The Nibbāna Sermons 12 to 22 by Bhikkhu K Ñāṇananda

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Sermon 22
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Etaṃ santaṃ, etaṃ paṇītaṃ, yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho

sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ.
"This is peaceful, this is excellent, namely the stilling of all preparations, the
relinquishment of all assets, the destruction of craving, detachment, cessation,
extinction". With the permission of the Most Venerable Great Preceptor and the
assembly of the venerable meditative monks. This is the twentysecond sermon
in the series of sermons on Nibbāna.
We made an attempt, in our last sermon, to explain that the comparison of the
emancipated one in this dispensation to the great ocean has a particularly deep
significance. We reverted to the simile of the vortex by way of explanation.
Release from the saṃsāric vortex, or the breach of the vortex of saṃsāra, is
comparable to the cessation of a whirlpool. It is equivalent to the stoppage of the
whirlpool of saṃsāra.
Generally, what is known as a vortex or a whirlpool, is a certain pervert,
unusual or abnormal activity, which sustains a pretence of an individual
existence in the great ocean with a drilling and churning as its centre. It is an
aberration, functioning according to a duality, maintaining a notion of two
things. As long as it exists, there is the dichotomy between a 'here' and a 'there',
oneself and another. A vortex reflects a conflict between an 'internal' and an
'external' - a 'tangle within' and a 'tangle without'. The cessation of the vortex is
the freedom from that duality. It is a solitude born of full integration.
We happened to discuss the meaning of the term kevalī in our last sermon.
The cessation of a vortex is at once the resolution of the conflict between an
internal and an external, of the tangle within and without. When a vortex ceases,
all those conflicts subside and a state of peace prevails. What remains is the
boundless great ocean, with no delimitations of a 'here' and a 'there'. As is the
great ocean, so is the vortex now.
 This suchness itself indicates the stoppage, the cessation or the subsidence of
the vortex. There is no longer any possibility of pointing out a 'here' and a 'there'
in the case of a vortex that has ceased. Its 'thusness' or 'suchness' amounts to an
acceptance of the reality of the great ocean. That 'thus-gone' vortex, or the
vortex that has now become 'such', is in every respect worthy of being called
tathāgata.
The term tādī is also semantically related to this suchness. The tathāgata is
sometimes referred to as tādī or tādiso, "such-like". The 'such-like' quality of the
tathāgata is associated with his unshakeable deliverance of the mind. His mind
remains unshaken before the eight worldly vicissitudes.
Why the Buddha refused to give an answer to the tetralemma concerning the
after-death state of the tathāgata, should be clear to a great extent by those sutta
quotations we brought up in our last sermon. Since the quotation diṭṭheva
dhamme saccato thetato tathāgate anupalabbhiyamāne, "when a tathāgata is
not to be found in truth and fact here in this very life", leads to the inference that
a tathāgata is not to be found in reality even while he is alive, we were forced to
conclude that the question 'what happens to the tathāgata after his death?' is
utterly meaningless.
It is also obvious from the conclusive statement, pubbe cāhaṃ etarahi ca
dukkhañceva paññāpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaṃ - "formerly as well as now I
make known just suffering and the cessation of suffering" - that the Buddha, in
answering this question, completely put aside such conventional terms like
'being' and 'person', and solved the problem on the basis of the four noble truths,
which highlight the pure quintessence of the Dhamma as it is.
We have to go a little deeper into this question of conventional terms like
'being' and 'person', because the statement that the tathāgata does not exist in
truth and fact is likely to drive fear into the minds of the generality of people. In
our last sermon, we gave a clue to an understanding of the sense in which this
statement is made, when we quoted an extraordinary new etymology, the
Buddha had advanced, for the term satta in the Rādhasaṃyutta.
Rūpe kho, Rādha, yo chando yo rāgo yā nandī yā taṇhā, tatra satto, tatra
visatto, tasmā 'satto 'ti vuccati. "Rādha, that desire, that lust, that delight, that
craving in form with which one is attached and thoroughly attached, therefore is
one called a 'being'."
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2012: 985):
“One is stuck, Rādha, tightly stuck, in desire, lust, delight, and craving for
form; therefore one is called a being. One is stuck, tightly stuck, in desire, lust,
delight, and craving for feeling … for perception … for volitional formations …
for consciousness; therefore one is called a being.”
SĀ 122
“Being defiled by attachment to and entangled with bodily form ― this is
called a living being. Being defiled by attachment to and entangled with
feeling … perception … formations … consciousness ― this is called a living
being .”
--------------------------------
Here the Buddha has punned on the word satta, to give a new orientation to
its meaning, that is, rūpe satto visatto, "attached and thoroughly attached to
form".
From prehistoric times, the word satta was associated with the idea of some
primordial essence called sat, which carried with it notions of permanent
existence in the world. As derivatives from the present participle sant and sat,
we get the two words satya and sattva in Sanskrit. Satya means "truth", or what
is "true". Sattva means a "being" or the "state of being". We might even take
sattva as the place from which there is a positive response or an affirmation of a
state of being.
Due to the semantic affinity between satya, "truth", and sattva, "being", an
absolute reality had been granted to the term sattva from ancient times. But
according to the new etymology advanced by the Buddha, the term sattva is
given only a relative reality within limits, that is to say, it is 'real' only in a
limited and a relative sense. The above quotation from the Rādhasaṃyutta
makes it clear that a being exists only so long as there is that desire, lust, delight
and craving in the five aggregates.
Alternatively, when there is no desire, or lust, or delight, or craving for any of
the five aggregates, there is no 'being'. That is why we say that it is real only in a
limited and relative sense.
When a thing is dependent on another thing, it is relative and for that very
reason it has a limited applicability and is not absolute. Here, in this case, the
dependence is on desire or attachment. As long as there is desire or attachment,
there is a 'being', and when it is not there, there is no 'being'. So from this we can
well infer that the tathāgata is not a 'being' by virtue of the very definition he
had given to the term satta.
The other day, we briefly quoted a certain simile from the Rādhasutta itself,
but could not explain it sufficiently. The Buddha gives this simile just after
advancing the above new definition.
"Suppose, Rādha, some little boys and girls are playing with sandcastles. So
long as their lust, desire, love, thirst, passion and craving for those things have
not gone away, they remain fond of them, they play with them, treat them as
their property and call them their own. But when, Rādha, those little boys and
girls have outgrown that lust, desire, love, thirst, passion and craving for those
sandcastles, they scatter them with their hands and feet, demolish them,
dismantle them and render them unplayable."
When we reflect upon the meaning of this simile from the point of view of
Dhamma, it seems that for those little boys and girls, sandcastles were real
things, as long as they had ignorance and craving with regard to them. When
they grew wiser and outgrew craving, those sandcastles became unreal. That is
why they destroyed them.
