Republic v. TransUnion Corp.

Rule on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

G.R. No. 191590, April 21, 2014  The Court finds that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying Transunion’s motion to dismiss considering that the latter’s further
J. Perlas-Bernabe reconsideration or appeal of the investigation report was not a condition precedent to
Facts: the filing of the Republic’s reversion complaint. As such, there was no violation of
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies nor can it be said that the
Leticia Salamat filed an Application to Purchase Friar Lands with the CENRO of the DENR. reversion complaint stated no cause of action.
Her application was subsequently indorsed to the Land Management Bureau (LMB) for final
action. Thereafter, Salamat was informed that subject lot was already covered by a TCT in the  To elaborate, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that if a
name of Transunion. This prompted Salamat to file a Protest against Transunion with the remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
LMB. administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
Transunion filed with the LMB a motion to dismiss, alleging that Salamat had no legal judicial power can be sought. The underlying principle of the rule rests on the
personality to attack the validity of Transunion’s title, and that it is the RTC which has presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass
jurisdiction to try and decide cases involving cancellation of titles. LMB Director Adobo upon the matter will decide the same correctly.
denied the motion to dismiss.

After due proceedings, Atty. Mandar issued an investigation report recommending for the
annulment of the subject TCT and the reversion of subject lot to the government. The
recommendation was adopted by the Legal Division in its memorandum, which was later
approved by the LMB Director.

Neither Salamat nor Transunion were furnished copies of the investigation report or
memorandum.

Thereafter, a complaint for cancellation of title and/or reversion was filed by the Republic
against Transunion with the RTC.

Transunion filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the RTC.

Dissatisfied, Transunion elevated the matter on certiorari.

The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling, observing that no decision was rendered in LMB Case No.
114 and that Transunion was denied the right to be informed of the DENR’s official action as
well as the opportunity to contest said action. As such, it pronounced that the filing of the
Republic’s reversion complaint was premature and that the latter’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies was fatal to its cause of action.

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA,
hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly granted Transunion’s petition for certiorari against the RTC's
order denying the latter’s motion to dismiss.

Held:
Department of Finance v. Dela Cruz Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself from further hearing the case.

G.R. No. 209331, April 24, 2015 Issues:

J. Carpio 1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents;

Facts: 2. Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the action before
the RTC;
The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2 September
2013, which created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of 3. Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately
Finance (DOF) after its publication;

CPRO "shall be responsible for reviewing the customs administration... policies, rules and Ruling:
procedures, and thereafter providing sound recommendations for the improvement of the
same." Jurisdiction over the Petition: Civil Service Commission as jurisdiction over all employees
of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including
Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon... issued Customs government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. However, the petition
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel holding the went beyond questioning the detail of respondents.
positions of Collector of Customs V and VI,... including respondents in this case, to CPRO
"effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked."... approved by DOF Secretary Cesar  The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
V. Purisima (Secretary Purisima... espondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the corporations with original charters. The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila relating to the civil service. The rule is that disciplinary cases and cases involving
personnel actions, including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer,
Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO for a period... of 72 hours enjoining petitioners or reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation," are
any person acting for and in their behalf from implementing CPO 189-2013. Thereafter, the within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.
case was raffled to the sala of Judge Laron-Cacanindin.
 However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents.
Order of 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended Executive Judge Dela Cruz's 72-
Respondents further assailed the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013.
hour TRO for 20 days or until 21 October 2013. She then set the hearing for the issuance of a Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued even before EC) 140, pursuant
preliminary injunction on 18 October 2013.
to which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became effective. Respondents alleged that
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, with prayer for the CPO 189-2013 was issued to beat the deadline of the Commission on Elections' ban
issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. They alleged that the case on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 October 2013 due to the
involves personnel action affecting public officers which is... under the exclusive jurisdiction scheduled barangay elections. When respondents raised the issue of validity and
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Also, they alleged that respondents failed to exhaust constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of the
all administrative remedies available CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus,
the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action.
In their Comment, respondents alleged that the case involves the validity and constitutionality
of CPO 189-2013, and thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: Exceptions.

Respondents further alleged that EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code... etitioners  The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows administrative
alleged that respondents only assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify their filing of an action agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
for declaratory relief. specialized areas of their respective competence. The doctrine entails lesser expenses
and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Therefore, direct recourse
Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents' application for the issuance of a writ of to the trial court, when administrative remedies are available, is a ground for
preliminary injunction. dismissal of the action.
  The doctrine, however, is not without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013. As such,
o where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; EO 140 took effect on 17 September 2013.
o where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction;
o where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant;
o where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive;
o where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice;
o where judicial intervention is urgent;
o where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage;
o where the controverted acts violate due process;
o where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies had been
rendered moot;
o where there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;
o where strong public interest is involved; and
o in quo warranto proceedings.

 In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and
unconstitutional. Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary, and
oppressive. This case clearly falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be resorted to by respondents.

Effectivity of E.O. No. 140

The proviso "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to an effectivity date other than after
fifteen days following the completion of the law's publication.

 Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended by E.O. No. 200. Laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

 The proviso "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to an effectivity date other than
after fifteen days following the completion of the law's publication. Thus, it is within
the discretion of the legislature, or the Executive Department in this case, whether to
shorten or extend the fifteen-day period as long as there is compliance with the
requirement of publication.

 Here, Section 9 of EO 140 provides that the "order shall take effect immediately
upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was
 and responsibilities basically involved the preparation of an evaluation report submitted to his
immediate superior, Aranas.

Issue:

Whether or not Eijansantos is guilty for grave misconduct.

Law on Public Officers
Held:
Eijansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156
Powers of the Ombudsman: The Court will not interfere with the exercise by the
G.R. No. 203696, June 02, 2014 Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers on complaints filed against
erring public officials and employees.
J. Mendoza

Facts:  The long-standing policy of the Court is non-interference in the powers given by no

less than the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. Except in clear cases of
Special Presidential Task Force 156 (SPTF) was created by former President Joseph Estrada in grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the
October 1999 to review, investigate and gather evidence necessary to prosecute Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers on complaints filed
the commission of irregularities in the various offices and agencies of the DOF.  The life of against erring public officials and employees. Its findings of fact are conclusive
SPTF 156 was extended by former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo in October 2001. when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,
SPTF 156 was further mandated to investigate the irregularities committed at the Center and to especially when they are affirmed by the CA. 
recover and collect lost revenues.
Substantial Evidence is the only quantum of evidence needed in administrative proceedings.
Pursuant to its mandate, SPTF investigated the 11 public officials of the One Stop Shop Inter-
Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (Center) of the Department of Finance (DOF)  In an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at
for possible grave misconduct in connection with the anomalous issuance of thirty four (34) hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) amounting to at least P110,194,158.00 to Evergreen Weaving requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest
Mills, Inc (Evergreen). standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies.
Based on the Investigation Report, dated March 16, 2004, it appeared that Evergreen’s Because administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence
existence was questionable. The suppliers and buyers were inexistent or could no longer be adequate to support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative
found. The sales invoices and delivery receipts which were used as bases of the tax credit offense have been performed (or have not been performed), reasonable doubt
claims of Evergreen were fake and the TCC transfers were fictitious. does not ipso facto result in exoneration unlike in criminal proceedings where guilt
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
For said reason, SPTF 156 Executive Director Atty. Alan A. Ventura, through a complaint-
affidavit,5 filed criminal charges for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, as  In this case, there is ample substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the
amended, and Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents, against those involved in the petitioner committed an act constitutive of grave misconduct. It need not be
aforesaid anomalous transactions, and likewise administrative charges for grave misconduct emphasized that from January 1994 to June 1998, a total of thirty-four (34) TCCs
against the public officials abovementioned. worth at least 110,194,158.00 were issued to Evergreen. 
Prosecution and Monitoring Bureau (PAMB) of the Ombudsman – the 11 public officials were
guilty of grave misconduct with the penalty of dismissal from the service including all
its accessory penalties and without prejudice to criminal prosecution.

CA – Affirmed.

Subsequently, Eijansantos filed a petition for review before the CA assailing the decision and
order of the Ombudsman. He argued, among others, that he could not be held guilty of grave
misconduct as he dutifully performed his responsibilities as evaluator; that his duties
 additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must
necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct."

 In this case, Alcantara and Jacinto admitted to taking and encashing checks of their
co-workers without permission. There is no doubt that their acts of repeatedly
stealing the checks and forging the signatures of their co-workers constitute grave
misconduct and dishonesty. Their alleged remorse for what they have done does not
erase the transgression they committed. "This Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks
Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Reynaldo C. Alcantara, Utility Worker I, Br. 70 of undesirables who undermine its efforts toward an effective and efficient
and Joseph C. Jacinto, Electrician, Hall of Justice, RTC Burgos Pangasinan administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public."

A.M. No. P-15-3296, February 17, 2015

Per Curiam.

Facts:

This case stemmed from an undated Letter-Complaint, addressed to Executive Judge Elpidio
N. Abella (Executive Judge Abella), Regional Trial Court, Alaminos City, Pangasinan,
charging respondents Reynaldo C. Alcantara (Alcantara) and Joseph C. Jacinto (Jacinto) with
the commission of several illegal activities in violation of Civil Service Rules. Alcantara
worked as Utility Worker I, Branch 70, Regional Trial Court, Burgos, Pangasinan, whereas
Jacinto was an electrician at the Hall of Justice in the same city.

In the Report dated July 17, 2013, Executive Judge Abella recommended that Alcantara and
Jacinto be immediately dismissed from service. He found that as early as 2009, Alcantara and
Jacinto received and encashed checks of their co-workers without consent.

Executive Judge Abella found that Alcantara's and Jacinto's actions constituted grave
misconduct and recommended their dismissal from service. It is likewise very clear that the
checks were encashed in another bank. . . forging the signatures of the payees.

Issue:

Whether or not Alcantara’s and Jacinto’s actions were constituted as grave misconduct.

Held:

Definition: Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct

 Dishonesty is defined as the "[disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of, integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray."[32]
 
 Grave misconduct is committed when there has been '"a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.' The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
  Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer
is entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional
disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer.

 In this case, the respondent committed insubordination when she failed to promptly

act on the June 16, 2000 memorandum15 issued by her superior, Regional Director
CSC and DOST v. Arandia Nepomuceno, reminding her of her duties to immediately turn-over documents to
and exchange room assignments with the new Administrative Officer-Designate,
G.R. No. 199549, April 7, 2014 Engr. Lucena. The subject memorandum was a lawful order issued to enforce
Special Order No. 23, s. of 2000 reassigning the respondent from Administrative to
J. Brion Planning Officer, and which warranted the respondent’s obedience and compliance.

Facts: Penalty of Insubordination, if a person is no longer a public official: The penalty of a fine

of one-month salary, which amount is to be deducted from her retirement benefits or from
Eriberta Nepomuceno, Regional Director of DOST-V, filed an administrative complaint4 for whatever benefits, if any, that she is still entitled to receive after her resignation. If there is
gross insubordination, gross neglect of duty, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of none, the respondent is ordered to pay the fine directly to and within the period to be
public service, grave misconduct and gross inefficiency in the performance of duty against directed by the CSC.
the respondent with the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. V (CSCRO-V),
Legazpi City.  Insubordination is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and
one day to six months. Since we merely found the respondent guilty of
Nepomuceno alleged that the respondent refused to sign, without justifiable cause, documents insubordination in not promptly complying with the memoranda for the tum-over of
for the payment of certain... miscellaneous and travelling expenses, phone bills, and the documents, we find the suspension of one month and one day as sufficient penalty
release of salaries and allowances of Nepomuceno and other employees of DOST-V. for her offense.

The respondent justified her refusal to sign and attributed it to the failure of Nepomuceno and  Considering, however, that respondent is no longer with DOST-V and is now
the other concerned employees to submit sufficient supporting documents for their claims working abroad, we can no longer impose on her the penalty of suspension from
for reimbursement and the release of their salaries and allowances. service. In lieu thereof, we impose on the respondent the penalty of a fine of one-
month salary, which amount is to be deducted from her retirement benefits or from
Director Cecilia R. Nieto of CSCRO-V found respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the whatever benefits, if any, that she is still entitled to receive after her resignation. If
best interest of the service only and imposed on her the penalty of suspension for six months there is none, the respondent is ordered to pay the fine directly to and within the
and one day.  The respondent... filed a motion for reconsideration but Director Nieto denied period to be directed by the CSC.
the motion in a subsequent order dated June 8, 2006. She then appealed her case to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) National Office.

The CSC partially found merit in respondent's appeal... the CSC still found the respondent
liable for insubordination for her refusal to obey several memoranda issued by Nepomuceno...
the CA ruled in the respondent's favor and dismissed the administrative complaint filed against
the respondent after it found that she actually complied with the subject office memoranda.

Issue:

The sole issue raised in the present petition for review on certiorari is the respondent’s liability
for insubordination.

Held:

Definition: Insubordination
 with forfeiture of all benefits, except leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Issue:
Whether Obispo is guilty of grave misconduct and violates Canon 1, Section 2 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel.
Velasco v. Obispo
Held:
A.M. No. P-13-3160, November 10, 2014
Yes.
J. Reyes
The behavior of all court employees is circumscribed with heavy responsibility. Their
Facts: conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times.
 Time and time again, the Court has stressed that the behaviour of all employees and
This administrative case concerns the liability of a court personnel charged with allegedly officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior
soliciting and receiving money in consideration for a favourable decision in the Petition for clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed before the trial court. by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the
public's respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel
Lolita Rayala Velasco (complainant) charged respondent Geraldo Obispo (Obispo), Utility must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
Worker of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, with Grave Misconduct and uprightness.
Violation of Republic Act No. 3019.
Court employees are not allowed to solicit nor accept any gift, favour, or benefit.
Complainant alleged that sometime in 2010, some court employees in San Pedro, Laguna  Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that "court
introduced her to Obispo, who can allegedly help her in the filing of the Petition for personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favour or benefit based on any explicit
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (Petition) of her son, Carlos R. Velasco II (Carlos) and or implicit understanding that such gift, favour or benefit shall influence their
daughter-in-law, Ria Samia Velasco (Ria). According to the complainant, Obispo assured her official actions," while Section 2(e), Canon III states that "court personnel shall not
that he can work out the annulment of marriage without the couple's appearance in court. x x x solicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favour, hospitality or service
under circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose
Immediately, Obispo demanded money from the complainant. As such, the latter issued a of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing official duties."
Metrobank check dated September 22, 2010 amounting to P75,000.00 in favour of Obispo. On
November 2, 2010, the complainant made the second payment in the amount of P10,000.00.  Undoubtedly, Obispo's act of soliciting money constitutes grave misconduct in
office which is appalling. The mere fact that he received money from the
However, the complainant averred that the annulment of marriage did not materialize. complainant inescapably creates a notion that he could facilitate the favourable
Consequently, she demanded the return of the P85,000.00 she made in favour of Obispo. In resolution of the case pending before the court. Such behaviour puts not only the
reply, Obispo requested that the refund be made in instalment. The complainant, however, did court personnel involved, but the Judiciary as well, in a bad light.
not agree and demanded that full payment be made.
First offense and lack of bad faith are mitigating circumstances.
In Obispo’s Comment, He denied that he gave assurance to the complainant that he could
work out the petition without the appearance of the parties in court. He claimed that he merely  In Baygar, Sr. v. Judge Panontongan, et al., respondent Tirana, Process Server of the
recommended to the complainant a lawyer who could handle the case and a psychologist who Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 1, was found guilty of soliciting
could conduct the required psychological evaluation of the couple. Also, he claimed that he from the wife of the accused the amount of P3,020.00 with the promise that he
merely told the complainant that Ria would appear in court only once during the time when would assist in facilitating the release of the accused from jail. The OCA
she will give her testimony. Nonetheless, he admitted receiving from the complainant the recommended respondent Tirana's dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
amount of P85,000.00 as he was authorized by the lawyer to receive it on his behalf. He retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-
alleged that the money was turned over to the lawyer upon the latter's return. employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court, however, found the
OCA - found Obispo guilty of grave misconduct and violation of Canon 1, Section 2 of the recommended penalty of dismissal too harsh, it appearing that this was respondent
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; and, thus, recommended his dismissal from the service Tirana's first offense in his 21 years in government service. As such, the Court ruled
 that suspension for one (1) year without pay was already sufficient penalty under the
circumstances.

 Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, grants the disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty.

 Applying the rationale in the aforesaid judicial precedents and rules, the Court
considers as mitigating circumstances the fact that this is the first infraction of
Obispo and more importantly, the lack of bad faith on his part in committing the act
complained of. The records show that Obispo merely helped the complainant
facilitate the annulment proceedings of the marriage of her son, Carlos, and Ria.
According to Obispo, his assistance was limited only to his recommendation of a
lawyer and a psychologist who were accordingly engaged for the filing of the case in
court. True to his words and defense, a careful review of the records show that a
portion of the money which Obispo received from the complainant was indeed used
as payment for the professional fees of the lawyer and psychologist, the filing fees
for the petition, and Sheriffs fees. As a matter of fact, the Petition was shown to have
been filed before the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 109, and the receipts 16 attached
therewith show that the required court fees were paid personally by Atty. Juanito P.
Noel, the counsel secured by Obispo for Ria. Nonetheless, for reasons not attributed
to the fault or deceit committed by Obispo, the Petition was dismissed at the instance
of Ria, who filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition to save her marriage with Carlos.
Accordingly, the Court finds that penalty of one (1) year suspension will suffice
given the facts and circumstances hereof.
 2. Whether her conviction and eventual discharge from probation prevent another
administrative case to be filed against her.
3. Whether the second administrative case was already barred by the prior administrative case
filed against Salvador.

Held:

Pagaduan v. Civil Service Commission 1. Yes.

G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014 Elements of crime involving moral turpitude: (1) conviction of a crime has attained finality;
and (2) the crime for which the accused was convicted was involves moral turpitude.
J. Mendoza  In resolving the issue of whether Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, the existence of only two elements is necessary: (1) the conviction of a
Facts: crime, which conviction has attained finality; and (2) the crime for which the
accused was convicted involves moral turpitude. There is no dispute as to the first
Petitioner Cecilia Pagaduan (Pagaduan) filed a notarized complaint with the Civil Service element, leaving Us to determine the presence of the other.
Commission against respondent Rema Martin Salvador (Salvador), newly appointed
Municipal Budget Officer at that time, charging her with the administrative offenses of Moral Turpitude everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals.
falsification and misrepresentation.  Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
Pagaduan alleged that Salvador did not actually possess the necessary budgeting experience social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
required by her position; and that although she indicated in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) that the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
she performed bookkeeping and accounting functions for Veteran's Woodworks, Inc. (VWI) conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Not every criminal
from August 1, 1990 to February 15, 1992, she was never in fact employed by the said entity. act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that the Court has to
determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.
In Salvador’s defense, she averred that that she was employed by Alfonso Tuzon, who was
granted full management, direct supervision and control of Veterans Woodworks’ logging The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good
operations; her name does not appear on the VVI payroll because Tuzon’s office was morals, and therefore, involves moral turpitude.
independent of the original staff. Pagaduan also filed a case for falsification of public  In the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces, the Court disbarred a lawyer on the
documents before the MTCC of Tuguegarao City. ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having found that
the said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
On the administrative case, Salvador was found liable for Simple Misconduct only and the Similarly, in In Re - Attorney Jose Avanceña, 42 the said lawyer was disbarred from
CSC approved her qualification as it was a “related field”. Pagaduan did not appeal this the practice of law due to a conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
ruling. The MTCC subsequently convicted Salvador for falsification of public documents; she turpitude after being convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
did not appeal this ruling, instead she applied for probation which was granted by the MTCC. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in GR. No. 161455 under Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, the Court reiterated that the
Thereafter, Pagaduan filed a second administrative complaint against Salvador, this time for crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and good
the offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Salvador submitted the morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.
required counter affidavit, raising the defenses of res judicata, forum shopping, and double
jeopardy on account of the finality of the decision in the first administrative complaint for  Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public
falsification. After finding a prima facie case in the second administrative complaint, Salvador document is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as
was formally charged. To answer the charges against her, she adopted her defenses in her therein solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of
counter-affidavit and submitted documents to support her cause. conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case. The Court
does not have to look beyond what is simply apparent from the surrounding
Issues: circumstances.
1. Whether Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
2. No. complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds were separate and distinct
from each other and entailed different sets of facts.
Probation does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the penalty.
Probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused, and not of his administrative Elements of Litis Pendentia: (1) Identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the
liabilities. same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of two preceding particulars.
 Finally, Salvador argues that her conviction and eventual discharge from probation
presents another administrative case to be filed against her because to do so would  Corollarily, Pagaduan cannot be liable for forum shopping. The established rule is
defeat the purpose of the Probation Law which was to erase the effect of conviction that for forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions,
and to restore civil rights that were lost or suspended. Suffice it to state that same essential facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of actions,
probation does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the subject matter, and issues. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present,
penalty imposed. While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same
human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon, probation does not interests in both actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
obliterate the crime for which the person under probation has been convicted. The the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two
reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannot justify his retention in the preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case,
government service. Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
accused, and not his administrative liabilities, if any. other." Since no res judicata exists, no forum shopping either exists in this case.

 Even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the principal penalty
imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if the administrative case had
been decided earlier than die criminal case, still the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal could not have been suspended by the grant of probation.

3. No.

Principle of Res Judicata is applicable either by way of “bar by prior judgment” or by

“conclusiveness of judgment”.
 Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or
question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in
a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by
final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with
them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment
or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or
petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any
future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-
interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the
same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues
are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

 Contrary to Salvador's contention, however, there appears to be no identity of issues

and facts in the two administrative cases. The first case involved facts necessary to
resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The second one
involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue in
the first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second case. The only fact to
consider in the second administrative complaint is the fact of conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, it must be borne in mind that both administrative
  Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in this administrative
case, is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. This standard is satisfied in the present case so long
as there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if the evidence may not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.

Impersonation Theory: It is already settled that the persons being impersonated actually
consent to the impersonation.
Civil Service Commission v. Herminigildo Andal
 In Donato v. CSC, In the offense of impersonation, there are always two persons
A.M. No. SB-12-19-P, November 18, 2014 involved. The offense cannot prosper without the active participation of both
persons. Further, by engaging or colluding with another person to take the test in his
Per Curiam. behalf and thereafter by claiming the resultant passing rate as his, clinches the case
against him. In cases of impersonation, the Commission has consistently rejected
Facts: claims of good faith, for "it is contrary to human nature that a person will do
(impersonation) without the consent of the person being impersonated."
At bench is an administrative case involving respondent Herminigildo L. Andal, employed as
permanent Security Guard II of the Sandiganbayan. The investigating officer, Sandiganbayan  By perpetrating his false eligibility and letting it remain on record, respondent
Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado, found him guilty of dishonesty for allowing another concealed and distorted the truth in a matter of fact relevant to his office. His actions
person to take his 2000 Civil Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test thus speak of his disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
(CSPE-CAT). Justice Jurado recommended that respondent be meted out the principal penalty lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; and lack of
of suspension from office for one year, and the accessory penalties of being barred from taking fairness and straightforwardness.
any civil service examination and disqualification from promotion.

Petitioner CSC claimed that respondent had applied for the CSPE-CAT scheduled for 24 In Dishonesty case, the mitigating circumstances of satisfactory performance, length of
January 2000 and that it appeared that he passed the test with a rating of 81.08%.  But based on service, and non-utilization of the acquired eligibility cannot be appreciated.
the differing photographs in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) and his Civil Service Application
Form, the CSC averred that he had not taken the test himself.  The court ruled that the reduced penalty of suspension cannot be justified by the
alleged mitigating circumstances of satisfactory performance, length of service and
Respondent admitted that he could not have taken the test on 24 January 2000, since he was in non-utilization of the acquired eligibility.
the province nursing an alcohol hangover. As his defense, he maintained that he had not
authorized another person to take the test for him. Respondent alleged that the impersonation  Dishonesty cannot be tolerated from government officials or employees, even when
was perpetrated by a group of employees who disliked him for revealing their drinking sprees
official duties are performed well. Accordingly, this Court maintains its exacting
and doping sessions to their superiors. He further narrated that in 2007, he learned from his co-
employee, Larry Lincallo, that the impersonator was Emmerson Nucom, the latter's high standards for those who seek to be employed in its fold. While we recognize that
school classmate. Aggrieved, respondent executed a Complaint-Affidavit  in 2012 charging respondent stands to lose his source of support for himself and his family, the Court
Nucom with impersonation before the CSC. cannot turn a blind eye to what is clearly a transgression of the law.  Dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Thus, similar to the fate of prior
Issue: employees who falsified their eligibility requirement, we castigate the grave offense
Whether Andal is guilty of Dishonesty. of respondent by imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from service.

Held:

Yes.

Substantial Evidence is the quantum of proof required in an administrative case.

  CA correctly overturned Ombudsman’s findings and conclusions, and explained the
reasons for exculpating Caberoy, respondent Ombudsman contradicted itself when it
found and held that petitioner was guilty of "oppression" for not paying the private
respondent her June 2002 salary, because as a matter of fact she has been paid albeit
delayed. Such payment is clearly and indubitably established from the table where it
was shown that private respondent received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002
salary in the amounts of P4,613.80 and P4,612.00, respectively.

 Even assuming, as the Ombudsman asserted, that Tuares received her June 2002
salary only on July 2002, the same does not constitute Oppression or Grave Abuse
Ombudsman v. Caberoy of Authority. The delay in the release of Tuares' salary hardly qualifies as an "act of
cruelty or severity or excessive use of authority," especially when she contributed to
G.R. No. 188066, October 22, 2014 the cause of the delay, that is, she submitted her Form 48 (Daily Time Record) for
June 2002 only on July 11, 2002.
J. Reyes
 It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil Service
Facts: laws, bad faith must attend the act complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn
Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
Iloilo City. She was charged with Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of RA No. There must be evidence, independent of the fact of such delay, which will lead to the
3019 or the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” by Tuares for allegedly withholding her inevitable conclusion that it was for the purpose of singling out Tuares. The Court
salary for the month of June 2002. has consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be disciplined
for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence against the respondent
The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her should be competent and must be derived from direct knowledge. Reliance on mere
failure to submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST), while allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with
the other teachers received their salaries for the same month. The Ombudsman concluded that no leg to stand on.
Tuares was “singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any
amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to
submit her clearance and PAST.”

Issue:
Whether or not Caberoy is guilty of Oppression and violation of Sec. 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019.

Held:

No.

Public Officers, Administrative Liability for Oppression (Abuse of Authority)

 Oppression is an administrative offense penalized under the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. xxx Oppression is also known as grave
abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who
under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of
authority. To be held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of
Authority, there must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s
allegations.
 Held:

1. No. Dela Cruz’s appointment is valid in accordance with the next-in-rank rule.

Career Service v. Non-Career Service

 The qualifications the appointee must satisfy depend on whether the position
belongs to the career service or the non-career service. Entrance in the career service
is based on "merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examination, or based on highly technical qualifications. On the other hand, entrance
in the non-career service is based on criteria other than the "usual tests of merit and
Abad v. Dela Cruz
fitness.
G.R. No. 207422, March 25, 2015

J. Leonen Three Levels in Career Service

Facts:  The first level includes positions requiring less than four (4) years of collegiate
studies.
Mayor of Muntinlupa, upon the concurrence of the majority of members of the Sangguniang  The second level includes positions with duties requiring at least four (4) years of
Panlungsod of the City Government of Muntinlupa, appointed the respondent (Dela Cruz) on college work up to the Division Chief level.
2006 as City Assessor in a permanent capacity as City Government Department Head III.  The third level includes positions in the Career Executive Service.
Petitioner (Abad), Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of the City Assessor,  Candidates for appointment to first and second level positions are generally screened
requested the disapproval of Dela Cruz’s appointment, alleging that the position of City by the Personnel Selection Board. In local government units, the Personnel Selection
Government Department Head III corresponded to Salary Grade 27, 9 salary grades higher Board is headed by the local chief executive and is composed of members appointed
than Dela Cruz’s former position as Local Assessment Operations Officer III with Salary by the sanggunian concerned. The Personnel Selection Board of each local
Grade 18. According to Abad, Dela Cruz’s appointment violated Item 15 of CSC government unit "assist[s] the local chief executive in the judicious and objective
Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001, which prohibits the promotion of an employee to selection of personnel for employment as well as . . . promotion.
a position more than 3 salary grades above his or her former position. Abad added that he and
 The appointing authority in local government units, therefore, is the local chief
3 other qualified applicants were allegedly excluded from the selection process, in violation of
executive who must assess the merits of the Personnel Selection Board's
Item 10 of the same Memorandum Circular, which is the automatic consideration of all the
recommendation. If heads of offices or departments in a local government unit are
next-in-rank employees for promotions to the next higher position.
appointed, majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned must concur in the
appointment. Finally, the appointment must be submitted to the Civil Service
On 2009, CSC-NCR invalidated the appointment of Dela Cruz which the latter  appealed to
Commission for attestation within 30 days from the appointment's issuance date.
CSC  which revered the CSC-NCR’s decision stating that applicants for City Government
Department Head III based on the following criteria: performance, work history, awards,
Appointment of an Assessor is Mandatory
education, training, potential, and physical characteristics and personality traits. Commission
ruled that Dela Cruz’s appointment was an exception to the three-salary-grade rule.
 For local government units, the appointment of an assessor is mandatory.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court dismissed Abad’s petition ruling that the three-  Section 472(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that no person shall
salary-grade rule only gives preference to the person occupying the position next in rank to a be appointed assessor unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local
vacancy, but does not by any means give the employee next in rank the exclusive right to be government unit concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college degree
appointed to the said vacancy.  As long as the employee appointed to the position possesses preferably in civil or mechanical engineering, commerce, or any other related course
the minimum qualifications for the position, the appointment is valid. from a recognized college or university, and a first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent. He must have acquired experience in real property assessment work or in
Issues: any related field for at least five (5) years in the case of the city or provincial
1. Whether Dela Cruz’s appointment is void for the violation of the next-in-rank rule. assessor, and three (3) years in the case of the municipal assessor.
2. Whether Dela Cruz’s appointment is an exception to the three-salary grade limitation.
  Item 15 of CSC Memorandum Circular, Series of 2001 on the three-salary-grade
Next-in-rank Rule: The appointing authority must automatically consider the employees rule states that “an employee may be promoted or transferred to a position which is
next-in-rank as candidates for appointment, insofar as promotion is concerned. not more than 3 salary, pay or job grades higher than the employee’s present
position.” However, this rule is subject to the exception of “very meritorious cases.”
 Section 21, paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Civil Service Law provide for the next-in- These “very meritorious cases” are provided in CSC Resolution No. 03-0106 dated
rank rule, to wit: January 24, 2003:
o When a vacancy occurs in a position in the first level of the Career Service  Any or all of the following would constitute a meritorious case exempted from the
as defined in Section 6, the employees in the department who occupy the 3-salary grade limitation on promotion:
next lower positions in the occupational group under which the vacant
position is classified, and in other functionally related occupational groups 1.The position occupied by the person is next-in- rank to the vacant position, as identified
and who are competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil service in the Merit Promotion Plan and the System of Ranking Positions (SRP) of the agency;
eligibility shall be considered for promotion. 2.The position is a lone, or entrance position, as indicated in the agency’s staffing pattern;
o When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second level of the Career 3.The position belongs to the dearth category, such as Medical Officer/Specialist
Service as defined in Section 8, the employees in the government service positions and Attorney positions;
who occupy the next lower positions in the occupational group under 4.The position is unique and/or highly specialized such as Actuarial positions and
which the vacant position is classified and in other functionally related Airways Communicator;
occupational groups and who are competent, qualified and with the 5.The candidates passed through a deep selection process, taking into consideration the
appropriate civil service eligibility shall be considered for promotion. candidates’ superior qualifications in regard to:
 "Promotion is the advancement of an employee from one position to another with an -Educational achievements Highly specialized trainings Relevant work experience
increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually -Consistent high performance rating/ranking; and
accompanied by an increase in salary." Employees next in rank are those "who 6.The vacant position belongs to the closed career system.
occupy the next lower positions in the occupational group under which the vacant
position is classified, and in other functionally related occupational groups and who  In the case at bar, Dela Cruz’s appointment falls under the 5 th exception. Contrary to
are competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil service eligibility. petitioner’s claim, the Personnel Selection Board conducted a deep selection
 The reason behind the next-in-rank rule is to maintain the policy of merit and process, ranking the candidates for the position of City Government Department
rewards in the civil service. Since appointments in the civil service are based on Head III based on approved criteria. Respondent’s case, therefore, is a “very
merit and fitness, it is assumed that the appointments of employees next in rank are meritorious case” and is valid.
equally meritorious. Appointments that consider rank, salary grades, and seniority
promote progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service.
 Still, the next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion.
The rule does not give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next
higher to theirs should that position become vacant. [81] Appointment is a
discretionary power of the appointing authority.  So long as the appointee possesses
the qualifications required by law, the appointment is valid.
 To successfully protest the issuance of an appointment, the employee next in rank
must prove his or her status as a qualified next-in-rank; otherwise, the protest shall
be dismissed. Being next in rank is a legal conclusion that would be the result of
inference from evidence properly alleged and proven. The burden of proof rests on
the employee alleging that he or she is next in rank.
 Here, Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving that he was a qualified
next-in-rank. He failed to prove that his position of Local Assessment Operations
Officer V has been previously determined to be next-in-rank to the position of City
Government Department Head III in the Office of the City Assessor of the City
Government of Muntinlupa.

