Baksh vs CA

breach of promise to marry-not an actionable wrong pero kapag may moral seduction,fraud and
deceit, pinangakuan mo, liable ka for damages.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

Issue:
whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of
Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

● According to the private respondent, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she
accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to
get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan
to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner
forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began
living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her
started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries, during a confrontation with a representative of the
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated
their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
● Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages
in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable.
Petitioner'd contention:
● Petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the
private respondent;
● He neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay
captain.
● he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of
P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent.

CA affirmed the decision of RTC in toto.

Petitioner's contention to SC:

● Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy;
 ● He has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has
never maltreated her.
● He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture,
and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic
and Christian ways.

Ruling:
Yes. Damages may be awarded by virtue of Art 21 of the Civil Code.
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by
a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations.

It was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage."

Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest
motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could not have even remotely occurred to
him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner.

*Pari delicto rule*

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may
not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in
sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction.
 ● Quasi-delict,known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than
culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as
well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

Barredo v Garcia
Banggaan– may namatay- pwde ba iheld liable yung employer? Yes.

This case held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of
Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said
Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later.

A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of
prision correccional.
The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved.

It is undisputed that Fontanilla's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was
driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility.

Issue:
Whether or Not the plaintiffs may bring the separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus
making him primarily and directly responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

Ruling:

Yes, the plaintiffs may bring the separate civil action against Fausto Barredo.

A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the
primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
Dy v People
GR No. 189081

Manager pinagkatiwalaan ng pagbabayad ng loan.

Civil liability ex delicto survives an acquittal in a criminal case for failure to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the Rules of Court limits this mandatory fusion to a civil action for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto.It, by no means, includes a civil liability arising from a
different source of obligation, as in the case of a contract. Where the civil liability is ex
contractu, the court hearing the criminal case has no authority to award damages.

● Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCI. In the course of her employment,
petitioner assisted MCCI in its business involving several properties. One such business
pertained to the construction of warehouses over a property (Numancia Property)
that MCCI leased from the Philippine National Bank (PNB).Sometime in May 1996, in
pursuit of MCCI's business, petitioner proposed to William Mandy (Mandy),President of
MCCI, the purchase of a property owned by Pantranco. As the transaction involved a
large amount of money, Mandy agreed to obtain a loan from the International China
Bank of Commerce (ICBC).Petitioner represented that she could facilitate the approval
of the loan. True enough, ICBC granted a loan to MCCI in the amount of
P20,000,000.00, evidenced by a promissory note. As security, MCCI also executed a
chattel mortgage over the warehouses in the Numancia Property.
● Mandy entrusted the petitioner with the obligation to manage the payment of the
loan.
● MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the mortgaged property due to its default in
paying the loan obligation.
● In order to prevent the foreclosure, Mandy instructed the petitioner to facilitate the
payment of the loan. MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank checks and 12
AsiaTrust Bank checks in varying amounts.
● Estafa-
RTC acquitted the petitioner by failure to prove the element of misappropriation.
The prosecution failed to establish that she was under any obligation to deliver them to ICBC in
payment of MCCI's loan. The trial court made this finding on the strength of Mandy's admission
that he gave the checks to the petitioner with the agreement that she would encash them.
Issue: WON an acquittal in the criminal aspect of the case would also extinguish civil liability.

Ruling:
No. while a criminal liability carries with it a corresponding civil liability, they are nevertheless
separate and distinct. In other words, these two liabilities may co-exist but their existence is not
dependent on each other.
The Civil Code states that when an accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be filed. In the latter case, only preponderance of evidence is
required.
When the element of misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa. In such
a case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto,there can be no civil
liability as there is no act or omission from which any civil liability may be sourced.
However, when an accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the
existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still be awarded. This
means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince
the court to the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts to estafa. As the act was
nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof justifying the imposition of any criminal
penalty, civil liability exists.

In this case, there was no adequate evidence to prove that Mandy gave the checks to petitioner
with the instruction that she will use them to pay the ICBC loan.
We hold that the better rule in ascertaining civil liability in estafa cases is that pronounced in
Pantig and Singson.

Actions focused on proving estafa is not the proper vehicle to thresh out civil liability arising from
a contract. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution dictates that a civil liability arising from a
contract must be litigated in a separate civil action.

Whenever a litigant erroneously pursues an estafa case, and the accused is subsequently
acquitted because the obligation arose out of a contract, the prescriptive period will still be
counted from the time the cause of action arose. In this eventuality, it is probable that the action
has already prescribed by the time the criminal case shall have been completed. This possibility
demands that prospective litigants do not haphazardly pursue the filing of an estafa case in
order to force an obligor to pay his or her obligation with the threat of criminal conviction.

Lumantas v Calapiz
GR No. 163753

On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-year-old
son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz),to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an
emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the petitioner, who suggested to the
parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain.
With the parents' consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of circumcision on Hanz
after his appendectomy. On the following day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which
exhibited blisters. His testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the child urinated
abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the
abnormality as normal.

The parents filed a criminal case of reckless imprudence resulting in serious Physical injuries
RTC acquitted the petitioner for insufficiency of evidence but he was not absolved from
civil liability kase there is preponderance of evidence that shows that the trauma was
caused by the procedure conducted by Dr. lumantas.

SC ruling:

Hanz's case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision performed by the petitioner
forced the young child to endure several other procedures on his penis in order to repair
his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings properly warranted the
amount of P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages.

Supreme Transportation Liner v San Andres

The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not anymore apply to the
independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Such actions may
be filed at anytime, provided the plaintiff does not recover twice upon the same act or omission.

Facts:
Belchez was the driver of the Mabel Tours Bus owned by Antonio San Andres.Nasidewsipe niya
ang Toyota Revo nung magovertake siya at nakabanggaan ang Supreme Transpo Liner Bus
driven by Ruz(petitioner sa case na to) . Because of the impact nabangga nila yung Jeepney
that was parked on the side of the road. Nobody died but all vehicles were damaged.

RTC Ruling:
The RTC opined that the respondent was not able to prove the petitioners' liability; and
that the petitioners' counterclaim should also be dismissed pursuant to Section 1, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute a separate
civil action precluded their right to recover damages from the respondent through their
counterclaim.