Aldaba v.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 188078. January 25, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: On May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law wherein the city of Malolos was separated from
its original legislative district. As a result of which, the city was entitled to its own separate
legislative district, however petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers, registered voters and
residents of the city, raised the issue of the constitutionality of the law for failing to meet the
minimum population requirement of 250,000 as provided under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution because the city only has a population of 223,069 when the law was proposed in
Congress in 2007.

Issue: Is the city of Malolos entitled to a separate Legislative District under RA 9591?

Ruling: The court ruled in the negative.

Under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, shall have at least one representative. In construing the provision, the
Court stated that the Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, a city must
have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. Moreover, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution states that “any city whose population may hereinafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one member…”.
Thus, in the case, the actual population of Malolos was less than the minimum population
requirement of 250,000 and therefore cannot be entitled to a legislative district.

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 Representative Teddy Brawner Baguilat v. Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez
GR No. 227757. Jul 25, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts: The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016,
several news articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or
anointment of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a
"cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives (or the House), and even purportedly
encamped himself in Davao shortly after the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of
President Duterte and the majority partisans. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep.
Suarez's election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House allegedly
"lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign membership in the Minority, and thereafter,
vote for him as the Minority Leader.
On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza had an
interchange before the Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all
those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the
other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of
the Minority.Thereafter, the Elections for the Speakership were held, "with 252 Members voting
for Speaker Alvarez, eight voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining
and one [(l)] registering a no vote,"thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress.
On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil Abayon, III (Rep.
Abayon), manifested before the Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those who did not vote for
Speaker Alvarez (including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the
Minority Leader.6 Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader) Farinas moved
for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader. This was opposed by Rep. Lagman
essentially on the ground that various "irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority
Leader, particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as he voted for Speaker
Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and (b) that the "abstentionists"
who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader are
supposed to be considered independent members of the House, and thus, irregularly deemed as
part of the Minority.7 However, Rep. Lagman's opposition was overruled, and consequently,
Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as the House Minority Leader.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be
recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a)  the "long-standing tradition" in the House
where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership
automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's
election to said Minority Leader position.

Issues:whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to

recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and
(b)  petitioners as the only legitimate members of the House Minority.

Ruling:The petition is without merit.

"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the
act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there
being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Special
People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, the Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus  is
an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of
procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right
to the performance of the act to be compelled.
After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to
the reliefs sought. Records disclose that prior to the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016,

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then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza
as to who would elect the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas then
articulated that: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and
those who vote for other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from
voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be
elected by the members of the Minority. Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of the House
proceeded without any objection from any member of Congress, including herein petitioners.
Notably, the election of the Speaker of the House is the essential and formative step conducted at
the first regular session of the 17th Congress to determine the constituency of the Majority and
Minority (and later on, their respective leaders), considering that the Majority would be
comprised of those who voted for the winning Speaker and the Minority of those who did not.

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 AtongPaglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC
GR No. 203766. April 2, 2013
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political
party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC,
on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in
the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for
the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. 
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

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6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

Issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.
2. Can the petitioners register themselves as a party-list?
3. What are the New Parameters of the qualifications of a party-list?

Ruling:
1. No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since
the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning
the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to
the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to
register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system
is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the
first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-
list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after
this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the
three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under
the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.
How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary
struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941

2. Yes, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may
now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters prescribed by this Court.

3. Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

5
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

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 Lico v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205505. September 29, 2015
SERENO, C.J.

Facts: AdhikaingTinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop) is a multi-sectoral party-list

organization which was registered under Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act.
Under its constitution and by-laws, its highest policy-making body is the National Convention.
The Central Committee, however, takes over when the National Convention is not in session.

In the 2010 Elections, Commission on Elections (COMELEC) proclaimed Ating Koop as one of
the winning party-lists. Petitioner, Atty. Isidro Lico, as the first nominee, took his oath of office
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives and assumed office.

Several months prior to its proclamation, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution
2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees. Lico was to serve
the first year of the three-year term.

In 2011, Ating Koop held its second National Convention, during which it introduced
amendment to its constitution and by-laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of
the Central Committee, which would still be composed of 15 representatives but with five each
coming from Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The amendments likewise mandated the holding of
an election of central committee members within six months after the second National
Convention.

In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (Interim
Central Committee) which was dominated by the members of the Rimas (Amparo Rimas) Group.

The Interim Central Committee expelled Lico from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Aside from the
allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, he allegedly refused to honor the term-
sharing agreement. Rimas Group filed with the COMELEC a petition against Lico to order him
to vacate the office. COMELEC upheld the expulsion of Lico.

Issue: Does COMELEC have a jurisdiction over the expulsion of a member of the House of
Representatives from his party-list organization?

Ruling: No. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has the jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of the Congress. In accordance with Section
17 Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.

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 Benigno Simeon Aquino III v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010
PEREZ, J.:

Facts: Republic Act no. 9716 was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on
October 12, 2009. By reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative of the province, the
said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur. To create a
new second legislative district, it combined the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabas, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza. The petitioner contends that RA 6716 is unconstitutional because the
reapportionment by the said law will leave the proposed first district with a population of less
than 250,000 which violates the constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of
250,000 to create a new legislative district.

Issue: Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for

the creation of a new legislative district in a province

Ruling: No. Second sentence of Article VI, Sec 5(3) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution only
provides the population requirement for a city to be entitled to a district representative. However,
it does not mention a requirement as to how many inhabitants should a legislative province must
have in order to be entitled to a district representative.
Therefore, the petition is dismissed and Republic Act No. 6716 is declared a valid law.

8
 Aldaba v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188078. January 25, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: The population of Malolos City on May 1, 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute
that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the
National Statistics Office that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. House
Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region
III of the National Statistics Office as authority that the population of the City of Malolos “will
be 254,030 by the year 2010.” The Certification states that the population of “Malolos, Bulacan
as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification further states that it was “issued upon the
request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed
creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.”

Issue: Is RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional?

Ruling: Yes. The City of Malolos does not have at least a population of 250,000 for the purpose
of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the May 10, 2010 elections.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is
without legal effect because she has no basis and authority to issue the Certification. The
Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the
population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010.

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 Navarro v. Ermita
G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act No.
9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the Commision
on Elections conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the
province under the Local Government Code. The plebiscite yielded 69, 943 affirmative votes and
63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao
del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands, the President appointed the interim set of
provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14,
2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who
assumed office on July 1, 2007.
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene Medina,
former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. They used as
an argument LGC, Title IV, Chapter 1 Section 461, Requisites of Creation- (a) A province may
be created if it has an average annual income as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) and that when the law was passed, Dinagat had
a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106, 951, failing to comply
with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the LGC, Title IV, Chapter 1 Section 461
which states that:
A province may be created provided that
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
In addition, the Supreme Court has decided that there is an exception which states that a district
should have a contiguous and compact territory and that is if the district is an island.

Issue: Is R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional?

Ruling: No, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government
unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province because the Supreme
Court has decided that there is an exception which states that a district should have a contiguous
and compact territory and that is if the district is an island. Also, its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four time more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the
creation of a province.

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 Jalosjos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191970. April 24, 2012
ABAD, J.:

Facts: Quezon City was Jalosjos’ place of birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively
changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. He came to the
Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. He then applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but
respondent Dan Erasmo, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Veteran’s Village, opposed the
same. Acting on the application, the Election Registration Board approved it and included
Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections voters list for Precinct 0051F of Barangay
Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. He then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Undaunted, Erasmo filed before the Municipal Curcuit Trial Court of Ipil-Tungawan- R.T. Lim
in Ipil a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list on the ground
that the latter made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225 (An Act Making The Citizenship Of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent) and the one year-residency requirement of the Local
Government Code.
On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s
decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brother’s house and,
for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile. Meanwhile, Jolosjos won the election and
was proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race in the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Issue: Did the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay?

Ruling: Yes. Still Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a
domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed to prove that he successfully
changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC points out that, since he was
unable to discharge the burden of proving Zamboanga Sibugay to be his rightful domicile, it
must be assumed that this domicile is either Quezon City or Australia. But it is clear from the
facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly
proving that he gave up his domicile there and he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibuga since November 2008. He then thus have been living in Ipil Zamboanga for a
year before he filed for his certificate of Candidacy on May 10, 2010 elections.

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 Mitra v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191938. October 19, 2010
BRION, J.:

Facts: In this case, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) oversteps the limits of its
discretion wherein a situation where resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by
the respondent. Mitra the petitioner, was alleged by the COMELEC to have misrepresented his
Aborlan, Palawan residence to deceive and mislead the people of Province of Palawan. The
Supreme Court (Court) needed to intervene in this matter despite its limited certiorari
jurisdiction in election cases because they are obliged and are constitutionally bound by it.
The Court found out that the COMELEC failed to consider if the petitioner deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the
position of Governor of Palawan but Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC. Thus, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its
appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan,
Palawan. According to the Court, the petitioner did all incremental moves to establish his new
domicile and in sum, the evidence in the present case was carefully reviewed which showed that
Mitra indeed transferred his residence from Puerto Prinsesa City to Aborlan within the period
required by law. On 19 July 2010, the Motion for reconsideration through the Office of the
Solicitor General, asks the Court to reconsider the 2 July 2010 decision due to overstepping the
review power over its factual findings as a specialized constitutional body, its findings and
conclusions of the COMELEC are respected and even given the status of finality. The
COMELEC now argues that Mitra’s purported dwelling lacks the determining the fact of
residency even though Mitra intended to transfer his domicile but it was still denied due to lack
of merit.

Issue: Is the Court qualified to intervene in regards to solving factual issues vested by the
Constitution to specialized agencies such as the COMELEC?

Ruling: Yes, the general rule is that the Court ordinarily does not review in a certiorari case, the
COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence but due to the presence of grave abuse of
discretion, the Court’s constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention
simply because a specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the factual issues.
One exception is when the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable. It is also stated in Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that "Unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a
separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a
petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause. In this circumstance, the Court is duty
bound under the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the
attendant’s grave abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it is said that Mitra’s petition argued that the COMELEC’s grave abuse of
discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false
representation. However, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion at every step in the
appreciation of the evidence according to the Court. Thus, the Court even with limited certiorari
jurisdiction to all factual issues, as long as there is a presence of grave abuse of discretion, the
Court is duty-bound to intervene in the name of justice.

12
 Tagolino v. HRET
G.R. No. 202202. March 19, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: On November 2009, Richard Gomez filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking congressional office as Representative of the
Forth Congressional District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. However, he was
disqualified for failing to comply with the residency requirement under the 1987 Constitution. As
a result of which, he was substituted by his wife, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez which was approved
by the COMELEC since the disqualification is not due to Richard Gomez’ CoC cancellation.
Subsequently, Gomez won the congressional race crediting his votes to Torres-Gomez with
respondent Tagolino placing second. Aggrieved, the latter filed a petition for quo warranto
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to oust Lucy Marie Torres-
Gomez. The HRET ruled in favor of Torres-Gomez adopting the COMELEC’s resolution that
Richard Gomez’ disqualification was not due to the cancellation of his CoC and thus the
substitution is valid and that she is domiciled in Ormoc City thus the residency requirement is
complied with. Tagolino then appealed with the Supreme Court claiming that the HRET
committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issues: Is the substitution of Lucy Maria Torres-Gomez valid?

Is Lucy Maria Torres-Gomez qualified?

Ruling: The Court ruled that the substitution is invalid. And that her residency qualification need
not to be dealt with because there was lack of proper substitution making her a non bona fide
candidate for the position.

The Court distinguished a petition for disqualification between a petition to dent due course to
and/or cancel a CoC . Disqualification under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, are those
who: a) are in possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or b) commits
certain acts of disqualification which includes among others, corruption, terrorism and
overspending. On the other hand, cancellation of CoC is based on the findings that a candidate
made material misrepresentations on his CoC. As to its effects, in the former petition, the
candidate is still considered to be a candidate while in the latter petition, the candidate is deemed
to have not been a candidate at all. Further, Sec. 77 of the same law requires that a person to be
substituted must be an official candidate.

Thus, in the case since Richard Gomez’ disqualification was based on a misrepresentation on his
CoC thus he is deemed to have not been a candidate at all or he is not considered to be an official
candidate. Hence, the substitution of Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez is invalid.

13
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC GR 119976
248 SCRA 300. Sept 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in Tacloban, Leyte, ran for
Congress representing the 1st district of Leyte. Her adversary, Montejo, sought to disqualify her
candidacy on the ground that, among others, she is not a resident of at least 1 year of Tacloban
and therefore she did not satisfy the residency requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the
Constitution as she in fact wrote in her Certificate of Candidacy that she resided “in the
constituency where” she sought “to be elected” for only “seven months”. She later claimed it to
be an honest mistake brought about by confusion and asserted that it is in fact her domicile
“since childhood”. However, COMELEC resolved in favor of Montejo and contended that
Imelda’s domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban.
In its resolution, COMELEC cited San Juan, Metro Manila and San Miguel, Manila as places
where she resided and served certain positions. Mention was even made of her residence in
Malacañang and Honolulu, Hawaii.

Issue: Is Tacloban, Leyte the legal residence of Imelda thereby satisfying the residence
requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution?

Ruling: Yes. The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy regarding the period of
residency does not negate the fact of residence if such fact is established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. It is settled that when the Constitution speaks
of “residence” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.” It was held that Tacloban,
Leyte was in fact the domicile of origin of Imelda by operation of law for a minor follows the
domicile of her parents (which was the same). In its Resolution, COMELEC was obviously
referring to Imelda’s various places of actual residence, not her domicile (legal residence). An
individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different
places. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, 80 and
Imelda has clearly always chosen to return to her domicile of origin. Even at the height of the
Marcos Regime’s powers, she kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating important personal milestones there, instituting well-
publicized projects for its benefit and establishing a political power base where her siblings and
close relatives held positions of power always with either her influence or consent.

14
 Aquino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts: On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among
others, Aquino provided the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz :
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM
VILLAGE, MAKATI. (8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:__Years and 10 Months.
On his Certificate of Candidacy, it indicated that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac in 1992 and was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election.
At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His
birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora and there was no indication therein of a change in domicile.
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman
of the LAKAS -NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate
for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a
period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.
The day after said petition for disqualification was filed, Agapito filed another certificate of
candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. Stating under item 8 of his certificate
that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for 1 year and 13 days.
On May 6, 1995, COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the instant petition for
Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for
the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May
6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where 3 candidates vied for the
ongressional seat in the Second District, Agapito garnered the highest votes as against the other
candidates.
On June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the
Second Division dated May 6, 1995 and declaring him ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in
the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.

Issues:
1. Whether or not COMELEC is correct to disqualify Agapito Aquino as candidate for the Office
of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City for lack of the constitutional
qualification of residence.
2. Whether or not the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes be proclaimed as
winner.

Ruling:
1. SC affirms the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective
position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent
commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the
1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their
representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions.
And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in
the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental
law itself.
*Note that the term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not
only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

15
2. The candidate receiving the next higher number of votes is not proclaimed the winner.
SC made a turnabout from our previous ruling in latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos
v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who
placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified
as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second
placer won by default.
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. Geronimo v Ramos pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall
within the category of invalid or nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no
candidate at all in the eyes of the law,".
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority, votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under no
circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office.

16
 Coquilla v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002
MENDOZA, J.

Facts: Teodulo Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He
joined the US Navy and was subsequently naturalized as a US citizen. In 1998, he came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the
United States. He applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 8171 which was approved. In
2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

In 2000, he registered as a voter in Oras, Eastern Samar. In 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of mayor pf Oras, Eastern Samar. He wrote in his certificate of
candidacy that he has been a resident of the said place for two years.
Incumbent mayor Neil Alvarez sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on
the ground that Coquilla had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in fact he has resided therein for
only about six months.

Issue: Is Coquilla qualified to be proclaimed as a mayor of Oras?

Ruling: No. Under the Local Government Code (RA 7160):

Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus
rendering such certificate liable to cancellation.

17
 Abundo v. Commission On Elections
G.R. No. 201716. January 8, 2013
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: The petitioner, Abundo, vied for the petition of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
for 4 successive regular elections namely the 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010 national and local
elections. He was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate in both the 2001 and 2007
elections and served as the mayor in the corresponding terms. However, in the 2004 elections,
the Viga municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Jose Torres as mayor who, in due time,
performed his functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested the election and proclamation
of Torres and was eventually declared as the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest and
assumed the office of the mayor starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the term which is on June
30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
During the 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres opposed each other again. Torres sought the
disqualification to run of Abundo by asserting the three-consecutive term limit rule.

Issue: Whether or not the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official
arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered
as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for
elective local officials

Ruling: No. The term of Abundo was effectively broken when he was initially deprived of title
to serve and occupy an office to which he, after due proceedings or the electoral protest, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. Thus, there was no
consecutiveness of three successive terms. Also, Abundo only assumed the position of mayoralty
for a period of a little over one year and one month and was not able to serve fully the entire term
to which he was entitled.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

18
 Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-23326. December 18, 1965
REGALA, J.:

Facts: Article VI, of the Constitution, reads as follows: The senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual
compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places of
residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided
by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. However, the original strict
prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were
approved in 1940.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation “other emoluments.” RA No. 3836 was then enacted which reads: AN ACT
AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX.
Subsection (c) of RA no. 186 reads: “Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of
age, who has rendered at least twenty years of service. “
RA No. 3836 currently reads “Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House
of Representatives and to an elective officer of either House of the Congress, regardless of age,
provided that in the case of a Senator or Member, he must have served at least twelve years as a
Senator and/or as a member of the House of Representatives, and, in the case of an elective
officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years, not less
than four years of which must have been rendered as such elective officer: Provided, That the
gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of the House of Representatives, or elective
officer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year’s salary for every four year of service in
the government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable
to attachment or execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the law based on the reason that the provision
on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries
of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.

Issues:
1. What does “emolument” mean?
2. Is RA 3836 constitutional?

Ruling:
1. Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded “emolument” as “the profit arising
from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is
annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.”
2. No, it is not constitutional the court declared R.A. No. 3836 unconstitutional for it allows the
retirement benefits immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article 6, Section 14 of the Constitution.

19
 Pobre v. Defensor Santiago
597 SCRA 1. August 25, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."
Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof."
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites
the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech
delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does
not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies
in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose
what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending
out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would
eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify
for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-
sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

Issues:
1. What is Parliamentary Immunity?
2. What is Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution?
3. Is her speech covered under the doctrine of Parliamentary Immunity?

Ruling:
1. Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."
2. Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the
House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof."

20
3. No. The Supreme Court has decided that Parliamentary immunity is not an individual
privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
benefit of the people and the institution that represents them

21
 People v. Jalosjos
G.R. No. 132875. February 3, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is

now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness based on Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes him
for reclusion perpetua or at least 30 years in prison.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the
sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made
possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable
procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases. The immunity from arrest or detention
of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows
that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department states that
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . .

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to
civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the
Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending
appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions
and in going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from
arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined
parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:

. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law
within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to
surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be
attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses,
it is enough that Congress is in session.

Accused-appellant's relied on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that —

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a
people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of
his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been

22
guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule
the will of the people.

Issues:
1. Is Parliamentary Immunity applicable in the present case?
2. Did the accused-appellant correctly relied in Aguinaldo v. Santos in the present case?

Ruling:
1. No, according to Art. VIII, Sec. 9 of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, A Member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the
same. For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity
from arrest. In the present case, since the accused-appellant was convicted for the crime of rape
which is punishable for at least 30 years and a member of the Batasang Pambansa also known as
the Philippine Parliament, parliamentary cannot be given to him.
2. No, the accused-appellant did not correctly relied in Aguinaldo v. Santos. It can be readily
seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment
arising from the enforcement of criminal law which is the issue in the present case. Moreover, in
the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not
removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

23
 Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel
G.R. NO. 179817. June 27, 2008
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: On 27 July 2003, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion due to
the marching of a group of more than 300 armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Later on in that day, the impasse was resolved through a series
of negotiations with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening. Trillanes IV the petitioner
along with his comrades, were charged with coup d etat defined under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
But when Trillanes IV entered into politics and won the Senatorial Elections, he filed a petition
with RTC Makati for an “Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Requests” (Omnibus Motion). It was denied by the trial court on 25 July
2007 and the denial was also reinstituted in petitioner’s motion for reconsideration which
excluded some parts of his requests on the order dated 18 September 2007. Hence, the present
petition for Certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court and, for prohibition and
mandamus.

Issue: Is the petitioner, as elected by the people in their sovereign capacity to the position of
Senator of the Republic provides the Proper Legal Justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate as a Senator?

Ruling: No, in the Doctrine of Condonation, the Court held that election or re-election does not
apply to criminal cases and does not obliterate a criminal charge. In this case, petitioner is known
to be detained by the public, thus, the voters elected him as a senator with awareness that there
are limitations on his freedom of action which he could only achieve legislative results within the
confines of prison. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by the public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. A mere absence of a member of the
Congress is said to be not affecting the legislation. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
The Parliamentary Immunities differ in types of gravity of the offense committed by government
officials, the greater the offense, chances of bail be granted by a court is dubious due to the fact
of human inclination of escaping the punishment which could possibly limit his locomotion in
perpetuity, the gravity must be analyzed by the courts before granting bails to detainees. Hence,
parliamentary immunities of members of the Congress differs depending to the profundity of the
crime committed, the lesser sanction decreases the chance for the grant of bail. Thus, the petition
is dismissed due virtually making the petitioner a free man if allowed to participate in his
juridical capacity as a Senator elected by the Sovereign Power of the People, renders such
purposes of the correctional system as a mockery.

24
 Trillanes IV v. Judge Castillo-Marigomen
G.R. No. 223451. March 14, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

Facts: On October 2014 the Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee held its hearing on the alleged
350-hectar estate owned by the Binay family. In his testimony, former Makati Vice Mayor
Ernesto Mercado stated that since the developer of the land, Hillmares’ Construction
Corporation, refused to charge its development on the Binays’ 13% “kickback” on all of the
Makati infrastructure projects, the company instead overpriced its bid on the Makati City Hall
Parking Building construction project to come up with the funds for the development of the 350-
hectar estate. Thereafter, herein private respondent Antonio Tiu claimed ownership of the estate
and that the allegations was not true; that his company was responsible for its development; and
that he has the financial means of owning that land.

Certain about such allegations, Senator Antonio Trillanes IV made statement on the media
accusing Tiu of being a “front” or “nominee” or an acting “dummy” of Vice President Binay.
Thus, Tiu filed a civil complaint for damages against Trillanes IV for his comments against him
in the media. In his defense Trillanes IV contended that, among others, he was immune from
such since his statements were made in the performance of his duties as a Senator under Sec. 11,
Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Are the remarks of Trillanes IV in the media accusing Tiu as the Vice President’s “front”
or “nominee” or “dummy” covered by the privilege of speech and debate clause under the 1987
Constitution?

Ruling: The court ruled in the negative.

Under Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution: “No member of Congress shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee
thereof”. The court opined that the Speech or Debate Clause under Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution which grants immunity to the members of Congress for their statements is only
limited to legislative acts which, as defined by US jurisprudence as an act generally done in
Congress in relation to the business before it. Further, the court ruled that to participate in or
respond to media interviews in not an official function of any lawmaker; that it falls outside the
privilege speech or debate under the Constitution; that it is not a legislative act, but is political in
nature which is outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under such Clause.

In the case, since Senator Trillanes IV gave his statements in the media which the Court does not
recognize as a legislative act, he cannot therefore invoke his parliamentary immunity.

25
 Liban v. Sen. Gordon
G.R. No. 175352. January 18, 2011
CARPIO, J.

Facts: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City
Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who
was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during
his incumbency as Senator. Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec.
13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that No Senator may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was
elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

Issue: Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

Ruling: NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because
it was not the very lismota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a
GOCC nor a private corporation. The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by
the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the
very lismota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue
of constitutionality. The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very
lismota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties
and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court
may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left
for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. The Court should not have declared
void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial
restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court
could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by
this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was
being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate
under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.

26
 Major General Carlos F. Garcia v. The Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

Facts:In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposedby law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% advalorem tax. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all importedarticles, including crude oil and other oil products
imported into the Philippines.

In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475was passed
reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oilproducts continued to be taxed
at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative fromBataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of thepublic debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusivelyin the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur withamendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enactrevenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuingExecutive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are
in the nature of revenuegeneratingmeasures.