The untaught worldling is in a similar situation. So long as he is attached to
these five aggregates and has not comprehended their impermanent, suffering-
fraught and not-self nature, they are real for him. He is bound by his own
grasping.
The reality of the law of kamma, of merit and demerit, follows from that very
grasping. The dictum upādānapaccayā bhavo, "dependent on grasping is
existence", becomes meaningful in this context. There is an existence because
there is grasping. But at whatever point of time wisdom dawned and craving
faded away, all those things tend to become unreal and there is not even a
'being', as there is no real 'state of being'.
This mode of exposition receives support from the Kaccāyanagottasutta of
the Saṃyutta Nikāya. The way the Buddha has defined right view in that
discourse is highly significant. We have already discussed this sutta on an
earlier occasion. Suffice it to remind ourselves of the basic maxim.
'Dukkham eva uppajjamānaṃ uppajjati, dukkhaṃ nirujjhamānaṃ nirujjhatī'ti
na kaṅkhati na vicikicchati aparappaccayā ñāṇam ev' assa ettha hoti. Ettāvatā
kho, Kaccāyana, sammā diṭṭhi hoti.
"It is only suffering that arises and suffering that ceases. Understanding thus,
one does not doubt, one does not waver, and there is in him only the knowledge
that is not dependent on another. It is in so far, Kaccāyana, that one has right
view."
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2000: 544):
“He has no perplexity or doubt that what arises is only suffering arising, what
ceases is only suffering ceasing. His knowledge about this is independent of
others. It is in this way, Kaccāna, that there is right view.”
SĀ 301
苦生而生，苦滅而滅，於彼不疑、不惑，不由於他而自知，是名正見」
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 85, c24
-------------------------------
What is called aparappaccayā ñāṇa is that knowledge of realization by
oneself for which one is not dependent on another. The noble disciple wins to
such a knowledge of realization in regard to this fact, namely, that it is only a
question of suffering and its cessation. The right view mentioned in this context
is the supramundane right view, and not that right view which takes kamma as
one's own, kammassakatā sammā diṭṭhi, implying notions of 'I' and 'mine'.
This supramundane right view brings out the norm of Dhamma as it is. Being
unable to understand this norm of Dhamma, contemporary ascetics and
brahmins, and even some monks themselves, accused the Buddha of being an
annihilationist. They brought up groundless allegations. There was also the
opposite reaction of seeking refuge in a form of eternalism, through fear of
being branded as annihilationists.
Sometimes the Buddha answered those wrong accusations in unmistakeable
terms. We come across such an instance in the Alagaddūpama Sutta. First of all
the Buddha qualifies the emancipated one in his dispensation with the terms
ariyo pannaddhajo pannabhāro visaṃyutto. Once the conceit 'am', asmimāna, is
abandoned, this noble one is called pannaddhajo, "one who has put down the
flag of conceit". He has "laid down the burden", pannabhāro, and is "disjoined",
visaṃyutto, from the fetters of existence. About this emancipated one, he now
makes the following declaration:
Evaṃ vimuttacittaṃ kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhuṃ sa-indā devā sa-pajāpatikā sa-
brahmakā anvesaṃ nādhigacchanti: idaṃ nissitaṃ tathāgatassa viññāṇan'ti.
Taṃ kissa hetu? Diṭṭhe vāhaṃ, bhikkhave, dhamme tathāgato ananuvejjo'ti
vadāmi.
Evaṃvādiṃ kho maṃ, bhikkhave, evam akkhāyiṃ eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā asatā
tucchā musā abhūtena abbhācikkhanti: venayiko samaṇo Gotamo, sato sattassa
ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ paññāpeti.
"A monk, thus released in mind, O! monks, gods including Indra, Pajāpati
and Brahmā, are unable to trace in their search to be able to say of him: 'the
consciousness of this thus-gone-one is dependent on this. And why is that so?
Monks, I say, even here and now the Tathāgata is not to be found.
When I say thus, when I teach thus, some recluses and brahmins wrongly and
falsely accuse me with the following unfounded allegation: 'recluse Gotama is
an annihilationist, he lays down an annihilation, a destruction and non-existence
of a truly existing being'."
-------------------------------
Translation Ñāṇamoli (1995: 233):
“Bhikkhus, when the gods with Indra, with Brahmā and with Pajāpati seek a
bhikkhu who is thus liberated in mind, they do not find [anything of which
they could say]: ‘The consciousness of one thus gone is supported by this.’ Why
is that? One thus gone, I say, is untraceable here and now.”
“So saying, bhikkhus, so proclaiming, I have been baselessly, vainly, falsely,
and wrongly misrepresented by some recluses and brahmins thus: ‘The recluse
Gotama is one who leads astray; he teaches the annihilation, the destruction,
the extermination of an existing being.’
MĀ 200
“Indra with his devas, Īsāna, and Brahmā with his assembly seek a basis on
which the consciousness of a Tathāgata depends, but are unable to find one. A
Tathāgata has become Brahmā, a Tathāgata has become cool, a Tathāgata is
without heat, a Tathāgata is not otherwise, it is like this, I say.
“Renunciants and brahmins misrepresent me, saying what is false and untrue,
namely: “The renunciant Gotama proclaims annihilation. He proclaims the
cutting off and destruction of a truly existing living being.”
“I do not make proclamations about what, in this context, is [in any case]
devoid of self. I do, [however], proclaim the thus-gone one to be without worry
right here and now.”
-------------------------------
As in the Anurādha Sutta, here too the Buddha concludes with the highly
significant statement of his stance, pubbe cāhaṃ etarahi ca dukkhañceva
paññāpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaṃ, "formerly as well as now I make known just
suffering and the cessation of suffering".
Though the statements in the suttas follow this trend, it seems that the
commentator himself was scared to bring out the correct position in his
commentary. The fact that he sets out with some trepidation is clear enough
from the way he tackles the term tathāgata in his commentary to the above
discourse in the Majjhima Nikāya. In commenting on the word tathāgatassa in
the relevant context, he makes the following observation:
Tathāgatassā'ti ettha satto pi tathāgato'ti adhippeto, uttamapuggalo
khīṇāsavo pi. "Tathāgata's, herein, a being also is meant by the term tathāgata,
as well as the highest person, the influx-free arahant."
-------------------------------
Anālayo 2017: "Some Renditions of the Term Tathāgata in the Chinese Āgamas", Annual
Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University,
20: 11–21. (esp. p. 13f)
-------------------------------
Just as he gives two meanings to the word tathāgata, Venerable Buddhaghosa
attributes two meanings to the word ananuvejjo as well. Ananuvejjo'ti
asaṃvijjamāno vā avindeyyo vā. Tathāgato'ti hi satte gahite asaṃvijjamāno'ti
attho vaṭṭati, khīṇāsave gahite avindeyyo'ti attho vaṭṭati. "Ananuvejjo - 'non-
existing' or 'untraceable'. When by the word tathāgata a being is meant, the
sense 'non existing' is fitting; and when the influx-free one is meant, the sense
'untraceable' is fitting."
