Legal Systems Method Study Guide

Introduction
Contents
Introduction to Legal system and method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Purpose and content of the module guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Module aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Learning outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Textbook and other reading material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Relevant websites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Essential information for the new law student . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Citation of legal cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Law Reports series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Glossary of key judicial offices in the English legal system . . . . . . . . . 9

page 2 University of London International Programmes
Notes
Legal system and method Introduction page 3
Introduction to Legal system and method

This is a foundational module which provides you with some essential building blocks
for the study of law. Learning about law and legal systems is endlessly fascinating
and the material in this module provides a basis for your understanding of the other
modules you will tackle as part of your University of London programme. This module
will help you to become familiar with some of the special vocabulary of the law; it will
introduce you to the essential skills of the lawyer – such as how to read legal cases
and statutes (Acts of Parliament); and it will provide an overview of some of the key
institutions and processes that make up what we understand as the legal ‘system’.
This module is different from other law subjects

The material in this module is somewhat different from many of your other modules.
While, for example, criminal law and contract law focus on detailed legal rules (what
we refer to as ‘substantive law’), this subject looks more broadly at the machinery
of the legal system which is necessary to make the law work – so that disputes are
resolved peacefully and so that those who have broken the law may be brought to
justice. You will need to have an understanding of what law is and its role in society
as well as the meaning and significance of the concept of the ‘rule of law’. You
need to understand some basic constitutional principles – such as the relationship
between the government, law makers and judges – as well as how various parts of
the legal system work together. You will also need to be familiar with some of the
guiding principles of legal procedure in relation to dealing with civil disputes (such as
disputes over contracts or property) and in relation to the detection, prosecution and
punishment of criminal offences (such as theft or murder).
Purpose and content of the module guide

This guide is designed to help you through the material that you need to learn,
understand and apply. It is not a textbook, but the chapters introduce you to
the factual information, ideas, policy issues and debates that form the subject
matter of the module. It guides your further reading and provides a framework for
understanding. Each chapter starts with an introduction to the topic and summarises
the key issues that you need to know and understand. The sections of the guide direct
you to Essential reading, comprising the set textbook, material in the accompanying
study pack and relevant legal cases which can be found on the virtual learning
environment (VLE) or in the Online Library. At the end of each chapter of the module
guide there is a summary of key points and some questions for reflection, to test how
well you understand the material you have read and to encourage you to undertake
further reading and research, to develop your knowledge and understanding of the
legal system and legal reasoning.
Module aim
The aim of the module is to achieve an overview of the central institutions and
processes of the English legal system and to introduce students to techniques of legal
reasoning and interpretation.
Learning outcomes
On successful completion of the module, you should be able to:
1.1 Understand the structure and operation of the central institutions and processes
of the English legal system and have a basic facility with techniques of legal
interpretation
1.2 Conduct legal research using primary and secondary resources

1.3 Understand techniques of legal reasoning covering precedent and statutory
interpretation
1.4 Describe the role of judges; in particular the Law Lords and the Supreme Court
1.5 Explain the basic structures of civil and criminal justice
1.6 Understand the role of due Process and the importance of Article 6 (ECHR) in Civil
and Criminal Justice
1.7 Explain the key concepts of Legal Aid.
Assessment
Formative assessment is conducted through interactive online activities. Summative
assessment is through a three-hour unseen examination.
Textbook and other reading material

Each chapter in this module guide contains Essential and suggested Further reading
that is specific to the material in that chapter. In addition, there are textbooks which
you may want to consult. Several of these are available electronically.
Essential reading
¢¢ Holland, J. and J. Webb Learning legal rules. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016) ninth edition [ISBN 9780198728436].
Further reading
Introductory texts which give a concise overview of this subject:
¢¢ Rivlin, G. First steps in the law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) seventh
edition [ISBN 9780198735892].
¢¢ Slapper, G. How the law works. (Oxford: Routledge, 2016) fourth edition
[ISBN 9781138914971].
¢¢ Wacks, R. Law: a very short introduction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)
second edition [ISBN 9780198745624].
Substantial legal system texts providing detailed material on module topics:
¢¢ Cownie, F., A. Bradney and M. Burton English legal system in context. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013) sixth edition [ISBN 9780199656561].
¢¢ Partington, M. Introduction to the English legal system 2016–2017. (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2016) [ISBN 9780198758808].
¢¢ Slapper, G. and D. Kelly The English legal system 2016–2017. (Oxford: Routledge,
2016) [ISBN 9780198758808].
¢¢ Slorach, S., J. Embley, P. Goodchild and C. Shephard Legal systems and skills.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) second edition [ISBN 9780198727453].
¢¢ Stychin, C.F. and L. Mulcahy Legal methods and systems: text and materials.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) fourth edition [ISBN 9780414041837].
Relevant websites
Website of the judiciary of England and Wales
This is a very useful site for accessing recent speeches by the senior judiciary, for
information about courts and the judiciary and for news about important changes to
procedure.
www.judiciary.gov.uk
Website of the Ministry of Justice
Useful for research publications, for information about government policy on the
courts and judiciary.
www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-justice
Website of the UK Parliament
Useful for accessing legislation, reports of committees, and Hansard – the official
record of debates in Parliament.
www.parliament.uk
Other websites that may be useful

Law Society
Useful for developments on legal aid and access to justice. Also may have information
about the judiciary and important new cases.
www.lawsociety.org.uk
Bar Council
Useful for developments on legal aid and access to justice, judiciary and leading cases.
www.barcouncil.org.uk
You could also look for other resources on the internet; for example, reputable legal
blogs or follow Twitter accounts about the law.
One useful resource is the blog by Martin Partington, the author of Introduction to the
English Legal System at https://martinpartington.com/
If you use Twitter, you could follow the Law Society, the Bar Council, the Ministry of
Justice, the UK Parliament, the UK Supreme Court and many others.
Essential information for the new law student

This module deals with legal system and method principally as applied to the system
of law of England and Wales. The legal system of England and Wales is a ‘common law’
system which means that much of the law is to be found in the decisions of judges in
individual legal cases. In your reading you will constantly be referred to legal cases or
what are sometimes referred to as ‘legal authorities’. These are the reports of cases
heard and decided in different courts within the legal system. You will be expected to
read some of these cases; and to be able to refer to cases as ‘authority’ for various legal
rules and principles. Case reports are published in a number of different series of law
reports and organised according to the year in which they were decided or reported.
The operation of the common law system of precedent depends on lawyers being able
to find out what the courts have said about any particular question. This requires that
we have a record of court decisions in individual cases. These records are referred to as
‘law reports’.
This section introduces you to some important information that will help you to
understand how legal cases and statutes are referred to or ‘cited’ in legal documents
and texts. This is information that you can keep coming back to as you progress with
your studies and find different styles of referencing cases.
Citation of legal cases

Refer to the helpful guides at:
http://ox.libguides.com/c.php?g=422832&p=2887383 or
https://ilrb.cf.ac.uk/citingreferences/oscola/tutorial/index.html
Citation is the accepted way of referring to the ‘primary’ sources of law, cases,
legislation and also books and journal articles. It follows a standard format which
makes it possible for anyone to find the cited item. This is essential information for
being able to locate relevant legal material and for being able accurately to refer to
legal cases or cite them in writing or in legal argument.
Civil cases
Davis v Johnson [1979] 2 WLR 553 (pronounced Davis ‘and’ Johnson, not Davis ‘v’ Johnson
or Davis ‘versus’ Johnson).
‘Davis’ is the name of the person bringing the claim (the claimant). ‘Johnson’ is the
name of the person defending the claim (the defendant). [1979] is the year in which
the case was printed in the law reports. ‘2’ is the volume number of the reports in
which the case appears. ‘WLR’ stands for Weekly Law Reports, which is the law report
series containing all formally reported legal cases. ‘553’ is the page number of volume
2 of the Weekly Law Reports in 1979 where you will find the reported case of Davis v
Johnson.
Davis v Johnson [1979] 2 WLR 553
Name of Name of Volume First page

claimant defendant number of case
(plaintiff) report
Date
reported
Weekly Law
Reports
Figure1: Example of case citation from Weekly Law Reports
Square and round brackets in case citation

Square brackets are used where one needs the year of the case in order to be able to
identify the relevant volume, and round brackets are used where the enclosed date
is just a courtesy because one could identify the relevant book of law reports by its
volume number alone. For example, to find Attorney-General v Associated Newspapers
Ltd [1994] 1 All ER 556, you need to go to the 1994 volumes of the All England Law
Reports, choose volume 1, and turn to page 556. By contrast, to find Montriou v Jeffreys
(1825) 2 C&P 113, you would not need to know the year of judgment, you would just
need to go to the second volume of the Carrington & Payne reports, and turn to page
113. (Explanation from Slapper, 2016, p.124.)
Criminal cases
Criminal case citations usually take one of the following three forms:
R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35 (R stands for Regina or Rex) (i.e. ‘the Crown and/against Smith’).
AG v Punch [2002] UKHL 50, [2003] 1 All ER 289, [2003] 1 AC 1046, [2003] 2 WLR 49
(‘Attorney General and/against Punch’).
DPP v Camplin [1978] AC 705, [1978] UKHL 2 (‘Director of Public Prosecutions and/against
Camplin’)
Other formulations
Private family case: P v BW [2004] Fam 22.
Public family case: Re B (Refusal to Grant Interim Care Order) [2012] EWCA Civ 1275.
Judicial review: R v Lord Chancellor ex parte John Witham [1997] EWHC Admin 237, [1998]
QB 575.
In re or Re (where there is only one party): Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)
[2002] 2 All ER 449.
Neutral citation
Since the growth of electronic sources unreported transcripts are also available on all
the major legal databases. Since 2002 ‘neutral citations’ have been used. These
citations give each case an individual number so that it can be identified. The neutral
citations comprise the year, the court abbreviation (for example ‘EWCA Civ’) and then
the case number. These look like normal law report citations but they are not. If all
that you have is a neutral citation you will need to access the case through an
electronic database in order to find the full law report citation. You can do this using
Westlaw or Lexis Library, accessible through the VLE, although one of the quickest ways
to access a case is to use BAILII, which is a free site on the internet.
R v James [2006] EWCA Crim 14
R v James
2006 EWCA Crim 14
Stands for: Case number

England and Wales assigned by court
Criminal Division of the
Year the case Court of Appeal Court of Appeal.
was heard Civil decisions
are marked ‘Civ’
Figure 2: Example of neutral citations
The basic formulation is to give the year of the case, the court in which it was decided
and the case number. EW stands for England and Wales, UK for United Kingdom.
[2005] EWCA Civ 101 (this is the 101st case of 2005 in the Court of Appeal Civil Division).
[2006] EWHC 101 (Admin) (101st case of 2006 in the High Court Administrative
Division).
[2003] UKHL 5 (5th case of 2003 in the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court)).
[2010] UKSC 48 (48th case of 2010 in the UK Supreme Court).
House of Lords case: Matthews v Ministry of Justice [2003] UKHL 4.
UK Supreme Court case: R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48.
Privy Council cases: Kelly and others v Fraser [2012] UKPC 25.
High Court cases: Salekipour v Parmar [2016] EWHC 1466 (QB).
The Law Reports series

There are many different series of law reports which are discussed in more detail at
the end of Chapter 3 of this module guide. The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting
(ICLR) publishes the Official Law Reports including Appeal Cases (AC), Queen’s Bench
(QB), Family (Fam) and Chancery (Ch). There is a hierarchy of law reports and the
Official Law Reports are considered the most authoritative or ‘best’ reports. The
ICLR also publishes the Weekly Law Reports and All England Law Reports. A full list of
abbreviations can be found at www.legalabbrevs.cardiff.ac.uk/
The Law Reports series are regarded as the ‘official’ law reports. In written or
oral submissions in court a Practice Direction requires that where a judgment is
used as authority and appears in the Law Reports that report must be cited. Their
abbreviations are as follows:
AC Appeal Cases
Ch Law Reports, Chancery Division
QB Law Reports, Queen’s Bench Division
KB Law Reports, King’s Bench Division
Fam Law Reports, Family Division
P Law Reports, Probate Division
Other commercial series
All ER All England Reports
Cr App R Criminal Appeal Reports
Cr App R (S) Criminal Appeal Reports Sentencing
LLoyd’s LR Lloyd’s Law Reports
WLR Weekly Law Reports
EHRR European Human Rights Reports
Free database of cases, statutes and other legal materials

The British and Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII) www.bailii.org/ provides access
to primary legal materials on one internet site without charge. Around 200,000
documents are available to search including case law, legislation, law reports and other
legal material, alongside links to international law resources and archives. You can search
BAILII by database, legislation, case name or case law. Recent decisions, additions and
new cases of interest are highlighted, as well as leading case law by subject.
Statutes
To cite an Act of Parliament use its short title and date. For example, Human Rights
Act 1998. To refer to a particular section or sections in the Act, use s or ss (section or
sections), Pt (Part) or Sch and para (Schedule and paragraph within a schedule).
Human Rights Act 1998, s 19(1)(b)
Title of Act Paragraph within

including year the subsection
Abbreviation Subsection
for section
Section number
Figure 3: Explanation of statute citation

Glossary of key judicial offices in the English legal system

In order to understand the material in this module you need to become familiar with
the name and function of some of the key judicial officers. The seniority of a judge
determines how important or authoritative their decisions are in cases and, indeed,
the speeches that they make.
For reference visit: www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/who-are-the-judiciary/

judicial-roles/
President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (PSC) – Head of the final court of
appeal in the United Kingdom.
Lord Chief Justice (CJ) – Head of the judiciary and President of the Courts of England
and Wales. Head of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal. Responsible for
training, guidance and deployment of judges. Represents the views of judiciary to
Ministers.
Master of the Rolls (MR) – Head of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal and Head of
Civil Justice.
Heads of Divisions
The Chancellor – Head of the Chancery Division of the High Court.
President of the Queen’s Bench Division (PQBD) – Head of Queen’s Bench Division of
the High Court.
President of the Family Division and Head of Family Justice – Head of the Family
Division of the High Court.
Lord Chancellor – Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 the Lord Chancellor was
both the head of the judiciary and a member of the government. Since 2005 the Lord
Chancellor is the Minister for Justice in the Ministry of Justice. He has no judicial role
and his previous powers have been transferred to the Lord Chief Justice who is now the
head of the judiciary. The Lord Chancellor retains power over judicial appointments,
although the selection of judges is made by the independent Judicial Appointments
Commission.
The Attorney General (AG) – This is a political appointment. The Attorney General is
the legal adviser to the government. He appears in court for the Crown in important
cases. The AG has power to refer points of law to the Court of Appeal in relation to
acquittals in criminal cases and against unduly lenient sentences.
Solicitor General – Deputy to Attorney General.
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) – Head of the independent Crown Prosecution

Service.
Self-assessment questions
1. What does ‘R’ stand for in the case of R v Smith?
2. Who is the Head of the Chancery Division of the High Court?
3. What does the Master of the Rolls do? In which court does he sit?
4. Explain this case citation: [2005] EWCA Civ 106.
5. What change did the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 make to the head of the
judiciary of England and Wales?
Notes
1 Introduction to law and the legal system
Contents
1.1 What is law? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 What is law for? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Sources of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Different types of legal system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Classification of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Constitutional principles and the legal system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.7 Doing justice in legal systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential readings and
activities, you should be able to:
uu describe the characteristics of law
uu outline the broad social purposes of law
uu identify sources of law and law-making processes
uu distinguish different types of legal system
uu outline the fundamental principles of the constitution
uu explain the essential requirements of the rule of law
uu distinguish between procedural and substantive law and adversarial and
inquisitorial procedures.
Legal system and method 1 Introduction to law and the legal system page 13
1.1 What is law?
Essential reading
¢¢ Wacks, Chapter 1 ‘Law’s roots’ (in the Legal system and method study pack).
¢¢ Holland and Webb, Chapter 1 ‘Understanding the law’.
Further reading
¢¢ Rivlin, Chapter 2 ‘The law and its importance’.
You might think this is an easy question to answer, but although our lives and
behaviour are regulated by a complicated system of rules, norms, and conventions,
only some of these are defined as ‘law’.
Our first introduction to rules comes from our parents – don’t talk with your mouth
full, don’t run up and down the stairs, don’t shout; and then at school – don’t speak in
class, don’t eat in class, do your homework on time and so on. Other rules are ‘social
norms’ or conventions – turn taking in conversation, covering your mouth when you
cough.
But the rules that we are concerned with in the study of law are those that can
be enforced by the state. Some rules have the force of law while other rules or
conventions will simply lead to social disapproval. If you break the rule ‘don’t take
someone else’s property’ you may be liable to pay a penalty that will be imposed
by the state. If you drive carelessly and injure someone you may be required to pay
them compensation. On the other hand, if you push to the front of a queue in the
supermarket in England you are likely to be subject to serious social disapproval, but
no formal penalty will be applied. There are significant differences between societies
when it comes to which kinds of behaviour will lead to disapproval and which kinds of
behaviour will lead to a formal penalty being imposed by the state. For example, while
adultery is disapproved of in England and Wales it will not lead to formal punishment
although it may be grounds for divorce. By contrast, in Islamic law adultery will lead to
a criminal penalty being imposed.
There is considerable philosophical debate about the nature of law and why some
rules are enforced by the state and others are not, but for present purposes a practical
answer to the question ‘what is law’ could be given as ‘the rules by which societies
agree to live, which are enforceable by the coercive power of the state’.
1.2 What is law for?
Essential reading
¢¢ Partington, Chapter 2 ‘Law and society: the purposes and functions of law’ (in
the Legal system and method study pack).
Law performs critical social functions. It has a broad important role in helping to
maintain order in society. When we talk of ‘society’ we are referring to humans living
together in relatively peaceful harmony and law is central to the notion of ‘social
order’. Partington argues that the broad or ‘macro’ functions of law are to maintain
public, political, social, economic, international and moral order (Partington, pp.8–18).
So, for example, laws relating to ownership of property, or laws relating to business
transactions support economic activity by ensuring that commercial transactions are
carried out in an orderly way and that rights and duties are respected and enforceable.
Law in this context can also protect weaker parties involved in commercial
transactions to ensure that bargains are fair.
Partington goes on to argue that the ‘micro’ functions of law are to achieve more
specific social objectives. So, for example, one of the micro functions of law is to define
the limits of acceptable behaviour by specifying action that is so morally reprehensible
that it will attract a criminal penalty – like murder or theft of property. This can be
contrasted with behaviour that is deemed morally wrong but not criminally wrong,
such as careless driving that causes damage, and which will attract a civil penalty
rather than a criminal penalty. Another important micro function of law is to ensure
that those in public office do not abuse their power.
Partington points out that one of the problems of the many functions of law is that
sometimes functions can be in conflict. So, for example, the objective of preserving social
order may conflict with the protection of civil liberties or the right to expression. This
conflict occurs when citizens want to take to the streets to demonstrate to express their
dissatisfaction about some issue and the police are concerned that such a demonstration
might lead to violent disorder. Which objective should prevail? Freedom of expression or
social order? Similarly, when governments are facing terrorist threats they must balance
the desire to protect society through enlarging the power of the police and courts
against the danger to civil liberties and infringement of human rights.
1.3 Sources of law
Essential reading
Further reading
¢¢ Partington, Chapter 3 ‘Law-making: authority and process’.
¢¢ Rivlin, Chapter 3 ‘The invisible palace I: common law and equity’.
In studying the operation of the legal system, we need to be able to recognise which
rules are regarded as ‘law’ and how important any particular rule is in relation to other
rules. In the English legal tradition the source of a rule is relevant in determining both its
significance and whether it might take precedence over a rule that comes from another
source. In the English common law system, there are four principal sources of law:
1. Law made by Parliament – referred to as ‘legislation’, ‘statute law’ or ‘Acts of

Parliament’. Written laws that express the will of the legislature.
2. Law decided in the courts – referred to as ‘common law’ or ‘case law’. Decisions
of judges in particular cases applied by other judges in later cases through the
process of precedent (combined common law and equity).
3. European Union law – referred to as ‘EU law’ comprising law emanating from the
European Commission, Council of Ministers and Court of Justice of the European
Union.
4. European Convention on Human Rights – referred to as Human Rights Law or

ECHR, emanating from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and now
incorporated into UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998.
1. Parliament and statutes

In England and Wales the supreme law-making body is Parliament. Parliament has two
‘chambers’: the House of Commons comprising democratically elected Members of
Parliament (MPs); and the House of Lords comprising members who are appointed
and some who have inherited the right to serve in the House (not to be confused with
the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords which until 2009 was the final court of
appeal for the UK). A valid ‘Act of Parliament’ is written law and is the end product
of a long process following the introduction of a draft ‘Bill’ in Parliament. Before a
Bill is introduced to Parliament, the government will normally go through a process
of consultation. They will publish what is called a ‘Green Paper’ which sets out the
tentative proposals for changes to the law and invite comments. Green Papers were
first used in 1967 and are now usually used as part of the legislative process. This will
be followed by a ‘White Paper’ which contains the government’s firm proposals
for new law and may have the draft Bill attached. Following consultation, the draft
Bill is introduced in Parliament and then debated, discussed and amended. Once a
Bill has gone through all of the necessary Parliamentary processes it will be signed
by the Queen (Royal Assent) and then published as an Act. A valid Act of Parliament
takes precedence over common law or case law. Indeed, it takes precedence over
everything except EU law.
The distinction between primary and secondary legislation

In discussion about legislation, or law emanating from Parliament, there is a
distinction between ‘primary legislation’ and ‘secondary legislation’. Primary
legislation refers to Acts of Parliament or statutes. Because it often takes a long time
for primary legislation to get through all of the various stages in the Parliamentary
process, the drafting of Acts may contain only broad provisions or rules and then the
detailed rules are produced later under the authority of the Act. These detailed rules
are known as secondary legislation or ‘statutory instruments’ and take the form of
‘regulations’, ‘rules’ or ‘orders’. They have the force of law, but can be implemented
with less scrutiny than primary legislation.
2. The courts and common law or ‘judge-made law’

In contrast to statute law, when we refer to the ‘common law’ we are referring to
the law contained in decisions of the courts rather than legal rules contained in Acts
of Parliament. England and Wales is a common law system, meaning that many of
our most fundamental legal rules and principles have been established by judges
deciding individual cases, rather than these rules being laid down by Parliament. So,
for example, most of the law relating to the formation of binding contracts is to be
found in the common law rather than in statutes. When a lawyer or judge is looking for
the rules on the formation of contract they will refer to important legal cases which
set out the legal principles. In other words, they will be looking at case law or ‘legal
precedents’ which establish the relevant legal principles.
As we will see later in the chapter, the body of court decisions that comprises the
English common law has developed over many years, dating back to its origins in the
12th century. In the 18th century, a famous judge and legal commentator, Sir William
Blackstone, explained the source of English common law as follows:
The Common Law is to be found in the records of our several courts of justice in books
of reports and judicial decisions, and in treatises of learned sages of the profession,
prescribed and handed down to us from the times of ancient antiquity. They are the laws
which gave rise and origin to that collection of maxims and customs which is now known
by the name of common law.
Sir William Blackstone 1723–1780, Commentaries on the laws of England.
We will look at the development of English common law later in the chapter. In the
meantime, it is important to note that the term ‘common law’ may also be used in
two other contexts. This can be confusing for students new to law, but gradually the
meaning in different contexts will become very familiar and cause no difficulty.
As well as the contrast between common law and statute law, the term ‘common
law’ is also used to distinguish law emanating from common law courts from law
emanating from courts of ‘equity’ (this is discussed in detail later in this chapter).
The third context in which the term common law is used is to distinguish ‘common
law’ legal systems or jurisdictions such as England and Wales, Canada, USA and Australia
from ‘civil law’ legal systems or jurisdictions such as Germany or France where the law is
almost entirely ‘codified’ (i.e. contained within written codes). The differences between
common law and civil law jurisdictions are discussed later in this chapter.
3. European Union law