Issue: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

Ruling: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress
of the Philippines.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: The Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharf age dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President.

27
 Padilla v. Alvarez
G. R. No. 231671. July 25, 2017
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on
the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution.

According to President Duterte’s Proclamation No. 216 and his Report to the Congress, the
declaration of a state pf martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole Mindanao ensued from the series of armed attacks, violent acts, and
atrocities directed against civilians and government authorities, institutions, and establishments
perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups.

Representatives from the Executive Department, the military, and other security officials of the
government were invited, on separate occasions, by the Senate and the House of Representatives
for a conference briefing regarding the circumstances, details, and updates surrounding the
President’s proclamation and report.

The Senate deliberated on these proposed resolutions: a) Proposed Senate (P. S.) Resolution No.
388, which expressed support for the President’s Proclamation No. 216; b) P. S. Resolution No.
390, which called for the convening in joint session of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to deliberate Proclamation No. 216.

P. S. No. 390 was opposed by the majority of the Senate. The proposal was also rejected by the
House of Representatives.

Issue: Does the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President’s
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: No. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to
vote jointly to revoke the President’s declaration or suspension.

By the language of Article VII, Section 18

of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is
only required to vote jointly to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of alarmed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

28
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

29
 Paredes v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 118346, August 10, 1995
Mendoza, J.:

Facts: In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur
filed a case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province),
Atty. GenerosoSansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three
allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued
against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification
from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the
arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained
that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes
claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the
Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of
Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by
the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
“x xx. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with
the power of each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’
and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the
qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.”

30
 Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001
VITUG, J.:

Facts: The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in
ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in
connection with pending in criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the
case from investigator Gualberto delaLlana after having been constituted by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for
approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his
Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate
informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the
informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.

On or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization for the stay of several aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in
violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of
said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by
said accused."

The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called
upon to resolve several other matters on the subject.
Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez,  petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019;
(2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez,  petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure order issued
by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing;
(3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03
March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare
Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution,
dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended informations against her; and
(4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, petitioner assailed the denial by the
Sandiganbayan of her motion for reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the
testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases, the Court declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case
No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she
failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting
of causes of action, is self-defeating.
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines
after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion
to quash the informations

31
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions.'
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e)
of R.A. No. 3019." 

Issues:
1. What is the difference between the order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution?
2. Is the order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 applicable in the present case?

Ruling:
1. The suspension contemplated in the constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
upon an erring member while in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner
for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
2. Yes. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim
simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. unless an infringement of any specific
Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own
judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear
disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for
Judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner
prescribed by the Charter itself. Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.

32
 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
235 SCRA 630. October 30, 1995
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco,
and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made
by them that R.A. No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax Law) did not "originate exclusively"
in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI of the Constitution. Although they admit
that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and
that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third
readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it
approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should
have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with
the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version
just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."

The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an
amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two
occasions during the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which,
in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. It is noteworthy that,
in the particular case of S. No. 1630, petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate,
voted to approve it on second and third readings.

S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that
S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification
that it was passed by the Senate "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S.
Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something substantially different
between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. From this premise, they
conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the Senate and that it is the
product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by
both houses of Congress."

In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of
the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of
petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates
that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill
was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass
the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it
was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No.
1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the
Conference Committee.

According to our courts, while Art. VI provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must
"originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an
entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a
committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding
sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a
substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at
all.

33
To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the
House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting
clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in
place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule
prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment
of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.

Issue: Are petitioners argument have merit?

Ruling: No, the petitioners argument have no merit. While Art. VI provides that all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also
adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the present case, the
arguments of the petitioners saying that the bill should originate from the House of
Representatives instead of from the house of Senate does not have any merit because the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments as provided in Art VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of
the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of
petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates
that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill
was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass
the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it
was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No.
1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the
Conference Committee.

34
 Brillantes v. COMELEC
432 SCRA 269. June 15, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also
mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer
equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998
presidential elections, particularly in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
The failure of the machines to read correctly some automated ballots, however, deferred its
implementation.
In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and local
positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been acquired for that electoral
exercise because of time constraints.
On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization
program for the 2004 elections consisting of three (3) phases, to wit:
(1) PHASE I – Computerized system of registration and voters validation or the so-called
"biometrics" system of registration;
(2) PHASE II – Computerized voting and counting of votes; and
(3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results.
It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases.

On the other hand, the validation scheme under Phase I of the AES apparently encountered
problems in its implementation, as evinced by the COMELEC’s pronouncements prior to the
elections that it was reverting to the old listing of voters. Despite the scrapping of Phase II of the
AES, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the AES through an
electronic transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of the 2004 elections for national,
provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Senate President Franklin Drilon had misgivings and misapprehensions about the
constitutionality of the proposed electronic transmission of results for the positions of President
and Vice-President, and apprised COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos of his position during
their meeting on January 28, 2004. He also wrote Chairman Abalos on February 2, 2004. The
letter reads:
Dear ChairmanAbalos,
This is to confirm my opinion which I relayed to you during our meeting on January 28th that the
Commission on Elections cannot and should not conduct a "quick count" on the results of the
elections for the positions of President and Vice-President.
Under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, it is the Congress that has the sole and
exclusive authority to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. Thus, any quick count
to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the
votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority
of the Congress, but also would be lacking of any Constitutional authority. You conceded the
validity of the position we have taken on this point.
In view of the foregoing, we asked the COMELEC during that meeting to reconsider its plan to
include the votes for President and Vice-President in the "quick count", to which you graciously
consented. Thank you very much.
On April 27, 2004, the COMELEC met en banc to update itself on and resolve whether to
proceed with its implementation of Phase III of the AES. During the said meeting, COMELEC
Commissioner Florentino Tuason, Jr. requested his fellow Commissioners that "whatever is said
here should be confined within the four walls of this room and the minutes so
that walangmasyadongproblema. Commissioner Tuason, Jr. stated that he had no objection as to
the Phase III of the modernization project itself, but had concerns about the budget. He opined
that other funds of the COMELEC may not be proper for realignment. Commissioners.

35
Despite the dire and serious reservations of most of its members, the COMELEC, the next day,
April 28, 2004, barely two weeks before the national and local elections, approved the assailed
resolution 6712 declaring that it "adopts the policy that the precinct election results of each city
and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC,
Manila." For the purpose, respondent COMELEC established a National Consolidation Center
(NCC), Electronic Transmission Centers (ETCs) for every city and municipality, and a special
ETC at the COMELEC, Manila, for the Overseas Absentee Voting.

Briefly, the procedure for this electronic transmission of precinct results is outlined as follows:
I. The NCC shall receive and consolidate all precinct results based on the data transmitted to it
by each ETC;
II. Each city and municipality shall have an ETC "where votes obtained by each candidate for all
positions shall be encoded, and shall consequently be transmitted electronically to the NCC,
through Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) facilities." For this purpose, personal computers
shall be allocated for all cities and municipalities at the rate of one set for every one hundred
seventy-five (175) precincts;
III. A Department of Education (DepEd) Supervisor shall be designated in the area who will be
assigned in each polling center for the purpose of gathering from all Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) therein the envelopes containing the Copy 3 of the Election Returns (ER) for national
positions and Copy 2 of the ER for local positions, both intended for the COMELEC, which shall
be used as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced precinct results.
The assailed resolution further provides that written notices of the date, time and place of the
electronic transmission of advanced precinct results shall be given not later than May 5, 2004 to
candidates running for local positions, and not later than May 7, 2004 to candidates running for
national positions, as well as to political parties fielding candidates, and parties,
organizations/coalitions participating under the party-list system.

In relation to this, Section 13 of the assailed resolution provides that the encoding proceedings
were ministerial and the tabulations were "advanced unofficial results." The entirety of Section
13, reads:
Sec. 13. Right to observe the ETC proceedings. – Every registered political party or coalition of
parties, accredited political party, sectoral party/organization or coalition thereof under the party-
list, through its representative, and every candidate for national positions has the right to
observe/witness the encoding and electronic transmission of the ERs within the authorized
perimeter.
Provided, That candidates for the sangguniangpanlalawigan,
sangguniangpanglungsod or sangguniang bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket shall
collectively be entitled to only one common observer at the ETC.
The citizens’ arm of the Commission, and civic, religious, professional, business, service, youth
and other similar organizations collectively, with prior authority of the Commission, shall each
be entitled to one (1) observer. Such fact shall be recorded in the Minutes.
The observer shall have the right to observe, take note of and make observations on the
proceedings of the team. Observations shall be in writing and, when submitted, shall be attached
to the Minutes.
The encoding proceedings being ministerial in nature, and the tabulations being advanced
unofficial results, no objections or protests shall be allowed or entertained by the ETC.
In keeping with the "unofficial" character of the electronically transmitted precinct results, the
assailed resolution expressly provides that "no print-outs shall be released at the ETC and at the
NCC." Instead, consolidated and per-precinct results shall be made available via the Internet, text
messaging, and electronic billboards in designated locations. Interested parties may print the
result published in the COMELEC web site.

NAMFREL and political parties have the following concerns about Resolution 6712 which arose
during consultation over the past week[:]
a) The Resolution disregards RA 8173, 8436, and 7166 which authorize only the citizen’s arm to
use an election return for an unofficial count; other unofficial counts may not be based on an
election return; Indeed, it may be fairly inferred from the law that except for the copy of the

36
citizen’s arm, election returns may only be used for canvassing or for receiving dispute
resolutions.
b) The Commission’s copy, the second or third copy of the election return, as the case may be,
has always been intended to be an archived copy and its integrity preserved until required by the
Commission to resolve election disputes. Only the Board of Election Inspectors is authorized to
have been in contact with the return before the Commission unseals it.
c) The instruction contained in Resolution 6712, to break the seal of the envelope containing
copies Nos. 2 and 3 will introduce a break in the chain of custody prior to its opening by the
Commission on Election[s]. In the process of prematurely breaking the seal of the Board of
Election Inspectors, the integrity of the Commission’s copy is breached, thereby rendering it
void of any probative value.
To us, it does appear that the use of election returns as prescribed in Resolution 6712 departs
from the letters and spirit of the law, as well as previous practice. More importantly, questions of
legalities aside, the conduct of an advanced count by the COMELEC may affect the credibility of
the elections because it will differ from the results obtained from canvassing. Needless to say, it
does not help either that Resolution 6712 was promulgated only recently, and perceivably, on the
eve of the elections.

Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory
basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and election
devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the
authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by
the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the
effectivity of the use of such devices. Section 52(i) reads:
SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. – In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall :
…
(i) Prescribe the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into
account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose: Provided,
That the Commission shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties
and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices
not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.

Issues:
Assuming the issues are not political, whether Resolution No. 6712 is void:
(a) for preempting the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
1987 Constitution to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President;

(b) for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of the 1987 Constitution that "no money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law;"

(c) for disregarding Rep. Acts Nos. 8173, 8436 and 7166 which authorize only the citizens’ arm
to use an election return for an "unofficial" count;

(d) for violation of Sec. 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, requiring not less than thirty (30)
days notice of the use of new technological and electronic devices; and,

(e) for lack of constitutional or statutory basis

Ruling:
(a) Yes, Resolution 6712 is void. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution provides in part:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate

37
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
As early as January 28, 2004, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon already conveyed to
Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. his deep-seated concern that the respondent COMELEC
could not and should not conduct any "quick count" of the votes cast for the positions of
President and Vice-President. In his Letter dated February 2, 2004 addressed to Chairman
Abalos, Senate President Drilon reiterated his position emphasizing that "any quick count to be
conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes
of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of
Congress, but would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."

Nonetheless, in disregard of the valid objection of the Senate President, the COMELEC
proceeded to promulgate the assailed resolution. Such resolution directly infringes the authority
of Congress, considering that Section 4 thereof allows the use of the third copy of the Election
Returns (ERs) for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives, intended for the COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and transmission of
advanced precinct results, and in the process, canvass the votes for the President and Vice-
President, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress.

(b) Yes, Resolution No. 6712 is void. The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the
constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law."
By its very terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results projected
under Resolution No. 6712 is "unofficial" in character, meaning "not emanating from or
sanctioned or acknowledged by the government or government body. Any disbursement of
public funds to implement this project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep.
Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its
funds appropriated for the AES for the "unofficial" quick count project may even be considered
as a felony under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Irrefragably, the implementation of the assailed resolution would entail, in due course, the hiring
of additional manpower, technical services and acquisition of equipment, including computers
and software, among others. According to the COMELEC, it needed ₱55,000,000 to
operationalize the project, including the encoding process. Hence, it would necessarily involve
the disbursement of public funds for which there must be the corresponding appropriation.
The COMELEC posited during the hearing that the 2003 General Appropriations Act has
appropriated the amount needed for its "unofficial" tabulation.

(c) Yes, Resolution No. 6712 is void he assailed resolution disregards existing laws which
authorize solely the duly-accredited citizens’ arm to conduct the "unofficial" counting of votes.
Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in
Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is
exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial"
counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including
the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes
of conducting an "unofficial" count. In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns,
while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the aforementioned laws, are not
intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The aforesaid COMELEC copies are archived
and unsealed only when needed by the respondent COMELEC to verify election results in
connection with resolving election disputes that may be imminent. However, in contravention of
the law, the assailed Resolution authorizes the so-called Reception Officers (RO), to open the
second or third copy intended for the respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced "unofficial" precinct results. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an "unofficial" count, but also taints the integrity of the
envelopes containing the election returns, as well as the returns themselves, by creating a gap in
its chain of custody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the COMELEC.

38
(d) Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the
statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and
election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify
the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected
by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to
the effectivity of the use of such devices. Section 52(i) reads:
SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. – In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall :
…
(i) Prescribe the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into
account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose: Provided,
That the Commission shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties
and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices
not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
From the clear terms of the above provision, before the COMELEC may resort to and adopt the
latest technological and electronic devices for electoral purposes, it must act in accordance with
the following conditions:
(a) Take into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose;
and,
(b) Notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas
affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days
prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
It is quite obvious that the purpose of this provision is to accord to all political parties and all
candidates the opportunity to object to the effectiveness of the proposed technology and devices,
and, if they are so minded not to object, to allow them ample time to field their own trusted
personnel especially in far flung areas and to take other necessary measures to ensure the
reliability of the proposed electoral technology or device.
As earlier pointed out, the assailed resolution was issued by the COMELEC despite most of the
Commissioners’ apprehensions regarding the legal, operational and financial impediments
thereto. More significantly, since Resolution No. 6712 was made effective immediately a day
after its issuance on April 28, 2004, the respondent COMELEC could not have possibly
complied with the thirty-day notice requirement provided under Section 52(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code. This indubitably violates the constitutional right to due process of the political
parties and candidates.

39
 Drilon v. De Venecia Jr.
G.R. No. 180055. July 31, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: In the first petition, Senator Drilon (Liberal Party Representative) filed a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary injunction against Speaker De Venecia. This is due to the fact that the
Speaker merely said that he would study their demand for appointment of one representative of
the Liberal Party to the CA. The significant issue raised for this topic in this petition is whether
the Liberal Party with at least twenty members who signed herein as petitioners, is
constitutionally entitled to one seat in the Commission on Appointments.
While in the separate petition of Senator Madrigal for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of temporary restraining order against Senator Villar in his capacity as Senate President,
Speaker Nograles, and the CA, alleging that respondents committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The essential issue raised in this petition is the failure
to comply with the constitutionally required proportional party representation of the members of
the Commission on Appointments. Thus, the Court consolidated these petitions on 1 July 2008.

Issues:
1) Whether the Liberal Party with at least twenty members who signed herein as petitioners,
is constitutionally entitled to one seat in the Commission on Appointments?
2) Does Senator Madrigal have the locus standi to file a petition to the Court for failure to
comply with the constitutionally required proportional party representation of the
members of the Commission on Appoinments?

Ruling:
1) Yes, the designation of Representative Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. of the Liberal Party as a
member of the House of Representatives contingent in the CA in replacement of
Representative Eduardo M. Gullas of KAMPI, thus, filed on 15 August 2008 a Motion
with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition.
2) No, Senator Madrigal does not have any affair regarding this issue because in the case of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. v. HRET, the Court ruled that:
"The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to
elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House
members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,
each chamber exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among
their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.”

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before
she may bring her petition to court. Thus, the instance Senator Madrigal erred to file the petition
to the HRET, the complaint became premature and even if she filed it to the House, the matter is
out of her concern just like Senator Pimentel demanding seats in the Commission on
Appointments for Congressmen who have not even raised the issue of its present composition in
the House. Hence, Senator Madrigal’s petition is dismissed.

40
 Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 127255. June 26, 1998
MENDOZA, J.

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
theChair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House 

Ruling: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed
to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to
a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House. 

41
 People v. Silton
600 SCRA 476
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy
pursuant to Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Information. Accused were found wandering
and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City, without any visible means to
support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. Respondents filed separate Motions to quash
on the ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overboard. The municipal
trial court denied the motions, directed respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, and
declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power or the power
of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property and
justified by the Latin maxim “saluspopuliest suprema lex” (which calls for the subordination of
individual benefit to the interest of the greater number). Respondents filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law
and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause. The RTC granted the petition
of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202 (2) unconstitutional.

Issue: Does Article 202 (2), RPCon vagrancy violate the equal protection clause?

Ruling: No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does
it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished
not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such
circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to
engage in immoral conduct.

42
 Camilo L. Sabio v. Senator Richard Gordon
G.R. No. 174318 October 17, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon Aquino installed her
regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. “Pursuant to this,
on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting
him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s
unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly
ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

Issue: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

Ruling: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power’s rendered more evident in
Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

43
 Senate of the Philippines v Eduardo Ermita
488 SCRA 1. April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation and others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections,
wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. The public hearing
was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate
the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail
Project.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights
of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. Due to this, the invited officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from
the president as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all public officials enumerated
therein to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the
issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has
already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and conceals information of
great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before the Congress valid and
constitutional

Ruling: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

44
 Gudani v. Senga
495 SCRA 671 & 498 SCRA 671
TINGA, J.:

Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed
by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said
Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two
testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan
to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for
investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military
service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared
unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their
successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently
enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the
Senate. 

Issues:
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative
inquiry? 
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October
2005?

Ruling: 

1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-
in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to
seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that
a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief.
Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the
Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed
forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-
advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement
today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces,
the clash may soon loom or actualize.

45
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President
desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative
creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so.
There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes
this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a
particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not
enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness
inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is
balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to
its rulings by the other branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be
outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the
officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen.
Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him
occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. 

46
 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
564 SCRA 152. September 4, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts: The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even
prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best
understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United
States. Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the
right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public." x x x In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of
executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term
in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon
decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences,
like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the values to
which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh
opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to
explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a
way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying
a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution x x x "

On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for
about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN
Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications
("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that
then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and
petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by
requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to
dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic
of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to

his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order
dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of
Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

47
Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of
the presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to
the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive
Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state
that the authority is "By order of the President", which means that he personally consulted with
her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official
in the executive hierarchy.

In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked
executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner
Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation.

Issues:
1. What is the meaning of presidential communications privilege?
2. Can the petitioner invoke executive privilege?

Ruling:
1. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in
the legal literature of the United States. Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly,
Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."

2. Yes, petitioner can invoke executive privilege. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the
privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege.
She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in
which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President",
which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power,
it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked
executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner
Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation.

48
 Balag v. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 234608. July 3, 2018
GESMUNDO, J.:

Facts: RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION

SECTION 1. Power to Conduct Formal Inquiries or Investigations:
The Senate or any of its Committees may conduct formal inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation in accordance with these Rules.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or appropriation, or
in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of, or in connection with future
legislation, or will aid in the review or formulation of a new legislative policy or enactment.
They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the
Senate alone.
On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio III), a first year law student of
the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Aegis Juris
Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university.
Petitioner was first asked on October 18, 2017, around 11:29 in the morning, whether he was the
president of the AJ Fraternity, based on school records, and he denied it; he was asked again at
12:09 in the afternoon whether he was the president of the AJ Fraternity but he still refused to
answer the question; at 1:19 in the afternoon, he admitted that he was a member of the fraternity
but still he refused to say whether or not he was the president, only saying that he is already
studying in another school. On November 6, 2017, at the resumption of the hearing, petitioner
was still unresponsive. According to respondents, these acts were contemptuous and were valid
reasons to cite petitioner in contempt.
Petitioner chiefly argues that the legislative inquiry conducted by respondent committees was not
in aid of legislation; rather, it was in aid of prosecution. He posits that the purpose of SR No. 504
was to hold accountable those responsible for the senseless act of killing Horacio III, and not to
aid legislation. Petitioner underscores that the transcripts during the September 25, 2017
committee hearing were used in the criminal complaint filed against him, which bolsters that the
said hearings were in aid of prosecution. He insists that the senate hearings would violate his
right to due process and would pre-empt the findings of the DOJ with respect to the criminal
complaint filed against him.
In their Comment, respondents, through the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, countered that
the purpose of the hearing was to re-examine R.A. No. 8049; that several documents showed that
the legislative hearing referred to Senate Bill Nos. 27, 199, 223, 1161, and 1591; that the
statement of the senators during the hearing demonstrated that the legislative inquiry was
conducted in aid of legislation; and that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation (Senate Rules) were duly published.
Further, respondents underscored that the question propounded to petitioner was not
incriminating because an admission that he was an officer of the AJ Fraternity would not
automatically make him liable under R.A. No. 8049. They emphasized that the Senate respected
petitioner's right to due process because the hearing was conducted in aid of legislation; that the
senators explained why he would be cited in contempt; that he was given several chances to
properly purge himself from contempt; and that no incriminating question was asked.
Then, on January 23, 2018, the Committees on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs and Justice
and Human Rights jointly adopted Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 and submitted the same
to the Senate. Committee Report No. 232 referred to the findings of respondent committees in
the inquiry conducted in aid of legislation; while Committee Report No. 233 referred to the
recommendation that Senate Bill No. 1662 be approved in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 27,
199, 223, 1161, 1591, and 1609. On February 12, 2018, the Senate passed on the reading Senate
Bill No. 1662.
During the trial the Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of
contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination
of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. Further, the Court rules that the
legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:
First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of Senate
Rules state:

49
Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.
The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the
Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred
to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar.
Evidently, respondent committees have terminated their legislative inquiry upon the approval of
Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 by the majority of its members. The Senate even went
further by approving on its 3rd reading the proposed bill, Senate Bill No. 1662, the result of the
inquiry in aid of legislation. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of
petitioner likewise ends.

Issues:
1. What is a legislative Inquiry?
2. What is the duration of the detention for a contempt ordered by the Senate?
3. Is the present case considered as moot and academic?

Ruling:
1. According to the RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF
LEGISLATION SECTION 1. Power to Conduct Formal Inquiries or Investigations
The Senate or any of its Committees may conduct formal inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation in accordance with these Rules.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or appropriation, or
in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of, or in connection with future
legislation, or will aid in the review or formulation of a new legislative policy or enactment.
They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the
Senate alone.

2. The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the
Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. Further, the Court rules that the
legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:
First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of Senate
Rules state:
Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.
The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the
Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred
to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar.

3. Yes, the present case is already considered as moot and academic. In this case, the Court finds
that there is no more justiciable controversy. Petitioner essentially alleges that respondents
unlawfully exercised their power of contempt and that his detention was invalid. As discussed
earlier, in its resolution dated December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate
release of petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer
detained under the Senate's authority.
Then, on January 23, 2018, the Committees on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs and Justice
and Human Rights jointly adopted Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 and submitted the same
to the Senate. Committee Report No. 232 referred to the findings of respondent committees in
the inquiry conducted in aid of legislation; while Committee Report No. 233 referred to the
recommendation that Senate Bill No. 1662 be approved in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 27,
199, 223, 1161, 1591, and 1609. On February 12, 2018, the Senate passed on the reading Senate
Bill No. 1662.
Evidently, respondent committees have terminated their legislative inquiry upon the approval of
Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 by the majority of its members. The Senate even went
further by approving on its 3rd reading the proposed bill, Senate Bill No. 1662, the result of the

50
inquiry in aid of legislation. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of
petitioner likewise ends.
Accordingly, there is no more justiciable controversy regarding respondents' exercise of their
constitutional power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, their power of contempt, and the
validity of petitioner's detention. Indeed, the petition has become moot and academic.