According to this exegesis, the term tathāgata in contexts where it means a
'being' is to be understood as non-existing, asamvijjamāno, which is equivalent
in sense to the expression anupalabbhiyamāne, discussed above. On the other
hand, the other sense attributed to it is avindeyyo, which somehow grants the
existence but suggests that it is 'untraceable'. In other words, the
Tathāgata exists, but he cannot be traced or found out.
The commentator opines that the term in question has to be understood in two
different senses, according to contexts. In order to substantiate his view, the
commentator attributes the following apocryphal explanation to the Buddha.
 Bhikkhave, ahaṃ diṭṭheva dhamme dharamānakaṃ yeva khīṇāsavaṃ
viññāṇavasena indādīhi avindiyaṃ vadāmi. Na hi sa-indā devā sabrahmakā
sapajāpatikā anvesantāpi khīṇāsavassa vipassanācittaṃ vā maggacittaṃ vā
phalacittaṃ vā, idaṃ nāma ārammaṇaṃ nissāya vattatī'ti jānituṃ sakkonti. Te
appaṭisandhikassa parinibbutassa kiṃ jānissanti?
"Monks, I say that even here and now the influx-free one, while he is alive, is
untraceable by Indra and others in regard to his consciousness. Gods, including
Indra, Brahmā and Pajāpati are indeed unable in their search to find out either
the insight consciousness, or the path consciousness, or the fruition
consciousness, to be able to say: 'it is dependent on this object'. How then could
they find out the consciousness of one who has attained parinibbāna with no
possibility of conception?"
Presumably, the argument is that, since the consciousness of the arahant is
untraceable by the gods while he is alive, it is all the more difficult for them to
find it out when he has attained parinibbāna. That is to say, the
arahant somehow exists, even after his parinibbāna, only that he cannot be
traced.
It is obvious from this commentarial trend that the commentator finds himself
on the horns of a dilemma, because of his inability to grasp an extremely deep
dimension of linguistic usage. The Buddha's forceful and candid declaration was
too much for him. Probably, he demurred out of excessive faith, but his stance is
not in accordance with the Dhamma. It falls short of right view.
Let us now recapitulate the correct position in the light of the above
sutta passage. The Buddha declares at the very outset that the emancipated
monk undergoes a significant change by virtue of the fact that he has abandoned
the conceit 'am'. That Tathāgata, that emancipated monk, who has put down the
flag of conceit, laid down the burden of the five aggregates, and won release
from the fetters to existence, defies definition and eludes categorization. Why is
that?
As we pointed out earlier, the word asmi constitutes the very basis of the
entire grammatical structure. Asmi, or "am", is the basic peg, which stands for
the first person. The second person and the third person come later. So asmi is
basic to the grammatical structure. When this basic peg is uprooted, the
emancipated monk reaches that state of freedom from the vortex. There is no
dichotomy to sustain a vortex, no two teams to keep up the vortical interplay.
Where there is no turning round, there is no room for designation, and this is the
implication of the phrase vaṭṭaṃ tesaṃ n'atthi paññāpanāya, which we
happened to quote on a previous occasion. For the arahants there is no vortex
whereby to designate.
That is why the Tathāgata, in this very life, is said to have transcended the
state of a 'being'. Only as a way of speaking in terms of worldly parlance one
cannot help referring to him as a 'being'. But in truth and fact, his position is
otherwise.
 Going by worldly usage, one might indiscriminately think of applying the
four propositions of the tetralemma to the Tathāgata as well. But it is precisely
in this context that the questioner's presumptions are fully exposed. The fact that
he has misconceived the implications of the terms satta and Tathāgata is best
revealed by the very question whether the Tathāgata exists after his death. It
shows that he presumes the Tathāgata to be existing in truth and fact, and if so,
he has either to go on existing or be annihilated after death. Here, then, we have
an extremely deep dimension of linguistic usage.
The commentary says that gods and Brahmās cannot find the Tathāgata in
point of his consciousness. The Tathāgata defies definition due to his
abandonment of proliferations of cravings, conceits and views. Cravings,
conceits and views, which bring in attachments, bindings and entanglements to
justify the usage of terms like satta, 'being', and puggala, 'person', are extinct in
the Tathāgata. That is why he is beyond reckoning.
In the Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya the Buddha makes the following
declaration about himself, after refuting the sixty-two views, catching them all
in one super-net.
Ucchinnabhavanettiko, bhikkhave, tathāgatassa kāyo tiṭṭhati. Yav'assa kāyo
ṭhassati tāva naṃ dakkhinti devamanussā. Kāyassa bhedā uddhaṃ
jīvitapariyādānā na naṃ dakkhinti devamanussā.
"Monks, the Tathāgata's body stands with its leading factor in becoming cut
off at the root. As long as his body stands, gods and men will see him. With the
breaking up of his body, after the extinction of his life, gods and men will not
see him."
And then he follows up this promulgation with a simile.
Seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, ambapiṇḍiyā vaṇṭacchinnāya yāni kānici ambāni
vaṇṭūpanibandhanāni, sabbāni tāni tad anvayāni bhavanti, evam eva kho,
bhikkhave, ucchinnabhavanettiko tathāgatassa kāyo tiṭṭhati. Yav'assa kāyo
ṭhassati tāva naṃ dakkhinti devamanussā. Kāyassa bhedā uddhaṃ
jīvitapariyādānā na naṃ dakkhinti devamanussā.
"Just as, monks, in the case of a bunch of mangoes, when its stalk is cut off,
whatever mangoes that were connected with the stalk would all of them be
likewise cut off, even so, monks, stands the Tathāgata's body with its leading
factor in becoming cut off at the root. As long as his body stands, gods and men
will see him. With the breaking up of his body, after the extinction of his life,
gods and men will not see him."
-------------------------------
Translation Walshe (1987: 90):
“Monks, the body of the Tathagata stands with the link that bound it to
becoming cut. As long as the body subsists, devas and humans will see him. But
at the breaking-up of the body and the exhaustion of the life-span, devas and
humans will see him no more. Monks, just as when the stalk of a bunch of
mangoes has been cut, all the mangoes on it go with it, just so the Tathagata's
link with becoming has been cut. As long as the body subsists, devas and
humans will see him. But at the breaking-up of the body and the exhaustion of
the life-span, devas and humans will see him no more.”
DĀ 21
“The Tathāgata knows that for himself birth and death have been eradicated.
He makes use of this existing body because of his wish to bring happiness and
deliverance to devas and human beings. If there were not that body, devas and
men in the world would have nothing to rely on. It is just like a Palmyra tree
whose top part has been cut off, which will not come to growth again. The
Buddha is just like that, having eradicated birth and death he will never come
to be born again.”
