostly in that the forms are
295
PLATONIC THEOLOGY
cum in aliis nonnullis turn in hoc vel maxime, quod nobis insunt
per absolutum perspicuumque modum formae83 sicut et illis.
Itaque divinae ideae absolutas atque distinctas ipsarum imagines
nobis tamquam speculis impressere, naturae autem corporali um-
bras quasdam confusiores, quemadmodum nos ad lumen imagi-
nem quidem nostri corporis claram in speculo pingimus, umbram
vero reddimus parieti. Ubi autem idea per modum lucet absolu-
tum perspicuumque, non modo lucet clara, sed fere tota• Omnes
enim ideae proprietates, quas in disputationis huius principio ex
Platonis mente narravimus, in eo consistunt potissimum quod
universalis sit atque soluta. Quod autem non umbrae idearum, sed
imagines perspicuae nobis insint, ex eo patet potissimum, quod
umbras illarum ab imaginibus earundem recta ratione distingui-
mus, quodve formulae illarum nobis insitae ipsas nobis perspicue84
repraesentant nosque ad eas convertunt, et umbrae idearum in
corporibus haud prius eas nobis referunt, quam per nostrae mentis
formulas purgentur atque reformentur. Denique si per distinctas
imagines atque per modum integrum splendent in nostris menti-
bus atque solutum, per modum85 quoque fulgent penitus immor-
talem. Quod si immortalis rei naturale subiectum est immortale
(subiecto namque soluto, quicquid subiecto haerebat, disperditur),
proculdubio mens hominis est immortalis, quae naturaliter firmi-
terque immortalium idearum species per modum suscipit immor-
talem.
: VI :
Ratio secunda: mens est subiectum veritatis aeternae.
i Aurelius Augustinus, divino vir ingenio, quo Latinorum nullus

platonicam maiestatem turn sapientia turn eloquentia expressit
296
present in us in an absolute and perspicuous way just as they are

in them. Thus the divine Ideas print absolute and distinct images
of themselves on us, as in mirrors, but certain vague shadows on
corporeal nature, just as we, the light upon us, reflect a sharp im-
age of our body in a mirror but cast a shadow on a wall. But where
the Idea shines out in an absolute and perspicuous way, it is not
only shining in its brightness but in its entirety almost. For the
properties of an Idea, which we described at the beginning of this
discussion on the basis of what Plato thought, consist mainly in
the fact that it is universal and immaterial. The principal demon-
stration that present in us are not the shadows of the Ideas but
clear images of them is the fact (a) that we do distinguish, using
right reason, the Ideas' shadows from their images, and (b) that
the formulae of the Ideas implanted in us represent the Ideas per-
spicuously to us and turn us back towards them, [whereas] the
shadows of the Ideas in bodies do not bring the Ideas back to us
until they have been purged and reformed through our minds' for-
mulae. Finally, if they do blaze forth in our minds wholly and in-
dependently by way of distinct images, then they also shine in a
manner that is totally immortal. But if the natural subject of
something immortal is immortal (for once the subject perishes
anything attached to it is destroyed), then man's mind, which nat-
urally and constantly receives the species of the immortal Ideas
and receives them in an immortal way, is undoubtedly immortal.
: VI :
Second proof: the mind is the subject of eternal truth.
Aurelius Augustine, a man of divine genius — than whom no other i

Latin has presented with clearer wisdom and eloquence the maj-
297
exactius, iactis a Platone superioribus fundamentis, argument at io-

nes huiusmodi construit.
Aliud est verum, aliud Veritas, quemadmodum aliud castas,
aliud castitas, praestantiusque est vero Veritas, siquidem omne ve-
rum veritate est verum. Cum vero aliquid quod verum dicitur inte-
rit, non tamen interit Veritas, sicut si quis castas intereat, castitas
tamen non interit, 'Si manebit86 semper hie mundus, verum est
semper esse87 mansurum; quod si non manebit, verum est non
semper esse mansurum. Quid cum interierit, si interiturus est,
nonne tunc id verum erit mundum inter iisse? Nam quamdiu ve-
rum non est occidisse mundum, non occidit. Repugnat igitur ut
mundus occiderit et verum non sit mundum occidisse, Non potest
autem aliquid esse verum ubi Veritas non sit. Erit igitur Veritas,
etiam si mundus intereat. Quid si ipsa Veritas occidat? Nonne ve-
rum erit veritatem occidisse? Verum autem non puto esse, si Veri-
tas non sit. Nullo modo igitur occidet Veritas.' Haec Augustinus.
Sed ubinam est Veritas? Non in corporibus; mutaretur enim
corporibus permutatis, cum tamen aeterna sit Veritas. Hinc sequi-
tur paradoxon illud platonicum, corpora non vere esse, quia scili-
cet in illis non maneat Veritas. Ergo quod aurum dicimus, si non
vere est aurum, falsum aurum est. Si hoc, neque aurum quidem
est. Atque ita de ceteris rerum corporalium speciebus. Praeterea,
affectio corporis duo88 temporis puncta non permanet penitus ea-
dem, ut ostendimus alias et in praesentia in hunc modum ostendi-
mus.
Sicut stabilis et simplex aeternitas rerum stabilium simpli-
ciumque mensura est, ita fluens et varium tempus mobilium et
multiplicium est mensura. Temporis puncta numquam permanent
eadem, sed sibi invicem surrepunt semper aliis alia succedentia.
Corpus mundi mobile tamquam mensuram sibi propriam tempus
298
• B O O K X I • C H A P T E R VI •
esty of Plato —used the foundations Plato laid down earlier to

construct the following arguments.
What is true is different from truth, just as a chaste person is 2
different from chastity; and truth is superior to what is true, since
everything that is true is true because of truth. But when some-
thing said to be true perishes, truth does not perish, any more
than when a chaste person dies chastity dies.51 "If this world is go-
ing to last forever, it is true it is going to last forever; but if it is
not going to last forever, it is true it is not going to last forever.
Moreover, when it comes to an end, if it is going to come to an
end, wont it be true that the world has then come to an end? For
so long as it is true that the world has not perished, it has not per-
ished. So it is unacceptable that the world should have perished
and that it not be true that the world has perished. But something
cannot be true where there is no truth. Therefore truth will exist
even if the world perishes. But what if truth itself were to perish?
Wont it be true that truth has perished? But I do not believe this
is true if truth does not exist. Therefore in no way will truth per-
ish." Thus Augustine.52
Where is truth to be found? Not in bodies, for it would change 3
as bodies change, and yet truth is eternal. Hence follows the Pla-
tonic paradox that bodies do not truly exist, because truth does
not reside in them.53 So what we call gold, if it is not truly gold is
false gold. In which case, it is not even gold. The same is true with
the other species of corporeal objects. Moreover, the affective dis-
position of a body does not remain completely the same through
two moments of time, as we proved elsewhere and are now about
to prove again as follows.
Just as eternity, being stable and simple, is the measure of 4
things that are stable and simple, so time, being in flux and varied,
is the measure of things which are mobile and multiple. Moments
of time never remain the same, but steal upon each other in an
endless succession. Time has the moving body of the world as its
299
habet. Si ita est, quadrat utique caeli dispositio et mutatio tempo-

ris fluxui. Itaque non potest in duobus temporis momentis esse
caeli dispositio penitus eadem. Nam si eadem per duo momenta
maneret, in ea ipsa morula tempus quidem de alio momento
fluxisset in aliud, caelum vero quievisset in uno. Fluxus vero quieti
minime congruit. Quod non congruit non metitur. Quomodo
enim motus mensurat quietem aut res fluens per duo rem stantem
in uno? Quapropter in ea morula tempus caelum non mensuras-
set.89 Metitur autem revera tempus semper caelum, non aliter
quam aeternitas ea quae sunt supra caelum. Ergo sicut ilia in aeter-
nitate continue sine ulla mutatione manent, ita caelum sub tem-
pore continue absque ulla quiete transcurrit. Si caelorum configu-
ratio nullo modo permanet, multo minus corpuscula quae sub
caelo sunt et caeli rapacitate raptantur. Necesse est enim haec per
influxum et effluxum, condensationem rarefactionemque, intensio-
nem remissionemve qualitatum, consonantiam et dissonantiam
complexionis, ceterosque motus continue variari. Quod quidem
abunde Plutarchus et Proclus demonstraverunt, et ante illos Hera-
clitus inquit: 'Quemadmodum non possumus eandem torrentis
aquam bis intrare, aut eandem rotae currentis particulam bis simi-
liter tangere, ita similem omnino dispositionem complexionemque
corporis per duo puncta perseverantem assequi non valemus. Si
nullius corporis afFectio duo momenta prorsus eadem et similis
perseverat, in eodem momento incipit qualitas talis et desinit.
Quod in natura incipit, nondum absolutum existendi vel operandi
actum possidet; quod desinit, talem iam actum non retinet. Igitur
in eo puncto in quo esse qualitas ilia dicitur, dici etiam potest non
esse, cum nondum a non esse omnino discesserit et iam in non
300
proper measure. That being so, the heavens disposition and muta-
tion conforms to the flux of time. So the heavens' disposition can-
not remain completely the same in two moments of time. For if it
did remain the same for two moments, time would have flowed
on, in that tiny pause, from one moment to another, but the heav-
ens would have remained stationary in one of them. But flux is to-
tally incompatible with a state of rest. What is incompatible does
not measure. For how can movement measure rest, or something
in flux between two things measure something that remains the
same in one of them? Wherefore in that tiny pause time would
not have measured the heavens. In point of fact, however, time al-
ways measures the heavens, just as eternity measures the things
that are above the heavens. So just as the super-celestials continu-
ally remain unchanging in eternity, so the heavens, in the domain
of time, continually hasten on their course without being ever at
rest. If the configuration of the heavens never stays the same in
any way, much less do the smaller bodies which lie beneath them
and which are snatched up by the heavens' rapacity. For necessarily
they must always be changing by way of influx and efflux, conden-
sation and rarefaction, intensification and remission of qualities,
the harmony and discord of temperament, and the rest of the
changing motions, Plutarch and Proclus have given abundant
proof of this,54 and Heraclitus declared before them: Just as we
cannot step into the same water of a river twice,55 or similarly
twice touch the same part of a moving wheel, so we cannot attain
a disposition or temperament of the body that remains entirely the
same from one moment to the next. If the state of no one body re-
mains completely the same or alike from one moment to the next,
then any quality it possesses starts and stops at the same moment.
In nature what is beginning does not yet possess the absolute act
of existing or doing; and what is ending no longer retains this act.
So in the very moment in which the quality is said to exist, it can
also be said not to exist, since it has not yet completely departed
301
esse labatur* Et quia celeritas temporis linguae celeritatem superat,

dum esse illam pronuntias, te pronuntiante subterfugit prius quam
hoc ipsum verbum est' ore protuleris* Et ut Timaeus inquit, fallit
pronuntiantem, nec umquam vere quicquam de hac pronuntiatur
aut percipitur* Nec esse magis quam non esse dici potest, cum et
sit et non sit pariter dum profertun Quoniam vero quae continue
permutantur, quatenus mutantur, eatenus fiunt; quae vero fiunt,
dum fiunt, revera non sunt; ideo quaecumque ita mutantur et
fiunt, non tam dicuntur esse quam esse videri*
5 Quid90 vero dicemus de tempore? Quod semper falso dicitur
esse, cum esse eius (ut ita loquar) sit non esse. Sane de quolibet
praesenti momento vere dicitur, hoc non est tempus, sed temporis
terminus* De praeterito autem aut futuro dumtaxat affirmatur esse
tempus, siquidem continuam successionem quandam tempore si-
gnificari putamus* Praeteritum vero futurumque non est* Igitur
esse temporis quodammodo in non esse locamus* Momentum
vero, quod est terminus temporis, dum esse pronuntiamus, verti-
tur in non esse atque pronuntiantes mentiri compellit*
6 Quod autem de tempore demonstramus, de temporalibus
quoque est iudicandum, esse scilicet in non esse (ut ita loquar) ha-
bere* His consonat pythagoricum illud: 'Qui homo dicitur, magis
non homo est quam homo, quia si innumerabiles eius partes
consideraveris, innumere poteris iudicare: haec pars non est homo
et ilia similiter* Semel dumtaxat de to to dices: hoc est homo*'
Unde et de elementis Timaeus disserens duas esse elementi partes
existimat, materiam atque formam; propter materiam non dici
ignem aut aquam, sed propter formam; ergo secundum partem*
Hoc igitur solum secundum partem ignis dicitur et illud aqua* Ac
revera non ignis hoc est, sed igneum; illud non aqua, sed
aquaeum*
302
from non-being and is already sliding back into it. And since the
speed of time exceeds the speed of the tongue, even as you say that
the quality exists, it eludes you as you speak and before you can
get the word "exists" out of your mouth. As Timaeus observes, it
deceives the person speaking it, and nothing can ever truly be said
or perceived about it.56 It cannot be said to exist any more than
not to exist, since as it is spoken it equally exists and does not ex-
ist. But since the things that always change, to the extent that they
change, also become, but things that become, while they become,
do not truly exist, it follows that all that change and become in
this way are said not so much to exist as to appear to exist.
What then shall we say about time? That it is always falsely 5
said to exist, because its existence is, in a sense, its non-existence.
Of any present moment we can truly say that it is not time but the
terminus or end of time. Of the past and the future only can we
affirm that time exists, because we believe that time signifies a
kind of continuous succession. But the past and the future do not
exist. So in a way we locate the existence of time in non-existence.
But the moment, which is times terminus, even as we say it exists,
turns into non-existence and compels those saying it to lie.
What we are demonstrating with time must be brought to bear 6
too on things that exist in time, namely that they have their exis-
tence in non-existence as it were. In accord with this is the Py-
thagorean saying: "The person called a man is more a non-man
than a man, since if you think of the enormous number of parts
he has, you can endlessly deliberate, 'This part is not the man and
likewise that part/ Only once, and of the whole, will you say, 'This
is the man.'"57 When Timaeus discusses the elements, he argues
that they have two parts, matter and form; and it is not because of
the matter that an element is called fire or water but because of
the form, and hence because of a part.58 So this element is called
fire and that one water only because of a part. But in reality this
one is not fire, just fiery, that one not water, just watery.
303
7 Adde quod illud est verum tale, quod merum tale est, puta ve-
rum vinum, quod merum est vinum* Natura vero cuiusque speciei
quando in materia est, primo quidem admixtam habet potentiam
ad non esse, ut in libro quinto probavimus* Deinde multa patitur
additamenta ac saepe contraria* Siquidem in aere saepe aliquid
igneum est, semper situs aliquid praeter aeris rationem* In homine
hoc vel illo saepe complexio aliqua contra naturam eius, semper
habitus aliquis vel affectus, figura vel situs ultra humanae speciei
necessitatem* Similiter se habent et reliquae rerum naturalium
species* Quoniam vero super omnia quae per partem et impure ta-
lia sunt, esse oportet ea quae secundum se tota et pure sunt talia,
putat Timaeus super inquinatas et mancas materiae formas esse
alias meras, integras, separatas* Atque eius rationis viribus confidit
maxime, quae sic argumentatur*91
8 Formae quae sunt in alio, scilicet in materia, sunt et ab alio,
non tamen ab informi natura materiae; et formam esse oportet a
forma, et a forma tandem per se subsistente, atque una formabilis
materia ad unum tandem reducitur formatorem* Nam et si quis
multos induxerit formatores, numquam multi, quatenus diversi
sunt, mutuum inter se habebunt ordinem atque ad unum opus
finemque conducent, sed quatenus ab uno omnium formatore du-
cuntur. Igitur necesse est formas dari materiae a mente quadam
plena formarum, ubi formae sint ipsa mentis essentia atque ideo
verae sint species* At quia mens ilia est esse primum, materia vero
est proxima nihilo; et ilia purus actus, haec pura potentia, sequitur
ut materia innumerabiliter paene sit mente deterior* Quicquid
autem ab aliquo capitur in suscipientis transit naturam* Quare
formae immersae materiae usque adeo sunt speciebus mentis dete-
riores, ut umbrae quaedam sint illarum potius quam imagines, et
304
Moreover, what is truly such is what is purely such; true wine, 7

