BOBIE ROSE D. V. FRIAS, AS REPRESENTED BY MARIE REGINE F. FUJITA, PETITIONER, VS.

ROLANDO F. ALCAYDE, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 194262, FIRST DIVISION, February 28, 2018, TIJAM, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Bobie Rose D.V. Frias, as lessor, and respondent Rolando Alcayde, as lessee,
entered into a Contract of Lease involving a residential house and lot located at No. 589 Batangas
East, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City, for a period of one year with a monthly rental of
P30,000.00. Respondent refused to perform any of his contractual obligations, which had
accumulated for 24 months in rental arrearages.

This prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with the MeTC
Muntinlupa against the respondent. As per the Process Server's Return, Tobias N. Abellano tried
to personally serve the summons to respondent, but to no avail. Through substituted service,
summons was served upon respondent's caretaker, May Ann Fortiles.

The MeTC, in its Decision on July 26, 2006, ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered
respondent to vacate the subject premises and to pay the petitioner the accrued rentals at 12%
legal interest, plus P10,000 in attorney's fees. Thereafter, the MeTC issued an Order, granting
petitioner's Motion to execute the July 26, 2006 Decision, and denying respondent's Omnibus
Motion thereto.

Respondent then filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for Issuance of
TRO and/or Injunction with the RTC Muntinlupa. Respondent averred that the MeTC's July 26,
2006 Decision does not bind him since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Respondent likewise averred that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the case for two reasons: (1)
petitioners' complaint has no cause of action for failure to make a prior demand to pay and to
vacate; and (2) petitioner's non-referral of the case before the barangay.

A copy of the petition for annulment of judgment was allegedly served to the petitioner.
Based on the Officer's Return, Sheriff IV Jocelyn S. Tolentino (Sheriff Tolentino) caused the
service of a Notice of Raffle and Summons together with a copy of the complaints and its annexes
to the petitioner, through Sally Gonzales (Ms. Gonzales), the secretary of petitioner's counsel,
Atty. Daniel S. Frias (Atty. Frias).

Petitioner, through her representative, Marie Regine F. Fujita (Ms. Fujita), filed a
Preliminary Submission to Dismiss Petition - Special Appearance Raising Jurisdictional Issues
(Preliminary Submission), on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. She pointed out
that the defect in the service of summons is immediately apparent on the Officer's Return, since
it did not indicate the impossibility of a personal service within a reasonable time. It did not
specify the efforts exerted by Sheriff Tolentino to locate the petitioner, and it did not certify that
the person in the office who received the summons in petitioner's behalf was one with whom the
petitioner had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter would receive or would be
notified of the summons issued in her name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent’s petition for annulment of judgment should be

dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
RULING:

Yes. The respondent’s petition for annulment of judgment should be dismissed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

It is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner once the
complaint or petition is filed. On the other hand, there are two ways through which jurisdiction
over the defendant or respondent is acquired through coercive process - either through the
service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court.

Nature of a petition for annulment of judgment for purposes of service of summons

For a proper perspective, it is crucial to underscore the necessity of determining first

whether the action subject of this appeal is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the
rules on service of summons under Rule 14 apply according to the nature of the action.

An action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought

against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person. Actions in rem are actions
against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole world. In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests
therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.

In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over
the parties is required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal
responsibility or liability upon a person. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law;
or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective.

Here, respondent filed a petition to annul the MeTC's July 26, 2006 Decision, which
ordered him to vacate the premises of the subject property and to pay the petitioner the accrued
rentals thereon, in violation of the parties' lease contract.

Annulment of judgment, as provided for in Rule 47, is based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes lack of due process as
an additional ground to annul a judgment. It is unlike a motion for reconsideration, appeal or
even a petition for relief from judgment, because annulment is not a continuation or progression
of the same case, as in fact the case it seeks to annul is already final and executory. Rather, it is an
extraordinary remedy that is equitable in character and is permitted only in exceptional cases.