-------------------------------
The simile employed serves to bring out the fact that the Tathāgata's body
stands with its leading factor in becoming eradicated. Here it is said that gods
and men see the Tathāgata while he is alive. But the implications of this
statement should be understood within the context of the similes given.
The reference here is to a tree uprooted, one that simply stands cut off at the
root. In regard to each aggregate of the Buddha and other emancipated ones, it is
clearly stated that it is cut off at the root, ucchinnamūlo, that it is like a palm tree
divested of its site tālāvatthukato.
In the case of a palm tree, deprived of its natural site but still left standing,
anyone seeing it from afar would mistake it for an actual tree that is growing. It
is the same idea that emerges from the simile of the bunch of mangoes. The
Tathāgata is comparable to a bunch of mangoes with its stalk cut off.
What then is meant by the statement that gods and men see him? Their seeing
is limited to the seeing of his body. For many, the concept of seeing the
Tathāgata is just this seeing of his physical body. Of course, we do not find in
this discourse any prediction that we can see him after five-thousand years.
Whatever it may be, here we seem to have some deep idea underlying this
discourse. An extremely important clue to a correct understanding of this
Dhamma, one that helps to straighten up right view, lies beneath this problem of
the Buddha's refusal to answer the tetralemma concerning the Tathāgata. This
fact comes to light in the Yamaka Sutta of the Khandhasaṃyutta.
A monk named Yamaka conceived the evil view, the distorted view, tathāhaṃ
bhagavatā dhammaṃ desitaṃ ājānāmi, yathā khīṇāsavo bhikkhu kāyassa bhedā
ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṃ maraṇā. "As I understand the
Dhamma taught by the Exalted One, an influx-free monk, with the breaking up
of his body, is annihilated and perishes, he does not exist after death."
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2000: 931):
“As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose
taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body
and does not exist after death.”
SĀ 104
“As I understand the Dharma taught by the Buddha, an arahant, with the
influxes being eradicated, will not exist anywhere after the body breaks up at
the end of life.”
-------------------------------
He went about saying that the Buddha had declared that the emancipated
monk is annihilated at death. Other monks, on hearing this, tried their best to
dispel his wrong view, saying that the Buddha had never declared so, but it was
in vain. At last they approached Venerable Sāriputta and begged him to handle
the situation.
Then Venerable Sāriputta came there, and after ascertaining the fact,
proceeded to dispel Venerable Yamaka's wrong view by getting him to answer a
series of questions. The first set of questions happened to be identical with the
one the Buddha had put forward in Venerable Anurādha's case, namely a
catechism on the three characteristics. We have already quoted it step by step,
for facility of understanding. Suffice it to mention, in brief, that it served to
convince Venerable Yamaka of the fact that whatever is impermanent, suffering
and subject to change, is not fit to be looked upon as 'this is mine, this am I, and
this is my self'.
The first step, therefore, consisted in emphasizing the not self characteristic
through a catechism on the three signata. The next step was to get Venerable
Yamaka to reflect on this not self characteristic in eleven ways, according to the
standard formula.
Tasmātiha, āvuso Yamaka, yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ
ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ va sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā panītaṃ vā yaṃ
dūre santike vā, sabbaṃ rūpaṃ n'etaṃ mama n'eso 'ham asmi, na me so attā'ti
evam etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammāpaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ya kāci vedanā ... ya kāci
saññā ... ye keci saṅkhārā ... yaṃ kiñci viññāṇaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ
ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ va sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā panītaṃ vā yaṃ
dūre santike vā, sabbaṃ viññāṇaṃ n'etaṃ mama n'eso 'ham asmi, na me so
attā'ti evam etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammāpaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.
Evaṃ passaṃ, āvuso Yamaka, sutavā ariyasāvako rūpasmiṃ nibbindati,
vedanāya nibbindati, saññāya nibbindati, saṅkhāresu nibbindati, viññāṇasmiṃ
nibbindati. Nibbindam virajjati, virāgā vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam iti
ñāṇaṃ hoti. Khīṇā jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ
itthattāyā'ti pajānāti.
"Therefore, friend Yamaka, any kind of form whatsoever, whether past, future
or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near,
all form must be seen as it really is with right wisdom thus: 'this is not mine, this
I am not, this is not my self'. Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... any kind of
perception whatsoever ... any kind of preparations whatsoever ... any kind of
consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future or present, internal or external,
gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all consciousness must be seen
as it really is with right wisdom thus: 'this is not mine, this I am not, this is not
my self'."
"Seeing thus, friend Yamaka, the instructed noble disciple gets disgusted of
form, gets disgusted of feeling, gets disgusted of perception, gets disgusted of
preparations, gets disgusted of consciousness. Being disgusted, he becomes
dispassionate, through dispassion his mind is liberated. When it is liberated,
there comes the knowledge 'it is liberated' and he understands: 'extinct is birth,
lived is the holy life, done is what had to be done, there is no more of this state
of being'."
As the third step in his interrogation of Venerable Yamaka, Venerable
Sāriputta poses the same questions which the Buddha addressed to Venerable
Anurādha.
"What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form as the Tathāgata?"
"No, friend.""Do you regard feeling ... perception ... preparations ...
consciousness as the Tathāgata?" "No, friend."
"What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathāgata as in form?"
"No, friend." "Do you regard the Tathāgata as apart from form?" "No, friend.
"Do you regard the Tathāgata as in feeling?" "No, friend." "Do you regard the
Tathāgata as apart from feeling?" "No, friend." "Do you regard the Tathāgata as
in perception?" "No, friend." "Do you regard the Tathāgata as apart from
perception?" "No, friend." "Do you regard the Tathāgata as in preparations?"
"No, friend." "Do you regard the Tathāgata as apart from preparations?" "No,
friend." "Do you regard the Tathāgata as in consciousness?" "No, friend." "Do
you regard the Tathāgata as apart from consciousness?" "No, friend."
"What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception,
preparations and consciousness as constituting the Tathāgata?" "No, friend."
"What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathāgata as one who is
devoid of form, feeling, perception, preparations and consciousness?" "No,
friend."
It was at this juncture that Venerable Sāriputta puts this conclusive question
to Venerable Yamaka in order to drive the crucial point home.
"But then, friend Yamaka, now that for you a Tathāgata is not to be found in
truth and fact here in this very life, is it proper for you to declare: 'As I
understand Dhamma taught by the Exalted One, an influx-free monk is
annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up and does not exist after
death'?"