2. Yes. Dela Cruz’s appointment is an exception to the three-salary grade limitation.

  
De Guzman received a copy of the Assailed Memorandum on November 6, 2010 and appealed
her dismissal before the CSC on December 10, 2010. PAGCOR opposed the appeal for having
been belatedly filed

CSC - the CSC ruled in favor of De Guzman and dismissed the administrative disciplinary
case against her, without prejudice to its re-filing.  CSC found that the Formal Charge and the
Assailed Memorandum were not issued by the proper disciplinary authority – PAGCOR in this
case – but merely by its employees, namely Atty. Sordan and HRDD-OIC Bailey,
respectively.

PAGCOR v. De Guzman CA – affirmed CSC ruling

G.R. No. 207422, March 25, 2015 Issue:

whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the CSC’s dismissal of the administrative
J. Perlas-Bernabe disciplinary case against De Guzman on the ground that she was deprived of her right to due
process.
Facts:
Held:
PAGCOR hired De Guzman as an Evaluation Specialist and assigned her to the Property and
Procurement Department. At the time of her employment, De Guzman accomplished a Yes.
Personal History Statement (PHS), which requires an attestation8 from the employee that the
information stated therein are true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief, and The power to remove or discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to
agreed that any misdeclaration or omission would be sufficient ground for denial of her appoint is vested.
application, clearance, or cause for separation. 
 Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
In her PHS, De Guzman indicated that she had no relatives currently employed with PAGCOR (URACCS) requires in administrative disciplinary proceedings that the disciplinary
and did not disclose that she has a sister named Adelina P. See (Adelina). authority furnish the employee concerned a formal charge specifying the latter’s acts
and/or omissions complained of, and directing him to answer the charges stated
In 2008, De Guzman updated her PHS, reiterating her statement that she had no relatives therein.
working with PAGCOR, but this time, listed Adelina as one of her siblings.  In the case at bar, it is undisputed that PAGCOR was the one that appointed De
Guzman to her position. Adhering to the well-settled principle that the power to
It was later found out, however, that De Guzman had a nephew named Gerwin P. See, her remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to
sister Adelina’s son, who worked in PAGCOR from July 26, 2001 until his resignation on appoint is vested, only PAGCOR has the power to discipline or remove De Guzman
September 22, 2005. for any transgressions she may have committed. As a corporate entity, PAGCOR
may only act through its Board of Directors as a collective body, which is vested
Upon discovery of De Guzman’s alleged deceit, Atty. Albert R. Sordan (Atty. Sordan) of with the power and responsibility to exercise all corporate powers under the law.
PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit sent De Guzman a Notice of Charges dated August Simply put, PAGCOR is the proper disciplinary authority of PAGCOR employees,
12, 2010 (Formal Charge) charging her of “Deception or Fraud in Securing Employee’s and as such, formal charges against its employees in administrative disciplinary
Appointment or Promotion” and directed her to show cause why she should not be subjected proceedings should emanate from it, through its Board of Directors, as in this case.
to any disciplinary action. In her reply-letter 15 dated August 16, 2010, De Guzman, among
other things, maintained that she updated her PHS with all honesty and to the best of her  However, in this instance, the Formal Charge, as well as the Assailed Memorandum,
knowledge. did not come from PAGCOR through its Board of Directors, but merely from Atty.
Sordan and HRDD-OIC Bailey, respectively. Records are bereft of any showing that
In a Memorandum dated November 5, 2010 (Assailed Memorandum) signed by Michael J. the latter were authorized by the PAGCOR Board of Directors to issue the aforesaid
Bailey, Officer-In-Charge of PAGCOR’s Human Resource and Development Department documents. As such, the Formal Charge and the Assailed Memorandum are null and
(HRDD-OIC Bailey), De Guzman was found administratively liable for the charges filed void. Consequently, De Guzman’s removal from PAGCOR without a valid formal
against her and was, thus, dismissed. charge was done in violation of her right to due process, warranting the dismissal of
 the instant administrative disciplinary case against her, without prejudice to its re- nonetheless, performed the functions of the position from that time up to the date of
filing. disapproval of her appointment on 3 December 2009 and even thereafter.  Hence, she was
considered to have met the minimum qualification required for the position.

CSCFO forwarded to Hon. Luis “Chavit” Singson (Governor Singson), successor of Governor
Savellano as Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, a photocopy of the decision for his
information and appropriate action. Gov. Singson filed a notice of appeal before the
Commission. The petition was anchored on the main argument that Argel is not qualified to
the Nurse II position as she lacks four (4) months of relevant experience at the time she was
appointed on 15 September 2009.

CSCROI denied the petition on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time.

Hence, this petition.

Argel v. Singson
Issue:
G.R. No. 202970, March 25, 2019 WON Argel is qualified to the Nurse II position.

J. Perez Held:

Facts: Yes.

Argel was appointed by then Ilocos Sur Governor Deogracias Victor B. Savellano (Governor  CSC Memorandum Circular No. 03, series of 2001 provides that the appointing
Savellano) as Nurse II under permanent status at the Gabriela Silang General Hospital authority may appoint an applicant who is not next-in-rank but possesses superior
effective 15 September 2009.  In accordance with procedure, her appointment was submitted qualification and competence and has undergone selection process.
to the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSCFO) – Ilocos Sur for evaluation.
 We give weight to the letter of Dr. Singson who attested and affirmed that Argel is
On 3 December 2009, the CSCFO-Ilocos Sur disapproved the appointment of Argel on the an asset/highly skilled/qualified for the subject position and that she only wanted the
ground that she failed to meet the one (1) year experience required for the position.  It was latter to have the Nurse II position because “she was the only trained staff to handle
pointed out that she still lacks four (4) months of relevant experience. technical work of the Provincial Health Office.”  Likewise, we give weight to the
fact that Argel’s appointment underwent scrutiny by the governor, as appointing
Dr. Carmela T. Singson (Dr. Singson) filed a motion for reconsideration. She claimed that authority; the selection board; and the Chief of Office where she was assigned.
Argel rendered services at the Gabriela Silang General Hospital from 15 July 2008 to 15
January 2009 (six months) as a volunteer and from 8 July 2010 to 8 January 2010 (six months)  We emphasize that Argel’s permanent appointment was approved by the CSCRO1
as contractual nurse or for a total of twelve months.  She concluded that Argel has completed and affirmed by the Commission in a decision which eventually attained finality.  It
the experience requirement as of 8 January 2010. is for this reason that she acquired a vested legal right to the position and therefore,
can no longer be removed therefrom except for valid causes.
Dr. Singson’s MR was denied. It explained that Nurse II has lower positions that are
considered next-in-rank, i.e, Nurse I.  It explained that those holding next-in-rank positions
should be given preference in consonance with the provisions of CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 3, s. 2001 or the Revised Policies on Merit Promotion Plan, which was also adopted by the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur for its Merit Promotion Plan.

Argel filed an appeal with the CSCROI assailing the disapproval of her appointment by
CSCFO-Ilocos Sur.

CSCROI granted the appeal. It held that although at the time the appointment was issued to
Argel on 15 September 2009 she lacked four (4) months of relevant experience, she,
 Supervising Auditor Abril denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Jimenez. Thereafter,
she submitted her Answer to the appeal of Chairman Nañagas arguing that his appeal did not
address the substance of the disallowance, to which he replied reiterating his arguments in his
appeal.

The Legal Services Sector of the COA denied the appeal of Chairman Nañagas. It held that
notwithstanding the DBP’s exemption from the Salary Standardization Law, it is still required
to comply with administrative directives, such as the AO No. 103, which was clearly violated
when the DBP directors travelled abroad without prior approval of the Office of the President.
Consequently, Chairman Nañagas filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

The COA further denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and added that the Opinion
of the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel cannot be equated to the required presidential
approval, since the same is not a definitive decision which sufficiently excluded DBP officials
DBP v. COA from the required clearance.

G.R. No. 202733, September 30, 2014 Issue:

1. Whether the prior clearance from the President is required on Foreign Travels.
J. Peralta 2. WON the Opinion of the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel may be deemed the act of the
President.
Facts:
Held:
The Corporate Auditor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Adela L.
Dondonilla, issued Audit Observation Memorandum noting that the foreign travels of former 1. Yes.
DBP Chairman Vitaliano N. Nañagas II and former Director Eligio V. Jimenez were not
cleared by the Office of the President as required by Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO)  As correctly observed by respondent COA, the provision applicable to the case at
No. 103. hand is not Section 5, as asserted by petitioner, but Section 8 under Title II, EO No.
248, as amended by EO No. 298, which provides that All official travels abroad of
The DBP Assistant Corporate Secretary, Maria L. Ramos, submitted its comments and actions Department Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, heads, senior
taken on said foreign travels and stated that while the same did not have prior clearance from assistant heads and assistant heads of government-owned and/or controlled
the Office of the President, they were made in good faith and in the discharge of the corporations and financial institutions, and heads of local government units like
duties, functions, and responsibilities as directors of the Bank. Provincial Governors and Mayors of highly urbanized cities or
independent component cities, and other officials of equivalent rank whose nature
The DBP Supervising Auditor, Hilconeda P. Abril, issued Notice of Disallowance disallowing of travel falls under the categories prescribed in this Order shall be subject to the
the amount of P1,574,121.62 consisting of P678,992.76 and P895,128.86 for prior approval of the President of the Philippines. All other positions concerned shall
the reimbursement of travel expenses of Chairman Nañagas and Director Jimenez, be with prior approval of their respective Department Secretaries and their
respectively, on the basis of the absence of clearance thereon from the Office of the President. equivalent; Provided, That, travel that will last for more than one (1) calendar month
shall also be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines.
Director Jimenez requested for a reconsideration of the disallowance arguing that the
questioned travel took place before the effectivity of AO No. 103, at a time when  For this purpose, official foreign travel that will last for one (1) calendar month and
presidential approval was not required. Wherease, Chairman Nañagas filed an Appeal below of other officials and employees of government-owned and/or controlled
Brief/Memorandum arguing that the disallowed disbursement is not a liquidation of a prior corporations and financial institutions shall be approved by the Department
travel cash advance but, rather, a reimbursement of expenses chargeable against an Secretaries or their equivalent to which such government-owned and/or
expense allowance to which all members of the DBP Board are entitled. They both invoked controlled corporations and financial institutions are attached, and by the Secretary
the opinion of the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel which the latter said that the clearance of of the Interior and Local Government in the case of other officials and  employees of
the President is not required in the Foreign Travels. local government units.
  Prior clearance from the Office of the president shall also be required for foreign
trips of delegations or groups of two or more persons regardless of the rank of
participants.

2. No.

 A reading of said opinion, however, negates the contention of petitioner:

o In the first place, the particular provision on which the opinion is based is
erroneous.

o In the second place, nowhere in the Presidential Counsel’s opinion was it

stated, either expressly or impliedly, that the travels of the DBP officials
concerned were exempt from the requirements of the law. In fact, it even
conditioned its ruling on what may be required by the law’s particular,
albeit incorrect, provision, in stating that if at the time of travel, the rules
of the DBP allow the reimbursement of travel expenses without prior
consent of the President thereon, then petitioner’s claims must be honored.

o Had the Presidential Counsel intended that its opinion be deemed as the

required prior presidential approval, despite the fact that it was rendered
almost three (3) years after the travels in question, it should have declared
the same therein. Hence, in the absence of any indication in the
Presidential Counsel’s opinion intending to exempt the DPB officials from
the requirements of the law, we refrain from sustaining petitioner’s
argument. 
 administratively charging them of Grave Misconduct, for passing and approving MAB-
Resolution.

In their defense, respondents maintained that the re-appraisal and revaluation of Lot No. 4431
was based on the MAB’s aim of maintaining a uniform assessment of lots with similar
attributes in the Municipality of Kawit, i.e., lands which are around “30 meters away from [the
national] road and classified as agricultural being fishpond or marsh land with similar
desirability, neighborhood and important need for the acquisition of a real property.”

OMB-Luzon - found respondents guilty of Grave Misconduct and accordingly, meted out the
penalty of dismissal from service with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. 

CA - reversed and set aside the OMB-Luzon Ruling, and thereby exonerated respondents from
administrative liability for Grave Misconduct and restored their entitlement to their earned
benefits. It was held that there is no substantial evidence to support the finding that corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of established procedures may be ascribed to
respondents.

Ombudsman v. De Zosa Issue:

WON respondents should be held administratively liable for Grave Misconduct.
G.R. No. 205433, January 21, 2015
Held:
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Substantial Evidence is required to support any findings in an administrative case.
Facts:
 It must be stressed that in administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to
The Sangguniang Bayan of Kawit, Cavite issued Resolution authorizing the mayor to sell the support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
municipal properties, particularly those under Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 9761-A, 9762-A, mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
and 9763-A (subject lands), and to perform such other acts necessary and related to such sales.
Pursuant thereto, the Municipal Appraisal Board (MAB) of Kawit, Cavite issued a resolution  The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that one is
whereby it decreased the assessed fair market value of the subject lands from P700.00 per guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be
square meter (sq. m.) to P500.00 per sq. m.  overwhelming.