51
 Belgica et al. v. Honorable Executive Secretary Ochoa et al
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013
PERLAS–BERNABE, J.

Facts: On August 28, 2013, petitioner (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition),
seeking that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be
issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in
their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of
Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the
“Pork Barrel System,” in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from
approving further releases pursuant thereto.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners (Belgica, et al.), and (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition
For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual “Pork Barrel System,”
presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF,
and the Executive’s lump–sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion
Petitioners question the phrases of PD 910 especially (a) “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910, relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and (b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund.

Issue: Is the pork barrel system unconstitutional?

Ruling: Yes, the pork barrel system is unconstitutional for it violates the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non–delegability of legislative
power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; and (e) local autonomy.
First, the court said that because of the principle of separation of powers, legislators, as soon as
they pass the annual budget law, should no longer have any participation in the implementation
of the law. Second, the court said that the power to provide the annual appropriations law cannot
be delegated to the individual members of Congress. Third, the court said that the pork barrel
violates the system of check and balances since it deprives the president the power to veto line
items in the annual appropriation law. Fourth, the court said that public office is public trust
however the public trust was violated when the pork barrel system was implemented. Fifth, the
court has ruled that instead of allowing local officials to identify projects in their local
government units, members of Congress, simply because of their title, are granted also the power
to identify infrastructure projects for their district.

52
 Araullo v. AQUINO III
G.R. No. 209287. July 1, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: An “incentive” of P50 Million was allotted for those senators voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona which was revealed by Sen. Jinggoy Estrada in
his privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines on 25 September 2013. Thereafter, Senator
Abad of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued a public statement entitled
Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program, explaining that the funds
released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by DBM to ramp up
spending to accelerate economic expansion. The funds under the DAP were usually taken from
1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; 2) unprogrammed funds; 3) carry-over
appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and 4) budgets for slow-moving items or
projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the DAP releases had been sourced from
savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had
been derived from 1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel
Services appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of
slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero based budgeting findings; and 2) the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been
earlier released to the agencies of the National Government. In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the
petitioners brought to the Court’s attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency
Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that
NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of
obligations, both for continuing and current allotments. The Court directed the holding of oral
arguments on the significant issues raised and joined.

Issue: Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the system of
checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public accountability enshrined in the 1987
Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators?

Ruling: The petitioners failed to completely show when and how the denial of equal protection
clause occurred, the explanation is also missing on why there was a denial in their situation. The
Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection when
some legislators were unaware of the DAP, so the insufficiency of factual and legal support
would be to compel it to speculate, and the outcome would not do justice to those for whose
supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal protection has been made. The Power of
Appropriation vested in Congress was violated when the President arrogated the utilization of
NBC No. 541 which authorizes the use of funds under the DAP for PAPs not considered in the
2012 budget. Article VI Section 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
The President violated the doctrine of separation of powers when he arrogated unto himself the
power of appropriation which translates into the cross-transfer of funds from a department into
another department. According to Article VI Section 25 (5), the President may be allowed to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices only. Thus, the
act done by the President in this case is violation of a constitutional mandate. The DAP also
violates the principle of public accountability because the adoption and implementation of it
constituted an assumption by the Executive of Congress’ power of appropriation, the DAP and
its implementing issuances were policies and acts that the Executive could properly adopt and do
in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to implement strategies to ramp up or
accelerate the economy of the country.

53
 TESDA v. COA
G.R. No. 196418. February 10, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.

Facts: DOLE Sec. Sto Tomas issued AO No. 430authorizing the payment of healthcare
maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to all officials and employees of the DOLE, including its
bureaus and attached agencies. It was purportedly based on CSC MC No. 33. Upon post-audit,
COA issued AOM No. 04-005 , stating that such AO had no legal basis. COA later issued a
Notice of Disallowance. TESDA filed an appeal before the COA Commission Proper, but this
was denied.

SC upheld the disallowance. It said that COA is endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the
purpose for which they had been intended by law. As “guardian of public funds,”COA is
generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and
responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are
perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law.

MC No. 33 dealt with a health care program for government employees. A program is ordinarily
understood as a system in place that will draw the desired benefits over a period of time. Its
dictionary meaning includes “a plan of procedure: a schedule or system under which action may
be taken toward a desired goal.” Ostensibly, MC No. 33 did not intend the health care program to
be a single activity or endowment to achieve a fleeting goal, for it rightfully concerned the
institutionalization of a system of healthcare for government employees. A careful perusal of MC
No. 33 and its precursor reveals the unequivocal intent to afford government employees a
sustainable health care program instead of an intermittent healthcare provision. 

Thus, whatever latitude was afforded to a government agency extended only to the determination
of which services to include in the program, not to the choice of an alternative to such health
program or to authorizing the conversion of the benefits into cash. The giving of health care
maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to the TESDA’s employees was not among any of the
hospitalization services or examinations listed in the circular. It bears reminding that pursuant to
Article VI Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Hence, the GAA should be purposeful,
deliberate, and precise in its contents and stipulations. Also, the COA was correct when it held
that the provisions of the GAA were not self-executory. This meant that the execution of the
GAA was still subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the President, and such
approved program of expenditure was the basis for the release of funds

54
 COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla et al
G. R. No. 151992. September 18, 2002
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Facts: On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the
supply and installations of information technology equipment and ancillary services for its
Voter’s Registration and Identification System Project or VRIS Project. Private respondent
Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate
as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA’s bid in the amount
of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning
bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252 approving the
Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA, which, in turn, immediately accepted the same. The parties
then proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain and Atty.
Rodrigo D. Sta. Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.

However, under Republic Act No. 8760 ]the budget appropriated by Congress for the
COMELECs modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available
funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the
COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.

Issue: Whether or not a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract

with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?

Ruling: No. PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to
formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by
Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is
considered void.

Section 46 of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that  “No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the
unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed
expenditure” while Section 47 states “no contract involving the expenditure of public funds by
any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official
of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds
have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the
proposed contract for the current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof,
subject to verification by the auditor concerned” (not complete provision. Just the pertinent
parts)

It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations
and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts.

Mandanas v. Ochoa
January 23,2018

55
 DELA CRUZ v. OCHOA
G. R. No. 219683. January 23, 2018
BERSAMIN, J.

Facts: The petitioners, as Members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers, assail the
implementation of the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) of the
Land Transportation Office (LTO) by using funds appropriated under Republic Act No. 10633
(General Appropriations Act of 2014), hereinafter referred to as the 2014 GAA.

The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the implementation of the MVPSP using funds
appropriated under the 2014 GAA.

Issues: 1. Did the 2014 GAA include appropriation for the implementation of MVPSP?
2. Is the use of the appropriation under 2014 GAA for the implementation of MVPSP
constitutional?

Ruling:
1. Yes. By appropriating the amount of ₱4,843,753,000.00 for MVPSP, Congress agreed
with the DOTC and the LTO that the said project should be funded and implemented.
Verily, the Court cannot question the wisdom of the legislative department in
appropriating the full budget of MVPSP in GAA 2014.
Thus, it is settled that MVPSP was adequately funded before the contract was signed by
the parties. Petitioner even admits, and the Court takes judicial notice, that the new
vehicle plates under MVPSP are being distributed by the LTO and released to new
vehicle owners.

2. Yes. The implementation of the MVPSP was properly funded under the appropriation for
Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services in the 2014
GAA; hence, no unconstitutionally transfer of funds took place.

56
 Tan v. Del Rosario,
237 SCRA 324. October 3, 1994
VITUG, J.:

Facts: Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. Petitioners posit that
RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners contended that public
respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional
partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient
for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self- Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when
the full text of the title actually reads,'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession,
Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners
also contend it violated due process.

Issue: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process

Ruling: NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such
transgression is so evident in herein case.
Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or
objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose,
(3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the
classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class. What is apparent from
the amendatory law is the legislative
intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income
taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on
taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and
inappropriate.

57
 Planters Products, Inc v. Fertiphil Corp.
548 SCRA 485. March 14, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:

Facts: Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated
under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,
pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI
No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component
(CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. The LOI provides:
The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula
a capital contribution component of not less than ₱10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be
collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be
applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines. Pursuant to the LOI,
Fertiphil paid ₱10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and
Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid ₱6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985
to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the ₱10 levy. With
the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI
No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damagesagainst FPA and PPI with the RTC in
Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of
law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used
the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.

Issue: Do the petitioners have locus standi to ask for the return or reimbursement of all the levies
it had paid for each bag of fertilizer it sold under the Letter of Instruction No. 1465?

Ruling: Yes. Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the
enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay, the P10 levy imposed for every
bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that Fertiphil has passed some or all
of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the
constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of
paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of
payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil.

58
 Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos
253 SCRA 559. February 13, 1996
Per Curiam

Facts: The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992
election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of
the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot
areas be deemed computed. The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the
protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by
her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the
30th of June in the year 1995.

Ruling: Yes. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or
considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and
her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.
The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in
the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest
would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the
1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation
during this period of national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if
after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present
evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest
indication that she no longer intends to do so.

59
 Macalintal v. PET
G.R. No. 191618. November 23, 2010
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: Confronting us is an undesignated petition filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty.

Macalintal), that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.

Issue: Is the creation of the PET constitutional?

Ruling: Yes it is constitutional. It is significant that the Supreme Court has characterized the
resolution of by the Electoral Tribunals of electoral contests as “essentially an exercise of
judicial power”, although “subject to judicial review via a petition for certiorari filed by the
proper party if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”

60
 Pimentel v. Congress
G.R. No. 163783.  June 22, 2004
EN BANC

Facts: The Joint Committee’s constitutionality was challenged by Senator Pimentel, Jr. by filing
a petition for prohibition seeking a judgment declaring null and void its continued existence and
to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily
canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004
elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004.

Issues:
1) What are the Qualifications, Election and term of the President and Vice-President?
2) Is the Joint Committee of Congress void following the adjournment sine die on 11 June
2004?

Ruling:
1.) In accordance to Article VII Section 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that:
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a
term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of
the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not
be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such
for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. No Vice-
President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he was elected. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. The returns of every
election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. The
person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more
shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the
vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The
Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

2.) No, in citation of Aquino v. COMELEC, Article VII Section 4 of the Constitution
expresses a directive to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and
Vice-President. The non-legislative functions of the National Board of Canvassers shall not be
defective because it must execute the constitutionally mandated task to proclaim and canvass the
votes of the Presidential elections. Thus, adjournment of the Congress does not render functus
officio the non-legislative functions of the Congress which is a constitutionally mandated task.
The petition of Senator Pimentel is hereby dismissed.

61
 Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738. March 2,2001
PUNO, J.

Facts: During the May 1998 election, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his
term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity.

On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a long time friend of the petitioner,
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of
all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote
of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets
of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the
Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau
chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day,
petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day,
he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and
Senate President Pimentel on the same day. After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion.

Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings
in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for
judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to
have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.

`
Ruling: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President when first,
he proposed for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. Second, the
Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well
as to open the second envelop to clear his name. Third, During the negotiations, the resignation
of the petitioner was treated as a given fact and that the only unsettled points at that time were
the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period. And lastly, His
resignation was also confirmed by his leaving of the Malacañang Palace.  In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation.  He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.  Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.  Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the

62
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion
of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.  Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.  The press
release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.

63
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317. February 22, 1991
FERNAN, C.J.

Facts: Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former President
Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries to
hold other than their government positions in addition to their primary positions.

 Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive

officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations and receive
corresponding compensation thereof.

 Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no case shall
any officer hold not more than two (2) positions other than his primary position.

 Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be
a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct
contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in
the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be appointed as a Cabinet member under
Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.

Issue: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional.

Held: The Court ruled in the negative.

It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A
doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.
The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from
holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which is a betrayal of public
trust. The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the express
mandate provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The
Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute. When
there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the highest law of the land. Thus, the Court held
that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran,
Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary
Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and employment. 

64
 Dennis A.B.Funa v. Acting Secretary Alberto Agra
G.R. No. 191644. February 19, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo
appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes
VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5,
2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity;
that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments
or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed
Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadizas the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor
General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different version
of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in
place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that
on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice
Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress
representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections;that he then relinquished
his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his
successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding
the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the two
offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving
the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.

Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.

Ruling: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.

A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2),Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, to wit: Section 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra,
whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold
any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

65
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152154. March 2, 2001
CORONA, J.

Facts: The Republic through Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) sought
the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than
US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth and
their forfeiture.
Sandiganbayan thereafter reversed its decision saying that “the evidence offered for summary
judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos
spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the
funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.”
“The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been
established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis.”

Issue: Is the Summary Judgment proper considering that private respondent did not posit any
genuine issue?

Ruling: Yes. SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the
action. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to
tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that
those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the
trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic.

66
 Senate v. Ermita
488 SCRA 1; 495 SCRA 170. April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.

Facts: On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita a letter requesting for the postponement of the hearing in order to afford the
invited officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that
they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights
of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which provided in Section 1 thereof that all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

Issue: Is Section 1 of E.O. 464 constitutional?

Ruling: Yes.
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences
between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these
provisions separately.

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has,
through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section
3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department
heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in
marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at
all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

67
 Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. No. 146710-15. March 2, 2001
PUNO, J.:

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million
Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that
slowly but surely eroded his popularity. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. Petitioner invokes Executive
Privilege on his defense.

Issue: Can the petitioner invoke Executive Privilege as his defense?

Ruling: No, he cannot. The Supreme Court has ruled that petitioner cannot cite the Executive
Privilege which will not make him liable. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity as an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any other trespassers.

68
 Gloria v. CA
G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000
PURISIMA, J.:

Facts: Respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that the
petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute ofience and
Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag
F. Lauro, on June 17, 1994.
On October 12, 1994, the President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.
After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment
of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an
expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is
more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned)b,
being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the
reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the
part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. 

Issue: Is the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the
private respondent?

Ruling: Yes. As held in Bentain "Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally

guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to
employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are
tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of
Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27
SCRA 138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the

employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his
removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly
terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the
provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria
vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116).

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security
of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.

69
 Lagman v. Pimentel
G.R. No. 235935. February 6, 2018.
TIJAM, J.

Facts: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by
members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). On May 25, 2017, within the 48-
hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to the
Senate and the House of Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that
impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No.
388 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full
support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.

The President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018
to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine.

Issue: Do the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No.
216?

Ruling: Yes. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the
extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension.

Rebellion thus exists when "(1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the
allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives."116

The President issued Proclamation No. 216 in response to the series of attacks launched by the
Maute Group and other rebel groups in Marawi City. The President reported to the Congress that
these groups had publicly taken up arms for the purpose of removing Mindanao from its
allegiance to the Government and its laws and establishing a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province in
Mindanao.

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves
the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general
public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."

The rising number of these rebel groups, their training in and predilection to terrorism, and their
resoluteness in wresting control of Mindanao from the government, pose a serious danger to
Mindanao. The country had been witness to these groups' capacity and resolve to engage in
combat with the government forces, resulting in severe casualties among both soldiers and
civilians, the displacement of thousands of Marawi residents, and considerable damage to their
City. In a short period after the Marawi crisis was put under control, said rebel groups have
managed to increase their number by 400, almost the same strength as the group that initially
stormed Marawi. Their current number is now more than half the 1,010 rebels in Marawi which
had taken the AFP five months to neutralize. To wait until a new battleground is chosen by these
rebel groups before. We consider them a significant threat to public safety is neither sound nor
prudent.

70
 Zabal v. Duterte
G.R. No. 238467. February 12, 2019
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first made public his
plan to shut it down during a business forum held in Davao sometime February2018. This was
followed by several speeches and news releases stating that he would place Boracay under a state
of calamity. True to his words, President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a
cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson
Harry L. Roque, Jr. in a press briefing the following day wherein he formally announced that the
total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26, 2018.

 Following this pronouncement, petitioners contend that around 630 police and military
personnel were readily deployed to Boracay including personnel for crowd dispersal
management. They also allege that the DILG had already released guidelines for the
closure.Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about, fewer tourists
had been engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely
enough to feed their families. They fear that if the closure pushes through, they would suffer
grave and irreparable damage. Hence, despite the fact that the government was then yet to
release a formal issuance on the matter,petitioners filed the petition on April 25, 2018praying
that:(a) Upon the filing of [the] petition, a TEMPORARYRESTRAINING ORDER (TRO)
and/or a WRIT OFPRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION be immediately issued
RESTRAINING and/or ENJOINING the respondents, and all persons acting under their
command, order, and responsibility from enforcing a closure of Boracay Island or from banning
the petitioners, tourists, and non-residents therefrom, and a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION directing the respondents, and all persons acting undertheir
command, order, and responsibility to ALLOW all of the said persons to enter and/or leave
Boracay Island unimpeded;(b) In the alternative, if the respondents enforce the closure after the
instant petition is filed, that a STATUSQUO ANTE Order be issued restoring and maintaining
the condition prior to such closure;(c) After proper proceedings, a judgment be rendered
PERMANENTLY RESTRAINING and/or ENJOINING the respondents, and all persons acting
under their command, order, and responsibility from enforcing a closure of Boracay Island or
from banning the petitioners, tourists, and non-residents therefrom, and further DECLARING the
closure of Boracay Island or the ban against petitioners, tourists, and non-residents therefrom to
be UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are similarly prayed for. On May 18, 2018,
petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition stating that the day following the filing of their original
petition or on April 26, 2018, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 formally declaring
a state of calamity in Boracay and ordering its closure for six months from April 26, 2018 to
October 25, 2018. The closure was implemented on even date. Thus, in addition to what they
prayed for in their original petition, petitioners implore the Court to declare as unconstitutional
Proclamation No. 475insofar as it orders the closure of Boracay and ban of tourists and
nonresidents therefrom.

 In the Resolutions dated April 26, 2018and June 5,2018, the Court required respondents to file
their Comment on the Petition and the Supplemental Petition, respectively. Respondents filed
their Consolidated Commenton July30, 2018 while petitioners filed their Replythereto on
October 12, 2018.On October 26, 2018, Boracay was reopened to tourism.

Issue: Is President Duterte immune from suit?

Ruling: Yes, the incumbent President Duterte is immune from suit due to the ruling of the case
in Professor David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the

71
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch
and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. Thus, the Court dropped President Duterte as a respondent in this case.

72
 National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario v. The Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 189028. July 16, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: The National Artists Awards Committee and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly
administer the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the
nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely:
Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the
aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors.
Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors,
cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro
Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa
and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely
abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process
for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation
Panels.

Issue: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards
to the violation of the right to equal protection

Ruling: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated
for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas
did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the
second shortlist.

Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were
exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the
Order of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails
to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner
Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established
procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.

In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an
interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.

73
 Banda v. Ermita
618 SCRA 488. April 20, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts: National Printing Office (NPO). NPO Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and... instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to
source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the
condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior... quality and lower in
cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO's
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.
First Petitioners maintain that former President Aquino's Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative
enactment,... as the same was issued while President Aquino still had legislative powers under
the Freedom Constitution; thus, only Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive
Order No. 285.
Second... petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the
eventual abolition of the NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees.
petitioners avow that the reorganization of the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted
with bad faith

Issue: it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order
No. 285 issued by... former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers
Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners' security of tenure, because it paves the way for the
gradual abolition of the NPO.

Ruling: Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President's constitutionally
granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation... of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary
(which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary
or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the
President.
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the President
Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among the offices in the Office of President
Proper but also the rest of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the
President implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the
functional and internal structure of the Office of the President, including the modification of
functions of such executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require.
there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred
to another agency.
he NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms
and... publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and
profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs,...
Republic Act No. 7645,... Executive Order No. 191
2003 General Appropriations Act... the aforequoted provisions in the appropriations law
recognize the power of the President to reorganize even executive offices already funded by the
said appropriations act, including the power to implement structural, functional, and operational
adjustments... in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of
funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
the... power of the President to reorganize agencies under the executive department by executive
or administrative order is constitutionally and statutorily recognized.

74
we find nothing objectionable in the provision in Executive Order No. 378 limiting the
appropriation of the NPO to its own income.
In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in government in
order to improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services by redefining the
functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to its own income and to transform it into a... self-
reliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well within the prerogative of President
Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office... the
presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is
subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.

75
 In re: Appointment of Hon. M. Valenzuela
AM No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998
NARVASA, C.J.:

Facts: The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) had previously resolved thatappointments to the
judiciary were not included in the period of banimposed by Art VII, sec 15 of the Constitution.
In the light of the upcomingelections on May 12, 1998, the Chief Justice (CJ) deferred to act on
theappointments for justices to the Court of Appeals transmitted to him bythe President on Apr 6
for such were dated Mar 11138 which indicated thatthe President impliedly considered that
appointments to the judiciary wereincluded in the period of ban imposed by sec 15, Art VII of
the Constitutionnotwithstanding the JBC’s previous resolution. In view thereof, saidprovision
seemed to be in conflict with Secs 4(1) and 9 of Art VIII whichrequired any vacancy in the
Supreme Court and lower courts to be filledwithin 90 days. Pending resolution, allegedly in the
interest of publicservice, Valenzuela and Vallarta were appointed as judges of the RTC.Such
appointments dated Mar 30, 1998 were transmitted to the CJ on May12. The Court resolved to
consider the case an administrative matter for ifthe CJ undertakes his obligation to transmit the
appointments to theappointees, he runs the risk of acting contrary to Sec 15, Art VII of the
Constitution.

Issue: May the President, in the interest of public service, make appointmentsto the judiciary in
view of sections 4(1) and 9, Art VIII of the Constitutionduring the period of the ban imposed by
sec 15, Art VII?

Ruling: No. Secs 4(1) and 9, Art VIII simply mean that the President is required tofill vacancies
in the courts within the time frames provided therein unlessprohibited by sec 15, Art VII. Sec 15,
Art VII is directed against two types ofappointments: (1) those for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisanconsiderations. The first are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Under the OEC, giving orpromising any office or
employment in order to induce anyone to vote foror against any candidate… is considered vote-
buying and is prohibited. TheCourt concluded that the prevention of vote-buying xxx outweighs
theneed for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies. The appointmentswere declared
void.139The ban on making presidential appointments around the time ofpresidential elections in
Sec 15 is confined to appointments in the ExecutiveDept. It does NOT extend to the
Judiciary.The filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period prescribed by Sec
4(1), Art VIII was made a true mandate for the President.

76
 Pimentel v. Ermita
G. R. No. 164978. October 13, 2005
CARPIO, J.

Facts: The Congress commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on
Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004.
Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their
respective departments. Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting
secretaries.

Issue: Is the appointment made by Arroyo constitutional provided that it was not subjected to the
concurrence of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session?

Ruling: No. Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting

capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended
only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there
is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

77
 De Castro v. JBC
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

Issue: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.

Ruling: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It maysit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers,
if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII,
most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

78
 Domingo v. Rayala
G.R. No. 155831. February 18, 2008
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic
Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before
Secretary BienvenidoLaguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Domingo
assails the CA’s resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the President.

She raises this issue: The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent
from dismissal to suspension from service for the maximum period of one year. The President
has the prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on an erring Presidential
appointee. The President was well within his power when he fittingly used that prerogative in
deciding to dismiss the respondent from the service.

She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the
President who has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OP’s
decision was arrived at after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service
is a prerogative that is entirely with the President.

Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense of a disgraceful and immoral conduct is
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second
offense is dismissal. On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service54 both provide that the first
offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.

Issue: Is the president the proper disciplining authority in the present case?

Ruling: Yes. In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining
authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as
NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by
law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than
the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first
offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error
for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a
penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

79
 Drilon v. Lim
235 SCRA 135. August 4, 1994
CRUZ, J.:

Facts: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.

In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government
Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances
and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and
supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." His conclusion was that the
challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as
vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation
not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of
local governments, and the policy of local autonomy in general.

Issue: Is Section 187 unconstitutional for it gave the Secretary the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines?

Ruling: No.Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it
with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or
unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law.
What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of
mere supervision.

80
 Banda v. Executive Secretary Ermita
GR No. 166620. April 20, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C.
Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285. On October 25, 2004,
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to
Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their
printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition
that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared
to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO's appropriation in
the General Appropriations Act to its income.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the
NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that it is beyond the executive
powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former
President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers.