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2000: 932):
 “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form as the Tathāgata?” –
“No, friend.” –
“Do you regard feeling … perception … volitional formations … consciousness
as the Tathāgata?” – “No, friend.” “
What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathāgata as in form?” –
“No, friend.” – “Do you regard the Tathāgata as apart from form?” – “No,
friend.” –
“Do you regard the Tathāgata as in feeling? As apart from feeling? As in
perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional formations? As apart
from volitional formations? As in consciousness? As apart from
consciousness?” – “No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception,
volitional formations, and consciousness [taken together] as the Tathāgata?” –
“No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathāgata as one who is
without form, without feeling, without perception, without volitional
formations, without consciousness?” – “No, friend.”
“But, friend, when the Tathāgata is not apprehended by you as real and actual
here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I understand the
Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is
annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after
death’?”
SĀ 104
[Sāriputta] asked again: “How is it, Yamaka, is bodily form the Tathāgata?”
[Yamaka] replied: “No, venerable Sāriputta.”
[Sāriputta asked again]: “Is feeling … perception … formations … consciousness
the Tathāgata?”
[Yamaka] replied: “No, venerable Sāriputta.”
[Sāriputta] asked again: “How is it, Yamaka, is the Tathāgata distinct from
bodily form? Is the Tathāgata distinct from feeling … perception … formations
… consciousness?”
[Yamaka] replied: “No, venerable Sāriputta.”
[Sāriputta] asked again: “Is the Tathāgata in bodily form? Is the Tathāgata in
feeling … perception … formations … consciousness?”
[Yamaka] replied: “No, venerable Sāriputta.”
[Sāriputta asked again]: “Is bodily form in the Tathāgata? Is feeling …
perception … formations … consciousness in the Tathāgata?”
[Yamaka] replied: “No, venerable Sāriputta.”
[Sāriputta] asked again: “Is the Tathāgata without bodily form … feeling …
perception … formations … consciousness?”
[Yamaka] replied: “No, venerable Sāriputta.”
[Sāriputta said]: “In this way, Yamaka, the Tathāgata as existing truly here and
now cannot be gotten at anywhere, cannot be designated anywhere. Why do
you say: ‘[As] I understand the Dharma taught by the Buddha, an arahant, with
the influxes being eradicated, will not exist anywhere after the body breaks up
at the end of life’? Is that properly spoken?”
-------------------------------
At last, Venerable Yamaka confesses "Formerly, friend Sāriputta, I did hold
that evil view, ignorant as I was. But now that I have heard this Dhamma
sermon of the Venerable Sāriputta, I have given up that evil view and have
gained an understanding of the Dhamma."
As if to get a confirmation of Venerable Yamaka's present stance, Venerable
Sāriputta continues: "If, friend Yamaka, they were to ask you the question:
'Friend Yamaka, as to that monk, the influx-free arahant, what happens to him
with the breaking up of the body after death?' Being asked thus, what would you
answer?"
"If they were to ask me that question, friend Sāriputta, I would answer in this
way: Friends, form is impermanent, what is impermanent is suffering, what is
suffering has ceased and passed away. Feeling ... perception ... preparations ...
consciousness is impermanent, what is impermanent is suffering, what is
suffering has ceased and passed away. Thus questioned, I would answer in such
a way."
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2000: 932):
“If, friend Yamaka, they were to ask you: ‘Friend Yamaka, when a bhikkhu is
an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, what happens to him with the
breakup of the body, after death?’—being asked thus, what would you
answer?”
“If they were to ask me this, friend, I would answer thus: ‘Friends, form is
impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering has ceased
and passed away. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations …
Consciousness is impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; what is
suffering has ceased and passed away.’ Being asked thus, friend, I would
answer in such a way.”
SĀ 104
[Sāriputta] asked again: “Yamaka, if you are further asked: 'Monk, as you
earlier declared an evil wrong view, knowing and seeing what has this now all
been completely removed?' What would you answer?”
Yamaka replied: “Venerable Sāriputta, if someone comes and asks, I would
answer in this way: 'The bodily form of an arahant, with the influxes being
eradicated, is impermanent. What is impermanent, is dukkha. What is dukkha
has become tranquil and become cool, it has forever disappeared. Feeling,
perception … formations … consciousness is also like this.' [If] someone comes
and asks, I would answer in this way.”
-------------------------------
Be it noted that, in this conclusive answer, there is no mention whatsoever of
a Tathāgata, a satta, or a puggala.
Now at this reply, Venerable Sāriputta expresses his approbation: "Good,
good, friend Yamaka, well then, friend Yamaka, I will bring up a simile for you
that you may grasp this meaning all the more clearly.
Suppose, friend Yamaka, there was a householder or a householder's son,
prosperous, with much wealth and property, protected by a bodyguard. Then
some man would come by who wished to ruin him, to harm him, to imperil him,
to deprive him of life. And it would occur to that man: 'This householder or a
householder's son is prosperous, with much wealth and property, he has his
bodyguard, it is not easy to deprive him of his life by force. What if I were to get
close to him and take his life?'
Then he would approach that householder or householder's son and say to
him: 'Would you take me on as a servant, sir?' Then the householder or
householder's son would take him on as a servant. The man would serve him,
rising up before him, going to bed after him, being at his beck and call, pleasing
in his conduct, endearing in his speech. The householder or householder's son
would regard him as a friend, an intimate friend, and would place trust in him.
But once the man has ascertained that the householder or householder's son has
trust in him, he waits for an opportunity to find him alone and kills him with a
sharp knife."
Now this is the simile. Based on this deep simile, Venerable Sāriputta puts
the following questions to Venerable Yamaka to see whether he has grasped the
moral behind it.
"What do you think, friend Yamaka, when that man approached that
householder or householder's son and said to him 'would you take me on as a
servant, sir?', wasn't he a murderer even then, though the householder or
householder's son did not know him as 'my murderer'? And when the man was
serving him, rising up before him and going to bed after him, being at his beck
and call, pleasing in his conduct and endearing in his speech, wasn't he a
murderer then too, though the householder or householder's son did not know
him as 'my murderer'? And when the man, finding him alone, took his life with a
sharp knife, wasn't he a murderer then too, though the other did not know him as
'my murderer'?" Venerable Yamaka answers "yes, friend", by way of assent to
all these matter-of-fact questions.
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2000: 933):
“Suppose, friend Yamaka, there was a householder or a householder’s son, a
rich man, with much wealth and property, protected by a bodyguard. Then
some man would appear who wanted to ruin him, to harm him, to endanger
him, to take his life. It would occur to that man: ‘This householder or
householder’s son is a rich man, with much wealth and property, protected by
a bodyguard. It won’t be easy to take his life by force. Let me get close to him
and then take his life.’