The Municipality of Kawit, Cavite auctioned Lot No. 4431, a 243,562-sq. m. parcel of land  After a judicial review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA that there is no
covered by TD No. 9763-A, at a minimum bid price set at P121,781,000.00, pegged at substantial evidence to hold respondents administratively liable for Grave
P500.00 per sq. m. Consequently, Lot No. 4431 was awarded to FJI Property Developers, Inc. Misconduct.
(FJI), which gave the highest bid of P123,123,123.00,8 or approximately P505.51 per sq. m.
The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.
In the Appraisal Review/Evaluation Report, COA found that the proper fair market value for
Lot No. 4431 should have been P878.26 per sq. m.  Hence, the COA Report concluded that the  Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
Municipality of Kawit, Cavite suffered undue injury when it was deprived of income in the particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
amount of P378.26 per sq. m., or a total of P92,129,762.12, from the sale of Lot No. 4431, dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
resulting in unwarranted benefits in favor of FJI. momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not
a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected
Resultantly, the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) filed a with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
Complaint against the members of the MAB of Kawit, Cavite, including respondents, maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of
criminally charging them of violating Section 3 (e) 13 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 and the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the
 elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of  Mr. Florendo B. Arias, Assistant Bureau Director, Bureau of Equipment, then OIC of the
established rule, must be manifest in the former. same Bureau recommended the approval of the twenty-four (24) Requisitions for Supplies
and/or Equipment (RSE), not requested/certified and signed by the end-users of the vehicles.
 In this case, records are bereft of any showing that respondents wrongfully intended Despite personal knowledge that the end-users of these vehicles (Mercedes Benz-NRV-687
to transgress some established and definite rule of action which is attended by and Nissan Pick-up-TAG-211) did not request/sign and/or certify the Requisition for Supplies
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of the rules when and Equipment (RSEs), Assistant Director Florendo B. Arias, signed the Request of
they, along with the other members of the MAB of the Municipality of Kawit, Obligation and Allotment (ROA) for the said vehicles and approved the Report of Waste
Cavite, approved MAB-Resolution No. 3-97 causing the re-appraisal and revaluation Material purportedly for the said vehicles when there were no such waste materials because
of the subject lands. these vehicles were not subjected to actual repairs.

Despite personal knowledge that the end-users of these vehicles (Mercedes Benz-NRV-687
and Nissan Pick-up-TAG-211) did not request/sign and/or certify the Requisition for Supplies
and Equipment (RSEs), Assistant Director Florendo B. Arias, signed the Request of
Obligation and Allotment (ROA) for the said vehicles and approved the Report of Waste
Material purportedly for the said vehicles when there were no such waste materials because
these vehicles were not subjected to actual repairs.

Notwithstanding personal knowledge that the end-users of the above-mentioned vehicles did
not request/sign and/or certify the Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSEs), Director
Burt B. Favorito approved twenty-four (24) RSEs.
Republic v. Arias
In sum, herein respondents have openly committed serious misconduct prejudicial to the best
G.R. No. 188909, September 17, 2014 interest of the service.

J. Perez Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) – found respondent and the other DPWH
officials guilty and recommended their dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement
Facts: benefits and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government office. It ruled that
in accordance with Item Nos. 4 and 4.1 of DPWH Department Order No. 33, Series of 1988 on
Respondent Florendo B. Arias was the Assistant Bureau Director of the Bureau of Equipment the Revised Guidelines for the Procurement of Supplies, Materials, Spare Parts, Equipment,
(BOE), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Respondent, along with other including Non-Personal Services dated 28 April 1988, and Items D, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6 of DPWH
DPWH officials Burt B. Favorito, Director of Administrative Manpower and Management Memorandum dated 31 July 1997 on Additional Guidelines Re: Purchase of Spare Parts and
Service; Emily M. Tanquintic, Director of Comptrollership and Financial Management Repairs of DPWH Central Office Service Vehicles, there is a need for a certification/request
Service; Oscar D. Abundo, Director of Legal Service; Abraham S. Divina, Jr., Director of by the end-user of a service vehicle before any action may be done on the request for repair.
BOE, and several unnamed presidential and non-presidential appointees of DPWH, were
charged with violation of of Section 3(e), (i) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, Sections Office of the President – concurred with the findings and recommendation of the PAGC.  Only
4(a), (c) and 7(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, and the Memorandum from the President dated 19 respondent appealed the unfavorable Order to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
November 1999 on the doctrine of command responsibility for corruption in government review.
office.
CA - granted the petition and dismissed the administrative charges filed against respondent.
The complaint alleged that respondents unlawfully and knowingly perpetrated acts complained The appellate court observed that the aforesaid documents appear to be regular on their faces
of by facilitating the alleged anomalous emergency repairs of several DPWH motor vehicles as the requisite signatures of the proper officials, particularly the three members of the Special
for CY 2000-2001 from the wrong fund source. In an Audit Report, Internal Audit Service Inspectorate Team who were tasked to conduct pre-repair and post-repair inspection of the
reported that the result of their review of almost 7,000 vouchers for the Fiscal Year 2001, 578 subject vehicles appear thereon, and it was only after inspection of these documents did
vehicles and equipment have undergone emergency repairs. The same Audit Report narrated respondent recommend the approval of the emergency repair of the three (3) service vehicles
that as of June 7, 2002, from a review of almost 7,000 vouchers, a total of 578 vehicles and and the payment thereof. The appellate court noted that respondent had to rely to a reasonable
equipment were subjected to emergency repairs, with a total cost of P139,633,134.26 was paid extent on his subordinates and on good faith of those who prepared and submitted the
out of the capital outlay and MOOE funds.  questionable documents. The appellate court ruled that the unlawful action of his subordinates
cannot be ascribed to respondent in the absence of evidence of the latter’s foreknowledge of  Petitioner correctly pointed out that the annotation on the RSEs “turned over to the
the falsities of the emergency repairs on the three (3) vehicles. CESPD-BOE due for repair and/or issuance to various field offices” should have
alerted respondent on the irregularity of the purported emergency purchases and
Issue: repairs.  Indeed, the fact that the vehicles were turned over to Central Equipments
Whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and Spare Parts Division for repair without certification from the end-users only meant
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. that repairs were not urgently needed.

Held: Dishonesty implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or fraud. Act of recommending
approval without certification from end-user constitutes gross neglect of duty.
Yes.
 Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact
or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his
The quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable in examination, registration, appointment or registration.  Dishonesty was understood
administrative cases is substantial evidence. to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of
integrity.
 Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is  Respondent’s act of recommending approval despite lack of certification from end-
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a users does not constitute dishonesty.  It is actually a form of gross neglect of duty
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. and grave misconduct.

General Rule: the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on Gross Neglect of Duty or Gross Negligence: In cases involving public officials, there is
the parties and are not reviewable by this Court; Exceptions. gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.

 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals  Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the
are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty
unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions: to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference
o When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, to consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected.  It is the omission of that
surmises and conjectures; care which even inattentive and thoughtless persons never fail to take on their own
o When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach
o Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; of duty is flagrant and palpable.
o When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
o When the findings of fact are conflicting; In Grave Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
o When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues disregard of established rule must be manifest.
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee;  Misconduct is an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
o When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; standard of behavior, especially by a government official.  As differentiated from
o When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific simple misconduct, in grave misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to
evidence on which they are based; violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest.
o  When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and  Hence, the failure of respondent to exercise his functions diligently when he
o When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the recommended for approval documents for emergency repair and purchase in the
absence of the signature and certification by the end-user, in complete disregard of
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
existing DPWH rules, constitute gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct which
undoubtedly resulted in loss of public funds thereby causing undue injury to the
 The instant case falls under the exceptions because the findings of fact of the Office
government.
of the President are contrary to that of the Court of Appeals warranting review by
this Court.
 CSC – found respondent guilty of serious dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of
official documents, and dismissed her from the service. They found that the picture pasted and
the signature appearing on the picture seat plan of the Career Service Professional
Examination held at the CSC Central Office on November 17, 2000 is different from the
pictures pasted and signatures appearing on respondent’s personal data sheet accomplished on
March 13, 2001 and personal data sheet accomplished on July 14, 2006.

CA – reversed and set aside CSC’s decision. The CA said that there is no showing that those
procedures were followed when the purported impersonation subject of this case happened.
The CA noted that the room examiners were not presented to prove that the examination
procedures were strictly implemented.  Thus, the CA held that the discrepancy in respondent’s
signatures and pictures on the personal data sheets and picture seat plan can be the result of a
simple mix up.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in reversing the ruling of the CSC on the ground that the discrepancies
in respondent’s pictures and signatures in the picture seat plan and personal data sheets were
due to a possible mix up.

Held:

Yes. The ruling is pure speculation and is belied by the evidence on record.

Civil Service Commission v. De Rios CSC examiners enjoy a presumption of regularity in the administration of the civil service
examination.
G.R. No. 203536, February 04, 2015
 We agree with petitioner that the presentation of the room examiners is not required
J. Villarama, Jr. to prove the observance of the procedure in preparing the picture seat plan and in
implementing the civil service examination.  More so in this case where the
Facts: supposed mix up in the picture seat plan was proven wrong by the records.  We
stress that CSC examiners enjoy a presumption of regularity in the administration of
The CSC conducted an investigation after receiving an anonymous complaint that several the civil service examination. 
employees of San Rafael Water District employed a fixer to pass the CSC’s Career Service
Professional Examination on November 17, 2000.   In Donato, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the court held that hose government
employees who prepared the [picture seat plan] and who supervised the conduct of
In the course of the investigation, CSC Director Aurora C. De Leon received a phone call the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination on August 5, 1990, enjoy the
implicating respondent in the alleged irregularity. Director De Leon’s verification with the presumption that they regularly performed their duties and this presumption cannot
Integrated Records Management Office of the Central Office of the CSC revealed that there be disputed by mere conjectures and speculations.
were discrepancies in the signatures and pictures of the respondent in her personal data sheets
and on the picture seat plan used for said examination.  Thus, respondent was formally  In the present case, respondent failed to controvert aforesaid presumption.  Thus, the
charged for dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents and conduct CSC examiners are conclusively deemed to have regularly performed their duties in
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. relation to the administration of the civil service examination.
In her defense, respondent testified that she was the one who took the examination.  Loline The picture seat plan is a public document which is admissible in evidence without need of
Padilla testified that she accompanied respondent when she took the examination.  Padilla proof of its authenticity and due execution.
admitted however that she never saw respondent take the examination.
 Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that “[d]ocuments consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
 prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”  As a public document, the picture 1. Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a search warrant since he had
seat plan need not be identified or presented by the custodian thereof in order to be been automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive Judge when several
admissible in evidence. administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court;

 Respondent must therefore be held administratively liable for serious dishonesty, 2. Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant which was to be enforced in Davao
grave misconduct, and falsification of official document in view of her City;
misrepresentation in the personal data sheet and the commission of fraud in
connection with the civil service examination on November 17, 2000. 3. The human remains sought to be seized are not a proper subject of a search warrant; 12 (d)
the police officers are mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human
remains.

4. The police officers are mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of
human remains;

5. There was a violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper specification
of the place to be searched and the articles to be seized.

6. The rule against forum shopping was violated

Manila-RTC – granted the motion of Laud “after a careful consideration [of] the grounds
alleged [therein].

CA – annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with grave
SPO4 Laud v. People abuse of discretion. It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were
satisfied, pointing out that an application therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder,
G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014 is an exception to the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court as explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC and reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-
Per Curiam 02-SC, provided that the application is filed by the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) or the Reaction Against
Facts: Crime Task Force (REACT-TF), with the endorsement of its head, before the RTC of Manila
or Quezon City, and the warrant be consequently issued by the Executive Judge or Vice-
The Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as in this case.
Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 50 (Manila-RTC) for
a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Issue:
Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-
called “Davao Death Squad” may be found. In support of the application, a certain Ernesto 1. Whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated the Search
Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed Warrant;
the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried
the victims. 2. Whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite non-compliance
with the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the
Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued 3. Whether the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was
Search Warrant. Consequently, the Search Warrant was later enforced. The search of the Laud violated.
Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains.
4. Whether the applicant for the search warrant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum
shopping.
SPO4 Laud filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence on the
following grounds: Held:
1. No.  Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the
issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and
Effect of Judge Peralta’s Administrative Penalties: Administrative Penalties Will Operate Quezon City. 
To Divest Vice Executive Judge Authority To Act As Such, But Will Not Invalidate Search
Warrant Issued By Him. o These special criminal cases pertain to those “involving heinous crimes,
 The imposition of said administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well
authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge, it must be qualified that the abstraction of as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of the Search Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the
Warrant considering that Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
as a de facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid. hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme
Court.”
Judge Peralta is considered as a de facto officer; hence his acts should remain valid.
 Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by “the National Bureau of
 A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is Force (ACTAF),” and “personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies.”
valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is
discharging [his] duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority  As in ordinary search warrant applications, they “shall particularly describe therein
derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in
is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as the Rules of Court.”
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned.  “The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges” are
 In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must concur: authorized to act on such applications and “shall issue the warrants, if
(a) there must be a de jure office; (b) there must be color of right or general justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the said courts.”
office in good faith.
 As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, the rule
 The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly, on search warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the
there is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a above-mentioned special criminal cases “shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule
colorable right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was 126 of the Rules of Court.” Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is being
only divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality – that is, the applied for in connection with a special criminal case as above-classified already
operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. presumes the existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect
would be superfluous and therefore should be dispensed with.
2.
 By all indications, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila
Yes. and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be served in places outside their
territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said section have been
The requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by complied with, as in this case. Thus, on these grounds, the Court finds nothing
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be the exception to Section 2, Rule 126 of the defective in the preliminary issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407. Perforce, the
Rules of Court. RTCs of Manila and Quezon City allow to issue warrants, in connection RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.
with special criminal cases, to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as
long as parameters under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC have been complied with. 3.

No.
Search Warrant That Covers Several Counts Of A Certain Specific Offense Does Not
Violate The One-Specific-Offense Rule.  As the Court sees it, the description points to no other than the things that bear a
direct relation to the offense committed, i.e., of Murder. It is also perceived that the
 In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures, description is already specific as the circumstances would ordinarily allow given that
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that the buried bodies would have naturally decomposed over time.
no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place 4.
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
No.
 Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search
 There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively avails of several judicial
warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
specific offense.
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
 In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, the court held that a search warrant that covers and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense adversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
rule. decision if not in one court, then in another.
o In this case, there were several counts of the offense of copyright
infringement and the search warrant uncovered several contraband items  Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this case considering the
in the form of pirated video tapes is not to be confused with the number various points of divergence attending the search warrant application before the
of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the Manila-RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in
one-specific-offense rule. each application were different. Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in
connection with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime. Finally,
 Hence, given that Search Warrant was issued only for one specific offense – that is, and more importantly, the places to be searched were different – that in Manila
of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts – it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the sought the search of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a
Rules of Court had been violated. particular area in the Laud Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts
and circumstances between the two applications, the rule against forum shopping
Human Remains is within the contemplation of “Personal Property” and “Subject of the
was therefore not violated.
Offense”

 Laud’s posturing that human remains are not “personal property” and, hence, could
not be the subject of a search warrant deserves scant consideration.
 SEC. 3.  Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of
the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.