Issue: Can a president amend or repeal an executive order which was issued by a former
president when the latter still exercised legislative powers?

Ruling: Yes. According to our courts, it is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the
President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line
with the President's constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by
virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.

81
 Pichay v. Office of the deputy executive secretary
G.R. No. 196425. July 24, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the
power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to
the President.
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary
Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit[2] for grave misconduct
against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees,
namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel
Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand
Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order[3] signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations
under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct
entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-
0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. Now alleging that no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law, petitioner
has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition

Issue: Is E.O. 13 unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to create a public
office?

Ruling: No, in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, the Court ruled that we must not lose sight
of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section
31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987),
"the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. The distinction between the allowable
organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the
other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches
upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall
within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it
was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential
Assistant II and I, respectively,  and was placed directly "under the Office of the President."  On
the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is
an office within the Office of the President Proper. 11 Since both of these offices belong to the
Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
In accordance to Article VII Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” Thus, the President exercise his power of control in
the Executive Department, in creating the ODESLA by virtue given by the constitutional
mandate and the E.O No. 292 is constitutional because the changes made by the President is
within the Executive Proper.

82
 DENR v. DENR region XII Employees
G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003
Ynares-Santiago, J.

Facts: On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum3 directing the
immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal
(formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, which
reads in part:
Subject: Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of Administrative Units in
the Regional and Field Offices:
Section 1.6. The supervision of the Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be
transferred from Region XI to XII.4
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees
association, "COURAGE", represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for
preliminary injunction.
Respondents filed a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. THE
RTC of Cotabato issued TRO against DENR Sec and Regional Executive Director from
transferring the offices
DENR then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that: The power to transfer the
Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is executive
in nature; The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on Executive Order No. 429,
which reorganized Region XII; The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the Honorable
Supreme Court in the Case of Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255.; Since the power to
reorganize the Administrative Regions is Executive in Nature citing Chiongbian, the Honorable
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition.
RTC then decided, ordering the DENR to cease and desist from enforcing their Memorandum
Order xxx for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on their part, and they are further ordered to return back the seat of
the DENR Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato City. An appeal was filed with the CA but was
dismissed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the DENR Secretary can transfer the DENR Offices from Region XII in
Cotabato City to Region XI at Koronodal, South Cotabato.

Ruling: Yes, the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided
for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution. However, as head of the Executive
Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers
personally all the time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except
when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he acts personally.
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no
buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month of
Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolled in schools in Cotabato
City, (4) the Regional Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang
Panglungsond, through a resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders.
However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality.

83
It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or
expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for each department is
supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach
upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire
into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions
made by the other departments.

84
 Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board
GR NO.181293. February 23, 2015
SERENO

Facts: That was issued PD 1112 thus creating the Toll Regulatory Board and that the subsequent
PD, PD 1113 thus creating Phil. National Construction Corporation. And that the former and the
latter consolidated authority to construct main toll facilities of Manila Express ways. PNCC then
entered into a contract with PT Citra Lamatoro Gung Persada. And that the following parties had
a toll operation agreement known as ASTOA and thus revised it with some modifications for the
construction of stage 2 of south Manila metropolitan station. Then PNCCT traffic management
filed a motion for strike for unfair labor practices. It alleged that the following contracts were
contrary to law and public policy.

Issue: Whether the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC secretary was valid.

Ruling: The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the
Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and
administrative functions are exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet
secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the
latter. This doctrine is rooted in the Constitution and the administrative code of 1987.

85
 DatuZaldyUyAmpatuan v. RONALDO PUNO
G.R. no. 190259. June 7, 2011
Abad, J.:

Facts:After the Maguindanao massacre on November 24, 2009, then-presidentArroyo issued

proclamation 1946 placing the provinces of Maguindanao andSultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato under a state of emergency tosuppress lawless violence and called out the AFP and the
PNP. After three daysof such proclamation, she issued AO 273-A which changed the latter
transferringthe supervision of the ARMM to the DILG. Subsequently, Petitioners filed a motion
under Rule 65 of the rules of court,citing that the said AO would thus be contrary to law,
especially the Constitutionparticularly on Local autonomy and RA 9054. They stated that the
said AOwould thus encroach into the powers and functions of the ARMM officials andthus the
DILG secretary would thus have the power to change or alter thedifferent officers of the
autonomous region. The President then replied throughthe OSG, stated that the said AO was not
to deprive ARMM of autonomy, butwas for the reason of peace. And thus invoking Section 18
on being thecommander-in-chief, exercising residual powers to ensure peace and order
wasapplied. And that, the president only delegated supervisory powers to the DILGsecretary
since the said cabinet member is the alter-ego of the president.

Issue:Whether or not President Arroyo illegally exercised emergency powerswhen she called out
the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidentsof lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

Ruling: No, the president did exercise emergency powers legally and under theconstitution,
under article 18, the president as the commander-in-chief of thearmed forces of the Philippines
and whenever necessary, he may call out sucharmed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. Thatbeing said, the Maguindanao massacre was indeed a lawless
violence thatsought the exercise of such power by the president because the primarysuspects had
armed followers at their disposal, hence, it is only legitimate to callupon the AFP and PNP for
safety.Hence, the petition is denied.

86
 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
637 SCRA 78. December 7, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: President Benigno Simeon Aquino III signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). The main objective of the said
commission is to investigate the alleged anomalies and corruption of the past administration
(Arroyo Administration).

Issue: Is E.O. 1 constitutional?

Ruling: No. It is violative of the equal protection clause.

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the
laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.

87
 Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakat Tan
675 SCRA 482
SERENO, J.:

Facts: Three Red Cross members who were just inspecting a water sanitation project for the
Sulu provincial jail, were kidnapped by three Abu Sayyaf members. Later on, the Governor of
Sulu – Tan. Formed a committee tasked to investigate such occurrence and thus places the
province of SULU under a state of emergency which he issued Proclamation no.1 and thus
invoked the Local Government Code to justify the said proclamation. In the said proclamation, it
stated that and called for the National Police and other civilian forces to set up checkpoints to
ensure safety and alike.
Subsequently, petitioner Jamar Kulayan, et al argues that the said proclamation was out of his
capacity and that it was unjustified for violating a couple of sections as provided in the
constitution. Specifically sections 1 and 18.

Issue: Whether or not a governor can exercise emergency powers just like the president.

Ruling: The Governor is not bestowed with the power as stated in article 1 and 18 and thus his
acts are ultra vires. The president has the exclusive power to issues such power to call upon the
armed forces in times of acute crisis and state of emergency. The said powers are summed up to
be executive powers and they are only vested in the chief executive of the Philippines as stated in
section 1, article VII of the Philippine constitution.

88
 Gonzales v. Abaya
498 SCRA 445. August 10, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that
some members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places
of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s
Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on
Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices
around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with
the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast
media, announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition
to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military
assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their
Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also
called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state
of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary
measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City.

Issue: Can the president effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces of the
Philippines?

Ruling: Yes. Our court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive
to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline
the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military
Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary
system that ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the
apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of
courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted)

89
 Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
421 SCRA 656. February 3, 2004
TINGA, J.:

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders
have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the
AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of
the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO
NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out
the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.

Issue: Can the president require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP?

Ruling: Yes. It has been ruled that the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs
in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers as vested by the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

90
 David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396. May 3, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines

and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President.
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part
of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the
NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Petitioners argue that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out
power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.

Issue: Does the calling-out power of the president have actual basis?

Ruling: Yes. The case of Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the
authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is
final and conclusive on the courts. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora -- a recent
case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the
Court considered the President’s "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion."

This Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his
assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing
PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.

91
 Lagman v. Executive secretary
July 4, 2017. G.R. No. 231658
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has
been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the
passing of time.

The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the
high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf IP (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These
groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government
operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government
authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. In particular, the
President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City
which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus

The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role
it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the
possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
President Duterte concluded, "While the government is presently conducting legitimate
operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety
necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is
completely quelled."

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 390
expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate
declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same".The Lagman Group, the
Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned (Petitions) the Supreme Court, questioning
the factual basis of President Duterte's Proclamation of martial law. The OSG sided with
President Duterte.

Issue: Is the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No.
216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55?

Ruling: Yes, it is different because in Article VII Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

92
The President is granted by virtue of the said provision of calling out military forces as the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary
such as in situations of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In Kulayan v. Tan, the Court ruled
that the President's calling out power is in a different category from the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus  and the power to declare martial law:
Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification. Thus, the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55 as ruled by the Supreme Court.

93
 IBP v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000
KAPUNAN,J.:

Facts: Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, as
commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and
PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence in Metro
Manila in the light of the escalating cases of crime and lawlessness in the city. The President
declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
Subsequently, the IBP filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the
“Marines”) to join the Philippine National Police (the “PNP”) in visibility patrols around the
metropolis.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the President’s discretion in calling of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines is not subject to judicial review. The discretion exercised by the president is a
question of wisdom, and not the legality of law. There is no provision under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out
the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. The petitioners failed to establish
that the calling of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be deployed in Metro Manila for
peacekeeping purposes was not without factual basis. There was escalating crime and
lawlessness in the city.
2. Supreme Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none ofthe Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position
to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy
the civilian character of the PNP.

94
 Lacson v. Perez
G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001.
MELO

Facts: On about May 1, 2001, President Arroyo was confronted by a mass of armed demonstrators that
were planning in barging inside of the Malacanang palace. In response of the said demonstration by the
people or masses, the president then issued a proclamation no.38 that there was a state of rebellion in the
National Capital Region. Subsequently, warrantless arrests were given to some of the demonstrator
leaders. On May 10, 2001, petitioners were filed before the court, the petitioners namely; Lacson et al,
Defensor-Santiago, Lumbao, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.

Issue: Whether or not the Petition should be dismissed for being rendered moot and academic.

Ruling: No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of being
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and
prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and mandamus is improper at this time.

Lagman v. Pimentel
February 6, 2018

95
 LAGMAN v. MEDIALDEA
G. R. No. 243522. February 19, 2019
CARANDANG, J.

Facts: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
whole of Mindanao to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG), for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days.

Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of Staff General Carolito G. Galvez, Jr. and Chief of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Director-General Oscar D. Albayalde recommended the
further extension of martial law.

The President, in a letter dated December 6, 2018 to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, requested for the third extension of Proclamation No. 216 from January 1, 2019
to December 31, 2019.15 The President stated in his letter that, although there has been
significant progress in putting rebellion under control and ushering in substantial economic gains
in Mindanao, the joint security assessment submitted by General Galvez of the AFP and
Director-General Albayalde of the PNP highlighted essential facts indicating that rebellion still
persists in Mindanao and that public safety requires the continuation of martial law in the whole
of Mindanao.16 Private sectors, Regional and Provincial Peace and Order Councils, and local
government units in Mindanao were also clamoring for a further extension of the proclamation.

On December 12, 2018, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted
Resolution No. 6, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao for another period of one (1) year from
January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019."

Issue: Is there a sufficient factual basis for the extension of martial law?

Ruling: Yes. The sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law in Mindanao
must be determined from the facts and information contained in the President's request,
supported by reports submitted by his alter egos to Congress. These are the bases upon which
Congress granted the extension. The Court cannot expect exactitude and preciseness of the facts
and information stated in these reports, as the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency and
reasonableness thereof. While there may be inadequacies in some of the facts, i.e., facts which
are not fully explained in the reports, these are not reasons enough for the Court to invalidate the
extension as long as there are other related and relevant circumstances that support the finding
that rebellion persists and public safety requires it.

The factual basis for the extension of martial law is the continuing rebellion being waged in
Mindanao by Local Terrorist Rebel Groups (LTRG) - identified as the ASG, BIFF, DI, and other
groups that have established affiliation with ISIS/DAESH, and by the Communist Terrorist
Rebel Groups (CTRG) - the components of which are the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP), New People's Army (NPA), and the National Democratic Front (NDF).

The test of sufficiency is not accuracy nor preciseness but reasonableness of the factual basis
adopted by the Executive in ascertaining the existence of rebellion and the necessity to quell it.

96
 Gonzales v. Narvasa
177 SCRA 668
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Facts: On December 9, 1999, private petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a

taxpayer, filed a petition and mandamus questioning the constitutionality of the creation of a
public office, Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or PCCR. The said commission
was created via of executive order no. 43 by then-president Joseph Estarada on November 26,
1998. It was tasked to study and recommend proposed amendments and revisions of the present
constitution. The said petitioner questioned the constitutionality based on the ground that only
the legislature can enact a law, thus creating a public office. And that the chief executive has
now powers to do so.

Issue: Whether the petitioner, as a taxpayer, has legal standing on the issue at hand.

Ruling: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger
of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only
Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to petitioner,
the President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to
propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or
even any indirect injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in
danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of
the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable
him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

97
 Marcos v. Manglapus
177 SCRA 668. October 27, 1989
EN BANC:

Facts: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her)
oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people.

In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed
the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present
time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died
in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the
remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time
as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.
[Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the
President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily.

Issue: Does the president have the power to bar a Filipino from his own country?

Ruling: Yes. According to the Supreme Court, among the duties of the President under the
Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest
and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with
this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.

98
 Borja v. COMELEC
295 SCRA 157. September 3, 1998
MENDOZA, J.

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of
law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected
mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was
reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.1
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.
Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected.

Issue: Does a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves
the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the
three-term limit?

Ruling: No. According to the court, to recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply. In the present case, the respondent has not been
reelected three consecutive times and has not served in the same elective position and thus he
must not be disqualified for running a third time as a vice mayor.

99
 Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary
669 SCRA 49. October 6, 2017
ABAD, J.:

Facts:  In 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961, the Coconut Industry Code, which
consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the coconut industry. The Code provided that
surpluses from the CCS Fund and the CID Fund collections, not used for replanting and other
authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of stock of corporations, including
the San Miguel Corporation (SMC), engaged in undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil
industries. UCPB was to make such investments and equitably distribute these for free to
coconut farmers. These investments constituted the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF).
P.D. 961 also provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-levy funds) shall be owned by the
coconut farmers in their private capacities. The COA reviewed the use of the funds. The Bureau
of Internal Revenue treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies
recognize their public character.

Issues:
1. Are the Coconut levy funds considered as public funds?
2. Did appropriating public funds violate substantive due process?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The court explained that the coconut levy fund was imposed in the exercise of the State’s
inherent power of taxation. It was raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental
purpose. “They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the
benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. As stressed by the Court in Republic v.
COCOFED, the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos.
232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry.
2. Yes. Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of
the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their
private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of
taxes or levies.

100
 Villavert v. Desierto
G.R. No. 133715. February 23, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts: An administrative charge for grave misconduct was filed against Villavert, Sales &
Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation Officer recommended the
dismissal of the case. However, Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas issued a Memorandum finding
Villavert guilty of the charge. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770.

Issue: Is the Supreme Court allowed to review the decision of the Ombudsman in pursuant to
Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 in regards to this case?

Ruling: No, in Namuhe v. Ombudsman, under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals not to be reviewed by the Supreme Court because it violates Article VI Section
30 of the Constitution which provides that “No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.”
Furthermore, in Fabian v. Desierto, any appeal by way of petition for review from a decision or
final resolution or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special civil action
relative to such decision, resolution or order filed with the Court after 15 March 1999 shall no
longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but must be forthwith denied or dismissed,
respectively.Since the petition was filed prior to 15 March 1999, decisions of the Ombudsman
regarding administrative cases shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition and
not to this Court.

101
 Ifurung v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 232131. April 24, 2018
MARTINEZ, J.

Facts: On July 25, 2011, Conchita Carpio Morales was appointed to a seven-year term following
the resignation of then-Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez who resigned on May 6, 2011 to avoid
impeachment trial in the Senate over allegations of incompetence and inaction on various cases.
Merceditas Gutierrez left an unexpired term until November 30, 2012.
In his Petition, Ifurung argued that Respondent Morales and her deputies must vacate their post
for supposedly overstaying as they must serve only the unexpired term of their predecessor. He
alleges that Sec. 8(3), in relation to Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6770 also known as the Ombudsman Act,
which provides that in case of a vacancy at the Office of the Ombudsman due to death,
resignation, removal or permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman and his deputies, the
newly appointed Ombudsman and his deputies shall be appointed to a full term of seven (7)
years, is constitutionally infirm as it contravenes Sec. 11 in relation to Secs. 8 and 10 of Art. XI
of the 1987 Constitution. He avers that like all constitutionally created positions, i.e., President,
Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and Members of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the Commission
on Audit (COA), the successor to the positions of the Ombudsman and deputies should serve
only the unexpired term of the predecessor. Hence, petitioner insists that the incumbent
Ombudsman and deputies have been overstaying in their present positions for more than two
years considering that their terms have expired on 1 February 2015. "To allow them to stay in the
said positions one day longer constitutes a continuing affront to the 1987 Constitution, unduly
clips presidential prerogatives, and deprives the nation of the services of legitimate Ombudsman
and Deputies Ombudsman."

Issue: Whether Sec. 8(3) in relation to Sec. 7 of RA 6770 also known as Ombudsman Act of
1989 is unconstitutional for being outright transgression of Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 8 and 10 of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: No, Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is not unconstitutional.Petitioner anchors his challenge
on the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 in the belief that because the Ombudsman
and the deputies have the same rank and salary as the chairman and the members of the
constitutional commissions, their term of office, following the Court's disquisition in Gaminde
case, shall always be seven years counted from 2 February 1987 and seven years thereafter, and
not the full term of seven years. However, the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional
commission. A commission is defined as "a board or committee officially appointed and
empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or
relation." Noteworthy, the CSC is composed of a chairman and two commissioners; the
COMELEC, a chairman and six commissioners; and the COA, a chairman and two
commissioners. These three constitutional commissions shall decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before it; thus, the commissions are collegial bodies whose
manner of working is characterized by a sharing of responsibility among the chairman and the
commissioners of the commission. In contrast, Office of the Ombudsman, albeit composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanod bayan, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon, the
Deputy for the Visayas, the Deputy for Mindanao, the Deputy for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Office (MOLEO), and the Special Prosecutor, is not a collegial body. The
Ombudsman and the deputies do not resolve cases by a majority of all its members but rather are
confined within the sphere of their respective jurisdiction.
Additionally, the constitutional commissions observe the appointment in regular rotational
plan which is seven, five and three years which cannot apply to the Office of the Ombudsman
because the Ombudsman and the deputies do not make a collegial body thus, making it
implausible to apply the regular rotation or cycle in its membership. The Ombudsman and the
deputies, in contrast to the constitutional commissions, do not decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before the Office of the Ombudsman. To stress, the
Ombudsman and the deputies have their respective jurisdiction; hence, they could not have
common responsibility relative to the discharge of their separate and distinct functions.

102
 Genuino, et al. v. De Lima
G.R. No. 197930. April 17, 2018
REYES, JR., J:

Facts: These consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) and/or Writs of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court assail the constitutionality of Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41, series of 2010,
otherwise known as the Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of
Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders and Allow Departure Orders, on the ground that it infringes on
the constitutional right to travel. On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the
assailed DOJ Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which govern the issuance and
implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs.

After the expiration of GMA’s term as President of the Republic of the Philippines and her subsequent
election as Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed against her before the DOJ
particularly plunder, malversation and/or illegal use of OWWA funds, illegal use of public funds,
graft and corruption, violation of the OEC, violation of the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and qualified theft. In view of the foregoing criminal complaints, De Lima issued
DOJWLO No. 2011-422 against GMA pursuant to her authority under DOJ Circular No. 41. She also
ordered for the inclusion of GMA’s name in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) watchlist. On October 20,
2011, two criminal complaints for Electoral Sabotage and Violation of the OEC were filed against GMA
and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo. Following the filing of criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ
WLO No. 2011-573 against GMA and Miguel Arroyo with a validity period of 60 days, unless sooner
terminated or otherwise extended. Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 197930, HDO No. 2011-64 was issued against
Genuino, among others, after criminal complaints for Malversation and Violation of Sections3(e), (g), (h)
an (i) of R.A. No. 3019. The petitioners therein seek to annul and set aside the following orders issued by
the former Secretary Leila De Lima, pursuant to the said circular.

Issues: Whether the DOJ has the authority to issue Circular No. 41; and

Ruling: The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. Under Sec 6, Art.3 of the 1987
Constitution provides three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national
security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of
statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment.

There is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of
the right to travel.

To be clear, DOJ Circular No.41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent the
scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere
administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which the
former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987.

It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there must
first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if there is a law
that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

PHAPI v. Medialde
Novermber 6, 2018

103
 Chavez v. JBC
679 SCRA 579.April 16, 2013
MENDOZA, J.

Facts: The Judicial and Bar Council was established to have a competent and independent body
to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section
8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eighth member
was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously
in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.

Issue: Did the framers of the Constitution intended only one representative of the Congress
instead of two?

Ruling: Yes. To say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer
inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive
enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to
them. It is very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate.
JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body,
was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.

104
 Bengson v. Drilon
208 SCRA 133. April 15, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts: On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions
of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty
(20) years of service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both,
having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge
the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the
salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.

On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower
Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court
providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for
the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.

Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill
is constitutional.

Ruling: As a general rule, the veto power of the president on a particular item or items in a bill is
unconstitutional. However, there is an exception. The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of
Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object. In the present case, the veto power of the president was constitutional
because it was valid in consonance with Section 27, Art. 6 of the Constitution

105
 In re Appointment of Mateo Valenzuela
298 SCRA 408. November 9, 1998
NARVASA, C.J.:

Facts: Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by His
Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Baguio City and of
Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. The appointments were received at the Chief Justice's
chambers on May 12, 1998. The referral was made in view of the serious constitutional issue
concerning said appointments arising from the pertinent antecedents.

The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998.
The meeting had been called, according to the Chief Justice as Ex Officio Chairman, to discuss
the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of ** appointments" to the Court
of Appeals, specifically, in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was drawn
to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution reading as follows:
Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his,
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.

According to the Supreme Court Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations.
The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential
election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election
Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-
called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of
Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in
his bid for reelection, became no more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to
"prepare for the transfer of authority to the incoming President."

Issue: Is the appointment made by the President in the present case considered to as
constitutional?

Ruling: Yes, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII — allowing appointments to be
made during the period of the ban therein provided — is much narrower than that recognized in
Aytona. The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the
article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban. In the
present case, the appointment which was made by the President was constitutional because it was
a temporary appointment made to the judiciary position.

106
 In re: Request for Creation of a Special Division
A.M. No. 02-1-09-SC. January 21, 2002
BELLOSILLO, J.

Facts: Resolution No. 01-2002 recommends that "the cases against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him be referred to a special division created by
constitutional authority of the Supreme Court composed of three justices with two alternates in
case of temporary absence of any of the three to be chosen from among the present composition
of this Court who will be able to participate therein until the termination of said cases."

On 10 January 2002 the Special Prosecution Panel filed its comment/suggestion maintaining that
the Third Division should continue hearing the Plunder Case, and to achieve constancy in the
membership of that division it recommended the creation of Special Third Division to be
composed of the remaining permanent member of the Third Division, Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro, and two (2) other justices who have heretofore at one time or another taken
part in hearing the Plunder Case, who are not retirable within the next three (3) years, and who
are not appointees of the principal accused.

The Defense Panel on the other hand, in its letter of 11 January 2002, argues that the creation of
an Ad Hoc Special Division "may create serious equal protection concerns and set a dangerous
precedent that may come back to haunt us." The Defense also manifests its "deep reservations"
against the participation of Justice Leonardo-De Castro "Being an object of an unresolved
petition to recuse as well as an administrative complaint." Consequently, it recommended the
transfer of the "Estrada Cases" to the Fifth Division composed of Acting Presiding Justice Minita
V. Chico-Nazario and Associate Justices Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and Francisco H.
Villaruz, Jr., "a tribunal with a predictable, stable, regular, permanent membership."

Issue: Does the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights and procedure in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan?

Ruling: Yes. Under Sec. 5, par. [5], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
and procedure in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, given the nature of the
Plunder Case and cases related thereto, the prominence of the principal accused and the
importance of the immediate resolution of the cases to the Filipino people and the Philippine
Government, this Court, in the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, with due
regard to the procedural and substantive rights of the accused, deems it best to create a Special
Division of the Sandiganbayan to be composed of members mentioned in the immediately
preceding paragraph. This Special Division shall hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder
Case and all related cases filed or which may hereafter be filed against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him, until they are resolved, decided and terminated.
The designation of temporary alternate members may be properly addressed later. Meanwhile,
until otherwise revoked, the Acting Presiding Justice is authorized to designate from time to
time, an alternate member to be drawn from the remaining members of the Sandiganbayan as the
exigencies of the service may require.