for instance, is what is pure wine. But first, the nature of each spe-
cies when it is in matter has the potentiality for non-existence
blended into it, as we have shown in Book Five.59 Further, it is
subject to many additional components that are frequently its con-
traries, In air, for instance, there is often something fiery, and al-
ways a disposition over and beyond the rational principle of air.
Present in this or that man there is often some complexion con-
trary to his nature, and always some habit or affect or physical
shape or disposition over and beyond what the human species
needs. The same is true of all the other species of natural objects.
But since above all that are partially or impurely such, there must
be others that are of themselves totally and purely such, Timaeus
believes that above the contaminated and crippled forms of matter
exist other forms that are pure, whole, and separate.60 He relied
mainly on the force of the following argument.
Forms that are in another, that is, in matter, are also from an- 8
other; but they cannot be from the formless nature of matter.
Form must come from form, and ultimately from form subsisting
of itself; and the one formable matter must ultimately be brought
back to the one form-giver. For if someone were to introduce
many form-givers, these many, insofar as they are different, would
never have a mutual order among themselves or lead matter to one
product and goal except to the extent they are led by the one who
is the form-giver of all. So the forms must necessarily be given to
matter by a mind replete with the forms, and in which the forms
are the minds essence itself and therefore the true species. Since
that mind is the prime being, whereas matter is next to nothing,
and since mind is pure act whereas matter is pure potency, it fol-
lows that matter is inferior to mind to an almost measureless de-
gree. But anything that is admitted by something else passes over
into the nature of its recipient. So forms that are immersed in
matter are so far inferior to the mind's species that they are their
305
illarum denominationem (et hanc quidem falsam) retineant potius

quam naturam. Sicut artificia sunt simulacra naturalium, ita natu-
ralia sunt simulacra divinorum. Propius autem accedunt artificia
ad naturalium veritatem (quia cum illis conveniunt in materia)
quam naturalia ad veritatem divinorum. Si ergo pictus equus
usque adeo a naturali equo deficit ut non sit verus equus, multo
magis naturalis equus adeo divino equo, id est ab idea veraque equi
ratione deficit, ut did debeat umbram equi ipsius potius quam for-
mam repraesentare. Ac si vera hominis et equi ratio naturaque
idea ipsa est hominis aut equi, et hanc non servat materia longis-
sime inde distans, concluditur illud Socratis in Pbaedone et in Repu-
blics videlicet veros homines verosque equos in materia non repe-
riri, quae idearum umbris ita ignorantium92 fallit animulas, ut
somniantium instar, dum rerum verarum simulacra vident, putent
se res ipsas inspicere.
9 His consonat illud Procli nostri paradoxon. Composita ex ele-
mentis neque sempiternitatem habent neque statum. Purae men-
tes utrumque possident suaque simul omnia comprehendunt. Ho-
rum media sunt, quae suam in motu quodam sempiternitatem
habent. Animae quidem mentibus proximae motum in operatione
dumtaxat admittunt; animae vero sequentes quodammodo insuper
in virtute. Universa denique corporei mundi machina, tamquam
per essentiam operatione virtuteque animarum inferior, essentiam
quoque ita mutabilem nacta est, ut tota undique sit temporalis.
Atque sicut res omnino aeterna in uno semper tota manet, ita
mundi huius machina penitus temporalis in quolibet temporis
infiniti momento tota a mundo divino effluat semper statimque
diffluat simul et refluat, non aliter quam quidam putent a sole lu-
306
mere shadows rather than their images; and they retain just their
name (and even that is false) and not their nature. But just as
products of art are the images of natural objects, so natural objects
are the images of divine objects* Products of art come closer to the
truth of natural objects (because they share in matter with them)
than natural objects come to the truth of divine objects* If a
painted horse, therefore, is so far short of being a horse in nature
that it is not a true horse, a fortiori a horse in nature falls so far
short of the divine horse, of the Idea and true rational principle of
a horse, that we ought to say it represents that horses shadow
rather than its form* If the true rational principle and nature of a
man or a horse is the Idea itself of man or horse, and matter no
longer retains this Idea being so far distant from it, we arrive at
Socrates conclusion in the Phaedo and the Republic:61 namely that
true men and true horses are not found in matter, which so de-
ceives the diminutive souls of ignorant men with the shadows of
Ideas that, like dreamers, they suppose they are gazing at things
true when they are merely gazing upon the images of them*
Our Proclus' paradox is consistent with this*62 Compounds 9
from the elements possess neither eternity nor stability* Pure
minds possess both, and they contain everything they possess si-
multaneously* What intervenes are things which possess their eter-
nity in some motion* Souls closest to minds admit movement only
in their activity; but lower souls admit it also in a way in their
power* Lastly, the universal machine of the corporeal world, being
inferior through its essence to souls in both activity and power,
has also been provided with an essence so changeable that it is en-
tirely and everywhere temporal* And just as a completely eternal
thing remains forever whole in one moment, so this world's ma-
chine, being entirely temporal, at every moment of infinite time
flows out in its entirety forever from the divine world, and imme-
diately ebbs away and simultaneously flows back again* Not dis-
similarly, certain people think that the light from the sun, moment
307
men per momenta semper effundi simul totum ac diffundi, re-

pente vanescens atque refundi*
10 Profecto quod individua aeternitas ipsa metitur, individuum
esse necesse est* Quod ergo divisibilem habet essentiam turn ex
partibus, turn ex naturis pluribus constitutam, qualis est mundi
machina, cum individua aeternitate non congruit, sed cum tem-
pore potius divisibili quo mensuratur, quocum93 perpetuo labium
Praeterea, divisibilem motu virtutem actionemque sortitur, qua-
propter mundi moles momentis singulis tota simul ex non esse in-
cipit esse atque desinit iterumque renascitur; quemadmodum in
motu et tempore, quibus omnino subiecta est, momenta profluunt
tota singulatim simul et refluunt* Quod quidem ita insuper con-
firmatur, quod perpetuo caelestium motui virtute opus est infinita*
Quam cum terminatum mundi corpus neque ex se habere neque
totam simul ab alio possit accipere, oportet ab opifice suo atque
motore paulatim momentis singulis haurire—haurire inquam,
momentaneam et subito vanescentem* Siquidem et temporalis
essentia omnino temporaliter accipit, et terminata natura capax
aeternitatis, cuius infinita totaque simul potentia est, esse non
potest* Sane et natura mundi infinitatem simul non potest acci-
pere* Et aeternalis infinitas, cum individua totaque simul constet,
a nullo potest accipi paulatim*
11 Hie Proclus ita distinguit: Essentias immobiles esse quidem a
deo quodammodo semel, sed a se ipsis suamet virtute servari*
Nam cum sine motu totae simul inde sint, ideo stabiles per se
deinde perseverare posse quodammodo, suaque virtute iam a qui-
busdam potentiis suis in suos actus posse procedere* Quamobrem
tales essentias per se subsistentes nominat, seque quodammodo
producentes afErmat, machinam vero corpoream, et post animae
motum tempusque, et una cum motu temporeque corporeo
308
by moment, forever pours forth in its simultaneous entirety, radi-

ating out to the vanishing point, and then pours back again.
Because eternity itself measures indivisibles, it must be some- 10
thing indivisible. So something that has a divisible essence both
from its parts and from its many natures like the machine of the
world is not compatible with indivisible eternity but rather with
divisible time by which it is measured and in which it perpetually
slips away. Moreover, it is allotted a power and an activity divisible
in motion, so the entire mass of the world moment by moment si-
multaneously begins to be from non-being and ceases to be and is
born again, just as in motion and time, to which the world is com-
pletely subject, all moments flow out one by one and simulta-
neously flow back again. This is confirmed by the fact that the
perpetual motion of the heavens requires infinite power. Since the
world s body, being determined, cannot possess this power of it-
self, nor receive it wholly and simultaneously from another, it
must derive it from its creator and mover a little at a time and mo-
ment by moment —derive it, that is, as a momentary power that
suddenly vanishes. For a temporal essence receives in an entirely
temporal way; and a limited nature is unable to acquire the capac-
ity of receiving eternity, whose power is infinite and whole simul-
taneously. Obviously the world s nature cannot receive infinity all
at once. And eternal infinity, because it is indivisible and whole si-
multaneously, cannot be received little by little by anything at all.
Here Proclus makes the following distinction: he argues that n
unchangeable essences come from God in a way just once, but that
they preserve themselves through their own power.63 For, since
they exist through God simultaneously and without motion as
wholes, they are able in some manner to remain at rest thereafter
through themselves, and then to proceed by their own power from
their own particular potentialities to their own acts. Wherefore he
calls such essences self-subsistent and claims that they are, in a
sense, self-producing, but that the corporeal machine, which flows
309
profluentem, nihil habere stabile nullamque habere virtutem sui-

met servatricem. Itaque non substantialem aut veram, sed umbra-
tilem omnino falsamque quasi Manichaeorum more cognominat,
perpetuo dilabentem perpetuoque influxu desuper instaurante
prorsus egentem, quasi corporis umbras in aqua velocissime
perfluente. Hinc illud Timaei: mundum intellegebilem semper
quidem esse, numquam vero fieri dicimus; sensibilem vero fieri
certe semper, esse numquam/ Hie Proclus addit mundum ilium
numero eundem semper existere; hunc vero non proprie unum
eundemque numero esse umquam, sed potius unum eundemque
numero continue recreari. Et quantum corpus est, fieri semper
atque incipere, quantum vero a mente divina dependet, factum
esse semper finemque subito consequL Sed huius paradoxon finem
iam habeat.
12 Quoniam igitur tota sensibilis machina vanitas quaedam est va-
nitatisque quotidie sensibus causa, ideo exclamavit Salomon: 'Va-
nitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas/ Non est igitur in rebus sensibili-
bus Veritas. Sed numquid in anima? Forsitan est in anima; non
tamen, ut opinatus est Protagoras94 atque Epicurus, in ea parte
animae quae sensus est, quia extra se respicit et cum passione qua-
dam sentire compellitur frequentibusque nugis deluditur sensibi-
lium. Propterea Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, Stilpo
dixerunt nihil veri sensibus comprehendi. Idem ferme Anaxagorae
Empedoclique placuit et Platoni. Nam etiam si quis dixerit esse
aliqua sensibilia eodem modo semper manentia, et quaestionem
nobis de sole atque stellis afferat, in quibus facile convinci non
possit, quod cita mutabilitate nos fallant, illud certe nemo est qui
non cogatur fateri: nihil esse sensibile quod non habeat simile fal-
sum, ita ut internosci non possit.
310
forth subsequent to the movement and time of soul but in com-

pany with the motion and time of body possesses nothing stable
and no power to sustain itself. So he calls it, almost in the
Manichaean manner, not substantial or true but utterly shadowy
and false, continually slipping away and needing to be continually
replenished by an influx from above, like a body's shadows in fast-
flowing water.64 Hence Timaeus' remark, "we say that the intelligi-
ble world always exists, but never becomes, but that the sensible
world always becomes certainly but never exists."65 At this point,
Proclus adds that the intelligible world always exists as numerically
the same, while the sensible world is never properly numerically
one and the same, but rather is continuously recreated numerically
one and the same.66 To the extent that it is body, it is always be-
coming and beginning, but to the extent that it depends on the di-
vine mind, it always exists and achieves its end immediately. But
let us now finish with Proclus' paradox.
So since this whole sensible machine is a vanity, and daily the 12
cause of vanity to the senses, Solomon exclaimed: "Vanity of vani-
ties; all is vanity."67 Truth, then, does not reside in sensible things.
But is it in the soul? Perhaps it is in the soul, but not, as
Protagoras and Epicurus thought,68 in the part of the soul that is
sense, because that looks outside itself, is forced to feel with a cer-
tain passion, and is deluded by the frequent trivia of things sensi-
ble. For that reason, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus
and Stilpo said that nothing true could be comprehended by the
senses.69 Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato felt much the same.
For even if someone were to claim that there are some sensibles
that always remain in the same way, and to raise the question for
us of the sun and the stars, wherein we cannot be easily convinced
that they are deceiving us by their rapid mutability, certainly there
is no one who is not forced to admit this fact: nothing sensible ex-
ists which does not have a likeness so deceiving that we cannot tell
between them.
311
13 Nam ut alia praetermittam, ut Augustinus inquit, omnia quae

per corpus sentimus, etiam cum ea non adsunt sensibus, imagines
tamen eorum patimur tamquam prorsus adsint vel in somno vel in
furore. Quod cum patimur, omnino utrum ea ipsis sensibus sen-
tiamus, an imagines sensibilium sint, discernere non valemus. Si
igitur sunt imagines sensibilium falsae quae discerni ipsis sensibus
nequeunt, et nihil percipi potest nisi quod a falso discernitur, non
est constitutum iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Atque fieri forte
potest ut sensus aliqua vere percipiat, ut Aristoteli placuit, num-
quam tamen discernit verene an95 contra percipiat. Et cum Veritas
rerum naturalium in eo consistat ut divinae mentis congruant ra-
tionibus, quemadmodum Veritas artificiorum ut congruant artifi-
ciosae mentis ideis, sensus congruitatem eiusmodi non agnoscit
ideoque non habet veritatis examen. Rursus, cum cognoscentis po-
tentiae Veritas turn oriatur, quando potentia rebus congruit co-
gnoscendis, perficiatur autem quando rerum adaequatur ideis,
sensus, qui neque illam congruentiam neque adaequationem ani-
madvertit, caret iudicio veritatis. Adde quod sensus non compre-
hendit intimam meramque rei substantiam, aut quo ordine in na-
tura res quaelibet disponatur, quod totum ad rei ipsius pertinet
veritatem. Sed subito impulsu allicitur qualitatum ad prosequen-
dum vel fugiendum, in quo corporis sui commoditati indulget po-
tius quam veritati rerum comprehendendae.
14 Ergo non est in sensu veritatis iudicium constitutum; constitu-
tum est96 autem in ratione. Nam privationes rerum per habitus co-
gnoscuntur, per lumen tenebrae, per voces vero silentium. Privatio
veritatis est falsum. Ratio nostra sensibilia et sensus redarguit
falsi, quod facere non potest, nisi praesentis veritatis examine.
Rursus, ratio veritatem ipsam ita describit: Veritas est naturae
312
* BOOK X I • C H A P T E R V I •
To leave aside other issues as Augustine says, even when all the 13
things we perceive through the body are not present to the senses,
we still receive their images as though they were completely pres-
ent whether in sleep or in delirium.70 When we receive them, we
cannot tell entirely whether we are perceiving them with the senses
or whether they are just images of sensibles, So if there are false
images of sensibles that cannot be distinguished by the actual
senses, and nothing can be perceived except what is distinguished
from the false, then the ability to judge of the truth has not been
established in the senses. Perhaps it is possible for some one sense
to perceive some things truly, as Aristotle maintains,71 but it can
never be sure it is perceiving truly or not. Since the truth of natu-
ral objects consists in their being congruent with the rational prin-
ciples of the divine mind, just as the truth of artificial objects
consists in their being congruent with the ideas in the artists
mind, the sense does not recognize this congruence and therefore
has no criterion of truth. Again, since the truth of the cognitive
power awakens when the power is congruent with the objects to
be known, and since it reaches perfection when it is adequately
matched to the objects' Ideas, so the sense, which cannot perceive
either that congruence or that adequacy, lacks the ability to judge
of truth. Furthermore, the sense does not comprehend the inner,
pure substance of a thing, or in what natural order each thing is
arranged, all of which pertains to its truth. Rather, excited by
mere qualities, suddenly it is lured into either seeking or avoiding,
and in this it is more concerned with its body's comfort than with
understanding the truth of things.
Judgment of the truth is not then located in the sense, but in 14
the reason. For things' defects or privations are known by way of
their [good] habits, darkness by way of light, silence by way of
speech. The privation of truth is the false. Our reason accuses sen-
sible objects and the senses of falsehood, which it cannot do ex-
cept by the criterion of truth that is present. Again, reason de-
313
cuiusque pura integritas et integra puritas. N o n definitur autem

