The Nibbāna Sermons 1 to 11 by Bhikkhu K Ñāṇananda

An e-learning course hosted by the

Numata Center for Buddhist Studies
University of Hamburg
in collaboration with the
Barre Center for Buddhist Studies
Massachusetts

Sermon 01
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Etaṃ santaṃ, etaṃ paṇītaṃ, yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho

sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ.
"This is peaceful, this is excellent, namely the stilling of all preparations, the
relinquishment of all assets, the destruction of craving, detachment, cessation,
extinction".
With the permission of the Most Venerable Great Preceptor and the assembly
of the venerable meditative monks.
Recently we have had an occasion to listen to a series of sermons on Nibbāna
and there have been differences of opinion regarding the interpretation of some
deep suttas on Nibbāna in those sermons. And so the venerable Great Preceptor
suggested to me that it would be useful to this group if I would give a set of
sermons on Nibbāna, touching on those controversial points.
At first, for many reasons, I hesitated to accept this invitation for a serious
task, but then, as the venerable Great Preceptor repeatedly encouraged me on
this, I gave some thought as to how best I could set about doing it. And it
occurred to me that it would be best if I could address these sermons directly to
the task before us in this Nissarana Vanaya, and that is meditative attention,
rather than dealing with those deep controversial suttas in academic isolation.
And that is why I have selected the above quotation as the theme for the entire
set of sermons, hoping that it would help create the correct atmosphere of
meditative attention.
Etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ, yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho
sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ.
 "This is peaceful, this is excellent, namely the stilling of all preparations, the
relinquishment of all assets, the destruction of craving, detachment, cessation,
extinction".
This in fact is a meditation subject in itself, a kammaṭṭhāna. This is the
reflection on the peace of Nibbāna, upasamānussati.
-------------------------------
Alternative translation: “This is peaceful, this is sublime, namely: the calming
of all constructions, the letting go of all supports, the extinguishing of craving,
dispassion, cessation, Nibbāna.”
AN 10.60 at AN V 111, translated Bodhi (2012: 1413):
“What is the perception of non-delight in the world? Here a bhikkhu refrains
from any engagement and clinging, mental standpoints, adherences, and
underlying tendencies in regard to the world, abandoning them without
clinging to them.”
--------------------------------
So if we can successfully make use of this as both the heading and the theme
of these sermons, we would be in a position to understand those six qualities of
the Dhamma. We are told that the Dhamma is svākkhāta, that it is well-
proclaimed, sandiṭṭhika, can be seen here and now, akālika, timeless, ehipassika,
inviting one to come and see, opanayika, leading one onwards, paccattaṃ
veditabbo viññūhi, that it can be understood by the wise each one by himself.
This set of sermons would have fulfilled its purpose if it drives home the true
significance of these six qualities of the Dhamma.
Now at the very outset I would like to say a few things by way of preparing
the background and I do hope that this assembly would bear with me for saying
certain things that I will be compelled to say in this concern. By way of
background something has to be said as to why there are so many complications
with regard to the meaning of some of the deep suttas on Nibbāna.
There is a popular belief that the commentaries are finally traceable to a
miscellany of the Buddha word scattered here and there, as pakiṇṇakadesanā.
But the true state of affairs seems to be rather different. Very often the
commentaries are unable to say something conclusive regarding the meaning of
deep suttas. So they simply give some possible interpretations and the reader
finds himself at a loss to choose the correct one. Sometimes the commentaries
go at a tangent and miss the correct interpretation. Why the commentaries are
silent on some deep suttas is also a problem to modern day scholars. There are
some historical reasons leading to this state of affairs in the commentaries.
In the Āṇisutta of the Nidānavagga in the Saṃyutta Nikāya we find the
Buddha making certain prophetic utterances regarding the dangers that will
befall the Sāsana in the future. It is said that in times to come, monks will lose
interest in those deep suttas which deal with matters transcendental, that they
would not listen to those suttas that have to do with the idea of emptiness,
suññatā. They would not think it even worthwhile learning or pondering over
the meanings of those suttas:
Ye te suttantā tathāgatabhāsitā gambhīrā gambhīratthā lokuttarā
suññatappaṭisaṃyuttā, tesu bhaññamānesu na sussūssisanti na sotaṃ
odahissanti na aññā cittaṃ upaṭṭhāpessanti na te dhamme uggahetabbaṃ
pariyāpuṇitabbaṃ maññissanti.
There is also another historical reason that can be adduced. An idea got
deeply rooted at a certain stage in the Sāsana history that what is contained in
the Sutta Piṭaka is simply the conventional teaching and so it came to imply that
there is nothing so deep in these suttas. This notion also had its share in the
present lack of interest in these suttas. According to Manorathapūraṇī, the
Aṅguttara commentary, already at an early stage in the Sāsana history of Sri
Lanka, there had been a debate between those who upheld the precept and those
who stood for realization. And it is said that those who upheld the precept won
the day. The final conclusion was that, for the continuity of the Sāsana, precept
itself is enough, not so much the realization.