The European Union (EU) is an economic and political partnership between 28
European countries, created after the Second World War. The initial approach was to
encourage economic cooperation on the assumption that economic interdependence
might avoid future conflict. The EU now encompasses both economic and political
union. It is based on the rule of law and its laws are based on treaties that have been
democratically agreed by all member countries.
One of the EU’s main goals is to promote human rights. Since the Treaty of Lisbon
in 2009, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights has placed all these rights in a
single document. The EU’s institutions are legally bound to uphold them, as are EU
governments whenever they apply EU law.
Since the UK joined the EU in 1973, law emanating from the European Parliament,
European Council and European Commission governs certain activities and practices
in the UK. Since the enactment of the European Communities Act 1972, European Law
takes precedence over domestic law. If there is a conflict between English domestic
law and European law, for example in the field of equal pay, the English courts must
apply European law. Matters concerning the interpretation and implementation of
European law are dealt with by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which
sits in Luxembourg (see Chapter 2). Section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972
provides that English law is to be interpreted and have effect subject to the principle
that European law takes precedence over all sources of domestic law.
An important case establishing the supremacy of European law over UK law is R v

Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 All ER 70, HL/ECJ and
R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 3) [1991] 3 All ER 769, ECJ. A
statute passed by the UK Parliament – the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 – provided
that fishing licences should be granted only to boats whose owners and crews were
predominantly British. Some Spanish fishermen, who could not be granted fishing
licences as a result of these provisions, claimed that the 1988 Act was contrary to EU
law. The case was referred to the CJEU. The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords held
that no national court had the power to suspend the operation of an Act of Parliament,
but the CJEU disagreed, holding that a rule of national (domestic) law which conflicts
with EU law should be set aside. The CJEU also said the 1988 Act breached Article 43 of
the EU Treaty, which guaranteed citizens of any member state the freedom to establish
their businesses anywhere in the Community, and the UK Government was obliged to
amend the legislation accordingly. Another case in which European law was deemed
to take precedence over English domestic law is the case of R v Secretary of State for
Employment, ex p Equal Opportunities Commission [1995] 1 AC 1 which can be accessed
online at www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1994/2.html
On 23 June 2016, the UK held a referendum on whether to leave or remain in the EU.
The majority voted to leave the EU. Although the British Prime Minister started the
formal process of leaving the EU at the end of March 2017, at the time of writing, it
is not clear what the timetable or outcome of the process will be. The government
has said that it will enact what it calls a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ as soon as the UK leaves
the EU. The effect of this would be to end the authority of EU law by converting
all its provisions into British law, while at the same time repealing the European
Communities Act 1972 and the sovereignty of EU law. The intention is that Parliament
would then be able to decide whether to retain, amend or repeal aspects of EU law in
the future. However, at the time of writing this module guide, the position of EU law as
a source of law in England and Wales has not changed.
4. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

The European Convention on Human Rights (www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Convention_ENG.pdf) is an international treaty which was drafted in 1950 and came
into effect in 1953 having been signed by European nations who were members of the
Council of Europe, a body set up in Strasbourg in France after the Second World War.
The UK signed up to the Convention in 1953 and was one of the first countries to do so.
Some 47 countries have now signed up to the Convention including most of the east
European, and former communist countries, and several countries that were once part
of the Soviet Union. The countries that have signed up to the Convention make up the
Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is quite separate from the European Union.
The operation of the European Convention in the UK is therefore not affected by the
referendum decision to leave the European Union.
The ECHR was a reaction to the experience of the horrors of the Second World War
and reflected the hope and belief that if nations joined together to agree to protect
human rights, the likelihood of a recurrence would be reduced. The ECHR provides for
individuals to bring proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg,
France, if they believe that a government is in breach of its obligations under the ECHR.
In 1998 the UK passed the Human Rights Act 1998 (www.legislation.gov.uk/

ukpga/1998/42/contents) which incorporated directly into English law the main
provisions of the ECHR. This means that if a UK citizen believes that the UK Government
is in breach of its human rights obligations, a case can be pursued in the English courts.
This is discussed further in Chapters 2, 3 and 5.
Certain fundamental rights and freedoms have been protected in English common
law since the signing of the Magna Carta (‘Great Charter’) by King John of England in
1215. The Magna Carta sets out many rights that are now referred to as ‘human rights’
or fundamental principles of good government. For example, it established principles
of due process and equality before the law. It contained provisions forbidding bribery
and official misconduct. Despite the provisions of Magna Carta and other rights
protected under English common law, since the passing of the Human Rights Act
1998 a wide range of fundamental rights and freedoms are now positively protected
by the Act and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has had a
significant impact on English substantive law and on legal process. The protection
of human rights is now regarded as fundamental to the rule of law (discussed later
in this chapter). For this reason we will deal with the ECHR in some detail here
and throughout this module guide we will refer to the influence of human rights
legislation on the institutions and processes of the English legal system, as well as on
some areas of substantive law.
The protected rights and freedoms

The purpose of the ECHR is the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.
The Convention is divided into ‘articles’. Articles 2 to 14 set out the rights that are
protected by the Convention. Over the years the Convention has been supplemented
by a number of ‘protocols’ that have been agreed by the Council of Europe. Some of
the protocols just deal with procedural issues but some guarantee rights in addition
to those included in the Convention. Some of the most important rights and freedoms
protected under the ECHR are:
uu right to life (Article 2)
uu prohibition of torture (Article 3) (‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’)
uu prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4)
uu right to liberty and security (Article 5)
uu right to a fair trial (Article 6) (‘everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law’)
uu no punishment without law (Article 7)
uu right to respect for family and private life (Article 8)
uu freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9)
uu freedom of expression (Article 10)
uu freedom of assembly and association (Article 11)
uu prohibition of discrimination (Article 14)
uu right not to be subjected to the death penalty (Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 6)
uu right to free elections (Article 3 of Protocol 1) (free elections at reasonable intervals

by secret ballot ensuring free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice
of the legislature).
The ECHR rights incorporated into English law under the Human Rights Act 1998 appear
as a Schedule to the Act. See www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/schedule/1
‘Derogation’
These fundamental rights and freedoms are not all seen in the same way. Some are
absolute and inalienable and cannot be interfered with by the state. Others are
merely contingent and are subject to ‘derogation’. That means that a signatory
state can opt out of them in particular circumstances. The absolute rights are
those provided for in Articles 2, 3, 4, 7 and 14. All the others are subject to potential
limitations.
Margin of appreciation
Essential reading
¢¢ The Open Society Brief 2012
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/echr-reform-margin-of-
appreciation.pdf
¢¢ Greer, S. ‘The Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights:

Universal Principle or Margin of Appreciation?’ (2010) UCL Human Rights Review
www.ucl.ac.uk/human-rights/research/ucl-hrr/docs/hrreviewissue3/greer
One of the difficulties in ensuring compliance with the ECHR by the 47 member states
of the Council of Europe is the diverse cultural and legal traditions of the various states.
To accommodate this, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed
the doctrine of a ‘margin of appreciation’ when considering whether a member state
has breached the Convention. It means that a member state is permitted a degree of
discretion, subject to Strasbourg supervision, when it takes legislative, administrative
or judicial action in the area of a Convention right. The doctrine allows the Court
to take into account the fact that the Convention will be interpreted differently in
different member states, given their divergent legal and cultural traditions. The
margin of appreciation gives the ECtHR the necessary flexibility to balance the
sovereignty of member states with their obligations under the Convention. In some
circumstances – for example, national emergency or security issues – member states
may be permitted a ‘wide’ margin of appreciation by the ECtHR. In other cases, for
example in relation to discrimination, the court will permit only the narrowest margin
of appreciation.
A case dealing with the margin of appreciation and one that received much publicity
is the case of Lautsi v Italy (Application no. 30814/06) (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-104040) heard by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in 2011. The applicant
(an Italian citizen of Finnish origin) brought a complaint against Italy on behalf of
her two children. She alleged that the display of the crucifix in classrooms of public
schools interfered with her children’s freedom of belief as well as their right to
education and teaching consistent with her philosophical convictions under Article
9 (protection of freedom of religion and belief). The ECtHR ruled that the presence of
crucifixes in Italian public schools does not infringe states’ obligations in relation to
Article 9. Highlighting the importance of the margin of appreciation principles, the
Court confirmed that religious matters fall within the sovereignty of member states in
order to respect the culture and traditions of each particular country.
Proportionality
Essential reading
¢¢ R v A [2001] UKHL 25, [2001] 3 All ER 1 (www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2001/25.html).
¢¢ Lord Justice Laws ‘The common law and Europe’ Hamlyn Lectures 2013
www.judiciary.gov.uk/announcements/speech-lj-laws-hamlyn-lecture-2013/
Closely linked to the concept of the margin of appreciation is the principle of

‘proportionality’. This concept is the means by which state interference with human
rights is to be judged. While it is accepted that sometimes the state may need to
restrict or interfere with a fundamental human right or freedom, the principle of
proportionality requires that such interference should be necessary and that it goes
no further than what is essential to achieve the objective. Thus any measure by a
public authority that affects a basic human right must be: appropriate in order to
achieve the intended objective; necessary in the sense that there is no less severe
means of achieving the objective; and reasonable in the circumstances. In his Hamlyn
Lectures in 2013 Lord Justice Laws referred to the principle of proportionality as one of
‘minimal interference’. He said:
…every intrusion by the State upon the freedom of the individual stands in need of
justification. Accordingly, any interference which is greater than required for the State’s
proper purpose cannot be justified. This is at the core of proportionality; it articulates the
discipline which proportionality imposes on decision makers.
In the case of de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands

and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69 Lord Clyde articulated the criteria that courts should adopt
to decide whether legislative interference with some fundamental right is arbitrary or
excessive. The court should ask itself whether:
i. the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental

right
ii. the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected
to it; and
iii. the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to
accomplish the objective.
Summary
uu Laws are enforceable by the state while norms and social conventions are enforced
informally.
uu Law has both broad ‘macro’ functions and more specific ‘micro’ functions.
uu A principal social function of law is the maintenance of different kinds of order

including social, political and economic order.
uu There are three contexts in which the meaning of common law is different:
i. common law jurisdiction as distinct from civil law jurisdiction
ii. common law as distinct from statute law
iii. common law as distinct from equity.
uu The main sources of law are statutes (primary and secondary legislation), common
law, European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights.
uu The protection of human rights is increasingly important in modern societies and

regarded as an essential element in the rule of law.
uu The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the ECHR into English law.
uu The rights and freedoms protected by the Human Rights Act 1998 include those
that are absolute and those from which states may derogate if necessary.
1. What are the different functions of law?
2. How does Partington distinguish between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ functions of law?
Do you think these cover all of the functions we can identify for law?
3. How important is law in maintaining social order and economic stability as

compared with unwritten rules or behavioural conventions?
4. Think of some important rules of behaviour that are not ‘laws’ as we have
defined them. How are they enforced? How important do you think those non-
legal rules are to social order?
5. What is the difference between primary and secondary legislation?

6. What are ‘Green Papers’ and ‘White Papers’?
7. When was the ECHR concluded, and what was its objective?
8. What is the difference between fundamental rights and absolute rights in the
ECHR?
9. Explain the principle of ‘margin of appreciation’ in the interpretation of ECHR

rights by the European Court of Human Rights.
1.4 Different types of legal system
Further reading
¢¢ Slorach, Chapter 2 ‘Sources of law in England & Wales’.
¢¢ Tetley, W. ‘Mixed jurisdictions: common law vs civil law (codified and

uncodified)’ (Part I) and (Part II) (1999) Uniform Law Review 591–618 and 877–907
www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/1999-3-tetley1-e.pdf
The legal system comprises the law – produced by law-making bodies (legislatures
and judiciary) – and the institutions, processes and personnel that contribute to
the operation and enforcement of those laws. So, for example, we can say that the
English legal system comprises: legislation and common law; courts; judiciary; legal
professionals; police; prosecutors; juries; and mechanisms for providing access to
justice. In effect, the legal ‘system’ describes the law and the machinery provided for
adjudication and implementation.
1.4.1 Legal traditions or ‘families’ of legal systems

Around the world there are different traditions in legal systems. As Tetley (1999)
explains, a legal tradition reflects deep-rooted, historical attitudes about the nature
of law, about the role of law in society and about the way law should be made, applied
and studied. Two major ‘families’ of legal systems are common law and civil law
systems.
1.4.2 Civil law or continental legal systems

Civil law is the oldest surviving legal tradition in the world. It had its origin in
Roman law and later developed in Continental Europe and around the world. A key
distinguishing feature of civil law is that it is a ‘codified’ system. Jurisdictions with civil
law systems, such as France, Germany and Japan, have comprehensive, continuously
updated legal codes that specify all matters capable of being brought before a
court, the applicable procedure and the appropriate punishment for each offence.
These codes distinguish between different categories of law. In a civil law system,
the judge’s role is to establish the facts of the case and to apply the provisions of the
applicable code. Though the judge often brings the formal charges, investigates the
matter, and decides on the case, he or she works within a framework established by a
comprehensive, codified set of laws. The judge’s decision is consequently less crucial
in shaping civil law than the decisions of legislators and legal scholars who draft and
interpret the codes.
Some key features of civil law systems are:
uu codified system of law (e.g. civil code, codes covering corporate law, administrative
law, tax law)
uu written constitutions based on specific codes
uu only legislative enactments are considered binding for all
uu little scope for judge-made law, although judges generally follow precedent
uu constitutional courts that can nullify laws and the decisions of which are binding.
1.4.3 Common law systems

The common law legal tradition has its roots in developments in England in the 11th
century. In common law systems, legal principles are to be found in the decisions of
judges adjudicating in individual cases. The common law is usually more detailed
than civil law and common law systems operate on the basis of ‘binding precedent’
so that judges in a particular case must follow the decisions of judges in earlier similar
cases (see Chapter 3). These precedents are maintained over time through the records
of the courts as well as historically documented in collections of case law known as
yearbooks and law reports. The precedents to be applied in the decision of each new
case are determined by the presiding judge. The common law tradition of England was
transported around the world to countries that were once part of the British Empire.
There are common law systems in Australia, USA, Canada and New Zealand – all having
connections with England (common law family).
Other countries have a ‘mixed system’ that include some elements of the common law
as well as some elements of civil law – for example parts of Africa, India and parts of
the Far East.
Some of the key features of common law systems are:
uu there is not always a written constitution or codified laws
uu judicial decisions are binding and decisions of the highest court can only be
overturned by the same court or through legislation
uu everything is permitted that is not expressly prohibited by law.
Historical development of the common law

It is possible to date the modern development of the English common law back to
the time of William the Conqueror who invaded England in 1066. Before the Norman
Conquest of England in 1066, there was no unitary, national legal system. The English
legal system involved a mass of oral customary rules, which varied according to region.
Each county or shire had its own local court dispensing its own justice in accordance
with local customs that varied from community to community and were enforced,
sometimes in a rather arbitrary fashion, by local lords or landowners. These local
courts are not what we would recognise as courts today.
William, as King of England, laid the foundations of the legal system. He understood
that in order to exercise real power over citizens he needed a central system of justice
over which the king had control and that had laws that would be obeyed. He did this
by creating what was called the Curia Regis – King’s Court. It was a court of law but
also a royal household comprising the King and his advisers who were a mixture of
powerful militarised landowners and learned clerics (religious men in holy orders).
The King and his court travelled around the country and citizens would bring their
grievances to be considered by the King and his advisers after which judgment would
be given. This activity was the beginning of the common law system.
Probably the most important contributor to the development of the common law was
Henry II who came to the throne in 1154 after a long period of disruption and civil war.
Henry took the throne wanting to regain stability, reform land law and deal with rampant
crime. He focused on creating a single system of justice for the entire country that would
be under the control of the king. At this time there were only 18 judges available to
dispense justice. In 1166 Henry ordered five to remain in Westminster in London to deal
with the cases that he would previously have decided, and the remaining judges were
sent out to travel to different parts of the country. Their responsibility was to decide
grievances, complaints and accusations applying the laws that had been developed by
judges in Westminster. In this way, local laws were replaced by new national laws. Laws
that were common to all – in other words, the common law.
In time, the decisions of the judges were written down. As the decisions of these
courts came to be recorded and published, so the practice developed where past
decisions (precedents) would be cited in argument before the courts and would be
regarded as being ‘authority’ for the application of pre-existing legal principles.
Common law courts grew up gradually as offshoots of the authority of the King and, as the
very word ‘court’ indicates, these courts of justice were originally a part of the Royal Court.
They were not created by law in order to administer pre-existing laws. They were created,
or grew up, in order to solve pressing practical questions – to dispose of arguments, to
solve disputes, and to suppress violence and theft. As they developed into what we would
today recognise as courts of law, they actually created the law as they went along.
Eventually their decisions began to fall into regular and predictable patterns, people
began to take notes of what the judges were deciding, and in due course there emerged
the modern ‘law reports’.
(Atiyah, P.S. Law and modern society. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995))
The contribution of common law to social order: the tranquillity of the state
The content of most of the law at the time that the foundations of the common
law were being laid was directed at preventing bloodshed by recognising rights
to property and personal freedom. Until the 12th century, the vendetta had been
an integral part of English life. But the ending of bloody feuds in England roughly
coincided with the establishment of the King’s Courts in the 12th Century. The courts
not only punished criminals, but provided a peaceful means of resolving disputes over
land and other property. The courts offered a service to the public. Instead of solving
disputes by violence, a judge would rule on rights and wrongs and offer a remedy.
In the resolution of disputes over land, contracts and debts, as well as dealing with
criminal offences, the courts were supporting social order and the tranquillity of the
state. The ability to ‘resort’ to law is preferable to the ability to ‘resort to violence’
and this is part of the critical social function of law. As we will see in Chapter 6 and
the discussion about the need for access to justice, some will argue that if citizens
are denied access to the courts they will ‘take the law into their own hands’. Those
concerns are similar to the concerns of Henry II some 800 years ago.
The development of equity

The word ‘equity’ means fair or just in its wider sense, but its legal meaning refers to
legal rules that were developed by the courts to overcome some of the inflexibility of
the rules and procedures of common law courts.
By the 15th century the procedures of the common law courts had become slow,
expensive and very technical. Interestingly, these are problems that people complain
of today as will be discussed in Chapter 6. Despite the development of common law
courts between the 12th and 15th centuries, the King himself continued to be a source
of English law. Citizens petitioned the King to ‘redress their grievances’ which meant
pleading with him directly to hear complaints and provide a remedy. For a time the
King dealt with these petitions himself, but as the work increased he passed them
to his senior legal adviser, the Chancellor (who was always a cleric), as the ‘Keeper of
the King’s Conscience’. The King, through his Chancellor, eventually set up a special
court, the Court of Chancery, to deal with these petitions. The Chancellor dealt with
these petitions on the basis of what was morally right. The Chancellor would give or
withhold relief, not according to any precedent, but according to the effect produced
upon his own individual sense of right and wrong by the merits of the particular case
before him. In 1474 the Chancellor issued the first decree in his own name, which
began the independence of the Court of Chancery from the King’s Council and the
development of a system of legal principles known as ‘equity’ which was different
from the common law.
Equity created new rights, for example by recognising trusts (somebody holding legal
title on behalf of another ‘beneficiary’) and giving beneficiaries rights against trustees.
The common law did not recognise such a device and regarded the trustees as owners.
Equity also created new remedies. If the Chancellor was convinced that a person had
suffered a wrong, the court would grant a remedy (i.e. they would devise some way
to ensure that something was done to put right the wrong that had been done to
the person). In this way, equity created new remedies that were not available in the
common law courts. At common law, the main remedy that a person could obtain
was the remedy of money compensation or damages. However, in equity more
flexible remedies were developed such as specific performance, which is an order
telling a party to perform their part of a contract, or injunction, usually an order to
stop a person doing a particular act, like acting in breach of contract (a prohibitory
injunction).
In time, however, the procedures of the Court of Chancery became expensive and it
took a long time for cases to be dealt with by a judge and for a decision to be given. By
the 19th century the court was the subject of considerable criticism. It was around this
time that the famous English author Charles Dickens wrote his novel Bleak house which
was deeply critical of the procedures of the Court of Chancery.
This is the Court of Chancery, which has its decaying houses and its blighted lands in every
shire, which has its worn-out lunatic in every madhouse and its dead in every churchyard,
which has its ruined suitor with his slipshod heels and threadbare dress borrowing and
begging through the round of every man’s acquaintance, which gives to monied might
the means abundantly of wearying out the right, which so exhausts finances, patience,
courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and breaks the heart, that there is not an
honourable man among its practitioners who would not give – who does not often give –
the warning, ‘Suffer any wrong that can be done you rather than come here!’
(Extract from Chapter 1 of Bleak house by Charles Dickens)
In 1873, the Common Law Courts and Courts of Equity were combined in the
Judicature Acts 1873–75. Although one of the divisions of the High Court is still called
the Chancery Division, all courts now deal with both common law and equitable
principles and remedies. The Chancery Division of the High Court deals with company
law, conveyancing, property, wills and probate, all of which are heavily influenced by
equity. Equity has added new principles to the body of common law and remedies for
those who have suffered an injustice.
1. Name three civil law and three common law jurisdictions.
2. Name three mixed law jurisdictions.
3. What are the most important points of difference between civil and common
law jurisdictions?
4. In what way did the development of the common law support social order?
5. How did the development of equity mitigate some of the problems that had
developed in the common law?
6. Name and explain an equitable remedy.
7. Which areas of law remain heavily influenced by equity?
1.5 Classification of law
Essential reading
Further reading
¢¢ Slorach, Chapter 2 ‘Sources of law in England & Wales’.
Lawyers have generally classified the law into several broad areas, although this is
complicated by the fact that some of the basic terminology has different meanings
depending on the context.
1.5.1 Three different meanings of the term ‘common law’

Common law and statute law: when common law is contrasted with statute law,
common law is referring to the law found in the decisions of the courts rather than the
legal rules contained in Acts of Parliament (statutes).
Common law and equity: in the previous section we described how equity developed
as a body of law reflecting principles of ‘conscience’ and designed to do justice in
situations where the common law was not able to do so. Even though the courts of
equity were combined with the common law courts in the 19th century, there are still
two distinct bodies of case law – common law and equity. Modern courts will refer
to certain principles or remedies as equitable, contrasting them with common law
principles and remedies.
Common law and civil law: in this context, the distinction being drawn is between
the English legal system and the family of common law jurisdictions with civil law
jurisdictions whose systems are derived from Roman law – such as Germany, France
and Japan. Interestingly, while England and Wales is a common law jurisdiction, the
legal system of Scotland is based largely on civil law.
1.5.2 Public law and private law

Private law deals with relations between individuals where the state is not directly
involved – such as the enforcement of contracts or ownership of property. Public law,
by contrast, deals with the relationship between citizens and the state; for example,
where an individual believes that their human rights have been infringed by an
action of the state. Judicial review is the procedure by which citizens can seek to
challenge the decision, action or failure to act of a public body, such as a government
department or a local authority or other body exercising a public law function. In an
action for judicial review, the judiciary will assess the extent to which a public body
or person has acted within their legal powers. This includes actions of government
ministers. See, for example, the case of R v Lord Chancellor ex p Witham [1997] 2 All ER
779 in which the Divisional Court of the High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) held that
the Lord Chancellor had exceeded his powers (ultra vires) in removing a provision
that citizens on low incomes would be exempt from paying court fees to access the
courts. It was held that the action denied their right to a fair trial. Mr Justice Laws
gave the leading judgment. He said that access to justice at an affordable price was a
constitutional right. It was a basic or fundamental right which could not be revoked
unless specifically permitted by Parliament.
1.5.3 Civil law and criminal law

