Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18630      December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.

P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.

Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support
and damages.

The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant
(appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age;
that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due
time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage
plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until
December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded
in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as
secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff
became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as
promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the
unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and
that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's
fees.

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.

Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case,
holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as
yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for
damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court
of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are
not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-
14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De
Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.

We find this appeal meritorious.

In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above
mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring
to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:

But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined
by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year
old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved.
The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and
her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a
right of action.

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27
Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or

inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path
of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

 On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is
the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of
the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission
of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to
the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class
of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)

Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as
follows:

I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City,
while defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where
he may be served with summons;

II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in
December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;

III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings;

IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of
young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to
each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of
marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to
have carnal knowledge with him;

V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in
December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
the plaintiff;

VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was
confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;

VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant
and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his
promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the
plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has
broken their engagement and his promises.

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may
correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this
Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the
Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.