-------------------------------------
pariyattiyā hi antarahitāya paṭipatti antaradhāyati, pariyattiyā ṭhitāya
paṭipatti patiṭṭhāti.
DN 16 at DN II 154: the Buddha’s permission that ‘minor rules’ can be abolished
after his passing away
But DN 16 at DN II 77 (= AN 7.21 at AN IV 21): Buddha states as a principle
against decline that the monastics do not abolish what has been promulgated
(and not promulgate something he has not promulgated)
At first saṅgīti, Vin II 288, Mahākassapa uses same phrase about not abolishing
what has been promulgated in support of not abolishing the minor rules.
--------------------------------------
Of course the efforts of the reciter monks of old for the preservation of the
precept in the midst of droughts and famines and other calamitous situations are
certainly praiseworthy. But the unfortunate thing about it was this: the basket of
the Buddha word came to be passed on from hand to hand in the dark, so much
so that there was the risk of some valuable things slipping out in the process.
Also there have been certain semantic developments in the commentarial
period, and this will be obvious to anyone searching for the genuine Dhamma. It
seems that there had been a tendency in the commentarial period to elaborate
even on some lucid words in the suttas, simply as a commentarial requirement,
and this led to the inclusion of many complicated ideas. By too much
overdrawing in the commentaries, the deeper meanings of the Dhamma got
obscured. As a matter of fact, the depth of the Dhamma has to be seen through
lucidity, just as much as one sees the bottom of a tank only when the water is
lucid.
Dve nāma kiṃ?
Nāmañca rūpañca.
"What is the 'two'?"
"Name and form."
This is the second out of the ten questions Buddha had put to the Venerable
sāmanera Sopāka who had attained Arahant-ship at the age of seven. It is like
asking a child: "Can you count up to ten?" All the ten questions were deep, the
tenth being on Arahant-ship. But of course Venerable Sopāka gave the right
answer each time. Now it is the second question and its answer that we are
concerned with here: nāmañca rūpañca. In fact, this is a basic teaching in
insight training.
-------------------------------------
1) all beings subsist on nutriment
3) three feelings
4) four noble truths
5) five aggregates of clinging
6) six inner sense-spheres
7) seven awakening factors
8) noble eightfold path
9) nine abodes of beings
10) ten factors of arahants
nāmarūpapariccheda
-------------------------------------
It is obvious that nāma means 'name', and in the suttas also, nāma, when used
by itself, means 'name'. However when we come to the commentaries we find
some kind of hesitation to recognize this obvious meaning. Even in the present
context, the commentary, Paramatthajotikā, explains the word 'name' so as to
mean 'bending'. It says that all immaterial states are called nāma, in the sense
that they bend towards their respective objects and also because the mind has the
nature of inclination: Ārammaṇābhimukhaṃ namanato, cittassa ca natihetuto
sabbampi arūpaṃ 'nāman'ti vuccati.
And this is the standard definition of nāma in Abhidhamma compendiums and
commentaries. The idea of bending towards an object is brought in to explain
the word nāma. It may be that they thought it too simple an interpretation to
explain nāma with reference to 'name', particularly because it is a term that has
to do with deep insight. However as far as the teachings in the suttas are
concerned, nāma still has a great depth even when it is understood in the sense
of 'name'.
Nāmaṃ sabbaṃ anvabhavi,
nāmā bhiyyo na vijjati,
nāmassa ekadhammassa,
sabbeva vasamanvagū.
"Name has conquered everything,
There is nothing greater than name,
All have gone under the sway
Of this one thing called name."
----------------------
Translation Bodhi (2000: 130):
“Name has weighed down everything,
Nothing is more extensive than name.
Name is the one thing that has
All under its control.”
SĀ 1020:「名者映世間，名者世無上，唯有一名法，能制御世間。」
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 266, a24-25); 映, yìng: DDB: “surpass”
-------------------------
Also there is another verse of the same type, but unfortunately its original
meaning is often ignored by the present day commentators:
Akkheyyasaññino sattā,
akkheyyasmiṃ patiṭṭhitā,
akkheyyaṃ apariññāya,
yogam āyanti maccuno.
"Beings are conscious of what can be named,
They are established on the nameable,
By not comprehending the nameable things,
They come under the yoke of death."
----------------------
Translation Bodhi (2000: 99):
“Beings who perceive what can be expressed
Become established on what can be expressed.
Not fully understanding what can be expressed,
They come under the yoke of Death.”
-------------------------
All this shows that the word nāma has a deep significance even when it is taken
in the sense of 'name'.
 But now let us see whether there is something wrong in rendering nāma by
'name' in the case of the term nāma-rūpa. To begin with, let us turn to the
definition of nāma-rūpa as given by the Venerable Sāriputta in the
Sammādiṭṭhisutta of the Majjhima Nikāya.
Vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phasso, manasikāro - idaṃ vuccatāvuso, nāmaṃ;
cattāri ca mahābhūtāni, catunnañca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāyarūpaṃ - idaṃ
vuccatāvuso, rūpaṃ. Iti idañca nāmaṃ idañca rūpaṃ - idam vuccatāvuso nāma-
rūpaṃ. "Feeling, perception, intention, contact, attention - this, friend, is called
'name'. The four great primaries and form dependent on the four great primaries
- this, friend, is called 'form'. So this is 'name' and this is 'form' - this, friend, is
called 'name-and-form'."