There is also another meaning of ‘civil law’. When dealing with the law within the
English legal system, as opposed to contrasting the English legal system with civil law
jurisdictions, civil law can be contrasted with criminal law. In this context, civil law
is a form of private law and involves the resolution of disputes between citizens or
businesses. Criminal law, on the other hand, is an aspect of public law in which the
state will prosecute an individual for behaviour that the state wishes to control and
which is deemed to be morally reprehensible. In criminal law the state prosecutes an
individual in the name of the Crown on behalf of society at large. This is why cases are
reported as ‘Regina v …’ which stands for ‘the Queen against …’
Standard of proof: in the English common law system, an important distinction between
civil and criminal law is in the ‘standard of proof’ required for different types of case.
The standard of proof relates to the requirement for the facts of cases to be proved by
evidence. How sure is the court that the evidence proves the facts? In criminal cases, the
prosecution is required to prove the case in court ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. This is a
demanding standard justified by the fact that the accused is facing the possibility of a
criminal penalty being imposed if found guilty. In civil cases, the standard of proof is on
‘a balance of probabilities’, a less challenging requirement which means that the court
merely has to be of the view that it is more likely than not that the defendant is liable.
Some major subdivisions of civil law

Contract law: this deals with legally binding agreements between parties. Contracts
are used to cover transactions relating to a wide range of issues such as sale of goods,
sale of land, employment relationships, etc. Key areas of court action relate to breach
of contract.
Law of tort: a tort is a civil wrong which causes another person to suffer damage or
loss. The law of tort covers a body of civil obligations, rights and remedies. Where
a person has suffered some sort of personal or financial damage as a result of the
wrongful actions of another person they may be liable under the law of tort to claim
financial compensation. Key areas of court action relate to negligence (careless
behaviour); and defamation (writing or speaking a false statement about someone
which damages their reputation).
Family law: family law deals with matters relating to family and domestic
relationships. Issues dealt with in family courts include distribution of property on the
breakdown of relationships, arrangements relating to children and child support.
Land law: land law is the set of rules that govern the land and anything attached to it,
such as trees or buildings; or anything in it; for example, treasure or oil. Key areas of
court action relate to disputes over rights to land, rights across land, rights in relation
to the use of land and boundaries between neighbouring land.
1. Explain the difference between civil and criminal law.
2. Explain the differences within the following statements:
uu ‘England and Australia are common law countries but Japan and China are not.’
uu ‘At common law even an unfair contract term would be enforced, but under
the Unfair Contract Terms Act such terms may not be enforced.’
uu ‘At common law the only remedy was damages, but equity has specific
remedies such as the injunction.’
3. What is the standard of proof in civil and criminal cases? Why do you think the
standard is different?
4. What is a ‘tort’ and what is the remedy for a tort?
1.6 Constitutional principles and the legal system
Further reading
¢¢ Slapper and Kelly, Chapter 2 ‘The rule of law and human rights’.
¢¢ Rivlin, Chapter 4 ‘The invisible palace II: the constitution’.
¢¢ Partington, Chapter 3 ‘Law-making: authority and process’.
1.6.1 The constitution

When we talk of a country’s ‘constitution’ we are referring to the way a country is
governed and the way that power is organised and distributed. Many countries, such
as the USA, Germany and more recently South Africa, have written constitutions in
which the rules for the governance of the country are laid down in a single document
and are specially protected so that changes to those rules are virtually impossible
to make. In the UK there is no written constitution which explains in one single
document how power is divided and exercised. Instead, constitutional rules and
principles are scattered over a range of written materials. The Human Rights Act 1998,
referred to earlier, is not a written constitution, but is a single set of rules guaranteeing
fundamental freedoms and rights.
The unwritten constitution in the UK has developed over many hundreds of years and
the rules relating to governance can be found in statutes, common law, custom and
what are known as constitutional conventions, which are longstanding practices
that are so widely recognised that essentially they have become unwritten rules. So
when it is said that the UK does not have a written constitution, it is perhaps more
accurate to say that the UK constitution is partly written (in statutes and common law
precedents), but that it is largely ‘uncodified’.
1.6.2 Constitutional principles

In the UK constitutional arrangements, three of the most important principles are:
1. the separation of powers
2. the sovereignty of Parliament
3. the rule of law.
1. The separation of powers
Essential reading
¢¢ Parliamentary briefing on separation of powers (2011)
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn06053.pdf
Within the modern state there are three main centres of power:
a. the legislature – which is responsible for making new laws (in the UK this is
Parliament)
b. the executive – which is responsible for implementing the law and running the
country
c. the judiciary – which is responsible for determining legal disputes and interpreting
legislation passed by the legislature.
The separation of powers between the three branches of the state rests on the idea
that a division of power prevents the accumulation of too much power in the hands of
one body or person and provides a system of ‘checks and balances’. One of the earliest
statements of the separation of powers was given by the French political thinker
Montesquieu in 1748:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty … there is no liberty if the powers of judging is
not separated from the legislative and executive … there would be an end to everything, if
the same man or the same body … were to exercise those three powers.
Montesquieu, The spirit of laws. (c.1748)
Thus, for example, the judiciary have responsibility for checking that the executive
governs according to law – that it does not exceed its lawful powers.
The legislature has responsibility for creating new laws; however, the judiciary are
responsible for the interpretation of that law. The judiciary are independent of the
legislature and executive and are not subject to interference by the Government.
Recent changes to the English constitution under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005
(CRA 2005) have been introduced to strengthen the formal separation of powers. The
Act created a separate Supreme Court and the Lord Chief Justice replaced the Lord
Chancellor as head of the judiciary in England and Wales. It placed a statutory duty on
ministers to uphold judicial independence and made provision for the establishment
of an independent Judicial Appointments Commission.
The independence of the judiciary
Essential reading
¢¢ United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/docs/judicial_reform_un_principles_
independence_judiciary_english.pdf
¢¢ Lord Phillips ‘Judicial independence’ lecture at the Commonwealth Law

Conference, Kenya, September 2007
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/misc/judicial_
reform_un_principles_independence_judiciary_english.authcheckdam.pdf
An essential element in the operation of the rule of law is an independent judiciary.

This means that individual judges and the judiciary as a whole should decide cases
according to law, free from interference by the executive and separate from the
legislature. They should be both impartial and independent of all external pressures
and of each other. This is important for public confidence in the judiciary and for the
proper functioning of the justice system according to law. Improper pressure could
be exerted by the executive, the legislature, litigants, pressure groups, the media or,
indeed, more senior judges. Judges are required to decide cases only on the evidence
presented in court by the parties and in accordance with the law. This is essential for
the delivery of fair and impartial justice.
As will become clear in later chapters of this module guide, the constitutional position
of the judiciary in relation to both the legislature and executive is a live and often
controversial issue. There is considerable scholarly debate about the question of the
extent to which the role of the judiciary in interpreting legislation and developing the
common law overlaps with the responsibility of the legislature. There is also debate
about the extent to which, in exercising their judgment in relation to the Human
Rights Act 1998, the judiciary, and in particular the UK Supreme Court, is involving itself
in what are essentially political rather than legal issues. This raises the question of the
extent to which the judiciary should be accountable as well as independent. These
issues are discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 5 of the module guide. In recent years
the role of the judiciary in disputes between the citizen and the state has increased
alongside the growth in governmental functions. The responsibility of the judiciary to
protect citizens against unlawful acts of government has thus increased, and with it
the need for the judiciary to be independent of government. As Lord Phillips, the first
President of the UK Supreme Court noted in 2011:
The citizen must be able to challenge the legitimacy of executive action before an
independent judiciary. Because it is the executive that exercises the power of the State
and because it is the executive, in one form or another, that is the most frequent litigator
in the courts, it is from executive pressure or influence that the judiciary are particularly to
be protected.
The importance of an independent judiciary and the need to protect that

independence is reflected in the provisions of the CRA 2005. At a time of change in
constitutional arrangements, the CRA 2005, for the first time, provided statutory
protection for judicial independence. Section 3 states that:
The Lord Chancellor, other ministers of the Crown, and all with responsibility for matters
relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice must uphold the
continued independence of the judiciary.
Particular duties imposed under s.3 of CRA 2005 to ensure judicial independence include:
uu the Lord Chancellor and other ministers of the Crown must not seek to influence
particular judicial decisions through any special access to the judiciary
uu the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the need to defend judicial independence
and the need for the judiciary to have the support necessary to enable them to
exercise their functions.
2. The sovereignty of Parliament
Essential reading
¢¢ Parliament website explanation of Parliamentary sovereignty
www.parliament.uk/about/how/sovereignty/
Parliamentary sovereignty is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution. It makes

Parliament the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law.
Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that
future Parliaments cannot change. Parliamentary sovereignty is the most important part
of the UK constitution. Since the UK joined the EU in 1973, however, EU law takes priority
over UK national laws and in those circumstances the UK Parliament is subordinate to
EU legislators. But for UK domestic law Parliament remains supreme. Any law passed by
Parliament takes precedence over common law and where there is a conflict between
statute and common law, ‘the statute will prevail’. The statute will be deemed to have
overruled the pre-existing common law (see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion).
3. The rule of law
Essential reading
¢¢ Lord Bingham ‘The rule of law’ 6th Sir David Williams Lecture, November 2006
www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/sir-david-williams-lectures/rt-hon-lord-bingham-
cornhill-kg-rule-law
The rule of law is a critical constitutional concept which is used to describe the
factors necessary for a well-functioning or healthy state and, in particular, to constrain
the exercise of arbitrary power. At its most basic, the rule of law dictates: (a) that a
citizen should only be punished if it is proved in court that they breached a law, so
that people cannot be punished arbitrarily; and (b) that no person is above the law,
and everyone is equal before the law. This means that the law applies to everyone
regardless of social, economic or political status or, indeed, wealth.
The idea of the rule of law was known to philosophers such as Aristotle, writing around
300 years BC, but the British constitutional theorist Albert Venn Dicey, writing in the
19th century, popularised the concept of the rule of law. One of the most influential
contemporary formulations of the rule of law was offered in 2006 by Lord Bingham, a
famous English judge. Lord Bingham’s articulation of the fundamental principle of the
rule of law is that:
… all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound
by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future
and publicly administered in the courts.
Lord Bingham then set out eight essential ‘ingredients’ of the rule of law.
1. The law must be accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable.
2. Questions of legal right and liability should normally be resolved by the application
of law rather than the exercise of discretion.
3. The laws of the land should apply equally to all, except where objective differences
justify differentiation.
4. The law must give adequate protection to human rights.
5. Some means should be provided for the resolution of civil disputes that do not
involve excessive cost or delay.
6. Ministers and public officers must exercise their powers reasonably, in good faith,
for the purpose for which the powers were conferred and without exceeding the
limits of such powers.
7. The adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair.
8. The state must comply with its obligations in international law.
Judicial independence and the rule of law
Essential reading
¢¢ ‘Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct’ United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007
www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_unodc_commentary-e.pdf
An essential element in the rule of law, which is implicit in Lord Bingham’s eight
principles but not spelled out explicitly, is the centrality of the concept of judicial
independence to the rule of law. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (adopted
in 2002) set out a code of judicial conduct which has been accepted widely around the
world. The first of the Bangalore Principles states:
Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of

a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.
In its commentary on the Bangalore Principles, the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime notes that judicial independence is a responsibility imposed on each judge to
enable him or her to adjudicate a dispute honestly and impartially on the basis of the law
and evidence, without external pressure or influence and without fear of interference.
The core of the principle of judicial independence is the complete liberty of the judge to
hear and decide the cases that come before the court; no outsider – be it government,
pressure group, individual or even another judge – should interfere, or attempt to
interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts a case and makes a decision.
Individual and institutional independence

Judicial independence refers to both the individual and the institutional independence
required for decision-making. ‘Individual independence’ refers to the state of mind of
the judge while ‘institutional independence’ relates to the relationship between the
judiciary as an institution and other branches of government.
Why is the rule of law important?
Essential reading
¢¢ World Justice Project http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law
¢¢ Tamanaha, B.Z. ‘The history and elements of the rule of law’ Washington
University in St. Louis, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-02-07.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012845
The World Justice Project (WJP) assesses the extent to which different states around
the world meet the requirements of the rule of law. The WJP argues that the rule of law
matters because:
… it is the underlying framework of rules and rights that make prosperous and fair
societies possible. The rule of law is a system in which no one, including government, is
above the law; where laws protect fundamental rights; and where justice is accessible
to all … Where the rule of law is weak, medicines fail to reach health facilities, criminal
violence goes unchecked, laws are applied unequally across societies, and foreign
investments are held back. Effective rule of law helps reduce corruption, improve public
health, enhance education, alleviate poverty, and protect people from injustices and
dangers large and small. Strengthening the rule of law is a major goal of governments,
donors, businesses, and civil society organizations around the world.
(World Justice Project, Introduction to Rule of Law Index 2014

http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/introduction_key_findings.pdf)
According to the WJP, rule of law systems are those in which four universal principles
are upheld:
(1) The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities
are accountable under the law.
(2) The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect
fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.
(3) The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible,
fair, and efficient.
(4) Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives

and neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the
makeup of the communities they serve.
(http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law)
The WJP goes on to elaborate essential rule of law ‘factors’ which should be evident in
healthy societies. These factors are as follows:
uu Limited government powers: in a society governed by the rule of law, the

government and its officials and agents are subject to and held accountable under
the law.
uu Absence of corruption: the absence of corruption – conventionally defined as the
use of public power for private gain – is one of the hallmarks of a society governed
by the rule of law.
uu Order and security: human security is one of the defining aspects of any rule of
law society. Protecting human security, mainly assuring the security of persons and
property, is a fundamental function of the state.
uu Fundamental rights: under the rule of law, fundamental rights must be effectively
guaranteed. A system of positive law that fails to respect core human rights
established under international law is at best ‘rule by law’.
uu Open government: open government is essential to the rule of law. It involves

engagement, access, participation and collaboration between the government and
its citizens, and plays a crucial role in the promotion of accountability.
uu Civil justice: in a rule of law society, ordinary people should be able to resolve
their grievances and obtain remedies in conformity with fundamental rights
through formal institutions of justice in a peaceful and effective manner, rather
than resorting to violence or self-help. Civil justice requires that the system be
accessible, affordable, effective, impartial and culturally competent. Accessibility
includes general awareness of available remedies, availability and affordability of
legal advice and representation, and absence of excessive or unreasonable fees
and hurdles. Impartiality includes absence of arbitrary distinctions, such as social
and economic status, as well as decisions that are free of improper influence by
public officials or private interests. Effective civil justice also implies that court
proceedings are conducted in a timely manner and judgments are enforced
without unreasonable delay. Finally, in a rule of law society, it is essential that
alternative dispute mechanisms provide effective access to justice, while refraining
from binding persons who have not consented to be bound by the mechanism.
uu Criminal justice: an effective criminal justice system is a key aspect of the rule
of law, as it constitutes the natural mechanism to redress grievances and bring
action against individuals for offences against society. An effective criminal justice
system is capable of investigating and adjudicating criminal offences effectively,
impartially and without improper influence, while ensuring that the rights of
suspects and victims are protected.
It is arguable that in the absence of these rule of law protections, societies may be
vulnerable to the use of arbitrary power, totalitarianism and corruption.
On the other hand, some modern legal scholars have argued that the concept of
the rule of law has become so vague and all-encompassing that it has lost any real
meaning. As Brian Tamanaha (2012) has commented:
It is necessary to maintain a sharp analytical separation between the rule of law,

democracy and human rights, as well as other good things we might want, like health and
security, because mixing all of these together tends to obscure the essential reality that a
society and government may comply with the rule of law, yet still be seriously flawed or
wanting in various respects. Or to put the crucial point another way, the rule of law may
be a necessary element of good governance and a decent society, but it is certainly not
sufficient.
The requirements for the rule of law, as set out by the WJP, are demanding and
wide ranging. In addition to constitutional principles, the WJP argues the need for
well-functioning civil and criminal justice systems and alternative forms of dispute
resolution, which are regarded as evidence of a well-developed legal culture
underpinned by rule of law values.
In Chapters 6 and 7 we examine the English civil and criminal justice systems in light of
the rule of law standards set out by the WJP. Throughout the study of this module, it is
important to consider the extent to which the institutions and processes of the English
legal system, and indeed the institutions and processes of other jurisdictions, meet
the rule of law requirements set out by Lord Bingham and the WJP. For many societies
and justice systems, these requirements are aspirational. But although a society may
not yet meet all of the requirements, striving to achieve rule of law objectives and to
embed rule of law values is likely to guard against arbitrary government and defective
justice systems. As Lord Bingham said in the Epilogue to his book The rule of law:
The concept of the rule of law is not fixed for all time. Some countries do not subscribe to
it fully, and some subscribe only in name, if that. Even those who do subscribe to it find it
difficult to apply all its precepts quite all the time. But in a world divided by differences
of nationality, race, colour, religion and wealth it is one of the greatest unifying factors,
perhaps the greatest, the nearest we are likely to approach to a universal secular religion.
It remains an ideal, but an ideal worth striving for, in the interests of good government and
peace, at home and in the world at large.
Summary
uu The constitution comprises the rules for governance of society and distribution of
power.
uu The English constitution is uncodified and found in common law, statute and
constitutional conventions.
uu Key constitutional principles are the separation of powers, sovereignty of

Parliament, and the rule of law.
uu Rule of law principles evident in fair societies include accessible and intelligible
laws, accountable government, fair legal processes and protection of fundamental
rights.
uu An independent judiciary is an essential element of the rule of law.
uu Access to justice is an essential element in the operation of the rule of law.
1. How would you distinguish between ‘rule of men’ and ‘rule of law’?
2. Why is an independent judiciary essential to the rule of law?
3. Why is access to justice an essential element in the rule of law?
4. How does the rule of law protect societies from tyranny?
5. Does the rule of law guarantee a just society?
6. In what sense might we say that the rule of law is an ‘aspiration’?
1.7 Doing justice in legal systems
Essential reading
¢¢ Holland and Webb, Chapter 5 ‘Law, fact, and language’.
Further reading
¢¢ Genn, H. Judging civil justice (The Hamlyn Lectures). (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009) [ISBN 9780521134392] Chapter 1 ‘Introduction: what is
civil justice for?’ (in the Legal system and method study pack).
1.7.1 The essentials of fair justice and fair process

There is no simple, single agreed definition of the nature of ‘justice’ or the
requirements of just process in legal systems. However, in the English common
law system there is agreement that there are certain fundamental matters that are
essential for legal proceedings to be fair. Procedural fairness is concerned with the
procedures used by a decision-maker. It requires that a fair and proper procedure be
used when making a decision. Fairness is important for the ‘legitimacy’ of the justice
system (i.e. that citizens recognise the authority of the law, and respect and obey the
decisions of judges in courts). The essentials of fair process, long recognised within
English common law, are that: laws should be known; that an individual should know
the nature of the case against them; and that they should be given an opportunity
to defend themselves. These principles ensure that a fair decision is reached by an
objective and impartial decision-maker.
The distinction between law and facts

In both civil law and common law legal systems, when people are in dispute over
a legal issue, or where a person is accused of a crime, it is for the courts to decide
the outcome of the case according to the legal merits of the case. The judge gives a
legal determination or ruling which is then enforceable by the state. So if a person is
accused of murder and the court finds them guilty, they will be sent to prison. If a car
driver has injured a pedestrian and the court finds that they have driven carelessly,
they may be ordered to pay compensation to the injured person and they will be
forced to do so by the state. In both of these situations, and in all legal systems, the
job of the court is to determine the facts of the case and apply the relevant law
in order to reach an accurate legal determination. Although there is sometimes a
blurred line between what is a ‘question of fact’ and what is a ‘question of law’, for
practical purposes we can say that questions of fact are those which attempt to
prove what happened in a particular case. Was the driver exceeding the speed limit
when he knocked over the pedestrian? Did the pedestrian run into the road without
looking? These questions of fact will be determined by various types of evidence such
as statements made by witnesses or expert evidence. Questions of law are the legal
principles that may be argued in a case and procedural rules determining how the
case will be dealt with in a court.
In dealing with legal cases and reaching a legal determination of the case the courts
will follow certain rules about what evidence of the facts needs to be provided, how
and when the evidence should be provided.
Substantive and procedural law

‘Substantive law’ is law that defines, regulates and creates the obligations and rights of
a particular party. By contrast ‘procedural law’ or ‘adjectival law’ deals with the steps
that have to be taken in order to enforce the substantive rules, both before cases are
brought to court and when they are being heard in court by the judge and in criminal
cases by a judge and jury. The system of procedural rules is designed to ensure that
judges in adversarial proceedings (see below) have all of the appropriate evidence
available so that they can determine the essential or ‘material’ facts of the case
and apply the substantive law to those facts. For example, in criminal trials hearsay
evidence is excluded. This is where a witness did not directly see or hear something
important but was informed of it by another person. For evidence to be ‘admissible’
in court, the court must be able to hear a witness who saw or heard something and be
able to observe them being cross-questioned, so that their credibility can be tested.
The significance of procedural law is that it is thought to guarantee fairness in legal

proceedings and to increase the chance that judges will make an accurate decision
on the basis of the facts and the law – a ‘substantively just’ decision. Jeremy Bentham
(a famous 19th-century English legal philosopher) saw the rules of procedure as being
central to the machinery of justice. For Bentham, the power of procedure was in the
link between evidence and correct decisions (what he called ‘rectitude’ of decisions).
Procedural justice
Procedure is also important to litigants – the parties involved in legal cases – and their
perceptions of fairness. Those involved in legal proceedings want an opportunity to
put their case; the opportunity to influence the judge; a judge who is impartial and
even-handed; and to be treated with courtesy and respect. So procedural justice is not
only important in leading to correct legal decisions or substantive justice, but it is an
important influence on citizens’ perceptions of the fairness of legal processes.
1.7.2 Inquisitorial and adversarial procedure
Essential reading
¢¢ Kessler, A.D. ‘Our inquisitorial tradition: equity procedure, due process, and the
search for an alternative to the adversarial’ (2005) 90 Cornell L Rev 1181
http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/03/Kesslerfinal.pdf
One of the differences between common law and civil law jurisdictions is in
their approach to legal proceedings. Although the differences can sometimes be
overstated, common law court proceedings are generally based on ‘adversarial’
procedures in which the parties are responsible for preparing their case and collecting
their evidence. At the trial of the case in court the parties’ advocates will present their
clients’ respective arguments in a sort of contest before a judge (or judge and jury).
Witnesses will be called to give evidence and then cross-examined on their evidence.
The role of the judge is to remain relatively passive during proceedings, ensure that
procedures are followed and at the end of the hearing or trial give the decision
based on a view of the legal merits of the parties in relation to the facts presented.
Adversarial processes work best when there is a rough equality between the parties in
terms of representation and resources.
By contrast, in civil law jurisdictions, legal cases are determined on the basis of
‘inquisitorial’ procedures. In inquisitorial proceedings the judge plays a more active
role in the investigation of a case. The judge will decide which witnesses should be
called and will take responsibility for uncovering the facts of the case. In serious
criminal cases in France, judges may be involved as part of the investigation as
examining magistrates. At the trial the judge assumes a direct role, conducting the
examination of witnesses, often basing his or her questions on the material in the pre-
trial dossier. Neither the prosecution nor the defence has the right to cross-examine.
The use of juries in civil law jurisdictions is rare although lay assessors frequently sit
alongside judges in serious criminal cases. The adversarial and inquisitorial models are
distinguished primarily by whether the parties or the court control three key aspects
of the litigation: initiating the action; gathering the evidence; and determining the
sequence and nature of the proceedings (Kessler, 2005).
1. What is the difference between procedural and substantive justice?
2. How do procedural rules contribute to just outcomes?
3. Could a judge reach an accurate decision by an unfair process?
4. Why is it important that citizens perceive court processes to be fair?
5. What are some of the key differences between adversarial and inquisitorial
procedures?
Notes
2 The courts and their work
Contents
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2 Some preliminary distinctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 The hierarchy of the courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 European courts and relationship with English courts . . . . . . . . . . 42