107
 Vivares v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
G.R. No. 202666 . September 29, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a
beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by
Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from
her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the
waist up, dressed only in brassieres.  Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls
in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the
streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred from joining
the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’
right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view
them, lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

Issue: Is the writ of Habeas Data developed by the Supreme Court?

Ruling: Yes, in accordance to Article VII Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution which provides
the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, to wit:
Section 5 (5): Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.

The Court aimed to protect individual’s right to informational privacy which is defined by
Andres Gamuz, a comparative law scholar that habeas data is a “procedure designed to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” The writ of habeas datais a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information
of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly
in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. This rule is within the rule-making power of the Supreme Court to

108
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights such as the
right to privacy.
In this case, the petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted,
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline. The Supreme Court denied the
petition due to finding that the respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors’
privacy rights.

109
 Infant Julian YusayCaram v. Segui
G.R. No, 193652. August 5, 2014
Villarama, Jr., J.

Facts: On July 26, 2009, petitioner Christina Caram had a child (Julian) whom she voluntarily
committed to DSWD to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for
having a second illegitimate son. On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Cabral
issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption” and was matched
with the spouses Medina of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation.
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she
wanted her family back together. However, the DSWD replied that the adoption process has
attained finality already and that Christina’s proper recourse should be through the regular courts
under RA 9253.
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo before the RTC
of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from the DSWD. In her petition,
Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her child to the
DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which
respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the
minor child had been complied with. Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations,
the respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced
disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority
over him. In its decision the Regional Trial Court granted the writ and ordered DSWD to present
Baby Julian in court to which DSWD complied. The DSWD contested the writ for being the
improper remedy to avail of in a case relating to a biological parent’s custodial rights over her
child. On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of Amparo
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina
availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child. The RTC further stated that Christina
should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If
there is extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegally detained by
another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a
principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the
case before this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether a petition for a writ of Amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child?

Ruling: No, the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these
two instances or to threats thereof. In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD
officers caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an
"enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position,
however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that
Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the
RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent
DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon
of August 5, 2010.There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance”.Christina's directly accusing
the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption,
supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental
authority over the child and contesting custody over him.Since it is extant from the pleadings
filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a
child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied

110
 Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., requesting exemption from payment of IBP Dues
B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 19772005 in the amount of
P12, 035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then
migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC
prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The
compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a
lawyer. His removal from the profession because of nonpayment of the same constitutes to the
deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

Issue: Whether or not inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual
membership.

Ruling: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by
the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory
requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a
practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is
denied.

111
 Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp
605 SCRA 100. June 23, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:The case involves the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area” (Diwalwal), a rich tract of mineral land
located inside the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve in Davao del Norte and Davao
Oriental. Since the early 1980s, Diwalwal has been stormed by conflicts brought about by
numerous mining claims over it. On March 10, 1986, Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC)
was granted an Exploration Permit (EP 133) by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG).
A long battle ensued between Apex and MMC with the latter seeking the cancellation of the
mining claims of Apex on the ground that such mining claims were within a forest reservation
(Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve)and thus the acquisition on mining rights should have
been through an application for a permit to prospect with the BFD and not through registration of
a DOL with the BMG. When it reached the SC in 1991, the Court ruled against Apex holding
that the area is a forest reserve and thus it should have applied fora permit to prospect with the
BFD. On February 16 1994, MMC assigned all its rights to EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which is alleged to be a 100%-owned
subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG registered SEM’s Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA)application and the Deedof Assignment. Several oppositions were filed. The
Panel of Arbitrators created by the DENR upheld the validity of EP 133.During the pendency of
the case, DENR AO No. 2002-18 was issued declaring an emergency situation in the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein.

Issues: 1.W/N EP 133 and its subsequent transfer to SEM is valid.

2. W/N the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO 66 declaring 729hectares of the
areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve asnon-forest lands and open to
small-scale mining purposes.
3. Who (among petitioners Apex and Balite) has priority right over Diwalwal?

Ruling:
1. INVALID. One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: “That this permit shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of the permit tee or his duly authorized agents and shall be used for
mineral exploration purposes only and for no other purpose.”
2. While it may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, there is no showing
that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. As such, the assignment is null and void
as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions of the grant of EP 133.
3a. The Deed of Assignment was a total abdication of MMC’s rights over the permit. It is not a
mere grant of authority to SEM as agent.
b. Reason for the stipulation. Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or individuals
possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining operations. Without such a
condition, non-qualified entities or individuals could circumvent the strict requirements under the
law by the simple expediency of acquiring the permit from the original permit tee.
c. Separate personality. The fact that SEM is a 100% subsidiary of MMC does not automatically
make it an agent of MMC. A corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality
separate and distinct from persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to
which it may be related. Absent any clear proof to the contrary, SEM is a separate and distinct
entity from MMC.
d. Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil inapplicable. Only in cases where the corporate fiction
was used as a shield for fraud, illegality or inequity may the veil be pierced and removed. The
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot therefore be used as a vehicle to commit prohibited
acts. The assignment of the permit in favor of SEM is utilized to circumvent the condition of
non-transferability of the exploration permit. To allow SEM to avail itself of this doctrine and to
approve the validity of the assignment is tantamount to sanctioning an illegal act which is what
the doctrine precisely seeks to forestall.
e. PD 463 requires approval of Secretary of DENR. Also, PD 463 (Mineral Resources
Development Decree), which is the governing law when the assignment was executed, explicitly

112
requires that the transfer or assignment of mining rights, including the right to explore a mining
area, must be with the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Such is not present in this case.
f. EP 133 expired by non-renewal. Although EP 133 was extended for 12 months until July 6,
1994, MMC never renewed its permit prior and after its expiration. With the expiration of EP
133 on July 6, 1994, MMC lost any right to the DiwalwalGold Rush Area. SEM, on the other
hand, has not acquired any right to the said area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is
invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM have not acquired any vested right over the area covered by
EP 133.2.

113
 CJ Renato Corona v. Senate of the Philippines
G. R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012
VILLARAMA JR., J.

Facts: On December 15, 2011, Corona received a copy of the complaint charging him with
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption.
Respondent committed culpable violation of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust
when he failed to disclose to the public his statement off assets, liabilities and net worth as
required under sec. 17, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno on the ground of partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner
aside from the fact that they have been openly touted as the likely replacements in the event that
petitioner is removed from office.

Issue: Is the impeachment of Corona subject to judicial review?

Ruling: Yes. Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of
democracy," was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-
existing factions with the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more by the
comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt." Given
their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a
matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction,
the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally
entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave
abuse or arbitrariness.

Unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not
exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the
proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment
Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors
and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part
of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a
political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.

114
 Araullo, et. al. v. Aquino III, et. al. G.R. No.
209135, July 01, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan.
Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting
for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government
project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a
few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF
(Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain
Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong AlyansangMakabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President
to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

Ruling:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in
Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an

115
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s
no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to
make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within
their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But
under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds
were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they
are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such,
transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when
there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP,
there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the
fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the
middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this
case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely
helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to
reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can
no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received
especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so
found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in
good faith.

116
 CSC v. Moralde
G.R. No. 211077. August 15, 2018
LEONEN, J.

Facts: Moralde's services were engaged as a Dental Aide in the Province's Provincial Health
Office.14 He was assigned to the municipalities of Villanueva and Claveria. According to the
Province, he had a history of falsifying public documents by forging his immediate supervisor's
signature onto his Daily Time Record. The Province also noted that he had a track record of
"frequent absences without leave, and . . . habitual tardiness."

Eventually, Moralde was formally charged with falsifying his Daily Time Records for March and
April 1998. Dr. Diana Marie L. Casiño, Municipal Health Officer of Villanueva, noted that his
Daily Time Records were altered to conceal how he did not report for work in those months. In
his written explanation, Moralde admitted that he did not render service from March 16 to 30,
1998. After conducting an investigation, Atty. Danilo P. Rubio (Atty. Rubio), the Provincial
Attorney, noted that Moralde had previously committed the very same infraction. Thus, he
recommended that Moralde be dismissed from service.

Unknown to the Province's officials, Moralde went to the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) while the administrative case against him was pending. There, on November 8, 1998, he
filed an "application for retirement" under Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as the
"Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977."

Issue: Did the Civil Service Commission erred in setting aside its ruling to reinstate respondent
Gabriel Moralde on the ground that the same ruling has become impracticable or unviable,
hence, moot and academic?

Ruling: Yes. This voluntary termination of employment was made before the administrative
complaint against Moralde could be resolved by the Province, at the first instance, and then
referred to the Commission, on appeal. It was also successfully concealed for almost nine (9)
years. Its discovery was made only long after the Commission ruled on his appeal. The Civil
Service Commission's willingness to rule on his appeal reveals that it was under the mistaken
impression that Moralde's continuance in office was still an unresolved, justiciable matter.
Evidently, however, the Civil Service Commission's ruling on Moralde's appeal was a pointless
superfluity. Any pronouncement on his continuance in office was reduced to a purely academic
exercise as Moralde had already put himself out of office.

The subsequent unraveling of the pointlessness and utter absurdity of reinstating an employee
who voluntarily left employment changed the entire complexion of Moralde's case. Confronted
with the basic and pressing demands of "practicality, logic, fairness and substantial justice," the
Civil Service Commission was correct in realizing that forcing the reinstatement of a voluntarily
deserting employee was impractical, illogical, unfair, and unjust.

117
 Pagdanganan v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 202678. September 05, 2018
LEONEN, J.

Facts: This is a Petition for Mandamus seeking to compel the Court of Appeals to resolve the
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 104291, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed inordinate
delay in violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases of Ernestina A. Pagdanganan,
Roderick ApaciblePagdanganan, Maria Rosario Lota, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Ernestina A. Pagdanganan, Ernest Jerome Pagdanganan and Sandra ApaciblePagdanganan, as
the heirs and substitutes of deceased Isauro J. Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan), Alfonso Ortigas
Olondriz (Alfonso), and Citibank N.A. Hongkong (collectively, petitioners).
Solid Guaranty, Inc. (Solid Guaranty) is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance
business. On November 23, 2007, Solid Guaranty, through Pagdanganan, a minority stockholder,
filed a complaint for interpleader before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The complaint was
filed because of the alleged conflicting claims between Ma. Susana A.S. Madrigal, Ma. Ana A.S.
Madrigal, and Ma. Rosa A.S. Madrigal (collectively, the Madrigals), and Citibank N.A.
Hongkong (Citibank) over the shares of stock previously held by the late Antonio P.
Madrigal. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-118329.
Petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus before the Court of
Appeals on July 11, 2008. On July 15, 2008, the Court of Appeals required respondents to
submit their comment on this Petition. On July 28, 2008, however, petitioners filed a Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Petition.
Meanwhile, respondents filed their Comment on August 5, 2008, while petitioners filed their
Reply on August 15, 2008. On September 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. On September 30, 2008, however, petitioners filed a Motion
to Admit Second Supplemental Petition. Thus, on October 13, 2008, the Court of Appeals
directed the submission of comments on the Second Supplemental Petition. Nonetheless, all the
parties had already submitted their respective memoranda by October 17, 2008.
On December 12, 2008, petitioners again filed a Motion for Leave to File a Third Supplemental
Petition. In its frustration, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated October 22, 2009,
stating:
From the records, it appears that the herein parties have already submitted their respective
memoranda, thus this Court could have very well considered this case submitted for decision.
Owing to the requirements of due process, the Court of Appeals, however, directed respondents
to file their comments on the Third Supplemental Petition, after which, the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. Thus, respondents submitted a Comment dated November 12,
2009. After assessing the merits of the Second and Third Supplemental Petitions, the Court of
Appeals expunged them both and deemed the case submitted for decision in its October 6, 2010
Resolution. The Court of Appeals reiterated:
This case is already ripe for determination had it not been for the filing of the instant Motions
and the consequent filing of pleadings. For in fact, the parties had already submitted their
respective Memoranda.

Issue: Were the petitioners given the right to a speedy disposition of cases?

Ruling: Yes. The Constitution specifies specific time periods when courts may resolve cases:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided
or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.
Under this provision, the Court of Appeals is given a 12-month period to resolve any case that
has already been submitted for decision. Any case still pending 12 months after submission for
decision may be considered as delay. The parties may file the necessary action, such as a petition
for mandamus, to protect their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
In this case, however, petitioners' invocation of the right to speedy disposition of cases is
misplaced since the Court of Appeals has resolved the petition in a timely manner within the
period provided by law.

118
 Labay v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 235937-40. July 23, 2018
VELASCO JR., J.

Facts: The case arose from the complaint dated May 11, 2015 filed by the Field Investigation
Office I (FIO I) of the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Johanne Edward B. Labay
(Petitioner Labay) for his participation in the alleged anomalous utilization of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of former Representative of the 1st District of Davao del
Sur, Marc Douglas C. Cagas IV (Rep. Cagas IV). The complaint was for violation of Article 217
(Malversation of Public Funds or Property), Article 171 (Falsification of Public Documents),
paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (7), Article 217 in relation to Article 171 (Malversation thru
Falsification of Public Documents), all of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as well as Section 3,
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended. The case was docketed as
OMB-C-C-15-0152.3

The complaint alleged that Rep. Cagas IV, in conspiracy with other public officials and private
individuals such as petitioner Labay, through the Technology Resource Center (TRC), sought the
release and transfer of his PDAF in the total amount of Php6,000,000.00 to Farmer-business
Development Corporation (FDC), which was led by its then president, herein petitioner Labay.
However, upon field verification conducted by the FIO I, it appears that the livelihood projects
funded by Rep. Cagas IV's PDAF were never implemented and were considered to be "ghost
projects."

In a Joint Order dated September 1, 2015, the Ombudsman directed respondents to file their
respective counter-affidavits. Several respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.
However, copies of this Order could not be served on petitioner Labay.

According to the Ombudsman, it exerted diligent efforts to serve copies of the September 1,
2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay through his office and at his last known address. However,
the copies were returned unserved because he was no longer employed in that office and he was
unknown at the given residential address. As such, the Ombudsman proceeded with the
preliminary investigation without any counter-affidavit or participation from petitioner Labay.

In a Resolution dated May 10, 2016, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Rep. Cagas
IV and his co-respondents, including petitioner Labay, for conspiracy in the commission of two
counts of Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, one count of Malversation of Public Funds, and
one count of Malversation thru Falsification

Issue: Should there be a remand of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for a
reinvestigation of petitioner?

Ruling: Yes. As pointed out by petitioner, the Ombudsman only tried to effect service of the
order to file his counter affidavit on petitioner on one instance, albeit to two different addresses.
However, this service failed since petitioner was no longer employed at his former office at
NAPC, as confirmed by the letter sent by the NAPC Secretary and Lead Convenor, and since he
was no longer residing at the residential address where the order was sent.

In its Comment, the OSP seeks refuge in paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure which provides that in cases where the respondents cannot be served with the order to
file their counter-affidavit, or having been served but does not comply therewith, the complaint
shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on the record.

While the Ombudsman was correct in resolving the complaint based on the evidence presented in
accordance with Paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, the situation,
however, effectively changed when petitioner made himself available to the Ombudsman when
he requested access to the case records. The Ombudsman had a clear opportunity to furnish

119
petitioner with copies of the complaint affidavit and its supporting documents. Instead, it merely
decided to furnish petitioner with a copy of its May 10, 2016 Resolution.

Even assuming that the Ombudsman was merely complying with Atty. Labay's request for
information when it responded with the case titles and docket numbers of the cases pending
against petitioner Labay, it should have exercised its duty to inform petitioner of the charges
filed against him by furnishing him copies of the complaint affidavit and its supporting
documents. Or at the very least, it should have directed and allowed petitioner to access these
records at its office. This, however, was not done by the Ombudsman.

120
 Tan v. Barrios
G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27 September 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to
create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as
may be referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30 September 1972, the military tribunals,
"exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others, over violations of the
law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the
preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. In General Order 12-b dated 7 November
1972, "crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added
to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions. Subsequently, General Order 49, dated 11
October 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals.
The enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49, Section 2 of the
same general order provided that "the President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military
Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa. On 17
April 1975, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan, with 12 others Ang Tiat Chuan,
Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, Leopoldo Nicolas, Enrique Labita, Oscar Yaun,
Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, Marciano Benemerito, Manuel Beleta, and John Doe,
were arrested and charged in Criminal Case MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1, for the
crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm, penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49,
for the killing on 25 August 1973 of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of
Cagayan de Oro City; and (2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45
SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential
Decree 9. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos,
pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier
order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court.
All the accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp Crame.
Upon arraignment on 6 May 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was
discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released from detention on 5 May 1975. Almost
daily trials were held for more than 13 months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and
35 defense witnesses filled up 21 volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages. On 10
June 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military
Commission finding 5 of the accused namely: Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr.,
Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty of murder, where each of them was sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from 17 years, 4 months, and 21 days, to 20 years. A
sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both murder and illegal possession of
firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution. 8 of the accused,
namely: Oscar Yaun, Enrique Labita, Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, William Tan,
Joaquin Tan Leh, and Vicente Tan were acquitted of the charges, and released on 11 June 1976.
On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals
and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs.
Military Commission 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December
1984 by Military Commission 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military commissions
and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged
with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and
functioning as they did during the period of martial law.
In October 1986, 6 habeas corpus petitions were filed in the Supreme Court by some 217
prisoners in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by
the military commissions during the 9-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983,
79077,79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs.
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, the
Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the

121
conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice
as their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule.
On 15 September 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order 226
designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de
Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case MC-1-67 and, if the evidence
warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction." On 15 November 1988,
State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City
in lieu of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself.
Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on 9 December 1988, in
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for (1) Illegal Possession
of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824]; and (2) Murder [Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15
original defendants in Criminal Case MC1-67 including those who had already died. Criminal
Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala
of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused,
Judge Demecillo issued an order on 26 October 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to
submit certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are
now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the cases, within 5 days from
receipt" of his said order. The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order. On 7 November
1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition praying that the informations in Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of
Judge dated 26 October 1988 be annulled, among others.

Issue: Did the respondent judge of Cagayan De Oro, Barrios the State Prosecutor of Department
of Justice and City Fiscal of Cagayan De Oro gravely abused their discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction which violates res judicata in prison grey of the petitioners?

Ruling: Yes, in Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546, the doctrine of
"operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused before
Military Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military
courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular
case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their
constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard
and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this
Court years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.
The trials that achieved finality during the Marcos Regime which were ruled by the Military
Tribunal will violate the doctrine of double jeopardy which protects the accused from harassment
by the strong arm of the State : "The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single
prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables
him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to
be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-
consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in
prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases
the state to do so." Thus, the Court granted the pleadings of the petitioners.

122
 Gayo v. Verceles
G.R. No. 150477. February 28, 2005
Callejo, Sr., J.

Facts: Sometime in 1977, the respondent migrated to the United States of America (U.S.A.) with
her family to look for greener pastures but retained her Filipino citizenship. In 1993, she returned
to the Philippines for good and would only travel to USA to visit her children. In 1997, he filed
her certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Tubao, La Union for the May 2008 election. On
January 28, 1998, she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila. The respondent ran in the May 11,
1998 elections and was elected Mayor of Tubao, La Union. Thereafter, during the May 14, 2001
elections, the petitioner ran for re-election and won. She was proclaimed as the duly-elected
Mayor on May 16, 2001. Her proclamation was however questioned for the reason that she is a
green card holder and has not complied with the residence requirement.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent was able to meet the residency requirement for the position
of municipal mayor during the May 2001 elections.

Ruling: Yes. Respondent effectively abandoned her residency in the Philippines by her
acquisition of the status of a permanent U.S. resident. Nonetheless, we find that the respondent
reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding of the May 2001 elections.
The records show that she surrendered her green card to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service of the American Embassy way back in 1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her
U.S. residency could not have been made clearer. Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the
Philippines for good in 1993, she continued living here and only went to the U.S.A. on periodic
visits to her children who were residing there. Moreover, she was elected Mayor in the 1998
elections and served as such for the duration of her term. We find such acts sufficient to establish
that the respondent intended to stay in the Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that she has
once again made the Philippines her permanent residence.

123
 Re: 1989 Election of the IBP
178 SCRA 398.  October 6, 1989
PER CURIAM:

Facts:  After the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter “IBP”)
held on June 3, 1989, the newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of office before the Supreme
Court en banc. However, disturbed by the widespread reports from lawyers who had witnessed or
participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers
about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for
the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C.
Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such
activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar,
resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
The election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) was unanimously
adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. What the Court viewed with considerable
concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by
the three candidates for president of the IBP.

The Court en banc formed a committee and total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in
response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.

Issue:  Whether or not IBP by-laws were violated.

Ruling: IBP by-laws were violated. Elections held on June 3, 1989 be annulled, relevant by-laws be
amended as per the court’s resolution and new elections be held such that the persons named in the
resolution cannot contest for any IBP position.

124
 Republic of the Phils v. Maria Lourdes Sereno
G.R. No. 237428. May 11, 2018
TIJAM, J.

Facts: From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UPLaw, or from October 2003 to
2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international
arbitrations known as the PIATCOcases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on
Human Rights. The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that
there was no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of
profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine(9) Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she
attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or
“drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The
JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were
recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief
Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among
which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and
“SALN as of December 31,2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement
further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will
not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since
she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming
from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she
became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her
government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UPHRDO and CSC
should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite
this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno,
alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of
Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said
that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs
of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to15,000, that were
not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs,
failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003.

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG,
invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in
relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition
for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s
appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. Capistrano,
Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno thenf iled a Motion for Inhibition
against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, andLeonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for
having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Issue: Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for
quo warranto.

Ruling: The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary
writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such
writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct
resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting

125
that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the
Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing
an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. An outright
dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on
impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely
presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for
the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle
actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in
deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an
impeachment court through the Senate.

126
 Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
368 SCRA 36. October 23, 2001
PARDO, J.

Facts: Pursuant to the government’s plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the
Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties
affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes. The
government won the expropriation case. DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners. The lower
court granted Tessie Amadeo’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH
to satisfy her unpaid claim. On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of
Levy, addressed to the Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties
subject of the levy as ‘All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the Department of Public
Works and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through and Alex
Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent
Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19, 1994. They were,
however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH properties, a certain
Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale, and
informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were still
serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation.

On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao
City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge
Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the
filing of an administrative case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the
anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. The Department of Public Works and
Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff
Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A. Fuentes be
charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and
likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a judge.
Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal
complaint charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3
(e).
Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or
manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint
against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an
investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the
Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.

The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the
Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the propriety of the
issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not filed any
administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present inquiry
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise
of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in
the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.

Held: No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary

127
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.”
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers.
The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the
land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ
of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may
be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of
execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the
judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. “No other entity
or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch,
not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final
and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order.

128
 People v. Gacott
246 SCRA 52. July 13, 1995
REGALADO, J.

Facts: On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108)
was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The
accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to
prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed
an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already beenabolished by Letter of
Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge
granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the
City Fiscal is not the “law” contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal
another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994
held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered
that the case be quashed.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his
discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

Ruling: Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in
the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the
Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI.
Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition
to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately
apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D.
No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2.

129
 City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero
600 SCRA 33. September 17, 2009
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two
parcels of land. It incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax years 1976
to 1983. For failure of TTTDC to settle its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City
Government of Tagaytay offered the properties for sale at a public auction. Being the
only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay and was
correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the properties . The City of Tagaytay filed an
unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in its favor before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC granted the petition. The TTTDC appealed to the CA. The subject
properties were later purchased by AmuerfinaMelencio-Herrera and EmilianaMelencio-Fernando
(Melencios) for the amount equivalent to the taxes and penalties due to the same. Meanwhile,
during the pendency of the case before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the
public auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the properties were not within
the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing authority. On the other hand,
the City of Tagaytay averred that based on its Charter, said properties are within its territorial
jurisdiction. The RTC denied this motion.

Issue: Is the City of Tagaytay is liable for damages when it levied real estate taxes on the subject
properties?