----------------------
Parallel MĀ 29 has the four immaterial aggregates instead.
「謂四非色陰為名」(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 463, c25-26)
However, a definition of ‘name’ similar to that found in MN 9 is found in the
Ekottarika-āgama (Anālayo 2011: 70 note 220, comparative study of MN 9)
----------------------
Well, this seems lucid enough as a definition but let us see, whether there is
any justification for regarding feeling, perception, intention, contact and
attention as 'name'. Suppose there is a little child, a toddler, who is still unable to
speak or understand language. Someone gives him a rubber ball and the child
has seen it for the first time. If the child is told that it is a rubber ball, he might
not understand it. How does he get to know that object? He smells it, feels it,
and tries to eat it, and finally rolls it on the floor. At last he understands that it is
a plaything. Now the child has recognised the rubber ball not by the name that
the world has given it, but by those factors included under 'name' in nāma-rūpa,
namely feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention.
This shows that the definition of nāma in nāma-rūpa takes us back to the
most fundamental notion of 'name', to something like its prototype. The world
gives a name to an object for purposes of easy communication. When it gets the
sanction of others, it becomes a convention.
While commenting on the verse just quoted, the commentator also brings in a
bright idea. As an illustration of the sweeping power of name, he points out that
if any tree happens to have no name attached to it by the world, it would at least
be known as the 'nameless tree'. Now as for the child, even such a usage is not
possible. So it gets to know an object by the aforesaid method. And the factors
involved there, are the most elementary constituents of name.
Now it is this elementary name-and-form world that a meditator also has to
understand, however much he may be conversant with the conventional world.
But if a meditator wants to understand this name-and-form world, he has to
come back to the state of a child, at least from one point of view. Of course in
this case the equanimity should be accompanied by knowledge and not by
ignorance. And that is why a meditator makes use of mindfulness and full
awareness, satisampajañña, in his attempt to understand name-and-form.
Even though he is able to recognize objects by their conventional names, for
the purpose of comprehending name-and-form, a meditator makes use of those
factors that are included under 'name': feeling, perception, intention, contact and
attention. All these have a specific value to each individual and that is why the
Dhamma has to be understood each one by himself - paccattaṃ veditabbo. This
Dhamma has to be realized by oneself. One has to understand one's own world
of name-and-form by oneself. No one else can do it for him. Nor can it be
defined or denoted by technical terms.
Now it is in this world of name-and-form that suffering is found. According to
the Buddha, suffering is not out there in the conventional world of worldly
philosophers. It is to be found in this very name-and-form world. So the ultimate
aim of a meditator is to cut off the craving in this name-and-form. As it is said:
acchecchi taṇhaṃ idha nāmarūpe.
Now if we are to bring in a simile to clarify this point, the Buddha is called
the incomparable surgeon, sallakatto anuttaro. Also he is sometimes called
taṇhāsallassa hantāraṃ, one who removes the dart of craving. So the Buddha is
the incomparable surgeon who pulls out the poison-tipped arrow of craving.
We may say therefore that, according to the Dhamma, nāma-rūpa, or name-
and-form, is like the wound in which the arrow is embedded. When one is
wounded by a poison-tipped arrow, the bandage has to be put, not on the archer
or on his bow-string, but on the wound itself. First of all the wound has to be
well located and cleaned up. Similarly, the comprehension of name-and-form is
the preliminary step in the treatment of the wound caused by the poison-tipped
arrow of craving.
And it is for that purpose that a meditator has to pay special attention to those
basic components of 'name' - feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention
- however much he may be proficient in words found in worldly usage. It may
even appear as a process of unlearning down to childlike simplicity. But of
course, the equanimity implied there is not based on ignorance but on
knowledge.
We find ourselves in a similar situation with regard to the significance of rūpa
in nāma-rūpa. Here too we have something deep, but many take nāma-rūpa to
mean 'mind and matter'. Like materialists, they think there is a contrast between
mind and matter. But according to the Dhamma there is no such rigid
distinction. It is a pair that is interrelated and taken together it forms an
important link in the chain of paṭicca samuppāda.
 Rūpa exists in relation to 'name' and that is to say that form is known with the
help of 'name'. As we saw above, that child got a first-hand knowledge of the
rubber ball with the help of contact, feeling, perception, intention and attention.
Now in the definition of 'form' as cattāri ca mahābhūtāni, catunnañca
mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ the four great primaries are mentioned because
they constitute the most primary notion of 'form'. Just as much as feeling,
perception, intention, contact and attention represent the most primary notion of
'name', conventionally so called, even so the four great primaries form the basis
for the primary notion of 'form', as the world understands it.
It is not an easy matter to recognize these primaries. They are evasive like
ghosts. But out of their interplay we get the perception of form, rūpasaññā. In
fact what is called rūpa in this context is rūpasaññā. It is with reference to the
behaviour of the four great elements that the world builds up its concept of form.