Veritas nisi sub naturali veritatis et propria ratione. In ipsa ratione
veritatis est Veritas. Est igitur Veritas in animo veritatem defi-
niente, sicut in animo falsum redarguente. Quinetiam est in animo
rem quamlibet describente. Speciei siquidem definitio ipsam rei
essentiam complectitur turn integram, turn ab extraneis contingen-
tibus segregatam.
15 Si ergo in ipsis speciebus est Veritas rerum, species autem
definitione comprehenditur et definitio mente,97 quis non videat
esse in mente hominis veritatem? Quae si est immortalis, satis de-
clarat mentem, cui inhaeret inseparabiliter, incorruptibilem esse,
nam qualitas, quae alicui subiecto inhaeret inseparabilis, subiecto
sublato, disperditur. Inhaerere autem veritatem nobis inseparabili-
ter, illud testimonio esse potest, quod vel assidue, vel saltern arbi-
tratu nostro, subito et sola mentis in seipsam collectione turn falsa
multa damnamus, turn communes naturas aliquas definimus sive
naturalium rerum, sive moralium, sive artificiorum. Quinetiam ex
eo idem concluditur quod in superioribus ostendimus, idearum
perspicuas rationes menti stabiles inhaerere. In ipsis vero rerum
omnium veritates comprehenduntur. Prae ceteris autem declarat
hoc summopere vis ipsa rationalis, quae non minus homini natu-
ralis est, quam avibus sit volatus canibusve latratus. Per hanc So-
crates homo est, per hanc homo ab illis animalium distinguitur
speciebus. Rationalem vim vocamus in praesentia ipsam ratioci-
nandi virtutem, quae consequentia cernit, id est, quid ex quoque
sequatur animadvertit gradatim et a praecedentibus ordine percur-
rit ad consequentia. Haec est naturalis quaedam dialectica, id est
ars disserendi, ab origine hominibus insita. Per hanc pueri et im-
peritissimi quique partes suas quibuscumque possunt coniecturis
assertionibusque tutantur. Atque omnis hominis sermo totaque
314
scribes truth itself thus: truth is the pure integrity and the integral
purity of each nature* But truth is not defined except in terms of
truths natural and appropriate rational principle* Truth is in the
rational principle of truth* Therefore truth is present in the think-
ing soul defining truth, as it is in the soul confuting falsehood* In-
deed it is present in the soul when it is describing anything* For
the definition of a things species embraces its essence as being
both integral and apart from all that is extraneous and contingent*
So if the truth of things is in the species themselves, but a spe- 15
cies is comprehended by a definition and a definition by a mind,
then who is unaware that truth is present in mans mind? But if
truth is immortal, it is sufficiently clear that the mind to which it
clings inseparably is incorruptible, for a quality which inheres in-
separably in any subject is destroyed once the subject is no more*
That truth inheres inseparably in us, however, can be proved by
the fact that we condemn many falsehoods either constantly or
when we choose to at least, and solely by the sudden gathering of
the mind into itself; and we define the common natures of natural
objects, of moral concepts, or of the products of art and skill* In-
deed this leads to the same conclusion we proved above: that the
perspicuous rational principles of the Ideas inhere unchangeably in
the mind* But in these are comprehended the truths of all things*
Principally and preeminently demonstrating this is the rational
power itself, which is no less natural to man than flight to birds or
barking to dogs* Through reason Socrates is a man, through rea-
son man is distinguished from the species of the animals* We call
the rational power in the present context the power of reasoning
itself which perceives consequences, that is, notices what follows
what step by step, and follows the order from antecedents to
consequents* It is a sort of natural dialectic, a skill in arguing im-
planted in men from the onset* Through it children and people
without any experience defend their positions with whatever con-
jectures and assertions they can* All mans converse, all the action
315
vitae actio et consultatio nihil est aliud quam argumentatio quae-

dam. Ac nemo est tam insanus, quin ex aliis alia inferat argumen-
tando, et ita ferme ab imaginibus ad imagines argumentetur,98 si-
cut sana mens ad res ipsas percurrit ex rebus. Vis ergo rationalis
numquam ab homine separatur. Quod si ab hac non separetur Ve-
ritas, ab anima n u m q u a m Veritas separabitur.
16 In hac disserendi virtute duae insunt necessitates, altera secun-
dum subiectum eius, altera secundum eius usum. Prima quidem
necessitas est, quia ipsa disserendi facultas toti hominum speciei
sic insita est, ut nequeat separari. Secunda vero necessitas, quae in
eius usu conspicitur, duplex est, absoluta et relativa.
17 Absoluta quidem necessitas in tribus apparet, scilicet in disci-
plinae principiis, definitionibus, proprietatibus. Principia sunt
huiusmodi: quicquid est, aut per se est aut per aliud. Contraria
sua se natura repellunt. Omne totum est maius sua parte. Suum
cuique tribuendum. Haec et talia plurima necessario ita se habent
ut necessario cognoscantur, quia neque possunt umquam aliter se
habere, neque ab aliquo quamvis imperitissimo ignorari. Est
quoque necessitas in definitionibus, ut quando sic circulus defini-
tur: circulus est figura a cuius centro ad circumferentiam omnes
lineae in rectum ductae sunt aequales. Quamvis enim vel talis ver-
borum coniunctio in ore vel figuratio talis in pulvere sit contin-
gens, Veritas tamen ilia est necessaria et sempiterna, quod ilia ipsa
circuli est natura. Similis in proprietatibus necessitas est, id est
quod circulus est capacissimus omnium figurarum. Atque ut ce-
tera omittam, nonne in numeris a necessaria veritate in necessa-
riam veritatem absque fine transcurrimus? Bis duo quatuor, ter
tria novem, bis quatuor octo et quae sequuntur. Idem facimus in
compositionibus comparationibusque figurarum. Quod si defini-
tiones proprietatesque in principiis confluunt (quia effluunt ex
316
and planning of his life are nothing other than a kind of argumen-
tation. No one is so insane that he cannot infer by arguing from
one thing to another; and even such a person argues from images
to images in almost the same way as the sane mind proceeds logi-
cally from realities to realities. So the rational power is never sepa-
rated from man. But if truth is not separated from that power,
then truth will never be separated from the soul.
Two types of necessity dwell in this power of examining, one 16
relating to its subject, the other to its practice. The first necessity
is because the ability to argue is so innate to the whole human spe-
cies that it cannot be separated from it. But the second necessity,
which is seen in the practice of argument, is twofold, one absolute,
the other relative.
Absolute necessity appears in three aspects: in the principles, 17
definitions, and properties of a discipline. Principles are of this
kind: Whatever exists either exists of itself or through another.
Contraries naturally repel each other. The whole is greater than its
part. Each must be given its own. These and many like principles
are necessarily such that they are necessarily known, because they
cannot ever be otherwise and cannot be unknown to anybody,
however ignorant. Definitions have a necessity too, as when a cir-
cle is defined as a figure in which all the straight lines drawn from
the center to the circumference are equal. For though a spoken
combination of words like this or a diagram drawn in the dust
may be contingent, yet the truth itself is necessary and everlasting,
because that is the nature of the circle. And properties have a like
necessity also: the circle, for instance, is the most capacious of all
figures. And, to leave aside other examples, don't we travel in the
case of numbers from one necessary truth to the next necessary
truth ad infinitum? Twice two is four, three times three is nine,
twice four is eight and so on. We do the same in the construction
and comparison of figures. But if both definitions and properties
flow back into principles (given that they flow out of principles),
317
principiis); principia vero necessario insunt semper virtuti rationali

(unde assidue aliqua de re ratiocinetur), fit ut hae tres necessariae
veritates, quae omnes absolutae vocantur, in naturali hominum
dialectica comprehendantur.
18 Restat necessitas relativa, quae etiam tres habet partes: alia qui-
dem est in positione, in conditione alia, alia in demonstratione.
Prima est talis: res nulla potest non esse dum est; animal dum vi-
vit, necessario vivit et similia, quae de praesenti tempore affirman-
tur. Ex quibus necessitas habetur praeteriti atque futuri. Quod
factum est, infectum esse non potest. Quod futurum est, non po-
test non fore. Secunda talis est: si corpus vivit, est necessario. Si
animal currit, movetur. Tertia est huiusmodi: omnis pars minor
est quam totum. Caput humani corporis pars est. Ergo caput illud
est humano corpore minus. Haec conclusio ideo omnino necessa-
ria est, quia duae praecedentes propositiones necessariae sunt si-
mul iunctae. Necesse est enim caput esse minus corpore, turn quia
pars est minor toto, turn quia ipsum est pars corporis.
19 Quapropter in his quoque tribus, positione," conditione, de-
monstratione, tres sunt necessariae veritates. At si tria ipsa in hu-
mana ratione sunt cum disputat, tres quoque hae veritates neces-
sariae sunt in ipsa. Et quia disputat semper, etiam dum tacemus,
et dum dormimus (tota enim hominis vita perpetua quaedam ra-
tiocinatio est), idcirco semper sunt illae veritates in ratione. Quae
semper, ut ita loquar, et veridica est et verifica. Veridica in primis
tribus veritatibus quae necessariae per se sunt, etiam si ratio nihil
egerit. Verifica in tribus aliis, quia ratio necessitatem quandam illis
imponit per positiones, conditiones, demonstrationes, sive per
quoslibet alios argumentandi modos. Contingit enim hoc animal
318
but principles are necessarily present in the rational power

(whence it can reason all the time about something), then it fol-
lows that these three necessary truths, which are all described as
absolute, are contained in the natural dialectic of men.
That leaves us with relative necessity, which also has three 18
parts: one is in propositional statements, the second in conditional
ones, the third in demonstrative ones, (i) Examples of the first are:
Nothing cannot exist while it exists; an animal while it lives is nec-
essarily alive; and similar propositions that are affirmed about the
present. From them derives the necessity of the past and of the fu-
ture: What has been done cannot be undone; what will be cannot
not be. (2) Examples of the second are: If a body is alive, it neces-
sarily exists; if an animal is running, it is in motion. (3) And an
example of the third is: Every part is smaller than the whole; the
head is part of the human body; so the head is smaller than the
human body. This conclusion is wholly necessary, because the two
prior necessary propositions have been linked together. For the
head is necessarily smaller than the body, both because the part is
smaller than the whole, and because the head is part of the body.
Accordingly, in these three forms of argument too — of proposi- 19
tion, condition, and demonstration — three necessary truths exist.
If the three relationships are in the human reason when it is en-
gaged in argument, then the three necessary truths are in it as
well. But because reason is always engaged in argument, even
when we are not speaking, and even while we are asleep (for the
whole of a mans life is in a sense an unending process of reason-
ing), so these truths are always present in the reason. Reason is, if
I may put it so, both truth-speaking and truth-doing: truth-speak-
ing in the case of the first three truths which are necessary in
themselves even if the reason does nothing; truth-doing in the case
of the other three, because reason imposes a necessity on them by
way of propositions, conditions, and demonstrations, or the other
forms of argument. For it is contingent that a particular animal is
319
vivere, non tamen, dum vivit, contingit vivere, sed est necessarium.
Contingit hunc hominem moveri, non tamen si currat, immo se-
quitur necessario. Contingit hoc caput esse hoc corpore minus,
sed positis ab animo prioribus illis duabus propositionibus, est ne-
cesse, quamvis in ipsa specie capitis et specie corporis numquam id
sit contingens. Si ratio in aliis necessariam veritatem capit, in aliis
ipsa facit, et capit semper et facit, quis negabit in ea esse perpe-
tuam veritatem? Immo quis negabit earn esse necessariam, post-
quam quae per se necessaria sunt, ita ut sunt, accipit, neque mu-
tat; quae vero non sunt per se talia, ipsa virtute sua efficit
necessaria? Et multo magis necessaria est quam omnia quae posi-
tionibus, conditionibus, argumentationibus necessaria efficiuntur
ab ipsa. Ipsa igitur absolute est necessaria ferme ut principia ilia
disciplinarum definitiones proprietatesque perpetuae. Quapropter
humana ratio vel necessario fuit semper et erit ut ilia, vel saltern
necessario semper erit. Nam quid prohibet fore perpetuam ratio-
nem cuius perennis actio nihil est aliud quam ex absoluta aeterni-
tate firmiter intra manente relativam aeternitatem temporalibus
quibuslibet contingentibusque praestare atque ex necessariis et
contingentibus seriem unam digerere necessariam et perpetuam?
Si erit semper, vivet et semper. Non enim est ratio nisi vivens et in
vivente.
320
alive, but not contingent while it is alive that it lives, rather it is