Ruling: Yes. It is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due
to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the failure
of the city officials in this case to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying
taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence. The negligence of its officers in the performance
of their official functions gives rise to an action ex contractu and quasi ex-delictu. Under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, the City of Tagaytay is liable for all the necessary and
natural consequences of the negligent acts of its city officials. It is liable for the tortious
acts committed by its agents who sold the properties to the Melencios despite the clear mandate
of RA No 1418, separating Barrio Birinayan from its jurisdiction and transferring the same to the
Province of Batangas. Decision affirmed with modification.

130
 Limkaichong v. COMELEC
594 SCRA 434. April 1, 2009.
PERALTA, J.

Facts: On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental,
filed the petition for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship
requirement of a Member of the House of Representatives. The petition, which was docketed as
SPA No. (PES) A07-006, alleged that she is not a natural-born Filipino because her parents were
Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando, also a registered
voter of the same locality, filed the second petition on the same ground of citizenship, docketed
as SPA (PES) No. A07-007. He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were still
Chinese citizens as the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never
attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed for the
cancellation of Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list
of qualified candidates for the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emerged
as the winner with 65,708 votes or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another congressional
candidate, Olivia Paras (Paras), who obtained 57,962.
On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First
District of Negros Oriental.
In a Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petitions
in the disqualification cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative of the
First District of Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike
out her name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBOC) to suspend her proclamation. In disposing the cases, the COMELEC Second Division
made the following ratiocination:
On the substantial issue of whether respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is disqualified to run for
the congressional seat of the First District of Negros Oriental on the ground that she is not a
natural-born Filipino, we hold that she is so disqualified.
Petitioners have successfully discharged their burden of proof and has convincingly shown with
pieces of documentary evidence that Julio Ong Sy, father of herein respondent Jocelyn Sy-
Limkaichong, failed to acquire Filipino citizenship in the naturalization proceedings which he
underwent for the said purpose.
An examination of the records of Special Case No. 1043 would reveal that the Office of the
Solicitor General was deprived of its participation in all the stages of the proceedings therein, as
required under Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law and Republic Act
No. 530, An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization.
The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG was not furnished copies of two
material orders of the trial court in the said proceedings. One was the July 9, 1957 Order granting
his petition for naturalization and the other was the September 21, 1959 Order declaring Julio
Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen. Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG
logbook, we have determined that the OSG did not receive a notice for the hearing conducted by
the trial court on July 9, 1959, prior to its issuance of the September 12, 1959 Order declaring
Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.
Another glaring defect in the said proceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy took his Oath of
Allegiance on October 21, 1959, which was exactly thirty (30) days after his declaration as a
naturalized Filipino. The respondent insists that naturalization proceedings are in rem and are
binding on the whole world.

Issue: Is the respondent’s argument tenable?

Ruling: No. According to the Supreme Court, the respondent’s argument would have been
correct had all the necessary parties to the case been informed of the same. The OSG, being the
counsel for the government, has to participate in all the proceedings so that it could be bound by
what has transpired therein. Lacking the participation of this indispensable party to the same, the
proceedings are null and void and, hence, no rights could arise therefrom.

131
 Malacora v. CA
G.R. No. L-51042. September 30, 1982
DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: On April 14, 1971, the respondent court rendered a decision in CAR Case No. 6, entitled
"Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas vs. Rodrigo Libarnes and Consuelo Libarnes", the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the herein
defendants RODRIGO LIBARNES and CONSUELO LIBARNES to pay the herein plaintiffs
DIONISIO MALACORA and LUCIA MARABULAS the total amount of TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY FIVE (P2,595.00) PESOS for onehalf of all the coconut trees
and of TEN (P10.00) PESOS for one-half of the banana plants said plaintiffs planted on the
defendants' land and after payment of said amounts their tenancy relation will be considered as
terminated and the said plaintiffs will be allowed to surrender and leave their tenanted holding.
Both parties in this case are hereby ordered to pay fifty-fifty the court fees, the plaintiffs to pay
their one-half share upon receipt of the payments for one-half of the improvements as herein
above ordered.
Defendants, petitioners herein, appealed to this Court (CA-G.R. No. 00658-R) which modified
the judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the
petitioners are ordered to pay P8.00 per coconut trees for one- half of all the coconut trees which
the private respondents had planted on the land in question, without pronouncement as to costs.
After Our decision became final and the case had been returned to the respondent court,
plaintiffs, private respondents herein, filed a motion for execution. Acting on the motion, the
respondent court, on September 20, 1974, entered an order of execution; and on October 4, 1974,
the Clerk of Court issued a writ of execution which commanded petitioners 'to pay plaintiffs
Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas the total amount of P2,184.00 for the 273 coconut trees
planted by the plaintiffs.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the writ of execution, the sheriff's certificate
of sale and the sheriff's final deed of sale, and the orders of June 27 and August 1, 1978 in CAR
Case No. 6 Agrarian '68 as annulled and set aside?

Ruling: No. The writ of execution is supposed to be to enforce the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the
petitioners are ordered to pay P8.00 per coconut tree for one-half of all the coconut trees which
the private respondents had planted on the land in question, without pronouncement as to cost. 3
The variance between the writ of execution and the final judgment of the court of Appeals sought
to be enforced is at once noticeable. On the basis of the judgment to be executed, the amount to
be paid by the private respondents to petitioners should be only P1,100.00, the value of 1/2 of the
275 coconut trees planted, at the rate of P8.00 a tree already fruit bearing or not. The writ of
execution fixed the value at P2,184.00. Not being in accordance with the judgment to be
enforced, in a very substantial manner, the writ of execution was correctly set aside as a nullity
by the respondent Court of Appeals, properly acting on the authority of the Collector of Internal
Revenue vs. Gutierrez, et al. 

132
 RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN
A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC. November 28, 2001
PARDO, J.:

Facts: In July 2000, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to the SC a resolution asking for the Court to conduct
an inquiry into the causes of delay in the resolution of incidents and motions and in decision of cases before the
Sandiganbayan. This resolution was prompted by numerous complaints from IBP members about serious delays
by the said trial court in their disposition of cases . In August 2000, the SC required Sandiganbayan PJ
Garchitorena to comment on the issue and submit a list of their pending matters .
In September 2000, the SC received Sandiganbayan’s compliance report showing a total of 415 cases that have
remained undecided long beyond the reglementary period. In November 2000, the SC directed Court
Administrator Benipayo to conduct a judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan. In January 2001, OCA Benipayo
submitted his report stating the various reasons for the Sandiganbayan’s delay such as non-submission of
reinvestigation reports, filing of numerous motions, suspensions due to certiorari and prohibitions, unloading of
cases, and even plain neglect by the trial court. On the basis of this report, OCA Benipayo considered ex mero
motu the IBP Resolution as an administrative complaint against PJ Garchitorena for incompetence, inefficiency,
gross neglect of duty and misconduct in office.

Issue: What are the Periods of Decision of the different courts, especially the Sandiganbayan?

Ruling:
In accordance to P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan as a special court the maximum period to
decide cases is within three months, to wit:
"Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases – As far as practicable, the trial of cases
before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until terminated and the
judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for
decision."
Furthermore, the Court disagreed on what the Court Administrator distinguished as the
reglementary period of deciding cases filed with the Sandiganbayan such as the 12 month
reglementary period for collegiate courts as well as the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
must not break its own rules and regulations provided in P.D. No. 1606 because it is a special
court created "in an effort to maintain honesty and efficiency in the bureaucracy, weed out
misfits and undesirables in the government and eventually stamp out graft and corruption." We
have held consistently that a delay of three (3) years in deciding a single case is inexcusably
long. Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission to the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts.
"(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself."22
This provision applies to the Sandiganbayan in regards to the final judgment submitted to it
within a perion of three months. Thus, the SC issued a directive wherein Presiding Judge
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan is relieved of his powers and duties until the backlog of cases
assigned to him as well as cases not assigned to any ponente are finally decided.

133
 Spouses Marcelo v. Judge Pichay
AM No. MTJ-13-1838. March 12, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: The present case stemmed from an unlawful detainer case filed by complainants Spouses
Marcelo against Spouses Magopoy which was pending before Judge Pichay of MeTC, Parañaque
City. A Joint Decision was released by Judge Pichay ordering Spouses Magopoy to vacate and
surrender the possession of the property to Spouses Marcelo. A writ of execution was issued and
later implemented by Sheriff Espres, thus, Spouses Marcelo obtained the possession of the
property. However, 6:00pm on the same day, Spouses Magopoy reentered the property and
regained its possession. As such, Spouses Marcelo moved to cite Spouses Magopoy in contempt
for disobedience to lawful court processes. In an Order by MeTC, defendants were not cited in
contempt but was instead ordered to surrender the property to Spouses Marcelo within 10 days.
Spouses Marcelo filed an Ex Parte Constancia because of the continued refusal of defendants to
surrender the property, which prompted Judge Pichay to issue and Order directing the Sheriff to
execute the eviction within 3 days. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by defendants, which
was opposed by complainants. During the hearing, Spouses Magopoywere directed to file their
Reply with Supplemental Motion to which they complied. However, instead of resolving the
case, Judge Pichay directed Spouses Marcelo to file their comment regarding the motion within 5
days and after which the court will resolve the pending incidents. Spouses Marcelo failed to file
their comment, nonetheless, Judge Pichay set the motion for hearing.
Disappointed with Judge Pichay’s continuous inaction, Spouses Marcelo filed an administrative
complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator charging him and Sheriff Epress with
inordinate delay in the disposition of the pending incidents in relation to the implementation of
the writ of execution of the decision.
In defense, Judge Pichay told that the delay was due to the new arguments raised in the
supplemental motion which may change the situation of the parties, hence, the execution of the
decision would be inequitable. In the interest of justice and equity, Judge Pichay schedule a
hearing for the Supplemental Motion which however was reset due to the request of complainant
and because Judge Pichay went on a leave.
OCA, through a Memorandum, recommended Judge Pichaybe held administratively liable for
undue delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in relation to the execution of the decision.
Moreover, a fine of 10,000 for the infraction. OCA found that Judge Pichay entertained dilatory
machinations that resulted in the delay of the implementation of the writ of execution, while the
case against Sheriff Epressbe dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Pichay should be held administratively liable for undue delay in
the resolution of the pending incidents.

Ruling: The Court concurs with the recommendation of OCA subject to modification regarding
the penalty. The Constitution requires our courts to observe the time periods in deciding cases
and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, in case of lower courts, 3 mos. from the date
they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution. In consonance with that, Sec 5, Canon 6 of
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that Judges shall perform all
judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently fairly and with reasonable
promptness. Noncompliance with the periods prescribed constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge. While trial court
judges are often burdened with heavy case loads, they are given the option to, for good reasons,
ask for an extension of the period within which to resolve a particular case or any pending
incident therein.
As observed in the case at bar, Judge Pichay failed to resolve the subject motions within the 3
month period prescribed therefor. The matter had already been submitted for Resolution but
Judge Pichay continued with the proceedings by setting the motions for hearing to the effect of
unreasonably delaying the execution of the subject decision. Judge Pichay did not sufficiently
explain the reasons as to why he failed to resolve the matter on time, as well as why he still had
to set the same for hearing and grant postponements despite the summary nature of ejectment
proceedings and the ministerial nature of the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution.

134
 Brillantes v. Yorac
192 SCRA 358. December 18, 1990
CRUZ, J.:

Facts: In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact
finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate
his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate
commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a
temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then
questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution “in no case shall any
member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity”.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come from the
President for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and
that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional
commission.

Issue: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC.

Ruling: Yes. Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made by
the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote “administrative
expediency” to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found
no basis on existing rules on statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC who should choose
whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally do that by
choosing the most senior member). But even though the president’s appointment of Yorac as
acting president is void, the members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting
chairman – the point here is that, it is the members who should elect their acting chairman
pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies.

135
 Dennis A. B. Funav. The Chairman, Coa
G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012
Velasco, Jr., J.:

Facts: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A.Villar as

Chairman of the COA. Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the
fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA
from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008,Villar was nominated
and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office asCOA
Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to
lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term
of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2,
2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Issue: WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having
served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the
term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art.
IX(D) of the Constitution

Ruling: Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that: (2) The Chairman and
Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years withoutr eappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and
the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Petitioner now asseverates
the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind
within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same
position(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position(commissioner
to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.

136
 Gaminde v. COA
G.R. No. 140335. December 13, 2000
PARDO, J.

Facts: Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the Philippines as Commissioner of
the Civil Service Commission, ad interim and assumed office on June 22, 1993 after oath of
office. The Commission on Appointments (COA) and the Congress of the Philippines confirmed
the appointment on September 7, 1993. Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the
President for clarification on the expiry date of her term of office. In response to her request, the
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term office will expire on February 2, 2000
instead of February 2, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, Gaminde remained in office after
February 2, 1999. However, on February 4, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon wrote COA
requesting opinion whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 2, 1999. The General Counsel
of COA issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has
expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional
intent.” Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice
of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-
terminus staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde appealed COA’s disallowance but it was
dismissed, and affirmed the propriety of the disallowance; and held that the issue of Gaminde’s
office term may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the
expiration date of February 2, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft of power to recognize
an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.
Gaminde moved for reconsideration, but was denied by COA.

Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as
stated in the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as claimed by her.

Ruling: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as appointed by
President Fidel V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However, she served as de-facto officer
in good faith until February 2, 2000. The term of office of the Chairman and members of the
Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1
(2):
“The Chairman andthe Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and
another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

137
 PAGCOR v. CA
202 SCRA 191. August 20, 2018
GESMUNDO, J

Facts: Respondent was an employee of PAGCOR with a position of Dealer stationed at Casino
Filipino-Waterfront Hotel, Lahug, Cebu City. In a random drug testing conducted by PAGCOR
to all its employees, respondent allegedly tested positive for methamphetamine. Thus, in its
March 30, 2006 Letter, respondent was informed that she was dismissed from the service for
gross misconduct and violation of company rules and regulations. Respondent moved for
reconsideration which PAGCOR denied in its May 11, 2006 letter.
On May 19, 2006, respondent appealed her dismissal with the CSC.
The CSC, in its March 24, 2008 resolution, dismissed the appeal and affirmed her dismissal.
When respondent moved for reconsideration of this resolution, the CSC, in its January 24, 2012
resolution, reversed itself and reinstated respondent into service.
PAGCOR received the January 3, 2017 resolution of the CA denying its motion for
reconsideration on January 11, 2017. Hence, PAGCOR had fifteen (15) days, or until January 26,
2017, to file its appeal. It let this period lapse and, instead, filed herein petition for certiorari on
March 13, 2017. Evidently, the present petition is a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
The CSC exonerated respondent from the administrative charges on account of PAGCOR's
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 38 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It found that respondent was not notified of
the positive screening result, which should have given her a window of opportunity to impugn
the result through a confirmatory testing. It held that notice of the screening test is part of her
substantive rights and the absence thereof is tantamount to denial of the due process granted to
her by law. Thus, it exonerated her of the administrative charges.
PAGCOR argues that the negligence of its former counsel was so gross that it effectively
deprived it of due process

Issue: Is the petitioner’s argument meritous?

Ruling: No. The Court finds in the instant case that PAGCOR failed to prove that the negligence
of its former counsel was so gross that it effectively deprived it of due process.
PAGCOR argues in its petition that its failure to comply with the CA's October 22, 2015
resolution was unintentional. It contends that its failure was merely due to the heavy workload of
its former counsel and an effect of the recurring water intrusion/leakage in its offices. The Court
fails to see how these excuses could amount to gross negligence on the part of its former counsel.
In fact, they themselves characterized it as a mere, unintentional lapse. This is simple negligence.
There is simply no gross negligence to speak of in the instant case.
Further, PAGCOR was not deprived of due process. On the contrary, it was given every
opportunity to be heard, which is the very essence of due process. The merits of its case were
heard by the CSC. It appealed the decision of the CSC to the CA. The CA initially dismissed the
case for failure to acquire jurisdiction over respondent due to PAGCOR's failure to comply with
its orders regarding service of a copy of the petition to respondent and/or her counsel. When the
CA reinstated the case in view of respondent's voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, PAGCOR
squandered the second chance given to it by failing to comply with the CA's directive to furnish
respondent with a copy of the petition. This is despite respondent volunteering the current
address of her counsel through the manifestations she filed. To add salt to injury, PAGCOR let
the period to appeal the January 3, 2017 resolution of the CA before this Court lapse. Instead, it
filed the present petition for certiorari as a substitute for its lost appeal.

138
 Casino Labor Association v. CA
554 SCRA 323. June 12, 2008
PUNO, C.J.

Facts: The present Constitution specifically provides in Article IX B, Section 2(1) that "the civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." (Emphasis
supplied)
There appears to be no question from the petition and its annexes that the respondent
corporations were created by an original charter, P.D. No. 1869 in relation to P.D. Nos. 1067-A,
1067-C, 1399 and 1632.
Moreover, P.D. 1869, Section 18, specifically prohibits formation of unions among casino
employees and exempts them from the coverage of Labor Code provisions. Under the new
Constitution, they may now form unions but subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in
offices and corporations governed by the Civil Service Law.

Issue: Does the Civil Service Commission instead of the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: Yes. In resolving the issue of whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over employer-
employee relations in PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC, the Third Division made the definitive ruling
that "there appears to be no question from the petition and its annexes that the respondent
corporations were created by an original charter." The Court collectively referred to all
respondent corporations, including PCOC and PSSC, and held that in accordance with the
Constitution and jurisprudence, corporations with original charter "fall under the jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission and not the Labor Department." The Court stated further that P.D.
1869 exempts casino employees from the coverage of Labor Code provisions and although the
employees are empowered by the Constitution to form unions, these are "subject to the laws
passed to regulate unions in offices and corporations governed by the Civil Service Law." Thus,
in dismissing the petition, the ruling of the Third Division was clear - - - it is the Civil Service
Commission, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the employer-employee problems in
PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC.

139
 UP v. Regino
221 SCRA 598. May 3, 1993
CRUZ, J.

Facts: Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the
Philippines was dismissed after being found guilty of causing the leakage of final examination
questions. After seeking relief from Merit Systems Board (MSB), MSB ruled in favor of
respondent. Thus, UP appealed to the Civil Service Commission which sustained the MSB and
ordered respondent’s reinstatement. On RTC, respondent’s immediate reinstatement was also
ordered. However, UP contends that under Section 6(e) of its charter, Act 1870, UP Board of
Regents has the power “to appoint, on recommendation of the president of the university,
professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the university, to fix their compensation
and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.”

Issue: Whether or not the administrative cases involving the discipline of petitioner’s employees
come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Held: Yes. As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the
Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a
special law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore
governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come
under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Under the 1973 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the
manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution
only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of
the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), which states: “The Civil Service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.”

140
 DOH v. NLRC
G.R. No. 113212 December 29, 1995
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Facts: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by the Department of Health in behalf of the
Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital (DJRMH) and its Director, Cesar J. Viardo, seeking to
review and set aside the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission which
dismissed herein petitioners' appeal from the January 2, 1992 Decision of Labor Arbiter Cornelio
L. Linsangan. Private respondent Ceferino R. Laur was a patient of the then Tala Leprosarium
(now Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital), treatment of Hansen's disease, commonly termed
leprosy. He was employed at the DJRMH as a patient-assistant by the then Hospital Director, Dr.
Artemio F. Runez assigned as a member of the Patient-Assistant Police Force
compensation/salary, initially, in the amount of P110.00 gradually increased complaints for
Alarm and Scandal, Oral Defamation, Grave Threats, Concealment of Deadly Weapon, Violation
of the Code of Ethics of Policemen, and Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer were filed
against said private respondent finding of guilt penalty of suspension for sixty (60) days stern
warning private respondent Laur got involved in the mauling of one, Jake Bondoc, along with
two policemen. Private respondent's account of the incident is a group of twelve (12) young boys
engaged another group of four male youngsters (4) in a stone-throwing encounter resulted in
damage to the windows of the nearby Holy Rosary College. It was at this point that one of the
policemen hit one of the stone throwers with a night stick. Complaint filed by a certain Jake
Bondoc, one of the young boys, against private respondent provoked an investigation private
respondent was dismissed by the Chief of Hospital. Private respondent filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal with additional claims for
payment of wage differentials, holiday pay, overtime pay and 13th month pay, as well as
payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation and with
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
Labor Arbiter Cornelio Linsangan rendered his Decision in private respondent's favor
Respondent Labor Arbiter Linsangan so ruled because private respondent was in truth an
employee in contemplation of the Labor Code, the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner hospital and private respondent being evident from the fact that
private respondent's work is necessary and desirable for the operation of the hospital.
Private respondent was allegedly performing such functions as were inherent to and undertaken
by the members of the regular police force. Second, private respondent's dismissal was illegal
because it was not for a just cause. The mauling incident was not sufficiently established.

Issue: Did the respondents, NLRC and Labor Arbiter Linsangancommitted serious error in their
decisions and acted without jurisdiction when they took cognizance of the complaint filed by
private respondent Ceferino R Laur before the NLRC instead of the Civil Service Commission.

Ruling: Yes, the issuance of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 93-2387, such appeals
shall now be filed directly with the CSC which states that:
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17 of Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which authorizes the Commission, as an independent constitutional body, to effect
changes in its organization as the need arises, the Commission Resolves as it is hereby Resolved
to effect the following changes:
1. Decisions in administrative cases involving officials and employees of the civil service
appealable to the Commission pursuant to Section 47 of Book V of the Code including personnel
actions such as contested appointments shall now be appealed directly to the Commission and
not the MSPB; 
In accordance to Section 2 (1), Article IX-B, Constitution, provisions of E.O. No. 292 and PD.
No. 807 otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, the Tala Leprosarium or
DJRMH is established as one of three leper colonies under CA No. 161 which is still maintained
up to this day as a public medical center attached to the Department of Health. Thus, DJRMH as
a government agency, falls well within the scope of the Civil Service Law from which the NLRC
and Labor Arbiter Linsangan acted without jurisdiction.

141
 CSC v. CA
G.R. No. 185766. November 23, 2010
MENDOZA, J.

Facts:In GR No. 185766, the Board of Directors of PCSO resolved to appoint Sarsonas as Asst.
Department Manager II of the Internal Audit Department (IAD) of PCSO under temporary
status. Thus, on the same day, PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte issued a temporary
appointment to Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II.

Civil Service Commission Field Office Office of the President (CSCFO-OP) disapproved the
temporary appointment of Sarsonas as she failed to meet the eligibility requirement for the
position. CSCFO-OP certified that there were qualified individuals who signified their interest to
be appointed to the position, namely, Mercedes Hinayon and Reynaldo Martin.

PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC-NCR but the latter affirmed the disapproval. PCSO filed an
appeal with the CSC but the same was dismissed. PCSO elevated the case to the CA, which
reversed the CSC resolution. CSC filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

In GR No. 185767, PCSO Board of Directors resolved to appoint Lemuel G. Ortega as Assistant
Department Manager II of its Planning and Production Department. The same events transpired
as in G.R. No. 185766.

In both petitions to the CA, it was ruled that CSC erred in finding that the position of Assistant
Department Manager II requires CSE eligibility, rendering improper the temporary appointments
of Sarsonas and Ortega, respectively. In G.R. No. 185766, the CA held that the resolution of the
PCSO Board to appoint Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II was a policy decision and
an exercise of management prerogative over which the CSC has no power of review. In G.R. No.
185767, the CA similarly ruled that the Career Executive Service does not cover the position of
Assistant Department Manager II in the Planning and Production Department of the PCSO.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the CSC resolutions disapproving the
temporary appointments of Sarsonas and Ortega.

Ruling: The Court ruled in the negative. In Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation v. Civil
Service Commission, the Court stated that the position of HIGC Vice President is not covered by
the CES as (1) the position is not enumerated by law as falling under the third level; (2)
respondent Cruz has not established that the position is one of those identified by the CESB as
being of equivalent rank to those listed by law; and (3) the holder thereof is not appointed by the
President.

In the 2005 case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, the Court used a
similar process of deduction to arrive at the conclusion that the position of Graft Investigation
Officer III was not a CES position. In the said case, the Court wrote:

From the provisions of the Administrative Code, persons occupying positions in the CES are
presidential appointees. A person occupying the position of Graft Investigation Officer III is not,
however, appointed by the President but by the Ombudsman as provided in Article IX of the
Constitution.

To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the CES and require an
appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure would be
absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the
President, in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by
a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.

