THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122641. January 20, 1997]

BAYANI SUBIDO, JR. and RENE PARINA, petitioners, vs. THE

HONORABLE SANDIGAN-BAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners seek
to set aside, on ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the
following acts of the respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 22825: (a) the
Resolution  of 25 October 1995 which denied the petitioners Motion to Quash of 28
[1]

August 1995 and Supplementary Motion to Quash of 7 October 1995; (b) the Order  of [2]

10 November 1995 which denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration; and (c) the
Order  of 10 November 1995 which entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioners and
[3]

set pre-trial on 12 January 1996.

In Criminal Case No. 22825, the petitioners were charged with Arbitrary Detention,
defined and penalized by Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), under an
information dated 17 July 1995 (but filed on 28 July 1995), the accusatory portion of
which reads as follows:

That on or about June 25, 1992, or sometime subsequent thereto, in Mandaluyong,

Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Bayani Subido, Jr., being then a Commissioner of the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and accused Rene Parina, being then a BID
Special Agent, while in the performance of their official functions, and conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause the issuance and implementation of a warrant of arrest dated June 25, 1992
against James J. Maksimuk, said accused knowing fully well that the BID Decision
dated June 6, 1991, requiring Maksimuk's deportation has not as yet become final and
executory considering the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration, resulting in the
detention of the latter for a period of forty-three (43) days and, thus, causing him
undue injury.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [4]

The arraignment was originally set for 28 August 1995. [5]

On 28 August 1995, however, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash,  contending

[6]

that in view of the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975  on 6 May 1995, amending 4 of P.D. No.
[7]

1606,  the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the
[8]

persons of the accused. They argued that: (1) Arbitrary Detention did not fall within
Chapter II, 2, Title VII of the RPC, but within 1, Chapter 1, Title II (Crimes Against the
Fundamental Laws of the State), hence, not covered by R.A. No. 7975 and, therefore,
the case should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila; (2) R.A.
No. 7975 should be given prospective application and at the time the case was filed,
petitioner Subido was already a private person since he was separated from the service
on 28 February 1995; while petitioner Parina did not hold a position corresponding to
salary grade 27; and (3) penal laws must be strictly construed against the State.
In compliance with the order of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed its
Opposition to the Motion to Quash  on 28 September 1995. It contended that it was
[9]

clear from 4(b) of R.A. No. 7975 that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over both the
offense charged and the persons of the accused considering that the basis of its
jurisdiction xxx is the position of the accused in the government service when the
offense charged was committed and not the nature of the offense charged, provided the
said offense committed by the accused was in the exercise of his duties and in relation
to his office. The fact then that accused Subido was already a private individual was of
no moment.
In a Supplement to the Motion to Quash  filed on 9 October 1995, the petitioners
[10]

further asserted that: (1) the allegations in the information were vague; (2) under 1, Rule
VIII of Memorandum Order (MO) No. 04-92 (Rules of Procedure to Govern Deportation
Proceedings), the grant or denial of bail to an alien in a deportation proceeding was
discretionary upon the Commissioner, hence could not be subject to a charge of
arbitrary detention; (3) petitioner Subido was separated from the service before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7975, hence retroactive application thereof would be prejudicial to
him; and (4) at the time the information was filed, petitioner Parina was not occupying a
position corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed by R.A. No. 6758. [11]

In its Rejoinder  filed on 20 October 1995, the prosecution maintained that with 4 of
[12]

MO No. 04-92, Salazar v. Achacoso,  and Gatchalian v. CID,  the only instance when

[13] [14]

an alien facing deportation proceedings could be arrested by virtue of a warrant of

arrest was when the Commissioner issued the warrant to carry out a final order of
deportation, which was absent in this case due to the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration timely filed. It further reiterated that the basis of the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction over the case was the position of the accused when the crime was
committed, not when the information was filed; in any event, petitioner Subidos position
as a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration was classified even higher than grade
27 under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989.
In its Resolution  of 25 October 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners
[15]

Motion to Quash and the Supplement thereto, ruling:

1. [T]he jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan remains not only over the specific offenses
enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. 1606 as Amended by R.A. 7975 but over offenses
committed in relation to their office, regardless of the penalty provided that the salary
of the accused is at Grade 27 under [R.A. 6758] or that he is occupying any of the
position described in Sec. 4(a)e of the law, which includes the position of Deputy
Commissioner.

2. [A]t this time the position of the prosecution in response to this Court's misgivings
stated in its Order of August 28, 1995, appears to be that aliens may not be arrested
except upon execution of a deportation order, a matter which can be taken up at
further proceedings after the arraignment of the accused.

It likewise set arraignment on 10 November 1995. To abort arraignment, the petitioners

filed on 9 November 1995 a motion for reconsideration  and submitted that under the
[16]

vast power of the Commissioner of the Department of Immigration, he could authorize

the arrest and detention of an alien even though a deportation order had not yet
become final, in light of the preventive, not penal, nature of a deportation order.
[17]

On 10 November 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order  denying the [18]

petitioners motion for reconsideration, and a second Order  entering a plea of not guilty
[19]

in favor of the petitioners since they objected to arraignment, setting pre-trial on 12

January 1996, and making of record that arraignment was conducted with the
reservation of the petitioners to seek redress with this Court from the denial of their
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this special civil action, where the parties, in the main, reiterate the
arguments they raised before the Sandiganbayan. In due time, we resolved to give due
course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda, which
they subsequently complied with.
The petition must be dismissed.
Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 7975 pertinently provide as follows:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of [P.D. No. 1606] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all

cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

xxx

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees

mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun
in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