 “Personal property” in the foregoing context actually refers to the thing’s mobility,
and not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular person. Article 416 of
the Civil Code, which Laud himself cites, states that in general, all things which can
be transported from place to place are deemed to be personal property. Considering
that human remains can generally be transported from place to place, and
considering further that they qualify under the phrase “subject of the offense” given
that they prove the crime’s corpus delicti, it follows that they may be valid subjects
of a search warrant under the above-cited criminal procedure provision.
 Thereafter, or on December 8, 2011, respondent and PO2 Aquino went to complainants’
residence and, on the strength of the Writ of Execution dated June 14, 2011 (subject writ),
allegedly forcibly took away the subject truck.

In this regard, complainants surmised that respondent committed irregularities in executing the
judgment and in the disposition of the subject truck. They claimed that they were not furnished
a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale anent the subject truck. Respondent never gave them the excess of
the proceeds, considering that the value of the subject truck was significantly higher than their
judgment debt which was less than P80,000.00. Respondent and PO2 Aquino connived in not
selling the subject truck at public auction and instead, appropriated the same for their personal
benefit, causing damage and prejudice to complainants because Zenaida personally saw the
subject truck being driven by a person other than PO2 Aquino.

Respondent vehemently denied the accusations against him and invoked good faith in the
performance of his duties. He maintained that he was merely enforcing the subject writ. On
December 21, 2011, he issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property  setting the
public auction on December 29, 2011 at 2 o’ clock in the afternoon at the Hall of Justice, RTC,
but since nobody participated in the auction,8 the vehicle was awarded to PO2 Aquino.

Later on, he readily admitted his failure to submit the Sheriff’s Return and attributed the same
to the fact that he is the only Sheriff in the MCTC after his colleagues either retired or went on
a leave of absence.

OCA – found respondent administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority and Simple
Neglect of Duty, mitigated by the fact that it was his first offense in his more than 19 years of
Sabijon v. De Juan service, and accordingly, meted him the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 payable
within thirty(30) days from receipt of the Court’s Resolution, with a stern warning that a
A.M. No. P-14-3281, January 28, 2015 repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
J. Perlas-Bernabe Issue:

Facts: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of
Authority (otherwise referred to as Oppression) and Simple Neglect of Duty.
Complainants Felisicimo R. Sabijon (Felisicimo) and Zenaida A. Sabijon (Zenaida;
collectively, complainants) against respondent Benedict M. De Juan (respondent), Sheriff IV Held:
of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North Cotabato, Branch 22 (RTC), charging him of
Grave Misconduct and Malfeasance. Yes. The Court concurs with the OCA’s findings and recommendation, except as to the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
In their Joint Affidavit-Complaint, they alleged that on May 19, 2007, Felisicimo and PO2
Recto Aquino (PO2 Aquino) figured in a vehicular accident whereby the former’s Isuzu Elf Sheriffs must discharge their duties with great care and diligence. Hence, any act deviating
Truck with Plate No. GJY-476 (subject truck), which complainants used for their livelihood, from the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants
hit PO2 Aquino’s van from behind. Due to their failure to settle, PO2 Aquino filed a civil case disciplinary action, which may be deemed as Simple Neglect of Duty19 or even Grave Abuse
for damages and attorney’s fees against Felisicimo and a certain Roger Saso, as driver/owners of Authority.
of the subject truck.
 Sheriffs, like respondent being ranking officers of the court and agents of the law,
must discharge their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and
implementing writs, as well as processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford
to err without affecting adversely the proper dispensation of justice. Sheriffs play an
 important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law, high  While “First Offense” and “Length of Service” may indeed be considered as
standards are expected of them. They should always hold inviolate and invigorate mitigating circumstances, the presence thereof does not automatically result in the
the tenet that a public office is a public trust. In this light, sheriffs are expected to downgrading of the penalty to be imposed upon respondent, especially in view of
know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers of the court, the existence of an aggravating circumstance.
relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should at all times show a
high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Any act deviating  Section 49, Rule 10 of the RRACCS. – When applicable, the imposition of the
from the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants penalty may be made in accordance with the manner provided herein below:
disciplinary action, which may be deemed as Simple Neglect of Duty or even Grave
Abuse of Authority. o A. The minimum of the penalty shall be imposed where only
mitigating and no aggravating circumstances are present;
 Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper
attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. o B. The medium of the penalty shall be imposed where no mitigating and
aggravating circumstances are present;
 On the other hand, Grave Abuse of Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor
committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts o C. The maximum of the penalty shall be imposed where only aggravating
upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act of and no mitigating circumstances are present;
cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.
o D. Where aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present,
 In this case, respondent, as a Sheriff, ought to know that pursuant to Section 9, Rule paragraph [a] shall be applied where there are more mitigating
39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment debtor, in case he has insufficient cash to pay circumstances present; paragraph [b] shall be applied when the
all or part of the judgment debt, is given the option to choose which among his circumstances equally offset each other; and paragraph [c] shall be applied
properties or a part thereof may be levied upon. Moreover, respondent should have when there are more aggravating circumstances.
known that under Section 14 of the same Rule, he is required to make a return on the
writ of execution and make periodic reports on the execution proceedings until  In this case, since there is one (1) aggravating circumstance (i.e. Simple Neglect of
either the full satisfaction of the judgment or the expiration of the writ’s effectivity, Duty) and two (2) mitigating circumstances (i.e. First Offense and Length of
as well as to furnish the parties copies of such return and periodic reports. Service), only the minimum of the imposable penalty for Grave Abuse of Authority
(or Oppression) should be meted against respondent.

The minimum of the penalty shall be imposed where aggravating and mitigating  Therefore, The Court deems it appropriate to impose upon respondent the penalty of
circumstances are present but there are more mitigating circumstances present. suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day, with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
 Section 50, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS) provides that  “[i]f the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or
more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to
the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating
circumstances.”

 Under the RRACCS, Grave Abuse of Authority (or Oppression)is punishable by

suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense and dismissal from service for the second offense, while the Simple Neglect
of Duty is only punishable by suspension for the period one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
 business interests, and financial connections.  Its administrative aspect asserted that Rigor
committed Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Documents.

On July 28, 2006, OMB found Rigor guilty of Dishonesty. Subsequently, Rigor moved for
reconsideration, which the OMB granted on April 29, 2011. It thus ruled that Rigor is guilty of
Simple Negligence only.

The DPWH Secretary then filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), an
Omnibus Motion (for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration), praying
for its intervention in the case to be allowed.  The DPWH argued that there existed strong and
compelling reasons for the reversal of the April 29, 2011 OMB Order. 

On July 18, 2011, OMB found Rigor guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Public
Documents.

Aggrieved, Rigor brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the OMB.

CA – set aside OMB’s decision. CA found Rigor guilty of Simple Negligence.

Issue:

1. Whether Petition for Certiorari is the correct remedy.

2. Whether Rigor is guilty of Serious Dishonesty.

Held:

1. No.

The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.

Casimiro v. Rigor  It is settled that certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedies of appeal and
G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014 certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. And even if the
special civil action of certiorari were to be allowed, Rigor still failed to show that the
J. Peralta OMB committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the intervention
Facts: of the DPWH.

Sometime in 2005, the General Investigation Bureau-A of the OMB (GIB-A-OMB) conducted Power of the OMB to promulgate its own rules of procedure.
a lifestyle check on respondent Josefino N. Rigor, then the Regional Director of the DPWH-  Under Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the OMB is authorized to
National Capital Region (DPWH-NCR).  Thereafter, the GIB-A-OMB filed a complaint promulgate its own rules of procedure.  As such, it likewise holds the power to
against Rigor charging him criminally and administratively before the OMB for alleged amend or modify said rules as the interest of justice may require. The relaxation or
unexplained wealth and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and R.A. 1379.  Said suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a case from their operation is
complaint was mainly based on certain irregularities on Rigor’s Statement of Assets, warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs), allegedly failing to declare therein several properties,
  Here, the records clearly show compelling and justifiable reasons for the OMB to regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct
allow the Omnibus Motion of the DPWH and, consequently, hold Rigor offenses, but both may be committed in one act, as in this case.
administratively liable. Rigor alleges that the business interests in the Jetri
Construction Corporation, the two-story building in Sampaloc, Manila, the Toyota
RAV 4 SUV, and the Dodge Ram Road Trek were all separate properties of his
second wife, Anastacia, that was why he never included the same in his SALNs. 
However, Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 requires him to declare under oath even the
assets, liabilities, and financial interests of his spouse.

2. Yes.

Failure to file SALN amounts to dishonesty.

 Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt on one’s ability to perform
duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.

 The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in the Constitution to promote

transparency in the civil service and serves as a deterrent against government
officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law,
every government official or employee must make a complete disclosure of his
assets, liabilities and net worth in order to avoid any issue regarding questionable
accumulation of wealth.  Full disclosure of wealth in the SALN is necessary to
particularly minimize, if not altogether eradicate, the opportunities for official
corruption, and maintain a standard of honesty in the public service.

 The failure to file a truthful SALN reasonably puts in doubts the integrity of the
officer and normally amounts to dishonesty.

 In the case at bar, Rigor deliberately and wilfully omitted his wife’s business
interests in the Jetri Corporation, the two-storey building in Sampaloc, the Toyota
RAV 4, and the Dodge Ram Road Trek in his SALNs for 1999, 2000, 2001, and
2002, despite being required by law to do so.

Falsification of an official document such as SALN is considered as grave offense, hence,

amounts to dishonesty.

 Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave

offense.  It amounts to dishonesty.  Both falsification and dishonesty are grave
offenses punishable by dismissal from the service, even for the first offense, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service.  The act of falsifying an
official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on
government service.  At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates
fundamental principles of public accountability and integrity.  Under Civil Service
 issued without authority, contravenes Republic Act No. 9280 (RA 9280) or the Customs
Brokers Act of 2004, and violates their right to practice the customs broker profession.

RTC – upheld the petitioners’ contentions and nullified CAO  3-2006. It found that the BOC
Commissioner had no authority to issue rules governing the practice of the customs brokerage
profession. This power, initially lodged with the Commissioner of the Civil Service
under Section 3409 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), had been
transferred upon the passage of RA 9280 to the Professional Regulatory Board for Customs
Brokers (PRBCB), which is under the supervision and administrative control of the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC).

The trial court also held that the required accreditation amounted to a licensing requirement
prohibited under Section 19 of RA No. 9280. This provision states that customs brokers who
have been issued certificates of registration by the PRBCB shall be allowed to practice the
profession in any collection district without the need of securing another license from
the BOC. By requiring accreditation, CAO 3-2006 imposed an additional qualification not
found in the law.

CA – reversed the RTC ruling finding its construction of CAO 3-2006 rigid and crippling on
the BOC’s efforts to ensure efficient customs administration and collection of taxes and duties.

Issue:

Whether CAO 3-2006 issued by BOC Commissioner is valid.

Held:

No. The Court upheld the ruling of the RTC.

RA No. 9280 expressly repealed Sections 3401 to 3409 of the TCCP and transferred
supervision and regulation of the customs brokerage profession from Board of Examiners
to the PRBCB.
Airlift Asia Customs Brokerage Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 183664, July 28, 2014  Prior to the passage of RA 9280, the TCCP (specifically, Sections 3401 to 3409
thereof) governed the entry, regulation, and supervision of the customs broker
J. Brion. profession. Sections 3401 and 3402 of the TCCP required all applicants for customs
brokers’ certificates to pass a written examination given by the Board of Examiners
Facts: for Customs Brokers14 under the supervision of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC).
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) Napoleon L. Morales, with the approval of
then Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves, CAO 3-2006. Under CAO 3-2006, it requires
 Section 39 of RA 9280 expressly repealed the TCCP provisions (Section 3401 to
“customs brokers desiring to practice their profession at the BOC [to] apply for
3409) on the customs brokers profession. Section 39 of RA 9280 further declared
accreditation and [to] obtain a Certificate of Accreditation before they may engage in
that “all laws…and parts thereof which are inconsistent with [RA 9280] are
customs brokerage practice.” Once accredited, customs brokers are entitled to practice their
[deemed] modified, suspended, or repealed accordingly.”
profession in any port of entry in the Philippines.

The petitioners assailed the validity of CAO 3-2006 through an action  for declaratory relief  In lieu of the Board of Examiners, RA 9280 created the PRBCB whose members are
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They primarily claimed that CAO 3-2006 was appointed by the President from a list of recommendees submitted by the PRC
 which has supervisory and administrative control over the PRBCB. Significantly, Regional Office to attest to his permanent appointment as Assistant Schools Division
RA 9280 excluded the BOC Commissioner as member of the PRBCB. The Superintendent. He argued that the position does not belong to the Career Executive Service
exclusion of the BOC Commissioner as a member of the PRBCB evinces the under the Administrative Code of 1987. Consequently, the position does not require career
legislative intent to remove any power he previously exercised over custom brokers, executive service eligibility.
and to transfer the supervision, control and regulation of this profession to the
PRBCB. The RTC granted the mandamus petition of Dr. Benito. Under Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Resolution No. 021011 dated August 1, 2002, only "director positions" in the ARMM
 Although we cannot deny that the BOC Commissioner has the mandate to enforce require career executive service eligibility and the Career Executive Service Board had not
tariff laws and prevent smuggling, these powers do not necessarily include the declared the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent a director position.
power to regulate and supervise the customs broker profession through the issuance The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the Regional Office for its failure to file the
of CAO 3-2006. required memorandum. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
CAO 3-2006 amounts to a licensing requirement that restricts the practice of profession of
customs broker and is prohibited by RA 9280. 1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao's appeal for its failure to file the
 We are unconvinced by the BOC Commissioner’s claim that CAO 3- 2006’s required memorandum;
accreditation requirement is not a form of license. A license is a “permission to do a
particular thing, to exercise a certain privilege or to carry on a particular business or 2. Whether respondent Dr. Benito correctly availed himself of a petition for mandamus against
to pursue a certain occupation.” Since it is only by complying with CAO 3-2006 that the Civil Service Commission's refusal to attest to his appointment;
a customs broker can practice his profession before the BOC, the accreditation takes
the form of a licensing requirement proscribed by the law. It amounts to an 3. Is Dr. Benito validly appointed as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in a permanent
additional burden on PRC-certified customs brokers and curtails their right to capacity by the Regional Governor of ARMM?
practice their profession.
Held:
 Under RA 9280, a successful examinee of the customs brokers examinations 1.
acquires a Certificate of Registration, which entitles him to practice the profession
as a customs broker with all the benefits and privileges appurtenant thereto. No. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the CSC Regional Office's appeal for
failure to file the required memorandum.
Bueno v. Benito
 Under Rule 44, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the
G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014 appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground for
dismissal of the appeal. This is reiterated in Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules.
J. Leonen

Facts:  The Court of Appeals ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. Instead
of filing the memorandum, the Regional Office requested additional 30 days to file
On August 27, 2004, Dr. Parouk Hussin, then Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region the pleading. The additional period requested lapsed without the Regional Office
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), appointed Dr. Sangcad Benito as Assistant Schools Division filing the required memorandum. The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly
Superintendent of the Department of Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I, in a temporary dismissed the appeal. We have ruled that heavy workload is no excuse for failure to
capacity. comply with the reglementary periods under the Rules.