necessary. It is contingent that this man is in motion, but not con-
tingent if he is running, for then it follows of necessity. It is con-
tingent that this particular head is smaller than this particular
body, but once the reasoning soul has posited the two earlier prop-
ositions [stated under (3) above], it is necessary, (though it is never
contingent in the species itself of head and the species of body). If
reason in some cases receives a necessary truth, but in others
makes a truth necessary, and if it is always receiving and making,
who will deny that perpetual truth dwells in reason? Or rather,
who will deny that reason itself is necessary, since things that are
necessary of themselves it receives just as they are and does not
change, but things that are not necessary of themselves it makes
necessary by its power? And reason is much more necessary than
all the things it makes necessary through propositions, conditions,
and other forms of argumentation. Reason is necessary, then, ab-
solutely, almost like the principles, definitions, and perpetual
properties of the different branches of knowledge. So like them
human reason either has always necessarily existed and always will,
or, at the least, will always necessarily exist. For what prevents
there being an everlasting reason, whose unceasing activity is noth-
ing other than (a) providing, from the absolute eternity lodged
unchangingly within it, a relative eternity to various temporal and
contingent objects; and (b) assembling, from both necessary and
contingent things, a single, necessary, and everlasting series? If it
always exists, it will always live. For reason does not exist unless it
is living, and living in a living being.
321
: VII :
Obiectio Scepticorum et responsio,

quod aliquid certum sciatur.
1 Neque audiendi sunt Sceptici, si negaverint in animis nostris esse

veritatem, quia videantur de singulis dubitare. Non enim de omni-
bus dubitat animus, ut apparuit in omnibus necessariis veritatibus
quas narravimus, et similibus. Hoc mihi candidum videri scio; hoc
mihi iocunde olere scio; hoc dulciter gustum attingere scio. Quis
nesciat summum bonum esse quo nihil praestantius, et esse vel in
homine vel extra hominem, et si in homine, vel in animo vel in
corpore vel in utroque? Quis non certe sciat Deum esse vel non
esse, et si sit, oportere unum esse vel plures, et si plures, aut finitos
numero aut infinitos? Oportere Deum esse corporeum vel incor-
poreum, ac si not sit corporeus, esse necessario incorporeum?
2 Item regulas multas astrologiae et medicinae certas esse declarat
effectus, ut arithmeticas et geometricas praetermittam, quibus ni-
hil est certius. Et quod maius est, si quando animus de re aliqua
dubitat, tunc etiam de multis est cert us. Nam se tunc dubitare non
dubitat. Ac si certum habet se esse dubitantem, a veritate certa id
habet certum. Quippe qui se dubitantem intellegit, verum intelle-
git, et de hac re quam intellegit certus est; de vero igitur est certus.
Atque omnis qui utrum sit Veritas dubitat, in seipso habet verum,
unde non dubitet. Nec ullum verum nisi veritate verum est. Non
igitur oportet eum de veritate dubitare100 qui potuit undecumque
dubitare, ut Augustinus inquit, praesertim cum non modo se du-
322
BOOK XI • C H A P T E R VII
: VII :
An objection from the Skeptics and its rebuttal

Knowledge of something certain is possible•
We should not listen to Skeptics if they deny that truth exists in i

our souls on the grounds that souls appear to be in doubt about
particular matters. For the soul is not in doubt about everything,
as was evident in all the necessary truths we talked about, and oth-
ers like them. I know that this looks white to me; I know that this
smells pleasant to me; and I know that this strikes my taste as
sweet.72 Who denies that the highest good is that to which noth-
ing is superior, that it exists either in man or outside him, and, if
it is in man, that it is either in his soul or body or both? And who
does not know for certain that God either exists or does not exist;
and if He exists, that He must be either one or more than one;
and if more than one, then either finite in number or infinite; and
that He must be either corporeal or incorporeal, and if not corpo-
real, then necessarily incorporeal?
Results have shown that many laws governing astrology and 2
medicine are certain, not to mention the rules of arithmetic and
geometry which are the most certain of all. More importantly,
whenever the soul does doubt something, at that very moment it
is certain of many things. For it does not doubt it doubts. And if
it knows for certain it doubts, it derives that certainty from a cer-
tain truth. Anyone who understands he is doubting, understands
something true, and is certain of what he understands, therefore
certain of what is true. So everyone who doubts whether truth ex-
ists, has something true in himself about which he is not in doubt.
No true thing is true except through truth. So he who was able to
doubt on any grounds must not be in doubt about the truth, as
Augustine says, especially since not only does he understand he is
323
bitare intellegat, sed quod hoc intellegit animadvertat, et quod ani-

madvertit agnoscat, ac deinceps in infinitum. Discernit praeterea
dubium animum ab indubio. Nec eum latet quanto satius foret
non dubitare et quam ardenter cupiat veritatem. Certitudinem
cum dubio comparat, quo fit ut de utrisque sit certus. Est insuper
certus se investigare, sentire, vivere, esse, siquidem nihil dubitat
qui non est, vivit, sentit et investigate Certus quoque est se non
esse primam veritatem, quippe cum ipsa de se non dubitet. Scit
earn dubitatione et errore non implicari. Scit oportere se in iudi-
cando falli aut non falli. Scit, sive fallatur sive non fallatur, dum
iudicat se proculdubio vivere. Postremo non ignorat esse extra ani-
mum suum aliquid aliud in natura quod ipsi inferat dubium. Tales
quaedam certae veritates in ipsa etiam dubitatione perspiciuntur.
Quo admonemur ut Aristonem, Pyrrhonem atque Herillum non
metuamus, qui dum opinantur nihil a nobis verum sciri, ipsi pro-
culdubio sciunt opinionem hanc suam oportere aut veram esse aut
falsam. Sciunt, si vera est, nonnihil ab homine verum intellegi;
sciunt, si falsa est, opinionem eis oppositam esse101 veram, scilicet
aliquid ab homine verum sciri.
: VIII :
Obiectio Peripateticorum et responsio,

quod Veritas animum familiariter habitat.
i Sed numquid metuendi Peripatetici sunt, qui negant familiariter

habitare in animo veritatem, ex eo quod tam pauci eius periti esse
videantur, et quisquis earn noverit, tanto ab infantia tempore fuerit
324
BOOK XI • C H A P T E R VIII
doubting, but he realizes he understands this and knows he real-

izes this, and so on to infinity.73 Besides he can distinguish be-
tween a soul in doubt and one that is not. And he is well aware
how much more satisfactory it would be not to doubt, and how ar-
dently he desires the truth. He compares certainty with doubt,
and, as a result, is certain of both. He is also certain that he is in-
quiring, feeling, living, existing, since he who does not exist, live,
feel, and inquire is not doubting at all. He is certain, too, that he is
not himself the prime truth, since that truth never doubts itself.
He knows that it is never involved in doubt or error. [But] he
knows that in forming judgments he himself must either err or
not err. He knows beyond a doubt whether he is erring or not,
when he decides he is alive. Lastly, he is not unaware that some-
thing else must exist in nature outside his own soul that is intro-
ducing him to doubt.74 Such are the certain truths that are per-
ceived in the very act of doubting. This should encourage us not to
fear Aristo or Pyrrho or Herillus,75 who, while they offer their
opinion that we cannot know anything true, know beyond a doubt
themselves that their opinion has to be either true or false. They
know that if it is true, then something true must be understood by
man; and they know that if it is false, then the opinion opposed to
theirs must be true, namely that something true must be known
by man.
: VIII :
An objection from the Peripatetics and its rebuttal

That the truth is at home in the soul
Should we then fear the Peripatetics, who deny that truth is really i
at home in the rational soul, because so few people seem to have
any experience of it, and anyone who knows the truth did not
325
indoctus? Certe non esse timendos Augustinus, ubi mentem Pla-

tonis exponit, ita testatur.
2 Aut est aliquid in animo quod in praesenti cogitatione non est,
aut non est in musico animo ars musica, cum de sola geometria
cogitat. Hoc autem falsum est, illud igitur verum. Non autem
quicquam se habere animus sentit, nisi quod in cogitationem vene-
ris Potest igitur aliquid esse in animo, quod esse in se animus ipse
non sentiat. Id autem quamdiu sit, nihil interest. Nam si diutius
fuerit in aliis animus occupatus (quamvis intentionem suam in
ante cogitata facile possit reflectere), oblivio vel imperitia nomina-
tur. Sed cum vel nos ipsi nobiscum ratiocinantes vel ab alio bene
interrogati, de quibusdam liberalibus artibus vera percipimus, ea
quae invenimus non alibi quam in animo nostro invenimus. Nam
ob idipsum oportet animum ad haec invenienda relictis externis
secedere in seipsum. Neque idem est invenire quod facere aut
gignere, alioquin aeterna gigneret animus inventione temporali.
Nam aeterna saepe invenit. Quid enim tam aeternum quam circuli
ratio, vel si quid aliud in huiusmodi artibus, neque non fuisse ali-
quando, neque non fore comprehenditur? Hinc manifestum est
immortalem esse animum humanum et omnes veras rationes in
secretis eius esse, quamvis eas sive ignorantia sive oblivione aut
non habere aut amisisse videatur.'
3 'Fac te aliquid esse102 oblitum aliosque te velle quasi in memo-
riam revocare. Dicunt ergo illi: numquidnam hoc est aut illud?
diversa velut similia proferentes. Tu vero nec illud vides quod re-
cordari cupis, et tamen vides non hoc esse quod dicitur. Num-
quidnam tibi cum hoc evenit, integra videtur oblivio? Nequa-
326
BOOK XI CHAPTER VIII
know it during the long time he was a child? Augustine, in the fol-
lowing exposition of Plato's views, certainly testifies we should not
fear them:
"Either76 something exists in the soul which is not present in 2
thought, or no art of music exists in a musical soul when it is
thinking only about geometry. The latter alternative is false, so the
former is true. However, the rational soul is not aware it has
something unless it actually swims into its thoughts. So it is possi-
ble for something to be in the soul which the soul does not know
is there in itself. How long it has been there is not significant. For
if the soul has been preoccupied for a long time with other matters
(however much it could easily turn its attention back to things it
had considered earlier), we call it forgetfulness or ignorance. But
when, either in reasoning with ourselves or in being questioned
properly by another, we ourselves perceive truths about the various
liberal arts, the truths that we discover we find nowhere else but in
our soul. That is why to find the truths the soul has to retreat into
itself, having abandoned externals. Finding is not the same thing
as making or generating, or else the soul would generate eternal
things through temporal discovery. It often finds eternal things.
For what is more eternal than the rational principle of a circle, or
some or other principle in the liberal arts, when it is understood
never at some point not to have been, and never not to be? It is
clear from this that the human soul is immortal, and has all the
true rational principles in its innermost parts, although it may ap-
pear through ignorance not to have them or to have lost them
through forgetfulness."
"Suppose77 you have forgotten something, and people want as it 3
were to jog your memory. They say to you, I s it this or that?'
proffering various things which might resemble it. You do not see
what you want to remember, but you do see it is not what they are
talking about. When this happens to you does it seem to be total
oblivion? Surely not. For discrimination itself, whereby you do not
327
quam. Nam ipsa discretio qua non admittitur quod falso ammove-
ris, pars quaedam recordationis est. Tales ergo nondum verum vi-
dent, falli tamen decipique non possunt; et quid quaerunt, satis
norunt. At si tibi quispiam dicat te post paucos dies risisse quam
natus es, non audes dicere falsum esse, et si auctor sit cui fides ha-
benda est, non recordaturus, sed crediturus es. Totum enim tem-
pus illud validissima tibi oblivione occultum est. Haec igitur ab ilia
oblivione plurimum differt, sed ilia media est. Nam est alia recor-
dation revisendaeque veritati propior atque vicinior. Cui simile est
quando videmus aliquid certoque agnoscimus nos id vidisse ali-
quando, atque nosse affirmamus, sed ubi, aut quando, aut quo-
modo, aut apud quem nobis in notitiam venerit satagimus repetere
atque recolere. Ut si de homine nobis contigerit, etiam quaeramus
ubi eum noverimus; quod cum ille commemoraverit, repente tota
res memoriae quasi lumen infunditur, nihilque amplius ut remi-
niscamur laboratur. Tales sunt qui bene disciplinis liberalibus eru-
diti sunt. Siquidem illas sine dubio in se oblivione obrutas eruunt
discendo et quodammodo effodiunt. Non tamen contend sunt
neque se continent, donee totam faciem veritatis (cuius quidam in
illis artibus iam splendor subrutilat) latissime atque planissime in-
tueantur. Sed in iis103 quidam falsi colores atque formae velut in
speculum cogitationes effundunt,104 falluntque inquirentes saepe
ac decipiunt, putantes illud totum esse quod norunt vel quod in-
quirunt; ipsae sunt illae imagines magna cautione vitandae, quae
deprehenduntur fallaces cum cogitationis variato quasi speculo va-
riantur, cum ilia facies veritatis una et immutabilis maneat.'
4 'Quamvis enim alterius atque alterius magnitudinis quadratum
sibi cogitatio depingat et quasi ante oculos praeferat, tamen mens
interior quae vult verum videre ad illud se potius convertit, secun-
328
accede to what you might have mistakenly lent an ear to, is a part
of recollection. So such people do not yet see the truth, but they
cannot be cheated or deceived; and they know sufficiently what
they are after. If someone says to you that you laughed just a few
days after you were born, you do not dare deny it is true; and if
the author of the story is someone trustworthy, you will not re-
member it but you will believe it. For that whole period is veiled
for you in total oblivion. This is very different from the first kind
of forgetting, but the first is in fact an intermediate kind. For there
is another kind of forgetting which is a next-door neighbor to
memory and to the recovery of truth. It is almost the same as
when we see something and know for certain that we have seen it
at some point before; and we agree we know it, but where or when
or how or with whom it came to our notice we cast around to un-
ravel and to recollect. If it happened to us because of a person, we
can even ask him where we met him; and when he has reminded
us, the whole matter comes flooding back into our memory like
the light, and we do not have to make any further effort to remem-
ber. This is what happens to people who are well-educated in the
liberal arts. Obviously the arts lie buried in oblivion within them,
and they rescue and in a way dig them out by means of learning.
Yet they are not content and do not cease their efforts until they
gaze upon the whole face of truth in all its fullness and clarity
(a pale splendor of which already glows in those arts). How-
ever, with these art-lovers certain false colors and forms flood into
their thoughts as into a mirror; and these illusions often cheat
those scrutinizing them and deceive those who think this mirror is
all they know or examine. These are images that must be very
carefully avoided; when they change in the changing mirror of
thought, they are perceived to be false, for the face of truth re-
mains one and unchanging."
"Though thought may depict for itself a square of one size or 4
another and summon it in a way before our eyes, the inner mind,
329
dum quod iudicat omnia ilia esse quadrata. Quid si quispiam no-
bis dicat secundum ideam105 iudicare, quod videre oculis solet?
Quare ergo dicit, si tamen vere erudita est, pilam veram vera pla-
nitie puncto tangi? Quid tale umquam oculis vidit aut videre po-
test, cum ipsa imaginatione cogitationis fingi quicquam huiusmodi
non possit? An non hoc probamus, cum etiam minimum circulum
imaginando animo describimus et ab eo lineas ad centrum duci-
musf Nam cum duas duxerimus, inter quas quasi acu vix pungi
possit, alias iam in medio non possumus ipsa cogitatione imagina-
ria ducere, ut ad centrum sine ulla commixtione perveniant, cum
clamet ratio innumerabiles posse duci, ita ut in omni earum inter-
vallo scribi etiam circulus possit. Hoc cum ilia phantasia implere
non possit, magisque ipsi oculi deficiant (siquidem per ipsos est
animo infusa), manifestum est, et multum earn differre a veritate,
et illam, dum hoc videtur, non videri.' Idem contingit quando ratio
lineam dividit in infinitum, quod neque cernit sensus, neque asse-
quitur phantasia.
5 Ex omnibus iis106 Augustinus confici arbitratur, quod et Plato
in epistola ad Syracusanos docet, ut veritates ipsae rerum mentem
nostram familiariter habitent ostendantque sua illam familiaritate
perpetuam.
330
which wants to see the truth, turns rather towards the criterion
which enables it to judge whether all are squares. How if someone
claims to us that he is judging what he usually sees with the eyes
according to an Idea? Why, then, does the mind declare, if it has
been properly trained, that a true sphere makes contact with a true
plane at some point? Has it ever seen such or could it ever see
such with the eyes, since nothing of this kind can be imagined
even in the imagination of thinking? Don't we prove this when we
describe a very small circle by imagining it in our mind and when
we draw lines from it to the center? Once we have drawn two
lines, there is scarcely room to stick a pin between them; and we
cannot even imagine drawing more lines in between so that they
reach the center without crossing into each other. But reason in-
sists that it is possible to draw an infinite number of them, and
such that in their every interval the [line of the] circle could also
be drawn. Since this [situation] cannot be imagined by the
phantasy, and our eyes are even more incapable (since via the eyes
the phantasy has been infused in the rational soul), then it is clear
both that the phantasy differs greatly from the truth, and that the
truth is not seen when the circle is seen," The same happens when
reason divides a line to infinity, something that neither the sense
sees nor the phantasy imagines.
From all this Augustine concludes what Plato too tells us in his 5
letter to the Syracusans:78 namely that the very truths of things
make their home in our mind, and in dwelling there demonstrate
that the mind is everlasting.
331
Notes to the Text
ABBREVIATIONS
A the editio princeps, Florence, 1482, with printed