Learning outcomes
uu describe the hierarchy of the courts
uu understand in broad terms the composition and jurisdiction of the courts
uu understand the relationship between European and English courts.
Essential reading
Further reading
¢¢ Slorach, Chapter 3 ‘The court system of England & Wales’.
¢¢ Cownie, Bradney and Burton, Chapter 3 ‘Courts in “the English legal system”’.
Legal system and method 2 The courts and their work page 37
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces you to the names and work of the main courts in the justice
system. A basic understanding of the hierarchical relationship of the courts and of the
kinds of cases with which different courts deal is necessary before moving on to the
discussion of precedent and statutory interpretation in Chapters 3 and 4. Although
some of the terms used at this stage will be unfamiliar, as you progress through your
reading, and as you begin to read some cases, the terminology will become more
familiar. If you are not sure of the meaning of a term as you read through the chapter
you should check the meaning by researching it on the VLE or internet.
2.2 Some preliminary distinctions
2.2.1 Civil and criminal courts

Civil courts exist in order to resolve disputes between private citizens or between a
citizen and the state. These disputes may involve, for example, breach of contract,
liability for injury in the law of tort, property rights, family disputes or the wrongful
exercise of power by a public authority. The person bringing the claim is the ‘claimant’;
and the person defending the claim is the ‘defendant’. If the defendant is found liable,
the court has the power to order the defendant to pay monetary compensation to the
claimant or to order some other remedy.
Criminal courts exist in order to hear and determine cases in which people are accused
of breaking the criminal law. The case will be brought by the ‘prosecution’ against an
‘accused’ or ‘defendant’. If the defendant is found guilty, the criminal court has the
power to inflict punishment in the form of a fine or imprisonment. The vast majority of
prosecutions are brought by the Crown Prosecution Service or other state agencies.
2.2.2 ‘First instance’ and ‘appeal’ courts

In both civil and criminal cases, once a decision has been given by the court, it may
be possible to appeal against the decision to a higher court. Thus there is a further
distinction between ‘first instance’ or trial courts and ‘appellate courts’.
2.2.3 Unanimous, concurring and dissenting judgments

In some of the courts in the hierarchy, judges sit in panels rather than alone (for
example, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal). In these cases, judges normally
sit in panels of 3, 5, 7 or 9 because in the English common law tradition it is permissible
and legitimate for a judge to disagree with others on a judicial panel. In such a case the
judge will deliver a ‘dissenting judgment’ and the case will be decided by the majority.
Where all of the judges agree, the decision will be unanimous. Even when all of the
judges agree, it is quite common for all of the judges hearing a case to write their own
decision. Although the judges agree, they may have a slightly different interpretation
of some of the issues in the cases or wish to express their view slightly differently from
the other judges. Where judges write a decision agreeing with the other members of
the panel it is called a ‘concurring’ judgment.
2.3 The hierarchy of the courts

The courts in the English legal system, shown in the diagram below, are in a
hierarchical relationship. Courts are organised on the basis of seniority. The more
senior the court in the hierarchy, the greater will be the authority of the decisions of
the court. So the decisions of the Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords) are the
most important and authoritative decisions of all the courts. The Court of Appeal and
High Court are also authoritative, but less so.
UK Supreme Court
Appeal only, on points of law.
Employment Appeal Tribunal
Appeals from the Employment
Tribunals.
Court of Appeal
Appeal only, on points of law to either the Employment Tribunal (England
Criminal or Civil Divisions. & Wales; Scotland)
Claims about matters to do
with employment.
High Court
Chancery, Queen’s Bench and Family Divisions.
Upper Tribunal
All three divisions hear appeals from other courts,
Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal.
as well as ‘first instance’ cases.
Crown Court
Jury trial for all indictable and some either-way criminal First-tier Tribunal
offences. Appeals against conviction and sentence from Appeals from executive
the magistrates’ court. agency decisions.
There are a number of other

tribunals outside of this structure
Magistrates’ Court (for example, School Exclusion
County Court Family Court
Trial for most Panels) – their supporting
Trial for most Trial for most
criminal offences. llegislation explains their individual
civil cases. family cases.
Some civil matters. appeal routes.
Figure 2.1: The court structure (adapted from www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/

uploads/2012/08/courts-structure-0715.pdf)
The courts and tribunals at the lower end of the hierarchy deal with the vast mass of
civil disputes and criminal cases (what are known as ‘inferior’ or ‘subordinate’ courts
and tribunals); while the courts at the top of the hierarchy hear a small number of
the most important cases on appeal in order to ensure that the decision of the trial
court was correct and to clarify points of law (‘superior’ courts). The judges who sit in
the superior courts are the most senior and distinguished members of the judiciary.
Superior courts have unlimited jurisdiction so can hear cases of any value or legal
complexity. Inferior courts have a limited jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal, High Court
and Crown Courts are now known as the ‘senior’ courts.
2.3.1 The United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) (Formerly the

Appellate Committee of the House of Lords)
Essential reading
¢¢ Department for Constitutional Affairs ‘Constitutional reform: a Supreme Court
for the United Kingdom’ Consultation Paper, 2003
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dca.gov.uk/consult/
supremecourt/supreme.pdf
¢¢ Thomas, C. ‘Decision-making by the United Kingdom Supreme Court and Judicial

Committee of the Privy Council: 2009–13’ (in the Legal system and method study
pack).
The UK Supreme Court was established by Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005
and officially came into being on 1 October 2009. It replaced the Appellate Committee
of the House of Lords (referred to simply as the House of Lords) in its judicial capacity
and assumed the jurisdiction of the House of Lords. The Supreme Court is, with a few
exceptions, the final court of appeal in the United Kingdom, although not for criminal
cases from Scotland. Most of its work involves hearing appeals on points of law of
public importance from the Court of Appeal but it may occasionally hear an appeal
directly from the High Court (‘leapfrog’ procedure). The UKSC comprises the President
who is the Head of the Court (at the time of writing this is Lord Neuberger, although
he is due to retire in September 2017), a Deputy President (currently Lady Hale) and
10 other Justices of the Supreme Court. It is a superior court and a court of record. Its
hearings are filmed, its decisions are regularly reported and all decisions are posted on
the Supreme Court website (www.supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/). It hears about 70
cases a year.
The creation of a Supreme Court was a major change both to the justice system of
England and Wales and to the constitution. At the time that the change was proposed
in 2003, the 12 judges of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (known as
the Law Lords) sat as the final court of appeal and heard cases within a committee
room that was located within Parliament. Although separate from the legislative
function of the House of Lords as the upper chamber of Parliament, the co-location of
both legislative and judicial activity was capable of causing confusion in the mind of
the public. The Government’s intention in creating the Supreme Court was to make
absolutely clear the separation of the judiciary and executive, especially since the
passing of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Government Consultation Paper published
by the Department for Constitutional Affairs in 2003, which preceded the creation of
the new Supreme Court, states that the purpose of the change was to make clearer the
independence of the judiciary:
The intention is that the new Court will put the relationship between the executive,
the legislature and the judiciary on a modern footing, which takes account of people’s
expectations about the independence and transparency of the judicial system … [the
functions of the Court] raise questions about whether there is any longer sufficient
transparency of independence from the executive and the legislature to give people
the assurance to which they are entitled about the independence of the Judiciary. The
considerable growth of judicial review in recent years has inevitably brought the judges
more into the political eye. It is essential that our systems do all that they can to minimise
the danger that judges’ decisions could be perceived to be politically motivated. The
Human Rights Act 1998, itself the product of a changing climate of opinion, has made
people more sensitive to the issues and more aware of the anomaly of the position
whereby the highest court of appeal is situated within one of the chambers of Parliament.
2.3.2 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC)

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the highest court of appeal for a
number of Commonwealth countries, as well as the UK’s overseas territories, crown
dependencies and military sovereign base areas. Although the JCPC is a UK court, the
substantive law which it applies is the law of the country or territory from which an
appeal comes. The JCPC has been co-located with the Supreme Court since October
2009 and the judges who sit on the JCPC are the Justices of the Supreme Court
occasionally sitting together with judges from constituent jurisdictions. It deals with
about 40 cases per year.
2.3.3 The Court of Appeal

Although the Court of Appeal is nominally one court, it is divided into the Criminal
Division and the Civil Division. The main jurisdiction of both Divisions is appellate,
hearing appeals against first instance decisions.
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

The head of the court is the Master of the Rolls (MR) who is also the Head of Civil
Justice. The judges who sit in the Court of Appeal are known as a Lord or Lady Justice
of Appeal. Most of the work of the court is dealing with appeals from first instance
decisions in the High Court and county courts.
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

The Lord Chief Justice is the head of Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), and is also
the Head of the Judiciary and the President of the Courts of England and Wales. He
sits with Lords Justices of Appeal. The court deals with appeals against conviction or
sentence from the Crown Court and also issues guidance on sentencing for the lower
courts. Under s.1 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 ‘permission’ is required for an appeal
from the Crown Court even if it is on a point of law. The principal ground of appeal is
that the conviction is ‘unsafe’. Under s.9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 cases may be
referred to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review
Commission for the correction of a miscarriage of justice.
2.3.4 The High Court of Judicature

Like the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, the High Court is a superior court of
record whose decisions are regularly reported. The High Court deals with both civil
and criminal cases at first instance and on appeal. It also has a supervisory function.
Although we refer to the High Court as one court, it has three ‘divisions’: the Queen’s
Bench Division (QBD); the Chancery Division (ChD); and the Family Division (Fam).
The Queen’s Bench Division (QBD)

This is the largest of the three Divisions of the High Court. The Head of the QBD is the
Lord Chief Justice (LCJ). There are about 70 judges who sit in the QBD (known as High
Court judges or puisne judges). The QBD has a wide civil jurisdiction hearing at first
instance cases in tort and contract. There are several specialist courts: the Admiralty
Court which deals with shipping cases; the Commercial Court which deals with
business disputes; and the Technology and Construction Court. The Administrative
Court deals with claims for judicial review of administrative action.
The Chancery Division (ChD)

The Head of the ChD is the Chancellor of the High Court (C) and about 18 puisne judges
sit in this Division. Issues dealt with include bankruptcy, ownership of land, trusts and
contentious probate (disputed wills). There is a patents court within the ChD with two
specialist judges.
The Family Division (Fam)

The Head of the Family Division is the President (P) and there are currently 18 puisne
judges in this Division. The court deals with matrimonial matters, issues to do with
adoption and other matters concerning children.
2.3.5 The Crown Court

The Crown Court has both appellate and first instance jurisdiction and sits in about
70 different places around England. The number of places in which the Crown Court
sits will be reduced as part of the government’s reforms of the justice system. The
government plans to close 86 court and tribunal buildings overall. The Crown Court
largely deals with criminal cases brought on ‘indictment’ (the most serious criminal
offences). It also hears appeals from magistrates’ courts. Any judge of the High Court
can sit to hear cases in the Crown Court and cases are also heard by circuit judges
and recorders (part time circuit judges). For criminal cases heard on indictment the
judge will normally sit with a jury – 12 citizens randomly selected from the register of
voters. The main functions of the Crown Court are: to try cases on indictment following
committal from the magistrates’ court; to hear appeals by way of rehearing from
summary trials conducted before magistrates; and to hear appeals by way of rehearing
from certain civil trials (family proceedings and licensing) heard before magistrates.
2.3.6 The Family Court

Family cases have traditionally been dealt with in the Family Division of the High Court,
the county courts and magistrates’ courts. Following a review of the family justice
system in 2011 a new single Family Court was established by the Crime and Courts Act
2013 and The Family Procedure (Amendment No. 3) Rules 2013/3204. The Family Court
deals with virtually all family cases previously dealt with in the High Court, county
courts and magistrates’ courts. The change streamlines the system for family cases.
The judiciary of the Family Court includes all levels of judge from High Court, circuit
judges, recorders, district judges and magistrates. There is a single point of entry for
the issue of proceedings and a centralised and unified administration.
2.3.7 The county court

Traditionally the county court system model has been based around the geographical
dispersion of physical court buildings where access to civil justice is available on a
local basis around the country. The judges who sit in the county courts are circuit
judges, recorders and district judges. The jurisdiction of the County Court is relatively
broad, dealing with civil cases arising from a variety of matters, such as contract, tort,
insolvency and probate. The County Court is an inferior court and its decisions are not
reported. Whether or not cases are heard by the County Court or by the High Court
usually depends on where the dispute was originally lodged and the subsequent
exercise of gatekeeping powers of the court to transfer a matter to the High Court. As a
general rule, lower value and/or less complex cases are heard by the County Court and
higher value and/or more complex cases are heard by the High Court. Until recently
170 county courts provided local access to civil justice in the County Court system.
In April 2014 the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2014 (SI 2014 / 407) implemented
the single County Court, which indicates a move towards the unification of the
courts and a practical attempt to make the civil justice system more effective and
less costly. The County Court is a single model in that it is a central system which is
served nationwide by business units; and the geographically dispersed physical court
buildings are only one aspect of the single model system. The single County Court
has the new operational features of two business centres, the Northampton Bulk
Centre and the County Court Money Claims Centre at Salford; and a Contact Centre for
administering telephone calls to the County Court system. The Bulk Centre relies as far
as possible on a ‘judge free’ approach and electronic, digitalised solutions which are
designed for the paperless resolution of particular types of disputes, such as Money
Claims On Line (MCOL) and Direction Questionnaires; for example, in the resolution
of small claims (under £10,000). The Salford Centre carries out similar work but as
a paper exercise. Supporting the work of the business centres is the Loughborough
Contact Centre, which filters incoming enquiries as a first point of access for incoming
telephone calls to the County Court system. These new features support the
overarching aim of a more efficient and less costly civil justice system by alleviating
individual courthouses from the burden of the types of claims they perform.
The traditional county courts are incorporated into the single County Court model
as the County Court Hearing Centres. The immediate impact of the introduction
of this new model has been an initial reduction of the original 170 to 145. Further
closures are expected as the improvements which the single model should deliver
will theoretically continue to reduce the workload of the Hearing Centres. In February
2016, the closure of further county courts was announced as part of the overall
reduction in court and tribunal buildings in England and Wales. This is part of the
government’s overall reform of the justice system, discussed in more detail later in
this guide.
2.3.8 Magistrates’ courts

Magistrates’ courts are local courts dealing mainly with criminal matters. Magistrates’
courts are inferior courts. They are not courts of record. The judges who sit in magistrates’
courts are generally not lawyers (lay magistrates or Justices of the Peace (JP)). They are
unpaid and sit part-time, generally in benches of three, assisted by a legally qualified
justices’ clerk, who advises the magistrates on the law but does not involve themself in
decision making. There are around 23,000 magistrates in England and Wales. There are
also around 140 professionally qualified, paid judges who sit in the magistrates’ courts.
These are District Judges (Magistrates’ Courts) or DJ (MC) (formerly known as Stipendiary
Magistrates). Magistrates’ courts try minor offences (summary offences) and conduct
preliminary hearings of indictable offences before a case is sent to the Crown Court to be
tried. Thus all criminal cases begin in the magistrates’ courts and over 90 per cent of cases
end there. Magistrates also deal with a wide range of civil proceedings.
2.3.9 Tribunals
Tribunals are decision-making bodies established by the state, mostly to deal with
disputes between citizens and the state. There are around 70 different tribunals
dealing with a wide range of subject-matter ranging across, for example, immigration,
welfare benefits, education, tax and parking. Unlike general courts, most tribunals
have a relatively restricted jurisdiction. Typically, tribunal panels comprise a legally
qualified tribunal judge who will sit together with two non-legally qualified panel
members. Tribunals tend to have less complex procedures than ordinary courts and
are intended to be accessible and user-friendly so that those challenging decisions of
public bodies in tribunals can proceed without legal representation.
2.3.10 Coroners
Coroners’ courts are inferior courts, the decisions of which are not reported. Their
main function is to inquire into the cause of sudden deaths. Coroners may be lawyers
or medical practitioners and they may sit with a jury of between 7 and 11 members if
that is considered necessary. Unlike courts, the process adopted in coroners’ courts is
inquisitorial.
2.4 European courts and relationship with English courts
2.4.1 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)

Under the European Communities Act 1972 the UK became a member of the European
Communities on 1 January 1973. The effect of s.2(1) of the 1972 Act is mandatory
incorporation of EU law into English law. The UK is required to give effect to any laws
passed by the EU. Since the accession of the UK, the CJEU has stood above the Supreme
Court as the ultimate court in disputes concerning European law. This may change
in the future following the UK’s vote in 2016 to leave the European Union. In internal,
domestic cases, the Supreme Court remains the final appeal court in the UK.
The CJEU was established in 1954. It consists of one judge from each member state –
together with eight Advocates General – who makes submissions to the court on the
relevant law to assist the court. The CJEU sits in Luxembourg and is usually referred
to as the European Court, but should not be confused with the European Court of
Human Rights, which sits in Strasbourg. The CJEU normally sits in chambers of three
or five judges, but may sit in a grand Chamber of 13 judges. An important point of
procedural difference between this court and UK courts is that the CJEU always
delivers a judgment of the court, without the possibility of dissenting judgments.
The CJEU deals with breaches of obligations under European Treaties and the uniform
judicial interpretation of European Law by member states of the European Union.
Cases are not appealed to the CJEU but instead ‘referred’ to the CJEU under Article 267
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It is thus a ‘Court of Reference’.
The Court makes the final judgment on the interpretation of EU law. The relationship
between the CJEU and the UKSC is important and is discussed in Chapter 3.
2.4.2 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is an international court based in
Strasbourg and should not be confused with the CJEU in Luxembourg. The ECtHR
hears cases alleging that there has been a breach of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Judges of the ECtHR are full-time, elected for six years by the Council
of Europe. The Court operates a two-stage procedure beginning with preliminary
scrutiny by a panel of three judges who decide if the case is admissible. If a case
survives this process it will proceed to a Chamber of seven judges who will normally
determine the case. In exceptional circumstances a seven-judge Chamber may refer
a case to a Grand Chamber of 17 judges if the case raises a serious question affecting
the interpretation of the Convention. The ECtHR does not sit within the English court
hierarchy, but since the UK has incorporated the European Convention on Human
Rights into its domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998, the decisions of the
ECtHR are highly influential on English courts dealing with human rights issues and the
UK Supreme Court generally follows the decisions of the ECtHR. See, for example, the
Grand Chamber decision in a case involving the right of prisoners to vote in elections.
This decision was considered by the UK Supreme Court in the case of Chester [2013]
UKSC 63.
Summary
uu The structure of the English court system is hierarchical and courts lower down the
court hierarchy are bound to follow decisions of courts higher up the hierarchy.
uu A major distinction is between courts of first instance and those with appellate
jurisdiction.
uu There is no rigid line of demarcation between civil and criminal courts since almost
all the courts exercise both types of jurisdiction (except county courts).
uu While not formally part of the English court hierarchy the CJEU in Luxembourg is a
Court of Reference and stands above the UK Supreme Court in relation to issues of
European Union Law.
uu The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, France, deals with
breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights.
uu Since the Human Rights Act 1998, English courts can deal directly with alleged
breaches of human rights, but their decisions are heavily influenced by the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
1. Name the superior courts in the English court hierarchy.
2. Name the inferior courts in the English court hierarchy.
3. Explain the difference between first instance and appellate courts.
4. What kind of cases does the Chancery Division of the High Court deal with?
5. What is a tribunal?
6. Which is the final court of appeal for matters concerning European Law?
7. What does the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights do?
Notes
3 The doctrine of judicial precedent
Contents
3.1 What is the doctrine of judicial precedent? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 The role of the judiciary in the operation of precedent . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 Precedent in practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 The European Court of Human Rights and the UK Supreme Court . . . . . 58
3.5 Judges as law-makers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.6 Postscript: the history of law reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.7 Citation of the Law Reports and the Weekly Law Reports . . . . . . . . . 64
Learning outcomes
uu understand what is meant by the doctrine of judicial precedent and why it is
important in the common law
uu recognise and distinguish between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta
uu explain and apply the rules of binding precedent in relation to each court
uu explain how the Human Rights Act 1998 affects the operation of binding
precedent
uu explain the extent to which judges can make law within the system of precedent.
Essential reading
¢¢ Holland and Webb, Chapter 6 ‘The doctrine of judicial precendent’ and Chapter 7
‘How precedent operates: ratio decidendi and obiter dictum’.
¢¢ Lord Dyson MR ‘Are the judges too powerful?’ Bentham Presidential Address,
UCL, 12 March 2014
www.judiciary.gov.uk/announcements/mor-speech-are-judges-too-powerful/
¢¢ Lord Justice Etherton ‘Liberty, the archetype and diversity: a philosophy of

judging’ (October 2010) Public Law 727 (available in Westlaw through the Online
Library).
¢¢ Lord Justice Laws ‘The common law and Europe’ Hamlyn Lecture 2013, Lecture III
www.judiciary.gov.uk/announcements/speech-lj-laws-hamlyn-lecture-2013/
Further reading
¢¢ Slapper and Kelly, Chapter 4 ‘Sources of law: case law’.
Legal system and method 3 The doctrine of judicial precedent page 47
3.1 What is the doctrine of judicial precedent?
3.1.1 The basic principles

The doctrine of judicial precedent is fundamental to the operation of common law. In
practice it means that a judge deciding a particular case will look for a ‘precedent’ – a
decision in an earlier similar case – to help them reach their decision in the case before
them. One of the most important justifications for following precedents is related to
the idea of doing justice. Consistency is seen as an essential element in doing justice,
in the sense that similar cases coming before the courts for determination should be
treated in a similar way. Another practical justification for following precedent is that
if judges follow the reasoning and decisions of their judicial colleagues, the common
law becomes certain and predictable. This is desirable so that people can organise
their affairs knowing what the law is, and to avoid continually litigating legal points.
Thus it is regarded as both fair and efficient to follow precedent. Expressed in this way,
the practice of precedent is not particularly unusual and is to be found to a greater
or lesser degree in most developed legal systems. Indeed, in civil law jurisdictions
there is a principle of non-binding precedent, sometimes referred to as the doctrine
of judicial consistency, according to which it would be thought erratic if the courts
significantly varied their approach to similar legal questions.
The concept of binding precedent