On June 20, 2005, Regional Governor Hussin reappointed Dr. Benito to the same position, this
time in a permanent capacity. However, the Regional Office, through Regional Director 2.
Buena, returned the appointment to the Regional Governor claiming that Dr. Benito did not
possess the career executive service eligibility required for the position of Assistant Schools Yes. A petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the Civil Service Commission
Division Superintendent. Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC to compel the to attest to the appointment of Dr. Benito.
  For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty.  The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a career position.
An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in Appointment to the position is based on merit and fitness and gives the appointee an
a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, such as Schools Division
to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety Superintendent. If permanently appointed, the appointee is guaranteed security of
or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person tenure. The position is above Division Chief. An Assistant Schools Division
must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by la w. This is Superintendent has a salary grade of 25. Also, the President appoints the Assistant
opposed to a discretionary act wherein the officer has the choice to decide how or Schools Division Superintendent.
when to perform the duty.
 It is settled, therefore, that the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent
 This court has ruled that the Civil Service Commission's attestation of appointments belongs to the Career Executive Service. The appointee to the position must be
in the civil service is a ministerial duty once it finds the appointee eligible for the career executive service eligible.
position. The Commission "is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of
determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions  In the case at bar, Dr. Benito does not possess the required career executive service
laid down by the law." If the appointee possesses the required civil service eligibility. He, therefore, cannot be appointed to the position of Assistant Schools
eligibility, the Commission has "no choice but to attest to the appointment. Division Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The Civil Service Commission
cannot be compelled to attest to the permanent appointment of respondent Dr.
  Dr. Benito availed himself of the correct remedy. Given his claim that he possesses Benito.
the required civil service eligibility for the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent, he correctly filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Civil If there is no regional law providing for the qualifications for the position at the time of
Service Commission to approve his appointment. appointment, the appointee must satisfy the civil service eligibilities required for the position
in the national government to be appointed in a permanent capacity.

3.  The Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has the
power to appoint officers in the region's civil service. However, ehen Dr. Benito was
No. appointed Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in 2005, there was yet no
regional law providing for the qualifications for the Assistant Schools Division
Position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a position in the Career Executive Superintendents of Divisions of the Department of Education in the ARMM.
Service. Consequently, the civil service eligibilities required for positions in the national
government shall likewise be required for appointments to positions in the
 Under the civil service law, positions in the Career Executive Service are:
Autonomous Region.
"Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service, and
other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President."

 In the exercise of its legal mandate, the Career Executive Service Board issued
Resolution No. 945 dated June 14, 2011, where it set the following criteria to
determine whether a position belongs to the Career Executive Service:
o The position is career;
o The position is above division chief; and
o The position entails performance of executive and managerial functions.

 Aside from satisfying the criteria set by the Career Executive Service Board, the
holder of the position must also be a presidential appointee.
 On July 20, 2001, private respondent Maria Elena Malaga filed a Complaint-Affidavit before
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMBVisayas) against Wilfredo Agustino (Regional
Director), Vicente M. Tingson, Jr. (OIC District Engineer), Reynold Soldevilla (Bids and
Awards Committee [BAC] Chairman), Assistant District Engineer Sales (BAC Chairman for
materials and equipment), Rodney Gustilo (BAC Member), Elizabeth H. Gardose (BAC
Member), Project Engineer Ruby P. Lagoc (BAC Member), Fema G. Guadalupe (Supply
Officer) and Blanca O. Pagal (Accountant III).

Malaga accused the above-named officials and employees of violating established rules and
regulations, making it appear that there was open, public and competitive bidding for the
materials and equipment needed for the skywalk construction projects to ensure that their
favored contractor, Helen Edith Tan of IBC Int’l. Builders Corp. (IBC) got the projects.

In her Counter-Affidavit, Lagoc stated that as a matter of practice in their office, a project
engineer automatically becomes a provisional member of the BAC and hence she merely acted
as such provisional BAC member. She said that her main job was to prepare the program of
works of the subject projects and upon completion forward copies thereof to the
Assistant District Engineer and District Engineer for approval. After approval, she furnishes a
copy each to the Resident Auditor, Supply Officer and Accountant. She thus claimed that “any
activity relative to the bidding process is beyond [her] job” and that she really wondered why
she was included in the complaint.

OMBVisayas – found substantial evidence of Misconduct against Tingson, Sales, Gardose and
Lagoc, and accordingly recommended that the penalty of one-year suspension without pay
be imposed on them. On the other hand, the complaint against Agustino,  Soldevilla and
Gustilo were recommended to be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Then Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo approved the recommendation but modified the offense and penalty to
Grave Misconduct and dismissal from the service for Tingson, Sales, Gardose and Lagoc.

CA – affirmed Ombudsman findings of fact and conclusions. The CA held that

Lagoc v. Malaga the Ombudsman correctly concluded that petitioners committed grave misconduct when they
conducted the bid process of and awarded the subject contracts without compliance with the
G.R. No. 184785, July 9, 2014 mandatory twin-publication requirement.

J. Villarama Jr. Issue:

Facts: Whether petitioners were guilty of Grave Misconduct.

The present controversy stemmed from the implementation of two projects undertaken by the Held:
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) through the Iloilo City District
Engineering Office: (1) Construction of Skywalk/Overpass from Iloilo Supermart to Yes.
Mercury Drugstore, Valeria St., Iloilo City in the amount of P2,000,000.00; and
 Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
(2) Construction of Skywalk/Overpass from SM Shoemart to Mercury Drugstore, Delgado St.,
substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight especially when they
Iloilo City in the amount of P3,500,000.00. The funds for the said project were provided under
are affirmed by the CA. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8760 otherwise known as the “General Appropriations Act, FY
Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly be made. And as long as
2000,” and was released under SARO No. BMB-A-00-0420.
 there is substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsman's decision, that decision Quisumbing, however, sent respondent a letter on the same day instructing her not to assume
will not be overturned. No such grave abuse of discretion is shown in this case. her position because her appointment is not yet complete.

 In this case, the Ombudsman found discrepancies in the evidence presented by the Later, CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing that it will conduct an
complainant (Malaga) and petitioners to prove compliance with the publication investigation on the appointment of respondent Cortes.
requirement. That petitioners submitted mere photocopies of the issues of The Director Cornelio of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing that the
Visayan Tribune and The Visayas Examiner added credence to the Ombudsman’s appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the rule on nepotism
conclusion that petitioners were covering up for their omission as the invitation to under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions.
bid for the materials and equipment was actually never published. According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with
respect to respondent Cortes despite being a mere member of the Commission En Banc.
 Misconduct is defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." Issue:
Misconduct becomes grave if it "involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which Whether the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR is not covered by the
must be established by substantial evidence. " prohibition against nepotism.

Held:

No. Respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where

his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition.

 Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third

civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing
authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4)
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed
that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of
consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.

 Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include
appointments made by a group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly. This principle is elementary and does not need
CSC v. Cortes
explanation. Certainly, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014 indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

J. Abad  In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the

Commission En Banc, where his father is a member, is covered  by the prohibition.
Facts:
Commissioner Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character
Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued a Resolution of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still
approving the appointment to the position of Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V
Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality
from voting and requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the respondent’s of the Commission En Banc.
appointment.

The CHR Legal Division Chief rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes’ appointment is
not covered by the rule on nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En
Banc, has a personality distinct and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson
 her negative behavior in dealing with her co-employees and with the public transacting
business in her office.

The Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation.

Issue:

Whether the relocation of the petitioner by respondent Municipal Mayor during the election
period from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor just a few steps
away constituted a prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant
Resolution of the Commission on Elections.

Held:

No.

Reassignment or relocation was not prohibited. The only personnel movements prohibited
by COMELEC were transfer and detail.

 Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one

government agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit
or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the issuance of an
appointment;”

 While, detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of

an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment.
Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer and detail must be construed
as such.

 The movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail

Causing v. Comelec within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically
transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor “some
G.R. No. 199139, September 9, 2014 little steps” away. We cannot accept the petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the
phrase “any transfer or detail whatsoever” encompassed “any and all kinds and
J. Bersamin
manner of personnel movement,”35 including the mere change in office location. 
Facts:
The act of transferring the office space of Causing was rooted in the power of supervision
Elsie Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. and control.
Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010, commanding for the detailing of
Causing at the office of the Municipal Mayor.  Equally material is that Mayor Biron’s act of transferring the office space of Causing
was rooted in his power of supervision and control over the officials and employees
Causing filed the complaint claiming that the issuance made by Mayor Biron being made serving in his local government unit, in order to ensure the faithful discharge of their
within the election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC was illegal and in duties and functions.
violation of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8737. Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of transferring the office of  His explanation that he transferred Causing’s workstation from her original office to
Causing was to closely supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding his office in order to closely supervise her after his office received
 complaints against her could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter continued Due to such reorganization, the services of all the employees of the NPC were terminated
to perform her tasks, and uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil effective February 28, 2003, wherein they received their separation benefits and terminal leave
Registrar even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor. pay. However, on March 1, 2003, some of the said employees were rehired by Transco.

Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena, Sine Lege On February 9, 2004, the Officer-in-Charge of the Human Resources Department of Transco,
Noli E. Pomperada, sent a query to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on the entitlement to
 Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with an election offense punishable under loyalty award of Transco employees who were previously employed with the NPC and who
Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a basic rule of statutory construction were re-hired by Transco with no gap in service under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06,
that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Every series of 2002 (CSC Memorandum Circular), otherwise known as the Revised Policies on
reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the accused. This means that the Grant of Loyalty Award.
courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law that are not clearly
embraced by it. In short, no act can be pronounced criminal unless it is clearly made In response, the entire service in the particular agency where a government personnel is
so by statute prior to its commission (nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege). So, too, employed as of January 1, 2002 shall be considered part of the 10th year loyalty award.
no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within Services rendered in other government agencies before January 1, 2002 shall not be
them. considered for purposes of completing the required 10-year loyalty award. Based on the
sample service record you cited, said Transco employee is entitled to receive the 10th year
loyalty award effective April 1, 2003 and Transco, where she/he is presently employed is
obliged to pay said personnel. However, services rendered at DENR and Congress can no
longer be considered for purposes of granting the loyalty award. Thus, on April 1, 2008,
she/he will again be entitled to 5,000 Loyalty Award for completing the 15th year service in
government. On the other hand, if the grantee had already been paid by NPC of the 10-year
Loyalty Award last October 3, 1998, Transco will only pay for the 5-year milestone Loyalty
Award on October 3, 2003.

Based on the CSC clarification, Transco granted loyalty award to qualified Transco employees
in the aggregate amount of P670,000.00, considering the services of said employees in the
NPC prior to their re-employment by Transco.

On July 5, 2005, the Legal and Adjudication Sector (LAS) of the Commission on Audit,
Cordillera Administrative Region, issued ND No. 05-037, disallowing the payment of loyalty
award to Transco NLO&M employees, on the ground that they had not met the 10-year
continuous government service required under the CSC Memorandum Circular, and therefore,
NTC v. COA is without legal basis and considered irregular under COA Circular 85-55A. The separated
employees were considered legally terminated when they availed the benefits and separation
G.R. No. 204800, October 14, 2014
pay prescribed under said Act. (Sec. 3b (i), Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and
J. Peralta Regulation). Thus, when these separated employees were rehired either by NPC or
TRANSCO, they are reconsidered as new.
Facts:
Issue: Whether the NPC employees who were separated from the service because of the
In 2003, the National Power Corporation (NPC) underwent reorganization pursuant to reorganization of the electric power industry and who received their separation pay under the
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of EPIRA Law are still entitled to receive loyalty awards under the CSC Memorandum Circular.
2001 (EPIRA Law), wherein NPC was split into two (2): the NPC, which became in-charge of
the generation of electricity, and the National Transmission Corporation (Transco), which was Held:
charged with the transmission of electricity to the power customers.
Yes.
Consequently, Transco was created effective June 24, 2001 and acquired all the transmission
assets of the NPC.
The separation benefits did not include the right of the employees that had already accrued provisions of RA 9497 (Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008) and the security of tenure of
by reason of continuous service to the government at the time of their separation from NPC, government employees guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution.
such as the grant of loyalty award.
The petition filed by CAAP-EU assails the Authority Orders, Memoranda and other issuances
 While Section 63 of the EPIRA Law provides that those who avail themselves of the related to the selection and filling up of positions issued by Director General Ciron and seeks
separation pay shall start their government service anew if absorbed by any the nullification thereof including the IRR of R.A. No. 9497, the new Organizational Structure
government-owned successor company, the “reset” relates only to any and all and Staffing Pattern (OSSP) and the Qualification Standards (QS) for the proposed new
separation benefits due to an employee once he is terminated or if he retires from plantilla of positions within the CAAP.
service. 
Issues:
 What is avoided is a situation wherein an employee who was separated from service
and availed himself of the separation package under the EPIRA Law, would still use (1) Whether ATO was abolished under R.A. No. 9497;
the accrued years of service in NPC for purposes of computing their future
separation benefits to be settled by the absorbing government agency or (2) Whether the incumbent ATO employees’ constitutional right to security of tenure was
government-owned successor corporation. impaired;
 It could not have been the intendment of the EPIRA Law to impair the employees’
rights to loyalty award, which have already accrued prior to its promulgation. Stated (3) Whether there was grave abuse of discretion when Section 60 of the IRR provided a “hold-
differently, before the EPIRA Law was enacted, the NPC employees had a fixed over” status for ATO employees, which was not expressly provided for under R.A. No. 9497.
right to the loyalty award under the terms and conditions then obtaining. They could Held:
not therefore be excluded from its enjoyment just because they have received
separation pay for the termination of their services in view of the reorganization, 1. Yes.
without violating basic precepts of fairness and due process.
 Indeed, the payment or non-payment of separation pay was never made a condition The power to abolish a public office is lodged with legislature, except where such office was
for the grant of loyalty awards to these employees. The CSC Memorandum Circular created by the Constitution itself.
neither distinguishes nor imposes a qualification for the grant of loyalty award
 Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that the power to abolish a public
except that: (1) effective January 1, 2002, the services are rendered in one or more
office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the
government agencies without any gap; and (2) services rendered in other
power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is created either by
government agencies prior to January 1, 2002 shall not be considered. Adding the
the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office
qualification of non-payment of separation pay would in effect be expanding the law
was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature
inappropriately without due process.
that brought it into existence.

 We find petitioner’s assertion that the real intention of R.A. No. 9497 was merely
CAAP-EU v. CAAP the reorganization of the ATO and not its abolition devoid of merit. The legislature
through R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO as explicitly stated in Sections 4 and 85
G.R. No. 109120, November 11, 2014
thereof. The question whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative
J. Villarama Jr. intent. In this case, petitioner tries to raise doubts as to the real intention of
Congress. However, there should not be any controversy if there is an explicit
Facts: declaration of abolition in the law itself. For where a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempt to
The CAAP-EU, a legitimate union of employees of the Civil Aviation Authority of the interpret. Verba legis non est recedendum, index animi sermo est. The legislature,
Philippines (CAAP), challenges the constitutionality of the Authority Orders, Memoranda through Sections 4 and 85 of R.A. No. 9497, has so clearly provided.
issued by the CAAP Acting Director General Ruben Ciron relating to the filling up of
positions within the CAAP whether existing or newly created. The said issuances allegedly 2. No.
resulted in the classification and treatment of the incumbent personnel of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO), now of CAAP, into “hold-over” status, thus violating the For right to security of tenure to be impaired, the abolition of an office must be done in bad
faith.
  For the ATO employees’ security of tenure to be impaired, the abolition of the ATO functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the
must be done in bad faith. A valid order of abolition must not only come from a principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from
legitimate body, it must also be made in good faith. An abolition is made in good suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of
faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does not government functions.
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. Abolition
of an office may be brought about by reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy
of functions, or a clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of
employment. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested
with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. When there is a void abolition,
the incumbent is deemed to have never ceased holding office.

Impairment of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office.

 To be precise, the case before us deals only with the issue of abolition and not
removal. Petitioner has failed to provide in detail any ATO personnel who had been
removed from office on account of R.A. No. 9497. Abolition of an office and its
related positions is different from removal of an incumbent from his office.
Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint,
there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is no
tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal
implies that the office and its related positions subsist and that the occupants are
merely separated from their positions.