Its perception, recognition and designation of form is in terms of that behaviour.
And that behaviour can be known with the help of those members representing
name.
The earth element is recognized through the qualities of hardness and
softness, the water element through the qualities of cohesiveness and
dissolution, the fire element through hotness and coolness, and the wind element
through motion and inflation. In this way one gets acquainted with the nature of
the four great primaries. And the perception of form, rūpasaññā, that one has at
the back of one's mind, is the net result of that acquaintance. So this is nāma-
rūpa. This is one's world. The relationship between rūpa and rūpasaññā will be
clear from the following verse:
Yattha nāmañca rūpañca,
asesaṃ uparujjhati,
paṭighaṃ rūpasaññā ca,
etthesā chijjate jaṭā.
This is a verse found in the Jaṭāsutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. In that sutta we
find a deity putting a riddle before the Buddha for solution:
Anto jaṭā bahi jaṭā,
jaṭāya jaṭitā pajā,
taṃ taṃ Gotama pucchāmi,
ko imaṃ vijaṭaye jaṭaṃ.
"There is a tangle within, and a tangle without,
The world is entangled with a tangle.
About that, oh Gotama, I ask you,
Who can disentangle this tangle?"
The Buddha answers the riddle in three verses, the first of which is fairly well
known, because it happens to be the opening verse of the Visuddhimagga:
Sīle patiṭṭhāya naro sapañño,
 cittaṃ paññañca bhāvayaṃ,
ātāpī nipako bhikkhu,
so imaṃ vijaṭaye jataṃ.
This means that a wise monk, established in virtue, developing concentration
and wisdom, being ardent and prudent, is able to disentangle this tangle. Now
this is the second verse:
Yesaṃ rāgo ca doso ca,
avijjā ca virājitā,
khīṇāsavā arahanto,
tesaṃ vijaṭitā jaṭā.
"In whom lust, hate
And ignorance have faded away,
Those influx-free Arahants,
It is in them that the tangle is disentangled."
It is the third verse that is relevant to our topic.
Yattha nāmañca rūpañca,
asesaṃ uparujjhati,
paṭighaṃ rūpasaññā ca,
etthesā chijjate jaṭā.
"Where name and form
As well as resistance and the perception of form
Are completely cut off,
It is there that the tangle gets snapped."
----------------------
Bodhi (2000: 101):
“Where name-and form ceases,
Stops without remainder
And also impingement and perception of form,
It is here this tangle is cut.”
----------------------
The reference here is to Nibbāna. It is there that the tangle is disentangled.
The coupling of name-and-form with paṭigha and rūpasaññā in this context,
is significant. Here paṭigha does not mean 'repugnance', but 'resistance'. It is the
resistance which comes as a reaction to inert matter. For instance, when one
knocks against something in passing, one turns back to recognize it. Sense
reaction is something like that.
The Buddha has said that the worldling is blind until at least the Dhamma-eye
arises in him. So the blind worldling recognizes an object by the very resistance
he experiences in knocking against that object.
 Paṭigha and rūpasaññā form a pair. Paṭigha is that experience of resistance
which comes by the knocking against an object, and rūpasaññā, as perception of
form, is the resulting recognition of that object. The perception is in terms of
what is hard, soft, hot or cold. Out of such perceptions common to the blind
worldlings, arises the conventional reality, the basis of which is the world.
Knowledge and understanding are very often associated with words and
concepts, so much so that if one knows the name of a thing, one is supposed to
know it. Because of this misconception the world is in a tangle. Names and
concepts, particularly the nouns, perpetuate the ignorance in the world.
Therefore insight is the only path of release. And that is why a meditator
practically comes down to the level of a child in order to understand name and
form. He may even have to pretend to be a patient in slowing down his
movements for the sake of developing mindfulness and full awareness.
So we see that there is something really deep in nāma-rūpa, even if we render
it as 'name-and-form'. There is an implicit connection with 'name' as
conventionally so called, but unfortunately this connection is ignored in the
commentaries, when they bring in the idea of 'bending' to explain the word
'name'. So we need not hesitate to render nāma-rūpa by 'name-and-form'.
Simple as it may appear, it goes deeper than the worldly concepts of name and
form.
Now if we are to summarise all what we have said in this connection, we may
say: 'name' in 'name-and-form' is a formal name. It is an apparent name. 'Form'
in 'name-and-form' is a nominal form. It is a form only in name.
We have to make a similar comment on the meaning of the word Nibbāna.
Here too one can see some unusual semantic developments in the commentarial
period. It is very common these days to explain the etymology of the word
Nibbāna with the help of a phrase like: Vānasaṅkhātāya taṇhāya nikkhantattā.
And that is to say that Nibbāna is so called because it is an exit from craving
which is a form of weaving.
To take the element vāna in the word to mean a form of weaving is as good as
taking nāma in nāma-rūpa as some kind of bending. It is said that craving is a
kind of weaving in the sense that it connects up one form of existence with
another and the prefix ni is said to signify the exit from that weaving.