“Then he would approach that householder or householder’s son and say to
him: ‘I would serve you, sir.’ Then the householder or householder’s son would
appoint him as a servant. The man would serve him, rising up before him,
retiring after him, doing whatever he wants, agreeable in his conduct,
endearing in his speech. The householder or householder’s son would consider
him a friend, a bosom friend, and he would place trust in him. But when the
man becomes aware that the householder or householder’s son has placed
trust in him, then, finding him alone, he would take his life with a sharp
knife.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, when that man had approached that
householder or householder’s son and said to him: ‘I would serve you, sir,’
wasn’t he a murderer even then, though the other did not recognize him as
‘my murderer’? And when the man was serving him, rising up before him,
retiring after him, doing whatever he wants, agreeable in his conduct,
endearing in his speech, wasn’t he a murderer then too, though the other did
not recognize him as ‘my murderer’? And when the man came upon him while
he was alone and took his life with a sharp knife, wasn’t he a murderer then
too, though the other did not recognize him as ‘my murderer’?”
SĀ 104
It is like the son of a householder; a son of a householder who is very rich and
has much wealth. He seeks widely for a retinue that well protects his wealth.
“Then an evil person who is his enemy pretends to have come as a close friend
in order to become his retainer. He often waits for an opportunity, going to
sleep late and rising early, looking after him nearby when he rests. He is
careful and respectful in his affairs, modest in his words, causing his master to
think of him with delight, to perceive him as a friend, to perceive him as a son,
with utmost trust and without doubt, without guarding himself. Later on, with
a sharp knife in his hand, he cuts off [his master's] life.
“Monk Yamaka, what do you think? That evil enemy, acting as the
householder's friend, was he not acting from the outset as an expedient with a
mind intent on harm, constantly waiting for an opportunity until bringing
about [the householder's] end? Yet that householder was not able to realize it,
until the moment he suffered harm.”
-------------------------------
It was then, that Venerable Sāriputta comes out with the full significance of
this simile, portraying the uninstructed worldling in the same light as that
naively unsuspecting and ignorant householder or householder's son.
"So too, friend Yamaka, the uninstructed worldling, who has no regard for the
noble ones, and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who has no
regard for good men and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma,
regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in
form. He regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... preparations as self ...
consciousness as self ...
He does not understand, as it really is, impermanent form as 'impermanent
form', impermanent feeling as 'impermanent feeling', impermanent perception as
'impermanent perception', impermanent preparations as 'impermanent
preparations', impermanent consciousness as 'impermanent consciousness'.
He does not understand, as it really is, painful form as 'painful form', painful
feeling as 'painful feeling', painful perception as 'painful perception', painful
preparations as 'painful preparations', painful consciousness as 'painful
consciousness'.
He does not understand, as it really is, selfless form as 'selfless form', selfless
feeling as 'selfless feeling', selfless perception as 'selfless perception', selfless
preparations as 'selfless preparations', selfless consciousness as 'selfless
consciousness'.
He does not understand, as it really is, prepared form as 'prepared form',
prepared feeling as 'prepared feeling', prepared perception as 'prepared
perception', prepared preparations as 'prepared preparations', prepared
consciousness as 'prepared consciousness'.
He does not understand, as it really is, murderous form as 'murderous form',
murderous feeling as 'murderous feeling', murderous perception as 'murderous
perception', murderous preparations as 'murderous preparations', murderous
consciousness as 'murderous consciousness'."
This, then, is what the attitude of the uninstructed worldling amounts to.
Venerable Sāriputta now goes on to describe the consequences of such an
attitude for the worldling.
So rūpaṃ upeti upādiyati adhiṭṭhāti attā me 'ti, vedanaṃ ... saññaṃ ...
saṅkhāre ... viññāṇaṃ upeti upādiyati adhiṭṭhāti attā me 'ti. Tassime
pañcupādānakkhandhā upetā upādiṇṇā dīgharattaṃ ahitāya dukkhāya
saṃvattanti.
"He becomes committed to form, grasps it and takes a stand upon it as 'my
self'. He becomes committed to feeling ... to perception ... to preparations ... to
consciousness, grasps it and takes a stand upon it as 'my self'. These five
aggregates of grasping, to which he becomes committed, and which he grasps,
lead to his harm and suffering for a long time."
Then Venerable Sāriputta contrasts it with the standpoint of the instructed
disciple.
"But, friend, the instructed noble disciple, who has regard for the noble ones,
who is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, who has regard for good men
and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, does not regard form as self, or
self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He does not regard
feeling as self ... perception as self ... preparations as self ... consciousness as
self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in
consciousness.
He understands, as it really is, impermanent form as 'impermanent form',
impermanent feeling as 'impermanent feeling', impermanent perception as
'impermanent perception', impermanent preparations as 'impermanent
preparations', impermanent consciousness as 'impermanent consciousness'.
He understands, as it really is, painful form as 'painful form', painful feeling
as 'painful feeling', painful perception as 'painful perception', painful
preparations as 'painful preparations', painful consciousness as 'painful
consciousness'.
He understands, as it really is, selfless form as 'selfless form', selfless feeling
as 'selfless feeling', selfless perception as 'selfless perception', selfless
preparations as 'selfless preparations', selfless consciousness as 'selfless
consciousness'.
He understands, as it really is, prepared form as 'prepared form', prepared
feeling as 'prepared feeling', prepared perception as 'prepared perception',
prepared preparations as 'prepared preparations', prepared consciousness as
'prepared consciousness'.
He understands, as it really is, murderous form as 'murderous form',
murderous feeling as 'murderous feeling', murderous perception as 'murderous
perception', murderous preparations as 'murderous preparations', murderous
consciousness as 'murderous consciousness'."
He does not become committed to form, does not grasp it, does not take a
stand upon it as 'my self'. He does not become committed to feeling ... to
perception ... to preparations ... to consciousness, does not grasp it, does not take
a stand upon it as 'my self'. These five aggregates of grasping, to which he does
not become committed, which he does not grasp, lead to his welfare and
happiness for a long time."
What Venerable Sāriputta wanted to prove, was the fact that everyone of the
five aggregates is a murderer, though the worldlings, ignorant of the true state of
affairs, pride themselves on each of them, saying 'this is mine, this am I and this
is my self'. As the grand finale of this instructive discourse comes the following
wonderful declaration by Venerable Yamaka.
"Such things do happen, friend Sāriputta, to those venerable ones who have
sympathetic and benevolent fellow monks in the holy life, like you, to admonish
and instruct, so much so that, on hearing this Dhamma sermon of the Venerable
Sāriputta, my mind is liberated from the influxes by non-grasping."
-------------------------------
SĀ 104
When the venerable Sāriputta spoke this teaching, the monk Yamaka by not
clinging attained liberation from the influxes in his mind.
-------------------------------
This might sound extremely strange in this age of scepticism regarding such
intrinsic qualities of the Dhamma like sandiṭṭhika, "visible here and now",
akālika, "timeless", and ehipassika, "inviting to come and see". But all the same
we have to grant the fact that this discourse, which begins with a Venerable
Yamaka who is bigoted with such a virulent evil view, which even his fellow
monks found it difficult to dispel, concludes, as we saw, with this grand finale of
a Venerable Yamaka joyfully declaring his attainment of arahant-hood.