3. No.

There is no grave abuse of discretion when Section 60 of the IRR provided for a “hold-
over” status on the part of ATO employees.

 A careful perusal of Section 86 of R.A. No. 9497 reveals that the transfer of ATO
personnel, unless they opted to retire from the service, to the CAAP implies the
application of the hold-over principle. There being no express, much less implied
prohibition of the application of the hold-over principle in R.A. No. 9497 per se,
such proviso in the latter’s IRR does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.

 Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an

officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has
qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed
or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume
that the law-making body favours the same.

 Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in
the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition
which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period
of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its
 JB Management Mining Corporation, Davao United Miners Cooperative, Balite Integrated
Small Scale Miners Cooperative, MISSMA, PICOP, Rosendo Villaflor, et al., Antonio G.
Dacudao, Puting Bato Gold Miners Cooperative, and Romeo Altamera, et al. filed adverse
claims against MPSA No. 128.

The adverse claims were anchored on DENR Administrative Order No. 66 (DAO No. 66)
issued on December27, 1991, declaring 729 hectares of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve as forest land open for smallscale mining purposes, subject to existing and valid
private rights.

Issues:
I. Whether the Court of Appeals can set aside the issue of forum shopping and litis pendencia
(SMGMC's petition in G.R. No. 132475), and dwell on the merits;

II. Whether the DENR Secretary can modify the PMRB’s decision; and

Held:

1. We do not need to decide on whether there was forum shopping or litis pendencia. Apex
Mining v. SMGMC mooted these petitions.

 Litis pendencia exists when the following elements are present: "(a) the identity of
parties, or at least suchas representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicatain the other." The existence
of litis pendenciaalso means that the rule against forum shopping was violated.

 Proclamation No. 297 dated November 25, 2002 excluded an area of 8,100 hectares
in Moncayo, Compostela Valley as a mineral reservation and as an environmentally
critical area: PROC. 297. to address the situation in the Diwalwal gold rush area.

Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.  This court denied the motions for reconsiderations, among others, in its 2009
resolution. Since this court declared that EP 133 expired and its transfer to SMGMC
G.R. No. 149916/G.R. No. 149638, December 10, 2014. is void, respondent SMGMC has no more basis to claim any right over the disputed
729 hectares in the Diwalwal gold rush area excluded from its MPSA.
J. Leonen
 Furthermore, since this court has declared that the DENR Secretary had no authority
Facts: to issue DAO No. 66 declaring 729 hectares of the Agusan Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve as forest land open for small-scale mining purposes subject to existing and
On February 16, 1994, Marcopper assigned EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining valid private rights, both the PMRB decision, and the DENR Secretary’s decision
Corporation (SMGMC). affirming it with modification, are consequently overturned for lack ofbasis in
delineating the 729 hectares from the MPSA.
On December 19, 1995, the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau director ordered the publication
of SMGMC’s application for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA No. 128) for the  Indeed, then President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297 excluding an
4,941 hectares covered by EP 133. area in Moncayo, Compostela Valley, declaring this as a mineral reservation and as
an environmentally critical area. DENR Administrative Order No. 2002-18
followed, declaring an emergency situation in this gold rush area and ordering the
 stoppage of all mining operations. Executive Order No. 217 thereafter created the
National Task Force Diwalwal. Castillejos Consumers Associations, Inc. (hereafter CASCONA) is an organization of electric
consumers from the municipality of Castillejos, Zambales under the coverage area of
2. Yes. ZAMECO II.

 Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7076 provides for the PMRB’s power to “declare  CASCONA, through its Board of Trustees, filed a letter-complaint with NEA seeking the
and segregate existing gold-rich areas for small-scale mining” but “under the direct removal of the petitioners. The letter-complaint was essentially based on the "Management
supervision and control of the Secretary” and Financial Audit Report of Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO II) for the
period from 01 January 1989 to 30 September 1997" dated June 1998 submitted by the
 Section 21.1 of DAO No. 34–92, the implementing rules and regulations of Republic Manager of the Coop Systems Audit Division to the NEA.
Act No. 7076, states that the DENR Secretary has “direct supervision and control
over the program and the activities of the small-scale miners within the people’s CASCONA alleged the following offenses: (a) illegal payment of 13 th  Month Pay and
small-scale mining area.” Excessive Mid-Year and Christmas Bonus to petitioners; (b) excessive expenses of the Board
President, petitioner Mr. Jose S. Dominguez, charged to ZAMECO Power Corporation (ZPC)
 In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an and Central Luzon Power Transmission Development Corporation (CLPTDC) but advanced
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or by ZAMECO II and treated as receivables by the ZAMECO II from aforesaid corporations; (c)
neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law anomalous contract with Philreca Management Corporation (PMC) for ZAMECO II's Systems
to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power Loss Reduction Program; and (4) overstaying as members of the Board of Directors of
of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ZAMECO II.
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter NEA – ruled in favour of CASCONA.

CA – denied the consolidated petitions on the ground that NEA properly exercised its
supervisory power over ZAMECO II. Corollary to this ruling is the Court of Appeals'
declaration that petitioners have not been deprived of due process in the administrative
proceedings. The appellate court denied reconsideration.

Hence, petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before SC, arguing that NEA's
power to supervise and control electric cooperatives had been abrogated by the EPIRA which
decreed that all outstanding financial obligations of electric cooperatives to NEA shall be
assumed by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM
Corp.).

Lastly, petitioners argue that NEA's Office of the Administrative Committee (ADCOM) does
ZAMECO II v. Castillejos Consumers Asso, Inc. not have the authority to hear election-related cases.

G.R. No. 176935-36, October 20, 2014 Issue:

1. WON NEA still have the authority to supervise and control over ZAMECO II, an electric
J. Tinga. cooperative.
2. WON Petitioners have been deprived of due process.
Facts:
Held:
Petitioners are are members of the Board of Directors of the Zambales II Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (hereafter ZAMECO II).  ZAMECO II is an electric cooperative organized and registered 1.
under Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended.
The passage of EPIRA law and creation of PSALM Corp. did not affect the power of the
NEA is a government owned and controlled corporation organized under Presidential Decree NEA to control over electric cooperatives.
(PD) No. 269, as amended by PD No.  1645.
  P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645, vested NEA with the authority to evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
supervise and control electric cooperatives. In the exercise of its authority, it has the must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does
power to conduct investigations and other similar actions in all matters affecting not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
electric cooperatives. The failure of electric cooperatives to comply with NEA cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
orders, rules and regulations and/or decisions authorizes the latter to take preventive decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
and/or disciplinary measures, including suspension and/or removal and replacement conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be
of any or all of the members of the Board of Directors, officers or employees of the rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
electric cooperative concerned. the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

 The passage of the EPIRA and its creation of PSALM Corp. which assumed all o Moreover, P.D. No. 269, from which NEA derives its jurisdiction over the
outstanding financial obligations of electric cooperatives did not affect the power of controversy, contains an express provision that a "hearing proceeding" be
the NEA particularly over administrative cases involving the board of directors, conducted wherein the party whose rights shall be substantially affected
officers and employees of electric cooperatives.  This authority is expressly by the exercise of NEA's jurisdiction shall be given the opportunity to be
recognized under the last paragraph of Sec. 58, Chapter VII of the EPIRA which heard.
states that, "NEA shall continue to be under the supervision of the DOE and shall
exercise its functions under Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended by  The case was remanded to CA for further proceedings.
Presidential Decree No. 1645 insofar as they are consistent with this Act."

 A review of the provisions of the EPIRA reveals that the ERC has been given the
specific mandate to "promote competition, encourage market development, ensure
customer choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured electricity
industry." PSALM Corp., on the other hand, was created in order to "manage the
orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and
other disposable assets, and IPP contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC
financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner." Obviously,
the functions of these two agencies do not come into conflict and are not
inconsistent with the supervisory power exercised by NEA in the instant case.

2. YES.

Ang Tibay Doctrine: Cardinal Rights which must be observed in an administrative

proceeding:

 Parenthetically, both the audit investigation and the administrative investigation on

account of CASCONA's letter-complaint were administrative proceedings. The
difference between the two is that in ruling that petitioners had violated various
guidelines pertaining to electric cooperatives and imposing the penalty of removal
from office, NEA exercised a function which was decidedly quasi-judicial in nature.
 As such, NEA's compliance with due process requirements should be evaluated
based on the standard set forth in Ang Tibay v. CIR, pertaining to the cardinal rights
which must be observed in proceedings before administrative tribunals, synthesized
in a subsequent case as follows:

o There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in

proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
 authorized under the General Provisions of the 2004-2007 General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) subject to certain conditions.

The audit team disallowed the payment of EME amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in
excess of the amount allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. It was further discovered that EME
were disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not of equivalent ranks as authorized
by the Department of Budget and Management.

TESDA, through Director-General Augusto Boboy Syjuco, Jr., appealed and argued that the
2004-2007 GAAs and the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual allowed the grant of
EME from both the General Fund and the TESDP Fund provided the legal ceiling was not
exceeded for each fund. TESDA argued further that the General Fund and the TESDP Fund
are distinct from each other, and TESDA officials designated as project officers concurrently
with their regular functions were entitled to separate EME from both funds. The COA denied
the appeal for lack of merit prompting TESDA, through its Director-General to file a petition
for review with COA. The same was denied. The COA ruled that failure of TESDA officials
to conform to the 2004-2007 GAAs negated their claim of good faith. Hence this petition for
certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction to annul COA decision.

Issues:
1. Did the COA properly disallow the payment of excessive EME by TESDA?
2. Should the TESDA officials refund the excess EME granted to them?

Held:

1. Yes. COA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the disbursement of
EME to TESDA officials for being excessive and unauthorized by law.

"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.”

 Provisions in the GAA are clear in stating that the EME shall not exceed the amount
fixed therein. Those entitled to claim EME not exceeding the amount provided in the
GAA are as follows: (1) the officials named in the GAA, (2) the officers of
equivalent rank as may be authorized by the DBM, (3) and the offices under them.
TESDA v. COA However, TESDA had a different interpretation of the law. It contends that there
was no prohibition under the 2004-2007 GAAs regarding the additional EME
G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015 chargeable against TESDP Fund. This argument deserves scant consideration.
 It is worth noting that TESDA, an instrumentality of the government established
J. Carpio under the TESDA Act of 1994, is accorded with budget for its implementation
which is included in its annual GAA. The TESDP Fund, which is being sourced
Facts: from the Treasury, belongs to the government. The Constitution provides that, no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
The TESDA audit team discovered that for the calendar years 2004-2007, TESDA paid made by law.
Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) twice each year to its officials from two  No law was pointed out by TESDA authorizing it to grant additional reimbursement
sources: (1) the General Fund for locally-funded projects and (2) the Technical Education and for EME from the TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicit requirement in the
Skills Development Project (TESDP) Fund for foreign-assisted projects. Payment of EME was Constitution and the law.
 on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad
2. Yes. Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to
Governor Pimentel that she be held administratively liable. On September 30, 1999, Governor
 The Director-General blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation Committees recommendation and dismissed
the 2004-2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence Gonzales.
amounting to bad faith. Hence, he is required to refund the EME he received from
the TESDP Fund for himself. TESDA officials, on the other hand, who had no On appeal, the CSC modified Governor Pimentel’s decision finding Gonzales guilty of
participation in the approval of the excessive EME acted in good faith and they need insubordination and suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed by Governor
not refund the excess EME they received. Pimentel, which the CSC denied.

The CSC then issued Resolution No. 002245, which directed Gonzales reinstatement.
Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000 but
terminated her services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter to the CSC
reporting his compliance with its order, and Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a confidential
employee.

The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008, which again directed Gonzales
reinstatement as provincial administrator. It clarified that while the Local Government Code of
1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160) made the provincial administrator position coterminous and
highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were
already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the new laws effectivity.
According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment as
provincial administrator and is entitled to continue holding this office despite its subsequent
classification as a coterminous position.

Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Nortes
incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded with Resolution No.
061988, which ordered Gonzales reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to
an equivalent position. Thus, the petitioner, through Governor Typoco, filed a petition for
review before the CA, seeking to nullify the CSCs Resolution No. 030008 and Resolution No.
061988.

The CA supported the CSCs ruling. Petitioner sought for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition before the SC. In its present petition for review on certiorari, the
petitioner argues that the provincial administrator position has been converted into a highly
confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer enjoyed security
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE v. BEATRIZ O. of tenure to the position she held prior to RA 7160s enactment.
GONZALES
Issue:
G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013 1. Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career
service to a primarily confidential, non-career service position;
J. Brion 2. Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of the
Province of Camarines Norte.
Facts:
Held:
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by
then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a permanent 1. Yes. Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a primarily
capacity. An administrative case was filed against her for gross insubordination, this was later confidential, non-career position.
 service. This change could not have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was
 We support the CSC’s conclusion that the provincial administrator position has been not the only provincial administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted.
classified into a primarily confidential, non-career position when Congress, through Rather, this change was part of the reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to
RA 7160, made substantial changes to it. further empower local governments and decentralize the delivery of public service.
 First, prior to RA 7160, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the old Local Government Code
(LGC), did not include a provincial administrator position among the listing of  Thus, Gonzales’ permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior to the
mandatory provincial officials, but empowered the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to enactment of RA 7160 is immaterial to her removal as provincial administrator. For
create such other offices as might then be necessary to carry out the purposes of the purposes of determining whether Gonzales’ termination violated her right to security
provincial government. RA 7160 made the position mandatory for every province. of tenure, the nature of the position she occupied at the time of her removal should
Thus, the creation of the provincial administrator position under the old LGC used to be considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment at the time she entered
be a prerogative of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. government service.
 Second, in introducing the mandatory provincial administrator position, RA 7160
also amended the qualifications for the provincial administrator position. While
Section 480 of RA 7160 retained the requirement of civil service eligibility for a No vested right in Public Office nor an absolute right to hold office.
provincial administrator, together with the educational requirements, it shortened the
six-year work experience requirement to five years. It also mandated the additional  Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the country's constitutional system that "public office
requirements of residence in the local government concerned and imposed a good is a public trust," and that there is no vested right in public office, nor an absolute
moral character requirement. right to hold office. No proprietary title attaches to a public office, as public service
 Third, RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its is not a property right. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in
primarily confidential. an office. The rule is that offices in government, except those created by the
constitution, may be abolished, altered, or created anytime by statute. And any
2. No. Congress’ reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a  valid issues on the classification for a position in government may be brought to and
exercise of legislative power that does not violate Gonzales’ security of tenure. determined by the courts.

Nature of a position and Right to hold a position are different. Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee.

 The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of Congress.  Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee
The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after
and statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature of the due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change
position. in the nature of the office held. In other words, the CSC might have been legally
correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales’ right to security of tenure
Legislative Power: The power to create office includes the power to abolish the same. when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the
situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered,
 Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the but her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at the time of
provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non- the termination of her service; i.e., she was then already occupying a position that
career service position. Flowing from the legislative power to create public offices is was primarily confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed
the power to abolish and modify them to meet the demands of society; Congress can the trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales’ termination for
change the qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory offices. When lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial
done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officer’s security of tenure, administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable position. This
even if they result in his removal from office or the shortening of his term. conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales’ entitlement to retirement
Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or shortening of its benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government service.
tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the
incumbent.

 In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial
administrator position but significantly modified many of its aspects. It is now a
primarily confidential position under the non-career service tranche of the civil
 Facts:

An undated letter-complaint addressed to the Complaints and Investigation Division (CID) of

the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) of the Supreme Court triggered this
administrative matter.