However, in the English common law system, we talk of the doctrine of ‘binding’
precedent in which the courts are bound to follow earlier decisions, even though
a judge in a second court might not approve of the earlier precedent. Sometimes
this will be referred to as the rule of stare decisis, which literally means ‘to stand by
decisions already made’. The idea of binding precedent in the common law system is
to ensure fairness through consistency, to provide predictability in the law and thus
to reduce the need for litigation. If people can determine what the law is, there is no
need to litigate the case and indeed no point in doing so. Legal advisers can advise
clients with confidence about what the legal principles are that a judge would apply
in deciding a dispute in court and what the outcome would be. The rule of binding
precedent is that the legal rule established in a precedent will continue to be applied
in subsequent similar cases until either another court decides that the case was
incorrectly decided; or for some other reason cannot be allowed to stand; or until a
court higher in the hierarchy overturns the decision; or until Parliament decides to
change the law by passing a new Act of Parliament that overrules or alters the rule laid
down by the court.
Binding and persuasive precedents

The doctrine of binding precedent represents a constraint on judicial decision-
making and there is a distinction between precedents which a judge may choose to
follow – persuasive precedent – and those which a judge is bound to follow – binding
precedent.
A precedent is persuasive where it is not binding, but will still be taken into account
by a court. The judge will feel that they are under some obligation to explain why they
are not going to follow a persuasive precedent. All serious statements made by judges
of the higher courts are treated with respect and may be cited in any court. However,
certain classes of especially persuasive precedent may be identified:
uu ratio of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC)
uu ratio of superior courts in other common law jurisdictions
uu High Court Judges treat the decisions of other High Court Judges as very persuasive,
especially where the decision was reserved (i.e. given after time for reflection).
See further discussion below.
Vertical and horizontal precedent

In the English common law system, the doctrine of binding precedent means that a
judge in a lower court must apply a decision made in a similar case in a higher court or,
indeed, in a court at the same level. These are the concepts of vertical and horizontal
precedent.
Vertical precedent – refers to the extent to which a court lower down the hierarchy is
bound to follow a decision of a court higher up the hierarchy. For example, is the Court
of Appeal bound to follow the decisions of the UK Supreme Court?
Horizontal precedent – refers to the extent to which a court at the same level is
bound to follow its own earlier decisions. For example, is the Court of Appeal bound to
follow its own earlier decisions?
The distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta

The decisions of judges in reported cases contain a large amount of material. Decisions
normally comprise material about the facts of the case; information about the
arguments made in court; and then there is the decision of the case and the reasons
for the decision – or the reasoning that leads to the decision. The essential pieces of
information in a reported case that will be important for the operation of the system
of binding precedent are: the material facts of the case; and the application of legal
principles to those facts that leads to the decision. What constitutes the precedent
that must be followed in later cases is the ratio decidendi – the ‘reason for deciding’.
The ratio decidendi is often contrasted with other parts of the judgment which are
regarded as obiter dicta – things said by the way, but which were not essential for the
decision in the case. The ratio decidendi is essentially the legal rule that leads to the
decision and it is this legal rule that is binding on a later judge. As Sir Rupert Cross
explained in his book Precedent in English law in 1977:
The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as
a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted
by him…
The ability to read a reported case and to identify its ratio decidendi is an essential
skill of the lawyer. It is a skill that must be developed in order to make sense of the
common law, to understand judicial reasoning and, ultimately, to be in a position to
provide advice on legal disputes and problems.
Material facts
The ‘material’ facts of a case are the facts that are important to the decision. Not all
facts in a case will be relevant to the decision and the judge will generally make fairly
clear which facts are relevant. So, for example, in the famous case of Donoghue v
Stevenson [1932] AC 562 the court dealt with the question of whether a manufacturer
of a food product could be liable for causing injury to the ultimate consumer of the
product as a result of negligent manufacture. In this case Mrs Stevenson was made
ill as a result of consuming ginger beer poured from a brown bottle which contained
a dead snail. The fact that the bottle was brown – and thus the contents could not
be examined – was a material fact, while the fact that the content of the bottle was
ginger beer was not material. The bottle could have contained lemonade or any
other drink. The point was that the contents could not be examined. For an excellent
account of the background to this famous case read Martin R. Taylor, QC, ‘Donoghue v
Stevenson: the legal world’s first glimpse of the most famous litigant of all time’
(www.scottishlawreports.org.uk/resources/dvs/most-famous-litigant.html).
Distinguishing
The doctrine of binding precedent requires that a judge follows the decisions of
earlier cases unless a similar earlier precedent can be ‘distinguished’. Cases can
be distinguished on their material facts or on the point of law involved. This is a
device sometimes resorted to by judges in order to avoid the consequences of an
inconvenient decision which is, in strict practice, binding on them.
How can cases lose their binding authority?

There are three principal ways in which a case can lose its binding force:
i. Express or implied overruling: a case may be expressly overruled by Parliament

if Parliament chooses to do so. Alternatively, if a case has not been expressly
overruled but is inconsistent with a later Act of Parliament it will be deemed to
have been ‘impliedly overruled’.
ii. Reversal: a case is reversed when the loser appeals and the appeal court agrees
with them. Sometimes cases are reversed only on some issue of fact. Where this
happens the ratio does not lose its binding force.
iii. Overruling: a case is overruled when a higher court, dealing with indistinguishable
material facts, either expressly overrules the earlier case, or produces a ratio which
is inconsistent with that of the earlier case.
How do you identify the ratio decidendi of a case?

This is the question that all law students ask. There is no simple way. The ratio does
not appear underlined and in red ink in the judgment. Reported cases may run to 10,
20 or 50 pages and include judgments given by several judges in the case. The only
way to identify the ratio is through a careful process of analysis and comprehension.
Reading through the case, following the analysis of the judge, following the judge’s
identification of the key legal principles and understanding how they have applied
those principles to the facts of the case in order to reach their decision. This is legal
method and you will learn it by reading cases together with the explanation of cases
that you find in your textbooks and study packs.
1. Explain the difference between a binding and a persuasive precedent.
2. Explain the difference between vertical and horizontal precedent.
3. Which part of a binding precedent is a judge bound to follow?
4. In reading a case, how can you distinguish between the ratio decidendi and
obiter dicta?
3.2 The role of the judiciary in the operation of precedent
3.2.1 The doctrine of binding precedent is a judge-made rule

It is worth noting that the doctrine of binding precedent is a limitation which the
judiciary have imposed on themselves. It is not a rule of Parliament but a judicial
discipline and if the judiciary were to agree on a change they would, in theory, be free
to do so. This is exactly what happened in 1966 when the judges in the House of Lords
(what is now the UK Supreme Court) decided to change their practice. They agreed
that in the future although they would normally regard themselves as bound by their
own earlier decisions, in appropriate cases they would be prepared to overrule an
earlier decision. This issue is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
3.2.2 Do judges make or declare the law?

Historically there has been considerable debate about the role of the judiciary in the
English common law system. Constitutionally it is for the legislature to make law and
for the judiciary to give effect to that law. The judiciary are not elected representatives
of the people and therefore lack legitimacy for law-making in a democratic society
governed by the rule of law (what is often referred to as a ‘democratic deficit’). This
strict approach to the role of the judiciary was expounded by William Blackstone and
is known as the ‘declaratory theory’ – that the role of the judge is to declare what the
law is, and not to make it. An example of this approach is given by Lord Simonds in the
case of Midland Silicone Ltd v Scruttons Ltd [1962] AC 446, where he said:
Nor will I easily be led by an undiscerning zeal for some abstract kind of justice to ignore
our first duty which is to administer justice according to law, the law which is established
for us by an Act of Parliament or the binding authority of precedent.
However, there is ample judicial writing and scholarly discussion to conclude that
in the English common law system the judiciary do perform a limited law-making
function in incrementally developing the common law to ensure that it keeps pace
with changes in social and economic conditions and remains sufficiently flexible to
accommodate new situations.
In his memoirs in 1972 after retiring from the House of Lords (what is now the UK
Supreme Court) Lord Reid indicated his view in the title of his book The judge as law
maker. He famously said:
We do not believe in fairy tales any more. So we must accept the fact that for better or
worse judges do make law, and tackle the question how do they approach their task and
how they should approach it.
More recently a number of judges have reflected on their role in developing the common
law. When he was Chairman of the Law Commission of England, Lord Justice Etherton
argued that public law and human rights developments have intensified and highlighted
the law making role of the judge (July 2009, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies lecture).
In the case of National Westminster Bank v Spectrum Plus [2005] 2 AC 680, Lord Nicholls
said at para.32:
The common law is judge-made law. For centuries judges have been charged with the
responsibility of keeping this law abreast of current social conditions and expectations.
That is still the position. Continuing but limited development of the common law in this
fashion is an integral part of the constitutional function of the judiciary. Had the judges
not discharged this responsibility, the common law would be the same now as it was in
the reign of King Henry II. It is because of this that the common law is a living instrument
of law, reacting to new events and new ideas, and so capable of providing the citizens of
this country with a system of practical justice relevant to the times in which they live.
However, in his essay The judge as lawmaker (1997), Lord Bingham identified some
situations where judges would or should be reluctant to make new law. For example:
where citizens have organised their affairs on the basis of their understanding of the
law; where a defective legal rule requires detailed amendments, qualifications and
exceptions; where the issue involves a matter of social policy on which there is no
consensus; or where the issue is in a field outside of ordinary judicial experience.
The extent to which any judge is prepared to innovate will depend on their view of the
balance to be achieved between competing requirements of the common law. These are:
uu the need for stability in the common law
uu the need for certainty in the common law
uu the need for flexibility in the common law
uu the desire to do justice between the parties in the instant case
uu the duty not to usurp (take over) the role of Parliament.
As Lord Dyson concluded in his 2014 speech on the power of the judiciary:
… in deciding whether to develop the common law or to leave any change to Parliament,
the courts do not apply some overarching principle … some judges are more cautious
than their colleagues; others are more adventurous. But despite these differences, the
common law continues to evolve. What is clear is that the judges have great power in
shaping the common law and, therefore, influencing the lives of all of us. The existence
of this power is, of course, always subject to Parliament. If Parliament wishes to change
the common law, it can do so. But, despite some notable exceptions … Parliament rarely
shows any appetite to change the common law. So far as I am aware, the manner in which
the judges develop the common law has not excited much political comment or given
rise to a demand to clip the wings of the judges. I would like to think that this is because,
on the whole, the judges have done a good job in this area and no-one has suggested a
fundamentally different way of doing things that would command popular support.
1. What is the ‘declaratory theory’?
2. Why are judges reluctant to legislate?
3. What approach does Lord Dyson think judges should take to the development of
the common law?
3.3 Precedent in practice
3.3.1 Vertical and horizontal precedent in the court hierarchy
The UK Supreme Court (formerly House of Lords)
Essential reading
¢¢ Lord Justice Laws ‘Our lady of the common law’ ICLR Lecture, 1 March 2012
www.judiciary.gov.uk/announcements/lj-laws-speech-iclr-lecture-01032012/
¢¢ Lee, J. ‘The doctrine of precedent and the Supreme Court’ Inner Temple
Academic Fellow’s Lecture
www.innertemple.org.uk/downloads/education/lectures/lecture_james_lee.pdf
¢¢ Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [2010] UKSC 28
(extract in the Legal system and method study pack).
¢¢ Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13.
Vertical precedent
The UK Supreme Court binds all of the courts below it in the court hierarchy. There
have been some occasions in the past when the Court of Appeal has challenged this
principle (see next section).
Horizontal precedent
Until the mid-19th century the House of Lords took the view that it was not bound by
its own decisions, but in 1898 in the case of London Street Tramways Ltd v London County
Council [1898] AC 375 the House confirmed that they would in future be bound by their
own decisions. The reason for this was to bring finality to cases and legal issues so that
they would not be continually re-argued. However, in the period that followed the
London Tramways decision it was felt that the effect of the decision was to constrain
the development of the common law and that rather than ensuring predictability and
certainty in the law, the effect was rather the opposite.
As a result, in 1966, all of the judges in the House of Lords joined together to issue
a Practice Statement (a statement by the court of a procedure that it intends to
introduce) providing that in future the House would no longer regard itself as bound
by its own earlier decisions. The statement was carefully worded to communicate that
this new power to depart from decisions would be used sparingly to avoid creating
uncertainty in the law.
The Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 3 All ER 77

The Practice Statement set out why the House of Lords was going to change its
practice and how it thought it would exercise the new freedom to depart from earlier
decisions of its own. It said:
Their Lordships recognise … that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in
a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose
therefore to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions … as
normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.
Together with the Practice Statement, the House of Lords published a press release
which gave more explanation about the new practice. The key points that emerged
from the Practice Statement and press release were that:
uu the court would only rarely depart from an earlier decision
uu the court would be most likely to use the new freedom in situations where
there had been significant social change so that a precedent was outdated or
inappropriate to modern social conditions, values and practices
uu the court would be likely to depart from an earlier decision if there was a need to
keep English common law in step with law of other jurisdictions
uu there was a special need for certainty in criminal law and as a result the court
would be very reluctant to depart from an earlier decision in a criminal case.
Horizontal precedent in the UK Supreme Court

Soon after the UK Supreme Court was established in 2009, Lord Hope gave a judgment
in Austin v Southwark London Borough Council [2010] UKSC 28, [2010] 4 All ER 16 in
which he made it clear that the prior jurisprudence of the House of Lords had been
transferred to the UK Supreme Court and that the UKSC would therefore not regard
itself as bound by earlier decisions.
The Supreme Court has not thought it necessary to re-issue the Practice Statement as
a fresh statement of practice in the Court’s own name. This is because it has as much
effect in this Court as it did before the Appellate Committee in the House of Lords. It was
part of the established jurisprudence relating to the conduct of appeals in the House of
Lords which was transferred to this Court by section 40 of the Constitutional Reform Act
2005. So the question which we must consider is not whether the Court has power to
depart from the previous decisions of the House of Lords which have been referred to, but
whether in the circumstances of this case it would be right for it to do so.
The use of the Practice Statement in the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court
The Practice Statement and accompanying press release provide a good example of
how, within the system of binding precedent, the judiciary have developed sufficient
scope for the law to remain flexible and responsive to social change. The freedom of
the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court to be less rigidly bound by precedent is a critical
feature of the English system of precedent. So long as the power is used cautiously,
it provides flexibility while broadly maintaining consistency and predictability in the
common law. However, the power to depart from an earlier decision and, effectively,
transform the law overnight raises issues about the line between a desirable level of
judicial creativity and flexibility on the one hand and crossing a line which trespasses
on the role of Parliament as the legislator within the English constitution on the other.
A cautious approach since 1966

The history since 1966 shows that the House of Lords and UKSC have used the power
very sparingly. In a study of the House of Lords judiciary published in 1982 called The
law lords, Professor Alan Paterson reported that between 1966 and 1980 there were
29 cases where the House of Lords was invited by counsel to overrule their own
precedents. In eight cases the court did overrule one of their own earlier cases. In a
further 10 cases at least one law lord would have been willing to overrule.
Examples of the use of the Practice Statement in criminal cases

Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435 This case was the first time after the publication of the
Practice Statement of 1966 that the House of Lords was invited to overrule a decision
in a criminal case (i.e. a controversial decision in Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220). In this case
Shaw had published a directory of the names and addresses of prostitutes called the
Ladies’ Directory. Despite having been advised by the police that this would not be
unlawful, he was subsequently arrested and convicted of the previously unknown
offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals. The House of Lords referred to an
18th century case which they argued was based on similar principles. Following the
decision there was considerable debate as to whether such an offence existed and
many thought that the case would be overruled if the opportunity arose. But the
House of Lords in Knuller refused to overrule Shaw. Interestingly, even though Lord Reid
had dissented in the case of Shaw, he thought it would be wrong to use the Practice
Statement to upset the decision. Lord Reid said: ‘however wrong or anomalous a
decision may be it must stand … unless or until it is altered by Parliament’.
R v Shivpuri [1986] 2 All ER 334 The first time that the House of Lords overturned one of
its own decisions in criminal law was in the case of Shivpuri in 1986 – some 20 years after
the court issued its Practice Statement of 1966. In the case of Shivpuri the House was
invited to overturn its decision in the case of Anderton v Ryan [1985] 2 All ER 355, perhaps
surprising since Anderton v Ryan had only been decided one year earlier. Ryan had
dishonestly handled a video recorder that she believed was stolen. In fact, it was not
stolen. The House of Lords held that Ryan could not be guilty of attempting to steal the
goods under s.1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. It was impossible because the goods
were not stolen goods. The court’s decision was criticised for having misinterpreted
s.1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. In the case of R v Shivpuri [1986] 2 All ER 334, the
defendant believed that he was dealing with a controlled drug when it was in fact
harmless and on the question of liability the House was invited to overturn Anderton v
Ryan. It did so. This was the first time that the House of Lords overruled its own decision
in a criminal case and it was regarded as a spectacular decision. In Shivpuri Lord Bridge
acknowledged that the earlier decision of the House of Lords had been wrong, that
there was no valid ground on which it could be distinguished and that it should be
overruled notwithstanding the need for certainty in the criminal law. He said:
If a serious error, embodied in a decision of this House has distorted the law, the sooner it
is corrected the better.
Another example involving criminal law in which the House of Lords overturned an
earlier decision is that of R v Howe [1987] 1 All ER 771 concerning duress as a defence to
murder. In Howe the House of Lords overturned its decision in DPP for Northern Ireland v
Lynch [1975] AC 653 and held that duress is never a defence to murder.
Examples of the use of the Practice Statement in civil cases
British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877 This case involved the duty of care
owed by an occupier of land to people trespassing on the land. The House of Lords
in Herrington overturned the much earlier case of Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358. In
Addie v Dumbreck the House of Lords had held that an occupier of land would only be
liable for harm caused to a trespasser if the harm was caused intentionally. The House
of Lords in Herrington held that social attitudes had changed in the intervening 50
years and occupiers of land, as a matter of common humanity, should take reasonable
steps to deter people from trespassing where they are likely to be injured. The Addie v
Dumbreck case had impeded the proper development of the common law and should
be overruled.
Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1990] 2 All ER 908 This is a decision of major
importance to the tort of negligence. The House of Lords overruled its own decision
in Anns v Merton London Borough [1977] 2 All ER 492. The decision in Anns had been
severely criticised at the time that it was decided and in Murphy the House of Lords
departed from all of the propositions in Anns. Lord Keith of Kinkel said:
I think it must now be recognised that [Anns] did not proceed on any basis of principle at
all, but constituted a remarkable example of judicial legislation. It has engendered a vast
spate of litigation, and each of the cases in the field which have reached this House has
been distinguished … There can be no doubt that to depart from the decision would re-
establish a degree of certainty in this field which it has done a remarkable amount to upset.
Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [2010] UKSC 28
This recent case demonstrates first, that the 1966 Practice Statement applies to the
Supreme Court; and second, that the UKSC will be cautious about overturning an
earlier decision on statutory interpretation unless there are very strong reasons for
doing so. The case concerned the interpretation of s.82(2) of the Housing Act 1985
which had been dealt with by the House of Lords in Knowsley Housing Trust v White
[2009] 1 AC 636. Lord Hope in Austin v Southwark felt that s.82(2) was capable of being
interpreted in different ways, but said that the question was whether it would be
‘right’ for the Supreme Court to depart from a previous decision of the House of Lords.
Lord Hope held that he was not persuaded that the Supreme Court should depart
from the decision of the House in Knowsley since the effect of reversing such a decision
which had stood for so long was incalculable in the circumstances.
1. Why did the House of Lords issue the Practice Statement in 1966?
2. What were the circumstances in which the House of Lords envisaged being
prepared to overrule earlier decisions?
3. Why has the House of Lords been cautious in using the power to overrule?
4. What was the significance of the Shivpuri case?
5. What is the position in relation to horizontal precedent in the UK Supreme

Court?
Vertical precedent in the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

It ought to be absolutely clear that the Court of Appeal is bound by the decisions of the
House of Lords/UK Supreme Court. Although this is certainly the case, there have been
occasions when the Court of Appeal has sought to argue that it ought not to be bound
by decisions of the House of Lords/UKSC. This was particularly so in the years after
the 1966 Practice Statement and when Lord Denning, a famously creative and rather
unique English judge, was sitting in the Court of Appeal. Lord Denning took the view
that in most situations the Court of Appeal was effectively the final court of appeal
because so few cases ever proceed for consideration in the House of Lords/UKSC. Lord
Denning thought that if the House of Lords could free itself from the constraint of
binding precedent, the Court of Appeal should be allowed the same freedom. A clear
example is to be found in the case of Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027. Lord
Denning awarded £25,000 exemplary damages to Captain Broome. The rules for the
award of damages had been laid down in the House of Lords case of Rookes v Barnard
[1964] AC 1129. But Lord Denning said that these rules were ‘unworkable’ and declined
to follow the guidance of the House of Lords. The case was appealed to the House
of Lords where Lord Hailsham took the opportunity to disapprove of Lord Denning’s
approach. He said:
It is not open to the Court of Appeal to give gratuitous advice to judges of first instance to
ignore decisions of the House of Lords … The fact is, and I hope it will never be necessary
to say so again, that in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is
necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions
of the higher tiers.
Thus the position on vertical precedent is that the Court of Appeal is bound by
decisions of the House of Lords/UKSC whether or not the Court of Appeal approves of
those decisions. Decisions of the Court of Appeal bind courts lower down the court
hierarchy.
Horizontal precedent in the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Essential reading
¢¢ Davis v Johnson [1978] 1 All ER 841 (CA), [1978] 1 ALL ER 1132 (HL).
The issue of horizontal precedent below the level of the Supreme Court is very
important. The Court of Appeal and the courts below in the hierarchy hear thousands
of cases each year. There will be many courts sitting in the Court of Appeal at the same
time. That means a large number of reported judgments and if the Court of Appeal was
not to follow its own earlier decisions this would inevitably lead to confusion and a
degree of uncertainty in the law.
The basic principle of precedent in the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal is that it
is bound by its own previous decisions. There are, however, several exceptions to
this rule. The exceptions were set out by Lord Green MR in the case of Young v Bristol
Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 293 and are as follows:
i. Conflicting decisions: where the material facts of two Court of Appeal cases are
similar but the decisions conflict, then a later Court can choose which case to
follow. Although in practice the Court will often follow the later case, it is not
bound to do so. Although conflicting decisions in this sense ought to not arise if
the system of precedent is observed by judges, in fact there are cases where it has
happened. An example of the use of this rule is National Westminster Bank v Powney
[1990] 2 All ER 416 where the Court was faced with two irreconcilable decisions
both decided in 1948: Lamb v Rider and Lough v Donovan. The Court in Powney
followed Lamb v Rider. See also Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 209,
where the Court of Appeal refused to follow Law v Jones [1973] 2 All ER 437.
ii. Conflict with subsequent House of Lords/UKSC decision: where a previous

decision of the Court of Appeal conflicts with a later decision by the House of Lords/
UKSC, the Court of Appeal must follow the decision of the House of Lords/UKSC
whether or not it approves of that decision. This is sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of ‘implied overruling’.
iii. Decisions ‘per incuriam’: where a previous decision of the Court of Appeal was
given per incuriam, which means, ‘in ignorance’ or ‘without sufficient care’, a later
court is not bound to follow the decision. A decision of the Court of Appeal will lose
its binding force where it was made in ignorance of some rule of law binding upon
the Court and which would have affected its decision. The per incuriam rule was
explained by Sir Raymond Evershed MR in the case of Morelle v Wakeling [1955] 2 QB
379, 406 as follows:
Decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision

or of some authority binding on the court concerned: so that in such cases some part
of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found, on that
account to be demonstrably wrong.
A further possible exception? Conflict with an earlier decision of the House of Lords/
UKSC: a further complication arises when a Court of Appeal decision conflicts with
an earlier decision of the House of Lords/UKSC. This ought not to occur, but there are
instances when it has. The question then for the Court of Appeal is whether to follow
its own decision or that of the House of Lords. This situation arose in the case of
Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443 where the Court of Appeal was faced
with a conflict between its own previous decision in Schorsch Meier GmbH v Hennin
[1975] QB 416 and an earlier (1960) House of Lords decision in Havanah which held that
judgments in UK courts could only be given in sterling. In Schorsch Lord Denning held
that he was not bound to follow that decision because when the reason for a legal rule
had gone, the law itself should go (‘cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex’). In Miliangos, the
conflict between Havanah and Schorsch was considered. At first instance the judge, Mr
Justice Bristow, held that he was obliged to follow the House of Lords in the Havanah
case and not the Court of Appeal in Schorsch. He said that the Havanah rule could only
be changed by statute or by the House of Lords. Miliangos then appealed to the Court
of Appeal and Lord Denning held that Schorsch was binding on the courts beneath the
Court of Appeal and on the Court of Appeal itself, because the exceptions to Young v
Bristol Aeroplane [1946] 1 AC 163 were confined to inconsistent subsequent decisions
of the House of Lords. The case was finally appealed to the House of Lords in 1976. The
House of Lords held first, that the Court of Appeal had acted incorrectly in Schorsch
when it failed to follow Havanah; but second, that Havanah should be overruled. Lord
Cross said that both Bristow J and the Court of Appeal should follow the House of Lords
decision, not the later Court of Appeal decision.
This is an area that remains somewhat uncertain and provides an example of

the extent to which some judges, within the system of binding precedent, may
occasionally depart from the rules when they feel it is right to do so.
Should the Court of Appeal be free to depart from its own earlier decisions?
After the House of Lords Practice Statement in 1966, Lord Denning conducted a
campaign to free the Court of Appeal from having to follow its own earlier decisions.
He argued in the case of Gallie v Lee [1969] 1 All ER 1062 that the Court of Appeal need
not be absolutely bound by its own prior decisions. He said that this was a limitation
self-imposed by the judiciary and that if the House of Lords could free itself from this
constraint there was no principled reason why the Court of Appeal could not do the
same thing. Lord Denning’s main concern was that if the Court of Appeal had made an
error in a case, the rule in Young v Bristol Aeroplane would mean that the Court would
be bound to continue to apply a bad precedent unless and until an opportunity arose
for the precedent to be overruled in the House of Lords. He repeated this view in the
case of Tiverton Estates v Wearwell [1975] Ch 146, but was unable to persuade all of the
Court of Appeal judges to agree with him.
The debate over horizontal precedent in the Court of Appeal was finally settled in the
important case of Davis v Johnson [1978] 1 All ER 841 (CA), [1978] 1 All ER 1132 (HL). The
case concerned the interpretation of s.1 of the then recently passed Domestic Violence
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976. Davis and Johnson lived together with their
baby daughter in a council flat of which they were joint tenants. Johnson was violent
and Davis ran away with her child to a refuge for battered wives. She applied to the
court for an order to reinstall her in the flat and have Johnson excluded from the flat.
The Court of Appeal had considered the same question on two occasions only a few
months earlier in B v B [1978] Fam 26 and Cantliff v Jenkins [1978] Fam 47. They held that
the 1976 Act did not protect a female cohabitee where the parties were joint tenants
or joint owners but only where she was the sole tenant or sole owner of the property.
In Davis v Johnson, Lord Denning called together a ‘full’ court of five judges, describing
it as ‘a court of all the talents’. The court held by a majority of three that the 1976 Act
does protect a female cohabitee even where she is not a tenant at all or only a joint
tenant. They declared B v B and Cantliff v Jenkins wrong and did not follow them. They
granted an injunction to order the man out and reinstall the woman.
Lord Denning was well aware that in doing this he was failing to follow horizontal
precedent. He said however:
On principle, it seems to me that, while this court should regard itself as normally bound
by a previous decision of the court, nevertheless it should be at liberty to depart from
it if it is convinced that the previous decision was wrong. What is the argument to the
contrary? It is said that if an error has been made, this court has no option but to continue
the error and leave it to be corrected by the House of Lords. The answer is this: the
House of Lords may never have an opportunity to correct the error; and thus it may be
perpetuated indefinitely, perhaps forever.
The case was eventually appealed to the House of Lords. The decision of the House
of Lords was that B v B and Cantliff v Jenkins should be overruled. However, it took the
opportunity to make an unequivocal statement about stare decisis in the Court of
Appeal. Lord Diplock said:
The rule as it has been laid down in the Bristol Aeroplane case had never been questioned
thereafter until … Lord Denning conducted what may be described … as a one-man
crusade with the object of freeing the Court of Appeal from the shackles which the
doctrine of stare decisis imposed upon its liberty … In my opinion, this House should take
this occasion to reaffirm expressly, unequivocally and unanimously that the rule laid down
in the Bristol Aeroplane case is still binding on the Court of Appeal.
This was a very explicit disapproval of Lord Denning’s approach. In his memoirs after
retirement Lord Denning referred to Davis v Johnson as his most ‘humiliating defeat’
and a ‘crushing rebuff’.
Horizontal precedent in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

In principle, precedent in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal is the same as
in the Civil Division. However, a somewhat more flexible approach to precedent is
taken in the criminal division if the court believes that the law has been misapplied in
a precedent. This is because of the seriousness of cases dealt with, the fact that they
may affect the liberty of citizens, and the serious social consequences of conviction for
criminal offences. Guidance on how this flexibility operates was given by Lord Goddard
CJ in the case of R v Taylor [1950] 2 All ER 170 who said that normally the principles in
Young v Bristol Aeroplane apply, but that the Court also has wider power to depart; if the
Court is to depart from one of its previous decisions then a full Court is essential; and
finally that the power should be exercised in favour of the citizen.
Divisional Courts of the High Court

Since the Divisional Courts have mostly appellate jurisdiction, the rules of precedent
are similar to those in the Court of Appeal.
Vertical precedent Divisional Courts of the High Court are bound by decisions of the
Supreme Court, previous decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal.
Decisions of the Divisional Courts are binding on inferior courts.
Horizontal precedent The Divisional Courts are normally bound by their own previous
decisions subject to the exceptions in Young v Bristol Aeroplane. When the courts are
not exercising appellate powers they are in the same position as the High Court.
The High Court The High Court is bound by the Supreme Court, previous decisions
of the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal and Divisional Courts. Its decisions bind all
inferior courts and tribunals. However, the High Court does not regard itself as bound
by its own previous decisions, although they are regarded as highly persuasive.
Crown Court The Crown Court is bound by decisions of the superior courts and its own
decisions are binding on the courts below it in the hierarchy. Decisions on points of
law are persuasive but not binding precedents, although inconsistent decisions can
lead to uncertainty. An obvious example is the issue of marital rape. Before the case of
R v R was finally decided in the House of Lords in 1991, cases dealing with marital rape
had come before the Crown Court sitting in different parts of England. The courts had
reached different decisions. The question for the courts was whether a man could be
criminally liable for raping his wife. The law until this point was based on an historic
principle set out in Hale’s History of the pleas of the Crown (1736) that on marriage a
woman gave irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with her husband. In the case
of R v R [1991] 1 All ER 747 the Crown Court sitting in Leicester accepted that consent
to intercourse was implied from the fact of marriage. Some three months later in the
case of R v C [1991] 1 All ER 755 the Crown Court sitting in Sheffield declined to follow
that decision and held that a husband could be guilty of raping his wife. In a third case
in the same year R v J [1991] 1 All ER 759 the Crown Court sitting in Teesside refused to
follow R v C.
The case of R v R was appealed to the House of Lords [1991] 2 All ER 481 (www.bailii.org/
uk/cases/UKHL/1991/12.html) where the House of Lords held that it was unlawful for
a man to have sexual intercourse with any woman without her consent. The original
proposition no longer reflected the status of wives in modern society where marriage
was viewed as a partnership of equals. This case is an interesting example of the
judiciary appearing to legislate. (See the discussion of this case in Lord Dyson’s 2014
speech on the power of the judiciary.)
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (‘Privy Council’ or ‘JCPC’)

Under normal rules of precedent, decisions of the Privy Council do not bind English
courts, although the decisions have strong persuasive authority because of the
seniority of the judges who sit in the Privy Council. However, a recent case casts a new
light on this established principle. In the case of Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 44, the
Supreme Court gave an important clarification on the precedent value of decisions of
the Privy Council. In this case the judge at first instance had had to consider a House of
Lords case which would lead her to strike out the claim in question, and also a more
recent Privy Council case which would lead to a different legal result.
The Supreme Court made it clear in its judgment that the courts should normally
follow the usual rules of precedent, and therefore not follow a decision of the Privy
Council if it conflicted with the decision of a court that did set precedents (e.g. the
Supreme Court). However, as the Privy Council is in practice often made up of Justices
of the Supreme Court, it is open to them to say that decisions of other courts (e.g. the
Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court) are wrong, and that the Privy Council decision
should be treated as representing the law of England and Wales.
If the Privy Council has made this statement that a decision is to be treated as being
the law, then its decision would be binding as a matter of precedent.
The Supreme Court sat in a panel of nine Justices, rather than the more usual five,
recognising that this was an important case. Although the judgment to a large extent
set out the accepted rules of precedent, the decision that the Privy Council could
in some circumstances overrule the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal was seen as
controversial by some.
1. How many exceptions are there to the rule in Young v Bristol Aeroplane?
2. Why did Lord Denning think that the Court of Appeal should be allowed to
overrule its own earlier decisions?
3. What principle did the House of Lords in Davis v Johnson confirm?
3.4 The European Court of Human Rights and the UK Supreme

Court
Essential reading
¢¢ Lord Irvine of Lairg ‘A British interpretation of Convention rights’ speech
December 2011
www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-institute/files/British_Interpretation_of_
Convention_Rights_-_Irvine.pdf
¢¢ Lord Mance ‘Destruction or metamorphosis of the legal order?’ speech at the

World Policy Conference, Monaco, December 2013
www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131214.pdf
¢¢ Lord Sumption ‘The limits of law’ 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur,
November 2013
www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf
The ECtHR is an international court sitting in Strasbourg and does not fit neatly into
the system of precedent. The relationship between the ECtHR and the House of Lords/
Supreme Court has been the subject of some debate in England in recent years and the
subject of a number of judicial speeches. In several Supreme Court cases the judiciary
have commented on the extent to which the UK Supreme Court is, or is not, bound by
decisions of the ECtHR.
The basic relationship between the English courts and the ECtHR is set out in s.2
of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. Section 2(1) provides that a court or tribunal
determining a question which has arisen in connection with a convention right must
‘take into account’ any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the
ECtHR. This suggests that the decisions of the ECtHR are not completely binding on UK
courts. It is clear, however, that there are different views among commentators and
the senior judiciary as to the extent to which English courts are bound to follow the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. While some feel that to ‘take into account’ requires due
consideration of ECtHR jurisprudence, rather than being bound by it, other judges feel
that it would require very exceptional circumstances for the English courts to depart
from a ECtHR decision. In a lecture in December 2011 Lord Irvine, the Lord Chancellor
responsible for introducing the HRA 1998, argued that Supreme Court judges have a
‘constitutional duty’ to reject ECtHR decisions they consider flawed and ‘should not
abstain from deciding the case for themselves’.
Case law provides examples of different standpoints. In R (on the application of
Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the
Regions [2001] UKHL 23, the House of Lords held that in the absence of some special
circumstances ‘the court should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights’. This decision was followed in Ullah [2004] UKHL 26
in which Lord Bingham said that the duty of national courts is ‘to keep pace with the
Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less’.
A rather different approach was taken by the UKSC in the leading case of R v Horncastle
[2009] UKSC 14 in which the question was whether the English common law rule on
the use of hearsay evidence in criminal trials breached Article 6 of the ECHR (right to
a fair trial). In this case the court declined to follow a decision of the Grand Chamber
in the case of Al-Khawaja v UK [2009] 49 EHRR 1 which held that Article 6 requires as an
absolute rule that no conviction can be based solely or to a decisive extent on hearsay
evidence. Lord Phillips said that a domestic court would normally apply the principles
established by the ECtHR, but where there was a failure of the Strasbourg court to
appreciate and accommodate ‘our domestic process’, then the UKSC could decline to
follow a ruling of the ECtHR. Interestingly, following the Horncastle decision, the ECtHR
reconsidered the case of Al Khawaja v UK (2011). They made some concession to the
reasoning of the UKSC and accepted that hearsay evidence could be relied upon under
certain circumstances. The ECtHR held that the use of hearsay was not inevitably a
breach of Article 6. This is an example of the way in which there can be a constructive
dialogue between the ECtHR and domestic courts. It suggests that there is some
flexibility in the approach to precedent between the UKSC and ECtHR although the
UKSC continues to hold to the view that it normally follows the ECtHR unless there is a
very strong reason for departing from a Strasbourg decision.
This flexible approach was again articulated in the case of Manchester City Council v
Pinnock [2010] 3 WLR 1441. Lord Neuberger said that:
This court is not bound to follow every decision of the European court. Not only would
it be impractical to do so: it would sometimes be inappropriate, as it would destroy the
ability of the court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the European court which
is of value to the development of Convention law … Of course, we should usually follow
a clear and constant line of decisions by the European court (Ullah) … But we are not
actually bound to do so or (in theory, at least) to follow a decision of the Grand Chamber.
As Lord Mance pointed out in Doherty … section 2 of the 1998 Act requires our courts
to ‘take into account’ European court decisions, not necessarily to follow them. Where,
however, there is a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent
with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning
does not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we
consider that it would be wrong for this court not to follow that line.
More recently, in the controversial case of Chester [2013] UKSC 63 the UK Supreme
Court was faced with a decision of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR that UK domestic
legislation which provided for an automatic ban on convicted prisoners’ voting in UK
elections was incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR which guarantees ‘free
elections … under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the
people in the choice of the legislature’. Prisoners serving a custodial sentence in the UK
do not have the right to vote. This ban was enshrined in s.3 of the Representation of the
People Act 1983 as amended by the Representation of the People Act 1985.
In 2004 the ECtHR gave a ruling in the case of Hirst v UK on the question of whether this
legislation was in breach of the ECHR. Seven judges at the ECtHR ruled that the UK’s ban
on prisoners’ voting breached Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR. The UK Government
subsequently appealed the decision and in October 2005 the Grand Chamber of the
ECtHR held, by a majority of 12 to five, that the UK ban on prisoners’ voting rights was
a violation of Article 3 Protocol 1 (right to free elections) – Hirst v UK (No 2) Application
no. 74025/01 [2005] ECHR 681 (www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2005/681.html). The
decision in Hirst was followed by Greens v UK and Scoppola v Italy in which the ECtHR
confirmed its decision that a blanket prohibition of this nature is an indiscriminate
restriction on a vitally important right and, as such, incompatible with Article 3 of
Protocol 1. This issue was politically very controversial and the Government undertook
two consultations in order to consider how it might modify legislation to ensure that
the UK was not in breach of the ECHR. The Government has prepared legislation to
modify the automatic ban in the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill 2012.
When the issue was raised again before the Supreme Court in Chester in 2013 the
Court held that the HRA 1998 requires the Court to ‘take into account’ decisions of the
ECtHR, not necessarily to follow them. This enables the national courts to engage in
a constructive dialogue with the ECtHR. However, the UKSC held that the prohibition
on prisoner voting in the UK had twice been considered by the Grand Chamber of the
ECtHR and each time it was found to be incompatible with the ECHR. Lord Mance held
that in these circumstances:
It would have then to involve some truly fundamental principle of our law or some most
egregious oversight or misunderstanding before it could be appropriate for this Court to
contemplate an outright refusal to follow Strasbourg authority at the Grand Chamber level.
In the same case Lord Sumption seemed to echo Lord Mance’s view saying that:
A decision of the European Court of Human Rights … is an adjudication by the tribunal

which the United Kingdom has by treaty agreed should give definitive rulings on the
subject. The courts are therefore bound to treat them as the authoritative expositions of
the Convention …
The case of Chester confirms that the current dominant approach of the UKSC is that it
normally expects to follow the jurisprudence of the ECtHR unless the matter in issue
involves some fundamental principle of English law.
3.4.1 Possible changes to the HRA?

In October 2014 the Conservative Party published controversial proposals for reform
of the relationship between the UK courts and the ECtHR: Protecting Human Rights in
the UK, October 2014 www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/
HUMAN_RIGHTS.pdf
This brief document stated that if re-elected the Conservative Party proposed to break
the formal link between British courts and the ECtHR and that in future Britain’s courts
would no longer be required to take into account rulings from the Court in Strasbourg:
‘The UK Courts, not Strasbourg, will have the final say in interpreting Convention
Rights, as clarified by Parliament.’ They also proposed to change the effect of a
declaration of incompatibility (see Chapter 4) so that such a ruling by the UK Supreme
Court would be advisory only. It is also suggested that the Government might leave the
ECHR if it is not possible to achieve a ‘looser’ relationship with Strasbourg.
In a speech at UCL in December 2014 entitled ‘Why it matters that Conservatives

should support the European Convention on Human Rights’, the former
Conservative Attorney General, Dominic Grieve QC, argued that opting out of the
ECHR would undermine respect for international human rights law and would have
‘potentially devastating’ consequences for the UK: www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/
constitution-unit-news/031214a
In the General Election in May 2015 the Conservative Party was re-elected to
Government. Following the election the then Prime Minister, David Cameron,
announced that he intended to repeal the Human Rights Act and replace it with a
British Bill of Rights. This is likely to face considerable opposition from politicians, the
legal profession and human rights organisations. Whether or not any changes are
introduced, the Conservative Government proposals highlight the inherent tensions
and political interest in the relationship between the UK courts and the ECtHR.
On 20 October 2015 the EU Justice Sub-Committee announced the commencement on

the Potential impact of repealing the Human Rights Act on EU Law Inquiry. The Inquiry
Report was published on 9 May 2016: www.parliament.uk/business/committees/
committees-a-z/lords-select/eu-justice-subcommittee/inquiries/parliament-2015/
potential-impact-of-repealing-the-human-rights-act-on-eu-law/
1. To what extent is the UK Supreme Court bound by the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR under the provisions of the HRA 1998?
2. How does Lord Irvine’s view of the meaning of s.2 of the HRA 1998 differ from
the view of Lord Slynn as expressed in the Alconbury case and Lord Bingham as
expressed in the Ullah case?
3. Did Lord Neuberger take a different view in the Pinnock case?
4. What view did Lord Mance and Lord Sumption take in the Chester case to the
question of following the jurisprudence of the ECtHR?
3.5 Judges as law-makers
Essential reading
¢¢ McLeod, I. Legal method. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) ninth edition
[ISBN 9781137027689] Chapter 14 ‘Arguments for and against judicial law-making’
(in the Legal system and method study pack).
¢¢ R v R (Marital Exemption) [1992] 1 AC 599.
¢¢ Nicklinson and Lamb v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961.
Further reading
¢¢ Slorach, S. et al., Chapter 5 ‘Case law’.
As we have seen, the principle of stare decisis or binding precedent serves the
objectives of predictability, consistency and fairness within a common law system.
Without binding precedent, there is a risk of conflicting decisions and uncertainty.
On the other hand, too rigid adherence to precedent can lead to rigidity in the
law. The English common law approach to precedent provides a balance between
predictability and flexibility. While most judges see themselves constrained by
binding precedent, there is scope within the rules for the development of common
law principles, for correction of errors and for the making of new law – albeit in a
measured and incremental way (Etherton, 2010; Dyson, 2014). The UK Supreme Court,
while largely free from the constraint of precedent, nonetheless adopts a cautious
approach to the making of new law. The Supreme Court does not have the democratic
legitimacy to introduce major changes to English law and it is mindful of its proper
constitutional position and relationship with the legislature.
The main argument in favour of some degree of judicial law-making (called judicial
‘activism’ in the USA) is that of speed. Courts can rapidly develop or change the law
(by overruling) if it is necessary. Parliamentary processes are lengthy and with a heavy
legislative agenda Parliament may not give priority to dealing with areas of law that
require updating or correction. Thus within the constraints of precedent the judiciary
are able rapidly to correct mistakes or to keep the law up to date.
The principal argument against the judiciary making new law is that of the ‘democratic
deficit’. The judiciary are appointed not elected. Thus in a Parliamentary democracy
under the rule of law, it is not for the judiciary to legislate but for Parliament. In his
speech on law making by the ECtHR Lord Sumption argues that the HRA gives the
judiciary power to make new law in politically controversial areas and that this is
essentially undemocratic. He argues that ‘law made in Europe by unelected judges is
changing the law in the UK in a way that is democratically unaccountable’.
The case law provides examples of the House of Lords/Supreme Court being willing to
develop or change the law and also refraining from making decisions where there was
a need for Parliament to legislate.
A case in which the House of Lords was prepared to introduce a major change to
the law was that of R v R (Marital Exemption) [1992] 1 AC 599 discussed earlier in this
chapter. The House of Lords justified the abolition of a 250-year-old rule that a man
could not be criminally liable for raping his wife on the ground that it was not creating
a new offence. It was, instead, removing an assumption that was no longer acceptable
in current social conditions (i.e. that on marriage a woman irrevocably consents to
intercourse). As Lord Dyson commented in a speech in March 2014, this was a change
to the law that the judiciary felt confident in making:
This change did not require any difficult policy choices to be made. It was uncontroversial,
widely welcomed and long overdue … It is and was inconceivable that Parliament
would reverse this decision. Parliament had had plenty of opportunity to legislate for
an amendment of the law. It seems that the political call for change was not sufficiently
compelling. The judges were surely right to step in.
Another case where the House of Lords appeared to create new law was the case of
R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75. Here the House held that homosexual sado-masochists
who inflicted harm on others with their consent could be convicted of assault
occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,
despite the fact that this sort of situation had not previously come before the courts.
However, there have been other recent cases where the judiciary have refused
to step in, even though they perceived the argument for a change in the law. An
important example is that concerning the legal ban on voluntary euthanasia in the
case of Nicklinson and Lamb v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961 (www.bailii.org/
ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/961.html). The appellants, both suffering from permanent
and catastrophic disabilities, wanted to be helped to die at a time of their choosing.
Neither was physically capable of ending their own lives without help and both argued
that as a matter of common law and the ECHR anyone helping them to end their life
should not be subject to criminal consequences. However, the current law is that
those providing such assistance will be committing the offence of assisted suicide
contrary to s.2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 (‘the 1961 Act’) if they merely assist a person
to take their own life, and murder if they actually terminate life themselves. The case
was heard in the Court of Appeal by the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls and
Elias LJ. The Court declined to rule in the appellants’ favour. The Lord Chief Justice made
clear that he felt this was an issue on which the courts should not be legislating.
The short answer must be, and always has been, that the law relating to assisting
suicide cannot be changed by judicial decision. The repeated mantra that, if the law
is to be changed, it must be changed by Parliament, does not demonstrate judicial
abnegation of our responsibilities, but rather highlights fundamental constitutional
principles … The circumstances in which life may be deliberately ended before it has
completed its natural course, and if so in what circumstances, and by whom, raises
profoundly sensitive questions about the nature of our society, and its values and
standards, on which passionate but contradictory opinions are held … For these purposes
Parliament represents the conscience of the nation. Judges, however eminent, do not:
our responsibility is to discover the relevant legal principles, and apply the law as we
find it. We cannot suspend or dispense with primary legislation. In our constitutional
arrangements such powers do not exist.
(paras 154–55)
This case was then considered by the Supreme Court in Nicklinson [2014] UKSC 38. The
UKSC unanimously held that the question whether the current law on assisted suicide
is incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR lies within the UK’s margin of appreciation.
The majority held that the UKSC has the constitutional authority to make a declaration
that the general prohibition in s.2 is incompatible with Article 8. But four Justices
held that the question whether the current law on assisting suicide is compatible
with Article 8 involves a consideration of issues which Parliament is inherently better
qualified than the courts to assess, and that under present circumstances the courts
should respect Parliament’s assessment.
The case clearly demonstrates differing views among the most senior judiciary about
whether and when to intervene in an area that requires a significant change in the law.
1. In the English common law system is it inevitable that judges will be making
law?
2. Why are judges cautious about changing the law dramatically?
3. Are there areas of law where they are especially cautious about changing the
law?
4. Did the House of Lords in R v R create a new law?
5. Does Lord Dyson believe that judges should always refrain from creating new
law?
3.6 Postscript: the history of law reporting