This episode bears testimony to the fact that the tetralemma concerning the
Tathāgata's after-death state has beneath it an extremely valuable criterion,
proper to this Dhamma. There are some who are even scared to discuss this
topic, perhaps due to unbalanced faith - faith unwarranted by wisdom. The
tetralemma, however, reveals on analysis a wealth of valuable Dhamma material
that goes to purify one's right view. That is why the Venerable Yamaka ended up
as an arahant.
So this discourse, also, is further proof of the fact that the Buddha's solution
to the problem of the indeterminate points actually took the form of a
disquisition on voidness. Such expositions fall into the category called
suññatapaṭisaṃyuttā suttantā, "discourses dealing with voidness". This category
of discourses avoids the conventional worldly usages, such as satta, "being", and
puggala, "person", and highlights the teachings on the four noble truths, which
bring out the nature of things 'as they are'.
Generally, such discourses instil fear into the minds of worldlings, so much so
that even during the Buddha's time there were those recorded instances of
misconstruing and misinterpretation. It is in this light that we have to appreciate
the Buddha's prediction that in the future there will be monks who would not
like to listen or lend ear to those deep and profound discourses of the Buddha,
pertaining to the supramundane and dealing with the void.
Puna ca paraṃ, bhikkhave, bhavissanti bhikkhū anāgatamaddhānaṃ
abhāvitakāya abhāvitasīlā abhāvitacittā abhāvitapaññā, te abhāvitakāyā
samānā abhāvitasīlā abhāvitacittā abhāvitapaññā ye te suttantā
tathāgatabhāsitā gambhīrā gambhīratthā lokuttarā suññatāpaṭisaṃyuttā, tesu
bhaññamānesu na sussūsanti, na sotaṃ odahissanti, na aññācittaṃ
upaṭṭhapessanti, na ca te dhamme uggahetabbaṃ pariyāpuṇitabbaṃ
maññissanti.
"And moreover, monks, there will be in the future those monks who, being
undeveloped in bodily conduct, being undeveloped in morality, being
undeveloped in concentration, being undeveloped in wisdom, would not like to
listen, to lend ear or to make an attempt to understand and deem it fit to learn
when those discourses preached by the Tathāgata, which are deep, profound in
meaning, supramundane and dealing with the void, are being recited."
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2012: 714):
“Again, in the future there will be bhikkhus who are undeveloped in body,
virtuous behavior, mind, and wisdom. When those discourses spoken by the
Tathāgata are being recited that are deep, deep in meaning, world-
transcending, connected with emptiness, they will not want to listen to them,
will not lend an ear to them, or apply their minds to understand them; they
will not think those teachings should be studied and learned.”
--------------------------------
This brings us to an extremely deep dimension of this Dhamma. By way of
clarification, we may allude to a kind of exorcism practiced by some traditional
devil dancers. At the end of an all-night session of devil dancing, the mediating
priest goes round, exorcising the spirits from the house with fistfuls of a highly
inflammable incense powder. Blazing flames arise, as he sprinkles that powder
onto the lighted torch, directing the flames at every nook and corner of the
house. Some onlookers even get scared that he is trying to set the house on fire.
But actually no harm is done.
Well, the Buddha, too, as the mediating priest of the three realms, had to
conduct a similar exorcising ritual over linguistic conventions, aiming at some
words in particular. It is true that he made use of conventional language in order
to convey his teaching. But his Dhamma proper was one that transcended logic,
atakkāvacaro.
It happened to be a Dhamma that soared well above the limitations of
grammar and logic, and analytically exposed their very structure. The marvel of
the Dhamma is in its very inaccessibility to logic. That is why it defied the four-
cornered logic of the tetralemma. It refused to be cornered and went beyond the
concepts of a 'being' or a 'self'. The saṃsāric vortex was breached and concepts
themselves were transcended.
Now this is the exorcism the Buddha had to carry out. He smoked out the
term attā, "self", so dear to the whole world. Of course, he could not help
making use of that word as such. In fact there is an entire chapter in the
Dhammapada entitled Attavagga. But it must be emphasized that the term in
that context does not refer to a permanent self. It stands for 'oneself'. Some who
mistakenly rendered it as 'self', ended up in difficulties. Take for instance the
following verse.
Attā hi attano nātho,
ko hi nātho paro siyā,
attanā hi sudantena,
nāthaṃ labhati dullabhaṃ.
 "Oneself, indeed, is one's own saviour,
What other saviour could there be?
Even in oneself, disciplined well,
One finds that saviour, so hard to find."
-------------------------------
Translation Norman (2004: 24):
“The self is indeed the lord of self; Who else indeed could be the lord? By the
self indeed, when well tamed, one obtains a lord who is hard to obtain.”
--------------------------------
Those who render the above verse literally, with a self-bias, would get stuck
when confronted with the following verse in the Bālavagga, the "chapter of the
fool".
Puttā m'atthi, dhanam m'atthi,
iti bālo vihaññati,
attā hi attano n'atthi,
kuto puttā, kuto dhanaṃ?
"'Sons I have, wealth I have',
So the fool is vexed,
Even oneself is not one's own,
Where then are sons, where is wealth?"
-------------------------------
Translation Norman (2004: 10):
“[Thinking] ‘I have sons’, ‘I have wealth’, the fool is tormented. He has indeed
no self of his own, how much less sons? How much less wealth?”
--------------------------------
Whereas the former verse says attā hi attano nātho, here we find the
statement attā hi attano n'atthi. If one ignores the reflexive sense and translates
the former line with something like "self is the lord of self", one will be at a loss
to translate the seemingly contradictory statement "even self is not owned by
self".
At times, the Buddha had to be incisive in regard to some words, which the
worldlings are prone to misunderstand and misinterpret. We have already
discussed at length the significance of such terms as satta and tathāgata, with
reference to their etymological background. Sakkāyadiṭṭhi, or "personality
view", masquerades even behind the term tathāgata, and that is why they raise
such ill-founded questions. That is also why one is averse to penetrate into the
meanings of these deep discourses.
Like the term tathāgata, the term loka also had insinuations of a self-bias. The
Buddha, as we saw, performed the same ritual of exorcism to smoke out those
insinuations. His definition of the 'world' with reference to the six sense-bases is
a corrective to that erroneous concept.
 Among the indeterminate points, too, we find questions relating to the nature
of the world, such as sassato loko - asassato loko, "the world is eternal - the
world is not eternal", and antavā loko - anantavā loko, "the world is finite - the
world is infinite". In all such contexts, the questioner had the prejudice of the
conventional concept of the world. The commentaries refer to it as
cakkavāḷaloka, the common concept of "world system". But the Buddha
advanced a profound definition of the concept of the world with reference to the
six bases of sense-contact.