The letter complaint, purportedly sent by a concerned employee who chose to remain
anonymous, assailed the profitable money-lending with usurious interest scheme engaged in
by respondents Dolores T. Lopez, an SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, and Fernando M.
Montalvo, an SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, both of the Checks Disbursement
Division of the Court’s Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO).

It stated that the respondents had been involved in the money-lending activities targeting the
low-salaried employees of the Court like the drivers and employees of the janitorial services;
that such money-lending had been going on with the help of the personnel of the Checks
Disbursement Division of FMBO by enticing employees of the Court to pledge forthcoming
benefits at a discounted rate; and that around 300 Automated Teller Machine (ATM) cards
were surrendered by the borrowers to the respondents as collateral for the individual
borrowings.

Issue:
Whether or not the money lending activities of the court employees is prohibited and may be
used to make them administratively liable.

Held:

Yes.

 Administrative Circular No. 5 (Re: Prohibition for All Officials and Employees of

the Judiciary to Work as Insurance Agents), dated October 4, 1988, has prohibited
all officials and employees of the Judiciary from engaging directly in any private
business, vocation or profession, even outside their office hours. The prohibition has
been at ensuring that full-time officers and employees of the courts render full-time
service, for only thereby could any undue delays in the administration of justice and
in the disposition of court cases be avoided. The nature of the work of
court employees and officials demanded their highest degree of efficiency
and responsibility, but they would not ably meet the demand except by
Re: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT ON THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT devoting their undivided time to the government service. This explains why
AND FOR ENGAGING IN THE BUSINESS OF LENDING MONEY AT USURIOUS court employees have been enjoined to strictly observe official time and to
RATES OF INTEREST OF MS. DOLORES T. LOPEZ, SC CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF devote every second or moment of such time to serving the public.
OFFICER, AND MR. FERNANDO M. MONTALVO, SC SUPERVISING
JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, CHECKS DISBURSEMENT DIVISION, FISCAL  Although many “moonlighting” activities were themselves legal acts that would be
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE. permitted or tolerated had the actors not been employed in the public
sector, moonlighting, albeit not usually treated as a serious misconduct, can amount
A.M. No. 2010-21-SC, September 30, 2014 to a malfeasance in office by the very nature of the position held.

J. Bersamin.
  In the case of Montalco, The Court concurs with the findings of the OAS that the
complaint against Montalvo had no factual basis. His involvement in money Facts:
lending was not shown to be habitual, going on only as far as accommodating
his friends during their personal emergencies without imposing any interests. The The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
statement in the letter-complaint to the effect that both respondents have been in the and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
forefront of syndicated lending activities was not supported by any proof. It is International Criminal Court  to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to
notable that Montalvo firmly denied the allegations against him, and that Lopez Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
corroborated his denial. Accordingly, the complaint against Montalvo should be
dismissed. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the
most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of
 In the case of Lopez, The Court agrees with the observations and findings of the aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN.
OAS about Lopez having engaged in money-lending activities. Her various The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or
admissions entirely belied her insistence that her activities did not constitute approval of the signatory state. 
money lending. Her claim that the amounts voluntarily given to her by the
recipients had not been interests on the loans extended to them was plainly Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
insincere. The fact of her parting with her money in favor of another upon function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed
the condition that the same amount would be paid back was exactly what constituted copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion. 
a loan under the law. 
Issue:
o Lopez, being the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division of the Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
FMBO, a major office of the Court itself, surely put the integrity of the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N.
Checks Disbursement Division and the entire FMBO under so much even without the signature of the President.
undeserved suspicion. She ought to have refrained from engaging in
money lending, particularly to the employees of the Court. We do not need Held:
to stress that she was expected to be circumspect about her acts and
actuations, knowing that the impression of her having taken advantage of No.
her position and her having abused the confidence reposed in her office
and functions as such would thereby become unavoidable. There is no  As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s
doubt about her onerous lending activities greatly diminishing the mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with
reputation of her office and of the Court itself in the esteem of the public. the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact
the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the
sole authority to negotiate with other states.

 Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
“no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”

Public International Law  The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed
essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the
President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary
G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005 in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth.

J. Puno
Signing of the Treaty and Ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty- Facts:
making process.
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
 It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during Second
separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the World War. He was charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff  of
signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed to
symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty violation of the laws and customs of war”. The said military commission was empaneled under
concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of the Philippines.
undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.  
Kuroda challenged the validity of Executive Order 68. His arguments, were as follows:
(1) Executive Order 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the
provisions of our constitutional law but also our local laws.

(2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947 and,
therefore, he is charged with “crime” not based on law, national or international.

(3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are
not qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and
the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national
sovereignty.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order 68 had violated the provisions of our constitutional law

Held:
No. Executive Order 68 has not violated the provision of our constitutional law.

Every State is, by reason of its membership in the family of nations, bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of its
own laws.

 The Supreme held that the Philippines is bound by the Hague Convention because it
embodied the generally accepted principles of international law binding upon all
nations.

 The Court declared, “It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague
and Geneva Convention form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of public international law. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part
Kuroda v. Jalandoni of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and
83 Phil 171, March 26, 1949 extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of
international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
CJ. Moran shall be signatory”.
 The petitioners in this case are victims of human rights violations under the martial law
regime. In 1991, they filed a class suit with the United States District Court of Hawaii, against
the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action
was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights
abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces
during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's
jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of
international law. Subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and
exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. A Final Judgment was rendered by the US
Court awarding the plaintiff class a total of USD 1,964,005,859.90

In 1997, petitioners filed a Complaint with the Makati RTC for the enforcement of the US
Final Judgment. The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-
payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid P410 as docket and
filing fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only P410 was proper,
pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.

The Makati RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. It
found that the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation and
Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application. The RTC
required the petitioners to pay a filing fee of over P472 Million, which had not been paid.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of
the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum
of money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay
the P472 Million in filing fees would negate the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of
Court.

Issue:
1. What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to
enforce a foreign judgment?
2. Whether the US Final Judgment can be enforced in the Philippines.

Held:
1.

No. Section 7(a), Rule 141 is not the basis in the computation of filing fees in the present case.
Computation of filing fees is governed by Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141 involving 'other actions
not involving property’.
Mijares v. Ranada
Subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, guiding principles.
G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005
 The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an action is
J. Tinga capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. In determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Facts:
 Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action combination two elements: (i) the established, widespread, and consistent practice
or remedy sought. on the part of States; and (ii) a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a
 If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the law requiring it.
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
 While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert
sought, [like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of judgment or to with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles
foreclose a mortgage,] this Court has considered such actions as cases where the of international law. There is a widespread practice among states accepting in
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations
exclusively by courts of first instance. of varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the
practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a
The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for
estimation recognition and enforcement. There may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by
each particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law
 It is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a
enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the foreign judgment.
adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for
"the enforcement of the foreign judgment," but there is a certain obtuseness to that  The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of  opinio juris in
sort of argument since there is no denying that the enforcement of the foreign international practice. This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the
judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money. procedure and requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not
merely from the procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
 As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it Constitution.
recognizes that the subject matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment
is the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the  The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country
foreign judgment. In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged merely due to an exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted
against an estate and is based on the US District Court's Final Judgment, this foreign practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave concerns in
judgment may, for purposes of classification under the governing procedural rule, be conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the
deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of "all property subject of the foreign decision. The vagaries of inflation, as well as the
other actions not involving property." Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal relative low-income capacity of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an
amount is required. award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the
docket fees for the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award
2.
sought to be enforced.
Yes.

Recognition of foreign judgments is a matter of compliance with generally accepted

principles of international law

 There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by
virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the
 Facts:

The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was
last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis
arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga
City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him
a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from
this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy
food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong
looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did
not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of

Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn
affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.

More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the
Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P.
Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen.
Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet.

Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land
Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their
friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of
her efforts did not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the
military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed
men. According to reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with
the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.

She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors, their
intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and
Razon v. Tagitis constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.

G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009 Issue: Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr.
Morced Tagitis.
J. Brion
Held:
Yes. The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a
thus the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies. Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance
with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law."  Under this Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
Issue: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
Held:
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State; No. Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective
application, whether civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull
disappeared person; concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes.
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. Ex Post Facto Law:
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when
not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. As a matter committed;
of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the
ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime;
adherence to "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."
3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or,
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such defendant.
as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
“Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. 
criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused.” This being so, there is
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced no absolutely no merit in petitioner’s contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining
disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared the Treaty’s retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s
enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal
the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. “It merely provides for the extradition of persons
consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed
allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.  or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.”

Wright v. CA

G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994

J. Kapunan

Facts:
 On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U. S. a Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand
Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of
Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted,
Jimenez appears to be charged with violation of the provisions of the United States Code
(USC0 relating to tax fraud, tax evasion, Election contributions in name of another, among
others.

On the same day, then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon (petitioner) issued Department Order
No. 249 designating a panel of attorneys to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1069 (Philippine Extradition Law).

Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the panel, respondent Jimenez, through
counsel, wrote a letter to Secretary Drilon requesting copies of the official extradition request
from the U. S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith. He also
requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.

Secretary Drilon denied the foregoing requests reasoning that it is only after the filing of the
petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court
with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents.

Respondent Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for mandamus (to
compel Secretary Drilon to furnish him the extradition documents) and prohibition (to restrain
Secretary Drilon from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the
extradition Jimenez to the United States).

RTC Judge Lantion issued a Temporary Restraining Order for Secretary Drilon et al to refrain
from conducting further proceedings in connection with the extradition request of the United
States Government against Jimenez.

Issue:

1. During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to
the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?

2. In the event that private respondent is entitled to notice and hearing at the evaluation stage
of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal
Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition
G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000 Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between
private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
J. Melo Treaty?

Facts: Held:
1. 60 days if no request is submitted. PD 1069 provides for a shorter period
of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged. Logically,
Yes. although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only
mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the
Evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is in the nature of an investigative or
prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not,
inquisitorial process.
subsequently rearrested, for he will only be discharged if no request is
 The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his
class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also possible flight from the Requested State.
erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, o Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the
the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the pendency of the extradition petition in court.
completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes  Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as
indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not imminent one.
punishable under non-military penal legislation . Hence, said process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding Right to notice and hearing available in the evaluation stage of an extradition proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power. (since such stage is akin to a preliminary investigation).
 The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is  Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed
signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and expeditiously. Nevertheless, mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to shortcuts. One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the
evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not
to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed
parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.  to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Plainly, the notice and hearing
 An administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents has no power requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved
to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and aside.
the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply
with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the 2. No.
basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The
body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. Duty to comply with treaty obligations (Pacta sunt servanada; Doctrine of incorporation)
That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of
 The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
Evaluation process in an extradition proceeding partakes of the nature of a criminal good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
investigation. compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Philippines.. adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
 However, in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is the law of the land..." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law
characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make
extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages:
o First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the  The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local
submission of the extradition request. This is so because the RP-US courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between
Extradition Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the
may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to
presentation of the request, but he shall be automatically discharged after both. However, where the conflict is irreconcilable , jurisprudence dictates that
 municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such The United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine
courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all Government Note Verbale No. 0522 requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also
circumstance.The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the known as Mario Batacan Crespo. The secretary of foreign affairs transmitted them to the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or secretary of justice for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of the Extradition Law.
municipal law in the municipal sphere.
Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila. The TRO prohibited the DOJ
 The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The Supreme Court upon Motion for
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, held that Marc Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become
effect - a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where final and executory.
the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with The Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed
the constitution.  with the RTC, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. They alleged that Jimenez was the
subject of an arrest warrant issued by the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
Application of the due process rights of notice and hearing in the evaluation stage of an connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States; (2) tax
extradition proceeding will not go against the RP-US Extradition Treaty or the evasion; (3) wire fraud and 2; (4) false statements; and (5) illegal campaign contributions. The
implementing law, PD 1069 Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest."
 The court observes that there is no conflict between an international law (RP-US
Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that Govt. of
Extradition Treaty) and municipal or national law (PD 1069) in the present case.
USA’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of
Instead, there exists a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
Jimenez and set the case for hearing. In that hearing, the Govt. of USA manifested its
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition
rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings.
case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, Jimenez sought
From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice
amount of P100,000.
and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto,
the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also
The RTC directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
manifests this silence.
liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
 In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order.
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go
against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition The Government of the USA filed for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to set
Law precludes these rights from a prospective extradite. aside the assailed Orders of the RTC.

Issue:

1. Whether the respondent entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.

US v. Purganan 2. Whether the respondent entitled to bail.

G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002 3. Whether there is a violation of due process of law. 

J. Panganiban Held:

Facts: 1. No. An extraditee is not entitled to Notice and Hearing before the Issuance of a Warrant
of Arrest.
  Section 6 of PD 1069, Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for
hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no
longer be considered "immediate."

 By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an
exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately
upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available
to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie
finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused.

 Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does
not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To
determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the
witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused
before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

2. No. An extraditee is not entitled to bail

 Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, apply only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
 The constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt."
It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

3. No Violation of Due Process in extradition proceedings

 The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point
out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.  Where
the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a
subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.

 In the present case, Jimenez will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently,
when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
 Facts:

Upon her assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution, then President Aquinoissued
Executive Order No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
Pursuant to its mandate to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, PCGG created an AFP Anti-
Graft Board to investigate corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.

The AFP Board investigated reports of unexplained wealth of Major General Ramas, the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986 (with the rank of Major General) and
filed a petition for forfeiture against him and his office clerk and alleged mistress, Elizabeth
Dimaano.

During the trial, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the PCGG does not
have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held
without a showing that they are" subordinates" of former President Marcos.

Moreover, during the raid conducted on Dimaano’s residence, there were items seized that
were not included in the search warrant.  Respondents therefore seek these items to be
excluded from evidence for being illegally seized.

Notably, the search and seizure were conducted on March 3, 1986 or five days after the EDSA
revolution.  According to the Republic, the items seize dare admissible since at the time of
their seizure, private respondents did notenjoy any constitutional right. What was in place at
the time of the seizure was a revolutionary government and it effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which was the basis of respondents’ exclusionary right.

Issue:

Whether PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition
against Major General Ramas and Dimaano.

Held:

No. PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against
Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.

a.   Ramas is not a ‘subordinate’ as the term is contemplated under EO No. 1.

b.   Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate"
as this term is used in EO No.1 absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
c.   There must be prima facie showing that Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of
G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003 his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
J. Carpio
d.   Such close association is manifested either by Ramas' complicity with former President
Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former  The search warrant, issued during the interregnum, was valid. However, the seizure
President Marcos' acquiescence in Ramas' own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any. of the items not included in the warrant was void, unless these items are contraband
per se, which they are not.
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute
forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary
investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition
rests with the Solicitor General.

The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to
prescription, laches or estoppel.

Rights under theRevolutionary Government (Legality of the seizure)

 The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum
o The EDSA Revolution took place on February 23-25, 1986. The
INTERREGNUM refers to period after the actual and effective take-over
of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to March 24, 1986 -- immediately before
the adoption of the Provisional Constitution). 
o During the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right
under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of
Rights during the interregnum During the interregnum, the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government were thesupreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.  

 Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy,
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration), almost the same rights found
in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
o The Declaration, to which the Philippines is as signatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”  
o Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the ‘generally accepted principles of international
law’ (customary international law) and binding on the State. Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to
observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.

 After the EDSA Revolution, the resulting government was a revolutionary

government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines,
assumed under international law.