But nowhere in the suttas do we get this sort of etymology and interpretation.
On the other hand it is obvious that the suttas use the word Nibbāna in the sense
of 'extinguishing' or 'extinction'. In fact this is the sense that brings out the true
essence of the Dhamma.
For instance the Ratanasutta, which is so often chanted as a paritta, says that
the Arahants go out like a lamp: Nibbanti dhīrā yathāyaṃ padīpo. "Those wise
ones get extinguished even like this lamp."
----------------------
Bodhi (forthcoming):
“The old is destroyed, there is no new origination,
their minds are dispassionate toward future existence.
With seeds destroyed, with no desire for growth,
those wise ones are extinguished like this lamp.”
----------------------
The simile of a lamp getting extinguished is also found in the
Dhātuvibhaṅgasutta of the Majjhima Nikāya. Sometimes it is the figure of a
torch going out: Pajjotass'eva nibbānaṃ, vimokho cetaso ahu, "the mind's
release was like the extinguishing of a torch."
The simile of the extinction of a fire is very often brought in as an illustration
of Nibbāna and in the Aggivacchagottasutta of the Majjhima Nikāya we find the
Buddha presenting it as a sustained simile, giving it a deeper philosophical
dimension. Now when a fire burns, it does so with the help of firewood. When a
fire is burning, if someone were to ask us: "What is burning?" - what shall we
say as a reply? Is it the wood that is burning or the fire that is burning? The truth
of the matter is that the wood burns because of the fire and the fire burns
because of the wood. So it seems we already have here a case of relatedness of
this to that, idappaccayatā. This itself shows that there is a very deep
significance in the fire simile.
Nibbāna as a term for the ultimate aim of this Dhamma is equally significant
because of its allusion to the going out of a fire. In the Asaṅkhatasaṃyutta of the
Saṃyutta Nikāya as many as thirty-three terms are listed to denote this ultimate
aim. But out of all these epithets, Nibbāna became the most widely used,
probably because of its significant allusion to the fire. The fire simile holds the
answer to many questions relating to the ultimate goal.
The wandering ascetic Vacchagotta, as well as many others, accused the
Buddha of teaching a doctrine of annihilation: Sato sattassa ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ
vibhavaṃ paññāpeti. Their accusation was that the Buddha proclaims the
annihilation, destruction and non-existence of a being that is existent. And the
Buddha answered them fairly and squarely with the fire simile.
"Now if a fire is burning in front of you dependent on grass and twigs as fuel,
you would know that it is burning dependently and not independently, that there
is no fire in the abstract. And when the fire goes out, with the exhaustion of that
fuel, you would know that it has gone out because the conditions for its
existence are no more."
----------------------
Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad 1.13 (translation Radhakrishnan):
“As the form of fire when latent in its source is not seen and yet its seed is not
destroyed, but may be seized again and again in its source by means of the drill
…”
Maitrī Upaniṣad 6.34 (translation Radhakrishnan):
“Even as fire without fuel becomes extinct in its own place, even so thought,
by the cessation of activity, becomes extinct in its own source.”
----------------------
As a sidelight to the depth of this argument it may be mentioned that the Pāli
word upādāna used in such contexts has the sense of both 'fuel' as well as
'grasping', and in fact, fuel is something that the fire grasps for its burning.
Upādānapaccayā bhavo, "dependent on grasping is existence". These are two
very important links in the doctrine of dependent arising, paṭicca samuppāda.
The eternalists, overcome by the craving for existence, thought that there is
some permanent essence in existence as a reality. But what had the Buddha to
say about existence? He said that what is true for the fire is true for existence as
well. That is to say that existence is dependent on grasping. So long as there is a
grasping, there is an existence. As we saw above, the firewood is called upādāna
because it catches fire. The fire catches hold of the wood, and the wood catches
hold of the fire. And so we call it firewood. This is a case of a relation of this to
that, idappaccayatā. Now it is the same with what is called 'existence', which is
not an absolute reality.
Even in the Vedic period there was the dilemma between 'being' and 'non-
being'. They wondered whether being came out of non-being, or non-being came
out of being. Katham asataḥ sat jāyeta, "How could being come out of non-
being?" In the face of this dilemma regarding the first beginnings, they were
sometimes forced to conclude that there was neither non-being nor being at the
start, nāsadāsīt no sadāsīt tadānīm. Or else in the confusion they would
sometimes leave the matter unsolved, saying that perhaps only the creator knew
about it.
All this shows what a lot of confusion these two words sat and asat, being
and non-being, had created for the philosophers. It was only the Buddha who
presented a perfect solution, after a complete reappraisal of the whole problem
of existence. He pointed out that existence is a fire kept up by the fuel of
grasping, so much so that, when grasping ceases, existence ceases as well.
In fact the fire simile holds the answer to the tetralemma included among the
ten unexplained points very often found mentioned in the suttas. It concerns the
state of the Tathāgata after death, whether he exists, does not exist, both or
neither. The presumption of the questioner is that one or the other of these four
must be and could be answered in the affirmative.