For purposes of summons, this Court holds that the nature of a petition for annulment of
judgment is in personam, on the basis of the following reasons:

First, a petition for annulment of judgment is an original action, which is separate,

distinct and independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered.
Thus, regardless of the nature of the original action in the decision sought to be annulled, be
 it in personam, in rem or quasi in rein, the respondent should be duly notified of the petition
seeking to annul the court's decision over which the respondent has a direct or indirect interest.

Second, a petition for annulment of judgment and the court's subsequent decision thereon will
affect the parties alone. Any judgment therein will eventually bind only the parties properly
impleaded. In this case, had the RTC granted the respondent's petition, the MeTC's July 26 2006
judgment would have been declared a nullity. This would have resulted to the following
consequences: as to the respondent, he would no longer be required to pay the rentals and
vacate the subject property; and, as to the petitioner, she would be deprived of her right to
demand the rentals and to legally eject the respondent. Clearly, only the parties' interests would
have been affected.

There was neither a valid service of summons in person nor a valid substituted service of
summons over the person of the petitioner

Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, as in this case,
the service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6
and 7 of Rule 14. Indeed, the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service.
Accordingly, this Court explained the nature and enumerated the requisites of substituted
service in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al., which We summarize and paraphrase below:
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one (1) month which eventually resulted in
failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two (2) different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful.
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left
with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is
of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said
person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons.

If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then
it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom
the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of
defendant, such as the president or manager. Such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance,
and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.
A perusal, however, of Sheriff Tolentino's Return discloses that the following circumstances, as
required in Manotoc, were not clearly-established: (a) personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons
was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's residence or upon
a competent person in charge of the party's office or place of business.

The Officer's Return likewise revealed that no diligent effort was exerted and no positive step was
taken to locate and serve the summons personally on the petitioner. Upon having been satisfied
that the petitioner was not present at her given address, Sheriff Tolentino immediately resorted to
substituted service of summons by proceeding to the office of Atty. Frias, petitioner's counsel.
Evidently, Sheriff Tolentino failed to show that she made several attempts to effect personal service
for at least three times on at least two different dates. It is likewise evident that Sheriff Tolentino
simply left the "Notice of Raffle and Summons" with Ms. Gonzales, the alleged secretary of Atty.
Frias. She did not even bother to ask her where the petitioner might be. There were no details in the
Officer's Return that would suggest that Sheriff Tolentino inquired as to the identity of Ms.
Gonzales. There was no showing that Ms. Gonzales was the one managing the office or business of
the petitioner, such as the president or manager, and that she has sufficient knowledge to
understand the obligation of the petitioner in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial
effects arising from inaction on the summons.

Thus, Sheriff Tolentino fell short of the required standards. For her failure to faithfully, strictly, and
fully comply with the requirements of substituted service, the same is rendered ineffective. As such,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, which is generally accorded
to a sheriff’s return,does not obtain in this case.

Special appearance to question a court's jurisdiction is not voluntary appearance

As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such
that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. In this
case, it is readily apparent that the petitioner did not acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
 The records show that the petitioner never received any copy of the respondent's petition to
annul the final and executory judgment of the MeTC in the unlawful detainer case. As
explained earlier, the copy of the said petition which was served to Ms. Gonzales was
defective under the Rules of Court. Consequently, in order to question the trial court's
jurisdiction, the petitioner filed several pleadings and motions. However, in all these
pleadings and motions, the petitioner never faltered in declaring that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person, due to invalid and improper service of summons. It is
noteworthy that when the petitioner filed those pleadings and motions, it was only in a
"special" character, conveying the fact that her appearance before the trial court was with a
qualification, i.e., to defy the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over her person.

To recapitulate, the jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner was never vested with the RTC
despite the mere filing of the petition for annulment of judgment. The manner of substituted service
by the process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due
process. Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense, the petitioner must be
properly served the summons of the court. Regrettably, as had been discussed, the Constitutional
right of the petitioner to be properly served the summons and be notified has been utterly
overlooked by the officers of the trial court.