R.A. No. 7975 took effect on 16 May 1995,  or one year, ten months and twenty-
[20]

one days after the alleged commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 22825
before the Sandiganbayan. The provisions of 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by E.O.
No. 184, but prior to their further amendment by R.A. No. 7975, are then the applicable
provisions. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 then pertinently provided as follows:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation

to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00
shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,  and subsequently in Sanchez v. Demetriou,  Natividad

[21] [22]

v. Felix,  and Republic v. Asuncion,  we ruled that for the Sandiganbayan to have
[23] [24]

exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or

employees under the aforementioned 4(a)(2), it was not enough that the penalty
prescribed therefor was higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years,
or a fine of P6,000.00; it was likewise necessary that the offenses or felonies were
committed in relation to their office.[25]

The information in Criminal Case No. 22825 before the Sandiganbayan charged the
petitioners with the crime of arbitrary detention which was committed while in the
performance of their official functions, or, evidently, in relation to their office. As the
detention allegedly lasted for a period of 43 days, the prescribed penalty is prision
mayor,  with a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Indisputably, the
[26]

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 22825.
The petitioners, however, urge us to apply 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A.
No. 7975, the law in force at the time of the filing of the information in Criminal Case No.
22825.They submit that under the new law, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged and their persons because at the time of the filing of the
information, petitioner Subido was already a private individual, while the classification of
petitioner Parinas position was lower than grade 27.
We are not persuaded. The petitioners overlook the fact that for purposes of 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, the reckoning point is the time of the commission of the
crime. This is plain from the last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a), 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975.
Petitioner Subido never denied the respondents claim that as commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation [now Bureau of Immigration] at the time of the commission
of the crime [he was] classified as having a position even higher than grade 27.  Both[27]

parties are, however, agreed that at such time petitioner Parina was holding a position
with a classification much lower than salary grade 27. There can, therefore, be no doubt
that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime allegedly committed by Subido.
That petitioner Parina held a position with a salary grade of less than 27 at the time
of the commission of the alleged arbitrary detention is of no moment. He is prosecuted
as a co-conspirator of petitioner Subido, a principal accused, who held a position higher
than grade 27. The following provision of 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975, then applies:

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions

corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758 ... exclusive jurisdiction therefor shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Finally, the petitioners invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity of penal
laws is misplaced. Simply put, R.A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal laws or statutes
are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their violation;  or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
[28]

punishment.  R.A. No. 7975, in further amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the
[29]

Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, is clearly a

procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure
by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.  Moreover, [30]

the petitioners even suggest that it is likewise a curative or remedial statute; one which
cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing obligations.  As noted by the [31]

petitioners, previous to the enactment of R.A. No. 7975:

As before, not [sic] matter what kind of offense, so long as it is alleged that the crime
is committed in relation to the office of the public official, the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiciton to try and hear the case, such that in many cases accused persons even
from the far away parts of the country, Mindanao, Visayas and the northern parts of
Luzon had to come personally to Manila to attend and appear for cases filed against
them, considering that the Sandiganbayan has its office/court in Manila.

The said R.A. No. 7975 changed this lamentable situation. For no as so provided in the said law,
there ha[s] been a modification that benefits [the] accused xxx in the sense that now where none
of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher as
prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758 xxx exclusive jurisdiction there shall be vested now in the
proper Regional Trial and Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be xxx.  [32]

All told, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be given
retroactive effect, there being no impairment of contractual or vested rights.  [33]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned resolution

and orders of the respondent Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Original Record (OR), vol. 1, 69; Rollo, 16. Per Garchitorena, P.J., Balajadia and Chico-Nazario, JJ.
[2]
 Id.,  86; Id., 17.
[3]
 Id., 87-88; Id., 18-19.
[4]
 OR, vol. 1, 1-2; Rollo, 20-21.
[5]
 OR, vol. 1, 32.
[6]
 Id.,  35-37;  Rollo,  22-24.
[7]
 Entitled An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended.
[8]
 Entitled Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special Court to be Known as
Sandiganbayan and for Other Purposes.
[9]
 OR, vol. 1, 57-58; Rollo, 25-26.
[10]
 Id., 61-64; Id., 27-30.
[11]
 Compensation and Classification Act of 1989.
[12]
 OR, vol. 1, 65-68; Rollo, 31-34.
[13]
 182 SCRA 155 [1990].
[14]
 197 SCRA 853 [1991].
[15]
 Supra note 1.
[16]
 OR, vol. 1, 77-82; Rollo, 35-40.
[17]
 Citing Mahler  v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, U.S. v. De los Santos, 33 Phil. 397, [1916]; Kessler v. Stracker, 307
U.S. 22, Murdock v. Clark, 53 F 2d. 15.
[18]
 Supra note 2.
[19]
 Supra note 3.
[20]
 8 thereof provides that the Act shall effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two national newspaper of general circulation. It was published in the 21 April 1995
issues of the MALAYA and The PHILIPPINE JOURNAL, and in the 17 July 1995 issue of the
Official Gazette.
[21]
 G.R. No. 98452, En Banc Resolution, 26 September 1991.
[22]
 227 SCRA 627 [1993].
[23]
 229 SCRA 680 [1994].
[24]
 231 SCRA 211 [1994].
[25]
 See People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, 220-221 [1995].
[26]
 Article 124(3), Revised Penal Code.
[27]
 Rejoinder to the Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash, Rollo, 31; Comment to the instant
petition, Id., 31.
[28]
 Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 367, [1937].
[29]
 Hernandez v. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 102 [1967], note 13, citing 82 C.J.S., 922.
[30]
 RUBEN E. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 268, [2d. 1990] (hereinafter Agpalo).
[31]
 See AGPALO, at 270-271.
[32]
 Petitioners Memorandum, 6; Rollo, 115 et. seq.
[33]
 See AGPALO, at 268-272.