corrigenda as noted below.
L Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, M S Plut.
L X X X I I I , 10, the dedication copy written for
Lorenzo de'Medici.
M Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, M S MagL
X X , 58, the codex unicus of Ficinos Disputatio contra
iudicium astrologorum.
Ep Marsilio Ficino: Lettere, I: Epistolarum familiarium liber I,
ed. Sebastiano Gentile (Florence: Olschki, 1990).
Marcel The reading of Raymond Marcel's edition, Marsile
Ficin: Theologie platonicienne de I'immortalite des ames
vols-. Parts? T.^s BÎIps tc\fkA.~nr\\
Opera The reading of the text in Marsilii Ficini . . . Opera
(Basel: Henricpetri, 1576; repr. Turin: Bottega
d'Erasmo, 1959, 1983).
P Marsilii Ficini Praedicationes, in Opera, I, pp. 473-494,
CAPITULA
1. The chapter headings in the table of contents (in A) give solutio, while the
reading of the internal chapter headings is resolutio
2. Omitted in the table of contents in A
BOOK IX
Marsilii Ficini Theologiae 3. relinquetur Marcel

de animorum immortalitate 4. 9.2.1 to 9.3.1 are excerpted
liber nonus incipit L from P (pp. 475-476).
et omitted in L 5. rationalis animus P
333
• NOTES TO THE T E X T •
6. omitted by Marcel 32. 9.3.4 from the beginning of the

7. Praestantissime animae paragraph down to oblectaris
j partes] Praecipuae quidem infinite is extracted from
rationalis animae partes Ficinos Dialogus inter Deum
duae P et animam theologicus ( =
8. After deceptus P adds Quod Ep 4, lines 80-103, ed. Gentile
plane comprobat Socrates in I, p. 15; the remainder of the
Phaedone paragraph follows closely lines
9« curis before multis P 54-58 of the same letter). Dei]
IO. After nubibus P adds nec Boni Ep
aliter animum corpore 33* Omitted in Ep
distrahente 34. Omitted in Ep
II. fulgetque P 35- Omitted in Ep
12. quietam Marcel Omitted in Ep
13* spiritibus P 37. Omitted in Ep
14- seiungatur P 38. Omitted in Ep
15- originem animi] animi 39. Omitted in Ep
rationalis originem P 40. Omitted in Ep
16. siquidem P 41. immutabile Ep
17. omitted in P 42. cuiusque Ep
18. immergitur A P 43* atque ipsum lumen]
19. cum P lumenque ipsum Ep
20. Transposed after corpore in P 44- ut abunde] proprie ut aeque
21. Nulla P Ep
22. After qua P adds quidem 45. Corporalibus Ep
23. circa ipsum P 46. diei before correction in A
24. After ipsius P adds naturaliter 47. solis lumen Ep
25. ferreretur P 48. Hie tuus e s t . . . phantasia
26. agit P omitted in Ep
27. prorsus adversatur P 49. mea Ep
28. Anima repugnat 50. After est Ep adds 0 anima
adversaturque omitted in P 51* rerum omnium corporalium
29. colligit L Ep
30. accederit before correction in A 52. meam Ep
3i. mane before correction in A 53* mea Ep
334
54* mea Ep 78. ipso after secum M

55- Omitted in Ep 79« nobis A, Marcel
56. me Ep 80. quo corpori . . . afficitur]
57* infinitafre/orecorrection in A quo ad corpus tamquam
58. benefici dei omitted in Ep filium et suum opus afficitur
59* lumen Marcel M
6o. Before infinite Ep has Me, 81. parvus L
me, inquam 82. omitted by Marcel
6i. quae before correction in A 83- medelam M
62. From 9.3.6 to the end of 9.4.3 84. suprema M
the text excerpts Ficino's 85. vitalis complexio corpori
Disputatio contra iudicium omitted in M
astrologorum, whose variants 86. Omitted before correction in A
are here indicated with the 87. deo] a Deo Marcel
siglum M (see vol I, p, 315, of 88. esset AL: omitted by Marcel
this edition). 89. Marcel inserts est after
63. Exuriente M perfectius
64. actio M 90. modo hoc AL: hoc modo
65. incorporales M Marcel before correction in L
66. The next few lines, to 91. negant before correction in A
abstinebant, are excepted from 92. omitted by Marcel
P (p. 475). 93- mea before correction in A
67* vir caelestis omitted in P 94. -que L
68. After locum in P 95» immo ducunt] atque
69- salubrem P conducant before correction in
70. corporis naturae] corporis P L
7i. iniussus P 96. angelisque L
72. indicabat P 97. movendi Marcel
73* After enervarent P adds et 98. impulsu before correction in A
sobrii forent ad 99^ per artem Marcels conjecture,
contemplandum as it seems] partem AL,
74* Magnae Matri] Dianae M Opera
75- corporalibus M 100. unitur Marcel
76. essent Marcel IOI. quoque L
77- corporalis M 102. despicit before correction in A
335
103. reliquae Marcel 121. caloris humor L, Marcel

104. confundat L 122. qui L, Marcel
105. animadverte A: advertere L; 123. Putant L
animadvertere Marcel 124. ilia Marcel
106. Nam ob id . . . ignorare 125. his L
omitted in L 126. cum Marcel
107. extrema L 127. quod vires aliae omitted in L
108. otius Marcel 128. ipsum quoque Opera, Marcel
109. vivendi before correction in A 129. speramusfre/orecorrection in
no. corpus before correction in A A
in. ut before correction in A 130. quaenam] quae natura before
112. respondeo A, Marcel correction in A
113. atque . . . ideo omitted before 131. incorporabili before correction
correction in A in A
114. retraheretur before correction 132. directe Marcel
in A 133. -gatur L
115. -tentur Marcel 134. omitted in L
116. diversitatis L 135. aliquos Marcel
117. iis A 136. emancipata ke/ore correction in
118. respiciunt before correction in A
A 137. Marcel inserts est a/fer
119. magis . . . conversae repeated mutabilis
mistakenly by Marcel 138. ex elementis Opera, Marcel
120. se L 139. virtutefre/orecorrection in A
BOOK X
I. Marsilii Ficini Theologiae 7. Epicurei before correction in L

de animorum immortalitate 8. elementalem Marcel
liber decimus incipit L 9* foeminum Marcel
2. unde before correction in A 10. fixae Marcel
3. quosque Marcel 11. omitted in L
4- tribuit Opera, Marcel 12. omitted in A before correction
5. a deo] adeo L 13- nos Marcel
6. ac L
336
14. etiam plaga L, after correction 40. inquamfce/brecorrection in A

in A : plaga esse before 41. luget A
correction in A: plaga etiam 42. artificius Marcel
Marcel (misreading the 43* illoL
corrigenda) 44. Marcel adds et before mixtione
15* terra Marcel 45* omitted in L
16. perpetuo L 46. omitted in A, Marcel
17- diutiusque AL, Opera; Marcel 47* Materiam Marcel
conjectures divitiusque (sic) 48. plantarumque L
18. corporibus L 49- fit omitted by Marcel
19. tamen after numquam before 50. colorem A
correction in A (incorrectly 51. omitted by L
reported by Marcel) 52. suae before correction in A
20, crescens before correction in A 53* inspiciat before correction in A
21. et after qualitates A, Marcel 54* inspiciantur before correction
22. -dam before correction in A in A
23. corpori L 55* aliter L
24. lis A 56. ardentiorem A
25. quidem Marcel 51* discurrere L
26. sequi A 58. imaginantis L
27. corporea Marcel 59* parte omitted by Marcel
28. accipit A 60. qui Marcel
29. materiae Marcel 61. habitura before correction in A
30. omitted in L 62. materiam praeparatam
31* debet L Marcel
32. omitted by Marcel 63. omitted by Marcel
33* ista Marcel 64- sextodecimo before correction
34- reditura before correction in A in A
35* semota before correction in A 65. sensibilis L
36. paulum qui Marcel 66. aeris Marcel
37. Not in AL; added by Marcel 67- Arbitrantur A
following Opera 68. progenitoribus L
38. formae Marcel 69. perierat A
39* ut tamquam before correction 70. iis L
in A 7i. omitted in L
337
72. pullularent before correction in 79- 0 anima Ep

A 80. Animi operatio . . .
73- intellectus Marcel cogitares paraphrased from Ep
74- formae before correction in A 81. et Ep
75* From here to the end of cap. 82. amandoque] atque amando
VIII Ficinos text follows that of Ep
Ep (I.4, ed. Gentile, I, p. 14), 83. ob aliam rationem Ep
lines 64-80. 84- ipsum bonum inquam]
76. Filia Ep bonum Ep
77' omitted before correction in A: 85- quidem after quod Ep
omnino] tibi Ep 86. omitted by Ep
78. omitted by Ep and before 87- omitted by Marcel
correction in A 88. mentis Marcel
BOOK X I
1. Marsilii Ficini Theologiae 14. iis A

de animorum immortalitate 15. naturas L
liber undecimus L 16. proprie A (perhaps to be read
2. ilia Opera3 Marcel: illo A L as propriae): proprie Opera,
3- accomodatam before correction Marcel: propriae L
in A 17. Igitur L
4- intellecturus L 18. perscribere AL, Opera: Marcel
5- intellectus L, before correction corrects silently to praescribere
in A 19- phantasia L
6, et L, capitula librorum in A, 20. hisdem A, Marcel
Marcel: e A, Opera 21. procreat Marcel
7- incolume Opera, Marcel: 22. efficiendum L, before
incolumen A L correction in A
8. omitted before correction in A 23. omitted in A
9- omitted by Marcel 24- ideo before correction in A
10. illo before correction in A 25. Ficino follows the version of this
11. musciculae before correction in logion found in Psellus, De
A oper. demonum, ed.
12. caloris before correction in A Boissonade, p. 9, line 8, rather
13- perspicue Marcel
338
than the version in Proclus, In 57, motionesfre/orecorrection in A

Crat., 21, i~2 58, torrentum Marcel
26. secunda L 59, -que omitted by Marcel
27. peregrina L 60• pulchra Marcel
28. Marcel inserts et after spectat 61. proprius Marcel
29. varietatem Opera, Marcel 62• pulchr(a)efee/orecorrection in
30. discedit L A
31 • notionem Marcel 63. singulares L
32. rationalis L 64* metiuntur Marcel (who
33. materia Marcel mistakenly applies the
34. aut actum omitted in L corrigendum [see note 65] to
35. sunt L this word)
36. earum before correction in A 6s* non mentiuntur before
37. naturam &e/ore correction in A correction in A
38. mutantfre/orecorrection in A 66. angelus Marcel
39. mutabilis before correction in A 67. necnefce/orecorrection in A
40. spiritalis Marcel 68. particeps Marcel
41. in corpora ke/ore correction in 69. Talisfee/orecorrection in A
A 70. proprius A
42. alia before correction in A 71. iamdudum before correction in
43. merita Marcel A
44. deum before correction in A 72. ut Marcel
45. quidam before correction in A 73. insecta sericia] sericii vermes
46. umquam Opera, Marcel (?e/ore correction in A
47. Marcel conjectures facillima 74. mutorum L, before correction
48. luce] lucere A, Marcel in A
49. tamen before correction in A 75. mediatur Marcel
50. incorporea L 76. haec before correction in A
51. generationique Marcel 77. superinfusas L: super
52. Opera, Marcel add est after infiisas A, Opera: insuper
confugiendum infusas Marcel
53. distincta L 78. usi L
54. omitted by L 79. dux A, Opera, Marcel
55. ne before correction in A 80. a natura before correction in A
56. necessaria Marcel 81 • Atque before correction in A
339
82. elisimus A 97. mentem L

83. formae L: ferme A (as it 98. -tentur L
seems), Opera, Marcel 99. propositione before correction
84. perspicuae Marcel in A
85. motum Marcel 100. verum e s t . . . dubitare
86. manebis A repeated after dubitare by
87. omitted by Marcel Marcel
88. Marcel adds per before duo 101. oppositam esse omitted by
89. mensuraret before correction in Marcel
A 102. esse aliquid L
90. Quod before correction in A 103. ex his Augustine
91. -tantur L 104. cogitationis se fundant
92. ignorantum (sic) A L Augustine
93. quocumque L 105. ideam AL: id earn Augustine,
94. Pythagoras L Marcel: idem Opera
95. -ne an] an ne L 106. his Opera, Marcel
96. omitted in L
340
Notes to the Translation
ABBREVIATIONS
Avicenna, Opera Auicene peripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi

opera (n.pL, 1508; repr. Frankfurt am Main:
Minerva, 1961).
Bidez-Cumont Joseph Bidez and Franz Cumont, Les mages
hellenises: Zoroastre, Ostanes et Hystaspe d'apres la
tradition grecque (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1938).
Collins Ardis B, Collins, The Secular Is Sacred: Platonism and
Thomism in Marsilio Ficinos Platonic Theology (The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1974),
Des Places Edouard Des Places, ed., Oracles Chaldaiques, avec
un cboix de commentaires anciens (Paris: Les Belles
Lettres, 1971).
Diels-Kranz Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, eds., Die
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols. (Berlin:
Weidmann, 1906-1910).
Ficino, Opera Marsilio Ficino, Opera omnia (Basel: Heinrich
Petri, 1576; repr. Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo,
1959)-
Hormann Wolfgang Hormann, ed., 5. Aurelius Augustinus:
Soliloquiorum libri duo; De inmortalitate animae; De
quantitate animae. Corpus scriptorum
ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, vol. 89 (Vienna:
Holder- Pichler-Tempsky, 1986).
In Phaedrum Michael J . B. Allen, Marsilio Ficino and the Phaedran
Charioteer (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1981).
Kaske-Clark Carol V. Kaske and John R . Clark, eds., Marsilio
Ficino: Three Books on Life (Binghamton, N Y :
Renaissance Society of America, 1989).
341
• NOTES TO THE T R A N S L A T I O N •
Marcel, Banquet Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin: Commentaire sur le