In this connection, we come across a highly significant discourse in the
Saḷāyatanavagga of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. There we find the Buddha making the
following declaration to the monks.
Nāhaṃ, bhikkhave, gamanena lokassa antaṃ ñātayyaṃ, daṭṭhayyaṃ,
patteyyan'ti vadāmi. Na ca panāhaṃ, bhikkhave, appatvā lokassa antaṃ
dukkhassa antakiriyaṃ vadāmi.
"Monks, I do not say that by travelling one can come to know or see or reach
the end of the world. Nor do I say that without reaching the end of the world one
can put an end to suffering."
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2000: 1188):
“Bhikkhus, I say that the end of the world cannot be known, seen, or reached
by travelling. Yet, bhikkhus, I also say that without reaching the end of the
world there is no making an end to suffering.”
SĀ 234
“I do not say that a person reaches the end of the world by walking, and I also
do not say that without walking [the path] one reaches the end of the world
and the unsurpassed transcendence of dukkha.”
--------------------------------
After this riddle-like pronouncement, the Buddha gets up and retires to the
monastery. We came across this kind of problematic situation earlier too. Most
probably this is a device of the Buddha as the teacher to give his disciples an
opportunity to train in the art of analytical exposition of the Dhamma. After the
Buddha had left, those monks, perplexed by this terse and tantalizing
declaration, approached Venerable Ānanda and begged him to expound its
meaning at length. With some modest hesitation, as usual, Venerable Ānanda
agreed and came out with the way he himself understood the significance of the
Buddha's declaration in the following words.
Yena kho, āvuso, lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī, ayaṃ vuccati ariyassa
vinaye loko. Kena c'āvuso lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī?
Cakkhunā kho, āvuso, lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī, sotena ... ghānena
... jivhāya ... kāyena ... manena kho, āvuso, lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī.
Yena kho, āvuso, lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī, ayaṃ vuccati ariyassa
vinaye loko.
 "Friends, that by which one has a perception of the world and a conceit of the
world, that in this discipline of the noble ones is called 'the world'. By what,
friends, has one a perception of the world and a conceit of the world?
By the eye, friends, one has a perception of the world and a conceit of the
world, by the ear ... by the nose ... by the tongue ... by the body ... by the mind,
friends one has a perception of the world and a conceit of the world. That,
friends, by which one has a perception of the world and a conceit of the world,
that in this discipline of the noble ones is called 'the world'."
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2000: 1190):
“That in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the
world—this is called the world in the Noble One’s Discipline. And what, friends,
is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the
world? The eye is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a
conceiver of the world. The ear … The nose … The tongue … The body … The
mind is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver
of the world. That in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a
conceiver of the world—this is called the world in the Noble One’s Discipline.”
SĀ 234
“Whatever there is of a ‘world’, of naming a ‘world’, of experiencing a ‘world’,
of designating a ‘world’, of a linguistic expression of a ‘world’, it all enters into
being reckoned as a ‘world’ Venerable friends, that is, the eye is a ‘world’, a
naming of a ‘world’, an experiencing of a ‘world’, a designation of a ‘world’, a
linguistic expression of a ‘world’, it all enters into being reckoned a ‘world’.
“The ear … the nose … the tongue … the body … the mind is also like that.
“A learned noble disciple understands as it really is the arising of the six sense-
spheres, their cessation, their gratification, their danger, and the escape from
them. This is called a noble disciple who reaches the end of the world, who
understands the world and who, having been burdened by the world, has
transcended the world.”
(Next Ānanda also offers a verse summary)
--------------------------------
It seems, then, that the definition of the world in the discipline of the noble
ones is one that accords with radical attention, yoniso manasikāra, whereas the
concept of the world as upheld in those indeterminate points is born of wrong
attention, ayoniso manasikāra.
In the present age, too, scientists, when they speak of an 'end of the world',
entertain presumptions based on wrong attention.
When those monks who listened to Venerable Ānanda's exposition reported it
to the Buddha, he fully endorsed it. This definition, therefore, is as authentic as
the word of the Buddha himself and conclusive enough. It is on the basis of the
six sense-bases that the world has a perception of the 'world' and a conceit of the
'world'.
The conceit here meant is not pride as such, but the measuring characteristic
of worldly concepts. For instance, there is this basic scale of measuring length:
The inch, the span, the foot, the cubit and the fathom. These measurements
presuppose this body to be a measuring rod. In fact, all scales of measurement,
in some way or other, relate to one or the other of the six sense-bases. That is
why the above definition of the world is on the side of radical attention.
The worldling's concept of the world, conventionally so called, is the product
of wrong or non-radical attention. It is unreal to the extent that it is founded on
the notion of the compact, ghanasaññā. The existence of the world, as a whole,
follows the norm of arising and ceasing. It is by ignoring this norm that the
notion of the compact receives acceptance.
Two persons are watching a magic kettle on display at a science exhibition.
Water is endlessly flowing from the magic kettle to a basin. One is waiting until
the kettle gets empty, while the other waits to see the basin overflowing. Neither
of their wishes is fulfilled. Why? Because a hidden tube conducts the water in
the basin back again to the kettle. So the magic kettle never gets emptied and the
basin never overflows. This is the secret of the magic kettle.
The world also is such a magic kettle. Gigantic world systems contract and
expand in cyclic fashion. In the ancient term for world systems, cakkavāḷa, this
cyclic nature is already insinuated. Taken in a broader sense, the existence or
continuity of the world is cyclic, as indicated by the two terms saṃvaṭṭa and
vivaṭṭa, "contraction" and "expansion". In both these terms, the significant word
vaṭṭa, suggestive of "turning round", is seen to occur. It is as good as saying
"rise and fall", udayabbaya.
When one world system gets destroyed, another world system gets
crystallized, as it were. We hear of Brahmā mansions emerging. So the
existence of the world is a continuous process of arising and ceasing. It is in a
cycle. How can one find a point of beginning in a cycle? Can one speak of it as
'eternal' or 'non-eternal'? The question as a whole is fallacious.
On the other hand the Buddha's definition of the term loka, based on the
etymology lujjati, palujjatī'ti loko, is quite apt and meaningful. The world is all
the time in a process of disintegration. It is by ignoring this disintegrating nature
and by overemphasizing the arising aspect that the ordinary uninstructed
worldling speaks of a 'world' as it is conventionally understood. The world is
afflicted by this process of arising and passing away in every moment of its
existence.
It is to be found in our breathing, too. Our entire body vibrates to the rhythm
of this rise and fall. That is why the Buddha offered us a redefinition of the
world. According to the terminology of the noble ones, the world is to be
redefined with reference to the six bases of sense-contact. This includes mind
and mind-objects as well. In fact, the range of the six bases of sense-contact is
all comprehending. Nothing falls outside of it.