The doctrine of precedent is of great antiquity, but only became truly binding in the
19th century when the system of law reporting had become comprehensive.
There have been three periods of law reporting:
1. The Year Books These were the first available law reports compiled during the 13th
century. Year Book reports were not intended for use by the judges as precedents,
but were probably simply notes compiled by students and junior advocates for use
by advocates.
2. The Private Reports The compilation of Year Books ceased in about 1535 after
which private sets of reports were produced, printed and published under the
name of the law reporter (e.g. Coke’s Reports (Co Rep) which are so well known
that they are sometimes cited merely as ‘reports’ (Rep)). Published between 1600
and 1658.
The private reports are cited by the name of the reporter (usually abbreviated)
and a volume and page number. The date of the report is not part of the reference
but is usually inserted in ordinary round (not square) brackets. Ashford v Thornton
(1818) 1 B&Ald 405 (i.e. volume 1 of Barnewall and Alderson’s Reports at page 405);
Pillans v Van Mierop (1765) 3 Burr 1664 (i.e. the third volume of Burrow’s Reports at
page 1664).
In practice most law libraries have the reports of the private reporters in the
reprinted edition known as ‘the English Reports’ (ER or Eng Rep). These are
published in 176 volumes and contain all the available reports of the private
reporters. With the English Reports is published a reference chart showing in which
volume the reports of any individual reporter are contained.
3. The Law Reports This is the current system of published law reports which began
towards the end of the 19th century. In 1865 private reporting ended. A Council was
established to publish reports of decisions of senior courts. The Council was under
professional control with a representative from the Bar and the Law Society. In 1870
it became the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales. The
Council produces the Law Reports, the Weekly Law Reports (WLR), the Industrial
Cases Reports (IC) and the Law Reports Statutes.
The Weekly Law Reports include a report of every decision which will appear in
the Law Reports and others which are not intended to be included later in the Law
Reports. The cases are reported in full. Volume 1 of the Weekly Law Reports contains
cases not intended to be included in the Law Reports. Volumes 2 and 3 of the Weekly
Law Reports contain cases which will eventually be included in the Law Reports.
3.7 Citation of the Law Reports and the Weekly Law Reports
Prior to 1875
Irving v Askew (1870) LR 5 QB 208
Fifth volume of Reports of cases in the Court of Queen’s Bench at page 208 (the date is
not part of the reference).
1875–90
Symons v Rees (1876) 1 Ex D 416.
Citation by abbreviation of the division of the High Court (e.g. Ch D, QBD or App Cas for
an appeal case). Date still not part of the reference and prefix LR was dropped.
1891
Date made part of the reference and letter D for division dropped. Date now included
in square brackets. Separate volume of Reports for each division of the High Court (QB,
Ch, Fam) and a separate volume for House of Lords and Privy Council cases (AC).
Court of Appeal decisions are reported in the volume for the division of the High Court
from which the appeal came. There is thus nothing in the reference to show that a
case is an appeal case.
Weekly Law Reports

1 WLR, 2 WLR or 3 WLR
The All England Law Reports are commercially published law reports published weekly
and abbreviated as All ER.
4 Statutory interpretation
Contents
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Why is the interpretation of statutes so difficult? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.3 Why does interpretation matter so much? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4 The basic approaches to interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.5 Aids to interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.6 European influence on statutory interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.7 The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on statutory interpretation . . 74
4.8 Human rights: interpretation or legislation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Learning outcomes
uu understand why statutory interpretation presents challenges to the judiciary
uu understand the constitutional responsibility of the judiciary in relation to
statutory interpretation
uu understand the difficulty of determining the ‘legislative intent’ of Parliament
uu explain historic and modern judicial ‘approaches’ to statutory interpretation
uu understand how different approaches may lead to different outcomes
uu appreciate the influence of EU law and the Human Rights Act 1998 on statutory
interpretation.
Essential reading
¢¢ Holland and Webb, Chapters 8 ‘Making sense of statutes’, 9 ‘Interpreting
statutes’ and 10 ‘“Bringing rights home”: legal method and Convention rights’.
¢¢ Bennion, F. Statute law. (London: Longman, 1990) [ISBN 9780851215808] Chapter

13 ‘Difficulties of the statute user’, available at:
www.francisbennion.com/pdfs/fb/1990/1990-002-209-statute-law-pt3-ch13.pdf
¢¢ R v Maginnis [1987] 1 All ER 907 (HL).
¢¢ Davis v Johnson [1978] 1 All ER 841 (CA), [1978] 1 ALL ER 1132 (HL).
Further reading
¢¢ McLeod, I. Legal method. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) ninth edition
[ISBN 9781137027689] Chapter 18 ‘Plain meanings, mischiefs, purposes and
legislative intentions’.
¢¢ Stychin and Mulcahy, Chapters 5 ‘Statutory interpretation: introduction to

legislation’, 6 ‘Statutory interpretation: the search for legislative intention’ and
7 ‘Statutory interpretation: the impact of the law of the European Union and
European human rights law’.
¢¢ Dworkin, R. Law’s empire. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) [ISBN 9781841130415]

Chapter 1 ‘What is law?’.
Legal system and method 4 Statutory interpretation page 67
4.1 Introduction
Once Parliament has passed legislation it is for the judiciary to make sense of the
provisions in statutes – to interpret or construe the meaning of the words used. The
interpretation of statutes is, in fact, a critical function of the judiciary. Despite England
and Wales being a common law jurisdiction, in the modern legal system there is a
large and growing volume of legislation as government seeks greater regulation of
social and economic activity.
As we saw in Chapter 1, the role of the judiciary in relation to the legislature is to ‘give
effect’ to Parliament’s intention. This means that in dealing with statutory provisions
the judiciary must interpret or construe the meaning of words in a statute in a way
that is consistent with what Parliament intended. As Tindal CJ in the Sussex Peerage
Claim (1844) expressed the approach:
The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act.
However, there are two fundamental complexities in this simple statement. First, the
natural limitations of language mean that interpreting the meaning of words can
sometimes be fraught. Words may have several different meanings depending on the
context, and the meaning of words changes over time. Different judges in the same
case may interpret words differently and it is necessary to understand the approach
that the judiciary take to this difficult task.
The second challenge for the judiciary in giving effect to Parliament’s intention is that
it is not always clear precisely what Parliament did intend when they used a particular
word or phrase in an Act of Parliament.
4.2 Why is the interpretation of statutes so difficult?

Interpretation is an essential step in human communication. We all interpret the
meaning of spoken and written words to ‘make sense’ of what is being read or heard.
However, there are special challenges in interpreting statutes. As explained by Francis
Bennion in his famous book Statute law (1990) there are a number of features of
statutes that make interpretation difficult. These include:
uu Ellipsis – when the draftsperson refrains from using certain words that they regard
as implied automatically.
uu Use of broad terms (wide meaning); for example, ‘vehicle’ clearly includes motor cars,
buses – but what else does it include? Also the meaning of broad terms may change
over time, for example does the word ‘family’ include a common-law spouse?
uu Unforeseeable developments – when there have been social or economic changes

that influence the meaning of words.
uu Inadequate use of words – printing errors, drafting errors.
4.3 Why does interpretation matter so much?

The way in which a judge interprets the meaning of a particular word may make the
difference between a defendant in a criminal trial being found innocent or guilty.
The judge must decide the meaning, scope and applicability of legislation to a
particular fact situation. The distinguished jurist A.V. Dicey noted how important the
interpretative work of the judges is:
Statutes themselves, though manifestly the work of Parliament, often receive more than
half their meaning from judicial decisions.
(Lectures on the relation between law and public opinion in England during the nineteenth
century. (1905, 2001 edn) p.486)
Some of the cases included in this chapter demonstrate clearly the practical impact of
differing judicial interpretations of statutory provisions.
4.4 The basic approaches to interpretation

Francis Bennion (1990) explains that the duty of the interpreter is to arrive at what
he calls the ‘legal meaning’ of the enactment, which is not necessarily the same as its
grammatical (or literal) meaning. He says,
There is a clear conceptual difference between grammatical meaning apart from legal
considerations and the overall meaning taking those considerations into account. While
it may sometimes be difficult to draw in practice, this distinction is basic in statutory
interpretation.
So in seeking to find the ‘legal meaning’ of a statutory provision, there is no rule of

law that dictates which approach a judge must take. It is largely up to the discretion
of the individual judge. Historically, judges have tended to adopt one of a number of
approaches, sometimes referred to as ‘three rules of interpretation’. These so called
‘rules’ are not rules at all, but it is worth briefly noting the differences between the
approaches and the impact that a different approach to interpretation might have on
the outcome of a case.
4.4.1 The literal rule or ‘literalism’

This approach requires the court to apply the ordinary English meaning of words used
by Parliament. The approach was explained by Lord Esher MR in the case of R v The
Judge of the City of London Court [1892] 1 QB 273,
If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest
absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has
committed an absurdity.
An ancient example of the use of the literal rule is the case of R v Harris (1836) 7 Car & P
446, 173 ER 198 which involved interpreting an offence to ‘unlawfully and maliciously stab,
cut or wound any person’. The court decided that a defendant who bit off the end of the
victim’s nose had not committed the offence. The court held that the words in the statute
indicated that for the offence to be committed some form of instrument had to be used.
A more modern case demonstrates how different judges in the same case can
interpret the meaning of a single word differently, thus leading to different outcomes.
The case of R v Maginnis [1987] 1 All ER 907 (HL) concerned the interpretation of s.5(3) of
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 which provides that:
It is an offence for a person to have a controlled drug in his possession, whether lawfully or
not, with intent to supply it to another …
The police found a package of cannabis resin in the defendant’s car. The defendant said
that the package did not belong to him, but that it had been left in his car by a friend
for collection later. The defendant was convicted at first instance and appealed against
conviction on the ground that an intention to return the drug to its owner did not
amount to an intention to ‘supply’ the drug within the meaning of the statute. In the
House of Lords the majority, adopting a ‘literal’ approach, held that a person left with
drugs intending to return them did have the necessary intent to ‘supply’. However,
a dissenting judgment was given by Lord Goff. He held that the offence was aimed at
drug pushers. The defendant was not a pusher and should have been charged with a
lesser offence of unlawful possession.
… I do not feel able to say that either the delivery of goods by a depositor to a depositee,
or the redelivery of goods by a depositee to a depositor, can sensibly be described as an
act of supplying goods to another. I certainly cannot conceive of myself using the word
‘supply’ in this context in ordinary speech. In ordinary language the cloakroom attendant,
the left luggage officer, the warehouseman and the shoe mender do not ‘supply’ to their
customers the articles which those customers have left with them.
Another case which led to a difference of view between judges on the interpretation
of the statute is that of R v Brown [1996] 1 All ER 545 (HL). This case concerned s.5(2)(b)
of the Data Protection Act 1984 which provides that:
It is an offence knowingly or recklessly to use personal data other than for the purpose
described in the relevant entry in the register of data users …
A police officer twice used the police national computer to check the registration
numbers of vehicles owned by debtors of clients of his friend’s debt collection
company. There was no evidence that he passed on the data to his friend, merely
that he had accessed the data. A majority of the House of Lords, adopting a literal
approach held that the offence was not committed by a person who merely accesses
information. Data are only ‘used’, and the offence committed if the defendant goes
on to make unauthorised use of it, for example by passing it on to someone else. The
court held that they had reached this conclusion by giving the word ‘use’ its ordinary
meaning. However, the dissenting minority adopting a more ‘purposive’ approach (i.e.
looking behind the words to the intention of the legislation) held that the word ‘use’
should be given a broad construction in order to achieve the purpose of Act, which
was the protection of citizens against invasions of privacy.
4.4.2 The golden rule

This is a modification of the literal rule. The judge begins by adopting a literal
interpretation but if this leads to an ‘absurd’ result the judge may modify the words to
some extent. This approach was explained by Lord Wensleydale in the case of Grey v
Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 106:
… the grammatical and ordinary sense of words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead
to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument,
in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to
avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.
An example of the use of the rule is the case of Adler v George [1964] 2 QB 7. Under s.3
of the Official Secrets Act 1920, it was an offence to obstruct Her Majesty’s Forces in
the vicinity of a prohibited place. Adler was arrested for obstructing forces within a
prohibited place. He argued that he was not in the vicinity of a prohibited place since
he was actually in a prohibited place (an air base). The court applied the golden rule
to extend the literal wording of the statute to cover the action committed by the
defendant. Had the literal rule been applied, it would have produced absurdity, since
someone protesting near the base would be committing an offence whereas someone
protesting in the base would not. See also the case of Re Sigsworth [1935] Ch 89.
4.4.3 The mischief rule

This is the oldest approach to statutory interpretation. As set out in Heydon’s Case
(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a, 76 ER 637 the approach involves the judge taking several steps in
order to reach an interpretation. The first step is to consider the state of the common
law before the Act was passed. The second is to consider the ‘mischief’ or shortcoming
that the Act was intended to cover. The judge then interprets the Act in a way that
achieves the intended purpose. To this extent the approach of the mischief rule is
very similar to the modern purposive approach discussed below. A classic example of
the use of the mischief rule is the case of Smith v Hughes [1960] 2 All ER 859. This case
involved interpretation of s.1 of the Street Offences Act 1959. The provision provided:
(1) It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public
place for the purposes of prostitution.
The accused was in a house, tapping on the window to attract the attention of passers-
by. She argued that she was not ‘in the street’. Instead of adopting a literal approach, the
court considered what ‘mischief’ the Act was aimed at. Lord Parker CJ said:
For my part I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act.
Everybody knows that it was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to
walk along the streets without being molested by common prostitutes.
Lord Parker found a secondary meaning in the words. It was the ‘solicitation’ which
must take place in the street, not the person who does the soliciting.
4.4.4 Purposive interpretation

Although similar to the mischief rule, judges adopting a purposive approach to
interpretation are taking a wider view and essentially trying to decide what Parliament
intended to achieve in passing an Act. This approach encourages the judge to look for
the ‘spirit of the Act’, and to read words into or out of the Act when this is necessary. A
clear statement of this approach comes from the judgment of Denning LJ in Magor & St
Mellons RDC v Newport Corporation [1950] 2 All ER 1226 (CA); [1952] AC 189 (HL). He said:
We do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament to pieces and to make nonsense of
it. That is an easy thing to do and a thing to which lawyers are too often prone. We sit here
to find out the intention of Parliament and of ministers and carry it out, and we do this
better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to
destructive analysis.
This view was somewhat ahead of the interpretive curve and the approach of Denning
LJ was severely criticised when the case was appealed to the House of Lords on the
ground that Lord Denning had gone beyond the proper role of the judge. The concern
is that the further judges move away from the language of the Act, the more likely
they are to be engaging in a legislative or quasi-legislative function. As Lord Simonds
commented in the Magor case in the House of Lords, ‘[Denning LJ’s views are] a naked
usurpation of the legislative function.’
In recent years the judiciary appear to be more comfortable using a purposive

approach to interpretation. To some extent this may reflect the effect of dealing with
European legislation, considered later in this chapter. In the case of Pepper v Hart
[1993] 1 All ER 42 the House of Lords accepted that the courts are now ready to adopt
an approach that seeks to give effect to the ‘true purpose’ of legislation and as a
result will consider extraneous material that has a bearing on the background to the
legislation (see below on the use of Hansard). Another important case in which the
court adopted a purposive interpretation was R (on the application of Quintavalle) v
Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687 concerning research on human embryos.
4.4.5 Giving effect to Parliament’s intention

Whatever approach judges take to statutory interpretation they are always seeking to
give effect to Parliament’s intention. That is their constitutional role and judges take
that responsibility seriously. However, as this discussion has shown, different judges
approach the task in various ways. Some may think that the best way to give effect to
Parliament’s intention is to stay very close to the words that Parliament actually used
via a literal approach to interpretation. Other judges might feel that they are better
able to give effect to Parliament’s intention by seeking to understand the purpose of
the legislation and then reading words in or out in order to achieve that aim.
1. Why is it necessary to interpret statutes?
2. What are the special challenges in dealing with statutory material?
3. What are judges seeking to do in interpreting statutes?
4. What practical difference might it make if judges differ in their approach to

interpretation?
4.5 Aids to interpretation
4.5.1 Presumptions of interpretation

Presumptions are a sort of judicial bias, a preference which a judge has for coming to
one conclusion rather than another. Many of them are used in order to save Parliament
the trouble of saying what it is not trying to achieve. All presumptions can be displaced
if Parliament so wishes. Parliament’s wish to displace a presumption can be shown
explicitly or implicitly.
Examples of presumptions
Statutes do not have retrospective effect Statutes are presumed to be prospective
(i.e. to operate only in relation to events which take place after the act comes into
force). This presumption is especially strong in the area of criminal law. An exception
to this presumption is s.58(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which allows the
prosecution in a criminal case to appeal against acquittal.
Changes to basic rules of common law must be clear If Parliament means to alter
some principle which the common law considers to be important, it must make its
intention to do so clear, or else the common law principle will survive. An example is
the case of Leach v R [1912] AC 305.
4.5.2 Rules of language

These language rules are similar to presumptions, and like presumptions they can
always be displaced expressly or by implication. They are different from presumptions
in that they are not exclusively legal in nature. Any sort of text can be subjected to
these rules.
Ejusdem generis rule

General words which follow specific words must be read in the light of those specific
words, provided that the specific words are examples of some particular class
(‘genus’). An example is the
Sunday Observance Act 1677 which provides that:
… no tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever, [shall work on

Sundays].
Many cases exist on the question of what occupations are ejusdem generis with the list.
Parliament cannot have intended all occupations to be covered by the Act, because it
would have been easier to say, ‘No person whatsoever shall work on a Sunday.’ This is
the justification for the ejusdem generis rule.
Noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps)

This rule is similar to ejusdem generis. It states that all words derive their meaning
from their immediate context. The rule is very useful when dealing with ambiguities
in individual words where the ambiguous word is used in close proximity to other
similar words. An example is the case of Pengelly v Bell Punch Co Ltd [1964] 2 All ER 945
concerning s.28 of the Factories Act 1961 which provided that: ‘Floors, steps, stairs
passageways and gangways [must be kept free from obstruction].’ The court held that
‘floors’ did not include areas designed and used for the storage of goods.
4.5.3 Intrinsic material

All of the components of an Act of Parliament can be used to assist in the process of
interpretation. These include: the long title of the Act (containing a brief description
of the purposes of the Act); the short title (a short name given by Parliament so that
the Act can be easily cited, e.g. The Theft Act 1968); a preamble if it exists (rare in
modern Acts). They are used to set out in detail the reasons for the existence of an Act.
They always begin with the word ‘WHEREAS …’; the enacting sections which are the
substance of the Act with their subdivisions into sections and subsections; marginal
notes which give a brief explanation of the contents of a section; and headings which
give clues as to the contents.
4.5.4 Extrinsic material

While the internal context is concerned simply with other parts of the Act under
consideration, the wider context is concerned with all other matters which a court
might wish to take into account in interpreting an Act.
Reports of debates in Parliament (Hansard)

Until 1992 courts were not permitted to look at reports of parliamentary debates
to help with statutory interpretation, either for the purposes of understanding the
mischief or of construing the words in question. The reason for this prohibition was set
out by Lord Reid in the case of Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58,
For purely practical reasons we do not permit debates in either House to be cited. It
would add greatly to the time and expense involved in preparing cases … moreover, in a
very large proportion of cases [Hansard] would throw no light on the question before the
court.
Despite the prohibition on the use of Hansard, in the case of Davis v Johnson [1978] 1 All
ER 841 (CA) Lord Denning confessed that he had reached his view on the interpretation
of the relevant statute by reading what had been said in Parliament when the Act was
being debated.
However, in the case of Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42, the House of Lords ruled that
having regard to the purposive approach to construction of legislation the courts
had adopted in order to give effect to the true intention of the legislature, the rule
prohibiting courts from referring to parliamentary material as an aid to statutory
construction should be relaxed so as to permit reference to parliamentary materials
where:
1. the legislation was ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning led to an absurdity
2. the material relied on or consisted of statements by a minister or other promoter

of the Bill, and
3. the statements relied on were clear.
Reports of Royal Commissions and similar bodies