 The Buddha solves or dissolves this presumptuous tetralemma by bringing in
the fire simile. He points out that when a fire goes out with the exhaustion of the
fuel, it is absurd to ask in which direction the fire has gone. All that one can say
about it, is that the fire has gone out: Nibbuto tveva saṅkhaṃ gacchati, "it comes
to be reckoned as 'gone out'."
It is just a reckoning, an idiom, a worldly usage, which is not to be taken too
literally. So this illustration through the fire simile drives home to the worldling
the absurdity of his presumptuous tetralemma of the Tathāgata.
In the Upasīvasutta of the Pārāyaṇavagga of the Sutta Nipāta we find the
lines:
Accī yathā vātavegena khitto,
atthaṃ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṃ,
"Like the flame thrown out by the force of the wind
Reaches its end, it cannot be reckoned."
Here the reckoning is to be understood in terms of the four propositions of the
tetralemma. Such reckonings are based on a total misconception of the
phenomenon of fire.
----------------------
Bodhi (forthcoming):
As a flame, thrown by a gust of wind,
(Upasīva,” said the Blessed One),
“goes out and cannot be designated,
so the muni, liberated from the mental body,
goes out and cannot be designated.”
“But does one who has gone out not exist,
or else is he healthy through eternity?
Explain this matter clearly to me, O muni,
for this Dhamma has been understood by you.”
“There is no measure of one who has gone out,
(Upasīva,” said the Blessed One).
“There is no means by which they might speak of him.
When all phenomena have been uprooted,
all pathways of speech have also been uprooted.”
----------------------
It seems that the deeper connotations of the word Nibbāna in the context of
paṭicca samuppāda were not fully appreciated by the commentators. And that is
why they went in search of a new etymology. They were too shy of the
implications of the word 'extinction'. Probably to avoid the charge of nihilism
they felt compelled to reinterpret certain key passages on Nibbāna. They
conceived Nibbāna as something existing out there in its own right. They would
not say where, but sometimes they would even say that it is everywhere. With an
undue grammatical emphasis they would say that it is on coming to that
Nibbāna that lust and other defilements are abandoned: Nibbānaṃ āgamma
rāgādayo khīṇāti ekameva nibbānaṃ rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo ti
vuccati.
But what do we find in the joyous utterances of the theras and therīs who had
realized Nibbāna? As recorded in such texts as Thera- and Therī-gāthā they
would say: Sītibhūto'smi nibbuto, "I am grown cool, extinguished as I am." The
words sītibhūta and nibbuta had a cooling effect even to the listener, though
later scholars found them inadequate.
Extinction is something that occurs within an individual and it brings with it a
unique bliss of appeasement. As the Ratanasutta says: Laddhā mudhā nibbutiṃ
bhuñjamānā, "they experience the bliss of appeasement won free of charge."
Normally, appeasement is won at a cost, but here we have an appeasement that
comes gratis.
From the worldly point of view 'extinction' means annihilation. It has
connotations of a precipice that is much dreaded. That is why the commentators
conceived of it as something out there, on reaching which the defilements are
abandoned, nibbānaṃ āgamma rāgādayo khīṇāti. Sometimes they would say
that it is on seeing Nibbāna that craving is destroyed.
--------------------------------
Sn 231: sahāv’assa dassanasampadāya …
--------------------------------
There seems to be some contradiction in the commentarial definitions of
Nibbāna. On the one hand we have the definition of Nibbāna as the exit from
craving, which is called a 'weaving'. And on the other it is said that it is on
seeing Nibbāna that craving is destroyed. To project Nibbāna into a distance and
to hope that craving will be destroyed only on seeing it, is something like trying
to build a staircase to a palace one cannot yet see. In fact this is a simile which
the Buddha had used in his criticism of the Brahmin's point of view.
In the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta we have a very clear statement of the
third noble truth. Having first said that the second noble truth is craving, the
Buddha goes on to define the third noble truth in these words: Tassāyeva
taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo.
This is to say that the third noble truth is the complete fading away, cessation,
giving up, relinquishment of that very craving. That it is the release from and
non-attachment to that very craving. In other words it is the destruction of this
very mass of suffering which is just before us.
 In the suttas the term taṇhakkhayo, the destruction of craving, is very often
used as a term for Nibbāna. But the commentator says that destruction alone is
not Nibbāna: Khayamattaṃ na nibbānaṃ. But the destruction of craving itself is
called the highest bliss in the following verse of the Udāna:
Yañca kāmasukhaṃ loke,
yaṃ c'idaṃ diviyaṃ sukhaṃ,
taṇhakkhaya sukhass'ete,
kalaṃ n'agghanti soḷasiṃ.
"Whatever bliss from sense-desires there is in the world,
Whatever divine bliss there is,
All these are not worth one-sixteenth
Of the bliss of the destruction of craving."