Banquet de Platon (Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
1956).
Marietti Petrus Marc, ed., Thomas Aquinas: Liber de veritate
Catholicaefideicontra errores infidelium qui dicitur
Summa contra gentiles, 3 vols. (Turin: Marietti,
1961).
PG Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus completus.
Series Graeca, 161 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1857-1866.)
PL Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus completes.
Series Latina, 221 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1844-1891).
Quandt Wilhelm Quandt, ed. Orphei Hymni, 4th ed.
(Dublin: Weidmann, 1973).
Saffrey-Westerink Henri-Dominique Saffrey and Leendert Gerrit
Westerink, eds., Proclus: Theologie Platonicienne,
6 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1968-97).
Schiavone Michele Schiavone, ed., Marsilio Ficino: Teologia
platonica, 2 vols. (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1965).
Tambrun-Krasker Brigitte Tambrun-Krasker, Oracles chaldaiques,
recension de Georges Gemiste Plethon (Athens:
Academy of Athens, 1995).
Thom Johan C . Thom, The Pythagorean Golden Verses with
Introduction and Commentary (Leiden: E. J . Brill,
1965).
For Ficino s debts to Aquinas we have noted below two kinds of parallel
passages from the Summa contra Gentilies assembled by Collins in The Sec-
ular Is Sacred, those indicating either "almost verbatim copying" or "a close
similarity in thought" (p. 114). A third category, consisting of similarities
"not marked enough to justify any conclusion about the presence of
Thomistic influence," has been ignored. We follow Collins throughout in
citing the paragraph numbers from the 1961 Marietti edition of the
Summa; thus, in the citation 1.43.363, "363" refers to the paragraph num-
ber of the Marietti edition.
342
BOOK IX
i* Pbaedrus 246A ff., 257A. But Ficinos own In Phaedrum 7 (ecL Allen,
p. 101) speaks only of the souls two wheels: "its turning back to itself and
its conversion to higher things."
2. Carmina aurea 47-48 (ed. Thom), tr. Ficino: "per eum qui animo nos-
tro quadriplicem fontem perpetuo fluentis naturae tradidit" (Opera,
p. 1979). Any mention of four in a Pythagorean context should be re-
ferred to the tetraktys, the sacred quaternary of 4, 3, 2 and 1 summing to
10; cf. Porphyry, Vita Pythagorae 20; Iamblichus, De vita pythagorica 28.150;
and Macrobius, In somnium Scipionis 1.6.41. See Michael J . B. Allen, Nup-
tial Arithmetic: Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on the Fatal Number in Book VIII
of Plato's "Republic" (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994), pp. 29, 66.
3. Crito 44AB, Apology 39CD (Socrates predicting his own death).

4. Si anima originem . . . impediatur a corpore: repeated, with a few varia-
tions, in Ficinos sermon De vita animae immortali (Opera, p. 476.1). For its
continuation, see nn. 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 8 below.
5. Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 1.40.96-97. Theramenes was an
Athenian statesman of moderate views who was executed in 404 B C
by the thirty tyrants under Critias. Critias died in battle the following
year.
6. See Cicero's De divinatione 1.30.64. Posidonius (c.135-51 BC) was an
important eclectic Stoic who taught in Rhodes where Cicero attended his
lectures and became his friend. He wrote, inter alia, on divination.
7. Ibid., 1.25.53.
8. Ibid., 1.23.47.
9. Diogenes Laertius, Lives 1.11.117-118. Pherecydes (fl. 550 BC) was pur-
portedly a teacher of Pythagoras. In the Tusculan Disputations 1.16.38,
Cicero declares he was the first to pronounce the souls of men eternal.
10. Non solum vero intellectus . . . potest esse mutatio: repeated, with a few
variations, as the close of Ficinos sermon De vita animae immortali (Opera,
p. 476.1) following on impediatur a corpore (see n. 4 above; also nn. 11 and
18 below).
343
11. Nulla res sponte sua . . . ducit originem: repeated, with a few variations,
as the opening of Ficinos sermon De vita animae immortali (Opera,
p. 475.3). See nn. 4 and 10 above and n. 18 below.
12. Dei faciem rursus intueri . . . oblectaberis infinite: repeated, with varia-
tions, in Ficinos Dialogus inter Deum et animam theologicus in his Letters
1.4.80-103 (ed. Gentile, I, p. 15 = Opera, pp. 610-611), a letter to
Mercati.
13. Quare igitur, obsecro, faciem . . . penitus assecutum: ibid. 1.4.54-58 (ed.
Gentile, I, p. 14). See n. 12 above.
14. This startling notion that the lung can be thirsty (since some of what
we drink passes into the lungs) is found in Plato's Timaeus 70CD, 78C ff.,
91 A , and then in the Hippocratic collection On the Heart (c. 340 BC). It
was a view opposed by Aristotle and others.
15. In his Letters 4.19 (Opera, p. 764.1: Vita Platonis sub Educatio), Ficino
cites both Basil, Sermones: de legendis libris gentilium 7 (ed. N . G . Wilson,
Saint Basil on Greek Literature [London: Duckworth, 1975], pp. 26-28, and
Jerome, Adversus Jovinianum 2.9 (PL 23. col. 298) to this effect. See too
Porphyry, De abstinentia 1.36 (tr. Ficino, Opera 1933.2).
16. Diogenes Laertius, Lives 4.2.7.
17. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 6.8.
18. Cum Plato noster . . . carnibus abstinebant: repeated, with a few varia-
tions, in Ficinos sermon De vita animae immortali (Opera, p. 475.3); see
nn. 4 , 1 0 , and 11 above. Cf. Porphyry, De abstinentia 4 passim.
19. Anatolian Cybele, the great mother of all the gods, loved the youth-
ful Phrygian shepherd Attis who became her priest under a vow of chas-
tity. Learning of his plan to marry another, in a jealous rage she made
him mad, and he castrated himself and died. She then transformed him
into a pine tree and he became her consort and the prototype of her eu-
nuch devotees and priests, the Galli. The Cybele-Attis cult was officially
brought to Rome from Asia Minor in 205/4 BC but only in the later em-
pire did Attis become an all-powerful deity and saviour. See Lucretius,
De rerum natura 2.600-640; Ovid, Fasti, 4.221-244, 361 ff.; Pliny, Natural
344
History 11.109,261; and Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus 2.13-14 (PG 8.

cols. 76-77)•
20. Augustine, De civitate Dei 7.26.
21. Saepe esuriente stomacho . . . stirpe semotum: reproduced, with a few
variants, in Ficinos Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum f. 20V (see n. 23
below).
22. Phaedrus 246A ff. See Ficinos In Phaedrum 7-8 (ed. Allen, pp. 96-
107).
23. Neque nos turbet quod . . . vitali complexioni: reproduced, with a few
variants, in Ficinos Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum f. 2iv, following
on stirpe semotum (see n. 21 above).
24. Timaeus 4 2 A - 4 3 A , 69C-70A, 89E-90A.
25. Itaque iudicium intellectus... ad telas araneae: cf. Aquinas, Summa contra
Gentiles 2.48.1246 (Collins, No. 66A). See n. 29 below.
26. Ideo omnes eiusdem . . . seipsos agunt: cf. Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles
3.85.2601, 2603 (Collins, No. 66B). See n. 28 below.
27. Cf. Ficinos sermon De vita animae, third part (Opera, pp. 477-78).
28. Unde enim contingere . . . est necessario liber: cf. Aquinas, Summa contra
Gentiles 3.85.2602 (Collins, No. 66C). See n. 26 above.
29. Quod autem iudicet libere . . . usum et voluptatem: cf. Aquinas, Summa
contra Gentiles 2.48.1246 (Collins, No. 66D). See n. 25 above.
30. Denique naturalia speciei . . . atque tractari: cf. Aquinas, Summa contra
Gentiles 3.85.2606 (Collins, No. 67).
31. "Sciences" in the older sense of "branches of knowledge"; cf.
Plotinus, Enneads 5.3.3, 5.5.1.
32. Plato, Symposium 217A-219D.
33. Alciphron was an Atticist author of the second or third century after
Christ, to whom has been attributed a collection of 122 fictitious letters
purporting to be of the fourth century B.C. See Der Neue Pauly:
Enzyklopadie der Antike, I (Stuttgart and Weimar, 1996), p. 507, and F. H .
Fobes introduction to the Loeb (1949) edition of the letters, pp. 6-18.
345
34. For Demosthenes (384-322 BC, the great Athenian orator), see
Cicero, De Oratore 1.61.260; for Xenocrates (396-314 BC, third head of
the Academy) and Cleanthes (c. 250 BC, who succeeded Zeno as head of
the Stoic school), see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers 4.2.6 and
7.5.168,170 respectively.
35. Marcel, but not Collins, again refers us to Aquinas, Summa contra
Gentiles 3.85, but 84-87 are all relevant. See nn. 26, 28, 30 above and 36
below.
36. Ibid. At 3.85 Aquinas himself cites Ptolemy, Centiloquium verbum 8.
37. Ibid, citing verba 1 and 8: "An astronomer should not speak in detail
on a matter but in general" (1); and "the wise soul assists the work of the
stars" (8). Aquinas cites the latter again in his Summa theologica 1.1.115.4,
ad tertium.
38. Plotinus, Enneads 2.3.7, 3.1.5 (and in general 2.3 "Are the stars causes"
and 3.1 "Fate"); Proclus, De providentia etfato et eo quod in nobis, passim
(ed. Boese, pp. 109-171); Avicenna, Metaphysics 10.1.
39. Laws 10.893B-899D.
40. Phaedo 65A ff.; Theaetetus 184M.
41. Phaedrus 245C-E; see Ficino's In Phaedrum 5 and 6 (ed. Allen,
pp. 86-97).
42. Aristotle, De anima 3.4.429aio-b5ff.
43. Hectic fever is a wasting disease; cf. Aquinas, Summa theologica
i.2.q.29, art. 3c.
44. See nn. 39 and 41 above.
45. Cf. Aristotle, De anima 3.4.429a3off.
46. Phaedo 65E-67B [?].
47. Unidentified. It is not in the De sensu et sensato (pace Marcel who
gives no specific reference) or the De anima.
48. Republic 10.609E-610A.
49. Origen, De principiis 2.8.3-4 (PG 11. cols. 221-225) —cf. 3*5AS i n n.
51 below; Plotinus, Enneads 4*3*9> 4.8.1, 3-5 (and in general 4.3 "Prob-
lems of the soul [II]" and 4.8 "The soul's descent into body").
346
50. With wordplay on genius (meaning both guardian spirit and inborn
talent) and ingenium.
51. Origen, De principiis 3.5.4 (PG 11. cols. 328-330) — cf. 2.8.3-4 in n. 49
above; Plotinus, Enneads 4.8.4.
52. Cf. Pamphilus, Apologia pro Origene 9 (PG 17. cols. 604-608) — St.
Pamphilus Martyr of Caesarea ( A D c. 240-309) was a disciple of Origen
and the master of Eusebius who much revered him and took the name
"Eusebius of Pamphilus." The first book of this apology for Origen alone
survives and only in a Latin version by Rufinus of Aquileia of question-
able accuracy. Schiavone (2:34 ad loc.) refers us generally instead to St.
Jerome's Letters.
53. Avicenna, De Anima 5.5 and 6; Algazel, Logica et Philosophia Algazelis

(Venice, 1506), II, tract. 4, ch. 4; V, tract. 5, ch. 1 and 2. Algazel or A1
Ghazali (1058-1111) was a Muslim jurist, theologian and mystic whose
brilliant critique of Islamic philosophy, The Incoherence of the Philosophers,
was translated into Latin in 1328.
54. De rerum natura 3.607-614.
55. Or literally "engorgements" or "swellings."
56. For strepitus here Schiavone (2:36 ad loc,) refers us to Quintilian's
Declamationes 13.4.
57. A paraphrase of Acts 17:28 "For in him we live, and move, and have
our being, as certain also of your own poets have said."
58. Origen, De Principiis 4.1.36 (PG 11. col. 411) — condensed and
adapted.
59. Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 1.11.24, 18.41, 22.51, 31.77.
Dicaearchus was a pupil of Aristotle.
60. Timaeus 40AB.
61. Epinomis 981C ff., 984D ff. Cf. Phaedo 109C, 111B (on aether).
62. This unidentified dictum is probably not by Anaxagoras and is not
in Diels-Kranz. It sounds Hermetic; cf. Pimander 10.25 ( o n earth man is
a mortal god, in heaven god is an immortal man), 12.1 (gods are immortal
men and men are mortal gods), and Asclepius 8 (the gods shaped man-
347
kind from the eternal and the mortal). Cf. too the Magian reference in
10.2.13, below.
BOOK X
1. The spirit in the technical sense of the aethereal substance uniting

body to mind. See chapter 2 below.
2. De rerum natura 3.800-802. Cf. n. 13 below.
3. Cf. Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 2.68 on the general principle of
gradation.
4. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 49C ff., 58D.
5. Symposium 202E-203A; Laws 4.713C-E.
6. Proclus, In Timaeum 1.76.30-77.23, adduces Origen, Numenius, and
Porphyry on the good and bad daemons and notes that the Egyptians lo-
cated the bad daemons in the West. Given the juxtaposition of these four
authorities, this passage is probably Ficinos source. But cf. Origen, Con-
tra Celsum 1.24 (PG 11. col. 705); Numenius, frg. 37 (Des Places); and
Porphyry, De abstinentia 2.36-43.
7. (ps.) Dionysius the Areopagite, Celestial Hierarchy 6.1-2 (PG 3. cols.
200-205), gives the principalities, archangels, and angels as the inferior
triad in the celestial hierarchy of three triads, the highest triad being the
seraphim, cherubim, and thrones, and the intermediary, the dominations,
virtues, and powers.
8. Timaeus 32BC, 36CD; Republic 10.616B-617B.
9. Phaedrus 246E-247A; cf. Ficino, In Phaedrum 10,11 (ed. Allen, pp. 110-
129).
10. Punning on homo (man) and humus (soil).
11. Proclus, In Alcibiadem primum, 67-73 (tr. Ficino, Opera, pp. 1912-1913).
For Ficino this commentary (which he translated/paraphrased in his Op-
era, pp. 1908-28) was Proclus' main demonological treatise.
12. Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum 17.419A-E, Demetrius participates in
the conversation, but not Aemelianus who is merely referred to.
13. Lucretius, De rerum natura 3.800-802. Cf. n. 2 above.
348
14. Cf, Olympiodorus, In Phaedonem 124.13 ff. (ed. Norvin, p. 124).