142
Thus, the CES covers presidential appointees only. As this Court ruled in Office of the
Ombudsman v. CSC:

"From the above-quoted provision of the Administrative Code, persons occupying positions in
the CES are presidential appointees.

The above 2007 case was, in turn, cited by the Court two years later in National Transmission
Corporation v. Hamoy, where again, it was categorically stated that the CES covers only
presidential appointees.

Thus, from the long line of cases cited above, in order for a position to be covered by the CES,
two elements must concur. First, the position must either be (1) a position enumerated under
Book V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e.
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service, or (2) a position of equal
rank as those enumerated, and identified by the Career Executive Service Board to be such
position of equal rank. Second, the holder of the position must be a presidential appointee.
Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be considered as one covered by the third-
level or CES.

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the position of Assistant Department Manager II is not
one of those enumerated under the Administrative Code of 1987. There is also no question that
the CESB has not identified the position to be of equal rank to those enumerated. Lastly, without
a doubt, the holder of the position of Assistant Department Manager II is appointed by the PCSO
General Manager, and not by the President of the Philippines. Accordingly, the position of
Assistant Department Manager II in the PCSO is not covered by the third-level or CES, and does
not require CSE eligibility.

143
 Geronimo v. Ramos
135 SCRA 435. May 14, 1995
GUTIERREZ, JR, J.:

Facts: On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from running as a candidate for the
mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political turn coatism. After hearing the petition, the
COMELEC on January 1980 issued Resolution No. 8305 disqualifying Meliton C. Geronimo. On January
22, 1980, Geronimo filed a motion to reconsider the said resolution, and on January 28, 1980 or two days
before the elections, he filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to restrain the COMELEC from
implementing its resolution. Or the same day, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against the
COMELEC. In the elections of January 30, 1980, Geronimo obtained a margin of 325 votes when he
garnered 2,695 votes as against his opponent Bayani Ferrera’s 2,370 votes. On March 11, 1980, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9554, reinstating the proclamation made earlier by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Baras, Rizal in favor of Geronimo as the winning candidate for mayor. On
September 26, 1981, this Court rendered a decision in G.R. No. 52413, entitled "Meliton C. Geronimo v.
Commission on Elections and Julian C. Pendre", dismissing the petition for certiorari and ordering the
lifting of the restraining order of January 28, 1980. We ruled that Geronimo was disqualified to run as a
candidate for mayor for being a political turncoat. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied with finality on January 19, 1982.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

Ruling: There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC when it held the
petitioner guilty of contempt. However, we find the penalty of five (5) months imprisonment to be harsh.
Time and again, this Court has held that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, on the corrective and not on the retaliatory Idea of
punishment. (See Repeque v. Aquilizan, 130 SCRA 258; Lipata v. Tutaan, 124 SCRA 880, citing
Gamboa v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 270; and People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265; Yangson v. Salandanan, 68 SCRA
43, Balasabas v. Aquilizan, 106 SCRA 502; and Sulit v. Tiangco, 115 SCRA 211-212).
We rule, therefore, that the thirteen (13) days during which the petitioner was confined in the National
Penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal more than suffice for the purpose of serving his sentence for contempt

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BANAT Partylist v. COMELEC
595 SCRA 477

BANAT Partylist v. COMELEC

595 SCRA 477. August 7, 2009
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency(BANAT) filed before
the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the
legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc. BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and
mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of
party list representatives provided by the Constitution. The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,
promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in
May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or
coalition in accordance with the Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula. Bayan Muna,
Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision
to use the Veterans formula ,COMELEC denied the consideration. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher filedfor certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution of
theCOMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.

Issue: Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participatingin the party-list
elections?

Ruling: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly
intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political
party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections
is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A.No.
7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.

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 GMA v. COMELEC
G. R. No. 205357. September 2, 2014
PERALTA, J.

Facts: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate
total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively.
They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the
press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the
exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.

Issue: Is Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) constitutional?

Ruling: No. The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary
as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the "aggregate-based"
airtime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute a compelling state interest which
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is
specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after
one has clipped its wings.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on
broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands.
There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country.
Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible,
then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of
these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself - a form of suppression of his political speech.

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 SWS v. COMELEC
GR No. 147571. May 5, 2001
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election surveythroughout the
period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them
directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint.
Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on
the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions.”

147
 DelaLlana v. The Chairperson, COA
665 SCRA 176. February 7, 2012
SERENO, J.

Facts: On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit
of government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The circular affirmed the
state policy that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in
accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or
improper disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the
operations of government. Further, the circular emphasized that the responsibility to ensure
faithful adherence to the policy rested directly with the chief or head of the government agency
concerned. The circular was also designed to further facilitate or expedite government
transactions without impairing their integrity.
After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave irregularities and
anomalies in the government’s financial transactions were uncovered. Hence, on 31 March 1986,
the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated the pre-audit of selected government
transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to be an effective, although temporary,
remedy against the said anomalies.
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government operations, the
COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled
corporations (GOCCs)

In the interregnum, on 3 May 2006, petitioner delaLlana wrote to the COA regarding the
recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of
Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. On 18 July 2006, the COA replied to petitioner,
informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299.  The 18 July 2006 reply of the COA
further emphasized the required observance of Administrative Order No. 278 dated 8 June 1992,
which directed the strengthening of internal control systems of government offices through the
installation of an internal audit service (IAS).
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the
pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-
audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious
irregularities in government transactions have been committed, such as the ₱728-million
fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the ₱550-million call center laboratory project of the
Commission on Higher Education, and many others.

Issue: Is the task of conducting a pre-audit a mandated task as a part of the task of COA?

Ruling: There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit
requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for
certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal
control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt
measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA
to perform.

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 Yap v. COA
619 SCRA 154. April 23, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the National

Development Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled corporation with original
charter. He was appointed by the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a
subsidiary of NDC as Vice-President for Finance effective June 14, 1991while remaining as a
regular employee of NDC. The additional employment entitled him to honoraria equivalent to
fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the office. In
the course of the regular audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued notices of disallowances
against Mr. Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the ground that appellants appointment to
MGC in addition to his regular position as Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent
receipt of the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the former directly contravened
the proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution. Mr.
Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the questioned benefits were
all approved by the MGC Board of Directors.

Petitioners appeal was denied by the CAO II, which affirmed the MGC Corporate Auditors
findings. Unperturbed, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent
COA arguing that his assignment to MGC was required by the primary functions of his office
and was also authorized by law, namely Executive Order No. 284 issued on July 25, 1987. In
turn, respondent COA denied petitioners appeal in herein assailed COA Decision No. 2002-
213.It upheld the CAO IIs ruling that characterized the disallowed allowances and
reimbursements as prohibited by the Constitution.Furthermore, it also ruled that the said
allowances and reimbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public purpose
requirement of the law and further emphasized that it is not enough that payments made to
petitioner be authorized by the Board of Directors of the MGC but it is likewise necessary that
said payments do not contravene the principles provided for under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445 on the use of government funds, more specifically on the public purpose
requirement that is provided in Section 4(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known
as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. A Motion for Reconsideration was
subsequently filed by petitioner, but this was likewise denied by respondent COA in COA
Decision No. 2003-087.

Issue: Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
used as a basis the public purpose requirement in affirming the questioned disallowances?

Ruling: No. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits
to government employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public
purpose. Public purpose in relation to disbursement of public funds means any purpose or use
directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as an
activity as will serve as benefit to the community as a body and which at the same time is
directly related function of government. However, the concept of public use is not limited to
traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases
of use by the public has been discarded. In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that
the term public purpose is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit
modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to
those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as
building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to
promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers,
low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use is now equated with public
interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons.

In view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and
benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for

149
valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees
must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and
benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and
functions of the government officers and employees. Petitioners theory that the compensation
and benefits of public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or
that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose
requirement is wrong. That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government
officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification
necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government.
Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to
prevent dissipation and waste.

150
 Pacete v. Acting Chairman of the COA
185 SCRA 1. May 07, 1990
CORTES, J.

Facts: On July 22, 1968, petitioner Elias V. Pacete was appointed by the then Mayor Antonio
C. Acharon of General Santos City as City Attorney of the said city.  On June 24, 1971,
Mayor Acharon was charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of General Santos City
and was detained without bail.  A few months later, on November 8, 1971, Mayor Acharon ran
for and was reelected as City Mayor of General Santos City pending the criminal case against
him and even while he was in jail.  On January 1, 1972, Mayor Acharon issued Administrative
Order No. 1 designating Vice Mayor Erlindo R. Grafilo as Acting Mayor.  On June 29,
1972, Acharon, while still in prison, issued another memorandum which had the effect of
revoking the aforementioned January 1, 1972 memorandum.
Subsequently, Acharon filed two cases with the Supreme Court challenging the authority of
Acting Mayor Grafilo to act as such, claiming that notwithstanding the fact that he was confined
as a detention prisoner due to the murder charge against him, Acharon may lawfully discharge
the duties and functions of the Office of the Mayor of General Santos City.  Both
petitions, City of General Santos and Hon. Antonio Acharon v. Atty. Erlindo Grafilo, et al., G.R.
No. 35303 and Antonio C. Acharon v. Pedro Samson C. Anomas, et al., G.R. No. L-33835, were
dismissed by the Court.  The Court, in a Resolution dated October 20, 1972 stated that "the
continued detention of . . . Antonio Acharon in jail, pending hearing and determination of his
case of murder, for which he has been denied bail, constitutes temporary incapacity to discharge
the duties of his Office of Mayor of General Santos City, under Section 17 of Republic Act No.
6388 which incapacity justifies the assumption of the Office of Mayor by respondent Vice-
Mayor Erlindo Grafilo . . ." [City of General Santos and Hon. Antonio C. Acharon v.
Atty. Erlindo Grafilo, et al., G.R. No. L-35303, October 20, 1972.]
In the meantime, acting Mayor Erlindo Grafilo suspended petitioner Elias V. Pacete as City
Attorney for a period of ten (10) days effective July 11, 1972.  Finally, on July 20, 1972, notice
was served on petitioner that he had been removed as the City Attorney of General Santos City
on the ground of loss of confidence.  Ostensibly, the Acting Mayor's loss of confidence in
petitioner was the result of the legal opinion of the latter impugning the authority of Acting
Mayor Grafilo to act as such and upholding the authority of Mayor Acharon to discharge the
functions of the Office of the Mayor even while the latter was in prison.
Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission the termination of his services as City
Attorney.  The Acting Commissioner on Civil Service in an indorsement dated October 13, 1972
directed Acting Mayor Grafilo to allow Atty. Pacete to continue in service as City Attorney
pending resolution of the merits of his appeal.  Acting Mayor Grafilo disregarded the directive of
the Civil Service Commissioner branding the same as an illegal order and contrary to the
Supreme Court decisions in Claudio vs. Subido, 40 SCRA 481 and Besa vs. PNB, 33 SCRA
330.  On September 14, 1972, Acting Mayor Grafilo appointed Atty. Hilarion Polistico as City
Attorney of General Santos City.
On October 12, 1972, petitioner filed with the City Treasurer of General Santos City a claim for
the payment of his back salaries in the amount of P2,275.00 corresponding to the period from
July 11 to October 15, 1972 invoking in support of his claim the aforementioned directive of the
Commission on Civil Service.

Issue: Is the position of Legal Counsel or City Attorney is confidential in nature, for which loss
of confidence is a valid ground for termination?

Ruling: Yes. In the case of Cadiente v. Santos, the Supreme Court has stated that the tenure of
officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their
term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal (Corpus vs. Cuaderno, L-23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591-596).  When such
confidence is lost and the officer holding such position is separated from the service, such
cessation entails no removal but an expiration of his term.  In the case of Hernandez vs. Villegas,
L-17287, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 548, it was held -

151
It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential
positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures.  The termination of their
official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involved no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office - two
different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.
The Court, after a careful consideration of the instant case, finds no cogent reason to depart from
the ruling of the aforecited cases that the position of Legal Counsel or City Attorney is
confidential in nature, for which loss of confidence is a valid ground for termination.  Hence, the
Court must rule that petitioner is not entitled to the backwages claimed.  Moreover, having
determined the legality of petitioner's termination from service as City Attorney, the Court must
likewise hold that respondent City Auditor Miguel Penalosa, Jr. cannot be held liable for
damages since his refusal to pass in audit petitioner's claim for backwages was pursuant to a
lawful order made by the respondent Acting Commissioner on Audit.

152
 Albon v. Fernando
G.R. No. 148357. June 30, 2006
CORONA, J.:

Facts: In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and
repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. It was undertaken by the
city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59. Subsequently, petitioner Albon filed a taxpayer’s
suit for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with damages against respondents City Engineer
AlfonsoEspirito, Assistant City Engineer AnakiMaderal and City Treasurer Natividad
Cabalquinto. According to the petitioner it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to
use government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds, of the City of Marikina
for the grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing sidewalks of Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were private property because Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government could
not use public resources on them. In undertaking the project, therefore, respondents allegedly
violated the constitutional proscription against the use of public funds for private purposes as
well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The trial
court ruled in favor of the respondents. Ordinance No. 59 is a valid enactment. The court
recognized the inherent police power of the municipality and with this it is allowed to carry out
the contested works. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court stating that
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision were public in nature and ownership thereof
belonged to the City of Marikina or the Republic of the Philippines following the 1991 White
Plains Association decision. Thus, the improvement and widening of the sidewalks pursuant to
Ordinance No. 59 of 1993 was well within the LGU’s powers.

Issue: Did both the trial and appellate courts erred when they invoke the 1991 decision in White
Plains Association and automatically applied it in this case?

Ruling: Yes, the Court, citing Young v. City of Manila, the Court held in its 1998 decision that
subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated
upon payment of just compensation. Before the City Mayor of Marikina could disburse public
funds for purposes of grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision owned by a private developer named V.V.
Soliven Inc., the developer shall be deemed relieved of the responsibility of maintaining road lots
and open space upon securing a certificate of completion and executing deed of donation of these
road lots and open spaces to the LGU in pursuant to PD 1216 which provides that it is the
registered owner or developer of a subdivision who has the responsibility for the maintenance,
repair and improvement of road lots and open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to
the concerned LGU. Thus, the Court remanded to the RTC Marikina City for the reception of
evidence to determine (1) whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. has retained ownership of the open spaces
and sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision or has donated them to the City of
Marikina and (2) whether the public has full and unimpeded access to, and use of, the roads and
sidewalks of the subdivision. The Marikina City Regional Trial Court is directed to decide the
case with dispatch.

153
 Funa v. MECO
G.R. No. 193462. February 4, 2014
Perez,J.

Facts: On the 23rd of August 2010, petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for a “copy of
the latest financial and audit report” of the MECO invoking for that purpose, his “constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern.” The petitioner made the request on the belief
that MECO, being under the “operational supervision” of the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), and thus subject to the audit
jurisdiction of the COA. Petitioner’s letter was received on the 25th of August 2010, and COA
Assistant Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum regarding the issue.

Taking the said Memorandum of Naranjo as an admission that the COA had never audited and
examined the accounts of the MECO, the petitioner filed the suit in his capacities as “taxpayer,
concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar and law book author.”

Petitioner claims that by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO, the COA has neglected its
duty under the Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise bona fide GOCC or
government instrumentality. Petitioner believes that MECO possesses all the essential
characteristics of a GOCC and an instrumentality under the Executive Order No. 292.

The MECO asks for the dismissal of the mandamus petition because MECO argues that the
mandamus petition was prematurely filed; and that it denies that it is a GOCC or a government
instrumentality because it is not owned by the government and it’s funds are private funds. The
MECO also explained that the President does not appoint their Board of Directors. As a
corporation organized under the Corporation Code, its laws and by-laws state that it is the
directors who elect the corporation’s officers; the members who elect the officers; and the
directors who admit the members by way of unanimous resolution. The role of the government
with regard to MECO is that it has policy supervision over it.

COA on the other hand, advances that the mandamus petition ought to be dismissed on
procedural grounds and on the ground of mootness due to Office Order No. 2011-698. They also
argue that the petitioner lacks locus standi to bring the suit and that the petition was filed in
violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Issue: Whether or not MECO is not a GOCC or Government Instrumentality.

Ruling: The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. Government

instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by reason of some “special
function or jurisdiction” they perform or exercise, are allotted “operational autonomy” and are
“not integrated within the department framework.” Republic Act No. 10149 or the GOCC
Governance Act of 2011 states that: Government-Owned or –Controlled Corporation (GOCC)
refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating
to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly or, where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least a majority of its
outstanding capital stock: xxx. In this case, it is clear that the MECO possesses the first and
second attributes. Records show that the MECO was incorporated as a non-stock corporation
under the Corporation Code on December 16, 1977. The establishment of the MECO is non-
profit in character and its purpose is the same with that of a trade, business, orindustry chamber
but instead of the business side, it aims to promote the general interests of the Filipinos in a
foreign land. The public character of the functions vested upon the MECO clearly shows in the
fact that they facilitate, on behalf of the Filipino people, unofficial relations with the people in
Taiwan. The MECO was also authorized by the Philippine government to perform certain
“consular and other functions” relating to the promotion, protection, and facilitation of the
Philippine interests in Taiwan. With all these being said, the third attribute, which is owned by
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, isn't met. In order to be considered a GOCC,

154
the corporation must be owned by the government. Owning is defined as controlling interest of
the government of at least 51% of the corporate capital stock. In this case, it has been proven that
the MECO is governed by the Corporation Code. The by-laws of the MECO proves that the
members, Board of Directors, Chief Executive, and other positions are done through election
within the members of the MECO. It is also significant to note that none of the original
incorporators of the MECO were shown to be government officials at the time of the
corporation’s organization.

On the question whether or not the MECO is a Government Instrumentality, the court rules that
it is NOT, for it is a Sui Generis Entity. The MECO cannot be any other instrumentality because
it was incorporated under the Corporation Code. It is clear that the MECO is uniquely situated as
compared with other private corporations, from its objectives, special duty and authority to
exercise certain consular functions, all the while maintaining its non-governmental entity – the
MECO is, for all intents and purposes, sui generis.

155
 Nacion v. COA
G.R. No. 204757. March 17, 2015
REYES, J.:

Facts: Petitioner was administratively charged by Commission on Audit (COA) for grave misconduct.
She was assigned by COA in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewage System (MWSS). During the
petitioner’s assignment in MWSS from 2001 to 2003, she availed of the MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan
Program, such as car loan, housing loan, and received benefits and bonuses from the latter. Petitioner
avers that she availed of the housing and car loan in an honest belief that she could avail of the benefits in
the absence of any prohibition thereon, considering that COA Resolution that prohibited COA personnel
from availing of all forms of loan, monetary benefits from agencies under their jurisdiction was issued
only on 2004. She denied receiving any allowances and bonuses and argued that the documents submitted
to establish the same are not conclusive evidence that she indeed received the money. COA cited
violation of Sec. 18 of RA 6758 prohibiting COA personnel from receiving salaries, bonuses, allowances
or other emoluments from government entity, local government unit, GOCCs and government financial
institution, except the compensation directly paid by COA. She was give one-year suspension as penalty,
finding in her favor mitigating circumstances her waiver of the formal investigation and admission of
availment of MWSS Housing and Car Loans The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. She
avers that she was denied of the right to due process as she argues that the records during her tenure with
the MWSS should not have been included by the audit team in its investigations, as no office order
covering it was issued by the COA Chairman.

Issue: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Nacion guilty of grave
misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.

Ruling: NO. Given the COA’s mandate to look after the compliance with laws and standards in the
handling of funds of government agencies where they are assigned to, COA personnel must prevent any
act that may influence them in the discharge of their duties. The primary function of an auditor is to
prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditure of government funds. To be able to
properly perform their constitutional mandate, COA officials need to be insulated from unwarranted
influences, so they can act with independence and integrity. The removal of the temptation and
aggressively enforcing the extra emoluments may provide is designed to be an effective way of
vigorously and aggressively enforcing the Constitutional provision mandating the COA to prevent or
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties.

156
 PHILHEALTH v. COA
G. R. No. 230218. August 14, 2018
TIJAM, J.

Facts: Philhealth CARAGA granted its officers, employees and contractors various benefits,
among others are: contractor's gift, special events gifts, project completion incentive, nominal
gift, and birthday gifts, amounting to ₱49,874,228.02.4

On 2009, the Audit Team Leader (ATL) of Philhealth CARAGA issued Notice of Disallowance
(ND) Nos. 09-005-501-(09) to 09-019-501- (09) on the payment of benefits to officers,
employees and contractors of Philhealth CARAGA in the calendar year of 2009 in the total
amount of ₱49,874,228.02.5

The reason for the disallowance was the lack of approval from the Office of the President (OP)
through the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as required under the laws, such as:
Section 6 of the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1597,6 Memorandum Order (M.O.) No. 207
dated June 25, 2001, and Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1038 dated August 31, 2004.

Issue: Did the Commission on Audit commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
disallowance?

Ruling: No. It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine
of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws that they are entrusted
to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality
when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court
entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
caprice, whim and despotism.

The COA as constitutional office and guardian of public funds is endowed with the exclusive
authority to determine and account government revenue and expenditures, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary excessive used of government funds.

157
 BAYANI FERNANDO v COA
G.R. Nos. 237938 and 237944-45, December 4, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

Facts: On March 22, 2004, the MMDA conducted a public bidding for the Design and
Construction of Steel Pedestrian Bridges in various parts of Metro Manila, with William L. Tan
Construction (WLTC) emerging as the winning bidder. Thus, on March 24, 2004, the MMDA
and WLTC executed a Contract where the latter agreed to design and construct 14 steel
pedestrian bridges for a price of P196,291,834.71to be completed within 120 calendar days from
receipt of the Notice to Proceed (NTP). The MMDA also issued the NTP on March 24, 2004 and
WLTC received it on the same day.
During the construction, WLTC executed Deeds of Assignment for parts of the project to third-
party contractors. The MMDA also issued three suspension orders (SOs) to WLTC on various
dates, as well as the corresponding resume orders subsequently. Based on WLTC's claimed work
accomplishment, the MMDA paid WLTC a total of P161,903,009.85 net of taxes and withheld
P9,052,570.48 as retention fee. The MMDA also did not pay WLTC the difference of
P5,861,078.43 since it was the computed liquidated damages for the 120-calendar day delay in
the completion of the project.
On post-audit, the Supervising Auditor of COA-MMDA issued Notice of Suspension (NS) No.
08-23-TF-(2004-2007) on all payments pending the MMDA's submission of required documents
within 90 days from notice, and by reason of the Technical Evaluation Reports (TERs) dated
March 9, 2007 and June 18, 2007 of COA engineers assigned at COA-MMDA. The TERs
concluded that the contract cost of P199,801,671.91 was excessive for being 29.63% above the
COA Estimated Cost of P151,409,330.45 due to high percentage mark-up and erroneous
computation of site works. The TERs also showed that the liquidated damages to be imposed
should be P18,153,348.63, instead of P5,861 ,078.43, due to the delay in the construction for 344
days.
On January 29, 2009, the COA State Auditor issued Notice of Disallowance (NO) No. 09-001-
TF-(04-06). The COA State Auditor held that the documents requested under the NS remained
unsubmitted. The COA State Auditor held WLTC, its subcontractors, and petitioners, except
Edenison F. Fainsan (Fainsan), liable for the disallowance.
The MMDA appealed before the COA-NGS Cluster-B, attaching WLTC's request for extension
of the contract period dated February 10, 2005 and the approval of the MMDA dated February
17, 2005. Ruling on the appeal, the COA-NGS Cluster-B lifted the disallowance, except for
liquidated damages of P2,063,321.56.The liquidated damages, on the other hand, were reduced
after the team considered the granted request for extension of time to WLTC.
In view of the modification of the ND, the decision of the COA NOS Cluster-B was elevated to
the COA Proper on automatic review. The COA Proper disapproved the decision of the COA-
NGS ClusterB and denied the appeal of the MMDA with modifications.It reduced the original
disallowance and contract cost variance. This was further reduced considering that the MMDA
already withheld P9,052,570.48 as retention money and as liquidated damages
The COA Proper named WLTC and the responsible officials of the MMDA liable for the
disallowance. It further ruled that WLTC was liable due to the delay in the construction for 344
days. The contract expressly provided that the project should be completed for 120 days, or on
July 21, 2004, counted from March 24, 2004.The project, however, was only completed on June
30, 2005 without any request for extension of time before the original date of completion. The
COA Proper also upheld the original disallowance representing contract cost variance. WLTC
explained that this pertains to additional cost of manpower and equipment due to increased
deployment of labor and equipment to expedite the completion of the project. However, the COA
Proper found that WLTC only needed to expedite the completion of the project because it had
long been overdue.