Many of the verses found in the Udāna are extremely deep and this is
understandable, since udāna means a 'joyous utterance'. Generally a joyous
utterance comes from the very depths of one's heart, like a sigh of relief. As a
matter of fact one often finds that the concluding verse goes far deeper in its
implications than the narrative concerned. For instance, in the Udapānasutta, we
get the following joyous utterance, coming from the Buddha himself:
Kiṃ kayirā udapānena,
āpā ce sabbadā siyuṃ,
taṇhāya mūlato chetvā,
kissa pariyesanaṃ care.
"What is the use of a well,
If water is there all the time,
Having cut craving at the root,
In search of what should one wander?"
This shows that the destruction of craving is not a mere destruction.
----------------------
Udāna prose story reports that brahmins had blocked a well with chaff in
order to prevent the Buddha and his monks from drinking.
Pande (1957: 75) comments that "the author of the prose … seems to have
grossly misunderstood the … verse, which intends 'water' in no more than a
merely figurative sense." (Studies in the Origins of Buddhism)
Chinese parallel to stanza has no prose story (T 212 at T IV 707c20)
----------------------
Craving is a form of thirst and that is why Nibbāna is sometimes called
pipāsavinayo, the dispelling of the thirst. To think that the destruction of craving
is not sufficient is like trying to give water to one who has already quenched his
thirst. But the destruction of craving has been called the highest bliss. One who
has quenched his thirst for good, is aware of that blissful experience. When he
sees the world running here and there in search of water, he looks within and
sees the well-spring of his bliss.
However to most of our scholars the term taṇhakkhaya appeared totally
negative and that is why they hesitated to recognize its value. In such
conventional usages as Nibbānaṃ āgamma they found a grammatical excuse to
separate that term from Nibbāna.
According to the Buddha the cessation of existence is Nibbāna and that means
Nibbāna is the realization of the cessation of existence. Existence is said to be
an eleven-fold fire. So the entire existence is a raging fire. Lust, hate, delusion -
all these are fires. Therefore Nibbāna may be best rendered by the word
'extinction'. When once the fires are extinguished, what more is needed?
But unfortunately Venerable Buddhaghosa was not prepared to appreciate this
point of view. In his Visuddhimagga as well as in the commentaries
Sāratthappakāsinī and Sammohavinodanī, he gives a long discussion on
Nibbāna in the form of an argument with an imaginary heretic. Some of his
arguments are not in keeping with either the letter or the spirit of the Dhamma.
First of all he gets the heretic to put forward the idea that the destruction of
lust, hate and delusion is Nibbāna. Actually the heretic is simply quoting the
Buddha word, for in the Nibbānasutta of the Asaṅkhatasaṃyutta the destruction
of lust, hate and delusion is called Nibbāna: Rāgakkhayo, dosakkhayo,
mohakkhayo - idaṃ vuccati nibbānaṃ.
The words rāgakkhaya, dosakkhaya and mohakkhaya together form a
synonym of Nibbāna, but the commentator interprets it as three synonyms. Then
he argues out with the imaginary heretic that if Nibbāna is the extinguishing of
lust it is something common even to the animals, for they also extinguish their
fires of lust through enjoyment of the corresponding objects of sense. This
argument ignores the deeper sense of the word extinction, as it is found in the
Dhamma.
In the Māgaṇḍiyasutta of the Majjhima Nikāya the Buddha gives the simile of
a man with a skin disease sitting beside a pit of hot embers to explain the
position of lustful beings in the world. That man is simply trying to assuage his
pains by the heat of the fire. It is an attempt to warm up, not to cool down.
Similarly what the lustful beings in the world are doing in the face of the fires of
lust is a warming up. It can in no way be compared to the extinction and the
cooling down of the Arahants.
As the phrase nibbutiṃ bhuñjamānā implies, that extinction is a blissful
experience for the Arahants. It leaves a permanent effect on the Arahant, so
much so that upon reflection he sees that his influxes are extinct, just as a man
with his hands and feet cut off, knows upon reflection that his limbs are gone. It
seems that the deeper implications of the word Nibbāna have been obscured by
a set of arguments which are rather misleading.
In fact I came forward to give these sermons for three reasons: Firstly because
the venerable Great Preceptor invited me to do so. Secondly in the hope that it
will be of some benefit to my co-dwellers in the Dhamma. And thirdly because I
myself felt rather concerned about the inadequacy of the existing interpretations.
What we have said so far is just about the word Nibbāna as such. Quite a
number of suttas on Nibbāna will be taken up for discussion. This is just a
preamble to show that the word Nibbāna in the sense of 'extinction' has a deeper
dimension, which has some relevance to the law of dependent arising, paṭicca
samuppāda.
By bringing in an etymology based on the element vāna, much of the original
significance of the word Nibbāna came to be undermined. On quite a number of
occasions the Buddha has declared that the cessation of suffering is Nibbāna, or
else that the destruction of craving is Nibbāna. Terms like dukkhanirodho and
taṇhakkhayo have been used as synonyms. If they are synonyms, there is no
need to make any discrimination with regard to some of them, by insisting on a
periphrastic usage like āgamma.
Yet another important aspect of the problem is the relation of Nibbāna to the
holy life or brahmacariya. It is said that when the holy life is lived out to the
full, it culminates in Nibbāna.