15. Cf. Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 11.18 (PG 21. cols. 892-900).
16. Plotinus, Enneads 2.9 (esp. 2.9.8); 4.7,14.
17. Proclus, Elements of Theology, props. 15-17, 42-44 (ed. Dodds) — all
six deal with self-reversion; Porphyry, Sententiae 12, 41 (ed. Lamberz).
18. Aristotle, De partibus animalium 4.io.687a5 ff.
19. Mollitia implies here the presence of wetness in the brain to offset the
dryness of the nerves.
20. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics I.5.i2i6an ff.; Diogenes Laertius, Lives
2.3.10. Cf. the reference to Anaxagoras at 9.7.4.
21. Chaldaean Oracles no. 14 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker [ed. Des Places,
frg. 104], with Plethos commentary on pp. 10-12, and with extensive edi-
torial commentary on pp. 89-103) — on the souls aethereal and airy vehi-
cles and on its descent; cf. Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis 1.11-12. See
Kristeller, Philosophy, pp. 371-373.
22. Cf. Ficinos own In Phaedrum 10,11 (ed. Allen, pp. 110-129).
23. Sophist 257AB. See Ficinos In Sophistam 37 (ed. Allen, Icastes, pp. 263-
264; with analysis on pp. 49-73).
24. Charmides 156D-157A; cf. Book X I I I , chap. 1 (forthcoming in vol. 4).
The attribution, however, is to Zalmoxis (the manumitted slave of Py-
thagoras) and the Thracians, not to the Magi; see Iamblichus, De vita
pythagorica 30.172.
25. Is this a reference to G o d s cursing the ground in Genesis 3.17 (cf.
5.29, 6.12-13), and to His recanting at 8.21 and then to his covenant with
Noah in 9.9-17?
26. See n. 24 above; also Chaldaean Oracles no. 11 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker
[ed. Des Places, frg. 97], with Plethos commentary on p. 9, and with ed-
itorial commentary on pp. 81-83). Ficino will later quote this oracle in
Book X I I I , ch. 4.
27. Asclepius 26.
349
28. Statesman 269C-274E (the myth of the alternating reigns of Cronus

and Zeus —for Neoplatonists the signature passage of the dialogue); and
possibly Timaeus 43B-44B.
29. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.3.1070224-26; cf. I069b35-i070b35,1072ai9-
I073ai3. Note that Ficino usually thinks of Book 12 (lambda) as Book 11.
30. Physics 2.7 J98ai4 f f . and passim.
31. Unidentified. But see 9.7.4, above.
32. Compare a similar statement in chap. 6, para. 2, below: "the mind
needs the images so it can be excited by their stimulus to give birth to the
universal species."
33. Phaedo 79D-81A, 109E.
34. See Allen, Icastes, pp. 157-166, for an analysis of the beginning of this
chapter.
35. Philebus 28DE, 30CD.
36. De caelo 2.6.288a-289a.
37. Phaedrus 246E4-5 (elaunon ptenon harma). See Ficino s In Phaedrum,
19 (ed. Allen, p. 149).
38. Here as elsewhere artifex refers to anyone who makes or produces a
work, be it a painting, be it a perfume.
39. Schiavone, 2:50 ad loc., corrects to humiditatem, erroneously in our
view, since fire is hot and dry, air hot and wet, water cold and wet, earth
cold and dry.
40. Schiavone, 2:52 ad loc., refers us to Isidore of Seville's Etymologiae
16.8. But see Ficino's own De vita 3.8.
41. Timaeus 29A, 34B-35B, 41CD.
42. See Book X V I .
43. In Scholastic philosophy the transcendentals are traditionally the at-
tributes of goodness, truth, beauty and unity; in Platonism they are the
highest of the Ideas.
44. Timaeus 30A, 50B-53B, 69BC.
45. Epinomis 986C (logos ho panton theiotatos).
350
46. Timaeus 4 7 E - 4 8 A .
47. Timaeus 69C-70A.
48. Unidentified, though Marcel cites De generatione animalium 2.3.736a.
49. Timaeus 41 A - D .
50. Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 1.32.79. Panaetius (c. 180 BC-post
129 BC) became head of the Stoic school.
51. Chaldaean Oracles no. 7 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker [ed. Des Places, frg.
115]; cf. p. 7 with Pletho's note, and pp. 76-77 with editorial commen-
tary). Cf. Psellus, Expositio in Oracula Chaldaica (PG 122. col. ii44di-2).
52. It is difficult to determine the force of the contrast here between
resolvit in Deum and refert ad Deum. See Tamara Albertini, "Intellect and
Will in Marsilio Ficino: Two Correlatives of a Renaissance Concept of
Mind," in Marsilio Ficino (2002), pp. 203-225, with further refs.
53. Non corporis natura parens . . . quodam in sempiternum, i.e. the rest of
this eighth chapter, is also found in the Dialogus inter Deum et animam
theologicus, a letter to Mercati in Ficinos Letters 1.4.64-80 (ed. Gentile,
=
pp. 14-15 Opera, p. 610). Cf. the similar borrowings in Book I X ,
chap. 3 above.
BOOK XI
1. Despite this apparent distinction, for Ficino the absolute species are
identical with the eternal rational principles as the recurrence of the verb
in the singular indicates.
2. Ipsum intelligibile propria est. . . desinet umquam: cf. Aquinas, Summa con-
tra Gentiles 2.55.1307 (Collins, No. 68).
3. Simulacrum means likeness, semblance or image and will usually be
rendered as "image" in the following chapters.
4. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.33.
5. This is a general ref. to Plato's epistemology; but given Ficinos refer-
ence to coruscatio at n. 15 below, see the Seventh Letter 341CD (note 341D1S
genomenon); also, given the Neoplatonic interpretation, the Parmenides
351
128E-135B (esp. 130E-131A and 132AB) and the Meno 81C ff. (see n. 13
below).
6. Boethius, De consolatione 5.5 (PL 63. col. 854).
7. See Aristotle, De anima 3.3. 428bi8-20.
8. Chaldaean Oracles no. 27 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 3 [ed. Des Places,
frg. 108]; cf. p. 16 with Pletho's comment, and p. 132 with editorial com-
mentary).
9. Hymns 25.9 (ed. Quandt, p. 21) — the "Hymn to Proteus."
10. This is a paraphrase of a citation from a lost work that Ficino en-
countered in Iamblichus Protrepticus 4 (ed. Pistelli, p. i6.i7ff). Archytas
was a Pythagorean friend of Plato's and one of the leading political fig-
ures in Tarentum in south Italy during the first half of the 4th century
BC. A brilliant mathematician and the alleged founder of mechanics, he
distinguished the harmonic progression from the arithmetrical and the
geometrical and solved the problem of doubling the cube. For testimonia
and extant fragments, see Diels-Kranz 1: 421-439.
11. De Trinitate 12.2 (PL 42. col. 999).
12. Aristotle, De anima 3.5.430a. See n. 14 below.
13. Plato, Parmenides 128E-135B (esp. 130E-131A and 132AB) and Meno
81C ff. (see n. 5 above and n. 15 below).
14. Aristotle, De anima 3.5.430a. See n. 12 above.
15. Republic 6.509 ff., and Seventh Letter 341CD "as light kindled by a
leaping spark," 344B "there bursts forth the light of the intelligible." Cf.
Ficinos epitome for the letter: "Subito lumen veritatis accendi. Sed
undenam? Ab igne, id est, a Deo prosiliente sive scintillante. Per scintil-
las designat ideas, exempla rerum in mente divina" (Opera, p. 1535); and
the last lines of his letter to Uranius (undated but in the twelfth book of
Letters): "subito tandem nobis velut ab igne scintillante lumen effulget in
animo, seque ipsum iam alit" (ibid., p. 950.1).
16. habitus is one of Aristotle's "post-praedicaments" and much used in
scholastic discourse: it means a condition that is habitual, and therefore
not easily changed, a habitual potentiality.
352
17. in effectivo habitu, again a scholastic phrase meaning "in a habitual

condition prepared for action or production/'
18. Phaedo 72E-77A, Meno 81C-86B, Theaetetus 148E-151D, 198D.
19. See n. 18 above. Parmenides 131A-132B, Timaeus 49D-50C, and Sympo-
sium 210E-212A — see the next paragraph on absolute Beauty.
20. See 4.1.6-7 (in Volume I).
21. Sixth Letter 323D —Ficino usually interprets this passage by reference
to the famous riddle in the Second Letter 312DE (see nn. 24 and 26 be-
low).
22. Enneads 5.1.6, 8; 5.5.3 (Intellect as a great god); and 5.8.1 (Father be-
yond Intellect). Schiavone also cites 3.7.5.
23. Epinomis 986C.
24. Second Letter 312DE. Plato thrice uses the preposition peri which
Ficino interprets literally as "around."
25. Republic 7.517BC.
26. Plotinus, Enneads 5.1.8, glossing Plato's Second Letter 312DE (which
Plotinus also cites at 1.8.2 and 6.7.42); and, glossing the same riddle,
Proclus, Theologia Platonica 2.8-9.
27. Timaeus 28C-29B, Republic 10.596C-E, Parmenides 1 3 4 C - E .
28. Plotinus, Enneads 5.8.5 (end) and 5.9.8; Proclus, In Parmenidem 4.896
(ed. Cousin). Cf. Ficino's own In Parmenidem 24 (Opera, p. 1145.2).
29. Playing on formositas meaning both "beauty" and "having form" — be-
ing truly beautiful because possessed of the true forms.
30. Proclus, In Parmenidem 3.790-791.
31. Again playing on formosus meaning both "beautiful" and "formed."
32. Cf. Book 4.1.5 supra for this same analogy of the carpenter inside the
wood.
33. Omnis vita prolem suam . . . capite natam reproduced by Ficino with
variations and elaborations in his De christiana religione 13 (Opera, p. 18).
For the Orphic reference, see Hymns 32.1-2 (ed. Quandt, p. 25) —the
"Hymn to Athena."
353
34. Timaeus 37C.

35. Pimander 5.10-11, 11.16, 20.
36. Timaeus 28A-30D.
37. Cf. Plato, Cratylus 4 0 1 D - 4 0 2 A . C f n. 55 below.
38. Plato, Parmenides 130E-132C.
39. Ficinos target here is probably Paul of Venice (1369/72-1429), the
terminist logician; see E. P. Mahoney, "Metaphysical Foundations of the
Hierarchy of being According to some Late Medieval and Renaissance
Philosophers," in Philosophies of Existence, Ancient and Medieval ed. P.
Morewedge (New York, 1982), pp. 165-257 at p. 191.
40. Enneads 3.7.7 (opening sentence).
41. See Allen hastes, pp. 129-147, for an analysis of this chapter.
42. Carmina aurea 63-64 (ed. Thorn), tr. Ficino: "At tu confide, quoniam
divinum genus hominibus inest, his enim sacra natura proferens universa
demonstrat" (Opera, p. 1979).
43. Pliny, Natural History 11.97.242. Cf. Book X I I I , chapter 2.
44. 1 Corinthians 12:6: "And there are diversities of operations, but it is
the same God which worketh all in all."
45. Theaetetus 149A-151C.
46. Republic 7.536E-537A.
47. Note the variant here: "Socrates the prince (dux) of teachers."
48. Theages 129E-130A (paraphrased).
49. Orpheus, Hymns 77*4-8 (ed. Quandt, pp. 52-53) —the "Hymn to
Memory" (with line 5 and the first halves of lines 6 and 8 missing).
50. Timaeus 4 1 D - 4 2 E , 4 6 D - 4 7 E .
51. A summary of Augustine's Soliloquies 1.15.27 (ed. Hormann, p. 41.1-15
= PL 32. col. 883).
52. Verbatim borrowing and paraphrasing of Augustine's Soliloquies 2.2.2;
cf. 2.15.28-29 (ed. Hormann, pp. 48.1-23, 82.21-83.18).
53. Timaeus 49DE.
354
54. Plutarch, De EI apud Delphos 18 (Moralia 392A-C); Proclus, In

Timaeum, 1:106 (ed. Diehl).
55. Heraclitus, frg. 91 (Diels-Kranz, 1:171) cited by Plato, Cratylus 402A;
Theaetetus 160D; and by Plutarch, De EI apud Delphos 18 (see n. 54 above).
Cf. n. 37 above.
56. Timaeus 37E-38B; cf. 49DE.
57. Cf. Aetius, Placita 1.3 (ed. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1879, no.
280), a text passed down under the name of Plutarch in the Renaissance;
Ficino may have known it via Francesco Filelfo s De morali disciplina (ed. F.
Robortello [Venice, 1552]; cf. pp. 5, 25, 55).
58. Timaeus 49D-51B.
59. See 5.12 (volume I).
60. Timaeus 5iCD.
61. Phaedo 78D-79A (cf. 74A-76B, 100B); Republic 5.476A-D, 6.508D ff.
62. Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 55.
63. Ibid. Props. 40-49 (on self-constituted existence).
64. Possibly, Proclus, In Parmenidem 823, 1119 (ed. Cousin), or De
malorum subsistentia 29 (ed. Boese, p. 208).
65. Timaeus 51E-52A (condensed).
66. Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 50 (see n. 62 above).
67. Ecclesiastes 1:2.
68. Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 152A ff.; Diogenes Laertius, Lives 9.51,10.31-32;
Cicero, Academica 2.46.142.
69. Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica 14.17.1 (Mras 2.303.14-16 = PG 21.
col. 1244).
70. Augustine, Contra Academicos 3.11.24-25 (PL 32. cols. 946-947).
71. Aristotle, De amma 2.6.4i8aio-i7.
72. Cf. Augustine, Contra Academicos 3.11.26 (PL 32. cols. 947-948).
73. Cf. Augustine, De vera religione 39.73.205-206 (ed. Green, p. 53.6-11
= PL 34. col. 154).
355
74* Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 10.3-5,15*12, (PL 42. cols. 975-977,1073-

1075).
75. Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.30.85.
76. This paragraph, Aut est aliquid in animo . . . amisisse videatur, is copied
almost verbatim from Augustine's De immortalitate animae 4.6 (ed.
Hormann, p. 107.6-26 = PL 32. col. 1024) with a few variants and addi-
tions.
77. The following two paragraphs, Fac te aliquid esse . . . videtur, non videri,
are copied, again almost verbatim but with some important variants,
from another Augustinian treatise, the Soliloquies 2.20.34-35 (ed.
Hormann, pp. 94.8-97.11 = PL 32. col. 902-904).
78. Seventh Letter 341CD.
356
Bibliography
Allen, Michael J , B. The Platonism of Marsilio Ficino: A Study of His

"Phaedrus" Commentary, Its Sources and Genesis. Berkeley & Los An-
geles: University of California Press, 1984.
. Icastes: Marsilio Ficino's Interpretation of Plato's "Sophist". Berkeley &
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989. Contains studies of
Ficino's ontology.
. Plato's Third Eye: Studies in Marsilio Ficino's Metaphysics and Its
Sources. Aldershot: Variorum, 1995. Various studies.
. Synoptic Art: Marsilio Ficino on the History of Platonic Interpretation.
Florence: Olschki, 1998. Includes chapters on Ficino's views on the an-
cient theology and the later history of Platonism.
Allen, Michael J . B., and Valery Rees, with Martin Davies, eds. Marsilio
Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy. Leiden: E . J . Brill, 2002.
A wide range of new essays.
Copenhaver, Brian P., and Charles B. Schmitt. Renaissance Philosophy. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Excellent introduction to the con-
text.
Field, Arthur. The Origins of the Platonic Academy of Florence. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988. Fine, detailed study of Ficino's for-
mative years.
Hankins, James. Plato in the Italian Renaissance. 2 vols. Leiden: E. J . Brill,
1990. A synoptic account of the Platonic revival.
. Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance. 2 vols. Rome:
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, forthcoming. Includes nineteen stud-
ies on Ficino and Renaissance Platonism.
Katinis, Teodoro. "Bibliografia ficiniana: Studi ed edizioni delle opere di
Marsilio Ficino dal 1986." In Accademia 2 (2000): 101-136. A bibliogra-
phy from 1986 to 2000.
Kristeller, Paul Oskar. Marsilio Ficino and His Work after Five Hundred
Years. Florence: Olschki, 1987. An essential guide to the bibliography.
357
BIBLIOGRAPHY
, Medieval Aspects of Renaissance Learning, ed. and tr. Edward P.