These may be used to understand the nature of any problem that Parliament may
have intended to solve by its legislation, but not so as to understand the nature of the
solution to the problem that Parliament has adopted.
Other materials
The court may look at international treaties, and other Acts of Parliament. Judges also
regularly refer to dictionaries to establish the ordinary meanings of English words,
either at the present day or at the time when the Act was passed.
1. Why might reports of debates in Parliament (Hansard) be useful to judges in
interpreting statutes?
2. What might the limitations of Hansard be?
3. Why did Lord Denning look at Hansard in the case of Davis v Johnson?
4. What was the significance of Pepper v Hart in terms of modern approaches to

statutory interpretation?
4.6 European influence on statutory interpretation
4.6.1 The continental approach to interpretation
Essential reading
¢¢ Holland and Webb, Chapters 9 ‘Interpreting statutes’ and 11 ‘European legal
method’.
In Chapter 1 we discussed some of the differences between common law systems and
civil law systems. One of the key differences is in the way that legislation is drafted
and the role of the judiciary in the different systems in giving effect to that legislation.
Within the continental legal tradition there are often different constitutional structures
involving written constitutions and constitutional courts. The substantive law is to be
found in comprehensive written codes and the role of the judiciary in these systems is
‘quasi-legislative’ in interpreting codes that are drafted in broad general language. By
comparison, English statutes tend to be detailed and relatively precise in their language.
Moreover, because judges in states with written constitutions are regarded as guardians
of the constitutions they generally feel relatively free to depart from the wording of
the code to ensure that it accords with constitutional principles. Judges in civil law
jurisdictions are used to ‘filling in gaps’ in the codes or elaborating on the use of general
words. They tend to adopt an approach to interpretation that focuses on the underlying
objectives of provisions rather than seeking the meaning of particular words.
The CJEU draws on a different legal tradition from the common law. Judges within the
continental tradition tend to use what is referred to as the ‘teleological’ approach.
This involves the court attempting to give a legislative provision an interpretation that
fits in with the general scheme of the legislation rather than seeking to establish the
subjective intention of the drafters of the text.
4.6.2 Interpreting the law of the European Union
Essential reading
¢¢ Fennelly, N. ‘Legal interpretation at the European Court of Justice’ (1996) 20(3)
Fordham International Law Journal
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1526&context=ilj
As we saw in Chapter 1, s.2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972 (unless and until
it is repealed as a result of the UK’s referendum decision to leave the EU) provides
that English law should be interpreted and have effect subject to the principle that
European law is supreme. Where an English statute cannot be interpreted in a way that
is consistent with EU law, the inconsistent law should not be applied (R v Secretary of
State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 All ER 70, HL/ECJ).
The CJEU has shown that in its approach to legislative interpretation, it is more likely
to be influenced by the context and purposes of a legislative provision than its precise
wording. In the case of Van Gend en Loos [1963] the CJEU stated:
To ascertain whether the provisions of an international treaty extend so far in their

effects it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of those
provisions.
In interpreting EU legislation, the English courts have to take a somewhat different

approach to the traditional approach used in domestic legislation. As Fennelly (1996)
points out, while all judges are seeking to give effect to legislation, judges from
different legal traditions vary in their approach:
The object of all interpretation lies in the true intention of the lawmakers, whether they
be framers of a constitution or a treaty, legislators, or drafters of secondary legislation. Its
pursuit at the Court [CJEU] demands of the common lawyer a readiness to set sail from the
secure anchorage and protected haven of ‘plain words’ and to explore the wider seas of
purpose and context.
Lord Denning signalled this change in the case of H P Bulmer Ltd v J Bollinger SA [1974]
Ch 401 (CA). The case involved an action which had been brought over use of the word
‘champagne’ in champagne cider and champagne perry. There was a request for the
case to be transferred to the European Court for a ruling as to whether such use of the
word infringed Community regulations. The court refused to make a reference and this
point was then appealed. In the course of refusing the appeal, Lord Denning spoke of
the nature of Community law:
uu All courts must attempt to interpret EC law in the same way and all apply the same
principles.
uu English statutes are drafted quite precisely and the courts have been used to giving
a literal interpretation to the words.
uu The EC Treaty is very different. It lays down general principles and expresses its aims
and purposes. However, it lacks precision and uses words and phrases without
defining what they mean. There are numerous gaps which have to be filled in by
the judges.
uu Given these differences, when English courts are faced with a problem of
interpretation they must follow the European pattern and look for the purpose or
intent rather than examining the words in meticulous detail. They must deduce
from the wording and the spirit of the Treaty the meaning of the Community rules.
If they find a gap they must fill it as best they can.
In a case a few years later, Lord Denning provided further explanations of the
differences between English and European approaches to interpretation. In Buchanan
and Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd [1977] 2 WLR 107 (CA) Lord Denning
argued that it was necessary to move away from traditional rules of interpretation
that stress the literal meaning of words and adopt the European method (i.e. look
for the design or purpose that lies behind the words). He said that when European
judges come upon a situation which is to their minds within the spirit, but not the
letter, of the legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and purpose
of the legislature – at the effect which it sought to achieve. They then interpret the
legislation so as to produce the desired effect. This means that they fill in gaps, quite
unashamedly, without hesitation. They are giving effect to what the legislature
intended, or may be presumed to have intended.
I see nothing wrong in this. Quite the contrary. It is a method of interpretation which I
advocated long ago …
Lord Denning’s view, while ahead of its time in the 1970s, has largely been accepted by
the English judiciary in interpreting European legislation.
Although some suggest that the approach of the CJEU is completely different from
the English common law approaches to interpretation, it is clear that the more
modern ‘purposive’ approach adopted by English courts has much in common with
the European approach. Moreover, it has been argued that the influence of the EU
has begun to affect the way that judges interpret domestic legislation. It is arguable
that the greater willingness of the English judiciary to adopt a purposive approach
– for example in cases like Pepper v Hart – is a manifestation of greater experience of
interpreting EU legislation.
1. In what ways is the continental approach to the interpretation of legislation
different from that in England?
2. What is it about the drafting of EU legislation that requires English judges to

adopt a different approach when interpreting EU legislation?
3. In what way is it thought that experience in interpreting EU legislation has

affected the approach of the English judiciary to the interpretation of domestic
legislation?
4.7 The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on statutory

interpretation
Essential reading
¢¢ Holland and Webb, Chapters 9 ‘Interpreting statutes’ and 11 ‘European legal
method’.
¢¢ R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Witham [1998] 2 WLR 849, [1998] QB 575.
4.7.1 Background
As discussed in Chapter 1, English common law has provided protection for human
rights since the 12th century, although the approach has been one of negative rather
than positive protection. This is what is referred to as the ‘negative theory of rights’
which says that citizens can do whatever they like unless it is specifically prohibited by
non-retrospective laws which are clear and accessible to the governed. The common
law also constrained the power of government, ensuring that it acted according to
law and not in excess of its powers. An example of protection of human rights prior
to the implementation of the HRA 1998 is the case of R v Lord Chancellor ex p Witham
[1998] QB 575. In this case the Lord Chancellor had significantly increased the fees that
litigants were required to pay in order to issue proceedings in the civil courts to have
a dispute decided by a judge. Previously, there had been an exemption for people on
low incomes to ensure that all people would be able to have access to the courts. The
new rules issued by the Lord Chancellor removed this exemption for people suffering
financial hardship and on an action for judicial review brought by Mr Witham the
High Court granted a declaration that the Lord Chancellor had exceeded his statutory
powers, because the effect of the increase would be to exclude many people from
access to the courts. In his decision Laws J said that the right of access to the courts is a
‘constitutional right’ that cannot be displaced except by Parliament:
It seems to me, from all the authorities to which I have referred, that the common law
has clearly given special weight to the citizen’s right of access to the courts. It has been
described as a constitutional right, though the cases do not explain what that means. In
this whole argument, nothing to my mind has been shown to displace the proposition
that the executive cannot in law abrogate the right of access to justice, unless it is
specifically so permitted by Parliament; and this is the meaning of the constitutional right.
4.7.2 The interpretation of domestic legislation after the Human Rights

Act 1998
Essential reading
¢¢ Holland and Webb, Chapter 10 ‘“Bringing rights home”: legal method and
Convention rights’.
¢¢ Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, October 1997 www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf
¢¢ R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] AC 45.
¢¢ Feldman, D. The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on English Public Law (2005)
http://resources.law.cam.ac.uk/documents/the_impact_of_the_human_rights_
act_david_feldman.pdf
When the Government introduced the HRA 1998 it intended that both Acts of
Parliament and secondary legislation should be interpreted, so far as possible, to be
compatible with the Convention. Previously, the English courts were merely required
to take the Convention into account in resolving any ambiguity in a legislative
provision. Under the HRA 1998 the English courts must interpret legislation so as to
uphold the Convention rights unless the legislation itself is so clearly incompatible
with the Convention that it is impossible to do so. This ‘rule of construction’ applies
to past as well as to future legislation. To the extent that it affects the meaning of
a legislative provision, the courts are not bound by previous interpretations. This
approach to interpretation is contained within s.3(1) of the HRA 1998 (known as the
interpretive obligation) which provides that:
So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be

read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.
Section 3(2) provides that s.3(1) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or
enforcement of any incompatible primary or delegated legislation.
Two strong promoters of the HRA, Lord Lester and Lord Pannick, writing about the
responsibility of the courts under s.3, have said that:
the role of the court is not (as in traditional statutory interpretation) to find the true
meaning of the provision, but to find (if possible) the meaning which best accords with
Convention rights.
4.7.3 Declarations of incompatibility

So the court must seek to read and give effect to domestic legislation in a way which
is compatible with the ECHR. If that proves to be impossible, the court can issue a
declaration of incompatibility. Section 4(2) of the HRA 1998 provides that:
If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may
make a declaration of that incompatibility.
Declarations of incompatibility are intended to be used as a last resort. Declarations

of incompatibility have no effect on the cases in which they are made, nor do they
affect the validity or continuing operation of the legislation. Thus, although the HRA
1998 gives the English courts the power to declare Acts of Parliament incompatible
with the ECHR, they do not have the power of, for example, the US Supreme Court
or continental constitutional courts to rule that legislation is unconstitutional and
therefore invalid. But under s.10 of the Act, a declaration of incompatibility may lead to
the provision being amended or repealed by Parliament.
In a recent case, Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial
Review [2015] NIQB 102, the court considered arguments as related to the law on abortion.
As a devolved government and in contrast to England and Wales, the Abortion Act 1967
does not extend to Northern Ireland. Abortion falls within the devolved matter of Criminal
Justice and Policing and is only permitted under very strict guidelines. It is governed
under the Offences against the Persons Act 1861. The applicant Commission applied
for a declaration that the law on termination of pregnancy in Northern Ireland was
incompatible with the ECHR, with particular regard to the criminalisation of abortion in the
circumstances of serious malformation of the foetus, including fatal foetal abnormality,
and the termination of pregnancies which have resulted as the consequence of serious
sexual crime, and the failure to provide exceptions to the law in such circumstances.
Following consideration of the interpretative obligation of s.3 HRA 1998 and the discussions
in Ghaidan (2004), Anderson (2002) and Bellinger (2003), Horner J at [5] concluded that
‘there is near unanimity among the parties in this judicial review, and that includes the
Commission, that for this court to try and read the impugned provisions in a Convention-
compliant way would be a step too far.’ A declaration of incompatibility was granted.
The provisions of the HRA 1998 on the interpretation of statutes show that when
Parliament incorporated the ECHR into UK domestic law, it did so in a way that
preserved Parliamentary sovereignty. It was agreed that the courts should not be able
to strike down primary legislation passed by Parliament because that would give the
judiciary a power over legislation which under UK constitutional arrangements they
did not possess and which would not be acceptable.
On this issue, when the Human Rights Bill was introduced to Parliament in 1997 the
Government made clear its intentions:
The Government has considered very carefully whether it would be right for the Bill
to go further, and give to courts in the United Kingdom the power to set aside an Act
of Parliament which they believe is incompatible with the Convention rights … The
Government has reached the conclusion that courts should not have the power to
set aside primary legislation, past or future, on the ground of incompatibility with the
Convention. This conclusion arises from the importance which the Government attaches
to Parliamentary sovereignty. In this context, Parliamentary sovereignty means that
Parliament is competent to make any law on any matter of its choosing and no court
may question the validity of any Act that it passes. In enacting legislation, Parliament
is making decisions about important matters of public policy. The authority to make
those decisions derives from a democratic mandate. Members of Parliament in the
House of Commons possess such a mandate because they are elected, accountable and
representative. To make provision in the Bill for the courts to set aside Acts of Parliament
would confer on the judiciary a general power over the decisions of Parliament which
under our present constitutional arrangements they do not possess, and would be likely
on occasions to draw the judiciary into serious conflict with Parliament. There is no
evidence to suggest that they desire this power, nor that the public wish them to have it.
Certainly, this Government has no mandate for any such change.
(Rights Brought Home, 1997)

4.7.4 The approach of the courts to interpretation and HRA 1998

compatibility
Initially, in dealing with legislation the judiciary will seek to interpret a provision in
the normal way using one of the traditional approaches to interpretation. It is only
if this does not achieve an interpretation that is compatible with the ECHR that the
courts will adopt a different approach. Aside from the traditional approaches to
interpretation, the judiciary have three other general techniques. These are known as
reading ‘down’ or ‘in’ or ‘out’.
uu Reading down involves limiting the meaning of words in the legislation so as to

achieve an outcome compatible with Convention rights.
uu Reading in allows the judge to introduce words or meanings which create

safeguards to ensure compatibility.
uu Reading out allows the court to remove or refuse to enforce provisions which
would otherwise make the legislation incompatible.
The approach to interpretation of English law was illustrated in the case of R v A,

decided by the House of Lords in 2001.
4.7.5 R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25

This was an appeal by a defendant to a criminal charge of rape and concerned
the question of whether certain evidence concerning the sexual behaviour of the
complainant would be admissible at trial. The defendant wanted to adduce evidence
of the complainant’s sexual behaviour in the three weeks prior to the alleged rape.
However, s.41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 prohibits the
admission of evidence as to the complainant’s sexual behaviour unless certain
conditions were fulfilled. The House of Lords held that an accused’s Convention
right to a fair trial might be violated if relevant evidence of the kind sought to be
addressed by the appellant was excluded. The question then arose whether s.41 could
be construed so as to prevent any violation of the defendant’s rights. Lord Steyn’s
discussion of the approach to interpretation under s.3 of the HRA 1998 indicates the
extent to which the judiciary are prepared to strain the meaning of words in order to
construe provisions in legislation as compatible with the ECHR. He said:
[T]he interpretative obligation under section 3 of the 1998 Act is a strong one. It applies
even if there is no ambiguity in the language in the sense of the language being capable of
two different meanings … Section 3 places a duty on the court to strive to find a possible
interpretation compatible with Convention rights. Under ordinary methods of interpretation
a court may depart from the language of the statute to avoid absurd consequences: section 3
goes much further … In accordance with the will of Parliament as reflected in section 3 it will
sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained.
The techniques to be used will not only involve the reading down of express language in a
statute but also the implication of provisions. A declaration of incompatibility is a measure
of last resort. It must be avoided unless it is plainly impossible to do so … In my view section
3 requires the court to subordinate the niceties of the language of section 41(3)(c), and in
particular the touchstone of coincidence, to broader considerations of relevance judged
by logical and common sense criteria of time and circumstances. After all, it is realistic to
proceed on the basis that the legislature would not, if alerted to the problem, have wished
to deny the right to an accused to put forward a full and complete defence by advancing
truly probative material. It is therefore possible under section 3 to read section 41, and in
particular section 41(3)(c) as subject to the implied provision that evidence or questioning
which is required to ensure a fair trial under article 6 of the Convention should not be treated
as inadmissible. The result of such a reading would be that sometimes logically relevant
sexual experiences between a complainant and an accused may be admitted under section
41(3)(c). On the other hand, there will be cases where previous sexual experience between
a complainant and an accused will be irrelevant, e.g. an isolated episode distant in time and
circumstances. Where the line is to be drawn must be left to the judgment of trial judges. On
this basis a declaration of incompatibility can be avoided. If this approach is adopted, section
41 will have achieved a major part of its objective but its excessive reach will have been
attenuated in accordance with the will of Parliament as reflected in section 3 of the 1998 Act.
That is the approach which I would adopt.
In Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 3 All ER 41 the House of Lords was faced
with the issue of whether a surviving homosexual partner could be the spouse of
a deceased tenant, for the purposes of succeeding to a statutory tenancy under
the provisions of the Rent Act 1977. In Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd
[2001] 1 AC 27 the House of Lords had recognised the rights of such individuals to
inherit an assured tenancy by including them within the deceased person’s family. But
it declined to allow them to inherit statutory tenancies on the grounds that they could
not be considered to be the wife or husband of the deceased as the Act required.
When the Ghaidan case was heard in the Court of Appeal the court held that the Rent
Act, as it had been construed by the House of Lords in Fitzpatrick, was incompatible
with Article 14 of the ECHR on the grounds of its discriminatory treatment of surviving
same-sex partners. The House of Lords in Ghaidan held that it was possible to ‘read
down’ the 1977 Rent Act under the HRA 1998 s.3 so that it was compliant with the rights
in the Convention. The court decided that the failing could be remedied by reading
the words ‘as his or her wife or husband’ in the Act as meaning ‘as if they were his or
her wife or husband’. Given that there was no objective and reasonable justification for
the discrimination, the relevant passages in the Rent Act 1977 should be construed (in
accordance with the HRA 1998) so as to give equal succession rights to a homosexual
couple living ‘as if’ they were husband and wife.
4.7.6 Declarations of incompatibility and the Government response
Essential reading
¢¢ Ministry of Justice ‘Responding to human rights judgment: Report to the Joint
Committee on Human Rights on the Government response to human rights
judgments 2014–16’
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/570753/responding-to-human-rights-judgments-2014-to-2016.pdf
Where the courts are unable to interpret domestic legislation in a way that is compatible
with the ECHR, the senior courts may make a declaration that the legislation in question
is not compatible with the rights provided by the ECHR. Since the HRA 1998 came into
force on 2 October 2000, there have been 34 declarations of incompatibility of which
22 have become final (in whole or in part). As previously mentioned, a declaration of
incompatibility neither affects the continuing operation or enforcement of the Act
it relates to, nor binds the parties to the case in which the declaration is made. This
respects the supremacy of Parliament in the making of the law.
Although there is no legal obligation on the Government to take remedial action

following a declaration of incompatibility, or upon Parliament to accept any remedial
measures the Government may propose, such a declaration creates pressure for action
to be taken. In most cases where there has been a declaration of incompatibility, the
Government has brought forward amending legislation by way of a remedial order
under s.10 of the HRA 1998 or through ordinary legislation.
The first declaration of incompatibility was issued in R v (1) Mental Health Review
Tribunal, North & East London Region (2) Secretary of State for Health ex p H in March
2001. In that case, the Court of Appeal held that ss.72 and 73 of the Mental Health Act
1983 were incompatible with Articles 5(1) and (4) of the ECHR because they reversed
the normal burden of proof, by requiring a detained person to show that they should
not be detained rather than the authorities to show that they should be detained.
The legislation was amended by the Mental Health Act 1983 (Remedial) Order 2001
(SI 2001/3712), which came into force on 26 November 2001.
In the case of Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21 a post-operative male to female

transsexual appealed against a decision that she was not validly married to her husband,
by virtue of the fact that at law she was a man. Section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act
1973 was declared incompatible with Articles 8 and 12 in so far as it made no provision for
the recognition of gender reassignment. In Goodwin v UK (Application no. 28957/95; 11 July
2002) the ECtHR had already identified the absence of any system for legal recognition
of gender change as a breach of Articles 8 and 12. This was remedied by the Gender
Recognition Act 2004, which came into force on 4 April 2005.
The leading case of A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56
(discussed in detail in Chapter 5) concerned the detention under the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 of foreign nationals who had been certified by the
Secretary of State as suspected international terrorists, and who could not be
deported without breaching Article 3. They were detained without charge or trial
in accordance with a derogation from Article 5(1) provided by the HRA 1998. The
Derogation Order was quashed because it was not a proportionate means of achieving
the aim sought and could not therefore fall within Article 15. Section 23 of the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was declared incompatible with Articles 5 and
14, as it was disproportionate and permitted the detention of suspected international
terrorists in a way that discriminated on the ground of nationality or immigration
status. The provisions were repealed by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which
put in place a new regime of control orders; it came into force on 11 March 2005.
4.8 Human rights: interpretation or legislation?
Essential reading
¢¢ Kavanagh, A. ‘The elusive divide between interpretation and legislation under
the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 24(2) Oxford J Legal Studies 259–85 (available
in LexisNexis through the Online Library).
It appears from the decided cases that the courts will strain to achieve compatibility
with the ECHR using s.3 of the HRA 1998. There is, however, a fine line between straining
to achieve compatibility and crossing the line between interpretation and legislation.
It is arguable that in reading down, in and out, the judiciary are taken very close to that
line. While it is now commonly accepted that the judiciary are involved in a limited
law-making function in operating the doctrine of precedent and developing common
law principles, there is, perhaps, another question about the extent to which they
are involved in law-making when interpreting statutes. As Kavanagh (2004) argues,
interpretation is regarded as an activity that goes beyond the mechanical task of
discovering and then declaring legal meaning. It is a limited, but important, form of
law-making.
1. What is the effect of s.3 of the HRA 1998 on the approach of English judges to the
interpretation of English law?
2. What techniques can judges use in meeting the requirements to interpret

domestic legislation in a way that is compatible with the ECHR?
3. In what way is s.4 of the HRA 1998 seen as a ‘last resort’?
4. What is the effect of a declaration of incompatibility under s.4 of the HRA 1998
on the immediate case and on the legislation?
5. Is the UK Government required to respond to declarations of incompatibility

under s.4 of the HRA 1998?
6. To what extent did the decision in Ghaidan make new law?
Sample examination question

‘The Human Rights Act 1998 has fundamentally changed the rules of statutory
interpretation.’
Do you agree with this statement?
Advice on answering the question

There are three key elements to the question that should be addressed:
1. What are the rules (approaches) of statutory interpretation?
2. How does the Human Rights Act 1998 affect these approaches to the interpretation
of statutes?
3. Does this constitute a fundamental change to the rules/approaches?
1. The fundamental purpose of interpretation is to give effect to Parliament’s

intention. There are no strict rules that judges must follow. Historically the
judiciary have adopted a variety of approaches. Briefly describe with examples.
Discuss development of the purposive approach with examples.
2. How does the Human Rights Act affect interpretation?
Describe the operation of s.3(1) and s.4 of the HRA 1998.
Describe the approach taken by the judiciary to s.3 and s.4 using examples.
A s.4 declaration of incompatibility is viewed as last resort.
Straining interpretation (e.g. R v A Lord Steyn).
Reading down (e.g. Ghaidan v Mendoza).
Reluctance where it is a controversial area of law (e.g. Nicklinson).
Examples of declarations of incompatibility (e.g. A v Secretary of State for the Home

Department).
3. Is this a fundamental change?
Judges continue to adopt a literal and purposive approach to interpretation.

They also continue to use traditional aids in seeking to give effect to Parliament’s
intention. The HRA does not radically change that, but there are ways in which the
ECHR changes the approach and the balance between judiciary and legislature.
Straining to avoid a declaration of incompatibility means judges going further

in reading in and out words in statutory provisions. Does this occasionally mean
that they are, in fact, doing violence to the intention of Parliament? This is the
argument currently being made by the Conservative Party.
While this doesn’t produce a fundamental change to the rules of statutory

interpretation, the emphasis on finding a way of reading provisions as compatible
with the ECHR has led to a difference in approach (e.g. Feldman, 2005) and a subtle
shift in the relations between judiciary, legislature and executive.

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Introduction

Purpose and content of the module guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Textbook and other reading material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Essential information for the new law student . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Citation of legal cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Law Reports series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Glossary of key judicial offices in the English legal system . . . . . . . . . 9

Introduction to Legal system and method

This module is different from other law subjects

Purpose and content of the module guide

1.2 Conduct legal research using primary and secondary resources

1.5 Explain the basic structures of civil and criminal justice

1.7 Explain the key concepts of Legal Aid.

Textbook and other reading material

Substantial legal system texts providing detailed material on module topics:

¢¢ Partington, M. Introduction to the English legal system 2016–2017. (Oxford: Oxford

Website of the UK Parliament

Other websites that may be useful

Essential information for the new law student

Citation of legal cases

Davis v Johnson [1979] 2 WLR 553

Name of Name of Volume First page

Figure1: Example of case citation from Weekly Law Reports

Square and round brackets in case citation

Private family case: P v BW [2004] Fam 22.

R v James [2006] EWCA Crim 14

2006 EWCA Crim 14

Stands for: Case number

Figure 2: Example of neutral citations

[2010] UKSC 48 (48th case of 2010 in the UK Supreme Court).

House of Lords case: Matthews v Ministry of Justice [2003] UKHL 4.

UK Supreme Court case: R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48.

High Court cases: Salekipour v Parmar [2016] EWHC 1466 (QB).

The Law Reports series

Free database of cases, statutes and other legal materials

Human Rights Act 1998, s 19(1)(b)

Title of Act Paragraph within

Figure 3: Explanation of statute citation

Glossary of key judicial offices in the English legal system

For reference visit: www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/who-are-the-judiciary/

Solicitor General – Deputy to Attorney General.

Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) – Head of the independent Crown Prosecution

2. Who is the Head of the Chancery Division of the High Court?

4. Explain this case citation: [2005] EWCA Civ 106.

1.2 What is law for? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1.3 Sources of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1.4 Different types of legal system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

1.5 Classification of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

1.6 Constitutional principles and the legal system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

1.7 Doing justice in legal systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

1.1 What is law?

¢¢ Holland and Webb, Chapter 1 ‘Understanding the law’.

1.2 What is law for?

1.3 Sources of law

¢¢ Rivlin, Chapter 3 ‘The invisible palace I: common law and equity’.

1. Law made by Parliament – referred to as ‘legislation’, ‘statute law’ or ‘Acts of

4. European Convention on Human Rights – referred to as Human Rights Law or

1. Parliament and statutes

The distinction between primary and secondary legislation

2. The courts and common law or ‘judge-made law’