In the Rādhasaṃyutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya we find the Venerable Rādha
putting a series of questions to the Buddha to get an explanation. First of all he
asks:
Sammādassanaṃ pana, bhante, kimatthiyaṃ? "For what purpose is right
vision?" And the Buddha gives the answer: Sammādassanaṃ kho, Rādha,
nibbidatthaṃ, "Rādha, right vision is for purposes of disgust or dejection". And
that is to say, disgust for saṃsāra.
The next question is: for what purpose is disgust? And the Buddha answers:
disgust is for dispassion. What is the purpose of dispassion? The purpose of
dispassion is release. What is the purpose of release? The purpose of release is
Nibbāna. Last of all Venerable Rādha puts the question:
Nibbānaṃ pana, bhante, kimatthiyaṃ? "For what purpose is Nibbāna?" And
the Buddha gives this answer: Accasarā, Rādha, pañhaṃ, nāsakkhi pañhassa
pariyantaṃ gahetuṃ. Nibbānogadhañhi, Rādha, brahmacariyaṃ vussati,
nibbānaparāyanaṃ nibbānapariyosānaṃ. "Rādha, you have gone beyond the
scope of your questions, you are unable to grasp the limit of your questions. For,
Rādha, the holy life is merged in Nibbāna, its consummation is Nibbāna, its
culmination is Nibbāna."
----------------------
Bodhi (2000: 984f):
“You have gone beyond the range of questioning Rādha. You weren’t able to
grasp the limit to questioning. For, Rādha, the holy life is lived with Nibbāna as
its ground, Nibbāna as its destination, Nibbāna as its final goal.”
----------------------
This shows that the holy life gets merged in Nibbāna, just as rivers get
merged in the sea. In other words, where the holy life is lived out to the full,
Nibbāna is right there. That is why Venerable Nanda, who earnestly took up the
holy life encouraged by the Buddha's promise of heavenly nymphs, attained
Arahant-hood almost in spite of himself. At last he approached the Buddha and
begged to relieve him of the onus of his promise. This shows that when one
completes the training in the Holy Life, one is already in Nibbāna. Only when
the training is incomplete, can one go to heaven.
Here, then, is a result which comes of its own accord. So there is no
justification for a periphrastic usage like, "on reaching Nibbāna". No glimpse of
a distant object is necessary. At whatever moment the Noble Eightfold Path is
perfected, one attains Nibbāna then and there. Now, in the case of an
examination, after answering the question paper, one has to wait for the results -
to get a pass.
Here it is different. As soon as you have answered the paper correctly, you
have passed immediately and the certificate is already there. This is the
significance of the term aññā used in such contexts. Aññā stands for full
certitude of the experience of Nibbāna.
The experience of the fruit of Arahant-ship gives him the final certificate of
his attainment, aññāphalo. That is why Nibbāna is called something to be
realized. One gets the certitude that birth is extinct and that the holy life is lived
out to the full, khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ.
Of course there are some who still go on asking: what is the purpose of
Nibbāna? And it is to answer this type of question that many scholars go on hair
splitting. Normally in the world, whatever one does has some purpose or other.
All occupations, all trades and businesses, are for gain and profit. Thieves and
burglars also have some purpose in mind. But what is the purpose of trying to
attain Nibbāna? What is the purpose of Nibbāna? Why should one attain
Nibbāna?
It is to give an answer to this question that scholars brought in such phrases as
Nibbānaṃ pana āgamma, 'on reaching Nibbāna'. They would say that 'on
reaching Nibbāna', craving would be destroyed. On closer analysis it would
appear that there is some fallacy in this question. For if there is any aim or
purpose in attaining Nibbāna, Nibbāna would not be the ultimate aim. In other
words, if Nibbāna is the ultimate aim, there should be no aim in attaining
Nibbāna. Though it may well sound a tautology, one has to say that Nibbāna is
the ultimate aim for the simple reason that there is no aim beyond it.
However, this might need more explanation. Now as far as craving is
concerned, it has the nature of projection or inclination. It is something bent
forward, with a forward view, and that is why it is called bhavanetti, the leader
in becoming. It leads one on and on in existence, like the carrot before the
donkey. So that is why all objects presented by craving have some object or
purpose as a projection. Craving is an inclination.
But what is the position if one makes the destruction of craving itself one's
object? Now craving because of its inclining nature is always bent forward, so
much so that we get an infinite progression. This is for that, and that is for the
other. As the phrase taṇhā ponobhavikā implies, craving brings up existence
again and again.
But this is not the case when one makes the destruction of craving one's aim.
When that aim is attained, there is nothing more to be done. So this brings us to
the conclusion that the term taṇhakkhayo, destruction of craving, is a full-
fledged synonym of Nibbāna.
Well, this much is enough for today. Time permitting and life permitting, I
hope to continue with these sermons. I suppose the most Venerable Great
Preceptor made this invitation with the idea of seeing one of his children at play.
For good or for bad, I have taken up the invitation. Let the future of the Sāsana
be the final judge of its merits.
--------------------------------
Salient points:
 Definition of ‘name’
 Fire imagery