Mahoney. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.
. The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1943; repr. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Lang, 1964. The authorita-
tive study of Ficino as a formal philosopher.
. Renaissance Thought and Its Sources. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1979. Pays special attention to Platonism.
. Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters. Rome: Edizioni di Storia
e Letteratura, 1956. Important essays on Ficinos context and influ-
ence.
. Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters IIL Rome: Edizioni di
Storia e Letteratura, 1993. More essays on Renaissance Platonism and
on individual Platonists.
Members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Sci-
ence, London, trs. The Letters of Marsilio Ficino. 6 vols, to date. Lon-
don: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1975-.
Toussaint, Stephane, ed. Marcel Ficin ou les mysteres platoniciens. Les Ca-
hiers de l'Humanisme, vol. 2. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002.
Trinkaus, Charles. In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Ital-
ian Humanist Thought. 2 vols. London: University of Chicago Press,
1970. Wide-ranging analysis of a Christian-Platonic theme.
Walker, D. P. Spiritual and Demonic Magic: from Ficino to Campanella. Lon-
don: The Warburg Institute, 1958. A seminal study.
Wind, Edgar. Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance, rev, ed., New York:
Norton, 1968. A rich book on Platonisms influence on Renaissance
mythography, art and culture.
358
Index
References are by book, chapter, and paragraph number.
Academy, 9.3.6 Basil of Caesarea, 9.3.6 (n.15)

Aemilianus, rhetorician, 10.2.8 Boethius, 11.3.2
Aetius, doxographer, 11.6.6 (n.57)
Alcibiades, 11.3.23 Callanus Indianus, 9.2.2
Alciphron of Megara, 9.4.10 Chaldaeans, 10.3.7
Alexander the Great, 9.2.2 Christians, early, 9.3.6
Alexander of Phaerae, 9.2.2 Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 9.2.2
Algazel, 9.5.25 (n.5), 9*4*io (n.34), 9*7*1
Anaxagoras, 9.7.4,10.2.13,11.5.8, (n.59), 10.8.1 (n.50), 11.6.12
11.6.12 (n.68), 11.7.2 (n.75)
Anaximander, 11.5,8 Cleanthes, 9.4.10
Anaximenes, 11.5.8 Clement of Alexandria, 9.3.6
Archelaus, 11.5.8 (n.19)
Archytas of Tarentum, 11.3.9 Critias, 9.2.2
Aristo, 11.7.2 Cronos, 10.3.5 (n.28)
Aristotelians, 9.5.3,11.1.2; see also Cybele, see Great Mother
Peripatetics
Aristotle, 9.2,2, 9,3.6 (n.14), 9.5.3 Demetrius, philosopher, 10.2.8
(n.42), 9*5*16 (n,45), 9*7*1 Demosthenes, 9.4.10
(n,59), 10,2,10, 10,2,13 (n,2o), Dicaearchus, 9.7.1
10,3,6, 10,4,1, 10,7,4,11,2,2, Didymus, 11.5.3
11,3,3 (n,7), n*3*2i, 11,3.22 Diogenes Laertius, 9.2.2 (n.9),
(n.16), 11.6.13 9.3.6 (n.16), 9*4*10 (n.34),
Athena, see Pallas 10.2.13 (n.20), 11.3.1 (n.4),
Attis, Phrygian shepherd, 9.3.6 11.6.12 (n.68)
(n.19) Dionysius the Areopagite
Augustine, Aurelius, 9.3.6 (n.20), (pseudo), 10.2.3 (n,7)
11.3.17,11.6.1-2,11.6.13,11.7.1
(n.72), 11.7.2,11.8.2,11.8.1-5 Egypt, priests of, 9,3,6,11,5,8
Avicenna, 9.4.18, 9.5.25 Egyptians, 10,2,3,10.2.7
359
INDEX
Empedocles, 11,6.12 Mars, 10.2.5

Epicureans, 9.7.1,11.2.1 Melissus, 11.6.12
Epicurus, 10.2.1,10.2.8,10.4.1, Memory, 11.5.9
10.6.1,10.6.7,10.7.1, n.3.1,11.6.12 Meno, 11.3.24
Eudemus of Cyprus, 9.2.2 Mercati, Michele, 9.3.4 (n.12),
Eusebius of Caesarea, 9.3.6 (n.17), 10.8.10 (n.53)
9.5.25 (n.52), 10.2.9 (n.15), Mercurius Trismegistus, see Her-
11.6.12 (n.69) mes Trismegistus
Mnemosyne, see Memory
Filelfo, Francesco, 11.6.6 (n.57) Moses, 10.3.5
Muses, 11.5.9
Great Mother, priests of, 9.3.6
Noah, 10.3.5 (n.25)
Heraclitus, 11.4.15,11.6.4 Numenius, 10.2.3,10.2.9
Herillus, 11.7.2
Hermes Trismegistus, 9.7.4 Olympiodorus, 10.2.9 (n.14)
(n.62), 10.3.5,11.4.14 Origen, 9.3.6, 9.5.23, 9.5.24, 9.6.6,
Hippocratic writings, 9.3.6 (n.14) 10.2.3
Homer, 11.5.3 Orpheus, 11.4.13,11.5.9
Orphics, 11.3.9
Iamblichus, 9.1.3 (n.2), 10.2.9, Ovid, 9.3.6 (n.19)
10.3.5 (n.24), 11.3.9 (n.io)
Isidore of Seville, 10.5.2 (n.40) Pallas, 11.4.13
Pamphilus of Caesarea, saint,
Jerome, saint, 9.3.6 (n.15), 9*5*24 9.5.24
(n.52) Pan, 10.2.8
Jupiter, 9.1.3,10.2.5,10.3.5 (n.28), Panaetius, 10.8.1
10.8.2,11.4.13,11.5.9 Parmenides, 11.4.15,11.6.12
Paul, apostle, 11.5.5
Lethe, river, 9.6.1 Paul of Venice, 10.4.16 (n.39)
Lucretius, 9.3.6 (n.19), 9-5*25, Peripatetics, 9.5.12,10.3.6,10.3.8,
10.2.1 (n.2), 10.2.8,10.6.1,10.6.7 10.6.2,10.7.2,10.9.2,11.2.4,
11.8.1; see also Aristotelians
Macrobius, 9.1.3 (n.2), 10.2.13 Phaedo, 11.3.24
(n.21) Pherecydes of Syros, 9.2.2
Magi, 9.3.6,10.2.13,10.3.5, n.5.8 Plato, 9.1.3, 9.2.2, 9.3.6, 9.3.7
Manichaeans, 11.6.11 (n.22), 9.3.8 (n.24), 9.4*10
360
(n.32), 9-4-19, 9-5-2, 9-5-3, Protagoras, 11.6.12
9-5-15, 9-5-18, 9-5-19, 9-7-3, 10.2.1 Proteus, 10.1.6,11.3.9
(n.4), 10.2.3, 10.2.5,10.2.7, Psellus, Michael, 10.8.4 (n. 51)
10.3.3, 10.3.5,10.3.8,10.4.1, Ptolemy, 9.4.14
10.5.8,10.7.2,10.7.3,10.7.5, Pyrrho, 11.7.2
10.7.6,11.1.2,11.3.1,11.3.21, Pythagoras, 9.1.3,10.3.5 (n.24),
11.3.24, n.4.1, 11.4.2,11.4.6, n.5.3
11.4-13, n.4-14, n.4-15 (nn.37- Pythagoreans, 9.3.6,11.3,9 (n.io),
38), 11.5.7,11.5.8,11.5.10,11.6.1, 11.6.6
11.6.3 (n.53), n.6.4 (n.55), 11.6.6
(n.58), 11.6.7 (n.6o), 11.6.8 Quintilian, 9.5.26 (n.56)
(n.61), 11.6.11 (n.65), 11.6.12,
11.8.1,11.8.5 Rufinus of Aquileia,. 9.5.24
Platonists, 9.3.7, 9.3.8, 9.5.3, (n.52)
9.5-15, 9-5-24, 9-5-25, 9-7-4,
10.2.3,10.3.5 (n.28), 10.3.8, Saturn, priests of, 9.3.6,10.2.5
10.6.3,10.7.3,10.8.9,10.9.2, Skeptics, 11.7.1
11.3.2,11.3.19, n.4.4,, n.4-5, Socrates, 9.2.2, 9.4.10, 9*5.19,
11.4.15,11.6.3 9.5.20,11.2.2,11.3.4,11.3,23,
Pletho, also known as Georgios 11.3.24,11.5.7,11.5.8,11.5.9,
Gemistos, 10.2.13 (n.21), 10.3.5 11.6.6,11.6.15
(n.26), 10.8.4 (n.51) Solomon, king of Judaea, 11.6.12
Pliny the Elder, 9.3.16 (n.19), 11.5.3 Speusippus, 10.2.9, n.3.24
(n-43) Stilpo, 11.6.12
Plotinus, 9.4.10, 9.4.18, 9.5-23, Stoics, 11.3.2
9.5.24,10.2.9, n-4-6, n.4-7,
11.4.8,11.4.22 Thales, 11.5.8
Plutarch, 10.2.8,10.2.9, n-6.4, Theaetetus, 11.3.24
11.6.6 (n.57) Theages, 11.5.8
Porphyry, 9.1.3 (n.2), 9.3,6 (nn.15, Theramenes, 9.2.2
18), 10,2.3, 10.2.9 Thomas Aquinas, 9.4.3 (nn.25-
Posidonius, 9.2.2 26, 28-29), 9.4.4 (n.30), 9.4.14
Preninger, Martin, see Uranius, (nn.35-37), 9-5-8 (n.43), 10.2.1
Martin (n.3), 11.1.3 (n.2)
Proclus, 9.4.10, 9.4.18,10.2.3 Thracians, 10.3.15 (n.24)
(n.6), 10.2.7,10.2.9, n.4.7, Timaeus, 9.3.8,11.6.4,11.6.6,
11.4.8,11.6.4, n-6.9, n.6.11 11.6.11
361
Uranius, Martinus (Martin Xenophanes, 11.6.12
Preninger), 11.3,21 (n.15)
Zalmoxis, 10.3.5 (n.24)
Venus, 9.3,6, 10.8.2 Zeno, 11.6.12
Zeus, see Jupiter
Xenocrates, 9.3.6. 9.4.10,10.2.9, Zoroaster, 10.3.5,10.8.4, n.3.9,
11.3.24 11.5.3
362

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THE I TATTI R E N A I S S A N C E LIBRARY

James Hankins, General Editor

Robert Black David Marsh

LATIN TEXT EDITED BY

THE I TATTI R E N A I S S A N C E LIBRARY

Series design by Dean Bornstein

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ficino, Marsilio, 1433-1499.

Notes to the Text 333

Nonus liber. Quod sit immortalis efficacius non modo ex eo

Cap. i Probatur per rationalem virtutem animam non

Cap. HI Tertia ratio: mens repugnat corpori.

Cap. v Quinta ratio: mens absque corpore operatur.

Cap. vn Obiectio Epicureorum et responsio de rerum

Decimus liber. Quod sit immortalis quantum ad ordinem rerum.

Cap. i Prima ratio: sicut ultimum in ordine corporum est

Cap. ii Obiectio Epicuri et responsio de rerum serie.

Ninth Book: What is immortal is more efficacious not only

Chapter i To demonstrate more clearly its immortality, the soul

Chapter 2 Second proof: the more the mind is separated from

Chapter 4 Fourth proof: the soul acts freely.

Chapter 5 Fifth proof: the mind operates without the body.

Chapter 6 Sixth proof: the soul conforms partly with things

Chapter 7 An objection from the Epicureans and its rebuttal.

Tenth Book: That the soul is immortal in respect of

Chapter 1 First proof: as the last in the order of bodies is

Chapter 2 Epicurus objection and its rebuttal. On the chain of

Cap. HI Secunda ratio: sicut in rebus naturalibus fit

Cap. iv Obiectio Epicuri et responsio de formis deo

Cap. vi Obiectio Lucretii et responsio, quod mens potest

Cap. VIII Obiectio Panaetii et responsio, quod anima sine

Undecimus liber. Quod sit immortalis in quantum unitur cum

Cap. i Prima ratio: mens unitur obiecto perpetuo et species

Cap. II Obiectio Epicureorum2 et responsio. De unione

Cap. HI Obiectio Epicuri et responsio, quod species innatae

Chapter 3 Second proof: as resolution reverts in natural objects

Chapter 4 Epicurus' objection and a response to it. On the

Chapter 6 Lucretius' objection and its refutation. That the

Chapter 8 Panaetius' objection and its rebuttal. That the soul

Chapter 9 Third proof: as is the object, so is the power.

Eleventh Book: that the soul is immortal insofar as it unites with

Chapter 1 First proof: the mind is united with an eternal object

Chapter 2 An Epicurean objection and its rebuttal. On the

Cap. iv Confirmatio superiorum atque insuper de ideis.

Cap. vn Obiectio Scepticorum et responsio, quod aliquid

Cap. VIII Obiectio Peripateticorum et responsio, quod Veritas

Chapter 4 Confirmation of the above. Further discussion of the

Chapter 5 Confirmation of the above by way of signs.

Chapter 8 An objection from the Peripatetics and its rebuttal.

Probatur per rationalem virtutem animam non modo esse

1 Hactenus probavimus per virtutem rationalem animam esse for-

To demonstrate more clearly its immortality, the soul is proved

constituatur. Itaque aut non reflectitur res aliqua in seipsam aut, si

tur alteri forma haec, quae sibimet innititur, quando adnititur ad

Secunda ratio: mens quo magis separatur

1 Si anima5 originem ullam a corpore traheret, quanto coniunctius

Second proof: the more the mind is separated

vaticinantur. Ideo nonnulli, ut in Critone et Apologia inquit Plato,

sleep or some other alienation from the body. Hence many, as