Issue: whether the MMDA and/or its concerned officers can be held liable for the liquidated
damages and/or contract cost variance.

Ruling: The Court denies the petition and sustains petitioners’ position that Ona, as Project
Manager, had the authority to issue the SOs and ROs, and to approve the request for extension of

158
contract time on behalf of the MMDA. Office Order No. 220, series of 2003issued by then
MMDA Chairman Bayani F. Fernando, and which designated Ona as Project Manager, has the
general objective of ensuring the proper implementation of the project We find that the authority
to suspend construction work and grant requests for contract time extension are necessarily
included in Ona's tasks. We take note of the practice in the construction industry where the
Project Manager exercises discretion on technical matters involving construction work. Owners
of the project are oftentimes not technically suited to oversee the construction work; professional
project managers are thus usually hired, precisely to oversee the day-to-day operations on the
construction site, exercise professional judgment when expedient, and render his independent
decision on technical matters such as adjustments in cost and time.
Petitioners do not deny the fact of delay in the project and actually state in their petition that it is
undisputed. Indeed, records show that petitioners counted a 120-day delay reckoned from March
2, 2005 until June 30, 2005.
In its Decision, the COA Proper held WLTC and the responsible officials of the MMDA liable
for the disallowance.
The liability of public officials who allowed the illegal expenditure or disbursement stems from
the general principle that public officers are stewards who must use government resources
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically to avoid the wastage of public funds.

159
 Geronimo v. COA
G.R. No. 2224163.December 4, 2018
REYES, J. JR.,J.
 
Facts: Petitioner alleged that the DPWH, through the officials and then Secretary Florante
Soriquez,asked him to do several landscaping projects along Ayala Boulevard, Padre Burgos St.,
RoxasBoulevard, Osmeña Highway and other major thoroughfares within Metro Manila in
connection with the 112th Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) Summit in Manila.The parties
involved did not execute any written contract due to time constraint. Upon completion, Petitioner
alleged that he incurred a total amount of ₱14,245,994.20. Despite such completion and several
demands, DPWH failed to pay Petitioner compensation for the services rendered. Hence,
Petitioner filed a Petition for Money claim before the Commission. He attached in his Petition
several letters and memoranda signed by the officials of DPWH, as well as photographs of the
completed projects to support his claims. DPWH, on the other hand, denied the liability arguing
that there was no written contract between him and the department. It further argued that
Petitioner cannot claim compensation based on Quantum meruit  as there was no proof that the
landscaping projects have been completed in accordance with the approved plans and
specifications by the DPWH, and that the public benefited there from. The Commission ruled
that the principle of quantum meruit is applicable. However, it still denied the Petition and ruled
that the Petition lacks supporting documents that would substantiate the project accomplishment
and the reasonableness of the cost thereof, pursuant to PD No. 1445 which requires the
submission of complete documents in claims against the government funds.

Issues:
1. What does the principle of Quantum meruit means?
2. Is the principle of Quantum meruit applicable in the present case?
3. Was the liability of DPWH sufficiently established?

Ruling:
1. It is a reasonable sum of money to be paid for services rendered or work done when the
amount due is not stipulated in a legally enforceable contract.
2. Yes. Jurisprudence dictates that absence of written contracts would not necessarily preclude
that contractor from receiving payment for the services he or she has rendered for the
government. The Court further explained that denial of the contractor’s claim would result in the
government unjustly enriching itself. Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of
quantum meruit. Recovery on the basis of Quantum meruit was also allowed despite invalidity or
absence of a written contract between the contractor and the government agency.
3. Yes. The Commission’s findings that DPWH acknowledged the existence of its obligation for
the landscaping and beautification project should be treated with utmost respect. The letters and
memoranda presented by the Petitioner unmistakably established DPWH’s recognition of the
completion of the projects and its liability therefor. These projects obviously redounded to the
benefit of the public in the form of uplifting the image of the country albeit superficially  to the
foreign dignitaries who passed through these thoroughfares during the IPU Summit. It would be
unjust and inequitable if there is no compensation for the actual work performed and services
rendered by Petitioner. However, without any reasonable computation and supporting document,
such as receipts of materials procured for the projects, to justify the figures contained therein,
these summaries could only be considered s self-serving statements which the Commission
properly disregarded. According to the SC, the most judicious action that the Commission should
have taken is to require Petitioner to submit additional supporting evidence and/or employ
whatever auditing technique is necessary to determine the reasonable value of the services he
rendered, and the market value of the materials used in the subject landscaping projects.

160
 Fernando v. COA
GR No. 214910. Feb 13, 2018
JARDELEZA, J.

Facts: On March 22, 2004, the MMDA conducted a public bidding for the Design and
Construction of Steel Pedestrian Bridges in various parts of Metro Manila, with William L. Tan
Construction (WLTC) emerging as the winning bidder. Thus, on March 24, 2004, the
MMDA and WLTC executed a Contract where the latter agreed to design and construct 14 steel
pedestrian bridges for a price of P196,291,834.71 to be completed within 120 calendar days from
receipt of the Notice to Proceed (NTP). The MMDA also issued the NTP on March 24, 2004 and
WLTC received it on the same day.

During the construction, WLTC executed Deeds of Assignment for parts of the project to third-
party contractors. The MMDA also issued three suspension orders (SOs) to WLTC on various
dates, as well as the corresponding resume orders subsequently. Based on WLTC's claimed work
accomplishment, the MMDA paid WLTC a total of P161,903,009.85 net of taxes, and withheld
P9,052,570.48 as retention fee. The MMDA also did not pay WLTC the difference of
P5,861,078.43 since it was the computed liquidated damages for the 120-calendar day delay in
the completion of the project.

On post-audit, the Supervising Auditor of COA-MMDA issued Notice of Suspension (NS) No.
08-23-TF-(2004-2007) on all payments pending the MMDA's submission of required documents
within 90 days from notice, and by reason of the Technical Evaluation Reports (TERs) dated
March 9, 2007 and June 18, 2007 of COA engineers assigned at COA-MMDA. The TERs
concluded that the contract cost of P199,801,671.91 was excessive for being 29.63% above the
COA Estimated Cost of P151,409,330.45 due to high percentage mark-up and erroneous
computation of site works. The TERs also showed that the liquidated damages to be imposed
should be P18,153,348.63, instead of P5,861 ,078.43, due to the delay in the construction for 344
days.

Issue: Is within the scope of the COA's authority to evaluate and determine whether the SOs or
the extension of the contract time, which necessarily includes the waiver of any penalty or
liquidated damages to be imposed considered as valid?

Ruling: No it is not. According to the court, the COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. As specifically applied here, it is well within the scope of the
COA's authority to evaluate and determine whether the SOs or the extension of the contract time,
which necessarily includes the waiver of any penalty or liquidated damages to be imposed, is
valid. The plain reason is that government funds are involved. Hence, even if the MMDA,
through Ona, favorably granted the requests for suspension of work and the extension of contract
time, this cannot bind or preclude the COA from exercising its constitutionally mandated
function in reviewing the same and to ensure its conformity with the law. It has the power to
ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended.
Thus, the COA is traditionally given free rein in the exercise of its constitutional duty to examine
and audit expenditures of public funds especially those which are palpably beyond what is
allowed by law. It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a
petition questioning its rulings.
Bearing all the foregoing in mind, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in
issuing its assailed Decision. Glaringly, petitioners do not deny the fact of delay in the project
and actually state in their petition that it is undisputed. Indeed, records show that petitioners
counted a 120-day delay reckoned from March 2, 2005 until June 30, 2005. In contrast, the COA
counted a 344-day delay reckoned from July 21, 2004 until June 30, 2005. The point of
difference in their respective computations was in how the SOs, ROs, and extension of contract
time were considered. For petitioners, these were valid; while for the COA, they were not. We
agree with the COA.

161
 Corona v. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012
VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts: On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which
a verified complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the
Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in
session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one third vote required by the
Constitution.On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which
convened as an impeachment court the following day.

On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and Corruption, which alleged
that:

I. He betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in
cases involving the Arroyo Administration from the time of his appointment As Supreme
Court justice and until his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present;
II. Respondent committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayed the public trust
when he failed to disclose to the public his SALN as required under sec. 17, art. XI of the
1987 Constitution;
III. Respondent committed culpable violations of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust by
failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under the constitution that provides that
“[a] Member of the judiciary must be a person of Proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence” in allowing the supreme court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which
Caused the issuance of flip-flopping Decisions in Final and executory cases; in creating an
excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in
discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court.

IV. Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the Constitution
when he blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo
ante” order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning the Impeachment of
then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.

And such other allegations of arbitrariness in relation to his office and his relationship with
former Pres. Arroyo and her husband, as well, failure to account for collections of the JDF.

Petitioner filed his answer and assailed the swift manner by which the impeachment complaint as
initiated and transferred from the HOR to the Senate.

Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either false or
baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright dismissal of the
complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court
enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.

Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press

conference revealing evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner,
which was carried on front page newspaper reports, the following day.

On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court,
commenced trial proceedings against the petitioner. Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing
was denied. On January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in
compliance with a subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and
submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010.

162
Other prosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs and other properties. In
a subsequent Resolution dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the
prosecution’s request for subpoena directed to the officers of two private banks where petitioner
allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar currencies.

On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238)
seeking to enjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the
aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and to bring the
original and certified true copies of the opening documents for petitioner’s alleged foreign
currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank
statements showing the yearend balances for the said accounts.

On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On February 13, 2012,
petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is being violated in
the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator Judges have lost the cold
neutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors.

The Petitioner was eventually impeached based on evidence presented to the Senate sitting as
impeachment court.

Issue: Did the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling for the former Chief Justice’s impeachment.

Ruling: No. Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious
crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of
power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through
the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator
Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel
during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any
Senator Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political
question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

163
 Gutierrez v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
G.R. No. 193459. February 15, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts: The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for
certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent). Before the 15th Congress opened its
first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article
VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment
complaint against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao
and Walden Bello.
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo
Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another
impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of... endorsement by Party-List
Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan,
Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.  On even date, the House of Representatives
provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. 
By letter still of even date, the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group's complaint to
Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,]also directed the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary
session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public
respondent.[11] after hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found
both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at
exactly the same time.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010
Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for
prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the
complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of
public respondent. On September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
with application for injunctive reliefs.
House of Representatives’ exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof.  These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one
year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. House of Representatives’ exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof.  These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official.
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari
jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Petitioner alleges that public respondent's chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep.
Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo
Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office
against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such
a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of
form and substance of the complaints against her.
Lastly, petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form
and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own
Impeachment Rules.
Issue:
whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions as she alleged the violation of Article XI,
Sec.3 (5) otherwise known as the one-year bar provision.
Ruling:

164
No, Article XI Section 3 of the Constitution, provides that the House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment in the exercise of the power to
promulgate rules “to effectively carry out” these provisions on Article of Impeachment. The first
resolution of 1 September 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it
considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. While the second resolution dated
7 September 2010, found the two complaints which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the
sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically
the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be
rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file
an answer to the complaints within 10 days.
In regards to Article XI Section 3 (5) which provides that no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, the Court ruled
that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge
representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense. Hence, the petition is dismissed. The assailed resolutions of 1 September
2010 and 7 September of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
are not unconstitutional.

165
 Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 120422. September 27, 1995
Davide, Jr.,J.

Facts: On May 18, 1995, eleven suspected members of the notorious robbery gang,
"KuratongBaleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout with composite teams of the National
Capital Regional Command (NCRC), Traffic Management Command (TMC), Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission (PACC), Central Police District Command (CPDC) and Criminal
Investigation Command (CIC).
SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central Intelligence Command (CIC) then made an expose',
stating that there was no shootout and that the "KuratongBaleleng" members were victims of
summary execution.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) received the complaint of the relatives of the slain
suspected gang members, accusing the PACC, NCRC, TMC, CIC and CPDC of murder. Acting
Ombudsman Villa directed public respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang to create a panel to
monitor the investigations being conducted by the Commission on Human Rights, the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Director for
Investigation regarding the alleged shootout.
The panel recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted against petitioners and all
the participating personnel listed in the After Operations Report of the PNP. Casaclang then
issued the order directing petitioner[s] and nine others to submit their counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence within ten days from receipt thereof, which the petitioners failed to
comply.
The petitioners instead filed a motion with Casaclang to suspend the preliminary investigation
against them pending resolution of the petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court.
Casaclang granted the motion, only to be reversed by Villa. Villa then took over "the direct
supervision and control of the preliminary investigation". The petitioners challenged the take-
over, asserting that neither the Ombudsman nor his Deputy may conduct preliminary
investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman are authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations.

Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative. By express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI (accountability of public officers) of the Constitution, among the functions of the
Ombudsman are those other powers, functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Through the passage of R.A. No. 6770, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was made an organic
component of the Office of the Ombudsman, while the Ombudsman was granted the following
powers, among others, to wit: 1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases; 2) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as
shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or
hereinafter provided.
The petitioners have not proven any distinction between "the duty to investigate" and "the power
to conduct preliminary investigations"; neither have the petitioners established that the power
remains with the Tanodbayan, now the Special Prosecutor.

166
 Lastimosa v. Vasquez
243 SCRA 497. April 6, 1995
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a
criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Initially,
the deputy ombudsman found no prima facie evidence. After review, Omb. Vasquez reversed and
directed that the mayor be charged with a criminal case in the RTC. The case was referred to provincial
prosecutor Lastimosa. She conducted her own preliminary investigation and found that only acts of
lasciviousness had been committed. She filed a case for acts of lasciviousness with the MCTC. As no
case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on
July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not
be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against
the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this
reason, it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for
indirect contempt for such refusal.

Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to
assist in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.

Ruling: Yes. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to “investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. “This power has been held to
include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of
whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty.
It does not matter that the office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
investigation and all that remained to be one was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject
to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman

167
 Disini v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010
ABAD, J.:

Facts: In 1989, the Philippine Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) wantedJesus Disini to
testify against the Westinghouse Electric Corporation before theUnited States District Court of
New Jersey and in the Arbitration case filedagainst the Republic before the International
Chamber of Commerce Court ofArbitration. Disini worked as an executive assistant for the
various companies ofHerminioDisini, his second cousin, from 1971-1984. The Republic believed
thatthe Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Power Plant,brokered by one of
Herminio’s companies, had been tended with anomalies.On February 18, 1989, the PCGG and
Disini entered into an ImmunityAgreement under which Disini agreed to testify for the
government. the PCGGguaranteed Disini that apart from the two cases, it shall not compel DIsini
totestify in any foreign or local proceeding brought by the Republic againstHerminio. Disini
complied with his undertaking, but February 2007,Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena duces
tecum and ad testificandum againstDisini. The same commanded him to testify and produce
documents before theCourt on March 6 and 30 2007 in an action by the Republic against
Herminio.

Issue:Whether the PCGG may revoke or terminate the Immunity Agreement.

Ruling:Section 5 of the Executive Order 14 vests the PCGG to grant immunity towitnesses.
Here, the PCGG offered Disini, not only criminal and civil immunity, butalso immunity against
being compelled to testify in any domestic or foreignproceeding other that the two cases
identified in the Immunity Agreement. Thecase against the Westinghouse had so huge a financial
impact on the Republicthat it was willing to waive its power and right to compel Disini’s
testimony inother cases.Through the government cannot be barred by estoppel based
onunauthorized acts of public officers, such principle cannot apply in this casesince the PCGG
acted within its authority when it provided Disini with aguarantee against having to testify in
other cases.

168
 University of San Agustin, Inc. v. CA
230 SCRA 761. March 7, 1994
NOCON, J.

Facts: Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael
Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San
Agustin (USA) who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two
semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not
lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II with Related Learning Experience). Its
persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and
finish a college degree and worse, no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to
accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and school residency requirement. They filed
a petition for mandamus to compel the school to re-admit them.

Petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under the
premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been violated
neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit them, since petitioner
USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and duties. Under the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic
freedom.

Issue: What is academic freedom?

Ruling: Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution is that
academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom of
educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or college to decide for itself,
its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them — free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purposes
and nullify its intent.

While it is true that an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a
fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue, since a contract creates reciprocal
rights and obligations, the obligation of the school to educate a student would imply a
corresponding obligation on the part of the student to study and obey the rules and regulations of
the school. When a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the
required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right. In this connection, this Court
recognizes the expertise of educational institutions in the various fields of learning. Thus, they
are afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable rules and regulations in the admission of
students, including setting of academic standards. Within the parameters thereof, they are
competent to determine who are entitled to admission and re-admission.

169
 Ateneo De Manila v. Capulong
222 SCRA 644. May 27, 1993
Romero, J.:

Facts: On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila Legis
conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof
and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991,
the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the
Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings,
ordered the expulsion of the seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong
of the Makati RTC, upon the students’ petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students.

Issue: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such
students pursuant to its rules.

Ruling: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and
therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim such a
venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast a
malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is
academic freedom on the part of the school which includes:
a. freedom to determine who may teach;
b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

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 University of San Carlos v. CA
166 SCRA 570. October 18, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.

Facts: Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos
(USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of
that school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of
"5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.
The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC.
Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student were then carried
over and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good grades.
However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of Architecture and that the
same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall academic performance to
determine if she could graduate with honors.
So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that her
grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her
grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports MECS
in Region VII on January 5, 1982 and this letter was referred to the President of the USC for
comment and return to the MECS.
In the 3rd Indorsement dated February 4, 1982, the President of the USC informed the MECS
that the university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any course would
disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from that policy would mean injustice to
students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduate with honors; that the bad
grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or removed because her subjects were
not "dropped" as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade which became a
failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade within one year; and that while her
three failures did not affect her graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless
caused her disqualification from graduating with honors. She was furnished a copy of said
indorsement but she did not ask for a reconsideration.
On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private respondent wrote to the
USC Registrar' requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar  referred her
letter to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved in a 4th indorsement of
March 22, 1982.  Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed to "1.9" by Professor
Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 were changed to
"W" (Withdrawn).
On March 24, 1982, Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS' Higher Education Division discovered that
the change of the grade of private respondent from "IC" to "1.9" did not have the supporting
class record required, so he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortiz requesting the submission of
the class record. 
On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondent graduated
with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, without honors.
Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages against
petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, docketed as Civil Case No. R22022
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Cebu, asking that petitioners be compelled to confer
upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, cum laude,
retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her all necessary credentials evidencing
her graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00.

Issue: Can a university may not be compelled by mandamus to grant graduation honors to any
student who, according to the university's standards, rules and regulations, does not qualify for
such honors.

Ruling: Yes. It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part

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of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of
universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the
graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less
controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested
parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic achievements.
Therein it is provided, among others, that a student may not officially withdraw from subjects in
the curriculum if he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian. For an
incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or removal within the period
announced by the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically
becomes final.  A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a
student from receiving honors.  A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18 units
per semester but a working student should earn no less that 12 units. A failure in any subject
disqualifies a student from honors. Good moral character and exemplary conduct are as
important criteria for honors as academic achievements. 
Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and is bound
to comply therewith.

172
 UP Board of Regents v. CA
G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999
MENDOZA, J.

Facts: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in

Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required
and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense. After going over her dissertation,
Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However, respondent was
allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr.
Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she
expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However,
Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it
did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated. Dr. Medina formally
charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her
be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private

respondent's doctorate degree. The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to
withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the University Council. She sought an
audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by
President

Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her
degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.

Issue: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to
substantive due process.

Ruling: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several

times. Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private
respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to
have been denied due process.

In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given
opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she
submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before
the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not
require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board
of Regents.

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 Cudia v. PMA
G.R No. 211362. February 24, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

Facts: Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of SiklabDiwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's
premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the
"A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. On November 14, 2013, the combined
classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations
Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room.

Per published schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432
was from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-
4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H). Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th
period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate
for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x. " Cadets 1 CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda,
Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.

On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were logged
and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned
cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCLCudia received his DR. In his Explanation of Report dated
December 8, 2013, Cadet lCLCudia reasoned out that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We
were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."

On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1
CL Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet
lCLCudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of
the punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded that she
never dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than
scheduled.

During the hearing, it was showed that the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code
violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified
of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report
against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would
undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a
written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report
together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings
and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed
of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his
side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the ' Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level - from the OIC
of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to
appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.

Issues:
1. What is the meaning of “academic freedom”?
2. How was the doctrine of academic freedom applicable in the present case?

Ruling:
1. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic
freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions

174
 of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the
choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who
cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and
distinction of being its graduates.
2. In the present case, using the doctrine of Academic Freedom which can also be found in
Art. XIV, Sec. 5, par. 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution the PMA has the jurisdiction
to issue the dismissal of Cadet Cudia on the ground that he violated the honor code of a
cadet which is sets the standard of norms that was set to be followed by a cadet.

175
 Funa v. CSC
G. R. No. 191672. November 25, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.

Facts: Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The
Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque’s appointment.

President Arroyo, furthermore, issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864) which one of the
subjects entailed was Duque’s designation as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of
the following government-owned or government- controlled corporations (GOCCs): (a) GSIS;
(b) PHILHEALTH;(c) ECC; and (d) HDMF, while being appointed as the chairman of CSC.

Petitioner posits that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the
prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office
or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event that a Board decision of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC
considering that such GOCCs have original charters, and their employees are governed by CSC
laws, rules and regulations.

Issue: Does EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the
prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office
or employment?

Ruling: Yes. As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status
of a government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the
Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office
of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are
exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President
of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members
of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC
Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President
without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.

176
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. March 8, 2011.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was
promulgated with Justice Mariano del Castillo as its ponente.  Motion for reconsideration was
filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most notably on the ground that not only
did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3 books and articles in discussing the principles
of jus cogens  and ergaomnes, but have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to
the intent of the original works.  The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1)
Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in
the Yale Journal of International Law; 2) Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing ErgaOmnes Obligations
in Internation Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark
Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime  published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of Internation Law in 2006.  Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the
Supreme Court spread over the media and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice
expressing discontent by the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.
On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of
plagiarism by issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed overall 37 faculty members.   In said article, the
faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the court had the hopes of relief from those
“comfort women” during the war “crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the Land.” 
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of another
person’s work as one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.”  Hence, it was
argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case form part of the Philippine judicial system, the
Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be promulgated.  Furthermore, the plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt
on the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Associate
Justice Mariano del Castillo.
In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of
words used were such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the independence
of the judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.  Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause
on why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common Compliance stating
therein that their intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign the Court but
rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal
system” by the words used therein as “focusing on constructive action.”  Also, it was alleged that
the respondents are correct in seeking responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed,
committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the article.  Furthermore, the respondents
argued that the article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a
democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.

Issue: Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various Canons and
Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling: Yes.  The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the respondent-signatories
in the questioned article is not sufficient in reasoning why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar.
“…the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
“However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless

177
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive.
“On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
“Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the
limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech.”
“In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views
on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and
vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the
Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors
or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity
towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of
their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.”
The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty, under Canons
1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending
matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.”

DISSENTING OPINION
Sereno, J.
The Court’s act in directing the law professors to furnish the Show Cause Resolution is like the
little boy who exclaimed that the emperor has no clothes in the Danish story be made to explain
why he should not be punished for his keen observation which is an act of prematurely judging
them guilty.  The Court’s act of labelling Justice del Castillo’s act as not plagiarism is what
makes this contempt case grave.  It should not be the place of the Court to seek revenge against
those who have the courage to say what is wrong with it. 
The Resolution requiring the Show Cause Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive
flexing of the judicial muscle that could hardly be characterized as judicious.  This knee-jerk
response from the Court stares back at its own face, since this judicial act is the one that is totally
unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.
 
Carpio, J.:
The Show Cause Resolution by the respondents is sufficient and there is no need to admonish or
warn them of the use of disrespectful language.  The Court adheres to the clear and present
danger test and it appears that the evil consequences of the statements are absent and it does not
exhibit that irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and
their members.  There is only contempt when the article is taken apart, contrary to the practice of
the Court which is to read with contextual care making sure that disparaging statements are not
taken out of context.

178